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UNITED STATES .CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

, Spec¥l Series
Number ' _

THE SOVIET LAND-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM' ,

1945-1972

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An Historical Overview

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Withheld from.
public release
Pub. L. 86-36

DECLASSIFIED UNDER ArTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEl:..
E.O. 13526, SECTION S.;i(b)(3)
ISCAP No. z.o I 0·- (;)OS" . ,document :2.

NOT RELEA.~ABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS T8f 8i181l:i1T WHOIt\

DOCID:

Foreword
,. :.'

The Soviet missile progr.am has, throughout the ¥e~rs,' been a ,major

"~figint target. Ever more sophisticated Sig1nt c::oHection,,' proces~ing.

analytic, and, reporting systems and techniques" hav'e evO'lved to ,follow

this program, calling for the commitm~nt of vast amounts of personnel

and material resources. Comint ,had begun tp play, a strong role in- the

development of the target by the ,;arly 1~50s. aIld Telint and'Elint had

b'e~yIl. ,to play a significan't role by the late 1950s"ex~anding rap;ldly

after that time. Combined ,t'tlese Sigl'p"t sources have a~counted for the
, '

<bulk of the intelligence available tht: last decade or so ,concerning

deveJ.ppments.,
. , -
capabilities. and
' . .systems.
. .
Although the S0viets employ, a: wide variety of miss;i.lesin'their

offensive and defensive forces with manY,and varying missions, this

history is slanted ~inly' toward' the development o,f their'+and-based

, surface-to-surface ba,Ilistic missile programs. 'To attempt to include'

all aspe~ts of the over-ail Soviet missile p'rogram under one cover wO\1ld

delay publication far into the future. Rather, it is conSi,dered more,

advantageous to pu~lish particular segments as they ,are ,completed, '

......
,making them available as soon ,as possib'le.

Subjects of other missile-related ,histories could deal'with the

Soviet Union's ABM program,

,
its nayal
.. missile systems .(both offensive
, .'

and, defensive). its defensive, surface-to':"air and, air-to-a,ir missile

programs, and the like. MissileprogJ;'amsof oth~i Sig:f.,nt targets~ such

as _ _-and of other major military and civil' programs as well

(ground forces, air forces, etc.)--could also be subjects of future

o
i~ hi~tories. ,The editors invite experts in the various fields to c,onsider
 the _preparation of such _studies fo-:[: future issuance in the United States

CryptoiLogic '~Histo'l;'Y Spec{al Series'.

C~toffdate for information in this history:is the ,f;md of 1971. On­

occasion, 'later ,data are -incorpqrated 'when'avaiiable ',arid' pertinent ~ and

where classification permits. Also, expansion~"-of' classified c611a~~r~1

source notations are available in E5l, the National CryptqlogicSchool

Press. They will be made availa;bl~ upon, written request, which provides
" .,',

, ,necessary justification.,

Vincent J. Wilson, Jr.

Chier, Cryptologic History 'Program

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DOCID: 34~1III"GII.'"

Summary

Before and during World War n, the Germans had developed a variety

of missile systems. At the end of the war, they stood alone in the

numbers and complexity of these systems. Some were used during the war

with varying degrees of effectiveness; others were evolving when the war

ended. Many of these missile systems, and the scientists who' had developed

them, were acquired by the Soviets after the war, permitting the USSR to

quickly establish its ~wn miss~le program.

At first the Soviets attempted to keep the missile-related facilities

intact on German soil. using German scientists to the maximum extent

possibl~ while Soviet counterparts were gaining familiarity in a new

field. Later, the Ger.mans, and most of the missile-related' facilities,

were sent to the USSR, where work continued under Soviet control.

The V-2, a German rocket·used operationally late in the war, was

the system most extensively studied arid emulated by the Soviets. It was

the first such missile tested in the USSR, inaugurating the opening in

1947 of the Soviet Union's first missile test range at Kapustin Yar.

Reflections of its design were seen years later'in the evolving Soviet

missile program. Other missiles, and missile-related systems and·subsystems,

also fell into Soviet hands after t~e war; they too provided the Soviets

with technology and hardware that would serve ·them,we.l1 in later years.

By 1953, most of the Germans had departed the ,USSR, and subsequent

developments were by and large the result of indigenous Soviet programs-­

planned, engineered. developed, and produced by Soviet personnel. In

1957, the USSR successfully tested its first ICBM, and by the early

19608 it had available a variety of ballistic missiles, from short-range

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ones to those capable of· covering intercontinental distances. By this

time, three additional major test ranges were operational or evolving,

and the Soviets had launched earth satellites into orbit. They had also

successfully conducted planetary probes, and they had launched the first

man into space.

By the early 1970s, further significant developments had occu.rred

in the Soviet. missile effort. By this time, the Soviet Union had a

major land-based ballistic missile force in being, .capable of achieving

·ranges up to 7,000 nautical ·miles or more. Refinements in guidance and

control systems saw missile accuracy· improve steadily. Yields· of nuclear

warheads of deployed missiles varied up to 25 mega·tons. Multiple reentry

vehicles, penetration aids, and multiple independently targetable reentry

vehicles had evolved or were evolving by this time. Hardened, dispersed

silos had come into widespread use, and mobile missile systems, mainly

for tactical use, had been deployed in large numbers.

In the early 1970s, tests began of newer-generat·ion missiles,

further enhancing the Soviet Union's capabilities in this area. Incor­

porating refinements in a number of significant areas, these newer

missiles, coupled with the older ones, provide the Soviet Union with an

effective weapons mix. Thus, from the early German assistance, from

technology gleaned from Western sources, and through its own efforts, it

can be seen that the USSR progressed steadily throughout·the years in

the missile field, culminating in its advanced systems of today.

Just as the Soviets were embarking on a new and unfamiliar field in

these early years, so did the Sigint establishment find itself faced

with a new and unfamiliar. problem. Organizations had to be built from

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.nothing;: personnel had to be trained; facilities and systems had to be

~. j.
deve10p~d; and a fragmen'ted ~ffort had ,to bestreamllne,d and 'centralized.

To further complicate the problem, thefuain int~r,e~t,of' the U. S. "

Comlnt establishment after 'Wel:1dWar II' concerned 'communicatio,ns signa1~,

in partic1,llar those transmitted'1n the • • • • and bdow: Equipment,

.systems, and facilities were'not available t9 adequately handle telemetry

,~ignals from fast-movinglriissilespropagatedin 'higher frequency bands•.

A~so', '. no national-level, Elinteffort existed until '1952... Artd the Elint

of that d.me was main1y'radar-Qriented; it haq ,littie' intere'st in telemetry

signals. Too, NSA did not c:ome into the telem~try,pfct1:lre officially

until ~958, and,it did not ac'quire,its over;"al1 ,Sigirtt ,resp6nsibil;ity

until 1959" some two years after the Soviets had 'launcJ1ed their first

ICBM.

In attempts to o;:ganize the numerous entities trying to, exp1eit

. ear1Y,Seviet develepments, internal NSA organ'izations' and : reo:rganizations

evolved. Cc>Hectien~ precess'ing, and, reporting progra~s wer~ developed

that combined the tetal, Sigint ef1;ort the

supplemented when necessary by mob:i,le platforms of varipu~ ki,nds,' to

',:

form a worldwide collection: network. ','

Assistance was'also obtained 'from a variety o'f sources ,outside the

S.fgint co,mm~nit.y •. ~o+lab6rating:agendes. the intell,igence .agencies,

,other 'Gov,e:rnment agencies, the arlU~d forces, and pr1-Vate contractors

.' h~ve made sign:ificant contributions thtbughouF'the years· to' variou~

, aspects af'NSA t, s missien in this field; And. as miss ile- and space­

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reI,a,ted s:t$nals became more and more compl~x in Iat;er:. ~~~:r.s,~, ',:~mpro,ved,'

.~ys<tems and~echniques have been developed' ~ok~ep; paG~,,~ith this,

~oph:f..sticated S'igi~,t,
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 DOCID: .344155~'~ se~dE '':t'S~34_552'
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Contents

. Page
1. Earl¥ Years (1945 - 1953) ••••••••••••• ~ ··i·· ...... ~ .. · .... '
The
The Soils, o'f War ....... '••.•••• ,. ~ J.,'" •••••••••• '•••• e, • • •' • • e, . . . . . • •

Soviet lOl.tatl.on 0 ACCJUl.~l.tl.ons ••••••••••

_._________.____....::.___- -_____ Initial Efforts in Germany.;, ••••••••• j • •.•• '•••••••••••••
Forced Exodus from GermanY-to-·tFie-US~:::-;~-:-•• ~ ••••••••
_ _.........--'-_ _ _---..I:.The.Ll2.~.;Em.ndfng Soviet Ballistic Mhsile Program ••••••••••••
The R-~O Project ••••·••••.• ,..... ~ •••••••• ·• ••• ~ ..... : •••••,· ••
____________...:.____ThUl.tlBi-IRJ.::.11, R-l2., B-13...frQ.jects ••••• ; •••.••••••.••••••••••
The R~14 Project •••••••••••.••••• ,••••.•••••••••••••••••-.
----------....--------....;T-he a.-~ ProJect.•.....___.._ ..._ ....·. ....................-......................................"'.....------.....,..--­
Other. Early Soviet· Missile Programl',l •••.• \.••••••••••'
\
•••••••• . .
----~--------------·----1:~ft\·~~~~~.-r~~~.,.~~~~~:r~~~......~••~.~.-----.-----.
The SChiiietterling· Project •.•• ~~ ••.••••..• ~\t ••••••••• •.••••• '.
'fheWasserfall Projeet. •••••••."•••••••• ~:' • '•••••••• ~ •••••
. . :. ________________'-1;1't!ifT;ht-e;;.,~M~e~s~s~J.;·~na;;~p:..;r~o_;.;j~et:c~t:· •• ~ • e • e e • e • • • • e • • • • .: ~." ."." • • • . ~ . . . . . . . . . .
~1S81le-aeJ:ated Project's ~ •••.••••••••• ~ ............ ':" ••••••••.

II. MissrleT~_
I KapustJ.n Yar
&nit' ~ .. ~ ·.... ~.' ...'..~~:~. ,.... ".i; ...... ; .••
.s.ule, Test Range' (KYMTRJ •••• ~ .. t . . . . . . . . . '.'
TYUratamMissile Test Range ('TTH'M} ••••••••••••••••••••••• ·
Plesetsk Missile and· Space Complex (P.M$c) •••••••• ~ ••••••••
~ary Shagan Missile, Te~tcomple~ (SSM~) ••.••••••••••••••••

III~

................................. ....
•.• • • • • • e e • • • • . • . ~., • • • • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
~

• ~ t ~ •
• • • • • • •• • • • • :. '• • • • • e • e. • • • • • • • • • • •

.. ... ... "

.... ....... ...... .................

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DOCID:. 344

I. The Early Years (1945-1953)

The SpOils of war

Near the end of ~rld war II, the Red Arir!Y ~ into eastern

Germany and captured V-l and V-2.missile sites, rockets,' supporting

systems, and facilities, and many of the German scientists who had
developed these, and other, special weapons systems. With the
acquisition of .these facilities, the weapons themselves, am the
scientists am engineers wtD developed them, the USSR had quickly

~ed the nucleus of its own missile p:rog:ram.

First used against I.orrlon .iil June 1944, the V-l inflicted
severe damage and casualties on Great ·Britain,. and particularly
wndon, in the latter part of the war, at the same tiIre significantly
. curtailing war-tima p:rxx'iuction in the wndon area.. It also posed a .

serious problem to the Allied invasion of Eu:ro:pe. The Allies found

it necessary to place high p:riorities on countering this threat,

diverting aircraft fran support of their invading annies to attacks
on V-l sites and supporting facilities. It, and the V-2, 'Were also

used effectively against cities and port facilities on the continent

after liberation by Allied forces. Antwerp, in particular, sUffered

severe damage fran massive attacks by these missiles.

A cigar-shaped mflC)plane, the V-l flew at subsonic s:peeds, and was
designed for cheap and fast production, sane even using w:x:rlen wings.

It could be la'lll¥::hed fran either ground sites or aircraft. Being

subsonic and subject to interception, many fell prey to anti-aircraft

guns a.rrl intercepting aircraft, though their high s:peeds taxed

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capabilities of the interceptors to their limits. others malfunctioned

aIX1. crashed. But several thousaIrl of these "buzz lx:rnbs" got tilrOOgh

to their targets, until Allied anni.es on the continent forced them

back cut of range.

The V-2 l presente::i a far ItDre serious problem than the V-I. Being

a ballistic weap:m, it could not be intercepb3d. Nor could its

guidarce system be jan:rced, for it was electronically guided only during

ascent. Deployed against Great Britain three nonths after the V-I was

first used, it caused grave concern arrong Allied leaders. With a

warhead weighing 2,000 pounds, a range approaching 200 miles, speeds in

excess of one mile a second, and invulnerability to interceptioo or .

jamning, it was truly a fannidable weapon. It, and the V-I, were

aptly~: the ''V'' stemning fran the -word Ve:rgeltungswaffe I or

"reprisal weapon."

When the Soviets captured German test facilities toward the end

~f the war, their main interest was umerstan:iably in the V-2. But

they also gained knowledge of a nunber of other German weap:ms systems

either un:ler developrent or operational. In addition to the V-l and

V-2, the Soviets captured missiles for air-to-air I air-to-surface, and

surface-to-air use.

'l\o.o of these, both air-to-surface missiles I had been developed

by the Gemans in the late 1930s and were used successfully against

ships during the war. (be, the FX-1400 (called the Fritz-x), sank

the 35,000-ton Italian battleship Roma in 1943. It.\\IEmt down within

~ Aggregate 4 (A 4), it Was the fourth in a series of tests of

this type of missile begun in Germany in the early 1930s. During the war,
it became kn.Jwn as the V-2, the second in the series of Hitler's "reprisal"

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· DOCID ~ 34"Z114~

a half-OOUr of two direct hits by Fritz-x missiles. During the same

year, in the Dodeca:riese Islarxls campaign in the Aegean Sea, the

Gennans sank seven, Allied destroyers in two days using an air-to-surface

missile called the HS-293. Both were captured by the Soviets at the

end of the 'War.

Infonnation about other German research and developrent projects

was also.obtained by the USSR, along with serre of the equi:prent. For

example, during the war the Gemans had developed a sul:marine~

barge for launching V-2s. Although never operationally tested, its

purpose was the towing of a V-2 in a barge to a predetermined spot

for firing. Both the subrarine arxl the barge ~e to travel to the
launching site su:J::marged, arxl once there, the barge ~d be floated

to the surface arxl upended, by flooding, into a vertical firing

{X>sitim. Vulnerability of the su1::m:u:'ine while towing the barge,

the possibility of rough seas disrupting fueling and launch, arxl

design limitations of the V-2, made this concept a risky one at

best. But it proved to be the forerunner of Soviet--as 'Well as

U.S.--sul:Jnarine-missile systems of the future, and both Countries

proved the feasibility of the concept when they launched V-Is fran

surfaced sul:rnarines soon after the war.

Thus, by the end of the war, it is seen that the Germans had .

made irrpressive progress in the special 'Weap:>.nS area, and. in reseaz:ch

am developnentof advanced concepts. This fact 'WaS not lost on the

Soviets, as it was not on the Allies, and the USSR quickly took

advantage of the availability of these rren and equipmant, ,even before

hostilities had ended. EveI:ything available--m:m, missiles, supp::>rting

systems, associated electrolucs, factories, am ever:yt:h:ing .else of

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va1ue-quick1y fC>1.lDd their way into SOviet hands.

Soviet Exploitation of ~r1d vm- II AcqUiSitions

Initial Efforts in Gennany

After the war, the Soviets at first tried to salvage the remainder

of Hitler's missile organizations and facilities, and, nvre or less,

to keep than intact on Ge:tman soil. This approach was first noted
in 1945, when they established Institute Rabe in B1eicherode, East

Germany. :rn:::luded in this organization were rrany of the scientists

who had developed the V""'\<\leapons, and it was here that the Gemans

'Nere given the primary task of doourrenting the V-2 program for the

USSR. This effort praiuced detailed studies on such subjects as

stability theory, ballistics and aerooynami.cs, acceptance specifica­

tions, manufacturing directions and procedures, evaluations am appli­

cations of test instruments for use in the manufacturing process,

and operational deployment and use by military units.

In ad:Ution to docUI'!V:mting the V-2 prcxJram, the Soviets investigated

and exploited other facets of the Gel:man war-tine missile effort.

Sites am. factories were carefully studied, sane of which were also

utiliz6i by the Soviets in a number of missile-related functions,

carresp:ll"lding closely to their missions during the war. One, the

Hensc:hel Works, was involved with air-to-surface missiles, such as

the previously mentioned HS-293. Another, a former Gennan V-2

repair facility located at Kleinl:x:rlungen, was converted into a

V-2 asseni:.lly area. Still another, at Lehesten, contained test

stards for V-2 power units and was used for the sane ptlrIX)se after .

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DOCID: 344.1.D!IW:~

the war. Another, located at Niedersac~fen, contained underground

V-l and V-:-2 assanbly facilities. In addition to the facilities them­

selves, the Soviets captured assembled V-ls here, and sufficient parts
to assemble others. Other V':"ls, and V-2s as well, abandoned by the

Gel:mans on trains and el~e, 'iI\Iere also captured intact. The

Soviets also acquired the facilities of the Gennan fitm Gema Haus,

located in Berlin, subsequently renaming it Institute Berlin. It

was here that qui.dance systems for surface-to-air missiles were worked
on by theGemlans during the war, and after the war under the auspices

of the Soviets.

Forced Exodus fran Germany to the USSR

In October 1946, sane of the Gennan missile specialists departed

for the USSR, m:>st against their will. The Germans were told they

'iIlOuld be living in the Soviet Union for periods up to five years,

b.lt sane were to stay at least eight years. With their departure,
missile installations and factories were disassembled and shippOO. to

the soviet Union. This was done despite the fact that the SOViets
had carefully organized, repaired, an:l, in sate cases, rebuilt
these facilities after the war.

This first group of Germans· was referred to as "contract"

specialists, because many of tien allegedly had signed contracts to

'iIlOrk in the USSR for specified pericrls of t.irre. 'rhis was in oontrast

to another group of highly qualified Gennans de:fX)rted to the USSR

in mid-1947. This latter group, which worked on the devel~t of

an air..-to-surface anti-ship missile, was classified as being in

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"PCM status"; apparently the Soviets believed them to be a kind of war

The group that arrived in the USSR in 1946, estima.ted to be about

50 in Il\llri:)e:r, was sent to the Scientific Research. InStitute (NIl) 88,

looated at Kaliningrad. (A few of the scientists in this group were

alSo sent to such locations as leningrad, Ilinskaya, l-bnino, Khimki,

and Podlipki.) Those at NIl 88 were subsequently organized into four

groups. These groups, each with a Soviet chief, \\'ere namad.:

(1) the Guidance an:i Control Group, (2) the PoWer Plant Group,
2
(3) the Design ard Drafting Group, and (4) the Schmetterling Group.

The nan in charge of the GeI::ma:ns as a group was himself a Germa.n

named Groettrup, wh::>se specialty was high':'frequency electroo.ics. He

had established a close working relationship with the chief Soviet

engineer at NIl 88.

The first six rronths in the USSR were devoted. by the Qennans

to further documenting their war-tine p:rograIllS,· a continuation of the

studies begun at Bleicherode and other looations in Germany. Again,

primary emphasis was placed on the. V-2, but other systems were also

documentErl, including, for example, the Wasserfall and Schmetterling

surface-to-air missiles. Although extensively studied and dOCl.ll't'ented,

no significant m:xUfications 'Were apparently made to the V-2 during

this period, nor previous to its first launch on Soviet soil in <k:tober

1947.

Final preparations for these initial. tests had begun a nonth

earlier at Kapustin Yar, the first ballistic missile test range in the

~ schmetterlin!1 was a Geritian surfaoe-to-air missile.

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Soviet Union. Iocated aboU.t 100 kilaneters east of Stalingrad (later

named Volgograd) I Kapustin Yar wa$ used for these and.' subsequent tests

of the V-2s. 'lhls initial series was o::mpleted by December 1947, during
Jo.u.~h<d..t_ .... ___ ...... _. . _~ __________
._.
which period 12 missiles wereit ~,-.- .._.- -..- .... . . .. ­

,- . - .. -... ,
~

The SOviet Union had apparently acquired. about 25 V-2s fran the

Getmans. Exactly how many they themselves manufactured later on cannot

be precisely determined.. But a German specialist named Muennich, who

had seen prcXluction parts for a pilot series of V-2s at a research facil­

ity at Novaya (NIl 885) I estimated that as many as 100 oe these missiles

were scheduled far proo.uction theret Also, the Soviets apparently

manufactured V-2 carrponents to at least 1951. In this regard, the

Ge.tn:ans estimated. that between 100 and. 150 such missiles \tOlld be

needed to make the transition fran the V-2 to an improved version.

By the early 1950s, the SOviets had exploited the Gel:mans to

the fullest p::>ss1bleextent, while at the same tirre satisfying than-

selves that they could continue the effort on their own, and. the

Germans began departing the SOviet union. By 1953, nost had retmned

to GemlanYi, a few rE!fl'aine:i until at least 1956.

