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Lifting the Fog of War

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Lifting the Fog of War

New Thinking about War and War Prevention

Edited by
John Norton Moore
Robert F. Turner
Michael Mott
Nathaniel W. Freeman
Margaret Kelly

Carolina Academic Press

Durham, North Carolina
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Copyright © 2018
Carolina Academic Press, LLC
All Rights Reserved

ISBN 978-1-5310-0886-4
eISBN 978-1-53100-887-1
LCCN 2018943758

Carolina Academic Press, LLC

700 Kent Street
Durham, North Carolina 27701
Telephone (919) 489-7486
Fax (919) 493-5668
www.cap-press.com

Printed in the United States of America

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For all the crosses on all the hills.

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Contents

Foreword, Richard H. Solomon ix

Preface, John Norton Moore xi
About the Editors xxiii
About the Authors xxvii
Acknowledgments xxxv

Image 1 · Man Makes War and Peace

Investigating the Human Face of War

1. Psychological Factors of the War Decision, Michael Mott 3

2. Reframing Human Irrationality in War and Peace, Kevin S. Donohue 65

3. Inside the Minds of Our Foreign Policy Brain Trust: Application of

Political Psychology to the National Security Council, Kenneth J. Duvall 83

Image 2 · States Create War and Peace

Investigating the Democratic Peace Theory

4. Testing Empirically the Democratic Peace: The Incomplete Story . . . and

the Rest of It, Davis Brown 113

5. Democracy and the War on Terror, Roy E. Brownell II 143

6. A Pattern in the Decision-Making Process of Autocracies Going to War,

Andrew Kagen 179

Image 3 · Global Power Dynamics Create War and Peace

Investigating Deterrence as an Instrument of Peace

7. Democracies and Deterrence, Chad Farrell 203

8. Objectivizing Deterrence, Geoffrey D. Fasel 253

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viii CONTENTS

9. Measuring Deterrence: A Comprehensive Methodology for Rating

Deterrence Levels, Anthony Stenger 305

10. Shark Attacks and the ICC: Investigating and Reframing the Deterrent
Capacity of the International Criminal Court, Margaret Kelly 333

Case Studies · Leaders, States, and Global

Power Politics Creating War and Peace

11. Deterrence and Divine Intervention: The Utah Expedition

of 1857–1858, Christopher Bowman Rich, Jr. 371

12. The South Ossetia War and Image One: Incentives of the Decision-
Making Elites, Ellen Valentine 427

13. Civil Rights and Non-Violence in Northern Ireland, Calleigh McRaith 465

14. Ukraine Conflict: An Incentive Theory Analysis, Luke A. Gilhooly 507

15. Enhancing Sanctions through Incentive Theory, Jessica Cavanagh 541

16. Incentive Theory: Lessons of the Iraq War, Wendy Reid 575

17. Warriors, Rebels and Jihadis: Exploiting Diversity in Islamic Militancy,

Christopher Swift 617

18. The Incentive Theory Explanation for the 9/11 Attacks,

James P. Whittaker 647

19. Operationalizing the Incentive Theory: Modernizing U.S. Bureaucracy

to Effectively Predict and Prevent War, Patrick Walsh 677

Index 703
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Foreword

Richard H. Solomon*

The collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 ended a major period in international
affairs. Fortunately for the human race the Cold War ended without a nuclear war
between the USSR and the United States. The “realist” logic of military deterrence
succeeded in containing the life-or-death rivalry between the worlds of Communism
and Democracy.
In the quarter century that followed, the dynamics of international relations
changed dramatically. While for a decade the United States was the preeminent power
in global affairs, a series of developments emerged that today present the US, and
the world, with new challenges to their security and economic well-being. Some of
these challenges are all too familiar, especially the resurgence of Russia and China as
assertive geo-political powers, indicating that the Cold War era concept of deterrence
by military means continues to be relevant for security management. But new threats
have emerged, for which the US has neither experience nor conception. The terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted that deterring or containing the threat of
politically motivated suicidal violence is a security challenge for which Cold War-era
notions of deterrence have limited relevance. Also challenging is deterring the de-
structive and elusive effects of “cyber warfare” where the perpetrator is not clearly
known nor subject to deterrent threats. High on today’s national security agenda are
non-deterrable threats of non-human agency: destructive climate changes and public
health pandemics.
Understanding the dynamics of this new era is critical to national security, man-
aging international conflict and preventing war. Indeed, it is increasingly misleading
to speak of “war,” which for the public evokes 20th century images of mass militaries

* Richard H. Solomon is currently a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation. He served as

president of the United States Institute of Peace from 1993 to 2012. One effort to assess the many
challenges to security and well-being in today’s world is the RAND Corporation project “Strategic
Rethink,” summarized in the sixth volume in the project series, Strategic Choices for a Turbulent World:
In Pursuit of Security and Opportunity,” by Andrew R. Hoehn, Richard H. Solomon, Sonni Efron,
Frank Camm, Anita Chandra, Debra Knopman, Burgess Laird, Robert J. Lempert, Howard Shatz,
and Casimir Yost, RAND Corporation, 2017.

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x FOREWORD

marching across international boundaries. A more relevant contemporary conception

is “conflict prevention and management” — the Congressionally mandated work of
the United States Institute of Peace.
Professor John Norton Moore and his students are leading a much-needed effort
to rethink the Cold War-era “realist” conception of deterrence as a critical approach
to conflict prevention. His “incentive theory” includes “the full spectrum of foreign
policy interests that influence a leadership’s decisions about war or peace — an effort
most appropriate in a time of increasingly complex multifactorial challenges to national
security. His students’ reassessment of the conception of deterrence contained in this
volume provides critical perspective for rethinking the conception that helped manage
the great interstate rivalries of the Cold War era.
Managing conflict requires more than just conceptual understanding. It also re-
quires restructuring the bureaucratic mechanisms by which leaders assess contem-
porary threats and develop policies that incorporate the full range of national
capabilities for preventing or deterring conflict, or managing the consequences of
violence. And if Cold War-era concepts need to be rethought, so to do the policy
management procedures inherited from that era. Thus Professor Moore appropriately
calls for the creation of a new office in the senior levels of government which through
theory-informed research and analysis could inform senior policy makers of “the
real-world risks of war.”
Grounding the conceptual and organizational insights in this volume is the political
challenge of building public support for unfamiliar approaches to international re-
lations and conflict management. Let us hope that among Professor Moore’s students
is a new generation of leaders in security planning and management who understand
the requirements of conflict prevention and management appropriate to the turbulent
world of the 21st century. We need talent to guide the country through the enduring
fog of international conflict.
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Preface

