Ddos Mitigation Guide (For Adc) : Acos 5.2.1-P3
Ddos Mitigation Guide (For Adc) : Acos 5.2.1-P3
Ddos Mitigation Guide (For Adc) : Acos 5.2.1-P3
1-P3
DDoS Mitigation Guide (for ADC)
September, 2021
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Getting Started 10
Application Access Management 11
Login Portal 11
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) 11
Authentication Relay 11
AAA Health Monitoring and Load Balancing 12
Online Certificate Status Protocol 12
DDoS Mitigation 12
Attack Detection and Prevention using ZBAR 13
Single CPU Attack Prevention 14
Policy-Based SLB 14
SYN Cookies 14
IP Limiting 15
ICMP Rate Limiting 15
Web Application Firewall 15
Slowloris Prevention 16
DNS Application Firewall 16
DNSSEC 16
SSL Insight 16
Geo-location-based VIP Access 17
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TCP-SYN-frag 20
IP Anomaly Filters for System-wide PBSLB 20
Threshold 21
SOCKSTRESS_CHECK Session State 21
Implementation Notes 21
Configuring IP Anomaly Filtering 22
Using the GUI to Configure IP Anomaly Filtering 22
Using the CLI to Configure IP Anomaly Filtering 22
Displaying IP Anomaly Statistics 23
Using the GUI to Display IP Anomaly Statistics 23
Using the CLI to Display IP Anomaly Statistics 23
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Chapter 5: IP Limiting 55
Overview of IP Limiting 56
Understanding Class Lists 56
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Chapter 1: Getting Started
ACOS provides a suite of security features that allow you to protect your customer traffic:
DDoS Mitigation 12
Policy-Based SLB 14
SYN Cookies 14
IP Limiting 15
Slowloris Prevention 16
DNSSEC 16
SSL Insight 16
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Login Portal 11
Authentication Relay 11
NOTE: For more information about AAM, see the Application Access Man-
agement Guide.
Login Portal
Provides certificate verification services and eliminates the need to import certificate revoc-
ation list (CRL) files to the ACOS device.
The CRLs are maintained on the OCSP responder (server). When a client sends its certificate
as part of a request for a secured service, ACOS first sends the certificate to the OCSP respon-
der for verification. After the certificate is verified, the client can access secured services.
Authentication Relay
Offloads your AAA servers. ACOS contacts the backend AAA servers on behalf of the clients,
and after a server responds, ACOS caches the reply and uses this reply for subsequent client
requests.
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Load balances authentication traffic among a group of AAA servers. ACOS supports custom
health checks for LDAP, RADIUS, Kerberos, and OCSP.
OCSP is an efficient alternative to CRLs, which is also supported by ACOS. To use CRLs with
ACOS, you must import the CRL files into the ACOS device. If you use OCSP, ACOS can also
send certificate verification queries to external OCSP servers (generally called responders).
This process only occurs when a client sends a certificate as part of a request to set up a
secure session to a server application that is managed by ACOS.
NOTE: For more information about OSCP, see: Checking Client Cer-
tificates Using OCSP in the SSL Configuration Guide and AAM
with OCSP in the Application Access Management Guide.
DDoS Mitigation
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a type of DoS attack where multiple systems that are
infected with a Trojan or malware are, in turn, used to target a particular system. This pro-
cess causes a denial of service. If a hacker (attacker) mounts an attack from one host, this is
classified as a DoS attack. In a DDoS attack, many systems are used simultaneously to launch
attacks against a remote system.
ACOS includes filters that check traffic for IP anomalies that can indicate a DDoS attack.
NOTE: For more information about DDos Mitigation, see IP Anomaly Fil-
tering.
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The captured packets for the bad sources can also be exported using the following com-
mand,
export visibility pktcapture-file file
Additionally, the following show commands are added to view ZBAR information:
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Policy-Based SLB
Policy-based SLB (PBSLB) allows you to “black list” or “white list” individual clients or client
subnets. Based on actions that you specify, ACOS will allow (white list) or drop (black list)
traffic from specific client hosts or subnets in the list.
SYN Cookies
SYN cookies provide protection against a common type of DDoS attack, the TCP SYN flood
attack. The attacker sends a high volume of TCP-SYN requests to the target device, but the
attacker does not reply to SYN-ACKs to complete the three-way handshake for any of the ses-
sions. The purpose of the attack is to consume the target’s resources with half-open TCP ses-
sions.
When SYN cookies are enabled, the ACOS device can continue to serve legitimate clients dur-
ing TCP SYN flood attacks, while preventing illegitimate traffic from consuming system
resources.
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NOTE: For more information about SYN cookies, see SYN Cookies.
IP Limiting
IP limiting provides a enhanced implementation of the source IP connection limiting and con-
nection-rate limiting feature that was available in earlier releases.
NOTE: For more information about ICMP rate limiting, see ICMP Rate Lim-
iting.
This new layer of security examines the following types of traffic to safeguard against Web
attacks and protect sensitive information hosted on Web servers:
NOTE: Fore more information about WAF, see the Web Application Fire-
wall Guide.
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Slowloris Prevention
In addition to the WAF, ACOS includes an HTTP security option that prevents Slowloris
attacks, in which the attacker attempts to consume resources on the target system with
incomplete HTTP request headers.
NOTE: For more information about DAF, see DNS Application Firewall.
DNSSEC
ACOS supports DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). In Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)
deployments, you can use DNSSEC with Hardware Module Security (HSM) to dynamically
secure DNS resource records for GSLB zones.
NOTE: The ACOS also supports DNS caching for DNSSEC, but DNSSEC
support for caching does not require GSLB.
SSL Insight
SSL Insight (SSLi) provides high-performance SSL decryption and re-encryption. When used
in conjunction with third-party traffic inspection devices, SSLi adds content-level security.
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SSLi decrypts SSL-encrypted client traffic and sends the decrypted traffic to a third-party
traffic inspection device. Traffic that is permitted by the traffic inspection device is re-
encrypted by ACOS and forwarded to its destination.
NOTE: For more information about SSL Insight, see “SSL Insight” in the
SSL Configuration Guide.
ACOS determines a client’s location by looking up the client’s subnet in the geo-location data-
base that is used by Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB).
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Chapter 2: IP Anomaly Filtering
ACOS helps you detect and mitigate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. One of the
features, IP anomaly filtering, can protect against numerous types of attacks.
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IP Anomaly Filters 19
Threshold 21
Implementation Notes 21
IP Anomaly Filters
Users can enable the following IP anomaly filters. This section has the following sub-sections:
Frag 19
IP-option 20
Land-attack 20
Out-of-sequence Packet 20
Ping-of-death 20
TCP-no-flag 20
TCP-SYN-FIN 20
TCP-SYN-frag 20
Frag
Drops all IP fragments, which can be used to attack hosts that run IP stacks with known vul-
nerabilities in their fragment reassembly code.
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IP-option
Drops all packets with IP options.
Land-attack
Drops spoofed SYN packets that contain the same IP address as the source and destination.
These packets can be used to launch an “IP land attack”.
Out-of-sequence Packet
This is a type of filtering packet.
Ping-of-death
Drops all jumbo ICMP packets, which are also known as “ping of death” packets.
TCP-no-flag
Drops all TCP packets that have no TCP flags set.
TCP-SYN-FIN
Drops all TCP packets in which both the SYN and FIN flags are set.
TCP-SYN-frag
Drops incomplete (fragmented) TCP Syn packets, which can be used to launch TCP Syn flood
attacks.
The following IP anomaly filters are supported for system-wide PBSLB, although you can also
use them without PBSLB:
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When these filters are enabled, the ACOS device checks for these anomalies in new HTTP or
HTTPS connection requests from clients.
Filtering for these anomalies is disabled by default. However, if you configure a system-wide
PBSLB policy, the filters are automatically enabled. You also can configure the filters on an
individual basis.
