Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20
Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in

Irregular Warfare
Craig Whiteside, Ian Rice & Daniele Raineri
To cite this article: Craig Whiteside, Ian Rice & Daniele Raineri (2019): Black Ops:
Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI:
10.1080/1057610X.2019.1628623
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STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1628623
Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare

Craig Whitesidea , Ian Riceb , and Daniele Raineric
a
Naval War College Monterey, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA; bDepartment of
Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA; cIl Foglio, Rome, Italy
ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper studies non-state militant group emulation and develop- Received 12 February 2019
ment of a special operation capability that stands in stark contrast to Accepted 27 May 2019
the normal repertoire of guerilla and terror tactics. Building on evi-
dence of one well-documented Islamic State attack in 2012 that fit
many of the criteria of a special operation, we analyzed the mission
using concepts from strategic studies to understand the decision-
making behind it. We then expanded our search of Islamic State
operational claims looking for other examples, in order to under-
stand the scope and frequency of Islamic State special operations
since 2006. We found solid evidence of at least three Islamic State
special operations over a decade: Ramadi, Iraq (2007), Haditha, Iraq
(2012), and Abu Ghraib/Taji, Iraq (2013). Using these insights, we pre-
sent two key levers – leadership and propaganda - used by the
Islamic State in the decision-making and centralized distribution of
resources to invest in a special operations capability that produced
outsized strategic effects. These findings contest the conventional
wisdom of the future of insurgency as decentralized structures made
up of loose, leaderless networks.
Special operations forces have become the “tool of choice” for modern states to deal
with a variety of national security threats.1 As such, the demands on special operations
units worldwide have increased dramatically; in Iraq and Syria, anti-ISIL coalition units
quickly expanded their mission set to include more front line advising and coordinating
for artillery and air strikes, even acting as “resolve stiffeners” of local partners in direct-
combat battle.2 This utility has not gone unnoticed by adversaries, especially militant
groups that are on the receiving end of this attention.
Since 2014, analysts have correctly drawn our attention to innovative aspects of the
so-called Islamic State’s governance, religious texts, media influence, and industrial scale
suicide bombing campaigns.3 In addition to these significant areas, there is evidence
that the group has augmented its terror campaigns with what appears to be similar to a
special operation capability. In early 2012, the group’s predecessor – the Islamic State of
Iraq – conducted a night raid that resulted in the death of over two-dozen police offi-
cers and two counterterror officials in the city of Haditha, Iraq.4 The unit conducting
CONTACT Craig Whiteside cawhites@nps.edu Naval War College Monterey, US Naval Postgraduate School, 1
University Circle, Monterey, CA 93943, USA.
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of
the article.
ß 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
2 C. WHITESIDE ET AL.
the mission achieved total surprise over opponents in several different objectives within
a large target area. The raiders were well trained, with sound intelligence of the city,
and withdrew in good order after accomplishing their objectives with only minor casu-
alties. All of this information is available to us thanks to the embedded Islamic State
media operatives who filmed all phases of the operation for use in a subsequent video,
timed to inaugurate a new campaign of increased attacks across Iraq.5 The Islamic State
media titled the video “Clanging of the Swords 2 (Salil al-Sawahirim).” 6 The scenes in
the video leave little doubt that the Islamic State movement can execute special opera-
tions at a very high level. We used the details revealed in the video of what the Islamic
State called the “Emir Jarrah al-Shami Raid” as a springboard to understand the Islamic
State’s experimentation with special operations. Using these clues, we searched the
group’s prolific history of military and terror operations to identify other examples of
possible special operations, and found a total of three that met our pre-estab-
lished criteria.
The realization that the Islamic State commissioned several special operations in its
history inspires several questions: Why would the Islamic State conduct a mission that
was so qualitatively different from its conventional approaches to military and terror
operations? How does the group think of and execute special operations, and how have
these operations evolved since the founding of the Islamic State of Iraq in October
2006, a milestone largely used to trace the beginning of a coherent movement that has
evolved into the contemporary Islamic State?7 How do non-state militant group special
operations differ from standard terrorist or military attacks?
The investigation that follows is more than a look at an armed group’s mimicry of
the modern cult of special operations.8 The Islamic State’s expansion from an irregular
force that conducted a mix of terror and guerilla acts, to what Hassan and Weiss called
a “terror army” and Ranstorp the “terror proto-state,” requires some flexibility from a
terrorism studies field that often holds to a sharp division between terrorism and insur-
gency, between attacks on civilians and those on military targets.9 The rigid boundaries
between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, largely reified thanks to the end of the wave of
revolutionary movements, have once again been blurred, if not obliterated by this
group.10 The Islamic State, a revolutionary actor in so many ways, embraces many tac-
tics in its quest to achieve its political objectives.11 As such, its experimentation with
state-like capacities, such as the execution of special operations, should be examined if
we are to better understand the future of non-state armed groups and their interactions
with states.12
We make two arguments as to why militant groups would augment their portfolio of
violence to include special operations, a category of missions which incurs a dispropor-
tionate set of opportunity costs and resource expenditures per militant. First, we believe
that non-state militant groups develop a special operations capability to communicate
to supporters and opponents that the shift from terror attacks against largely weaker
(often civilian) targets to more difficult ones signals a growing power with a commen-
surate proto-state capability. Any successful application of military prowess, directed at
a variety of targets alike but especially high security venues requiring special skill, gener-
ates a qualitative increase in the generation of political power for the militant group
over the ephemeral impact of random terror acts.13
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 3
Our second argument is that militant groups develop a special operation capability
when they are comfortable enough to take the risk of creating new mission sets or units
in order to achieve outsized strategic results. In low-level campaigns, terror acts can
achieve this effect, but in larger, more sustained campaigns like the Islamic State has
waged since its origins in Iraq in 2003 these irregular tactics become the conventional
style of fighting for such groups. As a result, the impact of terrorism can be muted in
these environments. To create an exceptional capability from the daily drumbeat of ter-
ror strikes, militant armed groups could develop a military capability that have a great
effect on the overall campaign or conflict. For militant groups, such operations increase
the group’s ability to translate violence into political power more readily than the com-
mon terrorist attack.14
The paper proceeds with a discussion of special operations and how they are different
from conventional military operations, terror attacks, and the confusion of special opera-
tions with specially trained units or individuals. Here, we highlight the key concepts that
make special operations different. Then, we present the evidence that the three raids we
found are best categorized as special operations for this militant group. The discussion that
follows addresses the leadership needed for these operations to be successful, leveraging
the results through messaging, and the organizational choices the Islamic made to execute
such missions. We conclude with some indicators and implications of militant group spe-
cialized capabilities and suggestions for future research on this subject area.
A special military capability

The body of research on special operations focuses on state military forces, particularly
organizational development, policy implementation, tactical prowess, and the effects special
operations can deliver. Furthermore, the majority of the research centers on the United
States’ special operations capabilities due to its large enterprise with global reach, with a sig-
nificant role in supporting national policies. In fact, United States Special Operations
Command developed its own education arm, the Joint Special Operations University, and
produced a number of theoretical monographs to better understand the capability.15 In short,
much of the debate surrounds how powerful actors develop and employ a capability with
small numbers and often large price tags. Such emphasis leaves an opening in the debate to
explore how significant actors with limited resources attempt to imitate this capability.16
The Islamic State’s seemingly enigmatic rise and subsequent domination of Sunni areas
of Iraq and Syria, complete with transition from guerilla style to a hybrid mix of conven-
tional and irregular, offer some insights into how non-state or proto-state decision makers
leverage large effects from limited resources.17 Perhaps surprisingly, smaller actors engag-
ing in special operations may have advantages prominent actors do not. For one, the mili-
tant capabilities we discuss are free of the institutional baggage many states suffer when
developing their special operations forces. With the increased risk and possible political
fallout that come with conducting special operations, tactical execution requires selecting
and training soldiers to help buy down the risk and lead to favorable outcomes.
This creation of special units has downsides as well that need to be avoided. The
effort to specially groom units can create a perception of a corps delite that can lead to
friction between special operations units and larger conventional military forces. At its
heart, this resentment stems from resource competition and the fight for the best
human capital.18 Past case studies analyzing the creation of a special operations capabil-
ity highlight the deep resistance to this innovation by conventional units.19 For example,
even after the failed rescue attempt in the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980 (Operation
Eagle Claw) and similar struggles in Grenada, the creation of a functioning and joint
United States special operations capability required an almost unheard of intervention
by the U.S. Congress.20
This problem is not unique to the creation of special operations capabilities. Bruce
Gudmundsson identified this challenge in his examination of the German battlefield innova-
tions to break the stalemate in the World War I trench. Stormtroopers developed a doctrine
for successfully breaching and assaulting enemy positions that was a large improvement
over the status quo. The capability was misunderstood, and the utility of the asset was often
lost without the direct supervision of an interested decision-making patron to guide the
effort.21 Thus, dynamic leadership was needed then, as it is today, to transform tactical
actions and innovations into larger effects at the operational and strategic level.
The involvement of leadership can also have its drawbacks. Just a few years after the
1987 formation of US Special Operations Command, Lucien Vandenbroucke argued the
failures of high-risk operations are closely connected to a combination of the overre-
liance on special capabilities to deliver results when the mission has national leadership
involvement.22 The study highlights a point often overshadowed by the glitz of the com-
mando mystique—special operations forces are closer to national decision makers
because the political risk is typically higher in this set of missions. Vandenbroucke’s evi-
dence repeatedly demonstrates failed politically sensitive operations can have reputa-
tional costs that far outweigh the tactical outcome. For smaller actors, such as the
Islamic State, regulating political risk with operational requirements may offer more
flexibility than larger and more visible state actors. Failed high-risk and strategic mili-
tary ventures can be more easily denied or misattributed as a lesser act. The militant’s
ambiguity can help buy down the risk of innovation such as developing a special opera-
tions raiding capability even if designed for specific operational outcomes.23
Achieving desired outcomes is what drives decision makers to form specialized units
and carry out such operations. Therefore, preparations and tactical execution must be
closely aligned with the desired outcome—the tactical engagement must fit into an over-
arching campaign. This is what makes the “great raids” remarkable; the raids demon-
strate excellence at the tactical level and the impact higher than expected for the
expenditure of resources and size of the force.24 Training, equipping, sound planning,
rehearsal, and rapid execution are all principles the former United States Special
Operations Command Commander, William H. McRaven, argued were essential to suc-
cessfully achieve the desired outcome during a great raid.25 These principles are the
foundation for achiving a “relative superiority:” the point in the operation when plan-
ning, training, surprise and guile allow smaller force to overcome a larger opponent.26
Defining special operations in the irregular context

