Michael Porter's Competitive Advantage

and Business History

Robert E. Ankli 1
Universityof Guelph

Strategicplanningas a formal disciplineoriginatedin the 1960sand

early 1970s.It soonbecamea fad, but faded equallyquicklywhen the
promisedsuccesses did not materialize[See 3, 13, 14, and 17 for recent
examples].Japanese success did not seemto dependon planningasmuchas
it did on quality,corporateandnationalculture,and management itself[12].
Yet the needfor planningremains,for, asPeterDruckerremindsus:

Managementhas no choicebut to anticipatethe future, to

attemptto mold it, and to balanceshort-rangeand long-range
goals....Theidea behind long-rangeplanning is that [the
question]"Whatshouldour business be?"can and shouldbe
workedonanddecided by itself,independent
of thethinkingon
"What is our business?" and "What will it be?" There is some
senseto this. It is necessaryin strategicplanningto start
separately
withall threequestions.Whatis thebusiness?What
will it be? What should it be? These are, and should be
separateconceptualapproaches.With respectto "WhatshouM
our businessbe?"the first assumptionmustbe that it will be
different.

Long-rangeplanningshouldpreventmanagers from uncritically

extendingpresenttrendsinto the future,from assumingthat
today'sproducts,services,
markets,andtechnologieswill be the
products,services,
markets,and technologiesof tomorrow,and
aboveall, from dedicatingtheir resources
and energiesto the
defenseof yesterday[2, pp. 121-2].

As business
historiansyouwould,of course,agreewith the lastsentence,
but
you might be wonderingwhy I think it necessaryto even repeat it.
Nevertheless
I do so for goodreason.

1Iwould
liketo thank
KrisInwood
andJames
Ingham
forhelpful
comments.

BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Second

Series,
VolumeTwenty-one,
1992.
Copyright(c) 1992by the Business
HistoryConference.ISSN 0849-6825.

228
 229

My interestin businessandbusiness historyfollowsthe questionthat

PeterDruckerasks,"Whatdo we haveto do todayto preparefor tomorrow?"
Part of what we have to do is to understandhow we got to where we are
todayandthereinliesmy interestin history,but, like manyof you,I am also
deeplyinterestedin the futureand so I try to read the currentliteraturein
thisarea. Thus,I find MichaelPorter'sworkuseful. It mightseemstrange
that a personlike myselfwouldbe givingsucha papersinceeachyear there
are severalpeoplehere eachyear from Harvard who havebeen students
and/or have workedwith Porter. Yet in the past coupleof years,I have
askedseveral(non-Harvard)peopleat thesemeetingsif theyhadreadPorter
andmostrepliednegatively.I thinkthatis a shamebecause he providesmany
tools for the business historian.
What intriguesme aboutstrategicplanningis thatoneplansin a world
in whichoutcomes are not certain,yetmanyof uswritehistoryasif we know
the outcome.Ghemawat,however,makesthe commonsense observationthat
success factorsare a shakyfoundation for strategy[3, pp. 5-6].2 The same
casecanbe madefor writinghistory.Of course,we do knowthe outcomein
a certain sense,but, unlesswe are very careful, we will miss intriguing
possibilitiesor leadsbecausewe alreadyhave our hypothesis.With this
explanationlet us go on to look at Porter'swork.
Michael Porter is one of the hottest(international)consultants to
business farmsandgovernments. His latestbookTheCompetitive Advantage
of Nations[10]hasbeencalled"brilliant" by someand"nothing new"by others.
While theimplications for presentpolicywill continueto be debated,Porter's
workdoesprovidethebusiness historianwitha powerfulparadigmandsetof
toolsfor considering business in history.Why are somefirmssuccessful and
othernot? Why do somenationsseemto specializein certainindustrieswith
lotsof competitors, whileothernationsdo not seemto knowthat an industry
exists?Porterprovides waysof thinkingaboutthesetypesof questions.This
paperwill look at his threebooks: Competitive Strategy[11], Competitive
Advantage [9], and TheCompetitive Advantage of Nations[10].
Porter's farst book CompetitiveStrategy,publishedin 1980, is an
exhaustive lookat strategy.His contextis the worldof the late 1970s,but the
structurethat he setsout is a veryuseful vehiclefor the business historian.
"Theessence of formulating competitive strategyis relatinga company to its
environment" [11,p. 3]. This is exactlywhatthe business historianshouldbe
doing.