NOTE: These filters are supported only for HTTP and HTTPS traffic.
Threshold
The threshold specifies the number of times the anomaly is allowed to occur in a client’s con-
nection requests.
If system-wide PBSLB is configured, ACOS applies the policy’s over-limit action to clients
that exceed the threshold. The range for the threshold value is 1-127 occurrences of the anom-
aly, and the default value is 10.
NOTE: The thresholds are not tracked by PBSLB policies that are bound
to individual virtual ports.
When the ACOS device checks a data packet against the new IP anomaly filters, the client’s
session is in the SOCKSTRESS_CHECK state. You might see this state if you are viewing
debug output for the client’s session.
Implementation Notes
Consider the following information when you work with IP anomaly filtering:
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To use the GUI, navigate to Security >> DDoS Protection and select the anomaly for which
you want to enable protection.
To enable IP anomaly filters from the CLI, use the ip anomaly-drop command.
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For example, the following command enables DDoS protection against ping-of-death attacks:
Refer to the “ip anomaly-drop” command in the Network Configuration Guide for more information
about this command.
For system-wide PBSLB statistics, you use the show pbslb client command. In the output
of this command, the counters for a dynamic client are reset to 0 when a client’s dynamic
entry ages out.
To clear all Layer 4 SLB statistics, including the IP anomaly counters, enter the clear slb l4
command:
NOTE: For more information about these commands, see Command Line
Interface Reference Guide.
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Chapter 3: Policy-based SLB
This chapter helps you understand and configure policy-based SLB (PBSLB).
Overview 25
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Overview
ACOS allows you to “black list” or “white list” individual clients or client subnets. White list
traffic is allowed, and black list traffic is dropped from specific client hosts or subnets in the
list.
For white list traffic, you can specify the service group to use. You also can specify the action
that will be taken (drop or reset) on new connections that exceed the configured connection
threshold for the client address.
Example
The user can configure ACOS to respond to DDoS attacks from a client by dropping excessive
connection attempts from the client.
You can apply PBSLB on a system-wide basis. If Server Load Balancing (SLB) is supported,
you also can apply PBSLB on individual virtual ports.
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Client IP lists, such as black/white lists, can be configured on an external device and impor-
ted to the ACOS device or can be entered in the GUI. The actions to take on the addresses in
the list are specified on the ACOS device. A black/white list can contain up to 8 million indi-
vidual host addresses and up to 64,000 subnet addresses.
For each IP address (host or subnet) in a black/white list, you can add a row by using the fol-
lowing syntax:
Black/White List
Parameter Description
network-mask Optional network mask length. The default is 32, which means that
the address is a host address.
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Parameter Description
NOTE: The conn-limit is a coarse limit. The larger the number you spe-
cify, the more coarse the limit.
Example
If you specify 100, the ACOS device limits the total connections to 100.
l As another example, if you specify 1000, the device limits the connections to a max-
imum of 992 connections.
l If the number in the file is larger than the supported maximum limit value, the parser
uses the longest set of digits in the number that you enter that makes a valid value.
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Example
l If the file contains 32768, the parser uses 3276 as the value.
l As another example, if the file contains 111111, the parser will use 11111 as the value.
The first row assigns a specific host to group 4. On the ACOS device, the drop action is
assigned to this group, which black lists the client.
The second row black lists an entire subnet by assigning it to the same group (4).
The third row sets the maximum number of concurrent connections for a specific host to 20.
The fourth row assigns a specific host to group 2 and specifies a maximum of 20 concurrent
connections.
NOTE: The ACOS device allows up to three parser errors when reading
the file but stops reading after the third parser error.
The ACOS device supports dynamic client entries. You can configure this feature by adding
the client address 0.0.0.0/0 (wildcard address) to the black/white list that is used by the sys-
tem-wide PBSLB policy.
When a client sends an HTTP or HTTPS connection request, the ACOS device checks the sys-
tem-wide PBSLB policy’s black/white list for the client’s IP address, with one of the following
results:
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l If there is no entry for the client, he ACOS device creates a dynamic entry for the cli-
ent’s host address.
l If there is a dynamic entry for the client, the ACOS device resets the timeout value for
the entry. (Dynamic entry aging is described below.)
NOTE: If there is a static entry for the client’s host or subnet address,
the static entry is used instead.
In this example, the clients who do not match a static entry in the list are assigned to group 1
and are limited to 20 concurrent connections.
The ACOS device supports up to 8 million dynamic client entries for system-wide PBSLB.
Once this limit is reached, the ACOS device no longer track connections or anomaly counters
for additional clients.
For dynamic entries in a system-wide PBSLB policy’s black/white list, the connection limit in
the list applies to each client.
In the example above, each client that has a dynamic entry in the black/white list will be
allowed to have a maximum of 20 concurrent connections.
When the ACOS device creates a dynamic black/white list entry for a client, the device also
sets the timeout for the entry. The timeout value for the dynamic entry decreases until the
timeout reaches 0 or the client sends a new HTTP or HTTPS connection request.
If the client sends a new HTTP or HTTPS connection request, the timeout is reset to its full
value. If the timeout reaches 0 and the client does not have active connections, the dynamic
entry is removed. However, if the client has an active connection, the dynamic entry is not
removed until the client’s connection ends. You can set the timeout to 1-127 minutes, and the
default is 5 minutes.
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If client-lockup is enabled, the timeout for a locked up client does not begin decreasing until
the lockup expires.
Dynamic client entries are supported only for system-wide PBSLB policies.
You can add a wildcard address (0.0.0.0/0) to a black/white list that is used by a virtual
port’s PBSLB policy. The group ID and connection limit that are specified for the wildcard
address are applied to clients that do not match a static entry in the list.
l The ACOS device does not create dynamic entries in the list.
l The connection limit applies collectively to all clients that do not have a static entry in
the list.
These options are not available in policies that are applied to individual ports.
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The following example drops any connections from clients exceeding one of the fol-
lowing limits:
l The connection limit that is configured in the specified in the Black/White list.
l The threshold of any of the new IP anomaly filters.
ACOS(config-policy)# exit
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ACOS(config)#
To display information for system-wide PBSLB, enter the show pbslb system or show pbslb
client commands.
To clear PBSLB information, use the clear pbslb system or clear pbslb client commands.
Use the entry option with the clear pbslb client command to clear both statistical coun-
ters and client entries; without this option, only the statistical counters are cleared.
Configuration Details 32
Configuration Details
You can configure PBSLB parameters for virtual ports by configuring the settings on indi-
vidual ports or by configuring a PBSLB policy template and binding the template to indi-
vidual virtual ports.
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These steps assume that the real servers, service groups, and virtual servers have already
been configured.
To configure PBSLB:
You can configure a policy template and bind the template to virtual ports or configure the
following settings on individual virtual ports:
To configure a PBSLB policy for individual virtual ports using the GUI, do the following:
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e. Click OK.
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The following commands import black/white list “sample-bwlist.txt” to the ACOS device:
The following commands configure a PBSLB template and bind it to a virtual port:
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In this example, the ACOS device drops all new connection attempts from a client if one of
the following conditions occur:
l The client already has 20 active connections and attempts to open a new HTTP or
HTTPS connection.
l The client exceeds any of the IP anomaly thresholds.
The lockup period is set to 5 minutes, to continue enforcing the over-limit action for 5
minutes after the over-limit action is triggered. The timeout for dynamic black/white list
entries is set to 2 minutes.
0.0.0.0/0 1 #20
The following command displays statistics for the system-wide PBSLB policy:
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The following command displays summary statistics for individual black/white-list clients:
The Age column indicates how many seconds are left before a dynamic entry ages out. For cli-
ents who are currently locked out of the system, the value in the Lockup column indicates
how many minutes the lockup will continue. For locked up clients, the age value is 0 until the
lockup expires. After the lockup expires, the age is set to its full value. In this example, the
lockup value is 120 seconds.