Colin Gray’s theoretical exploration of how special operations impact campaign and
conflict outcomes serves as the logical springboard to test our initial insight that the
Islamic State has executed special operations that are distinct from its guerilla and terror
campaigns. Gray defines special operations as military actions that by design influence
the campaign or conflict outcome greater than the tactical engagement itself. 27 This
effect can be a single decisive blow, such as a coup d’ main, or these operations could
be in support of a greater campaign, such as the idea of strategic attrition.28 This econ-
omy of force concept is the true utility of special operations. Exceptional tactical prow-
ess by small units expand the number of options available to military leaders to engage
the enemy. Gray refers to this specifically as a strategic utility which can free up war-
making, and more importantly, war-ending capabilities. Combined with this central fea-
ture of special operations are secondary benefits for conducting these operations that
can enhance a campaign’s outcomes. These aims include experimenting with innovative
techniques, increasing morale, showcasing competence, reassuring supporters, humiliat-
ing the enemy, controlling escalation, and shaping the future.29
Exceptional tactical execution allows propagandists to leverage the optics of a success-
ful mission into effective influence campaigns. However, executing special operations
should not be confused with the creation of special operations forces as a capability.
For many, these terms are used interchangeably, under the assumption that special
operations forces are the sole proprietors of special operations.30 However, since non-
specialized units execute special operations on occasion, this distinction is important for
this discussion on non-state militant use of this military capability.31 In terms of the
force itself, Tucker and Lamb offer five requirements that signify a unit as a special
operations force. These include awareness of political effects; an uncommon will to suc-
ceed typically foraged through extensive assessments and training; the use of unortho-
dox methods to achieve mission success; and the need for complementary unorthodox
equipment and specialized intelligence collection.32 These characteristics distinguish spe-
cial operations forces from those units that conduct conventional tactical operations.
Though specially trained and equipped forces may be the best choice to achieve the
desired outcome, “special” is relative to the institution that is developing the force in
the first place. Non-state militant groups find it challenging to train and field special
operations forces (although some claim to), and often must make do with adapting
regular units to conduct special operations. Special operations forces for one military
may be considered conventional forces in another, and states have different attitudes
toward the development of special operations capabilities.33 For example, NATO doc-
trine highlights just three special operations missions: Direct Action, Special
Reconnaissance and Military Assistance.34 This differs from the most dominant member
of the alliance, the United States, which has eleven core special operations tasks in its
doctrine.35 Finally, the use of special operations forces itself does not designate the tac-
tical mission a special operation.
For example, if a special unit is conducting a raid on a bridge in support of a tactical
infantry attack, the operation will also have a tactical effect.36 What makes the operation
a special operation is when the operation in support of a campaign or strategic objective
uses a force and means that allows for the disproportionate effect from the smaller
force. In addition to achieving these disproportionate effects from an economy of force
effort, specialized training and equipment may be warranted to help gain the advantage
and improve the probability of success. This latter point is often the focus of
understanding special operations forces, their use and misuse. Although special opera-
tions effects do not necessarily need special operations forces to achieve the effect, their
specialized training, organization, equipment and accompanying experiences does help.
Perhaps the most famous non-state operation that has the characteristics of a special
operation with large intended strategic effects is al-Qaeda’s multi-pronged air to ground
strike on September 11, 2001. In approximately 90 minutes, a well-planned and executed
operation destroyed a key node of the world’s financial system and struck the global
military headquarters of the world’s only superpower. Ignoring the criminality of this
abhorrent attack against thousands of innocent civilians, this non-state special operation
changed how the world travels and inspired military interventions in the Middle East
that have resulted in more instability in the region, to the benefit of organizations like
the Islamic State.
The case for an islamic state special operations capability

This research began with an analysis of the Clanging the Swords 2 video, which details
the Islamic State raid on the Anbari city of Haditha in 2012. The insights from the
video led us to determine that this mission met our criteria of a non-state special oper-
ation. The unit conducted special training, issued special equipment, used a ruse to dis-
guise their intentions, took over a city with around 100 fighters, and used the
opportunity to execute some key political and security figures that had bedeviled the
group since 2007. The result of the raid seems to have marked a shift in operations and
strategic communications, including the release of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s first speech
as emir of the Islamic State of Iraq. In essence, this seems to be emblematic of what an
Islamic State special operation might look like.
Using this mission as a template, and using a concept akin to that of snowball sam-
pling, we looked for similar operations in the Islamic State past that resemble the
Haditha raid in a comprehensive database of Islamic State operational claims and media
reports released by the group since October 2006.37 We used the founding of the
Islamic State of Iraq as a starting point due to the great level of continuity scholars find
in the operational aspects of the group’s various predecessors (Islamic State of Iraq,
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham), and the group has long celebrated this date as
its founding.38
We augmented the search for special operations by searching through Iraqi govern-
ment statements and interviews, Islamic State captured documents, and news reports to
identify events that might have been a special operation.39 Key indicators were the use
of the term raid in the announcement, any specific statement detailing extensive pre-
training of a force for a lengthy period (months not days), the mention of specialized
equipment or elaborate ruses, and a declaration that this operation was designed to
achieve outsized effects on a political and strategic level. One issue we had in coding
events was that the Islamic State has never distinguished between terror raids by small
cells, military raids on military objectives, or any kind of specialized raids. Therefore,
they have scores of raids (ghazawat)–the Arabic term used to describe these actions–
that did not come close to meeting our criteria for a special operation.40
In the end, our analysis identified three clear-cut instances of publicized events that
fit the criteria for this discussion of Islamic State special operations: “the Battle of
Donkey Island/Battle of Life” (Ramadi, 2007), the “Jarrah al-Shami Raid” (Haditha,
2012), and the Abu Ghraib prison break (2013). All three of these events were well
reported in western media, but analyzed individually and without reference to them as
special operations. Of the three events, the Jarrah al-Shami raid contained an over-
whelming amount of detail in addition to links that allowed us to understand, in part,
the 2007 event and the 2013 event. Cross referencing Islamic State press releases from
the Jarrah al-Shami raid allowed us the insight that the Battle of Donkey Island was a
special operation after we read the Islamic State’s version of the event – which the
Islamic State called “the Battle of Life” – and realized they were the same event. The
opacity of the Battle of Life stems from the fact that it was a failure, one the Islamic
State of Iraq did not report on until five years after the fact.
Our realization that the two sides call the same event different things strongly influ-
enced us to offer a caveat for the findings in this research. From a methodological per-
spective, it is likely that there could be other failed special operations that we did not
uncover, and the Islamic State declined to discuss. For the same reason that special
operations are tied to influence and media efforts, advertising tactical failures may not
serve the strategic utility of the group if they can get away with it. The Islamic State
used the Haditha Raid in 2012 extensively in its propaganda due to its clear-cut success,
but had a much more restrained approach to Abu Ghraib in 2013 for reasons we will
discuss later, and said nothing about its failure in the Battle of Life until the post-
Haditha press releases in 2012. Most helpfully, in its 2012 extensive coverage of the
raid, the Islamic State media department explained to us who Jarrah al-Shami was, and
why they named the Haditha raid after him.
Three raids (ghazawat)