The Expandi.ng Soviet Ballistic Missile Program

Following ~rld War II, the USSR seemed detemUned not to make

the same mistake the Ge.rm:ms had made early in the war, when, flushed

with initial successes, they cancelled or curtailed many of their

7
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DOCID:

missile-related develop:nental programs, because they did not. expect

a long war. For exan:ple, develoJ:m=Iltal lags of one of these, the

Sohmetterling surface-to-air rooket, cost the GeJ:mans dearly in

the latter part of the war, and, as many experts later c:x:.tmlenteCl,

perhaps cost the war itself. Fortunately for the Allies their air

supremacy was never seriously challenged by this missile, for the

war had ended before full prcxluctian, program:ned for late sumner of
1945, could .be. realized.

COnsequently, after the war the USSR set a oourse that ~

permit rapid developnent in the missile area, and, 'in particular,

the earliest possible develop:nent of .operational ICIfots. '!'hey

aptarently .believed that any major post:-War threat to the USSR would

.be primarily fran aircraft, rather tl1an fran ground attack, and they

see:ned det:errnined to oounter this threat by achieving technological

superiority over their chief p::>tential adversary, the United States,

through the rapid developnent of an operational ICBM. U. S •. Army

Intelligence, aware of SovietintentiCins and of their technological

capability to accanplish them, speculated that the USSR could Weed

accx:mplish its goal of acquiring operational

. , ICBMs, possibly as early
as 1958.

Thus, by the tine the Gel:mans departed the Soviet Union, the USSR

had developed a highly-significant capability of its own, staffed

by oc:mpet:ent personnel. Although small in .numbers when the Germans

first arrived in the SOViet Union, and possessing a.lIIX>St no practical

experience, these Soviet scientists and engineers steadily acqUired

awareness of and knowledge about inherent problems and detail. OVerlap

DOCID : 3 4 41iiiioi1-il1l,ll!

with the Germans also afforded th.emthe necessary on-the-job exposure,

and, as the Ge:J::ma.ns thEmselves later noted, "this group advanced with

astonishing rapidity" thereafter.

Also, the Soviets apparently paralleled the work of the Gel:mans

with d:::mparlion efforts of their crwn in a number of these early

missile projects, permitting them to choose later between their own·

design innovations and those of the Germans. Virtually no information

is available on these Soviet projects, because the Germans were

isolated fran than to the maxirmlm extent possible. SJt Soviet scientists,

who -were not directly associated with the Germans on particular projects,
frequently questioned them alx>ut technical matters in mar~e:ily similar

areas I leading to suspicions by' the Gennans that the Soviets were

weed paralleling their efforts. Thus, precisely when, and to what

extent, the Soviets themselves developed certain \Veapcns sy~terns in

these early years is not always possible to discern. Nor can lines be

finely drawn separating Soviet and Gennan involve:nent in particular

projects, wependent of or in conjunction with each other.

The R-lO Project

Following the initial V-2 tests at Ka.:pustin Yar in late 1947 I the

50 or so GentIans at NIl 88 again l1'DVE'.id. This time they \Vent to .

GoJ:Odanlya Island in lake Selinger I near Ostashkov. located alx>ut

midway between ~ and IJ:mi.ngrad, the Go:rodanlya Island facility

was known as Branch 1 of NIl 88. The island I s isolation affo:rOed an

excellent location for Classified o:perations•. The nove to Gorcxianiya

Island ended direct German involvenent at NII 88 at Kaliningrad; apparently

DOCID: 344 ........

the Soviets believa:l they oould continue work there on their own.

By ·1948, it 'is esti.n:latal that between 350 and 400 Gennan

missile specialists were working in the Soviet Union, a significant

increase CNer the 50 scientists ·who had first arrived in late 1946.
h
About half of this German' work force, was lcx:::at.ed at BrancJ\ 1 of NIl 88.
It was mainly here that the Germans becan:e involved in designing and

developing a successor to the V-2-called the R-10-and in other pro­

grams that were to follow, the R-ll through R-1S.
'lb:>ugh apprCNed by the Soviets in 1948, initial plans for the

R-10 Project had been proposed as early as the spring of 1947,nonths

before the V-2 tests were begun at Kapustin Yar. But these plans·
were rejected as "unsatisfactory, If and it was not until early 1948,

follCMing a major conference on the subject, that the project was

finally approved. Although only five Gemans were iooluded at this

conference, many Soviet specialists attended, including representatives

of the Air Aca:iemy a:rrl the Central AerodynariU.c Research Institute,

attesting to the high priorities the Soviets early attached to their
'. .J.
Inl.ss~e programs.

The Soviets already had a' head start on developrent of this

missile, for the Germans, during the latter part of the war, had done
sane preliminazy' research and developnent at Peenenunde on an improved

version of the V-2. Additional work was also conducta:1 at Bleicherode

, d.
.i.nm.3diately after the war. Points stres~ in designing and developing

the R:-10 were (1) improved accuracy, (2) a less catplicatedpropulsion

systan, (3) iooreased range, and ·(4) .cheaper production techniques.

,TOP ,SEGRET ,UMBRA ... ~ , "' '" .,. ...

II)
DoeID:
The R-10 project was slc:rw to evolve. Although its design stages

had occupied the Germans for rrost of two yea;rs, by 1949 it ranained

a "paper project." Even by 1951, when direct GeJ::man invo1\1E!Ie1lt

in this and. other projects ended because of su:idenlyimposed security

restrictions, it was still est:i.Irateci to be years away fran actual

dep1oyrrent. At that time, Dr. Magnus, a top Gennan scientist, estiInated

that lengthy periais of testing 'WOUld be required before the missile

could be mass-produced and operationally deployed.

Nevertheless, the R-10 project yielde1 a missile, at least in

design, that was much improved over the V-2. It was capable of longer

.range, of carrying a heavier payload, was lighter, and incorporated a

number of other technical refinercents that enhanced its over-all

performance. Specifically, the R-10 was designed for a range of alnlt

500 statllte miles, cOnpa.red to the approximate 190-mi1e range of the

V-2. The payload was increased slightly (by 150 poun:lS over the

2,OOo-pound weight of the payload of the V-2). An over-all weight

red.uction of 440 pounds was also realized. Though the size of

the engine (and of the rocket itself) ra:nained about the sane as that

of· the V-2, significant changes \olere designed into the engine to,

enhance its performance and. to niake it lighter. Other changes and.

m::xli.fications were made to the internal oonfiguration of the rocket,

but the exterior, . other than being scrrewhat longer, varied little fran

its predecessor in shape or design. Also, the Germans were well aware

of shortcanings of the V-2's guidance system, and i.mp.rovemants to it

were pl.a:nnEd to enhance the accuracy of the one to be used for the

R-lO. rut the fuel proposed for use in the R-10 retrained the sarre as

""
TOP &EGflE=r.. \J,M~RA,
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1/
/(
DOCID:

that of the V-2, liquid oxygen am alooool.

SOme tests of the R-10' s guidance systan 'III1ere apparently made on

the g:t'OI.:IOO am with aircraft, ,and static tests of its l:xx:>ster engine

were also probably cond.ucted. As far as can be determined, however,

the over-all system was not tested; nor did the R-10 project apt::erently
3
progress beyond the "w:>rk project" ptlase. But this missile, am. the

others that evolved in this time period, provided a foundation t..qX)n

'Which future Soviet programs could be based. Certain design aspects

of the R-10, for exanple, and of a carpanion project believed conducted

by the, Soviets, were iooorporated into what becarce known as the

Ko~olev short-range rocket (the SS-2). 4 Statercents by Korolev,

at a conference in IvDscow early in 1950, cor.rol:x>rab;!d this belief,

when he note::1 that sane design features of the R-10, including warhead

separation, -were in fact used in the Korolev rocket. 5 Another Soviet

3st.ages in these missile-design projects were clearly defined am

labeled. They were designated as preliminary, sketch, and 'WOrk projects.
The preliminary project required a brief report, outlin:i,ng the over-all
project in general terms and describing what fE'WciS--expect.ed-fO'aooarpllsh.
The sketch, or int:ernBliate, project, usually-eVOlvEcClnti,i'"studyof -­
,several hundred pages and called for fairly ~ific descriptions and
drawings of the over-all missile configuratim, sl'x:>wing, in considerable
detail, ~ent parts and their applicatims to the over-all system. The
w:>rk project stage called for detailed descriptions arxl drawings of the
entire system. or1t was to be in sufficient detail to permit factories to
build carrp::>nents parts and assemble the missile in its final form.

4 11SS " designators are assigned by u.s. authorities to identify Soviet

surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. For reference purposes within NA'IO,
they are identified by nicknames--e.g., Shyster (SS-3); Sandal (SS-4); etc.

5sergej Pavlovich Korolev, 00rn in January 1907, was long involved

in aircraft design. A pioo.eer in Soviet rocket technology, he was often
referrEd to as the II chief designer of space ships. tI Previous to his death
in 1966, Korolev was head of NIl 88 am director of the Central Design
Bureau for Space and Intercontinental Rockets.

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{v
DOCID:

rocket, the 55-4, also i.na:>rporated.· technical innovations developed

by the Gennans during their involvement in the R-IO project.

The R-ll, R-12, R-13 Projects

None of these missile projects apparently progressed beyond inter­

rredi.ate developnental stages, and little is known aJ::out their design.

It is believai, though, that the R-ll project was conductai ma.inJ.y by
the Soviets, as a parallel project of the R-lO. Certain of its design

innovations, along with sane of the R-lO, were probably inoorporated

into the R-l4 project, an;] into the Korolev :rccket as well.
The R-12 apparently servai as a test bed, incorporating a number

of designs and innovations and producing a number of widely differing

variations. ScIre of the nore pranising of these were subsequently

enployed in designing follow-on missiles i and in particular the R-14.

But the R-12 project itself, as noted al:x:>ve, did not progress beyond

the .i,nte:rnediate stage and did not, therefore, yield an operational

. missile.

The R-13 was apparently the resp:>nsibility of the Germans. It

too did not progress beyon:1 the int.errrediate stage of developtent,

and as such did not result in an operational missile. But, as in

the case of the other two projects, certain of its concepts were

used in sulJse:luent Soviet missile projects.

Each of these missile projects had sub-projects--the R-lla and

~-llb, forexainple--and, as notai previously, they prodUCErl a nl.1Iber

of design concepts that· WJuld be used by the Soviets in later missile

projects. For e:x:.anple, novable exhaust nozzles were designed to enhan::e

.TOP 6ECRE".,~UM8RA
rY
il
DOCID,: . 344155~ '. REF ID:A34.552
. .T P SEGRET._UMBRA
steering, aID multi-stage operation was incorp::>rated into the design

of at least one, .the R-12, and IX>ssibly into another as 'Vt"ell--the R-13.

Although these projects did not directly result in weapons

syste:ns, they nevertheless did provide a foundation upon which the

Soviet Union could base futllre missile programs. Many troubles<:lle

technical problemf3 had been extensively sbx3ied, and, to a significant

degree, overcane, at least on paper. Also, these efforts afforded

the Soviet scientists and technicians the initial experienc:e they

sorely neeie:l in the early years of involvement in an unfamiliar

field.

lJ:he R-14 Project

.Before direct German involvanent in specific projects ended in

1951, they had worked on the design of ~ other Soviet surface-to­

surface missile systerns--the R-14 and R-15. The first of these,

the R-14, was descr:ibe:l in one report asa "scaled-up version of

the Korolev project/R-lO endeavors. n It was designed as a single-

stage rocket, 77 feet in length ani 12.5 feet in diameter at its

base. With a range of 1,600 nautical miles, its payload was initially

designed to weigh 6,600 pounis, but was .later reduced by 30 percent,

according to the Germans.

But the R-14 project was marked by haste, and, as far as the

Gennans were aware, did not progress beyond the work project phase.
W:>rk began ab::mt mid-1949, and coocluded with canpletion of the work

J;hase in.the spring of 1950. lJ:huS, as was the case with the R-IO,

research and developnent through the \«)rk project phase had been can­

,...,
DOCID: 34,415~p S~Rfj¥t,.tt!RA
,.'
pletSl CIl paper, rut actual p.roduction of the R-14 app:u-ently did not

materialize.
1./
In levying the requil:;e:nent for the R-14 in mid-19A9, Ustinov6 state:i
only that the missile would have "a range of 1,600 nautical miles and

a 6,600-pound warhead." The R-14 was apparently seen as a neansof

bridging '!:he gap between smrt-range missiles (of the R-IO and R-ll

types) and the longer-range missiles that were to follow.

Short deadlines placed CIl devel.opnent of this missile by U8tinov

(he directed that r"ork on it be "started i.rtne:liately") resulted in

its progIesSing through the work project, phase in record time. The

preliminary phase wa,s c:acpleted in one m::mth, the intennediate stage

in less than three Ironths, and the work project phase in less than
six m::nths. But the haste that ~ed develqp:rent of the R-14

project was probably a major factor in precluding its bec:ahing a

satisfactory missile system.

As was the case of other devel.opnents in these early years, the

R-14 project yielded innovations that the Soviets r"ould use in develoPing

later missile systems. The R-14, for exarrple, was to be designed so

that it could be "launched in' un:ierground shafts 32 feet in diameter ,

and 9S! to 13oteeP." This proposal represented the beginning of the

USSR I s missile-silo programs of the future. It was also proposed

that a circular railway, with a rad.ius of over 14 miles, be built

6Dmitri F. Ustinov, appointed the Soviet Minister of Defense an

29 April 1976, reId various positions in'industry before W:>rld war II.
D.lring the war he supervised tank proouctiCll as Stalin 's Conmissar of
.AJ:mamants. Since then he' has been totally involved with the defense
sector, holding the posts of Minister of Defense Irdustry and Deputy, ,
Cllainnan of the' USSR Council of MinisterS. In these ,capacities he becane .
deeply involved in missile research, assuming administrative cootrol of
the entire missile-developIent program in the p:>stwar years.

TOP SEG~ET .~MBRA 1.)­

DOCID: 344~~

around the launch site, enhancing target selection by permitting the.

ground-guidance systan to be rroved in· a circle a.rourd the launch

site.

other techniques and subsystems were also unique to this missile,

or represented refinements of those begun in earlier missile projects.

The engine of the R-14, for exanp1e, was designed to tilt up to :!:. 5
degrees, and, \\ben static tested in 1951, caribustion was found to be

unaffected by this process. The tilting of the engine enhanced over-all·

control and guidance of the rocket. Calculations of final engine cutoff

were o:.xtp.lted rrore precisely for ·this missile (measured in milliseconds) ,

permitting a rrore precise trajectory. Techn,iques were also devised to

gradually shut down the engine's thrust in the final stages of ascent,

furtl'ler enhancing oontro1 of the rocket. Fuel for the R-14 was to be

kerosene, .a departure fram the a1col'X>l-fue1ed v-2 and R-10 rockets.•

A regulator, controlling fuel mixture and flow, was designed for this

missile, and actually tested on a v-2 in 1951­

. Other techniques and subsystem refi.narents were explored by the

Gem1ans and Soviets in their ~rk on. this missile, and many of

these innovations 'Were employed in:the deve1q;::m:mt of missiles in

later years. One in particular, the 88-5 (NATO nicknane skean) ,

probably incorporated many of the techniques developed for the R-14.

(The SS-5, a highly successful intermediate-range missile, was first

flight tested in June 1960, and was one of the missiles involved in

the CUban missile c:d:sis of 1962.) But the R-14 project, as noted·

previously, did not itself produce an operational ~p:::>ns system.

It.

"
DOCID: 34415

'lhe R-l5 Project .

The last Soviet surface-to-surface missile project in which the

Gennans were involved· was the R-l5. Despite much Work on the part of

the Ge.tn1ans in designing this missile (which Was. said to be a project

initiated am vigorously supported by Stalin himself), it reached oo.ly

the iilteIrl'e1iate stage of develq;:ment.

Labeled a "cruise" missile, the R-15 was designed to combine both

the V-l and V-2 into one system, with a v-1. l:x:::osting a V-l to an

altitude of l2.rto i8~les, 'Where the V-l would be launched toward the

target. The. range was planned to be over 3,700 statute miles (though

one reJ;X)rt placed it as high as 5,400 nautical miles), with a speed of

1,300 miles an hour ani a warhead weighing three tons. An int>roved

sOviet-desiqned version of the V-2 )?OWer unit was to be used as the
l::xxlster, deve1opip.g a thrust of 70 ,000 ~. Another i.n:oovation,

whereby the wings and warhead of the V-l would separate during the final

approach t.oward the target, was al9:> proposed for the systan. But
the Genna.ns doubted the practicality of the missile fran the beqi.mling,

am a calculation that over-all accuracy \tIOU1d be no better than i 12

to 24 statute miles at maxinun ran;;e, apparently forced cancellation
of the project at an early stage .of developne:nt.

Other Early Soviet Missile P.rc:?9t'ams

II
,
i
p,neurrent with their involvement in the ballistic missile field

in the p:::>st-war years, the Gennans 'WOrked on a number of other Soviet

mi.ssi~e-re1ated projects, inc1udinj surface-to-air missile systemS,

I

air-tb-surface anti-ship missile syst:enS, a:r:d refinements to a GeDnan

TOP SECRET .UMDRA

"'.... , • ,., . . . . 'II> "
DOCID: 344

telerretry system developed during the war.

The KaIet PrOject·

'~ of theSe, called the Komet by the Ger.inans, was designed

solely as an air-to-surface anti-ship missile. It was probably

based upon the wartime V-I design and on the Bat, the U.S. Navy's

"flying bcmb" of World war II fame. ~rk on developnent ·of this

missile was done at Leningrad, am some tests of it were believed

.~ as early as 1948, and, accordf:ng to one report, perhaps

as ~ly as late-1947.
'A group of highly qualified Germans were "selected" to work on

this ' project, am they ~ deported to the USSR urxier "PCM status"

ab:lut mid-1947. The Soviets apparently attached high priOrities to the

developnent of this missile, evidenced by the strong interest sb:::Mn in

!

it by high-ranking government and military leaders. Bulganin am Beria,

for exanple, nonitore:i its progress closely, as did senior navy and
air farce officers.

The Gennans worked on five prototypes of the Komet, designated

Komet I thrOugh V. Its size was described. as' 2St~o feet in

length and 31"

........., wt feet in diameter. The miSSil:;'was to be carried by

aircraft to within 80 nautical miles of the target, -where it would be

launched toward the objective. Initially controlled by the aircraft

by r~io beam-riding techniques, the missile would switch to radar

oontrol when within lot to lstiles of the target.

v
'.IW:> basic Komet designs apparentlyevolva1 fran these periods of

testing; one yielding missiles' of ''medium'' speed, another of "fast"

DOCID:

(th:lugh subsonic) speed~ Tests of the. foJ:ItVar design were begun in the

autmn of 1950, and 'Were proclaimed a succeSSi the faster version was

probably first tested in the SlIIlner of 1952.

Gex;:ma.n involvenent in this project also ended in 1951, when the

Soviets suddenly llnp6sed rigid security restrictions upon than, but

the' USSR continued to place enphasis on develo:p:nent of this type of

missile in subsequent years. One report, for example, described the

Komet as representing "a p:>int of departure fran Which greater Soviet

~p:>ns could be developed. II

The Schmetterl1ng'Project

w::>rk on the Scbmetterling surface-t.o-air missile was begun by the

Germans in'the late-1930s, continuing with varying degrees of urgency

throughout the war. Designata:i the HS-1l7 by the Gennans, the

Sch1netterling was designed as a "rarote-controlled anti-aircraft

rooket."

After the war I the Soviets showed strong interest in this missile,

am quickly set alxru.t reconstructing as many as possible fran war

booty I though apparently making no significant rOOdifications to it.

sane of the guidance and control equl.tJIeI1t for this missile was also

acquired by the Soviets fran "Test Bed No.9" at Peenemmde I Where

static testing of the Scbmetterling and Wasserfall had been conducted

during the war. This .guidarice eqW.I,mmt was sUbse:IUently shipped to

NII 88 for further study and documentation.

About 50, of the'missiles were .rebuilt by the Soviets and GemIanS

in Berlin after the war I and were sUbse:IUently shipped' to the USSR and

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DOCID:
3441~.S~UMHRA
tested near .MoSa:M' in 1948. kcording to a German assoc:iated with the

project, the tests were labeled bY the Soviets as "satisfactory." 'l\\u

separate test periods were apparently conducted; the first dealt with

launch aspects;' the' second, possibly six months later, was concerned

ma.inly with flight control.

Though labeled a "rocket," the Schmetterling zrore closely resembled

the V-I in design, operating at subsonic speeds. After launch fran '

, ground sites, it was designed to fly tcMard approaching ena.ny aircraft

. to intercept their flight path, exploding when in their proximity. by

radio catma.nd f:ran the ground. Though radar was used in· the grourid

ccmplex to locate and track the targets, the schmetterling itself was

visually tracked to the targets by a ground controller. Each launch

site controlled four missiles, which could be fired as a group or

irxtividually. The sites also had reload capability.

In late 1950, an audit was conducted at NIl 88 of the missile pr0­

jects being 'WOrked on there. One casualty of this reviE!!W was probably

the Schmetterling project. The SOviets apparently believed that spee:1,

limitations-am other shortcomings of this missile-rendered the

concept obsolete and precluded further study.

The Wasserfall Project

During the 'WaX, the GeIInans developed still another surface-to-air

missile that represented, at least in design, a far nore fonn:i.dable

threat to .Allied aircraft than did the Schmetterling. Pa,tterned after

the' V-2 design (produci?g esSentially a scaled-da-m. version of the V-2

referra:l to as a "V-2 Wasserfall hybrid"), arout '20 of theSe rockets

DOCID:

were tested by the Getmans during the latter part of the war. . The war

endi:!d, however, before the Wasserfall could be mass-produced.

