Eu Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 at Year one-QA0217807ENN

EU Gender Action
Plan 2016-2020
at year one
European Implementation
Assessment
EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 at year one
European Implementation Assessment
Study
On 13 December 2016, the Conference of Committee Chairs approved the joint request by
the Committee on Development (DEVE) and the Committee on Women’s Rights and
Gender Equality (FEMM) to undertake an implementation report on the ‘Implementation
of the Joint Staff Working Document (SWD(2015)0182) – Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External
Relations 2016-2020’ – Rapporteurs: Linda McAvan (DEVE) and Dubravka Šuica
(FEMM). This decision triggered the automatic production of a European
Implementation Assessment, which routinely accompanies such implementation reports.
This European Implementation Assessment on the one-year evaluation of the Gender

Action Plan for 2016-2020 was drawn up by the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit of the
Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, in the European
Parliament’s Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services. It aims at
contributing to the Parliament’s discussions on this topic, enhance understanding of the
subject, and ultimately feed into the implementation report under preparation by the two
aforementioned rapporteurs.
Abstract
The EU’s Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 (referred to as GAP II) is the Union’s
framework for promoting gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment in
external relations in third and partner countries, as well as in international fora and
agendas. GAP II is significant, as it constitutes the manifestation of the principles
related to gender parity outlined in the new European Consensus on Development. Its
goals are also key to the successful achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).
Against this background, this European Implementation Assessment seeks to provide
an initial assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of GAP II at its first milestone:
the end of its first year of operation in third countries. Given the short timeframe of the
evaluation, this study presents some preliminary findings on the achievements and
shortcomings in the application of GAP II, but also aims to assess the new framework
itself. Moreover, it provides Members with a number of opportunities for action and
recommendations for improving EU performance on promoting and protecting gender
parity and women’s empowerment in partner countries.
AUTHOR
Dr Isabelle Ioannides, Ex-Post Evaluation Unit
To contact the Unit, please email: EPRS-ExPostEvaluation@ep.europa.eu
The author wishes to thank Marta Mendez Juez, Trainee in the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit,
for her research assistance on this study. The author is also grateful to the peer reviewers
for constructive comments and to anonymous interlocutors in the European Commission
for their insights on the topic at hand.
ABOUT THE PUBLISHER

This paper has been drawn up by the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit of the Directorate for
Impact Assessment and European Added Value, within the Directorate–General for
Parliamentary Research Services of the Secretariat of the European Parliament.
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS
Original: EN
This document is available on the internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank
DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European
Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The
content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author and any opinions
expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the
source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a
copy.
Manuscript completed in October 2017.

Brussels © European Union, 2017.
PE 603.256
ISBN: 978-92-846-1255-0
DOI: 10.2861/75103
CAT: QA-02-17-807-EN-N
2
Contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 1
List of boxes ................................................................................................................................... 4

List of figures ................................................................................................................................. 4
List of tables ................................................................................................................................... 4
List of acronyms ............................................................................................................................ 5
Executive summary ....................................................................................................................... 7
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 9
1.1. Objectives .................................................................................................................... 11
1.2. Methodology............................................................................................................... 11
2. EU framework for gender parity and women’s empowerment in third countries . 16

2.1. Closing the gender gap in third countries .............................................................. 16
2.2. International prerogatives on gender parity .......................................................... 19
2.3. EU agenda for women’s empowerment in partner countries.............................. 22
3. Learning from past experience ......................................................................................... 24

3.1. Lessons from the Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP I) .................................... 24
3.2. Lessons from other international donors on gender equality and women’s
empowerment............................................................................................................. 26
4. Assessing the implementation of the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 ...................... 30

4.1. Achievements ............................................................................................................. 30
4.1.1. Understanding gender parity and women’s empowerment ....................... 30
4.1.2. Clear goals and connecting the dots ............................................................... 32
4.1.3. EU leadership ..................................................................................................... 33
4.1.4. Focus on EU institutional culture shift ........................................................... 35
4.1.5. Working together ............................................................................................... 36
4.1.6. Consistent monitoring....................................................................................... 39
4.1.7. Clear guidelines ................................................................................................. 42
4.1.8. Available financing and aid modalities .......................................................... 44
4.2. Shortcomings .............................................................................................................. 46
4.2.1. Underdeveloped themes ................................................................................... 47
4.2.2. Trade and gender − the missing link .............................................................. 49
4.2.3. Quantity over quality ........................................................................................ 51
4.2.4. Sidelining gender equality in difficult contexts ............................................. 53
4.2.5. Wide-ranging activities lead to mixed results ............................................... 54
3
5. Opportunities for action .................................................................................................... 55

5.1. Adopt a ‘whole of society’ approach ....................................................................... 55
5.1.1. Structure relations with non-state actors ........................................................ 57
5.1.2. Involve the private sector ................................................................................. 58
5.2. Ensure that political commitment for EU action translates into real action ...... 59
5.2.1. Make gender a priority at all levels ................................................................. 59
5.2.2. Further streamline monitoring ........................................................................ 60
5.2.3. Include gender equality in trade negotiations and the monitoring of trade
agreements .......................................................................................................... 62
5.2.4. Include men in EU programmes on gender equality ................................... 62
5.3. Adapt to local realities ............................................................................................... 63
5.3.1. One size does not fit all ..................................................................................... 63
5.3.2. EU delegations at the frontline ........................................................................ 67
5.3.3. Women as actors, not victims .......................................................................... 68
5.4. Enhance training and access to training for women − and implement it........... 68
5.5. Engage consistently and for the long term ............................................................. 70
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 72
References .................................................................................................................................... 74
EU legal documents ............................................................................................................ 74
Other EU documents ........................................................................................................... 74
EU Member States’ documents .......................................................................................... 76
Other international organisations’ documents ................................................................ 76
Other documents ................................................................................................................. 77
Conference presentations ................................................................................................... 80
Websites ................................................................................................................................ 80
List of boxes
Box 1: Key definitions .................................................................................................................. 13
Box 2: The sustainable development agenda and gender equality ....................................... 20
Box 3: Case study – Gender equality and African Union-European Union cooperation... 37
Box 4: Linking GAP II monitoring to the EU and international development context ...... 41
Box 5: Case study – Gender equality in the Western Balkans ............................................... 65
List of figures
Figure 1: GDP gain in 2025 by closing the global gender gap ............................................... 10
Figure 2: Gender Inequality Index - Regional comparison of EU development aid .......... 17
List of tables
Table 1: EU commitment to ODA on OECD Gender Maker actions (administrative costs
excluded, co-financing included) ................................................................................ 45
4
List of acronyms
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

ADB Asian Development Bank
AfDB African Development Bank
AU African Union
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
COP21 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
CSD Civil Society Dialogue
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSOLA Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DAC Development Assistance Committee, OECD
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVE Committee on Development, European Parliament
DG Directorate General
DG DEVCO Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development,
European Commission
DG NEAR Directorate General for European Neighbourhood Policy and
Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
EAMR External Action Management Report
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Commission
ECHO Directorate General or European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
Operations, European Commission
EDF European Development Fund
EEAS European External Action Service
EIA European Implementation Assessment
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EOM Electoral Observation Mission
EU European Union
EUD European Union Delegation
EUSR European Union Special Security Representatives
EVAL Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, Directorate for Impact Assessment and
European Added Value, European Parliamentary Research Service,
European Parliament
FEMM Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, European
Parliament
GAP Gender Action Plan
GAP I Gender Action Plan 2010-2015
GAP II Gender Action Plan 2016-2020
GDP gross domestic product
GFP gender focal person
5
GII Gender Inequality Index

HoD Head of Delegation
HRD human rights defender
HQ Headquarter
IcSP Instrument contributing to Security and Peace
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IFI International Financial Institution
IfS Instrument for Stability
ILO International Labour Organisation
INTA Committee on International Trade, European Parliament
JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
M&E monitoring and evaluation
MENA Middle East and North Africa
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA Overseas Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCD policy coherence for development
SARD Southern African Development Community
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SIA Sustainability Impact Assessment
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise
VP/HR Vice-President (of the European Commission)/High Representative (of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)
WTO World Trade Organisation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UN United Nations
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
US United States (of America)
6
Executive summary
The EU’s Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 (referred to as GAP II) is the Union’s framework
for promoting gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment in external relations
in third and partner countries, as well as in international fora and agendas. GAP II is
significant, because it constitutes the manifestation of the principles related to gender
parity outlined in the new European Consensus on Development. Its goals are also key to
the successful achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
This European Implementation Assessment (EIA) of the first year of implementation of

GAP II was prepared to accompany the drafting of the implementation report on this
topic by the European Parliament Committee on Development (DEVE) and the
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). This evaluation was
prepared in full recognition of the short timeframe since the adoption of GAP II and its
application (only one year to date). Accordingly, the objectives set take into consideration
that, under these circumstances, it is too early to make a full assessment of the impact of
GAP II.
The objectives of this EIA are threefold:

 First, to take stock of, on the one hand, the progress and achievements of GAP II
and, on the other, the difficulties and possible inconsistencies met when
implementing GAP II in third countries and across the whole spectrum of its
external action.
 Second, given the short timeframe for the evaluation, to examine and assess
GAP II framework itself.
 Third, to draw conclusions on how to improve EU action in support of gender
equality and women’s empowerment in third countries and offer some openings
for action for improving EU performance in this area.
This evaluation’s first section lays out the main tenets of gender equality and the limits of
the use of quantitative data in this area. It goes on to place the notion of gender equality
and women’s empowerment within the international context and the EU framework.
While the new framework offers a real opportunity to improve EU action on gender
equality, its strengths also depend on how well GAP II has addressed the potential risks
and weaknesses of the previous framework, GAP 2010-2015 (also referred to as GAP I). In
addition to delving into this issue, this section also examines how the EU’s new GAP II
compares to the best practices of other international donors on gender equality and
women’s empowerment in third countries.
First insights into the application of GAP II show that the EU has fundamentally
mainstreamed the notion and significance of gender equality and women’s
empowerment in partner countries in its discourse and external relations and cooperation
programmes. It has taken on board a number of lessons identified from its experience of
the preceding Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP I). Progress on supporting gender
equality in EU external action demonstrates that there is an understanding at EU
decision-making level that empowering girls and women across the globe is not an
option in our times, but a duty and a responsibility to future generations. In turn, gender
7
parity in partner countries has become synonymous with increasing productivity and
economic growth, respect and protection of human rights, sustainability and resilience of
a society.
Important GAP II successes so far include a better understanding of the underpinnings of

gender equality, including the role of men in ensuring gender equality and promoting
women’s empowerment. One of the most important achievements has been making
progress on GAP II focus on shifting EU institutional culture at headquarter (HQ) and
delegation levels, therefore pushing for a true systemic change in the EU institutions on
gender equality issues. In addition, much effort has been made in reaching out to civil
society actors, working better with other international donors present on the ground, and
consulting with stakeholders. This has in turn translated into stronger investments in
human capital and financial assistance for gender parity; an improvement of and
systematic monitoring of relevant activities; and the use of clear guidelines for
programme implementation. In that respect, the first annual European
Commission/EEAS monitoring report provided a clear template for identifying how well
their services have responded to the gender equality requirements of their programmes
at HQ and EU delegation levels.
Some weaknesses, however, persist, especially in terms of focusing on specific facets of

EU external action − the framework tends to concentrate on development aspects per se
and not enough on the EU’s potential in fragile and conflict countries and the use of trade
as political leverage to promote human rights. In addition, GAP II monitoring over-
concentrates on quantitative assessments of programmes and activities rather than
centring on the quality of delivery and potential (short-term, medium-term and long-
term) impact on recipient countries.
This study demonstrates that sustainable change in women’s empowerment and gender
parity in partner countries is a complex and lengthy process. It necessitates that the EU
engages consistently and in the long-term; that EU efforts are adapted to local realities in
recipient countries; that the EU demonstrates its political commitment clearly across
regions and at all levels; that improvements and further specialisation in training on
gender equality issues is necessary and that it should be made available to local partners
at government and among non-state actors (including NGOs); and, finally, that a ‘whole
of society’ approach be adopted in parallel to a ‘whole of government’ approach when
engaging with partner countries.
8
1. Introduction
The reviewed European Union (EU) framework on ‘Gender equality and women’s
empowerment: transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations
2016-2020’ (referred to as Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 or GAP II),1 was published in
September 2015 and has created many expectations. GAP II outlines an ambitious and
clear approach to gender equality and the promotion, protection and fulfilment of
women’s and girls’ human rights in third countries. It follows and builds on the Gender
Action Plan for 2010-2015 (known as GAP I),2 which was seen as lacking institutional
leadership, accountability and capacity.3 EU efforts on gender equality have received
scant prioritisation in EU external action and a recent evaluation gave a scathing
assessment of the EU’s support in this area.4
At the time of its launch, experts had projected that ‘if implemented fully, [GAP II] would
greatly increase women’s and girls’ opportunities to improve their lives, to enjoy and
exercise their full human rights and seek redress when these rights are denied or
abused.’5 This European Implementation Assessment, which seeks to inform the
improvement of performance of the EU in this field rather than determine its impact,
aims at examining whether the expectations set can be and have been met.
Even following decades of efforts at an international – not only EU – level and despite the
progress made towards enabling women to become equal partners with men in the
economy and society, the gap between the genders remains large. Gender equality and
women’s empowerment are now mainstream dimensions of any development discourse,
including the EU discourse. Gender equality has become a standard barometer for
measuring the maturity of a society. Nonetheless, persistent social norms, structures,
institutions and entrenched power relationships still prevent girls and women in
numerous third countries from participating on equal terms in public, social and political
life.
1 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, Joint Staff Working Document ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: Transforming the
Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020’, reference no.: SWD(2015) 182
final, Brussels, 21 September 2015.
2European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document ‘EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality
and Women’s Empowerment in Development 2010-2015’, reference no.: SEC(2010) 265 final, Brussels, 8
March 2010.
3O’Connell, Helen, The European Union’s New Gender Action Plan 2016-2020: Gender Equality and
Women’s Empowerment in External Relations, Overseas Development Institute, London, 26 October
2015, p. 1.
4Watkins, Francis et al., Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in
Partner Countries. Final Report. Volume 1: Main Report, Evaluation carried out by the consortium
composed by COWI A/S, ADE, Itad on behalf of the European Commission (contract N° – 2013/
319463), Brussels, April 2015, p. 94.
5O’Connell, Helen, More of the Same, or Radical Change? Options for the Successor to the EU’s Gender
Action Plan 2010-2015, Overseas Development Institute, London, November 2014, p. 2.
9
Nevertheless, gender equality is not just a matter of social justice or of principles; it is also
one of ‘smart economics’. Women’s participation in the economy is essential for
sustainable development and economic growth. A 2012 OECD study estimated that
closing the labour force gender gap by 2030 could yield a potential average gain of
12 % GDP in relation to the size of the total economy across OECD countries. The same
study noted that if women had equal access to productive resources as men, they could
increase yields on their farms by 20-30 % and raise total agricultural outputs. This could
lift an estimated 100-150 million people out of hunger worldwide, amongst other
benefits.6
Figure 1: GDP gain in 2025 by closing the global gender gap 7
Source: Adapted from Woetzel, Jonathan et al., The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women’s Equality
Can Add $12 Trillion to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Institute, London, September 2015, p. 3.
In a more recent study that examined 15 gender equality indicators8 for 95 countries, the
McKinsey Global Institute showed that narrowing the global gender gap in work would
not only be equitable in the broadest sense, but could double the contribution of women
to global GDP growth between 2014 and 2025 (see Figure 1). Effectively, according to that
study, a ‘full-potential’ scenario in which women participate in the economy identically
to men, female participation would add up to $ 28 trillion (the equivalent of
€ 26.5 trillion), or 26 %, to the annual global GDP in 2025 compared with a business-as-
6Thévenon, Olivier et al., Effects of Reducing Gender Gaps in Education and Labour Force Participation
on Economic Growth in the OECD, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers,
No. 138, OECD Publishing, 2012.
7These estimates assume that these is no decline in male participation as a result of the rising
number of women entering the workforce.
8These indicators fall into four categories: (1) equality in work; (2) essential services and enablers of
economic opportunity; (3) legal protection and political voice; (4) and physical security and
autonomy.
10
usual scenario. This impact is roughly equivalent to the size of the combined United
States (US) and Chinese economies. 9
1.1. Objectives
Against this backdrop, this European Implementation Assessment seeks to examine if the
attention the EU has given to gender equality and women’s empowerment in third
counties as a result and within the context of GAP II has positive results in its first year in
operation, and whether it has the potential to ensure that positive results are
consolidated.
Systematic reporting on GAP II by all EU actors has been set to improve the effectiveness,
transparency and coherence of EU investments and their impact on gender equality and
to improve accountability of EU investments to EU citizens and ultimately to
beneficiaries. The Council called on the European Commission services and the EEAS to
inform the Council on an annual basis on the implementation of GAP II.10 It is in this
context that the Conference of Committee Chairs approved the request by the DEVE and
FEMM Committees for an implementation report on GAP II, which automatically
triggered the preparation of this European Implementation Assessment.
In this context, this study has a threefold aim:

 First, to take stock of, on the one hand, the progress and achievements of GAP II
and, on the other, the difficulties and possible inconsistencies met when
implementing GAP II in third countries and across the whole spectrum of its
external action.
 Second, the timing of this evaluation (at the end of only one year of
implementation, as the starting date for implementation of GAP II was
January 2016) provides Members with the opportunity to recommend ways of
rectifying weaknesses identified in the GAP II framework itself. For this reason,
beyond examining and assessing the implementation of GAP II, this study also
evaluates the GAP II framework itself.
 Third, this evaluation seeks to draw lessons on how to improve EU action in
support of gender equality and women’s empowerment in third countries and
outlines possible opportunities for action for improving EU performance in this
area.
1.2. Methodology
The preparation by the DEVE and FEMM Committees of the implementation report on
GAP II coincides with the drafting of the first year monitoring report by the European
Commission Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG
DEVCO) in cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS). This
9 Woetzel, Jonathan et al., The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12 Trillion
to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Institute, London, September 2015.
10
Council of the EU, Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 - Council Conclusions (26 October 2015), reference
no.: 13201/15, Brussels, 26 October 2015, p. 6.
11
European Implementation Assessment aims at accompanying the work of the two

