Rogue States

Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude "Rogue States"?
Author(s): Elizabeth N. Saunders

Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 23-53
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InternationalStudies Review (2006) 8, 23-53
Setting Boundaries:
Can International Society Exclude
"Rogue States"?1
ELIZABETHN. SAUNDERS
Department of Political Science, Yale University
This essay addresses a prominent post-Cold War issue to which political

scientists have paid relatively little attention: the status of so-called rogue
states in international politics. The war in Iraq crystallized transatlantic
disagreement over whether "rogue states" exist and how they should be
treated, but the debate raged throughout the 1990s. This essay brings
international relations theory to bear on the issue of "rogue states," but
it does so with a theoretical twist. It argues that we must first identify the
entity from which these states are allegedly excluded as well as who gets
to set the membership criteria. If we stipulate that the international
system includes all states, then international society can be defined ac-
cording to various shared ideas and many realizations of international
society are possible. Powerful states may try to act as "norm entrepre-
neurs," promoting their ideas as the basis of international society. But
states, including great powers, may genuinely disagree over the basis and
boundaries of this society. It is thus vital not only to take both power and
shared ideas seriously, but also to describe the origins and limits of
shared ideas. The limits to shared ideas can be termed"bounded inter-
subjectivity." This essay uses the debate over "rogue states" and the
transatlantic crisis over confronting Iraq to underscore these theoretical
issues.
In the 1990s, the term "rogue state" became fashionable in US foreign policy
discourse. The United States government bestowed the "rogue state" label on
countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. The most commonly
invoked criteria for "rogue" status were state support for terrorism and the pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, many traditional US
allies, especially members of the European Union, consistently rejected the "rogue
state" label and stronger incarnations such as the "axis of evil." In 1995, a former
French ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia, Eric Rouleau (1995:59), asserted that
the "notion that there are rogue states ... has no equivalent in the French political
vocabulary." The diplomatic crisis surrounding the war in Iraq, however, crystal-
lized the dispute over "rogue states" and how to confront them.
1For helpful comments and advice, the author thanks Rafaela Dancygier, Keith Darden, Lilach Gilady, Daniel
Hopkins, Stephen Kosack, Bruce Russett, Tom Saunders, Jeremy Shapiro, Philip Towle, Stephen Watts, the anony-
mous reviewers, and the editors as well as participants in the Yale World Politics Workshop, April 2003, where an
earlier version of this essay was presented. The author is also grateful to the National Science Foundation for the
support of a Graduate Research Fellowship and the Brookings Institution for a Brookings Research Fellowship.
(c( 2006 International Studies Review.

PublishedbyBlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX4 2DQ, UK.

24 Setting Boundaries
Despite its persistence at the forefront of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War
era, the international relations literature has paid relatively little attention to the
"rogue state" debate. This oversight is surprising given questions surrounding
"rogue states" that should be interesting to political scientists and policymakers
alike. The concept of a "rogue state" and the controversy it has provoked raise two
puzzles for international relations theory. The first concerns the "rogues" them-
selves: Is there such a thing as a "rogue state," that is, a state that lies outside the
bounds of "normal" international relations? Or is it simply a new label for the
enemies of great powers? The second puzzle stems from European resistance to the
idea that "rogue states" exist at all. Who gets to decide whether "rogue states" exist
and, if they do, which states qualify? How can we explain the label's persistence in
the face of European opposition? Can any state with sufficient power use this lan-
guage effectively? To what extent must states agree on common criteria for "rogue
states"? Can reasonable states, including great powers, disagree over the definition
and boundaries of international society? Such contestation is not unique to the post-
September 11 period, but has been an important feature of the transatlantic dis-
agreement about "rogue states" since the end of the Cold War (on the continuity of
transatlantic tensions, see Lundestad 2003; Gordon and Shapiro 2004:chapter 1).
To answer these questions, this essay brings international relations theory to bear
on the "rogue state" debate, but with a theoretical twist: it examines the mirror
image of the "rogue state" issue. That is, the essay aims to identify the entity from
which these states have allegedly been cast out and who gets to set the membership
criteria. One reason that the "rogue state" issue is so difficult to pin down is its
slippery nature as a category, despite the universal standards that it implies. Most
writing on rogue states hones in on the behavior of "rogues," on inconsistencies
between criteria for designating "rogues" and the actual "rogue state" list, or on
how best to deal with "rogues" (Klare 1995; Tanter 1998; Rubin 1999; Hoyt 2000;
Litwak 2000, 2001; Henriksen 2001; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003, 2005).
Instead, the present essay focuses on exclusion from what has variously been
called the "international system," "international society," "international communi-
ty," and even the "family of nations." These terms are frequently but imprecisely
employed in the political science literature (Johnston 2003:8). Is there such a thing
as international society, distinct from the international system and, if so, does the
society have boundaries? Are those boundaries changeable and, if so, who has the
right to change them? What if the basis of international society is contested? Can
international society be exclusionary?
To answer these questions, this essay uses the debate over the designation of
"rogue state" as an analytical lens to assess the ability of international relations
theory to accommodate disagreement over the basis and boundaries of interna-
tional society. Accordingly, the essay will examine the "rogue state" label and the
larger issue of defining international society through the prisms of three theoretical
approaches: realism, social constructivism (along with the English School), and
liberalism. In framing the problem in terms of exclusion from the group of "nor-
mal" states, we will ask three basic questions of each theory:
1. What is the character of the international system; do subsets of states exist

that may be thought of as an international society?
2. If international society exists, can it be exclusionary?
3. If so, what states or entities are capable of doing the excluding?
This essay, thus, focuses on how states attempt to define international society
and use exclusionary rhetoric rather than advancing a specific set of hypo-
theses about "rogue" behavior or how to address "rogues" (for studies that
do explore the effectiveness of strategies such as sanctions or engagement,
see Blanchard, Mansfield, and Ripsman 1999-2000; Drezner 1999; Haass and
O'Sullivan 2000).

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 25
The central claims of the present essay are that we can think of an international
society, defined according to shared ideas, as a subset of the international system;
that many such subsets are possible; that states, including great powers, may dis-
agree about which set of ideas should define international society; and that power is
an important determinant of which set of ideas is selected as the basis for inter-
national society. Thus, a theoretical framework that can account for such disagree-
ment must take both power and shared ideas seriously. But it must also account for
the limits on how far ideas are shared, and thus it must address variation in state
preferences and behavior within the international system as a whole. As argued
below, the theories that are examined take as given a minimal definition of the
international system: that it encompasses all states. They disagree, however, on
whether international societies exist as subsets within this system. In building a
framework, the two most important contributions from these theories come from
constructivism's focus on shared ideas and from liberalisim's emphasis on variation
in state-level factors and zones of common state behavior, but both theories need to
explore the role of power more thoroughly.
Within the international system, one function of power is the ability to define
which issues delineate the boundaries of a particular international society-in a
sense, the ability to set the international agenda (for a reexamination of the concept
of power and its various forms, see Barnett and Duvall 2005). Powerful states-or
in the case of a unipolar system, the most powerful state-have the ability to put
forward new ideas, to define (or redefine) international society, and to exclude
those states that do not comply. In the case of the idea of a so-called rogue state,
since the end of the Cold War the United States has promoted the notion that
rogues" are states that seek weapons of mass destruction and support terrorism.
The ideas that originate within states-rather than simply from the international or
structural level-are thus crucial. States-or state elites-can try to act as "norm
entrepreneurs" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), attempting to get their ideas
accepted and shared so that they become the basis of a new norm. If a state has
sufficient power, these ideas may become prominent even in the face of resistance
by other great powers, and they may ultimately define the criteria for inclusion in
international society. Thus, international society can be exclusionary depending on
how ideas are selected, promoted, received, and shared.
This conception of international society implies that any theoretical framework
must include prominent roles for both state-level factors, including power, and
ideas that shape the particular form that international society might take. The
"rogue state" phenomenon highlights an important shortcoming of both structural
realism and social constructivism: the need to account for the origins and limits of
ideas, even the ideas emanating from powerful states. Despite their differences,
both structural realist and social constructivist theories emphasize the constraints
and homogenizing effects of structure rather than state-level variation in the pur-
poses to which states put their power. Realism misses variation in the ends states
pursue; social constructivism misses the crucial role of power in selecting whose
ends make it to the top of the international agenda (on this point, see also Barnett
and Duvall 2005:41). Although some realists and constructivists have begun to
correct the problems in structural approaches by examining the nature of states
and domestic politics, more work needs to be done. Constructivists and scholars of
international legitimacy have persuasively argued that smaller states (Hurd 2005)
and nonstate actors such as international organizations (Finnemore 1996) or "ac-
tivists beyond borders" (Keck and Sikkink 1998) significantly influence interna-
tional politics, but theory should pay greater attention to the empirical reality that
great powers are important sources and sponsors of ideas and norms. Yet, even
powerful states may not be able to persuade or impose their ideas on all states, so
theory must address the limits on how far those ideas actually spread. The limits on
the extent to which ideas can be shared can be termed "bounded intersubjectivity."

This essay will proceed as follows: (1) present the history of the "rogue state"
debate, making the case for recasting the debate in terms of exclusion from in-
ternational politics; (2) evaluate how realism, social constructivism (and the closely
related English School), and liberalism contribute to our understanding of the
debate over "rogues" and the competing bases of international society; and (3)
conclude with a discussion of how a synthesis of power, shared ideas, and variation
in state preferences and behavior can provide an agenda for future research,
building on the idea of the state as "norm entrepreneur." In the process, it is the
intent of the author to demonstrate that an approach that combines constructivist
insights to the role of ideas within states with the state-level variation found in
liberalism is a fruitful area of future research. Throughout the theoretical sections,
the essay will use the debate over "rogue states" and the transatlantic crisis over
how to confront Iraq to underscore theoretical issues. Although the Iraq crisis has
interesting connections to the "rogue state" question, it is important to keep in
mind that the concept of a "rogue state" long predates the George W. Bush ad-
ministration and was, in fact, forcefully employed by the Clinton administration.
Beyond the Iraq war, the recent reemergence of the Iranian nuclear issue dem-
onstrates the enduring relevance of the problem. This longevity is a useful starting
point to explore the idea of "rogue states."
What Is a "Rogue State" and Does It Matter?

