ARCHIVES OF TRANSPORT ISSN (print): 0866-9546

Volume 59, Issue 3, 2021 e-ISSN (online): 2300-8830

DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0015.0466

AIRCRAFT OPERATORS MAINTENANCE

DECISIONS SUPPORTING METHOD

Sławomir SZRAMA1, Adrian GILL2

1
31st Tactical Air Force Base Poznan-Krzesiny, Poznan, Poland
2
Faculty of Civil and Transport Engineering, Poznan University of Technology, Poznan, Poland

Abstract:
A key element of exploitation processes constitutes maintenance operations and tasks. While being conducted in the proper
way, they have a crucial effect on achieving the assumed by aircraft designer and operator goals. Properly conducted
maintenance operations allow to meet all the technical objects readiness requirements as well as to achieve desired ac-
ceptable risk level. Maintenance system effectiveness might be generally a crucial task for company or entity responsible
for the maintenance. In this context, particularly relevant become technical object maintenance procedures and tasks de-
veloped by their manufacturers. Experience of the article authors quite early shows the need of the maintenance pro-
grammes modification. Aircraft manufacturers usually are not so eager to develop and implement maintenance programme
modifications. Presented situation is very much the case in aviation transport. This was the reason why authors of this
article decided to prepare and develop this elaboration which might constitute the assistance and supports complex tech-
nical objects users in maintenance decision.
The main purpose of this article is to present maintenance decisions’ supporting method for the aircraft operators. This
article provides guidelines which include a description of risk in the context of aviation maintenance and introduction of
some methodologies, tools and criteria that support identification, analysis and evaluation of risk. Authors included idea,
how the aircraft preventive maintenance could be used to mitigate aircraft failure risk during flight operations. It also
shows how to adopt and develop effective maintenance program using tools for adequate risk analysis, optimal interval
assignments, and selection of the most effective maintenance task. Authors presented methodology and described steps of
the logic diagram analysis for the aircraft systems and their components, in order to manage and adopt aircraft mainte-
nance program to fulfil aircraft airworthiness requirements and operational availability. The whole methodology was de-
scribed on the basis of the F 16 aircraft maintenance system and with reference to the maintenance data. This article might
also constitute an introduction to the aircraft maintenance programme development method.
Keywords: MSG-3, Risk Based Maintenance (RBM), preventive maintenance, risk

To cite this article:

Szrama, S., Gill, A., 2021. Aircraft operators maintenance decisions supporting
method. Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0015.0466

Contact:
1) slawomir.szrama@put.poznan.pl [https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0729-071X],
2) adrian.gill@put.poznan.pl [https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2655-4584] - corresponding author

Article is available in open access and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
94 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

1. Introduction In this context, particularly relevant become tech-

The properties of the means of transport (including nical object maintenance procedures and tasks de-
the aircraft that article concerns) are already devel- veloped by their manufacturers. Such procedures are
oped at the design stage. The design runs in parallel usually prepared during object design phase and
with the analysis of RAMS (Reliability, Availability, they mainly result from predicted and prognostic
Maintainability and Safety) and development of a data. As an example, they may rely on the assumed
maintenance strategy. As the design of the means of environmental conditions of the object operations (if
transport is built, changing the characteristics of the any of these conditions are taken under considera-
RAMS becomes more and more difficult. The oper- tion). In result, technical object users and maintain-
ation phase however, is an important source of feed- ers during its operations quite early notice the need
back for the manufacturer to verify the RAMS char- of the maintenance programme modification. For
acteristics and introduce appropriate improvements. example, authors Tsagkas et al. (2014) analyze
A key element of exploitation processes constitutes twelve cases of deviations from prescribed proce-
maintenance operations and tasks, which being con- dures during scheduled/unscheduled maintenance
ducted in the proper way have a crucial effect on checks, carried out by an aircraft maintenance or-
achieving the goals assumed by aircraft designers ganization in Greece. As indicated in work
and operators. Properly conducted maintenance op- (Pogačnik, Duhovnik, and Tavčar, 2017), aircraft
erations allow to meet all the technical objects’ read- maintenance and repair organizations require the
iness requirements as well as to achieve desired ac- continuous improvement of processes and the elim-
ceptable/tolerable risk level. The importance of the ination of non-value-added activities during mainte-
maintenance role also results from the costs of real- nance.
izing maintenance strategy and tasks. In airlines al- However, how the practical experience of the article
most 9.5% of their operational costs are spent for authors shows, object manufacturers usually are not
maintenance (Lee and Mitici, 2020) but a similar oc- so eager to develop and implement maintenance pro-
currence is observed in other modes of transport. For gramme modifications. Such modifications require
example, in railways, the costs of preventive mainte- quite an effort and result in heavy workloads and fi-
nance are up to 30.5% of the Life Cycle Costs of rail nancial outlays (Samaranayake and Kiridena, 2012).
vehicles and are the second cost category after the In result, cost of these modifications, in many cases
costs of power or fuel (Szkoda, Satora, and Koniec- are covered by object operators. This might lead to
zek, 2020). Due to this fact, projects to improve the the situation, when it is irrational to go on with ob-
efficiency of the process of operation railway vehi- ject operations.
cles by changing the preventive maintenance, are Presented situation is very much the case in aviation
amongst the core areas of the strategies pursued by transport. However, its formal confirmation is very
rail transport companies. About seriousness of the difficult, as it is hardly documented. Contrary, the
maintenance role, as well as other aspects of its im- literature reports rather problems of pressure exerted
portance, it can be read among others in the works on aircraft manufacturers by their customers (Ward,
(Gill, 2017; Młynarski, Pilch, Smolnik, Szybka, and McDonald, Morrison, Gaynor, and Nugent, 2010).
Wiązania, 2020). How to solve this problem is the responsibility of the
It could be pointed out that increase in maintenance operators of the mentioned means of transport. They
system effectiveness can be generally a crucial task have to face and try to find the solution of the two
for company or entity responsible for the mainte- fundamental problems:
nance. As indicate Matusevych et al. (2018) it can − frequent maintenance procedures changes de-
be reached in three main interdependent directions velopment,
(technical, economic, organizational) that demands − rational changes selection, which are presented
to work in aspect of improvement of maintenance to the manufacturer and then implemented.
and repair strategy. However, it should be noted that This was the reason why authors of this article de-
in the case of maintenance strategy for objects (such cided to prepare and develop this elaboration which
as those that are the subject of this article), any deci- constitutes the assistance and supports complex
sion must be conditioned by risk. technical objects users in maintenance decision. The
main goal of this article is to present maintenance
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 95
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

