Ddos Mitigation Guide (For Adc) : Acos 5.2.1-P1
Ddos Mitigation Guide (For Adc) : Acos 5.2.1-P1
Ddos Mitigation Guide (For Adc) : Acos 5.2.1-P1
1-P1
DDoS Mitigation Guide (for ADC)
February, 2021
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Getting Started 11
Application Access Management 12
Login Portal 12
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) 12
Authentication Relay 12
AAA Health Monitoring and Load Balancing 13
Online Certificate Status Protocol 13
DDoS Mitigation 13
Attack Detection and Prevention using ZBAR 14
Single CPU Attack Prevention 15
Policy-Based SLB 15
SYN Cookies 15
IP Limiting 16
ICMP Rate Limiting 16
Web Application Firewall 16
Slowloris Prevention 17
DNS Application Firewall 17
DNSSEC 17
SSL Insight 17
Geo-location-based VIP Access 18
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TCP-SYN-frag 21
IP Anomaly Filters for System-wide PBSLB 21
Threshold 22
SOCKSTRESS_CHECK Session State 22
Implementation Notes 22
Configuring IP Anomaly Filtering 23
Using the GUI to Configure IP Anomaly Filtering 23
Using the CLI to Configure IP Anomaly Filtering 23
Displaying IP Anomaly Statistics 24
Using the GUI to Display IP Anomaly Statistics 24
Using the CLI to Display IP Anomaly Statistics 24
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Chapter 5: IP Limiting 55
Overview of IP Limiting 56
Understanding Class Lists 56
Class List Syntax 57
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IP Address Matching 58
Example Class Lists 59
Configuring Class Lists 59
Using the GUI to Import a Class List 60
Using the GUI to Configure a Class List 60
Using the CLI to Import a Class List 60
Using the CLI to Configure a Class List 61
Understanding IP Limiting Rules 61
Parameters 61
Match IP Address 63
Request Limiting and Request-Rate Limiting in Class Lists 63
CLI Examples: Request Limiting and Request-rate Limiting Settings Are Used 64
Example 1: GLID Used in Policy Template and Bound to Virtual Port 64
Example 2: LID Used in Policy Template and Bound to Virtual Port 64
CLI Examples: Request Limiting and Request-rate Limiting Settings Are Not Used 65
Example 1: Policy Template Bound to Virtual Server Instead of Virtual Port 65
Example 2: System GLID 65
Example 3: System-wide Policy Template 66
Configuring Source IP Limiting 66
CLI Examples - Configuration 66
Configuring System-wide IP Limiting With a Single Class 67
Configuring System-wide IP Limiting With Multiple Classes 67
Configuring IP Limiting on a Virtual Server 68
Configuring IP Limiting on a Virtual Port 68
Configuring Class List Entries That Age Out 69
CLI Examples - Display 70
Viewing Class-Lists 70
Viewing IP Limiting Rules 70
Viewing IP Limiting Statistics 71
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Glossary 129
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Chapter 1: Getting Started
ACOS provides a suite of security features that allow you to protect your customer traffic:
DDoS Mitigation 13
Policy-Based SLB 15
SYN Cookies 15
IP Limiting 16
Slowloris Prevention 17
DNSSEC 17
SSL Insight 17
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Login Portal 12
Authentication Relay 12
NOTE: For more information about AAM, see the Application Access Man-
agement Guide.
Login Portal
Provides certificate verification services and eliminates the need to import certificate revocation list
(CRL) files to the ACOS device.
The CRLs are maintained on the OCSP responder (server). When a client sends its certificate as part
of a request for a secured service, ACOS first sends the certificate to the OCSP responder for veri-
fication. After the certificate is verified, the client can access secured services.
Authentication Relay
Offloads your AAA servers. ACOS contacts the backend AAA servers on behalf of the clients, and
after a server responds, ACOS caches the reply and uses this reply for subsequent client requests.
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Load balances authentication traffic among a group of AAA servers. ACOS supports custom health
checks for LDAP, RADIUS, Kerberos, and OCSP.
OCSP is an efficient alternative to CRLs, which is also supported by ACOS. To use CRLs with ACOS,
you must import the CRL files into the ACOS device. If you use OCSP, ACOS can also send cer-
tificate verification queries to external OCSP servers (generally called responders). This process
only occurs when a client sends a certificate as part of a request to set up a secure session to a
server application that is managed by ACOS.
NOTE: For more information about OSCP, see: Checking Client Certificates
Using OCSP in the SSL Configuration Guide and AAM with OCSP in
the Application Access Management Guide.
DDoS Mitigation
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a type of DoS attack where multiple systems that are infec-
ted with a Trojan or malware are, in turn, used to target a particular system. This process causes a
denial of service. If a hacker (attacker) mounts an attack from one host, this is classified as a DoS
attack. In a DDoS attack, many systems are used simultaneously to launch attacks against a
remote system.
ACOS includes filters that check traffic for IP anomalies that can indicate a DDoS attack.
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Analytics infrastructure – It adaptively baselines multiple traffic metrics and creates a mon-
itoring entity that observes and determines the traffic baselines and sets attack thresholds.
On attack detection, it triggers the ZBAR infrastructure.
ZBAR (Zero Day source behavior Attack Recognition) infrastructure - It dynamically classifies
the incoming traffic based on real-time traffic conditions. The ZBAR framework performs clus-
tering based on multiple metrics from the sources hitting the attacked Destin-
ation/Destination-Service. By mapping the sources to these metrics, ZBAR determines the
miscreant source/sources, along with the associated confidence score, suspected of caus-
ing a DDoS attack.
Packet capture infrastructure – It automatically captures a few packets from the deemed
attackers and stores them as evidence and signature extraction. You can view these cap-
tured packets using the following show command,
show visibility packet-capture packet-capture-files
The captured packets for the bad sources can also be exported using the following com-
mand,
export visibility pktcapture-file file
Additionally, the following show commands are added to view ZBAR information:
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Policy-Based SLB
Policy-based SLB (PBSLB) allows you to “black list” or “white list” individual clients or client subnets.
Based on actions that you specify, ACOS will allow (white list) or drop (black list) traffic from specific
client hosts or subnets in the list.
NOTE: For more information about policy-based SLB, see Policy-based SLB.
SYN Cookies
SYN cookies provide protection against a common type of DDoS attack, the TCP SYN flood attack.
The attacker sends a high volume of TCP-SYN requests to the target device, but the attacker does
not reply to SYN-ACKs to complete the three-way handshake for any of the sessions. The purpose
of the attack is to consume the target’s resources with half-open TCP sessions.
When SYN cookies are enabled, the ACOS device can continue to serve legitimate clients during
TCP SYN flood attacks, while preventing illegitimate traffic from consuming system resources.
NOTE: For more information about SYN cookies, see SYN Cookies.
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IP Limiting
IP limiting provides a enhanced implementation of the source IP connection limiting and con-
nection-rate limiting feature that was available in earlier releases.
NOTE: For more information about ICMP rate limiting, see ICMP Rate Lim-
iting.
This new layer of security examines the following types of traffic to safeguard against Web attacks
and protect sensitive information hosted on Web servers:
NOTE: Fore more information about WAF, see the Web Application Firewall
Guide.
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Slowloris Prevention
In addition to the WAF, ACOS includes an HTTP security option that prevents Slowloris attacks, in
which the attacker attempts to consume resources on the target system with incomplete HTTP
request headers.
NOTE: For more information about Slowloris prevention, see HTTP Slowloris
Prevention.
NOTE: For more information about DAF, see DNS Application Firewall.
DNSSEC
ACOS supports DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). In Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)
deployments, you can use DNSSEC with Hardware Module Security (HSM) to dynamically secure
DNS resource records for GSLB zones.
NOTE:
For more information about DNSSEC, see DNSSEC Support.
The ACOS also supports DNS caching for DNSSEC, but
DNSSEC support for caching does not require GSLB.
SSL Insight
SSL Insight (SSLi) provides high-performance SSL decryption and re-encryption. When used in
conjunction with third-party traffic inspection devices, SSLi adds content-level security.
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SSLi decrypts SSL-encrypted client traffic and sends the decrypted traffic to a third-party traffic
inspection device. Traffic that is permitted by the traffic inspection device is re-encrypted by ACOS
and forwarded to its destination.
NOTE: For more information about SSL Insight, see “SSL Insight” in the SSL
Configuration Guide.
ACOS determines a client’s location by looking up the client’s subnet in the geo-location database
that is used by Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB).
NOTE: For more information about Geo-location-based VIP access, see Loca-
tion-Based VIP Access.
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Chapter 2: IP Anomaly Filtering
ACOS helps you detect and mitigate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. One of the fea-
tures, IP anomaly filtering, can protect against numerous types of attacks.
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IP Anomaly Filters 20
Threshold 22
Implementation Notes 22
IP Anomaly Filters
Users can enable the following IP anomaly filters. This section has the following sub-sections:
Frag 20
IP-option 21
Land-attack 21
Out-of-sequence Packet 21
Ping-of-death 21
TCP-no-flag 21
TCP-SYN-FIN 21
TCP-SYN-frag 21
Frag
Drops all IP fragments, which can be used to attack hosts that run IP stacks with known vul-
nerabilities in their fragment reassembly code.
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IP-option
Drops all packets with IP options.
Land-attack
Drops spoofed SYN packets that contain the same IP address as the source and destination. These
packets can be used to launch an “IP land attack”.