The following command displays detailed statistics for a specific black/white-list client:
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Chapter 4: SYN Cookies
This chapter describes the SYN-cookie feature and how it helps protect ACOS devices against
disruptive SYN-based flood attacks.
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During a TCP SYN flood attack, an attacker sends many TCP SYN Requests to a network
device, such as a server. The server replies with a standard SYN-ACK message. However,
rather than reply to this attempt at establishing a 3-way handshake with the standard ACK,
an attacker ignores the reply and creates a “half-open” TCP connection. System resources
are consumed because the device waits for a response from the client that never arrives.
Under large-scale attacks, excessive half-open connections cause a network device’s TCP con-
nection queue to become full. This over-subscription prevents the device from establishing
new connections with legitimate clients.
The graphics in this section illustrate how the ACOS device determines whether a particular
TCP connection is from a legitimate request or if it is part of a SYN flood attack.
The SYN-ACK Handshake (Legitimate Client) depicts a typical 3-way TCP handshake, which
includes a SYN request from the client, the SYN-ACK reply from the ACOS device, and finally,
an ACK from the client to the ACOS device.
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However, SYN flood attacks (SYN-ACK Handshake (Hacker) ) can cripple a network by sending
multiple SYN requests to a network device. The device responds to these SYN requests with
SYN-ACKs and waits for responses from the client that never arrive. These bogus requests
create many “half-open” sessions, which wastes system memory and other system resources.
The state of being oversubscribed reduces the device’s free resources, which prevents it
from accepting requests from legitimate clients.
Enabling SYN cookies mitigates the damage caused by such DoS attacks by preventing the
attacks from consuming system resources.
TCP connections for which the ACOS device did not receive an ACK from the client is iden-
tified as belonging to a SYN flood attack, and this information is displayed with the counter
in the output of the show command.
By enabling SYN cookies, the ACOS device’s TCP connection queue is prevented from filling
up during TCP SYN flood attacks. When a client sends an SYN request, the ACOS device
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responds with a SYN cookie. This response is a special type of SYN ACK message.
SYN cookies prevent hackers from consuming excessive system resources by encoding the
necessary state information for the client connection in a TCP sequence number. Rather than
storing state information for each TCP session, the sequence number in the SYN cookie acts
as a shorthand, which allows the ACOS device to compress much of the session information
into a smaller amount of data.
This sequence number is sent to the client as a SYN-ACK packet. When a legitimate client
receives this information, it replies with an ACK that contains the sequence number plus 1.
When the SYN ACK that contains the sequence number from the client is received, the ACOS
device reconstructs the connection information and establishes a connection with that cli-
ent.
If the SYN Request is part of an attack, the attacker does not send an ACK to the ACOS
device. The ACOS device sends a SYN cookie, but the attacker does not receive it (or may
choose to ignore it), and the ACOS device does not establish a connection.
You can configure on and off thresholds for SYN cookies. When there are no TCP SYN attacks,
the TCP options are preserved.
By default, hardware-based SYN cookies are disabled. When the feature is enabled, there are
no default settings for the on- and off-threshold. If you omit the on-threshold and off-
threshold options, SYN cookies are enabled and are always on, regardless of the number of
half-open TCP connections on the ACOS device.
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SYN Cookie Buffering optimizes performance by increasing the amount of buffers that are
allocated to TCP connections when system memory usage is low and reducing the number of
buffers when system memory usage is high.
When SYN cookies are enabled, the ACOS device allocates 10 buffers to each TCP connection,
and by default, offers a TCP window size of 8000.
When memory usage increases and system resources are scarce, the number of buffers that
are reserved for each TCP connection gradually reduces from 10 buffers to 1 buffer per TCP
connection. The window size also reduces during this process.
SYN Cookie Buffering is automatically enabled when SYN cookies are enabled. By default, 10
buffers are allocated to each TCP connection. Instead being dropped and requiring later re-
transmission, the packets are stored in the ACOS device’s memory and forwarded to the real
server when the back-end connection is available.
SACK
The ACOS device includes the Sack-Permitted option in TCP SYN health check packets sent
to servers.
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l If all of the up servers in the service group reply with a TCP SYN-ACK that contains a
SACK option, the ACOS device uses SACK with the software-based SYN-cookie feature
for all servers in the service group.
l If any of the up servers in the service group do not send a SACK option, the ACOS
device does not use SACK with the software-based SYN-cookie feature for any servers
in the service group.
MSS
The lowest MSS value that is supported by a server in the service group is the MSS value that
is used by the ACOS device for software-based SYN-cookies.
Details 44
FTA Models 45
Non-FTA Models 46
Details
Depending on the Thunder or AX model, you can use hardware-based SYN cookies or soft-
ware-based SYN cookies:
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l Hardware-based SYN cookies can be globally enabled and applied to all virtual server
ports that are configured on the device.
l Hardware-based SYN cookies are available on FTA devices. See the FTA Devices section
on the A10 Hardware Install Guides website for a list of FTA Thunder and AX devices.
l Software-based SYN cookies can be enabled on individual virtual ports. This version of
the feature is available on all AX models.
If your AX model supports hardware-based SYN cookies, A10 Networks recommends that you
use the hardware-based version of the feature instead of the software-based version.
If both hardware-based and software-based SYN cookies are enabled, only hardware-based
SYN cookies are used. Although software-based SYN cookies can be enabled, they are not
used.
l If the target VIP is in a different subnet from the client-side router, use of hardware-
based SYN cookies requires some additional configuration.
l Software-based SYN cookies are supported only in software releases that support SLB.
FTA Models
To enable hardware-based SYN cookies on ACOS models that feature FTAs, use the syn-
cookie enable command at the global configuration level:.
The command in the following example enables dynamic-based SYN cookies when the num-
ber of concurrent half-open TCP connections exceeds 50000 and disables SYN cookies when
the number falls below 30000:
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Non-FTA Models
To enable software-based SYN cookies, use the syn-cookie command at the virtual-port
level. For example:
Usually, the target VIP in an SLB configuration is in the same subnet as the client-side router.
However, if the target VIP is in a different subnet, to use hardware-based SYN cookies, con-
figure the following items:
l On the ACOS device, configure a “dummy” VIP that is in the same subnet as the client-
side router.
l On the client-side router, configure a static route to the VIP by using the dummy VIP as
the next hop.
Hardware-based SYN Cookies – Target VIP and Client-Side Router in Different Subnets is an
example of this deployment.
FIGURE 4-3: Hardware-based SYN Cookies – Target VIP and Client-Side Router in Different
Subnets
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The following commands configure hardware-based SYN cookies on the ACOS device:
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server dummyvip 10.10.10.154
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# exit
ACOS(config)# syn-cookie
NOTE: If VRRP-A is configured, add both the target VIP and the dummy
VIP to the same VRID so these VIPs will fail over as a unit.
To modify the threshold for TCP handshake completion, use the ip tcp syn-cookie
threshold global configuration command.
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Details 48
Details
When SYN cookies are enabled, 10 buffers are available to hold overflow packets from each cli-
ent session. When the system memory is occupied, the number of buffers dedicated to each
TCP connection is reduced. The reduction process occurs gradually and is tied to system
memory usage.
There are three different thresholds that can be configured on the ACOS device. When these
free system memory thresholds are breached, the number of buffers that are allocated to
each session (and the TCP window size) are reduced. This reduction in the TCP window sized
is an attempt to prevent the client from sending data faster than the ACOS device can
receive it.
The graduated buffers and window sizes appear below. By default, each TCP session is alloc-
ated 10 buffers, and the TCP window size is set to 8K.
l If the first threshold is breached, the buffer is reduced to 4 buffers, and the TCP win-
dow size is reduced to 4K.
l If the next memory threshold is breached, the buffer is reduced to 2 buffers, and the
TCP window size is reduced to 2K.
l If the final threshold is breached, the buffer is reduced to 1 buffer, and the TCP window
size is reduced to 1K.