Case #1: the battle of donkey island/the battle of life (ramadi, june 30, 2007)
Jarrah al-Shami (the Syrian) was an early recruit of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Tahwid
wal-Jihad group and had fought in the battles of Fallujah in 2004.41 Zarqawi appointed
him as emir (leader) of Ramadi, and later of all of Anbar Province in 2005. He led the
province during the height of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s rise to prominence, and was a member
of the shura council that voted to disband al-Qaeda in Iraq to form the Islamic State of
Iraq in October 2006. By the summer of 2007, Jarrah was the commander of Islamic
State forces in Baghdad. The rise of the tribal Awakening, and its efforts to establish a
base in the Anbar provincial capital of Ramadi, was a strong challenge to legitimacy of
the newly proclaimed Islamic State, which had declared the city to be the capital of its
nascent Islamic emirate. The mission objective was to counterattack into Ramadi and
destroy the lightly armed tribal forces before their American sponsors could react.
Accordingly, Zarqawi’s successors Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir
directed their military champion Jarrah al-Shami to train, equip, and infiltrate a large
segment of his Baghdad fighters across the desert into ar-Ramadi. The Islamic State
called the subsequent battle on the night of June 30, 2007 the “Battle of Life,” an indica-
tor of the strategic significance it played for the group.42
Jarrah’s plan to rendezvous was at a pre-designated staging area along the Euphrates,
known to locals as Donkey Island, just south of Ramadi. At this location, he placed two
large tractor-trailers full of weapons, ammunition, and supplies to supply his force for
the assault on Ramadi.43 The size of the force was estimated to be 70 to 200 well-
trained and equipped fighters that trained for months for the operation, as documented
on captured video belonging to dead fighters after the battle. Jarrah al-Shami had outfit-
ted the fighters with matching uniforms and equipment, making this an unusual unit
for irregular combatants. Surprised by a random U.S. military patrol in their final stag-
ing area, the Islamic State of Iraq unit fought ferociously in an engagement notable for
being one of the largest arrays of enemy forces seen by the U.S. in the post-invasion
period. After the battle, U.S. soldiers commented on the superior marksmanship and
individual and group movement skills displayed by their opponents during the fight,
which left several U.S. and 32 of the Islamic State commandos dead and the U.S. unit
almost out of ammunition.44 Unbeknownst to the Americans, Commander Jarrah was
one of the first to fall leading the fierce counterattack of the patrol, in an attempt to
allow the rest of the force to withdraw.45
The loss of Jarrah al-Shami and the defeat of his mission was a huge blow to an
already reeling Islamic State of Iraq. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, in his personal eulogy of
the commander, noted al-Shami was a member of the highest shura (consultative) coun-
cil of the Islamic State and compared him to other fallen luminaries of the movement:
founders Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani and Abu Anas al-Shami, spokesmen Abu
Maysara al-Iraqi and Muharib al-Jubouri, and southern province emir Abu Usama al-
Tunisi.46 In addition to losing a valuable leader, the disaster at Donkey Island was a
strategic setback of tremendous consequence – resulting in the permanent loss of
Ramadi and a corresponding loss of valuable manpower in the capital, Baghdad. The
chief Sharia judge of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, mentioned the
failure of the Ramadi counterattack in his extensive critique of the Islamic State and its
leadership, which led to his dismissal and “defection” to Al-Qaeda in Pakistan in the
summer of 2007:
I am highlighting the conditions of jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers and how, after it
was powerful and almost victorious, it became weak, leading to losing control of areas, one
after the other.As an example, Al-Ramadi was the first city in which the brothers were able
to declare an emirate. I am not saying that we had full control there, but the mujahideen
had the final word there while other groups were not active and Sheikh Abu-Mus’ab lived
there for the last few months before he was killed. [Now] This city became a haven for
apostasy [reference the Sahwa forces], may God protect us, with almost 30 checkpoints for
the infidel guard and the Americans surrounding it. 47
The leadership decision to send this force to Ramadi at a pivotal time for the fledg-
ling Islamic State movement, as well as several aspects of the failed operation, led us to
identify this as the group’s first special operation. Although information on the counter-
attack – in some ways the Islamic State’s attempt at an Ardennes’ style offensive –is
limited, it fit all of our criteria for a special operation: designed for strategic impact,
small sized unit, extensive training, extravagantly equipped, led by quality leaders, and
exceptional in character when compared to the group’s norm of irregular style. The
Awakening was in its infancy, and a routing of the lightly armed tribal forces early
could have prevented its spread across Iraq in the early summer of 2007 and made the
movement stillborn. Instead, the rival insurgent groups and hostile tribes that flocked to
the banner of Abu Risha al-Sittar and his tribal allies marked the first defeat of the
Islamic State’s goal of an early caliphate.48 Unfortunately, this defeat was not a last-
ing one.49
The sting of this defeat did not prevent Islamic State leaders in 2012 from reaching
back to honor Jarrah al-Shami by naming their next special operation in his honor.
Although planned for different reasons and against a different city in Anbar, the leaders
of the Islamic State must have seen promise in their near miss from the past and drew
on some of the very same principles for their next mission targeting Haditha in 2012.
These principles were passed onto the fighters in the Camp of the Two Sheikhs that
trained in the desert in the winter of 2011-12, quite possibly by some of the survivors
of the “Battle of Donkey Island/The Battle for Life.”
Case # 2: the commander jarrah al-Shami raid (haditha, march 5, 2012)

The beginning of 2012 marked an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq, which had
struggled to maintain a constant level of activity and manpower since 2008. Despite this
trend, analyst Brian Fishman argued in 2011 that U.S. government officials were under-
estimating the Islamic State of Iraq’s resilience by making an over simplistic comparison
of Iraqi violence levels to the peak of sectarian civil war in 2007. Fishman observed that
the group’s ability to sustain a terror campaign during a period of high counterterror
pressure was an indicator of future problems for the Iraqi government. The group’s
constant execution of guerrilla-style warfare was clearly designed to buy time to increase
its standing among anti-government Sunnis in Iraq, and this did not bode well in a
period where sectarian tensions were once again rising.50 With the United States transi-
tioning its capable military forces out of the country, there would now be some breath-
ing room to expand the militant group’s operations.51 Four years after its precipitous
collapse at the hands of tribal and insurgent groups that rallied to the government, the
Islamic State was marshaling its resources for another attempt to achieve Islamic State
founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s goal of establishing the caliphate.52
The group’s leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, had been appointed by the group’s shura
council after Iraqi and American Special Forces had killed Zarqawi’s successor and his
deputy, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, in 2010. The new “emir of
the faithful” for the putative proto-caliphate was a very careful operative. For two years
he had not made a single public speech, a huge lapse for a movement that had a savvy
understanding of strategic communications and had produced a steady stream of leader-
ship speeches since January 2004.53 This was a deliberate move, a radio silence during a
bust period for the group, as it waited for a turn in fortune.
In this environment, during the winter of late 2011/early 2012, around 90 men began
to train at a camp in the Anbar desert under the authority of the emir (commander) of
Anbar province. The camp was named Sheikhayn (Two Sheikhs) after the recently
deceased emir of the Islamic State and his deputy.54 The target would be the city of
Haditha, a city along the Euphrates River that had been the previous emir Abu Umar’s
hometown.55 Its central location in Anbar made it accessible to the raiders, yet it was
isolated from government forces elsewhere in the province and surrounded by desert.
The operation was named the “Emir Jarrah al-Shami Raid,” and took its inspiration
from the first major special operation we documented.
Unlike the scarce information available about the Islamic State’s first failed special
operation, there is probably not a better-documented event in the Islamic State move-
ment’s history than the Jarrah al-Shami raid. One reason for this unusual transparency
is that the leadership of the Islamic State, including its media officials - Abu
Muhammad al-Adnani and Dr. Wael al-Rawi - made the integration of Islamic State
media operatives into this special operation a priority.56 The embedded media filmed all
phases of the operation and captured enough of the raid from multiple perspectives to
indicate a robust participation.57 Al-Furqan Media productions released the resultant
video, “Clanging of the Swords 2,” in August of 2012, to support what would be a new
and yearlong campaign called “Breaking the Walls.”58
Deconstructing the video reveals that the leaders of the raid created a plan for the
Haditha raid that could have come out of a textbook on military operations. The force
had a designated security element that would isolate the objective from outside interfer-
ence, two support elements that would gain control at key points in and around the
town of Haditha during the raid, and a fourth assault force that would find and reduce
key targets within the city. The operation had a pre-planned withdrawal, making it a
prototypical raid according to standard military terminology.59
In the video, Islamic State commanders briefed the plan to the fighters with the aid of
Google Earth imagery projected onto a screen, using graphic design overlays to depict sub-
unit boundaries and routes. Following the briefings, the unit was seen conducting exten-
sive live-fire training on a desert range, including exercises designed to simulate combat
conditions - including an instructor who shot live rounds at the feet of the marksmen on
the range. The small unit (around 90 soldiers) conducted conditioning foot marches at
night and at least one full-scale rehearsal with vehicles and someone simulating Iraqi
policemen so the support force could practice a key part of the raid –subduing the outer
checkpoints without alerting the city. Near the end of the preparation period, the group
was issued brand new black military uniforms of the elite Iraqi Special Operations Forces
“Golden Division,” night vision goggles, body armor, an impressive array of tactical gear,
and matching black Iraqi military vehicles. The raiders would pose as Iraqi military in a
ruse, one that had to appear authentic and fool the Iraqi police for the duration of the raid.
This was the most audacious aspect of the plan and it was based on a keen under-
standing of the bureaucratic infighting between various elements of the Iraqi Security
forces. The raiders were targeting this vulnerability and counting on this dysfunction to
fool the local police into thinking that the federal force appearing in the middle of the
night was authorized by higher levels, serving legitimate court warrants, and relatively
benign in the sense that any arrests made by the force could be adjudicated later in the
normal bureaucratic fashion.
It is clear that the raiders in the video demonstrate a detailed knowledge of Haditha,
commenting on landmarks during the ride, performing a flawless navigation of the city at
night, and arriving at the correct location for their various targets. No amount of prepar-
ation could achieve this level of perfection without an innate knowledge of the target area
and the people within. What the video does not show is the extensive covert reconnais-
sance that probably took place to identify police manning, shifts, level of alertness at night,
and the homes and hideouts of the target officials. Nor does it reveal the probable existence
of sleeper agents that participated in the raid before melting back into cover.60
Another interesting aspect of the plan comes to light with the videographer’s inter-
view of fellow media men who were packing cases of Islamic State propaganda compact
discs for distribution during the raid. The media representative in the video complained
that there was a blackout of Islamic State messaging efforts in general and that this raid
was a unique opportunity to once again secure access to the population without harass-
ment by police or tribal Awakening authorities.61
The raid itself, which took place in the early hours of March 5, 2012, was an unquali-
fied success from the Islamic State’s perspective. The video documented a long ride
from the desert assembly areas, with the different elements approaching from opposite
sides of the city of Haditha. The raiders in their police cars with flashing lights easily
fooled the lightly manned checkpoints in the middle of the night. Apparently assuming
that the arriving force was a friendly unit, or maybe the harbinger of a new security
force turf war, the unsuspecting policemen at site after site were flex-cuffed and then
executed at close range with silenced pistols. The raiders quickly moved through and
killed the rest of the sleeping members of the police in makeshift barracks – while a
videographer in trail documented the horror of it all.
Once the city’s security centers were secured, the assault force made a long drive
north along the Euphrates to find two specific targets - former Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) commander and Haditha Awakening (Sahwa) founder Muhammad
Hussein Khalaf Shufair, and counterterrorism police Captain Khaled al-Jughayfi. Both
men were members of the Jughayfi tribe, which has fought the Islamic State and its
predecessors for most of the post-2003 period to date.62 According to the Islamic State
press release and the video editors of Clanging of the Swords 2, Shufair was the founder
of the Haditha Sahwa and was responsible for the serial murders of paroled Islamic
State members returning to Haditha from the U.S.-run Camp Bucca prison. Iraqi and
western news media reported Shufair’s killing as one of the senior police officials killed
in the raid. In reality, he was a former officer who founded the Sahwa five years before,
and was now a high-ranking member of the political leadership in Haditha.
The news reports buried the lede in this case; the Haditha raid was not about killing doz-
ens of police officers, but instead a robust plan for the publicized assassination of an import-
ant political rival to the Islamic State. By eliminating Muhammad Shufair, the Islamic State
decapitated the Sahwa unit in Haditha, which it correctly saw as its primary competition for
the allegiance and control of the local Sunnis.63 The focus on the face of Shufair as he is led
away to his execution is purposeful and deliberate, and at this point one realizes that this
might be the main message of the video.64 Researching deeper into Mohammad Shufair, we
found his name in a frequently cited captured Islamic State document in the Combating
Terrorism Center archives, the “Analysis of the ISI” (2007), and the author of this post-
Sahwa/Surge critique of the Islamic State’s collapse also took the time at the end of that
document to request approval for Shufair’s elimination – five years prior to the raid.65 The
fulfillment of this request, captured and broadcast as the climax of an episode of a popular
Islamic State video series before 2014 was a clear warning to the Sunni tribes of Anbar that
the newly invigorated Islamic State could reach anyone, even highly secured Sahwa leaders
in their own tribal areas, and the government was powerless to stop them.66
The catastrophe in Haditha was widely reported in both regional and global media
outlets, confirming all of the details in the Islamic State press release and the subsequent
video release later that summer. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki sacked the leader of
security forces in Anbar, Lieutenant General Abdulaziz Mohammed Jassim, as part of
the humiliating aftermath.67 In the only obvious flaw in the operation, different Islamic
State elements confused each other in the dark and the resulting firefight - caught on
video - was the only real fighting that happened the entire evening. Two Islamic State
fighters were killed and the video’s conclusion solemnly documented the careful burial
of one of the fighters, named Abu Ahmad al-Shami, back at the desert camp.68
The video of the Jarrah al-Shami raid portrays an innovative tactic designed to lift
morale and instill confidence in other Islamic State units by showcasing the impressive
competence, courage and guile of the raiding force in the face of superior odds. It treats
the audience to a confused and humiliated enemy as the Islamic State operatives march
their captives away to a dismal end in a dark alley, while evidence of their “crimes”
against the Islamic State are displayed on the screen. Yet probably the most important
message from the 2012 video is that the enemies of the Islamic State can expect more
of the same in the future. As such, the planned intent of the operation was to shape
how Iraqis, and supporters outside of the country, could expect to see the Islamic State
perform in the future.
The Jarrah al-Shami Raid video could also be considered a modern, non-state
example of the April 1942 Doolittle Raid against mainland Japan.69 In response to the
Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the planners of the Doolittle Raid used this
small and tactically insignificant bombing raid against the Japanese home islands as a
form of strategic communication to foe and friend alike.70 The Doolittle Raid met many
of Gray’s strategic utility objectives for a special operation, particularly in the innovation
of launching heavy Army bombers off a Navy aircraft carrier on a one-way mission to
improve American morale and humiliate the enemy. In many ways, the Jarrah al-Shami
Raid, and even the brief footage released of end of the Abu Ghraib breakout, served the
same strategic purpose for the Islamic State.
Case # 3 breakout: Abu ghraib (Anbar province, july 22, 2013)