2Thereasons
arethat"t isusually
difficult
toidentify
success
factors
relevant
toa particular
situation. Second, even when a successfactor has been diagnosedto be relevant, the
implicationsfor the leversmanagersmustpull are not completelyconcrete. Third, the success
factor approach lacks generality becauseit implicitly assumesthat successfactors are
undervalued.Finally,in view of its other defects,it wouldbe reassuringif the success
factor
approach to strategycontainedsome self-justification: a reason why strategicthinking is
necessary in the first place. It doesnot2
230

POTENTIAL
]
ENTRANTS

BUYERS
]

The structuralanalysisof industriesincludesdescriptionsof rivalry

amongexistingcompetitors, thethreatof newentrants,thethreatof substitute
productor services,the bargainingpowerof suppliers,and the bargaining
power of buyers.Figure 1 illustratestheserelationships. Startingwith the
threat of new entrants,Porter considersbarriersto entry which include
economiesof scale,productdifferentiation, capitalrequirements,switching
costs,access to distributionchannels,costdisadvantages independentof scale,
government policy,and expectedretaliation.
The intensityof rivalryamongexistingcompetitors dependson the
balanceof competitors, industrygrowth,thesizeof fixedor storagecosts,the
amountof differentiationor switching costs,the minimumsizeof investment,
the typesof competitors, the strategicstakes,and the size and type of exit
barriers. Substitute productsofferalternatives andlimit the sizeof profits.
Substitutes alsodependon priceandthe easeof switching costs.
The bargaining powerof buyersdepends on the volumeof purchases
relativeto the sellerscapacity,thefractionof costthepurchase represents,the
degreeof standardization of the purchase,the level of switchingcosts,the
levelof profits,thethreatof backwardintegration, andthe importance of its
quality. The bargaining powerof suppliers mirrorsthat of buyers. Susan
Helper's "CompetitiveSupplierRelationsin the U.S. and JapaneseAuto
 231

Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach"[4], demonstrates how differing

supplier/manufacturer bargainingpowermay lead to differentresults.
Competitive strategy should lead a firm to either a cost or
differentiationtarget. A firm may also seek a niche basedon cost or
differentiation.Porterarguesverystronglythat a firm shouldnot attemptto
bothdifferentiateandbe a low costleader. The dangeris thata firm maybe
caughtin the middle and loseto thosefirms that do specialize.He also
considersthe pitfallsof adoptinganyof thesegenericstrategies [9, pp. 41-4].
While the material seemsexhaustive,I have the impressionthat his
informationcannotbe usedfor developinga strategyin the way that he
suggests.It seemsto be saying,"Whatworks,works."But because he hasset
out sucha completetaxonomy,the business historianis givenexhaustive tools
for evaluatingthe successes
andfailuresof particularbusinessesin a historical
context.
The next book, Competitive Advantage, written in 1985,setsout the
conceptof the valuechain. "Everyfirm is a collectionof activitiesthat are
performedto design,produce,market, deliver, and supportits product."
Figure 2 illustratesthe chain. Primary activitiesin the value chain are
inboundlogistics,operations,outboundlogistics,marketingand sales,and
service. Support activitiesinclude firm infrastructure,human resource
management, technologydevelopment, andprocurement.Porterdemonstrates
that a firm may developa competitive advantagein anyone of theseareas.
For example,the disputebetweenO'Brienandothersoverthe rivalrybetween
GM and Ford in the 1920s is an argumentabout where GM gained
competitiveadvantage[7, 8]. O'Brien arguesthat it was in product
(operation,technology development), whileChandlerand othersthink that it
wasmorein process(infrastructure, marketing,andsales).JohnRae [15,p.
33] doesnot evenmentionFord's officeoperationsother than to saythat
Couzenshandledthe businessaffairs of the companyand with Norval
Hawkins organizedthe Ford dealer network. Chandler'swork virtually
ignoreshowFord organizedto increaseproductionof the Model T. His Giant
Enterprise[1, pp. 141-5]includesa sectionfrom Ford'sMy Life and Work
whichderidessystematic organization.Allen Nevins'firsttwovolumesof his
Ford work [5, 6] also ignoresorganizational questions exceptto say that
Couzenswasin charge. ChapterX in the secondvolumedisucsses dealers,
research,and Henry Ford'sdistrustof formal administration, but it doesnot
reallyexplainhowthe organization wasrun.
Individualfirms'chainsalsobecomelinkedwithbuyersand sellersand
it becomesimportantfor a firm to tap into thesevaluechains.Porter returns
to his earlywork on costadvantageand differentiationto showthat the value
chainaffectsthesegoals.He considers competitive advantagein the context
of technology, competitorselection(there are goodand bad competitors),
industrysegmentation, andsubstitution.Problemswith"synergy" asa strategic
232