Origins of the Term within the United States
Though aspects of the "rogue state" designation can be traced to the Cold War
period, the concept of a "rogue state" as a locus of major threats emerged as a
prominent feature of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The most com-
monly invoked criteria for defining "rogues" are state support for terrorism and
attempts to obtain WMD, though during the Cold War these two criteria were not
merged into one designation of threatening states. Robert Litwak (2000:53) locates
the origins of the "rogue state" idea in the Reagan administration, in the creation of
the State Department's official list of countries that sponsored terrorism in accord-
ance with the Export Administration Act of 1979. During the Cold War, however,
pursuit of WMD was not a criterion for exclusion. In the 1970s, some political
scientists (Betts 1977; Harkavy 1981) referred to states such as Israel, South Africa,
Taiwan, and South Korea that sought nuclear weapons as "pariah states." Except
for South Africa, these states were US allies surrounded by hostile states. In this
period, the term "pariah" described a condition certain disparate states found
themselves in rather than an active policy designating them as outcasts.
Although it appears in the Congressional Record as early as 1987, when Repre-
sentative Pete Stark called Iran a "rogue," it was not until the post-Cold War era
that the "rogue state" label gained widespread currency within the United States.
According to Michael Klare (1995:chapters 1-2), the idea of "rogues" as a class of
threats arose in the post-Cold War search for a new strategic vision. It was cemented
in a central place on the policy agenda in the wake of the first Gulf War among
members of the George H.W. Bush administration. According to this view, "rogues"
provided a way to justify post-Cold War defense budgets by filling in what Senator
Sam Nunn (quoted in Klare 1995:14) called a "threat blank." The "rogue state"
designation became official policy during the Clinton administration. In 1994, Na-
tional Security Advisor Anthony Lake (1994:45) referred in a Foreign Affairs article
to "recalcitrant," "outlaw," and "backlash" states. "Rogue" quickly became the ad-
jective of choice. As Figure 1 illustrates, the term appeared only once in the
Congressional Record in 1987, but it peaked at 77 mentions in 1999. In
June 2000, however, the US State Department formally changed its designation
from "rogue states" to "states of concern" because, as State Department spokesman

ELIZABETHN. SAUNDERS 27
90
80
70
S60
' 50
S40
30
20
10
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

Year
Note: Countincludes instancesof "roguestate"and "roguestates." The 2001 count is truncatedon
September10, 2001 to capturethe origins and early diffusion of the phrase.The frequencyfor 2001 is
calculatedby dividing the numberof instances throughSeptember10 by the proportionof the year that
had elapsed. Source: CongressionalRecord, availableat LexisNexis Congressional.Bethesda,MD:
CongressionalInformationService.
FIG.1. Instancesof "rogue state"in the Congressional

Record,1985-2001.
Richard Boucher (2000) put it, "a single description, one size fits all, doesn't
really fit any more." The incoming Bush administration quickly returned to the
"rogue state" label (see, for example, Vice President Cheney quoted in Lemann
2001:60). After September 11, President Bush pushed the language even further,
designating Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of evil."
Do all these shifts in terminology matter? On one level, they do (Litwak 2001).
The 2000 shift from "rogue states" to "states of concern" was a deliberate attempt
by the Clinton administration to tone down its rhetoric at a time when relations with
Iran and North Korea seemed relatively promising. Furthermore, the list of
"rogues" did contain inconsistencies, notably in states that did not make the
list-such as Pakistan, a WMD proliferator that had, it is now apparent, ties to many
of the other "rogues" (Sanger and Broad 2004). Yet, on another level, the various
incarnations of the "rogue state" label do reflect a common theme that transcends
semantics. As Litwak (2000:7) notes, with the exception of Cuba "the designation is
rooted in tangible external behavior of concern." The element of externally
threatening behavior is a constant feature of all the "rogue state" variants.
Thus, despite the changes in rhetoric since the end of the Cold War, there has
been remarkable agreement within the United States government about the nature
of new threats. As Jacques Hymans (2004:33, emphasis in original) points out in an
analysis of the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy, even though
many foreign policy elites criticized the Strategy's doctrine of preemptive war,
"overwhelmingly these elites-even political opponents of the Bush administra-
tion-did not criticize the threat assessment that underlies the doctrine." He
(Hymans 2004:33) argues that there was "broad-based agreement about the nature
of the contemporary threat environment" because "the mainstream opposition ...
had independently developed the same assessment as the Bush Administration."
Indeed, there are similarities between the Clinton administration's 1996 National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement and the 2002 Bush Strategy, both of
which identified "rogue states" as a central locus of threats (Hymans 2004:36; see
also Jervis 2003 for an analysis of the Bush Doctrine as the elements of the 2002
Bush Strategy have become known). Aside from a few tentative overtures (notably
the 1994 "Agreed Framework" between the United States and North Korea to halt
the North Korean nuclear program, and a brief softening of tensions with Iran in
the late-1990s), overall US policy sought to contain "rogues" through sanctions and

diplomatic isolation designed to keep them outside the boundaries of "normal"

international politics.
Transatlantic Disagreement
Many European countries, however, begged to differ (Haass 1999; Gordon and
Shapiro 2004:38-44). In the mid-1990s, when the transatlantic debate on how to
deal with Iraq (and other "rogues") centered on whether sanctions or cautious
engagement was the best policy, several European countries actively pursued links
with "rogues" (Tanter 1998; Haass and O'Sullivan 2000). In Iraq, France contin-
ually criticized the Anglo-US embargo and in 2000, together with Russia, delib-
erately broke the ban on flights into Iraq without waiting for UN authorization in
what a Le Monde article (Naim 2000) described as the politics of "des petits faits
accomplis" (see also Hurd 2005 for a discussion of the erosion of the sanctions
regime against Libya through similar violations, albeit from mostly smaller states).
In the Iranian case, the European Union (EU) took a more conciliatory approach to
Iran and strongly resisted US pressure for containment.
Much of Europe saw the US tendency toward coercion as unduly harsh (see, for
example, Rudolf 1999:86). In response, some US observers and officials criticized
the European Union's preference for engagement as mere cover for continuing
lucrative trading with countries like Iran. Whatever the motives behind European
disagreement, the United States government remained frustrated. As Under Sec-
retary of State Stuart Eizenstat (1997) put it in Congressional testimony, "some of
our allies do not seem to share our sense of urgency in confronting Iran's dan-
gerous behavior and convincing the new Iranian government of the need for
change." In 1996, US frustration with the European Union boiled over when the
US Congress passed two controversial pieces of legislation, the Helms-Burton Act
and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, notable for their provisions allowing sanctions
against foreign investors dealing with Cuba, Iran, or Libya. These laws caused a
major trade dispute between the United States and the European Union, though
eventually President Clinton waived the provisions on third-country penalties. The
controversy highlighted not only the transatlantic tensions but also the limits, even
before September 11, on the ability of the United States to impose its ideas about
how to deal with "rogues." The 2004 agreement between Iran and Britain, France,
and Germany, under which Iran agreed to suspend its nuclear program in return
for negotiations on trade, returned the sanctions versus engagement debate to the
fore. The debate remains salient as European powers struggle to keep Iran com-
mitted to the agreement.
How can we account for this disagreement among the transatlantic allies? Before
a club can exclude members, it must have membership criteria for those that are
allowed in and some sort of process for setting those criteria, even if they are only
prohibitions rather than active requirements. Reversing the "rogue state" question
gives us better analytical leverage over the problem. If we stipulate that the "in-
ternational system" encompasses all states, do subsets exist? Popularly known as the
"international community" or the "family of nations," the term "international so-
ciety" is favored by academics, particularly those writing in the English School
(Butterfield and Wight 1966; Bull 1977; Buzan 1993) or constructivist vein (Finne-
more 1996), to indicate states with more in common than simply their existence.
But as confusion and disagreement about "rogue states" in the 1990s indicates, the
boundaries of "international society" are not fixed. Thinking in terms of different
international societies based on issues such as terrorism or WMD proliferation
allows for different criteria for exclusion from such international societies as well as
for disagreement about whom to exclude. Although terrorism and WMD prolif-
eration are two prominent and relatively enduring criteria, there are other plau-
sible possibilities, such as democratic governance or respect for human rights.

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 29
Finally, posing the problem as one of exclusion more readily segues into the issue
of who has the ability to define the terms of exclusion, thus putting the "rogue
state" issue into a broader theoretical and geopolitical context and addressing the
second puzzle concerning transatlantic disagreement. The Iraq crisis in 2003 was
the final stage in a long dispute over threats and how to confront them, highlighting
the importance of both power and ideas. Throughout the 1990s, the United States
sought to isolate "rogues" through sanctions and occasionally military force,
whereas many European Union countries sought to engage the very same
"rogues." The "rogue state" debate is not just about what words US policymak-
ers use, but about who has the ability to shape the international agenda and how
they choose to shape it.
Thus, even though the semantic debates, both domestic and transatlantic, are
interesting, the words themselves are less important than the contested boundaries
of international politics that they suggest. The term "rogue state" and its variants
are undeniably rhetorical devices, and they are perhaps even intended to be sloppy
or vague, but real debates lie behind them. As the following discussion will dem-
onstrate, international relations theory has much to say about whether boundaries
exist and who has the right to shape them.
International Relations Theory and "Rogue States"