While we found tremendous amount of detail related to the Haditha raid, we found
very little about the audacious 2013 Abu Ghraib prison breakout that won the release of
some of the Islamic State’s most valuable leaders and fighters.71 What we do know
about the operation indicates that it outshone the proceeding raid at Haditha in terms
of complexity, scale, and result. The plan was to conduct a simultaneous double prison
breakout at Abu Ghraib outside of Baghdad and the Al-Hawt Prison near Taji. On July
22, 2013, units under the command of the emir of Wilayah Anbar set off twelve car
bombs to breach openings in the prisons; mortar fire was used to suppress the prison
guards while Islamic State agents armed the prisoners. Islamic State guerilla units
ambushed military reaction forces leaving Baghdad and Camp Taji and cut the high-
ways with roadside bombs to prevent reinforcements from reaching the prisons.72 Over
500 Islamic State members, many of them high-ranking leaders on death row, broke
out of Abu Ghraib during the operation.73
Although we know little else of the details of the prison break, the strategic impact of
the return of many movement veterans into a growing organization that had spread
into Syria is hard to miss. The Islamic State’s sweep across northern and western Iraq
in 2014 was led by many of these escapees, almost all of them veterans of the Islamic
State’s predecessor organizations Tawhid wal-Jihad and al-Qaeda in Iraq who had
fought with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Jarrah al-Shami.
Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi was one of the many members who escaped and rejoined
his former comrades. Bilawi, an original member of Zarqawi’s group and part of the
founder’s inner circle, went on to be the planner of the remarkable Mosul campaign of
2014.74 He was killed a month before the Islamic State takeover of Mosul in the city by
counterterror forces, belying the idea that the group had abandoned Iraq for Syria dur-
ing the period before the fall of Iraq’s second largest city.75 Another luminary freed
from Abu Ghraib prison was Abu Nabil al-Anbari, who became the emir of Salah ad-
Din province and later the wali of the affiliate in Libya, where he was killed in Derna in
a U.S. strike.76 Abu Nabil can be seen personally executing captives in one of the
Islamic State’s most infamous videos, the massacres of Iraqi Shia cadets at Camp
Speicher in 2014.77
More pertinent to this research on Islamic State special operations, according to an
online post by an Islamic State supporter, a more recently detained fighter was also
released during the Abu Ghraib breakout. This post was celebrating the freedom of a
leader by the name of Abu Umar al-Ansari, and the supporter identified this man as
the commander of the Jarrah al-Shami raid, who had been captured in the aggressive
counter-terrorism sweeps following Haditha just a year before. The online commenter
also claimed that Abu Umar al-Ansari was the figure in the video that executed
Mohammad Shufair, the Haditha Sahwa leader, as seen in the popular Clanging of the
Swords 2 video.78 This information is impossible to verify, and we could not find any
further information about this individual.
The leader of the raid/prison break was the Islamic State emir of Anbar - the former
Ba’athist officer Abu Muhannad al-Sweidawi.79 He had been a childhood friend of al-
Bilawi and served in the Iraqi Army before 2003 with the infamous Haji Bakr.80 These
connections put him at the center of a network that also reaches back to the Haditha
raid, and there are pictures of Emir Sweidawi (with face covered) at the training site
which were featured in a 2015 video called “Ramadi - Epic Battles in Anbar,” indicating
he visited the fighters during the preparation period.81 We don’t know his level of
involvement in the planning, but typically the heavy resourcing of the operation and
the decision to take large risks require high-level leadership decisions. Like many of the
Islamic State’s leaders since the establishment of the caliphate, al-Sweidawi was killed in
late 2014. The Islamic State media department published his eulogy in 2015 in concur-
rence with the Islamic State counter-offensive in Ramadi, named in his honor, with the
accompanying video described above.
The effectiveness of the Abu Ghraib/Taji raid in isolating the objective and safely
evacuating the high-ranking captives was a step-level improvement upon its previous
efforts. The Islamic State press release simply said that the preparation and training
phase took several months. Yet we know almost nothing of the raid, except for the
2015 mention of Sweidawi’s role. Why would the Islamic State give us such tremendous
detail from the Jarrah al-Shami raid and very little from the Abu Ghraib/Taji raid?
Other than a mention in one press release and in spokesman Abu Muhammad al-
Adnani’s speech that week, no other attempt was made to leverage this event.82 It could
be that the leadership was worried about protecting the identities of its escaped
commanders, and no footage of the actual raid has ever been released. The Islamic State
only released a few clips from a distance of anonymous escapees arriving at a desert
camp, followed by the joyous reunions of comrades long separated.83
Discussion
Why has the Islamic State executed special operations in the past, and when does it
choose to do so? What will this look like in the future? The following discussion aims
to answer these questions and highlight the distinctive aspects of the group’s creation
and use of a special operations capability.
The three cases we uncovered were clearly significant efforts (of over one hundred
fighters and untold number of facilitators) involving relatively extravagant resourcing in
the hopes of achieving outsized results that made an impact in the strategic fortunes of
the group. These operations were qualitatively distinct from the normal pattern of
decentralized guerilla operations that normally produce small results that intend to
aggregate effects in an attritional or exhaustive campaign.
The Islamic State relied on two levers to assist these small special operations in
achieving outsized results. The first was leadership, both in the decision-making for the
raid and in the execution phase. The second was the use of careful media exposure to
amplify the results of small actions and tie them convincingly to larger strategic narra-
tives about the inevitability of success for the movement.
Leaders and their role in shaping special capabilities

