Endless War Hidden Functions of The War On Terror (Keen)

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Endless War?
Hidden Functions of the ‘War on
Terror’
David Keen
Pluto Press
London • Ann Arbor, MI
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First published 2006 by Pluto Press

345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA
and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106
www.plutobooks.com
Copyright © David Keen 2006
The right of David Keen to be identified as the author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 0 7453 2416 9 hardback

ISBN 0 7453 2417 7 paperback
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data applied for
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Designed and produced for Pluto Press by Curran Publishing Services, Norwich
Printed and bound in the European Union by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and
Eastbourne, England
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Contents
Acknowledgements vii
1. Introduction 1
Aims and argument of the book 1
2. Fuel on the fire: predictably counterproductive tactics

in the ‘war on terror’ 8
Two models of terrorism 8
Violence for a safer world? 11
The doctrine of pre-emption 19
Fuelling anger 23
Anger in the targeted countries 25
Anger outside the targeted countries 31
Concluding remarks 48
3. War systems: local and global 51

Introduction 51
Insurgency and terror 54
‘Counter-insurgency’ and ‘counter-terror’ 57
4. Elusive enemies and the need for certainty 84

Economic insecurity and the search for certainty 91
5. The new witch-hunt: finding and removing the source

of evil 96
Devils and details: the neglect of reconstruction 107
6. The retreat from evidence-based thinking 115

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CONTENTS
7. Action as propaganda 131

‘Just world thinking’: might is right 132
Making your predictions and assertions come true 137
8. Warding off the shame of powerlessness 145

Violence as power 146
Dependence and omnipotence 150
Piggybacking US power 157
9. Shame, purity and violence 160

America ‘goes soft’: weakness, emasculation and
impurity 160
Resisting those who ‘blame America’ for 9/11 170
Counter-terror and the proliferation of enemies 177
Conclusion 187
10. Culture and magic 190

US history and sense of mission 190
Magic, consumerism and advertising 194
Intellectuals 201
11. Conclusion 210
Notes 220
Bibliography 270
Index 279
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Acknowledgements
At LSE, I would especially like to thank Sue Redgrave, Drucilla

Daley and Stephanie Davies, as well as Teddy Brett, Tim Allen and
Dennis Rodgers. I thank James Putzel in particular for helping to
fund the research via the Crisis States Research Centre at DESTIN,
LSE. For valuable episodes of intellectual exchange and input, I
would particularly like to thank Clive Hall, Mark Duffield,
Edward Balke, Freda Bear, Zoe Marriage, Thi Minh Ngo, Adekeye
Adebajo, Mats Berdal and the late Dominique Jacquin-Berdal.
At Pluto, I warmly thank Debjani Roy, Robert Webb, Julie
Stoll, Melanie Patrick and most especially Anne Beech, as well as
Liz Orme for the cover design. Big thanks, too, to Chris Carr at
Curran Publishing, and to Stuart McLaren for meticulous copy-
editing and Susan Curran for the index. And also to Joe Raedle for
the cover photograph.
A huge thank-you to all my friends, and to mum, auntie Anne
and the best sister in the world. My greatest debt is to my beloved
wife Vivian for her constant love, kindness and support – and for
her judicious advice and her faith in me throughout this project.
I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of Dominique
Jacquin-Berdal. Her passing in January 2006 is a major loss to
scholarship and to all who had the privilege to know her.
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1 Introduction
Aims and argument of the book
Current tactics in the ‘war on terror’ are predictably counterproduc-

tive. These tactics have included the use of military offensives to
combat terrorism: notably in the attack on Afghanistan, the attack on
Iraq and the heavy handed suppression of resistance and use of
collective punishment inside Iraq. Torture has been used in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Cuba and a range of other countries, and the British
government has taken the radical step of telling its diplomats they can
use information obtained through torture (as long as the torture is
done in some country other than Britain).1 International law – and
often the whole concept of the rule of law – has increasingly been set
aside. The counterproductive effects of such strategies are set out in
Chapter 2.
During the Cold War (and also before), a militaristic state-based
framework suggested that you could sensibly respond to threats
with war or the threat of war. But this framework, always risky and
costly, is now hopelessly out of date. This is because of the dangers
posed by elusive and often decentralised international terror
networks, by a proliferation of powerful weapons around the world,
and by a type of violence that is continuously fuelled by widespread
feelings of humiliation and anger, notably among many Muslims.
These feelings in extreme cases have created a willingness to take
innocent lives and to lose one’s own life in the process. The problem
of weapons proliferation has been deepened when suicide-killers
have turned even non-weapons like planes and skyscrapers into
instruments of death.
In these circumstances, trying to apply the old militaristic model to
the problem of terrorism is like trying to destroy a liquid with a
sledgehammer or a virus with a bullet. The idea of a centralised
enemy and the focus on states – both more plausible during the Cold
War – have been disastrously retained.2 Attacks on states are now
particularly redundant and counterproductive. The growing impor-
tance of sub-national and transnational dynamics, as Carl Conetta
notes, means resentments can’t be sealed neatly within the ‘black box’
of the nation state.3 And a militaristic approach to terror, apart from
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E N D L E S S WA R ?
being directly counterproductive, has also taken attention and

resources away from other, more promising, approaches to dealing
with terrorism.
Since terror is fuelled by anger and since terror networks are quite
decentralised, trying to physically eliminate terror and terrorists is not
going to work. This lesson should already be clear from civil wars.4
Today more than ever, we need to understand why non-state actors
participate in violence and how abusive counter-terror or counter-
insurgency operations tend to fuel the fire of violence.
Although it has become clear to most observers, including diplomatic
and intelligence officials, that militaristic and abusive actions are proving
counterproductive, they have nevertheless been adhered to (and often
with renewed enthusiasm and ferocity). Why is this? Simply condemn-
ing the tactics or pointing out that they are counterproductive provides
no answers here; indeed, it deepens the puzzle. The bulk of statements
about the ‘war on terror’ are concerned either with justifying recent
actions (the approach of the US and UK governments and the US ‘neo-
conservatives’), dismissing abuses as ‘mistakes’ or ‘failings’ (broadly, a
liberal perspective), or (usually from the left) condemning the US-led
coalition’s behaviour as immoral and counterproductive. However,
trying to explain why these counterproductive tactics have been adopted
and retained is a rather different task, and may ultimately help in chal-
lenging them. Since the US-led approach has not been based on facts so
much as on faith and power, it has exhibited a certain immunity to
conventional empirical challenges; it is therefore particularly important
to explore its inner logic and the (deluded) beliefs that sustain it.
All this becomes more urgent because George W. Bush has often
stressed that the ‘war on terror’ is both wide-ranging and ongoing.
Bush told West Point military cadets in June 2002 that the United States
must be prepared to take the ‘war on terror’ to up to 60 countries if
weapons of mass destruction were to be kept out of the hands of terror-
ists. 5 Iran has been a particular target for belligerent talk, and Bush
described Iran in February 2005 as ‘the world’s primary state sponsor
of terror’.6 For his part, Tony Blair responded in October 2005 to the
Iranian President’s admittedly outrageous call for Israel to be ‘wiped
off the map’: ‘If they carry on like this, the question people will be
asking us is – when are you going to do something about Iran? Can you
imagine a state like that with an attitude like that having nuclear
weapons?’7
Chapter 3 looks for political and economic explanations for the
current counterproductive tactics. It is suggested that the global ‘war on
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INTRODUCTION
terror’ is a system conferring important benefits, where the aim is not neces-
sarily to win. If the ‘war on terror’ is an endless war in the sense of a
perpetual war, it does not appear to be an endless war in the sense that
it lacks any goal or purpose. The suspicion that the ‘war on terror’ may
have hidden functions is heightened by the succession of ‘wars’ of one
kind or another in which the United States has declared its involvement
since the Second World War. Whilst taking off from the analysis of Chom-
sky and others, the discussion here draws on my previous analysis of
civil war as a system: where militarily and politically counterproductive
tactics have been commonplace and where (contrary to common belief)
the aim has not necessarily been military victory. A variety of civil wars
have shown the militarily counterproductive nature (and the hidden
political, economic and psychological functions) of indiscriminate
counter-terror.
Chapters 4–9 explore the psychological functions of predictably
counterproductive actions in the ‘war on terror’, and the psychological
factors that have shaped the changing – and often arbitrary – definition
of the ‘enemy’. The book suggests that the search for magical and
psychologically satisfying solutions has interacted with old-fashioned
militaristic paradigms in profoundly damaging ways. Again, the inten-
tion is to examine not only why such counterproductive behaviours
and unhelpful definitions of the enemy were originally adopted but
also why they have been maintained. The book looks at the appeal of
doomed tactics not only for leaders but also for large sections of the
electorate. It emphasises the mismatch between psychologically satis-
fying solutions (eliminating ‘the evil ones’) and solutions that might
actually work.
Part of the aim is to go beyond condemnation of the United States and
its allies and to throw light on the thought-patterns that underpin the
war on terror. Since these embody dangerous fallacies, it is important to
examine their origins and assumptions, their appeal, and how they are
made to appear plausible. Here, the analysis draws on Michel Foucault’s
insights, especially his discussion of how practices that may seem (to
many) unobjectionable and obvious nevertheless embody assumptions
that at a later point in history (or if we highlight a previously excluded
set of voices or step outside the ‘charmed circle’ of policy-makers) may
appear highly irrational.8 The analysis also draws on a number of other
authors who are not usually discussed in the context of the ‘war on
terror’, including the psychiatrist James Gilligan, the philosopher
Hannah Arendt, the sociologist Susan Faludi and historians Keith
Thomas and Omer Bartov.
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Chapters 4–7 suggest that the ‘war on terror’ has provided a sense of
safety and certainty that has repeatedly ‘trumped’ a more rational and
realistic sense of what is likely to promote lasting physical security.
There has been a re-birth of what I will call magical thinking, some-
thing that produces plausible (but spurious) answers to the problem of
explaining suffering and plausible (but spurious) answers to the proj-
ect of minimising future suffering. Magical thinking boils down to the
hope that we can order the world to our liking by mere force of will or
by actions that have no logical connection to the problem we seek to
solve. Part of this has been a repeated resort to scapegoating – to a
witch-hunt that finds someone, anyone, on whom blame can be heaped.
Scapegoating can be a way to deal with trauma and bewilderment;9 but
it provides only a temporary solution to the problem of identifying
(and destroying) the enemy, and there is always a danger that the
process will be repeated. The attack on Iraq followed that on
Afghanistan, and even after the Iraq debacle there is still an appetite in
some quarters of the US government for attacking Iran and North
Korea in particular. Scapegoating is replicated not only within Western
countries but also within countries targeted in ‘counter-terror’ opera-
tions: most notably, whilst targeting Iraq had provided an identifiable
and accessible victim, the occupation of Iraq meant that ‘the enemy’
became once more elusive; this seems to have encouraged the targeting
of more accessible enemies, including prisoners.
Bizarre systems (including witch-hunts) can be made to appear
reasonable, logical, unavoidable and incontrovertible – at least for a
period. In other words, magic can be made to look reasonable and
rational, helping to explain how populations could be so readily
mobilised into a project that is so counterproductive in terms of the
expressed aim of defeating terrorism. This is partly because dissenters
risk being labelled as ‘enemies’, partly because we often take punish-
ment as evidence of guilt (‘just world thinking’), and partly because
enemies can be made to resemble one’s pre-existing (and distorted)
image of them. Hannah Arendt’s idea of ‘action-as-propaganda’ is used
(in Chapter 7) to explain how abusive actions have come to acquire –
particularly for many Bush supporters in the United States – an air of
legitimacy and inevitability.
Part of the psychological function of counterproductive tactics is that
they have helped to ward off feelings of shame and powerlessness. This
is analysed in Chapters 8–9. Warding off shame involves finding others
who will confirm you in your illusions and reassure you that your behav-
iour (however irrational and immoral it may appear to most people in
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INTRODUCTION
the world) is really rational and moral after all. If and when these others
refuse to confirm your illusions and to sanction your definition of
enemies, they too are likely to become part of an ever-expanding cate-
gory of ‘enemies’. The USA’s dangerous project of serial persecution has
been consistently backed by the UK as well as getting sporadic support
from whoever else can be flattered, bribed, cajoled or coerced into
compliance. It is precisely the irrationality of this potentially endless
endeavour – somewhere between Bush magic and the Blair witch proj-
ect – that creates the necessity of orchestrating and bullying approval.
Warding off shame and powerlessness has also involved an attempt to
combat elements of apparent weakness and impurity – both in US
foreign policy and in policies aimed at ‘moral regeneration’ at home.
This response has important historical precedents.
Chapter 10 discusses a number of discourses that seem to have fed
into predictably counterproductive tactics. Foucault suggests in I, Pierre
Riviere that a crime cannot usefully be considered in isolation from the
texts, including religious texts, in which the perpetrator and his society
are immersed. Writers like Noam Chomsky and John Pilger tend to
portray discourse as merely a smokescreen for power. They see
distorted media coverage of the ‘war on terror’ as a pretty direct
expression of US war-mongers’ interests and as strongly reflecting US
government propaganda in particular. Sheldon Rampton and John
Stauber have also produced important analysis along these lines. But
this is only part of the story. David Miller – in the introduction to his
edited collection, Tell Me Lies – touches on an important qualification to
the emphasis on ‘lies’ in the book’s title: ‘members of the elite come to
believe their own lies,’ he writes, ‘and seem unable to break free of the
operating assumptions of the system … they come to believe that the
world seen through the distorting lens of their own self interest is how
the world really is’.10 The point is not elaborated in much detail, but it
is important to try to examine the nature of these ‘operating assump-
tions’ and where they come from. As Foucault noted, officials may in
some sense be trapped by dominant rhetoric, including their own.
Whilst often self-serving, misconceptions also spring from a particular
culture and a particular tradition, which help to sustain them in the face
of mounting evidence that they are not working. Paradoxically, belief in
these ‘operating assumptions’ seems to be strengthened by evidence of
their falsity, and an interesting question is this: what kind of evidence
would it take to convince Bush and Blair that they are wrong?
The question of intentions is a difficult one.11 Were the counter-
productive effects of the ‘war on terror’ foreseen or even desired? It is
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hard to give a definitive answer. But I would like to draw on Foucault

again and suggest that key leaders in the ‘war on terror’ have been
trapped within systems of language and thought that are at once a part
of a shared culture and also (as they surround themselves with those
sharing similar views) partially of their own making.12 This helps to
explain how the irrational can come to seem rational. Meanwhile, the
practical political and economic benefits accruing from perpetual war
have helped to ensure that challenges from within the dominant
nations and their local allies are insufficient to shake up the cosy and
erroneous ‘truths’ that have underpinned the current counterproduc-
tive approach. Although Bush, Blair and other close allies surely do not
want the ‘war on terror’ to fail, it would seem that other priorities take
precedence and help to cloud their awareness of what works and what
doesn’t. It is notable that, even once the (foreseeable) counterproduc-
tive effects become clear, they are still adhered to. Counterproductive
tactics have become part of a dysfunctional system that not only yields
certain benefits but also has a (fallacious) internal logic.
Revealingly, the idea that bad things are the responsibility of a few
‘evil individuals’ has informed both the tactics in the ‘war on terror’
and the official US response to revealed abuses like those at Abu
Ghraib, which were dismissed as the work of a few ‘bad apples’. The
use of torture in third-party countries like Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and
Saudi Arabia13 has also helped to preserve the idea that bad things are
the responsibility of ‘them’ and not ‘us’. These denials of responsibility
are part of a persistent tendency to exaggerate the decentralization of
violence in relation to one’s own ‘side’. Alongside this has been an
enduring habit of underplaying the decentralization of violence among
one’s ‘enemies’ (the terrorists). Thus, abuses in the ‘counter-terror’
system (if admitted) are said to reflect a ‘breakdown’ in the chain of
command, while the enemy’s abuses are held to reflect a ruthless impo-
sition of command. This neatly sidesteps responsibilities in the West as
well as the widespread anger that informs terrorism (and Western
nations’ part in fuelling this anger). Not dissimilarly, during the Cold
War, abuses in countries friendly to the West (if they were admitted at
all) were frequently depicted as aberrations or the result of loose chains
of command. A classic example was the dismissal of government-spon-
sored famine in Western-backed Sudan as the result of ‘ancient ethnic
hatreds’.14 At the same time, abuses in Communist-backed countries
were seen as demonstrating the essence of an abusive and rigidly
imposed Communist ideology. Of course, the Soviet Union could also
play this game in reverse.
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INTRODUCTION
Part of my work on civil conflicts has involved extensive study of

humanitarian aid: for example, in Sudan and Sierra Leone.15 When
things have gone wrong with humanitarian operations (for example,
relief is not delivered), this has usually either been disguised or
dismissed as arising from ‘mistakes’ or ‘failures’. But such ‘failures’
have typically been actively produced by a range of interests affecting
relief distribution at all levels and by a range of discourses (for exam-
ple, the idea that relief induces ‘dependency’ in the recipients) which
have helped to sustain counterproductive policies and to lend them
legitimacy. As Edward Clay and Bernard Schaffer (themselves influ-
enced by Foucault) say in relation to ineffective development projects:
The … important question is not why public policy ‘fails’. It

does not always necessarily or completely do so. The formula-
tion expresses an odd reification. Public policy is, after all, what
it does. The point is to explain what that is, and then see if that
explanation can itself be an instrument for change and
improvement.
Chapter 10 also suggests that the ‘war on terror’ appeals for many of
the same reasons that consumerism appeals. The ‘war on terror’ has
been sold with tried-and-trusted advertising techniques. And like
consumerism, it feeds on its own failure; crucially, failure sustains the
demand that is necessary for constant renewal, whether of consumerist
fantasies or of the fantasies behind the ‘war on terror’. In the case of the
‘war on terror’, the key demand sustained by failure is the demand for
safety. All that is needed to sustain this dishonest and counterproduc-
tive system, as with the false promises of advertising, is that we quickly
forget that the solution we were recently offered and readily ‘bought
into’ (attacking Afghanistan, attacking Iraq) has not magically met our
need for security. Here, much of the media has been complicit in
helping us to forget. This book is intended as an aid in not forgetting.
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2 Fuel on the Fire: Predictably

Counterproductive Tactics in
the ‘War on Terror’
Two models of terrorism
US President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney have been

very clear, repeatedly proclaiming that America and its friends must
‘wage war on terrorism’, that they must ‘hunt down the terrorists’ and
destroy them. In his State of the Union speech in January 2002, Bush
summoned all nations to ‘eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten
their countries and our own’. After the bombings in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, in May 2003, Cheney advised an audience in Washington ‘to
recognise the fact that the only way to deal with this threat ultimately is
to destroy it. There’s no treaty can solve this problem, there’s no peace
agreement, no policy of containment. … [W]e have to go find the terror-
ists.’1 The idea is that evil must be physically eliminated. As Bush put it,
‘our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and
rid the world of evil’;2 or again, ‘This will be a monumental struggle
between good and evil. But good will prevail.’3 Peter Singer’s research,
published in 2004, found that Bush had referred to evil in 319 different
speeches, and had usually used the word as a noun, a force in the world,
rather than simply as an adjective describing certain acts.4
The US-led approach to terror rests on the assumption that terrorists
are a discrete group of evil individuals who can be isolated and elimi-
nated. The approach has often been underpinned, as in Bush’s refer-
ence to parasites, by dehumanising language that may flash a warning
light in the mind of any student of fascism.5 The ‘destroy-the-evil-ones’
approach took tangible form in Bush’s desk at the Oval Office, where
9/11 prompted him to keep a file of the 22 most wanted terrorists, ‘his
own personal scorecard for the war’, as ‘Watergate’ reporter Bob Wood-
ward put it.6 Bush would put an X through the picture of those who
were not still ‘at large’. 7 (In the State Department’s website showing the
‘most wanted’ terrorists,8 Osama bin Laden is helpfully described as
approximately 160 pounds in weight, thin, with an ‘olive’ skin. He is
believed to be in Afghanistan, we learn, is left-handed, and walks with
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FUEL ON THE FIRE
a cane. A US$25 million reward is offered for information leading to his

apprehension or conviction. The website adds cautiously, ‘Should be
considered armed and dangerous’). Israel has a similar rogue’s gallery
of wanted terrorists, and the Bush model is very much in line with that
of Israeli hardliners like Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, with whom the
neo-cons have had a great deal of sympathy.
The idea that you can effectively isolate and eliminate ‘the evil
ones’ was eloquently criticised during the Cold War by the dissident
Russian novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who suffered persecution
by a Soviet Communist regime that had its own project of isolating
and eliminating evil:
If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people

somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, and it were
necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy
them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the
heart of every human being.9
While Solzhenitsyn was lauded by the West when Communism was the
enemy, his wisdom is now in danger of being forgotten. Although the
Bush administration’s model of combating terrorism has gained ascen-
dance, there is an alternative (and more accurate) model that places terror-
ist thinking at the extreme end of a continuum. According to this
alternative model, terrorists are not an entirely discrete, isolated or finite
group but rather a group whose numbers can always be swelled (or
diminished) – depending crucially on the way the threat of terrorism is
handled. In this approach, the key is to undermine support for terrorists
and to tackle the process by which some of those sympathising with
terrorist aims or grievances may themselves embrace or facilitate violence.
Paradoxically, certain kinds of liberal and ‘politically correct’ think-
ing may feed into the (superficial) plausibility of the model portraying
terrorists as a distinct group. Not least because of the need to try to
protect the increasingly precarious human rights of Muslims in the
West, many liberals find it necessary to repeat that terrorists are a small
minority whose views are emphatically rejected by the majority of
Muslims. This way of speaking, while perhaps accurate in relation to
9/11 and in many ways constructive, tends nevertheless to distract
attention from widespread feelings of indignation among Muslims at
the ‘war on terror’. Polls suggest that large numbers of British Muslims,
for example, now view the ‘war on terror’ as a war on Islam.10 A poll of
British Muslims in March 2004 found that 13 per cent believe that
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‘further attacks by al-Qaeda or similar organizations on the USA’

would be justified.’11
Even if we focus on the al-Qaida network itself, the problem cannot be
reduced to a few individuals. The demise of more hierarchical organiza-
tions like Shining Path in Peru may have clouded the picture and encour-
aged false optimism. In a debate with John Kerry on 30 September 2004,
Bush noted that ‘75 per cent of known al Qaida leaders have been brought
to justice.’12 Yet al-Qaida was estimated in May 2003 to have more than
18,000 members in up to 90 countries.13 They cannot all be killed or
captured, and even if they could, the process would inevitably be impre-
cise and would predictably produce replacements. As an International
Institute for Strategic Studies report put it, ‘If the minions were killed or
caught, their spectacular demise in the name of Islam’ would move
others to take their place.14 The case of Sayyid Qutb, often credited as the
father of Islamic fundamentalism, showed how this could work: he was a
relatively obscure writer before the Egyptian government executed him.15
Ethnicity, as British anthropologist David Turton eloquently argues, may
be a result of conflict as much as a cause of it. This would seem to be true
of the extreme ethnic identity of ‘holy warrior’.
If al-Qaida cannot be physically eliminated, neither can the Iraqi resist-
ance (often dumped under a general heading of ‘the terrorists’ by the
Bush administration). Some 24,000 Iraqi resistance fighters were detained
or killed between May 2003 and August 2004, according to estimates by
the Washington-based Brookings Institution.16 Yet the number of Iraqi
resistance fighters actually rose from 5,000 in November 2003 to 20,000 in
September 2004, the Pentagon reported, and the Deputy Commander of
the Coalition forces in Iraq, General Andrew Graham, told Time magazine
in early September 2004 that he thought the real number was 40–50,000.
Significantly, the alternative model for combating terrorism is in line
with much current thinking on the disarmament of more conventional
military factions: we have learned that even disarming a particular
group will not be enough for peace if the conditions turning civilians
into fighters persist, particularly since decentralised violence is encour-
aged by proliferating weapons and by opportunities for exploiting
global markets.17 Al-Qaida itself has benefited from diamond-trading
networks, including in West Africa, and shifted its focus from East to
West Africa as controls in the East tightened in the wake of the 1998
bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.18 A significant
degree of local initiative – and indeed local fund-raising – has
been built into the structure of the organisation. The targeting of the
leadership has in many ways reinforced this decentralisation.19
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FUEL ON THE FIRE
Violence for a safer world?
We were sold the war in Iraq as part of the ‘war on terror’. This was
a war that would supposedly make the world safer in the wake of
9/11. Iraq was supporting terrorism and Saddam’s ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ were an immediate threat: they might either be deployed
directly or passed to terrorists. Spreading democracy would itself
promote security – if only on the logic that democratic countries are
less likely to go to war. Yet the reasoning in all this was profoundly
flawed, and a detailed investigation in 2004 by James Fallows found
that nearly all US national security professionals saw the Bush
administration’s response to 9/11 as a catastrophe.20 Eight flaws
stand out.
First, there is no evidence of any significant connection between
Saddam and al-Qaida (let alone 9/11). Indeed, al-Qaida seems to
have been strongly opposed to Saddam’s regime, and Osama bin
Laden denounced Saddam as an ‘infidel’. The administration of
George W. Bush tried hard to prove a connection between al-Qaida
and Saddam Hussein, but failed.21 Questioned by British parliamen-
tarians on 21 January 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair admitted that
no evidence had been found of any links between al-Qaida and
Saddam Hussein – something his intelligence agencies had told him
repeatedly.22 Bush also eventually admitted, ‘We’ve had no evidence
that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11th’.23
A second major flaw with the project of making the world safer by
attacking Iraq was that, despite the best investigations of American and
British personnel inside occupied Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction
were found. Removing the alleged threat posed by these weapons was
the main justification given for the war. However, it now seems clear
that the existing system of weapons inspection was working well. As
the UN’s chief weapons inspector Hans Blix observed in 2004, ‘The
much maligned, relatively low-cost policy of containment had worked,
and the high-cost policy of counter-proliferation [in other words, war]
had not been needed’.24
A July 2003 report from the UK’s Foreign Affairs Committee
noted that documents claiming Iraq was seeking uranium
from Niger turned out to be crude forgeries. The urgency of disarm-
ing Saddam was underlined in the British government’s September
2002 report on Iraq, now discredited and known unaffectionately
as the ‘dodgy dossier’. The Foreign Affairs Committee report
went on:
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The dossier also claimed that the Iraq military would be able to
deploy warheads containing biological and chemical weapons
within 45 minutes of receiving an order to do so. It is known
that the claim rested on a single source and that there was no
corroborating evidence.25
As a former Labour government adviser put it, ‘no attempt was ever
made to explain that the notorious 45-minute claim referred to battle-
field munitions only, and came from single, uncorroborated sources. If
the attempt had been made, the Sun would not have declared [in
September 2003] ”Brits 45 minutes from doom.”’26
The third problem with the attack on Iraq – perhaps the most funda-
mental, and discussed in more detail later in this chapter – is that the
attack itself has already proven profoundly counterproductive in
combating terrorism. In looting that was prompted by the invasion,
nearly 380 tonnes of nuclear-related high explosives went missing from
a factory south of Baghdad, and the UN’s Atomic Energy Agency
warned that terrorists could be helping themselves ‘to the greatest
explosives bonanza in history’.27 More fundamentally, the attack has
deepened the anger that is fuelling terrorism among Islamist militants
in particular. It has led to major resistance inside Iraq, and whilst the
majority of resisters have been Iraqi, Iraq has also become something of
a magnet and a cause célèbre for these militants from elsewhere: much in
the same way that Afghanistan did during the struggle against the
occupying Soviet forces. Anger and fear have also been stoked by more
general US proclamations of a right to unilateral military action and
‘preventive self-defence’. Time magazine noted that its interviews with
religious leaders, Islamic scholars, government analysts and ordinary
citizens in dozens of countries around the world ‘reveal that the fervor
of those who adhere to radical forms of Islam has intensified since
9/11’.28 Even the UK’s Foreign Affairs Committee noted in July 2003
that the war with Iraq may have impeded efforts to combat bin Laden
and al-Qaida, and that the war may have enhanced the organisation’s
appeal to Muslims.29 The Iraq war has been helping the al-Qaida
network with its propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, as well as
serving as a training ground;30 it provides a particularly useful training
in urban tactics.31 Meanwhile, when the United States uses heavy fire-
power during counter-insurgency operations in Iraq, many of the
effects are videoed and later used as propaganda for insurgency.32 Toby
Dodge, a specialist on Iraq, commented that the Iraq war had had a
bigger impact on British Muslims than Chechnya or Israel–Palestine,
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where British and American soldiers had not been directly involved in
killing Muslims.33 It is true that the 9/11 attack predated the 2003 Iraq
attack, but this of course was targeted at the US, not the UK.
Hugh Roberts, an authority on Algeria and Egypt, stresses that there
is often nothing ‘natural’ or even long-standing about anti-American
sentiments (notwithstanding Chomsky’s emphasis on the longevity
and continuity of American abuses). Yet anger with one’s own govern-
ment has increasingly interacted with anger at the United States to
make a potent and dangerous combination.34 In Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Palestine, Algeria and elsewhere, the 2003 attack on Iraq has greatly
intensified anti-American sentiments – just as the earlier Gulf War did
in 1991. Following the 2003 attack on Iraq – in a world that was
supposed to be safer for the deposition of Saddam – we have seen
bombings linked to Islamic militants in Spain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Morocco, Russia, Chechnya, Turkey, Indonesia, the UK and else-
where.35 Blair was anxious to dismiss any connection between the July
2005 London bombings and the Iraq war, but most British people
disagreed. It had been David Blunkett, Blair’s Home Secretary at the
time, who defended anti-terrorism legislation in December 2001 with
the view that ‘a heightened level of risk comes with our military
alliance with the US’.36 Intelligence officials in the USA and UK
reported in early 2005 that a key threat came from ‘bottom up’ groups
of young, radicalised Muslims who might have little or no connection
to al-Qaida. In Britain, intelligence chiefs and senior police officers said
in early 2005 that planned terrorist attacks had been thwarted there.37
On 7 July 2005 there were four deadly explosions on London’s tube
trains and a bus, with a further four bombs failing to go off two weeks
later. In October 2005, Bush said that at least ten al-Qaida attacks had
been thwarted since 9/11, including three in the US.38
A fourth flaw in the promise to make the world safer – at once obvi-
ous and virtually unnoticed – is that the attack on Iraq and the subse-
quent occupation have themselves been a source of terror.39 Terror to
end terror makes no sense. One study compiled from media reports
concluded that up to 7,350 civilians were killed in the ‘major combat’
phase prior to 1 May 2003.40 Many more were killed in looting, subse-
quent crossfire and coalition retaliation, as well as from poor health
infrastructure. A detailed study in the Lancet, published in October
2004, found that ‘Making conservative assumptions, we think that
about 100,000 excess deaths or more have happened since the 2003
invasion of Iraq. Violence accounted for most of the excess deaths and
air strikes from coalition forces accounted for most violent deaths.’41 As
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one Iraqi internet ‘blogger’ put it in April 2004, ‘I hope someone feels
safer, because we certainly don’t’.42 Part of that danger has come from
the most sustained suicide bombing campaign in history. In all,
between August 2004 and May 2005, Iraqi civilians and police officers
were dying at a rate of more than 800 a month, with an increase in
death rates since the election of January 2005.43
A fifth flaw in the idea that attacking Iraq would make the world
safer is that it has exposed many foreigners in the country to violence
and death. This, of course, includes coalition soldiers. As of 25 October
2005, there had been 2,198 coalition troops deaths in Iraq, with at least
15,200 US troops wounded in action.44 On 19 August 2003, the bombing
of the Canal hotel used by the UN in Baghdad killed at least 23. Aid
agencies left Baghdad in large numbers.
A sixth problem is that the attack, so far from limiting the spread of
nuclear weapons, appears likely to encourage nuclear proliferation.
The fact that the United States has been talking, in effect, about a
nuclear ‘first strike’ against terrorist targets adds to a climate of fear. It
seems to be only those who do not pose an immediate threat that the
US/UK Atlantic coalition has been prepared to attack, and this policy
creates a perverse incentive to arm yourself rapidly (and covertly) so
that you can climb out of this vulnerable category. As in civil wars, an
emphasis on attacking the unarmed serves, in practice, as a major
incentive to acquire arms.45 US officials and international atomic
experts say Iran could have a nuclear bomb by 2006. It already seems
to have mastered the technology for uranium enrichment.46 John Kerry
noted in a pre-election debate with Bush that at the moment when Iraq
was invaded, some 35 to 40 countries had greater capability of making
weapons than Iraq. Comparing the capabilities of Iraq and North Korea
suggests that it is the lack of WMD that may create conditions for inva-
sion. As North Korea’s foreign ministry put it, ‘The Iraqi war shows
that to allow disarmament through inspections does not help avert a
war, but rather sparks it,’ concluding that ‘only a tremendous military
deterrent force’ could prevent attacks on countries the United States
dislikes.47 As Isabel Hilton commented in February 2003:
Since the Korean war, [the North Korean regime] has under-
stood that the disappearance of the Kim [Jong Il] regime, and
even of North Korea itself, is a long-term goal of US foreign
policy. Deterring the US, therefore, has been its fundamental
long-term objective. … China, Russia, Japan and South Korea
all want a nuclear-free North Korea. But they know that such
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an agreement would require a guarantee that the US will not

stage a pre-emptive strike. On September 20 last year, the US
proclaimed its right to stage pre-emptive strikes.48
Russian military spending has been rocketing during the Bush era; in
February 2004, Russia carried out its largest military exercises for two
decades, and Russian generals and defence minister Sergei Ivanov
announced that they were responding to Washington’s plans ‘to make
nuclear weapons an instrument of solving military tasks’. Some reac-
tion from China can also be predicted.49 We seem to have forgotten that
US atomic attacks on non-nuclear Japan in 1945 helped to spur the
Soviet atomic programme in the first place.
A seventh problem with the attack on Iraq is that it has helped under-
mine the whole idea of collective security and has severely damaged the
institutions – notably the United Nations – charged with achieving it.
One could say that the attack on Iraq was effectively a vigilante opera-
tion: except that this would be too kind. Vigilantes typically respond to
crimes, but this attack was essentially pre-emptive. In this it differed
from the coalition attack in 1991 when Bush senior responded to Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. Levels of international consent were also very differ-
ent: to put the matter in a catch-phrase, while the Iraq war of 1991 was
UN-endorsed (with Security Council approval), that of 2003 was simply
un-endorsed.50 The 2003 attack was opposed by a majority of the UN
Security Council members, and many prominent international lawyers
deemed it illegal.51 UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix commented,
‘It was not reasonable to maintain that individual members of the Secu-
rity Council had the right to take armed action to uphold decisions of the
Council when a majority of the Council was not yet ready to authorize
that action’.52 The UK Attorney General told Blair that it was for the UN
Security Council, not him, to decide whether Iraq was complying with
the earlier UN Resolution (1441) of November 2002 that called on Iraq to
allow free access for weapons inspectors.53 As international lawyer
Chaloka Beyani makes clear, it was also for the Security Council to decide
what would be the ‘serious consequences’ referred to in resolution 1441.54
In any case, the usual code for war is ‘to use all necessary means’, not
‘serious consequences’. Significantly, Resolution 1441 was introduced
with an assurance from British UN Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock that
the resolution would not have any ‘automaticity’ that would trigger a
war without further discussion by the Security Council.55
A final problem with the attack on Iraq is that the enterprise of
spreading democracy by force is deeply flawed. The humiliation of an
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imposed solution is one problem. George Soros, who knows something

about practical steps to promote democracy, said of the attempt to use
force to bring democracy to Iraq, ‘In light of the ethnic and religious
divisions, the introduction of democracy could easily lead to the disin-
tegration of the country.’56 Ethnic tensions are indeed rising, with many
Sunni Arabs feeling marginalised from negotiations over the new
constitution, Shi’ites and Kurds sitting on most of the oil, Sunni Arab
insurgents targeting Shi’ite mosques and pilgrims, and growing
numbers of retaliatory killings by Shi’ites; even the growing use of
ethnic terminology implies – and perhaps assists – the ethnicisation of
Iraqi politics.57
If the logic of the attack on Iraq was thus deeply flawed, what then
of the earlier attack on Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11?
Though the issue of weapons of mass destruction did not arise, there
were still many flaws in the approach.
First, the connection with 9/11, though less far-fetched, was still
very questionable. Certainly, the attack on Afghanistan reflected the
fact that the Taliban had allowed al-Qaida to establish its headquarters
and training camps in Afghanistan,58 and the attack did succeed in
disrupting al-Qaida, its leadership and its supporters in the Taliban –
not least by forcing many to flee.59 Bin Laden was certainly an impor-
tant connection between 9/11 and the Afghanistan attack, but he
famously escaped, helped by the US reliance on local militias and by
the gathering US focus on Iraq.60 Significantly, none of the 9/11 attack-
ers were Afghans; most were Saudis, with financial backing also
coming in large part from Saudis.61 Yet Saudi Araba escaped any retal-
iation. In a detailed report for the Project on Defense Alternatives, Carl
Conetta observed:
The Taliban regime, which absorbed most of our attention, bore

only a contingent relationship to Al Qaeda’s activities outside
the region. In fact, most of the Al Qaeda facilities and most of
the foreign troops under their control in Afghanistan had to do
with the civil war there. Most of the organization’s capabilities
to conduct far reaching terrorist acts resided and resides
outside of Afghanistan, and thus fell beyond the scope of
Operation Enduring Freedom [the US-led attack].62
When it came to the activities of al-Qaida beyond the region,

Afghanistan’s importance was not so much in providing sanctuary and
training; rather it lay in providing a recruiting ground for future cadre
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(with most al-Qaida volunteers used as shock troops in local civil war or
as a Taliban security force). Al-Qaida doesn’t really need states or massive
open-air training facilities, as Conetta notes; warehouses and small ad
hoc sites (like Florida flying schools) have served its purposes well.63
A second flaw with the Afghanistan attack was that other more
peaceful options were neglected. Previous US efforts to get the Taliban
to hand over bin Laden had not yielded him, but a deadline could
easily have been set.64 Taliban leader Mullah Omar had asked the US
government for evidence of bin Laden’s involvement in 9/11, and indi-
cated that if this was done he would be ready to hand bin Laden to an
Islamic court in another Muslim country. (Later, in an even more concil-
iatory offer, the Taliban said bin Laden could be handed over to a court
with at least one Muslim judge.)65 Pakistan had a lot of leverage on the
Taliban and a patient approach might have borne fruit over six months
or so.66 In fact, the leaders of two Pakistani Islamic parties are reported
to have negotiated the extradition of bin Laden to Pakistan, but extra-
dition was blocked by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, quite
conceivably on US advice.67 US demands for turning over bin Laden
and the al-Qaida cadre, and the closing of al-Qaida camps and sites,
were framed as non-negotiable, and Conetta comments that this
required that the Taliban assume a supine posture. A national-

ist reaction should have been predictable. And this gave lever-
age to the [Taliban veteran] hardliners in Kandahar, rather than
the more flexible shura (a council of village clerics and mullahs)
in Kabul.68
A third problem was that the attack on Afghanistan prompted signifi-

cant and continuing resistance inside the country. Fourth, the attack
itself was again a source of terror. Fifth, the attack on Afghanistan
stoked up anger among many Muslims around the world. These points
are elaborated later in this chapter.
Finally, the attack on the al-Qaida camps was of dubious benefit in
the context of an increasingly decentralised and amorphous enemy.
Indeed, the attack contributed to the decentralisation of al-Qaida, tend-
ing to disperse rather than eliminate the terror group. A top FBI
counter-terrorism expert estimated that the Afghanistan war led to only
a 30 per cent reduction in al-Qaida’s capacity. Many al-Qaida opera-
tives fled to Iran.69 Many of the al-Qaida leaders returned to their home
countries, with destinations including Chechnya, Yemen, East Africa
and Georgia.70
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Whilst some dispersed al-Qaida terrorists will certainly have found

it difficult to operate,71 dispersal is unlikely to have proved a major
hindrance. Rohan Gunaratna, an expert on al-Qaida, noted in 2003 that
regional commanders were now operating independently of
centralised control. Crucially, the dispersal of al-Qaida seems to have
helped to foster an increasingly decentralised leadership that often has
its own local sources of funding.72 In late 2001, American intelligence
officials said they believed bin Laden had delegated authority for
launching terror strikes to individual cells within the al-Qaida
network.73 In May 2003, Jonathan Stevenson of the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies commented that, perversely, the counter-
terrorism effort ‘impelled an already decentralized and elusive
transnational network to become even harder to identify and neutral-
ize. … Thanks to technology and the multinational allure of jihadism,
the Afghanistan camps were [now] unnecessary.’ Stephenson noted
that mid-level coordinators, already trained in Afghanistan, had subse-
quently been able to operate in dozens of countries, and that bombings
like those in Kenya in 2002 could be left to ‘local footsoldiers’.74
Certainly, the Afghan attack did not prevent the bombing of a Bali
nightclub in October 2002 – an atrocity coordinated by Jamal Islamiyah,
a south-east Asian Islamist terrorist group drawing funding from al-
Qaida.75 The Bali bombing of October 2002 cost perhaps US$35,000 to
carry out, a sum easily gathered from the credit card fraud and petty
crime networks that certain Islamist extremists run.76 Referring to al-
Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, Roland Jacquard, a French expert
on terrorism, commented, ‘What cost al-Qaida millions was the camps.
The group doesn’t have the same financial needs as it did before’. The
cost of planning and executing the 9/11 attacks has been estimated at
no more than US$4–500,000.77
Acting Assistant Director of the FBI’s counter-terrorism division, J. T.
Caruso, reckoned that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
would cause a ‘stuttering’ in al-Qaida’s operation but not necessarily a
‘pause’: because of the decentralised nature of the organization. Al-
Qaida has sometimes reportedly acted like a foundation, giving grants
to those who present ‘promising’ plans for terrorist attacks. It has also
been compared to a corporation with a common ‘mission statement’
and potential for local-level initiative. Decentralised organizations can
be harder to monitor and control.78
Whether the loose network of Islamist terrorists is even accurately
described as ‘al-Qaida’ is also questionable. William Dalrymple wrote
in the New York Review of Books:
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While al-Qaeda has dominated the news since September 11,

2001, there are dozens of similar groups made up of freelance
Islamic radicals trained since the 1980s in camps on the Afghan
border. Many of these were run by the ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence] and funded initially by the CIA (one reli-
able estimate puts the US contribution at 7 billion dollars), and
later, after the Soviet withdrawal, by Saudi intelligence.79
In an important study of al-Qaida, Jason Burke observed that by 9/11,

bin Laden had the loyalty of about a hundred motivated individuals –
the al-Qaida hardcore.80 Further:
For all but five (or arguably three) years of his life, bin Laden
was a peripheral figure in modern Islamic militancy. … Over
the past 15 years, tens of thousands of young Muslim men
made their way to training camps in Afghanistan. Many, as late
as 1998, had never even heard of Osama bin Laden.81
Even in terms of Afghanistan, the problem of al-Qaida was never

‘solved’: both the Taliban and al-Qaida remained present inside the
country’s borders. Al-Qaida was reported by the UN to have subse-
quently reopened training camps in remote areas of eastern
Afghanistan and new recruits were pouring in.82 While the war in
Afghanistan has long been presented as ‘over’, US bombing in
Afghanistan did not end in 2001. Indeed, Washington was still bomb-
ing in 2005: trying desperately to eliminate a force containing elements
of the Taliban and al-Qaida.83
The doctrine of pre-emption
Alongside the apparently serial selection of enemies there has been an

alarming and revealing change in expressed US foreign policy.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Haass stated:
What you are seeing in this [George W. Bush] administration is

the emergence of a new principle or body of ideas … about what
you might call the limits of sovereignty. Sovereignty entails obli-
gations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not
to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet
these obligations, then it forfeits some of the advantages of
sovereignty, including the right to be left alone inside your own
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territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain

the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even lead
to a right of preventive … self-defense. You essentially can act in
anticipation, if you have grounds to think it’s a question of
when, and not if, you’re going to be attacked.84
Referring to ‘those terrorist organisations of global reach and any

terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use
weapons of mass destruction or their precursors’, the US government
stated in September 2002:
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the

support of the international community, we will not hesitate to
act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by
acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them
from doing harm against our people and our country.85
Note that this is not just advocating pre-emptive strikes against those
with weapons of mass destruction; it is advocating pre-emptive strikes
against those attempting to acquire them, and indeed attempting to
acquire ‘their precursors’. It is not clear who is being excluded from this
wide-ranging project. Furthermore, Bush has declared, ‘We will make
no distinction between those who planned these [9/11] acts and those
who harbor them’.86 In fact, the doctrine seems almost infinitely extend-
able. All this represents a major shift from a policy of nuclear non-
proliferation to a policy of actively removing nuclear (and other WMD)
threats. The Pentagon has stated that the United States should prepare
to use nuclear weapons to prevent, or retaliate against, use of WMD.87
Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who pushed for Iraq to
be made a principle target in the ‘war on terror’ after 9/11, observed:
It’s not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding

them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the
support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism. It will
be a campaign, not a single action. And we’re going to keep
after these people and the people who support them until it
stops.88
All this adds up to a very wide-ranging license to kill and a pretty

strong hint of endless war. Donald Rumsfeld said in June 2005 that the
Iraqi insurgency could last as much as 12 years.89 Even the name that
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was initially adopted for the strikes on Afghanistan (‘Operation Infinite

Justice’) seemed to suggest a kind of hunger for perpetual warfare.90
The Pentagon has referred to the need for ‘regime change’ in Iran.
David Frum and Richard Perle, influential neo-Conservatives with
positions at the American Enterprise Institute, noted in 2003 that Iran
was ‘a terrorist state, the world’s worst’.91 Of the regimes in Iran and
North Korea they observed, ‘both regimes present intolerable threats to
American security. We must move boldly against them both and
against all the other sponsors of terrorism as well: Syria, Libya, and
Saudi Arabia. And we don’t have much time.’92 Saudi Arabia was
accused of inciting terror and of being a ‘disguised enemy’.93 Turning to
the Far East in more detail, Frum and Perle noted, ‘our interests (and
those of Japan) differ from those of South Korea. Put bluntly: A North
Korean nuclear warhead that might be sold to al-Qaeda or some other
terrorist group is more dangerous to us than a war on the Korean
peninsula. … In Korea, the surest way to avoid war is to prepare to
fight it.’94 In one chilling passage, Frum and Perle suggest:
Next, we must accelerate the redeployment of our ground

troops on the Korean peninsula so they are beyond the range of
North Korean artillery and short-range rockets. President Bush
and Secretary Rumsfeld have already begun to do this. U.S.
troops originally served to deter the North from invading a
second time; today they have become hostages, whose vulner-
ability the North exploits to deter us – and whose presence
discourages the South from improving its own defences… as
we reposition troops, we should develop detailed plans for a
preemptive strike against North Korea’s nuclear facilities.95
There were also vague threats towards China: ‘the North Korean
nuclear program is a Chinese responsibility, for which China will be
held accountable.’96 The authors referred to the possibility that China
may become ‘menacing’ over the long term.97 This worry found an echo
in a Pentagon review of America’s military needs – leaked in 2005 –
which mentioned China in the context of the need for huge military
spending to deter would-be superpowers.98
Nor is this kind of hunger for war restricted to the United States.
Tony Blair has said that if Bush had held back from intervention in Iraq,
he would have been pushing him in that direction. The British Prime
Minister is also on record as saying that after Saddam was toppled, it
would be necessary to ‘deal with’ North Korea. While there seem in
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practice to be limits to this project (not least because of the prospect of

a Labour revolt), Blair’s own inclinations appear to set few limits. Blair
stated just before the attack on Iraq, ‘What amazes me is how many
people are happy for Saddam to stay. They ask why we don’t get rid of
Mugabe, why not the Burmese lot. Yes, let’s get rid of them all. I don’t
because I can’t, but when you can, you should.’99
Pre-emption is now widely lauded as legitimate. But as a principle
on which to base international relations or international law, pre-
emption is woefully incoherent and dangerous. One difficulty is that a
government might say a war is pre-emptive when actually it has other
motives.100 More fundamentally still, a doctrine of pre-emption would
be totally unworkable if even remotely generalised.101 Let’s suppose it
is right to attack another country if you believe you are about to be
attacked. For those countries who see that this doctrine might be turned
against them (North Korea? Iran? Iraq itself?), do they then have a right
to attack the United States to pre-empt the coming attack?102
In September 2004, following the terrorist attack on Beslan school,
Russia asserted a right to pre-emptive strikes on terrorist bases around
the world.103 It would not be good (or welcomed by the US) if Russia
took it into its own hands to enforce UN Security Council resolutions
on the Israeli-occupied territories, for example.104 Peter Singer notes
that ‘America harbors Cuban exiles who have used Miami as a base
from which to carry out terrorist attacks in Cuba’, and asks whether
this gives Cuba a right to attack the US.105 Few would think that US
support for anti-Sandinista terror in Nicaragua would have justified
Nicaraguan bombing of the US.106 Nor are more distant historical prece-
dents a good advertisement for attacks on the alleged ‘state backers’ of
terrorism. In 1914 when Austria-Hungary went to war on Serbia
(precipitating the First World War), the Austro-Hungarian government
cited Serbian involvement in the assassination of Austrian Archduke
Franz Ferdinand.107
The grave problems arising from the assertion of a right to pre-
emptive strikes become even clearer if we apply the principle to the
realm of law and order within states. What kind of community would it
be if an attack on an individual was deemed acceptable and desirable
merely because some other member of the community believed they had
grounds for thinking that the individual intended harm to them?
Perhaps a community like Salem, Massachusetts, in 1692? What kind of
country would it be, moreover, if entire groups could be attacked because
some other groups believed the victims intended them harm? Perhaps a
country like Rwanda in 1994 or Germany in the 1930s? Mass violence has
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long been hailed and legitimised as ‘preventive’, and has been facilitated
precisely by such dubious predictions; in this sense, as in many others,
the Bush doctrine follows a long and dangerous tradition.
Fuelling anger
Despite the evident satisfactions of Bush’s high-stakes game of Oval

office bingo, the problem of terrorism – unfortunately – goes rather
beyond the 22 ‘evil’ individuals in his deck of cards. (In any case, three
years after 9/11, 19 of the 22 were still free.) Almost 2,700 ‘known or
suspected’ terrorists had been arrested by the United States and its
allies by May 2003.108 (The category of ‘suspected’ is itself suspect,
particularly given the major role that wrongful arrest has tended to
play in generating terrorism.) The figure of 2,700 arrested is still a frac-
tion of the estimated 18,000 al-Qaida members in 90 countries in 2003.
The CIA itself has claimed that some 70,000 to 120,000 recruits went
through bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan,109 though this
seems to involve adding al-Qaida terrorists together with other inter-
national terrorists as well as many terrorists with a national agenda.110
What is very clear is that the problem of terrorism cannot be contained
by a regime that assumes that the number of terrorists is both small and
finite. We can see this even within individual countries. In the wake of
the Bali bombing of October 2002, Indonesian police arrested more than
80 members of Jamal Islamiyah, the south-east Asian terrorist network
linked to al-Qaida. That did not prevent the bombing of a Western hotel
in Jakarta in August 2003, killing at least ten, or the repeat bombing of
Bali in October 2005.111 This is not to say that such arrests are a waste of
time; merely, that the apparently endless supply of ‘new’ terrorists has
to be taken seriously.
Even when dealing with insecurity inside Iraq, there has been an
erroneous assumption among US officials and generals that the enemy
represents a hierarchy – very much on the lines of the occupying forces
– and that elimination of the enemy leadership (first Saddam’s sons,
then Saddam) will disable the violence. The habitual sense of shock
when this happy outcome has persistently failed to materialise reveals
a particular mind-set.
While some US administration officials have optimistically
compared al-Qaida to a snake which will die when the head is cut off,
other analysts argue more plausibly that the network resembles a
mould: you have to tackle the environment in which it grows.112 Rather
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than imagining that terrorists are a discrete group of evil individuals,

we need to look at processes of becoming. How do people come to be
terrorists? This means looking at repressive domestic structures and at
the damaging effect of international conflicts: not least the damage
done by the ‘war on terror’ itself. In counter-terrorism, as in the
evidently very different field of famine relief, there has been a tendency
to focus on a target group without considering the processes by which
people arrived at this extreme state.113
To understand a process of becoming we need a sense of individual
and national history, as well as a sense of the West’s impact on the prob-
lem. But these have generally been lacking, particularly in the United
States. Bush put it with characteristic aplomb when he said, ‘I think we
agree, the past is over.’114 When it comes to history, the very word is
frequently used in the United States to mean something that is dead or
irrelevant (as in ‘you’re history’). At the same time, history is frequently
an arena for narcissism: notably, for Bush and Blair themselves, who have
often invoked ‘history’ to allude to how key actors (notably, themselves)
will be judged in the future. For example, Bush said in the introduction
to the National Security Strategy on 17 September 2002, ‘History will
judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.’115
Blair told the US Congress that if Saddam’s WMD capabilities were being
wrongly assessed, ‘That is something I am confident history will
forgive.’116 Former UK International Development Secretary Clare Short
noted that Blair had a preoccupation with his own legacy.117
The point that counter-terror critically determines the strength of the
terror threat might be lost on Bush, but it is not lost on the terrorists. As
Thomas Friedman put it, Islamist terrorists ‘want to trigger the sort of
massive US retaliation that makes no distinction between them and
other Muslims. That would be their ultimate victory – because they do
see the world as a clash of civilizations, and they want every Muslim to
see it that way as well and to join their jihad.’118
Quite apart from the effect of violent counter-terror in radicalising
people, Bush’s statements have also been encouraging a politics of polar-
isation. Bush famously said after the 9/11 attacks, ‘You are either with us
or against us in the fight against terror.’119 The phrase was apparently
intended to cajole would-be neutrals into supporting the ‘war on terror’.
But for those who do not want to be ‘with’ Mr Bush in his chosen path,
the perverse and unacknowledged logic of the instruction is: join the
terrorists.
Of course, many people are relieved to see the back of the Taliban
and Saddam. But the Bush/Blair retaliation has generated significant
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anger both inside and outside the chosen target countries. Consider the
‘insiders’ first.
Anger in the targeted countries
In theory, the US-led military forces responding to 9/11 were to distin-

guish sharply between the evil people and the good ones: bombing was
to be targeted, abusive governments were to be overthrown and the
welfare of ordinary people was to be protected with humanitarian aid.
However, there have been at least four problems here, all of them
fuelling anger with the US-led coalition.
First, such a project of ‘separation’ is inevitably difficult in practice:
bombs do not always find their targets, economies are inevitably
disrupted, civilians are forced to uproot and so on.
The attack on Afghanistan produced some 500,000 new refugees and
displaced persons,120 and a three-month interruption in humanitarian
supplies cost many lives.121 Even after the Taliban collapsed, banditry
and lawlessness impeded distribution.122 An estimated 3,400 Afghan
civilians were killed by US military action between the start of the
Afghanistan attack in October 2001 and end of March 2002.123 High-
level bombing was designed to avoid US casualties, and in this it was
successful: by 10 January 2002 only two US personnel had been killed
by enemy fire.124 The Pentagon’s most optimistic estimate was that 85
per cent of US bombs hit their targets. But even that implied some 15
per cent – 450 or more – went astray.125 The United States acknowl-
edged dropping two 225-kg bombs in a residential area north of
Kabul.126 Navy spokesmen said 60 per cent of bombs dropped on
Afghanistan were smart bombs, though most of these were originally
‘dumb’ bombs smartened with satellite-guided tail-fins.127 Killings in
Afghanistan continued even as press coverage faded almost to nothing.
For example, eleven civilians were killed in Paktika, eastern
Afghanistan, on 10 April 2003, after a US warplane mistakenly dropped
a laser-guided bomb onto a house. Such incidents inevitably alienated
the local population.
Between March and September 2002, a massive 1.7 million refugees
are estimated to have returned to Afghanistan. But lack of funding for
reconstruction meant many were finding it difficult or impossible to
survive, and some were having to leave once more. Much of the recon-
struction money was used for internally displaced people after ethnic
unrest in the north and widespread drought.128 In February 2003, one
visiting journalist described the country’s ‘utter desolation and
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poverty’, adding, ‘already about half of the 3 billion pounds from the
UN [pledged towards reconstruction] is said to have been spent,
though the Afghan government claims to have seen only a fraction of
the money’. Very large numbers of aid agencies were working in the
country but ‘with notable exceptions, their achievements are difficult to
discern’. Tens of thousands of refugees were living in the bombed-out
ruins. Meanwhile, the Afghan Army stood at only 4,000 – roughly one-
twentieth of its proposed level. ‘As fast as new soldiers sign up for
training at 20 pounds a month – if, indeed, they are paid at all – others
are homesick for their remote villages and are quitting’.129 In May 2003,
mines or unexploded shells were killing 100–150 people a month in
Afghanistan.130
A second problem was that the proclaimed international project of
separating the good from the evil, already unrealistic, was made more
so by the corresponding incentive in the ‘enemy’ countries to ‘muddy
the waters’, notably by mixing themselves with civilians. Taliban
artillery was sometimes adjacent to mosques and schools131 – at least in
part a legacy of the old Soviet-backed government, which put military
facilities in urban areas to protect them from the mujahadeen.132 In Iraq,
soldiers reported that some guerrillas dressed as civilians,133 and Sean
Huze, a US infantryman attached to the 1st Marine Division in 2003,
complained:
the position we were put in – fighting an enemy that used

women, children, and other civilians as shields; forcing us to
choose between firing at ‘area targets’ (nice way of saying
firing into crowds) or being killed by the bastards using the
crowds for cover – is indescribably horrible. I saw more than a
few dead children littering the streets in Nasiriyah [southern
Iraq] along with countless other civilians.134
A third problem was that civilian casualties inevitably fuelled resist-

ance, which led to further civilian casualties. Newsweek interviewed
three Iraqi resistance fighters in the summer of 2003 and noted, ‘The
fighters seemed able to move openly in Amriyah [some 30 miles east of
Baghdad], without fear that anyone might report them to the Ameri-
cans’.135 The resistance fighters added that they had 5,000 armed fight-
ers and were angry with US forces for the deaths, on 29 April 2003, of
18 parents and children protesting the military occupation of their
primary school in Fallujah. This was an incident that transformed the
threat to US soldiers, who had been largely safe in Fallujah and other
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cities north of Baghdad.136 The US military claimed US soldiers were

returning fire on gunmen in the crowd, but Human Rights Watch found
no ‘conclusive evidence’ of bullet damage on the school where US
soldiers were based.137 When four security contractors were killed and
mutilated in Fallujah on 31 March 2004, there was massive retaliation
by US marines against the city, killing perhaps 600–700. US command-
ers claimed nearly all were legitimate targets, but local doctors said
most were women, children and the elderly. US-led forces attacked
again in November 2004 and one week into the siege a BBC reporter
put the unofficial death toll at 2,000. An estimated 36,000 homes were
destroyed in the devastated city.138
Abuses by interrogators have been very widespread in Afghanistan,
with many of those arrested having few provable connections to any
outlawed organization. US officials have been torturing prisoners not
only at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, but also at Bagram in Afghanistan and
Guantanamo in Cuba.139 The CIA has been flying suspects to prisons in
Egypt, Jordan and Syria where they have been tortured.140 In Iraq,
arrests scooped up insurgents and non-insurgents alike, mimicking the
indiscriminate choice of Iraq as a target in the first place. In an alarm-
ing admission, coalition forces’ military intelligence officers estimated
that between 70 and 90 per cent of those deprived of their liberty in Iraq
had been arrested by mistake.141 Mark Danner commented that given
the paramount need for good intelligence, ‘arresting and imprisoning
thousands of civilians in murkily defined “cordon and capture” raids is
a blatantly self-defeating tactic.’142 Ill-treatment following capture in
many parts of Iraq was documented by the ICRC (International
Committee of the Red Cross).143 With coalition forces’ casualties mount-
ing, there was pressure to ‘break’ the prisoners and extract informa-
tion.144 Well before the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, Newsweek reported:
As many as 8,000 people have disappeared since Saddam’s

regime collapsed, and many relatives are searching for answers
about their fate. More than 5,000 are in U.S. custody. … Those
who have been detained are nearly always held incommuni-
cado, without access to lawyers or even the right to contact
their families. In most cases their loved ones can’t find out
where they are. … Conditions are primitive. … A frequent
punishment is to make men kneel outside in the sun, where
afternoon temperatures exceed 125 degrees Fahrenheit. Those
under interrogation are subject to sleep deprivation, loud
music and other methods the military believes stop short of
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torture. Authorities even held a suspect’s wife and children as

hostages until he turned himself in, which he did. … [O]ne Red
Cross delegate says [of the US authorities], ‘What they’re doing
is completely illegal, and they know it.’145
These atrocities – and especially those at Abu Ghraib – have fuelled

anger in many Arab and Muslim countries as well as encouraging large
numbers of young men to take up arms across the Sunni belt of Iraq.146
Atrocities by armed groups inside Iraq sometimes dramatised the links
with US abuses: several captives were beheaded when dressed in a
Guantanamo-style orange jump-suit. Abu Ghraib in particular must
have seemed to confirm extremists’ propaganda that depicted the
Western world as sexually immoral and decadent. Importantly, the
shame extended far beyond those who were directly humiliated. After
the Abu Ghraib scandal erupted, an Iraqi woman in her mid-twenties –
living in Baghdad and known on her website as ‘Riverbend’ – noted,
‘We burn with shame and anger at frustration at not being able to do
something.’147 One Iraqi civilian commented in April 2004, ‘Anyone
who does not fight will have a spot of shame on their face for genera-
tions’.148 A young commander of Sunni insurgents, Abu Theeb, said
that after the invasion of Iraq:
I roamed the streets with a dagger in my pocket. I was too

ashamed to come back home and see my family while Baghdad
was under the occupation, dead bodies and bullet shells every-
where. … When the infidel conquers your home, it’s like seeing
your women raped in front of your eyes and like your religion
being insulted every day.149
Referring to ‘the trauma of occupation’, Scilla Elworthy commented, ‘In

cultures where the concept of honour is profound, those who humiliate
and dehumanize do so at their peril’.150 A young man at Fallujah told
journalist Mark Danner in November 2003:
For Fallujans it is a shame to have foreigners break down their

doors. It is a shame for them to have foreigners stop and search
their women. It is a shame for the foreigners to put a bag over
their heads, to make a man lie on the ground with your shoe on
his neck. This is a great shame, you understand? This is a great
shame for the whole tribe. It is the duty of that man, and of that
tribe, to get revenge on this soldier – to kill that man. Their
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duty is to attack them, to wash the shame. The shame is a stain,

a dirty thing; they have to wash it. No sleep – we cannot sleep
until we have revenge. They have to kill soldiers.151
A fourth problem with the proclaimed project of separating ‘military’

and ‘humanitarian’ spheres is that the US-led coalition has repeatedly
been tempted to manipulate the humanitarian project so as to boost
the military enterprise (and this in turn has reinforced the determi-
nation of some local actors to disrupt the humanitarian project). The
credibility of the USA’s ‘humanitarian’ project was not helped by
previous actions and inactions. Western interest in Afghanistan had
waned in the 1990s with the end of the Soviet occupation and then
the rise of the Taliban. Humanitarian needs were severely neglected,
and by mid-2001 widespread famine conditions existed, with a deficit
of over one million tons of food.152 In Iraq, sanctions had killed
perhaps 500,000 children under five in the 1990s.153 While the events
of 9/11 freed up humanitarian resources, the military and political
motivations were hard to miss.
Bush and Blair tried to use humanitarian aid to show that they were
hostile only to the Afghan and Iraqi regimes and had only good inten-
tions towards civilians. However, civilian deaths were certain: not least
because of the tactic of high-altitude bombing. Some way had to be
found to sugar the kill. As Bush put it when planning the Afghan war,
‘Can we have the first bombs we drop be food?’154 Some of this aid was
indeed dropped from a great height, and may have exposed recipients to
dangers from mines.155 For the most part, the US media seems to have
enthusiastically embraced this feed-as-you-bleed approach. Yet the idea
that people will love you because you drop food as well as bombs is
perhaps a strange one; the parallel is not exact, but it is not entirely clear,
for example, that Osama bin Laden would have been forgiven for
destroying the World Trade Center had he decided simultaneously to
drop food packages on the homeless of Chicago.156
On 29 October 2001, Bush told his inner circle of security advisers in
the US National Security Council:
We also need a public relations campaign focused around the