The following sections will examine "rogue states" and the concept of international
society from different theoretical perspectives, keeping in mind the three questions
posed earlier in the introduction regarding the existence and nature of such a
society.
Realism
The identification of a new class of threats arising from "rogue states" would seem
to be ripe for analysis from a realist perspective. Indeed, the two criteria associated
with the "rogue" label, WMD proliferation and support for terrorism, concern
externally threatening behavior. Does realism shed useful light on this issue?
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is largely no. Realism comes in several va-
rieties, each of which makes slightly different assumptions about state behavior.
Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau (see Morgenthau and Thompson 1985)
focus on the power-seeking aspects of human nature; neorealists such as Kenneth
Waltz (1979) focus on the fear induced by the anarchic nature of international
relations; offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer (2001) emphasize how max-
imizing power through calculated aggression makes states more secure in an an-
archic world; and defensive realists such as Jack Snyder (1991) stress how states try
to maintain the existing balance of power. (For a review of realist approaches, see
Brooks 1997.) These theories also vary in the extent to which they emphasize the
constraining effects of the structure of the international system rather than do-
mestic or individual-level considerations. Despite their differences, most realists
agree on the inherently anarchic and conflictual nature of international relations
and on the importance of power, defined in terms of material capabilities. They also
emphasize great power competition, again in terms of material power, rather than
threats from smaller powers or competition over normative or ideational issues.
Existing realist arguments have little to say about "rogues" as sources of threat and
as states that lie outside an international society or, for that matter, about how to
resolve conflicts over the basis of international society.
A particularly stark picture emerges from neorealism, which focuses on the
structure of the international system. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979:97), the
anarchic nature of the international system constrains all states to behave in
the same way--states are "functionally undifferentiated" and are "distinguished

primarily by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks." Given
that the international system is anarchic, states must act according to the principle
of "self-help." As Stephen Brooks (1997:450) has put it, in neorealist theory "states
are shaped by the mere possibility of conflict." Given that all states behave
according to the same logic of self-help and that all states must be viewed with
suspicion, there is either no such thing as a "rogue state" or, put differently, all
states are potential "rogues." There is no role for shared ideas, rules, or norms in
this model; anarchy accounts for the character of the system. For Waltz, there is no
higher form of international organization beyond the system and, therefore, no
such thing as international society. The question of whether the United States, as
the dominant state in the system, gets to define international society is largely
irrelevant for Waltz (2000), who continued to predict a decade after the Cold War
ended that unipolarity would eventually give way to a balance of power and mul-
tipolarity.
Those realists, like Waltz, who focus on the structure of the international system
and the distribution of material power within it, might reasonably ask if the shift in
US policy toward "rogue states" is the product of the end of the Cold War. During
the 1990s, however, as the "rogue state" debate took a prominent place on the
policy agenda, much of the debate going on among realists centered on unipolarity
and whether another great power or coalition would emerge to balance US he-
gemony (see, among others, Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Wohlforth 1999). Of
course, "rogues" did not have a major place on the research agenda of other
mainstream theories either, and realists did weigh in once the invasion of Iraq
became the center of debate (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003a, 2003b; see also Jervis
2003:380-385 for a discussion of how realist arguments relate to the Bush Doc-
trine). But realists have continued to emphasize great power military competition
(Mearsheimer 2001), which makes their approach particularly unsuitable for the
question of "rogue states" in the Third World (for an exception, see Lieber 1998).
Interestingly, Waltz does not mention "rogue states" at all in his 2000 article, does
not refer to Iraq or Iran by name, and only mentions North Korea twice in passing.
He does not discuss terrorism and mentions nuclear proliferation largely in the
context of Japan.
On the question of defining an international society, some versions of realism,
including pre-Waltzian variants, provide a richer model that leaves room for
other forms of organization within anarchy. Hans Morgenthau's classical realism
is perhaps best known for its emphasis on power, but much of the second half of
his landmark study explores limitations on power through "morality, mores, and
law," which can "delimit, regulate, and civilize the struggle for power among
nations" (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985:247) and the development of a "world
community" that can mitigate conflict (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985:
chapter 30). In his classic study of the nineteenth-century Congress system, A
World Restored, Henry Kissinger (1964) details how the great powers constructed a
"legitimate" international order after 1815. Robert Gilpin (1981:27-34) also
explores elements of the international system, including the "form of control"
that constrains behavior, which may stem from hegemonic dominance, and
includes a "set of rights and rules that govern or at least influence the inter-
actions among states." Gilpin (1981:35) finds that "in part, rights and rules rest on
common values and interests and are generated by cooperative action among
states."
Other recent versions of realism, which accept Waltz's (1986:329) assertion that
his emphasis on structure explains "a small number of big and important things"
such as the superior stability of bipolar in contrast with multipolar systems, have
built on his model by exploring its implications for foreign policy. Such scholars
focus on whether states balance against threats (Walt 1987), bandwagon with the
stronger side to gain material profit (Schweller 1994), or "pass the buck," effectively

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 31
free-riding on allies' ability to confront threats (Christensen and Snyder 1990).

Some of these accounts eschew Waltz's pure structuralism, taking domestic politics
into account to explain imperatives or constraints on state action (see, for example,
Snyder 1991; Christensen 1996; Schweller 1998). These efforts usually focus on
great power dynamics in the face of threats from other great powers rather than
threats from smaller but potentially dangerous "rogues." Stephen Walt's (1987)
theory of threat balancing is to some extent an exception because he tests his
argument in the Middle East. But his argument is less useful for explaining dif-
fering perceptions of the threat from "rogues" between, for example, the United
States and Europe.
But these approaches have thus far remained within the logic of balancing or
bandwagoning, and usually relegate the role of beliefs and ideas to an artifact
or tool of power. Even though classical realists and realist scholars who focus
on hegemony, such as Gilpin (1981), have explored alternative forms of order,
most mainstream realists, writing in the wake of Waltz (1979), continue to
study great power material competition and thus do not address competition over
how to define an international society. As a result, realism does not provide
particularly interesting answers to the three questions posed in the introduction.
Indeed, realism's answers would be: the international system is all encompass-
ing; international society exists only in minimal form if at all; and the question
of exclusion is irrelevant. This lacuna is unfortunate because, as will be argued
below, theoretical approaches that emphasize ideas too often ignore the role of
power and the question of who gets to define international society.
And, as we have seen, US policymakers in the 1990s seem to have reached
consensus about the importance of "rogues." As for the American and European
disagreement over dealing with "rogues" or confronting Iraq, neither structure nor
material interests alone adequately capture the variation in approaches. It is true
that European countries had commercial and financial interests in pre-war Iraq,
though Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro (2004:77-78) note that these interests
were very small for both France and Germany. Moreover, these countries contrib-
uted to the 1991 Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan and arguably could have
done quite well materially in the reconstruction of Iraq by following Randall
Schweller's (1994) notion of "bandwagoning for profit." Indeed, Gordon and
Shapiro (2004:78) argue that "if commercial interests and cynicism were really the
main factors driving policy, the best strategy for France and Germany would have
been to strongly back the US threat of force, join the coalition, and insist on a share
of the spoils."
European countries have also been recent targets of terrorism and are physically
closer to Iraq, so that one might well have expected them to fear an Iraqi WMD
capability and WMD proliferation generally. Though they are largely concerned
with threats from great powers, realists such as Thomas Christensen and Jack
Snyder (1990) might argue that European leaders "passed the buck," leaving the
United States to act (see also Jervis 2003:384). But this explanation does not ac-
count for the prolonged European opposition to the very idea of a "rogue state" or
to the efforts by France and Germany to oppose the US invasion into Iraq, given
that presumably free-riders would still like to see their protectors succeed. Some
Europeans may also be seeking to balance or constrain US hegemony, whereas
Britain bandwagons, perhaps due to the "special relationship" between the United
States and Britain or Tony Blair's personal conviction that British interests lie with
the transatlantic partnership (Jervis 2003:384-386). But even though they may not
have been willing to participate actively in action against Iraq, Europeans arguably
have a long-term interest in strong antiterrorism and counterproliferation policies.
Their opposition to "rogue state" rhetoric and to containment of so-called
rogues--opposition that existed long before September 11--remains somewhat
puzzling.

32 SettingBoundaries
Even Robert Kagan (2003:3, 53), who has emphasized the importance of the
power gap between the United States and Europe in explaining why "on major
strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Euro-
peans are from Venus," concludes that the full explanation for the current schism
"lies somewhere in the realm of ideology, in European attitudes not just toward
defense spending but toward power itself." For Kagan, ideas about how power
should be used and threats should be met are just as important as actual power.
Kagan (2003:53) asserts that Europeans have turned away from the use of power in
the wake of two bloody wars, but they also continue to rely on the United States to
protect their "postmodern paradise" (see also Gordon and Shapiro 2004:57-58). As
a result, Europeans do not perceive "rogue states" to be urgent priorities. When
Europeans do address the issue, however, they prefer to use indirect means and
strategies of engagement rather than confrontation. Although power is an impor-
tant consideration in explaining the debate over "rogue states," ideas are necessary
to provide the context in which states use their power.
The English School and Social Constructivism

In searching for an alternative theoretical framework to illuminate the "rogue
state" issue, approaches such as the English School-which pushes realism to ex-
plore whether there could be an international society even amid anarchy-or social
constructivism-which emphasizes the role of shared ideas in shaping state inter-
ests-would seem to be promising alternatives. But both approaches have limita-
tions. The English School has tended to emphasize universal principles such as
sovereignty and diplomatic recognition as the basis for order, leaving debates over
other norms unexplored. The dominant strands of constructivist theorizing to date
suffer from two drawbacks. First, systemic (or "holistic") constructivism, exempli-
fied by the work ofAlexander Wendt (1992, 1999), shows a remarkable similarity to
structural realism in that it focuses on systemic or social constraints and, thus, is
unable to account for subsets or variation within the system. Second, more recent
constructivist work has reemphasized how agents shape structure, but this work has
thus far tended to examine international or nonstate actors rather than states. This
section explores how social constructivism and the closely related English School
view the question of international society, arguing that such approaches are prom-
ising but, as we shall see, still need to go further in exploring the limits of shared
ideas and the role of power.
The English School. One of constructivism's intellectual precursors is the English
School (or Grotian tradition) of international relations, which was instrumental in
developing the concept of international society. Though the English School was
already flourishing in the first half of the Cold War (as the essays in Butterfield
and Wight 1966 make clear), it is closely identified with the work of Hedley Bull
and his 1977 book The Anarchical Society.Like realists, Bull sees anarchy as the
underlying feature of any international system, which, in turn, encompasses all
states. But within this international system, a subset may form what Bull
(1977:16-18) explicitly calls an international society. This society is based on
common interests and values such as maintaining sovereignty, the keeping of
promises through treaties, peace (a subordinate goal), or the limiting of violence
(possibly by limiting war to "just" causes). The concept of international society
suggests that there exists an important form of order within the international
system and goes beyond Waltz. Bull (1977:196) also assigns a central role to great
powers, which "assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in
determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system
as a whole."
But Bull's argument (1977:61) emphasizes universal principles (such as respect
for sovereignty) that encompass all states, so that international society is "today a