These thresholds are based on system memory usage, and the values are configurable.
The total number of buffers varies from one model to the next and is based on the total
memory per connection.
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l If hardware-based SYN cookies are enabled, ACOS does not modify the TCP window
size.
NOTE: For more information, see the latest version of the Online Help for
additional information about the fields.
You do not have to change the system memory usage thresholds from the default settings.
However, you can modify these thresholds by entering the following CLI commands:
!
slb common
buff-thresh hw-buff num relieve-thresh num sys-buff-low num sys-buf-high num
For additional information about changing the system memory thresholds, see the buff-
thresh command in the Command Line Interface Reference.
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To display SYN-cookie statistics, navigate to the ADC >> Statistics >> L4 page in the GUI.
NOTE: For more information, see the latest version of the Online Help for
additional information about the fields.
This section summarizes some of the CLI commands that can be used to view SYN-cookie stat-
istics.
L4 SYN attack 50
L4 TCP Established 50
Examples 51
The following fields in the output of the show slb l4 command allow you to view TCP traffic
in terms of legitimate traffic and attacks.
L4 SYN attack
Displays a running counter of the number of packets that the ACOS device considers to be
from a SYN flood attack. This assumption is based on the fact that the device did not receive
an ACK from the client.
L4 TCP Established
Displays a running counter of TCP packets that the ACOS device considers to be from legit-
imate clients. When SYN cookies are enabled, and a legitimate client sends a SYN request, the
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ACOS device responds with a SYN ACK. If the ACOS device receives an ACK, the packet is con-
sidered safe.
Examples
These fields are highlighted using these examples.
l Current
l 1 second
l 5 seconds
l 30 seconds
l 1 minute
l 5 minutes
The following command displays SYN-cookie statistics across multiple time intervals:
The show slb attack-prevention fields displays the fields that appear in the CLI output of the
show slb attack-prevention command.
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Field Description
SYN cookie snt Number of TCP SYN cookie send attempts that failed.
fail
SYN cookie chk Number of TCP SYN cookies for which the responding ACK failed the SYN
fail cookie check.
SYN attack Total number of SYN connections that did not receive an ACK from the
client and assumed to be SYN attack.
Limitations
l When running the show slb attack-prevention command on an FTA model, the SYN
attack field does not display output for the historical counters (1s/5s/30s/1min/5min).
Output is only provided for the Current column.
l This feature is supported for L3V private partitions in non-FTA models. If the show slb
attack-prevention command is run from an L3V network partitions on an FTA model,
the SYN attack counter displays zero for all columns.
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...
L4 SYN attack 30
...
The SYN flood attack counter matrix shows the limitations that are associated with using
SYN flood attack counters under a variety of conditions.
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The SYN cookie counter incremented? column indicates whether the SYN cookie counter dis-
play will function correctly, based on the status of the other conditions that are associated
with this deployment.
1 If hardware-based and software-based SYN cookies are enabled, only hardware-based SYN
cookies are used. “Irrelevant” means that hardware-based SYN cookies are also enabled.
2“No” means that the SYN flood attack counters fail when hardware- and software-based
SYN cookies are enabled at the same time as L3V (private partitions). This is a known lim-
itation with this feature.
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Chapter 5: IP Limiting
IP limiting provides a an enhanced implementation of the source IP connection limiting and
connection-rate limiting feature. This chapter describes the IP limiting options and how to
configure and apply these options.
Overview of IP Limiting 56
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Overview of IP Limiting
IP limiting provides the following benefits:
l Configuration flexibility:
You can apply source IP limiting on a system-wide basis, on individual virtual servers, or on
individual virtual ports.
l Class lists:
You can configure different classes of clients, and apply a separate set of IP limits to each
class. You also can exempt specific clients from being limited.
l Concurrent connections
l Connection rate
l Concurrent Layer 7 requests
l Layer 7 request rate
NOTE: Layer 7 request limiting applies only to the HTTP, HTTPS, and
fast-HTTP virtual port types.
NOTE: Class lists can be configured only in the shared partition. A policy
template that is configured in a shared partition or in a private
partition can use a class list that is configured in the shared par-
tition.
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IP Address Matching 58
Each row in the class list defines a client class and has the following format:
The
Parameter Description
ipaddr Specifies the host or subnet address of the client. Both IPv4 and IPv6
addresses are supported.
glid num Specifies the ID of the IP limiting rule that will be used to match clients.
A glid configures an IP limiting rule that is configured at the global con-
figuration level.
lid num Specifies the ID of the IP limiting rule that will be used to match clients.
A lid configures an IP limiting rule that is configured at the same level
as the class list (in the same policy template).
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Parameter Description
age minutes Removes a host entry from the class list after the specified number of
minutes. You can specify 1-2000 minutes.
When you assign an age value, the host entry remains in the class list
only for the specified number of minutes. After the age reaches 0, the
host entry is removed from the class list in the next minute.
You can use the age option with IP limiting options in the LID or GLID to
temporarily control client access. Traffic limiting settings in the LID or
GLID that are assigned to the host entry are in effect only until the age
expires.
The age option applies only to host entries (IPv4 /32 or IPv6 /128). The
age option is not supported for subnet entries.
;comment- Custom comment. Use a semi-colon (;) in front of the comment string.
string
NOTE: The ACOS device discards the comment
string when you save the class list.
Class List Syntax Parameters provides a description of each portion of the format.
IP Address Matching
By default, the ACOS device matches the class-list entries based on the source IP address of
client traffic. Optionally, you can also match based on one of the following items:
l Destination IP address:
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Matches based on the IP address in a header in the HTTP request. You can specify the header
when you enable this option.
Here is an example of a simple class list. This list matches on all clients and uses an IP limiting
rule that is configured at the global configuration level:
0.0.0.0/0 glid 1
l For individual host 1.1.1.1, use IP limiting rule 1, which is configured in a policy template.
l A policy template can be applied globally for system-wide IP limiting or to an individual
virtual server or virtual port. This is described in more detail in a later section.
l For all hosts in subnet 2.2.2.0/24, use IP limiting rule 2, which is configured in a policy
template.
l For all hosts that do not match another entry in the class list, use IP limiting rule 10,
which is configured in a policy template.
l For individual host 3.3.3.3, use IP limiting rule 3, which is configured at the global con-
figuration level.
l For individual host 4.4.4.4, do not use an IP limiting rule.
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1. Hover over ADC and select SLB from the menu bar.
2. Click the Class Lists tab, then select Import from the drop-down list.
3. Click Import.
4. Specify the name and location of the file you want to import. Refer to the GUI online
help for this page for more information about each field.
5. Click Import.
1. Hover over ADC and select SLB from the menu bar.
2. Click the Class Lists tab, then select Configuration from the drop-down list.
3. Click Create.
4. In the Name field, specify a class list name.
5. Complete the fields on this page as desired. Refer to the GUI online help for this page
for more information about each field.
NOTE: If the class list contains at least 100 entries, you should use
the Store as a file option. A class list can be exported only if
you use this option.
6. Click Create.
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NOTE: See Class List Syntax for more information about the syntax.
Parameters 62
Match IP Address 63
CLI Examples: Request Limiting and Request-rate Limiting Settings Are Used 64
CLI Examples: Request Limiting and Request-rate Limiting Settings Are Not Used 65
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Parameters
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l Logging – Generates log messages when clients exceed a limit. Logging is disabled by
default.
When you enable logging, by default, a separate message is generated for each over-limit
occurrence. If you specify a logging period, the ACOS device keeps the repeated messages
for the specified period and sends a message at the end of the period for all instances that
occurred during this period.
The logging period can be 0-255 minutes. The default is 0, which means that there is no wait
period.
