4 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Plan Dalet: MasterPlan forthe
Conquestof Palestine

WalidKhalidi*

Zionism'sresponsibilityforthe Palestinianexodusand diasporais an

integralpartof the genesisof the State of Israel.In theirheartofhearts,
mostIsraelisknowthis,whichat leastin partaccountsfortheirpervasive
sense of insecurity.But the Israeligovernment will neveradmitto this
responsibilityand forthe lastfortyyearshas triedto divertattentionfrom
itthrough thepropagation ofthelie thatin 1948theArableadersbroadcast
ordersto the Palestiniansto evacuate theircountrypreliminary to its
"invasion"bythe regularArab armies.
The issueofresponsibilityforthePalestinianexoduswillremainso long
as thereis a Palestinianproblem,butit wasparticularly acutein the 1950s
and 1960sbecauseuntilthe 1967 War,all fivepermanent members ofthe

'Walid Khalidiis a founder

and thehonorary oftheInstitute
generalsecretary forPalestineStudies.He
is a leadingauthority conflict
on thePalestineproblemand theArab-Israeli and is currently
a research
fellowat the CenterforMiddleEasternStudies,HarvardUniversity.
 PLANDALET 5

UnitedNationsSecurity Councilwereofficially committed to thePalestin-

ian rightofreturn to Israelon thebasisofUN Resolution194, whichthey
had annuallyendorsedfor twentyconsecutiveyears. In the last two
decades,the highlighting by Israeland the World ZionistOrganization
(WZO) of the assumedrightof returnof SovietJewsand the automatic
equationoftheirdesireforemigration fromtheU.S. S. R. withthisrightare
at leastpartlydesignedto submerge and snuff out the Palestinianrightof
return.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

The chiefexponentuntil1967, outsideIsrael,ofthe Israeliversionof
thePalestinian exoduswastheAnglo-Zionist writerJonKimche,helpedby
his youngerbrotherDavid, then a memberof the Israeli intelligence
services,and morerecently of Irangatefame.
Those ofus at the timewho tookon theKimcheset al. adopteda two
trackapproach.Ratherthanbeingdutifully mesmerized bytheredherring
of the Arab evacuationorders,we chose to examinewhat was actually
happeningon the groundduringthe crucial monthsof the civil war
(December1947-15 May 1948) and, specifically, soughthelp fromthose
Hebrewsourceswhichwereunavailable in Englishtranslation.An early
resultwas myarticle"The Fall of Haifa" (MiddleEast Forum,December
1959) and "Plan Dalet" (MiddleEast Forum,November1961) reproduced
below.
Muchhas beenpublishedon 1948sincethen,especiallyin thelastyear
ortwo.The morerecentwritings ofIsraelischolars(Teveth,Segev,Flapan,
Shlaim,Morris)are,in documentation and respectforthefacts,lightyears
away from the persistentofficialIsraeliversionof the eventsof 1948. But
withthepossibleexceptionofFlapan,thereis a lingering reluctanceeven
in thesewritings to see the Palestinianexodusin its Zionistmoorings.
Morris, forexample,unequivocally andcommendably confirms thedeathof
the (albeit long-deceased)Arab evacuationorders.But along with the
othershe viewsthePalestinianexodusin an historical vacuum.To be sure,
he mentionsdiscussionsbefore1948 in the highestZionistcirclesof the
"transfer" (euphemism forexpulsion)of the Arab population,buthe sees
no linkbetweenthisand Plan Dalet. He regards theobviouslineardynamic
bindingtogether thesuccessivemilitary operationsofPlan D as fragments
in an, as it were,cubic configuration accidentally relatedto one another
onlythroughtheirjoint occurrencein the dimensionof time. Fromhis
perspective, no connectionexistsbetweentheimperative to "transfer"
the
Arabpopulationand seizeitslandsand theimperative to accommodate the
hundreds of thousandsofJewsit was plannedto bringto the newJewish
state.Morrisbravelyadmitstheevacuationthrough forceorfearofthebulk
6 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

of the 369 Palestinianvillages,whichhe meticulously lists(see Appendix

D below). Buthe subliminally placesthemoralburdenofthis,not on the
invader,but on the invaded,who by resistingor panickingbrought
permanent exile uponthemselves. Iftheirvillageswereblownup in order
to preventthe returnof theirinhabitantsand to parcelout theirfarms
amongexistingJewishcoloniesand newJewishimmigrants, thiswas only
as an afterthought, an extemporized innovation, a lightningbrainwave with
no ideological,attitudinal, motivational, or strategicantecedents.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Looking at what was happeningon the groundduringDecember
1947-15 May 1948was thefirst trackwe followedin examiningthe Israeli
versionofthe eventsofthisperiod;thesecondtrackwas to challengethe
Israelilie ofevacuationordershead on. Iftheorderswerebroadcastas the
government ofIsrael,itstopleadership, andtheKimchesetal. insisted,and
iftheseordersreachedhundreds ofvillagesand a dozentownscausingtheir
evacuationby hundredsof thousands,surelysome traceor echo of these
ordersshouldbe on record.The obviousplace to lookwas thebackfilesof
the Near East monitoring stationsof the Britishand Americangovern-
ments, (the BBC Cypruslisteningpost and the CIA-sponsoredForeign
Broadcast Information Service),bothofwhichcoverednotonlyall theradio
in
stations theNear East,butalso the local newspapers as well. I therefore
checkedthe BBC monitoring archivesat the BritishMuseum,Londonand
published theresultin myarticle"WhyDid thePalestinians Leave?"(Middle
EastForumJuly1959). Not onlywas thereno hintofanyArabevacuation
order,buttheArabradiostations hadurgedthePalestinians toholdon andbe
steadfastwhereas itwas theJewish of
radiostations theHaganahandtheIrgun
andStemGangwhichhad beenengagedin incessant andstrident psycholog-
ical warfare againsttheArabcivilianpopulation.
Subsequentlyand quite separately,the Anglo-IrishwriterErskine
Childerswentoverthe BBC monitoring fileson his own and reachedthe
in
same conclusions his article"The Other Exodus" publishedin the
Spectator on 21 May 1961. Meanwhile,I spenta sabbaticalyear(1960-61)
fromthe AUB at Princeton,whereI wentthroughthe FBIS fileswith
exactlythe same results.
The Spectator was owned by the familyof the distinguished British
statesmanand scholarSir Ian Gilmour.Fortunately, Mr. Gilmour(as he
thenwas) was open-minded on the issueand allowedequal access to his
columnsto Zionistsandnon-Zionists alike-an unheardofphenomenonat
the time,and still a rareone to thisday. This enabledthe issue to be
thrashed outin fullpublicviewin a majorEnglishperiodical.The Childers
articlebroughtan immediateand typicalresponsefromKimche, who
 PLANDALET 7

accusedChilders ofbeinginfluenced byme.Thiswas,ofcourse,untrue,

sinceChilders hadcarried outhisresearch quiteindependently ofmeand,
presumably, inparttocheckonmyownconclusions. ButI naturally joined
thefray,having justfinishedmyexamination oftheFBISfilesatPrinceton.
Thereensueda triangular debate(joinedoccasionally byothers)between
Childers,Kimche,and myself, whichlasteduntil4 August1961. An
opportunitywasthusafforded to flush outevery prevarication Kimchewas
capableofandpublicly to putthelie oftheevacuation orders in itsfinal

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

restingplace-at leastas faras seriousstudents of the MiddleEast are
concerned.
Muchofthenewdatarevealed in recentIsraeliwritings confirms the
conclusionsofmy1961articleon PlanDalet,whileno newevidencehas
beenturned up to causeme to modify anyofthem.At thesametime,
although some Israelischolars agree that the evacuationordersnever
theSpectator
existed, correspondence hasneverbeenpublished infullinthe
U.S. On theother hand,innoneoftherecent Israeli
ornon-Israeli writings
on 1948is therea comprehensive ordetailedaccountofPlanDaletorits
predecessors, norhave Englishtranslations fromHebrewof theiractual
textseverbeenpublished.
I wasabletolocatethesetextsseveral yearsafterthepublication ofmy
"PlanDalet,"andthereader
article canjudgeforherself orhimself whether
theyconfirm itsanalysis.Thisis why,whenaskedbyJPSto takea second
lookatPlanDalet,I suggested whatI did,as explained intheeditorial note
above.The reader's attentionis particularlydrawnto thesectionentitled
"Countermeasures" in Plan C (AppendixA), putintopracticeas of 1
December 1947andthe"Operational Objectives oftheBrigades" ofPlanD
(Appendix C), putintopractice as of1 April1948.
Somemayconsider thisretrospective lookat 1948a wasteful obsession
withthepastoratbestan academic exerciseirrelevanttothechallenges of
thepresent. Buton thisfortieth anniversary, a tribute,ifinadequate, isdue
totheendless ofa wholepeople.Noristhereanyirrelevance:
sufferings At
a timewhentalkoftheexpulsion ofthePalestinians from whatis leftof
theirpatrimony is on theincrease in Israelirulingcircles,it is onlyfitting
toremind theworld ofthecruelties perpetrated bythesecircles in 1948and
ofthesubterfuges usedto camouflage them.