decisions supporting method for the aircraft opera- 2016; Haladuick and Dann, 2017; Leoni, Ba-
tors. For the case study maintenance system of the hooToroody, De Carlo, and Paltrinieri, 2019;
most advanced Polish Air Force multirole aircraft: Utomi and Fah, 2020)
F-16C/D block 52+ was selected. − infrastructure/bridges e.g.: (Cheng et al., 2019;
Kaewunruen et al., 2021)
2. Literature review − manufacturing systems e.g.: (Ratnayake and
Developed and proposed by authors method belongs Antosz, 2017)
to the group of methods called RBM (risk-based − medical applications e.g.: (Vala, Chemweno,
maintenance), where we utilize the approach based Pintelon, and Muchiri, 2018)
on the risk management principles. RBM methods Even though maintenance based on risk has already
are usually applicable for the transport systems. been confirmed and acknowledged, hardly you may
Malfunctions or improper operations of the system find the applications of this in the air transport. Par-
elements might generate hazards which result in se- tially, in compliance with the RBM concept might
rious losses such as loss of health or human lives, be considered hazards analysis method, used in or-
significant system damage, degradation of the natu- der to communicate about the risk while performing
ral environment. We may underline the particular maintenance tasks. As an example, could be an arti-
relevance of these systems and their elements, which cle (Aust and Pons, 2019) dealing with the applica-
substantiates the RBM approach. tion of the Bow-tie method in identification of haz-
We could have noticed development of the RBM ards and their sources and consequences during vis-
methods in years 2000-2016 (Gill, 2017; Khan and ual inspection in engine maintenance. This approach
Haddara, 2004), but also nowadays significant atten- provides a better understanding of the risks in visual
tion is being concentrated on this issue and its ap- inspection during aircraft maintenance and a new
plicability. There have been tens of publications in- understanding of the importance of certain controls
dexed in the worldwide databases for the last five in the workflow. However, this is not the mainte-
years concerning problematic aspects of the RBM. nance programme planning based on risk.
For examples there were 31 articles in Web of Sci- Similarly, indirect aspects of the RBM could also be
ence, in the Scopus database we may find 102 pub- found in the (Ayse, 2019) publication. It presents the
lications (62 articles and 36 conference papers). All concept of the application of the elements of the risk
these publications are concerned with various econ- management in the maintenance process by optimi-
omy branches and transport systems i.e.: zation of the human performance while minimizing
− railway transport e.g.: (Kaewunruen, Sresa- both failures and errors by aircraft maintenance
koolchai, Ma, and Phil-Ebosie, 2021; technicians. Due to the fact that errors made by air-
Stipanovic, Bukhsh, Reale, and Gavin, 2021; craft maintenance technicians will cause aircraft ac-
Wang, An, Qin, and Jia, 2018) cidents or incidents or near miss incidents, we may
− maritime transport e.g.: (Cullum, Binns, Lons- conclude, that this is one of the steps in the risk man-
dale, Abbassi, and Garaniya, 2018; Zareei and agement methodology (the so-called risk monitor-
Iranmanesh, 2018) ing).
− power supply systems/wind turbine and off- Problematic aspects of the safety in aircraft mainte-
shore process facilities e.g.: (Ambühl and nance were also presented by Shukri et al. (2016).
Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2017; Nielsen, Tcherniak, Alike (Aust and Pons, 2019) they underline risk
and Ulriksen, 2021; Pui, Bhandari, Arzaghi, communication relevance in aircraft maintenance
Abbassi, and Garaniya, 2017; Rusin and processes. In research paper „The potential risk of
Wojaczek, 2019; Yazdi, Nedjati, and Abbassi, communication media in conveying critical infor-
2019; Yeter, Garbatov, and Guedes Soares, mation in the aircraft maintenance organization: a
2020) case study” authors stress the significance of the ver-
− pipeline gas transport e.g.: (Abdul, Asif, bal and written communication in conveying critical
Qadeer, Faisal, and Salim, 2019; Arzaghi et al., information concerning aircraft safety and air-
2017; Consilvio, Di Febbraro, Sacco, and Ieee, worthiness. The communication media used to con-
vey the critical information between departments at
an aircraft maintenance organization have potential
96 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

risk in misunderstanding of the information. Alt- capability of an item at or before a specified in-
hough this aspect in not connected with RBM, it pro- terval (age limit), regardless of its condition at
vides an inducement for our method to be relatively the time, to a level that provides a tolerable
simple and comprehensible for people who apply it. probability of survival to the end of another
Taking into consideration all capabilities (and bene- specified interval.
fits) of the risk-based maintenance application, 3. Scheduled discard (or hard time discard):a
which were mentioned above, we would like to point scheduled task that entails discarding an item at
out the relevant research gap indicating the lack of or before a specified age limit regardless of its
these types of methods applicable for aviation condition at the time.
transport. 4. Scheduled failure-finding inspection: a sched-
uled task used to determine whether a specific
3. Materials and methods hidden failure has occurred. The objective of a
3.1. Aircraft maintenance strategy failure-finding inspection is to detect a func-
In accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) tional failure that has already occurred, but is
No 1321/2014 (2014) the aircraft owner is responsi- not evident to the operating crew during the
ble for the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft performance of normal duties.
and shall ensure that no flight takes place unless: In some cases, it may not be possible to find a single
1. The aircraft is maintained in an airworthy con- task which on its own is effective in reducing the risk
dition, and; of failure to a tolerably low or acceptable level. In
2. Any operational and emergency equipment fit- these cases, it may be necessary to employ a “com-
ted is correctly installed and serviceable or bination of tasks” such as “on-condition inspection”
clearly identified as unserviceable, and; and “scheduled discard”.
3. The airworthiness certificate remains valid, and; If no task is found to be applicable and effective, de-
4. The maintenance of aircraft is performed in ac- fault strategies are introduced, which include:
cordance with the maintenance programme. ˗ no scheduled maintenance (no preventive
There are some aircraft maintenance strategies used maintenance, run to failure)
in aviation. Among them the most common is the ˗ redesign
failure management strategy known as Reliability- When it is technically unfeasible to perform an ef-
Centered Maintenance RCM, which consists of spe- fective scheduled maintenance task, and when fail-
cific scheduled maintenance tasks selected on the ure will not affect safety, the “no-scheduled-mainte-
basis of the actual reliability characteristics of the nance” or “run-to-failure” strategy will be accepted.
equipment, and they are performed at fixed, prede- Selection of the “no-scheduled-maintenance” option
termined intervals. means that the risk level of the failure and its conse-
The objective of these tasks is to prevent deteriora- quence is accepted. In cases where the failure has a
tion of the inherent safety and reliability levels of the safety effect and there is no effective scheduled
system. maintenance task, “redesign” is mandatory. In fact,
According to RCM methodology, maintenance ac- the decision depends on the seriousness of the con-
tivities may be assigned to four categories: sequences.
˗ Corrective maintenance; Maintenance Steering Group-3 (Air Transport Asso-
˗ Preventive maintenance ciation of America, 2007), on the other hand, con-
˗ Modifications of the object: siders the same failure management strategies as
˗ No maintenance activities those used by RCM, but has made some modifica-
The four basic forms of preventive maintenance of- tions. For example, the term “on-condition inspec-
fered by RCM (Naval Air Systems Command, 2005; tion” has been changed to “inspection/functional
SAE, 2002) include: check”. This was due to the fact that some mainte-
1. Scheduled on-condition inspection: a sched- nance engineers believe that “on-condition” means
uled task used to detect a potential failure. don't do anything or neglect to do anything until a
2. Scheduled restoration (or rework or hard time failure occurs. The above interpretation of “on-con-
restoration):a scheduled task that restores the dition” maintenance may cause operational surprises
which could not only prove very costly, but also
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 97
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

jeopardize the safety of an aircraft and its occupants if they occur. Barriers in accordance with (Modarres,
(Civil Aviation Safety Authority, 2001). To prevent 2006) can be viewed as obstacles that perform the
such an interpretation, MSG 3 changed the term. For function of containing, removing, preventing, miti-
the same reason, the term “failure-finding inspection” gating, controlling, or warning against hazards acti-
has been changed to “operational/visual inspection”. vations. A similar understanding of barriers is given
The types of maintenance strategies and activities e.g., by (Sklet, 2006) and concluded by (Gill, 2017)
recommended by (Air Transport Association of a few years later. Preventive maintenance (Figure 1)
America, 2007) include: acts as a preventive barrier whose aim is to mitigate
˗ Lubrication/Servicing the consequences of failure or reduce the risk of haz-
˗ Operational/Visual Check (for hidden failures) ard activation to a level which is acceptable to the
˗ Inspection/Functional Check: user. In this case scenario the main goal of the pre-
▪ General Visual Inspection (GV or GVI) ventive maintenance is to eliminate the failure com-
▪ Detailed Inspection (DI or DET) pletely, and, if this is impossible, to mitigate the
▪ Special Detailed Inspection (SI or SDI) probability/chance of the occurrence of failure
▪ Scheduled-Structural Health Monitoring and/or its consequences to an acceptable level.
(S-SHM) As shown in Figure 1, maintenance acts as a preven-
˗ Restoration tive barrier in order to preserve the main functions
˗ RandR Remove and Replace (Discard) of the aircraft system. In the middle block mainte-
˗ Combination of tasks (for safety effect) nance acts also as a preventive barrier to preserve the
˗ Redesign (for safety effect) function of a protective device, or to assure the avail-
It is evident that no default strategy is considered ability of a protective function. In this scenario this
and the “no-scheduled-maintenance” option is miss- could be for instance the end-of-runway inspection
ing. Nevertheless, MSG-3 guides that “where failure which is the inspection of the aircraft just before
has no safety effect and no form of an applicable and take-off and its main goal is to assure airworthiness
effective scheduled maintenance task(s) has been of the aircraft and its systems. This inspection is also
found, no scheduled maintenance is allowed to be called “last chance”, as it is the latest moment to pre-
selected (no task has been generated)”. vent undesired event to happen in the air.

