In Defence of Radical Disobedience

Author(s): ALAN CARTER

Source: Journal of Applied Philosophy , 1998, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1998), pp. 29-47
Published by: Wiley

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24354003

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Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1998

In Defence of Radical Disobedience

ALAN CARTER

ABSTRACT The article defends the forms of civil disobedience currently practis
environmental protesters. It reviews the justifications of civil disobedience by Dworki
and Singer, and finds them more or less wanting. A new and more extensive justifi
provided on the basis of our duties to prevent harm befalling future generations.

Note. Alan Carter is a director of Friends of the Earth. However, he insists that n
contained within this article should be construed as its policy.

In response to unjust political regimes there has been, historically, a long an

tradition of non-violent civil disobedience, with such milestone advocates as Henry
Thoreaufl], Leo Tolstoy [2] and, of course, Mohandas K. Gandhi [3]. The question
disobedience re-surfaced dramatically during the 1960s, first with the civi
movement in the United States, and then with widespread opposition to the Vietna
Presently, non-violent civil disobedience is practised in Britain by animal liberatio
most notably in opposition to bloodsports such as fox-hunting, and by environmen
more widely construed, especially in protest against further road-building[5].
Many today would regard opposition to racist regimes as justifiable. A large nu
would sanction the refusal to fight in an unjust war. But what could justify the k
protest currently being undertaken by environmentalists against seemingly just
democratic institutions? In particular, do the justifications of civil disobedience pro
in contemporary political philosophy support environmentally motivated protest
such protests are indeed morally praiseworthy, is a new justification required?

Some prominent philosophical justifications of civil disobedience

One prominent justification of civil disobedience, which was very much stimulated
activities of 1960s draft resisters, is that proposed by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin
that, for many people, the most powerful objection against tolerating dissent

is that a policy of tolerance would be unfair to the majority of citizens. It would b

unfair, so the argument goes, because the bulk of our citizens 'play the game,' b
obeying even those laws which they themselves disapprove or find disadvant
geous. If those who will not play the game go unpunished, then they are allow
to secure the benefits of deference to law, without shouldering the burdens [6

Dissenters who could expect to be able to break the law without being approp
punished would be demanding partial treatment and would be behaving unfairly

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30 A. Carter

failing to prosecute dissenters would be unfair. However, this objection

the dissenter is actually breaking the law, and that presumes that the
clear and constitutionally valid. But what the law demands is not alway
ought one to act when one believes the law to permit what others thin
There are three possibilities. One possible strategy is to play safe an
action is forbidden. This approach would certainly enable the citi
breaking the law. But Dworkin thinks that this would be too costly an
Society would lose out because laws are clarified and their constitutiona
in test cases. And test cases would never be brought if this play-s
universally chosen. Behaviour that results in test cases is extremely use
the one hand, it establishes whether certain undesirable consequences w
follow were the action permissible. On the other hand, it tests the comm
the behaviour in question and establishes whether the community's sens
play is offended, and, if so, how gravely. Hence, those who conscientiou
challenging behaviour regarding doubtful laws serve a very useful pu
particular law clarified and in forcing a decision on its constitutionalit
A second possible strategy is to act according to one's own judgement
been made by the highest court in the land determining that the act
clearly impermissible. But adopting this strategy would prevent the bri
might lead to the highest court altering an earlier decision. Even the
overrule its previous decisions and declare its new ruling to take effe
Hence, those who conscientiously engage in behaviour that challenges d
a very useful legal purpose even when the highest court has already m
behaviour can lead to the highest court reaching a new decision and rev
one. Moreover, when this happens, those whose convictions were b
decision that is then reversed could expect to be declared innocent. And
happen if the second strategy were adopted.
This leaves a third possible strategy: namely, that even after the highest
ruling, one ought to follow one's own judgement in those cases where
remains doubtful. And this is permissible because, as Dworkin w
allegiance is to the law, not to any particular person's view of what th
she] does not behave improperly or unfairly so long as he [or she] proce
own considered and reasonable view of what the law requires'[7].
following this third strategy side-steps what Dworkin regards as the
objection against tolerating dissent, which is that failing to prosecute la
unfair. This objection presumes that the law in question is clear and val
remain doubtful even after the highest court has decided on them, for it
decisions. Therefore, one does not behave unfairly when one follows on
regarding an uncertain law.
But perhaps it is possible to go further than Dworkin does in
disobedience. What about instances of conscientiously disobeying
chosen law when that law is unmistakably clear? Could such dissent ev
Dworkin, John Rawls regards civil disobedience as having an importa
democratic societies. By 'civil disobedience' Rawls means 'a public
conscientious act contrary to law usually done with the intent to bring
the policies or laws of the government'[8]. But in its attempt to change
clarify it, civil disobedience plays a different role in Rawls' political

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 31

which it plays in Dworkin's. In order to see why Rawls thinks civil disobedience is
important, we first need to consider his account of political obligation, for civil
disobedience is, in effect, a conditional denial of political obligation. To justify such a
denial, it is necessary to understand the limits of political obligation. Why, then, ought we
to regard ourselves as falling under political obligations? Rawls:

first of all, we have a natural duty not to oppose the establishment of just and
efficient institutions (when they do not yet exist) and to uphold and comply with
them (when they do exist); and second, assuming that we have knowingly
accepted the benefits of these institutions and plan to continue to do so, and that
we have encouraged and expected others to do their part, we also have an
obligation to do our share when, as the arrangement requires, it comes our
turn [9].

So, when the social arrangements are just and efficient, and when we enjoy their benefits,
we ought to comply with them.
But when are social arrangements just? In Rawls' view, they are just when they accord
with the principles that each would choose under a 'veil of ignorance' — in what Rawls calls
'the original position'. The core idea is that a society is just if the principles assigning those
goods which are necessary for whatever plan of life a person might decide upon — what
Rawls refers to as 'primary social goods' — are fair. And their fairness can be judged by
their acceptability to all who do not know what social position they will come to occupy or
what talents luck will allocate to them or even what their preferred plan of life will turn out
to be. Thus, the original position, from which the principles governing social institutions
are hypothetically chosen under a veil of ignorance, is designed to rule out all bias, and the
principles chosen in such a situation will therefore be fair.
On the basis of the principles that would be chosen in the original position, we are able to
assess whether the laws which have been passed in a democratic society are just or not.
Unfortunately, in Rawls' view, even the best practicable political procedure could result in
the enactment and enforcement of unjust laws and policies. And this is because Rawls
assumes that, 'at least under the normal conditions of a modern state, the best constitution
is some form of democratic regime affirming equal political liberty and using some sort of
majority (or other plurality) rule'[10]. Clearly, if we have to rely on majority rule, then
unjust laws can very easily be passed, because majorities are far from infallible. However,
when one agrees to a democratic constitution, even though one knows that it is an
imperfect procedure for arriving at just outcomes, one thereby agrees to be bound by
majority decisions. If one willingly accepts benefits provided under that constitution and
the constitution itself is just, then one is obliged to abide by what the majority decides.
Given that what the majority decides might turn out to be unjust, then, in Rawls' view, one
has a duty to comply with unjust laws, 'provided the injustice does not exceed certain
limits'[11].
But because their sense of justice is imperfect, the majority can occasionally pass laws
which do exceed acceptable limits. When this happens, civil disobedience may be
permissible.