Out-of-sequence Packet
This is a type of filtering packet.
Ping-of-death
Drops all jumbo ICMP packets, which are also known as “ping of death” packets.
TCP-no-flag
Drops all TCP packets that have no TCP flags set.
TCP-SYN-FIN
Drops all TCP packets in which both the SYN and FIN flags are set.
TCP-SYN-frag
Drops incomplete (fragmented) TCP Syn packets, which can be used to launch TCP Syn flood
attacks.
The following IP anomaly filters are supported for system-wide PBSLB, although you can also use
them without PBSLB:
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When these filters are enabled, the ACOS device checks for these anomalies in new HTTP or HTTPS
connection requests from clients.
Filtering for these anomalies is disabled by default. However, if you configure a system-wide
PBSLB policy, the filters are automatically enabled. You also can configure the filters on an indi-
vidual basis.
NOTE:
These filters are supported only for HTTP and HTTPS traffic.
For information about system-wide PBSLB.
Threshold
The threshold specifies the number of times the anomaly is allowed to occur in a client’s con-
nection requests.
If system-wide PBSLB is configured, ACOS applies the policy’s over-limit action to clients that
exceed the threshold. The range for the threshold value is 1-127 occurrences of the anomaly, and
the default value is 10.
NOTE: The thresholds are not tracked by PBSLB policies that are bound to
individual virtual ports.
When the ACOS device checks a data packet against the new IP anomaly filters, the client’s session
is in the SOCKSTRESS_CHECK state. You might see this state if you are viewing debug output for
the client’s session.
Implementation Notes
Consider the following information when you work with IP anomaly filtering:
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AX 3200-12
To use the GUI, navigate to Security >> DDoS Protection and select the anomaly for which you want
to enable protection.
To enable IP anomaly filters from the CLI, use the ip anomaly-drop command.
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For example, the following command enables DDoS protection against ping-of-death attacks:
ACOS(config)# ip anomaly-drop ping-of-death
Refer to the “ip anomaly-drop” command in the Network Configuration Guide for more information
about this command.
For system-wide PBSLB statistics, you use the show pbslb client command. In the output of
this command, the counters for a dynamic client are reset to 0 when a client’s dynamic entry ages
out.
To clear all Layer 4 SLB statistics, including the IP anomaly counters, enter the clear slb l4 com-
mand:
NOTE: For more information about these commands, see Command Line
Interface Reference Guide.
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Chapter 3: Policy-based SLB
These topics helps you understand and configure policy-based SLB (PBSLB).
Overview 26
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Overview
ACOS allows you to “black list” or “white list” individual clients or client subnets. White list traffic is
allowed, and black list traffic is dropped from specific client hosts or subnets in the list.
For white list traffic, you can specify the service group to use. You also can specify the action that
will be taken (drop or reset) on new connections that exceed the configured connection threshold
for the client address.
Example
The user can configure ACOS to respond to DDoS attacks from a client by dropping excessive con-
nection attempts from the client.
You can apply PBSLB on a system-wide basis. If Server Load Balancing (SLB) is supported, you
also can apply PBSLB on individual virtual ports.
NOTE:
ACOS also allows policy templates to be applied at the vir-
tual-server level. However, PBSLB does not take effect if you
apply the policy template at the virtual- server level. Only
class lists are supported at the virtual-server level. To use
PBSLB, you must apply the policy template globally or on
individual virtual ports.
If a connection limit is specified in a black/white list, the
ACOS device does not support using the list for system-
wide PBSLB and for PBSLB on an individual virtual port. In
this case, the ACOS device may increase the current con-
nection counter more than once, which results in a much
lower connection limit than the configured value. To resolve
this issue, you should use separate black/white lists.
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Client IP lists, such as black/white lists, can be configured on an external device and imported to
the ACOS device or can be entered in the GUI. The actions to take on the addresses in the list are
specified on the ACOS device. A black/white list can contain up to 8 million individual host
addresses and up to 64,000 subnet addresses.
For each IP address (host or subnet) in a black/white list, you can add a row by using the following
syntax:
ipaddr [/network-mask] [group-id] [#conn-limit] [;comment-string]
Parameter Description
network-mask Optional network mask length. The default is 32, which means that the
address is a host address.
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Parameter Description
#conn-limit Maximum number of concurrent connections that are allowed from the cli-
ent. By default, there is no connection limit. If you decide to set a limit, the
valid range is between 1 and 32767. On the ACOS device, you can specify
whether to reset or drop new connections that exceed this limit.
comment-string Comment; everything to the right of the semi-colon (;) is ignored by the
ACOS device when it parses the file.
NOTE: The conn-limit is a coarse limit. The larger the number you specify,
the more coarse the limit.
Example
If you specify 100, the ACOS device limits the total connections to 100.
As another example, if you specify 1000, the device limits the connections to a maximum of
992 connections.
If the number in the file is larger than the supported maximum limit value, the parser uses the
longest set of digits in the number that you enter that makes a valid value.
Example
If the file contains 32768, the parser uses 3276 as the value.
As another example, if the file contains 111111, the parser will use 11111 as the value.
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The first row assigns a specific host to group 4. On the ACOS device, the drop action is assigned to
this group, which black lists the client.
The second row black lists an entire subnet by assigning it to the same group (4).
The third row sets the maximum number of concurrent connections for a specific host to 20.
The fourth row assigns a specific host to group 2 and specifies a maximum of 20 concurrent con-
nections.
NOTE: The ACOS device allows up to three parser errors when reading the
file but stops reading after the third parser error.
The ACOS device supports dynamic client entries. You can configure this feature by adding the cli-
ent address 0.0.0.0/0 (wildcard address) to the black/white list that is used by the system-wide
PBSLB policy.
When a client sends an HTTP or HTTPS connection request, the ACOS device checks the system-
wide PBSLB policy’s black/white list for the client’s IP address, with one of the following results:
If there is no entry for the client, he ACOS device creates a dynamic entry for the client’s host
address.
If there is a dynamic entry for the client, the ACOS device resets the timeout value for the
entry. (Dynamic entry aging is described below.)
NOTE: If there is a static entry for the client’s host or subnet address, the
static entry is used instead.
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In this example, the clients who do not match a static entry in the list are assigned to group 1 and
are limited to 20 concurrent connections.
The ACOS device supports up to 8 million dynamic client entries for system-wide PBSLB. Once this
limit is reached, the ACOS device no longer track connections or anomaly counters for additional cli-
ents.
For dynamic entries in a system-wide PBSLB policy’s black/white list, the connection limit in the list
applies to each client.
In the example above, each client that has a dynamic entry in the black/white list will be allowed to
have a maximum of 20 concurrent connections.
When the ACOS device creates a dynamic black/white list entry for a client, the device also sets the
timeout for the entry. The timeout value for the dynamic entry decreases until the timeout reaches
0 or the client sends a new HTTP or HTTPS connection request.
If the client sends a new HTTP or HTTPS connection request, the timeout is reset to its full value. If
the timeout reaches 0 and the client does not have active connections, the dynamic entry is
removed. However, if the client has an active connection, the dynamic entry is not removed until
the client’s connection ends. You can set the timeout to 1-127 minutes, and the default is 5 minutes.
If client-lockup is enabled, the timeout for a locked up client does not begin decreasing until the
lockup expires.
Dynamic client entries are supported only for system-wide PBSLB policies.
You can add a wildcard address (0.0.0.0/0) to a black/white list that is used by a virtual port’s
PBSLB policy. The group ID and connection limit that are specified for the wildcard address are
applied to clients that do not match a static entry in the list.
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The ACOS device does not create dynamic entries in the list.
The connection limit applies collectively to all clients that do not have a static entry in the list.
These options are not available in policies that are applied to individual ports.
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The following example drops any connections from clients exceeding one of the following
limits:
The connection limit that is configured in the specified in the Black/White list.
The threshold of any of the new IP anomaly filters.
To display information for system-wide PBSLB, enter the show pbslb system or show pbslb cli-
ent commands.
To clear PBSLB information, use the clear pbslb system or clear pbslb client commands.
Use the entry option with the clear pbslb client command to clear both statistical counters
and client entries; without this option, only the statistical counters are cleared.
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Configuration Details 33
Configuration Details
You can configure PBSLB parameters for virtual ports by configuring the settings on individual
ports or by configuring a PBSLB policy template and binding the template to individual virtual
ports.
These steps assume that the real servers, service groups, and virtual servers have already been
configured.
To configure PBSLB:
You can configure a policy template and bind the template to virtual ports or configure the fol-
lowing settings on individual virtual ports:
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Optionally, change the action (drop or reset) that ACOS will take on connections that exceed
the specified limit.
Optionally, if necessary, change the client address matching from source IP matching to des-
tination IP matching.
To configure a PBSLB policy for individual virtual ports using the GUI, do the following:
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The following commands import black/white list “sample-bwlist.txt” to the ACOS device:
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The following commands configure a PBSLB template and bind it to a virtual port:
ACOS(config)# slb template policy bw1
ACOS(config-policy)# bw-list name bw1
ACOS(config-policy)# bw-list id 2 service-group srvcgroup2
ACOS(config-policy)# bw-list id 4 drop
ACOS(config-policy)# exit
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server PBSLB_VS1 10.10.10.69
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# port 80 http
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# template policy bw1
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# exit
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# exit
In this example, the ACOS device drops all new connection attempts from a client if one of the fol-
lowing conditions occur:
The client already has 20 active connections and attempts to open a new HTTP or HTTPS con-
nection.
