ANSllHPS N43.16-2021

American National Standard
ANSI/HPS N43.16-2021
Radiation Safety for Cargo and Vehicle Security

Screening Systems Using X-ray or Gamma Radiation,
Energies Up to 10 MeV
Approved: January 14, 2021

American National Standards Institute, Inc.
Published by
Health Physics Society

950 Herndon Parkway, Suite 450
Herndon, VA 20170
Copyright © 2021 by the Health Physics Society.

All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise,
without prior written permission of the publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
ii
The ANSI/HPS N43.16 Standards Subcommittee responsible for the development of this standard had the
following members:
Craig R. Jones, Co-Chair

U.S. Army Public Health Center
Richard T. Whitman, Co-Chair

Whitman Technical Consulting
Ronald Amoling
American Science & Engineering, Inc.
Maria Arribas-Colon
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Paul Bergstrom
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gongyin Chen
Varian
Daniel Kassiday
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Siraj M. Khan
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Jeffrey Lodwick
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Daniel Madson
Leidos
Joel Sadler
L3 Communications
Mershad Shahabidin
Rapiscan Systems, Inc.
Daniel Strom
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (retired)
John Volz
Smiths Detection
iii
The current working group gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions from the many past
working group members who have assisted with the development of this standard. Special thanks goes to
the following past members:
Frank Cerra
National Institute of Standards and Technology (retired)
Richard Schueller
American Science & Engineering, Inc. (deceased)
Steven Seltzer
National Institute of Standards and Technology (retired)
David Hamel
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Fran Szrom
U.S. Army Public Health Center (retired)
Alex Grosso
Customs and Border Protection, U
.S. Department of Homeland Security (retired)
Luke McCormick
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (retired)
iv
This standard was consensus-balloted and approved by the Accredited Standards Committee N43
Equipment for Non-Medical Radiation Applications on November 11, 2020. At the time of balloting, the
N43 Committee had the following membership:
Chairperson Craig R. Jones

Vice Chair Richard Whitman
ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. John R. Dukes
American Iron and Steel Institute Anthony LaMastra
American Society for Testing and Materials Edward Walker
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rajesh Garg
Health Physics Society Antonio Triventi
David Bytwerk (alternate)
Hopewell Designs, Inc. G. Spencer Mickum
Chris Vanderpool (alternate)
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Susan M. Langhorst
National Institute of Standards and Technology Jack Glover
Timothy Barvitskie (alternate)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tomas Herrera
Lymari Sepulveda (alternate)
U.S. Dept of the Air Force, Office of the Surgeon General Ramachandra Bhat
U.S. Dept of the Army Timothy Mikulski
LTC Brian Champine (alternate)
U.S. Dept of the Army, Office of the Surgeon General Craig R. Jones
Scott Goodison (alternate)
U.S. Dept of Energy John Blaikie
George Chiu (alternate)
U.S. Dept of the Navy Capt. Gregory R. Fairchild
U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service Daniel Kassiday
U.S. Dept of Homeland Security Siraj M. Khan
Individual Members David R. Brown
Gregory R. Komp
David W. Lee
William Morris
Sander Perle
Marvin Turkanis
Richard Whitman
v
Foreword (This foreword is not part of American National Standard N43.16)
The use of ionizing radiation to screen vehicles and cargo containers has increased rapidly over past
decades. This technology makes it possible to rapidly screen vehicles and cargo containers for the
presence of threat items and contraband. It also minimizes the need for security personnel to open or
enter the vehicles or containers. When this technology became commercially available, little guidance
had been published for this type of radiation use. In March 2003 the HPS/ANSI Accredited Committee
N43 appointed working group N43.16 to draft a consensus standard addressing the radiation safety
aspects of the technology.
This standard applies to security screening systems used for non-intrusive inspection of vehicles and
cargo containers in which people are not expected to be present. The standard provides guidelines
specific to the radiation safety aspects of the design, maintenance, and operation of these systems. It
does not include electrical safety guidelines or any other safety, performance or use considerations
outside of the realm of radiation safety. The standard is intended for manufacturers, distributors,
installers, and users of the systems.
In setting dose limits the standard takes into consideration the minimization of the dose as balanced
against the security benefit to society. This precludes the frivolous use of the security screening systems
where no benefit is to be derived. The standard contains three informative annexes. Annex A
(informative) provides descriptions of typical systems and operational modes. Annex B (informative)
provides information on radiation measurement quantities, terminology, equipment and techniques.
Annex C (normative) provides the background and examples for obtaining dose limits around systems
based on actual operational conditions. Annex D (normative) provides techniques for performing radiation
surveys.
It is important to reiterate that this standard includes requirements for both the manufacturers and users
of screening systems. Sections 4 and 6 of this Standard contain requirements for both manufacturers and
users. Section 5 contains only manufacturer requirements. Section 7 contains user requirements. Full
compliance with this standard requires systems to be both manufactured and operated according to the
standard. Simply procuring equipment that meets all the manufacturing performance requirements does
not guarantee compliance. When there is no requirement for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licensing or state registration, the authors of this standard recommend equivalent oversight be performed
by a qualified independent authority.
This standard does not address dose limits for intentional exposure of humans to the primary beam.
Users of systems intended to expose humans to primary beam x-rays, gamma-radiation, or both (e.g.,
pedestrians, occupied vehicles) as well as vehicles and cargo containers shall also comply with the
requirements of ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009 (Renewed as of 2018) Radiation Safety for Personnel Security
Screening Systems Using X-ray or Gamma Radiation.
Key words: cargo and vehicle screening, gamma rays, health physics, linear
accelerator (LINAC), national standard, radiation generating device (RGD),
radiation safety, sealed radioactive sources
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Contents
Foreword ................................................................................................................................ vi
1 Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................................. 1
2 Normative References............................................................................................................. 1
3 Definitions1
3.1 Shall and Should .............................................................................................................. 1
3.2 Specific Terms.................................................................................................................. 1
4 Federal, State and Local Regulations ..................................................................................... 4
5 Dose Limitation........................................................................................................................ 4
5.1 Dose to System Operating Crew ...................................................................................... 4
5.2 Dose to Bystanders .......................................................................................................... 5
5.3 Dose to Inadvertently Scanned Individuals ...................................................................... 5
6 System and Manufacturing Requirements .............................................................................. 5
6.1 Indicators and Controls .................................................................................................... 5
6.2 Safety Interlocks ............................................................................................................... 6
6.3 Ground Fault .................................................................................................................... 6
6.4 Labeling ............................................................................................................................ 6
6.5 Information to be Provided to the End User ..................................................................... 7
6.6 Records to be Maintained by Manufacturers.................................................................... 7
6.7 Records to be Obtained by Diealers and Distributors ...................................................... 8
7 Installation Requirements ........................................................................................................ 8
7.1 Site Selection ................................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Safety Systems ................................................................................................................ 9
7.3 Establishing the Radiation Control Area........................................................................... 9
7.4 Establishing Quality Control Parameters.......................................................................... 9
7.5 Warning Signs and Access Control ................................................................................ 10
7.6 Assessment of Potential Doses to System Operators.................................................... 10
7.7 Assessment of Potential Doses to Inadvertently Scanned Individuals ........................... 10
7.8 Documentation ............................................................................................................... 10
8 Operating Requirements ....................................................................................................... 11
8.1 Responsible Individual ................................................................................................... 11
8.2 Establish Operating Procedures..................................................................................... 11
8.3 Personnel Monitoring ..................................................................................................... 11
8.4 Personnel Training ......................................................................................................... 12
8.5 Radiation Safety Surveys ............................................................................................... 12
8.5.1 Initial and Periodic Radiation Safety Surveys ....................................................... 13
8.5.2 Routine Quality Control ......................................................................................... 13
8.6 Preventive Maintenance ................................................................................................. 14
8.7 Inadvertent Exposures ................................................................................................... 14
8.8 Records and Documentation .......................................................................................... 14
9 Informative References ......................................................................................................... 15
Annex A (Informative)
Security Screening Systems and Operations ........................................................................ 16
A.1 Imaging Technologies .................................................................................................... 16
A.1.1 Transmission Imaging .......................................................................................... 16
A.1.2 Backscatter imaging ............................................................................................. 16
A.1.3 Combined Imaging ............................................................................................... 17
A.2 Operational Modes......................................................................................................... 17
A.2.1 Moving Source Mode ........................................................................................... 17
A.2.2 Stationary Source Mode ....................................................................................... 18
A.2.3 Dual Mode ............................................................................................................ 18
A.3 Radiation Safety Implications......................................................................................... 18
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Annex B (Informative)
Radiation Dosimetry .............................................................................................................. 19
B.1 Radiation Dosimetry Quantities and Units ...................................................................... 19
B.2 Calculating Radiation Doses ........................................................................................... 20
B.3 Measuring Radiation Doses ............................................................................................ 21
B.3.1 Ionization chambers ............................................................................................. 21
B.3.2 Geiger Counters .................................................................................................. 21
B.3.3 Scintillation Detectors ........................................................................................... 21
B.3.4 Passive Dosimeters .............................................................................................. 22
B.3.5 Neutron Detection ................................................................................................ 22
B.3.5.1 Active Neutron Detectors .................................................................................. 22
B.3.5.2 Passive Neutron Detectors ................................................................................ 22
B.4 Air Kerma and Absorbed Dose Measurements for Compliance with
ANSI/HPS N43.16 .......................................................................................................... 22
B.4.1 Instrument Selection ............................................................................................. 23
B.4.2 Calibration ............................................................................................................ 24
Annex C )Normative)
Procedures for Measurements Made by Manufacturers ....................................................... 25
C.1 Air Kerma at a Reference location in the Primary Beam ................................................ 25
C.1.1 Equipment Required ........................................................................................... 25
C.1.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 25
C.2 Isodose Contours ............................................................................................................ 25
C.2.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 26
C.3 Dose Per Scan to the Driver of the Vehicle Being Screened .......................................... 26
C.3.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 27
C.4 Dose to an Inadvertently Scanned Individual ................................................................. 27
C.4.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 27
C.5 Boundary of the Radiation Control Area ......................................................................... 27
Annex D (Normative)
Establishing the Boundary of the Radiation Control Area ..................................................... 28
D.1 The Radiation Control Area ............................................................................................ 28
D.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................... 28
D.3 Example Calculations ..................................................................................................... 28
D.4 Radiation Control Area Survey ....................................................................................... 29
D.4.1 Equipment Required ........................................................................................... 29
D.4.2 Procedure ............................................................................................................ 29
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AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD ANSI/HPS 43.16-2021
Radiation Safety for Cargo and