For we are not required to accept the majority's acts unconditionally and to
acquiesce in the denial of ours and others' liberties; rather we submit our
conduct to democratic authority to the extent necessary to share the burden of

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32 A. Carter

working a constitutional regime, dictated as it must inevitably be b

women's] lack of wisdom and the defects of their sense of justice [1

Conscientiously contravening the law serves to implore the majority, b

sense of justice, to reconsider its decisions. Moreover, it acts as a
dissenters firmly believe that the conditions upon which social co-op
themselves being contravened. In short, in Rawls' view, it is the commo
of justice which justifies civil disobedience, for constitutionally valid
gravely flout that shared conception of justice negate the very basis for
might otherwise have to the constitution.
Nevertheless, Rawls thinks that those who engage in civil disobedie
justified in doing so, should expect and accept both arrest and pu
resistance. And they should avail themselves of legal retribution
willingness to pay the penalty for their actions, they manifest their
procedures. By willingly accepting arrest and punishment, dissenters
opposition to a law remains faithful to law, thereby demonstrating th
intended to address the sense of justice of the majority, are undertake
reasons and follow from sincerely held convictions.
However, Rawls spells out three conditions which he insists must be
justified in engaging in civil disobedience. The first is that the injustic
must have been more or less deliberately inflicted for some length of t
protesters having already followed more conventional routes for expre
that injustice (for example, by lobbying politicians). The second i
protested against must clearly violate the liberties involved in equal
third is that unacceptable consequences should not result from a gen
engage in civil disobedience whenever a case of similar standing arise
great a tendency to be civilly disobedient, then social co-operation w
and the protesters themselves would be undermining the conditions of
Nevertheless, if an instance of civil disobedience were to satisfy all thr
in Rawls' view, it would be legitimate.
Moreover, justified civil disobedience not only leads to greater fairne
a stabilising role in democracies; for as Rawls argues:

If straightaway, after a decent period of time to make reasonable p

in the normal way, men [and women] were in general to diss
disobedience from infractions of the fundamental equal liberties, t
would, I believe, be more rather than less secure. Legitimate civil
properly exercised is a stabilising device in a constitutional regim
make it more firmly just [13].

Of course, those who exercise political power tend to regard civil disob
disturbance of the peace — which is not surprising given that disobe
directed against those in power and constitutes a challenge to their a
Rawls' view, 'if civil disobedience seems to threaten civil peace, the re
so much on those who protest as upon those whose abuse of authority
such opposition'[14], Rawls thus seems to have gone quite a long way
disobedience.
However, Peter Singer thinks that Rawls hasn't gone far enough. Singer sees two

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 33

problems with Rawls' account that lead to its being too limited. The first is that Rawls'
dissenters have to appeal to the community's shared sense of justice. But why must any
appeal to the community be restricted to the principles of justice which it presently
accepts? If its sense of justice is imperfect, surely civil disobedience could be undertaken
not merely to induce the majority to reconsider whether or not its decisions satisfy the
principles of justice it currently accepts but also to reconsider whether or not its
conception of justice is adequate. As Singer is one of the foremost defenders of animal
liberation, then one area where he strongly feels that our society's conception of justice is
defective is in its lack of regard for the welfare of non-human animals. And some humans
might firmly believe themselves to be justified in engaging in civil disobedience in order to
induce the majority of our community to reconsider its attitude to, and treatment of, other
species. Moreover, in protesting on behalf of other species, such humans clearly would not
be acting in their own self-interests, but conscientiously.
The second problem is that Rawls thinks that civil disobedience must be justified in
terms of justice, rather than in terms of a wider personal morality. If we consider the case of
non-human animals again, Rawls seems to believe that although cruelty to animals is
immoral, this notwithstanding, humans cannot treat them unjustly. But as Singer remarks:
'If we combine this view with the idea that the justification of civil disobedience must be in
terms of justice, we can see that Rawls is committed to holding that no amount of cruelty to
animals can justify disobedience' [15]. Yet clearly there are a large number of people who
feel that non-violent direct action in defence of animals is legitimate — Singer being one of
them. Hence, it is not surprising that Singer should want to go further than Rawls in his
defence of civil disobedience.
To this end, Singer focuses upon the question of whether or not civil disobedience is less
justified in a democratic than in an undemocratic society. This is a relevant question to
address, for many feel that, while undemocratic societies are illegitimate, democratic ones
ought to command our allegiance. Nevertheless, Singer thinks that it is clear that the
obligation to obey the laws of even a democratic society cannot be absolute; for, as he asks:

Could anyone plausibly maintain that if the Nazis had received majorities in free
elections, and allowed freedom of speech, association and so on, this would have
made it right to obey laws designed to exterminate Jews? To maintain this would
require fantastic, and surely misguided, devotion to democratic laws [16].

The obligation to obey the law, then, is prima facie. We must attach some importance to
political obligation, but any such obligation can be overridden, rather like the way a
promise can be overriden, by a more important moral consideration.
Now, one possible reason for always obeying the laws of a society is that if anyone
disobeys them, then, by example, he or she encourges others to do so, too. This could lead
to law and order completely breaking down. However, an objection that can be levelled
against this defence of political obligation is, as Singer remarks, that' "law and order" may
be a catch-cry which conservatives are prone to use ... as an excuse for stifling legitimate
opposition'[17], Moreover, this provides no reason for being more obedient to a
democratic than to an undemocratic regime. This line of reasoning would seem to oblige
one to any effective regime, no matter how unsavoury — a conclusion few would
accept [18],
Another possible reason for obeying the laws is that if one enjoys benefits from a
society's laws, then, many assume one ought to obey them. But this argument would not

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34 A. Carter

hold in cases where the protesters were acting disobediently in order t

others rather than to themselves. Clearly, this objection would be particula
case of the animal liberation movement, where the intended beneficiarie
members of a different species. And again, this attempted defence of p
provides no reason for being more obedient to a democratic than to a
regime.
But there are some possible reasons for obeying the laws that do, at first glance, seem to
apply more to democratic than to undemocratic polities. Singer accepts that some weight
should be attached to the fact that democracies provide legal mechanisms whereby citizens
may attempt to bring about a change in the law. However, it is

a mistake to regard those possibilities of legal change which necessarily exist in a

democracy as a significant reason for obeying the law. Only when there is a real
possibility of legal change before the harm one seeks to prevent has occurred, is
this possibility an important reason for using only legal means to bring about
change in a law [19].