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The lockup period is set to 5 minutes, to continue enforcing the over-limit action for 5 minutes after
the over-limit action is triggered. The timeout for dynamic black/white list entries is set to 2
minutes.
The following command displays statistics for the system-wide PBSLB policy:
ACOS(config)# show pbslb system
System B/W list: bwlist-wc
Virtual Server Port Blacklist/whitelist GID Connection # (Establish Reset Drop)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
System bwlist-wc 1 12 0 0
2 0 0 0
The following command displays summary statistics for individual black/white-list clients:
ACOS# show pbslb client
GID = Group ID, S/D = Static or dynamic entry
Out-s = Out of sequence, Zero-w = Zero window, Bad-c = Bad content
IP S/D GID Conn-limit Curr-conn Age Lockup Out-s Zero-w Bad-c
------------------+---+---+----------+---------+-----+------+-----+------+----
40.40.40.168 /32 D 1 20 5 120 0 0 5 5
40.40.40.169 /32 D 1 20 6 0 5 0 6 6
40.40.40.170 /32 D 1 20 6 0 5 0 6 6
40.40.40.171 /32 D 1 20 6 0 5 0 6 6
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40.40.40.172 /32 D 1 20 6 0 5 0 6 6
40.40.40.173 /32 D 1 20 2 120 0 0 2 2
40.40.40.174 /32 D 1 20 5 120 0 0 5 5
40.40.40.175 /32 D 1 20 5 120 0 0 5 5
40.40.40.160 /32 D 1 20 5 120 0 0 5 5
40.40.40.161 /32 D 1 20 6 120 0 0 6 6
40.40.40.162 /32 D 1 20 6 0 5 0 6 6
40.40.40.163 /32 D 1 20 6 0 5 0 6 6
40.40.40.164 /32 D 1 20 6 0 5 0 6 6
40.40.40.165 /32 D 1 20 5 120 0 0 5 5
The Age column indicates how many seconds are left before a dynamic entry ages out. For clients
who are currently locked out of the system, the value in the Lockup column indicates how many
minutes the lockup will continue. For locked up clients, the age value is 0 until the lockup expires.
After the lockup expires, the age is set to its full value. In this example, the lockup value is 120
seconds.
The following command displays detailed statistics for a specific black/white-list client:
ACOS# show pbslb client 40.40.40.168
IP address: 40.40.40.168
Netmask length: 32
Type: Dynamic
Group ID: 1
Connection limit (0 = no limit): 1984
Current connection: 6
Age: 0 second
Lockup time: 5 minute
Out of sequence: 0
Zero window: 6
Bad content: 6
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Chapter 4: SYN Cookies
These topics describes the SYN-cookie feature and how it helps protect ACOS devices against dis-
ruptive SYN-based flood attacks.
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During a TCP SYN flood attack, an attacker sends many TCP SYN Requests to a network device,
such as a server. The server replies with a standard SYN-ACK message. However, rather than reply
to this attempt at establishing a 3-way handshake with the standard ACK, an attacker ignores the
reply and creates a “half-open” TCP connection. System resources are consumed because the
device waits for a response from the client that never arrives.
Under large-scale attacks, excessive half-open connections cause a network device’s TCP con-
nection queue to become full. This over-subscription prevents the device from establishing new
connections with legitimate clients.
The graphics in this section illustrate how the ACOS device determines whether a particular TCP
connection is from a legitimate request or if it is part of a SYN flood attack.
The FIGURE 4-1 depicts a typical 3-way TCP handshake, which includes a SYN request from the
client, the SYN-ACK reply from the ACOS device, and finally, an ACK from the client to the ACOS
device.
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However, SYN flood attacks (FIGURE 4-2 ) can cripple a network by sending multiple SYN requests
to a network device. The device responds to these SYN requests with SYN-ACKs and waits for
responses from the client that never arrive. These bogus requests create many “half-open” ses-
sions, which wastes system memory and other system resources. The state of being over-
subscribed reduces the device’s free resources, which prevents it from accepting requests from
legitimate clients.
Enabling SYN cookies mitigates the damage caused by such DoS attacks by preventing the
attacks from consuming system resources.
TCP connections for which the ACOS device did not receive an ACK from the client is identified as
belonging to a SYN flood attack, and this information is displayed with the counter in the output of
the show command.
By enabling SYN cookies, the ACOS device’s TCP connection queue is prevented from filling up dur-
ing TCP SYN flood attacks. When a client sends an SYN request, the ACOS device responds with a
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SYN cookies prevent hackers from consuming excessive system resources by encoding the neces-
sary state information for the client connection in a TCP sequence number. Rather than storing
state information for each TCP session, the sequence number in the SYN cookie acts as a short-
hand, which allows the ACOS device to compress much of the session information into a smaller
amount of data.
This sequence number is sent to the client as a SYN-ACK packet. When a legitimate client receives
this information, it replies with an ACK that contains the sequence number plus 1.
When the SYN ACK that contains the sequence number from the client is received, the ACOS
device reconstructs the connection information and establishes a connection with that client.
If the SYN Request is part of an attack, the attacker does not send an ACK to the ACOS device. The
ACOS device sends a SYN cookie, but the attacker does not receive it (or may choose to ignore it),
and the ACOS device does not establish a connection.
You can configure on and off thresholds for SYN cookies. When there are no TCP SYN attacks, the
TCP options are preserved.
By default, hardware-based SYN cookies are disabled. When the feature is enabled, there are no
default settings for the on- and off-threshold. If you omit the on-threshold and off-threshold
options, SYN cookies are enabled and are always on, regardless of the number of half-open TCP
connections on the ACOS device.
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NOTE: It may take up to 10 milliseconds for the ACOS device to detect and
respond to crossover of either threshold.
SYN Cookie Buffering optimizes performance by increasing the amount of buffers that are alloc-
ated to TCP connections when system memory usage is low and reducing the number of buffers
when system memory usage is high.
When SYN cookies are enabled, the ACOS device allocates 10 buffers to each TCP connection, and
by default, offers a TCP window size of 8000.
When memory usage increases and system resources are scarce, the number of buffers that are
reserved for each TCP connection gradually reduces from 10 buffers to 1 buffer per TCP con-
nection. The window size also reduces during this process.
SYN Cookie Buffering is automatically enabled when SYN cookies are enabled. By default, 10 buf-
fers are allocated to each TCP connection. Instead being dropped and requiring later re-trans-
mission, the packets are stored in the ACOS device’s memory and forwarded to the real server
when the back-end connection is available.
Software-based SYN cookies is an optional feature that is available on certain AX models at the con-
figuration level for virtual ports. The ACOS device bases Selective Acknowledgment (SACK) sup-
port, and the maximum segment size (MSS) setting, in software-based SYN cookies on server
replies to TCP health checks that are sent to the servers.
SACK 43
MSS 44
SACK
The ACOS device includes the Sack-Permitted option in TCP SYN health check packets sent to serv-
ers.
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If all of the up servers in the service group reply with a TCP SYN-ACK that contains a SACK
option, the ACOS device uses SACK with the software-based SYN-cookie feature for all serv-
ers in the service group.
If any of the up servers in the service group do not send a SACK option, the ACOS device
does not use SACK with the software-based SYN-cookie feature for any servers in the ser-
vice group.
MSS
The lowest MSS value that is supported by a server in the service group is the MSS value that is
used by the ACOS device for software-based SYN-cookies.
Details 44
FTA Models 45
Non-FTA Models 46
Details
Depending on the Thunder or AX model, you can use hardware-based SYN cookies or software-
based SYN cookies:
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Hardware-based SYN cookies can be globally enabled and applied to all virtual server ports
that are configured on the device.
Hardware-based SYN cookies are available on FTA devices. See the FTA Devices section on
the A10 Hardware Install Guides website for a list of FTA Thunder and AX devices.
Software-based SYN cookies can be enabled on individual virtual ports. This version of the
feature is available on all AX models.
If your AX model supports hardware-based SYN cookies, A10 Networks recommends that you use
the hardware-based version of the feature instead of the software-based version.
If both hardware-based and software-based SYN cookies are enabled, only hardware-based SYN
cookies are used. Although software-based SYN cookies can be enabled, they are not used.
If Application Delivery Partitioning (ADP) is configured, hardware-based SYN cookies apply to all
partitions. The feature is not partition-aware.
If the target VIP is in a different subnet from the client-side router, use of hardware-based
SYN cookies requires some additional configuration.
NOTE: For more information, see Configuration with Target VIP and
Client-side Router in Different Subnets.
Software-based SYN cookies are supported only in software releases that support SLB.
FTA Models
To enable hardware-based SYN cookies on ACOS models that feature FTAs, use the syn-cookie
enable command at the global configuration level:.
The command in the following example enables dynamic-based SYN cookies when the number of
concurrent half-open TCP connections exceeds 50000 and disables SYN cookies when the num-
ber falls below 30000:
ACOS(config)# syn-cookie enable on-threshold 50000 off-threshold 30000
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Non-FTA Models
To enable software-based SYN cookies, use the syn-cookie command at the virtual-port level. For
example:
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server vip1
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# port 80 tcp
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# syn-cookie
Usually, the target VIP in an SLB configuration is in the same subnet as the client-side router.