' i
FIRM INFRA.qTRUCTURB

HUMAN
Ri•OURCB
MA•AGBMBNT
TRCHNO! OGY DBV•L•plaMlaNT

PROCUREMENT

ZNBOUND OPBRATION S DUTBOUND

LOGI•TIC• ß SALBS

PRIMART ACTIVITIES

policyleadhimto promotetheimportance
of horizontal
strategy
[9,p. 319]3
and a discussion of how to achieveinterrelationships amongbusinessunits.
Finally, he examinesoffensiveand defensivestrategy. These final three
chapters are especiallyusefulbecause, again,he setsoutscenarios whichthe
business historiancan usefullyappropriatefor their ownwork.
Finally,hismostrecentandambitious book,TheCompetitive Advantage
of Nations,publishedtwoyearsago,seeksto determinehownationsbecome
economically successful.A nation'sindustrialfirmswillbesuccessful themore
rivalstheyhave. Openthe bordersto foreigncompetition, enforceanti-trust
laws,and do not favourmergers.Oncefirmsin an industrystopcompeting,
the industrywill undoubtedly stagnate,at leastrelativeto theirforeignrivals.
The recentUnited Statesautomobileindustryis a perfectexampleof this.

3"orizontal
strategy
isa concept
ofgroup,
sector,
andcorporate
strategy
based
oncompetitive
advantage,not on financialconsiderations or stockmarket perceptions. Corporatestrategies
built on purely financialgroundsprovide an elusivejustificationfor the diversifiedfirm.
Moreover,the benefitsof evensuccessful financialstrategiesare often temporary. Without a
horizontalstrategythereis no convincingrationalefor theexistence of a diversifiedfirm because
it is little more than a mutual fund. Horizontal strategy-not portfolio management--isthe
essenceof corporatestrategy."
 233

Don't think a nationcan succeed in the longrun usinglow wagesas a cost

advantage.It will neverbecomecompetitiveand it will not becomerich.
Porter comesto theseconclusions by focusingon whynationsbecome
homebasesfor successful internationalcompetitors in variousindustriesand
services.He doesthisby examiningten countries--the United States,Japan,
Germany,Switzerland,SouthKorea, Great Britain, Sweden,and Italy. He
alsolookedat Singaporeand Denmark,but did not report on them.
He arguesthat the term "competitivenation"has little meaning.
Instead,theeconomic goalof a nationshouldbe to producea highandrising
standardof livingfor its citizens.To do thisa nation,or ratherthe industries
of a nation,mustbecomemoreproductive.Hencehe studieswhatmakesan
industryand then later an economyproductive. Upgradingis the key.
Improving factor productivityallows firms to compete in sophisticated
industrialsegments and new industries, while maintainingfull employment.
A failure to upgrade results in slower productivitygrowth, declining
competitiveness,and eventuallyunemployment.
Porter usestheseconceptsto createa "diamond,"the four forcesthat
determinesuccess for an industry.Figure3 illustrates the diamond.The first
is factorconditions that includehuman,physical,knowledge,and capital
resources aswell asinfrastructure. A goodsupplyof physical resourcesis not
essentialfor economic growthas the caseof countrieslike Japanand South
Korea show. In fact, he believesthat countriessuchas Canada and Australia
have too "many"resourcesand this has preventedthem from becoming
internationally
competitive in industrialproducts.
The secondpoint of the diamondis demandconditions.By this he
doesnot mean "aggregate demand"in the economist's sense,but rather the
dynamiceffects.The qualityof demandis moreimportantthanits quantity.
North Americansacceptedlow qualityautomobilesin the 1960sand 1970s
from domestic suppliers andthisopenedthe marketto foreignproducers. 4
He is interestedin the compositionof homedemand,the sizeandpatternof
growthof home demand,and the mechanisms by whicha nation'sdomestic
preferencesare transmittedto foreignmarkets. For example,countrieslike
SwedenandWest Germany,whichrestrictadvertising, are not internationally
competitivein consumerindustries becausetheydo not knowhowto market.
On the otherhand,the United Statesdeveloped a competitiveadvantage in
medicalproductsbecausethereis still a privatemarketfor medicalservices
in thatcountry.Government-sponsored healthprogramstendto be morecost
conscious than results oriented.
Third is the presenceor absenceof relatedand supporting industries
(clusters)that are world competitive.The computerindustrylocatedin
SiliconValley is an example. Finally, firm strategy,structure,and rivalry
completethe diamond. This point of the diamondformedthe core of his
earlier books.