is thetextofProfessor
Thefollowing Khalidi's
1961article
"PlanDalet:
PlanfortheConquest
Master ofPalestine." with
Reprinted permission.
8 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

"Plan Dalet" or "Plan D" was the name givenby the ZionistHigh
Commandto thegeneralplanformilitary operationswithintheframework
ofwhichtheZionistslaunchedsuccessiveoffensives in Apriland earlyMay
1948 in variouspartsof Palestine.These offensives, whichentailedthe
destruction of the PalestinianArab community and the expulsionand
pauperization ofthebulkofthePalestineArabs,werecalculatedto achieve
the military faitaccompliuponwhichthe stateof Israelwas to be based.
It is onlyrecentlythatdirectreference has beenmadein EnglishZionist

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

sourcesto thefactthatsucha planas "Plan D" everexisted.Jonand David
Kimchein theirbookA ClashofDestinies*givea versionofthisplan. But
Jon Kimche, the senior authorof the two, heroicallystraddlinghis
perennialdilemma,is precariously poisedbetweenthenecessity forapprox-
imationto thetruthand thetacticalrequirements ofZionistpropaganda.A
stillmorerecentZionistworkin Englishwhichmakesexplicitreferences to
Plan D is TheEdgeoftheSword** byNetanelLorch.The author,an Israeli
and former memberofHaganah,is, likemanyIsraelis,notundulysensitive
about public opinion. His account is therefore refreshingly forthright
thoughhighlyselective.BoththeKimchesandLorchhaveleantheavilyon
Hebrewsources,notablySeferHaPalmach(The BookofthePalmach)tvols.
1 and 2 (particulary 2) and on Qravot5708 (Battlesof 1948),tt an equally
definitive Hebrew work coveringbothPalmachand Haganah operations.
But neitherthe KimchesnorLorchmentiontheseworksor acknowledge
theirstriking indebtedness to them.It is thereforeonlybycomparingthe
Kimcheand LorchversionswithSeferHaHaganahand Qravotthata truly
roundedpictureof Plan D can be drawn.

Problem
TheTerritorial
The studyofPlan D is important becauseofthe lightit throwson the
background of the interventionof the Arab regulararmiesafter15 May
1948 and the consequencesof thisintervention.It is also important
with
regardto the originsof theArab refugeeproblem.The traditional Zionist
accountof thisproblemhas been thatthe PalestineArabslefton orders
broadcastto themby theirleaders.It is truethatin recentmonthsthe
Zionistshave shown a certaindiffidence in stressingthis theme too

*New York:Praeger,1960.
* New York:G. P. Putnam'sSons, 1961.
tEditedbyZrubebelGilad (Tel Aviv: KibbutzHaMeuchad,1953).
ttlsraelDefenseForce(Tel Aviv: Marakhot,1955).
 PLANDALET 9

categorically buttheyhavenotaltogether dropped it, as is witnessed by

David Ben-Gurion's reiterationof thisexplanation of theArabrefugee
problem in hislatestspeechon therefugees in theKnesset.Thereis no
needhereto go intothisparticular problem. The Zionistclaimof the
existence ofArabevacuation orders hasalready beenshownto be a piece
ofmythmaking. Whatdoesneedtobe mentioned hereis thattheZionist
emphasis on Arabevacuation ordersis in facta skillful propaganda tactic
withmanifold purposes:itshiftsthemoralresponsibility fortherefugees on

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

to theArabsthemselves, putsthemon thedefensive, andshoulders them
withtheburden ofrefutation. Aboveall it directs theattention from the
primary to thederivative: fromthe actualcourseof eventsin 1948 in
Palestineto the realmof patience-consuming allegationand counter-
allegation.
Theideological premises ofPlanD aretobe foundin theveryconcept
of Zionism.The nineteenth century Zionistsof EasternEuropeshared
characteristics withmanyothernationalists ofthetime.Butunlikethe
othernationalist movements Zionism didnotthenpossessa landitcould
call itsown.The othernationalists werebasically trying eitherto break
awayterritorially from a foreign rulingpowerorto extract greater conces-
sionsin theirown territories fromsuchpowers.But the Zionistswere
literallyinsearchofa territory. The landthattheZionists werelooking for
wasonewhichtheywantedto possessandunmistakably stampwiththeir
ownimage.Butwhatifthislandwas already possessed byothers? The
Zionists hadtofacethisdilemma from theverybeginning. Andweknow
thatas earlyas TheodorHerzltheyhaddecidedthattheanswer wastobe
found in thetheory of"thelesserevil":in otherwords, thatanyhardship
inflicted on theindigenous population of the landchosenbythemwas
outweighed by the solution thatthe Zionistpossession ofthelandoffered to
the Jewishproblem.The yardstick of the lesserevil (consciously or
subconsciously applied)becamethemoralalibioftheZionistmovement,
dwarfing andfinally submerging theanguish ofitsvictims. ThusHerzlcould
saywithlittlequalmsofconscience oftheindigenous population oftheland
tobepossessed: "Weintend toworkthepoorpopulation acrossthefrontier
surreptitiously (unbemerkt) byproviding workforthemin transit countries
butdenying themanyemployment in ourownland."("TheTruthabout
Palestine" byL. Leonhard inLibertas,1960.)Thus,too,wasthisprinciple
institutionalized in theJewish NationalFundwhichfinanced landacquisi-
tionin Palestine andin whoseconstitution landacquired from theArabs
wastobecome"inalienably Jewish"andArablaborwastobe excluded from
Jewish land.
10 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

The ZionistPolicy
Butifthepremises ofPlanD can be seenin theveryconceptofZionism,
theimplementation oftheplan,too, has originsrootedin Zioniststrategic
thought.It is themild,learned,and socialistChaimArlosoroff, of
director
the PoliticalDepartmentof the JewishAgency,who throwsthe most
instructivelighton thisaspectof the problem.As earlyas 30 June1932
Arlosoroff sent Chaim Weizmanna confidential letter(see the Jewish

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

October1948) in whichhe outlinedhisviewson Zioniststrategy:
Frontier,
Zionist policy, he pointed out, should be judged only against "the
relationshipofforcesofthe twopeoplescontendingin the country."The
presentstage(i.e. in 1932) wasthat"theArabsareno longerstrongenough
to destroyour positionbut still considerthemselvesstrongenough to
establishan Arab state." The next stage will be attainedwhen "the
relationshipofthe realforceswillbe suchas to precludeanypossibility of
the establishment ofan Arab statein Palestine."This willbe followedby
anotherstageduringwhich"Arabswillbe unableto frustrate thegrowthof
theJewishcommunity." This willbe followedbyyetanotherstageduring
which"theequilibrium [sic]betweenthetwopeopleswillbe baseduponreal
forcesandan agreedsolutionto theproblem."The realtestofZionistpolicy
is whetherthe nextstagein thissequenceis attainableon the basisof its
currentstrategy. Arlosoroff concludedthat"underpresentcircumstances
Zionismcannotbe realizedwithouta transition periodduringwhichthe
Jewishminority wouldexercise organized
revolutionary rule* . . . duringwhich
the state apparatus,the administration, and the militaryestablishment
wouldbe in thehandsoftheminority." Arlosoroff is awarethatthis"might
even resembledangerously certainpoliticalstatesof mindwhichwe have
alwaysrejected,"but he will "neverbecomereconciledto the failureof
Zionismbeforean attemptis made whoseseriousness corresponds to the
seriousnessof the struggle."

oftheArabs
Transfer
ExceptfortheRevisionists,
theZionistsdidnotpubliclytalkofmoving
the Arab populationfromthe country.But thereis no doubt that the
problemwasdiscussedamongthemselves.As earlyas 1931HaroldLaski,at
thattimeconstantlyin touchwithWeizmann,wroteto FelixFrankfurter
in
the U.S. sayingthat"the economicproblem"in Palestinewas insoluble

All italicsin quoteswereaddedbythe author.

 PLANDALET 11

"unlessthe BritishGovernmentuses TransjordanforArab settlement."