After the war, the USSR also shoWed strong interest in this

missile, and .imnediately confiscated all available remnants,' test

facilities, and related systems (tlrilgh they did not acquire enough partS

to build a canplete rocket). A number of Germans wtD had ~rked on it

during t..'1e war were sent to Podlipki in the Soviet Union to continue

w:>rk there. Tests of the engine were apparently begun in early 1949,

and continued until at least 1951. Guidance tests were also apparently

conducted in 1951.

.Tw::> kinds of guidance systans were designe:1 by the .Germans for this

missile. The first e:t!ployed radars to track the target and guide the

missile. A secom, called Emden by the Germans, used infrared-haning

techniques. Another infrared-haning systan, the Madrid, was possibly

also intended for use in this missile. Both of these infrared systems

had been developed by the Germans to the point of mass production when

the war ended.

When the SovietS took over the Wasserfall effort after the war,

they gave the project the designator of R-1l3. Althoilghthey extensively'

studied and tested the missile and its subsystems, they apparently had

no strong intention of incorporating the missile itself into their post­

war weaponS arsenal. Rather, they apparently attempted to learn as IIUlCh

as possible about its advanced techniques. 'Ibis belief was substantiated

by the chief GeIl'!"an engineer of the project,a man named Fbch. He noted

that Soviet efforts in developing afollow-on missile to the Wasserfal1 '

hai reached only the sketch project stage by 1950,' when he was transferred

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DOCID: 34415

fran the R-ll3 project to another area. But the basic Wasserfall engine

was used later in two surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missiles,

the SS-lb and SS-lc.

The Messina Project

During the· war, the· Germans had designed and developed a telemetl:y7

systEm at Peenemunde for use in their missile p~ams. ~l available

systems, subsys:t:ems, ccmponents, and technical literature were

a.cxpired by the Soviets after the war, along wi.th nany of the Gennan experts

who had 'ttOrked on it. called Messina by the Germans, and later referred

to as Don by ·the Soviets, it was first used in the Soviet Onion in 1947

in the V-2 tests at Ka.:p.lstin Yar.

Study of .the Messina began at NII 885 shortly after the Gennans

arrived in lat.e-l946. But the Soviets quickly interjected themselves

into .the project, to the virbJal exclusion of the Germans, evide:nce:1,

for example, by the V-2 tests in 1947, when the telanetI:y aspects were

strictly a Soviet-run operation. ('!hese. telanetry o:perations, the Ger­

mans later noted, were plagued' by problemS, caused mainly by improper

use and adjustment of eqW.};II2Ilt, resulting in many and lengthy delays

.during launch ,operations ~ )

'!be GeJ::man Messina had a capacity of 16 infornation channels, as

did the Don. Later IOOdifications by the Soviets expanded its capacity •
\- ._- ...
, _..
~-
... ' - - _-----,
.... ...
-~--.- .. "- - -_ ..,_ .

7Telenetry, as it relates to the inissile .area, is a means of measuring

varioos aspects· of the missile's flight perf6:rmance~ and of relaying results
to a distant lcx::ation where it is displayed or recorded ~ .

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DOCID: 34415

By 1949, at least three prototypes of the Soviet version had, been

built, along with a half dozen or so operational units. Serial production

had also begun by this tine, with about 50 being rranufactured.(It was

later'rep::>rted that the Soviet grcup resr:onsible' for de'llelopnent of the

follow-oo. Don syste:n was formally cx:mnended by Stalin for its w::>rk in

this area',) Arrl, as predicted by the Gemans, the SOviets used this

system during the early de'llelopnental years of their missile program.

Missile-Related Projects

In addition to assisting in the develop.nent of missile and

telemetry systems in these early years, the Germans 'WOrked on a number .

of other projects while in the Soviet Union; sate ..vere directly missile­

relate:i r others were related in peripheral ways.

One concerned the design and developnent of a "vibration table ll

for use in testing the ability of electronic equi}Xtlel1t to withstand

shock and vibratialS. A German named Salm did extensive work in this

area for the Soviets after the war.

GenNm wartirre radio equiprent was also tho~hly investigated by

the Soviet Union after the War, and a number of Gennans w::>rked in

this area while in the USSR. For exarcple, Salm additionally aided the

Soviets in developing and testing a nultichannel radio-relay camtmications

system bet:ween 1945 and 1948. Elnploying pulse rcod.u1ation, this microwave

system was designed to provide Up to ~ight voice,-grade channels,' aild, by

seoondary nultiplexing, additional telegraphic charmels. The system r s

effective range Was reported to be 100 kilaneters.

. TOP SECRET ,UMSRJt\

. .
l. J .
DOCID: 34415

The SOViets also aoquire:i data al::xlut a number of electronic

missile-<:x:mtro1 systems developed by the Ge:t::mans. during the war. One,

'Which became operational near the end of the war, was a mid-course

gUidance system naned. Burgund. The system used a telescope for optical

tracking, a I transmitter at the control point to send cc:mnard signals

.
..A-­
to the miss1e in flight, and a receiver arxl carmand controls in the
It>
missile to receive the signals and activate appropriate missile-related
functions. A magnesium light in the tail of the missile assisted in·

optical tracking. ~ other electronic-control 8¥stans developed by

the Ge:t::mans during the war were cal1e:i Darmst:adt: and Mosel. with these
systems,' as with Burgund, signals were transmitted to the missile to

change a control function. But these signals 'If.1ere of short duration­

37 milliseconds for Darmst:adt: and 10 milliseconds for Mosel. .. ._ .. _•... ' .._._

w:>rk:. '·00 te1evisioo-guidance systems for missiles also receive:i

high priority in the USSR after the war, and a German war-time systan,
in particular, received close scrutiny •. called the To~e,.it was

used by the' Gennans as a "tracking aid" in their HS-293 'and Fritz-X

air-to-surface anti-ship missiles.' After confiscating all available

equipne:nt am personnel, the Soviets conducted follCM-On research of this

technique in an at:rcoS];ilere of utnDst secrecy, 'WOrking in canpa.rt:mented

areas. As a means of availing themselves of Gennan technb10gy on

the subject, :t"'lowever, withrut "revealing" their own strong interest

. in it, the SOViet scientists and engineers saw to it that the Gennans
were located in .an area close by,. ostenSibly to 'WOrk on "non-military

'IV" projects..
DOCID: 34415

.AnOther task given the Gerinans was the'developnent of a coastal

defense missile. Begun in 1949, its goal was the design of missiles
with a range of 60 miles. Plans also called for "an altimeter-rontrolled

altitude of approximately 100 feet" en route to the target, ar~: for

radar guidance. But it rercained only a "paper project" as far as the

Germans were aware, and they were excluded frcm further \I,Ork on the

project shortly after it. began.

Pin early.reIX>rt also mentions work by the Germans on a IIdigital

canputer" while in the USSR. A professor Gutenmacher was given credit

in the report for starting w::>rk on the project in Mosoow SaIEt..ine be­

't:::If.leen 1951 am 1952. Guterm\acher was also given credit for designing

an analog canputer that was "in use dur¥ig 1951." i~rk on the digital
canputer was apparently still in the experineltal stage by 1953.

The Germans worked on a number of other missile-related teclmiques

while in 'the USSR, concerning, for e:xanple, such sUbjects as navigation,

fuels, velocity measurerrent, pit:ch-arrl..-yaw control, cathcx1e-ray tube

developnent, alt..ineters, and the'l.i.Y..e. But by 1953, German work in ~

Soviet Union had ended, after nearly a decade of effort. All of the

Germans, except for a dozen or so, departed the' SOviet Onion by the end

of that year.

Of the missile systans the Germans were involved with; not one Was

actually prcx:iuced or deployed while they were in the USSR. This was

also the case with many of the ot.her missile-related projects in which

the Gennans were involved. But these Projects--especially the R-10,

R-14, Komet" Wa sserfa11 , ,ani Messina-..,.laid ~'9roundwork for future

Soviet' programs. The Germans provided'the USSR a solid base upon which to

TOP SECRE=r.UMDRA
DOCID : 344 .a...,.,....'"

expand, ani, in so doing I enabled the Soviet Union to leap years ahead of

what ot:heI:wise T"ould have been the· case~·

TOP &E~RET UMBRA

DOCID' : "3 A"'fIII.....
II. Missile Test Ranges

Throughout the years, the Soviet Union has developed a number of missile

test facilities for various purposes. Four of these--Kapustin Yar, Tyuratam,

Plesetsk, and Sary Shagan--are briefly disc~ssed in this section to show their

early history. The first two were developed mainly to test surface-to-surface

ballistic missiles, the last mainly for anti-ballistic missile. test purposes.

Plesetsk was initially established as an ICBM complex. later evolving into a

missile arid space complex. All four also participated to one degree or another

in various other Soviet missile- and space-related eyents and programs. Additional

information and detail of their development and operations .are incorporated into
later sections of this history.

The Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR~

Kapustin Yar, the first missile test range in the Soviet 'Union, was initiaI'ly

used in October 1947 to test V-2s, although one intelligence report notes that

some Germans and their V-2 rockets arrived there as early as 1946. The Germans

confirmed its operational status in late-1947, but intelligence

concerning this range was not obtained in appreciable .quantity until after about

Aerial

photography also provided detail concerning its early development, and about the

early history of the other test ranges. intelligence provided ·only

sparse information of the missile tests until about 1958. mainly because of the

lack of in this time period.

When the Germans first viewed the facilities at Kapustin Yar. they were not

impressed, noting that it had obviously been q~ickly established, with only a

few permanent structures. Also, most of the operations equipment and systems
were of the mobile variety. The surrounding terrain 'was sparsely populated, and

the Soviets'had further diluted the local population by closing down several small ~

NOfORN ''PAD Q¢PIYPTI'IMRRA ~I \J

DOCID: 34

villages, apparently as both security and safety measures.

The Germans noticed other evidence that Kapustin Yar had not been used

previous to 1947 for missile test purposes. For example, a concrete launch

platform was only partially completed, and a stand for static tests of rocket

engines had not yet been completed. Wire-connected field telephones--markedly

similar to German war-time versions--provided intra-rangehead communications,

with no radio facilities for such communications noted or used by the Germans.

In these early years, Kapustin Yar was also a dumping gr,::n.tnd for a

hodgepodge of war booty, some of which the Soviets apparently had little inten­

tion of testing or using. (The Germans recognized much of it as having

come from Peenemunde.) Most of it had been dumped in piles along a railroad

spur, where it was gradually being covered by shifting sands. Much of the

equipment was missile-related, but some was not. The Germans, for example,

recognized some of their war-time torpedoes in the rusting piles along the rail

spur.

The initial V-2 tests at Kapustin Yar were conducted under the direction

of Korolev. Though details of these tests are lacking; it is known that

many technical problems were encountered, and some, to a degree, overcome.

Also, many Soviet scientists and technicians were deeply involved, but only

about 16 Germans were included. Nor were the V-2 rockets that were used in

these initial tests apparently modified to any significant degree by the

Germans or Soviets; but, rather, they were almost without exception copies of

the war-time versions. Korolev further directed that, initially, the rockets

were to be fired according to procedures the Germans used during the war.
~
Of the 12 V-2s launched during the 1947 tests, about eight ....~normally.

The first three reached ranges between 250 and 300 kilometers, despite some

guidance problems with two of them. (Guidance and control reportedly improved

:rOP 6"=:"!:i;~b,
' . . . ...-::tV'~~"2".!'~J:.."',t-~.
- ., ";. . :. . - ~:. "':),llfWIR! R
""":7" 1!v lim:J"JIII'E
,J{
DOCID:

with subsequent' lau~cbe~ At least three,of the rockets failed completely,

because,of engine malfunction. Some of the missiles were permitted to go as

far as their fuel allowed, apparently in attempts to determine their maximum

possible range. Small aircraft (also of German origin) were used to locate the

impact areas, and although Korolev promised the Germans data provided by the

aircraft, none was given to them. A radar station (probably mobile) was located

several miles from the launch site. The Germans, however, were isolated from

. the radar, site and its operations, and from results of tracking data as well.

The V-2s w~re carried to the launch site on the same mobile vehicles used'by

the Germans during the war--the Meillerwagen.

Before launch, the various subsystems of the V-2s were tested in two

large buildings at the range. Four rockets could be acco;dated in each of

the buildings. The rockets themselves, however, had been

shIll"··
2
" .. . M
A.Germany

to the Soviet Union for testing.

A major V-2-related system was also acquired by the Soviets after the war"

and sent 'to Kapustin Yar. It was a special train designed to carry and launch

the rockets. Called the FMS train (Fahrbare Meteorologische Station, or mobile

meteorological station), it was completely self-contained and carried, in

addition to the V-2e,'all necessary equipment and fuels to effect launch. At

least two were sent to Kapustin Yare No V-2s were launched from them while

the Germans were at Kapustin Yar, nor had they apparently been used operationally

bi the Germans auring the war.

For these initial tests at Kapustin Yar, about 25 V-2s had been brought

from Germany, though only 12 were actually launched. 'Of the 25 rockets, 13 had

been captured intact at the end of the war, and a dozen had been assembled

in East Germany. Subsequent tests of V-2s at Kapustin Yar were, ·for the

most part, of rockets built:, from Soviet-manufactured and assembled components.

TOP SECRET UMBRL\

DOCID : 34 4.:q:::rc:Q:

Tests of the V-2 probably continued at Kapustin Yar into the early 1950s.

The exact number launched cannot be determined; but, as noted previously, the

Soviets themselves probably manufactured as many as 100, and possibly as many as

150, after the war. The tests were observed by. many high-level government and

military leaders of the USSR. According to the Germans, Soviet officers of all

the military services attended these early missile firings. Apparently the
primary objective of the tests was to acquaint Soviet personnel with the intri­

cacies of the rockets and launch programs, and to "sell" the concept to Soviet

military and government leaders. In these respects, the tests were successful.

These early tests gained for the Soviet scientists and technicians experience in

an unfamiliar field, and, once they had acquired sufficient exposure, they

quickly excluded the Germans from active involvement in V-2 launches, barring
them from further participation after the tenth V-2 had been launched at Kapustin

Yar.

began to play an increasing role in monitoring

activities of this and other missile-related activity. showing a pattern of

sharply expanding activity on the Kapustin Yar range. The USSR continued to

attach high significance to Kapustin Yar throughout the years, with one U.S.

intelligence report noting, in commemoration of its first 10 years of operation,

that it "has been continuously active since 1947."

The Tyuratam Missile Test Range (TTMTR)

In i955, construction of a new range at Tyuratam, with

major construction continuing through 1956.

o
~
•
And on 21 August 1957-theSoviet Union tested its

first ICBM on this range.

TOP .&beRET UMBRA

DOCID:

Although it would have been possible to test ICBMs on the Kapustin Yar

range, major changes and additions would have had to have been made to its

facilities; the down-range orientation would have had to have been modified; and

additional risk would ,have been added since~ the missiles would, have flown

over more densely populated areas en route to impact on the Kamchatka Peninsula •
..,.
Although the Kapustin Yarrange could have been extended to accommodate missiles

of intermediate range without major changes to its down-range orientation, the

Soviets apparently believed it to be impractical to modify the facility for

intercontinental-range. missile tests.

between 1955 and 1956 showed other aspects of construction and

control at Tyuratam. The work, for example, was being done under the auspices

of the Ministry of Defense. High-ranking government and military officials

closely monitored its progress, and electronics specialists were deeply involved

throughout. Concurrent with work at the rangehead, construction began of an

impact area on the Kamchatka Peninsula. also showed that the construc­

tion at Tyuratam was of facilities to accommodate ICBMs, attesting to the

significance attached to the new range.

the two ranges were to operate virtually

independent of each other.

While work was progressing at 'Tyuratam and on the Kamchatka Peninsula,

o• a related project at Kyzl Orda, southeast of Tyuratam. It was
~
here that the headquarters for construction of the range was apparently located.

The two military groups involved in the construction were also .shown to be

subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Special Construction, in turn subor­

dinate to the Ministry of Defense.

huge amounts of concrete were being used at

Tyuratam in the construction of blockhouses and launchpads, and that missile

DOCID: 344~~

service towers, complex systems of water piping, intricate lighting systems, and

service railroads were being built. When compared with construction of similar

ICBM test facilities in the U.S., they virtually matched. Further, many of the

personalities identified as being involved at Tyuratam had long histories of

involvement in the missile field. Two, for example, were previously associated

with a factory that produced missile-guidance radars and other missile-related

components. Another was identified as the former chief mechanical engineer at

Plant 456 in Khimki. (Plant 456 was identified by the Germans as an assembly

and research center for V-2 booster engines.)

By 1958, a rather clear picture of the entire Tyuratam range had emerged.

It extended over 3,400 nautical miles acr?ss the Soviet Union from Tyuratam to

Kamchatka, with the impact area

Construction at Klyuchi began about the same time as that at Tyuratam.

construction at Klyuchi was also being conducted under the

authority of the Chief Directorate of Special Construction. Additional data,

o. further linking the Klyuchi construction with the missile field,

~ when it was noticed that from Kapustin Yar

for shipment to Klyuchi. Some personnel were also trapsferred from Kapustin Yar

to the Kamchatka location.

Klyuchi was ideally located for its function as a missile-impact area.

Sparsely populated, an area of several hundred square miles was available

TOP SEcFiET UM8RA

DOCID: 34 4 ..LiIIW:~

without posing unacceptable risk to the local populace, settlements, and industry.

Also, radar and weather facilities were already available in the Klyuchi area.

Activity on the range in the first half of 1957 was apparently mainly of

the practice variety, of facilities at both Tyuratam and Klyuchi. And On 21

August 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched its first ICBM on this

range. Tass commemorated the event with the following announcement a few days

later:

A super-long-range intercontinental multi-stage rocket was

launched a few days ago. The tests of the rocket were suc­
cessful. They fully confirmed the correctness of the
calculations and the selected design. The rocket flew at a
very high, unprecedented altitude.. Covering a huge distance
in a brief time, the rocket landed in the target area.

A second ICBM was successfully launched on 7 September 1957, and the USSR

followed this event on 4 October when the first artificial earth satellite

(Sputnik I) was placed into orbit. At least 16 more launches were attempted

through December 1958, including-ICBMs, ESVs, and lunar probes. Ninewere

believed successful, six failed after launch, and one was cancelled.

These activities led to speculation within the U.S. intelligence community

that ICBM production had actuallY begun in the Soviet Union by 1958. This was

substantiated to a degree on 14 September 1958, when Khrushchev commented in

Pravda that " ••• production of the ICBM has been successfully set up." And he

followed this with a statement in Pravda on 28 January 1959 that "series pro­

duction of the ICBM has been successfully organized."

By October 1960, Sigint and aerial photography showed at least three

launch areas were operational at Tyuratam--designated areas A, B, and C by

U.s. authorities for identification purposes. The launch pad at area A

was the only one noted in use prior to mid-April 1960, when launch area B

was also noted active. Area C probably began operation in October 1960.

- 7
.TOP SECRET UMBRA
DOCID:' 344"'''

(On 1 May 1960, t.he Soviets downed Gary Powers' U-2, ending aerial photography

of the ranges and of other locations in the USSR.)

Association of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)l with Tyuratam was

Expansion and refinement of the Tyuratam complex progressed steadily

throughout the years. ' And its range was subsequently extended to approximately

8,000 nautical miles, through the stationing of Soviet Missile Range Instru­

mentation Ships at impact areas in the Pacific Ocean.

.
o The P1esetsk Missile and Space Complex (PMSC)
~ In 1960, the SRF established an ICBM complex at P1esetsk, and by 1961

ICBM launches from

~~ .
P1esetsk to Kamchatka. In 1963 and 1965, two _ _", ICBM test periods were

noted on this range: one during October 1963--when the first 55-7 ,ICBM was

noted being launched on ;his range--and another in December 1965. In the

latter case, two S5-6 and three SS-7 ICBMs were fired from P1esetsk to

Kamchatka, probably mainly for range-instrumentation test purposes.

lIn May 1960, Marshal of the Soviet Un10~ Andrej A. Grechko stated
that the rocket forces had become "the main branch of the armed forces,"
and that the Soviet Government had determined it "should become a separate,
special branch of the armed forces." Labeled .. the Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF), Grechko further stated that it would have "its own command
and organizational structure."
8

TOP SECRET UMBRA

DOCID·: 34

On 17 March 1966, a space event occurred at P1esetsk, inaugurating

the addition of this function to the complex. A year later (in April 1967)

In its first full year of operation as a missile and space complex,

the Plesetsk test range was not overly active, handling only about 15 per

cent of the volume noted at Tyuratam. For example, 20 Itoperationsll were

noted on the Plesetsk range in 1966, compared to 124 at Tyuratam. But

. activity on the Plesetsk range increased sharply thereafter, and in the

o. next four years (1967-1970), Plesetsk handled about 40 per cent of the
~
activity taking place on both ranges.

Plesetsk, as· noted previously, was established as one of the earliest

of the Soviet ICBM complexes. SS-7 ICBMs--and probably SS-6 and SS-8

ICBMs.--were operationally deployed there. Also ) between 1967. and 1970, SS-6,

TOP SECRET UMBR~A

DOCID : 344 .L...!I!lC!

55-7, and 55-8 ICBMs were launched from Plesetsk for troop-training purposes.

In this time period, earth-satellite vehicles (E8Vs) were also launched from

Plesetsk by 8L-3, 5L-4, 8L-6, SL-7, and 5L-8 launch vehicles,3 including

payloads for photo-reconnaissance. and Molniyacommunications satellites. A

small number of unidentified satellites were also launched, some of which

may have been used for radar calibration, while others were probably communica~

tiona-related.