From the evidence presented, the Islamic State’s leaders created temporary task forces
when there was an organizational need for a large strategic impact. There is no evidence
that the creation of special mission units was part of a desire to create a propaganda
friendly unit, notwithstanding the group’s exceptional use of media. In the Haditha
case, the Anbar commander dissolved the 90-man unit that executed the Jarrah al-
Shami raid and returned the men to guerilla warfare across Anbar and elsewhere. This
might have been by design, or it was necessitated by the increased attention to Anbar
province by vengeful Iraqi security forces looking for the remnants of the raid force.
Just like the Doolittle bombing raid, the unit had served its purpose and was returned
to normal duties. The mission, exposed and detailed for propaganda reasons, would not
be repeated.
Why would the organization put significant effort into the training of units for a spe-
cial mission only to disband them? Recall Gray’s explanation for why states develop the
capability. There is an opportunity to achieve a strategic gain with minimal force. These
opportunities are ephemeral, and while large states can afford to maintain special opera-
tions capabilities for niche or occasional use, resource conscious insurgents cannot.
Since these types of missions are often conducted from a position of weakness, it makes
sense to create the capability for a specific need, and then return the manpower and
resources back to the long attritional fight against a more powerful foe.84
Maintaining a residual and robust special operations unit would be a liability for an
insurgency fighting a largely guerilla campaign with limited external support.
Certainly, this force would attract attention from the counterinsurgents and become a
priority target for elimination.85 As insurgents tend to be careful managers of human
capital, it makes more sense to surge this capability when needed and then return the
skills back to the force. State militaries do this as well, although to a lesser extent. The
U.S. Army’s creation of the Ranger Regiment, today an element of U.S. Special
Operations Command, had a secondary benefit of spreading excellence back into con-
ventional forces, due to a policy of continual rotation of personnel between the two.86
An examination of Islamic State leadership grooming practices demonstrates that the
militant group shares some of these same ideas about cross-fertilization and the value
of broadening experiences in creating a cadre system.87 This personnel management
of human capital in the ranks could explain some of the group’s resilience in the face
of strategic bust periods.
The criticality of special operations attracts a certain type of leader. Jarrah al-Shami’s
reputation as a successful military commander led to his selection for the first special
operation. Abu Muhannad al-Sweidawi’s military experience and long ties to the early
founders of the group most likely improved the group’s planning and logistics for both
the Haditha Raid and the double jail breakout. The video evidence from Haditha, and
the extensive coverage of the preparation phase reveal scores of leaders like Abu Omar
al-Ansari – whose whereabouts today are unknown – who played a role in training the
unit for the raid. While the influence of former Ba’athist officers in the Islamic State’s
organization is often exaggerated in explanations of the group’s successful rise before
2014, when it comes to the execution of specialized military operations there can be no
doubt that the recruitment of this talent set was wise and paid large dividends.88
Beyond the senior leadership, scores of middle managers gained important experience
in the three special operations outlined in this paper. The infamous Shakir Waheeb, an
Islamic State commander in Anbar who rose to prominence after an early Islamic State
execution video in 2013, can be seen both in the Jarrah al-Shami raid video (with face
blurred) and in official photos linked to the “Two Sheikhs Camp,” and most likely par-
ticipated in the raid itself.89 It is possible that, as a member of Wilayat Anbar, he also
participated in the Abu Ghraib breakout as well.90
Beyond force management considerations, the strategic level leaders directed the unit
assembled to execute the Jarrah al-Shami operation to serve as a starting gun for its visible
and stepped up terror and subversion campaign to undermine security forces throughout
Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his advisors used the mission to create a larger sense of
purpose and provide a psychological lift to a movement that had struggled to adjust to the
post-Awakening security structure of Sunni Iraq.91 Occurring just three months after U.S.
forces had left Iraq, the raid’s clear success was both symptom and symbol of a growing
organizational capacity to operate at a much higher level. Four months after the raid, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi launched the acclaimed “Breaking the Walls” campaign that lasted over a
year (see Figure 1).92 It is no coincidence that his speech followed the success of the Jarrah
al-Shami raid, and the subsequent increase in terror attacks and guerilla warfare.
Figure 1: Islamic State official operational claims (2008-2014). The Jarrah al-Shami mission occurred
in March 2012, before the sharp increase in Islamic State activity demonstrated here (boxed area).111
A contrast to the Haditha raid was the attempt to short circuit the Awakening in
Ramadi in 2007. Instead of amplifying a new increased tempo guerrilla campaign of
attrition as the organization gained momentum toward establishing the caliphate, the
Battle of Life was an effort to change the dynamics of a pending slide in popular sup-
port, and its failure likely taught the Islamic State the limitations and risk of utilizing
special operations. This could explain why we could not find special operations after
2014, when the U.S. military had returned and would have punished any unit that tried
to change the trajectory away from certain defeat. The Islamic State’s pragmatism in
slowly transitioning back into an insurgency – what Hassan calls their “strategic retreat”
– is likely the reason there haven’t been any self-reported or documented special opera-
tions in the caliphate/post-caliphate era.93 As long as the U.S., with its technological
prowess, is militarily involved in the area, it is doubtful the Islamic State leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi would authorize a new special operation until the ability to achieve
relative superiority is feasible and realistic.
The propagandist’s dilemma