John Norton Moore

It was my privilege to be the first Chairman of the Board of the United States In-
stitute of Peace (USIP), and to guide the new Institute from its establishment in 1986
through its first forty-nine meetings of the Board of Directors. During that period
the Institute began a major effort to understand the origins of war and modalities
for enhancing peace. Indeed, its work led the World in serious inquiry and scholarship
about the origins of war. Based on its work in understanding that democracies rarely
wage major war against other democracies, which has since become known as “the
democratic peace,” USIP further initiated the movement for “rule of law” in gover-
nance; a movement which literally swept the World in the early 1990s but has since
been challenged by totalitarian pushback.
Subsequently, on returning to scholarly life at the University of Virginia Law School,
understanding war and war prevention has been my principal research interest. In
pursuing that interest I have taught seminars on “War and Peace” both at the University
of Virginia and at Georgetown University; seminars which have functioned as working
research seminars exploring the origins of war and modalities for war prevention.
The papers in this volume are some of the remarkable student papers written in those
research seminars.
For many years the principal theoretical tools in understanding war have been
competing theories of international relations. “Idealism,” one of the two major tra-
ditional theories, focuses on collective security, third party dispute settlement and
cooperative efforts at war avoidance. It is the principal approach of international
lawyers and many American statesmen, including Woodrow Wilson. “Realism” and
“neo-realism,” a second traditional and for many years more dominant theory, focuses
on state interests in an “anarchic” international system; that is, a system lacking cen-
tralized security or enforcement and thus subject to an inevitable “security dilemma.”
Unlike “idealism” this approach tends to focus on state power and views international
law as principally significant only in “low politics” rather than the “high politics” of
war and peace. Henry Kissinger was a classic statesman in this tradition, pursuing
balance of power as a central concern for national security. More recently, two newer
theories, “institutionalism” (sometimes called “liberal institutionalism” or “regime

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xii PREFACE

theory”), and “constructivism,” have emerged as reactions to principal shortcomings

of “neo-realism.” Thus, “institutionalism” takes aim at the “realist” view that inter-
national law and international institutions play little role in international life and
convincingly shows that states frequently pursue their interests through international
norms and institutions, even in matters of “high politics.” “Constructivism” takes
aim at the “realist” view that the international system is an “anarchic” given and shows
that, to some extent at least, the international system is “what states make of it.” That
is, “constructivists” show that the international system itself is in significant part
“constructed” by state actions and interests.
In understanding the strengths and shortcomings of these principal theories of
international relations it is useful to review a helpful heuristic device widely used in
international relations and originating in a seminal monograph on war and peace;
a monograph written by Kenneth N. Waltz entitled Man, the State and War (1954).
Professor Waltz, compiling widely held views on the origins of war from historical
sources, showed that some believed war was a product of individual leaders, some
believed war was a product of form of political system (that is; state “governance”),
and some believed war was a product of the international system. This matrix has
become known in international relations jargon as “image one”; the individual, “image
two”; the state, and “image three”; the international system. In these terms “realism”
and “neo-realism” have largely focused on image three, the international system, as
the principal mechanism at work in generating war; and particularly the “anarchic”
nature of that system creating in turn “a security dilemma” for all states. “Realists”
have tended to ignore or downplay images one and two. Indeed, at least one “offensive
realist” has even espoused a position denying significance for both individual leaders
and form of government even in the face of the powerful statistical evidence of “the
democratic peace.”
“Institutionalists” and “Constructivists,” correct in their analysis of central short-
comings of “realism,” have nevertheless still primarily focused on image three, as has
“realism,” perhaps because in their criticism of “realism” they principally began with
a “realist” framework. In recent years, however, a variety of “idealism” I call “neo-ide-
alism” has also begun to focus on image two; form of government. Indeed, as reflected
in the work of Professor Bruce Russett in his major book funded by USIP, Grasping
the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold-War World (1993), this focus on image
two has generated strong consensus around the importance of the “democratic peace.”
None of the traditional or newer theories of international relations, as discussed
above, have focused significant attention on image one. And, with some exceptions,
the principal empirical, as opposed to theoretical, analyses of the causes of war, have
been primarily within the newer “neo-idealism,” “democratic peace,” strain of the
major theories, though “institutionalists” and “constructivists” have also embraced
empirical work. Indeed, increasingly, grand theories have been losing ground to less
theoretical empirical work focused on smaller aspects of the overall problem of war.
“Realism” which until recently has dominated the field in international relations
departments has, I believe, led research astray despite its insights. That is, realists
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PREFACE xiii

are surely correct that states matter, power matters and incentives from the interna-
tional system matter. But they are wrong to the extent that they ignore incentives
from images one and two, too cavalierly dismiss international law and institutions,
fail to understand the extent to which the international system is shaped by state be-
havior, fail to offer much focus on non-state-actors such as ISIL, and fail to offer
much of interest in dealing with foreign policy concerns such as human rights, eco-
nomic development and environmental protection. To offer no useful explanation
for the horrific genocides in Cambodia or Rwanda is to lose relevance over a central
foreign policy concern. Indeed, the work of Professor Rummel in his seminal work
on Death by Government showing that “democide” (a term broader than “genocide”
in including killing of political opponents as well as racial and religious killing) has
killed more in the Twentieth Century than all wars combined drives this point home.
Nor, in my judgment, does “realism” offer much of real-world utility in predicting
or understanding the causes of individual wars. Of course the international system,
lacking a central “sheriff,” is “anarchic,” and that characteristic, in turn, is centrally
relevant for “war” writ large; that is; an aggregate of wars. But it tells you little of
when and why individual wars will occur. It is about as useful in studying the causes
of plane crashes as saying that crashes occur because of the law of gravity. While
true, such an observation gives us little useful information about the causes of indi-
vidual plane crashes. For planes fly frequently and only crash infrequently; always
with the ever-present reality of the law of gravity. Similarly, sometimes nations are
at war and sometimes not, despite the ever present reality of an “anarchic” interna-
tional system. If we are to understand war at a more useful level we need a better
theoretical framework than “realism.1
“Idealists” and the newer “neo-idealists,” for their part, are surely correct in un-
derstanding that effective collective security can make a difference, that international
law and international institutions play a role, and in their optimism that we can
reduce the risk of war. They are also importantly adding value in their focus on image
two and the “democratic peace.” They too, however, tend to neglect image one, offer
no theoretical basis for aggregating all the empirically discovered correlates with war,
and exaggerate the potential of third party dispute settlement as the answer to war.
Major war (that is with aggregate casualties of 1,000 or above) are not comparable
to disputes about contracts to deliver grain but are more akin to the gunman writ
large. When confronted with a street thug brandishing a 357 magnum and demanding

1. Realists seem to understand that “structural a-anarchy” alone cannot provide much guidance
as to when and where wars may occur, as it is a constant in the system. But they then offer only
another structural factor (i.e. an image 3 factor) as to whether the international system is “bipolar,”
“unbalanced bipolar,” “multipolar,” “unbalanced multipolar,” or controlled by a preponderant “hege-
mon.” Further, this system feature, like “structural a-anarchy” itself, is also a high-level abstraction
providing little guidance as to when or where a war will break out. And to add to the uncertainty as
to the effect on war of this image 3 factor, different realist scholars seem to reach differing conclusions
as to which of these systems is the more peaceful. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics 334–36 (2001).
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xiv PREFACE

