FIRE PROTECTION MANUAL

Volume 1: Fire Protection, Preparedness, Control, and Extinguishment

CHEVRON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY COMPANY

RICHMOND, CA

January 1997

Manual sponsor: For information or help regarding this manual,

contact R. B. Hartman
 Printing History

Fire Protection Manual

First Edition June 1990
First Revision November 1992
Second Revision December 1994
Second Edition January 1997

Restricted Material
Technical Memorandum

This material is transmitted subject to the Export Control Laws of the

United States Department of Commerce for technical data. Furthermore,
you hereby assure us that the material transmitted herewith shall not be
exported or re-exported by you in violation of these export controls.

The information in this Manual has been jointly developed by Chevron Corporation and its Operating
Companies. The Manual has been written to assist Chevron personnel in their work; as such, it may be
interpreted and used as seen fit by operating management.
Copyright  1990, 1992, 1994, 1997 CHEVRON CORPORATION. All rights reserved. This document
contains proprietary information for use by Chevron Corporation, its subsidiaries, and affiliates. All other
uses require written permission.

January 1997 Chevron Corporation

 List of Current Pages
Fire Protection Manual
The following list shows publication or revision dates for the contents of this manual. To verify that your
manual contains current material, check the sections in question with the list below. If your copy is not
current, contact the Technical Standards Team, Chevron Research and Technology Company, Richmond,
CA (510) 242-7232.

Section Date
Front Matter January 1997
Table of Contents January 1997
50 January 1997
Part I Fire Protection:
100 December 1994
200 December 1994
300 December 1994
Part II Fire Preparedness and Control:
400 December 1994
500 December 1994
600 December 1994
700 December 1994
Appendix A December 1994
Appendix B December 1994
Appendix C December 1994
Appendix D December 1994
Appendix E June 1990
Appendix F January 1997
Appendix G January 1997
Appendix H January 1997
Index January 1997
Volume 2 Design Guidelines and Standards:
Front Matter January 1997
Table of Contents January 1997
Part III General Design Guidelines:
1000 December 1994
1100 December 1994
1200 January 1997
1300 January 1997
1400 December 1994

Chevron Corporation January 1997

 Section Date
1500 January 1997
1600 January 1997
1700 December 1994
1800 January 1997
1900 December 1994
2000 December 1994
2100 December 1994
2200 December 1994
2300 June 1990
Part IV Specific Facilities:
3100 December 1994
3200 December 1994
3300 December 1994
3400 December 1994
3500 June 1990
3600 December 1994
3700 December 1994
3800 January 1997
3900 June 1990
4000 December 1994
4100 June 1990
List of Standard Drawings and Forms January 1997. See the list in the Standards
Drawings and Forms section of this manual.
Current revision dates are shown for Forms,
and current revision numbers are shown for
Standard Drawings.
Index January 1997

Chevron Corporation January 1997

 Maintaining This Manual
Fire Protection Manual
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Chevron Corporation January 1997

 (This page reserved for future use.)

January 1997 Chevron Corporation

 Fire Protection
Manual Sponsor: R.B. Hartman / Phone: (510) 242-4204 / E-mail: ribh@chevron.com
This document contains extensive hyperlinks (to figures and cross-referenced sections).
The pointer will change to a pointing finger when positioned over text which contains a link.

Volume 1—Fire Protection, Preparedness, Control, and Extinguishment

List of Current Pages

50 Using This Manual 50-1

Part I—Fire Prevention

100 Introduction to Fire Prevention 100-1

200 Fire Prevention Through Operation 200-1

300 Prevention Through Inspection and Maintenance 300-1

Part II—Fire Preparedness and Control

400 Emergency Response Organization 400-1

500 Fire Training 500-1

600 Fighting the Fire 600-1

700 Fire Investigation and Report 700-1

Appendices
Appendix A Work Plans and Permits
Appendix B Fire Protection Checklist
Appendix C LPG Handling and Storage—Loss Prevention Checklist
Appendix D FIRE Computer Database System User Guide
Appendix E Fire Extinguisher and Equipment Inspection and Maintenance
Appendix F Fire Water System and Pump Testing
Appendix G Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects
Appendix H Building Siting Assessments

Chevron Corporation TOC-1 June 1993

Table of Contents Fire Protection Manual

Volume 2—Design Guidelines and Standards

Part III—General Design Guidelines

1000 Quick Reference Guide 1000-1

1100 Basic Design Principles 1100-1

1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis 1200-1

1300 Layout and Spacing 1300-1

1400 Drainage 1400-1

1500 Electrical Classification 1500-1

1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment 1600-1

1700 Fireproofing 1700-1

1800 Critical Instrumentation 1800-1

1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors 1900-1

2000 Process Equipment 2000-1

2100 Buildings/Facilities Design 2100-1

2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations 2200-1

2300 Utilities 2300-1

Part IV—Specific Facilities

3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities 3100-1

3200 Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities 3200-1

3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation 3300-1

3400 Process Plants 3400-1

3500 LPG Storage 3500-1

3600 Loading Racks 3600-1

3700 Compressor and Pump Stations and Pipelines 3700-1

3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage 3800-1

3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants 3900-1

4000 Aviation Facilities 4000-1

4100 Mining and Dust Handling 4100-1

January 1997 TOC-2 Chevron Corporation

50 Using This Manual

Abstract
This section summarizes the contents and explains the organization of this manual.
It includes abstracts of each section and a list of other Company manuals.
Section 1000 Quick Reference Guide) and the index at the end of the manual refer-
ence particular topics.
This manual is in two volumes:
Volume 1 includes Part I, Fire Prevention, and Part II, Fire Preparedness and
Control, as well as the appendices.
Volume 2 includes Part III, General Design Guidelines, and Part IV, Specific Facili-
ties. Volume 2 also contains industry codes and standards.

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50 Using This Manual Fire Protection Manual

Scope and Application

The Fire Protection Manual provides guidelines for fire prevention, preparedness,
and control. These guidelines include comprehensive background information
about most aspects of fire protection, general design guidelines, and guidelines for
specific facilities. The appendices contain reminder sheets, checklists, and fire
pump testing procedures.
This manual is written for both fire protection professionals and nonspecialists,
regardless of experience. This manual should not be used as a substitute for sound
engineering judgment.
The intent of this manual is to provide practical, useful information and theory
based on Company experience and established practices. Forms are provided in the
front of the manual for your convenience in suggesting changes. Your knowledge
and experience are important for improving subsequent printings and keeping this
manual up-to-date.

Organization
The colored tabs in the manual will help you find information quickly.
• White tabs are for table of contents, introduction, appendices, PC disks, index,
and general purpose topics.
• Blue tabs denote engineering guidelines.
• Gray tabs are for model specifications, industry standards, and standard drawings.
• Red tab marks a place to keep documents developed at your facility.

Engineering Guidelines
The following are abstracts of each section of this manual.

Volume 1

Part I — Fire Prevention

Section 100, Introduction to Fire Prevention
This section covers the Company's policy on fire protection and briefly discusses
the principles of combustion.

Section 200, Fire Prevention Through Operation

This section discusses operating practices, standards, regulations, and codes. It
discusses sources of ignition and their control.

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Fire Protection Manual 50 Using This Manual

Section 300, Prevention Through Inspection and Maintenance

Inspection and maintenance activities must be integrated into the loss prevention
program. This section discusses elements of inspection and maintenance from the
fire protection view.

Part II — Fire Preparedness and Control

Section 400, Emergency Response Organization
Organization, clear definition of responsibilities, and prefire planning are key
elements of emergency response that are discussed in this section.

Section 500, Fire Training

This section addresses training requirements of OSHA 1910.120 (HAZWOPER)
and 1910.156 (Fire Brigades) as well as those appropriate for Company employees
responding to a fire emergency. Coordination of training with support personnel
and public fire departments is discussed.

Section 600, Fighting the Fire

This section covers basic fire fighting procedures for any fire, and especially
considers fire fighting for all types of fires likely to be encountered in petroleum
facilities.

Section 700, Fire Investigation and Report

This section discusses the general procedure for investigating a fire. Preparation of
the fire report is also discussed.
Appendix A Work Plans and Permits
Appendix B Fire Protection Checklist
Appendix C LPG Handling and Storage — Loss Prevention Checklist
Appendix D FIRE Computer Database System User Guide
Appendix E Fire Extinguisher and Equipment Inspection and Maintenance
Appendix F Fire Water System and Pump Testing
Appendix G Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects
Appendix H Building Siting Assessments: Guidelines for API RP 752

Volume 2

Part III — General Design Guidelines

Section 1000, Quick Reference Guide
This section references basic Company and industry design guidelines related to
fire loss prevention.

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50 Using This Manual Fire Protection Manual

Section 1100, Basic Design Principles

This section introduces the general design concerns addressed in the design guide-
lines contained in Sections 1200 through 1300.

Section 1200, Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

This section covers risk analysis in general. It gives simple procedures for calcu-
lating radiant heat from a fire and pressure effects from an explosion. It also
discusses dispersion modeling in general terms.

Section 1300, Layout and Spacing

This section discusses the layout of plants and the use of facility and equipment
spacing in design to minimize the potential for fire to spread to adjacent facilities.
Figures 1300-1 and 1300-2 at the end of this section give spacing guidelines for
plant-to-plant and plant-to-equipment spacing.
This section primarily covers process plants. Layout and spacing requirements for
other types of facilities are covered in Sections 3100 to 4100. Drainage is discussed
in Section 1400. Location and protection of critical controls are discussed in
Section 1700. Tank spacing is discussed in the Tank Manual.

Section 1400, Drainage

Detailed information on drainage system design is included in the Civil and Struc-
tural Manual, Section 500. This section discusses the design considerations for
drainage systems related to fire protection. A well designed drainage system will:
• Contain spills, preferably in a closed system.
• Carry oil spills, rainwater and fire water to a safe location where the spill can
be retained and recovered.
• Minimize the spread and area of exposure from spills and fires in process plants,
tankfields, marketing terminals, chemical plants, production platforms, etc.
This section is primarily for process facilities. For drainage requirements specific to
other types of facilities, see Section 3100 to 4100. For drainage around tanks and in
tank fields, see the Tank Manual.

Section 1500, Electrical Classification

This section presents the basis for determining electrical area classification
(commonly called area classification) for locations that may become hazardous
because of flammable liquids, gases, or vapor. It includes definitions of classified
locations, along with guidelines to be used in determining the extent of area classifi-
cation required. This section should be used in conjunction with API RP 500 and
NFPA 30. The Electrical Manual, Section 300, can be used for guidance on the
selection of types of equipment suitable for use in specific area classifications.

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Fire Protection Manual 50 Using This Manual

Section 1600, Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

This section provides fire water system design details and specifies fire fighting
equipment requirements. Preferred equipment locations and designs for various
facilities are also included.

Section 1700, Fireproofing

This section describes the relative merits, various types and properties of fire-
proofing materials. It gives guidance on how to determine what structures require
fireproofing and what materials are recommended, as well as recommended
suppliers and applicators. It also discusses the various types of fireproofed and fire
resistant systems for critical control systems.

Section 1800, Critical Instrumentation

This section discusses emergency isolation of equipment as a means of fire protec-
tion. More detailed design information on this subject is in the Instrumentation and
Control Manual, Section 1800.

Section 1900, Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors

This section highlights pressure relief valve and flare system requirements from a
fire protection viewpoint, and addresses conditions that place high demand on
relieving devices. The Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1200 and API
RP 520 and 521 are the primary references on relief valve and relief system design.
This section also describes the operation of and applications for thermal, water seal,
and stream velocity flame arrestors.

Section 2000, Process Equipment

This section discusses fire safety design features and techniques for preventing and
controlling fires around process equipment. Included are:
• Pumps
• Compressors
• Internal combustion engines
• Tanks
• Columns and vessels
• Fired heaters and boilers
• Heat transfer equipment
• Piping
This section supplements the detailed design information given in the Corporation
manuals for each of these subject areas.

Section 2100, Buildings/Facilities Design

This section covers fire-safe construction, fixed fire protection systems, fire water
systems, and safe personnel ingress and egress for buildings. Spacing will be
discussed in general; however, detailed spacing is covered in Section 1300, Layout
and Spacing. Warehouse fire protection considerations are discussed in Section 3800.

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50 Using This Manual Fire Protection Manual

Section 2200, Computer and Digital Instrument Installations

This section outlines fire protection guidelines for new computer and digital instru-
ment facilities, such as electronic data processing facilities, computer rooms, and
digital instrument process control rooms. Existing facilities should be evaluated
individually to determine if changes to implement these guidelines are justified.
This section also gives guidance on the use of Halon in computer installations.
Section 1660 discusses the environmental concerns in using Halon.

Section 2300, Utilities

This section discusses fire protection considerations related to steam generation
facilities (boilers), electrical generation and supply, instrument air systems, and
utility connections. Refer to the Utilities Manual for more information on utility
system design. Section 1600 discusses fire water systems design.

Part IV — Specific Facilities

Section 3100, Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities
This section establishes minimum fire protection and fire safety requirements for
manned and unmanned offshore facilities, and fixed and mobile drilling rigs and
vessels. Many of these requirements will also apply to single point moorings with
living quarters.
Fire prevention, rapid detection, and automatic and manual control of offshore
producing and drilling facilities during fire emergencies are emphasized. Because
of the confining nature of offshore facilities, well designed exposure protection and
complete evacuation facilities are warranted. Fire fighting facilities should be oper-
able with minimal manpower.

Section 3200, Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities

This section covers fire protection layout, design and installation, including mate-
rial selection and construction, for new onshore drilling and production facilities.
Also discussed is modification of existing facilities, with special attention to remote
and rural locations.

Section 3300, Marine Terminals And Marine Transportation

This guide presents design considerations and recommends fire protection systems
for marine terminal facilities. “Marine terminal” as used here is either an onshore or
offshore facility including, but not limited to, structures, equipment, and their appur-
tenances, used or capable of being used to transfer bulk cargo such as crude oil,
liquefied gases, petroleum products, and chemicals to or from a marine vessel.
Definitions and additional design and inspection guidance can be found in the refer-
ences listed in Section 3370. Criteria for coal and coke storage and handling are
addressed in the Fire Protection Manual, Section 4100.

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Fire Protection Manual 50 Using This Manual

Section 3400, Process Plants

Sections 1100 through 2300 give design guidelines as they relate to fire protection.
In general, these guidelines are applicable and important to process plants. This
section covers refinery process plants, petrochemical plants, and gas processing
plants.

Section 3500, LPG Storage

This section covers storage of flammable liquified petroleum gases (LPG) with a
vapor pressure exceeding 40 psia at 100°F. Examples include propane, propylene,
normal butane, isobutane, and butylenes. These materials are stored as liquids, but
are gaseous at atmospheric temperatures and pressures. LPG is contained in either
pressure storage (spheres and pressure storage drums) or low pressure storage in
refrigerated dome roof tanks or spheroids.
These types of facilities shall be designed in accordance with Section 1100 of the
Piping Manual. Section 1100 supplements API Standard 2510, “Design and
Construction of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Installations,” and gives Company
recommendations that exceed the API Standard. Both API 2510 and API Publica-
tion 2510A, “Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of Liqui-
fied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities,” are included in the Piping Manual.
This section of the Fire Protection Manual gives the background associated with
some of the more significant fire protection aspects of these designs.

Section 3600, Loading Racks

This section covers the fire safety features of facilities designed for truck tank or
tank car loading of refined products, LPG and asphalt.
This section contains fire protection recommendations for warehouses and outside
storage areas. This section pertains to Company-owned warehouses and should be
considered when leasing warehouses.

Section 3700, Compressor and Pump Stations And Pipelines

This section presents design considerations and recommends fire protection for
land-based compressor and pump stations, pipelines, and terminals. Loading and
unloading facilities at marine terminals are covered in Sections 3300 and 3600. Fire
protection for pumps and compressors is covered in Section 2000. Section 3790 is a
fire protection checklist for reciprocating gas compressors.

Section 3800, Warehouses and Outside Storage

This section contains fire protection recommendations for warehouses and outside
storage areas. This section pertains to Company-owned warehouses and should be
considered when leasing warehouses.

Section 3900, Laboratories and Pilot Plants

This guide presents design considerations and recommends fire protection for labo-
ratories handling hydrocarbons and chemicals, laboratories handling radioactive

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50 Using This Manual Fire Protection Manual

materials, and pilot plants. Laboratories handling radioactive materials capable of

nuclear chain reaction are not discussed.

Section 4000, Aviation Facilities

This guide provides fire protection criteria for small hangar and heliport facilities
including helidecks on offshore platforms and drilling rigs. Fueling operations are
also included. Hangars that exceed 12,000 square feet (1115 sq m) are not covered
by this guide (see NFPA 409).

Section 4100, Mining and Dust Handling

This section gives a brief overview of the fire protection considerations required
when designing and maintaining mining and bulk handling facilities. For additional
information not covered in this section, contact your local Safety, Fire, and Health
Specialist or the Fire Protection Staff.

Other Company Manuals

The text sometimes refers to documents in other Company manuals. These docu-
ments carry the prefix of that manual. The prefixes and their referents are:
Prefix Company Manual
CIV Civil and Structural
CMP Compressor
COM Coatings
CPM Corrosion Prevention
DRI Driver
ELC Electrical
EXH Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower
FFM Fluid Flow
HTR Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery
ICM Instrumentation and Control
IRM Insulation and Refractory
MAC General Machinery
NCM Noise Control
PIM Piping
PMP Pump
PPL Pipeline
PVM Pressure Vessel
TAM Tank
UTL Utilities
WEM Welding

[Revision Date] 50-8 Chevron Corporation

100 Introduction to Fire Prevention

Abstract
This section covers the Company's policy on fire protection and briefly discusses
the principles of combustion.

Contents Page

110 Fire Prevention Policy at Chevron 100-2

111 Corporate Policy 530
112 Principles of Fire Protection
113 Process Safety Management
114 Responsibilities of Personnel
120 Principles of Combustion 100-5
121 Definitions
122 Fire Triangle
123 Fuel
124 Source of Ignition
125 Spread of Flame
126 Explosion Hazard
127 Gas Testing
130 References 100-14

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100 Introduction to Fire Prevention Fire Protection Manual

110 Fire Prevention Policy at Chevron

This section gives the Company's policy on fire protection, lists the principles of
fire protection, and discusses how effective fire prevention includes good manage-
ment of process hazards. Responsibilities of personnel are also given.

111 Corporate Policy 530

Corporate Policy 530, dated October 5, 1989, for Safety, Fire, Health and the Envi-
ronment, sets the standard for fire prevention efforts in the Company. The policy
applies to Company operations worldwide and states:
It is the policy of Chevron Corporation to conduct its business in a socially
responsible and ethical manner that protects safety, health and the environment.
The goal is to be a leader within the industry by emphasizing innovation and
encouraging creative solutions, both of which will improve our competitive
position. To that end, the Company will:
– Integrate safety, fire, health and environmental protection into every aspect
of its business activities.
– Comply with all safety, fire, health and environmental laws or regulations
without regard to the degree of enforcement.
– Seek opportunities to participate in the formulation of safety, fire, health
and environmental legislation, regulation or policy issues that may signifi-
cantly impact our business. Work actively with the appropriate govern-
mental agencies to ensure timely, reasonable and cost effective solutions
for issues wherever possible.
– Encourage employees to initiate and maintain an open dialogue within the
Company and with the public or its agents regarding safety, fire, health
and environmental matters. This includes recognizing and responding as
appropriate to Company and community concerns about such matters.
– Follow relevant standards, good engineering practices and principles of
risk management to ensure Chevron's safety, fire, health and environ-
mental protection activities are conducted responsibly. This specifically
includes the design and siting of new facilities or modifications to existing
facilities.
– Exhibit socially conscious leadership and demonstrate exemplary safety,
fire, health and environmental performance.
– Conserve Company and natural resources by careful management of emis-
sions and discharges and by eliminating unnecessary waste generation.
This also includes wise use of energy in our operations. Discretionary envi-
ronmental, health and safety expenditures should be managed prudently to
enhance Chevron's long-term competitive position.
– Conduct scientific hazard and risk assessments, as needed, to identify,
characterize and safely manage any present or future potential hazards of
Company products and operations.
– Maintain a product stewardship program by taking the appropriate steps to
understand the health effects of Chevron products and to inform

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Fire Protection Manual 100 Introduction to Fire Prevention

employees, contractors, distributors, customers and the public with regard

to the proper handling, use and disposal of these products.
– Assess potential safety, fire, health and environmental liabilities prior to
the sale, lease, transfer or purchase of real property. Work to resolve any
problems created by past operations, practices or handling of oil or
hazardous materials.
– Ensure conformity with this policy by a comprehensive compliance
program including audits.

112 Principles of Fire Protection

The five principles below augment Corporate Policy 530. Fire protection programs
should be built on these principles.
• It is generally better to spend resources on fire prevention than on fire suppres-
sion.
• Facilities having fire potential are designed, built, and maintained in a manner
compatible with applicable industry codes and consensus standards.
• Fire protection is an integral part of the design, construction, maintenance, and
operation of a facility.
• Fire protection programs are maintained and kept up to date by periodic inspec-
tion to ensure effective performance.
• Those responsible for implementing fire prevention measures must know the
philosophy behind modern petroleum fire prevention programs and must under-
stand the fundamentals of ignition and combustion. The Fire Protection
Manual tries to give this needed information.

113 Process Safety Management

Fire protection includes concern for any release having the potential to ignite.
Because of this, a good fire protection plan for facilities having potential for fire
will include, in addition to specific fire protection programs outlined in this manual,
applicable elements of process safety management described below.
The objective of process safety management is to prevent accidental release of toxic
or flammable substances that have the potential for impacting the public. This
means having effective management controls in key areas of design, construction,
operation, and maintenance. The same elements of management control effective in
preventing large, accidental releases are equally effective in preventing small inci-
dents.
A process safety management program includes:
Process safety information. Facilities must have all current and necessary informa-
tion describing the hazards of the materials being handled, as well as applicable
process and mechanical design information, such as Piping and Instrumentation
Diagrams (P&IDs).

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100 Introduction to Fire Prevention Fire Protection Manual

Process hazards analysis. An analysis, using an accepted, recognized method,

such as a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), needs to be performed in order
to identify potential hazards, assess the likelihood and consequences of a failure,
and identify changes that could mitigate the risks involved.
Management of change. Many serious incidents have resulted from changes made
to a processing unit after initial designs are completed and the plant has been oper-
ating. All changes should be reviewed and all hazards associated with change
should be identified and controlled.
Operating procedures. Written operating procedures need clear instructions for all
phases of operation, including startup, shutdown, and interim activities (e.g., cata-
lyst decoking). The procedure should contain operating limits, and steps to avoid or
correct undesirable process deviations.
Safe work practices. Practices need to be set up to ensure the safe operation, main-
tenance and modification of our facilities as well as the control of materials and
substances that could affect process safety.
Training. All personnel operating and working in the facility must be trained
adequately. Training must be in accordance with accepted practices and standards
for the duties and responsibilities of personnel.
Critical equipment quality assurance and mechanical integrity. Critical equip-
ment needs to be identified, designed, fabricated, installed, and maintained in a
manner consistent with the service requirements. This includes maintenance,
testing, and integrated machinery inspection (IMI) procedures.
Pre-startup safety review. Pre-startup reviews must be conducted to confirm that
construction complies with the specifications and that safety, operating, mainte-
nance, and emergency procedures are in place and adequate.
Emergency response and control. An emergency response plan needs to be estab-
lished in accord with the requirements of OSHA 29 CFR 1910.38a, “Employee
Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Plans.” The plan should include emergency
procedures and hypothetical drills.
Incident investigation. Incidents that result in, or could have caused, a catastrophic
release need to be investigated in order to learn from the incident, prevent a recur-
rence, and help prevent similar incidents. This information should be disseminated
in a timely fashion to the rest of the Corporation.
Audit of the Process Safety Management Systems. All elements of process safety
management outlined above need to be audited periodically to ensure they are
being effectively implemented.
For more information on process safety management, refer to the American Petro-
leum Institute (API) RP 750, “Management of Process Hazards.”

114 Responsibilities of Personnel

Effective fire prevention requires giving the following responsibilities to personnel.

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Fire Protection Manual 100 Introduction to Fire Prevention

Management Responsibility
Responsibility for fire prevention lies ultimately with the management of each
facility. Management may delegate specific parts of fire prevention to subordinate
managers, supervisors, or specialists, but such personnel must be accountable to
management for properly carrying out the duties assigned them.

Employee Responsibility
Employees are responsible for their personal safety and for the safety of fellow
employees. This responsibility includes: following procedures outlined by manage-
ment, using and maintaining equipment as instructed, and being alert to unforeseen
fire hazards. Consistent with their training, employees should help prevent the
spread of fire and minimize any losses.

Employee Fire Fighting Responsibility

Employees must be trained for the level of fire response expected of them. Consis-
tent with this training, response might include varied roles, such as isolation of fuel
sources and suppression of incipient-stage fires. Employees expected to fight fires
beyond the incipient stage require appropriate training and personal protective
equipment.

120 Principles of Combustion

Effective fire prevention requires a thorough understanding of: 1) conditions under
which flammable and combustible materials vaporize; 2) what is meant by an ignit-
able or flammable mixture; and 3) what is meant by a source of ignition and how
combustion spreads from such a source. This section discusses these topics.

121 Definitions
Combustion (burning) is the rapid oxidation reaction between a reducing agent
(fuel) and an oxidizer (usually oxygen in the air) accompanied by the evolution of
heat and usually the production of flame.
Fuel means a material capable of combusting and particularly designates the mate-
rial (gas, liquid or solid) which feeds a fire.
Flammable refers to any material that is easily ignited and burns rapidly, usually
gases or liquids. A flammable liquid is one having a flash point below 100°F, and a
vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia at 100°F.
Combustible refers to a material that can burn and, with respect to accidental igni-
tion and flame spread, the word implies a lower degree of risk than “flammable.”
The word combustible is frequently applied to solid fuels and to liquids having a
flash point at or above 100°F.

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100 Introduction to Fire Prevention Fire Protection Manual

122 Fire Triangle

For a fire to start, three things must be present at the same time and place: fuel
(vapor), oxygen (air), and a source of ignition.
1. Fuel must be present in a vaporized form. Liquid fuel mists that are readily
converted to vapor or finely divided solid fuels have much the same combus-
tion characteristics as vapor. (Carbon and some metals are exceptions to the
general rule that fuel must be in the form of vapor before it can burn.)
2. Oxygen (usually in the form of air) must be present and mixed in suitable
proportion with the fuel vapor to form an ignitable mixture.
3. A source of ignition (high temperature and sufficient energy to start the chem-
ical reaction of combustion) must be present.

123 Fuel
How hazardous a fuel is depends on factors such as the fuel's vapor pressure, partial
pressure, flammable limits, and flash point. These factors, as wells as tests to
measure flammability, are discussed next.

Vapor Pressure
To understand the process of vaporization, consider the boundary surface between a
liquid and a closed air-free space above it. Molecules of the liquid tend to escape
the liquid state and assume the properties of gas. Other molecules previously
released may strike the liquid surface and re-enter it. When the number of mole-
cules leaving and re-entering the surface becomes equal, a state of equilibrium is
said to exist. At equilibrium, the pressure exerted by the molecules in the vapor
state is called the vapor pressure of the liquid at that temperature. Vapor pressure
is characteristic of any liquid. The vapor pressure of a liquid increases as its temper-
ature is raised.
To permit easy comparison, vapor pressures of petroleum liquids are usually
measured at a standard temperature—100°F—by the Reid method described in
ASTM Standard D-323. See Section 2.3 of API RP 2003 (in “Industry Specifica-
tions”) for a discussion of vapor pressure and flammability.
From the fire protection standpoint, it is the vapor pressure of petroleum liquid at
the temperature at which it is handled that is significant. This vapor pressure
controls the composition of the air-vapor mixture over the liquid surface.
Because vapor pressure cannot readily be measured in the low range where it is
significant as a criterion of fire hazard, testing a liquid to determine its flash point is
generally used to determine fire hazard. (Flash point is discussed below.)

Partial Pressure
If the space above the liquid should already contain a gas, for example, air vaporiza-
tion will proceed exactly as above. When equilibrium is established, the space
above the liquid will contain just as many vapor molecules as though the air were

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Fire Protection Manual 100 Introduction to Fire Prevention

not present. Moreover, the vapor exerts the same pressure as it would exert if it
occupied the entire volume by itself. The air is still present, however, and continues
to exert its original pressure. Thus the total pressure exerted by the vapor-plus-air
mixture will equal the sum of these two pressures. The pressures exerted by each of
these components are called their “partial pressures.” The partial pressure of the
vapor, divided by the total pressure of air-plus-vapor, is the volume percent concen-
tration of the vapor.

Vol %vapor = Ppvapor/(Pair + Pvapor)

Flammable Limits
A fuel vapor-air mixture cannot be ignited unless the ratio of vapor to air lies within
certain well-defined limits called the lower and upper limits of flammability. These
limits are usually expressed in terms of volume percent at atmospheric pressure and
temperature. The smallest concentration (percentage by volume) of fuel vapor in a
vapor-air mixture that can be ignited is called the lower flammable limit (LFL).
Similarly, the highest percentage by volume of fuel vapor in air in which ignition
can be produced is called the upper flammable limit (UFL). The region between
these two percentages is called the flammable range.
For gasoline vapors, this range extends from a little over 1% to almost 8% by
volume of gasoline vapor in air. Mixtures containing less than about 1% are said to
be too lean to burn; they cannot be ignited by any source of ignition, however
intense. Mixtures containing more than about 8% are said to be too rich to burn. A
closed space filled with such a mixture cannot be ignited, but the mixture can be
further diluted so that it will ignite and burn if the mixture is allowed to escape into
the open air.
Figure 100-1 shows the flammability limits of a combustible vapor as a function of
temperature in air at a constant initial pressure.
Figure 100-2 lists representative chemicals and their respective flammable limits.

Effect of Oxygen Content on Flammable Limits

When the vapor is mixed with an atmosphere containing more than the normal 21%
of oxygen, the LFL is only slightly lowered, but the UFL is raised, thus broadening
the flammable range. With mixtures of fuel vapor in pure oxygen, the range may be
as much as seven times that of vapor in air. Conversely, when the vapor is mixed
with an atmosphere containing less than the normal 21% of oxygen, the flammable
range is narrowed. Here, again, the lower limit is only slightly affected, but the
upper limit is reduced. At some point where the oxygen in the original atmosphere
is reduced to around 12 to 15%, depending on the diluent gas used, it becomes
impossible to produce a flammable mixture with any proportion of hydrocarbon
fuel vapor.
Inerting. It is possible to prevent the formation of a flammable mixture by diluting
the atmosphere with a gas lean in oxygen (say, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, or flue
gas). This practice is commonly, though somewhat incorrectly, called “inerting.”

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Fig. 100-1 Flammable Limits of a Combustible Vapor as a Function of Temperature, in Air at a Constant
Initial Pressure
Legend:

AIT
Auto-ignition temperature. The minimum
temperature at which a material begins
to self-heat at a high enough rate to
result in combustion—reported in the
Data Guides as the temperature in air at
one atmosphere.

TL
Equilibrium temperature at which the
lower flammable limit composition exists
over liquid in dry air at one atmosphere
(theoretical flash point).

Tu
Equilibrium temperature at which the
upper flammable limit composition exists
over liquid in dry air at one atmosphere.

Figure 100-3, on pages following, shows the flammability limits of a combustible

vapor in air as the mixture is inerted.

Flash Point
A fuel's flash point is the lowest temperature at which the vapor pressure of the
liquid is just sufficient to produce a mixture at the LFL. A fuel's flash point is a
good indicator of flammability.
Flash point test. The flash point test involves the concepts of both volatility and
flammable range. Consider a flammable liquid at a temperature so low that the
vapor pressure over the liquid surface is insufficient to produce an equilibrium
mixture within the flammable range. As the temperature is slowly increased, the
vapor pressure will rise and the amount of vapor in the mixture above the liquid
surface will increase. Until the LFL is reached, introduction of a source of ignition
such as a small flame into the vapor space will not cause combustion. When the
composition reaches the LFL, introduction of a flame will cause ignition, and flame
will spread momentarily across the oil surface. This is the method used in the
flash point test. See Section 1-2, NFPA 30 in “Industry Specifications” for accept-
able flash point tests.
There is no generally accepted corresponding test to determine the higher tempera-
ture at which the vapor composition over a liquid passes out of the flammable range
into the “too rich” region. Consequently, temperatures corresponding to the UFL
are not as generally available as those for the LFL.

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Fig. 100-2 Properties of Flammable Liquids and Gases(1)

Lower and Upper
Flammable Limits(2), Auto-ignition Flash Boiling
Product % by Volume Temperature, °F Point,°F Point,°F
Specific Auto- Vapor
Gravity ignition Density Closed
LFL UFL (Water=1) Temp., °F (Air=1) Cup
Acetone 2.5 13 0.8 869 2.0 -4 133
Acetylene 2.5 100 - 581 0.9 (gas) -118
Ammonia 15 28 0.7 1204 0.6 (gas) -28
Benzene 1.3 7.9 0.9 928 2.8 12 176
n-Butane 1.6 8.4 - 550 2.0 (gas) 31
(3) (4) (4) (4) (4)
Crude Oil NDA NDA .75-1.04 NDA NDA <59-199 100-1500
(3)
Diesel 0.6 7.5 <1 428-600 5-6 Per 175-340
Specification
Ethane 3.0 12.5 - 882 1.0 (gas) -128
Ethanol 3.3 19 .8 685 1.6 55 173
Ethyl 2.8 18 0.8 572 2.1 <0 95
Mercaptan
Ethylene 2.7 36 - 842 1.0 (gas) -155
Gasoline(3) 1.4 7.6 0.7 - 0.8 430-797 3-4 -49 77- 419
(Super
Unleaded)
n-Hexane 1.1 7.5 0.7 437 3.0 -7 156
Hydrogen 4.0 75 - 932 0.1 (gas) -422
Hydrogen 4.0 44 - 500 1.2 (gas) -76
Sulfide
iso-Butane 1.8 8.4 - 860 2.0 (gas) 11
JP-4 1.3 8 - 464 - -10 to +30 -
M85(4)(5) 2 34 <1 725 - 896 2 - 77-419
Methane 5.0 15.0 - 999 0.6 (gas) -259
Methyl 6.0 36 0.8 867 1.1 52 147
Alcohol
MTBE(3) 2.5 15.1 .74 435 3.1 -22 131
n-Pentane 1.5 7.8 0.6 500 2.5 <-40 97
Propane 2.1 9.5 - 842 1.6 (gas) -44
Propylene 2.0 11.1 - 851 1.5 (gas) -53
Toluene 1.2 7.1 0.9 896 3.1 40 231
(1) From NFPA 325M, “Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases and Volatile Solids.”
(2) In air at normal atmospheric temperature and pressure.
(3) Data from Chevron Material Data Sheet.
(4) “No data available.” Varies by type of oil. Crude oil is considered a flammable liquid.
(5) 15% methanol, 85% unleaded gasoline.

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Fig. 100-3 Flammability Limits of a Combustible Vapor as a Function of Added Inert

Contrary to what the words might seem to imply, “flash point” does not mean the
temperature at which a “flash” appears spontaneously; introduction of a source of
ignition is essential. Increasing flash point temperature is usually associated
with decreasing hazard, high flash point means low hazard and vice versa.
Flash points of fuels. The flash point of gasoline, the most commonly used volatile
petroleum liquid, is well below 0°F at atmospheric pressure. At ordinary handling
temperatures, the vapor pressure of gasoline is high enough to produce an equilib-
rium mixture above the UFL in a closed air space.
Kerosenes and domestic fuel oils usually have flash points within the range 100°F
to 150°F. For industrial fuel oils, the minimum flash point is usually above 150°F.
This means that these oils will not usually produce ignitable mixtures over their
surfaces unless heated.
Crude oils vary widely as to their characteristics and may range from thin, light
gravity liquids more volatile than ordinary gasoline to thick heavy substances such
as asphalt. Therefore, to determine the flammability of any particular crude oil, it is
necessary to know its characteristics. So called “refinable” crude usually contains
sufficient light components to place it in a flash point classification comparable
with gasoline.
See Figure 100-2 for flash points for selected chemicals.

124 Source of Ignition

In the preceding discussion of the “fire triangle,” the third requirement for fire was
designated simply as “source of ignition,” with the reservation that, for the partic-
ular chemical reaction concerned, considerations of both temperature and energy
are involved.

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An ignition source serves as the “starter” for the process of combustion. Thereafter,
the heat of combustion itself provides the energy for continuation of the reaction, so
long as properly proportioned supplies of fuel and air are available.
Different fuel substances have different ignition characteristics. The possibility of
ignition is influenced by ambient conditions, by fuel temperature, and by size, dura-
tion, and energy of the potential source of ignition.
It is difficult to strictly define an ignition source and to assign to any fuel substance
a particular ignition characteristic (such as the so-called “ignition temperature”)
that will be an unvarying property under all conditions. However, general character-
istics can be discussed.
Refer to Section 220 for additional information on sources of ignition and their
control.

Ignition Characteristics of Fuel

Fuel substances vary widely in their susceptibility to ignition. Variability depends
on physical state and chemical composition of the fuel, nature of the ignition
source, and conditions under which the two are brought together. For gas-air
mixtures, ignition is commonly thought to be an almost instantaneous process,
although this is not true under some conditions discussed later. Solid substances
usually must be vaporized before ignition can occur, thus involving a distinct time
element. Although rigid classification is impossible, common fuel substances fall
roughly into three groups:
• Easily ignited —chemically active vapors and gases such as:
Ignition Energy
Carbon Disulfide 1.5 x 10-4 Joules
Ethylene 0.7 x 10-4 Joules
Acetylene 0.2 x 10-4 Joules
Hydrogen 0.2 x 10-4 Joules

• Less easily ignited—hydrocarbon gases and vapors, including all of the prod-
ucts of petroleum together with most oxygen-containing organic chemicals
such as alcohols, ethers, acetones, etc., that have higher ignition energy require-
ments.
Ignition Energy
Methane 4.7 x 10-4 Joules
Ethane 2.85 x 10-4 Joules
Propane 3.05 x 10-4 Joules
Methanol 2.15 x 10-4 Joules
Dimethylether 2.9 x 10-4 Joules
Methyl Ethylketone 5.3 x 10-4 Joules

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• Slowly ignitable at low temperature—Cellulose-containing solids such as

paper, wood, and rags which, under long exposure to relatively low tempera-
tures, may dry out, char, finally glow and possibly burst into flame.
Within each group the energy required for ignition will vary, depending on the
nature of the ignition source and on the oxygen concentration. If the atmosphere
contains more than the normal amount of oxygen, ignition will be facilitated.

125 Spread of Flame

In a vapor-air mixture of flammable proportions, flame that started at one point will
spread in all directions until all of the mixture is consumed. The rate at which the
flame front moves—the rate of flame propagation—is subject to wide variation.
Rates. For mixtures near the upper or lower limit of their flammable range (near
their UFL or LFL), at which the reaction is barely self-sustaining, the flame propa-
gation rate is low—1/2 foot per second or less—and no significant pressure rise
results. Mixtures closer to the center of the flammable range produce more
vigorous flames that not only spread faster initially but also tend to accelerate. The
flame propagation rate is also influenced by the nature of the combustible material.
Maximum rates of flame propagation, with accompanying maximum explosive
effects, occur in mixtures slightly on the rich side of the flammable range.
In the open, a petroleum-vapor air mixture may burn at speeds up to about 8 to 10
feet per second, with no spectacular manifestation beyond the appearance of the
flame and an outward rush of gases characteristic of an unconfined explosion.
Unconfined vapor cloud explosions (UVCE) are discussed in Section 1200.
If burning occurs in a closed space, the heat of combustion produces a rise in pres-
sure. This can be eight to ten times the initial pressure. If the pressure exceeds the
strength of the container (e.g., a tank), failure will result and an “explosion” is said
to have occurred. If the container is strong enough (e.g., the cylinder of a gasoline
engine), there may be no external manifestation at all.
Detonation. In a container that provides opportunity for a long path of flame travel,
such as a pipeline or large process vessel, ignition of a mixture capable of
producing a fast-moving flame may lead to “detonation.” Instead of a layer-by-
layer process of flame spread, the energy to initiate flame is transferred to the
unburned gas mixture ahead of the flame front by means of a shock wave. Detona-
tion in gas mixtures travels above the speed of sound in atmospheric air, and the
sudden release of energy can produce destructive effects many times more severe
than the relatively low pressure rise of ordinary burning.
The tendency to detonate is associated with a high initial rate of flame travel and
high energy release per unit volume, so it is favored by high initial pressure,
oxygen-enriched atmospheres, and such fuels as hydrogen and acetylene. See
Section 1200 for more information.
Flashback velocity. A type of flame propagation called “flashback” is best
explained by example. Consider the Bunsen burner. Air and gas in premixed propor-
tions within the flammable range can be ignited above the burner tube, where the

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velocity has become slow by expansion of the stream, but the flame does not pass
down into the tube (or “flash back”) because the flow velocity of the mixture in the
Bunsen burner tube is higher than the rate of flame propagation in the turbulent
burning mixture above. If the flow velocity is sufficiently reduced, flashback can
occur. The rate at which flashback occurs is the flashback velocity. Earliest
attempts to measure the rate of flame propagation used the Bunsen burner method.
Flashback velocity depends on composition of the mixture, and to a lesser extent on
tube diameter. Velocities determined by the Bunsen burner method are reproducible
and are free of the variations and uncertainties that accompany burning rates of
mixtures initially at rest in pipes or vessels. Hence, velocities measured by the
Bunsen burner method may be used with confidence in the design of burners and in
the appraisal of risk of flashback in pipes, certain types of flame arrestors, etc.
Flashback velocity for a typical hydrocarbon vapor and air mixture is approxi-
mately 10 feet per second.

126 Explosion Hazard

Determining the percentage composition of mixtures of flammable vapor with air is
of great importance. Mixtures that are too lean to burn are not a fire hazard,
although if a mixture should be close to the LFL, consider the possibility that
changing conditions, such as an increase in temperature, might make the composi-
tion flammable.
Mixtures that are too rich to burn are not a fire hazard, but because such mixtures
may become diluted with enough air to become flammable, the surrounding condi-
tions must be carefully reviewed to see if a potential explosion hazard exists.
Mixtures within their flammable range are potentially very dangerous because it
requires only the presence of a source of ignition to produce a fire or explosion.
The degree of hazard depends upon the volume of the mixture, its location, the
degree of confinement, and the likelihood that a source of ignition might acciden-
tally occur. Flammable mixtures in large volume in partially or wholly confined
spaces (tanks, basements, etc.) are particularly dangerous because the force of the
explosion may destroy the enclosure and damage adjacent equipment. The likeli-
hood of severe destructive effects is increased when the mixture is initially above
atmospheric pressure in a vessel capable of sustaining a proportionally high pres-
sure before failure. The hazard is particularly serious if people are required to be in
or adjacent to such structures.

127 Gas Testing

Petroleum vapors in the range from zero up to the LFL can be detected by portable
combustible gas indicators. The scale of combustible gas detectors generally is
marked in percentages of the LFL. The “Lower Flammable Limit (LFL),” marked
near the upper end of the scale, indicates 100% of the LFL. The instrument must be
calibrated for the hydrocarbon or flammable vapor being sampled. Refer to the
manufacturers' instructions for limitations on accuracy of the instrument when cali-

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brated on a vapor other than the one being sampled, or when the atmosphere is
contaminated with inert gases, H2S or high moisture levels.
Tests of atmospheres within any confined space are required before hot work is
performed or personnel are permitted to enter. Plant, facility or department rules
generally prescribe the methods for testing and set limits within which entrance is
prohibited. These limits usually are only a small percentage of the LFL of the
composition (typically 10% LFL). In some states, legal requirements have been
established with respect to hot work (as a percentage of the LFL), and the entry of
spaces in which flammable or toxic vapors may be present (e.g., Cal/OSHA State
of California, Paragraph 6777, 6793, 6810). These limits are given as threshold
limit values (TLVs). Section 300 of this manual and API Publication 2207 cover
gas testing as applied to the cleaning of tanks and process vessels.

Testing for Rich Mixtures

Determining the exact composition of vapor mixtures within or above the flam-
mable range is a special problem. A rough idea of the composition may be obtained
with a combustible gas indicator by the use of a dilution valve or by other special
techniques, but precise knowledge of the flammability of rich mixtures or those
containing inert gas must be derived from laboratory analysis or direct explosion
test. We seldom need to know the exact composition of mixtures above the LFL.
All such mixtures must be considered potentially dangerous because dilution with
air can bring them within the flammable range, a possibility that depends more on
the source of vapor and the physical surroundings than it does on the original
composition.

130 References
General References
Zabetakis, M. G., “Flammability Characteristics of Combustible Gases and
Vapors,” U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Bulletin 627, 1965.
Coward, H. F., G. W. Jones, “Limits of Flammability for Gases and Vapors,” U. S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Bulletin 503, 1952
Hilado, C. J., S. W. Clark, “Autoignition Temperatures of Organic Compounds,”
Chemical Engineering, Sept. 4, 1972, pp 75-80
Chemical Safety Data Sheets, Manufacturing Chemists Association, Inc.
Calcote, H. F., C. A. Gregory, Jr., C. M. Barrett, and Ruth B. Gilmer, “Spark Igni-
tion Effect of Molecular Structure,” Ind. Eng. Chem. 44, 2659, 1952

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Fire Protection Manual 100 Introduction to Fire Prevention

American Petroleum Institute (API)

API 750 Management of Process Hazards
API 2003 Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Light-
ning and Stray Currents
API 2207 Preparing Tank Bottoms for Hot Work
API 2214 Spark Ignition Properties of Hand Tools

American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM)

ASTM D-323 Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 325M Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases, and
Volatile Solids

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

Title 29 CFR, Part 1910.38a, “Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention
Plans”

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200 Fire Prevention Through
Operation

Abstract
This section discusses operating practices, standards, regulations, and codes. It
discusses sources of ignition and their control.

Contents Page

210 Importance of Operation 200-3

211 Operating Practices and Standards
212 Published Regulations
213 Advisory Codes
220 Sources of Ignition and Their Control 200-4
221 Open Flames
222 Mobile Equipment
223 Powered Electrical Ignition Sources
224 Hot Surfaces
225 Propagation Through Pipe Lines
226 Vapor Recovery and Carbon Filter Beds
230 Static Electricity and Lightning 200-12
231 Definition
232 Static Electricity as a Source of Ignition
233 Generation and Accumulation
234 Mitigation Methods
235 Hazardous Situations
236 Lightning- and Storm-induced Charges
240 Autoignition, Spontaneous Combustion, Pyrophorics 200-18
241 Autoignition

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242 Spontaneous Combustion

243 Pyrophorics
244 Other Chemicals and Materials
250 Minimizing Contact With Air 200-23
251 General
252 Unavoidable Contacts
253 Other Precautions
260 Eliminating Unnecessary Combustibles 200-25
270 References 200-26

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210 Importance of Operation

The operations management in charge of any facility carries first-line responsibility
for minimizing fire hazards. The on-shift operating personnel must constantly
monitor changes in operating conditions—changes in pressure, temperature, flow,
speed, sound, vibration, smell, appearance, concentration, the level or the presence
of water, vapor or oil where the condition was previously different—so that if the
change is a warning of a condition that might result in fire, the operator will be
sensitive to it. Every change in operating procedure, equipment, or even the char-
acter of the stock being handled may have an influence on risk of fire hazard.
Steps such as draining lines, steaming out vessels, venting pumps, or lighting
furnaces, must not be permitted to become routine, but must be thoughtfully
conducted and checked under current operating conditions to make sure that the
objectives of the operation are achieved safely.

211 Operating Practices and Standards

The employees at each Company facility should be guided in fire prevention prac-
tices by rules, regulations, and standards adapted to conditions in their facility.
Employees must be familiar with these regulations and thoroughly understand their
duties under them. To this end, supervisors should arrange for their employees to
receive training, and they should also audit the results to assure that training is
understood. The objective of all such practices and procedures is for all employees
to recognize their responsibilities for observing fire protection precautions under
both routine and emergency conditions. It is important that procedures be
audited and updated to ensure that actual practice and written procedures are
in agreement. It is important to practice these procedures monthly.

212 Published Regulations

The operating practices adopted in this manual are those which, on the basis of long
experience, are regarded by the Company as an effective and economical means of
minimizing the risk of fire. Legal regulations (e.g., OSHA regulations), apply to the
operation of most petroleum industry properties in the United States and must be
followed. Similar regulations may apply elsewhere. Various petroleum industry
organizations frequently represent industry point of view with Governmental agen-
cies so that new or revised legislation is reasonable, practical, and enforceable.

213 Advisory Codes

Many codes, standards, and recommended practices, such as those issued by the
National Fire Protection Association and the American Petroleum Institute describe
good practices in the safe handling of flammable substances. Except where adopted
as a legal requirement, these documents should be regarded as advisory, and the
standards set forth in this manual should be given preference in any point of differ-
ence. There are many ways to achieve safe operation. Process Safety Management
(see Section 110) is a systematic way to review all aspects of a facility, identify

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risks, and initiate corrective action. While it may be reasonable to follow advisory
codes alone, other combinations of design standards and operating practices may be
equally acceptable.

220 Sources of Ignition and Their Control

There are three primary sources of ignition:
• flames
• sparks
• hot surfaces
Section 230 discusses static electricity, and Section 240 covers forms of auto-ignition
and spontaneous combustion. This section discusses the other sources of ignition.
Potential Hazards. In evaluating the importance of potential sources of ignition, it
is necessary to take into account both the hazardous potential of the ignition source
and the likelihood that there will be material in the vicinity to ignite. For example,
open flames and welding arcs are sources of ignition and will invariably ignite any
flammable mixture they contact. On the other hand, an electric extension cord can
cause a fire only if mechanical or electrical failure occurs or they are unplugged in
the presence of a flammable mixture.
The chance that a flammable mixture of hydrocarbon vapor, a mist or spray of
hydrocarbon liquid, or a combustible dust mixture will be present must also be
considered, together with the probable size of the area involved. Flammable or
combustible mixtures of inconsequential volume may be frequently or continuously
present in immediate vicinity of small leaks (at valve stems, etc.) without
producing any serious fire hazard. Control of sources of ignition is usually not
based upon such inconsequential fuel sources, but rather is directed toward
preventing ignition of large quantities of fuel which might be released by some acci-
dent or abnormal condition.
Job Planning. Construction and maintenance operations using equipment that may
be a source of ignition, such as cutting and welding, open flames, air-powered
tools, sparking electrical tools, gasoline or diesel engines, or other equipment that
may produce an ignition source, should be carefully controlled. Control of these
activities is discussed in Section 300.

221 Open Flames

Open flames are obvious sources of ignition. Flames of the shortest possible dura-
tion will ignite properly proportioned flammable vapor-air mixtures. Continuing
flame can also volatize solid or liquid fuels and ignite the vapor released. Once the
chemical reaction of combustion starts, the heat of the reaction releases the energy
(flame) that propagates the process. Open flames occur whenever fired heaters are
in operation; where welding, cutting, or brazing torches are in use; where waste gas
is disposed of by burning; or where other waste materials are disposed of by
burning in sumps, bonfires, etc. Other common types of open flames that might be

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Fire Protection Manual 200 Fire Prevention Through Operation

encountered are laboratory-type burners, matches and lighters. This section is

concerned with precautions that should be taken in the operation of such equipment.
Fired Heaters. Operating and emergency procedures to avoid tube ruptures or
explosions in fired heaters are discussed in the Fired Heater and Waste Heat
Recovery Manual.
Welding and Cutting. When welding or torch cutting must be done in areas where
sparks may reach combustible materials, precautions should be taken to prevent
their ignition by wetting down the area, providing wet tarpaulins (or fire blankets)
to deflect sparks, etc. Provide a charged fire hose, dry chemical extinguisher, or
other portable fire control equipment for immediate use in the vicinity of welding
jobs in pipe trenches and similar locations where it is not practicable to wholly
avoid the presence of combustible materials. A fire (or hot work) permit should be
obtained for each job before starting the work (see Section 300).
Smoking. Smoking is not permitted in petroleum handling facilities, except in areas
designated by management as safe for this purpose. Smoking areas should be
clearly identified and posted.
Matches and Lighters. “Strike anywhere” matches or lighters with an exposed
thumb wheel, which can produce flame if dropped, are prohibited anywhere petro-
leum products are handled or stored. Spark-type lighters for gas cutting torches
should be sheathed or otherwise protected against accidental operation.

222 Mobile Equipment

Operation of gasoline-, diesel-, or electric-driven mobile equipment around petro-
leum properties or in areas where combustible dust may be present should be
controlled by regulations adapted to the hazards of the particular property. Such
vehicles should not be driven into a vapor cloud nor permitted to operate where
petroleum vapor may be released, such as in the vicinity of open separators, spills
or volatile liquids or gases, or in sulfur handling facilities. See Section 1500. All
hazardous areas requiring vehicle entry must have procedures for vapor testing and
procedures for permits prior to entry. This includes tank fields as well as process
plant areas.
Modern automotive catalytic converters operate at temperatures high enough
(450°F) to ignite dried grass or brush. Precautions to avoid igniting grass or brush
include:
• Avoid leaving lease roads and driving cross-country.
• Avoid parking off the road. If necessary to do so, check for any accumulation
of flammable materials near the catalytic converter.
Industrial Trucks. Industrial trucks, such as tractors, platform lift trucks, fork lift
trucks, motorized hand trucks and other specialized industrial trucks powered by
internal combustion engines or electrically powered units that are to be operated in
classified areas, should be approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory
for operation in those areas. This is a legal requirement for U.S. facilities.

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Approved units are commercially available. Nonapproved equipment can be used in

a hazardous area if a hot work permit is issued for each use.
Highway Vehicles. Highway vehicles include automobiles, pickup trucks, boom
trucks, cargo trucks, cranes and other motorized vehicles suitable for the highway.
There are no commercially available highway vehicles approved for operating in
hazardous areas. At the present time no manufacturer produces or offers modifica-
tions for these vehicles that would make the vehicle acceptable for approval for
operating within hazardous areas.
If it is not possible to keep all highway-type vehicles out of potentially hazardous
areas, then those few specific pieces of equipment may be given special treatment
(as discussed in Section 2030) to reduce the hazard. Where this is done, an inspec-
tion and maintenance program, with audit, should be set up to insure the integrity of
the special safeguards provided. Caution! These modified vehicles may still
cause an ignition. They should never be driven into areas where flammable vapor
or gas is known to exist.

223 Powered Electrical Ignition Sources

Electric sparks are extremely hot, but their total energy varies widely. The fact that
a spark is readily visible is not proof that it can cause ignition. The electrical charac-
teristics of the system (open circuit voltage, resistance, capacitance, and induc-
tance) control the energy available. While the limiting minimum spark energy
necessary to produce ignition of a fuel mixture can be determined for some simple
systems (e.g., a jump spark, where capacitance and length are the only variables),
other variables affect the minimum spark energy. These include the size and shape
of the electrodes and their spacing or rate of separation.
Failure or improper use of electrical apparatus, including electronic control
systems, may cause sparks or arcs capable of igniting flammable mixtures. This
section discusses powered electrical ignition sources. Section 230 discusses static
electricity and lightning.

Power Electricity
Power Wiring. Overhead power lines do not ordinarily present a serious fire
hazard, even though they pass through areas that, at ground level, might be suscep-
tible to the accidental presence of flammable mixtures. However, during mainte-
nance or repair work, workers should be extremely careful that crane booms, long
pipes, etc., do not touch overhead power lines and create an ignition hazard as well
as expose employees to shock hazard. Never drive with crane boom elevated.
Similarly, buried electrical conductors can be an ignition source and shock hazard
during excavating or other construction work. Supervisors approving excavating
work should make sure that workers are warned about buried lines. Their exact loca-
tion should be marked as summarized in the Safety in Designs Manual and the
means of identifying them should be clearly explained to workers. Always consult
“USA Alert” or another pipeline location clearing house to determine location of
buried lines at a job site. Utilities will respond to an inquiry within 48-hours.

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Electrical Installations. If electrical installations have been designed, maintained

and installed in accordance with applicable codes and Company regulations (see
Section 1500), ignition hazards from this source will generally occur only in the
event of improper operation or maintenance.
Extension Cords. Electric extension cords serving lights, welding generators, or
other portable electric equipment are a potential source of hazard if they are
mechanically damaged, or if extension cords are connected in series. Light duty
domestic extension cords over 100 feet long should not be used. Commercial cords
are available in longer lengths. Remember that power wiring, including extension
cords, consumes electrical power. When very long cords are used, power loss (“IR
drop”) is high. This may cause circuits to overload, increasing chance of a fire.
When extension cords must be used in areas where flammable mixtures may exist,
be sure that they are always in good condition, that they are protected from mechan-
ical damage and that there is no chance of short circuits occurring as they are
moved about. If plug connectors are used, they should be of a type approved for
such locations. Because portable electric lights are subject to breakage they should
be used as little as possible in such locations. When lights on extension cords must
be used, the bulb should be protected against breakage with an outer vapor globe.
Fluorescent lights are preferred over incandescent lights because they do not have a
white-hot filament.
Telephones. The ordinary desk or wall-type telephone instrument may be used in
Class I, Division 2 locations. Based on extensive testing by Bell Laboratories and
by Underwriters' Laboratories, on Bell models 500C, 500D, 554A and 554B tele-
phone sets, ordinary desk or wall-type telephones are permitted by the National
Electrical Code and by the State of California for use in Division 2 locations. If
none of these Bell models is available, a set by another manufacturer may be substi-
tuted if it is certified by the manufacturer to be electrically equivalent to one of the
approved Bell models, and if the switchboard with which these phone sets are to be
used does not use a battery voltage in excess of 50 volts for switching and commu-
nications. Higher AC ringing voltages (typically 90V, 20 Hertz) do not present an
ignition risk because there are no make-and-break contacts in the telephone instru-
ment in that circuit.
Do not use the following types of equipment in Division 2 locations: (1) telephone
sets having auxiliary lighting or multiple line selector buttons, because these were
not included in the Bell Labs and Underwriters' tests; (2) bells and howlers
connected to power circuits, and the relays which activate them, unless they are
explosion proof or remotely located; (3) Magneto-type field phones, because they
might produce incendiary sparks under certain conditions.
Low-energy Circuits. Some types of low-energy signal and communication
circuits, including thermocouple leads, do not contain sufficient electrical energy to
produce incendiary sparks. They require no special enclosures for use in Division 2
locations. However, before you use a specific piece of equipment in a classified
area, check with the Communications Technology Department. The Instrumen-
tation and Control Manual, Section 1400, “Intrinsic Safety” is also a good refer-
ence.

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Intrinsic safety. Some electric devices cannot release enough electrical or thermal
energy to ignite a specific atmospheric mixture within its flammable limits. Exam-
ples include low voltage instrumentation and electrical tachometer generators.
These devices have been determined by testing for certain atmospheres to be intrin-
sically safe. This means that even under fault conditions, for example mechanical
failure, it is not possible to produce a spark or hot surface capable of causing igni-
tion. Devices should not be considered intrinsically safe unless so labeled by a
recognized testing laboratory such as FM or UL.
Non-incendive equipment. Equipment, which in its normal operating condition
will not ignite a specific hazardous atmospheric mixture in its most easily ignited
concentration, is called non-incendive. (The equipment may include circuits with
sliding or make-break contacts releasing insufficient energy to cause ignition.
Circuits not containing sliding or make-break contacts can operate at energy levels
potentially capable of causing ignition under abnormal conditions.) The concept of
“non-incendive equipment” is recognized in the NEC.
Battery-powered Transistorized Radios and Devices. Battery-powered transistor-
ized equipment, such as two-way radios, voice amplifiers, pagers, and cellular
phones, must be listed or approved as suitable for the area classification by an inde-
pendent testing laboratory or by MSHA. While in a classified area, never open a
battery case to make repairs or change batteries. Battery replacements must agree
with the models shown as suitable for the device on the label. Never use battery-
powered equipment in an area known to have a flammable atmosphere, except flash-
lights, as outlined below.
Flashlights and Electric Lanterns. Flashlights approved for use in a Class I Divi-
sion 2 area are available through Purchasing, at prices comparable to ordinary flash-
lights and are preferred for use in areas that may contain flammable vapor.
Cameras. Ordinary cameras equipped with electric shutters can be safely used in
Division 2 locations provided reasonable precautions are observed, i.e., do not use
them in an area where a flammable vapor or gas mixture is likely to be present,
such as when a plant is upset or a spill is apparent. There should be no attempt to
make repairs or change batteries while in a classified area. When it is necessary to
use the camera in a Division 1 area, the area should be checked with a combustible
gas indicator and, if the area is vapor-free, the camera may be safely used.
Flash equipment should not be used in a Division 1 or Division 2 area without first
assuring that there is no flammable vapor or gas present at the time.
Portable Tools. Portable electric tools are normally sparking devices. They should
not be used where there is any appreciable chance that a flammable mixture may
occur. Air-powered tools for drilling, grinding, sawing, etc., may produce enough
frictional heat to cause ignition. They should not be used where there is any appre-
ciable chance that a flammable mixture may occur. Hand powered portable tools
are usually safe for use where a flammable mixture may be present. However, be
aware that hand tools can cause sparks in some circumstances, such as when chip-
ping rust or breaking up concrete.

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Relamping, Refusing, and Overloads on Motors. Replacing burned out lamps or

fuses while the circuit is live can cause a spark capable of igniting flammable
mixtures; these operations should be avoided if any abnormal conditions likely to
produce flammable mixtures exist. Use of oversize fuses, or the practice of shorting
out a fuse when suitable replacement fuses are not readily available, is prohibited.
If electric motors are operated at overload or stall for long enough periods, they
may overheat. This can break down the insulation and cause arcing. If this should
occur at a time when a flammable mixture is in the vicinity and the motor protec-
tive device is not properly sized and in good condition, a fire can result.

Stray Currents
A stray current is any electrical current, not deliberately applied, which may flow
through piping and connected vessels that are normally located in more or less inti-
mate contact with the ground. Consult API RP 2003 for more information (included
in this manual).
Stray currents are of two principal types, differentiated according to their source:
1. Those generated by cathodic protection systems, or occasionally by electrified
railroads or street railway systems
2. Those resulting from leakage from power lines.
Stray currents of either type are seldom of sufficient potential to cause sparks, but
the arcs which result from contact breaking (such as opening a pipe flange) may
ignite petroleum vapor.
If gas or volatile petroleum pipe lines carrying heavy stray currents are severed,
sufficient arcing may occur at the point of separation to cause an ignition. Where
stray currents are known or suspected, this possibility may be reduced by
connecting a short heavy-gage bond wire or “jumper” across the point where the
line is to be opened. In order to be effective, such a bond must have a reasonably
low electrical resistance; it is most important that the wire be attached to the pipe in
a substantial manner to provide minimum contact resistance. Single strand
aluminum wire should not be used in classified areas. The aluminum strand is not
very strong mechanically and is easily broken. This causes arcing as no other
strands are available to carry the current.
Stray currents can be present in wharf piping because of onshore cathodic protec-
tion systems. These currents can produce electrical arcs if bonded loading hose is
used between the ship and wharf because the ship is an excellent ground. To avoid
stray current arcs, use nonconductive loading hose. Another way to provide assur-
ance against stray current arcs is to use insulating flanges between the ship and
wharf piping.

224 Hot Surfaces

Rarely will the exposed hot surfaces of process piping or steam lines or process
equipment be operated at a temperature sufficient to ignite flammable mixtures of

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petroleum vapor and air. However, many such surfaces will be hot enough to ignite
lint, rags, paper, and even wood that may inadvertently be permitted to contact
them. Also, lines covered with insulation may be hot enough to ignite oil soaked
into the insulation, where the heat from initial slow oxidation is prevented from
escaping. Precautions should be taken to avoid oil getting into insulation on very
hot (400°F or over) surfaces. Remove such oil-soaked insulation immediately. See
API 2216 for more information.
Never allow the liquid level in a tank or vessel having internal heating coils to drop
below the top of the coils when the coils are in service. This is particularly impor-
tant for tanks that are heated for blending (e.g., asphalt, lube-oil blending tanks).
Fires have resulted from allowing hot coils to be exposed above the liquid level.
Stoves and Heaters. Electric stoves and heaters with open, glowing elements, and
oil or gas fired heaters, constitute a hazard equivalent to open flames discussed
earlier in this section. Their use should be restricted to areas where flammable
mixtures cannot occur.
An exception is catalytic combustion heaters. These may be safely used in areas
that would be classified Group D, Class I, Division 2 for electrical purposes, if the
heater is installed and operated in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. The
following precautions should also be taken:
1. Provide adequate ventilation for combustion air and to carry off products of
combustion.
2. Only hydrogen sulfide-free natural gas or propane should be used as fuel. The
catalyst can be poisoned by hydrogen sulfide (H2S).
3. Pay particular attention to light-off instructions.
4. Check heater at least daily to make certain that it is operating correctly.
5. This type of heater cannot be used with a thermostat that operates an on-off
fuel control valve, unless the control valve is provided with a bypass that
passes at least 30 percent of rated input of fuel. Thirty percent of the rated
input is normally required to maintain activation of the catalyst. This may vary
with different manufacturers.
When the use of an electric stove or hot plate is necessary, such as in a laboratory, a
nonglowing element type should be used.
Friction Sparks. Tools struck against rusty steel can produce incendive sparks
capable of igniting flammable petroleum vapor-air mixtures. The sparking is actu-
ally a highly exothermic chemical reaction. A number of conditions must occur at
the same time: an easily ignitable flammable vapor must be present; the steel
impact surface must be rusty; the impact must occur at an angle between tool and
impact surface; the impact must occur over a small area of the tool; and there must
be sufficient potential energy available. It is unlikely that all the independent param-
eters required for ignition would occur simultaneously and in the right sequence
under field conditions.

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The relationship of size and temperature of hot surfaces as ignition sources explains
why sparks produced by the impact of steel on steel, stone, or other hard substances
will not ordinarily ignite vapors of gasoline or other petroleum products. The
temperature of the particles so produced is relatively high, but the particles are
small and the time of exposure short, so the energy transmitted to a vapor-air
mixture is insufficient to produce ignition. The sparks produced by using or drop-
ping tools or other similar steel objects are not a significant source of ignition in the
petroleum industry.
This reasoning cannot be safely extended to larger sparks produced by heavy
impact of large bodies or by high velocity rubbing at high unit pressure. For
example, a steel part from a vehicle sliding along the pavement as the result of a
crash can produce incendiary sparks. Nor can this reasoning be extended to easily
ignited materials such as hydrogen.
There is no sharp dividing line between small and large sparks. In some areas,
power-operated tools are arbitrarily placed in the “large spark” category. See API
2214, “Spark Ignition Properties of Hand Tools,” for more information.

225 Propagation Through Pipe Lines

Fires can also spread by the propagation of flame through flammable vapor-air
mixtures in pipe lines, sewers, etc. Operators should take precautions to avoid flam-
mable mixtures in pipe lines. When such mixtures are unavoidably present, take
special precautions against their ignition, such as avoiding hot work on pipe lines
within which such flammable mixtures may exist. Sewers should be water sealed to
prevent release of vapor near fired equipment and to prevent the propagation of
flame from one area into another. The maintenance of such water seals as well as
the cleanout plugs is an operating requirement that should not be overlooked. Install
detonation arrestors close to ignition sources and keep them maintained. See
Section 1900.

226 Vapor Recovery and Carbon Filter Beds

Vapor recovery equipment can provide a source of ignition. This equipment must
be carefully designed and controlled to prevent a flashback through the vapor line
to the tank, tanker, or tank truck.
If thermal oxidation (flare) is used, provide the thermal oxidizer with a water seal
that has a low level alarm and low level shutdown on the water level in the seal. An
option is to require a detonation arrestor between the thermal oxidizer and the tank.
Require that induced draft fans and blowers meet Class I, Division 2 electrical clas-
sification and be electrically bonded to the tank prior to start up. Make squirrel
cage-type blowers from aluminum or some other nonsparking material.
Activated carbon filter beds produce an exothermic reaction with hydrocarbon
vapors. The flow through the bed removes excess heat and maintains the bed
temperature below the autoignition temperature of most hydrocarbons. Incidents
have occurred after the flow has been shut off, when heat accumulated in the carbon

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filter, igniting the residual hydrocarbon vapors. Vapor freeing procedures should
include disconnecting the carbon filter anytime the flow is interrupted. Addition-
ally, require temperature detectors inside the carbon filter beds to detect any temper-
ature rise. Supply nitrogen or steam to purge and cool the carbon bed if the
temperature begins to rise.

230 Static Electricity and Lightning

This section defines and clarifies the concept of static electricity. It discusses the
generation mechanism and hazardous situations typically found in the oil industry.
See API RP 2003 in “Industry Specifications” for detailed theoretical and design-
related information on static electricity.
This section also discusses lightning- and storm-induced charges and their dissipa-
tion mechanism. It supplements NFPA 780.

231 Definition
Static electricity is the accumulation of an electrostatic charge on an object or
surface of a liquid. If sufficient charge density is accumulated, charges may
discharge in the form of an incendiary spark.
Static electricity is a natural phenomenon that is part of every activity. As we move
about or move objects from one place to another, we are constantly changing the
static charge on ourselves and the objects and materials we are handling. As we rise
from a chair, a car seat, etc., we exchange electrons with the surface we left behind.
The difference in the number of electrons, compared to the number we had while
seated, is called charge, EMF, or voltage. These charges are generally small and
harmless, but not always. Some people have received a frightening shock on getting
out of their car, and most everyone has experienced a shock while walking across a
carpet and reaching for a door knob.
Although these static charges can be startling, they are not considered an ignition
source as they do not carry enough energy. However, it is this same type of charge
that accumulates on an oil surface, objects floating on the oil surface, or vehicles,
with sufficient charge density to discharge incendiary sparks that can ignite flam-
mable vapors.

232 Static Electricity as a Source of Ignition

There are four conditions necessary for static electricity to be a source of ignition:
1. A charge must be generated.
2. An accumulator is required to produce a static charge density strong enough to
be an ignition hazard. Corners, sharp edges, and other surface discontinuities
are charge accumulators. Note that charges accumulate only on the outside of
a closed object (tank, vessel, etc.).
3. A spark gap is needed to promote rapid discharge of the accumulated charge.

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4. There must be a flammable vapor-air mixture in the area of the spark gap.
Therefore, for static electricity to be a fire hazard, the following sequence of opera-
tions and events must occur:
Generation + Accumulation + Spark Gap + Discharge + Flammable Mixture
Additional information on the theory of the generation and accumulation of static
electricity, detection methods, definition of terms, etc., are included in NFPA 77,
Static Electricity; and API RP 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of
Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents.

233 Generation and Accumulation

Flowing liquids generate static charges as they move through pipes, pumps, and
valves and especially as they pass through filters. When a container or tank is
filled, a charge accumulates on the fill pipe and container, and an opposite charge
accumulates in the liquid. When handling volatile liquids, it is important to main-
tain an electrical path between the pipe and container in order for these charges to
recombine without the chance of producing a spark.
Electrical charges may also be carried into a receiving tank and into the body of the
liquid, from which the charge will quickly migrate to the liquid surface. If the
charges are deposited faster than they can flow through the liquid to the shell of the
tank, a high enough charge may be accumulated to spark across the surface of the
liquid to the shell, or to some conductor in contact with the shell. If there is an ignit-
able mixture at that point, an ignition may occur. Unless the liquid surface has a
conductive cover floating on it or the liquid has relatively high electrical conduc-
tivity (see Conductivity vs. Nonconductivity of Liquids below), precautions against
static generation or provisions for charge relaxation will be necessary, if there is
any practical chance of a flammable mixture being present. See API RP 2003 for
recommended methods.
Some other activities that generate static include mixing and splashing. In these
cases, the mechanism is much like the action in the pipeline. Charges are separated
and the droplets are insulated. If the turbulence is sufficient, charges will accumulate.
Air blowing is a way of causing static charges and creating a flammable mixture of
vapor and air. This was the cause of several explosions before the mechanism was
understood. If solids such as rust scale are stirred up and settle, they can increase
the rate of charge that is generated in the liquid.
When water droplets fall through liquid hydrocarbon, the water drops will carry a
charge, leaving the opposite charge on the hydrocarbon liquid. This mechanism can
be created by air blowing that picks up water from the tank bottom and mixes it in
the oil. A static charge is generated as the water drops settle out. This mechanism
can increase the rate of charge accumulation in flowing liquid by 3 to 5 times.
Bound Charges. Bound charges on tanks can occur in a number of ways; for
example, by pumping a charged stream of liquid into a tank followed by the charges
accumulating on the floating roof. Because the floating roof is separated from the

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shell by a fabric seal, tube seal, or other similar seal, the charge cannot readily drain
away and so momentarily, at least, becomes “bound.” Bound charges are handled
by installing shunt strips and adding safety features to the pantograph hangers, etc.,
to allow charges to be safely dissipated. See the Tank Manual.

Conductivity vs. Nonconductivity of Liquids

Highly refined oils are generally poor conductors. The refined white oils (e.g.
diesel, jet fuel and kerosene) are only slightly conductive so are good static accumu-
lators. The charges generated are not quickly conducted to ground as occurs in lube
oils, asphalts, crude, etc. Anti-Static Additive (ASA) can be added to these refined
oils to increase their conductivity and, thus, their resistance to static charge accumu-
lation.
Experience indicates that most crude oils, residual fuel oils, asphalts (including
cutbacks), and water soluble products such as alcohols are non-accumulators of
electrostatic charges because of their relatively high electrical conductivity. Electro-
static charge accumulation is not significant when the conductivity of the liquid
exceeds 50 picosiemens per meter. Above this value, the charges recombine as fast
as they separate. Usually crude oils that are black or very dark in color have a high
enough conductivity that they do not accumulate a hazardous electrostatic charge.
Light-colored crude oils may not have adequate conductivity and should be handled
like a refined liquid. If in doubt, a conductivity test should be made. In the new
International System of units, the conductivity unit 1 picosiemen per meter is equiv-
alent to 1 picomho per meter in the old system of units.

234 Mitigation Methods

Limiting static generation. Static charges can be dissipated by several methods.
The safest method is to control the generation rate so that static charges are dissi-
pated as rapidly as they are generated. Once a hazardous static charge has been
accumulated on a surface, the hazard remains until it is dissipated. This can only be
accomplished by time. Bonding or grounding will not increase the speed at
which charges travel through the liquids, nor will grounding prevent static
accumulation in the liquid. Only waiting helps.
There are several ways to control or limit static generation. Some methods are:
• Controlling velocity in the piping, splashing, mixing, and general agitation so
that high levels of charge are not generated.
• Injecting antistatic additives into the refined oils, improving their conductivity
and thus allowing the charges to dissipate as rapidly as they are formed. As a
result there is no significant accumulation.
Bonding and Grounding. Bonding and grounding are helpful in keeping charges
in balance on the tank shell, tank trucks, and piping. Refer to API 2003. As a
general principle for guarding against accumulation of dangerous static charges,
electrical bond connections should be maintained between any conducting bodies
likely to be subjected to conditions favoring accumulation of static. Vessels resting

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on earth, rock and oil, concrete, or brick foundations, or on concrete or steel

supports, are effectively grounded against the accumulation of static electricity on
their external surface, and no special grounding devices are necessary. However, as
explained in API RP 2003, the charge that accumulates on the surface of liquids
cannot be removed by bonding or grounding the container holding the liquid.
Bonding cables between tanker ships and wharves will not reduce the risk of static
discharge and are not recommended. Bonding introduces a risk of stray current
discharge because of different power systems on the ship and wharf.
Minimizing spark length. Ignition by an electric spark is caused by the release of
a minimum amount of energy across a gap less than a minimum width that is called
the quenching distance (around 0.08 inch for C2 - C5 hydrocarbons). At distances
less than the quenching distance, the energy required to cause ignition increases
sharply. Hence, short sparks can harmlessly dissipate a relatively large amount of
energy, an important consideration in connection with bonding for the equalization
of static charges. In many cases, a rusty bond connection can have a high resistance
because of air gaps caused by the rust. The connection may still be effective in
preventing ignition despite the small air gaps. The gaps are small enough that a
spark occurring across a gap will be short and harmless rather than long and
dangerous.

235 Hazardous Situations

Barges, Ships, and Tanks
Gaging and Sampling. Where surface turbulence is produced in a body of liquid,
as by over-shot filling, high-velocity submerged fill lines, jet or propeller-type tank
mixers, large static charges may build up on the surface of the liquid. Such surface
charges may be discharged, with an accompanying spark, when the bob on the end
of a gage tape, a sample bottle holder, or a dropped conductive object reaches the
liquid surface.
Tanks in which there is any likelihood of a flammable mixture existing at or near
the oil surface should not be gaged with a tape until 30 minutes after turbulence has
subsided, unless the tank is equipped with a slotted gage well bonded to the tank
shell. Bonding ensures that liquid within the gage well is protected against the
formation of static charges. The waiting period is usually 30 minutes because of the
large surface area involved. Similar precautions should be taken with sampling
procedures. A charge relaxation time is necessary for tank trucks, marine vessels,
and other containers. Refer to API 2003.
Natural fiber ropes or metallic chains should be used on sample bottle holders, ther-
mometers, etc. Tests have shown that when synthetic (such as nylon and polyeth-
ylene) ropes rapidly slip through gloved hands for appreciable distances, such as
into large tanks, an insulated person may accumulate a hazardous electrostatic
charge.
Steam. Release of steam into free space, with accompanying condensation, can
generate large static charges. Thus, steam leaks can produce electrification of insu-

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lated conductive bodies in the path of the jet. A charge of this character can cause a
spark which may ignite any flammable vapor present. The nozzle of a pressure
vessel steam-out line should be bonded to the vessel, and to all conductive objects
in the path of the steam jet.
Dust and Solids. Static charges may be generated in the handling of dusts and
solids materials in operations such as free falling, sliding down a chute, flowing
through piping or ducts, etc. The degree of hazard is dependent upon the character-
istics of the materials being handled. Precautions against static discharge should be
taken if the material is ignitable or if there is a flammable vapor gas mixture
present. The entire handling system should be electrically conductive to avoid
charge accumulation on an electrically insulated section.
Tank Trucks. Static charges occurred in the petroleum truck transport and loading
industry for years before the static charge problem was understood. Conversion to
bottom loading significantly reduced this risk but did not completely eliminate it.
Static charges can accumulate inside a tank truck by several methods. If the liquid
being loaded has a low conductivity (<50 picosiemens/meter) a charge accumulates
on the surface of the liquid inside the cargo hold of the truck. Any equipment
protruding or introduced into the cargo hold (e.g., level markers or gaging tapes)
can provide a spark gap to the liquid. Loading arms, used during top loading
provide a similar spark gap. Follow the precautions listed in the next section.
Splashing and turbulence while filling a truck can also generate static charges, as
can filters located in the filling lines to the truck rack. Maintain flow rates and relax-
ation times within the parameters described in API 2003.
Spark Promoters. Spark promoters are design features or floating objects, etc.,
that can, under certain conditions, develop or form spark gaps. A prime example of
a spark promoter is the level marker installed in tank trucks. This marker is a 5/8-
or 3/4-inch diameter rod that extends from the top underside of the tank to indicate
the safe load level for the different fuels. As the charged surface of the liquid rises
near the point of the gage marker, a spark could occur. If vapor were present, a fire
or explosion would follow. This problem was solved by installing bonding cables
that extended from the point of the marker to the bottom of the tank.
Loading arms for top loading provide a similar spark gap. Provide top loading arms
with extension spouts so that the loading arm is in contact with the bottom of the
cargo hold.
Spray Painting. While the application of paint and other finishes by the spray
method may generate small charges of static electricity, actual experience indicates
that the hazard is not significant when the common type of air spray equipment is
used.
Abrasive Blasting. Abrasive blasting may cause electrostatic charges. These
charges accumulate on the abrasive blasting nozzle and hose and may result in a
spark discharge between the nozzle, hose, or hose couplings and a grounded,
conducting body. Precautions during abrasive blasting are covered in Section 300.

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Plastic Buckets. Fires have occurred when plastic, nonconductive, buckets are used
to catch samples of hydrocarbon liquids. As the liquid pours into the bucket, turbu-
lence generates static charges. The charges accumulate on the rising surface of the
liquid. In addition, there is often a flammable mixture of vapor and air at the liquid
surface. As the liquid rises in the bucket toward the valve or drain pipe, a spark can
ignite the flammable mixture. Using a conductive bucket, bonded to the sample or
drain connection, will allow the charges to dissipate and prevent this type of fire.
Vacuum Trucks. Because of turbulence and high velocity, static charges are
frequently generated during vacuum truck operations. To prevent charges from accu-
mulating on an insulated section of hose, it is important to check the continuity of
the hoses. Make sure all hoses are conductive from the truck to the equipment and
bond the hose nozzle to the equipment. This prevents a spark gap between the hose
nozzle and the equipment.

236 Lightning- and Storm-induced Charges

Protection against damage resulting from lightning or charged clouds is a special
problem that must take into account the nature of the structure, its vulnerability to
damage, and the lightning frequency in the area. The solution of such problems
requires specialized knowledge, and each problem must be considered individually.
NFPA 780, “Lightning Protection Code,” and this section contain useful informa-
tion on this subject.

Lightning- and Cloud-Induced Static Charges

Static electricity can be a serious problem in electrical storms. Tank fires have
occurred during electrical storms. There are two mechanisms that can cause a fire,
lightning strike and charged clouds.
Lightning Strike. Ignition of a tank by a direct strike is a clear problem. However,
in some cases, nearby tanks can also be ignited even though they are not hit.
As clouds build up and travel across land masses, they collect huge electrical
charges of millions of volts. As these charged clouds pass over trees, houses and
industrial sites, they induce an opposite charge on these ground objects. When a
charged cloud passes over a group of tanks in a tank farm, the charge is great
enough to induce charges on all tanks. When the cloud discharges in the form of a
lightning strike, a “bound” charge is left on the storage tanks surrounding the one
that was struck. The bound charge on an external floating roof may have a 100,000-
volt driving force to get to ground. The nearest path is the tank shell. So, without
proper shunts, sparks can jump across the pantograph hanger joints or other joints,
causing sparks and possible ignition in the vapor space between the floating roof
and shell below the fabric seal. Four or five tanks, or more, can be ignited by the
electrical discharge from one cloud.
Charged Clouds. The charged cloud that resulted in the lightning strike can cause
the same problem without a strike. Assume charges on the tankfield are induced as
discussed above. Instead of the charged cloud releasing its energy to ground, it
discharges to another nearby cloud. The results on the ground are the same. A

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sudden flash of lightning between two clouds has caused a condition that trapped
huge charges on the external floating roofs of several tanks. In one of the
Company's refineries several years ago, five floating roof seal areas were ignited
due to one lightning storm.
Direct Strike. Lightning contains such large amounts of electrical and heat energy
that it is impractical to prevent ignition of flammable vapor. Protection against
direct strikes requires a lightning rod or antenna as described in NFPA 780.

Dissipation Mechanism
Dissipation methods have been discussed. Simply put, the static charges and bound
charges must have adequate paths to ground.
For steel tanks, this involves installing lightning shunts in accordance with Standard
Drawing GB-D1082, located in the Tank Manual. Lightning protection for fiber-
glass tanks is discussed in Section 200 of the Tank Manual.
Ground Rods. Steel tanks over 15 feet in diameter do not need ground rods for
lightning protection. These tanks are considered adequately grounded because of
the contact between the tank bottom and earth. When adding nonconductive tank
bottoms or liners to the tank for leak protection, install ground rods according to the
guidelines in NFPA 780. The steel bottom beneath the liner may eventually
corrode, causing the tank to lose its inherent grounding. See Section 200 of the
Tank Manual for a discussion of lightning protection (including ground rods) for
nonconductive (fiberglass) tanks.

240 Autoignition, Spontaneous Combustion, Pyrophorics

241 Autoignition
When a combustible substance is mixed with air at elevated temperatures, an
exothermic oxidation reaction starts that may proceed fast enough to ignite the
mixture (auto-ignition). There can be a time delay before the chemical (oxidation)
reaction generates enough heat to initiate auto-ignition or spontaneous ignition.
Because of this delay, ignitions will not always occur even though the mixture is
initially hot enough to start the oxidation reaction. Therefore, the higher the initial
temperature, generally, the shorter the time delay and the greater the chance of igni-
tion.
If external surroundings are cooler than the flammable mixture, the reaction that
was initiated may not generate enough heat to warm the surroundings and still raise
the temperature of the mixture to its auto-ignition temperature (AIT). Thus, the
mixture will be quenched. Because of this phenomenon, many hot, flammable
mixtures released at a temperature high enough to initiate a reaction do not ignite
due to the external cooling. Failure to auto-ignite can happen in heavy oils such as
crude column bottoms and hot asphalt. Though heated to the reaction initiation
temperature, the reaction products are carried away by the breeze; thus, the cooling

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dissipates the heat, disperses the vapor and quenches the mixture so it cannot
generate enough heat to sustain the reaction.

Auto-ignition Temperature (AIT)

Auto-ignition temperature (AIT) is the minimum temperature required to initiate or
cause self-sustained combustion in a substance in the absence of a spark or flame.
Ignition temperature varies depending on the test method. Some typical ignition
temperatures are: acetone 1000°F, amyl acetate 750°F, butane 806°F, carbon disul-
fide 212°F, ethyl ether 536°F, gasoline 853°F, kerosene 410°F, etc.
If the heated surface becomes very large and completely envelops the mixture
under test, the temperature required to produce ignition (after a lapse of time)
becomes much lower. The so-called “autogenous ignition temperatures,” tabulated
in numerous publications, were frequently determined by methods in which the
heated surface completely enclosed the test mixture. In such tests, a time lag
between introduction of the fuel and appearance of the flame may be as much as
several minutes. The temperature so determined might properly be called “environ-
mental ignition temperature,” because it is actually the temperature of the environ-
ment at which the oxidation reaction starts and progresses with self-heating, up to
the point at which the flame appears.
Environmental ignition temperatures are much lower than those obtained by the
introduction of a heated body into a large volume of cold mixture or the contact of
a drop of liquid fuel with a heated surface in an atmosphere of ordinary ambient
temperature. Typical figures are:
1. Environmental temperature for ignition of gasoline—478°F.
2. Temperature of hot plate to produce ignition of drop of gasoline splashed
against it—about 1200°F.
These figures explain why bare pipes carrying hot oil or gases (hot exhaust pipes,
etc.) seldom are ignition sources even though they are at a temperature well above
the temperatures determined by environmental methods.

Oil-soaked Insulation
Fires in oil-soaked insulation are a result of auto-ignition. The insulation holds the
oil vapors near the heat source and prevents the oil trapped in the insulation from
cooling. Furthermore, the heavy oils trapped in the insulation on very hot lines may
be cracked to release lighter materials in the kerosene and diesel range, which are
easier to ignite. When fed by dripping heavy oil, the oil-soaked insulation can
smolder for extended periods. Replace oil-soaked insulation and repair the drips to
remove the potential ignition source. Regular inspection and removal of oil-soaked
insulation will greatly reduce this fire hazard. Application of water to the oil-soaked
insulation before removal will cool and wet it so it can be removed without causing
a fire.

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The following is the sequence of events in oil-soaked insulation fires:

1. Leaking oil soaks insulation with hydrocarbon.
2. Hot oil lines, steam lines or heat tracing heats up hydrocarbon-soaked insula-
tion and a slow oxidation reaction starts.
3. If heat input is high, about 400°F or more, the oil-soaked insulation will soon
begin to smolder and burn similar to glowing coals, because the heat, retained
by the insulation, will not be removed as fast as it is generated. If the fuel is
sufficient, it can glow but may not flame due to limited oxygen.
4. When the oil-soaked insulation is removed, it may flame or ignite vapors that
are present.
5. The insulation should be cooled with water before removal, to reduce the
chance of igniting flammable vapors in the area.

Heating Coils in Tanks

Fires and explosions have occurred in asphalt air blowing stills and lube-oil tanks
with heating coils. If heat (steam) is applied to the unsubmerged coils, ignition can
occur when products contact the hot coils. An explosion may result due to the vapor
released when oils contact the hot coils.

Pressure Effect on Auto-ignition

An increase in pressure on a mixture will decrease the auto-ignition temperature
(AIT). For example, the AIT of a natural gas-in-air mixture decreased from 530°C
at 1 atmosphere to 240°C at 610 atmospheres. The AIT of other hydrocarbons was
found to follow this pattern. Accordingly, the AIT values at atmospheric pressure
should not be used to assess ignition hazards at high pressures. Flammability limits,
as a function of temperature and pressure, are listed in Chapter 5 of the NFPA Fire
Protection Handbook, 16th Edition.

242 Spontaneous Combustion

There is an important difference between spontaneous combustion and auto-igni-
tion. That is, the spontaneous combustion initiating reaction is self-starting. It can
start at ambient temperature when conditions are right. Vegetable oils, turpentine,
and other pine tar derivatives used in paints oxidize very rapidly. If this process is
allowed to occur in a protected space with air circulation, such as a pile of oily,
paint-saturated rags in a corner or clothes locker, enough heat can be generated to
cause spontaneous combustion. Prompt and safe disposal of these materials is an
important safeguard to avoid fires.
In addition to vegetable oils, some fish oils and chemicals can spontaneously
combust. Some materials that have spontaneous combustion characteristics are:
• Linseed oil
• Oiled rags
• Oiled silk

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Petroleum products do not undergo spontaneous combustion. In general, these prod-

ucts must be heated to 400°F or higher before oxidation occurs.

243 Pyrophorics
Pyrophoric materials are self-igniting when exposed to air (oxygen.) The most
common pyrophoric is “iron sulfide.” It forms as a scale in piping, vessels, tanks,
and equipment when H2S reacts with iron and moisture in a low oxygen environ-
ment. When a vessel or tank is opened for maintenance, the pyrophoric material
oxidizes rapidly in an exothermic reaction. It can then ignite flammable or combus-
tible materials. A number of fires are attributable to iron sulfide. Also, the evolved
SO2 can cause the area to be unsafe for entry.
Iron sulfide is created as H2S reacts with the iron in the steel. When a sufficient
amount of oxygen is available, iron sulfide is then oxidized to produce iron oxide.
Since iron sulfide is a midproduct in the multistep reaction, (iron to iron sulfide to
iron oxide), iron sulfide cannot build up except in a low oxygen environment. In
laboratory experiments, iron sulfide forms only when the ratio of H2S to oxygen is
more than 1:1. For example, if the H 2S concentration is 2%, the oxygen concentra-
tion would have to be less than 2% to form iron sulfide. However, if water conden-
sate is present, the H2S dissolves in the water at a higher rate than oxygen. This
allows iron sulfide to form under the water layer even when the atmosphere above it
has a high oxygen content. When the iron sulfide dries out, it can self-ignite. Iron
sulfide can also form in piping, break-off and then be carried downstream with the
fluid.
To prevent the formation of iron sulfide, remove the H2S or increase the oxygen
and keep the system dry. A continuous air sweep through sour tanks is recom-
mended to continuously oxidize any iron sulfide. See the Tank Manual for more
details.
One can expect to find pyrophorics in inerted tanks and tanker holds, piping,
vessels, and equipment that contain H2S. Laboratory tests show no lower limit of
H2S. Even the lowest concentrations cause iron sulfide buildup when moisture and
an oxygen deficiency occur. After iron sulfide forms, introduction of oxygen at
levels over 10% can cause pyrophoric oxidation of the exposed material. (Levels
less than 10% allow controlled oxidation)
If you suspect the occurrence of pyrophoric iron sulfide, a source of ignition could
be present when the equipment is opened to the atmosphere. Take all precautions
necessary around any source of ignition. Make sure that no hydrocarbon vapors or
other fuel is available. Apply water to the pyrophoric deposits and keep them wet to
absorb heat and allow for controlled oxidation. The iron sulfide might be covered
by scale, rust or condensate and self-ignite when you remove the scale or conden-
sate during cleaning. Because the iron sulfide could be covered by other materials,
do not assume that it has completely oxidized even after long exposure to oxygen
(air). Procedures for tank cleaning are discussed in API 2015, “Cleaning Petroleum
Storage Tanks.”

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Asphalt Tanks. At high temperature (>400°F) and low oxygen conditions, asphalt
tanks can form pyrophoric deposits on the inside of the roof and upper tank shell.
When exposed to air, these deposits can oxidize rapidly and create a source of igni-
tion in a reaction similar to iron sulfide. To prevent buildup of pyrophorics, store
asphalt stocks at temperatures below 350°F and ventilate tanks continuously.
Routinely check vents for plugging.

244 Other Chemicals and Materials

There are a large number of water and air reactive chemicals used in the petroleum
industry. Some of these are:
Alkalies (e.g., caustic soda, NaOH). When mixed with water, these may generate
enough heat to ignite combustible material.
Aluminum Trialkyls. Triethylaluminum, the most common of these groups, ignites
spontaneously in air and reacts violently on contact with water.
Anhydrides. Acid anhydrides react with water, usually violently, to regenerate
acid. Organic acid anhydrides are combustible and usually more hazardous than the
corresponding acid. For example, the flash point of acetic anhydride is 129°F.
Charcoal. The principal causes of spontaneous heating of charcoal appear to be:
• Lack of sufficient cooling and airing before shipping
• Hydration
• Friction during grinding of charcoal that has not been sufficiently aired
• Carbonizing of wood at too low a temperature, leaving the charcoal in a chemi-
cally unstable state
Coal. Principal reasons for spontaneous heating are:
• Fineness of the particles
• Oxygen adsorptive abilities of the particles
• Trapped and confined moisture content of the coal
• Air trapped in voids in the coal piles
• Presence of sulfur in the form of pyrites or marcasites
• Free gases in the pile
• Foreign substances in the pile
Miscellaneous Chemicals. Numerous chemicals and compounds generate heat
when mixed. This is a common phenomenon in the chemical additives industry.
Heating must be controlled by rate and method of mixing.

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250 Minimizing Contact With Air

251 General
Virtually all petroleum equipment is designed to prevent contact of liquid or gas
with air. Operators should be continuously on the alert to ensure that appropriate
operating limitations are observed at all times so as to minimize any abnormal expo-
sure of petroleum fluids to air.

252 Unavoidable Contacts

There are some exceptions where air is present either deliberately or inherently,
such as in certain treating processes (e.g., Merox) vapor recovery systems, and
atmospheric storage in cone roof tanks. In these situations, control potential hazards
by eliminating ignition sources, maintaining the atmosphere outside of the flam-
mable range, or installing equipment to prevent flame propagation. Some operating
situations where it is impracticable to prevent contact of petroleum liquids or gas
with air are discussed below.
Tank Filling and Emptying. When fixed roof tanks are filled, the hydrocarbon
vapor existing in the space displaced with liquid will be discharged into the air,
unless the tank is connected to either 1) a vapor recovery system or 2) other tanks
through an interconnecting vapor system and liquid is being drawn out of these
interconnected tanks at a rate sufficient to make space for the vapor being displaced
from the filling tank. On very still days vapor discharged may tend to accumulate
near the tank vent. Pressure/vacuum (PV) vent valves are often installed on tanks in
lieu of an open vent. PV valves act as a flame arrestor in the event of a fire when
discharging directly to the atmosphere. See Section 3280 for additional information.
Operators can minimize the chance of overfilling a tank by double-checking the
valving to make sure flow is directed to the proper tank and by periodic checking of
the tank level using tank level indicators to verify the filling rate against control
room level indicators. In addition, a product that is at or above the atmospheric
boiling point of the liquid should never be pumped into an atmospheric storage tank.
In normal operations of floating roof tanks avoid “landing the legs” since this
would create a vapor space, causing air to be drawn in. The resulting atmosphere
may be in the flammable range. The only time a roof should be set down on its legs
is when the tank is to be taken out of service. When this is to be done and when the
tank is returned to service, safe operating procedures that have been established for
the product involved must be followed to minimize the hazards of a flammable
atmosphere contacting an ignition source. During initial filling, vapor will be
displaced as the space under the floating roof is filled with liquid.
Sample Drawing or Draining Water. Drawing petroleum samples from tanks or
pipe lines, or draining or bleeding equipment exposes small quantities of liquid to
the air, producing ignitable mixtures of limited volume; common sense precautions
should minimize hazards. Operators should preferably be standing where they can
immediately shut off the flow of liquid if fire should occur. If self-closing valves

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have been provided, these should under no circumstances be blocked or tied open
so as to nullify the protection provided. An open valve should never be left unat-
tended while taking samples or draining water. Sample draws used once a week or
more need not be plugged. All other open-end connections should be plugged when
not in use. The amount of sample flush should be minimized and all flush should be
routed to an appropriate safe collection system or location. Three-way valves are in
many cases an effective design tool to aid operators in this task. See the Piping
Manual, Sections 272 and 340. Temporary sample draws should be designed to
prevent vibration failures, or other potential releases to atmosphere, and should be
removed immediately following completion of the work that necessitated the tempo-
rary sample draw installation. Storage tank roof drains should be kept closed to
minimize the accidental release of oil to grade due to a leaking drain line. Proce-
dures should call for roof drains to be opened in a rainstorm.
Ventilating or Exhaust Systems. Where hoods or other ventilating systems have
been installed to remove vapors released in operations such as container filling,
laboratories, etc., operators should make sure that such equipment is in good oper-
ating order and is used when operations involving potential vapor releases are
involved.

253 Other Precautions

Seals. Liquid seals or sealed catch basins in oil-water drain systems should be
continuously maintained; if allowed to dry out, unnecessary release of petroleum
vapors to air may result. In some cases permanent ignition sources may be present.
Leakage. Operators should be constantly on the alert against leakage from petro-
leum handling equipment—through corrosion holes or joints in pipe lines (screwed,
flanged or welded), relief valves, stuffing boxes of valves, pumps or compressors,
etc. Possibilities of leakage of petroleum into water systems, as may occur in
coolers, condensers, washers, etc., should be particularly guarded against. In addi-
tion, operators should be on constant alert for small piping connections that may be
subject to vibration failure. See the Piping Manual for design considerations for
small diameter piping considerations.
Spills and Overflows. Whenever spills or overflows occur in the course of filling
containers, drums, trucks, tanks, or similar equipment, a hazard may be produced.
All operators of such equipment should be constantly on the alert to guard against
spillage. If, despite such precautions, occasional spills occur, prompt action is
necessary to keep possible sources of ignition (automotive equipment, smoking,
etc.) out of the area in which a flammable mixture may have been created by the
spill. Also, the spilled liquid should be removed promptly and carefully to mini-
mize pollution potential.
If a considerable amount of volatile petroleum liquid is spilled near operating equip-
ment where ignition sources exist (furnaces, motorized equipment, etc.), the opera-
tors of such equipment should be notified immediately so that the ignition sources
can be shut off for low vapor pressure flammables. Foam application will aid in
keeping vapor generation to a minimum. Note that foam applications to propane or

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butane spills may encourage vapor generation. New foams are now available to
assist in cleaning up acidic, basic, and non-polar solvent liquid releases.
Inert or Gas Blanketing. Vapor spaces may be provided with inert materials or gas
blanketing to protect against explosive mixtures. Design parameters are a function
of the flammables involved. The Fire Protection Staff will assist the designer.
Frequent checks should be made to determine that the systems are operating as
intended.
Note that inert materials and contaminants (e.g., humidity) can affect instruments
used to monitor or check the acceptability of blanketing. Check with the instrument
manufacturer to assure that the instrument readings are correct and properly inter-
preted.
If H2S may be present in the vapor space, special care is required when taking gas
blanketed equipment out of service for repair, since pyrophoric materials formed in
the absence of air may begin to oxidize and ignite when air is readmitted.

260 Eliminating Unnecessary Combustibles

Good Housekeeping
Eliminating unnecessary combustibles is largely a matter of good housekeeping.
Care exercised in this area can contribute effectively to preventing fires in oil-
handling facilities, or to minimizing the size of a fire.
The most obvious precaution in maintaining good housekeeping is to avoid any
accumulation of waste materials, particularly combustible items such as spilled oil,
woods, rags, and so on. Combustible waste materials can be a fuel source during a
fire. Also, as water is applied to a fire, waste materials can float to and cover drains,
increasing the severity of the fire. Even noncombustible accumulations (scrap iron,
pipe, broken bottles, etc.) can become a hazard that might hinder prompt applica-
tion of first aid fire fighting measures on incipient fires or handicap the control and
extinguishment of larger fires.
Gasoline must not be used for cleaning machine parts or other items. Supplies of
kerosene, paint thinner, or other high flash point oils should be provided for such
purposes where needed. They should be kept in small, covered metal containers
located where they will be protected against overturning or damage, and should be
labeled to clearly distinguish them from low flash point oils.
Oil-soaked rags should always be promptly disposed of in covered metal cans.
The presence of dry grass, brush, or weeds around oil-handling facilities or storage
areas can bring a range fire into a facility, or spread a fire within a facility from one
area to another. On most properties, this can be avoided by appropriate use of weed
killers, or by using a disc harrow or mower. The growth of evergreen vegetation
such as ice plant is also an effective means of keeping down the growth of weeds in
the areas near the seacoast where a moist atmosphere prevails. In some areas, where
permitted, carefully controlled and supervised burning of dry grass and weeds is the
only practical way of avoiding the risk of accidental fire.

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Use of Wood
The use of combustible building materials such as wood and fiberglass in areas of
hydrocarbon storage and handling is not recommended because of the increased fire
load, the possibility of spreading the fire, and the risk of flashback following extin-
guishment. The use of noncombustible building materials such as steel or concrete
is preferred.
For new construction, do not use combustible materials for walkways, platforms,
ladders and stairs if their use could cause the following situations in a fire:
• Spread the fire to a tank top, another tank basin, plant or process area.
• Increase the damage to important equipment, structures or control cables.
• Prevent access to important valves and controls during or immediately
following a fire.
Combustible materials are acceptable for temporary walkways, platforms, and scaf-
folding if they meet the other requirements of this manual. Combustible materials,
including wood or fiberglass, are acceptable in corrosive atmospheres such as at
fertilizer plants, cooling towers, and some chemical areas.
For existing facilities, combustible building materials in the areas listed below can
remain in use until replacement becomes necessary. At that time, use noncombus-
tible building materials such as steel and concrete. Don't install new wood in the
following areas.
• Inside tank impounding basins or diked areas if the tanks contain Class I flam-
mable liquids (flash <140°F).
• For tank manifold platforms.
• For access to large or critical pump or piping manifolds.
• For labs, sheds, or other buildings on plot in facilities handling, storing, or
processing Class I or Class II flammable and combustible liquids and gasses.

270 References
Chevron References
Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual
Piping Manual
Safety in Designs Manual
Tank Manual

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American Petroleum Institute (API)

API 2003 Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and
Stray Currents
API 2015 Cleaning Petroleum Storage Tanks
API 2216 Ignition Risk of Hot Surfaces in Open Air, Second Edition, In
Preparation

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 77 Static Electricity
NFPA 780 Lightning Protection Code

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300 Prevention Through Inspection
and Maintenance

Abstract
Inspection and maintenance activities must be integrated into the loss prevention
program. This section discusses elements of inspection and maintenance from the
fire protection view.

Contents Page

310 General Information 300-3

311 Importance of Fire Protection Inspections
312 Scope
313 Good Housekeeping
320 Inspection 300-4
321 Fire Protection Equipment
322 Safety Devices
323 Process Equipment
324 Tanks
325 Piping
326 Pumps and Drivers
327 Structures
328 Docks and Wharves
330 Maintenance 300-6
331 Job Planning
332 Blinding
333 Vapor-Freeing
334 In-Service Work on Tanks
335 Combustible Gas Detectors

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336 Repairs to Emergency Facilities

337 Abrasive Blasting
340 Dismantling Equipment 300-11
350 Cleaning Tanks and Process Vessels 300-11
351 Introduction
352 Remove Sources of Ignition
353 Empty the Vessel
354 Removing Vapor
360 Welding on Nonvapor-Free Lines, Tanks and Vessels 300-14
361 Introduction
362 General
363 Hot Tapping Precautions and Procedures
364 Special Considerations and Alternate Methods
370 References 300-18

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310 General Information

311 Importance of Fire Protection Inspections

Regular inspections by persons experienced in fire protection are an essential part
of any fire prevention program. Appendix B, “Fire Protection Checklist,” can be
used as a guideline during inspections.

Initial Inspection
An initial inspection should be made of new and converted facilities to determine
that the fire prevention principles have been properly applied. The initial inspection
should also acquaint operating personnel with all fire prevention features that have
been built into the facility.

Periodic Inspections
Reinspections should be made periodically to note any changes in hazards,
construction, equipment, conditions, etc. These inspections will probably be made
by qualified specialists familiar with applicable fire protection design consider-
ations (engineer, fire marshal, equipment inspector, etc.) and will include testing of
equipment, fire drills, inspection of new construction, etc., as described in Sections
500, “Fire Training,” and 600, “Fighting the Fire.” In addition to such general
inspections, which will perhaps be held every few months, a self-inspection should
be made every few days by operators, supervisors, superintendents, etc., to check
on local conditions in their own areas.

Outside Inspections
Inspections or Fire Loss Prevention Surveys with an outsider such as a member of
the Fire Protection Staff or an insurance inspector should be made periodically
(every one to three years will ordinarily be often enough). These inspections will
sometimes reveal hazards not apparent to those who have become accustomed to
the existing conditions, and will stimulate interest in fire protection efforts as well
as disseminate ideas that may be developed at other facilities. Surveys will be coor-
dinated with the OPCO facility Fire/Safety Engineer and/or Fire Chief to maximize
the benefits from the survey.

312 Scope
The general objectives of inspection and maintenance work intended to promote
fire protection include:
• Detection of operating procedures that introduce risks of starting fires or may
impede prompt control of fire.
• Application of safe maintenance practices to minimize potential fire hazards.
• Detection of equipment additions or modifications that increase the risk of fire
loss.

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• Detection and elimination of weaknesses in operating facilities that result from

normal wear and corrosion.
• Care and upkeep of fire detection, control, and extinguishing equipment.

313 Good Housekeeping

Through education and regular supervision, local management should stress the
principles of and necessity for, good housekeeping. Good housekeeping comes
under three general headings:
• General neatness. Dirty rags, trash, oil spills, gas or oil leaks, improper
storage of paints or hydrocarbon samples, the careless use of light oils for
cleaning, etc., are all potential fire hazards that can be controlled.
• Proper placement. Operators should be constantly alert to make sure that all
fire fighting equipment is in its established location and ready to operate on a
moment's notice (extinguishers and nozzles in place, valves freely operable,
etc.). Access to this equipment should never be obstructed by other equipment,
stacked materials, open trenches or ditches, etc.
• Careful maintenance. Examples include the following:
– Keeping junction and switch box covers tight on electrical circuits
(including assuring complete replacement of all bolts) in hazardous areas
– Promptly eliminating hydrocarbon leaks in lines, valves, and stuffing boxes
– Identifying deteriorated vessels, structures, fireproofing, etc., which, if not
repaired, may result in hazardous failures
– Removing and replacing oil-soaked insulation
– Ensuring uncovered drain openings and free-flowing drainage systems
remain free of debris

320 Inspection

321 Fire Protection Equipment

Scheduled inspections should be set up and made the responsibility of one indi-
vidual or position. See Appendix E for inspection checklists.

322 Safety Devices

Safety devices include valves, breather valves, regulators, overspeed trips, and other
devices designed to protect equipment against failure that could lead to fire.
Frequency of inspection, testing and maintenance of safety devices should be estab-
lished as required by law or service conditions. The inspector should be satisfied
that discharge through such safety devices does not introduce a secondary hazard.
Normally, time between such inspections should not exceed one year; however, in
no case should the interval be greater than required by any Federal, State, local and

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industry laws, statutes, or codes, or local operating practices established by experi-

ence.
Routine inspection and testing of flame, heat, smoke and combustible gas detectors
should be included in the normal maintenance program. These systems are
discussed in Section 1600.

323 Process Equipment

Process equipment covers such a wide range of types and services that only general
principles for its inspection can be given in this manual. Inspection frequencies
should be based on experience with similar equipment, or on anticipated corrosion
with the various stocks, chemicals, and materials of construction. Thorough inspec-
tion histories are critical in determining when equipment needs to be shut down,
what work needs to be done, and any materials changes required.
Inspection techniques for specific types of equipment are found in the specific
Company manual on that equipment.

324 Tanks
See the Tank Manual, Section 1000.

325 Piping
A visual external inspection of aboveground lines should be made annually for
adequacy of overpressure protection (thermal relief valves), for external corrosion,
and for adequacy of supports and provisions for expansion or vibration in service.
Particular emphasis should be given to the support of small connections. Nonde-
structive testing should be scheduled as appropriate, based on experience, service,
pressure and criticality of the lines. Refer to the Piping Manual for more informa-
tion.
Lines handling corrosive stocks can be tested using either pit gages or ultrasonic
(UT) gaging.
Buried lines should be daylighted and spot-checked occasionally for evidence of
external corrosion where bare pipe has been used and where there is evidence of
water drainage from any adjacent source. Lines partially buried by erosion and
other weather conditions should be completely uncovered periodically and checked
for evidence of soil corrosion. Housekeeping methods should be improved or
supports modified to prevent recurrence. Internal corrosion in buried lines can be
inspected by using “smart” pigs, or pipeline scrapers.
Lines that are heavily corroded may be hydrostatically tested to locate weak
sections. Hydrostatic testing of lines having isolated or localized pitting is of little
value except to find severe pitting or existing leakage; it will not give assurance of
future leak-free operation. These lines should be ultrasonically inspected, or
subjected to other nondestructive inspection methods to determine the remaining
useful life. The ratings and materials of flanges, valves and fittings should be

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checked to be sure that they are consistent with the service of the line. Preventive
steps to reduce corrosion, e.g., cathodic protection, may be appropriate to decrease
the rate of corrosion and frequency of failures.

326 Pumps and Drivers

Pumps should be inspected frequently for seal, gland or gasket leakage and general
cleanliness of the surrounding area, and inspected annually for general condition,
particularly for support of small connections. Motors should be checked for over-
heating, sparking, condition of switches, overload protection, and wiring. Combus-
tion engine drivers should be checked for cleanliness of 1) ignition system to
prevent external sparkovers and 2) the exhaust system to minimize fire hazard.

327 Structures
Structures containing pumps, compressors, piping or other equipment that might
possibly leak hydrocarbons should be well ventilated. All the rules of good house-
keeping should be particularly emphasized inside structures.

328 Docks and Wharves

Piles, decks, fender systems, pipeway supports, cranes and booms, firebreaks and
other structural components of docks and wharves should be inspected regularly.
The machinery and equipment for mooring vessels, cargo hose, insulating flanges,
slop facilities, thermal pressure relief valves, and the auxiliary equipment used in
emergencies (such as power boats, diesel generators, etc.) should also be inspected
periodically.
Refer to the OCIMF International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals for
additional information.

330 Maintenance

331 Job Planning

In facilities that handle flammable and combustible liquids and gases, control
construction and maintenance activities through careful job planning. Activities that
require special consideration include cutting and welding, use of open flames, air
powered tools, sparking electrical tools, and gasoline or diesel engines. Equipment
for activities such as sandblasting can also produce an ignition. This section
includes a general explanation of job planning. See Appendix A for checklists of
items for consideration. Examples of some different types of plans and permits in
use at various facilities are also included in Appendix A.
Job planning includes the proper use of general and hot work permits and the
creation of appropriate plans, which may include:
• A work plan

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• A contingency plan
• An emergency response plan
Job plans must be communicated to and understood by all the employees and
contractors doing the work. While the person issuing the permits is responsible for
adequately covering all conditions that can cause fires, it's also important for main-
tenance and contract personnel to check for blinding, bonding, equipment depres-
sure, covering of sewers, general cleanliness, and so on, as an added precaution
before opening or entering equipment or doing hot work. Personnel should be on
the alert for changing conditions in the area that might increase the fire hazard.
Scrutinize any deviation from established conditions or procedures before
proceeding.

General Work Permits

For simple, non-hazardous jobs in remote areas, such as repairing a fence, the super-
visor can review the situation thoroughly and issue appropriate instructions.
In refineries, chemical plants, offshore platforms and other places involving
complex operations, a general work permit shall be required to ensure conformance
with established procedures, and to make certain that all those whose activities
might be influenced by the work are informed. General work permits should be
prepared by a responsible person, after a personal review of the situation, and
should be very specific as to the work to be done, notices to be given, and precau-
tions to be observed.
See Appendix A for an example of a General Work Permit.

Hot Work Permits

In addition to the general work permit, or as a substitute for it, a hot work permit
should be prepared if work involves open flames, arc welding, electrically sparking
equipment or motors, or any other ignition sources within 50 feet of facilities
handling flammable and combustible liquids. If LPG or high pressure light hydro-
carbons are used in the facilities, consider extending the distance from the process
area where a hot work permit is required.
The hot work permit procedure is a checklist of safety items. Before starting work,
the operator of the facility and the individual responsible for the work review the
list. The checklist includes inspection of the work site, vapor testing, and other
precautions, as well as fire fighting equipment and fire watch requirements. See
Appendix A for a list of considerations to be used in developing a checklist and for
a sample hot work permit and procedure in use at some Company facilities.
In larger facilities, the operating management should ask for input from the fire
brigade leader, fire chief, or fire protection specialist before deciding on precautions.
Written hot work permits in prescribed form are required by OSHA PSM rule CFR
1910.120.

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Plans
For larger projects involving multiple permits or work performed in critical, high
value facilities, consider using written work plans. Prepare work plans before work
starts and include input from engineering, operations, contractors, and the facility
fire brigade where appropriate. See Appendix A for examples of the work plans
described in this section.
Work Plan. A work plan identifies and avoids potential hazards that can occur as
work progresses. A work plan might describe equipment isolation procedures such
as lockout/tagout, gas testing requirements, and methods to keep operations and
maintenance informed of the status of the work.
Contingency Plan. A contingency plan addresses the major “what ifs” that could
occur while a job is in progress. For example, what if the wrong pipe is cut? Or
what if a weld slag causes a fire in the tank seal area? What if a plant upset or
product spill occurs during the work?
Emergency Response Plan. An emergency response plan describes the actions to
be taken if a toxic release or fire occurs. Evacuation procedures as well as fire
fighting responsibilities for workers are included.

332 Blinding
Equipment to be repaired or entered should be isolated to prevent entry of toxic or
flammable vapor or liquid from connected equipment. Isolation may be accom-
plished by blinding or dismantling attached piping. Closing valves should never be
considered equivalent to blinding; when lines are broken they should be moved
aside to prevent any possible flow into the isolated equipment (e.g., dropout
spools). Double block and bleed valves are often used for equipment isolation, but
they should not be considered acceptable as isolation for personnel entry. Any varia-
tion from blinding or breaking lines for hot work or entry must be approved by oper-
ating management.

333 Vapor-Freeing
Before repair work is started on installations producing or containing flammable
vapor, the vapor concentration must be reduced to a safe point, generally regarded
as 10% of the lower flammable limit (LFL) or less, and sources likely to cause
further generation of vapor after the initial vapor-freeing operation must be
removed. For details see Section 335.

334 In-Service Work on Tanks

Tank work without vapor-freeing is recommended only when it is impractical to
take a tank out of service. Otherwise, the tank should be cleaned and vapor-freed
before any work is done on it. Refer to the Tank Manual for detailed information on
in-service work on tanks.

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335 Combustible Gas Detectors

Use combustible gas detectors when ventilating equipment, before hot work
commences, and at intervals while hot work is in progress. These detectors can help
determine if the combustible gas level is below the lower flammable limit (LFL)
and if any flammable mixtures of hydrocarbon vapor exist in hard-to-reach sections
of inerted equipment. Combustible gas detectors are typically hand-held and self-
powered. They indicate either the volume percent of flammable gas or the percent
LFL. In addition to flammable hydrocarbon vapors, some detectors also indicate the
percent of oxygen and hydrogen sulfide in the atmosphere.
Combustible gas detectors use a high temperature catalytic filament. Ambient atmo-
sphere is pumped into a small combustion chamber where it burns in contact with
the filament. Filament temperature is related to the flammable vapor concentration.
As the filament temperature changes, its electrical resistance also changes. Chem-
ical stain detectors, such as Drager tubes, are not recommended to detect combus-
tible gases because they only detect one particular substance. Other equally
flammable substances can go undetected because there is no reaction with the indi-
cator in the tube.
Because combustible gas detectors contain an ignition source they might not be suit-
able for Class 1, Group B (hydrogen atmosphere) use. They are, however, suitable
for Class 1, Group D (hydrocarbon atmosphere) use.
Manufacturers recommend calibrating combustible gas detectors on a daily basis.
Make sure that calibration gases are similar to the type of flammable gases the
meter will be exposed to in service. There will be an error experienced when
detecting a substance other than the calibration gas, for example, detecting gasoline
vapors after calibrating with methane.

336 Repairs to Emergency Facilities

Whenever repairs are required on critical alarm systems, means for ensuring conti-
nuity of protection by alternate systems should be provided, for example, visual
surveillance, or portable or temporary alarm systems.
A firewater system is “impaired” when a piece of the system is out of service for
maintenance or modification. All facilities should have a procedure in place to docu-
ment when and where a pump or piece of piping is out of service. One approach is
to mark a centrally located map. In an emergency, responders can quickly check the
map to determine the availability of resources. Issue permits before any part of the
firewater system is taken out of service.

337 Abrasive Blasting

Potential Ignition Sources
Static generation. Abrasive blasting may develop electrostatic charges. These
charges will accumulate on the nozzle and hose and may result in a spark discharge

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between the nozzle, hose, or hose couplings and a grounded, conducting body,
unless a conductive abrasive blasting hose is used. Most contractors now use
conductive hoses. However, if they do not, the electrostatic hazard can be safely
controlled by bonding the nozzle to the work metal and keeping the hose away from
areas where ignitable vapor-air mixtures may exist. Bonding the nozzle to the metal
being blasted will also eliminate static shocks to operators of the equipment.
Heating of metal. Although the abrasive effect of blasting will tend to heat the
metal at the point of impingement, the maximum temperature reached is well below
the ignition temperature of hydrocarbon vapor.
Friction sparks. The mechanical sparks produced in abrasive blasting operations
have not proved to be an ignition source for petroleum vapor-air mixtures.

Shells of Tanks and Vessels in Service

The shells of petroleum storage tanks and process or storage vessels can be safely
abrasive blasted while in service, provided:
1. The vapor in the tank (or vessel) vapor space is not above 0.6 of the lower flam-
mable limit (LFL), or is definitely too rich to burn (not less than 1.5 times the
upper flammable limit of the petroleum vapor in air), and
2. Liquid movement into and out of the tank or vessel is prohibited during
blasting, and
3. Inlet and outlet valves on the tank or vessel are closed and locked, and
4. All vents to atmosphere on tank or vessel containing a too-rich-to-burn vapor-
air mixture extend upward at least 10 feet above the work area, and
5. The abrasive blast nozzle is bonded to the tank or vessel, and the abrasive blast
hose is kept out of areas where ignitable vapor-air mixtures may exist, or a
conductive hose is used, and
6. A combustible gas indicator is used frequently to check the concentration of
vapors in the work area. If the concentration exceeds 5% of the lower flam-
mable limit, work should be suspended until the tank stops outbreathing or the
wind increases to decrease vapor concentration to a safe level.
7. Spark producing equipment associated with the abrasive blasting operation,
e.g., motors, are located in accordance with hot work permit procedures.

Roofs of Cone Roof Tanks in Service

Abrasive blasting the roof of a cone roof tank can be done safely, provided:
1. The conditions outlined in the preceding paragraph for shells of tanks are
complied with, and
2. The roof is structurally safe to men and equipment, and
3. Toxic gases, such as H2S, are not present in hazardous concentrations.

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Roofs of Floating Roof Tanks in Service

Abrasive blasting the roof of a floating roof tank can be done safely, provided:
1. The conditions outlined in the above paragraph for shells of tanks are complied
with, and
2. The top of roof at the shell is within 4 feet of the top angle, and
3. The space above the floating roof contains no harmful concentrations of toxic
vapors, and
4. The roof is free of oil deposits above their flash point temperatures.
Because hydrocarbons sometimes leak into the pontoon spaces, these spaces should
be checked for vapor concentration. Work should not be done on roofs with
pontoon spaces containing a vapor-air concentration more than 60% of the lower
flammable limit. Pontoon spaces should be kept tightly sealed.

340 Dismantling Equipment

Take appropriate precautions before dismantling equipment and piping to prevent
ignition of residual hydrocarbon gas and liquid. First ensure that the piping and
equipment to be dismantled is absolutely isolated from other process piping and
equipment. Thoroughly flush all piping and equipment before dismantling. Check
all low points and dead legs for trapped hydrocarbon. Check all bleeders to ensure
that they are not plugged with material. Remember that hidden, high pour point
materials can melt and ignite when heated during welding. Check gage wells,
internal ladders and supports, and tank pontoons for hidden hydrocarbon.
Clearly mark piping along the length to be removed. Expose buried piping to iden-
tify the correct line before cutting. Also before cutting, drill a small (1/2") hole in
piping low points to ensure that it is free of liquid and vapor. Since hydrocarbon
vapor is heavier than air, it will settle in low points. Testing elevated areas may not
indicate the presence of hydrocarbons.
Do not perform hot work unless necessary. Instead, unbolt flanges and cold cut the
piping to be dismantled. When hot work is necessary, use the appropriate permit
procedures.

350 Cleaning Tanks and Process Vessels

Cleaning tanks that have contained gasoline or other volatile stocks involves risks
of accident and fire that are not present in normal operation. It is, therefore,
extremely important that tank cleaning routines be carefully developed to avoid any
unnecessary hazards. Tank cleaning is discussed in more detail in the Tank Manual,
API 2015, “Cleaning Petroleum Storage Tanks,” CUSA Products Co., Refining
“Diesel-Based Tank Cleaning Process,” and CUSA Products Co., Marketing Proce-
dure for Tank Cleaning and Demolition.

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351 Introduction
Ventilation and cleaning of columns, drums, and other process vessels should
follow the same step-by-step procedure discussed in API 2015, except that some of
the conditions present in the process areas permit methods not ordinarily suited to
large storage tanks. Steam, not generally effective for vapor-freeing large storage
tanks because it is not ordinarily available in sufficient quantities in tank fields, is
usually readily available in quantity in process areas. Also, process vessels are
normally smaller in volume than storage tanks. Another important factor that makes
steam more useful in vapor-freeing process equipment is that such vessels are
frequently hot when emptied, greatly reducing the amount of steam lost through
condensation. Therefore, while ventilation with air is the preferred method of vapor-
freeing storage tanks, air and steam can both be considered for process equipment.

352 Remove Sources of Ignition

Process areas are usually quite congested and cleaning operations are often a part of
other maintenance work in the area. Because of this and before there is a chance of
any vapor release from a vessel to be drained and cleaned, all sources that might be
in the path of this vapor should be removed before the vessel is opened. Wind direc-
tion or portable fans may aid in assuring that wind-blown flammable vapors are not
carried to sources of ignition.

Pyrophoric Compounds
Most process vessels are parts of closed systems, and oxygen is not present during
normal operation. In such vessels suspect that the presence of pyrophoric iron
sulfide compounds might become a source of ignition particularly if stock
containing sulfur has been present. See API 2015, “Cleaning Petroleum Storage
Tanks” for the procedure to follow when pyrophoric compounds are present or
suspected. (See Section 243 for more information on pyrophorics.)

353 Empty the Vessel

Before any vapor-freeing operation can be started, the column or vessel must be
drained of liquid as completely as possible. If the vessel is not hot, or if air is to be
used for vapor-freeing, water can be used to float or flush out remaining flammable
liquid trapped in trays, etc. If, however, the vessel is hot and is to be steamed out,
the water would probably slow the steaming process by its cooling effect more than
it would help it by displacing trapped oil. All emptying and flushing operations
should be completed before large openings, such as manholes, are uncovered.
Drain connections sometimes become blocked with scale or coke. Before assuming
that a vessel has been completely drained, make sure that the drain is not
obstructed. If it must be back-washed to free it, keep track of the quantity of liquid
used, and make sure that at least this quantity of liquid drains out again. When
draining volatile liquids, be sure that the flow is always under control and cannot
reach a source of ignition.

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354 Removing Vapor

Ignition and Breathing Hazards
After a liquid, spent catalyst, etc., has been removed, a column or vessel may still
contain vapor within or above the flammable concentration range. Before personnel
enter such spaces for any reason without approved breathing apparatus, the
confined space must be tested and must contain not less than 19.5% oxygen, and
the flammable vapor content must be less than 10% of the lower flammable limit to
provide an ample safety factor for performing hot work inside the vessel.
The concentration of vapor must also be reduced below the threshold limit values
(TLV) of toxic materials before people without approved breathing apparatus may
enter the unit for inspection, cleaning or repair. Refer to the Material Safety Data
Sheets for more information.
The progress of any vapor-freeing operation should be closely followed by
checking the atmosphere in the vessel or the stream of vapor being displaced from
the vessel with a combustible gas detector. See Section 335 for additional details.

Ventilating with Steam

To be effective in displacing vapor, steam must be supplied at a rate high enough to
avoid significant condensation, and at a point where it may actually sweep the
vapor ahead of it and out the discharge opening into the surrounding air. Since
steam will condense on all cold metal surfaces, unless the whole vessel is initially
hot, it must be heated to nearly the boiling point of water (at least 170°F) before
effective displacement can occur. An actual discharge of steam from the vent
opening is necessary; the mere appearance of a plume of condensed water vapor
does not prove that the steaming rate is adequate.
Preferably, the steam should be introduced as near to the bottom as possible and
vented at or near the top so that expelled vapor can be safely dissipated. All interme-
diate openings should be kept closed. If the vessel is hot when emptied consider
starting steaming immediately, to reduce the loss of steam in heating the vessel to
170°F or higher.
Displacing vapor in a column or vessel with steam has the advantage of keeping the
inside of the unit moist until all vapor has been removed, preventing any pyrophoric
iron sulfide that might be present from drying out and becoming a source of igni-
tion while the concentration of flammable vapor is within the flammable range.

Ventilating with Air

Mechanical air ventilation can be just as effective on process equipment as it is on
tankage (refer to API 2015, “Cleaning Petroleum Storage Tanks”). However, on
some vessels, particularly columns, the mechanics of air ventilation may be more
difficult. If a jet eductor (steam or air operated) is used, it should be placed on a
manhole near the top, since it is undesirable to release vapor near the ground. A
blower (operated by electricity, air, or steam) can be attached to a manhole near the
bottom, venting the column or other vessel near the top. The blower should be set

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up and ready to operate before the bottom manhole cover is removed, so that vapor
is not released at that point during installation of the blower.
The blower should be started as soon as feasible. If possible, start it even before the
attachment is completed. All sources of ignition should be carefully controlled
during this period. The air rate should be equivalent to several air changes per hour.
Try to minimize the time during which the tank vapor space is in the flammable
range by maximizing the ventilation flow.
A relatively high air rate is particularly important if pyrophoric iron sulfide is
suspected. Higher air rates ensure a decrease in vapor concentration to well below
the lower flammable limit before the iron sulfide has had time to dry out and
oxidize rapidly enough to burn. If the vessel is dry when ventilation is started, intro-
ducing steam or a spray of water into the vessel to moisten any accumulations of
iron sulfide on surfaces is frequently desirable.
Recent air quality regulations at some locations require vapor recovery or activated
carbon filters to remove the vapors from tanks being opened for inspection,
cleaning, repairs and dismantling. It is important to recognize that this equipment
can provide a source of ignition if not properly designed and controlled. Blowers
should be bonded to the tank vessel and rated for Class I, Div. 2 use. See
Section 226 for additional details.

360 Welding on Nonvapor-Free Lines, Tanks and Vessels

361 Introduction
It is usually safest to empty, clean, and vapor-free any pipe, tank, or vessel before
welding on it with flame or electric arc. Frequently, this can be done without undue
expense or inconvenience.
However, sometimes cleaning and vapor-freeing is extremely expensive and diffi-
cult, causing lengthy downtime. In such a situation, certain jobs, such as hot-
tapping connections onto pipes, tanks, or vessels; welding brackets or other attach-
ments onto operating equipment; and replacing pieces of pipe or fittings can be
done on nonvapor-free equipment with reasonable safety, if specific precautions are
taken.
API 2201, “Procedures for Welding or Hot Tapping on Equipment Containing Flam-
mables,” is found in the Standards section of this manual.

362 General
The procedures discussed in this section for welding and hot tapping on pipelines,
vessels, and tanks containing flammable liquid, gas, or vapor should be used only
as a guide and source of information. They cannot be expected to cover all contin-
gencies. If a special need or problem exists, responsible supervision should review
these procedures, keeping in mind that safety is the first consideration.

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The possibility of burning through the walls of equipment during welding opera-
tions can be minimized by using capable and experienced welders and by thorough
and adequate inspection of the equipment prior to welding. Ultrasonic thickness
gaging is a valuable tool for such inspection. If a flammable atmosphere may exist,
do not weld or hot tap unless the equipment is inerted or vapor-free.
When arc welding, the welding machine must be located beyond any probable path
of vapor that might be released in the repair operation or from any other source.
Combustibles in the area such as staging boards, grass, or seal material on tanks can
be ignited by welding slag. These precautions, however are no different from those
required for any welding operation.

363 Hot Tapping Precautions and Procedures

Hot tapping is the welding on any pipe, vessel or tank while it is in service. The
principle is that there is enough flow in the pipe or liquid volume in the vessel or
tank to safely carry the heat away from the weld.
Detailed precautions and procedures for hot-tapping piping are included in the
Piping Manual and Welding Manual as well as API 2201. Procedures for hot
tapping tanks are in the Tank Manual.
In addition to the precautions outlined in these publications, standby fire extin-
guishers and/or water should be provided in the work area. All personnel concerned
with use or operation of the lines or equipment being worked on must be advised of
the proposed job plan. Use of a hot work permit system (see Section 331) is
required.
A Safety Checklist for hot tapping is in the Piping Manual.

364 Special Considerations and Alternate Methods

Oil Pipelines
Several methods have been used to permit cutting out a drained section of line and
venting only the section to be replaced, without vapor-freeing the entire line.
Temporary plugs. Several types of temporary plugs have been used to block off
the pipeline from the area where welding is to be done.
Any temporary plug may unexpectedly dislodge or leak if pressure builds up in the
line behind it, releasing flammable vapor into the welding area. Therefore, some
positive method of venting from the top of the line to a safe location should be used
to prevent pressure buildup in the line. This may require at least one hot tap for a
vent connection, which should be made before the line is taken out of service so
that heat will be dissipated by the flowing fluid while the hot tap is being made.
Test for combustible gas more frequently when temporary plugs are used.
One method of installing a mechanical plug which does not require venting is stop-
pling. A hot tap is made on the line and an articulated plug is inserted through the
hot tap valve and into the line. After repairs are made the stopple plug is with-

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drawn, and the hot tap valve closed. The advantages of this method include the
ability to isolate sections of pipelines repeatedly using the reinserted stoppling tool.
Disadvantages include a potential reduction in line integrity from an added branch
connection, and need to perform the proper welding procedure on the pipe while it
is in service.
Balloons inserted through small drilled holes in the pipe have been effectively used
for temporary plugs.
Clay packs have also been used, but some products, and some pumping and
metering equipment cannot stand the contamination.
Dry ice packs (solid carbon dioxide) avoid contamination of the line contents.
Their primary use is to make the working area nonflammable by establishing a
vapor barrier of inert gas, rather than to function as a plug.
Dry ice is not a true plug because it constantly diminishes in size as it forms carbon
dioxide gas (CO2). It has been used on motor gasoline and black oil pipelines. Tie-
ins with dry ice, however, should be limited to locations where liquid drain-down is
complete or incoming liquid is so slight that no appreciable amount accumulates
behind the dry ice during fitting and welding. Dry ice packs do not contain pressure.
The open end of the cut line should be covered with plastic or plugged after the dry
ice is in place if any delays are encountered or while the tie-in crew is at the other
end of the job. This keeps the CO2 vapor inside the line, prevents air from mixing,
and helps the carbon dioxide commingle with any hydrocarbon-air mixture back
inside the line.
A vent hole in the pipe behind the dry ice (on the opposite side of the dry ice from
the weld area) is useful to check for fluid accumulation, to test the vapor space in
the line for percent CO2, and to relieve pressure buildup while welding is in
progress. Before trimming or welding is started, the vapor space in the line should
be checked for flammability and, if possible, for percent CO2. Also, as usual, the
open end of the line and the ditch or bell hole should be thoroughly checked with a
combustible gas indicator.
After the pipe has been cut by nonigniting means a screw-expanding plug can be
used to block the line if the plug can be removed through a flanged opening after
welding is completed.
All of the methods discussed here require that the repair area be cleaned up and all
flammable liquid and vapor removed before welding can be done.
Weld-plus-end coupling. This is another commonly used method for making pipe-
line repairs. In this technique, the pipe is cold-cut with pipe cutters or a saw.
If a power saw is used, it must not be an ignition source. An air-operated or explo-
sion-proof electric motor should be used and the blade kept cool with water or
cutting oil.
The replacement length of pipe or fitting should be fabricated at a safe distance
from the repair site. The replacement length can then be slid into place and the

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weld-plus-end coupling clamped over the ends to be joined. The line can immedi-
ately be put back into operation. Then, after any spilled oil has evaporated or been
otherwise disposed of, the coupling can be welded into the pipe with flow in the
pipe to help carry away the heat.

Natural Gas Pipelines

Often natural gas lines are repaired while maintaining one to two ounces of gas
pressure at the top of the pipe in the area of the break, and excess gas is allowed to
burn during welding operations. However, use of this technique should be closely
controlled and those using it must be experienced in this type of work.
Air rapidly enters a large (over 12-inch) gas pipeline that is cut circumferentially. A
gas pressure sufficient to keep air out as the line is cut, results in a flame height
larger than a welder can work near, if the gas is ignited as it escapes the pipeline. A
positive pressure at the top of a pipeline is no guarantee that a negative pressure
does not exist at the bottom of the cut. It can be concluded that if flames are
observed burning outside the bottom of the pipe, no air is entering the pipe.
Conversely, if the flame is not burning at the bottom, air is entering the pipe and
there may or may not be burning on the inside. The ignition of a relatively small
volume of flammable mixture within a nearly closed pipeline may cause a pressure
increase large enough to expose the welder to serious burn. Therefore, use of this
technique should be closely controlled and those using it must be experienced in
this type of work.
The first torch cut should be made furthest from the gas supply to assure pressure at
successive cuts. Successive cuts should then be made progressively closer to the gas
source.
The first weld should be made closest to the gas source to assure pressure at each
weld. Successive welds should then be made progressively farther from the gas
source.
Do not stand in front of openings in the pipe while cutting or welding.
Avoid dead ends of piping systems to be cut or welded. Install a vent at the end to
assure gas flow through the pipe.

Water Pipe
A pipe filled with water can be welded safely if care is taken that there are no vapor
traps in the area being heated.

Tanks and Vessels

Welding on tanks and vessels can be done safely if the applicable precautions in
API 2201 and the Tank Manual are followed.
Welding above the liquid level. Welding should not be done on a tank above the
liquid level unless the tank's atmosphere in the vapor space is maintained at less
than 10% LFL and the area to be heated on the inside of the tank has been scraped
clean of any combustible residue or other material for a distance of at least three
feet in all directions. (See Inert Gas Blanketing for an exception.) Care must be

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taken to identify the area inside the tank that will be heated by the welding opera-
tion on the outside. If it is impractical to remove all combustible residue from the
area to be heated, the tank or vessel should be emptied and ventilated. Then, in
accordance with entry permit procedures, personnel should be stationed inside the
tank with a water hose, continuously cooling the heated area while welding is in
progress. The precautions listed in this paragraph apply to asphalt, fuel oil and all
other heavy hydrocarbons in addition to the lighter hydrocarbons. Even though the
residue is deposited at a temperature far below its flash point, it may be heated and
vaporized, and possibly ignited during the welding process.
Inert gas blanketing. An alternative to vapor-freeing and cleaning the affected
tank areas (see Section 350) is to blanket the tank atmosphere with CO 2 until the
oxygen concentration is below 10 percent.
If nitrogen is used as the diluent, the oxygen concentration should be reduced to 7
percent or below. Vessels containing more than one percent hydrogen should have
the oxygen concentration reduced to less than 4 percent, with CO2 as the inerting
agent. Accurate analysis of the oxygen concentration in representative samples of
tank vapor space is absolutely essential. Several portable oxygen indicators are
available that will indicate in these ranges.
The precautions listed above should be observed for installation of studs and
brackets by the resistance welding method (for instance, Nelson studs), unless it is
definitely established by test with the actual equipment to be used that control of
welding current, thickness of metal and other factors will prevent the temperature
on the inside of the tank from reaching the auto-ignition temperature point of the
material or 450°F, whichever is lower.
Welding should not be done on the roof of a floating roof tank unless the tank and
pontoons have been emptied and are vapor-free. Exceptions to this rule require
special precautions, management approval and review by the Fire Protection Staff.

370 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2015 Cleaning Petroleum Storage Tanks
API 2201 Procedures for Welding or Hot Tapping on Equipment
Containing Flammables

Chevron References
Piping Manual
Tank Manual
Welding Manual

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400 Emergency Response
Organization

Abstract
Organization, clear definition of responsibilities, and pre-fire planning are key
elements of emergency response that are discussed in this section.

Contents Page

410 Level of Response 400-3

411 Employee Responsibilities
412 Regulatory Codes & Standards
420 Incident Command System (ICS) 400-4
421 Background
422 The ICS Organization
423 The Incident Commander
424 Process Liaison
425 Command Staff
426 Operations
427 Other ICS Functions
428 Senior Executives
430 Pre-Fire Plan 400-11
431 Requirements
432 Preparation
440 Coordination with Outside Agencies 400-13
441 General
442 Advance Planning
443 Small or Unattended Facilities
444 Larger Facilities

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445 Public Utilities

450 Reminder Sheets 400-15
460 References 400-21
470 Fire Scenarios 400-21
471 Fire at Truck Racks or Manifold Area (Scenario 1)
472 Fire in Tank Field (Scenario 2)
473 Fire in Office Building (Scenario 3)

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

410 Level of Response

The type, size, and location of a facility determine the level of response to a fire.
Before incidents occur, management must specify the appropriate response level in
a pre-fire plan and train personnel to respond accordingly.
Management has three response options:
• Use the local municipal fire department instead of company employees. This is
often the only choice for office buildings and pipeline and marketing terminals.
• Train personnel to fight “incipient stage” fires only. Once the fire is beyond
this stage, call for outside help. This approach is often used at smaller facilities
which are not large enough to support a fire brigade, (such as small chemical
plants, gas plants, and production fields).
• Train Company personnel to fight all fires. If this option is selected, OSHA
requires the formation of a fire brigade. See Section 156 of Part 29, “Code of
Federal Regulations,” for information on fire brigade requirements. This option
applies to locations such as refineries and large chemical plants.
Management decides the appropriate level of response based on these factors:
• Availability of trained outside responders
• Criticality of the facility
• Environmental sensitivity
Management might choose a different response level for a facility that is small, crit-
ical in nature, and with few outside responders than for a facility that is the same
size but with less critical operations and a municipal fire department near by.

411 Employee Responsibilities

Company personnel must be trained for the level of response expected of them.
Generally, operations and maintenance personnel are trained to handle fires at the
incipient stage. At this stage, the fire can be controlled with small first-aid equip-
ment (hand-held extinguisher or hose 1 1/2 inch diameter or less).
First-response fire brigade members are trained to operate larger fire fighting equip-
ment and to take an offensive approach to fighting a fire. They normally bring addi-
tional and larger equipment and skilled personnel to the scene. In many smaller
installations, management relies on the public fire department for this level of fire
fighting.
Where public fire protection is not available, or at large installations where public
fire protection is inadequate, Company employees can be trained to provide this
protection. This organization is referred to as a fire brigade or emergency response
team. Some may be full-time fire protection personnel, but in most cases, this group
will be made up of various employees throughout the installation who can be
released from their normal duties on short notice and can proceed immediately to
the scene of the fire. These people should be volunteers, if possible. All employees

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chosen for this team must be given intensive fire training. See Section 500 for
training requirements.

412 Regulatory Codes & Standards

The requirements for organizing a fire brigade are in OSHA 1910.156 and NFPA
600 and 1500. See Section 500 for an explanation of OSHA 1910.156 require-
ments. NFPA 600 “Industrial Fire Brigade” covers fire brigades and emergency
response organizations for fire fighting. This standard applies to most Company fire
brigades. NFPA 1500 “Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and
Health,” OSHA 1910.120, and 1910.146 cover requirements for fire departments
where response includes medical, rescue, and HAZMAT skills.

420 Incident Command System (ICS)

421 Background
The Incident Command System (ICS) is designed so that various organizations can
work together effectively during a fire. The system consists of procedures for
controlling personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications. Used effectively,
ICS provides increased safety, organized and efficient response, and a high level of
confidence and support from outside response organizations.
OSHA (CFR 1910.120) regulations stipulate the use of the Incident Command
System during emergency incidents. The regulations require that ICS be incorpo-
rated in the facility emergency plans. OSHA also requires designation of an Inci-
dent Commander and Safety person as part of the ICS, with specific responsibilities
for each.
The ICS is used for all types or sizes of emergencies, ranging from a minor incident
involving only a few responders to a major incident involving several agencies. ICS
is especially important in major incidents because ICS allows agencies to communi-
cate in common terminology and use the same procedures. In an emergency,
outside services can be integrated quickly.
An ICS plan for a facility generally includes the following components:
• Organizational structure, including unified command
• Integrated communications
• Common terminology
• Pre-fire plans
• Manageable span of control
• Pre-designated facilities
• Resource management

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422 The ICS Organization

The ICS organization has five major functions and the Process Liaison, who is part
of facility operations. They are coordinated by the Incident Commander. The func-
tions are
• Command
• Operations
• Planning
• Logistics
• Finance
In small incidents, the Incident Commander coordinates most of the functional
areas. See Figure 400-1. It's better for the ICS to start small and expand as neces-
sary. Setting up an unnecessarily complex ICS organization wastes manpower and
causes confusion.

Fig. 400-1 Incident Command System (ICS) - Abbreviated Structure

IN C ID E N T
COM M AN DER

P ro c e s s
L ia is o n

S a fe ty

F ire F ig h tin g
Team s

ICS is based on manageable span-of-control. In general, the span-of-control of any

individual with emergency management responsibility is from three to seven
people. Figure 400-2 shows an example of the full ICS hierarchy.
The Incident Command System starts when the first ICS-trained person arrives on
the scene. This person might be a Company shift supervisor, field foreman, or a
member of the Company fire brigade.
As the incident progresses, more experienced people respond. For example, a
municipal fire department might arrive to aid a refinery brigade. The Incident
Command is transferred according to the facility emergency response plan.

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Fig. 400-2 Incident Commander System (ICS)

INCIDENT
COMMANDER

Command Staff

Process Liaison Public

Safety Agency Legal
Affairs

Logistics Planning Finance

Operations

Staging

Fire Attack Evacuation Medical Hazmat

.

ICS avoids conflicts during the transfer of command or when resources are
provided by multiple organizations.

423 The Incident Commander

Selection of the Incident Commander (IC) is based on the experience and level of
training of the available personnel on site, not on management position. As more
experienced people respond to an incident, the Incident Command is transferred in
an orderly fashion.
The Incident Commander is responsible for all activities related to the emergency
response effort. The IC has the following responsibilities:
• Size up the incident initially, decide on the appropriate level of response, and
set response objectives.
• Ensure that personnel safety has the highest priority. Verify that a hot zone has
been established around the fire area.
• Establish a command post in a safe location. From here, the IC can oversee
developments, receive reports, and be available to subordinates requiring
further instructions. Only for an extreme emergency should the IC leave this
command post, and then only after clearly designating someone else in the
command post as Deputy IC. The command post must have various means of

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

communications. Recommended are portable two-way radios, telephones, fax

machines, and messengers.
• Manage the response to the incident. The IC coordinates all fire fighting
efforts, fire department personnel, and equipment through Operations.
• Designate team members for each area of ICS responsibility.
• Expand the initial ICS organization if necessary and/or implement a unified
command system with outside responders.
• Serve as the contact person and ensure that Company management is periodi-
cally informed of the status of response operations.
• Ensure that all required and appropriate government and public agencies are
notified.
• Designate a Deputy Incident Commander and delegate any of the above respon-
sibilities, if required.

424 Process Liaison

The Process Liaison, who is knowledgeable in facility operations, might be an area
shift supervisor or a field foreman. The Process Liaison is responsible for assuring
that the fire fighting tactics and operational moves are coordinated. These include:
• Coordinating response plans and actions with Operations.
• Coordinating the safe isolation of the fuel source and controlled shutdown of
facilities.
• Providing guidance on materials, process and equipment hazards.
• Making sure that facility operating personnel understand hot zone and
personnel protection needs.

425 Command Staff

The Command Staff supports the Incident Commander. The Command Staff
includes Safety and others such as Agency Liaison, Public Affairs and Legal, when
needed.
As with all support teams working for the IC, jobs can be combined (or eliminated)
at small incidents and expanded beyond the basic coordinator positions for large
incidents. It's wise to start small and stay flexible.
Members of the Command Staff report to the Incident Commander. Descriptions of
their duties follow:
Safety is responsible for monitoring and assessing hazardous and unsafe situations,
developing personnel safety measures, documenting hazardous exposures and situa-
tions, and developing a site safety plan. Safety also enforces the hot zone and identi-
fies personnel protective equipment requirements, except in HAZMAT situations.

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Public Affairs is responsible for the formulation and release of information about
the incident to off-site management, the news media, and other appropriate agen-
cies and organizations.
Agency Liaison is the point of contact for the assisting and cooperating agencies.
This includes representatives from other fire agencies, the Red Cross, law enforce-
ment, public works, and engineering organizations.
Legal anticipates legal action that may result from the incident and provides legal
advice.

426 Operations
In this context, Operations refers to fire fighting, not facility operations. The Opera-
tions staff includes the fire fighting operations chief, the staging area manager, and
if the incident is large enough, fire attack leader(s), evacuation, HAZMAT, rescue,
and medical teams.
Operations is responsible for the direct management of all incident tactical activi-
ties. Responsibilities include:
• Supervising fire fighting operations.
• Rescue operations and removal of victims to a safe area.
• Removing water from the site.
• Making sure that operations personnel have the equipment, materials, and
supplies needed to carry out response operations in a safe, effective, and effi-
cient manner.
• Establishing the hot zone.
• Keeping the IC informed of all developments and the status of response opera-
tions.
• Coordinating response operations carried out by cooperatives, response contrac-
tors and organizations, and government agencies. Personnel and equipment
furnished by a municipal fire department or mutual aid should be used under
the direct supervision of the concern's representative.
The Staging Section is responsible for managing all activities within a staging
area. The duties include:
• Establishing a staging area upwind and uphill of the incident, as assigned.
• Determining support needs for storage of equipment, providing food, sanita-
tion, and security.
• Keeping a written account of all resources entering or leaving the staging area.
• Organizing the resources within the staging area for efficient deployment.

