Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko,

George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 26, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on November 26. ISW will cover
subsequent reports in the November 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes on Ukraine on the night of
November 25-26. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched nine Shahed-
136/131 from Primorsko-Akhtarsk direction and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down eight
drones.[1] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev, like other Ukrainian
officials on November 25, continued to praise the actions of Ukrainian mobile fire groups in
intercepting Russian drones.[2] Nayev stated that mobile fire groups will receive foreign-made man-
portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) in the near future.[3]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a

large-scale drone strike on Russian territory, and Russian occupation officials accused
Ukrainian forces of launching a strike on occupied Donetsk Oblast that resulted in
widespread power outages. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air
defenses shot down 24 Ukrainian drones over Moscow, Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk, and Smolensk oblasts
on the night of November 25-26 and on the morning of November 26.[4] Tula Oblast Governor Alexei
Dyumin stated that one drone crashed into an apartment building in Tula City after Russian air
defenses shot it down.[5] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing its own unnamed sources, reported that
the overnight Ukrainian drone strike on Russia was a GUR special operation.[6] Russian sources,
including Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin, also claimed that Ukrainian forces
conducted a large artillery and HIMARS strike on power distribution substations in occupied Donetsk
Oblast overnight, causing electricity outages in many settlements and cities, including Donetsk City,
Mariupol, and Manhush.[7]

Russian forces reportedly complained about the vulnerability of Russian ground lines
of communication (GLOCs) in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued
complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank. A Russian milblogger claimed
on November 26 that personnel of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed

1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
18th Combined Arms Army) often write to him complaining about the vulnerability of Russian
logistics in the east bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km
from the Dnipro River) to Ukrainian drone strikes.[8] The milblogger also agreed with another
Russian milblogger’s previous claims that Russian forces in this area struggle with unit coordination
as well as commanders’ negligence at the company and battalion levels.[9] The milblogger suggested
that Russian forces near Krynky should create a separate anti-drone company staffed by personnel of
the separate reconnaissance battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division to protect Russian
GLOCs.[10] Russian GLOCs on left bank Kherson Oblast, such as the E58 Antonivka-Sahy highway
(about 5-8km away from the Dnipro River), are located close to the Dnipro River shoreline, making
them vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction. ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers have
repeatedly complained about Russian forces near Krynky suffering from problems, such as
insufficient fire support, unit coordination, electronic warfare (EW), counterbattery, and air defense,
but has observed that these reported problems do not always translate into significant battlefield
effects.[11] Russian sources have continually claimed that Russian forces are unable to push
Ukrainian forces out of Krynky and that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to make operationally
significant advances in the east bank area.[12]

Russia continues to face skilled and unskilled labor shortages amid inconsistent and
contradictory Kremlin policies that disincentivize Russians who fled Russia and
migrant workers from working in Russia while simultaneously trying to increase
Russian industrial capacity and force generation. Russian State Duma Chairperson
Vyacheslav Volodin claimed on November 25 that many Russians who left Russia because of the full-
scale invasion of Ukraine are returning to Russia because they could not find work
abroad.[13] Volodin warned that Russia is not “waiting with open arms” to accept returning Russians
and claimed that they “committed treason against Russia, relatives, and friends.”[14] A prominent
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger agreed with Volodin’s statements on November 26 but noted
that Russia continues to face severe skilled labor shortages and characterized the number of returning
Russians as “catastrophically small.”[15] The milblogger added that the labor shortages have
increased the number of migrants seeking jobs in Russia and criticized Russian authorities for their
“open door policy” on migration.[16] The Russian government appears to be struggling to reconcile
incoherent and competing objectives by prioritizing crypto-mobilization efforts to send manpower to
the frontline at the expense of Russia’s national labor force while simultaneously enforcing policies
that restrict migrants’ prospects to work in Russia.[17] Russian law enforcement agencies are also
coercing migrants both with and without Russian citizenship into Russian military service, further
reducing the migrants’ ability to augment Russia’s labor force.[18] The Kremlin’s incoherent and
contradictory policies seek to achieve mutually exclusive objectives of reducing negative shocks to
Russia’s domestic labor force, while disincentivizing migrants from working in Russia and enticing
Russians to return from abroad while not providing them opportunities to work and trying to recruit
them into a war they fled. The poor implementation of these policies has not generated any apparent
or imminent threats to the Russian economy or war effort at this time, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes on Ukraine on the

night of November 25-26.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly
conducted a large-scale drone strike on Russian territory, and Russian

2 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
 occupation officials accused Ukrainian forces of launching a strike on
occupied Donetsk Oblast that resulted in widespread power outages.
• Russian forces reportedly complained about the vulnerability of Russian
ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the east (left) bank of Kherson
Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east
bank.
• Russia continues to face skilled and unskilled labor shortages amid
inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies that disincentivize Russians
who fled Russia and migrant workers from working in Russia while
simultaneously trying to increase Russian industrial capacity and force
generation.
• Russian forces continued attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line,
near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the
Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and
advanced in some areas.
• The Russian Supreme Court ruled that certain Russian mobilized individuals
have the right to serve in the Russian Alternative Civil Service (AKS) rather
than on the front lines.
• Russian occupation officials continue to establish programs aimed at
indoctrinating Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national
and cultural identities.