Vehicle Security Screening Systems 3. Definitions
Using X-Ray and Gamma Radiation,
3.1 Shall and Should
Energies Up To 10 MeV
The word “shall” is used to denote a requirement,
1. Purpose and Scope compliance with which is necessary to meet
current radiation protection standards; the word
This standard sets forth guidelines and “should” denotes a recommendation that is
performance criteria for radiation safety aspects intended to be followed when practicable.
of the design, operation, and maintenance of non-
intrusive inspection (NII) systems using x-ray or 3.2 Specific Terms
gamma radiation for security screening of cargo
containers and vehicles. Absorbed dose: The energy imparted to matter
by ionizing radiation per unit mass of irradiated
This standard does not apply to the following: material. The unit of absorbed dose, in the
a) Cabinet x-ray system (as defined in Title Système Internationale (SI), is the joule per
21, Code of Federal Regulations, Section kilogram, given the special name gray (Gy). (1 Gy
1020.40). = 1 J kg–1 = 100 rad.)
b) X-ray systems used for medical
diagnosis or treatment, medical Access: Entry or insertion of the body or a part
research, or non-destructive testing. of the body into a particular area.
Access panel: Any barrier or panel that is
For security screening operations where human designed to be removed or opened for
occupants of a vehicle are intentionally exposed maintenance or service purposes that, when
to the primary radiation beam, this standard removed or opened, affects radiation shielding.
addresses only those aspects of the operation
related to cargo or vehicle screening. Users Access point: Any location through which
conducting such operations shall also comply access to radiation areas or radioactive materials
with the requirements of ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009 is possible. This includes entry or exit ports of
[R2019], Radiation Safety for Personnel Security sufficient size to permit human entry, irrespective
Screening Systems Using X-ray or Gamma of their intended use.
Radiation.
Accessible area: Any area where the body or a
This standard does not address electrical or other part of the body may be exposed to radiation
safety requirements, detection performance, or without necessitating a shutdown of the radiation
other use considerations unrelated to radiation source.
safety. It also does not address the potential
effects of ionizing radiation on radiosensitive Activity (A): The rate of transformation of
cargo; however, it does require system radioactive material (defined as the quotient of dN
manufacturers to disclose the dose to an by dt, where dN is the number of spontaneous
inadvertently exposed individual, which provide nuclear transmutations or disintegrations that
an estimate of the dose to cargo. occur in a quantity of a radionuclide in the time
interval dt). The SI unit of activity is becquerel
2. Normative References (Bq). (1 Bq = 1 disintegration per second (s-1),
and 3.7 × 1010 Bq = 1 curie (Ci))
ANSI/HPS N43.17 – 2009 [Renewed 2019],
Radiation Safety for Personnel Security ALARA (as low as is reasonably achievable):
Screening Systems Using X-Ray or Gamma Making every reasonable effort to maintain
Radiation, Health Physics Society, Herndon, VA. exposures to radiation as far below the dose
limits as practical, taking into account the state of
technology, the economics of improvements in Effective dose: A summation of the equivalent

relation to benefits to health and safety, and other doses in tissues or organs each multiplied by the
societal and socioeconomic considerations. appropriate tissue weighting factor as defined by
the ICRU (ICRU, 1998). The tissue weighting
Ambient dose equivalent: In this document factors were modified by the International
ambient dose equivalent refers to H*(10) which is Commission on Radiological Protection in its
the dose equivalent at a point in a radiation field Publication 103 (ICRP 2007). The unit of effective
produced by the corresponding expanded and dose is joule per kilogram, and its special name
aligned field in the ICRU sphere (ICRU 1998) at is sievert (Sv). (1 Sv = 100 rem).
a depth of 10 mm on the radius opposing the
direction of the aligned field. The unit of ambient Equivalent dose: The absorbed dose in an
dose equivalent, H*(10) is joule per kilogram (J organ or tissue multiplied by the appropriate
kg-1), with the special name sievert (Sv). (1 Sv = radiation weighting factor (ICRU 1998). The unit
100 rem). of equivalent dose is joule per kilogram, and its
special name is sievert (Sv, 1 Sv = 100 rem).
Backscatter imaging: An imaging technology in
which an image of the vehicle or cargo container High radiation area: An area, accessible to
is created from measurements of radiation individuals, in which radiation levels from
scattered or deflected from the object in the radiation sources could result in an individual’s
backward direction. receiving an equivalent deep dose (Hd ) in excess
of 1 mSv (100 mrem) in 1 h at 30 cm (1 foot) from
Backscatter system: A security screening the radiation source or 30 cm (1 foot) from any
system that employs backscatter imaging surface that the radiation penetrates.
technology.
IDC(20): The isodose contour around the volume
Bystander: A person near the system, who is not outside of which the ambient dose equivalent rate
directly associated with the operation of the averaged over any 1 minute of continuous
system. Bystanders may include members of the operation does not exceed 20 microsieverts (2
public in the vicinity of the unit, drivers of vehicles millirems) per hour above background.
being scanned who have exited the vehicle, and
traffic controllers. IDC(0.5): The isodose contour around the
volume outside of which the ambient dose
Cabinet x-ray system: A cabinet x-ray system is equivalent rate averaged over any 1 minute of
any system that meets the applicability criteria of continuous operation does not exceed
the federal radiation safety performance standard 0.50 microsievert (50 microrems) per hour above
for cabinet x-ray (Title 21 CFR § 1020.40 Cabinet background.
x-ray systems (a) Applicability and (b)
Definitions). Inadvertent exposure: Unintentional exposure
of an individual to the primary beam. Inadvertent
Collimator: A device or devices used to limit the exposures include ground guides or passers-by
size, shape, and direction of the primary beam. who enter the radiation control area or
unauthorized individuals in cargo compartments
Contraband: Unlawful or unauthorized items of the vehicle or container (e.g., stowaways).
which may include explosives, weapons, drugs,
other threat agents, or stowaways. Kerma: The quotient of dEtr by dm, where dEtr is
the sum of the initial kinetic energies of all of the
Dose equivalent: It is the product of the charged particles liberated by uncharged
absorbed dose D at a point in tissue and the radiation (e.g., photons and neutrons) in a volume
quality factor Q at that point. The unit of dose element of mass dm:
equivalent, H, is the joule per kilogram (J kg-1), 𝑑𝐸!"
with the special name sievert (Sv, 1 Sv = 100 𝐾= .
rem). 𝑑𝑚
The unit of kerma is joule per kilogram (J kg-1) and
its special name is the gray (Gy). If the interacting
2
medium is air, this quantity is often referred to as the source housing into the volume defined by the
air kerma. collimator.
Leak test: A test to determine the integrity of the Qualified expert: A person having the
encapsulation of a sealed radioactive source. knowledge and training to assess both the
hazards presented by the specific radiation
Mobile system: A security screening system source(s) under consideration and the
designed to operate in a moving source mode. effectiveness of engineered and administrative
controls used to mitigate those hazards.
Moving source mode: An operational mode Examples of qualified experts would include, but
where the radiation source moves relative to the are not limited to, professionals certified by the
ground while the vehicle or cargo container being American Board of Health Physics, the American
inspected remains stationary. Systems operating Board of Radiology, or the American Board of
in this mode are commonly referred to as mobile Medical Physics. Regardless of certification
systems. status, the qualified expert must have knowledge
of: (1) the radiation physics associated with the
Non-intrusive inspection (NII): Detection of specific systems to be evaluated, (2) the
concealed contraband items which does not operating characteristics of the systems, (3) the
involve the opening of, or the entry of personnel facility-specific operational practices that will be
into, the vehicle and cargo container. used, (4) the operating history (problems) of
similar systems, and (5) applicable regulations
Occupancy factor: The fraction of the time and national standards.
during which the source is “on” that the maximally
exposed individual is present in the area in Quality factor (Q): An energy dependent
question. For purposes of radiation protection, dimensionless factor by which absorbed dose is
the accumulated radiation dose in an area may to be multiplied to obtain the operational quantity
be multiplied by the occupancy factor to provide called dose equivalent. The quality factor for x-
a better estimate of potential radiation doses that rays and gamma rays is 1.0.
may be received by individuals. The maximally
exposed individual is almost always an employee Radiation weighting factor (wR): An energy
at the facility rather than a member of the public. dependent dimensionless factor by which
Recommended occupancy factors for various absorbed dose is to be multiplied to obtain the
types of areas are provided in several radiation protection quantity called equivalent
publications, such as National Council of dose. The radiation weighting factor for x-rays
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) and gamma rays is 1.0.
Report No. 147, and range from 1 for offices,
laboratories, and reception area to 1/40 for Radiation area: Any area accessible to
outdoor areas with transient traffic. individuals in which radiation levels could result in
an individual’s receiving deep-dose equivalent in
Operational mode: The operational mode refers excess of 0.05 mSv (5 mrem) in 1 h at 30 cm (1
to the motion of the source relative to the ground, foot) from the source or 30 cm (1 foot) from any
see moving source mode and stationary source surface that the radiation penetrates.
mode.
Radiation control area: The physical area
Portal system: A security screening system required to safely operate the system and
designed to operate in a stationary source mode perform non-intrusive inspection, including the
where a vehicle moves through the primary beam area needed for radiation protection, physical
under the driver’s control. Note: ANSI N43.17- safety, operational concerns, and other hazards.
2009 also applies when the vehicle occupants
move through the primary beam. Radiation generating device: For purposed of
this standard, an apparatus or a device emitting
Primary beam: The radiation coming directly or capable of emitting ionizing radiation produced
from the radiation source through an aperture in by electrical means. For example, an x-ray
system or linear accelerator (LINAC).
3
Radiation safety survey: An evaluation of the Safe operation of the system includes initiating or
radiation hazards in and around an installation. It stopping the scan, verifying the system is
customarily includes a physical assessment of operating correctly, and/or controlling access to
the arrangement and use of the equipment along the inspection area. This does not include
with an assessment of the potential doses to individuals who may be remotely viewing the
individuals under the full range of expected image results, but are not directly responsible for
operating conditions. This is typically the other functions.
accomplished by a combination of on-site
measurements and calculations. Use factor (U): The fraction of time that the
primary beam is enabled.
Roentgen (R): The special unit of exposure. One
roentgen equals 2.58 × 10-4 coulomb per kilogram Very high radiation area: Any area accessible
of air. to individuals in which radiation levels from
radiation sources external to the body could result
Safety interlock: A device or group of devices in an individual’s receiving a deep-dose
with the associated control system that is equivalent in excess of 5 Gy (500 rad) in 1 h at 1
designed to sense a limit, an off-limit condition, or m (3.3 feet) from the source or 1 m (3.3 feet) from
an improper sequence of events and any surface that the radiation penetrates.
automatically prevent or terminate radiation
exposure. This is typically accomplished by 4. Federal, State, and Local Regulations
preventing access to the hazardous area or by
terminating or preventing radiation emission. Manufacturers, distributors and users of security
screening systems under this standard shall
Scattered radiation: Radiation whose path or comply with all applicable requirements in the
direction of propagation has deviated as a result U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which
of interaction with matter. include Title 21, Parts 1000 through 1004 and
1005.25, (U.S. Food and Drug Administration),
Sealed source: Any radioactive material or Title 10, Parts 19 & 20 and 30-33 (U.S. Nuclear
byproduct encased in a capsule designed to Regulatory Commission), and Title 29,
prevent leakage or escape of the material. 1910.1096 regarding occupational safety (U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
Shutter: A device that, when closed, prevents the In addition, the installation, operation, and
beam from emerging from the source housing. maintenance of these systems may be subject to
When the shutter is open, the beam emerges state and local regulations. Users shall comply
from the source housing. with applicable state and local regulations, which
may involve registration, licensing, and
Skyshine: Radiation scattered by the air above a compliance with specific requirements.
radiation source to points at ground level beyond
a protective shield. 5. Dose Limitation
Source housing: An enclosure for a source that This standard does not address dose limits for
provides attenuation of the radiation emitted by human occupants of a vehicle that are
the source. intentionally exposed to the primary radiation
beam. Users conducting such operations shall
Stationary source mode: An operational mode also comply with the requirements of ANSI/HPS
where the radiation source does not move N43.17-2009 [R2019], Radiation Safety for
relative to the ground. Systems operating in this Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X-
mode are commonly referred to as portal ray or Gamma Radiation.
systems.
5.1 Dose to System Operating Crew
System operator: A person having the
necessary training and experience to safely
The annual effective dose to any member of the
operate the inspection system, and who is
system operating crew shall be less than 50 mSv
authorized by the facility to perform the process.
4
(5 rem) and should be less than 1 mSv Each system shall have a means to prevent
(100 mrem). This standard assumes all system inadvertent production or emission of the primary
operators are adults (age 18 or older). In addition, radiation beam. This may be accomplished
all doses shall be maintained as low as is through the use of a captured key, password, or
reasonably achievable (ALARA). other feature affording an equivalent level of
control.
5.2 Dose to Bystanders
Each system shall have a means for the system
The effective dose to bystanders from the operator to initiate and terminate the emission of
operation of a security screening system shall not radiation other than the function of an interlock or
exceed 0.25 mSv (25 mrem) per calendar year. the main power control.
In addition, bystanders shall not be exposed to
radiation fields that could produce an ambient Each RGD shall have two independent means
dose equivalent in excess of 0.02 mSv (2 mrem) which indicate when and only when the primary
in any one hour. beam is being emitted and which are discernible
from any point at which the initiation of radiation
In determining compliance with the annual emission is possible. Failure of a single
effective dose limit, use and occupancy factors component of the system shall not cause failure
may be taken into consideration. In determining of both indicators to perform their intended
compliance with the short term limit of 0.02 mSv function.
(2 mrem) in any one hour, only use factors may
be applied. Each system shall have one or more red lights
which indicate when and only when the primary
5.3 Dose to Inadvertently Scanned beam is being emitted. A sufficient number of
Individuals lights shall be used to ensure that at least one
light is visible from any location within the
The effective dose to an individual for a single radiation control area (as defined in paragraph
inadvertent exposure shall not exceed 5 mSv 7.3) and from any access point into the radiation
(500 mrem) and should not exceed 1 mSv (100 control area. These lights shall be designed and
mrem). positioned such that they will not be confused
with traffic control lights, if used.
6. System and Manufacturing
Requirements Each system shall have an audible warning signal
which is actuated when emission of the primary
beam begins. The audible warning signal shall be
The requirements of this section apply to the
audible above the normal ambient sound level in
original system manufacturer and to any
the area and remain on for at least 3 seconds or
individual that makes modifications to a system
until emission of the primary beam is terminated,
that affect compliance with the requirements of
whichever is less. For portal systems with
this standard.
automatic scan initiation capabilities, the audible
warning signal is only required to sound if the
All indicators, controls, interlocks, and other
primary beam has not been emitted for five
system components that affect radiation safety
minutes or more.
shall be designed to function properly under the
environmental conditions in which the system is
Each system shall be provided with emergency
designed to operate. The environmental
stop switches. At least one emergency stop
conditions under which the system is designed to
switch shall be located on the control panel. A
operate shall be clearly indicated by the
sufficient number of emergency stop switches
manufacturer.
shall be located within the radiation control area
to ensure that access to an emergency stop
6.1 Indicators and Controls
switch does not require an individual to cross the
primary beam. Following interruption of radiation
All indicators and controls shall be legibly labeled
emission by activation of an emergency stop
to indicate their purpose.
switch, resetting the switch shall not result in re-
5
initiation of radiation emission. Use of the control emission. Use of the control for initiating radiation
for initiation of radiation emission shall be emission shall be necessary (See Section 6.1).
necessary.
6.3 Ground Fault
For systems with more than one operator-
selectable operational mode, a means shall be A ground fault shall not result in the generation of
provided to indicate the selected mode at any x rays or the opening of a source shutter.
location from which a scan can be initiated. Any
controls that are not intended to be used in the 6.4 Labeling
selected mode shall be disabled.
The location or range of locations where the
A system with more than one operator-selectable primary beam exits the exterior surface of the
scan speed shall have a means to indicate the system should be indicated on the exterior
selected scan speed at any location from which a surface. If it is not indicated on the exterior
scan can be initiated. Any controls that are not surface of the system, it shall be specified in the
intended to be used at the selected scan speed operator’s manual.
shall be disabled.
Every manufacturer of a system to which this
6.2 Safety Interlocks standard applies shall provide the following
information in the form of a tag or label
Each access panel shall have at least one safety permanently affixed or inscribed on the system so
interlock that prevents emission of radiation while as to be legible and readily accessible to view
the access panel is open. In lieu of interlocks, when the system is fully assembled:
systems using a radioactive source may use two
physically locked barriers (e.g., one on the source a) The full name and address of the
shutter and one on the source enclosure). manufacturer
Systems with automatic scan initiation b) The place and date (month and year) of
capabilities must have a minimum of three manufacture
independent input signals to prevent initiation of
a scan until the driver of the vehicle to be c) The model, serial number, and any other
screened is in the designated position outside the information needed to identify the
primary beam (e.g., position sensors, driver specific design and configuration of the
position push button or card scanner). system
Systems that use a radioactive source shall have d) The radionuclide, activity of the source,
at least one shutter. Shutters shall automatically and the date of assay shall also be
close upon loss of power. Shutters shall not provided for systems containing a sealed
automatically open when power is restored. radioactive source.
Manufacturers shall determine the minimum scan e) For RGDs, the end point energy (keV or
speed (either the speed of the scanning system MeV) and current (mA), and pulse rate
or the speed of the vehicle being inspected, as (Hz) if the RGD is pulsed. If more than
applicable). An interlock shall terminate emission one energy, current, or pulse rate can
of the primary beam when the scan speed drops selected, the label shall indicate the
below the minimum scan speed. maximum value.
Failure of any single component of the system For RGDs, a warning label containing the words
shall not cause the malfunction of more than one “CAUTION: X RAYS PRODUCED WHEN
safety interlock. ENERGIZED” shall be permanently affixed or
inscribed on the system such that it is clearly
Following interruption of radiation emission by legible and visible at the location of any controls
activation of a safety interlock, resetting the
interlock shall not result in re-initiation of radiation
6
which can be used to initiate emission of the beam, current (mA), and pulse repetition
primary beam. rate (Hz) for an X-ray source, or the
identity and activity of any radionuclides
For systems containing a radioactive sealed used, the thickness and material of any
source, access to the sealed source and source filtration along the beam path, location or
enclosure shall be clearly and legibly labeled in range of locations where the primary
accordance with the sealed source and device beam exits the beam exit surface, and
registration (SSDR) and applicable federal or the beam divergence characteristics in
state regulations. both the horizontal and vertical
directions.
For systems using a radioactive source, a
warning label using the words: “CAUTION: g) The air kerma at a reference location in
RADIATION PRODUCED WHEN SHUTTER IS the primary beam and the operational
OPEN.” should be prominently displayed near the parameters under which the
source housing. measurement was made. The air kerma
shall be measured using the procedure in
6.5 Information to be Provided to the End Annex C.
User
h) Diagrams showing the dimensions and
The manufacturer shall provide information to the locations of the IDC(0.5) and IDC(20).
end user sufficient to achieve and maintain The IDC(0.5) and IDC(20) shall be
compliance with this standard, allow the safe use determined using the procedures in
of the system, fulfill requirements, and prevent Annex C.
intentional or frivolous misuse. This includes, but
is not limited to, the following: i) The dose per scan to the driver of the
vehicle being screened due to scattered
a) Warnings of life-threatening dangers radiation and the operational parameters
(e.g., unauthorized modification of the under which the measurement was made
system). (for systems in which the driver may
remain in the vehicle during screening).
b) Notification that NRC or state licensing This dose shall be measured using the
(for sealed radioactive sources) or state procedure in Annex C.
registration (for x-ray sources) may be
required. j) The dose to an inadvertently scanned
individual and the operational
c) Operational procedures needed to parameters under which the
comply with this standard. [Ordinarily measurement was made. This dose shall
these operational procedures shall be be measured using the procedure in
part of the standard operational Annex C.
procedure (SOP) for the system.]
k) The potential for neutron production and
d) A list and description of all system safety the fraction of the total dose that is due to
features (e.g., interlocks, warning lights, neutrons.
etc.)
6.6 Records to be Maintained by
e) A schedule of preventive maintenance Manufacturers
tasks, leak tests (for sealed sources),
and periodic checks of all safety features. Manufacturers shall establish and maintain the
following records with respect to systems to
f) Sufficient information about the primary which this standard applies:
beam to perform adequate radiation
measurements. At a minimum, this a) A description of quality control
information shall include the end point procedures with respect to the system’s
energy (keV or MeV) of the primary radiation safety.
7
c) Date of sale, award, or lease.