However, if the target VIP is in a different subnet, to use hardware-based SYN cookies, configure
the following items:
On the ACOS device, configure a “dummy” VIP that is in the same subnet as the client-side
router.
On the client-side router, configure a static route to the VIP by using the dummy VIP as the
next hop.
FIGURE 4-3 Hardware-based SYN Cookies – Target VIP and Client-Side Router in Different Subnets
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The following commands configure hardware-based SYN cookies on the ACOS device:
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server dummyvip 10.10.10.154
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# exit
ACOS(config)# syn-cookie
NOTE: If VRRP-A is configured, add both the target VIP and the dummy VIP
to the same VRID so these VIPs will fail over as a unit.
To modify the threshold for TCP handshake completion, use the ip tcp syn-cookie threshold
global configuration command.
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Details 48
Details
When SYN cookies are enabled, 10 buffers are available to hold overflow packets from each client
session. When the system memory is occupied, the number of buffers dedicated to each TCP con-
nection is reduced. The reduction process occurs gradually and is tied to system memory usage.
There are three different thresholds that can be configured on the ACOS device. When these free
system memory thresholds are breached, the number of buffers that are allocated to each session
(and the TCP window size) are reduced. This reduction in the TCP window sized is an attempt to
prevent the client from sending data faster than the ACOS device can receive it.
The graduated buffers and window sizes appear below. By default, each TCP session is allocated
10 buffers, and the TCP window size is set to 8K.
If the first threshold is breached, the buffer is reduced to 4 buffers, and the TCP window size
is reduced to 4K.
If the next memory threshold is breached, the buffer is reduced to 2 buffers, and the TCP win-
dow size is reduced to 2K.
If the final threshold is breached, the buffer is reduced to 1 buffer, and the TCP window size is
reduced to 1K.
These thresholds are based on system memory usage, and the values are configurable.
The total number of buffers varies from one model to the next and is based on the total memory per
connection.
If hardware-based SYN cookies are enabled, ACOS does not modify the TCP window size.
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NOTE: For more information, see the latest version of the Online Help for addi-
tional information about the fields.
You do not have to change the system memory usage thresholds from the default settings.
However, you can modify these thresholds by entering the following CLI commands:
!
slb common
buff-thresh hw-buff num relieve-thresh num sys-buff-low num sys-buf-high num
For additional information about changing the system memory thresholds, see the buff-thresh
command in the Command Line Interface Reference.
To display SYN-cookie statistics, navigate to the ADC >> Statistics >> L4 page in the GUI.
NOTE: For more information, see the latest version of the Online Help for addi-
tional information about the fields.
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This section summarizes some of the CLI commands that can be used to view SYN-cookie stat-
istics.
L4 SYN attack 50
L4 TCP Established 50
The following fields in the output of the show slb l4 command allow you to view TCP traffic in
terms of legitimate traffic and attacks.
L4 SYN attack
Displays a running counter of the number of packets that the ACOS device considers to be from a
SYN flood attack. This assumption is based on the fact that the device did not receive an ACK from
the client.
L4 TCP Established
Displays a running counter of TCP packets that the ACOS device considers to be from legitimate cli-
ents. When SYN cookies are enabled, and a legitimate client sends a SYN request, the ACOS device
responds with a SYN ACK. If the ACOS device receives an ACK, the packet is considered safe.
Current
1 second
5 seconds
30 seconds
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1 minute
5 minutes
The following command displays SYN-cookie statistics across multiple time intervals:
ACOS# show slb attack-prevention
Current 1 sec 5 sec 30 sec 1 min 5 min
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SYN cookie snt 0 0 0 0 0 0
SYN cookie snt ts 0 0 0 0 0 0
SYN cookie snt fail 0 0 0 0 0 0
SYN cookie chk fail 0 0 0 0 0 0
SYN attack 0 0 0 0 0 0
The TABLE 4-4 displays the fields that appear in the CLI output of the show slb attack-pre-
vention command.
Field Description
SYN cookie snt Number of TCP SYN cookie send attempts that failed.
fail
SYN cookie chk Number of TCP SYN cookies for which the responding ACK failed the SYN
fail cookie check.
SYN attack Total number of SYN connections that did not receive an ACK from the client
and assumed to be SYN attack.
Limitations
When running the show slb attack-prevention command on an FTA model, the SYN
attack field does not display output for the historical counters (1s/5s/30s/1min/5min). Out-
put is only provided for the Current column.
This feature is supported for L3V private partitions in non-FTA models. If the show slb
attack-prevention command is run from an L3V network partitions on an FTA model, the
SYN attack counter displays zero for all columns.
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ies work correctly in L3V and non-L3V deployments, counters that are associated with hardware-
based SYN cookies do not work with private partitions.
The TABLE 4-5 shows the limitations that are associated with using SYN flood attack counters
under a variety of conditions.
The SYN cookie counter incremented? column indicates whether the SYN cookie counter display
will function correctly, based on the status of the other conditions that are associated with this
deployment.
1If hardware-based and software-based SYN cookies are enabled, only hardware-based SYN cook-
ies are used. “Irrelevant” means that hardware-based SYN cookies are also enabled.
2“No” means that the SYN flood attack counters fail when hardware- and software-based SYN
cookies are enabled at the same time as L3V (private partitions). This is a known limitation with this
feature.
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54
Chapter 5: IP Limiting
IP limiting provides a an enhanced implementation of the source IP connection limiting and con-
nection-rate limiting feature. These topics describe the IP limiting options and how to configure
and apply these options.
Overview of IP Limiting 56
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Overview of IP Limiting
IP limiting provides the following benefits:
Configuration flexibility:
You can apply source IP limiting on a system-wide basis, on individual virtual servers, or on indi-
vidual virtual ports.
Class lists:
You can configure different classes of clients, and apply a separate set of IP limits to each class.
You also can exempt specific clients from being limited.
Concurrent connections
Connection rate
Concurrent Layer 7 requests
Layer 7 request rate
NOTE: Layer 7 request limiting applies only to the HTTP, HTTPS, and fast-
HTTP virtual port types.
NOTE: Class lists can be configured only in the shared partition. A policy tem-
plate that is configured in a shared partition or in a private partition
can use a class list that is configured in the shared partition.
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IP Address Matching 58
Each row in the class list defines a client class and has the following format:
ipaddr /network-mask [glid num | lid num] [age minutes] [; comment-string]
Parameter Description
ipaddr Specifies the host or subnet address of the client. Both IPv4 and IPv6
addresses are supported.
glid num Specifies the ID of the IP limiting rule that will be used to match clients. A glid
configures an IP limiting rule that is configured at the global configuration
level.
lid num Specifies the ID of the IP limiting rule that will be used to match clients. A lid
configures an IP limiting rule that is configured at the same level as the class
list (in the same policy template).
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Parameter Description
age minutes Removes a host entry from the class list after the specified number of
minutes. You can specify 1-2000 minutes.
When you assign an age value, the host entry remains in the class list only for
the specified number of minutes. After the age reaches 0, the host entry is
removed from the class list in the next minute.
You can use the age option with IP limiting options in the LID or GLID to tem-
porarily control client access. Traffic limiting settings in the LID or GLID that
are assigned to the host entry are in effect only until the age expires.
The age option applies only to host entries (IPv4 /32 or IPv6 /128). The age
option is not supported for subnet entries.
;comment- Custom comment. Use a semi-colon (;) in front of the comment string.
string
NOTE: The ACOS device discards the comment string
when you save the class list.
IP Address Matching
By default, the ACOS device matches the class-list entries based on the source IP address of client
traffic. Optionally, you can also match based on one of the following items:
Destination IP address:
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Matches based on the IP address in a header in the HTTP request. You can specify the header
when you enable this option.
Here is an example of a simple class list. This list matches on all clients and uses an IP limiting rule
that is configured at the global configuration level:
0.0.0.0/0 glid 1
For individual host 1.1.1.1, use IP limiting rule 1, which is configured in a policy template.
A policy template can be applied globally for system-wide IP limiting or to an individual vir-
tual server or virtual port. This is described in more detail in a later section.
For all hosts in subnet 2.2.2.0/24, use IP limiting rule 2, which is configured in a policy tem-
plate.
For all hosts that do not match another entry in the class list, use IP limiting rule 10, which is
configured in a policy template.
For individual host 3.3.3.3, use IP limiting rule 3, which is configured at the global con-
figuration level.
For individual host 4.4.4.4, do not use an IP limiting rule.
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1. Hover over ADC and select SLB from the menu bar.
2. Click the Class Lists tab, then select Import from the drop-down list.
3. Click Import.
4. Specify the name and location of the file you want to import. Refer to the GUI online help for
this page for more information about each field.
5. Click Import.
1. Hover over ADC and select SLB from the menu bar.
2. Click the Class Lists tab, then select Configuration from the drop-down list.
3. Click Create.
4. In the Name field, specify a class list name.
5. Complete the fields on this page as desired. Refer to the GUI online help for this page for more
information about each field.
NOTE: If the class list contains at least 100 entries, you should use the
Store as a file option. A class list can be exported only if you use
this option.
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NOTE: See Class List Syntax for more information about the syntax.