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

• Dispatching resources as requested by the Incident Commander or Operations

Section.
Fire Attack Leaders are responsible for implementing their assigned portion of the
incident action plan. Their duties include:
• Evaluating the situation and working with the Process Liaison to develop a
specific plan for fire fighting operations.
• Identifying resource needs and working with the other units to obtain and
release manpower, equipment, materials, and supplies.
• Performing safe and effective fire fighting operations, as assigned.
• Ensuring an adequate water supply is maintained.
• Keeping the Operations Chief informed of the status of fire fighting operations.
The Evacuation Section is responsible for:
• Coordinating safe evacuation, as assigned.
• Establishing evacuation assembly areas.
The Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Unit is responsible for:
• Identifying all hazardous substances or conditions present, and developing a
specific plan for HAZMAT response operations.
• Defining the entire HAZMAT site.
• Identifying the contamination control line.
• Identifying the exclusion zone.
• Ensuring that personnel and equipment are properly decontaminated prior to
leaving the area.

427 Other ICS Functions

Planning is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and reporting all information
about the development of the incident and the status of resources. This information
is used to predict possible incident outcomes and prepare alternative control strate-
gies and operations.
Logistics is responsible for resource management at the incident. This could mean
providing the following facilities, services, and materials:
• Communications personnel and equipment
• Food services (catering)
• Supply services (fire resistant clothing and consumables)
• Personnel facilities (sleeping, sanitation)

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• Security services or coordination with plant protective services

• Ground support (transportation, crafts, and maintenance)
• Heavy equipment (backhoes, front end loaders, etc.)
• Waste disposal and cleanup
• Miscellaneous utility services such as vacuum trucks to remove spent fire
water for environmental cleanup
• Inventory of all equipment, materials, and supplies obtained during the
response effort
• Administration of vendor contracts and service and equipment rental agree-
ments
• Ensuring that records are maintained on services provided and contracts
executed
• Ensuring that Finance is advised of all cost commitments
Finance is responsible for cost analysis and all financial aspects of the incident and
for supervising members of the finance section. The duties include:
• Assisting Logistics to ensure fast and efficient delivery of materials and
services.
• Ensuring that appropriate cost and accounting control systems are established.
• Providing adequate accounting systems including auditing, billing, and docu-
menting labor, material, and services used.
• Ensuring that legal claims and insurance matters are properly handled.
Other ICS functions might be necessary at large fire or toxic release incidents,
including:
– Security
– Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup
– Medical
– Documentation
– Environmental
– Communications
– Purchasing
– Transportation
– Comptrollers
– Human Resources (for responders)
– Insurance

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428 Senior Executives

Senior executives arriving at a fire should review the situation at a location that is
separate from the Incident Command Post. Senior executives should stay out of the
fire area except in these situations:
• Their presence is requested (for example, to give the IC rest time).
• They received fire training, have personnel protective equipment, and are
willing to work under the direction of the IC.
An incident has only one commander; that person is the IC. Senior executives defer
to the IC unless the commander indicates otherwise. Executives can participate in
an emergency response and provide valuable service in the following areas: media
relations, logistical support, “home office” contacts, and redeployment of facility
resources. Some larger facilities have established Emergency Operation Centers
with responsibilities in these areas.

430 Pre-Fire Plan

431 Requirements
OSHA 1910.38a and 1910.120q(2) require that an employer prepare and maintain a
statement or written policy that establishes the elements of an emergency response
plan. As a minimum, the plan should include the following elements:
• Personnel roles
• Lines of authority
• Pre-emergency planning and coordination with outside agencies
• Training, communication, emergency recognition, and prevention
• Safe distances and places of refuge
• Site security and control
• This section discusses plans for emergencies and fires.
For larger facilities, the emergency response plan serves as the pre-fire plan. Some
areas, such as tank fields and LPG facilities, might also have a pre-fire plan to
address specific needs.
An up-to-date pre-fire plan must be available for inspection by the OSHA represen-
tatives. The plan must be changed whenever installations are expanded, people are
transferred, or changes in personnel or other conditions occur.
Pre-fire plans should be developed in conjunction with the local fire department and
mutual aid organizations. Provide outside response organizations with a copy of the
plan. During an incident, on-site copies of the pre-fire plan must be readily acces-
sible to outside responders.
Pre-fire plans should be prepared even if there is little chance of requiring or
obtaining outside aid. Although they are a valuable planning tool for outside agen-

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400 Emergency Response Organization Fire Protection Manual

cies, the primary purpose of pre-fire plans is to organize logical Company response
to an incident.
Periodically review the organization and role of each individual who might be
present at the time of a fire with all personnel. Review can take place during fire
training, or it may take the form of periodic fire drills with the emergency response
organization. Drills or fire training reviews should be frequent enough and hypothet-
ical fires large enough for personnel to gain the confidence needed to assume their
duties without hesitation during an actual fire. See Section 500 for more informa-
tion on hypothetical drills.

432 Preparation
The Company Pre-fire Planning Guide, GO-603, is at the end of this section. Also
included is a sample pre-fire plan for a marketing terminal.
A minimum pre-fire plan contains the following information:
• Basic emergency information
– Date plan was adopted
– Facility name and location (street address or directions from known land-
mark. Don't use post office addresses)
– Emergency phone numbers for fire departments, consultants, mutual aid,
rescue/ambulance, and other critical service organizations
– Name and address of facility managers and backup contacts
– Phone numbers for regulatory agency notification, as applicable (e.g. Fire
Department, Coast Guard).
• A sketch of the facility and immediate surroundings, preferably to scale. The
rendering should be as precise as possible, contain a plot plan if it is available,
and the following information:
– North arrow
– Tanks, structures, process and fire fighting equipment (hydrants, monitors,
fixed foam systems and subsurface foam injection points), possible hose
lays to equipment, any special or unusual risks
– Impounding areas with capacity in gallons and barrels
– Tank diameter, height, type of roof, class of product, foam solution appli-
cation rate, and total quantity of foam concentrate required
– Drainage paths
– Emergency shutdown switches
– Tank field drain valve
– Electrical power disconnects and natural gas (utility) block valves
– Escape routes, personnel mustering locations, and refuge locations
• A list of surrounding occupancies and land uses. Identify any unusual hazards
in adjoining occupancies (schools, brushland, flammable storage, etc.).

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

• The level of Company and outside response (see Section 410). List fire fighting
equipment on site, at the fire department, and at other locations (such as other
facilities or oil companies). Decide how equipment resources will be divided
during an incident. Develop protocols for sharing, borrowing, returning, and
repairing equipment.
• Note location of mobile fire fighting equipment in the area, such as foam
pumpers and trailers, subsurface foam makers, foam supplies, portable water
pumps, street barriers, and so on.
• Make a count of people that can be expected to respond to an incident. Include
Company, municipal, and other fire fighters.
• Location and description of water supplies such as hydrants, ponds, canals
(fresh and salt). Verify hydrant thread compatibility, as well as water pressure
and flow rate (or total volume). Locate the uninterruptable power source for
electric motor driven fire water pumps.
• Radio frequencies for emergency responders common to all response organiza-
tions.
• Schedule for annual pre-fire plan reviews and names of company and munic-
ipal fire department representatives.

440 Coordination with Outside Agencies

Most Company properties are located in municipal, county, or other fire districts
where fire fighting is a public function. These agencies are responsible for the
control of fires within their areas. In certain instances, private fire brigades from
other industrial concerns might offer assistance. Coordination is extremely impor-
tant and is best accomplished through a thorough pre-fire plan, periodic reviews,
and hypothetical drills.

441 General
To coordinate a pre-fire plan with outside agencies, do the following:
• Call the local fire department and invite them to the facility.
• Provide a familiarization tour. Explain the nature of the process and identify
Company personnel, such as the Process Liaison, who can assist emergency
responders during an incident.
• Point out emergency shutdown/power disconnect locations (they should be
prominently marked).
• Discuss various scenarios and extinguishment methods. Compare the resources
required by these methods to those stipulated in the pre-fire plan.
• Discuss sharing resources and manpower.

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400 Emergency Response Organization Fire Protection Manual

• Discuss any differences in the way the ICS is implemented between the organi-
zations. Develop common terminology and identification procedures (such as
coat colors).
• Arrange for compatible communications equipment.
• Point out any special protective measures on site, how they are used, and their
limitations.
• Schedule annual pre-fire plan reviews and hypothetical drills using scenarios
identified in the pre-fire plan.

442 Advance Planning

Plan for the use of public fire department personnel and equipment as follows:
• Determine what outside equipment is available. Equipment available from
outside resources dictates to some extent the amount and type of equipment the
Company needs to maintain at a particular facility. Some local fire departments
have considerable experience in oil fire fighting techniques and have special
equipment suitable for this purpose; others might not be so well equipped.
• Decide who should be in command at a fire. Suitably trained Company
employees are preferred as incident commanders because of their familiarity
with facility processes and equipment. When no suitably trained Company
personnel are available, or when outside agency personnel have greater experi-
ence or knowledge, an outside person becomes incident commander. A unified
command is usually appropriate in this case. Although the Company personnel
may lack emergency response training, their process knowledge is often crit-
ical.
• Train with mutual aid and/or municipal fire brigades annually. This will ensure
quick notification and mobilization, efficient use of incident command, smooth
access through plant security for responding public fire equipment, gates and
roads wide enough to accommodate their mobile equipment, compatible hose
connections, and procedures for the use of communications equipment.

443 Small or Unattended Facilities

In smaller installations such as service stations, most bulk plants, producing well
sites, and others where no fire equipment other than first aid is provided, public fire
departments are relied upon exclusively to control larger fires. In such cases, the
municipal fire chief serves as the IC and takes full charge of the fire fighting activi-
ties.

444 Larger Facilities

In larger installations, where a Company fire organization and fire fighting equip-
ment are provided, public fire departments supplement the Company forces. The IC
is generally a Company employee. Close cooperation between Company personnel

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

and those in charge of public fire equipment and personnel is essential to get the
maximum benefit from public services. Unified command is sometimes required by
the public fire department.

445 Public Utilities

Public utilities (electric, gas, phone, water) have emergency crews that can help in
case of serious fire. Knowledge of their work and equipment as well as the proce-
dure for calling them, should be part of the emergency preparedness program.

450 Reminder Sheets

Reminder sheets help the IC and assistants follow procedures during a serious fire.
The reminder sheets shown in Figures 400-3 through 400-7 for members of the
organization are included in the following pages and can be used as training aids.
• Incident Commander/Process Advisor
• Safety Officer
• Person in Charge of Records
• Information Center Supervisor Directing Press Relations

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Fig. 400-3 Incident Commander Reminders

1. Make sure the Fire Chief is on the job. Confirm that established procedures for rescue and fire fighting are
underway and that key positions in the fire organization are or will be filled.

2. Establish an Incident Command Post.

3. Make sure the Public Affairs representative is in place.

4. Size up the fire, and determine, if possible, the source, kind of fuel, and additional fuel sources which might
become involved.

5. Control the supply of fuel. The Process Liaison should issue instructions for limiting flow of fuel to the fire,
such as shutting down equipment and closing valves, pumping out vessels or lines or displacing them with
water, dumping to blowdown, and so on.

6. Apply cooling streams to exposures.

7. Make sure that water is not used in excess, flooding the area.

8. Analyze the situation to determine if a re-ignition hazard exists.

9. Make sure manpower and equipment are adequate and the most important activities are receiving first
consideration.

10. Coordinate activities of outside fire fighting forces (including mutual aid).

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

Fig. 400-4 Safety Officer Reminders

Oversee the general safety of all people involved.

1. Watch for falling debris, etc.

2. Watch for overhead leaks, oil floating on water, etc.

3. Make sure sewer openings are open and draining freely.

4. Watch for chemical spills.

5. Consult with an industrial hygiene resource to make sure personnel exposures are properly handled.

6. Check location of high tension wires and other electrical equipment and warn fire fighters.

7. Monitor for toxic vapors, gases, and high ambient temperatures (>140°F).

8. See that hazardous areas are secured from unauthorized access and from individuals not equipped with
proper personal protective equipment.

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Fig. 400-5 Incident Recorder Reminders

Record events in chronological order giving time and location where appropriate:

1. Time of arrival at scene of emergency.

2. Origin of fire–location and possible cause.

3. Wind and weather conditions.

4. Extent of flame–height, area covered, color of flame and smoke, etc.

5. Explosions (time and location).

6. Spread of fire to adjacent structures.

7. Arrival of fire fighters.

8. Use of each piece of fire equipment.

9. Number of people and amount of equipment used in various operations.

10. Effect of extinguishment—type, such as foam, water, etc.

11. Actions used to isolate and shut down the fuel source.

12. Effect of radiant heat.

13. Action of relief valves and flares.

14. Distance traveled by sparks and brands.

15. Quantity of water and foam concentrate used.

16. Rate of application of water and foam.

17. Efficiency of drainage.

18. Ability of various kinds of material to withstand fire conditions.

19. Injuries to fire control and other personnel.

20. Condition of tank or tank vessel shells—buckling.

21. Rate of progress of heat wave in tank (if crude oil).

22. Extent of each boilover or frothover (if crude oil).

23. Special equipment issued, and to whom.

24. Orders issued, when, and by whom.

25. Photograph and/or video tape the fire for Company records.

26. Provide information to supervisor in charge of investigation.

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

Fig. 400-6 Public Affairs Officer Reminders

Consider the following points where applicable:

1. Advise appropriate members of management and the Public Affairs Department of all significant features of
the fire.

2. Instruct guards not to discuss the situation with reporters and to escort all reporters and photographers to a
designated location for briefing.

3. Brief reporters on what is burning. Do not attempt to describe the fire control activities.

4. Do not release the names of injured persons or fatalities.

5. Avoid depicting a conflagration or referring to any possibility of extensive spread or exposure to the public.

6. Do not permit reporters to interview operators or fire fighters.

7. Conduct photographers to safe locations where they can take pictures of news value.

8. Arrange, if possible, an interview for the press with the facility manager as quickly as possible.

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Fig. 400-7 Example Pre-fire Plan

Facility Chevron Marketing Terminal
111 Main St.
Location Anytown, USA
The Marketing Terminal receives light pipeline products such as gasoline and diesel for
Purpose of Facility storage and sales via the truck racks.
Emergency Phone Numbers
Position Days Off-Hours
Fire Department (xxx-xxxx) 911 911
Chevron
Name Terminal Manager xxx-xxxx xxx-xxxx
Name Head Operator xxx-xxxx xxx-xxxx
Name Area Manager xxx-xxxx xxx-xxxx
Name Pipeline Dispatch xxx-xxxx xxx-xxxx
Name Regional Compliance xxx-xxxx xxx-xxxx
Mutual Aid
Equipment Availability
Other
Type Fire Dept On-Site Location
Turnout gear X
Breathing apparatus X

Fire extinguishers 30 lb. 6

Fire extinguishers 150 lb. 2
Hose reels 1 1/4" 7
Fire hydrants 4 1/2" hose connections 2
Subsurface foam makers 1 4
Pumper truck (2000gpm)
Foam truck 2 airport
1 refinery
Foam supplies
1300 gal. 3% AFFF foam (tank) 1
100 gal. 6% mutual aid
Portable water pump (1000 gpm) mutual aid
Facility Layout See attached plot plan
Fire Water/Foam System See attached schematic
Surrounding Occupancies Location and Type of Water Supplies
One 2000 bbl. tank and one 3000 bbl. tank on site and full of fresh
water. This is a 3 to 3 1/2 hour supply at a usage rate of 1000 gpm.
North: farmland To maintain the flow, use a fire department pumper truck to boost
South: farmland system pressure/flows. Tank levels are displayed at a location near
East: paved two-lane road and farmland foam manifold.
West: AAA Company
East of the plant are fresh water irrigation ditches.

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

460 References
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
Title 20 CFR, Section 1910.156
Title 20 CFR, Section 190.38a
Title 20 CFR, Section 1910.120

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 600 “Industrial Fire Brigade”
NFPA 1500 “Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health”

470 Fire Scenarios

471 Fire at Truck Racks or Manifold Area (Scenario 1)

Truck Driver Actions
Note If the terminal is unmanned at the time of the fire, the fire department takes
these steps:
1. Shut down terminal (pumps, tank suction valves, loading rack valves, and
vapor recovery). Use any emergency shutdown switch:
– At each end of the loading rack
– On light pole west of loading rack near fence
– On office building east wall
2. Call 911 to report fire to fire department
3. Call pipeline dispatcher on emergency phone in the grey metal box on the
north wall of the office building. Have the pipeline shut down and blocked in.
4. Attempt rescue of injured personnel if safe to do so.
5. Determine if fire can be safely extinguished by dry chem extinguishers on
hand. If not, move to a safe area, and wait for the fire department.
6. Open the gate and stand by to advise arriving fire fighting personnel of the situ-
ation and to control access to the area.
7. Call Chevron Operations personnel. (see phone numbers on front page).

Fire Department Actions

Major Objectives:
• Ensure personnel safety
• Perform rescues

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• Isolate the fuel source

• Prevent line ruptures/flange failures
• Extinguish the fire
Procedures:
1. Have the fire department dispatcher confirm the Chevron notifications (see
phone numbers on front page).
2. Set up Incident Command System (See ICS organization diagram attached).
3. Attempt rescue of injured personnel, if safe to do so.
4. Assess situation and call in mutual aid, if necessary.
5. Connect pumper truck to fire water main to boost pressure to 150 psig.
6. Set up portable foam generator, if necessary, to extinguish ground fire. Use
foam connection at foam tank.
7. If fire is impinging on any equipment such as vessels or piping, set up portable
monitors or hand lines to cool equipment.
8. If fire is being fed from a pressured source, use a brigade approach to isolate
the source.
9. Extinguish ground fires using foam from on-site foam tank.

Actions of Responding Chevron Operations Personnel

1. Assume role of Process Liaison in the Incident Command System.
2. Advise Incident Commander in isolating sources of fuel to the fire by identi-
fying critical equipment such as pumps and valves.
3. Maintain an accurate record of the event:
– Time fire reported, fire department arrived, and other notifications made
– Equipment, personnel, and tactics used to fight fire
– Foam usage, especially amount left on hand
– Any information useful to incident critique
4. Keep Marketing management informed of the situation.

472 Fire in Tank Field (Scenario 2)

Note In this scenario, the terminal is unmanned and a 911 call is received.

Major Objectives
• Isolate the fuel source
• Prevent line ruptures/flange failures in the tank field
• Cool tank shells with direct flame impingement

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

• Extinguish ground fires

• Extinguish tank fires
• Minimize water usage

Actions
1. Have the fire department dispatcher call the Chevron Pipeline dispatcher and
have the pipeline shutdown and blocked in. Also, have the fire department
dispatcher call Chevron Operations personnel (see phone numbers on front
page).
2. Set up Incident Command System (See ICS organization diagram attached).
3. Shut down terminal (pumps, tank suction valves, loading rack valves, and
vapor recovery). Use any emergency shutdown switch:
– At each end of the loading rack
– On light pole west of loading rack near fence
– On office building east wall
4. Assess situation and call in mutual aid, if necessary.
5. Connect pumper truck to fire water main to boost pressure to 150 psig.
6. Extinguish ground fire using portable foam generator, if necessary.
7. If fire is impinging on any equipment such as vessels and piping, set up
portable monitors or hand lines to keep equipment cool. Minimize the use of
water.
8. If there is an internal tank fire, determine whether to use foam application,
either surface or subsurface.
– Generally, if the roof is intact, the fire will be in the seal area, and subsur-
face application may be effective.
– If the floating roof has failed in a fully involved tank fire, subsurface foam
application isn't effective because the sunken roof impedes the flow of
foam to the surface. In this situation, try to protect adjacent equipment.

Subsurface Injection Procedure

Note Take these steps once the ground fire has been extinguished.
1. Verify that the tank is more than 2 feet below the overflow height by reading
on the tank level gage, or by contacting the Pipeline dispatcher to avoid a tank
overflow when the foam starts.
2. Use a fire brigade team to open the foam valve and inlet valves at the tank.
3. Verify that the fire water system pressure is 150 psig.
4. Start foam into the tank using the tank/foam maker concentrations listed in the
Figure 400-8 Foam Usage Table. Discontinue after 15 minutes to determine

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400 Emergency Response Organization Fire Protection Manual

impact on the size of the fire. If there is no impact, consider discontinuing the
application to minimize water usage.
5. If foam is having no impact, shift objectives to protect adjacent exposures.

Fig. 400-8 Foam Usage Table

Water Usage Foam Usage(1)
System Total Total
Tank Number GPM Gals(2) GPM Gals(2)
T-1 3 430 23650 13 715
T-2 1&2 300 16500 9 495
T-3 2 190 10450 6 330
T-4 1 110 6050 3 165
(1) 3% foam solution
(2) Total used in 55 minutes per NFPA 11, paragraph 3-2.4

Actions of Responding Chevron Operations Personnel

1. Assume role of Process Liaison in the Incident Command System.
2. Advise Incident Commander in isolating sources of fuel to the fire by identi-
fying critical equipment such as pumps and valves.
3. Maintain an accurate record of the event:
– Time the fire was reported, the fire department arrived, and other notifica-
tions made
– Equipment, personnel, and tactics used to fight the fire
– Foam usage, especially amount left on hand
– Any information useful to incident critique
4. Keep Marketing management informed of the situation.

473 Fire in Office Building (Scenario 3)

Chevron Plant Operator Actions
Note If terminal is unmanned at the time of the fire, the fire department performs
these functions upon arrival.
1. Shut down terminal (pumps, tank suction valves, loading rack valves, and
vapor recovery). Use the emergency shutdown switches:
– At each end of the loading rack
– On the light pole west of the loading rack near the fence
– On the east wall of the office building l
2. Call 911 to report the fire to fire department

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Fire Protection Manual 400 Emergency Response Organization

3. Call the pipeline dispatcher on the emergency phone in the grey metal box on
the north wall of the office building. Have the pipeline shut down and blocked
in.
4. Determine if fire can be safely extinguished by available dry chem extin-
guishers. If not, move to a safe area, and wait for the fire department.
5. Open the gate and stand by to advise arriving fire-fighting personnel of the situ-
ation and to control access to the area.
Call Chevron Operations personnel. (See phone numbers on front page).

Fire Department Actions

Major Objectives:
• Ensure personnel safety
• Perform rescues
• Extinguish the fire
Actions:
1. Have the fire department dispatcher confirm Chevron notifications (see phone
numbers on front page).
2. Set up Incident Command System (See ICS organization diagram attached).
3. Attempt rescue of injured personnel, if safe to do so.
4. Assess the situation and call in mutual aid, if necessary.
5. Connect the pumper truck to the fire water main to boost pressure to 150 psig.

Responding Chevron Operations Personnel Actions

1. Assume the role of Process Liaison in the Incident Command System.
2. Maintain an accurate record of the event:
– Time fire reported, fire department arrived, and other notifications made
– Equipment, personnel, tactics used to fight fire
– Information useful to incident critique
3. Keep Marketing management informed of the situation.

Chevron Corporation 400-25 December 1994

500 Fire Training

Abstract
This section addresses training requirements of OSHA 1910.120 (HAZWOPER)
and 1910.156 (Fire Brigades) as well as those appropriate for Company employees
responding to a fire emergency. Coordination of training with support personnel
and public fire departments is discussed.

Contents Page

510 General 500-2

520 Incipient Stage Fire Response 500-2
530 Fire Fighting Brigades or Crews 500-2
540 Incident Commanders 500-3
550 Training with Public Fire Departments 500-3
560 Hypothetical Drills 500-4
570 References 500-4

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510 General
All employees must receive fire training in the duties they are expected to
perform.
Fire training can be grouped into three primary categories: incipient stage fire
fighting, fire fighting brigades, and incident command. Incipient stage fire fighting
is response to incipient stage fires, using small equipment, such as fire extin-
guishers and hose reels. Fire fighting brigades must have a higher level of training
under the OSHA requirements, and would typically respond to fires of greater inten-
sity, or where a coordinated fire fighting attack by well-trained fire fighters is
needed. Finally, those who are responsible for supervising fire fighting efforts, such
as incident commanders or fire chiefs, need additional training. OSHA regulations
are found in OSHA Section 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency
Response (HAZWOPER) and 1910.156, Fire Brigades. NFPA 600 outlines the
requirements for industrial fire brigades.
Fire fighting training at various levels is available at several Company facilities,
where employees can learn both incipient stage fire fighting and more advanced fire
fighting techniques. The CRTC Fire & Process Safety Team can assist in identi-
fying such facilities. In addition, formal advanced training is available to supervi-
sors who may become incident commanders, through live fire and classroom
training at Texas A&M University, or at the University of Nevada, Reno Dodd-
Beales Fire Training Academy.

520 Incipient Stage Fire Response

Each employee should know the location of incipient stage fire equipment, how to
use it, and how to report a fire alarm. They should be given actual experience in
handling the equipment on small practice fires simulating actual situations as
closely as possible. As a minimum, this training should be conducted during a four
to eight hour session each year. Each session should include defensive fire response
and operation of all the incipient stage equipment employees are expected to use.

530 Fire Fighting Brigades or Crews

Employees designated to handle major units of fire extinguishing apparatus should
be thoroughly familiar with each piece of equipment and its use, and with the
tactics of combating all types of fires that may be encountered.
Such familiarity can be achieved only through a comprehensive program of regular
drills. These drills should include practice in using different types of equipment on
fires that simulate actual conditions and, so far as practicable, are comparable in
size to those that they might be called upon to fight.
OSHA 1910.156 specifies that fire brigade members shall receive training commen-
surate with their duties and functions including training at a fire school. In addition,
fire brigade members should have quarterly on-site training, completing a total of
40 to 80 hours of training each year. Instruction includes:

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• Chemistry of fire
• Water management and hydraulics
• Equipment, hose handling, and teamwork
• Extinguishers and extinguishing agents
• Foam and foam application
• Hazardous and toxic materials
• Fire emergency management
• LPG emergencies
• Tank fires
Training programs shall be similar to those conducted at:
• Texas A&M University
• Lamar University
• University of Nevada, Reno Dodd-Beales Fire Training Academy
• Delaware State Fire School
Contact the CRTC Fire & Process Safety Team for information on these schools.
Where rescue operations, HAZMAT response, or interior structural (building) fire
fighting are included in the brigade charter, additional training is required.
These drills should, from time to time, take the form of responding to a simulated
alarm, mobilizing, loading equipment into trucks where necessary, and going into
action as would be done in an actual fire. Regular inspection and tryout of plant
water systems is a good opportunity for such drills, which might include laying
hose, connecting it to hydrants and actually handling hose streams under various
conditions.
In plants that have permanent foam systems, these should be operated occasionally
by the group that would normally be assigned to this activity during a fire, to give
them practice in all operations (starting pumps, handling valves, etc.).

540 Incident Commanders

Training for personnel who perform the Incident Command role should be compre-
hensive, per the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 29, Section 1910.156,
“Fire Brigades.” Typically, this training includes fire brigade training plus 24 to 40
hours of incident command training at a fire school such as Texas A&M or Univer-
sity of Nevada, Reno Dodd-Beales Fire Training Academy.

550 Training with Public Fire Departments

Especially in smaller plants, where public fire departments are depended upon to
furnish personnel and equipment to combat fires beyond the control of incipient
stage equipment, local management should work with the chief of the local fire
department to coordinate on site training for fire fighting at the facility. Even for
large facilities where plant fire fighting organizations are maintained, there should

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be close liaison with the public fire department to ensure their effective cooperation
should they be needed in response to a major fire. Inviting fire department
personnel to participate in the training sessions of Company employees and to visit
facilities periodically will facilitate such cooperation.

560 Hypothetical Drills

In addition to hands-on fire training, one of the best training techniques is a hypo-
thetical drill. This technique assumes some serious failure in the plant, such as:
1) a high pressure line ruptures, 2) a pump seal fails on a debutanizer bottoms
pump, 3) a high pressure furnace tube ruptures, 4) a tank truck ignites while
loading, etc. The responsible personnel in a group session will discuss the problem
to determine how best to bring it under control. A new problem should be solved
each time a hypothetical drill is held. A copy of form GO-604, “Hypothetical Drill
Planning Guide and Checklist,” is included at the end of this section as
Figure 500-1.
The written hypothetical drill shall be supplemented by a hands-on drill as
often as possible. Tags can be used to indicate valves that should be closed, pumps
that should be shut down, venting, etc. It is beneficial to critique the drill after
completion.

570 References
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
OSHA 29 CFR Part 1910.120, “Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency
Response” (HAZWOPER)
OSHA 29 CFR Part 1910.156, “Fire Brigades”

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Fire Protection Manual 500 Fire Training

Fig. 500-1 Hypothetical Drill Planning Guide and Checklist (1 of 4)

Chevron Corporation 500-5 December 1994

500 Fire Training Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 500-1 Hypothetical Drill Planning Guide and Checklist (2 of 4)

December 1994 500-6 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 500 Fire Training

Fig. 500-1 Hypothetical Drill Planning Guide and Checklist (3 of 4)

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500 Fire Training Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 500-1 Hypothetical Drill Planning Guide and Checklist (4 of 4)

December 1994 500-8 Chevron Corporation

600 Fighting the Fire

Abstract
This section covers basic fire fighting procedures for any fire, and especially
considers fire fighting for all types of fires likely to be encountered in petroleum
facilities.

Contents Page

610 General Fire Extinguishing Methods 600-3

611 Quenching
612 Smothering
613 Flame Suppression
614 Flame Propagation Interruption
620 Evaluating the Situation (Size-up) 600-4
621 Introduction
622 Kinds of Fuel
623 Preventing the Fire from Spreading
624 People and Equipment Available
625 Methods of Control
626 Grass Firess
627 Fire in Electrical Equipment
630 Basic Fire Fighting Procedures 600-12
631 Procedure Depends on Location
632 Prompt Action Important
633 Use of Water
634 Welfare of Fire Fighters
635 Protection of Surrounding Property
636 Use of Foam
640 Specific Facilities—Part 1 600-17

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641 Process Units

642 Cone Roof Tanks
643 Floating Roof Tanks
644 Pressure Storage—Closed Containers
645 Onshore Oil and Gas Wells
646 Pipelines
650 Specific Facilities—Part 2 600-34
651 Loading Racks
652 Tank Trucks—Other Vehicles
653 Service Station Fires
655 Marine Terminals
656 Warehouses and Other Buildings
657 Natural Cover—Grass, Brush
660 References 600-47

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610 General Fire Extinguishing Methods

Fire extinguishing depends on one or a combination of the following:
• Quenching (cooling)
• Smothering (blanketing)
• Flame suppression (heat absorption)
• Flame propagation interruption (free radical-chain breaking)

611 Quenching
Quenching is the action of cooling a fuel to a temperature below its kindling or
flash point, at which it ceases to give off sufficient vapor to sustain combustion.
This method of extinguishment is usually used on solid fuels, such as wood, paper,
fabrics, etc. It is also effective on liquid fuels having a high flash point.
While any inert material (gaseous, liquid or solid) can absorb heat and might serve
as a quenching medium, noncombustible liquids that vaporize at a relatively low
temperature are the most practical. Water, because of its high specific heat and
latent heat, is by far the most effective.

612 Smothering
Smothering is accomplished by introducing an inert barrier between the source of
fuel vapor and the surrounding air, preventing them from forming a combustible
mixture. Examples of smothering agents include a cover (for use on vent fires), a
layer of liquid foam, and a blanket of carbon dioxide, steam, or other inert gas.
Foam is used primarily on pools or other horizontal surfaces. Once formed, a foam
blanket remains effective for some time. Inert gases such as CO2 not only form a
barrier between the fuel and the air, but also dilute the air in the immediate vicinity
so that the oxygen content is below the point necessary to sustain flame. The effec-
tiveness of gaseous smothering agents depends on applying them at a high enough
rate to completely fill the entire flame space at one time. Gases have a negligible
cooling effect. Smothering with gases temporarily interrupts contact of the fuel
with the air, and if hot coals or other ignition sources remain in the area, the fire is
likely to reflash as soon as the gas blows away.

613 Flame Suppression

An inert liquid or solid substance introduced into a flame absorbs or reflects part of
the radiant heat of reaction, reducing the flame temperature, even to the point of
preventing the flame from being self-propagating. Although akin to dilution (see
Section 612) the applications of flame suppression are different.
The heat-absorbing power of liquids increases as the surface area is increased by
subdivision. Therefore liquid sprays are the most effective. The droplets in a fine
spray “fog” of water absorb heat, which raises their temperature and partially evapo-
rates them. Not only does the absorption of heat cool the fire; the steam formed also

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dilutes the air, so that the effect is a combination of cooling and dilution. The drops
that do not evaporate cool solids in the area and serve as a screen against radiant
heat transfer.
Finely powdered inert solids cool only by absorbing heat and providing a screen
against radiant heat transfer.

614 Flame Propagation Interruption

In the combustion process the flame reaction fragments the molecules of fuel and
oxidant, producing in the simplest case (H), (O), and (OH) free radicals. These free
radicals are links in the combustion chain that propagate and continue the flame and
are simultaneously formed and consumed in the reaction. It follows that intercep-
tion of these free radicals would halt the combustion process. This is done by chem-
ical reaction of the extinguishing agent with the free radical to form a non-
combustible compound. The extinguishing properties of dry chemical powders and
halogenated hydrocarbons are due primarily to their chain-breaking properties,
which interrupt the propagation of flame.

620 Evaluating the Situation (Size-up)

621 Introduction
The tasks of the Incident Commander (see Section 400) at a fire are:
1. To form an adequate estimate of the situation
2. To organize and direct the personnel and equipment available to meet the situa-
tion in the most effective way possible.
In estimating the situation, the Incident Commander should first determine the
actions that must be started at once to effect rescue and to prevent the spread of fire.
He should then decide the most effective plan of attack as determined by the char-
acter of the fire and the personnel and equipment available. Carefully sizing up the
situation at the start may save considerable time; spontaneous decisions may result
in futile work, done without adequate plans.
Sizing up the situation involves answering a series of questions, which are
discussed in this and subsequent sections. This may be simple for a small incipient
fire where the persons discovering it can tell at a glance what is burning, what they
have to work with, and what they must do to control and extinguish it. The ques-
tions are the same for a large fire, but answering them correctly may be more
complicated.

622 Kinds of Fuel

The first question is “what is burning?” The tactics and extinguishing equipment
employed usually depend on the fuel involved. If the kind of fuel and the size of the

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fuel leak are known, the source and quantity of fuel normally give an indication of
the chance of the fire spreading or, at least, the speed with which spread is likely.
In large fires the exact nature of the fuel may be obscured by smoke and flame
during the early stages. In such cases, preliminary cooling will be necessary to
permit access and detailed size-up.

Wood and Similar Combustibles

Wood, paper, fabrics, and similar materials must be heated enough to produce a
vapor before they can be ignited. Therefore, spread of the flame is normally slow in
the early stage, but progresses rapidly as more heat is released. Fires in these mate-
rials soon become deep seated; that is, vapor is being formed beneath the surface in
the body of the fuel. This characteristic is important in selecting the method of
control.

Gases and Vapors

Petroleum gases and vapors will burn if mixed with the proper amount of air and
ignited. See Section 120 for a discussion of the properties of flammable vapors. Gas
fires, as discussed here, refer to gases and vapors that burn at some distance from
the liquid surface, as at vents, or in tanks or other containers.
Since gases and vapors normally burn near the point of release to the air, they tend
not to spread after ignition. Unignited gases and vapors, on the other hand, may
travel a considerable distance, particularly if released at ground level. They may
ultimately reach a source of ignition and flash back to the point of release. There-
fore, gas fires should not be extinguished until the flow of fuel is stopped.

Oil
Oil fires are really vapor fires that burn just above the surface and are fed by evapo-
ration from the oil surface. The heat of the fire tends to increase the rate of evapora-
tion. Liquid fuels will, of course, flow with gravity, spreading the fire.
The ease of ignition depends on the volatility of the oil. Light oils, such as gasoline,
are readily ignited and are difficult to extinguish, since sufficient vapor for burning
is given off at ordinary temperatures.
Heavy oils, such as heavier grades of fuel oil, are difficult to ignite, but once the
surface is heated sufficiently to produce vapor, the burning proceeds just as it does
with a more volatile oil. The surface layer of such a heavy oil can be cooled with
water spray to a temperature at which it no longer gives off sufficient vapor to
sustain the flame.

623 Preventing the Fire from Spreading

After rescue of personnel and taking steps to stop the flow of fuel, preventing the
fire from spreading is the next consideration in combatting any fire. Even after the
initial spread has been checked, continuous vigilance, using methods discussed in
this section, is necessary to prevent the ignition of other fuel in the vicinity.

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The principal elements affecting chance of spread are type of fuel, potential quan-
tity of fuel, and the proximity and vulnerability of exposed equipment and material.

Direct Flames
Fire can be spread by direct contact of flame with combustible materials. Volatile
combustible liquids, grass, and wood (small cross-section) ignite almost instantly;
heavy oils and massive structures spread flame more slowly.
Direct flame contact with metal structures can also contribute to the spread of fire
by softening them and causing loss of strength. This may:
• Drop elevated structures and cause a spill of liquid fuel
• Drop such structures onto lines containing liquid fuel and break them
• Soften and rupture the shell of a pressure vessel, releasing its contents. See
Section 644 for more information.
The size of a flame depends primarily on the rate of release of combustible vapor.
The distance to which it spreads horizontally to expose adjacent property depends
on its density, the pressure of the escaping vapor or liquid, the direction and
velocity of the wind, and the elevation of adjacent structures.
Spread of fire by direct flame can be retarded or prevented by playing water sprays
or streams directly on the flames and burning material and, if ample water is avail-
able, on adjacent exposures as well.
Water, especially in the form of spray, is an excellent medium for absorbing heat
and will reduce the flame size. When applied at close range the force of the spray
can also push the flame away from any exposure, minimizing heating of the expo-
sure.

Radiant Heat
Heat radiated from the primary fire can spread the fire by igniting other combusti-
bles. Radiant heat travels in a straight line in all directions regardless of wind, but
obstacles will protect areas in their “shadow.” The intensity of radiant heat from a
flame varies directly with its exposed area (i.e., that portion not obscured by smoke)
and inversely with the square of the distance to the objects exposed.
Only under extremely severe circumstances will petroleum substances be ignited
directly by radiant heat. However, wood and similar materials are more easily
ignited, and they, in turn, may ignite oil in the vicinity. The ignition of anything
more than 75 feet away from the flame is very unlikely unless the fire is very
intense, as with a boilover in a crude oil tank fire, a large impounding basin fire, or
major flare release.
Water sprayed on any exposed combustibles will prevent ignition. It is not normally
necessary to use water on steel storage tanks exposed to radiant heat until the paint
begins to blister.
See Section 1200 for more information on radiant heat.

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Fire Protection Manual 600 Fighting the Fire

Sparks and Brands

Large fires involving wood are likely to spread hot sparks and brands over a wide
area on the downwind side. If these drop on readily ignited material, another fire
may result. Continuous vigilance is necessary to prevent the fire from spreading by
this method. A group of fire fighters with water pump tanks, shovels, or wet sacks
patrolling the area around a fire can be extremely valuable in preventing secondary
fires from spreading. Prompt action along this line in the early stages of a fire is
often important. Large fires can lift fire brands that weigh several pounds into the
air and carry them over long distances.

Flow of Burning Oil

Oil released through a leak, spill, or damage to lines and fittings will, of course,
flow by gravity. Often, diversion ditches or walls can direct the flow of oil into an
area where little or no damage will result. The large quantity of oil spilled at the
boilover of a crude tank may require more elaborate means of control, such as
coping to dissipate the velocity of the oil and higher walls to protect important
exposed areas. Earthwork is a very economical fire mitigation measure, providing it
is completed before an incident occurs.

624 People and Equipment Available

After the fire has been sized up as to the kind of fuel and the chance for spread, but
before the plan of attack can be determined, the availability of people and equip-
ment must be established or at least estimated.

Equipment and Materials

Availability of fire fighting equipment and foam supplies, and the transportation
and amount of time required to reach the site and go into action must be deter-
mined. The pre-fire plan can be used to do this.
In addition to Company equipment at the installation, equipment can be brought
from other Company facilities, borrowed from other companies, and furnished by
public fire departments (mutual aid).

Personnel
Availability of personnel to operate fire fighting equipment and for other necessary
activities associated with extinguishing the fire must be determined before plans for
utilizing available equipment are made.
The skill and training of personnel who operate fire fighting equipment and fight a
fire is important. Only personnel with advanced fire fighting training (OSHA CFR,
Part 29) are permitted to fight fires that are past the incipient stage. Normally, equip-
ment such as a pumper furnished by a public or other private fire department will
have an operator with it. Public fire departments frequently furnish additional
people, who, even if not experienced in fighting large oil fires, are skilled in
handling hose, ladders, large hose streams, and other fire department equipment. A
number of jobs in connection with fighting a large fire require ordinary mechanical
skills or unskilled labor.

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It is necessary to assign available experienced personnel to supervise the various

phases of fighting a large fire. Those with the most experience in fire fighting and
in leading fire fighters should, of course, be assigned responsibilities most directly
associated with fighting the fire.
Professional fire fighters are also available for response. These outside companies
are highly trained and experienced in fighting specific types of fires, such as well
fires, marine barges and tankers, and fully involved tank fires. Recent incidents
have shown that use of outside professional fire fighters, such as those shown in
Figure 600-1, is appropriate in response to many large fires.

Fig. 600-1 Emergency Foam Supplies and Fire Fighters

Emergency
Phone
Service Company Number
Fire Williams Hazard Control (713) 999-0276
Fighters (Large tank fires, marine)

Red Adair (713) 462-6479

(Well fires)
Foam Chubb National Foam (215) 363-1400
Supplies
3M (612) 733-1110

625 Methods of Control

Select methods of control and extinguishment that are most effective given the
prevailing circumstances. Some of the more common methods of control are
discussed in the following paragraphs. Variations or combinations of these—as well
as other tactics—may be effective in special circumstances.

Shutting Off Fuel

Many oil and gas fires can most easily be extinguished by stopping or otherwise
limiting the flow of fuel and allowing the fuel that has escaped to burn out under
control. In many cases, the flow of fuel can be stopped by closing a valve a safe
distance from the fire, but in some instances the valve controlling the flow may be
surrounded with fire. In such cases, one or more teams with water spray lines can
be used to push back the heat and flames, protect the personnel, and cool the hot
metal in and around the valve, to permit approach to and operation of the valve.
After the source of fresh fuel has been shut off, the water spray should be used to
protect exposed facilities from damage and to prevent spread while the fire burns
out.
Several methods are used to stop the flow of fuel besides closing a valve. In some
cases there is no valve to close, or the valve is damaged.
For small pipes, the flow can sometimes be stopped by crimping or flattening the
pipe.

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Occasionally the flow of fuel can be stopped by directing a straight stream of water
into a leak. This is effective only when the water pressure exceeds that of the fuel
supply. This is difficult to accomplish but may interrupt the flow of fuel to a fire
long enough so that the ground spill can be flushed away. Then the leak can be
approached to close a valve, or the ground fire can be extinguished with some other
agent.
Another method of reducing or stopping the flow of fuel is to vent the pressure on
the container from which the fuel is escaping (if this can be done at a safe point) or,
if facilities are available, to empty the contents of the container into a sump or tank.
A method of control that has been used when a bottom connection has been broken
off a tank or vessel, or when something has pierced the shell near the bottom, is to
direct a stream of water into the vessel. The water naturally falls to the bottom and
if it enters at a rate higher than oil is being released, the oil level is eventually raised
above the leak and water is discharged instead of oil. After the remaining ground
fire has burned out or been extinguished, the leak can be approached and the hole
plugged. This method is suitable for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) spheres.

Allowing Fuel to Burn Out

Where large leaks of gas or volatile oil such as gasoline are the source of fuel, and
where there is a chance of re-ignition, extinguishment without control of the flow
of fuel may be extremely dangerous. The only safe method is to let the fire burn
under control until the source of fuel is exhausted.

Flushing Fuel Away

Under certain conditions oil fires resulting from small spills are best controlled by
using a water stream to flush the burning oil to underground drains in process areas
and loading racks, or to other safe locations. A straight stream of water is most
effective for this purpose.
It is imperative that any spills occurring around a loading rack or during a truck
delivery (whether ignited or not) should be immediately flushed away from under
the truck, rack, or other exposure. Similarly, small spills at service stations should
be flushed away immediately from under cars and around the fuel dispensers with a
water stream. Pushing the fire into an area where it can burn out harmlessly usually
results in less damage than attempting to extinguish it in place.
Caution must be exercised to assure that flushing does not create an environmental
problem. If so, flushed material must be directed to diked areas where it can be
vacuumed or pumped to a treatment center.

Cooling Heavy Oils

Water sprayed lightly on the surface of heavy oils, such as fuel oils and asphalt,
may extinguish the fire by cooling the oil surface to below the flash point. When
the water droplets strike the hot, viscous oil the steam formed produces a froth on
the surface. This froth is then further cooled until it no longer gives off enough
vapor to burn, and the fire goes out. Water should be applied sparingly at first, to
prevent excessive frothing. This method of control is also effective on fires

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involving relatively thin layers of crude oil (up to a few inches) that result from
spills, leaks, boilovers, etc. After the fire has burned long enough to consume the
light fractions, the residue will be similar to a heavy oil. Note that uncontrolled
application of water can create an increased risk of frothing over and/or boiling
over a tank. See Section 642 for a discussion of these risks.

Flame Propagation Interruption

Dry chemical powders and halogenated hydrocarbons interrupt the propagation of
flame. They can be used to rapidly snuff out flame; however, unless the larger or
longer-burning fires are simultaneously cooled with water or foam, re-ignition at
hot surfaces is likely.
Usually, halogenated hydrocarbons are used on small incipient fires where hand-
held extinguishers are provided, or in fixed total-flooding systems for enclosed
spaces where automatic actuation is provided (see Section 1600).
Dry chemical is often used with water. The water is used for personnel protection
and cooling of exposures and hot or smoldering materials. The dry chemical may
be the most effective method of rapid knockdown of flames and final extinguish-
ment (see Section 1600).

Smothering
Fire in which no wood or similar material is involved can often be smothered with
an inert gas, steam, or carbon dioxide, as discussed in Section 1600. Before extin-
guishment is attempted, sufficient equipment and personnel must be at hand to
permit covering the entire area at one time with a sufficiently high concentration to
smother the flame. Partial extinguishment is ineffective.
Before a fire can be finally extinguished, burning rubber, wood or highly heated
metal must be cooled with water or other means to prevent re-ignition.
Care must be taken in smothering a fire fed by gas under pressure. If it is a rela-
tively small leak and there is little likelihood of re-ignition, extinguishment by
smothering may be accomplished safely. But a large leak that cannot easily be dissi-
pated by the wind may become very dangerous if extinguished without shutoff.
Low velocity steam can effectively smother fires on hot equipment that might be so
damaged by a water stream that they release more fuel, and on small continuous
leaks, such as on furnace headers, where a leak cannot normally be repaired
without a shutdown. A flow of steam on the leak will prevent ignition and yet leave
no residue.

Foam
Foam, discussed in Section 1600, combines cooling and smothering. It is effective
for covering surfaces, such as pools of oil in ditches, pipe trenches, sumps, and
storage tanks. Since water is the primary constituent of foam, it is also effective on
wood and similar materials, reducing the chance for re-ignition. Foam is not effec-
tive on gas or liquid fuel leaks that are released under pressure. It is the only prac-

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tical method of extinguishing large oil storage tank fires. Refer to Section 1600 for
descriptions of foam equipment.
It is usually impractical to attempt to use foam to extinguish a fire covering a very
large area. The effective application rates given in Chapter 4, NFPA 11, “Foam
Extinguishing Systems,” apply to fires on the ground as well as in tanks. Note that
foam blankets may be affected by water streams.

Quenching Ordinary Combustibles

Deep-seated fires involving wood or other ordinary combustibles are subject to re-
ignition unless cooled, and must be quenched with some noncombustible liquid—
water, of course, being the most common. Foam is an effective extinguishing agent
for such fires if no other water is available.

626 Grass Fires

Grass is an ordinary combustible, but grass fires call for very different tactics than
do building fires. Most of the active burning takes place at the perimeter, which is
continuously moving and lengthening. Therefore, the perimeter must be the point
of attack.
Normally, grass fires are not hot enough to prevent close approach and direct attack.
Grass fires invariably travel with the wind, and they travel uphill much faster than
downhill. It is therefore very dangerous to approach a grass or brush fire from the
uphill side. This type of fire should be approached from the tail (windward side)
working along the flanks toward the head.
Unless water lines can reach over the area, firebreaks should be made by digging
with picks and shovels, throwing the loose earth back onto the fire, cutting brush in
the break, and throwing the brush away from the fire. The fire line should then be
patrolled by fire fighters equipped with water pump tanks used to immediately
extinguish any fire that gets across the break. Backfiring should be attempted only
as a last resort, and then only under the direction of someone experienced in natural
cover fires. Backfires can easily get out of control, resulting in two fires instead of
one (see Section 657).

627 Fire in Electrical Equipment

Only insulation and other combustibles will burn in electrical equipment. These
may be ignited by heat from faulty electrical installations or exposure fires. Such
fires can be controlled by simply shutting off the flow of electricity. Normally, use
of hand extinguishers on live electrical equipment should be restricted to extin-
guishers employing nonconducting meterial such as Halon, dry chemical or carbon
dioxide. Water spray may be used with caution on fires in electrical equipment, as
may the broken or pulsating stream of water from an ordinary straight stream
nozzle.

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630 Basic Fire Fighting Procedures

Listed below are the basic procedures for most fires:
1. Try to rescue anyone trapped or injured in the fire area.
2. Confine the fire, protect adjacent equipment or material not yet ignited or
damaged, and prevent spread.
3. Try to extinguish the confined fire.
In fires involving oil, part of the second step frequently involves shutting off all fuel
entering the fire area. After this has been done, it may in some cases be advisable to
omit the third step, opting instead to merely protect exposed facilities until the
remaining fuel burns up and the fire goes out. This is the safest procedure if prema-
ture extinguishment would leave volatile fuel that might be reignited, creating a
danger for fire fighters or others in the area.

631 Procedure Depends on Location

Various methods of controlling fires were discussed in the previous section.
These methods are applicable regardless of location, but location may determine
the fire fighting tactics and procedures to be employed. For example, a fire resulting
from a line break in a refinery would probably be discovered immediately. Trained
manpower with adequate equipment would have such a break isolated and the fire
controlled quickly with little chance of endangering non-Company property.
A fire resulting from a similar break in an identical pipe on a pipeline carrying the
same oil through a heavily developed urban area would develop differently. There
could be some delay before any Company personnel were made aware of the fire,
and further delay in getting Company personnel to the scene and isolating the
break. In the meantime, non-Company property would be involved or endangered.
Additionally, since the Company normally relies on public fire departments away
from its major installations, coordination and cooperation with such organizations
would be especially important.

632 Prompt Action Important

Prompt attack on the fire is extremely important. Under most circumstances, the
longer a fire burns before control measures are started, the more difficult it is to
extinguish.
This is particularly true in fires involving flammable liquids being released under
pressure. The longer the leak continues unrestricted, the more fuel is fed to the fire
and the larger the fire becomes. This will heat up adjacent equipment that may
contain—and release—additional fuel. This chain of events may continue at
increasing speed until all the combustible material in the area becomes involved.
Prefire plans (Section 400) help minimize response time. Anyone discovering an
incipient stage fire should first call for help, then try to extinguish it. With the wide-

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spread use of radios, it is possible to put in an alarm with practically no loss of time
from other fire fighting operations. Fires that are past the incipient stage may be
extinguished only by a trained fire brigade or by Municipal Fire Department
members.

633 Use of Water

The principles involved in controlling a fire with water are discussed in
Section 1600. Except for small fires that can be extinguished with a hand extin-
guisher, water streams are the major fire control tool in almost every fire situation.
On many fires, particularly flammable liquid fires, the effectiveness of the water
stream depends on the type of stream used and the way in which it is handled.
Straight streams for flushing away burning oil must be directed to prevent spread of
fire to other property. Cooling streams must cover exposed equipment. The
approach must be planned before the hose is laid out.
The number of hoses connected to a single riser or fed from a single main line
should be limited to avoid reducing pressure so much as to make all hose streams
ineffective.
Where mobile pumpers are available – either in the plant, or from public fire depart-
ments – it may be possible to augment water supply by taking suction from cooling
tower basins, water tanks, or from a river, lake or bay if plant is located adjacent to
such body of water.

Laying Hose
All fire hose nozzles have female hose thread, and all hydrants and pumper
discharge connections have male threads. The hose must therefore be laid out so
that a male connection is toward the fire and the female toward the source of water.
Hose layout procedures are described in detail in “Essentials of Fire Training” by
the International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), Volume No. 200. Two
layout procedures, forward lay and reverse lay, follow as examples. Consult the Fire
Protection Staff for more information.
Forward lay. The first layout practiced in the days before the availability of
pumper trucks was from the water supply source, typically a hydrant, to the fire.
This became known as the “forward lay.” The operation consists of stopping the
fire truck (pumper) at the water supply source and permitting the hydrant man to
safely leave the pumper and secure the hose. The pumper driver then proceeds to
the fire laying a line of hose out behind. Preconnected 1-1/2 inch lines or booster
lines that are advanced to the fire are also considered as forward lays. Whenever a
forward lay is made, it places the pumper in the street or alley near the scene of the
fire. In this situation, it may not be possible to use the fire truck pump, because of
the long run of suction hose.
Reverse lay. To obtain the maximum use from fire department pumpers, fire
fighters must often place the pumper at the source of water supply to feed the hose
lines with adequate pressure and volume. In order to make use of the pumper as a

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hose carrier, they must lay hose lines in reverse (from the fire to the water supply
source). Hence, the name “reverse lay.” The operation consists of stopping the
pumper so that a sufficient amount of hose may be safely removed from the bed.
All tools that may be required at the fire should be unloaded in a safe and conve-
nient place before the pumper leaves the scene of the fire since it will remain at the
water supply source. Whenever a reverse lay is made, it places the pumper at the
source of the water supply, where the on-board pump can operate efficiently with
the short suction hose.
It is extremely important to observe which way the hose is loaded on the fire truck,
hose cart, etc. In places where hydrant pressure is adequate to supply the hose lines,
the hose will normally be found stowed “hydrant-to-fire,” that is, with the female
connection out. In that case, the hose is laid from the hydrant to the fire (forward
lay), so that any hose remaining on the cart or truck, as well as nozzles, tools, etc.,
carried, will be near the fire if needed.
However, if the hydrant pressure is low and the truck that carries the hose is also the
pumper, the hose will probably be stowed “fire-to-hydrant” (reverse lay) so that the
truck will end up at the hydrant, where it can take suction to supply the hoses. It is
important in these cases to pull off sufficient hose at the fire to permit necessary
maneuverability. Other equipment that may be needed must also be unloaded there.
Care should be taken to lay out hose correctly. However, fire trucks should carry
double-male and double-female adapters to avoid having to turn hose end for end.
Other items to consider in handling hose are discussed in Section 1600.

Personnel Protection
Water spray is an effective means of protecting personnel from the heat of a fire.
Such protection permits work very close to the fire area. This is often important in
rescuing personnel, reconnaissance of the fire area to determine source of fuel, or
access to a critical valve or other control.
For maximum protection behind a hose stream, the nozzle, if adjustable, should be
set with a wide spray pattern, or full fog. The nozzle should be adjusted before
entering the fire area, and the hose laid out so that no kinks will occur during the
operation. The nozzle should be held very close to the body and comfortably low so
that the spray strikes the ground nearby. Approach to the fire area should be slow
and very deliberate, giving the water spray a chance to cool the hot gases and other
hot material. The nozzle should not be moved quickly, because of the chance of
flame approaching from an unexpected direction. The nozzle should not be plunged
into spill fires. This will splash fuel and create a potential hazard for the hose team.
In withdrawing from a fire area, even if the flow of fuel has been stopped and the
fire appears to be out, the spray should be maintained and the fire fighter should
back out slowly, thus providing protection against a flashback.
If two hoses are used together for personnel protection, the two spray streams
should be held so that they form a wedge. To do this, the fire fighters should stand
close together and keep the hoses on the outside (not between them) for greater
maneuverability. They should move forward slowly together. Since each person's

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hose is partial protection for the other, close coordination between the two is essen-
tial. Neither should make a quick move without due regard for the other's safety. A
leader works between the other two to coordinate their movements, close valves, or
take other steps toward extinguishing the fire.
Hose larger than 1-1/2 and 1-3/4 inch is seldom used for protection of personnel
due to the difficulty in maneuvering it; however, in some cases it may be desirable
to “cover” personnel entering a hot area with the stream from a larger hose.

Cooling Exposures
Normally, water can effectively protect exposed structures or equipment from heat
damage. Any method of application that keeps the surface of the material wet will
adequately protect it from the heat of the fire. Where possible, water spray should
be used because of the greater coverage for the quantity of water used. A straight
stream may go through the fire with little cooling and may not provide necessary
cooling to structures. Often, however, the spray pattern must be adjusted due to
distance. If it is not feasible to get close enough to use a water spray, and a straight
stream is necessary.
Although the outer end of a straight stream is broken up into a coarse spray, it still
does not cover much area; hence, it is generally necessary to move the nozzle back
and forth continuously to cover a larger area. It is seldom worthwhile to hold a
cooling stream in a fixed position; the water that runs off is virtually wasted. When
a structure stays wet after spraying, cooling water is not needed. The stream is
discontinued so the water can be used elsewhere. A hose holder enables one man
to readily manipulate a large hose and use the stream effectively for cooling
purposes.

Controlling Flames
Water spray can effectively control flames in many situations where the fire cannot
or should not be extinguished. This is often the case when gas, vapor, or light oils
are involved. The manner in which a water spray suppresses flame is discussed in
Section 1600.
Where there is no other controlling factor, it is normally easiest to approach the fire
from the windward side. The nozzle, if adjustable, should be set so that a maximum
amount of spray comes in contact with the flame.

Electrical Equipment
The use of water streams on live electrical equipment should be avoided, if
possible, because additional damage may be done to the equipment. However, if the
electrical lines or equipment are only incidental to other materials and equipment in
the fire area, the use of hose streams should not be delayed while the current is
being shut off.
Smoke from fires can ionize and create “short circuit” current paths in nearby elec-
trical equipment not otherwise affected. It is important to immediately shut off the
power to the fire and nearby equipment, in order to:

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• Prevent short circuit damage caused by arcing

• Stop input of energy to the fire
With caution, water streams can be used on live electrical equipment without
hazard to the fire fighter. Even with a straight stream of salt water, the hose operator
will not receive a dangerous shock if he does not approach the fire closer than is
necessary to reach it with the hose stream.
The National Fire Protection Association reports safe use of salt water through stan-
dard 1-1/8-inch straight nozzles at a distance of 30 feet from 22,000 volts. The
effective stream from such a nozzle operating at 40 psig or higher at the nozzle will
be at least twice the safe range. Smaller streams can be used at distances of 15 feet
or more from ordinary voltages of 440 volts and lower. Spray or fog streams can be
used at distances of three feet or more from live electrical equipment because the
stream is broken up as it leaves the nozzle.
Care must always be taken when fighting fires around electrical equipment to avoid
contact with live lines that have fallen.

634 Welfare of Fire Fighters

At large prolonged fires arrangements should be made to take care of the personal
needs of the fire fighters, such as water, food, and relief.
Persons assigned to duty at a fire are expected to and usually will stay with the job
until officially relieved. Workers may be forgotten in the stress of the emergency
unless relief shifts are systematically arranged. Where work is particularly
hazardous or strenuous, frequent changes of shift are desirable. Anyone injured in
fighting the fire must, of course, receive immediate and adequate attention.

635 Protection of Surrounding Property

Surrounding property and equipment may be exposed to flame, heat, sparks and
other hazards during a fire. Flying sparks and brands are typically generated from
burning wood, paper and other combustible solids.
Radiant heat travels in all directions but its intensity decreases rapidly with
increasing distance from the fire. Provide relief for closed containers and lines
subject to heat. Charring or blistering of paint is evidence of severe exposure and
indicates need of cooling with water. Water is also used to cool tanks where
exposed to direct flame. Cooling of vessels, pipes, or other similar closed
containers that may become overheated and burst is particularly important. Indis-
criminate use of cooling water on structures not actually endangered may jeopar-
dize water supply for fire extinguishment or could flood areas where fire fighters
must work.
Do not permit the vapor space of tanks or vessels to become flammable. Keep tanks
containing high flash point stocks cool. Keep air from entering tanks containing
low flash point stocks and do not pump or cool more than necessary to protect steel.

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It is important to close off pipelines connected to vapor spaces through which fire
can travel.
On adjacent equipment structures, keep supports cool with water fog. Keep
personnel off adjacent equipment unless necessary to conduct extinguishment.
Burning oil released from lines or vessels may flow to adjacent equipment and
spread fire. Dikes, dams, diversion walls, and/or coping may be effective in control-
ling spread of fire. See Section 642 for a discussion of boilover and frothover
hazards.

636 Use of Foam

A foam system must be properly handled to extinguish fire. A single mistake may
seriously delay or even entirely defeat the fire fighting. Correct action is more
important than haste. It is important that the water supply is adequate to operate
foam makers and that adequate foam is on hand to extinguish the fire. A portable
pumper will be necessary if hydrant pressure is not high enough to provide at least
75 psi (preferably 100 to 125 psi) at the foam maker.
Foam hose streams are effective on fires in small tanks, pits, or trenches and on the
ground. The foam should not fall directly on the burning oil surface, but should be
directed to some vertical surface so that foam piles up and slides out onto the oil
surface, or applied to the ground at the edge of the fire and forced to flow over the
oil.
For large tank fires, foam should be applied as gently as possible to the oil surface;
this is particularly important in fires involving gasoline or other light oils. After
foam has been started, do not interrupt flow. If it appears that progress in extinguish-
ment is not being made, attempts should be made to augment the foam supply,
using different points of application, or other means of applying foam where it can
more readily reach the set of the fire.
Foam is effective in blanketing oil spills to minimize the chance of ignition until
other corrective action is taken. Take care not to plunge the foam stream into the
spill. This can generate static charges, possibly igniting the hydrocarbon vapor. The
blanket must be reinforced periodically to replace normal foam deterioration.

640 Specific Facilities—Part 1

641 Process Units

Modern petroleum processing units are constructed primarily of incombustible
materials, and some parts of processing units contain a relatively small volume of
oil at any one time. Also, many units can be quickly emptied by discharging stock
to a safe location, leaving little fuel to burn at the unit itself.
Most processing units have sources of ignition such as furnaces, direct-fired
heaters, etc. If oil is released through mechanical failure or human error, a fire is

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therefore likely. In some cases, stock may be hot enough to ignite spontaneously
when released.
The high value of process units, their congestion, and their proximity to sources of
ignition usually makes provision of some built-in and portable fire control equip-
ment necessary. Built-in safety features are discussed in Sections 1100 to 2300, and
small hose stations and other portable equipment in Section 1600.
In general, fires do not occur in process units unless hydrocarbon is released. In
many cases, spilled oil that is ignited must be allowed to burn out. Control
measures must center on limiting the amount of fuel released and preventing further
damage to other equipment in the area, particularly damage that might release more
fuel.

Limiting Release of Fuel

Following a fuel spill, action should be taken as quickly as possible to isolate the
source and prevent an additional spill. Where the proper facilities are available, fuel
should be removed from the fire area by dumping it into a sump or vent tank, by
depressuring vessels and equipment through the blowdown system, and by
displacing vapors and liquid away from the leak with steam or water. Refer to
Section 620 for further discussion.
Displacement of fuel must be carefully supervised to make certain the fuel is being
moved away from the fire rather than into the fire. For example, if a furnace tube
has ruptured, introducing steam into a tube may accelerate burning by forcing more
oil into the firebox instead of displacing oil out of the furnace.

Fuel Under Pressure

Escape of fuel from process equipment cannot always be stopped by the methods
discussed above. Fires that involve release of liquid or gas under pressure can
normally be controlled most easily by closing valves in lines supplying fuel to the
fire.
Extinguishing the flame without stopping the flow of fuel may result in formation
of a very dangerous flammable cloud of escaped gas or vapor that might be ignited,
doing additional damage and possibly injuring personnel. Pressure-fed vapor fires
should be extinguished by shutting off the flow, unless there is a definite assurance
that all sources of ignition have been eliminated in the area.
Small fires fed by liquid fuel may be extinguished with water spray or hand extin-
guishers charged with dry chemical, Halon or carbon dioxide. Foam is not usually
effective on a pressure-fed fire, since a moving stream of gas or oil cannot be
covered with a blanket of foam.
Large pressure-fed fires cannot normally be extinguished with water spray or chemi-
cals; the flow of fuel must be stopped and the fire allowed to burn out, as already
described. Frequently, valves that control the fuel feeding the fire are in the fire
area. They can often be approached using a water-spray stream for protection of
personnel and using other techniques discussed in Section 633.

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After the flow of fuel has been shut off, the remaining fuel must either be extin-
guished or allowed to burn out. In either case, water streams should be used to keep
vessels, piping, instruments, and other equipment cool to prevent damage and
rupture that might release additional fuel. See Section 633 for further discussion of
water cooling.

Fuel in Trenches and Pools

Fires involving fuel in pipe trenches, sumps, and similar locations are handled with
the same equipment and in much the same way as the fires already discussed.
Avoid excessive application of water, which might spread burning oil to other areas.
Flow through undamaged lines in the area should be continued to help keep the
lines cool and prevent rupture, which would add more fuel to the fire. Exposed
pipe, fittings, and other equipment should be kept cool with water streams and the
flame should be controlled with water spray as discussed in Section 633.
If the fuel is heavy oil, the fire can probably be extinguished with water spray. Fires
in lighter oils may be extinguished with dry chemical after all hot surfaces have
been cooled and wood or similar combustibles extinguished with water so that re-
ignitions are prevented.
Where the fuel and fire are confined, as in a pipe trench, foam can be effective in
smothering the fire and extinguishing ordinary combustibles in the area, or can be
used as a dam to prevent further spread of burning oil. Foam may also be effective
in cooling exposed lines with a minimum amount of water, thus avoiding carrying
spilled oil along the trench as a layer on flowing excess water.

Insulation
Fires involving oil-soaked insulation, although frequently spectacular, are not
usually severe and can be quickly controlled with water streams and hand extin-
guishers. Caution should be exercised when smoldering insulation is opened and air
reaches the smoldering material, as it may burst into flames. Prompt repair of leaks
and cleaning of spills on insulation, with regular inspection and removal of oil
soaked insulation, will greatly reduce the chance of this type of fire. Application of
water to the oil-soaked areas before removing the insulation will minimize subse-
quent fires.

Pressure Vessels
Details concerning the problems and techniques of combatting fires involving pres-
sure storage tanks, cylinders, drums, etc., are covered in Section 644.

Furnace Tube Ruptures

Fires resulting from tube ruptures in process furnaces are usually confined to the
firebox, breaching and stack.
Fires involving oil released under pressure are most effectively controlled by shut-
ting off the supply source. However, if they cannot be isolated, the contents of the
furnace tubes and other downstream equipment will drain into the furnace firebox.
Thus, it is important that furnace fireboxes be equipped with a smothering steam

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system of sufficient capacity to restrict the burning rate. This is especially impor-
tant for furnaces equipped with unlined steel stacks, whether self-supporting or
guyed, which can become overheated by burning inside the stack, causing them to
structurally fail. Refer to the Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual for
more information.
Where dampers and combustion air fans can be operated safely during a firebox
fire, they should be considered as a means of limiting air flow into the furnace.
The application of smothering steam and operation of dampers and fans is primarily
an operating consideration; however, in combatting this type of fire, the fire fighting
organization should give consideration to the probability of stack overheating. This
evaluation should be made as soon as possible so that water can be applied to the
stack base before it becomes so hot that water is repelled from the surface. In the
sunlight, a dull red surface representing a metal temperature of about 900°F is very
difficult to see. At this temperature carbon steel has lost about 50% of its compres-
sive strength, and failure may be imminent.
Water should be applied by straight streams in preference to broken and spray
streams in order to remove the barrier film of steam and obtain rapid evaporation of
the cooling water. It will probably be necessary to use streams from several quad-
rants to keep the stack cool all the way around.
To get the needed reach and velocity at the point of contact, higher-than-normal
water pump pressures may be required. Also, smooth-bore nozzles will probably
give better results for this specific application than the combination spray-straight
stream nozzle; however, application of cooling water should not be delayed for lack
of these nozzles.
In some cases, it may be possible to extinguish a fire in a furnace firebox without
shutting off the supply of fuel, such as by the application of dry chemical. However,
this could lead to a potentially dangerous condition if the firebox is not kept vented
until all fuel has been removed. Vapors could be released, accumulate in the firebox
and passes, and be ignited by a hot spot or hidden flame, resulting in a firebox
explosion. Under most conditions, extinguishment of the fire within the firebox
with dry chemical or carbon dioxide should not be attempted.
It is important for plants to develop emergency procedures for responding to tube
failures in each furnace. Procedures should include the consideration discussed
above, and should include practices in hypothetical drills.

642 Cone Roof Tanks

Because of the large volume of product usually involved, monetary loss in tank
fires may be high (except for simple vent fires). For extinguishment, much appa-
ratus and many people are required. Refer to API 2021 and the API Fire Fighting
Guide.
Final extinguishment of a tank fire is almost always accomplished by covering the
entire oil surface with foam. Preliminary fire fighting efforts are directed toward

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establishing conditions that will allow this. Generally, there are complications
which make this preliminary job difficult.
Tank fire fighting is expensive and under some circumstances merely adds to the
total loss, although even then it may be necessary to protect other structures and
property. Tank fire fighting is likely to not be economical on a large tank that is less
than about a quarter full of product.
This is even more likely to be the case when quick extinguishment is impossible
and ground fires prevent approach to the tank. Under these conditions, fire fighting
should be confined to protecting adjacent property and salvaging the contents to the
extent possible. However, adverse governmental and public reaction to a controlled
burnout may make extinguishment desirable despite economic considerations.
Consider contacting a professional fire fighting company, such as those listed in
Figure 600-1 for all fully involved tank fires.

Steel Roof Tanks

Fire frequency in all-steel cone roof tanks is low, but when fires do occur they are
usually the result of an internal explosion that partially or entirely lifts the roof. The
falling roof may do considerable damage to adjacent tanks or piping, or it may fall
back onto the tank shell, partially resting in the tank and obscuring a portion of the
liquid surface. This makes coverage of the entire surface with foam considerably
more difficult.
The upward force of the roof tends also to lift the shell, frequently breaking connec-
tions to the tank. Whatever the specific effect of the explosion, fuel is usually
released onto the ground adjacent to the tank, seriously complicating the fire
control problem.

Wood Roof Tanks

Unlike steel roofs, wood roofs on tanks are usually ignited by an outside source
such as lightning. As the roof burns, it falls into the tank and ignites the oil. Even
fuel oil may be heated enough by the burning wood to be ignited.
If the fire originates with an explosion inside the tank, the weakness of the roof
reduces the tendency for the shell to rise. If the roof is displaced, it will fall in
pieces that are less likely to do serious damage to adjacent equipment.
There are only a few remaining wooden roof tanks in Company facilities. When
they fail they should be replaced with steel.

Vent Fires
Flammable vapors are discharged from tank vents during tank filling, during hot
weather after a night's cooling, and when the tank may be subjected to fire expo-
sure. If these vapors are ignited and the tank has a single atmospheric or pres-
sure/vacuum vent valve, the fire can be extinguished by stopping the filling
operation and then:
• covering the tank vent, or

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• withdrawing product from the tank, or

• cooling the tank with water, or
• using dry chemical at the vent, or
• applying water hose streams to blanket the opening
Note that the pressure pallet of pressure/vacuum valves closes as product is with-
drawn, snuffing the fire. This occurs before the vacuum pallet opens.
For tanks with open vents, fires may subside when filling is stopped. When product
is withdrawn, fire will be drawn downwards into the vent pipe and extinguished due
to the inerting effect of combustion products.
Extinguish ground fires first, then tank fires, to avoid re-ignition from vapor cloud
buildup.

Ground Fires
When a tank fire is complicated by a fire on the ground close by, it will first be
necessary to control the ground fire. This fire may be the result of an initial oil spill,
a break in pipe or tank fittings, frothover, or a combination.
Any continued flow of oil to the fire should be stopped. If the tank valve is open
and the ground fire is being fed by leakage from the connecting pipe line outside
the valve, or if there appears to be serious danger that fire damage to lines or
fittings will release tank contents, an attempt should be made to close the tank
valve. Use water spray for personnel protection as discussed in Section 633.
If valve closure is not possible, flow of oil from the tank may be stopped by raising
a swing line above oil level—if the swing-line winch is accessible—or adding
water to the tank by pump or by hose streams until the oil level has been raised
above the outlet.
If burning oil can be drained or flushed away from the tank and discharged to a
reasonably safe location, the intensity of the fire can be reduced and a water-spray-
protected approach made more feasible.
Equipment, lines and fittings subject to severe fire exposure should be cooled by
hose streams to avoid rupture and release of fuel. Contained ground fires can be
controlled or possibly extinguished with foam. However, as long as any leak
continues, constant replacement of the foam blanket will be required to prevent a
reflash if other fires are burning nearby. Refer to Section 625.

Cooling Exposures
Application of water to cool tanks exposed to fire is important and the amount used
should be minimized to conserve pressure and supply. Filling of the diked area not
only wastes water, but is likely to spread the spilled fuel, possibly ruling out fire
fighting from within the dike. See also Section 653 for discussion of cooling expo-
sures.
Normally, tanks require no shell cooling until the paint starts to blister. Vents may
be ignited, but, unless exposure is extremely severe, continued application of water

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on the tank will eventually cool it enough so that vents close or vapor discharge is
reduced to the point where the fire goes out by itself or can easily be snuffed out
with a hand extinguisher.

Crude Oil Boilovers

A crude oil fire in a fixed roof tank or reservoir may, under certain rare conditions,
boil over with considerable violence after burning for a period of time. The burning
oil can spread over a considerable area, and the increased size of flame is accompa-
nied by greatly increased radiant heat. The possibility of danger to personnel and
equipment in the area requires that persons concerned understand the problem and
recognize impending boilovers.
A boilover may occur if:
1. The oil contains both light fractions and heavy residues to form a heat wave
front; and
2. The heavy residues are viscous enough to trap steam passing through it and
form a froth; and
3. There is some water present; and
4. The tank is not a floating roof tank.
Crude oil stored in cone roof tanks frequently has this combination of conditions
and can produce a boilover. Experience indicates that a floating roof virtually elimi-
nates the chance of a serious boilover. Even if the roof is sunk, it will act as a
barrier to the progression of the heat wave. Gasoline, diesel fuels and fuel oils do
not produce boilover because they do not have all of the above characteristics.
A boilover occurs in the following manner: As the lighter fractions near the oil
surface vaporize and burn off, the heavy residue left behind sinks slowly. Since this
residue has been highly heated by the fire, it forms a heat wave front as it moves
downward to the cooler oil. When this front reaches water, steam is generated.
Then, if the heavy residue is viscous enough, part of the steam is caught as a froth,
increasing the oil volume and causing some of the oil to overflow the tank. Often
this process will be repeated several times. The first two boilovers, however, are
likely to be the most severe.
Use of water or foam to fight a tank fire does not increase the possibility of
boilover. Even a fraction of an inch of water can cause a major boilover that can
expel the total volume of the tank, and, in normal storage, all crude oil tanks
contain sufficient water as a layer at the bottom or as an emulsion to cause boilover.
However, draining free water from the tank bottom will reduce boilover severity.
When fighting a fire, some knowledge as to when a boilover can be expected is
necessary for the safety of personnel. The hot oil (up to 500 to 600°F) is consider-
ably above the boiling point of water, while the lower oil is near atmospheric
temperature. Hence, water sprayed upon the shell of the tank will serve to indicate
the position of the heat wave front by steaming above that point. If available, an
optical pyrometer may be used to indicate the progress of the heat wave. A tempera-

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ture-indicating crayon (250 to 300°F) can also be used. If no other method is avail-
able, it is sometimes possible to determine the position of the heat wave front by
observing the wavy appearance of the air currents adjacent to the hot portion of the
shell of the tank.
Though there is much variation, Figure 600-2 may be used for initial planning to
give a rough estimate of boilover time. A boilover is particularly likely any time
after the heat wave front approaches within about two feet of the water in the tank.
The occurrence of a boilover is usually preceded by a marked heightening and
brightening of the flames for a period of a few minutes. If someone has been posted
to watch for these warnings, there will usually be sufficient time to seek positions
of safety after the alarm has been given.

Fig. 600-2 Guide for Estimating Boilover Time

Heat Wave Rate Burning Rate
Type of Oil (Inches Per Hour) (Inches Per Hour)
Light Crude (25° API and above) 30 12
Heavy Crude 20 4
Kerosene None 6
Gasoline None 9
Casinghead None 20

The term frothover is used to describe a release of oil smaller than a true boilover,
and particularly the release which may result from applying water streams or foam
to a tank which has burned long enough to have a hot layer. An impending
frothover is indicated by signs similar to those of a boilover. A frothover may occur
almost any time during a fire, especially if the tank is nearly full. The amount of oil
discharged is normally small, and will not spread far. The discharge is ordinarily
not violent. It may, however, endanger people working close to the tank and under
such conditions a careful watch should, therefore, be maintained. The most severe
frothover reported filled the impounding dike, but did not spread beyond the dike.
In a boilover, the oil spreads outward from the tank in a wave at considerable speed.
In some cases, depending on topography and the presence of high value facilities, it
may be desirable to erect portable coping to break the force of the wave by turning
it back upon itself. Of course, where there are no high value facilities to protect, or
the wave would simply head to other areas of little value, no such actions are justi-
fied. There is no reason to incur the possibility of danger to people and the expense
of erecting coping or the like.
Suggested methods of erecting coping are indicated in Figure 600-3. Except in
highly unusual circumstances, the installation of permanent coping is not justified.
A bulldozer or grader may be of use in building, diverting or containing walls. A
series of small walls, portable coping erected on the level ground, or even plowing
the ground may slow or stop the oil flow.

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Fig. 600-3 Emergency Copings

Because burning crude oil in a fully involved fixed roof tank can be expected to boil
over if not extinguished, the chances for extinguishment should be determined as
early as possible. Whether or not to set up either foam towers or systems to apply
foam through fixed or portable monitors or hose nozzles depends on a number of
factors (amount of oil in tank, heat wave progress, water and foam supply equip-
ment, etc.), and a decision can be reached only after careful study of the situation.
Unless thorough analysis indicates a fair chance of success, it is generally better not
to attempt extinguishment, but to control the oil spilled by the boilover and allow
the tank fire to burn out.
Foam systems permanently attached to tanks and not rendered useless by explosion
and fire should be used at the earliest possible moment. However, haste should not
allow the foam mixture to be poor quality or the rate of application to be too low
(see NFPA 11); either of these mistakes will waste foam.
Whether foam application is through fixed chambers or portable equipment, water
should be sprayed lightly over the surface to cool the oil as much as possible before
foam application is started. Water application should be started as soon as possible,
but care should be taken to avoid frothovers. The water cooling of the oil surface
must, however, be stopped when foam application is started to avoid damage to the
foam blanket.
Concurrently with preparations to extinguish the fire in a crude oil tank, or even
more importantly if extinguishment is not practical, preparations should be made to
limit damage from tank boilover. Adjacent facilities can be protected against the
boilover wave by diking or diversionary walls that contain or divert the burning oil
to locations where damage can be minimized.
Oils should not be impounded around a tank unless necessary to prevent damage to
other facilities. Bulldozers and road graders are very useful in preparing diver-
sionary dikes and impounding areas to catch oil overflow. Wherever possible oil
should be pumped out of the burning tank, unless extinguishment is expected.

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Refined Oil Tankage

Fires in cone roof tanks storing refined oils or oils in the process of being refined
are not complicated by the problem of boilover. If the roof has lifted and foam
equipment is available in adequate quantity, apply foam through foam cannons,
articulated nozzles and nozzles mounted on cranes.
Final stage attack and mop-up may be made from tank gaging platform and wind
girder where girders and handrails are provided.
Oils having a high flash point (kerosene and heavier) are difficult to ignite and rela-
tively easy to extinguish. As soon as the oil on the surface is cooled below its flash
point, the fire is starved for fuel and goes out. Foam is usually the best extinguish-
ment agent.

Hot Oil Tanks (>250°F)

If stored above 250°F, any viscous oil is likely to froth and may froth over immedi-
ately when water or foam is applied. For small tanks, a controlled stream of fine
mist water applied to the surface may be effective. It will cool the surface oil
causing it to froth, covering the hot oil with a blanket of cool bubbles. Inerting the
tank vapor space is another extinguishment method, without a risk of frothover.

Light Oil Tankage

Fires in tanks containing light oils such as gasoline can usually be extinguished
only by covering the liquid surface with a blanket of foam.

643 Floating Roof Tanks

The only type of fire peculiar to floating roof tanks occurs at the seal between the
roof and the shell on tanks storing volatile oils. While the frequency of such fires
has been low, methods for combatting such a fire are being affected by air pollution
regulations requiring secondary seals. Refer to API 2021.

Ignition
Lightning is the most common source of ignition. Lightning-caused fires have
occurred with the roof in any position. Ignition, from a remote source, of a vapor
cloud moving away from a tank will cause a flash-back to the tank and result in a
seal fire. Refer to the Tank Manual and API 2003.
Ignition has resulted in an explosion in the vapor space under the primary seal,
rupturing the seal fabric in one or more places, and exposed relatively small areas
of flammable liquid which continue to burn. Tanks with secondary seals installed
are subject to ignition in the vapor space between the primary and secondary seals.
The first secondary seals were installed in early 1979, and a few fires have resulted
in spite of them. To reduce the chance of fire in tanks with secondary seals:
• Remove primary seal shunts when secondary seals are installed (this prevents
sparking between the seals).
• The secondary shunts should be external to the space between seals.

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Planned Attack
When a floating roof seal fire is discovered, the plan of attack should be carefully
thought out so as not to aggravate the fire or involve risk to personnel. Hasty action
should be avoided. Such fires have been known to burn for some time without
doing significantly more damage than occurred during the first few minutes.
In most cases, it is possible to ascend the stairway and look over the edge of the
shell to determine where the flames are and the extent of damage. Only rarely does
the fire burn all the way around the seal, because flames at one point tend to pull in
air at other points, preventing the discharge of flammable vapors.
If the burning area is near the stairway, the shell near the stairway may be hot,
making it uncomfortable to climb the stairs. In this case a water stream, preferably
adjusted to give a spray pattern, should be used to cool the shell so that the stairway
can be climbed for inspection.

Hand Extinguishers
If the roof is at a high level and if the fire has only burned for a short time, it is
possible to extinguish a seal fire with hand extinguishers. Extinguishment has been
effected with dry chemical extinguishers in the hands of two or three persons. In
other cases where the seal fabric is not extensively damaged, a seal fire can be extin-
guished with a hand foam line.
In many cases, however, enough seal will have been damaged in the initial explo-
sion to require extinguishment with somewhat larger equipment.
Hand extinguishers will probably not be useful on a fire in a covered floating roof
tank.

Cooling the Shell

As soon as equipment can be assembled water should be applied to areas on the
outside of the tank where the fire is intense enough to blister or discolor the paint.
Hose streams, usually of 1-1/2 or 2-1/2 inches, should be directed from the ground
outside the tank. Only water that vaporizes has been used to good effect; water that
runs off the tank is wasted.
Avoid getting any appreciable quantity of water on the roof; floating roofs, particu-
larly pan-type, can be sunk. Such an accident could transform a minor seal fire into
a fully involved tank fire. The roof drain valve should be opened, or checked to see
that it is open, as soon as fire fighting is started in case water should inadvertently
get on the roof.

Water and Foam Hoses

Foam applied with a 1-1/2-inch hand nozzle is probably the most universally appli-
cable extinguishing means. The best procedure is to lay 2-1/2-inch hose from the
nearest available fire hydrant to the base of the stairs of the tank and there install a
Y-connection with two 1-1/2-inch lines connected to it. One of these lines can be
used to provide water for cooling the shell in the vicinity of the stairs (if necessary),

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the other to generate foam for extinguishment. To reduce pressure drop 1-3/4-inch
and 3-inch lines are used in some cases instead of the 1-1/2 and 2-1/2-inch lines.
Larger diameter (up to 5-inch) hoses will reduce pressure drop, but require addi-
tional handlers. When purchasing large diameter hose, smaller connections may be
specified.
Foam is probably the easiest material to use. A foam-making nozzle with a dip tube
and several cans of foam concentrate should be sufficient to control most floating
roof seal fires. Since it should take only a small amount of foam to extinguish the
fire in any one place, usually all of the area within reach of any one location can be
covered in a short time. At this point, it is desirable to remove the dip tube from the
can of foam concentrate to conserve the concentrate. The water stream must be
diverted away from the seal space—preferably over the side of the tank or toward
the roof drain. After moving the hose nozzle to a new location, the dip tube should
again be inserted in the can of foam concentrate and another area of the fire covered
with foam.
Depending upon conditions, it may be easiest to manipulate the foam nozzle from
the top of the stairs, from the roof ladder, or from the wind girder of the tank, if it is
equipped with a handrail. In any event, it is desirable to first control any fire imme-
diately below the gaging platform, and then to gradually work around the tank.
Care should be exercised to prevent playing water streams on the foam blanket in
the area that has already been covered, and to avoid getting any more foam or water
on the surface of the roof than is necessary, since this will interfere with other activi-
ties and could sink the roof.

Using Fixed Equipment

Over-the-Top Application. Tanks built after 1972 with diameters over 120 feet are
likely to have a fixed system installed to use in fire fighting. A foam dam to retain
foam in the annular space of the seal will improve the effectiveness of using foam,
especially if the tank is equipped with a secondary seal or other obstruction above
the primary seal. A single dry pipe riser near the gaging platform may make it
necessary to lay hose up the stairs.
On tanks over 150 feet in diameter, a second dry pipe riser 180 degrees from the
gaging platform will reduce the length of hose required to move around the tank on
the wind girder.
Newer large tanks will also have a fixed foam chamber, nozzle and splash plate,
which should be used immediately to improve access to the gaging platform. See
the Tank Manual, Section 200 for fire protection for tanks.
Subsurface Injection. Some tanks over 200 feet in diameter have subsurface foam
injection nozzles installed at 100-foot intervals around the base of the tank. To use
this system, a foam maker assembly, if not permanently installed, should first be
installed on the nozzle located below the gaging platform. If necessary, it should be
used immediately to improve access to the gaging platform and to allow use of dry
pipe risers to extinguish a fire (if it is safe to work around the wind girder).

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If over-the-top application using hand foam lines is unsafe or unsuccessful, foam

maker assemblies should be installed on subsurface nozzles located below where
the fire is burning. Then foam injection at the required rates should proceed for 15
to 20 minutes. Foam pumping should then stop to allow the foam to spread undis-
turbed to seal off the liquid surface. If this technique does not work after 20
minutes, continued effort (unless some change is made) will probably be fruitless.
Subsurface foam injection may not be effective on tanks containing alcohol-based
stocks, but may work for hydrocarbon stocks. Do not try foam injection if the roof
has sunk.

Internal Floating Roof Tanks

Internal floating roof tanks are the safest type of tank—they act as a Faraday cage
and are immune to lightning.
The most common cause of internal floating roof tank fires is overfill with a remote
source of ignition. Consequently, any surrounding spill fire must be controlled
before the tank fire itself can be attacked. The extent of initial damage to the cover
will determine which method of attack has the best chance of success. For smaller
diameter tanks (under 120 feet) subsurface injection through tank fill or discharge
lines may be feasible if the floating roof has not sunk.
Foam can be applied to a roof through side vents, but will eventually sink the roof
as the weight of foam increases. It is better to inject foam into the tank through a
roof access hatch.

Product Pump-out
In most situations, oil should not be removed from a tank that has a fire. Lowering
the liquid level exposes more shell to heat damage and makes the fire more difficult
to reach from the top of the tank. Because extinguishment of a fire in a covered
floating roof tank may be difficult from the top of the tank, pump-out may be neces-
sary. Avoid landing the roof on its legs. This creates a vapor space under the roof,
which makes extinguishment more difficult. There is also a possibility of explosion
in the vapor space under the roof.
On fully involved fires where foam is not available in sufficient quantities, pump-
out should start as early as possible and continue over the entire fire fighting effort.

644 Pressure Storage—Closed Containers

Pressure storage tanks, cylinders, unvented drums, and smaller closed containers
become involved in fire as a result of exposure to other fires. Fuel in the vessel will
not become involved until it is released as vapor from relief vents or through
rupture of the vessel or connections to it. Such fires are most easily prevented by
keeping the vessel cool with streams of water, using only enough water to wet the
surface. This prevents overpressuring of the vessel and overheating of the metal in
the vessel. Refer to Section 200 and API 2510.

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Pressure Storage Tank Vents

Relief valves on pressure tanks discharge vapor to the atmosphere when abnormally
high pressures build up in the vessel. Even if these vapors are ignited, the resulting
vent fire will not spread or do significant damage unless the flame actually contacts
the tank shell or other exposed surface. The relief valve will close, extinguishing
the fire, as soon as the source of excess pressure has been controlled.

Ground Fire
Where the fire burning on the ground under or near a pressure storage tank comes
in direct contact with a portion of the shell above the liquid level, a localized hot
spot may develop that will soften the steel and result in failure. Such overheating
normally occurs only above the liquid level, can be caused only by continued direct
contact of flame, and can be prevented by application of water.
General heating of the vessel by ground fires raises the temperature of the contents,
and increases the pressure until the relief valves open.
To control a fire on the ground around a pressure storage tank, turn on any fixed
water equipment, such as sprays, cascades, deluge monitor nozzles, etc., as soon as
possible. The use of such equipment must be closely supervised to make certain all
surfaces contacted by flame are being wetted with water at a sufficient rate, but
excess application should be avoided because water waste on the ground serves no
purpose and may hamper other fire control efforts (see Section 642).
Where fixed equipment is unavailable or inadequate, portable hose and deluge
streams can be used effectively. In any case, a primary objective is to water cool the
exposed tank shell surface, particularly above the liquid level, until the fire has
burned itself out or has been extinguished. Fires of this type usually result from
broken piping near the vessel. Liquid burning on the ground may be flushed away
with straight streams (see Section 625, under Flushing Fuel Away).
Flames impinging on the tank shell from broken piping or flange leaks must be
controlled quickly and the tank shell continually cooled with water. Direct flame
impingement on a portion of the tank shell above the liquid level could cause weak-
ening and failure of the shell within a relatively short time, even if safety relief
valves are discharging. Note that safety relief valves release only excess pressure,
not total pressure in a vessel.
All personnel not specifically engaged in fire control activities should be kept as far
away from the scene as possible (more than 1/4 mile). Approach horizontal pres-
sure vessels from the sides as these vessels tend to move lengthwise if failure
occurs. Water should be applied to the entire top of the vessel, including heads,
using maximum range of streams. Water should be applied from hose streams at a
minimum rate of 0.10 gpm/ft2 based on one-half the surface area of the vessel. If
effective cooling is being obtained, the size and noise of the safety valve discharge
will decrease. If effective cooling is not being obtained, (i.e., safety valve discharge
continues at high rate and vessel shell does not remain wetted after water is
applied), the hose streams should be fixed in place, personnel withdrawn to a safe
location and water left playing on the top of the vessel. If effective cooling is being
obtained, fire fighters should move closer to the vessel under water fog protection

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and apply broken streams to the top of the vessel. If cooling is still effective, fire
fighters should approach the vessel more closely under water fog protection to
determine the source of fuel, whether it can be shut off or flushed away. If the fuel
cannot be eliminated, the fire should be allowed to burn out under control keeping
the top of the vessel and surroundings cool with fog streams.

Water Injection Connection

A water injection connection, valved and blinded when not in use, may be provided
on the fill line at a safe distance from the vessel. This connection allows water to be
pumped into the bottom of the storage vessel, displacing LPG and controlling leaks.
The connection for water injection should be clearly identified.
The fire should be allowed to burn until the fuel supply has been shut off, otherwise
extinguishment might permit formation of a large vapor cloud, which could be
ignited in a dangerous flash.

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

As first described twenty years ago, a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion
(BLEVE) is a major container failure (failure into two or more pieces) when the
contained liquid is well above its atmospheric-pressure boiling point. The
failure occurs when flame impingement of the vessel vapor space causes the metal
to lose yield strength. As pressure builds within the vessel due to fire exposure, the
weakened shell may fail, releasing the vessel contents. The contents vaporize,
causing a large vapor cloud and fireball. This can occur in as little as 10 minutes
following the start of flame impingement. Rupture may occur at pressures below
the pressure relief valve settings.
Refer to API 2510 (included in the Piping Manual).

LPG Portable Cylinders

When they become hot enough LPG portable cylinders exposed to fire discharge
vapors through relief valves, or fusible plugs melt out and allow the contents to
empty. Relief valves are normally set to operate at 375 psig and fusible plugs to
melt at 165°F. This is well below bursting strength of the cylinder.
As long as cylinders remain vertical, vapors and flames will be discharged from the
top of the cylinder until the supply of fuel is exhausted. However, if cylinders have
been placed carelessly or are on a wooden platform whose burning removes all
support, cylinders may tip on their sides and complicate fire fighting.
Once cylinders have fallen over, flames from one may impinge on another, weak-
ening the shell metal sufficiently for the cylinder to rupture. A cylinder lying on its
side is also likely to have liquid covering the relief outlets, which may restrict flow
sufficiently to prevent adequate pressure relief. If rupture occurs, a cylinder may be
propelled for considerable distances; therefore, care should be used in approaching
such a fire.

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The only useful fire control agent is water. Hose streams should be used to cool the
cylinders and protect exposed buildings and other exposures until the fuel supply in
the cylinders is exhausted and the surrounding fire extinguished.

Drums
In fighting fires that involve drum storage, it is important to apply water on all
exposed drums as soon as possible to prevent the drums from developing excessive
pressure. Drums and similar containers, of course, have no pressure relief vents.
Under severe fire conditions a full drum, if not cooled, may develop rupturing pres-
sure in a few minutes.
Immediate action is especially important when a fire starts among drums stored
inside a warehouse or other building. If drums start to rupture, the building may
quickly become untenable, and regaining control of the situation may be very diffi-
cult.
On open platforms or other outdoor storage areas, hose streams may be directed
from a safe distance to cool the drums, to prevent further rupture. The type of water
stream used is not important as long as the water covers all the drum metal exposed
to the fire. Straight streams are valuable for applying water from a relatively great
distance, or for flushing spilled fuel away from other drums. Water spray is effec-
tive in knocking down flames from close range and in distributing small quantities
of water efficiently.

Small Containers
When exposed to fire, five-gallon and smaller sealed cans and containers behave
much as do drums, except that their normally weaker construction reduces the
violence with which they rupture, and, of course, the volume of fuel added to the
fire is much smaller. The same control measures apply.

645 Onshore Oil and Gas Wells

Fires involving oil and gas wells differ in many respects from most other types of
fires, particularly in that the major damage is done in the first few minutes—usually
before any fire control measures can be taken—after which the fire is unlikely to
spread or do additional damage. Further loss is normally limited to the value of the
oil and gas burned.
The basic objective in fighting oil and gas well fires is to ultimately shut off the
well. Approach to make a shutoff requires considerable planning.
The well site is almost certain to be obstructed by the fallen rig and other equip-
ment, and it is frequently necessary to remove this material before an accurate esti-
mate can be made of the situation. Removal of obstructions serves three purposes:
• It allows approach to the well to determine conditions
• It permits the stream of gas and oil to flow straight up without deflection
• It clears the site of possible sources of re-ignition if the decision is made to
extinguish the fire before stopping the flow

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Water Supply
An adequate and dependable water supply is necessary in fighting well fires; water
spray and straight-stream protection are required for personnel to safely approach
the fire to remove equipment, to survey conditions, and to control and extinguish
the fire. Water spray for personnel protection is discussed in Section 633. Water
requirements are large and may exceed several thousand gpm. Each approach to the
fire must be carefully judged as to the time it requires, to make certain that the
water supply will be more than adequate for full coverage. Fire shields are
frequently helpful for protection of personnel observing and directing the fire
fighting effort.

Shutoff
The circumstances under which well fires occur vary so much that definite proce-
dures can be worked out only after examination and evaluation of the situation after
the fire has started. Considerable ingenuity is frequently required to overcome
existing circumstances.
In some cases it has been possible to reduce flame intensity by diverting the flow of
oil and gas away from the well so that a better approach can be made for shutoff.
Flames have been snuffed (after eliminating sources of re-ignition) by high pressure
water and steam jets, dry chemical, and dynamite and nitroglycerin blasts. If there
is a connection to which a mud line can be attached, the well may be killed with
mud. Well fires have also been extinguished by flooding with water injected from
an adjacent well.

Expert Assistance
If the situation warrants, an early decision should be made to request the assistance
of oil well fire extinguishing experts such as Red Adair and Boots and Coots. See
Figure 600-1.

646 Pipelines
Pipeline leaks which have been ignited are treated as pressure fires (see
Section 641). Shutdown procedures established for pipeline failure and repair
should be initiated before any attempts at extinguishment.

Control of Oil Flow

Since flow of fuel can continue for a considerable period of time after a shutdown,
every effort should be made to impound or divert any flow of burning fuel to loca-
tions where damage to other properties can be minimized.

Extinguishment
Extinguishment can be attempted as soon as reduced pressure on the line decreases
the flow of fuel and all sources of re-ignition have been eliminated. Foam can be
applied to the oil surface—where it has been possible to impound the fuel—and dry
chemical used to snuff the fire at the line leak.

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If the spilled oil is crude oil in a relatively shallow pool (up to a few inches deep),
burning will tend to consume the light hydrocarbons, leaving a fire in heavy oil that
may be frothed out with water sprayed gently over the surface. Generally, however,
unless the volume of fuel is large and salvage possible, the best procedure is to
maintain control of the fire until the fuel supply is exhausted and the fire burns out.
However, air pollution regulations may be a consideration and may be an influence
toward deciding to extinguish the fire rather than allowing a controlled burnout.

650 Specific Facilities—Part 2

651 Loading Racks

General
Loading rack fires are mainly spill fires, vapor flashes or a combination of the two.
Refer to Section 3600.

Dome Fires (top loading)

In the event of a dome fire, immediately shut off the flow of product by releasing
the handle of the self-closing, hand-held loading valve, and activate the emergency
shutdown system (if provided). These actions will reduce vapor discharge and
diminish the fire burning at the dome. Close the block valves in the risers and stop
all loading pumps. Do not remove the fill stem; such action may spread the fire or
spill flammable liquid on the loader.
The fire can be effectively extinguished with dry chemical. If the dome is unob-
structed by the fill stem or other object, closing the dome cover will smother the
flame. In some cases, the flames can be blown out with a straight stream of water
directed across the opening. However, care must be taken to avoid overflowing and
splashing of product out of the compartment.
If the fire cannot be immediately controlled, all block valves at the tanks and in
lines feeding the rack should be closed. No attempt should be made to move the
tank truck or tank car, because this may result in a product spill that increases the
spread and intensity of the fire.

Spill Fires
Product spill caused by compartment overflow or another cause may result in a
serious fire. Fuel flow into the area must be cut off as quickly as possible by shut-
ting down pumps and closing off all block valves on lines supplying the rack.
First aid hose lines equipped with fog/straight stream nozzles and monitors, where
available, should be used to aid in any shutoff activities, to flush burning fuel
away from exposures, and to cool off the tank vehicle and rack piping.

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652 Tank Trucks—Other Vehicles

General
Most fires in tank vehicles are small and can be extinguished with dry chemical or
other hand extinguishers available on the vehicle. However, occasions will arise
where fire is beyond control of hand extinguishers.
The most effective agent for such fires is water. Water streams should be directed at
any ground fire, on burning tires and over as much of the tank as possible until the
tank has been cooled enough for vents to close or for dome fires to be snuffed out.
Procedures to follow when tank vehicles are involved in fire during loading and
unloading operations are covered in Sections 651 and 653. Other situations are
discussed below.

Hose Connection Area Fires

Fires in the hose connection area are generally the result of small spills and are
usually of short duration. The first action should be to close the internal valves in
the tank to prevent release of more fuel, and then to attack the fire with first aid
hand extinguishers available on the truck.
If flames prevent access to the regular internal valve operating unit, the internal
valves may be closed by opening the remote emergency valve release. The location
of this release is marked on all tank vehicles with the letters “E.V.R.” centered in an
arrow. Prompt action will usually extinguish fires of this kind with minor damage.

Engine Fires
Fires in the engine compartment are generally caused by shorted wiring, fuel line
leaks or backfires through the carburetor. Such fires are usually small. Prompt shut-
down of the engine and use of dry chemical extinguishers carried on the vehicle
will usually result in extinguishment.

Tire Fires
Tire fires are stubborn, and difficult to control with extinguishers available on the
vehicle. A burning tire must be cooled with water. If the tire ignites while on a
truck in service, the truck should be kept rolling, if possible, until a location is
found where a good supply of water is available; the fire will intensify once the
vehicle is stopped. Good judgment dictates that a stop should be made in a location
which does not create a hazard for adjacent structures if the fire cannot be brought
under control. The most effective use of dry chemical extinguishers on a tire fire is
to repeatedly snuff the flames with short intermittent blasts, which allow some air
cooling between reflashes.

Miscellaneous Fires
Rags or the accumulation of grease and debris on hot exhausts may result in fire.
Dry chemical extinguishers or water are the best extinguishing media for such fires.

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Accidents
Crash fires from various causes may result in a spill and fire with serious involve-
ment of the tank vehicle. Fighting such fires consists largely of using water to cool
the vehicle and protect exposures.
Foam can be used to extinguish a gasoline spill fire in the area surrounding the tank
truck. Use foam to control the spill fire, and water to cool the vehicle. For small
ruptures, applying water may also retard product discharge. Note that foam will not
extinguish fires caused by spilling product.
Most trucks are equipped with dome vents that will release internal pressure,
preventing the tank from bursting even if the truck is surrounded by fire.

653 Service Station Fires

Because the quantity of flammable liquid involved is usually small, most fires at
service stations can be controlled by prompt action of the operator in calling the fire
department and using hand extinguishers. Types of fires which occur include the
following:
• Vehicle fires in upholstery, in the engine compartment (caused by wiring
shorts, fuel line breaks, etc.), or when repair work is being done
• Fires at gasoline dispensers occurring when vehicles crash into dispensers
• Spill fires from overfilling of underground tankage, while dispensing to vehi-
cles, or during the transfer of flammable liquids from one container to another
• Trash fires
• Heating unit fires resulting from defective heaters or oil spills, and from over-
heated stove vent stacks
• Vapor flashes at vents or fill stems when underground tanks are being filled

Vehicle Fires
The most common vehicle fires are smoldering fires in upholstery and engine
compartment fires resulting from wiring shorts or gasoline leaks. Dry chemical
extinguishers should be used on fires in the engine compartment and in shorted
wiring. Smoldering fires are most effectively extinguished with water.

Dispenser Fires
Occasionally, dispensers are knocked over by vehicles, and fire results when elec-
tric shorts ignite the spilled gasoline. The operator should immediately pull the
main switch operating the pumps. The spilled gasoline will soon burn out, and any
remaining fire involving building, contents, and vehicles may be attacked with
water streams and hand extinguishers.

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Dispensing Spills
Small spills and fires during dispensing to vehicles should be handled by immedi-
ately cutting off the fuel supply at the nozzle and then throwing the pump switch or
the main station switch. Water should be used to flush burning products into the
open and away from the vehicles and buildings. Hand extinguishers should be used
to control fire at the pump island and on the vehicle.

Unloading Spills
Serious fires at service stations have occurred as a result of overflow when filling
underground tankage. Such fires may almost immediately get beyond control of
hand extinguishers, in which case outside help will be required. If possible, stop the
flow of fuel to storage by operating either the regular valve or the remote emer-
gency valve release on the truck. Do not move the truck; this will only spread the
fire. Hand extinguishers should be used to attempt control and available water
should be used for cooling and protection of exposures. However, these actions
should not be at the expense of delay in notifying the local fire department.

Trash Fires
Trash fires occur in waste baskets and other accumulations of debris. Water is the
best extinguishing agent.

Heater Fires
Oil heaters and furnaces may be involved in fire because of overheating, defective
carburetors, and spillage of oil. Foam or water should be used to cool the heating
equipment and adjacent cabinet walls, etc., and to control the burning of the spilled
oil.

Vapor Fires at Vents

During filling of underground gasoline tanks, vapors are displaced through the tank
vents. If these vapors should become ignited, shut off the flow to the underground
tank. This will stop the flow of vapor out the vent and the flame will soon go out.
There is no danger of a flash-back to the tank; the vapor space within the tank will
be too rich to burn or explode.

Vapor Fires at Fill Pipes

If tank vents are clear and unobstructed, there will be no substantial release of
vapor at the fill pipe opening during filling operations. If vapor is released and
ignited, shut off flow to the tank. If the tank vehicle delivery valve and the regular
internal valve operating unit are inaccessible because of flame, the flow may be
stopped by closing the internal valves with the remote emergency valve release on
the truck. The flames will immediately diminish and may go out. Any small
residual flames can be extinguished with dry chemical. Do not attempt to remove
the hose from the fill pipe or to move the tank truck, since this will only increase
the possibility of spill, which would enlarge the fire.

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654 Tankships and Barges

More detailed precautions to prevent fire loss can normally be justified on tankships
and barges because of the value of the equipment and because the actual means of
escape from the fire area (e.g., abandoning ship) involve considerable risk to the
crew.
Fires on tankships and barges may occur in the quarters, galley, storerooms, paint
locker, engine room, pump room, cargo tanks, and on deck associated with the
cargo handling or vapor venting systems. Fires in the quarters are the most
frequent, usually resulting from improper disposal of smoking materials. Any fire
involving the cargo is extremely serious; of these, fire in the pump room is the most
likely.
All ships and marine terminals should have procedures ready for immediate imple-
mentation in any emergency, including fire, while a ship is tied up at a wharf. For
large tankship and barge fires, an early decision should be made to request assis-
tance from marine fire extinguishing experts. See Figure 600-1.

Basic Steps in Fighting Shipboard Fires

After sounding a shipboard alarm, the fire fighter must quickly determine what is
burning and where, the extent of the fire, whether personnel rescue is involved, and
what combustibles are in the immediate vicinity (e.g., in all surrounding spaces and
in the compartments above and below). He must also determine what vents and
other channels are present that would facilitate the spread of fire, choose the best
method of extinguishment, and choose the best technique to prevent spread of the
fire and to extinguish it.
All tanks, hatches and ports in the fire area must be closed. Ullage hole covers,
Butterworth plates, tank tops, ventilation ducts and all other vents not already
closed should be closed and secured throughout the vessel. Electrical circuits in the
vicinity of the fire should be de-energized.
If handling cargo, bunkers or ballast, or if tank cleaning is in progress, all opera-
tions should be stopped, valves closed and hoses or loading arms disconnected.

Extinguishing Fires
Selection of the method of extinguishment is the fire fighter's most important deci-
sion. He must use his knowledge and experience to choose from the devices avail-
able to him for shipboard fire fighting.
Fighting Ordinary Combustible Fires. Fires in bedding, clothing, wood, paper,
etc., are dealt with by cooling the burning material below its ignition temperature.
The greatest hazard presented by these fires is the possibility of them spreading to
the vessel's cargo, or if the ship is in ballast and not gas free, to the flammable
vapor in the tanks. Hose lines should be used between the fire and this hazard. Use
water fog or straight streams as required for extinguishment, and separate and soak
all involved combustibles to prevent rekindling.

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Fighting Electrical Equipment Fires. Where practical, electrical circuits should

be de-energized before any extinguishing agent is applied. Portable carbon dioxide
(CO2) extinguishers are recommended as the first choice where available. The fixed
50, 75 or 100-lb. CO2 cylinders should be used when required. However, the fixed
system protecting the machinery spaces should only be used as a last recourse when
all other means of extinguishment have failed.
When it is certain that equipment is de-energized, and when carbon dioxide and dry
chemical are not available, water or foam may be used to extinguish fires in elec-
trical apparatus.
Fighting Flammable Liquid Fires. The extinguishing agents recommended are
water, steam, foam, carbon dioxide, and dry chemicals. The particular agent or
combination of agents will depend on the nature and location of the fire. Fighting
fires in specific shipboard locations is described in the following paragraphs.
Fires in Cargo or Bunker Tank. To extinguish a fire in a cargo or bunker tank,
first attempt to completely shut off the supply of air (oxygen) by closing the tank
tops, ullage hole covers, Butterworth plates and any other tank openings. For a
ruptured tank, thoroughly wetted canvas, bedding or similar material should be
used to plug the opening, if it is not too large.
If the air supply can be shut off, fixed steam, CO2, or foam smothering systems
should be used. Steam smothering valves on branch lines leading to pump rooms,
cofferdams, or unaffected tanks that are not on fire and not adjacent to tanks should
be closed. Straight stream or water fog should be used to cool the surrounding
decks, bulkheads and other structural members.
All ordinary combustibles (wood, bedding, stores, rope, etc.) and flammable liquids
(paint, turpentine, grease and petroleum products) in containers in the vicinity
should be moved to a safe location or, if this is not possible, thoroughly wetted
down and shielded from fire.
If the air supply to the fire cannot be shut off by closing tank openings, of if the
tank is ruptured, foam should be directed into the tank using the deck monitors, if
provided, or hose streams. Special foam must be used for alcohol or other products
that mix with water.
It is recommended that water fog be used in alternation with foam whenever practi-
cable.
Fires in Pump Rooms. If the fire is small or in its incipient stage, portable dry
chemical or carbon dioxide (CO 2) extinguishers can be used effectively. If,
however, the intensity of the fire prevents close approach, pumps should be shut
down and isolated and the pump room sealed by tightly closing all openings and
shutting down the mechanical ventilation system.
On ships fitted only with steam smothering, the system should be turned on and the
valves on branch lines leading to cofferdams or to tanks that are not involved
should then be closed.

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On ships so fitted, the fixed carbon dioxide (CO2), water fog or foam system should
be turned on. Stea, if available, should be turned on in adjacent tanks and cofferdams.
Regardless of the extinguishing agent used, all tank openings throughout the vessel
should be closed as quickly as possible and water fog streams (or monitors if fitted)
should be used to cool the surrounding decks, bulkheads, and other structural
members.
Fires on Deck. Deck fires result from a cargo overflow, burst hose or leaking pipe-
line. The first action should be to shut off the supply of fuel, if possible. Foam, if
available, should be applied using either hoses or a fixed foam system.
In fighting deck fires, it is extremely important that the foam stream be played
against a nearby vertical structure of the vessel; this will cause the foam to run
down the structure and spread evenly over the fire. Foam can also be “bounced” off
the deck ahead of the flowing fuel to splash gently over the fire. A foam stream
played directly on the burning oil would cause the oil to scatter over the deck or
dock, spreading the fire.
Foam is not effective on flowing liquids, because movement of the liquid prevents
foam from forming a blanket. Therefore, if the supply of fuel cannot be shut off and
it is burning at its source, some other extinguishing agent must be used, such as
portable carbon dioxide (CO2), dry chemical extinguishers, or water fog streams.
These are effective when applied directly on the burning fuel as it emerges from the
opening. Foam should be sprayed ahead of the flowing fuel to form a dam and
prevent the spread of the fire.
Water spray should be used to augment the foam, to cool the surrounding structure
of the vessel, and to protect the fire fighters using the foam, permitting them to
approach the fire more closely. However, the water fog should be used in a manner
that does not affect the firmness of the foam blanket or dam.
All tank openings throughout the vessel and the pump rooms should be closed as
quickly as possible.
Fires in Machinery Spaces. Fires in machinery spaces should be extinguished
using portable dry chemical, or carbon dioxide (CO2) extinguishers, foam hoses (or
fixed foam system) or water fog, depending on the location and type of fire. The
fixed carbon dioxide or Halon system should be used only when manual
methods of extinguishment have failed.
Carbon dioxide supports neither life nor combustion. Therefore, before a fixed
carbon dioxide system is operated, all personnel must leave the spaces to which the
system is connected, the boiler fires must be extinguished, and the auxiliaries must
be stopped.
To prevent the loss of carbon dioxide, the ventilation system should be shut down
and all openings into the affected spaces closed.
Except in an emergency, spaces that have been flooded with carbon dioxide should
not be opened for at least 10 minutes after flooding. This a precaution to allow

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burning substances time to cool below their ignition temperatures and thereby
prevent re-ignition upon the admission of fresh air (oxygen).
Regardless of the type of extinguishing agent or equipment involved, water fog
should be used when necessary to protect the fire fighters and to cool the hot struc-
ture of the vessel.
Bilge Fires. Since it is difficult to gain access to this type of fire, water fog should
be used in conjunction with foam applied as described under Fire on Deck. If it is
available the fixed foam system in the bilges should be used.
Spill Fires on Floor Plates. First, shut off the source of fuel. Then, extinguish the
fire with a portable dry chemical, Halon or carbon dioxide (CO2) extinguisher or, if
necessary, water fog.
Liquefied Flammable Gas Fires. The choice of a method for combatting liquefied
flammable gas fires aboard ship depends primarily on the equipment aboard the
individual vessel. However, fires involving escaping liquefied flammable gas should
generally be extinguished only by stopping the flow of gas. At the same time, water
spray should be used to cool surrounding material while shutoff efforts are
underway. Extinguishing a large liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or liquefied natural
gas (LNG) fire while permitting the gas to continue flowing can be dangerous
because a flammable mixture may be formed in the air. Ignition of this mixture may
cause far greater damage than if the original fire had been allowed to burn.
Flames from small leaks may be extinguished by utilizing carbon dioxide or dry
chemical extinguishers, provided doing so permits closing valves to stop the flow of
gas.
If fire is adjacent to an LPG container, but no gas is escaping, the container should
immediately be moved from the fire area, if possible, or immediate steps should be
taken to keep the container cool, diminishing the possibility of a pressure buildup.
Burning Oil on Water. Use straight streams from ship's hose to push back the
flames. Use the wash of the propeller to create current to push burning oil away
from the ship. Use a tugboat's engine for the same purpose. If in port, do not push
the oil under the dock.
Fire on a Wharf. Generally, in wharf fires, vessels should prepare to pull away by
stopping all cargo or stores handling operations. The vessel crew may be able to
assist in containing and controlling the fire on the wharf by using the ship's fire
fighting equipment. If not, emergency removal of the vessel from the berth should
be carefully considered (see Appendix H, a recommended marine terminal emer-
gency plan). Ships must be prepared to slip or cut mooring lines if shore personnel
are unable to cast off from the wharf and it becomes necessary for the ship to leave
the wharf. (See Section 655 for a marine terminal fire fighting procedure.)

References
Additional details are available in the U.S. Coast Guard Fire Fighting Manual for
Tank Vessels (CG 329), Chapter 4.

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655 Marine Terminals

Refer to Section 3300. Fires at marine terminals are of two types, originating either:
• In the wharf or other terminal structures, or
• In the ignition of spilled oil, which in turn ignites terminal structures such as
the wharf, storage buildings or offices.
All marine terminals should have emergency procedures ready for fire.
A fresh spill of gasoline or crude on water ignites easily and, unless contained, will
spread rapidly. If not ignited it will, within a short period of time, “weather” to the
point where it is no longer ignitable. Kerosene and heavier oils, on the other hand,
are very difficult to ignite, even deliberately, when spread out in thin layers on
water.
If a spill is ignited, however, the fire will almost immediately involve any combus-
tible structure in its path. Spilled oil tends to spread out into a fairly thin layer,
hence the fire on the water is likely to be of short duration unless fed by a
continuing leak. If so fed, the oil will burn as fast as it is supplied when it has
spread out enough to reduce the thickness near the outer edge to about 0.2 inch.
When permitted to spread unrestrained, each gallon will spread to about 8 square
feet.
When the underside decking and timbers of wooden wharf structures are ignited,
the fire may continue to spread along the combustible wharf even though the
burning oil is consumed or has been flushed away.

Small Fires
If the wharf or other terminal structure, or a small spill or leak of oil, becomes
ignited, an immediate attempt should be made to extinguish the fire in the incipient
stage with first aid or other available fire fighting equipment. Should early efforts
fail to subdue the fire, proceed as described below.

Control of Oil
Control of oil that is potential fuel for the fire is of primary importance in any fire
involving a wharf. The first step is to block all oil lines leading onto the wharf,
starting as close to the fire as possible and working back to the shore or tank valves
to prevent additional fuel from flowing into the fire area.
If provisions are available to pump out the wharf lines or displace the oil with
water, this should be done as soon as possible. The only other control method is to
cool exposed piping and containers and their supports with water to prevent
collapse, rupture and spillage.

Large Spill Fires

After oil flow has been controlled, attempts toward extinguishment must be started
at the perimeter of the fire to prevent further involvement of combustible structures
and must be continued until the spilled oil has either been consumed, carried off by
wind or tide, or flushed away by hose streams.

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Ships and barges are very valuable and may sustain serious damage if exposed to
severe fire. Therefore, ship loading and unloading operations should be stopped
and, if the decision is made to cast off, the ship's senior officer given every aid in
disconnecting hoses and casting off from the wharf.
Where the ship is in no immediate danger and the ship's crew or fire fighting equip-
ment can assist greatly in combatting the wharf fire, it may be desirable to keep the
ship at or near the wharf. Even in these cases, preparations should be made for
moving the ship on short notice.
If possible, flush spilled oil out from under the wharf with straight streams, or cover
the spill area with foam. Play water streams on any piping, drums or other
containers that are exposed to the fire. As soon as possible, apply water to any
combustible wharf understructure either with streams from a fire boat or launch, or
with cellar nozzles. Cellar nozzles are used from above, either over the edge or
through holes cut in the deck. If the wharf has under-deck fire stops, attack should
be started at the one closest to the fire by keeping the side toward the fire sprayed
with water.

Spill and Fire Approaching Wharf

When an oil spill is spreading toward a wharf, cover it with foam or attempt to keep
the spill (and fire) from flowing under the wharf by sweeping along the front of the
spill with straight hose streams.
An oil spill on the water should be quickly surrounded by oil retention booms, if
possible, and contained in an area away from the wharf. A means of anchoring the
boom is necessary.
Where a blanket of foam can be contained against bulkheads or in partially
enclosed areas, gentle application of foam to the water surface can provide an effec-
tive oil stop. However, the foam blanket breaks down rapidly and a continuous
supply of foam is required. This method is normally limited to relatively small
areas.

Protection of Packaged Goods

Where a fire either under the wharf or on the wharf is in the vicinity of containers
stored on the dock, precautions should be taken to avoid overheating the containers
and thus adding fuel to the fire. This is done best by spraying water on the exposed
containers. The amount of water used and how it is applied depends on the circum-
stances. The use of water for controlling fires around drums and other small
containers is discussed in Section 644.

656 Warehouses and Other Buildings

General
Refer to Section 3800.
Whatever their origin, fires in structures require the same basic fire fighting tech-
niques. Water is the primary extinguishing agent for structural fires.

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Complications may arise from materials stored within the structure. Full advantage
should be taken of local public fire fighting organizations for structural fires; they
are specialists who can give valuable assistance.
Interior and structural fire fighting is not to be done without quarterly OSHA
training.

Wood Structures
Fires in wooden structures (houses, offices, warehouses, shops, etc.) usually have to
be extinguished with water.
The fire should be attacked from inside the building if possible, so that water can be
applied directly on the burning material and the stream turned off as soon as that
portion of the fire is extinguished. Excess water can be as damaging to the building
and its contents as the fire itself.
Small hoses 1-1/2 inches and smaller that are equipped with fog/straight stream
nozzles are easily maneuvered and are ordinarily the most effective inside buildings.
When working inside a smoke-filled building, it is desirable to wear a respirator
with self-contained air supply to protect against smoke and gases.
If the fire has advanced to the point that it must be fought entirely from the outside,
it is usually of little value to pour large volumes of water in through windows and
other openings. Rather, prevention of spread to other rooms or areas is of first
importance. Special attention should be given to concealed spaces, as in attics and
under floors, where fire can spread very rapidly and access is difficult.

Metal Structures
Although steel and other metal structures are incombustible, they may be seriously
damaged in a very short time by a fire involving combustible interior trim, furnish-
ings or other contents. Any exposed metal parts should be kept cool with water. The
amount of water used for this purpose need not be great, only enough to wet the
metal that is actually being contacted by flame.

Petroleum Product Storage

Fires that involve warehouses where petroleum products are stored may be difficult
to handle because the heat may rupture drums, containers and packaged goods, and
add fuel to the fire. Water in straight streams or spray is the primary fire control
medium. The use of water for controlling fires in drums and other small containers
is discussed in Sections 644 and 3800.

Pesticide Storage
Prefire planning is particularly important for pesticide storage (see Section 400). A
judgment should be made on whether the fire should be extinguished or allowed to
burn based on toxicity of products of combustion, wind direction, exposure to the
public and Company personnel, etc. Water used for exposure protection or extin-
guishment may be contaminated and runoff should be controlled for proper treat-
ment and disposal.

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Fire Protection Manual 600 Fighting the Fire

Vapor suppressing foam is available for volatile stocks.

657 Natural Cover—Grass, Brush

Natural cover fires involve ordinary combustibles, but their characteristics of
continual movement and usual remoteness from sources of water supply require an
approach somewhat different from most other fires. The only control methods suit-
able for this type of fire consist of removing the fuel supply (firebreaks) and
quenching with water. Full advantage should be taken of the services of federal and
state forestry officials and county fire fighting organizations, since they are usually
specialists in this type of fire and can give valuable assistance.

Spread
Wind has a marked influence on the direction and speed of spread of natural cover
fires. Spread will be most rapid with the wind, with less tendency to spread side-
ways. Fires travel uphill considerably faster than downhill. Therefore, fire fighters
should never be permitted to approach a natural cover fire from the front as it is
progressing up a hill. Escape may be too difficult.

Attack
The safest method of attack is to approach from the windward, controlling the fire
along the sides and working toward the head or front of the fire. In some cases the
speed of the fire may be so great that the head cannot be overtaken, and a head-on
approach must be made. This will usually involve some type of firebreak as
discussed below. Advantage should be taken of any natural or ready-made fire-
breaks, such as streams and roads. The top of a ridge is usually a good place to
make an attempted stop. Under any of these conditions, plans should be made in
advance to evacuate people and equipment should their position become untenable.
Type of Fuel. Fires involving brush do not ordinarily lend themselves to control by
direct extinguishment of the burning material. They must almost always be
controlled by surrounding the fire with firebreaks and letting the controlled fire
burn out. Small grass fires can usually be approached closely enough to actually
extinguish the perimeter fire with water, beaters, shovels, wet sacks, etc. Larger
grass fires must be handled with firebreaks.
Equipment Available. The attack will, to some extent, have to be adapted to the
equipment available. Grass and brush, being ordinary combustibles, can be
controlled with water if it is available in sufficient quantity and the means exist to
get it to the burning area.
Special nozzles to conserve water are available from equipment suppliers. In the
absence of sufficient water, which is the usual case, axes, shovels, picks, hoes, etc.,
are usually the most effective. Motorized earth-moving equipment, if available, can
be used to good advantage if the terrain permits.

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600 Fighting the Fire Fire Protection Manual

Firebreaks
Where inadequate water supply and equipment make direct extinguishment imprac-
tical, construction of firebreaks is generally the only effective method of control.
This involves removing all combustible material from a strip across the path of the
fire. This is done by cutting out brush and discarding it away from the fire and then
digging up the ground, turning dirt over toward the fire. Firebreak width is gener-
ally 10 feet.
A firebreak is created by removing both overhead and at-grade vegetation. Bull-
dozers are particularly helpful in preparing a firebreak through brush. A disc
harrow is effective in preparing a firebreak in grass. A road grader might also be
used. The firebreak should be widened as time allows, so long as there is always
time to evacuate all people and equipment, if necessary.
Although available water from back pack water cans or fire truck hoses can be used
to wet the area on both sides of the break, water is most effectively used while
patrolling the fire line to extinguish small fires started by flames or burning brands
that get across the firebreak.
In some cases, the firebreak can be made by controlling burning of the combustible
material in the path of the main fire. These “backfires” can be dangerous and
should normally be undertaken only under the supervision of someone experienced
in this type of work.
Consider firebreaks around plants when fire danger is high (hot, dry weather with
tall, dead vegetation).

Use of Water and Chemicals

It is important to conserve water when fighting natural cover fires, because the
amount available is generally limited by the capacity of the truck tanks used to haul
water to the fire.
Chemical wetting agents exist which, when added to water in low concentration
(0.3% to 2%), decrease surface tension and permit the water to penetrate combus-
tible materials more readily, reducing wasteful runoff. Water treated with such a
wetting agent is particularly effective in direct quenching of grass fires and fires
involving such hard-to-wet materials as cotton, hay, and overstuffed furniture.
“Wet water” has also been used to establish a barrier strip and position from which
backfires can quickly be set. A strip 10 to 15 feet wide, wetted by two small hose
streams directed from a moving fire truck, forms a barrier in front of which a back-
fire can be started almost immediately. Although the line should be continuously
patrolled, this wetted area should prevent a backfire from getting out of control
even under adverse wind conditions.
Wetting agents are an added cost and their effective use is quite limited. They are
ordinarily used only by public fire departments—usually county and forestry—that
have frequent calls to fight fires of this type. Use of wetting agents within the
Company is justified only in special and unusual cases where many grass and
similar fires are expected. Wetting agents should not be used along with any type of

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Fire Protection Manual 600 Fighting the Fire

foam, as it tends to break up the bubbles. “Wet water” is of no particular value over
plain water for fires.

Flame Retardant Chemicals

Certain other chemicals are on the market, such as those containing borax, which
act as flame retardants. Ordinarily, use of these chemicals cannot be economically
justified except under special conditions.

660 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2003 Recommended Practice for Protection Against Ignitions
Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents
API 2021 Guide for Inspecting Refineries
API 2510 Design and Construction of LP Gas Installations at Marine
and Pipeline Terminals, Natural Gas Processing Plants,
Refineries, Petrochemical Plants and Tank Farms

Fire Fighting Guide

International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA)

IFSTA Training Manuals

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 11 Foam Extinguishing Systems

Chevron References
Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual
Piping Manual
Tank Manual

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

OSHA 29 CFR Occupational Safety and Health Standards

U.S. Coast Guard

CG 329 U.S. Coast Guard Fire Fighting Manual for Tank Vessels

Chevron Corporation 600-47 December 1994

700 Fire Investigation and Report

Abstract
This section discusses the general procedure for investigating a fire and preparing
the fire report.

Contents Page

710 Fire Investigation 700-2

711 Data Collection
712 Investigation Team
713 Time Line
714 Root Cause Analysis
720 Fire Reporting 700-6
721 Importance
722 What Fires Should Be Reported?
723 When to Report
724 Preparation of a Report
725 How to Estimate Loss
726 What Happens to Fire Reports
727 To the Supervisor Preparing the Fire Report
728 To Management Reviewing the Report
729 Entering the Report into the Computer

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700 Fire Investigation and Report Fire Protection Manual

710 Fire Investigation

When a fire occurs it is important to learn why it happened in order to prevent
similar fires in the future. In all but the most obvious cases, investigation is needed.
Figure 700-1 is a flow chart that identifies each step in the investigation process,
starting with the fire itself and ending with distribution of information regarding the
lessons learned.

Fig. 700-1 Fire Investigation Flow Chart

Fire Occurs

Interviews, Charts, Logs,

Photographs, Physical
Evidence
Collect Data
See Section 711

First Line Supervisor

Form Investigation
Specialists
Team
See Section 712

Develop Time Line

See Section 713

Root Cause Analysis

Prepare
Recommendations

Document Investigation
Result

Form GO-106, "Fire" Database

See Section 720

Distribute Lessons
Learned

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Fire Protection Manual 700 Fire Investigation and Report

711 Data Collection

It is important to set aside a few hours to concentrate at the fire scene. Following
some basic steps and concentrating on the evidence often leads to the primary cause
of the fire. These steps are recommended:
1. Begin the investigation as soon as the fire area is safe to enter, and before any
cleanup or repair work is started.
2. Obtain eyewitness reports before personnel leave the facility. Interview opera-
tors on shift, fire fighters and any other eyewitnesses. Try to get as much detail
as possible; including sequence of events, estimates of elapsed time, color of
fire and smoke, noise and smells. If possible, tape-record your discussions with
eyewitnesses.
3. Review records and logs. Immediately following a serious fire, it is recom-
mended that all logs and records be dated, time-marked, and retained for later
reference. Other useful records include material samples, inspection records,
drawings, weather records, and any information that could help to reconstruct
conditions and events leading up to the fire. Some computer systems overwrite
data every 24 hours.
4. Inspect in detail the physical evidence and the damage. If a fire has burned in a
confined area, sketch a plot plan to show the outer limits of the damage, and
where flame actually touched.
Flame contact with any object heats the object rapidly to 1000°F or above. If
flame has not reached an object, its temperature will seldom exceed 400°F.
Figure 700-2 provides clues for estimating how hot various areas became
during a fire. Use these clues to draw “circles of temperature” on the plot plan
sketch.
Insulation fibers, grass, and leaves will be singed and charred by ignition of a
vapor cloud. These clues can help define the extent of the vapor cloud prior to
ignition.
The source of the fuel is usually located near the center of the highest tempera-
ture circle. An unexpected cool zone inside the otherwise hottest area might
point to a fuel source that continued to flow throughout the fire, providing
localized cooling. This could be the initial leak or failure.
Photographs for permanent record can be helpful during the review stage of
investigation.
5. Identify the fuel source. After sketching the “circles of temperature,” look care-
fully at the area inside the hottest circle to identify damage or leaks that
occurred during the fire. Rule out these items as an initial source of fuel. For
example, piping that splits during a fire will have knife-thin edges along the
tear. These thin edges were created by flame, which weakened the steel enough
for it to bulge, become thin, and then tear. On the other hand, failed piping that
shows no thinning at the edge of the failure except for possible corrosion,
should be noted as a likely initial cause.

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700 Fire Investigation and Report Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 700-2 Temperature Limits of Selected Materials

Material Characteristics Temperature, °F
Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) Distorts 185
Polystyrene Distorts 210
Paint Scorches 250
Plastic Melts 250
Plastic Chars 250-400
Paint Chars 250-400
Nylon Distorts 300-360
Wood Ignites 380-510
Dry coke Formed 400-1000
Steel Strength lost 1000-1200
Silver solder Melts 1165-1450
Aluminum Melts 1220
Glass Softens 1400-1600
Brass Melts 1600
Steel Excessive scaling and 1600
grain coarsening
Concrete Spalling 1800-2000
Copper Melts 1980
Stainless steel Melts 2600
References: Fire and Explosion Manual for Aircraft Accident Investigation, Bureau of Mines AD 771 191; Fire
Protection Handbook, NFPA 16th edition

A sample of the suspected fuel is helpful if you need to determine its vapor
pressure or flash point to support your conclusions from the examination of the
fire site.
6. Identify the ignition source. After you determine the probable source and type
of fuel, inspect the fire area again and review eyewitness reports to try to iden-
tify the source of ignition. Common sources of ignition are as follows:
– Welding, cutting, drilling, or burning
– Open flame, such as that from fired boilers or heaters
– Oil-soaked insulation on piping above 350°F
– Hot bearings on pumps
– Engines
– Pyrophoric compounds
– Spontaneous ignition

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Fire Protection Manual 700 Fire Investigation and Report

– Static electricity
– Electrical sparks or arcs
Do not be intimidated by what looks like total destruction, an impossible mess,
or a shapeless pile of junk. Look past the rubble. Visualize the original condi-
tions. Search out detailed clues. Identify the pattern of temperature and flame
contact, and you will have surrounded the fuel source.
7. Document details of the emergency response to the fire, including:
– Use of detection, alarm, shutdown systems
– Effectiveness of pre-fire plan
– Number of firefighters, including mutual aid, and response time
– Amount and type of firefighting equipment used
– Level of effectiveness of firefighting equipment and tactics, including
fixed equipment, mobile equipment, and the facility fire water system
For large fires, it is helpful to map locations of fire trucks, monitors, hose lays,
and the outline of the fire area.

712 Investigation Team

Employee participation on the investigation team is critical. Operation maintenance
or contractor personnel directly involved with the incident, including the first line
supervisor, should be included on the investigation team. As needed, include team
members with expertise in process, materials, machinery, or instrumentation. A
team leader with investigation experience can facilitate the group effort.
Supervisory and management personnel need to understand that their presence on
the investigation team can sometimes cause intimidation and limit the team's effec-
tiveness.
The CRTC Fire and Process Safety Team is available to provide on-site consulta-
tion and facilitate investigations where the fire is a large incident or the cause of the
fire is difficult to determine.

713 Time Line

The first step in analyzing the data collected is to establish a detailed time line of
events leading up to the fire, especially any changes in plant operations over the
few days prior to the event. The investigation team determines the approximate
time of fuel release, ignition, and discovery of the fire. Subsequent equipment fail-
ures that added fuel to the fire, operator response to the incident, and firefighter
response should be documented on the time line until control and extinguishment
are achieved.

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700 Fire Investigation and Report Fire Protection Manual

714 Root Cause Analysis

Root cause analysis is a method used to identify the underlying causes of an inci-
dent. Using root cause analysis, the investigation team tries to answer questions
such as these:
• What was the source of ignition and why was it in proximity to a source of
fuel?
• Why did the fire progress beyond the incipient stage?
• What systems affected the size of the incident? (positive/negative)
Each incident includes both physical causes (e.g., pump seal leak) and human
causes (e.g., inappropriate maintenance or operator response). Management system
causes often allow the human causes to occur (e.g., inadequate training or proce-
dures). Root cause analysis is a method to identify each type of cause and to help
prevent recurrence of the incident. Some methods of root cause analysis used
within the Company are the TapRoot method and the Why Tree method. For addi-
tional information on these methods, contact the CRTC Fire and Process Safety
Team.

720 Fire Reporting

721 Importance
Reports of fire are of great importance in a fire protection program. They provide
the following information:
• Reasons for fire occurrences, in order that corrective measures can be taken
• Company fire loss experience accumulated over many years. This experience
serves as a basis for changes in the way we design facilities, expenditures for
fire prevention and firefighting equipment, and training
• Valuable data for discussions with regulatory bodies regarding legislation
affecting industry operations
• A source of material for fire training programs

722 What Fires Should Be Reported?

Fires are defined as any occurrence of fire, combustion explosion, or spread of fire
involving Company properties, products, operations, or employees, not intention-
ally ignited for a useful purpose, irrespective of resulting deaths, injuries, or
damages.
Every fire provides a lesson in fire prevention and every report broadens our knowl-
edge of fire protection techniques. That is why it's important to report all fires. Two
objectives of a report are to describe the effectiveness of fire control measures and
to reveal the circumstances that permit a fire to start in unexpected places or in an

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Fire Protection Manual 700 Fire Investigation and Report

unexpected manner. The test is: “Was the fire an expected result or was it part of the
work being done?” Even if this fire was small, it may reveal a situation that, under
slightly different circumstances, could result in a serious loss. This type of informa-
tion, combined with experience in other areas, can provide the basis for important
steps in a fire protection program.
Reports of fire are intended to cover fires in Company owned or operated plants or
facilities.
In addition to Company fires, the following types of non-Company fires may
provide valuable information if they are reported.
• Fires in properties adjacent to Company activities, whether or not damage to
Company property results. Reports are helpful in determining the adequacy of
spacing from property lines and resistance to fire exposure.
• Fires in installations of other oil companies where a Company representative
assists, observes, or obtains reliable information.
• Fires in which Company products were or could have been a factor in either
the start or spread of the fire, even though no Company property was involved.
These reports are particularly important in furnishing a background for discus-
sions with local public officials concerned with fire prevention, and to prepare
for potential litigation.
• Fires involving contractors' equipment when working under contract on
Company property whether or not damage to Company property results. This
is also important for potential litigation.
Non-Company fires are not referred to in Company statistics, nor is any reference
made to infer or associate such fires with Company operations Form GO-106 is not
required for reporting a non-Company fire.

723 When to Report

Fires should be reported to the Chief Fire Protection Engineer within 10 working
days of the fire. If the investigation is not complete, submit the preliminary GO-
106, and follow up with a final version when the investigation is completed.
Major fires (over $100,000) or fires having special circumstances (any injuries,
fatalities, or media attention), should be reported by phone or fax to the Chief Fire
Protection Engineer within 24 hours or the first work day after the fire.
Telephone: CTN 242-4204 or (510) 242-4204
Fax: CTN 242-5947 or (510) 242-5947

Some operating companies have separate reporting requirements in addition to

these.

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700 Fire Investigation and Report Fire Protection Manual

724 Preparation of a Report

Note Figure 700-3 is located at the end of this section.
Following the investigation, a report is prepared. A sample report form (GO-106) is
given in Figure 700-3. Note that all questions apply to every fire, and answers to
some questions may need more space than is given on the form.
It is important that the information be accurate, complete, and that statements based
on opinion rather than fact be so designated. Reports cannot contain too many facts.
Sketches and/or photographs showing the area affected by fire and indicating signif-
icant dimensions or distances are desirable.
Try to prepare fire reports in such a way that possible legal concerns are not
compromised. The following points give some guidance:
• Report only the facts; avoid opinions.
• Avoid words like detailed, full, or complete. If a final report falls short of that
goal, use of such words could be difficult to explain.
• Assume that whatever is written is public information.
• If the possibility of legal action exists, you may wish to seek Company legal
counsel to review the report prior to entering the GO-106 onto the GO FIRE
System. The GO-106 can be prepared under attorney-client privilege.
Do not let the possibility of legal action deter you from preparing and submitting a
GO-106 form. A preliminary report may be prepared, followed by a final report
when investigation is complete.
The number of copies to be prepared and their distribution is established by local
Management. However, always send one copy to the Chief Fire Protection Engineer
at the address below.
Chief Fire Protection Engineer
Chevron Research & Technology Company
1003 W. Cutting Boulevard
Richmond, CA 94804
Operating companies may enter fire reports into the Company's GO FIRE database
system (see Section 729). Doing so satisfies the requirement to send a copy to the
Chief Fire Protection Engineer. Additional information, such as the results of a
subsequent detailed investigation, or photographs should be forwarded to the Chief
Fire Protection Engineer by mail as soon as available.
The front of the report form asks for specific information on the fire being reported;
i.e., where it was, what was involved, what was damaged, who was injured, when
did it happen and when was it controlled and extinguished. Section III includes a
time line to help you organize the description of the incident. Mark the time line in
chronological order starting with the first important event and ending with the date
and time that the root cause analysis (if performed) was started. Describe what
happened, including:

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Fire Protection Manual 700 Fire Investigation and Report

• The events leading up to the fire. The most valuable lessons from incidents
often come from a thorough and objective examination of the events leading up
to a fire.
• The discovery of the fire and initial response. What happened to either increase
or limit losses between the time the fire was discovered and the time it was
controlled? Were fuel sources isolated? Was an emergency shutdown system
used? Was anyone hurt at the start of the incident or during firefighting?
• Control and extinguishment of the fire. Describe the procedures used to fight
the fire. Who responded - the fire brigade? The municipal fire department?
Were firefighting tactics effective, and what were they? How long did it take to
extinguish the fire? Was there anything unusual about the control methods that
should be passed on to other Company locations?
The back of the GO-106 form is for analysis of the fire. Information given there is
important to the investigation and a most useful tool for gaining experience to
prevent future similar fires. Below is a description of each section. See
Figure 700-3 for a sample.
Sources of Fuel and Oxygen: Indicate the source of fuel. (EXAMPLE: tank,
pump, piping.) Air is the usual source of oxygen. However, check the box marked
“other” if there was another oxygen source. (EXAMPLE: hydrogen peroxide, leak.)
Describe what happened to allow the fuel to mix with oxygen. (EXAMPLE: tank
was overfilled, pump seal failed, tank inerting system failed.)
Source of Ignition: State how the flammable mixture was ignited. Select the most
appropriate box from the list, or check “other” and provide a description.
Explain why the source of ignition was in proximity to the flammable mixture.
Why did the fire start?
EXAMPLE 1: A lighting strike in the vicinity of the Buffalo Wallow tank setting
caused vapors from the pressure/vacuum vent to ignite. It is thought that the pres-
sure pallet inside the vent valve stuck in the open position.
EXAMPLE 2: A pump bearing failure caused internal friction (heating) and vibra-
tion that led to failure of the mechanical seal. A release of flammable material
occurred when the mechanical seal failed. The release was ignited by hot pump
surfaces.
What facility systems contributed to the severity of this fire, or reduced its
impact? Several choices are provided. Check all those responsible for allowing a
small easy-to-control fire to escalate into a large fire: or those that effectively
limited losses or the extent of the fire. This information is helpful because:
• It can be used to increase the effectiveness of your fire prevention program.
• It may be useful at other Company locations similar to yours.
Explain how the system checked above affected the fire (e.g., how they failed to
limit losses, or why they were successful in reducing fire losses).

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700 Fire Investigation and Report Fire Protection Manual

Elaborate on the advantages or shortcomings of the systems that affected fire

losses. Feel free to add marginal notes or attach a second sheet,. EXAMPLE: Equip-
ment could not be isolated from fuel sources because brass block valves melted.
What incident prevention (PSM) systems could have predicted the fire, or
prevented it from occurring? Check all the PSM systems that were in place, but
were not used or were needed to reduce risk of fire. To find out more about Process
Safety Management, contact your local ESF&H/HE&LP staff, or the CRTC PSM
Staff.
Is action necessary to prevent recurrence? List any proposed actions (or attach
root cause analysis & lessons learned). Section X is the final step in analyzing the
data contained in the fire report. Compare the PSM systems listed in Section IX
with the data contained in Sections IV through VIII and ask yourself the following
questions:
Should existing facility or PSM systems or other management controls be modified
to
• Prevent a flammable mixture from forming?
• Eliminate ignition sources?
• Reduce the impact of a fire?
• Improve emergency response?

725 How to Estimate Loss

In most cases, the reported loss includes the cost of in-kind replacement of the
damaged structure or equipment including removal and clean up of damaged equip-
ment) and the value of Company product consumed in the fire. It does not include
product loss due to downtime. Report the replacement cost or value of any non-
Company facilities. If the damaged equipment is abandoned, report book value.
The loss reported should be that resulting from the fire or explosion; do not include
the value of substantial improvements made when the structure or equipment is
replaced.
Only losses resulting from fire should be reported as a fire loss. For example, a
pump is blocked and the motor is supposedly shut down by remote action.
However, the signal to shut down the pump motor malfunctions. The pump
continues to run, overheats, and tears itself apart before the operator arrives to
check. A fire resulted, but the major pump damage occurred before the fire. Pump
replacement cost should not be charged to fire loss.

726 What Happens to Fire Reports

Although the individual preparing the report may not receive feedback, this does
not mean that the report has been ignored or simply filed. Every report is carefully
reviewed by Management to find out what can be done to correct conditions that
caused the fire. Where appropriate, existing operating procedures are reviewed,
equipment is checked and tested and action is taken to reduce the possibility of a

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Fire Protection Manual 700 Fire Investigation and Report

similar fire. In addition, records of reported fires are maintained in the office of the
Chief Fire Protection Engineer.
Fire reports entered into the GO FIRE system are retained for future review and
analysis with respect to location, date, type of equipment or installation, fuel
involved, source of ignition and other significant information. These reports are
compared with reports of other fires that occurred under similar conditions in this
and other companies.
The GO-106 reports form the basis for Lessons Learned bulletins and newsletters;
thus, results of this broad experience are available to all operating companies.
Records and statistics on fires can also be accessed. The net result is that every
properly filled out report serves to increase our understanding of fires and fire
prevention, and it also may help various other fire protection agencies in their
efforts to reduce fire loss. Finally, an Annual Fire Loss Report is issued, which
compiles all the fire loss data for the Corporation each year.

727 To the Supervisor Preparing the Fire Report

Form GO-106 Report of Fire is designed to assist supervisors in submitting perti-
nent information during personal investigation and interview of personnel who
were at the scene of the fire.
Your Report of Fire and personal observations are an important part of the fire
investigation. It is also important to advise personnel how to handle and use petro-
leum products safely and to point out conditions that caused the fire and corrective
measures to be taken. If you feel there is need for a more detailed investigation to
determine the cause of the fire you may request the services of the CRTC Fire &
Process Safety Team.

728 To Management Reviewing the Report

Management will review reports of fire for completeness and accuracy. The review
calls attention to the presence of hazardous operations and to personnel who may
have compromised safe operating practices. Give particular attention to item X on
corrective actions and make certain that recommendations for reasonable corrective
action are followed. Also note recommendations that are uneconomical or unreason-
able and add your comments before approving the report.

729 Entering the Report into the Computer

You'll find information on entering data into the GO FIRE database system in
Appendix D.
Once a report has been entered into GO FIRE, a hard copy need not be sent to the
Chief Fire Protection Engineer. However, supporting information (e.g., photos,
sketches, background data, investigative reports) which cannot be entered should be
sent directly to the Chief Fire Protection Engineer.

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700 Fire Investigation and Report Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 700-3 Sample Fire Report (Form GO-106) (1 of 2)

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Fire Protection Manual 700 Fire Investigation and Report

Fig. 700-3 Sample Fire Report (Form GO-106) (2 of 2)

Chevron Corporation 700-13 December 1994

Appendix A. Work Plans and Permits

Refer to the Fire Protection Manual, Section 300, for a discussion of Job Planning,
including the use of the following types of work plans and permits. The examples
included in this appendix have been gathered from various operating company loca-
tions. These examples may not be appropriate for use at other facilities.

Contents Page

A-1 Hot Work Permit Checklist A-2

A-2 Example Hot Work Permit A-3
A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure A-4
A-4 Example General Work Permit A-13
A-5 Work Plan Checklist A-14
A-6 Example Work Plan A-15
A-7 Example Contingency Plan A-16
A-8 Emergency Response Plan Checklist A-17
A-9 Example Emergency Response Plan - Evacuation Map A-18

Chevron Corporation A-1 December 1994

Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-1 Hot Work Permit Checklist

The hot work permit procedure contains a list of safety items to be examined before starting work. The
following should be considered for inclusion in the hot work permit procedure
1. Is hot work justified in the planned area, or can the work be done in a less hazardous area?
2. Can the job be done by cold work?
3. Has the site been inspected by a responsible individual?
4. Have pipe lines or equipment that may release flammable or combustible materials been blinded
off or disconnected? Are there any leaks that cannot be stopped?
5. Are pipe lines or equipment to be worked on vapor-free or vented?
6. Has the hydrocarbon been drained from all low points?
7. Are bleeders open and unplugged using proper rodding out procedure?
8. Have openings to sewers and underground drains within 50 feet of the work been sealed with
water and plugs or sand bags? Be sure to remove seals and/or sand bags when the job is finished.
9. When it is necessary to chip, gouge, saw, or drill metal where flammable vapors may be present,
use hand tools only and apply a cooling liquid to prevent heat buildup. The hot work permit should
document these special precautions.
10. Is there a potential for vapor emissions from equipment, piping, valves, and vents in the vicinity?
Are flammable vapor tests necessary? If so, how often? At what reading is it safe for work to
begin? (See Section 335)
11. Are adjacent areas safe? Are any water-reactive or other chemicals present in the vicinity that
could be a hazard to firefighters? Is it necessary to redirect venting from relief systems away from
the hot work area?
12. Are workers in adjacent areas and affected plants aware that the work is going on?
13. Will working conditions remain safe for the duration of the job? is it necessary to inspect/monitor
valves, flanges, or equipment frequently to ensure that leaks do not develop or become serious.
14. Is the fire watch qualified and have adequate instruction in what to look for and what to do if
hazardous conditions arise? Are radio communications between the fire watch and the control
room/supervisor needed? Do workers know how to report a fire?
15. Are combustible materials (e.g., wood, paper cloth) present that could be ignited? Is it likely that a
hydrocarbon spill elsewhere will run into the hot work area?
16. Are fire screens and blankets required to contain sparks and slag? Are charged fire hoses and
portable extinguishers available? Does the fire watch know how to use the equipment properly?
17. Are operating activities (e.g., venting, sampling) likely to release flammable vapors or liquid to the
atmosphere within 50 feet of the hot work area? If so, have hot work activities been coordinated
with Operations?
18. Are high-velocity, high volume fans required to direct potentially flammable vapors away from the
area? If the fans are electric-motor driven and located inside an electrically classified area, do
they meet NFPA 70 Class I Division 1 requirements?
19. Should the hot work area be inspected when workers leave the area (e.g., at shift change, breaks,
and when the work is complete)?
20. If the hot work will occur above grade, what is the chance that wind-borne hot particles could
drift outside the hot work area?