3.2. Results of the lighting inspection and dis- 3.3. Hazard Analysis and risk of failures
cussion Mathematical model of the risk value in most of the
Figure 1 shows the chain of events from cause, via cases comprises several components, which values
failure, to consequences in aircraft maintenance sys- (levels) are being set in the process of risk analysis
tem, and includes an illustration of the role of pre- conducted in accordance with specified criteria. Ac-
ventive maintenance. The process of failure begins cording to the typical risk models – provided for in-
with an initiating event (hazard source), which af- stance in (FAA, 2009; ICAO, 2018; Maklakovs,
fects the system, i.e., changes the status, availability Tereščenko, and Šestakovs, 2019; Pamplona and
and/or airworthiness of the aircraft. In this case it is Alves, 2020; Rios Insua, Alfaro, Gomez, Hernan-
the internal leak of the right-hand integrated servo- dez-Coronado, and Bernal, 2018; Sklet, 2006; Vin-
actuator of the horizontal stabilizer. If the failure and coli, 2014) – their components usually belong to two
its modes, cannot be managed at an early stage of groups. The first group expresses so called hazard
their occurrence, they will lead to a number of unde- activation/materialization, while the second compo-
sired events and undesired consequences. The con- nents group expresses the losses concerned with
sequences comprise of the all events causing any hazard activation (Kadziński, 2013). Each individ-
type of loss. This might be any type of injury or loss ual risk model component might be presented and
of life, environmental disaster, high repair costs, air- described using various formulas. We took ad-
craft loss, mission ground aborts etc. vantage of the concept presented in the elaboration
Maintenance barriers are used in order to prevent or of (Modarres, 2006):
mitigate the risk. Such a barrier is taken to reduce
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
the probability/chance of the undesired events to 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ( )=
𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟
happen, or to reduce their impact and consequences 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 (1)
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ( ) ∙ 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 ( )
𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
98 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

Fig. 1. Sequence of the events in the aircraft maintenance system. Own elaboration based on (Modarres, 2006)

The most important part of risk analysis is risk iden- instead of focusing on the hardware (Kumar and
tification. Only those risks which have been identi- Granholm, 1990; Moubray, 2001; Nowlan and Heap,
fied can be managed in a systematic and conscious 1978; Zio, Fan, Zeng, and Kang, 2019).
way. However, identification is not enough. There is RCM methodology shall ensure that all the follow-
also a need for action, using risk evaluation to take ing seven questions are answered satisfactorily
the appropriate operational and maintenance deci- in the order given below, to assure the success of the
sions regarding risk reduction and control, thus en- programme (SAE, 1999):
suring that the aircraft stays in a safe condition. 1. What are the functions and associated perfor-
Risk management is a systematic approach intro- mance standards of the item in its present oper-
duced to identify, analyze, and control areas or ating context (functions)?
events with a potential for causing undesired event 2. In what ways does it fail to fulfil its functions
(Kadziński, 2013). Through risk management, the (functional failures)?
risks associated with aircraft item failures are as- 3. What is the cause of each functional failure
sessed and systematically managed to mitigate them (failure modes)?
to an acceptable level. Risk management can further 4. What happens when each failure occurs (failure
be described as the act or practice of controlling risk effects)?
process which usually incorporates: risk analysis, 5. In what way does each failure matter (failure
risk evaluation and risk mitigation. consequences)?
Aircraft Preventive Maintenance Tasks can be seen 6. What can be done to prevent each failure (pro-
as a reliability and risk management methodology active tasks and tasks interval)?
which could be applicable and effective to the ability 7. What should be done if a suitable preventive
of those tasks to prevent or eliminate a failure, or at task cannot be found (default actions)?
least reduce the probability of failure occurrence to The RCM analysis of the aircraft maintenance strat-
an acceptable level, or reduce or mitigate the conse- egy may be performed as a sequence of activities or
quences of failure (the impact of failures). steps, including study preparation, system selection
and identification, functional failure analysis, criti-
4. Results cal item selection (significant item selection), data
4.1. Maintenance strategy selection collection and analysis, Failure Mode Effect and
In accordance with the RCM strategy the only rea- Criticality Analysis (FMECA), selection of mainte-
son for performing any kind of maintenance is not to nance actions, determination of maintenance inter-
avoid failures, but to avoid, or at least to reduce, the vals, preventive maintenance analysis, treatment of
consequences of failure (Rios Insua et al., 2018). non-critical items, implementation and in-service
RCM concentrates on the preservation of function data collection and updating (Rausand, 1998).
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 99
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

In Figure 2 authors proposed decision-making dia- the failure mode and the workcard task that allows
gram of the maintenance strategy comprising RCM analysis of the current inspection requirements.
methodology and risk mitigating analysis. Aircraft maintenance system complex analysis must
This diagram could be used to logically develop Pre- be conducted thoroughly and for every aircraft sys-
ventive Maintenance (PM) decisions and recom- tem and its item. That is why it is convenient to use
mendations. It might also be used for developing the international standard code system, not to omit any
final maintenance intervals. This working logic ac- of the aircraft systems. One of the most common and
complishes this by responding to the nature of the used for the both civilian and military aviation is the
failure mode rather than classification of the item as Air Transport Association of America (ATA) stand-
Functionally or Structurally Significant Item (FSI) ard code.
or (SSI). The logic flow starts with Aircraft System Selection
The failure mode analysis includes selection of the in accordance with Air Transport Association of
specific workcard tasks that address the failure mode. America standard code (Table 1).
The selection establishes a cross reference between

Aircraft System Selection

Work Unit Code

Aircraft System Item Selection

System Item Data

Failure Mode Data

Failure Modes for FSI Failure Modes for SSI

Risk model selection

Risk assessment
Risk evaluation

Risk-based preventive maintenance requirement assessment

Aircraft
Preventive No
Maintenance
Required?