Committees on their implementation report on the topic.
Three factors affected the choice of objectives and methodology for this study. First, the
timeframe of the evaluation, which in this case is of only one year. As noted in the Ex-
Post Evaluation (EVAL) Unit of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European
Added Value working document on the ‘method and process’ that EVAL follows when
undertaking implementation assessments, an interval of at least three years of policy
intervention/implementation is recommended before undertaking an evidence-based
evaluation of the relevance, impact, effectiveness and efficiency of EU action. Otherwise,
the findings are limited to an overview of the state of the transposition of the policy, 11 if
relevant information on the implementation is available. This European Implementation
Assessment therefore recognises the limits to evaluating GAP II, the fact that it is not
possible to assess whether change has taken place, whether it is the result of GAP II, and
if it can be sustainable. Accordingly, engaging in change on gender equality during the
first year of implementation is recorded as a success.
Second, the limited availability of first hand data on the single year of implementation of
GAP II. This results from the fact that the first final draft of the study was written before
the European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report was published. Alternative
sources of information were therefore used. More specifically, this evaluation examined
experiences and possible lessons on the implementation of EU efforts on gender equality
and women’s empowerment in its external action, collected and analysed by think tanks,
NGOs and other non-state actors.12 These are also complemented by the accounts of think
tanks, EU and NGO workers in the field, which have been collected either through
interviews or at events organised on the issue at hand in the Brussels environment. These
accounts were further supplemented by the data, lessons, achievements and weaknesses
of GAP II, as identified in the annual European Commission/EEAS monitoring report.
Third, the study acknowledges the inherent limitations of this approach. These refer to
the fact civil society actors consulted for the preparation of this study are not
representative of the entire civil society in a country or region. In addition, it is
recognised that civil society does not necessarily have the full picture of either the EU
intervention in a country or region, or of the diverse aspects of its external action
(development, trade, humanitarian aid, security support) that are underway.
Considering the short timeframe since the implementation of GAP II, this evaluation also
examines whether the lessons identified by think tanks and other civil society actors, as
11Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, Ex-Post Evaluation in the European Parliament: Method and Process, EVAL
Working Document, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, Brussels,
July 2017, p. 7.
12For the purpose of this study, non-state actors are understood, to include the private sector,
economic and social partners, including trade union organisations, and civil society, which is in line
with agreements the EU has with the developing world (see, for example, Article 6: Definitions, in
the Cotonou Agreement, p. 7).
12
well as the evaluation of GAP I that the European Commission contracted, and
recommendations proposed therein, have been incorporated when preparing GAP II.
To respond further to the above limitations, the analysis in this European

Implementation Assessment makes use of statistical data available in Eurostat and OECD
databases. It also includes empirical evidence collected in secondary literature related to
the evaluation of the EU contribution to gender parity and women’s empowerment in
third countries because of GAP II and its implementation. Moreover, this study includes,
when and where necessary, quantitative data regarding specific EU external action
financing programmes that is found in the European Commission/EEAS monitoring
report on GAP II.
When it comes to the sources of data used in European Commission/EEAS annual

monitoring report on the first year of implementation of GAP II, an internal database and
reporting tools regularly used by the European Commission and the EEAS for their
management implementation, helped to collect the necessary data for the monitoring of
activities. These tools include the External Action Management Report (EAMR); data
drawn from the EU Results Framework and Commission’s Statistical Dashboard
database, the International Cooperation and Development Result Framework; the OECD
DAC policy marker for gender equality and women empowerment; and a specific survey
targeting Gender Focal Persons.13 The annual monitoring report also drew on findings
from semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the EEAS and the European
Commission. Reporting on the thematic objectives was collected from EU delegations
(EUDs) (a Scoping Study of Gender Analysis Studies/Profiles) and the thematic
operational units at HQ level, in line with the March 20016 guidance note on GAP II.14
Box 1: Key definitions

Empowerment: the range of options that create opportunities and reinforce individual
and collective capacities to exercise control over the life of individuals and offer them
more choices. In that sense, empowerment can mean access to and control over
resources, but also self-determination and participation.
Gender: social and cultural differences between men and women that assign value and
create unequal opportunities in life. These characteristics are variable. Policies and
13European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, Joint Staff Working Document, EU Gender Action Plan II, “Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020”,
Annual Implementation Report 2016, reference no.: SWD(2017) 288 final, Brussels, 29 August 2017,
pp. iv and 3.
14European Commission, Guidance Note on the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, For DEVCO HQ
and EUD Operational Staff, Brussels, 8 March 2016.
13
structures play a very important role in shaping the conditions of life and, in doing so,
they often institutionalise the social construction of gender.15
Gender analysis refers to ‘the study of differences in the conditions, needs,

participation rates, access to resources and development, control of assets, decision-
making powers, etc., between women and men in their assigned gender roles.’16
Gender analysis is the basis for gender mainstreaming (explained below) and helps to
understand gender inequalities in a given situation or sector and to formulate projects
or (sector) programmes in a way that they address and redress the situation.
Gender analysis also helps to understand the root causes of inequalities, how they
might impact on the outcomes of a programme, how to tackle these; as well as to detect
if there is a need for specific, targeted actions for women and girls (or, in a given
situation, for men and boys). At the very least, it helps to understand how not to cause
any further damage (‘do no harm’ principle), thus avoiding incorrect assumptions and
stereotypes and reproducing unequal power relationships. 17
Gender equality: the absence of discrimination based on gender in the allocation of

resources, benefits and access to services.
Gender equity: achieving equal treatment in the distribution of benefits and

opportunities between women and men under the law and in practice by
mainstreaming gender into various areas of policy, and in public and private life.
Gender mainstreaming refers to the integration of gender analysis in all aid projects,
programmes and policies.18 Building on the 1995 UN Platform for Action of the Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing and a relevant European Commission
communication,19 the passing in December 1998 of the EU Council Resolution on
Kabeer, Naila, Gender Mainstreaming in Poverty Eradication and the Millennium Development Goals: A
15
Handbook for Policy Makers and Other Stakeholders, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2003.
16European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament - Programme of Action for the Mainstreaming of Gender Equality in Community Development
Cooperation, reference no.: COM(2001) 295 final, Brussels, 21 June 2001, p. 17.
17Austrian Development Cooperation, EU Gender Action Plan II (2016-2020): Gender Analysis on
Sector Level, Vienna, not dated, p. 2.
18Elgström, Ole, ‘Norm Negotiations. The Construction of New Norms Regarding Gender and
Development in EU Foreign Aid Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 7(3), Special Issue, 2000:
457. For a historical overview on the issue, see Pollack, Mark A. and Emilie Hafner-Burton,
‘Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 7(3) Special Issue,
2000: 432-256.
19European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council: A New Partnership
Between Women and Men: Equal Sharing and Participation. The European Community’s Priorities for the
Fourth UN World Conference on Women, Beijing, September 1995, COM(95) 221 final, Brussels, 29 May
1995.
14
Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation constituted a breakthrough as

regards gender awareness in official policy.20
Gender Focal Person (GFP): ‘a member who is responsible for facilitating the
promotion of women’s empowerment and gender equality issues in the activities of the
[EU] delegation.’21 More specifically, the GFP should spend 40-60 % of their weekly
time on gender issues. Duties notably include:
 Maintaining contact with civil society organisations (CSOs), women’s groups,
European and global networks and collaborating in identifying partner
organisations representing women’s and gender equality interests related to
the technical areas of interest;
 Soliciting a gender-balanced participation of experts used for European
Commission-funded activities; and
 Maintaining a roster of gender-sensitive experts to call on, whenever needed,
for the review, evaluation, etc. of all activities.
The GFPs work may be complemented by an additional gender champion, if deemed
necessary, who is picked and appointed from an EU delegation or EU Member State
staff.22
Intersectionality: an analytical tool for understanding and responding to the ways

gender identity intersects with and is constituted by other social factors, such as race,
age, ethnicity, class, colonial histories, religious, social and cultural categories and
identities, and sexual orientation.23
20Council Regulation (EC) No. 2836/98 of 22 December 1998 on integrating of gender issues in
development cooperation, Official Journal L 354, 30 December 1998, p. 5-9.
21van Osch, Thera, Report: Gender Focal Persons Workshop ‘What Can GFPs Do to Promote Gender
Equality in EU Development Cooperation?’, EU Gender Advisory Services 2010, Commissioned by
EuropeAid Cooperation Office (Specific contract no.: 2009/220/132), Particip, Brussels, 16-18 June
2010, p. 36.
22 CONCORD, EU Gender Action Plan II: Opportunities for Civil Society Participation to Kick-start
Implementation, CONCORD: European NGO confederation for relief and development, Brussels,
p. 3.
23See, for example, Section VI: Gender, Race, Intersectionality, in Harcourt, Wendy (ed.), The
Palgrave Handbook of Gender and Development: Critical Engagements in Feminist Theory and Practice,
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016, p. 367-437.
15
2. EU framework for gender parity and women’s

empowerment in third countries
This section lays out the main tenets of gender equality and the limits of the use of
quantitative data on the issue. It goes on to place the notion of gender equality and
women’s empowerment within the international context and the EU framework.
2.1. Closing the gender gap in third countries

It is difficult to assess the exact degree of gender inequality across regions, as different
organisations use different variables, do not define geographic regions in a homogeneous
way, and do not use quantitative data in the same way. This should alarm policy makers
to the over-simplification of complex issues using quantitative data, and to the limits of
such data (see section on Quantity over quality).
The McKinsey Global Institute report on ‘The Power of Parity’, for example, had received
much attention for the conclusion it drew from using the Gender Parity Score, which
measures the distance each country has travelled toward gender parity (set at 1.00). This
report found that there is more gender inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (0.54) than in the
Middle East and North Africa (0.48), India (0.48) and South Asia (excluding India)
(0.44).24 However, the use of the more prominent Gender Inequality Index (GII),25
developed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and its adaptation to how
the EU organises its development aid across the world (Figure 2 labels the geographic
regions according to how the EU designates regions for its financial instruments), gives
quite different results.26
to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Institute, London, September 2015, p. vii.
25 UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index (GII) links gender inequality to human development and
provides a notable guide to measuring gender inequalities in three important aspects of human
development: reproductive health (measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth
rates); empowerment (measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and
proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older, with at least some secondary
education); and economic status (measured by labour force participation rate of female and male
populations aged 15 years and older).
26It should be noted that the UNDP does not provide a GII variable for all the countries for which
the EU makes aid available. Accordingly, for each of the regions, the following countries were
included: Africa (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos,
Mongolia, Myanmar/Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan),
Caribbean and Pacific (St. Lucia, Cuba, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and
Tobago, Guyana, Haiti, Suriname, Belize, Jamaica, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga), Eastern
neighbourhood (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), Gulf (Yemen, Iraq
and Iran), Southern neighbourhood (Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and
Tunisia), and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Chile,
16
As Figure 2 illustrates, when the distinction is made between the Gulf and the Southern
neighbourhood, it becomes clearer that although extreme poverty (most pertinently, in
Africa) plays an important role in fuelling gender inequality (McKinsey’s Gender Parity
Score), social norms and attitudes can also have devastating effects on gender equality in
terms of violence against women, access to (reproductive) health, education, and
(quality) jobs (UNDP’s GII). When considering the data presented in Figure 2, note that,
contrary to the Gender Parity Score, the higher the GII value the bigger the disparity
between females and males, and the more loss to human development.27
Figure 2: Gender Inequality Index - Regional comparison of EU development aid
Source: Author using data from UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index 2016.
Regardless of the divergence across organisations on the level of gender inequality, what
comes across resoundingly from stakeholders working on women’s empowerment is that
‘gender gaps exist in capabilities as well as opportunities, and progress is still too slow
for realising the full potential of half of humanity’.28 Consequently, it is important to look
at what types of intervention experts and policy makers across the world consider as
necessary to bridge the gender gap, and against which GAP II can be evaluated. Experts
suggest that to strengthen gender equality in external relations, the following factors
must be tackled in parallel through ‘a comprehensive and sustained portfolio of
initiatives’.29
Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama,
Uruguay).
27 For further information on how the GII is calculated, refer to the Technical Notes.
28 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2016, Human Development
for Everyone, New York, NY, 2016, p. 19.
to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Institute, London, September 2015, p. 81.
17
A key factor affecting women’s empowerment is labour market characteristics.30

Women’s economic participation per se is not necessarily equal to women’s economic
empowerment. While increasing the number of women in the workforce is an important
objective, it is necessary to provide decent working conditions (in line with the
International Labour Organisation decent work agenda) to improve their
empowerment.31 Women (especially in developing countries and conflict environments)
often face exploitation, dangerous or stigmatised work, low pay, and job insecurity.32 In
addition, although women’s capacity to seize economic opportunities can be substantially
improved through individual support (e.g., training in business management skills),
what remains most important is to simultaneously tackle the structural causes of gender
inequality. In addition, fiscal policy has significant gendered impacts given that it
concerns the resources available to governments to advance gender equality, either
directly or indirectly (via spending on health, education and other services), and that
revenue-raising methods can be gender-discriminatory. This encompasses gender-
sensitive government budgeting and public expenditure, access to public jobs,
recognition of unpaid housework, taxation policies and measures to reduce possible
disproportionate tax burden on women. 33
Collective norms and perceptions have affected women’s place in society and in the work
place. Dominant patriarchal societies tend to tolerate gender‐based violence, creating a
challenging environment to promote gender equality and women empowerment.
Furthermore, in these societies, human rights and culture are perceived as conflicting
concepts.34 McKinsey Global Institute has established a strong link between gender
equality in society, attitudes and beliefs about the role of women, and gender equality in
work. More specifically, it has found that an increase in gender equality in society is
linked with an increase in gender equality in work. 35 Therefore, beyond economic
development, progress in four areas in particular − political underrepresentation; legal
protection and countering violence against women; health; and education level and
digital inclusion − could help accelerate closing the gender gap.36
30See, for example, Eriksson, Eeva, Women’s Economic Empowerment at International Level, reference
no.: PE 583.128, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Rights, Directorate
General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, Brussels, March 2017.
31International Labour Organisation, Decent Work Indicators: Concepts and Definitions, ILO Manual,
First version, Geneva, May 2012.
33Hunt, Abigail and Emma Samman, Women’s Economic Empowerment: Navigating Enablers and
Constraints, Overseas Development Institute, London, September 2016, p. 22-27.
34Hunt, Abigail and Emma Samman, Women’s Economic Empowerment: Navigating Enablers and
Constraints, Overseas Development Institute, London, September 2016, pp. 22-27.
to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Institute, London, September 2015.p. 13.
to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Institute, London, September 2015.
18
Experts on gender equality in third countries argue that no development strategy will be
effective unless women play a central role. As Rodríguez Ruiz and Rubio-Marín conclude
in their analysis of Europe’s parity laws, the equal representation of men and women in
public office is not about matching quota laws to electoral institutions, but about
achieving ‘a structural prerequisite of the democratic state’ 37 and ‘a permanent feature of
good governance’.38 Public policy has an important role to play to bring down structural
barriers to gender parity. It can push for men and women to be equally perceived as
workers and caregivers at home through the right legislation, the provision of care
services. It also can help protect women and girls from violence, including intimate
partner violence, child marriage and female genital mutilation.
Health is a key factor to consider when examining the dynamics of gender inequality.
Despite women’s contribution to the wellness of their families and communities, hazards
to their own health are among the key factors holding women back. According to the
World Health Organisation, 18 million women worldwide die every year from non-
communicable diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, infectious and parasitic diseases,
respiratory diseases and infections, diabetes, autoimmune disorders and forms of
cancers.39
Education, including community-level education, has a key role to play in addressing

collective norms and perceptions that instigate gender inequality. Investing in girls and
women has multidimensional benefits—for example, if all girls in developing countries
completed secondary education, the under-five mortality rate would be halved. ‘Lower
legal gender equality is associated with fewer girls attending secondary school relative to
boys, fewer women working or running businesses and a wider gender wage gap.’40
Women also need support to pursue higher education, particularly in science,
technology, engineering and mathematics, where future demand for high-level work will
be.41 Access to education (beyond primary education), technology and skills, and health
services, protect against internal and international migration (affecting in particular
vulnerable groups, e.g., domestic workers, adolescent workers) and sexual violence and
abuse.
2.2. International prerogatives on gender parity

The protection of women’s rights and gender equality for both men and women in all
spheres of life is solidly embedded in the international regulatory and policy framework.
First included in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as a core human
37Rodríguez Ruiz, Blanca and Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘The Gender of Representation: On Democracy,
Equality and Parity’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 6(2), April 2008: 289.
38 Suk, Julie C., ‘Gender Quotas after the End of Men’, Boston University Law Review 93, 2013: 1129.
39World Health Organisation, Non-Communicable Diseases: A Priority for Women’s Health and
Development, The NCD Alliance: Putting non-communicable diseases on the global agenda, 2011.
40World Bank Group, Women, Business and the Law: Getting to Equal, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015, p. 2.
19
right, it has also been endorsed in numerous UN conventions. These include most
notably, the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW, 1979), the ‘Beijing Platform for Action’ (1995), the ‘Agenda 21’ of the
UN Conference on Environment and Development (1993), the ‘Declaration and Action
Plan of the World Food Summit’ (Rome, 1996), and the UN Security Council Resolution
1325 that calls for the active participation of women in all stages of conflict prevention
and conflict management and their protection against sexual violence and rape in armed
conflict. International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and recommendations
relevant to women’s economic empowerment and other UN-led initiatives (e.g., the
Guiding principles on business and human rights and the Women’s empowerment
principles) also protect and promote gender equality.42 In addition, the EU’s candidate
countries (covered by the GAP II) have ratified the Council of Europe Convention on
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul,
2011).
2015 was a pivotal year for gender equality and the empowerment of girls and women in
the global context with the inter-governmental negotiations on the post-2015
development agenda leading to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The strong
EU (and EU Member States) positioning on the development agenda clearly contributed
to gender equality being accepted as a central element within the new SDGs. In 2016, as
the SDGs began to be implemented, so did the promises made in the Agenda 2030 to
ensure that gender equality is achieved. As Box 2 illustrates, gender equality and the
empowerment of women and girls is enshrined as a stand-alone goal (Goal 5), but more
importantly, it runs as a thread throughout all the other goals.
Box 2: The sustainable development agenda and gender equality

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 aims to achieve gender equality and empower
all women and girls by 2030. It has nine associated targets, all with links to economic
empowerment. They include:
 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere.
 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private
spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.
 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female
genital mutilation.
 Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of
public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of
shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally
appropriate.
 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for
leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
42United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights, Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, New
York and Geneva, 2011; Women’s Empowerment Principles, UN Global Compact and UN Women,
2017.
20
 Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights.
 Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as
access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial
services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws.
 Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and
communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women.
 Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion
of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels.
SDG 8 for decent work and economic growth also tackles gender disparities through
‘full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including
for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value’
(Target 8.5) and to ‘protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working
environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women
migrants, and those in precarious employment’ (Target 8.8).
SDG 10 for reduced inequalities addresses gender disparities by ensuring ‘equal

opportunity and by reducing inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating
discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation,
policies and action in this regard’ (Target 10.3) and by adopting ‘policies, especially
fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality’
(Target 10.4).
SDG 1 for ending poverty and underline the importance of social protection, with fiscal
and wage policies, in addressing the needs of ‘the poor and the vulnerable’ (Target 1.3),
while the revitalisation of finance, technology, capacity building, trade, and systemic
change fall under the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development in SDG 17.
Source: United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals: 17 Goals to Transform our World.
The SDGs built on the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of July 2015 that committed states to
eliminating gender-based violence and discrimination in all its forms and to ensuring at
all levels that women enjoy equal rights and opportunities in terms of economic
participation, voice and agency.43 It was adopted at the end of the UN Third International
Conference on Financing for Development that includes measures to overhaul global
finance practices to promote gender-responsive budgeting and monitoring. 2015 was also
the 15th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and
Security, and the 20th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.
These landmark events have given added impetus to the EU to reaffirm its strong
commitment to gender equality, social justice, non-discrimination and human rights and
by extension to review its own gender equality framework for external relations.
43United Nations, Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for
Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda), Third International Conference Financing for
Development, 13-16 July 2015, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, New York, 2015.
21
2.3. EU agenda for women’s empowerment in partner countries