And there is, in effect, only a theoretical possibility of legal change if the majority should
refuse to change the law. Yet there may also be just as much of a theoretical possibility of
legal change in an undemocratic regime - for example, when autocrats consider petitions.
In either case, one has to change someone else's opinions before the law will be altered. So,
in fact, this attempted defence of political obligation turns out to provide no reason for
being more obedient to a democratic than to an undemocratic regime. Nevertheless, the
possibility of change by legal means does suggest to Singer that they should be tried before
resorting to illegal actions.
Another possible reason for obeying laws passed in democratic as opposed to
undemocratic societies is that they derive from an authority which is more likely to be
legitimate. And what is usually thought to provide the basis for legitimate authority is
consent. However, individuals rarely give their express consent to be bound by the laws.
Consequently, tacit consent is usually claimed, and it is frequently presumed to be given
merely through choosing to remain a member of the society. But as Singer insists:
'Consent, to give rise to obligations, must be voluntary, and this means that there must be
some alternative to consenting' [20]. And disobeying is the only alternative [21 ]. So, if one
disobeys, one is not consenting. But if one is not consenting, then why ought one to obey
the law? Furthermore, this turns out in the end to provide no reason for being more
obedient to a democratic than to an undemocratic regime, for tacit consent could be
assumed to be given to any political order.
Yet another possible reason for obeying laws in a democratic society is that it is widely
assumed that all persons equally have the right to govern themselves. Hence, only those
political forms which grant to each an equal say ought to be obeyed. Unfortunately, as
Singer points out,

equality is not a completely satisfactory basis for explaining why we ought to obey
the law in a democracy. For the assumption or prescription can be turned against
the purpose for which it is being used. It can be taken as showing, not that there is
a special obligation to obey democratic authority, but that there can be no
obligation to obey any authority except oneself. In other words, it may be denied
that the equal rights of all to govern themselves are satisfied by majority

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 35

government over the minority. What reason is there for supposing that 'equal
rights' can be added up in such a way that the side with more has the right to
prevail over the side with less? Equal rights to a cake would not be satisfied if the
majority walked off with the whole cake [22].

However, there are two reasons for obeying the laws of a democracy which Singer
believes to be valid. The first is that, when a dissenter refuses to obey the law and
deliberately flouts what the majority have decided, he or she has, in effect, a greater say than
the others. But the rest could equally demand a greater say. If everyone is sincere in his or
her opinions and if they cannot reach agreement, it is far preferable that some compromise
is accepted. Anything other than accepting a compromise would be unacceptable to some
and would undermine any peaceful decision-procedure. Singer's view is that a democratic
decision-procedure giving an equal say to all members of the community (who abide by the
decision reached) can constitute a fair compromise. As he writes: 'the essence of the fair
compromise [is] that everyone gives up his [or her] own claim to have more than an equal
say in deciding issues, but retains his [or her] claim to have an equal say. In that way every
member can have the maximum influence compatible with a peaceful settlement [23].
Disobedience to the settlement would constitute a refusal to accept a fair compromise. It
would be an attempt to obtain a greater say in reaching decisions than the others have. And
that is obviously unfair. Moreover, it leaves the other with no other option than a recourse
to force on their part - and force is what we would all like to avoid. Hence, this does appear
to provide some justification for obedience to democratically arrived at laws.
The second is that choosing to participate in a procedure can incur an obligation to
abide by its outcome. If one participates in a decision-procedure alongside others of
differing views, but who would abide by the decision should it go against them, then by
participating in that procedure one creates in the others the reasonable expectation that
one will similarly abide by decisions contrary to one's preferred outcome, and one thereby
acquires the obligation to accept the decision reached. Singer refers to this as an example
of 'quasi-consent', which he thinks is different from either express consent or tacit
consent. Both express and tacit consent are forms of actual consent, whereas quasi
consent is not. Nevertheless, in Singer's view, quasi-consent incurs obligations just as
actual consent does. The example of quasi-consent which he gives is that of being in a
group where everyone is taking turns to buy a round of drinks. Even if you did not actually
consent to buying anyone else a drink, you would still incur the obligation to reciprocate if
you had happily accepted drinks from the others and behaved so as to give the others the
expectation that you would buy a round of drinks when it came to your turn. That
obligation would only have been avoided if you had specifically stated in advance that you
would not buy anyone else a drink.
Singer thinks that voting is very similar, for anyone who understands that an election
serves to enable a group decision to be arrived at, and who voluntarily participates in the
voting procedure to decide an issue, thereby leads the others to believe that he or she has
accepted the voting procedure as an appropriate means for reaching a group decision. In
this way, participation in a decision-procedure, something much more common in
democratic than in undemocratic societies, can oblige one to respect its outcome. Hence,
Singer concludes that both fair compromise and participation can provide greater reasons
for obeying democratic rather than undemocratic laws.
However, there are clear limitations on any such obedience. If no fair compromise is