b) Records of the results of radiation safety
tests, surveys, and evaluations. The The information obtained shall be forwarded
records shall contain the procedures, promptly to the manufacturer of the system.
operational parameters, and test or
survey equipment used. As a minimum, 7. Installation Requirements
these tests, surveys, and evaluations
shall include those performed to For safe and effective use of a security screening
determine the information provided to the system to be possible, the system must be
end user as specified in section 6.5. installed according to design requirements of
both the manufacturer or distributor and the end
c) For those systems displaying aging user. Therefore, installation of a security
effects that may increase radiation screening system shall be a joint effort between
emission, records of the results of tests the manufacturer or distributor and the end user.
for durability and stability of the system The level of this interaction shall be
and the basis for selecting these tests. commensurate with the type and complexity of
the security screening system.
d) Copies of all written communications
between the manufacturer and dealers, A radiation safety survey by a qualified expert
distributors, and purchasers concerning shall be performed after initial installation and
radiation safety including complaints, prior to first use to assess compliance of the
investigations, instructions, or installation with the requirements of this standard
explanations affecting use, repair, and any other applicable regulatory
adjustment, maintenance, or testing. requirements.
e) A record of the manufacturer’s The installation process consists of the following

distribution of systems in a form which elements:
shall enable tracing of specific systems
or production lots to distributors or a) Site selection
dealers.
b) Verification of safety systems
f) The records outlined in Section 6.7.
c) Establishing the radiation control area
All records shall be maintained for a minimum of and assessment of potential radiation
five years. doses to bystanders
6.7 Records to be Obtained and Retained by d) Establishing quality control parameters

