Can the Palestinian Authority Govern Gaza?

How to Revitalize the PA for Postwar Rule

At some point, the explosions and gunfire will stop, and the war in the Gaza Strip will end.
Someone must then govern Gaza, but the options are poor. Hamas certainly will not be left
in charge, since Israelis vow they will never allow the group to rebuild its military capacity
and again threaten Israel. Israel could decide to take over the strip itself, but it has little
desire to rule over two million hostile Palestinians who would undoubtedly wage a low-level
insurgency while Israel’s tottering international legitimacy declines further. Others have
proposed an international force composed mostly of troops from Arab states, but the
potential Arab participants have declared that a nonstarter.
The best bet, and the preferred approach of the Biden administration, is for the Palestinian
Authority to take the helm. Rule by the PA—the governmental body that currently controls
parts of the West Bank and that ran Gaza before 2007—is better than a lasting Israeli
occupation, chaos, or other options, since the PA favors peace with Israel and has the
support of much of the international community. But it is hardly without problems. Because
of its corruption, poor track record of governing with the West Bank, and perceived
complicity with Israel, the organization lacks legitimacy among Palestinians. In the West
Bank, it is increasingly losing the ability to suppress Hamas and stop violence without
significant help from Israel. And then there is the problem of the current Israeli
government’s lack of enthusiasm for the group: Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu declared that expecting the PA to solve Gaza’s problems is “a pipe dream.”
For lasting stability and better governance in postwar Gaza, Israel, the United States, and
the world need to bolster the PA and otherwise strengthen moderate Palestinians—a
process that should begin now but will take at least several years to complete. In the short
term, the PA and its backers should identify plausible technocrats who can help run Gaza in
the name of the PA but who enjoy more credibility than the group’s leaders in the West
Bank. Meanwhile, the United States should work with Arab countries to train thousands of
PA security forces, an effort the Biden administration is already beginning. In the medium
term, the governments in the West and the Arab world that fund the PA should use their
leverage to encourage the PA’s current generation of sclerotic leaders to retire and push for
a new generation of vibrant leaders to replace them.
One of the biggest challenges will be persuading Israeli leaders to support a role for the PA
in Gaza, since many, including Netanyahu, portray the PA as untrustworthy or even
supportive of terrorism. This task is doubly difficult given that the PA’s success in Gaza
hinges on whether Israel will build up the group’s credibility in the West Bank by rolling back
settlements, stopping violent settlers from attacking their Palestinian neighbors, and
providing greater respect for Palestinian autonomy in everyday life. The Israeli government
was moving backward on all these issues before October 7, and any perceived concessions
to the Palestinians are now more politically difficult. But despite these real problems, Gaza
must be governed, and the PA is the least bad choice for the job.
WEAKNESS IN POWER
The PA has ruled the West Bank since the end of the second intifada in 2005, and it has a
track record there of corruption and weakness. The PA’s security forces are particularly
problematic. They include a multifaceted array of competing organizations, each with its
own specific responsibilities. For example, the Palestinian National Security Forces patrol
the border and provide internal security, while the Preventive Security Force is an internal
intelligence and security agency that focuses on countering espionage, monitoring political
activity, and preventing internal dissent. These forces work with Israel to crush Hamas in the
West Bank, and they are often brutal in suppressing legitimate Palestinian dissent.
For years, the PA has worked closely with Israeli intelligence and the Israeli military, keeping
a lid on violence in the West Bank. The PA, however, is becoming weaker and weaker. In July
2023, Israeli military forces raided the refugee camp in the city of Jenin, claiming that the PA
was unable to arrest militants there, even when Israel provided it with precise information.
Violence on the West Bank was soaring before October 7, and in the months since, more
and more Palestinians are turning to local militias for security rather than relying on PA
security forces.
On paper, the PA has some presence in Gaza. As a Carnegie Endowment report notes,
before October 7, the PA spent a third of its budget in the strip. It paid the salaries of almost
40,000 Palestinian civil servants in Gaza—including 19,000 police officers who had not been
working for well over a decade, having been fired by Hamas when it took over in 2007—and
paid Israel for water and electricity there. The PA also has a shadow cabinet that claims
authority over the economy, education, and security in Gaza.
In the West Bank, the PA is losing the ability to stop violence without help from Israel.
Yet the writ of these officials is nonexistent, and the police officer payments are simply a
form of patronage, with Hamas exercising full control over the lives of Palestinians in Gaza
before October 7. Israelis rightly ask a question: If the PA cannot provide security in the
West Bank, where it is strongest, how could it provide security in Gaza, where it is weak?