Taliban. We need a donors’ conference [a conference of food aid
donor countries], someone who will organize it as an offset to
Ramadan [due in mid-November]. We need – how to get the
coalition something to hang its hat on when we continue the
bombing during Ramadan. We need to have humanitarian help
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during Ramadan, the likes of which Afghanistan has never

seen. We also need a political initiative in this time period.157
With bombing planned for Ramadan, Bush added a note of cultural

sensitivity: the United States should ease up on strikes during prayer
time.158 Bush was ready to take this ‘sensitivity’ even further. At a
National Security Council meeting on 31 October, he said, ‘We need a
humanitarian donors’ conference as we head into Ramadan. We ought
to be calling on the Taliban to let trucks pass. And if they don’t, that will
violate the principles of Islam.’159
In Afghanistan, food was useful not only in legitimising violence but
also as cover for military missions: a dual purpose also served by human-
itarian aid in earlier conflicts in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan.160 On 6
October 2001, there was a meeting of the National Security Council, with
a video link to Bush at the Camp David retreat. Secretary of Defence
Donald Rumsfeld worried that bombers would be noticed leaving
Missouri, and that since there were still 15 or more hours before they
arrived, the enemy might get valuable early warning of the coming
attack. Bush replied, ‘Let them go. Try some disinformation.’ Rumsfeld
in turn responded, ‘We’ll tell people they are full of food.’ 161 On the
ground, US soldiers in Afghanistan were soon to link relief distributions
to provision of information about the Taliban and al-Qaida.162
The blurring of military and humanitarian agendas seems to have
confused some key players who were instinctively distrustful of the
rush to war with Iraq. Most notably, Clare Short, a prominent critic of
Blair’s approach to war with Iraq, recalls that she nevertheless held on
to her position as International Development Secretary during the
attack on Iraq – in large part because she felt she was needed to lead the
UK humanitarian and reconstruction effort.163
Harnessing humanitarian operations to political agendas created
major problems for NGOs. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) did not
accept NATO funds and this helped it to operate, but many others in
Afghanistan were taking USAID money while still wanting to be seen
as neutral humanitarians.164 Despite MSF’s stance, the Taliban
claimed responsibility for the murder of five MSF workers in June
2004, and a Taliban spokesman stated that ‘international aid workers
were working for the policy of America’.165 In July 2004, MSF
announced it was withdrawing from Afghanistan after 24 years.166
Bush said humanitarian aid to Iraq was ‘an opportunity to change the
image of the United States’,167 while US Secretary of State Colin Powell
called for NGOs to act as ‘a force multiplier to us … an important part of
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our combat team’.168 Journalist Peter Stothard, who spent 30 days with
Blair from 10 March 2003 during the Iraq crisis, commented, ‘Labour
MPs like “a Kofi plan”. “We’d better Kofi this” means we had better
obscure this bit of military planning with a good coat of humanitarian
waffle.’169 UN and NGO staff quickly became a target in occupied Iraq.
Atrocities included the capture and killing of Margaret Hassan, director
of CARE International in Iraq. There was a widespread perception that
all assistance to Iraq was part of the US political agenda.170
Anger outside the targeted countries
Outside Afghanistan and Iraq, the ‘war on terror’ has also been stoking
up anger, especially among Muslims. The US and UK governments
have repeatedly stressed that they have nothing against Muslims as a
whole. Yet a State Department list of 26 countries whose nationals pres-
ent an elevated security risk within the United States had 25 Muslim
countries (and North Korea).171 How does that look if you are Muslim?
The violent side-effects of violence can be wide-ranging. For example,
the attack of Afghanistan seems to have stirred up conflicts in
Israel/Palestine and Kashmir, with India moving troops to the Line of
Control in the latter.172
Anger has been directed both at the main Western protagonists of
the ‘war on terror’ and at regimes collaborating in this ‘war’. Indeed,
the ‘war on terror’ has often meant that hostility towards the West and
the USA in particular has been ‘added on’ to what was previously
hostility towards one’s own government.
Anger at the West
The strength of those using terror against their own regimes should not
be taken for granted, and neither should the vehemence of their anti-
American ideology. Michael Mann has suggested that ‘al-Qaeda
consists of Arab exiles too weak to take on their own states.’173 Further,
many of those lumped in by the United States as ‘al-Qaida’ are essen-
tially national terrorists (Chechen, Kashmiri, Pakistani, Indonesian etc.)
Mann asks an important question, ‘Why should any of these national
terrorists consider themselves enemies of the US?’174 He concludes,
‘Jihadis … alienate most people through extreme violence, as they did
in the early 1990s in Algeria and Egypt. Islamism and jihadis were
declining from the mid-1990s. But then US actions began to revive
them.’175
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In Indonesia, even after the attack on Afghanistan, 61 per cent of

those surveyed reported that they viewed the United States favourably;
but by August 2004, after the attack on Iraq, this had fallen to only 15
per cent.176 The Iraq war has had the effect of hardening anti-US senti-
ments throughout Arab and Muslim worlds.177 Feargal Keane, a
widely-travelled journalist, commented on the 2003 Iraq war, ‘If there
is a silent Arab majority – or even minority – who believes this war is a
good thing, I have yet to find it.’178 Top US counter-terrorism expert
Richard Clarke noted, ‘Nothing America could have done would have
provided al-Qaeda and its new generation of cloned groups [with] a
better recruitment device than our unprovoked invasion of an oil-rich
Arab country.’179
Acts of terror naturally prompt the astonished and horrified reaction,
‘Why on earth would anyone do this?’ Incomprehension is almost
mandatory. But we now understand quite a lot about the making of a
terrorist and the role that world events may play in this process. Indi-
vidual personality disorders seem to be no more common among terror-
ists than non-terrorists.180 Everything we know suggests that a perceived
abuse of American power (including attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq)
has helped to push significant numbers of people along the path of anger
and alienation that can produce a terrorist.181 The Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan had earlier set a benchmark for the production of resistance
and, later, terror.
Now that interventions have increasingly been seen through the
prism of locally controlled media, this process has been reinforced. The
television station al-Jazeera (with an estimated 35 million viewers even
before the 2003 war) has provided a credible alternative to CNN’s
coverage of international conflicts, and during the 2003 attack on Iraq,
al-Jazeera showed footage of Iraqi casualties several times an hour.182
After the Abu Ghraib scandal erupted, photos were shown on some
Arab TV channels every few minutes. The potential mobilising power
of images is suggested by the tactics of extremist groups: for example,
at the Finsbury Park mosque in London, extremists have sometimes
used footage of abuses against Muslims (including in Bosnia) to cement
the loyalty of their followers and even to prepare them for fighting.
Of course, recent counter-terrorism wars do not arrive in a vacuum:
they come in the context of a long historical experience of colonialism
and institutionalised humiliation in Arab and Muslim countries. The
colonial experience has shaped perceptions not just in the Middle East
but also, for example, in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Part
of the humiliation of colonialism came when the Muslim Umma
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(community) was divided into nation states by the West.183 Bernard

Lewis notes that, ‘Muslims … tend to see not a nation subdivided into
religious groups but a religion subdivided into nations.’184 Indepen-
dence did not necessarily solve the problem: for example, the influen-
tial Egyptian Islamic extremist Sayyid Qutb saw nationalism as a
usurpation of God’s sovereignty, putting reverence for the nation and
the people where God alone should be.185
Humiliation has been repeatedly stressed by terrorists as something
they wish to redress. A bin Laden videotape of 7 October 2001 noted the
‘humiliation and disgrace’ that Islam had suffered ‘for more than
eighty years’186 The figure seems to hark back to the decline and fall of
the Ottoman Caliphate after the First World War. Speaking of the terror-
ists who killed 24 US servicemen in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, bin
Laden said they had ‘washed away a great part of the shame that has
enveloped us.’187 After her research on terrorists from various faiths,
Jessica Stern noted, ‘While the terrorists I met described a variety of
grievances, almost every one talked about humiliation.’188 While Islam
is often seen – particularly in the West – as legitimising a violent reac-
tion to grievances and humiliation, it can also be seen as tempering this
reaction. Fuad Nahdi, publisher of the Muslim magazine Q-News,
commented, ‘The humiliation of the Arab world has been much worse
than what the Germans went through. Thank god we have not seen a
Hitler in the Arab world, largely because of Islam.’189
The attack on Iraq in 2003 looked to many in the region and beyond
like a process of recolonisation. The longer the coalition forces stay, the
more this impression will be confirmed. While Saddam’s demise brought
widespread relief in Iraq and Kuwait in particular, the assertion of West-
ern power and the continued occupation has reopened many historical
wounds in the Arab world: not least the humiliating defeat of Egypt,
Syria and Jordan by Israel in 1967, a defeat that led to Israel’s occupation
of Sinai and the Golan Heights. The managing editor of the Cairo-based
al-Ahram Weekly, Hani Shukrallah, commented:
The sense of humiliation born out of June 1967 was perhaps the
most shattering of all in proportion to the immense hopes of
emancipation and restored national dignity that the wave of
pan-Arab nationalism, led and symbolised by Nasser’s leader-
ship, had come to trigger.190
Linked to this, of course, has been the widespread anger at abuses of

Palestinians by Israel, a country strongly supported by the United
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States – anger that can only be stoked up by everyday frustrations at

repressive regimes in the Arab world. Radical Islamists have often
equated the US occupation of Iraq with Israel’s policies towards the
Palestinians.191
One man whose family have for generations been keepers of an ancient
Muslim shrine at Kerbala, Iraq, commented, ‘If you compare the two
countries – Iraq and the US – their power [the US] is greater, so people
have to believe that there can be a stronger force, and that force is God.’192
After noting the enthusiastic reception of the news that an old Iraqi man
had shot down a US Apache helicopter during the ‘major combat’ phase
of the Iraq war, al-Ahram’s Hani Shukrallah suggested that such resistance
gave a sense of pride and humanity to many in the Arab world:
for the Arabs, as galling and bitter as the sense of injured dignity
has been and continues to be, it has also been disabling, creating
a situation and mindset in which their choices seemed to be
limited to either suicidal vengeance or abject and bitter hopeless-
ness. It remains to be seen whether the war in Iraq will put the
Arab masses on a new trajectory, one in which they fight to win,
rather than just to die while maintaining some sense of their basic
human dignity. But whatever the course of the war in the coming
days or weeks, for the moment the Arab masses have two things
going for them: They are not mice, and they are not alone.193
Any sense of empowerment, however, was fleeting in the face of the

overwhelming force of the United States. Humiliation during the war has
taken many forms. In April 2003, senior Guardian journalist Jonathan
Steele observed that in Jordan, ‘Many cite a photo, shown on several
front pages, which they found a shocking symbol of the looming occu-
pation. It showed three Iraqi women in long black robes and veils being
body searched by an American soldier.’194 Sheik Khaled el-Guindi, a
moderate imam in Cairo, commented, ‘Most of the pictures we see are of
Iraqi heads stepped on by American Army boots. It is no longer just an
occupation, but a humiliation’.195 Of course, the Abu Ghraib atrocities
added greatly to the sense of humiliation. Musdah Mulia, a progressive
scholar in Indonesia, observed, ‘Moderates are finding it more difficult
to discuss issues like human rights and democracy when photos of
Americans torturing Iraqis keep appearing’.196
The atrocities of 9/11 produced a need to retaliate, and this was natu-
ral enough. The phenomenon of ‘killing to wipe one’s eyes’ – of making
someone else mourn instead of oneself – is familiar to anthropologists.197
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9/11 saw thousands of innocent people slaughtered in cold blood, and

while some Americans urged restraint (including many relatives of the
9/11 victims),198 many members of the public as well as government offi-
cials and media reporters stressed that the USA should respond with
military strikes. Yet it is precisely this impulse to retaliate which should
show us why a ‘war on terror’ cannot be won.199 Why would other
people not feel similar emotions and impulses when they are attacked,
when their innocent people are bombed or shot in the name of somebody
else’s ‘justice’?
If in addition it is stated publicly and repeatedly that the ‘war on
terror’ will make the world a safer place (as the US and UK govern-
ments have done), does this not reinforce the message that you do not
believe your victims – and there are always innocent victims – are the
same as you, with the same emotions, including the same all-too-
human desire to retaliate? To your victims, your very confidence in
your own violence as a solution proclaims your racism and your failure
to recognise their humanity. Paradoxically, those who have been repeat-
edly insulted and systematically dehumanised may demand revenge in
part to remind themselves and their oppressors that they are human
(‘they are not mice’), that they do exist.200 This mechanism is hard to
grasp because such ‘brutal’ acts of revenge – as the adjective implies –
inevitably make the perpetrators seem less than human.
In Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, Shylock explains his seem-
ingly inhuman desire to mutilate Antonio (who owes him money)
precisely as a manifestation of his own humanity in a context where
others have dehumanised him:
He hath disgraced me … laughed at my losses … and what’s

his reason? I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew
hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? … If
you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not
laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us,
shall we not revenge?
Similar sentiments can be found among civil-war rebels. During Sierra

Leone’s war, the main political pamphlet of the rebel Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) stated that the military government ‘behaves as if
we are despicable aliens from another planet and not Sierra
Leoneans.’201 Significantly, after the joint army–rebel coup of May 1997,
the RUF broadcast an ‘Apology to the Nation’. It included the state-
ment, ‘We did not take to the bush because we wanted to be barbarians,
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not because we wanted to be inhuman, but because we wanted to state

our humanhood’.202 Meanwhile, government soldiers increasingly
conformed to the insult that they had become rebels or ‘sobels’. And
again, at the level of global terrorism, a tape apparently from bin Laden
asked, ‘Under what grace are your victims innocent and ours dust, and
under which doctrine is your blood blood and our blood water?’203 In
Afghanistan, a pro-Western military commander named Haji Muham-
mad Zaman, said, ‘Why are they hitting civilians? This is very bad.
Hundreds have been killed and injured. It is like a crime against
humanity. Aren’t we human?’204
While Shylock presents his violent revenge as a manifestation of his
humanity, he is also ready to adopt the inhuman persona he has been
saddled with, ‘Thou call’dst me dog before thou hadst a cause; But,
since I am a dog, beware my fangs.’ One of the sickening pictures from
Abu Ghraib prison was of a prisoner being pulled along on a leash. It
is hard to imagine a more dehumanising – or incendiary – image.
Demonising and infantilising people can have much the same effect
as dehumanising them. This is part of the problem with labels like ‘axis
of evil’. In April 2002, North Korea in effect challenged Bush to stop
calling it part of the ‘axis of evil’, agreeing to resume dialogue with the
United States on the condition that it was not ‘slandered’ again.205 Bush
has also tried to infantilise North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, referring
to him as a ‘pygmy’ and a ‘spoiled child at the dinner table’.206
Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist who grew up in the French Caribbean
island of Martinique and then went on to work in an Algerian hospital
during the Algerian war for independence, pointed to a feeling of non-
existence among those subjected to colonialism, the result of not being
treated as human beings. His radical solution was expressed in The
Wretched of the Earth, first published in 1961, ‘At the level of individuals,
violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority
complex and from his despair and inaction, it makes him fearless and
restores his self-respect.’207 We do not have to approve of this line of
thought or action to see that it makes a good deal of psychological sense.
The idea that violence could alleviate a feeling of non-existence was also
put forward by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, first
published in 1951. Arendt stressed that what she called ‘totalitarian
terrorism’ was different from earlier revolutionary terrorism:
It was no longer a matter of calculated policy which saw in

terrorist acts the only means to eliminate certain outstanding
personalities who, because of their policies or position, had
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become the symbol of oppression. What proved to be attractive

was that terrorism had become a kind of philosophy through
which to express frustration, resentment, and blind hatred, a
kind of political expressionism which used bombs to express
oneself, which watched delightedly the publicity given to
resounding deeds and was absolutely willing to pay the price
of life for having succeeded in forcing the recognition of one’s exis-
tence on the normal strata of society. … What the mob wanted,
and what Goebbels expressed with great precision, was access
to history even at the price of destruction.208
Some variation of Fanon’s ‘feeling of non-existence’ would be unsur-

prising in the case of Palestine, where Israeli Prime Minister Golda
Meir famously asserted in 1969, ‘There is no such thing as a Palestinian
people. ... It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their
country. They didn’t exist.’209 A similar idea was expressed in the older,
infamous slogan coined in 1901 by the writer Israel Zangwill in relation
to what is now Israel, ‘A land without a people for a people without a
land’.
In certain social contexts, participation in terrorism may bring kudos
and recognition for the perpetrator and his family. This has often been
the case in Palestine.210 In Pakistan, thousands will attend the funeral of
a boy who has ‘martyred’ himself in terror attacks in Kashmir. The
father of one such ‘martyr’ said that poor families became celebrities
after losing a son, and that everyone began to treat them with more
respect.211
If Fanon understood how humiliation feeds violence, this mecha-
nism has also been explored by American psychiatrist James Gilligan
(on whom more in Chapter 4) and by Mark Juergensmeyer in his book,
Terror in the Mind of God. Juergensmeyer observed that for a wide range
of religious terrorists (including in the paramilitary Palestinian organi-
zation, Hamas) remedying dishonour and humiliation seems to have
been of central importance.212 Juergensmeyer went on, ‘I do not think
that economic or social despair lead automatically to violence, since
virtually everyone on the planet has experienced some sort of economic
and social hardship in his or her life.’213 The most important factor, he
concluded from his case-studies, was:
the intimacy with which the humiliation is experienced and the

degree to which it is regarded as a threat to one’s personal
honour and respectability. These can create the conditions for a
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desperate need for empowerment, which, when no other

options appear to be open, are symbolically and violently
expressed.214
Preaching rights that you do not uphold has long been a source of
anger and violence. Hannah Arendt understood that rage comes more
from hypocrisy than from simple injustice.215 Somewhat similarly,
Evelin Lindner – who worked as a psychological counsellor in
Germany and the Middle East and who did research on humiliation
and violence in Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi – concluded that:
Deprivation is not in itself necessarily perceived as a form of

suffering that calls for action. However, deprivation that is
perceived as an illegitimate violation of ideals of equality and
dignity is perceived as a humiliation that has to be responded
to with profound sincerity. … Feelings of humiliation are trig-
gered when those – often referred to as the West – who preach
human rights and the inclusion of every human being within a
global ‘us’, are at the same time perceived as violating their
own preaching. This is called ‘double standards’.216
Again, the implication in these ‘double standards’ is that the victim is

not considered entirely human. After all, if human rights exist and are
heralded and yet a particular group is repeatedly abused, does it not
follow that the system is implicitly labelling them as not human?217
What conclusion can logically be drawn from the proclamations that
humans have rights and the reality of holding individuals incommuni-
cado, indefinitely and in cages at Guantanamo and other camps? When
Afief Safieh (the representative of the Palestinian authority in the UK)
expressed his anger at Israeli government indifference to Palestinian
victims, he added, ‘I don’t belong to a species that have children of a
lesser God’.218
Demonising the enemy can also be counterproductive in making
him more alluring. The ‘war on terror’ has apparently increased the
allure and mystique of bin Laden. The New York Times reported that ‘the
Afghan conflict seems to have confirmed Osama bin Laden as a folk
hero’.219 There is no doubt that bin Laden now has a cult following
among many people in the Arab and Muslim world.220 For example, in
Saudi Arabia, according to a 2004 poll, 49 per cent of the population
sympathised with the aims of bin Laden.221 Many British government
officials, including senior military figures, believe that American
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demonisation of bin Laden over the years has encouraged many people
in the Arab world to regard him as an icon.222
In his brief but insightful history of banditry, British historian Eric
Hobsbawm described the thin line between outright criminals and
‘social rebels’ (on the lines of Robin Hood) whose crimes are taken as
blows against the system. Hobsbawm referred to a category of bandits
he called ‘the avengers’. These were bandits who carried out spectacu-
lar acts of terror, often but not always against the powerful, and who
proved, Hobsbawm observed, that ‘even the poor and weak can be
terrible’.223 Of course, bin Laden was never poor, but many have still
come to see him as symbolising the political strength of the weak.
Saddam Hussein was another figure who attracted followers in the
Middle East by conspicuously standing up to the United States from a
position of weakness: for some at least, his status as ‘hero’ was strong
enough even to outweigh abuses against hundreds of thousands of
people – nearly all of them Muslims – within Iraq.
In the manner of colonial and other repressive governments in the
past, the US government sought to pin rebellion in Iraq on ‘external
elements’. Whilst this seriously underplayed the preponderance of
Iraqis in the resistance, Iraq has indeed become something of a magnet
for militants elsewhere in the Middle East. It has offered a chance to
escape surveillance in the militants’ own countries and a chance to fight
jihad against identifiable and accessible targets. American forces in Iraq
have arrested Egyptians, Palestinians, Tunisians, Yemenis and
Lebanese. Sunni Muslims of bin Laden’s Salafi persuasion were seen in
Fallujah. Shia Muslims from the Lebanese Hizbollah were reported by
the British Army to be active in Basra. London-based Saudi dissident
Saad al-Fagih said efforts to crack down on terrorism in Saudi Arabia
could be driving jihadis across the border into Iraq, ‘If a young man is
confronted with no choice but to end up in a small cell being tortured
and the other option is to flee to Iraq, Iraq is a good option. It’s an ideal
place and there’s an ideal enemy.’224
The process by which people have been radicalised to the point of
becoming terrorists is one that has played out differently in different
countries; but it seems to have some common elements. Very often, anger
at injustice in one’s own society has interacted with anger at interna-
tional events. Among those feeling angry at injustices at home have been
first and second generation immigrants in Western societies. The ‘war on
terror’ has tended to deepen this double-anger: not only by increasing
grievances at Western foreign policy but also by reinforcing domestic
oppression in many countries around the world and by boosting
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discrimination and anti-Muslim prejudice in the West. Particularly in the

United States, part of the Western reaction to 9/11 has been increased
suspicion of ‘internal enemies’ (see Chapter 9). It is important to under-
stand the factors that encourage Muslims in the West to see themselves
as part – or not part – of Western societies. Such factors – especially the
interaction of anger at one’s own society and anger at international
events – are well illustrated by the case of Zacarius Moussaoui (who
eventually pleaded guilty to helping al-Qaida carry out the 9/11 hijack-
ings). The story told by his brother, Abd Samad, is worth recounting in
some detail.225
As a boy, Zacarius showed no particular signs of ‘evil’. Abd Samad
describes his brother as ‘an ideal younger brother. He was smart, clever
and kind – a really nice boy.’ They were born in France to Moroccan
immigrant parents. Their parents were divorced when they were little,
and their mother put them in an orphanage. The brothers joined a gang
on a housing estate in Narbonne in southern France. They were rivals
with a gang from a neighbouring estate which had nearly all white
people. Zacarius made some middle-class friends at secondary school
but requested a move to a vocational school to be a mechanic. Abd
Samad comments, ‘I realised that he quite simply lacked self-confidence
because of his social roots. The son of a Moroccan cleaning woman in the
midst of sons of company directors? So he switched schools and joined
me at the vocational college. In no time he realised he had made a
mistake.’ The boys’ mother and stepfather moved to a smart area of
Narbonne. ‘We were the only north Africans in the area. We went from
one swimming pool to another, tried our hand at tennis and even, some-
times, pony-riding … thanks to Zacarius who was quickly accepted in
this circle.’ However, Abd Samad remembered being cut off from north
African culture:
Aicha [the boys’ mother] never talked to us in Arabic. So we

felt discriminated against even among the north African
community, because we didn’t speak its language. … Nor did
she teach us anything about Arab customs, or Muslim culture.
Zac and I asked her several times how you prayed and why. I
was 25 when I went into a mosque for the first time, in Mont-
pellier. I think the first mosque Zacarias went into was in
Britain [as an adult].226
The boys did not feel accepted in the West either – they were between
two worlds, ‘We didn’t feel French, and we realised as much every time
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we came up against racism’. At school, the boys were repeatedly asked

why they were not eating pork. When they said it was because they
were Muslims, Abd Samad remembers the reply was, ‘Oh for heaven’s
sake! Can’t you Muslim people be like everybody else?’ Zacarius had a
white girlfriend. He got into a fight at a club and while being hit, he
heard, ‘Had it with these niggers! They’re even taking our women.’ Of
course, not everyone chooses to react to such incidents with violence;
indeed, Abd Samad’s account suggests the brothers reacted very differ-
ently to similar circumstances, ‘When Zacarius was faced with humili-
ation, he reacted differently from me. He locked himself away in his
suffering, nurtured it, it gnawed away at him quietly.’ Zacarius seemed
to his brother to be quickly discouraged in looking for work, and quick
to suspect racism if refused. But racism was a fact, Abd Samad recalls,
and some bosses were quite frank, saying ‘I don’t want any Arabs.’
The 1991 Gulf War seems to have been important in further radicalis-
ing Zacarius Moussaoui. At the time, he was studying engineering at
Perpignan in southern France. During the war, classes split into pro- and
anti-American factions – as Abd Samad saw it, between those cheering
bombing and those ‘who were touched by the plight of Iraqi civilians’.
Abd Samad recalls, ‘We had the feeling that the France that sent in troops
to fight alongside the Americans was not our France. I think it was at that
moment that Zacarius started to feel that he belonged to the ‘Blacks’,
whereas people of French extraction were ‘Whites’.’ Zacarius had new
friends. He hardly spent time with born-and-bred French and his new
friends cultivated an attitude of rebellion, ‘They were forever denigrating
politicians and intellectuals – French ones in particular.’
Zacarius then went to South Bank University in London. He said the
English were tolerant only on the surface. Abd Samad had started to
practice Islam, but Zacarius showed no interest. Zacarius wanted to get
rich and asked his girlfriend to go to England with him. Abd Samad
recalls, ‘Zacarius was deeply wounded by her refusal to follow him.’ The
brothers’ sister said that Zacarius came to her saying, ‘Abd Samad and
[his wife] Fouzia are doing tawassul, they’re heathens. Be on your guard
with them, but whatever else happens don’t say anything to them.’ (For
Sunni Muslims, tawassul involves asking Allah for a favour, invoking the
name of a prophet or saint. It is rejected by Wahhabis [a Sunni reform
movement originating in Arabia].) Abd Samad heard that his brother had
behaved strangely during a visit to Morocco, ‘Everything for him was
forbidden (haram), but he was contradictory. He would forbid others to
smoke and yet he’d go to a corner of the building to smoke cigarettes.’227
Abd Samad describes the recruiting techniques of the extremists:
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‘Recruiters’ invariably proceed in the same way. First of all,

they pick out young people who have been estranged from
their families, the strong moral anchors that are their father,
mother, brothers and sisters, even friends.
After several months exclusively with an extremist group, the recruit

is ready to go for training in a camp:
Once in the camp, it is easy, as in any sect, to make him lose his
bearings. He is made to go hungry, belittled and set tasks he
can’t complete, but told that others before him have succeeded
and gone on to ‘great things’.
Abd Samad comments:
Because he is ‘incompetent’, the only thing he can do to help the

cause is to give his life to it. And this will also prove to others that,
at the end, he met their expectations. He is now ripe for suicide.228
The story of Zacarius Moussaoui shows how an individual can turn

against the West when a feeling of attraction to Western ways feeds into
an identity crisis. Simple antipathy does not capture the whole story.
The way that hostility towards the West in particular can co-exist with
an attraction to Western culture was noted by reporter John Burns in a
perceptive article just after 9/11. Burns wrote that:
When the Taliban began their rule in Afghanistan in 1996 by

hanging television sets from trees and outlawing music and
films, they were at the extreme edge of an uneasiness that is
widespread in traditional societies that have begun to feel
inundated by Western, and particularly American, culture.229
The lure of America – and long visa queues outside US embassies –

found a counterpart in anti-American feelings, in disappointment at
rejection, and often in resentment arising from harsh conditions in the
United States itself:
Often, in discussions with Islamic militants, anger over Israel

or Iraq or Bosnia spills over into a recounting of more personal
experiences, sometimes trifling, sometimes not, in which
encounters with America – time spent working in menial jobs
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or studying in the United States, or a brush with United States

immigration authorities – stirred resentments that became a
trigger for antagonism.230
Writer Jonathan Raban gives an account of a strain of terrorist thought

that has reacted violently to a Western decadence that has proven, very
often, all too tempting.231 Evidence that some terrorists have been
tempted by ‘Western decadence’ is plentiful. For example, the Kuwaiti-
born Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – said to be al-Qaida’s ‘number 3’ and
arrested in Rawalpindi in early 2001 – was a frequent visitor to the red-
light district in Manila when he lived in the Philippines, and had a
reputation as a womaniser.232 Zaid Jarrah, who crashed US Airlines
flight 93 in Pennsylvania on 9/11, was a gregarious party boy from
Lebanon.233 The attractions of the ‘high life’ may also fuel resentments
more directly: one 17-year-old Palestinian, whose attempt to carry out
a suicide bombing had failed, commented, ‘Our life is worthless. …
Israelis enjoy their life. They go out at night, they have cafes and night-
clubs. They travel all over the world. They go to America and Britain.
We can’t even leave Palestine.’234
When Juergensmeyer interviewed Mahmoud Abouhalima, an Egypt-
ian and one of the men convicted of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center, Abouhalima stressed the deceitful character of many contempo-
rary politicians claiming to be Muslim but following secular codes of
conduct.235 In 1981, at a time when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was
rounding up Muslim activists like Abouhalima, the young man decided
to go to Germany on a tourist visa. There he married a German nurse,
and when they broke up, another woman. During his initial years in
Germany, Abouhalima recalled, he lived a ‘life of corruption – girls,
drugs, you name it’. ‘He went through the outward signs of Islamic
reverence – daily prayers, fasting during the month of Ramadan – but he
had left the real Islam behind.’ Then he ‘got bored’ and returned to a
committed religious life. His (second) wife became a Muslim.236 In 1988,
Abouhalima joined the Muslim struggle in Afghanistan, though he
claimed it was only in a non-military capacity.237
An analysis by the veteran journalist Maruf Khwaja illuminates
some of the pressures that are created by conflicting demands on young
Muslims, particularly in the West. He notes that Islam is demanding in
terms of the expected rituals and sacrifices, and detects in Britain:
[a] widening generation gap within Muslim families – mani-

fested in the loss of parental control and decline in the moral
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authority of the family elder, and in the imposition of dracon-

ian restrictions (particularly on female dependents). … Muslim
young people, after all, want to do what their secular friends
do – have nights out, go clubbing, have boyfriends or girl-
friends. … The young resent the fact that in the traditional
Muslim home all the things that attract them – music, dance,
cinema, television, even many kinds of hobby and sport – are
taboo, cardinal sins, regarded as Satanic.238
People react to these processes in very different ways. But for a very
small minority, a violent rejection of all things Western seems to be an
attractive option.239
Knitting together diverse grievances
The Bush administration tends to stress that international terrorists ‘hate

America’ and that they ‘hate our freedoms’. We have seen how a variety
of US government actions have indeed fuelled anger and terror, but there
is also an element of inverted narcissism in the ‘they hate us’ analysis.
Many of the grievances harboured by terrorists have historically been
directed at local regimes. US actions become relevant, first, because they
have often bolstered undemocratic and unpopular regimes and, second,
because they have relatively recently encouraged a coalescing of diverse
grievances under an anti-American or anti-Western ideological umbrella.
In fact, the ‘war on terror’ has played a key role in knitting diverse griev-
ances together into an anti-American agenda. Even in West Africa, Muslim
populations express increasing opposition to US policy in the Middle East,
and a corresponding increase in fundamentalist proselytisation.240 Al-
Qaida, in effect, has capitalised on a range of essentially local struggles,
including Islamic groups using terror against their own governments – for
example, in the Philippines, Uzbekistan and Algeria. The ‘war on terror’
has also given additional licence for domestic repression, and, as Time
magazine noted, one factor intensifying the terror of radical Islamists has
been opposition to crackdowns on militancy carried out by governments
like those of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.241
Hugh Roberts stresses that al-Qaida is a synthesis, sealed in 1998, of
Wahhabi activism (bin Laden and company) and Egyptian extremism
(centred on Ayman al-Zawahiri), with both wings embracing anti-
Americanism rather recently. Egyptian extremists have traditionally
focused their hostility on the Egyptian state. For his part, bin Laden was
allied with the Americans over the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and
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Wahhabism focused on non-US enemies. Wahhabism took on an anti-

American aspect with the large-scale US military presence in Saudi Arabia
(home of Mecca) during and after the first Gulf War.242 Also underpinning
resentments in Saudi Arabia (which produced 15 of the 19 hijackers of 11
September as well as bin Laden himself) has been a major social and
economic crisis, with an estimated 35 per cent of Saudi youth being unem-
ployed.243 Rapid population growth has produced a situation where half
the country is under 18. Debt repayments have escalated, fuelled by costly
military purchases, an expensive welfare system, and generally moderate
oil prices (one of the main benefits to the United States of its alliance with
the Saudis). Said Aburish has written of a permanent uprising.244 There has
been widespread anger at the Saudi regime and, by extension, at US
support for it. 245
Hugh Roberts stresses that, insofar as Algerian jihadis have had
foreign targets at all, they have usually had France in their sights –
notably in the 1993–96 period. This choice of target reflected the colo-
nial experience, French resistance to decolonisation, and a profound
interference by French governments in Algerian politics from the 1980s.
Attacks on foreigners have not been directed at Americans. Yet hostil-
ity to US policies has been gaining ground in Algeria (as also in Tunisia
and Morocco, where France has again been the traditional enemy); at
the extreme, Algeria’s GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)
has ties to al-Qaida and its anti-American ideology has been strength-
ened. One key factor in the rise of (violent and non-violent) radicalism
in Algeria, Roberts suggests, has been the subversion of the authority
(moral, intellectual, social) of the ulema (the Muslim legal scholars),
with religious radicals going back to a more rudimentary version of
Islam. A second factor – as in Saudi Arabia and Egypt – has been US
foreign policy, notably the wars with Iraq. Significantly, in Algeria the
9/11 attacks and the war on terrorism gave a new lease of life to a
waning domestic military campaign. By the spring of 2001, the Alger-
ian military had been very much in the dock for a variety of abuses.
Roberts argues that the most pressing need in Algeria is constructing a
state (including an army) that is bound by the rule of law. Yet with 9/11,
the Algerian army has been able to secure a rehabilitation and say, in
effect, to the Americans, ‘Thank you, at last, for joining us in the war
against terrorism!’ At the same time, the rehabiliation of the Algerian
state has also been assisted by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s initia-
tives in retiring generals associated with Algeria’s 1990s ‘dirty war’.246
In Afghanistan, too, anti-American sentiment is neither natural nor of
long standing. Jason Burke notes that, ‘The Taliban used to be wary of
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Osama bin Laden and his brand of hard-line internationalised militancy.

Their project was limited to Afghanistan and they bore no ill-feeling to
America or the West.’ All that has changed, however.247
In an important study that chimes with Roberts’ and Burke’s analysis,
Fawaz Gerges notes that jihadi movements have tended to focus hostil-
ity on the ‘near enemy’ (governments in Algeria, Egypt and so on) rather
than the ‘far enemy’ (the USA and its Western allies). These movements
were largely in retreat through the 1990s: ordinary Muslims tended to
recoil from their excesses, and meanwhile national security services had
weakened the jihadis, who were also reeling from poor financial manage-
ment and internal divisions. In many ways the al-Qaida focus on attack-
ing America represented a desperate attempt to reignite flagging jihadi
movements by provoking US retaliation, with Egyptian leader al-
Zawahiri failing to convince key henchmen that the ‘far enemy’ was a
wise focus for attacks. The power of bin Laden – though given a great
deal of emphasis in the 9/11 Commission report – was by no means
absolute. However, US-led retaliation for 9/11 – and the Iraq war in
particular – has succeeded in doing just what bin Laden had hoped.248 As
al-Qaida commander Seif al-Adl put it, ‘The Americans took the bait and
fell into our trap’.249
In the Philippines, Islamist extremists have been given a boost by the
‘war on terror’, as James Putzel shows.250 Despite the US vilification of
the Islamist rebel movement Abu Sayyaf, the crisis in the Philippines is
complex, and again cannot be reduced to the ‘evil’ of a few terrorists.
Responding to pressure on land in the Philippines’ major agricultural
regions, and to a militant peasantry, the Philippine government encour-
aged mass resettlement. The Muslim population of Mindenau, fully 76
per cent in 1903, was down to 20 per cent from the 1960s. Muslims in
Mindenau and the Sulu archipelago have found themselves in a perma-
nent minority, with little prospect of remedying their poverty through
democratic means. To maintain its rule over Mindenau, Putzel suggests,
the state relied on a Christian settler elite, a tiny Muslim elite and private
armed forces. These processes helped to create Abu Sayyaf and the
armed movement in Mindenau. The government military campaign
against the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front (based in Mindenau and
neighbouring islands) in 2000 was ruthless and helped the rebels to gain
support.
In this context, 9/11 gave the government of the Philippines an oppor-
tunity to secure direct assistance from the United States in bringing
Mindenau under control. In early 2002, the first of some 660 US troops
went into combat – something that violated the Philippine constitution.251
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In February 2003, the Bush administration announced that these troops

would be joined by an additional 3,000.252 The US intervention has
tended further to unite Muslims in Mindenau in opposition to that inter-
vention.253 In fact, a revived Abu Sayyaf has now gained considerable
support among the local population.254 US involvement may help Islamic
militants to seize the nationalist mantle.255
Whereas the Muslims are a minority in the Philippines, they are a
majority in Indonesia and Malaysia. This means that the Indonesian and
Malaysian governments need to keep more distance from US foreign
policy. Even so, Indonesia has found the ‘war on terror’ useful in relation
to armed separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya.256 In the major military offen-
sive against Aceh in May 2003, the Indonesian government seems to have
been emboldened by 9/11.257
In Uzbekistan, repression linked to a terror crackdown has fed into
extremism. Police use of torture has been routine, something acknowl-
edged by the US State Department. The British ambassador to Uzbek-
istan, Craig Murray, said, ‘The intense repression here combined with
the inequality of wealth and absence of reform will create the Islamic
fundamentalism that the regime is trying to quash.’258 Torture has been
used to provide (almost entirely bogus) information to the CIA and
Britain’s MI6: information that links elements of the Uzbek opposition
with Islamist terrorism and al-Qaida.259
Pakistan also shows clearly some of the radicalising tendencies of the
‘war on terror’. While Iraq was attacked on the basis of weapons of mass
destruction it did not possess, Pakistan does have the nuclear bomb – and
the US-led ‘war on terror’ has threatened to put this armoury into the
hands of religious extremists. The Bush/Blair response to 9/11 has
already given a powerful shot in the arm to religious revivalism in
Pakistan. One Guardian journalist reported in May 2003:
In the months that followed September 11, a tide of Islamic

revivalism swept through Pakistan. Anger at American foreign
policy is deeply and universally felt. For many it began with
the US-led campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan and
the recognition in the months that followed that Washington
and London have neglected their promises of reconstruction in
the country they bombed. It is being fuelled again by increas-
ingly overt FBI raids across Pakistan in the search for al-Qaida
suspects and, inevitably and overwhelmingly, by the war in
Iraq. In Pakistani eyes, American foreign policy is targeting the
religion of Islam. Will Pakistan be next? It is the question on
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everybody’s lips. Suddenly, the Islamic parties no longer seem

to be on the margins of society but triumphantly riding a new
wave of national bitterness and frustration.260
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s popularity in Pakistan

foundered when he gave his support for the attack on Afghanistan, not
least because people from the Pashtun ethnic group in Pakistan saw the
fall of Pashtun power in Afghanistan.261 This drop in support was
particularly intense in North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Isabel
Hilton notes that:
In the NWFP, Musharraf’s support of the US was taken as

betrayal, and nothing has altered the conviction that the
Afghan war was a war against Islam. … On the ground, in the
NWFP and in southern Afghanistan, armed confrontations
continue between Pashtun fighters on both sides of the border
and US-led forces who are still trying to subdue what they
characterise as al-Qaida and Taliban resistance.262
Conservative religious parties have gained partial control not only of

NWFP but also of Baluchistan, another province to which many Taliban
and al-Qaida operatives fled from Afghanistan.’263
Concluding remarks
The ‘war on terror’ has not only been actively counterproductive; it has
also taken attention and resources away from a range of issues that
have to be tackled if terrorism is to be minimised. Part of this has been
a neglect of US homeland security. In this sense, it is part of an atten-
tion deficit disorder. (George W. Bush said in his first pre-election
debate with Kerry, ‘The best way to protect our homeland is to stay on
the offence.’) Another part of the attention deficit was allowing the
escape of bin Laden and neglecting the reconstruction of Afghanistan
while concentrating on the planned attack on Iraq (see Chapter 3).264
Alongside the focus on Iraq there has been a significant neglect of
nuclear proliferation. The bizarre incentive that the Iraq attack creates
for covert nuclear arms programmes has been mentioned. If anything,
this is made worse by new US enthusiasm for so-called ‘mini-nukes’
(designed to attack buried nuclear, chemical or biological threats) as
well as by the expressed willingness of the United States and the UK to
engage in ‘first use’.265 Unlike in the Cold War, the Pentagon now
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FUEL ON THE FIRE
contemplates ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons against countries that may

not have nuclear weapons themselves.266 The ‘war on terror’ also
distracts from the need to render secure the fissile material that already
exists. As Peter Singer notes:
Probably the most effective action that can be taken to prevent

terrorists from getting hold of nuclear weapons is to ensure
that all fissile material, whether from weapons programs like
those of Russia or Pakistan, or from nuclear power programs,
is rendered harmless, or safely stored and protected.267
Yet the Bush administration first tried to eliminate this programme for
the former Soviet Union, and then severely under-funded it.268 Russia
has perhaps 1,000 metric tonnes of weapons-grade uranium or pluto-
nium.269 More than three-quarters of its supplies are not properly
secured.270 Richard Norton-Taylor observed that in Russia:
more than 20,000 nuclear warheads sit in 120 separate storage

sites. A single artillery shell of nerve agents is small enough to fit
into a briefcase and contains enough lethal doses to kill 100,000
people. The US is blocking funds to secure Russian stores while
it spends billions sending tens of thousands of troops to the Gulf,
with British support, to topple a dictator who presents no
existing threat to American or British security.271
One final point is worth mentioning. Anger resulting from the ‘war on
terror’ may yet feed into terrorism by individual Americans (especially
soldiers). A key role in the second worst terrorist attack on the US, the
1995 Oklahoma bombing, was played by a 1991 Gulf War veteran horri-
fied by the killing of civilians in that war. Gore Vidal comments, ‘At the
close of the [1991] war, a very popular war, McVeigh had learned that
he did not like the taste of killing innocent people. He spat into the sand
at the thought of being forced to hurt others who did not hate him any
more than he them.’272 At first glance, this is pretty hard to square with
the fact that McVeigh later killed a large number of innocent people.
But the Gulf War experience does seem to have helped propel McVeigh
down a bizarre and violent path. It encouraged a belief that the US
government was waging war on civilians (a view subsequently rein-
forced by the deaths of cult-members at Waco, Texas, in 1993, after US
federal agents attacked – a tragedy that McVeigh journeyed to witness).
The anger of many American soldiers at the way they were misled into
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the Iraq war is not to be underestimated.273 Violence begets violence: we

often do not know how until afterwards.
If the idea of a war on terror is so counterproductive, how then are
we to explain the persistence and appeal of such counterproductive
tactics? Chapter 3 will consider self-interested elements, looking partic-
ularly at ‘war systems’. Some will hold that explanations based on self-
interest are less plausible than so-called ‘cock-up’ theory: the idea that
we are in the hands of a bunch of idiots – led by the archetypal ‘fool on
the Hill’ – who are making a series of horrendous mistakes. The latter
possibility is not discounted. However, it is important to investigate the
psychological functions of failing tactics, and how the magical thinking
behind these tactics is made to appear plausible. This is attempted from
Chapter 4 onwards.
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3 War Systems: Local and Global
Introduction
To understand the ‘war on terror’, we need to look more closely at the

notion of ‘war’. We may think we know what war is, but do we?
Many contemporary civil wars can be better understood as systems
than as contests. The normal assumption is that the aim is to ‘win’ – a
position that assumes that there are ‘two sides’ with aims that are
essentially military and set ‘at the top’. However, the aims in a war
are likely to be numerous, with many of the most important actors
being more interested in manipulating (and perhaps even prolonging)
a declared war than they are in gaining a military victory. In contem-
porary civil wars in Africa and elsewhere, both government and rebel
forces have repeatedly engaged in attacks on civilian populations that
have predictably radicalised these populations and have predictably
attracted support for the enemy. There have also been many instances
of soldiers selling arms to ‘the other side’ as well as various other
forms of co-operation between ostensible enemies; an example of the
latter came in May 1997 when there was a joint military coup by
Sierra Leonean soldiers and rebels who had ostensibly been fighting
each other for most of the previous six years. Within a framework
focused on ‘winning’, these behaviours seem incomprehensible or
irrational (or perhaps appear to be ‘mistakes’). However, aims other
than winning have often been important in civil wars. They include:
carrying out abuses under the cover of war, enjoying a feeling of
power, making money, and even creating or preserving some kind of
‘state of emergency’ so as to ward off democracy or provide cover for
the suppression of political opposition.1 When it comes to war, in
other words, winning is not everything; it may be the taking part that
counts. Indeed, as Orwell saw in his novel Nineteen Eighty-Four,
certain kinds of regimes may thrive off enemies and perpetual war.
The irrationality of counterproductive tactics, in short, may be more
apparent than real, and even an endless war may not be endless in the
sense of lacking aims or functions.
Michel Foucault gave some advice to those who might wish to
understand the internment of dissidents – which he refers to as the
Gulag – in the former Soviet Union. He emphasised the importance of:
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Refusing to restrict one’s questioning to the level of causes. If

one begins by asking for the ‘cause’ of the Gulag (Russia’s
retarded development, the transformation of the party into a
bureaucracy, the specific economic difficulties of the USSR),
one makes the Gulag appear as a sort of disease or abscess, an
infection, degeneration or involution. This is to think of the
Gulag only negatively, a dysfunctioning to be rectified – a
maternity illness of the country which is painfully giving birth
to socialism. The Gulag question has to be posed in positive
terms. The problem of causes must not be dissociated from that
of function: what use is the Gulag, what functions does it
assure, in what strategies is it integrated?2
Foucault also stressed that power shapes knowledge, and vice versa;
when it came to any set of social practices, he wanted to know who had
been given the right to speak what counted as the truth. His approach to the
Gulag and to power/knowledge are both useful in relation to civil
wars. First, the problem of the causes of these wars should indeed not
be dissociated from that of function. Second, in analysing civil war, we
can also usefully ask who has been given the right to speak what counts
as the truth; whose interpretations, conversely, have been marginalised
and disqualified; and what practical purposes have been served by the
language and definitions adopted? In civil wars, while both ‘sides’
have often portrayed the conflict as a battle between ‘us’ and ‘them’,
civilians (if they are consulted at all) have frequently pointed to
systems of collusion and to motivations that have very little to do with
military victory.3
Part of the key to understanding these systems is rejecting the temp-
tation to take the fault-lines of conflict at face value. What are the
systems of collusion obscured by ‘war’? What are the hidden conflicts
(for example, class conflict, conflict between armed and unarmed
groups, conflict between men and women, between young and old)
that are obscured when officials and journalists portray civil war as a
battle between two or more armed groups? Which groups effectively
rise above the law in the context of a conflict and which fall below the
law? While conflict is an undeniable reality, we need to keep a very
open mind about the nature – and the functions – of any particular
conflict.
Experience with civil wars and local wars should impress on us the
dangers of simplistically dividing the world into good and evil, those
who are ‘with us’ and those who are ‘against us’. It is not just that a
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complex world will always resist such oversimplifications. It is also

that we need to understand the reasons for violence, including extreme
violence and terror directed at civilians. What is more, many civil
conflicts teach us that it is precisely the initial or apparent legitimacy of
a particular struggle that may provide the space, opportunity and
impunity for abuses that will not be denounced or corrected; the most
striking examples of ‘legitimised abuse’ seem to arise when legitimacy
is derived from being the victim of a genocide (as in the case of Israel
and its oppression of the Palestinians; Rwanda and its exploitation of
the Democratic Republic of Congo; and even Serbia, where suffering at
the hands of Croatian Ustashe in the Second World War fed into the
1990s persecution of Bosnians and Kosovan Albanians).
This chapter brings some insights from civil wars into an under-
standing of the global ‘war on terror’: significantly, the global ‘war on
terror’ and contemporary civil wars share many of the same dynamics.
Some of these similarities seem to be inherent in the idea of ‘war’ itself
and the legitimacy it habitually bestows on very varied kinds of
violence.4 Other similarities reflect the fact that similar global forces
have helped to shape both contemporary civil wars and the current
‘war on terror’.
The advantages of bringing an understanding of civil wars to bear on
the ‘war on terror’ are underlined by the fact that the global ‘war on
terror’ is itself made up of civil wars to quite a large extent: for example,
in Colombia, the Philippines, Chechnya, Afghanistan and, increasingly,
Iraq. Aggressive approaches to the problem of ‘terror’ in relatively
localised wars have often created opportunities for lucrative abuse (for
example, by paramilitaries in Colombia or Russian generals and soldiers
benefiting from looting, kidnapping, taxing, salary diversion and oil
extraction in Chechnya); aggressive approaches also tend to prolong the
conflict that legitimises these abuses. Presenting civil wars within the
framework of a global ‘war on terror’ has often encouraged additional
demonisation of rebels and additional resources for counter-insurgency,
making a resolution more difficult.
Of course, one should not fall into the trap of insisting that dynamics
in the ‘war on terror’ are exactly the same as those in civil wars (which
themselves vary greatly). For one thing, a global war immediately runs
into problems of sovereignty. For another, the fact that counter-terror is
being waged in large part by major and well-resourced democracies
produces a significant difference from counter-insurgencies waged by
under-resourced autocracies: not least, perhaps, in heightening the need
to carry public opinion. Even so, there are valuable lessons to be learned
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from combating ‘terror’ in the context of a civil conflict. The main focus
in this chapter will be on experience with counter-insurgency and some
of the implications for global counter-terror operations. But first it is
important to examine some similarities between insurgency and terror
networks.
Insurgency and terror
Contemporary insurgencies and terror networks have some significant

common characteristics – many of them linked to the nature of contem-
porary globalisation. The first is decentralisation: factions have tended
to proliferate and chains of command have often been weak. This
makes it all the more difficult to isolate a fixed and finite group of rebels
or terrorists whose elimination will ‘solve the problem’, not least
because any such elimination would likely be followed by the emer-
gence of more armed rebels or terrorists.5 The tendency for factions to
be numerous and for chains of command to be weak reflects, in part,
the proliferation of cheap weaponry in the global market. Also signifi-
cant has been the increasingly free circulation of information, of a range
of primary commodities, and of money itself.6 The access which terror/
rebel organisations have enjoyed to lucrative global markets (as with
al-Qaida and diamonds in East and then West Africa)7 not only adds to
the difficulty of destroying them; it simultaneously encourages rela-
tively decentralised patterns of command by helping diverse groups to
gain access to weapons and to build organisational capability. Weak
states and underpaid officials have tended to be poorly positioned to
confront rebel or terror networks that are tied into global trading
networks. Nor are the sums of money required necessarily huge: it may
not be very expensive to acquire a few bombs to put on some trains or
buses, for example.
Also encouraging weak lines of command has been a tendency for
rebel/terror movements to try to take advantage of a wide range of
grievances, many of them only tangentially related to the expressed
goals of the various movements. In Sierra Leone, rebels took advantage
of the grievances of politically sidelined chiefs, marginalised traders,
ousted government officials and even underpaid government soldiers.
Yet members of these groups rarely subscribed to RUF (Revolutionary
United Front) ideology or even submitted to RUF commands. Many of
the grievances feeding rebellion were primarily local, reflecting in part
the way colonial and post-independence governments had ruled
through a kind of ‘decentralised despotism’ (to use Mahmood
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Mamdani’s phrase), a mode of rule that tended to defuse any incipient

national politics and to channel grievances in the direction of local
chiefs in particular.8 In a civil war, local grievances are most likely to
acquire some kind of coherent anti-government tone in circumstances
where there are major abuses within the government’s counter-insur-
gency operations. Within international terror networks, we can see a
combination of an anti-American agenda (very strong in al-Qaida prop-
aganda) and a very wide variety of local grievances against specific
governments – grievances that do not necessarily have much to do with
anti-American feelings.9 Hugh Roberts has stressed that anti-American
feelings are neither natural nor or long-standing in countries such as
Algeria and Egypt, but that aggressive US actions tend to superimpose
an American enemy on top of local grievances.10 Jason Burke has drawn
attention to the loose and shifting hierarchies among very diverse mili-
tant Islamic groups involved in terrorism, and to the fact that bin Laden
has often exerted weak or non-existent control over many of these
groups. Burke comments, ‘Some “Islamic terrorists” share most of bin
Laden’s aims, some share a few, some share none. The hundreds of
groups, cells, movements, even individuals, lumped together under the
rubric “Islamic terrorism” are enormously diverse.’11 As noted, the
dispersal of al-Qaida after the attack on Afghanistan tended to reinforce
the decentralization of violence. Burke points out that crackdowns on
terrorist leadership have frequently encouraged a more decentralised
violence and an increasing focus on ‘soft targets’.12 In both civil and
global wars, abusive counter-insurgency/counter-terror tends to knit
together the diverse grievances of those whose targets might otherwise
be resolutely local.
A third important similarity between insurgencies and terror
networks has been the key role of anger (an anger exacerbated by abusive
counter-insurgency). In recent civil wars and in terrorism, some of the
anger – which seems to be particularly strong among young men – comes
from a sense of exclusion that is linked to globalisation: human rights
have been proclaimed and desirable lifestyles publicised, whilst the
harsh reality is that economic, social and political rights have fallen short
(either for the rebellious individuals or for groups they identify with).13
Perhaps significantly, rebellion in Sierra Leone has been most common
among the semi-educated, those whose expectations have been raised
and horizons widened beyond what a rock-bottom economy can
provide.14 Terrorists, too, have normally had some education: as one man
who has defended British Muslims convicted of terrorist offences in
Yemen commented, ‘These are intelligent and semi-integrated people.’15
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Those living in a democracy (like those who carried out the July 2005
London bombings) may be in a better position than many, but their anger
(whatever the cause) would seem self-evident, and the expectation that
rights will be observed is perhaps heightened by living in the West with
its pervasive talk of rights and freedoms.
A fourth important similarity between rebel and terror networks is
that, in an age when media visibility is crucial in projecting your power,
these networks have frequently shown an interest in taking responsi-
bility for atrocities, whether or not they have actually carried them out.
This can help to create an exaggerated image of coherence and power.
Atrocities may ‘advertise’ the ability of terror groups to stand up to a
greater power.16 In Sierra Leone the rebel RUF – often rather uninter-
ested in holding territory – boosted its image of power and brutality by
claiming ‘credit’ for a wide range of atrocities against civilians when
many of these were actually carried out by government soldiers. Some-
what similarly, an analysis of al-Qaida in Time magazine noted in
December 2003:
Since the invasion [of Iraq], the number and frequency of

attacks have risen dramatically. It serves al-Qaeda’s propa-
ganda purposes to make people believe it is behind every
outrage – even if like-minded groups are acting on their own.
Investigators suspect bin Laden’s outfit had a direct hand in
the May bombings in Saudi Arabia and the August suicide
assault on Indonesia. But Moroccan and French security offi-
cials say the synchronized bombings in Morocco in May [2003]
were primarily a freelance affair.17
Considerable autonomy has also been attributed to those responsible

for the Madrid bombings of March 2004,18 and similarly to those who
carried out the London bombings of July 2005.19 Jason Burke stresses
that bin Laden has been ambiguous about his own responsibility for
atrocities, but adds that he does have an interest in enhancing the
importance of his own role in Islamic militancy.20
A fifth similarity between rebel and terror networks is the desire on
the part of some insurgents to create a brutal response which will bring
them additional recruits, while simultaneously confirming the insur-
gents’ propaganda about the callous nature of the enemy or even of the
world in general. As Hannah Arendt observed in relation to totalitarian
terror in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, action may constitute the
most effective propaganda – not least by making your enemy resemble
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the image in your verbal (or visual) propaganda. (This is discussed

further in Chapter 7.) Frantz Fanon believed that anti-colonial terror
could provoke retaliation that would expose the true, brutal nature of
colonialism (especially of French colonialism in Algeria);21 in this way,
terror would attract recruits to rebellion. Bin Laden is widely held to be
trying to create a kind of ‘clash of civilisations’ that will make Muslims
as a whole ‘realise’ the true enemy. Again, we have seen variations of
this before. In Guatemala during the 1980s, guerrillas were aware that
brutal counter-insurgency could bring them new recruits. For example,
the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor) used a tactic that evangelical
missionaries called ‘provoked repression’. This included planting flags
in a village at night to force villagers to choose between retaining the
flags (and perhaps attracting government retaliation) and uprooting
them (which would identify them to the guerrillas as government
supporters).22 In Liberia, Charles Taylor’s 1989 rebellion gained
strength by provoking massive retaliation against certain ethnic groups
on the part of Samuel Doe’s brutal regime.23 Escalating violence and
making your propaganda come true may have a less calculating
element: Paul Richards stresses that some of Sierra Leone’s rebels were
trying to reduce the world to ruins in line with their view that the
world was inherently corrupt and rotten.24
A sixth important similarity between rebel and terror networks is
that actions by them which tend to widen and prolong the conflict may
bring immediate benefits that outweigh any concern with ‘winning’.
The exercise of power-through-violence may bring immediate satisfac-
tions, especially where the perpetrator feels a deep sense of powerless-
ness or shame. There is also the possibility that rebel/terror networks
will evolve profitable trading mechanisms that begin to become an end
in themselves – helping to cement the desire to keep a conflict going.25
How far this has gone with al-Qaida is unclear, but there is some
evidence of profiteering.26
‘Counter-insurgency’ and ‘counter-terror’
If contemporary insurgency and terror have some important similarities,

so too do contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. The
first is the prevalence of counterproductive tactics. The second is that
violence (including extreme, indiscriminate and counterproductive
violence) has often had functions for a diverse coalition creating it. In
other words, it has often served a range of practical and psychological
purposes even as it fails in its proclaimed aim of defeating or reducing
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terror. In many ways, fuelling opposition and sustaining conflict can

actually be regarded as a policy success.27
Counterproductive tactics
Counterproductive tactics have taken three main forms: killing

civilians, letting the enemy escape, and trading with the enemy.
Both counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have frequently
included the killing of civilians. Those responding to rebellion/terror
can opt for a precise operation that carefully targets rebels/terrorists, in
which case ordinary people are relatively unlikely to be alienated and
radicalised. In its purest form, this option involves simply bringing indi-
vidual rebels or terrorists to justice via appropriate legal channels. At the
other extreme, those responding to rebellion/terror can opt for a policy
of intimidating or attacking a much wider group. This is likely to radi-
calise many people, generating additional enemies rather than reducing
their number. In Chapter 2, we saw the counterproductive effects of the
‘war on terror’ in fuelling anger and terror: notably, as a result of the
killing of civilians. This is also a vital lesson from civil wars: abusive
violence creates the enemies it claims to be trying to defeat.
Lessons from the decolonisation experience seem to have been
forgotten. As US terrorism ‘tsar’ Richard Clarke noted when he saw the
portrayal of French anti-insurgency in Algeria in the film The Battle of
Algiers: ‘After the known terrorist leaders were arrested, time passed,
and new, unknown terrorists emerged.’28 Much more recently, Algerian
army officer Habib Souaidia has documented how the Algerian Army’s
brutal and self-serving ‘counter-terrorism’ tactics have swelled the
ranks of the terrorists there.29
Part of what has characterised contemporary civil wars has been the
avoidance of outright battles against a strong enemy and a simultane-
ous tendency to pick on easy targets, notably civilians. This has at least
something to do with the weakness of many of the states experiencing
civil war, and in particular the failure of these states to establish a
monopoly of legitimate violence. In some ways, this contemporary
pattern echoes patterns of medieval warfare in Europe, a period before
strong European states were established. The conflicts in both Sudan
and Sierra Leone included apparently irrational attacks on hitherto
uncommitted civilians, which predictably radicalised them and
strengthened the enemy.30 In Sudan, northern Sudanese militia raids on
a variety of groups from the mid-1980s prompted those groups to affil-
iate with the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army.31 Rebellion spread
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as previously neutral sections of the southern Sudanese Dinka, for

example, were drawn into the struggle by indiscriminate attacks.32 In
Sierra Leone, too, nothing helped the insurgency quite so much as the
abusive and indiscriminate nature of the counter-insurgency. Ironically,
it was the Blair administration – and in particular the UK’s Department
for International Development – that played the leading role in reining
in abusive counter-insurgency in Sierra Leone by innovative work in
strengthening and reforming the army and police force. Yet a key lesson
– that reining in abuses by the counter-insurgency is vital – does not
seem to have been extended to the global ‘war on terror’. Drawing the
wrong lessons from Sierra Leone has been encouraged by the wide-
spread impression that the British brought peace to Sierra Leone by
defeating the vicious RUF rebels – apparently a boost to the idea that
you can somehow physically eliminate evil. In fact, British forces never
directly engaged with the RUF. Any weakening was done by Guinean
forces and local civil defence fighters. The importance of the British
contribution lay more in sending a signal of strength and resolution
while simultaneously reforming the abusive army.
Abusive counter-insurgency that fuels disorder and rebellion is by
no means a purely African phenomenon. Examining the US-backed
counter-insurgency in Guatemala in the 1980s, historian David Stoll
observed:
The army’s violence backfired. Instead of suppressing the guer-

rillas, it multiplied a small band of outsiders into a liberation
army, mostly Indians drawn from local communities. By the
end of 1980, government atrocities seemed to have alienated
the entire Ixil population [Mayans living in Guatemala’s
Quiche region].33
In Colombia, we have seen a variation of this pattern. Here, the govern-

ment has adopted a strategy of encouraging defections and of destroying
the rebel FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in particular
areas.34 However, the paramilitaries that form part of the counter-terror
apparatus have routinely abused and killed civilians, turning many civil-
ians against the government and sometimes even pushing them towards
the rebels. Isabel Hilton has noted, ‘The Colombian security services have
had a long-term strategy of civilian terror and sabotage of negotiation
with the guerrillas’.35 A key instrument deployed against the FARC has
been the destruction of the crops that sustain it (a tactic increasingly
emphasised in Afghanistan too). Yet these crops also sustain large
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numbers of Colombian peasant cultivators, and the coca-eradication

project has itself created significant new recruits for the rebels. Plans for
the economic and social transformation of coca areas have been largely
shelved, and in any case they pale in comparison to plans for social trans-
formation (including land reform) under the 1960s scheme known as
Alliance for Progress; instead, the focus has been on building up the
army.36 As in the global ‘war on terror’, the underlying assumption seems
to be that there exists a limited number of deranged or evil individuals
whose eradication will solve the problem. Again, there seems to be little
sense of history: little sense of how individuals have come to join the
FARC, for example, and little sense of the grievances that have led people
to embrace the risks of combat.37
In Chechnya, the Russian military adopted tactics, especially bomb-
ing and other forms of violence against civilians, that proved militarily
counterproductive, helping to generate resistance and to increase the
strength of Islamic militancy.38 As David Hearst observed, ‘Chechens
were not very observant Muslims when the republic declared its inde-
pendence in 1991. … Russia’s assault [first in 1994–96] had the effect of
increasing both the Islamic and the fundamentalist nature of the
Chechen resistance.’39 Noting the increasing importance of fundamen-
talism in the Chechen resistance, Anatole Lieven notes, ‘We all pray
when under fire.’40 Russian abuses helped precipitate a terrorist attack
on a Moscow theatre in October 2002, which itself drew a violent
response when Russian troops stormed the theatre.41
In October 2003, it was revealed that Israel’s army chief Lieutenant-
General Moshe Ya’alon had acknowledged in an off-the-record briefing
that the government’s hard-line treatment of Palestinian civilians was
strengthening ‘terror organisations’.42 Israel’s assassination of its lead-
ers has only prompted Hamas into new atrocities.43 Indeed, Hamas’s
work in clinics, universities and mosques has helped to create a degree
of mass loyalty that cannot be countered by Israeli elimination of lead-
ership.44 Conversely, since Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon,
security along Israel’s northern border has improved.45
A perverse variation of the killing of civilians in counter-insurgency
has involved soldiers impersonating rebel groups. This bizarre pattern
has been observed in Sierra Leone, Algeria and also, it appears,
Russia.46 In Algeria, the GIA [Armed Islamic Group] rebels became, in
effect, a weapon for discrediting Islam and persecuting members of the
FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), the Islamic political party that won the
aborted 1991 elections.47 In a detailed review, Gordon Campbell noted
in 2004:
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The details of French/Algerian collusion with the GIA are …

disturbing. It is not simply that Algerian death squads would
impersonate the GIA and carry out massacres or create local
militias – the so-called Patriotes – to do likewise. In recent years,
firm evidence has begun to emerge from Algerian military
sources and leading academics that the dreaded GIA has been –
perhaps from the outset and certainly under [Djamel] Zitouni’s
bloody leadership – a dummy, or ‘screen’ organisation managed
by French/Algerian counter-intelligence.48
Even within industrialised societies, violent counter-terror that kills

civilians has sometimes been marked, and has consistently been coun-
terproductive. Northern Ireland is a case in point. As Irish novelist
Ronan Bennett put it, ‘Bloody Sunday propelled thousands of young
men and women to take up the gun.’49 The counterproductive violence
extended to abuse of prisoners. Britain’s harsh internment policy in the
1970s, including use of torture, tended to radicalise the population.50
A second aspect of the counterproductive tactics has been a tendency
to allow key rebels and terrorists to escape capture, despite the very
significant inequality of resources between the demonised rebels/terror-
ists and the forces ranged against them. Of course, even where such
capture is seriously attempted, it can be very difficult. All the same, it is
remarkable how little concerted effort is sometimes put into this task.
In many civil wars, a persistent failure to capture or even seriously
to confront rebel groups has frequently led to suspicions that warfare
has too many benefits for it to be allowed to end. During civil wars in
such diverse countries as Guatemala, Uganda and Sierra Leone, rela-
tively small groups of rebels have been able to survive and even grow
in strength in the face of much larger counter-insurgency forces. In
Uganda and Sierra Leone, a large proportion of rebels have been chil-
dren; yet these rebel groups have survived over long periods, often
gaining in strength in the midst of almost universal condemnation. This
has led some local analysts to question whether the respective govern-
ments really wanted to bring their civil wars to an end.51 In Peru,
government soldiers sometimes released captured Shining Path guer-
rillas, something that tended to perpetuate insecurity in areas where
some soldiers were making money from drugs. In the Philippines,
senior officers in the army have been accused by their own soldiers of
helping convicted terrorists to escape.52
In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate
Hutus were killed. Aided by a French government-sponsored
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‘humanitarian’ intervention known as ‘Operation Turquoise’, many

of the perpetrators fled to neighbouring Zaire, now the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). After the Rwandan genocide, the new,
Tutsi-dominated government felt understandably threatened by these
perpetrators, who were using relief aid to regroup and to plan more
mass killings. Rwandan troops were sent to DRC to confront the
‘Interahamwe’ militias responsible for genocide. However, many
diplomats, fighters, aid workers and refugees reported that Rwandan
soldiers were now increasingly collaborating with their supposed
enemies. They appeared to be stalling on the disarmament of the
Interahamwe and making little effort to engage the Interahamwe in
battle. In 2002, one Rwandan-trained rebel fighter said his orders
were no longer to pursue the Interahamwe, adding, ‘Rwanda came
here to fight the Interahamwe but its objectives have changed. These
days, we only pretend to fight them – it’s all politics.’53 In April 2002,
the International Rescue Committee estimated that some 4.7 million
people had died as a direct result of the DRC war.54
In terms of the global ‘war on terror’, Michael Scheuer, a senior US
intelligence official involved in the hunt for bin Laden, reports that the
United States had up to a dozen serious chances to kill or capture bin
Laden in the year from May 1998.55 After 9/11, the Taliban’s offer to
hand bin Laden to a neutral country (if the United States presented
evidence of his involvement in 9/11) was rejected. Despite the US
targeting of al-Qaida camps in the 2001 attack, bin Laden famously
went free. Virtually all leading military analysts say the US government
should have used more American troops to capture bin Laden, rather
than relying on Afghan proxies.56 There was no attempt by US forces to
seal the border with Pakistan during operations against bin Laden and
al-Qaida in late November 2001,57 and Scheuer said the United States
missed its biggest chance to capture the al-Qaida leader at Tora Bora in
the Afghan mountains in December 2001 when General Tommy Franks
relied on unreliable surrogates rather than his own troops.58 Subse-
quently, the planning and execution of the Iraq adventure took atten-
tion and manpower – including Arabic speakers – from the hunt for
al-Qaida.59
Within Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance, seen as a key US ally,
proved much more interested in taking Kabul than capturing bin Laden.
Meanwhile, Pakistan barely pretended to close its borders to assist this
capture.60 In fact, former CIA station chief in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Gary Schroen, has argued that a fundamentalist strain within the army
and the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has undermined the desire of the
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Pakistani authorities to capture bin Laden.61 Experts have suggested