Dealers and Distributors
e) Posting of warning signs and access
Dealers and distributors of systems to which this control measures
standard applies shall obtain enough information
as necessary to identify and locate first f) Assessment of potential radiation doses
purchasers. If a manufacturer also acts as a to system operating crew
dealer or distributor, the manufacturer shall
obtain this information. The information shall g) Assessment of potential radiation doses
include: to inadvertently scanned individuals
(e.g., stowaways)
a) The name and mailing address of the
distributor, dealer, or purchaser to whom h) Documentation of the process and
the system was transferred. associated measurements
b) The brand name and identification
information of the system (e.g., model In addition to the requirements of this standard,
number and serial number). organizations often must comply with other
8
regulatory requirements such as environmental The qualified expert shall determine if any
impact statements. additional site specific safety systems or controls
are required. The proper functioning of these
7.1 Site Selection additional safety features shall also be verified.
Site selection requires consideration of the 7.3 Establishing the Radiation Control Area
following:
A radiation control area shall be established
a) Space constraints around each security screening system. The
radiation dose to the maximally exposed
b) Site grading (the location should be as bystander outside the radiation control area shall
level as possible to prevent roll back) not exceed the limit specified in section 5.2. The
potential for skyshine at distances away from the
c) Occupancy of surrounding areas and radiation control area boundary shall be
adjacent structures, including areas considered.
above or below ground level
Measurements used to demonstrate compliance
d) Traffic flow into, through, and from the with this section shall be made using the
radiation control area exposure parameters that result in the highest
dose (e.g., slowest scan speed, maximum beam
e) Security issues, including access to the energy, and highest beam intensity). Acceptable
radiation control area and contingency methods for demonstrating compliance with the
plans requirements of this section, along with example
calculations, are provided in Annex D.
f) Compatibility or interference with other
systems at the site (e.g., radiation portal For security screening systems, the total area
monitors or other radiation detectors, needed to conduct screening operations is
other screening systems, etc.) determined by considerations of radiation safety,
physical safety, traffic flow and control, and other
g) Radiation safety implications if multiple operational factors. This total radiation control
radiation sources are used at the same area typically exceeds the area needed for
site. radiation exposure control. In addition, traffic flow
through the area often makes it impractical to
7.2 Safety Systems mark or control access at the boundary of the
area which would be required for radiation safety
A means shall be provided for at least one system separately from control of this larger area.
operator to maintain full visual surveillance of the Therefore, radiation warning signs and access
radiation control area. controls (see section 7.5) may be placed outside
of the boundary of this larger area and the entire
A means shall be provided for the system area treated as the radiation control area. In all
operating crew to communicate with each other. cases, the system operators shall be aware of the
For systems operating in portal mode, a means location of the radiation hazard within the area,
shall be provided to control movement of traffic ensure unauthorized individuals are not present
through the portal. during system operation, and follow established
radiation safety procedures.
Each of the system safety features (see sections
6.1 and 6.2) identified by the manufacturer, per 7.4 Establishing Quality Control Parameters
section 6.5, shall be tested for proper operation.
This shall be performed by inducing an During the initial survey, the qualified expert shall
appropriate fault condition. The assistance of the establish specific QC parameters (e.g. expected
manufacturer may be needed to induce some doses or dose rates at specific locations under
fault conditions. specific conditions) that can be easily verified by
the system operators using readily available
9
instrumentation. These QC parameters are integration of traffic sensors with safety interlocks
intended to provide the users with the ability to triggered by the failure of a vehicle to exit the
verify consistent and appropriate operation of the radiation control area within a set time.
screening system and adequacy of established
controls. This is most important for mobile or re- 7.6 Assessment of Potential Doses to System
locatable systems for which the radiation control Operators
area must be re-established after each relocation.
During the initial survey, the qualified expert shall
7.5 Warning Signs and Access Control make an assessment of the potential effective
dose to the system operators. The potential
All accessible areas in which an individual could effective dose shall be determined using the
receive a radiation dose in excess of 0.05 mSv exposure parameters that result in the highest
(5 mrem) in any one hour at 30 cm from the dose (e.g., slowest scan speed, maximum
source or closest physical barrier shall be posted number of scans per hour, maximum photon
as a Radiation Area. Additional information may energy and intensity).
be included on the signage to clarify the
conditions under which the radiation hazard is The potential effective dose to the system
present (e.g. “when red light is flashing”). operators shall be less than applicable dose limits
(see section 5.1) and ALARA.
All accessible areas in which an individual could
receive a radiation dose in excess of 1 mSv The qualified expert shall take into consideration
(100 mrem) in any one hour at 30 cm from the the potential for neutron production, primarily in
source or closest physical barrier shall be posted the accelerator head, when performing this
as a High Radiation Area. Additional information assessment. Some materials commonly used in
may be included on the signage to clarify the accelerator heads can produce photoneutrons.
conditions under which the radiation hazard is
present (e.g. “when red light is flashing”). 7.7 Assessment of Potential Doses to
Inadvertently Scanned Individuals
The maximum potential radiation dose an
individual can receive in one hour should be During security screening of vehicles and cargo
determined by multiplying the maximum number containers, there is a potential for individuals to
of scans possible in an hour by the dose per scan be present in the vehicle or cargo container for a
at 30 cm from the beam exit surface. variety of reasons. These individuals may be
If the system does not require either a radiation inadvertently scanned during the screening
area or high radiation area sign, post the area process.
with signs stating “Caution: radioactive materials”
or “Caution: x-rays”, as appropriate. The qualified expert shall determine the potential
effective dose to inadvertently scanned
These warning signs should be affixed to the individuals. The potential effective dose shall be
security screening system near the radiation determined using the exposure parameters that
source and image receptor on both sides of the result in the highest dose (e.g., slowest scan
primary beam. Where this is not possible, the speed, maximum photon energy and intensity).
signs shall be posted at the boundary of the The effective dose to an inadvertently scanned
radiation control area. individual shall be less than the limit specified in
section 5.3.
The operating crew shall have a means to control
traffic flow into and through the radiation control 7.8 Documentation
area. This shall be accomplished either by
administrative controls (e.g. ground guides) or The qualified expert shall prepare a written report
engineered controls (e.g. sensors, barriers, that documents the initial survey and the
interlocks). When traffic control is accomplished decisions made based on this information that
by the use of engineered controls, the function affect the radiation safety of the operation. At a
and integration of those controls with the security minimum this report shall include:
screening system shall be verified. For example,
10
4) Recommendations for personnel

a) Documentation that the site is monitoring
appropriate for the intended operation
1) Occupancy of adjacent spaces g) Assessment of Potential Dose to
2) Combined effects of multiple Inadvertently Scanned Individuals
radiation sources in or adjacent to 1) The potential dose
the radiation control area 2) Parameters used
3) Factors that require re-evaluation of 3) Instruments used for measurements
the radiation control area boundary including last calibration date
including new QA parameters if 4) Recommended actions for
necessary inadvertently scanned individuals
b) Establishing the radiation control area 8. Operating Requirements

1) Diagram of the radiation control area
2) Measured dose per scan at the Even in the presence of robust engineering
boundary of the radiation control controls, supplemental administrative controls
area (work practices) to limit radiation dose are
3) Instruments used for measurements required. Such controls include providing
including last calibration date operational and radiation safety training,
4) Calculated maximum annual dose to controlling access to areas around screening
bystanders and the operational systems, establishing operating and emergency
parameters assumed procedures, limiting system use time, and posting
of warning and access control signs. The using
c) Verification of Safety Systems organization’s executive management shall be
1) Systems checked committed to implementing and maintaining
2) Test results administrative controls.
d) Establishing QA Parameters Systems must be installed and used in a way that

1) The QA parameters provides safe transit paths and waiting areas for
2) Recommended frequency for the drivers to exit and enter their vehicles.
checking QA parameters
3) Procedure for checking QA 8.1 Responsible Individual
parameters
4) Corrective actions to take if QA
The executive management of the organization
parameters have changed
using a screening system shall designate an
individual responsible for ensuring compliance
e) Posting of Warning Signs and Access
with radiation safety requirements.
Control Measures
1) Required signs
8.2 Establish Operating Procedures
2) Recommended locations
3) Identification of access control
measures An organization using a screening system shall
4) Verification that access control document its procedures for operating the
measures are adequate system. These procedures shall be consistent
with the manufacturer’s operator’s manual and
f) Assessment of Potential Dose to System the recommendations of this standard. These
Operators procedures shall be reviewed by a qualified
1) The potential dose to a system expert.
operator, including the embyo/fetus
of a pregnant woman 8.3 Personnel Monitoring
2) Parameters used
3) Instruments used for measurements The individual responsible for radiation safety
including last calibration date shall ensure a radiation safety assessment is
complete prior to the first use of the system and
11
after any change that could affect radiation 2) Sources and magnitude of common
safety. This radiation safety assessment shall be exposures;
performed by a qualified expert. The assessment 3) Units of measurement;
shall include an evaluation of the potential annual 4) Time, distance, and shielding;
dose to system operators (including the 5) The concept of ALARA;
embryo/fetus of a pregnant woman), service 6) Biological effects of radiation and
personnel, and the general public. radiation risks;
7) Emergency procedures;
The results of this assessment shall be used to 8) How to use survey
determine whether personnel monitoring is equipment/dosimetry, if applicable;
required in accordance with applicable 9) Rights of pregnant workers.
regulations and guidance. When personnel
monitoring is not implemented, the reasons shall b) Other safety hazards (e.g. physical
be documented. Even if personnel monitoring is hazards, electrical hazards);
not required, it may be conducted for a variety of
reasons including: c) Proper operating procedures, including
all indicators and controls for initiating
a) verifying the effectiveness of engineering and terminating the emission of radiation;
controls;
d) Physical security procedures to prevent
b) verifying the effectiveness of unauthorized use or access;
administrative controls;
e) System operator awareness and control
c) assessing actual individual and group of the radiation control area;
exposures;
f) Responding to public inquiries about
d) documenting exposures for regulatory or radiation;
legal purposes;
g) Familiarity with the information being
e) detecting unsafe working practices; provided to inadvertently scanned
individuals;
f) detecting changes in exposures
(including accidental exposures); h) Regulatory requirements;
g) aiding the administration of the ALARA i) Supervised hands-on training.

process; and
Proficiency should be demonstrated at the
h) satisfying labor or employee concerns. conclusion of training.
8.4 Personnel Training

Refresher training shall be required at least once
All personnel associated with the operation of the every twelve months.
system shall receive appropriate training
sufficient to operate the system safely prior to 8.5 Radiation Safety Surveys
performing their assigned duties. The scope and
depth of the training shall be commensurate with Appropriate radiation safety surveys shall be
the hazards associated with the system. At a performed on systems by the manufacturer and
minimum, this training shall include: by a qualified expert representing the end user to
verify correct system performance and validate
a) Radiation safety training specific to the the radiation control area boundaries.
system, including—
1) Types of radiation; All surveys shall be performed with appropriate
and calibrated survey meters. Results and all
12
necessary analysis shall be documented in the

survey records. c) model, serial number, and calibration
dates of instruments used;
8.5.1 Initial and Periodic Radiation Safety
Surveys d) raw data, assumptions, and calculation
parameters used;
Radiation safety surveys shall verify the boundary
of the radiation control area, potential doses at e) survey results including potential doses
system operator locations, and any other critical at the boundary of the radiation control
parameters identified by the manufacturer. area, potential doses to system;
Surveys shall be performed:
f) operators, and potential doses inside the
a) upon installation; cargo container;
b) at least once every three years; g) the significance of any changes from the
previous survey(s);
c) after any modification or replacement
that affects the radiation shielding, h) recommendations for root cause analysis
scattered radiation, or radiation and corrective actions, if necessary;
production components;
i) recommendations for selected
d) when making a significant change in measurements to be made during the
operating procedures beyond the initial operator’s quality control surveys
plan, such as increases in rate of
screenings, number of hours per week of
operation, or changes in occupancy of 8.5.2 Routine Quality Control
adjacent areas;
The system operators shall perform QC checks to
e) after any incident which could have ensure that the system performs consistently
damaged the system in such a way that from day to day. At a minimum the routine QC
radiation shielding, beam alignment, or checks shall include:
other radiation safety features might be
compromised. a) Prior to operating the system, the system
operators shall follow the manufacturer’s
Refer to Annex B for information on air kerma recommended start up procedure.
measurements, selection of instruments, and
estimation of effective dose. b) Daily, perform visual inspection of the
system and radiation control 13rea:
The results of the survey shall be documented 1) Check that postings are legible and
and provided to the user. At a minimum, the correctly positioned
survey report shall include: 2) Check that the radiation control 13rea
is clear (e.g. no unauthorized people,
a) the date of the survey; no debris, etc.)
3) Check that all barriers are intact and
b) name of person performing the survey; in place;
4) Check the system for damage
5) Check that warning systems (e.g.
visible and audible, as applicable) are
functional
c) At setup and when misalignment is

suspected (e.g. possible collision, visible
damage), perform a check of the
13
alignment of the primary beam and 3) System parameters (scan speed,

