Trespass to chattels is similar to conversion and detinue whereas all three relate to

wrongful interference with a chattel; however, the distinguishing nuance with trespass to
chattels is that the object remains in possession or control of the owner or person with
rightful possession which differs from conversion and detinue where the owner or person
with rightful possession is deprived of possession. Perhaps the easiest way to explain the
difference is to use the criminal law term in that conversion or detinue may arise from theft
(criminal law term) of the object, being interference by removing the chattel from the
possession of the rightful owner or person with right of possession and trespass to chattels
may arise from vandalism (criminal law term) being interference without removal of the
chattel.

The tort of trespass to chattels is found within the family of interference torts which
include, among others, the torts of conversion and detinue. The key difference with the
tort of trespass to chattels and the tort of conversion or the tort of detinue, is that with
trespass to chattels, the chattels, meaning goods or personal belongings, remain with the
rightful owner or person with rightful possession.

The tort of conversion primarily deals with the unlawful interference of another person’s
movable personal property, known as chattels. In contrast to trespass to goods, conversion
demands more than just a simple invasion of the plaintiff’s possessory rights; it necessitates
an interference that denies the plaintiff’s title.

Define the tort of nuisance, and identify some of the criteria that must be met
for a nuisance to be actionable.

What is the principle that guides vicarious, strict, and absolute liability?

Marcia is riding in a crowded subway car and must stand because there are no more seats. During the ride
home, Marcia is "sandwiched" between people who are pushing and jostling the whole time. At one point,
the train comes to a sudden stop and a passenger is forced to lean on Marcia due to the motion of the
train. Which of the following is true?

Question 1
Rubin and Derek are teammates on a minor league baseball team and their lockers in the clubhouse are
next to each other. At the end of the season, when the players were cleaning out their lockers, Ruben took
several baseball bats that he thought were his and brought them home. In fact, the bats Ruben took
belonged to Derek. When Ruben realizes what he has done, he returns the bats to Derek. Derek, angry
that his bats were taken sues Ruben for a trespass to chattels. Derek will probably:
Lose, because Ruben didn't know the bats didn't belong to him.
Lose, because Ruben returned the bats as soon as he realized his mistake.
Win, because Derek was angry.
Win, because Ruben took Derek's bats.

Question 2
Donald and Mickey are next door neighbors. Donald is very angry at Mickey because Mickey's dog,
Pluto, is always relieving himself on Donald's lawn. One morning, Donald sees Pluto walking onto his
lawn. Enraged, Donald gets his shotgun and kills Pluto. In an action against Donald, Mickey will
probably:
Win a suit for trespass and collect the value of his dog.
Win a suit for conversion and collect the value of his dog but Donald will then own Pluto's remains.
Lose, because Pluto shouldn't have been on Donald's land.
Lose, because Donald was justified in shooting Pluto.