(HaroldLaskibyKingsley Martin,p. 210) Butit was leftto theRoyalPeel
Commissionof 1937 to articulateZionistthoughts.For the commission's
report(p. 391) statedthat"if(as a resultofinvestigation) it is clearthata
substantialamountoflandwouldbe madeavailablefortheJewisharea,the
moststrenuous effortsshould be made to obtain an agreementfor the
exchangeoflandandpopulation."The reportcontinued,"itshouldbe part
ofthe agreement thatin the lastresorttheexchange wouldbe compulsory."

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Since accordingto thepartition recommendations ofthesamereportsome
1,250JewsweretofallinsidetheArabstateas opposedto aboutone-quarter
of a millionArabs in the Jewishstatethe commission's use of the word
"exchange"(stilla favorite wordwhentalkingaboutthefuture ofPalestine
Arabs)can onlybe said to be somewhatunusual.But theserecommenda-
tionsofthecommission werenotunilaterallysuggested bytheBritishside.
Weizmann and Ormsby-Gore(then BritishColonial Secretary)had
thrashedthem out togetherbeforethe publicationof the commission's
report.Accordingto theminutesdrawnup byWeizmannofthemeetingon
19 July1937 betweenthe two men (Jewish Chronicle,13 August1937)
Weizmannhad said on the subjectofthe transfer oftheArab population:
"I said thatthe wholesuccessof the schemedependedupon whetherthe
Government genuinely did or did not wishto carryout thisrecommenda-
tion.The transfer couldonlybe carriedoutbytheBritishGovernment and
notbytheJews.I explainedthereasonwhyweconsidered theproposal ofsuch
importance." The transfer oftheArabsofPalestinewasagainrecommended
towardsthe end of the WorldWar II on two notableoccasions.Firstin
1944 by the Labor PartyExecutivein Britain,whichresolvedthat"the
Arabsbe encouragedto move out as theJewsmove in" and secondlyby
ex-President HerbertHoover,whoin October1945advocateda solutionof
thePalestineproblemby"engineering" whichinvolvedthe transfer ofthe
ArabsofPalestineto Iraq. Thereis no doubtthatat leastthefirst ofthese
recommendations wasZionist-inspired andwasalmostcertainly theworkof
Laski, who was chairmanof the Labor partyat the time. The Hoover
scheme, if not Zionist-inspired, was blessedby the Zionists(vide the
two-column letterin itspraisein theNew YorkTimes,16 December1945
by ElishaFriedmanof the HadassahOrganization).Commenting on this
schemetheAmericanZionistEmergency Councilissueda statement to the
effect(in the wordsof the Zionistofficial periodicalPalestine vol. 2, nos.
9-10, November-December, 1945,p. 16): "thattheZionistmovement has
neveradvocatedthe transfer ofPalestine'sArabpopulationbuthas always
maintained thatPalestinehas roomenoughforitspresentpopulation,Jew
12 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

andArab,andforseveralmillionmoreofJewish The developments

settlers.
of the last 20 yearshave amplyprovedthis; nevertheless whenall long
acceptedremediesseemtofailitis timetoconsider
newapproaches.
The Hoover
plan," the EmergencyCouncil states, "representsan importantnew
approachin the realizationofwhichZionistswouldbe happyto cooperate
withthe greatpowersand theArab."

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Minimum
An Irreducible
The UN partitionrecommendation of 1947 heraldedthe cataclysm.
The decisionhad giventhe Zionists,who held less thansevenpercentof
percentof the country.Officially
Palestine,about fifty-five the Zionist
attitudewas that this was the "irreducibleminimum"that theywould
accept.Buttheopportunities nowbeckoningto themweredazzlingbeyond
words.ForalthoughtheUN recommendation had (inexplicably)envisaged
a peacablepartition,
themeansofimplementation had neverbeenseriously
considered.An umbrellaof legalismwas therefore offeredto the side that
"acquiesced"in the will of the international communityand dutifully
proceededwithits implementation. Converselythereneed be no limitto
the punitivemeasuresto be metedout to thosewho in defenseof their
primal rightsdefied"the will of the intemationalcommunity."The
situationin termsof realpolitik
was susceptibleto the fullestexploitation.
There wereotherurgentconsiderations, too, fromthe Zionistpoint of
view.The mostimportant wasthequestionoflandownership. Although90
percentof the Jewishlandholdings in Palestinefellwithinthe proposed
Jewishstate,yetthebulkofthecultivablelandin theproposedJewishstate
was not Jewish-owned nor even in the categoryof state domainwhose
ownershipcould be automatically assumedby a successorgovemment.
Thus, of 13,500,000 dunums (6,000,000 of which were desert and
7,500,000ofcultivableland) in theJewishstateaccordingto thePartition
Plan only1,500,000dunumsofcultivablelandwereJewishowned.On 30
January1948 the ZionistReviewin itsJewishNationalFund Supplement
pointedout: "We can purchase3,000,000 dunumswithoutdisplacingor
causinganyinjuryto thenon-Jewish population.As a resultwe shouldthen
have about4,500,000dunumsoutof7,500,000whichcan be utilized.That
means60 percentofthepresentcultivablearea. Can weafford as a peopleto
holdlessthan60 percentofthesoil?"
The problemof land ownership was compoundedby the Zionistplans
forlarge-scaleJewishimmigration into the proposedJewishstate. The
 PLANDALET 13

difficultyherewasthattherewerein factas manyArabsas Jewsin the

Jewish stateproposed bytheUN.
Butaboveall it wastheconsciousness ofpowerthatdictated Zionist
policy.As earlyas March1946Haganahhad toldtheAnglo-American
Committee ofInquiry: "IfyouaccepttheZionist solutionbutareunableor
unwilling toenforce it,pleasedo notinterfere,andweourselves willsecure
itsimplementation."* SincethentheBritish reluctanceforvarious domes-
ticandintemational reasons to replywithanyseverity to repeated Zionist

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

provocations greatly
increased Zionistself-confidence.American andRus-
sianbacking ofZionism at theUN in 1947further inflated
theZionistego.
Buthoweverexaggerated the Zionistconsciousness of powermayhave
been,itdidrestupona basisoffact,particularly in relationto localArab
strength. BytheendofMarch1948theZionists couldputinthefieldthree
brigades ofthePalmach(a highly mobilestrikingforceusedwherever itwas
neededmost),sixbrigades oftheKHISH (KhaylSadehor FieldForce),
whichoperated insixbrigade areasintowhichthecountry wasdivided, and
twobrigades oftheIrgunterrorist In addition
organization. therewerethe
forcesoftheKHIM (KhaylMatzavorgarrison troops),whowereatleastas
numerous as theKHISH, theJewish Settlement Policenumbering some
12,000,theGadnaYouthBattalions, andthearmedsettlers.
The armsat thedisposalof theseforces wereplentiful and muchin
excessofwhatmaybe superficially gatheredfromZionistsources.Thus
Kimche(ClashofDestinies, p. 76) quotesBen-Gurion as declaring that
Haganahpossessedinteralia in April 1947: 10,073 rifles,444 light
machine-guns and 186 medium machine-guns. Butthesefigures do not
coverthearmaments oftheJewish Settlement Policewhich,after all,were
partandparceloftheZionist military establishmentinthecountry though
notofficially partofHaganah.Indeed,thereis no reference at all to the
J.S.P. eitherbyLorchortheKimches. Secondly,eventhesefigures mustbe
a considerable underestimate ofHaganah's armory. Forexample, weknow
thatone Zionistagentworking in one country, Poland,was aloneable
beforethe beginning of WorldWar II to send 2,250 riflesand 250
machine-guns to Haganah(The SavingRemnant**by Herbert Agar,p.
204).Thestatistical dataofLorchandKimche mustalsobe viewedagainst
theinformation obtainable fromtheHebrewsources, particularly Sepher

* 'Head of Command,JewishResistanceMovement,to JointChairman [sic] Anglo-American

CommitteeofInquiry"25 May 1946,Jerusalem,
p. 11-A stenciledmemorandum
distributed
byThe
JewishAgencyDelegationduringthe committee's
session.
*"London:RupertHart-Davis,1960.
14 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

HaPalmach.We knowfromthisbook, (Vol. 2, p. 51) thatbyMarch1948

the local Zionistfactoriesin Palestinewereproducing100 sub-machine
gunsperday(to be increasedto 200 perdaybythe end ofthe first weekof
April) and 400,000 roundsof .9 mm.ammunition permonth.Moreover,
thesefactorieswerecopingwithordersofthe magnitude of 150,000Mills
grenadesand 30,000 shellsof 3-inchmortars-allof whichis not men-
tionedby eitherKimcheor Lorchor anyotherEnglishZionistaccountof
the time.Indeedthe local Zionistfactorieswereveryresourceful,and, in

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

additionto sten-guns,2-inchand 3-inchmortarsand theirammunition,
alsoproducedflame-throwers (a favorite
Zionistweapon),PIATS (antitank
guns) and a heavymortarcalled Davidkawhichwas the Zionistfavorite
weaponparexcellence.Accordingto Kimche(p. 161) theDavidka"tossed
a lumpof explosiveforsome 300 yards."The unsuspecting readermight
thinkthatherewassomeharmless and ratherquaintengine.Butthefactis
that the Davidka tosseda shell containing60 lbs. of TNT usuallyinto
crowdedbuilt-upcivilianquarterswherethe noise and blast maddened
womenand childrenintoa frenzy offearand panic.