Match IP Address
By default, the ACOS device matches class-list entries based on the source IP address of cli-
ent traffic. Optionally, you can also match based on one of the following options:
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If a LID or GLID in a class list contains settings for request limiting or request-rate limiting,
the settings apply only if the following conditions are true:
The settings apply only to the virtual port but do not apply in the following cases:
l The policy template is applied to the virtual server, instead of the virtual port.
l The settings are in a system-wide GLID.
l The settings are in a system-wide policy template.
ACOS(config)# class-list 2
ACOS(config-class list)# 5.1.1.100/32 glid 1023
ACOS(config-class list)# 55.1.1.0/24 lid 31
ACOS(config-class list)# exit
ACOS(config)# glid 1023
ACOS(config-glid:1023)# request-limit 10
ACOS(config-glid:1023)# request-rate-limit 2 per 100
ACOS(config-glid:1023)# over-limit-action reset log
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ACOS(config-glid:1023)# exit
ACOS(config)# slb template policy global_policy
ACOS(config-policy)# class-list 2
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:2)# exit
ACOS(config-policy)# exit
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server vs-55 55.1.1.55
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# vrid 1
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# port 80 http
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# service-group vlan-80-grp
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# template policy global_policy
ACOS(config)# class-list l2
ACOS(config-class list)# 55.1.1.100/32 lid 31
ACOS(config-class list)# exit
ACOS(config)# slb template policy poltemplate1
ACOS(config-policy)# class-list l2
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:l2)# exit
ACOS(config-policy)# class-list l3
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:l3)# lid 30
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:l3-lid:30)# request-limit 10
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:l3-lid:30)# request-rate-limit 2 per 100
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:l3-lid:30)# exit
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:l3)# exit
ACOS(config-policy)# exit
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server vs-55 55.1.1.55
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# vrid 1
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# port 80 http
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# service-group vlan-80-grp
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# template policy poltemplate1
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You can configure multiple policy templates with different IP limiting rules. You can use a
given class list in one or more policy templates.
Clients must comply with all IP limiting rules that are applicable to the client. For example, if
you configure system-wide IP limiting and also configure IP limiting on a virtual server, cli-
ents must comply with the system-wide IP limits and with the IP limits that are applied to the
individual virtual server accessed by the client.
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The following commands configure a standalone IP limiting rule to be applied globally to all IP
clients, which match class list “global”:
ACOS(config)# glid 1
ACOS(config-glid:1)# conn-rate-limit 10000 per 1
ACOS(config-glid:1)# conn-limit 1000000
ACOS(config-glid:1)# over-limit-action forward log
ACOS(config-glid:1)# exit
ACOS(config)# system glid 1
The following commands configure class list “global”, which matches on all clients and uses
IP limiting rule 1:
The commands in this example configure system-wide IP limiting by using a policy template.
The following command imports the class list that are used by the policy:
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The following command imports the class list that is used by the policy:
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The following command imports the class list that is used by the policy:
The following commands configure a class list with 2 host entries, and assign an age value to
each entry.
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The template includes an LID that sets the connection limit to 0. The LID also resets and logs
connection attempts.
In the configuration above, host 192.168.1.100 is not allowed to establish a connection during
the first minute after the host entry is created. After the age expires, the host entry is
removed form the class list, and the connection limit no longer applies to the client.
Host 192.168.1.101 is not allowed to establish a connection during the first 10 minutes after
that host entry is created. Once the age expires, the client is no longer locked down.
Viewing Class-Lists 72
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Viewing Class-Lists
Use the show class-list command to view information about your class list configuration.
NOTE: For information, see “ show class- list ” in the Command Line
Interface Reference.
Use the show glid command to view the configuration of each standalone IP limiting rule.
NOTE: For information, see “show glid” in the Command Line Interface
Reference.
NOTE: For information, see “show pbslb” in the Command Line Interface
Reference.
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Chapter 6: ICMP Rate Limiting
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ICMP rate limiting monitors the rate of ICMP traffic and drops ICMP packets when the con-
figured thresholds are exceeded.
l Normal rate – The ICMP normal rate is the maximum number of ICMP packets that are
allowed per second.
If the ACOS device receives more than the normal rate of ICMP packets, the excess
packets are dropped until the next one-second interval begins. The normal rate can be
1-65535 packets per second.
l Maximum rate – The ICMP maximum rate is the maximum number of ICMP packets
allowed per second before the ACOS device locks up ICMP traffic.
1 Subsequent references use the term “ICMP rate limiting”. Unless otherwise specified, this
term also applies to ICMPv6 rate limiting.
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When ICMP traffic is locked up, all ICMP packets are dropped until the lockup expires.
The maximum rate can be 1-65535 packets per second.
l Lockup time – The lockup time is the number of seconds for which the ACOS device
drops all ICMP traffic, after the maximum rate is exceeded.
NOTE: The maximum rate must be larger than the normal rate.
NOTE: For descriptions of the parameters, see ICMP Rate Limiting Para-
meters.
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NOTE: This option applies only to software releases that support SLB.
NOTE: For descriptions of the parameters, see ICMP Rate Limiting Para-
meters.
The following example configures a virtual server template that sets ICMP rate limiting:
ACOS(config)# slb template virtual-server vip-tmplt
ACOS(config-vserver)# icmp-rate-limit 25000 lockup 30000 60
You can enter the icmp-rate-limit command at any of the following configuration levels:
NOTE: For descriptions of the parameters, see ICMP Rate Limiting Para-
meters.
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Chapter 7: HTTP Slowloris Prevention
Details 78
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Details
The ACOS includes an HTTP template option that specifies the maximum number of seconds
allowed for all parts of a request header to be received. If the entire request header is not
received within the specified amount of time, ACOS terminates the connection.
This option provides security against attacks such as Slowloris attacks, which attempt to con-
sume resources on the target system by sending HTTP requests in multiple increments, and
at a slow rate. The intent of this type of attack is to cause the target system to consume its
buffer resources with the partially completed requests.
NOTE: The request-header wait time can bet set to 1-31 seconds. The
default is 7 seconds.
NOTE: For more HTTP security options, see the Web Application Firewall
Guide.
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Chapter 8: DNS Application Firewall
Configuring DNSSEC 81
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The DAF examines DNS queries that are addressed to a VIP to ensure that the queries are not
malformed. If a malformed DNS query is detected, the ACOS device takes one of the following
actions:
The DNS sanity checking on virtual-port type UDP is performed only for client requests.
For a DNS client request to pass the sanity check, all of the following conditions must be met:
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DNS sanity checking on virtual-port type DNS-UDP is performed for client requests and
server responses.
For a client request to pass the sanity check, all of the following conditions must be met:
For a server response to pass the sanity check, all of the following conditions must be met:
Configuring DNSSEC
This topic contains the following section:
Details 82
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Details
1. Create a DNS template and specify the DNS security action in the template.
2. Bind the DNS template to the DNS virtual port.
The following commands configure the real server and service group:
The following commands bind the service group and DNS template to the DNS virtual port on
a virtual server:
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Since the drop action is specified, malformed DNS queries sent to the virtual DNS server are
dropped by the ACOS device.
when DNS_REQUEST {
set record ANY
if {[DNS::question type] equals $record} {
pool rate_limited_service_group
} else {
pool no_rate_limit_service_group
}
}
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Chapter 9: DNS Response Rate Limiting
Configuration Example 90
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Details 85
Limitations 89
Details
For some ADC deployments, it may be difficult to control the rate of DNS responses from the
DNS servers to external hosts. This vulnerability could cause your network resources to be
used in DNS reflection attacks or DNS amplification attacks.
To prevent your network equipment from becoming an unwanted participant in a DNS reflec-
tion or amplification attack, this release introduces support for DNS Response Rate Limiting
(RRL).
The DNS Response Rate Limiting is a BIND feature which applies a rate-limit to the DNS
server responses, with the goal of decreasing unnecessary load on the authoritative DNS serv-
ers.