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 33
political fabric that embraces the whole of mankind." These universal principles
and an all-inclusive scope are at odds with the possibility of exclusion. Other
English School scholars are more explicit in defining the origins and potential
limits of international society, relying on cultural explanations or, like Bull, a
minimal interpretation of international society based on sovereignty. Martin
Wight (1977:114) explicitly inquires into the "geographical limits" and the
"boundaries" of the international system. He puts a particular emphasis on the
cultural origins and limits of what he calls the "states-system," with "two con-
centric circles, European and universal" (Wight 1977:118). More recently, Barry
Buzan (1993:343) has rejected this cultural basis for international society, arguing
instead that international society emerges functionally, from mechanisms such as
the exchange of ambassadors and the making of agreements that states use to
interact regularly. This argument still leaves the "values of security, contract, and
property rights" as the basis of a minimal international society, just as they are for
Bull; the question of how debates over the content of international society might
arise or be resolved is not discussed (Buzan 1993:343).
One interesting question that arises from the English School's notion of in-
ternational society is whether there can be multiple international societies, pos-
sibly existing at the same time. The tendency within the English School to focus
on basic norms of sovereignty and diplomatic interaction leaves this question only
partly answered. Bull (1977:41) notes that during the Cold War "the United
States and the Soviet Union were inclined to speak of each other as heretics or
outcasts beyond the pale," but they still maintained diplomatic relations. This
vision still rests on basic, fundamental values that can survive even in periods of
superpower hostility. It does not explore contestation over other values.
Buzan (1993:337) goes much further, arguing explicitly that it is "possible for
more than one international or 'world' society to coexist or for one part of the
system to have an international society while other parts do not." There may also
be significant variation in the depth and extent of shared values within the sys-
tem. He (Buzan 1993:349) also notes that in the post-Cold War era:
[a] small number of pariah states are partiallyexcluded by the refusalof many
others to accord them diplomaticrecognition.A few statessuch as North Korea
and Myanmar(Burma) place themselves on the outer fringes of international
society by accepting little more than the basics of diplomaticrecognition and
exchange.
Writing before the "rogue state" debate fully emerged, Buzan does not deal with
the contestation over the definition of international society that took place in the
1990s. Ultimately, he falls back on the mutual recognition of sovereignty as "the
defining boundary between international system and society" (Buzan 1993:345).
Thus, he still seeks to explain the ever-present underpinnings of state interaction
rather than exploring what happens when states disagree about those underpin-
nings or have alternative visions of international society.
Although Bull and others in the English School do inject norms, ideas, and
notions of order into realist theory, the concept of international disagreement over
the definition and criteria for membership in international society is difficult to
reconcile with universal norms and ideas. Their vision of international society,
defined by recognition of sovereignty and diplomacy, provides little guidance be-
yond these basic issues (though for a more recent application of Bull's theory to the
Iraq war that touches briefly on transatlantic disagreement over the management of
international security, see Press-Barnathan 2004:especially 203-205). The United
States has not had diplomatic relations with North Korea since the end of the
Korean War nor with Iran since 1980. But several European countries have es-
tablished diplomatic relations with North Korea since 2000 (including Britain and
Germany, but not France). Most European states have diplomatic relations with

Iran, though there have been some interruptions (such as the British protest over
the Iranian fatwa on the author Salman Rushdie). How do we interpret this var-
iation?
Social Constructivism.Constructivist approaches to international relations theory
are equipped to tackle a wider variety of potential norms and ideas. Construct-
ivists take aim at realism's assumptions of fixed state interests and self-help logic.
A major starting point for constructivist theories is that actors do not view the
world objectively but instead make decisions on the basis of shared, or intersub-
jective, ideas that become the basis for social order (for reviews of constructivist
studies, see Adler 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Social constructivists have
set out to demonstrate that such intersubjective ideas can act as social norms that
constrain the self-help behavior of states, even when security issues are involved
or during wartime (see, among others, Price and Tannenwald 1996; Legro 1997).
Norms and ideas may also define (or redefine) state interests, as Martha Finne-
more's (1996) argument about the role of international organizations in defining
state preferences illustrates (see also Klotz 1995, Finnemore 2003).
Social constructivist arguments often take the form of "constitutive" explana-
tions, "which characterize systems of beliefs and practices that in effect create or
define social objects and actors" (Fearon and Wendt 2002:65; see also Ruggie
1998:22-25). John Ruggie's (1998:188) work on the emergence of sovereignty as
an organizing principle, or the designation of "the right to act as a constitutive
unit of the new political order," is a prominent example that echoes the English
School's emphasis on sovereignty as the basis of international society (though see
Krasner 1999 for an argument against the universality of the post-Westphalian
sovereignty norm). Finnemore (2003:14-15) also explicitly considers her argu-
ment about the changing purpose of military intervention to be constitutive.
But in seeking to demonstrate the empirical reality that social norms exert an
influence on state behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:397), social construct-
ivists have not yet paid sufficient attention to variation in state behavior and
motivations or to what role power might play in selecting among competing
constitutive principles (though as discussed below, some of Ruggie's work is an
exception). Furthermore, even though constructivists have drawn attention to
the "agent-structure" debate (Wendt 1987), arguing that social structure must be
considered alongside the characteristics of the agents (whether states or individ-
uals) that live within it, in practice they have emphasized structure more than
agency (Checkel 1999:85). Although some (see, for example, Finnemore
1996:24-28) have sought to reclaim a role for agency, structure still has the
central role in constructivist theorizing.
Perhaps the most prominent social constructivist argument, that made by Al-
exander Wendt, illustrates how the emphasis on structure leads some versions of
constructivism to resemble structural realism. Wendt (1992, 1999) engages Waltz
directly and thus aims his argument at the level of the international system.
Wendt argues that anarchy does not inevitably produce a competitive interna-
tional system organized around the self-help principle. The structure of the social
world and the interactions that result from it confer identities and interests on
actors--that is, states--and those identities and interests are changeable. The
structure, "once constructed ... confronts each of its members as an objective
social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others" (Wendt
1992:411). Wendt (1999:chapter 6) characterizes the three possible realizations of
anarchy as Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, arguing that the international
system can move among all three. Shared ideas can lead to a Hobbesian culture
based on enmity just as logically as they can lead to a Lockean culture based on
rivalry within a basic respect for sovereignty or a Kantian culture based on
friendship and collective security. As the title of Wendt's 1992 article argued,
"anarchy is what states make of it."

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 35
But where does this structure come from? Wendt does not answer this question
adequately. He (Wendt 1992:399) contends that structures and agents are "mu-
tually constitutive," but he does not explore how agents might seek to change
structure or how a state might "make" something of anarchy. Notably, Wendt has
no special characterization of international society because he does not explore
the issue of whether all states share the ideas that define the international system.
This omission, viewed in light of what he does argue, implies that structure
constrains all states. Even a predatory state and its prey inhabit the same universe
of shared ideas. Wendt (1999:266-278) does include a dimension for the "degree
of internalization" or the relative depth of shared understandings about the
culture that produces international structure. He does not, however, discuss
whether there is room for more than one set of ideas. Indeed, his argument does
not seem compatible with the notion that there might be contestation over the
definition of international society or even two international societies at the same
time.
Yet, the essence of the "rogue state" label is that certain states are excluded
from international society because that particular society is defined by a specific,
but possibly contested, set of shared ideas that are salient in the international
system. In assuming that through coercion shared understandings spread
throughout the system, Wendt ignores the very real possibility that some states
will not internalize an idea at all, even in the face of coercion-that the structure
will constrain some actors but not others. Thus "rogue state" policy does not fit
into Wendt's theory and neither does European rejection of the "rogue state"
label. Neither the "rogues" themselves nor the Europeans have accepted the US
idea that WMD proliferation and support for terrorism should be grounds for
exclusion from international society. Furthermore, Wendt's theory does not ad-
equately address who defines or changes structure. Is there a role for powerful
states to make what they want out of anarchy? Part of the puzzle of the "rogue
state" issue is addressing who possesses the capacity to define or alter interna-
tional society and to position the boundaries of intersubjectivity.
Increasingly, constructivists are recognizing that all states do not share the
same norms and ideas. Constructivists are also exploring multiple norms or
variation in norm adherence or compliance. Jeffrey Checkel (1999:85), for ex-
ample, notes that "constructivism cannot account for an obvious fact: the same
norm will have a dramatic constitutive impact in one state, but fail to do so in
others" (see also Finnemore 1996:135; Kowert and Legro 1996:454; Legro 1997;
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Johnston 2003:22). But it is also important to
distinguish fundamental contestation over the very constitution of an interna-
tional society from the problem of variation in norm adoption or adherence that
some constructivists, such as Checkel, have rightly identified. To date studies
usually begin by describing a norm operating at the international level and ex-
amine domestic-level variation in compliance with or internalization of the norm.
If the idea of "rogue states," defined in terms of WMD proliferation and support
for terrorism, were widely accepted among the great powers, we might then be
able to examine variation in adherence among "rogues" and states teetering on
"rogue" status or among states that violate punishment regimes for "rogues."
However, the dispute about defining the category itself represents another level
of normative disagreement. European countries may believe that WMD prolif-
eration and support for terrorism are dangerous and threatening behaviors, but
part of their argument is that engagement is more likely to result in adherence to
nonproliferation and antiterrorism goals than a strategy of exclusion from in-
ternational society. Such contestation suggests the need to address the origins of
potentially competing norms as well as the limits on who accepts such norms as
constitutive before examining how widespread norm adherence is in the inter-
national system as a whole.