Model Essay Questions and

Answers Trespass to Chattel or
Conversion? A and B are neighbors.
On May 1, A asks B, "Could I
borrow your riding lawnmower to
cut my grass this weekend?" B
replies, "Sure, just bring it back by
next weekend." B gives A the key to
the mower, whereupon A drives it to
A's garage. At this time, B's mower
is well-maintained and in good
working order. The following
Saturday, May 4, A uses B's mower
to mow A's lawn. A does not
immediately return the mower to B,
but leaves it parked in A's garage.
On May 10, A decides to use the
mower for recreation. Specifically,
part of A's property is wooded, and
A drives the mower through the
woods at high speed—over fallen
logs, through mud, and among the
trees. A also decides to test the
mower's capabilities by attempting
to mow a stand of heavy brush at the
edge of the woods. The mower is not
designed to cut anything thicker than
grass; while trying to mow the
brush, A hears several loud and
unusual noises coming from
underneath the mower. On June 15,
B asks A to return the mower, and A
does so. Upon returning the mower,
A states that he forgot to bring it
back until B asked about it. B
immediately notices that the mower
is caked in mud, has several dents in
the body, and has a flat rear tire.
When B attempts to operate the
mower, B discovers that the
transmission shifts erratically, and
that the shaft that turns the mower
blades is bent, causing the blades to
wobble and to cut improperly.
Assume that A's use of the mower
caused all these problems. B obtains
an accurate repair estimate from the
local dealership where B purchased
the mower. The repairs to the body,
tire, transmission, and blade shaft
will cost a total of $950. Assume
that these repairs are needed to
restore the mower to the condition it
was in when A first borrowed it.
Assume further that the cost of the
repairs is commercially reasonable.
B purchased the mower new, two
years earlier, for $1,450. The same
mower now costs $1,600 new.
Questions -Does A's conduct as a
whole more likely constitute (a)
trespass to chattel or (b) conversion?
Explain, ignoring any potential
defenses, but addressing the proper
measure of damages. oConsidering
the extent of the damage that A
inflicted on the mower, the answer is
conversion. Trespass to chattel and
conversion are both intentional torts
that involve interference with
another's rightful possession of
personal property (chattel). The two
torts differ principally in the
magnitude of the interference, and in
the amount of damages available.
Trespass to chattel is defined as
intentional interference with
another's rightful possession of
personal property. Interference with
possession can take several forms,
including intentionally damaging the
chattel, depriving another of the use
of the chattel for a significant period
of time, or completely dispossessing
another of the chattel. The rightful
possessor may recover for damage
to the chattel, as well as harm
occasioned by any loss of use.
Conversion is similar in concept to
trespass to chattel, but differs in both
the degree of harm and the measure
of damages. Conversion is defined
as the intentional exercise of
dominion and control over another's
chattel, such that the just measure of
damages is the full value of the
chattel. As with trespass to chattel,
conversion can come in various
forms, such as preventing access to
chattel, obtaining control of chattel
by fraud or deceit, destroying
chattel, or using chattel beyond the
scope of the possessor's
authorization. In deciding whether
the actor's interference rises to the
level of conversion, the courts will
consider a range of factors,
including: the extent to which the
actor exercised control over the
chattel, the magnitude of
interference with the rightful
possessor's control, the actor's intent
to assert some right inconsistent
with that of the rightful possessor,
and the extent of damage to the
chattel. A's conduct, at a minimum,
satisfies the elements of trespass to
chattel. A's actions were intentional,
occasioned as they were by A's
deliberate decisions to drive the
mower through the woods and to test
its capabilities on a stand of brush. It
is not clear that A intended to inflict
damage to the mower by performing
these acts, but that does not matter.
A need only have intended to
perform the acts that caused the
damage. The mechanical damage
that resulted is one way to bring
about a trespass, so by intentionally
doing something that damaged
another's chattel, A has at least
committed trespass to chattel.
However, A's conduct probably
exceeded trespass to chattel, to reach
the level of conversion. In part, this
arises from the sheer degree of
dominion and control that A
exercised. B authorized A to use the
mower only to mow A's lawn, and to
do nothing else with the mower. A's
joyriding and brush cutting not only
went beyond the scope of B's
authorization, but presented a high
risk of damage to the mower. By
exposing the mower to risk, A
essentially treated the mower as his
own, to do with as he pleased. This
assertion of dominion and control is
directly opposed to B's own
possessory interest, and represents a
very high degree of interference with
B's rightful control over the mower.
The degree of damage that A caused
also supports conversion. The initial
cost of the mower to B was $1,450,
and the replacement cost is $1,600.
The damage caused by A was $950,
almost two-thirds of the value of the
chattel
when new. Assuming some
depreciation during B's two years of