“your wallet or your life” it is not likely to help to suggest that you both go to court
to determine how much of your wallet or your life the thug should get.
“Institutionalism” and “constructivism,” in turn, are correct in their critique of
“realism” as too broadly dismissing international law and institutions and as failing
to understand the more fluid nature of the international system as opposed to a fixed
DNA of an “anarchic” international system. Though both newer theories are correct,
and importantly so, in their critique of realism, neither offers a broader theory for
understanding war. Elsewhere I have described these newer theoretical approaches
in international relations as “screams against realism.”
Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings of traditional and newer theories, we do
need theory; theory which will provide an overall framework to link the many micro
pieces of the war puzzle. For these micro pieces, if unlinked, also offer little guidance
as to the causes of individual wars. Social reality, including the causes of individual
wars, is complex and usually multi-factoral. Theory, then, needs to be able to address
that complexity and aggregate all the relevant inputs. Thus, a more useful approach
will centrally mine the empirical correlations with war which are increasingly emerging
from micro research while providing a theoretical framework enabling their aggre-
gation. Ultimately, good theory should enable us to better understand the causes of
war; thus enabling both better prediction and, hopefully, modes of intervention to
lessen the occurrence of war.
With this need for better theory in mind, my work at the United States Institute of
Peace and subsequently, has led me to develop a newer approach to understanding
war. This approach called “incentive theory” also turns out to be a more useful approach
across the full spectrum of foreign policy interests; not only in understanding war, but
also in understanding economic development, human rights, environmental protection,
refugee flows, avoidance of terrorism, and other important foreign policy issues.
The starting point for “incentive theory” is simple. Major wars overwhelmingly
are not accidents or regular inevitable events like the movement of planets; rather
they are deliberately initiated by decision elites in pursuit of a goal. As such, the
central focus of “incentive theory” is the decision for or against war by the decision
elites empowered to make such decisions. In turn, that point of decision provides a
central point for aggregating the myriad of factors from all three images affecting the
decision; the belief system and psychology of the decision elite (image one), the belief
system and psychology of principal advisers or groups affecting the decision (image
one-and-a-half) (a term I have coined to get sharper focus on the importance of such
key advisers or groups in the decision for war), the form of government (totalitarian,
authoritarian, electoral democracy or liberal democracy) (image two), and the totality
of incentives from interactions with other nations and institutions (image three).
Individual leaders and their ideology, experiences, and psychology matter. Offensive
realism is wrong in failing to differentiate between Adolf Hitler and Mahatma Gandhi.
In this regard, likely extreme belief systems justifying use of force for extension of
values, certain personal experiences, national historical and cultural perspectives,
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PREFACE xv

individual personality type, and, as well, from prospect theory in behavioral eco-
nomics, whether the setting is one of loss avoidance (triggering willingness to take
higher risk) or gain (triggering greater caution) are all relevant inputs for image one.2
Similarly, the principal advisers around a decision elite, or groups engaged on the
issue, also matter. For example, following the removal of the usual democratic checks
on war initiation, as was the effect of the 9/11 attack, it is likely that the decision for
the Iraq War was principally driven by a group of high level advisers to President
George W. Bush who had networked together prior to the Bush Administration on
the importance of removing Saddam Hussein from office. We know from the strong
empirical evidence supporting the “democratic peace” proposition (that is, democracies
have rarely, if at all, fought major wars against each other) that form of government
matters. And there is a great deal of evidence that many different factors affecting
the totality of incentives from the aggregate of all other nations, international insti-
tutions and international law (that is, image three or the totality of the international
system) matter. Thus, security arrangements and clear communication of military
and political deterrence against an attack matter. Indeed, NATO may have prevented
World War III during the height of the Cold War, in sharp contrast with the absence
of effective security arrangements prior to World Wars I and II. Similarly, high levels
of bilateral trade, which are a positive incentive imposing a cost if lost in war, matter.
Even certain fixed incentives, such as physical contiguity, matter (physical contiguity
likely both in generating motivating factors for attack as well as facilitating ease of
attack). Moreover, the importance of each of these elements, which may vary from
war to war, are likely themselves multi-caused. Thus, with respect to “the Democratic
Peace” likely the phenomenon is related to a multiplicity of factors including shared
values and belief systems, checks and balances common to democratic systems, leaders
selected for competence in factors other than military prowess, ruthlessness, or
extreme belief systems, and the ability of totalitarian and authoritarian leaders to ex-
ternalize costs on others more effectively than democratic leaders, among many other
factors in a complex mosaic of differences between liberal democracies at one end
of the political spectrum and totalitarian regimes at the other end of that spectrum.
To recapitulate some of the more important correlations with war, we know from
the powerful statistical evidence of “the democratic peace” that form of government
matters. For democracies rarely if ever wage major war against other democracies.
Moreover, despite the conventional wisdom in international relations theory that
democracies are no less aggressive in initiating major wars, my own research shows
that they are far less aggressive in high-risk settings leading to major wars when meas-
ured by the initiation of coercion normative standards of the United Nations Charter,
or when measured by total casualties as a proxy for risk, or when measured by intent

2. An initial approach to conceptualizing the principal inputs contributing to both image one
and image one-and-a-half might be a six-part construct of 1) political belief system; 2) personality
type; 3) personal experience; 4) national historical and cultural perspectives; 5) whether the setting
is a gain or loss setting under prospect theory; and 6) the ability to personalize benefit and externalize
cost.
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xvi PREFACE