Yes

Task Data

Workcard Inspection and

Servicing Tasks

Fig. 2. Risk-based decision-making diagram for maintenance strategy selection. Own elaboration
100 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

Table 1. Example of the Aircraft System Selection (Air Transport Association of America, 2007)
ATA Number ATA Chapter name
ATA 20 STANDARD PRACTICES - AIRFRAME
ATA 21 AIR CONDITIONING
ATA 22 AUTO FLIGHT
ATA 23 COMMUNICATION
ATA 24 ELECTRICAL POWER
ATA 25 EQUIPMENT /FURNISHINGS
ATA 26 FIRE PROTECTION
ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS
ATA 28 FUEL
ATA 29 HYDRAULIC POWER
ATA 30 ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
ATA 31 INDICATING / RECORDING SYSTEM
ATA 32 LANDING GEAR

The next step is to determine the Work Unit Code (TCI) and what is the time change interval for the
(WUC) for the specific aircraft item. This code con- item, etc.
sists of alphabetic and numeric characters to identify The following step of the proposed procedure is to
the system, subsystem and component which was link the common data for an item, such as WUC, no-
worked in Figure 3. The WUC determination proce- menclature, etc. to the specific data applicable to
dure is the process implemented to assure that every each of the item's failure modes. In this step we must
aircraft system item and its failure modes will be determine all the failure modes for the selected item.
considered. Failure mode analysis for FSIs is the development of
The Aircraft System Item Selection step means se- FMEA data for significant failure modes. For SSIs,
lection of the items for a system which have WUC. it is the development of durability of flaw growth
Choosing the specific aircraft system item, we may characteristics data for significant control points.
determine the item’s data which is the following step A control point is treated as being synonymous to
of the logic diagram. a failure mode.
On the basis of the aircraft maintenance support sys- In this step we should determine what was the cause
tem, we are able to get information about the item, of the failure. We must also specify failure mode ef-
like: class of the item (either SSI or FSI), function of fects for the aircraft system/subsystem.
the item in the system, Mean Flight Time Between Following the “Decision making diagram” from Fig-
Failures (MFTBF), Maintenance Data Summary (to- ure 2 we encounter “Risk model Selection”, “Risk
tal maintenance actions on the item, flight hours be- assessment” and “Risk Evaluation” and finally Risk-
tween maintenance), if it is a Time Change Item based preventive maintenance requirement assess-
ment”.

Fig. 3. Work Unit Code (WUC) selection (Secretary of the Air Force, 2018.)
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 101
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

4.2. Aircraft maintenance risk model Time to Failure (MFTTF) and Mean Time to Repair
For the research purposes authors created their own (MTTR) assuming constant failure rate/intensity:
risk model, in order to assess and evaluate risk meas-
ure. Proposed risk model could also be successfully 𝑀𝐹𝑇𝐵𝐹 = 𝑀𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 (5)
adopted for the aircraft maintenance strategy verifi-
cation and development. Such a risk model will be As a result, P could be calculated as follows:
utilized to assess safety level of the aircraft mainte-
nance system strategy on the basis of the logic dia- 1
gram presented in Figure 2. 𝑃=𝑁⋅ (6)
𝑀𝐹𝑇𝐵𝐹
In this model risk of the aircraft system item failure
mode activation could be calculated as presented in where N is the number of aircraft system items on
equation 2: the aircraft.
For the whole aircraft fleet, the PTotal could be calcu-
𝑠
lated as follows:
𝑅𝑚 = 𝐹𝑀𝑅𝑚 ⋅ 𝑃 ⋅ ∑(𝑆𝑗 ) (2)
𝑗=1 1
𝑃𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐴𝐶 ⋅ 𝑁 ⋅ (7)
𝑀𝐹𝑇𝐵𝐹
where:
Rm – aircraft item failure risk of the m-type failure where AC – the total number of aircraft in the whole
(m = 1, 2,…, l); fleet.
FMRm – failure mode ratio for the m-type failure; Probability or frequency of the hazard risk activation
P – probability (frequency) of the scenario/adverse meaning as an aircraft item failure could be classi-
situation; fied in accordance with MIL-STD-882E System
Sj – j-th value of severity of the consequences in the Safety and shown in Table 2.
scenario/adverse situation. In accordance with Safety Investigations and Re-
FMRm could be calculated on the basis of the equa- ports AFI91-204 USAF (Department Of The Air
tion 3: Force - Headquarters Air Force Safety Center, 2020)
one may classify mishaps and events by total direct
𝑁𝐹𝑚 mishap cost and the severity of injury/occupational
𝐹𝑀𝑅𝑚 = (3) illness. Classification consists of 5 categories A to E
𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
and for instance Class A mishap is an event resulting
where: in one or more of the following:
NFm – number of m-type failures of the aircraft se- − direct mishap cost totaling $2,000,000 or more.
lected item; − a fatality or permanent total disability.
NFTotal – total number of failures of the aircraft se- − destruction of an aircraft
lected item. − permanent loss of primary mission capability of
As a result, the total risk of the aircraft system item an aircraft.
failure could be calculated as a sum of the risks for As a result, hazard activation severities could be
each identified types of failures (4): classified in accordance with Table 3.
Risk assessment criteria could be formulated in ac-
𝑙
cordance with the information presented in Table 4.
𝑅𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∑ 𝑅𝑚 (4) The next step in the formal risk assessment process
𝑚=1 is the risk evaluation. We propose to classify risks
into three categories: acceptable, tolerable and un-
Probability (frequency) of the failure consequences safe.
developed scenario could be calculated on the basis Criteria and descriptions to classify risks into the
of the index commonly used in aviation and known risk categories are presented in Table 5.
as a Mean Flight Time Between Failures (MFTBF). Unsafe category in risk category (Table 5) describes
This index can be calculated as a sum of Mean Flight the risks that being activated have their conse-
102 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

quences in safety of the aircraft operations. In avia- level. This is the goal the safety management per-
tion it is very common to use index describing “Loss sonnel want to reach. Unsafe category could also be
rate per 100k Flight Hours” to determine the re- determined as a number of Class A mishaps per
quired safety acceptable, tolerable and unacceptable 100k FH or Unit of Time.

Table 2. Example probability levels. Own elaboration

PROBABILITY (FREQUENCY) LEVELS
Description Aircraft Fleet Value (range)
Frequent Likely to occur often in the life cycle of an aircraft Continuously experienced 1E-01 ≤ P
Probable Will occur several times in the life cycle of an aircraft Will occur frequently 1E-02 ≤ P < 1E-01
Occasional Likely to occur sometime in life cycle of an aircraft Will occur several times 1E-03 ≤ P < 1E-02
Unlikely but reasonably ex-
Remote Unlikely, but possible to occur in life cycle of an aircraft 1E-06 ≤ P < 1E-03
pected to occur
Unlikely to occur, and assumed not to happen in the life Unlikely to occur but possi-
Improbable P < 1E-06
cycle of an aircraft ble

Table 3. Severity categories (Department Of Defense, 2012)

SEVERITY CATEGORIES
Description Value Hazard Activation Consequences Criteria
Could result in one or more of the following: death, permanent total disability, irreversible
Catastrophic 10000
significant environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding $10M.
Could result in one or more of the following: permanent partial disability, injuries or occupa-
Critical 500 tional illness that may result in hospitalization of at least three personnel, reversible significant
environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to or exceeding $1M but less than $10M.
Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness resulting in one or
Marginal 20 more lost work day(s), reversible moderate environmental impact, or monetary loss equal to
or exceeding $100K but less than $1M.
Could result in one or more of the following: injury or occupational illness not resulting in a
Negligible 10
lost work day, minimal environmental impact, or monetary loss less than $100K.

Table 4. Hazard activation risk assessment criteria (Department Of Defense, 2012)

Risk Risk value
Risk description criteria
Levels (range)
▪ Can lead directly to a catastrophic or critical mishap, or
HIGH 1.0E-05 ≤ R ▪ Places the system in a condition where no independent functioning interlocks (no barriers
exist) to prevent, preclude the potential occurrence of a catastrophic or critical mishap.
▪ Can lead directly to a marginal or negligible mishap, or
SERI- 1.0E-07 ≤ R < ▪ Places the system in a condition where only one independent functioning interlock, barrier
OUS 1.0E-05 or human action remains to prevent, preclude the potential occurrence of a catastrophic or
critical hazard.
▪ Influences a marginal or negligible mishap, reducing the system to a single point of failure,
or
ME- 1.0E-08 ≤ R <
▪ Places the system in a condition where two independent functioning interlocks, barriers or
DIUM 1.0E-07
human actions remain to prevent, preclude the potential occurrence of a catastrophic or
critical hazard.
▪ Influences a catastrophic or critical mishap, but where three independent functioning in-
terlocks or human actions remain, or
▪ Would be a causal factor for a marginal or negligible mishap, but two independent func-
tioning interlocks or human actions remain.
LOW R < 1.0E-08
▪ A software degradation of a safety critical function that is not categorized as high, serious,
or medium safety risk.
▪ A requirement that, if implemented, would negatively impact safety; however, code is im-
plemented safely.
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 103
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