Musharraf agreed with the United States after the Afghan war that he
would not seriously go after bin Laden, because he feared inciting trou-
ble in his own country as well as increased terror attacks on Western
targets abroad.62 Certainly, the popularity of bin Laden among many in
Pakistan means capture would create problems for Musharraf.63
The point is not that Bush did not want to capture bin Laden: such a
turn of events would certainly have given a boost to Bush’s electoral
chances in 2004. However, first, the US government had other priorities
that took attention and resources from this enterprise; and, second, the
counter-terror was a collaborative effort in which the aims reflected the
priorities of many parties beyond Washington. As former Labour
government adviser David Clark pointed out, a successful counter-
insurgency tends to have a military campaign aimed at the perpetrators
of violence and a political campaign designed to isolate them; the
current ‘war on terror’ has neither.64
A third element in the counterproductive tactics has been the pursuit
of some kind of business relationship between ostensible enemies. In
many civil conflicts, there has been significant trading with the enemy,
including selling arms to the other side, not only in Chechnya but also
in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and the Congo, where Rwandan troops
were observed selling arms to Interahamwe militiamen.65 Government
soldiers in the Philippines have protested at their own senior officers
who they say are responsible for several bombings and for selling
weapons and ammunition to rebel forces.66 The clearest example of
‘trading with the enemy’ in the context of the ‘war on terror’ is also a
civil war: the conflict in Chechnya. During the first war of 1994–96, the
Russian Army frequently sold arms to rebels.67 Shamil Basayev, who
rose to become the most powerful Chechen warlord, boasted that he
got 90 per cent of his arms from Russian troops. Even the leader of the
Arab fighters in Chechnya, Amir Khattab, was able to get money from
the Russian ‘enemy’ as well as from Chechen allies. The Russian Army
reportedly valued him as a provocateur to destroy the Chechen cause,
and he did indeed help to provoke massive Russian destruction of
Chechens from 1999 by leading a Chechen attack on Russian Dagestan
in that year.68
Even the briefest acquaintance with history should be enough to tell
us that the current definition of enemies and ‘evils’ is contingent on
important financial as well as political calculations. One of the para-
doxes of the ‘war on terror’ is that the strong trading relationship
between the United States and Saudi Arabia (including large-scale
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arms sales to the Saudis) has stood in the way of effective diplomatic
pressure on the Saudis to stop the kind of inculcation of violent ideolo-
gies that helped produce the perpetrators of 9/11. The links are
personal too.69 Dick Cheney’s former company Halliburton did more
than US$174 million of business developing oil fields and other projects
for the Saudis. Condoleezza Rice was formerly on the board of direc-
tors of Chevron, which does a lot of business with the Saudis. George
Bush the elder has worked as a senior adviser for the Carlyle Group,
which has a stake in US defence firms hired to equip and train the
Saudi military.70
We know that members of bin Laden’s family were speedily hustled
out of the United States after 9/11.71 Saudi funds have supported
jihadists in Bosnia and Chechnya,72 and the Saudis did not seriously
start to root out al-Qaida until the truck bomb attacks in Riyadh in
November 2003.73 Despite the so-called ‘financial war on terror’, the
Saudis were slow to co-operate with US officials in hunting for the
intermediaries helping to finance terrorists,74 and they also balked at
freezing the assets of organisations linked to bin Laden (though collab-
oration in private may have been more than either side will admit).75 Of
course, the targeting of the ‘state backers’ of 9/11 conspicuously
excluded Saudi Arabia.
Some of those who have been vilified in the ‘war on terror’ – notably
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden – are characters that the West
helped to arm and make powerful in the first place,76 though of course
providing arms to someone who becomes your enemy is not as strange
as the phenomenon (observed in civil wars) where parties may provide
arms to someone who is already their enemy.
Functions for a diverse coalition
In both the ‘war on terror’ and civil wars, counterproductive tactics in

the counter-terror have had important functions for diverse groups
shaping counter-terror. These functions have been economic and polit-
ical (discussed in this chapter) and also psychological (dealt with in
subsequent chapters). In failing to achieve the expressed goal of defeat-
ing or even weakening insurgency or terror, key actors have neverthe-
less succeeded in realising other (more hidden and often more valued)
goals.
In both civil wars and the current global ‘war on terror’, we can see an
abundance of opportunities for political, economic and psychological
‘pay-offs’ among actors collaborating – or claiming to collaborate – with
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a particular war effort but not necessarily sharing the aim of eliminating
the named terror. Part of this is because both counter-insurgency and
global counter-terror operate through a kind of licensing or harnessing
of violence by diverse groups. (As noted, this also applies to insur-
gency/terror to some extent.) The licensing and harnessing of diverse
violence within the counter-terror means that the aims of the ‘counter-
insurgency’ or ‘counter-terror’ are very diverse (although certain parties,
for example the United States in the case of the ‘war on terror’, have
clearly had a disproportionate influence in shaping these aims). As
Foucault observed, power is not simply located ‘at the top’ of any given
system but is dispersed (albeit very unevenly) through societies and
through systems of intervention. Significantly, the limits to US power on
a global stage tend to create strategies that mimic the strategies of
governments pursuing counter-insurgency within weak states. The ‘war
on terror’ represents an aggregation of aims within shifting coalitions
that collaborate for a variety of reasons and that claim to be participating
in this ‘war’. While the benefits for US corporate interests and the US
military are extremely important (as stressed by Chomsky and Pilger, for
example), pinning everything on Washington can take attention away
from important domestic dynamics within countries around the world.77
The beneficiaries of the ‘war on terror’ are located not only in the United
States and the UK but also in a variety of dubious regimes whose co-
operation has been sought and offered. Given this conglomeration of
benefits, the desire to defeat terror cannot necessarily be taken for
granted – whether in Western capitals or at a local level (for example, the
often-collusive behaviour of Russian troops in Chechnya where Russian
generals have made a lot of money). Crucially, as in civil wars, demoni-
sation of a particular enemy creates space for abuses by those who claim
to be fighting this pariah. The Cold War pattern of impunity for one’s
friends is being reinvented for the ‘war on terror’.
Though there is some loss of control of the aims of counter-terror, the
dispersal of violence through a complex coalition may also have certain
benefits for those who are ‘at the top’ of this system. In both civil wars
and the global ‘war on terror’, the licensing of violence (by governments
who encourage ‘tribal violence’ as part of a counter-insurgency, by coali-
tion partners involving private firms in the running of Iraq and its jails,
by Washington in using third-party states for torture or the Northern
Alliance for deposing the Taliban) has the advantage that it creates many
opportunities for ‘deniability’ when abuses are revealed. It minimises the
violence that is directly inflicted by the dominant power, and it reduces
the exposure to violence of the dominant power’s own forces.
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Economic functions of civil wars
Militarily and politically counterproductive attacks on civilians in

Sudan and Sierra Leone have been mentioned. If the aim of war is
simply to win, such actions make little sense. But perpetuating these
civil wars has brought important economic benefits. In Sudan, mili-
tary factions and allied traders and herders have enriched themselves
from raiding, from land-grabs, and from the price distortions accom-
panying and fuelling famine. Persistently counterproductive tactics
have helped to keep the war system going.78 In Sierra Leone, rebels
lost political support as a result of vicious attacks on civilians, but
these attacks nevertheless served to underwrite a system of resource-
extraction, notably through creating a partial depopulation of
diamond-rich areas. Abuses by Sierra Leonean government soldiers,
whilst also eroding political support, often had similar economic
functions. In Uganda, aid workers have reported army officers selling
supplies to the LRA and benefiting from inflating the numbers on the
payroll; ending war would end these benefits.79
The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from the
mid-1990s shows clearly the economic functions of violence as well
as the limits to any desire to defeat the ‘enemy’. The ostensible hunt
for the Interahamwe ‘genocidaires’ (or genocide perpetrators)
served as cover for the Rwandan Army’s desire to strip minerals.80
While the DRC is a very poor country, it is extremely rich in natural
resources, and over time these became an important factor in Rwan-
dan calculations as well as those of Uganda and Zimbabwe, coun-
tries that also became embroiled in the conflict. There is evidence of
Ugandan commanders actually inciting violence between rebel
groups, apparently so as to remain in regions rich in gold and
coltan.81 With the number of conventional battles between rival
armies falling, more and more energy was spent on economic
exploitation. Actual fighting in the DRC has often been concentrated
in areas rich in cobalt, copper and diamonds.82 In these circum-
stances, the enemy Hutu militiamen came to be seen not simply as a
threat but as a useful threat. In collaborating with their supposed
enemies, Rwandan soldiers were cynically prolonging their stay in
DRC.83 Promising steps towards peace have proved fragile, and in
November 2004 Rwanda sent troops across the border into DRC,
claiming to pursue the Hutu extremist Democratic Liberation Forces
of Rwanda (linked to the 1994 genocide).84 This sinister process is not
entirely dissimilar to dynamics in Sierra Leone where the RUF was
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sometimes maintained as a useful threat that justified profiteering

by parties other than the RUF.
In Central America, civil wars had a more obviously ideological
dimension. In Guatemala, however, many observers became suspi-
cious that the wider agendas of economic accumulation and the
suppression of democratic forces meant the government did not want
to end the war; even after the 1996 peace agreement, the Guatemalan
Army was able to disguise its own involvement in organised smug-
gling rackets under the cover of anti-narcotics operations and
suppressing ‘subversives’.85
Economic functions of the ‘war on terror’
The ‘war on terror’ has important economic functions. Rather in the

same manner as counterproductive tactics in civil wars, counterpro-
ductive tactics in the ‘war on terror’ have helped to perpetuate a
number of (often hidden) economic benefits – by helping to prolong
and deepen the conflict. This does not mean that this is the intention.
However, the persistence of counterproductive tactics over time
suggests, first, the evolution of a system that is functional in important
ways, and, second, at the very least, a lack of desire to dismantle or
reform this system. Vested interests have subtly undermined and
corrupted the drive against terrorism itself.
The uses of global ‘wars’ are not new: the terror of the Cold War
nurtured and sustained a lucrative military-industrial complex in the
United States (not to mention its Communist variant in the Soviet
Union). In the White House cabinet room in 1947, Republican Senator
Arthur Vandenburg told President Harry Truman that he could have
the militarised economy he wanted, but only if he first ‘scared the hell
out of the American people’ in relation to the Soviet threat.86 The Cold
War is over, but the spending spree is not. In fact, the US military
budget (in constant dollars) is near the peacetime average for the Cold
War period of the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s.87 Pentagon spending rose by
about a third even between 2003 and 2004.88 The history of conflict in
Korea and Iraq appears to have created institutional interests in the US
military in sustaining spending in these areas in particular – feeding
into the felt need for a ‘two war’ capability.89 The current Pentagon
budget of some $400 billion represents nearly twice the defence spend-
ing of the rest of the world’s military powers combined.90 The Pentagon
requested $419 billion for 2006.
The three largest US weapons makers – Lockheed Martin, Boeing and
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Raytheon – receive over $30 billion per year in Pentagon contracts,91 and
there is a cosy relationship between the defence industry and many top
government officials. For example, James Roche held several top posi-
tions with defence giant Northrop Grumman before becoming air force
secretary, and Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defence secretary, acted as a
consultant to the same company. Ronald Sugar, chief executive of
Northrop Grumman, said in 2003 that he saw ‘very significant growth in
sales and earnings’ as a result of hikes in budgets.92
How can all this be justified in the context of massive world poverty
and the high and growing levels of poverty within the United States
itself? The answer, to a large extent, has been through continued
conflict, whether the enemy has been Communism, ‘rogue states’,
‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘drugs’ or, most recently, ‘terror’. The ‘war
on terror’ represents a new application of an old doctrine: the doctrine
of endless war. Even in the post-Second World War ‘peace’, war has
been not so much the exception as the rule. The United States has inter-
vened militarily in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Libya, Panama, Iraq,
Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq again, not to mention proxy wars in
Angola, Mozambique and Nicaragua or the support for abusive
governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, the Philippines and
elsewhere.93 As Noam Chomsky notes, the war on terror has not so
much been declared as re-declared (and by some of the same people): the
first declaration occurred when Ronald Reagan came into the Presi-
dency and announced a war on state-supported terrorism in the
Middle East and Central America.
An almost tangible sense of relief at the emergence of a new enemy
was expressed by Vice-President Dick Cheney in a speech to the Council
of Foreign Relations in February 2002:
When America’s great enemy suddenly disappeared, many

wondered what new direction our foreign policy would take.
We spoke, as always, of long-term problems and regional crises
throughout the world, but there was no single, immediate,
global threat that any roomful of experts could agree upon. All
of that changed five months ago. The threat is known and our
role is clear now.94
The anti-terrorism agenda appears to have been fused with the agenda
of modernising US military capabilities, making it hard to question the
project of weapons modernization.95 In what could be seen as a cruel
application of a martial arts principle, it was the United State’s own
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strength – its skyscrapers and its planes – that was turned against it on
9/11. But if high-tech weapons systems were not the problem on that
day, they have repeatedly been hailed as part of the solution. Even
before 9/11, Bush and Rumsfeld were telling Americans that deterrence
didn’t work in the age of terror and rogue states, and that therefore they
needed a missile shield.96 Some three-quarters of the additional military
funding since Bush took office is not directly related to fighting terror-
ism, and includes spending on the missile shield.97 The new enthusiasm
for ‘mini-nukes’ is also part of the new weapons bonanza.
Also forming part of the military–industrial complex in the United
States are the large American firms carving out big bucks from recon-
struction, particularly in Iraq. The biggest contract for reconstruction in
Iraq – potentially worth US$680 million (or £415 million) – went to the
Bechtel conglomerate, which has close ties to the Bush administration
and makes substantial donations to the Republican Party and its candi-
dates.98 Halliburton, headed from 1995 to August 2000 by Cheney (who
retains stock options), was awarded the main contract for restoring
Iraq’s oil industry; the contract was awarded without competitive
tendering and Halliburton has been charging coalition authorities over
the odds for oil.99 In all, Halliburton’s Iraq contracts up until October
2004 were worth US$9 billion.100 In a move that suggests the evolution
of a profitable system based on destruction-and-reconstruction, the
Bush administration created in August 2004 an ‘Office of the Coordina-
tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization’, with a mandate to draw up
detailed ‘post-conflict’ plans for up to 25 countries that were not, as yet,
in conflict.101
As with the ‘modernisation’ of the military, the priority of gaining
access to oil has effectively been fused with the anti-terrorism agenda,
making it hard – as Michael Klare points out – to question the oil
motive.102 Oil has certainly been a factor in the USA’s choice of enemies
during the ‘war on terror’, influencing the choice of who will not be
attacked as well as who will. To say that the attacks on Afghanistan and
Iraq were part of a ‘war for oil’ would be a major oversimplification.
There is no doubt, however, that the US government has been anxious
to expand oil imports and to reduce its reliance on the Saudis; nor is
there any doubt that Afghanistan and Iraq have played a significant
role in this strategy. The Bush administration’s close links with the oil
industry have been noted. In May 2001, the report of the Cheney-
headed National Energy Policy Development Group (often called the
‘Cheney report’) predicted that US oil imports would need to rise from
10.4 million barrels a day to 16.7 million barrels a day by 2020. The
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United States was projected to import 66 per cent of its petroleum by

2020, up from 52 per cent in 2001,103 and the Cheney report called on the
White House to make the pursuit of imports ‘a priority of our trade and
foreign policy’ and to go for more geographical diversity in sourcing.104
At present, the United States leans heavily on Venezuela and Saudi
Arabia for crude imports, but political turmoil in Venezuela virtually
halted its oil exports to the USA while some investment and oil special-
ists have come to see Saudi Arabia as an unreliable political ‘powder-
keg’.105 Of course, the major role of Saudi nationals in 9/11 made
continued reliance on the Saudis all the more uncomfortable.106
From around the mid-1990s, the desire to use Afghanistan as an oil
pipeline became a major consideration in US foreign policy. Top US
officials have increasingly been mindful of the Caspian basin’s vast
reserves of fossil fuel (oil and natural gas). In a speech to oil indus-
trialists in 1998, Cheney observed, ‘I cannot think of a time when we
have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically
significant as the Caspian.’107 But how were these reserves going to be
transported to market? Funnelling them through Russia or Azerbai-
jan would greatly increase Russia’s control over the Central Asian
republics. Channelling oil and gas through Iran would go against the
US policy of trying to isolate Iran. Going through China would give
China a strategic boost and would in any case be a long way round
and expensive. That left a pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan
and India as the strongly favoured option. Among those involved in
negotiating for the pipeline under President Clinton were Dick
Cheney, representing nine oil companies, and Condoleezza Rice, then
a director of Chevron-Texaco with special responsibility for Pakistan
and Central Asia.108 After the fall of the Taliban, there were extended
negotiations aimed at getting a pipeline from Turkmenistan to
Pakistan via Afghanistan (a long-standing project of California-based
company UNOCAL), with future President Karzai as a top UNOCAL
adviser, but insecurity continued to hamper the plan.109 John Maresca,
formerly of UNOCAL, became US Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, US interest in Uzbekistan has been fuelled directly by oil
as well, perhaps, as by the need for a base for operations in
Afghanistan.110
What was the importance of oil in the Iraq attack? According to Bob
Woodward, ‘Before the [9/11] attacks, the Pentagon had been working
for months on developing a military option for Iraq.’111 Richard Clarke
remembered that just after the 9/11 attacks:
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I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and

Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national
tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the begin-
ning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been
pressing for a war with Iraq. My friends in the Pentagon had
been telling me that the word was we would be invading Iraq
some time in 2002.112
Oil was not the only motive here, but it was significant. Iraq exports
some 1.5 million barrels a day but experts say that by 2008 it could
export 6 million barrels a day.113 Even Christopher Hitchens, who
strongly defended the war on Iraq, observed, ‘The recuperation of the
Iraqi oil industry represents the end of the Saudi monopoly, and we
know that there are many Wolfowitzians who yearn for this but cannot
prudently say so in public’.114 The Bush administration has said it aims
to reverse the historic nationalisation of Iraqi oil before it has finished
with ‘reconstruction’.115
If oil has helped make some countries vulnerable, it has also
protected others. As noted, Saudi Arabia was the origin of 15 out of 19
hijackers on 11 September 2001, and yet there was no retaliation against
the Saudis. This reflects Saudi Arabia’s status as a key US ally and the
USA’s heavy dependence on Saudi oil. Saudis’ role in 9/11 may have
brought home the urgency of finding alternative US bases in Iraq.116
An often forgotten part of the war industry is the pro-war media
machine. This has not only promoted war but has also profited from this
promotion. Rupert Murdoch exploited and fuelled the war-fever over
Iraq with pro-war editorial positions. His 140 tabloid newspapers around
the world were selling 40 million a week.117 Murdoch’s hyper-patriotic
Fox news channel showed bombers heading for Baghdad to the accom-
paniment of the US national anthem. With far fewer correspondents in
the Middle East than its competitors,118 Fox still won the ratings war in
the United States. MSNBC, third behind Fox and CNN, had a 350 per
cent rise in viewers during the Iraq war,119 which of course means more
revenue from advertising. A Los Angeles Times survey in April 2003 found
70 per cent of Americans were getting most of their information from all-
news cable channels like Fox, CNN and MSNBC, with only 18 per cent
relying on the traditional nightly news.120 Public relations businesses also
benefited. For example, the Rendon Group got $397,000 to handle PR
aspects of the US military strikes in Afghanistan.121
The economic benefits of the ‘war on terror’ extend well beyond the
United States. For example, those controlling Russia’s war budget have
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benefited from a Chechen conflict that has now been incorporated into
the framework of the ‘war on terror’. In 2001, the Russian government’s
accounting board found nearly $45 million missing from the budget.
Most of it was soldiers’ salaries.122 The profits from selling arms to
Chechen rebels have been mentioned. In Colombia, paramilitaries and
their wealthy backers have profited from a civil war – again now offi-
cially part of the ‘war on terror’ – in which the rebel FARC and ELN
(National Liberation Army) have been the declared enemies but in which
the majority of (rebel and paramilitary) attacks have been on civilians.
Economic benefits have also sometimes extended even to ordinary
people in poor countries. One mechanism runs parallel to the petty rival-
ries that have fuelled violence in civil wars and even in many witch-
hunts: at least two prisoners at Guantanamo Bay believe they were
picked up by the Americans after being falsely denounced as terrorists by
rivals looking to take over their property in the Afghan town of Khost,
near the border with Pakistan.123 Given that American troops have been
anxious to show they have captured enemy personnel, the potential for
such misindentification is considerable.
Political functions of civil wars
In addition to their economic functions, civil wars have also had politi-
cal functions which go well beyond (and even work against) the goal of
winning. The political functions of violence – even militarily counter-
productive violence – have included the pay-off from uniting a country
around a common and clearly identified enemy. A second function has
often been the legitimisation of the military’s interference in politics. A
third (and often related) function in civil conflicts has been warding off
the threat of democracy, for example, by creating or maintaining a ‘state
of emergency’. Part of the aim here has often been to facilitate and legit-
imise the intimidation of a wider group of non-rebels under the cover of
‘war’: maintaining conflict can be useful in the suppression of free
speech, unions and democratic forces.124
In Sierra Leone’s eleven-year war, some politicians and military offi-
cers seem to have encouraged and even helped the rebels in the belief
that a ‘state of emergency’ was useful in warding off democracy. In
Rwanda, a small elite within the Hutu orchestrated a genocide when
faced with the threat of democracy arising from the 1993 Arusha peace
agreement.125 In Colombia, as Naomi Klein observes:
the government’s war against leftist guerrillas has long been
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used as cover to murder anyone with leftist ties, whether union

activists or indigenous farmers. But things have got worse
since President Alvaro Uribe took office in August 2002 on a
WoT [War on Terror] platform.126
Consider also the case of Guatemala. One analyst of the US-backed

counter-insurgency in Guatemala in the 1980s commented:
Most observers are in agreement that the purpose of the

Guatemalan army’s counter-insurgency campaign was as
much to teach the Indian population a psychological lesson as
to wipe out a guerrilla movement that, at its height, had prob-
ably no more than 3,500 trained people in arms. In essence, the
purpose of the campaign was to generate an attitude of terror
and fear – what we might term a ‘culture of fear’ – in the Indian
population, to ensure that never again would it support or ally
itself with a Marxist guerrilla movement.127
The Guatemalan rebel movement got new recruits as a result of this

tactic. But democratic forces were suppressed, the war system was main-
tained and the United States continued to bask in its self-image as the
defender of freedom against (tenacious) Communist rebels. Violence
against certain ‘delinquent’ groups is routine even today in Guatemala,
and police action has frequently been arbitrary, failing to target the
expressed enemy but succeeding in intimidating a much wider group. In
this respect, the current system resembles the preceding counter-insur-
gency;128 indeed, there is a logic to failing counter-terror operations that
to some extent transcends conventional distinctions between crime and
civil war (and between civil war and the global ‘war on terror’). Sergio
Morales, who has carried out a detailed study of crime and young people
in Guatemala City, told me in 2002:
The logic of the strategy towards youth – during the conflict, it

was to get young people onto drugs, so they wouldn’t partici-
pate in politics. The military introduced it on purpose. And
they made young people participate in religious meetings. At
least 20 young people are assassinated weekly in the city, now.
The authorities say they are delinquents, but we have doubt,
because when they catch the guys, when we see police catching
maras [marabuntas, or gangs], these young people are often
killed. They [the young people] use these hand-made pistols or
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other small weapons and must be killed with big calibres – not
what the gangs use. The police authorities use AK47s. And the
way of killing – four to six guys in a cafeteria or a store, and
they kill everyone. The police don’t make a good investigation.
They keep saying they are delinquents and it isn’t important.
The final objective is to keep young people afraid, so they don’t
participate. It’s striking how many of the victims are girls –
maybe 20–25 per cent women – young women, often very
young like 13. People are often killed in a horrible way, with
elements of torture – a manifestation of the [earlier] counter-
insurgency project. There’s a strong discourse against youth, an
open discourse against youth, especially those who dress
strangely and have tattoos. …129 There’s an ideological
construction where mara is equal to delinquent. The govern-
ment is always talking about security, and they need to create
the impression they have been taking action. If there aren’t
enough of them – criminals, gangs – you create some. So you
make it appear as if you are countering it.
This statement uncannily echoes several aspects of the global ‘war on

terror’. First, the attempt to divert political radicalism into religion has
resonance in the United States as well as in many Muslim countries.130
Second, the proper gathering of evidence has been set aside in the ‘war
on terror’ (as we shall see in Chapter 6 in particular). Indeed, killing
without proper legal process or proper investigation has been turned
into official US doctrine: ‘They keep saying those are delinquents [read
‘terrorists’] and it isn’t important.’ Third, the clumsy and violent
counter-terror demonstrates that its authors are taking action, and the
kudos is bizarrely increased by failure: ‘If there aren’t enough of them
– criminals, gangs – you create some.’ Fourth, and perhaps most impor-
tantly in terms of the functions of the violence, the indiscriminate
nature of the violence is in some sense functional: it maximises fear and
is seen as a deterrent to political particpation.131
In terms of domestic or regional wars, abusive rulers like Slobodan
Milosevic and Saddam Hussein have long understood the economic and
political advantages of perpetual conflict, including the perceived need
for a strong leader (that is, the need for them). Though often seen in the
West as a dictator, Milosevic was not unsuccessful in elections (though
these were compromised by state media control and intimidation).132
When I was in Belgrade in 1999, many of those I spoke with argued that
Milosevic and his cronies had actually courted international sanctions,
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and that these sanctions had helped him both politically and economi-
cally. First, they reinforced a sense of siege in Serbia, a sense that ‘the
world was against them’. In these circumstances, Milosevic was able to
put himself forward with some success as a strong leader who would
vigorously defend the interests of the Serbs. As one UN official with
long-term involvement in humanitarian aid to the region commented,
‘Milosevic’s strategy is to create conflict and offer a solution – protec-
tion’.133 Second, the sanctions significantly increased price differences
between Serbia and surrounding countries. While this damaged the
majority of Serbs, it created very profitable opportunities for the clique
around Milosevic who were able to bypass the sanctions and to benefit
from these enhanced price differences. In this sense, Milosevic’s political
and economic system in Serbia was arguably based on two kinds of
ethnic war: first, periodic warfare with a variety of ‘ethnic groups’ and,
second, a ‘wider war’ – the stand-off between Serbia and much of the
international community, itself largely the result of Milosevic’s local
wars. Many believe that Milosevic fell from power, in large part, because
he ran out of plausible wars.
The Chechen conflict is another where violence has served political as
well as economic functions. When Vladimir Putin (then serving as Acting
President after Yeltsin’s retirement) conducted the second vicious war in
Chechnya from 1999, it boosted his popularity and helped him to win
Russia’s presidential election in March 2000. This war was billed as
Russia’s own ‘war on terror’ after Chechen terrorists were alleged to
have killed more than 300 in a series of bombings of blocks of flats in
Russia. In September 2004, Putin cited the threat of terrorism – and
Beslan in particular– when proposing to appoint local officials himself
and more generally to centralise power in the Kremlin.134
Political functions of the ‘war on terror’
In the period before 9/11, Bush seems to have been less worried about
al-Qaida than he was about Al Gore. Bush received fewer votes in the
2000 election than his Democratic rival, and at the time of the attacks on
New York and Washington, Bush’s standing in the opinion polls was at
its lowest point since his inauguration, with only 50 per cent of respon-
dents giving him a positive rating. Within two days of the attacks, the
figure had shot up to 82 per cent. By 13–14 March 2003, the figure had
slipped back to 53 per cent, but on 18 March Bush declared war with
Iraq and his rating shot up to 68 per cent.135 Sidney Blumenthal
commented in February 2005, ‘The more terrorism dominates the
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media, the higher his ratings; and whenever terrorism declines, he

begins to sink.’136
Bush certainly seems to have watched the polls. When Bush’s
ratings rose from 55 per cent to 84–90 per cent in the month after 9/11,
his strategic adviser Karl Rove (hailed by many as architect of Bush’s
victories in 2000 and 2004) took the polling information to Bush and
explained that history suggested they had 30 to 40 weeks before polls
returned to normal. Woodward recalls: ‘”Don’t waste my time with it”,
Bush told Rove, pretending to have no interest but looking at the data.
… [T]he president carefully monitored his political standing’.137 The
head of Fox News, Roger Ailes, told Rove that support would dissipate
if the public did not see Bush acting harshly, and the message was duly
passed on to the president.138
After a 2004 campaign in which the ‘war on terror’ was a key issue,
Bush won significantly more comfortably than he had in 2000. The
overriding message of the preceding Republican convention was that
America was at war and it could not trust the Democrats to be resolute
in fighting this war. The tactic seems to have worked reasonably well.
In addition to boosts in popularity, the ‘war on terror’ has facilitated
the intimidation of domestic opponents and a degree of suppression of
dissent (something dealt with more fully in Chapter 9). The arbitrary
and unpredictable nature of much of the counter-terror seems to be
actively useful here, and torture too has played a part. The climate of
fear was well conveyed by Naomi Klein, who described how commu-
nity leaders kept silent at an event honouring Maher Arar, a Syrian-
born Canadian who had been taken from New York to Syria and held
for ten months while being periodically beaten. Klein commented:
Some speakers were unable even to mention the honoured

guest by name, as if he had something they could catch. And
perhaps they were right: the tenuous ‘evidence’ – later discred-
ited – that landed Arar in a rat-infested cell was guilt by asso-
ciation. And if that could happen to Arar, a successful software
engineer and family man, who is safe?139
Commenting on a new disrespect for law, Kenneth Roth, Executive

Director of Human Rights Watch, observed in early 2004, ‘The Bush
administration has used war rhetoric precisely to give itself the
extraordinary powers enjoyed by a wartime government to detain or
even kill suspects without trial’.140 America’s founding fathers had
made explicit their concern that war would increase the president’s
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power and that the executive was the most prone to war – a key reason
for their vesting the power of war in the legislature, which proved
compliant after 9/11. The founding fathers had understood that public
fear, in Al Gore’s words, ‘can trigger the temptation of those who
govern themselves to surrender that power to someone who promises
strength and offers safety, security and freedom from fear’.141
Certainly, counter-terror legislation has also exhibited a tendency to
seep into other spheres, and not just in the United States. In 2003,
special powers under the UK’s 2000 Terrorism Act were used against
demonstrators at a London arms fair.142 Just a few days after Britain’s
Home Secretary David Blunkett proposed lowering the standard of
proof in terrorist cases in February 2004, Blair posited the same change
for drug trafficking and other organised crime.143 In September 2005, an
82 year-old party member, Walter Wolfgang, was manhandled and
thrown out of the Labour Party conference after heckling Foreign Secre-
tary Jack Straw as the minister defended Britain’s role in Iraq; the old
man was prevented under anti-terrorist powers from re-entering the
hall.144 Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar banned the Basque
political party Batasuna, even though no direct link had been estab-
lished with terrorist acts; he also banned Basque human rights groups
and the Basque language newspaper.145
An important part of the political function of the ‘war on terror’ has
been the way it legitimises political intimidation by a range of allies
beyond the Bush/Blair/Aznar axis. In effect, the ‘war on terror’ has
given a license to internal repression in countries supporting this war.
This was discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to the anger generated by the
‘war on terror’. As in many civil wars, demonising one party has created
space for the (hidden) abuses of others. As Michael Mann observes,
labelling opponents as ‘al-Qaida’ ‘allows repressive governments to do
what they want with limited international criticism’.146
The war on terrorism has given opportunities for Israel to present
its own actions as part of a joint worldwide struggle against terror-
ism, and Rumsfeld and Cheney have argued that consistency in fight-
ing terrorism requires support for Sharon.147 Human Rights Watch’s
Asia Director Brad Adams said, ‘The worldwide campaign against
terrorism has given Beijing the perfect excuse to crack down harder
than ever in Xinjang [north-west China]’ where some 8 million
Uighurs, a Turkic-speaking group, live.148 In India, anti-terrorist legis-
lation has facilitated abuses against minority groups and political
opponents.149 Even abuses in the former Yugoslavia have been retro-
spectively justified as ‘anti-terrorism’. Certainly, the ‘war on terror’
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has been a major threat to Musharraf’s regime in Pakistan, notably

because of opposition to the US-led attack on neighbouring
Afghanistan. But in compensation, Pakistan got $600 million in cash,
help in rescheduling debt, the lifting of earlier US sanctions linked to
nuclear weapons tests, a lack of scrutiny for its nuclear programmes
and the shielding of rogue nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan from
US investigators.150 The autocrat Musharraf has been able to present
himself as a pillar of freedom.
In the Philippines, labelling opponents as ‘al-Qaida’ has fuelled
repression.151 This has included intimidation of trade unions, the appar-
ent targets of President Gloria Arroyo’s denunciation of ‘those who
terrorise factories that provide jobs’.152
In Colombia, the war against drugs allowed brutal counter-
insurgency to delegitimise its enemies as ‘narco-guerrillas’, and many
Colombian observers believe the global ‘war on terror’ has fed into
abuses there. In June 2002, the rebel group FARC was placed on the
USA’s list of foreign terrorist organisations, and FARC has been directly
targeted as part of the Plan Colombia and the ‘war on terror’. 9/11
encouraged the United States to loosen restrictions on the use of fund-
ing to confront guerrillas (as opposed to drug control operations), and
in general the USA encouraged the Colombian government to harden
its stance in relation to the FARC and the ELN rebels.153 Importantly,
there has been increased room for manoeuvre for Colombia’s paramil-
itaries, who have carried out numerous and severe human rights
abuses, often maintaining close ties with Colombian military units.154
Western criticism of Russian brutality in Chechnya has been notori-
ously muted.155 Arab fighters have been involved there since 1998, but
Michael Mann observed in 2003, ‘Russia exaggerates the links between
Chechen rebels and al-Qaeda to get American blessing for state terror-
ism.’156 We have seen how terrorists – like rebels in civil wars – may
have an interest in exaggerating the prevalence and coherence of the
insurgency/terror network; such exaggerations may also be peddled
by the coalition that makes up the ‘counter-terror’, a coalition that may
find this threat useful in important ways. In February 2002, the United
States agreed to blacklist three Chechen rebel groups, a long-standing
Russian request.157
Uzbekistan, which provided a base for operations in Afghanistan
and which has received large quantities of US aid, has been another
dubious bedfellow in the ‘war on terror’. In May 2003, there were some
6,500 political prisoners. The United States hardly protested.158 In May
2005, Uzbek government troops killed 500 protestors.159 Suppression of
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the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – a weak movement thought to

have been crippled by the coalition operations in Afghanistan – has
been used to justify repression of Islamists more generally. Some
reforms were implemented – for example, registering a human rights
group and a new newspaper – but the local representative of Human
Rights Watch said these were basically window-dressing to get military
funding through the US Congress’s ethical laws.160 The Uzbekistan
security service has cracked down on Hizb-ut-Tahrir (meaning ‘the
party of liberation’), an Islamist group (later banned in the UK by Tony
Blair). Another group targeted has been the Muslim group Akramiya,
whose ideology seems more based on economics than religious
dogma.161 Uzbekistan’s Ferghana valley has been a base for another
Islamist group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (ISU), which the
USA and UK say has links with al-Qaida. Significantly, as in Algeria
and in Iraq, a democratic vote could lead to an Islamist government
unfavourable to the United States.162
Some of the local functions of the ‘war on terror’ are subtle, but no
less damaging for that. While not directly participating in the ‘war on
terror’, some of the countries involved in destabilising the Democratic
Republic of Congo – notably Rwanda and Uganda – have benefited
from being labelled (not least by the UK government) as among the
‘good guys’ in Africa. Rwanda’s biggest ally and backer has been
Britain, which has given considerable financial aid to Rwanda and
which for a long time said little or nothing about these abuses. Uganda
and Rwanda, already favoured by the USA and UK, were part of the
ramshackle ‘coalition of the willing’ recruited to support the Iraq war
in 2003.163 Perhaps we are seeing a potentially dangerous coming
together of two ideas: one is the war against terrorism, which (rein-
venting a Cold War discourse) involves deciding who is with us and
who is against us. Another is what appears to be an increasing fashion
for concentrating aid on countries deemed to have good governance (at
least within their own borders).
Any war carries the need to win allies and with it the implication
that abuses by these allies will be tolerated. The war against Commu-
nism gave valuable leeway to the Sudan government, for example, in
waging a vicious war in southern Sudan and in manufacturing
famine there. After increased hostility in the 1990s, there has been a
partial rapprochement between Washington and Khartoum, with
increased co-operation over intelligence for the ‘war on terror’ (and
Washington showing renewed interest in Sudan’s oil). The effects
have been ambiguous: on the one hand, the partial détente has
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encouraged the Sudan government to accede to a peace in the south;

on the other, the rapprochement seems to have fed into a weak inter-
national stance in relation to government-sponsored abuses in Darfur,
western Sudan. On top of this, in May 2005 Amnesty General Secre-
tary Irene Khan said the United States had been unable to garner
support in Africa for military intervention (for example, in Sudan) at
least partly because it had spent its ‘moral currency’ in Iraq.164 Telling
the Sudan government to observe human rights was not made any
easier by Abu Ghraib.
Concluding remarks
Although we have often been told that 11 September 2001 was ‘the day
that changed the world’, most of us know that extreme terror was not
invented on that day. There are important lessons to be learned from
attempts to combat the use of terror within a range of civil wars, and
counter-terrorism can draw important lessons from counter-insurgency.
One crucial lesson has been that proliferating weapons and deep-seated
anger at political and economic exclusion have fuelled conflicts that
cannot be adequately understood, or addressed, as the struggle between
two teams: let alone between good and evil. A second is that patterns of
violence and terror are profoundly shaped by the nature of the response
to them: counter-insurgency has all-too-often attracted new recruits to an
otherwise-weak rebellion. Most importantly, rebels – like terrorists –
cannot sensibly be treated as a distinct and finite group that can be phys-
ically eliminated by violence. And focusing exclusively on some
demonised group – however vicious and violent it may be – creates space
for abuses by diverse actors who claim to be opposing this group.
In Sierra Leone, violence against civilians by government soldiers
impeded efforts to win hearts and minds in the war against the Revo-
lutionary United Front (RUF). The conceptualisation of Sierra Leone’s
war as a struggle between two teams (one good, one bad) was deeply
damaging. Identifying the RUF as the source of all evil – a common
position not only in the Sierra Leonean government but among inter-
national donors – actually created space for terror: first, it served to
distract attention from underlying grievances that fuelled the country’s
terror; and second, it distracted attention from abuses by the various
counter-insurgency forces. Similar problems surround the attribution
of terror to ‘evil’ or ‘an evil ideology’.
Ultimately, whether in Africa’s neglected conflicts, in Central Amer-
ica or in the higher-profile attacks of 9/11, lasting security can only
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come from defusing, rather than deepening, the underlying anger. In

the long term, this implies development and fostering democracy by
peaceful means. In the short term, it implies not making things worse
through violence and indiscriminate counter-terror. A basic medical
principle must urgently be applied to counter-terrorism: ‘First, do no
harm.’
While the idea of a ‘war on terror’ legitimises violence with the label
of war, the status of ‘prisoners of war’ has been denied to ‘the other
side’. Thus, we are invited to believe that this is simultaneously a war
and not a war. This mirrors the schizophrenic official discourse in many
civil wars where the state habitually delegitimises rebel violence as
‘criminal’,165 while legitimising its own violence as ‘war’ (and usually
favouring a military rather than a policing response). At the same time,
the terrorists have taken the idea that this is indeed a war and used it,
for example, to legitimise attacks on civilian contractors in Iraq and
other civilians in terror attacks around the world.
The so-called ‘war on terror’ has quickly become a pernicious system.
The regimes of Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic have famil-
iarised us with the importance of securing complicity in violence. Both
men cemented their own power by encouraging collaborators into their
own petty corruption or other crimes. In other words, loyalty and
complicity were cemented by crime. Local leaders’ participation in the
‘war on terror’ may help silence any criticisms they might have of US
initiatives in this ‘war’ or reservations they might have about US impe-
rialism. Meanwhile, US officials have sometimes been reluctant to criti-
cise abusive detentions in countries around the world, seeing
themselves as on thin ice in relation to detentions in US facilities.166
One question that arises from Chapters 2 and 3 is this. If the ‘war on
terror’ (and its predictably counterproductive tactics) nevertheless
have important functions, does the counterproductive nature of these
tactics not nevertheless undermine the legitimacy of their creators? In
other words, isn’t consistent failure a bit of a problem?167
The answer seems to be: not necessarily. Rewards may not be
dependent on correct identification of a threat; and appearing to defeat
a common enemy may be more important than actually defeating it. As
with humanitarian aid (where failure to deliver relief has sometimes
been praised as not creating ‘aid dependency’ or even as promoting
migration and modernisation),168 ‘failure’ in the ‘war on terror’ has
often been accommodated by redefining the objectives (and by defining
them rather vaguely in the first place). While this damages the inter-
national credibility of the United States in particular,169 it can often
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bolster a crumbling image of success, particularly within the USA.

When bin Laden proved elusive, Bush said part of his strategy was to
get bin Laden ‘on the run’, so he couldn’t be ‘plotting and planning’.170
On 21 October 2001, CIA Director George Tenet stated the objectives in
Afghanistan were, first, the collapse of the Taliban, and, second, for
Osama bin Laden to be ‘killed, captured or on the run’.171 In general, the
focus on bin Laden tended to recede in US government discourse, with
overthrowing the Taliban correspondingly elevated, and, later, over-
throwing Saddam. For his part, Tony Blair stressed that one reason to
attack Afghanistan was to rein in the drugs trade. But opium produc-
tion has boomed since the Taliban was toppled,172 with Afghan
warlords (often backed by the West) bankrolled by a drugs boom.173
The Taliban had actually managed to cut opium production dramati-
cally, in part to encourage food production during a drought.
Predictably, the expressed Western aim of controlling the drugs trade
has rather fallen from view. The Taliban’s oppression of women was
also sometimes stressed as a justification for military intervention, but
sexual violence has remained widespread and we do not hear much
about this now.174 When weapons of mass destruction were not found
in Iraq, the aim of intervention was frequently redefined as freeing the
Iraqi people. Very early on, Rumsfeld had set the tone for shifting objec-
tives: just after the 9/11 attacks, he was asked what would constitute
victory in the war on terrorism, and he replied that victory would be
persuading the American people that the war would not be ‘over in a
month or a year or even five years’.175 Winning, in other words, was not
winning; and if winning the war on terrorism was unlikely (given in
particular the counterproductive effects of counter-terrorism), then the
very definition of winning could neatly be changed.
Redefining civilians as enemies is part of what makes clumsy
counter-terror so counterproductive. However, it can also help in
presenting an ‘image’ of success. One British soldier stationed in
Afghanistan said, ‘if you carry a gun, as half Afghan men do, and point
it at one of the coalition special forces, you will inevitably die quickly
and once you’ve been shot, you are al-Qaida/Taliban by definition’.176
There is evidence that US officers in Iraq have been rewarded for enter-
ing into battles rather than for holding back and winning hearts and
minds. US Staff Sergeant Camilo Meija, who led his squad on many
dangerous missions in Iraq, said, ‘You had a bunch of officers who had
been in the military for 20 to 25 years and who had no combat experi-
ence. They were looking for fights so they could have it on their
resume. No commander ever said, “I am doing this to get medals”, but
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it was pretty obvious.’ Meija’s commanding officer disagrees with the

charge, but the Pentagon admitted morale has been perilously low in
Iraq, with three-quarters of the troops believing their superior officers
had little concern for their well-being.177
Again, some of these dynamics are familiar from other wars. In
Sierra Leone, civilians were sometimes ‘counted’ as rebels when
soldiers tried to prove they had done a good job. This included the
killing of small children.178 In Vietnam, Michael Bernhardt, a US soldier
who tried to oppose atrocities including the My Lai massacre, said that
in every encounter with a Vietnamese, you could decide whether:
the person is a threat to the security of yourself and your unit,

or not a threat. The person is a threat and you decide to kill the
person and that’s a correct action. … Or the person is not a
threat, and you can kill the person. The trouble is, the outcome
looks the same as the correct action. It doesn’t look any differ-
ent, and it’s not scored any differently. And you need the score.
The individual soldier needs the score, the commanding officer
needs the score, the battalion commander and the division
commanders need the score. So what else is going to happen?179
Sometimes it seems that everyone wants a piece of the ‘war on terror’.

Even DVD manufacturers have railed against piracy on the grounds –
poorly supported with evidence – that it was funding terrorists.180 In
the UK, the Blair government tried to ‘tie in’ its domestic disorder
agenda to the ‘war on terror’: as Times columnist Simon Jenkins
observed, ‘Security is used neatly to link the world of al-Qaeda, bomb-
ings and beheadings to a harmless drunk rolling down the neighbour-
hood street’.181 One of the urgent tasks today is to be vigilant about
what kinds of diverse agendas are being hitched onto the bandwagon
of ‘counter-terrorism’. Many are much more dangerous than the drive
against piracy or drunken behaviour, and many are actively fuelling
the terror itself.
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4 Elusive Enemies and the Need

for Certainty
Although the current tactics in the ‘war on terror’ are fuelling the anger
that in turn fuels terrorism, the ‘war on terror’ nevertheless has held
out the (false) promise of certainty and safety in an increasingly fright-
ening world. Whether in launching their international attacks or in
dealing with insurgency within Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush and Blair
have acted on the basis that there exists a discrete and finite group of
terrorists and state backers who can usefully and legitimately be elimi-
nated. Whilst counterproductive in reducing terror, this approach has
the advantage, above all, of identifying an enemy in circumstances
where the threat is both diverse and obscure.
Bush and his team have consistently pushed certainty as itself a
promoter of safety. For example, in his first pre-election debate in 2004,
Bush observed: ‘People know where I stand. People out there listening
know what I believe, and that’s how best it is to keep the peace’.1 In the
2004 presidential campaign Bush’s rival John Kerry, by contrast, was
repeatedly depicted as vacillating and confused, and hence a source of
danger. On top of the insistence on the connection between certainty
and safety, there may also have been a (secondary) concern with
certainty as a part of prosperity. In November 2002, Bush found plans
for further tax cuts were running into the problem of a stagnant and
uncertain economy amidst all the talk of war with Iraq; he told his
advisers, ‘Until we get rid of Saddam Hussein, we won’t get rid of
uncertainty.’2 In a rallying speech to the UK parliament on 18 March
2003 on the brink of the Iraq war, Blair noted, ‘the world is ever more
interdependent. Stock markets and economies rise and fall together.
Confidence is the key to prosperity. Insecurity spreads like contagion.
So people crave stability and order.’3
For most Americans, the feeling of vulnerability seems to have been
heightened by the high degree of immunity to war that they had previ-
ously enjoyed. There has been no war on mainland American soil since
the Civil War ended in 1865. (The United States did once come directly
under attack – by Japanese forces at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in Decem-
ber 1941 – a profound shock that precipitated US participation in the
Second World War and, arguably, culminated in the obliteration in
August 1945 of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.4) While
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fear was certainly intense during the Cold War, the stand-off with the
Soviet Union was precisely that: both sides, for the most part, stood off
from actual fighting. When there were wars, these were usually fought by
proxy: casualties, in effect, were exported to the developing world. A
partial exception was war in Vietnam, which killed large numbers of
Americans. But this seems only to have reinforced the feeling that Amer-
ican lives were sacrosanct. In the early 1980s, when I was living in Texas
(where George W. was to become governor), I remember a strange feel-
ing of invulnerability, a feeling that you were very far away from the
problems of the rest of the world (not to mention the rest of America). In
this environment, the Reagan administration’s madcap ‘Star Wars’
scheme (for knocking incoming missiles out of the sky) had an oddly
plausible ring to it – as if missiles were indeed no more than baseballs
which could be quickly dispatched by a former film-star president with
a particularly big bat.
One day in September 2001 dramatically destroyed this cumulative
sense of immunity, and subsequent official measures (for example,
colour codes for different levels of terror alert) have only heightened
the sense of dread. An article in Time magazine just over a month after
the 9/11 attacks vividly expressed the new climate of fear when it said,
‘Everybody finds himself caught on the frontlines’.5 In addition, there
was a profound sense of disorientation. Keeping the peace during the
Cold War was based largely on the principle of deterrence: anyone
contemplating a war had to reckon with the threat of large-scale retali-
ation. The principle of deterrence has also infused domestic law
enforcement, with firearms possession, widespread incarceration and
frequent use of the death sentence all seen as deterring criminals in the
United States.6 However, deterrence will not work with suicide terror-
ists. Part of this is because the terrorist is elusive and frequently escapes
punishment. Highly mobile and un-uniformed, the terrorist often
blends into the host society.7 He or she may draw sustenance from a
criminal underworld that constantly adapts to surveillance and
attempted suppression. Very frequently, the terrorist is elusive even in
death, with the worst perpetrators often escaping interrogation or
punishment because they have committed suicide in the course of their
crimes. This presents another problem for those who believe in deter-
rence: the terrorist may actively wish to die. Can anyone, for example,
have appeared so visibly elated at a death sentence as the Bali bomber,
Amrozi bin Nurhaysim, a smiling car mechanic from East Java? In
September 2002, Bush himself stated in the USA’s National Security
Strategy:
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Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terror-

ist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the
targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom
in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.8
One timeless rule of war would appear to be this: when the enemy is
elusive, more accessible enemies must be found. In Liberia’s civil war,
Bishop W. Nah Dixon of the Pentecostal Church said of abusive govern-
ment soldiers, ‘Incapable of facing the enemy on the battlefield, [they]
turned against innocent civilians …, killing them on suspicion of abet-
ting and hiding the rebels’.9 A similar problem emerged in Sierra
Leone.10 It seems retribution will always find its victims, and explana-
tion for suffering will find its object. Just after 9/11, Bush declared,
‘Somebody is going to pay’.11 He told King Abdullah of Jordan, ‘There’s
a certain amount of blood-lust, but we won’t let it drive our reaction. …
We’re steady, clear-eyed and patient, but pretty soon we’ll have to start
displaying scalps.’12 As Rene Girard has noted, ‘When unappeased,
violence seeks and always finds a surrogate victim. The creature that
excited its fury is abruptly replaced by another, chosen only because it
is vulnerable and close at hand.’13 A similar mechanism is highlighted
in a different context by American psychiatrist James Gilligan, who
shows how violent criminals have repeatedly vented their fury at past
humiliations on those who are unfortunate enough to be close at hand
and to have somehow reawakened past humiliations (a perspective
discussed more fully in Chapter 9).
After 9/11, Osama bin Laden, widely held to be the architect of the
September atrocities, was proving elusive. The old habit of making
threats against states itself fed into the identification of an accessible
target. Vice-President Dick Cheney revealed some of the underlying
‘logic’ when he said, ‘To the extent we define our task broadly, includ-
ing those who support terrorism, then we get at states. And it’s easier
to find them than it is to find bin Laden.’14 Rushing to war with
Afghanistan was not justified. For one thing, as noted, steps were
reportedly being taken by Pakistan and the Taliban after 9/11 to allow
the extradition of bin Laden himself from Afghanistan; of course, this
may not have worked, but a deadline for extradition could have been
set. In any case, the 19 hijackers (none of them Afghan) trained for their
mission in Europe and the United States, not Afghanistan.15 Yet key
leaders could not seem to let go of that tried and (strangely) trusted
solution: war. Enemies still had to be identified, and a military response
had to be exhibited.
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ELUSIVE ENEMIES
When policy-makers were planning war in Afghanistan, the target

country stood in pleasing contrast to the terrorist. Whilst the terrorist
was invisible and elusive, Afghanistan was right there on the map with
‘Afghanistan’ conveniently stamped on top of it: an identifiable,
immovable enemy. The same was true of Iraq, which was in some ways
considered a more desirable target: for one thing, as top US counter-
terrorism expert Richard Clarke recalls, Rumsfeld complained in the
wake of 9/11 that there were no decent targets for bombing in
Afghanistan and that the administration should consider bombing
Iraq, which he said had better targets.16
However, for American soldiers and their allies fighting inside these
countries, the situation was once again reversed, and the enemy tended
once again to become elusive, intangible and terrifying. Violence in
Afghanistan and Iraq took on elements of a civil war between insurgents
and Western-supported forces, and as in many purely internal wars,
soldiers were soon seeking accessible and identifiable targets. In fact,
targeting the enemy spilled over all too easily into killing civilians. Amer-
ican Sergeant First Class John Meadows commented on his experience in
Iraq:
You can’t distinguish between who’s trying to kill you and

who’s not. Like the only way to get through shit like that was
to concentrate on getting through it by killing as many people
as you can, people you know are trying to kill you. Killing
them first and getting home.17
US Marine Michael Hoffman wrote of his Iraq experience, ‘When your

enemy is unclear, everyone becomes your enemy.’18 This way of oper-
ating may even have been reinforced by the evident lack of links
between Iraq and 9/11: Hoffman observed:
‘War for oil’ is a term the troops in Iraq know well. That is
the only reason left for this war, leaving those on the ground
with only one reason to fight – get home alive. When this
kind of desperation sinks in, it is easy to make the person
across from you less than human, easier to do horrible things
to them.
Communication problems added to the difficulty of distinguishing

combatants from non-combatants,19 as did the fact that insurgents often
wore no uniform.20 In the event, no target proved more accessible or
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more tempting than the prisoner, and many of the prisoners in