December 1994 A-2 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-2 Example Hot Work Permit

Chevron Corporation A-3 December 1994

Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (1 of 9)

Contents
1.0 Purpose
2.0 References
3.0 Definitions
3.1 Hot Work
3.2 Gas Testing
3.3 Safe Atmosphere For Hot Work
3.4 Qualified Gas Tester
3.5 Fire Watch
3.6 Originator
3.7 Operations
3.8 Maintenance
4.0 Hot Work Permit (MS-3072)
4.1 When Required
4.2 Fire Watch Requirements
4.3 Required Initials and Signatures
4.4 Distribution of Copies
4.5 Time and Area Limits
4.6 Duration and Extension of Permit
4.7 Follow-up Gas Test
4.8 Job Interruption
4.9 Retention of Permits
5.0 Responsibilities
5.1 Maintenance
5.2 Operations
5.3 Fire Watch
6.0 Attachment
MS-3072 Hot Work Permit

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (2 of 9)

1.0 Purpose
This procedure is to be followed to control work which is capable of creating a source of ignition.
2.0 References [Insert appropriate references if these MOPs do not exist.]
WT-505 Work Request (MOC)
WT-510 Isolating Equipment/Breaking Lines
WT-512 Gas Testing
WT-513 Enclosed/Confined Space Entry
WT-515 Contractor Safety
WT-551 Excavation
WT-552 Hot Tapping Pipelines, Tanks, and Vessels
3.0 Definitions
3.1 Hot Work
Any work that is capable of creating a spark or flame of sufficient temperature to
ignite flammable or combustible material. Examples are: grinding, welding, cutting,
sandblasting or the use of open flames, sparking electrical or pneumatic tools, motor-
ized equipment, or vacuum trucks in areas where flammable vapor or combustible
materials may be present.
3.2 Gas Testing
The use of portable gas testing instruments to determine levels of flammable and
toxic vapors or gases present in the atmosphere. Initial gas tests must be taken before
hot work can begin and follow-up tests are required at least every 4 hours (every 2
hours if hot work is inside an enclosed space).
3.3 Safe Atmosphere For Hot Work
An atmosphere where any flammable vapors detected within 50 feet of where hot
work is going to be performed are 5% LFL (Lower Flammable Limit) or less.
3.4 Qualified Gas Tester
Personnel (Company and contractor) who have been trained in the use of portable gas
testing instruments and have demonstrated their use in the field. Training must
include the recognition of hazards inherent in hot work and enclosed/confined space
entry. Only qualified gas testers may conduct gas tests at the Terminal.
3.5 Fire Watch
A person whose primary function is to observe conditions in the immediate and adja-
cent areas to ensure that hot work is performed safely. [The Fire Watch is expected
to be able to sound the alarm] and immediately extinguish a small fire should one
occur.

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Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (3 of 9)

3.6 Originator
The originator of the "Hot Work Permit" is the person requesting permission to do
hot work. This is usually a Contractor on-site Foreman or Mechanic.
3.7 Operations
This is the Company person that has been designated to see that conditions in the area
are safe for the maintenance work to be performed. This can be either a [Head
Operator], Operator, the Terminal Manager, or Company Representative. See
Section 5.2 for responsibilities.
3.8 Maintenance
"Maintenance" refers to the Contractor on-site Foreman or Company or Contractor
Maintenance personnel who are responsible for ensuring that all maintenance
requirements of this procedure, including permit requirements, are met. See Section
5.1 for responsibilities.
4.0 Hot Work Permit (MS-3072)
4.1 When Required
A "Hot Work Permit" (MS-3072) is always required before using a source of ignition
in an area where flammable vapors or combustible materials could be present. A Hot
Work Permit is required whenever:
4.1.1 Heating, cutting, burning, or welding with a torch, electric arc, or soldering
iron anywhere in the Terminal
4.1.2 Operating motorized equipment in an operating process area or within a
diked area where flammable vapors may be present
4.1.3 Using electric or air driven power tools which are capable of causing "hot"
sparks or enough energy to ignite a flammable mixture in an area where flam-
mable vapors may be present
4.1.4 Using any equipment which generates an exposed flame or hot filament (i.e.,
some asphalt laying equipment, space heaters or during stress relieving)
4.1.5 Using tools which employ explosive charges
4.1.6 Spray painting and sandblasting
4.1.7 [Annual Permits are issued to the Maintenance Shop and the Lab for the use
of ignition sources unique to their operations.] These permits must be posted
at each location.
4.2 Fire Watch Requirements
A Fire Watch is required whenever:
4.2.1 Welding or cutting is being performed unless an exemption has been granted
by Operations, such as in an open area that is well away from equipment and
facilities

December 1994 A-6 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (4 of 9)

4.2.2 Hot Work is being performed inside an enclosed space. The Fire Watch can
double as a stand-by provided he/she has been trained.
4.2.3 Maintenance and/or Operations deems one is necessary because of the nature
or location of the work.
4.2.4 Fire Watch duties are listed in Section 5.3.
4.3 Required Initials and Signatures
. Before hot work can begin, the following must sign or initial the Permit
4.3.1 The Contractor on-site Foreman or Mechanic shall sign on the "Permit
requested by" line.
4.3.2 The Operations Representative shall specify the restrictions in the "Checks
Denote Precautions and Restrictions Required" section and sign on the
"Operations (restrictions specified)" line.
4.3.3 The Mechanic performing the work shall initial beside each check mark in
the "Checks Denote Precautions and Restrictions Required" section as
each condition is confirmed safe and sign on the "Contractor/Mechanic
(permit conditions understood)" line.
4.3.4 The person conducting the gas tests shall record the date, time, test results,
and initial in the "Gas Tester" box at the bottom of the Permit. Tests shall be
taken just prior to starting the hot work.
4.3.5 Operations must verify the gas tests and initial in the "Operations (restrictions
still met)" box at the bottom of the Permit.
4.3.6 Operations shall approve the Permit by signing on the "Operations (Restric-
tions Met-Work May Safely Begin)" line after they have checked the job
site and confirmed conditions are safe.
4.3.7 Any Permit that does not contain the current date, test results, necessary
signatures, and initials is not valid.
4.4 Distribution of Copies
The Permit is made out in duplicate and after approval is distributed as follows:
4.4.1 Top copy kept by Operations
4.4.2 Hard copy posted at the job site.
4.5 Time and Area Limits
4.5.1 The starting and expiration time of the Hot Work Permit must be specified
on the Permit.
4.5.2 The job location or boundary must be specified on the Permit. When the job
location is moved in any direction, additional gas testing is required before
the hot work begins. The mechanic can continue using the same Permit.

Chevron Corporation A-7 December 1994

Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (5 of 9)

4.6 Duration and Extension of Permit
A Hot Work Permit can be used for as long as there are boxes for recording gas
tests, however:
4.6.1 An existing permit can only be extended as long as conditions remain
unchanged and it is safe to do the work.
4.6.2 Gas tests must be taken and recorded before the start of work and at least
every 4 hours during work to confirm it is safe for hot work to continue.
4.6.3 At the beginning of each shift, Operations and Maintenance personnel doing
the work shall confirm that conditions are safe and the Permit restrictions are
met. They must date and initial the hard copy at the bottom of the Permit in
the appropriate Permit Extension box. The person taking the gas tests must
record the results and initial the Permit.
4.6.4 If a leak, spill, upset, accident, or other mishap occurs that creates a hazard,
the Permit is no longer valid and should be removed from the site. Gas tests
must be taken and conditions must be confirmed safe before the existing
Permit can be used.
4.6.5 When the job is completed or will continue the following day, Maintenance
personnel doing the work shall remove the Permit and give it to Operations.
4.7 Follow-up Gas Tests
4.7.1 Follow-up Gas Tests are required at least every 4 hours, except:
a) When welding, cutting, etc. inside an enclosed space, follow-up tests
should be taken every 2 hours, and the results recorded on the Permit
every 4 hours.
b) When the job is shut down because of an emergency or for more than 30
minutes, testing is required before hot work can resume.
4.7.2 The person conducting the follow-up tests shall record the date and time the
tests were taken, the test results, and initial in the "Gas Tester" box at the
bottom of the Permit.
4.7.3 The Operations person who verified that the tests were taken shall initial in
the "Operations (restrictions still met)" box.
4.8 Job Interruption
If the job must be stopped because of an adverse condition or the Fire Watch has to
leave the Permit area, work must be stopped and the Permit removed.
4.8.1 If conditions have changed, the area must be re-inspected, gas tested, and
confirmed safe before hot work can resume.
4.8.2 If the Fire Watch leaves the Permit area for any reason for more than 30
minutes the area must be inspected, gas tested, and confirmed safe.
4.8.3 If work resumes, the existing Permit can be used providing the area is re-
inspected, gas tested, and confirmed safe.

December 1994 A-8 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (6 of 9)

4.9 Retention of Permits
The Permit needs to be kept for 30 days once the job is completed unless an incident
occurs, then the Permit should be kept with the Incident Investigation Report.
5.0 Responsibilities
5.1 Maintenance
Maintenance is responsible for initiating the permitting process and ensuring neces-
sary steps have been taken to eliminate the possibility of accidental fire. They will:
5.1.1 Inspect the job site with Operations and together determine whether the
proposed work is necessary and can be done safely, if it should be done using
cold work methods, or delayed until the Terminal is shutdown.
5.1.2 Initiate the Hot Work Permit by completing the top portion. Make sure the
job is well defined and the exact location and boundaries are specified.
5.1.3 Sign the Permit on the "Permit requested by" line.
5.1.4 Prepare the site for hot work. Blind and/or disconnect lines as necessary,
cover drains and drainage vents within 50 feet of the proposed hot work, and
remove, cover, or wet combustible material as necessary.
5.1.5 Conduct the initial and all follow-up gas tests when requested by Operations.
The person taking the tests shall record the date and time each test was taken,
the test results, and initial in the "Gas Tester" box at the bottom of the Permit.
NOTE: It is permissible for Operations to conduct these tests.
5.1.6 Provide a fire watch when one is needed. The fire watch may double as a
standby if the hot work will be inside an enclosed space.
5.1.7 Make sure fire and safety equipment are in place and in usable condition
before work begins and the Fire Watch knows how to use them.
a) At a minimum, a 20 lb. ABC fire extinguisher must be immediately avail-
able and a charged fire hose (when available) should be at the site.
b) Contractors are required to provide their own fire extinguisher.
5.1.8 The mechanic shall initial beside each check mark as he/she confirms the
"Precautions and Restrictions".
5.1.9 Ensure that the mechanic doing the work understands the conditions, bound-
aries, precautions and restrictions of the Permit, and has signed on the
"Contractor/Mechanic (permit conditions understood)" line.
5.1.10 Make sure the hard copy of the Permit is posted at the job site before work
begins.
5.1.11 Erect portable welding curtains or shields as necessary to protect personnel
from electric arc eye burn.
5.1.12 String welding cables and hoses so as not to block walkways or create a trip-
ping hazard.

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Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (7 of 9)

5.1.13 Locate welding machines and their ground connections within the area
covered by the Hot Work Permit or an area approved for unrestricted use of
motor vehicles.
5.1.14 Ensure the arc welding ground bar is securely clamped or bolted directly to
the work piece.
5.1.15 Make sure loading operations are shut down if hot work will be performed
within 50 feet.
5.1.16 Notify Operations before starting work, when leaving the job site for more
than 30 minutes, and before resuming work.
5.1.17 Remove oxygen and acetylene hoses from enclosed spaces and shut off the
gas supply during break and lunch periods and at the end of the day. Pressure
should be bled off the hoses and the regulator at the end of the day.
5.1.18 Conduct follow-up gas tests at least every four hours and any time the job is
shut down because of an emergency. The person taking the tests shall record
the date and time of the gas test, test results, and initial in the "Gas Tester"
box at the bottom of the Permit.
5.1.19 Conduct gas tests every two hours if welding will be performed in an
enclosed space. Note the time, test results, and initial the Permit every 4
hours.
5.1.20 If welding at elevated locations make sure any falling hot metal, sparks, slag,
and electrode stubs do not create a fire or personnel hazard. Barricade the
area or catch the slag in a wetted tarp as necessary.
5.1.21 Stop the hot work and advise Operations if conditions in the area change
which could endanger workers or equipment. Do not restart work until safe
conditions have been confirmed.
5.1.22 Shut down machines and extinguish any fires when leaving the job site.
5.1.23 Store welding equipment left on the job site in a location designated by Oper-
ations.
5.1.24 Inspect the work area before leaving to ensure all metal is cool and there are
no smoldering materials.
5.1.25 Advise Operations when the work is complete and the job site is clean.
5.2 Operations
Operations has the overall responsibility for the safety of personnel and equipment
from operating hazards until the job is complete. They give the final approval of the
Permit.
5.2.1 Review work details and permit conditions with Maintenance at the job site.
5.2.2 After reviewing the work and the job site, complete the "Checks Denote
Precautions and Restrictions Required" section on the Permit. Establish
follow-up gas testing requirements.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (8 of 9)

5.2.3 Indicate the "Time Limits" and the "Job Location Limits" on the top portion
of the Permit.
5.2.4 Ensure that all drains and vents within 50 feet of the work area are sealed.
5.2.5 Either conduct or verify the initial gas tests.
a) Whenever possible, Operations should take tests preceding the scheduled
work so that if additional preparation, gas freeing, and clean up is
required it can be done prior to Maintenance's arrival.
b) Tests must still be taken just before hot work begins.
c) The person taking the gas tests must record the date and time of the test,
test results, and initial in the "Gas Tester" box.
d) When verifying tests, ensure the boxes at the bottom of the Permit are
completed and initial in the appropriate "Operations (restrictions still
met)" box.
5.2.6 Make sure the Fire Watch, when required, has been instructed to stop hot
work if conditions change that could endanger workers. Make sure he/she
knows how to use a fire extinguisher and fire hose and, when available, has a
two-way radio tuned to the Terminal's frequency.
5.2.7 Make a final inspection to ensure all Permit conditions are satisfied, blinds
are in place, drains covered, fire extinguisher and fire hose are at the site, and
that Maintenance understands the restrictions and has initialed and signed the
Permit.
5.2.8 If all conditions are satisfied, sign the Permit on the "Operations (Restric-
tions Met-Work May Safely Begin)" line.
a) Hang the hard copy at the job site.
b) Keep the top copy (original).
5.2.9 Periodically observe the job and stop the hot work if conditions in the area
change which could endanger workers or equipment. If the job is stopped,
remove the Permit.
5.2.10 Either conduct or verify that the contractor is taking follow-up gas tests every
4 hours (as a minimum) and is recording the date, time, test results, and
initialing in the appropriate box at the bottom of the Permit.
5.2.11 When the job is completed inspect the site to ensure the work was done satis-
factory, the site has been cleaned up, all metal is cool, and there are no smol-
dering materials.
5.2.12 Ensure the hard copy of the Permit is removed when work is completed.

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Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-3 Example Hot Work Procedure (9 of 9)

5.3 Fire Watch
The primary function of a Fire Watch is to observe conditions in the immediate and
adjacent areas and know what action to take to protect workers and equipment should
an accident, fire, or spill occur. When a Fire Watch is required (per Section 3.5)
he/she shall:
5.3.1 Stop the hot work when conditions warrant.
5.3.2 Have a 20# ABC fire extinguisher by his/her side, a charged fire hose (when
required) at the site, and have a basic knowledge of their use.
5.3.3 Have a two-way radio, when one is available and necessary, tuned to the
terminal's frequency.
5.3.4 Verify that all Permit conditions are satisfied.
5.3.5 Double as a standby when hot work is taking place in an enclosed space.
When doubling as a standby, the Fire Watch must also be trained in the use of
self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), First Aid, and CPR.
5.3.6 Remain at the job site as long as hot work is in progress.
5.3.7 Remain in the area 30 minutes after hot work has been completed to ensure
that all metal surfaces are cool and there are no smoldering materials.
6.0 Attachment
MS-3072 "Hot Work Permit"

December 1994 A-12 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-4 Example General Work Permit

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Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-5 Work Plan Checklist

A work plan helps to identify and avoid potential hazards that may be encountered as the work progresses.
Consider these items for inclusion in the work plan:

1. A description of the facility area and process equipment involved, including a description of the
work to be performed and the tools/equipment required for the work

2. Means of monitoring the work (e.g., safety operator or fire watch)

3. Equipment isolation requirements, including proper blinding and lockout/tagout instructions

4. Gas testing requirements

5. Special circumstances or needs not covered by permits

6. The times or shifts that work will be performed

7. The expected duration of the work

8. Methods to keep operations and maintenance informed of the job status.

9. Number of people (Company and contractor) at the job site

10. Assigned responsibility for safety on the job site

December 1994 A-14 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-6 Example Work Plan

Job Description

As part of the combustion analyzer project, the mechanics will field weld 8 instrument air pot flanges and instru-
ment air line. The Hot work will occur on the furnace roof with minimal or no exposure to combustible material.
See the attached EWO for more information

Special Approvals

The Superintendent or his designee must approve this work plan and hot work package and sign the initial Hot
Work Permit. It is not necessary for the Superintendent to sign renewal permits if the scope of the job has not
changed from the initial permit. The responsible Shift Supervisor will sign the initial Hot Work Permit and any
updates or renewal permits for the same job.

Chevron Corporation A-15 December 1994

Appendix A Fire Protection Manual

Fig. A-7 Example Contingency Plan

Contingency Plan

(Address the major “what if's” that could happen while a job is in progress, and assign communication responsi-
bilities.)

A. Fire

1. Maintenance or contractor personnel stop hot work immediately and contact operations and plant protec-
tion (555)

2. The Fire Watch may extinguish small incipient fires caused by the hot work.

3. In the event of a larger fire, the Fire Watch and Maintenance personnel should evacuate the area per the
attached map.

4. Hot work may not be restarted after a fire until the area is determined safe by the Safety Plant Operator
and Plant Protection.

B. Spill

1. Maintenance or contractor personnel stop hot work immediately and contact operations.

2. Evacuate as necessary per the attached map.

C. Vapor release

1. Maintenance or contractor personnel stop hot work immediately and contact operations.

2. Evacuate as necessary per the attached map. Be sure to evacuate upwind of the release.

3. Never walk through a vapor cloud

D. H2S Alarm or Evacuation Horn

1. Maintenance or contractor personnel stop hot work immediately.

2. Evacuate as necessary per the attached map. Be sure to evacuate upwind of the release.

3. Never walk through a vapor or H2S cloud.

E. Safety/Plant Operator Discretion

1. Maintenance or contractor personnel stop hot work immediately at the direction of the Fire Watch,
Plant/Safety Operator, or any concerned personnel, if a hazardous condition is detected or suspected.

2. Hot work may resume only when approved by the responsible Plant/Safety Operator.

F. Unusual or Unexplained Conditions

1. Maintenance or contractor personnel stop hot work immediately if any unusual or unexplained conditions
develop that could reasonably be assumed to present a hazard.

2. Hot work may resume only when approved by the responsbile Plant/Safety Operator.

December 1994 A-16 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix A

Fig. A-8 Emergency Response Plan Checklist

An emergency response plan tells what to do and where to go should an injury, release, or fire occur. Items to
consider include:

1. Who should be notified in the event of an injury, fire, or release? Who will perform the notifica-
tion? How will workers in the work area be notified of a fire or release (e.g. by siren, radio, or
personal contact)

2. Are workers expected to fight incipient stage fires?

3. Who will respond to the fire or release?

4. What are the evacuation routes? It may be advantageous to prepare a plot plan sketch showing

• a gathering area where everyone is to meet after evacuating the work area

• the work area

• the desired evacuation route avoiding directing workers through adjacent plants, drainage
paths where burning liquids may collect, and areas downwind of major potential risks.

5. What will be done in the event of an injury?

Chevron Corporation A-17 December 1994

Appendix A Fire Protection Manual
Fig. A-9 Example Emergency Response Plan - Evacuation Map
December 1994 A-18 Chevron Corporation
Appendix B. Fire Protection Checklist

The checklists contain items related to fire prevention and suppression pertinent to
Company facilities. You can use checklists during Fire Protection Surveys to gauge
the level of fire safety in a facility. You can also use the checklists during Pre-
Startup Safety Reviews (PSSR) and Management of Change (MOC) evaluations.

Contents Page

Housekeeping B-2
Fire Protection Equipment B-3
Emergency Response Plans B-4
Emergency Shutdown/Alarm Systems B-5
Electrical Equipment B-6
Control Centers B-7
On Plot Drainage B-8
Structural Steel B-9
Fired Heater Checklist B-10
Machinery B-15
Piping B-16
Tank Car/Tank Truck Loading Racks B-17
Tank Storage B-18

Chevron Corporation B-1 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Housekeeping +
1. Maintenance cleanup complete?
2. Oil-soaked insulation removed and
replaced on hot lines, exchangers,
pumps, etc.?
3. Valve packing leak free?
3a. Pump packing leakage not excessive?
4. Area around equipment and under piping
free of oil spills?
5. Drainage channels clear and free
flowing?
6. Combustibles stored in safe areas in
plant, control room or shop?(2)
7. Process areas are weed-free–fire cannot
burn to plant or equipment?(2)
8. Free access to fire fighting equipment?(2)
9. Material storage neat, orderly, and
current?
10. Spills promptly cleaned up?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A“NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

December 1994 B-2 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Fire Protection Equipment
(Fire Protection Manual, Section 1600 and Appendix E, F)
1. Fire extinguishers in place and ready to
use?(2)
2. Fire extinguishers inspected within the
past 30 days and serviced within the past
year?
3. First aid fire hose reels/boxes maintained
and ready to use?
4. First aid fire hoses provide adequate
coverage for all fire hazardous equipment?
5. On-plot hydrant fire hose connections
matched to municipal fire equipment? Have
they been tested?
6. Adequate foam supplies readily available
and of the proper type (i.e., alcohol-
resistant foam where needed)?
7. Fixed water sprays tested periodically?
8. Fixed extinguishing system (CO2, Halon or
substitute) inspected or serviced within
past 6 months? New Halon systems shall
not be installed.
9. Hydrant valves easy to operate and
spanner or hydrant wrench available?
10. Fire monitors serviced and valves closed
and free? Persuader available?
11. Main fire water pumps performance tested
annually?
12. Inspection and maintenance records
current?
13. Equipment painted or labeled so that it is
easy to locate from a distance?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

Chevron Corporation B-3 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Emergency Response Plans
1. Emergency response plan available and
up-to-date?(2)
2. All plants have established emergency
procedures that are tested periodically?
3. Public agencies and mutual assistance
organizations included in practice
sessions?
4. Incident command system (ICS) is being
used? Incident commander is positively
identified?
5. Emergency supplies and equipment readily
available?
6. Phone lists for company personnel callout,
mutual aid, local fire and police
departments, emergency supplies, etc., are
up-to-date and reviewed periodically?
7. Radio communication channel is available
for dedicated emergency use?
8. Crew hypotheticals are performed
monthly? Written copies of the hypotheti-
cals conducted are available for review?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

December 1994 B-4 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Emergency Shutdown/Alarm Systems
(Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1300, Fire Protection Manual, Section 1800)
1. ESD systems tested periodically? All
components checked? Operators are
trained on the testing procedures? ESD is
used to shut down equipment or processes
when feasible, such as before plant turn-
arounds?
2. ESD systems identified and labeled clearly?
3. ESD systems are failsafe? If not, are motor
or air operators on ESD valves and control
wiring fireproofed where within 50 feet of
pumps, furnaces, vessels, heater treaters,
etc., or in drainage path of potential flam-
mable spill?
4. Process alarms tested periodically
(monthly)?
5. ESD and alarm systems receive a high
maintenance priority?
6. Detection (gas, smoke, fire) systems tested
periodically (monthly)?(2)
(1) A “NO”response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

Chevron Corporation B-5 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Electrical Equipment
(NFPA 70, Fire Protection Manual, Section 1500)
1. Motor control centers clean and free of
combustible materials?(2)
2. Switches identified with equipment they
serve?(2)
3. Explosion-proof covers fully bolted and
tight?(2) Gaskets in good condition?
4. Screwed explosion-proof covers have 5 or
more threads engaged?(2)
5. Conduit sealed at area classification
changes?(2)
6. Seal fittings filled with sealant?(2)
7. Seals at arcing switch explosion-proof
enclosures?(2)
8. Vapor globes on lights in classified areas?(2)
9. Drain-type seals at electrical devices
subject to hydrocarbon entering (metal
diaphragm pressure switch)?(2)
10. Clear space of 30 square inches provided
in front of switch panels?(2)
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

December 1994 B-6 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Control Centers
(Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1100, and Fire Protection Manual, Section 2100)
1. Spaced at least 50 feet from equipment
containing hydrocarbon?
2. Purged if inside plot limit, pressure
maintained at 0.1 in. of water column or
greater?
3. Fan air inlet in safe area for vapor-free air?
4. Loss of pressurization alarm functional?(2)
5. Windows are minimized on side facing
plant equipment and are wire- reinforced?
6. Control centers free of stored flammable
liquids, including samples?
7. Rear of control panels free of stored
materials?
8. Covers on electrical devices?(2)
9. Panel alarm lights work and alarms tested
regularly?
10. Emergency response plan book
accessible?(2)
11. Hydrocarbon not piped into building for
instruments or lab samples?
12. No doorway or other opening between lab
and control center?
13. Kitchen areas kept clean and grease free?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

Chevron Corporation B-7 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
On Plot Drainage
(Fire Protection Manual, Section 1400 and Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500)
1. Plant graded to drain out from under and
away from equipment?
2. Gas-sealed catch basins with cleanout
plug in place? Liquid visible in catch basin.
3. Plant site free of low spots where spills
can accumulate?
4. Drains clear of debris?
5. Drain lines have cleanout connections?
6. Drainage system flow-tested for adequate
capacity?
7. Voids under concrete filled?
8. Separators/sumps are gas-sealed from the
drain lines?
9. Sealed manholes and separators are
vented properly?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.

December 1994 B-8 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Structural Steel
(Fire Protection Manual, Section 1700)
1. Pipe supports fireproofed on plot?
2. Vessel skirts fireproofed?
3. Vessel saddles over 9 inches high
fireproofed? (Not required for second and
higher vessels in stack.)(2)
4. No cracks over 1/8 inch wide, and no signs
of corrosion under fireproofing?
5. Fireproofing sealed to prevent entry of
moisture?
6. Fireproofing extended to protect equipment
at higher elevations where necessary (i.e.,
air coolers)?
7. Supports for large (over 1000 gallons)
flammable-liquid-containing vessels fire-
proofed?
8. Fireproofed supports to catch piping at
exposed spring hangers?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

Chevron Corporation B-9 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fired Heater Checklist Furnace No:

Service: Type:
Type of Draft: Temp In/Out: Press In/Out:
Type of Burner: No. of Burners: Stack Temperature:

Item Description Observation Recommendations Intent

Operations:
Incident history: Tube rupture, flameout, history
of fires, etc.

Startup procedures:
Instrumentation testing
Alarm & S/D testing Verify operability and
calibrate on startup
Run sheets Startup run sheets for more
frequent readings
Purging
Gas testing Steam or inert
At least 2-3 ft into box, several
Unblinding/lightoff locations
sequence Burner location, pilots
Minimum flow bypass
check Need all burners on
Startup procedures Need signs at each access to
posted the burners
Shutdown procedures:
Burner isolation Blind OOS burners
Purging
Decoking procedures
Emergency procedures:
Loss of process flow Are procedures complete and
Loss of fires understood?
Fan shutdown
Loss of power or air
Tube rupture
Training:
Hypotheticals Refer to Loss Prevention
Operator training Guide No. 16
Operator knowledge
Existing fired heater
safety program

December 1994 B-10 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fired Heater Checklist Furnace No:

Item Description Observation Recommendations Intent
Operations (continued)
Normal Operations:
Alarm & S/D testing Written procedures?
procedures
Testing frequency Monthly lists, documentation

Alarms on or B/O
Combustion analyzer status Do operators know limits?
Firebox appearance Impingement, hotspots
Flame condition Uniformity, ample O2, dirty F/G
Fuel BTU value H2 or LPG makeup?
fluctuations
Burner operation Throttled burners, turn down
problems
Burner register operation Operates freely, understood by
opers.
Out-of-service burners Properly isolated
Draft Ample draft, good profile

O2 & CO values Stable operation, reliability

Minimum flow bypass status Collared or car sealed, block

valves open
Pilot status Isolated or in service, why?

Pilot design understood

TI point status TIs monitored routinely
Damper operation Operates freely
Maintenance/Inspection:
Inspection records Corrosion rates well
understood
Analyzer maintenance Reliability
Maintenance priorities for
critical instruments

Chevron Corporation B-11 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fired Heater Checklist Furnace No.

Item Description Observation Recommendations Intent
Design:

Fuel gas system:

K/O pot
Supply PCV/setting
Fail-safe design?
TRCV Cascade control with
Fail-safe design? pressure?
Minimum flow/pressure bypass
Test facilities
Chopper valve
Header isolation Testability, Tight Shutoff
Burner piping/blinds
Accessibility
Tight shutoff fuel valves Access/egress
Waste gas system:
Flame arrestors used F/A are needed on all lines
vented into firebox
Location in firebox
Burners:
Side/bottom fired
Pressure limitations Designed for worst case
conditions?
Pilots
Classification/use
Fuel supply
Maintainability
Orientation
Combustion air:
Type (i.e., FD, ID, ND)
Damper design/stops Can damper close all the way?

Burner air register operation

December 1994 B-12 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fired Heater Checklist Furnace No:

Item Description Observation Recommendations Comments
Design (continued)
Flue gas:
Damper design/stops
O2/CO sample pt location Representative of actual O2 in
SCR design firebox
Firebox design:
Purging facilities Adequate locations and
identifications?
Sniffing ports Adequate locations and
identifications?
Snuffing steam location
Tubes:
Bowing tubes
Condition of supports
Hot spots?
Plug headers or U-bends
Protective instrumentation:
Stack/firebox temperatures
Tube skin temps Do they work and are they
(3/pass min.) monitored?
Skin point design/ Properly seal welded all the
installation way around
Process temperatures,
each pass
Inlet, outlet, crossover
Firebox draft location Location of lowest draft?
Fuel pressure
Atomizing steam pressure
Pass inlet pressure
Total process flow
Individual pass flow
Fuel flow
Flue gas analyzers
Automatic combustion control
Charge pump APS
Flame scanners Special case, furnaces with
few burners (<4)

Chevron Corporation B-13 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fired Heater Checklist Furnace No:

Item Description Observation Recommendations Intent
Design (continued)
Alarms: Audit alarm testing procedure

High stack temperature

Low/high process
temperatures
High tube skin temperatures
Low/high fuel gas pressure
Low draft
Low atomizing steam pressure
Low pass flow
Low total flow
High CO or combustibles
Low O2
Loss of FD or ID fans
Loss of air preheater drive
Loss of flame (special cases)
Instrument air failure
Power failure
Fuel gas shutdowns: Audit shutdown testing
procedures
Loss of process flow
Low fuel gas pressure
Low of FD or ID fan (if natural
draft is not adequate)
Loss of flame (special cases)

December 1994 B-14 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Machinery
1. Rotating machinery inspected and
preventive maintenance performed, i.e.,
bearing listening, oil reservoirs filled, etc.?
2. Machinery area oil free?
3. Pumps handling oil above 600°F have water
sprays 6 feet above gland (See Fire Protec-
tion Manual, Section 1600)?
4. Water spray valve in safe area? Valve
labeled and tested?
5. Small valves are seal welded on pump
cases and compressor bottles? No
unnecessary weight on valves?
6. Vibration free?
7. Automatic pump start (APS) and shutdown
systems routinely tested?
8. Isolation valves accessible in a fire
situation?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.

Chevron Corporation B-15 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Piping
(Piping Manual)
1. Hydrocarbon service valves are all steel?(2)
2. Bolts on long bolt valves in hydrocarbon
service (bolts spanning more than 3
inches) are protected with a flame impinge-
ment shield?
3. Small screwed valves (less than 2 inches)
are seal-welded on columns, vessels, and
pressure storage?
4. Small piping well supported?
5. Drain and vent valves plugged or blinded?(2)
6. Small instrument connections have restric-
tion orifices at the root valve?
7. Water draws (not tank water draws) have
double valves with a self-closing valve?
8. Control-valve manifolds are properly
supported?
9. Lines clearly labeled with direction
arrows? Critical emergency valves clearly
labeled?
10. Reflux drums, pressure storage vessels
with 2500 gallon capacity or more have
block valves on liquid outlet connections at
vessel?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

December 1994 B-16 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix B

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Tank Car/Tank Truck Loading Racks
(Fire Protection Manual, Section 3600)
1. Safe loading procedures are posted and
followed for switch loading?
2. Emergency shutdown switches are
installed at the base of the stairs or nearby
and clearly identified?(2)
3. Self-closing valves are used for top
loading?(2)
4. Self-closing valves are never blocked or
wired open?
5. Steel shutoff valves are located a safe
distance from the rack and provide tight
shutoff?(2)
6. Heat detectors are fire tested
periodically?(2)
7. Detectors shut down pumps and require
manual reset?
8. Alarms and shutdown systems tested
periodically?(2)
9. Fire extinguishers at the base of stairs or
end of islands.(2)
10. Signs to limit approach of waiting truck no
closer than 25 feet to rack.
11. Operators understand emergency
procedures?
12. Drainage arranged to flow from under
truck to safe location or slot drains?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

Chevron Corporation B-17 December 1994

Appendix B Fire Protection Manual

Fire Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No(1) Corrective Action
Tank Storage
(Tank Manual)
1. Impound basin capacity enough for largest
tank?(2)
2. Surface drainage systems adequate for
large spills?(2)
3. Area within dikes or drainage area free of
weeds, combustible material, and other
debris?(2)
4. Drainage patterns unaffected by settling,
erosion, new construction, etc.?(2)
5. Drainage is away from tanks and piping?(2)
6. Impounding basin drain valves closed?(2)
7. Roof drains and water draws operable and
kept closed?
8. Automatic gaging systems, high level
alarms, and shutdown systems checked
every 1 to 3 months?(2)
9. Pressure/vacuum breather valves checked
annually?
10. Thermal pressure reliefs tested every 3 to 5
years?
11. Tank heaters, mixers, etc., leak free?
12. Floating roof tanks with pantograph hanger
seals protected with lightning shunts?
13. Secondary seals properly installed and
shunted?
14. Foam dams properly installed?
15. Tanks equipped with fixed foam systems
where required?
16. Floating roof compartment covers in place
and bolted? (Some unbolted designs for
existing tanks may be adequate.)
17. Operating procedures regulate fill rates
and gaging to avoid static generation and
discharge?
(1) A “NO” response indicates corrective action is necessary.
(2) A “NO” response indicates noncompliance with federal OSHA regulations. Local codes and ordinances may apply to other items.

December 1994 B-18 Chevron Corporation

Appendix C. LPG Handling and Storage—Loss Prevention
Checklist

The LPG Loss Prevention Checklist contains items related to fire prevention and
suppression pertinent to LPG installations. You can use the checklist during Fire
Protection Surveys and gauge the level of fire safety in the facility. You can also use
the checklist during Pre-Startup Safety Reviews (PSSR) and Management of
Change (MOC) evaluations.

Contents Page

Operating Instructions C-3

Water Drawing C-5
Sampling C-6
Overfill Protection C-7
Refief Valves C-8
Instrumentation C-9
Piping C-10
Pumps C-12
Drainage C-13
Loading Rack C-14
Electrical C-15
Fire Protection C-16
Pressure Vessel–Premaintenance C-18
Other resources contain information on the design of loss prevention features at
LPG facilities, including the following:
API RP 2510
Industry guidelines on the design and construction of LPG storage facilities,
located in the Piping Manual.
API RP 2510A
Industry guidelines on the design and construction of fire protection at LPG
storage facilities, located in the Piping Manual.

Chevron Corporation C-1 December 1994

Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

Piping Manual, Section 1100

Company guidelines on the design and construction of LPG piping and storage
facilities.
Fire Protection Manual, Section 3500/3600
Company philosophy and guidance on fire prevention and suppression in LPG
piping and storage systems.
Fire Protection Manual, Appendix G, Section A.2
Company guidelines for design and construction of new LPG facilities.

December 1994 C-2 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Operating Instructions
1. Are there written operating procedures for
the storage equipment and system?
a. Are they periodically reviewed and
updated?
b. Do they list acceptable and unaccept-
able operating conditions?
c. Do they include:
1. Tank overpressure
2. Tank overfill
3. Venting non-condensibles
d. Do they include loading/unloading
trucks and rail cars?
e. Are they used in training new
operators and in refreshing or quizzing
experienced operators?
f. Are P&ID's and other drawings current
with the existing as-built facility and
equipment?
g. Are they readily available for reference
in an emergency?
h. Do they include specific procedures for
transfers of LPG to avoid overfilling?
2. Are there complete and regularly used
alarm and/or shutdown instrumentation
checklists?
a. Is there a procedure to followup on
needed repairs to critical systems?
3. Are your present LPG design, operating
and maintenance standards, instructions
or procedures current? (They should be
revalidated every three years and when
major changes to equipment or operations
are made.)
a. Do they include placing storage vessels
into service?
b. Do they include removal of vessels from
service?

Chevron Corporation C-3 December 1994

Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Item Yes No Corrective Action
Operating Instructions (continued)
4. Do you have a copy of the last LPG loss
prevention checklist?
a. Is a documentation file maintained?
b. Is the status of each item current?
c. Has a reasonable estimated time of
completion been established?
d. Has each item been extended as appli-
cable to all LPG storage equipment at
your location?
e. Are additional reminders being added to
this list that are specific to your opera-
tion?
5. Do you have written emergency
procedures?
a. Are emergency drills held?
b. Do the drills periodically include non-
Company persons or agencies which
would be called upon in a real emer-
gency?
c. Are they critiqued?
d. Do they include major emergencies?
e. Is there an emergency response plan
onsite?

December 1994 C-4 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Water Drawing
1. Are water drawing procedures current?
2. Are there at least two block valves at the
tank to protect against “ICING?”(1)
3. On open ended drains, is there a self-
closing or fusible link valve on the outlet
that will automatically close if exposed to
fire?(1)
a. If a fire occurred during water drawing,
at the point of discharge, could the
flame contact piping or the storage
vessel?
4. If water is drawn to a closed system, is
there a procedure to avoid drawing of LPG?
a. Are all parts of the water draw system
capable of withstanding LPG pressure?
(1) Company or legal requirements. Reference: Fire Protection Manual, API 2510, 2510A

Chevron Corporation C-5 December 1994

Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Sampling
1. Are operators given written procedures for
drawing LPG samples safely?
a. Are sampling procedures clear?
b. Are operators monitored to see that
they are following the procedures?
c. Is the operator protected against expo-
sure to LPG vapor?
d. Is the sample draw blown down to a
safe location before sampling?
e. Is the sample draw double valved?
f. Would a sample draw fire expose the
tank?
2. Are weathering samples run in a well-
ventilated area?
3. Do sample draws need modification to
improve safety?
a. Can a self flushing or 3-way type
sampling system be used? (Refer to
Standard Form PIM-EF-403–see the
Piping Manual.)
b. Should a self-closing deadman valve be
used?
4. Do operators understand the reason for
leaving room for liquid expansion in liquid
sample pressure containers?

December 1994 C-6 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklst

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Overfill Protection
1. Is there other protection against overfill of
your storage vessel in accordance with
API 2510, Sixth Edition, Section 5.1?
2. Are the maximum fill and pump-out limits
defined?
a. Do the limits allow adequate response
time to shut down transfers?
3. Do you know the consequences if the limits
are exceeded?
a. Are the instruments tested periodically?
b. Are the results documented?
c. Is there a second, independent level
indicating system where required?
d. Is there an independent high level alarm
per API 2510, Sixth Edition Section 5.1.2?
e. Is there provision for testing and
servicing the instruments and alarms
with the vessel in service?

Chevron Corporation C-7 December 1994

Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Refief Valves
1. Have relief valve settings been reviewed
and determined to be correct per ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel code?(1)
2. Is the discharge outlet directed upward
and away from the tank and the end of the
outlet at least 3 ft. above the shell and
above the head of personnel who may be
on the tank or adjacent stairs, platform or
ground?(1)
3. Is there a weep hole no larger than 3/8"
diameter at the low point of the discharge
stack and is the weep hole clear?(1)
4. Are the relief valves sized for the greatest
rate considering the liquid filling rate as
well as fire exposure?(1)
5. If the primary relief valves are directed into
a closed system, is a secondary relief valve
to atmosphere provided?(1)
6. Have all relief valves been serviced within
the last ten years?(1)
7. If bellows type relief valves are used, have
you removed the plugs?
a. Do bonnet vent holes require fitting with
elbows to prevent venting gases from
impinging on piping or a vessel?
(1) Company or legal requirements

December 1994 C-8 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Instrumentation
1. Are there adequate level, pressure and
temperature indication and alarms to
safely control the operations of your LPG
storage vessels per API 2510, Sixth Edition,
Section 5.1?(1)
2. Are alarms checked at least monthly and
records maintained?(1)
3. Are the alarms checked by using the initi-
ating device?
4. Are needed alarm repairs followed until
complete?
5. Are armored or magnetic follower gage
glasses used, and do gage glasses have
ball check type isolation valves?
6. Have columnar gage glasses or other
instruments susceptible to fire damage
been removed?(1)
7. Are restricted orifice adaptor bushings
used at all instrument connections? (Refer
to Standard Drawing GB-J-1223.)(1)
8. Where a combustible gas detector system
is used, are sensors placed adequately to
detect serious leaks or spills?
9. Are gas sensors at least 10 feet away from
potential leak sources to avoid nuisance
alarms from momentary minor leaks?
(1) Company or legal requirements

Chevron Corporation C-9 December 1994

Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Piping
1. Are all piping connections outside the
support pedestals on horizontal vessels?
2. Are vessel block valves located on the
vessel nozzle or as close as practical?(1)
3. Are valves Company-approved, fire resis-
tant, steel construction?(1)
4. Are backflow check valves at vessel fill
valves with the fill valve on the vessel
side?(1)
5. Are fusible link check valves or self-
closing remotely-operated valves
installed at the vessel suction valve with
the suction valve on the vessel side?(1)
6. Is the fusible link still in place and rated
to melt between 165°F and 350°F?
7. Are these valves tested monthly to close
automatically on fire exposure?
8. If remote-operated valves are used for
ESD, are the control signals, power
cables and motor or air operator
protected against fire damage?(1)
9. Is the operating station accessible during
a fire that exposes the vessel?
10. Is the LPG piping that can be blocked-in
protected by a thermal (sun) pressure
relief valve?(1)
11. Have the thermal relief valves been
serviced within the past five years?
12. Do all vessel nozzle connections that are
below the liquid level have an ANSI Class
300 flange rating?

December 1994 C-10 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Item Yes No Corrective Action
Piping (continued)
13. Are all small piping connections to the
vessel either ANSI Class 300 flanged or
seal-welded to the first (root) valve?

For new facilities in urban and offshore

areas, refineries and gas plants,
complete seal-welding is required on all
connections.

A male-female valve screwed directly

into a threaded boss on the vessel is
acceptable for producing facilites and
remote gas plants.
14. Are confined joint spiral wound type
gaskets used on liquid piping flanges?
15. Is piping routed and supported to allow
for expansion or ground settlement
without putting stress on the vessel
nozzle per API 2510, Section 6.7?(1)
16. Is piping labeled to identify service, i.e.,
“LPG - T3018 Fill”?
17. Has the piping been checked to be sure it
can withstand auto-refrigeration tempera-
ture if depressuring is a reasonable
possibility?
18. Have all packed sleeve and resilient
sealed couplings been removed from LPG
piping systems per API 2510, Sixth Edition,
Section 6.3.4?
(1) Company or legal requirements

Chevron Corporation C-11 December 1994

Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Pumps
1. Are pumps located 50 feet away from
storage vessels?(1)
a. For small installations in remote loca-
tions, 25 feet between pumps and
vessels is acceptable.
b. Are pumps taking suction on a storage
vessel at least 10 feet away from the
vessel shell?
2. If not, is back-up protection provided for
the vessel in case of a fire at the pump?
3. Are back-up valves available to isolate the
pump should the pump block valves not be
accessible due to fire?
4. Are pumps outside the impound area or
designed drain path for the vessels?
5. Should remote ESD be provided?
6. Is piping at the pump either flanged or
screwed, seal-welded and bridge-welded
to the root valve per Piping Manual,
Section 500, Fig. 600-2.
7. Are motor vehicles prevented from driving
closer than 50 feet to the pumps?
8. Is the preventative maintenance effort
adequate to avoid unexpected bearing
failures?
(1) Company or legal requirements

December 1994 C-12 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Drainage
1. Will drainage prevent a spill from pooling
under the vessel, pipeway, or conduit per
API 2510, Sixth Edition, Section 3.2?(1)
2. Is the capacity of the impound sized for
50% of the volume of the largest tank, or
25% if the RVP > 100 psi?(1)
3. Is the impounding area compartmented or
divided into smaller containment areas to
minimize the surface area of a spill?
4. Is the impound drain valve location acces-
sible during a fire?
5. Has the drain and draining valve been
cleaned and serviced within the last year?
6. Is drainage provided away from each pump
so other pumps, piping or equipment are
not exposed to a spill fire?
7. Is drainage provided away from truck and
rail car loading racks to a safe area?
8. Are potential ignition sources at least 100
feet from drain path and impound area?
9. Is there a response plan for a spill that has
not ignited as well as for one that is
burning?
10. Do you know the entire route of the LPG
drainage and what precautions to take in
case of a major spill?
(1) Company or legal requirements

Chevron Corporation C-13 December 1994

Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Loading Rack
1. Are loading procedures posted, under-
stood and followed?(1)
2. Is auto, truck, and rail car traffic controlled?
3. Do drivers and train engineers understand
the requirements for entry?
4. Are discussions held with drivers and engi-
neers to assure that they know how to get
approval to enter, and are they following
these procedures?(1)
5. Are emergency shutoff valves provided as
required by API 2510, Section 7.3.4?(1)
6. Is the piping anchored so any pull on the
hose or swivel piping will not cause a
break in the plant side of the ESD valve? (1)
7. Are isolation valves located where they
would be accessible in case of fire at the
rack?(1)
8. Is each product line clearly labeled?(1)
9. Have loading hoses been tested within the
past year?(1)
10. If piping is used to load, are swivel joints
leak-free?
11. Are valves provided at the open end of the
hose or loading arm to prevent vapor
release when disconnected?
12. Are loading hoses or arms depressured
and vented to a safe location?
13. Are there adequate pressure gages to
assure safe operation?
14. Are ESD switches or warning alarms
accessible and clearly labeled?
15. Bonding is not required for truck loading.
However, if bonding cables are provided,
are they in good condition?
16. For rail car loading, is a bond connection
provided between rail and loading rack
structure?(1)
(1) Company or legal requirements

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Electrical
1. Is there an electrical area classification
drawing for the LPG storage area and
loading rack?
2. Is all electrical equipment suitable for the
electrical area classification?(1)
3. Are all rated switch enclosures fully bolted
and threaded covers tight?
4. Are all EYS conduit seals installed where
needed and sealant poured?(1)
5. Is critical conduit routed away from fire
risk areas, including spill fires?
6. Is there a need to improve fire resistance
of critical power or control wiring by use of
fire-resistant wire or fireproofing? (Refer to
the Fire Protection Manual.)(1)
7. Do automatic shutdown systems require
manual resetting before they will restart?
8. Are emergency switches clearly labeled?
9. Are vapor globes installed over all incan-
descent light bulbs?(1)
(1) Company or legal requirements

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Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Fire Protection
1. Is there a current and tested prefire plan
on site?
2. In the event of a large LPG leak at the
bottom of a storage vessel, is there provi-
sion to inject water to displace LPG from
the bottom of the vessel?(1)
3. Is the injection point clearly identified,
including the injection pressure required,
and are necessary adaptor fittings
available?
4. Is grass and weed growth controlled so
fire cannot spread into the LPG area?
5. Has the insulation and/or fireproofing on
storage vessels or their supports been
inspected within the last year for evidence
of moisture, corrosion, pitting, or cracking?
6. Is there any evidence of structural steel
corrosion?
7. Are fire protection facilities tested regu-
larly and recorded?
8. Do you have a written checklist for each of
the following, telling exactly what to look
for:
a. Monitors?
b. Hose Reels?
c. Hydrants?
d. Deluge Systems?
e. Fixed Spray Systems?
f. Fire Extinguishers?
9. Are activation valves for fire deluge and
spray systems at least 50 feet away from
vessel and out of their drain path?
10. Are the valves well identified?

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Item Yes No Corrective Action
Fire Protection (continued)
11. Is the fire protection equipment located so
that it is accessible during a fire and not in
the drain path?
12. Are all systems' equipment and valves
serviced at least once a year?
13. Do storage vessel deluge systems have
adequate coverage and is the rate suffi-
cient to give 0.25 gpm per sq. ft. of area of
the upper one-half of the vessel?
14. On LPG spheres and spheroids are water
distribution rings effective and are weep
holes clear to prevent shell corrosion?
15. On horizontal vessels, does the water
monitor stream or deluge spray adequately
wet the head end with piping connections?
16. Are supports for deluge piping adequately
protected against damage during a fire?
(1) Company or legal requirements

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Appendix C Fire Protection Manual

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
(1)
Pressure Vessel–Premaintenance
1. Have local management and equipment
inspector been notified of work?
2. Are LPG handling precautions clear? Have
grounding bridge wires been installed?
3. Have gamma and beta radiation levels
been checked outside the vessel?
4. Have waste sample(s) been drawn and
tested? Have appropriate waste containers
been provided?
5. Have all sources of ignition been secured
(fireboxes out and smothered, welding
stopped, etc.)?
6. Have all non-intrinsically safe electrical
devices been turned off or locked out in the
vessel?
7. Has the vessel been blinded? Have relief
(or vent) line connections been blinded? If
there is a relief bypass vent, has it been
blinded?
8. After vessel was drained, was vessel made
vapor free? Refer to API 2510, Sixth Edition.
9. Are safe entry procedures being followed?
10. Is a sketch of vessel internals on hand? If
not, make one while the vessel is opened.
11. Have gamma/beta radiation levels been
checked inside the vessel?
12. Should vessel be inspected while it is
conveniently open?
13. Should packing be changed in all valves
“first off” the vessel?
14. Should all vessel flanges be regasketed?

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix C

LPG Handling and Storage–Loss Protection Checklist

Item Yes No Corrective Action
Pressure Vessel–Premaintenance (continued)
15. If flange bolts are re-used, are new nuts on
hand?
16. Has all unused or broken instrumentation
been removed?
17. Have all screwed piping connections been
removed, seal-welded, or replaced per API
2510, Sixth Edition?
18. Has all disassembled piping been
reinstalled?
19. Has vessel been closed in accordance
with local practices?
20. Is atmospheric vent open for post-
maintenance purge? Return per API 2510.
21. Have all flange bolts been checked for full
engagement? Do lines have flow direction
or content arrows? Check for piping leaks.
22. Has foreman/section lead been notified
that vessel is ready for service?
23. Was vessel checked again for leaks after
filling/pressurization with LPG?
24. Was safety inspection conducted after job
was complete?
25. Were plant records updated to reflect main-
tenance work?
(1) Checklist is designed to be completed as maintenance work progresses

Chevron Corporation C-19 December 1994

Appendix D. FIRE Computer Database System User Guide

The FIRE User Guide provides detailed information about these topics:
• Gathering data and entering GO-106 fire reports into the FIRE database
• Browsing and editing fire reports that have been input into the FIRE system
• Running reports (includes examples of reports)
• Look-up tables and security features
The FIRE database system was removed from the Loss Prevention System and
made a separate system in January 1993. This was done to simplify the system,
reduce computer run-time costs, and to take advantage of OPCO-supported changes
to the GO-106 fire report. The GO-106 was revised to include root cause analysis
tools, thus providing better understanding of the underlying mechanisms behind fire
losses.
Refer to the Fire Protection Manual, Section 700 for details on how to investigate a
fire and complete a GO-106 Fire Report form.

Contents Page

D1.0 Entering New Fire Reports D-2

D1.1 Screen 1 Instructions
D1.2 Screen 2 Instructions
D1.3 Screen 3 Instructions
D1.4 Screen 4 Instructions
D1.5 Screen 5 instructions
D1.6 Screen 6 Instructions
D1.7 Screen 7 Instructions
D1.8 Screen 8 Instructions
D1.9 Screen 9 Instructions
D2.0 Modifying an Existing Fire Report D-13
D3.0 Reports D-14
D4.0 Report Option Descriptions D-16

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

D1.0 Entering New Fire Reports

This section provides step-by-step instructions for filling out a GO-106 fire report
using the FIRE system. Because the GO-106 report form is identical to the
computer screens, this User Guide also provides the information necessary to use
the paper form effectively.
In order to use the FIRE system, you must have access to the VM mainframe
computer system.
1. Contact your RACF Coordinator to set up a HOVMA userid.
2. Contact the FIRE system administrator (Cheryl Robnett at [CTN]
(510) 242-4191) and provide the following information:

Your HOVMA userid name

Your printer node (batroute):

Your work address/phone:

The Company you work for:

Your Computer Initials:

(PROFS nickname)

3. Ask the FIRE administrator to send you a copy of the User Guide.
Once the FIRE administrator enters your information into the FIRE security tables,
you can access the FIRE system. Your local CITC contact or PC coordinator will
help you get the VM banner screen. Follow the logon sequence to enter the host
(HOVMA), your userid, your password, and the appropriate charge code. The logon
is complete when VM/CMS responds with the ready message/time stamp (Ready;
T=XXX time).
Note that when you are instructed to type a command, the command (or keystroke)
appears in uppercase and is enclosed in <BRACKETS>. Do not type the brackets.
Once you see the ready message, type “GO FIRE” to access the database. Your
terminal displays the following bulletin board screen.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

To continue, press <F3>. To quit FIRE, press <F12>. Other function keys are
shown at the bottom of the screen. They use standard key assignments commonly
seen in other CITC applications. For example, <F7> takes you forward, and <F8>
takes you backward. Generally, pressing <F3> or <F12> backs you out of the FIRE
subsystem you're in.
After pressing <F3> to continue your FIRE session, a menu appears. The menu has
five options:
1. Enter a new fire or look up or edit an existing entry.
2. Look at the tables used to keep track of users and to provide data for the help
screens.
3. Update the tables.
4. Generate reports.
5. User feedback and comments.
You will see the following main menu repeatedly. Select highlighted option 1.

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

Selecting “1” or <F1> takes you to the GO-106 search screen where you can look
for existing reports or enter new ones.

To enter a new fire, press <F4>. The first of ten input screens appears.
To move between input screens:
Press <F7> or <F8>, or
Enter the appropriate screen number on the command line and press <ENTER>.
Press <F1> for online help at any field.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

D1.1 Screen 1 Instructions

Enter the following information. Do not enter an incident number. The computer
will enter this for you.
Date of Fire: State the date that the fire incident occurred; month, day, and year.
EXAMPLE: January 1, 1993.
Facility: Enter the facility, region, or profit center. EXAMPLE: Pascagoula
Refinery or Marketing, Central Region. Press <F1> to select from a table.
Company: Enter operating company. EXAMPLE: CUSA Products Co., Chevron
Shipping Co. Press <F1> to select from table.
Department: Enter the appropriate department. EXAMPLE: Refining. Press <F1>
to select departments appropriate for company entered.
Division: Enter the appropriate division. EXAMPLE: Central Region. Press <F1>
to select divisions.
Location: Enter the location of the facility. EXAMPLE: El Segundo, CA or Vernal,
Utah. Press <F1> to select location code.
Facility Area: If the facility involved is further divided into plants or areas, state
the name of the plant or area. EXAMPLE: Hydroprocessing, McElroy field, Hono-
lulu Marine Terminal.
Facility Type: Indicate the use of the facility. EXAMPLE: Wharf, tank field,
processing unit. Enter names of marine vessels and offshore platforms on this line.

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

Material Involved/Flash Point: Indicate what caught fire and, for liquid fuel, the
flash point. EXAMPLE: Diesel fuel/141 °F flash, Gasoline/-45 °F flash, Wood/no
flash, Hydrogen gas/no flash. Common materials and their flash points are given in
the Material Table. Press <F1> to access the table. The fuel class is determined
automatically when you enter the flash point. If the product is unusual, or if you're
not sure of the flash point, you can enter the NFPA-30 class. You can enter the fuel
class manually, if you want.
Once the screen is filled out, press <ENTER> to save the information and continue.
If you change screens without pressing enter, all the information on the previous
screen is lost. Press <F8> to move to the next screen.

D1.2 Screen 2 Instructions

Structure/Equipment Type: Indicate the type code for the structure/equipment
involved in the fire. EXAMPLE: Pump; Tank; Piping; Staging. To obtain equipment
type codes:
1. Press <F1> for help
2. Type the code in the field on the bottom of the screen marked “current code.”
3. Press <ENTER> to “pass back” the code to screen 6. (Use this method to
select other codes also.)
Structure/Equipment Involved: State the structure involved (EXAMPLE: Tank
Truck Loading Rack, Laboratory, Office Building), or the piece of equipment
involved (EXAMPLE: Pump ####, Heater H-###, Station Canopy/Spanner, office
Copy Machine).

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

What structure/equipment was damaged or destroyed? Four additional lines are

provided so that you can record the extent of damage .

D1.3 Screen 3 Instructions

Estimated Dollar Losses: Enter the direct costs to replace Company struc-
tures/equipment on the left side of the line. If there are no losses, enter “0”. Record
Product Losses ($) on the right side of the same line. Next, enter non-Company
structure and equipment Losses (EXAMPLE: Customer Vehicle/$10,000) and Busi-
ness Interruption Losses (EXAMPLE: Lost Profit Opportunities = $250,000).
Because business interruption losses can be difficult to calculate, this field is
optional.
Number of Injuries/Fatalities: Enter the number of both Company and non-
Company injuries and fatalities. Also provide the incident (GO-42 or GO-414)
number for cross-referencing reports. Use the GO-42 number for Company inju-
ries/fatalities, the GO-414 number for non-Company injuries/fatalities. Explain the
nature and cause of injuries and the cause of fatalities in the following sections.
EXAMPLE: 1 Company injury, injury occurred during a vessel cleaning operation;
1 Non-Company fatality, contractor was burned during a vessel cleaning operation.
Media Attention: Indicate if the fire incident received media attention.
EXAMPLE: television news, radio announcement, newspaper. Provide details and
copies of relevant information, if possible. EXAMPLE: Newscast of fire, video
recording enclosed; newspaper clipping attached. This information is necessary to
comply with the chemical industry Responsible CAER program. This screen
contains a description of what was damaged or destroyed, the estimated loss, and
injuries related to the fire. Press <ENTER> to save the incident. Press <F8> to
move to the next screen.

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

D1.4 Screen 4 Instructions

How did the fire happen?
Describe the events leading up to the fire. Include significant events for the last
few hours or days leading up to ignition of the fire.
In Screens 4 through 6, the text can be as long as you need it to be. You can scroll
through the text using the <F5> and <F6> keys. Press <ENTER> before scrolling
the text to save your data. If you know how to use the VM XEDIT program, you
can use it to fill in this (and all other) text fields. To access XEDIT, press <F9>.
When you are finished, press <ENTER> to save your data. Press <F8> to move to
the next screen.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

D1.5 Screen 5 instructions

The discovery of the fire and initial response: What happened to either increase
or limit losses between the time the fire was discovered and the time it was
controlled? Were fuel sources isolated? Was an emergency shutdown system used?

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

D1.6 Screen 6 Instructions

Control and extinguishment of the fire: Describe the procedures used to fight the
fire. Who responded — the fire brigade, municipal fire department? What fire-
fighting tactics were used? Were they effective? How long did it take to extinguish
the fire?

D1.7 Screen 7 Instructions

Sources of Fuel and Oxygen: Indicate the source of fuel. EXAMPLE: Tank,
Pump, Piping. Air is the usual source of oxygen. However, check the box marked
“other” if there was another oxygen source. EXAMPLE: Hydrogen Peroxide Leak.
Describe what happened to allow the fuel to mix with oxygen. EXAMPLE: Tank
was overfilled, Pump seal failed, Tank inerting system failed.
Source of Ignition: State how the flammable mixture found an ignition source,
thus completing the three sides of the “fire triangle” necessary for fire to occur.
Select the most appropriate box from the list, or describe if the source is “other.”
Explain why the source of ignition was in proximity to the flammable mixture:
Why did the fire start?
EXAMPLE 1: A lightning strike in the vicinity of the Buffalo Wallow tank
setting caused vapors from the pressure/vacuum vent to
ignite. It is thought that the pressure pallet inside the vent
valve stuck in the open position.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

D1.8 Screen 8 Instructions

What facility systems contributed to the severity of this fire, or reduced its
impact? Check all items that were responsible for allowing a small, easy-to-control
fire to escalate into a large fire; or those that effectively limited losses or the extent
of the fire.
Explain how the systems checked above affected the fire (e.g., how they failed to
limit losses, or why they were successful in reducing fire losses): EXAMPLE: Equip-
ment could not be isolated from fuel sources because brass block valves melted.

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

D1.9 Screen 9 Instructions

What Process Safety Management (PSM) systems could have predicted the
fire, or prevented it from occurring? PSM systems are tools that will reduce the
risk of fire, if applied properly. In Screen 9, check the PSM systems that were in
place, but were not used correctly or were needed to reduce risk of fire. To find out
more about Process Safety Management, contact your local ESF&H/HE&LP staff,
or the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team.
Is action necessary to prevent recurrence? List any proposed actions (or attach
root cause analysis & lessons learned) .

D1.10 Screen 10 Instructions

Please include your name and phone number. This makes it easy to contact you if
there are questions. The local fire/safety GO-106 reviewer and the facility manager
should also be added. A line is provided for the fire/safety reviewers Social Secu-
rity Number—useful for searching the LPS database for fire/safety contacts.
When you have completed the report, you can press <F3> to exit to the main menu
or press <F12> to exit the system.

D1.11 Locating An Existing Fire Report

To locate an existing incident, log on to VM and access the FIRE System using the
GO FIRE command. When you see the bulletin board screen, press <F3> to
proceed to the main menu. Then enter “1” or <F1> to proceed to the search screen.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

To search for a specific incident, type one of the following items and press
<ENTER>.
• Date of fire
• Status
• Incident number
• Injury/cost flag (Y/N)
• Company
• Department
• Division
• Location
A list of incidents including name, date, incident number, etc. appears. Any infor-
mation matching the information you entered appears at the top of the list. If not,
the closest match appears.
When the desired incident appears on the list, you can view it or modify it.
To select the incident for viewing:
1. Use the tab key to position the cursor next to the incident to be modified.
2. Type an <I> in the command column.
3. Press <ENTER>.
You will see the first of ten INQUIRY screens. (The top line of the screen says
INQUIRY). From here you can view the entire incident. If you want to update
existing incidents, you can change to the UPDATE mode by pressing <F4>. To
move within a screen, press <F8> or type the screen number on the command line
and press <ENTER>.
When you are finished, press <F3> to exit to the main menu or press <F12> to exit
the system.

D2.0 Modifying an Existing Fire Report

The UPDATE mode is used to complete or modify existing incidents. To update an
existing incident, log on to VM, access the FIRE System, and locate the desired
incident as described in the section “TO LOCATE AN EXISTING FIRE REPORT.”
To select an incident to update:
1. Use the tab key to position the cursor next to the incident to be updated.
2. Type a <U> in the command column.
3. Press <ENTER>.
You will see the first of ten UPDATE screens. (The top line of the screen says
UPDATE.) In the UPDATE mode, you can type information into any field on the
screen. The updated incident becomes the official record. To move between

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

screens, press <F8> or type the screen number on the command line and press
<ENTER>.
Once you have located the field to modify:
1. Use the <TAB> key to position the cursor on the field you wish to change.
2. Make the change. If you need assistance in selecting a code or a response,
press the <F1> key for help.
When you finish making changes:
1. Press <F3> to save the changes. Any errors will be highlighted. Make the
required changes and press until the message “record has been updated”
appears.
2. Move to the next change (using <F7/F8> or the screen number).
3. Press <F3> to exit to the main menu or press <F12> to exit the system.

D3.0 Reports
Selecting the report option from the main screen displays the report subsystem
screen.

Press <F4> to check the report routing. You can change the NORC printer defaults
with the routing screen:

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

Position the cursor in the “Where to print” field and press <F1> to display the
NORC printer table. Select the print option that suits you.
Select a print priority in the “When to run” field. Options include “N” for now, “O”
for overnight, “W” for weekend, or “F” for a future (unspecified) date.
The number of copies is the last field to complete. One copy is the default.
After verifying the destination information, press <ENTER> to return to the report
subsection main screen. Press <F1> to list the available reports.

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

D4.0 Report Option Descriptions

Refer to the following report descriptions. The procedure for generating a report is
straightforward.
Table reports (Reports 0 through 92) merely print out the selected table with the
report number. No additional fields need to be filled in. As an option, you can
browse tables using the “Table Inquiry” function in the main menu. Use the
following procedure to specify database extractions (“600” series reports):
1. Select the report number.
2. Fill in Option 0 (generally a date range or facility code).
3. Fill in any other options necessary to obtain the required output.
4. Press <ENTER> to generate another report, or <F3> to run the report.
Graphical reports (“800” series reports) are slightly different. They require a plotter
location instead of a NORC printer. There is no plotter table; you specify the appro-
priate plotter when you request the report. The general statistical report (861) has
many options; only the date range is mandatory. The median loss chart (862)
requires cost indices. Ensure that the table has cost index values for the charted
period. The fire rate chart (863) requires production/throughput in millions of
barrels per day for the facility covered by the report. You can obtain produc-
tion/throughput values from the Corporation Annual Report.

Rep Opt
Num Report Description Num Option Description
0 List of Fire Reports and their Options This is report 0
1 Fire Product Involved Table Type of fuel table
2 Fire Equipment/Structure Involved Table Equipment type table
3 Source of Ignition Table Self-explanatory
4 Fuel Source Table Self-explanatory
5 Facility System Table Section VII of GO-106
6 Process Safety Management System Table Section IX of GO-106
7 Fire Cost Index Table CRTC inflation indices for medial loss chart
90 Fire Facility Table Facility table for “LOC” and “INQ” users
91 Fire User Table Computer initials of FIRE users
92 Fire Security Table Determines facilities about which users
can enter and obtain fire reports

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix D

Rep Opt
Num Report Description Num Option Description
660 Report of Fire (GO-106) LPS Report 600 0 Select on Fire Date Range
1 Select on Incident Number
2 Select on Company Codes
3 Select on Department Codes
4 Select on Division Codes
5 Select on Location Codes
6 Select on Facility Codes
7 Select Only Fires With Cost/Injury
11 Data
12 Select on Source of Ignition Codes
Select on Equipment Types

661 Summary of Fire Incidents 0 Select on Fire Date Range

LPS Report 602 1 Select on Incident Number
2 Select on Company Codes
3 Select on Department Codes
4 Select on Division Codes
5 Select on Location Codes
6 Select on Facility Codes
7 Select Only Fires With Cost/Injury
11 Data
12 Select on source of Ignition Codes
Select on Equipment Types

662 Marketing Fire Statistics 0 Select on Equipment Types

LPS Report 630

860 Major Fires & Total Fires, Graphics 0 Select on Year Range and Plotter
LPS Report 802 6 Select on Facility Codes

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Appendix D Fire Protection Manual

Rep Opt
Num Report Description Num Option Description
861 Ignit, Equip, Fac Sys, PSM Trends-Graphics 0 Select on Year, Plotter, Ignition Trend
**This is a new report** 2 Select on Company Codes
3 Select on Department Codes
4 Select on Division Codes
5 Select on Location Codes
6 Select on Facility Codes
7 Equip Type, Trend and Select Equip Types
8 Facility Systems Trend
9 Process Safety Management Systems Trend
10 Select on Source of Ignition Codes
11 Select on Facility System Codes
12 Select on PSM Codes
13 Select on regression type graph

862 Median Fire Loss, Graphics Report 0 Select Year Range and Plotter
LPS Report 804 2 Select on Company Codes
3 Select on Department Codes
4 Select on Division Codes
5 Select on Location Codes
6 Select on Facility Codes

863 Fire Rate, Graphics Report 0 Select Year Range, # Barrels, Plotter
LPS Report 805 2 Select on Company Codes
3 Select on Department Codes
4 Select on Division Codes
5 Select on Location Codes
6 Select on Facility Codes

December 1994 D-18 Chevron Corporation

Appendix E. Fire Extinguisher and Equipment Inspection
and Maintenance

Contents Page

E1.0 Extinguishers E-2

E1.1 General
E1.2 Inspection
E1.3 Maintenance
E1.4 Hydrostatic Pressure Test
E1.5 Record Keeping
E1.6 Dry Chemical Extinguisher Clogging and Packing
E1.7 Experience
E2.0 Inspection and Maintenance Record Keeping for Other Fire
Fighting Equipment E-12

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Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

E1.0 Extinguishers

E1.1 General
All fire extinguishers shall be inspected at least monthly or at more frequent inter-
vals where conditions warrant, and they shall be given the more detailed mainte-
nance servicing annually, or whenever the monthly inspection indicates a need. In
addition to being Company policy, this is a legal requirement in most areas where
the Company operates.

E1.2 Inspection
The inspection is a “quick check” to ensure that an extinguisher is in its designated
place, is accessible, has not been actuated or tampered with, and that there is no
obvious physical damage, corrosion or condition to prevent operation. The
frequency of inspections will vary based on the needs of the situation; they should
normally be conducted at regular intervals not to exceed one month. Inspections
should be completed by facility operators (as opposed to outside contractors). This
process will familiarize operators with the location and operation of extinguishers.
The value of an inspection lies in the frequency, regularity, and thoroughness with
which it is conducted. The inspector should include inspection items appropriate for
the type of extinguisher in use (see list below). Sample Inspection Check Sheets are
shown in Figures E-1 and E-2. Figure E-3 is a list of Extinguisher Inspections.
In locations where caking of the powder in cartridge-operated dry chemical extin-
guishers has not proven to be a problem, opening the extinguisher to dump and
screen the powder at monthly inspections is not recommended. This procedure
itself can cause caking by allowing moisture to get in.

E1.3 Maintenance
The maintenance check is a “thorough check” of the extinguisher and is
performed annually. Its purpose is to give maximum assurance that an extinguisher
will operate effectively and safely. A complete maintenance check should also be
performed whenever the need is indicated by the monthly inspection. A sample
Maintenance Servicing Record is included in this appendix as Figure E-2.
Maintenance checks should be performed in accordance with the instructions on the
manufacturer's label and the requirements of NFPA 10, Portable Fire Extinguishers.
Following are some specific comments on the maintenance of selected types of
extinguishers.

June 1990 E-2 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-1 Fire Extinguisher Monthly Inspection Check Sheet

Chevron Corporation E-3 June 1990

Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-2 Fire Extinguisher Annual Maintenance Servicing Record

June 1990 E-4 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-3 List of Extinguisher Inspections

Water Dry Chemical Units

Stored Pump Carbon Halon Disposable Cartridge Stored

Pressure Tank Dioxide 1211 Shell Operated Pressure

1. Ensure extinguisher X X X X X X X
is in designated
place, clearly
visible, and
accessible

2. Ensure visual X X X X X X X
seal(s) are intact

3. Check pressure X X X(1) X X

indicator or gage

4. Take from bracket, X X(2) X X X X

heft for proper
weight

5. Examine for X X X X X X X
damage, corrosion,
etc.

6. Check nameplate X X X X X X X
and instructions for
legibility

7. Examine hose for X X X X X X

cuts, weather
cracks, etc.

8. Check nozzle and X X X X X X X

hose for plugging
and operation

9. Check mounting X X X X X X X
bracket

10. Return extinguisher X X X X X X X

to proper location

11. Record inspection X X X X X X X

on tag and Check
Sheet

12. Initial and date X X X X X X X

Monthly Inspection
Check Sheet

(1) If equipped with pressure indicator.

(2) CO2 extinguishers should be weighed every six months.

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Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Stored-pressure Water and/or Antifreeze

These extinguishers need not be recharged annually. If the seal is broken or
missing, the liquid level should be checked by weight or observation, recharged as
necessary, then resealed.
Stored-pressure water extinguishers should also be serviced when:
1. Partially or completely discharged
2. Pressure is below the operating range or weight is less than required
3. Showing signs of physical damage or corrosion

Pump Tank Water Extinguishers

The water charge should be dumped and replaced every 12 months. These extin-
guishers should also be serviced when:
1. Partially or completely discharged
2. Liquid level is lower than required
3. Showing signs of physical damage or corrosion
The pump should be tested periodically by placing the nozzle in the tank fill
opening and operating the pump a few strokes. Hydrostatic pressure testing is not
required for this extinguisher.

Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Extinguishers

CO2 extinguishers need not be recharged annually. The weight of the full charge
and the gross weight are normally indicated on the extinguisher. CO2 extinguishers
should be weighed every six months. CO2 extinguishers should be serviced when:
1. Partially or completely discharged
2. The weight is less than required (90% of the full charge indicated on the extin-
guisher)
3. Showing signs of physical damage or corrosion
If a seal is broken or missing, the extinguisher should be leak tested and the weight
checked. The unit should be recharged if there has been a loss of 10% or more of
the weight of the full charge. The extinguisher should then be resealed.
New or recently recharged extinguishers should be inspected quarterly for the first
six months to detect any leakage; if none occurs, semiannual weighing should be
adequate. Special equipment is required for recharging this type of extinguisher. All
recharging must be done by a trained individual.

Halon 1211 (bromochlorodifluoromethane) Extinguishers

These units need not be depressured and recharged annually. They should receive a
thorough maintenance servicing and be recharged if there has been a weight loss of

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

5% or more of the Halon charge. Halon 1211 extinguishers should also be serviced
when:
1. Partially or completely discharged
2. The weight is less than required (95% of the charge weight indicated on the
nameplate)
3. Showing signs of physical damage or corrosion

Dry Chemical Extinguishers

Factory-sealed (disposable type) extinguishers should be inspected and main-
tained in accordance with the manufacturer's nameplate instructions. The annual
maintenance check normally consists of removing the head from the cylinder to
determine that the extinguisher has not been discharged. If the factory seal
assembly has not been perforated, the extinguisher should be reassembled, resealed
and returned to service.
Weighing the cylinder is not recommended (unless required by law, e.g., California)
because: 1) without special scales, loss of pressure on a weight basis is difficult to
determine due to the small amount of pressuring gas used, 2) the shells are factory
pressurized and tested for leakage, and 3) the probability of leakage through a
factory installed and tested cartridge seal assembly is considerably less than
through a valve assembly such as those used on the rechargeable types.
For extinguishers equipped with a pressure gage or indicator, visually inspect the
gage. Those shells indicating less than rated pressure should be depressured by
operating the extinguisher and then discarded.
Stored-pressure extinguishers equipped with a pressure indicator or gage are not
normally required to be depressured each year. However, in some jurisdictions, e.g.,
California, it is a legal requirement that all dry chemical extinguishers, except
factory-sealed disposable type, be depressured, the chemical removed, and the extin-
guisher given a thorough examination at each annual maintenance check.
Each extinguisher should be thoroughly examined whenever the monthly inspection
indicates the need or whenever the pressure indicator or gage shows the extin-
guisher pressure is not within the operable range. Stored pressure dry chemical
extinguishers on a 12-year hydrostatic test schedule should be emptied every six
years and subjected to the maintenance procedures listed in NFPA 10.
Stored-pressure dry chemical extinguishers should be serviced annually or when:
1. Partially or completely discharged
2. The weight is less than required
3. Showing signs of physical damage or corrosion
If a seal is broken or missing, the unit should be leak tested and weighed, refilled to
correct weight as required, and resealed.

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Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

To recharge most models of the stored-pressure type, invert the unit from its normal
operating position and open the valve to release any pressure remaining in the extin-
guisher. With the extinguisher in an upright position, remove the valve mechanism
and dump out any remaining chemical into a clean container. After verifying that
the chemical agent is all free flowing, return it to the extinguisher and make up any
deficiency with new chemical to the level designated by the manufacturer. Disas-
semble valve to clean chemical and all other material off all gaskets and other
sealing surfaces before reassembling and replacing valve assembly.
Repressure extinguisher to pressure designated on the unit following the detailed
procedure printed on the label. Most types are pressurized with nitrogen, but some
makes may be approved for air. Where air is obtained from an ordinary compressor,
some type of moisture trap should be used in the air line to prevent moisture
entering the chemical chamber.
The operating mechanism should be sealed, the date of recharge recorded on the
tag, and the tag signed. The pressure gage should be checked about 24 hours after
pressurizing to detect any leakage.
Cartridge-operated dry chemical extinguishers should be given a thorough main-
tenance check in accordance with the manufacturer's nameplate instructions and the
requirements of NFPA 10, annually or whenever a monthly inspection indicates the
need. This maintenance check should include removing the cartridge, checking that
the seal has not been punctured (some state or local regulations may be more strin-
gent, requiring weighing of the cartridge and replacement under specific condi-
tions), looking for and noting signs of corrosion, especially around moving parts
and the bottom seam. The moving parts should be operated to make certain they are
free.
Do not apply oil or grease to any moving part of the extinguisher. If these parts
cannot be restored to good working condition by cleaning and buffing with emery
cloth, steel wool, etc, they must be replaced.
Check condition of the hose. The hose and internal piping should be checked annu-
ally for possible obstruction with packed chemical by blowing air through the
nozzle, hose and piping.
Since experience with this type of extinguisher has resulted in a number of different
inspection procedures within the Company, a thorough discussion of the various
points that have given trouble and the methods that have been used to discover and
eliminate the difficulties is given in Section 1.6.
Cartridge-operated dry chemical extinguishers should be serviced annually or when:
1. Partially or completely discharged
2. Showing signs of physical damage or corrosion
If the seal is broken or missing, examine the seal disk on the expellant cartridge to
be sure it has not been punctured; check the chemical for condition and proper level.

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

To recharge most models of the cartridge-operated type, replace the cartridge with a
full one of the correct size and correct inert gas for the service and fill the dry chem-
ical container to the prescribed level or weight with recharge material.
Before removing the fill cap, generally release any residual gas and blow out the
hose. However, absence of a release of gas may indicate a plugged hose, and pres-
sure may still remain in the unit; the fill cap should be unscrewed cautiously to
allow any gas to escape through the vent holes in the cap.
Dump all remaining chemical into a clean container and make certain it is all free-
flowing. In all cases, the nozzle, hose and piping should be checked for freedom
from obstructions by blowing air through them as described earlier, prior to
recharging. Refill with the required amount of chemical.
When installing the replacement gas cartridge, the hose and nozzle must be placed
in the normal storage position to prevent the plunger from rupturing the cartridge
seal. Detailed recharging instructions are given in the manufacturer's instructions on
the extinguisher.
The date of recharge should be recorded on the tag and the tag signed. The oper-
ating mechanism should be sealed to make inspections easier.

E1.4 Hydrostatic Pressure Test

Fire extinguishers, except disposable shells and pump tank types, should be hydro-
statically tested at intervals not exceeding those specified in Figure E-4. Hydrostatic
tests should also be performed any time an extinguisher shows evidence of corro-
sion or mechanical damage or the unit should be replaced. Extinguishers under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) are subject to their test
requirements. Most jurisdictions make reference to or follow the testing require-
ments specified in NFPA 10. However, some jurisdictions may differ. Determine
what requirements are applicable to your facility.

E1.5 Record Keeping

Each extinguisher should have a securely attached tag or label that indicates the
month and year the annual maintenance check was performed and shall identify
the person performing the service. The same tag or label should indicate if
recharging was performed. Company tag GO-106-1 is suitable for indoor locations
and GO-106-2 for indoor or outdoor locations. Some locations may have special tag
requirements. Refer to NFPA 10, “Portable Fire Extinguishers,” and local (city,
county, fire marshall) codes. Determine what requirements are applicable to your
particular facility.
A file should also be kept for each extinguisher; it should include the date of annual
maintenance check and the name of the person or agency performing the work, date
when last recharged, date of hydrostatic test, and description of physical condition.
Consider including the monthly “quick check” inspections on this file record.

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Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-4 Hydrostatic Test Interval for Extinguishers (From NFPA IO)
Extinguisher Type Test Interval (Years)
Stored-pressure water and/or antifreeze 5
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 5
Dry chemical with stainless steel shells 5
Dry chemical, stored-pressure, with mild steel, brazed 12
brass, or aluminum shells
Dry chemical, cartridge or cylinder, operated, with mild 12
steel shells
Halon 1211 (bromochlorodifluoromethane) 12
Exceptions
1. Nonrefillable factory-sealed disposable containers do not require hydrostatic testing.
2. Extinguishers utilizing a cylinder that has DOT or CTC markings shall be hydrostatically tested or replaced
according to the requirements of DOT or CTC.
3. For extinguishers not covered in Exceptions 1 and 2, the first retest may be conducted within 12 months of
the specified test intervals.
4. Nitrogen cylinders or cartridges that are used for storage of inert gas used as an expellant for wheeled extin-
guisher shall be hydrostatically tested every 10 years, if the cylinder bears a five-point star after the last test
date (in accordance with Title 49 CFR, Part 173.34(e), October 1973). Otherwise, the test interval is five years.
5. Carbon dioxide-filled and nitrogen-filled cartridges used to expel the charge from dry chemical and some
other types of extinguishers fall under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Their
regulations say that all cylinders not exceeding two inches in outside diameter and with a length less than
two feet are exempted from hydrostatic retest. This includes most of the nitrogen cartridges used in low
temperature service extinguishers, as well as the carbon dioxide cartridges normally used. All others
become due for hydrostatic retest every five years. It is not necessary to depressure an in-service cartridge
because it is due for hydrostatic retest, but the cartridge must be retested before being recharged.

E1.6 Dry Chemical Extinguisher Clogging and Packing

Clogging of the nozzle has been attributed to failure to completely clear the hose of
residual chemical after use, and also to inverting the extinguisher or handling it
roughly so as to permit the chemical to work up into the outlet hose.
Dry chemical extinguishers (except the stored-pressure type) are not hermetically
sealed, so there is always a chance that rain or excessive atmospheric moisture may
enter the case and be absorbed in the powder, causing it to cake. Reports of some
difficulty have been received, principally from regions of high humidity or tempera-
ture extremes.
There have also been some reports of packed dry chemical plugging the outlet
elbow and rendering the unit inoperative in extinguishers carried on automotive
equipment.
The following procedures have been used to detect these conditions:

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

The presence of lumps of caked powder can be detected by screening. One large
user of Ansul extinguishers has adopted an inspection routine that involves
dumping the chemical out into a clean container through a funnel incorporating a
16-mesh screen. Lumps that do not break up are discarded. Before refilling, the
hose is shaken to dislodge any residual chemical. This user has not experienced
clogging of the outlet elbow as a result of vibration and does not feel it necessary to
blow through the hose to make sure that it is free. Extinguishers on automotive
equipment are checked once a month, and others once each six months.
Another user has concluded that packing caused by vibration is particularly impor-
tant. This conclusion was based on failure of several extinguishers to discharge
properly after they had been carried for several months on automotive equipment.
To guard against a repetition of such failure, this user instituted an inspection
routine involving blowing back through the outlet nozzle with a tire pump. At the
last report they are still applying this test once a week to extinguishers carried on
the fire truck and once a month on extinguishers carried on other automotive equip-
ment. This user has carried Ansul extinguishers upright. Some others prefer to
place these extinguishers on their sides with outlet elbow up when carried on vehi-
cles.
Richmond refinery has concluded that the formation of hard lumps in the powder is
not a significant problem. Their testing routine employs the tire pump as described
above. The top of the extinguisher is removed before the test so that the operator
can look in and see that the chemical fluffs up as the air is pumped through it. Extin-
guishers on automotive equipment are carried upright and are inspected once a
month. Extinguishers in stationary installations are checked every three months.

E1.7 Experience
Presently, there are more cartridge-operated dry chemical fire extinguishers in the
Company than any other type. Experience with the cartridge-operated extinguisher
has been good. However, there have been some problems, most of them related to
inspection and maintenance. To assist others in avoiding similar problems, prob-
lems and solutions are included here.
Maintenance difficulties with cartridge-operated dry chemical extinguishers have
involved loss of pressure in the actuating cartridge, rusting or sticking of operating
parts and packing, or caking of the chemical powder from moisture or other cause.
Inspection routines require the following five basic steps:
1. Check the CO2 cartridge.
Checking the CO2 cartridge involves weighing to the nearest 1/4 ounce, which
requires an accurate scale. In general, factory-filled cartridges should be used
in the maintenance of dry chemical extinguishers. Where this is done, periodic
weighing of the cartridge is not considered necessary due to the improbability
of leakage. A visual inspection of the cartridge seal disk assembly to determine
that it has not been perforated or damaged is an adequate inspection.

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Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Where cartridges are recharged by Company employees or extinguisher mainte-

nance organizations, the cartridge weight should be checked annually.
2. Check the condition of the puncture pin mechanism.
The puncture pin mechanism on early models of Ansul extinguishers gave
considerable trouble from corrosion where the units were unprotected and the
climate severe. This trouble has been partially corrected in later models by the
use of corrosion-resistant materials and rubber seals. (In cold climates an extin-
guisher may also be rendered temporarily inoperative if snow or moisture
freezes on parts of the nozzle or puncture pin mechanism.)
To check, break the tamper seal and remove the CO2 cartridge. Remove the
safety pin (if it is so equipped) and work the mechanism several times to see
that it moves freely. Check the cartridge gasket, and inspect the seal disk to see
that it is intact. Replace the tamper seal, the safety pin (if it has one), and then
replace the cartridge.
3. Check the functioning of the hose nozzle valve.
The hose nozzle valve should be worked to see that it operates freely. Manufac-
turer's instructions caution against the use of oil and suggest that the hose and
nozzle be shaken to dislodge any loose powder that may have worked into the
hose.
4. Check the hose and outlet tube for clogging.
5. Check the condition of the dry chemical itself. It is here that differences in
service experience and testing routines are most marked.
Note Figures E-5 through E-16 appear on the following pages.

E2.0 Inspection and Maintenance Record Keeping for Other Fire

Fighting Equipment
The following forms (included at the end of this appendix) are provided to aid in
inspection and maintenance of other fire fighting equipment:
• Fire Hose Reel Annual Service Check Sheet (Figure E-5)
• Fire Hose Reel Monthly Inspection Check Sheet (Figure E-6)
• Fire Water Monitor Weekly/Monthly Inspection Checklist (Figure E-7)
• Fire Water Monitor Annual Maintenance Check Sheet (Figure E-8)
• Water Spray System Monthly Inspection Check Sheet (Figure E-9)
• Water Spray System Annual Servicing Check Sheet (Figure E-10)
• Fire Hydrants (Freezing Climate) Monthly Inspection Check Sheet
(Figure E-11)
• Fire Hydrants (Freezing Climate) Annual Service Check Sheet (Figure E-12)
• Apparatus Driver's Mechanical Report (Figure E-13)
• Three Month and Annual Maintenance Checklist (Figure E-14)

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

• Fire Apparatus Preventive Maintenance Inspection Form (Figure E-15)

• Example of Apparatus-Related Form—Apparatus Inspection Report
(Figure E-16)

Chevron Corporation E-13 June 1990

Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-5 Fire Hose Reel Annual Service Check Sheet

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-6 Fire Hose Reel Monthly Inspection Check Sheet

Chevron Corporation E-15 June 1990

Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-7 Fire Water Monitor Weekly/Monthly Inspection

June 1990 E-16 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-8 Fire Water Monitor Annual Maintenance Check Sheet

Chevron Corporation E-17 June 1990

Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-9 Water Spray System Monthly Inspection Check Sheet

June 1990 E-18 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-10 Water Spray System Annual Servicing Check Sheet

Chevron Corporation E-19 June 1990

Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-11 Fire Hydrants (Freezing Climate) Monthly Inspection Check Sheet

June 1990 E-20 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-12 Fire Hydrants (Freezing Climate) Annual Service Check Sheet

Chevron Corporation E-21 June 1990

Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-13 Apparatus Driver’s Mechanical Report

(To be filled out once each month)
Date Company No. Type of Apparatus
Make Chassis No. Model
Speedometer Reading Engine Miles
Pump hours since last report Total pump hours

The following inspection shall be properly maintained daily. Check engine oil level, radiator level, water and
oil leaks, wheel lugs, brake controls, lights, siren, windshield wipers, and all other instruments. Check
batteries and inspect tires for cuts and bruises.
Marking Code: O.K. – √ Repairs Needed – 0 Adj. Made – X
1. Check steering for excess play 20. Auxiliary generator and floodlights
2. Foot brake pedal reserve 21. Portable pumps
3. Hand brake 22. Chain saw
4. Transmission shift lever and safety locks 23. Ladders
5. Pump shift levers and safety lock 24. Hand pumps (both strokes)
6. Clutch 25. Tool kit
7. Starter—both switches 26. Pikepole, axes, etc.
8. All lights: head, tail, compart, etc. 27. Aerial ladder operation
9. Windshield wipers 28. Any other miscellaneous appliances or
fittings
10. Clean, tighten battery connections, inspect 29. Check all masks and breathing equipment
cables
11. Check for gasoline, oil, and water leaks 30. Body or other damage
(engine hot and running)
12. Check all doors, latches, handles, and glass 31. General performance and appearance of
apparatus
13. Check all equipment brackets and holders REMARKS: When any of the above are
marked 0, an explanation shall appear
14. Check all pump controls
under remarks with that item’s listed
15. Check pump governor number. (Example: 9. wiper blades need
replacing.)
16. Check all discharge and suction port cap
and gaskets
17. Check all drain valves
18. Examine soft suction for damage or wear Driver’s Signature
19. Check all nozzles Officer’s Signature

June 1990 E-22 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-14 Three Month and Annual Maintenance Checklist

Date
Fire Department Vehicle & Make
Apparatus No.
Service to be performed: Odometer reading
“A” Three months or 1000 miles Engine miles
Pump hrs. since last report
“B” Annual or 4000 miles Total pump hours

Adjustment Made Repairs Required

A B Items O.K. A B
1. Check “Each Week” reports 7. Chassis
2. Cooling system a. Lubricate chassis
a. Hoses b. Wheel bearing (inspect and repack)
b. Radiator core (leaks) c. Universal joints and flanges
c. Flush (add rust inhibitor) d. Clutch and linkage (automatic transmission)
3. Oil: e. Oil all linkages
a. Drain and refill crankcase f. Steering mechanism
b. Replace oil filter g. Springs (damage and alignment)
c. Road transmission oil level h. Spring U-bolts
d. Pump transmission oil level i. Muffler and tailpipe
e. Rear axle oil level j. Axle, flange nuts (tighten)
4. Brakes: k. Wheel lug nuts (tighten)
a. Hand brake 8. Body of Apparatus:
b. Inspect and adjust brakes a. Cleanliness paint
c. Hydrovac–inspect and lubricate b. Doors and windows (hinges, etc.)
d. Drain air tank 9. Lights
e. Master cylinder (fluid level) 10. Siren and bell
5. Battery breakdown test 11. Windshield wipers (blade, arm, etc.)
6. Engine: 12. Pump mounting bolts (tighten)
a. Spark plugs (clean, etc.) 13. Winterization
b. Distributor cap, rotor, points 14. Auxiliary generators, pumps, etc.
c. Starter and generator 15. Road text
d. Voltage regulator a. Brakes
e. Set ignition timing b. Steering
f. Adjust carburetor at idle c. Clutch
g. Choke and throttle d. Transmission
h. Manifold nuts (tighten, etc.) e. Engine performance
i. Engine compression readings f. Engine oil pressure (hot)
1) 2) 1) Idle 2) 1000 RPM
3) 4) g. Engine temperature
5) 6) h. Rattles
7) 8)
9) 10)
11) 12)
Mechanic’s Signature
j. Adjust valve lash
k. Clean air and fuel filters
l. Instruments and gages Officer in Charge
m. Check fuel pumps

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Appendix E Fire Protection Manual

Fig. E-15 Fire Apparatus Preventive Maintenance Inspection Form

1st 2nd 1st 2nd
UNDER HOOD (Inspection): Ladders—lubrication, operation, cable adjustments, etc.
Coolant level and radiator core Turntable—rotation, gears
Fan and generator belts Jacks—hydraulic, mechanical, operation
Hood catches Control stand—operating lever, gages, etc.
Engine mounts Radius rods
Oil, fuel, and water leaks Rear axle oil leaks and level
Carburetor and choke Tie rods and knuckle stops
Generator, regulator, and alternator Transmission oil level
Motor lights—compartment Drive shafts and universals
DRIVER COMPARTMENT: BOOSTER TANK:
Master cylinder Check inside surface
Brake pedal Water level gage
Clutch pedal Leaks
Steering wheel play TESTING—ROAD:
Siren and/or horn Engine performance and acceleration
Batteries and connections Gear shift action
Seat upholstery Overdrive performance
Windshield wipers Brake performance (service—parking)
Lights: warning and others Steering action
Instruments TESTING—ROAD (Inspection):
Parking brake adjustment Front-end action
Vacuum clutch General rule
Cab doors, windows, etc. ENGINE OILING SYSTEM
OUTSIDE VEHICLE: Oil pressure
Wheel nuts Oil lines
Front end Oil filter
General body inspection Oil level and condition of oil
Oil pan and front rear seals for leaks IGNITION SYSTEM:
Spring mountings Spark plugs
Brake system for leaks Wiring
Tailpipe and muffler Timing
FUEL SYSTEM: Magneto
Throttle adjustment Distributor
Carburetor
Gasoline leaks ALL BLANKS ANSWERED BY OK
Gasoline tank OR IF ( √ ) SEE REMARKS BELOW
Gasoline lines
Fuel pump, electric Remarks:
Air cleaner
FIRE PUMP (Main):
Packing
Transfer valve
Working valves, disch., intake
Leaks: water, air
Gaskets
Shift
Gages
Relief valve or regulator
Piping
Priming pump and oil reservoir
Booster reel, brake, and gland
Pump transmission
Pump performance, vacuum—pressure
AERIALS AND SNORKELS: Serviceman:
Hydraulic system—leaks, relief valve, working
pressures, etc. Date:

June 1990 E-24 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix E

Fig. E-16 Example of Apparatus-related Form—Apparatus Inspection Report

Chevron Corporation E-25 June 1990

Appendix F. Fire Water System and Pump Testing

Contents Page

F1.0 General F-2

F2.0 Fire Pump Inspection, Load Testing and Performance Testing F-2
F2.1 Fire Pump Inspection (weekly)
F2.2 Pump Load Test (monthly)
F2.3 Annual Fire Pump Performance Test
F2.4 Example Fire Pump Performance Acceptance Test
F3.0 Fire Water System Testing F-7
F3.1 Equipment Necessary For Flow Test
F3.2 Personnel Necessary For Flow Test
F3.3 Flow Test Procedure
F3.4 Data Collected During Flow Test
F4.0 References F-16

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Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

F1.0 General
Fire pumps and fire water systems should be periodically inspected and tested to
verify reliability and/or determine mechanical condition. NFPA 25 - Inspection,
Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems provides
minimum requirements for inspection and testing frequency. The following sections
provide guidance and clarification for inspection and testing based upon experience
at various Chevron facilities.

F2.0 Fire Pump Inspection, Load Testing and Performance Testing

The following checklists will assist you in inspecting and testing fire pumps.
Recommended frequencies are: weekly inspection, monthly load test, and annual
performance (flow) test.
A flow test recirculation loop with pressure and flow indicators/recorders is recom-
mended for ease in conducting regular pump performance tests. Where a test loop
is not available, straight stream nozzles and pitot tubes may be used. Refer to
Section F3.1 for equipment that may be needed for flow testing.

F2.1 Fire Pump Inspection (weekly)

1. Pump condition
a. Valves set correctly and stems lubricated
b. Packing leaks at correct rate. Some packing take-up left.
c. Suction & discharge gages in working order
d. Oil level in bearing housing
e. Gland spray shield in place
f. Pump area clean and drained
2. Engine condition
a. Oil level, water level, fuel supply
b. Fan belts tight and radiator hoses in good condition
c. Battery charger working
d. Engine instruments function
1. Tachometer
2. Ammeter
3. Water temperature
4. Oil pressure

January 1997 F-2 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

e. Air filter, fuel filter, oil filter

f. Exhaust pipe and muffler
3. Engine run test for 15 minutes or until operating temperature is reached.

F2.2 Pump Load Test (monthly)

1. Start engine or turbine. Warm up. If electric, start motor.
2. Open pump bypass for flow through pump.
3. Slowly increase speed and check to see suction is picked up.
4. Slowly close pump discharge valve until pressure increases.
5. Increase speed and pressure until discharge pressure is 150 psi.
6. Increase engine throttle or open turbine steam valve until wide open. Hold
discharge pressure at 125-150 psi.
a. Engine now at operating load and speed.
b. Turbine now on governor speed control with steam controller wide open.
c. Electric motor now under load.
7. Run at full load 15 minutes.
a. Watch engine water temperature to be sure it stabilizes without over-
heating.
b. Watch pump and discharge pressure to be sure there is no vibration, over-
heating or loss of pressure.
8. Return engine or turbine to minimum speed and open pump discharge valve
fully. Allow 5 minutes cool-down time.
9. Shut down pump driver and set valves in normal position.
10. List troubles found and initiate repairs.

F2.3 Annual Fire Pump Performance Test

Follow these procedures when a test loop is not available. (Steps 4 and 6b are not
required when test loop is available.)
1. Inspect pump, driver and all appurtenances. See Fire Pump Inspection list. List
all items needing attention.
2. Install calibrated pressure gage on pump discharge on pump side of the block
valve.
3. Install calibrated pressure gage on pump suction.

Chevron Corporation F-3 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

4. Install four test nozzles on selected hydrant and close system block valves to
isolate that hydrant and pump from all other sources of flow. Make bleed-down
test to assure that valves do not leak severely.
5. Start pump and run to design speed with pump discharge valve closed and read
suction and discharge pressure for differential shutoff head. Then slowly open
discharge valve. Watch to avoid pump overheating.
6. With engine or turbine driver at design speed or electric motor driver running,
open hydrant valve with flow through one nozzle.
a. Adjust pump speed and record pump discharge and suction pressure.
Affinity laws should not be used to adjust speed as compensation for defec-
tive equipment that causes slow pump operation. Speed adjustments are
correctly used to compare test speed to the speed on the field acceptance
test curve.
b. Use Pitot tube and read nozzle discharge velocity head.
7. Repeat item 6 for flow through 2, 3, and 4 nozzles.
8. Return fire water system to normal, cool down pump driver, and shut down.
9. Convert pitot tube pressures to flow and plot a flow-pressure curve. Retest any
points not on smooth curve. Compare to curve from Field Acceptance Test run-
in curve (see Section F2.4).
10. Wash and dry all test equipment.
11. Initiate any repairs found necessary by the test.
12. File test data and curve for future use when retesting.

F2.4 Example Fire Pump Performance Acceptance Test

The objective of the annual performance acceptance test is to verify the mechanical
condition and reliability of the pump. To do this, we recommend taking readings at
0%, 50%, 100% and 150% of design flow to establish a pump curve.
The following example of a Fire Pump Performance Acceptance Test, courtesy of
the NFPA, was extracted from the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 17th Edition.
Additional information on curving and troubleshooting pumps is contained in the
Pump Manual.
Figure F-1 is a tabulation of data obtained by a typical field acceptance test of a
horizontal 1500 gpm, 100 psi, 1760 rpm (5678 L/min, 689 kPa, 1760 rpm) engine-
driven centrifugal pump. The net pressure and total flows are calculated from the
observed data (Figure F-1) and plotted on a graph (see Figure F-2). The curve best
fitting the plotted points is then drawn (curve A). In this installation the engine
governor appeared to be out of adjustment, restricting the average speed to 1689
rpm rather than the rated speed of 1760 rpm.

January 1997 F-4 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

Fig. F-1 An Example of a Log for a Fire Pump Acceptance Test Reprinted from Fire Protection Handbook, 17th
Edition, Copyright  1991, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02269
Acceptance Test 1500 GPM, 100 PSI, 1760 RPM Fire Pump
Corrected to
Streams Actual 1760 RPM
Pitot
Discharge Suction Net Number of Size Pressure Net
rpm psi psi psi(1) Nozzles in. psi GPM(1) Total(1) GPM(1) psi(1)
1700 125 +16 109 0 – – – 0 0 118
1695 120 +18 102 1 1- 70 742 742 772 110
3/4
1690 110 +16 94 2 1- 60, 60 687, 1374 1420 101
3/4 687
1686 95 +17 79 3 1- 55, 55, 657, 1971 2060 85
3/4 55 657,
657
1675 85 +16 69 4 1- 35, 37, 525, 2293 2410 75
3/4 48, 48 540,
614,
614
(1) Calculated from observed data.

Since the pump was tested at less than rated speed, the observed net pressures and
flows were converted to what they would have been at the rated speed of 1760 rpm.
Curve B is the characteristic curve at rated conditions. Although the rating point
was barely reached, the overload point exceeded the minimum by a good margin.
With the engine adjusted to operate at full speed, the pump performance would be
acceptable. Following is the conversion calculation procedure that was followed:
Flow is directly proportional to revolutions per minute. Net pressure is proportional
to (rpm)2.
Example:
Test flow —1971 gpm at 1686 rpm

Flow at 1760 rpm = 1971  ------------  = 2060 gpm

1760
 1686 

Net pressure for 1971 gpm at 1686 rpm is 78 psi

Chevron Corporation F-5 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

Fig. F-2 Head-capacity Curves Plotted from Data Compiled in a Fire Pump Acceptance Test Reprinted from Fire
Protection Handbook, 17th Edition, Copyright  1991, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA
02269

Net pressure for 2060 gpm at 1760 rpm is

1760 2
78  ------------  = 85psi
 1686 

Similar calculations can be carried out in SI units using the following affinity laws.
Q2 N 2  D 2 3
------- = -------  ------- 
Q1 N1 D1

2 2
H2 N2 D2 
------- =  -------   ------- 
H1 N 1 D1 

P2 ρ2 N 2
3
D2
5
------ = -----  ------
-  ------
-
P1 ρ1 N 1 D1

January 1997 F-6 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

where:
Q = Flow rate (gpm)
N = rpm
D = Diameter (ft)
H = Head (ft)
ρ = Density (slug/ft3)
In theory, the characteristic curve assumes operation at constant rated speed. Actu-
ally the speed of internal combustion engines and steam turbines is permitted to
vary within a range of 8 to 10% between shutoff and maximum load. Electric motor
speed is more nearly constant. Speed reduction may occur if the power supply is
overloaded.
It is normal for the field-generated curve to be as low as 90% of the factory pump
curve due to differences in test method, tighter tolerances of production line, labora-
tory-tested equipment vs. field-tested equipment, etc. It is important to monitor
subsequent field-generated pump curves against the field acceptance test results.
Significant differences must be resolved.
Performance variation greater than 10% from initial field acceptance curve or 15%
from manufacturer's curve indicates repairs are needed. Prepare a new field accep-
tance (run-in) curve after repairs are complete.

F3.0 Fire Water System Testing

The only way to adequately and reliably determine the amount of water the fire
water system will provide for fire fighting when needed is to flow test the water
distribution systems. Fire water systems are designed to provide a predetermined
amount of water to a unit, facility or piece of equipment. But without actually
discharging water, the integrity of the system will be unknown.
The primary objectives of testing the fire water system are:
• Determine the quantity of fire water available (minimum of 20 psi for use by
fire trucks and 100 psi for monitors) through actual flow test or interpolation.
• Compare test results with previous tests to determine if system is still adequate
and where potential problems may be.
• Determine if the system will supply the needed fire water for the plant due to
the age of the system or to upgrades made to the plant.
It is recommended that an entire facility fire water system be tested every 3 to 5
years. Although it may be practical at the some facilities to test the entire system at
one time, in larger facilities it may be more easily managed to test smaller portions
each year with the whole system completed over 3 to 5 years.

Chevron Corporation F-7 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

Two NFPA documents give useful information about testing:

• NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-
Based Fire Protection Systems provides guidance on the minimum testing
requirements
• NFPA 291, Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing and Marking of
Hydrants provides guidance on testing procedures.

F3.1 Equipment Necessary For Flow Test

Note In the list of equipment below, Items 2 and 3 are needed only if pump
discharge cannot be continuously read.
1. Accurate plot plan showing fire water system to be tested.
2. If needed - bourdon pressure gauge, 2 psi increments, calibrated, with appro-
priate fittings to install on pump suction (for horizontal pumps).
3. If needed - bourdon pressure gauge, 2 psi increments, calibrated, with appro-
priate fittings to install on pump discharge.
4. 0-200 psig bourdon pressure gauge, 2 psi increments, calibrated. Mount each
gauge, with bleeder valve, to a 2-1/2 inch brass hydrant cap. See Figure F-3
for example.
5. Multiple hand-held pitot gauges, with 0-200 psig bourdon pressure gauge,
liquid filled, calibrated. See Figure F-4 for example.
6. Radios - enough for each person to have one. This will expedite the testing.
7. Swivel-type elbows to connect nozzles to hydrant outlets (helps direct water
flow).
8. Underwriter's Playpipe, or other smooth bore nozzle - one for each hydrant to
be flowed if possible for more accurate readings.
9. Hydrant wrenches
10. Metal rule marked in 16ths of an inch

F3.2 Personnel Necessary For Flow Test

The more personnel available to assist in taking readings at the hydrants, the faster
the test will proceed, with less water being discharged in or around units or process
areas. If available, personnel should be at each hydrant to be flowed. An additional
person may be necessary at the pump(s) to ensure pump discharge remains at
maximum allowed for the system being tested.

January 1997 F-8 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

Fig. F-3 A Typical Hydrant Cap and Gauge.

Fig. F-4 A Typical Pitot Tube Assembly.

Chevron Corporation F-9 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

F3.3 Flow Test Procedure

Below we have included a typical procedure that may be modified to fit your facili-
ties needs. Refer to NFPA 291, Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing and
Marking of Hydrants for additional guidance.

Planning
1. Develop a written plan describing the purpose of the test, approximate duration
and other factors of concern to the affected personnel.
2. Obtain the latest plot plan showing the fire water system to be tested. Field
walk to ensure its accuracy.
3. Contact operations for the area to be tested to explain the need for testing,
obtain their permission and request personnel to assist in the test.
4. Contact Maintenance or the department responsible for operation of the fire
pump(s) and request their assistance.
5. Contact Environmental to let them know where and when additional water will
be discharged and sent to the separator.
6. Contact all non-essential users and inform them of disconnection or interrup-
tion for the period of the test. Do not discount users that would not be
discounted in an actual emergency.
7. Obtain equipment necessary and available to conduct test.
8. Organize a meeting with the personnel to be involved in the test (Operations,
Maintenance). Discuss the intent of the test, time of day, length of time the test
will take. Develop a plan and ensure all personnel know what their function is
and how to use the equipment. If using pitot tubes, make sure all users under-
stand the importance of positioning them correctly within the water stream.
Discuss safety issues and what to do in an emergency situation.
9. Select hydrants (2-1/2 inch outlets) and/or monitor nozzles to be flowed based
on a likely fire scenario and to minimize water damage.

Field Preparation
1. Field-walk the test area to confirm hydrants and monitors can be used with
least amount of water damage.
2. Determine and record each hydrant nozzle coefficient. (See NFPA 291)
3. Install gauge(s) at the pump(s), if needed.
4. Install pressure gauge #1. This gauge should be placed on the hydrant between
the main header and the hydrants where water is to be discharged. See Figures
F-5 and F-6.
5. Install pressure gauge #2 on the hydrant farthest from the main header next to
last flowing hydrant. Having the ability to record two residual pressures, taken
at opposite ends of the discharging hydrants/monitors, allows you to observe

January 1997 F-10 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

Fig. F-5 Sample Firewater Plot Plan

To Firepump

12" pipe G2
G1

P7

PLANT 29
10" pipe 10" pipe

P1

P2 P5 P6
P3
8" pipe

P4

G1, G2 Static/Residual Gauges

P1 ...P7 Points on hydrants and monitors (without nozzles) to take pitot readings

any noticeable pressure differences, and therefore can assist you in determining
the integrity of the pipe. It is not necessary to determine flow.
6. Take static pressure reading at pressure gauges #1 and #2 and record.

Flow Test
1. Pumps
a. Start all fire water pumps and run them up to rated RPM and pressure and allow
the pressure go down as water usage is increased for the duration of the test.
b. If fire water pump(s) will discharge at a higher pressure than the system
can take (example - max. system pressure of 150 psi), then each time you
open a hydrant or monitor nozzle and the pump discharge pressure goes
down, radio to the person at the pump to increase the pump discharge pres-
sure back up to 150 psi (the intent here is to maintain maximum system
pressure, using multiple pumps if necessary). Allow a few moments for
the pressure to come back up at the area being tested. Open nozzles and
repeat until the pressure in the area being tested does not come back up,
then open monitor and/or hydrant nozzles until there is a drop in pressure
at the residual hydrants of at least 50%.
2. Start opening hydrant(s), no more than two 2-1/2 inch nozzles at each hydrant.
Each time a nozzle(s) is opened you change the combination of open nozzles.
Each time you change the combination, you must redo all pitot readings and
residual pressure readings and record. See example data sheet, Figures F-7 and
F-8.

Chevron Corporation F-11 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

Fig. F-6 Sample Test

1. Record Static pressure at G1 and G2

2. Flow P1

a. Attempt to keep firepump discharge at rated pressure for the system, without dropping pump
suction below 20 psi

b. When fluctuating pressures stabilize, record readings at G1, G2, and P1

3. Flow P3

a. Attempt to keep firepump discharge at rated pressure for the system, without dropping pump
suction below 20 psi

b. When fluctuating pressures stabilize, record readings at G1, G2 and P1 P3

4. Flow P5

a. Attempt to keep firepump discharge at rated pressure for the system, without dropping pump
suction below 20 psi

b. When fluctuating pressures stabilize, record readings at G1, G2 and P1 P3, P5

5. Flow P7

a. Attempt to keep firepump discharge at rated pressure for the system, without dropping pump
suction below 20 psi

b. When fluctuating pressures stabilize, record readings at G1, G2 and P1, P3, P5, P7

6. Flow P2

a. Attempt to keep firepump discharge at rated pressure for the system, without dropping pump
suction below 20 psi

b. When fluctuating pressures stabilize, record readings at G1, G2, and P1 P2, P3, P5, P7

7. Flow P4

a. Attempt to keep firepump discharge at rated pressure for the system, without dropping pump
suction below 20 psi

b. When fluctuating pressures stabilize, record readings at G1, G2, and P1 P2, P3, P4, P5, P7

8. Flow P6

a. Attempt to keep firepump discharge at rated pressure for the system, without dropping pump
suction below 20 psi

b. When fluctuating pressures stabilize, record readings at G1, G2, and P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7

January 1997 F-12 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

Fig. F-7 Data Sheet for Annual Fire Water System Flow Test
PLANT
Pump(s) on for Test
Total
Hydrant Location Residual Nozzle Nozzle Pitot Flow Flow
Test # or Number Static PSI PSI Size Coefficient Reading GPM GPM

Residual Hydrant

Residual Hydrant

Hydrant #1 - ( )

Residual Hydrant

Hydrant #1 - ( )

Hydrant #2 - ( )

Residual Hydrant

Hydrant #1 - ( )

Hydrant #2 - ( )

Hydrant #3 - ( )

Residual Hydrant

Hydrant #1 - ( )

Hydrant #2 - ( )

Hydrant #3 - ( )

Hydrant #4 - ( )

Residual Hydrant

Hydrant #1 - ( )

Hydrant #2 - ( )

Hydrant #3 - ( )

Hydrant #4 - ( )

Hydrant #5 - ( )

Chevron Corporation F-13 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

Fig. F-8 Data Sheet for Recording Pitot Readings and Residual Pressure Readings
PLA N T: D A TE:
M A IN PU M PS RU N N IN G :
BO O STER PU M P S RU N N IN G :

V a lv e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SIZE
C o e ff.

STA TIC PRESSU RE

1 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
2 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
3 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
4 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
5 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
6 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
7 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
8 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
9 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2
1 0 PITO T
G PM
RESID . P 1 RESID . P 2

NNotes
o te s

Test hydrant locations:

Te st h y d ra n t lo c a t io n s:
See map.
Se e m a p .

Plant No.
Pla n t N o .___ ____

3. Each time you change combinations, wait a few moments for the system to
balance out and then record the readings.
4. End test when one of the following occurs:
a. Any emergency situation
b. If system pressure drops below 20 psi (additional fire water pumps should
be on line)
c. If fire pumps begin to lose suction

January 1997 F-14 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

5. When test is complete:

a. Inform pump operator and wait for signal from him/her to begin closing
hydrants.
b. Slowly close hydrants one at a time, ensuring that the fire pumps back
down safely and that there are no pressure surges in the system.
c. Monitor pressure gauges to ensure pressure does not exceed normal oper-
ating pressure.
d. Collect all equipment, recap hydrant valves/nozzles and replace monitor
nozzles.
6. Audit the test area, paying attention to possible damage from water discharge.
Also, note any deficiency of the drainage system.

F3.4 Data Collected During Flow Test

To determine the amount of water discharged in gallons per minute from the pitot
tube readings:
• Calculate the actual flow measured by the pitot readings using the following
formula:

Q = 29.83 C d 2 p

where:
Q = Flow in gpm
C = Nozzle coefficient (see NFPA 291)
d = Diameter of flow nozzle outlet in inches
p = Pressure measured on the pitot tube
• Use Figure F-9 and adjust for coefficient
To determine flow at any pressure:
• Using the results and the semi-exponential graph paper (Figure F-10), plot the
residual pressure #1 versus the total gpm for each combination of readings.
You can then draw a straight line to extrapolate how much flow you would
have at any pressure.
• Or you can use the formula
h r 0.54
Q R = Q F × -----------
-
h f 0.54

where:
QR = Flow predicted at desired residual pressure
QF = Total flow measured during test

Chevron Corporation F-15 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

hr = Pressure drop to desired residual pressure

(static - desired residual = h)
hf = Pressure drop measured during test (static - residual = h)
Evaluate the data collected and compare with the requirements established for fire
suppression for the area tested, as found in the Company's Fire Protection Manual,
Section 1600. Generate a report to facility management describing the purpose of
the test, the results of the test, conclusions drawn and recommendations.
The report should include information, such as:
• Location of test
• Date and time of test
• Personnel involved
• Plot plan showing pumps and monitors/hydrants used
• Results - desired and actual
• Conclusions/Recommendations

F4.0 References
NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Based
Fire Protection Systems
NFPA 291, Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing and Marking of Hydrants
NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, Seventeenth Edition

January 1997 F-16 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

Fig. F-9 Theoretical Discharge Through Circular Orifices Reprinted from NFPA 291, Fire Flow Testing and Marking
of Hydrants,  1995, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02269 (1 of 3)

Chevron Corporation F-17 January 1997

Appendix F Fire Protection Manual

Fig. F-9 Theoretical Discharge Through Circular Orifices Reprinted from NFPA 291, Fire Flow Testing and Marking
of Hydrants,  1995, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02269 (2 of 3)

January 1997 F-18 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix F

Fig. F-9 Theoretical Discharge Through Circular Orifices Reprinted from NFPA 291, Fire Flow Testing and Marking
of Hydrants,  1995, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02269 (3 of 3)

Chevron Corporation F-19 January 1997

 Appendix F Fire Protection Manual
Fig. F-10 Semi-exponential Graph Paper
January 1997 F-20 Chevron Corporation
Appendix G. Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

Chevron Corporation G-1 January 1997

Chevron Appendix G

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

CONTENTS

1.0 SCOPE .......................................................................................................................................................... 3

2.0 USING THESE GUIDELINES ................................................................................................................. 4

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................................... 5

A. GENERAL.................................................................................................................................................... 6

B. UTILITIES ................................................................................................................................................. 13

C. COLUMNS AND VESSELS.................................................................................................................... 16

D. TANKS........................................................................................................................................................ 16

E. EXCHANGERS AND COOLING TOWERS....................................................................................... 26

F. FIRED EQUIPMENT............................................................................................................................... 28

G. PUMPS........................................................................................................................................................ 34

J. CRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION....................................................................................................... 37

K. COMPRESSORS/ENGINES.................................................................................................................. 41

L. PIPING........................................................................................................................................................ 45

N. FIREPROOFING...................................................................................................................................... 48

P. ELECTRICAL AREA CLASSIFICATION ......................................................................................... 51

R. BUILDINGS............................................................................................................................................... 53

S. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES ............................................................................................................ 56

Copies of Appendix G without comment are available in both hard copy (paper) and electronic (MS Word for
Windows) format. To order, contact CRTC Technical Standards at either (510) 242-7232 or -7241.

Page 2 of 68 January 1997

Chevron Appendix G

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

INSTRUCTIONS TO USERS

1.0 SCOPE

1.1 These guidelines contain critical fire protection concerns which should be evaluated on new projects
to minimize the risk of incidents. The guidelines are based on Company and industry standards and
experience. Use of these guidelines in the design of new facilities can minimize cost over the project
life by:

• decreasing the number of releases and fires

• decreasing the magnitude of the loss
• minimizing processing losses from unscheduled plant or equipment down time

The Guidelines are worded similar to a specification for ease of use by the contractor. However, this
is not a compliance document or specification. The guidelines generally do not give instructions
on "how to" design a facility. In this way, contractor designs can be used when considering the
guidelines.

1.2 These guidelines should be used on all new projects and major modifications which could impact the
fire safety of a facility. They can be used by Company engineers or they can be given to design and
construction contractors for consideration in the contractor's designs.

Comment 1.2 Generally, contractors do not have the fire loss experience that the Company and
industry has; nor is it common for contractors to receive much feed back on their designs. By
incorporating Company and industry experience into new project scoping and design, the causes of
incidents which we have experienced in the past can be eliminated and future incidents prevented.

1.3 Exceptions taken to these guidelines shall be approved by the Company. Any questions can be
referred to the Fire and Process Safety Team in CRTC.

Comment 1.3 Exceptions taken to these guidelines may entail increased risk to the facility.
Consequently, it is important that the Company representative be involved in all decisions of this
nature. Documentation of these decisions is important for use on future projects, and in the event
these decisions are questioned in the future.

January 1997 Page 3 of 68

Chevron Appendix G

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

2.0 USING THESE GUIDELINES

2.1 General

These guidelines are intended to be tailored to the individual project and incorporated into the
project specifications during front end loading.

Comment 2.1 Feedback from the contractors indicate that incremental engineering and facility
costs related to these guidelines are minimized if the guidelines are discussed and incorporated at
the beginning of the project.

2.2 Comments

2.2.1 To help the engineer decide whether a provision is appropriate to include in the project
specification, italicized comments have been included explaining how that provision can
prevent fire-related incidents or lessen the impact of such incidents.

2.2.2 At the beginning of the comments, each provision is classified in one of the following
categories in order to help the engineer understand and prioritize the provisions:

• Legal Requirements - required by OSHA or other legal entities

• Industry Standard - accepted practice which is documented in industry specifications
(i.e. API, NFPA)
• Industry Practice - accepted practice which is not documented in industry
specifications
• Company Requirement - required by Chevron based on our experience
• Guideline - highly recommended by Chevron and important to consider in scoping the
project.

Along with the classification, for Company Requirements and Guidelines, the cost impact
on a project is also shown where it can be identified.

2.2.3 At the end of the comments, the appropriate Company and industry references have been
included in bold letters. A legend of all of the references used can be found in the
Reference section.

Page 4 of 68 January 1997

Chevron Appendix G

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

REFERENCES

Acronym Company Manual

CIV Civil and Structural

CMP Compressor
DRI Driver
ELC Electrical
EXH Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower
FPM Fire Protection
HTR Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery
ICM Instrumentation and Control
IRM Insulation and Refractory
MAC General Machinery
MD&C Model Design and Construction Specification
PIM Piping
PMP Pump
PVM Pressure Vessel
SID Safety in Designs
TAM Tank
UTL Utilities

Industry References

API American Petroleum Institute

NFPA National Fire Protection Association
UFC Uniform Fire Code
UBC Uniform Building Code
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

January 1997 Page 5 of 68

Chevron Appendix G

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

A. GENERAL

A.1 Spacing and Layout

The following site-specific conditions shall be considered in the site selection, spacing and layout of
plants handling flammable or toxic materials:

• Local weather conditions such as rainfall, lightning, freezing and prevailing winds
• Potential catastrophic events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, earth slides
• Proximity to public roads and populated areas
• Future development of adjacent properties
• Risk to/from adjacent facilities
• Storage quantities
• Topography of site including elevation and slope
• Environmental sensitivity of the area
• Availability of utilities
• Access for emergency response
• Local codes and regulations

Comment A.1 The focus should be on reduction of risks, prevention of incidents, and limiting
losses in the event of an incident along with economic considerations. For example, topographical
considerations include the potential for a hydrocarbon spill to drain into or away from a processing
area, and buildings should be put upwind of process areas.

A.1.1 Spacing

A.1.1.1 Figures 1300-1, Sheets 1 and 2, (located in the Fire Protection Manual) are
guidelines to aid in establishing plant-to-plant, plant-to-property line, plant-to-
building, and equipment spacing distances.

Comment A.1.1.1 Industry practice. Figures 1300-1, Sheets 1 and 2, have been
developed from Company experience and industry practice, and with significant
operating company review. They are similar to spacing guidelines used by other
oil companies. The Fire and Process Safety Team in CRTC is available to help
resolve these distances.

The plant-to-plant, plant-to-property line, and plant-to-building spacing guidelines

are intended to minimize the risk of a fire in one facility impacting other plants,
outside properties or buildings. Note that these spacing requirements pertain to
equipment setback lines, not plot limit lines. The equipment spacing guidelines
(i.e. pump-to-heat exchanger, etc.) are based on

• preventing an incipient stage fire at one piece of equipment impacting an

adjacent piece of equipment
• protecting against flammable vapor reaching sources of ignition
• providing access for control of fires FPM 1320

Page 6 of 68 January 1997

Chevron Appendix G

Fire Protection Guidelines for New Projects

A.1.1.2 Fired heaters and motor control centers shall be given additional spacing from
equipment which could have a flammable vapor release. Where practical, fired
heaters and MCCs should be located upwind of this equipment.

Comment A.1.1.2 Industry practice. A vapor release near a fired heater can be
drawn into the firebox with the combustion air resulting in ignition and flashback
to the source. FPM 1331

A.1.1.3 The minimum distance from an elevated flare to processing equipment handling
flammable hydrocarbons is 200 ft.

Comment A.1.1.3 Company requirement. The incremental costs are project-

specific. Flare spacing is normally based on radiant heat effects on adjacent
occupied facilities. However, the potential for liquid carryover impacting adjacent
facilities should also be considered. The 200 ft minimum spacing is similar to the
flare spacing requirements of other members of the oil industry. ICM 1244

A.1.1.4 Hydrocarbon pumps and compressors shall not be installed under overhead
pipeways. Hydrocarbon pumps placed alongside in-plant overhead pipeways shall
have the process end of the pump, including the seal area, located at least 5 feet
outside the extremities of the overhead pipeway.

Comment A.1.1.4 Industry practice. Pumps are a primary source of liquid

releases and fires. Locating the process end of the pump outside of the edge of the
pipeway can minimize the possibility of a fire at the pump involving the equipment
in the pipeway causing a much larger incident and lengthy shutdown.
Additionally, for LPG and "hot" pumps, consideration should be given to locating
the pumps on the outer sides of the plant where they are more accessible. FPM
1332

A.1.1.5 Pumps handling hydrocarbon above its auto-ignition temperature (or 600oF) shall
have the following additional spacing requirements:

• 5 feet minimum spacing between pump foundations

• 10 feet minimum spacing from equipment handling flammable material
• process end of pump located on the outer side of the plant or a minimum of 10
feet outside the extremities of the overhead pipeway.

Comment A.1.1.5 Industry practice. "Hot" pumps are a significantly greater

fire hazard than pumps operating below the auto-ignition temperature because 1)
the risk of a release in this type of service is greater, and 2) a release will likely
ignite. The greater separation is needed so that a packing gland or seal fire will
not expose adjacent equipment. FPM 1332

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A.1.1.6 Minimum spacing requirements for tanks shall be in accordance with Chapter 2 of
NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.

Comment A.1.1.6 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. In many locations, NFPA 30

has been adopted as a code. NFPA 30 spacing requirements are considerably less
than those used by others in the industry and are considered to be absolute
minimums.

A.1.1.7 LPG storage vessels shall be spaced in accordance with API 2510, 3.1.2.

A.1.2 Layout

A.1.2.1 Control room location and the need for blast resistant construction shall be
specified by the Company and shall be evaluated in accordance with API-RP 752.

Comment A.1.2.1 Additional design information is in the Civil and Structural

Manual, Section 400. Because of the impact on operations, the Company should
be involved in all decisions related to control room siting and blast resistance.
Consult the CRTC Fire and Process Safety Team for the criteria and methodology
for building siting evaluations.

A.1.2.2 In accordance with Section D.5.4 of this guideline, hydrocarbon pumps shall not be
located within the local impound basin or drainage path of a tank.

A.1.2.3 Air-cooled exchangers should not be located above pumps and other mechanical
equipment handling hydrocarbon.

Comment A.1.2.3 Guideline. The incremental costs to space air coolers away
from pumps and mechanical equipment could be substantial. Air cooler fin fans
pull the heat from a fire up through the pipeway causing more damage to the
equipment in the pipeway and to the air cooler itself. FPM 1333

A.1.2.4 Process piping shall be run on above-ground pipeways. There shall be no

mechanical equipment handling hydrocarbons located directly under the pipeway.

Comment A.1.2.4 Industry practice. Above-ground pipeways splitting a plant

(or between two plants) provide excellent separation between equipment and
plants decreasing the risk of a fire impacting adjacent facilities. Above-ground
pipeways have the following advantages over below-grade pipeways:

• piping in above-ground pipeways can be inspected and leaks easily detected

reducing the risk of piping failures
• the area under above-ground pipeways can be kept clear of oil and debris
minimizing the risk of a fire spreading and involving the entire pipeway.

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Fires on mechanical equipment located underneath pipeways can damage the

power and control cables and piping in the pipeway, and the pipeway may impede
firefighting access. FPM 1334 and 2085

A.1.2.5 Critical instrumentation, conduit banks or cable trays housing control cables, and
critical power cables shall be located in accordance with Section J of this Guideline

A.1.2.6 Spacing and layout of fire fighting equipment shall be in accordance with Section
S.3 of this Guideline.

A.1.3 Roadway Layout and Restrictions

A.1.3.1 Plants shall be separated by roadways to give access to all major elements. Road
layout shall allow two ways to access the plant.

Comment A.1.3.1 Industry practice. Block layout and roads provide excellent
fire breaks between plants, and facilitate maintenance and emergency access.
FPM 1315

A.1.3.2 Any road within 25 feet of potential release sources of flammable or toxic material
shall be considered a restricted road with barricades and signs installed at the
entrances to the plant. Roads located more than 25 feet from release sources are
considered unrestricted.

Comment A.1.3.2 Company requirement. Additional costs of this requirement

would be minimal. Vehicles are ignition sources. Access on roads less than 25
feet from potential releases must be restricted to prevent ignition of flammable
vapor released in the area. Furnaces can be 15 feet from unrestricted roads
because furnaces are themselves an ignition source. FPM 1315

A.2 LPG Storage and Handling

A.2.1 References

• API Recommended Practice 2510, Design and Construction of Liquefied Petroleum

Gas (LPG) Installations
• API Recommended Practice 2510A, Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and
Operation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities
• ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII
• Fire Protection Manual, Section 3500 and Appendix C
• Piping Manual, Section 1100, LPG Guidelines

Comment A.2.1 Chevron uses API 2510 and the additions/exceptions noted in the Piping
Manual, Section 1100 as the standard for LPG storage facilities. New and existing
facilities undergoing major modifications shall be designed and built to meet API 2510 with
the additions and exceptions noted.

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A.2.2 LPG Tanks

A.2.2 LPG tanks shall comply with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section
VIII. Vessels shall be designed to prevent brittle fracture at temperatures that would result
if the vessel's pressure were suddenly reduced from 100% to 40% of the maximum
allowable working pressure.

Comment A.2.2 Compliance with ASME Code is a legal requirement. Designing to

prevent brittle fracture is a Company requirement. The catastrophic effect of a brittle
fracture of an LPG tank justifies the use of the low temperature fracture resistant material.
Low temperature fracture resistant materials such as ASTM A516 are now available at
costs only slightly higher than ASTM A285C material. PIM 1100, Section 2.4.3

A.2.3 Appurtenances

A.2.3.1 Direct connections to the vessel shell shall be minimized. The first valve(s) below
the normal liquid level off a vessel shall be ANSI 300 lb. rated valves.

Comment A.2.3.1 Company requirement. The incremental costs of installing

higher ANSI rated piping through the first block valve is project-specific. The
piping and instrument connections are more likely to be a source of leaks than the
vessel itself. Leaks at these connections can cause direct flame impingement on an
LPG vessel. The intent of these requirements is to 1) minimize potential leak
sources and 2) provide isolation valves below the liquid level which are more
resistant to fire damage. PIM 1100, Section 2.5.4

A.2.3.2 All LPG tanks shall have protective instrumentation in accordance with API 2510,
Section 5. LPG tanks shall have high level alarms which are independent from the
level monitoring or control system.

Comment A.2.3.2 Industry standard. Automatic Tank Gauges (ATGs) are

intended to be used for the day-to-day operation of filling and emptying the vessels.
They should not be used as the high level alarm. The high level alarm should be
independent so that a single fault cannot result in both systems failing.

In high risk locations and tanks over 10,000 gallons, a second level indication
system should be considered along with a separate, independent high-high level
alarm/cut-off switch to shut down pumps and/or stop filling. High level alarm
systems should be tested frequently and the design should permit ease of operator
testing while the system is in service, (i.e., ease of access, isolation, etc.). PIM
1100, Sections 5.1 and 6.2.3.4; API RP 2510, Section 5.

A.2.3.3 Shut-off valves installed in accordance with API 2510, Section 5.1.7.3 shall have
remote activation from a safe location, shall close automatically on exposure to
fire, and shall activate pump shutdown systems. Installations with automatic
isolation and shutdown systems shall have an alarm in an attended location. As

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stated in API 2510, swing check valves on the dedicated fill lines fulfill this
requirement.

Comment A.2.3.3 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Shutting

off and isolating the source of fuel release is critical to extinguishing and
minimizing the loss associated with a fire. Remote activation capability can ensure
isolation is accomplished during emergency situations. It is not recommended to
extinguish an LPG fire without first isolating the source of fuel. API 2510, 5.1.7;
PIM 1100, 5.1.7.3.2

A.2.3.4 LPG tanks shall have pressure and vacuum relieving devices per API 2510, Section
5.1.6 and PIM 100, Section 5.1.6.

Comment A.2.3.4 Industry standard. It is preferable to vent relief valves to

atmosphere. However, some spheres are required to vent to a closed relief system.
The consequences of the closed relief system being damaged or not providing
sufficient relief capacity for the LPG tanks during an emergency may justify a
second relief valve vented to atmosphere. In addition, the second valve allows
maintenance and testing of the relief valves without taking the storage tank out of
service. PIM 5.1.6.4.5; API 2510, 5.1.6

A.2.3.5 Sample connections and water draws shall be routed out from under the vessel and
shall be adequately supported. Sample connections and water draws shall be
double valved, with the valve farthest from the vessel being a spring loaded, self
closing (or deadman) valve. Any atmospheric discharge points shall be routed so
the operator is not exposed to vented vapor and away from potential ignition
sources.

Comment A.2.3.5 Double valving is an industry standard; The use of a

deadman valve is a Company requirement. The additional cost of using a
deadman valve for the second valve is nominal. The depressuring of LPG can
result in water or condensate freezing around the outlet of piping and valves. Two
valves on sampling and water draw connections provides a second valve which
can be closed in the event the valve near the discharge end of the piping freezes up
and cannot be closed. The deadman valve requires the operator's presence while
material is being drained from the vessel. PIM 1100, 5.2.2.3; PIM-EF-403; API
2510, 5.2.2; API 2510A, 2.7.2

A.2.3.6 Restriction orifices shall be installed on all small fittings and instrumentation not
dependent upon flow rates.

Comment A.2.3.6 Restriction orifices minimize the release of LPG in the event of
a downstream component failure. PIM 1100,, 5.1.7.4; Standard Drawing GB-
J1223

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A.2.4 Spacing and Spill Containment

A.2.4.1 LPG storage vessels shall be spaced in accordance with Section A.1.1.7.

A.2.4.2 The site design shall include drainage which slopes away from all vessels, tanks,
pumps and piping. Surface area of LPG spills collected in impoundments shall be
minimized by sloping the bottom of the impoundment. Intermediate weirs with
overflow spillways shall be included in the design of spill collection ditches and
swales. Remote impoundments shall be located a minimum of 50 ft. from any
storage tank and 200 feet away from other sources of ignition such as flare stacks
or furnaces. Drainage and impound facilities shall not be constructed of loose
materials such as gravel or rock.

Comment A.2.4.2 Guideline. Incremental costs are project-specific. In low

wind conditions, LPG liquid and vapors can travel and accumulate in low areas.
Therefore, drainage and spill containment should be designed to carry any spills
away from the storage vessels and piping manifolds to avoid damaging those
facilities and adding to the release. Remote impoundment is preferred over diking
the area surrounding the tanks. Since LPG volatizes readily, minimizing the
surface area of any collected spills in turn minimizes the evaporation rate.
Drainage collection ditches and swales are typically less expensive than walls.
Sloping the bottom of remote impounds and installing intermediate weirs in
collection ditches minimize the surface area of a spill and reduces the evaporation
rate of an LPG spill. PIM 1100, 3.2; API 2510, Section 3; API 2510A, 2.2, 2.3
and 2.4

A.2.5 Fire Protection for LPG Vessels and Related Piping

A.2.5.1 Design guidelines for fireproofing and fire water systems for LPG installations are
covered in API 2510, Section 8 and API 2510A, Sections 5 & 6.

A.2.5.2 Water flood connections shall be provided into the vessel in accordance with API
2510, Section 5.2.7 and API 2510A, Section 6.6.7.1. Water flood connections
must be visibly identified and the required injection pressure clearly indicated.

Comment A.2.5.2 Guideline. Incremental costs are project-specific. Water

flooding the vessel above the level of a leak will change the leak from LPG to
water. It is important to ensure that the water supply pressure is higher than the
pressure in the LPG vessel plus any line losses. Also, the quantity of water needs
to be sufficient to overcome the leak long enough to allow maintenance to stop the
leak without overfilling the vessel. It may not be possible to use the fill line to
pump water into vessels with a common fill/suction line with a thermally actuated
emergency isolation valve at the tank. API 2510, 5.2.7; API-2510A, 6.6.7.1

A.2.5.3 Fire water systems for LPG installations shall be provided in accordance with API
2510, Section 8. Fire water application rates and methods of application vary for
different types installations and different types of fire exposures. Unless specified

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otherwise by the Company, LPG spheres shall have deluge or water spray
protection in accordance with API 2510, 8.5.2 & 8.6, and shall have monitor
coverage reaching the bottom of the vessel from at least 2 different directions.

Comment A.2.5.3 Industry standard. The deluge system is needed to provide

cooling from radiant heat exposure. The monitors provide direct fire water for
dispersing an LPG leak or for cooling areas of direct flame impingement. API
2510, Section 8; API 2510A, Section 5

A.2.6 LPG Loading Racks

A.2.6.1 LPG loading and unloading facilities shall be designed per API 2510, Section 7.

A.2.6.2 LPG loading racks shall restrict unauthorized traffic and provide ease of ingress
and egress. Spacing requirements shall be in accordance with Section A.1.1.1 of
this Guideline.

Comment A.2.6.2 Industry practice.

A.2.6.3 Emergency shutoff valves shall be provided to isolate loading, unloading and vapor
return piping per API 2510, Section 7.3.4.1.

Comment A.2.6.3 Industry standard. Excess flow valves have been found to be
unreliable and difficult to test or service. They have a tendency to slam closed
unexpectedly at high transfer rates and will not close for leak rates less than their
design low flow rate (i.e., if the transfer hose does not completely separate or the
piping downstream is partially obstructed). For these reasons, a more positive
means of isolating flow to the transfer piping should be provided.

A.2.7 Compressors

LPG compressors shall be designed per API 2510, Section 7.3.2.

A.2.8 Refrigerated Storage

A.2.8.1 API 2510, Section 9 describes the design requirements for refrigerated storage of
LPG.

B. UTILITIES

B.1 Reliability

Utility systems shall be designed for reliability. Redundant systems or spares should be provided
where it is necessary to minimize the risk of an unplanned shutdown of critical equipment or
processes.

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Comment B.1 Utility system shutdowns can lead to facility upsets or shutdowns and conditions
which can cause fire or business interruption. Loss of utilities often produces the greatest load on
the relief system. The degree of reliability required shall be established by the Company.

B.2 Spacing and Layout

Minimum spacing shall be in accordance with Section A.1 of this document.

Comment B.2 Industry practice. Since utility systems normally affect more than one process
plant, they need to be located such that they will not be exposed to fire or explosions originating in a
process plant.

B.3 Boilers

Design for safe firing of boilers shall be in accordance with NFPA 8501, NFPA 85C, and Section F
of this document where applicable.

Comment B.3 Industry Standard. NFPA 8501 and NPFA 85C are the industry standards for the
design operation and maintenance of boilers related to safe firing. Specific Company requirements
are contained in Section F.

B.4 Fuel Gas

A liquid knockout drum shall be provided in each facility using fuel gas to remove liquid before the
fuel gas goes to the user. The drum shall be provided with a gage glass and high level alarm.
Facilities shall be installed to safely dispose of any accumulated liquid.

Comment B.4 Industry Practice. Fuel gas can vary widely in specific gravity and dew point
causing liquid to condense out. Liquid in the fuel gas system can cause erratic firing, plugging of
the burner tips, and possibly burner flame-out. A properly sized knockout pot can minimize liquid in
the fuel gas.

B.5 Utility Connections

B.5.1 Permits

All utility connections shall be discussed with and approved by the proprietary operating
organization of the Company.

Comment B.5.1 Company requirement. If the local operating organization does not
have its own form, MFG-632 or Figure 100-2 in the Utilities Manual can be used for this
purpose. UTL 160

B.5.2 Classification

B.5.2.1 Temporary Occasional-Use Connections: Connections used less than once per
week which will be completely removed after use.

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As a minimum, double block, double check, and intermediate drain valves shall be
installed. The manifold shall be installed in an easily accessible location and
painted an identifiable color - usually purple. The connection shall be removed
immediately after use.

B.5.2.2 Permanent Occasional-Use Connections: Connections used less than once per
week which remain after use and are positively isolated when not in service.

Turn spools and blinds shall be installed as a means of positive isolation. The
manifold shall be painted for easy identification. Where a connection is for
emergency use, a double block and bleed manifold or a double block and bleed
gate valve may be acceptable if approved by the Company.

B.5.2.3 Constant-Use Connections: Connections that are continuously required for normal
plant operation or are used more than once per week. The design of the connection
depends on the services being connected.

Unless a local standard exists, constant-use connections shall be installed in

accordance with Figure 100-1, Sheets 1-4 in the Utilities Manual.

Comment B.5.2 Guideline. Improperly designed utility connections, or

connections left in place after shutdowns can cause serious incidents and near
misses. The Utilities Manual, Section 160, is the primary Company reference on
utility connections. The information and figures Section 160 were originally
developed at the Richmond Refinery as part of their Refinery Instruction, RI-503,
Connections or Alterations to Refinery Utility Systems. The latest version of RI-
503 can be obtained from the Richmond Refinery.

B.5.3 Requirements

B.5.3.1 The following utility systems shall not be connected to process or other utility
systems:

• instrument air
• breathing air
• drinking water
• fire water

Comment B.5.3.1 Company requirement. The incremental costs are project

specific. Connections to these critical systems can result in extreme life safety and
fire risks. UTL 160

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C. COLUMNS AND VESSELS

Comment C Annually, columns, vessels and reactors account for $1.5MM in fire loss, 4-5 recordable
fires, and 1-2 injuries. 55-60% of the fire loss and 25% of the fires were design-related. Large quantities
of fuel stored in columns, vessels and reactors can significantly increase the fire loss if allowed to escape
uncontrolled.

C.1 References

• ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

• CRTC Pressure Vessel Manual, Volume 1 (PVM1), and Volume 2 (PVM2)
• Fire Protection Manual, Section 2050, Columns and Vessels

C.2 Piping

The number of piping and instrument connections to the vessel shall be minimized. All connections
shall be welded up to the first valve or flange off the column or vessel. Small piping, sample
connections and other appurtenances shall be designed per Section L of this guideline.

Comment C.2 Guideline. 75% of the fire loss and 65% of the fires are due to external leaks,
usually at flanges. Piping connections are the primary locations for potential releases from the
vessel. Minimizing the number of direct connections to the vessel reduces the potential for releases.
FPM 2052

D. TANKS

Comment D The Company has 19-20 fires/year related to tanks accounting for around $500,000 in
annual fire loss and 1 injury. 51% of the fires and 69% of the fire loss occurs in downstream facilities.
With the exception of small steel and fiberglass production tanks where lightning is the major concern,
over 90% of the fire loss is related to the operating or maintenance procedures. There have been 3 fully
involved tank fires on large tanks in the last 10 years.

D.1 Spacing

Tanks shall be spaced in accordance with Section A.1.1.6.

D.2 Drainage and Impounding

D.2.1 Spills shall drain away from the tank and be contained in accordance with NFPA 30,
Section 2-3.3. The piping location and drainage pattern shall prevent spills from
accumulating or flowing under piping in the tank impound area.

Comment D.2.1 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. A tank over-fill presents a very serious
fire risk potential. Drainage away from the tank in accordance with NFPA 30 prevents a
fire at the base of a tank and minimizes underside corrosion. Drainage away from the

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piping is a cost effective way of protecting the piping and manifolds from failure during a
fire.

NFPA 30, Section 2-3.3 allows either remote impounding or local impounding using dikes.
Remote impounding is preferred because spills or burning liquid are routed rapidly away
from the tank minimizing the risk to the tank or the tank piping. Remote impounding for a
portion of the required volume in combination with local impounding is preferred to only
local impounding. Where available space is limiting, the additional capacity of the
drainage channel may be used to obtain the necessary containment volume. NFPA 30, 2-
3.3, TAM 231,232

D.2.2 Drainage channels or culverts to remote impounding shall be sized to handle a tank overfill
at the maximum fill rate or a separation of the largest pipeline under pump pressure or
gravity-fed from the tank.

Comment D.2.2 Guideline. This section clarifies the sizing criteria for the drainage
channels or culverts which is not addressed in NFPA 30. An overflow of the channel or
culvert could lead to a spread of fire to adjacent facilities. Note that these systems are not
designed to handle a tank rupture because it so rarely occurs. TAM 231

D.2.3 Piping in sleeves through dikes shall be sealed at the dike wall with a fire-resistant seal.

Comment D.2.3 Company requirement. The sleeves need to be sealed to maintain the
integrity of the impoundage required by NFPA 30. This prevents spread of fuel to adjacent
facilities. TAM 233

D.2.4 Where water draw sumps and drains under mixer spill pads are connected to a closed drain
system, the system shall be designed so that major spills are confined to the impound area.

Comment D.2.4 Company requirement. This provision is needed to maintain the

integrity of the impoundage required by NFPA 30. This provision prevents a major spill
from escaping the tank impound via the drainage system and involving other facilities.

D.3 Fire Water Systems

Comment D.3 There is no industry standard for fire water systems in tank fields. These provisions
give criteria for sizing the fire water main and locating the hydrants.

D.3.1 In general, the fire main shall be designed for the largest of the following:

• the maximum foam required for a seal fire on the largest floating roof tank in the area,
and cooling the upper half of that tank's shell for 50% of the periphery, or
• a fully involved tank fire where cooling is required for 25% of the circumference of the
top half of up to 3 adjacent tanks which would be downwind and within 70 feet
distance.

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Comment D.3.1 Guideline. These criteria are used as the worse case fire scenario for
any single tank in the tank field. There is no justification for sizing the fire water system to
extinguish a fully involved tank fire. TAM 242, FPM 1620

D.3.2 Hydrants shall be located so that:

• all parts of the tank shell can be reached with a hose no longer than 500 feet,
• cooling can be provided to any tank from 2 directions, and
• the hydrant is at least 50 feet from the tank or the edge of the tank impound.

Comment D.3.2 Guideline. Beyond 500 feet, line losses and hose handling problems
become excessive. Cooling is needed from 2 directions so that firefighters can always
approach from upwind. The 50' minimum spacing is recommended so that the hydrant can
be safely accessed in the event of a tank or impound basin fire. TAM 242

D.4 Electrical Classification

Tank field areas shall be classified in accordance with API RP-500, Classification of Locations for
Electrical Installations in Petroleum Facilities. Electrical equipment shall be located away from
drainage paths and outside of impounding facilities.

Comment D.4 Industry standard. API RP-500 is the petroleum industry standard for area
classification. Locating electrical equipment outside of impound areas may allow installation of
unclassified equipment and reduces the risk of the electrical equipment being an ignition source or
being damaged by fire.

D.5 General Design Requirements

D.5.1 New tanks in hydrocarbon service shall be designed and constructed in accordance with
NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, and one of the following standards:

API 12D Field Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids (500-10,000 Bbls)
API 12F Shop Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids (90-500 Bbls)
API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage
API 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, shall be used if the
project includes alterations or reconstruction of an existing tank.

Comment D.5.1 Industry standard. Following these industry standards has resulted in
minimal (<$20,000/year) fire loss related to tank design.

D.5.2 Tanks shall have an automatic tank gage readable from the ground and, where applicable, in
the control room on the tank gaging system. Where applicable, overfill protection shall be
in accordance with NFPA 30, Section 2-10 and API-RP 2350. The Company shall review
and approve the Safe Oil Height calculations of the tank designer.

Comment D.5.2 Industry practice. Tank overfills create a serious fire hazard around the
tank and the tank piping. An automatic tank gage may not apply to small facilities where

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the risk of overflow is low such as production tank batteries or facilities which only use 1-2
tanks at low filling rates. The tank gaging system, used in conjunction with the local
automatic tank gage can be an effective means of avoiding overfills. Overfill protection is
generally installed in Marketing or Pipeline facilities where tanks are filled with no
personnel present. NFPA 30, API-RP 2350, 2-10; TAM 700; TAM 434; TAM-EF-880

D.5.3 Piping

D.5.3.1 Piping materials shall be in accordance with NFPA 30, Section 3-3.

