Cobbah Article
Cobbah Article
Cobbah Article
REFERENCES
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extend access to Human Rights Quarterly
There is an ongoing debate among scholars over whether or not the con
of human rights is entirely Western.' Questions that have been rais
clude the following: Can we really expect non-Western peoples to em
the international human rights instruments which are by and large We
in character? 2 If non-Western cultures do not possess the Western con
tion of human rights, do they have other approaches to the enhancemen
human dignity? 3 It is perhaps in the nature of such a discussion that t
questions will never be satisfactorily answered. There seems to be some
sensus, however, that the concept of human rights as generally underst
is historically a Western concept. The more troubling questions fa
Westerners and non-Westerners alike pertain to whether contemporary
ternational human rights instruments, given their Western biases,
said to apply to peoples from non-Western cultures.
Despite an increase in the discussion of human rights in Africa, very
exists in the form of literature that approaches the idea of human rights
* An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Seventh Annual International H
Rights Symposium and Research Conference, Center for the Study of Human R
Columbia University, New York, New York, 9-13 June 1986.
1. Dunstan M. Wai, "Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Human Rights: Cultur
Ideological Perspectives, ed. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (New York: Pra
1979), 116; Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critiq
Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights," American Political Science Revie
(June 1982).
2. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, "Human Rights: A Western Construct with
Applicability," in Pollis and Schwab, note 1 above, 1-18.
3. Raimundo Pannikkar, "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?" Di
120 (Winter 1982): 75-102.
Human Rights Quarterly 9 (1987) 309-331 ? 1987 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
8. Edward Allen Kent, "Taking Human Rights Seriously," in Rationality in Thought and Ac-
tion, ed. Martin Tammy and K.D. Irani (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 37.
9. Ibid., 38.
10. Ibid.
11. See Niara Sudarkasa, "African and Afro-American Family Structure: A Comparison,"
Black Scholar 11 (November/December 1980): 44.
12. Gerald E. Frug, "The City as a Legal Concept," Harvard Law Review 93 (April 1
1086.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 1087-90.
15. Lewis P. Hinchman, "The Origins of Human Rights: A Hegelian Perspective," Western
Political Quarterly 37 (March 1984): 8.
16. Ibid., 9.
17. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1966), 466-467.
18. Hinchman, note 15 above, 10.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 12.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 12-13.
26. Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (1651; reprint, London: Oxford University Press, 1909),
chaps. 12-15.
27. John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government Book II (London: Dent, 1953), 96-99.
Autonomous man was possessed in nature with natural rights that were prior
to and supreme over the sovereignty of all associations of which he is part,
including the sovereign state.
28. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract Book I (London: Dent, 1913), chaps. 6, 7.
leaving aside everything contingent until, finally, one comes by analysis to the
abstraction called natural man.
If one thinks away everything which might even remotely be regarded as par-
ticular or evanescent, such as what pertains to particular mores, history, culture,
Hegel was disturbed by the claim of the classical liberals that the true nature
of something so supremely complex as modern society should be sought in
the abstraction of the "natural man."41 This method implies that the
understanding of anything complex lies in reducing the complexity to its
simple elements and perhaps to its beginnings.42 In the words of Hinchman,
40. Ibid., quoting G.W.F. Hegel, "Glauben and Wissen," Janaer Schrifkn 1801-1807 (1970):
445.
41. Ibid., 17.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 19.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., n. 17.
47. Ibid.
[t]here is at stake a basic clash of styles of thoughts, the one liberal and in-
dividualist the other "communitarian" and "holist." The one sees the individual,
and his freedom, his interest and his projects at the center of the field, society and
social relationships as marginal to the hard irreducible core of his individuality,
the other starts with the social relationships themselves and sees the individual as
a function of them, regards the individual not as an independent being related
only externally to others, but as a being whose whole nature is constituted by the
character of the social relations in which he stands."9
55. Ibid.
56. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Women's Rights, Affirmative Action, and the Myth
of Individualism," The George Washington Law Review 54 (January and March 1986):
338-374.
57. Ibid., 340.
58. Ibid.
59. Turner, note 52 above, 36.
60. John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1970),
61. Herbert J. Foster, "African Patterns in the Afro-American Family," Journal of Black S
14 (December 1983): 210.
62. Ibid., 211.
63. Ibid.
64. Sudarkasa, note 11 above, 44.
65. Ibid., 50.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Wai, note 1 above, 116.
71. See, e.g., Joseph B. Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs (London: Routledge, 1928), 182.
72. For example, traditional Ashanti warfare strategy classified extended families into the ad-
vance party, the rear guard, and the left and right flanks. Each division had its chief, sub-
chiefs and commoners.
73. Taslim Olawale Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1956), 83.
74. Ibid., 82.
75. Mbiti, note 60 above.
76. Michael Wallach and Lise Wallach, "How Psychology Sanctions the Cult of Self," The
Washington Monthly 16 (February 1985): 49.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., 50.
80. Ibid., 51.
81. Ibid., 50.
In his very reflective paper, Pannikkar observed that "[n]o culture, tradition,
ideology, or religion can today speak for the whole of humankind, let alone
solve its problem. Dialogues and intercourse leading to a mutual fecunda-
tion are necessary." 83 On the one hand, Pollis and Schwab have argued that
"it is evident that in most States in the world, human rights as defined in the
West are rejected or, more accurately are meaningless."84 Donnelly
disagreed with Pollis and Schwab and argued that these claims by Pollis and
Schwab are "strong claims" and "that for the most part they are not
justified." 85 While plainly admitting that the historical roots of human rights
are Western, Donnelly forcefully advanced the view that the concept has
universal application. He suggested "that for most of the goals of the
developing countries, as defined by these countries themselves, [Western]
human rights are as effective or more effective then either traditional ap-
proaches or modern non-human rights strategies."86 Speaking of the
possibilities for an African communitarian model, Howard argued as Don-
nelly did for the rejected of "this model of rural Africa." In Howard's view, if
we base human rights policy on this model we shall be ignoring the changes
which have occurred and are still occurring in the way Africans live.87
88. Rhoda Howard, "Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Implicit Com-
parisons," Human Rights Quarterly 6 (May 1984): 175.
89. Pannikkar, note 3 above, 90.
90. Na'im Akbar, "Africentric Social Sciences for Human Liberation," Journal of Black Studies
14 (June 1984): 396, quoting W. Nobels, "African Consciousness and Liberation
Struggles: Implications for the Development and Construction of Scientific Paradigms,"
presented at Fanon Research and Development Conference, Port of Spain, Trinidad,
1978.
91. Pannikkar, note 3 above, 77.
92. Kenneth Little, West African Urbanization: A Study of Voluntary Associations in Social
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
93. Josiah A.M. Cobbah, "The Role of the Informal Sector in National Development and In-
tegration Processes" (Ph.D. diss, University of Cincinnati, 1985), 92-96.
The dialogue and intercourse that will lead to the mutual fecundat
human rights have indeed begun. Cultural reactivist viewpoints are
currency in the human rights discussion. The problem, however, is tha
discussion is still Western and the African voices are still those of the
Western educated political and academic elites who, like Donnelly,
acknowledge the relativity of concepts but are trapped in their unquestion-
ing acceptance of the Western concept in the name of modernization and
images of a global (Western) village. For example, Donelly recently wrote a
paper in which he held onto his view that human rights are Western, but at
Individuality P h a lGroupness
Uniqueness Psycho-Behavioral
Moda lities Sameness
Differences Modalities Commonality
Competition Cooperation
Individual Rights Values and Customs Collective
Separateness and Responsibility
Independence Cooperateness and
Interdependence