Afghanistan and Iraq had no link to the respective insurrections.21
When considering the reflexes of Bush/Blair and of soldiers on the
ground, it is worth remembering the position of US soldiers facing their
own elusive enemy in Vietnam: a Viet Cong force that was adept at
using both the forest and Vietnamese civilians as cover. Former GI Greg
Olsen told the writer Susan Faludi, ‘We did a lot of walking in the
jungle, but never once did we have a confrontation with a mass enemy
that we could see.’ Most of the casualties in Olsen’s division had been
inflicted by booby traps and land mines. The US Army’s Lieutenant
William Calley played a key role in the My Lai massacre in Vietnam,
carried out by members of Charlie Company, Americal Division. His
atrocities seem to have arisen in part from his attempts to ‘solve’ the
problem of the ever-elusive Viet Cong (VC). He wrote later:
At last it dawned on me – these people, they’re all the VC. … I

realise there are Americans who say, ‘How do you really know
it?’ Well, I was there. I made decisions. I needed answers, and
I didn’t have a more logical one.22
Calley also stated:
My duty in our whole area was to find, to close with, and to

destroy the VC. I had now found the VC. Everyone there was
VC. The old men, the children, the babies were all VC or would
be VC in about three years. And inside of VC women, I guess
there were a thousand little VC now.23
At one point, Calley threw a two-year-old Vietnamese child back into

an irrigation ditch where civilians were being shot. Faludi commented
perceptively in her book Stiffed, ‘the killing of civilians was not simply
a primal rampage in an out-of-control realm; it was also an attempt to
reimpose an expected framework, no matter how ridiculous the fit … the men
would have their mission, one way or another.’24 It is fair to point out that
Bush and Blair made some efforts to minimise civilian casualties. Even
so, the largely indiscriminate nature of their choice of targets – as well
as the tendency for violence to spill over from targeting rebels to target-
ing ‘rebel suspects’ to targeting civilians – echoes the determination of
Calley and co. to ‘have their mission, one way or another’. The desire
to find an enemy came first: resistance to this neo-imperial project
stepped obligingly into the vacuum and supplied one.
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ELUSIVE ENEMIES
Identifying an enemy – even if the choice is arbitrary – seems to offer

the cognitive satisfaction of certainty in uncertain times, as Hannah
Arendt made clear in her study, The Origins of Totalitarianism. In one of
the pre-election debates with Bush in 2004, presidential candidate John
Kerry made a telling comment. ‘It’s one thing to be certain,’ he said,
‘but you can be certain and be wrong.’ Yet Hannah Arendt stressed that
for those leaders wishing to attract a mass following, the point was not
be right, it was to be certain.
Arendt suggested that part of the appeal of fascism was that the
identification of a clearly identified enemy – while frightening – was
less frightening and less disorienting than a world in which the
source of insecurity remained obscure. In Germany, the fascist project
involved taking those ‘enemies’ who were ‘already amongst us’,
labelling them, separating them and eventually eliminating them.
Significantly, Nazi propaganda tried to heighten fear of and hostility
towards the Jews by playing on the fact that, very often, they could
not be easily distinguished from non-Jews. Thus, dehumanising
language was linked with the statement, intended to shock and
frighten, that they look just like us!25 No group identified more deeply
with German culture than the Jews; no national minority was more
successfully assimilated. And yet this did not save the Jews. In fact,
assimilation was successfully redefined by the Nazis as pollution and
infection, and the implication drawn that the pollutant or infection
should be eliminated.
The terrorist, too, is also seen as all the more threatening because he
(or she) cannot easily be identified, separated out and labelled. Very
often, he is already amongst us. He may be attending our college or
flying school, or sitting next to us on the tube.26 How tempting, then, to
find a way of separating out the terrorist, identifying him on a map,
and attacking him! At the same time, this displacement from elusive
terrorist to identifiable ‘state backer’ has the (dubious) advantage of
helping to keep the old doctrine of deterrence alive. As Harvard law
professor Alan Dershowitz commented:
a desire for martyrdom need not eliminate all possibilities of

deterring the act by threatening severe punishment. It merely
requires that the severe punishment be directed against some-
one, or something, other than the potential martyr himself –
such as his cause, or those who harbor him.27
In other words, deterrence is dead; long live deterrence! So far from
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thinking of innovative solutions to an emerging problem, policy-makers

have defined the problem of terrorism in such a way that it invites the old
solution of war. The terrorist threat is very complex, with diverse and
often decentralised security threats springing from complicated political
and cultural processes. All the more tempting, then, to achieve some kind
of cognitive certainty by lumping everything together into a neat (but
ultimately meaningless) category labelled ‘evil’. One manifestation of
this ‘lumping’ tendency was Bush’s notion of an ‘axis of evil’, which
evoked the Second World War axis of Germany, Italy and Japan as well as
implying, erroneously, that Iraq, Iran and North Korea were collaborat-
ing with each other.28 (The listing of evil enemies does not always run
smoothly. Rumsfeld observed helpfully in early 2003, ‘There are four
countries that will never support us, never – Cuba, Libya and Germany.’
‘What’s the fourth?’ somebody asked. ‘I forget the fourth.’29) The
tendency to ‘lump’ was again exemplified during Bush’s first pre-election
debate with John Kerry, when the president blended the 9/11 attackers
and the Iraqi resistance with the militants who attacked a school in
Beslan, Russia:
This nation of ours has got a solemn duty to defeat this ideol-
ogy of hate, and that’s what they are, this is a group of killers
who will not only kill here but kill children in Russia, that will
attack unmercifully in Iraq hoping to shake our will. We have a
duty to defeat this enemy. … The best way to defeat them … is
to constantly stay on the offensive.
At some level, Bush really does seem to lump all his enemies
together, hence in part the muddled response to 9/11 and the discon-
nect between problem and solution. For Bush, the profound uncer-
tainty and disorientation arising from 9/11 demanded action. The
key question was not whether anyone thought it would work but
whether anyone had a better idea. Action was venerated for its own
sake, and Bush told West Point military cadets in mid-2002, ‘In the
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.’30
US government terrorism ‘tsar’ Richard Clarke observed that Bush
felt he needed to ‘do something big’ to respond to 9/11.31 Remember-
ing the scepticism of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Woodward
reported, ‘Powell realised that his arguments begged the question of
well, what would you do? He knew that Bush liked, in fact insisted
on, solutions.’32 Bush, it seems, would have his mission, one way or
the other.
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ELUSIVE ENEMIES
Economic insecurity and the search for certainty
In the close-fought US Presidential campaign of 2004, it seemed that the

economic and social insecurity associated with the Bush regime might
contribute to a Kerry victory. No such victory occurred, and perhaps
Hannah Arendt provided part of the clue when she suggested that in an
earlier era economic and social insecurity had fed not only into radical
consciousness and protest but also into a more supine yearning for leader-
ship, for certainty, and for the kind of ‘respect’ one may get from
identifying strongly with a powerful nation or ethnic group. According to
Arendt, the Nazis’ vilification of the Jews served to encapsulate and render
manageable a range of fears about modernity and economic insecurity.33
The Nazis offered an explanation for economic insecurity and defeat in the
Great War, and large numbers of ordinary people rushed to embrace it. In
this case, the identification of a named threat seems to have stood in for
other fears whose source was much harder to label or locate. Arendt saw
increasingly atomised individuals in interwar Germany who faced a
world they could not control or predict, a world where sources of income
and self-respect were under threat. This had given rise to a ‘self-centred
bitterness’,34 with anti-Semitism holding out the prospect of restoring self-
respect.35 Referring to economic disasters like unemployment and loss of
savings in hyper-inflation, Arendt noted, ‘The fact that with monotonous
but abstract uniformity the same fate had befallen a mass of individuals
did not prevent their judging themselves in terms of individual failure or
the world in terms of specific injustice’.36 She added:
From the viewpoint of an organization which functions accord-

ing to the principle that whoever is not included is excluded,
whoever is not with me is against me, the world at large loses
all nuances, differentiations and pluralistic aspects which had
in any event become confusing and unbearable to the men who
had lost their place and their orientation in it.37
Mark Juergensmeyer makes a related point when he notes, ‘To live in a

state of war is to live in a world in which individuals know who they
are, why they have suffered, [and] by whose hand they have been
humiliated.’38 In Germany, economic insecurity and the resulting
dissatisfactions had also apparently reinforced elites’ determination to
channel resentment away from economic issues and towards foreign
enemies and cultural issues: in this sense, the foreign enemy could
usefully stand in for the class enemy.39
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Of course, the United States has not faced an economic crisis on the
scale of interwar Germany. Even so, the ‘them and us’ certainties
projected by the Bush administration do seem to have gained in allure
as a result of conditions of extreme economic and social uncertainty
and inequality, misfortunes which this administration has simultane-
ously promoted. Meanwhile, inequality and insecurity have helped to
provide the necessary manpower, as poverty has fed powerfully into
military recruitment, particularly in the southern states and among
racial minorities.40
The United States is a profoundly unequal society, where the richest
1 per cent hold more than 38 per cent of the national wealth and where
life expectancy is lower than any other major industrialised nation.41 In
2001, a total of 9 million people in the United States were classed by the
country’s agriculture department as experiencing ‘real hunger’, with
fully 31 million food insecure. Poverty and inequality have been getting
worse under the Bush administration as recession has deepened and
welfare reform has put a time limit on social security payments – hence,
in part, the rise of a peculiarly America institution, the drive-through
soup-kitchen.42
In the 1990s, millions of ordinary Americans pursued the fairy-tale
of rags-to-riches through the stock market, boosting share prices. Capi-
tal gains taxes were cut, adding to the windfalls. When prices started to
tumble from 1999, corporate executives – helped by the deregulation of
oil, energy and financial institutions – were often quick to pull out their
money even as they advised ordinary shareholders and local employ-
ees to keep investing.43 Enron – a major sponsor of the Bush family –
was only the most spectacular example of defrauding investors. With
the Enron debacle and other corporate scandals getting increased
media attention by the end of 2001, Karl Rove worried that there could
be a fall-out for Bush and Cheney.44 The potential for a popular back-
lash was all the greater since US middle-class wealth had generally
been stagnating and Americans were was increasingly taking on
consumer debt they could barely manage.45
Instead of any kind of retribution or political backlash, the rich got a
huge tax cut courtesy of George W. Bush.46 In 2001 the Bush adminis-
tration presided over a total tax cut (income and estates tax) of $1.35
trillion (to take effect over ten years). About two years later, another big
cut was pushed through.47 All this added up to a great escape for Amer-
ica’s elite, the kind of people Bush was addressing at a fundraising
dinner when he acknowledged, ‘This is an impressive crowd – the
haves and the have-mores. Some people call you the elite. I call you
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ELUSIVE ENEMIES
my base.’48 Michael Moore, who has a particular feel for the class
dimensions of the ‘war on terror’, has written:
Perhaps the biggest success in the War on Terror has been its
ability to distract the nation from the Corporate War on Us. In
the two years since the attacks of 9/11, American businesses
have been on a punch-drunk rampage that has left millions of
average Americans with their savings gone, their pensions
looted, their hopes for a comfortable future for their families
diminished or extinguished.49
Thomas Frank provides a revealing case-study of how economic inse-

curity has fed into support for Bush and for right-wing politicians more
generally. Frank documents the devastation in the middle American
state of Kansas and highlights the paradox that a state where farming
has been ravaged by free-market reforms has been solidly behind
George W. Bush. Significantly, some of the poorest areas of Kansas have
been the strongest supporters of hard-line Republicans. At the turn of
the twentieth century, a powerful radical politics had flourished in
Kansas, with strong support for unions, for anti-trust legislation and for
public ownership. But these old remedies today mean little to most
people in the state. Indeed, Frank argues that the old hostility towards
corporations has been displaced onto hostility towards a range of ‘out-
groups’ and towards the forces (science, evolution, secularism, plural-
ism) that seem to undermine old and comfortable certainties.50
These forces are often seen as residing in the cities and in the coastal
strips of the United States. Simon Schama has argued very eloquently
that there are effectively ‘two nations’ in the United States: in ‘Godly
Middle America’, Republicans have tended to dominate. The ‘Worldly
America’ of immigrant-rich big cities and coastal areas is more
outward-looking, culturally and commercially, and seen by many in
Godly America as a source of corruption, impurity and promiscuity.
Godly America is about the farm, the church, the barracks (places that
are fenced and consecrated) and about making over space in its own
image, Schama suggests, whilst Worldly America is about finding ways
to share a crowded space.51
In Kansas, five or six huge agribusinesses have come to dominate the
farming sector, charging high prices to the consumer. Meanwhile, farm-
ers – having lost the combination of price subsidies and acreage set-aside
schemes originating in the 1930s ‘New Deal’ – have tried to stem the drop
in incomes by increasing production, pushing prices still lower. Farmers
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getting reduced payments from agro-conglomerates have been forced to

take loans from the conglomerates’ banks: assuming mortgages, suffer-
ing foreclosures and selling land to agribusinesses.52 Contributing to low
wages in agribusiness has been a large-scale use of immigrant labour in
the meatpacking industry and frequent relocation of plants to remote
areas. Both have undermined unionised labour.53 It is not hard to see
how this can feed into hostility towards ‘out-groups’, as in California,
where guest workers have faced increasing deportation hearings as the
economy turned sour.54 Meanwhile, US companies have become skilled
at playing towns and states off against each other, always looking for the
biggest tax breaks, and Thomas Frank reports from Kansas that this has
helped create a major revenue crisis for local government. One town sold
its state school on e-Bay. Meanwhile, megastore chain Wal-mart has
badly damaged local retail businesses.55 Given the prominent idea in
America that ‘everyone can make it if they only try hard enough’, there
is inevitably plenty of scope for what Arendt referred to as judging
oneself ‘in terms of individual failure’.56
The resulting bitterness and insecurity have fuelled what Frank calls
the ‘backlash’ politics of the Republican right, a politics that favours
‘tough’ foreign policy while stressing a diverse range of mostly cultural
issues. Adherents of this politics are in favour of capital punishment and
against a whole range of domestic ‘threats’ such as water fluoridation,
gay marriage, stem-cell research, evolutionary theory, gun-control,
gangsta rap and teen drug-use. Frank points to a surge of popularity for
the religious right since the 1980s and a dramatic switch of opinion on
abortion in particular. Influenced by Karl Rove more than anyone, the
Bush administration adopted the tactic of mobilising its domestic
supporters with a clear ideological stance and good organisation.57
In her 1999 book, Stiffed, Susan Faludi considered some of the
economic insecurity that also worries Frank, highlighting its corrosive
effects on traditional masculine roles that centre on protecting and
providing. She wrote of ‘the search for someone to blame for the
premature death of masculine promise,’58 and she elaborated:
What began in the 1950s as an intemperate pursuit of Commu-

nists in the government bureaucracy, in the defence industries,
in labor unions, the schools, the media, and Hollywood, would
eventually become a hunt for a shape-shifting enemy who could
take the form of women at the office, or gays in the military, or
young black men on the street, or illegal aliens on the border, and
from there become a surreal ‘combat’ with nonexistent black
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ELUSIVE ENEMIES
helicopters, one-world government, and goose-stepping UN

peacekeeping thugs massing on imaginary horizons.59
The desire to find some kind of an enemy was already in place, in other
words. The terrorist, perhaps the ultimate shape-shifter, stepped into
an existing template. And the displacement of aggression from the
terrorist to his (alleged and imagined) shadowy supporters mimicked
the rapid and arbitrary pre-9/11 shifts in the definition of enemies.
Concluding remarks
Part of the function of the ‘war on terror’, then, is that it provides a

sense of certainty and safety in a world where security threats do not
conform to old models based on deterrence and on states, a world
where economic insecurity has been exacerbated by market liberalisa-
tion and the erosion of social welfare. The search for certainty feeds not
only into Bush-style fundamentalism, but also into fundamentalism
within the Islamic world. As Scilla Elworthy observed in relation to the
occupation of Iraq in particular, ‘In an atmosphere of chaos and humil-
iation, fundamentalism offers a firm philosophy which can give the
impression of certainty in an uncertain world.’60 The work of a number
of analysts – Girard, Gilligan and Arendt in particular – teaches us that
enmity can be quickly displaced onto those who are close at hand,
vulnerable and ‘available’ for victimisation. Again, this is relevant not
only in relation to the ‘war on terror’ but in relation to terrorists, who
face the problem that their principal enemies – presumably Bush and
Blair prominent among them – are well protected, and who have gener-
ally preferred to attack more accessible targets. The lack of discrimina-
tion, precision or judicial procedure within the ‘war on terror’ opens
the way for a kind of a modern-day witch-hunt, a phenomenon to
which we now turn.
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5 The New Witch-Hunt: Finding

and Removing the Source of
Evil
If a calamity happens, how are we going to explain it? In his classic study
Religion and the Decline of Magic, Keith Thomas noted that when suffering
is not explicable within existing frameworks, human beings have tended
to resort to magical thinking: in other words, to turn to solutions with no
logical or scientific connection to the problem. The limits of medical
knowledge in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example,
created a powerful impulse to explain illness through ‘witchcraft’.
Thomas wrote, ‘In the seventeenth century … doctors were quite unable
to treat or diagnose most contemporary illnesses. … Nowhere was the
inadequacy of contemporary medical technique more apparent than in
its handling of the threat presented by the plague.’1 The situation was so
bad that one leading British physician Thomas Sydenham, was led to
remark that many poor men owed their lives to an inability to afford
conventional medical treatment.2 No explanation was available for
deaths that are today attributed to heart disease or cancer, and the
absence of germ theory made many kinds of infection utterly inexplica-
ble.3 Indeed, Keith Thomas notes that it was ‘generally believed that the
inability of learned physicians to identify the cause of their patient’s
sufferings was a strong indication of witchcraft’.4
Belief in witchcraft remains widespread in many parts of the world
where alternative explanations (and medical expertise in particular) are
relatively inaccessible. Moreover, even in those parts of the world
where modern, scientific frameworks have gained a strong hold, these
frameworks often cannot answer the question, ‘Why me? Why did I get
sick at that particular time and place, and not some other person who
was perhaps exposed to the same source of infection?’5
Significantly, witch-hunts have usually intensified in periods of
upheaval and anxiety.6 The English Civil War of the 1640s saw a surge
in accusations of witchcraft, as people sought scapegoats and explana-
tions for widespread suffering. Ongoing civil war in Uganda has also
seen a proliferation of witchcraft accusations.7 In Sierra Leone, various
military factions have sometimes blamed military setbacks on witch-
craft.8 More generally, Chabal and Daloz’s study of sub-Saharan Africa
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T H E N E W W I T C H -H U N T
suggested that the greater the disorder, the greater may be the tempta-
tion to invoke some form of magical counter-measures and perhaps to
pursue a reinvigoration of occult customs.9
In the West, we often imagine that such superstitions are behind us.
But Michel Foucault, for one, reminded us to seek out the ‘irrationali-
ties’ of the present as well as the past. Today, in the face of the ‘disease’
of contemporary terrorism and the increased disorientation and anxi-
ety after 9/11, severe shortcomings in explanatory frameworks have
helped to create political and intellectual space for explanations and
prescriptions that are once more leading us into the realms of the super-
stitious and the persecutory. In many ways, we see a return to magical
thinking: the belief and hope that we can re-order the world to our
liking by mere force of will or by actions that have no logical connec-
tion to the problem we are addressing. Such thinking – as Edward
Evans-Pritchard showed in relation to the Azande people in Sudan –
may often exist alongside more scientific frameworks.
Most of us have at times adopted behaviour that we feel may make
us safer but that bears little or no logical connection to actual threats:
avoiding cracks in the pavement, for example. Situations of extreme
fear and powerlessness seem to bring out this propensity for magical
thinking, however secular or rational our normal outlook. Some of us
cross our fingers when our plane hits turbulence; naturally, if the plane
does not crash, we may at some level believe that our superstitious
behaviour somehow ‘worked’. At the level of individual psychology, it
seems to be this mechanism that reinforces obsessive compulsive disor-
ders: we keep on doing what we do (however bizarre) because it seems
to have helped in warding off whatever it is that we fear.10 The same
could perhaps be said for the Cold War nuclear arms build-up: it was
crazy, but somehow as long as no one pressed the button, it seemed to
many to be ‘working’.
The personalities of both Bush and Blair have apparently
contributed to the latest wave of magical thinking. US analyst Joe Klein
said of Bush, ‘The President seems to believe that wishing will make it
so’.11 Novelist Doris Lessing said of Blair, ‘He believes in magic. That if
you say a thing, it is true.’12 Commenting specifically on Blair and the
supposed Iraqi ‘weapons of mass destruction’, Polly Toynbee observed
that the British Prime Minister:
is so easily carried away by the persuasiveness of his own

words and the force of his own arguments that you can hear
him mesmerise himself. … There is an almost childish blurring
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between the wish and the fact: if he says something strongly

enough, his words can magic it into truth.13
While personalities have played a role, the resort to magical thinking also
follows a well-worn historical path. The search for someone ‘evil’, some-
one who can be blamed, someone whose removal will produce a safer
world, is characteristic of a long sequence of witch-hunts. This has some-
times served to get leaders ‘off the hook’. In the early modern era,
plagues often prompted a witch-hunt. Anne Barstow comments, ‘By
condemning women to ritual violence, the leaders escaped the Christ-
role that would dictate that they sacrifice themselves in order to remedy
the problem’.14 Of course, it was natural that Bush, Condoleezza Rice and
company came under considerable pressure to explain why they had
failed to prevent the 9/11 atrocities.15 Inevitably, this added to the
pressure to find some external or internal actors to blame.
The disconnect between problem and solution that is manifest in the
leap from 9/11 to attacking Iraq was also a characteristic of the witch-
hunt; and as with the collective hysteria in seventeenth-century Salem
in North America,16 for example, a strain of superstitious, paranoid and
quasi-religious thinking has interacted damagingly with more
mundane aims (like economic gain).
If magical thinking thrives on the absence of credible explanations,
it is striking how existing approaches to conflict analysis leave a huge
gap when it comes to explaining something like 9/11. For one thing,
there has been relatively little mainstream discussion of why hostility
to America might be strong in some quarters (see Chapter 9). This
means that many Americans have been genuinely bemused about 9/11
and correspondingly predisposed to accept the explanation (and, by
extension, the solution) that has been offered by their government.
Deficiencies in conflict studies may also be part of the problem. The
field has been partially appropriated by economics, as in the attempts to
explain violence as a manifestation of ‘greed’ (an approach made promi-
nent by Paul Collier at the World Bank and one to which I have also
contributed). This kind of ‘rational actor’ framework has some advan-
tages (especially in countering the notion of violence-as-chaos) but does
not do a very good job with the anger that feeds violence nor with people
who might want to die.17 It also runs the risk of reinforcing the blinkers
of those with little sense of history and little willingness to listen to
historical grievances,18 perhaps contributing to deficiencies in under-
standing how people became violent and the role of counter-insurgency
and counter-terror in this process.
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Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ framework, which at

least addresses some cultural dimensions of conflict, is nevertheless very
much a part of the problem. In particular, it assumes rather than explains
cultural antipathies, and, in so doing, tends to reinforce them. The same
goes for the still-common (and related) explanation of war as ‘ethnic’ or
‘tribal’. Meanwhile, ‘politics’ has been too often appropriated by a form
of ‘political science’ that relies heavily on the deployment of numbers,
often trampling marginal voices in an army of figures. Even human-
rights reports, which can clearly play a very constructive role, can also
contribute to a culture that tends simply to condemn violence rather than
seeking to understand it: a culture of naming, blaming and shaming.
Words like ‘brutal’ and ‘inhumane’ – though part of an attempt to convey
the severity of violence – routinely take violence away from the sphere
of the human and the explicable, whilst tending to dehumanise the
perpetrators and increasing the shame that can fuel atrocity (see
discussion of James Gilligan in Chapter 9).
Perhaps the greatest problems lie with the discipline most often
invoked to explain major international conflicts: namely, international
relations. The end of the Cold War brought three major problems for the
discipline. The first was the failure to predict this turn of events; in partic-
ular the demise of Communism in the Soviet Union – the single biggest
event in the field – came as a near-total surprise.19 Second, the predomi-
nance of civil wars as the Cold War thawed created major problems for
a discipline emphasising relationships between states. Third, the rise of
terrorism as the major perceived threat at the turn of the twenty-first
century represented the ascendance of an activity in which non-state
actors have been critical. These problems all highlighted the importance
of areas in which international relations has traditionally been weak:
understanding the relationship between states and civil society, under-
standing the values and priorities of ordinary people and understanding
the nature of decentralised violence.20 As Mark Duffield has observed,
Western policy-makers have switched from a centralised enemy (the
Soviet Union) to a decentralised one; yet state-based strategies have
proved persistent.21 It seems significant that some key actors in Bush’s
‘war on terror’, like Rumsfeld, were groomed under Reagan. The empha-
sis on state-based solutions and on hierarchies also fits with the addiction
to ‘war’ as a solution for security problems.
Whatever the limitations of existing frameworks for understanding
violence, magical thinking cannot afford to advertise itself as such. The
old magical cures and beliefs studied by Keith Thomas generally
wrapped themselves in some kind of religious or scientific plausibility.
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And today, while there may again be no logical connection between the
problem and the favoured solution, this disconnect is obscured by
many means, both subtle and unsubtle. Whether the witch-hunt is old
or new, we need to understand how magical and irrational beliefs are
made to seem somehow rational and legitimate, how, in Foucault’s
terms, they are ‘made to function as true’.
The aim in a witch-hunt has been not simply to eliminate some
named and accessible evil; it has also been to generate legitimacy for
this dubious activity. Past experience suggests that where evidence in a
witch-hunt was lacking, the persecutors attempted to legitimise their
activities by getting the accused to condemn themselves: one possible
source of ‘proof’ has been a confession, and the greater the suspicion
that an accusation is not well-founded, the more a repressive system
seems to require a confession to legitimise it. In witch-hunts, a woman
accused of witchcraft could often save herself only by ‘admitting’ she
was a witch. Keith Thomas said of suspected witches in pre-modern
Europe, ‘If the witch confessed, that settled the issue; if she refused to
do so, she was adding perjury to her other sins.’22 Confessions have also
been important when witch-hunts have taken the form of mass perse-
cution by totalitarian regimes. As Hannah Arendt noted, confessions
were much favoured in the Soviet system as a way of legitimising the
mass persecution of dissidents.23
Today, our self-appointed witch-finder generals – mostly besuited
rather than in uniform – presume to locate the contemporary source of
evil and set out to provide the world with ‘proof’. At the individual
level, torture has again been routinely used to extract information that
might incriminate the suspect or third parties.24 While torture was used
during the Cold War (for example, in Vietnam), a new shamelessness
has attached to the practice, legitimized by new definitions and laws.25
Bush made clear that Saddam’s only way to avoid war was to give a
‘full and complete’ declaration of the illicit weapons of mass destruc-
tion, which he did not in fact possess. UN weapons inspector Hans Blix
himself compared the aborted weapons inspection in Iraq to a witch-
hunt; and when US officials rejected the idea that Iraq could meet spec-
ified ‘benchmarks’ so as to show willingness to co-operate with
inspectors and disarm (a path favoured by Germany and Russia and
being considered by the UK), Blix understood the US position to be,
‘The witches exist; you are appointed to deal with these witches; test-
ing whether there are witches is only a dilution of the witch hunt.’26
John Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, said that
the necessary ‘dramatic change’ in Iraq’s position on weapons of mass
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destruction (WMD) ‘would have necessitated that it admit openly, not

under pressure, that it had and has WMD and WMD programs’.27 Since
pressure does not come much more intense than the threat of war, this
option was clearly not available, even if Iraq had been willing to ‘admit’
to WMD that it did not have. A UK proposal setting out some bench-
marks (against which Iraq’s disarmament performance could be meas-
ured) also required Saddam to confess that Iraq had in the past tried to
conceal its weapons of mass destruction (which were said to include, as
with any self-respecting witch, an array of noxious chemicals).28 Blix
commented, ‘Requiring humiliation, I thought, would be a sure way of
getting the emperor of Mesopotamia to reject the idea of a declaration.
Perhaps this was the intention?’29
It is only fair to point out that the belief that Iraq had some WMD
was quite widely shared, including by the French and German govern-
ments, reflecting genuine gaps in information as well, perhaps, as a
degree of collective hysteria or ‘group-think’. But significantly not
everyone drew the same policy conclusions from their suspicions.
Possession of WMD does not in itself constitute a threat to the United
States, and means were in place for intrusive inspections to deal with
any that did exist in Iraq.30 As war with Iraq loomed, the French in
particular pressed for two separate UN resolutions: the first would be
for a new round of inspections; then, if there was any serious breach,
that would be debated by the Security Council, which would then need
to pass a second resolution if war was eventually to be authorised.
However, in mid-to-late 2002 Secretary of State Powell thought Vice-
President Cheney was terrified that the diplomatic route to the Iraq
weapons crisis might head off war.31 Powell noted that Cheney had ‘the
fever’ – an ‘unhealthy fixation’ with nailing the connection between al-
Qaida and Iraq.32 In October 2002, the head of the National Security
Agency, Michael Hayden, told his employees that given the weather in
Iraq and the requirement that US forces would have to wear chemical
protective gear (itself necessitated, in a further circularity, by the
presumed WMD), ‘You can’t start a war in Iraq later than March.
You’ve got to do it in January, February or March.’ Cheney insisted that
after a UN resolution for a new round of inspections, Saddam should
have to submit a declaration of all his WMD. Bob Woodward
comments, ‘It was designed more or less as a trap for Saddam. He
would claim he had no WMD and that lie would be grounds for war.
Or Saddam would confess he had WMD, proving he had lied for 12
years.’33 The point, clearly, was not to find a way to avoid war but to
find a way to go to war.
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As the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ failed to materialise, there was

much talk of Saddam concealing them, destroying them or shipping
them abroad. The US and UK governments argued that Saddam may
have destroyed his own weapons on the eve of war.34 Italian Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi observed, ‘If I was in the position of Presi-
dent Saddam Hussein, I would have made these arms vanish, either by
destroying them or sending them out of the country’.35 Keith Thomas
commented on more ancient witch-hunts, ‘If she were searched for the
Devil’s mark, her body was certain to offer some suitable mole or
excrescence; if not, then she must have cut it off, or perhaps concealed
it by magic; it was known that these marks could mysteriously come
and go’.36 Does that ring any bells in Downing Street, the White House
or the Palazzo Chigi?
Magical thinking has been invoked at least three times. First, there is
a mystical focus on ill-will, which is presumed to be dangerous in itself.
Alarmingly, the contemporary US official discourse on terrorism, and on
the pre-emption of threats more generally, includes the presumption that
you can know who is intending to do you harm and, more contentiously
still, that you can address major (past) setbacks like 9/11 by linking them
to evil intentions, notably, the evil intentions of a Saddam Hussein. This
is in line with the persecution of witches (continuing in many parts of the
world), where already occurring setbacks have habitually been attrib-
uted to evil intentions. Second, there has been a failure to discern – or
even interest oneself in – causal relationships lying beyond an egocentric
universe: thus, Iraq and al-Qaida can be assumed to be in league because
it is convenient to do so, and because they are said to have a shared
hostility to the United States; anti-Americanism is frequently seen as a
normal or natural state of affairs (‘they hate us and envy us’), marginal-
ising the possibility that many people’s main grievance (before the
violent counter-terror gathered steam) has been with their own govern-
ment; and, more generally, the need for evidence on cause and effect has
been routinely denigrated (see Chapters 6 and 7). A third element of
magical thinking has been that eliminating designated evil individuals
will somehow miraculously solve complex social and political problems;
the causal process by which terrorists are made and replaced has not
been taken seriously. What this all amounts to is a peculiarly double-
edged egotism: one minute, ‘we’ (meaning, principally, the United
States) are at the centre of a world which ‘will never be the same again’
and in which everybody hates/envies/wants-to-be us; the next minute,
awareness of self seems to disappear and almost no account is taken of
the effects that US-led actions will have in enraging others.
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The focus on evil intentions, of course, raises the question of who

gives themselves the right to presume to know these thoughts and
intentions. To judge evil intentions you may need access to some secret
occult powers, and it is here that the mystique of ‘secret intelligence’
proved so useful in lending spurious legitimacy to the witch-hunt.
Richard Norton-Taylor comments, ‘It seems that in his determination to
go to war, Mr Blair believed his trump card would be the publication of
“secret intelligence”, a kind of exotic substance that, he hoped, when
released, would convince even the most sceptical’. 37 We now know just
how flawed and dishonest this approach was. In any case, the occult is
not always a source of wisdom: as former UK Foreign Secretary
Douglas Hurd said, ‘There is nothing particularly truthful about a
report simply because it is a secret one. People sometimes get excited
because a report is secret and they think that therefore it has some
particular validity. It is not always so in my experience.’38
The focus on pre-emption and on the intentions of Saddam and
others also prompts comparison with George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four and his imaginary regime’s prohibition of ‘thought-crimes’. As in
Orwell’s novel, you can today be punished for what you thought or
intended or are presumed to have intended, rather than for what you
have actually done.39 During the Cold War, whilst the United States
flirted with the idea of a ‘first strike’, the dominant idea was that
nuclear weapons would be used only if there was an attack (and that
their function lay in deterring an attack). Current policy is based on the
idea of pre-emptive attacks, and this even includes the possibility that
nuclear weapons will be used against non-nuclear powers.
Saddam had an appalling human-rights record: my own research in
northern Iraq was enough to tell me that.40 However, Saddam’s gassing
of the Kurds in 1988 did not prompt any significant reaction by the
West. When violence is justified in terms of what someone is about to do,
a profoundly dangerous step has been taken. Indeed, propaganda
about ‘What they are about to do to us’ is a hallmark of regimes prepar-
ing for genocide: the destruction of a social group (the Jews in Germany
and Nazi-occupied Europe, the Tutsis in Rwanda) can arguably only be
achieved if large numbers of people can be convinced that this group is
about to destroy them.41
The Nazis’ persecution of the Jews can itself be seen as a twentieth-
century witch-hunt, whose magical solution for Germany’s ills proved
deeply alluring and even convincing despite lacking any basis in real-
ity. The business of isolating the evil ones and eliminating them has not
only informed the fascist project; it has also featured prominently in the
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paranoid Communism that Solzhenitsyn suffered and that led him to

warn against trying to isolate and destroy the ‘evil people’.
Past experience suggests that where a person is presumed to intend
you harm, this may be related to your own bad conscience in relation
to that person.42 Keith Thomas links many witchcraft accusations with
prior refusal of charity requested by the accused. For example, in
England:
It was no accident that Ruth Osborne, who was lynched for

witchcraft by a Hertfordshire mob in 1751, had been previously
refused buttermilk by the farmer whose subsequent mysteri-
ous illness provoked the accusation against her. The majority of
other informal witch accusations recorded in the eighteenth,
nineteenth and even twentieth centuries conform to the same
old special pattern of charity evaded, followed by misfortune
incurred.43
Could it be that an element of bad conscience has similarly fed into a

perception of evil Iraqi intentions towards the West and thereby to
Western hostility towards Iraq? What more massive refusal of assis-
tance could there be than the international sanctions which killed
perhaps 500,000 children in Iraq in the 1990s, sanctions that those
responsible for children’s welfare had repeatedly tried to get lifted? Of
course, these deaths could be blamed on Saddam’s regime, which did
indeed share the responsibility.44 Even so, the logic, at one level, is
impeccable: since we have been harming them, we may presume that
they intend to harm us; and when harm does happen to us (9/11), who
then are we going to blame?45 Afghanistan, too, may have been a source
of bad conscience (see Chapter 9). Related to all this is the possibility
that persecution reflects assumed envy. Research on German witch-
hunts in particular suggests that old women were typically the targets
and were frequently assumed to harbour ill-will as a result of envy
towards younger and still-fertile women.46 It is of course possible to get
too carried away with such comparisons; but it is striking how domi-
nant has been the discourse that terrorists attack because of the envy
they feel for Western lifestyles and for Western freedom in particular.47
As early as 1948, the influential US State Department analyst George
Kennan wrote a memo making clear that America’s disproportionate
wealth would attract ‘envy and resentment’ (and that the real task was
to maintain economic disparities by dispensing ‘with all sentimentality
and day-dreaming’).48 Some element of guilt about extreme global
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inequality may be feeding today’s variants of this discourse: given the

scarcity of understanding about terrorism and its causes, presumed
envy steps in readily as both explanation for misfortune and (implicit)
justification for persecutory violence.
Also notable in recent decades, as in a witch-hunt against the elderly
or women or any isolated individual, has been the weakness of those
who are claimed to embody the greatest threat; as Arundhati Roy was
prompted to observe by the 2003 attack on Iraq, ‘We once again
witnessed the paranoia that a starved, bombed, besieged country was
about to annihilate almighty America. (Iraq was only the latest in a
succession of countries – earlier there was Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya,
Grenada, Panama)’.49 Of course, weakness has the very practical advan-
tage that the target cannot easily hit back. One is reminded that during
the Cold War, the two superpower governments – who seemed to find
the perpetuation of (limited) conflict to be both politically and economi-
cally useful – were concerned to avoid direct (and suicidal) military
confrontation with each other, but nevertheless created havoc among
many less powerful nations through proxy wars. Neither then nor today
do we see US attacks on Moscow on the grounds that the Russians have
‘weapons of mass destruction’, for obvious reasons. Instead, we have a
bully’s focus on easy targets who cannot easily hit back.
Drawing on Rene Girard, British anthropologist Tim Allen has
suggested, controversially, that witch-hunts may, in some circum-
stances, serve some kind of positive function in focusing community
hostilities onto a single individual and helping a society escape a cycle
of revenge.50 It is an interesting idea, and Girard himself stated, ‘the
rites of sacrifice serve to polarize the community’s aggressive impulses
and redirect them toward victims that may be actual or putative,
animate or inanimate, but that are always incapable of propagating
further vengeance’.51 Whether we agree that this is in any way
‘functional’ for society, Girard’s reflections on the law are worth noting:
He who exacts his own vengeance is said to ‘take the law into
his own hands’. There is no difference of principle between
private and public vengeance, but on the social level, the differ-
ence is enormous. Under the public system, an act of
vengeance is no longer avenged; the process is terminated, the
danger of escalation averted.52
Following this logic, in circumstances where there is some kind of gener-

alised consent to a war (to a degree, the 1991 Gulf War), the potential for
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fuelling future violence will be far less than where the war is seen as an
act of private vengeance (Iraq 2003), which may itself be revenged.
Evidence from witch-hunts past and present suggests that they oper-
ate within closed systems of thought that make them difficult to chal-
lenge. When the killing or banishment of a witch does not eliminate a
particular problem, the conclusion is usually not that the witch-hunt
was ill-conceived but that more witches must be found. Similarly, when
the persecution of a larger group runs into problems or proves coun-
terproductive, a common response has been to redouble one’s efforts,
to intensify the witch-hunt. This is well mapped by Robert Robins and
Jerrold Post in their book, Political Paranoia, notably in relation to
purges by Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge.53 We can see hints of this impulse
when terror attacks have occurred in various countries in the wake of
the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq invasions. Such terror bombings
indicate, at the very least, that the punitive action has not eliminated
the problem. But the conclusion in official circles is typically not that
the counter-terror was ill-conceived or ineffective; rather, it is that we
must reinforce the existing strategy and perhaps widen the pursuit of
culprits. Time will tell whether Iraq’s fellow members in the ‘axis of
evil’ – Iran and North Korea – are also to be attacked in the name of
prevention.
Significantly, the ‘war on terror’ was not the first time that interna-
tional interventions were based on the (comforting) belief that elimi-
nating evil individuals would provide the key to safety. In the early
1990s, US attempts to relieve famine in Somalia foundered on a
complex war whose political and economic agendas were quickly
boiled down by the US government to the alleged ‘evil’ of one General
Mohamed Aideed. Aideed was the subject of the US government’s
‘most wanted’ posters and the target of a botched US raid in 1993 that
led to the deaths of as many as 1,000 Somalis in the fire fight. At the
turn of the twenty-first century, the complex problems of West Africa
were often neatly and dangerously simplified into the ‘evil’ of Liberian
President Charles Taylor – a profoundly destructive force, to be sure,
but hardly the only problem in a region where corruption and weak
states have repeatedly fed into brutal rebellion and equally brutal
counter-insurgency. In relation to Liberia, Alex Vines, head of the Africa
programme at London’s Royal Institute for International Affairs, said
in mid-2003, ‘Some on the Security Council seem to believe regime
change is desirable but lack any vision of what happens once Taylor is
gone’.54 More recently, the United States focused a lot of hopes in the
Middle East on removing Yasser Arafat, but the International Crisis
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Group (ICG) noted wisely, ‘Defects in Palestinian democracy did not

cause the Israeli–Palestine conflict any more than addressing them will
resolve it’.55 The personification of evil has long been a tempting
and perilous solution to complexity.
Devils and details: the neglect of reconstruction
The Bush administration has persistently proved more interested in

devils than details, more concerned with removing the evil ones than
with the painstaking business of reconstruction. Indeed, putting too
much faith in the elimination of evil individuals has encouraged great
naivety in relation to what happens next. Like the Communists and
Karl Marx himself, who analysed the shortcomings of capitalism with-
out saying much about its replacement, today’s neo-imperialists have
rarely considered the nature of the state after the bad guys have been
banished. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge observe, ‘There
was a straightforward contradiction between the pessimism of the
neocons’ diagnosis (the world is a much more dangerous place than
you think) and the optimism of their trust in transformation.’56 It is the
focus on evil leaders that largely explains this contradiction. With all
the focus on bin Laden and the Taliban, reconstruction in Afghanistan
was apparently little more than an afterthought. Bob Woodward
reported on a US National Security Council meeting on 4 October 2001,
three days before Afghanistan was attacked:
As for post-Taliban Afghanistan, [Paul] Wolfowitz and

[Condoleezza] Rice talked about getting other countries to put
up money for rebuilding. ‘Who will run the country?’ Bush
asked. We should have addressed that, Rice thought. Her most
awful moments were when the president thought of something
that the principals, particularly she, should have anticipated.
No one had a real answer, but Rice was beginning to under-
stand that that was the critical question. Where were they
headed?57
As usual, Woodward seems at least half blind to the outrageous nature

of the conversations he is documenting. (This may help to explain how
he was able to get the invaluable information in the first place, and
indeed the Bush administration seemed generally happy with his
work.)58 In the event, reconstruction was under-funded, and impeded
by drastically falling media coverage. The collapse of the Taliban
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unleashed centrifugal forces and gave a boost to warlordism, ethnic

politics, banditry and opium production.59 The US government was
reluctant to provide or allow peacekeeping troops, fearing they might
become targets or restrict US freedom of action against the Taliban and
al-Qaida.60
As a detailed and informative study for the Project on Defense
Alternatives (based in Cambridge, Massachusetts) observed, ‘The rush
into a large and ambitious military operation precluded making
adequate arrangements for the post-war political environment and
humanitarian needs.’61 Neglect of reconstruction created anger at what
some Afghans called ‘a second desertion’ by the West, after the earlier
abandonment when the Soviets were defeated.
James Dobbins, who was Bush’s special envoy for Afghanistan and
its first representative in liberated Kabul, said the outcome in
Afghanistan was shaped by the US government decision to avoid
peacekeeping activities, to oppose anyone else playing this role outside
Kabul, and to avoid engaging in counter-narcotics activities.62 The aim
of the US-led coalition force in Afghanistan was to hunt down the
Taliban and al-Qaida, not to provide security for the Afghan people.63
Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning for the State Depart-
ment, said in late December 2001, ‘We don’t want to get involved in the
intrusive nation-building which would be resented by Afghans or resis-
ted by them ultimately.’64 (One might think that bombing would also be
‘intrusive’, but it went ahead nonetheless.) As war with Iraq loomed
closer, another factor impeding the security presence in Afghanistan
was the practice of holding back troops for use in Iraq.65
The ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan was followed by a US-
approved ‘Transitional Administration’, depending heavily on the Tajik
and Uzbek ethnic minorities. This produced a sense of exclusion among
many Pashtun in the south, creating a fertile climate in which the
Taliban, al-Qaida elements and warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
were able to operate.66 Like the Iraqi Army in 1993, the Taliban disap-
peared quickly but resurfaced to create problems later. An April 2003
report by British aid agencies working in Afghanistan observed:
The indications are that the Taliban and other radical elements
have succeeded in their efforts to undermine the reconstruction
process in the south of the country, at least, with the withdrawal
of the aid community from effective programming in that area.
This inevitably risks further alienating the Pushtun population
from the transitional government and raises questions about the
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future integrity of Afghanistan as a nation state. The US-led

coalition forces appear powerless to reverse this trend and there
are strong indications that they may be reinforcing it.67
Most of the power in President Hamid Karzai’s US-approved govern-

ment seemed to rest with former Northern Alliance commanders – like
the Tajik defence minister Mohammed Fahim, who opposed admitting
other ethnic groups to his army. Karzai used aid money to try to buy
the support of regional warlords, while the warlords – and not central
government – benefited from taxing trade routes.68 This gave rise to
some pretty strange bedfellows for the West, as Isabel Hilton observed:
The British have been shipping cash to Hazrat Ali, the head
of Afghanistan’s eastern military command and the warlord
of Nangahar, who worked with the US at Tora Bora. His men
specialize in arresting people on the pretext that they are
Taliban supporters and torturing them until their families
pay up.69
A consortium of British aid agencies noted in April 2003, ‘Resentment

may also be generated over the support given by the US-led coalition
forces to particular local power holders whose power base might other-
wise be tenuous’.70 Certainly, many abuses have been carried out by
armed militia, regional commanders and police.71
Under Karzai, the authority of the central government did not
extend much beyond the capital, Kabul. The reach and size of the new
Afghan Army grew only slowly.72 The International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), with no US troops, was restricted to the capital.73 One
major impediment seems to have been that US Defence Secretary
Rumsfeld, busy planning the war with Iraq, did not want men tied
down in peacekeeping.74
In Iraq, as in Afghanistan, destruction was more carefully planned
than reconstruction. In Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the failure to ensure
essential services under a new regime added force to insurgency.
Despite promises of massive assistance made before the war,75 the
United States was reluctant to embrace the intellectual and financial
challenge of Iraqi reconstruction, but also unwilling to allow a major
role for the UN or the European Union. As Giles Foden put it in mid-
2003, ‘the careless approach to civil administration and humanitarian
relief in post-war Iraq has compounded the impression that opposing
evil does not, for Bush and his cohorts, mean the same thing as doing
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good’.76 Blair also gave little sign of having thought through Iraqis’
reception for the invasion/occupation.77
Post-Saddam Iraq has paid heavily for the tendency to reduce every
problem to the evil of Saddam and his fellow Ba’athists. The hierarchical
organisation that is the US military has tended to imagine the enemy in
its own image, that is, as a hierarchical organisation which will be fatally
weakened by the elimination of key leaders. In late 1993, military
strategist Jon Arquilla said of the hunt for Saddam in Iraq, ‘We are a
hierarchy and we like to fight hierarchies. We think if we cut off the head,
we can end this.’78 Saddam’s removal was supplemented by the rapid
dismantling of the Ba’athist state: again, an identifiable body of appar-
ently evil individuals whose removal would ostensibly make everyone
safer. In effect, Coalition Provisional Authority head Paul Bremer fired
the entire senior civil service,79 and up to 30,000 Ba’ath Party officials
were automatically excluded from office (a policy later partially
reversed).80 Even more dangerously, an army of some 400,000 Iraqi
soldiers was demobilised without any re-employment programme or
pensions. While these state structures had certainly proved profoundly
abusive, attempting to eliminate them overnight had the effect of
compounding insecurity, starting with widespread looting in the imme-
diate aftermath of the US-led attack. Dismantling an entire state in a
matter of weeks, though it might fit neatly with a neo-liberal agenda as
well as with the impulse to demonise a finite group of enemies, repre-
sents a pretty dangerous enterprise. (The flooding of Louisiana in 2005,
and information on the previous neglect of levees, of emergency
planning and the free-for-all building on wetlands were soon to remind
Americans, in a manner more damaging for Bush, of the dangers of a
Republican ideology that seemed to have little faith even in the idea of
government.81) In Iraq, the dangers from angry ex-officials themselves
were compounded when the damage to services gave a boost to insur-
gency and, in particular, the Shi’ite religious activism that so worried the
United States. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) observed:
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the virtual absence of an

effective central authority in a society in which 60 per cent of
the population relied on the state for its daily bread prompted
many who might not otherwise have done so to turn to the
clergy for help. Shi’ite activists provided welfare services,
health care and law and order. Without an effective police
force, vigilantes designated by religious leaders patrolled the
streets and administered hospitals and universities.82
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Moqtada al-Sadr and his ‘Mahdi army’ were guarding factories from
looters (and even helping to direct traffic) until Bremer provoked Sadr
into armed conflict by shutting his newspaper and arresting and killing
his deputies.83
Plentiful warnings on the consequences of wholesale sackings
were ignored. Although the Pentagon tended to favour a purge of
those tainted by the Ba’ath Party and Saddam, the US State Depart-
ment wanted to keep the government apparatus largely intact, at least
until elections could be held.84 The State Department also predicted
the widespread looting which duly occurred.85 At the end of May
2003, Ramiro Lopes de Silva, the UN’s most senior humanitarian offi-
cial in Iraq, warned that the sudden decision to demobilise a massive
army without any re-employment or pensions could generate a ‘low
intensity conflict’ in the countryside, particularly given the tightened
security in the capital.86 These sackings did indeed prove a significant
factor in the post-occupation insurgency. An American special forces
officer stationed in Baghdad said that after the dissolution of the
Army, ‘I had my guys coming up to me and saying, “Does Bremer
realize that there are four hundred thousand of these guys out there
and they all have guns?” So did these decisions contribute to the
insurgency? Unequivocally, yes.’87
Iraq’s police force was another problem, as was the failure to deal
with unemployment. Andrew Balthazor, for ten months the senior
intelligence officer for part of Baghdad, noted in August 2004 that the
former Iraqi police had been engaged far too late in the reconstruction,
that unemployment had foolishly not been made a priority and that
‘idle hands are dangerous’.88
The working assumption of the US government in particular has
been that if you remove Saddam (the heart of the problem), a democ-
racy would naturally grow up in its place. But Saddam loyalists proved
a significant force and were joined by nationalists driven by desire for
independence and security, and by Islamists wanting to return political
Islam to Iraq.89 There are reasons why democracy was absent in Iraq
through the twentieth century (not least the artificiality of colonial
borders and the artificially bolstered power of Sunni allies), and many
of these reasons persist. Removing a totalitarian regime creates a
vacuum, to be sure; democracy may have a chance, but it is only one of
the political systems which could fill that vacuum. A truly democratic
Iraq, moreover, could eventually put in power the kind of Islamist
government that the West doesn’t like (and helped forestall in Algeria).
Part of the problem with the United States’s aggressive
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‘democratisation’ programme has been the marginalisation of special-

ists.90 In 2002, the US Defense Department announced the closing of the
Army’s Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), the only government agency
devoted to studying how to get peace in failed states or post-conflict
situations.91 In April 2003, the Observer quoted a senior former diplomat
in Baghdad as saying, ‘There are no serious Arabists left in the [US]
government now; only those who have been telling the White House
what it wants to hear. The dragons have taken over.’92 When it came to
decisions by the US authority in Iraq, State Department Arab specialists
were marginalised while most decisions were made by Pentagon
appointees reporting to Rumsfeld.93 The Pentagon was warned by US
diplomats, soldiers and peacekeeping experts not only that post-war
chaos in Iraq was likely but that a substantial military police force would
be needed to control it. Yet, once again, these warnings were ignored.
This was despite precedents like the US invasion of Panama in 1989,
when much of the damage to Panama City occurred after combat oper-
ations were over.94
Apart from the crude attempt to dismantle the Iraqi state, another
key problem was the corruption and inefficiency within the external
reconstruction effort itself. By the time the occupation was officially
declared ‘over’ in mid-2004, the US government had spent only 2 per
cent of the $18.4 billion obtained from Congress for the reconstruction
of Iraq, a White House budget office report revealed. The US govern-
ment blamed insecurity.95 Iraqi oil revenues also went missing. A
special report to the US Congress found that lack of adequate controls
and transparency meant, ‘there was no assurance that the funds [some
8.8 billion dollars out of a total reconstruction fund of 20 billion raised
from oil revenues under the occupation] were used for the purposes
mandated by the UN Security Council’.96 Halliburton had won key ‘no
bid’ contracts, and US senior intelligence officer Andrew Balthazor said
that the use of no-bid contractors made things worse ‘by driving out or
discouraging some international and non-US NGOs who were working
the same areas that contractors like Bechtel were hired to fix’.97 Hiring
the cheap labour of rural Iraqis had annoyed urban unemployed Iraqis
and Balthazor observed, further:
CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] was as much our

enemy over there as the people planting roadside bombs and
shooting weapons at us. Several times they put US profit or
CPA control as more important than security for either Iraqis
or the US troops over there. CPA was mostly staffed by young
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Republicans who want to put CPA/Iraq on their resume so

they won’t be left out of the Party.98
In a detailed review of the CPA in September 2004, Peter Galbraith

noted that, ‘Republican political connections counted for far more than
professional competence, relevant international experience, or knowl-
edge of Iraq.’99 Experienced professionals had sometimes been replaced
by Republican political cronies. (This phenomenon also appears to
have helped to undermine the Federal Emergency Management
Agency in the run-up to the US Hurricane Katrina disaster; as Paul
Krugman points out, if you don’t believe government can do any good,
why not help your friends to a share of the pie?100) In Iraq, the slow and
misdirected US spending through the CPA (labelled by some Iraqis as
‘Cannot Provide Anything’) had left unemployment at around 50 per
cent,101 fuelling Iraqi bitterness. The marginalisation of popular Shi’ite
politicians by the CPA had made it easier for Moqtada al-Sadr to
portray the transitional government as an instrument of American
occupation. Iraq’s Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi responded as al-
Sadr had hoped, authorising US Marines to attack Shi’ite insurgents in
Najaf’s holy centre, leaving hundreds dead and producing new recruits
for al-Sadr. Meanwhile, the CPA Iraqi Army was not, for the most part,
a serious force. An exception was the 36th Iraqi National Guard battal-
ion (with its mostly Kurdish militiamen), which was used against
Fallujah and Najaf, thereby intensifying Shi’ite–Kurdish tensions.102
Concluding remarks
The focus on removing identifiable evil individuals has led, then, to a

neglect of complex reconstruction issues, and has fed into solutions that
have little or no connection to the problems posed by terrorism, with
accessibility favoured over logic.
Significantly, the witch-hunt reflex seems almost infinitely extend-
able. For one thing, the identification of foreign enemies has usually
gone hand-in-hand with the identification of some ‘fifth column’ at
home, a phenomenon explored in Chapter 9. Moreover, as we have
seen, political persecution has flourished in a wide range of countries
signed up to the ‘war on terror’.
Witch-hunts may also be useful in attempts to accommodate
revealed abuses by ‘one’s own side’. In responding to Abu Ghraib (just
as in the original ‘war on terror’), it has proved convenient to invoke
the idea that bad things are the responsibility of a few ‘evil individuals’,
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a few ‘bad apples’. For example, Bush was anxious to deny that this
torture reflected anything like official policy or that it was mirrored by
abuses in Cuba and Afghanistan.103 In the UK the Sun newspaper was
happy to label Lynndie England with the banner headline ‘Witch!’.104
In reality, the abuses at Abu Ghraib were not just individual acts of
sadism by a few ‘evil’ individuals; they were also the products of fear,
racism and signals from the top. Bush decided on 7 February 2002 that
the protection of the Geneva Convention would be withheld both from
al-Qaida and the Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, a particular problem
given the subsequent efforts to bring Guantanamo techniques to Abu
Ghraib.105 Justice Department and Defense Department lawyers argued
that Americans could torture prisoners and avoid criminal charges.106
Rumsfeld in December 2003 approved interrogation techniques includ-
ing the use of hoods, the removal of clothing and the ‘use of detainees’
individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress’.107 (He
rescinded this, reportedly after vigorous opposition from Navy
lawyers.) Tellingly, the idea that evil can be physically eliminated has
characterised the response to Abu Ghraib as well as the ‘war on terror’:
Bush’s principal response to Abu Ghraib was to suggest tearing the
prison down (though he neglected to provide for it in his budget).108
While the emphasis on ‘a few evil individuals’ characterises the
response both to abuses by the enemy and to abuses by one’s own side,
there has been a marked difference in terms of the degree to which the
violence is seen as decentralised. Specifically, alongside the exaggera-
tion of the decentralisation of violence in one’s own operations (‘there
were no orders to abuse’), there has existed a pretty systematic under-
estimation of the degree to which the enemy’s violence is decentralised.
The dangers here are two-fold: first, that this way of thinking and talk-
ing perpetuates abuses by one’s own side; and, second, that it rein-
forces counterproductive strategies based on eliminating a few key
‘evil’ individuals or regimes.
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6 The Retreat from

Evidence-Based Thinking
In August 2004, the London-based Economist magazine noted, ‘Mr Bush
has got the big foreign-policy decisions right … on the evidence that
presented itself at the time, he rightly decided to invade Iraq’.1 But
evidence did not simply ‘present itself’: it was sought out, interpreted,
highlighted, distorted and sometimes ignored.2
It is worth examining in more detail the extraordinary approach of
the Bush administration to ‘evidence’, notably in relation to Iraq.
A conventional approach to crime involves searching for evidence
about who was responsible, establishing proof of responsibility and
then punishing those found guilty. But this procedure was set aside in
relation to the heinous crimes of 9/11. First, the choice of Iraq as a
target to a large extent preceded 9/11: in effect, the guilt preceded the
crime. Second, there was (as noted) no evidence linking Iraq with
9/11. Third, there was in the George W. Bush administration a
surprisingly explicit rejection of the need for evidence or proof.3
While deception of the public is certainly an important part of the
story, what is less well documented is the extent to which key policy-
makers adopted (and sometimes openly expressed) the idea that you
do not need evidence on which to base something as serious (and
incendiary) as a war. Donald Rumsfeld came close to acknowledging
this with his statement that, ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence of weapons of mass destruction’.4 In general, evidence
became something you marshalled (and distorted) to support a
position you had already adopted, and remarkably little shame
seemed to attach to this procedure. At least in terms of the expressed
justifications for war like WMD and links to al-Qaida, the wagers of
the ‘war on terror’ have been proceeding on a no-need-to-know basis.
The Bush administration’s approach to security was presaged in the
wake of the 1991 Gulf War in the form of a draft document, written by
Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby and leaked in spring 1992. Wolfowitz
and Libby were analysts at the Pentagon at the time, with Dick Cheney
as their boss. The paper called for US pre-eminence over Eurasia
(Europe and Asia) by preventing the rise of any potentially hostile
power, and it advocated a policy of pre-emption against states
suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction.5 In 1997, a
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group of conservative thinkers headed by William Kristol set up the

Project for the New American Century, with a ‘statement of principles’
that called for new defence spending and stressed that America must
meet any challenges to its pre-eminence. Among the signatories were
Bush’s brother Jeb, Dick Cheney and Cheney’s chief of staff Lewis
Libby.6 We now know that there was a longstanding – and more specific
– neo-con plan to topple Saddam7 (though Bush’s team had not both-
ered to inform the electorate in the run-up to the 2000 elections). In
January 1998, the Project for a New American Century group organised
a ‘letter to President Clinton on Iraq’, urging the president to remove
Saddam Hussein from power. Additional signatories included Donald
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, who became deputy to
Colin Powell at the State Department, and Richard Perle, later chair of
the Defense Policy Board.8 With the election of George W. Bush, Cheney
became Vice-President, Wolfowitz was appointed as Deputy Defense
Secretary and Libby as Cheney’s chief of staff and national security
adviser.9 George W. Bush’s election – and even more so 9/11 itself –
proved a significant opportunity for a group of men who had been
powerful under Reagan but then largely marginalised under Bush
senior and Clinton.10 Rumsfeld had been special envoy to Iraq under
Reagan and Defense Secretary under Ford in 1975–77, when he had
played on fears of burgeoning Soviet power to increase the power of
the military at the expense of the CIA. He returned to the Pentagon in
January 2001 as Defense Secretary.
One might expect that foreign policy officials would accumulate
evidence on possible threats, and then choose an appropriate response.
But Iraq was a case where several senior US officials seem first to have
decided on the threat and then to have gathered evidence to fit their
theory. Significantly, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill reported that
getting rid of Saddam Hussein was a priority for Bush and his inner
circle from the beginning of his administration.11 He also noted that
discussions focused on how to get rid of Saddam and not why, or even
why now.12 In the case of Iraq, there was nothing new in the allegations
that it had weapons of mass destruction: Iraq’s weapons programme
had been contained for a decade (after the West had played a key role
in building up this weapons industry).13 Investigative journalist
Seymour Hersh wrote that according to a Pentagon adviser who
worked with the Pentagon’s ‘Office of Special Plans’:
Special Plans was created [in the wake of 9/11] in order to find
evidence of what [Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz
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T H E R E T R E AT FROM E V I D E N C E -B A S E D T H I N K I N G
and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to

be true – that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and
that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and
possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and,
potentially, the United States.14
(Alarmingly, the Office of Special Plans was later to become involved in

co-ordinating information on the threat from Iran.15) In the UK, the
Office of Special Plans may have found a counterpart in ‘Operation
Rockingham’, established by the Defence Intelligence Staff within the
Ministry of Defence in 1991 and apparently involved later in ‘cherry
picking’ intelligence that would prove an active Iraqi WMD
programme.16
In March 2001, Richard Perle, then chairman of the Pentagon’s
Defense Policy Board, told a Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee
that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons, adding:
How far he’s gone on the nuclear-weapons side I don’t think we

really know. My guess is it’s further than we think. It’s always
further than we think, because we limit ourselves, as we think
about this, to what we’re able to prove and demonstrate.17
This statement is not entirely without logic: in a fast-moving world it is

quite possible that some states have weapons that others don’t know
about. But this approach is nonetheless deeply dangerous. It threatens
to usher in a world where ‘pre-emptive’ war can be launched on a
hunch. Asked about the evidence of a link between Iraq and al-Qaida
(and particularly about the alleged meeting in Prague between
suspected 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta and Iraqi officials),
Wolfowitz replied, ‘I think the premise of a policy has to be, we can’t
afford to wait for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’18 Such statements
exhibit an explicit rejection of the world of evidence in favour of conjec-
ture, a frank willingness to embrace a truth that cannot be demon-
strated. He also stressed that he could not go into details because the
information was ‘classified’.19 Bob Woodward reported that Wolfowitz,
‘subscribed to Rumsfeld’s notion that lack of evidence did not mean
something did not exist’.20 This logic was applied both to the existence
of Iraqi WMD and the alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaida. Assess-
ing the threat from Iraq and the rights and wrongs of attacking Iraq,
Richard Perle noted, ‘We cannot know for sure. But on which side
would it be better to err?’21 In other words, if we do not know whether
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there is a threat, it is better to attack anyway, just in case, or ‘when in

doubt, hit out’. Yet as the sixteenth-century French essayist Michel de
Montaigne said of the Inquisition, ‘it is rating one’s conjectures at a
very high price to roast a man alive on the strength of them’.22 In rela-
tion to the Iraq crisis, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill later observed
that the newly emphasised policy of pre-emption created a huge
weight of responsibility to be right, but that politics in the United States
was no longer about being right; it was about winning.23 Perhaps the
best way to de-legitimise something is to equate it with something truly
horrible, like, say, nuclear war. This is exactly what Bush did with the
notion of proof, declaring in October 2002, ‘we cannot wait for the final
proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud’.24
In any case, proof took second place to what was ‘doable’. Bob
Woodward reported that Wolfowitz’s position in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11 was that:
Attacking Afghanistan would be uncertain. He worried about

100,000 American troops bogged down in mountain fighting in
Afghanistan six months from then. In contrast, Iraq was a brit-
tle, oppressive regime that might break easily. It was doable.
He estimated there was a 10–50 per cent chance Saddam was
involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks.25
How these figures were arrived at is anybody’s guess, since there is no

evidence linking Saddam to 9/11. Such decision-by-guesswork would
be unacceptable as a basis for punishing an individual, let alone
launching a full-scale war. If we are bandying figures about, why not
go for a 10–90 per cent chance, or even 0–100 per cent? The latter would
pleasingly cover all eventualities.
If the idea of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a central
pillar of the law, the setting aside of notions of proof is in line with
the United States’s willingness to set aside international law, whether
launching a war opposed by the majority of the UN Security Council
or ignoring the Geneva Conventions on holding so-called ‘enemy
combatant’ prisoners without trial or access to lawyers (at the US
camps in Guantanamo Bay, Bagram airbase in Afghanistan and inside
Iraq). The rounding up of Muslim terrorist suspects has often been
arbitrary: in many ways, this practice of acting and then hoping the
evidence comes to light embodies the same operating principle as the
attack on Iraq.26
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The drastic step of setting aside the notion of proof appears to have
been given a veneer of intellectual credibility by officials and analysts
who drew on the work of Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago,
including Paul Wolfowitz and William Kristol.27 Strauss’s former
doctoral student Abram Shulsky became Director of the Pentagon’s
Office of Special Plans and together with Gary Schmitt (a member of
the Project for the New American Century) he published an article in
1999 called, ‘Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (By Which We
Do Not Mean Nous)’. Seymour Hersh observes:
Echoing one of Strauss’s major themes, Shulsky and Schmitt

criticize America’s intelligence community for its failure to
appreciate the duplicitous nature of the regimes it deals with,
its susceptibility to social-science notions of proof [my emphasis],
and its inability to cope with deliberate concealment.28
Hersh quotes a former CIA expert who spent the past decade immersed
in Iraqi-exile affairs and who said of the Pentagon’s Special Plans
people, ‘They see themselves as outsiders. There’s a high degree of
paranoia. They’ve convinced themselves that they’re on the side of the
angels, and everybody else in the government is a fool.’29
Leo Strauss argued that good politicians should reassert the absolute
moral values that would unite society. He was worried by relativism:
the idea that nothing could be said to be absolutely or objectively true.
Religion had a vital political function in ensuring social order – what
Plato called a ‘noble lie’. Indeed, although Strauss is widely held to
have been an atheist, religion was seen as useful because it ‘breeds
deference to the ruling class’.30 This ambivalence mirrored Strauss’s
discussion of Niccolò Machiavelli’s view that a ruling prince should not
be religious but ought to appear so, since a religious populace was
necessary for social order.31 Also important for Strauss and those he
influenced seems to have been the idea of concealing things from
people incapable of understanding them.32 It was not hard to imagine
how this way of thinking could feed into the elevation of ‘faith’ and the
distortion of evidence. Nor it is difficult to see a synergy between this
way of thinking and the Republican ‘backlash’ – as analysed by
Thomas Frank – which diverted economic and social discontent into
anger over diverse ‘moral issues’.
Signals from the top encouraged the production of inaccurate and
biased information. As Paul O’Neill, who was asked to resign from his
post of Treasury Secretary in December 2002, put it:
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If you operate in a certain way – by saying this is how I want

to justify what I’ve already decided to do, and I don’t care how
you pull it off – you guarantee that you’ll get faulty, one-sided
information. … You don’t have to issue an edict, or twist arms,
or be overt.33
The use of a general signal from the top on the kind of evidence that
was required had some similarities with signals sent out in relation to
torture and coalition soldiers’ abuses: Mark Danner quotes a lawyer for
one of those accused of abuses in Iraq, Staff Sergeant Ivan Fredericks:
The story is not necessarily that there was a direct order. Every-
body is far too subtle and smart for that. … Realistically, there is
a description of an activity, a suggestion that it may be helpful
and encouragement that this is exactly what we needed.34
Direct pressure to distort evidence on WMD was also used. UN chief

weapons inspector Hans Blix accused the Bush administration of leaning
on his inspectors to produce more damning language in their reports.35
MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove told a Downing Street meeting in July
2002 that in the United States ‘the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy’.36 Robert Dreyfuss reported in December 2002:
The Pentagon is bringing relentless pressure to bear on the

agency [the CIA] to produce intelligence reports more support-
ive of the war with Iraq, according to former CIA officials. …
Morale inside the US national-security apparatus is said to be
low, with career staffers feeling intimidated and pressured to
justify the push for war.37
The CIA’s past failings did not help in resisting this pressure. The CIA
had lost credibility for failing to anticipate or prevent 9/11. For exam-
ple, those al-Qaida operatives it was tracking were never put on the
immigration service watch list.38 This was only the latest in a series of
errors by the CIA – not only its failure to foresee the Soviet collapse but
its failure to provide warning of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center in 1993, on US military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996, on US
embassies in East Africa in 1998, and on the USS Cole in 2000. Then
there was the CIA’s failure even to notice India’s underground nuclear
testing in 1998.39 Where information is weak and predictions inade-
quate, exaggerating threats was likely to be bureaucratically safer than
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underplaying them. According to Mel Goodman of the Center for Inter-

national Policy, ‘Since 1998, CIA analysis of Third World missile
programs has taken on a worst-case flavor, exaggerating the national
security threat to the United States and politicising the intelligence data
in the process’.40 Somewhat similarly, John Kampfner suggests that
both US and UK intelligence, having failed to make sufficiently specific
warnings about 9/11, did not want to be caught out on Saddam.41
Intelligence agencies’ ability to report the truth also seems to have
been undermined by competition between them. To put it crudely, if
you did not provide the required answer, somebody else would. The
Bush administration seems to have preferred the analysis of Iraq
supplied by the Iraqi National Congress (or INC, an opposition group)
to that coming from the CIA. Yet the INC’s intelligence-gathering abil-
ities were minimal. Indeed, former CIA official and counter-terrorism
expert Vincent Cannistraro said the INC made no distinction between
intelligence and propaganda, using alleged informants and defectors to
say what INC head Ahmad Chalabi wanted said.42
Proving a pre-existing theory was helped by the highly selective
picking of facts. General Hussein Kamel, who was in charge of Iraq’s
weapons programmes, defected to Jordan in August 1995, together
with his brother, Colonel Saddam Kamel. These defections and the
provision of evidence by these two men were cited by Bush as the
moment when Saddam’s regime:
was forced to admit that it had produced more than thirty

thousand liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents.
… This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has
never been accounted for, and is capable of killing millions.43
This was certainly frightening information. But the full record of

Hussein Kamel’s interview with UN inspectors shows that he also said
that Iraq’s stockpile of chemical and biological warheads, manufac-
tured before the 1992 Gulf War, had been destroyed, and that in many
cases this was in response to ongoing inspections.44
On 7 September 2002, Bush cited an International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA] report from ‘when the inspectors first went into Iraq’
which he said had noted that Iraq was six months from developing
nuclear weapons. Bush added, ‘I don’t know what more evidence we
need’. Yet the IAEA itself made it clear that it had made no such state-
ment.45 In Bush’s 12 September 2002 address to the UN, the US Presi-
dent cited Iraqi purchase of aluminium tubes which he said were ‘used
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to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons’. But the IAEA was soon report-
ing that the size of the tubes meant they were ill-suited for uranium-
enrichment and that they were identical to those previously used by
Iraq to make conventional artillery rockets. Despite the IAEA’s rebuttal
in January 2003, Powell repeated the aluminium tubes charge in his
speech to the UN on 5 February.46 The CIA had warned in 2001 that
documents purporting to show Iraq had attempted to buy 500 tons of
uranium from Niger were fakes. Yet these documents were cited by
Bush in his spring 2003 State of the Union address.47 On 7 October 2002,
Bush made a speech warning that Iraq had a growing fleet of
unmanned aircraft which could be fitted with chemical or biological
weapons and used ‘for missions targeting the United States’. But in
reality the aircraft did not have the range to reach the United States.48
And so it goes on.
Britain’s September 2002 dossier on Iraq’s WMD was heavily
massaged. Early drafts were called ‘Iraq’s Programme for WMD’, but
the published dossier was called ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’.
Tony Blair’s foreword said Saddam’s military planning allowed for
some of his WMD ‘to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use
them’. Yet the initial draft made clear that Saddam could not launch a
nuclear attack on the UK; this was deleted. Chemical and biological
weapons, reported by intelligence, were only battlefield ones. The
dossier gave the impression that these were long-range and press
reports on these lines were never corrected.49 Bush twice cited the 45-
minute claim in the British dossier,50 but CIA boss George Tenet
privately referred to the ‘they-can-attack-in-45-minutes shit’.51
A British government dossier released at the end of January 2003,
cited by Powell in his 5 February 2003 address to the UN Security
Council as a ‘fine paper’, was actually plagiarised – most of it from a
paper by a postgraduate student, which itself drew largely on informa-
tion that was more than ten years old.52 According to a July 2003 report
from the UK’s Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘it appears likely that there
was only limited access to reliable human intelligence in Iraq and that
as a consequence the United Kingdom may have been heavily reliant
on US technical intelligence, on defectors and on exiles with an agenda
of their own’.53
When it comes to following one’s hunches (rather than an evidence-
based procedure), the doctrine of ‘preventive self-defence’ has offered a
great deal of scope. The doctrine’s great advantage is that the chosen
enemy does not actually have to have done anything. Donald Rumsfeld
in particular argued that the demise of traditional enemies and the
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heightened terrorist threat demand a new kind of security policy based,

in his semi-mystical formulation, on the need to ‘deter and defeat adver-
saries that have not yet emerged to challenge us’.54 Similarly, President
Bush told West Point military cadets in mid-2002, ‘We must take the
battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats
before they emerge’.55 The present and future, as Brian Massumi has
suggested, were dangerously elided.56 Bush was asked on ABC Televi-
sion about ‘the hard fact that there were weapons of mass destruction, as
opposed to the possibility that [Saddam] might move to acquire those
weapons’. Bush replied, ‘What’s the difference?’57 Further obscurity was
thrown on the WMD issue by Rumsfeld’s memorable statement that:
There are things we know that we know. There are known

unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we
don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are
things we don’t know we don’t know. … Each year, we
discover a few more of these unknown unknowns.58
Rumsfeld saw the ‘unknown unknowns’ as the real killers.59 We were

now being plunged deep into the murky world of Steven Spielberg’s
film Minority Report with its ‘pre-crime’ police division seeking to elim-
inate criminals before they can commit their crimes. Significantly, there
have been moves to extend the doctrine of pre-emption into the domes-
tic sphere, as when the then British Home Secretary suggested in early
2004 that those who might become suicide bombers should be incar-
cerated before they can do anything bad, and that they could be tried
on a lower standard of proof in secret courts.60 The new doctrine of pre-
emption insists that we would be much better off if we could intervene
to stop aggression before it happens rather than the present, ‘too-late-
by-half’ tactic of trying to punish perpetrators once a crime has taken
place (also known as the law). Of course, the new fashion does raise
small problems in terms of how we know what crimes or acts of aggres-
sion are about to happen, who is about to do them, who will make the
decision to intervene and ‘prevent’, and how to deal with the anger of
those who experience or witness a wrongful accusation.
There are some indications that, for the Bush administration, the aim
was less to study reality (and then base behaviour on it) that to create
reality. In the summer of 2002, journalist and author Ron Suskind met
with one of Bush’s senior advisers, who was unhappy with an article
Suskind had written about the administration’s media relations. The
adviser commented that:
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guys like me were ‘in what we call the reality-based commu-

nity,’ which he defined as people who ‘believe that solutions
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.’ I
nodded and murmured something about enlightenment prin-
ciples and empiricism. He cut me off. ‘That’s not the way the
world really works anymore,’ he continued. ‘We’re an empire
now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while
you’re studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we’ll act
again, creating other new realities, which you can study too,
and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors …
and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.’61
Linked to the denigration of evidence and the celebration of self-made