to use force for value extension as opposed to value conservation. This focus on form
of government is a classic image two factor. With respect to image three there is pow-
erful evidence, though based both on case studies and the objective measuring system
for levels of “deterrence” discussed subsequently and developed in two papers in this
volume, that high levels of overall deterrence prevent major international war and
that such war tends to occur at low or negative levels of deterrence. As one factor in
overall “deterrence” we also know from strong statistical analysis that high levels of
bilateral trade between two countries strongly reduces the risk of major war between
them. Trade is simply an aggregate of positive incentives which, if lost in war, become
a negative discouraging war. Thus, high levels of bilateral trade go along with a strong
military, military security arrangements, effective collective security, effective com-
munication of will and intent to deter, and other factors in making up the aggregate
of incentives from the international system collectively producing some level of “de-
terrence.” These factors are, of course, image three factors. Finally, there is good case
study evidence to suggest that extreme ideologies supporting use of force as a modality
of value extension are correlated with high-risk aggression. This was certainly the
case with Adolf Hitler in World War II, Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and Mao in the Korean
War, Ho Chi Minh in the Vietnam War, Saddam Hussein in the 1990 Gulf War, and
Al Qaeda and ISIL leaders in ongoing contemporary struggles against terror. And,
as the paper by Michael Mott in this volume suggests, modern psychology now usefully
addresses factors contributing to individual risk taking and aggressiveness, something
as yet which has played little role in the understanding of war because of the general
neglect to date of image one. These latter factors, of course, are image one factors.
These likely major factors can today be supplemented by many other more micro
correlations from one or another of the “images,” such as prior military experience
of the regime elites, their religious belief system, physical contiguity of the countries
at war, and many other factors emerging from more micro and empirical research
about war.
The strength of “incentive theory” is that it seeks to aggregate all of these factors
as applicable in individual cases and it offers a point, the decision for war by a na-
tional decision elite, around which these factors can be aggregated. It offers a simple
overarching theory, but it then enables incorporation of a myriad of empirically
proven inputs. The deductive theory (simple and thus meeting the useful test of
Occam’s Razor) is needed to provide the point for aggregation and analysis. The
rest is left to empirical truth. Known correlations, of which there are now many,
are placed into the model and given appropriate weight. Myths, deliberate omissions
of important correlates out of stubborn adherence to some deductive theoretical
constructs, and outright false beliefs about war, have no place and are omitted. Im-
portantly, though “incentive theory” uses the decision point in image one as the
point for aggregating inputs from all images (or even new images if existing images
are more contextually subdivided in the future), “incentive theory” is emphatically
not a theory that wars occur simply because of image one or inputs solely relating
to the individual. To the contrary, it uses the point of decision for or against war
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(which is the real-world origin of war rather than the movement of planets or ran-
dom events), to aggregate factors from all the images and it asserts, unlike other
theories, that all of the images are potentially relevant in analyzing the causes of
war and the risk of individual war. It is the aggregate of incentives for the decision
elite which then produce war or no war. Similarly, “incentive theory” is not simply
an offshoot from economic theory. Rather, it is rooted in full social context and
seeks to include all relevant disciplines. Perhaps, however, given that incentives are
the core mechanism for both physical and social evolution we should not be sur-
prised to find that incentives matter in decisions for war or elsewhere in foreign
policy.
But does not “incentive theory” assume rationality of decision elites in making
their decision for or against war under the aggregate of incentives from all image
sources? Yes and no. Yes, in recognition that the decision for war, including a thor-
oughly evil aggressive attack, in case after case seems to be based on a series of as-
sumptions reflecting incentives at the point of decision. There are few, if any, cases
of modern major war being initiated by the mentally ill. That is likely explained by
the difficulty of a truly mentally ill leader staying in power very long in a modern
state of whatever political variety. Moreover, if wars are simply random or not driven
by decision elites making what they believe are rational decisions under the circum-
stances of the totality of incentives at the time of decision, then no theory is going
to be any better than “incentive theory.” But no, in yet another advantage for “incentive
theory” over traditional and newer theories, “incentive theory” takes into account
image one with respect to the individual decision elite and those around them. As
such, it is able to importantly weight extreme belief systems affecting decision when
other principal theories largely neglect image one. One example that has always
seemed to me to make this point is that of Pol Pot’s continuing military attacks against
Vietnam from Cambodia based on his ultra-radical belief system, despite Vietnam
at the time having one of the largest battle-hardened armies in the World. When
Vietnam ultimately got tired of these aggressive attacks against them they ultimately
invaded Cambodia and wiped out Pol Pot’s far less capable army. Ultra-radical belief
systems of a decision elite may be capable of overriding incentives others would regard
as more than adequate to deter. That, in turn, suggests the importance of including
image one in any framework of analysis about war. In the contemporary world it
may suggest special attention should be paid to the obviously radical belief system
of ISIL concerning setting aside by force the existing state system, and the ultra-
radical belief system of the current leader of North Korea, a rogue nuclear power.
“Incentive theory” has other advantages, as well. In addition to providing greater
utility on the problem of war, many of its principal inputs also correlate with other
major foreign policy interests. Thus, democratic forms of government correlate in
the aggregate with higher levels of economic growth, enhanced human rights and
quality of life, enhanced environmental protection, lower corruption and refugee
flows, and less participation in terrorism. Realism, in contrast, has little to say about
these other important foreign policy goals. Moreover, the fact that “the democratic
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peace” correlates with so many of these other major goals reinforces that its weighting
on war is also important.
“Incentive theory” also provides a framework facilitating sharper governmental
analysis for appraising the risk of war in a particular crisis setting, and when the risk
gets high, of applying measures which might lessen that risk. I believe the United
States would be well served to create a small new office within the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Office of the Director of National Intelligence which would have two
roles. First, it would pursue the correlations from all images through continuing em-
pirical research; striving through time to build a theoretical model based on “incentive
theory” (or a better theory when one is found) which would become better and better
in assessing the real-world risk of war. Second, this office would systematically apply
this model to crises and other settings of concern, and convey an early warning to
the national security policy apparatus about settings presenting high or increasing
risk. A second task force or office would be created on an interagency basis within
the National Security Council that would be the recipient of these risk warnings.
That NSC Task Force/Office would have studied a tool kit of measures to damp down
risk and would then address, as a national policy, measures to deal with the specific
warning coming from the CIA/DNI office. Presumably, recommendations from this
NSC policy entity would be sent to the President for decision after clearance through
the interagency process. The intelligence community, of course, already engages in
risk assessment; an inherently difficult task. A model which could, through time, en-
able better and better risk assessment based on the best scientific evidence available
about war, however, would certainly be an important national asset. Even more im-
portantly, likely it is the second step of linking a warning capability with a policy
mechanism focused on making recommendations for reducing the risk of war (a
mechanism only episodically or peripherally present today) which offers the best pay-
off to the Nation. Both better prediction, and better understanding of measures to
reduce risk — thus enabling better policy response, require a better theory for un-
derstanding war. “Incentive theory” is at least incrementally better in this task than
our current theoretical toolkit.
Since the superb papers in this volume came from my “War and Peace” seminars
at Virginia and Georgetown, not surprisingly the authors are at least aware of “in-
centive theory,” and many are pursing that theory in their analysis. Of particular
note, the papers by Anthony Stenger and Geoff Fasel develop what I believe is the
most sophisticated effort at a more objective scoring system for “deterrence,” a term
I have been using in “incentive theory” to reflect the entire aggregate of incentives
from image three, both positive and negative, not just military deterrence. Political
scientists in their Polity series, as well as Freedom House in its ranking system for
democracy and the rule of law, have long devised effective systems for measuring
levels of democracy and democratic freedoms. Surprisingly, to my knowledge there
has never been a comparable effort at objectivizing another obviously critical com-
ponent of the war equation; that of deterrence, or the aggregate of incentives from
image three. Possibly this again results from being led astray by the “realists” with
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PREFACE xix

their preoccupation with “power.” Power, of course, is a component of deterrence,