In 1969 and 1970, Plesetsk's share of missile firings declined as the

SS-7 was phased out. While large numbers of 58-9 and 85-11 ICBMs were fired

from Tyuratam, neither of these missiles had been launched on the Plesetsk

range. Conversely, the proportion of ESV launches was increased at Plesetsk

from parity with Tyuratam in 1968 and 1969 to almost double as many launches in

provided the 80viets with greater flexibility in their photo-reconnaissance ESV

program, and Elint-reconnaissance and navigational satellites were unique to

Plesetsk. In 1969 and 1970, as a result of the decline in missile firings and

the increase in ESV launches, the latter outnumbered the former at Plesetsk.

Two missile research and development programs--the S8-l3 and SS-X-IS

ICBMs--wereundertaken at Plesetsk, both apparently with limited success. Only

eight missiles were launched there in the 5S-X-IS test and development program.

The SS-13 program~ which was moved to Plesetsk from Kapustin Yar in 1966,

continued at a fairly slow rate, including one launch in 1966, ten launches in

1967, nine in 1968, six in 1969, and sixteen in 1970. The increase in 1970 was

3"SL" is the U.8. designator for "space launcher."

10

TOP &SCRET UMBRA

DOCID: 344~t!I

due to a series of firings of a modified SS-13~ in addition to apparently

routine--possib1y troop-training~-firings of standard SS-13s. The development

of these two missiles at Plesetsk~ a range with presumably limited facilities

compared to Tyuratam, implies that the Soviets expected neither program to

become a large one.

coincided with "tests of a new

naval missile--the SS-N-S.

In summary, the Plesetsk Missile and Space Complex, the existence of which

has never been publicly admitted by the Soviets~ was probably set up to relieve

Tyuratam of some of its burden at a time when the Ss-7 troop-training program

was expanding rapidly and when Tyruatam could expect heavy SS-9 and SS-ll

commitments in the near future. Troop~training programs involving SS-6, SS-7,

and SS-8 ICBMs; test and development programs of the SS-13 and SS-X-15 missiles;

and launches of ESVs for a variety of purposes characterized activity at the

P1esetsk missile and space complex in these early years.

o
~
•
The Sary Shagan Missile Test (SSMTC)

In 1960,

a missile-related facility was being developed in the Sary Shagan area,

west of Lake Balkhash. large-scale construction in the Sary

Shag an area as early as 1956, and probable test firings had been

conducted in 1957, but it was not until 1960 that a rather clear picture of the

activity could be pieced together.

11

TOP S.CRET UMBRA

 Located about 1,000 nautical miles east of ' the ~pustin Yar rangehead,

the new site at SaryShaganencoDipasseJ a 1argearea'of about 8,400 square

became a~parent that the Sary Shagan faGility would serve a 'major ,future

role i,n the Soviet Union:' s deve,lopm.ent· of an.ti-:-bal1;f.stic ~ssile sy'stems,

(A~). ,This was 'confirmed t~ a degree in mid~1960du:i:ing an "integrated

, ,

weapo,ns demonstration" at Sary Shagari" 'Foll~1ng toe de~~nstrati,~n, Marsh:~l

Kozakov, Firs t Deputy C01llDl:8nder:of Sov:iet' Artillery,' remarked that the
So~iet' Union'now had rockets·which ,~ou1d uhit high speed aircraft and

pilotless offensive devices ~tgreat altitudes,"

Though the activity at Sary)hagan 'was not confirmed as being ABM-re1~ted

o.
~
until 1960; special Soviet in~erests in such systems~ and, in th~ Sary Shagan

area as well, were seen much sO,oner.' In 1949, for example, a Soviet named

Spiridonov, of the Ministry of Armaments, had held lengthy disc~ssionsof such'

a system with the Germans at NU 88;, And in 1953, a railroad w~s completed from

Mointy to Chu. passing through the Sary Shagan area. Too,the SaryShagan'

area,was closed to foreign visitors in 1953,

12
~.;'':: "

ToPS~CRE,.·tJMBRi'
DOCID: 344=F!M

_ was established near Bajkonur in 1957, from which the 330-nautical-mlle

SS-2 could be launched to impact in the Sary Shagan area. Another

_ was located near Che1kar, from,which 88-3s, with a range of 630 nautical
miles, could be fired to impact in the Sary Shagan area at a

Longer-range missiles (the 58-4 with a maximum range of 1,050 nautical miles,
R
and the 5S-5 I~BM) also impacted at the after launch from Kapustin

Yar.

o•
~

In July and August 1957,· launches also occurred· of SS-2s _ impacting

at Sary Shagan. As many as eight SS-2s were possibly included in this series.

By this time both the SS-2 and SS-3 were considered to be operational, and these

firings to Sary Shagan were therefore believed to have been conducted for two

main reasons: (1) to further test and refine the ter~na1-flight aspects of

13

TOP SECRET UMBRA

DOCID: 344+552_ ' ,,~F ID :'A3416S52
.. ::rOP. 6E~E'tUMBRA
E.O. 13526, sec~i6n 3.3(b)O)

~ .

, -----,.,-:Similar tests were a 180 conducte<i dU~l.ng October ana'o~em6er

, 19t;Z;-'::-:fio::;:'w7::e~";""'er=-,-~--:--
.

,', .'

,On 7 November 1963" the,Soviets p~aded ,a new milSsile through Moscow.

, Labeled an anti-Ddssile missile by thEi Soviet' commentator.t to Western observel;s
~ , . . ' . ' ~. f' .

the, missile ;(NA,TO nickname Gri£f?n) looked more like a sur£~ce-to-air missile

, (SAM),' desig~ed. pr*rily . ..for defen~e against aerodynamic t.arget~ such' as

bolllbe~s and, air-to':surface missiles. The' G~iffGn was big, and ,it was believecl

. =rOP ~&GREf UMDI~" .,-.--, 1 (-0­

DOCID: 344~552 e REF ID :,A344i1P52 -- ¢'

TOP SECRET.UMBRA
---ta-ha:ve-wn~mu'C'h-a:erodynam:i:c-"wfng/-f±n-sUrtace-~funct-±on-in'--the-1"6-1e701 is k:i:gh--'' - ,

acceleratl.on antl. -IC1;H weapon j lot, was not'COmparati1-e-;-t"ott-s-lt';Si-lI"C'ount"el-part,.-,#I~---

On ? November 1964, the Soviet Union paraded an~ther new, mi!Ssile through
the streets ot Moscow. This missile, nameQ'Galosh by NATO, was also called, an

ASM by the 50viet'cOmmentator~ Althotigh ~neLOsed in a metal ~anister! the Galosh

, '

was estimated tc? be abOut 58: teet in length an~ about 6 teet in diameter. Also',
, ',\, ' , ,

the aft canister was' not cover~, and it couldb~ seen that the

booster solid-propellant motors, and that ·fold-out fins

for'attitude stabilization

The U.S. counterpart' to the Galosh is th,eSpartan ~BM~ d esigned to engage

and destroy ~ffensive oallsiti~ missiles at long r.airI"'t~s·-s hundred miles­

moth balls, following a short period of operation.

\
DOCID: ,3441552 • REF 'ID: A344.2·
'. \ " " " ' ,

.,TOp: SECRET' .UMBRA'

. r E.O. )3526, section 3.3(b)(1) I

.. J

,
, . . ,
 III. Soviet Land-&l.sed Ballistic Missiles

As noted previously, the Soviet Union inherited .inpressive missile

technology developed by the Germaris before and duririg the war. In this

. field the Germans had no equal by 1945, ar.d the USSR took full advantage

of everything available-scientists, technology, and hardware.

Initially, they employed German techniques and missiles, later

developing follow-on systems of their own. '!he V-2 in particular was

extensively stuUed, tested, m::rli.fied, and emulated in the years inmediately

after the war, and the early SOViet ballistic missiles distinctly

resembled this weapon.

other German missile-related systems were also docmented and tested

after the war. SUCh systems, and related subsystems of many types, were

carefully studied in att.E!tpts to isolate the cnes show,ing p:ranise for the

future, and to weed out those that had been rendered obsolete by advances

in technology. In addition to surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise

missiles, the SOViets spent vast arrounts of tin'e arx1 resOurces in laying

f0u.n:3.ations for future d.eve1oprents in the broad spectn1m of missile

and space technology.

Beginning with the early tests of the V-2 at Kapustin Yar in 1947,

the Soviet Union OOl'Xlucted subsequent tests at this and other missile

ranges of ~ wide variety of such systems. By the early 1960s they had

developed at least 10 1and-based surface-to-surface ballistic missile

mAB.Il1.A) 1.
systems. Included were SRBMs, MRJiS., IREMs, and ICBMs, with ranges fz:an

"
l Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) - up to 600 nautical mile ranges.
~um-Ranqe Ballistic Missiles (MRlI4s) - aOOut 600 to 1,500 nautical miles.
Intez:mediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) - abJut 1,500 to 3,000 nautical
miles.
Interoontinental-.Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) - about 3,000 to 8,000
nautical mile s.
NOFORN
 75 to 6,500 nautical miles, giving the Soviets a weapon mix that, a:nld

threa.t.en a variety of targets 'WOrl:d-wide. A sul:Jnarine-lauhched ballistic

missile (SIB1) with a range of 300 nautical miles was also operational by

1960. Also, by this time they had launched into orbit earth satellites,

and they had successfully oorduc:ted lunar probes. In 1960, the USSR

conducte::! its first planetary probe, am en 12 April 1961 Yuri Gagarin

'.beca1ne the first man in space aboard Vostok 1. '!hus, by 1961 the Soviet

union was '\Nell on its way toward achieving its goal-the developnent of I!I.

m:XI.ern ar.d versatile missile and space effort.

SS-;;I (Scunner)

The SS-la short-range ballistic missile was,' essentially, an elongated

verSion of the GeIman V-2. Early U.S. intelligence reports, for exarrple,

referred to it as "the Soviet V-2 ••• II arid, because of its exterded length,

the GellnanS called it the "flying ch:inney." The missile is oonsiderEd

to be obsolete, and has been deleted fran the Soviet Missile inventory •

. Korblev, while :in Ge:rmany in 1946, directed a project· that .produced

several of these elongated. V-2s. TheY'lNere later sent to NIl 88, and
'Were reportedly first tested. at Kapustin Yar in 1949. The extended

length of the Soviet version was apparently mainly for the purpose of

~reasing the range of the Getman V-2, and during the tests in 1949

the Germans est:imi:J.ted that a range of "about 350 nautical miles" had beeri
att.ained. 2

2.rowa.m the en1 of the initial Soviet tests of the Gennan V-2 in 1947,
the few GeImans at Kapustin Yar wer:e assigned elsewhere. Consequently, their
estimates of the acoanpli.shnelts. of these early tests of the SS-la (and of
. other early Soviet missiles tested at Kapustin' Yar) did not result f.ran per- .
sonal observation or involvement. As a result, ranges attriblted by the
Gennans to these early tests of the SS-la are not considered to be overly
reli.able, am a maxin'un range of al:x:ru.t 170 nautical miles was believed to be
the true capability of the missile.

TOP SECRET UMBR ~

t..
DOCID: 3441.........
Paralleling Soviet w:rk on the SS-la was the German R-10 project,

web also had as its min p..u:pose the refinement of the V-2, anong other

things extending its range to 500 nautical miles. As noted earlier 1

however, the R-10 project did not itself prcxiuce an operational missile.

l-tldifications to the German V-2 that 'iNere incorporated into the SS-la

yielded an increase in fuel capacity (fran 8,400 to 8,820 pa.ll':ds), in

oxidizer capacity (fran 10,800 to 11,025 pounds), arxi in thrust (fran

55 , 300 to 57 , 600 pounds).

Like the V-2 the SS-la was a single-stage missile with a nonseparating

nosecone, the nosecone \eighing a.b:>ut 2,200 p:::lUl'XIs. It used a cxyogenic

oxidizer and storable fueJ"... Missile Cbntro1 was maintained by jet vanes
and IlDV'ab1e aerodynamically confi9ured control surfaces on the fins.

Carrying a 1,720 pound high-exp1osive warhead with a circular error

3
probability (CEP) of a.b:>ut 1.5 nautical miles, the SS-la was roa1 trans­

portable and designed for tactical applications.

The single liquid bipropellant main engine of the SS-la, as noted

previously, developed about 57,600 poundS of thrust. Gross weight of the

missile was abJut 30,000 pounds with an over-all length estimated at

48.8 feet (canpared to the 46-foot length of the V-2). Maxirro..m\ diameter

was assessed at 5.4 feet (excluding the fins).

The trarlSf:X,)rtab1e launch facility of the SS-la was similar to that

used for the German V-2. The launch platform consisted of a ring-type

frame to support the missUe and a flame def1e::tor below the ring. . The

launch p1atfo:tT!\ was probably placed on a concrete pad at the launch site.

3Cil::cular error probability is the radius of a circle, centered on the

intended target , within which 50 percent of the missile warheads are expected
to fall.
DOCID:

was probably not operationally deployed in significant numbers, and, as

noted preViously, it is consi.derEd to be obsolete and deletEd fran the

Soviet missile inventory.

ss-lJ!' (SCuit A)
/

Design of the short-range, nx>bile, tactical SS-lb began in the early

1950s, am by 1957 the missile was believed to have been operationally

deployed in l.i.nU.tEd nUmbers. Enployi.ng a design utilizing the basic

wasserfall IStorable propellant engine, the single-stage SS-lbprobably

was developed to replace the SS-la. The SS-lb, in turn, is believed to

have been largely replaced by the ss-l.c.

Tr,.;o types of nonseparating nosecones are enployed by the SS-lb. one,
a hign-explosive/chemical-warfare version, pemU.ts a range of about 160
. • 4 • .
nautJ.cal nules. The other, a nuclear verSJ.on, restrJ.cts the range to

al:x>ut 85 nautical miles. Noseoone weight of the 85-nautical mile version

is 2,850 p:>unds, and nosea>ne weight of the l60-nautical mile variant is

1,545 }?OWlds.

Over-all length of the SS-lb is 34.5 f~, with a dianeter of 5.9

feet including the fins, and 2.9 feet excluding the fins. Gross weight

of the 85-nautical mile version is 13,000 pou:OO.s: gross weight of the

4RangeS shown 'for missiles in this history reflect "non-rotating­

earth" distances. Thus, because of the earth's rotation, acb.lal (rotating­
earth) ranges for missiles launched towam the east will be greater than
their non-rotating earth ranges; the opposite WJUld be the case for missiles
fired towam the west. To oonvert distances fran non-rotating-earth to
rotatinq-earth, the latittX1e of the launch point, the launch azircuth, and the
non-rotating-earth range must be kno"wn. Conversion charts are aVclilable for
these puzposes.' '

TOPSfiCRET'
., UMBRA
DOCID:
l60-nautical mile version is 11,700 pounds. Booster engine thrust is

assessed at 16,800 pounds.

The missiles I profUlsion system consists of a single chamber,

fixed-position engine using a liquid bip:ropellant pressure-fed system.

Glidance is inertial, with nol'lIl'OVable a.erOOynamically configured fins

sexving as stabilizers in the denser at:lrcsphere. With a nuclear yield

estimatEd bebJeen .01 a:rx1 .04 megaton, CEP is believed to be .7 nautical

mile at two-thirds maxim:Im range.

The missile is transported by a tracke:i transporter-erector-launcher

('!EL) derived fIan ~ Stalin-class tank. OVer-all weight of tie TEL

is about 41' tons, with acrufsing speed 01; about 25 miles an hoo.r and a
naximJm cruising range (with external tanks) 'of about 187 nautical miles.

Alsc:>, on 7 November 1957 the'missile was

paraded publicly for the first time in ~scOW', revealing additional

data concerning its design, capabilities, anl int:ended operations.

S8-li (Scud B)
I
The SS-Ic, a sh:>rt-range tactical missile I was first seen in a r-bscow
parade on 7 Novanber 1961. It was probably operational at that time,

and it is deployeJ tdlay in the Soviet, Union and the satellite nations.

TOP SECRET UMBRA "

DOCID: 3441:...
Designed as a highly nobile missile system, the SS-lc represents

significant refinatents over the SS-lb. The range of the nuclear-anred

SS-lc, for example, has been extended to aoout 150 nautical miles, can­

pared to the approximate 8S-nautical mile range of the nuclear;"a.tTOOd

versic::n of the SS-lb. In addition to a tracked TEL, a wheeled TEL is .

available to the SS-lc, providing greater nobility, higher speeds (an

~rease of about fiVe miles an hour), less maintenance, and. a self­

loading capability. The SS-lc is also about three feet longer than the

SB-lb, though their dia:rreters are· the same. Gross weight is assesSed

at 13,000 pounds,. the BaIre as that. of the nu:::lear-antBi SS-lb, rut

thrust of the SS,...lc has been increased to about 20,200 paUrds.

As was the case with the SS-lb, two types of payloads are available

for the missile; one is a nuclear version, the other a high-explosive/

chan:ical-warfare type. Maximum range of l::x:>th versions is the same­

aoout 150 nautical miles. The single-stage SS-lc srploys a nonseparating

nosecone, with a CEP estimated a .5 nautical mile at two-thiJ::ds ma.ximum

range, and a nuclear warhead yielding .01 to .10 Itleg'aton.

Inertial guidanceS is used for the SS-lc, with four jet vanes arployed

to assist· in con:trolli.:ng the missile in flight. As was also the case

with the SS-lb, the SS-lc uses aerocIynami.cally configured l'lOJ"lIt¥:)Vale fins

to serve as stabilizers in the denser atIrosphere. The missile t s thrust

is generated by a liquid bipropellant turbop.mp-fed system.

5As defined by the Soviets in 1955 in their unclassified publication

Red Star, inertial guidance is "accatplished by an apparatuS, installed·.in
the missile itself, the flight prc)3ram of which is preset before la~hing. If

TOP SEGRE~r UMBRA.

"
DOCID: 344155
. '!he SS-lc also reflects teclux>logy and design of the German wart.lme

missiles, particularly the Wasserfall 6 and V-2. The engines of ~ SS-lb

am 5S-lc are believEd to .be virtually the same, both evolving fran that
used by the W':lsserfall. The guidance systems of these two missiles are

probably similar to that designed for the V-2. The ~s, as well as

steering ItDtDrs for the vanes, are also similar to those uSErl on the V-2.

f.ti.lit:ary deployment of the SS-lc, am of the SS-lb as W311, is

believed to center around. a brigade with nine missiles assigned to it.

Each brigade is further divided into three battalions, with three

missiles assigned to each battalion. Fach brigade is believed to be

deployed in a 30- by 50-kilometer rectangular area, located no closer

than about 30 Jd.laooters fran the forward edge of the battle area.

The missile brigades are believed to be sub:n::d.inate to amty or higher

First imications of resea.rt:h and developnent of the· SS-lc were

in Decanber 1959, am, as noted previously,

the SS-lc was believed to have been operatianal by 1961. By 1963, it was

seen replacing sate of the SS-lb missiles in the USSR and Warsaw Pact
countries, am today it is believed. to have largely replaced the SS-lb.

S6-2 (Sibling)

The design of the SS-2 was basically pattemed after the V-2,

trough sanewhat longer. Work on the design of this missile was begun

after the war in Get:::many un:ler the directioo of Korolev. Because of

his persooal. involveoon.t in the devel.op:rent of this missile, it was

6As noted previOusly, the wasserfall, a surface-tD-air anti-aircraft

missile, was essentially a sca.led-down version of the V,,:,2. Alsocalled
the C-2 by the Germans, the W':lSserfall was a.1xx1t 26 feet in length
(OOtparEd to the 46-foot length of the V~2) •

TOP &.CRET
1
UMBRA.
.
DOCID: 34a:i~

referre:i to as the Koro1ev rocket for identification pJrpOses within the

U.S. intelligence ocmwnity in its early deve1q;:menta1 period. Prototypes

of the missile were sent to the SOviet Union bet:ween 1946 and 1947, alcng

with V-2s am other war l:xx>ty. First Soviet tests of the SS-2 reJ?Ortedly

.ocxru.rred at Kapustin Yar in 1ate-1949, though "unsuccessfully," am

with .the missile had begun by 1954.

But it was not until 1957 and 1958 that extensive

in regard to this missile. The SS-2 is considered to be

obsolete tcxlay.

~ versions of the missile evolved. The first, called the Koro1ev I,

was similar to the V-2, except that it was about 10 feet longer. The

other version, the Koro1ev. II, was about two feet 1cnger than the
Koro1ev I. It was also believed to in::orporate an "improved guidance
systan. II other than in these areas, the two versions of the rocket

•
o•
~

Aerial photography of the Kapustin Yar rangehead in December 1959

provided SCJll:! data concerning the SS-2 '. s dimensions and supporting systems.
Its rraxirn..:an length was detennined to be al:x:>ut 57.7 feet, with a maxinun

diameter of !¢out 5.4 feet (excluding the fins). Also, liquid ~

trailers, of the type formerly associated with the German V-2, were seen

. grouped around the misSile. Ground rrobile support equiptEnt, alsO of

Gemlan w:>rld War· II design, was seen in the area,· indicating that the

rocket was designec1 for a nobile tactical capability. The missile was

located at the _ of the Kapustin Yar rangehead, at that tine con-

TOP SECRET UMi$RA

,
DOCID : 34CklDJlliI

.was
t.aining bK,) separate lalmCh .... Q\,............... L.~"'C:iO--

still under construction, rut a t least two launch sites were

evolving, spaced about 800 feet apart..

Area

had three launch sites,

spcw::ed approximately 2,000 feet apart.