‘reality’ has been a tendency for leaders to sanctify their own ‘instincts’,
what one writer called ‘Almighty Gut’.62 The redundancy of Cold War
doctrines and the confusion and fear around 9/11 seem to have helped
to elevate ‘instinct’ as the new benchmark for policy. George Bush
spoke repeatedly of his instincts. ‘I’m not a textbook player. I’m a gut
player.’63 Bob Woodward commented, ‘It’s pretty clear that Bush’s role
as politician, president and commander in chief is driven by a secular
faith in his instincts – his natural and spontaneous judgments. His
instincts are almost his second religion.’64 Palestinian Prime Minister
Abu Mazen recalls that Bush told him, ‘God told me to strike at al-
Qaeda and I struck them: then he instructed me to strike at Saddam,
which I did; and now I am determined to solve the problem in the
Middle East. If you help me, I will act.’65 If this were a serial killer
speaking (or perhaps bin Laden himself), the dangers of acting on
‘God’s voice’ would be particularly hard to miss. As philosopher Peter
Singer points out:
If everything depends on faith, then why should terrorists not

have faith that their particular version of Islam is right? Why
should they not ‘learn’ from an eminent religious teacher that
God wants them to destroy the greatest power standing against
an Islamic way of life?
For his part, Tony Blair declared simply, ‘Leadership comes by instinct’.66
After his month with Blair, journalist Peter Stothard said of the Prime
Minister, ‘He has great faith in his powers of personal intuition’.67 Blair
also seems to have persuaded others by banishing self-doubt. In mid-
March 2003, he threw everything into convincing the House of
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Commons (and especially his own party) that war was justified. Stothard
commented:
After all the editing upstairs, he says little more than that the
future cannot be known before it happens – with which all can
surely agree. But the piling of argument on argument is brutal.
Logic, however, will only take him so far. Those whom he wins
over, he wins by showing so powerfully his confidence that he is
right. To many of his critics such certainty is the way of madness.68
Clare Short stressed that Blair’s highly personalised style of decision-

making undermined the formulation of a considered policy on Iraq.69 The
Cabinet committee known as Defence and Overseas Policy was supposed
to supervise foreign policy strategy, but it never met on the Iraq crisis.
Moreover, the Iraq debacle had symbolised, for Short, a wider collapse of
collective decision-making.70 The late Robin Cook confirmed this picture:
There is never a paper offering different options for the cabinet

to choose between. The result is that the British cabinet is no
longer a forum in which decisions are taken, but in which deci-
sions are endorsed. … The real problem was that Blair made it
only too clear that his mind was made up [on the need for war
with Iraq] – and his cabinet had no collective experience of
trying to make the prime minister change his mind.71
Significantly, Blair was the first British prime minister who did not owe
his status as party leader to his parliamentary colleagues. Elected by a
vote among party members, he could afford to make enemies among
his own MPs.72 Stothard noted, further:
Some have decided that he is already mad, made so by too long

in power, too many admirers, too many enemies and too little
listening carefully to either friends or foes. The isolation of
Downing Street, even friends say, has changed the warm, open,
accommodating young MP and lawyer they used to know. The
man who could always talk around an issue is now taking one
view and holding it like a creed. Others stress the actor in Tony
Blair, the promising courtroom barrister, the somewhat less
promising imitator of rock stars. They say that he is feigning his
peculiar mad certainty, that he needs something to hide his
obedience to American orders.73
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Significantly, Blair’s faith in himself as a persuader was not matched by

his ability to persuade foreign leaders. He underestimated the convic-
tions of the Russians, the French and the Germans and he also turned
out to have little influence over Bush.74
Religion played a part in all this veneration of instinct. Though a natu-
ral political ally for Democrat President Clinton, Labour leader Tony
Blair seemed at first to have very little in common with the Republican
George W. Bush,75 and Blair seems to have been particularly anxious to
find some common ground.76 When Bush was quizzed on what he had
in common with Blair, the US President replied, ‘We both use Colgate
toothpaste and we both like physical exercise’77 – perhaps not the most
promising basis for an alliance to build a new world order. One signifi-
cant thing the two men have had in common, however, is a strong belief
in Christianity.78 Bush attributes his recovery from ‘the devil drink’ to his
religious faith, and at a private meeting with Amish farmers in Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania, in 2004, Bush was reported to have said, ‘I trust
God speaks through me.’79 For his part, Blair has a very evident mission-
ary zeal.80 Banishing doubt through faith seems to fit with certain
selected – many would say distorted – elements of Christian teaching: the
demand for proof will only take you so far; there is always a need for
faith, a belief in things unseen. Indeed, doubt may be seen as calling for
a renewal of faith. Yet as a basis for policy, this is woefully inept.
In the end, leaders citing God’s authority or approval are logically
committed to the dubious claim that their God is superior or their
access to His will is purer. Bush said he experienced almost no doubt
that he was doing the right thing. He said he didn’t read the editorial
pages.81 Blair, too, was reported to read little.82 Bob Woodward recalls
that towards the end of October 2001, when US bombing of
Afghanistan did not seem to be dislodging the Taliban:
Rice believed the president would tolerate debate, would

listen, but anyone who wanted debate had to have a good
argument, and preferably a solution or at least a proposed fix.
It was clear that no one at the table had a better idea.83
Bush has shown an increasing intolerance for anyone in his adminis-

tration or in Congress who has expressed doubt or asked him to explain
his positions. Even asking for facts to support the administration case
could lead to accusations of disloyalty. Open debate has been seen as
encouraging doubt, which undercuts faith.84
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Concluding remarks
The delusional arrogance of the Bush administration is revealed not

just by the rejection and distortion of evidence but by the (surprisingly
explicit) rejection of the need for evidence. Given Bush’s apparent intel-
lectual limitations, this kind of approach may have been comforting.
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill reported that the Bush administration
was dominated by ideologies based around pre-emption and the inher-
ent value of tax cuts,85 adding: ‘Ideology is a lot easier, because you
don’t have to know anything or search for anything. You know the
answer to everything. It’s not penetrable by facts. It’s absolutism.’86
Certainly, George W. Bush’s immunity to evidence has been very
persistent. In his first pre-election debate with Kerry in October 2004,
Bush said, ‘Saddam had no intention of disarming.’ Yet it was public
knowledge by this point that no weapons of mass destruction had
been, or were likely to be, found. Clearly, at some level Bush had not –
even then – faced the reality that Saddam had no WMD.
At times, Bush has seemed genuinely confused. He gives the impres-
sion of being a very muddled thinker, and of seeking to replace this
muddle with false certainties. Yet because these false certainties do not in
the end make sense or match empirical realities, the muddle is
compounded (and so too, presumably, the search for certainty). In the
same debate with Kerry, the president remarked, ‘Of course we’re after
Saddam Hussein, I mean bin Laden.’ When Bush was asked whether the
Iraq experience made it more likely or less likely that he would take the
United States into another pre-emptive military action, he replied, ‘I
would hope I never had to. … But the enemy attacked us and I have a
solemn duty to protect the American people.’ Bush was then challenged
by Kerry, who pointed out that it was not Saddam that attacked Amer-
ica but Osama bin Laden, to which Bush replied, ‘Of course I know that
Osama bin Laden attacked us. I know that!’ False certainties must be
constantly propped up with action, a theme revisited in Chapter 7.
Bush and Blair were informed – by those in a position to know – that
attacking Iraq was likely to increase terrorism by stoking up anger.
Despite all this evidence and advice, Bush and Blair went ahead with the
attack on Iraq; hence, in part, the conclusion that they have embraced a
kind of irrationalism. The message Tony Blair was getting from senior
Whitehall officials charged with combating Islamic extremists was that
the threat posed by Islamic extremists was much greater than that posed
by Saddam, and that this threat would intensify when the United States
and the UK attacked Iraq.87 The UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee,
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which had produced the September 2002 dossier hyping the threat of
WMD, assessed in February 2002 that the threat from al-Qaida and asso-
ciated groups would be heightened by military action against Iraq.88
In the United States, Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to
Bush senior during the 1991 Gulf War, said on TV in August 2002 that
an attack on Iraq could turn the Middle East into a ‘cauldron and thus
destroy the war on terrorism’.89 Particularly prominent in warning of a
backlash against the ‘war on terror’ was Colin Powell. Bob Woodward
reports that at a meeting with Bush and Rice at Bush’s residence:
Powell told Bush that as he was getting his head around the
Iraq question, he needed to think about the broader issues, all
the consequences of war. … Powell said the president had to
consider what a military operation against Iraq would do in the
Arab world. Cauldron was the right word. He dealt with the
leaders and foreign ministers in these countries as secretary of
state. The entire region could be destabilized – friendly regimes
in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan could be put in jeopardy or
overthrown. Anger and frustration at America abounded. War
could change everything in the Middle East.90
Successive terrorist attacks were not taken as evidence that the United
States was on the wrong path. In fact, Wolfowitz showed he was quite
capable of using them to draw the opposite conclusion: to show the ever-
elusive connection between Iraq and al-Qaida. Woodward reports that
Wolfowitz ‘thought it more than a coincidence that al Qaeda, which had
been relatively inactive since 9/11, had resumed activity [including the
Bali bombing] after the president had gone to the U.N. and threatened
unilateral action against Iraq’.91 Assessing whether the ‘war on terror’ is
‘working’ has also seen the sidelining of evidence-based thinking. For
example, uncomfortable think-tank data on the efficacy of the ‘war on
terror’ has been suppressed by the US government.92
The lesson seems to be that once faith takes hold, evidence will
prove whatever you want it to. Yet religious faith does not have to lead
in this delusional direction. Christian author and activist Jim Wallis
used to be invited to the White House in the early days of the Bush
administration. He told Ron Suskind:
If you’re penitent and not triumphal, it can move us to repen-

tance and accountability and help us reach for something
higher than ourselves. … Real faith, you see, leads us to deeper
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reflection and not – not ever – to the thing we as humans so

very much want.
Asked what that was, he replied, ‘Easy certainty’.93

One final aspect of the disconnect between problem and chosen solu-
tion is worth mentioning. To some extent, the impression of madness and
arbitrary behaviour may have been cultivated on purpose. Prominent
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman said a key problem was that
terrorists and those harbouring them thought Americans were soft,
adding that Bush’s team was right ‘to be as crazy as some of our
enemies’.94 Arbitrary behaviour can also intimidate third parties, and
Saddam Hussein himself understood that the very arbitrariness of offi-
cial violence could usefully reinforce feelings of terror among those he
wished to intimidate.95 While there were many reasons for attacking Iraq,
British playwright David Hare touched on an important truth when he
commented:
The intention to destroy the credibility of the United Nations

and its right to try and defuse situations of danger to life, is not
a byproduct of recent American policy. It is its very purpose.
Bush chose Iraq not because it would make sense but because
it wouldn’t. … The thinness of the justification for this war is,
in fact, its very point. As is the arbitrariness of the target.96
On 19 December 2001, Reuel Marc Gerecht, a neo-con close to Richard

Perle and the Iraqi National Congress,97 wrote in the Wall Street Journal:
If we really intend to extinguish the hope that has fueled the

rise of al Qaeda and the violent anti-Americanism throughout
the Middle East, we have no choice but to reinstill in our foes
and friends the fear and respect that attaches to any great
power. … Only a war against Saddam Hussein will decisively
restore the awe that protects American interests abroad and
citizens at home. We’ve been running from this fight for ten
years.98
As Stanley Cohen observes in relation to states that terrorise their own

people, ‘The culture of state terror is neither secret nor openly acknowl-
edged. … Fear inside depends on knowledge and uncertainty: who will
be picked up next?’99 Where the targeting of individuals is also arbi-
trary (as with the shooting of the young Brazilian man, Jean Charles de
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Menezes, at Stockwell tube station after the attempted 21 July 2005

London bombings), this again will tend to maximise the fear. This may
not be intentional, but it does keep everyone on edge. Charles de
Montesquieu in his De l’esprit des lois (published in 1748) pointed out
that witchcraft accusations rest on reputation rather than actions,
‘Consequently, a citizen is always in danger, since the best conduct in
the world, the purest morals, and the fulfilling of all social duties are no
guarantee that an individual will not be suspected of committing these
crimes’.100
Declaring one’s indifference to evidence, then, is rather more than
foolishness; it is an assertion of total power and, at some level, an
attempt to intimidate. The following chapter looks at how the use of
arbitrary power may create a degree of plausibility around nonsensical
beliefs.
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7 Action as Propaganda
In the ‘war on terror’, extreme and unlawful violence has been used to
make violence seem legitimate and necessary, a disturbing example of
what Hannah Arendt called ‘action-as-propaganda’. Explaining this
term, Arendt referred to ‘the advantages of a propaganda that
constantly ”adds the power of organization” to the feeble and unreli-
able voice of argument, and thereby realizes, so to speak, on the spur of
the moment, whatever it says’.1 For Arendt, factual propaganda actu-
ally worked better even than Joseph Goebbels’ rhetoric. Although
Arendt focused on the way action-as-propaganda could persuade
others, the concept can also help to explain how abuses sometimes
legitimise themselves in the eyes of key perpetrators.
We have noted already the allure of certainty in uncertain times, the
desire for simple solutions and tangible targets. Action-as-propaganda
can reinforce an oddly reassuring feeling of certainty, helping to bend
reality into line with a distorted and propagandistic image of the world.
It also distorts our perceptions of this reality so that the gap between
public perception and official propaganda is further diminished.
Arendt’s concept helps us to understand how the wagers of the ‘war on
terror’ have in effect taken something irrational (a magical solution to
the problem of terror) and through their actions made it appear to
many people (and, crucially, large sections of the American electorate)
to be both rational and plausible.
In their daily lives people are buffeted around by chance, and the
massive economic and social disruption in the United States has fuelled
a sense of insecurity and uncertainty which 9/11 compounded. Arendt
understood how our desire for certainty and predictability could feed
into abusive ideologies. ‘What the masses refuse to recognize’, she
wrote, ‘is the fortuitousness that pervades reality.’2 Consistency,
however constructed, was deeply alluring:
Before the alternative of facing the anarchic growth and total

arbitrariness of decay or bowing down before the most rigid,
fantastically fictitious consistency of an ideology, the masses
probably will always choose the latter and be ready to pay for
it with individual sacrifices – and this not because they are
strong or wicked, but because in the general disaster this
escape gains them a minimum of self-respect.3
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Arendt saw how this respect could come from denigrating – or even
attacking – others, and how this aggression could, in addition, generate
(spurious) legitimacy for itself. Part of the source of this ‘legitimacy’
was what has been called ‘just world thinking’, where people in effect
assume that punishment implies a crime, and where this assumption
serves to protect them from the fear of a totally arbitrary world.4 Signif-
icantly, ‘just world thinking’ may be more tempting as the world – and
accusations – become more arbitrary: thus, the more irrational the
actions of the Bush administration, for example, the greater may be the
felt need to reassure oneself that ‘there must be a reason’ for the
selection of victims (and therefore that ‘we’ are safe).
Arendt suggested that another means by which violence could
generate its own legitimacy was by allowing leaders to make their own
predictions come true: first, when people came to resemble a distorted
and propagandistic image of them (as sub-human or disease-ridden,
for example); second, when alleged historical laws about the triumph
of a particular group or idea were ‘revealed’ as accurate; and third,
when humanitarian ideals were similarly ‘revealed’ as an unrealistic
irrelevance. Again, these ideas will prove relevant in relation to the
‘war on terror’.
‘Just world thinking’: might is right
Part of the ‘proof’ that legitimises a witch-hunt is typically generated

by the witch-hunt itself. Confession-under-duress helps to make the
persecution more plausible, as we have seen. But punishment can itself
be used to imply guilt. As Arendt observed in the context of the Nazi
holocaust, ‘Common sense reacted to the horrors of Buchenwald and
Auschwitz with the plausible argument, “What crime must these
people have committed that such things were done to them!”’5 Taking
one’s moral cues from a regime of punishment may seem a very
subservient attitude, but it is also part of how any human being grows
up and learns about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ – by noticing what is being
punished and what is not.
How, in the spring of 2003, did Americans and the British know that
Iraq was the enemy? Why, because they were now at war with it! In a
sense, the guilt of Iraq was ‘proven’ by the fact that it was earmarked
for punishment. More generally, the very extremity of a ‘counter-terror’
response (ignoring the UN, invading Iraq, abusing human rights at
Guantanamo and other US military bases, and so on) may be taken, at
some level, as evidence of the extremity of the targets’ guilt.
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ACTION AS P R O PA G A N D A
Sociologist Stanley Cohen noted in 2001 that according to ‘just world

thinking’, victims ‘deserve to suffer because of what they did, must
have done, support doing, (or will do one day if we don’t act now)’6 –
a formulation that uncannily anticipates the justifications made for
attacking Iraq in 2003. The common inclination to infer guilt from
punishment seems to have helped the Bush administration to set aside
not only international law but a central tenet of law in general, that
guilt should be established before punishment is meted out.
High levels of deference to government judgments have been impor-
tant here, particularly in the United States: a sense that ‘our adminis-
tration must know what it is doing’.7 Americans were repeatedly told
about links between Iraq and 9/11. None of the evidence was good, but
the sales-pitch worked anyway. In an October 2002 opinion poll, 66 per
cent of Americans said that they believed Saddam Hussein was
involved in the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and 79 per cent
believed that Iraq already possessed, or was close to possessing,
nuclear weapons.8 A poll in February 2003 suggested that 72 per cent of
Americans believed it was likely that Saddam Hussein was personally
involved in the 9/11 attacks.9
The dubious virtues of action-as-propaganda seem to have been
well understood by the Bush administration, with key officials hold-
ing that a demonstration of power could be potent propaganda in
itself and that ‘might’ would soon, in effect, be seen to be ‘right’.
Thus, Bush’s close adviser Karl Rove said of the war on terrorism,
‘Everything will be measured by results. The victor is always right.
History ascribes to the victor qualities that may not actually have
been there. And similarly to the defeated.’10 (Hitler expressed a simi-
lar sentiment, ‘I shall give a propagandist reason for starting the war,
no matter whether it is plausible or not. The victor will not be asked
afterwards whether he told the truth or not. When starting and
waging a war it is not right that matters, but victory.’11) In relation to
the attack on Iraq in 2003, one senior White House adviser
commented, ‘The way to win international acceptance is to win.
That’s diplomacy: winning.’12 Bush himself said:
I believe in results. … I know the world is watching carefully,

would be impressed and will be impressed with results
achieved. … [W]e’re never going to get people all in agreement
about force and the use of force … but action – confident action
that will yield positive results provides kind of a slipstream
into which reluctant nations and leaders can get behind.13
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Remember also the Bush adviser’s chilling suggestion to journalist Ron

Suskind that, ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our
own reality. And while you’re studying that reality – judiciously, as you
will – we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study
too.’ This is a path to madness, but a perversely persuasive one.
In the run-up to war, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi was worried
about Italian public opinion. But Bush told him in January 2003, ‘You
watch, public opinion will change. We lead our publics.’14 Among inter-
national actors, the willingness to follow Bush’s lead was not confined
to Blair, Berlusconi and Aznar. For example, British journalist Paul
Johnson wrote in the Spectator that the world ‘needs hero states, to look
up to, to appeal to, to encourage and to follow’.15
Hesitant officials and publics were confronted by the message that
war with Iraq was ‘inevitable’. MSNBC cancelled a liberal program
featuring Phil Donahue just before the war with Iraq, replacing it with
a show called ‘Countdown: Iraq’.16 Phillip Knightley, an expert on war
and the distortion of information, observed that, ‘Politicians, while call-
ing for diplomacy, warn of military retaliation. The [Western] media
reports this as “We’re on the brink of war”, or “War is inevitable.”’17
Colin Powell’s reservations seem to have been eroded by the momen-
tum of events. In February 2001, Powell had declared of sanctions
against Iraq, ‘frankly they have worked. He [Saddam] has not devel-
oped any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass
destruction’;18 but by mid-2002, Condoleezza Rice was telling him that
opposing a decision to attack Iraq would be a waste of breath,19 and the
rush to war eventually saw Powell marshalling dubious evidence
before the UN about the supposed threat posed by these weapons.
The logic behind the general sense of ‘inevitability’ appears to have
been this: the war is happening; are you going to be part of it or are you
going to stand on the sidelines of history? This is by no means the first
time that this technique has been brought to bear. For example, in the
(very different) context of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, official Rwan-
dan propaganda proclaimed, ‘The graves are already half full. Who will
help us to fill them?’20, and the invitation to complete what had been
started was embellished with the strong hint that those who declined
might not simply be bystanders but also, potentially, victims. Bush
made his own variation of this threat with his famous insistence that
‘You are either with us or against us in the fight against terror.’
While the then UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson had avoided
committing British troops to Vietnam, Tony Blair seemed ready to fall
without resistance into the ‘slipstream’ that Bush referred to. In line with
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Colin Powell’s analysis at the time, Blair told the House of Commons in
November 2000, ‘We believe that the sanctions regime has effectively
contained Saddam Hussein’.21 But Blair, too, seems to have been
persuaded, in part, by the ‘inevitability’ of the war. A key moment came
in Blair’s meeting with Bush in Texas in April 2002, which helped
convince the British Prime Minister that Bush was set on war with Iraq.22
Blair came back committed to supporting military action for regime
change in Iraq (reportedly on the understanding that efforts would be
made, first, to eliminate WMD through weapons inspections and,
second, to form a coalition to shape public opinion).23 Blair’s preparations
on returning to the UK included telling Chancellor Gordon Brown to
redesign budget calculations to pay for a war.24 However, ‘inevitability’
had a Janus-face for Blair: John Kampfner comments in his book, Blair’s
Wars, ‘Blair set about his immediate task of preparing the public for mili-
tary action, while maintaining the front that it was “not inevitable”.’25 At
an early stage in the preparations for war, a public proclamation that war
was unavoidable would no doubt have smacked too much of
subservience to Washington. But significantly, once US troops were
headed for Iraq, Blair was ready to change tack and to use the idea of
inevitability and the momentum of events as a tool to persuade his own
public and party. Blair’s March 2003 speech to the House of Commons
included the passage, ‘This is a tough choice. But it is also a stark one: to
stand British troops down and turn back; or to hold firm to the course we
have set.’26 Tony Blair worried about the damage that would be done in
the world by a unilateral American victory; on this logic, Britain would
have to go to war to avoid America going to war alone.27 Meanwhile,
Blair subscribed to some of the confidence of Bush and Karl Rove that
victory would generate its own support: Robin Cook recalled of Blair, ‘In
the many conversations we had in the run-up to the war, he always
assumed that the [Iraq] war would end in victory, and that military
triumph would silence the critics.’28
In the domestic sphere, ‘winning’ had already proved a useful tool
of persuasion and intimidation. Dissent within the Labour Party had
been stifled: first in the interests of winning power from the Tories and
then in the context of the legitimacy that winning bestowed. Kampfner
observed that Blair ‘had dominated his party for a decade, his author-
ity allowing him to push through foreign and domestic policies even
when they were at odds with his MPs and activists – even members of
his own Cabinet’.29 As British writer Beatrix Campbell put it, ‘The party
gave itself up to alchemists who proclaimed that they, alone, possessed
winning powers’.30 Of course, the free market ideology that Bush – and
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to a large extent Blair – have espoused itself constitutes a kind of vener-

ation of ‘winners’: only the fittest are meant to survive, and success
implicitly proves your vigour and virtue. For George Soros, the ‘social
Darwinism’ of market fundamentalism was a natural ally for religious
fundamentalism and both had been dangerously boosted in confidence
by the collapse of the Soviet system and the advance of globalisation.
International law itself was increasingly sometimes expected to fall
into line with the ‘confident action’ that Bush felt would bring
compliance. David Frum and Richard Perle observed, ‘if the UN
cannot or will not revise its rules in ways that establish beyond ques-
tion the legality of the measures the United States must take to protect
the American people, then we should unashamedly and explicitly
reject the jurisdiction of these rules’.31 This is a very odd conception of
international law, to put it mildly. Just after the start of the attack on
Iraq, Perle eagerly anticipated, ‘As we sift the debris of the war to
liberate Iraq, it will be important to preserve, the better to under-
stand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through
international law administered by international institutions.’32 While
Bush administration officials labelled the UN as weak and potentially
‘irrelevant’, US policy had itself been critical in weakening the UN –
not just over Iraq but also earlier. During the Cold War, the United
States had persistently used its veto to stymie the UN Security Coun-
cil.33 The US government had also repeatedly reneged on funding
commitments, and infamously denied and ignored the 1994 Rwandan
genocide. Undermining the UN through confident action may have
borne some fruit: public confidence in the UN fell sharply in the wake
of the attack on Iraq: not only in the United States but also in the UK,
France and Germany;34 we do not know how lasting this effect will be,
but in many ways the effect of near-unilateral action (and possibly
part of the intention) is that belief in ‘human rights’ and ‘international
law’ comes to look like the height of naivety. Again, it was Arendt
who had earlier seen this most clearly, arguing that factual propa-
ganda worked partly because:
the incredible plight of an ever-growing group of innocent

people was like a practical demonstration of the totalitarian
movements’ cynical claims that no such thing as inalienable
human rights existed and that the affirmations of democracies
to the contrary were mere prejudice, hypocrisy, and cowardice
in the face of the cruel majesty of a new world. The very phrase
‘human rights’ became for all concerned – victims, persecutors,
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and onlookers alike – the evidence of hopeless idealism or

fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.35
Once the occupation of Iraq was underway, the hope that ‘might would
be seen to be right’ was also expressed in relation to the insurgency.
One US officer involved in attacks on Fallujah stressed the role of
aggression followed by ‘psy-ops’, ‘always coming back to the theme of
the inevitability of the superior tribe’.36 Journalist Robert Kaplan
commented from Iraq, ‘People in all cultures gravitate toward power.
… The chieftain mentality is particularly prevalent in Iraq.’37
Making your predictions and assertions come true
Hannah Arendt saw the desire for predictability and consistency as

creating opportunities for totalitarian regimes to underline and bolster
their own power by making their own predictions come true. This
would seem to be an alluring option for some democratic countries too;
and with civil liberties increasingly infringed and a mass media largely
compliant, the distinction between totalitarian and democratic is not
always as clear as one might hope: Norman Mailer has said of the
United States, ‘I think we have a pre-totalitarian situation here now.’38
Conformity to laws
Hannah Arendt observed that the broad mass of people ‘are predis-
posed to all ideologies because they explain facts as mere examples of
laws and eliminate coincidences by inventing an all-embracing
omnipotence which is supposed to be at the root of every accident’.39
Further, in conditions of uncertainty people are likely to be attracted to
an ideology that claims to be actively shaping history in line with some
long-term historical laws, thereby re-establishing some sense of control.
In the case of the Nazis, the long-term historical law was a kind of racial
Darwinism; for Soviet governments, it was the inevitable and scientifi-
cally predicted triumph of the proletarian class.40 Arendt pointed out
that the Nazis spoke of soon-to-be-extinct races and the Soviet regime
of dying classes, and that the murderous actions of these totalitarian
regimes helped underline their power and omniscience by making
these predictions come true.41 Bush has not matched these earlier abom-
inations; however, he is certainly keen to emphasise that he and the
United States form part of a grand design that conforms with God’s
wishes and laws. In his January 2005 inauguration speech, Bush
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referred to freedom as a ‘force of history’, adding, ‘We can go forward

with complete confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom. …
History has an ebb and flow of justice, but history also has a visible
direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty.’42 Or again, liberty is
‘the plan of heaven for humanity and the best hope for progress here on
Earth’.43 This is rather more than saying, ‘God is on our side’; it is an
insistence that the direction of history is on our side and that we,
through the ‘confident action’ Bush had earlier advocated, can prove
this to be the case. Though purporting to be veneration of God, this
stance is ultimately a veneration of the self: a self whose confidence and
violence will ultimately gain the victory that secures approval from
other nations and simultaneously reaffirms God’s approval for the
longer-term transformative project. This capacity of ‘revealing God’s
approval’ suggests that ‘successful’ violence can serve a function rather
like wealth for Max Weber’s Protestants.
A comparable sense of confidence has sometimes been expressed by
Islamic fundamentalists, for whom the triumph of Islam is held to be
‘inevitable’, as was the triumph of socialism.44 To the extent that vari-
ous fundamentalist belief systems see God as actively intervening in
the world, there will always be a temptation to see whatever action is
taken as having received his blessing or as being his work.45 It is not
simply a question of who had God on his side but of who can demon-
strate this through victory. Thus, violent counter-terror has been seen
by its authors not only as blessed by God but also as countering the
terrorists’ belief that they have God and history with them. In Septem-
ber 2003, Bush noted that prior to 9/11 the terrorists had become
‘convinced that the free nations were decadent and weak. And they
grew bolder, believing history was on their side.’ He added that the war
on terror had reversed this pattern.46
Mixed in with the idea of a grand design is the idea – most
commonly expressed by America’s evangelical right – that war might
bring closer a predicted Apocalypse and the Second Coming of the
Messiah.47 Even Blair has flirted with this imagery, ‘September 11 was
for me a revelation. What had seemed inchoate came together. … Here
were terrorists prepared to bring about Armageddon.’48 A more secular
version of the ‘coming apocalypse’ thesis was expressed in Samuel
Huntington’s prediction of an inevitable ‘clash of civilisations’ (on this
thesis, see Chapter 10). Bush and Blair have been careful to state that
the ‘war on terror’ is specifically not a clash of cultures or a clash of
religions. Yet through their aggressive actions they have helped give
plausibility to Huntington’s prediction.
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Once war had been declared, criticism of the Bush and Blair admin-
istrations became much more difficult (see also Chapter 3). The imper-
ative of ‘supporting our troops’ became dominant. Criticism of the
military was particularly taboo, and the deaths of US soldiers in some
ways reinforced the difficulty of opposing the war. As Michael Mann
put it, ‘Any criticism of the [Iraq] war was widely regarded, not just as
unpatriotic, but also as disrespect for our dead.’49 After the killing of 21-
year-old Jonathan Kephart in Iraq, local Baptist pastor David Food said,
‘If I hear anything negative [about the Iraq war], I take it personally. I
feel that they are saying it about John. It invalidates the sacrifice he
made.’50 In June 2005, with violence escalating in Iraq and the total of
US troops killed rising relentlessly, Michael Ignatieff observed in the
New York Times magazine, ‘Thomas Jefferson’s dream [of freedom for all
nations] must work. Its ultimate task in American life is to redeem loss,
to rescue sacrifice from oblivion and futility and to give it shining
purpose.’51 In other words, the sacrifice of US troops – which Ignatieff
had supported – must be made to be meaningful. There are uncom-
fortable echoes here of the way an earlier violence helped to feed prop-
aganda for more violence. Noting the common argument that US
soldiers in Vietnam were betrayed by a liberal elite, Thomas Frank
observed in 2004:
This may be conservatism’s most striking cultural victory of all:

the fifties-style patriotism that was once thought to have victim-
ized the Vietnam generation is today thought to be a cause that
is sanctified by their death and suffering. What their blood calls
out for is not skepticism but even blinder patriotism.52
By such mechanisms does endless war renew itself. Significantly, John

Kerry chose not to make the Abu Ghraib scandal a part of his
campaign for the Presidency in 2004.53 Criticisms of the Iraq war
could be presented as ‘demoralising’ the troops. Even Kerry’s tenta-
tive criticisms of the Iraq war prompted Bush to comment (in the first
pre-election debate), ‘What kind of message does it say to our troops
in harm’s way: wrong war, wrong place, wrong time? That’s not a
message a commander-in-chief gives.’
Colin Powell went so far as to import some of this logic into the pre-war
period. On learning in mid-January 2003 from Bush that the president was
committed to war, Powell said walking away would have been disloyal to
the president, the military and mostly to the several thousand who would
be going to war.54 Again, we see the bizarre logic engendered by
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‘inevitability’: out of loyalty to our troops, we must back the policy that
puts them in harm’s way for no good reason. This kind of upside-down
reasoning must have helped to confirm Bush’s belief that opposition
would wilt in the face of ‘confident action’.
If war could stifle dissent, holy war might do so in spades. Political
commentator George Monbiot pointed out that the US government’s
religiously tinged sense of ‘mission’ meant that disagreement was not
simply dissent; it was heresy. Of course, war may also reinforce reli-
gious feelings. When battle is underway, it is clearly reassuring (and
gives courage) to believe that God is on your side. This in turn can
bolster the legitimacy of war.
Making people resemble your propaganda
Here is another example of action-as-propaganda from Hannah

Arendt:
The official SS newspaper, the Schwarze Korps, stated explicitly in

1938 that if the world was not yet convinced that the Jews were
the scum of the earth, it soon would be when unidentifiable
beggars, without nationality, without money, and without pass-
ports crossed their frontiers. ... A circular letter from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to all German authorities abroad shortly after
the November pogroms of 1938, stated, ‘The emigration move-
ment of only about 100,000 Jews has already sufficed to awaken
the interest of many countries in the Jewish danger. … Germany
is very interested in maintaining the dispersal of Jewry. … [T]he
influx of Jews in all parts of the world invokes the opposition of
the native population and thereby forms the best propaganda for
the German Jewish policy.’55
How this worked out in practice is another issue, but the SS intention
here was clear. More than this, the persecution of the Jews – confining
them to disease-ridden ghettoes, numbering them, herding them
behind walls and fences in concentration camps, starving them and
slaughtering them en masse – was a process that tended to take
away most of the manifestations of a normal human life and in the
process helped to create a dehumanised image that matched the Nazis’
dehumanising language.
It is, of course, easy to see differences between the events Arendt is
discussing and the current debacle. Even so, the ‘war on terror’ is a
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classic example of turning ‘the other’ into a preconceived and negative

image that has been entertained (and propagated) by the perpetrators
of violence. This applies to both sides of the conflict, since both sides
seem to share an interest in ‘proving’ their enemy to be just as brutal as
they had always insisted. In civil wars and global wars, violence tends
to create the enemies it claims to weaken or eliminate (Chapter 2), and
so generates its own (spurious) legitimacy. Frantz Fanon (and after him,
bin Laden) understood how terrorists themselves could take advantage
of the phenomenon of ‘action-as-propaganda’: notably by using
violence to bring out the underlying and previously part-hidden
brutality of their opponent/oppressor. The Arabic word for ‘martyr’
translates also as ‘witness’ – in other words, someone who by their
actions or speech makes a hidden truth clear to an audience.56 Mark
Juergensmeyer has said of international terrorism:
What the perpetrators of such acts of terror expect – and indeed

welcome – is a response as vicious as the acts themselves. By
goading secular authorities into responding to terror with terror,
they hope to accomplish two things. First, they want tangible
evidence for their claim that the secular enemy is a monster.
Second, they hope to bring to the surface the great war: a war that
they have told their potential supporters was hidden, but real.57
One logic of terrorism is this: if America is not quite the evil imperial-
ist of our propaganda and our imagination, let us help to make it so. It
works on the other side too: in circumstances where the terrorist has
been portrayed as all around us and bent on our destruction, counter-
productive actions that lead to a proliferation of angry enemies, while
leading us all towards lives of fear, at least bring the perverse cognitive
satisfaction (particularly for the leaders who chose this path) of know-
ing, ‘Yes we are right, the enemy is indeed as powerful, pervasive and
dangerous as we portrayed it; we must redouble our efforts.’ It is hard
to imagine that Bush and Blair consciously wish to make thing worse;
even so, they inhabit a world in which mad solutions generate (spuri-
ous) legitimacy for themselves. Indeed, it seems ‘both sides’ in the ‘war
on terror’ are busy nurturing their favourite nightmares. At the level of
civil wars, we have seen how accusations that rebels were ‘Muslim
fundamentalists’ can, over time, acquire an increasing degree of truth,
as in Chechnya and the Philippines. Anti-American feeling in much of
the world is often taken as a ‘given’; but this sentiment, as noted, is not
a natural or even a long-standing one.58
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Billed erroneously as a key source of terrorism prior to the war, Iraq has
become so – a development that lends spurious credibility to the initial
accusation. The propaganda was made to become true, at the cost of much
distortion and many lives. As John Kerry said when debating with Bush,
‘The President just talked about Iraq as a center of the war on terror. Iraq
was not even close to the center of the war on terror before the President
invaded it.’59 Even attacks on occupying forces have been quickly labelled
as ‘terrorist’, and a common charge by the US command in Iraq has been
that Iraqi fighters have been using terrorist tactics.60 However, attacks on
occupying soldiers are not terrorism: even the US State Department’s defi-
nition of terrorism centres on the use of violence against civilians.61 How
do you justify the devastation of an entire city – like Fallujah in November
2004? First, you announce that it harbours ‘terrorists’; then when most
people flee in fear, you declare the city a free-fire zone on the grounds that
the only people left behind must be the terrorists.62
As well as creating enemies by deepening anger, violence can cause
displacement, thereby ‘contaminating’ new ‘targets’ with enemy
groups. A paranoid state of mind interprets even the displacement
resulting from its own violence as a conspiracy by evil governments
intent on ‘harbouring’ terrorists. For example, one of the main alleged
links between Saddam and bin Laden, the Jordanian Abu Masab al-
Zargawi (whom Bush called the ‘best evidence’ for a connection
between Iraq and al-Qaida)63 appears to have sheltered in Baghdad
after fleeing the US-led attack on Afghanistan.64 Thus, one attack
helped justify the next. After Baghdad fell, al-Zargawi was then said to
be sheltering in Fallujah, something that was used to justify the devas-
tation of that city in November 2004. Earlier, in May 2003, US officials
had turned up the heat on Iran, saying it was harbouring al-Qaida lead-
ers and Saddam loyalists. Syria too was accused of harbouring Iraqi
Ba’athists. But it was quite natural that the attacks on Afghanistan and
Iraq would displace into surrounding countries many of those who
were being explicitly targeted. Sir Andrew Green, UK Ambassador to
Syria in 1991–94, commented, ‘The Syrian authorities cannot prevent
Iraqis getting across a 400-mile desert border.’65 Syria has indeed
become a source of jihadis for the Iraqi insurgency,66 but again this
‘rogue’ status is a predictable consequence of the attack on Iraq, rather
than confirmation that Syria is inherently anti-American or is part of an
expanded ‘axis of evil’. In 2005, US military officials were predicting
that the ‘vast ungoverned spaces’ of the Horn of Africa would play host
to al-Qaida fighters retreating from Iraq67 – a trend (or perception) that
could bring more trouble for that region. Quite apart from the effects of
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displacement, insurgency in one occupied country creates opportuni-

ties for accusing neighbours of complicity, and the desire to dissociate
insurgency from ‘ordinary Iraqis’ itself creates an incentive to highlight
foreign interference. Accusations that Syria has been facilitating the
flow of fighters into Iraq have certainly been persistent.68
Another way in which violence can make people resemble your
propaganda is by creating a climate in which dehumanising images of
the enemy are seen as legitimate or even necessary. On the cusp of the
2003 attack on Iraq, MSNBC (Microsoft-NBC) added Michael Savage to
its line-up. In their informative overview of media distortions, Sheldon
Rampton and John Stauber comment that Savage:
routinely refers to non-white countries as ‘turd world nations’

and charges that the US ‘is being taken over by the freaks, the
cripples, the perverts and the mental defectives.’ In one broad-
cast, Savage justified ethnic slurs as a national security tool,
‘We need racist stereotypes right now of our enemy in order to
encourage our warriors to kill the enemy’.69
Thus, it is war itself that may help to create the sense of an implacable and
inhuman enemy. Meanwhile, abuses by coalition forces within Iraq have
dehumanised the enemy not only by fuelling anger and violence but also
by stripping people of their dignity. A report by the US Major General
George Fay noted that general practices such as the extensive use of
nudity ‘likely contributed to an escalating “de-humanization” of the
detainees and set the stage for additional and more severe abuses to
occur’.70 Violence is often a process, in which initial abuses create spuri-
ous legitimacy for worse atrocities.71 Part of the function of extreme
violence, moreover, is to convince the victims themselves that they are
not worthy of rights: for if they did have rights, why then are they being
so systematically attacked or dehumanised? General Janis Karpinski,
suspended as head of a unit running prisons because of the Abu Ghraib
scandal, said she was told by Major General Geoffrey Miller, former
commander of Guantanamo Bay camp, ‘This place [Abu Ghraib] must be
Gitmo-ised. … [T]hey are like dogs. If you allow them to believe they are
more than dogs, then you will have lost control.’72
Concluding remarks
Relying on ‘victory’ to generate legitimacy is of course a double-edged

sword. There may be limits to the plausibility of something that is
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manifestly not working, and criticism of US government choices

tended to surface and then intensify as the Iraq occupation ran into
increasing difficulties. Hannah Arendt herself noted that Nazism as an
ideology collapsed very suddenly when defeat meant it could no
longer back its propaganda with imposing and successful actions.
Moreover, those who claim that God is on their side may be particularly
vulnerable to a loss of popularity and prestige when defeat or stalemate
implies that God is more ambivalent.73 As war in Iraq drags on, popu-
lar American enthusiasm is turning to disillusion. Taking the extremity
and direction of response as evidence of both the severity and source of
the problem is a mechanism that may not work for ever.
All this can be compensated for in two ways, however. First, the
appearance of victory may be sustainable for a significant period even
when the reality is pretty desperate. Presentation counts (something
discussed in more detail in Chapter 10). Short-term and conspicuous
victories may be more important to the interveners than actually making
a positive impact on the problem. The benefits of action-as-propaganda
derive not so much from winning as from appearing to win. For exam-
ple, elections in Afghanistan and Iraq, for a time at least, perhaps pulled
some credible veneer of success from the general debacle – helping
temporarily to disguise the deeper counterproductive effects of the
attacks and the long-term security and governance problems in these
countries.
Second, even a lack of success may lend legitimacy to the insistence
that America and its allies must devote ever-greater energy to defeating
terrorism. Indeed, those waging war on terror seem to have an interest
in insisting that they are simultaneously both winning and losing. This
is a confusing message, to be sure; but a mixed message has the signif-
icant advantage that it can never be disproved. Any form of evidence,
any positive or negative turn of events, can be harnessed to the
(ambiguous) official line. Each victory brings some new atrocity and
some new struggle in its wake: the toppling of the Taliban is followed
by the bombing of Bali; the ousting of Saddam is followed by the bomb-
ing of Madrid; elections in Iraq, but bombings in London. It would
seem the task is never done: as Mark Duffield pithily puts it, ‘It is
always a case of one more massacre, of winning this endless war, and
we will be free.’ Just as we breathe a sigh of relief, we find some new
anxiety catching in out throats. The war on terror is drawing to an end;
long live the war on terror!
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8 Warding off the Shame of

Powerlessness
The tendency to blame bad things on a small and implicitly finite group
of evil people has been fed not only by a desire for safety and certainty
but also by a desire to ward off feelings of shame. The desire to defuse
the threat of shame seems to have helped to shape terrorism as well as
counter-terrorism (as when Iraqi resistance was seen as washing away
the shame of Fallujah or when bin Laden depicted terrorist violence as
washing away the shame of Western domination).
Psychiatrist James Gilligan has suggested that people will go to
extreme and violent lengths to ward off feelings of shame and humili-
ation.1 The experience of working with and listening to some of Amer-
ica’s most violent criminals convinced Gilligan that these individuals’
past experiences had given them a heightened sensitivity to feelings of
shame and humiliation, and that when someone else was unlucky
enough to arouse or reawaken these feelings, that person ran the risk of
being killed. Through killing (not uncommonly including attacks on
eyes-that-see and tongues-that-talk), the murderer could temporarily
eliminate the threat of shame. Significantly, the target for violence was
usually not the source of the initial humiliation. This suggested a radi-
cal disconnect between ‘solution’ and ‘problem’ – a key element of
magical thinking more generally. Gilligan has argued that the desire to
eliminate a source of shame and thereby keep a sense of personal worth
has often been a more powerful motivation even than self-preservation,
leading violent criminals into self-destructive behaviour as well as the
abuse of others.
The atrocities of 9/11 and their aftermath seem to have brought
three important threats of shame for the United States, with key actors
going to extreme – and often violent – lengths to ward off this threat.
The first threat of shame (discussed in this chapter) arose from the
sheer powerlessness of the 9/11 tragedy (and then, by extension, of US
personnel deployed in response).
The 9/11 attacks can be seen as a response to humiliation, a response
which was itself humiliating. The US-led response has involved passing
on feelings of powerlessness and shame to others through a spectacu-
lar assertion of US military power. As with Gilligan’s murderers, the
source of the initial humiliation was not readily to hand (not least
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because the terrorists had committed suicide), and this set the scene for
a disconnect between ‘solution’ and ‘problem’ that was every bit as
stark as with the displaced violence highlighted by Gilligan. The cycle,
as noted, is potentially endless, since those onto whom powerlessness
and shame are ‘offloaded’ will be (and are being) tempted to remedy
their own powerlessness and shame through their own feeling of
power-through-violence, as they embrace terror attacks and simple
resistance to occupation. ‘Killing and torture’, as Eric Hobsbawm wrote
in his study of bandits and rebels, ‘is the most primitive and personal
assertion of ultimate power, and the weaker the rebel feels himself to be
at bottom, the greater, we may suppose, the temptation to assert it’.2
The attacks brought a second, more insidious threat of shame: the
threat arising from the suspicion, however dimly or reluctantly sensed,
that 9/11 occurred because of something that those targeted (meaning,
principally, Americans) had done or failed to do. Identifying the source
of the violence as some finite external ‘evil’ seems to have offered a
more palatable alternative. This process is discussed in Chapter 9.
A third threat of shame (also considered in Chapter 9) has arisen
from the violent reaction to 9/11, a reaction that prompted wide-
spread condemnation of the United States (and to a large extent the
United Kingdom) in countries around the world as well as consider-
able antipathy to soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. Key
actors in the counter-terror reacted to this additional threat of shame
by widening their circle of enemies and simultaneously narrowing
their circle of trusted confidantes. The potentially wounding criticism
of ‘friends’ could be neatly – but dangerously – warded off by exclud-
ing them or, at the extreme, redefining them as ‘enemies’. This
process helps to explain the vehemence of aggression against domes-
tic and foreign critics of the ‘war on terror’ and also against many
civilians in those countries attacked.
Violence as power
When news of abuses like Abu Ghraib leaked out, the revealed humilia-
tions were generally dismissed by US officials as exceptional and unrep-
resentative. There was also a more general debate about torture, with
some arguing that a degree of torture might be justified if it meant access
to information that could prevent a terror attack or otherwise help the
‘war on terror’. But what if abuses are not just an aberration or a ruthless
attempt to ‘win’ but actually a central goal? What if humiliation is not the
exception or even the means, but the point?
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WA R D I N G O F F THE SHAME OF POWERLESSNESS
While violence is usually presented as serving some purpose

beyond itself (for example, making the world safer or more just), we
know from many studies of war around the world that violence
frequently brings its own rewards: notably the immediate satisfaction
of imposing one’s will and of reversing previous feelings of powerless-
ness and humiliation. In this sense, the point of violence may be the
violence itself. While the rhetoric of mass violence tends to revolve
around ‘justice’, ‘prevention’ and defeating your enemy, the purpose of
the violence may be much more immediate. This means that it may
become surprisingly unimportant either to pick the right target or to
defeat the proclaimed enemy.
Contemporary West African wars have shown the immediate func-
tions of violence. For example, analysts of the civil war in Liberia have
stressed the thrill of exercising power through the barrel of a gun.3 In
neighbouring Sierra Leone, anyone interpreting violence as a means to a
long-term end ran up against the paradox that both rebels and soldiers
were predictably alienating civilians through their attacks on civilians
(see Chapter 3). However, if we see violence as an immediate assertion
of power and an immediate response to powerlessness, much of this
violence makes more sense. In line with Hobsbawm’s insights on the
‘levelling’ functions of ‘social banditry’ more generally,4 violence in
Sierra Leone was often a way of achieving a crude and immediate level-
ling down of society through destruction. In a sense, both status and
visibility were often inverted through violence: those who were poor
and poorly regarded could become ‘big men’; and those who were
ignored and forgotten could become front-page news. Important under-
lying factors were the lack of status, jobs, voice and even marriage
prospects for many youths prior to outright war.5 Meanwhile, govern-
ment soldiers – endangered by a clever and elusive rebel group and
simultaneously neglected by their superiors – tended to vent their anger
and frustration on those who could not defend themselves: civilians.6
Although unpopular chiefs were sometimes attacked by rebels, there
was – as with Gilligan’s murderers – a marked readiness among abusive
soldiers and rebels alike to inflict violence and shame on those who were
not the source of the underlying grievances and humiliations.
In her analysis of wars in early twentieth-century China, historian
Diana Lary had earlier found strangely similar dynamics. She argued
that the widespread brutality towards civilians sprang not from some
innate ‘evil’ in the soldiers but from their sense of powerlessness: the
beatings they received, the neglect of their welfare, the exposure to
disease in terrible conditions and the powerlessness they had earlier felt
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as civilians.7 Taking it out on those less powerful than themselves seems

to have been a response to this cumulative sense of powerlessness.8
When it comes to America and American soldiers in recent years,
there has been a sense of powerlessness at both the macro and micro
levels. Caught by surprise on 11 September 2001, the world’s richest
and most heavily armed government was conspicuously unable to
protect thousands of its own citizens; the hijacked planes brought
down a towering twin-symbol of US wealth before knocking a massive
hole in the very institution, the Pentagon, that was charged with the
country’s defence.9 Osama bin Laden was able to gloat in a video
released by al-Jazeera, ‘Here is America struck by God Almighty in one
of its vital organs, so that its greatest buildings are destroyed.’10
Powerlessness can be experienced at a variety of levels, and even at
the local level it could feed into violence. Again, the elusiveness of an
enemy prepared to carry out suicide attacks was a factor. Poor resourc-
ing was also significant. We know that at Abu Ghraib, for example, the
Bush administration’s desire to limit troop commitments had
contributed to severe under-resourcing, with a shortage of interpreters
and interrogators and a prisoner-to-guard ratio as high as 75:1. The
prison also came under daily mortar attack. The resulting sense of siege
seems to have fed into the abuses there, including outright torture.11
As with wartime violence more generally, torture is not adequately
explained as a means to some longer-term end. Certainly, part of the
expressed purpose of torture has been to get information. But we have
seen how many of those imprisoned and tortured by US soldiers have
had no connection to the Iraqi resistance. In any case, torture naturally
incites hostility and violence. From his extensive interviews with jihadis
in the Middle East, Fawaz Gerges notes that ‘Arab/Muslim prisons,
particularly their torture chambers, have served as incubators for gener-
ations of jihadis.’12 Any ‘advantage’ in terms of information-gathering
would seem to be more than outweighed, first, by the creation of more
enemies and, second, by a predictable diminution in access to informa-
tion from ordinary Iraqis and others in the Muslim or Arab world.13 Infor-
mation obtained through torture is anyway notoriously unreliable.
Psychiatry professor Robert Lifton, who studied torture victims coming
out of Communist China in the 1950s, noted that torture made people say
what their interrogators wanted to hear: the victims would regularly
come up with wild confessions.14 This remains true today. As Human
Rights Watch observes, ‘The US Army’s interrogation manual makes
clear that abuse undermines the quest for reliable information. The US
military command in Iraq says that Iraqi detainees are providing more
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useful intelligence when they are not subjected to coercion.’15 Top US

commanders told the New York Times on 27 May 2004 that they learned
‘little about the insurgency’ from the Abu Ghraib interrogations.16
We are led back, once again to the witch-hunt. Ann Barstow,
commenting on sixteenth-century witch-hunts in Europe, notes, ‘It
appears that jailers, [witch] pickers, executioners and judges, all could
take their sadistic pleasure with female prisoners [accused of witch-
craft]. Men involved wanted more from witch-hunting than the convic-
tion of witches: namely, unchallengeable sexual power over women.’17
Barstow adds, ‘the basic fact of having total juridical power over women
may have fanned the propensity for violence’. Today, the temptations of
exerting extreme power in the form of torture would appear to be partic-
ularly great in the context of: first, the extreme powerlessness of 9/11;
second, the fear and sense of powerlessness among occupying soldiers
living among an increasingly hostile population (notably in Iraq); and
third, the opportunities for control and impunity offered by implement-
ing the ‘war on terror’. Experience in countless wars as well as in the field
of criminal violence tells us that there is nothing more dangerous than an
individual (or group) with a sense of victimhood and a simultaneous
sense of impunity.18 This describes the position not only of many military
personnel on the ground but also of the United States as a whole (its
impunity deriving in large part from the absence of any other super-
power following the collapse of the Soviet Union).
Prison abuses at Abu Ghraib and other American facilities, including
in Afghanistan, seem to have been designed to inflict maximum power-
lessness and shame on the victims, with photographs serving as what
Mark Danner calls a kind of ‘shame multiplier’.19 In these prison
abuses, it appears that local sensibilities have been consciously taken
into account, and turned against the victims. A training manual for the
Marine Corps includes advice that takes Iraq’s culture into account:
Do not shame or humiliate a man in public. Shaming a man will

cause him and his family to be anti-Coalition. … Shame is given
by placing hoods over a detainee’s head. Avoid this practice.
Placing a detainee on the ground or putting a foot on him
implies you are God. This is one of the worst things we can do.20
Yet the lure of ‘shaming’ others was clearly very great. An immediate
sense of powerlessness stemming from 9/11 seems to have been all the
greater for the fact that America has been accustomed to exercising great
power and authority: like a child grown used to having everything its
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own way, America was in the habit of imposing its will, not of having
others impose their will on it. The shock of 9/11, moreover, seems to have
come on top of a wider unease: a collective anxiety at the slipping away
of America’s economic supremacy. In this dual context, fantasies of
renewed omnipotence have been deeply alluring: they seem to have
helped to reassert some sense of control. The desire to reassert control
was evident even in small details, as when Bush insisted that the United
States would respond to 9/11 ‘at a time of our own choosing’.
Closely linked to reversing the shame of powerlessness is the desire
for revenge, a revenge whose chosen victims have been determined to
a significant extent by high-level definitions of the enemy. Again, this
has very little to do with winning the ‘war on terror’ and tends actively
to impede the business of winning. On 4 February 2002, about 25 men
from three US Special Forces units and three CIA paramilitary teams
gathered near the Pakistan border of Afghanistan. A pile of rocks had
been arranged as a tombstone over a buried picture of the destroyed
World Trade Center. One man read a prayer and then declared, ‘We
consecrate this spot as an everlasting memorial to the brave Americans
who died on September 11, so that all who would seek to do her harm
will know that America will not stand by and watch terror prevail.’21 So
far, so Bush-like. But soldiers can sometimes go further than a president
in spelling out an underlying desire for violence. The prayer continued,
‘We will export death and violence to the four corners of the earth in
defense of our great nation’. Similar sentiments could be found among
some US soldiers serving in Iraq. Corporal Michael Richardson, 22,
commented:
There’s a picture of the World Trade Center hanging up by my

bed and I keep one in my Kevlar [flak jacket]. Every time I feel
sorry for these people, I look at that. I think, ‘they hit us at
home and, now, it’s our turn.’ I don’t want to say payback but,
you know, it’s pretty much payback.22
One British former officer interacting with US troops in Iraq said the
feeling was that ‘the gloves are off’, adding, ‘Many of them still think
they are dealing with people responsible for 9/11.’23
Dependence and omnipotence
No-one is weaker than a baby, and in May 2003, Canadian singer-

songwriter Neil Young observed, ‘The US is like a baby with a bomb’.24
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The comparison no doubt will have annoyed a lot of people: just as did
the US officials’ and observers’ attempts to infantilise France for its lack
of belligerence over Iraq (Chapter 9) or North Korea’s leader Kim Jong
Il (Chapter 2). However, the musician’s words may be something more
than a provocative phrase. British psychoanalyst Joan Riviere, in a book
co-authored with child psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, notes, ‘a baby
does not recognise anyone’s existence but his own … and he expects all
his wants to be fulfilled’.25 When he realises that he is dependent on
others, he is likely to become very aggressive. Riviere goes on, ‘The
baby cannot distinguish between “me” and “not-me”; his own sensa-
tions are his world, the world to him; so when he is cold, hungry or
lonely there is no milk, no well-being or pleasure in the world.’26 This
realisation of powerless may itself be a primary source of shame.27
Barbara Ehrenreich has written that before 9/11, ‘We Americans had
been lazy, willfully ignorant, and self-involved to the point of solip-
sism. If there was an outside world, we didn’t want to know about it,
unless the death of a beautiful princess was involved.’28 In many ways,
9/11 reinforced a certain deep-seated self-absorption. How many times
has the world been told that 11 September 2001 was ‘the day that
changed the world’, that ‘our sense of security vanished on that day’,
that ‘nothing would ever be the same again’? These statements have a
degree of truth to them, and through their cataclysmic nature, they
have helped feed a reaction (and a doctrine of pre-emption) that has
itself radically changed the world. But there is self-absorption and
blindness here too. If you try to make a case for 6 April 1994 as ‘the day
that changed the world’, you will get mostly blank looks on the streets
of New York (or London, for that matter). You will be lucky indeed to
run into someone sufficiently educated and aware that they can dimly
recall, ‘Oh yes, wasn’t that the start of the Rwandan genocide that
killed some 800,000 people?’
Of course, the United States is not a child but an innovative and
technologically advanced nation with a rich and diverse culture; but in
a country that runs up a record trade and budget deficit while launch-
ing expensive wars and implementing a US$350 billion tax cut, is there
not something of this creature expecting ‘all his wants to be fulfilled’?
Is there not also something infantile or at least irresponsible in the
magical thinking that sees high-tech wars as almost cost-free for the
victims and the perpetrators, the belief that one can usefully respond to
terror by increasing spending, the view that evil can be somehow cut
free from the rest of us, and, finally, the belief that if you close your
eyes and wish for something hard enough (some weapons of mass
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destruction in time for Christmas or Easter), they will magically

materialise?29
In many ways, US policy seems to be based on maintaining a fool’s
paradise in the here and now, while problems are exported either to other
geographical zones (delivering violence, sucking in capital for deficit-
financing) or to other time zones (a future blighted by climate-change and
pollution, a future when current deficits and the Iraq war will be paid for
through cuts in Medicare, access to prescription drugs, social security and
so on).30 Economist David Gold noted in 2004, ‘the overall Bush defense
programme will require extensive further increases in federal spending,
if current plans are carried out. With tax cuts and spending growth in
other areas, this is a classic recipe for a budgetary train wreck.’31 If there is
wishful thinking here, it cannot all be pinned at the door of the politi-
cians. In the International Herald Tribune, Bob Herbert raised the interest-
ing and disturbing possibility that in contemporary US elections
‘candidates can’t tell voters the truth and still win’, adding that ‘We
Americans … want our leaders to manipulate reality to our liking.’32
Novelist Justin Cartwright describes a trip to Buffalo, in upstate
New York:
I stopped at a diner for breakfast, where everyone was eating

generous combinations of kiddies’ food: pancakes with syrup,
eggs over easy or sunny side up, juice, milk, milkshakes. As the
waitresses made encouraging noises it suddenly occurred to
me that they were treating us exactly as if we were huge babies.
And every time I watched television, the presenters – coiffed,
buffed and shining – were speaking as if to infants, cheerfully,
full of encouragement, sometimes switching to a grave
demeanour for the important stuff like the non-appearance of
weapons of mass destruction.33
Cartwright argues that religious fundamentalism ‘provides a simple,

infantile, answer to the world’s problems’:
The problem is a society that has no confidence in attributing

value: hence the resort to self-indulgence and infantile behav-
iour; hence the infantile political solutions and the infantile
commercial promises. It’s a kind of make-believe because we
don’t know what our values are.
The yearning for the restoration of lost values is certainly part of the
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rhetoric of the American right. In general, adults may be encouraged to

be childish by a sense that childhood – and innocence – have somehow
been snatched away. Thomas Frank’s book brings out the way nostalgia
for the ‘lost paradise’ of youth has sometimes fed into the conservative
‘backlash’ in the United States, with authors like G. Gordon Liddy
mourning the loss of freedoms associated with an American youth: the
way an over-regulated society has taken away simple pleasures like
burning leaves, cutting down trees, or (the lost innocence of it all!) shoot-
ing birds with a gun. Imposing one’s will – even one’s violence – on
nature has featured strongly in American history and folklore, and one
significant strand of thought sees liberals in Washington as snatching
away this lost paradise of America’s youth (and one’s own).
Yet part of growing up is realising that the world cannot always be
bent to your will. Bush – who was protected from many realities by
money and later, perhaps, by drink – seems particularly lacking in this
mature perspective. In particular, he seems implacably hostile to the
idea that there are powerful forces beyond America who should be
taken into account in the design of policy. Debating with Bush before
the 2004 election, John Kerry said
Osama bin Laden uses the invasion of Iraq in order to go out to

people and say ‘America has declared war on Islam.’ We need
to be smarter about how we wage a war on terror. We need to
deny them the recruits.
This gets to the heart of the matter and eloquently highlights the coun-
terproductive nature of Bush’s approach. But the president’s reply was
as unapologetic as it was revealing, ‘My opponent just said something
amazing’, he began:
He said Osama bin Laden uses the invasion of Iraq as an excuse

to spread hatred for America. Osama bin Laden doesn’t deter-
mine how we defend ourselves. Osama bin Laden doesn’t get
to decide. The American people decide. I decided. The right
action was in Iraq.
We have noted Hannah Arendt’s argument that the point of policy-

making was not necessarily to be right, but to be certain. Here, Bush
makes a related statement: the point is not to be right, but to be
autonomous. It is, in effect, another implicit invocation of the freedom of
infancy: for freedom is effectively defined as the freedom to make
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decisions independently of the constraints that an awkward world

might impose. This makes a certain amount of psychological sense in a
complex and sometimes dangerous world; it is also crazy. Imagine that
Bush is crossing a road. Will he walk out in front of a speeding car
proclaiming, ‘The driver doesn’t get to decide when I walk. The
American people decided. I decided’? Are there not certain external
realities which policy, by mere force of will and wishful thinking,
cannot overcome?
A kind of cultural arrogance has fed into the Bush administration’s
self-centred world view, as it has into the approaches of previous
administrations. Shortly before Edward Said died in September 2003,
he wrote:
What American leaders and their intellectual lackeys seem

incapable of understanding is that history cannot be swept
clean like a blackboard, so that ‘we’ might inscribe our own
future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser
people to follow. It is quite common to hear high officials in
Washington and elsewhere speak of changing the map of the
Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can be
shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar.34
Said added that the idea that ‘human beings must create their own
history [has] been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or
western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard
other cultures with contempt’. Further, ‘Without a well-organised sense
that the people over there were not like “us” and didn’t appreciate
“our” values – the very core of traditional orientalist dogma – there
would have been no war.’35 In this reinvigorated orientalism, there is no
room, as Said put it, for ‘hospitality’, for minds that actively make a
place for a foreign ‘other’ and attempt to understand it on its own
terms.
What these habits and shortcomings add up to is a kind of political
autism: a deep-rooted failure to appreciate that there exist real, living,
deciding human beings beyond the self-referential world of Western
leaders.36 Only a few individuals seem to have been willing to entertain
thoughts outside this egocentric box. One was Secretary of State Colin
Powell, who may as a black man have been more conscious than most
of the downside of imperialism. Bob Woodward notes that at a meeting
of senior US officials on 29 October 2001, Powell ‘worried that the
United States was playing superpower bully, trying to move the
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[Afghan] opposition forces, the Northern Alliance and the various

warlords around on the chessboard as if they did not have a stake in
this war’. Powell also asked, ‘Do they have any ideas about what they
want to do, as opposed to what we think they ought to do?’37 Yet even
Powell seems to have been prone to US-centric distortions, as when he
helped to pave the way for war with Iraq by telling the UN Security
Council (on live TV), ‘Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq
and al-Qaida together.’38 In other words, ‘They both hate us, so they
must be in league.’ Crucially, insofar as the world divides into ‘me’ and
‘not me’, relationships within the ‘not me’ category are likely to be
poorly understood.39 Bush echoed Powell’s ‘analysis’ in a speech at Fort
Bragg military base, North Carolina, in June 2005 when he suggested
that the Iraqi insurgents shared a common ‘totalitarian ideology’ with
al-Qaida and that if they were not defeated there, they would use the
country as a base to launch terror attacks on the United States itself.40
If we go back to the link that Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere draw
between aggression and dependence, it is interesting to think about oil
– and debt. As Emmanuel Todd argues, America has been picking on
weak targets even as its real economic power has been diminishing and
even as its economic dependence (notably via the trade deficit) has
increased.41 The United States relies on attracting savings from around
the world and the attractions of holding dollar investments; however,
the dollar has been weakening, and the dollar’s status as a reserve
currency has become uncertain, with Iraq itself converting oil pricing to
Euros in November 2000.42 With America’s dependence on oil has come
an understandable fear of this dependence – part of the context for the
worries about over-dependence on the Saudis and the interest in secur-
ing alternative bases and full control of Iraqi supplies.43 The United
States’s massive fiscal deficit means, in effect, that the United States has
also become dependent on continued inflows of capital (notably from
East Asia) to sustain its over-consumption. Again, we see the strange
dependency of the world’s sole superpower. Hannah Arendt suggested
that violence increases as those with power feel it slipping from their
hands (a point that perhaps receives further support from Fawaz
Gerges’ argument that jihadis’ focus on the ‘far enemy’ sprang from the
weakness and divisions in jihadis traditionally focusing on the ‘near
enemy’).44
At a memorial service at the Pentagon exactly one month after 9/11,
Rumsfeld likened the terrorists to the vanquished totalitarian regimes
of the twentieth century that sought to rule and oppress, and
commented:
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The will to power, the urge to dominion over others … makes

the terrorist a believer not in the theology of God, but the
theology of self and in the whispered words of temptation, ‘Ye
shall be as Gods’. In targeting this place, then, and those who
worked here, the attackers, the evildoers correctly sensed that
the opposite of all they were, and stood for, resided here.45
But Rumsfeld surely protests too much. Key US officials seem themselves
to have been tempted by these whispered words; and their own ‘will to
power’, their own ‘theology of self’, has flourished in the context of
economic dependency and the powerlessness of 9/11 itself. It is true that
terrorists have in some ways elevated themselves to a God-like status:
they claim to speak with God’s authority, and they ‘play God’ with inno-
cent lives. Yet what US politicians persistently fail to realise is that they
too are seen as playing God, as falsely claiming God’s authority, as play-
ing God with innocent lives, as ignoring law rather than abiding by it.
The noisy and violent project of ‘exporting liberty’ also gives the impres-
sion of a country seeking, in John Feffer’s phrase, ‘to remake the world in
its own image’: an enterprise that the Bible originally attributed to God.46
One taxi-driver in South Africa’s Johannesburg expressed a common
view when he told me, ‘Bush has got so much power that he thinks he is
God.’ The confidence of the neo-conservatives in their ability to trans-
form the world seems to owe something to the belief that they had
defeated the Soviet Union (a feat, incidentally that many al-Qaida terror-
ists attributed to themselves and that helped give them a kind of overcon-
fidence).47 When the US administration initially named the attack on
Afghanistan as ‘Operation Infinite Justice’, the choice of name suggested
that the United States had set itself up with a god-like status, and indeed
the label was withdrawn when it was pointed out that in Islam it is only
Allah that can dispense ‘infinite justice’. One is reminded of a Percy
Shelley poem called ‘The Mask of Anarchy’, which was written in the
aftermath of the 1819 Peterloo massacre in Manchester, England:
Last came Anarchy; he rode