The Lisbon Treaty considers ‘equality between women and men’ among the EU’s four
core values and objectives − in Articles 2 and 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union and
in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights −, which the EU is committed to integrating
into all of its activities (Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). Moreover,
the EU has developed its gender equality policy in its external action in accordance with
these core values, mirrored in the EU’s extensive gender equality legislation applicable in
the EU Member States, and in line with the aforementioned international agreements.
Since 1995, following the Beijing UN Women’s Conference, the Council committed to
integrate five gender considerations into all aspects of its operations and policies. 44 The
2007 Conclusions of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council are among
the strongest expression of EU policy on gender equality, as they broaden the focus
beyond development cooperation to other areas, ‘such as economic growth, trade,
migration, infrastructure, environment and climate change, governance, agriculture,
fragile states, peace building and reconstruction’. 45 Among the most important EU
actions in this field was the adoption of the EU Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP I),
which resulted from the growing awareness of the gap between the policy and
operational levels of the EU on gender equality.
More recently, the EU Global Strategy46 and the Commission’s proposal for a new
European Consensus on Development (May 2017)47 and relevant Council conclusions 48
have committed the EU to building on these remarkable progress by strengthening
further the Union’s partnership with civil society and by protecting its space, two key
principles for the decades to come. The new European Consensus gives gender equality
and women empowerment a central role as the main principle for EU policy-making and
as a key enabler for obtaining results. It integrates social, economic and environmental
44 In a ground-breaking resolution of late 1995 the EU Council of Ministers first declared the
integration of a gender perspective in development cooperation as a crucial principle underpinning
the development policy of the Community and the Member States. See, Council of the EU,
Resolution on Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation, reference no.: 12847/95, 20
December 1995.
45 Council of the European Union, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development
Cooperation - Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States meeting within the Council, reference no.: 9561/07, Brussels, 15 May 2007, p. 3.
46High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Shared Vision, Common
Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,
June 2016.
47European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Proposal for a new
European Consensus on Development ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’, reference no.: COM(2016)
740 final, Strasbourg, 22 November 2016.
48Council of the EU, The New European Consensus on Development: “Our World, our Dignity, our
Future”, reference no.: 9459/17, Brussels, 19 May 2017.
22
dimensions, and retains poverty eradication as the main goal of EU development

policy.49
In the context of the negotiations on a new European Consensus, the European

Parliament had advocated for poverty eradication to remain the main goal of
development policy and defended need- and efficiency-based criteria for the allocation of
development aid. It also proposed a strong reinforcement of legal tools and institutional
mechanisms to implement EU-wide coordination and policy coherence for development
(PCD), without which EU internal inconsistencies could jeopardise EU contribution to the
Agenda 2030 implementation.50
The new framework GAP II builds on the lessons learned from and achievements of, the
previous Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP), which further examined in the section on
Lessons from GAP I. In 2013, as the ‘EU Action Plan for Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment in Development 2010-2015’51 (GAP I) was coming to an end, the Council
entrusted the Commission and the EEAS with setting up a Taskforce to develop a new
Gender Action Plan for 2016-2020. This Taskforce was composed of representatives from
the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU delegations, the European Commission
services and Member States, and drew on consultation with Member States and civil
society.
GAP II takes a comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach (so-called gender

mainstreaming across all EU external action policies and programmes) for action. Its aim
is to support partner countries, especially in developing, enlargement and neighbouring
countries to achieve tangible results towards gender equality, which is at the core of
European values, as well as the new SDGs. GAP II also strives aim to increase EU
financial contribution to gender objectives in the current EU financial framework 2014-
2020 through targeted activities and gender mainstreaming,52 as will be analysed later
(see section on Available financing and aid modalities).
49For an analysis of the merits and challenges of the new European Consensus, see Latek, Marta,
New European Consensus on Development: Will it Be Fit for Purpose?, reference no.: PE 599.434,
European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, Brussels, April 2017, p. 1.
50European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 14 February 2017 on the Revision of the
European Consensus on Development, reference no.: P8_TA(2017)0026, Strasbourg 14 February 2017.
March 2010.
Vila, Blerina (Wexam Consulting, Brussels), EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, capactiy4dev.eu -
52
Connecting the development community, 17 October 2016.
23
3. Learning from past experience

While the new framework offers a real opportunity to improve EU action on gender
equality, its strengths also depend on how well GAP II has addressed the potential risks
and weaknesses of the previous framework, GAP I. In addition to delving into this issue,
this section also examines how the EU’s new GAP II compares to the best practices of
other international donors on gender equality and women’s empowerment in third
countries.
3.1. Lessons from the Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP I)

Both the evaluations of GAP I produced by the Overseas Development Institute and the
one prepared by the consortium composed of COWI A/S, ADE and Itad53 for the
European Commission, gave a rather bleak picture on progress made on gender equality
and women’s empowerment in third countries through GAP 2010-2015 (GAP I).
Although some important and inspirational results have been achieved on gender parity,
these were patchy and poorly documented.
The COWI A/S, ADE and Itad evaluation first argued that EU delegations did not
demonstrate an understanding of the gender equality context, nor implement it. The
integrated three-pronged approach that effectively combined gender mainstreaming,
gender specific actions with political and policy dialogue to maximise outcomes, that was
proposed in GAP I, was not applied. Nor did the implementation of GAP I consider how
various instruments and modalities could be used to support outcomes on gender
equality and women’s empowerment. Despite successes at the international level through
EU work on ‘women, peace and security’ and on gender-based violence, these efforts not
well reflected at the level of country cooperation.54
Similarly, the Overseas Development Institute evaluation of GAP I concluded that GAP I
had not recognised or responded to the structural inequalities that perpetuate unequal
gender power relations, nor did it take into account how gender inequality intersects
with other inequalities (e.g., class, race and age). In that vein, that same evaluation
observed that gender equality and women’s empowerment could no longer be regarded
as being only a development aid matter. 55 A positive change is observed in GAP II (see
section on Understanding gender parity).
319463), Brussels, April 2015.
319463), Brussels, April 2015, p. 37-38.
Action Plan 2010-2015, Overseas Development Institute, London, November 2014, p. 13.
24
Second, the evaluation pointed to the lack of necessary commitment to and institutional
and political leadership on gender equality and women’s empowerment during the
time of implementation of GAP I. It argued that the European Commission Services and
EEAS leadership and management had not clearly communicated gender equality and
women’s empowerment priorities to their own staff at headquarters or in EU delegations.
Neither had they put in place the necessary institutional architecture and incentives to
motivate staff to take issues related to gender equality and women’s empowerment
seriously in their work, and to require and facilitate delivery on the policy commitments
made.
This meant that, in an environment where staff were overstretched and faced with
competing priorities, gender parity issues were put on the backburner.56 ‘Lack of
consistent and long-term leadership on gender equality and weak accountability and
incentives’ was also noted by the ODI, which, in response, had called for the
responsibility for implementation of the successor GAP II to rest with the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European
Commission (HR/VP).57 On this point too, there has been noticeable improvement on
support to gender parity and gender mainstreaming at the highest levels of the EU
leadership, and with more commitment to actual implementation at HQ level (see section
on EU leadership).
Third, the COWI A/S, ADE, Itad evaluation pointed to a mismatch between
commitments to gender equality and women’s empowerment made on paper and the
low organisational capacity to deliver them. Although EC financial commitments to
programmes on gender equality in external action had increased in the period 2007-2013,
human resource capacity to manage this increasing volume of work had not. Staff,
including gender focal points (GFPs), had not given gender the required attention in their
work nor did they have the tie or adequate technical expertise to tackle this issue.
Furthermore, technical guidelines and resources are available to staff but they are not
comprehensive, not adapted to staff needs and not well known or utilised by staff.58
Some of these concerns have been addressed in GAP II, as the section on EU leadership
demonstrates. However, more needs to be done on training (see section on Enhance
training and access to training).
319463), Brussels, April 2015, p. 81.
Action Plan 2010-2015, Overseas Development Institute, London, November 2014, p. 2. Also see,
O’Connell, Helen, Implementing the European Union Gender Action Plan 2010-2015: Challenges and
Opportunities, Overseas Development Institute, London, March 2013, p. 4 and 8.
319463), Brussels, April 2015, p. 81.
25
Fourth, on programming and financing, the evaluation contracted by the European

Commission argued that it was not possible to know exactly how much money had been
spent on mainstreaming gender into programming (largely due to poor application of the
gender marker59 that assesses how well programmes consider gender) and assess the
quality of investments. These needs have been better accounted for in the first year of
operation of GAP II (see section on Available financing and aid modalities).
Fifth, when assessing the EU method for institutional and programmatic accountability,
that same evaluation demonstrated that the programme/project results frameworks and
consequently the results reporting did not adequately integrate gender sensitive
indicators. EU delegations made little attempt to develop a robust analytical tool to
understand the gender context to inform country strategy objectives,
programmes/projects and dialogue. The systematic and methodical mandatory
monitoring of activities related to gender equality and women’s empowerment has been
reformed (see section on Clear guidelines and Consistent monitoring). But ultimately, it is
the progress made in shifting the institutional culture that have pushed for programmes
to be better monitored.
Last but not least, the lack of understanding of the local context of gender inequality in
third countries impeded on EU delegations’ ability to grab opportunities for promoting
gender equality and women’s empowerment in country strategies and their
implementation. It also results in missed opportunities for working with partner
governments and relevant stakeholders, such as other donors and civil society.60 This
concern has to some extent been addressed in GAP II and its implementation (see section
on Working together), but more needs to be done (see section on Adopt a whole of
society approach).
3.2. Lessons from other international donors on gender equality

and women’s empowerment
The EU and its programmes − as it happens with other international financial donors −
need to be held accountable for negative, not only positive, gender impacts of the EU
development and cooperation policies. A comparative study that evaluates the
operationalisation of gender policies of five international financial institutions (IFIs) − the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) − has shown that IFIs need strong gender safeguard policies to
59 More specifically, the OECD Gender policy marker (G-marker), which is compulsory in EU
cooperation, is a donor policy indicator used when the donor agrees with the objectives of the
programme (PIN, or sector programmes, budget support, projects) to check that gender equality is
included in the objectives. A monitoring of the G-marker is done at the stages of identification,
formulation and implementation of a given programme. See, Gender Equality Policy Marker,
Public Group on Gender, capacity4dev.eu - Connecting the development community, 15 May 2012.
60
Watkins, Francis et al., Evaluation of EU Support to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in
319463), Brussels, April 2015, p. 43, 52-53, 59 and 62.
26
guard against policies that often marginalise and even harm women. These policies may
drive women to losing traditional farmland and income, which in turn increase their
dependence on men, driving some of them into sex work. This creates a chain of possible
consequences: it can spread HIV, creates unstable households for children, and intensifies
violence against women.61
With these assumptions in mind, this comparative study analyses and outlines potential
benchmarks for assessing gender equality and women empowerment. First, gender
policy goals have the potential to influence IFIs’ strategic objectives and resource
allocation. Because of this, it is crucial that they inclusively promote women and men’s
equal rights and uphold economic and social wellbeing. The IDB’s Operational Policy on
Gender Equality and Development (Operational Gender Policy) is a case in point. It
integrates gender as a cross-cutting issue throughout all IDB interventions and commits
to proactive and preventive actions to safeguard and advance women’s equal rights. The
AfDB’s 2001 Gender Policy, which aims to promote gender equality across Africa and
within the AfDB structure, is also considered relatively strong in committing to a rights-
based goal oriented toward gender-inclusive interventions.62
In the same vein, the EU GAP II constitutes an attempt at mainstreaming gender equality
across the full spectrum of the EU external action, as analysed in the sections on
Understanding gender parity and Clear goals and connecting the dots. For a fully
optimal EU policy on gender parity and women’s empowerment in external relations,
this study makes relevant suggestions in the section entitled Openings for action.
Second, gender policies require robust mandates to implement their initiatives. The
strongest mandates are those that make it mandatory for gender considerations to be
integrated into all relevant frameworks. Such is for example the case for all aspects of the
ADB operations.63 As will be demonstrated later in this study, the EU GAP II does not go
far enough on this aspect (see the sections Underdeveloped themes and Trade and
gender).
Third, in practical terms, the strongest operational gender framework and policy and
programme (financial instruments) mandates are those that incorporate ‘essential do-
no-harm safeguard measures’ and are all-inclusive, that is, they are applied ‘without
exceptions for different lending types’. 64 This is the case, for example, of the IDB’s
Operational Gender Policy. This is not the case, however, for the EU’s GAP II.
Bible, Sarah with Elaine Zuckerman, How Do IFI Gender Policies Stack Up?, Gender Action,
61
Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 1.

62

Asia Development Bank, Gender and Development in ADB Operations - Operations Manual, Manila, 6
63
December 2010, p. 2.
64
27
Fourth, a ‘good gender policy requires solid mechanisms to effectively carry out its
goals and priorities. The strongest mechanisms include identification of an authority
responsible for implementing gender initiatives, tools to conduct proposed actions, and a
plan for reporting measurable progress on baseline and targeted indicators.’ 65 Such tools
may include the possibility to identify a department dedicated to carrying out the gender
policy and programmes. Such a department also adopts gender capacity building tools
for staff that aim to improve gender analysis, data, knowledge and research, as is the case
with at the IDB.
By choosing to mainstream gender equality throughout its EU external action policies,

tools and financing programmes, GAP II has opted not to develop such a centralised
responsible department. Nevertheless, there is a specific Unit, ‘B1. Gender Equality,
Human Rights and Democratic Governance’ in DG DEVCO’s Directorate on ‘People and
Peace’ with primary responsibility on gender parity and women’s empowerment in
external action. On the EEAS side, Ambassador Mara Marinaki is the Principal Adviser
on Gender and on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
Other mechanisms may include those adopted by the ADB, such as the requirement for a
gender assessment in each project’s Initial Poverty and Social Assessment and countries’
Country Strategy Programmes, the outlining of in-depth gender implementation tools in
the ADB’s Operations Manual outlines, and the inclusion of gender guides for assessing
key gender considerations throughout project design and implementation, including
negative impacts arising from user-fees, land loss, or resettlement.66
Equally, the COWI A/S, ADE and Itad evaluation of GAP I that was prepared for the
European Commission highlighted the need for the results framework used in
monitoring gender equality to include targets, mandatory gender-sensitive indicators
and gender-disaggregated baseline data used in all sectors in order to provide the basis
for evaluation.67 The EU’s GAP II has also developed strong monitoring tools and
guidelines (see sections Consistent monitoring and Clear guidelines).
Fifth, in order to implement gender policy mechanisms and advance an actionable, broad
mandate that promotes women’s rights, IFI staff must possess strong gender capacity.
Developing this capacity requires sufficient resources to support gender integration, a
demonstrated institutional commitment to gender equality, and incentives to encourage
staff development. For example, the IDB incentivises staff gender capacity building by
65

66

319463), Brussels, April 2015, p. 24, 48-50,
28
integrating staff contributions to gender equality into annual performance reviews.68

GAP II, as will be analysed, has put much emphasis on pushing forward with shifting the
institutional culture at HQ and EU delegation levels on gender parity issues. In that
context, the European Commission and the EEAS have developed specialised training for
EU officials working on gender issues in external relations, even though it is not
compulsory (see section Focus on EU institutional culture shift).
Sixth and related to the aforementioned point, adequate IFI funding not only
demonstrates institutional and cultural commitment to sustainable and consolidated
gender equality in the functioning of the donor and recipient’s institutions, but is also
essential to carry out gender policy initiatives. As explained later in this study, GAP II
has provided the conditions for gender aspects to be included in the EU’s financial
instruments. According to the European Commission/EEAS first monitoring report
finances on gender parity in external relations have been made available systematically
and consistently over the past year and the conditions have been set for this to continue
(see section entitled Available financing and aid modalities).
Last but not least, clear monitoring and evaluation (M&E) guidelines are essential for
IFIs to measure their progress towards achieving women’s rights, empowerment, and
gender equality goals. The strongest M&E guidelines adopt project and institution level
indicators to measure long-term progress towards gender equality, as is the case in the
IDB’s Operational Gender Policy.69 As already mentioned, the Council has called on the
European Commission services and the EEAS to inform it on an annual basis on the
implementation of the GAP II.70 Moreover, the GAP II promotes more efficient
monitoring of EU activities and resource and budget allocation in this area. In that
respect, the European Commission has also issued a ‘Guidance Note on Indicators and
Reporting Methodologies’ for its staff at HQ and EU delegation levels (see sections on
Consistent monitoring and Clear guidelines).
68

69Inter-American Development Bank, Operational Policy on Gender Equality in Development,
Washington, DC, 3 November 2010.
70Council of the EU, Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 - Council Conclusions (26 October 2015), reference
29
4. Assessing the implementation of the Gender Action

Plan 2016-2020
This section aims to provide an insight into the first results of the implementation of
GAP II. Considering that the EU’s new framework on gender equality and women’s
empowerment has been in operation only since a year, this study also examines and
assesses the framework itself. While on the one hand, GAP II has laid a solid base for
strengthened implementation in 2017 and beyond to 2020, on the other, shortcomings in
GAP II itself have led to sub-optimal implementation results.
4.1. Achievements
The first year of operation of GAP II has laid the foundations for solid improvement of
the protection and promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU
external relations. The European Commission and the EEAS have markedly
demonstrated that they understand the multi-faceted nature and complexity of the
gender parity dimensions. They have also integrated this understanding in the
implementation of GAP II, illustrated by the clear operationalisation and strong
commitment of EU leadership to the objectives of the framework examined. Furthermore,
the shift of the EU institutional culture on gender equality in third countries has been a
centre feature in the implementation of GAP II, as illustrated in the responsiveness of
European Commission services to gender issues and attention to training. The relevant
EU institutions also appear to have worked well together and with EU Member States,
some of which have made much progress in integrating the principles of GAP II in their
development aid. A solid monitoring system that has the potential to hold EU actors at all
levels to account for their shortcomings and determine effective implementation has been
put in place. Equally guidelines at EU level and among Member States allow for this
monitoring to take place consistently. While funding earmarked for gender equality in
EU external relations has increased, more commitment is needed to ensure that this
continues, as will be developed in the sections on Shortcomings and Openings for action.
These two latter sections will also demonstrate that monitoring of GAP II could be
further improved and the guidelines further developed and better used.
4.1.1. Understanding gender parity and women’s empowerment

GAP II is in line with the EU’s fundamental norms underpinning its democratisation and
peacebuilding efforts and in full alignment with the EU ‘Human Rights Action Plan’71
and the ‘Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019’.72 It has substantially built
on GAP I, adopting a broader view of gender equality and inequality. More specifically,
GAP II identifies and analyses the underpinnings of gender inequality, namely the
unequal gender power relations and gender-based social norms that discriminate against
71European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Action Plan on Human
Rights and Democracy (2015-2019), “Keeping Human Rights at the Heart of the EU Agenda”, reference
no.: JOIN(2015) 16 final, Brussels, 28 April 2015.
72European Commission, Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019, reference no.:
SWD(2015) 278 final, Brussels, 3 December 2015.
30
women and girls, in turn marginalising them from the benefits of social, economic and
political change. It also accepts that the promotion of gender equality is about building
conducive environments within which all people can enjoy greater opportunities and
improve their lives: women and girls, men and boys, and those who identify and express
their gender differently. Therefore, it includes in its analysis of the key factors affecting
gender equality all the elements that experts and other international organisations take
into account, as outlined in the section on Closing the gender gap in third countries.
4.1.1.1 The role of men and masculinity