'!he short-range 55-2 was capable of carrying a 3,300 pJUnd separating

reentry vehicle (with a warhead weighing 2,200 pourxls) 7 to a range of

al:xJut 330 nautical miles. The original reentry vehicle was believed

to have been designed for a high-explosive charge, alt:b::>ugh a nuclear

capability was also believed to have been available to the missile. The

SS-2, was road transp:>rtable, an::1 when first paraded .publicly in May 1962,

it was seen II.O.lnte::l on a nmified version of the V-2 transporter/erector

(the Meillerwagen). The SS-2 launcher was believed to have been supported

on concrete pads and lccate::l at presurveyed sites.

Altrough basicaily an "upgraded" version of the V-2, the extended

length of the SS-2, anl intenlal in:Xlifications, permitted it to carry

nore fuelr The engine was also in:Xlified ~ that of the V-2, increasing

engi.ne-chamber pressure- and yielding a booster thrust of about 81,500

pounds. OVer-all weight of the missile was assessed at 44,750 pounds.

AlcOhol and liquid oxygen were probably used to fuel the missile. Missile

control was maintained by jet vanes and mvable control surfaces on the

aerodynamically configured fins. Reentry vehicle separation was probably

~
acx::anplished by explosive b:>lts with the reentry v;eucle pushed away
fran the booster by medlanical springs. CEP was estimated at about one .

nautical mile.'

- 7'Ihe reentry vehicle is that part of the missile des~ to reenter

the earth's atn'osphere in its final stages of flight. Included are the
weights of the warhead, the weights of necessary shie1.dinq and structure,
and of other required canpanents. The warhead is that part. of the reentry
vehicle containing an explosive,· chemical, nuclear or other such device.

TOPSECaET \JMBRA
- .
 Beginning on 27 June 1959, tests of another missile were notEd on
J..;
the Kapustir. Yar range, overlapping to a degree the test perio~ of

the SS-2. closely related to the SS-2 in

performance and capabilities.

missile, it was noted being launched in subsequent tests to dist:ances of

...-... about 30, 85, and 300 nautical miles. Its flig~ and burn titoos at the
~
'-"
...-...
~
'-"
M
•
long er distance were virtually the same as that of the Korolev II.

that t.i.n'e, U.S. ArIl¥ intelli~ reports speculated that

'WaS
the.
b eing developed "as a 300"'nautical-mile rocket to be launche:! fran
At

missile

M
=
Q
••
......­
c.J
The.
sutrn arines...

missile~t program was divided into two phases.

first lasted fran 27 June to 1 Ck:tober 19591 the second fran 24 Deoember
The

~
r:I'l 1959 to 25 February 1960. Eleven launches were noted during the first
.....
\C series~ five in the se::::orrl. missiles also
N
l.()
M
occur red on 28 July 1959 am. 3 February 1960, When they \\'ere either
~
lalmc ha:i vertically or lalmched to the very short distances noted above.
•
0• during these

~
IrOdel of the .or
early tests, indicating, acx:ording to a U~S. A:J::rrri report, "an

an experiIrental reentty vehicle."

iIri>roved.
(Apparently ~

designator for the R-13 is the SS-N-4). The _test

becarre the R-13 when it was actually prcxluced and deployed-the u.S.
program pI:Obably

t:eJ:minated in February 1960; apparently the Soviets believed the rooket

had been developed to the p:>int where further testing am. refinerent could

8The Soviets give their missiles an "R-series" designator when they

reach operational status. These designators, :hc:lwever, are not to be confused
with the R-10 t:hrough R-15 projects discussed earlier in this histo:ry, which
. \'1ere separate and distin:::e narie1'1clatures used in the early years of German
involvanent in the Soviet missile program. As noted previously, none of these
earlier "R-series" missiles in which the Germans were involved were actually
pnxiuoed or deployed by the Soviets.

TOP 6E~J!T UMBRA

DOCID:· 3441

By the em of FebI:uary 1961, at 'least. ~OO'laUnches of tile SS~2

had been cand~by 1;:he Soviets". nDst ,on .t:l':e Kapustiri Yar ,range.
Twenty-eight
.
SS-2s ~e also 0bserved
.
.being. fired·on the sary' Shagan
... . ~

'range. An:1, as noted previously,' the' SS-2 is nolonge.r an 'operatioruu

·ndssile.

r •

ss-3 (Shyster)
:
. "

The S~3 was' still anOther soviet ,missile patterned'

. to 'a considerable
.

degree after the V-2. First tested in 1955; it was pIague:i with problems
' . ~. ~. .
. .

o. al.rtoSt fran the start, and Qy 1962 was . no longer l::i9iieveCi to be. o:peraticnally
~ deployed.

By 1956 it had achieved initiai ~operational Capabilit:l J

production had also· prQbably begUn by that year.

The max:inum range of :the SS-3 'was 630 na~ical lniles; and it was
. designed for a 3, 30o-FOund reentry veh.i,cle· (with a warhead welghing .

2,200 pounds). . The

J
circular error probability was :believed
.
to be .~

naut..ical mile, the.same as· that of the SS-2. It, and ~sociated' equip­

men~, were also :"tr~rtable. ft. But the system had major draWbackS •. Up

to fiw";hours 'were required tp prepare it fOr launch,. arid a. concrete pad

. was necessary, making it a p:x>r candidate, as a Itr.?bile -weapons systan. , '

9Init:tal operational capability <IP:) equates to tretime the firs~, .

operatialal uriit is believed to· have been trained and equipPed with mis~iles.
an:! the necesBar¥ launch facilities.. . . . ..'

... .. TOP SEG~rpr UMDR~ . •. . )J

. DOCrD : 344.:q:::l1;ql
In addition to its role as a medium-range missile, the 55-3 was

. userl by the Soviets in a variety of ot.l'er· areas. It was use:l in

vertical launches for research and aevelopnent of space-related

efforts, and it was used in ~ tests on the sary Shagan range. Although

nO longer deployed operatima1ly by 1962, it continuEd to be used well

into that year, and possibly as late as 1965, mainly
_ AlSQafter 1961 launches of 55-3s were associated witn a n .
making identification of the missile

difficult thereafter.

'!he SS-3 was approximately 68 feet in length, about 10 feet longer

than the 55-2; its diameter also slightly exceeded tllat of the SS-2.

Oller-all weight of the 5S-3 was about 65,000 pounds, and its booster engine

. was capable of generating .about 100,000 pounds of thrust. It used liquid

oxygen and alcohol as fuel, as was probably also the case Wi. th the SS-2.

Fuel capacity of the SS-3, hcMever, was assessed at 60 percent greater than

that of the 55-2. Whereas the 55-2 was labelerl. a tactical missile, the

SS-3 was probably designed mainly for a strategic role. Earlier versions

probably carried a high-explosive warhead, but oPerational versions

were nuclear-aJ:lled.

Initially e:nploying a radio-inertial guidancesystan, the 55-3 was

assisted early in flight by radio, the transmitter located 11- to 16-nau­

tical miles to the rear of the launch site am sighted on a line with

the intended launch azirruth. ('1his technique was also ettployErl With early

versioos of the 55-2 and of other early Soviet missiles as well.l As

nore reliable inertial canponents becarce available, an autanawus

inertial guidance system possibly became available for the. missile. The

SS-3 was controlled in flight by aerO:iynarnically configured fins and by

TOP SECRET UMBRl\

. I·
fY
DOCID: 3441¥@F
.
seeR
"

jet vanes.

;Reflectioos of German technology were also seen in this system.

Parts of the launch platfoIm were similar to those used. for the V-2,

ana. engine shutdown t:.ecmiques ~loy~ by this missile-and by the,

, SS-:-la, SS-2, and SS-4---were first used in the German V-2. This
teclmique pemitted a reduction in thrust prior to engine bumout,

the missile continuing at this, re:iuced capacity until the desired speed

and. trajectory had been obtained., at which time catrplete engine shutd£:Mn

occurred. Aerial photography also showed that design of the exhaust seg­

ment of the SS-3 was similar to that of the V-2.

Between June 1955 and April 1959, at least 68 SS-3s had been
l~hed by the Soviets to accanplish a variety of missions. Thirty­

two nore were seen being launched between 1959 and 1962 on the Sal:.'y
Shaqan range, sane as target vehicles for the evolv:lng Af:M effort.

In the latter case, ranges of al:x:lut 525 nautical, miles were ,achieved.
Although no longer operational after 1962, the SS:"3, as noted

previOusly, was still being launched after that date, including vertical

fir:lngsat the Kap.lstin Yar test range. Its early obsolescence as an

operational mis~ile was probably mainly the .result of the successful

developnent of the 5S-4, and because of shortcanings of the over-all

missile system itself.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Il
 - 55-4 (Sardal) ,

in its developnental $ges,

of Kap,lstin Yar in
, '

mid.-1957, and,again in,December1959." First launched in June 1957 ~

...-----,
the SS-4 'W8S shown ,publicly for t:ll.e <first ti.m.::in a parade in Novenber

1960. several distinct, stages, were -notal', in ,regaro ':to the develop:tent
--of' this missi1e~ the first, in-·1957, 'the last,

in 1960, involvaii,it:s use

two· pericds of :resea:reh and. devel.op:tent were' noted.

'l'tJe SS-4- ~s '~single-st.age:missile'·ca~le of delivering a

3,300-J?OUn:i reeri'tJ:y· vehicle ,-to 'a inaxi.m.lm- range -of about 1 , 050 nautical

miles. -Weighi:ncg aOOut,'87,260 ~, •., .it· is _slightly over 74 feet in

lengtb,~ with a d~terat itsbaseof.5~4·feetexc:luding the fins, and

10 feet with the fins. ' B00ster :thrust :is assessed at,135,200pourids.

CE:P is believed t:6 be al:::oot L25 nautical miles, with a nuclear yield of

.5 to 2 megatons.

Like its predecessors, the SS-4 employs sane of, the older V-2

techniques. Its;liquid -bipropellant' blrbo-purrp-fed systan,o for exanple,

• -
0­
.

arploys a' tw:>-phase Cll'tOff ~e similar to that. use:l -in .the GeJ::man
• V-.'). • Also, thrust IOOdulation' is use:l,- by ,the fixed-positi~, engine to
~
ooritrol velocity, -and it also appears' that 'the 'gas generator is siinUar '
'------'

, to -that uSErl an the V-2.

Pr-elimina:ry design: 0f·the missile was probably' begun by the Soviets

in late 1952'1 and, as noted p;reviously",it subsequently evolved. through

a ruimber of- dist.i.ret- deve10pnental'phases. 'r.he first -began on 22 June

1957 and ended on 29 August of that year.

were of the over-all missile, systan".i.nclucling c;JUidanee, and Iffi.:.ssiles

iTOP SECRET lJMBRA

, - I~
 DOCID:
~e lal:IDChed to impac:.:t areas 950- and 1,OSO...nauticalmilesdistant•.
. .
. FollCM.iIlg c:a:rpletioo of/these early ;tests, a' 11:111 . of nil1e rronthS
CCCI.ltted., apparently to perrn,ft an evaluation of the results and to

ma.keneeessary' ll'dlifications.
The secx:mdphase of",t,he developrentalprograrn. began: on; 27 May 1958.
. I '"

Missiles ·were :fired 00450-, ·950-, aI'ldl,050.,.nautical mile distances.

assoc:.:iatai with these tests,

,.-... during ~ch periQd 13 missiles ~neted" being launched.

....-i . A
'-"
,.-... The thi.rdtest~ develo~t phas~~an in.late-1958.
..c
'-" .
tf')
:iDdicating =the missile
•
tf') had ~lved,into an··lfadvanced researehand.'developte;nt phase." '(A

.........=
.Q -limited operational capability.. was. also. possibly achievedby'this ti.Ire.)
.t:J These tests were characterized. by" a. relativeiy, high number. of failures I
QI
"-l
5 of 23 failing between. July ,1959· and, FebruaJ::y19.60.· By cooparison;
\C'"
M
In . failed :in. the ,earlier test periods.
only three were known to have .
Many·
tf')
~. om · 0perat'~ons were cance·I'led"
,. er II II· . . ..
prev~ous.
:·,to "1aunch .'
•
0•
~

AlSo i a number, of: the',missi1es'(at

least eight) were fired to 650-nautical. mile .impact areas, indicating

. that .this 'WOUld possibly· be 'the SS-4' s mi.n.in:'o..m1 range.

TOP SECRET lJMDRA

S1
DOCID : 34 4=-::A
On 28 July 1959, Chief Marsha.l of Artillery Mit;rofan I. NedelinlO

witnessed' the launch.of ~._miSsiles to a 950-nautical-mile impact

area." . These missiles'.. were launched' in less than· three hours of each .

0ther, apparently .with ·.no associated·_·

Military training· for operati0nal, deployment probably began' in

earnest with a launch 00 26 July 1960, and the first probable launch of

a deployed SS~ tookplaee on .the 'Iy.uratam ra.rlg'e on 4 NovE!lll::>er 1960.

By 1961, at least 150. of .these missile~ had been launched for a

'variety of. purposes, 'including tests. of the ABM program on the . sary.

Shagan range. The SS-4figut:.a:i prcmineJ:l.tlyinthe 0Jban Missile Crisis

. .
of .1962, ani it remains an operational missile to:iay., deployed in the

peripheral' areas of the USSR. Also, sir:ce 1966 the SS-4 has been use1
extensively' as a carrier vehicle f0J! a variety of ballistic missile test

efforts.

S5-5 (Skean)
•
o• The 55-5 is an intermed.iate-range missile that alS() inherited SCIOO

~ of the te:::lmiques .developed .by the Germans. in W:;)rld War II. Its design

. and capabilities additionally :reflectwoJrk done by the Gentan$ after

the war, .and in particular. in .regard. t:0 their involvauent in the R-14

Pr0ject. in. the late 1940s.anl early195Qs.

its developrental periOO.,. the SS-5 was first noted

lOkoording to an article in the 16 Octt;)ber 1965 issue of The Manchester

Guardian, Nedelin,"arrl 300 others, were kiJ;ledin the fall of 1960 when a
missile ~loded Gm its launch pad'. Quoting as its source the "secret
reports" of Oleg V. Penkovsky, a S0viet citizen sentenced to death in 1963
., fGr'sP!td.IlJ for the West·, 'The Guardian noted that·the countdCMn for the
missil~escri.bed as one with "a nuelear propellan~If-woent snrx:>th1y, but
the "new missile failed to leave the ground~" . After· waiting 20rn.inutes,
. the observers left the shelters, at which time the missile exploded. The
SovietS piblicly attributed Nedelin' s death to "an air accident. If

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Il
DOCID: 3441~

being tested on the Kapustin Yar range in June 1960. It probably

achieved initial cperational capability in .1961, and the missile was

shown !XJ,blicly for the first tine in a parade in M::>scX>w on 7 Noyember

1964. ~.SS-5 remains an operatiooal missile tcxlay.

Although the missile probably did rot achieve operational capability

until 1961, refla::tions of its develDptent were seen earlier. System

design was probably begun in 1953, as a follOW'-On proja::t to the R-14.

Aerial photography of the Kapustin Yar ranqehead in the late 1950s also

showed related de~or;:ments, when it revealed a crnplex with three

launch areas. The center launch area was still umer construction, but
enough had been canpleterl to s1:rJw its orientation toward the 2, OOo-nau­

tical-mile.inpact area near Krasnoyarsk, maki.nq it a likely candidate for

testing_miSsiles. Also, RhrushChev, in May 1960, alll'rled to the

imninency of a SOViet IRB1, and. it had been speculated by U.S. intelligence

analysts that such a missile Tt.1OUld evolve fran the R-14 Project.

The single-stage ss-5 is capable of delivering a 3,500-pourrl reentty

vehicle to a maximum range of about 2,200 nautical miles. Its over-all

length is 79 feet, with a diarreter of eight feet (exclOOinq the fins) •

~ghing aoout 216,000 pounds, itsbcx:>ste.r engine is capable of developing

360,000 pounds of thrust. The propulsion segment of this liquid-fueled

rocket consists of four thrust chambers am two turbopump units, each

consisting of a turbine, fuel pump, and oxidizer p!Jl'Cp.

TWo reentty vehicles are associated with the missile; one, designated

the M:xi I, is 9.3 feet in length, the other, the Mcx1 2, is 7.5 feet

long. CEP is estimated to be about one-half nautical mile, and warhead

yield of both the ~s 1 and 2 is assessed at 1.5 to 5 neqatons. Inertial

guidance is e:nployed for the SS-5, and velocity control· is maintained by

TOP 6EGf1,ET UMBRA

DOCID:34~1'1II
engine throttling. Jet vanes on the exhaust nozzles are used for

attitme control. A technique successfully used. for this missile

pe:rtainErl to reentr;y vehicle separation. SOlid-fueled retro~ . ."

were E!IPloyed to accanplish separation of the reentIy vehicle.

During its develo~tal perioo, fran June 1960 to April 1963,

the missile was launched to distances of 1,050, 2,000, and 2,500

nautical miles. The first t\«) launches of the SS-5--oo 6 and 25 June 1960­
were to the 1,050 nautical mile distance. The first full-range launch
occurred on 3 August 1960, impacting in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk, a

distance, as noted previously, of. alxmt 2,000 nautical miles. These

three launches were nonitored

The extended-range lal.lnches

to 2,500 nautical miles occurred on 26 and 29 November 1960, both

of which were successful. 'lWo additional extended-range tests 'NeI'e

also noted on 14 July and 6 August 1965. The missile launched in

August, however, failed to reach· the intended impact area because o f l l

It fell short after reaching a dis­

tance of about 1,880 nautical miles.

associated with these initial·SS-5 events.

o••
~

was no longer used· for SS-5s follovring a launch on 4 October 1965 •

.::rOP SECRET UMBRA

"
DocrD:
Though not yet operational in early 1961, sufficient infonriation

.had bec::ooo available by that ti1oo. to disceri?- ~ aspects of its

intenierl usage. on the basis of aerial photography of its .launch

( . pad . '.

at KaPustin Yar, for exanple, it was determined.· that a degree .of nobility' - .

was designai into the missile, making 'it ":road ·trClIl.SIX>rtable." One
:indication of this capability was the sparseness· of ~t construction

near the SS-5 launch pad at Kapustin. Yar.Another indication· was the
.
pad itself, which was flat and hard-surfaced With no apparent provisions.

for venting rOcket exhaust gases. on the. basis of these observations,

it was estim:lterl'at the tine .that the .r:ocket. could be transportec.i'ani

that laUnch facilities would be of :the soft variety-that is, above

ground. '!he rocket, however, is believed to be deployed at both soft

and hard sites (silos).

Probable user trials for theSS-5were f'irst held in 1962,

Feb~ 1963 to Januazy 1967, the ~ fran March 1967 to April 1969~ •.
. and the ~ frem 'June 1969 through at. least June 1970.

The first launch of.~ SS-5 fran a deployed. site probably occurred

. an 22 <ktober 1963 on the Kapustin Yar range. This lallllCh, 90incided

with the first launch of a Cleployed SS-7 ICFM by the SRF. on the
. . . ' . '. '

Plesetskrange, :iInpacting'
an the Kamchatka PeilinSula. Also, launches

of the SS-5 occurred nost frequently du:nn9 its system-developne:nt period.

During this pericxi, of alOOst three years duration,. at least 63 miSsiles

:rOP ~.CRET.U.M[)RA. '. ';'"

',,",

;4 "
DOCID: 344~1CI
were launched. A sharp decline was noted between June 1963 and August

1966, when. only 27 missiles were noted being latmched.

The SS:"5 (and the SS-4' as well) figured praninenUy in the CUban

Missile Crisis of 1962. Although no SS-5s were actually photographed in

Cuba, site preparations for then revealed a number of aspects concerning

their interrled deplO}'IlleIlt and operation.

Two sites were chosen by the Soviets for initial deployment of the

SS-5s in CuDa~ one was located in the extreme westezn part of the island,

the other was IDsitioned near the· center of the country. Both lccations

were' within eight miles of seaports, apparently because of the difficulty

of trans:r;:orting this large missile and its supporting systems any

considerable dista:nce. Each SS-5 battalion in CUba consisted of t'!NO

launch pads and a control building. Also, 1:!pecial arch-roofed buildings

.were seen under construction to house the nosecones.

55-6 (Sa~)

First launched on the 'IYUratarn range on 21 August 1957, the SS-6 gave

the Soviets their initial ICBvi capability. It also enabled them to pioneer

in space operations. The missile is considered to be obsolete today as

an ICBM, although it continues to be used as a 1::x::>oster for various

space-related operations.

A large missile, the SS-6 is capable of developing nearly a million

p:>Unds of thrust, with a gross weight of about 558,000 :r;:ounds. It is

about 102 feet in length over-all , with amaximJm range of al:x:lut 6,500

'nautiCal miles. Called a "one and one-half stage rocket, fI the SS-6

uses parallel staging of its 1::x::>oster engines which were jettisoned during

f.light. In this configuration, the first stage consists of four booster

+OP &fiCRitlT UMBRA

...
DOCID: 344~~

engines (each 8.8 feet in diameter) and one sustainer engine, all of which

are ignited simultaneously. In additicn, the missile has four liquid

vernier/control chambers on the sustainer eng1rle and two on each of the

1::xx:>ster engines. Differential throttling of the 1::xx:>ster engiI)es provides

initial attitu:Ie control.

f<t '
Designed and manufactural at NIl 88 and Factory I i at Kaliningrad, '
, "
,~ missile was first deployed operationally in early 1960 at soft sites

in the USSR, with a reentry vehicle weighing about 15,000 pounds and a

range believei to be less than 5,000 nautical miles. Later, a lighter

reentry vehicle had been testal, and this version was probably fitted

to deployed missiles to give them a range in excess of 6,000 nautical

miles.