On a white horse, splashed with blood;
He was pale even to the lips,
Like Death in the Apocalypse.
And he wore a kingly crown;
And in his grasp a sceptre shone;
On his brow this mark I saw –
‘I AM GOD, AND KING, AND LAW!’48
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At one level, those who promote perpetual war are natural allies:
extremism seems bizarrely in love with its opposite number.49 At
another level, these enemies seem destined to misunderstand each
other, perhaps in part because they resemble each other in important
ways and cannot bear to recognise the fact. The insistence that someone
is the opposite of you may grow more forceful as you come to resem-
ble them more; indeed, work on nationalism has suggested the impor-
tance of the ‘narcissism of minor differences’: the smaller the real
difference between people (as in former Yugoslavia), the larger it may
come to loom in their imagination.50 The common roots of Judaism,
Christianity and Islam certainly do not seem to have been a particular
source of harmony, and the more extreme manifestations of fundamen-
talism associated with these religions seem particularly anxious to
dismiss any commonalities. All the more reason, then, to follow Karen
Armstrong’s advice when she suggests, ‘We must educate ourselves to
see the distress, helplessness, fear and, latterly, rage that underlie the
various religious fundamentalisms.’51
Piggybacking US power
The British, of course, have a more long-standing sense of confusion

and loss of power than the Americans. At the moment of one of
Britain’s greatest triumphs (the end of the Second World War), the
British – encouraged by their American friends – lost an entire
empire. Like membership of the UN Security Council and of the so-
called ‘nuclear club’, piggybacking US power seems to provide some
compensation, some escape from the shame of such a dramatic fall
in influence and leadership. And since the United States somehow
still appears as a kind of protégé – after all, Americans speak
‘English’, not the other way round – the reality of subservience can
often be suppressed and ‘Great Power’ status can be magically
maintained.52 (Interestingly, a sense of violent frustration at the ‘end
of empire’ has also sometimes been attributed to Islamist extremists
harking back to the glory of the Ottoman Caliphate.53) Blair’s delu-
sions of grandeur have often been clear enough, as when he declared
in 1997:
Century upon century it has been the destiny of Britain to lead

other nations. That should not be a destiny that is part of our
history. It should be part of our future. We are a leader of
nations or nothing.54
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Subordination to the United States is not new: it is an extension and

variation of patterns during the Cold War. However, the subservience
has now gone to new lengths. Perhaps Blair’s elevation to American
hero after 9/11 proved too seductive.55 In a June 2003 speech to Royal
United Services Institute, UK Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon declared
that ‘it is highly unlikely that the United Kingdom would be engaged
in large-scale combat operations without the United States’, and that
therefore the UK’s armed forces should now be ‘structured and
equipped’ to meet the demands of wars fought by the United States.56
To Blair’s critics, the abject subordination could hardly be clearer and it
casts Britain in the role of junior partner in a kind of Axis of Weevil: a
tiny but enthusiastic parasite on US wealth and power. Britain has also
been ridiculed as a colony of its former colony, and Blair himself has
been widely lampooned as ‘Bush’s poodle’, ‘Bush baby’ or ‘My little
Tony’.57
Reading 30 Days (Peter Stothard’s book about Blair), after reading
Woodward’s Bush at War is a peculiarly dispiriting experience. Many of
the conversations recorded in Bush at War are horrifying; but at least
you do get a sense of excitement, a sense that here – though it is being
used very badly – is some kind of power. Stothard’s book, subtitled ‘A
Month at the Heart of Blair’s War’, describes a mini-world dominated
by issues of presentation with Blair and Campbell trying to convince
the public and the Labour Party (and perhaps themselves) of the justice
of what is not really ‘Blair’s War’ at all, but Bush’s.58
While some British people find this one-sided ‘special relationship’
elevating or amusing, others see it as dangerous and humiliating. Blair
is not insensitive to humiliation in general: in October 2003, he said that
he couldn’t have left an ‘emboldened’ Saddam in place ‘with the
world’s democracies humiliated’59; but Blair does seem wilfully blind
to his humiliation by Bush. Bush’s unilateralism (on issues like steel
tariffs and British prisoners at Guantanamo, as well as the Iraq war
itself) has repeatedly undermined Blair’s attempts to show that the
special relationship was paying dividends. When Ariel Sharon was
allowed to stall on the peace ‘road map’ and adhere to his plan for
maintaining selected Jewish settlements in the West Bank, that was a
blow to any coherent Palestinian state and a blow to Blair too.
Meanwhile, right-wing newspapers and politicians in Britain
expressed much more concern about a few hundred men deployed
under EU command in Macedonia, for example, than about the major
erosion of sovereignty in relation to the United States. George Monbiot
asked pertinently, ‘Why has the old reactionary motto “my country,
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right or wrong” been so smoothly replaced with another one, “their

country, right or wrong?”’ He suggested, ‘our fake patriots know where
real power lies. Having located it, they wish to appease it. For the very
reason that the United States is a greater threat to our sovereignty than
the European Union, they will not stand up to it’60 – a variation, in other
words, of ‘might is right’.
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9 Shame, Purity and Violence

If the powerlessness of 9/11 fed into shame and a violent response, a
second threat of shame arose from the suspicion that 9/11 was linked
to Americans’ actions or inaction. Many said America had shown too
much weakness (see the section, ‘America “goes soft”’ below), and a
few suggested it had exhibited too much interference and belligerence
(see the section, ‘Resisting those who “blame America” for 9/11’ later
in this chapter). A third threat of shame – arising from the violent
response to 9/11 – is addressed in the section ‘Counter-terror and the
proliferation of enemies’.
America ‘goes soft’: weakness, emasculation and impurity
Many catastrophes – across a wide range of cultures and time-periods

– have brought forth a call for explanations and for associated ‘purifi-
cations’. Drawing on his fieldwork in northern Uganda, anthropologist
Tim Allen noted that elders frequently sought to explain misfortune
(for example, illness in a former soldier) with reference to past anti-
social behaviour – in other words, with reference to a morality they
sought to promote.1 In African civil wars, abstinence from sex and alco-
hol has frequently been hailed as giving immunity to violence.2 Among
the ancient Mayan civilisation of Central America, drought prompted
rituals involving the mutilation of sexual organs and these seem to
have been attempts to appease the gods and thereby end the drought.
In the modern era, the Nazis threw invective at a materialist Germany
that had allegedly grown weak, feminine, soft and ‘bourgeois’,3 and
writer Klaus Theweleit stressed that most of the first Nazi storm troop-
ers were German soldiers who were hostile to the forces and people –
broadly, ‘revolution’, ‘Jews’, ‘corruption’, even ‘women’ – that were
seen as undermining the strength, masculinity, pride and purity of
Germany and as paving the way for the humiliation of the 1919 Treaty
of Versailles. Omer Bartov’s book Mirrors of Destruction – in an argu-
ment related to Arendt’s and Theweleit‘s – drew attention to the
tendency in Germany to blame military catastrophe in the First World
War on those who had allegedly undermined the war effort and
betrayed German soldiers. In effect, the need to explain and glorify
suffering led to the mutation of enemies from soldiers ‘over there’ to
civilians ‘over here’, from the British and French to the Jews.4 James
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SHAME, PURITY AND VIOLENCE
Gilligan and Thomas Scheff both stress links between German ‘shame’
at the Treaty of Versailles and the search for scapegoats culminating in
the mass killing of Jews. Even in France, itself deeply traumatised by
the First World War, significant groups found it tempting to welcome
Nazism as a solution to internal weaknesses and impurities. Bartov
observes that many in occupied France saw the Nazi occupation as
confirmation of France’s moral decline and its drift to secularism and,
at the same time, as an opportunity to reverse these trends with an
alliance between the Church and head of the Vichy regime, Marshall
Henri Pétain.5
After the Second World War, military reversals continued to feed
into various kinds of ‘purging’. In the mid-1970s, heavy bombing by
the United States encouraged a perverse and violent search for ‘purity’
in Cambodia, a purging of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’ via the
Khmer Rouge’s forced uprooting of urban populations and its killing of
Vietnamese, ‘Vietnamese sympathisers’ and alleged spies and ‘collabo-
rators’.6 After the Rwandan army had suffered the ‘humiliation’ of a
peace agreement at Arusha in 1993, a search for sources of weakness
and ‘impurity’ seems to have fed powerfully into the 1994 Rwandan
genocide.7
A powerful strand of thought in the United States has suggested that
9/11 occurred, in part, because America had become weak and hedonis-
tic. This has fed into two disturbing and ultimately counterproductive
reactions. The first has been aggression towards various external enemies.
The second has been a redoubling of the pursuit of ‘purity’ and ‘moral
regeneration’ at home: as if to reinvigorate a society grown soft and
susceptible to attack. The Republican Party and the religious right have
tended to adopt a schizophrenic view of the state, that it should interfere in
personal morality and steer clear of the market (with defence spending
being a notable exception). This approach has apparently been reinforced
by 9/11: the felt need to reinvigorate ‘American values’ in the wake of 9/11
has encouraged more interference in personal morality and still greater
economic liberalism via tax cuts in particular. However, public spending
has tended, paradoxically, to rise – especially defence spending.
Part of the humiliation of 9/11 was a feeling that the United States
had not been strong enough, or macho enough, to deter it. The view
that a weak response to 9/11 would invite a worse attack was even
expressed by some ostensible liberal commentators. While warning
against failing to distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists, New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote just after 9/11, ‘To not retali-
ate ferociously for this attack on our people is only to invite a worse
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attack tomorrow and an endless war with terrorists.’8 For many officials
and analysts, the US self-image as a superpower demanded ‘tough
action’. As Vice-President Cheney said when the Afghan attack ran into
significant resistance, ‘We should encourage the Northern Alliance to
take Kabul. We as a superpower should not be stalemated.’9 Signifi-
cantly, Bush and many members of his national security team saw the
Clinton administration’s response to bin Laden and international
terrorism as so weak that it was virtually an invitation to hit the United
States again. Criticism of Clinton was particularly strong when it came
to his launching of 66 cruise missiles into al-Qaida training camps in
Afghanistan in response to the bombings of two US embassies in Africa
in 1998.10 Bush commented after 9/11:
The antiseptic notion of launching a cruise missile into some

guy’s, you know, tent, really is a joke. I mean, people viewed
that as the impotent America … a flaccid, you know, kind of
technologically competent but not very tough country that was
willing to launch a cruise missile out of a submarine and that’d
be it. I do believe there is the image of America out there that
we are so materialistic, that we’re almost hedonistic, that we
don’t have values, and that when struck, we wouldn’t fight
back. It was clear that bin Laden felt emboldened and didn’t
feel threatened by the United States.11
This was to be an enduring theme. In June 2005, Bush told US soldiers

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, ‘The terrorists believe that free societies
are essentially corrupt and decadent, and with a few hard blows they
can force us to retreat.’12 This kind of analysis fed into a much broader
strain of thought that has for many years portrayed liberal America as
indecisive and soft. Pointing to Paul Wolfowitz’s long-standing hostil-
ity to Saddam Hussein, Professor Stephen Holmes observed that,
‘Wolfowitz’s anger is fundamentally an anger against the weakness of
American liberalism … a source of weakness, and a source of rot and a
source of relativism that has been corroding American society for
decades.’13
If America had indeed become ‘flaccid’, ‘hedonistic’ and had lost its
‘values’, them some kind of moral revival was apparently required to
ward off future threats. This may be an important part of the explanation
for the increased emphasis on ‘moral issues’ – notably opposing abortion
and gay marriage – in the 2004 elections, which saw Bush re-elected with
an increased majority and many voters galvanised and organised into
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supporting Bush by the religious right.14 Fears that America had grown
weak and materialistic also seem to have fed into a foreign policy back-
lash in which doubts about one’s own values and vigour were violently
cast aside. Norman Mailer observed of America in 2004, ‘We have
become a guilty nation. Somewhere in the moil of the national conscience
is the knowledge that we are caught in the little contradiction of loving
Jesus on Sunday, while lusting the rest of the week for mega-money. How
can we not be in need of someone to tell us that we are good and pure and
he will seek to make us secure?’ On this logic, we might expect that the
economic interests in war (oil, guns) would only reinforce the vehemence
of the self-styled moral agenda. Moreover, as Mailer notes, the reformed
alcoholic Bush may himself have been in special need of such moral re-
clothing: ‘George W.’s piety has become a pomade to cover all the
tamped-down dry-drunk craziness that still stirs in his livid inner air.’15
Compare these dynamics (whether societal or individual) with an
account from Swiss intellectual Tariq Ramadan, a Muslim, on the
process by which some young Muslims have been recruited into terror
organisations:
Young people are told: everything you do is wrong – you don’t

pray, you drink, you aren’t modest, you don’t behave. They are
told that the only way to be a good Muslim is to live in an
Islamic society. Since they can’t do that, this magnifies their
sense of inadequacy and creates an identity crisis. Such young
people are easy prey for someone who comes along and says,
‘there is a way to purify yourself’. Some of these figures even
keep the young people drinking to increase their sense of guilt
and make them easier to manipulate.16
On similar lines, veteran journalist Robert Fisk notes that some

Muslims have enjoyed freedoms and pleasures in the West but feel
somehow ‘corrupted’ for doing so. For a dangerous few, terror attacks
might be a way not only of tackling this guilt but of hitting back at the
society that had ‘corrupted’ them.17 Part of the lure of violence, as many
Nazis seemed to understand very well, can lie in the offer of escape
from the materialism and everyday corruptions of peacetime.
Bush has occasionally come close to portraying 9/11 as an opportu-
nity for moral or even personal renewal. In February 2002, he declared:
None of us would ever wish on anyone what happened on that

day [9/11]. Yet, as with each life, sorrows we would not choose
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can bring wisdom and strength gained in no other way. This

insight is central to many faiths and certainly to the faith that
finds hope and comfort in a cross.18
The idea that worldly suffering is some kind of message or Godly

inducement to morality has a long history: in the nineteenth century,
many British opinion-formers interpreted the Great Famine in Ireland
as a sign that God disapproved of Britain’s Corn Laws (seen as imped-
ing food imports);19 more recently, the view that HIV/AIDS punishes
behaviour that God disapproves of has contributed to ambivalence and
delays in tackling the AIDS epidemic.20
The idea of suffering as a corrective for moral lapses is written deep
into a powerful strand of American religious thought. Noting that the
template for a ‘Chosen People’ is taken from the Old Testament,
Clifford Longley observed:
The Chosen People syndrome, as we have defined it, suggests

that nations whose history is subject to that pattern will expe-
rience a cycle. Faithfulness will be followed by laxity, by idola-
try and by infidelity (in the religious sense at least); this will
lead to suffering and misfortune as Providence intervenes to
apply the corrective chastisement. (That is not to make God
responsible for causing the misfortune; all he does is to lift his
protection.) Prophets will arise to explain what has gone wrong
and urge the Chosen People to return to their earlier obedience;
as they do so, they are restored (redeemed) back to the earlier
state of grace.21
Despite this context, Bush’s linking of 9/11 with the perception of

America as weak and without values is odd in a number of ways. First,
like a lot of statements about terrorists’ motivations, it presumes to get
inside the head of a very elusive and diverse group. (After each terror-
ist attack, we hear that such-and-such a path of action – the one not
favoured by the speaker or writer – would be ‘giving the terrorists what
they want’.)22
There is a second element of strangeness in Bush’s statement: it is
almost as if the terrorists have become a kind of ‘mouthpiece’ for the
fears and prejudices of both Bush himself and the religious right more
generally. In effect, the terrorists are bizarrely credited with accurately
diagnosing American society’s faults, and the diagnosis is oddly in line
with the moral issues ‘backlash’ politics dissected by Thomas Frank. To
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some extent at least, this ghoulish harmony seems to reflect a certain

‘moral overlap’ between competing fundamentalisms, especially in the
expressed hostility towards worldly pleasure-seeking: as psychoanalyst
Otto Kernberg has noted, fundamentalist ideologies tend to have not
only a sharp divide between the faithful and the infidel but also a sexu-
ally restrictive morality for the chosen; hostility towards secularisation is
also a shared trait.23 American evangelist Jerry Falwell took Bush’s
ventriloquistic manoeuvre even further when he portrayed 9/11 as
God’s retribution for abortion, homosexuality and secularisation24 (an
interpretation echoed by some religious leaders in 2005 when Hurricane
Katrina was portrayed as retribution for abortion and for a New Orleans
gay festival disrupted by the storm).25 In effect, Falwell was portraying
God and the terrorists as speaking with a single voice (a claim made
more obviously by the terrorists themselves – for example, when bin
Laden said 9/11 was ‘America struck by God’).26
It is interesting to compare the welcome extended by some leading
French Catholics to German occupation as a route to reversing an
alleged Jewish/Freemason-inspired separation of Church and State in
France. W. D. Hall commented that it almost seemed as if God had
sided with Nazism in order to purify France.27 Interestingly, Richard
Hofstadter’s classic 1965 study of paranoia in American politics had
noted that ‘a fundamental paradox of the paranoid style is the imitation
of the enemy’ – whether Ku Klux Klan donning priestly robes and
adopting elaborate rituals and hierarchies or the John Birch Society
emulating its Communist enemies with ‘front’ groups and a ruthless
prosecution of ideological war.28
A third anomaly with Bush’s attempt to reverse the attackers’ image
of America is that it sits very oddly with his emphasis on the need for
autonomy – his insistence (noted in Chapter 8) that ‘Osama bin Laden
doesn’t determine how we defend ourselves.’ For implicit in Bush’s
remedial action is that bin Laden does get to determine a significant part
of the response: in fact, the terrorist’s presumed world view gets to
exert a powerful influence not only on (an increasingly aggressive)
American foreign policy but on the government’s (morally reforming)
domestic agenda too.
The Reverend Falwell’s view is clearly linked to the common Christian
view that God is all-powerful and all-knowing: events cannot happen
without his knowing or doing, his rewarding or punishing. Within this
framework, a catastrophe like 9/11 carries a very potent threat of shame
since people are naturally led to ask: punishment for what? Adding to the
threat of shame is a Protestant tradition that has tended to see prosperity
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as a sign of virtue.29 Many Americans have taken the power and conspic-
uous wealth of ‘God’s own country’ as a sign of God’s approval and
special favour. Shortly after Bush took office, White House press secretary
Ari Fleischer rejected calls for drivers to reduce fuel consumption, saying,
‘The President believes it’s an American way of life. … The American
way of life is a blessed one.’30 As Clifford Longley put it in his study
Chosen People, ‘a nation enjoying success can easily convince itself it is
basking in the benevolence of Providence’.31 By the same logic, an assault
on power and conspicuous wealth may bring the threatening thought
that God is no longer smiling on a virtuous and chosen people. Thus,
wealth and power must be maintained not only for their own sake but as
a sign of God’s continuing approval.
In Bush’s interpretation of terrorists’ views of America, the use of the
words ‘impotent’ and ‘flaccid’ should alert us to a worry that the
United States has not been sufficiently masculine or virile. Bush seemed
to invoke the language of mid-life crisis when he ‘worried that the
United States had lost its edge’.32 Perhaps significantly, Bush has
favoured macho language (often with a Spanish flavour) when praising
his friends. He told Blair aide Alastair Campbell, ‘Your man has got
cojones’.33 Bush sometimes called Ariel Sharon ‘toro’ or ‘the bull’.34 Bush
and his entourage may have felt a particular need to talk tough and to
banish internal weakness: those who managed to avoid military serv-
ice in Vietnam included not only George Bush himself but John
Aschroft, Richard Perle and Dick Cheney – influential figures described
by playwright David Hare as ‘Men willing to send others to do what
they would not do themselves’.35 The unease of these ‘chicken hawks’
was evidenced in the Republican attacks on the record of someone who
had conspicuously not opted out of the Vietnam war, John Kerry.36
Comparing Bush and Kerry, Norman Mailer observed pithily, ‘Bush is
the better actor. He has been impersonating men more manly than
himself for many years.’37 If all this machismo could be deployed in the
name of the oppressed women of Afghanistan (a refreshing, if sudden,
priority for the Republicans), then so much the better.
It is not difficult to see an underlying assertion of ‘masculine’ virtues
in many other responses to 9/11. For example, David Halberstam, a
prominent critic of the Vietnam war, now praised the ‘muscularity and
flex of American society’, adding that ‘our strengths, when summoned
and focused, when the body politic is aroused and connects to the polit-
ical process, are never to be underestimated.’38 Conversely, those
opposing the Iraq war were often derided as unmanly. On the eve of the
war, Timothy Garton Ash commented:
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The current stereotype of Europeans is easily summarised.

Europeans are wimps. They are weak, petulant, hypocritical,
disunited, duplicitous, sometimes anti-Semitic and often anti-
American appeasers. … They spend their euros on wine, holi-
days, and bloated welfare states instead of on defense. … If
anti-American Europeans see ‘the Americans’ as bullying
cowboys, anti-European Americans see ‘the Europeans’ as
limp-wristed pansies. The American is a virile, heterosexual
male; the European is female, impotent, or castrated. … The
word ‘eunuchs’ is, I discovered, used in the form ‘EU-nuchs.’39
While this dichotomy can be overstated, it certainly mirrors Robert

Kagan’s catch-phrase, ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are
from Venus’.40 Within this framework, the US State Department, seen
by many on the American right as unduly cautious in relation to
counter-terror wars, was ‘an outpost of Venus’,41 while Tony Blair was
cited in Washington as a shining exception to the rule of Europeans as
wimps.42 Deriding Democrats as unmanly was a well-established
reflex. In his book Unlimited Access, Gary Aldrich (an FBI agent
assigned to Clinton’s White House) famously referred to the
‘Clintonoids’ as ‘girlie men’, and this was a phrase he later wheeled out
for liberals who couldn’t understand why 9/11 had happened when
they had been so ‘nice’ to the terrorists.43 On the Clinton team, he
observed:
There was a unisex quality to the Clinton staff that set it far
apart from the Bush [senior] administration. It was the shape
of their bodies. In the Clinton administration, the broad-
shouldered, pants-wearing women and the pear-shaped,
bowling-pin men blurred distinctions between the sexes. I
was used to athletic types, physically fit persons who took
pride in body image and good health.44
In this view, even traditional gender distinctions were being under-

mined by liberalism (a problem brought into particular focus by gay
marriage). Clinton, of course, had run into a political storm when he
tried to lift a long-standing ban on gays in the US military. Whatever
the truth about Clinton (and he seems to have done his best to assert a
certain kind of under-the-table masculinity), Bush appears to have
fallen squarely into the pride-in-your-body camp. On a personal level,
Bob Woodward’s book Bush at War brings out the president’s concern
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with his own physical prowess, ‘I’m doing 205 pounds [bench-
presses],’ Bush enthuses boyishly at one point, ‘isn’t that the best for
any president?’45 And who can forget Bush moving seamlessly from
clubbing bad guys to clubbing golf balls in Michael Moore’s film
Fahrenheit 9/11, ‘I call upon all nations to do everything they can to stop
these terrorist killers. Now watch this drive!’ Meanwhile in London,
Bush’s colleagues and caddies were also desperately keeping fit. Blair
was devoted to stretching exercises and fruit lunches.46 Key Blair aide
Alastair Campbell was training for the London marathon.47 While the
Bush team was using sports analogies to describe war,48 the Blair team
was busy deploying war analogies to describe sport.49
Matching this machismo was an impulse to emasculate the enemy.
Some of the language surrounding 9/11 seemed designed to remove
any claim to conventional masculinity from the attackers, as when they
were labelled as ‘cowards’ or when the National Enquirer reported that
‘World Trade Center terrorist Mohamed Atta and several of his bloody
henchmen led secret gay lives for years.’50 Unsurprisingly, the culture
among US soldiers in Iraq was macho in the extreme.51 In both Iraq and
Afghanistan, female American soldiers were used to humiliate male
prisoners (and at Abu Ghraib were photographed doing so); Allen
Feldman suggests plausibly that this was designed to extract male
identity and sexual power from the Iraqi ‘terrorist’ and transfer them to
male US soldiers.52 This not only exploited Muslim cultural norms; it
may also have said something about the insecurities of the Western
troops, insecurities that mirrored bullying and insults during military
training. As Eric Hoffer once observed, ‘You can discover what your
enemy fears most by observing the means he uses to frighten you’. In
October 2005, the Australian investigative programme ‘Dateline’
reported that US soldiers in Afghanistan had faced the bodies of two
Taliban fighters towards Mecca and burned their bodies, before broad-
casting over loudspeakers in the local dialect:
Attention, Taliban, you are all cowardly dogs. You allowed

your fighters to be laid down facing west and burned. You are
too scared to come down and retrieve their bodies. This just
proves you are the lady boys we always believed you to be.53
Bush’s fears about the United States being seen as impotent and flaccid
can also be seen in the context of a much broader set of fears in the
United States, centring on emasculation.54 These fears have been most
strongly expressed by the far-right. In The Turner Diaries, a book that
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seems to have established a blueprint for the 1995 Oklahoma bomb-

ing,55 liberal government is portrayed as expecting an obedience that is
‘feminine’ and ‘infantile’.56 Turner Diaries author William Pierce
embraced a racist version of Christian fundamentalism, something that
also influenced Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh and Christian
militias in the United States. Mark Juergensmeyer, in his comparative
study of terror and religious fundamentalism, notes that US Christian
militias have been beset by:
fears not only of sexual impotence but of government’s role in

the process of emasculation. Men who harbor such fears
protect themselves, therefore, not only by setting up veiled
defenses against the threats of powerful women and unmanly
men, but also by attempting to reassert control in a world that
they feel has gone morally and politically askew.57
Juergensmeyer sees these fears as fuelling extremism among groups as

diverse as Christian militias in the United States and Hindu national-
ists in India. For a significant lobby in the United States, possession of
guns is an important democratic freedom, and on the far-right taking
away people’s guns is regarded as a threat to their masculinity and
even as a prelude to the subjugation of the American people by a tyran-
nical or meddlesome state.58 For this kind of constituency, the allure of
a government that is fiercely ‘masculine’ in the foreign domain, that
resists the ‘feminisation’ inherent in liberalism, seems to be very strong.
In terms of personnel, the foreign policy arena remains very much
a man’s world. In the well-organised, right-wing US think-tanks that
have helped to formulate and legitimise the radical new US foreign
policy, nearly all the participants have been men.59 This has also been
true of influential UK think-tanks like the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, where I used to work. For women trying to operate
within (and perhaps ameliorate) a male-dominated and sometimes
macho official climate where ‘weakness’ is regarded as suspect, it has
been particularly difficult to articulate a clear alternative or non-
militaristic vision. Condoleezza Rice, the most powerful woman in
the Bush administration, was praised by UN weapons inspector Blix
for her straightforward approach to WMD, but she still backed the
Iraq war. The details of her professional and personal life – a 136,000
ton oil tanker named in her honour, a tennis challenge to Britain’s
Tim Henman – did not suggest someone actively trying to distance
herself from a macho culture.
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In Peter Stothard’s account of Blair and his entourage, one gets a

queasy sense of a group of boys talking happily about football and mili-
tary tactics, with UK Development Minister Clare Short as mother-
figure occasionally tut-tutting in the background. Clare Short is
described by Stothard as having ‘an unofficial position as “the
conscience of the party”’.60 If true, this would seem to leave the others
(nearly all men) bizarrely off the hook. Even Short seemed to reject the
‘soft’ world of sympathy when she dismissed as ‘emotional’ the calls
from aid agencies for a pause in the bombing of Afghanistan to allow
the delivery of humanitarian aid.61 Equating peace with softness was
also common in the British media in the wake of 9/11. Following the
9/11 attacks, Polly Toynbee, a distinguished and perceptive British
columnist who might have been expected to avoid such sexually
loaded and goading language, drew a distinction between ‘limp liber-
als’ who will not defend their most profound values and ‘hard liberals’
who ‘hold basic human rights to be non-negotiable and worth fighting
for’.62 As James Gilligan notes, violence becomes more likely when non-
violence is constructed as unmanly and therefore shameful.63
Resisting those who ‘blame America’ for 9/11
At the other end of the political spectrum from the Reverend Falwell’s
interpretation of 9/11 as moral corrective were those who stressed that
the United States had made enemies with an aggressive foreign policy.
Terrorism purports to be retribution, and the question could not
entirely be expunged from consciousness: retribution for what? We
know from studies of disasters like wars and famines, moreover, that
victims often blame themselves. In many ways, this is a variation of the
‘just world thinking’ discussed in Chapter 7: punishment is held to
imply a crime.64 An obvious alternative to self-criticism and the shame
of responsibility is to point the finger at others – in other words, to
choose blame over shame, perhaps in a violent manner.
From 1996 onwards Osama bin Laden fairly consistently gave three
reasons for attacking the United States: US military occupation of Saudi
Arabia; US support for Israel/‘Zionists’/‘Jews’; and the 1991 invasion
of Iraq and subsequent bombing and starving of its people. He subse-
quently added the 2001 attack on Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of
Iraq.65 This analysis demands to be taken seriously, yet it clearly carries
some kind of threat of shame for the West. It was more palatable simply
to blame the catastrophe entirely on some external ‘evil’ – just as Blair
linked the 2005 London bombings with ‘an evil ideology’ – and to label
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as internal enemies or terrorist sympathisers anyone who questioned

this simplistic explanation.
9/11 did give rise to a certain amount of soul-searching on foreign
policy, as some Americans were prompted to wonder what it was that
they as a nation might have done to precipitate or provoke such a vicious
attack. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, novelist Barbara Kingsolver
went so far as to highlight similarities between ‘them’ and ‘us’:
Ten years ago, early on a January morning, bombs rained down

from the sky and caused great buildings in the city of Baghdad
to fall down – hotels, hospitals, palaces, buildings with moth-
ers and soldiers inside – and here in the place I want to love
best, I had to watch people cheering about it. In Baghdad,
survivors shook their fists at the sky and said the word ‘evil’.66
Yet Kingsolver’s message was one that even liberal intellectuals found
very difficult to hear,67 and any criticisms of US foreign policy tended to
go down badly. Michael Moore recalls how, in the aftermath of 9/11, the
original publisher of his bestseller Stupid White Men tried to bury the
book (which was critical of US foreign policy). The National Educational
Association, American’s largest teachers’ union, created a ‘Remember
September 11’ website that was widely condemned for its allegedly
‘blame-America’ approach; George Will wrote in the Washington Post that
the website showed ‘a politically correct obsession with “diversity” and
America’s sins’, and was ‘as frightening, in its way, as any foreign
threat’.68 David Horowitz, a Marxist in the 1960s, suggested that ‘self-
described progressives’ had made alliances ‘with Arab fascists and
Islamic fanatics in their war against America and the West’ – apparently
‘an updated version of the Nazi-Soviet entente’.69 He suggested, further,
that 9/11 and the war against Iraq had provided an opportunity to a
radical movement ‘whose permanent agenda was war against America
and its perceived global “domination”’,70 and that attacks on the admin-
istration were giving encouragement to terrorist forces.71 In his pamphlet
The Art of Political War, distributed to Republican Congressman during
the 2000 elections, Horowitz argued that ‘Politics is war conducted by
other means’.72 Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber point out that this
makes war the norm; and if war is the norm, there may be no need to
concern oneself about whether to start one.73
In general, the 9/11 attacks made self-awareness less rather than
more likely and meant that many Americans came to perceive them-
selves overwhelmingly as victims. Any incipient feelings of shame for
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American foreign policy – or any attempt to articulate these feelings –

were usually quickly suppressed in favour of focusing on an ‘evil
other’. Significantly, psychiatrist James Gilligan links violence not only
to the threat of shame but also to an inability to express shame or self-
doubt (something that may be more marked in men, who have been
overwhelmingly the more violent gender); with some significant excep-
tions, an inability or unwillingness to express shame or self-doubt
seems to have been a marked feature of public discourse in the United
States.
Falwell’s interpretation of 9/11 as God’s displeasure with America
got him into trouble and he had to retract; emphasising an external
‘evil’ proved much more palatable. From a Christian viewpoint, it may
have served a function in relieving God of responsibility, and, by exten-
sion, in relieving Americans of the shame of having incited his wrath.
‘Evil’ invokes the Devil, and as philosopher Leslek Kolakowski, author
of Conversations with the Devil, noted, ‘The Devil serves to identify what
evil is, and became an entity who was responsible for evil that let God
and ourselves off the hook. That has been the function of the Devil in
history.’74
Avoiding any genuine introspection was helped by the frequent
assertion that the attackers were jealous or fearful of ‘our’ way of life,
as when Bush told Congress on 20 September 2001, ‘They hate our free-
doms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to
vote and assemble and disagree with each other.’ In other words, the
violence was linked not to American vice but to American virtue. Once
again, there was a stark contrast between the inability to find the enemy
and the willingness to claim detailed knowledge of the enemy’s aims,
hatreds and motives.
If Solzhenitsyn was right that ‘the line dividing good and evil cuts
through the heart of every human being’, then trying to isolate the
evil group and eliminate them makes no logical sense but a great deal
of psychological sense: it helps in warding off the threat of shame.75
Most threatening of all, it appears, has been any echo of Kingsolver’s
message that the terrorists might have something in common with
‘us’, a notion emphatically rejected in Rumsfeld’s comment on 9/11,
‘In targeting this place, then, and those who worked here, the
attackers, the evildoers correctly sensed that the opposite of all they
were, and stood for, resided here.’ Yet this sense of the terrorist as the
opposite of us tends to destroy the possibility of understanding what
motivates the terrorists, precisely because it excludes ‘us’ from the
picture. First, it excludes our past historical actions, including the
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effects of military interventions over a long period and of Western

support for abusive regimes of various kinds; as a result, we are often
poorly placed to understand the process of becoming a terrorist.
Second, the emphasis on the terrorist as entirely opposite tends to
crowd out awareness of our own violent reactions to victimhood,
which could potentially tell us a great deal about why other human
beings (in this case terrorists) resort to violence. Note that the terror-
ist – like the counter-terrorist – does not usually respond simply or
solely to his or her own victimhood but to the victimisation of those
whose suffering he or she has come to find (and has often been
encouraged to find) humiliating and intolerable.
They say that history is written by the victors; however, it seems to be
much better remembered by the vanquished. The United States and its
chief ally the United Kingdom have a long tradition of not recognising
the damage done by their foreign policies. No easy line connects the 9/11
atrocities with past abuses by the United States. But anti-American senti-
ment has undoubtedly been fuelled by a pattern of damagingly uncon-
ditional support for Israel. Then there was Western support for a range
of autocratic regimes, notably in the Arab world. These included Egypt,
Iran under the Shah, and Saudi Arabia, where the US bases that were
maintained after the 1991 Iraq war were particularly incendiary. Western
support for undemocratic regimes has often turned the mosque into the
only place where people can express anger and dissent, a classic exam-
ple being Iran where a CIA-backed coup in 1953 toppled a democrati-
cally elected government which had just nationalised the oil industry; the
coup ushered in two decades of dictatorship under the Shah and thus
helped pave the way for Khomeini’s Islamist revolution.76 Naturally, US
condemnations of human-rights abuses do not have the same virtuous
ring when they are heard in countries where the United States has
supported violence and dictatorship.
As Noam Chomsky points out, US acts of terror have not counted as
terror but as ‘counter-terror’ or even ‘just war’.77 The history of US
killing of civilians includes dropping nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki – the only use so far of nuclear weapons in a war. It also
includes the Vietnam war, when perhaps 5.1 million Vietnamese were
killed, as well as the bombing of large swathes of Cambodia (largely
obliterated in the American memory by the atrocities of the Khmer
Rouge, which had themselves resulted partly from the collective
madness induced by the American bombing). After Vietnam, an over-
riding concern to avoid American casualties seems to have fed into a
new emphasis on US-sponsored terrorist activity (killing of civilians to
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spread terror) within southern Africa and then Central America.78

Killing of civilians has also taken the form of fuelling warfare and geno-
cide in Central America: sometimes revealingly referred to as ‘low-
intensity conflict’. Most US citizens have little awareness of their
government’s support for Turkey’s oppression of its Kurdish popula-
tion, Indonesia’s Suharto, Mobutu in the Congo, Siad Barre in Somalia,
Samuel Doe in Liberia, and so it goes on. The United States has been
supplying almost half the world’s arms exports.79 It also has a huge
supply of weapons of mass destruction.
Consider also the Afghan story – another major ‘blind spot’. Despite
a number of exposés, it seems relatively few people in the West under-
stand how the United States fuelled terrorism through the manner of its
intervention in (and withdrawal from) Afghanistan in the 1980s. Yet the
help to mujahadeen fighting the Soviet Union constituted an active
nurturing of groups that later proved a significant source of terrorism,
particularly given the anger at Western withdrawal from Afghanistan
when its people were crying out for reconstruction. The CIA infiltrated
the mujahadeen’s training centres and associated refugee camps inside
Pakistan, and supplied a huge quantity of light weapons, much of it
diverted to the Pakistani market. Trucks taking weapons to
Afghanistan brought heroin on the way back, and the burgeoning
opium-based drugs trade came to be used by the mujahadeen as a
‘revolutionary tax’ that helped to sustain the struggle against the Soviet
Union as well as later jihadi activities.80 Like the invasion of Iraq in
2003, the United States’s old Afghanistan strategy was presented as
strangely ‘costless’: Gilles Kepel suggested that the Afghan jihad
against the Soviets was particularly attractive for the US government
because, ‘the jihadists would do battle against the Soviet Union, spar-
ing American GIs, while the oil monarchies of the Gulf would foot the
bill, sparing American taxpayers’.81 The Afghan war was also seen as an
outlet for the energies of radical Sunni Muslim activists who threatened
the conservative Gulf monarchies supported by the United States.
In 1989, the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Communism was collapsing and Khomeini died in 1989; in these circum-
stances, enemies were rapidly redefined. Not just the Afghan jihad but
Afghanistan itself was pretty much abandoned as the country descended
into post-Cold-War style warlordism.82 The neglect of Afghan refugees
fed into the success of the Taliban, particularly with many of the poorest
refugee families sending children to religious schools.83 Cut free from
their former backers and then angered by the use of Saudi Arabia as a
base for US forces ejecting Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, the international
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brigade of jihad veterans previously based in Afghanistan and border

areas of Pakistan was now, in Kepel’s words, ‘available to serve radical
Islamist causes anywhere in the world’. Kepel noted:
The jihad intensified in 1992 in Bosnia, Algeria, and Egypt, as

soon as veterans of the Afghan war began arriving home from
Peshawar [Pakistan, near the Afghan border]. In Egypt as in
Algeria, the combatants were native born; they had made the
pilgrimage to the Afghan camps in the mid-1980s, discreetly
encouraged to do so by their governments, which were only
too happy to rid themselves of potential malcontents and trou-
blemakers. In Bosnia, the jihadists were all foreigners, Arabs
for the most part, many of them Saudis. In Tajikistan – and in
Chechnya after 1995 – other Arab volunteers played an impor-
tant role in the attempt to turn a local conflict into a full-blown
jihad. The dispersal all over the world, after 1992, of the
[jihadists] formerly concentrated in Kabul and Peshawar, more
than anything else, explains the sudden, lightning expansion of
radical Islamism in Muslim countries and the West.84
Another American blind-spot, of course, has been Iraq itself. With the
ascendance of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979, Saddam was seen as a
bulwark against militant Shi’ite extremism and the possible fall of pro-US
regimes in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.85 In 1982, Iraq was actually
removed from Washington’s official list of states that supported terror-
ism.86 The United States backed Iraq in its war with Iran, and both the
Reagan and Bush senior administrations authorised the sale to Iraq of
numerous items with both military and civilian applications, including
poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses like anthrax and
bubonic plague.87 The US government also showed little concern about
the use of chemical weapons at this time. Even the press seemed docile, as
when the Washington Post said in 1984 that it was ‘not surprising’ that Iraq
would use gas given the ferocity of the Iranian enemy, adding that it was
‘a bit odd when you consider all the ways that people have devised to do
violence to each other, to worry overly about any particular method’.88
The intensity of Saddam’s abuses is not in doubt, not least in the use
of gas against the Kurds at Halabja in 1988, when at least 5,000 people
were killed. However, such abuses are hardly a credible explanation for
the 2003 attack on Iraq. Again, some sense of history is helpful. In the
early 1970s, with Iraq getting too close to the Soviet Union and threat-
ening the US-backed Shah of Iran, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon
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promised help to an ongoing Kurdish revolt against Saddam. However,

when Saddam ceded some land to Iran, Kissinger and Nixon withdrew
advisers from the north and watched as he sealed the borders and
massacred the Kurds.89 Western companies and businesses helped
Saddam to assemble a formidable arsenal, including chemical
weapons.90 US support for Saddam also fed into Western quietude over
subsequent attacks on the Kurds, notably in 1988. The 1987–89 attacks
on the Kurds – of which Halabja was just one part – killed some 50,000
rural Kurds, even by the most conservative estimates.91
Then, in 1991, the Kurds in northern Iraq and Shi’ite groups in the
south were incited to rise up in revolt following the Gulf War. The West
did not intervene to prevent Saddam’s military retaliation against
them. (There was, however, a significant effort to provide a safe haven
for the Kurds once they had been attacked and fled to Iran and Turkey,
the latter a key Western ally.)92 Having virtually disappeared from US
news stories from 1989, Halabja was increasingly mentioned from
September 2002 when the George W. Bush administration began its
public push for war with Iraq.93
Britain has its own blind-spots – not least in backing the illusion that
it is still a Great Power and refusing to see that it has been relegated to
a status somewhere between side-kick and sitting duck. Years of denial
over the British Empire (and its demise) are hardly a promising foun-
dation. As Seumas Milne commented in the Guardian, selective memory
of old colonialism seems to be part of justifying the new imperialism.94
German novelist Günther Grass observed, ‘I sometimes wonder how
young people grow up in Britain and know little about the long history
of crimes during the colonial period. In England it’s a completely taboo
subject.’95 Empire is acknowledged to be a neglected subject in British
schools.96 How many British adults know anything about the famine
under British rule that killed some 3 million people in 1943? (It took
place in Bengal.) My awareness of the blind-spots in my own country,
the UK, was improved by a conversation with a Nigerian friend, Adek-
eye Adebajo, who said Britons’ record of genocide in relation to Native
Americans and Aboriginal Australians was shameful. But these atroci-
ties, I protested, were the work of Australians and Americans. My
friend had to point out that most of the perpetrators had come from
Britain. Another set of blinkers: how many understand the sense of
disillusionment that arose when Britain’s encouragement of Arab
nationalism (as a spur to revolt against the Turks in the First World
War) ran up against the promise of a Jewish state and the desire to
extend British and French imperial control once the war ended? Even
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the better moments in British history can feed contemporary blind-

spots: notably, the ‘good war’ against Nazism has been used to justify
all manner of subsequent wars in the name of democracy against ‘new
Hitlers’.97
Iraq itself is a British construction, cobbled together after the First
World War from three provinces of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. The
British wanted to avoid the creation of representative government in
Iraq, since the majority Shia population was seen as fanatical while the
Baghdad Sunnis – whose political predominance survived to the
Saddam era – were regarded as more docile and pro-British.98 This clas-
sic colonial ‘divide and rule’ was never mentioned, of course, when the
‘Sunni triangle’ came to be seen as the main source of opposition to the
US/UK occupation from 2003. The authoritarianism which the United
Kingdom and the United States used to justify the 2003 attack on Iraq has
had as much to do with the artificiality of this colonial construct as with
the personality of Saddam on which the West has focused so exclusively.
How many people, moreover, know anything of Britain’s bombing of
northern and southern Iraq through the 1920s, under its League of
Nations mandate, bombing that seems to have killed nearly 9,000 Iraqis
in the summer of 1920 alone? The British Army used poison gas in that
year and national hero Winston Churchill, who was serving as Secretary
of State at the War Office, noted, ‘I am strongly in favour of using
poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes … [to] spread a lively terror.’99
Counter-terror and the proliferation of enemies
When the transatlantic alliance’s violent and illegal response to 9/11

led to widespread condemnation, this tended to heighten the threat of
shame. One technique for warding this off was to treat every abuse as
an exception, as when Bush said photographs of Abu Ghraib ‘do not
represent America’. Comedian Rob Corddry satirised this approach
when he said, ‘It’s our principles that matter, our inspiring, abstract
notions. Remember: Just because torturing prisoners is something we
did, doesn’t mean it’s something we would do.’100
Also important in warding off shame arising from the counter-terror
(as well as in maintaining public support) was a compliant media.
Truth is notoriously the first casualty of war.101 Vietnam had shown the
importance of media control, and the lesson had been vigorously
applied in the 1991 Gulf War. As the 1993 attack on Iraq loomed, Amer-
ican journalists gave little attention to worries in the US intelligence
community about how Bush was using the data on Iraq. After a
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detailed investigation, Michael Massing said of journalists in Washing-

ton, ‘In a city where access is all, few wanted to risk losing it.’102 Then,
during the invasion, the practice of ‘embedding’ journalists with Coali-
tion military units, as Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber noted,
‘encouraged reporters to identify with the soldiers they were covering
… the journalists embedded with troops witnessed weapons being
fired but rarely saw what happened at the receiving end’.103
Photographs of flag-draped coffins returning to the United States were
banned. Self-censorship was widespread in the press – for example, in
relation to pictures of dead soldiers or dead children.104
A third technique that helped in warding off shame was the strategy
of bullying approval through political and economic pressures, notably
on the various members of the Security Council during attempts by US
and UK officials to get agreement to an attack on Iraq.105
However, these three techniques only worked to a degree. Also vital
in warding off shame arising from the response to 9/11 has been a
continuous redefinition of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. Bush and Blair have
played the leading role in the tendency to deal with criticism by
narrowing their circle of confidantes and widening their circle of
enemies. Allies perceived as insufficiently warlike became a focus for
intense wrath. The category of enemies came to include increasing
numbers of internal critics and, in practice if not in theory, many civil-
ians in targeted countries (notably Iraq).
In so far as Bush and Blair have entertained a genuine belief that
they are bringing freedom to the oppressed, this element of sincerity
seems to have added to their fury at those who have opposed this
deluded project.106 We have repeatedly seen the intimidation of anyone
who threatens to introduce shame into the near-shameless world that
leaders have constructed around themselves. Warding off shame has
also been a factor for coalition soldiers on the ground, some of whom
have reacted with growing anger to the perceived ‘ingratitude’ of
ordinary civilians for their ‘liberation’.
Shrinking the circle of confidantes
US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill has observed that Bush, particu-

larly after 9/11, was caught in an echo chamber of his own making, a
diminishing circle of advisers who shielded him from reality;107 signifi-
cantly, reliance on this small circle of domestic confidantes largely
survived into the second George W. Bush administration, carrying their
gift of shamelessness.108 Another part of Bush’s shame-free zone came
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courtesy of Blair. Bullies rarely stand alone; they need people to

approve their behaviour and give them the ‘respect’ they crave. In Viet-
nam, US soldier Michael Bernhardt found that when he tried to inter-
vene to stop incidents in which US soldiers were abusing civilians, the
soldiers backed off relatively quickly:
They were typical bullies, who are actually cowards, terrible

cowards. Just being there after a while was enough. It wasn’t
that they were afraid of me – I don’t think I look that danger-
ous, now or then. It was almost like Mom looking over your
shoulder, I guess.109
Blair’s support seems precisely to have removed the possibility of a

Mother Country looking disapprovingly over the president’s shoulder.
Here was a voice consistently reassuring Bush junior that violence and
bullying were both necessary and desirable.110 Moreover, as columnist
Timothy Garton Ash observed, ‘American opinion polls showed that
Bush needed a prominent ally to be sure of popular support for the war
on Iraq. He needed Britain.’111
Meanwhile, Blair himself was constructing his own zone of shame-
lessness, sealing himself off from the anti-war views of his own party and
the majority of the British people.112 Critical here was his reliance on rela-
tionships with a small pro-war group. John Kampfner noted in his book
Blair’s Wars that the British Prime Minister came to rely on a narrow
domestic inner circle ‘for each and every decision. … His entourage
meant everything to him.’ Key figures in the inner circle were Sir David
Manning, Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell, Alastair Campbell, Director of
Communications, and Sally Morgan, Political Director.113 Foreign Office
officials tended to be marginalised, and Kampfner observed that, ‘The
concentration of power in the hands of unelected officials, some with
considerable experience of international affairs, others with very little,
infuriated many British diplomats.’114 Internationally, Blair was clearly
sustained by his bond with Bush (as well as vice versa). Spanish Prime
Minister José Maria Aznar became one of the most frequent telephone
callers to Blair, and as Blair turned more towards his pro-war coterie, this
in itself alienated other friends and supporters. Kampfner noted:
Tony Blair says the name “José Maria” with almost the same
affection as he says “Sally” [Morgan] or “Alastair” [Campbell].
Some of his friends find this attraction to a man of the European
right as hard to endure as his closeness to George Bush.
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The disapproval may itself have become a badge of conviction and

honour. Peter Stothard observed of Bush and Blair, ‘The two men have
grown used to swapping stories of how weak their domestic support
is’. Having ridden to power with an instinct for popularity, Blair now
found energy and solace in a shrinking circle of approval. He was not
the first to do so, nor the first to go deeper into fantasy and unrealistic
thinking as a result. In a more general discussion, psychoanalyst Otto
Kernberg has written:
The excessively narcissistic leader needs to be loved and

admired, tends to surround himself with ‘yes men’ and thus
produces a split in the intermediate leadership: an ‘in group’
that in its submissiveness and adulation protects him from the
critique and resentment of the rejected ‘out group’ and main-
tains his narcissistic equilibrium at the price of depriving him
of realistic criticism and feedback.115
This mechanism helps to explain how Bush and Blair were able to
maintain some elements of genuine belief in the desirability of actions
whose predictably counterproductive effects were widely noted by
experts and intelligence officials. The political and economic pay-offs
from ‘perpetual war’ probably also played a part in shoring up their
self-delusion.
Internal enemies
We have seen how James Gilligan and Rene Girard (in their different
ways) have shown that violence is frequently visited on those who are
available and readily to hand, and not necessarily on those responsible
for some initial provocation. We have also seen how, both historically
and in the present, the pursuit of purity seems to offer some kind of
solution or compensation for defeat and humiliation, and some kind of
magical immunity to external enemies. This involves at least a partial
relocation of the threat from the external to the internal. We know that
the identification of ‘evil’ over there typically dovetails at some point
into the identification of a corresponding evil, a ‘fifth column’, over
here. In the United States itself, a classic example was Senator Joseph
McCarthy’s anti-Communism in the 1950s.116 Earlier, there had been
round-ups and deportations of eastern European immigrants in the
United States at the time of the 1917 Russian Revolution. The search for
moral regeneration in the wake of catastrophe has often spilled over
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into racial or religious intolerance, and into a racial or religious defini-

tion of ‘purity’.117 In the aftermath of 9/11, particularly after Bush’s
blunder in talking of a ‘crusade’, he and Blair trod carefully when it
came to religion, stressing the peaceful nature of the majority of
Muslims. Yet in the aftermath of 9/11, significant discrimination and
numerous violent incidents were directed against Muslims and people
of Arab origin in the United States.118 In the UK, senior figures from the
UK Muslim community said Muslims were seen as ‘an enemy within’
after 9/11.119 In the Sunday Telegraph in 2004, an article by what turned
out to be British Council official Harry Cummins stated, ‘All Muslims,
like all dogs, share certain characteristics.’ Another Cummins article
stated, ‘It is the black heart of Islam, not its black face, to which millions
object.’120 The Europe correspondent on London’s The Times newspaper,
Anthony Browne, wrote that ‘Islam really does want to conquer the
world,’ adding threateningly:
In the last century some Christians justified the persecution

and mass murder of Jews by claiming that Jews wanted to take
over the world. But these fascist fantasies were based on delib-
erate lies, such as the notorious fake book The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion. Now, many in the Muslim world are open about
their desire for Islam to conquer the West.121
All this vitriol was before the suicide attacks of July 2005 by UK-based
Muslims.122 The London bombings of 7 July 2005 were quickly followed
by attacks on mosques in the UK.
The tendency to broaden the definition of the enemy is particularly
troubling in view of what we know about the ‘career trajectory’ of
several well-known terrorists and their feeling of having been rejected
by Western societies in which they live. To the extent that this rejection
is reinforced by ‘anti-terrorism’ measures, by anti-immigration rhetoric
like that of the UK’s Conservative Party or the American journalists’
jibes about ‘Londonistan’ after the July 2005 London bombings, by
suspicion of Muslims or Arabs in general, and more generally by a new
search for racial or religious ‘purity’, we can (again) expect the creation
of more terrorists.
It was not just Muslims who could be considered as internal
enemies. The ranks of the demonised sometimes expanded rapidly as
the irrationality of the original persecution led to a determination to
defend it as rational and reasonable. Those questioning the definition
of the ‘enemy’ might soon acquire that label. Fear of being deemed an
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internal enemy can help in maintaining political order and minimising

dissent – especially given the arbitrariness of the choice of enemies.
William Bennett, Reagan’s former education secretary, who wrote a
2002 book called Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism,
stated in the New York Times in March 2002:
The threats we face today are both external and internal: exter-
nal in that there are groups and states that want to attack the
United States; internal in that there are those who are attempt-
ing to use this opportunity to promulgate their agenda of
‘blame America first’. Both threats stem from either a hatred for
the American ideals of freedom and equality or a misunder-
standing of those ideas and their practice.123
Many Democrats, especially in the Senate, came to fear Bush and Rove,
who in 2002 approved advertisements showing Democratic Senators’
faces alongside bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.124 Opposition to the
Patriot Act, which expanded powers to tap phone calls and detain or
deport immigrants on the order of the attorney general, meant you
risked being depicted as unpatriotic. Journalists questioning the rush to
war with Iraq could also quickly become part of the ‘enemy’. As Mass-
ing observed, ‘Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, and the Weekly Standard,
among others, all stood ready to pounce on journalists who strayed,
branding them liberals or traitors – labels that could permanently
damage a career.’125 William Kristol wrote in the autumn of 2002 of ‘an
axis of appeasement – stretching from Riyadh to Brussels to Foggy
Bottom [the neighbourhood of the State Department in Washington]’.126
Meanwhile, Lynne Cheney, wife of Dick, played a lead role in the
American Council of Trustees and Alumni, which singled out profes-
sors who were deemed insufficiently patriotic.127 In academia, there
were moves to link federal funding with avoidance of excessive criti-
cism of US foreign policy.128 Some of the intimidatory tactics were to
come back to haunt the Bush administration. Notably, in 2005 the polit-
ically damaging ‘Plamegate’ investigation centred on who leaked the
identity of CIA agent Valerie Plame to reporters: apparently in order to
smear her husband Joseph Wilson, a critic of the build-up to war.129
In the UK after the London bombings of July 2005, politicians once
again felt free to make all kinds of statements about what the terrorists
‘want’. A frequent theme was that they want to ‘divide us’: a key impli-
cation being that criticism of government policy would hand the terror-
ists a victory. In August 2005, Tony Blair announced his intention to
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criminalise ‘the condoning, glorifying or justification’ of terrorism

anywhere in the world – a dangerously broad formulation that threat-
ens freedom of speech and would not perhaps be good news for Tony’s
wife Cherie, who once said at the launch of an appeal by a Palestinian
medical charity, ‘As long as young people feel they have got no hope
but to blow themselves up, you are never going to make progress.’130 In
a particularly daft move, Home Secretary Charles Clarke said he was
preparing a list of earlier terrorist acts the celebration of which would
be a criminal act, with Ireland hastily mentioned as exempt.
Arthur Miller, author of The Crucible, noted that there was a horrible
logic to the Salem witch-hunts in North America. The Bible had noted
the existence of witches. So if you said there were no witches, you were
denying the teachings of the bible, proof in itself that you were a witch
and should be killed. Today too, it seems, if you reject the concept of
‘evil’ as an explanation (in particular for 9/11), that may be taken as
proof you are in the Devil’s company. This mechanism tends to ‘lock’
public discussion into a permanent lack of understanding. As Joan
Didion put it, ‘Inquiry into the nature of the enemy we faced … was to
be interpreted as sympathy for that enemy.’131
Even neutrality was increasingly construed as dangerous.
Commenting on Argentina’s Dirty War in the 1970s, Antonius Robben
argued that both the military and the guerrillas had a kind of fear of the
neutral.132 Those who refused to take sides were often attacked,
verbally or physically. Robben explained:
The indifferent, the timid and the frightened did not constitute
a military or political threat but a conceptual and moral threat,
a threat to the oppositional meaning of enmity and the partisan
morality it entailed. They showed that the violence was not
inevitable but a product of human choice and making.
If the ‘inevitability’ of violence was key to legimitising and securing

support for it (Chapter 7), it follows that anyone challenging this
inevitability would be seen as a threat. In the UK, the dispute between
the British Broadcasting Corporation (the BBC) and the UK govern-
ment showed precisely how neutrality could become a threat. Widen-
ing the circle of enemies to include the BBC itself helped ward off
shame and offered a useful distraction from the UK government’s
dishonesty. It was also simple bullying: Richard Sambrook, the BBC’s
Director of News, said, ‘It is our firm view that No 10 tried to intimi-
date the BBC with its reporting of events leading up the war and
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during the course of the war itself’.133 BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan
was pilloried for suggesting (accurately) that the government knew
that weapons of mass destruction could not be launched within 45
minutes, while the attack on Gilligan focused on relatively small
details like his calling UK civil servant and weapons expert David
Kelly a member of the intelligence service and Gilligan’s decision not
to script his live broadcast.134 One letter to the Guardian newspaper
summed up the government’s double-standard well, ‘[Director of
communications] Alastair Campbell expects the BBC to have a higher
level of evidence before running a story than he expects the govern-
ment to have before running a war.’135 A government less sensitive to
criticism might actually have been happy with the BBC: according to
a Cardiff University study, the BBC was using a relatively high
proportion of coalition government or military sources, compared
with other TV channels, and was placing less emphasis on Iraqi casu-
alties.136 The vilification of Andrew Gilligan and the shaming and
naming of David Kelly showed that the appetite for witch-hunts – for
an easy target that would deflect criticism and avoid self-reflection –
was almost infinitely extendable. Even the Hutton enquiry (into
Kelly’s death) was in many ways a distraction from the central issue
of the dishonest rush to war with Iraq. In the United States,
scapegoating of the CIA helped take some of the heat off Bush.137
Lapsed allies
Any international actor questioning the dominant analysis or the

favoured ‘solution’ was quickly labelled as a betrayer. US anger at
Russia, Germany and (especially) France was intense. The attitude of
France, Germany and Russia was characterised by Condoleezza Rice as
‘non-nein-nyet’ (subtext: these people do not even speak English).
Many in Washington saw German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder as
having won his re-election in September 2002 by cynically exploiting
anti-Americanism.138 As for the hostility to France, renaming French
fries as ‘freedom fries’ was just one manifestation. The New York Post
ran a front-page picture of a cemetery for US soldiers who died in
France in the Second World War, accompanied by the line, ‘Sacrifice:
They died for France but France has forgotten.’139 In an article making
the astonishing plea that France be removed from the UN Security
Council, self-styled liberal Thomas Friedman wrote, ‘if America didn’t
exist and Europe had to rely on France, most Europeans today would
be speaking either German or Russian’.140
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In an Orwellian manoeuvre, countries urging military restraint were

blamed for causing the war. On the eve of the Iraq war, Blair said, ‘The
bottom line has to be that a strong, united message to Baghdad from the
rest of the world means peace. A weak message means war.’141 This line
was echoed by Thomas Friedman, with the added bonus of infantilis-
ing France, ‘The only possible way to coerce Saddam into compliance –
without a war – is for the whole world to line up shoulder-to-shoulder
against his misbehaviour, without any gaps, but France, as they say in
kindergarten, does not play well with the others.’142 Anti-French feeling
proved persistent: as late as September 2004, rogue Democratic senator
Zell Miller made a speech at the Republican convention in which he
claimed that Kerry would take his orders from Paris.143
Civilians in targeted countries
In other contexts, military factions have frequently seen civilians as

disloyal and ungrateful – and also as a threat to the fighters’ own security.
Naturally, the escalating abuse of civilians tends to produce further disil-
lusionment among the civilians, and the cycle may be renewed and deep-
ened. Anger and fear have frequently fed off each other. For example, in
the civil war in Sierra Leone, the violence of rebels and government
soldiers was explicable in part through their economic agendas, but my
own investigations (and the very extremity of the violence) also pointed
to the importance of more emotional factors, in particular, a shared hostil-
ity towards civilians among the fighters, hostility that grew much more
intense when civilians began to show their ‘ingratitude’ by ‘pointing the
finger’ at rebel or soldier abuse and greed. Thus, fighters’ sense of them-
selves as moral actors actually fed into their anger and abuse, and civilian
condemnation of fighters tended to exacerbate the violence. This process
relates closely to a phenomenon observed by psychiatrist James Gilligan:
that individuals’ sense of themselves as moral actors can feed into aggres-
sion as they violently ward off shame. One Sierra Leonean human-rights
worker commented, ‘When we realised it was a war against civilians, the
rebels became our enemies. And because the civilians now condemned
them, they actually turned [all the more] on the civilians.’ Significantly,
the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone frequently committed atrocities while forc-
ing their victims’ relatives to applaud the abuse – as if the rebels were
forcing recognition of their new role as ‘big men’ and removing any sense
of shame from their immediate environment.
The bitter civil war in Guatemala also showed how shame arising
from violence could feed into further violence, and how condemnation
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could widen the circle of enemies. For example, Judith Zur’s work on
war widows in Guatemala demonstrated that the leaders of the abusive
civil patrol militias have tended to harbour a strong fear of women’s
words (and the words of war widows in particular). These militia lead-
ers have feared ridicule, laughter, physical retribution and legal retri-
bution. All this has fed into continuing violence, particularly against
women. Attempts to redistribute shame from victim to perpetrator – for
example, in ceremonies designed to re-humanise the victims of violence
– have sometimes pushed the perpetrators into vicious retaliation, or
mental breakdown.144
In the case of Iraq in particular, the circle of enemies tended also to
widen to include many Iraqi civilians, and again avoidance of shame
was an important mechanism. The habit of separating the evil people
from ‘the rest of us’ seems to have helped create a state of perpetual
shock when those being saved from evil failed to show the anticipated
gratitude towards the self-declared ‘good guys’. This mirrored patterns
in the Vietnam war.145 In Washington and London, politicians, soldiers
and foreign affairs experts had been predicting for months that the
capture or killing of Saddam would calm the conflict. Analysts thought
the killing of Saddam’s sons, Uday and Qusay, would weaken the
insurgency, but it grew stronger.146 Also (wrongly) predicted to mark
the retreat of insurgency was the creation of the interim Iyad Allawi
regime in June 2004, and then national elections in January 2005.147
In Iraq, many US soldiers, targeted in guerrilla attacks, seemed unable
to understand why so many Iraqis were so angry.148 Was this not a fight
against evil, after all? Fearful and angry, US soldiers have sometimes
drawn little distinction between enemy combatants and civilians.149
Sunday Times reporter Mark Franchetti quoted US Corporal Ryan Dupre,
‘The Iraqis are a sick people and we are the chemotherapy. I am starting
to hate this country. Wait till I get hold of a friggin’ Iraqi. No, I won’t get
hold of one. I’ll just kill him.’150 A senior Defense Department civilian
commented in mid-2000, ‘Too many of our soldiers out there are begin-
ning to hate the Iraqis.’151 Soldiers’ disillusionment was mirrored among
some soldiers’ families. In Hinesville, Georgia, where the Third Infantry
Division has its home-base, there has been anger that soldiers’ sacrifices
have not been more vociferously recognised by the intended bene-
ficiaries.152 One woman had a husband driving a truck for this division,
which had so far lost 35 soldiers. She commented, ‘I thought they [the
Iraqis] would be more enthusiastic, I mean, who wouldn’t want to live
like Americans, to live in democracy, to send your children to school? I’m
surprised how naïve the Iraqis are.’153
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For the US military, the shame arising from opposition to occupation

could be warded off by blaming ‘terrorists’, Saddam loyalists or exter-
nal infiltrators.154 Another label for those opposing the occupation was
‘anti-Iraqi forces’ (a phrase echoed by CNN).155 But widespread and
persistent resistance repeatedly undermined the attempt to dissociate
opposition from civilians. Extreme sensitivity to criticism by Iraqis was
illustrated when Paul Bremer, then head of the US-led authority in Iraq,
issued a decree in June 2003 outlawing any ‘gatherings, pronounce-
ments or publications’ that called for opposition to the US occupa-
tion.156 Within Iraq, media control could be particularly blatant and
violent, as when US troops raided the news HQ of SCIRI (Supreme
Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq). For the US soldiers them-
selves, anger at locals’ ingratitude seems to have combined danger-
ously with a sense – again, familiar from Vietnam and many other
conflicts including Sierra Leone – that soldiers’ military and political
superiors had let them down.157 Once you start to kill civilians, more-
over, a new and damaging dynamic commonly kicks in. Omer Bartov,
in his book Hitler’s Army, pointed to the demand for racist propaganda
at the Russian front – notably to remove the shame for atrocities already
committed. Jonathan Glover quotes a Russian soldier who had attacked
civilians with grenades in Afghanistan, ‘You have to find some kind of
justification to stop yourself going mad.’158
Conclusion
Shame may work in mysterious ways. As American writer Naomi Wolf

put it:
We were willing to be held in contempt by those effeminate

Frogs – by ‘old Europe’ – when we were intoxicated with
ourselves; our isolationism made that easy. But now [after
Hurricane Katrina in particular] we are actually ashamed of
ourselves at home, we can’t bear international contempt in the
same way. Now it hurts.159
Before that self-reflection, shame could be dealt with be redefining the

enemy. It is sometimes said that Bush retaliated for 9/11 by attacking
Afghanistan and Iraq. This is true, but does not get us very far. We need
to understand the overwhelming threat of shame that was created by
9/11 and then exacerbated by the violent reaction to 9/11. This helps us
to understand the proliferation of enemies – and notably the abuses
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against civilians – in the counter-terror; it helps to explain the progres-

sive narrowing of confidantes; and most importantly, it helps to explain
the strongly arbitrary element in the choice of targets in the ‘counter-
terror’. Given the importance of reversing powerlessness and shame
(as opposed to ‘winning’), the priority has been to attack demonised
targets that cannot hit back and to suppress any opposition to this
deluded project. This brings us to a further reason why we need to
understand the centrality of shame: if reversing powerlessness and
shame has been a key motivation for the United States and its allies, it
is also going to be a key motivation for those incensed by these attacks.
Nor are they likely to be any more discriminating in their choice of
targets, since they too are indifferent to (and often actively in favour of)
incensing their opponents.
Much of the discussion of the war on terror can be divided into those
who see the United States, the United Kingdom and their respective mili-
taries as having good intentions (marred by some errors and occasional
abuses) and those who perceive bad intentions (leading to wholesale
abuses). However, if James Gilligan is right that extreme violence is
linked to a desire to maintain ‘respect’, then a heightened sense of one’s
own moral mission may lead to intensified violence when this source of
self-respect is threatened.
Blair’s New Labour has proven a natural ally for the Bush project of
bullying approval while warding off shame with renewed aggression.
First, New Labour has always been wary of being considered ‘weak on
defence’, particularly since former Labour leaders Neil Kinnock and
Michael Foot were vilified for more radical stands (for example, on
nuclear weapons). Second, from the outset of Bush’s presidency, Blair –
who had after all built his reputation on selling Labour as safe and
fiscally conservative – was determined to prove he could get along with
a Republican president just as he had with the Democrat Clinton.160
Third, New Labour’s ‘win/win’ ideology suggested that you could
(magically) help the poorer people without increasing taxes on the
richer people, and this belief system (assisted by economic growth, it
should be said) has sat very comfortably with the ‘win/win’ ideology
of a ‘no-new-taxes, minimal casualties war’ that ostensibly allows you
to promote human rights and justice at negligible cost to yourself or
others. Fourth, New Labour has consistently stressed a need for
punishment and deterrence in relation to domestic law and order. It
proclaimed the need to be ‘tough on crime, and tough on the causes of
crime’, and this translated fairly readily into ‘tough on terrorism, and
tough on the causes of terrorism’ (though the latter, especially the
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Israel/Palestine issue was generally sidelined by Bush). Fifth, New