3 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-
covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of
these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and
specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

4 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
 • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the
remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and
northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on

November 26 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 26 shows
that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Pershotravneve (24km east of
Kupyansk).[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks
near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske
(14km northwest of Svatove), and near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of
Kreminna).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have unsuccessfully attempted to
advance northeast and east of Kupyansk over the past week.[21] Ukrainian Ground Forces
Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo reported that Russian forces have intensified their
use of loitering munitions and first-person view (FPV) drones near Synkivka in attempts to advance
toward Kupyansk.[22]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-
Kreminna line on November 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian
attacks near Synkivka, Ivanivka, and near the Serebryanske forest area.[23] A Russian milblogger
claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to seize the initiative in the Serebryanske forest area over the
past week by taking advantage of a Russian troop redeployment from the area to other unspecified
directions.[24] Russian milbloggers have routinely claimed in recent weeks that Ukrainian forces are
preparing to launch a localized offensive effort near Kreminna.

5 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
6 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the
entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued conducting assaults south of
Bakhmut on November 26 and are inflicting personnel and military equipment losses on Russian
forces.[25]

Russian sources claimed on November 26 that Russian forces marginally advanced near Bakhmut. A
Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian armored group attacked near Klishchiivka (7km southwest
of Bakhmut) and seized unspecified positions but that Ukrainian forces still control key heights
around the settlement.[26] The milblogger added that Russian forces advanced northeast of
Klishchiivka, towards Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), and near the railway in the vicinity of
Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) over the past week.[27] A Russian news aggregator similarly
claimed on November 25 that Russian forces advanced towards Klishchiivka and on its northeastern
outskirts, and successfully counterattacked near Andriivka.[28] Some milbloggers, however, claimed
that there had been no changes to the Bakhmut frontline.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported
that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[30] Russian
milbloggers indicated that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) 58th Spetsnaz
Battalion (1st Army Corps, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and 137th Guards
Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division) are operating in the Bakhmut direction.[31]

Ukrainian forces reportedly attacked northwest of Horlivka (25km south of Bakhmut) on November
26 but did not make claimed or confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces
repelled Ukrainian attacks near Pivdenne and Shumy (both immediately northwest of
Horlivka).[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that there have not been any changes on the Horlivka
frontline as of November 26.[33]

7 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northwest of Horlivka on November 26. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on the eastern part of Pivnichne
(just northwest of Horlivka).[34]

Russian forces made confirmed advances northwest and southeast of Avdiivka on November 26.
Geolocated footage published on November 26 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced
northwest of Krasnohorivka (7km northwest of Avdiivka) and in the eastern part of the industrial
zone on Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts.[35] Geolocated video footage on November 26 shows
Russian armored vehicles attacking Ukrainian positions in the northern part of the industrial area on
Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts.[36] Russian milbloggers overwhelmingly claimed that Russian

8 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
forces captured the entire industrial area near the Yasynuvata-2 railway station on November 26 after
clearing the last remaining buildings in the area on November 25, though ISW has not observed visual
confirmation of these claims yet.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that the industrial zone is located
on a slight hill that they assessed would allow Russian forces to shell Ukrainian positions on the
outskirts of Avdiivka and develop further offensive operations.[38] Some Russian sources claimed
that capturing this industrial area will not make further offensive operations easier for Russian forces,
however, as Russian forces will need to develop offensives on Avdiivka’s other flanks or mobilize more
personnel to achieve rapid and decisive results.[39] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian
forces gained a foothold near the railway adjacent to the Avdiivka Coke Plant.[40] A prominent
Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian attacks on the Avdiivka Coke
Plant and near Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka) on November 26 and that Russian forces
advanced on the eastern approaches to Avdiivka and near Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka) over
the past week.[41] The milblogger observed that Russian advances over the past week do not
immediately threaten Ukrainian forces and largely do not affect Russian efforts to capture Avdiivka
but simply extend the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled
Russian assaults east of Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka); south of Novokalynove; and
near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Stepove, Avdiivka, and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of
Avdiivka).[42]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to counterattack on the Avdiivka frontline on November 26 but
did not make claimed or confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are
continuing to counterattack despite retreating from their fortified positions near
Stepove.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces failed to restore the lost
position in the industrial zone on Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts after counterattacking in the
area.[44]