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36 A. Carter

reached, then disobedience with the aim of obtaining a more approp

procedure - one in which a fair compromise is represented - would be leg
when there is a permanent minority, for example, then majoritarian vot
relying on equal voting rights will not guarantee a fair compromise betwee
parties. The permanent majority will be able to do virtually what
compromise will obtain between their preferences and those of the perma
And when there is any systematic tendency towards unfairness regarding
laws or their operation, those who suffer that unfairness lack the reason f
would otherwise provide for obedience.
This means that minorities (or otherwise disempowered, or potentially d
groups) need to have rights against the majority. If there is any restriction on
of speech, for example, then fair compromise would be destroyed. If some
their case, then there is less chance that others will be converted to their v
their preferred choice, or even take it sufficiently into account. The same
other right that would need to be safeguarded for a democratic decision-
arrive at a fair compromise. Should anyone's democratic rights be violated
would be justified in engaging in civil disobedience, because the reasons f
outcome of the democratic process would no longer apply.
Civil disobedience may also be justified in order to draw attention to an im
issue. Bertrand Russell, for example, argued that the media were bi
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament did not receive a fair hearing. N
disobedience was therefore necessary to publicise the issues. Civil disobed
case, serves to bring about a more equal presentation of views - some
essential if a fair compromise is to be reached. And if there is no fair compro
reason for obedience no longer holds. However, Singer insists that any suc
be non-violent, otherwise it would be a case not of persuasion, but o
intimidating the majority.
Civil disobedience may also be justified in order to implore the majority t
decision, for democratic procedures often fail to take into account the inte
of different groups. The intensity of the minority's feelings can be revealed
by the minority engaging in civil disobedience, especially when it is pre
punishment for disobeying the laws.
Such examples of civil disobedience would be justified even in the most
societies - for example, societies which are direct and participatory
representative democracies. In the latter, the electorate is presented with
of'package deals' by the major political parties (which are highly oligarchic
possessing considerably more power than is compatible with a fair comp
reached), and none of the package deals on offer might accord with the act
of the electorate. In addition, as the control of newspapers and great diffe
cash out into considerable differences in the ability to fight elections or t
pressure, then the so-called democracies are a long way from offering the pr
compromise. Hence, as Singer regards the democratic credentials of exist
be highly dubious in the extreme, then, in his view, civil disobedience is ce
in order to obtain a fair compromise.
In short, none of us lives in anything like as democratic a society as w
with the reasons Singer offers for obeying the laws. Our present societies
the embodiment of a fair compromise and, consequently, cannot justifiabl

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 37

obedience. Consequently, if political obligation is as weak as Singer appears to have

established, then civil disobedience is easily justified.

A justification of radical disobedience

Perhaps, though, it is possible to develop a more powerful justification of civil

disobedience than even Singer provides? On Singer's approach, it would seem to follow
that if one were to participate voluntarily in a genuinely democratic process which
constituted a fair compromise between all participants, then one could not, with
justification, act disobediently. However, there is an indeterminate class of people who
cannot participate in any democratic polity that we might construct. Yet we can affect that
class even to the point of determining its size. At one extreme, it could be as large as the
present human population. At the other extreme, it could be nearly infinite in number. I
am, of course, referring to those humans who have not yet been born (never mind to future
generations of both human and non-human animals). We can ensure that the class is at the
small extreme by destroying the planet within a generation. Or, by living sustainably, we
could allow that class to be unimaginably large, for it would then comprise generations into
the indefinite future. The decisions that we might make democratically could ensure that
future generations live well or die horribly in an environmental nightmare. Their lives and
their well-being are in our hands. Yet not only do they lack a say in any democratic polity
we might devise, they cannot conceivably have any say whatsoever.
The interests of future generations can only be advocated now by those who are
prepared to take their side. If non-human animals appear defenceless and in need of animal
liberationists, future generations are even more defenceless. Like non-human animals,
they cannot plead their case. But it is impossible for future generations even to retaliate
against us. To them we are completely invulnerable. If democratic polities were intent on
pursuing a course of action that would harm the interests of future generations, then
disobedience on their behalf might require an even more radical justification than that
offered by Singer. This is because, inadvertently, he seems to have established that
participants in a genuinely democratic decision-procedure, generating a fair compromise
between them, are bound by it [24]. That would have to include those who wished to act on
behalf of future generations. Yet it is impossible for future generations to be civilly
disobedient now on their own behalf, just as it is impossible for them to participate in our
present decision-procedures.
Why is the fact that future generations cannot participate in any democratic polity we
might construct morally important? Participating in a democratic procedure could be
taken as signifying that one has consented, in accordance with the collective decision, to
forgo having some of one's individual interests satisfied[25]. It is that apparent consent
which could, conceivably, justify the collective (when carrying out democratically arrived
at decisions) acting in a manner that goes against some of the interests of its individual
members. But as future generations cannot now participate, it cannot be presumed that
they have consented. In fact, it is impossible for us to obtain their consent to our acting
against their interests. Hence, it could be argued, we have no justification for acting
against their basic interests when it is unnecessary for meeting our own.
But, it might be objected, the fact that future generations cannot participate in our
institutions does not lead to constraints on our actions, rather to the converse. Future

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38 A. Carter

generations cannot participate because they do not exist. Hence, they ar

is the interests of persons that matter, and as future generations are n
persons, their interests (if, indeed, it can intelligibly be said they have a
In fact, as future generations do not exist, then they cannot have inter
we cannot act against their interests. In short, we cannot harm future
Certainly, future generations are not, at this moment, persons. Howe
thought that they are at least potential persons. Nevertheless, it might
only persons matter, and potential persons do not now exist as person
potential persons are not the sort of entity that matters. But, in respon
distinguish between two kinds of potential person: those that will, as a
actualised; and those that, as a matter of fact, will never exist - the latt
Anne Warren terms 'merely potential people' [26]. If we destroy the pla
years from now, those who would have been born after that time had we,
live sustainably, will never exist. But because they would exist if
sustainably, then they are potential persons. If we destroy the planet in
time, they will never exist and, as such, are merely potential persons.
Clearly, merely potential persons cannot possibly be harmed. But it co
potential persons who will be actualised can be. They can be harmed w
persons, and it is that fact which is morally important. Harm rarely o
moment that the harmful action is performed. If I pull the trigger of a g
at you, I cannot excuse my action by saying that it did not harm you, for
when the bullet struck you, which was after my action of pulling the t
fraction of a second later). If I fire a missile at you which strikes in sev
cannot use that time delay to deny all responsibility for the harm that en
a landmine, which is detonated by a passer-by in one month's time, I can
action of planting the mine is not harmful, for it is presently harming n
leave a bomb lying around timed to explode in one year, I cannot exc
grounds that my action is not harming anyone now. The action is mor
someone is likely to be harmed when the bomb explodes next year.
But what if the person who is harmed in a year's time by the explosio
born? It would not be too controversial to claim that there is no moral difference between
the bomb's harming a two-year-old and its harming an infant of nine months. The date of
birth of the victim is morally insignificant. The fact that the infant was not born when the
bomb was planted makes no moral difference whatsoever. Some of our present actions
will, as a matter of fact, harm persons who will exist in the future. If our present actions
lead to the destruction of the life-support systems of this planet, billions of people who do
not yet exist will die in horrific conditions. As they do not yet exist, they have, as of yet, not
undertaken any actions. In a word, they are wholly innocent. And to harm, needlessly,
wholly innocent persons is wrong [27].
One objection that might be raised against this argument is that future generations
could turn out not to be innocents. But while they might, in fact, not be innocents at the
time they suffer harm, they are certainly innocent at the time some of the actions harmful
to them are performed. And one cannot justifiably unleash a punishment on someone in
advance of a wrong they might commit. Moreover, that none of them would turn out to be
innocent at the time the harm befell them is extremely implausible. Some of them would,
at that time, be infants. And it is certainly immoral to inflict harm gratuitously on
innocents such as young children [28].