TheRealProblem
It was thispowerwhichthe Zionistauthorities nowbentto the taskof
realizingHerzl'svision.The basicfeatures ofthe situationfromthe power
point of view were as follows:As betweenthe Jewsand the Arabs of
Palestinethe former unquestionably possessedoverwhelming power.The
Arab strengthlay, however,in the fact that theywere in situ. To be
defeatedtheArabshad to be dislodgedand dislodgedtheyhad to be ifthe
Zionistswere to get the state "given"themby the UN. For the UN
partitiondecisionofNovember1947 did notconsecratetheexistingstatus
quo in Palestine.On thecontrary, thepartitiondecisionwas a revolution-
arydecisiondesigned to effecta territorial
radical redistribution in favorof
the Zionists.To succeedthe Zionistshad to revolutionize the statusquo,
and action,initiative,and offense weretherefore the sinequa nonforthe
realizationoftheZionistobjectives.Buttherewereat leasttwopotentially
limitingfactors.The firstwas thepresenceofthe Britishin Palestine.The
secondwas the regulararmiesofthe neighboring Arab states.The British
had declaredtheirintentionofleavingPalestineby 15 May 1948. On that
day the Mandatewouldend, and juridically therewoulda vacuumsince
Britainrefused to shareresponsibilitywiththe UN duringthe Mandateas
a preliminaryto the establishment ofthe successorstates.It was therefore
possiblethatthe Arab armiesmightenterPalestineon 15 May and do so
 PLANDALET 15

withlegalimmunity becauseofthejuridicalvacuum.Butiftheregular Arab

armiesenteredPalestinewhilethe Arabsof Palestinewerestillin situthe
forcesin supportof the statusquo in the country(i.e. againstthe UN
partitiondecision)wouldbe overwhelming. The mosturgentproblemfor
the Zionistswas therefore to dislodgethe PalestineArabsbefore15 May.
But how weretheyto do thatwiththe Britishstill in the countryand
claimingexclusivejurisdiction over it? The questionin the last analysis
hingedon the Britishattitudeto partitionand the actual time-tableof

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Britishwithdrawal fromthecountry. In spiteofwhattheZionistsmaysay,
the Britishgovernment was not hostileto the idea of partitionas such,
thoughtheyprobably favoreda smallerJewishstatethanthatenvisagedby
theUN. But it was the time-table ofBritishwithdrawal thatwas the crux
ofthematterand thiswas basicallya technicalmilitary decisionin which
the requirements of the securityof the Britishforcesbeing withdrawn
predominated overall otherconsiderations. At firstthe chiefworry ofthe
Zionistswas that the Britishwould maintaineffective controlover the
wholecountry and surrender it in one go on 15 May,thusfacilitating the
consolidationof the Arab statusquo in Palestineby the regularArab
armies.But it soon becameobviousthatthe British,whilemaintaining de
jure authorityover the whole country,weresurrendering de factopower
oversuccessiveareasofit. This wasprecisely whattheZionistswanted,for
the de jure authority claimedby Britainover Palestineacted as a shield
protectingtheZionistsfromtheregular Arabarmies.This gavetheZionists
to
time dislodge theArabs ofPalestine and to createby15 Maya newstatus
quo in the country whichwouldbe beyondthemeansofthe regularArab
armiesto reverse.

The Plans
Zionistmilitaryplanningwas accordingly based upon a two-phased
strategy to thesituation.In "Plan Gimmel"or Plan C theobjectives
fitted
were,throughso-called"countermeasures" to maintainconstantpressure
everywhere againsttheArabsofPalestinewhilemaintaining contactwith
theJewish settlementsin theareaoftheproposedArabstate.YigalAllon,
thecommander ofthePalmach,gavetwomainreasonsforthemaintenance
ofthesesettlements:"(a) theabsolutenecessityto divertan enemyadvance
uponlargeciviliancenters;and (b) whentheforcesunderattack[i.e. the
Jewishforces]intendto mountan offensive soon,in orderto unitewiththe
thathadbeencutoff."The secondphaseof Zioniststrategy
settlements was
the all-outoffensiveto conquerand hold territory in the wake of the
16 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

retreatingBritishforces.Logicallyand operationally,
thiswas a continuous
processwhich was unlikelyto stop voluntarily but only if effectively
counter-checked. This was the essenceof Plan D. In the wordsofQravot
1948 (p. 16), thepurposeofPlan D was "controloftheareagivento us by
theUN inaddition toareasoccupied byus which
wereoutsidetheseborders and
thesettingup offorcesto counterthepossibleinvasionofArabarmiesafter
May 15." This is explicitenough.
The transition fromPlan C to D dependedto someextenton thespeed

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

and extentofBritishwithdrawal. Buttherewereotherconsiderations too,
foremost amongwhichwas the economicfactor.The Zionisteconomyin
Palestinewas delicatelybalanced and closelyinterrelated. This directly
influencedtherateofmobilization andthereforethehittingpoweravailable
at any one timeto the ZionistHigh Command.But it was two largely
unpredictable factorswhichin factdictatedthe timingof the implemen-
tationof Plan D. The firstwas the extraordinaryresistanceputup by the
Arabsof Palestine.In spiteof the explosionof minesin Arab residential
quarters,and the repeatedand mercilessraidsagainstsleepingvillages
carriedout in conformity with Plan C, the Arabs held theirground
throughout theperiodfromDecember1947to March1948. Up to 1 March
not one singleArab village*had been vacatedby its inhabitants and the
numberofpeople leavingthe mixedtownswas insignificant. It lookedin
fact as thoughthe Arabs were to remainin situ and so frustrate the
revolutionin the statusquo envisagedbytheUN decision.Not onlythat
but by the end of Marchthe Zionistshad desperately triedand failedto
maintaincontactbetweenthe variouspartsof the country.

TheCrisisinMarch
No wonderthattheUN PalestineCommissiongaveup, declaringthat
partitioncouldnotbe peacablyimplemented. No wonder,too, thatQravot
(p. 15) describedthisperiod,particularly
thelastweekofMarch1948, "as
perhapsthe mostseriousoperationalcrisis"confronted by the Zionists
duringtheentirewarof 1948. ButevenmoreseriousfromtheZionistpoint
of view was the reversalthathad occurredin the Americanattitudeto
partition.BythemiddleofMarchtheU.S. government had to all intents
andpurposestumeditsbackon partition whatever mayhavebeenPresident
Truman'spersonalfeelings on thesubject.Dr. SilveroftheJewishAgency

*Theauthorconsiders in errorhere.At leasttenvillagesoutofthefourhundredthatfellin the

himself
period1948-49 werecapturedbythe Zionistforcesby 1 March 1948.
 PLANDALET 17

describedthe new Americanpolicyas "a shockingreversal"(New York

Times,20 March,p. 3), theAmericanJewish Congressas "shameful tactics
and duplicity"and the Zionist CongressmanCeller as "shoddyand
underhandturnabout"(New YorkTimes,21 March, p. 6). The most
significant commentperhapscamefromDr. E. Neumann,president ofthe
ZionistOrganization ofAmerica,who said that"ifthe GeneralAssembly
recommendation is nullifiedthereis no doubtaboutit, theJewswillpress
the claimforimmigration and settlement in all ofPalestine."