but only one component. The will to use that power and clear communication of
that will is also critically important. That is, deterrence, with all of its pieces, is a
more useful input than power. Just to provide a few examples, the United States was
clearly more powerful than North Korea before North Korea’s decision to unleash
the Korean War, yet United States communication of its determination to defend
Korea was not only not communicated to Stalin and North Korea, it was not even
known to the American military and foreign policy establishment prior to the decision
by President Truman following the North’s Soviet assisted invasion. Similarly, the
United Kingdom and United States clearly were much more powerful than Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq but again a failure of communication led to his miscalculation in at-
tacking Kuwait. When measured against a gestalt contextual analysis of major wars
the objective scoring system generally correlates well with the conclusions from the
more contextual but less systematic analysis. In one case, however, perhaps showing
the importance of maximum contextual analysis, I believe the more complete gestalt
analysis was superior. Thus, the objective system scored deterrence against Germany
as increasing after Russian mobilization on the eve of World War I. But knowledge
of the “Schlieffen Plan” and Germany’s two front war problem in World War I called
for the opposite conclusion in the more complete contextual analysis. Once Russia
mobilized, the Schlieffen Plan suggested that Germany had to attack and win in the
West before taking on Russia in the East. This example, in turn, tells us that assessing
“deterrence” is not always easy, and sometimes what might seem as a measure en-
hancing deterrence might work the other way. Indeed, United States economic sanc-
tions against Japan, in the face of a hugely powerful Japanese navy, may have lessened,
rather than increased, deterrence before the Pearl Harbor attack. Most importantly,
whether based on this objectivized deterrence system, or simply scoring war by war
from overall context, “incentive theory” is correct in providing an important input
for deterrence, or the totality of incentives from the international system. For high
levels of deterrence seem to prevent war and wars seem to be associated either with
low levels of deterrence or negative levels of deterrence.
I would also call particular attention to the paper by Michael Mott, one of the ed-
itors of this volume, who wrote on “Psychology and the War Decision.” Because image
one has tended to be neglected in traditional approaches to the decision for war, less
has been written exploring this important component at the level of variations in in-
dividual psychology, as opposed, for example, to the effects of belief in a radical
utopia to be forcefully imposed, or the insights of Prospect Theory and other insights
from Behavioral Economics. Michael, who came to the seminar with graduate work
in psychology, has, I believe, done seminal work in developing a first stage complexity
in understanding this component of image one. His paper shows, using modern psy-
chological theory, how wrong it likely has been to ignore individual psychology in
the decision for war, and more broadly in understanding foreign policy behavior.3

3. A recent book, also focusing on image one, explores experiences of national leaders with respect
to their propensity for war. See Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, & Cali M. Ellis, Why Lead-
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xx PREFACE

The paper by Andrew Kagen on “A Pattern in the Decision-Making Process of Au-

tocracies Going to War” also provides strongly suggestive evidence as to the importance
of individual leaders (image one) and their principal advisers (image one-and-a-half)
in the decision for war. This paper explores the decision of the French King Louis
XVI and his foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes, to intervene in the American
Revolution, the decision of Emperor Franz Joseph of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and his ministers and Army Chief of Staff to go to war against Serbia (triggering
World War I), and the decision by Emperor Hirohito of Japan and his Prime Minister
and Army and Navy Chiefs to attack Pearl Harbor.
The paper from Davis Brown, an international relations PHD, who has gone on
to do seminal work in the relevance of religious beliefs of national leaders and country
populations, does the kind of outstanding work which good scholarship (and good
theory) requires in empirically testing our theories.
Finally, the paper by Margaret Kelly, on “Shark Attacks and the ICC” is a beautiful
case study as to why international law and international institutions can, at least in
many significant ways, have an important real world effect. Margaret, a Princeton
Graduate before attending the University of Virginia Law School, and also one of the
editors of this volume, writes with an extraordinary gift. Oh, to use the English lan-
guage like Margaret!
I would be remiss if I did not also thank Professor Robert F. Turner, who has been
my frequent co-teacher in the War and Peace seminar at Virginia, and who served as
the first President of the United States Institute of Peace. Bob’s extraordinary knowl-
edge of the Vietnam War, and his service in multiple branches of the United States
Government, have greatly contributed to the papers in this volume.
The real work in compiling these papers, and herding the cats to make the project
come to fruition, has been that of Michael Mott, Margaret Kelly, and Judy Ellis. Or-
chids to them!
All of the papers in this volume reflect extraordinary work in pressing the state of
human knowledge about war. I believe this volume not only showcases outstanding
student work, but more importantly, the volume advances mankind’s knowledge of
the causes and modes of controlling war. That has been the genesis and motivation
for its publication.

Addendum to Preface
Incentive Theory: A Closer Look
There is no good short name for what I have termed “Incentive Theory.” Unfortu-
nately, the term by itself does not capture the theory’s focus on decision or its insistence

ers Fight (2015). It seems likely that political beliefs of national leaders, particularly extreme beliefs
supporting expansion of values through aggressive use of force, will also correlate with increased
propensity for war.
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PREFACE xxi

on taking into account all factors affecting decision — including the interaction between
decision elites of both the war-initiating and the target state. The following outline
presents this as “DecInCo Theory,” with a fuller explanation. Note that “DecInCo” has
been deliberately created as a non-word to avoid the potential confusion resulting
from use of the phrase “Incentive Theory.” Emphatically, this approach is not simply
yet another “economic” approach to understanding war and foreign policy.

DecInCo Theory: Decision — Incentive — Complexity

1. Focus: Point Of Decision
• Wars are not accidents!
• Focus on the decision for or against the use of force in a particular case.
• A decision made by the decision elites of the state: not by some vague formula
such as “states as agents” or “states as billiard balls colliding.”
2. Consider: all Incentives Affecting the Decision
• From Image One: the decision elites
• From Image-One-and-a-Half: key advisors
• From Image Two: constraints/opportunities from form of government
• From Image Three: external inducements from the international commu-
nity — nations, international organizations, etc.
3. Complexity
• Interactions between incentives from all images
• Interactions between the relevant international actors/decision elites
Greater Color on Aggregate Incentives:
A Closer Look at Images One, One-and-a-Half, Two, and Three
Image One: National Decision Elite
• Political belief system
• Personality type (the Five-Factor Model) & “dark triad”: Machiavellianism, sub-
clinical narcissism, and sub-clinical psychopathy)
• Personal experience
• National, historical, and cultural perspectives
• Whether the setting is a gain or loss setting under prospect theory (See generally,
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)
• Ability to personally benefit and externalize cost
Image One-And-A-Half: Key Advisors
• Political belief systems
• Personality types (the Five-Factor Model) & “dark triad”: Machiavellianism,
sub-clinical narcissism, and sub-clinical psychopathy)
• Personal experiences
• National, historical, and cultural perspectives
• Whether the setting is a gain or loss setting under prospect theory
• Ability to personally benefit and externalize costs
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xxii PREFACE

Consistency of advice from key advisors?