Comment D.5.3.1 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. Materials such as cast iron,
brass, and aluminum will fail when involved in a fire. Ductile iron has properties
similar to cast iron and is also not recommended. This requirement does not apply
to remotely located production tanks less than 3000 Bbls in capacity. NFPA 30,
3-3

D.5.3.2 Tank nozzles for filling, withdrawing, and water draw-off should not be installed
beneath stairways.

Comment D.5.3.2 Guideline. This protects the stairway access should one of the
nozzles leak and catch fire. TAM 261

D.5.3.3 The water draw manifold shall be located at least 15 feet from the fill and suction
nozzles.

Comment D.5.3.3 Guideline. The water draw manifold is an area with greater
risk of fire at the tank. This design avoids involving the larger fill and suction
nozzles in a fire at the water draw. TAM 212

D.5.3.4 Connections for external heater circulation piping shall be located at the tank
fill/suction manifold. Internal piping shall be used to return heated oil to the far
side of the tank.

Comment D.5.3.4 Guideline. The incremental cost for this design is nominal.
Locating all the valves in one area provides for faster isolation in the event of a
fire. It also reduces the potential fire exposure of piping inside the impound basin.

D.5.3.5 Piping shall be designed with enough flexibility to accommodate expected settling
of the tank and shell movement from thermal expansion or filling and emptying of
the tank. Flexible couplings shall only be used with the approval of the Company.
Resilient-sealed couplings shall not be used.

Comment D.5.3.5 Industry practice. Rigid piping can result in a nozzle or

flange failure if there is any tank movement. Flexible joints generally use
elastomers for sealing and are vulnerable in a fire. Resilient-sealed couplings
such as Dresser couplings have a history of failing and adding fuel to a fire. TAM
652

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D.5.3.6 Tank sample connections shall be designed with the root valve in an accessible
location.

Comment D.5.3.6 Guideline. A root valve allows isolation of the sample lines in
the event of a fire or line break at the sample manifold. Circulating side sample
systems should be considered for those tanks which need to be sampled at different
heights frequently. These systems eliminate spillage resulting in less emissions and
potential for fire. The incremental cost of a circulating side sample system is
around $30,000. TAM 261, TAM 664, TAM-EF 878

D.5.4 Hydrocarbon pumps shall not be located within the local impound basin at a tank containing
Class I, II, or IIIA liquids.

Comment D.5.4 Guideline. The incremental cost is installation-dependent. Locating a

pump inside the tank's local impound basin may result in:

• the pump not being accessible to pump the tank out in the event of a fire or over-flow
(there have been three fires in the last 10 years where this was required, and
• a pump failure causing a release of stock and fire around the tank and tank piping.
TAM 233

D.6 Cone Roof Tanks

D.6.1 Cone roof tanks shall not be used in services where the vapor space will be in the flammable
range the majority of the time. For cone roof tanks which could periodically operate in the
flammable range, the design shall include an inerting or enrichment systems.

Comment D.6.1 Company requirement. In the past 10 years, we have had 55 vapor
space ignitions, 90% of which are on small producing tanks. Generally, the vapor space of
tanks handling Class I materials will be above the flammable range, and the vapor space of
Class II or III materials will be below the flammable range. However, consideration
should be given to situations where this may not be the case (i.e. stock within 20oF of the
flash point). This is particularly important where the tanks have open vents or vent to a
closed system which contains a potential ignition source like a flare or vapor recovery
system.

D.6.2 Cone roof tanks shall have normal venting in accordance with NFPA 30, Section 2-3.4.
Pressure/vacuum vent valves shall be used on cone roof tanks in Class I liquid service.

Comment D.6.2 Legal (NFPA 30) requirement. P/V valves reduce the vapor loss by
minimizing the amount of venting. P/V valves discharging to atmosphere are also effective
flame arrestors. NFPA 30, 2-3.4; API 2000; TAM 681

D.6.3 Emergency venting for fire exposure shall be provided for all cone roof tanks in accordance
with NFPA 30, Section 2-3.5. Tanks over 15 feet in diameter shall be designed with a
"frangible" roof-to-shell joint for emergency venting in accordance with API 650.

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Comment D.6.3 Emergency venting is a legal (NFPA 30) requirement. Frangible joint
construction is a standard contractor design. There are no additional costs frangible
joints as long as it does not cause an increase in shell thickness. In a fire exposure, a
frangible joint will open up causing the tank to vent at the top of the tank rather than
rupturing the shell-to-bottom seam and releasing the tank contents. A frangible joint will
also act to vent the pressure resulting from an internal explosion. NFPA 30, 2-3.5; API
650, 3.10.2.5; TAM 471

D.7 Floating Roof Tanks

D.7.1 Floating roofs shall be double deck or single deck pontoon design in accordance with API
650, Appendix C. Pan roofs shall not be used.

Comment D.7.1 Industry standard. A sunken roof is the only condition that can result in
a fully involved tank fire. Therefore, floating roofs must be designed to minimize the risk of
sinking. Pan roofs will sink if the roof accumulates liquid by storm, fire water, or a single
leak in the pan. Pontoon roofs with pontoon surface areas greater than 30% are more
resistant to sinking if a pontoon leaks. Double deck roofs are the design least likely to sink
and is usually the economic choice above 170 foot diameter. API 650, App.C; TAM 472

D.7.2 Floating roof tanks greater than 120 feet in diameter shall have wind girders with handrails
for safe emergency access.

Comment D.7.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost is $150-$200/foot of

diameter. The handrails on the wind girder allow safe emergency access around the top of
the tank, and can also be used for roof and seal inspections. The seal area of tanks less
than 120 feet in diameter can be reached from the gager's platform. API 650, 3.9.4; TAM
693; TAM-MS-967, 3.9.4

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D.7.3 Fixed Foam Systems

Where required, fixed foam systems shall be installed in accordance with the following
guidelines:

Tank Diameter Design Criteria

≤ 120 feet No requirements for fixed foam systems.

121 - 150 feet A dry pipe riser from ground level to a point near the gager's
platform just above the wind girder with two 2-1/2" valved
outlets and an over-the top foam maker assembly to enable
firefighters to access the platform.
151 - 200 feet Three dry pipe risers with two 2-1/2" valved outlets - one near
the gager's platform and two 90o each way from the first. The
one near the platform shall have an over-the-top foam maker
assembly to enable firefighters to access the platform.
Over 200 feet A permanent over-the-top foam application facility around the
circumference of the tank designed in accordance with NFPA
11.

Comment D.7.3 Guideline. The incremental costs for these systems are $10M for the
single riser, $25M for the three risers, and $300-$400/foot of tank diameter for the over-
the- top system. Our fire history indicates that the seal fires and the fully involved tank fires
which we have had in the last 10 years have been extinguished using portable equipment.
NFPA 11, 3-2.11.1 states that fixed foam systems are generally not required because
trained personnel can extinguish seal fires using portable equipment. However, any of the
following criteria may justify the investment in a fixed foam system:

• system is required by the local jurisdiction

• the facility is located in a sensitive geographic area with public exposure
• the fire brigade are not trained to use portable equipment

For smaller diameter tanks, the pre-fire plan is to lay hoses up the stairs and apply foam
from the gager's platform. Tanks over 120 feet in diameter need varying degrees of fixed
foam equipment because these tanks are too wide to reach all of the areas with portable
foam lines from the gager's platform, and this equipment minimizes hose handling. NFPA
11, 3-2.11.1; TAM 243

D.7.4 Floating roof tanks with secondary seals shall have a continuous foam dam which extends at
least 6" above the top of the secondary seal designed with bottom drain slots in accordance
with NFPA 11, A-3-2.11.1.

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Comment D.7.4 Industry standard. Foam dams hold the foam next to the seal allowing
more effective use of foam in a seal fire. TAM-MS-968, 2.3.1.1; TAM 243

D.7.5 Secondary seals shall include lightning shunts installed above the secondary seal in
accordance with API RP 2003.

Comment D.7.5 Industry standard. Shunts bond the roof plate to the shell minimizing
the chance of ignitions at the seal both from direct and induced lightning. STD. DWG.
GB-D1O82; TAM 262

D.7.6 All pontoon compartments shall be made liquid tight in accordance with API 650, C.3.5 and
C.3.6.

Comment D.7.6 Industry standard. Liquid-tight manway cover and raised vent prevent
liquid entry from flooding or sinking. The goose neck vents are needed to vent the
compartment preventing solar-caused pressurization. Liquid can accumulate in individual
compartments as a result of seam leaks, hung-up or tipped roofs, or from high levels of
storm water of fire water on the roof. This provision protects against the roof sinking by
preventing liquid from one flooded compartment leaking into the next compartment. API
650, C.3.6; TAM-MS-968, 2.2.1.1; TAM 472

D.7.8 Floating roofs tanks shall have flexible pipe or swing joint fixed pipe roof drains. Tanks
over 120 feet in diameter shall have at least three closed roof drains. Double deck floating
roofs should also have at least 3 open ended emergency drains discharging into the tank.

Comment D.7.8 Closed drains are an industry standard. Emergency drains are a
Company requirement. The incremental cost of emergency drains is about $500 each.
Roof drains prevent water accumulation which could tilt or sink the roof. Spills can result
from leaking roof drains inside the tank. Emergency drains are insurance against plugged
or closed roof drains resulting in a sunken roof. It is important that the Company review
and approve the roof drain design. API 650, C.3.8; TAM-MS-968, 2.3.3; TAM 632

D.8 Internal Floating Roof Tanks

D.8.1 Internal floating roofs shall be designed in accordance with API Std 650, Appendix H. Pan
roofs shall not be used.

Comment D.8.1 Company requirement. The incremental cost of a non-pan roof is

installation dependent. Pan roofs will tip, flood, and sink if they develop a leak or
accumulate storm or fire water. API 650, App.H; TAM 472; TAM-MS-968, 3.0

D.8.2 Internal floating roof tanks shall have circulation vents with weather shields and screens
around the perimeter in the shell or fixed roof and at the high point center of the fixed roof
in accordance with API 650, H.6.2.2.

Comment D.8.2 Industry standard. Adequate venting prevents the accumulation of

flammable vapors above the roof. The Tank Manual, Section 472, gives guidance on

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designing the vents. Consider using low melting point material for the weather shield so
that the shield would melt during a fire. This allows the fire fighters to access the tank
vapor space through the ventilation openings for application of firefighting hose streams.
API 650, H.6.2.2; TAM-MS-968, 3.4.10; TAM 472

D.8.3 Overflow openings designed for the maximum pumping rate shall be provided in the shell.

Comment D.8.3 Company requirement. The incremental cost is installation dependent.

These openings are needed to prevent damage to the roof and potential roof collapse in the
event of an overfill of the tank. TAM-MS-968, 3.4.9; TAM 472

D.8.4 The floating roof shall be bonded to the tank by a minimum of 2 flexible cables from the
tank roof to the floating roof in accordance with API 650, H.4.2.4. All movable metal parts
shall be bonded to the roof.

Comment D.8.4 Industry standard. The floating roof is essentially insulated from the
shell by the roof seal. Bonding is required to prevent static accumulation which could
discharge to the shell causing a seal fire or vapor space explosion. API 650, H.4.2.4;
TAM 262

D.9 Elevated Temperature Tanks (>200oF)

Comment D.9 The primary risks in elevated temperature tanks are:

• water entering the tank causing a froth-over into the containment area
• sudden boiling of water accumulated on the tank bottom when hot stock enters the tank or
incoming oil mixes with the water.
• low flash stock or stock at temperatures above its flash point entering the tank resulting in a
flammable atmosphere or in overpressuring the tank.
• the formation of pyrophoric material which can be a source of ignition when air is introduced
into the tank. TAM 1200

D.9.1 If tank heating is required, the system used shall minimize the risk of water or steam
entering the tank.

Comment D.9.1 Guideline. Use of steam heating can result in condensate leaking into
the tank and possibly a froth-over. Use of a oil-based heat medium eliminates this risk.
TAM 1213

D.9.2 A cone down bottom with a center sump and a slope of 1-1/2% to 2-1/2% shall be installed.

Comment D.9.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is nominal. This type of bottom
prevents water accumulation around the perimeter of the tank, and protects against internal
corrosion at the bottom-to-shell joint. Locations where settling is a problem may not be
able to use this type of bottom. TAM 1213

D.9.3 The outlet line shall elbow down into the center sump.

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Comment D.9.3 Guideline. Incremental cost is installation dependent. This design

allows water to be continuously drawn off with the stock. The Tank Manual, section 1213
shows the design of this system. TAM 1213

D.9.4 The inlet fill line(s) shall have local temperature indicators and high/low temperature alarms
in the control room. The tank shell shall have a minimum of 2 local temperature indicators -
one close to the fill line and one 180o away.

Comment D.9.4 Guideline. The cost is $200 per indicator. Temperature indication is a
cost-effective way of determining if low temperature, light material or material at an
unusually high rundown temperature is entering the tank. TAM 1215

D.10 Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Tanks

D.10.1 FRP tanks shall be designed and constructed in accordance with API Specification 12P
Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Tanks.

Comment D.10.1 Industry standard. In areas where a tank failure would pose a
significant hazard to personnel or the facilities, or could cause a substantial business
interruption, consideration should be given to using an engineering firm with FRP design
experience to develop a complete design/construction package. TAM 1242

D.10.2 Above ground FRP tanks shall not be used in flammable liquid service.

Comment D.10.2 Company requirement. Historically, FRP tanks have been prone to
failure when exposed to external fire or lightning-induced charges. In the 1/1982 - 12/1991
time period, we experienced 22 lightning-related fires on FRP tanks resulting in a fire loss
of $320M. Failure of an FRP tank in hydrocarbon service can add significantly to the
amount of fuel in a fire. TAM 267

D.10.3 In locations where the failure of an FRP tank presents a hazard to personnel or the facilities
and there is a possibility of flammable vapor in the tank, the tank shall be protected from
lightning-induced charges in accordance with Section 6-3.3 of NFPA 78. Protections shall
include:

• gas blanketing
• eliminating splash filling
• bonding all metallic objects on the tank such as manways, nozzles, gaging instruments,
or hatch covers together and grounding
• eliminating metal projections inside the tank which can act as a spark gap.

Comment D.10.3 Industry standard. Lightning-induced charges can accumulate on

metallic appurtenances which are not bonded and grounded. If the unbonded
appurtenance is above the liquid level and accumulates a high enough charge, it may
induce a spark to the conductive water layer igniting the flammable vapor in the tank. This
risk is most common in produced water tanks. NFPA 78, 6-3.3; API RP-2003, TAM 267

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E. EXCHANGERS AND COOLING TOWERS

Comment E In the 10 year period from 1982 - 1992, there were 20 recordable exchanger-related fires
causing $4,500,000 in fire loss with one incident accounting for 90% of the loss. 75 % of the fires result
from small flange leaks which soak insulation or ignite off hot surfaces. The two large-loss fires
(>$100,000) were caused by overpressuring the exchangers.

E.1 References

• Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual, Section 500 & Appendix G
• Fire Protection Manual (Vol.2) Section 1900
• Section A.1 - Layout and Spacing

E.2 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers

E.2.1 Where possible, shell and tube cooling water exchangers shall be designed so that the
pressure on the process side is always lower than the pressure on the water side.

Comment E.2.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Having the water
side at a higher pressure prevents flammable liquids or gases from entering the water
stream and thereby traveling to the cooling tower where vapor may be released. In one
five-year period, Company plants experienced 12 cooling tower fires or explosions due to
releases from process plants through the cooling water system to the tower. FPM 2070

E.2.2 Heat exchanger body flanges shall be designed per Appendix G of the Heat Exchanger and
Cooling Tower Manual. Body flanges in services over 100oF should be insulated.

Comment E.2.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost will be substantial. Leaks
that result from process upsets, corrosion, and damage to the flange surfaces cause over
75% of the exchanger-related fires in the Company. Exchangers designed only to ASME
standards have been the source of many leaks during thermal and pressure excursions in
process upsets. Use of Appendix G procedures results in thicker flanges and higher
allowable gasket loading to prevent leakage due to upset conditions. Process controls may
also reduce the risk by minimizing rapid temperature changes that cause high bolt stress
and flange loosening. The project design team should develop torquing procedures to
prevent leaks.

Insulating the body flanges prevents leakage due to temperature gradients across the
flange. Refer to Section 554 in the Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual for
guidance on the insulation and bolting of exchanger flanges. EXH 532, 554 and
Appendix G

E.2.3 Heat exchangers shall be designed with overpressure protection on both the shell and tube
sides of the system.

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Comment E.2.3 Legal requirement. The ASME Code requires overpressure protection.
Section 500 of the Heat Exchanger Manual gives the criteria for pressure relief and thermal
relief of heat exchangers.

E.3 Air-Cooled Exchangers

E.3.1 Vibration switches shall shut the fan down before vibration reaches a destructive level.

Comment E.3.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is $10M - $15M per fan. Fan failure
can cause extreme vibration resulting in piping or tube leaks. Also, failed fan blades can
damage piping and endanger personnel. FPM 2070

E.3.2 Well labeled emergency shutdown switches shall be located at the motor control center or at
grade at least 50 ft from the cooler.

Comment E.3.2 Company requirement. Remote shutdown is critical to prevent damage

to the air cooler from a fire at grade. The motor starter located in the motor control center
can be used for emergency shutdown if it is conspicuously labeled.

E.4 Cooling Towers

E.4.1 Cooling water pumps shall be spared and the drivers shall use a reliable power supply or
steam.

Comment E.4.1 Industry practice. Like other utilities, the cooling tower is essential to a
safe operation. Cooling tower failure or loss of the cooling water flow can lead to
emergency shut-down and potential hydrocarbon leaks and fires elsewhere. FPM 2070

E.4.2 Electrical area classification of fan motors, pump motors and other electrical apparatus
associated with cooling towers shall be in accordance with API 500.

Comment E.4.2 Industry standard. There is a potential for hydrocarbon vapors at the
cooling tower due to process leaks from exchangers and other points into the cooling water
system. API 500, Fig. A.9; EXH 2220; FPM 2070

E.4.3 Vibration switches shall shut the fan down before vibration reaches a destructive level.

Comment E.4.3 Guideline. The incremental cost is $10M - $15M per fan. Fan failure
can cause extreme vibration resulting in piping or tube leaks. Also, failed fan blades can
damage piping and endanger personnel. FPM 2070

E.4.4 First-aid fire hose reels shall be spaced at 100 ft. intervals at the top deck. There shall be at
least two hose stations located at opposite ends of the cooling tower deck.

Comment E.4.4 Guideline. The incremental cost is $1,000 - $1,500 per reel. In cold
climates, the hose stations should be on a dry stand pipe arranged to be supplied by hose
from a hydrant. FPM 2070

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E.5 Heat Transfer Liquids In Closed Systems

Heat transfer liquids in closed systems shall be designed to operate below the autoignition
temperature of the fluid.

Comment E.5 Guideline. Salts, special high flash point liquid and hot oils are used as heat
transfer media in the petroleum industry. Fires involving these liquids can occur in spite of the high
flash point. If the heat transfer medium temperature is raised above the autoignition temperature
and leaks to the atmosphere, the liquid can autoignite. Process controls should be set to operate at
temperatures below the autoignition point when possible. FPM 2070

F. FIRED EQUIPMENT

Comment F The Company has 11-12 unplanned fires/year involving fired heaters. Of these, there are
4-5 incidents per year which involve significant fire loss or injuries. The $3MM/year fire loss (does not
include process loss) on the major incidents breaks down as follows:

• tube failures from overheating - 34% of the fires, 43% of the fire loss
• tube failures from corrosion - 19% of the fires, 40% of the fire loss
• firebox explosions - 22% of the fires, 17% of the fire loss
• fires external to the furnace - 25% of the fires, <1% of the fire loss

In Refining, the recommendations of the Furnace Safety Team establish the minimum standards for fired
heaters. This section complements and, if necessary, expands on those recommendations.

F.1 Firebox/Ducts/Stack

F.1.1 Stack dampers used to control air to the furnace shall be designed to open on air failure and
shall have mechanical stops or built-in clearances to prevent total closure.

Comment F.1.1 Company requirement. Total closure of the stack damper may over-
pressure the firebox endangering personnel from hot combustion gases and possibly
damaging the firebox structure. Total closure can also cause the firebox to become fuel-rich
resulting in a possible flameout and firebox explosion. HTR 450

F.1.2 Where more than one furnace use a common stack, individual stack dampers will be located
in the breeching from each furnace.

Comment F.1.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Individual furnaces

need individual dampers for draft control. Also, in the event of a tube rupture, this design
helps confine the fire to a single furnace. HTR 450

F.1.3 Furnaces shall be designed to either shutdown or go to natural draft on loss of the forced
draft fan.

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Comment F.1.3 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Loss of the forced
fan can cause a serious reduction in combustion air rate and the risk of a flame-out. Drop
out doors costing $10,000-$15,000/door can allow operation at reduced rates until the fan
is back in service. The doors will be located in a safe area and barricaded to prevent
access. In some cases, the design of the furnace (i.e. those with SCR's) may require a safety
shutdown system on loss of the FD fan.

F.2 Tubes and Headers

F.2.1 U-bend headers shall be used unless an alternative is approved by the Company.

Comment F.2.1 Guideline. There are 4-5 fires per year resulting from plug leaks. While
these fires rarely involve significant fire loss, they do cause plant shutdowns and significant
loss profit opportunity. On a new furnace, U-bends are a less expensive construction.
Plug-type headers are prone to leak and have been the cause of fires and unplanned
shutdowns. Also, U-bends can be installed in the firebox eliminating the need for header
boxes which are a source of air leakage into the furnace. HTR 424, API 560, 4.2-4.3

F.3 Piping

F.3.1 Fuel Gas

F.3.1.1 Individual burners shall have means for positive isolation when the burner is out-
of-service. In order of preference this includes:

• a double block and bleed manifold at each burner

• a single block with an operator blind downstream at each burner

Comment F.3.1.1 Industry practice. Firebox explosions have been caused by

single block valves on individual burners leaking by on start-up or shutdown.
Double block and bleed is the preferable system because the operator blinds can
be a source of fuel gas leakage due to poor seating of the blind or bolt-up of the
flanges. Leaking burner block valves have also been the cause of flashback fires
during blind turning. On furnaces with large numbers of burners (i.e. reforming
furnaces) it is acceptable to blind groups of burners at the header. HTR 331

F.3.1.2 Burner valves, lighting and viewing ports should be located to maximize the safety
of the operator during light-off. For floor-fired units, valves and burner isolation
blinds should be located at the side of the firebox.

Comment F.3.1.2 Guideline. The majority of operator injuries and near misses
on furnaces occur during light-off. Consider building a model of the burner and
piping so there can be agreement on the configuration which provides safe access
and egress and a high degree of light-off safety for the operators. HTR 472;
MD&C, F.4.e

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F.3.1.3 On furnaces or boilers which do not have continuous operating pilots, fuel control
valves shall have minimum fire bypasses. Minimum flow bypasses, manually set,
shall be installed on furnaces which operate with all of the burners in service all of
the time. Minimum pressure bypasses shall be installed on furnaces where burners
will be removed from service frequently.

Comment F.3.1.3 Company requirement if pilots are not used. The incremental
cost would be project-specific. Minimum fire bypasses have been a very reliable
way of preventing the flame from being extinguished by the fuel control valve
cycling closed unexpectedly. When burners go in and out of service, the minimum
flow to the furnace changes. A minimum pressure bypass will maintain this
pressure independent of the number of burners in service. HTR 643

F.3.2 Process Piping

F.3.2.1 All flanges to be used for blinding the furnace on shutdowns which are in process
or fuel oil service shall be outside the perimeter of the furnace in locations where
spillage will not flow onto or into the furnace.

Comment F.3.2.1 Guideline. Leakage of oil into the firebox from blinding
operations has caused fires and start-up delays as this oil burns off. HTR-MS-
1350,5.1.10

F.3.2.2 An isolation valve on the feed(s) to the furnace shall be located a minimum of 50 ft
from the firebox in a location accessible during a fire involving the furnace. An
isolation valve downstream of the furnace should be considered if there are large
volumes of hydrocarbons above their boiling point in the downstream process
which cannot be de-inventoried to storage or relief.

Comment F.3.2.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. There

are 3-4 tube ruptures per year reported. This provision allows safe isolation of the
furnace in the event of a tube rupture minimizing the fire loss. The pass flow
valves are usually too close to the furnace and may not have tight shut-off. The
downstream isolation valve may need to be a remote-operated emergency block
valve if it is in close proximity to the furnace.

F.3.3 Smothering steam shall be provided for the radiant and convection sections and any header
boxes in accordance with API 560. Block valves shall be at grade in a location accessible
during a fire involving the furnace. The steam manifold shall have a steam trap to
continuously remove the condensate. The manifold shall be clearly labeled.

Comment F.3.3 Industry standard. Smothering steam can be an effective way to control
or extinguish a tube rupture fire in the firebox. The recommended amount is 2 lb/hr of
steam per cubic foot of combustion volume. HTR 474; API 560, 11.3.1

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F.4 Burners

F.4.1 Burners shall be supplied with gas pilots for light-off safety.

Comment F.4.1 Industry practice. Pilots are mandatory for fired boilers per NFPA 85B;
however, they are not required for process heaters. 33% of the operator injuries and 17%
of the fire loss on fired heaters are caused by firebox explosions mostly during light-off.
Properly maintained pilots used on start-up of the furnace can greatly decrease the risk
during start-up. The amount of fuel which enters the box prior to lighting a pilot is far less
than the amount of fuel from lighting the main burner. This is especially important for
large burners (≥2" fuel gas line size to burner). Also, the operator is not at risk from
inserting a lighted torch into the firebox to light the main burner. NFPA 85B, 4-1.2; API
560, 10.1.5; HTR 643

F.4.2 Burners shall be designed to operate with available draft without flame impingement at
above the design heat release in accordance with API 560, 10.1.3.

Comment F.4.2 Industry standard. This allows burners to be removed from service
without resulting in flame impingement. API 560, 10.1.3

F.4.3 Burners shall be removable for maintenance on the run.

Comment F.4.3 Industry standard. During a 2-3 year run, burners in fuel gas service
tend to plug. This can cause poor firing and flame impingement. API 560, 10.1.9; HTR
561; HTR-MS-1350, 10.1.4;

F.4.4 Burners shall be tested at the manufacturers facility for flame stability at the
minimum/maximum operating conditions specified.

Comment F.4.4 Guideline. The incremental cost is about $10,000 for each type of
burner tested. Burner tests aid in understanding the operating parameters of the burners
such as min/max operating pressures, stability at maximum draft, sound levels, flame
length, etc. Such tests are particularly helpful for burners with which the Company has no
prior experience. HTR 563; HTR-MS-1350, 13.5.4

F.5 Appurtenances

F.5.1 Gas testing ports shall be provided for combustible gas testing on start-up. These ports
extend through the refractory and are located in portions of the firebox where stagnant gas
can collect - usually the upper four corners.

Comment F.5.1 Company requirement. The incremental cost is $200/port excluding the
costs of platforms to access the ports. Firebox explosions can be caused by fuel gas leaking
into the firebox and not being purged out during the start-up process. Gas testing process
heaters prior to light-off is a Company requirement. The ports are used to obtain a
thorough gas test. HTR 331; HTR 475; HTR-MS-1350,11.1.3.5

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F.5.2 View ports with safe access shall be installed so that the entire length of each radiant section
tube and each burner can be observed.

Comment F.5.2 Industry standard. Visual observation of the tubes and burners is
important to prevent flame impingement and potential overheating of the tubes. The view
ports can also be used for routine thermographic surveys in those furnaces prone to coking.
API 560, 8.3.2.5

F.6 Instrumentation

API RP-550, Part III shall be used as the design standard for instrumentation on fired heaters. The
following sections clarify or are in addition to API RP-550.

F.6.1 Monitoring Instrumentation

F.6.1.1 Generally, a minimum of three skin point thermocouples shall be installed on each
pass in areas most prone to overheating. The leads to the thermocouples shall be
protected from flame impingement.

Comment F.6.1.1 Company requirement. The incremental cost runs $600-

$700/skin point. Three skin points are needed to identify passes that are beginning
to coke-up. The furnace manufacturer needs to investigate and recommend TI
locations which are most likely to overheat. The RefractoPad design has been
found to be the most reliable and durable. HTR 613; HTR-MS-1350, 11.4; GD-
J1201

F.6.1.2 If heater charge is single phase flow, each pass shall have manual or automatic
flow balancing valves and flow indication in the control room. Control valves shall
have minimum stops to prevent full closure.

Comment F.6.1.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost is $5,000-

$6,000/pass. Pass flow indication can be critical in preventing tube rupture from
low flow. The type of balancing system used depends on the stability of the flow
regime in the furnace. Tube ruptures can result from pass flow control valves
closing unexpectedly. Mechanical stops prevent full closure of the pass flow
control valves. API 550, PT.III, 1.5.3; HTR 622

F.6.1.3 Fuel flow to each firebox shall read out in the control room.

Comment F.6.1.3 Company requirement. The incremental cost for routing flow
indication to control room is $1,500-$2,000. Fuel flow is an important indicator of
a potential "bogged" or fuel rich firebox.

F.6.1.4 Flue gas O2 and possibly CO analyzers shall be installed between the convection
section and the radiant section. The design and type of analyzer shall be approved
by the Company.

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Comment F.6.1.4 Guideline. The incremental costs are $25,000-

$35,000/analyzer. Reliable flue gas analyzers can provide a continuous trend of
the stability and degree of combustion in the firebox. The sample point should be
located to minimize the possible sources of air leakage upstream of the sample
point. It is important from both a maintenance and operability standpoint that the
Company have input into the type of analyzer used. HTR 630

F.6.1.5 The furnace charge pump shall be backed up with a steam-driven spare on APS.

Comment F.6.1.5 Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. This

prevents loss of flow in the furnace from a pump failure. A spare pump may not be
needed if there is an automatic fuel shutdown on loss of process flow.

F.6.2 Alarms

As a minimum, the following alarms shall be installed. Those marked with an "*" are
considered critical, and shall be independent of any process control variable and totally
testable on the run.

• High stack temperature • Low O2

• High transfer line temperature* • Loss of FD/ID fans*
• High skin point temperature* • Low total feed to furnace*
• Low/high fuel gas pressure* • Low pass flow*
• Low draft

Comment F.6.2 Guideline. The incremental costs are $1,000-$1,500/alarm. The

specified alarms are necessary for the operator to understand a problem and react to it
before it becomes a major incident. Critical alarms need to be separate from the control
signals to prevent a single component failure from causing an upset and eliminating the
alarm capability. NFPA 85B,4-2.2.3; API 550 Pt.III, 1.9; HTR 650

F.6.3 Shutdowns

An automatic fail-safe system to chop all of the flow to the furnace shall be installed,
activated by the following:

• Low pass or total flow

• Low fuel gas pressure
• Loss of fan (if natural draft is not adequate)
• Manually from the control room

The shutdown system design and degree of reliability shall be approved by the Company.
Systems requiring high reliability shall be totally independent of the plant DCS, and shall be
designed to prevent spurious trips and to be testable on the run.

Comment F.6.3 Industry practice. Fuel chop systems, properly designed and tested, can
reduce fire losses on fired heaters and resulting process losses by 40-50%. These systems

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have been an industry standard for several years. They are required by the insurance
industry. They can be designed to be very reliable. The level of reliability required
depends on the criticality of the furnace and the consequences of a nuisance trip. Costs
range from $20,000 for a relay-based system to $500,000 for a triple redundant system. A
process hazards analysis must be conducted to determine the parameters which activate the
shutdown system and the level of reliability required. The CRTC Control Systems group
and the Fire and Process Safety Team can be consulted for assistance. HTR 332; HTR
650; API 550 Pt.III, 1.9, NFPA 85C

F.6.4 Boiler instrumentation and controls should be in accordance with NFPA 85C - Explosion
Prevention, Multiple Burner Boiler, Gas Fired

F.7 Access

F.7.1 Platforms for operator and maintenance access to burners should be at least 4 ft wide and
have two means of access.

Comment F.7.1 Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. The 4 foot width
can aid in pulling the burners and in quick egress in the event of an external fire during the
light-off procedure. HTR 480; HTR-MS-1350, 8.4.3

F.8 Fans

F.8.1 Forced or induced draft fans should be designed to operate in a power failure unless
allowances are made to go to natural draft.

Comment F.8.1 Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. A power failure
could cause a loss of flow to the furnace. The fan(s) are needed to cool the furnace down
quickly to prevent a tube rupture. MD&C F.4.g

G. PUMPS

Comment G From 1982 through 1991, pumps were an issue in 350 fires, with losses totaling
$38,212,000 (including a $25.3 MM fire in 1991). Seal failures were involved in 23% ($25,697,000
losses) of pump fires; bearing failures in 20% ($10,941,000 losses); and packing leaks, mechanical
failures, & piping failures in 2% each (about $700,000 losses) of pump fires. Operating/maintenance
procedures, electrical fires (mainly motors), housekeeping (oil soaked insulation), and fires of unknown
cause contributed less than 1% of losses, but 26% of incidents. Lack of isolation capability was a factor in
many of the large loss fires.

G.1 General

G.1.1 Pumps handling flammable or hazardous materials shall have steel or alloy cases suitable
for the service.

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Comment G.1.1 Industry standard. Cast iron cases should be limited to remote, non-
critical production facilities or to non-hazardous, non-critical service where exposure of
public and adjacent facilities is very low Cast iron pumps are likely to be damaged in the
event of a fire when installed in the drainage path of pumps handling flammable and
combustible liquids. Cast iron pumps must be installed in such a manner that connecting
piping will not excessively stress pump cases. Refer to the Pump Manual for pump selection
information. API 610; FPM 2010

G.1.2 Mechanical seals shall be specified for all hydrocarbon pumps.

Comment G.1.2 Industry practice. Although mechanical seals are more expensive to
install than packing, their higher installed cost is offset by reduced maintenance over their
[5 year] service life. Packed pumps require frequent surveillance and maintenance, and
may leak (a slight leak through the packing is necessary for lubrication). Mechanical seals
can reduce the risk of fire by eliminating packing leaks. Also, overly-tightened packing can
cause fires. Refer to the Pump Manual, Section 800 for seal selection criteria. PMP 800;
API 610; FPM 2010

G.1.3 Hydrocarbon pump cases should have non sparking throat and throttle shaft bushings.
Throttle bushings should be retained by shoulders, suitable dowel pins or screws. Throat
bushings should be pressed in from the fluid side.

Comment G.1.3 Company requirement. There are nominal incremental costs if specified
initially. Throat and throttle bushings prevent excessive flow to the atmosphere if a seal
leaks. The degree of clearance depends on the stock being pumped and the type of bushing
lubrication. PMP 255; FPM 2010

G.1.4 Where pumps are handling flammable liquids, liquids above their flash point, or liquids
above 600oF, small fittings for pressure gauges, sample connections, vapor vents and drains
shall be seal-welded to the pump case and up to the first valve. Minimum pipe size shall be
3/4" and fittings shall be close coupled to the pump case. Case openings which do not have
valves shall be plugged and seal welded.

Comment G.1.4 Company requirement. The incremental cost of seal/bridge welding is

project-specific. These requirements will minimize the vibration failure of long
unsupported small piping. Typical bridge-weld construction drawings can be found in the
Piping Manual (see Section 342) and should be used where vibration and metal fatigue
failures can occur. API 610; API 2510; FPM 2010

G.1.5 Seal oil piping shall not be run directly above the pump. Piping shall be run away from the
pump seal area and out of the drainage path from the pump. The seal oil system shall be
isolatable in an emergency.

Comment G.1.5 Guideline. There is no incremental cost. If the seal oil system fails in a
fire, large amounts of fuel can be released into the fire, increasing the damage. Kenco fire-
stop valves can be installed in the oil system to provide isolation. The valves contain a
fusible link which melts in a fire, isolating the seal oil system.

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G.1.6 For critical pumps, the following protective instrumentation should be considered:

• Low-suction pressure alarm

• Continuous vibration monitoring and shutdown
• High bearing temperature alarm
• High discharge pressure alarm

Comment G.1.6 Guideline. The incremental costs are project specific. Depending upon
the process, these same protections can be used for initiating automatic shutdowns. FPM
2010

G.1.7 Where water monitors are not available or may be blocked by equipment, water sprays
should be provided in accordance with Section S.3.8.

Comment G.1.7 Industry practice. Water sprays can provide effective cooling in the
event of a fire and limit losses to overhead equipment. FPM 1670; NFPA 15

G.2 Isolation

G.2.1 Pumps handling high vapor pressure stocks (greater than 15 psia), or liquids at temperatures
above autoignition, shall be equipped with a means of emergency isolation, provided the
pump is being fed by a vessel containing 2,500 gallons or more of stock.

Comment G.2.1 Industry practice. A vessel with 2,500 gallons or greater capacity is
considered a major source of fuel which, if released and ignited, is likely to involve
adjacent equipment. Pumps handling LPG have a high potential for a large loss if there is a
vapor release. Pumps operating above autoignition have a high likelihood of a fire if there
is a release. FPM 1830

G.2.2 Pump emergency block valves (EBVs) may be manual block valves where they are
accessible in a release or fire. If this is not possible then a fail-safe, remotely operated valve
shall be provided in accordance with Section J.6. EBV activation shall also result in
shutdown of the pump and other affected equipment.

Comment G.2.2 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Remotely operated

valves should only be considered where safe manual isolation is not possible (i.e. manual
valve <50 feet from the pump). The valve should be designed to close automatically in the
event of a fire (i.e. Fisher Posiseal butterfly valve with the Fire Sentry Actuator). Valve
actuation should also result in the pump shutdown to prevent damage to the pump. FPM
1830

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G.3 Drainage

G.3.1 Surface drainage around pumps shall be designed to drain spills away from the pumps and
away from the pump isolation valves in accordance with Section S.1.

Comment G.3 Company requirement. Adequate drainage can prevent the accumulation
of hydrocarbons around the pump and can quickly transport leaks to a safe location. FPM
2010; FPM 1420

G.3.2 Pump base plate shall be designed to be easily cleaned and to drain freely away from the
pump.

Comment G.3.2 Guideline. Oil and combustible material accumulation on the pump
base plate can significantly add to the fuel load during a fire. A system using a 1"x3"
channel to drain the base plate is superior to the typical 3/4" hole but will result in extra
costs.

J. CRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION

Comment J In the 1989-1991 time frame, inadequate or non-functional instrumentation had a

significant impact on one third of the major incidents (> $100,000). The potential decrease in fire loss
during this time period is $45MM-$50MM and breaks down as follows:

• inadequate or lack of instrumentation - 10 incidents/$32MM

• non-functional instrumentation - 4 incidents/$16MM

J.1 Scope

J.1.1 In this section, critical instrumentation is defined as instrumentation which, if it fails to

operate properly, could cause a major process hazard:

• personnel hazard (i.e. fire, explosion, overpressure, uncontrolled release of hazardous

materials)
• mechanical damage to major plant equipment
• significant environmental impact

J.1.2 Critical instrumentation includes:

• protective systems needed to safely shutdown and isolate a piece of equipment or a

facility, including:
• emergency shutdown systems and controls
• emergency block valves
• critical alarms
• large multi-cable conduit or cable trays (i.e. homeruns)

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J.2 Protection from Fire

Critical instrumentation systems shall be protected from fire by one of the following methods (listed
in order of Company preference):

• Locating outside fire-exposed envelope as defined in Section N and API 2218.

• Designing system to fail to a safe condition on loss of power or instrument air in accordance
with Section J.2.2.
• Using inherently fire-resistant designs (i.e. high temperature wiring)
• Fireproofing all of the system components located within fire-exposed envelope in accordance
with Section N.4 of this Guideline.

Comment J.2 Industry practice. A "total system approach" to protecting critical instrumentation
should be taken. All of the components (power and control wiring, solenoid valves, junction boxes,
valves and valve actuators, etc.) should be protected in the event of a fire.

Locating critical instrumentation outside of the fire-exposed envelope or designing the

instrumentation to "fail safe" are the most reliable, and often the most economical, ways to protect
critical instrumentation from fire. High temperature wiring is more costly than standard wiring, but
can be practical if only a small number of critical systems are being protected. Properly installed
fireproofing is reliable, but can be expensive. Fire water spray protection can be less reliable
because it is an "active" system which may not function properly and therefore must be tested
frequently. FPM 1732

J.2.1 Location

J.2.1.1 Switchgear housing and junction boxes for power and control of critical
instrumentation shall be located outside fire hazardous areas.

J.2.1.2 Power wiring, cable trays, and conduit banks shall either be routed underground or
on the upper levels of elevated pipeways at least 30 feet above the ground and
outside the drainage path of hydrocarbon spills.

Comment J.2.1.1/J.2.1.2 Industry practice. Damage to these systems can lead

to 1) loss of control in the plant increasing the potential for a serious process upset
and fire, and 2) a lengthy plant shutdown. Consequently, these systems should be
located at the highest levels of the pipeway where they gain some degree of
protection from the piping underneath. FPM 1738.

J.2.1.3 Manual controls (i.e. start/stop switches) for protective systems shall be accessible
during the emergency for which they are needed, and shall be well labeled and
visible from a distance.

Comment J.2.1.3 Industry practice. As a general rule, the controls are located
at least 50 feet from the protected equipment. More spacing may be required
depending on the layout of the plant and the type of hydrocarbon being handled.
FPM 1820

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J.2.2 Failure Modes

J.2.2.1 Unless specified otherwise by the Company, protective systems shall fail to a safe
condition on loss of power or instrument air.

Comment J.2.2.1 Industry practice. "Fail safe" designs can minimize the risk of
the protective systems not working when they are needed. However, false trips are
a concern with this type of system. These can be minimized through reliable
designs that can be tested and maintained. The failure mode should be considered
as part of the Process Hazards Analysis. FPM 1820, ICM 1340

J.2.2.2 Critical alarm and shutdown systems shall be designed with de-energize to trip
components.

Comment J.2.2.2 Industry practice. A de-energize to trip design causes an

alarm or shutdown to activate on the failure of any system component. De-
energize to trip designs can minimize the risk that a system will not operate when
needed. However, there may be an increased risk of false trips. ICM 1341

J.2.3 Fireproofing

J.2.3.1 Systems which are not "fail safe" and are located inside the fire-exposed envelope
shall be designed to operate under fire conditions. This requires that critical
controls, wires, actuators, etc. be protected in accordance with Section N.4.

Comment J.2.3.1 Industry practice. Energize-to-trip systems must be designed

for fire exposure or protected in the event of a fire because a loss of any system
component will prevent the system from tripping. The level of protection required
is discussed in Section N.4. FPM 1820, FPM 1731, FPM 1733

J.2.3.2 Cable trays or conduit banks shall be fireproofed if they contain critical
instrumentation cables for non-fail safe systems and are located inside the fire-
exposed envelope.

Comment J.2.3.2 Guideline. The incremental cost of fireproofing is installation

dependent. Fireproofing homeruns in the fire-exposed envelope prevents a
relatively small spill fire from damaging these facilities causing a lengthy plant
shutdown. Generally, it is most economic to segregate the non-fail safe critical
instrumentation leads from the rest of the controls and protect them separately. It
then becomes an economic decision as to whether or not fireproofing the cable
tray or conduit bank is justified. FPM 1738

J.3 General

J.3.1 Critical instrumentation systems shall be installed separate from process control functions.

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Comment J.3.1 Industry practice. Separating the protective systems from process
controls can eliminate the possibility of a fault in the process control system also causing a
malfunction of the protective system. For example, if a single level transmitter served both
a level controller and a low level alarm, a faulty high level signal from the transmitter
would cause the control valve to open and draw down the level. This same faulty signal
would prevent the low level alarm from activating. FPM 1820, ICM 1351

J.3.2 Protective systems and alarms must be designed so that in-service testing back to the
primary element and in-service maintenance/calibration can be performed.

Comment J.3.2 Industry practice. Protective systems and alarms must be periodically
tested back to the primary element to be reliable. For example, the reliability of a simple
level alarm can increase by a factor of 15 with monthly testing as opposed to testing on a 3
year turnaround. Testing should be done on energize-to-trip systems since a component
failure will not cause a shutdown or alarm. FPM 1820, ICM 1320,1342

J.4 Alarms

J.4.1 Critical alarms shall be connected to a dedicated, easily read and interpreted alarm
indication system.

Comment J.4.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is $200-$300/alarm. Critical alarms

must be quickly observed and reacted to by the operators to avoid a potential release, fire
or major process upset. Using a separate annunciator panel or alarm screen allows the
operator to differentiate between the critical alarms and non-critical, computer-generated
alarms.

J.5 Shutdowns

J.5.1 The need for shutdowns, their failure mode and the degree of reliability required shall be
specified by the Company. All shutdown logic shall be documented on logic diagrams
approved by the Company.

Comment J.5.1 The Company must be involved in the design of the shutdown system so
that the system meets our reliability requirements, and can be maintained through the
existing maintenance organization. Optimally, all shutdown systems at a given location
should be a standard design for ease of maintenance and testing. Logic diagrams aid in
ease of understanding and operator training. Ladder diagrams are not an acceptable
alternative.

J.5.2 Emergency shutdowns shall be equipped with pre-shutdown alarms to warn that a trip is
impending.

Comment J.5.2 Industry practice. Pre-shutdown alarms can enable the operator to take
corrective action before the shutdown occurs. ICM 1352

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J.5.3 Shutdown systems shall be provided with a manual reset so that the process remains
shutdown until it is manually cleared by the operator.

Comment J.5.3 Industry practice. A manual reset can eliminate the potential hazards of
the shutdown system clearing (and shutdown valve opening) before the condition which
caused the shutdown has been investigated and rectified. ICM 1371

J.6 Emergency Block Valves (EBVs)

J.6.1 EBVs are valves which 1) isolate a piece of equipment from a source of fuel and 2) operate
automatically or can be activated remotely in the event of an emergency. EBVs are required
for high fire potential equipment (as defined in API 2218, Section 2.2.1) where safe manual
isolation is not possible in the event of an emergency involving that equipment.

Comment J.6.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific. Isolation of the fuel
source minimizes the hazard to personnel and the equipment damage in the event of a fire.
EBVs should only be considered when safe manual isolation is not possible. FPM 1830;
ICM 1360

J.6.2 Unless specified otherwise by the Company, emergency block valves shall be remotely
actuated and shall be designed to fail to a safe position in the event of a fire.

Comment J.6.2 Industry practice. Remote actuation allows the operator to shut the valve
from a safe location. The "fail safe" design results in the valve automatically closing (or
opening) should a fire occur before the valve can be manually actuated. This can
significantly reduce the amount of hydrocarbon being fed to the fire.

J.6.3 Shutdown valves shall be designed for testing. If bypass systems are used, a management
system is required to ensure that the bypass valve remains in the proper position.

Comment J.6.3 Industry practice. Full closure testing of the shutdown valve should be
done in situations where tight shutoff is needed (i.e. fuel gas shutoff to furnace) or where
there is a history of fouling which could prevent full closure (i.e. HF/LPG block valves).
There have been incidents resulting from incorrect use of a bypass. ICM 1360

K. COMPRESSORS/ENGINES

This section applies to compressors, engines, and turbines handling flammable vapors and gases.

Comment K For the 10 year period of 1982 through 1991, 67 compressor-related fires resulted in fire
losses totaling $1,500,000 for an average loss per fire of $22,000. Design issues were identified in 13% of
fires, operations/maintenance/management issues in 62% of the fires.

Major incidents (loss greater than $100,000) have occurred when flammable mixtures filled compressor
rooms and were ignited. One of the following scenarios typically occurs to generate the large volumes of
flammable vapor necessary to cause a major fire:

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• The fuel gas system leaks (usually the fuel valve)

• Established management controls are not followed (e.g. inadequate job planning and not following
established instructions/procedures)
• Unpredictable mechanical failures occur (e.g., gaskets blow out, or pistons/rods fail)

There were 77 engine and turbine fires in the 1982 - 1991 time period totaling $2,900,000. Major losses
have occurred on engines and turbines when supervisory controls were not followed. For example:

• A $1,500,000 fire occurred in 1982 when lube oil collected in an engine exhaust system. Operating
instructions were not followed correctly.
• A $975,000 fire occurred in 1987, due to job planning, when unburned fuel was allowed to enter
engine exhaust ducting.
• $175,000 loss occurred in 1987 when engine fueling instructions were not followed, resulting in a fuel
spill and fire.

Lube oil leaks are common cause of engine fires and in the severity of the fires. Inadequate inspection and
surveillance impacted 41% of the fires.

K.1 References

• Compressor Manual
• Driver Manual
• Fire Protection Manual

K.2 General

K.2.1 The area around and under compressors, engines, and turbines shall be designed to
minimize the accumulations of lube oil. This generally requires surfaces to be sloped a
minimum of 1" per foot to a closed drain system. Facilities should be provided to wash
down oily surfaces.

Comment K.2.1 Industry standard (API-2001). The 1:12 drainage slope is an industry
practice. The area around this type of equipment can accumulate lube oil which can be
ignited by a small gas release and flash fire. This may allow what would have been a very
minor incident to quickly become a very serious incident. In areas with limited access,
fixed nozzles may be required to provide effective washdown capabilities.

K.2.2 Sources of liquid that can add fuel to a fire shall not be located within the compressor
building except for reservoirs that are an integral part of the engine or compressor or are
located in the unit base plate. This includes fuel tanks, lube oil reservoirs, knockout pots that
carry a substantial liquid level, etc. Fuel gas pressure reduction or let-down stations shall be
located outside the compressor building. Engine starters utilizing fuel gas as the motive
force shall exhaust outside the compressor building.

Comment K.2.2 Company requirement. The incremental cost is project-specific.

Relatively minor fires have escalated to major fires destroying entire compressor buildings

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when lube oils or other liquids have become involved and spread the fire. Locating sources
of liquid fuel that could be released outside the compressor building can minimize the fuel
source should a fire occur.

K.2.3 Hydraulic and lube oil lines, valves, level controllers, and other components shall not be
made of low melting point or non-fire resistant materials. If these materials must be used,
fire stop valves shall be installed both upstream and downstream of this equipment that will
stop the flow of oil in case of a fire.

Comment K.2.3 Industry standard (NFPA-37). Reports from fires in compressor

buildings consistently point to lube oil fires needing extinguishment after gas fires are out.
Oil lines are often made of rubber or plastic, oil level controllers have aluminum bodies
with plastic lenses, valves are made of brass, etc. In case of a flash fire where the oil
accumulations are ignited, these materials will quickly fail, dumping lube or hydraulic oil
from the crankcase and reservoirs into the fire. Fire stop valves such those made by
KENCO in Tulsa, OK can isolate such equipment when exposed to fire.

K.2.4 Compressor stations shall be provided with an Emergency ShutDown (ESD) system that
will shutdown all compressors, block all incoming gas (including gas for the engines), and
blowdown piping and equipment to a remote flare or vent. ESD valves are to be fail safe.
The ESD shall be activated on fire detection, gas detection at 60% of LFL, or manually by
remotely located ESD switches. The gas detectors shall alarm at 20% of LFL.

Comment K.2.4 Industry standard (API-RP-14G) for offshore platforms. Industry

practice for onshore facilities. An ESD system that quickly de-pressures the compressor
section is very effective in controlling a gas fire. The remaining fires, if any, can then be
dealt with using other extinguishing means. This is primarily applicable to upstream
facilities. There have been many incidents where ESD activation at the onset of a fire has
isolated and de-pressured the facility, extinguishing the fire before a major loss occurred.
FPM 3730

K.2.5 Gas turbines and centrifugal compressors placed inside of individual machine enclosures
should be protected by full flood CO2, dry chemical, or water mist fire suppression systems
in accordance with Section S.3.10. The CO2 shall be capable of being released manually or
by any one or a combination of:

• UV optical flame detection,

• rate-of-rise thermal detection, and
• combustible gas detection.

Comment K.2.5 Industry practice. The incremental costs are project specific. Large loss
fires have resulted from leaks in lube oil or fuel systems. CO2 is currently the preferred
agent for fire suppression due to the mandated phase-out of halon and the fact that the
enclosures are not occupied except for maintenance. Dry chemical is an acceptable agent
if the turbine/compressor manufacturer agrees. Water mist systems have been approved for
gas turbine enclosures and have advantages over CO2 in several areas (i.e. testability, ease
of recharge, life safety).

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K.2.6 Gas compressor and gas turbine buildings shall be outfitted with UV/IR optical flame
detection and combustible gas detection. The location of combustible gas detectors shall
take into account the specific gravity of the gas being compressed. If located near the
ceiling, as would be the case for lighter than air gases, the detector heads shall be outfitted
with devices to allow for calibrating from grade.

Comment K.2.6 Industry practice. The incremental costs are project specific. Most
manufacturers of combustible gas detectors make devices to allow for remote calibration.
Without remote calibration, detector heads located near the ceiling are very difficult to
access for calibration and may not be kept properly calibrated or maintained. FPM 3730

K.2.7 If water is available, foam hose stations with 60 gallons of foam concentrate capacity shall
be provided, preferably just outside the doors to the compressor building. In cold weather
areas, they can be placed just inside the access doors. Sufficient stations should be installed
to provide coverage of all compressors. If water is not available, 150# wheeled dry
chemical extinguishers should be supplied, the quantity and location dependent on the size
and configuration of the compressors and building.

Comment K.2.7 Company requirement. The incremental costs of suppression equipment

are small compared to installed cost of a compressor station. For example, a foam hose
reel station costs about $2000. Although the ESD system will quickly control the gas fire,
residual fires involving lube oil and combustible solids may have to be extinguished by
other means. Where possible, the extinguishers and hose reels should be located 50 feet
from the equipment they are protecting. Ready-to-use first aid fire suppression equipment
used by on-site personnel extinguish 75% of all Chevron fires before they result in damage.

K.3 Compressors

K.3.1 The distance pieces on reciprocating compressors located inside of a building shall be
enclosed and vented outside of the building.

Comment K.3.1 Industry standard API-618 specifies that distance pieces of

compressors be vented. It is an industry practice to pipe vents containing flammable
vapor outside the compressor building. This is necessary to prevent the accumulations of
flammable gases within the building. Consideration should be given to inert purging
distance pieces to prevent flammable mixtures.

K.3.2 Small piping, 3/4" to 1 1/2", attached to the compressor or its piping shall be minimized.
Connections which are required shall be close coupled, socket or seal welded and properly
supported. 1/2" or smaller piping shall not be installed.

Comment K.3.2 Industry standard (API-618). Due to the vibration of compressors,

screwed piping should be avoided as well as all piping ½" and smaller. Where the mass of
the attached valve or appurtenance may subject the supporting nipple and weld to
significant vibration stress, supporting gussets or braces shall be provided. Socket welded
pipe is preferred to seal welded screwed pipe because it is less prone to fatigue failures.

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Vibration-induced failures have occurred with significant frequency and consequences to

warrant additional measures to reduce the risk. Four such failures resulted in $1,000,000
in direct fire loss, excluding lost production opportunities. FPM 2020

K.4 Gas Engines

K.4.1 Gas engine drivers for compressors shall have explosion relief devices supplied for each
crank throw to vent crankcase explosions.

Comment K.4.1 Industry practice. Explosion vents such as the Bicera type explosion
relief device provide a controlled means of venting an explosion in the crankcase to prevent
a catastrophic failure of the crankcase. These spring-loaded vents close to prevent air re-
entering the crankcase and causing a secondary explosion or sustaining a residual fire.
Crankcase explosions have seriously damaged engine crankcases, blown covers off, and
seriously injured personnel.

K.4.2 Engine air intake shall come from outside the building. Engine exhaust shall discharge
outside the building and above or beyond the eave. Both exhaust and intake shall be on the
opposite side of the building from the gas piping. If the exhaust pipe creates a thermal
hazard to personnel, expanded metal guarding is preferred over insulation.

Comment K.4.2 Industry standard (NFPA-37). With the air intake inside the building, a
gas release in the building could result in an engine back fire and ignition of the vapor or
over-speeding of the engine/compressor. The exhaust should be above or beyond the eave
line to avoid exhaust gases being an ignition source or a personnel hazard inside the
building. If there is a prevailing wind direction, the exhaust should be on the downwind
side of the building. Expanded metal guarding can eliminate the risk of oil-soaked
insulation fires. FPM 2020

K.4.3 Engine ignition systems shall be low tension (voltage), preferably with combination
coil/spark plug units for each cylinder. Shielded high tension (voltage) wires should be
avoided.

Comment K.4.3 Company requirement. The use of combination coil/spark plug units
eliminates high tension wiring and the chance of it sparking to the engine or supports.
Shielded wire can short to the shielding which can spark to the engine. This has been the
source of ignition in engine fires at leaking injectors and other leak sources. FPM 2020

L. PIPING

Comment L In the time period from 1982 - 1991, we have had 8 - 9 recordable fires per year related to
piping resulting in $190MM in fire loss. Three fires account for $170MM. Facility design played a role
in 25% of the fires and 62% of the fire loss. The primary causes of design-related fires breaks down as
follows:

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• inadequate materials or pipe class - 6 fires - $104MM

• small piping fatigue - 3 fires - $5MM
• piping stress - 2 fires - $9MM
• other - 9 fires - $0.4MM

L.1 Materials

L.1.1 Seamless steel pipe and steel valves, flanges and fittings shall be used for hydrocarbon
service.

Comment L.1.1 Guideline. The incremental cost is project-specific, Butt-welded seams

(e.g. EFW, ERW) are more susceptible to leakage. Steel piping offers strength, flexibility,
ductility and weldability. Steel is better able to handle thermal shock, bending loads and
hydraulic and mechanical shock. However, steel may not be practical for some acids,
chemicals or for use at high temperature. Generally, cast iron should not be used oil and
gas service due to its brittleness. Brass, copper and aluminum should not be used due to
their low melting points. FPM 2080

L.1.2 All pipe class transition changes shall be reviewed with the Company representative both
during the design stage and after field installation. Positive material identification (PMI)
shall be used to verify that the specified alloys have been purchased and installed.

Comment L.1.2 Guideline. Transitions in pipe at the wrong location can result in the
wrong material being installed and the potential for a pipe rupture. PMI significantly
decreases the possibility that wrong materials will be installed during construction. This is
particularly important for high temperature chrome alloy piping.

L.2 Valves

L.2.1 Flangeless valves with exposed bolts, wafer-type bodies, shall not be used in liquid and gas
hydrocarbon, LPG or H2S service if they are in an area where they can be exposed to fire.

Comment L.2.1 Company requirement. In a fire, it has been observed that studs which
have more than 3" of their length exposed between the flanges quickly get hot, expand, and
allow the flange connection to leak, ultimately causing total failure of the connection and
allowing hydrocarbons to feed the fire. Most manufacturers also supply lug-body valves or
flanged valves. FPM 2080

L.2.2 Fire-safe valves with soft, non-metal seats, shall meet the requirements of API Standard
607, "Fire Test for Soft-Seated Quarter Turn Valves."

Comment L.2.2 Industry standard. When exposed to fire, rubber-like or teflon materials
used for sealing valve seats will fail much faster than the valve metal possibly allowing
leakage. FPM 2080

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L.3 Threaded Piping

Threaded piping systems shall not be used in sizes larger than 2 inches in hydrocarbon or critical
utility services.

Comment L.3 Industry practice. Threaded piping connections can be susceptible to thread
disengagement by expansion when exposed to fire and can be more susceptible to vibration and
fatigue failure then welded or flanged connections. FPM 2080

L.4 Thermal Relief

Thermal relief shall be provided in accordance with Paragraph S.2.2.3.

L.5 Pipeways

Piping systems within process units shall be installed on aboveground pipeways.

Comment L.5 Industry practice. Grade or below grade pipeways should be avoided. They can be
fire hazards because they are difficult to keep clean and they obstruct free access. Also, because the
piping is difficult to inspect, there is a greater chance that external corrosion and leaks will go
undetected. FPM 2080

L.6 Sample Connections

Sample connections in flammable service shall be the 3-way recirculation type.

Comment L.6 Guideline. The cost of a recirculating sample system can run 75-100% more than a
dead-ended system. However, the recirculating sampler minimizes leakage and hazard to
personnel. These may also be required for environmental reasons in some areas. FPM 2080;
PIM-EF-403

L.7 Couplings

L.7.1 Victaulic couplings can be used in hydrocarbon service only if all the following conditions
apply:

• ANSI Class 150 piping system

• Rural or remotely located production facilities
• Fire resistant gasket is specified
• Low H2S service (less than 1% H2S by volume or .1 psia H2S partial pressure)

L.7.2 Dresser couplings shall not be installed in hydrocarbon service or in produced water service
if their failure during a fire would allow hydrocarbon liquid to feed the fire after the water
has drained out.

Comment L.7.2 Industry practice. Dresser couplings have resilient seals that can fail
quickly when exposed to fire. Also, a dresser coupling is placed over the two facing ends of

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pipe. When the pipe is exposed to fire, bending stresses in the pipe, caused by uneven
heating become very high and can pull the coupling apart. FPM 2080

L.7.3 Unibolt connectors shall not be used in hydrocarbon service.

Comment L.7.3 Company requirement. The incremental costs are project-specific.

Unibolt connectors have not been fire tested. FPM 2080

N. FIREPROOFING

N.1 References

API Publication 2218 Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Facilities

UL Subject 1709 "Structural Steel Protected for Resistance to Rapid Temperature Rise Fires"
Fire Protection Manual, Section 1700

N.2 Definitions

N.2.1 Refer to API 2218, Section 2.2.1, for the definition of fire-exposed envelope and fire-
potential equipment.

Comment N.2.1 Industry standard. API 2218, Section 2.2.2, defines the fire-exposed
envelope as "one that extends 20-30 feet horizontally and 30-40 feet vertically from the
source of liquid fuel". Company experience indicates that this is appropriate for low
pressure, low volume facilities. For higher pressure (>100 psi), higher volume (>5000 gal
or >100 gpm) the horizontal distance should be extended to 50 feet. API 2218, Section
2.2; FPM 1700

N.2.2 Refer to Section J for definitions of critical instrumentation and homeruns.

N.3 Support Structures

N.3.1 Level of Protection Required

Fireproofing shall protect support structures from reaching 1000oF for three hours with fire
environment temperatures of 2000oF as defined by UL 1709.

Comment N.3.1 Industry standard. The UL 1709 rapid rise temperature profile is
representative of the temperatures equipment would be exposed to in a hydrocarbon spill
fire. The three hour protection (equivalent to 4 hours under the previously used ASTM E-
119 testing procedure) gives adequate protection of the high-valued equipment under
almost any reasonable fire scenario. If studies show that a fire's duration would always be
less than 3 hours, the fireproofing rating could be decreased. FPM 1720

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N.3.2 Where Protection is Required

Refer to API 2218, Section 3, for determining where to install structural fireproofing.

N.3.2.1 Vessels or reactors with a "hot box" design at the shell-to-skirt joint shall be
fireproofed as specified by the Company.

Comment N.3.2.1 Company requirement. The "hot box" design requires

insulation for thermal stress reasons. Covering the insulation with heavy gage
stainless steel weatherjacketing can provide protection for the vessel skirt in that
area. The CRTC Pressure Vessel specialist should be contacted for this design.
FPM 1725

N.3.3 Types of Fireproofing Systems

Unless approved by the Company, a cementitious type fireproofing system shall be used.

Comment N.3.3 Industry practice. Cementitious fireproofing systems insulate the

structural steel from the fire and are very durable. Concrete is the most impact resistant
and is generally used in high traffic areas where the fireproofing could be damaged.
Proprietary cement-based products (i.e. Pyrocrete 241 or Fendolite M II)generally have
better fireproofing characteristics, are lighter, and may be more economical to install than
concrete. FPM 1724; FPM 1700, Figs. 1700-1&2

N.3.4 Application

Prior to fireproofing with concrete, the structural steel shall be abrasive blasted and primed
with a polyamide epoxy to provide protection against corrosion. For proprietary
fireproofing, the manufacturer's guidelines should be followed. The top of structure should
be sealed where fireproofing joins the steel.

Comment N.3.4 Industry practice. Water seeping between the fireproofing and the steel
can cause accelerated corrosion of the steel. The polyamide epoxy is considered the most
durable protection against corrosion by the CRTC Materials Division. FPM 1724; GA-
N33336; GD-N99994

N.4 Critical Instrumentation

N.4.1 Level of Protection Required

Critical instrumentation shall be fireproofed to permit emergency function for at least 20

minutes with fire environment temperatures of 2000oF as defined by UL 1709.

Comment N.4.1 Industry practice. Generally, 20 minutes is considered to be sufficient

time to safely de-pressure and isolate a process facility. Instrumentation which may need to
operate longer than 20 minutes for a safe shutdown should have fireproofing designed
appropriately. FPM 1731

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N.4.2 Where Protection is Required

Section J of this Guideline outlines where fireproofing is required.

Comment N.4.2 Section J gives criteria for determining the protections required for the
critical instrumentation. This section assumes that the decision has been made to
fireproof the specified equipment. This section focuses on the types of fireproofing
systems used. In all cases the Company should review and have input into the type of
system used.

N.4.2.1 Valves

The valve shall be of a fire-safe design. The valve actuator shall be fireproofed
with Thermal Designs' K-Mass intumescent fireproofing.

Comment N.4.2.1 Guideline. The incremental cost of K-Mass is 30-40% higher

than a fireproofed enclosure. The K-Mass system should be considered before
using a box or blanket system in that the K-Mass is molded to the valve and allows
normal operator and maintenance access. The box or blanket systems need to be
removed or opened up to allow access. Fireproofing integrity is lost if the box or
blanket is not properly replaced. K-Mass can also be used to fireproof non fire-
safe valves such as soft-seated plug or ball valves. FPM 1733

N.4.2.2 Enclosures

Enclosures housing critical instrumentation and located in fire hazardous areas

shall be fireproofed with K-Mass fireproofing or equal.

N.4.2.3 Instrument and Electrical Cables

N.4.2.3.1 Critical pneumatic instrument tubing made of low melting point

material shall be fireproofed with calcium silicate insulation and stainless steel
jacketing.

Comment N.4.2.3.1 Guideline. For single runs of tubing using 2" calcium
silicate insulation with stainless steel jacketing is the most cost effective system.
The stainless steel weatherjacket can survive a fire and prevent the fireproofing
from being blown off by fire water or an impinging pressure fire. FPM 1737

N.4.2.3.2 Unless approved otherwise by the Company, critical instrument

cables and critical power wiring located in fire-exposed areas shall be installed
separate from the non-critical cables, and shall be fire resistant wiring.

Comment N.4.2.3.2 Industry practice. Fire resistant wiring (Pyrotenax MI

Cable, Whittaker SI Fire Cable, or equal) will maintain circuit integrity in a UL
1709 fire environment without additional fireproofing. This is generally less

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expensive, easier to install and more reliable than normal wiring installed in
conduit and fireproofed. Installing critical wiring separate from the non-critical
wiring can eliminate the expense of fireproofing the homerun. Do not install high
temperature wiring in areas where it could be exposed to molten aluminum in a
fire (e.g. in or under cable trays). This has resulted in failure of the sheathing.
FPM 1737

N.4.2.4 Cable Trays and Conduit Banks

Where required (see Section J.2.3), cable trays and conduit banks shall be protected
with a fireproofing system tested and approved per Section N.4.1.

Comment N.3.3.4.3 Guideline. The incremental costs can run $100-200/foot for
an 18" x 4" cable tray. Only fireproofing systems tested in a UL 1709 fire
environment should be used. Section 1740 in the Fire Protection Manual lists some
of the approved systems. The Company should review the system to be used.
Additionally, cable tray supports need to be insulated to prevent conducting heat
inside the fireproofing during a fire. FPM 1738

P. ELECTRICAL AREA CLASSIFICATION

P.1 Industry Standards and Codes

Area classification shall be in accordance with:

API RP 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 497A Classification of Class I Hazardous Locations for Electrical Installations
In Chemical Process Areas

Comment P.1 The design engineer should verify compliance with all appropriate federal, state,
and local codes. The documents listed may represent legal requirements. API RP 500 is divided
into 3 sections, refining, production and pipeline, and gives guidance on the extent of area
classification within a facility. NFPA 497A also gives guidance on the extent of area classification
at smaller, low risk process areas. NFPA 30 gives guidance on recommended levels of ventilation.
NFPA 496 gives design requirements for ventilation and purging systems.

The Electrical Manual, Section 300, and the Fire Protection Manual, Section 1500, give guidance on
the Company's area classification policy and practices. Standard Drawing GF-P99987, located in
the Fire Protection Manual illustrates the Company's typical area classification practices in process
plants and tank fields. FPM 1500; ELC 300; GF-P99987

P.1.1 Area Classification drawing(s) shall be approved by Company.

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Comment P.1.1 Industry standard. It is suggested that this drawing be done early in the
design phase so instrumentation and electrical equipment can be located outside the
classified areas as much as practical. The area classification drawing is used for electrical
purchase only, so it is not customary to extend the classification into adjacent roads, since
electrical equipment is not normally installed in roads.

P.2 Ventilation and Purging of Enclosed Process Areas

An enclosed area containing process equipment shall be considered adequately ventilated if it is

ventilated at a rate sufficient to maintain the concentration of vapors within the area at or below 25%
of the lower flammable limit (LFL). Methods of confirming adequate ventilation and design
requirements for ventilation systems shall be in accordance with NFPA 30, Paragraph 5-3.3 and
Appendix F.

Comment P.2 Industry standard. Open outdoor locations usually are considered adequately
ventilated. Note that 20% of LFL is required by the MMS in OCS areas. FPM 1530; NFPA 30, 5-
3.3 and Appendix F

P.3 Declassifying Enclosures by Purging

Unclassified electrical equipment can be used in buildings or enclosures located in classified areas
provided they are "pressurized" or "purged" in accordance with NFPA 496.

Comment P.3 Industry standard. Purging prevents flammable vapors from entering the building
or enclosure. NFPA 496 defines the type of purging and design requirements for a purged
enclosure. NFPA 496; FPM 1540

P.4 Piperacks

Outdoor, aboveground pipe racks which do not contain valve manifolds generally are not classified.

Comment P.4 Guideline. These installations have a low risk of leaks. FPM 1540

P.5 Hydrogen Processing Facilities

P.5.1 Adequately ventilated piping, vessels and exchangers containing hydrogen need not be
classified unless reciprocating or rotating mechanical equipment, sample draws, or
atmospheric vents are included in the equipment.

Comment P.5.1 Guideline. These systems are considered closed systems. Also, valve
packing leaks will either ignite or disperse so rapidly, that there is little probability that
electrical sources can or will increase the risk of ignition. FPM 1546

P.5.2 Hydrogen processing plants that include areas where Group D hydrocarbons are processed
shall be classified Class I, Group D. In addition, Group B classification shall apply in
specific areas where high concentration hydrogen leaks are most likely to occur, such as
around compressors and high pressure separators.

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Comment P.5.2 Guideline. In areas where hydrocarbon and hydrogen are both present
(as in hydrocracking processes), Group B designations should be used for those areas
where high concentrations (>30%) of hydrogen are being handled. Wherever practical,
electrical equipment should be located outside Group B areas to enhance safety and
decrease project cost. FPM 1540

P.5.3 Battery rooms need not be classified Group B if adequately ventilated.

Comment P.5.3 Guideline. Generation of hydrogen from batteries is low, so adequate

natural ventilation is sufficient to ensure that the flammable mixture is less than 25 % LFL.

R. BUILDINGS

R.1 General Requirements

R.1.1 Buildings shall be designed and constructed in accordance with applicable legal
requirements. These may include NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, the Uniform Fire Code, the
Uniform Building Code and applicable local codes. Building siting shall be evaluated in
accordance with API RP-752.

Comment R.1.1 Legal requirements. The design engineer should verify all legal
requirements with the local authority having jurisdiction. Many locations have codes in
addition to those listed above.

R.1.2 Smoke detection is required for all occupied buildings. Sprinklers or other fixed fire
protection systems shall be considered for use in all buildings.

Comment R.1.2 Industry practice. The Fire Protection Manual gives guidance on when
sprinklers, CO2 and other fixed fire protection equipment may be appropriate. FPM 2134
and 2200

R.2 Control Houses

Comment R.2. Refer to Section A.1.2.1 in this specification for criteria regarding the use of blast
resistant construction.

R.2.1 The structural members, and the interior and exterior walls of control houses shall be
constructed of noncombustible materials. Combustible wall coverings, wood paneling,
trim, or cabinets shall not be used.

Comment R.2.1 Guideline. The incremental cost of non-combustible construction is low

if included at the beginning of the project. Combustible materials contribute to the fuel
load during a fire. Building code requirements may include fire resistive ratings of one
hour or longer for walls. Because of the reduction/elimination of full flood halon systems, it
is very important to minimize the combustible load in control rooms. FPM 2121

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R.2.2 Control rooms for plants handling flammable liquids or combustible dusts shall not have
windows.

Comment R.2.2 Company requirement. This can provide additional protection against
explosion or fire for the control room and the people inside it. FPM 2121

R.2.3 Buildings which are located next to equipment handling flammable or toxic material, and
which need to be occupied in an emergency, shall be supplied with positive pressure
ventilation in accordance with NFPA 496. The air intake shall be taken from a safe, vapor-
free location at least 25 feet above grade. If flammable or toxic vapors can be drawn in by
the air system, a vapor detection system shall be provided on the air intake. If the control
room is inside a classified area, the system shall alarm in the control house at 20% lower
flammable limit (LFL) and cause automatic shutdown of the ventilation system or start
100% recirculation of the ventilating system at 60% LFL (or threshold limit value of H2S or
other toxic gas).

Comment R.2.3 Industry practice. These levels of alarm on the air intake will prevent
the control room air from reaching the IDLH for either hydrocarbon or H2S, thus providing
a safe haven for personnel in the event of a process upset in the plant area. FPM 2121;
NFPA 496, Chapter 3

R.2.4 A one-hour fire resistive wall shall separate the lab from the control areas. Entry into the
lab shall be through an outside door only. Fire resistive walls shall also separate the
electrical power equipment rooms, kitchen facilities and office areas from the control room,
rack room and computer rooms. Fire resistive walls shall extend from the foundation to the
roof.

Comment R.2.4 Company requirement. The incremental cost is project-specific. Fire

resistive walls extending from the floor slab to the roof protect the control area in the event
of a fire in one of the other areas. Doors between the lab and the control area are not
allowed because they reduce the fire safety of the building. FPM 2121

R.4 Temporary Buildings

R.4.1 Temporary buildings shall be limited to 8000 square feet, per Section 505 of the Uniform
Building Code.

Comment R.4.1 Guideline - may be a legal requirement in some areas. Temporary

buildings include trailers and prefabricated buildings often used as shutdown trailers,
construction offices, temporary offices or storage space. These buildings are usually of
light combustible construction. The size restriction is necessary to reduce the fire risk area.
Multiple buildings of 8000 sq ft can be used if there is 40 feet of separation between each
building. FPM 2140

R.4.2 Skirts shall be provided around elevated portable buildings.

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Comment R.4.2 Guideline - Skirts help prevent the accumulation of combustible

materials underneath the trailer. FPM 2140

R.5 Shops and Garages

R.5.1 If flammable or combustible liquids are to be stored in the building, then the storage space
area shall be in accordance with NFPA 30, Chapter 4.

Comment R.5.1 Industry standard - in some areas, this may be a legal requirement.
NFPA 30 can be used to determine the method and quantity of liquid that can be stored,
access, fire protection and spacing requirements. FPM 2150

R.6 Living Quarters

R.6.1 Sprinklers shall be provided in multi-story living quarters.

Comment R.6.1 Industry standard - may be a legal requirement in some areas. The use
of sprinklers as life safety devices can be supported by insurance statistics.

R.6.2 Fixed dry chemical extinguishing systems shall be installed over cook tops and deep fat
fryers.

Comment R.6.2 Cook tops and fryers can start fires when left unattended.

R.7 Process Buildings

R.7.1 Process buildings shall be of noncombustible construction. Process buildings include

buildings located within plant process areas, as well as all field buildings that contain
hydrocarbon liquid and flammable gas piping and equipment.

Comment R.7.1 Industry standard. Some examples of process buildings are: analyzer
buildings, metering stations, pump stations, compressor buildings, and oil-water separation
stations.

R.7.2 If process buildings are fully enclosed, ventilation shall be provided to prevent the
accumulation of flammable vapors. The building exhaust vents shall be located to preclude
the accumulation of heavier than air vapors at low points, as well as lighter than air vapors
and gases at the ceiling. Detectors shall be provided to warn personnel of a fire and release
of flammable or toxic vapors within the building.

Comment R.7.2 Industry standard. Process buildings should be open on all sides
whenever practical to allow for natural ventilation and access by fire water streams in case
of fire. Ventilation may not required for buildings containing only tight piping systems.
Refer to NFPA 30, Section 5-3.3 for ventilation guidelines.

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R.8 Warehouses

R.8.1 All warehouses shall be designed and constructed per NFPA 231, Standard for General
Storage. The storage of flammable and combustible liquids shall be in accordance with
NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.

Comment R.8.1 Industry standard - may be a legal requirement in some locations.

FPM 3800

R.8.2 Smoke and heat venting shall be provided as calculated per NFPA 204.

Comment R.8.2 Industry standard. Venting can remove the smoke and heat from a
warehouse so that fire fighters can gain access to the seat of the fire. FPM 3820

S. MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

S.1 Drainage

The primary objectives of the drainage system related to fire protection are to:

• isolate flammable liquids from manned areas, ignition sources and equipment
• isolate flammable vapors in drainage piping from ignition sources
• route burning liquids and fire water away from equipment that might rupture and add more fuel
to the fire
• provide clear access and reduce exposure of firefighters to flammable or combustible liquids
floating on fire water
• minimize exposure to adjacent plants or property by conducting leaks/spills to a safe location

S.1.1 References

• Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500.

• Fire Protection Manual, Section 1400

S.1.2 Process Unit Drainage

S.1.2.1 Surface Drainage

S.1.2.1.1 Surface drainage shall be designed to quickly remove spilled liquids

out from under pipeways, air coolers and overhead vessels; and away from oil
handling equipment such as pumps, manifolds and vessels. Areas shall be
sectioned to prevent the spread of a spill to other areas. Drainage patterns should
minimize pooling of liquid near equipment.

S.1.2.1.2 Place high points in the grade as follows:

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• at the centerline of overhead pipeways or support structures

• between critical equipment and its spare
• between pumps handling flammable liquid and adjacent equipment
• through buildings
• on the centerlines of roads or access ways surrounding the plants
• personnel escape and emergency response access routes

Comment S.1.2.1.1/S.1.2.1.2 Company requirement. There is no additional

costs for these provisions if accounted for at the beginning of the project. Design
criteria for sectioning, sloping and draining a process area can be found in the
Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500.

S.1.2.2 Underground Drainage

Comment S.1.2.2 It is up to the individual operating location to determine the

type of underground drainage systems which should be used (i.e. segregated,
unsegregated, etc.). This section does not address that consideration.

S.1.2.2.1 Drainage trenches shall not be used in process areas.

Comment S.1.2.2.1 Company requirement. Trenches have been considered as a

means of secondary containment for process drains. Trenches can transmit
leaks/spills from one part of a facility to another part potentially spreading the fire
and increasing damage. Installing a system to foam the trench is not adequate
mitigation of this significant risk.

S.1.2.2.2 Drainage systems designed to contain spills on site shall have the
capability of being routed to the sewer in the event of a fire emergency. Valves
shall be accessible and well-labeled.

Comment S.1.2.2.2 Industry practice. Routing the surface run-off directly to the
sewer in a fire emergency can eliminate the possibility of backing up liquid and
floating burning liquid throughout the process area, decreasing the risk to
emergency response personnel and the potential for damage.

S.1.2.2.3 Catch basins and drain lines shall be sized for the maximum fire water
application rate or the design rainfall - whichever is greater.

Comment S.1.2.2.3 Industry Practice. Normally, fire water flow dictates the
hydraulic design of the drainage lines. A fire water flow of 0.20 gpm per square
foot is the rate generally required to absorb the heat of a hydrocarbon spill fire.
This fire water rate corresponds to catch basin design capacities of 500 gpm for a
50 foot square area or 1125 gpm for a 75 foot square area.

Mains are normally designed to carry away the maximum fire water rate. Larger
catch basins or drain lines may be needed in plants or around equipment with high
capacity fixed fire water systems.

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The Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500, should be consulted for the
hydraulic design of drainage systems.

S.1.2.2.4 Catch basins, manholes and drain lines should be gas-sealed as

follows:

• All oily water drains or process area catch basins should be individually gas-
sealed, except that up to 6 drains can be connected unsealed to a common
lateral if the drains are in "line of sight" and serve equipment of similar service.
In this situation the lateral must be sealed at its first connection to another line
or manhole.
• Branches or laterals in oily water systems must enter main lines through a gas-
sealed manhole.
• Branches or laterals in clean or storm water systems may enter main lines
without gas seals if sealed catch basins are used.
• Main lines may intersect without seals if upstream catch basins or manholes
are gas-sealed.
• Main lines leaving a plot limit must be gas-sealed at the first offplot manhole.
• Oil-water separators should be gas-sealed from both inlet and outlet drain
lines.

Comment S.1.2.2.4 Guidelines. The incremental costs are project-specific. Gas

sealing is needed to prevent vapors released in one part of the facility from
spreading through the drainage system to other parts of the facility. Separators
should be sealed to prevent fire and explosions from propagating through the
system back to the separators.

S.1.2.2.5 Catch basins shall be designed so that they can be checked

periodically to verify that the liquid seal is in place. P-trap seals should not be
used.

Comment S.1.2.2.5 Guidelines. There are nominal incremental costs for catch
basins vs. P-traps. Standard Drawing GC-S78325 in the Civil and Structural
Manual shows a cast iron liquid sealed catch basin. P-trap seals are very difficult
to clean and to visually determine that there is a liquid seal.

S.1.2.2.6 Manholes shall be vented to a safe location.

Comment S.1.2.2.6 Industry practice. Venting is needed to relieve pressure and

to prevent the accumulation of flammable vapors. The Civil and Structural
Manual, Section 537 contains guidelines for location and sizing of manhole vents.

S.1.3 Offplot Drainage

S.1.3.1 Drainage in tank fields is covered in Section D.

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S.1.3.2 Pipeway Drainage

S.1.3.2.1 The surface under a below grade or grade level pipeway shall slope to
a point on the outside edge of the pipeway with a minimum of a 1% slope.
Drainage shall be away from instrument leads and power cables.

Comment S.1.3.2.1 Guideline. This entails no additional cost if accounted for at

the beginning of the project. Sloping to one side results in spilled liquids quickly
draining out from under lines minimizing the risk of line rupture in the event of a
spill fire. FPM 1440

S.1.3.2.2 For below grade pipeways, fire stops shall be installed every 300 to
500 feet of pipeway. Each section separated by fire stops shall have a drain inlet to
carry the liquid away.

Comment S.1.3.2.2 Guideline. Additional costs are project-specific. Fire stops

can prevent the spread of spilled liquid or fire to other sections of the pipeway
minimizing the risk to the rest of the pipeway and to adjacent facilities. FPM 1440

S.2 Pressure Relief and Venting

S.2.1 Industry Standards and Codes

Pressure relief and venting systems shall be designed, fabricated, and installed in
accordance with:

API RP 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing
of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms
API RP 520 Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of Pressure
Relieving Systems in Refineries
API RP 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII

Comment S.2.1 Industry standard. The following documents are intended for guidance,
but may also be enforced locally (e.g., in the form of state safety orders). The design
engineer should verify compliance with all appropriate federal, state, and local codes:

API Std. 526 Flanged Steel Safety-Relief Valves

API Std. 527 Commercial Seat Tightness of Safety Relief Valve with
Metal-to-Metal Seat
API Std. 2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks
NFPA-30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, Chapter 2,
"Tank Storage"
API Std. 2510A Design and Construction of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Installations

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S.2.2 Design Basis

S.2.2.1 The single emergency that results in the largest load on the relief and venting
system shall be the basis for design for the relief system.

Comment S.2.2.1 Industry standard. The single emergency that results in the
largest load on the relief and venting system is the basis for design because the size
and cost of facilities would be excessive if they were designed to handle every
conceivable emergency simultaneously. Fire, loss of cooling water, loss of power,
are examples of typical design bases. Note that the "worst case" emergency for a
single piece of equipment may be different than that for an entire relief system.
FPM 1910; API 520, 5.2

S.2.2.2 A relief valve protecting multiple vessels shall be designed as if it was protecting a
single vessel with the surface area and volume of all vessels combined.

Comment S.2.2.2 Industry standard. When more than one vessel is protected by
a single relief valve, the combined wetted surface - below 25 feet - of all the vessels
connected to the single relief valve is used in computing heat input from fire.
(FPM 1912, API 520, 5.2)

S.2.2.3 Thermal relief shall be provided on all piping that can be blocked in if no valve
leakage is expected. Thermal relief shall also be provided on all piping confined
by valves where leakage past the valve can be expected, but there is more than 200
feet of pipe per valve; on lines and valves that are steam or electrically traced, and
may be blocked closed; and on four inch and larger double seated (block and
bleed) valves with interference fit bonnet seals.

Comment S.2.2.3 Industry standards. The 200 feet per valve rule is a Company
guideline. High pressures from thermal expansion can occur in completely filled
lines and valve bodies. This can result in a fire hazard if piping rupture and
product spillage occurs. Thermal pressure relief should be provided
commensurate with risk.

Thermal relief valves should be installed with maintenance block valves,

particularly if the thermal relief valve piping bridges the first block valve off a
tank. The maintenance block valves should be locked or sealed in the open
position. Piping systems designed with multiple thermal relief valves must be
designed to compensate for excessive back pressure. ICM 1260; API 521.

S.2.3 Layout and Spacing

S.2.3.1 All relief systems shall vent to safe locations. Discharge points shall be located
and oriented so that flammable concentrations do not reach people or ignition
sources.

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Process vent lines and vent stacks shall discharge vertically a minimum of seven
feet above the highest platform within a 10-foot radius of the vent outlet, or three
feet above the equipment being vented. Such vent lines shall be properly supported
and braced, with no caps, bends or obstructions in the discharge path. 3/8"
diameter drain holes should be provided at the low point of the discharge stack to
prevent liquid or ice accumulation in the relief valve discharge piping.

Comment S.2.3.1 Company requirements. There are nominal additional costs.

Atmospheric discharge systems must be designed to avoid exposing workers to
toxic substances and the radiant heat from a fire. Likewise, nearby equipment
should not be exposed to radiant heat from a relief vent fire. Dispersion modeling
can be performed if there is concern that flammable mixtures may form near
ignition sources.

Discharge from vents and vent stacks should not be directed towards personnel or
equipment. If larger than 3/8", the relief discharge piping drain hole should be
directed away from the vessel and piping being protected to prevent possible flame
impingement in case of a fire. The 3/8" drain hole prevents corrosion from
plugging the hole. FPM 1920; API 521

S.2.4 Relief Valve Piping Design

S.2.4.1 The following are acceptable isolations for relief valves:

• single relief valve with no block valve between it and the protected system if
protected equipment can be removed from service for relief system testing and
maintenance.
• single relief valve with a block valve between it and the protected system with
the block valve positively locked open.
• Dual full capacity relief valves, with individual block valves or tied into a
three-way valve, for critical or hard-to-isolate equipment.

Comment S.2.4.1 Industry standard. Block valves under relief valves allow
inspection and maintenance without taking the protected equipment out of service.
However, management must have strict control over the closure of block valves,
and maintain a program of regular inspection to ensure block valves remain open.

Relief valve isolation methods should meet the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, Paragraph UG-135, and Appendix M requirements. FPM 1913 and 1916

S.2.4.2 Relief system block valves shall be designed and installed to prevent failure in the
closed position.

Comment S.2.4.2 Industry standard. Examples of installations that will not fail
in the closed position include:

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• A gate valve or slide (knife) gate valve installed with the stem at or below the
horizontal position.
• A slide gate with its stem above the horizontal position with a positive,
secondary, and externally visible device provided to fix the wedge in the open
position, such as a locked pin through the body and gate.
• A globe valve installed with the pressure source under the disc.
• A quarter turn valve (e.g., plug, butterfly, or ball) with a permanent position
indicator positively secured to the stem. API 521

S.2.4.3 Where LPG (and other vaporizing liquids) will be discharged into the relief system,
the piping and knockout drum materials shall be suitable for auto-refrigeration
temperatures.

Comment S.2.4.3 Industry standard. Auto-refrigeration occurs as vapor (or a

flashing liquid such as LPG) passes through a relief valve. As a consequence, the
cold vapors also cool the piping and vessels that they are exposed to. The piping
and vessels need to be designed for the auto-refrigeration temperatures to prevent
loss of ductility and possible brittle fracture. Check valves are not recommended
in cold climates because the trim can freeze in the closed position. FPM 1914;
API 521

S.2.4.4 When rupture disks are used under relief valves to shield the valves from corrosive
fluids, the rupture disk assemblies shall not interfere with the normal operation of
the valves they are protecting. Rupture disks shall be non-fragmenting.

Comment S.2.4.4 Industry standard. Some types of rupture disks are composed
of a scored plate of carbon material which fractures on overpressure. The pieces
of carbon may block the relief valve inlet and prevent it from functioning correctly.
ASME Section VIII Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, UG-127

S.2.5 Relief System and Flare Design

S.2.5.1 Relief systems shall contain at least one knockout drum, located upstream of the
flare stack. The liquid disposal system shall be designed for the knockout drum to
operate without a liquid level under normal conditions, and shall be sized so that
not more than half the usable drum volume is filled, assuming a 10 minute
maximum discharge through the drum. The knockout drum shall have a high level
alarm separate from the level control system.

Comment S.2.5.1 Industry standard. Relief streams from process plants should
be assumed to contain liquids. Flares are designed to burn vapors only. If liquids
are carried over into the flare, the flare may discharge burning liquids out the top.
It's common to locate knockout drums in relief piping near the plot limits of
individual plants in addition to the one at the flare. Also, it is often appropriate to
provide a single knockout drum for a group of plants. API 521

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S.2.5.2 Flares shall be equipped with a flame barrier designed to prevent flashback into the
relief system (e.g., liquid seal or flame arrestor). Detonation arrestors shall be used
when the arrestor cannot be installed near (<15 feet) the end of the pipe.

Comment S.2.5.2 Industry standard. Liquid seals provide the final vapor-liquid
separation before the flare stack and prevent the entry of air into the relief system.
They also prevent flame propagation into the relief system if ignition does occur.
Both liquid and molecular seals are acceptable. The depth of liquid seal is
commonly 6" for ground flares and 2 feet for elevated flares. Ground flares
connected to an alternate elevated flare for over-capacity protection may use a
double seal design to divert excess gas to the elevated flare.

Refer to Fire Protection Manual section 1900 for selection and spacing of flame
arresting devices. Flame arrestors installed in the line greater than 15 feet from
the end of the line may pass flame unless they are designed as detonation
arrestors. API 521; ICM 1200; FPM 1940

S.3 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

S.3.1 Fire Water System Design

Projects which involve significant changes to the fire water system (i.e. changes or additions
to the fire water main, sprinkler systems, etc.) shall review the design and material selection
with the authority having jurisdiction.

Comment S.3.1 This section provides guidance on design of fire water systems for
process plants. Remote, non-critical or low value facilities may not require a fire water
system. In many locations, the local fire department is the "authority having juris-diction"
especially if they routinely respond in the event of a fire. The insurance carriers also
require a review of projects involving major changes to the fire water system.

S.3.1.1 The capacity of the facility fire water system shall be designed to handle the largest
single fire contingency for a four hour duration. If an existing firewater system will
be used by a project, the existing system shall be flow tested at the tie-in points to
determine that there is sufficient capacity to handle the largest single fire
contingency of the project.

Comment S.3.1.1 Guideline. The largest single fire contingency is based on the
largest single process unit fire or on the largest tank fire scenario whichever is
greater. If two process units are less than 50 feet apart, then the combined area
should be considered a single fire area. See Section D for tank firewater
requirements. The flow testing is needed to determine whether adequate water is
available to handle any potential hazards resulting from the project. FPM 1620

S.3.1.2 The firewater system shall be dedicated to firewater use only.

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Comment S.3.1.2 Company requirement. Using firewater for process

operations or cooling may lead to contamination of the firewater or reduce the
amount of firewater available in an emergency. Also, it could lead to a severe
process upset when fire water is used, causing a process water pressure drop.
Temporary connections to firewater systems shall be in accordance with Section
B.5. FPM 1620

S.3.2 Fire Water Pumps

Projects which require additional firewater pumps or pumping capacity shall be in

accordance with the Fire Protection Manual, Section 1631, and NFPA 20. New fire water
pumps shall be designed with flow meters to facilitate flow testing the pumps.

Comment S.3.2 Industry standard. Flow testing is generally not performed unless flow
meters are installed.

S.3.3 Fire Water Piping

S.3.3.1 Steel pipe shall be used above ground. Underground piping systems should be
constructed of steel, lined steel, or FM-approved high density polyethylene
(HDPE). Underground steel pipe shall be externally coated for corrosion
resistance.

Comment S.3.3.1 Guideline. Local approval authorities may require

compliance with NFPA 24 "Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their
Appurtenances." HDPE piping is recommended for underground service only.
Piping in salt water systems may require internal coating. FPM 1630; NFPA 20,
2-14

S.3.3.2 Fire water mains shall be arranged in loops around each process unit and major
tank field area. Shutoff valves shall be located to allow isolation of individual
segments of the system for maintenance. Each segment may include up to 6
monitor and hydrant connections. The loops shall be sized to provide a minimum
of 60 percent of the design flow rate to a process area with one segment of the loop
out of service.

Comment S.3.3.2 Industry practice and contractor standard. The looped

system is needed to allow future maintenance on parts of the system without taking
the entire system out-of-service. FPM 1630.

S.3.3.3 The fire water piping shall be designed to deliver the design flow rate at 100 psig at
the furthest hydrant.

Comment S.3.3.3 Guideline. This provision allows portable or fixed monitors to

be used without boosting. FPM 1633

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S.3.3.4 Fire water mains and headers looping facilities shall be 8 inch minimum. Laterals
supplying single hydrants or monitors shall be 6 inch minimum. Each process area
shall be provided with a 4 inch minimum header to serve first aid hose stations.
Branch lines to hose stations shall be 2 inch minimum. The pipe diameters shall be
increased one size to allow for deposits and scale buildup in firewater systems
using salt water.

Comment S.3.3.4 Guideline. These sizes are the minimum sizes which can
provide the required flow rates and pressures. FPM 1630

S.3.3.4 When installed aboveground, firewater pipe shall be located where the risk of
damage from fire, explosions or mechanical damage from vehicles is minimized.

S.3.4 Fire Water Hydrants

S.3.4.1 In freezing climates, the dry-barrel type hydrant shall be installed.

S.3.4.2 Fire water hydrants shall have a minimum of one 4 1/2 inch outlet and two 2 1/2
inch outlets. Each 2 1/2 inch hydrant outlet shall be individually valved, so that
each hose can be controlled separately. Connections shall be compatible (without
the use of adapters) with the emergency responders' equipment.

Comment S.3.4.2 Guideline. Commercial or shop-fabricated hydrants may be

used. Consider Standard Drawing GD-99621 for design of shop fabricated fire
hydrants. Threaded connections should permit interconnection with local
emergency responders. National Hose Threads should be used in the absence of
other guidance. The 4 1/2 inch connection can be used for suction by fire trucks.
In facilities with no fire truck response, the 4 1/2 inch connection is unnecessary.
FPM 1630

S.3.4.3 Hydrants shall be spaced so that any plant area is within reach of two hydrants by
hoses of 250 feet maximum length. Hydrants shall be located at least 50 feet from
buildings or the process equipment to be protected.

Comment S.3.4.3 Guideline. Generally, this means that hydrants should be

placed on each street corner and if the distance between each hydrant is more than
300 feet, another hydrant should be placed in the middle. Hoses of greater lengths
may be difficult to handle in plant areas. Fire water equipment should be far
enough away from the hazard area to allow operation in an emergency. FPM
1630

S.3.4.4 In tank fields, hydrants shall be located as described in Section D.3.

S.3.5 Fire Water Equipment

S.3.5.1 1 1/4 inch first aid hose reels shall be located not closer than 20 feet from process
equipment or buildings they are protecting. Hose reels shall be located so that all

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process areas, loading racks and manifolds are within 100 feet of two hoses. First
aid water hose nozzles shall be 60 gpm rated.

Comment S.3.5.1 Guideline. First aid hose reels can be operated by one person
to fight small, incipient stage fires. Lengths longer than 100 feet are difficult for
one person to handle. Hose reels are preferred due to ease of use. Responders
only need to pull out the length of hose necessary and the system is immediately
charged with water. Folded hoses require pulling out all of the hose and laying it
down before charging with water. FPM 1640; GD-S99633

S.3.5.2 Fire water monitors, where required, shall be located between 40 and 70 feet from
the hazard to be protected.

Comment S.3.5.2 Guideline. Monitors are used in high risk, high value
facilities, where personnel for fire control is limited or for the protection of a
specific risk within a plant (such as fire hazardous equipment or vessels containing
large holdups of flammable liquid). Consider the use of pilot-activated Inbal
valves to isolate monitors FPM 1640

S.3.6 Foam Systems

S.3.6.1 Foam systems shall be designed and constructed in accordance with NFPA 11
"Foam Extinguishing Systems," NFPA 11A, "High Expansion Foam Systems," and
NFPA 11B, "Synthetic Foam and Combined Agent Systems."

Comment S.3.6.1 Industry standard. Foam is used primarily for extinguishment

of liquid pool fires, sumps or trenches, tanks, and fires on offshore platforms.
Consider Section 1650 of the Fire Protection Manual for a discussion of the
different types of foam available. Consider Section D for the tank foam system
requirements.

S.3.6.2 Foam hose reels shall be installed in areas where the primary hazard is from leaks
and spill fires.

Comment S.3.6.2 Guideline. Refer to Std. Dwg. No. GD-S1093 for foam hose
reel design. FPM 1652

S.3.7 Portable Fire Extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers shall be located between 20 and 50 feet from the risk to be
protected. Extinguishers shall be easily accessible, located near doors and exits, and shall
be conspicuously marked. Extinguishers shall be set at least 4 inches off the floor or
ground.

Comment S.3.7: Guideline. Consider Figure 1600-19 in the Fire Protection Manual for
guidance in selecting the type of fire extinguisher. NFPA 10, Life Safety Code, lists the

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travel distance requirements for buildings. Locations shall be clearly marked to alert
personnel in the event that an extinguisher is missing. FPM 1660; NFPA 10

S.3.8 Fixed Water Spray Systems

S.3.8.1 Fixed water spray systems shall be designed and constructed per NFPA 15 and API
2510. Deluge systems shall be designed per API 2510. Sprinkler systems shall be
designed and constructed per NFPA 13.

S.3.8.2 Fixed water spray systems shall be located in the following areas:

• Uninsulated vessels containing 2,500 gallons or more of flammable liquid

where monitor streams cannot reach all exposed surfaces that are above the
normal liquid level.
• Pumps or other mechanical equipment that contain liquids that are above their
auto-ignition temperature or 600°F, or mechanical equipment containing
volatile liquid that is located under pipeways, air coolers or other high value
equipment.

Comment S.3.8.2: Guideline. The incremental costs are project-specific. Water

sprays can provide cooling, limiting the extent of damage and exposure to
overhead equipment. Other possible locations for water spray systems include:
over critical equipment located on offshore production platforms, or over critical
equipment in unattended facilities where personnel for fire fighting may not be
immediately available. Use of water sprays should be considered when sizing
drainage systems, refer to Section S.1. For insulated vessels in fire risk areas,
where the insulation is designed to handle a fire scenario, water sprays are not
needed. FPM 1670

S.3.8.3 Spray systems for pumps and other mechanical equipment shall be designed to
deliver a minimum of 0.5 gpm per square foot of area covered. Sprays shall be
designed to protect the process end of the pump assembly including shafts, packing
glands, connections, and other critical parts.

Comment S.3.8.3 Industry standard. The area covered equals the area of the
nozzle's circle of coverage at the pump centerline. Refer to Figure 1600-23 in the
Fire Protection Manual for details. Double-ended pumps require two nozzles for
adequate coverage. Sprays can be activated manually from a safe location or by
fusible plugs installed near the seal area. FPM 1670; NFPA 15

S.3.8.4 Spray systems for vertical vessels shall be designed to deliver a minimum of 0.25
gpm per square foot of exposed uninsulated surface. Spray systems for horizontal
vessels shall be designed to deliver a minimum of 0.25 gpm per square foot of
uninsulated surface area above the lowest operating level of the vessel. The design
can allow for rundown in accordance with API 2510, 8.5.4.2.

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Comment S.3.8.4 Industry standard. Company and industry guidelines give

credit for rundown from the upper half of the vessel to the lower half although
NFPA 15, "Water Spray Fixed Systems" does not. FPM 1670; API 2510, 8.5.4.2

S.3.8.5 Water spray nozzles shall be installed in accordance with API 2510, 8.5.4.
Additionally, a drain valve shall be provided at grade and the piping shall be sloped
to provide gravity drainage. The system shall be designed without low points
which can trap water and increase scaling.

Comment S.3.8.5 Guideline. The drain valve and sloped line can prevent water
accumulation in the line and plugging of the nozzles. Refer to Figure 1600-24 in
the Fire Protection Manual for additional details. In unmanned facilities,
automatic activation of water sprays is recommended. Consider using quick-
opening valves such as the Inbal for activation of water sprays. FPM 1670; API
2510, 8.5.4

S.3.9 Halon Extinguishing Systems

Halon shall not be used unless approved by the Company.

Comment S.3.9 Company requirement. Both the Montreal Protocol and the Clean Air
Act require that the production of Halon be phased out due to its depletion of the ozone
layer. Halon should not be used in new facilities except where life safety is a factor and
after review by the CRTC Fire and Process Safety Team. FPM 1670

S.3.10 CO2 Extinguishing Systems

Fixed CO2 extinguishing systems shall be designed and constructed per NFPA 12 "Carbon
Dioxide Extinguishing Systems."

Comment S.3.10 Industry standard. CO2 will not sustain life and should not be used for
locations where personnel can be expected. CO2 may be appropriate for use on small
turbine enclosures and under floor areas. The CRTC Fire and Process Safety Team should
be consulted before using CO2 in areas accessible to people. FPM 1670

Page 68 of 68 January 1997

Appendix H. Building Siting Assessments

Abstract
This appendix gives supplemental guidelines for API RP 752 - Management of
Hazards Associated with Process Plant Buildings. It was developed by CRTC’s
Process Risk Team.

Contents Page

H1.0 Building Siting Assessment Overview H-2

H1.1 API RP 752 Methodology
H1.2 Study Team Members
H1.3 Study Timing
H2.0 Stage 1 - Hazard Assessment H-4
H2.1 Building Identification
H2.2 Hazard Screening
H2.3 Occupancy/Function Screening
H2.4 Recommendations
H3.0 Stage 2 - Building Evaluation H-7
H3.1 Toxic Hazards
H3.2 Explosion Hazards
H3.3 Fire Hazard
H4.0 Stage 3 - Risk Assessment H-13
H4.1 Risk Assessment Team
H4.2 Qualitative Evaluation
H5.0 Documentation and Follow-up H-15
H6.0 References H-16

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H1.0 Building Siting Assessment Overview

Building Siting Assessments are performed to provide a better understanding of
potential exposure to incidents by building occupants. Assessments are also
performed to meet the “facility siting” component of the plant Process Hazards Anal-
ysis as required by OSHA 1910.119(e). Following the methodology in API RP 752
“Management of Hazards Associated with the Location of Process Plant Buildings,”
the assessment includes a review of each building at the facility. Each building is
evaluated for hazard, function and occupancy levels, and consequence modeling is
performed for those buildings which exceed the screening criteria. Where necessary,
recommendations are made to reduce the risk to building occupants.

H1.1 API RP 752 Methodology

The study methodology is described in API RP 752 “Management of Hazards Asso-
ciated with the Location of Process Plant Buildings.” API RP 752 outlines a three-
stage analysis process for identifying hazards and managing risk to building occu-
pants from explosions, toxic releases, and fires.
The staged approach systematically identifies and evaluates buildings in which
occupants may be at risk. As the study progresses through each stage, the analysis
becomes more complex. At each stage, buildings are screened out of further study if
it is determined that the risk to occupants is below predetermined screening criteria.

Stage 1
Hazard Identification
Occupancy/Function
Screen

Stage 2
Building Evaluation
Consequence
Modeling

Stage 3
Risk Assessment
Qualitative and/or
Quantitative

Stage 1 - Building and Hazard Identification

During Stage 1, the study team identifies each process plant building, defined as
any building in the facility, temporary or permanent, that may be occupied during a
release from a process area. The team then identifies whether a hazard exists at
each building due to fire, toxic release, or explosion. Hazards are identified by
comparing the hazard screening criteria against the building location and process
conditions. (See Section H2.2, hazard screening criteria). Buildings that meet the

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hazard criteria are evaluated for occupancy and function. Other buildings are
exempt from further evaluation.
Occupancy data is gathered for each building to determine the peak occupancy load
and the average occupancy level (hrs/wk). Building function is evaluated to deter-
mine if a building must be occupied during an incident for safe shutdown of the
facility or if a building is designated as an emergency response shelter. The occu-
pancy data is then compared against the occupancy/function screening criteria (See
Section H2.3). Buildings that exceed the criteria proceed to Stage 2 - Building Eval-
uation. Buildings that do not meet the criteria are exempt from further evaluation.

Stage 2 - Building Evaluation

During Stage 2, the buildings that met the previous screening criteria are evaluated
with consequence modeling for explosion and toxic release hazards, and/or are eval-
uated against a checklist for fire hazards. The study team reviews P&ID and
process flow data to select representative release scenarios in each process area.
Each release scenario is then modeled. For toxic release hazards the team deter-
mines the maximum potential toxic concentration at each affected building and the
time required to reach the ERPG-2 concentration. For explosion hazards, the poten-
tial blast overpressure at each building is determined. This modeling information is
then used to determine potential personnel exposure and what recommendations, if
any, should be made to reduce the risk. Recommendations may include building
modifications, emergency response changes, changes to the building function and
occupancy, or process plant modifications.
The team may determine that some buildings have a sufficient hazard and occu-
pancy level that a Stage 3 risk assessment is justified. Typically, this is used in
explosion cases only, where it may not be possible to evacuate large occupancy
buildings in a timely manner, and recommendations that could lower the hazard
level involve extremely costly building modifications/relocations.

Stage 3 - Risk Assessment

During Stage 3, a team is convened at the facility to analyze the potential scenarios
in a semi-quantitative manner. Using the scenarios developed in Stage 2, the team
reviews the predicted consequences. The team develops possible causes for each
scenario as well as the applicable safeguards. The team also reviews previous inci-
dent history within the Company and industry to estimate the frequency of the
scenario. Using a risk ranking matrix, the team then determines whether risk reduc-
tion is required for the scenario. Mitigation and/or prevention options are proposed
to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or severity of the consequences for each
scenario. This is the final evaluation step in the API RP 752 Building Siting Assess-
ment methodology.

H1.2 Study Team Members

The building assessment study should be done by a team with the following
training and experience. One team member can perform more than one of these
functions:

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Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

• Facility representative with knowledge in the plant process and operations.

• A member with training in the application of API RP 752. (Both API and
CRTC offer one day training courses. Contact the CRTC Process Risk Team.)
• Dispersion modeling should be done by CRTC or an approved outside
consultant.

H1.3 Study Timing

It is more efficient to perform one building siting assessment for the entire facility,
since most of the modeling done in Stage 2 will affect multiple buildings.
Completing the study one process unit at a time, or one building at a time, is
possible but may involve extensive duplication of effort.
One use of Building Siting Assessments is to meet the “facility siting” requirement
of Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) in OSHA’s PSM rule. These Building Siting
Assessments should be completed within the timeframe allowed for completing the
facility PHA’s. There are three exceptions:
1. Some facilities have already identified a significant risk to a building through
an initial plant PHA. These facilities should proceed with a building siting
assessment as soon as practical.
2. Where a new building is being constructed or a major modification is planned
to a building or process, a siting assessment should be completed during the
feasibility phase, prior to detailed design.
3. Where a facility can document that a building assessment was already
completed during the plant PHA, or during design/construction, a new assess-
ment is not required. The original assessment must have included toxic and
explosion modeling. During PHA revalidation, the original assessment should
be reviewed and upgraded as necessary to meet the specific requirements in
these guidelines.
The building siting assessment may produce recommendations that are time
consuming to implement. (e.g. moving occupants, or construction of a new
building). As with any other PHA or risk management decision, all recommenda-
tions should be addressed in a timely manner, with responsibility assigned for each
recommendation and the actions tracked to completion.

H2.0 Stage 1 - Hazard Assessment

In Stage 1 of the building assessment the facility identifies whether hazards exist at
each building due to fire, toxic release, or explosion (Refer to Figure H-1). Hazards
are identified by comparing the hazard screening criteria against the building loca-
tion and process conditions. Occupancy data is gathered for each building to deter-
mine the peak occupancy load and the average occupancy level (hrs/wk). Building
function during an incident is also evaluated. The study team then compares the

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Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

Fig. H-1 Stage 1 - Hazard/Occupancy Screening Flowchart

Is
building
routinely No
occupied?
See Section H2.1

Yes

Is
there a toxic, No further
fire, or explosion No
evaluation
hazard?
See Section H2.2

Yes

Is occupancy
Yes
> 400 hrs/wk?
See Section H2.3

No

Is peak
Yes occupancy
> 40/one hr?
See Section H2.3

No

Must the
building be
Yes
occupied during
an incident?
See Section H2.3

No

Verify building has

Stage 2 emergency response plan
Building Evaluation for identified hazards that
required includes sufficient warning
and appropriate evacuation

Chevron Corporation H-5 January 1997

Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

occupancy data against the occupancy/function screening criteria. Comparison with

the screening criteria determines the need for Stage 2 consequence modeling.

H2.1 Building Identification

As the first step, the list of buildings should be developed. A building can be
defined as having a roof and 75% of the perimeter enclosed. (Some enclosed
smoking posts are buildings.) Every building in the facility that could be occupied
during a release should be listed. One rule of thumb - if there is a chair in the
building it should be listed. For example, if a substation receives periodic mainte-
nance only, then it does not need to be listed. If, however, it contains a desk and
chair, then personnel probably spend some additional time in the building and it
should be included in the list. Low occupancy buildings will be quickly screened
out of the study, so if there is any question about a building, include it in the initial
list. Both temporary and permanent buildings should be included in the building list.

H2.2 Hazard Screening

Once the building list is developed, the next step is to identify the hazards associ-
ated with each building. API RP 752 addresses three types of hazards: explosions,
toxic releases and fires.
• Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) - A building has a potential VCE hazard if
process streams in the facility contain C2’s, C3’s, or C4’s. A VCE hazard
should also be identified if heavier hydrocarbons are processed at temperatures
higher than their flash point.
• Physical Explosion - A building has a potential physical explosion hazard if the
process contains exothermic chemical reactions that could runaway, with a
corresponding vessel rupture. BLEVE’s are not addressed because these are
typically secondary events that occur after a vessel is exposed to fire for a
significant period of time.
• Fire - A building has a potential fire hazard if the building is located less than
50 feet from process areas containing flammable liquids or gases, (or combus-
tible liquids at temperatures greater than their flash point).
• Toxic Release - A building has a toxic hazard if the facility stores or uses
highly hazardous chemicals as defined by OSHA PSM rule 29CFR 1910.119
or EPA RMP rule. (e.g. H2S, Ammonia, Chlorine) A complete chemical list is
available from the Process Risk team. If the state or local community has iden-
tified other highly hazardous chemicals, these should also be included as toxic
hazards.
Note Exception - if a process stream contains less than the ERPG-2 level for a
chemical. ERPG levels are described in Section H3.1.2.

January 1997 H-6 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

H2.3 Occupancy/Function Screening

Each building is now compared against the occupancy screening criteria. The
following screening criteria were developed based on the industry screening levels
described in API RP 752.
• Occupied >400 hours per week, or
• Occupied by >40 people for one hour, or
• Required occupancy during an incident for safe shutdown of the facility, or
• Designated as emergency response shelter
Examples of buildings that meet the above criteria are:
1. A maintenance shop that has 10 full time employees. (10x40 =400 hrs/wk
occupancy)
2. A control room that is occupied round the clock by 3 people.
(3x24x7=504 hrs/wk)
3. A cafeteria that is used for safety meetings attended by 50 people each month
4. A control room that must be occupied during emergency shutdown of the
process area
5. A safety building designated as the incident command center

H2.4 Recommendations
Buildings that meet the hazard and occupancy/function criteria proceed to Stage 2
to be evaluated with consequence modeling (for explosion & toxic hazards) or eval-
uated against a checklist of Company design standards (for fire hazards).
Buildings that do not meet the criteria are exempt from further evaluation in the
study. These buildings should be reviewed to ensure that the emergency response
plan addresses the identified hazard, including appropriate notification and evacua-
tion. For example, if a chlorine hazard is identified for a small maintenance
building with one occupant, there is an identified hazard, but low occupancy. This
building would not be subject to Stage 2 consequence modeling, but there should
be an emergency response plan that details how the building occupant would be
alerted in the event of a chlorine leak and the appropriate response. Typical docu-
mentation of Stage 1 findings are shown in Figure H-2.

H3.0 Stage 2 - Building Evaluation

During Stage 2 of the assessment, buildings are evaluated that exceeded the
previous Stage 1 screening criteria. Consequence modeling is performed for the
identified hazards which could impact these buildings. P&ID’s and process flow
data are reviewed to select representative release scenarios in each process area.
Each release scenario is then modeled. For selected toxic release scenarios, the
maximum potential toxic concentration is determined for each affected building.
For explosion hazards, the potential blast overpressure level and duration at each

Chevron Corporation H-7 January 1997

Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

building is calculated. For fire hazards, the building is evaluated using a checklist of
Company design standards.

Fig. H-2 Preliminary Hazard Screening

Building Hazard Occupancy Recommendation
Administration VCE, Toxic (H2S) >400 hrs/wk Further evaluation with consequence
>40 people in one hr modeling
Control House/Lab VCE, Toxic (H2S) >400 hrs/wk Further evaluation with consequence
Occupied during modeling
plant shutdown
Maintenance Shop VCE, Toxic (H2S & Does not meet No further evaluation in this study
Ammonia) criteria Verify building has emergency response
plan for release incidents that includes suffi-
cient warning and appropriate evacuation
procedures

H3.1 Toxic Hazards

Dispersion modeling should be performed using an approved computer model. At
this time, only the QuestFocus Consequence Modeling Package is recommended.
(licensed by Quest Consultants Inc. of Norman, OK) This comprehensive software
package is a collection of thermodynamic, fluid flow, atmospheric dispersion and
other algorithms. These sub-models are systematically coupled together and, as a
software package, can predict the consequences of various hazardous release
scenarios. For example, a jet dispersion model may be used to account for the
turbulence and mixing during the initial stage of the release. Once the jet
momentum dissipates and the released material plume is moving downwind at the
same speed as the wind, the model transitions to a dense gas model. Dense gas
models are applicable to releases with little or no momentum and involve plumes
which are heavier than air. These releases tend to drop or slump toward the ground
and spread out as they collapse. Refer to Section 1200 of the Fire Protection
Manual for additional information on dispersion modeling.

Release Scenarios
The release scenarios to be modeled should include a 2 inch hole in any piping
system or equipment identified as having a toxic hazard potential.
Note Exception: the maximum piping size should be used if it is less than 2 inch
Although small flange and seal leaks and small piping breaks (<3/4 inch) are more
likely scenarios, 2 inch releases have occurred within the Company on a yearly
basis. Larger releases from line breaks are extremely rare events and as such, are
not credible scenarios for building design. Potential leak sources should include
underground piping. Atmospheric vents and atmospheric relief valve discharges
should be modeled as well. A range of weather stability and wind speeds should be
modeled for each release point. Often, the most severe scenario involves “F” atmo-
spheric stability and 5 mph winds, conditions that might be found during a calm,
cool night or early morning. Inputs to the dispersion modeling program include:

January 1997 H-8 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

• Analysis of process stream showing individual components

• Normal operating pressure, temperature and flow rate
• Line size, vessel size, PSV size
• Description of surrounding terrain and containment

Recommendations
Results of the dispersion modeling are used to determine the potential maximum
concentration at the buildings studied and the time to reach this concentration,
assuming that the cloud is blowing toward the building. Concentrations are
predicted as 60 minute average values at the building location. If the concentration
is less than the ERPG-1 level, then no mitigation is required. This is the level at
which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr
without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a
clearly defined objectionable odor. Also included is the time to reach the ERPG-2
level. This is the level at which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1
hr without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or
symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action. If a building
evacuation will take longer than the time to reach ERPG-2 then, personal protective
equipment will be necessary in order to safely evacuate, or if it will be necessary to
shelter in place. A list of some ERPG levels is included in Figure H-3. A complete
list is available from the American Industrial Hygiene Association. (See Refer-
ences, Section H6.0.)

Fig. H-3 ERPG Levels

Material ERPG -1 ERPG -2
Ammonia 25 ppm 200 ppm
Chlorine 1 ppm 3 ppm
Hydrogen Sulfide .1 ppm 30 ppm
Vinyl Acetate 5 ppm 75 ppm
Source American Industrial Hygiene Association, “Emergency Response Planning Guidelines,” 1995

Potential mitigation measures to consider include:

• Ventilation system controls with appropriate detection, and fail safe control
measures, which stop the flow of a contaminated air supply to the building.
• Use of elevated intake stack for potential releases of heavier-than-air materials
• Emergency response plan, with scheduled drills, which may include safe shel-
ters in the building and/or clearly identified evacuation routes.
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) for building occupants
• Review of locations of potential gas infiltration into the building for sealing
Typical documentation of Stage 2 - Toxic Evaluation findings are shown in
Figure H-4.

Chevron Corporation H-9 January 1997

Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

Fig. H-4 Toxic Evaluation Findings

Release Time to Max
Building Scenario Weather ERPG-2 concentration Recommendations
Control House C-1000 Btms F & 5mph <5 sec 1400 ppm H2S Stress importance of existing auto-
(<5 sec) matic ventilation controls and verify
that the system is tested on a
regular basis
Administration V-2000 Ovhd F & 5mph 140 sec 900ppm H2S 1. Automate the existing ventila-
(180 sec) tion to close upon detection of
H2S.
2. Verify that the emergency
response plan covers adequate
response to toxic hazards and
that the plan is practiced on a
regular basis
3. Seal any exterior wall locations
where gas infiltration is possible.

H3.2 Explosion Hazards

Vapor Cloud Explosion Modeling
The Baker-Strehlow method is the current state-of-the-art methodology used to esti-
mate the potential overpressure at each building due to a vapor cloud explosion.
This method incorporates the concepts of the Multi-Energy method, using the Stre-
hlow curves for determination of explosion energy. It accounts for the effects of
confinement and congestion on the explosion overpressure. Using the Multi-Energy
concept, only the volume of a flammable vapor cloud within a partially confined
and/or obstructed environment will contribute to an explosion. The remaining
portions of a cloud will burn more slowly without contributing significantly to
blast. Other methodologies (e.g. TNT) are often inaccurate due to conservative
assumptions and the differences between high explosive blast characteristics and
vapor cloud explosion characteristics.
The study uses the results of the FOCUS vapor cloud dispersion modeling to obtain
the potential size of the vapor-air cloud, within the flammable limits, for each
release scenario. (See Section H3.1.) The flammable clouds are then superimposed
on the facility plot plan to determine the volume within areas of partial confine-
ment/congestion due to process equipment, piping and plant structures. The volume
of equipment or piping is then deducted to obtain the blast source volume.
A graphical solution using the Strehlow curves is then applied to determine the
predicted overpressure (Ps) at the building in question and the predicted impulse
(is). Choice of the curve is dependent on the level of plant congestion within the
cloud, the degree of cloud confinement and the fuel reactivity. The Baker-Strehlow
method is described in detail, with an example, in Section 1200 of the Fire Protec-
tion Manual.

January 1997 H-10 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

Physical Explosion
In processes that have the potential for a “runaway reaction,” a vessel rupture
scenario should be modeled to determine potential blast overpressures at affected
buildings. This overpressure due to a vessel rupture (physical explosion) should be
estimated using the calculations described in Section 1200 of the Fire Protection
Manual. The method is very similar to that described above for vapor cloud explo-
sions, except that the energy term is calculated differently.

Recommendations
The response of the affected buildings to an explosion is dependent upon both the
overpressure and the duration of the blast. These values should be compared with
the data from the 1995 WBE Industry Tech Coop reports to determine the predicted
building response. (Software is available from the Process Risk team). Damage
levels are described in Figure H-5 and Figure H-6. Where building damage is
predicted above the 2B level, mitigation measures should be taken to reduce the
risk to occupants. Mitigation measures may also be appropriate for buildings within
the vapor cloud itself (within 100% LFL). Potential mitigation includes:
• Change of function (e.g. designating a different building as the emergency
response center)
• Prevent scenario (e.g. remove walls that produce confinement in the process
areas)
• Upgrade building (e.g. reinforce roof-to-wall connections, strengthen walls -
Contact the Process Risk team for information on cost effective building
upgrade options)
• Relocate the building
• Change the process to eliminate/reduce the risk. (e.g., shutdown the process)

Fig. H-5 Building Damage Levels

Damage Level Building Consequence
1 Onset of visible damage. Repairs are only needed for cosmetic reasons. Building is reusable
following an explosion. Very little risk to occupants because of building damage.
2A Localized building damage. Building performs function and can be used; however, major repairs
are required to restore integrity of structure envelope. Total cost of repairs is moderate. Risk of
injury is moderate.
2B Widespread building damage. Building cannot be used until major repairs are completed. Total
cost of repairs is significant, approaching replacement cost of building. Significant risk of injury.
3 Building has lost structural integrity and may collapse due to environmental conditions, (i.e.,
wind, snow, rain). Building blast protection is impaired. Total cost of repairs exceeds replace-
ment cost of building. High risk of severe injury to occupants caused by building damage.
4 Building fails completely. Repair is not feasible. High risk of fatality.

Chevron Corporation H-11 January 1997

Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

Fig. H-6 Building Damage Thresholds

Overpressure Impulse
Building Type Damage Level (psig) (psi-msec)
Steel Frame
Metal siding/roof 1 0.5 7
2A 1.3 45
2B 1.5 60
3 2.5 120
Steel Frame
Unreinforced masonry walls 1 0.5 5
2A 1.0 30
2B 2.0 50
3 3.0 120
Trailers 1 0.5 10
2A 1.2 20
2B 1.8 40
3 2.0 50
Load Bearing
Unreinforced masonry walls 1 0.5 5
2A 0.8 25
2B 1.0 35
3 1.5 70
Source WBE Industry Tech Cooperative 1995 Study, "Conventional Building Blast Performance
Capabilities"

Windows can be expected to fail with high fragment velocities between .15 and .6
psig, depending upon the size of the window and the blast duration. Where the
predicted overpressure falls within this range, the SAFEVUE software can be used
to determine if the window will break. (Contact the CRTC Process Risk team for
information on SAFEVUE.) Windows that are expected to break can be removed or
upgraded to meet the predicted overpressure. The Process Risk team can provide
design details on the application of polyethylene film to the window, which
removes the fragment hazard for blast overpressures of up to 5 psig. New buildings
should use laminated glass designed for the predicted overpressures.
Documentation of typical Stage 2 explosion modeling results are shown in
Figure H-7. Where the mitigation measures are impractical or extremely costly, a
risk assessment is recommended to be completed per Section H4.0.

January 1997 H-12 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

Fig. H-7 Explosion Modeling Results

Building Scenario Blast Overpressure Recommendations
Maintenance VCE following release 1.4 psig Move the trailer or occu-
Trailer at V-1000. Sufficient to shatter glass and damage pants to a less hazardous
wood panels location.

Admin Building VCE following release .5 psig Review windows using

at V-1000 Sufficient to shatter large panes of Safevue software to deter-
glass, depending on blast impulse mine appropriate level of
mitigation.
Control Building VCE following release 7.5 psig at present Seal the area under the
at C-1000 that accu- .7 psig after Recommendation is North MCC building to
mulates under North complete prevent vapor cloud accu-
MCC prior to ignition. mulation.

H3.3 Fire Hazard

There are two concerns associated with buildings that have an identified fire hazard.
The building itself could be a potential ignition source following a release in the
nearby process area. In addition, a fire in the process area could spread to the
building, increasing the magnitude of loss and plant down time. Process area refers
to hydrocarbon equipment or piping.
All buildings with an identified fire hazard should be compared with the checklist
in Figure H-8. This table is based on the guidelines in the Fire Protection Manual.
If the answer to any question is “No,” it is recommended that the building be
upgraded to meet the requirement. In addition, if a building has an identified fire
hazard, future modifications to the building or process area should not increase the
fire risk. In other words, additions to the plant or building should not further
decrease the separation distance.

H4.0 Stage 3 - Risk Assessment

It is expected that Stage 3 risk assessments will be unlikely. Most building siting
assessments will be complete following Stage 2, when recommendations are made
to address the predicted consequences for each scenario. However, in a few cases,
the mitigation measures for the explosion hazards may be impractical or extremely
costly (e.g. moving a control room). In these cases, a risk assessment may be
performed using Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) methodology. The risk assess-
ment will evaluate the frequency and consequences of scenarios and assign an
overall risk to the building occupants.

H4.1 Risk Assessment Team

A team should be formed to perform the risk assessment that includes, as a
minimum, the following members:
• A person trained in the use of HAZOP technique of process hazard analysis

Chevron Corporation H-13 January 1997

Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

Fig. H-8 Building Checklist for Fire Hazards

Question Yes/No
1. If the building is in an electrically classified area, (see API RP 500) is it pressurized per NFPA 496?

2. Is there a hydrocarbon detector in the inlet air duct for the building that alarms at 20% LFL and
shuts down the ventilation system at 60% LFL?
3. Is the air intake for the ventilation system located 30 feet above grade?

4. Have windows facing the process area been removed?

5. Is there a personnel egress door located on the opposite side of the building from the process
area?
6. Is there a fire water monitor located within 40 -70 ft from the building that can protect the
building from a fire in the process area.
7. Are the roof and wall(s) facing the process area rated for 2 hour fire?

8. Is the surface drainage sloped away from the building toward the process area?

9. Are the drains within the building sealed to prevent vapors from entering the building from the
underground drainage system?
10. Is there an emergency response plan for building occupants that details their response in the
event of a fire?
11. Are annual hypothetical drills held to practice the emergency response plan?

• A person trained in the application of RP 752 hazard and consequence assess-

ment
• A person experienced in operations and the plant processes at the facility
Additional team members could include ESF&H personnel, operators, mechanics,
inspector and corrosion specialists, equipment specialists, and process engineers.

H4.2 Qualitative Evaluation

The risk assessment team will make a qualitative evaluation of the risk to building
occupants using PHA methodology in the following step by step manner for each
explosion scenario:
1. List the explosion scenario identified during Stage 2 of the building assess-
ment. (e.g. 2-inch hole in the debutanizer overhead piping to the reflux drum)
2. List the potential causes of the scenario. (e.g. corrosion, vibration, mechanical
impact, wrong line cut, etc.)
3. Review the previous incident history at the facility, including other similar
scenarios in other process units at the facility. The team should also review the
history of the specific equipment or piping in question. (e.g. inspection records,
maintenance history)

January 1997 H-14 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual Appendix H

4. Review industry history of incidents in similar systems. (Contact the Fire &
Process Safety Team for information)
5. List the consequences predicted during Stage 2 of the scenario. For damage
level >2B, the consequence is major. For damage level >1, the consequence is
serious.
6. List and critically evaluate the safeguards in place at the facility that could
prevent the scenario from occurring. (e.g. shutdown systems, inspection
programs, safe work practices, control of ignition sources, etc.) Do not list a
program or procedure unless it has been confirmed during the most recent
PSM or Safe Operations audit. Do not list automatic shutdowns unless quar-
terly testing is performed and documented.
7. Use the risk ranking matrix shown in Figure H-9 to assign an overall risk for
the scenario.
8. If the assigned risk is a 1 or 2, then prevention or mitigation is required. If the
assigned risk is a 3, then the team should evaluate whether additional safe-
guards can be added to reduce the risk to a 4 or 5. (e.g. increasing inspection,
improving safe work practices) If the assigned risk is a 4 or 5 then no addi-
tional mitigation is required.

Fig. H-9 Risk Ranking Matrix

Likelihood of Frequent Occasional Seldom Unlikely
Occurrence
With 1 2 3 4
Safeguards
This incident This incident is This incident has Given current
has occurred likely to occur occurred at a practices and
at this facility at this facility similar facility and procedures,
and/or is within the next may reasonably this incident is
Severity of reasonably 15 years. occur at this not likely to
Consequences likely to occur facility within the occur at this
Without Safeguards at any time. next 30 years. facility.
Major 1 1 1 2 4
Safety - Fatality or permanently
disabling injury.
Serious 2 1 2 3 5
Safety - Severe injury.

H5.0 Documentation and Follow-up

The building siting assessment documentation should be added to the facility’s
PHA files. Recommendations, plot plans, process flow drawings, occupancy data,
dispersion modeling and blast calculations should all be kept in the building assess-
ment file. All recommendations should be numbered, with assigned responsibility
and dates for completion. The recommendations should be tracked to completion,

Chevron Corporation H-15 January 1997

Appendix H Fire Protection Manual

as with other PHA recommendations. Revalidation is required for the building

siting assessments as well as for other PHA’s.

H6.0 References
American Industrial Hygiene Association Emergency Planning Committee, “Emer-
gency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG),” September 1995.
American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practice 752, “Management of
Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings,” 1995.
Wilfred Baker Engineering, Inc., “Upgrade of Windows to Mitigate the Glass Frag-
mentation Hazard from Vapor Cloud Explosions,” prepared for the 1993-1994
Petroleum and Chemical Processing Industry Technology Cooperatives.
Wilfred Baker Engineering, Inc., “Conventional Building Blast Performance Capa-
bility,” prepared for the 1995 Industry Technology Cooperative.

January 1997 H-16 Chevron Corporation

1000 Quick Reference Guide

Abstract
This section references basic Company and industry design guidelines related to
fire loss prevention.
The references agree with equipment categories used in the standard drawing
books. For example, the letter “A” covers Plot Plans and P&ID's; “C” covers
Columns and Vessels; “D” covers Tanks, Drums and Spheres, and so forth. The
other abbreviations are as follows:
E — Exchangers
F — Furnaces
G — Pumps and Drivers
J — Instrumentation
K — Compressors
L — Piping
M — Structures
N — Insulation
P — Power (Electrical)
Q — Foundations
R — Buildings
S — Miscellaneous

Chevron Manual References:

CIV — Civil and Structural Manual
CMP — Compressor Manual
ELC — Electrical Manual
EXH — Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual
FPM — Fire Protection Manual
HTR — Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual
ICM — Instrumentation and Control Manual
IRM — Insulation and Refractory Manual
MAC — General Machinery Manual

Chevron Corporation 1000-1 December 1994

1000 Quick Reference Guide Fire Protection Manual

PIM — Piping Manual

PMP — Pump Manual
TAM — Tank Manual

Industry References:
ANSI/ASME — American National Standard Institute/American Society of
Mechanical Engineers
API — American Petroleum Institute
NEC — National Electrical Code, by NFPA
NFPA — National Fire Protection Association
Questions relating to the current interpretation and application of these data should
be directed to the CRTC Fire & Process Safety Team in Richmond, CA (510) 242-
4204.
(Note: In the listings, the number following the three-letter code for Chevron
manuals refers to the section number in that manual.)
A Plot Plan
Plant setbacks, office setback, shops and parking lot locations, etc. FPM 1300
NFPA 30
Control-house and switchgear building-to-plant spacing. FPM 1300
Plant-to-plant spacing. FPM 1300
Plant-to-tank and tank-to-tank spacing. NFPA 30
TAM 200
Plant-to-flare spacing. FPM 1300
Plant-to-main-road or public-way spacing. FPM 1300
Plant-to-property-line spacing. FPM 1300
Spacing of equipment within the plant. FPM 1300
Fired-heater-to-process-equipment spacing. HTR 300

C Columns and Vessels

Fixed water spray systems based on liquid holdup in the vessel. FPM 1600
FPM 2000
Column skirts and structural support fireproofing. FPM 1700
Relieving capacity of vessels containing volatile FPM 1900
liquids under fire exposure. ICM 1200
PIM 1100
API RP 520
API RP 521
Discharge locations of relieving devices. FPM 1900

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Fire Protection Manual 1000 Quick Reference Guide

D Tanks
Shell-to-shell spacing. TAM 200
Shell-to-property-line spacing. TAM 200
Drainage provisions around tanks and pipeways. TAM 200
NFPA 30
Impounding provisions. TAM 200
Roof vent systems. TAM 200
TAM 600
API RP 2000
Roof design.
Frangible roof design. TAM 400
Pontoon welding inside. TAM 400
Pontoon covers fixed liquid-tight. TAM 400
Roof drains. TAM 600

Firefighting water systems. TAM 200

FPM 1600
Fixed fire protection systems for large tanks. TAM 200
NFPA 11
Foam dams for floating roofs with fixed foam systems. TAM 200
Dry-line risers for fighting seal fires. TAM 200
Handrails on wind girders for personnel protection. TAM 400
High level alarms when needed (remote gaging). TAM 200

LPG Facilities
Self-closing valves on all lines below liquid level. PIM 1100
API 2510
Block valve location. PIM 1100
PAI 2510
Piping location. PIM 1100
API 2510
Deluge system, water sprays, or fire water monitors for fixed protection. PIM 1100
API 2510
Drainage away from vessels. PIM 1100
API 2510
Vessel orientation. API 2510
Shell-to-shell spacing. API 2510
Fireproof-support members. FPM 1700
API 2510
Fire protection considerations. API 2510

E Exchangers, Air Coolers, and Cooling Towers

Fireproofing of supports. FPM 1700

Chevron Corporation 1000-3 December 1994

1000 Quick Reference Guide Fire Protection Manual

Location with relation to pumps and furnaces. FPM 1300

Vibration shutdowns. EXH 2200

F Furnaces
Fireproofing of supports. FPM 1700
Smothering steam for tubes, fire box and header box. HTR 300
HTR 400
Fuel control devices to handle fuel failure or flameout conditions. HTR 300
HTR 600
Alarms and shutdowns. HTR 300
HTR 600
API 550, Part III
Fireproofing and internal lining for stacks. IRM 2400

G Pumps
Hot oil pump protection; i.e., water sprays or monitors. FPM 2000
Spacing of hot oil pumps. FPM 1300
Pump case material. GD-99877 (PMP)

J Instruments
Routing: underground or away from fire exposures or fireproof. FPM 1700
Protection of critical instrument leads by fireproofing or by location. FPM 1700
Fail-safe instrument design. ICM 900
ICM 1300
Sealing conduit to prevent hydrocarbon vapor from entering control house. ELC 1000
Relief systems. NFPA 30
PM 1900
ICM 1200
Alarms and shutdowns. ICM 1300
FPM 1800

K Compressors
Oil in starting air (lubrication hazard). FPM 2000
Venting of seal chambers. FPM 2000
Provide safety valves. FPM 2000
Recommended shutdown devices. CMP 300
General alarms and shutdowns. MAC 1200

L Piping
Support fireproofing. FPM 1700
Isolation valve location. FPM 1800

December 1994 1000-4 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1000 Quick Reference Guide

Design of small connections to resist vibration failure. PIM 300

PIM 2000
Thermal pressure relief valve protection. FPM 1900
Selection of valves, fittings, and material. PIM 200
Piping flexibility. PIM 300
Flexible couplings. FPM 2000
Hose design. PIM 500
Vents and drains. PIM 300

N Fireproofing
Structural support fireproofing. FPM 1700
Critical control fireproofing. FPM 1700
Fireproofing materials. FPM 1700

P Power (Electrical)
Routing of electrical supply lines. FPM 1300
FPM 1700
ELC 1000
Vapor sealing of enclosures for sparking electrical apparatus in classified area. FPM 1500
Area classification. FPM 1500
A 30
API RP 500
NFPA 497
Selection of classified equipment. ELC 300
NFPA 70
(NEC)
Location of switchgear centers. FPM 1300
Sealing of power and instrument leads. ELC 1000
Purging of enclosures. NFPA 496

R Building
Control house blast resistance criteria. CIV 400
General spacing of control houses from operating plants. FPM 1300
Need for pressurization in plant areas. FPM 1500
General spacing between buildings and plants. FPM 1300
Process control computer protection. FPM 2200
Sprinklers. NFPA 13
Warehouse design. FPM 3800
Flammable liquid storage. NFPA 30

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1000 Quick Reference Guide Fire Protection Manual

S Fire Water Systems

Sizing. FPM 1600
Fire water pumps. FPM 1600
Fire water piping design and isolation valve location. FPM 1600
Hydrants and monitors. FPM 1600
First-aid hoses and reels. FPM 1600
Portable dry-chemical, pressurized-water, and CO2 extinguishers. FPM 1600
Fixed sprays for process equipment. FPM 1600
Sewers and Drains
Gas-sealed catch basins. CIV 500
Gas-sealed branch lines. CIV 500
Gas-sealed manways within the plant. CIV 500
Vent manways on sealed systems. CIV 500
Plant drainage pattern. CIV 500
FPM 1400
Tankfield drainage design. CIV 500
TAM 200
NFPA 30
Drainage system capacities. CIV 500
FPM 1400

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1100 Basic Design Principles

Abstract
This section introduces the general design concerns addressed in the design guide-
lines contained in Sections 1200 through 1300.

Contents Page

1110 Process Hazards Review 1100-2

1120 Design Objectives 1100-2
1130 Basic Considerations 1100-2
1131 Siting
1132 Spacing
1133 Drainage
1134 Isolation of Equipment
1135 Protection of Equipment
1136 Fire Control
1137 Safe Access/Egress During Fire
1138 Continuity of Service
1140 Economic Justification of Fire Protection Expenditures 1100-5
1141 Economic Analysis
1142 Estimation of Frequency
1143 Estimation of Loss
1150 Fire Protection Checklist 1100-6
1160 Quick Reference List 1100-8

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1100 Basic Design Principles Fire Protection Manual

1110 Process Hazards Review

Before proceeding with plans for a new plant or part of a plant, management should
consider the major fire causes and evaluate the adequacy of the fire prevention
features of the plant. Similarly, before approving additions or alterations to a plant,
management should study the effects of the proposed changes on fire causes and
consider the resulting arrangement from the standpoint of fire hazards.

1120 Design Objectives

Specifically, this study should answer the following questions:
• Spacing. Do spacing, fire walls, and fire doors adequately divide the plant,
building, and large structure(s) to limit the spread of fire? Are ways provided
to stop the flow of fuel and to drain fuel and fire water?
• Access. Will personnel who respond to a fire have safe access to important
equipment? Are evacuation routes adequate?
• Fire resistant materials. Will fire resistant materials be used for plants or
units under construction, and where economically justified?
• Flammable vapors. Have practicable steps been taken to minimize the escape
of flammable vapors and, where release of vapors is necessary, to guard against
hazards of ignition?
• Ignition sources. Have sources of ignition in potentially hazardous locations
been identified and reasonable safeguards provided?
• Fire control. Are provisions made for controlling fires and for protecting adja-
cent facilities?

1130 Basic Considerations

Although fire protection designs are often unique to a given facility, depending
upon the type and condition of material handled, certain design considerations are
common to all facilities. These include:
• Siting
• Spacing
• Drainage
• Isolation of equipment
• Protection of equipment
• Fire control
• Safe access/egress during fire
The site design evaluation should include, as a minimum, a review of these
elements, each of which is briefly discussed below.

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Fire Protection Manual 1100 Basic Design Principles

Fire prevention through design is also based on proper selection and installation of
reliable, high quality equipment in accordance with industry codes and standards.
The designer should be familiar with applicable Company design manuals and stan-
dards, which are available from individual operating companies or from Chevron
Research and Technology Company (CRTC).

1131 Siting
Depending on the type of materials handled, facility location may influence specific
fire protection designs. Site-specific conditions include:
• Local conditions, such as hurricanes, lightning, or severe freezing
• Proximity to populated areas
• Proximity to public ways
• Risk from adjacent facilities
• Storage quantities
• Present and predicted development of adjacent properties
• Topography of the site, including elevation and slope
• Access for emergency response
• Utilities
• Requirements for the receipt and shipment of products
• Local codes and regulations

1132 Spacing
Proper spacing of facilities can be a strong ally in both preventing and fighting a
fire. Spacing prevents fire by reducing the risk of exposure to, and from, nearby
facilities. If a fire occurs, good spacing limits the spread of the fire.
Proper spacing of equipment is one of the most important design considerations.
When a fire occurs, adequate spacing is often a major line of defense in limiting the
loss. See Section 1300.

1133 Drainage
Proper drainage ensures that spills of flammable materials are carried away from
equipment and potential sources of ignition. A well designed drainage system also
provides rapid removal of fire water at full application rates. Hydrocarbons are
often released during a fire and, being lighter than water, will float on top of any
pools of water, potentially spreading around the affected unit and to adjacent units.
See Section 1400.

1134 Isolation of Equipment

The most effective way to extinguish a hydrocarbon fire is to remove the source of
fuel from the fire. This is often done with isolation valves that are remotely oper-
ated or manually accessible to operators during a fire. Isolation valves either stop

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1100 Basic Design Principles Fire Protection Manual

the flow of fuel to the fire, as with remotely operated fire-safe valves in pump
suction lines, or they direct the inventory of hydrocarbon to a safe location, as with
emergency depressuring valves.
The issue of equipment isolation is best considered in the early stages of a project,
as Process and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID's) are developed. As existing facilities
are reevaluated, critical equipment should be reviewed to see that suitable isolation
is provided. See Section 1800.

1135 Protection of Equipment

Careful use of fire resistant materials, such as fireproofing and high temperature
wiring, can help to prevent a fire from spreading and limit its damage. Typically,
fireproofing is provided for critical structures, vessel and column skirts and
supports, exposed pipeway columns (including essential crossmembers), and
control and power leads necessary for safe plant shutdown. See Section 1700.

1136 Fire Control

Hydrocarbon fires are most frequently attacked by applying cooling water streams
to the fire and to surrounding exposed equipment while simultaneously attempting
to stop the flow of fuel to the fire. Fire water systems, complete with hydrants, first-
aid hose stations, and fixed monitors, are commonly installed in larger facilities.
Fixed water spray systems have proven effective for certain applications, such as to
remove heat from a hot-oil (600°F) pump fire, thus protecting nearby equipment.
Dry chemical extinguishers are used extensively for quick extinguishment of small
fires. Other agents, such as foam and Halon, also provide extinguishment capa-
bility. For specific applications, see Section 1600.

1137 Safe Access/Egress During Fire

When designing a facility, take care to provide suitable access for firefighting equip-
ment, such as wheeled extinguishers and fire trucks. See Section 1300.

1138 Continuity of Service

Reliable continuous service in water, steam, and electric power distribution systems
is another factor of plant layout. It can minimize fire hazards in two ways:
• By minimizing operating interruptions and occurrence of abnormal conditions
that increase fire risk.
• By ensuring that firefighting crews have utilities services when they need them.
Water storage and pumping facilities, power and steam plants, electrical distri-
bution centers, etc. should be centrally located, yet isolated from operating
units which, in event of a fire, would endanger them.

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Fire Protection Manual 1100 Basic Design Principles

Main distribution systems for water, steam, and electric power should be looped,
with block valves (or disconnect switches on electric lines) at appropriate points so
that, if any part of the system is damaged, supply can be obtained from another
source. Branch lines should have block valves (or disconnects) near the point of
take-off from mains so that they can be isolated if ruptured or damaged. Normally,
electric power lines should not traverse areas where fires are likely to occur. In
some cases, buried cables may provide the best protection against damage and loss
of critical power. See Section 2300.

1140 Economic Justification of Fire Protection Expenditures

1141 Economic Analysis

The general principles governing capital expenditures are printed on the back of
GO-36-C. Try to follow these principles in analyzing the economic justification for
proposed capital expenditures with the object of reducing fire losses. Evaluation of
fire protection proposals requires:
• Estimating the decrease in annual fire losses resulting from proposed invest-
ments. Such estimates are speculative; however, basing them on fire records
and the experience of those involved with fire protection work gives more reli-
able results than basing estimates solely on precedent, local experience, or
personal judgment.
• Considering intangible factors, such as the effect of fires on public and
employee relations, possible injury or death of employees, and serious loss of
productive capacity.
Estimate the “earnings” resulting from proposed fire protection investments in
terms of the resulting annual reduction in fire loss. Estimating such reduction
involves two factors—fire frequency and fire loss.

1142 Estimation of Frequency

The economic analysis should consider how frequently fires may occur in the struc-
ture or plant. Also consider the fire history of similar installations and local factors
that might influence the start of a fire. Examples of local factors are the chemical
nature of the process or materials involved, supervision, housekeeping, weather
conditions, surrounding properties, and the likelihood of arson or sabotage.
In analyzing complex units such as refineries or major plants within refineries, the
frequency with which fires occurred in the past may be of little help, because some
fires that do little damage may occur rather often. Factors that might permit small
fires to grow into conflagrations are usually not recorded. Where the fire record
covers a number of properties or structures of comparable size or complexity
(service stations, bulk plants, petroleum storage tanks, etc.), a record of fire
frequency, where available, furnishes a valuable guide.

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1100 Basic Design Principles Fire Protection Manual

Frequency factors for tanks. The API has collected data on tank fires over a
number of years. Figure 1100-1 shows the relative risk from fire for three types of
steel roof tanks storing oils of different grades. The fire frequency factors range
from 0.00001 (one fire per 100,000 tank years) for heavy oils stored under floating
roofs, to 0.004 (one fire per 250 tank years) for oils having relatively high hazard
from ignition by static electricity, when stored in steel roof tanks having non-gas-
tight roofs or open appurtenances. Intermediate values are assigned for other combi-
nations of stock and type of roof. Because of the wide range of susceptibility to
ignition, considerable discretion must enter into the choice of an appropriate fire
frequency factor.

1143 Estimation of Loss

An estimate of the anticipated loss takes into account the physical conditions of the
plant/equipment and the behavior of the particular fuels involved. Factors to
consider are:
• Susceptibility of the equipment to fire damage that could cause the release of
fuel
• The total amount of fuel that may be released
• Methods for shutting off or controlling the release of fuel
• Fire control measures and the chance that fire will spread to adjacent plants or
structures.
Methods for estimating the consequences of a major release, fire, or explosion are
discussed in Section 1200.
Loss experience. Another way to estimate probable annual loss is to review loss
figures published by insurance companies, the API, and similar agencies for compa-
rable structures or plants. While average figures do not necessarily apply directly to
a specific problem, they are of value in checking the order of magnitude of the esti-
mated probable annual loss.
The CRTC Fire & Protection Safety Team can provide information on the
Company's fire loss experience for various types of equipment (e.g., pumps and
exchangers).

1150 Fire Protection Checklist

The Fire Protection Checklist in Appendix B asks questions to help you evaluate
the effectiveness of local fire prevention and emergency response programs. The
size and value of the installation and the organization of the operating company or
department may influence the applicability of the items in the checklist.
The checklist also gives local management a guide for performing periodic compre-
hensive analyses of their operating center's fire preparedness without relying
entirely on visits of fire protection specialists.