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 39

There is, however, a more powerful objection that requires answering - namely, that we
cannot, as a matter of fact, harm distant, future generations. For example, Thomas
Schwartz has argued that if a government were to embark on a long-range environmental
protection policy, then different individuals would be born in the distant future than
would have been born if that policy were not adopted [29]. If harming someone consists in
making him or her worse off than he or she would have been otherwise, then failing to
protect the environment would not harm any people in the distant future - they would not
be made worse off, because had our government chosen to enforce an environmental
protection policy, they would not have existed.
This argument might apply to the actions of governments, but what about to those of
individuals? If I act in a certain way, then A might be born rather than B. But if my action
affects C, whose existence is not dependent upon that action, then I can harm C. How
could I possibly know that there will be no-one whose existence is not dependent upon my,
as opposed to our collective, environmentally damaging behaviour? If the existence of C has
resulted from my environmentally damaging activities rather than yours, your
environmentally damaging actions can still harm him or her. Schwartz's argument
depends upon regarding people as acting collectively. We, as a group, are considered to be
responsible for the existence of another group, and that seems to imply that we (viewed as a
collective) cannot harm them. But can we (viewed as individuals) harm them? Are an
individual's actions responsible for the existence of every future individual he or she
affects? If not, then he or she can harm others even in the far distant future, for he or she
can make them worse off than they would have been otherwise. Schwartz's argument fails
the moment we disaggregate environmentally damaging activities. In short, we cannot
evade our individual responsibilities not to harm future innocents as easily as Schwartz's
argument might at first suggest[30].
But do our obligations only go as far as refraining from harming innocents? Singer has
presented a compelling argument demonstrating that we have an obligation to come to the
aid o/innocents [31 ]. He offers the analogy of an adult passing a shallow pond into which a
child has strayed. The child, being small, is drowning. The adult, being tall, could easily
save the child, although it would cost him or her a trip to the drycleaners. Clearly, if one is
the adult in this scenario, one has a duty to wade in and save the child, even though one will
get one's clothes wet and muddy.
But let us now extend Singer's analogy. Suppose, instead, that the child hasn't simply
strayed into the pond. Suppose that the child is being drowned by an adult for no other
reason than the adult in question simply couldn't care less whether the child lives or dies.
Wouldn't one be under an equally strong obligation to come to the child's assistance in this
situation as in the earlier one? Yet this is, whether we like it or not, the situation that we
adults are now in. The present generation is acting so as to ensure that future chlidren will
'drown' in a sea of life-threatening pollution. In short, as it is morally incumbent upon us
to prevent needless harm befalling innocents, it is our duty to interfere in others' actions
when by so doing we would prevent such harm. Consequently, it is our moral responsibility
to prevent the present generation from continuing to harm future generations.
However, it might be objected that we do not have any responsibility to come to the aid
of a drowning child, for although it is morally wrong to kill a person, it is not wrong to let
him or her die. But in both cases the bad that occurs - the person's loss of life - is the same.
Why, then, should anyone subscribe to the 'acts and omissions doctrine' when it leads to
such a callous conclusion? James Rachels offers this hypothesis:

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40 A. Carter

Human beings are to some degree altruistic, but they are also to a grea
selfish, and their attitudes on matters of conduct are largely determine
is in their own interests, and what is in the interests of the few other pe
especially care about. In terms of both the costs and the benefits, it is to
advantage for people in the affluent countries to regard killing as wo
letting die. First, the costs of never killing anyone are not great: we can
well without ever killing. But the cost of not allowing people to die,
could save them, would be very great. For any one of us to take seriously
save the starving would require that we give up our affluent life-style
could no longer be spent on luxuries while others starve. On the other
have much more to gain from a strict prohibition on killing than fr
prohibition on letting die. Since we are not in danger of starving, we
suffer if people do not regard feeding the hungry as so important; but
be threatened if people did not regard killing as very, very bad. So, both
and the benefits encourage us, selfishly, to view killing as worse than lett
is to our own advantage to believe this, and so we do [32],

But, of course, although it is the case that many view killing with horror, wh
allowing people to starve to death, that is not to say that it is not, in fact, m
behaviour to stand by and let people die when they could be saved. For th
killing is worse than letting someone die can be argued, as Rachels' hypoth
reveal an outlook which has evolved from a history of immoral selfishn
outright international exploitation). And such an outlook is certainly no
moral one.
However, would my responsibility for saving the drowning child in Singer's analogy be
less if I were one of a group of twenty adults passing by the pond? Would that make me only
one-twentieth as responsible for saving the child as I would have been had I been the only
adult passing by? Rachels presents an argument suggesting otherwise. Imagine one of the
vicious characters the actor Jack Palance has played so well in the movies. Imagine that one
such character is watching a child starve to death in the same room as himself and he can't
even be bothered to pass her the sandwich he is eating. If he invited nineteen of his friends
into the room to watch the child die, would he become one-twentieth of the moral monster
he would otherwise have been? Similarly, to return to Singer's analogy, would I reduce my
responsibility for saving the drowning child to one-twentieth of what it was by calling my
friends over to the side of the shallow pond to watch her drown? What if there were two
drowning children? What if I waded in to save one and left the other to drown, saying that
one of the friends I summoned over should save her? Have I done my bit or, if no-one else
will wade in, should I save the other child as well? These examples suggest that each of us is
wholly and individually responsible for saving as many persons as we can from harm,
irrespective of the indifference of others.
How, then, ought we to respond in practice to the harm that the present generation is
causing future generations through the environmental consequences of its activities? In a
word, what measures are required of us? It is evident that significant changes must be
made to our lifestyles if we are to secure the conditions necessary for future generations to
live worthwhile lives [3-3]. But what will bring about these changes? Several broad kinds of
response immediately come to mind: what might be labelled eco-authoritarian, eco
reformist and eco-Marxist[34]. Each offers its own individual approach for attempting to