Parameters 61
Match IP Address 63
CLI Examples: Request Limiting and Request-rate Limiting Settings Are Used 64
CLI Examples: Request Limiting and Request-rate Limiting Settings Are Not Used65
Parameters
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When you enable logging, by default, a separate message is generated for each over-limit occur-
rence. If you specify a logging period, the ACOS device keeps the repeated messages for the spe-
cified period and sends a message at the end of the period for all instances that occurred during
this period.
The logging period can be 0-255 minutes. The default is 0, which means that there is no wait
period.
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NOTE: For more information, see Request Limiting and Request-Rate Lim-
iting in Class Lists. The request limit and request-rate limit options
apply only to HTTP, fast-HTTP, and HTTPS virtual ports. The over-limit
logging, when used with the request- limit or request- rate- limit
option, always lists Ethernet port 1 as the interface.
Match IP Address
By default, the ACOS device matches class-list entries based on the source IP address of client
traffic. Optionally, you can also match based on one of the following options:
Destination IP address – Matches based on the destination IP address in packets from clients.
IP address in client packet header – Matches based on the IP address in the specified header
in packets from clients. If you do not specify a header name, this option uses the IP address
in the X-Forwarded-For header.
If a LID or GLID in a class list contains settings for request limiting or request-rate limiting, the set-
tings apply only if the following conditions are true:
The settings apply only to the virtual port but do not apply in the following cases:
The policy template is applied to the virtual server, instead of the virtual port.
The settings are in a system-wide GLID.
The settings are in a system-wide policy template.
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You can configure multiple policy templates with different IP limiting rules. You can use a given
class list in one or more policy templates.
Clients must comply with all IP limiting rules that are applicable to the client. For example, if you con-
figure system-wide IP limiting and also configure IP limiting on a virtual server, clients must comply
with the system-wide IP limits and with the IP limits that are applied to the individual virtual server
accessed by the client.
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The following commands configure a standalone IP limiting rule to be applied globally to all IP cli-
ents, which match class list “global”:
ACOS(config)# glid 1
ACOS(config-glid:1)# conn-rate-limit 10000 per 1
ACOS(config-glid:1)# conn-limit 1000000
ACOS(config-glid:1)# over-limit-action forward log
ACOS(config-glid:1)# exit
ACOS(config)# system glid 1
The following commands configure class list “global”, which matches on all clients and uses IP lim-
iting rule 1:
ACOS(config)# class-list global
ACOS(config-class list)# 0.0.0.0/0 glid 1
ACOS(config-class list)# exit
The commands in this example configure system-wide IP limiting by using a policy template.
ACOS(config)# slb template policy global_policy
ACOS(config-policy)# class-list global
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:global)# lid 1
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:global-lid...)# conn-rate-limit 20000 per 1
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:global-lid...)# conn-limit 5000000
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:global-lid...)# over-limit reset logging
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:global-lid...)# exit
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:global)# exit
ACOS(config-policy)# exit
The following command imports the class list that are used by the policy:
ACOS(config)# import class-list global_list ftp:
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The following command imports the class list that is used by the policy:
ACOS(config)# import class-list vs_list ftp:
Address or name of remote host []? 1.1.1.2
User name []? ACOSadmin
Password []? *********
File name [/]? vs_list
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The following command imports the class list that is used by the policy:
ACOS(config)# import class-list vp_list ftp:
Address or name of remote host []?1.1.1.2
User name []? ACOSadmin
Password []? *********
File name [/]? vp_list
The following commands configure a class list with 2 host entries, and assign an age value to each
entry.
ACOS(config)# class-list local
ACOS(config-class list)# 192.168.1.100 /32 lid 30 age 1
ACOS(config-class list)# 192.168.1.101 /32 lid 30 age 10
ACOS(config-class list)# exit
The template includes an LID that sets the connection limit to 0. The LID also resets and logs con-
nection attempts.
ACOS(config)# slb template policy 1
ACOS(config-policy)# class-list local
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:local)# lid 30
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:local-lid...)# conn-limit 0
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:local-lid...)# over-limit-action reset log
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:local-lid...)# exit
ACOS(config-policy-class-list:local)# exit
ACOS(config-policy)# exit
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In the configuration above, host 192.168.1.100 is not allowed to establish a connection during the
first minute after the host entry is created. After the age expires, the host entry is removed form the
class list, and the connection limit no longer applies to the client.
Host 192.168.1.101 is not allowed to establish a connection during the first 10 minutes after that host
entry is created. Once the age expires, the client is no longer locked down.
Viewing Class-Lists 70
Viewing Class-Lists
Use the show class-list command to view information about your class list configuration.
NOTE: For information, see “show class-list” in the Command Line Inter-
face Reference.
Use the show glid command to view the configuration of each standalone IP limiting rule.
NOTE: For information, see “ show glid ” in the Command Line Interface
Reference.
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NOTE: For information, see “ show pbslb ” in the Command Line Interface
Reference.
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Chapter 6: ICMP Rate Limiting
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ICMP rate limiting monitors the rate of ICMP traffic and drops ICMP packets when the configured
thresholds are exceeded.
Normal rate – The ICMP normal rate is the maximum number of ICMP packets that are
allowed per second.
If the ACOS device receives more than the normal rate of ICMP packets, the excess packets
are dropped until the next one-second interval begins. The normal rate can be 1-65535 pack-
ets per second.
Maximum rate – The ICMP maximum rate is the maximum number of ICMP packets allowed
per second before the ACOS device locks up ICMP traffic.
1Subsequent references use the term “ICMP rate limiting”. Unless otherwise specified, this term also
applies to ICMPv6 rate limiting.
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When ICMP traffic is locked up, all ICMP packets are dropped until the lockup expires. The
maximum rate can be 1-65535 packets per second.
Lockup time – The lockup time is the number of seconds for which the ACOS device drops all
ICMP traffic, after the maximum rate is exceeded.
NOTE: Specifying a maximum rate (lockup rate) and lockup time is optional.
If you do not specify them, lockup does not occur. Log messages are
generated only if the lockup option is used and lockup occurs. Other-
wise, the ICMP rate-limiting counters are still incremented but log
messages are not generated. The maximum rate must be larger than
the normal rate.
NOTE: For descriptions of the parameters, see ICMP Rate Limiting Para-
meters.
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NOTE: This option applies only to software releases that support SLB.
NOTE: For descriptions of the parameters, see ICMP Rate Limiting Para-
meters.
The following example configures a virtual server template that sets ICMP rate limiting:
ACOS(config)# slb template virtual-server vip-tmplt
ACOS(config-vserver)# icmp-rate-limit 25000 lockup 30000 60
You can enter the icmp-rate-limit command at any of the following configuration levels:
NOTE: For descriptions of the parameters, see ICMP Rate Limiting Para-
meters.
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Chapter 7: HTTP Slowloris Prevention
Details 78
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Details
The ACOS includes an HTTP template option that specifies the maximum number of seconds
allowed for all parts of a request header to be received. If the entire request header is not received
within the specified amount of time, ACOS terminates the connection.
This option provides security against attacks such as Slowloris attacks, which attempt to consume
resources on the target system by sending HTTP requests in multiple increments, and at a slow
rate. The intent of this type of attack is to cause the target system to consume its buffer resources
with the partially completed requests.
NOTE: The request- header wait time can bet set to 1- 31 seconds. The
default is 7 seconds.
NOTE: For more HTTP security options, see the W eb Application Firewall
Guide.
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Configuring DNSSEC 81
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The DAF examines DNS queries that are addressed to a VIP to ensure that the queries are not mal-
formed. If a malformed DNS query is detected, the ACOS device takes one of the following actions:
The DNS sanity checking on virtual-port type UDP is performed only for client requests.
For a DNS client request to pass the sanity check, all of the following conditions must be met:
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DNS sanity checking on virtual-port type DNS-UDP is performed for client requests and server
responses.
For a client request to pass the sanity check, all of the following conditions must be met:
For a server response to pass the sanity check, all of the following conditions must be met:
Configuring DNSSEC
This topic contains the following section:
Details 82
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Details
1. Create a DNS template and specify the DNS security action in the template.
2. Bind the DNS template to the DNS virtual port.
The following commands configure the real server and service group:
ACOS(config)# slb server dns-sec1 10.10.10.88
ACOS(config-real server)# port 53 udp
ACOS(config-real server-node port)# exit
ACOS(config-real server)# exit
ACOS(config)# slb service-group dns-sec-grp udp
ACOS(config-slb svc group)# member dns-sec1 53
ACOS(config-slb svc group-member:53)# exit
ACOS(config-slb svc group)# exit
The following commands bind the service group and DNS template to the DNS virtual port on a vir-
tual server:
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server dnsvip1 192.168.1.53
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# port 53 udp
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# service-group dns-sec-grp
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# template dns dns-sec
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Since the drop action is specified, malformed DNS queries sent to the virtual DNS server are
dropped by the ACOS device.
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Chapter 9: DNS Response Rate Limiting
Configuration Example 91
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Details 86
Limitations 89
Details
For some ADC deployments, it may be difficult to control the rate of DNS responses from the DNS
servers to external hosts. This vulnerability could cause your network resources to be used in DNS
reflection attacks or DNS amplification attacks.
To prevent your network equipment from becoming an unwanted participant in a DNS reflection or
amplification attack, this release introduces support for DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL).
The DNS Response Rate Limiting is a BIND feature which applies a rate-limit to the DNS server
responses, with the goal of decreasing unnecessary load on the authoritative DNS servers.