A DNS reflection attack is when a hacker hijacks multiple computers using botnets and then
sends a large number of queries to one or more DNS servers. The hacker’s DNS requests
include a spoofed source IP address, so it appears as though the DNS queries are originating
from what is essentially a fake address (that is, the address of the intended victim). The
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unwitting DNS server replies to the spoofed address of the victim instead of replying to the
real source of the threat. When the hacker scales-up the attack by employing botnets, the
replies from the DNS servers can use up all the resources on the target’s network, preventing
legitimate traffic from getting through.1
DNS runs on the connectionless UDP protocol, so it is difficult to check the validity of each
DNS query and drop malicious traffic in a targeted manner. However, the ACOS can employ a
blunt approach to mitigate this type of threat by applying rate limits to the traffic.
The ACOS identifies potentially malicious queries if the following are true of the DNS
requests:
Once the source is flagged as potentially malicious, then ACOS can take protective action.
To respond to this threat, ACOS applies rate-limits to the DNS server responses associated
with those DNS requests that have been flagged as potentially malicious.
NOTE: Note that ACOS does not apply rate limits to the malicious quer-
ies themselves, but only to the responses from the DNS server to
the victim.
When this feature is enabled, ACOS monitors the DNS response rate and request rate, and it
detects any abnormal increase in the rate or frequency, which is based on the IPv4/IPv6
source address (source IP of the request).
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In its implementation of DNS RRL, BIND software tracks all DNS queries by placing them into
one large table. However, in order to allocate system resources in a more efficient manner,
the ACOS implementation of DNS RRL uses a two-tiered system with two tables.
The first of the two tables is called the “filter table”, and the second of the two tables is
called the “rate-limiting entry table”. Both tables apply rate limits to DNS queries, but the
“filter table” uses only two bytes for each DNS query in its table, while the “rate-limiting
entry table” uses approximately 100 bytes for each DNS query.
All DNS queries first go to the “filter table”, and if the query is flagged as potentially mali-
cious, subsequent requests from that source IP + FQDN combination are stored in the second
table (the rate-limiting entry table).
More Information 88
l “filter table” – This table is for the non-offenders making normal DNS requests. This is
where all normal DNS queries are processed. Rate limits can be set for this table using
the filter-response-rate command under response-rate-limiting.
l “rate-limiting entry table” – This table is for the offenders making abnormal DNS
requests, who need to be monitored more closely. Only a small subset of DNS queries
are placed into this table of potential abusers. Rate limits can be set for this table using
the response-rate command under response-rate-limiting.
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l “window” – This option configures the rate-limiting-window, which is the time interval
over which rates are measured for response-rate and slip-rate. If the same DNS
mapping is requested too many times, similar queries from that client are dropped for
the rest of the window’s interval.
l The “rate-limit entry table” is for the offenders who have exceeded the rate limits con-
figured in the filter table. The sources address (and hash of the FQDN) for these
requests are tracked based on the combination of information (source IP + requested
FQDN). These queries are monitored more closely than regular DNS queries and the
rate-limiting table allocates a credit rate to each entry (for example, a credit of up to 10
requests per second), which can be used up. Any DNS queries exceeding their credit
rate are then rate-limited, meaning ACOS will drop the traffic.
After 1000 entries in the table are used up, all other traffic is placed into an overflow bucket
where the source IP + FQDN is no longer tracked.
More Information
NOTE: For more information about any of these CLI commands, see the
following commands in the CLI Reference for ADC.
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Limitations
This release contains the following limitations for the DNS RRL feature:
l Any changes to the SLB maximum table entries (CLI command: dns-response-rate-lim-
iting max-table-entries under slb common) requires disabling and then re-enabling
the template on the virtual port to which it is bound.
Use the show command to verify that all rate-limiting entries have been aged out
before re-enabling the template.
Log-only mode offers a simulation of how many packets would be getting Dropped/Al-
lowed/Slipped if the device were not in observation mode, but while in observation
mode, none of the packets are actually getting dropped.
The entries in the rate-limiting tables are not yet visible via the GUI or CLI.
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l DNS RRL was not supported on L3V partitions. DNS RRL is now supported on L3V par-
titions.
l If you configured slb template <name> response-rate-limiting without configuring
anything underneath it, then response-rate-limiting line was not appearing in the
output of the show running-config command.
The updated show command now displays the entry in the rate-limiting tables.
Configuration Example
This following topics are covered:
The DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL) feature helps prevent network equipment (DNS
authoritative servers) from becoming unwanted participants in a DNS reflection or DNS amp-
lification attack.
From this page, you can configure the options needed to enable DNS Response Rate
Limiting (RRL).
4. Click OK to save your changes.
To set limits around the amount of memory consumed during a DNS reflection attack:
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The following example shows the DNS response rate limiting entries returned by the show
command:
NOTE: For more information about these configuration and how to mon-
itor these commands, see the CLI Reference for ADC Guide.
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Chapter 10: DNSSEC Support
This chapter describes the ACOS device’s DNSSEC support.
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Details
An ACOS device that is configured as a Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB) controller can
act as an authoritative DNS server for a domain zone. As the authoritative DNS server for the
zone, the ACOS device sends records in response to requests from DNS clients. The ACOS
device supports the ability to respond to client requests for the following types of records:
l A
l AAAA
l CNAME
l NS
l MX
l PTR
l SRV
l TXT
If you place the ACOS device in the DNS infrastructure, the device is exposed to potential
online attacks. When DNS was originally designed, there were no mechanisms to ensure the
DNS infrastructure would remain secure.
In an unsecured DNS environment, the client’s DNS resolver has no way to assess the validity
of the address it receives for a particular domain name, so the client’s DNS resolver cannot
tell whether an address received for a particular domain is from the legitimate owner of that
domain.
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This potential security hole makes DNS vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attacks, DNS
cache poisoning attacks, and other online attacks that could be used to forge DNS data,
hijack traffic, and to potentially steal sensitive information from the user.
To close this security hole, in the 1990s, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) intro-
duced a set of standards called Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). These
additional standards add authentication to DNS and help ensure the integrity of the data that
is transferred between the client resolvers and DNS servers.
DNSSEC offers authentication through the use of cryptographic keys and digital signatures,
which ensure that entries in DNS tables are correct and that connections are made to legit-
imate servers. The ACOS device’s implementation of DNSSEC is based on RFCs 4033, 4034,
and 4035.
The DNS Packet Flow without DNSSEC illustrates basic DNS without DNSSEC. The figure
shows the recursive lookup process that occurs when a client resolver requests the IP
address for a URL. Note that this illustration shows how a client request works in a simple
DNS environment without DNSSEC.
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A client (shown at upper left) requires access to a server in the domain zone1.example.org (at
lower left). The ACOS device, which is acting as the GSLB controller, is the authoritative DNS
server for the zone. To access this server, the client requires the IP address for this zone or
domain.
When the user enters the domain name in the web browser’s URL, the process to obtain the IP
address that is associated with this domain is as follows:
1. The DNS resolver that is embedded in the client’s web browser sends an address
request (“A?”) to the Caching DNS server to see whether the Caching DNS server has
the required IP address cached in its memory for the requested example.org domain.
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2. The Caching DNS server has a list of IP address-to-domain mappings, but the list is not com-
prehensive, and unfortunately, the Caching DNS server does not have the required IP
address.
It acts as a proxy for the client and makes a recursive query to the Root DNS Server,
which is located at the top of the DNS hierarchy.
3. The Root DNS Server does not have the requested IP address.
4. In an attempt to point the Caching DNS server in the right direction, it responds to the
request with a Name Server (NS) record, which contains the IP of the Top Level Domain (TLD)
server for the “.org” domain.
5. The Caching DNS server now has the IP address for the name server that manages the
“.org” domain, so it sends an address request on behalf of the client to the TLD DNS
server for the “.org” domain.