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Fire Protection Manual 1100 Basic Design Principles

Fig. 1100-1 Fire Frequency Factors for Various Stocks

Fire Frequency Factors

Classification of Stocks Steel Roof Tanks

Gas-Tight with
Breather Non-Gas-Tight
Floating Valves or One or with Open
10% Point A.S.T.M.(1) Typical Examples Roofs(2) Open Vent Appurtenances

100°F or below (Stocks likely Natural Gasoline, 18 lb. .002 .0001 —

to boil in storage under Reid vapor pressure
normal conditions) and above

100°F –185°F(3) Gasolines; Volatile .0001 .0002 .001

Thinners; Most
Gasoline-bearing
Crudes

185°F – 300°F
(Vapors normally in
EXPLOSIVE RANGE) (Flash
point about 20°F – 100°F)
a. Oils with relatively low Some Intermediate .0001 .0006 .003
electrical resistance Crudes
(little static hazard)
b. Oils with relatively 250, 300 Thinners; .0001 .002(4) .004(4)
high electrical resis- Jet Fuel B
tance (greater static
hazard)

300°F – 425°F(5) Jet Fuel A; 350 Thinner; .00005 .0001 .00008

(Flash point about 100°F – Light Diesel Fuel; Non
150°F) Gasoline-bearing
Crudes

Above 425°F(6) Heavy Diesel Fuel, Fuel .00001 .00005 .00005

Oils, Lubes, etc.

(1) The flash point is the best indication of flammability, but since it is not normally determined for many products,the 10% A.S.T.M. distilla-
tion point is used as the basis of classification.
(2) Frequency factors shown for floating roofs do not include seal fires which do not progress to fully involved tank fires.
(3) Some stocks in this class will boil under floating roofs (particularly pan-type roofs) when exposed to high atmospheric temperatures or
radiant heat from the sun, or when the temperature of the stream entering the tank is abnormally high. When these conditions are likely
to exist for a considerable part of the time, use the factors in the classification above.
(4) Factors shown assume that tanks storing these stocks are provided with either (a) automatic tape gages and sample drawing facilities,
or (b) a slotted gage well in which both gaging and sampling are done. In the absence of such safeguards—which eliminate manual
operations favoring the chance of producing a static spark at the oil surface—factors several times those shown above should be used.
(5) Frequency factors shown for this class apply when stocks will be stored at or near atmospheric temperatures. If under special condi-
tions they should be stored at temperatures at or above their respective flash points, the factors for oils with relatively high electrical
resistance Group B above should be used.
(6) In this case, also, the factors shown apply when stocks are stored at atmospheric temperatures. When stored stocksmay be heated
above their flash point (e.g., in asphalt shipping tanks, hot tar run-down tanks, etc.) multiply factors by 5.

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1100 Basic Design Principles Fire Protection Manual

1160 Quick Reference List

Section 1000 of this manual is a quick reference guide to help you find Company
fire protection information on specific topics.

December 1994 1100-8 Chevron Corporation

1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence
Analysis

Abstract
This section covers methods of fire and explosion analysis. It gives simple proce-
dures for calculating radiant heat from a fire and pressure effects from an explosion.
It also discusses dispersion modeling in general terms.

Contents Page

1210 Risk Analysis 1200-2

1220 Radiant Heat 1200-3
1221 Effects of Radiant Heat
1222 Method for Calculating Radiant Heat Intensities
1223 Radiant Heat Intensity From a Pool Fire
1224 Radiant Heat from Tank Fires
1225 Temperature Calculations
1226 Uses of Radiant Heat Calculations
1230 Blast Effects 1200-14
1231 Defining Explosions
1232 Effects of an Explosion
1233 Blast Effects from Vapor Cloud Explosions (Chemical Explosions)
1234 Method for Calculating Overpressures from Vapor Cloud Explosions (Chem-
ical Explosions)
1235 Physical Explosions of Confined Spaces
1236 Calculating Pressure Effects from Pressure Container Failure (Physical
Explosion)
1237 Preventing and Mitigating Explosions
1240 Dispersion Modeling 1200-26
1241 Dispersion Modeling Software
1250 References 1200-29

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1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis Fire Protection Manual

1210 Risk Analysis

Risk is defined as a combination of consequence and frequency.
Risk = Consequence x Frequency
Consequence refers to the potential severity of a problem. Frequency refers to the
probability of occurrence for the problem. To determine the magnitude of a poten-
tial risk, a risk analysis can be performed. The analysis can be qualitative or quanti-
tative and includes both a consequence assessment and a frequency assessment. The
following sections describe how to perform quantitative consequence assessments
for fire and explosion events. Qualitative assessments in general and frequency
assessments are not covered in this manual. Refer to Section 1250, References for
additional resources on risk analysis and frequency assessment.
A fire and explosion consequence analysis can be required by government regula-
tions (e.g., UK Safety Case, EPA RMP rule). A consequence analysis could also be
triggered after a fire or explosion hazard has been identified in an existing or
proposed facility. A Process Hazards Analysis (PHA), fire protection design review,
Loss Prevention Survey, incident investigation, Management of Change or other
part of the plant's overall risk management process could identify a potential fire or
explosion hazard.
The CRTC Fire and Process Safety team can offer guidance on identification tech-
niques for fire and explosion hazards. A key factor in whether a fire or explosion
hazard exists is the type of chemical process involved in the facility. Factors
affecting the hazard include:
• Physical properties of reactants and products
• Chemical reaction rates
• Pressure
• Temperature
• Flammable liquid volumes and flow rates
• Plant Layout
• Materials of construction
• Reliability of utilities
• Operating personnel available
• Source of ignition
The consequences of potential incidents may be minimized by improved drainage,
isolation, depressurization, liquid removal, fireproofing, automatic and manually
activated water sprays, inerting, ventilation, blast resistance, and fail-safe instrumen-
tation. It is also important to evaluate the effect of manual firefighting capabilities
on the overall risk. This capability depends on personnel, equipment, training,
communications, water supply, emergency planning, mutual aid, and the layout of
the unit. All safeguards involve expense and, depending on the severity of the conse-
quences and the potential frequency, there is a limit beyond which further expendi-
tures cannot be justified.

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

Evaluating the consequences of fires, explosions, and vapor releases is an important

part of running a hydrocarbon handling facility. Heightened public and in-plant
awareness of emergency planning makes it essential for plant personnel to under-
stand the effects of fires, explosions, and vapor releases.
This section gives operating personnel and plant engineers some basic tools to eval-
uate the consequences of fires, explosions, and vapor releases. This section is not
designed to take the place of in-plant specialists or hazard evaluation experts. It is
intended to provide reasonable but conservative estimates of consequences. The
CRTC Process Risk team is available for consultation on dispersion modeling,
radiant heat calculations, and blast overpressure calculations.

1220 Radiant Heat

Hydrocarbon-spill fires release large amounts of thermal energy. Equipment in
direct contact with flame can be severely damaged in a short time. Personnel and
equipment not in contact with flame can be adversely affected by radiant heat if the
intensity is high enough. According to literature, the intensity of a typical liquid
hydrocarbon fire can be between 10,000 and 60,000 BTU/hr/ft2. Depending on
distance to the fire, this exceeds the acceptable limits for unprotected field
personnel and equipment.
The purposes of this section are to present the effects of radiant heat on personnel
and processing equipment, discuss methods to calculate radiant heat and tempera-
ture profiles, provide typical values for a variety of hydrocarbon fires, and offer
ideas for using these calculations.
API RP 521 and the Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1200, discuss
radiant heat from elevated flares.

1221 Effects of Radiant Heat

The effects of radiant heat can vary from the burn equivalent of a minor sunburn to
a major equipment failure due to a large hydrocarbon spill fire. Listed in Figure
1200-1 are maximum permissible intensities suggested in the literature that might
be helpful in estimating radiant heat effects.
Effective water streams can protect personnel and equipment from these intensities.
Water can absorb about 9000 BTU/gal, which will dramatically reduce radiant heat
intensities. Controlling water usage for radiant heat cooling is essential to avoid
overtaxing drainage systems and water supplies (see Section 1600 for more details).

1222 Method for Calculating Radiant Heat Intensities

Presented in sections 1223–1225 are methods for calculating radiant heat intensities
that are widely accepted and commonly used by the petroleum industry. Section
1226 discusses the use of radiant heat calculations.

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1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 1200-1 Radiant Heat Effects

Maximum Permissible Intensity of Radiant Heat
Item Intensity, BTU/hr/ft2
Solar Radiation on a hot summer day 320
Continuous exposure(1) 500
Operating area or platform(2) 1500
Exposed skin(3) 1760
Areas with infrequent personnel exposure(4) 2600
Exposed skin(5) 3000
Plastic melted; Public roads 4000
Property line(4) 5000
Plant equipment(6) 7000
Full storage tanks(6) 10,000
Piloted ignition (flame contact) of wood, 1-minute 10,000
exposure
Cotton clothing(7), (8) 12,800
Spontaneous ignition of wood, minimum flux(9) 20,000
(1) No evacuation required.
(2) Immediate evacuation to protected area required.
(3) Requires protection in 1 minute to avoid injury.
(4) 2600 BTU/hr/ft2 recommended at base of flare (on-shore), or at property line where public is located <100 ft.
(5) Requires protection within a few seconds to avoid injury.
(6) Higher intensities may be allowable, depending on the material of construction and equipment contents.
(7) Ignites in a few seconds.
(8) Radiant fluxes required to ignite many synthetic polymers are in the same range as those for wood. However, some synthetic polymers
are more fire resistant than wood.
(9) Spontaneous ignition occurs without direct contact with flame.

1223 Radiant Heat Intensity From a Pool Fire

The following example situation shows how to calculate radiant heat from a spill
fire.
A 50-foot diameter gasoline spill is ignited by a welder's torch. What is the radiant
heat at a hexane tank 100 feet from the center of the spill?
Data needed to solve the problem:
Heat of combustion, hc = 19,200 BTU/lb
Note This value is generally appropriate for the common hydrocarbons.
Specific gravity, spg = .80

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

Mass Burning Rate

Under windless conditions, the liquid burning rate can be approximated for
different hydrocarbons using Figure 1200-2.
m = gasoline burning rate =
0.055 kg/m2 sec = 0.0112 lb/ft2 sec
(Eq. 1200-1)
The effects of wind on a pool fire are complex and difficult to estimate. Most litera-
ture agrees the burning rate increases as wind speed increases. An estimation of the
effect of wind on burning rate is given by Blinov and Khudiakov [Reference 2].

mwindy /mstill = 1 + 0.15 (wind velocity/pool dia)

(Eq. 1200-2)
where:
Wind velocity = meters/sec
Pool diameter = meters
Equation 1200-2 can be used to adjust the mass burning rate (m). For the purpose
of this example, windless conditions are assumed.

Fig. 1200-2 Mass Burning Rates and Fraction Radiated

Burning Rate(1) Fraction
Material (kg/m2sec) Radiated(1)
Butane 0.078 0.27-0.30
Benzene 0.085 0.14-0.38
Hexane 0.074 0.20-0.40
Gasoline 0.055 0.18
Crude Oil 0.022 - 0.045 0.18
JP-4 0.051 0.35
(1) Data obtained from NFPA Handbook, 16th Edition, Table 21-6A

Flame height for small diameter hydrocarbon fires is 2-3 times the pool diameter.
For large pool diameters, flame height is typically equal to the pool diameter.

Flame Height
To estimate the flame height, the following equation from Thomas [Reference 3]
can be used:

h/d = 42(m/ρa(gd).5)0.61
(Eq. 1200-3)

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1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis Fire Protection Manual

where:
m = mass burning rate, kg/m2 sec, use 0.055
ρa = density of air, use 1.206 kg/m3
g = acceleration of gravity, use 9.78 m/sec2
d = pool diameter, meters, use 15.24 m
or 50 ft
Substituting the numbers gives:
h/d = 42(.055/1.206(9.78 x 15.24).5).61
= 1.39
h = 1.39 × 50 ft = 69.5 ft

Total Heat Flux

Total heat flux available can be calculated using the following equation:

Q = hc m A
(Eq. 1200-4)
where:
Q = total heat flux, BTU/sec
hc = heat of combustion, BTU/lb
A = area, ft2, 3.14(d2)/4
m = mass burning rate, lb/ft2 sec, use 0.0112
Only a fraction of this heat is radiated to the surrounding environment. Listed in
Figure 1200-2 are typical radiation fractions that have been proven by experimenta-
tion. A value of 0.18 is used for gasoline. Then the heat radiated from a 50-foot
diameter gasoline pool fire is
Q = (19,200) (.0112)[(3.14)(50)2/4](0.18)
Q = 76,000 BTU/sec

Surface Heat Flux

The surface heat flux can be calculated assuming the top of the cylindrical flame is
included.

qo = Q/S
(Eq. 1200-5)
S = cylinder surface area = 3.14 d2/4 +3.14(h)d
S = (3.14)(50)2/4 + 3.14(69.5)(50) = 12,881 ft2
qo = 76,000/12,881 = 5.9 BTU/sec/ft2 = 21,241 BTU/hr/ft2

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

Now that potential surface heat flux has been calculated for the pool fire, the heat
flux at various distances from the fire can be calculated. Several methods are avail-
able to perform this calculation. The two methods presented in this section are the
View Factor Method and the Inverse Square Law.

Calculating Heat Flux—View Factor Method

This method is the more accurate of the two calculations because it takes into
account humidity and the geometry of the flame (i.e., the shape of the flame). This
method requires more precise information and, therefore, requires more time.
The heat absorbed by a receiver (e.g., process equipment or personnel) at various
distances from the center of the pool fire is given by:

qx = er tx Fx qo (BTU/hr/ft2)
(Eq. 1200-6)
where:
qx = heat flux at distance x
er = receiver surface emissivity
tx = atmospheric transmissivity at distance x
Fx = view factor from receiver to flame
qo = heat flux at flame surface
Receiver emissivity. This is a measure of the ability of an object to absorb heat
rather than reflect it. Listed in Figure 1200-3 are values published in literature for
specific types of materials.

Fig. 1200-3 Receiver Emissivity

+
Receiver Temperature °F Emissivity
Aluminum
Rouge Plate 78 0.055
Oxidized 390-1110 0.11-0.19
Iron and Steel
Sheet steel, shiny 75 0.82
Steel plate, rough 100-700 0.94-0.97
Glass, smooth 72 0.937
Painted Surface
black lacquer 100-200 0.96-0.98
white lacquer 100-200 0.80-0.95

This example uses an er value of 0.94.

Atmospheric transmissivity. This factor takes into account the amount of thermal
radiation absorbed by water vapor in the air. There are accurate methods for deter-

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1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis Fire Protection Manual

mining this factor, which takes into account relative humidity and the partial pres-
sure of water vapor; for worst case conditions, a factor of 0.85 is used.
View factor. This constant relates the amount of thermal radiation emitted by a
flame to the amount of thermal radiation received by an object not in direct contact
with the flame. This constant takes into account flame size, shape and orientation,
the distance between the flame and the object in question, and the orientation of the
object in relation to the flame.
Figure 1200-4 shows the view factor for cylindrical flames at various heights. For
our example:
h = flame ht = 69.5 feet
D = pool diameter = 50 feet
X = distance from center of spill = 100 feet
L = X/D = 100/50 = 2.0
H = h/D = 69.5/50 = 1.39

Fig. 1200-4 View Factor for Cylindrical Flames

From Figure 1200-4, the View Factor Fx = 0.09.

The heat flux can now be calculated using Equation 1200-6:
qx = (0.94)(0.85)(0.09)(21,241)
= 1527 BTU/hr/ft2

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

Calculating Heat Flux—Inverse Square Law

This is a quick method to calculate thermal heat flux at various distances. Use this
method only if a rough estimate is acceptable.

qo/qx = x2/r2
(Eq. 1200-7)
where:
r = flame radius = D/2
qx = qo (r2/x2) = (21,214)(50/2)2 / (100)2
= 1326 BTU/hr/ft2
Both methods indicate that the tank in question will have little or no damaging
effects from radiant heat. Therefore, fire water streams do not have to be used for
cooling the tank and can be directed to other areas that require water. Figures
1200-5 and 1200-6 give heat fluxes at various distances for four different fuels
(gasoline, crude, propane, and butane) using the view factor method.

1224 Radiant Heat from Tank Fires

Radiant heat generated from a fully involved tank fire is similar to that from a spill
fire except that the effects at ground level are reduced because of the height of the
tank. Figure 1200-7 illustrates this concept.
For the gasoline example, let's consider a burning tank 50 feet wide by 20 feet high.
The Q for this example would be the same as for the spill conditions and is equal to
76,000 BTU/sec. The flux can be calculated by the following equation:

qx = (Q) cos θ / (4)(3.14)(r2)

(Eq. 1200-8)

r = {(x)2 + (y)2}1/2
(Eq. 1200-9)
where:
x = distance from centerline of tank = 100 ft
y = tank height + 1/2 h
r = {(100)2 + (20 + .5 × 69.5)2} 1/2
r = 114 feet
cos θ = x/r = 100/114 = 0.88
qx = (76,000)(0.88)/(4)(3.14)(114)2
= .409 BTU/sec/ft2 = 1474 BTU/hr/ft2

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Fig. 1200-5 Radiant Heat for Various Hydrocarbons

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Fig. 1200-6 Radiant Heat for Butane and Propane

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Fig. 1200-7 Heat Radiation From a Burning Tank

1225 Temperature Calculations

Not all the radiant heat from the fire is absorbed by the receiving object. Some of
the heat is reflected by the surface of the object. The absorbed radiant heat causes
the temperature to rise. The larger the heat flux, the larger the temperature rise.
While the object is absorbing heat, it is also giving off heat due to radiation and
convection. When the object is exposed for a sufficient length of time, it reaches a
steady-state temperature. Performing a heat balance yields the following:

q x e r = B(T) 4 + U (T-T a )
(Eq. 1200-10)
where:
qx = heat flux at distance x, BTU/ft2 hr
er = receiver surface emissivity
(See Figure 1200-3)
B = Stefan - Bolzman constant
= 1.714 x 10-9 BTU/ft2 hr °R4
T = surface temperature, °R
Ta = ambient temperature, °R
U = overall convective heat transfer coefficient, BTU/ft2 hr °R

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

Figure 1200-8 gives typical temperature/heat flux profiles at various wind condi-
tions. This figure assumes the following convective coefficients:
Wind Condition, mph Coefficient (U),
BTU/ft2hr °F
0 to 15 3
15 to 30 8
30 to 45 14

Fig. 1200-8 Temperature vs. Incident Heat Flux

1226 Uses of Radiant Heat Calculations

You can use radiant heat calculations in the following ways:
• To determine spacing of plant equipment (e.g., flares, tanks, impound basins)
from buildings housing employees (e.g., office buildings, control rooms, labs).
• To determine the spacing and location of plant equipment relative to public
roadways or buildings.
• To determine location and height of flares (see the Instrumentation and Control
Manual) with respect to people and equipment in the area.

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• In prefire planning to estimate the safe distance from a fire for people without
protective clothing, and guide the fire department in setting up equipment and
applying cooling water.
• To determine the fire water rate required for cooling exposures for the largest
fire scenario.
• To determine the need for radiant heat shields to prevent exposure of people
and equipment.

1230 Blast Effects

This section discusses the effects of explosions. The Civil and Structural Manual,
Section 400, discusses ways of building blast resistance into buildings.

1231 Defining Explosions

In general terms, the word “explosion” means a rapid release of high pressure gas
into the atmosphere. The key word is “rapid.” The release must be so fast that the
energy contained in the high pressure gas is dissipated in a shock wave. Pressures
from explosions can be as high as 10 to 20 times the initial pressure conditions. The
overpressure from an explosion depends on the quantity of flammable vapor in the
cloud, the type of hydrocarbon burning, the amount of dilution, the congestion and
confinement, and the strength of the ignition source.
The two types of explosions are physical explosions (the overpressure of a
containing vessel—much like the bursting of a balloon) and chemical reactions
(combustion of a gas or dust mixture in an unconfined area). Sections 1223 and
1234 concentrate on the chemical reaction explosion, in which a fuel (e.g.,
methane) mixes with air, ignites, and burns to produce carbon dioxide, water vapor,
and other products. Sections 1236 and 1237 deal with physical explosions and the
methods used for calculating blast effects.

Dust Explosions
Sections of process plants handling solids (e.g., cokers) need to take precautions to
avoid dust explosions. Dust explosions are possible when finely divided combus-
tible particles are dispersed in air in sufficient concentration (typically where visi-
bility is restricted to a few feet) and in the presence of an ignition source strong
enough to cause ignition. Combustion dust explosions have a slower rate of pres-
sure rise and lower final pressure than combustible vapor explosions. Many dusts
moving through air of low humidity can generate static electricity on isolated elec-
trical conductors. Potentially, the static electricity can accumulate high enough to
produce an incendiary spark. The ignition energy for dusts is significantly higher
than for vapors.
Dust explosion tests can indicate hazard potentials of other combustible dusts.
When using quantitative test data for design purposes, remember that there are
many variables, and a given dust test in equipment of different geometry or volume
will give varying quantitative results.

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1232 Effects of an Explosion

Damage from an explosion can take place in a matter of milliseconds from the time
the explosion occurs. This is because the pressure wave from the explosion can
travel at speeds close to or above the speed of sound. Figure 1200-9 illustrates the
effects of an unconfined explosion. The high pressure material expands to the
surroundings and forms a spherical shock wave. This wave causes an instantaneous
rise in pressure called the peak overpressure. A building affected by the wave
reaches a uniform overpressure because the reaction occurs so fast. The wave
decays quickly over time, briefly going negative and finally returning to atmo-
spheric pressure. Behind the shock wave is an area of air moving at hurricane veloc-
ities. This area, commonly called the dynamic pressure region, causes damage
similar to that from high winds.

Fig. 1200-9 Explosion Effects

Effects of shock waves on structures and equipment, as referenced in literature, are

listed in Figure 1200-10.

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Fig. 1200-10 Effect of Shock Waves (Structural)(1)

Structure Failure Overpressure (psi)(2)
Glass windows(3) Shattering at high velocity .15 – 1
Concrete or cinder-block wall panels 8-12 inches Wall failure .8 – 1
thick (not reinforced, no steel frame)
Typical wood house construction, trailers Wall damage 1.2
Collapse 2
Building - Metal siding/metal roof Wall damage 1.3
Collapse 3.5
Oil storage tanks Rupture 3–4
Wooden utility poles Snapping failure 5
Loaded rail cars Overturning 7
(1) This is a brief summary of pressure effects on a small group of building types. Additional information on
other types is in Appendix H.
(2) Damage is also dependent upon the duration of the pressure wave. See Appendix H and Section 1234 for
further details.
(3) Heavily dependent on size of window. "Safevue" analysis software is available through the CRTC Process
Risk team.

Listed in Figure 1200-11 are estimates of physiological effects. These figures

reflect effects due to the shock wave only and do not take into account effects from
damaged structures or projectiles.

Fig. 1200-11 Effect of Shock Waves (Physiological)

Physiological Effect Overpressure (psi)
Personnel knocked down 1
Eardrum damage 3
Lung damage 15
Threshold for fatalities 35

1233 Blast Effects from Vapor Cloud Explosions (Chemical Explosions)

Vapor cloud explosions (combustion- type) can lead to major property and equip-
ment damage and injured personnel due to pressure effects. Pressure waves associ-
ated with vapor explosions have been known to severely damage nearby buildings.
Glass breakage may occur up to several miles away from pressure waves as low as
1/4 psig.
Designs are meant to prevent such incidents. Mitigation of the consequences of an
explosion can be incorporated into the design. The purpose of this section is to
discuss the effects of vapor cloud explosions and to give reasonable estimating tech-
niques for calculating effects from explosions.
A number of factors influence the probability that a cloud will explode and also
influence the severity of an explosion:

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• Cloud configuration (size, shape, and height)

• Cloud composition (degree of mixing with air)
• Degree of confinement
• Degree of congestion created by equipment and structures
• Intensity of ignition sources and reactivity of material released
Until recently it was thought that a minimum quantity of vapor release (sometimes
quoted as 5 or 10 tons) was required to initiate a vapor cloud explosion. This
seemed to be verified by records of vapor cloud explosions in the industry, all of
which involved large releases of vapor. However, there was no theoretical basis for
this belief in a minimum size vapor cloud and recent research indicates that there
may be no minimum. Very small vapor clouds have been known to explode in the
presence of partial confinement and/or obstacles.
Recent experiments and literature on vapor cloud explosions show that the presence
of partial confinement and obstacles are necessary for blast overpressures to
develop. This confinement can be formed by plant equipment, pipe racks, struc-
tures, or even groups of vehicles parked closely together. The part of the vapor
cloud within the confined space detonates, while the rest of the cloud is consumed
by flash fire. There is little likelihood of an explosion in open areas with no confine-
ment or obstacles to the vapor cloud.

1234 Method for Calculating Overpressures from Vapor Cloud Explosions

(Chemical Explosions)
Calculating potential pressures from releases can help with placement of critical
structures within a plant. An example is the placement of a control house. If the
potential for a large release is great and the control house is nearby, then blast resis-
tant construction may be required. Calculations to determine pressures on the
building from an ignited cloud released from a reasonable scenario can determine if
blast resistant construction is required.
Until 1994, the TNT equivalency method was the only method recommended for
calculating overpressures from vapor cloud explosions. This method is simplistic,
but does not accurately predict the overpressures generated by vapor cloud explo-
sions. The TNT method tends to over-estimate pressures close to the center of the
explosion and under-predict pressures far away from the center. Alternate methods
are now available which provide better overpressure estimates from vapor cloud
explosions. The new methods, known as the “multi-energy” and “Baker-Strehlow”
methods, take into account plant congestion and confinement. The Baker-Strehlow
method is preferred and is presented in this section. The principal application of
overpressure calculations is for building siting. Refer to Appendix H for Guidelines
on application of API RP 752, Building Siting Assessment or contact the CRTC
Process Risk team.
The Baker Strehlow method is used to calculate an overpressure and corresponding
duration for a vapor cloud explosion. Dispersion modeling results are used to obtain
the potential size of the vapor-air cloud, within the flammable limits, for each
release scenario. (See Section 1240 for additional discussion). The flammable

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clouds are then superimposed on the facility plot plan to determine the volume
within areas of partial confinement/congestion due to process equipment, piping
and plant structures. The volume of equipment or piping is then deducted to obtain
the blast source volume. The blast source volume is multiplied by the heat of
combustion (3.5MJ/m3) to obtain the potential energy released. (The energy value
is then doubled to account for ground reflection of the blast.)
A graphical solution using the Strehlow curves (Figures 1200-13, 1200-14) is then
applied to determine the predicted overpressure (Ps) at the building in question and
the predicted impulse (is). Choice of the curve is dependent on the level of plant
congestion within the cloud, the degree of cloud confinement and the fuel reactivity.
Reactivity:
Low - methane
Medium - ethylene, propane, butane, ethane
High - ethylene oxide, hydrogen, acetylene, propylene oxide and mixtures
containing these high reactivity components
Confinement:
3D - plant areas where the vapor cloud can expand in three dimensions (e.g.,
typical process plants, pipeway areas)
2D - areas where the vapor cloud is confined by a solid plane so that it can
expand in 2 dimensions only. (e.g., under elevated buildings, under a roof
canopy, on one deck of a multi-level structure)
1D - areas where the vapor cloud is confined by solid planes so that it can
expand in one direction only (e.g., in tunnel or covered trench)
Congestion:
Low density - There are 1 or two rows of equipment or structures blocking the
expansion of the vapor cloud. In each row, the blockage is <10% of the area
through which the cloud expands.
Medium density - There are 1 to 3 rows of equipment or structures blocking
the expansion of the vapor cloud. In each row, the blockage is <40% of the area
through which the cloud expands. This is typical of most process plant areas
built to current Company spacing guidelines.
High density - There are 3 or more rows of equipment and structures blocking
the expansion of the vapor cloud. In each row, the blockage is >40% of the area
through which the cloud expands. A good test for a high density area - if you
stand in the middle and have difficulty seeing daylight then the area is usually
high density.
The Baker-Strehlow method uses the following equation to determine a scaled
distance (R) to the building in question.

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

rP o1 / 3
R = ------------
-
E1 / 3
(Eq. 1200-11)
where:
R = scaled distance
r = distance from building edge to center of
vapor cloud (m)
Po = atmospheric pressure (101,325 Pa)
E = energy (J)
Mw is determined using Figure 1200-12.

Fig. 1200-12 Mw for Average Fuel Reactivity Vapor Clouds(1)

Congestion/Obstacle Density
Confinement High Medium Low
1D Flame Expansion 2.265 1.765 1.029
2D Flame Expansion 1.235 .662 .118
3D Flame Expansion .206 .100 .037
(1) Refer to “Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis,” Presented at AIChE 28th annual Loss Prevention Symposium April, 1994, for high or low
reactivity fuels

Once R and Mw are determined for a blast scenario/building combination,

Figure 1200-13 is used to find Ps/Po. Ps is the predicted overpressure at the building.
Figure 1200-14 is used to determine the impulse factor

is ao
--------------------------
2⁄3 1⁄3
Po E
(Eq. 1200-12)
where:
ao = speed of sound (330 m/sec)
is = impulse of blast wave (Pa sec)
The duration of the blast wave is calculated as follows:

2 ( is )
t = ------------
Ps
(Eq. 1200-13)
where:
t = blast duration (sec)

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Ps = blast overpressure (Pa)

Example - Baker Strehlow VCE Calculation

Find the predicted blast overpressure and duration for a propane/air vapor cloud
explosion with a predicted cloud size 300 ft long x 40 ft wide x 40 ft high. Assume
that the confinement is 3D and the process equipment provides a medium density
area of congestion 20 ft high x 200 ft long by x 40 ft wide. The blockage by obsta-
cles is approximately 20%. The building is 110 ft from the center of the cloud.
Blast source volume = (20)(200)(40)(.8) = 128,000 ft3(.0283m3/ft3) = 3,620 m3
E = 3,620(3.5 MJ/m3)(2) = 25,300 MJ = 2.53 × 1010J

rP o 1 / 3 ( 110ft ) ( .304m/ft ) ( 101,325Pa ) 1 / 3

R = -------------- = ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- = .53
E1 / 3 ( 2.53 × 10 10 J ) 1 / 3

Mw = 0.100
from Figure 1200-13, Ps/Po = .045
Ps = .045 × 101,325 Pa = 4560 Pa

= 0.7 psig

is ao
from Figure 1200-14 , ---------------------- = .035
P o2 / 3E 1 / 3

( .035 ) ( 101, 325 ) 2 / 3 ( 2.53 × 10 10 ) 1 / 3

i s = ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ = 675 Pa sec
(330m/sec)

2 ( 675 )
t = ----------------------- = .296 sec blast duration
( 4560Pa )

1235 Physical Explosions of Confined Spaces

In the case of a physical explosion, pressure builds up faster than the vessel's
existing venting system can handle. This pressure can be caused by process upset,
safety equipment failure, or an external heat source. When the vessel's internal pres-
sure exceeds its ultimate tensile strength, the vessel fails at its weakest part. This
pressure can be four times the design pressure of the vessel.

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1236 Calculating Pressure Effects from Pressure Container Failure

(Physical Explosion)
To calculate the energy stored in a compressed gas, an isothermal process (constant
temperature) is assumed. This is considered “worst case.” Therefore, the energy
equation for this process can be written as follows:

( P 1 – P o )2V 1
E = ---------------------------------
( δ1 – 1 )
(Eq. 1200-14)
where:
E = energy, J
V1 = volume of gas filled space (m3)
P1 = absolute pressure of compressed gas at bursting, (Pa)
Po = absolute pressure of ambient air (Pa)
δ = ratio of specific heats of gas in system
(1.1 to 1.2 for most hydrocarbon gas)
Outlined below is an example problem using this technique to calculate pressures
from a physical explosion.
What is the potential energy stored in a 3m by 5m vessel with a design pressure of
2.5 psig (assume entire contents of vessel is vapor)? What is the expected overpres-
sure and impulse at 100ft?

V1 = (π(D2)/4)(L) = (π(32)/4)(5) = 35.3m3

P1 = (4)(design pressure) + atmospheric
pressure
= [(4)(2.5 psig) (6895 Pa/psig) +101,325 Pa]
= 1.70 × 105 Pa
Po = Final pressure = 1.01 × 105 Pa
δ1 = 1.1

5 5
( 1.7 × 10 – 1.01 × 10 )2 ( 35.3 )
E = -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
( 1.1 – 1 )

E = 48.7 MJ

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Fig. 1200-13 Baker Strehlow Curve–Peak Side On Overpressure
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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis
Fig. 1200-14 Baker Strehlow Curve–Impulse
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Using Equation 1200-11: to calculate the scaled distance gives:

Po 1 / 3
R = r  ------  = 100ft(.304m/ft)  ------------------------
101,325Pa  1 / 3
-
E  7 
4.8 × 10 J
Using the vessel burst line on Figure 1200-13
Ps/Po = .08
Ps = 1.2 psig at 100 feet
From Figure 1200-14, the impulse factor is .015. Using Equation 1200-12 to calcu-
late the impulse:

i s ( 330 m/sec )
.015 = ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
2⁄3 7 2⁄3
(101,325) ( 4.87 × 10 )

is = 283 Pa sec
This calculation method gives a conservative estimate of overpressures. It does not
take into account elevation differences, equipment interferences, and partial venting
before explosion. All these factors tend to lower the potential overpressures.

1237 Preventing and Mitigating Explosions

Prevention of Vapor Cloud Explosions
Good maintenance and operating procedures as well as a carefully designed plant
can help to reduce the probability of a vapor cloud release. A well documented
procedure for isolating and cleaning equipment, including isolation blinds and
adequate flushing, will limit vapor releases during maintenance. Good operating
instructions to prevent plant upsets and contingency plans to handle vapor releases
are critical. Finally, adequately designed plants, including properly designed over-
pressure protection and emergency shutdown systems (see the Instrumentation and
Control Manual), are essential in reducing releases to the atmosphere.
Following the layout and spacing guidelines in Section 1300 of this manual will
help reduce the congestion within a plant that can lead to higher overpressure.
Limiting ignition sources in a facility helps to reduce the chance of ignition of a
vapor cloud. Hot work permits should be obtained for all spark-generating jobs
(e.g., welding or cutting) around hydrocarbon handling equipment. Hot work
permits are required for anyone driving a vehicle in a restricted area. Under no
circumstance should a vehicle be driven into or out of a vapor cloud. All perma-
nently installed electrical equipment should be rated for the electrical area classifi-
cation per Section 1500 of this manual, and API 500; and should be installed per
the Electrical Manual and NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code. Where there is a
prevailing wind, known ignition sources (e.g., furnaces or fired heaters) should be
located upwind from equipment that could release large quantities of vapor.

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

Also consider the following to reduce the possibility of a vapor cloud forming and
subsequently igniting:
• Provide combustible vapor detectors as outlined in Section 1600.
• Install isolation valves for equipment and storage vessels, as outlined in
Section 1800
• Minimize volatile liquid storage in process areas and separate main storage as
far downwind as practicable from process and other important areas.
• Develop an emergency plan for potentially dangerous releases.

Mitigation of Physical Explosions

A combustion-type explosion (chemical explosion) within a confined space, such as
a pressure vessel or a tank, can reach up to 10 times the initial pressure. Process
vessels designed for 150 psig or higher operating pressure can withstand an internal
explosion if the vessel is at atmospheric pressure at the time of the explosion. Low
pressure containers, such as atmospheric pressure storage tanks, require means of
mitigating the explosion effects.
Explosions can be safely vented or controlled if the correct type of venting or explo-
sion suppression device is installed. One example of such a device is the weak shell-
to-roof joint on an API 650 cone roof tank. This seam is designed to be the first
seam on the tank to fail and to safely vent an explosion in the vapor space of the
tank. Refer to the Tank Manual, Section 400 for more information on this design.
For detailed guidance of venting and suppression of explosions and deflagrations,
see NFPA 68, “Venting of Deflagrations” and NFPA 69, “Explosion Prevention
Systems.” The CRTC Fire & Process Safety team is available to answer questions
regarding suppression and venting.

Prevention of Dust Explosions

The following are general guidelines for preventing and controlling dust explosions:
• Bond ducts, bag houses, blowers, etc.
• Do not allow dust producing operations to pose a fire risk to other facilities or
be at risk themselves.
• Do not allow equipment and transfer lines to emit dust; use positive controls
where emissions do occur.
• Use inerting to maintain atmosphere below the flammable range.
• Employ explosion suppression methods.
• Keep buildings free of dust and provide explosion relief. (This includes dust
accumulations on horizontal surfaces.)
Additional information can be found in Section 4100 and in NFPA 77, NFPA 91,
and NFPA 654.

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1240 Dispersion Modeling

Dispersion modeling is a technique for determining what flammable and/or toxic
concentrations will occur in the ambient air downwind of a release of material to
the atmosphere. Concentrations downwind of a release are influenced by a number
of variables, such as atmospheric stability and wind speed, the quantity of material
released, the release mechanism (hole, tank failure, etc.), the physical state of the
material, the pressure, temperatures and ground/surface conditions. Because these
effects are complex and interrelated, computer programs are used to predict concen-
trations from releases. The CRTC Process Risk team can provide expertise in
dispersion modeling.

1241 Dispersion Modeling Software

The program used by CRTC Process Risk Team to predict concentrations from acci-
dental releases is called FOCUS, licensed from Quest.

Emissions Estimating
Dispersion models perform two steps to predict concentrations from an accidental
release: 1) emissions estimating and 2) dispersion and prediction of concentrations.
The first step calculates the quantity of material emitted to the atmosphere and
depends on user-supplied parameters such as the composition of the material
released, hole size, storage quantity, storage temperature and pressure. The program
can then calculate liquid or vapor flow from a hole in a pipe or tank.
Emissions can be calculated for evaporation from any liquid pool that may form on
the ground. For pressurized liquids such as ammonia or chlorine, the “aerosol” frac-
tion is calculated. Actual releases of these chemicals show that liquid released from
pressurized liquid chemicals goes into the air as aerosols rather than pooling on the
ground. Because the presence of the aerosol dominates dispersion of the material
downwind, it is important to account for its effects.
The model can also calculate exponential declines in emission rates as the pipeline
depressures (although an average of the emissions within the first few seconds of
the release is used to predict concentrations).

Jet Dispersion
After emissions estimating, the program decides which of three dispersion models
is appropriate. The first is a jet dispersion model designed to predict concentrations
from high pressure releases of material from holes, such as those occurring from a
natural gas pipeline rupture. Because the pressure at the source can cause emissions
to be released as a high velocity jet, turbulence and mixing with air can occur.
Neglecting this mixing can result in substantial overprediction of concentrations.
The program accounts for this additional dilution.
The jet dispersion model also predicts concentrations downwind of aerosol-type
releases, and concentrations from jet releases that are heavier, lighter, or the same
density as air.

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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

Dispersion of Heavy Concentrations

A second model predicts concentrations from releases of materials that are heavier
than air, such as LPG. The releases can be instantaneous or pool-forming. This
model takes into account the important effects of gravity, because the material is
denser than air. It also takes into account any initial dilution by air that might be
present because of the nature of the release. Finally, the model can predict concen-
trations in the regime where the cloud has diluted sufficiently to be the same
density as air.

Dispersion of Light Concentrations

The third model predicts concentrations from releases of materials that are either
lighter or of the same density as air, and are either instantaneous or pool-forming.
The model takes into account any initial dilution by air that might be present
because of the nature of the release.
Because concentrations are a function of not only the release mechanism but also
atmospheric conditions, a range of meteorological conditions is often modeled to
determine the greatest downwind impact.
The models predict concentrations in the air in either percent or ppm at various loca-
tions downwind as a function of time. Maximum predicted concentrations at loca-
tions of interest can then be determined from the results. For fire protection, the
extent of concentrations equal to the lower flammable limit (LFL) is usually the
concentration of concern. In some jurisdictions or for conservatism, 20 to 50% of
the LFL may be the concentration of concern. An example output from a dispersion
model is shown in Figure 1200-15. The example shows the downwind extent of the
LFL and one-half the LFL for a break in a 2-inch hose transferring LPG from a
tank truck to a storage tank.

Predicting Fire Impact

Dispersion models can also determine impacts resulting from fires. Four types of
fires can be modeled: BLEVE's, rectangular pool fires, circular pool fires, and torch
fires. The model predicts the radiant heat energy absorbed at various distances from
the fire.

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Fig. 1200-15 Momentum Jet Dispersion from LPG Hose Rupture, Overhead View
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Fire Protection Manual 1200 Fire and Explosion Consequence Analysis

1250 References
1. NFPA Handbook, Section 21, Chapter 6, Sixteenth ed. 1986.
2. Lees, F.P., Loss Prevention in the Process Industry, Volume 1, Section 16.7,
Butterworth & Co. Ltd, 1980.
3. Martinsen, W.E., D.W. Johnson, and S.B. Millsap, Determining Spacing by
Radiant Heat Limits, 1987 API Meeting, Energy Analysts, Norman, Ok, 1987.
4. Cruice, W.J., NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, Sixteenth Ed. Section 4,
Chapter 2, 1986.
5. Baker, et al., “Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis,” presented at the AICHE Loss
Prevention Symposium, April 1994.

American Petroleum Industry (API)

API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installation
in Petroleum Facilities
API 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring
Systems
API 752 Management of Hazards Associated with Location
of Process Plant Buildings

Chevron References
Civil and Structural Manual
Electrical Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual
Tank Manual

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 68 Venting of Deflagrations
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code

Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)

Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 1989
Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires and
BLEVES, 1994
Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 2nd Edition with Worked Examples, 1992

Chevron Corporation 1200-29 January 1997

1300 Layout and Spacing

Abstract
This section discusses plant layout and facility and equipment spacing to minimize
the potential for fire to spread to adjacent facilities. Figure 1300-1 and 1300-2 at the
end of this section offer guidelines for plant-to-plant and plant-to-equipment
spacing.
This section covers layout and spacing requirements for process plants. Require-
ments for other types of facilities are covered in Sections 3100 to 4100. Drainage is
discussed in Section 1400. Location and protection of critical controls are discussed
in Section 1700. Tank spacing is discussed in the Tank Manual.

Contents Page

1310 Layout Considerations 1300-3

1311 General
1312 Legal Requirements
1313 Design for Local Conditions
1314 Layout Objectives
1315 Block Layout and Roads
1316 Drainage
1320 Plant Spacing 1300-6
1321 Spacing Tables
1322 Protection of the Public Through Spacing
1323 Plant-to-Plant Spacing
1324 Plant-to-Offplot Facilities Spacing
1325 Spacing of Unrelated Facilities
1330 Process Equipment Spacing 1300-9
1331 General Philosophy
1332 Pumps and Compressors
1333 Air-Cooled Heat Exchangers

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1334 Process Piping

1335 Other Equipment Spacing Concerns
1340 Specific Facilities 1300-11
1350 Building Siting in Process Plants 1300-11
1360 References 1300-12

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Fire Protection Manual 1300 Layout and Spacing

1310 Layout Considerations

1311 General
The primary consideration in the layout of a petroleum handling facility is its
impact on the public and the environment. Assessment of this impact requires
knowledge of the process or operation and an understanding of laws and regulations
concerning fire protection designs, public safety, and environmental controls.
Economics is another consideration in the layout of facilities. The designer must
balance the incremental benefit resulting from greater spacing against the additional
cost.
Legal and safety spacing requirements in plant layout apply to alterations and addi-
tions as well as to new installations.

1312 Legal Requirements

Of primary importance in laying out an oil handling facility are the laws and regula-
tions concerning fire protection design and public safety. Most communities, states
and countries have such requirements. They may establish limitations such as
minimum distances of structures from property lines and from the nearest side of a
public way. Legal requirements must be followed unless variances or other specific
approvals for deviation are obtained from the enforcing authority.

1313 Design for Local Conditions

New facilities and modifications should be designed to accommodate local condi-
tions that may affect the safety of personnel and equipment. Where the historical
record indicates a reasonable probability of extreme conditions, the designer should
make appropriate provisions in laying out facilities. Extreme conditions include
hurricanes, tornadoes, violent hailstorms, heavy snow loads, severe and prolonged
freezing temperatures, airborne salt water spray, cooling tower fog, lightning
storms, floods, and exposure to earth slides, rock slides or earthquakes.

1314 Layout Objectives

Understanding the safety requirements for plant layout is important in planning new
installations and in making alterations and extensions to existing facilities. From
the standpoint of fire safety, general requirements for layout of an oil handling
facility are summarized as follows:

Separation from Adjacent Public Property

It is important to protect the public from exposure to spills, fires, explosions, heat,
smoke, odors, hazardous releases, or noise. Consider both present and possible
future activities on land adjacent to the plant site, and operations on any rights-of-
way for highways, railroads, and pipelines that may traverse the property.

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Separation of Facilities
Protect Company personnel and equipment by separating independent elements,
such as process units, storage tanks, and control houses. This helps to prevent fire,
explosions, radiant heat, spills, etc. in one element from significantly affecting adja-
cent elements.

Protection of Critical Equipment

Critical equipment should be located and designed for maximum protection. For the
purposes of this section, critical equipment is defined as that equipment necessary
for safe, normal plant operation and control as well as equipment necessary for safe
shutdown during plant upsets, fires, and other emergencies. Critical equipment may
include instrument air supplies, process control systems, electrical power, substa-
tions, main process block valves, certain pumps and compressors, emergency shut-
down (ESD) and depressuring systems, and fire water systems. The location and
protection of critical controls is discussed in Section 1700.

Separation of Hazardous Areas

Separate high-hazard plants from each other and from low-hazard plants. High-
hazard units typically involve high pressure (greater than 500 psig), high tempera-
ture, and volatile processes with flammable materials and fast chemical reaction
rates. These units have a greater chance for a release, fire or explosion than low-
hazard units (such as storage tank areas, power generating plants, and boilers).
Although low hazard units have a lower probability of incident, the consequences
can be much greater.

Protection for Utilities

Power-generating plants, boiler plants, and substations generally serve several
process plants. They should remain operable when one or more of the process
plants is in distress. It may be prudent to have greater spacing between boiler plants
and a high-pressure process plant than between two process plants.

Protection Against Flooding

Provide good drainage and protection against flooding of vital areas of the plant.

Meteorological Conditions
Consider general climatic, meteorological, and related conditions such as direction
of prevailing winds, maximum storm wind velocities, frequency of thunderstorms,
maximum and minimum temperatures, and the occurrence of earthquakes.

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Plant Equipment Access

Equipment access and layout is also critical to safe normal operation and emer-
gency response. The Piping Manual includes three engineering forms illustrating
typical piping and equipment layouts.
PIM-EF-579 Process Plant Cross-Section —Equipment and Pumps
on Same Side of Pipeway
PIM-EF-580 Process Plant Cross-Section — Equipment Separated
from Pumps by Pipeway
PIM-EF-883 Process Plant Cross-Section — Two-Sided Plant with
Air Coolers

Security
Plant location and degree of public access may indicate that plant borders and
entrances should be supervised and protected.

Evacuation
Evacuation routes should take into account the location of potential releases,
prevailing winds, drainage patterns, etc.

1315 Block Layout and Roads

A large plant composed of several major units should be laid out in a rectangular or
block pattern with adequate roadways giving access to major elements. Streets that
separate blocks are excellent fire breaks and facilitate movement and use of fire-
fighting equipment.
For purposes of fire protection, economy of operations, and maintenance, main
access roadways are needed. Within operating areas, every unit and facility should
have roadways that allow for firefighting equipment.
During an emergency, it may be necessary to block certain roadways; therefore,
each unit should have two or more approaches. Block layout will generally provide
two-direction access.
On tank farms, roads should provide ready access to tanks. These roads may be
narrow, but they should be all-weather roads and have turnouts at convenient inter-
vals.
Maintenance considerations should include access by large lift vehicles, if appro-
priate. Roadways and pipeway crossings should be able to handle expected weight
loads.

Restricted and Unrestricted Roads

As discussed in Section 2000, vehicles are ignition sources. To minimize the risk of
a vehicle igniting flammable material in a facility, any road within 25 feet of poten-
tial release sources of flammable or toxic material is designated as a restricted road.

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Restricted roads should not be used for routine plant travel of operations and main-
tenance vehicles.
Traffic on restricted roads can be closely controlled by installing barriers and signs
at the entrance to the facility, and by requiring procedures such as hot work permits
for vehicles that must enter the facilities. This usually requires that the operators
test for combustibles in the area prior to vehicular entry.
Unrestricted roads are those roads located more than 25 feet from release sources.
They do not require traffic control.

1316 Drainage
In process units, area drainage prevents spills from accumulating under vessels or
piping. Drainage design requirements are described in the Civil and Structural
Manual, Section 500, and in Section 1400 of this manual. Firefighting water
requirements are determined by the size of fire that could occur and the fire control
techniques and equipment likely to be used.

1320 Plant Spacing

1321 Spacing Tables

The spacing tables in Figures 1300-1 (sheets 1 and 2) and 1300-2 give minimum
spacing guidelines for the following:
• Plant to plant
• Plant to property line
• Plant to equipment
• Equipment to equipment
These guidelines have been developed through Company experience and industry
standards. Where special circumstances allow less spacing, the facility or project
team should document the rationale and mitigation efforts. Following are examples
for using the spacing tables.

Plant-to-Plant or Plant-to-Property Line Spacing

Note Figures 1300-1 and 1300-2 are foldouts located at the end of this section.
Refer to Figure 1300-1, sheet 1 for your situation. Sheet 1 gives the codes to use on
sheet 2 to locate the minimum spacing.
Example: Spacing of control house to high pressure plant.
From Figure 1300-1, sheet 1, the code is B13. B on the diagonal and 13 on the hori-
zontal gives you 50 feet accompanied by Note 16.

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Plant-to-Equipment or Equipment-to-Equipment Spacing

Refer to Figures 1300-1 (sheet 2) and 1300-2.
Choose one type of equipment on the diagonal and go down or across to the other
type of equipment.
Example: Spacing of motor control center to air cooler.
Locate motor control center on the diagonal (column 25). Drop down column 25 to
the row corresponding to air coolers (row 30). Where they intersect is the minimum
spacing number—in this case, 50 feet.

1322 Protection of the Public Through Spacing

Where practical, use offices, warehouses, and other low-risk buildings as buffers
between the process plants and the public. Greenbelts and planted areas are often
used to this end. These areas give the industrial facility a friendly, modern image
that can make them more acceptable to the public.
Protection of the public and the environment is a Company priority and this area is
becoming increasingly regulated.

1323 Plant-to-Plant Spacing

These are the major concerns in plant-to-plant spacing:
• Personnel safety and operator access
• Explosion damage prevention
• Spill spread control
• Vapor releases and vapor cloud travel
• Fire and fire spread
• Flood control
• Maintenance access
• Firefighter access
• Radiant heat from fire
• Economical construction
Spacing between process units is based on the estimated hazard of one or both facil-
ities.
Once the overall risk is agreed upon, it is important to determine what effect a fire
or explosion would have on the surroundings. This effect is a function of the degree
of explosive violence possible in the process and/or the rate of flow, total volume,
volatility, temperature, and toxicity of the liquid or vapors that might be acciden-
tally released. This determination should further help to establish the justified
spacing between units.
Close spacing of operating units permits shorter runs of transfer pipe, more central-
ization of plant control, and more compact electrical supply systems. Close spacing

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minimizes surge between plants and has other tangible economic benefits.
However, close spacing increases the likelihood of fire spreading between units,
increases the problems of major maintenance work, and may hamper firefighting
activities.
Each foot of separation costs money, and there is a point at which additional separa-
tion may increase the fire hazard, especially if control is highly automated and
centralized. Leaks may go undetected and operators may be restricted in their
visual observation of the unit.
In general, spacing between major process units should not be less than 75 feet
between equipment setback lines. Spacing greater than 200 feet, except for special-
ized operations such as emergency high capacity flare systems, provides little
decrease in risk and may actually increase the overall hazard.
It is acceptable for an overhead or grade-level pipe rack to cross a segregation space
transversely. A pipe rack may also be routed longitudinally along a segregation
space, provided that it does not occupy the full width. At least 20 feet (6 meters) of
the segregation space should be left clear of the pipe rack as a firebreak and to
permit fire fighting access.
The likelihood of future expansion of any major process unit should be considered
in the spacing layout. The minimum spacing between units should not be viewed as
a location for possible unit expansion.

1324 Plant-to-Offplot Facilities Spacing

Refer to Figure 1300-2 for offplot facility spacing.
A block layout of plants and roads conveniently separates process units from
nonprocess equipment such as cooling towers, storage tanks, utility plants, elec-
trical substations, and fire water pumps. See Section 1315 for more considerations
on the layout of roads.
Firefighting facilities, critical instrumentation systems, and utility plants should be
able to operate in the worst-case plant failure. They are the last line of defense in
fire and accident control. Therefore, the plant layout should allow greater spacing
between these facilities and those that may be sources of toxic releases. See
Figure 1300-2.
Separators and holding ponds also require special attention to spacing. These are
electrically classified areas because they often contain oil.
In general, shops and warehouses can be placed closer to the process units than can
office buildings.

1325 Spacing of Unrelated Facilities

Nonprocessing facilities involved in packaging, shipping, and pipeline marketing
may be located near process plants. Examples of such facilities are pipeline pump
stations, marketing terminals, warehousing distribution, and marine terminals.

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These facilities should be treated as offplot facilities and spaced accordingly.

Consider the prevailing winds when siting tank truck loading racks and gas bottling
plants, to minimize vapor release travel into other plants or to ignition source
should a spill occur.
The vehicle traffic pattern should not interfere with vehicle traffic to the refinery or
process area parking lot. For example, tank truck loading-rack traffic is normally
heaviest in early morning, when employees begin to arrive at work. Heavy traffic
may interfere with fire equipment access.

1330 Process Equipment Spacing

1331 General Philosophy

Process flow generally dictates the layout of equipment within an operating unit.
The spacing between individual pieces of equipment is determined by requirements
for piping flexibility, access for operation and maintenance, and fire protection.
Equipment spacing for fire protection is calculated to provide:
• Protection against flammable vapor reaching sources of ignition
• Access for fire control
• Protection of important equipment from fire
Keep fired equipment away from equipment and portions of the plant where a flam-
mable vapor release might occur. Where possible, locate furnaces on the outside
edge of plants, upwind of other equipment.
General spacing recommendations are shown in Figure 1300-2.

1332 Pumps and Compressors

Mechanical equipment, such as pumps and compressors handling flammable fluids
and vapors, is the equipment most likely to be a source of accidental leakage to the
atmosphere. Locate this equipment at least 40 feet from sources of ignition, such as
furnaces, and far enough from other equipment to prevent a gland fire from over-
heating adjoining or overhead equipment.
In general, locate pumps alongside in-plant overhead pipeways, with the process
ends of flammable liquid pumps 5 feet outside the extremities of the overhead
pipeway.
Consider locating LPG and hot pumps on the outside edge of plants to improve
access, drainage, and fire water coverage.

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Pumps Handling Hydrocarbon Above its Auto-ignition Temperature

(or 600°F):
Use the following guidelines:
• Locate pumps at least 25 feet from furnaces; both are sources of ignition
should a pump leak occur.
• Place pumps 5 feet apart
• Pumps should be 10 feet from equipment handling other flammables so that a
packing gland fire or mechanical seal fire will not expose adjacent equipment.
• Locate pumps along the outer edge of the plot limit, outboard of columns and
vessels, and with no equipment installed overhead. If it is necessary to locate
such pumps alongside in-plant overhead pipeways, the process ends should be
10 feet outside the extremities of the overhead pipeway. Where desirable to
further reduce risk of fire loss, a pump may be separated from its spare by
another pump or by increased spacing.
You should discuss any exceptions to these guidelines with the CRTC Fire &
Process Safety Team.

1333 Air-Cooled Heat Exchangers

It is preferable to locate air-cooled heat exchangers over areas where risks of
serious fires are minimal. Do not locate them near pumps or other mechanical
equipment.

1334 Process Piping

Process piping should be run above ground and preferably overhead. Do not install
new below-grade pipe trenches. Upgrade existing below grade pipeways that
contain flammable materials. Overhead pipeways provide excellent separation
between equipment and generally run through the center of an operating unit. They
also are less prone to external corrosion and can be inspected more easily. Do not
locate mechanical equipment under overhead pipeways.

1335 Other Equipment Spacing Concerns

• Spacing between furnaces and pumps, columns, vessels, etc. (see
Figure 1300-1).
• Spacing between the control house and process equipment (See Figure 1300-1).
• Spacing for access by operating personnel, maintenance personnel, and fire
fighting crews.
• Hydrocarbon vent locations (Section 1900).

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Fire Protection Manual 1300 Layout and Spacing

• Where vents and relief valves are piped to a closed system, locate the relief
line away from fire hazardous equipment. If it is located onplot, it should be
properly supported or have fireproofed supports.
• Place instruments, instrument leads, and critical power cables out of the fire
hazard area. If this is not possible, protect them or place them underground as
discussed in Section 1700.
• Spacing between process plant equipment and fire suppression equipment,
including portable extinguishers (Section 1652), wheeled dry chemical extin-
guishers (Section 1657), hydrants (Section 1624), and fire water monitors
(Section 1636).

1340 Specific Facilities

Spacing and layout guidelines specific to a certain type of facility are found in
Sections 3100 to 4100.
Spacing and layout guidelines related to tanks and tankfields are found in the Tank
Manual.

1350 Building Siting in Process Plants

Buildings and Control Rooms at facilities should be analyzed to determine if the
location and construction type are appropriate for potential hazards from the
process areas. Potential hazards include: fire, toxic release and Vapor Cloud Explo-
sion (VCE). For new control rooms and buildings (at facilities handling flammable
or toxic materials), a hazard assessment should be done to insure that the design
requirements are sufficient to mitigate potential hazards. This could include blast
resistant design, protected ventilation systems, or gas detectors. The Process Risk
Team at CRTC can conduct the hazard assessment or provide guidance.
Existing buildings at a facility can also be reviewed to understand and manage the
associated risk from the hazards in the plant. API's "Recommended Practice 752 -
Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings"
provides a framework for conducting a Building Siting Assessment. Following this
practice will meet the requirement for OSHA's PSM Rule 1910.119(e) for facility
siting.
API RP 752 outlines a three-stage analysis process for identifying hazards and
managing risk to building occupants from fires, toxic releases, and explosions. The
staged approach systematically identifies and evaluates buildings in which occu-
pants may be at risk.
• Stage 1 of the study will identify each building at the facility, verify potential
hazards, and screen out buildings based on occupancy levels and function
during an emergency.
• During Stage 2, the buildings that met the previous screening criteria are evalu-
ated with consequence modeling for vapor cloud explosion and toxic release

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hazards; and they are evaluated against current Company design standards for
fire hazards. If the team determines that a building(s) has a sufficient hazard,
then a Stage 3 is justified.
• During the Stage 3, the study team identifies and analyzes the frequency of
potential scenarios either qualitatively or quantitatively. Recommendations are
then developed to mitigate the risks where appropriate. This is the final evalua-
tion step in the API RP 752 facility siting assessment methodology. Specific
guidance and criteria for such a study are in CRTC's "Building Siting Assess-
ment: Supplemental Guidelines for API RP 752", and is included in Appendix
H of this manual.

1360 References
American Petroleum Industry (API)
API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations in
Petroleum Facilities
API 2510 Design and Construction of LP Gas Installations at
Marine and Pipeline Terminals, Natural Gas Processing
Plants, Refineries, Petrochemical Plants and Tank Farms
(included in the Piping Manual)
API RP 752 Management of Hazards Associated with Location of
Process Plant Buildings

Chevron References
Civil and Structural Manual
Electrical Manual
Tank Manual

National Fire Protection (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (included in
this manual)
NFPA 50A Gaseous Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites
NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases
NFPA 59 Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases at
Utility Gas Plants

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Fire Protection Manual 1300 Layout and Spacing

Fig. 1300-1 Plant and Equipment Spacing (1 of 2)

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Fire Protection Manual 1300 Layout and Spacing

Fig. 1300-1 Plant and Equipment Spacing (2 of 2)

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Fire Protection Manual 1300 Layout and Spacing

Fig. 1300-2 Process Units to Offplot Facility Spacing

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1400 Drainage

Abstract
Detailed information on drainage system design is included in the Civil and Struc-
tural Manual, Section 500. This section discusses design considerations for
drainage systems related to fire protection. A well designed drainage system:
• Contains spills, preferably in a closed system.
• Carries oil spills, rainwater, and fire water to a safe location where the spill can
be retained and recovered.
• Minimizes the spread and area of exposure from spills and fires in process
plants, tank fields, marketing terminals, chemical plants, production platforms,
etc.
This section covers drainage for process facilities. For other types of facilities, see
Sections 3100 to 4100. For drainage around tanks and in tank fields, see the Tank
Manual.

Contents Page

1410 Process Unit Drain Systems 1400-3

1411 Surface Drainage
1412 Oily Water Drainage System
1413 Sanitary Sewer System
1420 Drainage System Design 1400-3
1421 Plant Area Division by Functional Category
1422 Segregation of Waste Streams
1423 Drainage Area Layout and Capacity
1424 Surface Drainage
1425 Acid, Caustic, Corrosive, and Toxic Wastes
1426 Oily Storm Water and Process Waste Water
1427 Vents
1430 Drainage Areas, Offplot 1400-8

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1431 General Fire Protection Considerations

1432 Offplot Manhole Venting Requirements
1433 Infrequently Used Sealed Catch Basin Hazard
1434 Sealing Requirements
1435 Process Drain Maintenance
1440 Pipeway Drainage 1400-9
1450 References 1400-10

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1410 Process Unit Drain Systems

A process unit drain system may consist of several parts.
• Surface drains for storm water
• Oily water drain system
• Sanitary sewer system
• Special chemical system
Large plants may have independent systems for these functions. In small plants, one
system may be designed to serve all functions except the sanitary sewer (see
Section 1413).

1411 Surface Drainage

The surface drainage system is designed to carry away rainwater, fire water or large
oil spills resulting from equipment failure or misoperation. A typical drainage plan
is given in Figure 1400-1.

1412 Oily Water Drainage System

This drainage system is designed for atmospheric draining from raised hubs at
water draws, sampling points, pumps, etc., where oil is often present.

1413 Sanitary Sewer System

This system is designed to carry waste from cafeterias, offices, living quarters, etc.
The sanitary sewer must be kept separate to prevent entry of gases from oily water
process drains into the buildings. Also, sewer water is treated in a different manner
than process water.

1420 Drainage System Design

This section discusses general rules about layout and design of onplot drainage.
Working with an updated plot plan, the designer should proceed as described in the
following steps.

1421 Plant Area Division by Functional Category

Divide the plant area into categories by function, such as equipment areas, pipe-
ways, and walkways so that drainage from one area does not pass through another
area on the way to the catch basin. Note special areas such as acid, caustic, hot oil
furnace, or heat exchanger areas. (See Figure 1400-1.)

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Fig. 1400-1 Typical Drainage Plan

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1422 Segregation of Waste Streams

Determine to the extent to which waste streams should be segregated for environ-
mental, disposal, cross-contamination or reactivity reasons. You can request input
on segregation from operations or the local environment group.

1423 Drainage Area Layout and Capacity

Divide regions within each category (Section 1421) into approximately 50-foot
squares to equalize slopes. For very large, high-capacity process plants, the size of
these areas may be increased to 75-foot squares.
Size catch basins for fire water or rainfall, whichever is greater. The minimum catch
basin capacity is 500 gpm for the 50-foot-square area. The maximum is 1125 gpm
for the 75-foot-square area. These numbers are based on fire water flow or rainfall
of 0.20 gpm per square foot of drainage area. For any one plant, provide a
minimum drainage capacity of 3000 gpm.
Drainage capacity must be adequate to carry away approximately 75% of the
maximum fire water application rate. The balance will evaporate or fall outside the
drainage area. Typically, drainage capacity greater than 5000 gpm is not justified. If
fire water systems can exceed 125% of the drainage system capacity, either the
prefire plans should limit the water application rate or the drainage system should
be increased.
Larger drainage requirements may be justified in more hazardous areas or in plants
where the fire-fighting equipment includes fixed, high-capacity monitor streams or
fixed water-spray systems. Considerations other than fire flow (e.g., washdown or
rainfall) may require larger drainage systems.
Accumulations of rainwater or fire water within operating units may interfere with
operations and can dangerously hamper firefighters' mobility during a fire. Means
should exist to safely dispose of such rainwater and to prevent flooding from
outside sources. Fire water flow and rainfall should not be combined in sizing the
drainage system; the greater flow will establish the system design criteria.
Fire water requirements are determined by the size of the largest practical fire that
could occur and the fire control techniques and equipment likely to be used.
Although individual drainage areas vary in size and shape, they should have the
following characteristics:
• Drainage inlets are centrally located as far away from equipment and overhead
pipeways as possible. A minimum spacing of 10 feet from major equipment is
desirable.
• Outer edges or ridge lines of each drainage area are at a constant elevation.
• The preferred differential elevation from any ridge line to drainage hub is 6
inches for a 50-foot-square area and 9 inches for a 75-foot-square area.

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• Slopes should range from 3/16 inch per foot to 1/4 inch per foot for paved
areas. Absolute minimum and maximum slopes are 1/8 inch per foot and 1/2
inch per foot. Around pumps and other areas where leaks are anticipated, 1/4
inch per foot is preferred.
• Drainage patterns should minimize ponding of runoff near equipment and
prevent drainage from unpaved areas from entering drain hubs in paved areas.
• All areas under process equipment should be paved to assure that liquids drain
away from equipment and do not pool.

1424 Surface Drainage

Design surface drainage to quickly remove spilled hydrocarbons from under pipe-
ways, air coolers, and other oil-handling equipment. This minimizes exposure of
piping and equipment to flames should a fire occur.
Within practical limits, the high point of grade should pass through buildings, large
equipment, and centerlines of roads and pipeways so that drainage flows away from
such equipment.
It is a good practice to isolate plant units by installing peripheral roads that are 6
inches higher than the high-point grade of adjacent units. This prevents spills, fire
water, and rainwater from flowing from one unit across the road to adjacent plants,
should the drainage system become overloaded.
It is also good practice to provide a gradual drainage slope away from facilities.
Leaks, spills, floods, and water from firefighting can appear where least expected.
Be prepared for such contingencies.

Drainage Trenches
Do not install open drainage trenches in areas where liquid hydrocarbon spills can
occur. Hydrocarbon liquid can enter the trench and spread from one area of a plant
to another. Burning liquid can also spread through the plant in trenches, increasing
the magnitude of a fire.

1425 Acid, Caustic, Corrosive, and Toxic Wastes

These wastes should be handled in segregated systems until treated or rendered
harmless.

1426 Oily Storm Water and Process Waste Water

Lay out oily storm water and process waste water networks of underground drain
pipe, catch basins, drain hubs, etc., in accordance with the Civil and Structural
Manual, Section 500. Following is a list of considerations related to fire protection.
(See Figure 1400-2, Drainage System Components.)

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Fig. 1400-2 Drainage System Components

• Combine up to 6 units of similar or compatible pump drainage in the same

drainage area if they are within line of sight of each other. (“Line of sight”
means that all other drains are visible from any one drain. Such groups of
drains must be sealed from other groups of pump or process drains by gas-
sealed catch basins or gas-sealed manholes.)
• Seal drain catch basins in the process area for purposes of gas control. Use
seals that are easily cleaned out. See Standard Drawing GC-S78325 (in the
Civil and Structural Manual) for an acceptable design. P-traps are not accept-
able unless they are modified so that they can be cleaned out and the presence
of the water seal can be verified. Catch basins need to be checked periodically
to verify that a liquid seal is in place and that the cleanout plugs are installed.
• Branches and laterals in oily water systems must enter main lines through a
gas-sealed manhole. (See CIV-EF-411 in the Civil and Structural Manual.)
• Branches and laterals in clean or storm water systems may enter main lines
without gas seals if gas-sealed catch basins are used.

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• Onplot main headers of both oily and clean water systems may enter other
main drain lines without gas seals if gas-sealed catch basins or gas-sealed
manholes are used at upstream junctions.
• Main lines leaving a plot limit must be gas-sealed at the first offplot manhole.
Typical onplot drainage layouts and design calculations are given in Section 500 of
the Civil and Structural Manual.
For fire protection purposes, drainage systems that may contain flammable vapors
should be sealed both onplot and offplot. Otherwise, toxic and flammable gases
may be released in an area well away from where the release occurred. Seal oil-
water separators from both the inlet and outlet drainage lines. Unless drainage lines
are sealed, fire and explosions could propagate through the system from offplot
back to the separators.

1427 Vents
Vent manholes (usually with 2-inch pipe) at an elevation 18 inches above the
highest line or equipment within a 10-foot radius. The vent should be at least 12
feet above grade or above any walkway or work platform within the 10-foot radius.
The vent should be at least 50 horizontal feet from furnaces. The vent opening
should point straight up.
Flame arrestors are generally not warranted in sewer system vents, and the system
pressure is not adequate to pass a water seal type. Catch basins in process plants
have only 3 to 4 inches of water seal. The water seal is designed to prevent vapor
releases and thus eliminate the need for flame arrestors.

1430 Drainage Areas, Offplot

1431 General Fire Protection Considerations

Simplicity should be the main feature of offplot drainage. Pay particular attention to
the following:
• To minimize exposure of piping and pipe supports to flames during a fire,
design surface drainage to quickly remove spilled hydrocarbons from under
pipeways.
• For tank fields, provide a slope of not less than one percent away from the tank
for at least 50 feet or to the dike base, whichever is less. This slope will mini-
mize potential fire loss in the event of a major spill or tank overflow.
• Remote impounding is recommended to further isolate liquid spills.
• Water from the tank water draw normally empties into a catch basin adjacent to
the tank. To limit exposure of tank valves to a potential fire hazard, do not
place the catch basin directly below or adjacent to the valves.

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Fire Protection Manual 1400 Drainage

See NFPA 30 and the Tank Manual for drainage and impounding requirements.

1432 Offplot Manhole Venting Requirements

Vent offplot manholes 12 feet above grade. Locate vents away from roads and igni-
tion sources, and straight up to disperse vapor. Normally, 2-inch diameter vents are
adequate.

1433 Infrequently Used Sealed Catch Basin Hazard

Infrequently used basins may dry out and allow a gas to escape and accumulate in
the area. It may be appropriate to provide a water drip system to keep the seal full,
or to remove the drain and provide another means of drainage.

1434 Sealing Requirements

• Oily water drains need to have seals at catch basins or manholes.
• Chemical waste drains should be sealed to control toxics and odor.
• Miscellaneous wastes require seals if gas or odor is a problem.
• Sanitary sewers should be sealed and vented due to the potential odor problem.
• Surface drains may not require seals when they drain only clean surface water
into a system that could not contain light hydrocarbon vapors. Catch basins for
surface drains do catch sediment and reduce plugging of the underground drain
system.

1435 Process Drain Maintenance

Keep process drains maintained in good repair. Volatile products and liquid conden-
sate in the system can generate pressure, and vapor can escape through any
unsealed or poorly sealed part of the system. This system should be designed for
ease of maintenance. Chemical and miscellaneous wastes may require special drain
pipe materials, which may in turn require additional maintenance techniques. Any
liquid leakage can contaminate the surrounding soil and accumulate on the water
table.

1440 Pipeway Drainage

The industry has experienced several serious pipeway fires. Contributing to the size
of the fires were inadequate or plugged drains, pipelines laying on the ground, and
inadequate fire stops. Pipeway fires can be expensive and can cause significant busi-
ness interruption.

Drainage Slope in Pipeway

The surface under pipeways requires a 1% slope toward the outside of the pipeway
and toward a drain point, so that spills will quickly drain from under the pipes. A
drainage channel 10 feet from the edge of the pipeway is desirable for fire protection.

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Fire Stops
Install a solid transverse barrier as a fire stop at 300- to 500-foot intervals in main
below-grade pipeways. This prevents a spill from a leaking line from spreading to
the entire pipeway. If the spill ignites, the barrier prevents the spread of fire to other
sections of the pipeway. Provide a drain inlet in each section of the pipeway to
carry away the flow of leaks and fire water if a fire should occur.

Daylighting of Piping
Check pipeways frequently and clear any piping that is contacting the soil to
prevent external corrosion and allow good drainage flow.

Stabilizing Shifting Soil

It may be necessary to stabilize soil in some locations to prevent washout and
gullies where oil can accumulate and cause a fire risk.

Sealing of Pipe Sleeves Under Roads and Through Dikes

Roadways or dikes across pipeways often form a needed barrier to limit flow. This
barrier can be effective only if the pipe sleeves under the road are kept sealed
against liquid flow. The Tank Manual, Section 230, and the Piping Manual, Section
300 give information on sealing between pipe sleeves and pipes. Dow Corning Sili-
cone RTV foam has also been used for this purpose.

Provide Pipe Clearance from Drainage Areas

In some cases, it may be necessary for a drain channel to flow under a pipeway. If
so, cover the channel to prevent burning oil in the channel from endangering the
piping.

Drainage Away From Instrument Leads and Power Cables

Instrument leads and power cables are often run along one side of a pipeway. For
the fire safety of this equipment, a 1% slope drainage to the opposite side of the
pipeway is needed.

Connect Surface Drains to Underground Systems

Fire safety is best served when spills are contained in closed systems. Therefore,
when possible, route surface drains into closed systems.

1450 References
1. Seelye, Elwyn E., Data Book for Civil Engineers—Design, Volume One.
2. Handbook of Concrete Culvert Pipe Hydraulics, Portland Cement Association.
3. Design Data, American Concrete Pipe Association.
4. Water Control Federation Manual of Practice No. 9 or ASCE Manual of Engi-
neering Practice No. 37, Design and Construction of Sanitary and Storm
Sewers.

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Fire Protection Manual 1400 Drainage

Chevron References
Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500
Tank Manual

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible LiquidsCode

Standard Drawings and Engineering Forms

GC-S78325 Standard Cast Iron Catch Basin
CIV-EF-411 Manhole Details

Chevron Corporation 1400-11 December 1994

1500 Electrical Classification

Abstract
This section presents the basis for determining electrical area classification
(commonly called area classification) for locations that may become hazardous
because of flammable liquids, gases, or vapor. It includes definitions of classified
locations and guidelines for determining the extent of area classification required.
Use this section in conjunction with API RP 500 and NFPA 30. You can use the
Electrical Manual, Section 300, as a guide for selecting types of equipment suitable
for use in specific area classifications.

Contents Page

1510 Predesign Considerations 1500-3

1511 Purpose and Need
1512 Responsibility for Classification
1513 Industry Standards and Codess
1514 Selection of Equipment
1515 Legal Requirements
1516 Modifications to Existing Facilities
1517 Plant Roads
1520 Classified Locations 1500-5
1521 Classes and Groups
1522 Class I, Division 1 Locations
1523 Class I, Division 2 Locations
1524 Unclassified Areas
1530 Determination of Classification 1500-8
1531 Methods
1532 Evaluating the Location
1533 General Rules
1534 Ventilation

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1540 Applications 1500-12

1541 General Rules
1542 Purging Control Rooms or Electrical Equipment Buildings
1543 Below Grade Trenches, Underground Sumps and Oil-water Separators
1544 Pumps, Manifolds, and Piping
1545 Tanks
1546 Hydrogen Processing Facilities
1550 Using Fugitive Emissions to Determine Adequate Ventilation 1500-16
1551 General
1552 Calculation Technique for Fugitive Emissionss
1553 Natural Ventilation Rates Due to Thermal Forces
1554 The IEC Area Classification System
1560 References 1500-19

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1510 Predesign Considerations

1511 Purpose and Need

The purpose of area classification is to identify locations where electrical equip-
ment could provide a source of ignition to flammable liquids, gases, or vapor that
may be present. Classifying locations is necessary for selecting and installing elec-
trical equipment. Other design considerations, such as ventilation requirements for
protection of personnel, are not within the scope of this section.
This section is intended to give inexperienced personnel a basic understanding of
area classification. Consultation with project engineers, process engineers, and fire
protection engineers may be needed to establish area classification.
In general, classification is required if the answer to either of the following ques-
tions is yes.
• Are flammable vapors or gases likely to be present?
• Are liquids having flash points at or above 100°F likely to be handled,
processed, or stored at temperatures above their flash points?

1512 Responsibility for Classification

The responsibility for area classification is normally that of an experienced engi-
neer in consultation with a fire protection engineer. The fire protection engineer or
an engineer experienced in area classification should be consulted in cases of
conflict with local codes, or if clarification of the codes is needed.
In some areas, such as offshore platforms, the authority having jurisdiction may
specify a document (e.g., API RP 500) to follow. However, classification is not
always based on strict requirements, but rather on good engineering judgment. In
classifying a location, one should use guidelines referenced herein along with a
practical understanding of the products and processes involved, the climatic and
physical conditions, and past experience.
For assistance in areas not addressed by this practice, or for interpretation of this
and related industry standards, consult an engineer experienced in area classifica-
tion. Such a person might be a plant or area engineer, an electrical engineer, or a
member of the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team.

1513 Industry Standards and Codes

Use the industry standards and codes listed below as guides in classifying locations.
Refer to these documents for definitions of terms and basic design philosophy. This
section is intended to supplement these standards and codes. Section 1560 is a more
complete list of Company and industry documents related to area classification.
• American Petroleum Institute RP 500—Classification of Locations for Elec-
trical Installations in Petroleum Facilities (included in this manual)

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• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 30—Flammable and Combus-

tible Liquids Code (Included in this manual)
• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 497A—Class I, Hazardous Loca-
tions for Electrical Installations in Chemical Plants

1514 Selection of Equipment

After area classification drawings are made, select and install electrical equipment
as governed by the following local laws and codes:
• Applicable codes of cities, municipalities, or states
• Applicable codes for other countries
• NFPA 70, National Electrical Code (NEC)
• API RP 14F, Design and Installation of Electrical Systems for Offshore Produc-
tion Platforms
• Canadian Electrical Code
For further guidance on selecting and installing electrical equipment, refer to the
Electrical Manual, Section 300.

1515 Legal Requirements

The design engineer should verify compliance with appropriate federal, state, and
local codes. Many local municipalities have adopted NFPA 30 into their codes.
Also, NFPA 30 is referenced by some enforcement agencies.
API RP 500 is required by the National Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Order for
offshore facilities.
If no other requirement is in force, it is recommended that API RP 500 be used as
appropriate to determine area classification. The Electrical Manual, Section 300,
the National Electrical Code (NFPA 70), or API RP 14F should be used to select
and install electrical equipment.

1516 Modifications to Existing Facilities

Two questions often arise related to electrical classification of existing facilities:
• What standards should be used when developing “as built” area classification
drawings of existing plants or updating the original area classification draw-
ings?
• What standards should be used for modifications to existing facilities?
In general, updated area classification drawings should be based on the area classifi-
cation standard in effect when the original facility was built. For example, if the
facility was originally designed to the Engineering Department's Recommended

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

Practice No. 1 (RP-1), the updated drawings should be based on RP-1 with explana-
tory notes to that effect. There is no requirement to retrofit existing facilities to
the new API 500 standard. A copy of the original standards used should be avail-
able in the facility files. (RP-1 can be obtained from the CRTC archives by
contacting the Technical Standards group.)
Small modifications to the existing facilities which are internal to the facility and
within the framework of the existing electrical system should use the original area
classification standards of the facility as the design basis. New plants, or large modi-
fications to existing plants that are segregated from the original facilities and
require the addition of new motor control centers, transformers, etc. should use API
500 as the design basis.

1517 Plant Roads

In defining the area surrounding a pump where flammable vapors may be present, it
is common for the area classification to end at a plant road, because fixed electrical
equipment is not normally installed on a road. However, vehicular traffic on the
road can be a source of ignition and it may be desirable to control the road for
vehicular entry.
See Section 1300 for additional information on restricted and unrestricted roads.

1520 Classified Locations

1521 Classes and Groups

To determine the type of electrical equipment to use for a specific service, classify
the area in which it will be used. Of primary consideration is the likelihood that a
flammable atmosphere may be present.
Factors to consider for classification include the quantity of flammable material that
might escape, the adequacy of ventilation, the total area involved, and the history of
incidents in the industry with respect to explosions or fires. The term flammable
refers to any material that ignites easily and burns rapidly. A flammable liquid is a
liquid with a flash point below 100°F and a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia at
100°F.

Classes
The National Electrical Code (NEC) designates hazardous locations as Class I
(flammable gases or vapor), Class II (combustible dusts), or Class III (easily ignit-
able fibers). Because the majority of Company facilities are either Class I or unclas-
sified, this section focuses primarily on those areas.

Groups in Class I
Class I locations are further divided into Groups A, B, C, and D, based on
maximum explosion pressure, maximum safe clearance between mating parts in an
enclosure, and minimum ignition temperature of the atmospheric mixture. (See

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Figure 1500-1 for a listing of materials by group.) Certain chemical atmospheres,

such as carbon disulfide, may have characteristics that require safeguards beyond
those required for any of the above groups.
Most hydrocarbon atmospheres are in Group D. Hydrogen sulfide is in Group C.
Hydrogen is in Group B. Because of hydrogen's special properties (wide flamma-
bility range, high flame-propagation velocity, low vapor density, and low minimum
ignition-energy level), it requires special consideration. Such consideration includes
source, quantity, and relative confinement or ventilation for each situation.
However, hydrogen is much lighter than air and, except when it occurs in enclosed
spaces, will seldom produce a flammable atmosphere close to grade where most
electrical equipment is installed (see Section 1546).

1522 Class I, Division 1 Locations

Locations classified as Class I, Division 1 are likely to have ignitable concentra-
tions of gas or vapors under normal conditions. As defined by NFPA 70, a Class I,
Division 1 location has any one of the following properties:
• Ignitable concentrations of flammable gases or vapors can exist under normal
operating conditions.
• Ignitable concentrations of such gases or vapors may exist frequently because
of repair or maintenance operations or because of leakage.
• Breakdown or faulty operation of equipment or processes might release ignit-
able concentrations of flammable gases or vapors, and might also cause simul-
taneous failure of electric equipment, which could become a source of ignition.
Any area located within a Division 2 facility that allows hazardous vapor or gas
concentrations to collect and remain under normal operating conditions requires a
Division 1 classification. Examples are pits and trenches where flammable fluids
can accumulate.

1523 Class I, Division 2 Locations

Class I, Division 2 locations are those likely to have flammable gases and vapors
only under abnormal conditions. The rationale for Class I, Division 2 is:
• arcs, sparks, and hot surfaces do not occur unless electrical equipment fails,
• flammable mixtures are only present if process equipment fails and
• one failure is not likely to cause the other.
Therefore protective measures can be much less restrictive for Division 2 than for
Division 1. As defined by NFPA 70, a Class I, Division 2 location has any of the
following:
• Volatile flammable liquids or flammable gases are handled, processed, or used,
but such liquids and gases normally are confined within closed containers or
closed systems. They can escape only by accidental rupture or breakdown of
such containers or systems, or by abnormal operation of equipment.

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

Fig. 1500-1 Materials in Class 1 Areas, by Group

Group A Atmospheres
acetylene
Group B Atmospheres
acrolein (inhibited)(1) manufactured gases containing more than
butadiene(2) 30% hydrogen (by volume)
ethylene oxide(1) propylene oxide(1)
hydrogen
Group C Atmospheres
acetaldehyde epichlorohydrin
allyl alcohol ethylene
n-butyraldehyde ethylenimine
carbon monoxide hydrogen sulfide
crotonaldehyde morpholine
cyclopropane 2-nitropropane
diethyl ether tetrahydrofuran
diethylamine unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH
1, 1-dimethyl hydrazine)
Group D Atmospheres isopropyl ether
acetic acid (glacial) mesityl oxide
acetone methane (natural gas)
acrylonitrile methanol (methyl alcohol)
ammonia(3) 3-methyl-1-butanol (isoamyl alcohol)
benzene methyl ethyl ketone
butane 2-methyl-1-propanol (isobutyl alcohol)
1-butanol (butyl alcohol) 2-methyl-2-propanol (tertiary butyl alcohol)
2-butanol (secondary butyl alcohol) petroleum naphtha(4)
n-butyl acetate pyridine
isobutyl acetate octanes
sec-butyl alcohol pentanes
di-isobutylene 1-pentanol (amyl alcohol)
ethane propane
ethanol (ethyl alcohol) 1-propanol (propyl alcohol)
ethyl acetateethyl 2-propanol (isopropyl alcohol)
acrylate (inhibited) propylene
ethylene diamine (anhydrous) styrene
ethylene dichloride toluene
gasoline vinyl acetate
heptanes vinyl chloride
hextanes xylenes
isoprene
(1) Group C equipment is permitted for this atmosphere if the equipment is isolated in accordance with
Section 501-5(a) of the National Electrical Code by sealing all conduit 1/2-inch size or larger.
(2) Group D equipment is permitted for this atmosphere if the equipment is isolated in accordance with
Section 501-5(a) of the National Electrical Code by sealing all conduit 1/2-inch size or larger.
(3) For classification of areas involving ammonia atmosphere, see Safety Code for Mechanical Refrigeration
(ANSI B9.1-1971) and Safety Requirements for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia (ANSI
K61.1-1972).
(4) Saturated hydrocarbon mixture boiling in the range 68°F to 275°F. Also known by the synonyms benzine,
ligroin, petroleum ether, or naphtha.

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1500 Electrical Classification Fire Protection Manual

• Ignitable concentrations of gases or vapors are normally prevented by positive

mechanical ventilation, which might become hazardous through failure or
abnormal operation of the ventilating system.
• It is adjacent to a Class I, Division 1 location, and could be exposed to ignit-
able concentrations of gases or vapors. Such exposure can be prevented by
adequate positive-pressure ventilation from a source of clean air, and by
providing effective safeguards against ventilation failure.

1524 Unclassified Areas

Areas not classified as either Division 1 or Division 2 are unclassified. In these
areas, any normal type of electrical equipment can be installed if it satisfies the
authority having jurisdiction and is acceptable for the environmental conditions
present.
Flammable atmospheres can occur in an unclassified area. Some areas can be desig-
nated as unclassified even though a periodic escape of flammable gas may occur,
provided that the escaping gas is in small quantities and has been found by experi-
ence not to present a hazard.

1530 Determination of Classification

1531 Methods
Area classification can be determined in two ways, as described in this section.

Codes, Ordinances, and Industry Recommended Practices

The American Petroleum Institute (API) has published API RP 500 Classification
of Locations for Electrical Installations in Petroleum Facilities.
This document gives the basic philosophy of area classification in the petroleum
industry and, as indicated in Section 1515, may represent legal requirements. The
API document was used as a reference in developing this section. The document is
included at the end of this manual. Refer to it for additional background and guid-
ance.
For certain “specific occupancies,” the extent and type of area classification may
also be established by other codes and ordinances, as listed in Section 1560. For
example, NFPA 70, in conjunction with NFPA 30A, includes specific guidance for
area classification in gasoline dispensing and service stations. NFPA 497A is appro-
priate for small chemical plants and low risk facilities containing small quantities of
flammable liquids (see Figure 1500-2).

Operating and Engineering Judgment

Although you can usually use API RP 500 to determine area classification, major
facilities in the petroleum industry are sometimes too complex to base area classifi-
cations on only one standard or recommended practice. In units such as these, area

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

Fig. 1500-2 Relative Magnitudes of Process Equipment and Piping Handling Flammable
Liquids or Gases
Process Small/ Large/
Equipment Units Low Moderate High
Size gal <5000 5000 to 25000 >25000
Pressure psi <100 100 to 500 >500
Flow Rate gpm <100 100 to 500 >500

classification is best determined by good engineering judgment and experience and

guided by the available standards. This section contains information to assist in
applying good judgment. Using the expertise of an engineer experienced in area
classification ensures reasonable uniformity throughout the Company.
The extent of a classified area may be influenced by the pressure in the system
under consideration and by the quantity of flammable liquid, vapor, or gas that
could be released. In cases where pressures are 500 psi or greater, or where a flam-
mable atmosphere from a large release of volatile liquid or vapor would extend
beyond 50 feet, the size of the Division 2 area should be increased.

1532 Evaluating the Location

The following questions and answers can help in evaluating locations:
• Are flammable concentrations of vapors present under normal conditions, or
only under abnormal (including normal and unplanned maintenance) condi-
tions? If vapors are normally present, the location requires a Class I, Division 1
classification. If vapors are present only under abnormal conditions, the loca-
tion normally is classified Class I, Division 2.
• Is ventilation adequate to prevent the accumulation of ignitable vapors?
Section 1534 gives guidelines to determine if the ventilation is adequate.
• Are other fixed ignition sources (furnaces, boilers, heaters) located in the area?
If so, these sources preclude fixed electrical equipment as a primary ignition
source. Therefore, this area is unclassified. Expected sources of vapor release
should not be located in the vicinity of fixed ignition sources. It may be
prudent to classify portions of these areas. For example, electrical equipment
may be exposed to flammable gas during burner blind changes on a fired heater.
• Has experience shown similar locations to be correctly classified? If so, use
good engineering judgment and classify the location according to similar expe-
rience. Refer to API RP 500 for guidance and document the justification for
classification.
• Do the classification boundaries minimize unnecessary changes and conduit
seals? Often it is practical and economical to extend classified areas between
facilities to avoid unnecessary transitions in area classification.

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1533 General Rules

Most areas in the vicinity of equipment containing flammable hydrocarbon liquids
and vapor are considered either unclassified or Class I, Division 2 areas. Division 1
area classifications are rare.
In choosing between a Division 1 and a Division 2 classification, you might
consider the contaminants in the air during normal operations. Ignitable concentra-
tions of gases and vapor frequently occur in Division 1 locations during normal
operations; in Division 2 locations, this is not true.
Records of employee exposure levels during normal work conditions can indicate
contaminants in the air, even though this is unrelated to electrical area classifica-
tion. It may be helpful to ask, “Are the air contaminant levels in the work environ-
ment below OSHA-permissible exposure limits or below the Threshold Limit Value
(TLV)?” If the answer is "yes," you probably won't designate the area a Division 1
location, unless an accident could simultaneously release ignitable gas or vapor and
also damage electrical equipment so that it could cause a fire.
Health and safety codes place limits on the concentrations of most flammable
vapors where people work. The limits are always a small fraction of the lower flam-
mable limit concentrations. Where a small release of vapor (continuous or intermit-
tent) occurs, such as leakage from valve packing, it probably will not present a fire
or explosion hazard that would demand Division 1 classification, if the atmosphere
meets the requirements of respiration. However, if a reasonable possibility exists
that unusual amounts of flammable liquid or vapor may be released (for example, a
spill or equipment failure), Division 2 (or even Division 1) classification may be
warranted. If the location is an enclosed space, use one of the methods described in
Section 1534 to determine if the space is adequately ventilated.

1534 Ventilation
Definition of Adequate Ventilation
A critical factor in area classification is determining the degree of ventilation neces-
sary to meet the requirements of NFPA 30, the Flammable and Combustible Liquid
Code. NFPA 30 defines adequate ventilation as follows:
An area is adequately ventilated if it is ventilated at a rate sufficient to maintain
the concentration of vapors within the area at or below 25% of the lower flam-
mable limit. This shall be confirmed by one of the following:
a. Calculations based on the anticipated fugitive emissions; or
b. Actual vapor concentration sampling under normal operating conditions,
conducted at a radius of 5 feet from equipment.
An acceptable alternative is to provide ventilation at a rate of not less than 1
cubic foot per minute per square foot of solid floor area.
Ventilation shall be accomplished by natural or mechanical ventilation, with
discharge of exhaust to a safe location, without recirculation of the exhaust air.

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

Open outdoor locations are usually considered adequately ventilated.

Subject to approval by the authority having jurisdiction, an enclosed or partly
enclosed space is usually considered adequately ventilated if any of the following
conditions exist:
• Numerical calculation shows that the ventilation, either natural or mechanical,
is sufficient to prevent the accumulation of vapor-air mixtures above 25% of
the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL). Such a method requires a quantitative anal-
ysis of normal hydrocarbon emissions from all sources, including small leaks
from flanges, valve stems, pump seals, compressor rod seals, and other sources
of “fugitive emissions.” (Fugitive emissions are discussed in Section 1550.)
Note This method is not acceptable in offshore OCS areas unless calculations are
approved by the Minerals Management Service (MMS).
• Actual vapor concentration sampling conducted under normal operating condi-
tions confirms that the vapor-air mixture is less than 25% of the LFL. Samples
should be taken at a 5-foot radius from the potential source(s) and locations
where vapor may accumulate. The sampling results need to be documented and
retained.
Note This method is not acceptable in offshore OCS areas under the jurisdiction
of the MMS.
• It meets the alternate ventilation requirements from NFPA 30 of one cubic foot
of air per minute per square foot of floor area.
Note In offshore OCS areas, the air flow rate required by the MMS must also
provide a minimum of 6 air changes per hour. See API RP 500, Section 4.6.2.2.2.
• It is substantially open and free to the natural passage of air, vertically or hori-
zontally. The guideline used in API RP 500 (and required in offshore OCS
areas) is that an area is considered adequately ventilated if less than two-thirds
of the wall/floor/ceiling total surface area is enclosed, or if it meets the require-
ments of Section 4.6.2.2.4.

Design Considerations
If mechanical equipment provides the required ventilation, safeguards are needed to
protect against its undetected failure.
Discharge or exhaust must be to a safe location outside the building.
Ventilation rates can be achieved either by continuous introduction of fresh make-
up air into the enclosure, or by recirculation of air in the room. A recirculation
system should ensure that the air is monitored continuously using a system that
automatically alarms, stops recirculation, and provides full exhaust to the outside in
the event that vapor-air mixtures over 25% of the lower flammable limit are
detected. The MMS limit is 20% in offshore OCS areas. See API RP 500 4.6.2.2.5.

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1500 Electrical Classification Fire Protection Manual

Recirculation should be designed with adequate air movement and direction to mini-
mize “dead” areas where vapor may collect. If other criteria are lacking, a recircula-
tion rate of 1 cubic foot per minute per square foot of floor area can be used.
Some designs include contingency for introducing large quantities of fresh make-up
air upon detection of vapor-air mixtures over 25% of the lower flammable limit. For
Class I, Division 2 locations, this precaution may not always be warranted because
a concurrent failure of the electrical equipment, which would create a source of igni-
tion for the vapors, is deemed improbable.
Whether or not ventilation is achieved through make-up air or recirculation, good
mixing is required to ensure adequate ventilation of all floor areas, pits, or pockets
where flammable vapors may collect.
If conditions include the risk of a large flammable vapor release occurring in a
confined space, and the calculated rate of diluent ventilation is not sufficient to
dilute and disperse the released vapor to below the LFL within a reasonable time
(i.e., four hours), then supplemental emergency ventilation should be provided.
Emergency ventilation can be natural ventilation through panels or louvers, or
switching recirculation fans to full fresh air make-up or exhaust. The travel direc-
tion of ventilated vapor should avoid its reaching an ignition source outside the
enclosed space being ventilated.

1540 Applications
This section discusses general application of electrical area classification principles.
Applications for specific types of facilities are covered in Sections 3100 to 4100.
Specific applications are also discussed and illustrated in API RP 500 NFPA 30,
NFPA 30A, NFPA 70 (NEC), and NFPA 497A.
Standard Drawing GF-P99987, in the Standard Drawings Section, shows the area
classification of a typical processing facility.

1541 General Rules

Based on experience and engineering judgment, the Company's position for facili-
ties handling volatile stocks in outdoor locations (other than producing) is that a
distance of 50 feet from a possible source of vapor is far enough to extend the clas-
sified area in most instances. If the pressure is high (500 psi or greater), or if an
unusual condition might release large volumes of volatile liquid or vapor, consider
extending the classification further.
Under certain conditions it is acceptable to have a Division 2 classification extend
less than 50 feet from a source of release. For example, in outdoor producing loca-
tions that handle crudes at lower pressure in lower volumes, the area that needs clas-
sification around the leak source is generally smaller (e.g., a 10-foot radius for gas
compressor or pump) as specified in API RP 500.

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

An adequately ventilated location is normally classified as Division 2. Under

normal conditions, vapor is not released in concentrations that could produce a
flammable atmosphere. For adequately ventilated indoor locations, it is often neces-
sary to classify the entire building or enclosure Division 2, unless it is clear that a
credible abnormal release could not possibly fill the entire building.
For inadequately ventilated indoor locations, it is usually necessary to classify the
entire building or enclosure as Division 1, unless sufficient mechanical or natural
ventilation with clean air exists in other parts of the building or enclosure to
disperse the vapors below 25% of the LFL.

Changes in Service
In determining area classification, consider possible future changes in service of the
equipment. Tanks are particularly susceptible to changes in service. If an area is
likely to require classification because of a change in service, you might want to
install equipment suitable for the anticipated classification at the outset. Electrical
retrofitting is costly.

1542 Purging Control Rooms or Electrical Equipment Buildings

Electrical classification restricts the choice of electrical equipment and instruments
suitable for the process or plant, and increases the cost. Therefore, it is desirable
that control houses and electrical switchgear rooms be unclassified. Often it is
possible to locate these buildings in an unclassified area.
Sometimes the control house or electrical switchgear room must be located within a
Division 2 area because of plot limitations or economics. In these situations, the
normal practice is to “purge” (often referred to as “pressurize”) the room. A source
of air is taken from an unclassified area (typically 25 feet or more above ground)
and introduced into the building with mechanical ventilating equipment. The elec-
trical power for the ventilating equipment should be connected to an emergency
power system.
Since doors and windows may be opened frequently, the term “purged” or “pressur-
ized” more realistically means “supplied with clean air under slight pressure.”
Alarms should be provided to warn personnel if the ventilating system fails.
Depending on the type of purging (x, y, or z) specified in NFPA 496, it may be
necessary to disconnect electrical power also. Part A of NFPA 496, Standard for
Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment in Hazardous Loca-
tions, contains additional information on this subject.
If purging is used in areas containing high humidity or corrosive air (e.g., offshore
and in some chemical plants), the purging air must be conditioned first to prevent
corrosion of the equipment in the purged area.

1543 Below Grade Trenches, Underground Sumps and Oil-water Separators

Underground sumps, oil-water separators, and the associated pump and tanks can
contain hydrocarbon and should be classified. See Figure 1500-3 for details.

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Fig. 1500-3 Underground Covered Sump or Oil-water Separator in Adequately Ventilated Area

Sumps or below-grade trenches located within a Division 2 area are normally classi-
fied Division 1, because these are low points where spilled liquid is more likely to
flow and heavier-than-air vapor may collect and remain. Consequently, it's best to
avoid installing electrical equipment in these areas. Such equipment would have to
meet Division 1 requirements even though Division 2 equipment would be accept-
able if it were located a few feet away.

1544 Pumps, Manifolds, and Piping

Pumps, seals, valves, and piping connections and manifolds are all potential leak
sources. The area surrounding these types of equipment should be classified if the
equipment handles flammable material. This also includes piping manifolds with
multiple flanges. Outdoor, above-ground adequately ventilated pipelines and pipe
racks with occasional flanges are usually not classified.

1545 Tanks
Areas around tanks, including the roof and vent area, the drainage path and the
impounding basin should be classified in accordance with API RP 500 as appli-
cable, and with the Tank Manual, Section 200.

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1546 Hydrogen Processing Facilities

Hydrogen behaves differently from typical hydrocarbons. It is much lighter than air.
When a leak develops, it rises and disperses rapidly and does not spread far horizon-
tally. Hydrocarbon vapor stays low to the ground, is slower to disperse and tends to
move along the ground. According to petroleum industry experience, when leaks
occur, hydrogen frequently self-ignites even at ambient or moderate temperatures if
the leaks are from high pressure systems. Therefore, leaking hydrogen is often its
own primary ignition source and electrical arcs or sparks do not add significantly to
the likelihood of ignition.
For these reasons, the extent of area classification boundaries from a potential
source of hydrogen leakage do not have to be nearly as great as for hydrocarbon
vapor. In sections of plants containing only hydrogen, such as hydrogen manufac-
turing plants, the classified areas may be restricted to locations immediately adja-
cent to potential release points such as compressors or hydrogen vents. Leakage
from valve packing or flanges in other process equipment is so small and so infre-
quent that the Class I, Division 1, Group B area classification need not extend into
the remaining plant area. Also, hydrogen leaks from valve packing and flanges
disperse immediately and do not constitute a serious hazard.
Guidelines for classifying areas of process plants manufacturing hydrogen or
containing hydrogen streams follow. Figure 1500-5 (foldout at end of chapter) is an
example of area classification for a hydrogen-hydrocarbon process plant.

Unclassified Areas
Process equipment such as piping, vessels, and exchangers are considered tight,
sealed systems. The area being evaluated does not need to be classified for
hydrogen if it doesn't contain mechanical reciprocating or rotating equipment,
sample draws, vents to the atmosphere, or other potential sources of hydrogen
leakage in significant quantities.
Valve packing leaks in hydrogen service are not a significant source of hydrogen.
Packing leaks will either ignite or disperse so rapidly that there is small probability
that electrical sources can or will increase the risk of ignition.

Class I, Division 2, Group B Areas

The area 15 feet horizontally and 25 feet vertically from a hydrogen compressor
should be classified Class I, Division 2, Group B. The distance is measured from
the packing gland or seal, or other potential source of hazardous quantities of
hydrogen leakage. If the compressor is on the elevated open structure, the classified
area need not extend more than 15 feet below it.
Other process equipment containing hydrogen or hydrogen-rich streams is normally
comprised of “tight” process equipment such as piping, vessels, or exchangers.
Tight systems exclude additional mechanical equipment such as pumps or compres-
sors which have the potential for hydrogen leakage in significant quantities. Tight
systems, therefore, need not be classified for hydrogen.

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Class I, Division 2, Group D Areas

Hydrogen manufacturing plants include areas where Group D hydrocarbons are
processed. These locations should be classified Class I, Division 2, Group D. This
provides reasonable protection, since any hydrogen that may be entrained in vapor
releases in these areas will quickly rise and dissipate.

Designation of Group B and Group D Areas

The process of designating area classification for facilities containing hydrogen
should use good engineering judgment and follow the same practical approach as
for facilities containing hydrocarbons. The Group B area classification should
include areas where there is reasonable risk that a flammable concentration of
hydrogen could accumulate.
Areas where both hydrocarbon and hydrogen are present (as in hydrocracking-type
processes) should be designated Group B and/or Group D, as applicable. Areas
containing flammable concentrations of hydrogen, such as areas around a hydrogen
compressor, should be classified Group B. In addition, API RP 500 recommends
that areas with mixtures of hydrogen and hydrocarbon gases be considered Group B
if the gases contain more than 30% hydrogen. Wherever practical, locate electrical
equipment (particularly electric motors) outside Group B areas to enhance safety. It
is good engineering practice to install electrical equipment approved for Class 1,
Division 2, Group D in intermediate “islands” between and adjacent to Group B
areas. This practice provides additional mechanical strength and weather protection
as well as an additional “buffer zone” of safety. It is common in a hydrogen
processing facility to have both Group B and Group D equipment.

1550 Using Fugitive Emissions to Determine Adequate Ventilation

1551 General
One way to provide adequate ventilation for an enclosed area is to make a reason-
able estimate of fugitive emissions from hydrocarbon-handling equipment within
the enclosed area and then provide sufficient diluent ventilation. This method has
been adopted by the 1990 edition of NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible
Liquids Code, included in the Standards section of this manual. Using this method
requires certain calculations as described in NFPA 30, Appendix F.
Note: This method is also used in API RP 500 for determining “limited” ventila-
tion. For offshore producing facilities under MMS jurisdiction, calculations for
ventilation requirements must be reviewed and approved by the MMS.
To calculate the required ventilation rate, first determine the anticipated hydro-
carbon leakage rate (under normal conditions). Then add sufficient dilution air to
the space in question to ensure that the concentration of flammable vapor/gas is
maintained below 25% of the LFL for all but periods of process upset, abnormal
operation, or equipment rupture or breakdown.

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

You can obtain fugitive emission factors for specific hydrocarbon handling equip-
ment from emission testing at specific facilities or from existing publications such
as these:
• API Publication 4322, Fugitive Hydrocarbon Emissions from Petroleum
Production Operations, Volumes I and II (1980)
• An EPA/Radian Study conducted in 1979
• EPA document “Protocols For Generating Unit-Specific Emission Estimates
For Equipment Leaks of VOC and HAP,” 1987 (Document No. 87-222-124-10-
02)
These publications are available from the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team. Emis-
sion data should be reviewed to assure emission rates are representative of condi-
tions during normal operation.
An example of how this method is useful—a large enclosed process building that
requires environmentally controlled (i.e, heating or cooling) ventilation air. Deter-
mining ventilation rates by the fugitive emissions method can give a lower required
ventilation rate because it is based on a reasonable estimate of hydrocarbon
leakage. Thus, use of this method can reduce operating costs.

1552 Calculation Technique for Fugitive Emissions

An example of the fugitive emission method is included in API RP 500 and NFPA
30, Appendix F (both documents are included in this manual).

1553 Natural Ventilation Rates Due to Thermal Forces

For naturally ventilated buildings, air flow due to thermal forces (stack effect)
provides adequate ventilation if the inlet and outlet ventilation openings are prop-
erly sized and located. The procedure for calculating minimum areas of ventilation
openings required for adequate ventilation is found in API RP 500, Section
4.6.2.2.3. This method, acceptable for use in Company facilities, is normally
allowed by the MMS in offshore COS areas only for buildings of 1000 cubic feet or
less.

1554 The IEC Area Classification System

The 1996 National Electrical Code (NEC) includes a new way to classify hazardous
areas, contained in Article 505, "Class I Zones 0, 1, & 2 Locations". It is based on
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), used in Europe and other
parts of the world. At this time Article 505 is simply a framework that explains the
alternative system. It will be revised when documentation is completed and defines
the requirements for classification, designing, building and inspecting hazardous
areas classified under the Zone concept.
The main differences between the Zone and Division systems are wiring practices
and prevalent use of plastics in the Zone system. There is potential for lower costs

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1500 Electrical Classification Fire Protection Manual

in using Zone practices and equipment. However, at this time most manufacturers
of electrical equipment have not completed the testing and calibration required to
provide Zone system ratings for their equipment.
Figure 1500-4 below compares the differences between the two systems with regard
to how areas are classified.

Fig. 1500-4 Comparison of IEC and NEC Classification Areas

Classified Areas
Time That Ignitable Hazardous
IEC Group II NEC Class I Gases are Present
Zone 0 Continuously
Division 1 Normally present
Zone 1 Occasionally in normal operations
Zone 2 Division 2 Not normally present

Cost savings are achieved by having three Zones instead of two Divisions, thereby
creating a narrower range of expected conditions. Equipment for each Zone is
more specifically tailored to those conditions, as opposed to Division equipment,
which may be over-designed for a given application
In the near future classifying areas under the Zone system will present less diffi-
culty than obtaining equipment rated for Zones. Assuming that eventually the Zone
system becomes a world-wide single standard, there will be a difficult interim
period during which both systems must coexist.

Selecting an Area Classification System

Information contained here is intended to provide awareness of potential changes in
electrical area classification practices, rather than instruction on how to use the
Zone system. In some cases new projects may be candidates for the Zone system,
and the Project Team should therefore investigate the option and obtain additional
information.
In deciding whether to consider using the Zone system in the near future, consider:
• Zones and Divisions should not be mixed. A relatively large domestic facility
(expansions and new processes) with good separation from existing facilities
may be a candidate for a switch to Zones, but the Division system should be
retained for upgrades to existing domestic facilities.
• For facilities located outside North America the Zone system may be well
established, and should be given greater consideration.
• Equipment rated for Division 1 or 2 can be used in Zones 1 and 2 respectively,
but the reverse is not true.
• Migration to the new standards may be relatively rapid, and the preferred
course of action for a specific project type will need to be revisited frequently.

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

• The decision to adopt the Zone classification system will affect many func-
tional areas, including training, maintenance, and operations, and will tempo-
rarily create additional expense.

1560 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2G Production Facilities on Offshore Structures
API 2L Planning, Designing and Constructing Heliports
for Fixed Offshore Platforms
API 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design
Installation and Testing of Basic Surface Safety
Systems on Offshore Production Platforms
API 14F Design and Installation of Electrical Systems for
Offshore Production Platforms (included in the
Electrical Manual)
API 14G Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type
Offshore Production Platforms
API 4322 Fugitive Hydrocarbon Emissions from Petroleum
Production Operations, Volumes I and II (1980)
API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installa-
tions in Petroleum Facilities (included in this
manual)
API 540 Electrical Installations in Petroleum Refineries
(included in the Electrical Manual)

Canadian Standard Association (CSA)

CSA-C22.2 No. 30 Explosion-proof Enclosures for Use in Class I
Hazardous Locations
CSA-C22.2 No. 157 Intrinsically Safe and Non-Incendive Equipment for
Use in Hazardous Locations

Chevron References
Electrical Manual
Tank Manual

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Protocols for Generating Unit-Specific Emission Estimates for Equipment Leaks of
VOC and HAP, 1987 (Document No. 87-222-124-10-02)

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National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (included in this
manual)
NFPA 30A Automotive and Marine Service Station Code
NFPA 45 Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals
NFPA 58 Standard for the Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petro-
leum Gases
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 321 Basic Classification of Flammable and Combustible Liquids
NFPA 325M Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases and
Volatile Solids
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
in Hazardous Classified Areas
NFPA 497A Classification of Class I Hazardous Locations for Electrical
Installations in Chemical Plants
NFPA 497M Classification of Gases, Vapors and Dusts for Electrical
Equipment in Hazardous Classified Locations
NFPA 505 Powered Industrial Trucks Including Type Designations,
Areas of Use, Maintenance and Operation

Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL)

UL 674 Safety Standard for Electric Motors and Generators for Use
in Hazardous Locations, Class I, Group C and D, Class II,
Groups E, F and G
UL 698 Standard for Industrial Control Equipment for Use in
Hazardous Locations, Class I, Groups A, B, C and D, and
Class II, Groups E, F and G
UL 844 Standard for Electrical Lighting Fixtures for Use in
Hazardous Locations (Class I and II)
UL 913 Intrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus for
Use in Class I, II and III, Division 1, Hazardous Locations
UL 1604 Electrical Equipment for Use in Hazardous Locations, Class
I and II, Division 2, and Class III, Division 1 and 2

See the Electrical Manual for other references.

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Fire Protection Manual 1500 Electrical Classification

Fig. 1500-5 Typical Electrical Area Classification for Hydrogen Plants

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1600 Fire Water System and Fire
Fighting Equipment

Abstract
This section provides fire water system design details and specifies fire fighting
equipment requirements. Preferred equipment locations and designs for various
facilities are also included.

Contents Page

1610 Basic Design Philosophy 1600-4

1611 Single Fire Concept
1612 Firefighting Methods
1613 Use of Water as an Extinguishing Agent
1614 Water Capacity and Rates
1615 Sources of Water
1616 Fire Water Consumption by Process Operation
1617 Fire Water System Impairments
1620 Fire Water System Design 1600-7
1621 Fire Water Pumps and Drivers
1622 Fire Water Supply Piping/Hose
1623 Fire Water Piping Design
1624 Fire Water Hydrants
1630 Fire Water Equipment 1600-13
1631 Fire Water Hose
1632 Fire Water Couplings
1633 Fire Water Nozzles
1634 Fire Water Accessories
1635 Incipient Stage Hose Systems

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1636 Fire Water Monitors

1640 Foam Systems 1600-23
1641 Types of Foam
1642 Foam Systems
1643 Storage and Testing of Foam
1644 Foam Proportioners
1650 Portable Fire Extinguishers 1600-29
1651 Limitations
1652 Fire Extinguisher Selection
1653 Water Extinguishers
1654 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishers
1655 Dry Chemical Extinguishers
1656 Halogenated Agent Extinguishers (Halon)
1657 Wheeled Units
1660 Fixed Fire Detection, Control and Extinguishing Systems 1600-36
1661 Fixed Water Spray Systems
1662 Fixed Foam Systems
1663 Fixed Halon Systems
1664 Fixed Dry Chemical Systems
1665 Fixed Carbon Dioxide Systems
1666 Steam
1667 Fire Detection Systems
1668 Combustible Gas Detector Systems
1669 Explosion Suppression
1670 Other Firefighting Equipment 1600-52
1671 Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment
1672 Fire Station (Plant Protection Office)
1673 Fire Equipment Cabinets
1674 Personnel Protective Equipment
1675 Communication Facilities
1676 Miscellaneous Equipment
1680 Testing and Maintenance 1600-59
1681 Dry Chemical Extinguishers Inspection/Maintenance

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1682 Hoses
1683 Fire Trucks—Pumpers
1684 Fire Water Distribution System
1685 Fire Pumps
1686 Fixed Fire Water Systems
1687 Other Equipment
1690 References and Manufacturers 1600-62
1691 References
1692 Manufacturers

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1610 Basic Design Philosophy

1611 Single Fire Concept

The fire water system and the firefighting equipment in hydrocarbon processing or
handling facilities are designed to handle firefighting efforts associated with one
major fire at a time. In other words, the design capacity of major firefighting facili-
ties is determined by the largest single fire contingency.
However, some system components are sized to handle less significant contingen-
cies. For instance, foam concentrate requirements are usually determined by a tank
fire rather than by the worst contingency, which may be a fire in the process area.

1612 Firefighting Methods

Fire extinguishing consists of one or more of the following methods:
• Quenching (cooling)
• Smothering (blanketing)
• Flame suppression (heat absorption)
• Flame propagation interruption (free radical-chain breaking)
These extinguishing methods are discussed in more detail in Section 610.

1613 Use of Water as an Extinguishing Agent

Water continues to be the most widely used and accepted fire extinguishing mate-
rial because it is economical and effective. Used properly, it has excellent
quenching capabilities, cooling effectiveness, and, for some materials, vapor disper-
sion characteristics. A gallon of water applied at 50°F and entirely vaporized into
steam at 212°F removes over 9000 BTUs of heat.
In a light spray, water cools the surface of hot oils. It may form a froth on viscous
oils, which can cool to below the flash point of the fuel, resulting in “extinguish-
ment by frothing”—a special case of quenching. A water spray is also a flame
suppressor. It reduces the size and intensity of the flame, and cools and protects
materials exposed to flames. Even as a spray, however, water is not usually capable
of extinguishing fire in gases or vapors of volatile oils.
Water can also be used as a smothering agent, particularly in fighting fires
involving liquids heavier than water (e.g., carbon disulfide).
The steam generated as fire vaporizes water can displace or exclude air, extin-
guishing the fire by smothering. Smothering is aided by confining the steam gener-
ated to the combustion zone.
Flammable materials that are soluble in water (e.g., methyl alcohol) may, in some
instances, be extinguished by dilution.

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1614 Water Capacity and Rates

Fire water demand is the maximum rate of water needed at a given time by a single
process unit. Thus, the requirements of the largest single-fire contingency deter-
mine the capacity and design of major firefighting facilities. Normally, this design
is based on the assumption that a single unit will be involved. Where separation of
units or hazardous equipment is less than 50 feet (15 meters), the combined area is
considered a single fire area. If the design water flow rate for the process unit
requiring the largest flow is less than the requirement for the largest tank or group
of tanks, the tank protection demand becomes the design basis. See Figure 1600-1
for general design guidelines for new facilities.

Fig. 1600-1 Design Guidelines—Duration and Rate—New Facilities

Duration and Rate Facility
1-hour supply at 500–1000 gpm Offices, shops, warehouses
Single-berth dock
2-hour supply at 1000–2000 gpm Sulfur plant, H2S recovery plant
Small processing plants
Tankfield areas
Pipeline terminals
Marketing terminals
Refinery tank fields
4-hour supply at 2000–4000 gpm Midsize, 0–500 psi process plants
Gas plants
Multi-berth docks
Offshore platforms
4-hour supply at 4000–6000 gpm Integrated, high value, 0–500 psi plants
Midsize, 500–1000 psi process plants
6-hour supply at 6000–8000 gpm Integrated, high-value plants, large quantities of fuel
at pressures above 1000 psi
Note: Minimum rate with one section of looped supply piping out of service should be at least 60% of design rate.

The rate and duration of water flow for each plant or facility depends on the amount
of hydrocarbon liquid contained in the area and the capability to stop flow of fuel to
the area quickly.
Flow rates are a function of available pressure, hose diameter, and nozzle diameter.
Given a steady supply pressure, flow is not linear for a given set of orifice diame-
ters. For instance, at 200 psig supply pressure, flow through a 1/2-inch orifice is
105 gpm. A 1-inch nozzle flows 420 gpm, and a 2-inch nozzle flows 1680 gpm.
Figure 1600-2 provides a chart of pressure supply and orifice diameters.

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Fig. 1600-2 Typical Flow Rates and Pressures for Various Hose Sizes
Nozzle Size Flow Pressure
3/4-in. ID garden hose and nozzle 7-8 gpm 30 psi
1-in. ID hard rubber hose and 15-35 gpm 100 psi
combination nozzle
1 1/4-in. ID hard rubber hose and 40-60 gpm 100 psi
combination nozzle
1 1/2-in. fabric covered rubber 60-90 gpm 100 psi
lined hose, or hard rubber hose
and combination nozzle
2 1/2-in. fabric synthetic hose and 200 gpm 100 psi
combination nozzle
3-in. fabric synthetic hose and 450 gpm 100 psi
combination nozzle
4-in. fabric synthetic hose and 800 gpm 100 psi
combination nozzle
5-in. fabric synthetic hose and 1300 gpm 100 psi
combination nozzl

1615 Sources of Water

Most water that does not contain a significant amount of oil is suitable for fighting
fires. After considering all available sources, use the most reliable and most
economical source for the primary supply. Integrated, high value process facilities
should have a secondary source available as well. Conduct hypothetical drills to
practice making connections to the secondary source.
Include plans for utilizing all sources of water for extreme emergencies or as
backup for the primary source. Public water systems, wells, ponds, canals, rivers,
lakes and oceans are sources to consider. In some cases, access roads, piping and
inlet hydrants on the fire main, additional valves, and other provisions may be
needed to make these water sources usable. Weigh the cost of these additions
against the potential value of the water for firefighting. Often these provisions can
be made at relatively little cost. (See Figure 1600-1.)
Give the same consideration to water storage within the plant—reservoirs, cooling
tower basins, cooling water storage tanks, and boiler feedwater storage. Drawing on
these for fire protection is normally justified. Systems such as cooling water and
boiler feedwater systems also include pumping facilities that may be able to serve
as supplementary fire systems. Be sure, however, that such use does not create
further hazards by depriving vital equipment of needed cooling or process water.
Pumper suction connections may be attached to cooling water lines at strategic loca-
tions for use by mobile pumpers in fire emergencies.
Municipal water systems can be a suitable source of water for fire protection if rela-
tively large quantities of flammable liquids are not processed, handled, or stored in

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the facility. The moderate water pressure (30 to 60 psi) carried in these systems is
sufficient if a fire pump is provided or if a fire department pumper is available for
boosting pressure. Otherwise, a minimum water pressure of 75 psi is required for
incipient stage fire protection (i.e., small hand-held hose lines). For foam applica-
tion equipment, the minimum pressure requirement is established by the manufac-
turers of the devices —generally 100 psi. A small jockey pump is required to
maintain system pressure. Where higher pressure is needed fire department
pumpers can be used.
Public systems with inadequate water flow may be used to supply storage facilities,
which then supply the fire water systems through pumps or by gravity flow.

1616 Fire Water Consumption by Process Operation

Do not use the fire water distribution system to supply regular process utility water
requirements (e.g., shell and tube heat exchangers), or for recurring line flushing or
product displacement. Use of the fire water system for process purposes must be
approved by the plant manager. The time of start and the time of finish and discon-
nection from the fire system must be recorded. Such use can lead to contamination
of the fire water system. Where fire water is provided by municipal water supplies,
such use may be prohibited or may require approved backflow prevention devices,
such as double check valves.

1617 Fire Water System Impairments

Fire water systems are critical safety systems and should be protected to ensure
their availability in an emergency. A fire water system is “impaired” when a piece
of the system is out of service for maintenance or modification. Facilities should
have a procedure in place to document when and where any portion of the fire
water system is taken out of service for maintenance or modification. One
Company facility keeps a map in a central location and marks it when a pump or
piece of piping is out of service. In the event of an emergency, responders can
quickly check the map to determine the availability of resources. Permits should
also be required before any part of the fire water system is taken out of service.

1620 Fire Water System Design

1621 Fire Water Pumps and Drivers

Refer to the Pump Manual for more extensive coverage of pump and system design.
Jockey Pumps. For reliable and immediate first aid protection, use a small centrif-
ugal pump (i.e., jockey pump) to maintain fire water system pressure at 125 to 150
psig under low-flow conditions. Jockey pumps are typically installed to run in recir-
culation mode when not needed to boost fire water system pressure. Systems
without jockey pumps need to have surge protection to avoid damaging the piping
when the main pumps start.

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Main Fire Pumps. Main fire pumps should be automatically controlled to start
whenever there is a demand that reduces system pressure below 100 psig. Pumps
should be sized to maintain 100 psi residual pressure at the most distant hydrant, at
the system design flow rate. Provide spare pumps for rapid manual or automatic
switchover if the primary pump fails. Spare pumps should be diesel-engine driven
with independent fuel tanks. Where steam is available, steam driven pumps may be
used to supplement the electric and diesel driven units.
Each main pump should be piped to allow for performance testing at its design flow
rate while isolated from the plant fire water system (see Appendix F). In-line flow
meters or orifice plates facilitate periodic testing of the pumps and system fire
water flow rates. These devices should be provided for new fire water pump installa-
tions.
• Mobile Pumps. Portable pumps are useful for drafting from open water and
pumping into the main supply lines, drafting from open water or from a tank
and pumping directly into hose lines, or pumping into hose lines from hydrants
on process water or low pressure fire systems. The two most commonly used
types of portable pumps are:
• Trailer pumpers (pump and prime mover on a trailer) that can be towed to
position with a car or pickup. They give considerable flexibility for a nominal
investment. Their usual capacity is about 500 gpm at 120 psig. These units are
also useful in routine plant maintenance for pumping out tanks, sumps, etc.,
and to control flooding caused by high fire water runoff when fighting major
fires.
• Truck-mounted pumps (fire trucks) that are ready to pump as soon as the
truck reaches the fire. They may be front-mounted and engine-driven by an
extension to the engine crankshaft, or “midship-mounted” behind the cab and
driven through the main truck transmission. Such trucks usually carry consider-
able hose and other firefighting equipment. Occasionally, pumping units incor-
porating their own separate engine drive may be mounted on a truck (see
Section 1671).

1622 Fire Water Supply Piping/Hose

Suction Hose. Drafting from open water requires a “hard” suction hose that will
not collapse, an inlet strainer, and a means of removing air (priming) to start the
flow. Most fire department pumpers have a gear pump, exhaust ejectors, or mani-
fold-vacuum primer. Although the maximum theoretical suction lift is 34 feet, the
practical maximum is about 20 feet. Suction hose should be no longer than neces-
sary and connections must be airtight.
Boosting from hydrants or other outlets is most commonly done with 5-inch hard
suction hose. With hydrants that have only 2 1/2-inch outlets, multiple (parallel)
suction lines are connected between the hydrant and the pumper suction. Regular
fire hose is permissible for such a connection if the suction lines are kept short and
pressure on the hose is maintained above 10 psig. The suction hose may collapse if
pressure drops below 10 psig.

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

Permanent Suction Connections. Where drafting from a standing water source

(such as a tank or pond) is planned as a regular part of the fire protection procedure,
consider installing a permanent suction pipe to a point of easy pumper access.
Do not overlook the possibility of the water source freezing or water freezing in the
pipe. If in a pond, the suction pipe should usually have a strainer and foot valve.
Consider fiberglass or PVC pipe to avoid clogging by marine growth.

1623 Fire Water Piping Design

Pressure Requirements
For small incipient stage hoses with fog nozzles, required nozzle pressures vary
from 60 to 75 psig. For 1 1/2-inch and larger fog/straight stream nozzles and large
straight stream nozzles, nozzle pressures can be up to 100 psig or greater. A 3/4-
inch garden hose can be used at 30 psig or more. Foam nozzles are designed to
operate between 50 and 100 psig. Most foam eductors require at least 75 psig.
To provide these nozzle pressures and allow for friction loss in hoses, hydrant pres-
sures under flow conditions should be between 75 psig and 135 psig. For hazards
that require over 2000 gpm flow, the minimum hydrant pressure under flow condi-
tions should be 100 psig. Distribution lines and fire pumps should be designed so
that static (shutoff) pressure is no more than 50 psig above the pressure at rated
flow. Hoses are difficult to handle under low flow (hence high pressure) conditions.
Static hydrant pressures of more than 150 psig are undesirable. When high pres-
sures (above 150 psi) do exist at low flow, incipient stage hose should be no larger
than 1 1/4 inch so that the average person can safely handle the first nozzle opened
on the line.
Here are a few rules of thumb for estimating pressure drop:
• Pressure drop for 1 1/2-inch hose is between 1 and 30 psig, depending on the
nozzle size. Larger nozzle sizes yield large flow rates and accompanying high
pressure drop. Common nozzle sizes are 1/4-inch through 3/4-inch.
• Pressure drop for 2 1/2-inch hose varies between 1 psig (5/8-inch nozzle) and
25 psig (1 1/4-inch nozzle). The same holds true for larger sizes.
• Deluge guns or monitors add 5 to 10 psig pressure drop.

Distribution System
Materials. Steel pipe should be used aboveground. Underground piping systems
should be constructed of steel, cement-lined steel, or high-density polyethylene
(Plexco). Concrete is acceptable, but seldom economical except in large diameters.
Underground steel pipe should be externally coated for corrosion protection. High-
density polyethylene coating is preferred; double tape wrap is acceptable. Internal
lining may be justified for salt water systems. In some areas, local approval agen-
cies may require compliance with the requirements of NFPA 24, “Installation of
Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances.” Requirements should be

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determined early in the design stage of the project, as they affect material selection
and other design specifications.
Plexco high-density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe is a Chevron product that should be
considered for new underground fire water systems. HDPE does not corrode, resists
accumulation of scale, and is very ductile and lightweight. HDPE pipe allowable
working pressure must be reduced at temperatures over 73°F; therefore, it should be
used only in buried installations. Burial also provides protection from fire and
mechanical damage. Refer to Section 400 of the Piping Manual for information on
pressure rating, hydrotesting, and installation requirements for HDPE pipe.
Fiberglass pipe has been used on offshore platforms due to the highly corrosive
environment found there. Based on fire tests, fiberglass manufacturers strongly
recommend fireproofing some or all of a fiberglass piping system. Where the
system is dry (normally not filled with fire water), fiberglass pipe and fittings
should have fireproofing. Wet systems need fireproofing only around the fittings,
where leaks are most likely.
All material used must be rated for the maximum pressure the system will reach,
including test pressure. Choice of material will also be influenced by crushing
strength, susceptibility of joints to leakage and ground settlement expected.
The Piping Manual discusses water pipe for use in plant piping systems. Refer to
the Coatings Manual for information on internal and external linings.
Layout and Size. In climates where freezing does not occur, aboveground installa-
tion of steel fire water distribution lines has the advantages of low first cost and
ease of inspection and repair. Pipe lines should be routed to minimize fire or
mechanical damage. In cold climates, distribution lines should be buried below the
frost line. Recommended depth of cover in feet for fire water systems in the U.S. is
given in Figure A-8-1.1 of NFPA 24.
When possible, fire water mains should be arranged in loops around process facility
and tankfield areas. Shutoff valves should be located to allow isolation of system
segments for maintenance while still providing water for all facilities. The
minimum water rate with a section of pipe out of service should be at least 60
percent of the design rate at design pressure for that area.
See Figure 1600-3 for a typical layout. A 4-inch minimum fire water header should
be provided in each process facility area to serve incipient stage hose stations.
Branch lines to hose stations should be 2 inches minimum. Fire water mains and
headers looping the facilities should not be less than 8 inches in diameter. Laterals
supplying single hydrants or monitors should not be less than 6 inches in diameter.
In fire water systems using salt water, the pipe diameter should be increased one
size to allow for deposits and scale buildup.
Valves. High performance-type butterfly valves, gate valves, and post-indicator
style valves are recommended for block valves in fire water distribution systems.
They should provide reasonably tight shutoff and use sealing materials that do not
swell or deteriorate with age. Good shaft and shaft attachment design is desirable to
prevent broken shafts. Because many valves will be buried and, therefore, will be

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

Fig. 1600-3 Typical Looped Fire Water Distribution System

expensive to maintain, durable valves requiring little maintenance are desirable. See
the Piping Manual for additional guidance.

1624 Fire Water Hydrants

Hydrants are necessary to supplement ready-connected incipient stage hoses and
monitors for major protection of large risks. Required flow rates depend on the risk
and the number of 2 1/2-inch hose streams required to control a fire of maximum
anticipated extent and duration.
Hydrant Selection. Hydrant selection for a particular installation depends on
whether freezing temperatures are expected. In all but freezing climates, hydrant
outlets are normally valved individually aboveground. Commercial hydrants with a
4 1/2-inch pumper suction connection permit easier hookup to a foam pumper
truck. This type of hydrant may be advisable for locations anticipating foam require-

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ments. In freezing climates, install the commercial, dry-barrel hydrant. See

Figure 1600-4 and the manufacturer list at the end of this section.

Fig. 1600-4 Types of Fire Hydrants Courtesy of International Fire Service Training Assoc. IFSTA

Hydrant risers should be designed to avoid damage from frost heave. Each 2 1/2-
inch outlet should be individually valved, so that hoses can be controlled separately.
Hydrant Location. Locate hydrants for the main system at least 50 feet from build-
ings or other important structures to be protected. Hydrants should be near enough
to fire hazard areas to permit the total flow required for a major fire. Unless
portable booster pumps are available, no hose line should exceed 500 feet in length.
In process facilities, space hydrants so that any fire risk area is within reach of two
hydrants by hoses of 250 feet maximum length. Generally, this means that hydrants
should be placed on each street corner of a facility and, if the distance between
hydrants is more than 300 feet, another hydrant should be placed in the middle.
In tankfields, locate hydrants so that all parts of the shell of each tank are within
reach of a stream from a hose not longer than 500 feet. Note that radiant heat from
a fire may prevent connection to hydrants within 70 to 100 feet of an impoundment
or drainage area.
Outlets. The normal main system hydrant should have one 4 1/2-inch outlet and
may also have one or two 2 1/2-inch outlets. Where water and personnel, either
Company or public, are plentiful, and in high-value facilities, you may want addi-
tional 4 1/2-inch and 2 1/2-inch outlets on each hydrant. Note that coupling size is

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

not the same as hose size. For example, 5-inch hose can be fitted with 4 1/2-inch
couplings.
Because it provides versatility, at least one 4 1/2 inch diameter outlet is desirable on
commercial hydrants. A large hose may be readily connected for maximum flow
rate, and you can use adapters to attach smaller diameter hoses for smaller fires or
crews. This is a departure from past practices of providing a manifold of several 2
1/2 inch outlets connected in parallel to provide flow rates equivalent to one 5-inch
outlet. Five-inch outlets are also most convenient for low-pressure (less than 100
psig) fire water systems that are meant to be connected to mobile (portable) pumps
and pumper trucks.
Hydrant Valves. Shop- or field-fabricated hydrants should have composition disc
globe valves for tight shutoff and easy opening without tools. Use angle valves
wherever possible. Usually, the pipe inlet on valves at hose connections is a size
larger than the nominal hose size; that is, 2 inches by 1 1/2 inches for 1 1/2-inch
hose, and 3 inches by 2 1/2 inches for 2 1/2-inch hose. Pacific, Walworth, Crane
and other manufacturers produce acceptable valves. Consult Volume 2 of the Piping
Manual for more information.
Commercial hydrants are invariably equipped with replaceable composition valves.
Valves with composition discs or other parts should always be fully open when in
use to avoid damaging the disc and seat; they should never be used to throttle the
flow.
Threads. Hydrants and other outlets for fire hose should have threaded connections
that permit interconnection with the fire equipment of adjacent plants and local
public agencies. Use National Hose Threads for 1 1/2-inch, 2 1/2-inch, and 4 1/2-
inch fire hose in the absence of other interconnection criteria.
Hydrant Inspection and Servicing. Hydrants require periodic inspection and
servicing to be sure they will function during an emergency. Valves may not
operate, hose attachment threads may be damaged or leaks may develop. Refer to
Appendix E for Inspection and Servicing Checklists.

1630 Fire Water Equipment

1631 Fire Water Hose

A 2 1/2-inch hose operating at 100 psi nozzle pressure with a 1 1/8-inch nozzle
discharges at about 250 gpm. A 2 1/2-inch combination nozzle designed for
portable use delivers between 150 and 200 gpm, depending on the stream pattern.
See Figure 1600-2 for flow rates and pressures for various hose types.
Hoses used for maintenance purposes should be tested per Section 1682 before
being returned to fire protection service. Hoses unsuitable for fire protection may
be used for utility service, providing the couplings are marked to differentiate such
hoses from those dedicated to fire protection.

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Various types and sizes of fire hose are designed for specific uses. Three types are
described here:
• All-synthetic. All-synthetic hose prevents premature hose deterioration from
severe abrasion or contact with oil, acids, chemicals, etc. It is also immune to
mildew and rot. Its weight is comparable to cotton warp-synthetic fiber hose,
and it can be supplied with either single or double jackets. This hose is recom-
mended for general use when durability is a primary concern. Larger diameter
hose is becoming widely accepted due to the lower pressure drop. Purchase
larger diameter 1 3/4-inch and 3-inch synthetic hose to replace, 1 1/2-inch and
2 1/2-inch cotton hose, respectively, when replacement hose is needed. Reuse 1
1/2-inch and 2 1/2-inch brass end couplings whenever possible.
• Cotton warp-synthetic fiber filler. This type of hose is not recommended due
to high maintenance and replacement costs.
• Neoprene or plastic cover jacket. This is a single-jacket cotton/synthetic hose
with an oil-resisting Neoprene or plastic cover. The hose is designed for protec-
tion against oil, acids, grease, and other deteriorating agents. It is immune to
mildew and rot. It is tested to 300 psi. This hose is typically used for 1 1/4-inch
hard rubber first aid hose service. To minimize friction losses, 5-inch hose is
now being used to carry water to and from pumpers.

1632 Fire Water Couplings

Couplings for 1 1/2-inch, 1 3/4-inch, 2 1/2-inch and 3-inch hose should be of the
rounded ear (rocker lug) type designed to slide over obstructions without catching.
Note Use 1 1/2-inch couplings for 1 1/2-inch and 1 3/4-inch hose. Use 2 1/2-inch
couplings for 2 1/2-inch and 3-inch hose. The most common and preferred material
is brass. Although aluminum couplings are preferred due to their light weight, they
should be used only in fresh water systems and in a noncorrosive atmosphere.
Corrosion may occur when dissimilar metals are connected. Use plastic couplings
only for light-duty, non-firefighting purposes.

1633 Fire Water Nozzles

Hose stored on carts, trucks, or elsewhere should have at least one nozzle for every
250 feet of hose. Combination monitor nozzles are desirable in large facilities. It is
usually necessary to manifold more than one 2 1/2-inch stream into such nozzles,
because the typical flow is 500 gpm or more. Refer to Figure F-4 (Appendix F) for
typical nozzle diameters and flow rates.

Straight Stream Playpipe Nozzles

Straight stream nozzles (see Figure 1600-5) are used infrequently. They are only
needed for long-range high pressure, high-density water stream cooling, such as for
cooling LPG vessels from a distance.

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

Combination Straight Stream/Fog

Combination nozzles are most often used in fire, gas, dispersion, flushing, and
personnel protection situations (see Figure 1600-6). Good quality nozzles are
required for the protection of firefighting personnel. It is important to have a good
supply of extra nozzles available.

Fig. 1600-5 Straight Stream Playpipe Nozzle Fig. 1600-6 Combination Straight Stream/Fog Nozzle
Courtesy of Akron Co. Courtesy of Akron Co.

Combination nozzles are available in three types:

• Twist-to-adjust nozzles. The nozzle barrel is twisted to adjust between
straight and fog streams. This type of nozzle is recommended for incipient
stage.
• Pistol grip nozzles. These make hose handling easier and less tiring. Because
of expense, these nozzles are generally limited to use on fire apparatus by fire
brigades.
• Non-pistol grip nozzles with bail. A straight barrel nozzle with a handle (bail)
used to vary the stream (see Figure 1600-7).

Special Purpose Nozzles

Special electrical equipment fog nozzles are available for fighting electrical fires
with water (see Figure 1600-8). It is advisable to de-energize the circuit prior to
attempting extinguishment. Use of CO2 is preferred to water or dry chemical
because less cleanup is required.
Extension nozzles and cellar nozzles are available for use through windows, under
the floor, under docks, etc. (see Figure 1600-9).

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Fig. 1600-7 Adjustable Fog Nozzle Courtesy of Akron Co.

Fig. 1600-8 Fixed Pattern for Electrical Fires Fig. 1600-9 Cellar Nozzle
Courtesy of Akron Co. Courtesy of Akron Co.

Monitor Nozzles
Monitors are high-capacity water users and their use must be controlled. Using
combination nozzles of 500 gpm capacity on monitors is usually adequate. (See
Figures 1600-10 and 1600-11 for examples of monitor nozzles.) Additional straight
stream and stack nozzles should be available for occasional long-range stream needs.
Use multi-gallonage nozzles only when it is important to conserve water.

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

Fig. 1600-10 Multi-gallonage Nozzle Courtesy of Akron Co.

Fig. 1600-11 Fixed Monitor Nozzle Courtesy of National Foam

Portable Monitor Nozzles

Nozzles for portable monitors (see Figure 1600-12) should be the same as for the
fixed monitors. In some large plants, portable monitors with capacities of 1000 to
2000 gpm are part of the available firefighting equipment.

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Fig. 1600-12 Portable Monitor Nozzle Courtesy of Akron Co.

1634 Fire Water Accessories

Examples of useful accessories are as follows:
• Wyes. Use a wye with a 2 1/2-inch inlet by 2 1/2-inch outlets when using a 2
1/2-inch hose line inlet and splitting to two 2 1/2-inch lines at the point of use
(see Figure 1600-13). Several wyes are usually required. Internal clapper
valves are recommended in the wyes. When using 1 3/4-inch and 3-inch hoses
acquire appropriately sized wyes. Aluminum wyes may be used in fresh water
service because they are light and easier to handle than brass.
• Reducers. These are used to reduce the 2 1/2-inch hydrant outlet to 1 1/2
inches when a single hose line is needed. Other sizes, such as 3-inch to 1 3/4-
inch, should be stocked where applicable.
• Hose clamps, hose coupling wrenches, adapters, hose holders, etc., should be
standard equipment.

1635 Incipient Stage Hose Systems

Incipient stage hose reels generally mean the permanently connected small hose in
the immediate vicinity when a fire starts (see Figure 1600-14). Incipient stage hose
requires relatively small flow. Because ready-connected incipient stage hoses are
intended for use by one person, the rate of application for each hose is necessarily
limited.
Incipient stage hoses are to be used only to fight small, incipient stage fires. They
do not provide adequate protection for a larger fire.

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

Fig. 1600-13 Ball Valve Wye Fig. 1600-14 FIrst Aid Hose Reel
Courtesy of Akron Co. Courtesy of Herbert S. Hiller

Ordinarily, a hose line discharging 60 gpm at 100 psi is the maximum that can be
safely handled by one person under all conditions. One person can, however, safely
handle smaller hose at higher pressures, such as 1-inch hose at 150-175 psi.
Handling of smaller hose, (1 1/4-inch and below), is similar to handling garden
hose. Soft, collapsible hose is somewhat more difficult to handle.
In soft hose storage devices listed by a nationally recognized laboratory, such as
Underwriters' Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM), the water control valve
can be opened before the hose is pulled out. This results in water at the nozzle as
soon as all the kinks are removed. When hose is fully extended, a hand pull releases
a pin, allowing water to enter the hose. With other types, the water cannot be turned
on until after the hose is pulled out to the ground, because expansion of the hose
when the water is turned on may make the hose extremely difficult to move.
Location. Locate incipient stage hoses near all risks to be protected, but not where
they would be unduly exposed to a potential fire. Incipient stage hose stations
should normally be located not closer than 20 feet from the equipment or location
being protected.
Where volatile flammable liquids are handled, locate hoses so that more than one
water stream could be applied to any location when using a maximum of 100 feet
of 1-inch, 1-1/4-inch, or 1-1/2-inch hose. Greater lengths are difficult for one
person to handle.
Provide incipient stage fire equipment in and around process units, near pumps and
important manifolds (particularly where frequent blind-changing is necessary), at
loading racks (except those handling penetration asphalt), and in or around most
buildings.

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Types and Sizes of Hose. Incipient stage hose may be 3/4-inch garden hose, 1-inch
or 1 1/4-inch ID two-braid Neoprene-covered hose, 1 1/2-inch cotton hose, or
synthetic fiber jacketed rubber-lined hose.
Garden hose is suitable protection for low hazard occupancies such as offices, labo-
ratories, storage areas containing little or no flammable liquids, shop areas, etc.
Pressure on the hose should be limited to 30 to 75 psi.
Inicipient stage fire hose must be of a size easily handled by one person under any
expected line pressure. Where pressure on the nozzle does not exceed about 100 psi
at any time, hose up to and including 1 1/4 inches can be used satisfactorily. Where
nozzle pressures exceed 100 psi, it is desirable to limit inci-pient stage hose to 1
inch, or to reduce the pressure.
Short lengths of 1-1/2-inch hose (not over 100 feet) can be laid out by pulling on
the nozzle. Pulling longer lengths from one end might put an excessive strain on the
couplings. Additional people are required to handle long lengths of 1-1/2-inch hose;
it then ceases to be first aid equipment.
Incipient stage 1 1/2-inch fire hose is normally synthetic fiber jacketed. It is stored
flat, and must be laid out without kinks before water will reach the nozzle. Time
and space are required for this operation. Because of these disadvantages, 1 1/4-
inch hose reels are normally recommended for incipient stage hose stations. The
smaller hose is usually “hard” and full flow is immediately available at the nozzle
when the valve is opened, even when it is stored on reels or in loops. Take no more
hose than you will need from the storage place. Comparing 1 1/4-inch hose with 1
1/2- inch hose during first response, the speed and ease of handling 1 1/4-inch hose
frequently more than offsets the lower water flow rate.
For large facilities or areas where the potential for large fires is higher, it may be
justified to install 1 1/2-inch preconnected hose stations in addition to incipient
stage hose reels. Providing 1 1/2-inch hose stations reduces the time required for
firefighters to connect hose and begin to cool and contain a fire. Hose stations
should at least 50 feet away from the fire area of concern and should be used by
teams of firefighters rather than by one person, as is incipient stage hose.
Nozzles. Each incipient stage hose should have a nozzle attached. In general,
nozzles should be adjustable so that they can discharge a spray or straight stream
and can be shut off. Garden hose should have a common garden hose nozzle with
variable stream pattern and shutoff. A 3/4-inch nozzle delivers about 7 gpm at 30
psi nozzle pressure. Adjustable fog nozzles with a full range of patterns and shutoff
should be provided for all 1-inch and larger first aid hoses. These nozzles should be
of the type that directs a portion of the water into the spray cone, giving a solid
spray pattern. This feature is particularly important for personnel protection, such
as for closing a valve within a fire area. The increased amount of water in the cone
helps to move the flame away from the nozzle and decrease the amount of radiant
heat transmitted through the spray.
Valves. It is essential to use a valve that does not leak for hydrant valves and valves
on 1 1/4-inch and 1 1/2-inch first aid hoses, both hard rubber and synthetic. It is
even more important that the valve be opened easily without the aid of wrenches or

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

other tools. Ball valves with Neoprene seats and angle valves with composition
disks are reliable in these services.
To reduce friction loss and to prevent damage to valve parts, valves should always
be fully opened when in use.
Threads. Hydrant and hose threads should be compatible with those used by the
local public fire department that might respond to a fire. Provide adapters where
necessary. The following hose threads should be specified unless in conflict with
local custom or regulations:
• 1-inch Straight Iron Pipe Thread
• 1 1/2-inch and larger National Hose Thread
Method of Storage. Garden hose can be stored on a live reel, hung in loops over a
saddle, or coiled in a box. Normally, 1 1/4-inch hose should be stored on a live reel
(see Figure 1600-14). Acceptable manufacturers and models are shown at the end
of this section. Figure 1600-15 shows the piping arrangement for freezing climates
where the valve cannot be located in a heated area.
Synthetic 1 1/2-inch and 1 3/4-inch hose is normally stored in accordion folds in a
box for protection against the weather. You can also store it in a double roll (both
hose couplings on the outside) on a reel. In severe, cold climates it may be desirable
to provide heated storage for incipient stage hoses.

1636 Fire Water Monitors

In high-risk, high-value facilities, where fire control personnel is limited because of
operating activities, consider using monitors as a combination incipient stage and
fire-control device. (Refer to Standard Drawing GB-S1007 in the Standard Draw-
ings section.) Monitors may be either fixed or portable.
Fixed monitors can be installed to protect a specific risk within a plant or for more
general coverage where personnel availability is limited. Two fixed monitors may
be required—one on each side—to adequately protect a single risk in adverse wind
conditions. Portable monitors can be strategically located around the facility.
During a fire they can be quickly moved and connected by hose to the nearest
hydrant. Due to the wide variation in flow rates and ranges that can be obtained
from monitors, each installation must be designed for the specific risks and condi-
tions involved.
Monitors discharge large volumes of water and have good straight stream range.
Discharge can be controlled by the type and size of adjustable nozzle or diameter of
straight stream nozzle. A 1-inch diameter nozzle at 100 psi has a flow of about 300
gpm with a range of 140 to 150 feet when the wind is less than 5 mph. Beyond this
distance the stream loses its continuity, but water is thrown somewhat further in the
form of heavy rain, which is easily carried away by the wind. In adverse winds (10
mph or more), the range may be shortened as much as 40%.
The effective range of spray patterns is about 40 feet at 500 gpm and 100 psi nozzle
pressure, to about 125 feet at 100 psi with straight stream.

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Fig. 1600-15 Valve Box for Freezing Climates

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

Monitor nozzles are not designed to be the primary water flow shutoff. The block
valve at the monitor must be closed when the monitor is not in use. To reduce fric-
tion loss and to prevent damage to valve parts, the block valve should always be
opened wide when in use. A “persuader” should be provided at each block valve to
increase the handle moment arm. Some Company locations use an Inbal diaphragm
valve on fire water monitors. These valves are operated using a small quarter turn
valve to vent the diaphragm, allowing full flow through the monitor in a fraction of
the time required to open a gate valve.
To assure an adequate stream, locate monitor nozzles 40 to 75 feet from the hazard
to be protected. Also consider the supply of water to the area and the drainage
conditions. (See the Civil and Structural Manual, Section 500, and Section 1300 of
this manual.) Elevated monitors may be needed to protect elevated structures
containing fire hazardous equipment (see Figure 1600-16).
Monitors on Pickup Trucks. In some locations, monitors with foam capability are
mounted on pickups. These are effective because they can be moved easily.