Israelis also fault the PA for radicalizing Palestinians. They note that PA-produced textbooks
glorify anti-Israeli violence and otherwise create fertile ground for militancy. PA-run parks
and public buildings bear the names of militants who have killed Israelis. Mahmoud Abbas,
the PA’s leader since 2005, has given money to the families of jailed Palestinians and those
who have died fighting Israel.
But the argument that the PA is radical often rings hollow. Abbas himself has embraced
peace negotiations, and the PA security forces in the West Bank have proved willing
partners for Israel. The Netanyahu government, in contrast, has actively allowed the flow of
aid from Qatar and other sources to the far more radical Hamas, part of a deliberate
strategy of keeping Palestinians divided and thus creating an excuse to avoid peace
negotiations with the PA. In the West Bank, Israel expanded settlements and declined to
punish settlers who launched pogroms against their Palestinian neighbors. This policy
demonstrated to Palestinians both the futility of negotiating with the Netanyahu
government and the inability of the PA to provide basic security. Unilateral Israeli raids
against suspected terrorists deepened this perception and created a vicious circle: the
weaker the PA was perceived, the more Israel acted on its own, which in turn further
undermined the PA’s credibility.
The PA’s security forces are often brutal in suppressing legitimate Palestinian dissent.
Abbas himself does not seem fit to lead the PA, and Netanyahu’s accusations of moral
cowardice have validity (although the Israeli prime minister himself is hardly a profile in
courage). Abbas is an 88-year-old chain smoker, and under his leadership, independent
Palestinian courts and civil society groups have withered. Not surprisingly, the mix of
corruption, incompetence, and weakness have led many Palestinians to look on Abbas with
scorn. In its October 7 attack, Hamas demonstrated its commitment to fighting Israel in
contrast to a dithering PA. According to a December poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy
and Survey Research, a staggering 90 percent of Palestinians want Abbas to resign. In part to
offset this weakness, the Biden administration has pushed the PA leaders to expand their
ranks and include new faces.
Finally, Israeli politics make it difficult for the PA to play a role in Gaza. Since the outbreak of
the second intifada in 2000, Israelis have been skeptical of anything that smacks of a
concession to Palestinians, and the October 7 attacks have almost certainly enhanced this
concern. Since the attacks, Israel has barred the 150,000 or so Palestinians who live in the
West Bank and work in Israel from returning to their jobs, worsening the already difficult
economic situation in the territory. Israel has also blocked payment of the salaries of PA
officials in Gaza. All this shows the PA cannot deliver for its own people, making it difficult
for it to make the case that it can effectively play a far bigger role for Palestinians in Gaza in
the face of Israeli pressure.
Already, Netanyahu and his allies have tried to undermine their political opponents and
counter U.S. pressure to give the PA a major role in Gaza by claiming that allowing the
organization to take charge would be tantamount to putting a new batch of terrorists in
power in the strip. “I will not allow the entry into Gaza of those who educate for terrorism,
support terrorism, and finance terrorism,” Netanyahu vowed in December. Itamar Ben-Gvir,
Netanyahu’s far-right minister of national security, has even declared that the PA “is not an
alternative to Hamas, it is an ally of Hamas, and that it is how it should be treated, both now
and after the war.”
THE LEAST BAD OPTION
To state the obvious, the primary objective of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza is to ensure
that Hamas does not return to power there—ever. If Israel simply departs Gaza after leaving
it in ruins, Hamas will resume its control there. Its leadership is still mostly intact, and it has
thousands of fighters at its disposal. It has also ruled the strip for almost 20 years, and even
before that, it had deep educational, religious, and social welfare networks there. Deeply
enmeshed in Gaza, it will be difficult to extirpate.
One option is simply for Israel to become an occupying power in Gaza. Understandably,
Israel has no desire to expand its rule over another two million Palestinians, most of whom
have long hated Israel, have celebrated the October 7 attacks, and now loathe the country
even more for its bloody and destructive war in Gaza. Israel would face a low-level
insurgency, adding to the casualties it has suffered and the considerable damage to its
international reputation it has endured. Not surprisingly, Netanyahu has asserted that
becoming a long-term occupier is not a goal.
Israel might also put a government composed of unaffiliated technocrats with experience in
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund in charge of Gaza. In
theory, this government would be less corrupt and more efficient than the current PA
leadership, focusing on providing services, establishing law and order, and otherwise
building institutions to replace those established by Hamas. In practice, however, the
technocrats by themselves lack a power base: both the PA nomenklatura and Hamas would
oppose their rule. Israel would be forced to provide security, and the technocrats would
quickly be seen as a façade for Israeli rule, further damaging their legitimacy. Technocrats
are necessary, but they cannot rule without support.