Are key advisors collaborating or “ganging-up” on the decision elite?
Image Two: Constraints/Opportunities from Form of Government
• Democratic checks on decision elites versus totalitarian settings where decision
elites have the ability to externalize costs and internalize benefits
• Traumatic events lessening democratic checks, for example, the Pearl Harbor
and 9/11 attacks. Did Pearl Harbor largely remove democratic checks on Franklin
Roosevelt’s decision to send Japanese-Americans to internment camps? Did 9/11
largely remove democratic checks on George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq?
Image Three: External Incentives from the International Community
• Consider the totality of all external incentives
• Include positive as well as negative external incentives and opportunity factors
• Positive would include high levels of bilateral trade and high levels of joint
participation in international organizations, etc.
• Negative would include deterrence through political, economic, or military
sanctions, etc.
• Opportunity factors would include territorial contiguity, etc.
Image Three: Classic Deterrence
• Capability
• Will
• Signaling/communication
Image Three: A Refined/Interactive Deterrence Model
• The sending entity: capability, will, signaling/communication
• The receiving entity: accurate or inaccurate perception of the above, and balanced
against other goals of the receiving entity. Some examples:
• Germany responds to Russian mobilization pre-WWI by attacking on the
Western Front and is not deterred by the mobilization because of the Schlieffen
Plan need to deal with a two-front war — apparent deterrence has an opposite
effect;
• Japan responds to American economic sanctions pre-WWII by attacking Pearl
Harbor and is not deterred by the sanctions because of its perceptions of dom-
inant Japanese naval power and weak American will — apparent deterrence
has an opposite effect.
Applying Incentive Theory
• How does incentive theory explain George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq?
• How might incentive theory suggest a plan of action to deal with the North Ko-
rean nuclear and missile threats?
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About the Editors

John Norton Moore

John Norton Moore, who joined the faculty of the University of Virginia School
of Law in 1966, is an authority on international law, national security law and the
law of the sea. He also teaches advanced topics in national security law and the rule
of law. Moore taught the first course in the country on national security law and con-
ceived and co-authored the first casebook on the subject. From 1991–93, during the
Gulf War and its aftermath, Moore was the principal legal adviser to the Ambassador
of Kuwait to the United States and to the Kuwait delegation to the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait
Boundary Demarcation Commission.
From 1985 to 1991, he chaired the board of directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace,
one of six presidential appointments he has held. From 1973 to 1976, he was chair
of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea and
ambassador and deputy special representative of the president to the law of the sea
conference. Previously he served as the counselor on international law to the State
Department. With the deputy attorney general of the United States, he was co-chair
in March 1990 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks in Moscow and Leningrad on the rule of
law. As a consultant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, he was honored
by the director for his work on the ABM Treaty Interpretation Project.
He has been a frequent witness before congressional committees on maritime policy,
legal aspects of foreign policy, national security, war and treaty powers, and democracy
and human rights. He has been a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution. Moore is a member of advisory and
editorial boards for nine journals and numerous professional organizations, and he
has published many articles on oceans policy, national security and international law.
A principal focus of his research is the origins and prevention of wars.

Robert F. Turner
Robert F. Turner holds both professional and academic doctorates from the Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law. He co-founded the Center for National Security
Law with Professor John Norton Moore in April 1981 and has served as its Associate

xxiii
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xxiv ABOUT THE EDITORS

Director since then except for two periods of government service in the 1980s and
during 1994–95, when he occupied the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International
Law at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. A veteran of two
Army tours in Vietnam, Turner served as a research associate and public affairs
fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace before spend-
ing five years in the mid-1970s as national security adviser to Senator Robert P.
Griffin, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He has also served
in the executive branch as a member of the Senior Executive Service, first in the
Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, then in
the White House as Counsel to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, and
at the State Department as acting assistant secretary for legislative affairs. In 1986 –
87, he was the first president of the congressionally established United States Institute
of Peace.
A former three-term chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Law and Na-
tional Security (and for many years, editor of the ABA National Security Law Report),
Turner has taught undergraduate courses at Virginia on international law, U.S. foreign
policy, the Vietnam War and foreign policy and the law in what is now the Woodrow
Wilson Department of Politics. In addition, he teaches law school seminars including
Advanced Topics in National Security Law with Professor Moore.
Turner is the author or editor of more than fifteen books and monographs (in-
cluding co-editor of the Center’s National Security Law & Policy, National Security
Law Documents, and Legal Issues in the Struggle Against Terror) and numerous articles
in law reviews and professional journals.
A former distinguished lecturer at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Turner
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Academy of Political Science,
the Committee on the Present Danger, and other professional organizations. He was
selected for inclusion in Who’s Who in American Law less than two years after grad-
uating from law school and Who’s Who in the World before he reached the age of
forty. Dr. Turner has testified before more than a dozen different congressional com-
mittees on issues of international or constitutional law and related topics.

Michael Mott
Michael Mott graduated magna cum laude from the College of William & Mary
in 2008 with a dual major in Psychology and Shakespeare. Before continuing to the
University of Virginia School of Law to graduate with the Class of 2014, he completed
some graduate work in personality and social psychology at Michigan State University
and co-authored two scientific papers: one relating to outgroup bias and the other
examining the “Trolley Problem” in virtual reality simulations. During his tenure in
law school, he served as the Managing Editor of Publication for the Virginia Journal
of International Law (VJIL). Upon graduating, he spent 18 months as a general prac-
tice litigator in Culpeper, Virginia, before accepting a position at S&P Global Ratings,
where he advises rating analysts on the transactional documents underlying com-
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ABOUT THE EDITORS xxv

mercial mortgage-backed securities. Michael lives in Scottsville, Virginia, with his

wife and son on a 20-acre farm.

Nathaniel W. Freeman
Nathaniel Freeman is a recent graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law
(Class of 2017). As a research assistant for Professor John Norton Moore, he edited
various national security and oceans law publications, including a recently published
textbook: National Security Law & Policy, Third Edition. After being selected into the
Graduate Law Program of the Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corp, Nathaniel
fulfilled various leadership responsibilities as a cadet at the University of Virginia De-
tachment 890 and completed field training in the summer of 2016. As former President
of the John Bassett Moore Society of International Law, Nathaniel organized events
to bring broader awareness to international law issues. He also served as the student
fundraising leader for the University of Virginia Law School Foundation. Nathaniel
graduated with highest honors from Brigham Young University in 2010. During his
time at BYU, he lived in both the Czech Republic and Italy. Before law school,
Nathaniel worked at an investment bank. Having commissioned as a lieutenant in
May 2017, he will soon receive orders for his first assignment in the Air Force.
Nathaniel lives with his wife and two boys in Utah.