Table 5. Risk evaluation criteria. Own elaboration As a result, the aircraft item will be treated as a TCI,
RISK LEVEL RISK CATEGORY with predetermined replacement interval. This solu-
LOW tion would allow to mitigate risk activation by per-
ACCEPTABLE
MEDIUM forming “remove and replace” procedure set at the
SERIOUS TOLERABLE time intervals allowing to mitigate risk of failure of
HIGH UNSAFE the aircraft system item.
Properly selected maintenance actions and tasks im-
4.3. Risk mitigation idea plemented into the maintenance program work as a
The next steps “Task Data” and “Workcard Inspec- risk mitigating barrier (Figure 1).
tion and Servicing Tasks” are related to the specific
failure mode of the aircraft selected item. It depends 5. Verification of the presented methodology
on the failure modes and their effects and conse- For the verification of the proposed methodology
quences. If the risk is acceptable, we may decide that authors decided to choose the most advanced Polish
the preventive maintenance is unnecessary and “no Air Force multirole aircraft: F-16C/D block 52+.
maintenance action” is required. If the safety criteria First step, in accordance with the presented in Fig-
set by the organization are not complied with, it is ure 2 logic diagram was the “Aircraft System Selec-
recommended to implement preventive maintenance. tion” in accordance with Air Transport Association
This could be based on the “on condition” or “con- of America (Air Transport Association of America,
dition monitoring” type of maintenance. If such a 2007). As a result, the flight controls system was
type of maintenance is selected there is no time limit selected which corresponds with ATA 27 Code. The
for the specific item. Airworthiness of the consid- next step is to find the Work Unit Code for the se-
ered system is based on the results of the preventive lected system. In our case WUC which is assigned
maintenance. This could be either operational to FLCS in accordance with PL16-16CJ-06 (Lock-
checkout, visual inspection or non-destructive test- heed Martin Corporation, 2018) is 14000. The next
ing (NDT). Preventive maintenance may also be the step is to determine the Work Unit Code (WUC) for
combination of the actions. For instance, as a part of the specific aircraft item. For the research purposes
departing procedure pilots are required to perform so the Integrated Actuator, Horizontal Tails was se-
called “Build-in Test” of the flight control system. lected which is described by 14BB0 WUC. For the
In case of the operational anomalies of the system, next step, being the System Item Data, we may de-
digital flight control computer signalizes the crew termine:
about them as a “Flight Controls Caution Light” and − Class of the item - ISA is the Functionally Sig-
FLCS fault code displayed on the Multifunctional nificant Item FSI,
Displays MFDs. For the failure modes which could − Function of the item in the system - for ISA,
not be detected on the basis of the operational check- classified as FSI, its function is to: transfer hy-
outs usually the NDT or visual inspection is required. draulic directional control to horizontal stabi-
Such inspection is implemented into the mainte- lizer assemblies as directed by the flight control
nance program as a part of the either preflight, computer,
thruflight or end-of-runway inspections. There is a
− Mean Flight Time Between Failures (MFTBF)
requirement for the crew chief performing previ-
- let us assume its MFTBF is 1500FH,
ously mentioned inspection to visually inspect the
− Maintenance Data Summary (total mainte-
condition of the aircraft system item.
nance actions on the item - for instance 170,
There might be the question raised: “What if the im-
Flight Hours between maintenance – for in-
plemented maintenance actions and tasks will not
stance 600FH), Horizontal ISA is not a Time
work as a risk mitigating barrier and do not mitigate
Change Item (TCI), etc.
the risk activations?” In this case scenario we may
In the following step of the logic diagram, we must
have to change the maintenance strategy of the se-
determine all the failure modes for the selected item.
lected aircraft system item, and implement “sched-
Failure mode analysis (PN-EN IEC 60812:2018-12,
uled discard (or hard time discard)” strategy. It
2018) for the Horizontal ISA being the FSI item is
means that instead of “on-condition or condition
the development of FMEA data for significant fail-
monitoring”, the “time change” strategy will be used.
ure modes.
104 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

In this step we should determine what was the cause brakes i.e., most of the systems using hydraulic
of the failure, for instance: hydraulic cylinder or seal power from system B. As a consequence, aircraft
rupture. We must also specify failure mode effects mission must be aborted. Failure should be evident
for the aircraft system/subsystem. In our scenario it to the crew as a “HYD PRESS” warning light mean-
could be: degraded hydraulic pressure available for ing Hydraulic Pressure Indicator for System B.
control of affected horizontal stabilizer, and poten- The first step in formal risk assessment is identifica-
tial 50% loss of hydraulic supply pressure for hori- tion of the set of failure modes that may affect nor-
zontal tail movement. As a result, we may expect po- mal flight operation. In Table 6 FMEA analysis for
tential loss of hydraulic system B resulting in a 50% the Horizontal ISA is presented, comprising failure
reduction in primary flight controls and loss of modes, their causes and consequences for the air-
power to gun, landing gear, in-flight refuel and craft crew and system itself.

Table 6. FMEA analysis for the aircraft horizontal ISA. Own elaboration
Failure Mode Effects
Fm# Failure Mode Cause
System Crew Mission Aircraft
Potential loss of 50%
Degraded hydraulic pressure
Severe exter- hydraulic power to pri-
available for control of af-
nal leakage, mary flight controls,
Hydraulic cylinder fected horizontal stabilizer. Aborted
1 hydraulic sys- and loss of speed- None
or seal rupture potential 50% loss of hydrau- Mission
tem A cham- brakes, fuel flow pro-
lic supply pressure for hori-
ber portional and EPU CA-
zontal tail movement.
PABILITY
Potential loss of hy-
Degraded hydraulic pressure draulic system B result-
Severe exter-
available for control of af- ing in a 50% reduction
nal leakage,
Hydraulic cylinder fected horizontal stabilizer. in primary flight con- Aborted
2 hydraulic sys- None
or seal rupture potential 50% loss of hydrau- trols and loss of power Mission
tem B cham-
lic supply pressure for hori- to gun, landing gear,
ber
zontal tail movement. in-flight refuel &
breaks
Internal leak-
Reduction of force applied to Slower horizontal tail
age of hydrau- Seal leakage; se-
3 horizontal actuator resulting in response time to com- None None
lic system A vere contamination
slower response time manded inputs
or B
Potential loss
of air-
The respective horizontal tail
Structural defor- Crew will be unable to craft/flight
No or reduced will be locked in position and Aborted
4 mation; binding, direct tail in desired po- crew due to
output will not respond to command Mission
stuck or jammed sition. degradation or
inputs
loss of con-
trolled flight
Servo valve, Moni- None;
tors, Spools, Main Single point failure of internal
Control Valve, Fail ISA component or function
Internal single
5 Safe Solenoid which results in unscheduled None None None
point failure
Valve, Pressure maintenance or repair but does
Switch, Electrical not affect operation due to
Connector/Wiring built in system redundancy.
Minor exter-
nal leakage of Seal leakage; Con- Minor hydraulic fluid leakage
6 None None None
hydraulic sys- tamination from affected actuator
tem A or B
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 105
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