1640 Foam Systems

1641 Types of Foam

Foam is a blanketing agent consisting of an aggregate of gas-filled or air-filled
bubbles that can float on an oil surface. It prevents its contact with air, cools the
surface and inhibits (or suppresses) the formation of vapor. It is used primarily for
extinguishing liquid pool fires.
Foam is effective on any liquid hydrocarbon at temperatures up to the boiling point
of water. Applying foam to hydrocarbons heated above the boiling point of water
may cause frothing and slopovers. Foam, being largely water, is also an effective
quenching agent for fires in ordinary combustible materials.
Details concerning foam requirements, application rates and expansion ratios are
given in NFPA 11, “Foam Extinguishing Systems”; NFPA 11A, “High Expansion
Foam Systems”; and NFPA 11B, “Synthetic Foam and Combined Agent Systems.”
Foam types and application equipment are described in this section. The Fire
Protection Staff is available to provide recommended types, brands, and application
rates.
The differences between fluoroprotein foam, aqueous film forming foam (AFFF),
and multipurpose foam concentrates are not significant in extinguishing most fires.
Selecting a foam is primarily an economic decision. Foam is expensive to purchase
and to store. For facilities that store both hydrocarbons and alcohol, and oxygenated
fuels over 15% by volume, consider purchasing a multipurpose foam to use on both
alcohol and hydrocarbon-type liquid fires, and avoid storing two types of foam. In
all cases, standardize on 3% concentrates, so common proportioning equipment can
be used regardless of type or brand. Foam is also available in 1% concentrate, but
this requires special metering equipment. Where weight or volume limitations exist,
1% concentrate may be preferable.

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Fig. 1600-16 Elevated Fire Water Monitor Courtesy of Elkhart Brass Manufacturing Co.

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Chemical Foam. Chemical foam is now obsolete. Chemical foam systems and
supplies should be dismantled and scrapped.
Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF). AFFF concentrates are based on fluori-
nated surfactants plus foam stabilizers, and are diluted with water to a 3% or 6%
solution. Use of 3% concentrate is recommended to reduce the amount kept in
inventory.
The foam acts as a barrier to exclude air or oxygen and to develop an aqueous film
on the fuel surface that can suppress the evolution of fuel vapors. AFFF is espe-
cially effective on relatively thin layers of flammable liquid, such as spills. AFFF is
effective on pooled hydrocarbons and was originally designed for fires requiring
quick knockdown for rescue, such as aircraft or tank vehicle accidents, and for use
on aircraft carriers.
Fluoroprotein Foam. Fluoroprotein foam is the most common type of mechanical
foam. Concentrates are diluted with water to a 3% or 6% solution. Use of 3% foam
concentrate is recommended to reduce the amount kept in inventory.
Fluoroprotein foam was derived from protein foam concentrates to which small
amounts of fluorochemical surfactants were added, similar to those used in AFFF
foam agents, but in much lower concentrations. These foams generally have very
good heat stability and resist burnback (decomposition of the foam from fire expo-
sure, allowing the fire to regain area as the foam breaks down).
Film Forming Fluoroprotein (FFFP). FFFP combines the quick knock-down
quality of AFFF with the holding power of protein foam. It can be used where
either AFFF or protein foams are required.
Alcohol-Resistant Foam. Alcohol-resistant (ARC) foams are suitable for use on
fires in water soluble and certain flammable or combustible liquids, and in solvents
that are destructive to regular foams, such as alcohols (greater than 15% of volume
in hydrocarbon, such as gasohol), ketones, etc.
Alcohol-resistant foam concentrates are available in a 3% or 6% solution. Use of
3% solution is recommended to reduce the amount kept in inventory.
This type of foam has an insoluble barrier in the bubble structure that resists break-
down at the interface of the fuel and foam blanket.
All-Purpose foam. This type combines the properties of AFFF (or fluoroprotein)
and alcohol-resistant (polar fuel) concentrates, and is also available in a 3% or 6%
solution. Use of 3% concentrate is recommended to reduce the amount kept in
inventory.
All-purpose foam is the most expensive type of foam. Its cost is about 50% more
than other types, so its use needs to be justified.
High-Expansion Foam. High expansion (synthetic detergent) foam, when used
with high expansion foam generators, produces a large volume of air bubbles, the
film of which has little water. Consequently, this type of foam suppresses fire by the
displacement of air. Because of its very low specific gravity, it is most effective in

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enclosed spaces where foam mass can be built up and is not carried away by wind
or air currents. High-expansion foam is used for fires in laboratories, aircraft
hangers, paint shops, and other enclosed buildings.

1642 Foam Systems

Fixed Systems
Fixed foam systems should be justified based on a risk evaluation. However, semi-
fixed systems are frequently warranted for large storage tanks, especially for low-
flash products. The Tank Manual has a section covering the design of fire protec-
tion for large tanks and outlines the Company position on semi-fixed systems for
storage tanks. The basic design requirements given in NFPA 11 should be followed.

Foam Hose Reels

Sixty-gallon foam hose reels are sometimes placed at strategic locations in process
areas that have a higher risk of spill fires. See Figure 1600-17.
Foam is very useful in process areas for controlling and extinguishing fires:
• Fires at low points where hydrocarbons collect (e.g., sumps and trenches)
• Fires on offshore platforms
• Spill fires

Portable Foam Units

Sixty-gallon portable foam hose stations may be considered for large pump
stations, for process areas, or at tank truck loading racks. Large foam trailers, fire
trucks, etc., are discussed in Section 1670 of this manual.

Fixed Foam Units

Fixed foam units generally consist of a monitor with an educting nozzle (flows
between 350 and 500 gpm) and a 20-minute supply of AFFF or all-purpose foam.
Higher volume (greater than 500 gpm) monitors are also available.

1643 Storage and Testing of Foam

Inventory
Foam storage should be adequate to handle the largest anticipated need. This may
be a seal fire on the largest tank, a reasonable spill fire, or a fully involved tank fire.
The latter typically requires substantially greater amounts of foam. Depending on
the size, location, and layout of the facility, foam storage to handle such a fire may
not be justified. However, it is prudent to have a plan for emergency backup
supplies. This can consist of on-site storage or sources immediately available
(within 24 hours) from suppliers or through mutual aid agreements. See Manufac-
turers list at the end of this section.

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Fig. 1600-17 Foam Hose Reel Courtesy of Herbert S. Hiller

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Testing
Foam samples should be tested annually for quality. Reliable testing of foam
insures its effectiveness during an emergency situation. Testing is performed as a
free service by major foam manufacturers such as National Foam, Ansul, 3M, and
Angus.
Testing frequency varies depending on how and where the foam is stored. The
manufacturer, as a free service, will test the foam sample for pH, specific gravity,
sedimentation, and quality. If the sample fails one of these tests, the manufacturer
performs a fire test at a nominal fee. Contact the specific foam manufacturer for
details on sending samples.
Anti-foam agents may be used following foam system performance tests to reduce
the amount of water needed to flush away spent foam.

Storage
Store foam in a container properly designed for bulk storage. Protect the containers
from extreme weather conditions. The temperature should not exceed 100°F for
long periods of time. Do not store different types of foam (e.g., AFFF and fluoro-
protein) in the same container.
Listed below are the three basic types of storage categories and their corresponding
recommended test frequencies.
Inside Storage. Foam stored indoors in the original shipping containers and kept
within the manufacturer's recommended storage temperature range (usually 35 to
100°F) needs to be tested at least once every three years. Some jurisdictions may
have adopted NFPA 11 as a legal requirement. This recommends annual testing
(Chapter 5-3.5). However, foam deterioration is extremely slow if stored indoors.
Apparatus Storage. Foam stored in active firefighting equipment (i.e., fire trucks,
hose reels, portable foam tanks, etc.) where dilution is possible needs to be tested at
least annually, and more frequently if dilution is suspected.
Outside Storage. Foam stored outside in the original containers needs to be tested
once every year.
The preferred storage is indoors under controlled environmental conditions. This
eliminates the chance of dilution and minimizes temperature degradation, which
destroys the quality of the foam. In addition, indoor storage decreases the frequency
of testing and has resulted in foam storage life of 20 years or more, which in turn
reduces costs. Foam should not be stored outside in freezing climates.
Following are additional foam storage tips:
• Rotate foam storage containers so that old foam is used before new foam.
• In smaller facilities such as marketing terminals and small chemical plants, the
foam in one hose reel should be used for fire training once a year. The foam in
the reels not used for training should be tested on an annual basis.

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• If more than one container of foam has the same batch number, then only one
sample from the batch needs to be taken, provided all containers are stored
under the same conditions.
• Some larger facilities may want to test their own foam. Contact the foam manu-
facturer's local supplier for details on testing procedures.

1644 Foam Proportioners

To apply foam to a small spill or fire, you need a foam proportioner; that is, an in-
line eductor (or eductor-type nozzle), a pickup tube, and a container of foam.
Normally a fire truck or equipment carrier has foam proportioners. See
Figure 1600-18.

Fig. 1600-18 Pickup Tube Proportioner Courtesy of National Foam

1650 Portable Fire Extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers include both self-contained fire extinguishing equipment
that can be carried by one person and wheeled units that can be handled by one or
two people (refer to NFPA 10, “Portable Fire Extinguishers”). Portable extin-
guishers are used in the following situations:
• To provide the primary means of extinguishment where piped water is unavail-
able
• To quickly extinguish small fires where they are better adapted, quicker, or less
messy than water (e.g., small CO2 extinguishers in laboratories or computer
rooms)
• To supplement hose lines where a combination of cooling and another control
method is needed

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1651 Limitations
Portable fire extinguishers are incipient stage equipment. They are designed for
fires of limited size, and their period of discharge is short.
Different fire extinguishers are not equally effective on all kinds of fires. When
choosing a fire extinguisher, consider the type of fire that may occur and the nature
of the process or occupancy.
As with all incipient stage equipment, portable fire extinguishers have limited effec-
tiveness unless trained personnel are present when the fire starts.

1652 Fire Extinguisher Selection

General guidelines for selecting portable fire extinguishers are given in
Figure 1600-19.

Fig. 1600-19 Fire Extinguisher Selection

GUIDELINE FOR SELECTING PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
Class A – Ordinary Combustible Hazards
Piped water not available or where portable extin- 2 1/2 gallon stored-pressure water. If freezing condi-
guisher is legally required tions are expected, add anti-freeze chemicals or use
multipurpose dry chemical extinguishers.

Multipurpose dry chemical may be considered for

some warehouse facilities and offices where light-
weight fire extinguishers are desirable for easier
handling.
Class B – Flammable Liquids and Gases Hazards
All outdoor hazards (e.g., loading racks, process Dry chemical
plants)
Light indoor hazards (e.g., laboratories, computer Carbon dioxide
rooms)
Kitchens/deep fat fryers Multipurpose dry chemical
Class C – Electrical Hazards
Heavy electrical machinery (e.g., motors, trans- Carbon dioxide, or dry chemical. Dry chemical
formers) requires clean up; others do not.
Delicate electrical and electronic equipment (e.g., Carbon dioxide. (Dry chemical is an effective agent
telephone exchanges, computers) but difficult to clean up and may damage the equip-
ment.)

Location
Locate portable fire extinguishers near the risk to be protected, but not so close that
they can become involved in the fire. The suggested distance is between 20 feet and
50 feet. From any grade level point in a process plant, the maximum horizontal
distance to a dry chemical extinguisher should not exceed 50 feet. In multi-level

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structures and elevated platforms containing processes with an associated risk of

fire, a dry chemical extinguisher should be located on each level, near the stairway
landing, and in other logical areas if the travel distance exceeds 50 feet.
Where possible, place extinguishers near doors or other accessways so that a fire is
not likely to occur between approaching personnel and extinguishers. Extinguisher
locations should be conspicuous, clearly marked, and visible from several direc-
tions. Do not place equipment, supplies, or other material in front of extinguishers
that might conceal them or impede access to them.
Small extinguishers with gross weight less than 40 pounds should be located at a
convenient height with the top not more than five feet above the floor. Extin-
guishers with gross weight greater than 40 pounds (except wheeled types), should
be installed with the top of the extinguisher not more than 3 1/2 feet above the
floor. The clearance between the bottom of the extinguisher and the floor should be
at least four inches. Do not set extinguishers on the floor or ground because of the
increased chance of bottom corrosion.

1653 Water Extinguishers

The superior cooling capacity of water over other extinguishing agents makes it
particularly effective on fires involving ordinary combustibles such as wood, paper,
fabrics, or rubber. Water extinguishers furnish a convenient, effective, and econom-
ical way to provide a small stream of water under limited pressure for locations
where piped water is not justified. Water extinguishers do not require extensive
cleanup after use and they are noncorrosive to electronic circuitry, both of which
are characteristic of dry chemical extinguishers.
Stored-Pressure Water Extinguishers. These extinguishers contain water stored
under air pressure of about 100 psi. They are manufactured with a capacity of 1 1/2
to 33 gallons of water. For offices, the 2 1/2-gallon size is recommended because it
is easy to handle. A pressure gage indicates the internal pressure. Stored-pressure
water extinguishers are operated in a vertical position by opening a valve at the top
of the extinguisher; the water is expelled by internal pressure. The stream has a 12-
to 15-foot range. Intermittent flow can be controlled by the valve on most types.
Antifreeze Additives. When water extinguishers are subject to freezing weather,
add antifreeze (calcium chloride) to the water to lower the freezing point However,
do not use calcium chloride antifreeze additives in extinguishers with stainless steel
shells, as stainless steels are subject to chloride corrosion attack. Extinguishers with
stainless steel shells should be winterized according to the manufacturer's instruc-
tions.

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As a guideline, dissolve the following amounts of calcium chloride in sufficient

water to fill a 2 1/2-gallon extinguisher:
Approximate Freezing Amount of
Temperature Calcium Chloride
10°F 5 lb
0°F 6 lb 4 oz
-10°F 7 lb 6 oz
-20°F 8 lb 2 oz
-30°F 9 lb 2 oz
-40°F 10 lb

This table is based on granulated 75% calcium chloride (free from magnesium chlo-
ride). Individual recharges are marketed by most fire extinguisher manufacturers.

1654 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishers

Carbon dioxide (CO2) is a gas, liquified under high pressure. It vaporizes when
released, resulting in a smothering action on the fire by excluding the air (oxygen)
needed for combustion.
☞ Caution The concentration of CO2 needed to extinguish fire will not support life.
It is safe to discharge a CO2 extinguisher in a room, but then ventilate the room to
assure safe levels of oxygen. A CO2 extinguisher is well suited for indoor use
where winds or drafts do not affect the discharge of the gas. Carbon dioxide extin-
guishers (see Figure 1600-20) are preferable to water or dry chemical extinguishers
where water damage and fouling of delicate electrical, electronic, or laboratory
equipment cannot be tolerated or where cleanup is a consideration.

Fig. 1600-20 Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguisher

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Carbon dioxide extinguishers are designed to be carried to the fire. You discharge
them from the vertical position toward the base of the flame by opening the control
valve at the top of the extinguisher. If the extinguisher is tilted, the total contents
cannot be discharged. To prevent accidental discharge, most types have a locking
pin that must be removed before you can operate the valve. Because the unit
discharges a gas readily dispersed by wind, you need to hold the discharge horn
within a few feet of the fire.
Carbon dioxide extinguishers are manufactured in sizes ranging from 2 to 25
pounds capacity; however, the 5-, 10-, and 15-pound sizes are the most widely
used. Smaller sizes discharge for about 15 seconds, while larger sizes discharge for
about 30 seconds. The discharge can be stopped and started at will on most types
by operating the control valve. These extinguishers are suitable for installations
where the temperature is between -40 and 120°F.

1655 Dry Chemical Extinguishers

Five basic types of dry chemical extinguishing agents are available. The first three
are the most widely accepted.
• Sodium bicarbonate base
• Potassium bicarbonate base (Purple K)
• Monoammonium phosphate base (multipurpose chemical)
• Potassium chloride base
• Urea-potassium bicarbonate base
Do not convert an extinguisher to use a chemical other than the one for which it
was designed. Conversion voids the UL label, as does using a chemical other than
that specified on the extinguisher nameplate. OSHA standards require compliance
with manufacturer's instructions on the extinguisher nameplate and thus prohibit
conversion.
Sodium bicarbonate chemical. Sodium bicarbonate was the original dry chemical
extinguishing agent. The chemical currently available is a mixture consisting prima-
rily of sodium bicarbonate with various additives to improve flow and storage char-
acteristics. Chief among the additives is a silicone polymer. It is used to prevent
moisture absorption and consequent caking of chemical. Water repellency obtained
by coating the particles of dry chemical with a silicone polymer makes the use of
dry chemical compatible with foam and/or water spray. The chemical has a medium
particle size of 25 to 35 microns. Because particle size has a definite effect on extin-
guishing efficiency, it is important to use quality chemicals. The extinguishing effec-
tiveness of dry chemical is due primarily to its ability to interrupt the propagation
of flame. It also acts as a shield from heat radiation. Its electrical resistivity is high,
and it is nontoxic. This agent may be used for extinguishing fires involving flam-
mable liquids, gases and electrical equipment. It is not effective in extinguishing
deep-seated fires in ordinary combustibles.
Potassium bicarbonate chemical. Potassium bicarbonate chemical is more effec-
tive than sodium bicarbonate and monoammonium phosphate chemicals for extin-

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guishing fires involving flammable liquids and gases. Its physical properties are
similar to those of sodium bicarbonate chemical. Potassium bicarbonate, commonly
known as Purple K, is recommended for new major oil handling facilities. It is also
suitable for use on fires involving electrical equipment. This agent is not effective
in extinguishing deep-seated fires in ordinary combustibles.
Multipurpose dry chemical. Multipurpose dry chemical (principally monoammo-
nium phosphate) is effective in controlling and extinguishing fires involving flam-
mable liquids and gases, ordinary combustible materials, and electrical equipment.
It is recommended where piped water is not available, where freezing conditions
are expected, or where a combination of different classes of hazards exists. It has
physical properties similar to the sodium bicarbonate chemical and is more effec-
tive on flammable liquid fires. However, this type of extinguisher is corrosive to
electronic circuitry.
Warning: Do not mix multipurpose dry chemical with either sodium bicarbonate,
potassium bicarbonate or urea-potassium bicarbonate dry chemical. A chemical
reaction can occur that generates CO2 and other gases, causing a pressure buildup
that could rupture the extinguisher.
Potassium chloride chemical. Potassium chloride chemical is seldom used. It has
about half the effectiveness of potassium bicarbonate chemical in extinguishing
fires involving flammable liquids or gases. Potassium chloride chemical is not
recommended for use where it could contact major equipment made of materials
subject to chloride stress corrosion cracking, such as stainless steels.
Urea-potassium bicarbonate chemical. Urea-potassium bicarbonate chemical was
developed in the late 1960's and was first listed by Underwriters' Laboratories in
1972. Its increased effectiveness compared to potassium bicarbonate is due to its
decrepitation when heated by the flame of a fire. It becomes a mass of much
smaller particles, which increases its extinguishing effectiveness. The additional
cost, however, is not normally justified. Only a few manufacturers are currently
marketing an approved fire extinguisher using this chemical.
Dry chemical extinguisher types. Dry chemical extinguishers are manufactured in
two types:
Cartridge-operated. Cartridge-operated dry chemical extinguishers have a replace-
able cartridge of compressed carbon dioxide (CO2), usually located outside the
chemical container (see Figure 1600-21). Nitrogen cartridges are available for low
temperature use. To operate the extinguisher, a valve or puncture mechanism
releases the gas in the small cylinder into the larger container. The flow of chemical
is controlled by another valve, usually located at the end of the discharge hose.
Stored-pressure. The stored-pressure (rechargeable) type is similar to the cartridge
type, except that the chemical container is under full pressure all the time. Nitrogen
or dry air is usually used as the pressuring medium. A gage on the unit indicates the
pressure in the chemical container. A lever or trigger operates the single valve that
controls the flow of chemical. Stored-pressure types with disposable shells are avail-
able in the smaller sizes. They are manufactured with and without gages and
operate like the rechargeable types.

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Fig. 1600-21 Cartridge-Operated Dry Chemical Extinguisher Courtesy of Ansul Fire Protection

Applications of dry chemical extinguishers. Cartridge-operated extinguishers

with mild steel shells are recommended for protection of oil handling facilities
except as noted below. Low temperature (nitrogen) cartridges should be used when
ambient temperatures at extinguisher locations drop below 10°F for extended
periods.
Applications where the stored-pressure (rechargeable) extinguishers can be consid-
ered as acceptable substitutes for cartridge-operated extinguishers are:
• Protection of low risk occupancies (e.g., garages).
• Locations not subject to vibration or humidity. These conditions may cause dry
chemical packing, making the extinguisher unreliable.
• Installation where refilled cartridges are difficult to obtain.
• Installation where only one or two small extinguishers are needed (e.g., service
stations). The disposable-shell type is also suitable for this application.
• Installation where appearance is particularly important (e.g., public assembly).

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Use of dry chemical extinguishers. Dry chemical extinguishers are designed to be

carried to the fire. Details of operation vary, depending on whether the unit is the
cartridge type or the stored-pressure type.
Most models of both types of extinguishers have a locking pin or seal to prevent
accidental discharge, which must be removed or released before the unit can be
operated. Both types of dry chemical extinguishers are made in a variety of sizes
containing from 2 to 30 pounds of chemical. The larger sizes have a range of 20 to
25 feet and discharge for about 20 seconds under normal conditions, but the flow of
chemical can be controlled by opening and closing the valve. The flow should never
be throttled by partially opening the valve.

1656 Halogenated Agent Extinguishers (Halon)

The manufacture of Halon was eliminated as of January 1, 1994, due to its adverse
effect on the earth's ozone layer. Use of this agent should be carefully considered
and should be restricted to only those applications where other agents would not be
suitable, such as critical electronic facilities. See Section 1663.

1657 Wheeled Units

In addition to small size extinguishers that are carried by one person, extinguisher
units are available in larger sizes, mounted on two-wheeled carts (see
Figure 1600-22). These larger units have 10 to 20 times the capacity of hand extin-
guishers. They are intended for use on fires beyond the capacity of hand units or
where larger fire control capacity must be handled by fewer people.
Wheeled dry chemical extinguishers with 50 feet of hose should be located on
accessible concrete pads. Primary coverage is for pump groups and fired process
heaters in flammable or combustible liquid service. Each process unit should have
at least one wheeled dry chemical extinguisher. More than one may be warranted
where obstructions could cause difficulties in moving the extinguisher. In some
areas, 350-pound units may be justified.
Also available are special purpose wheeled extinguishers with 33 gallons of
aqueous film forming foam (AFFF). These may be useful where a limited foam
extinguishing capability is needed, such as at remote locations where piped water is
not available and an unusual risk of spill fire exists.

1660 Fixed Fire Detection, Control and Extinguishing Systems

1661 Fixed Water Spray Systems

Refer to NFPA 15, “Water Spray Fixed Systems,” for additional information.
Water in spray form is more effective than straight streams, especially on burning
surfaces and on surfaces to be cooled.

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Fig. 1600-22 Wheeled Fire Extinguisher Units Courtesy of Ansul Fire Protection

In most places, water spray streams can be applied with hand-directed nozzles on
hoses or monitors after a fire starts. However, fixed sprays are justified in some
facilities. Conditions that may justify fixed sprays include:
• Process vessels containing 2500 gallons or more of flammable liquid under
pressure, and where monitor streams cannot reach all exposed surfaces above
the normal liquid level

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• Mechanical equipment containing liquids above their auto-ignition temperature

or that are volatile and located under other high-value equipment
• Where pumps are handling hydrocarbons above 600°F or above their auto-igni-
tion temperature
• Where high-value, long-delivery, critical pumps are located under other high-
value equipment, such as air coolers
• Critical surfaces such as valves, manifolds, headers, etc., where large volumes
of high temperature hydrocarbons are processed and where effective cooling is
required
• Where critical equipment is located on offshore production platforms, such as
wellhead production and compression equipment areas
• Where critical equipment resides in unattended facilities or where firefighting
personnel may not be immediately available
• Where sprays are used as an alternative to fireproofing for structural members
or critical instrument cables
Water spray systems should be tested at least quarterly to verify that the system is
working properly, that nozzles are not plugged, and that coverage is adequate. See
Section 1686.

Fixed Water Spray Requirements

The possible variables encountered during fires with flammable liquids or gases in
petroleum handling facilities make precise calculations difficult. Volume, pressure,
and temperature of the materials being handled—as well as the structural configura-
tion involved and weather conditions—are all factors that influence water applica-
tion rates. Other factors to consider include available water supply, drainage
capacity, and dispersion of flammable or possibly toxic materials.
The following sections give recommendations for minimum water application rates
(densities) for fixed water spray systems.

Spray Systems for Pumps

Pumps and other devices that handle flammable liquids or gases should have the
shafts, packing glands, connections, and other critical parts enveloped in directed
water spray at a density of not less than 0.5 gpm per square foot of area covered
(see Figure 1600-23). For a given nozzle the “area covered” equals the area of the
nozzle's circle of coverage at the pump centerline. This assumes a horizontal
circular pattern of spray coverage at pump centerline.
Interference from piping may require that one or more spray nozzles be located
higher or lower than the normal 4 or 5 feet above pump centerline. Narrow-angle
nozzles have a long reach. Wide-angle nozzles have a short reach and wide
coverage.

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Fig. 1600-23 Spray System for Pumps

Lateral lines coming off the top of the header minimize most nozzle plugging prob-
lems. Other recommended features are main lines sloped to drain and a flush valve
at the end of each main line.

Spray Systems for Vertical Vessels

Water should be applied to vessels at a rate of not less than 0.25 gpm per square
foot of exposed uninsulated surface. To ensure adequate coverage, the horizontal
distance between nozzles must be close enough to permit meeting of spray patterns.
The vertical distance between nozzles may be as much as 12 feet, provided
rundown is expected. Nozzles should be no more than 4 to 6 feet from the vessel.

Spray Systems for Spheres or Vessels

Water sprays on spheres or horizontal cylindrical vessels should be capable of
discharging 0.25 gpm per square foot of surface area of the upper half of the vessel.

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The main components of spray systems for horizontal vessels are shown in
Figure 1600-24. Lateral lines coming off the top of the header eliminate most
nozzle plugging problems. Lines sloped to drain and a flush valve are also desirable
design features.

Fig. 1600-24 Water Spray System for Horizontal Drums

Surfaces of the lower half are not always wetted by water rundown from above;
additional coverage may be required by hand-held hoses or monitors if the vessel is
likely to be less than half full of liquid. Grading and drainage out from under
vessels are important factors to minimize heat input to the lower vessel surface.
Water sprays are not effective in providing cooling for high-velocity, jet-impinging
fires. The velocity of jetting gases blows the water spray droplets away from the
vessel shell. For LPG storage vessels, water monitors are required in addition to
sprays. Refer to API 2510A for additional information.

Deluge Systems for Spheres

Deluge systems, or high-capacity water spray systems, are preferred on LPG
storage spheres. A density coverage of 0.25 gpm per square foot of surface area
above the equator is recommended. For example, about 1600 gpm of fire water
would be required to adequately protect one 65-foot diameter sphere.
The main components of a water deluge system are shown in Figure 1600-25 and
are listed here:

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• An adequate water supply line to the top of the sphere, terminating in an open-
ended pipe that spills the water onto the top of the sphere.
• Weir box for even distribution of water over the top of the sphere, or two or
three water distributor rings spaced above 2 feet apart to further distribute flow
over the sphere surface. Provide drain holes to prevent retention of rain water.
• A valve and drain line in the water line located at least 50 feet from the sphere.
This is normally a quick-opening (quarter turn) manual valve, but could be
operated by a fire detector in unattended locations. This valve could be an
Inbal diaphragm valve (see Section 1636). The valve must be located away
from the drainage path from the sphere.

Fig. 1600-25 Deluge System for Spheres

Structures and Miscellaneous Equipment

Where projections such as manway flanges, pipe flanges, support brackets, or
vessel legs obstruct water spray coverage, (including rundown on vertical surfaces),
additional deflectors or nozzles may be needed to maintain the wetting pattern on
pressure-holding surfaces.

Nonmetallic Electrical Cable and Tubing Runs

Open cable trays/conduit banks (unfireproofed) may be protected by fixed sprays
when there is potential for fire exposure, such as above hot-oil pumps or near
furnaces. The preferred protection is to route critical control and power wiring
away from fire risk areas. Where routing outside a fire risk area is not feasible, use

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properly installed sprays instead. An application rate of .30 gpm per square foot of
projected area is recommended.

System Components
Components of a fixed water spray installation should be standardized to provide an
interchangeable system. Systems may be operated automatically or manually,
depending on the anticipated degree of hazard.
Equipment exposed to corrosive atmospheres should be constructed of corrosion-
resistant materials or covered with protective coatings to minimize corrosion.
Pipe, tubing, and fittings should be designed to withstand a working pressure of not
less than 175 psi. Include a strainer and full-flow bypass in the system.

Nozzle Selection
Nozzles producing a solid cone spray pattern are effective for most fire control and
surface cooling applications. However, flat spray or other patterns may be more suit-
able for certain applications.
Select a nozzle with an angle of discharge and capacity at the pressure available
that gives the needed density on the surface, considering the distance to the nozzle
mounting location.
Spray nozzles are manufactured in a variety of configurations. Take care to ensure
proper application of the nozzle type. Distance of “throw” or location of the nozzle
from the surface is limited by the nozzle discharge characteristics.
Select nozzles that are not easily obstructed by debris, sediment, sand, rust deposits,
etc., in the water. The nozzle orifice size should be at least 3/8 inch. Use the largest
practical nozzle size. Installing a few large nozzles is preferable to installing a
greater number of smaller nozzles. Nozzles with no internal parts are less likely to
plug. Include approved strainers with full capacity bypass and flushout connections
where debris may cause plugging problems. See the manufacturer list at the end of
this section.
Stainless steel nozzles are recommended. However, brass and other materials are
available.

Water Supplies
The type of water used is important. Fresh water has the advantage of less plugging
and corrosion than salt water. If salt water is used, a fresh water flush is recom-
mended.
The water supply flow rate and pressure should be able to maintain water discharge
at the design rate and duration for all systems designed to operate simultaneously.
Allow for the flow rate of hose streams and other fire protection water requirements
when determining the maximum water demand for fixed sprays.
Manual control valves or remote actuation point should be located at least 50 feet
from the hazard and identified to ensure accessibility during an emergency. When

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system actuation is automatic, provide manual overrides. Consider using an Inbal

diaphragm valve, described in Section 1636, to actuate fixed water spray systems.
The water supply should be from reliable sources, such as Company hydrant
systems, connections to city water systems, fire pumps, or fire department connec-
tions for mobile pumpers. The total water supply necessary for these installations
will vary considerably. See Figure 1600-1.

Size of System
Protect separate fire areas with separate spray systems. Keep single systems as
small as is feasible.

Separation of Fire Areas

Typical fire areas are:
• Operating sections that can be shut down independently of other sections
• Offshore platform modules
• Process sections such as distillation, exchanger banks, manifolds, or reactor
sections
• Natural fire breaks (such as pipeways)
Refer to Section 1300 for more information.

Drainage
It is important to make provisions for drainage of water or foam solution that is
likely to be discharged into an a fire area. Drainage capacity should allow for the
expected amount of spilled oil. See Section 1400 and the Civil and Structural
Manual, Section 500, for more detail on this subject.
Automatic Sprinkler Systems. In manned process facilities, sprinkler systems are
generally not automatic. However, in offices, laboratories, and warehouses, auto-
matic heat-actuated systems are commonly used. Sprinkler system design should
follow NFPA 13.
Multi-story living quarters on offshore facilities should be sprinklered. Such
systems are normally fresh water packed with provision for salt water makeup if the
system is activated.
The need for actuation of systems to transmit an alarm to a fire station is based on
local code requirements and whether the facility is manned continuously. The more
usual method is to notify the local fire department by phone.

1662 Fixed Foam Systems

Fixed foam equipment is seldom recommended for use in the Company except on
large floating roof hydrocarbon storage tanks (over 120 feet in diameter), as
covered in the Tank Manual, and for special situations such as manifold pits or
onboard tank vessels. NFPA 11, “Low Expansion Foam and Combined Agent

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Systems,” provides further information on this subject. A discussion on foam as an

extinguishing agent is included in this section of the manual.

1663 Fixed Halon Systems

Halons are vaporizing liquids that chemically inhibit combustion by interrupting
flame propagation similarly to dry chemical. The two most widely used Halons are
Halon 1301 and Halon 1211. Their installation and use is discussed in NFPA 12A
and 12B, respectively.
Based on the discovery that Halon can harm ozone in the atmosphere, as of January
1, 1994, Halon can no longer be legally produced in this or any other developed
country. No new Halon systems should be installed.

Halon Alternatives
Some Halon substitutes have received EPA approval as part of the Significant New
Alternatives Program (SNAP) and are listed in Figure 1600-26. These products
require significant redesign of existing fixed suppression equipment. Approved
substitutes require storing and dispensing from 1.7 to 10 times the volume of Halon
1301. A substance that allows simple exchange of gas in existing storage cylinders
does not exist. This list is changing, and information is quickly obsolete. Contact
the CRTC Fire & Process Safety Team for the latest information on acceptable
Halon alternatives. The National Fire Protection Association will also provide guid-
ance in NFPA 2001. Note that we require UL and FM approval of specific applica-
tions for all substitute extinguishing systems.
One brand of Halon substitute, Inergen™, is a mixture of inert gases, nitrogen,
argon, and carbon dioxide. Releasing large volumes of Inergen reduces oxygen in
air, which extinguishes the fire. However, carbon dioxide is maintained at an
optimum lower level that stimulates, rather than depresses, breathing in humans and
other animals. Therefore, it is not necessary to evacuate people from the area prior
to release, as required with CO2 extinguishing systems. Inergen systems should be
designed by experts familiar with calculating the correct volume of release. Other
EPA-approved replacement gases are true suppressants like Halon, but require
higher concentrations in air than Halon.
The substitutes for Halon in Figure 1600-26 do not cause ozone depletion (ODP =
0), but substitutes can have other potential effects on the atmosphere. These effects
are related to the length of time they require to break down in the atmosphere. Prod-
ucts with longer atmospheric life could contribute to global warming and may be
regulated in the future. Low global warming-potential products are preferred.

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Fig. 1600-26 Halon Substitutes

EPA-Approved Halon Replacement Gases
Agent FM-200 Inergen Carbon Dioxide FE-13 PFC-410

Chemical Name Heptafluorpropane 52% Nitrogen, 40% Carbon Dioxide CO2 Trifluoromethane CHF3 Perfluorobutane C4F10
CF3CHFCF3 Argon, 8% Carbon
Dioxide

Manufacturer Great Lakes Chemical Ansul Fire Protection Many E. I. DuPont Co. 3M Fire Protection
(317) 497-6206 (916) 676-3344 (302) 992-2177 (612) 736-6055

Atmospheric Life 31 to 42 Years Not Applicable Not Applicable 235 Years 500-10,000 Years
Global Warming Low None None High Likely to be
Potential High

Allowed 10 Seconds to 95% 60 Seconds to Design 60 Seconds to Design 10 Seconds to 95% 10 Seconds to 95%
Discharge Time Discharge Concentration Concentration Discharge Discharge

Design Concentration 7% 34% to 50% 34 to 75% 14% 6% - 8%

Halon: 5%

Storage Space 1 Square Foot 9 Square Feet 6 Square Feet 2 Square Feet Unknown
Required One Cylinder Nine Cylinders Six Cylinders Two Cylinders

Advantages • Lowest volume • Consists of • Consists of • Lowest cost true • Lowest storage
and pressure naturally naturally fire suppressant pressure.
replacement. occurring gases. occurring gases. replacement gas
• Lowest cost to • Can be substi- • Cheapest available.
convert from tuted for carbon replacement
Halon. dioxide with gases.
• Low global greater margin of
warming potential. safety.

• Greater number • Only commercial

of distributors and formula that does
hardware not release high
vendors. concentrate of HF
breakdown
products.

Disadvantages • Most expensive • Requires very • Must have safe- • Requires high • Allowed by EPA
for gas replace- high storage guards to prevent storage pressure. only when others
ment, so acci- pressure. suffocation. • Hardware cost proved not to
dental trips and • Hardware cost • Extra hardware higher than for work due to
test runs more higher. for time delays, other suppressant global warming
expensive. etc. makes it the gas. potential.
• Not a true fire
suppressant gas. highest priced • May be restricted
alternative to conditional use
• Requires most
initially. by EPA.
storage space.

Existing Fixed Halon Systems

Removal of existing Halon systems is not required. Maintaining an existing system
could be expensive, however, especially if false alarms and unnecessary releases
occur. If a supplier can be found, lost Halon can be replaced, but replacement is
costly. Existing Halon extinguishing systems should be evaluated to determine if
they can be eliminated without significant increased risk of fire loss. The Halon can
then be stockpiled for critical uses. In occupied areas that are manned 24 hours per
day by personnel trained in incipient stage firefighting, a fixed system may not be
necessary. Devices used to trigger the release of Halon can easily be converted to
manual audible alarms and control board alarms.

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Most Halon releases to the atmosphere are caused by false alarms. Consider
converting retained Halon systems to manual discharge to minimize the potential
for inadvertent releases. As with all electronics, instrumentation systems for fire
protection have improved greatly in the past few years, and this is a good time to
review and possibly upgrade them.

1664 Fixed Dry Chemical Systems

Fixed dry chemical systems may be installed to protect an area of unusual hazard
where the powder would not cause additional damage or where other media would
be substantially less effective. Systems can be installed either inside or outside and
should be designed in accordance with NFPA 17, “Dry Chemical Extinguishing
Systems.” Consider the effects of wind for outdoor systems. A disadvantage of
fixed dry chemical systems is that they must achieve extinguishment with one
discharge, or the fire will continue unabated. Consultation with the CRTC Fire &
Process Safety team is recommended before proceeding with the design for these
systems.

1665 Fixed Carbon Dioxide Systems

Carbon dioxide (CO2) extinguishes almost entirely by smothering, although it does
have a negligible cooling effect of about 100 BTU per pound. Liquid carbon
dioxide is stored under pressure in steel cylinders. When the valve on the cylinder
opens, the rapid expansion of the liquid into gas produces a refrigerating effect,
which solidifies part of the carbon dioxide to a “snow.” This “snow” soon sublimes
into gas, absorbing heat from the burning material or surrounding atmosphere. The
gas extinguishes fire by reducing the oxygen content of surrounding air below the
flammable limit of the fuel.
Unless this concentration of gas is maintained for an extended period, carbon
dioxide does not normally extinguish fires in materials that smolder or produce
glowing embers, such as paper and wood. Its greatest effectiveness is on flammable
liquid fires that do not involve material that might cause a reflash after the CO2 has
dissipated. It is especially suitable for laboratories. It also has wide application in
the protection of delicate electrical and electronic equipment, where cleanup after
extinguishment is an important consideration.
Carbon dioxide is clean and leaves no residue to damage the equipment. It extin-
guishes by reducing (diluting) the oxygen in air to a level that does not sustain
combustion.
☞ Warning CO2 will not sustain life. It cannot be used safely in closed manned facil-
ities unless warning alarms are sounded and personnel are either evacuated before
the CO2 is released or use self-contained breathing apparatus.
Carbon dioxide systems should be designed in accordance with NFPA 12, “Carbon
Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.” Consult the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team
before designing any new fixed CO2 systems in the Company.

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1666 Steam
Steam should not be considered a fire control agent. Unlike water sprays, steam is
not effective in cooling or protecting fire-exposed equipment to prevent further
damage. However, because of its availability in most process plants, it provides an
economical way to prevent some types of small fires. It is especially useful in
preventing ignition of leaks in hot equipment such as furnace header boxes, where
the leak is not serious but can be stopped only with a shutdown. It is also effective
in preventing ignition of flange leaks by reducing the amount of air available at the
leak and by dispersing and diluting the leaking material.
When used to prevent ignition, steam can be applied continuously to small leaks for
extended periods without damage to the equipment or objectional residue. Steam
can be applied at known troublesome leak points, such as a heat exchanger flange.
A ring of pipe (with small holes) can be temporarily installed to create a ring of
steam around the flange and effectively prevent ignition of a leak until permanent
repairs can be accomplished. Steam is generally provided for controlling tube
rupture fires in process furnaces or heaters. A commonly accepted rate is 2 lb/hr/ft3
of firebox volume. Refer to the Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual.
Hand-held, unbonded steam lances not in contact with piping have ignited leaks
when static electricity accumulated on the lance and subsequently discharged.

1667 Fire Detection Systems

Fire or smoke detection systems are desirable in installations where a fire might go
undetected for considerable time, or in gas, oil or petrochemical facilities with
significant public exposure or potential environmental impact. In some areas, detec-
tion systems may be required by the authority having jurisdiction (e.g., local fire
department). Consider fire detection systems in places such as unattended critical
producing facilities, driver-operated truck-loading facilities, high-value computer
facilities, storage areas for vital records, and facilities where personnel sleep adja-
cent to operating facilities. Fire detection devices may be actuated by fixed tempera-
ture or rate of temperature rise, by smoke or ionized particles in the air, or by the
radiation emitted by flames.
When selecting a detector for a specific application, consider the location of prob-
able fire, whether immediate flame or smoldering is likely, and the precision with
which the location of a fire could be pinpointed. Detectors can be made to sound an
alarm locally or at a remote location, shut down and depressurize equipment (e.g.,
pumps and compressors), close valves, shut down ventilating systems, discharge
extinguishing agent or perform other operations.
All fire detection and alarm systems except those detectors having parts that
destruct on exposure (as by melting), should be tested periodically by causing them
to actuate. Develop a suitable test program for each unit to assure that detectors,
alarms, and other intended functions will operate should a fire occur. Test detectors
at least every six months or more often depending on the location and the environ-
ment to which the device is exposed. Maintain test records and correct any deficien-
cies immediately.

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Following are descriptions of the most common types of fire detection equipment.
See Figure 1600-27 for comparisons of various detectors. Additional guidance can
be found in Sections 2100 and 2200 for computer room applications.

Fig. 1600-27 Fire Detectors

Type Advantages Disadvantages Applications
Fusible Link Needs no electricity Very slow Outdoors/indoors
Highly reliable Heat must impinge Equipment isolation and
Low unit cost shut down
Suppression system
Fixed Temperature Reliable and simple Slow Indoors/enclosed areas
Heat Detectors Effective indoors Affected by wind
Low unit cost
Rate of Rise Self-adjusting to temperature Actuated by convected heat Indoors/enclosed areas
Heat Variations of day/night and Heat must impinge
Detectors summer/winter Affected by wind
Can detect rapidly growing
fire more quickly
Low unit cost
Smoke Ionization Early warning Easily contaminated limited Indoors, offices, computer
Smoldering fires environment rooms, electrical rooms
Low unit cost Affected by weather
Smoke Photoelectric Early warning of smoldering Smoke must be contained Indoors, offices
fire Limited to indoor use Ordinary combustible fires
Low unit cost only
Infrared (IR) High speed Affected by temperature Indoors/enclosed areas
Moderate sensitivity Subject to false alarms due
Manual self-test through the to myriad of IR sources in
window industrial environment
Moderate unit cost No automatic self-test
Ultraviolet (UV) Highest speed Subject to false alarms from Outdoors/indoors
Highest sensitivity few identifiable source
Automatic self-test Blinded by thick smoke
Moderate unit cost
Dual Detector Moderate speed Limited operating Outdoors/indoors
IR & IR Moderate sensitivity temperature range
Low false alarm rate Limited self testing
High unit cost
Dual Detector High speed Thick smoke reduces range Outdoors/indoors
IR & UV High sensitivity High unit cost Critical equipment
Low false alarm rate shutdown, isolation
Wide temperature range Suppression system
Automatic self-test

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Flame Detectors
Ultraviolet (UV) and infrared (IR) flame detectors react to radiation emitted from
the flame. They must be located so the detector can “see” the flame directly. Detec-
tors must be shielded from external sources of ultraviolet or infrared radiation such
as welding arcs, lightning, or radiating black bodies (e.g., hot engines, manifolds,
and hot vessels) to minimize false alarms. Their field of vision usually covers a
larger area than heat detectors, but they do not detect a smoldering fire as quickly as
some smoke detectors. Flame detectors are not affected by air flow characteristics
and do not depend on the heat of combustion or the amount of smoke liberated.
Flame detectors are suitable for inside or outside use. Where false alarm sources
cannot be avoided and false alarms must be minimized, consider using combination
UV/IR detectors.

Heat Detectors
Heat detecting devices fall into two categories—those that respond when the detec-
tion element reaches a predetermined temperature (fixed-temperature types) and
those that respond to an increase in temperature at a rate greater than some predeter-
mined value (rate-of-rise types). Preferred types combine both the fixed-tempera-
ture and rate-of-rise principles. Heat detecting devices can also be categorized as
the spot-pattern type, in which the thermally sensitive element is a compact unit
covering a small area, or the line-pattern type, in which the element is a continuous
wire or heat-sensitive tube.

Fusible Links
Fusible links are made of low melting point materials designed to vent pneumatic
systems as the fire melts the link. Fusible fittings that fit standard tubing systems
are available as well. These fittings are filled with a low melting point material.
Fusible links should not be covered or painted. See the manufacturer list at the end
of this Section.

Smoke Detectors
Photoelectric detection of smoke has been employed for many years, particularly
where the type of fire anticipated generates a substantial amount of smoke before
temperature changes are sufficient to actuate a heat detection system. Three forms
of photoelectric detectors are in common use: the spot-type detector, the line-type
detector, and the sampling detector. Each type measures the change in current
resulting from partial obscuring by smoke of a photoelectric beam between a
receiving element and a light source. An alarm is tripped when this obscuration
reaches a critical value.
The refraction type operates on the principle of reflection of a light source into a
photoconductive cell by means of smoke particles. A small chamber, open to the
atmosphere, contains a light source and a photoconductive cell. These are arranged
so that the beam of light from the light source does not impinge upon the photocon-
ductive cell. When a sufficient quantity of smoke particles enters the chamber, the
smoke particles reflect light into the photoconductive cell. This changes the resis-
tance of the cell, and a signal is obtained.

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The ionization type of fire detector consists of an assembly of ionization chambers,

an electronic tube, and related parts. When product-of-combustion particles, which
are larger than air molecules and may be invisible, enter one of the ionization cham-
bers, they absorb or interfere with the alpha radiation produced by a radioactive
source. This interference with the normal ionization process in the detector is
employed to produce a signal.

1668 Combustible Gas Detector Systems

Fixed combustible gas detectors sample the atmosphere continuously or periodi-
cally and give warnings if preset levels of combustible gas or vapor are present. The
alarm signal may be located away from the sampling point, and usually is actuated
at a concentration of 20% of the lower flammable limit.
Combustible gas detectors also can be used to shut down equipment or to actuate an
alarm at a preset concentration, such as 20% (or 0.2 on a 0-1 scale) of the lower
flammable limit for alarm and 60% of the lower flammable limit for shutting down
equipment. Alarm and shutdown settings should be separated by 40% to minimize
occurrence of false trips. Interposing relays can be connected to start or stop venti-
lating fans or release inert gas. Some detection systems have a sensing element at
each sample location, and others draw a sample through tubing to a central sensing
point.
Most fixed and portable combustible gas detectors operate on the principle that a
rise in temperature of a wire causes a corresponding increase in its electrical resis-
tance. These instruments usually employ a heated platinum wire filament,
frequently coated with a catalyst, that causes combustion of the gas or vapor
sample. The heat from the combustion is directly proportional to the concentration
of gas or vapor present in the sampling chamber. The heat raises the temperature of
the filament, and at the same time increases its electrical resistance. The filament is
one arm of a Wheatstone bridge, which provides a means for measuring change in
resistance. The change is indicated by an electrical meter.
Most systems are calibrated to give reasonably accurate readings for common
hydrocarbons, but they can be calibrated more accurately for a specific gas or
vapor. Because of varying characteristics, instruments should be used only for the
type of service recommended by the manufacturer. Be sure to follow the manufac-
turer's instructions. Periodic checking of the instrument ensures reliable operation.
For sample draw-type instruments, minor variations in the flow of samples aspi-
rated to the detecting unit do not materially affect the operation of these instru-
ments, but clogging of sample lines, flame arrestors, and filters makes them
inoperative. Take care to regularly inspect them and keep them free from obstruc-
tions.
Fixed combustible gas detectors are recommended only for locations that are
partially or wholly unattended, locations where the consequences of an undetected
leak may be serious, and locations where required by the authority having jurisdic-
tion. Typical applications for combustible gas detectors include:

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• Air intakes for building pressurization systems and gas turbines. These detec-
tors should alarm at 20% lower flammable limit (LFL) and shut down the air
intake at 60% LFL.
• Cooling towers to monitor for process exchanger leaks. (Other methods can be
used also.)
• Pumps and compressor areas, particularly when enclosed.
It is desirable for gas detection systems to operate on DC power supplies. Systems
operated on AC power supplies should be equipped with automatic switchover
devices to ensure continuous system energization. Otherwise, systems installed in a
fail-safe manner will generate unwarranted alarms or shutdowns.

Inspection and Testing

Routine inspection and testing of combustible gas detection systems is recom-
mended and should be included in the normal maintenance program. Remove and
clean diffusion sensor head flame arrestors periodically per the manufacturer's
instructions. Most recommend air or soap and water because trapped vapors can
affect operation. Also, many solvents contain chemicals (e.g., silicon) that may
poison detector elements. Check and adjust alarm set points and instrument calibra-
tion routinely. Check the manufacturer's recommendations for specific maintenance
and testing requirements.

1669 Explosion Suppression

Suppression of explosions is possible under certain conditions, because a short but
significant period of time elapses before destructive pressures develop. If conditions
are right, it is possible to use the time available to operate a suppression system.
Effective use of the rate of pressure rise to suppress an explosion requires three
major considerations in the design of suppression systems:
1. The explosion must be detected in its incipient stage to allow time for opera-
tion of the suppression equipment. Due to the relatively short time available,
detection and suppression must be automatic, with provisions to discriminate
between an explosion and ambient variables that normally exist.
2. The mechanism for dispersing the extinguishing agent must operate at
extremely high speed to fill the enclosure completely within milliseconds after
detection of the explosion. The detection must automatically actuate to assure
no time lag. The extinguishing agent must be dispersed in a very fine mist form
at rapid speed, normally through the use of an explosive release mechanism.
3. The extinguishing agent is normally a liquid compatible with the combustion
process to be encountered. Factors involved in the suppression mechanism are
the same as those for fire extinguishing—cooling, inerting, blanketing, and
combustion inhibiting.
Explosion suppression systems are not in general use in the petroleum industry, but
they may be considered for the protection of high-hazard, high-value operations

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where an explosion would have very serious consequences and normal methods of
fire protection are not adequate. Explosion suppression systems are more
commonly encountered in dust handling processes (Gilsonite, coal, or grain). NFPA
69, “Explosion Prevention Systems,” provides further information on this subject.

1670 Other Firefighting Equipment

1671 Mobile Fire Fighting Equipment

Fire Trucks. Facilities with a well designed fire water system maintained at 125 to
150 psig may not need a pumper truck. Only in special cases are pumpers needed,
such as to supply high rates of proportioned foam, to boost water pressure when
necessary or to control pressure to hand-held fire hose lines. Foam proportioning
units are used with semifixed foam systems for fighting tank fires and to supply
hand lines for fighting fires in process areas, pump manifolds, pipe trenches, tank
truck loading racks (TTLRs), or other locations where spills and fire may occur. A
fire water pumper may be required for facilities with only low pressure fire water
systems. Also, large gallonage monitors (sizes 1000 to 2000 gpm), which are
specialized pieces of equipment used only in infrequent situations, may need a
pumper to provide the required monitor pressure. For example, a 1500 gpm pumper
can supply a 2000 gpm monitor.
Fire trucks should have the following features:
• Pumper capacity of 1000 to 1200 gpm. Larger units require special justifica-
tion due to a special chassis and nonstandard cab.
• 1000-gallon foam concentrate tank.
• Automatic foam proportioning system for foam proportioning. Refer to NFPA
1901 for guidance in selecting and specifying a fire truck, or discuss with a
member of the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team.
Foam Trailers. A foam trailer with a 500-gpm monitor and 300 gallons of foam
concentrate can deliver foam for 20 minutes. Large trailers can store more concen-
trate and deliver foam to a fire for a longer time. A foam concentrate trailer with
proportioning capability, hoses, nozzles, etc., may be a suitable alternative to a
foam pumper fire truck.
Twin agent units. These consist of pressurized AFFF (foam) and dry chemical
units mounted on a skid unit in a small truck. Twin agent units are effective in quick
fire control. This system can be operated by one person. Skid units are preferred
because they can be easily moved when replacement trucks are purchased.
A generic pumper truck specification is available from the CRTC Fire and Process
Safety Team.

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1672 Fire Station (Plant Protection Office)

The fire station (or plant protection office) serves several functions and is a focal
point for large-facility fire fighting organizations. The station is the communica-
tions base to which fires are reported. The fire station needs to have an enclosed
area for storing the fire truck, foam truck, and trailer-mounted pumper as well as
hoses, nozzles, gear for the firefighter (boots, bunker coats, hats, gloves, self-
contained breathing apparatus units) and other equipment needed in emergencies.
Normally, this equipment is mounted on mobile fire fighting apparatus that can be
driven to the fire site.
The station may also contain facilities for repairing hoses and nozzles and for
refilling extinguishers and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) units. The
station should be as centrally located as practical, but safely away from the plant so
that it will not be inaccessible, damaged, or involved in fires or explosions. See
Figure 1300-2 in Section 1300 for spacing recommendations.

1673 Fire Equipment Cabinets

Fire equipment cabinets may be justified at strategic locations around a facility.
Typical cabinet contents include:
• Two 50-foot lengths of 2 1/2-inch hose
• Four 50-foot lengths of 1 1/2-inch hose
• One 2 1/2-inch combination nozzle
• Two 1 1/2-inch combination nozzles
• Two to four 5-gallon containers of foam concentrate
• One educting-type 1 1/2-inch foam nozzle
• Two 30-pound dry chemical extinguishers
• One 2 1/2-inch by 1 1/2-inch gated wye
• Two hose wrenches

1674 Personnel Protective Equipment

The purpose of this section is to assist operating facilities in developing local work
clothing programs. Following are criteria to assist in defining levels of risk of expo-
sure to flash fire commensurate with existing operating areas. This section should
be the basis for designating appropriate fire resistant (FR) clothing for regularly
assigned operating and maintenance personnel. Guidance on the use of fire resistant
clothing should also be developed to cover other personnel. Local management is
responsible to evaluate needs for and justifying fire resistant clothing. Refer to
recommendations in Figure 1600-28 as a guide.

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Fig. 1600-28 Recommendations for Use of Fire Resistant Clothes

Recommendation Area
Use of fire resistant clothing is encouraged Refinery and chemical processing
Offshore production platforms with compression, fired
equipment and power generation
Gas processing and compression
Major pump/pipeline stations
LPG handling and storage
Major tank storage areas
Major wharf handling flammables
Loading/unloading trucks and rail cars
Repair of hydrocarbon piping/equipment, on and off site
Well hot oil servicing
Evaluate need for fire resistant clothing(1),(2) Small, low pressure process areas
Laboratories handling flammables
Pilot plants
Smaller tank storage areas
Drilling and production well site operations
Offshore platforms with separation
Marketing terminals (except truck loading)
Small docks and piers
Fire resistant clothing is considered unnecessary(2) General purpose/liquid warehouses
Offices, shops, and off-plot areas
Laboratories handling non-flammables
Vapor-free equipment
(1) Work areas should be evaluated to determine need for fire resistant clothing, based on operating conditions and history of
accidental releases and fires.
(2) Regular work clothes will generally suffice for these areas. Unique circumstances should be evaluated.

General
Hard hats and gloves are normally a part of each firefighter's personal equipment.
Anyone who may be called on to help fight fires is urged to bring these items when
responding to a fire alarm. Arrangements should also be made to transport any
storehouse stock of these items to the scene of a large fire.

Fire Resistant Clothing

Recent incidents in the Company and in the industry have led us to review and
update our guidance on the use of fire resistant clothing. Guidance documents have
been developed to assist each operating company to develop local policies
regarding the use of fire resistant clothing by employees, contractors, and visitors,
and the use of firefighters' turnout clothing.
Exposure to flash fires, when vapor-air mixtures ignite, cause burn injuries to
exposed skin. Skin covered by clothing is less likely to be burned in a flash fire than
is exposed skin. However, neither normal clothing nor fire resistant clothing totally
prevent burn injuries because they provide minimal insulating protection from the
heat of burning gases in a flash fire.

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Cotton or wool fabrics typically minimize the burn from a flash but are likely to
ignite and cause serious burn injuries. Synthetic fabrics, e.g., polyester or nylon,
provide less protection, and are also likely to ignite. Such materials also melt in a
flash fire and may adhere to the skin and further increase the severity of the burn
injury.
The benefit of fire resistant clothing is that it prevents further injury because it does
not melt or ignite in a flash fire. Fire resistant clothing is not required for incipient-
stage fire response.
In a review of certain fire resistant materials, differences were found in comfort,
moisture absorption, abrasion resistance, and resistance to damage during laun-
dering. Differences in properties are important in wearing comfort and durability.
To ensure maximum employee acceptance, take care in making selections from
products currently available. Current acceptable materials include Kermel, Kevlar,
and Nomex III.

Fire Retardant Cotton

Fire retardant cotton was reviewed and tested by one refinery. It was found to lose
much of its fire retardant property after several launderings.
Shrinkage problems were also experienced. Manufacturers claim that improved
material will not lose significant fire retardant properties after laundering. Test data
on this claim is conflicting. At prolonged fire exposures (>3.5 seconds), the fire
retardant cotton produces significant amounts of off-gases and hot vapors as a result
of the FR treating. These off-gases can create additional risk for the wearer. In addi-
tion, tests at one Company facility indicate that the lower initial cost of the FR
cotton garments does not compensate for the shorter life of the garment.

Turnout Clothing
Full firefighters' turnout clothing is recommenced for those fighting fires beyond
the incipient stage. An incipient stage fire is defined by OSHA as a “. ..fire which
is in the initial or beginning stage and which can be controlled or extinguished by
portable fire extinguishers, Class II standpipe (1-1/2" fire hose) or small hose
system without the need for protective clothing or breathing apparatus.”
Turnout clothing is mandatory for trained fire brigade members. Turnout clothing
includes helmet with face shield, coat, trousers, gloves, and insulated firefighters'
boots. Turnout clothing is also recommended for any personnel who enter the “hot
zone.” For example, an operator asked to assist the brigade in closing a valve
should have firefighters' turnout clothing. The “hot zone” is the area too close to the
fire for comfort because of radiant heat. No employee should be permitted to wear
turnout clothing and engage in firefighting unless they have received the training
required by OSHA 29 CFR 1910.156.

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OSHA 29 CFR 1910.156 (e)(2)(iii) states in part:

1. Body protection shall be coordinated with foot and leg protection to
ensure full body protection for the wearer. This shall be achieved by
one of the following methods:
a. Wearing of a fire-resistive coat meeting the requirements of para-
graph (e)(3)(ii) of this section in combination with fully extended
boots meeting the requirements of paragraphs (e)(2)(ii) and
(e)(2)(iii) of this section; or
b. Wearing of fire-resistive coat in combination with protective trou-
sers, both of which meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(3)(ii)
of this section.
2. The performance, construction, and testing of fire-resistive coats and
protective trousers shall be at least equivalent to the requirements of
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard NFPA No.
1971-1975, “Protective Clothing for Structural Fire Fighting.” (See
Appendix D to Subpart L) with the following permissible variations
from those requirements:
a. Tearing strength of the outer shell shall be a minimum of 8
pounds (35.6 N) inany direction when tested in accordance with
paragraph (2) of Appendix E; and
b. The outer shell may discolor but shall not separate or melt when
placed in a forced air laboratory oven at a temperature of 500°F
(260°C) for a period of five minutes. After cooling to ambient
temperature and using the test method specified in paragraph (3)
of Appendix E, char length shall not exceed 4.0 inches (10.2 cm)
and after-flame shall not exceed 2.0 seconds.
Turnout gear can be located on fire apparatus such as a fire truck or headquar-
ters/equipment truck. It can also be carried in a pickup truck or located in control
centers or field operations offices. Trained operations and maintenance personnel
can use turnout gear stored in control centers to enter a hot zone or spill area.
The OSHA regulation calls for yearly training for fire brigade members and quar-
terly training for such members expected to perform interior or confined space fire-
fighting. More comprehensive training is required for firefighting leaders.

Proximity Suits
Facilities that have a trained fire brigade may justify having two or three proximity
(heat-reflecting) suits available for rescue or for unusually difficult approaches,
such as for closing valves or similar fire control actions. Only persons with
adequate training and supervision should be permitted to wear these specially
designed suits. Use the suits only for those conditions approved by the manufac-
turer.

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Medical Equipment
First aid kits should be available so that small burns and scratches can be treated
promptly. Stretchers, body burn kits, blankets, and other items for first aid treatment
should be available at large fires. An emergency medical technician (EMT) should
be available during emergencies to treat serious injuries. Supervisors should under-
stand the procedure for obtaining an ambulance. This procedure should be prear-
ranged.

Handheld Combustible Gas Indicators

Flammable vapors may be released outside the fire area from broken lines,
unburned liquid, or other sources. A combustible gas indicator can help to detect
the extent and spread of such vapors to determine the hazard involved. Indicators
can also determine hazards from flammable liquids or gases that may remain after a
fire has been extinguished. Since this equipment is normally available in areas
where large quantities of flammable liquids are handled, it does not have to be
provided for fire use exclusively. Providing an indicator to the scene of a fire should
be included in prefire planning. Do not permit personnel to enter an area containing
a flammable vapor-air mixture.

Breathing Apparatus
Because firefighters must sometimes enter smoky areas, self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBAs) should be available. This equipment is normally available at
facilities for operational or emergency use. Plans for getting this equipment to the
scene of a fire should be a part of the prefire planning. SCBAs are required for inte-
rior fire fighting.

1675 Communication Facilities

Coordination of the numerous activities involved in controlling a large fire requires
a reliable means of communication. This is best accomplished with a dedicated
emergency radio channel that provides rapid communication.
Communications between the incident commander (see Section 400) and the divi-
sion or sector commanders in charge of the various phases of fire control can be
accomplished by messenger, portable two-way radio, or field telephone. Messen-
gers should always be available to maintain contact with people outside the reach of
other means of communication, but make full use of any telephone or radio equip-
ment available. You can also use automobiles that are radio-equipped for opera-
tional reasons. Many pieces of public fire equipment and most police cars are radio-
equipped. These facilities are frequently available for summoning additional equip-
ment from remote locations and for communication between units.

1676 Miscellaneous Equipment

Emergency Lighting Equipment
Normal lighting is frequently lost in a fire area. If firefighting occurs at night,
portable generators and floodlights are essential. Lighting the fire area is required,

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particularly in the latter phases of a fire when most of the flame has been extin-
guished but much salvage and cleanup work remains to be done. Adequate lighting
helps reduce accidents during these periods.
A Crouse-Hinds type ADE-14 series with a 505 wheel base is a good portable light
fixture for an emergency source. If portable generators producing 120-volt current
are not readily available in the desired capacity. You can use welding generators as
a source of power for emergency lighting. Power for 120-volt incandescent lamps
(500-watt, 500/RS-Rough Service type) can be obtained from the auxiliary power
tap on some generators (1000 watt), or from the main generator by adjusting the
voltage regulator.
Automobile and truck headlights may also serve as a temporary source of emer-
gency lighting, but these are less satisfactory for many uses because they are so
directional.

Hand Tools
Shovels may be needed at the time of a fire for controlling drainage, removing
debris, and similar uses. Pry bars and axes are occasionally needed to gain access to
buildings and to provide additional ventilation for a burning building. These and
other basic mechanical tools, such as pipe wrenches or valve handle persuaders, are
normally available because of regular operating and maintenance requirements.

Ladders
Large installations should have ladders that can reach the roof of most buildings
and tanks. Ladders that may be used during a fire should be able to safely hold
more than one person at a time.

Heavy Equipment
Earth moving equipment (front-end loaders, backhoes, bulldozers) and other heavy
equipment may be useful at fires involving tanks and oil wells. They can be used to
raise diversionary or impounding walls and to remove debris. Front-end loaders are
particularly useful to construct an earthen fire stop for tankfield or main pipeway
fires. Supervisors should know where such equipment can be obtained on short
notice. This information should be included in the pre-fire plan.
Exercise caution at a spill; heavy equipment is an ignition source. Beware of the
following:
• Vapor clouds
• Buried piping
• Firefighting equipment temporarily placed in normally unobstructed areas.

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1680 Testing and Maintenance

1681 Dry Chemical Extinguishers Inspection/Maintenance

Refer to Appendix E and NFPA 10 for detailed inspection and maintenance proce-
dures, checklists, and record keeping procedures.

1682 Hoses
Visually inspect hoses monthly and after each use by following these guidelines:
• Look for cuts, abrasions, burns, or other damage.
• Check couplings for free rotation, thread damage, and gasket damage.
• Check aluminum couplings for corrosion and apply a protective coating after
each use as recommended by supplier.
• Dry out thoroughly before storing if other than synthetic hose. When storing
hose, fold in different places than previously folded.

Testing and Maintenance

Test hose annually with water to 150 psi or 50 psi above normal working pressure,
whichever is higher. Replace cotton hose with synthetic when replacement is
needed. Synthetic hose is longer wearing, mildew-resistant and does not need to be
dried out before storing. Reuse end couplings whenever possible.
Maintain a record of hose inspections and tests. One method is to stamp a number
on a coupling on each length of hose and maintain a complete history on each
length by number.
Following are guidelines for testing and maintaining hoses:
• Test any hose that appears damaged.
• Replace damaged or out-of-round coupling.
• Lubricate coupling and threads with graphite.
• Replace any damaged, cracked or dried-out gaskets. Provide gaskets for each
female coupling and hand tighten connections.

1683 Fire Trucks—Pumpers

Refer to Appendix E for maintenance and inspection checklists.

Annual Test
Fire trucks shall be recertified annually per NFPA 1901.
Annual performance tests (minimum of one hour) of the water pump are conducted
with a minimum of 10 feet (3 meters) suction lift through 20 feet (6 meters) of
suction hose with a strainer attached. Refer to IFSTA Specification No. 106 for

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1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment Fire Protection Manual

guidance in conducting a performance test. This specification may be obtained

from the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team.
Tests of proportioned foam solution shall be conducted to verify proportioning rates
(refer to NFPA 11C).

Weekly Inspection
Inspect to assure that all equipment is in place and is properly maintained.
Check batteries to ensure they are charged.
Test drive vehicles to ensure they are roadworthy and can be positioned effectively
at appropriate locations throughout the facility in response to fire.

Daily Inspection
Run truck engines for 15 minutes, or until operating temperature is reached, to
ensure that water trapped in the crankcase evaporates.
Keep fuel tanks full and check engine oil, water, and battery.

1684 Fire Water Distribution System

The fire water distribution system should be pressure tested at least once a year, and
after major repairs, to 50 psig above the maximum pump discharge pressure.
During these tests, determine the actual flowing pressure at various discharge rates
at representative locations. Draw flow performance curves and compare them with
pervious flow tests to detect signs of obstruction or restriction. Test block valves by
opening or closing them about once every three months. Periodically flush out
water line dead ends and hydrants. Conduct a flow test of the main headers every
five years.

1685 Fire Pumps

Conduct a load test on each fire pump monthly at rated speed and discharge pres-
sure to check condition of the pump, bearings, and shaft sealing. The suction and
discharge valves should be set correctly and pressure gages should be accurate. The
pump area should be clean and well drained.
Conduct a performance test in each fire pump annually at full rated pumping
capacity to verify the pump condition and that the suction line is not obstructed.
Draw a pump performance curve and compare it with the field curve established
when the pump was first installed (see Appendix F) and manufacturer's curve.
Correct any deficiencies promptly. A smaller (jockey) pump is advisable to main-
tain system pressure during periods of low demand. It should be sized to supply two
first aid hose streams plus allowance for leakage (typically about 250 gpm).
See Appendix F, Fire Pump Inspection and Testing.

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

1686 Fixed Fire Water Systems

All new installations should be flow tested with water to ensure that nozzle layout,
discharge pattern, and overall performance is adequate. When practicable, the
maximum number of systems that may be expected to operate in a fire should be
tested simultaneously to ensure adequate water supply. Open the main supply
header flush valves at the start of testing.
Test water spray systems at least quarterly to ensure reliability. Note that no leakage
or misalignment problems have been experienced as a result of testing or using
water sprays over hot pumps. The rain-like drops of water do not quench localized
areas; thus are less risk than hose streams.
Where sprays are to be tested on painted surfaces, discoloration from rust and pipe
deposits can be minimized by testing during local rainfall or by wetting the surface
with clean fire water before testing. A deluge system can be pickled to remove rust
and silica from piping and storage vessels. Pickling solution is generally a low
concentration of passivated hydrochloric acid, and sometimes hydrofluoric acid.
Remember to flush piping well after treatment is finished.
Refer to Appendix E for inspection and annual servicing checklists.

1687 Other Equipment

Monitors
Refer to Appendix E for inspection and annual maintenance checklists.

Hose Reels/Boxes
Refer to Appendix E for inspection checklists.

Hydrants
Refer to Appendix E for inspection and servicing checklists.

Foam Proportioners
Foam proportioners are susceptible to plugging and must be kept clean. Wash thor-
oughly after each use, inspect the internal parts and foam proportioning orifice, and
dry thoroughly before storing.

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1690 References and Manufacturers

1691 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2021 Guide for Fighting Fires In and Around Petroleum Storage Tanks
API 2510A Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities

Chevron References
Civil and Structural Manual
Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual
Piping Manual
Pump Manual
Tank Manual

CUSA Standard Drawings

GB-128461 Deluge System
GA-128462 Spray System
GD-S99633 Hose Reels
GD-S99643 Fire Hose Box
GB-S1007 Fire Monitor

International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA)

IFSTA 106 Introduction to Fire Apparatus Practices (available from
IFSTA Headquarters, Customer Services, Fire Protection
Publications, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK
74078, Phone (405) 624-5723)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 10 Portable Fire Extinguishers
NFPA 11 Low Expansion Foam and Combined Agent Systems
NFPA 11A Medium and High-Expansion Foam Systems
NFPA 11B Synthetic Foam, Combined Agent Systems
NFPA 11C Mobile Foam Apparatus
NFPA 12 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 12A Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 12B Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishing Systems

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Fire Protection Manual 1600 Fire Water System and Fire Fighting Equipment

NFPA 13 Installation of Sprinkler Systems

NFPA 13A Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 15 Water Spray Fixed Systems
NFPA 17 Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 20 Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps
NFPA 24 Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 194 Fire Hose Connections
NFPA 291 Fire Flow Testing and Marking of Hydrants
NFPA 1901 Automotive Fire Apparatus
NFPA 1961 Fire Hose
NFPA 1962 Care, Maintenance and Use of Fire Hose
NFPA 1971 Protective Clothing for Structural Fire Fighting

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.156, “Fire Brigades”

United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)

Montreal Protocol

1692 Manufacturers
Anti-Foam Agents G. E. Silicones
(800) 643-0642
Fire Pumps Hale Fire Pump Co.
(215) 825-6300
Fire Resistant Clothing Cairns & Brother, Inc.
(201) 473-1357
Foam Supplies National Foam
(215) 363-1400
Ansul (715) 735-7411
3M (612) 736-6055
Foam Systems National Foam
(215) 363-1400
Fusible Fittings Cajun/Swagelok Fittings
(216) 467-0200
Hose Reels Dooley-Tackaberry
(713) 479-6321
Herbert S. Hiller Corp
(504) 736-0030

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Hydrants/Valves American-Darling
(205) 325-7856
Monitors/Nozzles Akron Brass Co.
(216) 264-5678
Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co.
(219) 295-8330
Portable Fire Ansul Fire Protection
Extinguishers (715) 735-7411
Water Spray Nozzles BETE Fog Nozzle Inc.
(800) 235-0049

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Fire Protection Manual 1700 Fireproofing

1700 Fireproofing

Abstract
This section describes various types, relative merits, and properties of fireproofing
materials. It gives guidelines for determining structures that require fireproofing
and recommended materials and suppliers. It also discusses the various types of fire-
proofed and fire resistant systems for critical control systems. API RP 2218 is the
industry standard for fireproofing and is included in this manual.

Contents Page

1710 Introduction 1700-2

1711 Definition of Terms
1712 Company and Industry Documents
1720 Support Structures 1700-3
1721 Where Fireproofing of Support Structures Is Warranted
1722 Level of Protection Required
1723 Layout and Design Considerations
1724 Materials
1725 Specific Applications
1730 Critical Valves, Instrumentation, and Shutdown Systems 1700-13
1731 Emergency Shutdown or Isolation Valves
1732 Tank Block Valves
1733 Air Supply
1734 Switchgear Housing and Junction Boxes
1735 Instrument and Electrical Cables
1736 Home Runs for Cable Trays and Conduit Banks
1740 Materials Suppliers and Applicators 1700-19
1741 Support Structures
1742 Critical Valves, Instrumentation, and Shutdown Systems
1750 Fireproofing Test Methods 1700-21
1760 References 1700-22

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1700 Fireproofing Fire Protection Manual

1710 Introduction
Selecting a fireproofing material involves answering three questions:
• What level of protection is required, if any?
• What materials will provide this level of protection?
• Of those materials, which is the appropriate choice?
Section 1720 answers these questions for support structures and Section 1730 for
critical valves, instrumentation and shutdown systems.
This section defines terms used in fireproofing and lists relevant Company and
industry documents.

1711 Definition of Terms

Fireproofing: Protection that provides resistance to fire and heat transfer long
enough to allow critical structures to remain standing or critical control systems to
operate, while the fire is brought under control.
Fire-Exposed Envelope: Area within 30-50 feet horizontally and 30 feet vertically
of fire potential equipment. Distances can be expanded or reduced based on
drainage, pressure, and liquid holdup.
Fire Potential Equipment:
• Fired equipment, including heaters and furnaces, that handles flammable mate-
rials.
• Rotating or reciprocating mechanical equipment, such as pumps or compres-
sors, that handles flammable materials.
• Drums, exchangers, columns, and similar operating vessels that handle flam-
mable materials and have a volume of more than 1000 gallons (24 barrels).
• Plot-limit piping manifolds that contain flammable materials and ten or more
valves.
• Tanks, spheres, and spheroids that contain flammable materials including their
drainage and relief path and impounding basin.
Flammable Materials: For the purpose of this section of the manual, flammable
materials include flammable gases, vapors, and liquids having a flash point below
100°F or being handled at temperatures above their flash point.
Emergency Shutdown or Depressuring System: A system that will shut down a
plant or other facility under emergency conditions, either automatically or by
remote push button; actuate remote block valves to stop the flow of flammable
liquids or gases; stop heat input to process furnaces, reboilers, or heaters; stop the
rotation of associated machinery (especially pumps); or depressure the equipment
through a vent, if appropriate.

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Fire Protection Manual 1700 Fireproofing

Emergency Isolation System: A system of remote-operated valves to isolate a

piece of equipment or unit involved in a fire or other emergency, thus limiting the
supply of fuel. This may be an individual pump, compressor, vessel, LPG sphere,
etc., or it may encompass an entire area inside the plot limits of a plant or battery.
Critical Instrument or Electrical Cables: Cables or tubing associated with emer-
gency shutdown, depressuring, or isolation systems.
Home Runs: Large groups of multiconductor signal cables from the control house
to the main junction boxes in the plant. Home runs are expensive to install and time
consuming to repair. Their loss may cause damage to plant(s) outside the fire area
as a result of loss of control.
Plot Limit Valves: The boundary valves for a plant area containing a complete
operation or group of operations that may be shut down as a unit. These valves are
used for isolation on turnarounds or fire emergencies. They should have at least a
50-foot separation from other hydrocarbon-handling facilities.

1712 Company and Industry Documents

See Section 1760, References, for a complete listing of Company and industry
guidelines for fireproofing. The Standard Drawings can be found in the Standard
Drawings section. Use API RP 2218, Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petro-
chemical Processing Plants, included in this manual, as a guide to determine the
extent of fireproofing required. This section is a supplement to that publication.

1720 Support Structures

This section presents guidelines for fireproofing support structures to protect them
from failure due to fire exposure for specific time periods.

1721 Where Fireproofing of Support Structures Is Warranted

Fireproofing of the principal members is warranted if the structure is in the fire-
exposed envelope and failure of these members could cause any of the following:
• Threat of injury to personnel
• Loss or serious damage to valuable or critical supported equipment
• Release of large volumes of flammable material
• Release of toxic material
• Threat to adjacent property and structures of high value
• Serious loss of productive capacity
Conversely, fireproofing is not warranted in these situations:
• The value of the structure and supported equipment is low when compared to
the cost of fireproofing.

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1700 Fireproofing Fire Protection Manual

• Member failure would not cause failure of the structure or equipment. Thus,
wind and earthquake bracing and other secondary members, such as supports
for stairs, platforms, and walkways, are not normally fireproofed.
• The structure is far enough removed from the source of a fire to preclude
serious damage.
• The fire would cause failure or serious damage to supported equipment
whether or not the structure was fireproofed.
• The structure supports piping that is not carrying flammable liquids. Piping
carrying only gases does not normally justify fireproofing of the supports.

1722 Level of Protection Required

Major factors that determine the level of fireproofing needed are the intensity and
duration of potential fire and the importance of the structure or equipment. Typi-
cally, fireproofing should protect structures supporting high-risk or valuable equip-
ment from reaching 1000°F for a period of three hours, as defined by UL 1709 (see
Section 1750). For dense concrete, this is equivalent to four hours as defined by
ASTM E-119, the test used prior to 1984. Fireproofing in excess of these require-
ments may be necessary for special high valued equipment such as reactors or
equipment handling large quantities of flammable material in congested areas. Non-
critical structures are not protected. Consult the Fire Protection Staff if you feel the
above criteria do not fit your needs.
When fireproofing of structural supports is warranted, the following types of protec-
tion are recommended:
Three-hour fireproofing as shown on Standard Drawing GA-N33336 (in Standard
Drawings Section) is for main support members of structures and equipment within
the fire-exposed envelope (see Section 1711.)
Less than three-hour protection. Thinner coatings may be used where three-hour
protection is not warranted. See Figures 1700-1 and 1700-2 for guidance. Three-
hour protection may not be justified in areas where the flammable inventory is such
that a three-hour fire is unfeasible.
A three-hour rating for formed and poured concrete fireproofing is usually worth
the small incremental cost of the additional concrete. If gunite concrete is used, it is
economical to use the thickness corresponding to the particular fire rating needed
because cost is more nearly proportional to thickness.

Comparative Fire Rating

The required weight and thickness of fireproofing material for a given duration of
fire exposure varies depending on the type of material chosen. Estimated weights
and thicknesses for different types of material and different ratings are given in
Figures 1700-1 and 1700-2.

December 1994 1700-4 Chevron Corporation

 Fig. 1700-1 Properties of Cementitious Base Fireproofing Materials
Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual

<— High Strength —> <— — — — — — Intermediate Strength — — — — —> <— — — Low Strength — — —>

Concrete Poured-in- Haydite Coroc(1) Pydrocrete(1) Pydrocrete Fendolite(1)

Place or Gunited Vermiculite Mix II 301 241 M II

Standard mix of portland Haydite and vermiculite Precast cementitious Proprietary inorganic Organic cementitious Spray-applied
cement and rock (light weight aggregate) panel system magnesia cement vermiculite vermiculite portland
aggregate plus portland cement formulation cement mix
Density (lbs./cu. ft.) 140-150 75-95 11.5 psf(2) 55-60 50-55 48
Compressive Strength (psi) 2500-3000 1500-2000 2246 825 550 493
Thermal Conductivity 13 3 0.094 Not Reported 6.2 1.32
BTU in/ °F-hr-sq ft. @
75°F mean temperature
Hardness (Shore D) 70-90 70-90 85 65-75 45-55 40
UL 1709 Fire Time Rating Design No. XR001 New Product; Design No. XR702 Read Note 11 first(3)
Thickness (inches) at not yet tested
1 hour – – – 11/16 (0.688) 1
1 1/2 hours – – – 7/8 (0.875) 1.25
2 hours – – – 1 (1.000) 1.50
2 1/2 hours – – 2.00 – 1.75
3 hours
– – – 1 1/4 (1.250) 1.875
4 hours
– – – 1 1/2 (1.500) 2.188
1700-5

ASTM E-119 Fire Time Rating Design No. X001 Design No. X780 Design No. X732 Design No. X754
(UL 263, W10x49)
Thickness (inches)(4) at
1 hours
1 0 – 7/16 (0.438) 9/16 (0.563) 0.875
1 1/2 hours
– – – 5/8 (0.625) 13/16 (0.813) 1.125
2 hours
1-1/2 – – 1 3/16 (0.813) 1 (1.000) 1.375
3 hours 2 – 2.0 1 1/18 (1.25) 1 3/8 (1.375) 1.750
4 hours 2-1/2 2 2.50 1 1/2 (1.500) 1 3/4 (1.750) 2.125
Recommended Primer Epoxy(5) Epoxy(5) Epoxy(5) Epoxy(5) Epoxy(5)
Recommended Topcoat None(6) None(6) None Epoxy(7) Epoxy(7) None
Recommended Use Note(8) Note(9) Note(8) Notes(9),(10) Notes(9),(10) Notes(9),(10)

(1) The Company has not used this system extensively. Before using it, contact the CRTC Materials and Equipment Engineering Specialist.
(2) Panels are 2 inches thick.
(3) Final tests not completed. Preliminary results are given here.
(4) Thickness ratings for given fire exposures come from the 1982 U.L. Fire Resistance Directory. The X-number designation is the U.L. code number for the materials of interest for a
specific lining design. There are no U.L. tests on concrete or HV mix since these are not proprietary materials.

1700 Fireproofing
(5) Coating System Data Sheet 4.4 in the Coatings Manual.
December 1994

(6) For severe weathering and corrosive conditions, consider an epoxy topcoat.
(7) Follow manufacturer's recommendations.
(8) Structures such as piers, legs, stanchions, etc.
(9) Vessels, skirts and other applications requiring lighter weight aggregate. Generally not used on structural steel.
(10) Oil platforms and other applications requiring lighter weight and low volume (Thermolag 330-1 was used on Platform Gail and Esther.)
 Fig. 1700-2 Properties of Non-Cementitious Base Fireproofing Materials
December 1994

1700 Fireproofing
<— — — — — — Intumescent — — — — —> <— — Subliming — —> <— — Insulating — —>

Chartek IV(1) Albi Clad(1) 800 Pittchar(1) Thermolag 330-1 PABCO Super Fire Temp

Composition 100% solids epoxy intumescent Vinyl based intumescent 100% solids epoxy intumescent Subliming water-borne one- High density calcium silicate
mastic component compound insulation
Density (lbs./cu. ft.) 69.9 64 73 62 18 or 28
Compressive Strength (psi) 5500 1760 2359 800 260 or 350
Thermal Conductivity BTU-in/
°F-hr-sq ft. @ 75°F mean
temperature 164 (at 66°F) 3.0 0.927 0.84 .57 or .60 (at 200°F)
Hardness (Shore D) 75 64 65 30-35 –
UL 1709 Fire Time Rating XR613 Design No. XR607 Design No. XR601 X307
Thickness (inches) at 608,609
1 hour .27 0.25(2) 0.36 –
1 1/2 hours .41 0.35(3) 0.58 –
2 hours .55 0.51(3) 0.84 –
2 1/2 hours .70 0.62(3) – –
3 hours – 0.75(3) 1.33 –
4 hours – – – –
X307ASTM E-119 Fire Time Design No. X606 Design No. X614 Design No. X612 X307
1700-6

Rating (UL 263, W10x49)

Thickness (inches)(4) at
1 hours .21 0.25(5) 0.26 7/32 (0.219)(6)
1 1/2 hours .32 – 0.39 –
2 hours .46 0.50(5) 0.58 –
3 hours .71 – 0.97 –
4 hours – – – –
Recommended Primer Epoxy(7) Epoxy(7) Epoxy(7) Polyester Epoxy(7)
Recommended Topcoat None Epoxy(8) None Chlorinated Rubber Notes(9)
Recommended Use Note(10) Note(10) Note(10) Note(10)

(1) The Company has not used this system extensively. Before using it, contact the CRTC Materials and Equipment Engineering Specialist.
(2) No reinforcement.
(3) Fiberglass ribbon reinforcement.
(4) Thickness ratings for given fire exposures come from the 1982 U.L. Fire Resistance Directory. The X-number designation is the U.L. code number for the materials of interest for a

Fire Protection Manual

specific lining design.
Chevron Corporation

(5) Wet film thickness.

(6) Ratings do exist for ASTM E-119 W-14-228 Columns.
(7) Coating System Data Sheet 4.4 of the Coatings Manual.
(8) Follow manufacturer's recommendations.
(9) Outdoor installations need weathering jacketing. Silicone waterproofing is recommended by PABCO and may be adequate for dry locations.
(10) Oil platforms and other applications requiring light weight and low volume (Thermolag 330-1 was used on Platforms Gail and Esther.)
Fire Protection Manual 1700 Fireproofing

1723 Layout and Design Considerations

The API Publication 2218, “Guideline for Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and
Petrochemical Processing Plants,” gives a sequence of steps to follow when consid-
ering what to fireproof. This section of the manual offers supplemental information.
Consider the following during design:
• General layout of the plant (see Section 1300).
• Drainage (both of the plant area and within structures) should carry hydro-
carbon spills away from supports, structural members, and equipment. This
reduces the amount of potential fire damage due to an accidental spill. Where
drainage does not meet these criteria, additional fireproofing may be justified
(see Section 1400).
• Fire risks in plants should be adequately spaced from one another (see
Section 1300).
• Sources of ignition—furnaces, shops, etc.—should be located as far as prac-
tical from areas where flammable vapor might be released to the air. Where
risks are not adequately separated, additional fireproofing may be justified.

1724 Materials
Types of Fireproofing Materials
The Company usually uses concrete material because it is often the most cost-effec-
tive. Many commercial products are also available. They have specialized uses and
are usually more expensive than concrete. Fireproofing materials come in three cate-
gories:
• Cementitious-based materials such as concrete, Carboline's Pyrocrete 241,
and Hydraulic Press Brick Co.'s Haydite-Vermiculite field mix.
• Ablative materials or non-cementitious coatings such as Thermal Science
Inc.'s (TSI) Thermolag 330-1 (subliming) and Textron's Chartek IV (intumes-
cent)
• Insulation-based material such as PABCO Super Firetemp
Figures 1700-1 and 1700-2 give the UL 1709 and/or ASTM E-119 rating for these
materials. Use these figures to compare the relative performance of the tested mate-
rials. New applications should use materials that have been rated by UL 1709.
Both cementitious-based and insulation-based materials insulate the structure from
heat generated during a fire. These materials are not destroyed by the high tempera-
tures of a fire. Both intumescent and subliming coatings absorb heat through mass
reduction. Subliming coatings absorb heat by transforming to a gas and intumescent
coatings work by quickly swelling to four times their original thickness to insulate
the structure.

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If you use concrete, follow Specification CIV-EG-850, Placing and Curing

Concrete. Concrete should be specified as ASTM C-150, Type II. If you use other
materials, follow the manufacturer's recommended installation procedures.
“High rise” fire testing (described in Section 1750) indicates that gunited concrete
may not provide the same protection as cast-in-place concrete. Even though
Company experience with gunited concrete in actual fire conditions is limited, it
does not indicate that gunited concrete is inferior to cast-in-place concrete. Until
experience indicates otherwise, gunited concrete can be considered a cost-effective
fireproofing method for low-risk, lower-value areas where aesthetics is not a high
priority. Consult with the Fire Protection Staff about using it in critical high risk
areas.

Properties of Fireproofing Materials

Figures 1700-1 and 1700-2 compare fireproofing materials. Some of the terms used
in the figures are discussed below.
Applied Weight. Design of structures must include the weight of fireproofing,
which can significantly add to the total dead weight load. Concrete has a density of
150 lb/cu ft. Less dense materials minimize dead weight. However, lighter weight
materials may not save money because they are generally more expensive than
concrete.
Compressive Strength. Will the area you are fireproofing be subject to mechanical
abuse? Compressive strength is a good indicator of impact resistance. Some light-
weight fireproofing systems such as Pyrocrete 241 have low compressive strength
and are more easily dented or damaged. These materials should not be used in high-
traffic, high-maintenance areas.
Thermal Conductivity. Normally, thermal conductivity is not a major factor in
choosing a fireproofing material unless the material is to insulate the structure also.
Figures 1700-1 and 1700-2 show 75°F mean temperature K factors for some
common materials. If used as both insulation and fireproofing, these materials
should not be exposed to continuous temperatures over 200°F.

Mineral/Chemical Composition of Fireproofing Materials

The composition of a fireproofing material determines its compressive strength and
the need to use primers and/or topcoating with the material.
Concrete and H-V Mix. Concrete fireproofing is a standard mixture of Portland
cement and rock aggregate conforming to ASTM C-150. The Haydite-Vermiculite
(H-V) mixture also uses Portland cement but with lightweight aggregates. Except in
severe freeze-thaw service, concrete and the H-V mix do not normally need a
topcoat.
Lightweight Cementitious Materials. Commercial lightweight cementitious fire-
proofing materials must be topcoated. They are mostly lightweight aggregate with
just enough cement to hold them together. The lightweight aggregates will absorb
water and tend to degrade much faster than normal concrete. Topcoating slows
degrading.

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Although Pyrocrete 201 has good compressive strength, it is not like normal cemen-
titious fireproofing. Its cement backbone is based on magnesium oxychloride which
can cause severe corrosion problems if it gets wet and if a good primer was not
used on the structural steel. Pyrocrete 201 must also be topcoated to prevent it from
picking up moisture.
Pyrocrete 240 and 241 have a much lower chloride content and do not cause the
same corrosion problems that Pyrocrete 201 does.
The new Pyrocrete 301 replaces 201 without its corrosion problems. It is stronger
than 241 but also more costly.
Noncementitious Materials. The Company has relatively little experience with
noncementitious coatings like Thermolag 330-1 and Chartek IV. Thus far, experi-
ence has been good on the few existing applications. However, a cautious approach
is warranted with their use. Thermolag 330-1 is a subliming coating which just
chars away during a fire. It comes in a pure grade with under 50 ppm chlorides and
in a regular grade with 500-1000 ppm chlorides. While these levels are much lower
than the approximately 30,000 ppm chlorides in Pyrocrete 201, consider their corro-
sion impact over the long term on the structural steel.
Intumescent coatings, like Chartek IV, work by quickly swelling up to four times
their original thickness during a fire. The swelled material forms a strongly oxida-
tion-resistant char layer. In this manner, it resists the fire. It also protects the under-
lying steel by being a good insulator. Chartek IV comes in the form of a strong
epoxy. Epoxies are not very permeable, so leaching of chloride should not be a
problem.
Pyrocrete 201, Thermolag 330-1, and Chartek IV are acceptable for use over
carbon steel if you use appropriate primers. However, Pyrocrete 201 and the regular
grade of Thermolag 330-1 should not be used over 300 Series stainless steels,
which are susceptible to chloride stress corrosion cracking. Chartek IV is epoxy-
based and does not have chlorides to leach out.
Shelf Life of Fireproofing Materials. Some of these specialty fireproofing mate-
rials have a limited shelf life, similar to some brands of coatings. Therefore, it is
unwise to purchase excessive amounts that cannot be used in a short time. The shelf
life of Pyrocrete 241, for example, is one year. In general, suppliers will not take
their material back and there will be disposal costs for the expired material.
Weathering. Long-term environmental exposure does not have much effect on fire-
proofing materials. Dense cementitious materials are usually unaffected. Light-
weight cementitious materials and noncementitious materials can be protected by
topcoating. However, the weathering resistance of noncementitious coatings needs
a more careful evaluation. Figures 1700-1 and 1700-2 indicate where topcoating is
recommended.
In a 1975 test program by the Smithers Company, (an independent testing labora-
tory), a noncementitious, intumescent coating, Albi Clad 890, was found to retain
only 30% of its fireproofing capabilities after an accelerated weathering test. This
loss in fireproofing was greater than that indicated by physical appearance. Another

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intumescent coating, Firex RX 2384, showed only a nine-minute time of protection

in a high rise fire after accelerated weathering. When new, the same thickness
provided a 74-minute protection time in an ASTM E-119 test. Consequently, these
products are not recommended.
The Smithers program did not test Chartek IV and Thermolag 330-1. However,
product literature states that these two products can pass accelerated weathering
tests without significant loss of fireproofing capabilities.
Reuse After a Fire. Cementitious fireproofing materials are not necessarily ruined
after exposure to a fire. Remaining properties depend on how much water of hydra-
tion was lost. The amount lost is a function of the intensity and duration of fire
exposure. Concrete is a good insulator and it is not unusual to find much of the
remaining concrete in good condition after a fire. All loose and damaged material
must be removed. The fireproofing can then be rebuilt to original thickness using
standard concrete repair practices found in the Civil and Structural Manual, Section
260.
Proprietary materials (e.g., Pyrocrete 241) may require reapplication of material to
bring the total thickness back to the required fire rating.
Intumescent and subliming fireproofing systems must be replaced after a fire. Insu-
lation-based systems would normally also need to be replaced after a fire.

Problems with Fireproofing

The Company has no reported failures of a fireproofing material during a fire.
However, fireproofing has caused the following problems:
• Severe corrosion of the structural steel and reinforcement mesh underneath fire-
proofing. The primary cause is water that gets between the fireproofing and the
steel. As noted above, some proprietary fireproofing may cause corrosion prob-
lems if the steel is not coated. Refer to the Corrosion Prevention Manual,
Section 630, for more information on corrosion under fireproofing.
• Excessive cracking of cementitious fireproofing.
Corrosion Prevention. Abrasive blasting and priming the structural steel prior to
fireproofing and proper cure of cementitious fireproofing are important in elimi-
nating corrosion. Flashing or caulking prevent entry of water between the fire-
proofing and the steel. Acceptable sealants should be specified. Two such products
are Dow Corning No. 732 Silicone elastomeric sealer and H. B. Fuller, Foster Prod-
ucts Division No. 94-95 butyl caulking.
Commercial fireproofing manufacturers usually specify primers to be epoxy, inor-
ganic zinc, or combinations of the two. However, epoxy provides better protection
against corrosion. Epoxy is preferred in plants that have a previous history of corro-
sion under fireproofing. Standard Drawings GA-N3336 and GD-N99994 specify a
polyamide epoxy (Coating System Data Sheet 4.4 in the Coatings Manual) on a
near white metal finish.

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Chlorinated rubber coatings may also be considered where application restrictions,

such as low-temperature climates, limit the use of epoxy.
Touchup is required if the primer is damaged during shipment or application of the
reinforcing anchor studs. The touchup coating must be compatible with the original
primer. Also consider economics— spraying a new primer coat may be less costly
than extensive touchup.
Cracking and Proper Cure. Proper cure of cementitious fireproofing materials
greatly reduces the amount of cracking. In some geographic locations, it is neces-
sary to take extra measures like spray-applying a curing compound to seal the
surface to prevent moisture loss. Another measure is to wrap the freshly poured
concrete work with burlap or polyethylene sheet; however, this method can cause
staining. The concrete can also be cured by continuous application of a fine fresh
water mist to keep the surface moist.
Cracking can occur even when concrete is properly cured. The main causes are
thermal cycling, shrinkage, and corrosion of reinforcing steel. If the cracking is bad
enough, it can accelerate corrosion of the underlying steel by allowing in water.
While cracking is undesirable, it is not cause for rejection unless severe.
There are no well-established criteria for judging severity of cracking. However, the
following checks can help you decide if a job needs more thorough review or repair.
• Spalling of concrete, removing more than 20% of depth.
• Many long, full-thickness cracks wider than 1/8 inch.
• Substantial thinning of the steel substrate.

Selecting the Appropriate System

Concrete has usually been the most cost-effective fireproofing material. It is readily
available and the materials are least expensive. It does not require specialized instal-
lation techniques like some commercial fireproofing materials.
Some proprietary fireproofing systems, such as Pyrocrete 241, are becoming more
competitive with concrete from an installed cost standpoint, and have performed
better than concrete in fire tests.
Consider the long-term costs of fireproofing systems. If a topcoat is required in the
original design, plan to recoat it about every 10 years. Discounted cash flow calcula-
tions may show this maintenance cost to be low; however, also consider the chance
that the required planned maintenance will not be carried out. Concrete fireproofing
avoids this problem.
The weight savings of lightweight fireproofing does not always translate into cost
savings. Some offshore platforms are exceptions. Users should be wary of this
claim and be sure that the benefits are real.

1725 Specific Applications

Refer to API RP 2218 for guidance on where to apply fireproofing. This section
provides supplemental information.

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Vertical Vessel Skirts

Fireproofing for skirts of columns and other vertical vessels is detailed in Standard
Drawing GD-N99994 (see the Standard Drawings Section). Skirts limited to one
access openings of less than 24 inches in diameter, with pipe openings of no more
than 1-inch maximum annulus clearance around the pipe or pipe insulation (per the
Standard Drawing) need not be fireproofed on the inside. Spilled fuel within the
skirt cannot get sufficient oxygen through only one opening. Additional openings
would permit cross-ventilation that could greatly increase the intensity of a possible
fire and would justify fireproofing the inside of the skirt. Fireproofing should be
included at the bottom of the skirt in the bolt area between the bottom reinforcing
plate and the base plate ring per Standard Drawing GD-N99994. Fireproofing for
the support legs of vertical vessels should be similar to that shown in Drawing GA-
N33336.

Hydroprocessing Reactor Skirts

Reactors with a “hot box” design at the shell-to-skirt joint should be fireproofed to
the bottom of the hot box. Insulation covering the hot box should be protected with
a 10-gage stainless steel flame shield. The flame shield should extend from the top
of the fireproofing to the head-to-shell joint and be mechanically secured. Consult a
fireproofing or reactor design specialist for details of the flame shield.
The flame shield design was tested in 1989 with a UL 1709 test modified with a
high pressure hydrogen jet. The flame shield protected the underlying insulation
from the erosive effects of the hydrogen jet. Concrete fireproofing and Pyrocrete
241 were also tested, and neither was affected by the hydrogen jet. See Materials
Division Report, “Fireproofing Tests with Hydrogen Jet Impingement,” M.D. Gibb,
January, 1990 File No. 56.35, available from Chevron Research and Technology
Company, Materials Division.

Piers or Legs for Horizontal Vessels

Support piers or legs for horizontal vessels near ground level, when not constructed
of reinforced concrete, should be fireproofed. (Exception: Metal saddles less than 9
inches high at the lowest point need not be fireproofed.)

Offshore Structures
Cementitious fireproofing materials have performed poorly offshore because the
reinforcing steel in the concrete corrodes. Consequently, these materials are not
recommended for offshore structures. Specialty, lightweight fireproofing materials
are often used offshore instead of concrete, to save space and weight. In addition,
there are no reinforcing bars in the materials to corrode. Chartek 59 and III were
used on Platform Ninian, Pyrocrete 241 was used on Platform Hidalgo, and Ther-
molag 330-1 was used on Platforms Gail and Esther.

Fireproofing for Structures Subject to Physical Damage

For structures subject to physical damage, we recommend Portland cement
concrete with normal aggregates and a compressive strength of at least 2500 psi (28-
day test) or one of the proprietary fireproofing materials with comparable compres-

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sive strength. Fireproofing for vessel skirts is normally made with lightweight
aggregates per Standard Drawing GD-N99994. Follow CIV-EG-850 for the proper
installation and curing procedures for concrete.
Intumescent coatings do not resist mechanical damage nearly as well as gunited
concrete does. For this reason, intumescent coatings should be considered only for
pipeway stanchions and secondary risk applications. They should not be considered
equivalent to gunited concrete for critical applications such as column skirts or
major vessel supports without detailed review.

Filling Hollow Supports with Concrete

Filling pipe stanchions and other hollow supports with concrete increases resistance
to failure from fire exposure up to an hour or longer. Tests have shown that tank
legs constructed of structural steel tubing and filled with concrete withstood two
hours of fire exposure without collapse or failure. Under some conditions, this type
of construction provides adequate fireproofing for pipe stanchions because the
piping being supported generally fail in less time.

Prefabricated Fireproofed Beams

Often it is economical to fireproof structural members off-site. Material such as
Pyrocrete 241 can be used to “butter up” the ends of prefabricated concrete fire-
proofed beams after they are installed.

1730 Critical Valves, Instrumentation, and Shutdown Systems

1731 Emergency Shutdown or Isolation Valves

Fail-Safe design is preferred for emergency valves. It uses spring opposed valved
actuators and normally pressured or electrically energized control circuits. Failure
of the control circuit will cause the valve to move to its fail-safe position. See the
Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1300 for more information on failure
modes.

Fireproofing Systems for Valves

If a fail-safe design is not feasible and the valve must be located in a fire hazardous
area, the valve must be fireproofed to withstand a UL 1709 fire for 20 minutes. This
is done by using a fire-safe valve design (see Section 2080) with a fireproofed valve
actuator and locating a remote actuation station at grade in a safe location at least
50 feet from the protected equipment.
Valve actuators can be fireproofed with the following systems:
• Intumescent Coating (preferred); K-Mass Fireproofing System. K-Mass is a
Chartek-based intumescent coating system shop-applied to a thickness of about
1/2-inch. During a fire, the coating swells and forms an insulating char under a
glazed surface. Because of the molding-type process used to apply the coating,
K-Mass systems can be designed to provide normal maintenance and operating

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access to the actuator. The major disadvantage is that the system can be applied
only in the Thermal Designs Shop in Houston, TX.
• Insulated Box Enclosure. This system (Figure 1700-3) is a box-like assembly
to fully enclose the motor/air operator of a critical valve including motor,
gearbox, and drive nut or the entire housing of the protected component. The
fireproofing enclosure is made from a refractory ceramic fiber (RCF) block
inside a stainless steel weather jacket. It is designed to keep the internal temper-
ature of electrical components at or below 200°F for 20 minutes during a fire.
This fireproofing system is easily applied to the smaller- sized and more rectan-
gular-shaped valve operators.
The enclosure should be designed and installed so that leakage (e.g., from a
valve stem packing) does not enter the enclosure. If there is evidence of oil
accumulation, the enclosure should be promptly removed and cleaned and the
leakage problem corrected.
Normal local operation of an MOV/AOV (e.g., push buttons, lights, declutch,
or handwheel) may be retained by minor modification to the valve operator.
Components that require servicing are made accessible by removing the insula-
tion cover and insulation as required. This is a significant disadvantage because
frequently these covers or panels are not reinstalled properly, reducing fire
protection capabilities.
• Insulated Bag. This system (Figure 1700-4) uses insulation pads laced
together with galvanize- coated steel wire to form a bag that fully encloses the
motor/air operator of a critical valve, including motor, gearbox, and drive nut
or the entire housing of the protected component. The insulation bag is
constructed of semi-flexible pads of ceramic fiber or fiberglass insulation. The
assembly is weather protected by a vinyl-coated Dacron cover. It is designed to
keep the internal temperature of electrical components at or below 200°F for
20 minutes if exposed to a 2000°F fire, as described by UL 1709.
This fireproofing system is easily applied to the larger-sized and more complex-
shaped valve operators.
The enclosure should be designed and installed so that leakage (e.g., from a
valve stem packing) does not enter the enclosure. If there is evidence of oil
accumulation, the enclosure should be promptly removed and cleaned and the
leakage problem corrected.
Normal local operation of any MOV/AOV (e.g., push buttons, lights, declutch
or handwheel,) may be retained by minor modification to the valve operator.
Components that require servicing are made accessible by unlacing and
opening or removing the bag, which takes only a few minutes. As with the insu-
lated box enclosure, this is a major disadvantage of this system.

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Fig. 1700-3 Insulated Box Enclosure for Valve Fig. 1700-4 Insulated Bag for Valve Actuators
Actuators

1732 Tank Block Valves

Tank valves 12 inches or smaller are easily hand-operated and are not normally
power-operated; therefore, fireproofing is not required.
For larger size tank valves where air or motor operators have been installed, fire-
proofing may be justified for the operator, conduit, and controls within the fire
hazardous areas. The switchgear should be located outside the tank impounding
areas or drainage paths and the conduit should be buried as close as possible to the
valve. For MOVs with a separate control box, it is normally less costly to locate the
box outside the tank impounding basin. This is because a water-tight enclosure
(NEMA 3 or 4) can be used instead of an XP enclosure (NEMA 7) and fireproofing
is not necessary. This also improves access in case of fire.
Fireproofing of motor operators on tank block valves is justified where all of the
following conditions are met:
• Tank fill/suction valves are larger than 12 inches.
• Flash point of tank contents is under 100°F.
• Valve or piping failure during a fire would cause burning liquid to spread fire
to other tanks, equipment, important facilities, or the property of others.
Other considerations that may justify fireproofing include:
• The tank field is operated from a remote control center.
• The facility is considered a major or critical facility.

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• The number of personnel available during the first 20 minutes of a fire emer-
gency is limited, so remote operating capability must be maintained.
• The risk of a tank overfill is increased due to high use or filling rate.
• A spill resulting from a fire could cause serious environmental damage.

1733 Air Supply

Air supply tubing for control and motive power for air-operated emergency isola-
tion valves (AOVs) should be steel or stainless steel. It should be supported every 6
feet in horizontal runs or every 8 feet in vertical runs; or it should be in rigid steel
conduit, supported every 10 feet. Type 304 or 316 stainless steel tubing, without
fireproofing can safely be used for instrument air through a fire hazardous area as
long as it is well supported.
For air used for motive power of AOVs, consider locating air filters, lubricators,
and solenoids outside the fire hazardous area. If this is not practical, then these
items must be fireproofed along with the valve activator.

1734 Switchgear Housing and Junction Boxes

Switchgear housing and junction boxes for power and control of emergency shut-
down, and isolation valves (MOV's), and motor starters should be located outside a
fire hazardous area. If this equipment must be placed closer, the entire enclosure, as
well as the rear of any exposed mounting support plate, should be fireproofed.
Johns Manville—Marinite, Type I fireproofing can be used in this application.
Switchgear and junction boxes can also be protected to a lesser degree by installing
a radiant heat shield between the enclosure and the potential fire source.

1735 Instrument and Electrical Cables

Critical control tubing, instrument cables, and power wiring should be located
outside fire hazardous areas wherever possible. This includes routing underground
and routing in the upper level of elevated pipeways, separate from main cable trays,
to prevent a single incident from disabling both systems.
Critical instrument tubing or electrical cables located above ground within 50 hori-
zontal feet of fire hazardous equipment should be fire resistant or fireproofed to
withstand exposure up to 2000°F for at least 20 minutes. Cables should be installed
in galvanized steel conduit or cable tray.
Do not locate fire resistant wiring in or under aluminum conduit or cable trays. The
tray or conduit can fail during a fire, causing the wiring to fail, or melted aluminum
can fall on the wiring, damaging the sheathing.
Where main cable runs are buried, individual cable risers to motors, switches, etc.,
should withstand exposure up to 2000°F for at least 20 minutes or be externally fire-

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proofed if the motors and switches are part of a critical emergency shutdown and
isolation system and the system is not fail-safe.
You can use the following systems, presented in order of preference, to protect crit-
ical wiring or tubing systems located in fire hazardous areas. These systems are
designed to maintain circuit integrity for at least 20 minutes in a 2000°F fire, as
described by UL 1709.

Fire-Resistant Wiring with Rigid Sheathing

This system can be of two types: 1) wiring enclosed by mineral insulation inside an
Incoloy 825 shield (e.g., MI Cable); or 2) nickel conductors enclosed by silicon
dioxide insulation in a stainless steel sheath (e.g., SI Fire Cable). Neither system
requires conduit.

Fire-Resistant Wiring Needing Steel Conduit

This system uses wiring or cable with electrical insulation which will withstand
exposure up to 2000°F for at least 20 minutes. The cable must be installed inside a
steel conduit for support (e.g., Firezone CRC or DeKoron Fire Resistant Circuit
Integrity Cable).

Nonfire-resistant Tubing or Wiring with Thermal Insulation

This system protects critical instrument leads or electrical wiring that is not heat
resistant (e.g., plastic tubing and wiring with PVC insulation). It consists of the
tubing or wiring inside a rigid steel conduit covered by thermal insulation and stain-
less steel weather jacketing.
Conduit should be rigid steel with steel fittings and covers. Supports should be
spaced 6 feet or less in horizontal runs and 8 feet or less in vertical runs to support
the weight of the fireproofing material and to avoid sagging during a fire. In fire
hazard areas, conduit supports should be insulated because they may conduct heat
inside the fireproofing during a fire.
Thermal insulation that can withstand exposure up to 2000°F for at least 20 minutes
should cover the conduit. Due to the short exposure, most thermal insulation for
pipe will be adequate if it is at least 1-1/2 inches thick. Extended protection may be
gained by using ceramic fiber or two-layer calcium silicate insulation. Mineral wool
would also work, but for a shorter length of time. To seal against weather and
protect against mechanical damage, a galvanized or stainless steel weather jacket
secured with stainless steel bands should cover the insulation. Aluminum weather
jacketing would melt, exposing the insulation to damaging effects of the fire or
hose streams.

1736 Home Runs for Cable Trays and Conduit Banks

Location
Home runs of cable trays and conduit banks should be routed outside fire hazardous
areas wherever possible. This includes routing underground and routing on the

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upper level(s) of elevated pipeways at least 30 feet above the ground and outside
the drainage path of hydrocarbon spills.
Home runs located within 50 feet of equipment or drainage that could expose them
to a spill fire (e.g., areas within the drainage pattern of pumps operating over 600°F,
or over the auto-ignition temperature, or pumps with a history of fires) should be
fireproofed if loss from the home run and corresponding facility down time is unac-
ceptable.
It is often preferable to separate the critical instrumentation and alarm wiring from
the home runs. Non-critical home run cables do not require fireproofing. Critical
cables should not be protected as described in Section 1735.

Design
Generally, cable trays are recommended over conduit banks because of their ease of
installation and fireproofing.
Conduit or tray supports should be spaced 6 feet or less in horizontal runs and 8
feet or less in vertical runs to bear the weight of the fireproofing material and to
avoid sagging during a fire. Supports should be insulated to protect the conduit or
tray within a fire hazard area because they will conduct heat inside the fireproofing.
Conduit should be rigid steel with all steel fittings and covers.
Due to the cost of re-entry into a fireproofed conduit raceway or tray, future addi-
tions should be taken into account during initial construction. Fireproofed cable
tray networks should contain about 20% spare cables or tubing for future additions
and replacements because the tray is totally enclosed by the fireproofing system.
Where home run conduit and cable trays enter control buildings, wall penetrations
should be sealed to prevent entry of vapors, smoke, and fire.

Methods of Fireproofing
The following methods of fireproofing prevent internal temperature from exceeding
200°F for 20 minutes in a 2000°F fire per UL 1709.
• Wrap the conduit bank or tray with flexible blanket insulation designed for use
at 2000°F and cover with stainless or galvanized steel weather jacket and stain-
less steel bands.
3M's Interam system uses ceramic fiber blanket with an aluminum covering.
This material is thinner than conventional insulation (0.6 inches vs. 1.5 inches)
and can be used economically on odd shaped sections where fitup of thicker,
more rigid systems is difficult.
• Box-in cable trays with prefabricated panels (usually calcium silicate) and
weather jacketing. This type of system is economical for simple rectangular
shapes. Promat-H COROC II, and PABCO Super Firetemp can be used for this.

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1740 Materials Suppliers and Applicators

The recommended sources listed below are current as of (1994).

1741 Support Structures

Fireproofing Materials
Albi 800
Albi
Division of StanChem, Inc.
401 Berlin Street
East Berlin, CT 06023
Phone: (203) 828-0571
Chartek, COROC II
Textron Specialty Materials
2 Industrial Avenue
Lowell, MA 01851
Phone: (508) 454-5312
Fendolite MII, Marine Mandolite
Mandoval Vermiculite Products, Inc.
10850 Richmond, Suite 255
Houston, TX 77042
Phone: (800) 847-5768
Pittchar
PPG Industries
One PPG Place, 38 East
Pittsburgh, PA 15272
Phone: (412) 434-3131
PABCO Super Firetemp
PABCO
9800 NW Freeway
Suite 503
Houston, TX 77092
Phone: (713) 681-9173 or (800) 231-1024
Pyrocrete
Carboline
1401 South Hanley Rd.
St. Louis, MO 63144
Phone: (314) 664-1000
Thermolag
Thermal Science Inc. (TSI)
2200 Cassens Dr.
St. Louis, MO 63026
Phone: (314) 349-1233

Chevron Corporation 1700-19 December 1994

1700 Fireproofing Fire Protection Manual

1742 Critical Valves, Instrumentation, and Shutdown Systems

For sources of acceptable wire other than those listed below, we strongly recom-
mended that you consult with CRTC, Electrical Power Systems Division.

Valve Actuator Fireproofing

K-Mass Fireproofing System and Box Enclosures
Thermal Designs, Inc.
5352 Prudence Street
Houston, TX 77045
Phone: (713) 433-8110

High Temperature Wire

DeKoron Fire Resistant Circuit Integrity Cables
Furon Company
1199 So. Chillicothe Road
Aurora, OH 44202
Phone: (216) 562-9111
Firezone CRC
The Rockbestos Company
285 Nicoll Street
New Haven, CT 06511
Phone: (203) 772-2250
MI (Mineral Insulated) Cable
Pyrotenax
Phone: (415) 680-8928
SI Fire Cable
Whittaker Electronic Resources
1955 Surveyor Ave.
Simi Valley, CA 93063
Phone: (805) 584-4100

Cable Tray Fireproofing

3M Interam
3M Ceramic Materials Dept.
Building 225-4N, 3M Center
St. Paul, MN 55144-1000
Phone: (800) 328-1687
Promat H
Promat, Inc.
Village Center Drive
Reading, PA 19607
Phone: (215) 775-7775

December 1994 1700-20 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1700 Fireproofing

PABCO Super Firetemp

PABCO
9800 NW Freeway
Suite 503
Houston, TX 77092
Phone: (800) 231-1024

1750 Fireproofing Test Methods

Various tests measure the level of protection offered by a fireproofing material or
system. If the material fails the test after 2 hours, it gets a 2-hour rating on that test;
if it fails after 4 hours, it gets a 4-hour rating.

UL 1709 Standard for Rapid Rise Fire Tests of Protection Materials for
Structural Steel
Underwriters Laboratories, in cooperation with the industry, has developed tests to
more closely simulate fire conditions expected in a process plant. These tests are
now used by many companies, including Chevron. Fireproofing manufacturers use
the tests instead of ASTM E-119, because the UL 1709 tests more closely approxi-
mate hydrocarbon fires. These “high rise” fire tests include a faster temperature rise
and higher energy input than ASTM E-119 as shown in Figure 1700-2. The ASTM
E-119 test is primarily for buildings or combustible structures. Hydrocarbon fires
reach higher temperatures more quickly than building fires. The first standardized
oil industry test for high rise fires, UL 1709, came out in late 1984.
The ASTM E-119 fire time ratings are often longer than the UL 1709 counterpart.
For example, depending on the material, the ASTM E-119 4-hour test is equivalent
to only 2 to 3 hours in the UL 1709 test. Consequently, the UL 1709 test usually
shows that thicker protection is needed than that predicted by ASTM E-119. It also
shows that the behavior of some materials may be significantly poorer in hydro-
carbon fires than in conventional fires. This is why UL 1709 is now used both for
structural supports and for critical control systems.

ASTM E-119 Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials

In this test, a uniform thickness of fireproofing is applied on a steel I-beam. The I-
beam is then put in a firebox. Temperature of the steel I-beam is monitored by 12
thermocouples on the steel, evenly distributed along its length. Flame exposure and
radiant heat cause a rapid, controlled temperature rise (see Figure 1700-2). Failure
of the fireproofing occurs when any one thermocouple on the steel reaches 1200°F
or when the average temperature at any one level exceeds 1000°F.
The standard ASTM E-119 test beam is a W10X49—a 10-inch nominal beam
depth weighing 49 pounds per linear foot. If other sizes are used in the test, the
rating for a given thickness of fireproofing material can change. The Underwriters
Laboratory Fire Resistance Directory gives specific rating for different thicknesses
and configurations. The Materials Division has a copy of this directory. Some theo-
retical relationships have been developed between I-beam size, fireproofing thick-
ness, and fire. Underwriters Laboratory (UL) is paid by the manufacturer to test

Chevron Corporation 1700-21 December 1994

1700 Fireproofing Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 1700-5 Comparison of Standard and High Rise Time-Temperature Curves

their fireproofing materials. Therefore, nonproprietary materials like concrete have

no UL rating. However, favorable Company experience shows that concrete and the
H-V mix provide the degree of protection recommended. (Figures 1700-3 and
1700-4 compare the ASTM E-119 and UL 1709 results of some commonly used
fireproofing materials.)

1760 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2218 Guideline for Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and
Petrochemical Processing Plants

American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM)

ASTM E-119 Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials

Chevron References
Specifications and Engineering Forms:
CIV-EG-850 Placing and Curing Concrete
COM-EF-872 Acceptable Brands List

Standard Drawings:
GA-N33336 Standard Details—Concrete Fireproofing for Structural
Members
GD-N99994 Standard Fireproofing Specification for Vessel Skirts

December 1994 1700-22 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1700 Fireproofing

CRTC, Materials Division: “Fireproofing Tests with Hydrogen Jet Impingement,”

M.D. Gibb, January 1990, File No. 56.35
Civil and Structural Manual
Coatings Manual
Corrosion Prevention Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual

Underwriters' Laboratories (UL)

UL 1709 Standard for Rapid Rise Fire Tests of Protection Materials for
Structural Steel

Fire Resistance Directory

Chevron Corporation 1700-23 December 1994

1800 Critical Instrumentation

Abstract
This section discusses critical alarms, safety interlock systems, and fire protection
of critical instrumentation. More detailed design information on this subject is in
the Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1300. The primary expertise on
critical instrumentation lies in the CRTC Monitoring and Control Systems Group.

Contents Page

1810 Definition - Critical Instrumentation 1800-2

1820 Critical Alarms 1800-3
1830 Safety Interlock Systems 1800-4
1831 Pump Isolation
1832 Compressor Isolation
1833 Fired Heaters
1834 Critical Unattended Facilities
1835 Application to Specific Facilities
1840 Fire Protection for Critical Instrumentation 1800-8
1841 Level of Protection
1842 Methods of Protecting Critical Systems
1850 References 1800-9

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1800 Critical Instrumentation Fire Protection Manual

1810 Definition - Critical Instrumentation

In this section, critical instrumentation is defined as instrumentation that could
cause immediate loss of production or a major process hazard if it fails to operate
properly. Examples are as follows:
• Personnel hazard (fire, explosion, overpressure, uncontrolled release of
hazardous materials)
• Mechanical damage to major plant equipment
• Significant environmental impact
Critical instrumentation includes critical alarms and homerun conduits or cable
trays. Critical instrumentation also includes safety interlock systems needed to
safely shutdown and isolate a piece of equipment or a facility, such as emergency
shutdown systems (ESD) or emergency block valves (EBV). Safety interlock
systems either help prevent a release of flammable material, thus eliminating the
risk of fire, or in the event of a fire, isolate the equipment and remove the source of
fuel.

Design Considerations
Critical instrumentation must be carefully engineered. Improperly designed critical
instrumentation may not perform as required, and may even add hazards to the oper-
ation—by not responding to an emergency or by activating protective systems when
not called upon to do so. In the years 1989-1991, inadequate or non-functional
instrumentation had a significant impact on one-third of major incidents
(>$100,000). The potential decrease in fire loss during this time is $45MM–
$50MM and includes 10 incidents ($32MM) due to inadequate or lacking instru-
mentation and 4 incidents ($16MM) due to nonfunctional instrumentation.
For a detailed discussion of design considerations for critical instrumentation, refer
to Section 1300 of the Instrumentation and Control Manual. Specific applications
of critical instrumentation should follow these principles:
• Provide critical systems with their own sensors, signal transmitters, and actua-
tors or operating parts, separate from the process control functions. This elimi-
nates the possibility of a fault in the process control system causing a
malfunction of the critical system. For example, if a single transmitter served
both a controller and a high-level alarm, a faulty low-level signal from the
transmitter would cause the control valve to operate incorrectly. This same
faulty signal would prevent the high-level alarm from activating.
• Design critical alarms and safety interlock systems to fail to a safe condition
on loss of power or instrument air. Spurious trips are a concern with this type
of system. These can be minimized through reliable designs and an effective
testing and maintenance program.
• Access to critical alarm or shutdown set points should be restricted.
• Monitor and alarm critical process variables directly instead of indirectly. For
instance, temperature should not be monitored by a pressure sensor.

January 1997 1800-2 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1800 Critical Instrumentation

Testing
Design of critical systems should allow for in-service testing from the sensor to the
final element and in-service maintenance/calibration. Periodically test protective
systems and alarms to the primary element to ensure reliability. For example, the
reliability of a simple level alarm increases by a factor of 15 with monthly testing
as opposed to testing on a 3-year turnaround. Testing is even more critical on ener-
gize-to-trip systems where a component failure will not cause a shutdown or alarm.
The test procedures should include:
• Testing the alarm and/or shutdown back to the initiating signal. For example,
this could mean first verifying the accuracy of the level transmitter, then raising
the level to activate the alarm and/or shutdown system.
• Cycling the shutdown valves through their full stroke to the closed position to
determine if they have tight shutoff.
• Documenting alarm and/or shutdown set points, test results, date of test, name
of person performing the test, instrument no., and type of test performed.

1820 Critical Alarms

All alarms are not critical. Some alarms are important for operations of the facility,
and some may simply indicate status of field equipment. Figure 1800-1 is a flow-
chart to help determine when an alarm is considered “critical.” Because critical
alarms require separate alarm switches and transmitters in the field and separate
annunciation in the control room, they are more costly and should be chosen with
care.
Connect critical alarms to a dedicated, easily read and interpreted alarm indication
system. Separate critical alarm annunciator panels are recommended. The alarm
panel may be driven by signals from a DCS controller if appropriate redundancy is
designed into the system. Contact the CRTC Control System team for details.
Operators must be able to quickly observe and react to critical alarms to avoid a
potential release, fire, or major process upset. Using a separate annunciator panel
allows the operator to differentiate between critical alarms and non-critical
computer-generated alarms. “Operator overload” has occurred during several major
incidents in the last few years as operators are faced with dozens of alarms on the
DCS computer screens and are unable to distinguish between critical and non-crit-
ical alarms. All alarms displayed on DCS screens should be prioritized and color
coded to help highlight critical alarms.

Chevron Corporation 1800-3 January 1997

1800 Critical Instrumentation Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 1800-1 Critical Alarm Flowchart

S ta rt

(H 2 S M o n ito rs )
YES C ritic a l a la rm ;
T o x ic e m is s io n ? u s e s e p a ra te
a la rm tra n s m itte r

NO

Does
(F ire /H C V a p o r) c o n d itio n c a u s e m a jo r
YES YES
E n v iro n m e n ta l o r e q u ip m e n t d a m a g e , p o s s ib ly
fire h a z a rd ? e n d a n g e r p e rs o n n e l
o r u n it s h u td o w n ?

NO

NO
(B e n ze n e F la re )

M a n d a te d YES
by
a g e n c y?

NO
(F u rn a c e
L o w F lo w T rip )

YES
S h u td o w n s ys te m

NO
(L o w -L o w
In s tru m e n t A ir)
YES
Im m e d ia te lo s t
p ro d u c tio n

NO YES YES YES

(L o w -L o w L u b e
O il P re s s u re )
W ill U n s p a re d
YES NO Is m e c h a n ic a l NO
e q u ip m e n t fa il c ritic a l
P ro te c t E q u ip m e n t? d e s ig n lim it e q u ip m e n t?
o r s h u td o w n ?
exceeded?
(L u b e /S e a l
NO O il F a ilu re )
NO

N o rm a l p ro c e s s a la rm ;
u s e c o n tro l
tra n s m itte r

1830 Safety Interlock Systems

When to Consider Safety Interlock Systems
Emergency shutdown and isolation can be performed manually in many instances.
However, it is sometimes necessary to provide remote or automatic controls called
safety interlock systems, for this purpose. The primary objective of safety inter-
lock systems is to prevent the release of toxic or flammable substances. The deci-
sion to install safety interlock systems is usually made during the design stage of a
new facility, following analysis of the process hazards and evaluation of other

January 1997 1800-4 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1800 Critical Instrumentation

layers of protection. A Safety Objectives Analysis (SOA) can be used for this
purpose. Contact the CRTC Control Systems Team for information on the SOA
process. Consider safety interlock systems if equipment malfunction or incorrect
operation can result in injury, damage to equipment, or lost production or a release
of flammable or toxic materials, and any of the following conditions exist:
• The facility is unattended.
• Safe plant shutdown involves a critical sequencing of individual unit and equip-
ment shutdowns.
• The operator cannot respond quickly enough to avoid a hazardous situation.
• The operator is presented with too much information to troubleshoot and
respond appropriately to plant upset conditions.
• An installation represents a high capital investment.

Design Considerations
Specific application of safety interlock systems should follow these principles:
• Safety interlock systems are to protect people.
• Safety interlock systems are to protect equipment while providing acceptable
unit availability.
• The manual activating controls (switches, pushbuttons) must be accessible
during the fire or release. As a general rule, the controls are located at least 50
feet from the protected equipment. More spacing may be required depending
on the layout of the plant and the type of hydrocarbon being handled.
• Safety interlock systems should have pre-shutdown alarms to warn that a trip is
impending. This enables the operator to take corrective action if time permits
before the shutdown occurs.
• Safety interlock systems should have a manual reset so that the process
remains shut down until it is manually cleared by the operator. A manual reset
eliminates the potential hazards of the protective system clearing (and the shut-
down valve opening) before the condition that caused the shutdown has been
investigated and rectified.
• Safety interlock systems should be separate from process control functions to
minimize the possibility of routine maintenance and modification work
inducing faults or spurious trips. Power supplies and distribution should allow
non-safety-related equipment to be powered down for maintenance without
impairing the safety interlock system operation.
• Where pneumatic actuators are used, primary instrumentation air should have
an automatic backup supply. In addition to installed spare compressor capacity,
inert gas systems can be used in the system.
• Whenever possible, use the safety interlock system to shut down equipment
during a planned shutdown, in order to test the protective system.

Chevron Corporation 1800-5 January 1997

1800 Critical Instrumentation Fire Protection Manual

• Safety interlock systems are to be well labeled and visible.

1831 Pump Isolation

Pumps generally have a higher potential for failure than other more passive compo-
nents (e.g., process piping, vessels). Depending on the process conditions and type
of fluid being pumped, a bearing or a seal failure may lead to a hydrocarbon
release. The release could ignite from hot metal surfaces of the failed seal or
bearing, or from other nearby sources of ignition. If the fluid being pumped is
above its auto-ignition temperature or above 600°F, there is a higher risk of fire
because the fluid may ignite spontaneously when it contacts air.
LPG is also of particular concern because of the potential for a large vapor cloud
release, which can travel long distances to find an ignition source. The ensuing
explosion and fire can cause major damage to the plant.
A large vessel feeding a pump can be a major source of fuel, which, if released into
a pump fire, could increase the magnitude of the fire. To prevent escalation of an
incident, emergency isolation valves are recommended on the suction of pumps in
the following situation:
• The pump is fed by a vessel containing 2500 gallons or more of stock AND
• The pump handles volatile liquids (C3-C5 , >15 psia vapor pressure) or hydro-
carbon liquid above its auto ignition temperature or 600°F.
It may also be desirable to install emergency isolation valves on pumps handling
flammable liquids (<100°F flash) or liquid above its flash point if the pumps are
located in a congested area where access is difficult and exposure of adjacent equip-
ment high.
The emergency isolation valve can be a manual block valve, located out of the fire
area, more than 50 feet from the pump. If it is not possible to locate a manual valve
that distance from the pump, the isolation valve should be a remotely actuated fire-
safe Emergency Block Valve (EBV) activated by a switch located out of the fire
area, more than 50 feet from the pump.
The actuators for EBVs should be a fail-safe design and should activate a shutdown
of the pump and other affected equipment. The control system itself should be
designed in accordance with Section 1300 of the Instrumentation and Control
Manual.
EBV design alternatives include:
• Retrofitting the existing pump suction gate valve with an actuator such as the
Bettis Linear Actuator. (Bettis 713-463-5100)
• Installing a quarter turn fire-safe valve with a fail-safe mechanical spring actu-
ator such as the Fisher Posi Seal fire-safe high performance butterfly valve
with a Fire Sentry Actuator. (203-599-1140)

January 1997 1800-6 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1800 Critical Instrumentation

• Installing a quarter turn fire-safe ball valve or butterfly valve with an air piston
or diaphragm actuator such as the Bettis air piston actuator.
• Installing a spring loaded quick closing valve such as the Greenwood Valve.
(619-433-5860)
• Installing an air or electric motor operated valve with fire-proofed actuator and
controls. (This is generally the highest cost, least reliable alternative.)
For pairs of pump, it is recommended that an EBV be installed on the suction of
each pump to facilitate testing.
Refer to the Instrumentation & Control Manual, Section 1360, for EBV design
guidelines.

1832 Compressor Isolation

Compressor systems should be designed for equipment isolation in the event of a
fire or leak. Locate manual block valves away from the compressor for safe access.
Critical compressor systems should have automatic isolation and depressuring
valves, called “block and bleed,” activated either manually or automatically upon
detection of fire or high concentrations of flammable vapors in the air. These
systems should fail to a safe condition. Refer to Section 2000 for more information
on compressors.

1833 Fired Heaters

Fired heaters with potential for a serious incident should have a protective system
that shuts off the fuel gas flow to the firebox upon loss of process circulation or loss
of fuel pressure. Refer to the Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual for
more detailed information on the need for emergency shutdowns.
Feed pump and compressor valves, and feed control valves are normally used to
stop the flow of process fluids to furnace coils. These valves should be located at
least 50 feet from the furnace unless they are designed to operate in a fire. Emer-
gency isolation valves in a furnace outlet line are also desirable where a backflow
of downstream materials would have a major effect on the duration and extent of a
tube-failure fire. Factors favoring the installation of an EBV on the outlet of a
furnace include high pressure, large downstream inventories of volatile liquids, and
the absence of downstream facilities for vapor blowdown or liquid removal.

1834 Critical Unattended Facilities

If operators are not present to respond to plant upsets, and if the release of materials
handled present a potential hazard to the public or environment, or a substantial
loss to the Company, protective systems should automatically shut down (and
depressure, if appropriate) the facility upon detection of a potentially hazardous
condition. Special fixed extinguishing systems may be appropriate as well.

Chevron Corporation 1800-7 January 1997

1800 Critical Instrumentation Fire Protection Manual

Activation of the emergency shutdown system or of a fire extinguishing system

should be monitored at a constantly attended location. Fire or gas detection instru-
mentation should also be designed to transmit a signal to a constantly attended loca-
tion.

1835 Application to Specific Facilities

Emergency isolation or shutdown systems as they apply to specific facilities (e.g.,
offshore platforms, loading racks) are discussed in Sections 3100 to 4100.

1840 Fire Protection for Critical Instrumentation

If critical systems are protected from fire damage, fire losses can be minimized by
keeping essential control circuitry operational during the early stages of a major fire
and by minimizing shutdowns resulting from minor fires.
This section gives guidance for protecting critical instrumentation systems,
including valve motor operators, power, and control wiring. Terms used here were
defined in Section 1710. See Section 1730 for specific methods of fireproofing for
critical system components.
Protection from potential fire damage is warranted for critical systems if exposure
to fire could result in functional failure of these systems and thus increase risk to
employees or cause substantial loss of capital or production.

1841 Level of Protection

Protection should permit emergency function for at least 20 minutes with fire envi-
ronment temperatures up to 2000°F as defined by UL 1709 (see Section 1750).

1842 Methods of Protecting Critical Systems

It is important to take a “total system approach” to protecting critical instrumenta-
tion. This means protecting all components of the critical system (power, control,
instrument, and alarm wiring, and pneumatic tubing,valve actuators, junction boxes,
and home runs). The following recommendations will help to ensure critical system
function during a fire.
Fail Safety: Use a design in which the critical valve goes to a safe condition if its
control signal is lost during a fire. Generally, if an EBV is fail-safe, fire proofing of
the system components is not required.
Minimize Fire Exposure:
• Locate critical instrumentation valves and components outside the fire-exposed
envelope. These areas should be identified as early in a project as possible.
• Route critical power, control, instrument, and alarm wiring and pneumatic
tubing outside the fire-exposed envelope. Cable trays and conduit banks should

January 1997 1800-8 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1800 Critical Instrumentation

be routed underground or on the upper levels of elevated pipeways at least 30

feet above the ground and outside the drainage path of hydrocarbon spills.
Fire Resistant Design: Use inherently fire resistant designs, such as high tempera-
ture wiring.
Fire Protection:
• Fire-proof all components of non-fail-safe critical systems within the fire-
exposed envelope. See Section 1730 for specific methods of fireproofing for
critical system components.
• Or, provide an automatic fire water protection system—either fixed sprays or
monitors, which will turn on in the first 30 seconds of fire exposure.
Locating critical instrumentation outside the fire-exposed envelope or designing the
instrumentaion to “fail safe” are the most reliable and often the most economical
ways to protect critical instrumentation from fire. High-temperature wiring is more
costly than standard wiring, but is practical if only a small number of critical
systems are being protected. Properly installed fireproofing is reliable, but can be
expensive. Fire water spray protection is less reliable because it is an “active”
system that may fail and, therefore, must be tested frequently.

1850 References
Chevron References
Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual
“Thermally-Activated Fire-Safe Emergency Block Valve,” CRTC Monitoring and
Control Systems Unit, July 1991

Chevron Corporation 1800-9 January 1997

1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame
Arrestors

Abstract
This section highlights pressure relief valve and flare system requirements from a
fire protection viewpoint, and addresses conditions that place high demand on
relieving devices. The Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1200 and API
RP 520 and 521 are the primary references on relief valve and relief system design.
This section also describes the operation of and applications for thermal, water seal,
and stream velocity flame arrestors.

Contents Page

1910 Pressure Relief Systems 1900-3

1911 Basic Design Considerations
1912 Criteria for Determining Relief Load
1913 Relief Valves Discharging to Atmosphere
1914 Closed Relief Systems
1915 Typical Relief Valve Arrangements
1916 Use of Block Valves on Pressure Relief Valves
1920 Atmospheric Venting 1900-7
1930 Flares 1900-7
1940 Flame Arrestors 1900-7
1941 Background Information
1942 Thermal-type Flame Arrestors
1943 Water Seal-type Flame Arrestors
1944 Velocity-type Flame Arrestors
1945 Detonation Arrestors
1946 Applications
1950 Vapor Recovery and Vapor Processing 1900-13

Chevron Corporation 1900-1 December 1994

1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors Fire Protection Manual

1960 Inerting, Enrichment, and Dilution Systems 1900-14

1970 References 1900-15

December 1994 1900-2 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors

1910 Pressure Relief Systems

1911 Basic Design Considerations

Basic design requirements are detailed in the following publications:
• Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1200, Relief Systems
• API RP 520, “Design and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Systems in
Refineries”
• API RP 521, “Guide for Pressure Relief and Depressuring Systems”
• Section VIII, Division I of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
These guidelines cover the following areas:
1. Determining emergency relieving rate requirements
2. Sizing and selecting relief valves
3. Establishing the relief loads for the design of relief headers and the disposal
system

Single Risk Concept

The single risk concept specifies that only one emergency (or group of interrelated
emergencies) will occur at one time, and that the emergency or group of emergen-
cies develops from a single fundamental cause. The probability that multiple unre-
lated incidents would occur simultaneously is so low that it is not a credible
consideration.
The size and cost of safety facilities would be excessive if they were designed to
handle every conceivable emergency and to handle them all simultaneously. Conse-
quently, the single risk concept has been accepted as the basic design criteria for
sizing safety relief valves and discharge systems.
The single risk emergency that results in the largest load on the safety facilities is
called the largest single risk and forms a basis for design of the safety equipment.
The emergency establishing maximum loads for individual safety valves could be
different from that for maximum loads for the closed discharge system. For
example, loss of the pumpout pumps could result in the maximum individual
safety valve load on a vessel, while fire could result in the maximum overall
system load in the same area. A plant-wide utility failure could also produce
maximum load on the relief system (see API RP 520).

1912 Criteria for Determining Relief Load

Typical conditions requiring relief protection are covered in API RP 520 and 521.
Relief capacity under an external fire scenario can be calculated using API RP 520.

Chevron Corporation 1900-3 December 1994

1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors Fire Protection Manual

Multiple Vessels
When more than one vessel is protected by a single safety valve, the combined
wetted surface—below 25 feet—of all the vessels connected to the single safety
valve is used in computing heat input from fire.

1913 Relief Valves Discharging to Atmosphere

Design Considerations
In addition to complying with local and environmental requirements, relief valves
discharging directly to the atmosphere should meet the following good fire and
safety practices:
• Only noncondensable vapors should be discharged to atmosphere.
• Discharge point of atmospheric releases must be located and oriented so that
flammable concentrations do not reach ignition sources.
• Ignition of the effluent would not expose adjacent equipment or personnel.
• Vapor must not be toxic.
• Per API 2510A, the velocity of discharge at rated capacity should not exceed
100 ft/sec.
• The atmospheric vent shall be designed per Section 1920.

Acceptable Arrangements
If equipment can be easily removed from service, relief valve isolation capability is
not important. To provide onstream testing and maintenance, the following accept-
able arrangements are listed in order of preference:
1. Dual relief valves tied in to a three-way valve so that at least one relief valve
remains in service at all times.
2. A single relief valve with a block valve between it and the pressurized system,
providing that a positive seal or lock or other control method is employed to
ensure that the block valve is open. Management should institute strict control
over the closure of these block valves and maintain a program of regular
inspection to ensure that the block valves remain open. Check local regulations
on block valve requirements.
This method meets the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Paragraph UG-
135 and Appendix M requirements.
3. A single relief valve with no block valve between it and the pressurized system.
This method does not meet the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code re-
quirements and is discouraged.

December 1994 1900-4 Chevron Corporation

Fire Protection Manual 1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors

1914 Closed Relief Systems

Design Considerations
• Relief valve discharge piping and relief headers should be designed in accor-
dance with API RP 520 and 521.
• Piping and knockout drum materials should be suitable for auto-refrigeration
temperatures.
• Where it is readily apparent that a group of relief devices could operate simulta-
neously, such as during a cooling water failure, capacity should be provided for
this emergency.
• Frequently, however, the characteristics of a process are such that operation of
one safety valve removes sufficient material from the system so that a down-
stream relief device will discharge less fluid, and may even reset. In such
cases, special design may be warranted.

1915 Typical Relief Valve Arrangements

Figure 1900-1 shows a typical arrangement of relief valves for protection of frac-
tionating equipment. Note that a single safety valve protects the fractionating
column, the overhead condenser and the reflux drum. Shell and tube exchangers
seldom have pressure relief valves (PRVs) for fire exposure. The reasoning is that
vapors generated in such vessels quickly flow unrestricted to the next accumulator
or tower and are pressure relieved there. However, exchangers often have thermal
relief valves to protect against overpressuring the cold side.

1916 Use of Block Valves on Pressure Relief Valves

Block valves are sometimes installed between the vessel and the relief valves to
allow inspection and maintenance of the relief valve while the system remains in
service. However, per the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, Para-
graph UG-135 and Appendix M, a block valve can only be installed between a
safety valve and the system it protects if:
1. Closing the block valve will not leave the system with less than the required
relieving capacity, and
2. The block valve is locked or sealed open and is only closed by an “authorized
person,” and
3. There is additional operator monitoring of the system pressure when the block
valve is closed
The concern with block valves is that they may be closed by mistake or they may
fail closed (e.g., the gate falls off). Locking or sealing the block valve open protects
against the valve being mistakenly closed.

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Fig. 1900-1 Relief Valve Arrangement

Any block valve that is installed so that it can be closed by an operator shall be one
of the following designs:
• A gate valve or slide gate valve installed with its stem at or below the hori-
zontal position
• A slide gate valve with its stem above the horizontal position when a positive,
secondary and externally visible device is provided to fix the wedge in the
open position, such as a locked pin through the body and wedge
• A globe valve installed with the pressure source under the disc (assuming the
globe valve pressure drop does not exceed the 3% maximum allowable pres-
sure drop for the system)
• A quarter-turn valve (e.g., plug or butterfly valve) with a position indicator
positively secured to the stem

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Fire Protection Manual 1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors

1920 Atmospheric Venting

Vent lines and vent stacks on all atmospheric relief valves shall be installed as
follows:
• Stacks should be at least three feet above the vessel, and 12 feet above grade.
Stacks should also be 10 feet horizontally from mechanical equipment, or
seven feet above the highest platform within a 10 foot radius of the vent outlet,
whichever is highest.
• They should be properly supported and braced, with no caps, bends or obstruc-
tions in the discharge path.
• Discharge should generally be directed upwards, away from personnel or equip-
ment.
• Drain holes must be provided at the low point of the discharge stack to prevent
liquid or ice accumulation in the relief valve discharge. The drain opening
should be 3/8-inch diameter. If larger, the drain hole must be directed away
from the vessel and piping to preclude flame from the hole impinging on the
vessel or piping, in the event of an ignition. Piping to safely direct gases that
may be blowing from the drain hole shall be limited to a single ell or an ell and
short nipple to minimize risk of plugging.
• Where vent stacks on hydrocarbon relief valves are susceptible to ignition by
lightning, consider installing a snuffing steam connection tied into the
discharge riser.
• Pressure relief valves capable of venting liquids should discharge through a
separator to recover the liquids.

1930 Flares
Flares, knockout drums and seal pots are discussed in the Instrumentation and
Control Manual, Section 1200, and in API RP 520 and 521.
Section 1300 gives the minimum spacing recommendations for flares.

1940 Flame Arrestors

1941 Background Information

Flame burning at the open end of a vent or flare may continue to burn at that point
provided either of the following conditions exist:
• The mixture being vented is above the flammable range in the pipe, or
• The mixture is in the flammable range, but the velocity at the open end exceeds
the flame propagation velocity

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A laboratory Bunsen burner is a good example. Under normal conditions, a flam-

mable mixture of gas and air flows through the burner tube at a velocity which
exceeds the flame propagation velocity. When the gas supply valve is closed slowly,
a point is reached when the mixture velocity drops below the flame propagation
velocity and the flame enters the burner tube. When this happens, the unstable
flame quickly accelerates down the tube toward the supply of flammable mixture. If
the burner tube were long enough, the flame propagation velocity would accelerate
through the subsonic range and become supersonic.
See Figure 1900-2 for the relationship between flame speed and pipe length.

Fig. 1900-2 General Effect of Pipe Length on Flame Speed

A deflagration occurs when the flame front propagates by transferring heat and
mass to the unburned vapor-air mixture ahead of the front. Flame speeds can range
from 1-350 M/sec and peak overpressures can be as high as 20 times the initial pres-
sure. If the flame front continues unchecked, it can continue to accelerate due to the
shock wave produced in the front of the flame. A detonation occurs when the
flame velocity reaches supersonic speeds of 2000-2500 M/sec. Peak overpressures
can range from 20-100 times the initial pressure.
The distance required for a deflagration burning at subsonic speeds to accelerate to
a detonation burning at supersonic flame speed depends on the flammable mixture,
temperature, pressure, the enclosure and its length and configuration, and the igni-
tion source. For these reasons, it is imperative that burning gases be controlled near
the ignition point while the burning rate is manageable. Normally this is considered
to be about 30 pipe diameters, or 15 feet.

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Fire Protection Manual 1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors

A flame arrestor is a device or method that prevents the propagation of flame past a
certain point for a specified period of time. Because no arrestor is 100% effective
for all conditions, such a device should be considered only as a safeguard for the
designated design conditions.
Occasionally, the term “in-line” flame arrestor is used. This can be a misnomer
because “in-line” implies that a flame arrestor that can be placed anywhere in the
pipe. Flame arrestors are tested by the manufacturer for maximum distances from
the atmospheric outlet of the pipe in which they are installed. Typically, this is 15
feet. There have been many occasions where flame arrestors were installed incor-
rectly. It is imperative that flame arrestors be installed in accordance with the manu-
facturer's instructions. If there is a need to place the flame arrestor farther from the
atmospheric outlet, or within a closed piping system, it must be tested for that loca-
tion and service. The Fire Protection Staff is available for consultation.

1942 Thermal-type Flame Arrestors

This type of flame arrestor employs a cellular heat-absorbing medium to stop the
flame by absorbing the heat of combustion, while at the same time permitting gas
or vapor to flow through it. Other thermal-type flame arrestors use multiple layers
of screens or perforated metal plates, bundles of short metal tubes, alternating
layers of crimped and flat metal sheets, and packed spherical pellets of metal. In the
usual design, the length of the path in the direction of gas travel is several inches,
and the size of the aperture is on the order of 1/10 inch in the smallest dimension.
The principle of a thermal-type flame arrestor is the extinguishment of flame by
cooling. The cooling is accomplished by combining a small passageway for the
flow of fuel and a large amount of heat-absorbing material. Heat is absorbed by the
metal plates or tubes, lowering the temperature of the vapor below its ignition
temperature so that it no longer supports combustion.
If fuel flow through the arrestor is not safely stopped and the condition allowing the
flame to burn at the arrestor is not corrected, the flame will continue to burn at the
face of the heat-absorbing surface in the arrestor. If the flame arrestor is exposed to
long burning periods, heat from the flame will raise the temperature of the arresting
medium and its enclosure, and it is possible for the heat absorbing medium to
become hot enough to ignite the flammable mixture on the downstream side of the
arrestor. The thermal-type arrestor has a number of drawbacks which restrict its
application to places where continuous flow of a flammable mixture is unlikely.
Some of these drawbacks are:
• Failure to arrest flames if not installed in conditions similar to the ones for
which it was tested and approved.
• Failure under prolonged burning
• Clogging of arrestor elements from deposits formed by vapors when they come
in contact with air, or by solid materials carried by the gas stream
• Freezing of moisture condensation in the arrestor elements

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• Reduced flow capacity of the system due to the large pressure drop across the
arrestor element
• Failure of the small gas or vapor passages through corrosion or mechanical
damage
For vent application in systems open to the atmosphere, use a UL-approved flame
arrestor.

1943 Water Seal-type Flame Arrestors

This device employs a water seal in which a gas stream bubbles through the liquid.
Gas distribution is important to prevent channeling of the stream and to maintain
the flow as a stream of individual bubbles. The gas inlet connects to a distribution
pipe drilled with rows of holes or vee notches below water level to form the water
seal. The outlet connection is located on the top of the drum.
The water seal-type arrestor is most suitable for installation in systems where the
following conditions prevail:
1. The flow is only in one direction.
2. There is a reliable flowing water supply to assure the seal is not lost.
3. The allowable pressure loss through the arrestor is at least several inches of
water.
4. Freezing of the seal will not occur.
The seal at the base of flares is often of this type.

1944 Velocity-type Flame Arrestors

The velocity flame arrestor employs a method by which the flow velocity of the
flammable mixture is maintained at a higher rate than the velocity of flame propaga-
tion through the mixture. The Bunsen burner is an example of this type of flame
arrestor. A fuel-air mixture within the flammable range can be ignited above the
burner tube, where the velocity has slowed due to expansion of the stream.
However, flame does not pass down into the tube (or flash back) because the flow
velocity in the burner tube is greater than the flame propagation velocity of the
mixture.
If the flow velocity is sufficiently reduced, flashback can occur. When the gas flow
velocity falls to near the flashback velocity, steam can be turned on, thus increasing
flow velocity and tending to inert the flowing mixture. Velocity flame arrestors
usually consist of a Venturi-type tube provided with a steam nozzle located close to
the throat or steam ports in the throat of the tube. Depending on the corrosive
nature of the gas medium, one system of steam injection may have advantages over
the other. Other mediums may prove as effective and more economical than steam.
Also, it may be economical to inject the steam or other gas continuously.