Margaret Kelly
Margaret Kelly is a Director at Grover Bond, where she focuses on associate, coun-
sel, and partner placements at leading law firms nationwide. Before joining Grover
Bond, Margaret was an associate in the Washington D.C. office of Venable, LLP where
she focused on government regulatory matters involving financial services, telecom,
and cybersecurity. She received her J.D. from the University of Virginia (2015), her
A.B. in Political Theory, with honors, from Princeton University (2010), and is an
alumna of Phillips Academy Andover. Her Senior Thesis at Princeton, “Because Grief
Unites Us: Humanitarian Intervention and our Responsibility to Protect” was her first
foray into international humanitarian law, focusing on the politics of the transbound-
ary use of force in defense of human rights.
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About the Authors

Davis Brown
Davis Brown is a Senior Research Associate at the Association of Religion Data
Archives and Nonresident Fellow at the Baylor University Institute for Studies of Re-
ligion. He has a J.D. from New York University (1994), an LL.M. in international
law from George Washington University (2003), and a Ph.D. in international relations
from the University of Virginia (2012). After law school he practiced in the Air Force
and privately for 13 years. Dr. Brown is the author of The Sword, the Cross, and the
Eagle (2008), on American Christian just war theory, and is a contributor to the
newly released Ashgate Research Companion on Military Ethics. Dr. Brown’s research
areas are jus ad bellum, international security, and ethics of war.

Roy E. Brownell II
Roy E. Brownell II is an attorney and author living in Washington, D.C. He is the
co-editor of the recent book Magna Carta and the Rule of Law and has contributed
to a number of books and journals on topics related to governmental structure and
law.

Jessica Cavanagh
Jessica Cavanagh (née Chow) graduated from the University of Virginia School of
Law in 2016. While in law school, she externed in the Office of Economic and Business
Affairs in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Legal Adviser and served on
the Editorial Board of the Virginia Law Review. From 2010 to 2011, Jessica lived in
Kunming, China, under the auspices of the U.S. Fulbright Program; her research fo-
cused on the long-term impact of U.S. military assistance during World War II on
the Chinese populace. Jessica graduated magna cum laude with a double concentration
in mathematics and Chinese from Colgate University in 2009.

xxvii
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xxviii ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Kevin S. Donohue
Mr. Donohue graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law in 2005.
Prior to attending law school, Mr. Donohue served in the U.S. Army in field artillery,
special operations, and base operations assignments worldwide, achieving the rank
of lieutenant colonel.
Mr. Donohue completed his undergraduate work at the United States Military Acad-
emy at West Point. Mr. Donohue currently works in the General Services Administration
(GSA) Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Prior to that, Mr. Donohue worked as
an associate in the Washington, D.C. offices of two international law firms, where he
specialized in government contracts, foreign acquisitions, and national security law.

Kenneth J. Duvall
Kenneth Duvall received his undergraduate degrees from Saint Louis University,
majoring in International Studies and Psychology and minoring in Russian Studies
and Criminal Justice. After receiving his J.D. from the University of Virginia School
of Law, he clerked for the Honorable Alok Ahuja on the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Upon leaving his clerkship, he has practiced for the law firm of Berkowitz Oliver
Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt LLP, focusing on commercial and other civil litigation.

Luke Gilhooly
After graduating from the University of Virginia School of Law in May 2016, Luke
Gilhooly was commissioned as an officer in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General
Corps and is stationed at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Luke served in the U.S. Army from
2004 to 2013, primarily as a Communications and Intelligence Sergeant with the 1st
Special Forces Group (Airborne). Before enlisting, Luke graduated from Cornell Uni-
versity and worked at a financial institution in New York City.

Geoffrey D. Fasel
Geoffrey D. Fasel leverages his national and international relationships in the busi-
ness, investment, financial, scientific, and academic communities to develop and
achieve his clients’ legal, financial, and business goals. His understanding of his clients’
needs was shaped by his early experiences representing key leaders including the
Stowers Institute and Bayer Animal Health, and continues with a wide variety of en-
tities advancing human and animal health, plant science, “clean-tech,” industrial and
computer/software technologies, and bio and agricultural safety. Geoffrey represents
clients at all stages of a company’s life cycle — beginning with technology creation
and protection, through corporate formation and capital attraction, key third-party
relationships, growth, maturity and strategic exits. Geoffrey also leads his group in
private securities placements, including formation of VC and PE funds, and repre-
sentation of companies seeking or having taken pooled investment.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS xxix

Geoffrey speaks on various aspects of business formation, operation, aggregation

and attraction of capital, and strategic exits, including for the national meeting of
the Association of University Technology Managers, as well as the Innovate! program
at the Carey Business School of Johns Hopkins University. Geoffrey also serves on
the Translational Medicine Committee for the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Com-
merce’s “Big Five” initiative.

Chad Farrell
Chad Farrell was an Associate Legal Officer at the International Court of Justice
in The Hague from 2011 to 2015, performing legal research and analysis related to
cases before the court. Before assuming the Associate Legal Officer role, he worked
as a University Trainee (Law Clerk) at the court. Prior to that, he was a Law Clerk
at the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mr. Farrell received his JD from the University of Virginia School of Law in 2007,
where he served as an Executive Editor of the Virginia Law Review. He obtained his
undergraduate degree in international relations from Brown University in 2002. He
originally hails from Seattle. The views expressed in his paper are his own, and do
not represent the positions of his current or former employers.

Andrew Kagen
Andrew Kagen was born and raised in the suburbs of Philadelphia. He attended
Cornell University where he received his bachelor’s degree in history, graduating
magna cum laude. His thesis, “The Horse and the Rider” examined the problems
party leaders faced when they tried to enact policy that significant portions of their
party did not support in the context of Victorian politics. Andrew currently attends
the University of Virginia School of Law and will graduate in the Spring of 2017. He
has focused on criminal and international law during his studies. After graduation,
he will clerk for the Honorable Michel Pierson of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City. He plans to work in criminal prosecution for his career.

Calleigh McRaith
Calleigh M. McRaith is a 2012 graduate of the University of Virginia School of
Law. Ms. McRaith currently works as an Immigration Attorney at a private law
firm in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where she provides a range of services including
removal defense, and representation on humanitarian applications, family-based
immigration, and employment-based immigration cases. Prior to her current po-
sition, Ms. McRaith served as an Attorney Advisor for the Bloomington Immigration
Court as a part of the Department of Justice Honors Program. Ms. McRaith also
previously worked as a law clerk for Justice G. Barry Anderson on the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
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xxx ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Ms. McRaith has served as a research assistant to the UN Special Rapporteur on

Violence Against Women and completed field research on human rights issues in sev-
eral countries including Haiti, Sri Lanka and Mongolia.
During law school, Ms. McRaith was a joint recipient of the Monroe Leigh Fel-
lowship in International Law, which allowed her to intern with the International
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in Cape Town, South Africa. At ICTJ, she
worked on numerous post-conflict projects, including drafting an amicus brief for
a case before the South African Constitutional Court on the application of amnesty
provisions. Prior to law school, Ms. McRaith spent a summer conducting legal research
for a nonprofit organization in Derry, Northern Ireland, that assisted British police
in investigating the unresolved conflict-related deaths that occurred during the Trou-
bles. It was this experience, combined with her work at ICTJ on post-conflict issues,
which sparked Ms. McRaith’s interest in non-violence as a method for social change
and served as the inspiration for her paper.