The European Consensus talks of ‘gender inequality intersect[ing] with other forms of
exclusion. Promoting women’s and girls’ advancement and gender equality requires
working with boys, men, girls and women to foster an understanding of rights, equality
and roles in society.’73 The participation and commitment of men is thus fundamental in
the gender mainstream paradigm to change the social and economic position of women.
Even if policies are directed at women only, the gender mainstreaming approach stresses
that in order to remove imbalances in society both women and men must share the
responsibility.74 This means involving and engaging men in gendering efforts.
GAP II explicitly calls for ‘[s]upporting agents of change working to shift negative social
or cultural norms, including the media, women’s grassroots organisations and the active
involvement of men and boys,’75 in line with the ‘Council conclusions on Gender in
Development’.76 It systematically takes into consideration the role of men as actors able
and needing to contribute to the solution, nor only as a measure of comparison for
identifying the gender gap. For example, under the thematic priority on ‘Physical and
Psychological Integrity’, GAP II includes in its objectives the following: ‘[p]rotection for
all women and men of all ages from sexual and gender based violence in crisis situations;
through EU supported operations.’ Similarly, in its indicators for the same thematic
priority, the following possible activity is suggested: ‘[e]ncourage broad based education
for behavioural change regarding gender based violence, engaging men and boys and
communities.’77 Similar examples could also be noted in the section on thematic priority
on ‘Political and Civil Rights - Voice and Participation’.
740 final, Strasbourg, 22 November 2016, p. 15.
74Debusscher, Petra, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in European Commission Development Policy:
Conservative Europeanness?’, Women’s Studies International Forum 34, 2011: 39-49.
final, Brussels, 21 September 2015, p. 11.
76Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on Gender in Development, reference no.: 9242/15, Brussels,
26 May 2015.
31
4.1.2. Clear goals and connecting the dots

The new framework for gender equality and women’s empowerment (GAP II) has come
a long way in putting forward a comprehensive and clear agenda that spans across the
entire EU foreign policy agenda. It goes well beyond GAP I, which limited itself to a
‘three-ponged approach’ consisting of political and policy dialogue, gender
mainstreaming, and specific actions to put gender equality more systematically on the
agenda of the political dialogue with partner countries.78
In doing so, the EU has pushed forward with connecting the dots between EU external
action instruments, policies and actors − DG DEVCO, the Directorate General for
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the
Directorate General or European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
(ECHO), the EEAS and the EU delegations. It has also focused on clear objectives putting
forward thematic pillars for the first time. This has meant that four pivotal areas have
been identified, which could transform the lives of women and girls if action is taken.79
Three of these pillars are functional and include:
1. Fighting violence of any kind against women and girls, including protecting
women against violence in situations of conflict, preventing the trafficking of
girls and women, fighting harmful practices like Female Genital Mutilation and
Cutting, and empowering women to have control over their sexual and
reproductive life.
2. Economic and social empowerment by, for instance, increasing access of
women and girls to quality education and training, including on
entrepreneurship, facilitating their access to financial services, to decent jobs
and to basic services like energy or clean water.
3. Strengthening voice and participation by, for instance, supporting women’s
increased participation in policy and decision-making at all levels, enhancing
their role as peace-builders, supporting them in changing social and cultural
norms through grassroots organisations or media.
A last pillar is horizontal:

4. Shifting institutional culture to one that systematically supports, tracks and
measures gender equality and that enables a more effective delivery on EU
commitments. To do so, all EU actors are expected to analyse the development
priorities in the third countries where they work and the local context for
women and girls, as well as implement those priorities that are most relevant to
March 2010, p. 7-10.
final, Brussels, 21 September 2015, pp. 4-15.
32
them. Furthermore, the coordination, coherence and leadership on those

priorities would be further strengthened.
Accordingly, GAP II is seen as being ‘narrow in focus, but broad in scope and
engagement.’80 Including the gender equality aspects of all of the EU external action in
one framework (GAP II) and in a single document, has enabled the EU to find and track
progress in the entire external family. The stated aim is to avoid overlap and
fragmentation (which existed in the past), and make it easier to push for change where it
is needed. Moreover, the framework’s alignment with the goals of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development could help further boost the EU role in international fora. 81
4.1.3. EU leadership
Already with the Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP I), the EU demonstrated that it
recognises that gender equality is more than a benchmark against measuring the
maturity of a society (thus, a matter of human rights and principles). GAP II has gone
further in setting strong foundations that ensure dedicated political and management
leadership across EU actors, both at HQ and delegation levels.
GAP II applies to the European services (DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, and ECHO), the EEAS
and the EU Member States, all of which endorsed the joint staff working document in the
Council Conclusions on the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 on 26 October 2015.82
However, the guidance note of 8 March 2016 that outlines the resources and tools for the
implementation of GAP II only applies to DEVCO (HQ and EU delegations) and EEAS
(only at EU delegation level). EU Member States were to generate their own guidance or
adapt this one and some have already done so (see section on Working together).
At the level of political leadership, European Commissioner for Development Neven

Mimica has made it a point to put gender equality a priority, arguing that ‘women’s
participation in the economy is essential for sustainable development and economic
growth and is intrinsically linked to the global goal of eradicating poverty.’ Equally, the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy /Vice-President of the
Commission has declared that gender is a priority in relations with third countries.83
At a more operational level, but still at HQ level, a specific Unit (‘B1. Gender Equality,
Human Rights and Democratic Governance’) in DG DEVCO’s Directorate on ‘People and
Peace’ has primary responsibility on gender parity and women’s empowerment in
external action. On the EEAS side, Ambassador Mara Marinaki is the Principal Adviser
80O’Connell, Helen, The European Union’s New Gender Action Plan 2016-2020: Gender Equality and
2015. p. 1.
81 Exchange with European Commission official 2, in Brussels, in August 2017.
no.: 13201/15, Brussels, 26 October 2015.
See, for example, European External Action Service, Stepping it up for Gender Equality and Women’s
83
Empowerment Worldwide, Brussels, 16 June 2016.
33
on Gender and on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
The cooperation between these two EU actors appears to have functioned well, with a
clear division of tasks and division of reporting/monitoring, also attested in the
European Commission/EEAS first annual monitoring report.
At the level of the EU delegations, the Head of Delecation (HoD) is charged of steering
the implementation of EU external policy in the partner country. It is up to the EU
delegations to translate the available policy and guidance in relevant areas in a way that
fits the context. They also have a key role in adapting the EU strategy as the situation
evolves, provided that they are given the power and the tools to adapt or change the
course of action in the face of developments on the ground. This inevitably also applies to
gender policies in a given country. Since the leadership of the HoD determines to a large
extent the role of the EU delegation on a policy, when a HoD is a gender champion,
women’s empowerment is more visible in activities implemented and the manner these
are monitored. Every delegation staff is under his/her political direction, but whether
there is a shared sense of purpose depends in large part on how the delegation operates
internally. Involving the whole of the delegation in context analysis exercises and in joint
reflections over the implications for the EU strategy in country is likely to facilitate
synergies across policy areas and activities. HoD leadership and knowledge of EU’s
technical and political complexity determines also (along with collaborative attitude of
the staff) his/her ability to circumnavigate the institutional differences and create a
culture of joint work, regardless of the institutional affiliation of staff. 84
The European Commission/EEAS report shows mixed results on this issue and admits
that there ‘is still a long way to go but progress is significant regarding synergy of
hierarchy support and involvement of GFPs with the GAP implementation.’85 In
addition, focus has been put on improving the ratio of women HoDs, which is down to
20.3 % (the equivalent of 28 women out of 138 EU delegations) compared to 24 % in 2014.
Similarly, 5 out the 10 civilian CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions are
headed by women, while all 7 military missions are headed by men. This yields 29 % of
female HoMs. Based on these statistics, the EEAS concludes that ‘there is still a gender
barrier for women to have access to management posts.’ 86 This has also been
strengthened by the continuous renewal and reinforcement of the GFPs network.
84Faria, Fernanda, What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU Action Plan and Beyond,
Briefing Note no. 71, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, October
2014, p. 13.
p. 6.
p. 19-20.
34
4.1.4. Focus on EU institutional culture shift

Prioritising the transformation of the EU’s institutional culture is the sign of a more
robust EU approach to delivering on gender equality and women’s empowerment in
external relations. It addresses a key conclusion of the evaluation of GAP I commissioned
by European Commission, which explained that the EU’s weak delivery is primarily an
institutional problem rather than a technical one (see section on Lessons from GAP I).
Experts have demonstrated how the EU’s ‘institutional practices’ have structurally
marginalised the voices of women and their movement, which is problematic in the
context of an increasingly authoritarian state. ‘The largest stumbling block to putting
gender sensitive policies into practice seems to be a broader institutional weakness’ of EU
programme.87
GAP II, however, appears to have set the conditions for a solid change in this domain.
Commission services and EEAS – both at HQ and delegation levels – were required to act
and report on each of six objectives to shift institutional culture and select and report on
at least one objective under the three thematic priorities. This can been seen by the
responsiveness of the European Commission services and the EEAS. Their
implementation report is based on the contributions of progress in the implementation of
GAP II in 2016 received from 108 EU Delegations (reporting on 133 countries, including
the regional mandate of some of them, which is equivalent to 81 % of the total number of
Delegations); Commission services related to external relations, the EEAS and 22 Member
States.88
In addition, as the European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report notes, some

Head of Missions, Heads of Delegation and Heads of Cooperation have made gender
equality promotion a bigger priority with the advent of GAP II. First, some new Gender
Champions have been nominated or appointed. During 2016, a continuous renewal and
reinforcement of the gender focal persons (GFPs) network emerged and some are
enjoying greater leadership/management backing. 89
87See, for example, Dubusscher’s work on the implementation of EU development aid in Rwanda:
Debusscher, Petra, ‘Gender Mainstreaming on the Ground? The Case of EU Development Aid
Towards Rwanda’, in Weiner, Elaine and Heather MacRae (eds), The Persistent Invisibility of Gender
in EU Policy, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special issue 1(18), 2014: 1-23.
8826 Delegations did not report, including the delegations to developed OECD countries (it was
optional) and the delegations to partner international organisations (UN, WTO, OECD, etc.) that
were not requested to report. European Commission and High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Document, EU Gender Action Plan II, “Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of girls and Women through EU External
Relations 2016-2020”, Annual Implementation Report 2016, reference no.: SWD(2017) 288 final,
Brussels, 29 August 2017, p. 2-3 and 11.
p. v.
35
Second, training on the integration of gender analysis is taking place in several EUDs, EU
Member States, DGs and HQ Units, and is often attended not only by GFPs but also by
Programme Managers and Political Section staff. There has also been a positive move in
the direction of mainstreaming gender in the core training curricula for EU staff. More
specifically, ‘[a]s of the end of 2016, 42 new Gender Analysis Studies were prepared. Of
these, 15 were written anew in-house using existing and reliable sources, 11 were
prepared anew through contracting external experts commissioned under Framework
Contracts (supported by Commission HQ funding), 10 analyses were carried out jointly
with other partners (implying also pooling of funds), and there were 6 instances where
the delegations relied on gender analysis of trustworthy external resources (e.g.
development banks’ country gender profiles).’90
4.1.5. Working together

GAP II made clear that Member States would report on their selected thematic priority or
priories, and feed in their own international reporting on the institutional culture shift.
According to the European Commission/EEAS first annual report on GAP II,
coordination amongst EU institutions and with EU Member States has increased. The
report argues that GAP II has provided additional opportunity to the EU delegations,
European Commission services and EEAS at headquarters, and Member States – both in
Embassies and capitals – to coordinate their efforts when identifying thematic objectives
and preparing the 2016 reports. When implementing activities on gender parity,
coordination and collaboration with EU Member States continues took place at ‘HQ level
(for example, through the regular EU Member States Gender Expert meetings) and at
partner country level (through, for example, gender coordination groups, the EU Heads
of Mission meetings).’91
In addition, some Member States have issued their guidelines for the implementation of
GAP II and have put cooperation with the EU institutions, particularly on the ground,
squarely at the heart of their objectives.92 Equally, partnerships are fostered between EU
and stakeholders to build national capacity for gender equality, allowing for the time
taken for GAP II start-up and implementation. More specifically, ‘some informal or
formal burden sharing between EUD and EU Member States is in place in 29 partner
countries. Coordination is led by an EU actor in 35 partner countries; in several, however,
p. iv.
91
European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
p. iv and 2.
92 See, for example, Austrian Development Cooperation, EU Gender Action Plan II (2016-2020):
Gender Analysis on Sector Level, Vienna, not dated; Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Development Policy Action Plan on Gender Equality 2016-2020, reference no.: BMZ
Paper 3/2016, Berlin, 30 January 2016.
36
donor coordination mechanisms on gender do not exist or are not functioning.’93 It is,
however, unclear who or what will drive Member States’ endorsement of the thematic
areas and how their contribution and burden-sharing will be reported and measured.
Furthermore, gender equality and women’s empowerment must not be seen as a stand-
alone objective. Beyond cooperation between the EU organs, among EU Member States
and with the EU institutions, and between European actors and the beneficiaries, the EU
organs must also work with other multilateral/inter-governmental donors that are
present in the recipient countries. Closer collaboration and coordination among these
organisations will enhance efficiency by avoiding duplication of efforts and services, and
ensure complementary planning and programme delivery that will accelerate the
integration of a gender approach in policies, planning, programming, monitoring and
evaluation.94 It will also help to manage competition for scarce resources, as will be
further explained in the section on Available financing and aid modalities.
The Instrument contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP) supports the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in undertaking a ‘Data collection on Violence
against Women in conflict-risk areas’ in 10 OSCE countries in the Western Balkans and
Eastern Europe over 3 years starting in 2016. Similarly, the FPI identifies programmes
that will directly involve CSOs working for women's rights in the targeted countries. 95
For instance, the European institutions are the second biggest donor worldwide for
Africa through various funding instruments, such as the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and
the European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), through which they
also promote women’s empowerment and protect gender equality. Moreover, the EU
delegation to the African Union (AU) was established to create closer linkages between
the EU and the AU in operational terms and at the level of political dialogue. See Box 3.
Box 3: Case study – Gender equality and African Union-European Union cooperation
In view of the upcoming African Union-European Union summit in Abidjan, in
November 2017, is it worth delving into the ways for boosting gender equality and
women’s empowerment in Africa. The summit will mark the 10-year anniversary since
the 2007 Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon that launched the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)
that sets out the intention of both continents to move beyond a donor/recipient
p. iv and 11.
94Martin, Olga, The African Union’s Mechanisms to Foster Gender Mainstreaming and Ensure Women’s
Political Participation and Representation, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, 2013, p. 27 and 26 (respectively).
Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, 2013, p. 23.
37
relationship towards long-term cooperation on jointly identified, mutual and

complementary interests.
The AU-EU partnership is the fruit of a gradual relationship that has reshaped and
deepened the Africa-Europe reciprocal partnership. The EU has tended to favour
region-to-region cooperation, first through their grouping with African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries, and then through the new context outlined in the Joint Africa-
EU Strategy (JAES) that aims for the relationship to be more egalitarian. Since the first
Africa–EU Summit in Cairo in 2000, considerable changes have taken place on both
continents. This summit underlined the need to combat gender-based discrimination
and violations, and to include a gender perspective in policies, programmes and
legislative action, but with reservations (i.e. ‘where appropriate’).
During the second Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007, both organisations agreed to
work together on key political challenges, such as gender issues. Lastly, in the third
Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli in 2010, the action plan for 2011-2013 included the
development of a strategy of cooperation on gender equality and the establishment of a
gender observatory. The European Commission has committed € 24.4 billion through
its various financial instruments for the period 2007-2013 in support of the JAES and its
thematic partnerships.
The 4th Africa-EU Summit of April 2014 reaffirmed the commitment to the 2007 Joint
Africa-EU Strategy and the ambition to deepen political dialogue and cooperation. The
principle of EU-AU Summits every three years, annual College-to-College meetings
(that include the AU Commission and European Commission) to monitor progress, and
Peace and Security Council-to-Political and Security Committee meetings to provide
political leadership, was confirmed. These are complemented by regular high-level
contacts between European and African Leaders on common challenges and crisis
situations (e.g. Valletta).
In its latest Joint Communication, the European Commission and the EEAS call for the
inclusive participation of women in formal political and decision-making processes to
increase trust in state institutions. It also calls for creating wealth through more and
better jobs to favour women’s empowerment and for transforming African agriculture,
agro-business and its blue economy (key economic activities in which half the labour
force is composed of women). Last but not least, it calls for supporting the development
of digital skills and literacy, including women entrepreneurs. 96 These areas of action
reflect the objectives outlined in the GAP II and demonstrate that the gender dimension
has been standardised in EU policy-making. However, they have not been made a
priority; instead, the focus of the European Commission’s Joint Communication is on
youth.
Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council for a Renewed Impetus of the
Africa-EU Partnership, reference no.: JOIN(2017) 17 final, Brussels, 4 May 2017, pp. 9, 6, 14-15.
38
Equally, the JAES still needs to mainstream gender into the eight priority areas of
cooperation, since it does not include gender as a stand-alone priority. These are: peace
and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade, regional integration and
infrastructure; the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); energy; climate change;
migration, mobility, and employment; and science, information and space. In each of
these eight priority areas, African and European experts meet on a regular basis to
strengthen Africa-EU cooperation. Every six months, AU and EU Commission staff,
together with representatives from Member States, the Pan-African and European
parliaments, civil society, and the private sector, meet to discuss progress and develop
new areas of cooperation.
Source: Martin, Olga, The African Union’s Mechanisms to Foster Gender Mainstreaming and Ensure
Women’s Political Participation and Representation, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, 2013; Joint Africa-EU Strategy, DG DEVCO, European
Commission.
4.1.6. Consistent monitoring