detector array (or any beam stop). mode of operation, any other
variable parameter)
d) At the frequency specified by the 4) The manufacturer and model of the
qualified expert (see section 7.5.1), security screening system involved
Perform the recommended 5) Cause of the inadvertent exposure
measurements to ensure the system is
operating as initially installed. For g) Operating crew contact information
mobile systems, sufficient
measurements shall be performed to h) Estimated radiation dose (may be based
verify the system and radiation control on radiation dose to cargo information
area boundaries are properly set up. provided by the manufacturer if a more
complete analysis is not available) Note:
8.6 Preventive Maintenance If a system failure occurs during the
inadvertent exposure a more detailed
The operating institution shall follow the radiation dose estimate shall be made if
manufacturer's recommended maintenance appropriate (e.g. if the radiation dose
schedule. Maintenance or repair activities shall may have exceeded the limit in section
only be performed by a person qualified to 5.3)
perform such maintenance or repair. Any
maintenance performed shall be documented. i) Any other pertinent information
8.7 Inadvertent Exposures The user shall provide a report to the individual
inadvertently exposed, if requested. Include the
estimated radiation dose and provide an example
System Operators shall cease scanning if an
that compares the radiation dose to a radiation
individual (e.g., a ground assistant or passerby)
dose from a commonly known source of radiation,
enters the radiation control area.
for example: “The radiation from this inadvertent
exposure is roughly equivalent to _______”.
In the event of an inadvertent exposure, the user
shall record the facts relevant to the exposure. At
If the radiation dose from inadvertent exposure
a minimum these facts shall include;
exceeds an applicable radiation dose limit from
section 5 above, is the result of a system
a) The nature of the inadvertent exposure
malfunction, or is related to system maintenance,
(e.g. unauthorized person in radiation the user shall report the incident. For a RGD, the
control area, unauthorized person in user shall notify the manufacturer and the
vehicle or cargo area, system operator
manufacturer shall report incident to the FDA as
out of position, etc.) required. For radionuclide based systems,
incidents will be reported to the appropriate
b) Geographic location where the regulatory agency in accordance with applicable
inadvertent exposure occurred regulations.
c) Date and time of the exposure
8.8 Records and Documentation
d) Name and age of the individual exposed
The institution operating the system shall collect
e) Contact information and maintain the following records:
f) Circumstances of the exposure, a) Each system operator’s training records

including: including sufficient information to show
1) Individual’s location relative to the compliance with section 8.4;
primary beam
2) Type of vehicle or container if b) Personnel dosimetry records shall be
applicable maintained for a minimum of 70 years.
14
c) Upgrades, modifications, maintenance, Physiological Data for Use in Radiological

and repair records shall be maintained Protection: Reference Values. ICRP Publication
for the life of the system; 89. Oxford, UK: Elsevier LTD.
d) QA Log ICRP. 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the

International Commission on Radiological
e) Records of radiation surveys as required Protection. ICRP Publication 103, Oxford, UK:
in Section 8.5; Elseveir LTD.
f) Evidence and analysis to show that the International Commission on Radiation Units and
dose limits specified in Section 5 are Measurements (ICRU). 1998. Conversion
being met; Coefficients for Use in Radiological Protection
Against External Radiation. ICRU Report 57.
These records shall be maintained for 5 years or Bethesda, MD: ICRU.
more as noted above or as required by federal,
state, or local regulations. ICRU. 2011. Fundamental quantities and units for
ionizing radiation (Revised). ICRU Report 85a. J
Additionally the following information shall be ICRU 11(1a)
kept current and readily available to the system
operator: International Standards Organization (ISO).
1999. X and Gamma Reference Radiation for
a) The name and contact information for the Calibrating Dosemeters and Doserate Meters
responsible individual designated as and for Determining Their Response as a
required in Section 8.1. Function of Photon Energy – Part 3. ISO
Standard 4037-3
b) A complete set of operating procedures as
required in section 8.2 shall be readily Knoll, Glenn F. 2010. Radiation Detection and
available to the system operators. Measurement, Fourth Edition. Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
9. Informative References NCRP. 2004. Structural Shielding Design for
Medical X-Ray Imaging Facilities, NCRP Report
ANSI/HPS N43.3 - 2008 [Renewed 2018], For No. 147. Bethesda, MD: NCRP.
General Radiation Safety – Installations Using
Non-Medical X-Ray and Sealed Gamma Ray NCRP. 2007. Radiation Protection and
Sources, Energies up to 10 MeV, Health Physics Measurement Issues Related to Cargo Scanning
Society, Herndon, VA. with Accelerator-Produced High-Energy X Rays,
NCRP Commentary No. 20. Bethesda, MD:
ANSI/HPS N43.14 – 2011 [Renewed 2016], NCRP.
Radiation Safety for Active Interrogation of
Cargo, Energies up to 100 MeV , Health Physics Soares, C.G. and Martin, P.R. 1995. A Consistent
Society, Herndon, VA. Set of Photon Conversion Coefficients for
Personnel and Environmental Dosimetry.
Attix, F.H. 1986. Introduction to Radiological Proceedings of the Panasonic Users Group
Physics and Radiation Dosimetry. N.Y. John Meeting, Somerset, PA, June 5-9, 1995.
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Turner, James Edward. 2010. Atoms, radiation,
Birch, Marshall, and Ardran. 1979. Catalogue of and radiation protection. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH
Spectral Data for Diagnostic X-rays. Scientific Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA.
Report Series 30. London: The Hospital
Physicists’ Association.
International Commission on Radiological

Protection (ICRP). 2003. Basic Anatomical and
15
Annex A (Informative)
Security Screening Systems and
Operations
This annex provides an overview of the key

imaging technologies used in security screening
of vehicles and cargo containers. This overview
is intended to provide both system operators and
radiation protection personnel with information
that will help to understand and evaluate the
nature of the radiation hazard associated with
their specific screening system and operation.
Fig. A1. Transmission Imaging. A narrow fan-
A.1 Imaging Technologies shaped beam of radiation passes through the
vehicle being screened. Variations in radiation
There are two primary imaging technologies used intensity due to the vehicle and its cargo are
for security screening of vehicles and cargo measured at the detector array and processed to
containers with ionizing radiation: transmission create an image.
imaging and backscatter imaging.
A.1.1 Transmission Imaging
In transmission imaging, the radiation is usually

collimated into a narrow fan-shaped beam.
Radiation transmitted through the vehicle being
screened is detected by an array of detectors Fig. A2. An example of a transmission image.
positioned opposite the radiation source as Areas of higher density in the cargo and vehicle
shown in Fig. A1. As the screening system moves appear dark while areas of lower density appear
past the vehicle (or, as the vehicle moves past the lighter. (Photo used with permission.)
screening system), the intensity of radiation
passing though the vehicle and its contents is A.1.2 Backscatter Imaging
measured. The intensity of the radiation reaching
each detector depends primarily on the density of In backscatter imaging, the radiation is collimated
the materials along the path of the radiation. This into a very narrow pencil-shaped beam. The
information is processed by computer software to pencil-shaped beam is then swept across the
create an image of the entire vehicle. The final vehicle being screened while the screening
image looks very similar to a traditional medical system moves past the vehicle (or, as the vehicle
x-ray image. A typical image is shown is Fig. A2. moves past the screening system). Detectors are
The radiation source in a transmission imaging placed on the same side of the vehicle as the
system can be a gamma ray source (sealed radiation source and measure the intensity of the
source containing radioactive material) or a RGD radiation scattered back toward the screening
(x-ray tube or linear accelerator). system by the vehicle and its contents as shown
in Fig. A3. The intensity of the radiation reaching
the detectors varies depending the nature of the
materials along the path of the radiation (e.g., low
vs. high atomic number materials). As with
transmission imaging, the radiation intensity
information is processed by computer software
and an image of the vehicle and its contents is
produced. However, the image looks more like a
photograph than the transmission image (See
Fig. A4). Backscatter systems typically use an x-
ray tube as the source of radiation.
16
van) or it can be moved along short rails

constructed at a fixed location. In this mode, the
vehicle or cargo container is brought into the
radiation control area and positioned for
screening. Vehicle occupants typically exit the
area to a location outside the radiation control
area and the vehicle or container is screened.
This mode of operation is illustrated in Fig. A5. In
some cases, the driver of the vehicle remains in
the passenger compartment and only the cargo
area of the vehicle is screened. If the entire
vehicle is screened with the driver and/or
passengers inside, the user must ensure that the
requirements of ANSI/HPS N43.17 are met (see
Section 5).
Fig. A3. Backscatter Imaging. A highly collimated
pencil-shaped beam is repeated swept across the
vehicle being screened. Very sensitive detectors
measure the variations in the intensity of back-
scattered radiation which is processed to create
an image.
Fig. A4. An example of a backscatter image.

Lighter areas indicate low atomic number
materials while darker areas indicate high atomic
number materials. (Photo used with permission.)
A.1.3 Combined Imaging
Some screening systems are capable of

performing both transmission and backscatter
imaging at the same time. This is most often done
with two radiation sources—one for transmission Fig. A5. An example of a system operated in
imaging and one for backscatter imaging—along moving source mode.
with detector arrays positioned appropriately on
each side of the vehicle being screened. A.2.2 Stationary Source Mode
A.2 Operational Modes In a stationary source mode, the security

screening system is stationary and the vehicle
Security screening systems are usually operated being screened is moved past the security
in one of two operational modes. screening system, usually under its own power.
This means that the vehicle driver will be inside
A.2.1 Moving Source Mode the passenger compartment during the screening
process. Some systems are designed to initiate
In a moving source mode, the security screening radiation emission only after the occupied part of
system (the source) is moved past a stationary the vehicle has passed the primary beam. In this
vehicle or cargo container. The screening system case, the occupied part of the vehicle is not
may be mounted on a vehicle (usually a truck or screened and the driver is exposed only to small
amounts of scattered radiation. In situations
17
where the entire vehicle is screened with the the highly collimated beam and the lower-energy
driver and/or passengers inside, the user must radiation typically used for backscatter imaging,
ensure that the requirements of ANSI/HPS doses around backscatter systems are usually
N43.17 are met (see Section 5). very low except directly along the path of the
radiation beam.
If a system is operated in a moving source mode,

the radiation beam moves during a screening.
This reduces the potential dose at any given point
around the system, allowing the radiation control
area to be somewhat smaller in the direction of
the radiation beam. However, a larger distance is
typically required perpendicular to the beam to
allow for movement of the system. Conversely,
for a system operating in stationary source mode,
the radiation control area may be quite small
perpendicular to the primary beam, but
considerable larger in the beam direction.
In both modes of operation, the beam intensity
(i.e., the in-beam dose rate) and the scan speed
(relative speed of the source and target) are the
major parameters determining the dose to objects
Fig. A6. An example of a system operated in or individuals in the screened vehicle. In many
stationary source mode. screening scenarios, the hardest variable to
control—and therefore, the largest contributor to
A.2.3 Dual Mode variations in dose—is the scan speed.
Some systems are able to operate in either The dose equivalent (H) to cargo (or an
moving source or stationary source mode (e.g., a inadvertently screened individual) can be
vehicle mounted screening system that can be estimated from the following formula (adapted
parked and operated as a portal system). from NCRP Commentary No. 20):
𝑤 𝜃𝑑
A.3 Radiation Safety Implications 𝐻= ≈ 𝐻̇
𝑣 𝑣
Each of these imaging technologies and
operational modes has implications for radiation Where, 𝐻̇ is the dose equivalent rate in the
safety and survey measurements. In primary beam, 𝑤 is the beam width (𝑤 ≈ 𝜃𝑑, θ is
transmission imaging, the detector array opposite the beam divergence in radians, d is the distance
the radiation source provides some degree of along the beam to the point where the dose is to
radiation attenuation. However, the detector be estimated), and v is the scan speed. Note that
array may not intercept the entire radiation beam unit conversion factors may be needed
and usually does not provide sufficient shielding depending on the units in which the values of
to reduce potential doses to levels required by dose rate, distance, and speed are expressed.
this standard. Therefore, additional distance
beyond the detector array is typically needed.
In backscatter imaging, a portion of the radiation

beam still penetrates through the vehicle or cargo
container being inspected, but is not used for
production of an image. The lack of a detector
array opposite the radiation source means more
distance will typically be needed than for a
transmission imaging system. However, due to
18
Annex B (Informative) estimates. These quantities are then