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 41

deal with the environmental crisis before us. Let me, therefore, examine each approach.
Considerations of space mean that the following discussion will, of necessity, be cursory.
However, it does indicate the general direction that political practice will have to take. I
begin with Marxist responses, and that will first require a brief excursus into Marxist
theory.
The most coherent interpretation of Marx's theory of history is widely agreed to be
G. A. Cohen's [35]. In a nutshell, Cohen claims that Marx's theory can only be made
coherent if interpreted as resting on functional explanations: the development of
technology (an economic force) selects economic relations that are functional for it; and
economic relations select a political structure (a set of political relations) that is functional
for them. As Marxists widely assume, inegalitarian economic relations will select a coercive
state apparatus in order to preserve themselves. Now a major political implication of this
theory (and of Marxism in general) is that if egalitarian economic relations are attained,
then no coercive state will be required, for there will be no inequalities requiring coercion
for their protection. If the regime of private property is superseded, then, to use Engels'
famous phrase, the state will 'wither away'. Thus, the principal thrust of most varieties of
Marxism is that if the economic structure is transformed by means of a communist
revolution, then all other major problems will simultaneously be overcome. Eco-Marxists
tend to think that this includes environmental problems, as well.
However, the Russian Revolution of 1917 - ironically, the revolution responsible for the
ascendancy of Marxism on the Left - contradicts this theory of history. Egalitarian
relations arose within Russian industry when the workers set up their own factory
committees. But Lenin's response was to replace them with inegalitarian one-man
management. His reason: 'All our efforts must be exerted to the very utmost to . . . bring
about an economic revival, without which a real increase in our country's defence potential
is inconceivable'[36], In other words, it wasn't that the state withered away when it was
dysfunctional for egalitarian economic relations. Rather, the state replaced egalitarian
economic relations with inegalitarian ones when egalitarian relations were not perceived to
be functional for the state.
This suggests that Marxist theory has the world upside down. In other words, it could be
argued that it is not economics which has explanatory primacy, but the state. In order to
expand on this claim, it is necessary to note a pair of distinctions that Cohen draws. On
Cohen's account of Marx's theory of history, as we have noted, economic forces
(technology) select economic relations that are functional for those forces, while the
economic relations select political relations (the state) that are functional for those
economic relations. This employs a distinction between forces and relations and a further
distinction between the economic and the political. But this pair of distinctions can
provide us with four categories, not just the three employed by Cohen. We can identify not
only economic relations, economic forces and political relations, but also political forces.
Economic forces comprise primarily those who work for those in dominant positions
within the structure of economic relations, as well as the technology involved. We could
regard political forces as comprising primarily those who work for those in dominant
positions within the structure of political relations, as well as the technology involved: for
example, soldiers and their weapons. How are such political forces to be fitted into a theory
of historical change?
As Lenin's behaviour following the Russian Revolution seems to show[37], states
(structures of political relations) select economic structures (structures of economic

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42 A. Carter

relations) which develop technology (economic forces) because that is

developing their military capacities (political forces), without which t
power. I refer to this as the State-Primacy Theory[38], Unfortunately,
ships that this theory describes result, in practice, in an environmen
dynamic. In order to remain militarily competitive with neighbouring s
to do so it might not survive), a state needs a growing military capabil
ever-more productive technologies appropriate to meeting military nee
present circumstances, nuclear power stations in order to produce plut
weapons). This also involves an ever-expanding surplus to pay for a st
short, the state's requirements cannot be met without an economic str
to developing technology and productivity on an ever-increasing scale
massive consumption of finite resources and a frighteningly high outpu
dynamic also threatens war - and today that could mean nuclear war,
environmentally catastrophic event imaginable.
It is precisely this environmentally hazardous dynamic which is drivin
cause so much harm to future generations. And as those who have no
cannot justifiably be thought to deserve such harm, it is our moral ob
any such harm from occurring. This means that we have a duty t
environmentally hazardous dynamic that we are presently trapped wit
we to escape from it?
Eco-Marxists tend to identify the economic relations as the caus
problems[39]. But (as the State-Primacy Theory tells us) focusing alm
economic relations and seeking transformation there, as most Marxists
fail, for states will simply replace economic relations which are dysfuncti
ones that are functional - just as the Bolshevik state was forced
compromise' economic relations would not be exploitative and would
surplus required by any state needing to remain militarily competitive.
varieties of eco-Marxism provide no solution to the problems we are un
generations.
However, if, as on Cohen's account of Marx, it is the development of technology which
selects appropriate economic relations, perhaps we can rely on some environmentally
benign technology (an economic force) being developed that will solve the environmental
problems we are creating. But if that technology implies less consumption (which it would
have to in order for it to be environmentally benign), then capitalists would not have an
interest in developing or promoting it, for it would clearly reduce their profitability. And if
it did not generate the high productivity an expanding military capacity requires (and if it
were genuinely environmentally benign it wouldn't), then the state wouldn't have an
interest in developing or promoting it either.
On the other hand, Marxists have traditionally advocated a tremendously abundant
socialism based upon a highly productive technology. In fact, Marx went so far as to
claim that post-capitalism would not be established until capitalism had developed
technology as far as it was capable of doing [40], This would greatly reduce the length of
the working day - a precondition, in Marx's view, for real freedom. But Cohen, for one,
accepts that 'if the "crisis of resources" is as serious as some say, it is a genuine threat to
the realisation of forms of communism which depend upon a radically reduced working
day, for those forms require astronomically high levels of productive power'[41].
However, the problem is even greater than this suggests, for a more serious limitation on