9 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on
November 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched unsuccessful
offensive operations near Marinka (immediately west of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km
southwest of Donetsk City).[45] A prominent Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian
forces did not advance near Marinka or Novomykhailivka on November 26 but claimed that Russian
forces made some unspecified advances near Novomykhailivka over the past week with the

10 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
operational objective of reaching Vuhledar.[46] The milblogger added that Russian forces pushed
Ukrainian forces back to the northwestern part of Marinka over the past week.

The Russian MoD claimed on November 26 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near
Marinka and Shevchenko (8km southwest of Vuhledar).[47]

11 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline
positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

12 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did
not make any confirmed advances on November 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces
made unspecified advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 26.[48] The
Ukrainian General Staff reported in its morning situation reports that Russian forces unsuccessfully
attacked east of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Zolota Nyva (11km
southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and reported in their evening situation report that Russian forces did
not conduct any offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[49]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia
Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 26. A Russian milblogger

13 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Robotyne and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne)
with small infantry groups.[50] Russian sources claimed on November 25 and 26 that Ukrainian
forces reduced the tempo of their operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in part due to poor weather
conditions.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 26 that Ukrainian forces advanced half a
kilometer towards Novofedorivka (15km northeast of Robotyne) and unsuccessfully tried to advance
in the direction of Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne) in the past week.[52]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any
confirmed advances on November 26. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a
series of counterattacks along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line and advanced near
Verbove.[53] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces achieved unspecified tactical successes
near Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne) before heavy rainfall disrupted the active
fighting.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in its morning situation reports that Russian
forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and noted in their evening situation report that Russian
forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction.[55] A Russian source
claimed that elements of the Russian 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Territorial Troops
[TRV]) and 136th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern
Military District [SMD]) are operating near Robotyne.[56] Russian sources claimed that elements of
the Russian 108th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards VDV Division) and the 70th
Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are operating in
the Zaporizhia direction.[57]

14 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
15 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Ukrainian forces maintained positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as Russian forces
made claimed advances on the east bank on November 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[58] Russian sources
claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of forest areas near Krynky (30km northeast
of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces entered the western outskirts of Krynky.[60]

16 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful missile strike against
occupied Crimea on November 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down
two Ukrainian S-200 missiles over the Sea of Azov that some Russian sources claimed targeted the
Kerch Strait Bridge.[61]

17 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat
power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Supreme Court ruled that certain Russian mobilized individuals have the right to serve in
the Russian Alternative Civil Service (AKS) rather than on the front lines. The Russian Supreme Court
ruled on November 23 in favor of Pavel Mushumansky, who served in the AKS based on his religious
beliefs after conscription in 2019 and asked to serve in the AKS again after mobilization in fall
2022.[62] Mushumansky deployed to a military unit and appealed his case to the Supreme Court after
the Leningrad Oblast court denied his appeal to serve in the AKS. Kremlin newswire RBK reported
statements from Russian legal experts that the Supreme Court’s ruling affirms the right of Russian
conscripts and mobilized personnel to replace military service with AKS if military service contradicts
their spiritual or religious beliefs.[63] The experts noted that the mobilization ruling only applies to
individuals who can demonstrate that military service violates their beliefs and who have not served
in the military or as a conscript previously, however.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological

innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative

control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian
sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to establish programs aimed at indoctrinating Ukrainian

children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities. The Kherson Oblast
occupation administration announced on November 26 that it and the Kremlin-backed United Russia
party are opening a center for children without parental care in occupied Kherson Oblast.[64] The
Kherson Oblast occupation administration noted that Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights
Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova supported the project and that the Ryazan Oblast government will
help renovate the center.[65] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on November 26 that
Russian occupation authorities are launching a program at institutions of higher education in
occupied Melitopol to train students to create minefield maps.[66]