6. The TLD Server does not have the requested IP address.
7. The TLD server points the Caching DNS server in the right direction by providing an NS
record that contains the IP address for the next name server in the DNS hierarchy,
which is the authoritative DNS server for the example.org subdomain.
8. The Caching DNS server has the IP address that is needed to reach the authoritative
DNS server for the example.org domain, so the server sends a request for zone1.ex-
ample.org to this authoritative DNS server.
9. The authoritative DNS server does not have the requested information, but it can get
the Caching DNS server one step closer to its destination by providing the NS record for
the authoritative DNS server for the zone1.example.org domain.
10. The Caching DNS Server sends a request to the authoritative DNS server for the
zone1.example.org domain.
11. The ACOS device, which is the authoritative DNS server for zone1.example.org, has the
IP address that the client needs.
12. The ACOS device sends the requested IP address to the Caching DNS server.
13. The Caching DNS server sends the IP address that is provided by the ACOS device to
the DNS resolver in the client’s browser.
The client now has the IP address needed to reach the server in the zone1 subdomain.
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The FIGURE 10-2 illustrates how the DNS query process works when the security extensions
are used with DNS to provide security (DNSSEC). The process is similar to the process illus-
trated in the DNS Packet Flow without DNSSEC, but with the notable exception that DNSSEC
uses the following additional resource record types to provide security:
l DNS Key (DNSKEY) – Public key used by an Authoritative DNS server to sign resource
records for its zone.
l Delegation Signer (DS) – Hash (message digest) of a public key. A DNS server uses the
DS for a zone that is directly underneath it in the DNS hierarchy to verify that signed
resource records from the Authoritative DNS server for that zone are legitimate.
l Resource Record Signature (RRSIG) – Digitally signs another resource record, such
as an A record.
The digital signature is created by applying a hash function to the DNS record to reduce its
file size, an encryption algorithm is applied to the hash value (using the private key), and this
encrypted hash value appears as the digital signature at the bottom of the resource record.
The RRSIG record, which contains the private key that is used to encrypt the hash value,
appears at the bottom of the record being signed.
While the DNS Packet Flow without DNSSEC shows how basic DNS works without DNSSEC,
the FIGURE 10-2 shows how the DNS lookup process works with DNSSEC.
The recursive lookup process remains largely unchanged, with the higher level DNS servers
pointing to lower level servers in the DNS hierarchy to move the request closer to the author-
itative server for the desired domain.
However, when DNSSEC is added, the additional records such as DS, RRSIG, and DNSKE are
used to sign and authenticate the communications from the DNS servers. This step proves to
the client that each of the name servers in the “chain of trust” are authoritative for their
respective domains.
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The FIGURE 10-2 shows the resolution process for an address query from the DNS resolver on
a client for the IP address of zone1.example.org.
1. The DNS resolver on the client sends an address query for the IP address of a host
under zone1.example.org.
2. The Caching DNS server, which does not have the address, forwards the request to the
root server.
3. The root server redirects the Caching DNS server to the TLD DNS server for the .org
domain.
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This is accomplished by sending an NS record with the IP address of that TLD server.
The root server uses an RRSIG record, which is used to store the private key, to sign the
NS record, and the root server sends a copy of the DS record to the Caching DNS server,
which points to the TLD server.
4. The Caching DNS server sends the address query to the TLD server for the .org domain.
5. The TLD server does not have the requested address, so it points the Caching DNS
server to the Authoritative DNS server for example.org.
6. The TLD server sends an NS record with the IP address of the authoritative server for
example.org, and the TLD server signs the NS record with the private key in the RRSIG
record.
7. The Caching DNS server sends the address query to the Authoritative DNS server for
example.org.
8. The Authoritative DNS server for example.org does not have the requested address, so
it responds to the caching server’s request by sending the NS record (signed with the
RRSIG record).
9. This NS record contains the IP address of the Authoritative DNS server for zone1.ex-
ample.org.
10. The server sends the DS record for the zone1.example.org server to the Caching DNS
server.
11. The Caching DNS server sends the address query to the Authoritative DNS server for
zone1.example.org, which happens to be the ACOS device.
12. The Caching DNS server has reached the Authoritative DNS server for zone1.ex-
ample.org.
13. The Authoritative DNS server (which is the ACOS device) replies with an SOA record,
the requested A record, and RRSIG records that contains the private key, which is used
to sign the SOA and A records.
14. The Caching DNS server asks the ACOS device for its DNSKEY record, which is where the
public key for the zone is advertised.
15. This public key is needed to unlock the resource records and verify the hash values
back up the chain.
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16. The ACOS device sends its DNSKEY record, with an RRSIG record that was used to sign
the DNSKEY record.
17. The RRSIG record contains the private key.
18. To continue assembling the chain of trust, the Caching DNS server asks the Author-
itative DNS server for example.org for its DNSKEY record.
19. The Authoritative DNS server for example.org sends its DNSKEY record with an RRSIG
record (with the private key) that was used to sign the DNSKEY record.
20. The Caching DNS server asks the TLD server for .org for its DNSKEY record.
21. The TLD server sends its DNSKEY record with an RRSIG record that was used to sign the
DNSKEY record.
22. The Caching DNS server now has all the private/public key pairs and has validated all of
the links in the chain of trust.
The Caching DNS server can now send the trusted response to the DNS resolver on the client.
The presence of a Chain of Trust allows the client’s DNS resolver to know that all of the DNS
servers in the chain have vouched for one another, starting from the Root DNS Server and
continuing down to the lowest-level DNS server.
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The DNSSEC Chain of Trust shows the Authoritative DNS Server for the zone1.example.org
domain at the bottom left, and the Root DNS Server is located at the upper right.
Starting from the lower left, the Authoritative DNS Server for the zone1.example.org domain,
has a DNS key record (DNSKEY). This DNSKEY record contains the public Zone Signing Key
(ZSK) for zone1. The ZSK is used to sign other record types, such as A records, for the zone.
The DNSKEY record is signed by the Key Signing Key (KSK), which also belongs to this zone.
The Start of Authority (SOA) record indicates that this server is the Authoritative DNS Server
for zone1. The A record provides the IP address for zone1.example.org.
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The next level up in the DNS hierarchy corresponds to the next “label” in the example.org
domain, and it has a record called the Delegation Signer (DS). The DS record contains a hash,
or message digest, of the public Key Signing Key (KSK), which belongs to the Authoritative
DNS Server for the node below, zone1.example.org.
The DNS resolver (or the Caching DNS Server) can compare the hash value for any of the
nodes in the Chain of Trust, and the values should match. If the hash values in a DS record
cannot be recreated from the DNSKEY record, packet that contains the key record may have
been tampered with, cannot be trusted, and should be discarded.
However, if the hash value is correct, this indicates that the Chain of Trust is unbroken and
that the DNSKEY record for the Authoritative DNS Server that is associated with the zone1.ex-
ample.org domain is properly linked to the DS record above.
In turn, the DNSKEY record for the Authoritative DNS Server associated with the example.org
domain is properly linked to the DS record above. This process of DNSKEY records being
linked with the DS record of the node above continues all the way to the Root DNS Server.
The client’s DNS resolver knows that the Root DNS Server is legitimate due to the presence of
a “trust anchor”. This trust anchor, which consists of information for the Root DNS Server, is
included in the resolver software that is installed on the client. This minimizes the chance
that a client could access a corrupt root DNS server.
Because of this anchor, the client knows that the Root DNS Server can be trusted, and the cli-
ent can infer that the other nodes in the Chain of Trust can also be trusted. The hash values
match all the way down the line, which is an indication that the Chain of Trust is intact, and
that the client’s DNS resolver can trust the Authoritative DNS Server for zone1.example.org.
The Server is located at the bottom of the Chain of Trust in the DNS hierarchy.