Labour has a distinct bullying tendency: it was designed to win and its
leadership came to power with a view that the war against the Tories
justified the strict internal discipline and bullying of errant MPs. It is
not hard to see how the Iraqi debacle might have been encouraged by
a long-standing New Labour view that winning was all-important, that
intimidation was a legitimate means to an end, and that victory would
itself justify all the compromises made along the way. Sensitivity to crit-
icism has always been a prominent feature of the Blair governments,
and Blair and Campbell were used to playing ‘good cop, bad cop’. Sixth
(and related to the concern with winning), the importance attached to
media manipulation and spin – so important in drumming up some
degree of support for the Iraq war – has been evident in New Labour
from the outset. In many ways, this was a reaction to the prominent role
of the press in undermining Labour leader Neil Kinnock in the 1992
elections. The orchestration of support for war was only the most
extreme and immoral example. Finally, across a range of policy areas,
Blair has focused on results and delivery, rather than process. But as
Michael Quinlan notes, process is thoroughness, consultation, co-
ownership, legitimacy – and it often has a big influence on outcomes.161
Even as British support helped minimise American shame, the
shame of the British was minimised by a traditional sense of superi-
ority to ‘Uncle Sam’. For many Britons, the alliance with the United
States offered not just the warm glow of American approval but also
the chance to minimise shame by contrasting British with American
behaviour. As columnist Jackie Ashley observed, the British media
repeatedly portrayed British troops in Iraq as much smarter than the
Americans, forever going on walkabouts among the Iraqi people – in
contrast to the trigger-happy US cowboys cowering inside their
armoured vehicles. As one British officer put it, ‘Unlike the Ameri-
cans, we took our helmets and sunglasses off and looked at the Iraqis
eye to eye.’162 In the British stance, we can see two classic strains of
shame-avoidance. First, we were only obeying orders (from our
leaders, the Americans). Second, we did not entirely approve of these
instructions and did our best to reduce the damage. As sociologist
Stanley Cohen stresses, contradictory justifications for violence can
often exist side by side.163
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10 Culture and Magic

Counterproductive counter-terror cannot be explained simply by
focusing on key individuals like Bush and Blair. This simplistic
approach risks a new kind of scapegoating, and it may yet be that US
conservatism will turn on Bush (battered by Hurricane Katrina and
an array of other scandals) in a bid to keep right-wing politics on the
road.1 It is stressed here that the US-led response to 9/11 – and espe-
cially the ‘magical thinking’ it involved – did not come out of
nowhere. It sprang from forces and traditions that would help to
shape a Democrat administration, and not just a Republican one.2
This chapter sketches some of the historical, cultural and intellectual
context in which the madness of a ‘war on terror’ became (for some)
a plausible and even respectable idea. A country does not necessarily
react to attack by targeting a foreign enemy or by accepting its own
government’s attribution of responsibility. Consider Spain. The
March 2004 Madrid bombings took place on the eve of Spain’s
general election, and the Spanish government’s hasty suggestion that
ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), the Basque terrorist group, was
behind the attacks went down very badly with most of the Spanish
electorate, who turned on their own government, with many
Spaniards accusing Prime Minister Aznar of having brought the
terror to Madrid by supporting the Iraq war.
US history and sense of mission
The idea of America’s special calling to remake the world has proved
persistent ever since the country’s inception and Tom Paine’s eloquent
1776 rant against tyranny, Common Sense, in which he declared, ‘We have
it in our power to begin the world over again’.3 The origins of the present-
day United States of America were intertwined with the idea of ‘manifest
destiny’: the belief that the United States had a divinely-inspired mission
to expand served as an ideological justification for annexation of Texas,
California and Oregon as well as the accelerated destruction of Native
American peoples. Going into the Great War in 1917, President Woodrow
Wilson famously proclaimed:
I believe that God planted in us the vision of liberty. … I cannot

be deprived of the hope that we are chosen, and prominently
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C U LT U R E AND MAGIC
chosen, to show the nations of the world how they shall walk
in the paths of liberty.4
While the American isolationist tradition is not to be underestimated,

the idea that the United States has a calling to re-fashion the world still
has great force and energy, helping to underpin the neo-conservative
project of spreading democracy around the world (and around the
Middle East in particular). Victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold
War seems to have fed the expectation that America could spread its
version of democracy and capitalism around the globe.5 In 2004, one
neo-conservative theorist, Michael Ledeen, expressed the way an old
anti-tyranny reflex was being harnessed to a new security agenda,
‘Down with tyranny. … We think that America is better off in a world
primarily populated with free countries. … We think that if the whole
world were like that, then we would be much more secure.’6 Across the
Atlantic, Tony Blair also seems to have picked up on some of the Tom
Paine spirit – for example, when he declared in the wake of 9/11, ‘Let
us re-order this world around us.’7
American idealism and optimism have often existed alongside a
degree of paranoia and racism, something that seems to have fed into the
current proliferation of enemies and the indiscriminate nature of retalia-
tion. (Proceeding from 9/11 to Iraq surely reflects, at some level, the idea
that ‘they are all Arabs’.8) Introducing his own play, The Crucible, the late
Arthur Miller suggested that the paranoia of witch-hunts in Salem in
seventeenth-century North America was difficult to separate from a feel-
ing among settlers, themselves fleeing religious persecution, that they
were living on the edge of chaos and that they were surrounded by
threatening forces in the form of the Godless Indians in the encircling
forests. When the ‘chosen people’ expanded westwards, they did so
under the cover and comfort of an ideology that viewed those outside
this community as less than fully human.9 Richard Hofstadter has noted
an enduring paranoid style in American politics, the habit of seeing a
conspiratorial network (Catholics or Freemasons in an earlier era) which
promotes evil.10 This was the context for the view that the Soviet Union
was an ‘Evil Empire’ as well as for Joe McCarthy’s ‘witch-hunt’ against
the Communist ‘fifth column’ within the United States. Rooting out evil
continues to be a major preoccupation among many Americans, espe-
cially among the religious. A Time magazine poll that found 53 per cent
of Americans ‘expect the imminent return of Jesus Christ, accompanied
by the fulfilment of biblical prophecies concerning the cataclysmic
destruction of all that is wicked’.11
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Alongside the isolationism that has traditionally tempered the US

sense of mission has been a tradition of anti-imperialism that goes
back to the war for independence from Britain and that later informed
US encouragement for European powers to shed their empires. A
related tradition – still alive and well among many that Bush does not
speak for – emphasises that hostility to tyranny should also embrace
hostility towards American tyranny. Unfortunately, the new American
imperialism seems to have combined with the old ‘anti-imperial’
tradition to encourage a neglect of the importance of winning ‘hearts
and minds’. The United States has not acquired any detailed knowl-
edge of the ‘hearts and minds’ problem from any direct experience of
running an empire. Moreover, British knowledge about the best way
to deal with resistance and terror (for example, in relation to Northern
Ireland) is seen by some American colleagues as tainted by colonial-
ism, according to a senior British official in Iraq; in this sense, it is
‘dirty knowledge’.
Also informing the ‘war on terror’ has been an anti-intellectual
tradition in the United States, something that has fed the retreat from
evidence-based thinking. George W. Bush himself has a strong anti-
intellectual streak,12 and this has sometimes been a political asset. In
late 2002, Mark McKinnon, a long-time media adviser to Bush, railed
against writer Ron Suskind and his fellow intellectuals on the east and
west coasts of America, arguing that portraying Bush as a fool was
itself quite foolish. Referring to the ‘big wide middle of America, busy
working people who don’t read the New York Times’, McKinnon said:
They like the way he [Bush] walks and the way he points, the
way he exudes confidence. They have faith in him. And when
you attack him for his malaprops, his jumbled syntax, it’s good
for us. Because you know what those folks don’t like? They
don’t like you!13
In his study of Kansas, Thomas Frank observes, ‘Anti-intellectualism is

one of the grand unifying themes of the [conservative] backlash, the
mutant strain of class war that underpins so many of Kansas’s other-
wise random-seeming grievances.’.4 An early 2004 TV commercial by
the conservative Club for Growth advised Democrat candidate
Howard Dean, former Governor of Vermont to ‘take his tax-hiking,
government-expanding, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving,
New York Times-reading, body-piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing
freak show back to Vermont, where it belongs’.15 Kerry himself was
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portrayed as a rich, aloof and insincere east coast intellectual.16 Hostil-

ity to city-dwellers can be part of this. Opposition to intellectuals
within the Republican Party in particular included opposition to those
who designed the New Deal in the 1930s. In the 1950s Joe McCarthy
targeted intellectuals who were allegedly ‘selling out’ the United States.
The most conspicuous ‘betrayal’ by intellectuals is said to have been
over Vietnam. Frank comments:
What you hear … today is that the soldiers were victimized by

betrayal, first by liberals in government and then by the anti-
war movement. … The mistake wasn’t taking the wrong side in
the wrong war; it was letting those intellectuals – now trans-
formed from cold corporate titans into a treasonable liberal
elite – keep us from prevailing, from unleashing sufficient
lethality on the Vietnamese countryside. Conservatives like
Barry Goldwater made this argument at the time, of course, but
it took decades for the idea to win the sort of mainstream
audience it has today.17
A kind of cult of individualism makes Bush’s unilateralism seem more

normal and more acceptable. Bush has many times been condemned as
a ‘cowboy’ but seems to revel in the image. A common storyline in West-
erns is for a lone cowboy to take the law into his own hands when the
law-abiding sheriff is too weak to sort out the bad guys.18 We see more
modern versions of this theme in films such as the Dirty Harry series star-
ring Clint Eastwood as well as Sylvester Stallone movies such as Cobra
and the Rambo trilogy.19 It is not hard to see how seamlessly the UN can
step into the archetype of a pseudo-protector too constrained by laws
and red-tape to be of any real use. Nor is it difficult to see how Bush and
his sidekick may fit into the lexicon of buddy movies: any takers for Bush
Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, or the Lone Ranger and Tonytoo? In contem-
porary movies and TV series, the torturer as hero has become
disturbingly common, with 24 helping to blaze the trail.20 As many
observers have pointed out, it is increasingly hard to draw the line
between Hollywood entertainment and US politics. No surprise, then,
that in the wake of film-star-turned-president Ronald Reagan came the
heavy footfall of ‘The Governator’: film-star-turned-governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger (‘he’s back, and this time it’s political’) promising to
‘terminate’ everything from the state deficit to the energy crisis. Norman
Mailer wrote that Bush may ‘sense better than anyone how a war with
Iraq will satisfy our addiction to living with adventure on TV’.21
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Magic, consumerism and advertising
The magical thinking in the ‘war on terror’ is easier to understand if we

remember the magical thinking that underpins consumerism and
advertising. Some 22 minutes out of every hour on US TV are given
over to advertising.22 People are used to being sold things on the prom-
ise of nirvana if they only succumb. The process can be extended –
remarkably smoothly, in many ways – to selling (and buying) a war.
Bush administration officials have sometimes been very frank about
the need to sell the ‘war on terror’. Andy Card, Bush’s chief of staff,
said Congress had not been asked in August 2002 to authorise military
force in Iraq because, ‘From a marketing point of view, you don’t intro-
duce new products in August.’23 When Colin Powell appointed a Madi-
son Avenue advertising star, Charlotte Beers, as Under-Secretary of
State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, he explained on 6
September 2001, ‘I wanted one of the world’s greatest advertising
experts, because what are we doing? We’re selling. We’re selling a prod-
uct … democracy … the free enterprise system, the American value
system.’24 This was less direct than Andy Card, but one could easily
add ‘war’ to this list of goodies since war – particularly after the cata-
clysm of five days later – was a favoured way of achieving these bene-
fits.25 Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber commented, ‘Rather than
changing the way we actually relate to the people of the Middle East,
[US officials] still dream of fixing their image through some new
marketing campaign cooked up in Hollywood or Madison Avenue.’26
But what techniques do you use when selling a war? The usual rules
of advertising seem to have served just fine. The first rule is this: say it
often enough and people will believe it. Adolf Hitler had already taken
this insight into the political sphere, ‘The receptivity of the great masses
is very limited, their intelligence is small, but their power of forgetting is
enormous. … [Propaganda] must confine itself to a few points and repeat
them over and over.’27 Hitler, in fact, made the connection with commer-
cial advertising explicit, ‘All advertising, whether in the field of business
or politics, achieves success through the continuity and sustained unifor-
mity of its application.’28 While the Nazis’ pathological contempt for
ordinary people’s intelligence is clearly odious and riven with prejudice,
the points about repetition and forgetting are insightful, and Hannah
Arendt herself stressed the importance of repeating lies.29 After 9/11, US
government officials repeatedly stressed the links between Iraq and 9/11,
and we have seen how this manoeuvre was largely believed by some
two-thirds of Americans. Bush repeatedly linked bin Laden and Saddam
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Hussein in the same breath, though he was pretty tricky in the exact
wording, suggesting he knew it was an artful lie.30
A second rule of advertising is: find some memorable catch-phrases.
After Bush introduced the phrase ‘axis of evil’ in a January 2002 speech,
Bob Woodward reports, ‘[Paul] Wolfowitz saw once again how impor-
tant it was to grab the headlines, and he was reminded that academics
didn’t get it; oversimplification was required in a sound-bite culture.’31
When Rumsfeld mentioned the concept of ‘shock and awe’, Bush said
it was a catchy notion. (He also wondered if it might be a ‘gimmick’,
but it was adopted nonetheless.)32
A third rule of advertising is pretty obvious: promise big benefits
from your product. Advertising has always been about wish-fulfilment:
a pervasive and powerful kind of magical thinking. Typically, the prod-
uct is portrayed as possessing magical qualities that will bring you
love, sex, respect, security or some combination of these. Raymond
Williams argued that the problem with consumer society is not that we
are too materialistic, but that we are not materialistic enough; if we
were sensibly materialistic, if we confined our interest to the usefulness
of objects, we would find most advertising to be of insane irrelevance.33
Promising big benefits means selling not just the product but the
deficit it purports to fill. To sell the toilet-cleaner, in other words, you have
to sell the germs. When it comes to selling the ‘war on terror’, you have to
sell the threat. Of course, elements of the threat cannot be doubted: 9/11
was a horrifying fact. But the threat from Iraq in particular was greatly
exaggerated.
Increasingly, the wish fulfilled in ads is the wish to get rid of people.
The product is chosen in preference to the person, while the ad portrays
the superiority and desirability of things over people.34 (We have not
yet had an ad inviting us to choose liberation at the expense of the liber-
ated – or at least the invitation has not been explicit.) This advertising
trend is in line with countless reality TV programmes centring on rejec-
tion: for example, the Big Brother format of ‘who stays, who goes? – you
decide’. The fantasy – in the ads, in the reality shows, and to some
extent in the ‘war on terror’ – is one of power and control. You decide.
You can choose – of course, on the basis of a closely edited version of
‘reality’ – to get rid of the bad or annoying people. Let’s vote Saddam
out of the house!
A fourth rule in advertising is also very basic: you stress that the
product will not cost much. Bush underlined this promise in the case of
the ‘war on terror’ by pushing through tax-cuts in the run-up to war.
Indeed, the belief that major foreign and domestic problems can be
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magically solved without raising significant new taxes is something

that seems to have united the Republican Bush and Labour’s Blair.
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz said oil money and allies would minimise the
financial burden on Americans.35 Wolfowitz told Congress, ‘There is a
lot of money to pay for this [the Iraq war]. It doesn’t have to be US
taxpayer money. We are talking about a country that can finance its
own reconstruction and relatively soon.’36 On top of this, the cost of the
continuing occupation of Iraq was disguised by US officials claiming it
could not be built into the budget for Congressional approval – because
it was ‘not knowable’.37 (Add that, then, to Rumsfeld’s list of ‘known
unknowns’, or perhaps ‘unknown unknowns’.) UN chief weapons
inspector Hans Blix estimated the cost of going to war at $80 billion a
year (and of the previous containment at only $80 million a year).38 By
mid-2005, the Iraq war had actually cost about $300 billion (over and
above the annual $400 billion Pentagon budget), plus tens of billions of
dollars for the botched reconstruction.39 Promising low costs also
included promising low troop commitments and low casualties
(notably, on ‘our side’), the latter reflecting the emphasis on technolog-
ical ‘advances’ like Cruise missiles. Rumsfeld in particular promoted
the idea of quick and relatively costless military solutions. Once again,
this deceptive brand of magic hardly bears scrutiny. The size of the
invasion force for Iraq was around three times what Rumsfeld had
wanted six months prior to the invasion.40 As for casualties, we know
they have been high on both sides. Death and war are blood brothers
who do not wish to be separated: what was supposed to be ‘a new kind
of war’ turned out to be a pretty old kind in many ways, with tanks
very prominent.41 Meanwhile, the idea that casualties ‘over there’ will
not be matched by casualties ‘over here’ has been challenged – and
made to look like another variation of magical thinking – by terrorists
in Madrid, London and elsewhere.
All these marketing techniques are fine and well, but the essential
dishonesty of advertising presents a potential problem, whether in the
sphere of consumerism or war. How can consumerism, for example,
sustain itself in the face of a reasonably consistent and persistent failure
to bring happiness by means of a new skirt, car, deodorant, floor-
cleaner or whatever? Crucially, in the capitalist system, the dissatisfac-
tion arising from the false promises of advertising is not so much a
problem as a solution: it creates continued demand. This is the perverse
genius of capitalism, and it was implicitly celebrated in an unusually
frank in-store 2004 campaign by London department store Selfridges,
which reminded its customers, ‘You want it, you buy it, you forget it.’
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If skilfully manipulated, frustrated desires can be encouraged to home-

in on some new product, some new promise that is also unlikely to be
fulfilled, and evidently sometimes very little shame need attach to the
whole procedure.
It is the same with the never-ending wars to ‘make us safe’ (of which
those in the ‘war on terror’ are only the latest in a long line). In 1996, the
Taliban was welcomed by Western diplomats as a relatively palatable
and pliable alternative to the warlords terrorising Afghanistan. But this
was soon forgotten as al-Qaida moved centre-stage and the Taliban was
increasingly seen as a key backer. The toppling of the Taliban was not an
initial aim of the US-led war; the stated purpose was to bring justice to
those responsible for 9/11 and eliminate their bases. But again this was
quickly pushed aside.42 The 2001 attacks on Afghanistan did not bring
peace, either there or in the wider world. Again, this was not necessarily
a problem so long as the TV crews disappeared and some new crisis
could be brought to Western TV screens. If the Afghan war did not get
rid of the terrorists, neither did the Iraq war. Newsflash: there are still bad
guys out there! But once again, this failing is not necessarily a problem
for selling endless war. In fact, the bizarre ‘beauty’ of the ‘war on terror’
is not only that it fails to remove the security deficit; it actively creates
demand! First, it produces new terrorists. Second, it fosters a general
sense of dread even in the West – in other words, more terror that needs
to be tackled. (As esoteric writer Richard Doyle has pointed out, waging
‘war on terror’ is waging war on an affect, ‘If you wage war on an affect,
it will become infinite’.43) Potentially, Westerners’ frustrated desire for
security can always be harnessed to some new promise, some new war,
some new threat: a Syria, Iran or North Korea. For those in search of
safety and certainty, war has both the advantages and limitations of a
drug or a piece of ‘retail therapy’: each new war we imbibe or buy into
can bring some temporary relief in the context of a general free-floating
powerlessness; but this inevitably wears off and before long you may
need another hit to make you feel better. All it requires, to keep the
dysfunctional system going, is that we quickly and obligingly forget how
badly the last ‘solution’ worked, that we erase how soon the good trip
turned to bad, that we subscribe to the new definition of evil as readily
as the media-drenched ‘proles’ of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, that we
choke off our disillusion through some new fever; in short, that we take
the Selfridges slogan and let it seduce us into supporting whatever war
is currently on offer, ‘You want it, you buy it, you forget it.’44
Rumsfeld himself happily observed of journalists, ‘they’ve got the
attention-span of gnats’,45 and TV seems to be the perfect medium here.
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A survey in the United States by a team at the University of Massachu-

setts during the 1991 Iraq war found, ‘The more TV people watched,
the less they knew. … Despite months of coverage, most people do not
know basic facts about the political situation in the Middle East, or
about the recent history of US policy towards Iraq.’46 In the run-up to
the 2003 attack on Iraq, Rupert Murdoch’s media outlets – which
included Fox News Network in the United States and some 140 tabloid
newspapers around the world – all adopted editorial positions in
favour of the war. Fox called the war ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, which
effectively pre-judged what the war was about; MSNBC soon followed
suit.47 Revealingly, the more that people watched Fox, the more likely
they were to believe Iraq had WMD and was linked to al-Qaida.48 On
top of this, at least in the case of Afghanistan, the amount of coverage
fell drastically once the immediate onslaught had passed. On NBC, CBS
and ABC, Afghanistan got 306 minutes of coverage during the war in
November 2001; in the month of March 2003, the total was just one
minute.49 The fact that conflict was continuing despite American
‘victory’ was largely lost, helping to pave the way for the next war in
Iraq (which refused to disappear so quickly from our screens). Noting
the popularity of films dealing with forgetting, Natasha Walter
observed in 2004 that many politicians seem to walk, unencumbered by
the past, in the eternal sunshine of spotless minds.50
We tend to assume that reducing the forces of the enemy is a policy
success, but this is not necessarily so. During the attack on Afghanistan
in 2001, US officials ‘admitted privately that they would soon be
running out of things to bomb – and running short of the videos that
help keep public support for the war afloat’.51 (As with music sales, a
short video can do wonders.) Bob Woodward noted, ‘[Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz said that the Taliban were getting rein-
forcements but [General Tommy] Franks [head of US Central
Command] thought that had a good news side – it would create more
targets’.52 Again, we see the warped logic that also characterises
consumerism. If the solution does not solve the problem, that can be
positive since it creates demand for the product.
And all this time, the warmongers are not simply selling the war but
also the instruments of war. For each new instalment of perpetual warfare
– not least in the ‘war on terror’ – brings a chance to advertise your high-
tech killing wares. In this sense, war is advertising.53 As with other aspects
of the ‘war on terror’, the synergy between violence and advertising finds
a mirror on ‘the other side’. Insurgents in Iraq have been routinely video-
ing their attacks – partly because it serves as propaganda on satellite TV
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channels and partly because insurgent cells operate on a freelance basis,

hiring themselves out to key al-Qaida figures with video as evidence of
their abilities.54 Martyrdom in suicide attacks has itself been described as
‘a horrendous form of advertising’, deriving its meaning from being
witnessed by the media.55
Another ‘beauty’ of consumerism is that you throw so many prod-
ucts at people at the same time that they do not know which ones to
blame for their continued sense of dissatisfaction. That helps a great
deal in the necessary business of forgetting. Some US officials had a
related understanding of the ‘war on terror’. At a meeting of the
National Security Council on 25 September 2001, Donald Rumsfeld
said, ‘Look, as part of the war on terrorism, should we be getting some-
thing going in another area, other than Afghanistan, so that success or
failure and progress isn’t measured just by Afghanistan?’56 On this
logic, the launching of one ‘product’ was necessitated by the problems
anticipated for a related brand.
The instinct for solving every problem through the lens of
consumerism goes beyond this penchant for magical thinking and the
accommodation of failure. Significantly, the fever of consumerism
intensified in the aftermath of 9/11. Whilst the US intervention in the
Second World War had led to a concerted recycling effort and to
rationing of petrol/gasoline and food, 9/11 led only to calls to US
consumers to maintain their spending as a patriotic duty: there was to
be a veritable feast at the wake.57 On 17 October 2001, Bush declared,
‘They want us to stop flying and they want us to stop buying, but this
great nation will not be intimidated by the evildoers.’58 Bush’s
expressed concern that the United States was seen as ‘too materialistic’
was clearly not to be allowed to spoil the spending spree. Consump-
tion, in some sense, was what America stood for; and large numbers of
Americans were apparently eager, moreover, to consume this vision of
America.59 The terrorists envied (and sought to destroy) America’s way
of life, we were told; only maintaining a hectic level of consumption
would prevent their ‘victory’. More generally, warfare and
consumerism were linked at an ideological level: the war for democ-
racy and freedom was also a war for free markets and consumerism,
and some warned of the disappointment and false promises that
consumerism might bring.60
Capitalism and the ‘war on terror’ not only help to sustain one another
but they also have this in common: they worship success but are nour-
ished by failure. As dutiful children of capitalism, we must pat ourselves
on the back for our high standards of living, and yet we can never admit
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that we have enough. We celebrate our economic victory (as individuals,

as ‘the West’, as ‘developed’ nations), and America’s particularly high
levels of consumption are sometimes taken as attaching a special, other-
worldly seal of approval to ‘God’s own country’. But at the same time we
are constantly reminded, every hour of every day, of what we do not have
and of all the material and physical desires (often re-defined as ‘needs’)
that remain unfulfilled. The ‘war on terror’ works in something of the
same way. We celebrate each (fleeting) military victory, which some see,
again, as attaching God’s approval to this endeavour. But we are
constantly reminded – by the government, by the police, by journalists –
of what we do not have, and all the ways in which our need for security
and certainty remain chronically unfulfilled. We are forever winning the
‘war on terror’, in other words, but we can never be allowed to feel it has
been won. One day Bush is standing aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln after
the fall of Saddam and declaring under a banner proclaiming ‘Mission
Accomplished’, ‘We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen
the turning of the tide.’61 Twelve days later, there are bombings in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, and in a special on the ‘war on terror’, Time magazine has to
break the news to its readers, ‘No, it’s not over.’62 Each terror attack serves
to remind us that we remain chronically in need of those whom we know
(but somehow keep forgetting) are making the problem worse.
In this macabre dance of officialdom and the media, victory and fail-
ure are simultaneously glorified, and each failure – in a pattern that has
long characterised humanitarian relief, for example – is redefined as both
‘need’ and ‘opportunity’. Is the doctrine of deterrence increasingly
redundant in the face of suicide attacks? Then we must renew our
commitment to it by deterring states from supporting terrorists that they
do not, in any case, support! Has the technology of the West been turned
against itself on 9/11 by attackers armed with no more than knives, box-
cutters and a willingness to die? Then we must have more technology:
more high-tech weapons, more smart weapons and drones! Are jihadi
groups angry at our meddling in the Middle East? Then we must meddle
some more! Is there, finally, a problem of over-consumption and over-
dependence on Middle Eastern oil? Then let us drive, fly and spend our
way out of trouble!
Blair’s entourage has come up its own variations on these ‘hair of
the dog’ remedies. The influential Foreign Office adviser to Blair,
Robert Cooper, suggested that a key contemporary problem was that
European empires had left a legacy of failing states that were sources of
drugs, international crime and terrorism. His solution: we need more
empires to sort it out! Cooper has a sound bite to hand; but his call for
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‘voluntary imperialism’ looks like a nonsensical label that wraps the

attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq in the cotton wool of Blairite pseudo-
consensus and obfuscation.63
While these various ‘remedies’ pander to our addictions (including
our sense of self-importance), bringing off the trick of perpetual war does
have its difficulties. For all the best endeavours of a sound-bite culture, lies
may not be forgotten overnight, and the false promise of a quick and easy
solution to the desire for security has often gone down badly in military
circles.64 Many US soldiers and relatives had the impression that taking
Baghdad would be the soldiers’ ticket home, for example. As Julian Borger
wrote in July 2003 about the home-base of the US Third Infantry Division
in the state of Georgia, ‘Hinesville feels the pain of a war that is refusing to
end as neatly as was advertised’ [my emphasis].65 The Swedish diplomat and
arms inspector Hans Blix summed up the Iraq debacle well. Noting that
US and UK governments presumably proclaimed their certainty that
weapons existed in order to get endorsement by their legislatures and by
the UN Security Council, he added that governments ‘are not just vendors
of merchandise but leaders from whom some sincerity should be asked
when they exercise their responsibility for war and peace in the world’.66
But the shrewd vendor knows something that many of us do not: his
products will not bring us the promised benefits; yet if our frustrated
desires can be managed successfully, we may want these products all the
more for that.
Intellectuals
The plea for lack of understanding
The ‘war on terror’ has an intellectual arm, and many of the most signifi-
cant contributors are ‘liberals’. Part of the problem is that those who have
attempted to understand causes have been portrayed as themselves a
cause of 9/11. A prime example is the work of Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard
law professor with a reputation for liberal stances on civil liberties. For
Dershowitz, attempting to understand and eliminate the root causes of
terrorism was ‘exactly the wrong approach’,67 and indeed helped to
explain why 9/11 happened in the first place. He argued that terrorists
were trying through terror to get attention to these ‘root causes’. Thus,
attempting to address them rewarded terrorism. ‘The real root cause of
terrorism is that it is successful – terrorists have consistently benefited
from their terrorist acts.’68 Dershowitz cited the case of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization and the acquisition of a Palestinian homeland.
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Dershowitz argued, further, that, ‘The international community – prima-

rily the European governments and the United Nations, but also, at times,
our own [US] government – made it all but inevitable that we would
experience a horrendous day like September 11, 2001.’ They did this, he
argued, by giving in to terrorist demands and recognising terrorist leaders
and causes. For Dershowitz, the sensible response to terrorism is to send
out this message, ‘we will hunt you down and destroy your capacity to
engage in terrorism’.69 The point that addressing terrorists’ demands tends
to reward their terrorism is one that cannot be lightly dismissed. What is
troubling is the wilful blindness to root causes, combined with the old
fantasy that terrorists are finite and can be physically hunted down and
destroyed. It was Ami Ayalon – head of Shabak, Israel’s General Security
Service, between 1996 and 2000 – who observed that ‘those who want
victory’ against terror without addressing underlying grievances ‘want an
unending war’.70
Chaos and double standards
A notable modern variation of ‘living on the edge of chaos’ paranoia

that seems to have informed the Salem witch-hunts was expounded in
an article by Robert Kaplan called ‘The Coming Anarchy’, which circu-
lated widely around US embassies after its publication in February
1994, just before the Rwandan genocide began in April of that year. The
article illustrates an already existing sense of threat and paranoia at the
time of the 9/11 attacks. Kaplan portrayed the global ‘threats’ of over-
population, drugs, disease and refugees as a kind of witch’s brew
threatening to spill over into a more orderly and rational Western
world. The analysis is often credited with helping to reinforce US isola-
tionism in the mid-1990s. Kaplan’s emphasis on conflict as a kind of
mindless evil fed easily into a sense of powerlessness in the face of
suffering overseas, with whole areas of the world in danger of being
dismissed as beyond help. 9/11 compounded these existing fears of
chaos and mindless violence. The perceived anarchy beyond the West
was now held by Kaplan to justify ignoring international laws and
procedures:
foreign affairs entails a separate, sadder morality than the kind

we apply in domestic policy and in our daily lives. That is
because domestically we operate under the rule of law, while
the wider world is an anarchic realm where we are forced to
take the law into our own hands.
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This analysis was echoed by Tony Blair’s adviser Robert Cooper. In 2005,
Cooper was nominated by Prospect magazine as one of the top 100 ‘public
intellectuals’ in the world, and his views throw disturbing light on what
came to pass for respectable analysis. Cooper stated in April 2002:
The postmodern world has to start to get used to double stan-

dards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and
open cooperative security. But, when dealing with old-fashioned
states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to
revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-
emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary. … Among
ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the
jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.71
In many ways, this is a restatement not only of attitudes during the

Cold War (peace and democracy at home; burning villages and backing
coups abroad) but also of the double standards institutionalised in
slave-owning democracies run by the Greeks and the Romans (and, to
a large extent, the United States pre-1865). Influential columnist and
author Robert Kagan said Cooper’s notion of an international double
standard for power would appear to lie at the heart of Blair’s global
strategy. This may sound like criticism, but Kagan intended not to bury
the British Prime Minister but to praise him, ‘give Blair credit for trying.
He is the only world leader today who really is trying to find the
synthesis of the American and European worldviews.’72 Kagan himself
argued that the United States ‘must live by a double standard’,73 and he
subtly delegitimised European concerns with international law by
suggesting that these:
reflected Europe’s military weakness – a situation reversed in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the United States had
complained that European powers were ignoring international
law and international opinion.74
Yet all this lauding of double standards represents a practical as well as

a moral error: as Evelin Lindner’s research suggests, deprivation does
not necessarily call forth violence; but when expressed ideals of equality
and dignity are violated by double-standards, violence becomes likely.
In his book Breaking the Nations, first published in 2003, Robert
Cooper (then serving as Director General of External and Politico-
Military Affairs for the Council of the European Union) noted:
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It would be irresponsible to do nothing while even one further

country acquires nuclear capability. Nor is it good enough to
wait until that country acquires the bomb. By then the costs of
military action may be too high. Hence the doctrine of preven-
tative action in the US National Security Strategy.75
Then there was a sensible note of caution, ‘If everyone adopted a

preventative doctrine the world could degenerate into chaos … as
countries tried to second-guess their neighbours and get their retalia-
tion in first’.76 But then came an outrageous resolution of the problem
of generalised chaos:
A system in which preventative action is required will be stable

only under the condition that it is dominated by a single power
or a concert of powers. The doctrine of prevention therefore
needs to be complemented by a doctrine of enduring strategic
superiority – and this is, in fact, the main theme of the US
National Security Strategy.77
In other words, because we must have the principle of pre-emption, we

need a doctrine ‘of enduring strategic superiority’. And what is the way
to maintain this superiority? Why, pre-emption of course! Such are the
circularities that kow-towing creates.
The vision of a world split between order and chaos has also been
expressed by US liberals. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman
said of the Cold War superpowers:
They represented different orders, but they both represented

order. That is now gone. Today’s world is also divided, but it is
increasingly divided between the ‘World of Order’ – anchored
by America, the EU, Russia, India, China and Japan, and joined
by scores of smaller nations – and the ‘World of Disorder’. The
World of Disorder is dominated by rogue regimes like Iraq’s
and North Korea’s and the various global terrorist networks
that feed off the troubled string of states stretching from the
Middle East to Indonesia.78
Casualties in this ‘world of disorder’ do not seem to have the same

status as those in the United States. An article in a book called Worlds in
Collision (published in September 2002) was entitled ‘Who may we
bomb?’79 It sounds like an anti-war article, but the author actually
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seems to be taking the question quite straight. (Strictly speaking, it

should be ‘whom may we bomb?’, but that seems a small point in the
circumstances.) Acknowledging that the case for bombing Iraq may be
weak, Barry Buzan argued that in a case like Afghanistan, the militari-
sation of society makes it very hard to draw a line between civilians
and soldiers, and further, that ‘Some Afghans clearly deserve the
government they got [the Taliban].’ Buzan went on to draw a parallel
with civilians in Japan and Germany who were attacked in the Second
World War and who also apparently ‘deserve[d] the government they
got’, because of governments coming to power through ‘popular revo-
lution’ or having ‘mass support’. Again, let us try to generalise this
argument. Suppose we do not like the Bush administration (and many
do not). Does that mean American civilians are legitimate targets (for
example, for terrorist attacks) because they ‘deserve the government
they got?’ Clearly, it does not. Remember that it was Mohamed Siddiq
Khan, one of the July 2005 London bombers, who made the argument
– in a video recorded before the atrocities – that civilians in the West
were ‘directly responsible’ for the deaths of Muslims when they
supported democratic governments that perpetrated atrocities.80
Leading liberal Michael Ignatieff has been chipping in with unhelp-
ful suggestions of his own. He declared, ‘Sticking too firmly to the rule
of law simply allows terrorists too much leeway to exploit our free-
doms. … To defeat evil, we may have to traffic in evils: indefinite deten-
tion of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even
pre-emptive war.’81 Electing himself as spokesman for a new consensus,
he adds, ‘everyone can see that instead of waiting for terrorists to hit us,
it makes sense to get our retaliation in first’.82 By contrast, in the last line
of a New York Times article, he proclaims, ‘We have to show ourselves
and the populations whose loyalties we seek that the rule of law is not
a mask or an illusion. It is our true nature.’83 But how exactly are we
going to do this if we recoil from ‘sticking too firmly to the rule of law’?
The kindest thing to say about this contribution is that Ignatieff is very
confused.
The ‘clash of civilisations’
Part of the intellectual context for 9/11 and its backlash has been set by
Samuel Huntington’s influential thesis of a Clash of Civilisations.84 Hunt-
ington was responding to the breakdown of the East–West division and
of the realist paradigm and also to the perceived unhelpfulness of the
chaos model; in contrast to these models, he found the essence of
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contemporary and future conflict in competing ‘civilizations’, and saw

the West as in danger of losing its place as a dominant civilization in the
face of a number of new threats, including China, Latin America and,
notably, Islam. Immigration was seen as (literally) bringing these
threats home – especially immigration from Latin America to the
United States and from Islamic countries to Europe. Meanwhile,
humanitarian interventions were seen as following ‘civilizational’ lines.
Huntington’s argument has important empirical flaws. First, civiliza-
tions are not as distinct as Huntington makes out.85 Second, one gets little
sense from Huntington of how ethnicity is a result of conflict as much as a
cause of it.86 Third, there are plenty of ‘counter-examples’ to Huntington’s
thesis on the cultural fault-lines of interventions. US-led interventions in
Bosnia and Kosovo were designed, at least in part, to help Muslims. So too,
arguably, was the intervention in Somalia. Conversely, when Muslims
have been killed in large numbers, the culprit has frequently been govern-
ments in the Arab world, as Paul Berman points out;87 of course, Saddam
Hussein himself is responsible for killing very large numbers of Muslims;
the Sudan government’s genocide against predominantly Muslim peoples
in the west of the country is another example.
Even more significant, perhaps, than these empirical flaws is the
dangerous nature of Huntington’s argument. First, the emphasis on the
ongoing and impending conflict between the West and Islam can be seen
as highly convenient for a US military establishment in search of a new
enemy in the post-Cold War era, not least to justify continued military
spending. (Some of the sources cited by Huntington on the strength of
the Islamic threat are precisely US military personnel, so there is a weird
circularity about the argument.) Second, the book climaxes with an
emphatic and intolerant rejection of multiculturalism in the United States
as the only way to keep ‘Western civilisation’ strong; Huntington’s
horror of cultural contamination is a distasteful echo of the horror
expressed by extremists in the Islamic world;88 the advocacy of cultural
‘purity’ as a route to strength and safety has distinct fascistic overtones
and clearly resonates with the views of those (from whichever strain of
fundamentalist thought) who seek a ‘moral revival’ to ward off vulnera-
bility to external and internal enemies. A third danger with Huntington’s
thesis – perhaps the most important – is that his diagnosis/prediction of
an inevitable clash between civilizations has the potential to be damag-
ingly self-fulfilling. Certainly, bin Laden has favoured this idea of a ‘clash
of civilisations’. Huntington’s orientalism has proven alarmingly seduc-
tive; his ‘West’ is an occident waiting to happen, and Bush and Blair are
helping to fulfil the prophesy.89
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Endorsing torture
Since the US-led coalition has been moving back in many ways to the
methods and the mind-set of witch-finders and inquisitors of old, it is not
surprising that it is beginning to welcome back the inquisitors’ favourite
means of securing information and compliance: torture. In one of the
more frightening tomes on terrorism and counter-terrorism, law profes-
sor Alan Dershowitz observes wistfully that ‘we could easily wipe out
international terrorism if we were not constrained by legal, moral, and
humanitarian considerations.’90 It is hard to think of a more deluded
statement. Pulling himself back from this vision of nirvana, Dershowitz
proposes ‘a series of steps that can effectively reduce the frequency and
severity of international terrorist attacks by striking an appropriate
balance between security and liberty.’91 It is here that torture raises its
ugly head. Dershowitz suggests that torture could be a justifiable
response to terrorism, giving the example of a ticking bomb where
forcibly extracting information could save the lives of large numbers of
civilians.92 He also argues that with the United States already subcon-
tracting torture to third-party states, it is better if any torture gets an offi-
cial warrant from the president of the Supreme Court; yet as Human
Rights Watch’s Executive Director Ken Roth points out:
the fact that sometimes laws are violated does not mean you
want to start legitimising the violation by getting some judge to
authorise it. If you start opening the door, making a little excep-
tion here, a little exception there, you’ve basically sent the
signal that the ends justify the means, and that’s exactly what
Osama bin Laden thinks.93
Significantly, Dershowitz scarcely considers the terrorism that torture

may precipitate.94 Sayyid Qutb, whose radical doctrines have fed into
terrorism, was himself radicalised by being tortured in an Egyptian
prison. So too was bin Laden’s longstanding professional partner
Ayman al-Zawahiri.95 Moazzam Begg, a British Muslim imprisoned at
Bagram in Afghanistan and then Guantanamo Bay, said, ‘One of the
quotes I heard people tell the guards a lot is that they weren’t terrorists
before they came in, but they certainly will be when they leave.’96 Nor,
as we have seen, is torture a reliable route to good information.
Michael Ignatieff’s suggestion that ‘coercive interrogation’ may be
necessary has been noted. As part of his argument that ‘Either we fight
evil with evil or we succumb’,97 he adds that we should be prepared to
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consider the necessity of ‘relentless – though nonphysical – interroga-

tion’ that violates human dignity when this is a ‘a lesser evil’ than
‘allowing thousands of people to die’ – a tragedy which the information
gained could supposedly prevent.98 Ignatieff goes on to say of such an
interrogation that ‘its necessity would not prevent it from remaining
wrong’.99 Ignatieff is clearly concerned to emphasise that he doesn’t like
interrogation that infringes dignity and hence he wants to hold onto the
label of ‘evil’ for such acts. However, for a leading and intelligent
liberal, he ends up in a remarkably extreme and dangerous territory:
namely that we should do evil things.
Ignatieff says he is against physical torture; but even as he seems to
close this door, he opens a window. First, ‘relentless interrogation’
seems to come pretty close, particularly when it is ‘a violation of their
dignity’ and ‘would push suspects to the limits of their psychological
endurance’.100 Second, if survival necessitates ‘fighting evil with evil’,
there is no logical reason to stop short of physical torture. Ignatieff
might feel that this is going too far, but others can easily pick up his
slogan (perhaps reassuring themselves that this has come from a lead-
ing liberal with a recent Chair in Human Rights Practice at Harvard),
and create their own definitions of just how much ‘evil’ is necessary to
‘fight evil’. Of course, the process of defining – and redefining – how
much evil is ‘necessary’ is part of the shameful story of Abu Ghraib. As
Ignatieff himself observes (and his confusion runs pretty deep on these
issues), ‘If you want to create terrorists, torture is a pretty sure way to
do so.’101
The French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault noted the
importance of changing fashions for punishment and the proper sphere
for interventions, and in particular a shift from the fashion for address-
ing the criminal’s body (for example, through torture and execution) to
working on his mind (for example, through a period of incarceration).102
Ignatieff’s and Dershowitz’s attitudes to torture (and, significantly,
torture even before a crime has taken place) suggest a new ‘respectability’
for physical, bodily solutions to the problem of international violence.
Their views here are broadly in line with the general assumption that evil
has a finite, physical embodiment that can be physically eliminated –
perhaps a natural (if immoral and counterproductive) response to the
elusiveness of the modern terrorist. In many ways, this new emphasis on
the body contrasts with the old model of deterrence, where the empha-
sis was on influencing the mind of your opponent. It also contrasts with
approaches that seek to understand how terrorists came to be what they
are. We would be wise to remember, in the midst of this new zeal for the
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tools of inquisition and authoritarian government, Foucault’s analysis of

why torture and execution originally fell out of fashion. Foucault noted
that the publicly tortured or executed criminal was being too often trans-
formed, in the eyes of the watching public, into some kind of hero, while
the government took on the aspect of a villain.103
Promising ‘humanitarian intervention’
The concept of humanitarian intervention has helped win important

support for the ‘war on terror’ from some on the left and from liberals,
including Michael Ignatieff and Paul Berman.104 Stephen Holmes points
out that in the 1990s – for example, over Bosnia and Kosovo – liberals
often lambasted the UN and were quick to point out the limitations of
acting through multi-lateralist organisations. UN failings in Rwanda in
many ways reinforced this unease and added to the sense that bolder
action should have been taken earlier, even if this meant acting unilat-
erally and on the basis of information predicting a genocide.105 These
are uncomfortable points. Certainly, when I was working on northern
Iraq for Save the Children Fund in 1993, UN-bashing was a fairly popu-
lar activity. Holmes sees the left’s championing of ‘humanitarian inter-
vention’ in the 1990s as paving the way for the Iraq war; and certainly
conservatives have often taken up the issue opportunistically. For his
part, Blair seems to have seen himself as on a humanitarian roll. John
Kampfner details the five wars in which he has been involved. First
there was the bombing of Iraq under Operation Desert Fox in 1998.
Then there was Kosovo – an earlier example of intervention to pre-
empt which also provoked. When Clinton was hesitating over ground
troops for Kosovo in 1999, Blair complained that ‘Americans are too
ready to see no need to get involved in the affairs of the rest of the
world’. His plea for humanitarian intervention was seen as seminal by
some right-wing US interventionists.106 Then there was Sierra Leone
(where some local people had made Blair feel he was single-handedly
responsible for their freedom).107 And then there was Afghanistan.
Kampfner observes that, ‘with each war, Blair’s confidence grew.’108
Finally (or perhaps not finally), there was the Iraq attack of 2003.
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11 Conclusion
The ‘war on terror’, then, is based on the false premise of a finite
number of evil individuals and their ‘state backers’ and the false
assumption that the source of the problem can be physically elimi-
nated. This damaging approach effectively reduces complex historical
processes to something akin to a crude video game in which an identi-
fiable enemy can simply be shot away. We need alternative and non-
violent models if we are to come up with less crude and less
counterproductive solutions. Even video games are not necessarily this
simple: in a game called ‘September 12’, players can blast away at
targets in an Arab village but women weep over their dead children as
more terrorists grab guns to defend their homes.1
In sport, a good rule of thumb for tacticians is this: what would my
opponent least like for me to do? This approach has evidently not
been followed in the ‘war on terror’. We have seen how the ‘war on
terror’, like many civil wars, can be better understood as a system
than a contest. Sustained by counterproductive tactics that predictably
create more terrorists, the system simultaneously yields a range of
political, economic and psychological benefits for a variety of actors,
notably those within a diverse coalition participating in the ‘counter-
terror’. As in a civil war, benefits have percolated through the system:
the political and economic benefits of the ‘war on terror’ have
accrued not only at the ‘top’ (notably, in Washington) but among a
wide range of regimes and interest groups that have collaborated (or
have appeared to collaborate) in the attempt to eliminate the desig-
nated ‘evil’. Terrorists have also pursued tactics that predictably
alienate people and reinforce opposition. This war may be endless,
but it is not aimless. Just because a particular tactic is predictably
counterproductive does not, of course, imply that all these counter-
productive effects were foreseen and wilfully embraced. Neverthe-
less, their persistence implies an accommodation to failure which is
so prolonged and so systematic that it cannot be realistically labelled
as ‘failure’ any more.
Part of the psychological function of this ‘war on terror’ is the sense
of certainty and the (fleeting) sense of security it brings. It represents a
kind of serial witch-hunt in which the rule of law and the practice of
evidence-based thinking have been largely set aside. The process is
surprisingly shameless and key US officials have sometimes boasted
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CONCLUSION
about their willingness to set law and evidence aside. As in civil

conflicts, war provides impunity for setting the law aside.2
Power, in the end, will do what it likes, and it may be quite brazen
in how it chooses its enemies and justifies its actions. In one of Jean de
La Fontaine’s fables, a wolf approaches a lamb who is drinking from a
river. ‘You are interfering with my drinking,’ the wolf says. The lamb
meekly goes to drink downstream, but the wolf is still not happy, ‘Last
year you were telling lies about me.’ The lamb points out that last year
it had not even been born. ‘Well,’ says the wolf, ‘It was you or your
brother.’ When the lamb points out that it has no brothers, the wolf
replies, ‘It must be one of you people because you never spare me –
you, your shepherds and your dogs,’ and kills the lamb. The lesson: ‘La
raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure’.3
This message that ‘might is right’ has been integral to the deployment
of ‘action-as-propaganda’ by US officials in particular, something that
has helped to secure compliance for the ‘war on terror’, notably from
large sections of the American electorate. Part of this was using punish-
ment to imply a crime and using violence to make one’s own predictions
come true (for example, through creating terrorists and through portray-
ing embodiments of international law like the UN as ‘irrelevant’).
However, the violent reaction to 9/11 – in many ways a response to
shame and humiliation – itself creates an additional threat of shame: the
killing of civilians and the deaths of Coalition soldiers always threaten to
bring shame crashing into the largely self-congratulatory world of those
who lead the ‘war on terror’. Indeed, their self-righteousness, being ill-
founded and fragile, actually redoubles the threat of shame. This shame
(whether the shame of weakness or the shame of too-much-force) has in
turn been warded off by the pursuit of moral ‘purity’ at home and
abroad, by the emphasis on evil as something external and eradicable, by
intimidating those who criticise, and by widening the circle of enemies.
Again, there are important parallels with the evolution of civil wars –
especially the way condemnation of fighters by civilians can feed into a
mutation of enemies and the targeting of civilians.
What kind of evidence would it take to convince Bush and Blair that
they are wrong? Since their position is not evidence-based, it is partic-
ularly difficult to challenge with evidence. And since it plays fast and
loose with the category of ‘enemy’, any such challenge will feel inher-
ently risky. Yet such challenges can be made; and they need to be
supplemented with an analysis of the functions that such beliefs have
served and an analysis of how these beliefs emerged and are sustained.
The mad and comforting delusions of the ‘war on terror’ have been
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nurtured and sustained by a particular history, a particular culture and

a particular intellectual climate. The old idea of ‘manifest destiny’, the
habitual hunt for the sources of ‘evil’, the view that the United States is
somehow an instrument of God: all these have fed into the ‘war on
terror’. Double-standards (legal procedures for us, torture and the law-
of-the-jungle for them; pre-emption by us, but not by them) have been
enthusiastically embraced, even by those with some previous record of
liberalism.
The ‘war on terror’ has been sold to relevant electorates – especially in
the United States – with many of the same techniques used to sell
consumer products. As with advertising and consumerism more gener-
ally, the failure to solve the problem of terror brings hidden benefits in
shoring up demand for future counter-terror. The system has seemed
almost immune to criticism: advances are held to show that ‘we’ are
winning, while setbacks show only that ‘we’ need to redouble our efforts.
Sustaining this cosy, closed system of thought and action demands noth-
ing more or less than that we in the West forget, that we erase our latent
awareness of just how destructive, useless and counterproductive our
actions have been. But we do not have to forget.
It might be hoped that with the passing of time, with the prolifera-
tion of enemies and the accumulation of evidence of rising anger in the
Muslim and Arab worlds, even devotees of the crudest Bush/Rumsfeld
mysticism will not be able to avoid some hazy realisation that their
high-tech sorcery is not providing an answer. We have seen how the old
witch-hunts of Europe and North America represented closed systems
of thought where even a denial of guilt or a denial of the existence of
witches was taken as evidence of witchery. But these persecutions were
eventually discredited, coming to appear barbaric and even ridiculous.
Part of this process, as Keith Thomas showed, was the advance of
science: notably, the advance of alternative, medical explanations for
illness. This underlines the importance of resisting the assault on
science and ‘evidence-based thinking’ that has come from large
sections of the American right-wing: the attack on evolution theory, on
stem-cell research and, most especially, on those who seek to question
the logical and empirical basis between problems and solutions in the
drive against terrorism.4 In this sense, the denigration of science needs
to be rescued from the veneration of weapons and technology; in fact,
technology without science is the worst of all worlds. The long struggle
to quell belief in witches and to advance more evidence-based expla-
nations and solutions for suffering should not be so quickly and lightly
set aside. In his classic analysis of witch-hunts, Max Gluckman noted:
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CONCLUSION
It is a witch-hunt so long as persons are blamed for misfortunes

that they are not responsible for. The hunt may, as in Africa,
temporarily resolve conflicts … [but] beliefs in magic and
witchcraft help to distract attention from the real causes of
natural misfortune. They also help to prevent men from seeing
the real nature of conflict between social allegiances. We can
only hope that it may yet be possible to run a society without
any kind of distracting obscurity.5
These sentiments could hardly be more pertinent; and just as humour

was part of what made the old witch-hunts appear increasingly ludi-
crous (for example in the writings of Voltaire),6 so too the work of
Michael Moore and other satirists has already played a valuable role.
This study has underlined that pre-emption cannot reasonably be
advocated as a principle: in other words as a mode of conduct which
one would be happy for everyone to adopt. The United States has been
named among those with a ‘right to intervene’, but any suggestion that
others might have a right to intervene in the United States or to inter-
vene in other countries in a similarly unilateral or ‘pre-emptive’
manner has been rejected as anathema. This has even included a rejec-
tion of the idea that US citizens might be held to account in an interna-
tional criminal court. Yet as David Held has noted, ‘Kant was right’; the
violent abrogation of law and justice in one place ricochets across the
world’.7 Robert Cooper’s argument that the chaos of universal pre-
emption can only be prevented by ensuring US hegemony is perverse,
craven and unsustainable.
The doctrine of unilateral pre-emption and the abuses at Guan-
tanamo, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere reflect the doctrine – influential in
parts of Latin America, for example – that only those who stay within
the law are guaranteed human rights, while the right to decide who is
worthy of rights and who is not remains with an entity (the army in
Guatemala, for example) that is partially outside the writ of the law.8
Unless there are agreed procedures for interference in national sover-
eignty, a similarly arbitrary quality extends to pre-emption and even to
‘humanitarian intervention’.
To those expressing scepticism about Bush’s warlike response to
9/11, the US president sometimes responded, in effect, ‘What would
you do?’9 One answer will be familiar to doctors: first, do no harm. The
global body politic has at least some capacity to heal itself, and ordi-
nary people have a natural revulsion against atrocities, particularly if
they are not subsequently incensed by some violent retaliation. Jason
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Burke has noted, ‘The main reason for the failure of the Islamic revolu-
tion in Algeria and Egypt was that most people wanted to have noth-
ing to do with men who mutilated and maimed innocent people.’10 As
Gandhi understood, a non-violent reaction to violence and injustice
gives people the chance to perceive and understand the original
violence, while a violent reaction tends to blind people to the original
provocation. Expanding the war on terror to embrace and legitimise all
manner of national conflicts is a major mistake. As Michael Mann notes,
‘The United States should leave alone conflicts involving national liber-
ation fighters’, including in Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines and
Indonesia. The way US actions revived jihadis in Algeria and Egypt,
who had been fading from around the mid-1990s, should be an object
lesson.11 In short, the United States should avoid actions that continue
to infuse an anti-American sentiment into diverse local grievances.
In terms of practical and useful actions that can be taken, there is
plenty to do. The currently favoured magical solutions to the problem
of terror are not only proving counterproductive; they are also – in
line with Max Gluckman’s comments on the ‘distractions’ of believing
in witchcraft – distracting attention from many of the most pressing
problems. A realistic alternative approach would be based essentially
on treating terrorists as criminals and upholding the law, both nation-
ally and internationally. At present, the label of a ‘war on terror’ feeds
into the terrorists’ propaganda, self-image and self-delusions; for
example, it makes it hard to counter the claims of London bomber
Mohamed Siddiq Khan that his actions in July 2005 were part of a
‘war’ in which civilian voters were a legitimate target. Of course, the
label of a ‘war on terror’ also legitimises violence by the United States
and its allies. Calling it a war legitimises what is often a very one-
sided violence – like calling bullfighting a sport.
Part of treating terrorism as a crime lies in integrating the struggle
against terrorism with the fight against organised crime. Criminal
networks (sometimes linked to terror networks) have learned to think
trans-nationally; yet governments responding to crime and terrorism
are often still thinking within the framework of the nation state.12
Controlling flows of funding can make a contribution.13 One pressing
practical need is for better inspection of shipping: in 2004, one report
said that only 2 per cent of ships arriving in the United States were
being physically inspected.14
Terrorist organisations like al-Qaida can be countered with the use of
informers. Finding those who will inform on suspected terrorists is
always going to be much harder in conditions where the counter-terror
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CONCLUSION
is arbitrary and abusive. Moreover, simple practical measures have often

been neglected. Intelligence expert James Bamford says the CIA never
tried to infiltrate al-Qaida, and meanwhile rivalry with the FBI in the
hunt for bin Laden led to withholding information that the CIA had
garnered overseas.15 Julian Borger reported in September 2004 that in
excess of 120,000 hours of conversations involving terror suspects since
9/11 had not been translated because the FBI lacked sufficient linguists.16
On the ground in Iraq, US commanders at Fallujah said they lacked suffi-
cient translators, and thus the ability to communicate effectively with the
local community.17
When it comes to alternative, non-violent approaches to terrorism,
Bush’s record is not a good one. He wrecked a European Union initia-
tive to contain money-laundering in tax havens favoured by terrorists.
In July 2001, Bush rejected (to British Foreign Office fury) the global
monitoring of chemical and biological weapons by independent
inspectors. The United States has opposed global weapons monitoring
and an international criminal court (also extremely relevant for dealing
with terrorism). Britain now seems too ‘polite’ even to mention these
initiatives to the United States.18
The idea that development and security should be integrated has been
gaining ground. In some ways, this is no bad thing. Aid that builds up
state services can be vital in minimising the opportunities for terror
groups; conversely, programmes of structural adjustment have often
contributed to a collapse of education, health and nutrition: in Sierra
Leone, this fed directly into the emergence of terror groups; in Pakistan,
it has helped Islamic schools to set up in a vacuum that some have used
to preach an extreme message;19 in Palestine, gaps in security and serv-
ice provision have been filled by paramilitary organisation (and 2006
election winner) Hamas.20 Conflict-resolution should be part of the drive
against terrorism, and this should include assisting failed or fragile
states. Yet the US government gives just over US$16 billion in foreign aid
– less than one-ninth of the money spent on the Iraq war and occupation
up to January 2005.21 The Iraq war has been taking away from the British
government’s anti-poverty programme in eastern Europe, Central Asia
and Latin America,22 not to mention natural disaster preparedness
worldwide (including in the United States itself).23 Peacekeeping is often
vital in conflict resolution; yet in 1994, the most expensive year in the
history of peacekeeping, the United States spent $290 on defence for
every dollar spent on UN peacekeeping.24
Aid money can also be used to improve human rights performance
in countries where terrorists have emerged – the $2 billion a year that
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Egypt has been getting from the United States offers potential for this
kind of pressure. The United States should stop propping up undemo-
cratic regimes more generally in the Middle East (notably, in Saudi
Arabia). Helping to ease this path would be reduced dependence on
Middle Eastern oil via a programme to promote energy efficiency and
developing renewable resources.
If focusing on development issues can contribute to security, there
are also major dangers in linking security and development.25 One is
that those countries considered marginal to the ‘war on terror’ may be
systematically neglected. A second is a reinvention of Cold War-style
discrimination against enemies and over-forgiveness of the sins of your
friends. A third is that NGOs, many of them heavily dependent on
government funding, may subordinate their agendas to a Western secu-
rity agenda;26 tarring NGOs with the brush of US military policy has
threatened (and cost) the lives of aid workers in Iraq and Afghanistan
and has helped to limit the humanitarian presence there.
A ‘nuclear 9/11’ is a terrifying possibility; but attacking Iraq does
not make it any less likely. A key priority should be securing Russia’s
nuclear legacy – something estimated to cost US$30 billion. There is
also a pressing need to get India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel to
join the non-proliferation treaty. Israel’s WMD (including nuclear
weapons and a chemical weapons programme) should be addressed as
a matter of urgency. There is a need to link intelligence and export
control networks with border, port and airport security to prevent
moving of nuclear materials and technology.27 One way in which
nuclear weapons could fall into extremists’ hands is through a change
of regime in Pakistan: actions that fuel extremism in Pakistan hardly
help. Ensuring moderation in Pakistan is also important in other ways.
It was a Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who was found to be
at the centre of an international black market in nuclear materials, sell-
ing nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Pakistan also
holds one of the keys to stability in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s madrassa
religious schools for the poor – funded in large part by Saudi and
American money – educated many of the Afghan refugees who went
on to form the Taliban; today, the remnants of the Taliban continue to
draw support and find shelter from fellow Pashtun inside Pakistan.
In all the thinking about arms control ‘over there’, arms control at
home should not be forgotten. Without further nuclear disarmament in
the West, many states will rebel against non-proliferation norms, seeing
a double standard.28 Gun control is also important, both in terms of
international trade and domestic sales. (An upbeat al-Qaida pamphlet
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CONCLUSION
found in Afghanistan noted that firearms training is available to the

general public in the United States. ‘Useful courses to learn are sniping,
general shooting, and other rifle courses. Handgun courses are useful
but only after you have mastered rifles.’29)
Looking seriously at the position of ethnic minorities in the West will
also be crucial. This includes an improved understanding of poverty,
exclusion and discrimination. Widespread rioting in France has under-
lined the urgency of this. After the July 2005 London bombings, senior
UK officials tended to pin responsibility for preventing a repetition on
‘the Muslim community’. Clearly, ordinary Muslims have a role to play
in preventing terrorism (as do those from other sections of the commu-
nity). But this has to be handled with sensitivity, or an existing sense of
exclusion and discrimination will be exacerbated. As Tania Loa, an
audience member at a 2005 public meeting in London, commented,
‘Whenever there is a problem with black, Asian or Muslim youth,
suddenly they become a problem of that community. When they are
winning medals, they become British. How is it that our Britishness is
so much more fragile than that of the white people?’30
When using any instrument, we need to keep in mind that these may
take on a very different aspect among those ‘on the receiving end’. Taking
seriously the autonomy of other societies and the feelings of other indi-
viduals demands an end to the current fashion for political autism. Even
when in ‘enlightened’ mode, Western policy-makers tend to see them-
selves as manipulating sticks and carrots with a view to producing a
better world: if only ‘we’ can find the right combination of bribes, sanc-
tions and bombs, then ‘we’ will make a better world. Implicitly at least,
this represents a kind of ‘playing God’ and can easily feed into resent-
ment and even terror. Sticks and carrots are for donkeys, after all, and
people on the receiving end are often aware of the indignity. People
generally wish to make their own history; they do not wish to be shaken
up, in Edward Said’s phrase, ‘like peanuts in a jar’. Manipulating punish-
ments and incentives is closely linked to behaviourist psychology: the
idea that one can manipulate people (or rats) by changing the system of
incentives under which they operate.31
The perception that you are ‘playing God’ and denigrating other
peoples is a particular problem when you yourself are not seen as a
credible example of human-rights observance. That means looking at
double standards – in pre-emption and torture, and in relation to Israel,
UN Security Council resolutions and UN Security Council member-
ship. It means that the United States and the United Kingdom in partic-
ular have to prove they are genuinely on the side of democracy and
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justice. The twentieth-century record of sustained democracy from US

military conquest or occupation is not good, and the successes in Japan
and Germany are not readily replicable.32 There are always internal
pressures for democracy, which can be built upon through funding,
encouragement and incorporation into regional structures where
democracies predominate.33 As Ronan Bennett has observed:
If the collapse of authoritarian, anti-democratic governments in