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 43

technological expansion than finite resources is the limited capacity which the
environment has for acting as a sink for pollution without its life-support systems being
seriously compromised. In fact, Marxism appears to be singularly unsuited as an answer
to environmental problems given its faith in increased productivity. Thus a variant of
eco-Marxism that put its faith in technological development - the economic forces - would
provide no solution either.
If Marxism fails, what about eco-authoritarianism? Eco-authoritarians assume that
society will have to be coerced into behaving in an environmentally benign manner. Thus,
eco-authoritarians place their faith in the power of the political forces. But this position, at
its best, reduces to some form of benevolent dictatorship - environmentally benevolent
dictatorship, to be precise. Yet all of the problems frequently rehearsed against benevolent
dictatorships are equally applicable to environmentally benevolent ones. In particular,
what guarantee is there that such a dictatorship would remain benign? Moreover, any such
emphasis on the political forces and their coercive capacity will pose a threat to
neighbouring states. This means that those states would have to develop their military
capacity further, which the environmentally benevolent dictatorship would have to
respond to if it were to remain secure. In other words, it can be argued that eco
authoritarian responses will tend to accelerate the environmentally hazardous dynamic
rather than allow us to escape from it.
Finally, if Marxists and eco-authoritarians both lack a solution, what about eco
reformists? They seek a gradual transformation of the political relations. But any change in
the political relations that went against the interests of the political forces would most
likely incur military intervention. This threat could be reduced significantly: by
safeguarding the interests of the military through continuing to invest in the nation's
coercive capacity and thereby remaining militarily competitive. But that would be to
remain firmly within the environmentally hazardous dynamic. Moreover, eco-reformists
would have to rely on the present economic system - at least until their gradual political
changes resulted in a major transformation of the economic structure. Unfortunately, the
environmental crises are so pressing that we do not have the time to wait.
However, all of this supposes that there is a need for change. But defenders of the free
market might respond that the present economic system can solve the problems we face. At
present, the rich can avoid the worst effects of our environmentally damaging behaviour.
And whatever the rich enjoy today will 'trickle down' to the poor tomorrow.
Unfortunately, this assumption does not hold in the case of 'positional goods' [42], If, in
a market economy, the principal value of education, for example, is that it serves, while few
possess it, as a guaranteed passport to better employment, then that particular value
cannot be enjoyed when it becomes available to all. A far more important objection to this
response, however, is that there is reason to think that whatever 'trickles down' to the mass
of people will not be environmentally benign.
Consider F. A. von Hayek's 'echelon advance' theory of economic growth. According to
this highly influential theory, rich people are required to provide the demand which acts as
a spur to innovation. As the first of a new and innovative range of products will be very
expensive to develop and then produce, no innovation would take place, it is argued, unless
there were some rich people to buy new and expensive items. Later on, however, the
production costs will fall and the innovative product will lower in price and become
available to the mass of people - as happened in the case of televisions, computers and air
transport, to take obvious examples.

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44 A. Carter

But does the assumption that (positional goods aside) what the rich can e
be available for everyone tomorrow imply that the market will provide
response to the environmental crises facing us? Unfortunately, it does not.
environmentally-aware rich people might create the requisite initial dem
panels, say. But because a small minority of very rich people are not mass
as it is the sheer volume of polluting activity which constitutes a key f
environmental threat, then, while whatever it is that the rich consume
small number of people, it can be highly polluting or resource-demanding
an environmental catastrophe. In which case, there is reason to believe tha
developed in an economy relying on 'echelon advance' will continue to be e
damaging. For example, as the rich can afford 'gas-guzzling' sports cars, a
drive them without posing too severe a threat to the ecosphere, such cars w
What would then 'trickle down' to the rest of society would be a highly
resource-consumptive privatised form of transport, rather than an ener
public, mass transit system.
In short, the present system can only lead us to inflict more and more harm
generations. But neither revolutionary eco-Marxism (in either variety co
eco-authoritarianism, nor eco-reformism is likely to stop us harming them
reason is that each of these political perspectives focuses upon only one
environmentally hazardous dynamic: either on the economic relation
forces, the political forces or the political relations. The problem is, unfortun
dynamic is mutually reinforcing. If one seeks to transform one element i
the other elements can simply re-constitute it in order to serve their purp
means is that every element of the dynamic has to be opposed if we are to st
being driven to inflict major harm on future generations. And this requ
disobedience more radical than many have considered hitherto. I shall te
violent opposition to every element of the environmentally hazardous d
disobedience'.

Earlier, we noted that Singer argues that Rawls' defence of civil disobedience does
go far enough, for it seems unable to justify disobedience on behalf of non-human an
But it might be thought that Rawls' approach to 'intergenerational justice' could j
radical disobedience on behalf of future generations. Rawls' view is that each gene
ought to preserve the benefits of its civilisation, maintain its just institutions, and p
posterity with a capital accumulation greater than it inherited from its ancestors. J
Passmore construes the latter as requiring of each generation that it ask itself wh
society could reasonably expect from its predecessor. 'If it then acts upon the ans
which it arrives, each generation will be better off than its predecessor but no gene
will be called upon to make an exceptional sacrifice' [43]. However, our generation is
situation of leaving to its successors a planet that has been so damaged that the ra
disobedience now required on their behalf demands that we make just such an her
sacrifice. But, as Passmore argues, given that 'Rawls' theory is based on the conce
justice, fairness, equal shares', then 'it leaves no room for the heroic sacrifice' [44].
However, it might be objected against any moral requirement on our part to mak
an heroic sacrifice for future generations that to do so by engaging in the
disobedience which the environmentally hazardous dynamic demands would be the h
of arrogance, for protesters are fallible, and what makes them more likely to be righ
the government? That future generations will need the resources that many of us p

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 45

they will need is open to doubt. The government might finance research which would free
future generations from a reliance on scarce resources. But any assumption that a future
generation will be invulnerable to any harm from a polluted environment is far more
improbable. And it is clear that when governments allow and encourage the production of
nuclear waste without any clear idea of how it is to be disposed of safely, then the harms
that are likely to be inflicted upon future generations are obviously being disregarded. In
such cases, protesters are more likely to be right than the government, for the government
obviously does not care about the harms to future generations it is allowing and, indeed,
encouraging. Hence, certain protests in defence of future generations would seem to be
unproblematic.
But, more importantly, the analysis offered here in fact side-steps the objection that
protesters may be fallible. We are all, including our governments, at present trapped within
the environmentally hazardous dynamic, and that dynamic is driving us to harm future
generations. Before we can be free to decide on, and then implement, the morally right
course of action with respect to future generations, we must escape the environmentally
hazardous dynamic. In other words, radical disobedience is the moral precondition for any
morally acceptable outcome [45].
One final point: the environmentally hazardous dynamic is driving us to harm not only
future generations of humans but also presently existing non-human animals and future
generations of non-human animals. It is also driving us to damage the ecosphere as a
whole. Any of these 'harms' could be employed as a basis for radical disobedience. But
given the 'speciesism' of most humans, and rather than rely on any argument about our
responsibilities to the ecosphere or nature as a whole, I have confined my defence of radical
disobedience to what appears to me to be the responsibility easiest to defend: namely, our
obligations to other human persons - except in this case it is to future human persons.

Conclusion

To conclude, from the perspective offered by the State-Primacy Theory[46], o

obligations not to cause harm to future generations, as well as to defend them from be
harmed needlessly, entail that we must oppose not merely governmental policy.
cannot, morally, continue to participate in any element of a dynamic that is so deadly
innocents. In other words, we must be disobedient with respect not only to t
preservation of the prevailing political relations, but also to the continuation of
predominant economic relations, economic forces and political forces. I have termed th
'radical disobedience'. Moreover, such disobedience is not merely permissible n
(because of an unquestioned assumption that civil disobedience on behalf of othe
supererogatory, at best) is it merely commendable. Radical disobedience is, quite sim
nothing less than the duty of each and every one of us.