Contrary to the voluntary and narrative-biased reporting mechanism of the GAP I, the
GAP II commits to an annual reporting of all EU actors on the EU contribution to at least
one objective per thematic priority and on each of the six objectives regarding the shifting
of institutional culture. Reporting seeks to serve two purposes:
 to improve effectiveness of EU initiatives and their impact on gender equality;
 to improve accountability of EU initiatives to EU institutions and citizens, and
ultimately to beneficiaries.
Annex 1 of GAP II provides the monitoring and accountability framework against which
to measure progress on gender equality and girls’ and women’s rights and
empowerment in third countries. The indicators, reflecting thematic priorities, apply to
all partner countries where the EU and its Member States are funding international
cooperation and development assistance. The reporting aims to inform EU knowledge of
the national context and provides an overall picture of the development status across
partner countries. In the most part these indicators are SDG indicators and will be
reported on by partner countries irrespective of EU activity.
Systematic gender analysis for all new external actions will be carried out and will cover
all relevant European Commission services in developing, enlargement and
neighbourhood countries, and all relevant EEAS’ activities in all partner countries,
including fragile and conflict-affected states and emergency situations. In particular,
systematic reporting on the institutional culture shift for all EU actors against the
indicators set out in the document.97 In its Joint Staff Working Document, the European
Commission and the EEAS ‘adopt a clear results-driven approach that sets high
39
standards for reporting, evaluation and accountability mechanisms, and promotes

evidence-based decision making. This will include investing in, and using, systematic
high quality gender evidence and analysis to contextualise and tailor approaches to the
specific social, political and demographic characteristics of the partner country where the
EU operates, and the commitment to data disaggregation across all EU’s monitoring and
evaluation’.98
EU Delegations, Commission services, the EEAS and EU Member States were required
(by June 2016) to have a gender analysis at the correct level of intervention (context
specific, and, as appropriate, at sector, project or national level), unless such a study
existed already and was still current. ‘The gender analysis would inform the selection of
thematic objectives and indicators and all subsequent project actions’ design and
formulation.’99 The gender analyses prepared or referred to during 2016 are broad in
scope, covering the legal, human rights and policy frameworks, political, economic, social
and socio-cultural context, and key government, civil society and international actors. In
the case of the EU’s flagship initiative on the garment sector, for example, the European
Commission aims to ensure that all initiatives have a positive impact on women and
girls, that child rights are respected, and that women are empowered to higher positions
through skills development and entrepreneurship programmes. 100
For each objective, GAP II proposes a series of actions, each with indicators and timing, to
be carried out by the EU delegations, the European Commission and Member States. EU
thematic and geographical actions will be able to point to where they have contributed to
the overarching four priorities highlighted in the GAP II, to how progress has been
measured and to resources dedicated to supporting gender objectives. EU contribution is
defined as development outputs and direct outcomes of EU projects and programmes
that can be linked to the achievement of specific objectives of the GAP II.101
Importantly, the new monitoring system has set the foundations for stronger and clearer
accountability, as the European Commission/EEAS monitoring report shows. Consistent
efforts were made to increasingly leverage the internal quality support procedures to
improve the quality of gender mainstreaming of new programmes. Moreover, as
p. 7.
100European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution of 27 April 2017 on the EU
Flagship Initiative on the Garment Sector 2016/2140 (INI), reference no.: P8_TA-PROV(2017)0196,
Brussels, 27 April 2017, p. 3.
40
mentioned in the section on Focus on EU institutional culture shift, as of the end of 2016,
42 new Gender Analysis Studies were prepared. ‘Of these, 15 were written anew in-house
using existing and reliable sources, 11 were prepared anew through contracting external
experts commissioned under Framework Contracts (supported by EU funding), 10
analyses were carried out jointly with other partners (implying also pooling of funds),
and there were 6 instances where the delegations relied on gender analysis of
trustworthy external resources (e.g. development banks’ country gender profiles).’102
The European Commission/EEAS implementation report on GAP II clearly identifies

which EU delegations have been good students by reporting on progress and which have
not. The disaggregated information is detailed enough to also pin point which parts of
the reports received from each delegation are missing. It also sets out clear
recommendations in the monitoring: senior level and operational level for improvement
in the future. This monitoring system has the potential of holding EU actors at all levels
to account for their shortcomings and determine effective implementation.
Box 4: Linking GAP II monitoring to the EU and international

development context
The important shift in assessing activities on women’s empowerment and gender
equality as part of GAP II is in line with the European Consensus on Development,
which takes a comprehensive approach to implementation, drawing on the Addis
Ababa Action Agenda. This agenda combines aid with other resources, sound policies,
and a strengthened approach to Policy Coherence for Development.
The new European Consensus includes a more coordinated approach to development

between the EU and its Member States, one that promotes joint programming and
actions. It puts emphasis on better-tailored partnerships with a broader range of
stakeholders and partner countries. It has bound the EU and its Member States to
‘integrate the respect of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and gender equality
into their political dialogue’. According to the European Consensus, ‘[t]his dialogue
w[ould] be conducted with and beyond partner governments and will be a major
platform for action, where a shared understanding will be promoted, progress will be
regularly reviewed and appropriate supporting measures identified.’ 103
p. iii.
41
In line with this, the GAP II makes the systematic use of gender analysis and gender
disaggregated data, which is a requirement for all new external actions
(bilateral,regional and thematic).104 This is in line with the SDGs agenda as well as with
guidelines used by the UN in it work. It should be noted, however, that the UN goes
further in recognising that ‘key economic data must be disaggregated by sex, as well as
other relevant characteristics. There is also a need for improved data and analysis on
issues of particular importance to women’s economic empowerment, such as unpaid
work, paid care work, informal work, part-time work and domestic work.’105
Despite notable improvements in the EU monitoring of gender parity in third

countries, the methodology and implementation of the monitoring of the GAP II needs
to be further developed (see section on Further streamline monitoring)
4.1.7. Clear guidelines

For the most part, GAP II indicators are based on the indicators proposed in the ongoing
international discussions on SDGs indicators and on the EU Results Framework.106 In
October 2015, the Council had emphasised that ‘[g]iven the importance of the GAP as a
tool for implementation of the 2030 Agenda, [it looked] forward to the final set of SDG
indicators expected in 2016 and calls on the Commission to revise the GAP indicators and
the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework accordingly. In
this context the Council underline[d] an important role of the European Institute of
Gender Equality.’107
More specifically, to ensure real and long-lasting improvements to gender equality, the
European Commission services and the EEAS set out a number of measures, including:
 to set up a gender advisory board with leading experts from partner countries;
 to provide additional detailed guidance to ensure rigorous and outcome focused
reporting on these measures;
 to hold themselves and implementing partners to account, including by ensuring
that an independent evaluation of the implementation of the measures set out in
Annex 1 is carried out;
105Italics are the author’s. Secretariat of UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Women’s
Economic Empowerment, Leave No One Behind: A Call to Action for Gender Equality and Women’s
Economic Empowerment, Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Women’s
Economic Empowerment, 2016, p. 99.
106European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Launching the EU International
Cooperation and Development Results Framework, reference no.: SWD(2015) 80 final, Brussels, 26
March 2015.
42
 to establish a helpdesk at headquarters in Brussels to support EU delegations and

headquarters’ operational units in implementing the measures proposed. 108
According to the European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report, these have

been met. Gender advisory boards to consult external senior expertise on strategic and ad
hoc issues in relation to gender equality has been set up in 15 EU Member States and the
guidance note DG DEVCO has created a Gender Equality Helpdesk at HQ level.
Moreover, detailed guidelines, in the form of a comprehensive guidance note of 8 March
2016, have been developed to support the implementation of GAP II, European
Commission HQ and EU delegation operational and management staff at all levels,
involved in programming, policy development and political dialogue.109 Since the role of
the EU delegations has increased with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty − the diplomatic
missions of the EU now mandated to act as EU delegations representing EU institutions
in third countries − such a guidance note targets EU civil servants and providing clear
tools and resources for the implementation of GAP II could bring significant results.
This guidance includes numerous entry points for cooperation with CSOs and EU
Member States. EU Member States are responsible themselves to ensure implementation
of GAP II via that note or other guidance. As already mentioned in the section on
Working together, some Member States have already developed their own indicators for
the implementation of gender equality and women’s empowerment programmes in their
respective development policies. Their guidelines have affected primarily the social
sectors, and is limited to separate components in other sectors enumerated in GAP II.
According to the European Commission/EEAS first monitoring report, ‘in some MS
[Member States] development cooperation, legislation requires, inter alia, the integration
of gender analysis or assessment of impact on gender equality, for example, in Belgium
and the UK, while in several other MS gender mainstreaming is mandatory or common
practice across the board, as with The Netherlands, Spain, and Germany which
emphasised its three-pronged approach (gender mainstreaming, empowerment, policy
dialogue).’110
Last but not least, as explained in the section on Consistent monitoring, implementing
partners are held to account on the EU funding they receive and use through
independent evaluation of the implementation of the measures set out in Annex 1.
final, Brussels, 21 September 2015, p. 16-17.
109European Commission, Guidance Note on the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, For DEVCO HQ
and EUD Operational Staff, Brussels, 8 March 2016.
p. 4.
43
4.1.8. Available financing and aid modalities

At a practical level, GAP II seeks to be more focused on tangible results. GAP II responds
to civil society and the Council concerns that have called for greater financial resources to
be committed to gender equality work as an essential requirement. 111 About € 100 million
has already been allocated to concrete measures specifically targeted to improve women
and girls’ rights, while gender will also be mainstreamed throughout other sectors of
development cooperation.112 In the period 2007-2013, the EU committed an amount of
around € 1 258 million to activities targeted at improving gender equality and girls’ and
women’s empowerment.113
In this context, the EU has a wide range of external assistance instruments in furthering
its goals of promoting gender equality and empowering girls and women in third
countries:
 Specific bilateral or regional development support programmes: for instance, the
women’s economic empowerment project financed by the EU Trust Fund for
Central African Republic, and the Pan-African programme on female genital
mutilation.
 A number of targeted activities are also to be funded through the Global Public
Goods and Challenges thematic programme included in the Development and
Cooperation Instrument (DCI), with around € 100 million committed to improve
the lives of girls and women.
 In addition, gender aspects are taken into consideration in several other thematic
actions like food security, rural development, private sector development, and
for instance, gender specific actions will be developed under the climate change
programme for the years 2014-2016 (estimated € 16 million, DCI).
To facilitate GAP II implementation, the European Commission has put aside specific
funding for carrying out such gender analysis for a number of EU delegations. It has also
ensured that the relevant expertise is made available in the EU delegations. Robust
gender evidence is used to inform all EU external spending, programming and policy-
making, and progress is systematically measured against indicators.114
111See, for example, Cox, Tanya, Plan International EU Office Response to the Council Conclusions on
the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, Plan International, Brussels, not dated; Council of the EU, Gender
Action Plan 2016-2020 - Council Conclusions (26 October 2015), reference no.: 13201/15, Brussels, 26
October 2015.
112 European Commission, New Framework for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment:
Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations (2016-2020) Adopted, Press
release, Brussels, 22 September 2015.
113Provisional OECD data shows that already in 2013, 39 % of the EU ODA considered gender
dimensions as either significant or principal. See, Vila, Blerina (Wexam Consulting, Brussels), EU
Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, capactiy4dev.eu - Connecting the development community, 17
October 2016.
44
In 2016, DG DEVCO consistently increased its ODA commitment on the amount of funds
used for gender mainstreamed actions in all regions (see Table 1). In the same year,
DG DEVCO gender mainstreamed actions in Africa, Americas, Asia, and Oceania. This
increase is consistent with the trend from 2015 and demonstrates a significant increase,
with Oceania having the highest increase from the previous year (nearly 32 %).115 One
could question why a bigger increase was not afforded to Africa, which is a region in the
immediate neighbourhood of the EU and which experiences extreme poverty affecting
women in particular.
When looking at the work of specific European Commission services, the 2016 analysis in
the European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report demonstrates that 58.8 % (i.e.
213 out of 362) of new initiatives adopted in DG DEVCO have been marked as primarily
or significantly aiming at promoting gender equality and/or women empowerment. In
DG NEAR, the percentage amounts to 56.6 % (47 out of 83) of new initiatives in the same
period. As far as the quantitative investment in gender equality is concerned, these
results point to an improvement from 2015 when on average 47.3 % of new actions were
launched. In addition, in 2016 the EU has more than quadrupled its humanitarian
assistance to education in emergencies as a follow-up to the European Commission’s
commitment to reach the global target of 4 %.116
Table 1: EU commitment to ODA on OECD Gender Maker actions (administrative

costs excluded, co-financing included)
European Commission Service Commitment 2016 (in €) Disbursement 2016 (in €)
DG DEVCO 9 423 449.659 6 047 205.779

DG NEAR 4 600 625.059 3 040 166.063
Other DGs 3 007 865.662 3 426 225.483
TOTAL 17 031 940.380 12 513 597.326
Source: Adapted from European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Document, EU Gender Action Plan II, “Gender Equality
and Women’s Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of girls and Women through EU External Relations
2016-2020”, Annual Implementation Report 2016, reference no.: SWD(2017) 288 final, Brussels, 29
August 2017, pp. 6-7.
p. iv.
pp. 7 and 103-104.
116
p. 28.
45
EU commitment to gender parity and women’s empowerment in third countries was

reinforced with the launch, on 20 September 2017, of the joint EU-UN global gender
initiative, the so-called Spotlight Initiative, 117 focused on eliminating all forms of violence
against women and girls. More specifically, this initiative seeks to address sexual and
gender-based violence and harmful practices; specific forms of domestic and family
violence; femicide; trafficking in human beings and economic exploitation, depending on
the needs and challenges faced by the targeted regions. Its stated aim is ‘achieving
transformational change at the regional level’, that is, not only deal with physical
violence but also its institutional, cultural and legal roots. It will be made available for
Asia, the Pacific region, Africa (particularly sub-Saharan Africa), Latin America and the
Caribbean. This new multi-stakeholder trust fund, which will be opened to other donors,
is envisaged to carry a budget of € 500 million. On the EU side, the funding is provided
through the DCI and European Development Fund (EDF). This Initiative will be
implemented together with the UN system, in particular through UN Women, the
UNFPA and the UNDP.118
4.2. Shortcomings
The joint European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report, unlike many other
evaluations carried out internally, includes quite openly the weaknesses of the
implementation of GAP II and provides ways for remedying them. This section goes
beyond the deficiencies identified in that monitoring report, since − as already mentioned
in the section on Methodology − this evaluation comes early in the process, it is also
worth examining the GAP II framework itself.
Despite having set solid foundations for progress in the field of mainstreaming,
protecting and promoting gender equality in the EU’s external relations, GAP II faces
certain weaknesses. When operationalising GAP II, efforts on gender parity have
primarily centred on development aid and cooperation, while women’s role in fragile
contexts and their role in mediation and negotiation are neglected. Additionally, GAP II
does not address sufficiently nor in specific terms the link between trade and gender, an
area where women are affected in terms of access to finances/resources, labour and
employment conditions, and wage conditions. Furthermore, while a solid monitoring
framework and clear guidelines have been established with GAP II, these are
disproportionately focused on quantitative data and analysis. What is missing is a
qualitative analysis in terms of evaluating the choice of objectives, the results of activities,
potential risks and benefits, and likely long-term effects. Furthermore, when looking at
the programming of EU activities, the gender dimension seems to be side-lined in
situations of crisis or difficult conflicts, and on occasion activities are of a broad nature,
which makes it difficult to track real progress and to have a specific outcome.
117See The Spotlight Initiative to eliminate violence against women and girls (initiated by the
European Union and the United Nations)
118Chadwick, Vince, ‘Details Emerge of 500M Euro EU-UN Program on Women’s Rights, Family
Planning’, DEVEX, 10 July 2017; United Nations Radio, European Union and UN in Talks to Launch
“Gender Initiative”, 19 May 2017; European Commission, EU and UN Team Up to Eliminate Violence
Against Women and Girls, Press release, New York, 20 September 2017.
46
4.2.1. Underdeveloped themes

While GAP II has managed to deconstruct the notion of gender equality and women’s
empowerment and to contextualise it within the entire spectrum of external relations,
when it comes to operationalising GAP II, the focus has remained on development
assistance and cooperation. Key issues, such as the role of women in fragile, post-conflict
and emergency environments, and the role of women in mediation and negotiation,
remain underdeveloped.
4.2.1.1. Women in state fragility

The elimination of gender-based inequalities is a key prerequisite for achieving peace,
security and sustainable development. This idea is recognised in GAP II, which clearly
states that the ‘EU and its Member States will address all aspects of preventing and
responding to sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations,
and will support women as positive agents for conflict prevention, conflict resolution,
relief and recovery, and building sustainable peace.’119 It is also an issue that the
European Parliament has raised in its resolutions. 120
In practice, however, this has been limited to adopting a gender-sensitive approach in the
programming of relevant EU instruments (e.g. Partnership Instrument and the
Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, IcSP) and in the organisation of other
relevant activities (e.g. the implementation of EU Electoral Observation Missions).121
Work in conflict affected and crisis contexts does not feature significantly in the EUD
reports from the six geographical regions.122 Only a small number of EUD reports
mention support to the development and review of National Action Plans on UNSCR
1325 (Women, Peace and Security). Equally, the gender dimension in conflict settings has
been under-addressed in the political dialogues that the EU holds (featuring only in the
framework of the annual human rights dialogue with Ukraine).123 When looking more
See, for example, European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 14 December 2016 on the
120
Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World and the European Union’s Policy on the
Matter 2015 (2016/2219(INI)), reference no.: P8_TA(2016)0502, Strasbourg, 14 December 2016.
121
p. 28.
These include the Americas, Asia & Pacific, Eastern & Southern Africa, Europe & Central Asia,
122
Middle East & North Africa, and Western & Central Africa.
123
p. 18 and 34.
47
specifically at the activities underway on women’s role in peace and security these are
minimal. They include a project in Nigeria on ‘Promoting Women’s engagement in Peace
and Security in Northern Nigeria’ (for the period 2014-2017, funded by the EU with
€ 9 600 000 and implemented by UN Women); and a project in Ethiopia that aims to
support the CSO interventions in the areas of women leadership.124
Moreover, there are two basic ways in which gender considerations are important in
fragile states. First, the acknowledgement that men and women are affected differently
by state fragility in terms of human rights violations, access to justice, extreme poverty,
and discriminatory politics/regimes. Second, gender roles and relations are crucial to
understanding opportunities and obstacles to statebuilding. 125 However, while the
GAP II addresses gender equality in such challenging settings, it tends to focus on
minimalist priorities, such as promoting gender equity in service delivery and providing
basic education to women and girls, rather than embedding gender equality in broader
and more comprehensive human rights and good governance context and practice.
4.2.2.2. Women in mediation and peace negotiations

While the role of women in peace negotiations and mediation is taken into consideration
in GAP II, it remains underdeveloped. It is only mentioned under the thematic priority
on ‘Political and Civil Rights - Voice and Participation’ and associated solely with a
quantitative indicator.126 The single example of an activity is broad, imprecise, giving no
sense how it could be implemented. The European Commission/EEAS monitoring report
counted four countries (EUDs and/or Member States embassies) selected to work with
female mediators, negotiators and technical experts under that priority. Most such
thematic programmes were in the Asia and Pacific region. 127 It would have been
important to consider the role of women in mediation (especially through civil society
actors) in the other thematic priorities, in particular on ‘Physical and Psychological
Integrity’, in order to promote a change in societal norms.
124Fellin, Irene, Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), Presentation on ‘The Implementation of the
EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020’, at the Workshop for the Committee on Women’s Rights and
Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Committee on International Development (DEVE) on
‘Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women Through EU External Relations’, jointed organised by
the Policy Department Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs and the Policy Department -
EXPO External Policies, European Parliament, Brussels, 25 September 2017.
125Baranyi, Stephen and Kristiana Powell, Fragile States, Gender Equality and Aid Effectiveness: A
Review of Donor Perspectives, Report prepared for the Gender Equality Division (YWD) Policy
Branch, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) by The North-South Institute,
Ottawa, Canada, 11 August 2005.
127
p. 78 and 88.
48
Similarly, while an all-inclusive concept of security − encompassing physical but also

economic security − of women is developed in GAP II when developing the risks and
challenges to women’s security, the recommendations for tackling the problem do not
meet the same standards. The concept of security used in the recommendations for
tackling gender inequality is limited to physical security of women from threat, without
demonstrating a clear understanding of the aspects of violence of against women
(physical, psychological and economic, present in societies that are dominantly
patriarchal). Moreover, the indicators are again quantitative and concentrate on the role
of EU security personnel (peacekeepers) rather than women in security in third countries.
Similar observations can be made for issues regarding peacebuilding, conflict prevention,
and humanitarian action.
This situation exists despite the fact that the Council of the EU in October 2015
‘welcome[d] the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 which stressed
the unique role of women and girls in resilience building, vulnerability reducing and risk
management in the respective communities.’ The Council also ‘stresse[d] the centrality of
gender equality and women’s empowerment in ongoing international processes and their
subsequent implementation, such as the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP21) and the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit.’128
4.2.2. Trade and gender − the missing link