Radiation Dosimetry appropriately weighted by factors that take into
account the characteristics of the radiation field
This annex contains information necessary for through weighting factors based on the type and
making calculations and measurements of the energy of radiation yielding equivalent dose. It is
radiation output of security screening systems. necessary to also weight the quantities by factors
The discussion in this annex pertains only to that express the irradiation geometry (photon
quantities that are relevant to this standard and is fluence) and by those that categorize the effects
not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of of radiation on organs yielding effective dose.
radiation physics. For more comprehensive Equivalent and effective doses are given the
treatments of this topic see, for example, Knoll special unit sievert (Sv), which like physical dose,
(2010), Turner (2007). is energy deposited per mass (J/kg), but modified
by the appropriate weighting factors.
B.1 Radiation Dosimetry Quantities and Units
Operational dosimetry is used to track present
exposure to radiation. Operational quantities
The field of radiation dosimetry is customarily
include ambient dose equivalent, directional dose
broken into three practices. These practices are
equivalent and personal dose equivalent.
physical dosimetry, protection dosimetry, and
Ambient dose equivalent is the dose calculated at
operational dosimetry. Each practice uses
a point at a specified depth in the ICRU sphere
different dosimetric quantities and tools.
(consisting of a 30-cm diameter sphere of tissue
However, the practices are inter-related as shown
equivalent material) multiplied by a quality factor
in Figure B-1.
that depends on the radiation type (i.e. alpha,
beta, gamma and x rays, or neutrons) and is the
Physical dosimetry is the object of primary
primary operational quantity of interest here.
metrology. It derives from the national standards
Ambient dose equivalent assumes a uniform
for absorbed dose to water and for air kerma,
radiation field and is denoted by H*(d), where d is
which are established by the National Institute of
the depth in the sphere at which the dose is
Standards and Technology. Absorbed dose to
calculated (d = 0.7 mm is customary for
water is the energy deposited in water by
estimating shallow skin dose; d = 10 mm is
radiation divided by the mass of the water. The
customary to estimate deep dose). These
term kerma refers to the sum of the initial kinetic
quantities can be obtained either through
energy of all ionizing particles liberated (per unit
measurement or through calculation. As in the
mass) in a material. Air is the material used to
case of protection dosimetry, operational
determine the dosimetric standard for kerma. The
dosimetric quantities are given the special unit
standards are established through a combination
sievert.
of measurements and calculations (ICRU 90).
These standards are then disseminated to
secondary laboratories through transfer protocols
and, from these secondary laboratories, to the
measurement instruments of field workers
through calibrations. These measurement
devices are used in dosimetry in applications
involving the use of radiation in medicine and in
the irradiation of non-human objects. Absorbed
dose to water and air kerma are both expressed
in the unit gray (1 Gy = 1J/kg).
Protection dosimetry is used to establish

prospective risks and operational guidelines for
radiation facilities as well as for retrospective
analysis of risks due to irradiation. Protection
dosimetry is primarily done through calculation.
These calculations rely on physical dose
19
separately from the national laboratories, such as

the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) and Brookhaven National
Laboratory (BNL), or from radiation advisory
bodies such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) or the International Commission
on Radiation Units and Measures (ICRU).
Dosimetric data are those data that directly relate

the incident radiation field to the resulting dose or
kerma. They encapsulate the contributions of
Figure B.1. Relationship between the physical, secondary processes without having to explicitly
operational, and protection quantities. (Adapted treat them. As such, they present the opportunity
from ICRU Report 85a.) to greatly reduce computational effort in
evaluating radiation doses. These data also take
B.2 Calculating radiation doses two forms. One form, used in primary metrology,
does this for individual photons (mass-energy
As discussed above, calculations play a key and transfer, mass-energy absorption coefficients …).
complementary role to measurements in The other form (fluence-to-kerma, fluence-to-
radiation physics and protection. This has always dose coefficients) does this for realistic fields
been true, but as computers have become composed of photons and/or neutrons. The
cheaper and faster, the computer codes that are former data are available from NIST. The latter
used for radiation dosimetry have become are available from standards organizations such
increasingly capable. These factors have led to as American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
their increasing application in radiation dosimetry. or from advisory bodies (ICRU, International
The purpose of this section is to discuss the tools Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP)).
that are available for computational radiation
dosimetry. The main tools that are currently used The physical and dosimetric data discussed
in computational radiation dosimetry are physical above are used by computer codes to determine
reference data, dosimetry data and computer physical, radiation protection, and operational
codes. Physical reference data are the numerical dosimetric quantities. There are a number of
representation of the fundamental processes empirical and semi-analytic approaches that
when radiation interacts with matter. Dosimetry were traditionally used in such work. Monte Carlo
data are numerical coefficients that relate gross transport simulations, given detailed input on the
properties of incident radiation fields to dosimetric source and on the system configuration, can
quantities. Computer codes have sophistication provide essentially exact evaluations of
from simple approximations to full simulations of dosimetric quantities. In the past, the
the transport of radiation in matter. computational demands of Monte Carlo modeling
prevented the quantitative application of the
Physical reference data typically take one of two method in many circumstances, although
forms. The first form is the data representing the qualitative observations often become readily
interaction of a given photon, electron or neutron apparent after a much smaller effort. The
with an atom or nucleus. The basic quantity is the principal barriers to use of the method at present
interaction cross section. Total cross sections are obtaining the full details of sources and
determine the attenuation of an incident beam in configurations to be modeled and the effort it
matter. Differential cross sections determine the takes to take the details and transform them into
properties of secondary particles produced by the input for the codes. These problems can be
attenuation processes. The second form that overcome and Monte Carlo is increasingly the
physical reference data takes, typically for method of choice in radiation dosimetry
charged particle data, is the representation of problems. Codes can be obtained from a number
multiple interactions as single pseudo- of sources, both domestic and international,
interactions. Data in these forms may be obtained including Oak Ridge National Laboratory
20
(ORNL), European Council for Nuclear Research B.3.2 Geiger counters.

(CERN), and the National Research Council of
Canada (NRCC). The Geiger counter consists of a Geiger Muller
(GM) tube and a pulse counting circuit. The GM
B.3 Measuring radiation doses tube is similar to an ionization chamber except
that it is filled with a special gas and operates at
This section gives an overview of the device higher voltage. The electrodes are usually in the
types that are available for practical field form of a cylinder and a concentric thin wire.
measurements. The available device types Because of this geometry and the small thickness
employ different physical principles to measure of the wire, the electric field near the inner
dose or kerma. As a result, the devices are electrode is extremely high. When radiation
typically used in different applications. After interacts with the gas it ionizes the gas, producing
introducing the dosimeter types, in the next electron-ion pairs. The resulting free electrons
section, we discuss where and how they should are accelerated by the electric field and go on to
be used. produce other electron-ion pairs which in turn
produce more ionization. This avalanche effect
B.3.1 Ionization chambers. results in a fairly large electrical pulse, which can
easily be detected and counted by the circuitry.
The ionization chamber is a type of radiation Therefore, in intense fields, these types of
probe consisting of a volume of air (or other gas) instruments will saturate, providing an
between two electrodes. A voltage is applied to erroneously low reading.
the electrodes. When the chamber is irradiated,
electrically charged ions are created in the air This makes the Geiger counter extremely
volume of the chamber in the chamber walls and sensitive to radiation. However, the pulses
in the air (or another gas) inside the chamber. counted are a measure of number of “events”
These ions and electrons are collected on the rather than actual energy deposited. Unless the
oppositely charged electrode. Ideally, the number instrument is calibrated in a radiation field having
of ions created is proportional to the energy an energy spectrum identical to the field
deposited in the air volume. In order for this to be measured, it is difficult to estimate dose from a
true, the chamber walls must be thick enough to Geiger counter reading. Geiger counters are
exclude the collection of ions and electrons useful for locating a source of radiation and giving
created outside the chamber walls. a general idea of its strength.
Simultaneously, the collection of ions and
electrons within the chamber walls must be B.3.3 Scintillation detectors.
properly accounted for as well as the effects of
the attenuation and scatter of the primary beam Scintillation detectors consist of a scintillator
by the chamber walls. An electrometer is used to material, a photomultiplier tube (or solid-state
measure the charge or electrical current. light detector), and associated electronics. When
the scintillator is exposed to ionizing radiation, a
The amount of charge produced per unit mass of portion of the energy absorbed is immediately
air is related to air kerma by the calibration factor released in the form of visible or near visible light.
or coefficient of the chamber and electrometer The light is directed to the photomultiplier tube,
setup. The air kerma rate is similarly determined, which converts it to an amplified electrical signal.
using the calibration factor or coefficient by Like the GM tube, the scintillation detector can be
measurement of the electrical current (charge very sensitive. It has the advantage, however,
produced per unit time). If the air volume is not that the signal is proportional to the energy
sealed, the mass of air in the volume changes absorbed in the crystal. If the electrical circuit
with temperature and pressure. In this case, measures the current or charge produced (rather
appropriate gas law corrections should be made. than counting the number of electrical pulses
produced), the resulting measurement is an
indication of dose. Although this is a very good
way to measure the dose delivered to the
scintillator, it is not always indicative of the dose
21
that would be delivered to human tissue. Some selection of detectors for neutron dosimetry
scintillator materials, called tissue-equivalent, primarily to passive detectors.
mimic the radiation response of muscle tissue for
a certain energy range. B.3.5.2 Passive Neutron Detectors. Allyl
diglycol carbonate (commercially known as CR-
B.3.4 Passive dosimeters 39®) is a solid-state nuclear track detector that
can be used to measure doses from neutrons.
Thermoluminescent (TL) or optically stimulated CR-39® is a plastic material (commonly used for
luminescent (OSL) dosimeters are preferred as optical lenses) which is etched after exposure to
passive detectors for dose measurement due to reveal neutron tracks in the material. These
photons. They are capable of measuring both low tracks are counted and used to determine the
and high fluence rates, and low and high doses, neutron dose. A low dose results in too few tracks
in the beam and near the scanning systems, as for accurate counting. At high doses, the tracks
well as environmental doses at distances away become superimposed and make accurate
from the source. Special calibrations may be counting difficult. As long as the doses are below
required for the high-energy photons produced by ~250 mSv (for neutrons with energies between
accelerators and buildup caps may also be 40 keV and 40 MeV) accurate measurements are
required to establish electronic equilibrium. possible. Consequently, CR-39® could be used
Subtraction of doses from naturally occurring for in-beam neutron measurements. Neutron
background radiation is required for accurate doses can be measured with CR-39® both inside
dosimetry for low doses (i.e. comparable to the and outside the radiation control area. Sufficiently
natural background). Long exposure times (e.g., long exposure times are required for these latter
from several months to a year) may be required environmental measurements to ensure that the
for both TL and OSL dosimeters used for detector threshold is exceeded for accurate
environmental monitoring due to the anticipated measurements. The detection threshold for
low fluence rates. Subtraction of background neutron measurements with CR-39® is 0.2 mSv.
dose is particularly important when carrying out CR-39® is not affected by naturally-occurring
environmental measurements. environmental photon radiation or other low linear
energy transfer (LET) radiation, and is packaged
B.3.5 Neutron Detection within the typical dosimeter so that it is protected
from environmental radon or other sources of
B.3.5.1 Active Neutron Detectors. The neutron high-LET radiation.
dose equivalent rate meters employed for dose
measurements do not operate well in pulsed, B.4 Air kerma and Absorbed Dose
mixed fields near the primary photon beam. The measurements for compliance with
response is dominated by the photon flash to ANSI/HPS N43.16
such extremes that they respond to radiation
fields as pulse counters providing essentially no This section provides general guidance on the
neutron information. However, moderator type selection and use of instruments for measuring
neutron detectors, such as rem balls, perform physical and operational dosimetric quantities.
well in low intensity, out-of-beam, pulsed fields. The wide variations in intensity and beam energy
The moderation and slowing of the neutrons in that are encountered makes the practice of
metal or concrete shielding, as well as the dosimetry very different, for example, in-beam
moderator, will stretch out the time of the neutron measurements compared to measurements at
pulses reaching the neutron sensor and reduce the perimeters of the screening system. These
the maximum dose rate in the beam. There are a situations also vary substantially from those
few available neutron dose equivalent rate encountered in the laboratories where such
meters with the response based upon foil instruments are calibrated. Appropriate
activation. Such meters are not affected by the correction factors will be discussed.
photon flash. However, the sensitivity of such
devices is limited. These considerations limit the
22
B.4.1 Instrument selection For measurements in the scattered field, either an