ownership, the damage is even closer
to the complete destruction of the
mower's value. The law does not set
a specific percentage loss of value,
at which trespass turns to
conversion. But considering both the
extent of the dominion that A
asserted and the substantial
devaluation of the mower that
resulted, conversion would seem to
be the more appropriate tort. B
should therefore be able, in fairness,
to recover the mower's complete
value from A. The precise measure
of damages can vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but will
generally include some combination
of (1) the cost of repairing the
mower, (2) any diminution in the
mower's market value following
repair, and (3) the difference in
market value before and after the
damage occurred. But none of this
analysis factors in the length of time
for which A kept the mower. B
authorized A to use the mower for
approximately one week, yet B did
not get the mower back for six
weeks. The length of time for which
an actor possesses a chattel can be a
factor in assessing trespass or
conversion. Here, however, it is not
clear that A intended to keep the
mower longer than B authorized,
because A claimed that he forgot to
return it. If this were true, then A's
retention of the mower would not
have been an intentional act, and it
would not support an intentional
tort. In any case, given A's other
actions, factoring the time of
retention is not necessary for a court
to hold A liable for conversion. -If B
sues A over the mower, and A
asserts the defense of consent, is that
defense likely to succeed? Explain.
oThe answer is no. Consent by the
chattel's rightful possessor can be a
defense to trespass or conversion.
Such consent can be either express
or implied. Express consent is
objectively manifested by the person
giving consent—for example,
explicit words of consent. Implied
consent can reasonably be inferred
from the consenting party's conduct
in light of the circumstances, or it
may arise by operation of law.
While B did consent to A's
borrowing the mower, that alone is
not enough to absolve A. Instead, A
would need to prove that B
consented to (1) A's driving the
mower through the woods and (2)
A's attempt to mow the brush with it,
because those are the tortious acts at
issue. There is no indication that B
consented to these activities. The
conversation between A and B was
limited to A's one-time use of the
mower to cut A's grass. There was
no communication about A's other
uses of the mower, and therefore B
did not expressly consent to them.
Nor is there any indication of
implied consent, as no facts indicate
that B became aware of A's
unauthorized uses until after they
occurred. Finally, the facts do not
identify any laws that would impute
consent in these circumstances. This
is not surprising, considering that the
misuse of another's property is not
something that the law is likely to
permit by implication. For these
reasons, A will not be able to rely on
consent to avoid liability to B.
when new. Assuming some
depreciation during B's two years of
ownership, the damage is even closer
to the complete destruction of the
mower's value. The law does not set
a specific percentage loss of value,
at which trespass turns to
conversion. But considering both the
extent of the dominion that A
asserted and the substantial
devaluation of the mower that
resulted, conversion would seem to
be the more appropriate tort. B
should therefore be able, in fairness,
to recover the mower's complete
value from A. The precise measure
of damages can vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but will
generally include some combination
of (1) the cost of repairing the
mower, (2) any diminution in the
mower's market value following
repair, and (3) the difference in
market value before and after the
damage occurred. But none of this
analysis factors in the length of time
for which A kept the mower. B
authorized A to use the mower for
approximately one week, yet B did
not get the mower back for six
weeks. The length of time for which
an actor possesses a chattel can be a
factor in assessing trespass or
conversion. Here, however, it is not
clear that A intended to keep the
mower longer than B authorized,
because A claimed that he forgot to
return it. If this were true, then A's
retention of the mower would not
have been an intentional act, and it
would not support an intentional
tort. In any case, given A's other
actions, factoring the time of
retention is not necessary for a court
to hold A liable for conversion. -If B
sues A over the mower, and A
asserts the defense of consent, is that
defense likely to succeed? Explain.
oThe answer is no. Consent by the
chattel's rightful possessor can be a
defense to trespass or conversion.
Such consent can be either express
or implied. Express consent is
objectively manifested by the person
giving consent—for example,
explicit words of consent. Implied
consent can reasonably be inferred
from the consenting party's conduct
in light of the circumstances, or it
may arise by operation of law.
While B did consent to A's
borrowing the mower, that alone is
not enough to absolve A. Instead, A
would need to prove that B
consented to (1) A's driving the
mower through the woods and (2)
A's attempt to mow the brush with it,
because those are the tortious acts at
issue. There is no indication that B
consented to these activities. The
conversation between A and B was
limited to A's one-time use of the
mower to cut A's grass. There was
no communication about A's other