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Fire Protection Manual 1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors

Tests have shown the flame flashback velocity to be a function of pipe diameter,
fuel-air mixture properties, and gas temperature. Because heating of the Venturi
throat may allow a flame to flash through the throat, flame should not be allowed to
reside at the throat. Flow velocity must be sufficient to hold the flame at the igni-
tion source. Where this is not always possible, a temperature sensor can be installed
to detect flame at the Venturi. This can be designed to automatically increase flow
or admit steam. The velocity-type arrestor may be used for continuously flowing
streams such as air-gas mixtures from asphalt air blowing stills.
As with thermal-type flame arrestors, velocity flame arrestors must be designed to
the conditions for which they have been tested. Normally this is about 20 pipe diam-
eters and not more than 50 feet from the ignition source. Distance from the ignition
source is critical. These flame arrestors are designed to prevent flashback, but if the
flame speed is too high, flame may pass through the flame arrestor. This spacing
limit ensures that the flame does not have sufficient distance to accelerate past its
flashback velocity.
The velocity-type arrestor is most suitable for installations where the following
conditions prevail:
• Gases or fumes are to be burned in a waste disposal furnace
• Flow is in one direction only
• Flow rate is normally constant
• Allowable pressure loss through the arrestor is small

Minimum Velocity
The minimum velocity at the venturi throat must be greater than the flame propaga-
tion velocity. The flame propagation velocity (flashback) through a flammable
mixture can be calculated using the following equation:
V = 1.1034 (µ/ρ)0.3070 (gF,L)0.6930 (D)0.6525
where:
V = flame velocity (ft/sec)
µ = viscosity of hydrocarbon (cp)
ρ = density of hydrocarbon (lb/ft3)
gF,L = laminar flashback gradient at flowing temperature(sec-1)
D = pipe i.d. (in)
Flame speeds of flammable mixtures vary from 5 ft/sec to 100 ft/sec with methane
at the slower end and acetylene and hydrogen among the fastest. Typical values of
gF,L at 78°F are:
Propane 550 sec-1
Methane 385 sec-1
Ethane 1400 sec-1

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To correct for flowing temperature, multiply the above values by

 temp °R 2.0771
-------------------- 
 538 °R 

1945 Detonation Arrestors

Detonation arrestors are essentially heavy duty thermal-type flame arrestors
designed to handle the peak overpressures of a detonation. These would only be
used in “closed” systems where the UL criteria for distance from the atmospheric
outlet or ignition sources cannot be met.
Large detonation arrestors (18-inch) are currently (1989-1990) being tested for use
in marine vapor recovery. Several smaller detonation arrestors (less than 8 inches)
have already been tested. Consult the Fire Protection Staff prior to selecting and
installing a detonation arrestor.
The current testing standards for detonation arrestors are in Appendix A of 33 CFR
154, the USCG Standard for Marine Vapor Recovery Systems and UL 525.

1946 Applications
Atmospheric Storage Tanks
Steel cone roof storage tanks equipped with pressure-vacuum-type breather valves
should not be equipped with flame arrestors. Cone roof petroleum storage tanks
should be operated with a vapor space that is either too lean or too rich to burn.
Properly operated tanks will not present a condition where a flammable atmosphere
exists both within the tank and through the breather valve, and for some distance
outside of the tank. Even if a flammable atmosphere did exist, the discharge
velocity past the breather valve pallet would be greater than the flashback velocity
if the valve discharges directly to atmosphere. Also, an ignition source must be
present at the time of the flammable mixture discharge. Years of operating tanks
safely shows that the risk of both a flammable atmosphere and an ignition source
occurring at the same time is small.
In addition, putting a flame arrestor under a breather valve is not recommended
because of the need for additional maintenance to prevent clogging, plugging, or
freezing of the arrestor. This can cause a tank to collapse by vacuum if products are
being pumped out.
Additional information on this subject may be found in the API PSD 2210, “Flame
Arrestors for Tanks Storing Petroleum Products.”

Venting Systems to Atmosphere

Flame arrestors are not necessary on process vents normally discharging a rich
mixture to the atmosphere because there cannot be a fire inside the vent. If the

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Fire Protection Manual 1900 Pressure Relief, Flares, Flame Arrestors

process involves intermittent venting, or venting of a flammable mixture, consider-

ation should be given to installing liquid seals or venting to a flare system.

Fume Systems
Where gases or fumes are to be burned in a waste disposal furnace (e.g., some
vapor recovery systems) and there is a possibility of flammable mixtures being
carried in the system, a water seal or velocity-type flame arrestor should be
installed to prevent possible flashback from the burners. It is also possible to direct
a certain amount of the fuel gas into the waste stream, thereby making that stream
too rich to burn. If this is done, a flame arrestor is not needed.

Other Flame Arrestor Uses

Any gas disposal or gas handling system that feeds the gas stream into a flare,
furnace, incinerator or other high temperature disposal system should have flame
arrestor protection. Examples are:
• Flares, between the pilot flame and the incoming flow.
• Off gases from asphalt air blowing stills—install a flame arrestor near the incin-
eration point.
• Vapor recovery systems for ship, truck and railcar loading should have flame
arrestors to protect the recovery equipment from internal system ignition
sources and external on-site ignition sources.
• Miscellaneous process plant waste gases that are incinerated in furnaces or on-
site incinerators should have flame arrestors in the waste gas line near the incin-
eration point.

1950 Vapor Recovery and Vapor Processing

More stringent air quality regulations have resulted in requirements to capture and
process flammable vapor which, in the past, would have been vented to atmosphere.
Examples of areas where vapor processing or vapor recovery is used include:
• marine terminal loading facilities
• waste water treatment plants and tank vents
• waste treatment facilities
• degassing facilities for tank maintenance
• marketing loading racks
• production tank batteries
• waste gas burning facilities in process plants
Handling flammable vapors in closed systems can result in the potential for
increased risks. The following key areas should be considered in the design of these
facilities:

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Overpressure/Vacuum Protection. Tanks and vessels need to have overpres-

sure/vacuum protection independent of the vapor processing system to prevent
damage from a malfunction of the vapor-processing system.
Potential Ignition Sources. The vapors being processed can be in the flammable
range. Therefore, control of ignition sources is critical.
• Vapor lines should be electrically conductive to prevent potential for static
buildup
• Use of mechanical equipment to move vapors should be minimized.
• If mechanical equipment is needed to move vapors, it should be designed to
prevent sparks under both normal and equipment malfunction conditions.
Examples of this are liquid ring vacuum pumps and blowers with non sparking
parts. Protective instrumentation (i.e. high vibration alarms, low lube oil pres-
sure and flow alarms, low sealing liquid level, etc.) to warn of an impending
equipment malfunction should be considered.
• Atmospheric vents should be located well away from possible ignition sources
( see Section 1913)
• Locate unclassified electrical equipment at least 50 feet away from vapor
recovery equipment or install equipment designed for use in a classified area.
• In waste handling facilities, activated carbon adsorption units have overheated
to ignition temperatures. These systems should be protected by detonation
arresters and high bed temperature shutdowns.
• Flares, thermal oxidizers and incinerators are open flame devices which under
certain conditions can cause flashback into the vapor line. In general, there
should be at least two levels of protection against flashback in these types of
facilities. This can include:
– a flame arrester at the atmospheric connection. For a flare, this would be
just below the pilot and flare tips. On a thermal oxidizers or incinerators,
this could be the vapor line connection to the shell.
– an approved detonation arrester in the line (see Section 1945)
– a water seal drum in the vapor line usually within 30 pipe diameters of the
vessel.
– a system to keep the vapor outside of the flammable range. This can be
done with enrichment, dilution, or inerting (see Section 1960)
– an automatic isolation valve to quickly isolate the vapor line from the igni-
tion source if flame or heat are detected in the line.
NFPA 30, Section 5-5, can be used as a guideline for vapor processing systems.

1960 Inerting, Enrichment, and Dilution Systems

Inerting, enrichment and dilution systems are designed to keep the vapor composi-
tion outside the flammable range. Explosions have occurred in the industry because

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inert systems have been taken out of service. These systems should be designed to
NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems. These systems are critical
safety systems. As such, they must be designed for easy inspection and testing by
operators. This inspection and testing includes:
• routine testing of vapor to verify composition is outside the flammable range.
Critical processes use continuous analyzers to do this.
• routine testing of inert, enrichment or dilution gas to verify composition. This
is especially important if the gas is being supplied as a byproduct of another
process (example: CO2 produced in a hydrogen plant)
• verification of adequate flow of inert, enrichment or dilution gas and
alarms/shutdowns on low flow.
There should be a management system in place to prevent operating the facilities if
the inert, enrichment or dilution systems are out of service.

1970 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 520 Design and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Systems in Refineries
API 521 Guide for Pressure Relief and Depressuring Systems
API 525 Testing Procedure for Pressure-Relieving Devices Discharging
Against Variable Back Pressure
API 2000 Guide for Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks
API 2001 Fire Protection in Refineries
API 2210 Flame Arrestors for Tanks Storing Petroleum Products

API Guide for the Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter XVI, Pressure-
Relieving Devices

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

Department of Transportation (DOT)

United States Coast Guard (USCG)
33 CFR Part 154 Guidelines for Detonation Flame Arrestors

Underwriters Laboratories
UL525 Flame Arrestors

Chevron References
Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1200

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2000 Process Equipment

Abstract
This section discusses fire safety design features and techniques for preventing and
controlling fires around process equipment. Included are:
• Pumps
• Compressors
• Internal combustion engines
• Tanks
• Columns and vessels
• Fired heaters and boilers
• Heat transfer equipment
• Piping

This section supplements the detailed design information given in the Corporation
manuals for each of these subject areas.

Contents Page

2010 Pumps 2000-3

2011 Some Typical Failure Modes
2012 Fire-safe Design
2013 Pump and Driver Inspections
2014 Fire Control Design Features
2020 Compressors 2000-6
2021 Fire Protection Design Features
2022 Piping
2023 Hydraulic and Lube Oil Piping
2024 Explosion Hazards in Compressed Air Systems
2025 Shutdown and Alarm Systems
2030 Internal Combustion Engines 2000-9
2031 General Information

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2032 Types of Company IC Engines

2033 Engine Modifications for Classified Areas
2034 Fire Protection
2040 Tanks 2000-17
2050 Columns and Vessels 2000-17
2051 Fire-safe Design Features
2052 Fire-safe Design and Construction
2053 Operating Safety Features
2054 Gas Freeing Provisions
2055 External Fire Exposure Risk
2056 Supplemental Fire Protection
2057 Protection Systems for Higher Risk Processes
2058 Inspection and Maintenance
2060 Fired Heaters and Boilers 2000-23
2070 Other Heat Transfer Equipment 2000-23
2071 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers
2072 Air-cooled Exchangers
2073 Cooling Towers
2074 Heat Transfer Liquids in Closed Systems
2080 Piping 2000-26
2081 Materials
2082 Fire-safe Valve Design
2083 Gaskets
2084 Limitations for Piping and Fittings
2085 General Fire-safe Piping Features
2086 Use of Resilient-sealed Couplings
2087 Nonmetallic and Nonmetallic Lined Steel Pipe
2090 References 2000-35

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Fire Protection Manual 2000 Process Equipment

2010 Pumps

2011 Some Typical Failure Modes

Pump seal or packing failures are recurring problems in the industry. In addition to
normal wear and tear on the seal, failure may also be caused by the following:
• Bearing failure of the driver or pump shaft. Vibration resulting from such fail-
ures will destroy the seal.
• Coupling failures will also result in vibration that will destroy seals.
• Failed bearings can also generate frictional heat, igniting packing leakage or
seal leakage.
Throat bushings and bearing cooling streams are installed to mitigate the conse-
quences of these failures. Tracking and measuring critical pump and motor vibra-
tion significantly reduces vibration failures.

2012 Fire-safe Design

Pump Cases
Pumps in petroleum facilities, chemical plants and other plants or facilities
handling flammable or hazardous materials should have steel or alloy cases suitable
for the service. Cast iron cases should be limited to nonhazardous, noncritical
service where exposure of public and adjacent facilities is very low. Cast iron
pumps must be installed in such a manner that connecting piping will not exces-
sively stress pump cases. See the Pump Manual.

Mechanical Seals and Packing

Leaks can occur at pump seals and pump shaft packing. The frequency of seal fail-
ures can be reduced by using double seals. Therefore, double seals should be
considered in services where a high degree of reliability is required. This may be
appropriate for toxic materials or to meet environmental requirements. Mechanical
seals, either single or double, are preferred over packing because of their higher reli-
ability, longer life, and lower probability of leakage.

Throat Bushings
Pump cases should have close fitting shaft bushings to prevent excessive flow if a
seal or packing fails. Throat bushings for pumps handling LPG, any stock above its
flashpoint, or toxic materials should be retained by shoulders, suitable dowel pins
or screws. Refer to the Pump Manual for details.

Seal or Packing Quench

Where serious hazard might result from gland leakage, pumps handling hot oils in
excess of 350°F should be fitted with water quench glands per the Pump Manual.

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2000 Process Equipment Fire Protection Manual

Running Against a Closed Block Valve

Avoid prolonged running against a shutoff head. In some situations requiring a
large turndown, a minimum flow bypass may be justified.

Small Piping Connections

Small fittings on pump cases for pressure gages, sample connections, vapor vents
and drains should be seal-welded to the pump case and up to the first valve. Typical
bridge-weld construction drawings in the Piping Manual show construction of
small piping that will minimize vibration and metal fatigue failures. Where vibra-
tions may be severe, the fitting should be braced. These precautions may not be
justified in remote, onshore producing locations for low pressure, low volume
service.
For fire-safe features in piping design, see Section 2080 of this manual and the
Piping Manual.
Install steel plugs in all open ended valves when not in use. Route vents and drains
away from the pump if possible.
In clean services, install restriction orifices on root valves under pressure gage and
pressure transmitter connections to minimize the release if damage to the gage or
pressure lead occurs. See Standard Drawing GB-J1223 in the Instrumentation and
Control Manual.

Thermal Relief
Consider the use of thermal (sun) pressure relief valves for low or ambient tempera-
ture pumps that can be blocked.

Protective Instrumentation
Automatic Pump Start (APS) control instruments should be of fire resistant
construction.
For high pressure, high temperature and high capacity pumps, consider the
following protective instrumentation:
• Low suction pressure alarm
• Vibration monitoring and shutdown
• High bearing temperature alarm
• High discharge pressure alarm
• Seal failure (leakage) alarm (for double sealed pumps)
Depending on the process, these same protections can be used for initiating auto-
matic shutdowns.

2013 Pump and Driver Inspections

Pumps should be inspected at regularly scheduled intervals. A checklist should be
used so that all personnel will check all the items. The checklist also serves as a
training tool. Check the seal gland, gaskets, mechanical seal leakage, lube oil

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Fire Protection Manual 2000 Process Equipment

chamber level, and coupling for general conditions. Checklists in the Pump
Manual, Section 1000 can be adapted for this purpose.
Bearing failures are the most frequent cause of pump fires. Chevron now electroni-
cally measures and plots bearing vibration on critical pumps and drivers to deter-
mine change and predict failure. Removing a bearing from service before it fails
should greatly reduce the fire loss associated with pumps.
In addition to a vibration check, electric motor inspection should include a check
for signs of overheating or sparking, and the condition of switches, overload protec-
tion, and wiring.
To minimize fire hazards, combustion engine drivers should be checked 1) for clean-
liness of the ignition system to prevent external spark-over and 2) for the adequacy
of the exhaust system. See Section 2030 of this manual for firesafe features of
internal combustion engines.
Inspect pump cases for the following problems to prevent external leakage.
• Cracks or holes in the casing
• Failure of small piping attachments
• Thread corrosion on plugs and pipe nipples
• Inadequate thread engagement at threaded connections
• Shaft sleeves—seal or packing leaks
• Poor gasketing

2014 Fire Control Design Features

Generally, fire is controlled by isolating (shutting off) the fuel source. The
following design features help do this.

Isolation Valves at Pumps

Provide valves at pumps that can be quickly closed in case of fire. Consider remote
operation of valves for high capacity pumps handling volatile and high temperature
materials. These valves should be fail safe or fireproofed per Section 1700. Refer to
Section 1800 and the Instrumentation and Control Manual for more information on
these systems.
Manually operated isolation valves should be accessible during a fire involving the
pump and kept lubricated so they operate easily.

Water Spray
Where fire water monitors are not available or may be blocked by equipment, water
deluge should be provided over pumps handling liquids above their auto-ignition
temperature or above 600°F. Water sprays should be remotely operated from a point
at least 50 feet from the pump being protected. See Section 1600.

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Drainage — Surface and Oily Water Systems

The drainage should be designed to carry liquids away from the pump as indicated
in Section 1400.

2020 Compressors
Refer to the Compressor Manual for design guidelines related to compressors.
Refer to Section 3700 and Appendix D of this manual for information related to fire
protection of compressor stations.

2021 Fire Protection Design Features

Liquid Knockout Pots and Scrubbers on Compressor Suctions
Every reasonable precaution must be taken to prevent liquid from entering the
compressor cylinder. Liquid knockout pots and scrubbers are ordinarily provided in
suction lines for this purpose. When wet gas is being compressed, there is an even
greater potential hazard. Consequently, high level alarms and compressor shutdown
devices should be installed on knockout pots and scrubbers. See Section 2024.

Relief Valves
Adequate relief valve capacity must be provided for each cylinder or group of cylin-
ders discharging into a common header. The discharge from these valves must
extend outside any compressor enclosure and above the eave. The relief valve and
outlet piping must be braced to withstand vibration.
If the relief valves discharge to a lower pressure system, the designer must consider
the effects of back pressure on the relief valve design. See Section 1900.

Ignition Systems for Engine-driven Compressors

Low-tension magneto systems with a coil at each spark plug should be used.
Provide protective boots or covers over all high-tension connections. For automo-
tive-type engines, replace “standard equipment” high-tension wire with high
temperature silicon rubber ignition wire. Because insulation on the latter wire is
higher quality, there is less risk of arcing to ground.
Use stranded or resistance-type wire such as those having fiberglass filaments with
acrylic coating. Do not use wound copper conductor, impregnated linen core
(carbon-filled) resistance wire; the conductor is easily broken by bending the wire,
making it more susceptible to arcing. Wires should be inspected regularly and main-
tained in good condition. Wires should be replaced at each tune-up.
Shielded ignition wire is not required. The safety value of shielded wiring is ques-
tionable, and shielding presents some hazard of its own. Periodic inspections and
annual replacement are generally required for shielded wire systems, and they make
engine testing and maintenance difficult. Because of these problems shielding has
been removed or left off in some locations. Experience from the fire-safety point of
view has been satisfactory with nonshielded systems, as long as they are properly

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protected against mechanical damage and are securely connected to the spark plug.
Therefore, when nonshielded wiring is used, a maintenance program of frequent
inspection and regular replacement must be followed. Note that shielding may be
mandatory in some locations (e.g., Alberta).

Air Intake and Exhaust Systems

Combustion air for all internal combustion compressor drivers should come from
outside the compressor house through filtered air intakes. Engine exhausts should
extend above the eaves a minimum of two feet. Air intake and exhaust should both
be located on the opposite side of the building from the gas headers.
It is important to check exhaust piping and mufflers for potential leaks that could
produce open flame at points normally considered free of ignition sources.

Packing Area Ventilation

Ventilation of the packing area must be designed so that flammable gases are not
forced into the crankcase. This would pose a serious explosion risk. Vents should be
extended outside and above the eaves of any enclosure.

Preventing Air Leakage

Air leaks into a compressor or residual air left after a shutdown may create an
explosive hazard. To minimize this hazard:
• Eliminate unnecessary vents on suction lines.
• Minimize bypass lines and valves connecting discharge and suction lines.
• Provide facilities to purge the compressor system with gas before startup.
Purging is necessary any time the equipment is opened to the atmosphere.

Preventing Vibration
Pulsation Dampeners. Provide pulsation dampeners on reciprocating compressors.
Where pulsating discharge from reciprocating compressors results in pipe vibration
so serious that piping and equipment may fail, installation of additional pulsation
dampeners may be warranted. The Compressor Manual describes methods to inves-
tigate the effects of pressure pulsation.
Stress Mitigation. Use long-radius pipe ells to minimize stresses in piping at
changes in direction. Short radius ells and mitered joints should be avoided.

2022 Piping
Piping Connections
Avoid using small pipe fitting connections (less than 1 inch) to compressors and
piping. They are very susceptible to vibration that can result in metal fatigue and
brittle failure. Appropriate welded heavy wall fittings and short nipples with bridge

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weld construction to the first valve can minimize this failure risk. Small piping runs
should be well supported and braced to control vibration.

Isolation Valves
Block valves for isolating the compressor should be placed well away from the
compressor so that they will be accessible during a leak or fire emergency. Such
valves may warrant automatic operators, especially at unmanned facilities. An
exception to this are remote, single-well producing applications where the conse-
quences of a compressor failure are minimal.
Design of remote isolation valves is discussed in Section 1800 of this manual and
in the Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1300.
Potential Leak Points for Routine Inspection
• Small piping, such as vent lines, sample points and gage fittings
• Threaded connections, such as plugs and nipples
• Inadequate thread engagement
• Shaft sleeves
• Poor or damaged gaskets
• Packing and seals

2023 Hydraulic and Lube Oil Piping

Rubber, neoprene, plastic, aluminum, brass and other low melting point materials
should not be used for hydraulic or lube oil piping or other components around
compressors. A small fire near these materials will cause them to fail quickly with
the potential to release large volumes of oil into the fire. Piping and components
made of these materials should be replaced with steel components or Pyrex fire-
resistant glass for level controllers. Where fire-resistant replacement components
are not available, a fire stop valve such as the Kenco Fire Stop Valve or equivalent
can be installed on both sides of the component to stop the flow of oil in case of a
fire near the component.

2024 Explosion Hazards in Compressed Air Systems

Large internal combustion engines are usually started with air. This air is provided
by a compressor—ordinarily a conventionally lubricated reciprocating machine—
and piped to an air distributor on the engine. The distributor, cam driven by the
engine, allows air to be injected into the individual cylinders through check valves.
There have been explosions in these compressed air systems. The fuel is combus-
tible lubricant that has entered the air system from the air compressor or from the
air distribution system on the engine. Although maintenance of the check valves
will minimize this hazard, the valve can stick open from scale or other causes that
can affect a recently serviced valve as readily as an old one.

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These explosions can be avoided by replacing the combustible lubricants with

noncombustible lubricants, as follows:
1. The air starting system must be cleaned of all combustible lubricant before
applying the fire resistant lubricant.
2. Make certain the starting air distributors on the engine are designed so that
lubricants from the engine cannot enter the starting air system.
3. Fire-resistant synthetic lubricants must not be contaminated with hydrocarbons
or varnish-like materials.
4. Stauffer Chemical Company's Fyrquel 555 fire-resistant synthetic lubricant for
starting air compressors is recommended.
Fire-resistant synthetic lubricants are required for all internal combustion engine
starting air systems. For other air services where a direct source of ignition does not
exist, fire-resistant lubricants should be used, as a minimum, when discharge
temperatures exceed 300°F and pressures exceed 300 psig. When using fire-resis-
tant lubricants, ensure that the seals are of a compatible material. See the
Compressor Manual and the General Machinery Manual for more details.

2025 Shutdown and Alarm Systems

Manual Shutdown
Compressors should be provided with shutdown stations at expected personnel
access points and at a safe distance from the equipment so that, in the event of a
hazardous occurrence, the engines and compressors can be controlled and shut
down without endangering personnel.
Process alarms and automatic shutdowns for compressors and drivers are discussed
in the Compressor Manual and the Driver Manual. Design of these systems is
discussed in the Instrumentation and Control Manual. Fireproofing of critical
controls is discussed in Section 1700 of this manual.

2030 Internal Combustion Engines

This section discusses ways to modify large stationary engines, highway vehicles,
and industrial trucks, for limited use in classified areas.

2031 General Information

Internal combustion (IC) engines have many applications in both stationary and
mobile equipment throughout the Company. They can be a source of ignition when
exposed to a flammable mixture of hydrocarbon vapor. The design and purchase of
IC engines is covered in detail in the Driver Manual. This section discusses those
aspects of design related to fire protection.

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This section gives suggestions for modifying IC engines to allow their limited use
in classified areas. A modified IC engine is less likely to be an ignition source than
is an ordinary IC engine. When special operating conditions justify modifying and
maintaining this equipment, the recommendations of this section should be consid-
ered.
Generally, the fire loss risk should be evaluated on the basis of:
• Probability of a hydrocarbon vapor release near the engine
• Design characteristics of the engine, (e.g., type of fuel system and ignition
system)
• Existing fire protection facilities (e.g., equipment spacing, fire walls, detection
and extinguishing systems, etc.).

2032 Types of Company IC Engines

Size, type, and function of Company IC engines may be categorized as follows:
• Large stationary engines—commonly used as gas-fueled drivers of large
compressors or pumps
• Intermediate size stationary engines—fueled by gas, gasoline, diesel, or LPG
and used to drive pumps, compressors, generators, mixers, etc.
• Mobile engines—small to intermediate size, fueled by gasoline, diesel, or LPG
and used to drive mobile equipment including cars, trucks, cranes, forklifts,
pumps, generators, front-end loaders, etc.

Large Stationary Engines

Fire protection recommendations for stationary gas-fueled, IC engines used for
compressor drivers are presented in a checklist in Appendix D of this manual, “Fire
Protection Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations.” The
checklist should be used in conjunction with the recommendations in Sections 1100
to 2000 of this manual. Much of the information contained there also can be
applied to other types of IC engines.

Highway Vehicles
Because of the difficulty in regulating the use of motorized vehicles and portable IC
engines in areas where flammable vapor may be present, it is recommended that
guidelines set forth in Section 1300, and this section be followed.
Cars, trucks, and other motorized vehicles normally used for highway transporta-
tion should not be permitted to enter process units, tank batteries, and similar
restricted locations except as follows: the area first must be thoroughly checked
with a combustible gas indicator to ensure that concentrations of flammable vapors
do not exceed 25% of the lower flammable limit (LFL).

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Industrial Trucks
IC engine-powered industrial vehicles are subject to OSHA Standard 1910.78 and
NFPA 505. Vehicles with designations DS or DY (diesel); GS (Gasoline); LPS (LP
Gas); ES, EE, and EX (electric powered) can generally be operated in Class I, Divi-
sion 2 areas. Only electrically powered vehicles conforming to the requirements for
an EX designation as specified in NFPA 505 are permitted to operate in Class I,
Division 1 areas.
Testing standards for industrial trucks are:
ANSI/UL 558 Safety Standard for Internal Combustion Engine Powered
Industrial Trucks
ANSI/UL 583 Safety Standard for Electric Battery Powered Industrial Trucks

An approved vehicle meeting these standards is one so labeled by Underwriters

Laboratories or Factory Mutual Engineering Corporation for the area classification
in which it will be used. The UL or FM designation (e.g., GS, ES, etc.) must be on
the manufacturer's nameplate.

2033 Engine Modifications for Classified Areas

There are no currently available standards that can assure completely safe
operation of IC engines in flammable atmospheres.
However, IC engines modified as discussed in this section are less likely to be an
ignition source if they are driven or operated in a cloud of flammable vapor than is
an ordinary engine. A thorough maintenance program is necessary to ensure integ-
rity of the modification.
It must be emphasized that these modifications do not make a vehicle “safe” to
operate in a flammable atmosphere. Permits to enter a restricted area where there is
a potential for the release of flammable material would be the same with or without
these modifications. Use of modified vehicles does decrease the risk of ignition so
that there is more time to shut down the vehicle in the event of a flammable vapor
release.
These modifications would be considered for vehicles used in areas where a flam-
mable release is unlikely but not impossible. Such vehicles include:
• Transportation used in marine terminals
• Gager's vehicles used in large tank fields handling flammable materials
• Maintenance vehicles used in restricted areas

Starter Motor
The starter system should be either an electrical type meeting the applicable area
classification (e.g., Class I, Division 2 Group D) requirements or one of the
following non-electric types: pneumatic (commonly used in Producing locations),
hydraulic, spring recoil or inertia.

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It may be acceptable to use an electric starter motor that does not meet the area clas-
sification requirements if proper entry permits are used and one of the following
criteria is satisfied.
1. A lockable switch is provided so that the electric starter motor can be locked
out to prevent its use in a classified area.
2. The starting battery is kept outside the classified area and the engine is started
there.
3. The starter, the starter motor switch, and the solenoid are inspected to be sure
they are not an open device:
– The starter motor should have a tight fitting cover band with a gasket
installed to shield commutator arcing.
– The starter motor switch should have a tight fitting cover or the switch
cover to the solenoid should be epoxy-sealed. An enclosed switch solenoid
remote from the starter is acceptable.
– If the starter solenoid is located on the starter motor, it should be gasketed
to the starter housing. If not, seal with epoxy.
– Cover the terminals with protective boots or other material to avoid acci-
dental shorting.

Generator, Voltage Regulator, Switches, Lighting, and Auxiliary Systems

The generator system should be either approved for the classified area (e.g., Class I,
Division 2 Group D) or the engine should be equipped with an enclosed marine-
type alternator and voltage regulator.
The horn button should be replaced with a vapor-tight microswitch. Other switches
are normally enclosed in a metal or bakelite body and are acceptable because they
have lower risk of being an ignition source.
Provide protective boots or covers on exposed electrical terminals and battery termi-
nals to protect against accidental shorting.
Electrical auxiliary equipment should be effectively grounded to the main frame. A
lockable switch that disconnects all electrical systems not meeting Class I, Division
2 requirements should be provided.
“Jumping” a dead battery will always produce sparks and must never be permitted
in a Class I, Division 2 area, unless a hot work permit system has been issued.

Ignition Systems
Provide protective boots or comparable covers over all high voltage (high-tension)
connections. For automotive-type engines, replace “Standard Equipment” high-
tension wire with high-temperature silicon rubber ignition wire. This provision
minimizes arcing to ground through insulation leaks.
Use stranded or resistance-type wires as recommended by the engine manufacturer;
however, do not use wound copper conductor, impregnated linen core (carbon-
filled), resistance wire because the conductor is easily broken by bending the wire,

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making it more susceptible to arcing. Wires should be inspected regularly and main-
tained in good condition. Wires should be replaced at regular intervals or when they
are obviously deteriorated. The use of shielded ignition wire is not required in most
areas, but the use of a protective jacket (metallic or nonmetallic) is recommended to
minimize physical damage.
Ignition systems now in use that have given satisfactory service are manufactured
by:
1. Filko Mag-Core by
F & B Manufacturing Company
Filko Automotive Product Division
5480 North Northwest Highway
Chicago, Illinois
2. B. G. Flash-Tite Lead Assembly by
B. G. Service Co. Inc.
1400 Alabama Avenue
P.O. Box 2259
Palm Beach, Florida 33402-2259
3. The CSA approved ignition system for large industrial applications by Reagan
Equipment Company
2230 Peters Rd.
Harvey, LA 70058
(504) 367-1870
Several manufacturers, including B. G. Service, also market an integral coil
assembly with the coil mating directly to the plug, so the high tension lead is short.
The low voltage (primary) lead to the coil is less likely to arc to ground than the
high tension lead since it operates on low voltage.
It may be desirable to modify the distributor to reduce the chance of flame escaping
from the distributor if hydrocarbon vapor is ignited inside the distributor. There is
no one simple, universal, solution, but the following modifications should be consid-
ered:
• A new distributor cap will reduce the chance of external arcing.
• A clamp can be provided that will securely hold the distributor cap in place if
there is an ignition of vapor inside the distributor.
• Removal of the vacuum advance unit. Install a metal cover and seal it with
epoxy.
• A flame arrestor vent installed in the distributor body can minimize the
chances of propagating an explosion or flame to the outside.
Replacement of the mechanical contact points with a solid-state ignition system is
recommended for stationary engines. These systems will reduce ignition system
maintenance and will improve spark plug life.

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Exhaust System Discharge of Sparks or Flames

The exhaust system for stationary engines with higher risk exposures should be
leak-tight so flames from a backfire cannot escape, and they should be equipped
with a spark-arresting type of muffler. Equipment of the following types is available.
• Dry cyclone type (lowest maintenance)
• Labyrinth type
• Gas conditioner box (water bath type)
• Multiple plate type
Intake or Induction System
If necessary, modify the air cleaner and filter cartridge to reduce the chance of
flame escaping from the air cleaner if the engine backfires through the air intake
system. The air cleaner assembly should include the following:
• The body should be all metal with a gasketed cover to body joint.
• There should be a gasket between the air cleaner and the carburetor.
• The air cleaner should be securely held or fastened to the carburetor.
• The air filter element should be a good quality dry cartridge consisting of a
treated, fire-resistant pleated paper or cellulose filter medium with a metal
screen on the inside and outside and a resilient sealing surface top and bottom
to seal tightly against the air cleaner body and cover. Most name brand air filter
replacement cartridges will meet this requirement.
For stationary engines with higher risk exposures, equip the intake system with a
U.S. Coast Guard approved flame-arresting-type air cleaner or an approved flame
arrestor downstream of the air cleaner. The flame arrestor should have corrosion
resistant internals and be easily dismantled for cleaning and inspection. An accept-
able alternate is to locate the air intake in a safe area. The system should be leak-
tight so that flames from a backfire cannot escape.
Air intakes on diesel engines shall be equipped with an airtight shutoff valve actu-
ated by one of the following:
• A speed sensor having a mechanical linkage to the valve
• Differential pressure across the valve in the intake system providing a closing
force which can overcome the force exerted by the valve spring
• The injection of carbon dioxide gas activated by a speed sensor
It is desirable to include a provision for manually closing the valve with any auto-
matic system used.
For equipment that is closely attended, the above systems may be replaced by a
manually operated airtight shutoff valve in the air intake. When any valve is
installed in the intake system, it should be tested to ensure that it will not inadvert-
ently close during any operating condition.

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Excessive Temperature or Exhaust Gases and Surface Temperature of

Exhaust System
As the volume of cooling air passing over the engine increases, the formation of
static pockets of vapor/air mixtures exposed to hot surfaces decreases.
Therefore, hydrocarbon vapors should not auto-ignite because they are mixed with
engine cooling air and dispersed. Vapor is not normally in contact with hot engine
parts long enough to auto-ignite.
During operation, the surface temperature of the engine or the exhaust system is
normally hot enough to ignite oily rags or other combustible material left on the
engine but not hot enough to ignite liquid hydrocarbon that might be spilled on
exposed surfaces.
The exhaust from stationary engines should be routed to a safe location maintaining
at least 6 inches clearance from combustible material. Avoid use of insulation on
exhaust piping where liquid hydrocarbon may spray or leak onto the line and
soak into the insulation. This will significantly increase the risk of auto-ignition.
If personnel protection is required, use expanded metal shielding. See the Safety in
Designs Manual.
If the line passes vertically through a roof, combustible material must be protected
by a ventilated metal thimble that extends 9 inches above and below the roof and is
6 inches larger in diameter than the exhaust pipe. If the line passes horizontally
through a wall, combustible wall material must be protected by a ventilated metal
thimble that extends 6 inches past the sides of the wall, and is 6 inches larger in
diameter than the exhaust pipe. There should be at least 3 inches of fireproof insula-
tion between the thimble and combustible material.

Fuel Systems
Fuel lines should be of steel tubing or piping with flexible steel or steel-braided
tubing sections where necessary to absorb pipe vibration. They should be located
with at least 2 inches clearance from exhaust and electrical systems.
Fuel lines, valves, fittings and vents should be located so that leakage will not drip
on electrical or exhaust systems.
Steel shutoff valves located for access in time of fire should be provided in main
fuel lines.
Electrically operated fuel pumps should conform to the requirements of Under-
writers Laboratories Standard No. 558 which covers fuel pump endurance and oper-
ation without overheating.
LPG fuel systems should conform to the Standard for the Storage and Handling of
LPG, NFPA No. 58 (ANSI Z 106.1).

Marking of Equipment and Vehicles

Labels. Equipment and motor vehicles modified according to this section shall be
clearly labeled. A label should be installed on the vehicle which reads as follows:

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Restricted Area Vehicle

Restrictions: Vehicle Entry Permit
Required. This equipment cannot be
operated in a known flammable
atmosphere.
Label wording such as “sparkproof” or “explosionproof” is not recommended. If
you use equipment labeled that way, you may mistakenly circumvent the require-
ment for specific approval prior to entering a classified area.
Equipment Certification. Modified equipment should be provided with a certificate
with a record showing:
• The name of the Company representative who certified that the vehicle or
engine has been modified to reduce the risk of ignition when operated in a
Class I, Division 2 area in accordance with this section
• The name of the contractor performing the modification
• The date of the last maintenance inspection
• The date the next maintenance inspection is due
• Annual recertification by a qualified mechanic

2034 Fire Protection

Spacing of Equipment
Adequate spacing between adjacent pieces of equipment driven by IC engines
should be provided to minimize the possibility of ignition of flammable vapors and
the spread of fire. Spacing considerations are outlined in Section 1300.
Where operating conditions necessitate locating adjacent pieces of equipment
closer than desirable from a fire protection standpoint, such as often found on
offshore platforms, additional fire protection measures should be considered. A
review of fire protection facilities should be made of individual installations where
IC engines must be located near high value or critical equipment handling flam-
mable liquids such as gasoline, naphthas, LPG, crude oil, etc.
The installation of fire walls to separate adjacent equipment in congested areas or to
isolate critical IC engine-driven equipment from the driver will minimize the
chance of ignition should a leak occur, and will reduce fire exposure and flame
spread hazard. This is especially important where several engine-driven pumps or
other machines are in the same service, such as at a pipeline pumping station. Care
should be exercised to maintain adequate ventilation (See API RP 500A and NFPA
30) and not to inadvertently create an area warranting a Class I, Division 1 classifi-
cation.

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Ventilation
Where it is not practical or economical to modify a permanently installed IC engine
as outlined in Section 2033, an acceptable alternate is to provide adequate ventila-
tion to prevent accumulation of hydrocarbon vapor in concentrations above 25% of
the lower flammable limit. The engine may be enclosed in a pressurized area to
exclude vapor or ventilated with an air sweep that will ensure vapor concentration
will never reach the flammable range. Automatic shutdown shall be provided in the
event of a ventilation system failure.

Extinguishing Systems
Fixed fire control systems such as fire water monitors or water sprays over critical
or high-risk equipment or carbon dioxide flooding of enclosures should also be
considered. Except for combustion gas turbine enclosures, situations warranting
such protection are not common. Therefore, the advice of a Fire Protection Engi-
neer should be sought when considering these systems.

Detection System
The same detection and control systems recommended for larger stationary gas-
fueled engines driving reciprocating compressors, as presented in Appendix D,
should be considered for other critical or high risk equipment. Fire and combustible
gas detectors should be employed to sound alarms or shut down operating equip-
ment, shut off fuel supply, activate motor-operated valves to close all intake and
discharge lines, relieve pressure to a vent stack, or activate fixed extinguishing
systems. These detection systems are recommended for all critical unattended or
not-regularly-attended facilities.
For enclosed IC engine facilities the detection system should alarm and activate any
emergency ventilation systems to keep air in the facility below 20% of the lower
flammable limit. If the combustible levels continued to rise up to 60% of LFL, the
detection system should activate further protections (e.g., shutting down the ventila-
tion and shutting down the engine). Another consideration should be the location of
ventilation exhausts with respect to outside ignition sources.

2040 Tanks
Fire protection design considerations such as tank selection, location, spacing,
drainage and impounding, fire protection systems, and static electricity and light-
ning protection, are included in almost all aspects of tank design, and are discussed
in detail in the Tank Manual.
Section 140 of the Tank Manual contains a comprehensive list and short abstracts
of the commonly used industry codes and standards related to tank design.

2050 Columns and Vessels

Refer to the Pressure Vessel Manual for more information on pressure vessel design
and repairs.

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2051 Fire-safe Design Features

Overpressure Protection
Pressure safety valve (PSV) protection shall be provided per Section 1900. PSVs
shall be tested and maintained in a safe operating condition in accordance with the
test and maintenance intervals given in API 510, Pressure Vessel Inspection Code,
Section 6. A 5-year interval is common, but shorter intervals may be required, such
as the one-year interval for boilers and offshore pressure vessels. Overpressure may
result from loss of electrical power, steam, cooling water, etc.

Reflux Vessels
Reflux streams are used to control temperatures and pressures in the columns and
vessels. The reflux stream is generally a side stream that has been cooled to give the
operator control of temperature as well as product purity. When reflux is pumped
into the column, it vaporizes, absorbing heat and cooling the column. Reflux
vessels generally have large liquid inventories and, therefore, must be protected
against fire exposure. Water sprays are often used if the vessel is not insulated or
protected by adjacent monitors. Reflux stream control valves may be fireproofed
and have protected instrument leads to allow the operator a means of providing
optimum cooling during fires and other emergencies. Reflux vessels should have
independent high and low level alarms. They should also have double valves on the
water draw connection.

Feed Control
Mishaps involving columns and vessels generally require immediate control of the
feed and reflux streams. Board-operated control valves are needed for high pressure
and high volume critical streams. Manually operated field valves may be acceptable
for isolating some equipment units; however, the valves must be available in antici-
pated emergencies.

Heat Control
Heat control should be provided by the installation of appropriate valves and
remote instrumentation that can be operated from the control room. These systems
include:
• Furnace firing and other heat input controls
• Cooling systems for rapid heat removal, including reflux streams, cooling
water systems and fin fan coolers

Fixed External Cooling

Deluge systems, fire monitors, and other fire control systems may be needed to
prevent an external fire from causing additional leakage from flanges or connec-
tions, as well as a vessel rupture. In general, nonfireproofed vessels with liquid
holdup of 1000 gallons or more should be provided with water cooling by one of
the aforementioned methods. Remote locations where a fire does not pose a signifi-
cant risk to people or equipment may be an exception.

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Fail-safe Control Valves

Control valves on inlet, outlet and reflux streams are crucial for overpressure protec-
tion during plant problems involving loss of utilities such as steam, electrical power
and instrument air. Close consideration must be given to the choice of fail-safe
features. Normally, feed valves should fail closed, and outlet and reflux valves
should fail open. However, there are exceptions, and each situation must be individ-
ually evaluated during the process hazards analysis, (PHA). Keep in mind that a
valve that fails open may allow needed cooling to one piece of equipment while
starving others.
Valves that are not fail safe should be fireproofed as discussed in Sections 1700 and
1800.

Low Temperature Operation

Consideration must be given to the proper design materials for columns and vessels
handling low-boiling-point liquids that may cause auto-refrigeration during emer-
gency venting. Propane boils at about -43°C (-44°F) and ethane at near -85°C (-
120°F). Ordinary carbon steels become brittle at temperatures below -40°C (-40°F).
De-ethanizers, depropanizers and vessels containing similar liquefied gases may
require special low-temperature steels to withstand auto-refrigeration temperatures
associated with emergency venting. Designers must consider this contingency
during the design phase.
Refer to the Pressure Vessel Manual for more information on minimum pressur-
izing temperature (MPT).
Equipment in cryogenic service and with heat-sensitive insulation should be
protected with fireproofing insulation to keep heat-sensitive insulation below degra-
dation temperature. Directional water spray at a density of 0.25 gpm/sq ft (10
L/min/square meter) may also be used in this case.

2052 Fire-safe Design and Construction

Small Pipe Connections
Limit the number of small pipe connections. Threaded gage connections, sample
points, level control nozzles, etc., are subject to mechanical damage, vibration
fatigue and corrosion. The potential failure points are minimized by:
• Installing only those connections actually needed.
• Making the appendages as short as possible.
• Using extra heavy pipe nipples and 3/4-inch minimum diameter to the first
valve off the vessel.
• Using socket-weld and bridge-weld construction and appropriate weld fittings,
especially between the vessel and the first valve.
• Selecting materials for the stress and corrosion anticipated for the process.

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Material Selection
It is imperative to select fire-safe materials—materials that are resistant to fire, acid,
erosion and corrosion, and materials compatible with the process conditions.

Fireproofing
Fireproofing of columns and vessel supports is discussed in Section 1700.
Generally, fireproofing is only warranted on vessel and column skirts and not on the
vessels themselves. However, fireproofing should be considered on the vessel when
all the following conditions exist:
• High pressure systems are involved.
• Failure of the vessel could result in very large releases of flammable liquids or
gases.
• Liquid inventory is high and time for controlled depressuring and emptying is
significant.
• Equipment in the area is critical because of its cost and replacement time.
• Line or vessel is normally not flowing or not liquid-full so that there is no
internal cooling.
• Fuel source for an external fire is viable, for instance, a nearby hot, high pres-
sure pump.
• A source of ignition is present, such as a furnace, or there is potential for auto-
ignition.
• Adequate water cooling is not available and vessel needs to be protected
against rupture or boiling liquid, expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) from
flame impingement. Piping, flanges, other vessels, pumps, etc., can be a source
of impingement flame.
If a vessel or column requires insulation for other reasons, cost effective fire-
proofing can often be accomplished by using stainless steel weatherjacketing over
the insulation, provided the insulation is suitable for the fire temperature. See
Section 1700 and the Insulation and Refractory Manual for more information.

Water Spray or Deluge Systems

Water spray or deluge systems can replace fireproofing for vessel protection and
should be provided when vessel contents are reactive. These are discussed in
Section 1600.

2053 Operating Safety Features

The following operating features may be necessary to warn of conditions that, if not
monitored and controlled could lead to spills, vapor releases and possible fires:
• Level alarms (LAL and LAH)

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• Temperature alarms (TAL and TAH)

• Pressure alarms
• pH indicators
• H2S detectors
• Fire alarms and gas detectors for pumps and compressors associated with LPG
columns

2054 Gas Freeing Provisions

Design provisions should be made for venting, draining, steam-out, purging and
liquid pump out. Steam-out and purging are required for clean-up before entry for
inspection and repairs. Also, inerting is used to reduce fire and explosion potential.
Internal weirs, trays and downcomers should have holes provided for draining
liquids from the column during cleanup.

2055 External Fire Exposure Risk

Drainage
Drainage should be designed so that flow is away from columns and vessels. See
Section 1400.

Spacing
See Section 1300 for equipment spacing.

Isolation
Valves must be accessible to isolate the vessel from mechanical equipment (e.g.,
pumps, compressors) during a fire involving that equipment. In some cases, these
valves may have to be remotely operated and fire safe.

2056 Supplemental Fire Protection

The following fire protection equipment is detailed in Section 1600.
• First aid fire hose reels
• Fire water monitors
• Fixed water sprays and deluge systems
• Sprinkler systems
• Portable and fixed dry chemical equipment
• Fire detectors
• Combustible gas detectors

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2057 Protection Systems for Higher Risk Processes

For more information on protection systems for vessels used in higher risk
processes, see NFPA 68 and NFPA 69. Protection can include explosion suppres-
sion systems and rupture discs.

2058 Inspection and Maintenance

Periodic inspection by a competent inspection team can provide a basis for a well
planned and effective maintenance program. An organized inspection and mainte-
nance program should include the following:
• Inspections to monitor the physical conditions of the vessels and columns, the
type, rate and cause of corrosion, erosion, hydrogen blistering, stress cracking
or other deterioration.
• Internal corrosion coupons and gage points installed as check points for the
inspector.
• Corrosion inhibitors used judiciously because when used at incorrect rates,
they can accelerate corrosion.
• Detailed records of corrosion rates, mechanisms of corrosion, locations of
corrosion, and inhibitors used.
• Records of equipment failures, maintenance or repair methods.
• Inspection and maintenance records of the pressure relief valves and other pres-
sure relieving devices.
• Periodic inspection of fireproofing systems.
With this information, appropriate maintenance and operating action can be taken
to maintain the equipment's integrity. Refer to the Corrosion Prevention Manual for
more information on corrosion.

Operator Inspections
Operators play a key role in the fire safety of columns and vessels:
• At least once a day, all connections and manways should be checked for
leakage. Flange leakage and oil-soaked insulation is a serious fire hazard.
• All fire protection equipment must be checked routinely. (See Section 1600
and Appendix E.)
• Corrosion inhibitor systems must be monitored closely.
• All alarms, shutdowns, and emergency isolation valves should be tested at least
once a month.

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2060 Fired Heaters and Boilers

Fired heaters and boilers are a major cause of large fire losses and lost production.
The Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual discusses the magnitude and
causes of these losses and gives recommendations in the areas listed below. It
should be used as the primary Company reference for fired heater safety.
• Fired heater selection
• Location and spacing considerations
• Access recommendations
• Safe firing procedures
• Inspection procedures
• Protective instrumentation
• Firebox design
• Fuel system design
• Burner design
• Furnace tube selection
The Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual also contains the following
industry standards related to fired heater safety.
• API RP 530, “Calculation of Heater Tube Thickness in Petroleum Refineries.”
• API RP 550, “Manual on Installation of Refinery Instruments and Control
Systems,” Part III, Fired Heaters and Inert Gas Generators.
• API Standard 560, Fired Heaters for General Refinery Service
• API Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter IX, Fired Heaters
and Stacks.
• NFPA 85C, "Prevention of Furnace Explosions/Implosions in Multiple Burner
Boiler - Furnaces" is another applicable industry standard.

2070 Other Heat Transfer Equipment

The design of shell and tube exchangers, air coolers, and cooling towers are all
covered in the Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual.

2071 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers

Leaks
Fires involving heat exchangers usually occur as a result of leaks. Problem areas
are:
Tube Failures in Coolers. This may allow flammable gases to enter the water
stream and from there the cooling tower, where the gases are released. In one five-
year period, Chevron plants experienced 12 cooling tower fires or explosions due to
releases from process plants through the cooling water system to the tower. One

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design feature used to prevent this is to maintain differential pressures so that

process pressure is lower than water pressure. Each service should be carefully
monitored to assure adequate differential, and tubes should be inspected often
enough to eliminate tube failures.
Leaks at Flanges in Shell and Tube Exchangers. These leaks can result from
process upsets or from corrosion or damage to flange surfaces. Extra thick flanges,
oversized bolts, and added gasket loading safety factor address this risk. The Heat
Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual, Section 500 addresses body flange design
and insulation recommendations in detail. Process controls may also reduce the risk
by minimizing rapid temperature changes that cause bolt expansion and flange loos-
ening.
Fires have also occurred at shell drain valves because of flammable liquids leaking
from valves that were not plugged.

Relief Protection
Because of the potential of overpressure caused by blocking in one side of a heat
transfer system, it is important that both sides of the system have overpressure
protection. Refer to Section 1900. The Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower
Manual, Section 500, gives the criteria for pressure relief and thermal relief of heat
exchangers.

2072 Air-cooled Exchangers

Overhead air coolers are susceptible to severe fire damage because the draft created
by the fan pulls heat from fires up to sensitive air cooler components. This risk can
be reduced by locating equipment with high potential fire risk (e.g., pumps,
compressors) away from overhead air coolers. See Section 1300.
Fan failure can cause extreme vibration resulting in line flange leaks. Also, failed
fan blades can damage piping and endanger personnel. Vibration switches that can
be set to shut the fan down before vibration reaches a destructive level are recom-
mended for all air coolers. Also, limiting the maximum tip speed to 10,000 fpm
will decrease the vibration and noise levels of the air cooler.
Exposed air coolers, when mounted in fire hazardous areas over pipe racks or struc-
tures, should have three-hour-rated fireproofing per the UL 1709 high-rise fire test
on their supporting structure up to the point of load. See Section 1700 for additional
fireproofing comments.

2073 Cooling Towers

Like other utilities, the cooling tower is essential to safe plant operation. Cooling
tower failure or loss of the cooling water flow can lead to emergency shutdowns
and potential hydrocarbon leaks and fires. Consequently, cooling water pumps
should be spared and the drivers should use a very reliable power supply or steam.
Cooling towers may contain flammable vapors and combustible liquids that enter
the water stream from leaking exchanger tubes. Explosions and fires have occurred

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due to this hydrocarbon leakage. As a result, the following precautions should be

taken in cooling tower designs:
• Cooling towers are electrically classified. Fan motors, pump motors and other
electrical apparatus must meet Class I, Division 2 requirements.
• If possible, design coolers so that the water side is at a higher pressure than the
process side.
• Where the process pressures in exchangers are higher than the cooling water
side, disengaging standpipes or chambers are installed on the water return line
to the cooling tower to release gases before the water reaches the tower water
distribution system.
• Cooling towers are generally located away from process equipment and
furnaces. See Section 1300.
• Water pumps and their switchgear should be located at least 10 feet from the
base of the cooling tower.
• Structural requirements and fill characteristics result in an installation that is
largely combustible. Sheathing the exterior with noncombustible material or
using low-flame-spread plastics can give a degree of fire resistance from
external exposures.
• Two manual shutoff switches for fans should be installed at the cooling tower,
one at grade and one at the top deck. Vibration cut-out switches are recom-
mended for all fans. (See the Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual for
details.)
• Hydrants with monitors should be spaced such that any area of the cooling
tower can be covered by streams from at least two directions.
• First aid fire hose reels should be spaced at 100-foot (30-meter) intervals on
the top deck, but in any arrangement there should be at least two hose stations
located at opposite ends. In cold climates, the hose stations should be on a dry
standpipe, arranged to be supplied by hose from a hydrant. The hand hose
should be 1-1/2 inches, preferably hard type on live reel, with a combination
shutoff nozzle.
If the cooling tower will not be used, an automatic sprinkler system should be
provided. See Section 1600 for more detail.

2074 Heat Transfer Liquids in Closed Systems

Salts, special high flash point liquid and hot oils are used as heat transfer media in
the petroleum industry.
Fires involving these liquids can occur in spite of the high flash point. If the liquid
temperature is raised above the auto-ignition temperature in the presence of air, and
an ignition source is available, vapors flashing off can be ignited. Generally,
process controls are set to operate at temperatures below the auto-ignition point

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when possible. Other design considerations include keeping the heat transfer
medium from entering preheated tubes and preventing loss of heat transfer media
flow.

2080 Piping
This section discusses the fire safety aspects of piping design. For detailed design
and material selection information, refer to the Piping Manual.

2081 Materials
Steel Pipe
Seamless steel pipe affords maximum fire safety. Butt-welded seams (e.g., EFW,
ERW) are more susceptible to leakage and should not be used in facilities where
sources of ignition or exposure of facilities to the public exist. Pipe of butt-welded
seam construction used in oil or gas service should be fusion welded (EFW).
Steel piping offers strength, flexibility, ductility, and weldability making it a
designer's choice. However, steel may not be practical for some acids, chemicals, or
for use at high temperatures.
Steel valves, flanges, and fittings are superior to cast iron, nodular iron, and
malleable cast iron. Welded joints in steel and steel alloys are more likely to remain
tight through a fire than any other type. In large-size pipes, welded joints cost less
than screwed or flanged joints and should be used in all cases except where flanged
valves and the installation of slip blinds makes flanged joints mandatory.
Steel valves, flanges, and fittings, because of their superior ability to tolerate
thermal shock, bending loads, and hydraulic and mechanical shock, should be used
on all tanks and lines carrying petroleum products in or close to operating units or
high value equipment. Steel should also be used in lines carrying water or steam
where failure at times of fire could interfere with fire fighting activities.

Alloys
Alloy materials are often chosen for severe temperature or corrosion services. Use
of the correct alloy is often critical to plant safety. Non alloy steel has been installed
in some locations by error and there have been cases where the factory pipe mark-
ings were in error. Positive identification of alloy materials, by instruments such as
the Texas Nuclear gage is recommended during initial construction and replace-
ment.

Pipe Class Transition

Special care should be taken in areas where the pipe class changes. Each of these
locations should be reviewed in the Process Hazards Analysis. Premature failures of
piping can occur if pipe class transitions to less severe service piping are located
too near the more severe service. For example, a transition from high temperature
to low temperature rated pipe was located adjacent to the normally closed isolation

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valve on the high temperature line. Normal temperature migration through the steel
isolation valve caused the low temperature pipe to heat up to temperatures higher
than its rating, leading to an unexpected pipe rupture and fire.

Cast Iron Pipe

Cast iron pipe is undesirable in oil or gas service because of its brittleness. If heated
by fire exposure and then quenched, it can fail. Also, cast iron valves in a steel line
can fail due to stresses in the line because of fire exposure. Therefore, cast iron
should not be used in services where fire exposure might cause it to fail and add to
the fire problem or contribute fuel to the fire. Section 2084 discusses the use and
limitations of cast iron valves.

Brass, Copper, and Aluminum Piping

Piping made of these materials is sometimes used for special purposes. The
designer should keep in mind their relatively low melting points (e.g., aluminum
melts at 1220°F and will fail at much lower temperatures) and potential for failure
if the piping is exposed to fire.

2082 Fire-safe Valve Design

Refer to the Piping Manual for a detailed discussion on the different types of valves
and their applications.
Valves used in hydrocarbon liquid service should be designed to not trap liquids in
their bodies. The liquid could expand during a fire and overpressure the valve body.
Standard gate valves are normally not a problem because excessive pressure can be
relieved by minor leakage past the valve seat. However, valves such as the “double-
block and bleed” type will trap liquid. When these valves are used in liquid service,
body relief valves shall be provided. Plug cocks have been known to trap liquid
inside the plug and bonnet area and cause potentially serious releases during mainte-
nance. Safety precautions must be exercised when dismantling such valves.
WKM “pressure seal” valves have been a problem in liquid, light hydrocarbon (C5s
or lighter) service. These valves should no longer be purchased, and existing valves
in liquid, light hydrocarbon service in fire hazardous locations should be replaced
or retrofitted with bolted bonnet valves. See the CRTC Valve Specialist or the Fire
& Process Safety team for more information.

Flangeless Valves
Only lugged-body (single-flange), fire-resistant butterfly valves approved by the
Company are acceptable for use in liquid and gas hydrocarbon, LPG, and H2S
service. A lugged-body valve is one with a body that extends over and covers the
flange studs, preventing flame impingement on the stud. Drilled-through lugs are
preferred to permit use of standard flange studs. Refer to the Piping Manual,
Section 270 for additional information. Purchasing maintains a list of approved
valves.

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Other flangeless valves with exposed bolts, wafer-type bodies, including control
valves and some check valves, should not be used in fire hazardous areas of
refinery process plants, chemical plants, producing gas plants, offshore platforms,
marketing terminals and other high value facilities in liquid and gas hydrocarbon,
LPG or H2S service. In a fire, exposed studs quickly get hot, expand and allow the
flange connection to leak, ultimately causing total failure of the connection.
In existing facilities where flangeless valves have been used, flame impingement
shields should be installed as shown in Figure 2000-1 (see Standard Drawing GB-
L1110, in the Piping Manual) if all of the following conditions exist:
• The valve is in liquid or gas hydrocarbon, LPG, or H2S service.
• The valve has 3 inches or more of exposed studs between the flanges or is an 8-
inch valve or larger.
• The valve is located such that it could be exposed to direct flame impingement
from a hydrocarbon fire other than one caused from its own leaking
• The valve is in service so that its failure would result in the release of signifi-
cant amounts of hydrocarbon or would cause the fire to spread.

Fig. 2000-1 Installation of Flame Impingement Shields

Flame impingement shields should not be allowed for flangeless valves used in new
facilities. This shield only extends the time of failure of the connection from about
5 minutes to about 20 minutes. It is still a weak point in the piping that should be
avoided.

Valve Seat Material

When exposed to fire, rubber-like or Teflon materials used for sealing valve seats
will fail much faster than the valve metal. Therefore, all ball valves, plug valves,
and valves that depend on O-ring stem seals in liquid hydrocarbon service should

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be designed so that failure of the seat material will not cause more than minor
leakage past the ball, plug, or stem. API Standard 607, “Fire Test for Soft-Seated
Quarter-Turn Valves” provides specification data for fire-safe valves.

2083 Gaskets
For the majority of moderate-temperature services, composition gaskets on raised
face flanges are acceptable. At flanged joints where additional reliability is desired
or for higher temperatures, spiral-wound gaskets on raised face flanges should be
used instead of composition ring gaskets. For services with special temperature,
pressure, or chemical hazard problems, a ring-type joint or equivalent should be
considered. For details see the Piping Manual.

2084 Limitations for Piping and Fittings

Threaded Piping
Threaded piping systems have the following weaknesses and should not be used in
sizes larger than 2 inches, or smaller than 3/4 inch, in hydrocarbon or critical utility
service. Exceptions are low-temperature or low-pressure services in low risk areas,
i.e., utility water, yard air, small producing facilities, etc.).
• Weakness resulting from the notch effect at the root of the thread, which is a
point of stress concentration.
• A decrease in effective wall thickness where the threads are cut.
• Susceptibility to thread disengagement by expansion when exposed to fire.
• Susceptibility to vibration and fatigue failure.
Small piping that is socket welded or screwed-and-seal-welded (weld covering all
threads) is considered equivalent in fire safety to butt-welded or flanged joints.

Use of Cast Iron Valves and Fittings in Hydrocarbon Service

Cast iron valves are less expensive and in some cases more corrosion resistant than
steel valves. However, they are not as fire resistant as steel valves. Cast iron valves
are more susceptible to cracking due to thermal shock than steel valves. Although
malleable iron and ductile (nodular) iron is slightly less brittle than cast iron, the
difference in fire resistance is negliable. All types of iron valves can be expected to
perform poorly in a fire.
Steel valves are required in flammable and combustible services (flash point below
200°F or temperature is within 30°F of the flash point) with the following excep-
tions:
1. A cast iron, malleable iron or ductile iron valve may be used as the first valve
off a tank if all of the following are met:
– Tank has a storage capacity of 3,000 barrels or less

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– Tank is located in a producing facility

– Tank is in an isolated or rural (excluding offshore) location
2. Tanks that are in Class III-B liquid service (flash point at or over 200°F),
outdoors, and not within a diked area or a drainage path of a tank storing a
Class I, II or III-A liquid (flash under 200°F), may have cast iron, malleable or
ductile iron, brass, or other similar metal valves.
3. In piping other than that described in exceptions 1 or 2 above, cast iron,
malleable or ductile iron valves and fittings are acceptable under ground, above
ground or inside a building if the valve meets one of the following:
– It is suitably protected against fire exposure
– It is located where any leakage resulting from the failure would not unduly
expose persons, important equipment or structures, and environmentally
important areas
– It is located where leakage can readily be controlled by operation of an
accessible remotely located valve(s)

2085 General Fire-safe Piping Features

Thermal Expansion
The need to provide for thermal expansion of hot process lines is obvious; and even
in lines expected to operate at normal temperatures it is desirable to provide suffi-
cient flexibility for expansion and contraction caused by changes in atmospheric
temperature, possible fire exposure, steam-out, pump-out, settlement, etc.
Flexible couplings with combustible seals such as Dresser or Victaulic may fail
rapidly under fire exposure and should be avoided wherever possible in systems
handling hydrocarbons. Couplings such as Dresser that can come apart if subjected
to line stresses should not be used if their failure will result in a release which will
expand the fire. Obtaining needed flexibility through offsets in the welded piping is
much safer. See Section 2086 for more detail.

Thermal Relief
Provision should be made to relieve excess pressure developed in lines due to the
thermal expansion resulting from temperature changes. Relief valves should be
installed on all lines that can be blocked and where no valve leakage is expected,
and on lines confined by valves where leakage past the valve can be expected, but
where there is more than 200 feet of pipe per valve. Refer to the Instrumentation
and Control Manual, Section 1200.

Self-closing Valves
The use of self-closing valves is justified only in congested locations where failure
to close valves manually might permit flow of oil or gas into areas where a serious
fire may result. The types of installation for which self-closing valves should be
considered include water and chemical draws, vents, bleeders, drains, level cocks,
sample cocks, and tank truck and barrel filling and emptying systems. For require-

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ments in LPG systems, see this manual, Section 3500 and the Piping Manual,
Section 1100.
For facilities under the jurisdiction of the Uniform Fire Code, self-closing valves
are not allowed for emptying of drums holding Class I or II liquids (UFC 79.802).

Vents and Drains

Where it is frequently necessary to empty piping systems for blending, cleaning,
inspection, and repair or alteration, etc., adequate vents and drain connections
should be provided. Where the established procedure requires that lines be steamed
out or displaced with air or water, suitable connections should be provided for this
purpose. Small connections should be made with welding bosses and extra heavy
nipples.

Pipeline Isolation
To avoid the necessity of shutting down complete pipeline systems in the event that
portions are exposed to fire or other damage, block valves should be installed at
points where major branches take off from mains. When continuity of service is
important, looped systems with block valves that will permit isolating certain
portions and leaving the remainder in operation can be installed.

Hydrostatic Testing
To ensure against failure resulting from defective material and workmanship, all
new piping, and all old piping, after alterations or repairs or after a prolonged shut-
down, should be given a hydrostatic test at least to the pressure specified in the
applicable Code.

Insulation
As far as practicable, pipe insulation should be noncombustible to eliminate it as a
possible means of fire spreading from one area to another. Where hot piping insula-
tion can be exposed to hydrocarbon leaks, it should be provided with metal weather
jacketing, as oil soaked into the insulation can auto-ignite even with line tempera-
tures as low as 350°F.

Pipeways
Piping systems within process units should be installed on aboveground pipeways
whenever possible. Grade level or belowgrade pipeways should be avoided. They
are fire hazards because they are difficult to keep clean, they obstruct free access,
and the piping is more difficult to monitor for external corrosion and leaks.

Sample Connections
Sample connections in flammable service should be the three-way recirculation
type as shown on PIM-EF-403. An alternative is the Faulkner Continuous Flow-
through sampler. These types of sample systems minimize leakage and hazards to
personnel.

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2086 Use of Resilient-sealed Couplings

Victaulic Couplings
For New Construction and Major Modifications in ANSI Class 150 Service
In production facilities located in rural or remote areas where there is limited expo-
sure risk to adjacent properties and the potential loss to the Company is minimal,
Victaulic couplings with a fire-resistant gasket can be used based on economics.
However, if the facility, even though remotely located, has critical business impor-
tance, has more than 3000 barrels storage capacity, or has potential fire exposure
from adjacent plants, the use of coupled connections should be minimized.
Even though the test data indicate that the integrity, in a fire situation, of the
Victaulic coupling with a fire resistant gasket is comparable to that of an ANSI
Class 150 flange connection, we do not feel it should be used interchangeably with
all flanged connections until we have field experience with it. We do, however, feel
the risk is acceptable for use in the above limited application. As we gain field expe-
rience, we will continue to evaluate potential applications for it.
For H2S service, the Piping Manual, Section 1000, “Piping and Equipment for H2S
Service” should be followed. The recommendations for the use of Victaulic fire-
resistant gaskets and couplings are as follows:
• For low H2S service, (containing less than 1% H2S by volume for gas or 0.1
psia H2S partial pressure for liquids): Couplings can be used in place of
flanged, threaded, or welded connections.
• For moderate H2S service (containing 1% to 24% H2S by volume for gas or
0.1 to 4.0 psia H2S partial pressure liquids): Couplings can be used in place of
flanged connections. However, all connections must be kept to a minimum, and
couplings cannot be used in place of welded connections.
• For high H2S service (containing over 24% H 2S by volume for gas or over 4.0
psia H2S partial pressure for liquids): Couplings cannot be used in this service.
Contact the local Safety Engineer or the Fire Protection Staff for guidance on use of
Victaulic couplings in areas other than those described here.

For Maintenance and Repair Work

A fire-resistant gasket should be the only type used for maintenance and repair
replacements. No existing standard gasket should be reinstalled.

For Existing Facilities

Victaulic couplings now in service do not need to be replaced with welded pipe and
flanges. However, the standard gaskets should be replaced with fire-resistant
gaskets on a programmed basis in the following selected locations:
• Where leakage resulting from its failure could spread a spill or fire and unduly
expose adjacent properties, important buildings, or environmentally important
areas

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• Inside the diked area or drainage path of a tank storing Class I or II liquids
(flash point under 140°F)
• Within 50 feet of fire hazardous equipment, such as pumps and fired heaters
handling hydrocarbons, or vessels containing more than 1000 gallons of Class
I or II liquids
Gaskets need not be changed to the fire-resistant type (except for routine mainte-
nance) if one of the following applies:
• Low pressure natural or produced gas
• Water service or nonflammable liquid service, provided that hydrocarbon
liquids will not spill after the contents have drained from a failed coupling.
(For example, couplings must be changed out on a water line when the
coupling is between a three-phase separator and the first block valve, because
the failed coupling would uncontrollably dump oil after the water has drained
out.)
• In production facilities in rural or remote locations that are small and of low
value and where there is limited exposure or risk to adjacent properties

Dresser Couplings
Dresser couplings should not be installed in liquid hydrocarbon service. They
can be installed in hydrocarbon vapor service at or near atmospheric pressure
provided their failure during a fire will not cause the fire to spread. They should not
be installed in produced water service if their failure during a fire would allow
hydrocarbon liquid to feed the fire after the water has drained out.
There are two major weaknesses with Dresser couplings:
1. They have resilient seals that will fail quickly when exposed to fire.
2. A Dresser coupling is placed over the two facing ends of pipe. When the pipe
is exposed to fire, bending stresses in the pipe, caused by uneven heating of the
pipe, become very high and can pull the coupling apart, resulting in a cata-
strophic failure. There have been catastrophic failures of Dresser couplings due
to hydraulic shock without any fire exposure.
Existing Installations. If any one of the following conditions exists, the Dresser
coupling, if in liquid hydrocarbon service, should be replaced at the first available
opportunity:
1. Located so that any leakage resulting from its failure would unduly expose
persons, important buildings, equipment or structures, or environmentally
important areas
2. Located where leakage cannot be readily controlled by operation of an acces-
sible remotely located valve or valves

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3. Located inside fire hazardous areas which include:

a. The diked area or drainage path of a tank storing Class I or Class II liquids
(flash point under 140°F), or
b. The area within 50 feet of fire hazardous equipment such as fired heaters,
furnaces, pumps, compressors, LACT units or vessels containing more
than 1000 gallons of Class I or Class II liquids, or
c. The on-plot area in an oil, gas or chemical facility.
If the Dresser coupling is in flammable liquid service (flash point below 100°F)
with the potential of fire exposure and is not included in one of the above catego-
ries, it should be replaced at the most convenient maintenance turnaround or next
shutdown. In the meantime, the Dresser coupling should be protected in the
following manner:
1. Insulate it with a fire-resistant cover that can be easily removed to inspect for
leakage or corrosion under it. This cover can be stainless steel weatherjack-
eting over calcium silicate, ceramic fiber, or mineral wool insulation; or a
prefabricated fire-resistant blanket such as that available from Darchem Engi-
neering, Inc. in Pasadena, CA (818-449-3222). Covers should extend at least
12 inches to 18 inches beyond the ends of the coupling.
2. Raise the grade under the coupling as high as feasible (up to 3 feet) for at least
5 feet horizontally around the coupling. This will keep a spill fire from burning
directly under it.
If the Dresser coupling is in any of the following services, it doesn't need to be
replaced:
1. Gas or vapor at less than 50 psi, provided its failure during a fire will not
expose other equipment
2. Water or nonflammable liquid service, providing hydrocarbon liquid will not
spill after the contents have drained from the failed coupling
3. Located in remote producing areas and not falling in any of the above catego-
ries (i.e., fire exposure is unlikely)
The best way to avoid the use of Dresser couplings is to design and arrange the
piping in a way that adequate piping flexibility is inherently provided with welded
connections, or use welded expansion loops. Other alternatives are flexible metal
hose of steel or stainless steel (without rubber), steel bellows expansion joints, Van
Stone flanges (rotational), or ball joints with metal-to-metal seals. Refer to Section
650 of the Tank Manual and Section 330 of the Piping Manual for additional infor-
mation on piping flexibility.

Grayloc Connectors
Although Grayloc Connectors have not been tested to the API standard fire test for
piping connectors, they have been fire tested to 920°F at 1500 psi for 96 hours with
negligible leakage. They are a 100% steel clamped connector with a steel seal ring.

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Fire Protection Manual 2000 Process Equipment

They are considered to be fire safe and are approved from a fire protection stand-
point for use in hydrocarbon service.

Unibolt Connectors
Unibolt Connectors have not been fire tested. They are available with either steel or
bronze seal rings. Although it is not recommended that they be removed from
existing service, it is recommended that they not be installed in any critical hydro-
carbon service until they have proven to be fire resistant via the API standard fire
test for piping connectors.

2087 Nonmetallic and Nonmetallic Lined Steel Pipe

The uses and limitations of nonmetallic pipe are discussed in the Piping Manual,
Section 400.

2090 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations
in Petroleum Facilities
API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: Inspection, Rating,
Repair, and Alteration
API 530 Calculation of Heater Tube Thickness in Petroleum
Refineries
API 550 Manual on Installation of Refinery Instruments and
Control Systems
API 560 Fired Heaters for General Refinery Service
API 607 Fire Test for Soft-Seated Quarter-Turn Valves
API 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations

Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter X

API Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter X, Pumps, Compressors,
and Blowers, and Their Drivers.
API Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter IX, Fired Heaters and
Stacks

Chevron References
Compressor Manual
Corrosion Prevention Manual
Driver Manual
Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual

Chevron Corporation 2000-35 December 1994

2000 Process Equipment Fire Protection Manual

General Machinery Manual

Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual
Insulation and Refractory Manual
Piping Manual
Pressure Vessel Manual
Pump Manual
Tank Manual

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquid Code
NFPA 37 Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines
NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases (ANSI Z106.1)
NFPA 68 Venting of Deflagrations
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 78 Lightning Protection Code
NFPA 214 Water Cooling Towers
NFPA 493 Intrinsically Safe Apparatus in Division Hazardous Areas
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 505 Powered Industrial Trucks Including Type Designations, Areas of
Use, Maintenance and Operations

Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

OSHA Standard 1910.78

Underwriters' Laboratories (UL)

UL 558 Safety Standard for Internal Combustion Engine Powered Industrial
Trucks
UL 1709 Safety Standard for Electric Battery Powered Industrial Trucks

December 1994 2000-36 Chevron Corporation

2100 Buildings/Facilities Design

Abstract
This section covers fire-safe construction, fixed fire protection systems, fire water
systems, and safe personnel ingress and egress for buildings. Spacing will be
discussed in general; however, detailed spacing is covered in Section 1300, Layout
and Spacing. Warehouse fire protection considerations are discussed in
Section 3800.

Contents Page

2110 General Design Considerations 2100-3

2120 Control Houses 2100-4
2121 General Design
2122 Structural Design
2123 Spacing
2124 Drainage
2125 Fire Protection
2130 Office Buildings 2100-6
2131 Codes and Standards
2132 Special Areas
2133 Spacing
2134 Fire Protection
2140 Temporary Buildings 2100-7
2141 General Design
2142 Spacing
2143 Drainage
2144 Fire Protection
2150 Shops and Garages 2100-8
2151 General Design
2152 Spacing

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2153 Drainage
2154 Fire Protection
2160 Living Quarters 2100-10
2161 General Design
2162 Layout and Spacing
2163 Drainage
2170 Process Equipment Buildings 2100-10
2180 References 2100-11

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Fire Protection Manual 2100 Buildings/Facilities Design

2110 General Design Considerations

The design features of any building should provide adequate safety to protect the
occupants, building contents and surrounding exposures from fire. The designer
should base the design on the following considerations:
• Code requirements. These requirements may determine size of building,
construction materials, occupancy, and minimum fire protection requirements.
• Life safety. If no code is in force, building size, construction materials, occu-
pancy, and minimum fire protection requirements should be chosen to limit fire
spread and provide a minimum acceptable level of life safety. NFPA 101, Life
Safety Code, the Uniform Fire Code and the Uniform Building Code may be
used as guidelines.
• Exposures. Special design features may be justified for:
– Adjacent fire or explosion hazards. Greater spacing may also be warranted.
– Adjacent toxic substance hazards. This is particularly true for air condi-
tioning systems.
• Response capability. Building design may be affected by the availability of
fire fighting equipment, trained response personnel and water supplies. Five
categories of buildings will be discussed. These are:
– Control houses
– Office buildings
– Temporary buildings
– Shops, garages
– Living quarters
– Process buildings
Warehouses, including packaging and distribution centers, are discussed in
Section 3800.
• Plastic building materials. These materials should be avoided. In general, the
smoke developed during a fire is toxic and corrosive, even when so-called
“flame retardant,” or “fire resistant” plastics are used. The CRTC Fire and
Process Safety team should be consulted before a building design using plastic
building materials is accepted.
• In seismically active areas, cabinets, shelves, etc. over 48 inches high should
be restrained to prevent toppling and blocking evacuation routes during an
earthquake.

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2120 Control Houses

2121 General Design

Most design requirements are found in the Instrumentation and Control Manual,
Section 1100. Refer to Section 2200 for additional design considerations if the
control house contains process control computers. The structural members, and the
interior and exterior walls of control houses should be constructed of noncombus-
tible materials. Fire resistive ratings of one hour or greater may also be required.
Wall coverings, wood paneling, trim, or cabinets should not be used within the lab
or control areas because they contribute to the combustible fuel load. Doors should
be constructed of noncombustible materials or have a solid wood core. Control
rooms in plants handling flammable liquids or dust should not have windows.
Furnishings should be non-combustible.
Metal cabinet space should be provided for personal belongings so that operators
do not have to use the backs of instrument control racks for storage.
Racks must be kept unobstructed to allow air circulation for cooling.

Ventilation
Positive, forced-air ventilation should be provided in the control house. The air
intake should be taken from a safe, vapor-free location at least 25 feet above grade.
If hydrogen sulfide, hydrocarbons or other toxic or hazardous vapors could be
drawn in by the air system, a vapor detection system should be provided. This
system should alarm personnel in the control house at 20% lower flammable limit
(LFL) and cause automatic shutdown at 60% LFL (or H2S threshold limit value
(TLV)) or start 100% circulation of the ventilating system. Provisions should be
made to allow easy testing and maintenance of the systems. Where personnel are
required to stay in the control room during a controlled shutdown, there should be
an alarm on loss of the fan or ventilation pressure. Refer to NFPA 496 for design
details, when a building is pressurized to meet area classification requirements.

Area Separation
Different functional areas in the control house (e.g. rack room, control room, lab,
office area) should be separated by fire resistive walls that extend from the floor to
the roof. Compartmentalizing the building in this way limits the area of potential
damage in the event of a fire.
Penetrations through fire walls require fire stops, and HVAC ducting requires fire
dampers. Some locations use sand boxes, shown in Figure 2100-1, to seal wall pene-
trations under a raised floor for electrical cables.

Control Room Lab

A one-hour fire resistive wall shall separate the lab from the control areas. Entry
into the lab shall be through an outside door. Doors shall not be installed in walls
between the lab and the control room, because they reduce the fire safety of the

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Fire Protection Manual 2100 Buildings/Facilities Design

Fig. 2100-1 Fire Wall Penetration for Under Floor Cables

Raised
Floor

Fire Wall

Half Rounds to
Protect Cable
Cable

Sand

facility. See the Instrumentation and Control Manual, Figure 1100-9, for more
information.
There may, however, be circumstances where a window is desired and can be justi-
fied because the lab does not handle significant amounts of flammable liquids,
reagents or solvents or combustible liquids above the flash point. In such cases, the
window should be 1/4-inch wired glass, set in a steel frame and limited to 2 square
feet total area.
The CRTC Fire & Process Safety team should be consulted for special circum-
stances.

2122 Structural Design

Whether the control house is to be of conventional or blast resistant design is deter-
mined by the spacing and processes nearby. Section 1300 and the Civil and Struc-
tural Manual, Section 400, should be reviewed for blast-resistant design
considerations. The intent of blast-resistant design is to accept a level of damage
from a local explosion while protecting personnel and critical equipment.

2123 Spacing
Spacing of control houses from operating plants should be based on the control
house design (whether conventional or blast-resistant) and on the degree of fire or
explosion risk presented by the operating plant. Section 1300 details spacing guide-
lines.

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2100 Buildings/Facilities Design Fire Protection Manual

2124 Drainage
The control house foundation site should be higher than the surrounding areas so
that a spill or surface drainage flows away from the control house and does not
block access.

2125 Fire Protection

In the lab, provide at least one CO2 extinguisher having a minimum 5B:C rating. In
the control house area provide at least one CO2 extinguisher having a minimum 2A-
40B:C rating. Halon 1211 portable extinguishers are not recommended for labs
because of their high discharge velocity. The extinguisher discharge is capable of
knocking over glassware, which can cause the fire to spread. CO2 extinguishers
have a low discharge velocity because the agent is released as a gas.
Consider providing a dry chemical or 2-1/2 gallon pressurized water extinguisher
near offices located in a control house. Refer to Section 1600 for guidelines on
inspection and maintenance of the extinguishers.

2130 Office Buildings

2131 Codes and Standards

Office spaces must comply with local codes and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). Good references are the Uniform Building Code (UBC), the Uniform
Fire Code (UFC), and NFPA 101.

2132 Special Areas

Vaults, record storage areas, photographic developing and reproduction labs,
special files, etc., may require special design considerations, such as the following:
• If the building contains a computer system, refer to Section 2200 for additional
design considerations.
• If a concrete or steel vault is housed in the building, is the structure capable of
supporting the vault during a fire?
• Are important or vital records duplicated and stored off-site? If not, consider
doing so. Also consider one-hour fire resistive wall construction around record
storage areas.
• In photo labs, staffed photocopy-reproduction centers and other similar areas,
provide cabinets and segregate incompatible chemicals.
• In small unstaffed photocopy rooms, no special requirements are justified.
• In janitorial rooms, provide adequate cabinet and shelving space for neat
storage of supplies.

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Fire Protection Manual 2100 Buildings/Facilities Design

• Rooms used for storage of confidential materials may justify one-hour fire
resistive separation walls.
• In all areas, provide adequate cabinet and shelving space to allow good house-
keeping.

2133 Spacing
Office buildings should be spaced per local building code requirements. If no local
code is in force, the Uniform Building Code may be used as a guide.

2134 Fire Protection

As a minimum, provide a dry chemical or 2-1/2 gallon pressurized water extin-
guisher for every 6000 square feet of office space, and limit travel distance to any
extinguisher to not more than 75 feet. For life safety reasons, sprinkler protection is
recommended, particularly in buildings of over two stories. Refer to NFPA 13 for
sprinkler design. Fire extinguishers should be inspected and maintained as
discussed in Section 1600.
Stairways should be designed in accordance with the UBC and UFC when other
codes do not apply.
Stairways in buildings of over 2 stories should be enclosed in one-hour fire rated
construction. For buildings over 4 stories, the stairway should be enclosed in two-
hour fire rated construction. If the building is over 75 feet high, at least one
stairway should be in a smokeproof enclosure. The smokeproof enclosure should
consist of a vented vestibule leading to a continuous stairway enclosed by a two-
hour wall.
Stair treads should be made of concrete, stone, steel, or other noncombustible mate-
rial.

2140 Temporary Buildings

2141 General Design

Temporary prefabricated buildings, including trailers, are used extensively
throughout the Company for construction offices, temporary office space, storage
space and laboratories. Use of such buildings for housing will be discussed later.
These buildings are usually of light, wood frame construction. They come in stan-
dard sizes to allow easy highway transport and usually can be connected together to
make multiwidth buildings. The number of trailers connected together depends on
space requirements. However, local codes may restrict building size. If no code is in
force, building size should be limited to 8000 square feet, to limit the fire risk area.
To avoid these types of buildings becoming “permanent,” there should be a date
agreed on for their removal.

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2100 Buildings/Facilities Design Fire Protection Manual

2142 Spacing
Temporary buildings should be spaced as required by local building code. Where
no code is in force, buildings should be divided into 8000 square-foot areas and
spaced at least 40 feet apart. The intent is to maintain 40 feet between every 8000
square feet of plot area, not between each individual trailer.
Because of their light, combustible construction, these buildings should be placed at
least twice the distance from an operating plant as a conventional control house.
However, separation need not exceed 200 feet.
It may be acceptable (if agreed to by the operating management) to place a trailer in
a processing unit during shutdown if all of the following conditions are met:
• It is placed in the plant after the plant is shut down.
• It is removed before plant startup.
• It meets minimum spacing distances from any other operating plant.
• At least a 20-foot-wide fire break is cleared around the building if the building
is located in or near grass or brush land.

2143 Drainage
Drainage should be directed away from the building and major vehicular access
routes.

2144 Fire Protection

Provide at least one dry chemical or 2-1/2 gallon pressurized water extinguisher for
every 6000 square feet of space and limit travel distance to any extinguisher to 75
feet for multiwidth trailers.
Provide at least one 2-1/2 gallon pressurized water extinguisher for single width
trailers. Refer to Section 1600 for more information on extinguishers and proper
inspection and maintenance procedures.
Provide skirts around elevated portable buildings (e.g., trailers) to prevent accumula-
tion of combustible materials underneath.
If computers are present in the trailers, then a CO2 1211 fire extinguisher with a
minimum 1A-10B:C rating is required.

2150 Shops and Garages

2151 General Design

See Section 3800, Warehouses and Outside Storage, for more design information.
In designing such buildings consider the following:

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Fire Protection Manual 2100 Buildings/Facilities Design

• Local building codes

• Flammable or combustible liquids stored in the building. Use NFPA 30,
Chapter 4 to determine the quantities of liquid that can be stored.
For example, liquid quantity and allowable stacking height guidelines from NFPA
30, Paragraph 4-5.6.3 are:
• If welding or cutting is done, limit combustibles in the area. For cylinders in
storage, provide space for upright storage of compressed gas cylinders. Provide
either a minimum spacing of 20 feet between oxygen cylinders and acetylene
cylinders or provide a 1/2-hour fire rated wall at least 5 feet high. These provi-
sions do not apply for cylinders in use.
• Restrain cylinders so they cannot fall over. This is especially important in seis-
mically active areas.
• Refer to Section 1500, Section 3800 and NFPA 70 to determine electrical area
classification and equipment selection for these occupancies.
• Provide access to and clearance around main electrical panels per NFPA 70.
• Local codes and economics normally determine construction materials. It may
be acceptable to construct the building of combustible material if the contents
present an equal or greater combustible load. However, surrounding exposures
should be considered so that a fire outside the building cannot spread into the
combustible building.
• Fire protection and spacing for inventory pallet or rack storage should conform
to Section 3800. See also NFPA 30 and NFPA 231. Sprinkler system piping
and controls, if required, should be situated so racks and shelves will not fall
on them in an earthquake.
• Procedures should be in place to assure equipment is vapor-free prior to
entering the building. Otherwise the work area shall be ventilated and classi-
fied. Refer to Section 1500 and NFPA 30. Portable shop work lights that will
be used when working on non-vapor free equipment shall be suitable for use in
Class I, Division II areas.

2152 Spacing
These buildings should be spaced as recommended in Section 1300. It is important
that a fire break of at least 20 feet from combustible vegetation be maintained
around the buildings.

2153 Drainage
Drainage should be directed away from the building and major vehicular access
routes.

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2100 Buildings/Facilities Design Fire Protection Manual

2154 Fire Protection

Provide at least one 2-1/2 gallon pressurized water or 30-pound multipurpose dry-
chemical extinguisher for every 1000 square feet of area and limit travel distance to
any extinguisher to 75 feet in shops and garages unless 3/4-inch garden hoses, with
spray-type garden hose nozzle are provided in sufficient number and length to reach
all areas of the warehouse or shop. In those locations containing water-reactive
chemicals or other special hazards, provide protection commensurate with the
hazard. Multipurpose dry-chemical extinguishers should not be installed around
electronic gear.
Sprinklers. Local jurisdictions and codes may require sprinklers for facilities
handling flammable materials. Sprinklers may also be appropriate for highly valued
facilities. Where chemicals stored may present an exposure to the public if exposed
to fire, and it is desirable to limit such exposure, sprinklers should be considered.
The drainage of sprinkler water contaminated by the fire may represent an environ-
mental exposure which needs design considerations. The Fire Protection Staff is
available for consultation.

2160 Living Quarters

2161 General Design

As a minimum, living quarters should be constructed of materials as specified by
the local building code or UBC. Noncombustible materials are preferred for
onshore living quarters and recommended for offshore. Sprinklers should be
provided in living quarters. Other fire protection equipment should meet the require-
ments in Section 2134.

2162 Layout and Spacing

Layout and spacing details for offshore platform living quarters are given in
Section 3100. Onshore living quarters should comply with the spacing require-
ments of the Uniform Building Code if a local building code is not in effect.

2163 Drainage
Surface drainage should enter storm drains rather than process drains. Process or
oil-water drains should not be located near living quarters. The intent is to prevent
the escape of process vapors in unclassified areas and to reduce overloading of the
oil-water sumps and treatment facilities.

2170 Process Equipment Buildings

Process equipment buildings are buildings that contain hydrocarbon piping and
equipment. Some examples are: analyzer buildings, metering stations, pump
stations, compressor stations, and separation stations.

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Fire Protection Manual 2100 Buildings/Facilities Design

Process equipment buildings should be of noncombustible construction. They

should have openings on all sides whenever practical to allow for ventilation and
access by fire water streams in case of fire. If they must be fully enclosed due to
ambient conditions, ventilation based on Section 1500 should be provided to
prevent the accumulation of flammable gases. The building exhaust vents should be
located to preclude the accumulation of gases at low points such as pipe trenches,
as well as at the ceiling. Fixed suppression systems should be considered for
process equipment buildings containing high value or critical equipment, such as
generators, compressors, or gas turbines.

2180 References
Chevron References
Civil and Structural Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 13 Installation of Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 101 Safety to Life from Fire in Buildings and Structures
NFPA 231 General Storage

Uniform Building Code (UBC)

Uniform Fire Code (UFC)

Chevron Corporation 2100-11 December 1994

2200 Computer and Digital Instrument
Installations

Abstract
This section outlines fire protection guidelines for new computer and digital instru-
ment facilities, such as electronic data processing facilities, computer rooms, and
digital instrument process control rooms. Existing facilities should be evaluated
individually to determine if changes to implement these guidelines are justified.
This section also gives guidance on the use of Halon in computer installations.
Section 1660 discusses the environmental concerns in using Halon.

Contents Page

2210 When to Provide Fire Protection 2200-2

2220 Protection From External Exposures 2200-2
2230 Protection Within Computer or Digital Instrument Equipment Rooms 2200-3
2231 Building Design
2232 Materials and Equipment
2233 Portable Fire Extinguishing Equipment
2240 Automatic Fire Detection and Fixed Fire Extinguishing Systems 2200-5
2241 Fire Detectors and System Control Panel
2242 System Response
2243 Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System
2244 Manual Switches
2245 Smoke and Fume Venting
2250 References 2200-8

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2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations Fire Protection Manual

2210 When to Provide Fire Protection

These guidelines are intended to assist managers (with responsibility for computer
or other digital equipment facilities) to evaluate the need to provide supplemental
fire protection. Supplemental fire protection may range from hand-portable fire
extinguishers to automatic alarm and fire extinguishing systems.
Fire protection for the building in which computer or digital process control facili-
ties are located should be provided in accordance with applicable state and local
ordinances, codes, and regulations. In the absence of other requirements, it is
recommended that Uniform Building Code and Uniform Fire Code practices be
followed.
Usually, time-share terminals, printers, teletype equipment, keypunch equipment,
personal computers and data access terminals do not require special protection.
This equipment is attended, and when properly connected, is no more of a fire
hazard than electric or electronic typewriting equipment. Note that overloaded wall
sockets and ungrounded three-prong adapters increase the risk of fire.

2220 Protection From External Exposures

Computer or digital instrument process control equipment should be housed in a
fire-resistant, noncombustible building for protection from fires originating outside
the building. Masonry and banked soil around buildings will provide additional
protection from external fires.
Computer and digital instrument equipment should be located inside the building in
an area where exposure to fire, water, corrosive fumes, heat and smoke from
adjoining areas and activities is minimized. Equipment rooms should have, as a
minimum, one-hour fire-rated walls that run from the structural floor to the roof or
the bottom of the structural floor above. Walls in libraries storing magnetic
recorded data or paper/card recorded data should have a minimum fire rating of two
hours and should run from structural floor to floor.
It is recommended that magnetic recorded data be stored separately from
paper/card recorded data. Magnetic tapes, flexible disks and similar materials may
be severely damaged at sustained ambient temperatures as low as 100°F to l20°F.
Computer and digital instrument equipment may be damaged when exposed to
sustained ambient temperatures as low as 110°F for extended periods. Damage to
paper products may begin at sustained ambient temperatures as low as 350°F.

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Fire Protection Manual 2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations

2230 Protection Within Computer or Digital Instrument

Equipment Rooms

2231 Building Design

Compartmentalization of Equipment Areas
It is usually desirable to compartmentalize computer or digital instrument equip-
ment installations consistent with efficient operations. Compartmentalization limits
the area of potential equipment damage from smoke and heat and minimizes use of
the extinguishing agent.

Raised Floors
Structural supporting members and decking for raised floors should be of concrete,
steel, aluminum, or other noncombustible materials. Access floor panels should be
provided so that the space beneath the raised floor is easily accessible. Special
access tools (such as a suction floor-lifter), should be kept in a designated, well-
marked locations. At least two should be kept in each room.
The space below the raised floor should be subdivided by tight, noncombustible
bulkheads. Subdivisions, as recommended in National Fire Protection Association
Standard NFPA 75, “Protection of Electronic Computer/Data Processing Equip-
ment,” should not exceed 10,000 square feet. Some local codes may restrict the
maximum area to less than 10,000 square feet.

Above-the-ceiling Spaces
Consideration must also be given to the need for fire protection in the space above
hung ceilings. Usually protection for this area is not necessary. The need will
depend upon intended uses of the space, materials of construction, and combustible
load within the space. Above-the-ceiling spaces should be compartmentalized using
the same separation walls used to divide the above-the-floor spaces.

Penetrations
Doors, air handling ducts, cable openings, and other penetrations through fire-resis-
tant-rated walls, ceilings, under-the-floor separation bulkheads and floors must be
provided with appropriate fire-rated closures or be suitably sealed to maintain the
integrity of the separation.

2232 Materials and Equipment

Office furniture should be made of noncombustible materials. Metal waste
containers should have “self-extinguishing” fire-safe covers.
Smoking is not permitted within magnetic tape or paper/card data libraries or in
computer and digital instrument equipment rooms.

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2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations Fire Protection Manual

Paper stock and other combustible storage inside the equipment room should be
minimized. Such materials should be kept in totally enclosed metal file cases or
cabinets. Reserve stocks of paper, unused recording media, and other combustibles
should be stored at another location.
Fire protection requirements for paper and forms storage rooms should be evalu-
ated. Additional protection may be justified if paper stock or forms are special
items that could not be replaced quickly or economically.

Wiring Type
Fire exposure or electrical overheating of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) electrical insula-
tion evolves particulate matter and hydrogen chloride gas. Combined with moisture
from the combustion process and in the surrounding air, this gas forms hydrochloric
acid, a strongly corrosive agent that attacks terminals, solder circuitry and elec-
tronic components.
Wiring and cable used should meet the requirements in NEC Article 300-22,
Article 645, and NFPA 75, Protection of Electronic Computer/Data Processing
equipment.

2233 Portable Fire Extinguishing Equipment

In most cases, a reliable detection system along with portable fire extinguishers is
the system of choice. If computer components are stored in cabinets, provide ports
for directing portable fire extinguishers into the cabinets.
Computer and digital process control equipment rooms should have carbon dioxide
portable fire extinguishers. Consult with CRTC Fire and Process Safety team for
currently available substitutes to Halon 1211.
In addition, 2-1/2-gallon pressurized water extinguishers should be provided for
control of fires involving ordinary combustibles. These extinguishers should be
spaced so that at least one of each type is within a 50-foot travel distance of any
point in the room. As a minimum, one of each type should be available at the main
entrance to the room. Extinguisher locations should be clearly marked and ready
access maintained. Water extinguishers will be prominently marked:
DO NOT USE ON
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT.
Type ABC dry chemical extinguishers should never be used on or near important
computer equipment. The powder travels through very small openings, is very
corrosive to circuit boards and computer components, and can cause serious
damage to nearby computer equipment.
Small first aid fire hose connections should be provided in the vicinity of major
tape storage vaults or paper storage rooms.

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Fire Protection Manual 2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations

2240 Automatic Fire Detection and Fixed Fire Extinguishing Systems

Fixed extinguishing systems (e.g. CO2, water sprinkler, Halon substitute) are not
usually justified in manned computer installations. Fixed extinguishing systems
with automatic fire detectors should be considered in unattended locations where
some or all of the following exist:
• The loss of system use would result in a significant loss of revenue to the
Company.
• The loss of system use would create a serious business interruption, such as in
process monitoring, process control, payroll, or accounts receivable.
• Replacement units or duplicate facilities are not readily available, or are very
expensive (more than $1 million).
Fixed systems will limit a fire to the room of origin. There is disagreement over the
extent of water damage during a fire due to discharge from a fixed sprinkler system.
These factors and those listed above should be taken into consideration when deter-
mining if a fixed system is required.
The need for full-flood extinguishing systems under raised floors must be carefully
evaluated. Wiring typically is low current, wiring insulation will generally stop
burning after the circuit is de-energized, and the frequency of fires is very low. A
good detection system in conjunction with portable extinguishers is usually
adequate protection.
Automatic-early-warning fire detection and full-flood fire extinguishing systems
should be engineered for the specific area to be protected. They should be designed,
installed and maintained in accordance with NFPA 75, “Protection of Electronic
Computer/Data Processing Equipment,” NFPA 72E, “Automatic Fire Detectors,”
NFPA 13, “Automatic Sprinkler Systems, NFPA 12, “ Carbon Dioxide Extin-
guishing Systems, and any applicable local codes. As discussed in Section 1660,
Halon 1301 systems should not be installed in new facilities. Consult the CRTC
Fire & Process Safety team for information on Halon alternatives.

Sprinkler Systems
Sprinkler systems can be used effectively in computer installations and are some-
times required by local codes. Although slightly less reliable than wet pipe systems,
and more costly to maintain, pre-action systems or manual-remote-operated
systems may be used when there is a concern about water leakage onto computer
equipment.
Automatic pre-action sprinkler systems are actuated by a zoned detection system.
The sprinkler system is dry until detectors in two separate zones are activated,
allowing water to enter the system. Power shutdown occurs at actuation to reduce
chance of electrical short circuit. An advantage cited for this system is that acidic
products of combustion from burning PVC are washed out of the air, minimizing
subsequent damage to electrical components of the computer system. Many
computer installations have been returned to service following activation of a sprin-
kler system, after drying the system components. Experience shows that damage

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2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations Fire Protection Manual

due to sprinkler systems in computer rooms is minimal. Most components are

undamaged after being dried.
Computer systems protected by sprinkler systems must have all power disconnected
prior to sprinkler activation. For process control computer systems, the risk of
unplanned system shutdown should be evaluated.
Where sprinklers are provided in main equipment rooms, they should be designed
as ordinary hazard systems as defined in NFPA 13. In magnetic record storage
vaults where tapes and disks are stored in plastic cases on open shelves an extra
hazard design as defined in NFPA 13 should be used. For paper-base records or
stationery storage rooms, use an ordinary hazard schedule unless storage exceeds
fifteen feet in height, in which case extra hazard schedule will be needed. Sprinkler
systems should be designed, installed, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 13
and any applicable local codes.

Carbon Dioxide (CO2)

Carbon Dioxide (CO2) flood systems will not sustain life. These systems are accept-
able only in small unmanned buildings or equipment enclosures (e.g. combustion
gas turbine enclosures, under-floor areas in unoccupied rooms) Manual overrides
and a warning alarm and evacuation procedures are required. A sign should be
placed outside the room to warn against entry during an alarm unless self contained
breathing apparatus is worn. Refer to NFPA 12 for additional details on the design
and installation of Carbon Dioxide systems.

2241 Fire Detectors and System Control Panel

Detectors used with fixed fire extinguishing systems should be of a high quality
commercial type capable of detecting products of combustion (POC) rather than
heat. The detector should be capable of detecting fire in the incipient stage (before
flames appear). Ionization-type, photoelectric-type, or a combination of both may
be used. Location of detectors should be in accordance with NFPA 72E.
Detectors are normally cross-zoned, i.e., divided into two circuits. Should a
detector in one circuit (first zone) activate, the events in Section 2242 will trigger. A
detector in the second circuit (second zone) of the same level of protection must
activate to initiate release of the extinguishing agent. Cross-zoning reduces the
possibility of inappropriate dumping of the extinguishing agent.
To assist personnel in investigating the cause of first-zone alarms, it is desirable to
have visual indication of which detector has actuated. This may be done with visual
indicator lights on detectors that are in view of the operating personnel and remote
indicators for detectors that are not normally visible. Graphic indicator panels are
effective in showing the location of the actuated detector.
The system control panel should be located near the protected area. The system
should be electrically supervised to protect against open wire faults in the detection,
alarm, and actuation circuits, and in system alarm relay and trouble relay coils.

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Fire Protection Manual 2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations

The control panel should provide both audible and visual indication for detector
alarms in each level of protection in each area and for system trouble signals. Elec-
trical power to the control panel should be from a reliable 120-volt AC power
circuit or an uninterruptible power supply system. The control panel system should
include an emergency standby battery backup providing 1) at least 24 hours oper-
ating capacity and 2) the ability to discharge the extinguishing agent and sound all
audible devices for 5 minutes at the end of the 24-hour standby period.
Alarm and system trouble signals should normally indicate both audibly and visu-
ally at a remote location that is attended around the clock, such as the building
control center, or a security station.

2242 System Response

A first-zone smoke detector actuation triggers the following events:
1. Audible alarm sounds and rotating beacon activates, as appropriate.
2. Visual indicator lights up on local system control panel, indicating zone actu-
ated and location of actuated detector.
3. Appropriate dampers close in the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
(HVAC) supply and exhaust ducts that penetrate the affected area. This isolates
the area in preparation for release of the extinguishing agent.
4. Local air conditioning units in affected area power down as appropriate.
5. Magnetic door holder devices release and any other closure device in the
affected area actuates to isolate the area in preparation for the release of the
extinguishing agent. (Note: Appropriate hardware must be provided on the
doors so that personnel may safely exit the area.)
6. An alarm is actuated at a central monitoring or fire/security control station.
Activation of any detector in the second zone triggers the following events:
1. Evacuation horn sounds.
2. All computer or other digital equipment powers down. It may not be desirable
to automatically power down process plant control instrumentation; each
system must be designed to meet the process plant requirements.
3. Extinguishing agent is released after preset time delay period, normally not
more than 30 seconds. This delay allows time to abort release of the agent if
the problem has been corrected and allows time for personnel to evacuate the
room. The abort switch should be on the control panel.

2243 Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System

Rooms for computer or other digital equipment and data storage libraries should be
isolated from all ductwork feeding other building areas and have their own HVAC
systems. All ducts penetrating separation walls, floors, or ceilings of computer and

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2200 Computer and Digital Instrument Installations Fire Protection Manual

digital equipment rooms, data storage libraries or storage rooms protected by fixed
systems should be equipped with motor or pneumatic-operated dampers. Dampers
should be instrumented to close on first-zone smoke detection to isolate the area in
preparation for releasing the extinguishing agent.

Plenums
When the air space below a raised floor or above a suspended ceiling is used as a
supply or return plenum for an HVAC system, construction should be noncombus-
tible. This prevents flame or smoke from being generated within the plenum and
spreading throughout the building.

2244 Manual Switches

Provide manual switches for powering down the computer or digital equipment,
local air conditioning equipment, and all other electrical equipment in the room,
except for the lights. These switches should be located inside the room adjacent to
the major exit doors. The switches should be prominently identified. Provide a
method to manually initiate (electrical or mechanical) release of the extinguishing
agent, and a switch to abort the release of the agent. These switches will normally
be located at the fixed system control panel, and at exits from the room.

2245 Smoke and Fume Venting

Provide a method to exhaust smoke and fumes from the protected areas. Exhaust
systems should require manual start. Careful consideration should be given to the
probable paths such smoke and fumes will take, and efforts should be made to mini-
mize exposure of computer and digital equipment.
Particular attention should be given to under-the-floor spaces where hydrogen chlo-
ride may be generated when PVC insulation is involved in a fire or electrical break-
down. Venting may be accomplished by a separate emergency mechanical venting
system or by 100% exhausting with the HVAC system.

2250 References
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
NFPA 12 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 13 Installation of Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 72E Automatic Fire Detectors
NFPA 75 Protection of Electronic Computer /Data Processing Equipment

December 1994 2200-8 Chevron Corporation

2300 Utilities

Abstract
This section discusses fire protection considerations related to steam generation
facilities (boilers), electrical generation and supply, instrument air systems, and
utility connections. Refer to the Utilities Manual for more information on utility
system design. Section 1600 discusses fire water systems design.

Contents Page

2310 General Design 2300-2

2320 Boiler Plants 2300-2
2321 Layout
2322 Safe Firing Controls
2323 Fire Protection for Boiler Plants
2330 Electricity Supply and Power Generation 2300-3
2331 Electrical System Reliability
2332 Layout Considerations
2333 Fire Protection
2340 Instrument Air System 2300-4
2350 Utility Connections 2300-4

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2300 Utilities Fire Protection Manual

2310 General Design

In general, utilities systems are designed to be highly reliable so that involuntary
shutdowns are minimized. Loss of utilities can lead to emergency shutdowns of
process plants and to conditions which could cause fire (e.g., overheating and over-
pressure). Loss of utilities often produces the greatest load on the relief system.
In large plants, redundant systems or spares are provided to minimize the risk of
involuntary shutdown of facilities and to increase the reliability for critical equip-
ment and control systems. However, in some small plants, full sparing of utilities
cannot be justified. Therefore, the plant operating procedures must include contin-
gencies for such shutdowns.
Refer to the Utilities Manual for information on the design of specific utilities
systems.

2320 Boiler Plants

Steam is used for numerous purposes in process plants, i.e., spare critical pumps,
heating, heat tracing, steam-out, vessel gas freeing, fire control, etc. Steam is of
particular importance during shutdowns and power outages.

2321 Layout
As a safety feature, because of the emergency needs, the boiler and other utilities
should be located well away from process facilities so that they will not be exposed
to fires and explosions originating in the process plants.
Where there is more than one boiler (fired heater) in a given area, individual stacks
are preferable to common breaching with a common stack. However, energy conser-
vation may take priority. When it does, the appropriate isolation and monitoring
equipment should be specified for the common breaching and stack.
Utility boiler houses should contain only equipment and operations associated with
the production of steam.

2322 Safe Firing Controls

Safety Controls for All Boilers
All boilers should have the following safety controls:
• A pressure relief safety valve capable of relieving overpressure at maximum
heat input
• Low and high water alarm, and low-low and high-high water alarm and inter-
lock to shut off fuel input
• Alarms and interlocks on airflow to shut off fuel supply in the event of forced-
draft fan failure.

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Fire Protection Manual 2300 Utilities

Additional Safety Controls for Gas-fired Boilers

Gas-fired boilers should have additional controls that are listed below. These
controls should cause the safety shutoff valves to close if a condition they monitor
deviates from normal.
• Low and high gas pressure switches
• Main burner and pilot double-block-and-bleed safety shutoff valves
• Flame failure scanners with the time limiting “trial for ignition” feature
included in the circuitry.
Oil burners and coal burners are also equipped with fuel control and fail-safe
devices. For general information on boiler safety controls see the Fired Heater and
Waste Heat Recovery Manual and NFPA 85, NFPA 85B, and NFPA 85D. Pulver-
ized coal burners are discussed in NFPA 85E and NFPA 85F.

2323 Fire Protection for Boiler Plants

Fire water hydrants and hose reels should be provided. Fire extinguishers such as
dry-chemical, Halon and CO2, and first aid fire hose reels shall be provided to
handle any small fires that are anticipated, such as fuel piping, pump or electrical
fires. On some boilers with under-boiler air ducts, faulty or plugged fuel oil burners
can cause fuel oil to back up into the air ducting where it will accumulate and burn.
Provision for injecting fire foam or steam should be provided.

2330 Electricity Supply and Power Generation

Refer to the Electrical Manual for information on design of electrical systems.

2331 Electrical System Reliability

Generally, economics dictate the use of electricity for the primary drivers of most
pumps, compressors, etc. Steam turbines are used only for limited sparing, in most
cases. Power generation is unnecessary in many regions because electric companies
have established extensive back-up facilities that minimize power outages. Therefore,
the power supply is limited to substation and motor control centers. Because these
units are the critical link to the power supply, they must be extremely reliable. In a
major processing complex, the power source will often be on a loop system so that,
should one source fail, the power can automatically be cut in from an alternate source.

2332 Layout Considerations

Substations and other utilities must be spaced safely away from process areas and
areas of potential flooding. One should also consider exposure to heavy traffic
areas. See Section 1300 for spacing considerations from other plant equipment.

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2300 Utilities Fire Protection Manual

The station yard (electrical switchgear) should be large enough to allow 30 feet (9
meters) or more between oil-filled transformers and buildings and between switch-
gear and transformers.
The area below the generator floor must be well drained, to take care of any lube oil
spill. Effective drainage can be accomplished by floor slopes, floor drains, trenches,
or diversion curbing.

2333 Fire Protection

When onsite generation is the sole or major irreplaceable source of electric power,
the following fixed water protection systems should be installed:
• Directional water spray at a density of 0.25 gpm/sq ft (10 liters/minute/square
meter) for pedestal bearings and lube oil lines at the drive turbine, if steam
temperature is at or above 90% of the auto-ignition point of the lubricating oil
or its mist.
• Deluge at a density of 0.25 gpm/sq ft (10 liters/minute/square meter) for lube
oil lines at consoles and where cables are concentrated below the generator floor
CO2 or Halon fire extinguishers should be distributed throughout the facilities with
a maximum horizontal travel distance not exceeding 50 feet (15 meters).

2340 Instrument Air System

Normally, instrument air systems are designed with parallel systems and spare air
driers so that there is a very low risk of losing the entire system.
Instrument air systems should be placed in low risk areas where exposure to
process fires and explosions are minimal.
In the past, there have been explosions from oil in the instrument air system. Oil
from lubricated cylinders of reciprocating air compressors was either auto-ignited
or ignited from a hot cylinder. This problem can be eliminated by 1) installing non-
lubed centrifugal or reciprocating compressors, or 2) using a synthetic, flame retar-
dant lubricating oil such as Stauffer's Fyrquel 550. In either of these cases, consult
the CRTC Mechanical and Electrical staff for guidance.

2350 Utility Connections

Improperly designed utility connections, or connections left in place after shut-
downs, have caused serious fires and many near misses. See the Utilities Manual
for detailed information on the design of utility connections. Temporary connec-
tions must be designed as though permanent, unless procedures and other design
features to prevent failure are incorporated.
Temporary electrical connections must meet National Electrical Code requirements
for the area classification. The use of electrical adaptor cords to convert from explo-

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Fire Protection Manual 2300 Utilities

sion-proof receptacles to conventional plugs is not allowed in a classified area

without a hot work permit.

Chevron Corporation 2300-5 June 1990

3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling
Facilities

Abstract
This section establishes minimum fire protection and fire safety requirements for
manned and unmanned offshore facilities, and fixed and mobile drilling rigs and
vessels. Many of these requirements will also apply to floating production systems,
and single point moorings with living quarters.
Fire prevention, rapid detection, and automatic and manual control of offshore
producing and drilling facilities during fire emergencies are emphasized. Because
of the confining nature of offshore facilities, well designed exposure protection and
complete evacuation facilities are warranted. Fire fighting facilities should be oper-
able with minimal manpower.

Contents Page

3110 Fire Protection Design and Life Safety Philosophy 3100-3

3111 Life Safety
3112 Fire Protection Systems
3120 Fire Protection Design 3100-3
3121 Area Classification
3122 Layout Considerations
3123 Fire Walls
3124 Drainage
3125 Ignition Sources
3126 Fireproofing
3127 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Systems
3128 Detection Systems
3129 Vent Stacks
3130 Fire Suppression 3100-9
3131 Fire Water Supply System

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3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities Fire Protection Manual

3132 Fire Water Distribution System

3133 Extinguishing Equipment
3140 Life Safety Systems and Equipment 3100-17
3141 Evacuation and Survival
3142 Storage of Dangerous Materials
3143 Inspection and Maintenance Schedules
3144 Fire Protection Organization and Training
3150 Helidecks on Platforms and Mobile Rigs 3100-17
3151 With Fuel Servicing
3152 Without Fuel Servicing
3160 References 3100-19

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities

3110 Fire Protection Design and Life Safety Philosophy

3111 Life Safety

Offshore facilities may be well away from shore and may be in hostile weather envi-
ronments during at least part of the year requiring enclosed structures. To ensure
the safety of personnel and facilities, enclosed facilities require special concern
with respect to vapor control, spill control, fire detection and ventilation. Safety
precautions and provisions that must be available for personnel evacuation in emer-
gencies are equally important.

3112 Fire Protection Systems

Fire protection systems should quickly and automatically control or extinguish
fires. They should also initiate automatic shutdown or alarm to allow for manual
shutdown of process systems, and depressure equipment to lessen the fire danger.
If they cannot immediately effect extinguishment, fire protection systems must
provide a high degree of exposure protection until the fuel is exhausted or manual
extinguishment can be effected.
Manual fire fighting and extinguishing equipment and agents should require
minimum manpower to make the system as self-sufficient as possible. Fixed moni-
tors and live hose reels, both foam/water and water only, should be used as backup
support for the fixed fire extinguishing systems.

3120 Fire Protection Design

3121 Area Classification

Section 1500 and API RP 500 should be used to determine electrical area classifica-
tion. Also, see Section 1500 for general information in this area.
Electrical area classification must be determined for all areas. This is crucial as a
basis for selecting and installing electrical apparatus that could be ignition sources.
Offshore facilities usually lack space for unclassified areas unless vapor-tight walls
and pressurized rooms and enclosures are used. When pressurization is used, the
guidelines in NFPA 496, Chapter 3 (for control rooms) and Chapter 4 (for other
electrical rooms) should be followed. These guidelines require pressure of 0.1
inches H2O and velocity through open doors of 60 fpm. The guidelines do not
require air-lock doors or de-energization on pressure loss.
Pressurizing air must be taken from a safe location, usually an elevated location on
the upwind side of the platform. Gas detectors should be installed in the inlet duct
to detect hydrocarbon. Fan controls should be designed to go to lower speeds or
shut down upon hydrocarbon detection.

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Most open areas are classified Class I, Division 2, Group D. Although not required,
wellhead areas, even when open, are sometimes classified Class I, Division 1.
Battery rooms should be unclassified, provided with ventilation, and if located in an
electrically classified area, pressurized.

3122 Layout Considerations

It is advisable to segregate equipment by degree of hazard where feasible. That is,
locate equipment with the highest potential for release of hydrocarbons and for fire
as far from control rooms, fire pumps, generators, and living quarters as possible.
Preferably, on a fully integrated platform, this will result in the wellheads being
placed on one end of the platform and the living quarters, control room, and other
“safe” equipment on the opposite and “upwind” end. The production and gas
compression equipment would then be located in the center sections with flame
impingement walls separating them from the wellhead area and from the “safe
area.” Because helidecks are typically located on top of quarters buildings, this
layout provides maximum distance between helicopters and the drilling rig. On
some platform designs (i.e., a six-leg jacket design), it is more practical to place the
wellheads between the jacket legs and cantilever the compression module over one
end and the living quarters over the opposite end. Production equipment and utili-
ties would be located between the other legs, with appropriate flame impingement
walls installed.
Other layout considerations include:
• Where practical, living quarters should be located on a separate platform, 75
feet (23m) from the process area. In deeper water, this becomes impractical.
• Whenever possible, exit doors for living quarters should be located on the sides
of quarters facing away from potential fire hazards.
• Flammable and combustible liquids or gases should be stored as far away as
possible from living quarters and valuable equipment.
• Fired equipment should be located on the perimeter of the platform and sepa-
rated from production equipment by a fireproofed flame impingement wall.
• Incoming high pressure gas lines should be routed away from fire hazardous
areas. Grating should be installed under these lines up to the ESD valve to
prevent liquids from pooling underneath.
• Risers should be located away from boat landings and should be physically
protected to prevent damage from boats.
• Pigging facilities are generally best located on a subcellar deck away from crit-
ical equipment, with openings facing outboard of the platform.
• Cable trays should be routed to minimize their exposure to potential fire risks.

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities

3123 Fire Walls

Living quarters and enclosed evacuation routes should be protected by fire walls.
Fire walls should be considered for other safe areas, (e.g. control rooms, fire water
pumps, utility systems, etc.) that cannot be adequately spaced from high risk
process equipment. Section 1700 and API RP 2218 contain criteria for defining the
fire exposed envelope. This criteria can be used to determine if a safe area is too
close to a fire risk area. For example, if the fire water pump is within the fire
exposed envelope of the wellhead area, then a separation wall should be considered.
There are some disadvantages to fire walls. Fire walls will increase the congestion
on a platform which may interfere with access to equipment and evacuation routes.
Walls increase the risk of accumulating flammable vapors by interfering with the
natural ventilation. Walls may also hamper fire fighting efforts by making it more
difficult to direct water streams onto equipment. Additional mitigation measures
such as water spray systems and hydrocarbon detection, may be justified in areas
with fire walls.
Fire walls are typically flame impingement walls that protect against flame, heat
and smoke for a specific time period. Where the safe area is above the fire risk area,
the floor should be rated for fire as well. The international rating system for flame
impingement walls is described in Figure 3100-1. One hour ratings are recom-
mended, unless additional time is needed for safe shutdown and evacuation of the
platform. See Section 3126 for recommendations on types of fireproofing suitable
for flame impingement walls.

Fig. 3100-1 International Rating System – Flame Impingement Walls

Rating Description Typical Uses
A60 Rated to prevent smoke, heat and Fire walls between living areas and
flame from passing through for 60 other “safe areas” such as control
minutes during exposure to a fire of rooms or battery rooms.
ordinary combustible materials.
H60 Rated to prevent smoke, heat and Fire walls between safe areas and
flame from passing through for 60 hydrocarbon processing/well head
minutes during exposure to a fire of areas.
hydrocarbon materials.
A120 Rated to prevent smoke, heat and Not typically used.
flame from passing through for 120
minutes during exposure to a fire of
ordinary combustible materials.
H120 Rated to prevent smoke, heat and Fire walls between safe areas and
flame from passing through for 120 hydrocarbon processing areas,
minutes during exposure to a fire of where shutdown and evacuation
hydrocarbon materials. could take longer than 60 min.
Additional information is available from the testing organizations, Firto, Det Norske, or Lloyd's Register.

Fire walls are not typically constructed to provide blast protection. On most open
platforms with oil and natural gas, there is sufficient natural ventilation to prevent

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3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities Fire Protection Manual

an accumulation of hydrocarbon gas needed to cause a blast. When process equip-

ment is enclosed inside modules with walls, flammable vapors can build up and
significant blast overpressure could result. Provide explosion venting for these
enclosures. If safe areas are located nearby, blast overpressure modelling should be
used to determine the blast resistance needed on the separation walls. Explosion
venting should be directed away from safe areas. The CRTC Air Team and the Fire
& Process Safety Team are available for assistance in blast overpressure modelling.

3124 Drainage
Identification and containment of spills is crucial on offshore facilities. Good
drainage control will limit pollution, risk of large fires and risk to personnel and
facilities.
All decks where oil is handled must have solid decking and be curbed to contain
spills. Platforms should be designed so that drainage does not cause pooling under
equipment or pass under adjacent equipment. Segregated drainage around areas of
potential flammable liquid spills such as pumps may be used to help achieve this
objective. Drainage areas should be isolated with gas seals or traps to prevent the
migration of vapors from one area to another. Gas seals should be installed between
each deck. Drains should be piped to a sump on the lowest deck with provisions to
pump oil back to the oil system and to allow water to drain to a sump pile. The
sump vent line should be outfitted with a flame arrestor located within 30 pipe
diameters of the outlet.

3125 Ignition Sources

Ignition sources that may be present on offshore facilities include, but are not
limited to, the following: lightning, static electricity, hot surfaces, cutting and
welding, electrical equipment, and smoking. These sources are controlled by either
design or operating procedures. For further information refer to API RP 14. Fired
equipment, i.e., heater treaters or cogeneration facilities, require special attention
with respect to spacing, location and control of the ignition source.

3126 Fireproofing
Because of the weight added, fireproofing of structures is generally limited on
offshore facilities. Normally, water sprays and monitors are used instead. Fire-
proofing is used on flame impingement walls to maintain their integrity during a
fire. Normally a one-hour UL 1709 rating is recommended. Proprietary products
such as Pittchar, Thermolag 440, Chartek IV, Pyrocrete 241, and Marine Mandolite
550 are preferred because of their light weight.
Critical control valves and control leads that are not fail-safe ESD valves should be
designed to operate for 20 minutes under fire exposure conditions if their operation
may be required to help control a fire. Refer to Section 1700 for more information.

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities

3127 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Systems

All offshore platforms require ESD systems in accordance with API RP 14C.
Smaller, more basic platforms usually have a simple, fusible plug single-level
system that shuts in and depressures everything on the platform. Larger, more
complex platforms are more likely to have multilevel ESD systems. Refer to API
RP 14C for a discussion of these systems. Also refer to the Instrumentation and
Control Manual for more design guidelines.
Manual actuation stations for ESD systems should be located at the egress points
from each deck, in the control room, and at the heliport and boat landing.

Multilevel ESD Systems

First Level. The first level of a multilevel ESD system is actually a process equip-
ment shutdown which may shut down a small area of the platform without inter-
fering with other unaffected areas. Such a shutdown is generally caused by process
upset that does not involve fire. A first level block and bleed is likely to be triggered
manually or by detection of 60% LFL by hydrocarbon gas detectors.
Second Level. The next level closes all surface safety valves, blocks in and bleeds
down all process equipment on the platform, and actuates the deluge system for the
affected area. This level does not shut in pipelines that only pass through the plat-
form nor does it close the surface controlled subsurface safety valves. This level
would likely be triggered either manually or by a fusible plug, flame detector, or
smoke/heat sensors.
Third Level. The third level blocks in everything, including the surface controlled
subsurface safety valves through the wellhead control system, and bleeds down all
equipment on the platform. It also shuts down the main generators, leaving only the
UPS system for emergency power. This is the last resort before abandoning plat-
form and is manually triggered.

Fusible Plugs
Fusible plugs are the simplest, most reliable, and least expensive shutdown system
commonly used. Detailed guidelines for their design are found in API RP 14C.

Isolation Valves
Although API RP 14C only requires a check valve on departing lines from a plat-
form, it is recommended that a shutdown valve be installed to assure positive isola-
tion of the line in an emergency. Shutdown valves should be installed outside the
splash zone in an easily accessible location, as close to the water as practical. Some
countries are now requiring subsea emergency shutoff valves on pipelines.
Remotely activated isolation valves are also recommended on pump suction lines
for pumps being fed by large holdups of liquid hydrocarbon (>2500 gal).

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3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities Fire Protection Manual

3128 Detection Systems

Operation of any detection device, manual station, or automatic protection system
should activate a general platform alarm and initiate emergency shutdown of appro-
priate process equipment or systems as defined in the platform's operations manual.
Consideration should be given to keeping the system simple and maintainable.

Smoke Detectors
Ionization detectors should be provided in living quarters, in laboratories, in
computer rooms, and under the floor in computer rooms. Photoelectric detectors
should be used in rooms with high voltage switchgear such as Motor Control
Centers (MCC's). Detectors should be spaced 50 feet apart maximum or for a 300
square foot area. If fixed suppression systems are provided in conjunction with such
detection systems and the detectors are arranged to automatically activate these
systems, they should be cross-zoned to minimize false dumps.

Thermal Detection Units

Thermal detection units should be fixed-temperature, for instance, pilot heads,
fusible plug, or Fenwal. Rate-of-rise detectors should be provided for actuation of
the turbine hood fixed suppression systems and for fire detection in maintenance
and storage areas, where ionization smoke detectors might cause unnecessary
alarms.

Ultraviolet and Infrared Flame Detection

Ultraviolet (UV) and/or infrared (IR) flame detection should be installed in areas
where a fire may develop quickly and early detection may help in controlling it.
This includes the wellhead area, production area, compressor area, inside turbine
enclosures, etc. In areas where UV light from sources other than a hydrocarbon fire
may cause spurious trips, UV/IR combination detectors or tuned IR detectors
should be considered. Detectors should be tied into an annunciator panel in the
control room that shows the location of the alarming detector.

Manual Fire Alarm Stations

Manual fire alarm stations should be provided at convenient locations throughout
the living quarters with at least one on each level located near the stairway. They
should also be located throughout the platform near the ESD stations, as well as in
areas with a higher-than-usual risk of fire, such as the welding shop.

Alarm and Detection Control Panel

The key element in the fire alarm system should be the alarm and detection control
panel. This panel provides all electrical power to the field detectors; supervises
these power lines for shorts, ground faults, and detector disconnects; provides all
fire alarm logic functions; and activates all field output devices, such as suppression
agent release valves, horns, alarm bells, lights, etc. An uninterruptible power
source, such as batteries, should be provided as a backup power feed to the panel.
This panel should be located in the control room.

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities

Flammable Vapor Detection and Alarm Systems

Flammable vapor detection systems should be provided to monitor the atmosphere
for dangerous concentrations of flammable vapors, especially in all inadequately
ventilated, enclosed areas. Detectors should be provided in the air inlets of air
conditioning and air pressurizing equipment serving unclassified areas. Adequate
ventilation, as described in API RP 14C, should be provided to reduce the number
of detection points. Detector locations should be chosen on the basis of platform
arrangement and equipment location.
The detectors should be monitored by a separate panel located in the control room.
Alarm levels should be set at approximately 20% of the LFL for alarm and 60% for
shutdown of air handling equipment. These setpoints will allow adequate time for
personnel to react to developing situations and to initiate shutdowns as necessary.
All gas detection equipment should be designed and installed in accordance with
API RP 14C, and RP 14F.

3129 Vent Stacks

Vent stacks should terminate outboard of the platform. Atmospheric vent stacks
should be equipped with flame arrestors to prevent flashback to the vessel or sump
being vented. Flame arrestors must be accessible for servicing. See Section 1900
for additional information on flame arrestors. CO2 extinguishing systems are often
used for vent stack snuffing on large vent systems.

3130 Fire Suppression

Offshore producing facilities require special fire fighting equipment because of
their limited accessibility. Water, foam and dry chemical systems are all required:
oil spill fires are best controlled with foam, while releases of volatile materials such
as natural gas are best controlled with water, but can only be extinguished by either
eliminating the fuel or using dry chemical agents.
Provisions for fire suppression on offshore producing and drilling facilities is influ-
enced by normal manpower levels, process and equipment on the platform, facility
criticality, spacing, and fire response capability, as follows:
• Manual fire suppression systems have limited value on essentially unmanned
platforms.
• More fire suppression is required for facilities with gas compressors, pumps,
furnaces, flares and large vessels than for facilities with simple piping, pumps
and vessels.
• The loss of some platforms may result in major consequences to business and
therefore may justify automatic fixed fire detection and suppression systems.
• Offshore platforms usually have tighter spacing than similar onshore facilities
and need more automatic detection, shut-in, depressuring, fire fighting (moni-

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3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities Fire Protection Manual

tors, hydrants, hose reels) and fixed spray systems. Early review of offshore
platform design by a fire protection engineer is especially important.
For specific recommendations on fire water supply and distribution systems refer to
Figure 3100-2.

3131 Fire Water Supply System

Ship-to-Shore Fire Connection
Offshore platforms should have an international ship-to-shore fire connection so
that fire boats or work boats fitted with fire pumps can connect to the platform fire
water system. The connection should match with ones on work boats in the area. In
areas with dedicated workboats, larger connections can be used.

Water Flow Rate

The fire water flow rate should be based on the quantity of water required to control
the largest fire practicable, within the abilities of personnel to function safely. The
total flow rate should include the sum of the following:
• Flow rates from all water spray systems expected to activate
• Flow required for the combined use of fixed monitors and hose streams
The minimum designed flow rate should be 2,500 gpm on new fully-integrated plat-
forms. On new critical facilities without living quarters or without wellheads, this
can be reduced to 1500 gpm. API 14G, Section 5, requires a minimum of 180 gpm.
This is enough water for two or three hose streams only, allows nothing for moni-
tors or fixed systems, and generally is considered to be inadequate for most
offshore platforms.

Fire Pumps
The fire water supply system should consist of primary pumps capable of providing
100% of required flow, either electric or diesel driven plus 100% backup diesel
driven. Some jurisdictions require 100% backup available at all times, which
requires a third 100% backup so one pump can be serviced. Pumps should be auto-
matic start, manual stop, vertical turbine fire pumps taking seawater suction. (See
Figure 1600-1 for volume and water rate guidelines.) Fire water pumps should be
designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 20. Enough pumps should be
provided to meet fire protection system demands, including manual equipment,
with the largest fire pump out of service. Discharge pressure requirements for the
fire pumps should be developed on the basis of the operational requirements of the
fire water system users (normally, the helideck sets this requirement). Normally,
nozzle pressure should be 100 psi with a shutoff pressure not to exceed 150 psig.
This provides a safe range for handling hoses.
The fire water distribution system should be pressurized using a 100 gpm electric-
motor-driven pressure maintenance (jockey) pump. The system should be charged
with fresh water. After use, the system should be flushed of salt water and again
charged with fresh water. The pressure at the hose reels on the highest platform

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities
Fig. 3100-2 Fire Fighting Equipment Applications
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3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities Fire Protection Manual

level should be 90–100 psig. Pressure reducing valves may be needed on lower
levels to restrict the pressure at hose reels to less than 150 psig.
With 10 to 15 psi (0.7 to 1.0 kg/sq cm) drop in pressure, the main fire pumps should
start automatically.
Design of the fire water pumping system and equipment should provide for the
following:
• A test line with a calibrated metering device for flow testing fire water pumps.
Fire water pump testing is described in Appendix F.
• An accessible cone or basket-type fire water pump intake strainer of corrosion-
resistant material. Strainers should be equipped with a full size bypass.
• Where marine growth may restrict water intake, antifouling paint or other
control measures, as required.
• Location of the fire water pumps at a lower level to minimize the possibility of
damage in the event of fire. They should be isolated as far away as practical
from external fuel and ignition sources. If they cannot all be located in a safe
zone they should be separated to minimize the possibility of a single fire
damaging all pumps.
• If provided, vertical shaft, turbine-type or submersible pumps should be
located by platform hoisting equipment or provided with an alternative method
of retrieving the pump for maintenance.
• The pump driver controls should be easily accessible from at least two direc-
tions and, where practical, located near a stairwell to permit access from other
platform levels. Remote start controls should be located in the control room.

Materials of Construction for Firewater Pumps

Metallurgical considerations for seawater fire pumps include:
• Zinc-free bronze for bowls, impellers, wear rings, stabilizers, strainers, and
gland assemblies.
• 316 stainless steel for bowl bolting, lock collets, pump shaft, line shaft, line
shaft coupling, column bolting, and gland assembly bolting.
• Suitable seawater-resistant material should also be considered for diesel engine
cooling system parts, such as the heat exchanger, strainer, pressure regulating
valve, solenoid valve, and supply piping.

3132 Fire Water Distribution System

Lift Column
The lift column assembly should be constructed from materials resistant to corro-
sion by seawater. It should be encased in a steel pipe for protection against wave

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities

action and mechanical damage. The protective pipe should be securely attached to
the platform.
Where practical, the lift column should be located where it will be protected by the
platform framing to minimize damage from marine vessels.

Piping
Piping should be designed according to API RP 14E and should be hydraulically
designed so that the maximum probable demand will be available at a residual pres-
sure sufficient to allow for the proper operation of the protection system. All levels
of the platform should have water.
Carbon steel piping is acceptable for firewater systems when installed with a corro-
sion allowance suitable for marine service. Fiberglass piping is also acceptable
when fireproofed as follows:
• all dry piping
• fittings in wet piping
Refer to the CRTC report “Use of Low-Pressure Fiberglass Piping on Offshore Plat-
forms”, for additional information on the use of fiberglass firewater systems.

Platform Loops
All fire water distribution systems should be looped to allow water to reach the
operational systems even if one portion of the loop is out of service. Where
multiple platforms are to be fed from one source, the platforms should be looped
via piping installations on personnel bridge accessways. Where possible, the ring
main should be routed adjacent to main steelwork to afford as much protection
from fire and explosion as possible.
The distribution system should be provided with sufficient valving to allow any
section of the platform loop to be taken out of service with minimum impairment to
the remaining systems. In the event of multiple platform loops, valving should also
be provided to isolate each platform from the others.
Outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) valves should be used. All valves in the fire water
system should be identified by signs or painted red.

3133 Extinguishing Equipment

Water Spray Systems
Water spray systems should be installed to provide the following water densities in
these areas:
• Process areas, including pumps handling flammable liquids—0.5 gpm/ft2 of
deck area
• Wellhead areas—0.75 gpm/ft2 of deck area
• Compressor modules—0.5 gpm/ft2 of deck area

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• Critical surfaces such as flanges, valves, manifolds, heaters, and supporting

structural equipment on and near Christmas trees should be protected with
directional nozzles at a rate not less than 0.25 gpm per square foot of total
exposed surface
In areas where all critical equipment and surfaces are protected by directional spray
nozzles, an additional overall area spray system is not required. Where an area
spray system is installed, individual vessels, pumps, piping and valves do not
require individual spray nozzles unless they are shielded from the area sprays in
some way. Because piping alone is not considered a significant fire risk, area spray
nozzles can be located below overhead piping runs to provide better protection for
the equipment underneath. In areas where drainage is sufficient to prevent large
pool fires, the underside of vessels and piping do not need additional spray nozzles.
All water spray systems should be designed and installed in accordance with
Company standards, which require spiral nozzles with 3/8-inch minimum orifice
size with taps off the tops of headers, flush valves, self-draining lines, fresh water
flush, etc. Refer to Section 1600.
Each water spray system should be activated by its own pilot head system, with suit-
able alarms monitored in the control room or at a manned area. In addition to the
pilot head releasing system, systems provided with gas detection should activate at
60% of the lower flammable limit (LFL). To reduce or eliminate the incidence of
false trips, cross-zoned gas detection is essential.

Sprinkler Systems
Automatic sprinkler systems should be provided for the living quarters. Density
should be 0.15 gpm/sq ft. Systems supplied by salt water should be preaction (auto-
matically activated dry) systems, so that small leaks will not drip salt water into the
rooms. An acceptable alternative is to provide a manual block valve in the main line
of the sprinkler system in a convenient location outside the quarters building. This
valve should be conspicuously labeled. If first-aid fire fighting efforts fail to extin-
guish a fire in the building, this valve can be opened. A 1/4-inch bleeder valve
should be installed immediately downstream from this block valve and kept in the
open position. Provisions should be made to flush the system with fresh water.
All automatic sprinkler systems should be installed in accordance with NFPA 13.
Waterflow indicators in each system should be monitored in the control rooms of
each platform.

Fixed Suppression Systems

Turbine enclosures should be protected by a total flooding fixed extinguishing
system. These systems should be designed to shut down the turbine upon detection
of fire and to extend discharge over the entire turbine run-down period. Due to the
effect of Halon on the atmospheric ozone layer, it is no longer recommended for
use in fixed extinguishing systems. Since turbine enclosures are rarely occupied,
CO2 systems are typically used.

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CO2 does not support life. All CO2 extinguishing systems shall be installed per
NFPA 12 with appropriate alarms, warning signs and system lockout proce-
dures for personnel safety.
Normally, the underfloor areas of control rooms that are manned 24 hours per day
can be adequately protected by providing a network of ionization smoke detectors
that are annunciated on a panel in the control room, removable floor panels and a
portable extinguisher with enough CO2 to flood a local area. A means to power
down the computer equipment must also be provided. Computer, control telecom-
munication, and rack rooms should have ionization smoke detectors that alarm to a
manned location. Exact location of activated smoke detectors must be indicated on
a graphical display. CO2 flooding may be provided for the underfloor areas. Ioniza-
tion detectors arranged for cross-zoned operation should be provided to initiate
system release.

Fixed Wet Chemical Systems

The cooking range, deep fryer, and vent hood areas of the galleys should be
protected by fixed, automatic, wet-chemical extinguishing systems designed and
installed in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Activation of
these systems should be by thermal (fusible link) detectors and should shut off
power and fuel supply to the range, fryer, and vent hood fans.

Foam Hose Reels

Foam hose reels should be installed on high value platforms at the gas-oil separa-
tion facilities. Foam is effective in areas where hydrocarbon liquid can pool, but not
on pressure fires or where open deck grating is used. Aqueous film forming foam
(AFFF) is recommended for rescue and personnel protection because of its ability
for quick knockdown. The foam system is in addition to the water sprinkler system
that may be installed.
Foam hose reels are recommended for solid deck areas where hydrocarbon liquids
can accumulate. Each hose station should be capable of providing a minimum of 95
gpm of 3% AFFF solution for not less than 20 minutes. Manual select valves
should be provided to allow the operator the choice of selecting foam or water for
an extinguishing agent. Foam tanks should contain 60 gallons of concentrate. Refer
to the Standard Drawings Section, Drawing GD-S1093, for details.
Each reel should have either 50 feet or 100 feet of 1-1/2-inch solid rubber hose with
a combination spray-to-straight-stream nozzle. Whenever possible, hose reels
should be located near interdeck stairway landings for easy access. All areas should
be accessible from two hose reels located so as to provide access from opposite
directions.
One hose station is recommended for helidecks. This foam hose station can be
located on the upper landing, near the top of the access stairway.

Water Hose Reels

Water-only hose reels should be used for open decking where foam would not be
useful. The reels should have either 50 feet or 100 feet of 1-1/4-inch hard rubber

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hose. They should have 60-gpm nozzles, fully adjustable from straight stream to
full fog.

Fixed Monitors
Fixed monitors have limited use on platforms because of congestion. They may,
however, be useful as backup for fixed water spray systems in open process and
wellhead areas. They may even be used in place of deluge on top decks of plat-
forms where they can reach all potential fire areas.
Each monitor should be accessible from two directions. Each monitor should be
rated for 500 gpm (1,900 liters/minute) using a combination spray-to-straight-
stream nozzle.
For areas not protected by fixed protection systems, at least two monitors should be
capable of reaching the fire point at all times. Wind and weather conditions affect
this capability and should be considered prior to monitor placement.

Manual Equipment
In areas where hydrocarbons are handled, 30-pound Purple K fire extinguishers
should be installed no further than 50 feet (15 meters) from any point in these areas.
For both open and enclosed areas where no hydrocarbons are handled, such as the
living quarters or galley, an extinguisher with at least a 2A rating should be located
no further than 75 feet (23 meters) from any point in these areas. This may be dry
chemical, CO2 or water, according to what is most appropriate for the equipment in
the area.
For specific electrical hazards, such as switchgear or control rooms, CO2 fire extin-
guishers should be provided.
Extinguishers should be placed near doors or passageways wherever possible.
Wheeled dry chemical units are useful and should be provided in higher risk areas.
They can be either 150-pound or 350-pound purple dry chemical units.
Where applicable, manual equipment should be approved by the local regulatory
agency (i.e., U.S. Coast Guard).
Large dry-chemical storage skids with remote hand-held lines may be provided to
protect open deck areas when area access and exposures allow.

Fire Tugboat
The general practice is to equip tugboats and service boats with fire water pump,
monitor and foam capability where they regularly service marine terminals or
offshore production platforms.

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities

3140 Life Safety Systems and Equipment

3141 Evacuation and Survival

Evacuation and survival equipment and employee training must be provided for all
personnel. Minimum training requirements should include an API RP T-1 Orienta-
tion Program for personnel going offshore for the first time.
All platform passageways must be sufficient for personnel to escape from a fire or
other emergency and to travel to a means of evacuation. Employees should be given
periodic training in abandoning the platform. Evacuation drills should be held once
per week. Evacuation facilities must be available at all times to carry every person
aboard the platform. It is helpful to paint lines with arrows on the walkways to
direct people to their muster points and/or high visibility paint along evacuation
routes. Emergency lighting should also be provided along these routes.
Refer to Lord Cullen's report on the Piper Alpha Disaster for additional information
on personnel evacuation and life safety.

3142 Storage of Dangerous Materials

Radioactive isotopes, explosives, and other dangerous materials should be stored in
areas not subject to exposures from normal operations. Explosives should be stored
on quick-release trays located on the platform edge so that they may be easily jetti-
soned in an emergency.

3143 Inspection and Maintenance Schedules

Inspections and maintenance should be performed at a frequency that will keep the
facility in a good and operable condition. The proper maintenance, operation and
care of the life safety equipment and fire fighting equipment should be performed at
least in accordance with API RP 14G.

3144 Fire Protection Organization and Training

All personnel should undergo live fire training on oil and gas fires, using the same
type of extinguishing apparatus they have at their place of work. Training should be
repeated at least annually. Annual variation in the props is desirable. Refer to
Sections 500 and 600 for more information on training and fire fighting. Fire
training should include hypothetical drills to test emergency response plans and fire
fighting equipment.

3150 Helidecks on Platforms and Mobile Rigs

The location, design, and installation of the helideck should be such that helicopter
operations will not encroach upon other activities and should follow API RP 2L.
Consideration should be given to the operational requirements of helicopters and of
the contractors furnishing helicopter services.

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3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities Fire Protection Manual

3151 With Fuel Servicing

General Information
Where fueling operations are necessary at offshore locations, the following princi-
ples apply.
• Only authorized personnel trained in the safe operation of fueling equipment,
in the operation of emergency controls, and in emergency procedures should be
permitted to fuel aircraft.
• Aircraft should be fueled outdoors and no closer than 25 feet (8 m) from any
structure; however, where combustion or ventilation air intakes face the fueling
area, the distance should be 50 feet (15 m). Fuel servicing hydrants, pits, and
cabinets should be at least 50 feet (15 m) from any structures. No passengers
should be in the aircraft during fueling. All power sources and their controls,
such as the aircraft's engines, radar equipment, combustion heaters, and Master
Switch, should be in the off position.
• Open flames or other sources of ignition (e.g., battery chargers) should be
prohibited within a 50-foot (15 m) radius of the fuel servicing operation. The
area should be posted “NO SMOKING” and personnel should not carry
lighters or matches on their person while engaged in fuel servicing operations.
Aircraft ground-power supplies should not be connected or disconnected
during fueling and should not be located within a 10-foot (3 m) radius of
aircraft fuel system vent openings.
• Fuel servicing operations should be suspended when there are lightning
discharges in the immediate vicinity.
However, hot refueling of helicopters with jet engines may be permitted only in
extreme emergencies, such as when high winds make it unsafe to shut down and
refueling is absolutely necessary. In these rare cases, the pilot must remain at the
controls of the helicopter, no passengers can be on board, and the fire station on the
refueling side of the helicopter must be manned during refueling.

Fire Protection
Two 30-pound Purple K fire extinguishers, along with a manually actuated alarm
connected to the platform or rig's general alarm system, should be provided near
each access to the helideck. ABC multipurpose dry chemical fire extinguishers
should not be used because they corrode electrical equipment.
Either a foam hose reel and a dry chemical extinguisher or a twin agent system—
that is, a dry protection unit designed to use dry-chemical and AFFF foam—should
be provided for protection of helidecks. The area to be protected should include the
fueling area and the area equivalent to the sweep rotor of the largest helicopter for
which the deck is designed. The twin agent system should have a minimum extin-
guishing discharge time of 60 seconds.

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Fire Protection Manual 3100 Offshore Producing and Drilling Facilities

The system should have operating controls at each of its hose locations, be
protected from icing and freezing, and be capable of operations within 10 seconds
after the activation of the controls.
The system should have at least one harness (at each of the access routes to the
helideck), reel-mounted and long enough to cover any point on the helideck. Each
harness should include one dry-chemical and one AFFF hose with each nozzle
arranged so that the operator can apply either agent or both.

3152 Without Fuel Servicing

Where no fuel servicing is performed, the platform or rig's own fire fighting capabil-
ities, where they are readily accessible to the helideck, need only be supplemented
by one 30-pound Purple K fire extinguisher. Also, a manually actuated alarm,
connected to the platform or rig's general alarm system, should be located near each
access tothe helideck. Where the platform or rig's fire fighting capabilities are not
readily accessible to the helideck, Figure 3151 should be followed.

3160 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API RP 2L Planning, Designing and Constructing Heliports for Fixed
Offshore Platforms
API RP T-1 Orientation Program for Personnel Going Offshore for the
First Time
API RP 14C Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of Basic
Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production Platforms
API RP 14E Design and Installation of Offshore Production Platform
Piping Systems
API RP 14G Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type Offshore
Production Platforms

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 12 Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 13 Installation of Sprinkler Systems
NFPA 20 Centrifugal Fire Pumps

UK Department of Energy, HMSO Publications

The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, Lord Cullen, November 1990

CRTC
W. S. Putnam, “Use of Low-Pressure Fiberglass Piping on Offshore Platforms”
1993

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3200 Onshore Drilling and Production
Facilities

Abstract
This section covers fire protection layout, design and installation, including mate-
rial selection and construction, for new onshore drilling and production facilities.
Also discussed is modification of existing facilities, with special attention to remote
and rural locations.

Contents Page

3210 General Considerations 3200-2

3220 Spacing Guide 3200-2
3230 Drainage 3200-4
3240 Area Classification 3200-4
3250 Fire Protection Equipment 3200-4
3260 Existing Facility Modifications 3200-5
3270 Piping, Valves, and Couplings 3200-5
3280 Tanks 3200-8
3290 References 3200-10

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3200 Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities Fire Protection Manual

3210 General Considerations

The primary causes of fires in onshore production facilities are:
• Piping leaks
• Lightning strikes on tanks
• Heater treater ruptured tubes
• Hot work
• Flare fires from liquid carryover
Production facilities are often unattended. The design should take into account the
degree of operator attention the facility will receive.

3220 Spacing Guide

Note Figure 3200-1 is a foldout which appears at the end of this section. Refer to
the table of notes below when viewing the figure.
Figure 3200-1 is a spacing guide developed to provide guidelines for laying out
new facilities and for making major modifications to existing facilities. It maintains
a reasonable balance between cost and potential risk and consequence. The
distances in the guide are based on the assumption that the facility is in a remote
and rural location, has minimal or no fire water available, and is operated with few
or no people on site. For facilities with different parameters, the distances should be
adjusted to compensate for increased or decreased risk. They do not apply to urban
sites or to modular construction, which will require closer spacing and additional
fire prevention and fire protection measures.