Wendy Reid
Wendy Reid is Vice President for Operations at Alion Science & Technology. She
manages an organization that provides acquisition management, engineering services,
and logistics support to the United States Navy and Defense agencies. Prior to Alion,
she worked for 10 years with Science Applications International Corporation, starting
there as a Policy Analyst supporting arms control and WMD consequence management
programs, and advancing to Senior Vice President for Operations in which post she
ran an organization that supported, among others, the Office of Secretary of Defense,
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the U.S. Strategic Command in the areas
of combating WMD and nuclear matters. In 2010, she was selected into the Depart-
ment of State’s Franklin Fellows Program, a year-long executive development forum
to bring fresh ideas from the private sector into government.
In the Department’s Office of War Crimes Issues, she supported the U.S. govern-
ment’s responses to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in West
Africa, the Sudan, and the Middle East. Ms. Reid received her Bachelor of Arts degree
from Yale University, her Juris Doctor from UCLA School of Law, and her LL.M.
from Georgetown University Law Center.

Christopher Bowman Rich, Jr.

Christopher Bowman Rich, Jr. graduated cum laude from Brigham Young Uni-
versity with a BA in History and received a juris doctor from the University of Virginia
School of Law. Upon graduation, he entered the United States Army Judge Advocate
General’s Corps where he has held a number of positions including Trial Counsel
and Defense Counsel. He deployed to Iraq with the 4th Infantry Division from 2010–
11 where he served as a Claims Judge Advocate and Chief of Client Services. His
latest assignment was as an International and Operational Law Attorney for U.S.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS xxxi

Army Africa (USARAF). There he assisted in the execution of Operation United As-
sistance (OUA), the Department of Defense’s counter-Ebola efforts in Liberia. His
other publications include: “The True Policy for Utah: Servitude, Slavery, and ‘An
Act in Relation to Service’,” Utah Historical Quarterly; Winter 2012, Vol. 80 Issue 1,
p. 54; and a forthcoming article concerning the legal aspects of OUA which he has
co-authored. He currently lives with his wife and two children in Vicenza, Italy. His
contribution represents his own views; not those of the US Army or JAG Corps.

Anthony Stenger
After law graduating from the University of Virginia School of Law, Anthony prac-
ticed as a commercial litigator in Washington, D.C. He left practice after six years to
pursue graduate studies in political science at Washington University in St. Louis.
Anthony now lives with his family in Groveland, Illinois and teaches courses in
political science and public administration at Indiana State University.

Christopher Swift
Christopher Swift is an Adjunct Professor of National Security Studies at George-
town University. An attorney and political scientist, Dr. Swift brings more than fifteen
years of experience to his research on terrorisms, armed conflict, and the intersection
between constitutional law, international law, and national security. His forthcoming
book, The Fighting Vanguard: Local Insurgencies in the Global Jihad, draws on field
research in Afghanistan, Yemen, and other contemporary conflict zones to untangle
the complex global web of terrorist and insurgent groups.
In addition to his academic pursuits, Dr. Swift is also an attorney with Foley &
Lardner, LLP. As a member of the firm’s White Collar Litigation, National Security,
and International practices, he counsels clients on matters involving arms controls,
economic sanctions, export controls, foreign investment, international trade disputes,
treaties and other aspects of public and private international law. He also represents
pro-bono clients in matters involving constitutional law, veterans’ law, and refugee
and asylum law.
Prior to entering private practice, Dr. Swift served in the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control, where he investigated international transactions in-
volving terrorist syndicates, weapons proliferators, and other sanctioned entities. He
also served as an International Law Fellow at the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom, where he advised policymakers on terrorism and human rights
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union.
Dr. Swift’s policy experience spans roles with Dartmouth College, Freedom House,
Center for Strategic & International Studies, and the University of Virginia Law
School’s Center for National Security Law. He frequently appears as a guest analyst
on legal and national security issues for ABC News, Al-Jazeera, the BBC, CBS News,
CNN, National Public Radio, and other leading broadcast media.
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xxxii ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. Swift is an Eagle Scout and term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
He holds a Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cam-
bridge, a J.D. from Georgetown University, and an A.B. in history and government
from Dartmouth College.

Ellen Valentine
Ellen Valentine obtained her J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law
in 2010 and is an associate in Kutak Rock LLP’s office in Richmond, Virginia. Her
law practice includes public finance, creditor’s rights and public finance. In her
public finance practice, she represents state and local governments in bond
financings. In her bankruptcy and creditor’s rights practice, she represents bankruptcy
trustees and financial institutions. For financial institutions, her experience includes
representations in bankruptcy cases, probate cases, foreclosure sales, repossessions,
collateral acquisitions, workouts, settlements and litigation in bankruptcy, federal
and state courts. She also drafts loan documents, conducts closings and provides
guidance to creditors on federal regulations. She was selected as a 2015 Rising Star
by Super Lawyers.
She has been married to her husband for eight years and they have one child. She
is a high school group leader for Journey Christian Church in Midlothian, Virginia.
She loves to read, write, cook, cycle, ride roller coasters and go to her local outdoor
shooting range.

Patrick Walsh
Major Patrick Walsh is a Senior Instructor at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center in Glynco, Georgia. As a member of the Legal Division, he is involved in
teaching various courses in constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedure and
intelligence law.
Mr. Walsh served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Nevada, where
he prosecuted major drug traffickers, violent criminals, white-collar criminals and
suspected terrorists. He also served as the lead national security and terrorism pros-
ecutor for the district. Mr. Walsh is a military reservist who recently served three
years as an Associate Professor in the International and Operational Law Department
of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. He deployed
to Iraq in 2008 as a legal advisor to a military police unit. He has also taught law
students as an adjunct professor at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas, Boyd
School of Law.
Patrick received his undergraduate degree from Loyola Marymount University,
his law degree from the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, an LL.M.
emphasizing international law from the U.S. Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Legal
Center and School and a second LL.M. focusing on national security law from the
University of Virginia School of Law.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS xxxiii

James P. Whittaker
James Whittaker is a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army and 3L at UVA Law. James
was commissioned into the Army after spending four years at UC Davis as an ROTC
Cadet and will serve as a Judge Advocate after graduation. James spent his 1L summer
interning at the Small Business Administration’s Office of General Council, Procure-
ment division, and his 2L summer interning at Fort Belvoir, in the USALSA Contract
and Fiscal Litigation Division. James enjoys playing golf, softball, basketball, and
cooking for his friends after long days of exercise.
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Acknowledgments

The editors are grateful for the thoughtful scholarship that breathed life into this
project; for the help and patience of Mary Ellen (Mer) McLernon throughout; for
the editorial assistance of Judy Ellis; and for the generous support of the Law School
Foundation at the University of Virginia.

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