Although the first launch of an S~-6 occurred on 21 August 19'57,

culminating in the first launch on 21 August. A second

SS-6 was successfully launched on 7 September 1957, these first two

launChes probably representing the "feasibility" aspects of 'the SS-6

missile p:rogram.

Following theSe two initial launches, the SS-6 was extensively

tested fral1 January 1958 through July 1960, the ntm1ber of launches

peaking in 1959 and early 1960. In this time of peak activity, three

distinct test periods were noted. '!be first, which lasted f.rarI March '

through June 1959, Six launches

.::rOP 5EGRET UMBRA

 were noted during these tests~ A secorrl test series,· fran July

to November 1959, when at least

eight missiles were launched. Durir.v:J these tests, weights of the reentJ:y

vehicles were assessed at abolit 15,000 j;ourDs. Two of the missiles

in the 'latter test ~ies were also launchel'i.to a Pacific itrpact area

on 22 an:i 25 a:tober 1959, representing the first exten:lErl-range launches

involving the use of The thi:td test series

0
I~
1

began in DeceII'ber 1959, lasting into July 1960. Thirteen missiles 'Were

noted being launched in this perioo, of which at least five impactaJ.

in the Pacific (three launched on 20, 24 am 31 January 1960 am two

on 5 arrl. 7 July 1960). All of these exterrlErl-range flights to the

Pacific were successful, except for the one m 24 January which failed

in flight. The other missiles were launched to Kamchatka.

The missiles launcha::i during this "final phase of research and

developnent" of the SS-6 program differErl fran earlier versions in a

number of ways. The weight of the reentJ:y vehicle, for example, had

been reduced to about 9,000 poun::ls. An all-inertial guidance system

had been successfully developed and tested for it, arrl in-flight control

of the missile had been inprovErl. The reduction in reentry-vehicle

weight also peI.Tnitted longer range.

DeSpite these later improvanents, the missile continued to have

major sb:::>rta::mings, severely I'la:qering its role as an operational. ICBM.

It was, .for example, deplo.Yed at soft sites, making it vulnerable

to attack am sabotage. Also, its use of a cryogen;i.c oxidizer permittErl

,....
the missile to be held in a high state of readiness ·for only about one
hour. An:l lengthy periods of time were required to prepa.re it for launch.

=roP SEGRE=rUMBRA
DOCID: 34415'
These Ci:r-awback.s, coupled with a CEP assessed at no better than tw:>

, nautical miles, severely curtailed its deployment. Also, by this ,

time other I<::Ef.1s were evolving, that incorporated significant inprove-.
ments over the caPabilities of the SS-6, furt.1:lE!r speeding its
obsolescence as an ICBM. Following the, "fin.a.r' test and developnent

series, launchings of the SS-6 ICBM steadily decli.ne:3. I averaging only

about tw:> a year after 1961. The last observed launch of an SS-:-6 in its

ICBM tole occurred in 1966.

SS-7 (Sad:ller)

The 55-7 is an· ICBM deployed in the Soviet tJ:n.i.ori. at both soft and '
hard sites. FI:an a ratherinauspic;ious beginn.ing (the .first t::trree': launches

of 55-7s 'WE!re failures), the missile evolved into an effective weap:n

systan, capable of achieving intercontinental ranges .between about '

4,000 and 7,000 nautical miles. First tested on 24 ~ 1960 on the

Tyuratam range, this missile was believed to have reached initial

operational capability by early 1962, and the first missiles (~rllaps

as many as 10. in nuriiber) could have beEm depl~ at soft ,sites by this

t.ime.

Although test and developnent phases of the 55-7 missile p:rogram

were conducted at Tyuratam, for the operational

deployment of the missile -were mainly conducted on the Plesetsk range.

High trajectories were ,flown fran Tyuratam (370-500 nautical miles) i

lC1Ne.r trajectories were flown f.rom Plesetsk (330-365 nautical miles).

Ebth high-' arid lCM-ballistic coefficient reentry vehiclesll were tested

l~ Speed of a reentry vehicle is gauge1 through its ballistic

coefficient, which is a reentry-vehicle characteristic whose value is
a function of reentrY-vehi.cle weight and shape. The speed with which a
reentry-vehi.cle passes through the atn:osphere increases as the ballistic
coefficient increases. .
,TOP &Ii:CRET UMBRA.
.,.3
bOCID: 3441::....
at Tyuratam. Only the high-speed reentry vehicles were tested at

Plesetsk.

A m.mIber of variations of the SS-7 have evolved. Designated.

Mods 1, :2, 3, and 4, these variants are distinguished mainly by

varying reentry vehicle weights and configurations. The first, the

Mod 1, was tested during initial phases of the 55-7' s developnent.

The Mcx:1 :2. reentry vehicle, which ~ighed ab:>ut· 3,500 pounds, the sane
as that of the M:xI i, was first noted tested in October 1962 to 3,400­
and 6,500-nautical mile distances. A heavier reentry vehicle, the Mod 3,

was first testEd during November 1~6:2 to Karrchatka (a distance of 3,400

nautical miles) and to the Pacific (4,800.nautical miles). The weight

of the r~ 3 was ab::Iut 4,200 pourds. A still heavier reentry vehicle,

the Mod 4, was first testEd during the !;UI'I'I'I'eI' of 1963, to 3,400- and

4,800-nautical mile distances. ~ighing a1:xJut 4,800 pounds, its

intended ~ could not be discerned, and it was not believed to

have been deployed operationally. SUbsequent SS-7 tests in 1964 and

1965 arployed mainly Mod 2 and 3 reentry vehicles , naking them the

m::>st likely candidates for deploynent. FUrther, ~isons of the SS-5.

J:eentry vehicle. with that of the SS-7 Mcx:1 1 indicated that they were
probably the sane. Since both of these missiles evolved in ab:>ut

the sane time perioo, and since 1:x:>th. reached initial operational

capability at about the sane time, it is likely that the SOViets had

decided upon a standard reentry vehicle for use on both the SS-5 and

SS-7.

The ss-7 is about 100 feet in length, with a max.i:rtun dianeter of .

10 and 8 feet for the first and second stages respectively. GroSs

~ight of the missile is a1:xJut. 327,000 pounds,. with a second stage

TOP ·&.CRET UMBRA

.~"
DocrD: 3441
weight of al:x>ut 100,000 poun:1s. Maxinu.mt range for M:xl 1 arrl 2 variants

is 7,000 nautical miles; the M:xl 3 variant has a max:imJm range of

6,000 nautical miles. First sta~ thrust is about 570,000 pounds;

sooond stage thrust is about 203,000 fX>UIlds. 12

A two-stage missile,. the 88-7 1 s first stage has three liquid-fueled

engines ani four liquid-fueled vernier engines to assist in control of

the missile during first-stage operation. The second stage. has one liquid­

fueled nain engine with four liquid-fueled verider (or control) engines.

Possibly four solid-propellant retrori:ckets provide first ani second

.stage separation: reentry vehicle. separation fran the second stage is

also probably aa=anplished b.Y four solid-fueled retro:rockets. Gu.i.dance

is inertial, and velacity control is acccmplished b.Y rnain-engine

throttling arrl vernier-engine cutoff. '!'he SS-7 1 s circular error

probability is believed to be between 1 arrl 1.25 nautical miles.

As was the case with other Soviet missiles, the SS-7 developiental
program was divided into a number of distinct test phases. The

first, of "feasibility" tests, extended ftan about o=tober 1960 to

September 1961. A second period, fran about October 1961 to December

1962, was of tests to discern the over-all capabi.l;ities of "tl'le missile.

ani its supporting systems. A third, fram 29 November to an undetermined

te:rmination date, was of series-proouction Ill:Xlels, during which missiles

~ 'Were apparently selected randanly and tested to verify that they

'-'
~
'-'
M satisfied design specifications. SUbsa:Juenttest pericx:1s, fran January
~

...== to Decanber 1962, March 1963 to February 1967, and

.....
~
Ma.rch 1967 to

'" March 1969, DUring these

l2F irst stage thrust depicts sea-level neasurenents; second stage

thrust (ani that of other upper stages where applicable) reflects

neasurerents in a vacuum. TOP SECRET UMBRA

"
DOCID: 344s:c~

The technique of de:r;>loying missiles in silos was rel!ative1y nE!'#l

to the Soviets by the time the SS-7 reached operational status. Also,

inherent costs, and tiine-consun'i:i.ng construction that delayed deployment,

caused silos to lag bEmi.nd missile deve1()pnent in these early years.

ConseqUently, the first SS-7s 'Were probably deployed above ground at

soft sites--but with major drawbacks. The launch site itself was

highly vulnerable to attack and· saOOtage. Also, lengthy periods of

tine were required to prepare the missile for launch. It had to

be IrOVEd fran storage to the launch pad, erected, fueled, and sub­

systems checked out, causing fran one to b;o hours delay.· Conversely,

between five and twenty minutes 'Were required to prepare the missile for
. . ~
launch when it was store1 in a silo, and it could be hel~ fully fueled

for extended periods ina high state of readiness. .

Preliminary design of the SS-7 was probably begl.m in 1958, and

prod\X:tion of test IOOde1s had probably started by 1959. As noted

previously, the first missile tested, on 24 October 1960, failed,

as did subsequent launches on 2 February and 3 MaI:ch 1961. But by ..

early 1962 the M:xi 1 was probably operational and deployed, and the

M::xls 2 and 3 probably achieved initial operational capability in late

1962 and 1963 respectively. The r.t:d. 4 apparently was not deployed

operationally. By mid-1966, production of the SS-7 was believed to

I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) I

TOP GEGRe=F UMBRA

l.t
 DOCID: 3441
SS-8 (Sasin)

'Ihe SS-8, a't\«:)-stage liquid-fueled ICBM, was probably initially

deployed in 1963. It ra:nains an operational missile today although

, I
its dep10ymant is believed to be limited, due mainly to its use of

a cr:yogenic oxidizer.

'!he SS-8 deve10pnent program was associated with a high

failure rate fran the beginning. Thirteen of the first 29 launches

resulted in failures, includ.ing the initial launch on 9 April 1961.

Following the initial 1atmch, a spasm:dic test program ensued.

M:>st of the tests were corrlucted on the Tyuratam range, but sane

missiles \Ere also 1atmched on the P1esetsk range.

Although the first test of an 55-8 failed, the second test,

on 21 April 1961, was a sucx::ess. A third launch, on 29 May 1961,

was also sucx::essful. And fran July to a:::tober of that year, nine

nore latmches of SS-8s were att.anptErl, but with four failures. Three

of the 1aurrl'les in October were fran Tyuratam to the Pacific, a test

series that also included firings of the SS-6 and' SS-7 to the sane
iIllpact area.
After carpletion of this test series, a lengthy pause of five

nonths cx:x::urred in the SS-8 t;est program, ending with a launc~ in

March 1962. In March and April, a tOtal of five launches were attempted,

with tw:> failures. A pause of six weeks was again noted, ending with
the rapid firing of. 10 missiles between 9 June and 29 July 1962.

Again, the failure rate was high, with four failing in flight.
,.£
It waS apparent fran thesJ\ tests that

_But
significant IIDdifications had been made to the SS-8 and

I E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(1) I
no additional launches were noted for the next six

TOP SECRET UMBRr\

, :a.." .
.DoeIr> :' "'344~~
nonths; apparently' the' Sovietshad_~rarily~stopped testing of

, . the s,s-8 to pennit ti.n:e ,to reassess its ,te.chnicaldesignand

,capabilities· in view of' the presistent+y high percentage offaUures

the missile was experiencing 'in itJ:l.developnental pr09ram. .

Launches of the ~S-8' resumed. in rebi:uary196'3' when ti.io missiles
. .'

-
~.

,e
.~
~'

=
.....
....Q
.~. ' riarke:Uy similai:' to the one usal for the Pacific launches .in 1961. (The
!;I'J' .

on nine flights of SS-8s between

5 November 1963 and 2 February 1964.) 'The appearance of

for the SS-:-8 was probably the result of ~ differen-t;

prOOuction rrodels, one for ICBM usage, the other for space-related

operations •
On 22 Janucu::y 1964, three ss-as, were lal.lIlchEd withiri a period of

30 minutes. The first irrpac~ in the Pacific, the second "failed

in flight, and the third ~cted an Kand1a.tka. '.These·launches

. .
pclSsibly represented the "final acceptance" of the ss-8 bY the
SRF •.

'l'he SS-8 is capable of a range of alxmt 6,000 nautical miles.'

. Its over:-all length· is aOOut 77 feet,' with a, first-stage diarreter of

.
. aboUt ten feet arrl a second-stage c:ti.aImter of about eight feet. Gtoss "

..... weight of .the missile is appro.x:.i.rnate1y 167,000 pounds, With the :

t-eent,ry'vehicle weighing between.3,'000 and 3,500 pourrls. FirSt··'
'." .

stage ~st is alxmt 290,000 poUndsisecond stage thrust is alx>ut:, .

. . . - • • ~I,

67,000 pounds.' The' first stage Sti'loys a liquid-fueled propulsion

TOP SECRET
.. ' . ...8
UMBRPt
" " " ...
DOCID: 3441101 9EiiiEIli.:"~l\
system with four canbustion chambers", which are thrust-mJdulated. to

natch a pz:ogrant'!W.'.rl velocity. Thrust vector and roll control" are p:robably

provided by vernier engines or jet vanes. The second stage is

believa:i to have a, single biprope11ant nain engine and four vernier

engines~ its pro:p.llsion system is started. prior to first-stage cutoff

and separation. The reentry vehicle is pr<.ilably separated. fran the

booster by a pneumatically or explosively actuated system. With a

length of aOOut 6.6 feet and a diameter at its base of about 4.4 feet,

the" cil::'ctihar error probability of the reentry vehicle is about one

nautical mile.
Although troubled throughout itsdeve10pnental prog:ram by ~high

failure rate, and although its role as an ICR-1 is severely haIrf?ered

by its use of a cryogenic oxidizer, the SS-8, as noted. earlier,

remains an operational missile texlay. Its deployment as' an operational

ICBM, hcMever, is believed to be limited.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

7(
 "
DOCID: '34~--

SS-9 (Scarp),

The SS-9 provides the Soviet Union with,:a -very r·eliable ICBM, capable of
; .

deliv~ring huge payloads 'to intercontinental distances wiihahigh degree of

accuracy. Reaching op:erational capability in the l!Iid-1960s, the SS':"9is

capable of ranges between about 5,,~00 and, 7, OQO nautical miles. Some 300.
. ' ..
SS-9s are believed to have been deployed in hardE!Oed silos. ~

Although' first launched on 3 December 1963, the initial design ,of

, . . . .
subsystems, for the SS;-9 was,~robably started as early as 1958, with over-all

design ofth~ missile probably begun about, the same time the S8-'7 reached
' .
,
. .
init1a~loper<l:tional capability., It is believed that the sanie team that

designed the 88-7 ,was also respons~b1e for the design of th~ 88-:9. ,

Apparently the Soviets had placed urgent priorities ori the deployment

of an improved ICBM in the 1961-to-1962 time period, evidenced by th.e,

8S-7 and S8-8 programs; which, were marked by haste a~d ~n u~usually hig~ rate

of failur~s. The 88-9 developmental 'program, however, seemed to be more

deliberately planned and managed, and. more 'carefully and methodically pursued.

WitHin a year of the first test of an 85-7, ':for example,' an average of four

missiles a month were being launched. But this firing rate was not achieved

in the 88-9 program until two 'years after the initial launch.

Following the initial launch in December 1963, l2·5S-9s were fired in

, , .

the next 10 months; Eight of these were launched to Kamchatka, with one

in-flight failure, 'and four, to the Pacific, again .with:',one in-flight failure.

When compared to the initial lO-month test program of the 8S-7. the percentage

of in-flight failures of the 85-9 wassli~ht1yover'15 percent; contrasting

. 's'harply w,ith an in-flight ,failure rate of aoout 3~ percent for the 88-7 .

.=rep.SECRET JjMBRA
"
DOCID:

Early in its developmental program, the SS-9 was involved in two

demonstration ,exercises. The first, occurring on 30 May 1964, involved a

launch from Tyuratam to Kamchatka. An SS-7 and SS-lO were also fired as part
. of this exercise. The three missiles were fired within a four.:-hour period,

representing the first time the Soviets had successfully launched three

different categories of ICBMs in One exercise. At the time, the SS-9 and

S8-l0 were still early in their developmental programs, these la\1nches

representing only the. sixth of an SS-9. and the third of an 8S-l0.

The second demonstration involving an 8S-9 early in its test program

occurred on th.e Tyuratam range on 24. 25, arid 26 September 1964. Two Soviet

teams ·were apparently responsible for these efforts. The first, designated

Group A, handled activities on the first day, when an SS-lO, 88-8, and

S8-6 were launched, the 88-6 as a booster for Kosmos 46/ The second day saw

the launch of an 8S-9 to the .Pacific, a distance of 7,000 nautical miles,

and an SS-7 to Kamchatka. Group B apparently handled these efforts.

On the final day an 8S-7 was la\1nched to Kamchatka. These events, probably

held for visiting dignitaries, were highly significant for a number of

reasons. First, all ICBMs that had been tested on the Tyuratam range to that

time were involved, representing "one of the most intensive periods of

operations ever conducted on the range in such a short time." Also of

significance was the launch of the 8S-9 to the extended-range Pacific impact

area, after only 11 previous firings of the missile.

For this early beginning, the 8S-9 evolved into a missile capable of

performing a variety of functions. Four separate reentry vehicles have peen

associated with it (called Mods 1, 2, 3 and 4).

1•
 DOCID: 34 "¥tMesEcME¥ ~MlItM~.

The first of the reentry variants, the Mod l~

t
weights about 9~500
'-" .
pounds and is capable of 7 ~OciO-nautical mile ranges. Th.e Mod 2 carries a

heavier payload (13,500 pounds) to a range of about 5,300 nautical miles.

Test and development programs of these variants were conducted between

December 1963 and December 1965, and both reached initial operational ;

The Mod 3 variant is an FOBS/DICB~ (Fractional Orbital Bombardment

System/Depressed Trajectory ICBM). First tested in December 1965, the

Mod 3 is believed to be capable of ranges up to 7,400 nautical miles. 11IIIIIIII

IIIIIIIIIIfor Mod 3 deployment reportedly began in September 1969, and between

that date and September 1970 three launches were noted inv01vingllllllllll

The Mod 4 is a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV), capable of delivering

three 3,200-pound payloads to a maximum range of about 5~200 nautical miles .

•
o• The Mod 4 was the first such multiple reentry vehicle developed by the Soviets •
~ First launched on 28 August 1968, developmental launches to the Pacific and

to Kamchatka continued to at least 5 November 1971. Twenty-one launches

. of the Mod 4 were noted in this period. Of note were two launches .on 2

and 19 December 1969, when the Soviets

-TOP SECRET UMBRA

DOCID:

Tests of another "phase u of the Mod 4 began ,on 24 'January 1973. Six'

tests of modified reentry vehicles' of the Mod' 4 category were noted in that

year. These reentry vehic1es'were lighter ~nd capable 'of higher reentry speeds

than previous Mod 4 models. This modified version is referred to as the SS:"'9

Mod 4A.
, ,

In 1972, five SS-9s were a1so'noted being launched in t~sts of what was
apparently a new type of reentry vehicle, the forerunner of multiple

independent1ytargetab1e reentry vehicles (MIRVs). IE.O; 13526, section 3.3(b)(l)

a'ccuracy. Also, radio guidance, used e~r1y in the SS-9. test program to

"
,l_ __ ~_.:... _ _ __

- - _ . , - - .. _-------------_."-- -~---.------.--.. ------------.-----'-.

TOP. SECRET UMBRA

L_-----------------~~------__~--------~~-----------.~
..... '
 DOCID:

supplement the missile's inertial guidance ,system, was discontinued in

1965 with the improvement of 13

I E.O~ 13526, sectijm 3.3(b)(1)
The SS-9 is assessed as being one of the most' accu~ate operation ICBMS

in the Soviet arsenal. The circular, error .~pro1;H~.bilitY (CEP) 'of the missile's

warhead is estimated at between .4 and .5 nauti~a1, mile; whereas, for example)

'CEPs of the SS-7 and SS,8 aI;'e estimated at l-,.·to"::'1.25 4nd ·1-naut1ea:1 miles

respectively. Also, as not~d previously,

, . 8S-9 is capable 'of delivering
.the
' .., ' ,

, huge warheads. The Mod ,1 warhead, ·for example,

'f
'has a, yield estimated to be
1 •

between 12 and 18 megatons, a:'nd the Mod' 2 has a yield hetween 18 and 25 megatons.

, By comparison, the explosive force of ·the nuclear warhead' of the SS..q is

. . ,

estimated to be between 2 .and 5 megatons, and that of the SS-8 ,between 2 and

3.5 megatons.

Over-all length of the two-stage S8-9 .is about 107 feet, including the

reentry vehicle, with a maximum diameter'of about 10 feet. Its first stage'

has. three double-chambered liquid bipropellant main engines, with four liquid

bipropellant vernier-thrust units providing attitude control. Retrorockets

are used for separatio.n. Weighing anaverage of about 410,000 pounds,

-
.....
'-'
---
~ .._13_-C...i.. .. ___ , _____ ...___.__ -.:._'.,..__ --:. .._.. __ ._____ , _.___. ' _ _' __ "
~ Prior to 1965, a radio-guidance system augmented the inertial-guidance syste~
~~ in certain Soviet missiles, enhancing missile performance. However, this radio+­
~ technique was not seen in use after 1965, when it was last observed in!
C.i
~ iatedwith the SS-9. The development of more reliab1~ a11--=--_~..__ _
v:t ma,de the concept unnece!:i$
N
l/)
~
.....