The following step in the presented in Figure 2 logic case our risk could be presented as a 4.5E-05. Let us
diagram is the “Risk model selection”. Authors of assume that the “unsafe” category of risk set by our
this article presented their own Risk Model in sec- organization was the R<1.0E-05. It means that our
tion 4. In order to calculate Rm, we must determine, risk level is HIGH and risk category is unacceptable
on the basis of the maintenance support system, – meaning UNSAFE.
FMRm. This could be calculated on the basis of the As a result of the risk assessment and risk evaluation
equation 3. Let us assume that the total number of processes we found out that the risk of failure of the
failures of the horizontal ISA was 170. The number horizontal ISA for our aircraft fleet is unacceptable,
of each failure mode were as following: FM1 – 7, and following the next step of the logic diagram
FM2 – 6, FM3 – 15, FM4 – 55, FM5 – 56, FM6 – 31. from Figure 2, being the “Risk-based preventive
FMRm for each failure mode were presented in Ta- maintenance requirement assessment” we may con-
ble 7. clude that the preventive maintenance for the se-
lected aircraft item is absolutely necessary, to miti-
Table 7. FMR calculation effects. Own elaboration gate the risk of failure. If the answer to the question
FM # NFm NFTotal FMRm “Is preventive maintenance required” is “Yes”, we
1. 7 4.1E-02 should follow to the next step “Task Data”.
2. 6 3.5E-02 This is the step where we must implement some
3. 15 8.8E-02 maintenance actions into the maintenance strategy to
170
4. 55 3.2E-02 mitigate the risk of aircraft system item failure. Gen-
5. 56 3.3E-02 eral idea of the risk mitigation idea in the aircraft
6. 31 1.8E-02 maintenance program was presented in subchapter
“Risk mitigation idea”. This is the process of analyz-
Assuming that MFTBF for the selected horizontal ing possible maintenance options we may imple-
ISA was 1500 FH, and knowing that there are 2 of ment into the maintenance program.
the ISAs on the aircraft, P could be calculated in ac- At this step we should link recommended task of
cordance with equation 6 and resulted as 1,3E-03. maintenance to either workcard inspection or servic-
Looking at the table 2, Probability (Frequency) Lev- ing task (Figure 2). This will allow for linking of the
els, we may determine that the probability of failure maintenance program requirement inspections with
of the horizontal ISAs for one aircraft is “Likely to the failure mode under analysis. In our case scenario
occur sometime in life cycle of an aircraft” and de- it is the Technical Order (TO) Scheduled Inspection
scribed as “Occasional”. But if we have the fleet of and Maintenance Requirements PL1F-16CJ-6
100 aircraft, the probability results as 1,3E-01, what (Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2020). This docu-
means that the probability is “Likely to occur often ment contains complete requirements for accom-
in the life cycle of an aircraft”, described as “Fre- plishing scheduled maintenance on this aircraft dur-
quent” and “Continuously experienced for the whole ing its entire service life.
aircraft fleet”. As a result of the analysis, we decided to implement
As far as the severity is concerned, it is being some additional tasks for the crew chief to inspect
different for each failure mode and this could be de- the condition of the ISA like: “Check/Inspect Hori-
termined on the basis of the information provided in zontal Stabilizer Servoactuator drain holes for fluid
Tables 3 and 6: FMEA analysis for the aircraft hori- leakage” while performing prefight, thruflight,
zontal ISA, and Severity Categories. postflight and end-of-runway inspection.
In Table 8 there were presented results of the FMR, In order to mitigate the risk level of the failure of the
P, Sj, Rm and RTotal calculations in accordance with item we may also specify a requirement for the in-
equations 3, 4, 6 and 7. spection during the nearest aircraft major inspection
The following step of the risk analysis is the risk meant as “Phased Inspection”, “Programmed Depot
evaluation. In our case scenario the total risk of the Maintenance (PDM)”, “Periodic Maintenance” or
horizontal ISA failure, concerning all failure modes, “Major Isochronal Inspection”.
was calculated and equal 4,5. Evaluating the cate- In considered case scenario this could be the visual
gory of risk we compare the value of the calculated inspection during Phased Inspection. The complete
total risk in relation to the 100k Flight Hours. In this workcard inspection might be like this:
106 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

“Inspect left and right horizontal stabilizer inte- of the ISA failure. This would require the redesign
grated servoactuators for: of the horizontal ISA or its components. These ac-
A. Wear washers worn more than approximately tions will have a positive effect on the severity of the
half of original thickness, gouged, or deformed. ISA failure. In Table 9 were presented results of the
If worn or damaged reference to specific T.O. implemented maintenance actions on the total risk
B. Integrated servoactuators, fittings, and mount- of the aircraft system item.
ings for cracks, cleanliness, leakage, and secu- In relation to the 100k FH the total risk results as
rity; electrical connectors for security, chafing, 2.8E-06. Comparing our result to the risk level cri-
and discoloration.” teria presented in table 4, we find that our risk is
These actions implemented into the maintenance classified as “Serious”, and the category of the risk
program will not affect the probability (frequency) is “Tolerable”.

Table 8. Risk calculation effects. Own elaboration

FMRm P Sj Rm RTotal
4.1E-02 10, 20, 500 2.8E-02
3.5E-02 10, 20, 500 2.4E-02
8.9E-02 10, 20 3.4E-03
1.3E-03 4.5
3.2E-01 10, 20, 500, 10000 4.4E+00
3.3E-01 10 4.3E-03
1.8E-01 10 2.4E-03

Table 9. Risk calculation effects. Own elaboration

FMRm P Sj Rm RTotal
4.1E-02 10, 20, 500 2.8E-02
3.5E-02 10, 20, 500 2.4E-02
8,8E-02 10, 20 3.4E-03
1.3E-03 2.8E-01
3.2E-01 10, 20, 500 2.2E-01
3.3E-01 10 4.3E-03
1.8 E-01 10 2.4E-03

6. Conclusions Presented situation is very much the case in aviation

The main goal of this article is to present mainte- transport. This was the reason why authors of this
nance decisions supporting method on the example article decided to prepare and develop this elabora-
of Polish Air Force multirole aircraft: tion which might constitute the assistance and sup-
F - 16C / D block 52+. ports complex technical objects users in mainte-
Maintenance system effectiveness might be gener- nance decision.
ally a crucial task for company or entity responsible Developed and proposed method belongs to the
for the maintenance. In this context, particularly rel- group of methods called RBM (risk-based mainte-
evant become technical object maintenance proce- nance). Even though maintenance based on risk has
dures and tasks developed by their manufacturers. already been confirmed and acknowledged, hardly
Experience of the article authors quite early shows you may find the applications of this in the air
the need of the maintenance programmes modifica- transport. Partially, in compliance with the RBM
tion, but the aircraft manufacturers usually are not so concept might be considered hazards analysis
eager to develop and implement maintenance pro- method, used in order to communicate about the risk
gramme modifications. Such modifications require while performing maintenance tasks. Additionally,
quite an effort and result in heavy workloads and fi- we have indicated a few examples of methods that
nancial outlays. In result, cost of these modifications, can indirectly qualify as RBM in air transport.
in many cases are covered by object operators. This Taking into consideration all capabilities (and bene-
might lead to the situation, when it is irrational to go fits) of the risk-based maintenance application,
on with object operations. which were mentioned above, we would like to point
out the relevant research gap indicating the lack of
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 107
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