Russian occupation authorities continue to use maternity capital benefits to augment passportization
efforts in occupied areas. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Militia claimed on November 26 that
residents in occupied Luhansk Oblast can apply for maternity capital payments for their second and
third children and their first child (if the first child was born after January 1, 2020) if they or their
children have Russian passports.[67]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian sources are seizing upon a civilian protest on the Ukrainian-Polish border to amplify
standard Kremlin narratives aimed at driving a wedge in relations between Ukraine and Poland.
Polish truckers began a blockade of three border crossings between Ukraine and Poland on November
6 and expanded the blockade to a fourth border crossing on November 24 as part of a strike to
prevent Ukrainian truckers from crossing the Polish border into Ukraine.[68] The Polish truckers are
reportedly protesting the competition from Ukrainian trucks and only allow humanitarian and
18 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
passenger vehicles to cross the border, creating significant traffic jams of over 2,000 trucks and a
humanitarian crisis at the border crossings that has resulted in the deaths of two Ukrainian truck
drivers.[69] Ukrainian officials have routinely called for an end to the protest, and Latvian Foreign
Minister Krisjanis Karins expressed willingness on November 26 to mediate between Poland and
Ukraine to unblock the border.[70] Pro-Kremlin Russian sources are claiming that the blockade has
created critical fuel and military shortages in Ukraine, that some Ukrainian officials are also
protesting, and that the strike may expand further.[71] These narratives are likely intended to
undermine Ukrainian-Polish relations and sabotage future negotiations to end the strike.

The Russian MoD continues efforts to portray Russian-led international organizations as unified
during Russia's full-scale invasion in Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on
November 26 that the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has effectively
created a unified air defense network because Russia already has bilateral air defense agreements
with all other CSTO member states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[72] A
bilateral agreement creating a joint regional air defense network between Russia and Kyrgyzstan as
part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) framework came into force on November
9.[73] Shoigu’s mention of Armenia alongside other CSTO member states is notable, as Armenia did
not attend the CSTO Collective Session in Minsk, Belarus, on November 23 amid continued Armenian
efforts to distance itself from Russia.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in

Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)

The independent Belarusian monitoring project The Hajun Project reported on November 26 that
Russian and Belarusian forces have extended joint exercises in Belarus to mid-December that have
been ongoing since April 29, 2022.[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly
available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western
reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and
other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are
provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fccXumsFLRaANkyWmbXqYS47Bm8
DGorn7qaBNsjYjjAfZ7dpaRqSWcmRjv9EMXx3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/
pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; http
s://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFX
WePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl ; https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0YeKQoV6e
6wHCSDVNbusdXpH2V9BYEzFEjzQxQeWk5t6XRMnFQxyTm9d52K68tkrbl?locale=uk_UA ; https:
//armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/26/nashi-chergovi-grupy-postijno-vidstezhuyut-na-radarah-
mozhlyvi-ruhy-bpla-yurij-ignat/

[2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/25/na-pivnochi-bilsha-polovyna-vorozhyh-

bezpilotnykiv-znyshhena-mobilnymy-grupamy-sergij-nayev-pro-nichnu-ataku-shahediv/

19 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/26/najblyzhchym-chasom-mobilni-vognevi-grupy-
protypovitryanoyi-oborony-otrymayut-perenosni-zrk-inozemnogo-vyrobnycztva-sergij-nayev/

[3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/26/najblyzhchym-chasom-mobilni-vognevi-grupy-

protypovitryanoyi-oborony-otrymayut-perenosni-zrk-inozemnogo-vyrobnycztva-sergij-nayev/

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/32861 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32865 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32

871

[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/11/2023/6562b32d9a794746fddb738c?from=from_main_3

; https://vk dot com/tularegion71?w=wall-56015144_241630

[6] https://suspilne dot media/625695-nicna-ataka-bezpilotnikiv-na-rosiu-bula-specoperacieu-gur-

dzerela/

[7] https://t.me/dva_majors/29690 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104766 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivisio

n/12245 ; https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/9461 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42938 ; https://t.me/andriys
hTime/15454 ; https://t.me/pushilindenis/4038 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/26/glava-
dnr-denis-pushilin-zayavil-chto-chast-anneksirovannogo-regiona-byla-obestochena-iz-za-
massirovannogo-obstrela-so-storony-ukrainy
; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38780 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69921 ;
https://t.me/pushilindenis/4041

[8] https://t.me/zhivoff/11815 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29722

[9] https://t.me/zhivoff/11815 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29722 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29419 ;

https://t.me/zhivoff22/13497

[10] https://t.me/zhivoff/11815 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29722

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
november-21-
2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2023

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
november-25-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-
campaign-assessment-november-17-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2023 ;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-
2023
; https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2954 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12351 ; https:/
/t.me/wargonzo/16486 ; https://t.me/rybar/54430 ; https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2194 ; https://twit
ter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1727731938742436076/photo/1 ; https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2197 ; ht
tps://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1727733682767618373 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29460

[13] https://t.me/vv_volodin/719

20 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[14] https://t.me/vv_volodin/719