It is unfortunate that GAP II, which poses itself as a one-stop shop and an overarching
EU strategy for promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in third
countries, does not address in specific terms the link between trade and gender.
Admittedly, the European Commission has considered gender aspects in the EU Strategy
on Aid for Trade.129 Nevertheless, the updated Aid for Trade document (prepared by DG
DEVCO in 2016) clearly states that this strategy will ‘fit within the framework established
by and build upon existing parallel strategies and initiatives’130 [italics my own], which
points to possible overlap and confusion. The EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 is one of
the parallel initiatives named in the updated Aid for Trade strategy. Moreover, the 2015
edition of the annual monitoring report on EU Aid for Trade, reporting on figures from
2013, did not mention gender or women once. 131 Nor does the new EU trade and
investment strategy ‘Trade for All’.132 However, the latest EU ‘Action Plan on Human
Council of the EU, EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: Enhancing EU Support for Trade-Related Needs in
129
Developing Countries - Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States Meeting within the Council, reference no.: 14470/07, Brussels, 29 October 2007.
130European Commission, Towards an Updated EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: Making Aid Fit to Support
Trade as an Enabler of Sustainable Development in Developing Countries, Background document, DG
DEVCO C.4, Brussels, version of 5 May 2016.
131European Commission, Aid for Trade: Report 2015, Review of progress by the EU and its Member
States, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 22 June 2015.
132European Commission, Trade for All - Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy,
Brussels, October 2015.
49
Rights and Democracy’ acknowledges that research has demonstrated that ‘labour
provisions in trade agreements ease labour market access, particularly for women and
narrow the gender wage gap.’133
There are conflicting observations on the impact of trade on women in third countries.
On the one hand, it is believed that trade liberalisation helps bring women into paid
employment. According to this logic, globalisation and trade liberalisation have – for
some women – resulted in higher incomes, increased economic independence, replaced
unpaid work at home or in informal economy, and elevated their social status. Trade
creates jobs, particularly for women in export-oriented sectors in middle-income
countries (e.g. in Latin America). And women are heavily employed in two sectors that
continue to undergo adjustment and change due to trade liberalisation: agriculture, and
textiles and clothing. These jobs bring more household resources under women’s control,
which in turn has a positive effect on investments in the health and education of future
generations.134 An OECD study estimated that ‘the average per capita growth over 30
years could have been as much as 64 % higher in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 % higher in
South Asia and 32 % higher in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), if initial
gender enrolment conditions and enrolment gender gaps had mirrored those in East
Asia.’135
On the other hand, there are also concerns about the impact of EU trade on women in
third countries, in particular the impact of trade expansion and trade intensification on
decent work, wages, including gender wage gaps, and the potential of female- (and male-
) owned micro and small businesses to scale-up to increasingly larger-sized enterprises
that would enable sustainable livelihoods and a life with dignity. Some experts argue
that, due to limitations on government regulation (particularly public services and the
liberalisation of government procurement), trade liberalisation can generate greater
adjustment burden for low income women, namely gross re-allocation rates. Moreover,
most informal cross-border trade (e.g. affecting domestic workers) is conducted by
women, which exposes them to bribery, harassment and physical attacks at border
points.136 Female farmers, as noted by ILO, are also more affected by standards and other
Policy, Joint Staff Working Document, EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019):
Mid-Term Review June 2017, reference no.: SWD(2017) 254 final, Brussels, 27 June 2017, pp. 17-18.
134For an analysis of the impact of human right clauses in trade agreements, see , The Effects of
Human Rights Related Clauses in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and the EU-Chile Association
Agreement: Ex-Post Impact Assessment, reference no.: PE 558.764, European Parliament, Brussels,
February 2017.
135Korinek, Jane, Trade and Gender: Issues and Interactions, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No.
24, OECD, Paris, p. 8.
136Williams, Mariama, The South Centre, Presentation for ‘Gender Equality in EU Trade
Agreements: Perspectives from the South’, at the Hearing on Gender Equality in EU Trade
Agreements, jointly organised by the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and the Committee
on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), European Parliament, in Brussels, May 11 2017.
50
technical barriers to trade.137 Additionally, women not only face more demands on their
time because of family responsibilities, but also face restricted access to productive
resources such as land or credit.
Beyond the ethical concerns regarding women’s wellbeing that may be related to the
above issues, experts explain that gender inequality has serious negative effects for
sustainable economic development because in the long term it discourages skill
development and technical innovation. In other cases, gender inequalities in access to
land, other productive resources and markets, have muted supply response in
agriculture, particularly in Africa.138 These issues are most notably linked to Goals 8 and
9 of the SDGs.139
Notwithstanding the need to monitor the impact of trade on women, the 26 sustainability
impact assessments (SIAs) that had been completed as of June 2017 in the European
Commission did not include any specific statistics on Trade and Gender.140 Similarly,
monitoring the impact of such agreements on women’s empowerment and gender
equality during implementation, has also been neglected.141
4.2.3. Quantity over quality

GAP II has concentrated on ensuring that progress on gender parity is measured in the
planning and execution of EU actions/programmes, as well as their monitoring to ensure
accountability. In practice this means, in line with the European Commission
Communication on Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development142 and the Council
Conclusions on Gender in Development143, ‘defining expected results, tracking resources,
137International Labour Organisation, Report IV: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and Decent and
Productive Employment Creation, reference no.: ILC.104/IV, International Labour Conference, 104th
Session, Geneva, 2015.
138Fontana, Marzia, SOAS, University of London, Presentation for ‘Gender Equality in EU Trade
139Goal 8 refers to promoting sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and
productive employment and decent work for all. Goal 9 talks of building resilient infrastructure,
promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, and fostering innovation.
140European Commission, Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution of 27 April 2017 on the EU
Brussels, 27 April 2017, p. 7.
141Ioannides, Isabelle, The Effects of Human Rights Related Clauses in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement
and the EU-Chile Association Agreement: Ex-Post Impact Assessment, reference no.: PE 558.764,
European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, Brussels, February 2017.
142 European Commission, A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development
after 2015, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, reference no.: COM(2015) 44 final,
Brussels, 5 February 2015.
143Council of the EU, Council conclusions on ‘A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and
Sustainable Development after 2015’, reference no.: 9241/15, 26 May 2015.
51
monitoring and evaluations, and integrating gender into indicators/results data and
corporate results frameworks, where relevant. Increased visibility of results obtained for
girls and women will be key.’144
Specifically, as explained in the sections on Clear guidelines and Consistent monitoring,

every new EU-funded project must include measurable targets and objectives on gender.
The European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report demonstrates that solid
foundations have been laid towards collecting quantitative data in the monitoring of EU
programmes and projects, which are then used for measuring progress towards meeting
GAP II objectives. These are complemented by systematic gender analyses carried out in
the designing phase of all new external actions undertaken, such as in projects, and
bilateral and regional programming to understand the specific problems of the sector at
hand and how to respond to them. The European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring
report demonstrates that the Commission services and the EEAS have used in their
reporting on activities sex-disaggregated data, wherever the EU delegations provided
such data.
The merit of the statistics produced is that it helps identify the slackers: the EU
delegations and Commission/EEAS services that have not reported, have partially
reported and/or have not incorporated gender when carrying out their activities/
programmes. Nonetheless, quality of gender equality outcomes and not only quantity −
thus going beyond the averages and disaggregating statistics − is imperative when
assessing social-economic and political development that aim to ensure that human
development benefits reach everyone. 145 The European Commission/EEAS annual
monitoring report does not provide a qualitative analysis and evaluation of the results of
its activities on gender equality and women’s empowerment in external relations. It is not
clear whether the chosen objectives were the right ones, how these were received by the
third country (at government and civil society levels), and what the results of the
activities/programmes undertaken were.
The European Commission/EEAS annual report notes that ‘[i]t is not possible from the
reports to gain a full understanding of the substance of dialogues in partner countries
given that they are often confidential. The reports from DG NEAR are a notable
exception, providing detail on the topics discussed, commitments made and follow-up
actions.’ The same evaluation admits that tis important to ‘integrat[e] gender dimensions
into Sector Dialogues, such as on Public Finance Management, Public Administration
Reform, Trade, Energy, Agriculture, Transport and Infrastructure’, which will not be
fully met before the institutional cultural shift leads to gender mainstreaming throughout
for Everyone, New York, NY, 2016.
52
and across all parts of the EU’s external actions.146 The same applies for the human rights
dialogues carried out by the EEAS: the information on what happened and whether there
was any follow up, and if so, what that was, are questions that remain unanswered.
In addition, the availability and quality of the data used is unclear. Questions could be
raised as to how the data is produced and whether and to what degree it is comparable.
The European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report admits, for example, that
‘the indicator and question on EU Member States programmes supporting the
achievement of GAP II was interpreted in two ways: most delegations counted the
number of EU Member States programmes, others provided a number for the EU
Member States operating in the country.’
In addition, the structure and length of Thematic Priority and Objective reports received
by EUDs has varied considerably. Some were ‘more elaborate, selecting multiple
objectives and listing multiple programmes and projects. Others are brief, or partial, for
example presenting only one section, e.g. the one on institutional culture shift or on
thematic priority and objectives.’ Contributions from EU Member States into the EUD
also varied widely, since not all EU Member States present in each country sent in their
contributions.147 Furthermore, determining which lines of disaggregation are needed to
reveal inequalities along particular dimensions (health, education, economic growth,
poverty, to name a few) can be difficult without making the distinction among the
different societies’ processes of exclusion and marginalisation. Factoring in political,
social and cultural sensitivities is also important since these elements can promote
exclusions and deprivations.
4.2.4. Sidelining gender equality in difficult contexts

When it comes to including gender equality and women’s empowerment in the EU work
in fragile, conflict and post-conflict contexts, the implementation of GAP II principles
remains rather weak. It should be recognised that, gender mainstreaming has
increasingly become a comprehensive and multi-sectoral strategy, whereby women have
been recognised for the strategic and challenging role they play in advancing and
stabilising their societies. This has been particularly true at country level policies, but it
seems more complicated for regional policies, where GAP II also applies. A case in point
would be the Mediterranean region, where the EU operates through the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Experts argue that the concept of ‘gender equality’,
although spelt out and progressively better understood, has been used with ‘elasticity’ in
p. 5.
p. 11-12.
53
the EU’s external goals and the necessity of coping with many emergencies in the
Mediterranean region, especially after the 2011 awakening. 148
In that context, Guisti argues that the ENP allows for a certain flexibility through the
principle of ‘joint ownership’, which is mainly intended to give the possibility of
choosing a set of objectives already endorsed by the EU. In practice, the ENP offers
partners the opportunity to select what is more suitable and convenient for them without
actually letting them take part in the making of policies over which the EU holds full
power. Moreover, the EU’s conditionality, which is very pervasive in the accession
process, is weaker in the ENP since each partner benefits from a wider space for
manoeuvring with regard to prioritising the reforms. As a result, gender parity, which is
seen as a cultural and political product of the West, can be side-lined.149
4.2.5. Wide-ranging activities lead to mixed results

Some non-governmental actors have argued that GAP II is not ‘sufficiently ambitious or
comprehensive’ because it is not enough ‘for any EU actor work on just one objective
under the three thematic pillars of the Plan’, and that discrimination against women −
‘the single most important root cause of all forms of gender inequality’ − is not tackled
sufficiently in GAP II objectives and indicators.150 This evaluation, however, finds that
discrimination against women is explicitly addressed under the three thematic priorities
of GAP II.
Instead, what seems to be lacking in GAP II − not only regarding the specific issue of
discrimination against women − is specific activities against measurable indicators. The
broad nature of the proposed activities make it difficult to track real progress and to
ensure that these will lead to specific results. Some examples of broad activities include:
‘prevent and decrease sexual and gender based violence in conflict, through community
level redress systems, empowerment of women, and engagement of men and boys’; and
‘implement safeguarding policies for adequate humanitarian responses that address the
specific needs and vulnerabilities of men and women of all ages.’151 It is difficult to see
how these can been operationalised to bring concrete outcome and how the EU
contribution can be measured.
148Giusti, Serena, ‘Gender Mainstreaming towards the Mediterranean: the Case of the ENP’, Journal
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 19(5), 2017: 525.
149Giusti, Serena, ‘Gender Mainstreaming towards the Mediterranean: the Case of the ENP’, Journal
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 19(5), 2017: 525.
150Cox, Tanya, Plan International EU Office Response to the Council Conclusions on the Gender Action
Plan 2016-2020, Plan International, Brussels, not dated.
54
5. Opportunities for action

Having taken stock of the merits of GAP II and the progress made in implementing it, as
well as the weaknesses faced, this section outlines measures that could further enhance
EU efforts to enhance gender equality and women’s empowerment in the EU’s external
relations.
5.1. Adopt a ‘whole of society’ approach

Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the EU has made progress on its ‘whole of
government’ approach. It has moved from an EU comprehensive approach152 that links
tools and policies across the EU external action, to an EU integrated approach 153 that also
links EU external action at a strategic level. This approach was used when establishing
cooperation among the different EU organs, cooperating with EU Member States, and
engaging with governments in partner countries.
As of 2012, the EU also shifted its approach to supporting societies in third countries,
according to which CSOs, including women’s NGOs, are no longer perceived and treated
as mere implementers of development assistance; instead, they have become key
development policy actors in their own right.154 In the same vein, the EU has introduced a
permanent structured dialogue with CSOs, the Policy Forum on Development, which has
helped establish new local strategies through CSO country roadmaps in 105 countries.
CSOs also now play a central role in the EU’s external financing instruments that they
help to design, implement and monitor. With a contribution of € 2 billion, representing
73 % of the world’s support to local CSOs in partner countries, the EU is the leading
donor worldwide supporting local civil society. The EU is also the first global donor for
CSOs in humanitarian crises and has the largest human rights and democracy CSO
programme.155 This has often been an EU mantra on its development efforts; reality on
the ground, however, is more complex and opinions from recipients more mixed, as this
study has aimed to demonstrate.
EU support for local CSOs has not been aided by the shrinking space for civil society in
recent years. Civil society (including women’s groups) has become a victim of its own
152European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, Joint Staff Working Document ‘Taking forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External
Conflicts and Crises - Action Plan 2016-17’, reference no.: SWD(2016) 254 final, Brussels, 18 July 2016;
Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach, Foreign Affairs Council
meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014.
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Shared Vision, Common
153
Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,
Brussels, June 2016, pp. 9-10 and 28-32.
154European Commission, The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe‘s Engagement
with Civil Society in External Relations, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, reference no.:
COM(2012) 492 final, 12 September 2012.
155European Commission, Report on EU Engagement with Civil Society, DG for International
Cooperation and Development, Brussels, April 2017, p. 5.
55
success with a backlash from governments in third countries (and not only), leading to
restrictions of their rights (e.g. changing the laws governing their existence, cutting
available funding, and incarcerating their leaders). Even civil society actors present in
what could be argued are less challenging transitional contexts, such as the Western
Balkans, argue that it is not enough to support civil society through aid; ‘the EU needs to
facilitate our relationship with our governments’. 156 At a time when the space for civil
society is shrinking, and notwithstanding the EU effort to mainstream this ‘shrinking
space problem’ at the heart of its external action both at policy level157 and through its
instruments,158 the EU needs to sharpen and broaden its strategies. Such considerations
would also better incorporate the gender dimension in policy discussions.
In response, the EU could develop a ‘whole of society’ approach, whereby all relevant
non-state stakeholders can be actors of change. NGOs have often criticised EU foreign
policy instruments for not being ‘people-centred’,159 and especially in terms of gender
equality, for being unable to ensure women’s effective participation. In response, a twin-
track approach on gender mainstreaming and specific policy and programmes is needed.
This would, on the one hand, address gender inequalities and women’s empowerment
and, on the other, ensure that specific measures to combat societal discrimination and
gender inequality always accompany legal and policy commitments.
156Participant from the Western Balkan region, in ‘Reflection Forum on the run-up to the Trieste
Summit on Western Balkans’, Berlin Process side event for think tanks, organised by Istituto Affari
Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE), Nice/Berlin,
Austro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe (CFA), Vienna, and supported by a number of
other think tanks and EU Member States, in Trieste, 26-27 June 2017.
157Beyond a new generation of EU external action instruments to support CSOs as actors of
development and democratic governance, the EU has also adopted an ‘Action Plan on Human
Rights and Democracy’ that addresses the threats to civil society space, and a ‘rights-based’
approach to development to protect all human rights (including gender equality and the
empowerment of girls and women).
158 The EU funds a human rights defenders (HRD) protection mechanism, now known as
ProtectDefenders.eu. through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR). The Emergency Fund for HRDs at risk channels funds to human rights defenders quickly
when they face a moment of acute danger. Other instruments have also increasingly paid more
attention to the shrinking space problem: the EU’s new ‘Civil Society Roadmaps’, now
implemented in 105 countries; a new generation of ‘Human Rights and Democracy Country
Strategy Papers’; the European Neighbourhood Instrument; and the thematic programme under
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for Civil Society Organisations and Local
Authorities (CSOLA). EU delegations’ capacity has been enhanced through human rights focal
points and human rights defenders liaison officers, who are responsible for supporting the
protection of vulnerable groups and individuals (including women).
159People-centred development is an approach to international development that focuses on
improving local communities’ self-reliance, social justice, and participatory decision-making. It
recognises that economic growth alone is not enough to ensure human development, and calls for
changes in social, political, and environmental values and practices.
56
5.1.1. Structure relations with non-state actors

The commitment to mainstreaming or integrating gender analysis and perspectives
across all instruments and modalities is gaining prominence in the European
Commission, even if the practice is not yet as robust as intended. For the ‘whole of
society’ approach to work, formal and consistent relations with women’s NGOs/CSOs
are needed. While this is carried out in the context of the Instrument contributing to
Security and Peace (IcSP), this is not the case for other EU tools. For example, civil society
is mentioned in several places in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), especially in the
role of monitoring, but mechanisms should be in place to translate the principles agreed
at political level in practice. In most SADC countries, while NGOs are recognised, their
relationships with the national mechanisms are not spelled out and proceed on an ad hoc
basis.160 The need for a growing role for women in local communities and female NGOs
in monitoring and holding government/authorities accountable and acting as catalysts
for change, is an issue that comes up repeatedly when speaking with activists and experts
in the field.
Experts also explain that it is important to extend the narrow playing field with which the
EU engages when working with/supporting women in third countries, to regions away
from the urban centres and dense rural areas. There is an increasing need to encourage
female participation in the rural areas, where their struggles are usually different (and
sometimes more difficult) than those in urban areas.161 The contribution of women to civil
society and non-state actors as accountability mechanisms, in response to the situation in
the Mediterranean, has already been analysed in the section on Sidelining gender
equality in difficult contexts.
The contributions comments made at the EU Partnership Forum organised by the