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

It is againstthisbackground thatPlan D was finally implemented. The
plan visualizeda seriesofoperationswhich,iftheyhad succeeded,would
have leftthewholeofPalestinein 1948 underZionistmilitary occupation.
It is not theobjectofthisarticleto describetheseoperationsin detailbut
simplyto listthemand pointout theirobjectives:
*1. Operation Nachshon:1 April-
To carveout a corridorconnectingTel Aviv to Jerusalem and by so
doingto splitthe mainpartof theArab stateintotwo. (Defeated)
*2. Operation Harel: 15 April-
A continuation ofNachshonbutcenteredspecifically on Arab villages
nearLatrun.(Defeated)
3. Operation Misparayim: 21 April-
To captureHaifaand routitsArabpopulation.(Successful)
*4. Operation Chametz:27 April-
To destroy theArabvillagesroundJaffa and so cutJaffa offfromphysical
contactwiththerestofPalestineas a preliminary to itscapture.(Successful)
*5. Operation Jevussi:27 April-
To isolateJerusalem bydestroying theringofsurrounding Arabvillages
and dominatingthe Ramallah-Jerusalem road to the north,the Jericho-
Jerusalem roadto theeastand theBethlehem-Jerusalem roadto thesouth.
This operationby itselfwouldhave causedthe wholeofJerusalem to fall
and would have made the Arab positionwest of the Jordanaltogether
untenable.(Defeated)
6. Operation Yiftach:28 April-
To purify eastemGalilee ofArabs. (Successful)
7. Operation Matateh:3 May-
To destroyArab villages connectingTiberias to eastem Galilee.
(Successful)
*8. Operation Maccabi:7 May-
To destroythe Arab villages near Latrun and by an outflanking
movementto penetrateinto Ramallahdistrictnorthof Jerusalem.(De-
feated)
18 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

9. Operation Gideon:11 May-

To occupyBeisanand driveawaythe semi-sedentary Bedouincommu-
nitiesin the neighbourhood. (Successful)
10. Operation Barak:12 May-
To destroytheArabvillagesin theneighbourhood ofBureiron theway
to theNegev. (Partiallysuccessful)
* 11. OperationBenAmi: 14 May-
To occupyAcre and purify westernGalilee ofArabs. (Successful)

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

* 12. OperationPitchfork:14 May-
To occupytheArabresidential quartersin theNew CityofJerusalem.
(Successful)
*13. Operation Schfifon:14 May-
To occupythe old cityofJerusalem. (Defeated)
The singleasterisks
aboveindicatetheoperations whichwerecarriedout
beforetheentry oftheArabregular armiesinsidetheareasallotted
bytheUN to
theArabstate.It willbe notedthatof thirteen specificfull-scale
operations
underPlanD eightwereoutside theareagivenbytheUN to theZionists.It is
to notethattheKimchesin theirbookmentionbynameonlyfive
interesting
ofthesethirteenoperations,inspiteofthelearnedintroduction tothebookby
Kimcheentitled"On Writing Contemporary History."

ThePalmach
Tactics
The bestdescriptionofoneofthemeansadoptedbytheZionists toachieve
theirobjectivesin theseoperations is givenbyYigalAllon, thehead of the
Palmachand thegreatheroofthewarof"liberation." The quotationis from
SeferHaPalmach, vol. 2, p. 286. The translation
is literal:
Therewereleftbeforeus onlyfivedays,beforethethreatening date, the 15th
of May. We saw a need to clean out the innerGalilee and to createa Jewish
territorial in theentireareaoftheupperGalilee. The longbattleshad
continuity
weakenedourforces,and beforeus stoodgreatdutiesofblockingtheroutesof
the Arab invasion(literallyplishaor expansion).We therefore looked for
meanswhichdid not forceus intoemploying force,in orderto cause the tens
ofthousandsofsulkyArabswho remainedin Galilee to flee,forin case ofan
Arab invasionthesewerelikelyto strikeus fromthe rear.We triedto use a
tacticwhichtookadvantageof the impression createdby the fallof Safad**
and the (Arab) defeatin the area which was cleaned out by Operation
Matateh***-a tacticwhichworkedmiraculously well.

**Safadfellon 11-12 May 1948.

***OperationMatatehis no. 7 on the listabove.
 PLAN DALET 19

I gatheredall oftheJewish Mukhtars, whohavecontactwithArabsin different

villages,and askedthemto whisperin the earsof some Arabs,thata great
Jewishreinforcement has arrivedin Galilee and thatit is goingto bum all of
the villagesof the Huleh. Theyshouldsuggestto theseArabs,as their friends,
to escapewhilethereis stilltime.And therumorspreadin all theareasofthe
Huleh thatit is timeto flee.The flight
numbered myriads. The tacticreached
itsgoal completely. The buildingof the police stationat Halsa fellintoour
handswithouta shot.The wideareaswerecleaned,thedangerwas takenaway
fromthetransportation routesand we couldorganizeourselvesfortheinvaders

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

alongtheborders,withoutworrying aboutourrear.

As wassaidabove,Plan D had potentially considerablepossibilities

the
limitsto whichcouldbe setonlybyan adequatecounter-force. A studyon
themapofthetheatres oftheoperationslistedabovewillindicatethatthe
Zionistswerewell on the wayto the completemilitary dominanceof the
wholeofPalestine.That theydidnotentirely succeedin theirplanswasdue
not to politicalscruplesor technicallimitations
but to the long-delayed
intervention of the regularArab armies.This pointis concededby Yigal
Allon who againwas in a supremepositionto know.
This stage of the war, which was made possibleby the gradualBritish
evacuationand endedwiththe invasionoftheArabarmiesintothecountry,
gave Haganahvaluablevictories.Thanksto thelocal offensive war[i.e. plans
C & DI, thecontinuity oftheJewishterritorieswasaccomplished and also the
penetrating ofourforcesintoArabareas.The Arabflight, whichreachedgreat
numbers,madeit easieron ourforcesto supervise vastareasand was a burden
to the enemy,who had to put all of his efforts into the absorptionand
organization It is easyto imaginethe spiritof defeatthatthe
of the refugees.
refugees tookwiththemto theArabareas.Ifitwasn'tfortheArabinvasion there
wouldhavebeenno stoptotheexpansion oftheforces
ofHaganahwhocouldhave,
withthesamedrive,reachedthenaturalbordersofwesternIsrael,becausein
thisstagemostof the local enemyforceswereparalyzed.(SeferHaPalmach,
vol. 2, p. 186)
20 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

APPENDIXA

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Text of Plan Gimmel(Plan C),
May 1946: Section on
Countermeasures
The textthatfollowsis translated
fromSeferToldot Hahaganah[History of
theHaganah],vol.3, ed. byYehudaSlutsky
(Tel Aviv:Zionist
Library,
1972),
Appendix 39, pp. 1939-43.

A. The aimofa counterattack is to strike

at eachsourceat thebeginning
ofan Araboutbreak in orderto detertheinstigators ofthe incidentsand to
preventtheparticipation and support oftheArabmasses.Forceful and severe
blowswillserveto identify and isolatetheactiveelements.
B. Becauseofthe difficulty in directlyengagingthe activeArabforces
while theyare carrying out theiractivities,the countermeasures we will
adoptwillmostlytaketheformofretaliatory operations.Likeall retaliatory
operations, theywillnot alwaysbe directedonlyagainsttheexecutorsofa
particularaction,butwillalso be aimedat otheractivegroupsorthosewho
providethemwithassistance.
C. Counterattacks mustbe appropriate in kindto theoperations which
led to theretaliation.
These attacksmustbe as immediate as possible,and
mustaffect largeareas.The reasonsfortheretaliationmustbe detailedto
the Arabs in full,usingall availablemeansof communication: leaflets,
announcements, radiobroadcasts, etc.
D. It is preferablethattheseoperationsshouldstrikethe Arab rearin
orderto undermine the Arab senseofsecurity.
E. Counterattacks mustbe dividedintotwokinds:warningoperations
and strikeoperations.
 PLAN DALET 21

Warningoperationswill come in responseto limitedor singleArab

operations,and theiraim will be to warn the Arabs of what may be
expectedin the future.These operationswill mostlybe executedin the
sameareain whichtheArabswereactivebuttheymustbe accompaniedby
the widestpossiblemediacoverage.
The aimofstrike operations willbe topunishserious operations carriedout
againstus. Thesestrike operations willbe moreextensive in natureandat the
regionalor country-wide level, theirgoal being severepunishment. For