A DNS reflection attack is when a hacker hijacks multiple computers using botnets and then sends
a large number of queries to one or more DNS servers. The hacker’s DNS requests include a
spoofed source IP address, so it appears as though the DNS queries are originating from what is
essentially a fake address (that is, the address of the intended victim). The unwitting DNS server
replies to the spoofed address of the victim instead of replying to the real source of the threat.
When the hacker scales-up the attack by employing botnets, the replies from the DNS servers can
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use up all the resources on the target’s network, preventing legitimate traffic from getting
through.1
DNS runs on the connectionless UDP protocol, so it is difficult to check the validity of each DNS
query and drop malicious traffic in a targeted manner. However, the ACOS can employ a blunt
approach to mitigate this type of threat by applying rate limits to the traffic.
The ACOS identifies potentially malicious queries if the following are true of the DNS requests:
Once the source is flagged as potentially malicious, then ACOS can take protective action.
To respond to this threat, ACOS applies rate-limits to the DNS server responses associated with
those DNS requests that have been flagged as potentially malicious.
NOTE: Note that ACOS does not apply rate limits to the malicious queries
themselves, but only to the responses from the DNS server to the vic-
tim.
When this feature is enabled, ACOS monitors the DNS response rate and request rate, and it
detects any abnormal increase in the rate or frequency, which is based on the IPv4/IPv6 source
address (source IP of the request).
In its implementation of DNS RRL, BIND software tracks all DNS queries by placing them into one
large table. However, in order to allocate system resources in a more efficient manner, the ACOS
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The first of the two tables is called the “filter table”, and the second of the two tables is called the
“rate-limiting entry table”. Both tables apply rate limits to DNS queries, but the “filter table” uses
only two bytes for each DNS query in its table, while the “rate-limiting entry table” uses approx-
imately 100 bytes for each DNS query.
All DNS queries first go to the “filter table”, and if the query is flagged as potentially malicious, sub-
sequent requests from that source IP + FQDN combination are stored in the second table (the rate-
limiting entry table).
More Information 89
“filter table” – This table is for the non-offenders making normal DNS requests. This is where
all normal DNS queries are processed. Rate limits can be set for this table using the filter-
response-rate command under response-rate-limiting.
“rate-limiting entry table” – This table is for the offenders making abnormal DNS requests,
who need to be monitored more closely. Only a small subset of DNS queries are placed into
this table of potential abusers. Rate limits can be set for this table using the response-rate
command under response-rate-limiting.
“window” – This option configures the rate-limiting-window, which is the time interval over
which rates are measured for response-rate and slip-rate. If the same DNS mapping is
requested too many times, similar queries from that client are dropped for the rest of the win-
dow’s interval.
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The “rate-limit entry table” is for the offenders who have exceeded the rate limits configured
in the filter table. The sources address (and hash of the FQDN) for these requests are tracked
based on the combination of information (source IP + requested FQDN). These queries are
monitored more closely than regular DNS queries and the rate-limiting table allocates a credit
rate to each entry (for example, a credit of up to 10 requests per second), which can be used
up. Any DNS queries exceeding their credit rate are then rate-limited, meaning ACOS will
drop the traffic.
After 1000 entries in the table are used up, all other traffic is placed into an overflow bucket where
the source IP + FQDN is no longer tracked.
More Information
NOTE: For more information about any of these CLI commands, see the fol-
lowing commands in the CLI Reference for ADC.
Limitations
This release contains the following limitations for the DNS RRL feature:
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Any changes to the SLB maximum table entries (CLI command: dns-response-rate-lim-
iting max-table-entries under slb common) requires disabling and then re-enabling the
template on the virtual port to which it is bound.
Use the show command to verify that all rate-limiting entries have been aged out before re-
enabling the template.
Log-only mode offers a simulation of how many packets would be getting Dropped/Al-
lowed/Slipped if the device were not in observation mode, but while in observation mode,
none of the packets are actually getting dropped.
The entries in the rate-limiting tables are not yet visible via the GUI or CLI.
DNS RRL was not supported on L3V partitions. DNS RRL is now supported on L3V partitions.
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The updated show command now displays the entry in the rate-limiting tables.
Configuration Example
The following topics are covered:
The DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL) feature helps prevent network equipment (DNS author-
itative servers) from becoming unwanted participants in a DNS reflection or DNS amplification
attack.
From this page, you can configure the options needed to enable DNS Response Rate Limiting
(RRL).
4. Click OK to save your changes.
To set limits around the amount of memory consumed during a DNS reflection attack:
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The following example shows the DNS response rate limiting entries returned by the show com-
mand:
ACOS#show dns response-rate-limiting entries
Source Address FQDN Hit Count
-----------------------+-------------------------+----------
10.211.3.101 test4.example.com 4
10.211.3.100 test4.example.com 3
10.211.3.101 test0.example.com 4
10.211.3.100 test0.example.com 4
10.211.3.101 test1.example.com 3
10.211.3.100 test1.example.com 3
10.211.3.101 test3.example.com 3
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10.211.3.100 test3.example.com 4
10.211.3.2 test2.example.com 4
10.211.3.2 test4.example.com 4
10.211.3.2 test0.example.com 3
10.211.3.2 test1.example.com 3
10.211.3.2 test3.example.com 4
10.211.3.101 test2.example.com 4
10.211.3.100 test2.example.com 3
Total Entries: 15
NOTE: For more information about these configuration and how to monitor
these commands, see the CLI Reference for ADC Guide.
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Chapter 10: DNSSEC Support
These topics describe the ACOS device’s DNSSEC support.
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Details 96
Details
An ACOS device that is configured as a Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB) controller can act as
an authoritative DNS server for a domain zone. As the authoritative DNS server for the zone, the
ACOS device sends records in response to requests from DNS clients. The ACOS device supports
the ability to respond to client requests for the following types of records:
A
AAAA
CNAME
NS
MX
PTR
SRV
TXT
If you place the ACOS device in the DNS infrastructure, the device is exposed to potential online
attacks. When DNS was originally designed, there were no mechanisms to ensure the DNS infra-
structure would remain secure.
In an unsecured DNS environment, the client’s DNS resolver has no way to assess the validity of
the address it receives for a particular domain name, so the client’s DNS resolver cannot tell
whether an address received for a particular domain is from the legitimate owner of that domain.
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This potential security hole makes DNS vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attacks, DNS cache pois-
oning attacks, and other online attacks that could be used to forge DNS data, hijack traffic, and to
potentially steal sensitive information from the user.
To close this security hole, in the 1990s, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) introduced a set
of standards called Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). These additional stand-
ards add authentication to DNS and help ensure the integrity of the data that is transferred
between the client resolvers and DNS servers.
DNSSEC offers authentication through the use of cryptographic keys and digital signatures, which
ensure that entries in DNS tables are correct and that connections are made to legitimate servers.
The ACOS device’s implementation of DNSSEC is based on RFCs 4033, 4034, and 4035.
The FIGURE 10-1 illustrates basic DNS without DNSSEC. The figure shows the recursive lookup pro-
cess that occurs when a client resolver requests the IP address for a URL. Note that this illustration
shows how a client request works in a simple DNS environment without DNSSEC.
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A client (shown at upper left) requires access to a server in the domain zone1.example.org (at lower
left). The ACOS device, which is acting as the GSLB controller, is the authoritative DNS server for
the zone. To access this server, the client requires the IP address for this zone or domain.
When the user enters the domain name in the web browser’s URL, the process to obtain the IP
address that is associated with this domain is as follows:
1. The DNS resolver that is embedded in the client’s web browser sends an address request
(“A?”) to the Caching DNS server to see whether the Caching DNS server has the required IP
address cached in its memory for the requested example.org domain.
2. The Caching DNS server has a list of IP address-to-domain mappings, but the list is not com-
prehensive, and unfortunately, the Caching DNS server does not have the required IP
address.
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It acts as a proxy for the client and makes a recursive query to the Root DNS Server, which is
located at the top of the DNS hierarchy.
3. The Root DNS Server does not have the requested IP address.
4. In an attempt to point the Caching DNS server in the right direction, it responds to the
request with a Name Server (NS) record, which contains the IP of the Top Level Domain (TLD)
server for the “.org” domain.
5. The Caching DNS server now has the IP address for the name server that manages the “.org”
domain, so it sends an address request on behalf of the client to the TLD DNS server for the
“.org” domain.
6. The TLD Server does not have the requested IP address.
7. The TLD server points the Caching DNS server in the right direction by providing an NS
record that contains the IP address for the next name server in the DNS hierarchy, which is
the authoritative DNS server for the example.org subdomain.
8. The Caching DNS server has the IP address that is needed to reach the authoritative DNS
server for the example.org domain, so the server sends a request for zone1.example.org to
this authoritative DNS server.
9. The authoritative DNS server does not have the requested information, but it can get the
Caching DNS server one step closer to its destination by providing the NS record for the
authoritative DNS server for the zone1.example.org domain.
10. The Caching DNS Server sends a request to the authoritative DNS server for the zone1.ex-
ample.org domain.
11. The ACOS device, which is the authoritative DNS server for zone1.example.org, has the IP
address that the client needs.
12. The ACOS device sends the requested IP address to the Caching DNS server.
13. The Caching DNS server sends the IP address that is provided by the ACOS device to the
DNS resolver in the client’s browser.