Palestinians inspecting damage from an Israeli strike in Rafah, Gaza Strip, January 2024
Ibraheem Abu Mustafa / Reuters
Another alternative is simply chaos, with a Gazan version of Somalia on Israel’s border.
Various clan leaders, municipal figures, and other local power brokers would come to the
fore, at times cooperating and at times fighting each other. Israel would back or suppress a
given leader based on his willingness to keep Hamas down and otherwise stop anti-Israeli
violence. Gazans, of course, would continue to suffer as constant low-level fighting would
endure.
Some observers have also broached the idea of an international force, perhaps composed in
part of troops from Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, or other Arab states that have
friendly relations with Israel and are hostile to Hamas. But these countries have little
appetite for getting involved in Gaza. Although their rulers oppose Hamas, their people do
not, and the countries do not want to be seen as Israel’s partner in oppressing the
Palestinians. Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s foreign minister, left little doubt about Arab
interest: “Let me be very clear, there will be no Arab troops going to Gaza. None. We’re not
going to be seen as the enemy.”
Indeed, to avoid the appearance of abetting an Israeli occupation, Arab states are likely to
demand a greater role for the PA if they are to contribute to Gaza’s reconstruction. Saudi
Arabia, for its part, will want Israel to make concessions to the PA so it can show that it is
not abandoning the Palestinians—a far more politically salient issue than it was before
October 7—if it is to proceed with normalizing relations with Israel.
A PLAN FOR GAZA
Every answer to the Gaza governance question is unsatisfying. But in the words of one
Israeli security official who spoke to me on the condition of anonymity in December, “It’s
obvious to all that the PA will be back in Gaza, except for the people in the Israeli
government.” Several steps can be taken now to make the task more feasible, especially
several years out.
First, a much more massive program of recruiting and training PA security forces needed to
begin yesterday. The Biden administration is considering plans to reactivate what is left of
the deactivated but still present-on-paper PA security forces in Gaza, perhaps retraining
around 1,000 of them as the nucleus of a larger future force. Some proposals also envision
U.S. support for the training of an additional 5,000 PA security forces in Jordan in
counterterrorism. But far more officers will be needed.
Second, Israel, the United States, and interested European and Arab countries need to
identify Palestinian technocrats from outside the PA who could play a limited role in
governing Gaza when the fighting stops, or at least diminishes. These technocrats could help
provide basic services, set up a new education system, and build institutions such as courts
and local governments. But these leaders will have to nominally be associated with the PA
as part of the process of bringing new, uncorrupted figures into the PA—and to ensure that
the PA does not use its power to undermine them.
Arab states are likely to demand a greater role for the PA if they are to contribute to
Gaza’s reconstruction.
Third, to succeed in Gaza, the PA needs more credibility, and that requires delivering
progress for Palestinians in the West Bank. The fates of Gaza and the West Bank are tied
together: it would be humiliating for the PA in the West Bank if it played no security role in a
postwar Gaza, and it will be necessary for the PA to succeed in the West Bank if it is to
succeed in Gaza. The 150,000 Palestinians in the West Bank who work in Israel but who
have been barred from entering after October 7 need to be allowed to return to their jobs,
albeit with careful security screening, in order to preserve a modicum of economic stability
in the West Bank. Whenever possible, Israeli security forces must partner with PA security
forces when fighting Hamas or other terrorists in the West Bank, making it clear publicly
that the PA is in the lead. Israel also needs to stop expanding settlements and crack down
hard on settler violence, both of which are political impossibilities given the current Israeli
governing coalition.
Finally, greater PA credibility will also require a leadership change, a prospect U.S. officials
are indirectly referring to as a “revitalized” PA. Younger leaders with more nationalist
credibility are needed. Abbas is too damaged, both in Israel and among Palestinians, to
expand the role of the PA in Gaza. Neither is he respected in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and other countries that might aid the Palestinians. These countries should use
their diplomatic and financial muscle to push Abbas and other PA leaders to bring a new
generation into senior PA ranks.
Thinking about the PA’s role in governing Gaza may seem premature as the fighting still
rages. One lesson from Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflicts, however, is that removing a
hostile regime is often the easy task. Far harder is building a new government that can
provide for its people and ensure long-term peace. If Israel and its partners avoid the hard
decisions about governance until after the fighting stops, by then it may be too late.