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When HSM and DNSSEC are enabled, ACOS uses the following key generation and rollover set-
tings for DNSSEC:
l Key size – Length of the keys in bits. You can specify 1024-4096 bits. The default
length for ZSKs and KSKs is 2048 bits.
l Lifetime – Maximum amount of time a dynamically generated key remains valid.
l Rollover time – Amount of time to wait after a new key becomes active, before gen-
erating that key’s replacement.
The range of values for the lifetime and rollover time is 1 to 2,147,483,647 seconds (about 68
years). The default lifetime and rollover time differ for ZSKs and KSKs:
l ZSKs – The default lifetime is 7,776,000 seconds (90 days), and the default rollover time
is 7,171,200 seconds (83 days).
l KSKs – The default lifetime is 31,536,000 seconds (365 days), and the rollover time is
30,931,200 seconds (358 days).
The features such as dynamic key generation and rollover are enabled by default when a
DNSSEC template becomes active. No additional configuration is required. The DNSSEC -
Default Rekey and Rollover shows the rekey and rollover schedule if the default rekey and
rollover settings for ZSKs and KSKs are used.
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When DNSSEC is enabled, HSM generates a KSK for the GSLB zone, generates a ZSK for the
zone, and signs it with the KSK. The following text is an example of message that appears in
the log.
ACOS generates messages such as the following when key regeneration occurs:
Log Buffer: 30000 Jul 31 2013 06:49:13 Notice [DNS]:succeed to reload the sig-
nature of zone "test.com"
Jul 31 2013 06:48:58 Notice [CLI]: DNSSEC module:succeed to generate ZSK test.-
com_zsk_2013-07-31-06-48-58 for zone test.com
Jul 31 2013 06:48:58 Notice [CLI]: DNSSEC module:please transfer the DS RR of
zone test.com to the parent zone for the initial process.
Jul 31 2013 06:48:58 Notice [CLI]: DNSSEC module:succeed to generate KSK test.-
com_ksk_2013-07-31-06-48-57 for zone test.com
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The first message, starting at the bottom, indicates a successful generation of a KSK for child
zone test.com. The next message, which is second from the bottom, is a reminder to copy the
DS resource record for the key to the authoritative DNS server for the parent zone.
The third message indicates a successful generation of the ZSK for child zone test.com. The
final message at the top, indicates completion of the rekey process.
The import command is used to import and export DNSSEC key files. For example, to import a
file:
To export a file:
After enabling DNSSEC, wait about a minute for the key to be generated. You can use the
export dnssec-ds command to copy the DS resource record for the zone to the DNS server
that is authoritative for the parent zone.
The dnssec key-rollover command allows you to force an immediate key rollover, if neces-
sary. For example, to force an immediate ZSK rollover in emergency mode:
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The start option initiates a rollover for the specified key type.
For KSK rollover, the ds-ready-in-parent-zone option indicates that the DS record for the
new KSK has been exported to the parent zone. Use this option only after you have installed
the DS record for the new KSK on the authoritative DNS server for the parent zone. For
example:
Use the zsk lifetime and ksk lifetime commands to change the lifetime and rollover set-
tings for ZSKs and KSKs, respectively.
Enter the commands at the configuration level for the DNSSEC template.
NOTE: For more information about the supported values, see Key Gen-
eration and Rollover Parameters.
The current release supports a software emulation version of HSM in ACOS. Keys are gen-
erated and stored on the ACOS device. This version can be useful for testing or for envir-
onments where the additional security of a hardware-based HSM is not required.
HSM is required for DNSSEC, and manual key generation of DNSSEC ZSKs or KSKs is not sup-
ported. For information about external HSM support, contact A10 Networks.
DNSSEC Configuration
This following topics are covered:
Modes 108
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Modes
The following are the configuration modes from a device that is configured for DNSSEC.
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Configuring GSLB
The following commands configure GSLB.
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The dns server command enables server mode, and also enables this ACOS device to be the
authoritative DNS server for the GSLB zones that use this policy.
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Chapter 11: Location-Based VIP Access
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ACOS determines a client’s location by looking up the client’s subnet in the geo-location data-
base that is used by Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB).
Example
The following class list maps client geo-locations to limit IDs (LIDs), which specify the max-
imum number of concurrent connections allowed for clients in the geo-locations.
L US 1
L US.CA 2
L US.CA.SJ 3
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The following commands import the class list to the ACOS device, configure a policy tem-
plate, and bind the template to a virtual port. The connection limits specified in the policy
template apply to clients that send requests to the virtual port.
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Success: 3
Geo-location M ID Permit Deny Conn Last
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
US.CA.SJ v 3 1 1 1 77.1.1.107
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Total: 1
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Methods 118
Details
You can configure the list by using a text editor or enter the list into the GUI. If you con-
figure the list by using a text editor, import the list to the ACOS device.
2. Configure an SLB policy (PBSLB) template.
In the template, specify the black/white list name, and the actions to perform for the
group IDs in the list.
3. Verify that the geo-location database is loaded.
For more information about loading the geo-location database, see Loading the IANA
Geo-Location Database.
4. Apply the policy template to the virtual port for which you want to control access.
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Methods
You can configure black/white lists in one of the following ways:
l Remote – Use a text editor and import the list to the ACOS device.
l Local – Enter the black/white list in a management GUI window.
With both methods, the syntax is the same. The black/white list must be a text file that con-
tains entries (rows) in the following format:
The various parameters in the syntax are described in the Black/White List Syntax Descrip-
tion.
Parameter Description
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Parameter Description
L "US" 1
L "US.CA" 2
L "JP" 3
NOTE: For more details and information about any of the required
fields on this page, see the latest version of the GUI Online
Help.
3. Click Create.
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NOTE: For more details and information about any of the required
fields on this page, see the latest version of the GUI Online
Help.
5. Click OK.
NOTE: For more information, see the Global Server Load Balancing
Guide.
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CLI Example
The following command imports black/white list “geolist” onto the ACOS device.
The following commands configure a policy template named “geoloc” and add the black-
/white list to it. The template is configured to drop traffic from clients in the geo-location
mapped to group 1 in the list.
The following commands apply the policy template to port 80 on virtual server “vip1”:
To view SLB geo-location statistics, use the show slb geo-location command.
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Details
By default, when a client requests a connection, the ACOS device checks the connection
count only for the specific geo-location level of the client. If the connection limit for that spe-
cific geo-location level is not reached, the client’s connection is permitted. Similarly, the per-
mit counter is increased only for that specific geo-location level.
Geo-location connection limit example shows an example set of geo-location connection lim-
its and current connections.
US 100 100
US.CA 50 37
US.CA.SanJose 20 19
Using the default behavior, the connection request from the client at US.CA.SanJose is
allowed even though CA has reached its connection limit. Similarly, a connection request
from a client at US.CA is allowed. However, a connection request from a client whose location
match is simply “US” is denied.
After these three clients are permitted or denied, the connection permit and deny counters
are increased in the following way:
When full-domain checking is enabled, the ACOS device checks the current connection count
not only for the client’s specific geo-location, but for all geo-locations higher up in the
domain tree.
Based on full-domain checking, all three connection requests from the clients in the example
above are denied. This is because the US domain has reached its connection limit. Similarly,
the counters for each domain are updated as follows:
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To enable full-domain checking for geo-location-based connection limiting, enter the geo-
location full-domain-tree command at the configuration level for the PBSLB template:
NOTE: You must enable or disable this option before you enable GSLB.
Changing the state of this option while GSLB is running can
cause the related statistics counters to be incorrect.
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Details
You can enable sharing of statistics counters for all virtual servers and virtual ports that use
a PBSLB template. This option causes the following counters to be shared by the virtual serv-
ers and virtual ports that use the template:
l Permit
l Deny
l Connection number
l Connection limit
To enable the share option, enter the geo-location share command at the configuration
level for the PBSLB policy template:
NOTE: You must enable or disable this option before you enable GSLB.
Changing the state of this option while GSLB is running can
cause the related statistics counters to be incorrect.
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