The focus on the strategic impact of special operations should not come at the expense
of the obvious – that special operations must be executed with a high level of tactical
excellence in order to achieve both unexpected and exceptional results. The Islamic
State’s ghazawat examined here have these characteristics of tactical skill, and largely
achieved McRaven’s requirement that successful special operations raids achieve relative
superiority – a condition of temporary advantage over a larger and prepared opposing
force that increases the chance of a successful outcome.94 The idea to integrate these
instances of tactical prowess into propaganda amplifies the effects of actions at the tac-
tical level, and makes it more likely to achieve outsized results. Presenting operations
that are successful and demonstrate superiority over the enemy helps the organization
with its narrative construction concerning the larger fight. In answering the rank and
file question, “can we be successful using this strategy,” the involvement of special oper-
ations can help answer in the affirmative. Of interest in these three cases is differenti-
ation in the use of propaganda. In the first case, which was an unqualified failure, had
delayed use in a legacy building fashion due to the strategic situation in 2007 and even-
tual collapse of the fledgling Islamic State of Iraq. The second special operation maxi-
mized propaganda involvement and exploitation. The third, due to concerns over
releasing too much information about a mission set (prison break) that will be used
again in the future in order to retain human capital, was not used for propaganda gain.
The differences demonstrated in the three cases indicate the need for decision-makers
to balance information and influence gains with the dangers of operational security
exposure of key tactics or personnel.
According to Jacob Shapiro, the terrorist’s dilemma revolves around balancing efforts
to increase the efficiency of the organization (especially controlling violence) against
security vulnerabilities caused by the increased interaction between leader and fol-
lower.95 This is an under-emphasized concept in the study of how groups manage vio-
lence, in an era that believes in virtual caliphates and leaderless networks.96 The
propagandist has the same basic conflict: how to balance the release of information
without exposing people and future operations to harm. Western recognition of the
Islamic State’s propaganda prowess came belatedly in 2014, as the Islamic State’s leaders
demonstrated an exceptional ability to integrate operations and strategic communica-
tions in a much earlier operation, as exemplified in this case study. Embedding media
in a special operation and producing a video about it can be a dangerous proposition,
since exposing these techniques to adversaries violates McRaven’s security principle and
ensures they cannot be used again. Nonetheless, the Islamic State’s leaders decided to
reveal how they executed the Jarrah al-Shami raid for its propaganda value, much like
the U.S. government released footage of the Doolittle raid to U.S. audiences to bolster
the popular support after the Pearl Harbor defeat and to further humiliate its adversary.
At the same time, this release gave away a secret: the raid originated from the USS
Hornet (CV-8), and not the mythical Shangri La as described by President Roosevelt.97
Propagandist involvement in many of the operation’s important decisions was fairly
comprehensive, shown by the marketing of the operation’s naming convention. Before the
raid, Jarrah al-Shami was a relatively unknown Islamic State commander outside of the
small circle who knew his importance to Zarqawi and his successors. This changed when
his biography was published on a jihadi website to enhance and explain aspects of the
operation as popularized in the video “Clanging of the Swords 2.”98 With the Islamic State
investing heavily in expanding influence in the Syrian front against Bashar Assad, the
media department carefully used the Syrian connection of the raid to remind its target
audience that the Islamic State had Syrian natives in high positions in its history. This was
an important narrative to present at a time when the foreign fighter flow was beginning to
increase for the first time since 2008.99 A beneficiary of this human capital bonanza in the
past, the Islamic State’s goal was to dominate this source of human capital once again.100
This was hugely important at the exact time the group was expanding into Syria, as well as
enticing foreigners to come to Syria and the eventual caliphate.
Jarrah al-Shami was not the only Syrian highlighted in the strategic communications
campaign during August 2012, which was co-led by the Islamic State spokesman and
Syrian native Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami. Abu Ahmad al-Shami, the militant
killed in the fratricide during the Haditha raid whose poignant burial by his comrades
served as the closing to the Clanging of the Swords 2 video, was also a Syrian.101
Ostensibly about an operation in the heart of Anbar province, the video’s ending
reminds supporters and prospective members that while all eyes were on the Syrian civil
war and government abuses of the Sunni population, the death of a young Syrian in
Iraq had a greater meaning. Iraqis were fighting in Syria against Assad, and Syrians
were fighting in Iraq against the “murtadin” (apostates) and “rafida” (rejectionists or
Shia).102 The celebration of the death of Abu Ahmad al-Shami in Iraq was a form of
virtue signaling, and the message was that the collective good of the population should
come before individual motives. More importantly, the borders drawn by western
powers would not divide the jihadis of the Islamic State. Jarrah al-Shami’s biography,
written by the propagandist wing of the group, mentioned how he had long looked
west when he was fighting in Iraq from 2003-7, waiting for the opportunity for jihad to
spread to his country. “He always wanted to have a chance to fight the oppressor of the
Levant, Bashar. His wish may be fulfilled by his students in Homs, Aleppo, Damascus,
and Dayr al-Zawr.”103 This 2012 propaganda film carefully telegraphed the larger inten-
tions of a group whose predecessors had operated exclusively in Iraq since 2003 and
Syria since 2011. Those intentions were global, and the multinational aspects of the
fighters in the group would become very important in its global expansion after 2014.
Conclusion
Our research on this militant group’s use of special operations highlights a trend by a
prolific “terror group” whose rapid growth and diversity of tactics transcends terrorism
studies. A group that is an external terror wing, millenarian movement, insurgency,
conventional military, and proto-state often draws analysts and scholars that study what
they know, at the detriment of a holistic view of the group. Admittedly, this study is no
different in its limited scope but tries to transcend the gap between terrorism, irregular
warfare, and more conventional capabilities.
To demonstrate the work that still needs to be done, an examination of the Global
Terrorism Database finds that the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) only coded the Haditha raid as a terrorist event, des-
pite news articles on all three of our events. The Battle of Donkey Island, which was a
strictly military engagement that preempted any of the terror acts that could have fol-
lowed, would not be coded as such under any definition. The Haditha raid in 2012 was
coded as two different attacks (for unknown reasons), and it incorrectly lists the victims
as all police. 104 The target of the raid, Muhammad Shufair, was a former policeman,
and a civilian political leader when assassinated by the group. Certainly, some in the
terrorism studies field would challenge that this should be coded as a terror act due to
its targeting of police, or dispute that a military style raid could be terrorism and not
an example of guerilla warfare. Finally, the Abu Ghraib/Taji prison breaks, which cost
the lives of ten policemen and numerous prisoners, cannot be found in the database for
unknown reasons.105 This disparity illuminates why this area of study deserves further
research and additional work to achieve improved conceptual clarity.
What does this study portend for the future of militant adoption of special opera-
tions, and its use by a festering Islamic State which has returned to its insurgency roots
in the post-caliphate era? While our investigation only found three examples of special
operations missions, the collapse of the Islamic State caliphate would suggest that the
leadership might reach into this tool bag again – if and when the leadership feels the
stage is set to move to a higher level of activity beyond terror acts and guerilla warfare.
Accordingly, it will look for opportunities to achieve a relative superiority over its gov-
ernment opponents in missions that can produce a specific, achievable, and lasting stra-
tegic impact. For this reason, leaders might choose to direct a disproportionate amount
of resources (skilled soldiers, money, equipment, time) toward a special operation in
order to make a significant impact on the fortunes of war. There is high level of risk in
these commitments, and they are not taken lightly.
Much additional research is needed on the topic of militant adoption of special opera-
tions capability, and even more on the cases in this study. The Abu Ghraib/Taji raid
should be evaluated in greater detail as it is quite possibly the most impressive undertaking
ever conducted by the Islamic State, considering its scale and the difficulty in breaking key
leaders out safely. In addition, there seems to have been a special mission set for prison
breakouts during the “Breaking the Walls” campaign of 2012-2013, which Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi announced in his very first speech. Prisons, and the valuable human capital they
contain, will be the key to any future resurgence of the group. Once additional captured
documents become available for use in analysis, it would be useful to look at how the
group functioned as a learning organization to improve its special operations doctrine,
something that we found impossible to judge with the sources we were able to find.
There is also much work needed to sketch out the Islamic State’s creation of units
with specialized mission sets outside of what we considered to be special operations.
The Islamic State has long developed and used these types of units for a variety of tasks
in regular and irregular warfare. For example, the infamous commander Haji Bakr,
Sweidawi’s predecessor as the chief of the military council, was once the commander of
an assassination unit called the Knights of the Silencers, which rotated through the
provinces assassinating political rivals and security officials based on the approval by
Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.106 This could be considered a spe-
cialized unit, serving the slow attrition strategy of the Islamic State before 2014.
More recently, the Islamic State has trained specially selected fighters in a “special oper-
ations” course they have advertised in its propaganda. Despite this unusual telegraphing of
this new capability, there is no evidence that these fighters have participated in a special
operation. 107 The external operations wing of the Islamic State’s security service (amni) has
reportedly used some of these specially trained fighters to execute horrific terrorist attacks in
European cities, but these terror attacks do not meet any of the criteria we used to define a
special operation. This determination also goes for members of the “plunging units” (ingi-
masi), who act as near-suicidal shock troops on the battlefield. These fighters have no special
equipment other than suicide belts and their missions have no impact outside of the tactical
level.108 To sum, there are a plethora of specialized tactics and units whose popularity and
notoriety has the effect of contaminating our understanding of the important role that spe-
cial operations can have on a campaign or conflict, but should be broadly studied for a better
understanding of their role in the Islamic State way of war.
Finally, the successes of the Islamic State in executing impactful special operations con-
tradicts the conventional wisdom that insurgencies have changed from hierarchical organi-
zations with a distinct chain of command to “loose network of small groups … all
working toward a common purpose but without central direction.”109 Certainly without
the benefit of thick-description cases like the ones presented in this paper, this description
of modern insurgency seems reasonable and fits in with other concepts like swarming net-
works and leaderless resistance.110 This case study refutes these ideas by presenting the
doctrine of a group that does insurgency better than any other active militant group we
can identify. This doctrine requires centralized leadership decision-making and risk taking,
with orders and resources allocated by leader fiat. Add to this the leveraging of the most
successful insurgent media outlet in history to amplify the effects of special operations, and
it is clear that the trend for insurgencies will be in the direction of centralization of key
functions. The management of violence, by states or non-state militaries, is still a crucial
activity for those trying to achieve political objectives.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank @AbuFancyPants, Tim Ball, Mia Bloom, Gareth Browne, Andrea
Dew, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Todd Greentree, Mohammad Hafez, Hassan Hassan, Patrick
Johnston, Nick Kramer, Montgomery McFate, @Mr0rangetracker, Jacob Rosen, Gunner Sepp,
Robert Tomlinson, Cayla Whiteside, James Wirtz, and two anonymous reviewers.
Notes
1. Linda Robinson, “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces,” (CFR, 2013), 4.
2. Linda Robinson, “SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, With, and Through’ Local Forces,”
The Cipher Brief, May 9, 2017 https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/sofs-
evolving-role-warfare-by-with-and-through-local-forces-2 (accessed April 23, 2018).
3. Aymenn al-Tamimi, “The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary
Evidence,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4, (2015); Craig Whiteside, “Lighting the Path:
The Evolution of the Islamic State Media Department (2003-2016),” (ICCT-The Hague,
November 15, 2016); Vera Mironova, “Adaptation and Innovation with an Urban Twist:
Changes to Suicide Tactics in the Battle for Mosul,” Military Review 97, no. 6 (November-
December 2017).
4. Al Jazeera, “Iraqi forces targeted in deadly attacks: Armed men dressed in police uniforms
kill 27 officers, including two commanders, after raids on checkpoints in Haditha,” March
5, 2012 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012356231575710.html ; Bill
Roggio, “AQI claims attacks on Haditha, Barwana,” Long War Journal, March 16, 2012
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/03/aqi_claims_attack_on_haditha_b.php
5. Al Furqan Media (Islamic State of Iraq), “Clanging of the Swords, Part 2,” August 16, 2012
http://jihadology.net/2012/08/16/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-
islamic-state-of-iraq-clanging-of-the-swords-part-2%e2%80%b3/
6. Al Furqan Media (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), “Clanging of the Swords, Part 4”
May 17, 2014
http://jihadology.net/2014/05/17/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-
islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-clanging-of-the-swords-part-4/ ; for an analysis of the
impact of the viral hit, see Aymenn al-Tamimi, “Clashing of the Swords - new nashid
from Ajnad Media,” personal blog, June 18, 2014 http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/06/
clashing-of-the-swords-new-isis-nasheed-from (accessed April 23, 2018). This video has
long been overshadowed by a sequel in the series - the fourth episode was a viral hit
complete with a nashid of the same name in 2014.
7. Despite the insistence of analysts and U.S. government officials who called the group Al Qaeda
in Iraq (AQI) between 2006 and 2013, the group had announced shortly after the founding of
the Islamic State of Iraq in late 2006 that AQI had been folded into the larger political entity,
and no longer existed. Our research included examining operations under the all of the group’s
previous designations since the declaration of an Islamic State of Iraq in 2006.
8. According to U.S. joint doctrine, special operations are defined as “operations requiring unique
modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile,
denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following:
time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces,
requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations (Washington DC: Joint Staff, July 16, 2014), 1.
9. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Terror Army (Regan Arts, 2016);
Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone, and Eva Entenmann, “Fear they Neighbor:
Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West” (ICCT-The Hague, 2017), 11; Boaz Ganor,
“Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” Police
Practice and Research 3, no 4 (2002); Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The
Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 52.
10. David C. Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism,”
Current History 100, no. 650 (December 2001), 419-424.
11. Stathis Kalyvas, “Is ISIS a Revolutionary Group, and if Yes, What are the Implications?”
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 9. No. 4, August 2015, 42-47.
12. Querine Hanlon, “Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups,” in Armed
Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency, edited by
Jeffrey H. Norwitz (Newport: Naval War College, 2008), 115-126.
13. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40-41.
14. Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition. (New York: Columbia
University Press. 2006), pp 40-41.
15. See Richard W. Rubright. JSOU Report 17-1: A Unified Theory for Special Operations.
(Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, 2017); Tom Searle. JSOU Report 17-4: Outside
the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations. (Tampa: Joint Special Operations
University, 2017); and Peter McCabe and Paul Lieber Editors. JSOU Report 17-6: Special
Operations Theory. (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, 2017).
16. See Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson Ed. Special Operations from the Small State
Perspective: Future Security Challenges (London: Palgrave, 2017).
17. We use the word “enigmatic” here to point out that there is great confusion and little
understanding of how they rose to power. As we understand it, and present here, the
Islamic State waged a prolonged and successful insurgent campaign until they obtained a
dominant position in their areas.
18. See Thomas K. Adams. US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of
Unconventional Warfare. (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 60-61 and pp179-180. Also see
David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb. United States Special Operations Forces. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 78, pp. 146-147.
19. Susan Marquis. Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces.
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press), 6.
20. Ibid., pp. 144-147. See also James D. Kiras. Special Operations and Strategy:From World
War II to the War on Terrorism. (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 6-7.
21. Bruce I. Gudmundsson. Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918.
(Westport,CT: Praeger, 1989).
22. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke. Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S.

Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 5-8.
23. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb. United States Special Operations Forces. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp.146-147.
24. James D. Kiras. Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on
Terrorism. (London: Routledge, 2006), 2.
25. William H. McRaven. Spec Ops - Cases Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and
Practice. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996), pp. 8-9.
26. Ibid., pp. 4-7.
27. Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 162.
28. For special operations as a coup d’ main see John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: Special
Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lahnam: University Press of America, 1996), 1; for
special operations in support of strategic attrition see James Kiras, Special Operations and
Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006), 2.
29. Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 169.
30. For example see United States Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations (14 July 2014). In
the introduction, “Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics,
techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or
politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or
more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work
with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and
cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk … Special operations may differ from
conventional operations in degree of strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic
risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and
indigenous assets … ” I-1. Later in Chapter II, “SOF are those forces identified in Title 10,
United States Code (USC), Section 167 or those units or forces that have since been
designated as SOF by SecDef … SOF are those Active Component and Reserve Component
(RC) forces of the Services specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and
support SO,” II-1.
31. See Richard W. Rubright, “JSOU Report 17-01: A Unified Theory for Special Operations”
(Tampa, FL: JSOU University Press, 2017), 20-21; Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy,
141-143; and Christopher Lamb “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions,”
Special Warfare (July 1995), 1-2, 7-8.
32. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp 148-149.
33. Ronny Modigs “The Utility of Special Operations in Small States,” in Special Operations
from the Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges, edited by Gunilla Eriksson and
Ulrica Pettersson (London: Palgrave, 2017), 44.
34. See Allied Joint Publication 3-5: Special Operations (January 2009), “Chapter II: Allied
Joint Special Operations Principal Tasks.” Though there are three principal tasks, the
chapter describes variation how the skills for each task can achieve a number of mission
foci. AJP 3-5 is currently under revision.
35. See United States Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations (16 July 2014), II-3.
36. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 159.
37. We primarily relied on the associated database from one of the author’s dissertation:
Craig Whiteside, “The Smiling, Scented Men: The Political Worldview of the Islamic
State of Iraq, 2003 – 2013,” Dissertation, Washington State University, 2014.
38. See Brian Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final
Victory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016) and Ahmed Hashim, The Caliphate at
War: Operational Realities and Innovations of the Islamic State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
39. For the purpose of this examination, we examined the Islamic State movement from its
declaration of an Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006 until the present. It is unlikely that
any special operations were conducted prior to 2006 according to the criteria we used to
code such events.
40. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, “Islamic Rulings on Warfare,” (Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2004), 6; Hassan Hassan
confirmed for us that the Islamic State heavily uses the term ghazua to denote a raid
(ghazawat plural form – raids) in an operational sense, and there are certainly traditional
narratives that are leveraged by the use of this term in propaganda. Ghazua could also be
interpreted as a foray or a brief strike. Raid can also be translated as ghara (plural gharat).
41. Mu’awiyah al-Qahtani, "The Biography of the Brave Leader and Lion of Epic Battles:
Jarrah al-Shami, May God Rest Him in Peace," posted on the Ana al-Muslim Network,
August 26, 2012. One picture of him exists from archived Islamic State of Iraq videos,
Daniele Raineri, “And many others, included Ibn Jarrah al-Shami, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir
and this old one I don’t know,” Twitter, August 19, 2016 https://twitter.com/
danieleraineri/status/766700879500181504 (accessed October 10, 2018.)
42. Ibid.
43. Ann Scott Tyson, “A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,” The Washington Post August
19, 2007.
44. Ibid.
45. Since the news of the death of the emir of Baghdad did not appear in the media, it is
assumed that like many senior level deaths - U.S. forces either did not know about it or
chose to keep it quiet. Since it was an out of sector raid, it is likely that it went unnoticed.
46. The “Shami” kunya (nickname) and his biography indicate he was of Syrian origin. Abu
Umar’s recognition of Jarrah al-Shami as a “hero” of the Islamic State on its second
anniversary can be found in Nibras Kazimi, “Al-Baghdadi’s Twelfth Speech: Putting a
New, Divine Spin on ‘Victory’,” Talisman Gate (October 20, 2008) http://talismangate.
blogspot.com/2008/10/al-baghdadis-twelfth-speech-putting-new.html accessed March
1, 2018.
47. Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, letter to al-Qa’ida leadership (dated April/May 2007), posted on
Ana al-Muslim network, November 24, 2013, leaked by al-Qa’ida to embarrass the Islamic
State in 2013;
48. Craig Whiteside, “Nine Bullets for the Traitors, One for the Enemy: The Slogans and
Strategy behind the Islamic State’s Campaign to Defeat the Sunni Awakening (2006 –
2017),” (ICCT-The Hague, 2018) https://icct.nl/publication/nine-bullets-for-the-traitors-
one-for-the-enemy-the-slogans-and-strategy-behind-the-islamic-states-campaign-to-defeat-
the-sunni-awakening-2006-2017/, p. 10; Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted:
Zarqawi’s Ideological Heirs, Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their Self-
Styled Islamic State of Iraq,” (Hudson Institute, July 1, 2008) https://www.hudson.org/
research/9854-the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-a-caliph-
and-the-collapse-of-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq accessed March 1, 2018.
49. Carter Malkasian, Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic
State (Oxford University, 2017).
50. Brian Fishman, “Redefining the Islamic State: The Fall and Rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq”
(New America Foundation, Aug 2011), 4-5.
51. Michael Schmidt and Eric Schmitt, “Leaving Iraq, U.S. Fears New Surge of Qaeda Terror’,”
The New York Times, November 5, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/world/
middleeast/leaving-iraq-us-fears-new-surge-of-qaeda-terror.html (accessed March 1, 2018).
52. Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted.”
53. For example, little known Abu Umar al-Baghdadi produced over twenty audio taped
speeches in the almost four years he was emir of the group, see Whiteside, “Lighting the
Path,” 10-20.
54. The name of the camp can be seen on the red flag in the Clanging of the Swords 2 video
(al-Furqan Media), and in subsequent pictures released by the Islamic State
media department.
55. Abu Usama al-Iraqi, “Stages in the Jihad of Emir al Baghdadi,” posted on Global Jihad
Network, May 12, 2012, (previously accessed May 2012, no longer accessible online).
56. Adnani was narrating Islamic State of Iraq videos in early 2010 after his release from
Bucca, and al-Rawi was the overall emir by this time, having succeeded Abu Zahra al-
Issawi who was killed in 2009; see Whiteside, “Lighting the Path,” 14-21.
57. This is an early example of the media department’s unofficial slogan: “Media Operative,
You are a Mujahid, Too;” see Charlie Winter, “Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine
for Information Warfare,” (ICSR, 2017).
58. Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, "But Allah Will Not Allow But That His
Light Should Be Perfected," al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production, July 21, 2012,
posted to Hanin Network Forums; Islamic State of Iraq, Ministry of Information,
“Statement on the first wave of Operation Breaking the Walls,” Al-Fajr Media Center,
posted to Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, Jul 24, 2012.
59. U.S. Army, Ranger Handbook, SH 21-76 (Fort Benning, GA: Infantry School, July 2006), 5-14.
60. Local police suspected some insider involvement in the raid, as reported in AFP, “Qaeda
fighters kill 27 policeman in West Iraq.”
61. It is important to note that even at this point in 2012, the Sunni Sahwa (tribal Awakening)
was still influential in securing key areas for the government. Haditha in particular has
remained out of Islamic State control even during the caliphate period due to
hostile tribes.
62. Omar Hejab, “The Defiant Iraqi Tribe of Haditha,” The Arab Weekly, Mar 7, 2015 https://
thearabweekly.com/defiant-iraqi-tribe-haditha
63. For more on the campaign to eliminate the Sahwa, see Craig Whiteside, “The Islamic State
and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 27 (August
5, 2016).
64. Ministry of Information, Islamic State of Iraq, “Statement on Emir Jarrah al Shami’s Raid,
God Rest his Soul, in Haditha City,” (Al-Fajr Media, March 15, 2012).
65. Anonymous, “Analysis of the ISI,” (written in 2007), captured document NM EC 2007-
612449, CTC West Point, 52 (original page 38), https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony-program/
analysis-of-the-state-of-isi-original-language-2/
66. Again, the Islamic State had killed thousands of Sahwa leaders and men since 2006, but
this special operation was designed to amplify the message to tribal leader to repent before
it was too late. Many did. See Whiteside: “The Islamic State and the Return of
Revolutionary Warfare (2016) and “Nine Bullets for the Traitors, One for the Enemy: The
Slogans and Strategy behind the Islamic State’s Campaign to Defeat the Sunni Awakening
(2006-2017), ICCT (2018).
67. AFP, “Qaeda fighters kill 27 policeman in West Iraq,” Muscat Daily (March 5, 2012)
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Gcc/Qaeda-fighters-kill-27-police-in-west-Iraq
68. Apparently the other was left behind along with an ISI flag and some of the propaganda
material, according to the AFP article, the ISI press release, and the Clanging of the
Swords 2 video.
69. For raw footage of the Doolittle Raid launch from the USS Hornet, see Combat Area Activities
of the Army Air Forces, “Doolittle Raid Launch Footage” (Wright Field: Technical Data
Laboratory, 1942) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1CTyJPLek94 (accessed March 28,
2018); this footage is best compared to the edited and narrated newsreel: Castle Films, “Yanks
Bomb Tokyo!” (Pare Lorentz Center at the FDR Presidential Library and Museum, 1942)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yXzYxUC93A (accessed March 28, 2018).
70. James M. Scott, Target Tokyo: Jimmy Doolittle and the Raid that Avenged Pearl Harbor
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2015), 304-306.
71. By this point (early 2013), the group had changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant/Sham (ISIL/ISIS) in belated recognition of its expansion into Syria.
72. Adam Schreck and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “More than 500 escape Abu Ghraib,” Boston
Globe, July 22, 2013 https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/07/22/prison-break-
abu-ghraib/BGFvHuDOzrw6ym24PBwqpL/story.html (accessed October 10, 2018.)
73. Al-Anbar: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, “Messages from the land of epic battles #11,”
al-Furqan Media Productions, October 30, 2013, available at Jihadology.net https://
jihadology.net/2013/10/30/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-
state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-messages-from-the-land-of-epic-battles-11/ (accessed May 1,
2018). It seemed that the Taji break was a failure.
74. Bilawi was from the “first generation” in the movement before his capture in 2005 and long
stay in Camp Bucca and other prisons. A translation of spokesman Mohammad al-Adnani’s
eulogy of Bilawi can be found here in Kyle Orton, “The Man who planned the Islamic State’s
takeover of Mosul,” blog, January 31, 2017 https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2017/01/31/