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

if
example, they strikeone of the Jewish means of transportationbydestroying
vehiclesalongwiththeirpassengers, the responseshouldbe comprehensive
and aimat thedestruction ofall Arabmeansoftransportation.
F. Strikesmustbe carriedout againstthefollowing targets:
1. Strikingat the politicalleadership.
2. Strikingat agitators,theirfinancialbackers,and others.
3. Strikingat the executorsof operationsand those who provide
themwithshelter.
4. Strikingat high-ranking Arab officers and officials.
5. Strikingat Arab transportation.
6. Strikingat vitaleconomictargets(waterinstallations, flourmills,
etc.).
7. Attackson villages,neighborhoods, and farmsused as bases for
theArabarmedforcesorfortheirorganization, launching,and retreat, etc.
8. Strikingat clubs,caf6s,meetings, assemblies,and the like.
G. The aim ofstriking at the politicalleadershipis the following:
1. Doing damageto theirproperty.
2. Imprisoning membersin orderto hold themhostageor prevent
themfromperforming theiractivities.
3. Expellingthemor physically harmingthemin someotherway.
Theseoperations willbe carriedoutby(Arabist)individuals, orbyunits
the size of a squad or sub-squadwhichare equippedwithlightarmsand
whoseline ofretreatis as secureas possible.
H. The aimofstriking at agitatorsand financialbackersis thefollowing:
1. Doing damageto theirproperty.
2. Doing damageto theirprinting presses.
3. Harmingthemphysically.
4. Expellingor imprisoning themin certaincases.
These objectiveswillbe realizedalongthe line specifiedin sectionG.
I. The aim of striking at the executorsof operationsand thosewho
shelterthemis thefollowing:
1. Expellingthem.
 OF PALESTINESTUDIES
22 JOURNAL

2. Doing damageto theirproperty.

3. Imprisoning themin certaincasesin orderto collectinformation
orholdthemhostage.Such operations willbe executedbyunitsthesizeof
a squad or sub-squadifthe siteof the operationis smalland close to our
bases,and willbe executedbyunitsthesizeofa platoonor largerifthesite
is farfromourbases.
J. High-ranking Arabofficers andofficialswillbe targeted in
as specified
sectionG, above.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

K. The aim of striking at Arab transportation is thefollowing:
1. Carrying outpunitivemeasures againsta particularservicerouteor
an individualvehiclethrough sabotage.
2. Strikingat servicesbydamagingvehiclesand targeting suspected
travelers.
3. Destroying theArabtransportation network eitherwhollyor inpart.
The operationsmentionedin 1 above willbe carriedout bydamaging
the servicestationsalong thatroute,or by sabotagingits vehicles,or by
stoppingone or morevehicleson theroad,evacuatingthepassengers, and
destroying them.The operationsmentionedin 2 abovewillbe carriedout
bysettingup ambusheson the road,evacuatingpassengers, and physically
harmingthe passengerssuspectedof active assistanceagainstus, and
destroying thevehicles.The operationwillbe executedbyaboutone ortwo
squads.The operations mentionedin 3 abovewillbe executedbycarrying
out attackson the servicestationsand destroying the vehicles.The force
neededforsuch missionsis one or two platoons.
L. The aim of operationsdirectedagainstclubs,caf6s,meetingsand
assemblies,etc. is thefollowing:
1. Dispersalof inflammatory gatherings.
2. Encircling theplacesmentioned abovewhentheycontainknown
leadersand agitators in orderto imprison themor expelthem.
3. In some cases, it is necessaryto demolishone of the above-
mentionedplacesafterevacuatingpeoplefromit.
The forceneededto carryoutsuchoperations willbe determined bythe
particularcircumstances and willrange from a sub-squad platoon more.
to a or
M. Striking at Arabeconomictargets is difficult
becauseofthescarcity
ofvitalprojectswhich,ifhit,wouldparalyzeor severely damagetheArab
economy.There are fewindustrial projectsand mostare of a non-vital
natureforthe manufacture of tobacco,soap, etc. Strikingat such estab-
lishments is not alwaysin ourinterest becauseit mayresultin swellingthe
ranksof the Arab forceby scoresof unemployed workers.This does not
mean that these targetsshould be removedfromconsideration,but
 PLANDALET 23

establishments mustbe soughtwhich, if hit, would lead to the most

effectiveconsequencespossible,such as waterreservoirs in urbanareas,
flourmills,the [olive]oil industry,and the like.The importance ofstrikes
againstsuchtargetslies in theirimplementation on a widescale, whether
locallyor regionally.
Striking at suchtargets does not requirea largeforce;
in mostcasesa forcethesizeofa squadorsub-squadis enoughto mountan
operationagainsta singlespecifictarget.
N. The aim of launchingattacksagainstvillages,neighborhoods,

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

farms,and hamletsis the following:
1. Kidnappingor expellingleadersand members ofgangsand those
who assistthem.
2. Punishingvillagesthatprovidegangswithshelter,by destroying
theirproperty.
3. Attackingvillageswherean armedArabforceis located.
Fortheexecution ofoperations mentioned in 1 above,seeSectionI above.
Forthe executionofoperationsmentionedin 2 above, the villagewill
be surrounded bya forcewhosesizewillvarywiththecircumference ofthe
villageand theresistance expectedfromit (the sizeoftheforcewillrange
froma platoonto a company).A partofthisforce-at leasthalf-will enter
thevillageand carryout actsofsabotagebysettingfireto and blowingup
targets.If the objectiveis generalpunitiveaction, everything possible
shouldbe set on fireand the housesof the instigators and participantsin
operationsmustbe demolished.
As forthe operationsin 3 above, theywill implemented accordingto
theprinciples relatingto attackson an entrenched hostileforce.
0. Mostoperations shouldbe carried outundercoverofdarkness because
ofthedifficultyofmovement [inthedaytime]. In addition,dueconsideration
shouldbe givento retuming menand equipment to theirbases.
P. In orderto implement the countermeasures detailedin thischapter
in an effectivemanner,activeand extensiveintelligenceand reconnais-
sance networks mustbe set up and theArabistunitsmustbe developed.
Q. Propaganda willhavea largeeffecton theextenttowhichincidents are
publicizedand on the deterrent value thiswill have on the Arab masses.
Therefore,an extensivepropagandanetworkmustbe organizedby the
followingmeans:
1. Radio.
2. Leaflets.
3. Whispering campaignsdiffused byArabsor Arabists.
Each ofourcountermeasures shouldbe widelypublicizedand reverber-
ate in everyArab village.
24 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

APPENDIXB

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Text of Plan Dalet (Plan D), 10
March 1948: General Section
The textthatfollowsis translated
fromSeferToldot Hahaganah[History of
theHaganah],vol.3, ed. byYehudaSlutsky
(Tel Aviv:Zionist
Library,
1972),
Appendix48, pp. 1955-60.

1. Introduction
(a) The objectiveof thisplan is to gain controlof the areas of the
Hebrewstateand defenditsborders.It also aimsat gainingcontrolofthe
areasofJewish settlement and concentration
whicharelocatedoutsidethe
borders[oftheHebrewstate]againstregular, semi-regular,and smallforces
operatingfrombasesoutsideor insidethestate.
(b) This plan.isbasedon threepreviousplans:
1. Plan B, September1945.
2. The May 1946 Plan*
3. YehoshuaPlan, 1948.* *
(c) Since theseplansweredesignedtodealwiththesituationinsidethe
country(the firsttwoplansdeal withthefirstphaseofincidents,whilethe
thirdplan dealswiththepossibilityofinvasionbyregulararmiesfromthe
neighboring countries),theaimofPlan D is to fillthegapsin theprevious

*Thisis plan Gimmelor Plan C

* This is an earlyversionofPlanD, so-calledafterYehoshuaGloberman,a Haganahcommander
killed
in earlyDecember1947. Plan D itselfwas finalized on 10 March 1948.
 PLANDALET 25

threeplansandto makethemmoresuitable forthesituation to

expected
rulein thecountry.
obtainat theendofBritish

2. BasicAssumptions
Thisplanis basedon thefollowing
basicassumptions:

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

(a) TheEnemy
1. Expected composition offorces:
-The semi-regular forcesof theLiberation Armyaffiliated withthe
ArabLeague,whichoperate from already occupiedbasesor basesto be
occupiedin thefuture.
-The regular forcesofneighboring countries,whichwilllaunchan
invasionacrosstheborders, orwilloperatefrom basesinsidethe~ country
(theArabLegion*).
Smalllocalforces whichoperate, orwilloperate, from basesinside
thecountry andwithin theborders oftheHebrewstate.
All threeforceswillbe activated at thesametimein accordance witha
plan,andwillsometimes
jointoperational engageintactical coordination.
2. Actualoperations expected from theenemy:
-Isolationand,ifpossible, occupation oftheeastern Galilee,western
Galilee,andtheNegev.
-InfiltrationintotheheartoftheareaofSharonandEmekHefer* * in
thedirectionofQalqiliyyah-Herzliya andTulkarm-Netanya, roughly.
-Isolationofthethreemajorcities(especially rel Aviv).t
-Disruption of food supply linesand othervitalservicessuchas water,
etc.
electricity,
3. Expected tacticalmethods:
-Attacksbytheregular andsemi-regular forces on settlements,using
heavyinfantryweapons, as wellas fieldartillery,
armored vehicles,andthe
airforce.
-Air strikesagainst centers within ourcities(especiallyTel Aviv).
-Harassment operationscarried outbysmallforces againsttransporta-
andsettlements
tionarteries togivetheoperations mentioned abovedirect

*Thiswas a British-commanded and financedarmyof King 'Abdallah'sTransjordan,unitsof which

servedin PalestineunderBritisharmyordersuntilthe end of the mandateon 15 May 1948.
**Sharonis the coastalplainbetweenHaifaand Tel Aviv, EmekHeferbeingitscentralsection(in
ArabicWadi al-Hawarith).
tThe twoothersareJerusalem and Haifa.
26 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

or tacticalsupport.These forceswill also carryout sabotageoperations

and terrorist
againstvitaleconomicfacilities raidswithincities.