4Charles
Garfield
reported
inarecent
talkinToronto
thataEuropean
friend
didnotknow
what
the word •lemon' meantand couldnot believethat we havegenericcategories
whichare labelled
nlemons.n
234

The contextin which firms are created,organized,and managed,as

well asthe natureof homecompetition variesamongnationsandplaysa role
in determininghowsuccessful firmsandindustries
will be. Porteremphasizes
commitmentto an industryasimportantandarguesthat mobilityof resources
in the economist'ssensemay actuallybe detrimentalsince too rapid a
movementof humanresources couldimplya lack of trainedworkers.
"Chance"in suchformsaswar,oil shocks, or actsof pureinventionwill
havean influence,but they are ultimatelysecondary.Governmentwill also
be important,but not as a frith determinant.Rather government's role is to
influencethe four pointsof the diamond.

PlIM
ITI/EEO?

•NDITIONI

CamplatoDlamomd

The "diamond"becomesthe methodof analysisfor mostof the book.

Porterstresses the dynamicandinterdependentnatureof the four pointsof
the diamond.He demonstrates howthe absenceof anyof theseelementscan
lead to a lossof nationaladvantage.But he particularlystressesdomestic
rivalryasthe mostimportantelementof thisanalysis.Firmsmaynotrespond
 235

to opportunitiesunlessthey are pushed. "Competitiveadvantageemerges

from pressure,challenge, and adversity,rarelyfrom an easylife."
Porterusesthe "diamond" to look at the Germanprintingindustry,the
United Statespatientmonitoringequipmentindustry,the Italian ceramictile
industry,andthe Japanese roboticsindustryin somedetail. He emphasizes
the importanceof domesticrivalryandhowits absencemayprovecostlyfor
someof theseindustries.Mergersseemto offeropportunities for successby
developing economies of scale,but the lackof domestic rivalryseemseven
moreimportantin hurtingthe industry.He stresses that free trademakesthe
domestic or homebaseall the moreimportant.If production cantakeplace
anywhere,the homebaseis key. Industrywill emigratefrom or not develop
in a locationwhereall four elementsof the diamondare not strong.Reliance
on a competitiveadvantagebasedon factor costswill not be successful
becausesomewhere therewill alwaysbe a locationor countrywherefactor
costsare cheaper. Employingforeigntechnology will alsobe a problem
becausesuchuserswill alwaysbe a generationbehind.
More than half the book looksat the eight countries(referred to
above)sinceWorld War II. His argumentis that postwarindustrialhistory
is a storyof creating,not exploiting,existingadvantage.It is a storyof
overcomingdisadvantage.High labor costsare a static,or a competitive
weakness,but they force f•rms to find new (and better) ways of
manufacturing, thus becominga dynamicadvantage.Or, to give a more
recentexample,restrictiveenvironmental controlsshouldnotbe viewedas a
costburden,but ratherasan opportunity to developan advantage in a new
area.