A. All tankage except crude (Class I, II, IIIA, per NFPA 30) with a flash point less than
200°F. Produced water tanks with gas blankets or an oil layer on the top of the
water would also be included. For combustible liquids that have a flash point
above 200°F, see Tank Manual, Section 200.
B. LPG vessels should not be located inside diked areas of other flammable or
combustible liquid tankage. Horizontal LPG vessels should be spaced a minimum
of 5 feet apart or 1/4(d1+d2). Horizontal tanks should be lined up in a single row
with the long axes parallel to each other and should be oriented so that the end is
not pointed towards the facility, other tanks or other important equipment. Tanks
should be divided into groups of no more than 15 tanks or 600,000 gallons of total
product. Each group should be separated by a distance of 50 feet. See
Figure 3500-1 for spacing to property lines and public ways.
C. blank
D. Crude oil tank spacing — See Tank Manual, Section 200. Spacing should not be
less than 75 feet.
E. Place main pipeway outside of diked area or drainage path.
F. Where possible, place motor control center, switches, etc., outside of electrical
classified area to avoid costly protective housings. Always place electrical equip-
ment outside of drainage paths and diked areas.
G. blank

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H. LPG Tank Spacing from Property Line — See Figure 3500-1. For other spacing
requirements see the Fire Protection Manual, Section 3500 and API 2510A located
in the Piping Manual.
I. blank
J. Place pumps and other mechanical equipment outside the diked area and
drainage path. Spacing between pumps is 3 feet between foundations and at least
10 feet from the shell of a tank or vessel. Pumps for LPG storage vessel must be at
least 50 feet from the shell of the vessel. Saltwater disposal pumps can be located
within diked areas of saltwater disposal tanks if cost to locate them outside is
prohibitive or pollution risk is unacceptable.
K. Keep vessels, both fired and unfired, and other listed equipment 10 feet apart
(clear space) for both fire protection and maintenance reasons.
L. Spacing on a well has been set at 150 feet for fire, safety, and operations, but
primarily for well maintenance reasons. Realizing that there are many types of
wells and well sites, pumped, flowing, high pressure, injection, gas, CO2, oil, steam,
water, single well sites and multiple well sites, the 150-foot spacing is used for
most locations. Around most wells, well maintenance is the controlling factor.
There may be a need up to 50 foot greater or lesser spacing depending on the
hazard. A steam or water injection well may be able to have a closer spacing. A
high pressure flowing well or a multiple well site may need up to 50-feet greater
spacing. Urban and multiple well sites usually require a tight spacing and there-
fore demand more fire prevention/ protection.
Spacing should not be less than 100 feet, since the well is a source of large
volumes of flammable liquid. Involvement of a well in a fire greatly increases the
magnitude of the fire, difficulty in extinguishment, loss of profit opportunity and
capital loss.
M. Overhead power lines at 750 volts and under require 8 feet vertical clearance and
3 feet horizontally. Lines operating between 750 volts and 22.5 kilovolts require 12
feet vertical clearance and 6 feet horizontally. Road crossings require a clearance
of 18 feet vertically and 30 feet horizontally.
N. 10 feet clear spacing between units. Maintenance may require greater spacing.
O. blank
P. Vent stacks should be located to maximize the dispersion and dilution of vapors
below the flammable limits. Vent stacks should be downwind of possible fixed igni-
tion sources, i.e., flares, boilers and heater/treaters. Exit velocity, stack height,
volume of gas released, and radiant heat levels can influence spacing. These
numbers do not apply to individual relief valves. Individual stacks should be 3 feet
above the vessel, 12 feet above grade and 10 feet horizontally from other equip-
ment. Venting gases are to be directed vertically or inclined 45 degrees from
vertical where weather and icing conditions require.
Q. This is for an elevated (50-ft) flare stack. Design spacing should be in accordance
with the Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1200. A 200-foot minimum
horizontal spacing is the basic standard. Radiant heat levels and toxic levels need
to be considered in the final decision.
R. blank
S. blank

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3200 Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities Fire Protection Manual

T. Fire Protection Equipment:

1. Hydrants should be placed 250-500 feet center-to-center grid spacing around
the area to be protected.
2. Provide fire truck access to hydrants.
3. Monitors should be placed 50-75 feet from the equipment to be protected.
4. A hose reel should be at least 20 feet from the equipment to be protected.
Each piece of equipment should be reached by two hose streams.
5. Fixed water spray system valves should be 50 feet from the protected area.
6. Hand held fire extinguishers should be placed for a maximum of 75 feet of
travel distance in plants. Areas like tank batteries, well sites, separator sites
can be protected by hand held units mounted on operators' vehicles.
U. Spacing between well head and places of public assembly, schools, institutions,
etc., is 300 feet, required where the Uniform Fire Code has been adopted.

3230 Drainage
When a new facility is being built, properly designed drainage is one of the least
expensive and most effective methods of fire protection. When upgrading an
existing facility, drainage improvement is generally very cost effective fire protec-
tion. Drainage should prevent a spill from endangering other equipment or piping,
and should be directed to a safe location for recovery or to burn out. Surface
drainage generally will suffice for small, rural producing areas. For large facilities
with gas-oil separation facilities, sealed drain systems may be needed (see
Section 1400).

3240 Area Classification

Onshore producing facilities and drilling sites should be classified per API RP 500.
Also, refer to Section 1500.

3250 Fire Protection Equipment

The extent of fire protection for onshore producing facilities is a function of the
number of employees normally at the facility. One person may be able to begin
isolation and shutdown procedures, but would not be able to handle a 2-1/2-inch
hose. Other factors include the extent of automatic isolation and shutdown systems,
proximity to the public, maintenance capability, likely fire scenarios, planned use of
fire protection equipment, value of the facility and the effect of its loss on the
overall profitability of the company. Judgment should be used to assure that the fire
protection equipment is appropriate, reasonable, and cost effective. The CRTC Fire
& Process Safety team is available to assist in this judgment.

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Fire Protection Manual 3200 Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities

3260 Existing Facility Modifications

Evaluating the need to upgrade existing facilities in remote or rural producing facili-
ties requires value engineering and decision analysis based on operating and fire
safety experience. Future conditions and service must be considered, and continued
safe operation should be given high priority.
Company guidelines are quite clear on materials for new construction but are not
always applicable to existing facilities. For this reason, we have developed the
following guidelines for older facilities:
• Identify the service as gas, crude oil, produced water, etc.
• Where production contains a high percentage of water, use the following guide-
lines:
– If oil production in a given line is less than 2000 BPD, treat the liquid
streams containing less than 15% oil as nonflammable liquid when evalu-
ating existing materials of construction. Note: This is not appropriate for
lines that contain much higher concentrations of oil during upset condi-
tions.
– Liquid streams containing more than 15% oil should be treated as crude
oil. Existing facilities should have materials suitable for crude oil, which,
in most cases, is a Class I liquid (flashpoint under 100°F).
For guidance on materials and type of construction for services containing medium
and high concentrations of H2S (concentrations exceeding 100 PPM by volume),
see the Piping Manual, Section 1000.
Where existing facilities contain materials unsuitable for the service, the specific
deficiency should be identified and prioritized according to exposure risk and poten-
tial loss, including risk of injury and environmental damage as well as equipment.
Local management should establish a reasonable timetable for the necessary
upgrading.

3270 Piping, Valves, and Couplings

3271 Piping
The Piping Manual gives specific guidance on producing piping. This section
covers special fire protection features.
In general, high melting point materials that resist fire damage, such as steel and
stainless steel, should be used in oil and gas handling systems.
Welded or flanged steel piping is preferred to screwed steel pipe for hydrocarbon
service. It is less susceptible to leakage, cracking from vibration, and joint failure,
especially when exposed to fire. This is particularly important in larger, critical
facilities.

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Screwed piping in sizes from 3/4 inch to 1-1/2 inches is commonly used in
producing areas and is acceptable. However, it is good practice to seal-weld to the
first valve (root valve) off main lines, tanks and vessels if this valve is installed
below the normal liquid level. Bridge welding is highly desirable and is preferred if
the root valve is subject to vibration. (Refer to Standard Drawing GD-L1057 in the
Piping Manual for root weld description.)
Socket-welded pipe is preferred for new construction of the 3/4-inch to 1-1/2-inch
pipe sizes. Minimum pipe size should be 3/4 inches for mechanical strength of
connections.
Socket-welded connections or seal-welded screwed connections are recommended
to the first block valve off vessels and storage tanks in LPG service. However, in
remote, non-critical, low value producing facilities not handling H2S, seal-welded,
bridge-welded and socket-welded connections may not be justified.

3272 Valves
Steel valves are required in flammable and combustible services (flash point below
200°F) with the following exceptions:
• A cast iron valve may be used as the first valve off a tank if all of the following
are met:
– Tank has a storage capacity of 3,000 barrels or less
– Tank is located in a producing facility
– The location is isolated or rural
– The process or operation is non-critical
• At other locations, valves containing cast iron, brass, or other lower melting
point metal materials are acceptable if the valves are:
– Suitably protected against fire exposure
– Located so that any leakage resulting from the failure would not unduly
expose persons, important building, equipment or structures, and environ-
mentally important areas
– Located where leakage can readily be controlled by operation of an acces-
sible remotely located valve or valves
• Tanks that are in Class III-B liquid service (flash point at or over 200°F),
outdoors, and not within a diked area or a drainage path of a tank storing a
Class I, II, or III-A (flash point under 200°F) may have cast iron, brass or other
similar metal valves.
Cast iron valves can accidentally be installed in the wrong service (i.e., one
requiring a steel valve). They cannot be repaired by welding. For these reasons,
steel valves are generally preferred over cast iron valves.
“High performance” butterfly valves are not acceptable in flammable service unless
they are lugged style and firesafe per API 607. When used as the first valve off a
tank, butterfly valves shall be lugged style, regardless of service.

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Fire Protection Manual 3200 Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities

Gate and globe valves size 4 inches and larger, with interference fit bonnet connec-
tions (e.g., WKM “pressure seal”), when used in flammable services, shall be
furnished with body pressure relief. Thermal expansion may cause bonnet connec-
tion to fail when valve is closed.
Brass cock valves for gage glasses in crude oil service should be replaced with
steel. As Pyrex gage tubes fail, they may be replaced with Halar if they are located
where exposed to mechanical damage and if the stop valves are stainless steel with
ball checks to stop the flow of liquid when the Halar melts during a fire.
For more information, see Section 2000.

3273 Couplings
A flexible pipe joint with combustible gaskets, i.e., a Dresser coupling with
neoprene seals, is not recommended in flammable or combustible service (flash-
point below 200°F). The main concern with this coupling is that it will quickly
begin to leak when exposed to fire and may fail completely in a short time. Industry
experience has shown this coupling has failed, and in some cases, has significantly
increased damage from uncontrolled spill of flammable liquids. Victaulic couplings
are an exception. They are available as rigid couplings with ductile iron clamps and
a fire-resistant, metal-reinforced, soft gasket for hydrocarbon service. Recent
Company-sponsored fire tests have shown this to be an acceptable design for off-
plot applications.
No new non-fire resistant couplings should be installed. Existing non-fire resistant
couplings should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as follows:
• If any one of the following conditions exists, the coupling, if in liquid hydro-
carbon service, should be replaced at the first available opportunity:
1. Located so that any leakage resulting from its failure would unduly expose
persons, important buildings, equipment, structures, and environmentally
important areas
2. Located where leakage cannot be readily controlled by operation of an acces-
sible remotely located valve or valves
3. Located inside fire hazardous areas. This includes:
a. The diked area or drainage path of a tank storing Class I or II liquids
(flashpoint under 140°F)
b. The area within 50 feet of fire hazardous equipment such as fired heaters,
furnaces, pumps, compressor, lease automatic custody transfer (LACT)
units, or vessels containing more than 1000 gallons of Class I or II liquids
c. The on-plot area in a facility handling oil, gas, or chemicals
• Couplings in flammable liquid service and with potential fire exposure that are
not included above should be replaced at the most convenient maintenance
turnaround or next shutdown.

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• Couplings need not be changed if in low pressure (less than 50 psi) gas, vapor,
or water or nonflammable liquid service providing hydrocarbon liquid will not
spill after the contents have drained from a failed coupling.
• Couplings located in remote producing areas and not falling under the above
criteria (i.e., fire exposure unlikely) may not need to be replaced. Contact the
local safety engineer or the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team for guidance.
Other ways to provide flexibility in pipelines include:
1. Flexible piping geometry
2. Flexible bellows expansion joints
3. Steel bellows expansion joints
4. Van Stone flanges (rotational flexibility)
5. Ball joints with metal-to-metal seals

3280 Tanks
Refer to the Tank Manual, Section 200 for information related to fire protection.
Crude oil tanks and vessels should be steel. Wooden tanks should be replaced first,
then tanks of fiberglass and other nonferrous materials. Welded steel tanks are
preferred. Bolted tanks have an increased risk of leakage and require additional
environmental protection to compensate.
Produced water tanks can be either steel or nonferrous (e.g., fiberglass, polyeth-
ylene). Bolted tanks have proven to be unreliable due to external corrosion caused
by leaking bolted joints. Tanks of fiberglass or other nonconductive material should
either be gas-blanketed or have all metallic objects on the tank that are larger than a
flange bolt and open to the vapor space grounded (by a common wire or individu-
ally) for lightning protection (refer to NFPA 780). In areas subject to frequent light-
ning, consider gas blanketing and lightning rod protection per NFPA 780.
Fiberglass tanks used for secondary crude/water separation, such as wash tanks,
settlers, gun barrels, and boots may not need to be replaced with steel if the tank
content is normally 20% oil or less, or totals no more than 150 barrels. The risk of
increased fire loss is not considered sufficient to justify tank replacement; however,
environmental consequences of spillage should also be addressed.

3281 Vents
Tanks must have vents that are adequate for normal fill and pumpout. Additional
emergency venting is required per NFPA 30 (see the Tank Manual, Section 600).
Vents on tanks that contain crude or other volatile oil should have a pressure-
vacuum (PV) valve. When discharging directly to the atmosphere, PV valves are
effective flame arrestors. Refer to API 2210. Other types of flame arrestors should
be avoided on atmospheric tank vents because of possible plugging, which can
result in damage to the tank during fill or pumpout.

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Fire Protection Manual 3200 Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities

Operating tanks with the vapor space in the flammable range greatly increases the
risk of an internal explosion in the tank from ignition sources such as lightning, hot
work, vent system flares or ground fires around the tank. A PV valve will maintain
a slight back pressure on a tank, keeping most higher volume crude tank vapor
spaces above the flammable limit (too rich to burn). However, produced water tanks
often have vapor spaces in the flammable range. Small production tanks (less than
1000 barrels) which have not been produced into for several hours or which have
less than 5 barrels of oil per day (BOPD) production can have vapor spaces which
are in the flammable range. This occurs when natural “breathing” of the tank due to
changes in the outside temperature causes hydrocarbon vapors to be displaced by
air through the tank vent. Heavier, lower volatility crudes are more susceptible to
“breathing” because there are less vapors to displace. However, given enough time
at low or no production rates, the vapor spaces of tanks containing higher volatility
crudes can also become flammable.
The following recommendations will reduce the risks associated with flammable
vapor spaces:
• Minimize the number of small crude tanks in operation. This increases usage
of the operating tanks which helps keep the tank vapor space above the flam-
mable range. Minimizing the number of tanks also decreases the maintenance
costs, decreases the hydrocarbons vented to the atmosphere and decreases the
risk of bottom leaks and groundwater contamination. Note that tanks which are
taken out-of-service need to be emptied, isolated and ventilated.
• Use gas blanketing, where practical, to enrich the vapor space of small crude
tanks and produced water tanks. Treat gas blanketing systems as critical safety
systems.
• Ensure all gage hatches are closed and that they seat properly to prevent cross-
ventilation in the tank.
• Where vapor recovery units (VRU) are used, the VRU shutoff pressure should
be set above the vacuum setting for the tank to avoid lifting the tank PV valve
when the VRU is running and pulling air into the vent system.
• Reinforce, with all operating personnel responsible for tank gaging, that they
must assume that the tank vapor space is flammable and that the necessary
precautions must be taken. These precautions include:
– staying off the tank platforms during periods of possible electrical storm
activity
– keeping all sources of ignition off the gager's platform
– following established safe gaging and sampling procedures
– posting the area with the appropriate warning signs
Where tank vents are connected to a flare, there is a risk of flashback through the
vent line to the tank when the tank vapor space and vent system are operating in the
flammable range. A water seal or flame arrestor is required between the flare and
tank vent line. To be effective, flame arrestors must be installed within 15 feet of
the source of ignition. If the arrestor location is farther than 15 feet from the igni-

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tion source, a detonation arrestor should be used. Only Kemp, ProtectoSeal and
Westech detonation arrestors have been tested and found reliable for closed piping
systems.

3290 References
Other areas of concern for fire protection at onshore drilling and production facili-
ties are covered as follows:
Electrical (Area) Classification — see Section 1500 and API 500.
Static electricity — see Section 200.
Grass fires — see Section 600.
Emergency shutdown, isolation and blowdown facilities — see Section 1800.
Flares and burn pits — see Section 1900.
Compressors — see Section 2000.
Heat transfer and fired equipment — see Section 2000.
Buildings — see Section 2100.
Utilities — see Section 2300.

American Petroleum Institute (API)

API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum
Facilities
API 2210 Flame Arrestors for Vents of Tanks Storing Petroleum Products

Chevron References
Piping Manual
Tank Manual

National Fire Protection Assocation (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 780 Lightning Protection Code

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Fire Protection Manual 3200 Onshore Drilling and Production Facilities

Fig. 3200-1 Minimum Spacing Guidelines for Production Equipment

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3300 Marine Terminals and Marine
Transportation

Abstract
This guide presents design considerations and recommends fire protection systems
for marine terminal facilities. “Marine terminal” as used here is either an onshore or
offshore facility including, but not limited to, structures, equipment, and their appur-
tenances, used or capable of being used to transfer bulk cargo such as crude oil,
liquefied gases, petroleum products, and chemicals to or from a marine vessel.
Definitions and additional design and inspection guidance can be found in the refer-
ences listed in Section 3370. Criteria for coal and coke storage and handling are
addressed in the Fire Protection Manual, Section 4100.

Contents Page

3310 Layout and Equipment 3300-3

3320 Electrical Area Classification 3300-3
3321 Offshore Loading Platforms (Jetties)
3322 Tanker and Barge Loading Docks and Wharves
3323 Package Loading Area on Wharves and Jetties
3330 Drainage 3300-5
3340 Emergency Shutdown 3300-5
3350 Fire Protection 3300-5
3351 Fire Main
3352 Fire Pumps
3353 Fire Tugboats and Workboats
3354 Fire Suppression Equipment
3355 International Ship-to-shore Fire Connection
3360 Recommended Marine Terminal Emergency Plan 3300-8
3361 General

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3362 Communications
3363 Fire Fighting Equipment Plan
3364 Other Services
3365 Emergency Removal of Tankship from Berth
3366 Training and Drill
3370 References 3300-15

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Fire Protection Manual 3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation

3310 Layout and Equipment

Equipment spacing and layout should be designed for efficient operation of the
terminal. Spacing between pieces of equipment shall allow operator access, mainte-
nance personnel access and fire fighter access. Spacing of equipment should
conform to that in Figures 1300-1 and 1300-2 (Section 1300), or alternative protec-
tion should be provided. Unless the operator control house is outside the hazardous
or classified area it must be pressurized. Air for pressurization must come from a
safe location. Safe exit routes must be provided.
Manifolds and pumps should be spaced to provide emergency access and to mini-
mize exposure to adjacent equipment in the event of a product release and fire.

Loading Arms and Hoses

Insulating flanges shall be provided near the end of the loading arm that connects to
the ships manifold. When hoses are used, an insulating section should be provided
on the ship end of the hose. Note that insulating flanges are not used in conjunction
with insulated hoses. Refer to Section 900 of the Civil and Structural Manual and
the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals for additional
information.

3320 Electrical Area Classification

Electrical area classification is covered in detail in Section 1500. This section
discusses electrical area classifications applicable to marine terminals and facilities.

3321 Offshore Loading Platforms (Jetties)

Offshore loading platforms (sometimes called jetties or sea islands) are generally
classified. Control rooms, laboratories, etc. required on the jetty are not classified.
If they are located in a classified area they need to be pressurized per NFPA 496.

3322 Tanker and Barge Loading Docks and Wharves

Classification of tanker and barge loading facilities requires an understanding of the
loading procedure. Any liquid pumped into an atmospheric vessel or tank displaces
an equal volume of vapor. These releases can be prevented by vapor recovery
systems. However, flammable products loaded without either of these systems may
require a larger classified area. See Figures 3300-1 and 3300-2 for guidance. Shore-
side facilities must classify areas consistent with these potential vapor releases as
well as with the leak potential of the materials handled onshore.

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Fig. 3300-1 Marine Wharf or Loading Dock Berthing Possible on One Side of Dock Only—
No Vapor Recovery System

Fig. 3300-2 Marine Wharf or Loading Dock Berthing on Both Sides of Dock—No Vapor Recovery System

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Fire Protection Manual 3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation

3323 Package Loading Area on Wharves and Jetties

Nonhazardous packaged goods may often be stored and handled on wharves and
jetties that also handle flammable and combustible materials. If these goods must
be transferred through classified areas while products or crude oil are being trans-
ferred, forklift trucks and other loading equipment shall be listed or approved for
use in these classified areas. See Sections 2030 and 3800 for more information on
using powered industrial trucks in electrically classified areas.

3330 Drainage
The following concepts should be incorporated into the drainage system design:
• Provide curb, gutters, scuppers, etc., and slope drainage from manifolds and
pumps into closed systems to prevent spills flowing into the waterway under
the wharf or off Company property.
• Confine fire hazards to the loading structures and platform by placing low
points between adjacent facilities and draining into a closed system.
• Provide waste oil tanks or sumps with vents, level alarms, and drain lines to an
onshore facility. These tanks and sumps also need adequate capacity for spill
control.
• Provide closed systems for pumping out and draining hoses, loading arms and
the loading lines.

3340 Emergency Shutdown

Marine terminals are required by USCG 33 CFR 154.550 to have a shutdown
system of the loading operation in the event of hose, loading arm, or manifold valve
failure, or other irregularity in the transfer operation. If the protective system closes
a valve on the loading line (as in the case of gravity fed loading) care must be taken
to ensure the line is protected from possible resultant pressure surges.
Motor operated valves on the terminal-to-shore lines shall have activators at the
terminal and shore side to facilitate isolating the lines in an emergency. Operating
points shall be strategically located for ease of access by operators both onshore
and on the terminal.

3350 Fire Protection

Tanker loading facilities such as piers, wharves and sea islands require special fire
fighting equipment because of their limited accessibility. Fire protection is required
per Table 1, Section 2.3 of the Chevron Shipping Company's Marine Terminal
Safety Program. Oil spill fires on water or in contained areas are best controlled
with foam. Releases of volatile materials such as LPG are best controlled with
water, but they can only be extinguished by eliminating the fuel or using dry chem-
ical agents. LPG fires should not be extinguished until the source has been isolated.

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3351 Fire Main

A fire main is required to provide water to each berth. Isolating valves should be
installed between berths to permit blocking in sections without closing the entire
main. For small one berth wharves, where facility fire water is not available, a dry
pipe main should be installed on the wharf with a connection for the responding fire
department.

3352 Fire Pumps

At critical, high value marine terminals, fire pumps should be 100% spared with a
diesel-driven pump for reliability. Volume and water rate guidelines are given in
Chevron Shipping Company's Marine Terminal Safety Program, Section 2.3. Pres-
sure range should approximate 100 psig at flow conditions and shutoff head pres-
sure of 150 psig maximum. This is an acceptable safe range for handling of
standard hose lines and nozzles by personnel. Refer to Section 1680 for testing and
maintenance requirements.

3353 Fire Tugboats and Workboats

The general practice is to equip all tugboats and workboats (service boats) with a
fire water pump, monitor and foam capability if they regularly service marine termi-
nals or offshore production platforms.

3354 Fire Suppression Equipment

Fire protection varies greatly with the quantity of equipment and the volume and
pressure of the products handled. Small facilities may have no fixed systems, while
a large, complex facility may need all of the systems enumerated in Figure 3300-3.
The individual needs of facilities should be considered when specifying fire
suppression equipment — not all types of equipment shown in the guidelines may
be appropriate or necessary for a single terminal. Guidelines for general needs are
provided in Chevron Shipping Company's Marine Terminal Safety Program,
Section 2.3, and the Guide on Marine Terminal Fire Protection and Emergency
Evacuation, published by the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF).
Fire suppression equipment guidelines for marine terminals are tabulated in
Figure 3300-3.
The fire water supply at marine terminals is often unlimited from oceans, rivers,
dock basins, etc. Where the water supply is limited, such as a tank or reservoir, then
the capacity should be sufficient for at least four hours continuous use at the
maximum-design discharge rate of the fire water system. Typically, protection is
provided to offset the largest single risk in a facility, the largest ship berth. Fire
water flow rates should be determined accordingly—it is not necessary to multiply
the “per berth” water requirement by the number of berths.
Locate hydrants and hoses so that at least two hose streams can reach any part of
the wharf. For safe access to fire suppression equipment, emergency responders

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Fire Protection Manual 3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation

Fig. 3300-3 Fire Protection Guidelines for Marine Terminals

Dry Chemical Fire Required
Water Hydrant Hose Extinguishers Quantity of
Demand Monitor Reels International Foam
# 30 lb. 150 lb. Shore Concentrate Fire Boat
Type of Terminal GPM #-GPM size Portable Wheeled Connection gallons Connection

Barge Terminals & 500 2-250 2 2 1 1 264(1) Optional

Tankers to 20,000 1 1/2”
DWT
(Less Than 1 Ship
Loading per Week)

Tanker Berth: 20,000 1500 2-500 2 2 1 1 300(1) 2

DWT or less (More 1 1/2”
Than 1 Ship
Loading per Week)

Tanker Berth: 20,000 1500 2-500 4 2 2 2 2000 2

to 70,000 DWT 1 1/2”

Tanker Berth: 70,000 3000 2-500 4 3 2 2 2000 2

DWT and Larger 1 1/2”

Sea Islands Fire protection on sea islands should be provided as above, according to size and use of tanker ships.

(1) can be provided by onshore mobile equipment

should not be required to cross spill paths or areas where wharf flammable liquids
may collect. Hydrants should be spaced at intervals of not more than 150 feet in the
berth or loading arm areas, and not more than 300 feet along the approach or access
routes to a wharf. Hydrant mounted monitors should have a minimum of two 1 1/2"
hydrant outlets on each monitor riser.
Fire water monitors should be considered for all wharves to provide protection for
volatile oil loading manifolds. At small or infrequently used wharves, first aid hose
reels may be an acceptable substitute. The use of foam with monitors may be justi-
fied in some situations. Docks and wharves having four-inch or larger water supply
lines should have an international shore fire connection to allow connection of the
fire water supply from the shore to a ship's fire main (see Section 3355).
One first aid hose reel at each berth should have foam capability. Foam hose reels
should be equipped with a 60 gallon fiberglass or stainless steel foam concentrate
storage tank, a 60 GPM brass foam eductor with a water bypass, a 50-foot 1 1/2"
hose, and a 60 GPM variable pattern brass nozzle suitable for the type of foam
being used.
Locate portable 30-pound dry chemical fire extinguishers no more than 50 feet
from normal operating locations. Wheeled 150-pound dry chemical fire extin-
guishers should also be considered to provide an additional level of protection espe-
cially at wharves handling large capacity vessels, wharves handling LPG, and
remote facilities with slow or inadequate emergency response from local agencies.
Additional 150-pound or 350-pound wheeled dry chemical extinguishers should be
installed at locations where fire water is unavailable. Dry chemical extinguishers
are especially appropriate for pressure fires that could occur in manifold areas, or at
LPG terminals. See Section 1600 for design guidelines and additional information
on fire suppression equipment.

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3355 International Ship-to-shore Fire Connection

The purpose of the International Shore Fire Connection is to connect the fire water
supply from shore to a ship's fire main or to interconnect the fire mains of two
ships. The shore fire connection provides a standardized joint between two systems
where each otherwise have couplings or connections that do not match.
All ships, jetties and apparatus ever likely to require an emergency source of fire
water or likely to provide it should have at least one shore fire connection.
The flange on the connection has the dimensions shown in ISGOTT, Appendix E.
The bolt holes may be either slotted or drilled as shown. The flat flange face must
match with all other connection flanges. Bolts and gaskets should be readily avail-
able.
The connection should have a nipple or boss threaded or shaped to connect with the
usual coupling on the hose or fire hydrant of the owner of the connection.
Fire hose having a shore fire connection on the end is led to its counterpart and the
flange joints are bolted together. If the shore fire connection is permanently fixed to
a hydrant or pipe, then a portable connection for use on a hose must be available in
case the opposite fire main has only a fixed connection.
If fixed on a vessel, the connection should be accessible from either side of the
vessel and should be plainly marked. The shore fire connection should be ready for
use when a ship is in port.
Where the service fleet is dedicated to Chevron, an additional, larger diameter fire
connection may be provided on the boat(s) and dock to improve flow rates.

3360 Recommended Marine Terminal Emergency Plan

3361 General
All terminals should have procedures ready for immediate implementation in the
event of an emergency. The emergency will frequently be a fire, but the procedures
should also cover other hazardous situations such as hose or pipeline ruptures,
cargo overflow, collision between ships, or a person collapsed in a tank. Similarly,
the equipment to be deployed will often be fire fighting equipment, but procedures
should also cover other emergency equipment such as breathing apparatus, resusci-
tators, etc.
The procedures should be familiar to the personnel involved, who must clearly
understand the action they would be required to take. They should include instruc-
tions on the sounding of alarms, the setting up of a control center and the organiza-
tion of personnel to deal with the emergency.

Preparation
Each terminal should develop and maintain a terminal emergency plan covering all
aspects of the action to be taken in the event of an emergency.

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Fire Protection Manual 3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation

The plan should allow for urgent preventive action by those at the location of the
emergency. If this initial action is not successful in containing and overcoming the
incident, it must be possible to quickly mobilize the entire resources of the terminal
and of any other local sources of assistance so as to make a concentrated effort to
deal with the incident, whether it is on the wharf or a ship berthed at the wharf.

Responsibility
It is essential that the terminal emergency plan make absolutely clear the person (or
persons in order of priority) who has overall responsibility for dealing with the
emergency (see Incident Command, Section 400). It must also clearly state respon-
sibility for the actions of the various parts of the terminal organization which may
be called upon to participate in the effort to contain and control the incident. Failure
to define lines of responsibility can easily lead to confusion and to the loss of valu-
able time.

Control Center
At major terminals, provision should be made for a control center to be set up at a
convenient central point, not adjacent to the location of the incident—possibly in
the main terminal office. A secondary unit, the forward control, may be needed to
take charge of operations at the site of the incident, under the overall command of
the control center particularly in the case of major fires.

3362 Communications
The control center should be capable of directing, coordinating and controlling all
fire fighting and other emergency activities, either directly or through the forward
control. This includes advice to shipping, and for these purposes the control center
should have a communications system linking it with:
Within the Terminal: Fire service (ashore and afloat)
Medical service
Outside the Terminal: Fire Service
Medical Service
Harbor authorities (e.g., Coast Guard)
Tugs and Launches
Pilots
Police
Other necessary civil authorities (e.g., environmental
agencies)

It may not be possible in practice for small terminals to implement all the following
recommendations regarding communications, but they should deploy a communica-
tions system adequate for their requirements. Reliable communications are essential
in dealing successfully with emergency situations. Because of their importance
consideration should be given to setting up a secondary system to take over if the
main system is put out of action.

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3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation Fire Protection Manual

Communications System
There are three basic elements which the system should be able to handle:
• Terminal fire alarm
• Summoning of assistance
• Coordination and control of all fire fighting and emergency activities,
including movement of vessels
The communications system must have the flexibility to cover operations located:
• On a tankship
• On the wharf
• On adjacent water
• Elsewhere in the terminal
Most of the communications equipment should therefore be portable or mobile,
particularly that for use by the forward control. It should also be of a type approved
for any location in which it may be used. The most satisfactory system to meet all
the requirements is a UHF/VHF radio-telephone system. Tugs, water-borne fire
fighting equipment and designated rescue launches, if available, should be perma-
nently fitted with UHF/VHF radio-telephone equipment capable of operation on the
channel designated for emergency use.
For communication links from a control center, the following equipment is
suggested:
• Internal fire service – Special fire alarm and normal communication
system
• Forward control – UHF/VHF radio-telephone; normal communi-
cation system in reserve
• Personnel and – Normal communication system
internal medical
service
• Fire fighting craft – UHF/VHF and rescue radio-telephone; via
launches harbor or port authorities as reserve
• Ships at berths – Normal portable walkie talkie link used in
cargo handling operations. There may be occa-
sions when it would be helpful to station a
terminal employee with a portable radio on a
tanker at a berth. VHF radio-telephone may be
used as a secondary means.
• Civil authorities, – UHF/VHF radio-telephone or public telephone
including fire system
services, police, and
medical services

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Fire Protection Manual 3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation

• Harbor authorities – UHF/VHF radio- telephone or public telephone

(Coast Guard), pilots system
tugs and other harbor
craft

Communications Discipline
All personnel should understand and appreciate the necessity for strictly observing
rules for using communications in an emergency, and they should receive frequent
instruction on these rules. The rules should include the following:
• All sections should be allocated a call sign, and this should always be used to
identify the section concerned.
• Calls, announcements and conversations should be as brief as possible consis-
tent with intelligibility.
• Calls, announcements and conversations should be interrupted only when the
demands of another section are vital to the outcome of the emergency.
• Calls from the control center should take priority over all other calls.
• Only persons authorized to do so under the terminal emergency plan should
use the communications system.

Communications Information for Vessels Berthed at Terminals

Vessels arriving at terminals should be provided with an emergency alarm and
communications information card, which should briefly provide essential alarm and
communication information for fires, medical emergencies, and oil spills. This
information should be presented to the Master at the Pre-Transfer Conference (see
Figure 3300-3 for an example).

Harbor Authorities (Coast Guard)

The local harbor authority should be informed of any major emergency involving
the terminal or ships berthed or moored at the terminal with details of:
• Nature and extent of emergency
• Name of ship or ships involved, with locations
• What is being done to control the emergency
• Nature of any assistance required
This information will be required to enable the harbor authority to decide whether
to restrict navigation within the port area or close the port.

3363 Fire Fighting Equipment Plan

A fire fighting equipment plan showing clearly the location and particulars of all
fire fighting equipment on or immediately adjacent to the berth should be perma-
nently displayed at the berth and at an appropriate control center.

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3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation Fire Protection Manual

Access to Equipment
Fixed and portable fire fighting equipment, resuscitation equipment, etc., should be
kept clear of obstructions at all times.

Traffic Movement and Control

Wharf approaches and wharf heads should be kept free of obstructions to the move-
ment of vehicles at all times. Packed cargo or stores for a ship should not be
stacked on the wharf so they are in the path of direct access in an emergency. Vehi-
cles brought to a wharf or on a wharf approach should not be immobilized and igni-
tion keys should not be removed.
During an emergency, vehicular traffic into a terminal or on to berths must be
strictly limited to vehicles required to deal with the emergency or to render assis-
tance. When available, and if it is practicable request that local police exercise
control well outside the terminal so that the roads that converge on the terminal are
kept free for essential traffic movement.

3364 Other Services

Municipal and Port Services
A terminal emergency plan should make the best possible use of the services which
can be relied upon to be available. In such circumstances success in dealing with an
emergency could depend upon the degree of cooperation achieved and upon prior
combined training carried out with these services. Frequent combined exercises
simulating terminal emergencies should be held.
If a terminal is located in an area where a concentration of industry exists, it may be
practicable to sponsor setting up a mutual assistance plan.

Police and Fire Services

Any emergency requiring assistance beyond the resources of the terminal should be
reported to the local police and the local fire services, as appropriate.

Pilots
In an emergency it may be necessary to call for pilots to unberth ships if partial or
total evacuation of wharves is decided upon. Procedures for doing this should be
established in the emergency plan.

Tugs
If available, tugs may be required in an emergency to:
• Assist in fighting a fire
• Unberth the ship involved in the emergency
• Unberth other ships in the area
Tugs equipped with special fire fighting appliances may not be available for unber-
thing operations during an emergency.

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Fire Protection Manual 3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation

Tugs with fire fighting equipment should be inspected regularly to ensure that the
equipment and foam concentrate stocks are in good condition.
Tugs that come under the command of the control center during an emergency
should be fitted with a communications system that can be integrated with the
control center's system.

Rescue Launches
A launch or launches, if available, should be detailed to act as rescue launches in an
emergency for the recovery of personnel who may be in the water or trapped on a
tanker or on a berth.
The crews of the launches should receive instruction in rescuing survivors from the
water, bearing in mind that they may be seriously injured or suffering from exten-
sive burns. They should also receive instruction in artificial respiration.

Medical Facilities
Terminal and outside medical facilities should be alerted at once if there is any like-
lihood that their services might be needed. As soon as possible they should be
informed of:
• Nature and location of the emergency
• Likelihood of casualties
• Probable nature of casualties
• Whether medical staff are required at the location of the emergency
As soon as details of any casualties are known, these should be passed to the appro-
priate medical authorities, with names if available.

3365 Emergency Removal of Tankship from Berth

If a fire on a tankship or on a berth cannot be controlled, it may be necessary to
consider moving the tankship from the berth. Planning for such a eventuality may
require consultation between the Coast Guard or a port authority representative or
Harbor Master, the responsible terminal official, the Master of the tankship and the
senior local authority fire officer. The plan should stress the need to avoid precipi-
tate action which might increase, rather than lessen, the danger to the ship, the
terminal, other ships berthed nearby and other adjacent installations.
The plan should include:
• Designation of the person or persons, in order of priority, who have the
authority to decide whether to move a ship from a berth of retain a ship on fire
at a berth
• Action to be taken with respect to ships at other berths
• Designation of safe locations to which a ship on fire can be moved under
controlled conditions, if this decision is taken

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3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation Fire Protection Manual

The decision whether to move a ship under controlled conditions or to retain it at

the berth can involve:
• Capability of fire fighting equipment that is at the terminal or readily available
from nearby sources
• Availability of tugs for moving the ship from the berth
• The ability of the ship to move under her own power
• Availability of safe locations to which a ship on fire can proceed or be towed
and possibly beached
• Availability of adequate fire fighting equipment and personnel to fight a fire if
a ship is towed to a safe location, which will probably be remote
• Proximity of other ships at the terminal
• Shipping and other facilities in the area and possibility of closure of the port
for a period
• Relative investment and earning capacity of the ship and to the terminal facili-
ties that could become inoperative or be destroyed by the fire

3366 Training and Drill

The extent of training of terminal personnel in fire prevention and fire fighting may
depend upon whether there is a permanent fire fighting unit attached to the terminal
or to a plant nearby, or whether arrangements have been made for speedy assistance
from an outside source.
Selected terminal personnel should receive instruction in the use of the fire fighting
and emergency equipment available at the terminal and in shipboard fire fighting on
board typical tankships. All personnel working at terminals should receive instruc-
tion in fire prevention and in basic fire fighting techniques. Periodic refresher
training should be provided, including emergency drills. Where the terminal relies
on outside assistance for emergency response, verify that the emergency responders
have been trained to fight hydrocarbon fires.
Crews of tugs that can be used for fire fighting should receive instruction and
training in fighting oil fires in cooperation with land-based fire fighting services. To
fully utilize the tugs' fire fighting equipment and potential during an emergency, it
may be necessary to supplement the crew with trained shore personnel. Frequent
opportunities should be provided for combined practices involving the tugs and
shore fire fighting services.
Opportunities may arise whereby a combined fire practice or conference can be
arranged between shore personnel and crew members of a tankship at a berth,
without imposing operational delay on either the terminal or the tankship. This
would help to make the tankship personnel familiar with the fire fighting equipment
ashore. Shore personnel would also have the opportunity to become familiar with
the types and locations of fire fighting equipment on board as well as being

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Fire Protection Manual 3300 Marine Terminals and Marine Transportation

instructed on any design features on tankships which may require special attention
in case of fire.

3370 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 500 Recommended Practice for Classification of Areas for
Electrical Installations in Petroleum Facilities
API 2003 Recommended Practice for Protection Against Ignitions
Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents

Chevron Shipping Company Documents

Safety Requirements for Marine Terminals (Barges)
Marine Terminal Safety Program
Declaration of Inspection and Safety Checklist Procedures
Marine Regulations

Miscellaneous References
International Chamber of Shipyard Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT)
Title 33 CFR, Part 154, “Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations for Marine Oil
Transfer Facilities,” Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard Regulations

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 307 Marine Terminals and Piers
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
in Hazardous Classified Areas

Chevron Corporation 3300-15 December 1994

3400 Process Plants

Section 3400 of the Fire Protection Manual has been discontinued to streamline the
manual and avoid duplication with other sections. Refer to Section 1300 for guid-
ance on spacing for process plants, Section 1200 for information on explosion
prevention, Section 1600 for fire water and fire fighting equipment recommenda-
tions, Section 1500 for electrical area classification, Section 1900 for pressure relief
systems, and Section 1800 for critical instrumentation and controls.

Chevron Corporation 3400-1 December 1994

3500 LPG Storage

Abstract
This section covers storage of flammable liquified petroleum gases (LPG) with a
vapor pressure exceeding 40 psia at 100°F. Examples include propane, propylene,
normal butane, isobutane, and butylenes. These materials are stored as liquids, but
are gaseous at atmospheric temperatures and pressures. LPG is contained in either
pressure storage (spheres and pressure storage drums) or low pressure storage in
refrigerated dome roof tanks or spheroids.
These types of facilities shall be designed in accordance with Section 1100 of the
Piping Manual. Section 1100 supplements API Standard 2510, “Design and
Construction of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Installations,” and gives Company
recommendations that exceed the API Standard. Both API 2510 and API Publica-
tion 2510A, “Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of Liqui-
fied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities,” are included in the Piping Manual.
This section of the Fire Protection Manual gives the background associated with
some of the more significant fire protection aspects of these designs.

Contents Page

3510 Standards 3500-2

3520 General Considerations 3500-2
3521 Auto-refrigeration
3522 Large Releases
3530 Spacing 3500-3
3540 Drainage 3500-3
3550 Fire Suppression 3500-3
3560 Refrigerated Tanks 3500-4
3570 LPG Checklist 3500-4
3580 References 3500-5

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3500 LPG Storage Fire Protection Manual

3510 Standards
API 2510, “Design and Construction of Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) Installations,”
has been accepted throughout the Company as providing minimum design require-
ments. Additional information and requirements are contained in the Piping
Manual, Section 1100, which was organized, numbered, and titled to correspond to
API 2510.
API 2510A, “Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of LPG
Storage Facilities,” supplements API 2510 with design consideration, philosophy,
background, methods and alternatives. It includes guidance for operations, mainte-
nance, pre-fire planning, training, and fire fighting tactics. It provides a thorough
understanding of the fire protection principles involved and is of value to design
engineers, fire protection engineers, operators, and those responsible for handling
fire emergencies.
Both of these standards are contained in the Piping Manual.

3520 General Considerations

Whether LPG is stored at atmospheric temperatures under pressure or in low pres-
sure refrigerated tankage, releases readily vaporize and produce large volumes of
flammable vapor. Vapor densities are heavier than air and large vapor clouds can
flow along the ground for some distance from the release area to reach ignition
sources. Liquid spill control is more important with refrigerated storage than with
high-pressure storage, because the vaporization rate is slower.

3521 Auto-refrigeration
Because pressure-stored materials auto-refrigerate when containment pressure is
reduced or removed, special attention must be given to the metal embrittlement
properties of the materials of construction at the resulting low temperatures. Auto-
refrigeration is not as significant a problem for refrigerated liquid gases. Consult
the Pressure Vessel Manual for information on Minimum Pressurizing Temperature.

3522 Large Releases

Damage from large releases and vapor cloud explosions can be widespread, causing
additional fuel release from other sources. Therefore, LPG facilities must be
designed to eliminate potential sources of uncontrolled hydrocarbon release.
Generally, for large releases, it is impractical to put out the fires with extinguishing
agents. Fire control should be attained by shutting off the source of release while
maintaining water streams to cool the involved vessels and equipment until the
released materials burn out.

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Fire Protection Manual 3500 LPG Storage

3530 Spacing
Aboveground LPG storage tanks are spaced in accordance with Figure 3500-1 and
API 2510.

Fig. 3500-1 Minimum Spacing Requirements for Aboveground LPG Storage Tanks(1)
Minimum Distance in Feet From
Property Line Which Is or Can Be
Built Upon, Including the Opposite Minimum Distance in Feet From
Capacity, Gallons Side of a Public Way Nearest Side of Any Public Way
132 or less(2) 3 3
132 to 528(2) 10 10
528 to 1,981(2) 25 25
2,000 to 30,000 50 50
30,000 to 70,000 75 75
70,000 to 90,000 100 100
90,000 to 120,000 125 100
Over 120,000 200 100
(1) Every diked or remotely impounded area must have a 10-foot clear area around the outside of the dike or remotely impounded area and
a 5-foot clear area inside of any dike for firefighting access.
(2) API 2510 does not apply to tanks smaller than 2,000 gallons.

3540 Drainage
Drainage of an LPG tankfield area should ensure that a release of liquid drains
away from tanks, spheres, manifolds and piping, in accordance with API 2510 and
2510A.
LPG, being a low boiling-point product, vaporizes readily when released to the
atmosphere and on contact with the ground. It will, however, reach a steady state
vaporization rate of about 0.04 to 0.05 inches/minute if in a pool.
Since the amount of vapor released depends on the surface area of the pool, it is
recommended that drainage be designed to minimize the surface area of the liquid
release. Liquid can be drained to a remote basin via a trench divided by weirs along
its length. As liquid flows into the trench, it backs up behind the weir, limiting
surface area in a step-like manner.

3550 Fire Suppression

Pressurized storage areas are of particular concern because of the large flammable
liquid inventories involved. Water is the primary agent for cooling exposed facilities
until the fuel supply feeding the fire can be isolated, pumped out, or displaced from
the pressurized tanks with water.

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3500 LPG Storage Fire Protection Manual

Spheres and pressure storage. For protection of spheres, provide a water deluge
system and fire water monitors per Section 1600. Provide monitors for protection of
horizontal pressure storage vessels. Local regulations may require sprays. They are
not preferred, because spray nozzles can plug and they may not be effective for
pressure fires. Sprays should be supplemented with monitor protection. Refer to the
Piping Manual, Section 1100; API 2510; and API 2510A.

3560 Refrigerated Tanks

Refer to API 2510 for information on methods of providing fire protection for
refrigerated LPG storage. Less protection is justified than for pressure storage
because refrigerated storage is pressurized at less than 15 psig. When involved in
fire, low pressure tanks containing refrigerated LPG are affected in much the same
way as atmospheric tanks containing a volatile flammable liquid, thus protection is
normally the same. This typically will be a fire water supply and hydrants as
described in Section 1600. Where the proximity of the tank to the public or impor-
tant facilities warrant added protection, or if there is limited manpower to respond
to a fire, fire water monitors or deluge over the top of the tank may be provided as
described in API 2510.
If additional fire protection beyond water is warranted, passive protection can be
provided by selecting tank insulation which has resistance to fire and covering the
insulation with a fire resistant weather jacket such as stainless steel. Depending on
the type and thickness of the insulation, one- or two-hour protection can be
achieved. This will allow sufficient time for fire fighters to respond and establish
cooling streams.
Water cannot extinguish most gas fires. In some cases, pools of refrigerated liquid
gases pick up heat from fire water, causing more vaporization and increased fire
intensity. However, water is necessary to help control an LPG fire, cool exposed
vessels above the liquid level, cool adjacent equipment, limit damage to structures,
and protect operators and fire fighters during fire control and extinguishment.
Hand-portable dry chemical extinguishers and wheeled units should be provided
near pump sites and piping manifolds. Dry chemical should only be used to extin-
guish an LPG fire if the LPG supply can be shut off quickly. Water deluge systems
are generally installed on LPG vessels to protect them in fire situations. See
Section 1600.

3570 LPG Checklist

Appendix C contains a design checklist for LPG facilities. It can be used for the
following purposes: 1) during design of new LPG storage facilities, to identify
many areas that should be taken into account; and 2) during review of existing facil-
ities, to call attention to the primary fire protection considerations. The checklist
incorporates the features of API 2510, 2510A and Section 1100 of the Piping
Manual.

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Fire Protection Manual 3500 LPG Storage

3580 References
Chevron References
Piping Manual
Pressure Vessel Manual

American Petroleum Institute (API)

API 2510 Design and Construction of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Installations
API 2510A Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities

Chevron Corporation 3500-5 June 1990

3600 Loading Racks

Abstract
This section covers the fire safety features of facilities designed for truck tank or
tank car loading of refined products, LPG and asphalt.

Contents Page

3610 Layout and Spacing 3600-2

3620 Drainage 3600-2
3630 Fire Safe Design Features 3600-3
3631 Emergency Isolation Devices
3632 Emergency Shutdowns (ESDs)
3633 Electrical Area Classification for Selection of Equipment
3634 Control of Ignition Sources
3635 Design Considerations—Top Loading
3636 Design Considerations—Bottom Loading
3640 Fire Fighting Facilities 3600-5
3650 Safe Loading Procedures 3600-6
3651 General Procedures
3652 Bottom Loading
3653 Top Loading
3654 Switch Loading
3660 LPG Loading Racks 3600-7
3670 Asphalt Loading Procedure 3600-8
3680 References 3600-8

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3600 Loading Racks Fire Protection Manual

3610 Layout and Spacing

Tank truck loading racks (TTLRs) should be spaced from other plant facilities in
accordance with Section 1300. The access route and tank truck loading area should
allow the following:
• Clear, unrestricted truck access during peak hours. Access should not conflict
with or congest access to adjacent facilities.
• A waiting area for trucks standing by to be loaded that allows orderly evacua-
tion in case of emergency, without cross traffic or confusion.
• A parking location for trucks making load and seal checks and completing
final paper work.
• An access route that does not require tank truck paths to cross on entry and exit.
Weather protection canopies should not impede emergency access or restrict
application of fire water or foam.

3620 Drainage
• Provide sealed catch basins at each bay to prevent vapors due to a single spill
from accumulating under vehicles in adjacent bays.
• Isolate each bay by high points and grading that slopes to the sealed catch
basin. This prevents liquids from accumulating under vehicles in adjacent bays,
due to a single spill.
• Slope the TTLR area for good control of spills. Provide good drainage into a
closed system from under the trucks being loaded.
• Place drain inlet between truck and rack piping, away from areas where a
driver might be standing, such as the loading point or ESD switch.
• Drainage for critical areas and escape routes must be provided. The drainage
pattern should slope away from entrance and exit gates so that vehicles will not
have to drive through spills or over open drains.
• The major drainage pattern should also slope away from the TTLR and away
from the waiting trucks—good practice is a low point drain between the
loading rack and the line for waiting trucks. However, there must be a grate-
covered ditch drain or adequate catch basins separating them.
• Provide drainage adequately sized for fire water flow rates. See Section 1600
for flow rates.
• Drainage for pump manifolds should be arranged to flow away from pumps
and adjacent vessels or equipment to a safe area, or to a catch basin. Access to
the area for fire fighting and for egress by personnel or drivers should not be
blocked by the drainage pattern.
• The loading rack area should be paved.

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Fire Protection Manual 3600 Loading Racks

3630 Fire Safe Design Features

3631 Emergency Isolation Devices

In addition to the set-stop meters and block valves on the loading line assembly, a
truck filling valve should be of the spring-loaded, self-closing type that closes as
soon as the actuator is released.
All piping to the rack should enter the TTLR plot area at a common location, with
rack isolation valves placed together in a boundary block valve manifold. The
boundary manifold should be located at least 50 feet from the rack and should not
be in the drainage path of spilled product. The boundary isolation valves should be
steel and should be accessible in fire situations. These valves should be clearly iden-
tified.

3632 Emergency Shutdowns (ESDs)

Emergency shutdown (ESD) provisions should be located at each end of the rack
for bottom-loading facilities and at the base of each stairway for top-loading racks.
An additional ESD should be located a minimum of 75 feet from the rack. Shut-
downs should be clearly identified and easily accessible. These ESDs should shut
down all pumps and all power to the loading rack structure and should close tank
valves or boundary block valves.

3633 Electrical Area Classification for Selection of Equipment

Tank truck or tank car loading racks are areas where vapors may be released during
loading and where tanks being filled may be open to the atmosphere. Generally, the
TTLR is Class I, Division 2. Some small areas such as drainage trenches will be
Division 1 (although it is unlikely that electrical equipment would be installed in
such trenches). The extent of classification should comply with Section 1500 and
NFPA 30. See Figures 3600-1 and 3600-2 for guidance.

3634 Control of Ignition Sources

• Selection and installation of electrical equipment installation must meet the
area classification requirements in accordance with NFPA 70 and the Electrical
Manual.
• Overhead lights must be installed so they will not be struck and broken by
movement of the loading arms.
• Static electricity, an ignition source, is discussed in Section 3660, Safe Loading
Procedures, and in Section 200.
• Trucks waiting to load must have room to park at least 25 feet from the edge of
the loading bay.

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3600 Loading Racks Fire Protection Manual

Fig. 3600-1 Top Loading of Volatile Liquids in Tank Truck or Tank Car

Fig. 3600-2 Bottom Loading of Volatile Liquids in Tank Truck or Tank Car

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Fire Protection Manual 3600 Loading Racks

3635 Design Considerations—Top Loading

Though top loading is becoming less common, there are frequently special circum-
stances that may require it. Additional information and standardized design are
available from the Chevron U.S.A. Marketing Engineering group.
• Down spouts shall extend to the truck tank bottom.
• Down spouts shall have a nonsplashing tip design or a 45-degree angle bevel to
minimize splashing. Down spouts must not be set flat-ended on the truck tank
bottom.
• Loading arms shall have self-closing valves with adjustable closing rates.
• Provisions for bonding the loading arm to the truck shall be provided.

3636 Design Considerations—Bottom Loading

• Dry-break type connectors shall be used to prevent spills.
• Loading arms should be balanced or spring-supported for ease of operation.
• Vapor recovery systems are designed to collect vapors that are displaced from
the truck tank during loading. The typical system is composed of a dry-break
connector or Camlok fitting with internal check valve that connects the truck to
the vapor recovery system. The vapor recovery system piping is arranged to
slope downward from the loading rack without liquid pockets to a knockout
drum. It then continues through an approved in-line detonation flame arrestor
to the vapor recovery unit. The recovered gases are then either compressed and
recovered, or burned.
The vapor line would be rich or above the upper flammable limit (UFL) if only
gasoline were loaded. However, switch loading and loading of mid-distillates, such
as diesel or jet fuel, allows air to be displaced into the system so that flammable
mixtures can sometimes exist in some parts of the system. Couplings and piping
must be kept in good condition so that no vapor will be released. Other techniques,
such as purging with gas or inerting, may be warranted to eliminate flammable
mixtures in the system. Vapor recovery connections should be accessible at grade.

3640 Fire Fighting Facilities

Refer to Section 1600 for the design of fire fighting facilities. At least two fire
water hydrants should be located on opposite ends of the rack between 100 and 250
feet from the nearest bay.
• One and one-half inch first aid foam hose stations should be available so that
any point in the rack can be reached by two hoses. One and one-quarter inch
water hose reels can be used as an alternative.
• Fire water monitors or fixed foam spray systems may be warranted where
personnel are few and the municipal fire protection response may not be timely.

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3600 Loading Racks Fire Protection Manual

• Racks transferring flammable liquids may warrant fixed protection in addition

to hydrant protection. If water or foam deluge is required by local code, a fixed
foam system using Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) should be used.
AFFF's quicker spreading and knockdown make it preferable to fluoroprotein
foam in this application. Refer to NFPA 16 for the decision of foam sprinkler
systems. Fixed dry chemical systems are no longer recommended.
• A 30-pound dry-chemical (Purple K) hand extinguisher should be available at
each bay, preferably at the base of each stairway. A 150-pound wheeled dry-
chemical (Purple K) unit with a 50-foot hose may be warranted at large
TTLRs. The wheeled units should be readily accessible, located more than 50
feet from the rack.

3650 Safe Loading Procedures

3651 General Procedures

• Prohibit the use of smoking materials in the loading rack area.
• Prohibit vehicles in poor repair.
• Stop the vehicle engine before start of loading.
• Where filter/separators are installed, the piping system should be designed so
that there is 30 seconds of residence time between the filter/separator and the
point of discharge. This allows static, generated in the filter/separator, to dissi-
pate to a safe level. See Section 200 and API RP 2003.

3652 Bottom Loading

Some locations install interlocks that will not allow loading to begin until the truck
has been bonded. Bottom loading racks do not need bonding, because the loading
connections are sealed and there are no spark gaps.
Unless rail car loading racks have conductive supply piping that is bonded to the
track, bonding should be done between the supply piping and the rail car chassis or
track rails.

3653 Top Loading

Bonding cables must be used at all top loading racks handling Class I products.
Bonding cables must be attached prior to opening fill hatch. Limit splash loading
and control static and ignition hazards by:
1. Extending the loading arm to bottom of truck tank.
2. Loading at a pipe velocity of about a one meter (three feet) per second until the
bottom of the down spout is covered.

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Fire Protection Manual 3600 Loading Racks

3. Increasing loading rate not exceeding the safe pipe velocity specified in API
RP 2003.

3654 Switch Loading

Switch loading involves loading a Class 2 fuel, i.e., jet fuel, kerosene, diesel, etc.,
into a tank that has previously contained a Class 1 fuel such as gasoline, but that
has not been gas-freed.
Switch loading should be avoided. If it cannot be avoided, the following steps
should be followed.

Top Loaded Vehicles

1. Bond the truck tank to the loading piping first before opening any compartment.
2. Extend the loading arm or down spout to the bottom of the tank. (The down
spout must not set full circle on the bottom of the tank.)
3. Fill tank. The pipe velocity should not exceed 3 feet per second until the
bottom of the fill spout is covered with liquid and there is no splashing. The
velocity can be increased after the fill spout is covered. See API 2003 for
maximum safe pipe velocity.
4. After loading, wait one minute before gaging or sampling.
5. Close the compartment cover of the filled tank before opening the next tank.

Bottom Loaded Vehicles

1. Bottom loading nozzles must be designed to prevent splashing inside the tanks.
2. Nozzle wells are desirable so that the inlet will be quickly submerged.
3. Loading line velocity should not exceed the safe velocity given in API RP 2003.
4. Any protruding points inside the tank, such as level markers, level control
leads, etc., should be avoided or bonded to the tank bottom.
See API RP 2003 for more details on TTLR loading safety.

3660 LPG Loading Racks

The design of LPG loading racks is covered in Section 1100 of the Piping Manual,
API Standard 2510, “Design and Construction of LPG Installations” (in the Piping
Manual), and API 2510A, “Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and Oper-
ation of LPG Storage Facilities” (in the Piping Manual). An LPG checklist is
included in this manual as Appendix C.

Fire Protection
First aid hoses, usually 1-1/4-inch hard rubber hoses, on hose reels and with adjust-
able nozzles, should be provided within 75 feet of each island to supplement fire

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3600 Loading Racks Fire Protection Manual

water hydrants. The hoses should reach any point on the loading rack. For large
racks, fire water monitors may be justified.
Hand-held dry chemical fire extinguishers shall be provided at each island.
Wheeled dry chemical extinguishers may also be provided for loading racks with
high usage. Dry chemical should only be used to extinguish an LPG fire after
shutoff of the LPG.

3670 Asphalt Loading Procedure

Asphalt loading requires strict adherence to safety procedures to prevent injuries
and fires. There are several potential hazards that may cause frothovers and fires.
The auto-ignition temperature, flash point and normal product handling temperature
of asphalt are about the same. Ignitions have occurred at about 500°F. In some
cases, asphalt passed through a heater to the truck was overheated and ignited. To
further complicate the problem, cut-back asphalt may have a flash point well below
the handling temperature. Therefore, asphalt should be loaded with care. These
safety steps should be observed:
• The loading spout should be chained to the truck tank so it will not rise out of
the truck due to the jet action of the asphalt stream being loaded. This will also
bond the loading spout to the truck.
• Asphalt loading temperature should not exceed 450°F to reduce auto-ignition
potential.
• Truck tanks must be free of water. Otherwise the hot asphalt will turn the water
to steam with explosive force, resulting in a frothover and possible truck damage.
• Cut-back asphalts should be treated as flammable materials around the dome.
Area classification should be considered where cut-backs may have flammable
vapors above the liquid surface.

3680 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2003 Recommended Practice for Protection Against Ignitions Arising
Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents
API 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations (Included in the
Piping Manual)

Chevron References
Piping Manual

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code

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3700 Compressor and Pump Stations
and Pipelines

Abstract
This section presents design considerations and recommends fire protection for
land-based compressor and pump stations, pipelines, and terminals. Loading and
unloading facilities at marine terminals are covered in Sections 3300 and 3600. Fire
protection for pumps and compressors is covered in Section 2000.

Contents Page

3710 Definitions 3700-3

3720 General Guidelines 3700-3
3721 Site Selection and Layout
3722 Construction
3723 Emergency Action Plans
3724 Testing and Maintenance
3730 Compressor Stations 3700-4
3731 Spacing and Layout
3732 Gas Compressor Units
3733 Relief Valves
3734 Emergency Shutdown Systems
3735 Plant Fuel Gas
3736 Fire and Gas Alarm and Detection Systems
3737 Toxic Gas
3738 Fire Protection
3740 Main Line Pump Stations 3700-7
3741 Layout
3742 Design

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3743 Emergency Shutdowns

3744 Tanks
3745 Fire Protection
3750 Gathering Pump Stations 3700-9
3760 Pipeline Maintenance 3700-9
3761 Ignition Sources
3762 Excavation
3763 Fire Emergencies
3770 Unattended Locations 3700-10
3771 Emergency Shutdown
3772 Remote Supervision
3780 References 3700-11
3790 Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations 3700-11

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3710 Definitions
Compressor station: a facility where natural gas or other compressible hydro-
carbon is introduced into a pipeline, or a facility located along a pipeline that
increases pipeline pressure and/or flow.
Main line pump station: a facility where liquid hydrocarbons are introduced into a
transmission pipeline or a station located along a transmission pipeline that
increases pipeline pressure and/or flow.
Gathering pump station: a facility at a production field where hydrocarbons are
produced or accumulated and pumped to a main pipeline facility.
Terminal: a facility where gas, crude oil, or refined products are received and
stored or distributed.
Unattended: a facility that does not have operating personnel on site or available to
respond to an incident 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Service buildings: offices, laboratories, maintenance structures, change houses,
shops, and other nonprocess structures; small shelters at loading racks (such as a
driver's shelter) are excluded.

3720 General Guidelines

3721 Site Selection and Layout

Because most hydrocarbon vapors are heavier than air, planning of the plant site
should take into account the elevation of different sections. Also, care should be
taken to reduce fire situations and personnel exposure arising from released flam-
mable or combustible liquids and vapors.
Drainage should be provided to safely remove flammable liquid spills from the
area. All drainage should be directed to an impounding pond, separator, or safe
discharge point, so as not to expose adjacent property or equipment. Sewer lines
should be provided with liquid traps (water seals) at the drain inlets.
Prevailing winds and the possibility of flooding should be considered in site selec-
tion.
Fired heaters, flares, maintenance shops, and any other areas where open flames or
sparks may be present should be located upwind of the main facility.
Vehicular traffic patterns should be established to minimize traffic in hazardous
areas of the plant. For example, loading racks should be at the edge of the site and
arranged so that vehicles need not enter the main facility. Access roads for emergen-
cies should be provided.

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3722 Construction
Service buildings should be of noncombustible construction. The design of offices
and laboratories should follow Section 2100. Any insulating materials or interior
finishes used on walls and/or ceilings should be noncombustible and contain no
asbestos.
Control rooms or buildings should be of noncombustible construction and follow
the criteria in Section 2100.
Compressor buildings and pump houses should be of noncombustible construction
and be erected without basements. Compressors may be located under a protective
roof, preferably without sidewalls. If sidewalls are used, they should provide
minimal enclosure to allow for good ventilation. For fully enclosed structures, fresh
air ventilation should be provided based on NFPA 30 ventilation requirements. See
Section 1500 for calculation procedures.
Glass should be kept to a minimum in compressor buildings and pump houses. If
glass is used, it should be laminated safety glass (ANSI Z97.1).
Electrical installations should conform with the Electrical Manual, applicable
sections of NFPA 70, and any other legal or regulatory requirements. API RP 500,
NFPA 497, and Section 1500 of this manual may be used in determining the extent
of hazardous areas for electrical equipment classification.

3723 Emergency Action Plans

Each location should have an emergency action and fire prevention plan in accor-
dance with Company requirements. See Section 400 of this manual.

3724 Testing and Maintenance

Fire protection equipment should be tested and maintained in accordance with
Company requirements. See Section 1600 and Appendix E and F of this manual
and local standards.

3730 Compressor Stations

3731 Spacing and Layout

Spacing should be in accordance with Section 1300.
Station blowdown valves, main line isolation valves, and bypass valves should be
accessible under all emergency conditions. Preferably, such valves should be within
the perimeter fence and not less than 200 feet (61 meters) nor more than 500 feet
(152 meters) from the main compressor.
Cooling towers of combustible construction should be located not less than 100 feet
(30 meters) from compressor buildings and other buildings.

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3732 Gas Compressor Units

Refer to Section 2000 and the Reciprocating Compressor Checklist at the end of
this section for fire protection information on compressors.
Compressors and their drivers should be equipped with safety shutdown or alarm
devices as listed in the Compressor Manual. Location, value, business interruption
consequences, staffing, and service of equipment should be considered in deter-
mining whether these devices should actuate shutdown interlocks or provide only
an alarm. Also, see Section 1800 and the Instrumentation and Control Manual.
During maintenance, all gas lines, including relief lines to and from the compres-
sors, should be blinded. Double block and bleed valves may be used in lieu of
blinds, provided procedures are in place to verify the tightness of the valves and
that the bleed valve is not plugged.

3733 Relief Valves

All compressor final-stage discharge lines should have relief valves. If compression
is in several stages with block valves between stages, each stage should have a
relief valve.
Relief valves on a compressor discharge or from scrubbers should vent to a
common vent line located outside and above the eaves of the building, and away
from ignition sources. Bypass arrangements around the relief valves for compres-
sors venting to a common header should be avoided, since block valves in bypass
lines have sometimes been inadvertently left open following repairs.
Critical relief valves should be tested, inspected, and reset annually. Others in less
critical service should be tested not less than every 5 years. The test results for pop
pressure, set pressure, etc., should be recorded. Relief valves that require block
valves under them for maintenance purposes must be supervised. The valve must be
car-sealed or locked open during operation and the key must be kept by a respon-
sible supervisor.
All aboveground liquid hydrocarbon piping that can be blocked at both ends should
be checked to determine if thermal relief is required.
To limit the return of hydrocarbons to the compressor building as a result of back
pressure in the flare line, a check valve should be installed in the blowdown line
between the relief valve and the flare header.
Refer to Section 1900 for more information on relief valves, vents and flares.

3734 Emergency Shutdown Systems

Emergency shutdown (ESD) systems for compressor stations should be controlled
from at least two separate locations on opposite sides of the facility so that the
system can be actuated even though one location is inaccessible. One ESD station
should be located adjacent to the main station entrance gate, another outside the
compressor building. ESD stations should be clearly identified by signs.

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When activated, the system should shut down machinery, close incoming and
outgoing gas lines, and open a blowdown valve to depressure the station. The shut-
down system should shut off the fuel to gas engine drivers. The following addi-
tional features are recommended:
• The emergency shutdown activation system should be designed such that
failure of the system will cause the compressor station to shut down.
• Station isolation and fuel gas valves should be designed to fail closed.
• Blowdown valves should be designed to fail open.
Refer to Section 1800 and the Instrumentation and Control Manual for more infor-
mation.

3735 Plant Fuel Gas

Fuel gas piping to gas engine drivers should incorporate a double block and vent
system. The vent line should be extended outside and above the eaves of the
compressor building.

3736 Fire and Gas Alarm and Detection Systems

A combustible gas detection system should be installed in all enclosed compressor
buildings. As a minimum, gas detection heads should be installed above and below
the compressors. Final location of the gas detection heads should be specified on
site. An alarm should be activated when the detector indicates 20% of the LFL of
the gas handled, and the relevant system should automatically shut down when the
detector indicates 60% of the LFL.
A thermal fire detector system should be installed in compressor buildings. The
system may include detectors at critical locations of the compressor where gases
might be released.
All alarm and detection systems should be designed and installed in accordance
with the Instrumentation and Control Manual.

3737 Toxic Gas

Additional requirements are necessary in facilities where natural gas containing
toxic gases such as hydrogen sulfide is present. Hydrogen sulfide detectors should
be installed in the compressor building, control building, and any areas where
hydrogen sulfide may be present in the air. Excessive hydrogen sulfide (5 ppm)
should activate an alarm.
Self-contained pressure-demand breathing apparatus should be provided and worn
when fire fighting. A sign should be posted at the entrance to the area stating that a
potential exists for hydrogen sulfide exposure.

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3738 Fire Protection

Gas fires at compressor stations normally are not extinguished, but are allowed to
burn out under controlled conditions once the fuel supply has been shut off. There
must, however, be sufficient fire fighting equipment to protect nearby equipment,
minimize fire spread, and rescue personnel.

Extinguishers
The general provisions for fire extinguishers should be in accordance with
Section 1600, and with the following specific requirements:
• One 20-pound multipurpose extinguisher (ABC) should be provided for every
2,500 square feet (232 square meters) of floor area in offices, warehouses, and
change houses.
• One 30-pound Purple K dry-chemical extinguisher (BC) should be provided
for every 2,500 square feet (232 square meters) of floor area in pump houses,
compressor houses, utility buildings, and garages.
• 30-pound Purple K dry-chemical extinguishers (BC) should be distributed
throughout the yard areas where flammable liquids are processed and stored,
so that the maximum spacing between units is 100 feet (30 meters).

Fire Water Systems

Fire pump mains, hydrants, etc., generally are provided only at large, high-value
compressor stations or at those which could expose the Company to an unusually
large business interruption loss. Where installed, such protection should conform
with Section 1600 with the following exceptions:
• One fire pump should be provided with a minimum rating of 1,000 gpm at 125
psi (3,800 liters/minute at 8.8 kilograms/square centimeter) and be driven by a
diesel engine. The pump should be arranged for automatic starting.
• The fire pump suction supply should have sufficient capacity to supply the fire
pump for 2 hours of continuous operation at its rated capacity.
• A reliable means of replenishing the water supply in not more than 24 hours
should be provided.

3740 Main Line Pump Stations

3741 Layout
Spacing should be in accordance with Section 1300.
The site grading should be arranged to direct flowing liquids to unexposed areas.
Station isolation valves on suction and discharge lines should be located a safe
distance (outside of the spill area) from pump rooms and manifolds, where they
will be accessible under emergency fire conditions.

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3742 Design
Area classification should conform with Section 1500 and API 500C. Electrical
installation should conform with the Electrical Manual and NFPA 70.
Pumps and their drivers should be equipped with safety shutdown or alarm devices
as listed in the Pump Manual. Location, value, business interruption consequences,
staffing, and service of equipment should be considered in deciding if these devices
should actuate shutdown interlocks or provide only an alarm. Also, see
Section 1800.

3743 Emergency Shutdowns

There should be at least two emergency shutdown stations. One should be located
at the pump room entrance; the other at least 100 feet (30 m) from the pump room.
ESD stations should be clearly identified by signs.
Activation of the emergency shutdown system or signal failure should shut down all
pipeline pumps and close the station (or pump room manifold) suction and
discharge valves.

3744 Tanks
If the location has storage tanks, they should be located, arranged, and protected in
accordance with the Tank Manual.

3745 Fire Protection

Remote Unmanned Pumping Stations
Typically, these stations are small, consisting of two pumps. Hand-held dry chem-
ical extinguishers should be provided.

Major Pipeline Station

These large pipeline stations have pumps, storage tanks, and product manifolds.
Hand-held and wheeled dry chemical extinguishers should be provided. Fire water
systems should also be provided. See Section 1600, Figure 1600-2.

Refined Product Manifold

These stations are typically in marketing terminals, delivering refined product to the
terminal. Hand-held dry chemical extinguishers should be provided. For larger fires
the terminal's fire water system can be used.

Fire Extinguishers
The general provision of fire extinguishers should be in accordance with
Section 1600, with the following specifics applicable:

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• One 20-pound multipurpose extinguisher (ABC) should be provided for every

2,500 square feet (232 square meters) of floor area in offices, warehouses, and
change houses.
• One 30-pound Purple K dry-chemical extinguisher (BC), should be provided
for every 2,500 square feet (232 square meters) of floor area in pump houses,
utility buildings, and garages.
• 30-pound Purple K dry-chemical extinguishers (BC) should be distributed
throughout the yard and flammable liquid storage areas so that the maximum
spacing between units is 100 feet (30 meters).
• One or more 150-pound Purple K dry-chemical wheeled extinguishers should
be provided in each station. The units should be strategically located.

Fire Water Systems

The need for a fire water system should be based on the dollar value of the station,
the business interruption loss which might result from a fire, personnel available to
use the system, and the availability and adequacy of public fire protection.
Protection should conform with Section 1600 with the following exception: one fire
pump should be provided with a minimum rating of 1,000 gpm at 125 psi (3,800
liters/minute at 8.8 kilograms/square centimeter) and be driven by a diesel engine.
The pump should be arranged for automatic starting.

Detection Systems
Pump rooms of high value or critical pump stations should be equipped with a
thermal fire detection system. Actuation of the system should sound an audible
local alarm and an alarm in a continuously attended location. Refer to Section 1800
and the Instrumentation and Control Manual for more information.

3750 Gathering Pump Stations

Section 3740 also applies to gathering pump stations, except that fire protection can
be reduced according to the monetary and operational value of the station.
However, as a minimum these stations should be equipped with two 30-pound
Purple K dry-chemical extinguishers.

3760 Pipeline Maintenance

Principles to be followed for pipeline repair, normal maintenance, and leak elimina-
tion can be found in Chevron Pipeline Company's “Pipeline Leak Repair Safety
Procedures.” Copies are available from Chevron Pipeline Company's Safety Engi-
neer at (415) 894-9325.

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3761 Ignition Sources

Surface terrain, direction and velocity of winds, and proximity to possible sources
of ignition must be considered. Some sources of ignition are:
• Residences. It may be necessary to have any fires and pilot lights extinguished.
• Highways and Roads. Roadblocks should be set up immediately when
needed. Local police and county authorities should be called upon for assis-
tance.
• Railroads. If the work area is in hazardous proximity to a railroad, the proper
railroad officials should be notified.

3762 Excavation
Once the excavation is completed, the appropriate gas tests (for example, flam-
mable range and H2S) should be conducted to determine if the work area is safe. If
the tests indicate the presence of toxic gases, self-contained pressure-demand
breathing apparatus must be worn.

3763 Fire Emergencies

Should a fire occur, immediately call for assistance. Do not fight a fire without
others knowing you are doing so. See that the local fire department is notified.
If a rescue must be made, it should be made by more than one person, using proper
respiratory protection. All rescue and fire fighting operations should be done from
the upwind side of the work area. At least one person, equipped with a self-
contained pressure-demand breathing apparatus, should remain on standby outside
the emergency area.

3770 Unattended Locations

The absence of operating personnel justifies a higher degree of fail-safe and shut-
down automation than is required in attended locations. All features, however, may
not be appropriate in remote low-value, noncritical facilities. See Section 1800 and
the Instrumentation and Control Manual for detailed design information.

3771 Emergency Shutdown

In emergency situations, the system design should cause the following to occur:
1. Shut down all compressors or pumps.
2. Close power-operated inlet and discharge valves to isolate the facility.
3. Open facility bypass valve (if one is provided).
4. Depressurize or vent all high pressure gas within the facility.

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5. Cut off power to all pumps, except the fire water pumps and any other pumps
required to maintain circulation or flow of cooling water for a safe shutdown.
6. Close valves in piping to product storage tanks where backflow of product may
be encountered.

3772 Remote Supervision

If the plant is supervised from a remote, constantly attended location, fail-safe shut-
downs may be converted to remote manually actuated functions. Closed-circuit tele-
vision can be used for monitoring of the process operations, as well as for security.

3780 References
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
Z97.1 Safety Glazing Material Used in Buildings

American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM)

D189 Test Method for Conradson Carbon Residue of Petroleum Products

American Petroleum Institute (API)

API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations in Petroleum
Facilities
API 2003 Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and
Stray Currents
API 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations

Chevron References
Compressor Manual
Electrical Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual
Pump Manual
Tank Manual
Guide to Fire Prevention

3790 Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

The Checklists on the following pages may be helpful during the design phase.

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National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 24 Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurte-
nances
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 37 Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas
Turbines
NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 77 Static Electricity
NFPA 78 Lightning Protection Code
NFPA 214 Water-Cooling Towers
NFPA 493 Intrinsically Safe Apparatus in Division 1 Hazardous Locations
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 497 Electrical Installation in Chemical Plants

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Fire Protection Manual 3700 Compressor and Pump Stations and Pipelines

Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Compressor Cylinders
1. Is the maximum allowable working pres-
sure (MAWP) at least 110% (120%
preferred) of the maximum safety valve
set pressure?
2. Are cylinder barrel, head and gaskets
ofcorrect materials for service? They
should be steel for pressures above
1000 psig.
3. If the distance piece crosshead housings
are provided with coverplates, are
adequately sized vents and drains
provided to properly dispose of piston rod
blow-by gas and lubricant?
4. Are cylinder supports adequate? Ensure
that they are not affected by temperature
changes in the discharge gas piping.
5. Are cylinder head (or crank) end volume
pockets sized properly so that head (or
crank) end gas flow will always be
adequate to keep cylinder cool? If not,
have permanent adjuster stops been
installed?
6. Are compressor valves designed to
prevent interchanging suction and
discharge valves and to prevent installing
the valves upside down?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Compressor Cylinder Piping
1. Are intake and discharge pulsation
dampers properly designed and
supported to minimize destructive
pulsations?
2. Is piping adequately designed for stress
induced by internal pressure, thermal
expansion, and vibration?
3. Is piping adequately supported and
restrained?
4. Are drain and instrument root valves
installed and close coupled to main
piping to minimize pendulous-mass-type
vibration?
5. Is 3/4-inch to 1-1/2-inch piping socket- or
seal-welded?
6. Is there any piping smaller than 3/4 inch?
If so, is there a plan to replace it?
7. Are force feed lubrication connections
provided with a steel doubleball check
valve at each line terminus to prevent gas
escape back through oil lines if they
should break?
8. Are intake piping and bottles designed to
prevent the accumulation and slugging of
liquids into the cylinder?
9. Is piping instrumentation routed away
from crankcase blast doors?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Overpressure Protection
1. Are safety valves provided for each
compression stage to protect all portions
of the pressured system in accordance
with the following?
a. Have block valves been eliminated
between cylinder discharges and
safety valve inlets?
b. Are safety valves located ahead of
coolers where deposits could form?
c. Are safety valves located and braced
to minimize destructive vibration
forces?
d. Are safety valves located upstream of
small diameter choke tubes where
carbon deposits could restrict gas
flow?
e. Are safety valves equipped with
closed bonnets if located in confined
areas?
f. Is safety valve discharge piping
adequately sized and braced, and is it
discharging to an adequate elevation
and away from sources of ignition? If
safety valves are located at grade for
maintenance access, the discharge
should be extended back up to a safe
elevation.
g. Is discharge piping or valve body
properly drained to prevent liquid
accumulations that would affect valve
operation?
h. Are safety valves and downstream
piping heat traced where necessary to
prevent blockage by hydrates or ice?
i. Are high pressure (above 1500
psig)safety valves properly designed
for maintaining seal/valve tightness
after operation and during test or
other circumstances?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Overpressure Protection (continued)
2. Are stack or kickover (bypass) regulators
provided where practical to maintain
pressure increases below safety valve
pressure settings and in accordance with
the following?
a. Are regulators properly sized on the
basis of the conditions (frequently
abnormal) in which they are intended
to operate?
b. Is kickover regulator piping arranged
to prevent temperature buildup by gas
recirculation through compressor
cylinders during extended periods of
operation?
c. Are regulators and piping heat traced
if necessary to prevent solid deposits
from blocking gas flow?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Station Piping
1. Is overpressure protection adequate at all
points, with respect to abnormal
operating pressures and to thermal relief
of vapors generated in the event of fire?
2. Are block valves provided at a fire-safe
location on all flammable gas and liquid
piping streams?
3. Are check valves provided on final station
gas discharge line to prevent backflow of
gas in the event of an in-station line break?
4. Are check valves provided on atmospheric
vents and drains where startup or other
operation involving subatmospheric pres-
sures could result in air being drawn into
the compression gas system?
5. Is piping designed to minimize entrap-
ment and slugging of liquid (carry-through
or in-line condensation) into compressor
intake piping?
6. Are automatic drains provided on gas
lines where frequent liquid accumulations
are probable?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Compressor Engine Ignition System
1. Are solid state ignition systems used
where lowest hazard probability is
required?
2. Is all primary wiring (low voltage)
enclosed in metallic conduit for protec-
tion against deterioration and mechanical
damage?
3. Are all wire terminal connections of a
good design and properly connected
(primary and secondary)?
4. Is secondary wiring of premium quality,
e.g., stranded copper conductor and high
temperature silicon rubber insulation?
5. Are coils (ignition transformers) mounted
close to the spark plugs to minimize
secondary wire length?
6. If metallic shielding is provided on
secondary wiring (not recommended), is
the shielding bonded to a good electrical
ground at intervals of two feet or less?
Engine Exhaust System
1. Does the engine have water cooled mani-
fold or air cooled manifold and exhaust
pipe, shielded for personnel protection?
2. If required by fire codes, does the muffler
have adequate spark arresting features?
Engine Crankcase
1. Are crankcase vents adequate to keep
case pressure low?
2. If crankcase scavenging system is used,
is the pressure control method adequate
to prevent subatmospheric case pres-
sures?
3. Are crankcase explosion doors recom-
mended by the manufacturer—if so, are
they adequately sized and do they have
fire barrier screens?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Electrical
1. Are all electrical power and lighting
installations in conformance with appli-
cable codes and good design practices?
2. If located in a hazardous area, is elec-
trical instrumentation intrinsically safe,
properly enclosed or otherwise designed
to avoid the possibility of igniting any
surrounding combustibles?
3. Is all instrument and other electrical
wiring adequately protected from acci-
dental mechanical damage by operating
and maintenance personnel?
Starting Air Systems
1. Are air compressors properly staged and
intercooled to maintain temperatures
within the limitations of the lubricant?
Note that high temperature lubricants
(e.g., Stauffer Fryquel) are available.
2. If system pressure exceeds 100 psig, a)is
compressor of non-lube design or prop-
erly designed and fitted to use a synthetic
phosphate-tester lubricant (low fire
hazard), and b) are block valves of a non-
lube design and fitted to resist synthetic
lubes?
3. Is each stage of cylinders and interstage
piping adequately protected by safety
valves in the event of faulty operation of
any one stage?
4. For direct air start (air injection into
power cylinders) engines, is the air
distributor designed to prevent the entry
of flammable engine lubricants into the
air chamber?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Maximum Instrumentation
1. Will each of the following malfunctions
result in quick equipment shutdown? All
items should be mandatory for unattended
operations and are highly recommended
for all operations.
a. Engine oil pressure to bearings–(PSL)
b. Engine water temperature, out–(TSH)
c. Engine overspeed
d. Engine vibration (magnetic latch switch
only)
e. Engine turbocharger overspeed
f. Engine turbocharger oil pressure–(PSL)
(if separate turbocharger pressure oil
system used)
g. Engine main and conn-rod bearing
temperature–(TSH) (engines 1000 hp
and over, or smaller engines in critical
service)
h. Intake scrubber liquid level–(LSH)
i. Compressor oil pressure to bearings–
(PSL) (for separate compressor frames)
j. Compressor vibration (for separate
compressor frames)
2. Will operation of the malfunction sensors
required in Item result in the following
events?
a. Positive shutoff of engine fuel in two
cycle engines and in all turbocharged
engines
b. Disabling of ignition system on naturally
aspirated four cycle engines and on
other engines where fuel shutoff takes
longer
c. Positive and unique annunciation of the
malfunction causing shutdown
3. Are one or more manually operated emer-
gency shutdown stations provided in a
remote, safe and readily accessible location?
4. Are all portions of safety instrumentation
designed for frequent, efficient and thorough
performance testing?

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Fire Protection Manual 3700 Compressor and Pump Stations and Pipelines

Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Optional Instrumentation (Generally Recommended)
Has the following relatively low cost instrumentation been given adequate consideration–(either as shutdown
devices on unattended or partially attended stations or as warning devices on attended stations)?
1. Low cooling water level–on system or
individual unit surge tanks (more positive
than high temperature switches on some
systems)
2. Low cooling water pressure–recom-
mended where cooling water pump is not
driven by the engine
3. Low crankcase lube oil level–available in
combination with level control in some
automatic fill systems–recommended as
low cost insurance
4. Compressor rod packer high tempera-
ture–recommended for non-lube for high
pressure (over 1000 psig), for rod diame-
ters over 2-1/2 inches or for critical
service applications
5. Compressor cylinder high gas discharge
temperature–recommended where rod
packer temperature protection is not
used or where more positive protection
against cylinder valve malfunction is
required
6. High intake pressure, to protect against
possible excessive cylinder pressure
7. Low intake pressure, to protect against
possible compressor cylinder rod over-
loading, or against the possibility of
pulling air into intake gas systems in the
event of line breaks

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Optional Instrumentation (Generally Recommended) (continued)
8. High discharge pressure, to prevent
continued relieving of gas in the event of
discharge line blockage (by solids
obstruction or by unauthorized closing of
discharge system block valves)
9. Low discharge pressure, to prevent
continued gas blow-through ruptures in
the discharge piping system
10. Differential pressure across compressor
cylinders where pressure changes could
result in serious cylinder rod overloads
11. High compressor valve (cover) tempera-
ture–recommended only for extremely
critical service

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Fire Protection Manual 3700 Compressor and Pump Stations and Pipelines

Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Gas Detectors
Has the feasibility been considered of installing a continuous flammable gas monitoring system that, in the event
of a hazardous atmosphere developing around sources of possible ignition, will shut down operating equipment
and/or transmit an alarm? Sensitive areas where detector heads or sampling tubes may be effective include
areas adjacent to:
1. Compressor cylinders where blown rod
packers or ruptured valve cover gaskets
are relatively frequent occurrences
2. Engine cylinder heads where leaking fuel
injector valve packing and piping leaks
occur, and also where defective insula-
tion spark plug lead wires have proven to
be sources of ignition
3. Trenches under compressor cylinders
(the probability of gas “flooding” due to
piping breaks is greater in this area due
to the high pressure, temperature, and
vibration stresses inherent in compressor
discharge piping)
4. In ridge area of compressor houses
where natural or induced ventilation
combined with low specific gravity of
many hydrocarbon gases could result in a
flammable atmosphere

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Flame Detectors
Has the insurance value of ultraviolet-sensitive scanners been adequately evaluated? Installation of one or more
heads to scan the following potentially sensitive areas could prevent minor fires from developing into major
catastrophes.
1. Compressor cylinders and discharge
piping–scanner “sighting” along the
heads of compressor cylinders, which
frequently are aligned in rows, would
have good probability of detecting small
fires at their inception.
2. Compressor room overhead–one scanner
located high in one end of a moderately
sized building and "sighting” toward the
far end would have a high probability of
detecting top of engine fires as well as
fires in other locations inside the building.
3. Compressor intake and discharge piping
headers–scanners “sighting” along
header-ways would quickly detect fires
resulting from breaks in laterals or other
gas leaks.
4. Auxiliary engine rooms or other enclosed
areas where potential fuel and ignition
sources exist.

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Fire Protection Manual 3700 Compressor and Pump Stations and Pipelines

Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Manual Station Shutdown
1. Are hand-operated block valves to shut
off all flammable streams located in
easily accessible and fire-safe locations?
2. Are emergency switches to shut down
compressors, engines and auxiliary equip-
ment located in an accessible and fire-
safe location?
3. Are these emergency valves and
switches conspicuously marked?
4. Do you have an emergency shutdown
plan? Has it been practiced?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Automatic Station Shutdown
1. Is automatic shutoff of hazardous gas
and liquid streams with “motor” valves or
power valve actuators directed by a
signal from one or more of the safety
instruments listed in “Minimum Instru-
mentation” or “Optional Instrumentation?”
2. Will all hazardous streams entering a
fire-sensitive area be shut off when
necessary?
3. Are automatic shut-in systems fail-safe in
the event fire or other accidents damage
any portion of the system (including
energy source)?
4. Are manual block valves provided in safe
areas to isolate the station in the event of
failure in an automatic system, and for
maintenance work?
5. Are lubrication and hydraulic system
supply lines all steel? If not, are low
melting point parts (rubber, brass,
aluminum and plastic) protected with
Kenco fire stop valves between the part
and the oil/hydraulic fluid supply?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Equipment Isolation
1. Have possible sources of ignition (fired
heaters, sparking electrical devices, etc.)
been located at a safe distance from
sources of possible gas leaks (compres-
sors, vessels, tanks, etc.)? Refer to
Section 1300.
2. Have major equipment items been
isolated from possible fires in adjacent
equipment (insofar as practical) by:
a. Adequate spacing?
b. Fire-resistant bulkheads or partitions?
c. Adequate surface drainage?

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Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations

Reviewed by: Date:
Item Yes No Corrective Action
Miscellaneous
1. If compressor house (and other enclo-
sure around gas pressured piping equip-
ment) is not open-sided, are adequate
ridge and wall vents (or other ventilating
system) provided?
2. Are trenches and floors adequately
sloped and drained to prevent accumula-
tion of flammable liquids?
3. Are utility drain systems, into which flam-
mable hydrocarbons may be discharged,
properly sized, sealed, sloped and other-
wise designed to minimize the probability
of in-line fires and explosions?

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3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

Abstract
This section contains fire protection recommendations for warehouses and outside
storage areas. This section pertains to Company-owned warehouses and should be
considered when leasing warehouses.

Contents Page

3810 Definitions 3800-3

3820 Indoor Storage 3800-5
3821 General Building Construction Guidelines
3822 General Pile Storage
3823 Sprinklers and Other Fire Protection
3824 Rack Storage
3825 Rubber Tire Storage
3830 Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids 3800-9
3831 General
3832 Fire Protection
3833 Electrical Area Classification
3834 Filling Operations
3840 Ammonium Nitrate Storage 3800-12
3850 Aerosol Storage 3800-13
3860 Outdoor Storage 3800-14
3861 Yard Maintenance and Fire Protection
3862 Outdoor Lumber Storage
3863 Coal and Coke Storage
3864 Outdoor Drum Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids
3870 Powered Industrial Trucks 3800-16
3871 Classifications and Occupancies

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3872 Maintenance
3873 Driver Training
3880 Special Hazards 3800-17
3881 Cutting and Welding
3882 Smoking
3883 Cylinder Storage
3890 References 3800-19

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3810 Definitions
Aerosol: a mist or spray dispensed from its container by a propellant under pressure.
Automatic rack: pallets that rest on two rails running perpendicular to the aisle.
Bin box storage: storage in five-sided wood, metal, or cardboard boxes with one
open face on the aisles. Maximum dimensions are 6 feet by 6 feet by 6 feet (1.8
meters by 1.8 meters by 1.8 meters).
Class I commodity: a noncombustible product on combustible pallets, in ordinary
corrugated cartons, or in ordinary paper wrappings with or without pallets.
Class II commodity: Class I products in wooden crates, solid wooden boxes, multi-
thickness paperboard cartons, or equivalent combustible packaging with or without
pallets.
Class III commodity: wood, paper, natural fiber, cloth, or Group C plastic with or
without pallets.
Class IV commodity: Class I, II, or III products containing an appreciable amount
of Group A plastics in ordinary corrugated cartons; and Class I, II, or III products
in corrugated cartons with Group A plastic packing, with or without pallets. Group
B plastics and free-flowing Group A plastics are also in this class.
Closed array: a storage arrangement in which air movement is restricted through
the pile due to small vertical flues.
Encapsulated: a method of packing in which a plastic sheet completely encloses a
pallet load containing a combustible commodity.
Free-flowing plastic materials: plastics which fall out of their containers in a fire,
fill flue spaces, and smother the fire.
Groups A, B, and C plastics: see Figure 3800-1.
In-rack sprinklers: special sprinklers designed to cover areas within racks that are
shielded from ceiling sprinkler systems.
Open array: an arrangement in which air movement is increased through the pile
due to large vertical flues.
Palletized storage: storage of materials on square wooden or plastic slatted,
portable supports (pallets). These form horizontal spaces between tiers of storage.
Racks: any combination of support members used to store materials.
Remote area: that area used in designing the capacity of a sprinkler system which
would produce the worst case hydraulically. For the purpose of this guide, the area
shall be 3000 square feet (279 square meters).
Shelf storage: storage on structures less than 30 inches (76 centimeters) deep with
shelves usually 2 feet (0.6 meters) apart vertically, separated by 30-inch (76-centi-
meter) aisles.

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Fig. 3800-1 Plastic Commodities Groups

Group “A” Plastic Commodities

ABS (Acrylonitrile-Butadiene-Styrene Copolymer)

Acrylic (Polymethyl Methacrylate)
Acetal (Polyformaldehyde)
Butyl Rubber
EPDM (Ethylene-Propylene Rubber)
FRP (Fiberglass-Reinforced Polyester)
Natural Rubber
Nitrile Rubber (Acrylonitrile-Butadiene Rubber)
PET (Thermoplastic Polyester)
Polybutadiene
Polycarbonate
Polyester Elastomer
Polyethylene
Polypropylene
Polystyrene
Polyurethane
PVC (Polyvinyl Chloride-highly plasticized, e.g., coated fabric, unsupported film)
SAN (Styrene Acrylonitrile)
SBR (Styrene-Butadiene Rubber)
Group “B” Plastic Commodities

Cellulosics — Cellulose Acetate, Cellulose Acetate Butyrate, Ethyl Cellulose

Chloroprene Rubber
Fluoroplastics — ECTFE-Ethylene-Chlorotrifluoroethylene Copolymer; ETFE-Ethylene-Tetrafluoroethylene
Copolymer; FEP-Fluorinated Ethylene-Propylene Copolymer
Nylon (Nylon 6, Nylon 6/6)
Silicon Rubber
Group “C” Plastic Commodities

Fluoroplastics — PCTFE-Polychlorotrifluroethylene; PTFE-Polytetra Fluoroethylene

Melamine (Melamine Formaldehyde)
Phenolic
PVC (Polyvinyl Chloride-rigid or lightly plasticized, e.g., pipe, pipe fittings)
PVDF (Polyvinylidene Fluoride)
Urea (Urea Formaldehyde)

All inventory should be reviewed to determine its potential for fire or explosion.

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Solid piling: storage of piles in direct contact with each other to the full dimensions
of each pile.
Transverse flue space: the space between rows of storage parallel to the direction
of loading.

3820 Indoor Storage

3821 General Building Construction Guidelines

Location
Selection of the construction site is critical, since geographic location affects
construction type and other factors as well. Special attention should be given to
flood and earthquake studies for the area, local geography, snowfall, mean tempera-
tures, and wind severity. Site selection should also consider availability of access
roads to storage areas, adequate municipal fire protection, adequate water supply,
and sufficient storage area to provide clearance around buildings and combustibles.
Office and parking areas should be located well away from product handling areas.
Generally 50 feet is adequate. See Section 1300 for spacing information.

Building Construction Types

New construction should be fire-resistive or of approved noncombustible materials
as defined in NFPA 220. All construction standards should conform to the Uniform
Building Code, except where national or local codes are more stringent.

Internal Partitions and Interior Finishes

Internal partitions and interior finishes should be of noncombustible materials when-
ever possible. Where combustible materials have been used, fire-retardant coatings
or sheathings should be considered.

Fire Walls and Doors

Fire walls and doors break up the continuity of combustibles in a warehouse,
reducing the potential for a total loss in a fire. All fire door and wall installations
should comply with NFPA 80.

Storage Area Limitations

One of the best ways to limit loss from fire in storage operations is to limit the
storage area. Large storage areas should be subdivided such that no area exceeds
40,000 square feet (3716 square meters). To maintain the integrity between areas, a
4-hour rated fire wall should be provided for each 40,000 square feet (3716 square
meters) of storage (UBC Section 509, Table 5B).

Smoke and Heat Venting

Smoke and heat venting is recommended to remove smoke and heat from the ware-
house so that the fire department can gain access to the seat of the fire. The ratio of

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the vent opening to the floor area in warehouse occupancies with concentrated quan-
tities of combustibles should be calculated in accordance with NFPA 204 for a
building with 15-foot ceilings.

Draft Curtains
Draft curtains aid venting by directing the smoke and heat toward the vent areas.
They should extend from the ceiling a minimum of 6 feet (1.8 meters) and be of
sheet metal or other heavy noncombustible material. The distance between draft
curtains should not exceed 100 feet (30 meters), and the contained area should be
limited to 10,000 square feet (929 square meters).

Life Safety
Every warehouse should have sufficient and properly designed exits, and proper
illumination, fire alarms, and general construction necessary to the safety of its
occupants. All design should conform with NFPA 101. Exit requirements are
enhanced by the installation of sprinkler systems, in that distances to exit doors
may be increased.

3822 General Pile Storage

General pile storage entails storage of Class I through IV combustible materials and
Group B and C plastics to heights of 30 feet (9 meters), and Group A plastics
(except free flowing) up to 15 feet (4.6 meters). Higher storage is not covered in
this section, and should be coordinated with the corporate and/or local fire protec-
tion and safety groups.
Arrange different Class materials in separate piles and/or separate rack storage, and
always store Class I materials in segregated piles.

Storage Arrangements
The distance between the top of the storage and ceiling sprinkler deflectors should
be at least 18 inches (0.5 meters). A minimum clearance of 3 feet (90 centimeters)
in all directions must be maintained from unit heaters, duct furnaces, and radiant
space heaters.
Floor loading should be taken into account in all storage arrangements. Pile
stability should be considered for purposes of normal warehouse activity. In earth-
quake zones, additional bracing and floor attachments may be warranted.
Aisles between storage areas are critical in retarding the transfer of fire from one
area to another. Aisles should be designed to limit piles to 50 feet (15 meters) in
width or 25 feet (7.6 meters) if the pile abuts a wall. Aisles should be at least 48
inches (1.2 meters) wide, and main aisles should be at least 8 feet (2.4 meters)
wide. For new liquid storage facilities, aisles between storage areas should be at
least 6 feet (1.8 meters) wide, and main aisles at least 8 feet (2.4 meters) wide.
Idle pallet storage presents a severe fire hazard. In all cases, pallets should be stored
outside if possible. If pallets are stored inside, they should be limited to 8 ft (2.4 m)

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Fire Protection Manual 3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

in height and be protected by a sprinkler system designed for a density of 0.30

gpm/square feet.

3823 Sprinklers and Other Fire Protection

General Criteria and Philosophy for Existing Storage Facilities
Automatic sprinklers are a reliable and effective means of minimizing loss from
fire. Factors to consider when determining if sprinklers should be provided are:
• Loss of product. Loss includes initial dollar loss, replacement cost, and
customer dissatisfaction.
• Loss of building. Loss includes initial dollar loss and replacement cost.
• Business interruption. Loss of building and/or product can result in servicing
delays to customers and loss of production.
• Criticality of stored equipment. Replacing critical equipment can take a long
time and can seriously affect production level.
• Hazard potential. Some stored materials are more hazardous than others. All
inventory should be reviewed to determine its potential for fire or explosion.
• Code compliance. Compliance with local and national code requirements.
• Political, social, and environmental effects. For example, consider the effects
of a release into the environment of toxic gases and smoke.

Sprinkler Design for New Facilities

New facilities should meet the requirements of NFPA 30, Section 4-8. Where auto-
matic sprinklers are used, consult NFPA 30 Tables 4-8.2(a) through 4-8.2(f), which
incorporate the following criteria in determining sprinkler design requirements:
• Applicable Liquid class
• Container type
• Storage arrangement

Plastics
Group B plastics are protected as Class IV commodities and Group C plastics are
protected as Class III commodities. Group A plastic protection should be designed
for a density of 0.40 gpm/sq ft.

Lumber Storage
Automatic sprinkler protection should be provided for all lumber stored in build-
ings; however, separate storage sheds used exclusively for lumber are not consid-
ered buildings. Sprinkler systems for indoor storage should be designed for a
density of 0.25 gpm/sq ft. Sprinklers should be installed over the storage area and
extend 20 feet (6 meters) beyond on all sides. See also Section 3862, Outdoor
Lumber Storage.

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Fire Extinguishers and Inside Hose Protection (See Section 1600)

Fire extinguishers. Fire extinguishers are an integral part of any sound fire protec-
tion design. As a general rule, a 2-1/2-gallon pressurized water extinguisher for
Class A materials and 20-pound or 30-pound dry chemical extinguishers for Class
B and C materials should be used. Each extinguisher should be installed to provide
a maximum of 2500 square feet of floor area per extinguisher with a maximum
travel distance of 75 feet (30 meters) to any extinguisher. If automatic sprinklers are
provided, the fire extinguisher requirements can be reduced by 50%.
All extinguishers should be inspected at least monthly, with maintenance performed
yearly or as needed. Extinguishers should be recharged as needed or as indicated on
the label. All inspections, maintenance, and recharging should be in accordance
with local Company requirements. Occupants who are expected to use fire extin-
guishers and hose lines should be trained in accordance with Section 500.
Inside hose protection. Small 1-1/4-inch or 3/4-inch garden-type hose lines should
be located so that all portions of storage areas can be reached by two hose lines.
Adjustable stream nozzles are recommended for hoses.

3824 Rack Storage

Because of the complexity of rack storage design, the Corporate and/or local fire
protection and safety groups should be consulted for all fire protection design infor-
mation.

3825 Rubber Tire Storage

This section applies only to separate tire warehouses or areas with more than
10,000 average-sized passenger tires.

General Arrangements
The various storage configurations should conform to NFPA 231D. Columns in
storage areas should be protected when storage exceeds 15 feet (4.6 meters) in
height. Piles should not be more than 50 feet (15 meters) wide, except that piles
along walls should not be more than 25 feet (7.6 meters) wide, with main aisles not
less than 8 feet (2.4 meters) wide. Piles should not exceed 20 feet (7 meters) in
height. Clearance between the top of storage and sprinkler deflectors should be a
minimum of 3 feet (1 meter).

Fire Walls
When stored materials are up to 15 feet (4.6 meters) high, walls between adjacent
warehouse areas and between warehouse and manufacturing areas should be rated
for at least 4 hours. The walls between the warehouse and manufacturing areas
should be rated for 6 hours when storage is over 15 feet (4.6 meters) high.

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Fire Protection Manual 3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

Fire Protection
Ceiling sprinkler fire protection should consist of a wet pipe sprinkler system. Dry
systems are acceptable where it is impractical to provide building heat and there is
a possibility of freezing water in the sprinkler system. (Refer to NFPA 231D,
Section A 4-3.3.)

3830 Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids

3831 General
Liquid warehouses are separate, detached or attached buildings used for liquids
storage only. All storage of flammable and combustible liquids should be in accor-
dance with NFPA 30, which incorporates new requirements for protected storage
installed after January 1, 1997. Flammable and combustible liquids are subdivided
as shown in Figure 3800-2.

Fig. 3800-2 Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids

Flammable Liquids
Class Flash Point Boiling Points
Class IA < 73°F < 100°F (37.8°C)
Class IB < 73°F (22.8°C) ≥ 100°F
Class IC ≥ 73° and < 100°F
Combustible Liquids
Class Flash Point
Class II ≥ 100°F < 140°F (60°C)
Class IIIA ≥ 140°F < 200°F (93°C)
Class IIIB ≥ 200°F

Storage Area Design

• Flammable and combustible liquids should be stored in a segregated area of
general purpose warehouses (i.e., inside rooms or cutoff rooms), or in separate
liquid warehouses.
• Inside and cutoff storage rooms in general purpose warehouses and liquid
storage warehouses should be constructed according to NFPA 30.
• All floors and areas where floors meet walls should be liquid tight.
• All door openings should be listed 1-1/2-hour Class B fire doors for interior
walls of 2-hour ratings.
• Raised sills of at least 4 inches (10 centimeters) should be provided at all door
openings to prevent liquid flow to other areas.

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• An open-grated trench that drains to the process sewer can replace the sill.
• A separate gravity or continuous mechanical ventilation system should be
provided in accordance with NFPA 30.
• Fire walls that separate dispensing and filling operations from other occupan-
cies should be 4-hour-rated with openings protected by Class A fire doors.
Exterior walls less than 10 feet (3 meters) from an exposure should be 4-hour
fire walls with Class A fire doors. Exterior walls 10 to 50 feet (3 to 15 meters)
from an outside exposure should be 2-hour-rated walls with Class D fire doors,
per NFPA 30.
• Drainage should be designed to remove any spilled or burning liquid to a safe
location in accordance with environmental considerations. Drainage must be
sized to include the total sprinkler discharge plus 500 gpm (1900 liters/minute)
from hose streams.
• Class I storage is not allowed in basement areas. Basement storage of Class II
and III liquids is strongly discouraged. However, if basement areas must be
used, automatic sprinkler protection is required.

3832 Fire Protection

All indoor storage of liquids with flash points below 200°F (93°C) should be
protected as specified in NFPA 30. The sprinkler systems design should be based
on 0.16 gpm/square foot.
Two hydrants should be within 200 feet (61 meters) for fire fighting use for all flam-
mable liquids storage.

3833 Electrical Area Classification

General purpose warehouses are normally not classified. Indoor warehousing and
outdoor storage of liquids in containers, where there is no flammable liquid transfer
should also be designated as unclassified. However, dispensing or filling of flam-
mable materials should be done in a separate classified room as noted below.
Also, in special cases, buildings or rooms for storing volatile and flammable mate-
rial should be classified. These areas would include those storing gases in cylinders,
such as acetylene, hydrogen, naphtha, etc. (References: API 500; NFPA 30; NFPA
58 and NFPA 59.)

Container-filling Areas
In areas where there is liquid transfer and adequate ventilation, NFPA 30, Chapter 5
requires that the location be Class I, Division 1 within 3 feet of fill or vent openings
and Division 2 between 3 and 5 feet of fill or vent openings. The area 18" above
grade within 10 feet horizontally of fill or vent openings is also classified Division
2. See Figure 3800-3 for guidance.

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Fire Protection Manual 3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

Fig. 3800-3 Drum and Container Filling Outdoors or Indoors with Adequate Ventilation

Dispensing Locations
Dispensing locations should be classified for the selection of electrical equipment
to be installed there. However, it is typical for fork lifts to drive into these areas.
This is safe because, at the low dispensing rates, vapor released at the dispensing
point will travel only a short distance before being diluted and dispersed by the air
to a point below the lower flammable limit (LFL). As discussed above, electrical
area classification is used only for a basis to select electrical equipment. It is unre-
lated to motor vehicle access, though it is often used as a consideration.

Electrical Installations
All electrical design, materials, and protection should conform to applicable
sections of NFPA 70 and 70E. Care should be given to compliance with require-
ments for special occupancies as described in NFPA 70.

3834 Filling Operations

Dispensing of Class I and Class II flammable liquids is not permitted in a general
purpose or liquid warehouse unless a dispensing area is provided which is properly

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separated from combustibles and other liquid storage areas. These areas should
comply with NFPA 30.
Class I or II liquids shall be drawn from or transferred into vessels within a building
only from original shipping containers of 5 gallons (19 liters) or less, safety cans,
closed piping systems, or gravity systems with self-closing valves or faucets.
Transfer of liquids by pressurized air is not allowed.

3840 Ammonium Nitrate Storage

General Characteristics
Ammonium nitrate is classified as an oxidizing material. It gives off oxygen under
fire conditions and will therefore support combustion. If heated under confinement
with pressure buildup, it can detonate. The sensitivity to detonation increases at
higher temperatures.

Storage Locations and Structures

Permits (from the local authorities) are required for more than 1000 pounds (454
kilograms) of storage. Where more than 60 tons (54,468 kilograms) are to be stored
in a location, corporate and/or local fire protection and safety groups should be
advised. All storage buildings should be designed without basements (unless open
on one side or more), be no more than one story high, and have adequate ventila-
tion. All construction should be noncombustible or protected from impregnation,
and should not have open drains, traps, tunnels, etc.

Storage in Bags, Drums, or Other Containers

Storage piles should not exceed 20 feet (6 meters) in height, 20 feet (6 meters) in
width, or 50 feet (15 meters) in length. If the building is of noncombustible
construction or has automatic sprinklers, the length of piles is not limited. In all
cases, the top of storage should be greater than 3 feet (1 meter) from the roof of
supporting beams. Aisles should be at least 3 feet (1 meter) wide with at least one
main aisle of 4 feet (1.2 meters) or more.

Bulk Storage
Bulk storage includes piles or bins in warehouses in separate bin-type structures.
Storage structures should be no more than 40 feet (12 meters) high (unless adequate
fire protection is available) and free of contaminants. All storage bins or compart-
ments should be labeled AMMONIUM NITRATE.

Precautions and Protection

Good housekeeping should be maintained, all sections of NFPA 70 should be
followed, and open flames and smoking should be prohibited in storage areas. All
fork trucks should conform to NFPA 505 and no vehicles should be allowed to
remain unattended in storage areas.
Quantities of greater than 2500 tons (2,270,000 kilograms) should be protected by
automatic sprinklers. All systems should be designed with a density of 0.25

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Fire Protection Manual 3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

gpm/square foot (10L/min/square meter) and installed in accordance with NFPA

11. Small hoses and extinguishers should be provided throughout warehouse areas
and in loading and unloading areas.
The bagging operations should be located in a separate area.

3850 Aerosol Storage

Aerosol storage areas should be designed per NFPA 30B.

General Characteristics and Types

The type of propellant is generally not a factor in determining the degree of hazard
of aerosol storage. The main consideration is the product being dispensed. The
product falls into one of three general categories:
• hydrocarbon-based materials
• alcohol-based materials
• noncombustible materials
The major hazard with aerosols is that, when subject to rapid overheating during a
fire, they tend to rupture. This creates three major problems:
• They will rocket around the warehouse, causing severe problems for fire
fighters.
• If the contents are flammable, a fire ball may result.
• Some of the contents may pass through the fire, igniting surfaces beyond the
initial fire area.

Storage Arrangements
Flammable or combustible aerosols (flammability of product, not propellant)
should be stored in warehouses in a separate room with 4-hour-rated fire walls and
double automatic Class A fire doors at all openings. Palletized or bulk storage, as
well as in-rack storage, should not exceed 5 feet (1.5 meters) in height.

Filling Operations
All aerosol containers should be filled and pressurized in a room separate from the
remainder of the building and located at an exterior wall. When flammable or
combustible products are to be filled, two separate rooms should be provided: one
for product filling and one for propellant pressurization.
The walls enclosing this area and exposed to the building exterior should have a fire
resistance rating of 2 hours. Personnel access to the aerosol and product filling
rooms should be from the exterior of the building only. The fire wall separating the
product and aerosol filling operations should also have a 2-hour rating.
The propellant tank should be located outdoors parallel to, and at least 25 feet (7.6
meters) from the building wall, so that the ends of the tank do not face any struc-
ture. A hydrant or monitor should be located within 100 feet (30 meters) of the tank

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3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage Fire Protection Manual

to provide exposure protection. The aerosol and product filling rooms should be
provided with a wet pipe sprinkler system capable of providing a density of 0.30
gpm/square feet over the entire area. Conveyor openings of the aerosol can line
should be protected by a sprinkler head, even in buildings without sprinklers, and
with heat collectors, on both sides of all openings. An outside screw and yoke valve
should be provided to facilitate isolation of this system in the event repair of the
system is necessary.
Electrical systems in the room should be Class I, Group D, Division 1. Forced venti-
lation, with floor level pickup, should be installed, capable of providing six air
changes per hour. The ventilation system should be separate from the building
system and should exhaust to a safe point outside the building. A single switch
should control both the room lighting and the ventilation system.

3860 Outdoor Storage

Many materials are stored outside because of their bulk. It may also be preferable to
store some materials outside if there is no inside fire protection available and the
materials are not subject to damage from weather conditions.

3861 Yard Maintenance and Fire Protection

• All outside storage areas should be kept free of grass, weeds and other combus-
tibles. Remove cuttings from the area.
• Sufficient lighting should be provided and all electrical equipment should
conform to NFPA 70.
• Smoking should be permitted in authorized smoking areas only.
• Travel distance from any point in the yard to an extinguisher should not exceed
75 feet (23 meters).
• Hydrants should be provided so that all storage areas can be reached by at least
two hose streams. A minimum spacing of 250 feet (76 meters) between
hydrants should be provided.
• Storage piles should be as low and as stable as possible, with a 10-foot (3-
meter) minimum width. Aisles should be provided between storage piles, piles
and buildings, and piles and boundary lines.

3862 Outdoor Lumber Storage

Piles of lumber should not exceed 250,000 board feet. Aisles should be at least 20
feet (6 meters) between individual piles. Storage should not be located under
conveyors or any other combustible equipment. At least two hydrants should be
provided, and no part of the storage should be over 200 feet (61 meters) from a
hydrant.

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Fire Protection Manual 3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

Lumber piles should be located a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from masonry
walls with protected openings, 100 feet (30 meters) from protected combustible or
metal-clad walls, and 150 feet (46 meters) from unprotected combustible and unpro-
tected metal-clad walls. Protected walls have sprinklers, fire-resistive sheathing, or
other protection.

3863 Coal and Coke Storage

Bituminous coal and green coke are subject to spontaneous heating and are very
difficult to extinguish. Calcined coke is not a fire hazard. The general safeguards
already given in this section should be followed, along with the following:
• Prevent the movement of air through the pile. This can be aided by compacting
the coal.
• Monitor the internal temperature weekly. If temperatures reach 160°F (71°C),
the hot area should be exposed by dispersing the pile.
• Do not expose the pile to heat sources and keep it away from other
combustibles.
• Coal bins (and other structures) should be of noncombustible construction.

3864 Outdoor Drum Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids

Full Drum Storage
The general safeguards mentioned in Section 3861 should be followed. Specific
storage amounts, aisles, and heights shall comply with requirements of NFPA 30.
All storage areas should be graded to divert spills from buildings or other expo-
sures. Drainage should be to a safe location. Storage should be 50 feet (15 meters)
from other structures or 5 feet (1.5 meters) from adjacent pile/rack storage. The
quantity of storage may be doubled if an automatic water spray system is provided.
Storage of drums according to class is recommended.

Empty Drum Storage

Empty drums used for storage of flammable or combustible liquids present a poten-
tial fire hazard due to vapors which still may be present in the drums. Only sealed
drums should be stored. This will prevent the release of any flammable vapors. If
sealing is impossible, all drums should be completely emptied of all excess liquids.
All empty drum storage piles should be a minimum of 50 feet (15 meters) from
buildings or other exposures. Aisles and fire protection should be provided as
described above.

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3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage Fire Protection Manual

3870 Powered Industrial Trucks

3871 Classifications and Occupancies

No trucks should be allowed in warehouse areas containing the following flam-
mable materials. In other flammable liquid storage areas, trucks must conform to
the electrical classification of the warehouse area.
• Acetaldehyde
• Acrolein (inhibited)
• Acetylene
• Allyl alcohol
• Butadiene
• n-butyraldehyde
• Carbon monoxide
• Crotonaldehyde
• Diethyl ether
• Diethylamine
• Ethylene oxide
• Ethyleneamine
• Epichlorohydrin
• Hydrogen
• Hydrogen sulfide
• Manufactured gases containing more than 30% hydrogen (by volume)
• Morpholine
• Propylene oxide
• Tetrahydrofuran
• Unsymmetrical dimethyl hydra-ethylenezine (UDMH 1,1-dimethyl hydrazine)

3872 Maintenance
Powered industrial trucks should be repaired in designated areas. All trucks should
be cleaned regularly. Only cleaning agents with flash points over 125°F (52°C)
shall be used. Only glycol-based antifreeze should be used. Truck nameplates
should be clearly visible.

Fueling and Recharging

All fuels should be stored and handled safely. Separate areas, free of combustibles,
should be designated for fueling and recharging. Engines should be off when they
are being refueled and recharged.

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Fire Protection Manual 3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

3873 Driver Training

Extensive damage has been caused in warehouse facilities by industrial truck opera-
tors. Most of these accidents are caused by driver error. All operators should be
provided with a comprehensive driver training course. Safety driving rules should
be posed in warehouses. The corporate and/or strategy center safety groups should
be consulted for driver training courses.

3880 Special Hazards

3881 Cutting and Welding

General
Cutting and welding are two of the major causes of industrial fires. Refer to the
Welding Manual. Management should develop a written procedure for cutting and
welding operations. The procedures should:
• Designate individual(s) responsible for authorizing cutting and welding opera-
tions.
• Establish designated areas and procedures for approving cutting and welding.
• Specify approved cutting and welding equipment.
• Require training in safe operations for all welders (both inhouse and outside
contractors).
• Provide a written cutting and welding “hot work” permit that must be signed
before work begins and after work is completed.

Fire Protection and Prevention

All cutting and welding should be done in areas that have been made fire safe by
removal or protection of all combustibles. For instance, no combustibles without
flame-resistant covers should be located within a 35-foot (10.7-m) radius of the
work area. All openings or cracks in walls and floors should be covered. Charged
fire extinguishers and non-combustible fire blankets should be available at the work
site. A fire watcher should be designated in areas where the potential for a serious
fire exists.

3882 Smoking
Smoking in warehouses should be controlled by providing designated smoking
areas. These areas should have approved receptacles for cigarette butts and be free
of combustibles.

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3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage Fire Protection Manual

3883 Cylinder Storage

General Recommendations
Cylinders should be stored in accordance with all state and local regulations, and
storage areas should be prominently posted with the names of the gases to be stored
there.
Where gases of different types are stored at the same location, cylinders should be
grouped by type of gas, and the groups arranged to take into account the gases
contained. For example, oxidizers should be stored separately. Full and empty cylin-
ders should be stored separately with the storage layout planned so that cylinders
comprising old stock can be removed first with minimum handling of other cylin-
ders.
Storage rooms should be well ventilated and dry and should be of fire-resistive
construction. Storage room temperature should not exceed 130°F (54°C). Basement
storage should be avoided.
Fuel gas cylinder storage inside buildings that have other occupancy should be
limited to a total gas capacity of 2500 cubic feet (71 cubic meters) of acetylene or
nonliquefied flammable gas or a total water capacity of 735 pounds (333 kilo-
grams) for LPG or methyl-acetylene-propadiene, stabilized, in any one area. If
there are two or more storage areas within a building, they should be separated by
at least 100 feet (30 meters).
When areas are protected by sprinklers designed with an application rate of 0.25
gpm/sq ft, the gas storage capacity may be increased to 5000 cubic feet (142 cubic
meters).
Cylinders should not be stored within 20 feet (6 meters) of readily ignitable
substances such as gasoline or combustible waste, or near combustibles in bulk,
including oil.
A 30-pound dry-chemical fire extinguisher should be provided for protection of
compressed gas cylinders and be located within 50 feet (15 meters) of cylinder
storage.
Cylinders should not be exposed to continuous dampness and should not be stored
near salt or other corrosive chemicals or fumes. Corrosion may damage the
containers and may cause the valve protection caps to stick.
Cylinders should be protected from any object that will produce a harmful cut or
other abrasion in the surface of the metal. Cylinders should not be stored near eleva-
tors, gangways, unprotected platform edges, or in locations where heavy moving
objects may strike or fall on them.
The user should store cylinders standing upright. Cylinders containing flammable,
toxic gases, and all cylinders fitted with regulators should be chained upright or
stored in a dedicated rack. Other cylinders should be stored where they are not
likely to be knocked over, or should be secured in an upright position.

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Fire Protection Manual 3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage

Cylinders may be stored in the open but should be protected from the ground
beneath to prevent bottom corrosion. Cylinders may be stored in the sun except in
localities where extreme temperatures prevail. If the supplier recommends storage
in the shade for a particular gas, such recommendation should be observed.

Specific Recommendations
Liquefied-gas containers used in welding or cutting should be stored and used
valve-end-up (less than 45 degrees from vertical). Acetylene cylinders should be
stored and used valve-end-up. Storage of acetylene cylinders valve-end-up will
minimize possibility of solvent being discharged.
Oxidizing gases, especially oxygen, must be stored at least 25 feet from combus-
tible gases and liquids, and other easily oxidizable materials. An impermeable wall
five feet high may also be used as separation.
Combustible gases such as acetylene, hydrogen, petroleum gases, etc., require safe
storage, with 25 feet of space from oxidizing materials and ignition sources or a 5-
foot high impermeable wall as separation. See NFPA 50; NFPA 50A; NFPA 50B,
NFPA 51; NFPA 51A.
Hazardous chemicals, i.e., chlorine, ammonia, acids, etc., must be stored at appro-
priate locations. See NFPA 43C, Storage of Gaseous Oxidizing Materials; NFPA
43A, Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizing Materials; NFPA 43B, Storage of
Organic Peroxide Formulations; NFPA 43D, Storage of Pesticides in Portable
Containers.

3890 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations in Petroleum
Facilities

Chevron References
Welding Manual

Compressed Gas Association

Safe Handling of Compressed Gases in Containers

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 11 Low Expansion Foam and Combined Agent Systems
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquid Code
NFPA 30B Manufacture and Storage of Aerosol Products
NFPA 43A Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizing Materials
NFPA 43B Storage of Organic Peroxide Formulations
NFPA 43C Storage of Gaseous Oxidizing Materials

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3800 Warehouses and Outside Storage Fire Protection Manual

NFPA 43D Storage of Pesticides in Portable Containers

NFPA 50 Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites
NFPA 50A Gaseous Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites
NFPA 50B Liquified Hydrogen Systems at Consumer Sites
NFPA 51 Design and Installation of Oxygen-fuel Gas Systems for Welding,
Cutting and Allied Processes
NFPA 51A Acetylene Cylinder Charging Plants
NFPA 51B Cutting and Welding Processes
NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of Liquified Petroleum Gases
NFPA 59 Storage and Handling of Liquified Petroleum Gases at Utility Gas
Plants
NFPA 70 National Electric Code
NFPA 70E Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces
NFPA 80 Fire Doors and Windows
NFPA 101 Safety to Life from Fire in Buildings and Structures
NFPA 204 Smoke and Heat Venting Guide
NFPA 220 Types of Building Construction
NFPA 231 General Storage
NFPA 231A Outdoor Storage
NFPA 231C Rack Storage of Materials
NFPA 231D Storage of Rubber Tires
NFPA 490 Ammonium Nitrate
NFPA 505 Industrial Powered Trucks
NFPA 703 Fire Retardant Impregnated Wood and Fire Retardant Coatings for
Building Materials

Uniform Building Code

January 1997 3800-20 Chevron Corporation

3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants

Abstract
This guide presents design considerations and recommends fire protection for labo-
ratories handling hydrocarbons and chemicals, laboratories handling radioactive
materials, and pilot plants. Laboratories handling radioactive materials capable of
nuclear chain reaction are not discussed.

Contents Page

3910 Definitions 3900-2

3920 Laboratories Handling Chemicals 3900-3
3921 General Guidelines
3922 Design Considerations
3923 Area Classification
3930 Laboratories Handling Radioactive Materials 3900-5
3931 General Guidelines
3932 Design Considerations
3933 Protection Against Fire and Explosion
3940 Pilot Plants 3900-6
3941 General Guidelines
3942 Outdoor Facilities
3943 Indoor Facilities
3950 Fire Protection: Organization and Emergency Plan 3900-7
3960 Testing and Maintenance 3900-7
3970 References 3900-7

Chevron Corporation 3900-1 June 1990

3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants Fire Protection Manual

3910 Definitions
Hazardous material: chemicals, substances and their combinations which can
harm personnel or property upon impairment of a controlled environment. This
section uses the material classification system defined in NFPA 45 and NFPA 49 in
which values of 1, 2, 3, or 4 are assigned for health (H), fire (F), and reactivity (R).
For our purposes a material should be classified as hazardous if H, F, or R is 3 or 4.
Hazardous work: the handling of hazardous materials or involvement with high
pressure reactions. High pressure reactions are those in the area above the curve
shown in Figure 3900-1.

Fig. 3900-1 High Pressure Hazardous Reaction Limits

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Fire Protection Manual 3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants

Laboratory unit: the enclosed space containing a laboratory or contiguous sepa-

rate laboratories plus the immediate service and office areas used by the unit
personnel.
Bench scale: a laboratory test system consisting of laboratory glassware or metal
containers; glass, metal or plastic tubing, portable supports; extension cords; etc.
Normally, only a few gallons of material are handled, usually in batch mode.
Pilot plant (demonstration unit): a test system using metallic components that
require permanent supports, utility connections, and storage facilities for raw mate-
rial and finished product. When the volume of material handled exceeds the criteria
of NFPA 45, the unit is considered a pilot plant.
Radioactive sealed source: a source that is tightly encapsulated and is not to be
opened. The encapsulation is resistant to fire, explosion, physical damage, etc.
Radioactive unsealed source: a source that is not encapsulated or is intended to be
opened.
Safety can: an approved 5-gallon (19-1iter) or smaller container with spring-loaded
closures capable of safely relieving internal pressure when subjected to fire expo-
sure.

3920 Laboratories Handling Chemicals

3921 General Guidelines

Property damage and personnel injury in laboratory and pilot plant operations have
been minimal. In general, this good experience is owed to the following:
• Small volumes and weights of materials
• Basic procedures developed and carried out by highly qualified and well
trained personnel
• Improvements in laboratory equipment that have increased efficiency and incor-
porate better safety features
• Improved construction techniques, standards and layouts
The following factors, which are covered in detail in NFPA 45 and OSHA 29 CFR
Part 1910, should be considered when developing laboratory guidelines, specifica-
tions, and design:
• Laboratory enclosure and positions relative to adjacent facilities
• Maximum area consistent with hazard classification (see Section 3923)
• Means of egress and prevention of unauthorized access to laboratory area
• Electrical system design
• Fire protection and extinguishing systems

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3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants Fire Protection Manual

• Fire detection and alarm systems

• Explosion hazards and protection
• Ventilation requirements for health and safety
• Storage, handling, and disposal facilities for liquid and gaseous raw materials
and products
• Preparation, content, and dissemination of operating, maintenance, and emer-
gency procedures
• Identification of hazardous material and areas

3922 Design Considerations

In general, laboratories should be designed in accordance with NFPA 45. The
following exceptions to NFPA 45 apply:
• Only noncombustible construction should be used for laboratory units.
• HVAC system design should consider exhaust hood requirements when posi-
tive pressurization of the laboratory is specified.
• In some facilities, a standpipe (a vertical riser supplying fire water to building
fire hoses) is provided. For standpipes, 1-1/2-inch hose with combination spray-
straight stream nozzle should be used instead of 2-1/2-inch hose.
• Areas that do not have sprinklers or equivalent systems should have smoke
detectors and an alarm system in accordance with Section 600.
• Combustible gas detectors should be provided when a potential flammable
vapor or combustible gas explosion hazard exists.
• Production or quality control laboratories that are essential to the operation of
the facility should be provided with an automatic sprinkler system that is
designed for an application rate of 0.25 gpm/sq ft.

3923 Area Classification

Most laboratories handle only small quantities of volatile flammable liquids, and
may contain other ignition sources, such as Bunsen burners. These laboratories are
normally unclassified. If the laboratory expects to handle samples that may release
larger quantities of flammable vapor, a ventilation hood should be provided. The
area within the hood, the duct and an area around the vent outlet should be classi-
fied, normally Division 2. See the Safety in Designs Manual, for recommended
classification guidelines.
At some laboratories, however, significant amounts of flammable gas or vapor may
be released into the room. These laboratories, or portions of them, should be classi-
fied as Division 2, with the possibility of small areas of Division 1. The amount of
mechanical ventilation provided will be an important factor in classifying such labo-

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Fire Protection Manual 3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants

ratories. Engineering judgment must be used. Locations such as fume hoods, bottle
washing rooms, and sample storage rooms, all of which may contain substantial
concentrations of flammable vapor, should be classified areas in all laboratories.
In-plant laboratories are normally unclassified since they handle only small quanti-
ties of flammable liquids and gases. Most laboratory test equipment is not suitable
for use in a classified area. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to classify an area
where this equipment is to be used, and experience has shown the equipment to be
safe when properly used.
Refer to NFPA 45 for more information on electrical classification and vent hood
design in laboratories.

3930 Laboratories Handling Radioactive Materials

3931 General Guidelines

For the following reasons, radioactive material in a laboratory unit increases the
problems of fighting a fire, rescuing trapped personnel, and reducing loss:
• The possibility of serious radiation exposure during the emergency period
• The generation of radioactive vapor or dust during a fire or explosion, allowing
the contamination to spread more easily
• The fire fighting technique used (such as a sprinkler system) may increase the
spread of contaminated material
• The necessity for complete decontamination of the area before reconstruction
can start
• The possibility that a structure cannot be sufficiently decontaminated and must
be completely removed or abandoned
The supervisor responsible for each laboratory unit should keep the emergency
brigade or fire department advised of the location and general nature of all radioac-
tive materials within the laboratory unit. The safety group or its designee at the
laboratory unit location should ensure that those in charge of fire fighting under-
stand the hazards and options for dealing with them.
The laboratory supervisors, safety group, and an HE&LP representative should
jointly develop an emergency plan for each laboratory unit. This plan should be
subject to an automatic periodic review as well as modification at any time, espe-
cially when there is a significant change in the radioactive content of the laboratory.
Periodic hypothetical situation drills should be conducted by the emergency team.

3932 Design Considerations

Criteria from Section 3920, Laboratories Handling Chemicals, should apply unless
specifically superseded by NFPA 801.

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3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants Fire Protection Manual

3933 Protection Against Fire and Explosion

NFPA 801 outlines specific recommendations concerning the design and protection
of glove boxes and hot cells. These recommendations should be followed in all
laboratory units handling radioactive materials.

3940 Pilot Plants

3941 General Guidelines

Pilot plants are normally used to gather the data required to scale-up the results of
bench scale tests or determine the effects of changes in existing processes. Conse-
quently, they handle larger quantities of materials than laboratories and therefore
should be considered a small operating plant.
In general, pilot plants should be spaced as stated in Section 1300. However, since
the elements and sizes can vary greatly within pilot plants, consult the Fire Protec-
tion Staff for spacing recommendations.
The basic design of any new unit of this type or basic modification to an existing
unit should also be reviewed by the Fire Protection Staff and the Safety Group.
All buildings and structures shall be of noncombustible construction.

3942 Outdoor Facilities

Pilot plant facilities may be housed in structures considered outside facilities. These
structures may have solid deck roofs and curtain walls. The curtain wall should
extend no lower than 1/3 the vertical distance between decks.
For outside facilities the following special considerations may apply:
• In extra-hazardous facilities (see Section 3400), the use of area water spray or
foam sprinkler systems may replace fireproofing.
• In ordinary hazard facilities (see Section 3400), fireproofing is not required.
Sprinklers, area water spray, or foam sprinklers should be installed in critical
locations.

3943 Indoor Facilities

For indoor pilot plants, the following should be provided:
• Ventilation, air exhaust, and air makeup systems designed for a minimum of
six air changes per hour.
• Explosion relief devices for exterior walls, to decrease the probability of
damage from overpressure in an explosion. These walls and explosion vents
should be designed in accordance with NFPA 68.

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Fire Protection Manual 3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants

• A minimum of two 30-lb. Purple K dry chemical extinguishers for indoor pilot
plants, with additional extinguishers so that the maximum travel distance
between any point to be protected and the extinguishers is 50 feet (15 meters).
Where a larger-than-normal fuel load is stored in the piping, vessels and stored
containers, larger fire fighting equipment such as 150-pound Purple K dry
chemical wheeled extinguishers and a 1-1/2-inch quick-action hose reel may
be appropriate. The hose length should be 75 feet (23 meters) and the nozzle
should be a combination spray-straight stream type.
• Egress should meet the requirements of NFPA 101.
• Such activities should be in a minimum-sized area with at least one exterior
wall. Separation walls between pilot plants and all other areas of lesser hazard
should be two-hour rated.

3950 Fire Protection: Organization and Emergency Plan

Laboratories and pilot plants should have an emergency response organization.
Each laboratory unit should have a written emergency and fire prevention plan in
addition to the overall emergency plan for the location. See Section 400 and Loss
Prevention Guide No. 16 for more information on developing these plans.

3960 Testing and Maintenance

Testing and maintenance of fire protection equipment should be conducted in accor-
dance with sound and established testing procedures.

3970 References
Chevron References
HE&LP Loss Prevention Guides

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 14 Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 43A Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizing Materials
NFPA 45 Standards on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals
NFPA 49 Hazardous Chemicals Data
NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases
NFPA 68 Explosion Venting
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 77 Static Electricity

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3900 Laboratories and Pilot Plants Fire Protection Manual

NFPA 91 Installation of Blower and Exhaust Systems for Dust, Stock and
Vapor Removal or Conveying
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code
NFPA 801 Recommended Fire Protection Practice for Facilities Handling
Radioactive Materials

Other References
OSHA 29 CFR Occupational Exposures to Hazardous Chemicals in Laboratories

June 1990 3900-8 Chevron Corporation

4000 Aviation Facilities

Section 4000 of the Fire Protection Manual has been discontinued due to a
reduction in the use of Company operated aviation facilities. Refer to NFPA 409 -
Aircraft Hangars for industry guidelines on the construction and operation of
hangars. See Section 3300 of this manual for fire protection of heliports. Contact
the CRTC Fire & Process Safety team for additional guidance.

Chevron Corporation 4000-1 December 1994

4100 Mining and Dust Handling

Abstract
This section gives a brief overview of the fire protection considerations required
when designing and maintaining mining and bulk handling facilities. For additional
information not covered in this section, contact your local Safety, Fire, and Health
Specialist or the Fire Protection Staff.

Contents Page

4110 History of Explosions and Fires 4100-2

4120 Dust Characteristics 4100-2
4130 Design Considerations to Prevent Dust Explosions 4100-3
4131 Area Classification
4132 Methods for Controlling Dust Explosions
4140 Mobile Equipment 4100-5
4150 Other Design Considerations 4100-6
4151 Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids
4152 Warehouse Design
4153 Maintenance Garages
4154 Equipment Parking Areas
4155 Static Electricity
4160 Emergency Response 4100-7
4170 References 4100-8

Chevron Corporation 4100-1 June 1990

4100 Mining and Dust Handling Fire Protection Manual

4110 History of Explosions and Fires

Mining and dust handling operations have caused major fires in our company. In
1987 mining fires resulted in damage/loss estimated at $750,000 at Chevron. In
1988 a $10,000 loss occurred when fire caused major damage to a ground corn cob
storage silo. A large percentage of these mine and bulk handling fires were caused
by dust handling equipment or large mobile equipment. Most of these fires could
have resulted in smaller losses or could have been avoided altogether if proper fire
protection considerations were incorporated into the design, operation, and mainte-
nance of these facilities.

4120 Dust Characteristics

Like hydrocarbon vapors, dusts have a flammable range and a minimum ignition
temperature. Typically for coal and chemical dust (e.g., polyethylene, PVC, etc.)
the ignition energy is much higher than flammable vapors. That is, it takes a larger
energy source to ignite dust. Ignition energy for hydrocarbons range from 0.00002
to 0.001 joule while coal and chemical dusts range from approximately 0.015 to
0.100 joule. Listed in Figure 4100-1 are ignition properties of various dusts.

Fig. 4100-1 Ignition Properties of Various Dusts(1)

Minimum Cloud Minimum Minimum Cloud
Ignition Explosive Ignition
Temperature, Concentration, Energy,
Material °F oz/ft3 joule
Coal, 1130 0.050 0.030
Kentucky-Bituminous 356 (layer)
Coal 1130 0.055 0.060
Pittsburg 338 (layer)
Polyethylene 788 0.020 0.30 - 0.060
(2)
Styrene 824 0.045 0.050
680 (layer)
Sulfur 374 0.035 0.015
428 (layer)
(1) For a complete list of properties see the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Handbook.
(2) Modified polyester-glass fiber texture (65/35 blend)

As dust particle size gets smaller, explosive pressures in an ignited dust cloud
increase and minimum explosive concentrations decrease. The minimum explosive
concentration of dust also decreases when hydrocarbon vapors are present. When
the particle size is above approximately 400 micrometers even a high ignition
energy cannot ignite a dust cloud. However, controlling the particle size is not an
effective explosion control method, because mixing only a small amount of fine
dust (5% to 10%) within material that is over 400 micrometers can make an explo-
sive mixture.

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In general, a dust layer of approximately 1/32 inch is sufficient to warrant imme-

diate cleanup efforts. The dust layer can create a hazardous condition if it exceeds
5% of the total floor area of a building. Caution: do not use air hoses to blow dust
accumulations. This practice creates a potentially explosive dust cloud. NFPA 654,
“Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions in the Chemical, Dye,
Pharmaceutical, and Plastic Industries,” gives guidelines on dangerous dust layers.
Typically a dust explosion sequence starts with a small initial explosion followed
by a larger explosion. The first explosion may be caused by the ignition of a small
dust release from dust handling equipment. The second explosion, which is gener-
ally more violent, is caused by a larger combustible dust cloud formed by dust
shaken loose from the first explosion. This may be the case in an underground mine
explosion where the initial explosion may be due to methane, which then creates a
coal dust cloud that ignites. This is why housekeeping is extremely important in
and around mines and dust handling facilities.
There can be many ignition sources in a coal mine and dust handling facilities.
These can include hot exhausts on mobile equipment, improper hot work proce-
dures, friction from dust handling equipment and static electricity. It is extremely
important to keep potential dust clouds from these ignition sources.
In addition, hot work permits should be obtained for all jobs that require that an
ignition source be brought into a dust handling or dusty area. A few examples of
ignition sources are welding and/or cutting operations, use of extension cords not
approved for the area, and operating motor vehicles in electrically classified areas
(see Section 400 for further information on hot work permits).

4130 Design Considerations to Prevent Dust Explosions

The following sections will explore different aspects of design that will help reduce
the chance of a fire or explosion in facilities that have dust in the operation.

4131 Area Classification

The objective of electrical area classification is to ensure that the correct electrical
equipment is installed so that it will not be an ignition source in an environment
that may contain dust. It's up to the Design Engineer in consultation with Opera-
tions and Maintenance to develop an area classification drawing that covers the
entire facility. The Fire Protection Staff is available to help with determining area
classification.
Dust handling areas are Class II Division 1 or 2 locations. The division chosen will
depend on whether or not dust is in the area under normal operation (see
Section 1500 for a discussion on divisions). Each dust can be categorized into one
of two main groups. The two groups of dusts are 1) Group E, metal dusts or
combustible dusts having a resistance less than 105 ohm-centimeters; and 2) Group
G, atmospheres containing combustible dust with a resistance greater than 105 ohm-
centimeters. Therefore, the more complete electrical classification description
would be Class, Division, and Group.

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The National Electrical Code (Article 502) gives guidelines for the types of elec-
trical equipment allowed in Class II locations. The electrical equipment should be
correctly selected, installed, and maintained to eliminate potential ignition sources.
The CRTC Mechanical and Electrical group is also available for assistance in this
area.

4132 Methods for Controlling Dust Explosions

Equipment containing dust includes storage silos, bulk filters, conveyer systems, or
any other equipment that may contain dust during normal or abnormal operation.
Four basic ways to prevent or control potential explosions in equipment containing
dust are: 1) inerting the equipment, 2) using suppression systems, 3) venting an
explosion and 4) building the equipment to contain an explosion. This section will
briefly describe these techniques.

Inerting
An inerting system is designed to prevent explosion. It dilutes the dust atmosphere
with a gas (e.g., nitrogen, or CO2) so that the atmosphere inside the equipment
containing dust lacks enough oxygen to support combustion. For most dust atmo-
spheres, the oxygen content of the equipment should be maintained below 10% to
preclude a combustible atmosphere. The inert gas chosen must be one that will not
react with the dust. For example, certain metallic dusts react with CO2 and
nitrogen. Helium and argon are suitable diluents in such instances. NFPA 69,
“Explosion Prevention Systems,” Appendix A, gives guidelines for calculating inert
gas requirements.
Static electricity may be a concern when using CO2 as an inerting agent. The
precautions outlined in API RP 2003, “Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of
Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents,” Section 2.17, should be followed. (API RP
2003 is included in this manual.)
The instrumentation to measure the concentration or flow of inert gas or natural gas
into the equipment should be tested at least once a quarter. Extreme care should be
taken not to allow personnel into inert atmospheres unless they have breathing appa-
ratus appropriate for the environment.

Explosion Suppression
An explosion suppression system is most commonly activated by a sudden pressure
rise in a contained area. This sudden pressure rise is caused by the early stages of
an explosion. The suppression system is designed to stop this pressure buildup
before it reaches pressures that will damage the equipment. Typically, Halon gas is
used as a releasing agent to suppress the explosion. The pressure sensing devices on
this type of system can activate and release the Halon in milliseconds and extin-
guish the explosion before it can build up destructive pressures.
These systems can and have been installed on storage equipment, conveyor
systems, and processing equipment. One company that makes explosion suppres-
sion systems is Fenwal Incorporated. For additional information on suppression
systems see NFPA 69.

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Venting Explosions
The basic concept behind this technique is to install a device that will vent the pres-
sure buildup in the equipment before the equipment catastrophically fails. Venting
is one of the better methods for limiting explosion damage because this simple
passive system does not rely on instruments or mechanical devices. Examples of
this are a vent or frangible joint on a storage silo and an emergency rupture disk on
dust handling equipment. Both devices are designed to relieve pressure before the
equipment fails. It is important to note that the outlet from these vents should vent
to a safe location away from other equipment and personnel. For guidelines on
designing venting systems refer to NFPA 68, “Venting of Deflagrations.”

Equipment Design
The dust handling equipment can be designed with sufficient strength (e.g.,
increased thickness, different grades of materials, etc.) to withstand an internal
explosion. This is probably the most costly alternative to prevent explosion damage.
NFPA 69, Chapter 5, gives details on design pressure calculations.

4140 Mobile Equipment

Mobile equipment fires account for a large portion of fires in mines and bulk
handling facilities. A majority of these fires result from high pressure hydraulic
systems leaking on diesel powered equipment, which sprays hydraulic fluid onto an
ignition source, such as a hot exhaust manifold. Another cause of fire on mobile
equipment is faults in electrical systems. These faults occur on draglines and large
shovels. Listed below are a few precautions that can be taken to limit this loss.
NFPA 121, “Self-Propelled and Mobile Surface Mining Equipment,” gives addi-
tional information on mobile equipment.

Extinguishing Systems
As a minimum, each piece of mobile equipment should be equipped with at least
one portable multipurpose dry chemical extinguisher (ABC). On high-value, large
mobile equipment (over $150,000 in value) that is critical to a facilities operation, it
is advisable to install a fire suppression system. The system can be either manually
or automatically actuated by a detection system. The system should be checked
quarterly to ensure reliability. Fixed systems should be serviced every 6 months as
mentioned in NFPA 17, “Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.”

Maintenance and Inspection Programs

A good maintenance and inspection program to inspect mobile equipment on a
regular basis can help reduce the chance of fire. This inspection should include, but
not be limited to, the hydraulic system, electric system, brakes, tires, suppression
systems (if any), extinguishers mounted on the equipment, etc. Hydraulic tubing
and electrical wiring should be routed in protected areas and securely mounted to
prevent damage. Each piece of mobile equipment should have a record kept on all
maintenance performed. In addition to this regular check, it should be the responsi-
bility of each driver to inspect his equipment before operating it.

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4150 Other Design Considerations

4151 Storage of Flammable and Combustible Liquids

Storage should be limited to quantities needed for day-to-day operations. This is
especially true for underground operations where space is critical. Whenever
possible, underground storage of Class I liquids (flammable liquids) should be
avoided. Class I liquids in small containers (i.e., 5 gallons or less) should be stored
in an approved storage cabinet.

Spacing
Adequate spacing shall be provided in accordance with NFPA 123, “Underground
Bituminous Coal Mines,” and NFPA 124, “Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in
Underground Mines,” for underground locations. For aboveground locations, NFPA
30, “Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code,” and Section 1300 of this manual
shall dictate spacing requirements. In addition, the above mentioned NFPA docu-
ments give good guidance on drainage, adequate venting, and other design consider-
ations when storing flammable and combustible liquids.

4152 Warehouse Design

In many instances, bulk materials are stored in large warehouses either in bulk piles
or packages. The guidelines outlined in Section 3800 and NFPA 231, “General
Storage,” give adequate standards for storing bulk materials. Some of the design
features that must be considered are storage spacing, aisle separation, and drainage.
The fire protection equipment required in warehouses can vary depending on the
location of the facility. Local building and fire codes typically dictate whether a fire
water system or sprinklers are required in or around a warehouse. As a general rule,
sprinkler systems are justified if the warehouse and/or its contents are critical to the
operation of the facility, or if a potential fire could damage adjoining buildings or
facilities. Care must be taken when installing a sprinkler system over bulk material
that can be damaged by water. In this case, it would be up to the facility manage-
ment to determine the risk versus benefit of a sprinkler system.
First aid fire protection should be supplied by water hose reels and/or fire extin-
guishers (ABC rated). The equipment should be placed so that it is quickly acces-
sible from all parts of the warehouse. This equipment should be visible and not
blocked by any other equipment or storage.

4153 Maintenance Garages

Only the amount of flammables required for day-to-day use should be stored in
garages. All flammables should be stored in approved storage cabinets.
When performing hot work (e.g., welding, cutting, etc.) the area should be clear of
hydrocarbon vapor, fuel, and any combustibles that may be ignited by the hot work.
A fire extinguisher or a water hose should be readily available at all times. Welding

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should not be done in pit areas unless the area has been cleared with a combustible
gas indicator.
The lighting used in the pit must be approved for the electrical area classification.
In most cases this lighting should have an explosion-proof rating.

4154 Equipment Parking Areas

Adequate spacing should be left between groups of idle mobile equipment. A
maximum of about three pieces of high value equipment should be grouped in one
area. Spacing between groups of high value equipment should be at least 20 feet.
This space can help reduce the spread of fire from equipment. The area around the
parking should be kept clean of grass and bushes to help prevent the spread of fire.

4155 Static Electricity

Static electricity can exist in bulk handling equipment, especially in conveying and
process areas, because the flow of dust and particles causes separation of charges
(see Section 200 and API RP 2000 for more details on static electricity). This sepa-
ration of charge can supply an ignition source for a potential dust cloud. All
conveying hoses and processing equipment should be bonded to help prevent the
buildup of static electricity.

4160 Emergency Response

Role of Local Fire Department
A majority of the mining and bulk handling facilities rely on local fire departments
for fire fighting. The fire department should be invited to visit the facility and
become familiar with its operation. It is important to develop a prefire plan and
review it with them. This plan should include a diagram of the facility, location of
exits and entrances to mines, location of fire fighting equipment, emergency phone
numbers, and preferred evacuation routes. The fire department should have a copy
of this plan. Loss Prevention Guide No. 16 can be very helpful in developing this
plan. Also refer to Section 400.

Hypothetical Drills
Drills are an important part of a successful emergency response program. For under-
ground mines, at least biannual evacuation drills should be held. For aboveground
areas, one or two large-scale drills should be held yearly and involve a large portion
of the facility. These drills can include a fire scenario with a response from the fire
department. The drills should be documented and appropriate revisions made to the
prefire plan to reflect lessons learned. See Loss Prevention Guide No. 16 for more
information on drills.

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4170 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 2000 Static Electricity
API 2003 Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and
Stray Currents

Chevron References
HE&LP Loss Prevention Guide No. 16

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 17 Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
NFPA 68 Venting of Deflagrations
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code, Article 502
NFPA 121 Self-Propelled and Mobile Surface Mining Equipment
NFPA 123 Underground Bituminous Coal Mines
NFPA 124 Diesel Fuel and Diesel Equipment in Underground Mines
NFPA 231 General Storage
NFPA 654 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions in the
Chemical, Dye, Pharmaceutical, and Plastic Industries

[Revision Date] 4100-8 Chevron Corporation