European Commission in Brussels, in June 2017, demonstrate the utility of regular
fora/seminars/conferences/debates, not only for connecting local state and non-state
actors from the field with relevant EU actors, but especially for creating a platform for
voicing concerns, exchanging lessons and building cooperation for future projects.
However, while dialogue is structured with relevant CSOs at the HQ level (also through
the Civil Society Dialogue Network), the situation is more arbitrary in the field. In the
area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), only 9.8 % of peacekeeping and
peacebuilding missions contain specific provisions to improve the security and status of
girls and women of all ages. Nevertheless, CSDP missions and EU Special Security
Representatives (EUSR) aim to consult with relevant CSOs to promote the security and
status of women; but this is done on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, gender sensitivity does not
apply to Electoral Observation Missions (EOM), where women represent only 17.9 % of
technical experts. Efforts are currently in progress to counter this trend: ‘the standard EU
methodology for EOMs foresees that the issue of women’s participation is mainstreamed
161 Presentations and side discussions with participants at the ‘EU Partnership Forum 2017:
Strengthening and Deepening our Partnerships Worldwide with Civil Society and Local
Authorities’, organised by DG DEVCO, European Commission, in Brussels, on 6-7 July 2017.
57
into all aspects of the mission and its reporting on women’s participation in the electoral
process.’162
When looking at EU engagement in Rwanda, for example, Dubussher raises concerns as

to the opportunities that are given to marginalised and vulnerable women. She argues
that the ‘institutional practices and norms at the EU delegation – including the almost
exclusive use of budget support as well as the strict bureaucratic criteria for civil society
funding – structurally marginalise the voices of Rwandan women and their movement.
This process endangers Rwandan women’s country ownership, which is particularly
problematic in the context of an increasingly authoritarian state.’163 It is also important to
go beyond the partnership, signed in April 2012, between the EU and UN Women, set up
to strengthen cooperation on empowering women and gender equality and ensuring
closer collaboration, sharing of information, expertise and analysis effectively to advance
women’s rights in the Southern Mediterranean region, Africa and Europe. The EU
relationship with UN Women should not be privileged over partnering with other CSOs,
including local NGOs.164 As pointed out in the case of EU democracy-building in Africa,
‘the EU should take care not to promote or support its preferred non-state actor partners
and collaborators, but instead agree jointly with African governments on preferred non-
state actor partners in African states.’165
5.1.2. Involve the private sector

Internationally, the EU needs to invest more effort in building partnerships that are more
effective, with other organisations working to address the shrinking civil society space
problem. One way could be to get the private sector more involved. The EU needs to
push CSOs to pay more attention to building links downwards through their own
societies and with business actors. Experts argue that if they were less isolated
domestically, they would be better protected from regimes. 166 According to a recent
McKinsey Global Institute, the private sector would also benefit from focusing on the
large economic opportunity of improving parity between men and women. Although not
a goal that can realistically be met in the short-term, private companies could benefit both
p. 23-24.
163Dubusscher’s work on the implementation of EU development aid in Rwanda: Debusscher,
Petra, ‘Gender Mainstreaming on the Ground? The Case of EU Development Aid Towards
Rwanda’, in Weiner, Elaine and Heather MacRae (eds), The Persistent Invisibility of Gender in EU
Policy, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special issue 1(18), 2014: 19.
164 Interview with European Commission official 1, Brussels, March 2017.
165Bradley, Andrew, The European Union and Challenges to Democracy Building in Africa, in
Democracy in Development. Global Consultations on the EU’s Role in Democracy Building, International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, 2009, p. 62.
166Youngs, Richard and Ana Echagüe, Shrinking Space for Civil Society: the EU Response, reference
no.: PE 578.039, Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament,
Brussels, April 2017, pp. 15, 21.
58
directly and indirectly by taking action on gender equality in the workplace in concert
with governments and non-governmental organisations.
In that context, the same study provides examples of financial incentives that the private
sector can offer to boost gender equality. On incentivising behavioural changes in the
family and community on the role of girls and women, for example, the Naning’oi Girls
Boarding School project in Kenya is mentioned, which substitutes the traditional practice
of ‘booking girls for marriage’ with booking them for school. According to this project,
the traditional dowry of livestock or gifts offered to the girls’ parents is given in exchange
for the girl going to school rather than getting married.
Another example offered as a way to promote higher labour force participation,

corporations could supplement government subsidised child care through school
scholarship programmes made available for girls. The business world could also support
movements/associations working on the removal of tax disincentives to both partners
working. Moreover, the private sector could finance infrastructure and technology
projects to ensure, for example, that schools offer sanitation facilities for girls, and to
create apps designed for female entrepreneurs, and gender- and mobile-based emergency
services for female victims of violence. To create economic opportunities, multinationals
could invest in skills-building programmes tied to future job placements and
employment opportunities; provide offices that are adapted to the local culture (e.g. all-
female business processing centres in Muslim societies); and provide capacity-building
programmes and peer networks for women in the workplace. The private sector can also
play a role in shaping attitudes by financing advocacy efforts, either by working with
communities through NGOs or through public relations and corporate social
responsibility efforts. 167
5.2. Ensure that political commitment for EU action translates into

real action
5.2.1. Make gender a priority at all levels
Experts have accused the EU of discrepancy between its strategic level (where gender
equality is conceptualised) and its operational level (where gender dimensions are
integrated gender throughout its programming). While the highest formal (i.e. binding)
EU rules are very clear that ‘equality between women and men’ is a core objective that
must be integrated into all aspects of its operations and policies (Article 2, Treaty of
Amsterdam, 1997), ‘this is not matched in the EU’s external services on the ground,
which tend to marginalise gender equality issues and/or implement gender
mainstreaming in an instrumental and limited manner.’168 By adopting such an approach
to development, the EU is seen as pursuing multiple and often competing goals, with its
gender equality project crafted on top and out of an economic edifice oriented principally
167 Woetzel, Jonathan et al., The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12
Trillion to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Institute, London, September 2015, pp. 19-22.
168Debusscher, Petra, ‘Gender Mainstreaming on the Ground? The Case of EU Development Aid
in EU Policy, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special issue 1(18), 2014: 10.
59
towards economic growth and competiveness. The result of this situation is that only
‘purely formal’ gender mainstreaming policy is put in practice, where only basic and
instrumental gender issues are included (such as maternal health and basic education).
Less evident policy areas, such as transport and agriculture, are – falsely – assumed to be
gender-neutral. The ensuing problem is that underlying processes that aggravate social
inequality (e.g., structural and cultural obstacles) are neglected.169
The predominant focus of gender equality policies on the public sphere (even though
equality in the public sphere heavily depends on equality in the private sphere), and their
use in an instrumental fashion (especially to contribute to employment-led goals) is not
new.170 For example, an analysis of the programming of EU development aid towards
Rwanda (until programming year 2014) reveals that gender is included extensively in the
country analysis, but to a much lesser extent in the strategy and budget. More
specifically, the Country Strategy Paper on Rwanda mentioned several problems of
gender inequality (e.g., poverty, HIV/AIDS and women’s limited access to employment,
credit and higher education), while the National Indicative Programme that is the most
concrete part of the document (it includes timetables, budgets and measurement
indicators), contained only two general sentences on the participation of
women/vulnerable groups in employment creation in rural development and
infrastructure. The document did not specify how women’s participation would be
guaranteed. Instead, ‘gender seems to get filtered out when measures become more
concrete’. In addition, while integration of gender issues in EU development aid has been
a formal requirement since 1995, Dubusscher argued that it was difficult to assess how
gender would figure into the development policy programming (2014-2019).171 GAP II
has set solid foundations for the gender dimensions to appear clearly at all levels of
programming: the country strategy, the indicative programme, the budget, and the
specific activities.
5.2.2. Further streamline monitoring

While much progress was made with GAP II in addressing the monitoring of gender
parity and women’s empowerment in external relations, a number of shortcomings still
need to be addressed. Some of these are acknowledged by the European Commission and
the EEAS in their first implementation report, which notes that, ‘in many instances the
statistics and data available are not sufficiently in-depth for use in the design of action
documents on the EU’s selected concentration areas. This means that even where a
170See, for example, Chiva, Cristina, The Limits of Europeanisation: EU Accession and Gender
Equality in Bulgaria and Romania’, Perspectives on European Politics in Society 10(2), 2009: 195-209;
Lewis, Jane, ‘Work/Family Reconciliation, Equal Opportunities and Social Policies: the
Interpretation of Policy Trajectories at the EU Level and the Meaning of Gender Equality’, Journal of
European Public Policy 13(3), 2006: 420-437.
60
gender country profile exists, further action is required for generating data – as part of
the preparation of the action documents – to provide the level of detail required. Thus, in
many cases, additional sector-specific gender analysis is/will be required at programme
or project formulation stage.’172
Equally, as noted in the minutes of the Member States Gender Experts Meeting of
July 2016, ‘gender analysis is still included as an annex (in the check list) and not yet in
the core of the programme document’. 173 The European Commission/EEAS report notes
that ‘a review of selected programme proposals in the second-half of 2016 (submitted to
the internal Quality check by the so-called Quality Support Group) showed that most
Action Documents were prepared before the gender analysis was done or completed.
Some draw on existing gender analysis of EU, international and/or national partners, but
are weakened by a lack of sector-specific gender analysis. Gender analysis and data are
present in some Action Documents cross-cutting Annexes, and briefly in the cross-cutting
issues section of Action Documents, but not in the main body of the Action Document
(context, problem analysis, objective, risks/assumptions, activities, results, log frame).’174
In addition, it is important to clarify how reliable the gender analysis is, how EU
delegations and Member States have collected the data, how developed the data is, and
to ensure that it is prepared in a streamlined manner to make it comparable to that of
other EU delegations. Importantly, the input and expertise from international and
national partners, academia/think tanks, and women’s organisations should not only be
consulted but should also feed into the monitoring of EU financed activities and
programmes on gender equality. It is not clear whether this is the case today.
While new gender focal points have been appointed or nominated in the EUDs, for some
their time is stretched as the GFP tasks are in addition to their core or other
responsibilities. The European Parliament has often called on VP/HR and the EEAS to
develop clear operational guidelines on the role of focal points in delegations, so that
they may improve, act as true human rights advisors and carry out their work
efficiently.175
p. 7-8.
173 Minutes, Member States Gender Experts Meeting, 7-8 July 2016, in Brussels, p. 2.
p. 8.
175European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 14 December 2016 on the Annual Report on
Human Rights and Democracy in the World and the European Union’s Policy on the Matter 2015
(2016/2219(INI)), reference no.: P8_TA(2016)0502, Strasbourg, 14 December 2016.
61
5.2.3. Include gender equality in trade negotiations and the monitoring of

trade agreements
As explained in the section on Trade and gender, although trade affects women’s
wellbeing both positively and negatively, it is not explicitly considered in the European
Commission’s SIA, nor when monitoring trade agreements in force. To respond to these
problems, Fontana suggests better documenting of the gender dynamics associated with
changes in services, standards and regulations, and taking a more comprehensive
approach to gender than is currently the case in SIAs. Fontana also calls for gender
analysis to be regularly included in the monitoring of implementation of trade
agreements that are in force. At the implementation level, and in particular in relation to
trade with developing countries, the EU could more effectively use multilateral
development cooperation frameworks such as the ‘Aid for Trade’ initiative to support
governments in the implementation of gender equality goals within their trade
strategies.176
Furthermore, in order to pursue gender smart procurement in all political and economic
settings, governments should seek to implement a three-pronged approach (in the image
of policies that are adopted in EU Member States): targets and strategies to increase
diversity in procurement (no more all-male boards in companies), including supporting
women as procurement professionals; targeted action to help women overcome the
barriers to participate in government tenders, with a special focus on SMEs; and
increased transparency around gender equity in procurement. 177 Moreover, studies have
shown that the introduction of labour rights chapters in trade agreements is welcomed.
More specifically, such provisions ease labour market access, in particular for working
age women; they impact on the narrowing of the gender wage gap; and they do not
divert or decrease trade flows. It is essential that ILO decent work standards are
enforceable.178
5.2.4. Include men in EU programmes on gender equality

As analysed in the section entitled Understanding gender parity, there is a clear shift in
the EU discourse on gender mainstreaming in GAP II, which compared to earlier EU
efforts, has moved forward. This is also exemplified in earlier studies conducted by
gender experts who argued that, before the review of GAP I, the EU did not conceive
176Fontana, Marzia, Gender Equality in Trade Agreements, reference no.: PE 571.388, Policy
Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Directorate General for Internal Policies,
European Parliament, Brussels, 2016.
177Subacchi, Paola, Presentation: Gender-Smart Procurement, Gender Equality in EU Trade
178See International Labour Organisation, Handbook on Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade and
Investment Arrangements, Studies on Grown and Equity, 2016 (Preprint version). For an example of
the impact of the absence of such provisions in the EU agreements, see Ioannides, Isabelle, The
Effects of Human Rights Related Clauses in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and the EU-Chile Association
Agreement, reference no.: PE 558.764, European Parliamentary Research Service, European
Parliament, Brussels, February 2017.
62
gender as a relation between men and women, but simply as a ‘women’s issue’.179 While
this has changed in GAP II, the role of men and boys in EU financed programmes on
women’s empowerment remains limited.
As the first annual European Commission/EEAS monitoring report admits, although

adolescent boys were to some degree involved in EU programmes that fall under
Objective 7 (Girls and women free from all forms of violence against them both in the
public and in the private sphere) of the priority related to the shift in institutional culture,
more needs to be done to engage men.180 Similarly, in her interviews with gender
professionals in European Commission services, Debusscher had found that expertise
and knowledge on gender mainstreaming was ‘sometimes rather limited’ and that ‘the
words ‘men’ (or ‘male’, or ‘boy’) were barely mentioned in the interviews, only when
explicitly put into a question.’ In response, as experts have over the years pointed out, it
is important to educate men in equal representation in politics, at the workplace and in
society at large.181
5.3. Adapt to local realities

As already mentioned in the section entitled Adopt a ‘whole of society’ approach, the EU
has moved forward on linking its external policy tools and programmes in line with the
EU comprehensive approach,182 and at strategic level in line with the EU integrated
approach.183 Nonetheless, EU intervention on promoting gender equality in third
countries appears to have left out some relevant stakeholders in the design, planning,
implementation, and monitoring of its activities.
5.3.1. One size does not fit all

While women across the world often face similar challenges, such as limited access to
property and financial services, lack of social protection and the unpaid care burden, the
179Debusscher, Petra, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in European Commission Development Policy:

p. 17.
181Tjandradewi, Bernadia, United Cities and Local Governments – Asia Pacific (UCLG ASPAC), at
‘EU Partnership Forum 2017: Implementing the European Consensus on Development:
182European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, Joint Staff Working Document ‘Taking forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External
Conflicts and Crises - Action Plan 2016-17’, reference no.: SWD(2016) 254 final, Brussels, 18 July 2016;
183
Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,
Brussels, June 2016, pp. 9-10 and 28-32.
63
proposed solutions cannot follow the same format. When it comes to governance reforms
in the recipient countries, the EU needs to make sure that these are pursued in a way that
is not generic and abstract, but instead more connected to the immediate diplomatic
policy in specific countries. Formal improvements in the legal environment for CSOs, for
example, often fail to protect civic activists in practice. The EU needs a foreign policy
capable of tackling the political specificities of the shrinking civil society space in
individual states (see section on Adopt a ‘whole of society’ approach). Freedom of
association must be backed up by a more expansive focus on the right to participate. For
this, the EU needs to leverage oblique forms of political pressure. 184
In addition, the GAP II monitoring scheme should consider intersectionality more clearly,
in line with SDG 17.18: ‘By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing
countries to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data
disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability,
geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.’ The
intersection of these variables makes for new needs to which the EU must tailor its
approach. Intersectionality has not been integrated sufficiently in the EU efforts so far
and is only alluded to once in GAP II, as follows: ‘Critical moments in a girl’s or woman’s
life, the need for age-specific support, as well as the intersection of gender with other
social inequalities, will inform the [rights-based] approach.’185 The importance of taking
‘age into account because gender discriminations do pile up while ageing’, was an issue
that was raised by civil society organisations at the Member States’ expert meeting in the
context of the implementation of GAP II, in July 2016.186
Demographic, economic and cultural contexts also affect women’s experience and make
it different from others. It should be recognised that each region and country, with their
own legal, institutional and cultural underpinnings are at differing stages of compliance
with international (and EU) standards on gender equality. As Hudson and Lowe have
pointed out, merely ‘copying’ the same policies in different circumstances can lead to
different results, which are dependent on previous policies, institutional and structural
factors, as well as the normative understanding of policies.187
Furthermore, transitions, democracy-building and embedding human rights (including

gender equality) in a state and society is complex and messy. In any transition, the new
social reality that is created is not a mere result of transfer of existing models. Instead,
184Youngs, Richard and Ana Echagüe, Shrinking Space for Civil Society: the EU Response, reference
no.: PE 578.039, Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament,
Brussels, April 2017, p. 6-7.
186 Minutes, Member States Gender Experts Meeting, 7-8 July 2016, in Brussels, p. 7.
187Hudson, John and Stuart Lowe, Understanding the Policy Process: Analysing Welfare Policy and
Practice, Policy Press, Bristol, 2004.
64
there is a great deal of continuity with the past – legacy is important.188 The force of
resistance and inertia in organisational settings, be they EU foreign policy organs or
recipient country institutions, should not be underestimated.189 Experts and field workers
have often noted the domestic resistance to implementing and discussing gender equality
in certain third countries/regions.190 Experience in supporting transitions can also be a
precursor for strengthening EU policies in other regions. For example, using Croatia as a
case, Dobrotić et al. showed that the gender agenda was added to the EU accession
negotiation process rather late – primarily via EU conditionality. Although narrow in
scope and often limited in impact to just ‘paper compliance’ with EU legislation, it led to
the opening of discussions in the gender equality area in post- communist countries and
empowered women’s organisations.191
Box 5: Case study – Gender equality in the Western Balkans

Gender equality is one of the requirements with which Western Balkan candidates and
potential candidates for EU accession (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia) must comply.
Despite having adopted or amended their relevant legislation (e.g., criminal and labour
laws), elaborated national strategies and action plans, and established institutional
mechanisms to carry out and monitor the policies in the area of gender equality, in
practice, such policies are seen as low-priority.192
As a result, the institutions responsible for implementing gender equality policies are
weak and enjoy little public trust; women do not tend to use them when they are in
need. Lack of effective rule of law protection from gender inequality, abuse and
violence against women, means that women in the region still share similar challenges
of increased personal, economic, and social insecurity. For example, in Serbia, one in
two women has suffered some form of violence and 330 women have been killed in the
last 10 years as a result of gender violence. Cases of abuse of women remain
188See, for example, Illner, Michal, ‘Post Communist Transformation Revisited’, Czech Sociological
Review 4(2), 1996: 157-169.
189For a development of this argument, see Elgström, Ole, ‘Norm Negotiations. The Construction
of New Norms Regarding Gender and Development in EU Foreign Aid Policy’, Journal of European
Public Policy 7(3), Special Issue, 2000: 457-476.
See, for example, Vasiljević, Snježana, Gender Equality in Croatia, in Örtenblad, Anders et al.,
190
Gender Equality in a Global Perspective, Routledge, New York and London, pp. 246-260.
191Dobrotić, Ivana et al., Gender Equality Policies and Practices in Croatia – The Interplay of
Transition and Late Europeanization, Social Policy & Administration 47(2), April 2013: 218-240.
192 For a description of the legislative and institutional framework regulating gender equality in
each of the Western Balkan countries, see Lilyanova, Velina, Rights and Empowerment of Women in
the Western Balkans, reference no.: PE 607.273, European Parliamentary Research Service, European
Parliament, Brussels, June 2017.
65
unreported or unrecorded, especially in Kosovo, because women are too afraid to come
forward with no real 193
In turn, traditional stereotypes that place women and girls in a subordinate position are
perpetuated, and public awareness of their rights is low. This has meant that, similar to
other post-communist countries, the Western Balkans region experiences the remnants
of policies dating from the socialist period: the economic independence of women is
favoured, primarily by granting them employment in the public sector, but the position
of women in the private sphere, that is, societal norms, have not been addressed. This
has resulted in a comparatively high participation of women in the labour market, but
also in a double burden, since the traditional division of care work was preserved and
remains a persisting problem.194 Moreover, unequal access to participation in high-level
politics (despite existing quotas) are palpable issues concerning women that have not
been tackled yet.
The response of Western Balkan countries’ governments to these challenges is largely

seen as inadequate. In the framework of EU accession, the EU has called for more
attention to be paid to ensuring gender equality, including for an increased role for civil
society. However, the region’s political instability (high, depending on the country)
signifies a high uncertainty about future political developments, including
uncertainties about EU membership prospects. EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender and
on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, Ambassador
Mara Marinaki’s first visit to Albania was part of the effort to promote the EU gender
priorities in the Western Balkans and also included a first stop in Kosovo.195
The ambivalence of the EU and its Member States regarding EU enlargement196 also
affect the role of the EU in social development. In these transition societies, social
193‘Joint Exchange of Views on Violence Against Women in the Western Balkans and Turkey’,
organised by Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), the Subcommittee on
Human Rights (DROI), the Delegation to the EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association
Parliamentary Committee, the Delegation for relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo,
the Delegation to the EU-former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee,
the Delegation to the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, the
Delegation to the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, and the
Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, European Parliament, Brussels, 8
June 2017.
194Lilyanova, Velina, Rights and Empowerment of Women in the Western Balkans, reference no.: PE
607.273, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, Brussels, June 2017.
Delegation of the European Union to Albania, EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender Ambassador Mara
195
Marinaki Visits Albania, Press release, Bruxelles, 5 May 2017.