[15] https://t.me/rybar/54497

[16] https://t.me/rybar/54497

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111423

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112423 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-

offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-
2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
july-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-
assessment-april-24-2023

[19] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1728821451967644027?s=20; https://t.me/brigade_14/1875

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62
SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo
5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pf
bid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/26/okupanty-ne-polyshayut-sprob-povtorno-

zahopyty-kupyansk-volodymyr-fito/; https://suspilne dot media/625507-rosia-vnoci-atakuvala-
dronami-souzniki-nadadut-ukraini-konvoj-morskih-kateriv-641-den-vijni-
onlajn/?anchor=live_1701018349&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeT
NAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/post
s/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/16680

[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[28] https://t.me/readovkanews/69914

[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104739

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62
SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/po
sts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl;

21 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyug
mFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5009; https://t.me/milinfolive/111483

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104733 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52381

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62
SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl

[35] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1728817596475318387?s=20; https://t.me/khornegroup/1019;

https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7850; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1523912645038740
/?mibextid=rS40aB7S9Ucbxw6v; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1728781434255560867?s=20; http
s://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1523912645038740; https://x.com/TankDiary/status/17287
35206578835786?s=20; https://t.me/BARSRF11/6336

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104776

[37] https://t.me/rybar/54494 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/22943 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/

31110; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57194; https://t.me/rusich_army/11932; https://t.me/dva_majors/
29690; https://t.me/notes_veterans/13706; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52381 ; https://t.me/bori
s_rozhin/104733; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/5075; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52379

[38] https://t.me/rybar/54494 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/22943 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/

31110; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57194; https://t.me/rusich_army/11932; https://t.me/notes_vetera
ns/13719

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696; https://t.me/readovkanews/69914; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/

13603

[40] https://t.me/rybar/54494 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/22943 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/

31110

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/16680 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62
SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/po
sts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyug
mFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104805

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62
SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/po

22 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
sts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyug
mFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeT
NAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyug
mFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHC
DPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/29690

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52381 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104733 ;

https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5008 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4996

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57262

[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57262

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeT
NAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyug
mFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHC
DPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl

[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/29692

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4996 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29725

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62
SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/po
sts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyug
mFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/16680 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29690

; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5005

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5005

23 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/32873; https://t.me/wargonzo/16692 ;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104774 ; https://t.me/vrogov/13040

[62] https://t.me/netprizyvu/2607; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/verhovnyy-sud-rf-podtverdil-

pravo-mobilizovannyh-na-ags/32697323.html

[63] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/11/2023/656200729a79475724c7a908

[64] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/15703

[65] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/15703

[66] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3870

[67] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/11301

[68] https://www.ft.com/content/8ce3b3b5-b2b1-4871-baec-
394bc74e8911; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-
ukraine-border-crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-up-on-polish-border/;
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ready-evacuate-stranded-truckers-polish-protests-
persist-2023-11-24/

[69] https://www.ft.com/content/8ce3b3b5-b2b1-4871-baec-394bc74e8911;
https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-ukraine-border-
crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-up-on-polish-border/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-
ready-evacuate-stranded-truckers-polish-protests-persist-2023-11-24/; https://www.kyivpost dot
com/post/24545; https://forbes dot ua/ru/money/tse-bude-katastrofa-polski-perevizniki-
zablokuvali-kordon-shchob-zakhistiti-vid-ukraintsiv-rinok-perevezen-es-na-370-mlrd-ekonomistka-
irina-kosse-poyasnyue-shcho-vidbuvaetsya-naspravdi-23112023-17450

[70] https://suspilne dot media/625667-glava-mzs-latvii-zaaviv-pro-gotovnist-dolucitisa-do-

peregovoriv-iz-rozblokuvanna-kordonu-ukraini-ta-polsi/; https://euromaidanpress dot
com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-ukraine-border-crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-
up-on-polish-border/; https://www.ft.com/content/8ce3b3b5-b2b1-4871-baec-394bc74e8911;
https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-ukraine-border-
crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-up-on-polish-border/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-
ready-evacuate-stranded-truckers-polish-protests-persist-2023-11-24/

[71] https://ria dot ru/20231125/postavki-1911872219.html; https://ria dot

ru/20231126/obraschenie-1911881224.html; https://ria dot ru/20231123/defitsit-
1911351580.html; https://ria dot ru/20231123/ukraina-1911297390.html; https://tass dot
ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19380707; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-
panorama/19366731; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19325977; https://tass dot
ru/obschestvo/19334835; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/19231615;
https://t.me/readovkanews/69911

[72] https://t.me/astrapress/42947 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19381789 ;

24 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-
november-9-2023

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20
Assessment%2C%20November%2024%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf

[75] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/7568

25 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023