Several strands of constructivist theorizing are potentially promising avenues

for addressing these issues. The first are arguments about how agents work to
build or change norms, with varying degrees of success. Finnemore and Sikkink's
(1998) important model of norm development highlights the role of "norm
entrepreneurs" who seek to create or change norms as well as the process of
"strategic social construction" as these entrepreneurs try to achieve their goals.
Many constructivists have explored mechanisms triggering norm emergence that
involve nonstate actors, often at the international or transnational level. Exam-
ples include studies of transnational networks of activists (Keck and Sikkink
1998), experts or "epistemic communities" (Adler and Haas 1992), and inter-
national organizations (Finnemore 1996). Recent constructivist accounts have
also explored other sources of norms and ideas. Finnemore's (2003) discussion of
how the purpose of intervention changes, for example, includes both collective-
and individual-level mechanisms. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald's (1996)
work on the origins of weapons taboos distinguishes between the transnational
origins of the chemical weapons taboo and the origins of the nuclear weapons
taboo largely within the United States. In this research, international and non-
state actors form the bulk of the agents of normative change. As Chaim Kauf-
mann and Robert Pape (1999:642) note, "in principle, none of the elements of
transnationalism [or] cosmopolitanism ... may be essential to constructivist the-
orizing about international moral action; in practice, however, these elements
dominate the existing literature."
Other studies have located the source of ideas within states and described how
these ideas become salient in foreign policy. Emanuel Adler's (1992) study of the
national epistemic community of elites working on arms control within the Unit-
ed States during the Cold War is one domestic-level example. In their study of
Britain's "costly moral action" to stop the Atlantic slave trade, Kaufmann and
Pape (1999) argue that both ideas and domestic politics within Britain played a
vital role and that the transnational and cosmopolitan ethical concerns often
highlighted by constructivists were not relevant. Scholars of strategic culture and
of domestic norms and collective state identity have also highlighted domestic-
level variation in how states orient their foreign policy and security institutions.
Culture and identity may produce constraints on the exercise of state power
(Katzenstein 1993; Berger 1996; Katzenstein 1996), or it may shape the way that
states produce or use power, even producing forms of "realism" (Johnston 1995;
Kier 1997; Nau 2002). Wendt (1994:385-386) himself does suggest a role for
domestic identity or norms in defining self-interest in addition to systemic factors.
Such arguments illustrate that the process of idea formation may, indeed, be
social, as constructivists have argued, but that this social process may operate
within one state and then diffuse outward in an "inside-out" process rather than
beginning at the transnational level and then influencing states.
Another possibility, still largely unexplored in constructivist accounts, is that
states, or state elites, may try to act as norm entrepreneurs. Arguably US pol-
icymakers have attempted something along these lines in defining a new class of
rogue states." Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:893) hint at such a process, noting
that "many international norms began as domestic norms and become interna-
tional through the efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds." Most of their ex-
amples, however, focus on transnational or nonstate actors. Michael Barnett's
(1998) study of how Arab leaders fought over the norms that govern inter-Arab
relations highlights the promise of looking at the state or state elites as a source of
norm origination and contestation. The last section of this essay will discuss ways
that states might be considered "norm entrepreneurs," but it will also emphasize
that the success of such entrepreneurship is not inevitable and depends crucially
on both power and the responses of other states. Here, it is sufficient to note that
even though transnational or nonstate actors are certainly important sources of

ELIZABETHN. SAUNDERS 37
ideas and change, constructivists have paid less attention to problems of power
and state action.
Bounded Intersubjectivity.A state-level focus on the origins of norms and ideas is
only one aspect of the "rogue state" debate that requires further attention; the
other is the limits on how far ideas are shared. One constructivist argument that
does combine the role of power with a state-level account of the origins and limits
of shared ideas as the basis of social order is John Ruggie's work on post-World
War II international economic regimes. In his essay on "embedded liberalism,"
Ruggie (1998:64) elucidates a conception of authority in the international system
as the combination of power and "legitimate social purpose." The social purpose
dimension, usually ignored by realists, gives international order its "generative
grammar" and its "content" (Ruggie 1998:64). In the postwar international eco-
nomic compromise, the combination of multilateralism and domestic interven-
tionism "reflected the shared legitimacy of a set of social objectives to which the
industrial world had moved unevenly but ... 'as a single entity"' (Ruggie
1998:76). By limiting the scope of these social objectives to the "industrial world,"
Ruggie describes how other states came to accept these objectives as the new basis
for order and implies that shared ideas have boundaries.
The power dimension, usually ignored by constructivists, ensures that the
dominant state in the system-the so-called hegemon-will be the driving force
in international politics. Thus, as Ruggie argues, the United States was able to
define and project its own social purpose within a set of "social objectives" shared
by a subset of the international system: the "industrial world." The multilateral
element of the compromise originated in the United States, and Ruggie
(1998:73) calls it an "achievement of historic proportions for the United States
to win adherence to the principle of multilateralism, particularly in trade." This
acceptance was the result of "the power and perseverance of the United States"
(Ruggie 1998:76). In another essay, Ruggie (1998:206-217) also locates the or-
igins of ideas at the elite level by focusing on presidential leadership. His argu-
ment, thus, gives a role both to power and to the hegemon's identity and
preferences-in effect, allowing for a state to be a norm entrepreneur. As Ruggie
(1998:14, emphasis in original) puts it, "contra neorealism, I suggest that the fact
of Americanhegemony was every bit as important as the fact of American hegemony
in shaping the post-World War II international order."
Ruggie's argument suggests that theory must attend to both the origins and
limits of shared ideas. This limited scope of shared ideas can be thought of as
"bounded intersubjectivity."2 Although shared ideas can have a powerful effect
on behavior, the set of states that share those ideas is often bounded, even when
those who hold the idea (or the nature of the idea itself) imply that it should be
universal. The term is intended to convey two aspects of "boundedness," both of
which reflect the puzzles surrounding "rogue states." First, the set of states sub-
scribing to an idea may be bounded because the ideas themselves may be defined
in exclusionary terms. Thus, the idea of a "rogue state," defined in terms of
WMD proliferation and support for terrorism, purports to specify standards of
behavior that states must subscribe to as a condition of entry into a society. Shared
ideas may incorporate the concept of a boundary between those who subscribe
and those who do not. This exclusivity may be an inherent and deliberate feature
of the shared ideas, a feature similar to defining an "in-group" in relation to an
"out-group," or enemy, in order to increase in-group cohesion. Such deliberate
exclusivity is an enduring theme in the sociology of conflict (Simmel 1955:chap-
ter 3), in the literature on nationalism and violence (Brubaker and Laitin
2This term is not directly related to Herbert Simon's (1957) concept of "bounded rationality," which refers to the
limits on human rationality. Simon's concept refers to the limits on cognitive processes, whereas "bounded inter-
subjectivity" refers to the boundaries on shared ideas among different actors.

1998:433-434; Snyder 2000), and in arguments about states or leaders that de-
liberately define their foreign policy in terms of a distinct enemy or "oth-
er"-even to the point of manipulating or exacerbating threats (Wendt 1994;
Gagnon 1994-1995; Barnett 1996:408; Christensen 1996). Echoing the notion of
the "threat blank," in this view the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the
United States of its "other" and led to "ambiguity in US interests" (Jepperson,
Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996:60).
Such deliberate exclusivity is not necessary. Those who seek to advance a par-
ticular set of ideas may aim them at all states, excluding those who do not sub-
scribe at a given time while leaving open the possibility of letting them back into
the fold. This reformist option arguably applies to "rogue states" and to the
example of Libya, which is normalizing relations with the great powers. The
crucial point here is that there are limits on the size of the group that shares
ideas, regardless of whether that group intends to be forever exclusive or to
ultimately extend its ideas universally. This facet of boundedness is closely related
to arguments about which states subscribe to, comply with, or internalize a given
norm.
A second aspect of boundedness, however, arises from the possibility that
states-even major powers-may disagree over which ideas, drawn from a larg-
er set, should be salient. This characteristic of boundedness could in principle be
compatible with constructivism's concept of constitutive rules: the particular set
of ideas that is constitutive of an international society is not always obvious and
could be contested. Power will have an important role to play in determining
which set of ideas becomes salient. When we move beyond the minimal spec-
ification of international society conceived of by the English School--recognition
of sovereignty, respect for diplomatic interaction, and other basic functions-to
more complicated norms and rules, it is possible to conceive of states, even within
an already identified subgroup, disagreeing over new definitions of, or refine-
ments to, international society. Thus, it is important to understand not only the
origins of any ideas that are being considered as a basis for international society
but also the distribution of power among the states that might advance those
ideas. Some states may voluntarily stay out of the group defined by a set of
boundedly intersubjective ideas; others, even major powers, may actively contest
the ideas or propose alternatives; still others may have no choice but to reluc-
tantly tolerate or even sign on, perhaps eventually becoming bound by the ideas.
It is also interesting to note that including both power and ideas lead to two
mechanisms for change in the basis of international society: change in either the
distribution of power or in the foundation of the shared ideas within the orig-
inating state.
How might this argument bear on "rogue states"? One could argue that the
end of the Cold War, like the end of World War II, provided the opportunity for
normative or ideational change (on defining order after major wars, see Iken-
berry 2001). The United States, as the dominant power, has had to assume a
disproportionate burden for enforcing norms in international society and thus
has had a disproportionate influence in shaping that society. It has sought to
define international society in terms of WMD nonproliferation and the renun-
ciation of terrorism. Given that, in principle, these two security issues affect all
states, it is not especially surprising that the United States has aimed this norm at
all members of the international system.
Certainly this universal aim does not mean that the norm will, in fact, be
accepted by all states, as "rogue state" behavior and European dissent demon-
strate. European dissent highlights a crucial difference between the post-World
War II international economic consensus described by Ruggie and the US at-
tempt to define "rogues" in the post-Cold War era. As John Ikenberry and
Charles Kupchan (1990:285) have argued, "hegemonic control emerges when

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 39
foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and accept it as
their own." European countries, despite initial resistance, accepted the normative
compromise after World War II partly as a result of US sensitivity to European
concerns, though the compromise still represented an exercise of US power
(Barnett and Duvall 2005:63-64). Europe has been much less accepting of US
dominance in the post-Cold War era.
"Rogue states" might be a way to reconceptualize the international society
previously defined by the Soviet enemy, though the universalist rhetoric of ex-
cluding "rogues" makes such an interpretation less plausible. But even if
"rogues" are simply the new "other" for a society previously based on fighting
the Soviets, it is important not only to understand how the United States seeks to
redefine international society, but also how European resistance may lead to
disagreement over such redefinition. Yet, there remains the possibility that if
certain key states should decide to promote these norms, they will become a new
salient boundary for international society, with states that fail to comply ostracized
as "rogues."
The vociferous European criticism of what has been perceived as Bush uni-
lateralism perhaps may reflect the degree to which Europe has come to expect
multilateral behavior from the United States, though in the Clinton years most
European countries often declined to help or even hindered multilateral efforts
to isolate "rogues." As the most powerful state in the system, however, the United
States can afford to choose an unpopular principle and stand alone, hoping to
persuade others to adopt it. Moreover, the United States can afford to make
exceptions according to its interests, as in the case of Pakistan, known to be a
WMD proliferator. But it is also entirely possible that the idea will fail to define a
new international society and that the United States will have to exercise power
alone rather than benefiting from the cooperation of allies who share its ideas
intersubjectively. And, yet, even in such a case, Europeans must take the idea of
"rogue states" into account in their international relations until they accept it,
defeat the idea outright, or the United States decides to abandon it.
The constructivist focus on ideas is an attractive way of tackling the "rogue
state" issue and the struggle to define international society. It allows for an in-
ternational society based on shared ideas even though the essence of the problem
suggests that there is variation in state behavior and a prominent role for agency.
Constructivism has not yet fully addressed the second two questions posed in the
introduction to this essay concerning whether international society can be ex-
clusionary or who excludes. Theories such as Wendt's imply that international
society is encompassing; other theories explore variation in norm adherence or
compliance. But, as discussed, this variation is not quite the same as true ex-
clusivity or normative contestation. The next section describes how liberal in-
ternational relations theory contributes to an understanding of the "rogue state"
debate, before discussing how these disparate elements might be synthesized in
future research.
Liberalism
There are two features of the "rogue state" phenomenon that evoke liberal inter-
national relations theory. First, the very idea of a "rogue state" implies some di-
chotomy between the group of "normal" states and the "rogues." Second, many
European policymakers have dissented, suggesting multiple visions of how inter-
national society comes to be defined. Liberalism has a long and somewhat dis-
jointed history within international relations theory and has often been stigmatized
by its old association with the utopianism of the interwar period (see Carr 1964).
But modern liberal theory is a distinct alternative to realism and social construct-
ivism insofar as it focuses on the preferences and varying domestic properties of
individual states.