---'--, -_.._-_._­
:rOP S.CRiiT UMBRA
3"
DOCID:

the first stages 0,£ the Mods 1, 2. and 4 are, capable of developing about

540,000 pounds of thrust. The gross weights of the second stages, ,of the Mods

1 and 4 variants average about 127,000 pounds, with a main-engine thrust

averaging about 210,000 pounds.

'Operational 55-9 missiles are located in hard~ned. dispersed silos.

88:--10
14
The 88-10 'two-stage ICBM was first tested on the Tyuratam range on

11 April 1964.' The program was discontinued after only the eighth launch

on 20 October 1964. During this brief test series, seven of the eight

missiles were launched successfully, six impacing on Kamchatka and the

last in the Pacific. However, only the, flight to the Pacific--a'distance

~,

of about 6,500 nautical miles--apparently demonstrated the full potential of

the missile's capabilities, and it was therefore believed that the 88-10

program was discontinued by the Spviets"before the initial test;-flight

phase, was completed. II

14
The 88-10 is refer~ed to as the SS-X-lO'in some source documentation.

TOP.. SEGR,ET UMBR'A,

DOCID: 3'441553 . REF ID :A34.552 ..
. ",T~P SECRET ,.U1V!BRA
Despite its promising beginning, .anddespite i,ts demonstrated capabili,ty

of delivering a 7,000-pound reentry vehicle to, operational ranges of over

6,000 nautical miles, 'the program, as noted above, was ca,ncelledafter only

about ,six months of testing. As a" result, the missile was not deployed

operationally, though evidence s~ggested that itwas--at least initially~-

included in Soviet spaee-related planning.

Preliminary design of the missile was probably, begun in 1958 or 1959.

with emphasis apparently d'irectedtoward the design of improved propulsion

systems and techniques. ,In most other aSp',e~~s t however t the 55,..,10 appeared to

be mainly a hybrid missile, incorporating 'a variety of the components and

, '

techniques of the other SOviet ,ICBMs' developed.inthat time period--,theS5-6,

S5-7, SS-8 and S5-9.

An innovation of the

The ss-10 was about 95 feet long, with a first-stage diameter of about,

10 feet. The first ,stage employed four engines! capable of developing about

400,000 pounds of thrust. The second stage employed one main engine. Gross
.DOCID:

Th~SS-lO was ~esigned to fly a:precomputeQtrajectory. Measurements

' , ' .

of the'velocity of the'missile were compared in flight to ~recomputed, stored

velocity' magnitudes,theres~ltant signals actuating 'varioliscontrol funcU,Qns

to' keep the missile aligned ,"in accordance w1.th positions andvelocit:;tes of

,ttiepre~omputed ,trajectory.

Though not new to this missile, a "prQpellattt utilization system" was

used to insure ,that the fuel and oxidizer tanks 'would, be emptied at the

" same time. With tliis technique, fuel and oxidizer flows were adjusted
< ' . . . •

.' .propo,rt;.ionally' in flight. .This' technique ap.parentlyod,gi,nated with the

Ger,maldesigned R-:4missile, of the"early 1950s, rE\ferred to at that time

as the i'alpha stabilizer."

Although the first'SS-lO,failed, the next seven launches were

successful. With such a promising heginnirig,it'is dif~1cultto 'discern, .

. .
the reasoning behin4 its sudden demise. But., the relatively successful'

development of, the ss:"7, the develo~ment of the fiighly successful.SS-:-9, and

. evolving
the other ICBMs that were .
at that time, possibly led the Soviets ,

to the belief that the SS-lO progra~ was redundant and therefore unnecessary,
",

and that additional expenses, could be avoided by cutting'off furth~r,developmeht

and testing.
.
"-,
.: i
SS-11 (Sego)' '·1

The SS-l1, a comparatively s~ll 'liquid-fueled ICBM, was filrst launclled,:,

-t.
.. on the Tyuratam ran~e on 19 April 1965, imp,aclng on Kamchatka., It underwent

intensive testing 'in a relatively short period, culminating in its early.

, initial deployment in 1966 •. Hundreds have be~n:ll~anufactured and deployed

. throughout the years.

. . :rOP ·SSCRE=F" UMBRA
3'.
-.
DOCID:

The 55-11 evolved into a vers'atile weapons sy-stem.' Its, range, for
,"
e'xa1l,lple, varies between about 500 and 6,000 nautical miles ... Also, three

reentry-vehicle variants have been 'developed. rhe first, the Mod 1, consists

of a single ,reentry, vehicle weighirig about 1,500 pounds. With this reentry

v~hicle, the missile's range is believed to be 6,000 nautical miles. With

the'Mod 2 variant, the missile is capable of delivering a reentry vehicle and

two penetration aids to 'a 6,000-nautical mile range. Over-all weight of the

Mod 2 is about 2,100 pounds, with the reentry vehicle weighing about 1,500

pounds. The Mod 3 variant, with an ,over-all weight of about 2,300 pounds, is
"

capable of delivering three reentry v~hicles (MRVs). With this variant, the

missile is capable of a distance of about 5,500 nautical miles. Some tests

of Mod 3 variants have additionally include4 up to four cylindrical obj~cts

leading the reentry venicles, probably empioyed as penetration aids.

, ,

As noted previously, the two-stage SS-ll is a comparatively small

missile, measuring 64 feet in length with a first~stage diameter of eight

feet and a second stage diameter of six feet • Ove'r-all weight of the missile

is 105,000 pounds for the Mod 1 variant, anq, about 121,000 pounds for the

Mods 2 and 3. First-Stage thrt:1st is estimated to be about 190',000 pounds for

all three variants; second-stage thrust is estimated to be ,30,000 pounds for

the Mod 1, and 31,000 pounds for the Mods 2 and 3. Short reaction times-­

30 seconds to, three minutes--and unlimited 'hold times characterize the missile,

along with CEPs of 1 nautical mile for the ,Mod 1, and about .6 nautical mile
I
, I
for the Mods 2 and 3. Warhead yield, however"is relatively small when

compared to other ICBMs developed ·to that time: an estimated. 6 to 1. 2

megatons for the Mods 1 :and 2.

=rOP. SECRET lJMBRA

DOCID: 3441

Following the first launch in April 1965, an intensive test period

ensued. In 1966, for example, at least 44 missiles were launched. By early

1966, series-production had probably started, and in March 1967, intensive

for the missile's deployment began. One-hundred and forty-five

launches of 55-lls had been to the end of 1969. liliiii

further showed that by 1967 approximately 200 missiles were being produced
annually, and U.S. intelligence sources estimated that about 1,700 had been

produced by the end of 1972. Also, an estimated 61 battalions w e r e _

The first stage of the 5S-11employs four main engines. The second

stage has one main engine similar to first-stage design though smaller.

All-inertial guidance is used for

o
•
~

Testing of penetration aids (penaids) was first noted on 20 ,September 1967,

with Radint revealing "new separation sequences and the appearance of additional

objects." Tests of penaids continued until at least -July 1968, during which

month five launches were made to ranges of'only 500 to 600 nautical miles.
 DOCID:
I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
A .new test phase began on 23 July 1969 (of the,Mod 2 described

previously) •

to ranges of 500, 3,400, and 4,800 nautical miles (as was also the case early

ih the Mod 3 test program).

On 12 September 1969, tests of'the Mod 3 variant were f1rst noted.

Carrying three reentry vehicles (MRVs), it was seen being launched into 1971.

On two such flights, on ~l and 22 August 1970, U.S, surveillance ships

visually observed the three separate vehicles reentering the atmosphere. A

reduction of reentry vehicle-associated telemetry in 1971 probably signaled

lithe completion of basic research and development." Like the Mod 2, the Mod 3

reentry vehicles had higher ballistic coefficients that that of the Mod 1"

enabling a reduction in,the time required to penetrate the earth's atmosphere,

thereby enhancing penetration capability. Also, certain tests of the Mod 3

showed a capability to space out reentry vehicles along a common trajectory,

rather than their release simultaneously at the same point.

Beginning in February 1971, still another testing phase began, possibly

representing a new variant of the Mod 1. These tests were characterized by

a higher apogee, .second-stage pitching, and the appearance of unidentified

objects trailing the second stage by 10 to 14 nautical miles. Use of second-

stage pitching in. these flights was unique to the Mod 1, though all Mod ·2 and

3 variants employ this technique.

SS-ll reentry vehicles launched to Kamchatka (a distance of 3,400

nautical miles) impacted in areas other than those used for other ICBM tests •

.J'OP $ECflEtUMBRA
DOCID: 3441¥(I:! 5ta!RWr~~"q~,
I E.O. J3526, section 3.3(b)(1) I
that two, and possibly three, impact areas near Klyuchiwere

used, all outside the "normal" impact area. One was located about 30 nautical

miles south of Klyuchi, a second onelO-to l5-nautical miles southeast,

and a possible third impact area about 15 nautical miles northeast of the

second location.

Three SS-Us were launched from deployed sites on U November 1970 during

an 8RF exercise, and by 1973 it was estimated that the 8S-ll comprised up to

two-thirds of the Soviet ICBM missile force. The missiles are deployed in

hardened silos, with, as noted previously. short reaction and unlimited hold

times. And be.cause of the varying ranges of the misSile, the Soviets probably

realized the additional option of augmenting their 88-4 MRBM and S8-5 IRBM

forces with the 88-11.

88-12 (8caleboard)

First launched on the Kapustin Yar range on 5 February 1964, the S8-l2

8RBM attained initial operational capability in mid-1965. With a minimum and

maximum range of about 100 and 500 nautical miles respectively, the liquid-

fueled 8S-l2 evolved quickly through a testing program associated with no

lengthy pauses, indicating the probable use of proven technology in its design.

A single-stage missile with a separating reentry vehicle, the 88-12 is

39 feet long and 3.3 feet in diameter. Gross weight of the missile is 18,800

pounds, with a reentry-vehicle weight of about 1,300 pounds. Maximum thrust

1s assessed at about 31,000 pounds. All-inertial guidance is used for the 88-12,

with jet vanes employed for directional control. In addition to a nuclear

warhead, a high-explosive warhead is possibly also available for the missile.

CEP is estimated to be about .3 nautical mile at two-thirds maximum range.

TOP SECRET UPIIBRA

til
DOCID: 34415

Designed for mobile tactical applications, two transporter-erector­

launchers (TELs) have been associated with the 88-12. 'The first, mounted

on a MAZ 543 chassis, was seen in a Moscow parade in 1965. The second version

is similar except that the missile is enclosed in a protective canister':.

Named 8caleboard, the latter version was first seen in a Moscow parade in 1967.

The research and development program of the 88-12 was also marked by

distinct

Radint showed that the missiles had been tested primarily to ranges of about

285, 325, and 450 nautical miles. A possible fourth impact area,

~ was approximately 200 nautical miles from the Kapustin

N
~ Yar rangehead. Following completion of the third test phase in 1965, an
.....
began almost immediately, reflecting the

apparent high priority placed by the 80viets on the rapid deployment ';of the

,88-12.

By the end of 1968, at least 71 S8-l2s had been launched, a collaborating

agency estimating that approximately 380 missiles had been manufactured to

that time. Production continued into at least 1969.

88-13 (Savage)

The 88-13 was the first solid-propellant ICBM to be deployed by the

8oviets. A three-stage missile, the 88-13 evolved' into a highly reliable

system, one study showing a launch-reliability factor of 95 percent, and an

in-flight reliability factor of 90 percent (on the basis of only seven

failures of the first 55 missiles tested). The SS-13 is probably deployed in

hardened and dispersed unmanned silos.

:raP SEC~ET
 DOCID: 34

Flight tests of probable solid-propellant missiles were first noted in

late 1965, when three were launched on the Kapustin.Yar range. The first,

on 16 September, was given the arbitrary designator of KY-5 for identification

purposes. Two more tests of KY-55 fol~owed on i2 October and 16 November 1965 •.

The impact area of the missile ~ested·on16 September could not be determined

by Radint, a possible
distance of between 130 and 150 nautical miles had been achieved. Two impacts

were revealed by Radint concerning the 12 October test. The first impact
'i
location, .probably. of the booster sta~e, was about 288 nautical miles down

range. The other. impact location, probably of the reentry vehicle, was about

197 nautical miles from the launch site. Radint showed a single impact for

the 26 November launch of "approximately 203 nautical miles down range."

On 26 February 1966, another test of a probable solid-fueled missile was

seen on the Kapustin Yar range, to a distance of 1,050 nautical miles. Five

more flights of this missile (given the designator KY-6) were noted to mid~
•
o• 1966 on the Kapustin Yar range. Although no firm relationship could be established
~
between the KY-5 and KY-6, it

26 February, 15 March, and 11 April 1966, further showed the KY-6 to be a

. three-stage tandem missile "with the two upper stages us ing solid propellants."

l5 It would later be seen that the two p~ograms were in fact related, the
KY-5 being the forerunner of the SS-14 MRBM, and the KY-6 the forerunner of
the SS-13 ICBM. The SS-14, essentially, consisted of the secopd and third
stages of the SS-13.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

DOCID: 3441

When compared to a three-stage solid-fueled ICBM which had been displayed,

in a Moscow parade in May 1965, the one on disp1ay--referred to as the

Savage--and the KY-6 were believed to be the same missile.

Resembling to a degree the U.S. Minuteman ICBM in design, the SS-13

was launched for the first':time on the P1esetsk range on 4 November 1966?

to a distance of 3,100 nautical miles. ,Following this transfer of the test

and development program from Kapust1n Yar to Plesetsk, the missile was

subsequently noted being launched on the latter range to a variety of impact

areas, including Kamchatka and the Pacific Ocean.

As was true of other ICBMs in the Soviet missile test programs, variants

of the SS-13 evolved. Distinct test phases also characterized the missile's

development. The first test phase (of.feasibility aspects) of the over-all

missile system began with the initial launch of the KY-6 on the Kapustin Yar

range on 26 February 1966, continuing into July of that year. Six missiles

were noted being launched in this test phase to distances of 1,050 nautical

miles. The first launch on the P1esetsk range, on 4 November 1966, possibly

also concerned feasibility ,tests of the missile.

Following the 4 November 1966 launch, a pause 0.£ five months occurred

in the S8-13 test program. The lull ended when

began in April 1967, this phase continuing to August 1968. Fifteen launches

were noted on the P1esetsk range in this test phase, four of which were to

4,700-nautical mile distances. At least four other launches in late-196B

were probably for the purpose of

five launches between October

::rop SECRET UMBRA:

DOCID: 34415

Two variants of theSS-l3 have been identified. The first, or Mod 1,

probably achieved initial operational capability in 1969. It is capable of

delivering a reentry vehicle of about 1,200 pounds to a maximum range of

5,500 nautical miles, with a CEP estimated at one nautical mile. Research

and development tests of another version, the Mod 2, were essentially completed

by 197.1. Characterized by a change in reentry vehicle design'.'snd-a CEP of::

about .7 nautical mile, the Mod 2, so far as is known,was not: operationally

deployed, and this aspect of the program has probably been terminated. Its

maximum range, like the Mod I, was estimated at 5,500 nautical miles.

First-stage thrust of the SS-13 is about 210,000 pounds, second-stage

thrust about 98,700 pounds; and third-stage thrust about 45,000 pounds.

Gross weight of the missile is about 111,000 pounds, with an over-all length

of 66.5 feet. First-stage diameter 1s 5.85 feet, second-stage 4.9 feet,

and third-stage 3.3 feet. Approximate warhead yield is .6to 1.5 megatons.

The three stages of the all-inertial-guided S5-l3 employ solid-propellant

Inaddit10n to its being the first solid-fueled ICBM deployed by the

Soviets, the 5S-l3 test and development program was associated by other note­

worthy happen~~gs. Relocation of the program to Plesetsk in November 1966,

for example, represented the first effort at that facility for missile test

and development purposes. Of additional note were launches of S8-l3s in

August 1970 tb -L,.OOO-nautical mile distances, suggesting a variable :role

for the missile. These firings, on 7 and 29 August, were from Plesetsk
~ 'iJ ' .
to the Norilsk impactl\of the Northerj, Fleet Missile Complex. They further

TOP SECRET U~BRlt\

represented the first time missiles had been launched from P1esetsk to

distances of less than 3,100 nautical miles. Also, the display of a prototype

. of the missile in the Moscow parade in May 1975--months before it was ,fi,rst

f1ight-tested--represented a departure from normal Soviet practice. Public

displays of missiles usually trail their operational deployment, if they are

shown at all.

S5-l4 (Scamp)

As no~ed in the preceding section, the 88-14 (or KY-5) was essentially

the two upper stages of'the SS-13. First flight tested in September 1965,

the solid-fueled missile could have reached initial operational capability

in 1970. So far as is known, however, the missile was not deployed

operationally and is believed to have been deleted from the Soviet inventory.

A two-stage mobile MRBM, the S8-l4 was first seen in a Moscow parade

in November 1967. It was associated with the Scamp transporter-erector'"

. (/J
launcher (TEL), which ha~ been seen in Moscow parades since 1965. Capable

of delivering an approximate 1,200-pound reentry vehicle to a maximum range

of about 1,600 nautical miles, the all-inertia1-guided 88-14 was assessed

as having a CEP of .5 nautical mile at 1,500-nautica1-mile distances. Gross

weight of the missile was about 35,800 pounds, with a second-stage weight

of about 10,800 pounds. First-stage thrust was approximately 86,000 pounds,

with a second~stage,thrust of about 45,000 pounds. Over~al1 length of the

missile was 34.2 feet, with a first-stage diameter of 4.9 feet and a second-

stage diameter of 3.3 feet •

.::rOP DEeRE"," UMBRA

..
,04"
DOCID: 3441

Other than three probable launches of an SS-14-type missile in late 1965,

only two other distinct test and development phases were noted of the missile.

Launches on 9 February, 22 March, and .30 May 1967 were assessed as feasibility

tests. The first launch was to a range of 960 nautical miles; the next two

were to distances of 1,050 nautical miles. Following a lengthy pause, the next

test of an SS-14 was not seen until February 1968. Eight launches were noted
between February and October of that year, labeled as Itgeneral systems tests."

Distances achieved for these tests were mainly 1,050 nautical miles, though a

launch of 485 nautical miles was also noted. Another missile tr.aveled only

330 nautical miles when the reentry vehicle failed to separate. Over-all,

only 19 flights of SS-14s have been noted, and none were observed that could be

labeled as being or of production models.

The last observed launch of an SS-14 occurred on· 14 March 1970 and was

categorized as an operational suitability flight.

during this last ~light. and it is

its variable-range capability enabling it to fulfill anMRBM role as well

as that of an IRBM and ICBM.

SS-X-i5 (Scrooge)

Designed asa mobile ICBM, the two-stage SS-X-15 was first noted beiqg launched

on the Plesetsk range on 12 February 1968, though unsuccessfully. Following

this initial flight, two additional launches were noted in 1968--on 18 June and

2 July •. Both of these launches were successful, impacting on Kamchatka.

The SS-X-15 test and development program apparently progressed slowly following

these 1968 launches, with infrequent tests noted into 1969 •.

.
TOP 5EGRE~rUMeRA
~ -.:~. '-~--" --.. . . .H

""
DOCID:

The missile was estimated to be capable of carrying a reentry vehicle

weighing between 1,000 and 1,500 pounds, with a maximum range of approximately

4,200 naut·ical miles.. Employing inertial guidance. the CEP of the probable

liquid-fueled SS-X-15 was estimated at one nautical mile.

A missile believed to have been the SS~X-15 was seen in a Moscow parade

in 1967, housed in a 65.5-foot-long canister on a Scrooge-type TEL. On the

basis of this observation, the missile was estimated to be about 59 feet in

length, with a diameter between 5.5 and 6.3 feet.

Only sparse information is available concerning this missile. It can

not be discerned on the basis of available data how far it progressed into

its test and development program. or if it in fact reached operational capability.

Newer-Generation Missiles

From the foregoing, it can be seen that, in ~he years following World

War II, the Soviets advanced steadily in the missile field. By the early

1970s they had a major land-based ballistic missile force in being, capable of

accomplishing a variety of missions. Ranges of their deployed missiles

extended from short-range varieties (150 nautical miles or less) to those capable

of ranges up to 7,000 nautical miles or more. Some also employed variable ranges,

giving them wider applications. Nuclear yields had been achieved varying from

a megaton or less to that of the SS-9--up to 25 megatons. Refinements in

guidance and control systems saw CEPs improve as newer missiles evolved.

Multiple reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and multiple independently

targetable reentry vehicles had evolved or were evolving in this time span.

Hardened, dispersed silo·s had come into widespread use, and mobile missile

systemS. mainly for tactical applications, had been developed and deployed in

TOP SECRET UMBR}\

.if
DOCID:

large numbers. Thus, from its meager beginning in the mid-1940s, the Soviet Union

had developed, by the 1970s, an impressive land-based ballistic missile force.

But even as some of these missiles were being deployed operationally, the

Soviets were planning and developing newer-generation missiles that would·

further enhance their' over-all capabilities. Incorporating refinements in a

number of significant areas, these newer-generation' missiles--the SS-X-16,

55-17,.55-18, 55-19 and 55-X-20~-promise for the 50viet'Union continuing 5ig­

nificant progre·ss. in the ballistic-missile field. .It is not the purpose of this

article to define in detail their evolution, capabilities, deployment, and the

like. But certain of their highlights should be mentioned by way of conclusion.