Alan Carter, Heythrop College, University of London, Kensington Square, London W8 5

UK.

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46 A. Carter

NOTES

[1] For the classic discussion, see Henry David Thoreau (1971) Civil disobedience in Walde
Writings (New York: Bantam Books).
[2] Tolstoy's major writings on civil disobedience can be found in Leo Tolstoy (1967) On Civil
and Non-Violence (New York: Bergman).
[3] For an exposition of Gandhi's views, see Raghavan Iyer (1973) The Moral and Political
Mahatma Gandhi (New York: Oxford University Press).
[4] Concise justifications of the moral stance of animal liberationists can be found from uti
deontological perspectives in Peter Singer (1986) All animals are equal in idem, (ed.) Ap
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) and in Tom Regan (1985) The case for animal rights in
(ed.) In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Blackwell), respectively.
[5] 'Landmark' campaigns have recently been 'fought' at Twyford Down, Oxlees Wood, the ext
Mil and Newbury.
[6] Ronald Dworkin (1971) Law and civil disobedience in James Rachels (ed.) Moral Problems:
of Philosophical Essays (New York: Harper and Row), p. 144.
[7] Ibid., p. 149.
[8] John Rawls (1971) The justification of civil disobedience in Rachels (ed.) Moral Problems,
[9] Ibid., p. 126. The second reason is H. L. A. Hart's 'mutuality of restrictions', which can b
giving rise to special rights. See H. L. A. Hart (1967) Are there any natural rights? in Anth
(ed.) Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[10] Rawls, op. cit., p. 130.
[11] Ibid., pp. 130-31.
[12] Ibid., p. 131.
[13] Ibid., p. 136.
[14] Ibid., p. 140.
[15] Peter Singer (1973) Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 90
[16] Ibid., p. 6.
[17] Ibid.
[18] For a powerful refutation of Hobbesian arguments concerning the supposed need for an authoritarian,
centralised power in order to ensure co-operation, see Michael Taylor (1976) Anarchy and Co-operation
(London: John Wiley and Sons).
[19] Singer, Democracy and Disobedience, p. 22.
[20] Ibid., p. 25.
[21] This is certainly true when the whole land surface of the planet is the territory of some state or other.
[22] Ibid., p. 28.
[23] Ibid., pp. 45-46.
[24] I say 'inadvertently' because Singer's conclusion seems to rule out many of the activities animal
liberationists might feel morally obliged to engage in should a genuine democracy arise that lacked a deep
concern for the welfare of non-human animals.

[25] This could be argued to be the intuition lying behind the social contract tradition.
[26] See Mary Anne Warren (1978) Do potential people have moral rights? in R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry
(eds) Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).
[27] For a powerful response (on the basis of not inflicting gratuitous harm) to a number of objections against
the view that we have obligations to future generations, see Richard Routley and Val Routley (1978)
Nuclear energy and obligations to the future, Inquiry, 21, pp. 133-79.
[28] See Richard Wasserstrom (1985) War, nuclear war, and nuclear deterrence: some conceptual and moral
issues in Russell Hardin, John J. Mearsheimer, Gerald Dworkin and Robert E. Goodin (eds) Nuclear
Deterrence and Strategy (Chicago: Chicago University Press).
[29] See Thomas Schwartz (1979) Welfare judgements and future generations, Theory and Decision, 11,
pp. 181-2.
[30] A less cursory treatment of this issue can be found in Alan Carter (forthcoming) Can we harm future
people?
[31] See Peter Singer (1972) Famine, affluence and morality, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 3, pp. 229-43.

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 In Defence of Radical Disobedience 47

[32] James Rachels (1983) Killing and starving to death in Jan Narveson (ed.) Moral Issues (Toronto: Oxford
University Press), p. 165.
[33] On one element of the environmental threat that we pose to future generations - that concerning our
continued ability to feed ourselves - see Alan Carter (1996) The environmental crises and political
theory, Cogito, 10, 1.
[34] See Alan Carter (1996) Eco-authoritarianism, eco-reformism, or eco-Marxism?, Cogito, 10, 2.
[35] G. A. Cohen (1978) Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
[36] V. I. Lenin (1970) The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government (Moscow: Progress Publishers), p. 6.
[37] But the following theory is not applicable solely to the Russian Revolution. Michael Taylor argues that
state actors were responsible for the selecting of new economic relations in France from the fifteenth
century. See Michael Taylor (1989) Structure, culture and action in the explanation of social change,
Politics and Society, 17, 1, pp. 115-60. For an account of how the behaviour of Third World states also fits
the theory that follows, see Alan Carter (1995) The nation-state and underdevelopment, Third World
Quarterly, 16, 4, pp. 595-618 and Alan Carter (1997) State-Primacy and Third World debt, The
Heythrop Journal, 38, 3.
[38] See Alan Carter (1992) Functional explanation and the state in Paul Wetherly (ed.) Marx's Theory of
History: The Contemporary Debate (Aldershot: Avebury).
[39] Marx himself subscribes to the view that 'the economical subjection of the man [and woman] of labour to
the monopoliser of the means of labour, that is, the sources of all life, lies at the bottom of servitude in all
its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence'. Karl Marx (1974)
Provisional rules of the International in idem., The First International and After, ed. David Fernbach
(Harmondsworth: Penguin), p. 82.
[40] This claim can be found in Karl Marx (1977) Preface to A Critique of Political Economy in idem., Selected
Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 390.
[41] Cohen, op. cit., p. 61.
[42] For this objection, see Fred Hirsch (1977) Social Limits to Growth (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul),
passim.
[43] John Passmore (1980) Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London:
Duckworth), p. 87.
[44] Ibid.
[45] I should add, however, that my view is that radical disobedience should be carried out in a constructive
rather than in a destructive way. For some clarification of this point, see Alan Carter (1993) Creating co
operative autonomy, Cogito, 7, 3. It is also worth noting that there are means of engaging in civil
disobedience that are appropriate for socialising individuals towards 'co-operative autonomy' - for
example, by participating in 'affinity groups'. For a brief account of the useful role affinity groups play in
civil disobedience, see the direct action handbooks produced for the attempted occupations of the
construction site of the Seabrook nuclear power station.
[46] For a fuller statement of the environmental implications of the State-Primacy Theory, see Alan Carter
(1993) Towards a green political theory in Andrew Dobson and Paul Lucardie (eds) The Politics of
Nature: Explorations in Green Political Theory (London: Routledge).

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