The client now has the IP address needed to reach the server in the zone1 subdomain.
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The FIGURE 10-2 illustrates how the DNS query process works when the security extensions are
used with DNS to provide security (DNSSEC). The process is similar to DNS packet flow without
DNSSEC, but with the notable exception that DNSSEC uses the following additional resource
record types to provide security:
DNS Key (DNSKEY) – Public key used by an Authoritative DNS server to sign resource records
for its zone.
Delegation Signer (DS) – Hash (message digest) of a public key. A DNS server uses the DS for
a zone that is directly underneath it in the DNS hierarchy to verify that signed resource
records from the Authoritative DNS server for that zone are legitimate.
Resource Record Signature (RRSIG) – Digitally signs another resource record, such as an A
record.
The digital signature is created by applying a hash function to the DNS record to reduce its file size,
an encryption algorithm is applied to the hash value (using the private key), and this encrypted
hash value appears as the digital signature at the bottom of the resource record. The RRSIG record,
which contains the private key that is used to encrypt the hash value, appears at the bottom of the
record being signed.
While the DNS Packet flow without DNSSEC shows how basic DNS works without DNSSEC, the
FIGURE 10-2 shows how the DNS lookup process works with DNSSEC.
The recursive lookup process remains largely unchanged, with the higher level DNS servers point-
ing to lower level servers in the DNS hierarchy to move the request closer to the authoritative server
for the desired domain.
However, when DNSSEC is added, the additional records such as DS, RRSIG, and DNSKE are used
to sign and authenticate the communications from the DNS servers. This step proves to the client
that each of the name servers in the “chain of trust” are authoritative for their respective domains.
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The FIGURE 10-2 shows the resolution process for an address query from the DNS resolver on a cli-
ent for the IP address of zone1.example.org.
1. The DNS resolver on the client sends an address query for the IP address of a host under
zone1.example.org.
2. The Caching DNS server, which does not have the address, forwards the request to the root
server.
3. The root server redirects the Caching DNS server to the TLD DNS server for the .org domain.
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This is accomplished by sending an NS record with the IP address of that TLD server. The
root server uses an RRSIG record, which is used to store the private key, to sign the NS record,
and the root server sends a copy of the DS record to the Caching DNS server, which points to
the TLD server.
4. The Caching DNS server sends the address query to the TLD server for the .org domain.
5. The TLD server does not have the requested address, so it points the Caching DNS server to
the Authoritative DNS server for example.org.
6. The TLD server sends an NS record with the IP address of the authoritative server for
example.org, and the TLD server signs the NS record with the private key in the RRSIG record.
7. The Caching DNS server sends the address query to the Authoritative DNS server for
example.org.
8. The Authoritative DNS server for example.org does not have the requested address, so it
responds to the caching server’s request by sending the NS record (signed with the RRSIG
record).
9. This NS record contains the IP address of the Authoritative DNS server for zone1.example.org.
10. The server sends the DS record for the zone1.example.org server to the Caching DNS server.
11. The Caching DNS server sends the address query to the Authoritative DNS server for
zone1.example.org, which happens to be the ACOS device.
12. The Caching DNS server has reached the Authoritative DNS server for zone1.example.org.
13. The Authoritative DNS server (which is the ACOS device) replies with an SOA record, the
requested A record, and RRSIG records that contains the private key, which is used to sign
the SOA and A records.
14. The Caching DNS server asks the ACOS device for its DNSKEY record, which is where the
public key for the zone is advertised.
15. This public key is needed to unlock the resource records and verify the hash values back up
the chain.
16. The ACOS device sends its DNSKEY record, with an RRSIG record that was used to sign the
DNSKEY record.
17. The RRSIG record contains the private key.
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18. To continue assembling the chain of trust, the Caching DNS server asks the Authoritative
DNS server for example.org for its DNSKEY record.
19. The Authoritative DNS server for example.org sends its DNSKEY record with an RRSIG record
(with the private key) that was used to sign the DNSKEY record.
20. The Caching DNS server asks the TLD server for .org for its DNSKEY record.
21. The TLD server sends its DNSKEY record with an RRSIG record that was used to sign the
DNSKEY record.
22. The Caching DNS server now has all the private/public key pairs and has validated all of the
links in the chain of trust.
The Caching DNS server can now send the trusted response to the DNS resolver on the client.
The presence of a Chain of Trust allows the client’s DNS resolver to know that all of the DNS servers
in the chain have vouched for one another, starting from the Root DNS Server and continuing
down to the lowest-level DNS server.
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FIGURE 10-3 shows the Authoritative DNS Server for the zone1.example.org domain at the bottom
left, and the Root DNS Server is located at the upper right.
Starting from the lower left, the Authoritative DNS Server for the zone1.example.org domain, has a
DNS key record (DNSKEY). This DNSKEY record contains the public Zone Signing Key (ZSK) for
zone1. The ZSK is used to sign other record types, such as A records, for the zone. The DNSKEY
record is signed by the Key Signing Key (KSK), which also belongs to this zone.
The Start of Authority (SOA) record indicates that this server is the Authoritative DNS Server for
zone1. The A record provides the IP address for zone1.example.org.
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The next level up in the DNS hierarchy corresponds to the next “label” in the example.org domain,
and it has a record called the Delegation Signer (DS). The DS record contains a hash, or message
digest, of the public Key Signing Key (KSK), which belongs to the Authoritative DNS Server for the
node below, zone1.example.org.
The DNS resolver (or the Caching DNS Server) can compare the hash value for any of the nodes in
the Chain of Trust, and the values should match. If the hash values in a DS record cannot be recre-
ated from the DNSKEY record, packet that contains the key record may have been tampered with,
cannot be trusted, and should be discarded.
However, if the hash value is correct, this indicates that the Chain of Trust is unbroken and that the
DNSKEY record for the Authoritative DNS Server that is associated with the zone1.example.org
domain is properly linked to the DS record above.
In turn, the DNSKEY record for the Authoritative DNS Server associated with the example.org
domain is properly linked to the DS record above. This process of DNSKEY records being linked with
the DS record of the node above continues all the way to the Root DNS Server.
The client’s DNS resolver knows that the Root DNS Server is legitimate due to the presence of a
“trust anchor”. This trust anchor, which consists of information for the Root DNS Server, is included
in the resolver software that is installed on the client. This minimizes the chance that a client could
access a corrupt root DNS server.
Because of this anchor, the client knows that the Root DNS Server can be trusted, and the client
can infer that the other nodes in the Chain of Trust can also be trusted. The hash values match all
the way down the line, which is an indication that the Chain of Trust is intact, and that the client’s
DNS resolver can trust the Authoritative DNS Server for zone1.example.org. The Server is located at
the bottom of the Chain of Trust in the DNS hierarchy.
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When HSM and DNSSEC are enabled, ACOS uses the following key generation and rollover settings
for DNSSEC:
Key size – Length of the keys in bits. You can specify 1024-4096 bits. The default length for
ZSKs and KSKs is 2048 bits.
Lifetime – Maximum amount of time a dynamically generated key remains valid.
Rollover time – Amount of time to wait after a new key becomes active, before generating
that key’s replacement.
The range of values for the lifetime and rollover time is 1 to 2,147,483,647 seconds (about 68 years).
The default lifetime and rollover time differ for ZSKs and KSKs:
ZSKs – The default lifetime is 7,776,000 seconds (90 days), and the default rollover time is
7,171,200 seconds (83 days).
KSKs – The default lifetime is 31,536,000 seconds (365 days), and the rollover time is
30,931,200 seconds (358 days).
The features such as dynamic key generation and rollover are enabled by default when a DNSSEC
template becomes active. No additional configuration is required. The FIGURE 10-4 shows the
rekey and rollover schedule if the default rekey and rollover settings for ZSKs and KSKs are used.
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When DNSSEC is enabled, HSM generates a KSK for the GSLB zone, generates a ZSK for the zone,
and signs it with the KSK. The following text is an example of message that appears in the log.
ACOS generates messages such as the following when key regeneration occurs:
Log Buffer: 30000 Jul 31 2013 06:49:13 Notice [DNS]:succeed to reload the sig-
nature of zone "test.com"
Jul 31 2013 06:48:58 Notice [CLI]: DNSSEC module:succeed to generate ZSK test.-
com_zsk_2013-07-31-06-48-58 for zone test.com
Jul 31 2013 06:48:58 Notice [CLI]: DNSSEC module:please transfer the DS RR of
zone test.com to the parent zone for the initial process.
Jul 31 2013 06:48:58 Notice [CLI]: DNSSEC module:succeed to generate KSK test.-
com_ksk_2013-07-31-06-48-57 for zone test.com
The first message, starting at the bottom, indicates a successful generation of a KSK for child zone
test.com. The next message, which is second from the bottom, is a reminder to copy the DS
resource record for the key to the authoritative DNS server for the parent zone.
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The third message indicates a successful generation of the ZSK for child zone test.com. The final
message at the top, indicates completion of the rekey process.
CAUTION: Although key generation and rollover are automatic, ACOS does
not automatically send the DS record for the new KSK to the par-
ent zone. This part of the process must be performed manually. If
the default key generation and rollover settings are used, this pro-
cess needs to be performed once a year.