uses of the mower, and therefore B
did not expressly consent to them.
Nor is there any indication of
implied consent, as no facts indicate
that B became aware of A's
unauthorized uses until after they
occurred. Finally, the facts do not
identify any laws that would impute
consent in these circumstances. This
is not surprising, considering that the
misuse of another's property is not
something that the law is likely to
permit by implication. For these
reasons, A will not be able to rely on
consent to avoid liability to B.
Tortious Assault?
X is driving through the parking lot
at a busy shopping mall, looking for
a parking space. Y is doing the
same. Both X and Y approach an
empty space at the same time from
opposite directions, and both drivers
simultaneously attempt to pull into
the space. X pulls forward into the
parking space just ahead of Y,
effectively snagging the spot from Y,
and then steps out of his car. Y
believes X has been rude, so Y stops
his own car and gets out to confront
X. An argument ensues, and after a
heated dialogue, Y steps toward X
and swings his fist at X's head. X
and Y are approximately the same
height and weight. However, X is a
fit young man in his twenties and an
accomplished amateur boxer, but Y
is an overweight, middle-aged man.
Because of X's youth, physical
condition, and boxing experience, X
is not afraid of Y at any point in
their interaction. X easily dodges Y's
punch, and then counterpunches,
striking Y's solar plexus. Y
immediately drops to his knees and
doubles over in pain. X then turns
and walks away from Y, toward the
mall entrance. Meanwhile, a mall
security guard, Z, is patrolling the
parking lot in a small truck. Z
arrives just in time to see X punch Y
and then turn to leave; Z sees none
of the events leading up to X's
punch. Z immediately exits the truck
and shouts to X, "Hey, you!" When
X turns to look at Z, from a distance
of approximately 12 feet, Z draws a
can of pepper spray and sprays it in
X's face. Pepper spray is a
pressurized aerosol spray containing
a powerful chemical agent; the agent
causes temporary but extreme pain
when it contacts a person's eyes,
nose, and mouth. The spray has its
intended effect on X, who falls to
the ground, unable to see and
virtually incapacitated from pain.
The spray's effects last for
approximately 30 minutes. As soon
as X hits the ground, Z drags X over
by Z's truck, and then calls the
police, who arrive five minutes later.
Z stands over X until the police
arrive. During this interval, X is
thrashing about on the ground,
rubbing his eyes and crying, "Leave
me alone! Leave me alone!" The
relevant jurisdiction's tort law
includes the following statute:
Defense of Another: An actor is
privileged to use force to defend
another only when the person whom
the actor defends is privileged to use
defensive force in the present
circumstances. Questions -Did Y's
conduct toward X constitute tortious
assault? Explain. oThe answer is yes.
Assault occurs when an actor (1)
intentionally causes another (2) to
reasonably apprehend (3) immediate
(4) harmful or offensive physical
contact. It does not matter whether the
contact actually occurs, nor does it
matter whether the actor actually
intended to make contact with the
victim. Rather, assault protects
against the psychological or
emotional harm caused by the very
threat of such contact. The first
element is intent. Intent to assault
exists where the actor desires, or
knows to a substantial certainty, that
his or her actions will cause the
victim to apprehend immediate
harmful or offensive contact. Y
demonstrated the necessary intent
here. Y swung his fist toward X's
head, making no attempt to hide the
attack. One could infer, then, that Y
was substantially certain that X would
apprehend, or perceive, Y's actions.
Moreover, there was nothing
accidental or involuntary about Y's
movement; instead, Y appears to have
deliberately escalated the verbal
argument by swinging his fist.
Accordingly, Y acted with the
necessary intent. Alternatively, one
could analyze Y's actions using the
transferred-intent doctrine.
Transferred intent applies to the
intentional torts of assault, battery,
trespass to chattel, trespass to land,
and false imprisonment. When an
actor intends to commit one of these
five torts, that intent is deemed
sufficient for any of the other torts in
this group that may result from the
actor's behavior. This is true whether
or not the actor actually intended the
other tort, and whether or not the
actor succeeded in committing the tort
originally intended.
In this case, one could argue that Y
intended to commit battery against X,
and that this intent then transferred to
assault when Y's punch failed to
connect with X. Battery is defined as
intentionally inflicting harmful or
offensive physical contact upon
another. The facts show that Y did
intend battery at first. As explained
above, Y's swinging his fist at X was a
deliberate, voluntary way to escalate
their argument. Moreover, it appears
that Y would have struck X, had X
not dodged. These facts indicate that
Y desired to inflict harmful physical
contact (a punch to the head) upon X,
which is sufficient to establish intent
for battery and, under the transferred-
intent doctrine, assault. More
specifically, the contact that Y
intended would almost certainly have
been harmful, because such blows to
the head nearly always cause
appreciable physical injury and pain.
The blow would also have been
offensive, because it was a way to
intensify the existing