(b) The Authorities

This plan restson the generalassumption thatduringits implementa-
tion, the forcesof the [British]authoritieswill not be presentin the
country.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

In the eventthatBritishforcescontinueto controlcertainbases and
areas,theplan mustbe modified to deal withthissituationin theseareas.
Additionalinstructionswillbe issuedin thisregard.

(c) International
Forces
This plan restson the assumption
thattherewill be no international
forcesstationedin the country are
which capableof effective action.

(d) Operational
Objectives
1. Self-defense againstinvasionbyregularor semi-regular forces.This
willbe achievedby the following:
-A fixeddefensive systemto preserveoursettlements,vitaleconomic
projects,and property, which will enable us to providegovernmental
serviceswithinthe bordersofthestate(basedon defending the regionsof
the stateon the one hand, and on blockingthe mainaccess routesfrom
enemyterritory to the territory
of thestate,on the other).
-Launching pre-planned counter-attacks
on enemybases and supply
linesin theheartofhisterritory, whether withintheborders ofthecountry
in
[Palestine]or neighboring countries.
2. Ensuringfreedomof militaryand economic activitywithinthe
bordersofthe [Hebrew]stateand in Jewishsettlements outsideitsborders
byoccupying and controlling important high-groundpositionson a number
of transportation arteries.
3. Preventingthe enemyfromusingfrontlinepositionswithinhis
territory which can easilybe used forlaunchingattacks.This will be
effected byoccupyingand controlling them.
4. Applyingeconomicpressure on theenemybybesiegingsomeofhis
citiesin orderto forcehimto abandonsomeofhisactivitiesin certainareas
ofthe country.
 PLAN DALET 27

the capabilityof the enemyby carryingout limited

5. Restricting
occupationand controlofcertainofhisbasesin ruraland urban
operations:
areaswithinthe bordersofthe state.
6. Controllinggovernment servicesand property
withinthebordersof
thestateand ensuringthesupplyofessentialpublicservicesin an effective
manner.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

3. Assignment
ofDuties
In viewoftheoperationalobjectivesoutlinedabove,thevariousarmed
servicesare assignedthefollowing duties:
(1) Strengthening the fixeddefensivesystemdesignedto defendthe
zones,and coordinating itsdeploymenton theregionallevel. In addition,
the main enemyaccess routesto the landsof the statemustbe blocked
throughappropriate operationsand measures.
(2) Consolidationof the defensive apparatus.
(3) Deploymentin majorcities.
(4) Controlofthe maintransportation arteriescountry-wide.
(5) Encirclement ofenemycities.
(6) Occupationand controloffrontline enemypositions.
(7) Counterattacks insideand outsidethe bordersof the country.

(a) The FixedDefensive

System

1. The fixeddefensivesystemin ruralareas dependson two main

factors:usingprotectedareasforthe purposeof defending the circumfer-
ence,on theone hand, and main
blocking transportationroutes usedbythe
enemy,on the otherhand.
2. The securityarrangements pertainingto the zones in ruralareas,
which were originallydesignedto repel small enemyforces,must be
modifiedin termsof planningand reinforcement to suit the tactical
measuresexpectedto be employedbysemi-regular or regularenemyforces.
This will be effectedaccordingto instructionsissuedby the operations
branchin chargeofdefenseand planningin ruralareas.
3. In addition,if we take into considerationthe tacticalmeasures
expectedto be employedby the enemy,efforts mustbe made to make a
transitionfroma positionaldefenseto a regionaldefense,so thatthe unit
ofdefenseis the regionand not thezone.
4. In orderto achievethisobjective,thefollowing stepsmustbe taken:
 OF PALESTINESTUDIES
28 JOURNAL

a) Transformation ofthe regionalstaff froman administrative staff

to a generalstaff(selectionof a location,settingup a communications
network, etc.)
b) Formation ofa regionalmobilereserve,to be recruited fromthe
forcesappointedto thezones,whichwouldreinforce theforcesorcarryout
counterstrikes in the zoneswithineach regionaccordingto pre-arranged
plans.
c) Adaptationand incorporation of the plansconcerning fortifica-

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

tionand opening in
fire the zones to those of the region,as faras possible,
takingintoconsideration geographical circumstances and typesofweapons
used. These plans mustalso be coordinatedwith the operationsof the
regionalmobilereserves.
5. Settlements whichbecauseoftheirgeographical locationcannotbe
in
included a fixedregionaldefenseplan mustbe organizedinto local
defensezones.Accordingly, theymustbe equippedto blocktransport roads
used by the enemy,or if tacticalcircumstances permit,to controlthe
heights,settingup fortifications and barricades and layingmines,etc. This
will be done in additionto activatingthe zone's defensiveapparatus.
Additionalforcesmustbe assignedto carryout theseduties,as will be
detailedbelow.These specifications also applyto isolatedregions.
6. Blockingthemainenemytransportation routes.
a) The main enemytransportation routeswhichlinkhis lands to
the lands of the state, such as roads, bridges,main passes, important
crossroads,paths,etc. mustbe blockedby means of: acts of sabotage,
explosions,seriesof barricades, minefields,as well as by controlling the
elevationsnearroadsand takingup positionsthere.
b) A systemof barricadesmustbe set up in additionto the fixed
defensive system. The tacticalplansconcerning barricades mustbe adapted
to and coordinated withthe defensive plansconcerning the zoneslocated
near thesebarricades.They mustalso be coordinatedwiththe regional
defenseplansifthisis possiblefromthegeographical pointof view.

(b) Consolidation and Barricades

ofDefenseSystems
The followingoperationsmustbe carriedout if the fixeddefensive
and iftherearof thissystemis to be protected:
systemis to be effective
1. Occupationofpolicestations. *

These "police stations"werein factfortresses, of whichwerebuiltby the Britishthroughout

fifty
Palestineafterthe Arab rebellionof 1936-39 in orderto controltheArab population.
 PLANDALET 29

2. Controlofgovernment installationsandprovision ofservicesin each

and everyregion.
3. Protection ofsecondarytransportation arteries.
4. Mountingoperationsagainst enemypopulationcenterslocated
insideornearourdefensive system in ordertopreventthemfrombeingused
as basesbyan activearmedforce.These operations can be dividedintothe
following categories:
-Destruction of villages(settingfireto, blowingup, and planting

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

minesin thedebris),especiallythosepopulationcenterswhicharedifficult
to controlcontinuously.
-Mounting combingand controloperations accordingto thefollowing
guidelines: encirclementofthevillageand conducting a searchinsideit. In
the event of resistance,the armedforcemustbe wiped out and the
populationmustbe expelledoutsidethe bordersof the state.
The villageswhichareemptiedin themannerdescribedabove mustbe
includedin thefixeddefensivesystemand mustbe fortified as necessary.
In the absenceof resistance,garrisontroopswill enterthe villageand
take up positionsin it or in locationswhich enable completetactical
control.The officer in commandof the unitwill confiscateall weapons,
wirelessdevices,and motorvehiclesin the village.In addition,he will
detain all politicallysuspect individuals.Afterconsultationwith the
Uewish]politicalauthorities,bodieswillbe appointedconsisting ofpeople
fromthe villageto administer the internalaffairs of the village.In every
region,a Uewish]personwillbe appointedto be responsible forarranging
thepoliticaland administrative affairs
ofall [Arab]villagesand population
centerswhichare occupiedwithinthatregion.

inMajorCities
(c) Deployment

Positionswill be takenin the largecitiesaccordingto the following

principles:
1. Occupationand controlofgovernment facilities
and property
(post
telephoneexchanges,railroadstations,police stations,harbors,
offices,
etc.)
2. Protectionofall vitalpublicservicesand installations.
3. Occupationand controlofall isolatedArab neighborhoods located
betweenour municipalcenterand the Arab municipalcenter,especially
thoseneighborhoods whichcontrolthe city'sexit and entryroads.These
neighborhoods will be controlledaccordingto the guidelinesset for
30 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES

combing villages.In caseofresistance,thepopulation willbe expelledto

theareaoftheArabmunicipal center.
4. Encirclement ofthecentralArabmunicipal areaand itsisolation
from externaltransportation
routes,as wellas thetermination ofitsvital
services fuel,etc.),as faras possible.
(water,electricity,

(d) ControlofMainTransportationArteriesontheRegionalLevel

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

1. Occupationandcontrol oflocations whichoverlook mainregional
transportation such
arteries, as policestations,waterpumps, etc.
Theseelevatedlocations willbe transformedintofortified
surveillance
poststobeused,whentheneedarises, as basesfora mobiledefensiveforce.
(In manycases,thisoperationwillbe coordinated withtheoccupation of
whichaimsat consolidating
policestations, thefixeddefensivesystem.)
2. Occupation andcontrol ofArabvillages whichconstitute a serious
obstructionon anyofthemaintransportation arteries.
Operations against
willbe carried
thesevillages outaccording tothespecifications
givenunder
theitempertaining to thecombing ofvillages.