The first of these, the SS-X-16, is a three~stage solid-propellant ICBM,

assessed as being capable of delivering a throw weight 16 of about 2,100 pounds to

a range of 5,000 nautical miles. It was .first noted being tested on 14 March 1972

on the Plesetsk range. Initial operational capability could .have been achieved

by late 1975, and deployment wo~ld probably be in hardened and dispersed unmanned

silos, and possibly in a mobile capacity as well. Believed to employ a single

reentry vehicle, the SS-X-16 employs a post-boast-vehicle (PBV) capability.

Operating after third-stage operation terminates, the PBV provides an additional

range of about 500 nautical miles for the l,OOO-pound reentry vehicle (extending

the range to 5,500 nautical miles with the PBV). The PBV employs four small

solid-propellant motors and is capable ofp~oviding both forward and reverse thrust.

With a nuclear warhead yielding between .6 and 1.5 megatQns, the approximate

67-foot-long SS-X-16 is estimated to be capable of achieving a CEP of about

.4 nautical mile.

l6Throw.. .weight is all weight located above the final booster stage of th.e missile,
including that of the PBV, of the payload (reentry vehicles, penetration aids,
telemetry, instrumentation), and of PBV subsystems (guidance and.control''11
separation, propulsion systems, propellant.s, e~c.). "" .. 'aRA..
=rOP . C;","'A ,.... , tfc--t..a
UMg~)IiiI[
Cl!i:!';~.. ., t ..... p - ' ..... •

. ""-' ..
DOCID:

A second newer-generation missile, the SS-17, is a two-stage canister-

launched liquid-fueled ICBM. A PBV with a maximum of four positions for reentry
vehicles provides a MIRV capability, each of the four reentry vehicles weighing

about 900 pounds. A single reentry vehicle has also been tested--on the first

five launches--but it has not been seen in launches since 6.Aprfl 1973. indicating

that it is not" intended for the primary mission. Assessed as being capable
of delivering a throw weight of approximately 6,000 pounds to a range of
17
5,500 nautical miles, the SS-17 eIJlploys the "sabot" launch technique.

Initial operational CEP is estimated at .34 nauUcal mile at S·,OOO-nautical

mile range, with a future (1980) potential of .28 nautical mile believed possible.

First noted being tested on 15 8eptember 1972 on the Tyuratam range, the 88-17

. will probably be deployed' in hardened and dispersed silos. The approximate

67-foot-long missile is a candidate for partial replacement .of 88-11 ICBMs.

A third newer-generation missile, the 88-18, is a large two-stage liquid­

bipropellant ICBM •. Three reentry-vehicle variants are available to the missile.

One of these, the Mod 1. is assessed to be capable of a maximum range of

6,200 nautical miles with a l3,SOO-pound reentry vehicle. Another. the Mod 3,

is believed capable of delivering an 11, DOD-pound reentry vehicle to a range of

about 8,000 nautical mi,les. Th~ Mod 2,. a MIRVed versio,n, has dem<;>nstrated aC4.~bl/,ti
fl1 de~;1H1 '+ +0 1# w-:e44I'rr'1 v81'11 c /es. ~ SS-IG
abo If!,mj}Jl141s a." p8V ,.
capability (for the MIRVed variant only), a~d the launch-assist sabot technique

for ejection of the missile from the silo. Nuclear yields of the single-

reentry vehicle variants are assessed at between 18 and 25 megatons; the

l7The IIsabot," or "cold launcl'i,1t technique enables the missile to be ejected

from the silo prior to main-engine ignition. This technique permits a reduction
in the diameter 6f the silo.

TOP SECRET _UMBRA

DOCID:

yields of the MIRVed variants are assessed at between .3 and 2.3 megatons

(Mod ZA) and .4 to 1.3 megatons (Mod 2B). The Mod 1 variant was probably

initially tested on the Tyuratam range in October 1972, the Mod 2 in

August 1973, and the Mod 3 in June 1973. The Mod 1 probably attained initial

operational capability (rOC) by early 1975, and the Mods 2 and 3 by late 1975.

Deployment of the SS-18is occurring

in large new silos and modified SS-9 silos.

First tested on the Tyuratam range on 9 April 1973, the.SS-19 probably

reached initial operational capab:flity in 1975. Characterized by a highly

successful test and development program (only three failures in the first 30

launches), the 8S-l9 is probably intended to partialiy replace the SS-ll

ICBM missile force. A two-stage liquid-fueled missile, the S8-l9 incorporates

significant improvements,over its predecessor, the S8-ll, with, among other

things, a considerable improvement in throw weight and the employment, of six

/

independently targetablereentry vehicles, each weighing about 750 pounds.

Nuclear yield is estimated at one megaton for each of the six reentry vehicles.

The CEP of operational versions at 5,OOO-nautical-mile distances is estimated

at .3 nautical mile, with a pot,ential CEP of .25 nautical mile estimated possible

by 1980-., Though employing a PBV capability, as far as is known the 88-19 does.

not use the sabot launch technique; rather, the missile is probably "hot launched"

from the silo. The 88-19 is assessed as being capable of delivering--with the

PBV capability--all six reentry vehicles to a maximum range of 5,200, nautical

miles. 80me of the reentry vehicles could achieve 5,800-nautical mile ranges~

but with significant reduction of impact-pattern flexibility. The 88-19 uses a

q;S

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DOCID: 344~~

new inertial-guidance system, which affords better accuracy and could provide

flexibility against selective strategic targets. Believed to be transported to

th~ silo in a canister which also serves as the, launch tube" the80....foot-long

missile is probably launched from modified SS-l1 silos.

First launched on the Kapustin Yar range on 21 September 1974, another new

missile, the SS-X-20, is a two-stage solid-propel1ant IRBM. Comprising the lower

two stages of the SS-X-16 ICBM, a PBV, and MIRVs, the missile is assessed to
be capable of a maximum range of about 2,500 nautical miles. With a gross weight

of approximately 83,000 pounds, and an approximate 53-foot length, the SS-X-20

is believed to be capable of aChieving a CEP of .25 nautical mile. Employing

three MIRVs weighing about 620 pounds each. the SS-X-20 could have reached IOC

in 1976. It is probably intended as a replacement for the S8-4 ~BM and the

SS~5 IRBM. and will probably be deployed ,ina mobile mode. most likely using

presurveyed and prepared launch sites within a reasonable distance of a common

logistics support area.

=roP SECRET UMBRA

('V
..

::::::::::::: .

TO~ALS
. . .

[NOT RELEASABLE
.. t 1

TOP SECRET UMBRAj. .. . ... ~

 DOCID: 3441~~P ~fif~~J
E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) ..' . - .

~t - In telecx:mnunic~tions,. a number of associated, groups of links;'

, all contrGlled' at a COI'II'!'bn lOcation ana. presumably serving the sane iIrmediate
superior headquarters •
. Netwdrk - The totaltelecamumicatioossystem of an organization,' or
a· major part of it, including all sulxmtinate or related nets. .
Grcup - One or rrore radio links whose stations \\Ork' together un:'ier a
ocnm.m operating control.
'Link - Any single direct 'system 'of teleca:tmmicatidns between two
stations.' .
. 2

[ Tep SECRET UMBRA I

 DOCID:

I E.G. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) I 3 . .

1;---T-O-P-S-E-C-R-'-:ET-~·-U--'-T~-IB-\.Ii-~A;a.---"--l[
 DOCID: I E.O. 13526, section 3:3(b)(l)
'.

I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I) I' "4

I'~T=-O=-=P=----=S=EC-=R=-:;E=T=-r-=-U=-M=~B=R'--'A:-----11
I _"
 DOCID:

I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1), I 5

r------:=T9-==-=,P=---==SE==-:::C::-::="R-=:BT;;;;;;;;- UMBRA I·
. . I
 DOCID: 344i5¥-~fiBETD ~ .----------,

I E.O. 13526, s~ction 3.3(b)(I) I

·1 TOP SECRET UMBR~ ,

 DOCID:

1 E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) I

r WP SECRET ~.!
7
 DOCID: 21 E.~. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

. i E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) 1.

TOP SECRET UMBRA I!

 \ .. , ._1 .
DOCID : 34 4\11Ut SECItilff II>TM~~ I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I) i

I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I) I '

9

.\ TOP SECRET UMBRA I '

 DocrD: 3441b_ SE~1D~2~ E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(D!

I E.O. 13526, se~tion 3.3(b)(1) I

10

I TOP SECRET UMBRA . !

 DOCID: 34J~.~~1IiJJ'
. .
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­ jE. O.13526,section3.3(b)(l) I

r
I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I) I II lo..!.

r=.------------------~

I·TOP SECRET UMBRA

 DOCID: 2 ! KO. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I)

(0(,
I E.O. 13,526, section 3.3(b).(l) '\ ' , 12.

" T-O-P-S-EC--=-=R=-=E===T::--::U=-==~:-=fB:::-:::R:;:-;A-l
 DOCID: 3441~

i E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I) I . . 13

I TOP SECRET UMBRA

 DOCID:
causedt:Q.e· establishrcent. within NSA of organizations speeifically responsi­

.ble for· following··this expand:i.ng. Soviet effort~

The' first· of these organizations'

(NSA-9~4), was establisha:i 0Il 1 Ma.rch'1955 •. Elevated

to division status' on l'November 1955~ it was redesignated as NSA-:96.

In July of the follOlrr.i.ng year.; the problem was sublividEil and placed

in the Office of ·General· Studies .(GENS). .' The .three Service ·CryptolOCJic
Agencies--uSASA, NAVSEOJRJ, an;]: USAFSS--in agreement. wi.th NSA, controlled
,-.
~ GeNS-l,. GENS-2, and. GEN8-3. The services' were mairUy con::emed
--­
,-.
~
--­•
~
~

=
o
..­
."""
c:J
CI..I
~ . ~ purpose of .the m::>ve was· to
\C'"
M ooncentrate the responsibility for all phases of .
1II
~
~

o
~
•

GENS":'6 was. subdivided· into five branches •. , The first, GENS-6l

(fonrerly. GENs-12), wasresp:.')nSilile, for

I TOP 'SECRET UMBRAl

 DOCID: '3441~ r-=-...::....=.. I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) I

I E.O.13526, section 3.3(b)(I) [

15
 DOCID: 34415~~ ~1>:YN~·j

,..-.....
~
........" . The·"last major organization. within GENS~6.1' the Analytic 'SUpport Branch
~
~
........"
~
•
~

=0
.,....
.....­
.

to provide.background data. for use by the GENS-6analytic

~ .. '
~ branches. GENS-65 was dividecLinto four, sections'-ciF.:NS-65l through
rIJ..
GENS-654 •
.....
\C
M
l/").
~
~
•
0•
~

The launch by the SOVi~ts of theixfirst 10118 in 1957 I the· inrninence

of 'ICEJ.1 prcd~tionand deployrrent.. inthe last 1950s and, imitations of

I

the strong effort the Soviets were placing on other. missile programs, .
16· ItO

I T()p SECRET UMBRA I

DOCID: 3441 2
triggered additiooal. actions within the intelligence carmunity in attempts .

to keep pace. In,this tim;! fraroo, tl-Je united States Inte:);ligence-Board .

(USIB) was espec:i,ally concemai with the lack of adequate intelligence.con- .

cerni:ng- the locations -am_construction of opeJ;:'ational ·1a1.lIlCh. sites, the

-manufacture an::1. depl<:>y.tl'elt .CDf. missiles, an::1 the trainin9". pf personnel re­

quired to launch deployed missiles. The organi~ational make-up of the missile

f0rces,how they· fit into the Soviet militaIy establishment,. and their ­

<:X!Imla.tld"'and-control strtx:ture,. ~e. aliSG of" primary corx::ern •. To cope with

these problem'areas, ~sion and refinement ·of Sigint collection and

.
prpcessln<J ·were: d~~ .
t::~'::1\-=v. ne::essary,
~-.:I USIB
a.LA;L
.
-. -,-~ N·SA· ..
ta~.·· m·. .
• .it;, ways
th d evl.Sl.eR
~

to plan arxl :in'q;)le:nent appropriate programs.

A planning group, calleCt Qperation r:roJ.'.EBOARD~ was subsequently

oonvened lit NSA to respolxl to ~ tiSIB requil:ement .l4eeting in April

am Hay of .1959, its pr:imary goal. \\TaS the developoont of a plan which

I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) i··

III
.17

r TOr SECRET UM!l1!~. J

 DOCID : 34 41_~DlJ.Mq!d:i E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(IU

[ E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I).

7 For years it was <lebated Whether or. not telemetry Was a form of '
camtUnications or noncarmunications, arid, as, suchi should be s\:llx::ategory
of C'an:int. or Elint. In an attempt to settle the matter., USIB, in 1959,
proclair£e1 that telE!llE!tJ:y would be "treated like Elint.~' .But deba,te cxm­
tinUal, fue¥tt'
p..nd on 25 January:'1973,·.DaD Directive,S-3115.7, "Signals·
Intelligence,", dir~tedthat, effective october 1973, Elint, canint, and
Telint w:JUld be treated as separate. and distinct Slll;)qategories of Sigint.

18

L!OP. SECRET UM'lJRA l

, I E~O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
, 19
DOCID:

. I E.O. 13526; section 3.3(b)(1) .1

... Organizing the 'r'elanetry ~ collection Effort .
9

After ror1d war II the·U.S. GoV'etnmentwas aware of the basic nature

of the radio· telenetty that had bee:h used by the Germans at Peenemunde

in the test firings of the A 4 (V-2) missiles. This 16-channel telerretry

system, called Messina by the Genna:nS,was of the PPM/Nl.type. ·It was

9~Uch.Of the infonnation.in this section, and in the precedihg section

• • • • • • • • • • • • • is taken fran articles on these subjects. in
. the Crypto1ogic Spectrum and the.. NSA.,'l'echnical Journal.;Eiltl:tled~ "Talooatry
and How ,it Grew," the article in Spectrum was written by Mr. Melville J. Boucher•.
,It appeared as a ~part article .iJ:l the Fall 1971 'and. Winter' 1972 issues,
Vol. I, No.3, and Vol. 2, No.1, respectively. The artic1e:in' the Technical
JOI.l.(na.l, entitlErl . , w a s written by Witbbeld from
It appearoo' in the v.linter 1976 issue of the Jou.m.al., Vol. 'xxI, No. 1. 'public r.elease
Pub. L. 86-36
\1 q
20

I . TOP SEC~ET UMBR~~

DOCID: 3 4 4 f g SE~~~~
,believed to 'use freqUencies in the f~ve-roeter band (60 MHz) .10 Butthe

- U~S~, in subsequent tests qfthe V-2 at the White sarrlsProving GrbUIXi

.,
in Ne'VI Iofexico, designed and used its ('MO.,te1~$YStem,

different type of nOOu1ationand operatlng'at higher frequeOOies

employing a

than did
'the'Messina. Copsequently" in the~years af~ the War little use was made'

of U.S. k::n.ow1edge of the Messina system.

Also, in this tUne perioo,nonationa1""level E1int effbrtexisted

, ,

'until the S\m1I'!ler' of 1952. when the Army~Navy Electronics Evaluation

'Group (AN.EE!G), Was established. ~er, the Elint of the day was aJ.m::)st,

totally rada.i:-orienta:1. It had little interest in :instrumentation-data

",­

/
21 il \

!'foP SECRET UMBRA

 DOCID:

i E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I) I 22

[rOp SECRET UMBRA

i E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1>1

'.23

r
I
TOP SECRET· UMBRA J
 DOCID: 34415

I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I)

24

·1 ·TOP SECRET ~J
 DOCID: "---=-r-I ~.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) I

I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) . I 25

I TOP SECRET UMBRA~

DOCID: IE.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)~1

private contractors .also contribute:'i.significantly to theover:-'cill effort

in these early years, arXlin particular in regard to technical studies con­

ducted on Telint and. Elint matters.

In 1961 and 1962, Admiral Frost, then Director of NEA, sent letters

to various Goverimimt organizations soliciting their assistance :in resolving

certa:in .technical problans--inparticular those. pertaining to Soviet

missile- am space-related telemeti:Y. Ineluded.were the National J!.ero- .

26
nautics and SJ?a.ce Adrninistration (NASA), the Defense Atanic Support 'PJ;jency

(1)AgA), and the Ar!:r¥, Navy, and Air Farce. The results of their assistance

were "very beneficial to NSA and the over;"all teleffietry analysis effort."

In 1963, the new Director I General Blake I expanderl this intra-qovem­

zoont cooperation by cansunmating an agreement between NSA and the Air Force

systans Ccrrmandfor further "scientific and technical consultant support

and services." During the sane year I similar arranganents were made
between NSA and the North AIrerican Air Defense Ccrrmand (NORAD). And I as

noted previously, the Telemetry and Beaconry Analysis carmi ttee (TEB2IC)

was created in 1960. Olaired by NSA, its purpose is to bring together

experts fran the GOvernrrent, the private sectors, and the collal:x:>rating

agencies to study the problem and recarmend solutions. 1rlditionally, an

NSA member and alternate mamber are apfX)intal to attend IOOetings of the
Gliderl Missile and Astronautics Intelligence camu.ttee CaNe) of t}SIB.

Meetings are held weekly or whenever deemed necessary by the Chainnan.

NSA is responsible mainly for contributing Sigint-derived information.
In 1963, the Deputy SecretaJ:y of Defense far Research and Engineering,
in further attanpts to insure that the best possible effort was being

cbnducted against this high-priority target, levied a requirenent on NSA to

plXXiuce a SllI'Ittla.rY of the Sigint programs directed against SOViet missile ana
space targets. NSA' s response was to be part of the inplt to a I:lci) review

group responsible for evaluating missile- and space-relate::1 intelligence.

In particular, the review group wanted to insure that (1) collection was
fully responsive and supported, (2) relevant "raw data" was made available
rapidly to analytic elenents in Defense and CIA, (3) analysts were of the

highest caliber available, and (4) analytic results would be exchanged

freely am rapidly bebEen IbD and CIA. NSA's resp:>nse, subnitted to

\
'10-\
27
.--- --~~. --_ ..... _-- -----_. - . ,._" ..... -._----­
TOP SECRET UMBRA
 ~- .---------_.. -- --' - ".~ .--- ----~--- - ....... -- .-- --.

DoD in late 1963, recam:lenderl, annng other things, the establishmeilt of

--...
'-'
.1:1
'-'
~
~ located at NSA. Alt:h:lugh an NSA effort of this type was already in
.S=
..as operation (NSA/srmc), the h;Jency recam:ended that it be expanded to include
'"
...t; personnel fran DIA, noting that the end result would
N

...
IrI
~

o~
'---'

envisioned in the NSA response, and realized with the subsequent establish­

ment of a joint NSA-DIA effort (DEF/~1lC) •

In 1971, A4 became t-7l in an intemal NSA reorganization. And in

1973 a reorganization within (".roup W resulted in a new alignment of Wl, ,

and of other organizations an:1 functions within Group ~1.

labeled the Office of Space and Missiles, Wl is responsible for

TOP SECRET UMBRA

 DOCID: 34415SWJ? SI\G!Ufi¥dlMi!~.o.13526.s.. tion3.3(b)(1) I

i E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1) J ..__ _____ d _. 29. ___ .. __ .. ___ _ _.. ~.___ .. _

TOP SECRET UMBR}..

DOCID: 344155~!'. ~:~-
Still another organization,

W4, the Office of Prcxiuction Controls, advises and assists the Chief, 'V'J,

in the general operation of the Grcup. An::'i, as was the case with its

praiecessor organizations, WI, to accanplish its objectives, requires

continuing support fran a variety of othei:' organizations, both within am

outside the Sigint establishment.

Conclusion
It can be seen fran the foregoing chapter that the Sigint. establishment,
as was the case with the Soviets, was embarking on a new and unfamiliar field

in these early years. Just as the Soviet missile program did not evolve
instantly into a rrodern am sophisticated target, nor could the Sigint
cx:rmunity be expected to S'lJ.ldenly attain max.imurn effectiveness against

it. Both grew rather spasm:xlically in the beginning years, am both ex­

perienced successes and failures. And because of stringent security

procea.ures practice:'i by the Soviets, the Sigint effort was forced, on

nore than one occasion, to react belate::Uy to Soviet missile programs, ~

of which were in relatively adVanced stages of developnent when they were

first discovered. Also, blrlget constraints, and t:i.ne-lagsin developing state­
~
of-the-art equipnent, . . faciliti~A.SYstans, forced the Agency to make-do
with less-than-optimum resources in these early years.

Starting virtually fran scratch, NSA, and the other organizations

involve:'i in the collection. ani prooessing of missile and space signals,

had to acquire and train employees, design arrl implement effective collection

systems am facilities, fin:l ani isolate, in a maze of traffic, relevant

aspects of tOO Soviet missile establishment, am streamline and refine

processing and reporting capabilities. Huge aIIOlmts of data had to be

30

TOP SECRET UMBRA

acquired, precessed, analyzed, ard correlated, ard difficult analytic

prob1ens had to be reso1ve:l. Arrl, as telemetry, beaconry, data, voice,

video, carrrmrl and other signals becarre rore and rore cCftlP1ex :in subse­

quent years, inproved collection and precessing systems arx1 techniques

'Were nee:ied to keep the state of the CI'yptologic art equal to the challenge

of this sophisticated Sigint target.

31

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