The import command is used to import and export DNSSEC key files. For example, to import a file:
ACOS# import dnssec-dnskey zone-name scp://exampleuser@examplehost.com/file
To export a file:
ACOS# export dnssec-dnskey zone-name scp://exampleuser@examplehost.com/file
After enabling DNSSEC, wait about a minute for the key to be generated. You can use the export
dnssec-ds command to copy the DS resource record for the zone to the DNS server that is author-
itative for the parent zone.
The dnssec key-rollover command allows you to force an immediate key rollover, if necessary.
For example, to force an immediate ZSK rollover in emergency mode:
ACOS(config)# dnssec key-rollover zone1 ZSK start
The start option initiates a rollover for the specified key type.
For KSK rollover, the ds-ready-in-parent-zone option indicates that the DS record for the new
KSK has been exported to the parent zone. Use this option only after you have installed the DS
record for the new KSK on the authoritative DNS server for the parent zone. For example:
ACOS(config)# dnssec key-rollover zone2 KSK ds-ready-in-parent-zone
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Use the zsk lifetime and ksk lifetime commands to change the lifetime and rollover settings
for ZSKs and KSKs, respectively.
Enter the commands at the configuration level for the DNSSEC template.
NOTE: For more information about the supported values, see Key Gen-
eration and Rollover Parameters.
The current release supports a software emulation version of HSM in ACOS. Keys are generated
and stored on the ACOS device. This version can be useful for testing or for environments where
the additional security of a hardware-based HSM is not required.
HSM is required for DNSSEC, and manual key generation of DNSSEC ZSKs or KSKs is not supported.
For information about external HSM support, contact A10 Networks.
DNSSEC Configuration
The following topics are covered:
Modes 109
Modes
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The following are the configuration modes from a device that is configured for DNSSEC.
Configuring GSLB
The following commands configure GSLB.
ACOS(config)# gslb service-ip vip-1 1.0.0.1
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1)# port 80 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1-port:tcp)# health-check-protocol-disable
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ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1-port:tcp)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1)# port 21 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-1)# exit
ACOS(config)# gslb service-ip vip-2 1.0.0.2
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2)# port 80 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2-port:tcp)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2-port:tcp)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2)# port 21 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-2)# exit
ACOS(config)# gslb service-ip vip-3 1.0.0.3
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3)# port 80 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3-port:tcp)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3-port:tcp)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3)# port 21 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3-port:tcp)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3-port:tcp)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-3)# exit
ACOS(config)# gslb service-ip ns 10.10.10.5
ACOS(config-service-ip:ns)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:ns)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:ns)# exit
ACOS(config)# gslb service-ip vip-4 1.0.0.4
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4)# port 80 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4-port:tcp)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4-port:tcp)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4)# port 21 tcp
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4-port:tcp)# health-check-protocol-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4-port:tcp)# health-check-disable
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4-port:tcp)# exit
ACOS(config-service-ip:vip-4)# exit
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The dns server command enables server mode, and also enables this ACOS device to be the
authoritative DNS server for the GSLB zones that use this policy.
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Chapter 11: Location-Based VIP Access
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ACOS determines a client’s location by looking up the client’s subnet in the geo-location database
that is used by Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB).
NOTE: This feature requires you to load a geo-location database, but does
not require any other configuration of GSLB. The ACOS system image
includes the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) database.
By default, the IANA database is not loaded but you can easily load it.
For more information, see Loading the IANA Geo-Location Database.
Example
The following class list maps client geo-locations to limit IDs (LIDs), which specify the maximum
number of concurrent connections allowed for clients in the geo-locations.
L US 1
L US.CA 2
L US.CA.SJ 3
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The following commands import the class list to the ACOS device, configure a policy template, and
bind the template to a virtual port. The connection limits specified in the policy template apply to cli-
ents that send requests to the virtual port.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Total: 1
Details 120
Methods 121
Details
You can configure the list by using a text editor or enter the list into the GUI. If you configure
the list by using a text editor, import the list to the ACOS device.
2. Configure an SLB policy (PBSLB) template.
In the template, specify the black/white list name, and the actions to perform for the group
IDs in the list.
3. Verify that the geo-location database is loaded.
For more information about loading the geo-location database, see Loading the IANA Geo-
Location Database.
4. Apply the policy template to the virtual port for which you want to control access.
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Methods
You can configure black/white lists in one of the following ways:
Remote – Use a text editor and import the list to the ACOS device.
Local – Enter the black/white list in a management GUI window.
With both methods, the syntax is the same. The black/white list must be a text file that contains
entries (rows) in the following format:
L "geo-location" group-id #conn-limit
The various parameters in the syntax are described in the TABLE 11-1 .
Parameter Description
geo-location String in the geo-location database that is mapped to the client’s IP address,
for example, “US”, “US.CA”, or “US.CA.SanJose”.
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NOTE: For more details and information about any of the required
fields on this page, see the latest version of the GUI Online Help.
NOTE: For more details and information about any of the required
fields on this page, see the latest version of the GUI Online Help.
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4. Complete the Host and Location fields to specify the location of the file you are importing.
5. Leave the Template fields blank.
6. Click Import.
NOTE: You can also import a custom geo-location database. For more inform-
ation, see the Global Server Load Balancing Guide.
CLI Example
The following command imports black/white list “geolist” onto the ACOS device.
ACOS(config)# import bw-list geolist scp://192.168.1.2/root/geolist
The following commands configure a policy template named “geoloc” and add the black/white list
to it. The template is configured to drop traffic from clients in the geo-location mapped to group 1 in
the list.
ACOS(config)# slb template policy geoloc
ACOS(config-policy)# bw-list name geolist
ACOS(config-policy)# bw-list id 1 drop
ACOS(config-policy)# exit
The following commands apply the policy template to port 80 on virtual server “vip1”:
ACOS(config)# slb virtual-server vip1
ACOS(config-slb vserver)# port 80 http
ACOS(config-slb vserver-vport)# template policy geoloc
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To view SLB geo-location statistics, use the show slb geo-location command.
Details 124
Details
By default, when a client requests a connection, the ACOS device checks the connection count
only for the specific geo-location level of the client. If the connection limit for that specific geo-loc-
ation level is not reached, the client’s connection is permitted. Similarly, the permit counter is
increased only for that specific geo-location level.
TABLE 11-2 shows an example set of geo-location connection limits and current connections.
US 100 100
US.CA 50 37
US.CA.SanJose 20 19
Using the default behavior, the connection request from the client at US.CA.SanJose is allowed
even though CA has reached its connection limit. Similarly, a connection request from a client at
US.CA is allowed. However, a connection request from a client whose location match is simply “US”
is denied.
After these three clients are permitted or denied, the connection permit and deny counters are
increased in the following way:
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When full-domain checking is enabled, the ACOS device checks the current connection count not
only for the client’s specific geo-location, but for all geo-locations higher up in the domain tree.
Based on full-domain checking, all three connection requests from the clients in the example
above are denied. This is because the US domain has reached its connection limit. Similarly, the
counters for each domain are updated as follows:
To enable full-domain checking for geo-location-based connection limiting, enter the geo-loc-
ation full-domain-tree command at the configuration level for the PBSLB template:
ACOS(config)# slb template policy example_policy_template
ACOS(config-policy)# geo-location full-domain-tree
NOTE: You must enable or disable this option before you enable GSLB.
Changing the state of this option while GSLB is running can cause
the related statistics counters to be incorrect.
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Details
You can enable sharing of statistics counters for all virtual servers and virtual ports that use a
PBSLB template. This option causes the following counters to be shared by the virtual servers and
virtual ports that use the template:
Permit
Deny
Connection number
Connection limit
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To enable the share option, enter the geo-location share command at the configuration level for
the PBSLB policy template:
ACOS(config)# slb template policy example_policy_template
ACOS(config-policy)# geo-location share
NOTE: You must enable or disable this option before you enable GSLB.
Changing the state of this option while GSLB is running can cause
the related statistics counters to be incorrect.
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Glossary
B
destination rule
DNS
D
Domain Name System. A hier-
archical model and decentralized
DDoS
naming system that identifies com-
Distributed Denial-of-Service. A puters, resources and network-
malicious attempt that floods a tar- based services over a private net-
geted server and its surrounding work or the Internet. It specifies
infrastructure with internet traffic. information on web domain names
The purpose of DDoS attack is to associated with respective entities.
distort the normal traffic of serv-
ers, services or networks by exploit-
E
ing multiple compromised IoT
devices, computer systems, and
network resources as sources of escalation
traffic attacks. A sudden rise of potential security
problems made across multiple con-
destination object texts of networking.
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Glossary
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P T
S traffic scrubbing
A unified station for cleaning data
sFlow and analysing traffic for removal
An industry standard, termed as of malicious traffic.
sampled flow, used in network
monitoring for exporting trun- U
cated packets along with interface
counters at Layer 2 of the OSI UDP
model.
User Datagram Protocol. An altern-
ative to TCP and used for setting
SSL
up connections with low-latency
Secure Sockets Layer. A set of and loss-tolerance between inter-
cryptographic protocols that net applications.
provide data transport and com-
munications security over a net- W
work.
white list
static destination
A list of usernames or IP addresses
An unchanging IP address which that have been granted access to
serves as the endpoint for packet specific systems or protocols.
forwarding.
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zone
A group of terminals, gateways,
and multipoint control units
(MCUs) within a specific domain of
a multimedia network. It can be
permanently configured on
devices or made relative as a
runtime entity for a specific event.
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