air kerma measurement or an absorbed dose
To check compliance with the dose limits, an measurement may be used along with a
instrument is needed that is capable of making conversion factor to determine ambient dose
accurate measurements of air kerma or dose for equivalent or effective dose. Some instruments
the types of irradiation conditions encountered in may be calibrated directly in terms of ambient
security screening. These conditions vary widely dose equivalent. For traceability to the primary
depending on the system and the position relative standard at NIST, a calibration in terms of air
to the primary beam. The differences can be kerma or absorbed dose is preferred.
encapsulated in terms of beam energy and
intensity. Usually these factors are correlated. The verification of shielding also requires H*(10)
The highest energy radiation and the highest measurements and the above discussion
intensities typically occur in the primary beam. regarding the instrument calibration applies. For
The scattered field is lower in intensity and this purpose, a second instrument for localizing
energy. the “hot spots” is also useful. A count rate meter
employing a probe “wand” consisting of an array
Higher beam intensities adversely affect some of of GM tubes is a suitable localization instrument.
the devices listed above. One class of The instrument should indicate the responses of
instruments that may suffer at high intensities is the GM tubes separately so that localization of
the ionization chamber. This is mainly the case the highest exposure is possible. At least two
when excessive recombination occurs. The such instruments are commercially available for
degree of recombination can be assessed by surveying cabinet x-ray systems. After the “hot
several methods in order to determine if it can be spots” are found, follow-up measurements using
corrected. Typically, in an intense field, small the calibrated meter should be made at those
volume ionization chambers are used to mitigate locations.
this effect. Low beam intensities result in
insufficient ionization in small volume ionization The rest of this discussion pertains to accurate
chambers. So, a chamber that is appropriate in measurements of air kerma or absorbed dose to
the direct beam is not typically useful in the water. The most appropriate detector for such
scattered field. A large volume ionization measurements is an ionization chamber. The
chamber will produce a larger current at the instrument should have: (1) an integrating mode,
electrode but not necessarily a sufficient current. (2) high sensitivity, and (3) known energy
response. The integrating mode is necessary to
If one uses a pressurized chamber the current measure the total accumulated electrical charge
read usually increases to useful levels. Passive during the course of one or more complete scans.
dosimeters such as TLDs and OSLs can work in Through use of the calibration factor/coefficient,
both the primary beam and in the scattered field. this yields a measurement of the air kerma or
The downside of these dosimeters is that they absorbed dose at the point of measurement. An
take time to read, perhaps they even need to be instrument having only a rate mode (i.e.
sent to a laboratory to be read. This makes it measuring in Gy/s or R/s) may not be as useful
difficult to perform typical field dosimetry for measurements involving a scanning beam. To
functions. Radiation protection instrumentation is obtain an accurate reading, the entire volume of
typically calibrated by quasi monoenergetic the ionization chamber should receive the same
radioisotopic sources (Cs-137, Co-60). While amount of radiation exposure during the course
these sources have been used in cargo of the scan.
inspection systems, they are swiftly being
replaced by accelerator-based sources. The Instrument sensitivity is extremely important.
accelerator beams differ from the radioisotopic Outside of the beam, the level of air kerma to be
sources both in energy, they are usually higher in measured is often only slightly higher than
energy, and in the pulsed time structure of the background radiation. The electrical signal
beam which increases the instantaneous produced is so small that it requires a very stable
intensity. electrical circuit with a minimum of electronic
noise to be measured accurately. The ionization
chamber should be large enough so that enough
23
electrical charge may be produced for the approximately the charge produced in 1500 cm3
electrometer to make an accurate measurement. of air by 10 µR).
Even with a large volume ion chamber, the
electrometer itself should be very sensitive. B.4.2 Calibration
Automatic background subtraction is not
recommended. If the instrument used performs The instrument and ion chamber should be
automatic background subtraction, the process appropriately calibrated under conditions likely to
should be understood and care should be taken be encountered during use. The calibration
that all of the "real" signal is measured, taking into should be traceable to one of the NIST standard
account the time-dependent ionization rate and beams.
the sequence and duration of scanning of the
ionization chamber volume. At the present time, the highest-energy standard
calibration beam at the NIST is a Co-60 source.
The energy dependence (uniformity of response) Some inspection systems use Co-60 or, perhaps,
is also very important. The radiation fields Cs-137 sources and calibrations performed using
associated with these systems cover a large a Co-60 or Cs-137 source are directly applicable
range of energies. For measurements in the to such systems. Increasingly, high-energy
beam, a small-volume ionization chamber is accelerators are being used in inspection
recommended. If the chamber and associated systems. Once the accelerating potential
electrometer are calibrated for air kerma or for exceeds 2 MV, it is necessary to take into account
absorbed dose to water at lower energy, the differences between the calibration source
additional material should surround the chamber and the fielded system. This has been done
to increase the response to approximately its routinely for years by medical physicists. Among
maximum. This buildup material, typically a cap, the protocols developed for this purpose are
is thus used to establish electronic equilibrium those specified in the reports of Task Groups 21
within the active volume of the chamber. The and 51 of the American Association of Physicists
buildup material must be chosen so that it is fully in Medicine (AAPM).
illuminated by the beam or corrections for partial
illumination must be made.
For radiation fields composed in large part of

photons of relatively low energies (e.g., scattered
radiation), the chamber wall preferentially
attenuates the lower energy photons, so a thin
wall is preferable. However, for a large chamber,
because of structural integrity the wall cannot be
made very thin. Some ionization chambers are
pressurized in order to maximize the air mass and
therefore the sensitivity. This requires a thicker
wall to hold the pressure, and the pressurized air
itself also attenuates the radiation. All these
factors point to the fact that there will be energy
dependence, particularly when measuring x-ray
systems operating at low energy. The effects may
be minimized by choosing the best ion chamber-
electrometer system for the energy range in
question and by proper calibration. A large (at
least 1500 cm3), non-pressurized ion chamber is
recommended. A good quality electrometer with
at least a 0.1 picocoulomb (pC) resolution,
capable of measuring a pulse of charge of 5 pC
magnitude and 10 ms duration, within ± 10%
accuracy is also recommended (this is
24
Annex C (Normative) record the air kerma rate. The radiation

Procedures for Measurements Made beam shall remain on long enough for the
ionization chamber to reach a steady
by Manufacturers state response. This time will vary
depending on the specific instrument
Section 6.5 of this standard requires used, but is typically a minimum of 10-30
manufacturers to provide specific information seconds.
about the system to the end user. This
information includes five data elements (items 6.5 4. Alternatively, a measurement may be
g-k) that require measurement of radiation levels. made in integrate or accumulate mode
This annex establishes the procedures to be for a set beam-on time. The rate can then
followed by manufacturers in making these be determined by dividing the total air
measurements. kerma by the duration of the
measurement.
C.1 Air Kerma at a Reference Location
in the Primary Beam 5. For instruments calibrated in exposure
units (i.e., roentgen), an appropriate
A measurement of air kerma rate in the primary conversion factor shall be applied to
beam at a specified distance is the most convert the exposure in roentgen to air
fundamental measurement that can be made on kerma in gray.
a security screening system. It can also be used
by the qualified expert to estimate radiation doses 6. If the entire chamber volume was not
along the path of the primary beam. within the radiation beam a volume
correction factor shall be applied. The
C.1.1 Equipment Required volume correction factor is the ratio of the
chamber’s sensitive volume to the
An ionization chamber. Ideally, the ionization volume actually exposed.
chamber should be small enough to be
completely covered by the radiation beam. If the 7. If the system has multiple operational
chamber is larger than the beam width, a volume modes with different technique factors
correction factor shall be applied to the measured (tube potential, tube current, or pulse
value. For high energy beams, appropriate build rate), this measurement shall be made at
up material shall be used. each selectable mode.
C.1.2 Procedure C.2 Isodose Contours

1. Position the ionization chamber at the The isodose contours at 0.5 μSv (50 μrem) per
reference distance (usually 1 m) from the hour (IDC(0.5)) and 20 μSv (2 mrem) per hour
source (sealed radioactive source or x- (IDC(20)) provide a way to visualize the area
ray focal spot). around a system in which a radiation hazard may
exist. For a system that moves during the
2. Set and record the appropriate source screening process, the isodose contours do not
information. For a sealed radioactive provide a full picture of the hazard (see the
source, this is the radionuclide (e.g, Co- discussion in Annex A).
60) and its activity (MBq) at the time of
the measurement. For an electrically C.2.1 Equipment Required
powered RGD, this is the tube potential
(kV or MV) and tube current (mA), and A suitable radiation survey meter.
pulse repetition rate (Hz) if the source is A scatter object consisting of three stackable 5
pulsed. gallon plastic containers filled with water.
3. With both the beam and detector

stationary, initiate radiation emission and
25
C.2.2 Procedure locations at which the ambient dose

equivalent rate is 0.5 μSv (50 μrem) per
1. Position the screening system on a level hour and 20 μSv (2 mrem) per hour.
surface with the radiation beam directed Make these measurements starting from
toward an unoccupied area or an each of the four sides of the grid.
appropriate barrier.
7. Determine the x and y coordinates of the
2. Mark a rectangular grid on the surface at marked locations on the grid to create a
1 m intervals with the origin directly below map of the isodose contours at 0.5 μSv
a convenient reference point on the (50 μrem) per hour and 20 μSv (2 mrem)
screening system (e.g., the location per hour.
where the radiation beam exits the outer
surface of the screening system) and one For the measurements in this section for the
axis of the grid centered along the beam IDC(0.5) and IDC(20), volume correction factors
path. need not be applied. For instruments calibrated in
exposure units (i.e., roentgen), the radiation
3. Set and record the appropriate source protection assumption that an exposure of 1 R is
information. For a sealed radioactive equivalent to an ambient dose equivalent of 0.01
source RGD, this is the radionuclide and Sv (1 rem) may be used. For systems with pulsed
its activity (MBq) at the time of the beams, the dose rate may be averaged over a
measurement. For an electrically period of 1 minute.
powered RGD, this is the tube potential
(kV or MV) and tube current, and pulse C.3 Dose Per Scan to the Driver of the
repetition rate (Hz), if it is a pulsed Vehicle Being Screened
source.
The driver of a vehicle is typically considered a
4. Initiate radiation emission. With the member of the general public and the dose
radiation detector 1 m above ground limitation requirements of section 5.2 apply. The
level, begin at the furthest grid point from measured dose per scan can be used to estimate
the origin along the beam path and move the annual dose to a driver who frequently passes
slowly toward the source. Mark the through the screening checkpoint to ensure
locations at which the dose equivalent compliance with this limit. The exception is a
rate is 0.5 μSv (50 μrem) per hour and 20 driver who is an employee of the organization
μSv (2 mrem) per hour. (The point at operating the security screening system and
which to start can be estimated from the whose job is to drive vehicles though the
in-beam measurement described in checkpoint. In this case, the dose limits for the
section C-1 using the inverse square system operating crew in section 5.1 may be
approximation.) applied.
5. Terminate radiation emission and place The measurement procedure below is only
the three water containers in a vertical applicable in situations where the entire vehicle is
stack at the center of a flatbed trailer (or not screened, but the driver is still in the vehicle.
similar support structure) in the path of If the area of the vehicle containing the driver (or
the primary beam at the distance from any passengers) is exposed to the primary beam,
the beam exit surface where the surface the provisions of ANSI N43.17 shall be followed
of the vehicle being screened would be in determining the potential dose to these
located during normal operation. individuals.
6. Initiate radiation emission. With the C.3.1 Equipment Required