(e) Enemy CitiesWillBe Besieged totheFollowing

according Guidelines:
1. By isolatingthemfromtransportation arteries
by layingmines,
blowing up bridges,anda system offixedambushes.
2. Ifnecessary,byoccupying highpoints whichoverlook transportation
arteriesleadingto enemy ofourunitsin these
cities,andthefortification
positions.
3. Bydisrupting vitalservices,suchas electricity,
water,andfuel,orby
usingeconomic resources availableto us*orbysabotage.
4. Bylaunching a navaloperation againstthecitiesthatcan receive
supplies bysea, in orderto destroy thevesselscarryingtheprovisions,
as
wellas bycarrying outactsofsabotage againstharborfacilities.

(f) Occupation
andControl
ofFrontline Positions
Enemy
theaimofthisplanisnotanoperation
Generally, ofoccupation
outside
thebordersoftheHebrewstate.However, enemybaseslying
concerning
close to the borderswhichmaybe used as springboards
directly for
infiltration
into the territory
of the state,thesemustbe temporarily

The meaningin the originalis unclear.

 PLAN DALET 31

occupiedand combedaccording to theaboveguidelines,

and theymust
thenbe incorporatedintoourdefensive systemuntiloperations
cease.
Baseslocatedin enemy territorywhichareintendedto be temporarily
occupiedandcontrolledwillbe listedamongtheoperationaltargets
forthe
various *
brigades.

(g) Counterattacks InsideandOutside theBorders oftheState

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

Counterattacks willbeusedas auxilliary measures forthefixeddefensive
system inorder toaborttheorganized attacks launched bysemi-regularand
regularenemy forces,whether from basesinsidethecountry orfrom outside
theborders.
Counterattacks willbe launched according to thefollowingguidelines:
1. Diversionary attacks;i.e., whiletheenemyis launching an attack
against oneofourareas,[ourforces willlaunch]a counterattackdeepinside
another areacontrolled bytheenemy withtheaimofdiverting in
hisforces
thedirection ofthecounterattack.
2. Striking at transportation and supplyroutesdeep insideenemy
territory,especiallyagainsta regular enemyforcewhichis invading from
acrosstheborder.
3. Attacking enemybasesin hisrear,bothinsidethecountry [Pales-
tine]andacrossitsborders.
4. Counterattacks willgenerally proceed as follows:
a forcethesizeofa
battalion, on average,willcarryouta deepinfiltration and willlaunch
concentrated attacks againstpopulation centers andenemy baseswiththe
aim of destroying themalongwiththe enemyforcepositioned there;
alternatively,thisforce maysplituptocarry outsecondary such
operations,
as actsofsabotageand diversion on theenemy's militarytransportation
routes andarteries.
5. A detailedlistof counterattacks willbe includedin the [listofl
operational targets** oftheStrategic MobileForce[PALMACH]. t

4. DutiesoftheArmed
Services
ofdutiesin thefixeddefensive
(a) Allocation system:

See AppendixC, below.

**Thislistis not in the Hebreworiginalof thisdocument.
tPALMACH is shortforPlugotMachats,i.e., crushing battalions.Byspring1948, thisforcewas made
up of threebrigades(Yiftach,Harel, and HaNegev) numbering just above 8,000 men. See Walid
Khalidi,FromHaventoConquest(Washington:Institute forPalestineStudies,1987), 861.
32 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

1. The following dutiesare the responsibilityof the GarrisonForce

[KHIM]*: defenseof the zones and of isolatedand fortified posts and
formation of the regionalreserves.
2. Withinthe framework of the fixeddefensivesystem,the Field
Force[KHISH]* * are responsible forthefollowing duties:
-Operations to blockenemytransportation routes.Forthispurpose,
everyblockingoperationwillbe assigned,on thebasisofitsimportance and
type,a specified FieldForceunitwhosesize is appropriate to thenatureof

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

the mission.
-In addition,theFieldForcebrigadein questionwillbe responsible
fordutiesrelatedto consolidating thefixeddefensive system,as outlinedin
section3 (b).
3. In specialand exceptionalcircumstances, FieldForceunitsmaybe
positionedin theregionsor zones,or in isolatedand fortified positions,in
orderto reinforcezonal or regionaldefense.Efforts mustbe made to
decreasethenumberofsuchcases,as faras possible.
4. In addition to the duties detailed above, the Field Force's
in thecontextofthefixeddefensive
responsibilities systemgenerally consist
in mountinglocal counterattacks involvingunits no smallerthan a
company(largerunitsshouldbe usedifpossible)againstenemyunitswhile
theyareattacking thefixeddefensive in orderto blocktheirlinesof
system
retreatand destroythem.These counterattacks will usuallybe launched
fromfixedoperationalbaseswhichwillbe specified forthe FieldForcein
thecontextofthedutiesforwhichitis responsible in theregionas a whole.
These instructions requirethattheFieldForceunitsbe concentrated as
muchas possible,and not be dividedup intosecondary units.
5. The chain of commandin the cases mentionedabove willbe in
accordancewithAddendum1 to theOrderconcerning RegionalInfrastruc-
ture,November1947.
6. In circumstances in whichthe blockingsystem(whichthe Field
Forceis responsible fordefending) is incorporatedintothezonalorregional
defensivesystem,the commanderof the Field Forcebattalionconcerned
will appointthe commander in chargeof theentiredefensivesystem.
(b) 1. In additionto thedutiesassignedto theFieldForcebrigadein

KHIM is shortforKhaylMatzav,thesecondline troops.Byfall1947, theynumberedabout32,000.

See Khalidi,FromHaventoConquest,862.
* *KHISH is shortforKhaylSadeh, thefront
linetroops.By 1 May 1948,theynumbered
about30,000.
See Khalidi,FromHaventoConquest,861.
 PLANDALET 33

questionconcerning theconsolidation ofthefixeddefensive system, the

brigadewillalsocarry outthefollowing duties:
-Consolidationofpositions in thecities.
-Control ofmaintransportation arteriescountry-wide.
-Encirclement ofenemy cities.
-Occupationandcontrolofenemyfrontline positions.Thiswillbe
effectedin accordancewiththeoperational dutiesassigned to thevarious
FieldForcebrigades.*

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/18/1/4/161297/2537591.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020

In orderto carryoutoneorall oftheseduties,thesupreme command
can assignunitsof the StrategicMobileForce[PALMACH],which
constitutethecountry-wide reserves, to theFieldForce.
2. During theimplementation ofjointmissions withtheFieldForce,
unitsof the Strategic MobileForce[PALMACH]will fallunderthe
command oftheFieldForcebrigade thatcontrols theareain whichthese
unitsareoperating.
3. After completionofthemission, theunitsoftheStrategic Mobile
Force[PALMACH]willrejointhecountry-wide reserves.
4. Effortsmustbe madetoensure thattheperiodduring whichunits
ofthecountry-wide reserves areassigned to theFieldForceis as shortas
possible.
(c) 1. The StrategicMobileForce[PALMACH]is responsible for
carryingoutcounterattacksinsideandoutsidetheborders ofthecountry.
2. The supreme command mayreducethe numberof duties
assignedtooneoranother oftheFieldForcebrigades as itseesfit(i.e. those
relatedto thesiegeofenemycities,controloftransportation routesand
occupationof frontline positions)and allocatethemdirectly to the
StrategicMobileForce[PALMACH]instead.
(d) The variousdepartments and services of the generalstaff are
requiredtocomplete theaboveplanning instructionsin theirvarious areas
andtopresent
ofresponsibility theplansto theFieldForcebrigades.

'See AppendixC, below.