the-man-who-planned-the-islamic-states-takeover-of-mosul/ accessed May 1, 2018.
75. Peter Singer wrote this about the effects of U.S. special operations on the Islamic State:
“Eventually, the shattered remnants of al-Qaeda would flee Iraq for Syria, where they
would later reorganize themselves into the core of ISIS.” This is a completely incorrect
description of the history of the group during this period, as this paper documents. This
idea is unfortunately widespread. See P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, “Social Media
is Revolutionizing Warfare,” The Atlantic, Oct 2, 2018 https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2018/10/likewar-internet-new-intelligence-age-flynn/571903/
76. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Eulogy to Abu Nabil al-Anbari: Islamic State leader in Libya,”
January 7, 2016 http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/eulogy-to-abu-nabil-al-anbari-
islamic-state accessed May 1, 2018.
77. Daniele Raineri, “Abu al Mughirah al Qahtani (Abu Nabil al-Anbari) executing 6 Iraqi
recruits from Camp Speicher in Tikrit, June 2014,” Twitter, January 21, 2016 https://
twitter.com/DanieleRaineri/status/690233620187975680 accessed May 1, 2018.
78. Researcher @Mr.0rangeTracker found this thread on the palfd.net (Palestine Network for
Dialogue), on March 23, 2018. The message said: “Among those released from Abu Ghraib
prison is your brother, Sheikh Mujahid, commander of the valiant horse (Abu Omar
Ansari), may Allah preserve him, the military commander of the raid of Sheikh Jarrah al-
Shami, may God have mercy on him, which we saw in the championships in the issuance
of (Salil al-Sawaram 2).”
79. The Islamic State movement emirs of Anbar were: Abu Azzam al-Iraqi (2004), Abu Osama
al-Jazrawi (2005), Abu Jarrah al-Shami (2006), Ibrahim al-Zaidi (prior to 2010), and
Sweidawi (2013).
80. Kyle Orton, “Adnan al-Suwaydawi: Saddam’s Spy, Islamic State Leader,” January 31, 2017
https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2017/01/31/adnan-al-suwaydawi-saddams-spy-islamic-
state-leader/ accessed May 1, 2018
81. The dramatic seizure of Ramadi in 2015 by the Islamic State was named after Sweidawi,
according to this Islamic State radio program: Al-Bayan Radio correspondent in Wilayah
Al-Anbar, “Correspondent’s Program: The Raid of The Raid of Abu Muhannad al-
Suwaydawi” (Al-Bayan Radio, 1320 GMT on June 4, 2015) and posted to Twitter. An
older interview of Sweidawi can be seen in the video “al-Ramadi: The Epic Battles of Jihad
– Wilayat al-Anbar,” al Furqan Media Productions, October 9, 2015, accessible at Aaron
Zelin’s Jihadology website https://jihadology.net/2015/10/09/new-video-message-from-the-
islamic-state-al-ramadi-the-epic-battles-of-jihad-wilayat-al-anbar/ accessed May 1, 2018.
82. Mentioned in the a speech by the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham spokesman: Abu
Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, “They will do you no harm, Barring a Trifling
Annoyance,” al-Furqan Media, July 30, 2013, disseminated by Al-I’tisam Establishment for
Media Production and posted to Hanin Network Forums.
83. Al-Anbar: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, “Messages from the land of epic battles #11.”
84. Colin Gray, 162.
85. Kata’ib Hezbollah has maintained specially trained groups under Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps support since the US occupation of Iraq. See Mapping Militant Organizations
(Stanford University, 2010-2018) http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/
groups/view/361?highlight=kataib+hezbollah accessed on March 30, 2018.
86. Ken Keen, “The Ranger Regiment: Strategic Force for the 21st Century” (U.S. Army War
College, April 1, 1998), 5. See David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb. United States
Special Operations Forces. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp.78-79.
87. For the Islamic State, it seems to be the media department that becomes a grooming
assignment for its future leaders, including Muharib al-Jubouri, Khaled al-Mashadani,
Muhammad al-Adnani, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; see Whiteside, “Lighting the Path” (2016).
88. Craig Whiteside, “A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic
State Movement,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, 3 (2017).
89. Daniele Raineri, “Speaking about progressive understanding: Abu Waheeb, opening shot of
"Salil al Suwarim 2", via @Mr0rangetracker,” Twitter, December 12, 2014 https://twitter.
com/DanieleRaineri/status/543432056924291072 . Shakir Wahib al-Fahdawi al-Dulaimi
gained fame during the sack of Fallujah in early 2014, and earlier as the killer of three
truck drivers on camera in 2013; see Colin Freeman, “Islamic State executioner who
devised deadly ‘Quranic quiz’ killed by U.S. air strike,” The Telegraph May 9, 2016 https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/09/key-islamic-state-leader-killed-in-coalition-air-strike-
in-iraqs/ (accessed March 1, 2018).
90. Waheeb’s rise in celebrity led to his mention by Omar Mateen in his phone conversations
with police during the Orlando nightclub terror attack in 2016; see Dan Frosch and Nicole
Hong, “Transcripts Show ISIS Influence on Orlando Gunman,” The Wall Street Journal,
September 27, 2016 https://www.wsj.com/articles/transcripts-show-isis-influence-on-
orlando-gunman-1475023090 (accessed October 10, 2018).
91. The struggle to develop a strategy is told in this original document: Anonymous, “The Strategy
to Improve the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq,” (jihadist website, 2009),
translated by Dr. Mohammad Hafez; a description of the document can be found here: Marc
Lynch, “AQ-Iraq’s counter counter-insurgency manual,” Foreign Policy, (March 17, 2010)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/17/aq-iraqs-counter-counter-insurgency-manual/ accessed
May 1,2018.
92. Jessica Lewis, “Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent” (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of
War, 2013).
93. Hassan Hassan, “Insurgents Again: The Islamic State’s Calculated Reversion to Attrition in
the Syria-Iraq Border Region and Beyond,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 11 (December 2017). One
possible exception is an Islamic State attack by a small force of ingimashi on the U.S. base
at al-Tanf on the Iraqi-Syrian border in April 2017 which could be evidence of a special
operation, as the attackers tried to enter the compound disguised as U.S. proxies before
being defeated soundly; see Christopher Woody, “ISIS fighters got inside the wire during a
hellish firefight with US Special Ops in Syria,” Business Insider, April 11, 2017 https://www.
businessinsider.com/isis-attack-on-us-troops-at-al-tanf-in-southern-syria-2017-4 .
94. McRaven, 4-7.
95. Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 4-12.
96. Haroro Ingram and Craig Whiteside, “In Search of the Virtual Caliphate: Convenient
Fallacy, Dangerous Distraction,” War on the Rocks, Sept 27, 2017 https://warontherocks.
com/2017/09/in-search-of-the-virtual-caliphate-convenient-fallacy-dangerous-distraction/
97. Sandor Klein, “One year later, Tokyo raid story told” (UPI, April 20, 1943) https://www.
upi.com/Archives/1943/04/20/One-year-later-Tokyo-raid-story-told/8761134802538/
accessed May 1, 2018.
98. al-Qahtani, "The Biography of the Brave Leader and Lion of Epic Battles: Jarrah al-
Shami,” (2012).
99. Tim Arango and Eric Schmitt, “A Path to ISIS, Through a Porous Turkish Border,” The
New York Times, March 9, 2015 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/europe/
despite-crackdown-path-to-join-isis-often-winds-through-porous-turkish-border.html
(accessed May 1, 2018).
100. Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the
Sinjar Records” (CTC West Point, 2007), 5-6.
101. Abu Ahmad al-Shami was one of the two raiders killed in the fratricidal shootout in
the dark.
102. Islamic State code for apostates and rejectionists, nicknames for its enemies both Sunni
and Shia, respectively.
103. al-Qahtani, "The Biography of the Brave Leader and Lion of Epic Battles: Jarrah al-Shami.”
104. The Jarrah al-Shami raid appears in the GTD database as events 20120305003 and
20120305004, with the perpetrators listed as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (sic) and the targets
described as police; Global Terrorism Database, START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
(accessed October 10, 2018.)
105. Schreck and Abdul-Zahra, “More than 500 escape Abu Ghraib,” July 22, 2013.
106. For a description of Haji Bakr’s role leading the assassination unit, see Bill Roggio, “ISIS
confirms death of senior leader in Syria,” Long War Journal, February 5, 2014 https://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/isis_confirms_death.php (accessed May 1, 2018);
for documented evidence of a centralized approval system for ISI operatives to kill high
ranking tribal sheikhs, see Abu Khaldun, “Synopsis of the Relations Committee in
Baghdad’s Southern Belt,” Captured Records Research Center, National Defense University
Document AQ PMPR-D-001–717, (2009).
107. Rukmini Calimachi, “How a Secretive Branch of ISIS built a global network of killers,” The
New York Times, August 3, 2016. This article interviews a defector who went through
“special operations” training for selection into a unit known as the Islamic State special
forces, but while the training is advanced, the article does not detail specific missions or
mission sets the “Army of the Caliphate” executes other than special reconnaissance for
offensive operations, something the group has not conducted on a large scale since 2015.
108. Charlie Winter makes a clear distinction between suicide bombers and “plungers” in his
paper “War by Suicide,” (ICCT-The Hague, February 2017), 4-5.
109. Steven Metz, “Why America Will Face Even Deadlier Insurgents in the Future
Friday,” World Politics Review, May 3, 2019 https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/
27813/why-america-will-face-even-deadlier-insurgents-in-the-future
110. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Swarming and the Future of Conflict,” RAND/ National
Defense Research Institute, 2005; of note, Jarrah al-Shami’s elements swarmed on Ramadi
only to be caught at their focal point and decimated by a random U.S. patrol that had no idea
what it found that night. Abu Musab al-Suri’s ideas of leaderless jihad have not been adopted
by the Islamic State, despite his alleged meetings or connections with the founder of the
movement; for more on his doctrine see Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-
Qaida Strategist Abu Musab al-Suri (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
111. This data is derived from the authors’ ongoing research using Islamic State self-reported
claims during the period, and indicate individual events that use violence to target enemies
or civilians. Of note, these claims are an order of magnitude greater than data from more
conventional databases, indicating a wide delta between self-reported activity and database
collection of media reports. This paper is forthcoming as “The Modern Phoenix:
Documenting the Insurgent Campaign of the Islamic State of Iraq (2008-2013) “at the
2019 Society of Terrorism Research conference, Oslo.
Disclaimers
This article reflects the views of the authors, and does not represent the views of the U.S. Naval
War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Government, or the Il Foglio newspaper.
There are no financial conflicts to report.
Notes on contributors
Craig Whiteside (@CraigAWhiteside) is an associate professor at the Naval War College Monterey
and an associate fellow with the International Center for Counterterrorism – The Hague (ICCT).
Ian Rice is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Daniele Raineri (@DanieleRaineri) is a journalist with Il Foglio covering militant groups in Libya
and Iraq.
ORCID
Craig Whiteside http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4094-7173
Ian Rice http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9449-6080
Daniele Raineri http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4693-359X

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in

Craig Whiteside, Ian Rice & Daniele Raineri

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1628623

Published online: 25 Jun 2019.

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Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

A special military capability

Defining special operations in the irregular context

The case for an islamic state special operations capability

Three raids (ghazawat)

Case # 2: the commander jarrah al-Shami raid (haditha, march 5, 2012)

Case # 3 breakout: Abu ghraib (Anbar province, july 22, 2013)

Leaders and their role in shaping special capabilities

The propagandist’s dilemma

22. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke. Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S.

Ian Rice is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles.

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