radiation detector 1 m above the surface
and beginning at the edge of the grid, An ionization chamber capable of measuring an
move along each grid line perpendicular accumulated ambient dose equivalent on the
to the radiation beam and mark the order of 10 nSv (1 μrem) or less.
26
A scatter object consisting of three stackable 5 equivalent on the order of 10 μSv (1 mrem) or
gallon plastic containers filled with water. less.
C.3.2 Procedure A scatter object consisting of three stackable 5

gallon plastic containers filled with water.
1. Position the screening system on a level
surface. C.4.2 Procedure
2. Position a target vehicle for screening 1. Position the screening system on a level
and place the three water containers in a surface.
vertical stack in the cargo area of the
vehicle directly behind the driver’s 2. Position a target vehicle for screening
position in the cab as close to the driver and place the three water containers in a
as possible. vertical stack in the cargo area about 30
cm from the side closest to the radiation
3. Place the ionization chamber at the source. Ensure the water containers are
location of the driver’s head (this is sufficiently secured to remain in place
usually the least shielded location on the during the screening process.
driver’s body). Place the ionization
chamber in an integrate or accumulate 3. Position the ionization chamber between
mode. the water containers and the side of the
cargo container nearest the radiation
4. Perform 10 screenings of the vehicle source and as close to the water
without resetting the ionization chamber. containers as possible. Place the
Record the total ambient dose equivalent ionization chamber in an integrate or
for the ten screenings. accumulate mode.
5. Divide the total ambient dose equivalent 4. Perform 10 screenings of the vehicle
by 10 to obtain the average dose per without resetting the ionization chamber.
screening to the driver. Record the total ambient dose equivalent
for the ten screenings.
For instruments calibrated in exposure units (i.e.,
roentgen), the radiation protection assumption 5. Divide the total ambient dose equivalent
that an exposure of 1 R is equivalent to an by 10 to obtain the average dose per
ambient dose equivalent of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) may screening to the driver.
be used.
For instruments calibrated in exposure units (i.e.,
C.4. Dose to an Inadvertently Scanned roentgen), the radiation protection assumption
Individual that an exposure of 1 R is equivalent to an
ambient dose equivalent of 0.01 Sv (1 rem) may
This measurement is used to demonstrate be used.
compliance with the dose limit for an inadvertently
scanned individual specified in section 5.3. It is C.5. Boundary of the Radiation Control Area
also an estimate of the dose to cargo, which may
be of interest in cases where radiation sensitive Manufacturer’s shall also determine the
cargo needs to be screened. dimensions of the radiation control area using the
procedures in Annex D. This determination shall
C.4.1 Equipment Required be made using the parameters that maximize the
size of the operational area (e.g., the combination
An ionization chamber or dosimeter capable of of number of screenings per hour and scan speed
measuring an accumulated ambient dose that results in the largest total beam-on time per
hour).
27
Annex D (Normative) D.3 Example Calculations

Establishing the Boundary of the
Radiation Control Area Scenario 1
Consider a screening system that is used by a
given operating crew for a standard 2000-hour
D.1 The Radiation Control Area work year (8 hours per day, 5 days per week, 50
weeks per year) to screen cargo containers. The
The primary purpose of the radiation control area,
user organization has decided that the dose to
as defined in this standard, is to ensure employees at their facility will not exceed 1 mSv
individuals outside this area do not receive per year (a dose constraint equal to the dose limit
radiation doses in excess of the limits specified in for the general public). Based on the nature of the
section 5.2 of this standard. However, due to the
screening operation and screening system
design of cargo and vehicle systems, the area design, it has been determined that a maximum
actually marked and controlled may be larger of 40 vehicles can be screened in one hour (i.e.,
than what would be needed for radiation positioning a vehicle for screening, conducting
protection alone. Other factors, such as the flow
the screen, interpreting the results, and removing
of vehicular traffic through the system, vehicle that vehicle will take approximately 1.5 minutes).
size, and vehicle motion may require more space
The only individuals near the system during
and limit where barriers can be placed to control
normal operation are the operating crew and
entry into the area.
designated facility employees who bring the
containers to the screening location.
Cargo and vehicle screening systems typically
have a very narrow radiation beam and may have
As a conservative approach, the system is
a detector array and associated support
assumed to be in continuous use at the maximum
structures that provide some reduction in
possible screening rate for the entire 2000-hour
radiation intensity. Thus the location of the work year. Because the system is assumed to be
radiation hazard is primarily along the path of the in continuous use, a dose constraint of 0.5 μSv h-
primary beam between the beam exit surface and 1
(1 mSv per 2000 h) can be applied. Dividing this
the detector array, if one is present. The radiation
dose constraint by the maximum number of
hazard may extend a small distance to either side
vehicles that can be screened in any hour gives
of the beam due to scatter radiation from the
an allowable dose of 0.0125 μSv h-1 (0.5 uSv h-1
object being screened and other materials in the / 40 screenings).
path of the beam. In addition, the detector array
may not intercept the entire primary beam and,
Scenario 2
although it provides some degree of radiation Consider a screening system that is used at an
attenuation, this is not its primary function.
entrance to a secure facility where the operating
Therefore, some degree of radiation hazard may
crew works 12-hour shifts, 6 days per week for
extend beyond the detector array. See Appendix full year. At approximately 1-year intervals, the
A for a more detailed description of the types and
operating crew rotates out and a new crew is
usage of cargo and vehicle screening systems.
brought in. Because each operating crew works
for only a 1-year period and the operation has
D.2 Methodology national security implications, the organization
has determined that a dose constraint of
The first step in determining the required radiation 5 mSv y-1 (one-tenth of the occupational dose
control area dimensions is to determine the limit) will be used. Given the system design and
maximum radiation dose per screening that can the nature of the screening operation, a maximum
be permitted at the area boundary. Once this of 30 screening can be performed in one hour (2
maximum value has been determined, the survey minutes per vehicle). However, historical data
methods of section D-4 can be used by the indicates that an average of 100 vehicles per day
qualified expert to establish the appropriate arrive at the checkpoint for screening. Other than
radiation control area. the system operators, the only other individuals
present near the radiation control area boundary
The maximum radiation dose per screening are the drivers of the vehicles who are instructed
depends on the applicable dose limit/constraint, to remain in a designated area just outside the
the nature of the screening system, and how the radiation control area while their vehicle is
system is used in a given screening operation. screened. Historical information also indicates
Acceptable methods and issues that need to be that two delivery truck drivers make regular visits
considered are illustrated below.
28
to the facility and make, on average, two visits to ground and set it to an integrated
the facility per day. measurement mode.
In this scenario, both the dose to the system 3. Perform 1-10 screenings of a typical
operators and the vehicle drivers needs to be vehicle or cargo container. (The number
considered and different dose limits are applied of screenings needed will depend on the
to each. For the system operators, the dose per sensitivity of the instrument and the
screening at boundary cannot exceed maximum dose per screen determined
using the methodology above. The
5mSv/y minimum measurable dose divided by
6 d⁄wk × 50 wk⁄y × 100 screenings⁄d the number of screenings must be less
= 1.7 × 10#$ mSv (0.17 µSv) than the maximum allowable dose per
screening.)
A more conservative value would be obtained if
constant operation at the maximum number 4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 at several locations
screenings per hour was assumed. around the boundary of the radiation
control area.
For the vehicle drivers, the maximally exposed
driver is expected to be present for only two 5. Divide each of the measured values by
screenings per day. In this case, the dose limit for the number screenings performed for
the general public is used and the maximum dose each measurement to get the average
per screening is dose per screening. This value must be
less than the maximum allowable dose
1 mSv⁄y per screening at each location.
6 d⁄wk × 50 wk⁄y × 2 screenings⁄d
= 1.7 × 10#% mSv (1.7 µSv) 6. If any measured values exceed the
maximum allowable dose per screening,
Because the maximum dose per screening for the increase the dimensions of the radiation
system operators is the lowest, that value should control zone and repeat the
be used as the basis for establishing the radiation measurements.
control area boundary.
Alternatively, measurements can be made at
D.4 Radiation Control Area Survey designated grid locations around the system and
the appropriate dimensions determined by the
D.4.1 Equipment Required grid points at which the average dose per
screening is acceptable.
An ionization chamber or other instrument
calibrated for dose measurements at the
appropriate photon energy. Ideally, the
instrument should be capable of measuring an
integrated dose of 0.01 μSv (1 μrem) or less.
D.4.2 Procedure
1. Make an initial estimate of an appropriate

radiation control area size and set up the
system for screening operations. This
initial estimate may be based on
calculations, simulations, experience, or
a combination thereof and should
consider both radiation and non-radiation
factors. The system, as studied, needs to
match actual use conditions.
2. Position the survey instrument at a point

along the boundary of the radiation
control area at a height of 1 m above the
29

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American National Standard

Radiation Safety for Cargo and Vehicle Security

Approved: January 14, 2021

Health Physics Society

Copyright © 2021 by the Health Physics Society.

Printed in the United States of America

Craig R. Jones, Co-Chair

Richard T. Whitman, Co-Chair

Chairperson Craig R. Jones

Radiation Safety for Cargo and

technology, the economics of improvements in Effective dose: A summation of the equivalent

c) Date of sale, award, or lease.

e) A record of the manufacturer’s The installation process consists of the following

6.7 Records to be Obtained and Retained by d) Establishing quality control parameters

4) Recommendations for personnel

b) Establishing the radiation control area 8. Operating Requirements

d) Establishing QA Parameters Systems must be installed and used in a way that

g) aiding the administration of the ALARA i) Supervised hands-on training.

8.4 Personnel Training

necessary analysis shall be documented in the

c) At setup and when misalignment is

alignment of the primary beam and 3) System parameters (scan speed,

f) Circumstances of the exposure, a) Each system operator’s training records

c) Upgrades, modifications, maintenance, Physiological Data for Use in Radiological

d) QA Log ICRP. 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the

International Commission on Radiological

This annex provides an overview of the key

A.1.1 Transmission Imaging

In transmission imaging, the radiation is usually

van) or it can be moved along short rails

Fig. A4. An example of a backscatter image.

A.1.3 Combined Imaging

Some screening systems are capable of

A.2 Operational Modes In a stationary source mode, the security

If a system is operated in a moving source mode,

In backscatter imaging, a portion of the radiation

Annex B (Informative) estimates. These quantities are then

Protection dosimetry is used to establish

separately from the national laboratories, such as

Dosimetric data are those data that directly relate

(ORNL), European Council for Nuclear Research B.3.2 Geiger counters.

B.4.1 Instrument selection For measurements in the scattered field, either an

For radiation fields composed in large part of

Annex C (Normative) record the air kerma rate. The radiation

C.1.2 Procedure C.2 Isodose Contours

3. With both the beam and detector

C.2.2 Procedure locations at which the ambient dose

6. Initiate radiation emission. With the C.3.1 Equipment Required

C.3.2 Procedure A scatter object consisting of three stackable 5

Annex D (Normative) D.3 Example Calculations

1. Make an initial estimate of an appropriate

2. Position the survey instrument at a point

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