Balfour, Rosa and Corina Stratulat (eds.), EU Member States and Enlargement towards the Balkans,
196
EPC Issue Paper No. 79, European Policy Centre (EPC), Brussels, July 2015.
66
policy-making is influenced by state fragmentation and state-building, as well as the

fact that welfare is conditioned by a constant re-definition of citizenship.197 (Also see
section Long term engagement). For its part, civil society has repeatedly called for
stricter monitoring, more consistent implementation and public awareness-raising as
part of the national agenda.
What the region needs is more funding for women’s shelter; real commitment from
governments in the region to implement relevant laws; a change of societal norms on
the issues of sexual harassment and gender equality through the inclusion of gender
studies education curricula and the development of advocacy programmes;
strengthened institutional capacity in rule of law; the eradication of impunity and the
setting up of rehabilitative measures; and the strengthening of the capacity of women’s
organisation to carry out government oversight effectively.198
5.3.2. EU delegations at the frontline

As confirmed by the European Commission/EEAS annual monitoring report, the EU
delegations play a central role in implementing GAP II. As with other EU common
policies and actions, the EU delegations represent the EU diplomatically at country level
in the dialogue with the government and local actors, carry out the technical and political
coordination with Member States in the country, and are the first contact point on
coordination of EU efforts with international partners in the country.
In doing so, it is their job to ensure that the implementation of policies, including the
mainstreaming, protection and promotion of gender equality is a collective exercise and
much more of a two-way street. This implies that information and analysis is shared
between the EU and its Member States, as well as proper consultation of local actors
(governmental and non-government) in the design, drafting and implementation of the
EU’s multi-annual programming. EUDs also have a role on regional strategies and
programmes. In practice, however, regional programmes are generally managed by one
EUD. Experts have noted that often knowledge or involvement of other EUDs in the
region is weak, partly as a result of lack of human resources.199
197Dobrotić, Ivana et al., Gender Equality Policies and Practices in Croatia – The Interplay of
198‘Joint Exchange of Views on Violence Against Women in the Western Balkans and Turkey’,
June 2017.
199See, for example, Faria, Fernanda, What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU Action
Plan and Beyond, Briefing Note no. 71, European Centre for Development Policy Management,
Maastricht, October 2014, p. 13.
67
5.3.3. Women as actors, not victims

NGO experts and activists argue that the participation of women in public spaces,
especially in justice, research, and political decision-making, still needs to improve.200 Ole
Elgström demonstrates that, ‘[t]he decision to rely on a network of national and EU
gender experts – almost all of them women – in the early phase of the EU decision-
making process ensure[s] that gender equality concerns [are] clearly established in the
ensuing resolution. The continued involvement of such experts throughout the decision-
making process ensure[s] that such concerns [are] not forgotten during the later stages of
the process.’201 Equally, when it comes to women’s role in a conflict context, an ODI
study argues that women play a key role throughout conflict situations, not only for
meeting basic needs, but also as advocates, fostering the trust and collaboration − the
‘social capital’ − that are so critical in reconciliation.202
Therefore, the EU should strengthen its support to women’s participation, shifting their
role to one of actors. It is important to factor into policy the gender expertise that exists in
third countries (for example, in Africa) and put creative resource mobilisation strategies
in place to promote sustainability of change in gender equality. In that context, the EU
should more closely with CSOs, since these organisations are able to mobilise public
support and solidarity and to combine development and advocacy actions anchored in
the economic, social and cultural realities of people’s lives. For example, the Women’s
Protocol in Africa could be disseminated widely at national level so that it becomes
embedded in the population’s psyche, transform mentalities, and ensure its
implementation. Women’s organisations therefore have an important role to play in
lobbying governments to ratify the Protocol and bring it into force.203
5.4. Enhance training and access to training for women − and

implement it
In recent years, DG DEVCO has trained an impressive number of EU external services
staff on gender mainstreaming in development cooperation (over 2 000 people since
2004). Continuous efforts are made to produce better results for gender mainstreaming in
the relevant EU institutions by strengthening the competences of staff both at HQ and
EUD levels (e.g. through revision of core curricula, preparation of guidance notes on
specific thematic issues, regular training sessions organised by thematic area or region,
200Quintana, Karla, Secretaria, Suprema Corte de Justicia de Mexico, at ‘EU Partnership Forum
2017: Implementing the European Consensus on Development: Strengthening and Deepening our
Partnerships Worldwide with Civil Society and Local Authorities’, organised by DG DEVCO,
European Commission, in Brussels, on 6-7 July 2017.
201Elgström, Ole, ‘Norm Negotiations. The Construction of New Norms Regarding Gender and
473.
202Moser, Caroline and Fiona Clark (eds), Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and
Political Violence, Overseas Development Institute, London, July 2001.
68
etc.) and by increasing the number of gender focal persons that can act as catalysts and
orient their peers on resources and available support. The EU Gender Resource
Package204 is now available online, and additional gender expertise has been made
available during the year to support the implementation of GAP II through preparation
of gender analysis and mainstreaming of gender in new programmes across sectors.205
Nevertheless, a look at the contractual status and hierarchical position of the trained staff
members shows that large parts of the EU staff trained were contract agents with
temporary assignments who have since left the EU institutions. Based on that data,
experts have concluded that the temporary and least powerful actors in the bureaucracy
are becoming more skilled in gender mainstreaming, while the more powerful
permanent officials seem more interested in other training opportunities. 206 Specifically,
in a context of ‘gender apathy’, a person with gender expertise (in the case the GFP) is
marginalised by (senior) staff members for whom gender may be a non-issue. Indeed,
staff members responsible for fostering gender mainstreaming are very often female
contract agents with temporary assignments (as opposed to permanent officials) in non-
decision-making positions. This is the case not only in the EU delegation in Rwanda but
in most EU delegations around the world.207 There is thus an obvious power asymmetry,
to the disadvantage of staff working on gender equality, which manifests itself in the
struggle over which ideas matter and who accumulates resources, privilege and
opportunity. This power difference does not only occur between gender policy and non-
gender policy staff specifically but also between female and male staff more generally.’208
In response, higher levels of EU staff (officials) should make better use of the training that
staff in the EU delegations have received. Dubusscher’s research on training available to
officials in the EUD in Kigali, Rwanda shows that there was no follow up to the training
that staff received and no necessary pressure and commitment by middle management to
support GFPs who attempted to organise EU delegation staff meetings on gender
equality in EU development. Dubusscher concluded that, in the informal standard
204European Commission, ILO International Training centre, UN Women, learn4dev: Joint

Competence Development, Resource Package on Gender Mainstreaming in EU Development
Cooperation.
p. 26.
206van Osch, Thera, Dripping Hollows out Rock: ‘Enhancing Capacity for Gender Mainstreaming,’
Assessment on Needs for Enhancing Capacity Development in Gender Mainstreaming, Train4Dev Gender
Expert Group 2011, OQ Consulting BV, 30 September 2011.
207van Osch, Thera, Dripping Hollows out Rock: ‘Enhancing Capacity for Gender Mainstreaming,’
69
operating procedure of the bureaucracy, it is acceptable to put a gender meeting on the

bottom of your priority list. Such informally understood conventions and norms are
embedded in the everyday practice of a bureaucracy. They are disguised as standard and
taken for granted, but they are also ‘particularly sticky and resistant to change’ as they
represent the status quo.209
Moreover, DG DEVCO should not only have more gender advisors within the B1 Unit,
but it should also train the staff within the geographical units on gender equality issues,
and more specifically on the ‘Women, Peace and Security agenda’. Equally, the EEAS and
Member States should include training on gender issues in the pre-deployment package
that is available for all personnel working in CSDP missions.210
Very importantly, women in recipient communities would benefit from access to training
on political participation. Women are neither trained sufficiently nor are they trained to
access politics. Their civic participation tends to be limited only to campaigns in favour of
the electoral participation of women rather than effective participation of women in
politics. It is for this reason that experts have repeatedly pointed to the significance of
empowering organisations (especially NGOs) to train women so they can participate in
politics.211
5.5. Engage consistently and for the long term

While GAP II laid solid foundations for an institutional shift in all relevant EU
institutions/services at HQ level and in third countries, the challenge will be to continue
in this direction with consistency and in full recognition that it is unlikely that ‘success
stories’ will follow in the short-term. This responsibility is recognised in the first
European Commission/EEAS monitoring report.212 Similar to other aspects of EU
external action, sustainable change in gender equality will necessitate long-term
engagement from the EU institutions. Such an approach will also help the EU move
towards genuine partnerships and build credibility in its external action.
210Fellin, Irene, Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), Presentation on ‘The Implementation of the
EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020’, at the Workshop for the Committee on Women’s Rights and
211 Doubia, Mama Koite, FEMNET, at ‘EU Partnership Forum 2017: Implementing the European
Consensus on Development: Strengthening and Deepening our Partnerships Worldwide with Civil
Society and Local Authorities’, organised by DG DEVCO, European Commission, in Brussels, on 6-
7 July 2017.
Annual Implementation Report 2016, p. 9.
70
At the same time, there is a need for the EU to recognise the limits of any EU effort in its
foreign policy. Doing so, will help the EU set realistic objectives that are outlined and
linked to clear benchmarks and to a clear timeline. Despite good intentions, impact on the
ground is not always controllable. Moreover, it is determined by the engagement of the
third country’s government and community,213 in addition to that of the EU and its
Member States. As experts have explained, institutions are defined as ‘relatively
enduring features of political and social life (rules, norms and procedures) that structure
behaviour and cannot be changed easily or instantaneously’.214
Adequate funding on gender equality in external relations will be necessary to sustain

political commitment to this goal. Yet, despite significant increases in recent years, the
overall funding resources for gender equality and women’s empowerment actions
remain inadequate. Experts who have monitored EU development aid distribution over
the years argue that EU funds for development have been moved to other priorities on
the EU agenda. The amount of money the EU and its Member States commit to
promoting human rights, encouraging democratic reforms and strengthening civil society
− all of which are policies through which gender equality and women’s empowerment is
supported − is extremely limited compared to the budget proposed for a EU defence
fund. In addition, in recent years, most EU Member States have slashed their aid
budgets.215
In the draft budget for 2018, the European Commission suggests to reduce the total funds
under heading 4 of the EU budget, ‘The EU as a Global Player’, by € 232 million
(i.e. 5.6 %) to € 9 593 billion. This money is also used as a ‘margin’ in the budget to
support migrants in Turkey, if needed. The most important budget line for development,
the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), is now earmarked for ‘contributing to
the fight against the root causes of irregular migration’, instead of exclusively focusing on
poverty reduction. This contradicts the EU treaties, which determine that poverty
reduction and eradication should be the primary objective of development cooperation.
Furthermore, the EU’s recently adopted framework for development policy renewed the
EU’s commitment to poverty eradication, gender equality, climate change, and food
security.216
213Ioannides, Isabelle, The Effects of Human Rights Related Clauses in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement
and the EU-Chile Association Agreement: Ex-Post Impact Assessment, reference no.: PE 558.764,
European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, Brussels, February 2017.
214Waylen, Georgina, ‘Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality’, Political
Research Quarterly 67(1), 2014: 213.
215 Youngs, Richard, ‘Europe’s Defense Fund Ignores Real Threat: Populism’, Politico, 15 June, 2017.
216 Oel, Florian, EU Budget: Don’t Use Development Aid For Controlling Migration, Oxfam
International, Brussels, 30 May 2017.
71
6. Conclusion
This evaluation of the first year of implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-
2020 (GAP II) was prepared to accompany the drafting of the implementation report on
this topic by the DEVE and FEMM Committees. This evaluation was prepared in full
recognition of the short timeframe since the adoption of GAP II and its application (only
one year to date). In these circumstances, it is too early to make a full assessment of the
impact of GAP II.
First insights into the application of GAP II show that the EU has fundamentally
mainstreamed the notion and significance of gender equality and women’s
empowerment in partner countries in its discourse and external relations and cooperation
programmes. It has taken on board a number of lessons identified from its experience of
the preceding Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP I). Progress on supporting gender
equality in EU external action demonstrates that there is an understanding at EU
decision-making level that empowering girls and women across the globe is not an
option in our times, but a duty and a responsibility to future generations. In turn, gender
parity in partner countries has become synonymous with increasing productivity and
economic growth, respect and protection of human rights, sustainability and resilience of
a society.
Important successes of GAP II so far include a better understanding of the underpinnings

of gender equality, including the role of men in ensuring gender parity and promoting
women’s empowerment. One of the most important achievements has been making
progress on GAP II’s focus on shifting EU institutional culture at headquarter and
delegation levels, therefore pushing for a true systemic change in the EU institutions on
gender issues. This understanding has also been integrated in the implementation of
GAP II, illustrated by the clear operationalisation and strong commitment of EU
leadership to the objectives of the framework examined. Furthermore, the shift in EU
institutional culture on gender equality in third countries has been a central feature in the
implementation of GAP II, as illustrated in the responsiveness of European Commission
services to gender issues and their attention to training.
The relevant EU institutions also appear to have worked well together and with EU
Member States, some of which have made much progress in integrating the principles of
GAP II in their development aid. In addition, much effort has been put into reaching out
to civil society actors, working better with other international donors present in the field,
and consulting with stakeholders. A solid monitoring system that has the potential to
hold EU actors at all levels to account for their shortcomings and determine effective
implementation has been put in place. Equally, guidelines at EU level and among
Member States allow for this monitoring to take place consistently. This has in turn
translated into stronger investments in human capital and financial assistance for
promoting gender parity in EU external relations.
Despite having set solid foundations for progress in the field of mainstreaming,
protecting and promoting gender equality in the EU’s external relations, GAP II faces
certain weaknesses. When operationalising GAP II, efforts on gender parity have
72
primarily centred on development aid and cooperation, while women’s role in fragile
contexts and their role in mediation and negotiation are neglected. Additionally, GAP II
does not address sufficiently nor in specific terms the link between trade and gender, an
area where women are affected in terms of access to finances/resources, labour and
employment conditions, and wage conditions. Furthermore, while a solid monitoring
framework and clear guidelines have been established with GAP II, these are
disproportionately focused on quantitative data and analysis. What is missing is an
assessment of programmes and activities concentrating on the quality of delivery and
potential (short-term, medium-term and long-term) impact on recipient countries. In
addition, when looking at the programming of EU activities, the gender dimension seems
to be side-lined in situations of crisis or difficult conflicts, and on occasion activities are of
a broad nature, which makes it difficult to track real progress and to have a specific
outcome.
This study has demonstrated that sustainable change on women’s empowerment and
gender parity in partner countries is a complex and lengthy process. It necessitates that
the EU engages consistently and in the long-term; that EU efforts are adapted to local
realities in recipient countries; that the EU demonstrates its political commitment clearly
across regions and at all levels; that training on gender equality issues be improved and
further specialised and that it be made available to local partners in government and
among non-state actors (including NGOs); and, finally, that a ‘whole of society’ approach
be adopted in parallel to a ‘whole of government’ approach when engaging with partner
countries.
73
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EU Gender Action

European Implementation Assessment

This European Implementation Assessment on the one-year evaluation of the Gender

ABOUT THE PUBLISHER

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DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT

Manuscript completed in October 2017.

List of boxes ................................................................................................................................... 4

Executive summary ....................................................................................................................... 7

2. EU framework for gender parity and women’s empowerment in third countries . 16

3. Learning from past experience ......................................................................................... 24

4. Assessing the implementation of the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 ...................... 30

5. Opportunities for action .................................................................................................... 55

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

GII Gender Inequality Index

This European Implementation Assessment (EIA) of the first year of implementation of

The objectives of this EIA are threefold:

Important GAP II successes so far include a better understanding of the underpinnings of

Some weaknesses, however, persist, especially in terms of focusing on specific facets of

Figure 1: GDP gain in 2025 by closing the global gender gap 7

In this context, this study has a threefold aim:

European Implementation Assessment aims at accompanying the work of the two

To respond further to the above limitations, the analysis in this European

When it comes to the sources of data used in European Commission/EEAS annual

Box 1: Key definitions

Gender analysis refers to ‘the study of differences in the conditions, needs,

Gender equality: the absence of discrimination based on gender in the allocation of

Gender equity: achieving equal treatment in the distribution of benefits and

Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation constituted a breakthrough as

Intersectionality: an analytical tool for understanding and responding to the ways

2. EU framework for gender parity and women’s

2.1. Closing the gender gap in third countries

Figure 2: Gender Inequality Index - Regional comparison of EU development aid

A key factor affecting women’s empowerment is labour market characteristics.30

Education, including community-level education, has a key role to play in addressing

2.2. International prerogatives on gender parity

Box 2: The sustainable development agenda and gender equality

SDG 10 for reduced inequalities addresses gender disparities by ensuring ‘equal

2.3. EU agenda for women’s empowerment in partner countries

dimensions, and retains poverty eradication as the main goal of EU development

In the context of the negotiations on a new European Consensus, the European

GAP II takes a comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach (so-called gender

Connecting the development community, 17 October 2016.

3. Learning from past experience

3.1. Lessons from the Gender Action Plan 2010-2015 (GAP I)

Fourth, on programming and financing, the evaluation contracted by the European

3.2. Lessons from other international donors on gender equality

Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 1.

Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 2.

Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 4.

By choosing to mainstream gender equality throughout its EU external action policies,

Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 4.

Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 5.

integrating staff contributions to gender equality into annual performance reviews.68

Washington, DC, April 2013, p. 6.

4. Assessing the implementation of the Gender Action

4.1.1. Understanding gender parity and women’s empowerment

4.1.1.1 The role of men and masculinity