Liberalism is often associated with the literature on the democratic peace, which
posits that liberal democracies have made a separate peace based on Kantian prin-
ciples. This separate peace can be thought of as one incarnation of an international
society based on a limited set of shared ideas, or bounded intersubjectivity. Indeed,
Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001:302) note at the end of their study of the
Kantian peace that "some states remain outside the Kantian system and can be
dangerous." The Kantian peace contains some transnational elements such as trade
and international organizations, but domestic politics lie at its core. Michael Doyle
(1986), who revived the study of Kantian philosophy in international relations
scholarship, emphasizes the specific substantive content of liberalism as a compact
between citizens and the state. Hence, in international relations:
liberal states assume that nonliberalstates, which do not rest on free consent,
are not just. Because nonliberal governments are in a state of aggression
with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments
deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberalsbenefit from a presumption of amity;
nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity.(Doyle 1986:1161; see also
Owen 1997)
This statement is a little too strong for the "rogue state" question given that the
United States certainly has not branded all nonliberal states as "rogues." But this
theory does keep some states beyond the boundaries of "normal" international
relations based on ideas, suggesting that international society can be exclusionary. It
may even imply that two international societies can exist at the same time. Inter-
estingly along these lines, we note the emphasis on regime type in the Bush ad-
ministration's 2002 National Security Strategy (see also Jervis 2003:366-369). Only
certain WMD proliferators or supporters of terrorism are singled out in the Strategy
(Bush 2002:14): those that "brutalize their own people" and "reject basic human
values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands" (see also Lake
1994:46).
Doyle's vision of a separate liberal peace is based mostly on a just, rights-based
connection between state and people, not necessarily other forms of state behavior
related to international security. Furthermore, Doyle does not address hegemony
or power relations within the liberal zone, thus providing little guidance for the
second puzzle concerning differing conceptions of international society. The "rogue
state" question has highlighted discord among the liberal democracies, though the
democratic peace itself appears in little danger of shattering. The more recent
democratic peace literature (Russett and Oneal 2001:300-305) has begun to ad-
dress the question of hegemony and multilateralism, though it has not explored
competing definitions of international society.
Pulling back slightly from the substantive content of liberalism, we can take lib-
eralism more generally to mean a state-level focus on domestic variation and pref-
erences. In this vein, Andrew Moravcsik (1997) has articulated a version of
liberalism based on domestic preferences. Moravcsik (1997:525) argues that one
form that liberal international relations theory could take is "ideational liberalism,"
in which domestic identities and values determine state preferences. His theory,
however, does not adequately specify where state preferences come from and is too
quick to dismiss elite ideas. As Ikenberry (2003:539) points out, "the United States
is so powerful that the ideologies and policy views of a few key decision makers in
Washington can have a huge impact on the global order."
But Moravcsik's focus on domestic politics, purposive state action, and variation
in state preferences is an important indictment of system-level approaches. Liber-
alism is well placed to tackle the question of competing visions of international
society--or variation in state norm entrepreneurship. In the period of the "rogue
state" debate and the Iraq crisis, alternative conceptions of international society
have arisen. Some countries, especially in Europe, seek to define an alternative

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 41
international society based on principles of multilateralism and international or-

ganizations. Such an international society could be exclusionary, as it arguably
proved in the 1991 Gulf War. The war on terrorism could fit into this framework
but would not necessarily define it. Kagan (2003:39-42, 60) alludes to this alter-
native multilateral vision for international society, claiming that it is natural for
weaker states to want to restrain stronger ones through international law. Although
power disparities matter, both the US and European conceptions of international
society are viable "social purposes," to use Ruggie's language. Liberalism's ability to
allow for subsets of states would also help explain the extent of international society.
A liberal approach would also be able to address head-on claims that the "rogue
state" idea and some of its stranger policy outcomes-such as the Helms-Burton or
Iran-Libya Sanctions Acts, which sparked a major US-EU trade dispute--resulted
from domestic interest group pressure. Furthermore, in the lead-up to the Iraq
War, variation in domestic political pressures played a significant role in European
foreign policy. Several countries, including France and Germany, were concerned
about domestic unrest given their large Muslim minority populations (Gordon and
Shapiro 2004:90). And public opinion put pressure on European leaders, though to
differing degrees. Gordon and Shapiro (2004:145) argue that French President
Jacques Chirac could not resist "the opportunity to lead a unified French public
opinion, including the Muslim population, and European and world opinion,"
whereas British Prime Minister Tony Blair supported the United States but sought
a second UN resolution for political cover. Additionally, as Gordon and Shapiro
(2004:175) note, there was significant variation even within Europe over support
for the war, with a majority of European countries supporting the United States.
Like the other theories, liberalism has its limitations. Doyle's approach focuses on
liberalism as an ideology, but it leaves power and ideas about other security issues
largely unexplored. Neoliberal institutionalists, like Robert Keohane (1984), do
examine how state preferences are aggregated to form international institutions,
which may in turn induce cooperation even amid anarchy. Hegemons have a role to
play in the development and maintenance of stable institutions that might other-
wise never overcome the barriers of anarchy (Lake 1993) and can persist even after
the hegemon's decline (Keohane 1984). Keohane (1984:26) argues that "the United
States shaped the system as much as the system shaped it." The neoliberal insti-
tutional approach shows how order can emerge from anarchy through agent- or
state-driven institution building.
The Iraq confrontation, however, raises questions about the role of institutions
such as the United Nations and the preferences of states with enough power to
circumvent those institutions. US hegemony means that the United States can af-
ford to pursue its vision of international society, by force if necessary. In the long
term, this strategy may have damaged US relations with its allies in significant ways.
As Ikenberry (2001) argues (echoing Ruggie), the post-World War II international
society had a distinctly US character, but its explicit functioning through interna-
tional institutions made the role of US power more palatable. The dispute over
"rogue states" even before September 11 and the war in Iraq left the United States
appearing to undermine institutions, even as it tried to persuade Europeans to
strengthen their commitment to containing "rogues." Whether or not the United
States will succeed in "socializing" other countries to its criteria for membership in
international society remains to be seen. As Ikenberry (2001) has suggested, he-
gemons must be careful about how they wield their power and may benefit from
binding themselves through institutions. But the "rogue state" debate and the Iraq
war demonstrate that power can be put in the service of many different ideas.
Liberalism is useful as a lens through which to view "rogue states" insofar as it
provides boundaries for shared ideas and values and focuses attention on the state
level to account for the origins and limits of international society. Although it has yet
to address fully the final question posed in the introduction, about who gets to

1. Summaryof Theories
TABLE
Theory International Society? Exclusionary? Who Excludes?
Realism No (except some Irrelevant Irrelevant

classical realists)
Social Yes No (though perhaps with Not yet clear

Constructivism variation in norm adherence)
Liberalism Yes Yes Not yet clear
decide on exclusion from international society, its state-level approach is potentially

suitable for addressing that question. Let us turn in the final section of this essay to
a discussion of how liberal and constructivist theories, combined with a role for
power, might engage each other in future research.
Future Research: The State as Norm Entrepreneur?

Table 1 summarizes the answers each major international relations theory gives to
the three questions posed in the introduction. These answers do not, of course,
reflect every study within each approach, but they refer to how the approaches
would in general answer the questions. As shown, liberalism and constructivism
provide the most interesting answers, though the question of who excludes remains
largely unexplored, at least beyond institutionalism. The variety of liberalism or
constructivism also matters, as shown in Table 2, which summarizes the major
theories. The table is adapted from one developed by Wendt (1999:32) to outline
"four sociologies of international politics." The four sociologies revolve around two
dimensions. The first distinguishes between an emphasis on material interests and
resources, on the one hand, and ideas, on the other. The second dimension ranges
from holistic, or structural-level approaches, to individual-level approaches, in
which the "individual" could simply mean the state. Holistic, interest-based ap-
proaches are best represented by neorealism. Holistic, ideas-based approaches have
thus far tended to be systemic or structural versions of social constructivism; in-
deed, Wendt locates his own work in this box. Individual, interest-based approach-
es are exemplified by classical realists and liberals who focus on the material bases of
domestic politics. Individualistic, ideas-based approaches, which this essay argues
are the most appropriate for addressing the "rogue state" question, could involve
liberal approaches with a focus on ideas, keeping in mind the minimalist definition
of "liberal" theory that describes variation in state motivations. Some of Ruggie's
(1998) work, particularly on "embedded liberalism," arguably fits into this quad-
rant, as does work on domestic norms and identity. In principle, work that de-
scribes ideationally based, unit-level accounts of realist behavior-such as Alastair
Iain Johnston's (1995) work on "cultural realism"--could also be placed in this box
2. Major International Relations Theories

TABLE
Interest Based Ideas Based
Holism Neorealism Systemicconstructivism

Individualism Classicaland domestic-based Ideationalliberalism?
realism;materialliberalism Individualisticconstructivism?
Culturalrealism?
Note: Table adapted from Wendt (1999:32).