these types of methods applicable for aviation point of view it is irrelevant what are the correspond-
transport. ing or dependant failures. What is the most relevant,
This article provides guidelines which include a de- it is the source of the failure (the initial failure) and
scription of risk in the context of aviation mainte- the results (severity), consequences of the failure,
nance and introduction of some methodologies, taking into consideration the worst-case scenario.
tools and criteria that support identification, analysis As a result of the presented methodology and its ver-
and evaluation of risk. Authors included idea, how ification presented in chapter 5, we found out that
the aircraft preventive maintenance could be used to proposed methodology works as assumed. We were
mitigate aircraft failure risk during flight operations. able to confirm our assumptions and calculations.
It also shows how to adopt and develop effective Even though we decided to change the aircraft
maintenance program using tools for adequate risk maintenance strategy and maintenance program, our
analysis, optimal interval assignments, and selection risk activation was classified as tolerable. It means
of the most effective maintenance task. Authors pre- that we should implement risk communication and
sented methodology and described steps of the logic risk monitoring methods. This will allow to continue
diagram analysis for the aircraft systems and their aircraft operations with the awareness that we
components, in order to manage and adopt aircraft should monitor the risk activations level.
maintenance program to fulfill aircraft airworthiness One of the weaknesses of proposed method is the
requirements and operational availability. high sensitivity of the model and the significant in-
The original contribution of this work is the devel- fluence of subjective parameters on the final results.
oped risk model (including criteria and descriptions By changing the Severity parameter for one of the
to classify risks), in order to assess and evaluate risk Failure Mode, the risk category can change from
measure. It seems likely that the proposed risk Unacceptable to Tolerable, without changing Proba-
model could also be successfully adopted for the air- bility of the failure.
craft maintenance strategy verification and develop- Future works on this topic is the development of a
ment. The analytical considerations presented in the specific maintenance program using the developed
work are theoretical, which is emphasized in the as- method.
sumptions in chapter 5 – Verification of the pre-
sented methodology. All the most important input Acknowledgment
data for the verification of the proposed model, such The research was conducted with subsidy for the
as: MFTBF, Maintenance Data Summary, the total support and development of research potential for
number of failures are estimated data (assumed by the Faculty of Civil and Transport Engineering at
the authors). Unfortunately, in most of the cases air- Poznan University of Technology.
craft and its components’ reliability data such as
MTBF, etc is regarded as protected data, and usually References
neither operators nor manufacturers are eager to [1] ABDUL, H., ASIF, R. S., QADEER, A.,
share such data. Situation becomes even more diffi- FAISAL, K., SALIM, A., 2019. A decision
cult as far as the military aircraft are concerned. In support tool for bi-objective risk-based
this case, such information is treated as either sensi-
maintenance scheduling of an LNG gas
tive of even restricted. We took into consideration
our assumption that the proposed method must be sweetening unit. Journal of Quality in
practical, and feasible. In order to meet this demand, Maintenance Engineering, 25(1), 65–89.
the operator should take advantage of the flight data https://doi.org/10.1108/JQME-04-2017-0027.
he might be able to get access to. In most of the cases [2] AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF
this would be the parameter he should be able to ac- AMERICA. ATA MSG-3.
quire. Such extremely detailed information consid- Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled
ering each scenario of an adverse event is probably
Maintenance Development, 2007. USA,
beyond reach.
We have decided to analyze only independent fail- Pennsylvania.
ures due to the fact that from the proposed method [3] AMBÜHL, S., DALSGAARD SØRENSEN,
J., 2017. Sensitivity of Risk-Based Maintenance
108 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

Planning of Offshore Wind Turbine Farms. 4.

Energies . https://doi.org/10.3390/en10040505. [11] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE., 2012.
[4] ARZAGHI, E., ABAEI, M. M., ABBASSI, R., Department of Defense Standard Practice -
GARANIYA, V., CHIN, C., KHAN, F., 2017. System Safety (MIL‐STD‐882E).
Risk-based maintenance planning of subsea [12] DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE -
pipelines through fatigue crack growth HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE SAFETY
monitoring. Engineering Failure Analysis, 79, CENTER., 2020. Safety Investigation and
928–939. Hazard Reporting AFI91-204.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engfail [13] EUROPEAN COMMISSION. COMMISSION
anal.2017.06.003. REGULATION (EU) No 1321/2014 on the
[5] AUST, J., PONS, D., 2019. Bowtie continuing airworthiness of aircraft and
Methodology for Risk Analysis of Visual aeronautical products, parts and appliances,
Borescope Inspection during Aircraft Engine and on the approval of organisations and
Maintenance. Aerospace . https://doi.org/ personnel involved in these tasks, 2014.
10.3390/aerospace6100110. [14] FAA, 2009. Risk Management Handbook
[6] AYSE, K. Y., 2019. Strategic approach to (FAA-H-8083-2). Federal Aviation
managing human factors risk in aircraft Administration, U.S. Department of
maintenance organization: risk mapping. Transportation. Retrieved from
Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/.
Technology, 91(4), 654–668. https://doi.org/ [15] GILL, A., 2017. Optimisation of the technical
10.1108/AEAT-06-2018-0160. object maintenance system taking account of
[7] CHENG, M.-Y., CHIU, Y.-F., CHIU, C.-K., risk analysis results. Eksploatacja i
PRAYOGO, D., WU, Y.-W., HSU, Z.-L., LIN, Niezawodnosc - Maintenance and Reliability,
C.-H., 2019. Risk-based maintenance strategy 19(3), 420–431. https://doi.org/10.17531/ein
for deteriorating bridges using a hybrid .2017.3.13.
computational intelligence technique: a case [16] HALADUICK, S., DANN, M. R., 2017. Risk-
study. Structure and Infrastructure Engineering, Based Maintenance Planning for Deteriorating
15(3), 334–350. https://doi.org/10.1080/1573 Pressure Vessels With Multiple Defects.
2479.2018.1547767. Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, 139(4).
[8] CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY. https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4036428.
Airworthiness Bulletins, AWB 02-1, Issue 1 - [17] ICAO, 2018. Safety Management Manual (Doc
On-condition maintenance, 2001. 9859) (Fourth Edi). Quebec: International Civil
[9] CONSILVIO, A., DI FEBBRARO, A., Aviation Organization.
SACCO, N., 2016. Stochastic Scheduling [18] KADZIŃSKI, A., 2013. Studium wybranych
Approach for Predictive Risk-Based Railway aspektów niezawodności systemów oraz
Maintenance. 2016 IEEE International obiektów pojazdów szynowych [Study on
Conference on Intelligent Rail Transportation selected dependability aspects of systems and
(Icirt), 197–203. rail vehicles objects]. Poznań: Wydawnictwo
[10] CULLUM, J., BINNS, J., LONSDALE, M., Politechniki Poznańskiej.
ABBASSI, R., GARANIYA, V., 2018. Risk- [19] KAEWUNRUEN, S., SRESAKOOLCHAI, J.,
Based Maintenance Scheduling with MA, W., PHIL-EBOSIE, O., 2021. Digital
application to naval vessels and ships. Ocean Twin Aided Vulnerability Assessment and Risk-
Engineering, 148, 476–485. https://doi.org/ Based Maintenance Planning of Bridge
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2017.11.04 Infrastructures Exposed to Extreme
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 109
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

Conditions. Sustainability . https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.6506.