Porter showshow small family f•rms in Italy have been able to

overcomethe debilitatingeffectsof itsnationalgovernment.He demonstrates
howSouthKorea is the oneAsiancountry,otherthanJapan,that hasbeen
able to becomecompetitive withoutrelyingon foreign-owned industry.He
explainsthe growthand development of competitiveadvantageof Japanin
some industries as a result of the "diamond" forces, not the role of
government.He believesthatthe impactof MITI's researchgroupswasthat
it forcedindividualcompanies to devoteresearcheffortsfor the particular
projectsthey workedon becausethey knew that their domesticrivalswere
workingon the samethings.Thesecompanies usuallydid not put their most
productive researchersin suchgovernment-sponsored research.
It would be fair to say that Porter sees importantand perhaps
devastatingproblemsfor all of thecountrieshe examines.Of coursethisdoes
not meanthat anyoneof themwill losetheir presentadvantages. After all,
he arguesthat presentsuccess has often been the result of overcoming
disadvantages, but it does mean that their are opportunitiesfor other
industriesand countriesto gain advantage.
His messagefor governments is to developthe "diamond."Thismeans
usinggovernmentas an aid, but not as the primaryforce. He doesnot
believe that industrialpolicies(targeting)will be ultimatelysuccessful.
.Targeting
distorts
market
signals
andalters
theincentives
off•rms
tocompete
m an industry. When this happenspressureis placed on government
bureaucracies
to pick industrieswherethe diamondcan be developedand
236

exploited. Suchcountriesas SouthKorea, whichhave practisedtargeting,

havehadmixedresults.Despitetargetingmachinery andchemicalindustries,
SouthKorea hasnot becomecompetitivein theseindustries.
Porter emphasizesthat nearlyeveryindustryhe studiedin almostall
of thecountries tookresponsibility
for creatingor improving humanresources.
Firmsthattraintheirworkerswill keepthembecause employees wantto work
for suchemployers.He alsoemphasizes the role of educationandtrainingfor
all of the successful
postwareconomies he studies.A nationwill not havethe
abilityto respondto opportunitiesunlesshumanresources havethe abilityto
exploit them. Indirect targetingby governmentin this area shouldprove
beneficialbecauseit providesmoreopportunities for firmsto be successful.
Briefly concluding,Porter's work, especiallythe first two books,
providesimportantchecklists for the business historian,while the last offers
intriguinghypotheses aboutmanufacturing growthsinceWorld War II that
demandmoretesting,bothfor the periodhe discusses andfor earierperiods.
References

1. Alfred D. Chandler,Jr., GiantEnterprise

(New York, 1964)
2. Peter F. Drucker,Management:Tasks,Responsibilities,Practices(New York 1973,1974).
3. PankajGhemawat,Commitment: TheDynamics of Strategy(New York, 1991).
4. SusanHelper, "CompetitiveSupplierRelationsin the U.S. and JapaneseAuto Industries:
An Exit/Voice Approach,"Business andEconomic History,SecondSer., 19 (1990),153-62.
5. Allen Nevins,Ford: The•7mes,theMan, the Company(New York, 1954).
6. , Ford: ExpansionsandChallenge:
1915-1933(New York, 1957).
7. AnthonyPatrickO'Brien,"Developing the Modem ManufacturingCorporation:The Early
Years at Ford," unpublished,August 1991.
8. , "How to Succeedin Business:Les•onsfrom the StruggleBetweenFord and
General Motors during the 1920sand 1930s,"Business
andEconomicHistory,SecondSet.,
18 (1989).
9. Michael E. Porter, Competitive
Advantage: Creatingand SustainingSuperiorPerformance
(New York, 1985).
10. , TheCompetitive Advantage of Nations(New York, 1990).
11. , CompetitiveStrategy(New York, 1980).
12. , "Thestateof strategicthinking,"TheEconomist, May 23, 1987,19-22.
13. , •I'he Core Competence of the Corporation,HarvardBusinessReview,(May-
June,1990).
14. C.K. Prahaladand Gary Hamel, "StrategicIntent,"Harvard Business Review,May-June,
1989).
15. JohnB. Rae, TheAmericanAutomobile Industry(Boston,1984).
16. RobertB. Reich,TheWorkof Nations(New York, 1991).
17. GeorgeStalk,PhilipEvans,and LawrenceE. Schulman,"Competingon Capabilities:The
New Rulesof CorporateStrategy,HarvardBusiness Review,(March-April,1992).