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 43
(see also Barkin 2003 and the responses to that piece edited by Jackson 2004 on the
possibility of a "realist constructivism").
There remains more work to do, however, with regard to individualistic, ideas-
based approaches. Moreover, although material capabilities are not the most useful
predictors of state behavior in the case of the "rogue-state"debate, power remains an
important factor in determining the fate of ideas. The argument made in this essay is
that, in order to adequately specify the salient substantive issues defining a bounded
international society, the ideas originating in powerful states must be treated sys-
tematically as must the limits of such ideas. This argument suggests that a framework
for understanding the "rogue state" debate requires a synthesis of ideas, the power
considerations that describe the origins and spread of these ideas, and variations in
both state preferences and purposes and in the acceptance of new ideas as the basis of
order. Building on Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) model of norm development, we
can imagine the state acting as a norm entrepreneur, even as we must also consider
how the ideas originating within states may or may not become intersubjective norms
as they propagate out from the state. Future research should push existing points of
tangency between power, ideas, and state-level variation even further by examining
(1) the origins of ideas within states; (2) processes of diffusion or imposition of ideas,
taking power into account; and (3) variation in receptivity to new ideas, defining the
boundaries of intersubjectivity.
Future Researchon Ideas and the State

If we are to understand how states might become norm entrepreneurs, more
research on how ideas become salient within states and shape state preferenc-
es-which can vary-will be crucial. An approach at the intersection of states and
ideas, drawing on both liberalism and constructivism, is a promising avenue for
future research, (see also Moravcsik 1997:539).
Certainly some scholars have already begun to move in this direction. Consider
those mentioned above who are working on domestic norms and identity.
Additionally, in terms of bounded subsets of states that share a common set of
ideas, there are important connections between the democratic peace literature and
the literature on security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett
1998). Thomas Risse-Kappan's (1995) study of NATO and cooperation among
democracies calls for liberalism and the community of democracies to be under-
stood in terms of shared ideas and norms among the Atlantic allies and demon-
strates the effect that the European powers had on US policy even during the Cold
War (see also Owen 1997). Indeed, in a later essay (Risse-Kappan 1996:365), he
explicitly calls his mode of analysis "a liberal constructivist approach." Christopher
Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein (2002) employ what they call an eclectic theoretical
approach, drawing on constructivism but also acknowledging power and the limits
of collective identity, in asking why the United States built a multilateral organ-
ization for its postwar alliance in Europe but pursued bilateral alliances in Asia.
More research on the sources of ideas within the state itself would push this
program further. Keith Darden's (forthcoming:chapter 2) "pragmatist" theory ar-
gues that it is crucial to specify whose ideas matter within the state because ideas
aggregate from the bottom up, first from individuals and then within the state and
finally to the international level. Whose causal ideas matter depends on the degree
to which the government is accountable and controls information. Domestic politics
and the relative power of actors determine how ideas lead to different national
preferences regarding international institutional arrangements.
The ideas of state or governmental elites themselves also merit significant atten-
tion. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul's (2003) study of US policy toward
Russia in the post-Cold War era argues that different US administrations have taken
markedly different approaches toward Russia. Their argument explicitly notes the

role of individuals' ideas in shaping the purpose of US policy toward Russia. Given
the central, agenda-setting role of executive leadership even within a highly frag-
mented state such as the United States (Krasner 1978:11; Russett 1990:chapter 4;
Howell 2003:103-106), research on the sources and impact of elite ideas concern-
ing how to employ power (building on earlier work such as George 1969) might
prove useful, especially in explaining variation in how states act as agents of norm-
building. Such work need not close off the possibility that nonstate or societal actors
might also try to influence elites. The concept of the state, or government elites, as
norm entrepreneurs should complement existing studies of nonstate actors.
The "rogue state" case and the war in Iraq provide an impetus for this kind of
research. Gordon and Shapiro (2004:161) argue that elite leadership played a vital
role in the Iraq crisis. Whereas domestic political considerations may have influenced
French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der, Brit-
ain's Tony Blair supported the United States in defiance of British public opinion. Ivo
Daalder and James Lindsey (2003) have proposed that George W. Bush personally
led a revolution in US foreign policy. Although it is still too early to understand the
genesis of the war with all the tools of empirical analysis, it seems clear that elite
ideas-rather than simply preferences induced by material power-played an im-
portant role in the decision to attack Iraq. The war itself is too costly to dismiss as
driven purely by material interests; furthermore, journalistic evidence suggests a
strong ideational component to the administration's Iraq policy stemming from a
small inner circle of foreign policy elites (see Keller 2002; Beaumont et al. 2003; for a
more skeptical view, see Economist 2003). Several in this group were members of the
George H.W. Bush administration and were instrumental in the initial development
of the "rogue state" idea. Robert Jervis (2003:366) has argued that the Bush Doctrine
itself was a product of both "idiosyncratic and structural factors." Even within the
"rogue state" framework, North Korea and Iran arguably present more pressing
threats. Yet, the United States chose to attack Iraq, prompting commentators such as
Thomas Friedman (2002) and even Richard Haass (2003), Bush's director of the
State Department Policy Planning Staff during the lead-up to the war, to contend that
the invasion was a "war of choice."
Research on elite ideas need not concentrate only on principled beliefs or beliefs
traditionally associated with the substantive content of liberalism such as free trade
or democratic institutions (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:403 also make this point).
A promising area is the study of causal ideas, or "beliefs about cause-effect rela-
tionships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites"
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993:10). Scholars have linked causal ideas about how to
achieve goals to observable-and varying--behavior in the international arena
(McNamara 1999; Darden forthcoming).
Empirically, causal beliefs may have played an important role in the transatlantic
split over both "rogue states" and how to confront Iraq. As discussed earlier, a
remarkable feature of the "rogue state" concept is its longevity in US domestic
politics, spanning several administrations. This continuity suggests that the differ-
ences in the administrations' approaches to "rogues" are differences of means and
limits rather than ends. The Clinton administration was much more willing-and
indeed sought--to build a consensus for its "rogue state" policy. But on a fun-
damental level the United States has consistently embraced a harder-line approach
whereas the Europeans have sought to use the tools of engagement with "rogues,"
suggesting differences in beliefs about how to confront such threats.
It is possible to view the transatlantic split over the Iraq war as a clash of causal
beliefs. Although the operational link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's
regime was dubious, it seems clear that key US policymakers regarded regime
change in Iraq--in effect, eliminating a "rogue state" and remaking it into a com-
pliant member of a US-defined international society--as the best way to address
the threats facing the United States and its allies. The administration was quite

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 45
willing to pursue this belief alone. Most US allies recognized the threat from Iraq,
but they did not see regime change in Iraq as the right way to address the threat,
preferring instead to pursue inspections through the United Nations. As Gordon
and Shapiro (2004:146) note, even though French President Chirac may have had
domestic reasons to oppose the United States, France "genuinely thought the war
was a bad idea and worried that a Western occupation of Iraq could turn into a
quagmire that would serve as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda." Notably, as mentioned
earlier, even some realists argued that containment and deterrence would be pref-
erable strategies for confronting Saddam (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003a, 2003b). A
dispute over causal beliefs-how best to meet terrorist and WMD threats-thus
threatened to undermine shared ideas about the threats themselves. Kagan
(2003:60) hints at this possibility when he describes how Europeans apply their own
post-World War II multilateralism "with the evangelic zeal of converts," preferring
engagement strategies even with "rogues." But even though France and Germany
could make things harder for the United States, they could not stop the invasion.
Far from being irrelevant, power played a central role in the crisis.
Future Researchon Power and the Spread of Ideas

Even though research linking states and ideas may provide an important way for-
ward, power deserves a central place on the agenda for future research. How do
resources, either material or ideational, affect an actor's capacity to be an effective
and successful norm entrepreneur and to convince other actors to accept a new
idea as the basis for membership in international society? Of course, power has
always received the lion's share of attention in international relations scholarship,
but future research should concentrate on different expressions of power. Power
may stem from material capabilities, as realists have long argued, but how powerful
states employ or frame their power often depends on ideas.
Studies of hegemony are important building blocks. In addition to the literature on
institutions and hegemony, some scholars draw on the work of Antonio Gramsci to
explore hegemonic dominance and have included ideational and cultural factors in
their research (Cox 1987; see also Russett 1985:228-230 for a discussion). Ikenberry
and Kupchan (1990; see also Ikenberry 2001) argue that periods after major wars
have been critical times for hegemons to socialize other states to their vision of order.
But much more work remains to be done on the relationship between power and
ideas or, as Ruggie puts it, "social purpose." In their recent reconceptualization of
power, Barnett and Duvall (2005:40) lament that those crafting theoretical re-
sponses to realism--including liberals and constructivists-have deliberately sought
to "distance themselves" from power and its causal influence rather than embracing
or redefining the concept of power. They propose a fourfold typology of power,
whieh, either directly or through more diffuse processes, takes the form of control
over others' actions or the power to define actors constitutively. These distinctions
are useful in the "rogue state" case, though it is important to keep the "bound-
edness" of intersubjectivity in mind. The US attempt to define a class of actors called
rogue states" may represent a way to exercise what Barnett and Duvall (2005:52-
53) call "structural power," in which an actor seeks to define "what kinds of social
beings actors are." The problem, of course, is that not all those within the "non-
rogue" community agree, and powerful states have resisted the designation.
The power processes highlighted by Barnett and Duvall suggest that to com-
plement studies of the sources of ideas, another important avenue for future re-
search concerns how an idea that originates in one country is transmitted or
diffused to another group of states. In addition to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998)
model of the norm "life cycle," which includes a stage for a norm to "cascade," the
epistemic communities' literature has explored the diffusion of knowledge (see, for
example, Hall 1989; Adler 1992).