https://doi.org/10.3390/su13042051. [28] MŁYNARSKI, S., PILCH, R., SMOLNIK, M.,
[20] KHAN, F. I., HADDARA, M. R., 2004. Risk- SZYBKA, J., WIĄZANIA, G., 2020. A model
based maintenance of ethylene oxide of an adaptive strategy of preventive
production facilities. Journal of Hazardous maintenance of complex technical objects.
Materials, 108(3), 147–159. Eksploatacja i Niezawodnosc, 22(1), 35–41.
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhaz https://doi.org/10.17531/ein.2020.1.5.
mat.2004.01.011. [29] MODARRES, M., 2006. Risk analysis in
[21] KUMAR, U., GRANHOLM, S., 1990. engineering: techniques, tools, and trends.
Reliability centred maintenance: a tool for CRC press.
higher profitability. Maintenance, 5(3), 23–26. [30] MOUBRAY, J., 2001. Reliability-centered
[22] LEE, J., MITICI, M., 2020. An integrated maintenance. Industrial Press Inc.
assessment of safety and efficiency of aircraft [31] NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND.
maintenance strategies using agent-based Management manual guidelines for the naval
modelling and stochastic Petri nets. Reliability aviation reliability-centered maintenance
Engineering and System Safety, 202(May), (RCM) process, 2005. USA: Naval Air Systems
107052. Command (Navair 00-25-403).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2020.107052. [32] NIELSEN, J. S., TCHERNIAK, D.,
[23] LEONI, L., BAHOOTOROODY, A., DE ULRIKSEN, M. D., 2021. A case study on risk-
CARLO, F., PALTRINIERI, N., 2019. based maintenance of wind turbine blades with
Developing a risk-based maintenance model structural health monitoring. Structure and
for a Natural Gas Regulating and Metering Infrastructure Engineering, 17(3), 302–318.
Station using Bayesian Network. Journal of https://doi.org/10.1080/15732479.2020.17433
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 57, 26.
17–24. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016 [33] NOWLAN, F. S., HEAP, H. F., 1978.
/j.jlp.2018.11.003. Reliability-centered maintenance. United Air
[24] LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Lines Inc San Francisco Ca.
2018. Technical Manual PL16-16CJ-06 Work [34] PAMPLONA, D. A., ALVES, C. J. P., 2020.
Unit Code Manual. Lockheed Martin Does a fighter pilot live in the danger zone? A
Corporation. risk assessment applied to military aviation.
[25] LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Transportation Research Interdisciplinary
2020. Technical Order PL1F-16CJ-6 Perspectives, 5, 100114. https://doi.org/10.
Scheduled Inspections and Maintenance 1016 /j.trip.2020.100114.
Requirements. Lockheed Martin Corporation. [35] PN-EN IEC 60812:2018-12., 2018. Failure
[26] MAKLAKOVS, J., TEREŠČENKO, J., mode and effect analysis (FMEA i FMECA).
ŠESTAKOVS, V., 2019. Risk Assessment of Polski Komitet Normalizacyjny.
the Adverse Events in Air Transportation. [36] POGAČNIK, B., DUHOVNIK, J., TAVČAR,
Transport and Aerospace Engineering, 7(1), 5– J., 2017. Prognozowanie uszkodzeń statków
13. https://doi.org/10.2478/tae-2019-0001. powietrznych dla celów obsługi
[27] MATUSEVYCH, O., KUZNETSOV, V., konserwacyjnej na podstawie ich parametrów
SYCHENKO, V., 2018. The method for oraz danych z eksploatacji. Eksploatacja i
increasing theefficiency of equipment’s Niezawodnosc, 19(4), 624–633. https://doi.org/
maintenance in railway traction power supply 10.17531/ein.2017.4.17.
systems. Archives of Transport, 47(3), 39–47. [37] PUI, G., BHANDARI, J., ARZAGHI, E.,
110 Szrama, S., Gill, A.,
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

ABBASSI, R., GARANIYA, V., 2017. Risk- Documentation, Policies and procedures.
based maintenance of offshore managed Retrieved from https://www.tinker.af.mil/
pressure drilling (MPD) operation. Journal of Portals/106/Documents/Technical
Petroleum Science and Engineering, 159, 513– Orders/AFD-180615-00-20-1.pdf.
521. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j. [46] SHUKRI, S. A., MILLAR, R. M., GRATTON,
petrol.2017.09.066. G., GARNER, M., 2016. The potential risk of
[38] RATNAYAKE, R. M. C., ANTOSZ, K., 2017. communication media in conveying critical
Development of a Risk Matrix and Extending information in the aircraft maintenance
the Risk-based Maintenance Analysis with organisation: A case study. IOP Conference
Fuzzy Logic. Procedia Engineering, 182, 602– Series: Materials Science and Engineering,
610. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 152(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-
proeng.2017.03.163. 899X/152/1/012044.
[39] RAUSAND, M., 1998. Reliability-Centered [47] SKLET, S., 2006. Safety barriers: Definition,
Maintenance. Reliability Engineering and classification, and performance. Journal of
System Safety, 60(2), 121–132. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,
[40] RIOS INSUA, D., ALFARO, C., GOMEZ, J., 19(5), 494–506. https://doi.org/10.1016/
HERNANDEZ-CORONADO, P., BERNAL, j.jlp.2005.12.004.
F., 2018. A framework for risk management [48] STIPANOVIC, I., BUKHSH, Z. A., REALE,
decisions in aviation safety at state level. C., GAVIN, K., 2021. A Multiobjective
Reliability Engineering System Safety, 179, Decision-Making Model for Risk-Based
74–82. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/ Maintenance Scheduling of Railway
j.ress.2016.12.002. Earthworks. Applied Sciences .
[41] RUSIN, A., WOJACZEK, A., 2019. Improving https://doi.org/10.3390/app11030965.
the availability and lengthening the life of [49] SZKODA, M., SATORA, M., KONIECZEK,
power unit elements through the use of risk- Z., 2020. Effectiveness assessment of diesel
based maintenance planning. Energy, 180, 28– locomotives operation with the use of mobile
35. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/ maintenance points. Archives of Transport,
j.energy.2019.05.079. 54(2), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.5604/01.
[42] SAE, 1999. Evaluation Criteria for Reliability- 3001.0014.262.
Centered Maintenance (RCM) Processes [50] TSAGKAS, V., NATHANAEL, D.,
JA1011_199908. The Engineering Society for MARMARAS, N., 2014. A pragmatic mapping
Advancing Mobility Land Sea Air and Space. of factors behind deviating acts in aircraft
[43] SAE, 2002. A Guide to the Reliability- maintenance. Reliability Engineering System
Centered Maintenance (RCM) Standard Safety, 130, 106–114. https://doi.org/10.1016
JA1012_200201. /j.ress.2014.05.011.
[44] SAMARANAYAKE, P., KIRIDENA, S., [51] UTOMI, E. A., FAH, T. K., 2020. Fuzzy
2012. Aircraft maintenance planning and Reliability and Risk-Based Maintenance of
scheduling: An integrated framework. Journal Buried Pipelines Using Multiobjective
of Quality in Maintenance Engineering, 18(4), Optimization. Journal of Infrastructure
432–453. https://doi.org/10.1108/1355251121 Systems, 26(2), 4020008. https://doi.org/
1 281598. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X
[45] SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, 2018. .0000537.
Technical Manual T.O.00-20-1 Aerospace [52] VALA, S., CHEMWENO, P., PINTELON, L.,
Equipment Maintenance Inspections, MUCHIRI, P., 2018. A risk-based maintenance
Szrama, S., Gill, A., 111
Archives of Transport, 59(3), 93-111, 2021

approach for critical care medical devices: a 158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2018.05.014.

case study application for a large hospital in a
developing country. International Journal of
System Assurance Engineering and
Management, 9(5), 1217–1233. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s13198-018-0705-1.
[53] VINCOLI, J. W., 2014. Basic Guide to System
Safety, Third Edition. John Wiley Sons Inc.
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118904589.
[54] WANG, L., AN, M., QIN, Y., JIA, L., 2018. A
Risk-Based Maintenance Decision-Making
Approach for Railway Asset Management.
International Journal of Software Engineering
and Knowledge Engineering, 28(04), 453–483.
https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218194018400065.
[55] WARD, M., MCDONALD, N., MORRISON,
R., GAYNOR, D., NUGENT, T., 2010. A
performance improvement case study in
aircraft maintenance and its implications for
hazard identification. Ergonomics, 53(2), 247–
267.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00140130903194138.
[56] YAZDI, M., NEDJATI, A., ABBASSI, R.,
2019. Fuzzy dynamic risk-based maintenance
investment optimization for offshore process
facilities. Journal of Loss Prevention in the
Process Industries, 57, 194–207.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.201
8.11.014.
[57] YETER, B., GARBATOV, Y., GUEDES
SOARES, C., 2020. Risk-based maintenance
planning of offshore wind turbine farms.
Reliability Engineering System Safety, 202,
107062. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.ress.2020.107062.
[58] ZAREEI, M. R., IRANMANESH, M., 2018.
Optimal Risk-Based Maintenance Planning of
Ship Hull Structure. Journal of Marine Science
and Application, 17(4), 603–624.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11804-018-00058-2.
[59] ZIO, E., FAN, M., ZENG, Z., KANG, R., 2019.
Application of reliability technologies in civil
aviation: Lessons learnt and perspectives.
Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, 32(1), 143–