250
200
• I US
150 I "
,
, ---UK
- - - France
S 100 -- ---Germany
I
50-
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

Year
Note: Countincludes instances of "roguestate"and "roguestates"in the US and UK; "Etatvoyou"and
"Etatsvoyous"in France;and "Schurkenstaat"and "Schurkenstaaten" in Germany. Sources counted
via LexisNexisexcept where noted (see footnote 3 for a list of sources and exceptions in dates of
coverage). Coveragebegins in 1990, except for Germanywhere coverage begins in 1993. As with the
CongressionalRecord search,the 2001 count runs throughSeptember10. The frequencyfor 2001 is
calculatedby dividing the numberof instances throughSeptember10 by the proportionof the year that
had elapsed.
FIG.2. Instancesof "rogue state"in leading newspapers,1990-2001.
But there is room for further exploration of the role of power in ideational and
normative change. Including the role of power would seem to be a natural ex-
tension of models of "norm entrepreneurship." However a potential norm orig-
inates (even if it is simply an idea initially accepted by only one state), its fate may be
profoundly shaped by a powerful sponsor. One could imagine an existing inter-
national society based on a set of boundedly intersubjective ideas but facing the
challenge of a new set of ideas that seeks to redefine the terms of the particular
international society. Shifts in power within the international system as a whole
could have important effects on such redefinitions as arguably happened within the
society of Western democratic states after the collapse of the Soviet threat.
Yet, even if the "rogue state" label encounters resistance, its very use may rep-
resent an exercise of a different kind of power. An alternative conception of power
in Barnett and Duvall's (2005:55-57) typology is "productive power," which seeks
to define actors constitutively (as structural power does) through less direct prac-
tices, such as the diffusion of knowledge or discourse. Barnett and Duvall (2005:56)
specifically mention the term "rogue" as one in a series of "categories of classi-
fication" that are manifestations of "productive power." To see how the idea of a
"rogue state" diffused from the United States to other countries, consider, for
example, the path of the phrase "rogue state" through the world media. Figure 2
charts the number of uses of the phrase "rogue state" or "rogue states"-or its local
translation-in two leading daily newspapers each from the United States, Britain,
France, and Germany.3
3The US search included the New YorkTimes and the WashingtonPost; for Britain, the Financial Times and The
Guardian; for Germany, the FrankfurterAllgememne Zeitung and the SziddeutscheZeitung; and for France, Le Monde and
Le Figaro. Except for the German newspapers, the search covered the period from January 1, 1990 to September 10,
2001 because the phrase "rogue state" only really hit the US mainstream in 1990 and because here we are primarily
concerned with the origins and initial diffusion of the term. The search was conducted via LexisNexis,supplemented
by a search of the Le Figaro website (http://www.lefigaro.fr) because LexisNexiscoverage of Le Figaro begins in 1997.
Data points for Germany were not included for 1990-1992 because the FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung electronic
coverage begins in 1993 and the SsiddeutscheZeitung in 1991. But given the dearth of mentions in the French papers
prior to 1993 and in the SuiddeutscheZeitung in 1991 and 1992, it seems likely that there would be very few mentions
in Germany between 1990 and 1993. The author is grateful to Rafaela Dancygier for help with the German search.

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 47
The number of hits for Britain, Germany, and France lags behind the United
States totals. Mentions in the British press-Britain being the closest ally of the
United States and a frequent military supporter of US operations against Iraq in
the 1990s-track fairly closely with those in the United States, lagging behind by
about a year. But Germany, and especially France, hardly register any mentions at
all until 1996 (Germany) and 1998 (France). Germany had caught up with and even
surpassed the United States by 2001. In German and French news articles, the
phrase often appears in quotation marks or is followed by the English translation
"rogue state." Many articles are highly critical of the phrase, and many refer to the
phrase as a US term. But even though Rouleau, as was mentioned earlier, could
claim in 1995 that there was no French equivalent to "rogue states," by the end of
the decade the phrase had gained a foothold in the diplomatic lexicon of these
European countries. Like it or not, Europeans had to at least consider the pos-
sibility of a "rogue state," even as they continued to resist its legitimacy. More work
by scholars who incorporate the idea of communicative action, including the role of
power in shaping discourse, would be useful in addressing this type of diffusion
(see, for example, Campbell 1998; Risse 2000).
Future Researchon Receptivityto Ideas

That even a powerful state's efforts at norm entrepreneurship will be successful is
not, however, preordained (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:895). Whether ideas be-
come intersubjectively shared, and how far they are shared, are empirical ques-
tions. Theoretically, it is possible that other states might sign on to a new idea
proposed by a powerful state who, in turn, could succeed in being its own inter-
national "norm entrepreneur" or alternatively that same idea may not become
entrenched and an expenditure of power will be necessary to sustain its relevance.
These possibilities suggest that a final avenue for future research is the exploration
of normative contestation and the conditions under which other states are receptive
to the ideas of the powerful. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:897) also argue, "in
constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative
norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and
interest." Some states may subscribe to an idea for social reasons (see Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998:902-904 for a review of several socialization mechanisms, such as
praise, censure, sanctions, or the desire for conformity) or because the ideas are
initially in their interests. But other states may resist. The idea may not become
intersubjective at all and may have to be coercively imposed on weaker states, as
Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer (1996:80) note in the context of conventions.
Such foisted conventions are likely to be much more fragile and divisive, however,
as has certainly occurred in the "rogue state" case.
To explore these concepts further (including at the level of the fundamental
conflict over using norms to define society rather than simply variation in adher-
ence), it would be useful to move beyond hegemonic dominance to explore ide-
ational contestation between equal powers or resistance to hegemonic dominance
by smaller but still relatively powerful actors. When other powers do not accept one
power's ability to define international society, normative or definitional battles may
result. Models of normative contestation that incorporate a role for power would
help explain which norms or ideas "win" or become salient. Ian Hurd's (2005)
exploration of how states struggle over how to define, redefine, and interpret the
legitimacy of institutions such as the United Nations is a recent example, although
he is more concerned with how weaker states (like Libya) influence such struggles.
Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:293) argue that there are particular conditions
under which hegemonic socialization will be successful. If the vision of hegemonic
elites is "rebuffed," a reworking or compromise may be required. Refusal to engage
in such rethinking may limit the number of states that accept the new order,

hampering its effectiveness. Recognition of such limits and of the efficacy of mul-
tilateral arrangements may have driven the United States, at least in the 1990s, to
try to convince other major powers to subscribe to its notion of "rogues" even in
the face of resistance. The Bush administration has been much less willing to ac-
commodate the resistance of allies, but, in turn, arguably has paid a price in having
to accept a smaller "coalition of the willing" in Iraq. As Jervis (2003:388) has
pointed out, Europe is unlikely to balance the United States militarily, but it could
provide strong political opposition and, thus, the "the fate of the American design
for world order lies in the hands of its allies." Whatever the mechanisms that
account for acceptance of new bases of order, theories should allow for the pos-
sibility that these processes do not operate uniformly and that ideas may only
spread to a limited number of states, resulting in "bounded intersubjectivity."
None of these theories adequately specifies a microprocess behind the idea of the
"rogue state" and the actual exclusion of some states from international society.
Indeed, this section of the essay has indicated that much work remains to be done
on the role of the state as the originator of new ideas, on variation in how states
might act as agents of normative change, and on the role of power and variation in
responses to it in determining the extent to which such ideas become boundedly
intersubjective. Constructivists who employ a state-level or individual approach,
with their emphasis on intersubjectivity and ideas as causal factors, might fruitfully
collaborate with liberals focusing on variation in state purposes and subsets of states
to tackle the problem of defining international society and identifying the limits of
shared ideas. Any such theorizing must, however, incorporate a role for power.
Conclusion
This essay has argued that international relations theorists should be interested in
the question of whether "rogue states" exist outside the boundaries of international
society and how states contest the definition or redefinition of international society.
So-called rogues are still part of the international system, but even a cursory ex-
amination of their recent history suggests, on a commonsense level, that they do not
have a "normal" role in international relations. As the dominant power in the
system, the United States is responsible for this status. But the designation was not
inevitable. International relations theories that focus only on US material power or
simply on ideas within the United States are indeterminate. Only by understanding
how the United States chooses to wield its power and how other powers respond,
can we understand the evolving basis of a bounded international society. Whether
"rogue states"' status will change or become entrenched depends on the "rogues'"
own behavior and, should it continue unchanged, on the degree to which other
states embrace the "rogue state" formulation.
Libya's admission in 2003 that it had a clandestine WMD program that it planned
to give up, and Muammar el-Qaddafi's apparent wish for some time to come back
into the international fold, may be evidence that "rogue" behavior can change
without regime change (see Anderson 2003; Sanger and Miller 2003). The role of
"rogue state" rhetoric and the Iraq war in Libya's shift remain to be evaluated.
Hurd's (2005) recent study of Libya's strategic manipulation of the United Nation's
role as a legitimate institution of liberal internationalism is an important cautionary
tale. Even if there is widespread agreement among great powers (as there was in
the Libyan case) on how to treat a specific "rogue," weaker powers can still un-
dermine the rhetorical and symbolic power of punishment regimes. Beyond con-
testation within institutions like the United Nations, when great powers disagree
about the very definition of "rogue states" (which is arguably a debate over the very
definition of international society and who gets to define it), weak powers have even
more room to exploit differences among great powers. With the ability of
the United States to use military power against "rogues" now constrained by the

ELIZABETH
N. SAUNDERS 49
practical difficulties of postwar Iraq, the United States seems more willing to back
European approaches to problems such as Iran's nuclear program, whereas the
European Union has taken a harder line on Iran itself.
The question of how to deal with a "rogue state" also needs reviving. The debate
over the effectiveness of coercive sanctions versus economic and international po-
litical engagement, prominent in the late 1990s, has been lost amid the war in Iraq,
but it is returning to the fore as the Iranian nuclear issue regains a central place on
the international agenda. A theoretical framework for the emergence of a norm that
excludes "rogue states" from international society may provide clues to future
policy, but it could, in turn, benefit from an understanding of whether exclusion
from international society actually works as a strategy to reform "rogue" behavior
or whether inclusion and engagement are better options.
The US strategy of trying to impose its vision of international society unilaterally
on its allies and its enemies alike may yet backfire. But for now, all states must live,
however uncomfortably, with the effects of a US policy that makes WMD prolif-
eration and terrorism the relevant criteria for inclusion in what can be an exclu-
sionary international society.
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Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude "Rogue States"?

Author(s): Elizabeth N. Saunders

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Department of Political Science, Yale University

This essay addresses a prominent post-Cold War issue to which political

(c( 2006 International Studies Review.

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1. What is the character of the international system; do subsets of states exist

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What Is a "Rogue State" and Does It Matter?

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1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

FIG.1. Instancesof "rogue state"in the Congressional

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diplomatic isolation designed to keep them outside the boundaries of "normal"

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International Relations Theory and "Rogue States"

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free-riding on allies' ability to confront threats (Christensen and Snyder 1990).

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The English School and Social Constructivism

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Several strands of constructivist theorizing are potentially promising avenues

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international society based on principles of multilateralism and international or-

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Theory International Society? Exclusionary? Who Excludes?

Realism No (except some Irrelevant Irrelevant

Social Yes No (though perhaps with Not yet clear

Liberalism Yes Yes Not yet clear

decide on exclusion from international society, its state-level approach is potentially

Future Research: The State as Norm Entrepreneur?

2. Major International Relations Theories

Interest Based Ideas Based

Holism Neorealism Systemicconstructivism

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Future Researchon Ideas and the State

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Future Researchon Power and the Spread of Ideas

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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

FIG.2. Instancesof "rogue state"in leading newspapers,1990-2001.

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Future Researchon Receptivityto Ideas

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HAASS,RICHARD N. (2003) Wars of Choice. WashingtonPost, November 23.

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