South Africa, Latin America and eastern Europe in the late 80s
and early 90s taught us anything, it is that such regimes cannot
endure. Their lifespan is limited because it is simply impossible
for even the most brutal dictator to bring all political life to a
halt.34
If Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is potentially self-

fulfilling and if action-as-propaganda threatens to shape the world in a
way that makes fascistic propaganda more and more ‘plausible’ and
‘respectable’, these processes can also be resisted. As Jonathan Steele
reported from Jordan in April 2003:
Arabs who fear a rise in Islamic fundamentalism take comfort

from the peace marches in Europe and America, the anti-war
stand of Schroder and Chirac, and the position of the Vatican.
The protests showed this was not a clash of civilisations but an
unpopular war run by a small coalition of the willing.35
The need for critical introspection is universal and not confined to ‘the
West’. The impulse to ward off shame is a major barrier to self-
understanding and a major spur to violence by many parties. This
includes a few Muslims who may, as Tariq Ramadan argued, turn to
violence to ward off the shame of having been ‘corrupted’ or contami-
nated by Western ways. There are many problems in the world – includ-
ing the Muslim world – that cannot be attributed to ‘American
imperialism’. Bhikhu Parekh, Chair of the Commission on the Future of
Multi-ethnic Britain, has argued that Muslims must ‘stop blaming the
West for all their ills’.36 Roula Khalaf, Middle East editor of the Financial
Times, has argued that Arab and Muslim countries have ‘slipped into an
easy anti-Americanism that shows little understanding of what the US is
really like as a society’.37 Edward Said refers to a sense of ‘failure and
frustration’ and ‘an Islamism built out of rote learning and the oblitera-
tion of what are perceived to be other, competitive forms of secular
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CONCLUSION
knowledge’. 38 He noted, further, that picking on the United States has

often served a function by distracting attention from faults in one’s own
society.39 The temptation to pin all blame on some external ‘evil’ is
unhelpful, from whichever quarter this impulse emanates. In an
interesting contribution that has made her predictably unpopular with
many fellow Muslims, the writer and broadcaster Irshad Manji high-
lights a number of disturbing episodes and phenomena that she says
many Muslims are anxious to forget or dismiss: the Turkish massacre of
Armenian Christians at the end of the First World War; the lack of
hospitality and settlement schemes for Palestinian refugees in many
Arab countries; the strong streaks of anti-Semitism, misogyny and homo-
phobia in some quarters of the Muslim world; and, finally, the role of
Islam in 9/11 itself. Also calling for stringent self-examination has been
the use of Islam to justify massive abuses in Sudan, a tragedy that I have
investigated at first hand.40 Manji asks provocatively, ‘What makes us
righteous and everybody else racist?’, before adding, ‘You’ll want to
assure me that what I’m describing isn’t “true” Islam. I hope you’re right
… [but] everything is wonderful as an ideal.’41
Of course, such self-examination is not helped by the attacks on Iraq
and Afghanistan. As was shown by many Americans’ reactions to 9/11
itself, the experience of being physically attacked is hardly an aid to
critical introspection. The ultimate challenge is to retain our capacity to
think for ourselves, and to resist the injunctions of those deluded and
frequently self-interested leaders who offer to do our thinking for us
and who accept civilian (and military) casualties as inevitable or even
desirable. We need an open discussion – notably on the causes of terror-
ism, which often remains a taboo area. This is particularly so in the
United States, but even in the UK many MPs are frustrated at the
constrained nature of discussions. Without a genuine debate, it is hard
to articulate a coherent alternative to the present path. The last word is
best left to the late Edward Said, who wrote that, ‘Critical thought does
not submit to commands to join in the ranks marching against one or
another approved enemy.’42
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Notes
Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, ‘One huge US jail’, Guardian Weekend,
19 March 2005.
2. Mark Duffield, ‘“Getting savages to fight barbarians”, development, secu-
rity and the colonial present’, Conflict, Development and Security, 2005, 5(2):
141–60; Clive Hall, personal communication.
3. Conetta, Strange victory, pp. 30, 33.
4. The term ‘civil war’ is adopted here, but of course many contemporary
civil conflicts – such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Afghanistan – have very significant international involvement.
5. Times Online, 3 June 2002, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-
315250,00.html.
6. George W. Bush, State of the Union address, 3 February 2005, www.white
house.gov.
7. Philip Webster, ‘Blair hints at military action after Iran’s “disgraceful”
taunt’, Times, 28 October 2005.
8. See, e.g. Foucault, Power/Knowledge.
9. Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction, p. 96.
10. Miller, Tell Me Lies, pp. 5–6.
11. I am particularly grateful here for feedback from Chris Dolan, Chris
Cramer, Teddy Brett and Laurie Nathan.
12. See also, Clay and Schaffer, Room for Manoeuvre.
13. For example, Jane Mayer, ‘Outsourcing torture’, New Yorker, 14 February
2005, www.globalpolicy.org.
14. Keen, The Benefits of Famine. We can also see this pattern in civil wars after
the Cold War (see, e.g. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone).
15. See, e.g. Keen, The Benefits of Famine; Keen, The Kurds in Iraq; Keen, Conflict
and Collusion in Sierra Leone.
Chapter 2: Fuel on the fire: predictably counterproductive tactics

in the ‘war on terror’
1. Oliver Burkeman, ‘US says it will hunt down terrorists’, Guardian, 14 May
2003.
2. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 67.
3. ibid, p. 45.
4. Singer, The President of Good and Evil, p. 2.
5. Bush famously said of bin Laden, ‘We’ll smoke him out of his cave’ (see e.g.
www.dailyherald.com). An unexceptional example of dehumanising
language from the press referred to Islamist terrorism and portrayed the
[ 220 ]
NOTES
Middle East as ‘the breeding ground for this particular brand of savagery’
(Max Boot, ‘America’s next move in the Middle East’, Sunday Times, 18 May
2003).
6. Woodward, ibid, p. 224.
7. ibid, p. 316.
8. www.state.gov/r/ (accessed in 2004).
9. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago.
10. See, e.g. Faisal Bodi, ‘Fear and loathing’, Guardian, 21 January 2003; Fuad
Nahdi, ‘From peace marches to jihad’, Guardian, 1 April 2003.
11. Bill Powell, ‘Struggle for the soul of Islam’, Time, 13 September 2004, p. 56.
12. Debate in Miami, Florida.
13. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Terror crackdown has not reduced al-Qaida threat,
warns think tank’, Guardian, 14 May 2003, citing International Institute of
Strategic Studies report, ‘Strategic Survey’ by Jonathan Stevenson,
www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,955333,00.html.
14. ibid.
15. Peter Bergen, ‘The long hunt for Osama’, Atlantic Monthly, October 2004.
16. Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy in Focus, ‘A Failed ”Transi-
tion”: The Mounting Costs of the Iraq War’, September 2004, www.global
policy.org.
17. See e.g. Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. The price of
a hand grenade at Al Kut in southern Iraq: US$1.50 (Scott Johnson, ‘Inside
an enemy cell’, Newsweek, 18 August 2003, p. 17).
18. Global Witness, ‘For a few dollars more: how al Qaeda moved into the
diamond trade’, London, April 2003, available at www.globalwitness.org.
19. Burke, Al-Qaeda; Jason Burke, ‘Who did it – and what was their motive?’,
Observer, 10 July 2005; Peter Taylor, ‘The new al-Qaida’, BBC2 TV, first
broadcast 25 July 2005.
20. James Fallows, ‘Bush’s lost year’, Atlantic Monthly, October 2004.
21. See e.g. Kean and Hamilton, The 9/11 Report. One part of this attempt was
when Washington said a Jordanian ‘bin Laden associate’, Abu Musab al-
Zargawi, had sheltered in Baghdad after fleeing the US-led coalition attack
on Afghanistan, but this man was a member of a group, al-Tauheed, set up
in competition with bin Laden. Washington stressed contacts between
Saddam’s regime and bin Laden inside Afghanistan, but while bin Laden
did send representatives to talk with an Iraqi emissary who was sent to
Afghanistan in 1998, these Iraqi overtures were rejected by bin Laden. The
Bush administration also stressed that the Iraqi militant group Ansar-al-
Islam had links with al-Qaida. This was true, but the group were based in
northern Iraq, an area not controlled by Baghdad (Jason Burke, ‘Ghost of
al-Qaeda left out of story’, Observer, 27 July 2003). The weaponry of this
group was also greatly exaggerated. US Secretary of State Colin Powell
told the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003 that Ansar al-Islam had a
‘terrorist chemicals and poisons factory’ (Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of
Mass Deception, p. 98), but Luke Harding of the Observer visited the site
three days later and found no sign of chemical weapons anywhere, just a
dilapidated collection of buildings (Luke Harding, ‘Revealed: truth behind
[ 221 ]
“poison factory” claim’, Observer, 9 February 2003). Finally, much was

made by the Bush administration of an alleged meeting between 9/11
hijacker Mohammed Atta and Iraqi officials in April 2001 in Prague. But an
FBI investigation concluded that Atta was in Virginia at the time when the
meeting was supposed to have taken place. Czech President Vaclav Havel
confirmed that there was no evidence of the meeting (Rampton and
Stauber, ibid, pp. 92–3).
22. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘A blindness that puts us all in danger’, Guardian,
23 January 2003.
23. White House press release, 17 September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/09/20030917-7.html.
24. Blix, Disarming Iraq, p. 269.
25. A large part of the dossier was lifted without attribution or consent from
an article by Ibrahim el-Marashi, an American research student.
26. David Clark, ‘Why wait for Hutton?’, Guardian, 9 January 2004.
27. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Axis of failure’, Guardian, 3 November 2004.
28. ‘Struggle for the soul of Islam’, Time, 13 September 2004, p. 5.
29. ‘Iraq war may help al-Qaida, MPs report’, Press Association, in: Guardian
Unlimited, 31 July 2003, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/
0,12956,1009806,00.html.
30. Paul Wilkinson, Royal Institute of International Affairs paper, reported in:
Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Use and abuse of intelligence’, Guardian, 19 July
2005.
31. Paul Rogers, ‘A jewel for al-Qaida’s crown’, 11 August 2005, opendemoc
racy.net. See also Gerges, The Far Enemy.
32. Paul Rogers, ibid.
33. Ewen MacAskill, ‘The suicide bomber is the smartest of smart bombs’,
Guardian, 14 July 2005.
34. Hugh Roberts, ‘North African Islamism in the blinding light of 9-11’, work-
ing paper no. 34, 2003, Crisis States Programme, www.crisisstates.com.
35. On 12 May 2003, bombings in Riyadh killed at least 34 people, and US offi-
cials said they bore all the hallmarks of al-Qaida. On 15 May, time-bombs
went off at 21 petrol stations in Karachi, Pakistan. On 16 May, suicide
bombings in Casablanca killed at least 41. Two suicide bombings in Chech-
nya left more than 70 dead (probably not the work of al-Qaida). In July 2002,
two women blew themselves up – killing at least 14 others – at a Moscow
rock festival. Bombings in Israel have been numerous, and have drawn in
perpetrators from countries as far away as Britain. On 5 August 2003, just
before the first verdict in the trials for the bombing of Bali in October 2002, the
bombing of a US-managed hotel in Jakarta killed at least 16. The explosion of
two passenger planes on the same day in August 2004, believed to be the
work of two Chechen suicide bombers, left 90 dead. The following month,
more than 300 died, mostly children, at Russia’s Beslan School Number 1.
There were bombings in Istanbul and Riyadh in November 2003. Whether
terrorist attacks are actually rising since the 1990s is a moot point (see, e.g.
Justin Lewis, ‘At the service of politicians’, Guardian, 4 August 2004). There
have also been bombings in Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Kenya and India.
[ 222 ]
NOTES
36. Hugo Young, ‘Once lost, these freedoms will be impossible to restore’,
Guardian, 11 December 2001.
37. Richard Norton-Taylor and Duncan Campbell, ‘How real is the terrorism
threat today?’ Guardian, 29 January 2005.
38. Jamie Wilson, ‘Ten al-Qaida plots foiled since 9/11’, Guardian, 7 October
2005.
39. Noam Chomsky, ‘One man’s just war is global terror’, Sunday Independent
[South Africa], 13 July 2003.
40. http://www.iraqbodycount.net/database.
41. Les Roberts, Riyadh Lafta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khudhairi and Gilbert
Burnham, ‘Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster
sample survey’, The Lancet, 29 October 2004, www.thelancet.com. The
organization ‘Iraq Body Count’ put the figure of those killed, including
through poor health and sanitation provision, at a minimum of 26,457 by
October 2005, www.iraqbodycount.net/.
42. ‘Baghdad burning’, 7 April 2004, http://riverbend.blogspot.com/.
43. ‘Sabrina Tavernise’, New York Times, 14 July 2005, www.nytimes.com.
44. CNN, ‘Forces: US and coalition casualties’, http://edition.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/.
45. Cf Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.
46. Ian Traynor and Dan De Luce, ‘UN watchdog presses Iran on nuclear
inspections’, Guardian, 16 June 2003.
47. Seumas Milne, ‘Iraqis have paid the blood price for a fraudulent war’,
Guardian, 10 April 2003.
48. Isabel Hilton, ‘Why Korea has returned to the cold’, Guardian, 11 February
2003.
49. Noam Chomsky, ‘The resort to force’ (excerpted from Hegemony or Survival,
Metropolitan Books, 2004), http://www.chomsky.info/books/hege-
mony03.htm.
50. US unilateralism in relation to Iraq compounded earlier go-it-alone poli-
cies, such as Bush’s withdrawal in 2002 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (amid fears it would impede US anti-missile defence programmes),
his pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming in the same year,
his refusal to strengthen the convention on biological weapons, and his
backing off from the International Criminal Court.
52. ibid.
53. ‘The document and what it means’, Guardian, 28 April 2005.
54. Chaloka Beyani, ‘International law and the “war on terror”’, in: Joanna
Macrae and Adele Harmer, ‘Humanitarian action and the “global war on
terror”’, HPG Report 14, Overseas Development Institute, London.
55. Geoffrey Bindman, ‘Tony Blair and the Iraq war: in the eye of the law’, 13
April 2005, opendemocracy.net.
56. Soros, The Bubble of American Supremacy, p. 59.
57. Peter W. Galbraith, ‘Iraq: Bush’s Islamic Republic’, New York Review of
Books, 11 August 2005; ICG, ‘Unmaking Iraq: a constitutional process gone
awry’, Amman/Brussels, 26 September 2005.
[ 223 ]

59. Some said the camps were mostly empty (e.g. Woodward, Bush at War, pp.
79, 174), though this is disputed (Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 73).
60. See, e.g. Clarke, Against All Enemies.
61. Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, p. 103.
62. Conetta, Strange Victory, p. 5.
63. ibid, pp. 5, 12, 32.
64. George Monbiot, ‘Dreamers and idiots’, Guardian, 11 November 2003.
66. Conetta, ibid.
67. Milan Rai (ed.), War Plan Iraq (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 37–8.
68. Conetta, ibid, p. 12
69. John Feffer, Power Trip, p. 17.
70. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The method, the means and the will: the hallmarks of
al-Qaida’, Guardian, 29 November 2002.
71. Some analysts have argued, for example, that Egyptian extremists set up in
Afghanistan precisely because they were finding Egypt an inhospitable
environment in which to operate (Martin Woollacott, ‘Al-Qaida is
spending its men and blowing its networks’, Guardian, 23 May 2003).
72. Michael Elliott, ‘Why the war on terror will never end’, Time, 26 May 2003;
Taylor, ‘The new al-Qaida’, BBC2 TV, first broadcast 25 July 2005.
73. Andrew Buncombe and Andrew Gumbel, ‘Terror cells ‘no longer need
approval’ for fresh attacks’, Independent, 31 October 2001.
warns think tank’, 14 May 2003, Guardian, citing International Institute of
Strategic Studies report, ‘Strategic Survey’ by Jonathan Stevenson.
75. Some of the local Indonesian Islamic extremists involved had originally
trained in Afghanistan.
76. Michael Elliot, ‘Why the war on terror will never end’, Time, 26 May 2003,
p. 34.
77. Kean and Hamilton, The 9/11 Report, p. 245.
78. Audrey Kurth Cronin (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Division),
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 23 May 2003.
79. William Dalrymple, ‘Murder in Karachi’, New York Review of Books, 4
December 2003, pp. 53–6.
80. Burke, al-Qaeda, p. 13.
81. ibid, p. 5.
82. Feffer, Power Trip, p. 17, cites Colum Lynch, ‘Al Qaeda is reviving, UN
report says’, Washington Post, 18 December 2002.
83. See, e.g. Daniel Cooney, ‘Fighting in Afghanistan kills 21’, AP, 12 October
2005.
84. Passage quoted in G. John Ikenberry, ‘American’s imperial ambition’,
Foreign Affairs, September–October, 2002, 81(5): 52.
85. US Department of State, 2002.
87. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘As the US lowers the nuclear threshold, debate is
stifled’, Guardian, 5 October 2005.
[ 224 ]
NOTES

89. BBC News, ‘Iraq rebellion “could last years”’, 27 June 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4625215.stm.
90. Infinite justice, of course, is no justice at all.
91. Frum and Perle, An End to Evil, p. 98.
92. ibid, p. 98.
93. ibid, pp. 137–8.
94. ibid, pp. 95–6.
95. ibid, pp. 103–4.
96. ibid, p. 102.
97. ibid, p. 104.
98. Martin Jacques, ‘Cold war, take two’, Guardian, 18 June 2005.
998. 13 March 2003, Stothard, 30 Days, p. 42.
101. See notably Singer, ibid. As Mary Kaldor notes, for Bushites, ‘sovereignty is
conditional for other states, but unconditional for the United States because
the United States represents “good”’ (Kaldor, ‘American Power’, p. 12).
102. See notably Singer, ibid, p. 187.
103. Nick Paton Walsh, ‘Putin puts £6m price on rebels’ heads’, Guardian, 9
September 2004.
104. Singer, ibid, p. 159.
105. ibid, p. 145.
106. Chomsky, War Plan Iraq, p. 24.
warns think tank’, Guardian, 14 May 2003.
109. Johanna McGeary, ‘When no one is truly safe’, Time, 1 December 2003, p.
55.
110. Mann, Incoherent Empire, p. 188. One report to Congress said estimates for
those trained in Afghanistan and Sudan ranged from 20,000 to 60,000
(Cronin, Report for Congress, ibid).
111. Joe Cochrane, ‘Illusion of security’, Newsweek, 18 August 2003, p. 21.
p. 34.
113. Cf Keen, The Benefits of Famine.
114. Simon Hoggard, ‘Clowning around with “socialism” in the States’,
115. US Department of State, 2002, ‘The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America’, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/
secstrat.htm. Cf also Bush’s statement that ‘our responsibility to history’ is
to rid the world of evil.
116. Andrew Sparrow and Toby Harndon, ‘History will forgive the war on Iraq,
Blair tells us’, Daily Telegraph, 1 October 2005, www.telegraph.co.uk.
117. Clare Short, ‘How Tony used me to offer Gordon a deal’, Independent, 22
October 2004.
118. Thomas Friedman, ‘Smoking or non-smoking’, 14 September 2001,
Longitudes and Attitudes, p. 37.
[ 225 ]
119. CNN.com, ‘You are either with us or against us’, 6 November 2001, http://
archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/.
121. Jonathan Steele, ‘Do Americans care for any casualties but their own?’,
Guardian, 20 May 2002.
122. Conetta, ibid, p. 38.
123. Marc Herold, n.d., ‘A dossier on civilian victims of United States aerial
bombing of Afghanistan’, www.cursor.org/sotries/civilian_deaths.htm.
125. There were some 90 sorties a day during the second week of the campaign
(Conetta, ibid).
126. Romesh Ratnesar, ‘The new rules of engagement’, Time, 5 November 2001.
127. Mann, Incoherent Empire, p. 132.
128. Turton, David and Peter Marsden, ‘Taking refugees for a ride? The politics
of refugee return to Afghanistan’, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit (Kabul, December 2002), pp. 1–2.
129. David Jones, ‘Return of the Taliban’, Daily Mail, 8 February 2003.
130. Jon Henley, ‘Did we make it better?’, Guardian, 29 May 2003.
131 Ratnesar, ibid.
132. Marc Herold, ibid. Herold is an economics professor at the University of
New Hampshire.
133. Bob Graham, ‘I just pulled the trigger’, Evening Standard, 19 June 2003,
accessed at http://www.thisislondon.com/news/articles/5402104?
source=Evening%20Standard.
134. Michael Moore, Will they ever trust us again?, p. 47; see also, Evan Wright,
Generation Kill.
135. Scott Johnson, ‘Inside an enemy cell’, Newsweek, 18 August 2003, p. 17.
136. Sami Ramadani, ‘Faluluja’s defiance of a new empire’, Guardian, 10
November 2004.
137. Human Rights Watch, ‘Violent response: the US army in al-Falluja’, June 2003.
138. Jonathan Steele and Dahr Jamail, ‘This is our Guernica’, Guardian, 27 April
2005.
139. Mark Danner, ‘The logic of torture’, New York Review of Books, 24 June 2004.
140. Victoria Brittain, ‘Why are we welcoming this torturer?’, Guardian, 24
February 2005.
141. Mark Danner, ‘Torture and truth’, New York Review of Books, 10 June 2004,
pp. 46–50, quoting, ‘Report of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War
and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During
Arrest, Internment and Interrogation’, February 2004; see also, Mark
Danner, ‘Abu Ghraib: the hidden story’, New York Review of Books, 7
October 2004.
142. Mark Danner, ‘Abu Ghraib: the hidden story’, New York Review of Books, 7
October 2004.
143. ‘Violations were tantamount to torture’, edited extracts of ICRC report into
treatment of Iraqi prisoners by coalition forces, Guardian, 8 May 2004.
144. Mark Danner, ibid.
[ 226 ]
NOTES
145. Rod Nordland, ‘Rough justice’, Newsweek, 18 August 2003, pp. 18–20.
146. Rory McCarthy, ‘Fundamental errors of inflexible army’, Guardian, 13 April
2004.
147. ‘Baghdad Burningburning’, 7 May 2004, http://riverbend.blogspot.com/.
148. Rory McCarthy, ‘We will fight until the end’, Guardian, 8 April 2004.
149. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘We don’t need al-Qaida’, Guardian, 27 October 2005.
150. Scilla Elworthy, ‘Tackling terror by winning hearts and minds’, 20 July
2005, www.opendemocracy.net.
151. Mark Danner, ‘Torture and truth’, ibid.
152. British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Afghanistan: Monthly Review, June
2001.
153. Reuters, ‘UN says sanctions have killed some 500,000 Iraqi Children’, 21
July 2000, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/072100-03.htm.
154. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 130. Woodward seems to find this question
morally unremarkable, commenting: ‘Anyone with a basic understanding
of military strategy might have smiled at the question. The noisy, slow-
moving transport planes used for food drops are sitting ducks until air
defense installations are wiped out’ (Woodward, ibid, p. 130).
155. ‘US food drops “useless” for hungry hordes’, Daily Record and Sunday Mail,
16 October 2001, accessed at nucnews.net/nucnews/2001nn/0110nn/
011016nn.htm.
156. Nor is it clear that food was the form of aid most wanted by Afghans
(Johnson).
158. ibid, p. 294, citing Wolfowitz.
159. ibid, p. 279; my emphasis. In the event, the decision about whether to bomb
during Ramadan was overtaken by events: namely, the occupation of
Kabul by the Northern Alliance and a few Pashtun leaders (ibid, p. 313).
160. John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War; Human
Rights Watch, Evil Days; Keen, The Benefits of Famine.
161. Woodward, ibid, p. 204. US planes carrying food were taking off from
Germany at the time.
162. Isabel Hilton, ‘Hearts and minds at any cost’, Guardian, 13 July 2004; Ewen
MacAskill, ‘Pentagon forced to withdraw leaflet linking aid to information
on Taliban’, Guardian, 6 May 2004.
163. Short, An Honourable Deception?
164. Jacqui Tong, Médecins sans frontières (MSF), ‘Disobedient humanitarian-
ism: violence, politics and aid’, talk given at LSE, London, 17 November
2003.
165. British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Afghanistan: Monthly Review, June
2004, p. 2.
166. Ewen MacAskill, ‘Aid agency quits Afghanistan over security fears’,
167. Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 278.
168. Martin Woollacott, ‘Humanitarians must avoid becoming tools of power’,
Guardian 2 April 2004.
169. Stothard, 30 Days, p. 139.
[ 227 ]
170. Nicolas de Torrente, ‘Humanitarian action under attack: reflections on Iraq

war’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17, spring 2004.
172. Conetta, Strange Victory, pp. 28, 69.
173. Mann, ibid, p. 186.
174. ibid, p. 189.
175. ibid, p. 116.
176. Bill Powell, ‘Struggle for the soul of Islam’, Time, 13 September 2004.
177. Conetta, Strange Victory.
178. Fergal Keane, ‘Does the West understand how this hated war is altering the
Arab world?’, Independent, 29 March 2003.
179. Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 246.
180. This was a finding from a study of the biographies of 400 terrorists by
forensic psychiatrist and former CIA officer Marc Sagemen (‘Understand-
ing terror networks’, 1 November 2004, Foreign Policy Research Institute,
Philadelphia, www.fpri.org).
181. See, e.g. ‘My brother Zac’, Abd Samad Moussaoui, Guardian Weekend, 19
April 2003, (http://www.guardian.co.uk/weekend/story/0,3605, 938576,
00.html); Hugh Roberts, 2003, ‘North African Islamism in the blinding light
of 9-11’, working paper no. 34, Crisis States Programme, DESTIN, LSE,
London, www.crisisstates.com.
182. Michael Massing, ‘The unseen war’, New York Review of Books, 29 May 2003,
nybooks.com.
184. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. xix.
185. Hugh Roberts, ibid.
186. Lewis, ibid, p. xv.
187. Lisa Beyer, ‘Why the hate?’, Time, 1 October 2001, p. 60.
188. Jessica Stern, ‘Holy avengers’, FT Magazine, 12 June 2004, p. 16.
189. Fuad Nahdi, ‘What happened? What changed? What now?’, transcript of
an openDemocracy/Q-News meeting at Chatham House, 4 August 2005,
www.opendemocracy.net.
190. Hani Shukrallah, ‘We are all Iraqis now’, Guardian, 27 March 2003.
191. Bill Powell, ‘Struggle for the soul of Islam’, Time, 13 September 2004.
192. Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Religious revival offers solace amid sanctions and
resistance to invaders’, Guardian, 22 February 2003.
193. Hani Shukrallah, ibid.
194. Jonathan Steele, ‘It feels like 1967 all over again.’, Guardian, 9 April 2003.
195. Powell, ibid, p. 55.
196. ibid, p. 55. In Iran, coalition belligerence has in many ways strengthened the
hard-line fundamentalists. Even threats of a further war on terror can be very
destructive. For example, the Pentagon’s announcement in 2003 that it would
try to ‘destabilise’ Iran’s Islamic republic helped some of the country’s clerics
to portray their liberal opponents as traitors (Dan De Luce, ‘Pentagon adds to
despair of Iran’s reformers’, Guardian, 27 May 2003).
197. This is discussed in Barbara Ehrenreich’s Blood Rites, p. 138.
198. See, e.g. Milan Rai (ed.), War Plan Iraq (London: Verso, 2002).
[ 228 ]
NOTES
199. The US bombing of Libya in response to the Berlin disco bombing of 1986
was followed by Libya’s 1988 attack on Pan Am flight 103, killing 270.
200. See also Keen, ‘Since I am a dog’; Michael Jackson, In Sierra Leone.
201. RUF (Revolutionary United Front), Footpaths to Democracy, 1995, p. 12.
202. Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service, 18 June 1997; my emphasis.
203. Mark Lawson, ‘Terrorist nostalgia’, Guardian, 17 April 2004.
205. John Gittings, ‘North Korea will talk if it is not labelled evil’, Guardian, 4
April 2002.
206. John Feffer, ‘The response’, in: Feffer, Power Trip, p. 179.
207. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 74.
208. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 332; my emphasis.
209. Meir statement to the Sunday Times, 15 June 1969, http://en.wikipedia.org.
210. Robert Baer, ‘The cult of the suicide bomber’, Channel 4, broadcast 4
August 2005.
211. Jessica Stern, ‘Pakistan’s Jihadjihad culture’, Foreign Affairs, November/
December 2000, http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~.jstern. CSIA.KSG/pakistan.
htm.
212. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 187.
213. ibid, p. 195.
214. ibid.
215. Arendt, On Violence, p. 65.
216. www.life-peace.org/newroutes.
217. In Guatemala, some Mayan victims of brutal counter-insurgency told
human rights workers involved in organising prosecutions for genocide
that the process was important to them partly because it conferred inter-
national and state recognition that they were indeed human and worthy of
having their human rights upheld (Keen, ‘Demobilising Guatemala’).
218. ‘Jonathan Dimbleby’, ITV1, broadcast 15 June 2003.
219. Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Many Arabs say Bush misreads their history and
goals’, New York Times, 31 January 2002.
220. For example, Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes.
222. For example, Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Don’t demonise Bin Laden, cautions
MoD official,’ Guardian, 8 November 2001.
223. Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits, p. 58.
224. Brian Whitaker, ‘Easy targets are magnet for Islamic militants’, Guardian, 20
August 2003.
225. Abd Samad Moussaoui, ‘My brother Zac’, Guardian Weekend, 19 April 2003
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/weekend/story/0,3605,938576,00.html).
226. ibid.
227. ibid.
228. ibid.
229. John Burns, ‘The power, the glory and the grievances’, Guardian, 18
September 2001.
230. Ambivalence towards ‘the mother country’ could take a similar form in
Sierra Leone (Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone).
[ 229 ]
231. Jonathan Raban, ‘My Holy War’, The New Yorker, 4. February 2002.
232. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Womaniser, joker, scuba diver: the other face of al-
Qaida’s no 3’, Guardian, 3 March 2003. Hamdi Osman, suspected of a role
in the attempted London bombings of 21 July 2005, had lived in Italy and
acquired a reputation as a ‘Romeo’ and a dancer who loved American
popular culture (John Hooper, ‘Suspect was a Roman Romeo in love with
US’, Guardian, 2 August 2005).
233. Peter Bergen, ‘In the beginning’, Guardian, 20 August 2004.
234. Interviewed on ‘Inside the mind of the suicide bomber’, director Tom
Roberts, Channel 4, broadcast November 2003.
235. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 64.
236. ibid, p. 65.
237. ibid, p. 66.
238. Maruf Khwaja, ‘Muslims in Britain: generations, experiences, futures’, 2
August 2005, openDemocracy, http://opendemocracy.net/conflict-terror-
ism/identity_2721.jsp.
239. See the quote from Tariq Ramadan in Chapter 9 (note 16).
240. ICG, ‘Islamist terrorism in the Sahel: fact or fiction?’, 31 March 2005.
241. For example, Bill Powell, ‘Struggle for the Soul of Islam’, Time, p. 54.
242. Hugh Roberts, 2003, ‘North African Islamism in the blinding light of 9/11’,
working paper 34, Crisis States Programme, DESTIN, LSE, London,
www.crissistates.com.
243. Scott MacLeod, ‘The Enemy WithinThe enemy within’, Time, 26 May 2003,
p. 37.
244. Said Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, 2nd
edn (London: Bloomsbury, 2005).
245. Martin Woollacott, ‘Saudi’s regime can’t please both the US and its people’,
246. Hugh Roberts, personal communication; see also Hugh Roberts, ibid.
Torture had been used in the course of police investigations under Morocco’s
new anti-terrorism law (David Pallister, ‘Two Britons face terror charges in
Morocco’, Guardian, 2 August 2003, citing Paris-based International Federa-
tion of Human Rights Leagues).
247. Jason Burke, ‘Stronger and more deadly, the terror of the Taliban is back’,
Observer, 16 November 2003.
248. Gerges, The Far Enemy.
249. ibid, p. 271.
250. Putzel, in Buckley and Fawn.
252. ibid.
253. Putzel, ibid.
254. Mann, ibid, p. 184.
255. Putzel, ibid.
256. ibid.
257. Naomi Klein, ‘A deadly franchise’, Guardian, 28 August 2003.
258. Nick Paton Walsh, ‘US looks away as new ally tortures Islamists’, Guardian,
26 May 2003; see also, John MacLeod and Galima Bukharbaeva,
[ 230 ]
NOTES
‘Neighbourhood watch’, Guardian, 7 April 2004.

259. Craig Murray [British ambassador to Uzbekistan, 2002–03], ‘What drives
support for this torturer?’, Guardian, 16 May 2005.
260. Rory McCarthy, ‘Destiny and devotion’, Guardian Weekend, 17 May 2003.
261. Rory McCarthy, ‘Pressure piles up on reluctant Pakistan’, Guardian, 10
March 2003; see also, Conetta, Strange Victory.
262. Isabel Hilton, ‘Pakistan is losing the fight against fundamentalism’,
264. Neither was Abu Musab al-Zargawi killed or captured in the November
2004 attack on Fallujah that was justified by his presence (Jonathan Steele
and Dahr Jamail, ‘This is our Guernica’, Guardian, 27 April 2005).
265. Bush’s planners have been pressuring Congress to lift a decade-long ban
on research into so-called ‘mini-nukes’. A leaked Pentagon strategy docu-
ment details plans for nuclear weapons to be used against buried targets,
including biological or chemical weapons facilities (GlobalSecurity.org).
This implies a nuclear ‘first strike’, and doesn’t help Bush in persuading
NPT waiverers to renounce all nuclear ambitions (e.g. ‘Ban the mini-
bomb’, Economist, 17 May 2003, pp. 10–11). On UK willingness to counte-
nance ‘first use’ in relation to Iraq, see Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Weapons no
one needs’, Guardian, 9 April 2004.
266. See, e.g. Scott McConnell, ‘Ground zero’, 12 March 2002, anti-war.com.
268. David Gold, ‘Some economic considerations in the U.S. war on terrorism’,
The Quarterly Journal, 3(1), March 2004.
269. Singer, ibid.
270. Ian Traynor, ‘The west’s truce with Iraq buys time for both sides, but
spectre of proliferation remains’, Guardian, 23 November 2004.
271. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘A blindness that puts us all in danger’, Guardian, 23
January 2003. (The report draws on a report by the Washington-based Center
for Strategic and International Studies which suggests that state support is
less of a worry than terrorists getting weapons from the open market.)
272. Vidal, Perpetual War, p. 80, citing Robert Serrano, One of Ours: Timothy
McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing.
273. See testimonies in Moore, Will They Ever Trust Us Again?
Chapter 3: War systems: local and global
1. Whilst Paul Collier has tended to stress the economic agendas of rebels, the
cover of warfare can also be important for governments and their supporters.
2. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp. 135–6.
3. For example, Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars; Keen,
Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.
4. Compare Tim Allen, who sees war as conferring status, and sometimes
legitimacy, on violence (Tim Allen, ‘Perceiving contemporary wars’, in: The
Media of Conflict: War reporting and representations of ethnic violence, New
York: St Martin’s Press, 1999.)
[ 231 ]
5. Burke, Al-Qaeda; Jason Burke, ‘Who did it – and what was their motive?’,
Observer, 10 July 2005.
6. See e.g. Castells, End of Millennium.
7. Global Witness, ‘For a few dollars more: how al Qaeda moved into the
diamond trade’, London, April 2003, available at www.globalwitness.org.
8. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone; Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and
Subject; Bruce Berman ‘Ethnicity, patronage and the African state’, pp.
305–41.
9. See notably Mann, Incoherent Empire; Roberts, ‘North African Islamism in
the blinding light of 9-11’.
10. See also Mann, ibid.
11. Burke, ibid, p. 25.
12. Jason Burke, ‘Who did it – and what was their motive?’, Observer, 10 July
2005.
13. Sierra Leone shows the dangers of focusing on leaders rather than follow-
ers. An attempt was made to ‘neutralise’ the late rebel leader Foday Sankoh
with concessions in a 1999 peace agreement at Lome, Togo. For a long time,
very little was done to address the anger or grievances of his followers
with an effective programme of disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration (DDR). The peace broke the following year.
14. Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest; Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.
15. Rashad Yaqoob, audience member, ‘What happened? What changed?
What now?’, transcript of an openDemocracy/Q-News meeting at
Chatham House, 4 August 2005, www.opendemocracy.net.
16. Cf Hobsbawm, Bandits.
17. Johanna McGeary ‘When no-one is truly safe’, Time, 1 December 2003, p 5.
18. See, e.g. Kim Sengupta, ‘The police’s nightmare: home-grown terrorists’,
Independent, 13 July 2005.
20. ibid.
21. For example, Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1965).
22. David Stoll, ‘Evangelicals, guerrillas and the army: the Ixil Triangle under
Rios Montt’, in Carmack, Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the
Guatemalan Crisis, p. 104.
23. Paul Richards, ‘Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: a crisis of youth?’.
24. Paul Richards, 1996, ‘Violence as cultural creativity? Social exclusion and
environmental damage in Sierra Leone’, mimeo.
25. See e.g. Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.
26. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, pp. 213–17, cited in David Gold (2004), p. 9.
27. Cf Clay and Schaffer, Room for Manoeuvre (1984).
29. See e.g. Ferdinando Imposimato, ‘Preface to ”The Dirty War” by Habia
Souaidia’, Algeria-Watch, 15 January 2001, http://www.algeria-watch.
org/farticle/sale_guerre/imposimatoengl.htm.
30. Keen, The Benefits of Famine; Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.
31. Keen, The Benefits of Famine.
[ 232 ]
NOTES
32. Cf Scott Straus, ‘Darfur and the genocide debate’, Foreign Affairs, 81(4):
123–33, January/February, 2005.
33. Stoll, ‘Evangelicals, guerrillas and the army’.
34. Francisco Gutierrez Sanin, personal communication.
35. Isabel Hilton, ‘Terror as usual’, Guardian, 23 September 2003.
36. Luis Eduardo Fajardo, ‘From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colom-
bia’, working paper no. 28, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, London,
www.crisisstates.com.
37. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, 2003, ‘Criminal rebels? a discussion of war and
criminality from the Colombian experience’, working paper no. 27, Crisis
States Research Centre, LSE, London, www.crisisstates.com.
38. Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, p. 361.
39. David Hearst, ‘Vladimir’s big adventure’, Guardian, 9 November 2001,
cites Gall and de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War.
40. Lieven, Chechnya, p. 356.
41. A total of 129 hostages and 41 Chechen fighters were killed, mostly by the
gas used to knock out the hostage-takers.
42. Chris McGreal, ‘Our strategy helps the terrorists – army chief warns
Sharon’, Guardian, 31 October 2003.
43. Karen Armstrong, ‘Our role in the terror’, Guardian, 18 September 2003.
44. Kevin Toolis, ‘You can’t make a deal with the dead’, Guardian, 10 September 2003.
45. Henry Siegman, ‘Sharon and the future of Palestine’, New York Review of
Books, 2 December 2004.
46. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. At the town of Ryazan, south of
Moscow, where strangers were spotted in September 1999 moving heavy
sacks of explosives into the basement, a number of factors pointed suspi-
ciously at the FSB Russian secret police. Several apartment explosions
earlier that month were blamed on Chechen terrorists and used as a reason
for relaunching the war in Chechnya. The strangers were planting a bomb
of the same type as those used to create earlier explosions in Moscow,
Buinaksk and Volgodonsk, which had been blamed on Chechen terrorists.
47. Interview with Samraoui, author of ‘Chroniques des Annees de Sang’. in:
Campbell, ‘The French connection’, New Zealand Listener, 14–20 February
2004, http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/mil/francalgerie/french_
connection.htm.
48. Gordon Campbell, ‘The French connection’, ibid.
49. Ronan Bennett, contribution to ‘What would you do?’, Guardian, 28 February
2003.
50. See, e.g. Jane Mayer, ‘Outsourcing torture’, New Yorker, 14 February 2005.
51. Keen, ‘Demobilising Guatemala’; Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone;
on Uganda, see Chris Dolan, Understanding War and its Continuations: The Case
of Northern Uganda, PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2005.
52. Naomi Klein, ‘Stark message of the mutiny’, Guardian, 15 August 2003.
53. James Astill, ‘Rwandans wage a war of plunder’, Observer, 4 August 2002,
www.guardian.co.uk/congo.
54. James Astill, ‘Conflict in Congo has killed 4.7m, charity says’, Guardian, 8
April 2003.
[ 233 ]
56. Suskind, ‘Without a doubt’.
58. Julian Borger, ‘Bush told he is playing into Bin Laden’s hands’, Guardian
Unlimited, 19 June 2004.
59. Clarke, ibid, p. 276; Fallows, ibid, citing Clarke and Michael Scheuer.
60. Fallows, ibid.
61. Declan Walsh, ‘Most wanted’, Guardian, 5 August 2001.
62. Rory McCarthy, ‘Inside story of the hunt for Bin Laden’, Guardian, 23
August 2003.
63. Declan Walsh, ‘Most wanted’, Guardian, 5 August 2001.
64. David Clark, ‘The war on terror misfired. Blame it all on the neocons’,
65. James Astill, ‘Rwandans wage a war of plunder’, Observer, 4 August 2002,
www.guardian.co.uk/congo; on Sierra Leone, see Keen, Conflict and
Collusion in Sierra Leone; on Cambodia, see Berdal, Mats and David Keen,
‘Violence and economic agendas in civil wars: considerations for policy-
makers’, Millennium, 26(3), 1997.
66. Naomi Klein, ‘Stark message of the mutiny’, Guardian, 15 August 2003.
67. Gall and de Waal, Chechnya: A small victorious war.
68. Mann, Incoherent Empire, pp. 174–5.
69. Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: The secret relationship between the
world’s two most powerful dynasties.
71. Unger, ibid.
73. ibid, p. 281.
75. Rampton and Stauber, ibid, p. 104; Brian Whitaker, ‘Saudi Arabia to ques-
tion 12,000 citizens’, Guardian, 15 August 2003.
76. Donald Rumsfeld sat on the board of Zurich-based engineering giant ABB
when it sold two light water nuclear reactors to ‘axis of evil’ member North
Korea in 2000 (Randeep Ramesh, ‘The two faces of Rumsfeld’, Guardian, 9
May 2003).
77. See Hugh Roberts, ‘North African Islamism in the blinding light of 9-11’,
working paper no. 34, Crisis States Programme, 2003, www.crisis
states.com.
78. Keen, The Benefits of Famine; Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.
79. See e.g. Tim Judah, ‘Uganda: The secret war’, New York Review of Books, 23
September 2004.
80. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, S/2001/357, April 2001.
81. ibid.
82. ibid; see also International Crisis Group, ‘Storm clouds over sun city’.
83. Report by James Astill, ‘Rwandans wage a war of plunder’, Observer, 4
August 2002, www.guardian.co.uk/congo. Rwanda did withdraw the
[ 234 ]
NOTES
majority of its troops from the Congo in October 2002, but seconded at least
5,000 soldiers to its rebel proxy (the Rally for Congolese Democracy) and
maintained a significant degree of control. While Rwanda claimed some
50,000 Hutu militiamen remained in Congo in April 2003, independent
estimates put their number at about 15,000. At least 80 per cent of these
were children and very unlikely to have been in any way responsible for
genocide. In April 2003, the scattered garrisons of Rwanda and Uganda
(formerly allies, but now sworn enemies) were estimated to be occupying
about a third of the Congo. Astill noted, ‘Since its partial withdrawal,
Rwanda has conceded the job of disarming the Hutus to the UN, though it
still has a hand in the process. UN officers complain that whenever they
make contact with one of the Hutu militias, the RCD [Rally for Congolese
Democracy] attacks and scatters it.’ (James Astill, ‘Counting the dead’,
Guardian, 10 April 2003).
84. ICG, ‘The Congo’s transition is failing’, 30 March 2005.
85. Keen, ‘Demobilising Guatemala’.
86. Gore Vidal, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, p. 158.
87. William Hartung, ‘Military–industrial complex revisited’, Foreign Policy in
Focus, http://www.fpif.org/papers/micr/index_body.html.
88. Tim Weiner, ‘Lockheed and the future of warfare’, New York Times, 28
November 2004.
89. Carl Conetta, ‘The Pentagon’s new budget, new strategy, and new war’,
Project on Defense Alternatives, briefing report no. 12, Cambridge, Mass.,
25 June 2002.
90. Kaldor, p. 11.
91. Hartung, ‘Military–industrial complex revisited’.
92. Julian Borger and David Teather, ‘So much for the peace dividend: Penta-
gon is winning the battle for a 400 billion dollar budget’, Guardian, 22 May
2003.
93. See, e.g. Simon Tisdall, ‘War remains the option of first resort – not last’,
Guardian, 27 February 2003.
94. Frances Fitzgerald, ‘How hawks captured the White House’, Guardian, 24
September 2004.
95. Michael Klare, ‘Resources’, in: Feffer, Power Trip, pp. 50, 58–9.
96. Thomas Friedman, ‘A memo from Osama’, 26 June 2001, in: Friedman,
Longitudes and Attitudes, pp. 27–8.
97. William Hartung, ‘Military’, in: Feffer, ibid.
98. Vikram Dodd, ‘US contracts come under scrutiny’, Guardian, 23 May 2003;
cronyism in CPA (NYRB Galbraith article).
99. CBS News, cbsnews.com, ‘Cheney’s Halliburton ties remain’, 26 September
2003; Robin Cook, ‘The financial scandals of occupation are worse than the
errors of judgement’, Independent, 7 November 2003.
100. David Leigh et al, ‘Cheney oil firm faces UK inquiry’, Guardian, 30 October
2004.
101. Naomi Klein, ‘The rise of disaster capitalism’, The Nation, 2 May 2005.
102. Klare, ‘Resources’, in: Feffer, Power Trip, p. 50.
103. Cheney report, in: Klare, ‘Resources’, ibid, p. 52.
[ 235 ]
104. ibid, p. 53.

105. Terry Macalister, Ewen MacAskill, Rory McCarthy and Nick Paton-Walsh,
‘A matter of life, death – and oil’, Guardian, 23 January 2003.
106. Michael Klare (ibid, p. 57) sees the war in Afghanistan as an extension of
the shadow war in Saudi Arabia between the US-backed royal family and
Saudi extremists led by Osama bin Laden.
107. Lutz Kleveman, ‘The new great game’, Guardian, 20 October 2003.
108. John Pilger, ‘What good friends left behind’, Guardian Weekend, 20
September 2003.
109. US Department of Energy, ‘Afghanistan fact sheet’, June 2004, http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/afghan.html.
110. Craig Murray, ‘What drives support for this torturer’, Guardian, 16 May 2005.
111. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 49; see also Suskind, The Price of Loyalty.
113. Terry Macalister, Ewen MacAskill, Rory McCarthy and Nick Paton-Walsh,
‘A matter of life, death – and oil’, ibid.
114. Christopher Hitchens, ‘Machiavelli in Mesopotamia’, Slate, 11 November
2002, http:/www.frongpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=4514.
115. Seumas Milne, ‘The right to resist’, Guardian, 19 June 2003. Whatever oil
dreams US planners were entertaining, they have not been realized in the
short term. Sabotage and theft mean Iraq’s oil production after the occupa-
tion was only a fraction of that under Saddam. As a result, Saudi Arabia’s
influence has been strengthened, and oil prices remain high (‘Bush’s oil
move backfires’, editorial, Guardian, 5 August 2003).
116. Robin Cook, ‘The financial scandals of occupation are worse than the
errors of judgement’, Independent, 7 November 2003.
117. Rampton and Stauber, Banana Republicans (London: Robinson, 2004).
119. ibid, p. 174.
120. ibid, p. 74.
121. ibid, p. 49.
122. economist.com, sent to author, 12 April 2002.
123. Martin Delgado, ‘The Americans didn’t let us sleep, blinded us with
constant lights and made us kneel until we fell unconscious’, Mail on
Sunday, 5 October 2003. Even as early as 1996, a leader in India’s Sikh sepa-
ratist movement told researcher Mark Juergensmeyer that ‘terrorist’ had
replaced the word ‘witch’ as an excuse to persecute those whom one
dislikes (Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 9).
124. Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars; Keen, ‘Demobilising
Guatemala’.
125. African Rights, Rwanda: Death, despair and defiance, London, 1994.
127. Shelton H. Davis, ‘Introduction: sowing the seeds of violence’.
128. In practice, ‘delinquents’ were targeted in both periods.
129. ‘When the court system analyzed arrest warrants for juveniles, it found
such reasons as having tattoos or scandalous behaviour in public’ (US State
Department, 2003b, 11/35).
[ 236 ]
NOTES
130. See notably Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with America?
131. Somewhat similarly, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (in Death without Weeping)
has suggested in relation to north-east Brazil that police actions are often
arbitrary and that they intimidate entire social groups.
132. See e.g. Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic.
133. Interview, Belgrade, 1999.
134. Bridget Kendall, ‘Analysis: Putin’s drastic measures’, BBC News Online, 13
September 2004, news.bbc.co.uk.
135. Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, pp. 143–4.
136. Sidney Blumenthal, ‘Domestic gibberish’, Guardian, 10 February 2005.
137. Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 206–7.
138. ibid, p. 207.
139. Naomi Klein, ‘The true purpose of torture’, Guardian, 14 May 2005.
140. Kenneth Roth, ‘The law of war in the war on terror’, Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101facom-
ment 83101/kenneth-roth/the-law-of-war-in-the-war-on-terror.html.
141. Al Gore, ‘Democracy itself is in grave danger’, Common Dreams News
Center, http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0624-15.htm.
142. Rebecca Allison, ‘Police can use terror powers on protestors’, Guardian, 1
November 2003.
143. Helena Kennedy, ‘Take no comfort in this warm blanket of security’,
Guardian, 15 March 2004.
144. Ben Russell and Andrew Grice, ‘Don’t mention the war’, Independent, 29
September 2005.
146. Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 17.
147. Frances Fitzgerald, ‘How hawks captured the White House’, Guardian, 24
September 2004.
148. Human Rights Watch, ‘China: religious repression of Uighur Muslims’, 12
April 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/11/china10447.htm.
149. Aidan White, ‘Journalism and the war on terrorism: final report on the after-
math of September 11 and the implications for journalism and civil liberties’,
International Federation of Journalists, Brussels, 3 September 2002.
150. Simon Tisdall, ‘Riding the crest of a terror wave’, Guardian, 7 December 2004.
153. Luis Eduardo Fajardo, ‘From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colom-
bia’, working paper no. 28, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, London,
www.crisisstates.com.
154. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005.
155. One factor may be that the USA wants to redesign the 1972 anti-ballistic
treaty because it wants a ballistic missile defence system, and this means it
needs Russia on side (Menzies Campbell, ‘A wider arms deal’, Guardian, 15
November 2001).
157. BBC News Online, ‘US to blacklist Chechen groups’ http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2786725.stm.
[ 237 ]
158. Nick Paton Walsh, ‘US looks away as new ally tortures Islamists’, Guardian,
26 May 2003.
159. Nick Paton Walsh and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Straw clashes with Uzbek leaders
after 500 killed’, Guardian, 16 May 2005.
160. Nick Paton Walsh, ‘US looks away as new ally tortures Islamists’, ibid.
161. Nick Paton Walsh, ‘Brutality and poverty fuel wave of unrest’, Guardian, 16
May 2005.
162. Ewen MacAskill, ‘Scepticism greets Straw’s reproof’, Guardian, 16 May 2005.
164. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Guantanamo is gulag of our time, says Amnesty’,
165. See, notably, Mark Duffield’s Global Governance and the New Wars.
166. Human Rights Watch, ‘Coercive interrogation’, January 2005, http://
hrw.org/wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/3.htm.
167. Noting that prisons tended to produce and educate more criminals,
Foucault described the prison system as ‘the detestable solution which one
seems unable to do without’ (Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The
birth of the prison, p. 232).
169. Rami Khouri, ‘Democracy from America? An Arab’s advice’, 31 March
2005, opendemocracy.net.
170. Statement at National Security Council meeting on 10 October 2001
(Woodward, Bush at War, p. 224).
172. See e.g. Luke Harding, ‘US helicopters in secret mission to spray
Afghanistan’s blossoming opium fields’, Guardian, 9 June 2003; also Colin
Brown and Andrew Clennell, ‘Opium trade booms in basket-case
Afghanistan’, Independent, 28 July 2004.
173. Declan Walsh, ‘Warlords, poppies and slow progress’, Guardian, 7
December 2004.
174. For example, Mariam Rawi, ‘Rule of the rapists’, Guardian, 12 February 2004.
177. Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘The stand’, Guardian, 5 May 2005.
178. Tim Judah, ‘Uganda: the secret war’, New York Review of Books, 23
September 2004.
179. Faludi, Stiffed, pp. 331–2.
180. Duncan Campbell, ‘Introducing Del-Qaida’, Guardian, 17 July 2004.
181. Simon Jenkins, ‘Once they kept us from fear. Now our leaders want to
frighten us senseless’, Times, 24 November 2004.
Chapter 4: Elusive enemies and the need for certainty
1. One banner at a Bush election rally 2004 proclaimed simply, ‘You make me
feel safe’ (Madeleine Bunting, ‘Age of anxiety’, Guardian, 25 October 2004).
2. Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, p. 306.
3. Full text at: http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,91 6790,00.
[ 238 ]
NOTES
html. George Soros has compared the false confidences of the ‘war on
terror’ with a speculative bubble: in both, a big gap has opened between
perceptions and reality (Soros, The Bubble of American Supremacy, p. 184).
4. This may not have been a direct cause-and-effect, but it’s still an ominous
portent today, particularly in view of Bush’s statement on 11 September
2001 that ‘The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today’ (quoted
in Woodward, Bush at War, p. 37).
5. Michael Duffy and Nancy Gibbs, ‘Defender in chief’, Time, 5 November 2001.
6. Even in relation to ordinary criminals it is not clear that punishment
prevents future crime. Psychiatrist and prison activist James Gilligan sees
bad conditions in prisons as compounding the shame and humiliation that
propelled violence in the first place (James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on
our deadliest epidemic).
7. This might be done strategically; see e.g. Peter Taylor on the Taqfiri, who
believe in blending in to a host society the better to carry out attacks (Peter
Taylor, ‘The new al-Qaida’, BBC 2 TV, first broadcast 25 July 2005).
8. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html.
9. Bishop W. Nah Dixon, Great Lessons of the Liberian Civil War.
10. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone.
12. ibid, p.168; my emphasis.
13. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 2. The terrorist too may pick enemies in
an arbitrary way. In Bali, the bombed Sari bar was used much more by
Australians than Americans. Iraqis were for a long time bombed and half-
starved at a distance and some have also now found an identifiable and
accessible enemy: the occupying soldier.
14. Woodward, ibid, p. 43. Of course, the terrorists also face the problem that
their principal enemies – presumably Bush and Blair prominent among
them – are well protected, and the terrorists have generally preferred to
attack more accessible targets.
15. Jonathan Steele, ‘Fighting the wrong war’, Guardian, 11 December 2001.
18. Michael Hoffman, ‘The civilians we killed’, Guardian, 2 December 2004.
19. The enemy was also largely incomprehensible. US forces came to Iraq equip-
ped with every kind of imaginable machine for killing, healing, spying and
communicating with each other, but very, very few personnel with the incli-
nation or the capacity to communicate with Iraqis. (This same combination
had helped undermine the US intervention in Somalia.) US forces relied heav-
ily on a machine called a ‘Phrasealator’, an eggbox-sized translation machine
that could cope with ‘get out of your car slowly’ but not with any deeper
understanding of Iraqis’ needs and priorities (James Meek, ‘Speaking a differ-
ent language – but we’ve got the Phrasealator’, Guardian, 31 March 2003).
20. Bob Graham, ibid.
21. Mark Danner, ‘Torture and truth’.
[ 239 ]
22. Faludi, Stiffed, p. 330.

23. ibid.
24. ibid; my emphasis.
25. Cf Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction; Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism.
26. The need to ‘separate’ may be all the greater since some terrorists have
gone out of their way to blend in. One such group, allied to al-Qaida, is
called Taqfir wal Hijra (Anathema and Exile). Its members apparently
make a point of concealing their strict fundamentalism behind a Western
façade (James Graff, ‘Hate club: the European connection’, Time, 5 Novem-
ber 2001). After the 7 July 2005 London bombings, commentators regis-
tered shock that one of the bombers came from a family with a fish and
chip shop, another was a member of local cricket and football teams and a
third worked with special needs children.
27. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, p. 29. He adds, ‘In theory, the punish-
ment could also be directed against his family, but such a strategy would
raise daunting questions of morality and fairness’ (ibid, p. 29).
29. Matthew Engel, ‘Pentagon hawk at war with his own side’, Guardian, 13
March 2003.
30. Kenneth Adelman, ‘A doctrine is born’, Fox News, www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,54469,00.html.
32. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 333. Sceptics like Powell seem to have been
deflected from criticism by the invitation to find allies for the proposed
action. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill described how Bush and his inner
circle quickly focused on the ‘how’ of Iraqi regime change rather than the
‘why’ (Suskind, The Price of Loyalty).
33. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism.
34. ibid, p. 315.
35. ibid, p. 356. In the Nazis’ avowed rejection of hypocrisy and corruption in
favour of purity and violence, there were also echoes of the views of
Islamist extremists now (cf e.g. Berman, Terror and Liberalism).
36. Arendt, ibid, p. 315.
37. ibid, p. 381.
38. Juergensmeyer, ‘Religious terror and global war’.
39. For many privileged people in Germany and elsewhere in continental
Europe and the UK, the Russian Revolution showed the dangers of class
warfare and the need to deflect class politics into some kind of ethnic or
national politics (Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction).
40. The lure of a college place has been used in recruiting for service in Iraq.
Recruiters have contacted youths as young as 16, who then signed up at 17.
Some also join to get home loans, and some report being told (mislead-
ingly) that they can leave at any time (Moore, Will They Ever Trust Us
Again?, pp. 17, 39). Green cards may be another attraction (Dan Glaister,
‘Crosses in the sand for war’s lost’, Guardian, 31 May 2004).
42. Julian Borger, ‘Long queue at drive-in soup kitchen’, Guardian, 3
[ 240 ]
NOTES
November 2003.
43. Kellner, From 9/11 to Terror War, p. 189.
45. Richard Sennett, ‘The age of anxiety’, Guardian, 23 October 2004.
46. Moore, Dude, Where’s My Country?, pp. 137–55.
48. Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004), written and directed by Michael Moore.
49. Moore, ibid, p. 137.
50. As Simon Schama has noted, the internet is not only a source of pluralism
but also a useful ally for those wishing to argue that evolution is just a
theory or that Iraq really did bring down the Twin Towers (‘Onward
Christian soldiers’, Guardian, 5 November 2004).
51. Schama, ibid.
52. Vidal, Perpetual War, p. 61. Vidal also suggests a link between farmland
dispossession and Christian fundamentalism (ibid, p. 60).
53. More generally, de-industrialisation has plunged large numbers of work-
ing-class and middle-class Americans into a poorly paid service sector at
the same time as large numbers of immigrants have also been entering this
sector (Todd, After the Empire, p. xi).
54. Gary Indiana, ‘Kindergarten governor’, London Review of Books, 6
November 2003.
55. Thomas Frank, What’s the matter with America?
56. Those who have imbibed a business ideology and training in poor coun-
tries may also have their anger stoked by teachings that require them to
interpret poor circumstances as personal failure (Jeremy Seabrook, ‘The
making of a fanatic’, Guardian, 20 December 2001).
57. See, e.g. Schama, ibid.
59. ibid.
60. Scilla Elworthy, ‘Tackling terror by winning hearts and minds’, 20 July
Chapter 5: The new witch-hunt: finding and removing the

source of evil
1. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 10–11.

2. ibid, p. 17.
3. ibid, p. 639.
4. ibid, p. 641.
5. See notably Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the
Azande.
6. See e.g. Caro Baroja, The World of the Witches.
7. Allen ‘The violence of healing’; see also Behrend, ‘War in northern Uganda’.
9. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p. 81.
10. Many people know some variation of the old joke about the man who
throws bits of blue paper out of a train window in the UK. When his fellow
[ 241 ]
passenger asks why, he replies, ‘To keep away the elephants’. And when
his companion points out that there are no elephants here, he is
triumphant, ‘Exactly!’
11. Joe Klein, ‘How Bush misleads himself’, Time, 28 July 2003, p. 25.
12. Gary Younge, ‘Never mind the truth’, Guardian, 31 May 2004.
13. Polly Toynbee, ‘Did Blair lie to us?’, Guardian, 30 May 2003.
14. Anne Barstow. Witchcraze, p. 153.
15. See, notably, Kean and Hamilton, The 9/11 report.
16. See e.g. Arthur Miller, The Crucible.
17. Collier takes this framework to an extreme when he suggests that listening
to grievances is useless since rebels will always stress their grievances
rather than their greed (e.g. ‘Doing Well out of War’).
18. See also Richani, Systems of Violence, on Colombia.
19. I am grateful to my friend Adekeye Adebajo, who has a doctorate in interna-
tional relations from Oxford University, for bringing this to my attention.
20. ‘War studies’, sometimes half in love with war, has been closely linked to
international relations and has often been stuck in the study of World Wars
and Cold Wars, again, a state-based framework.
21. Mark Duffield, ‘“Getting savages to fight barbarians”: development, secu-
rity and the colonial present’, Conflict, Development and Security, 2005 5(2):
141–60.
22. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 658; see also Caro Baroja, The
World of Witches.
23. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 353.
24. Once you start torturing someone, the pressure is on to find them guilty or
get a confession. Otherwise, you are left torturing an innocent person.
25. Naomi Klein, “The US has used torture for decades. All that’s new is the
openness about it”, Guardian, 10 December 2005.
27. ibid, p. 201.
28. Chemical weapons had been used against Iraqi Kurds in 1988.
29. Blix, ibid, p. 244.
30. Clarke, Against All Enemies, pp. 267–8.
32. ibid, p. 292.
33. ibid, p. 222; see also p. 234.
34. This would certainly be unusual behaviour, to put it mildly, prior to a
major conflict.
35. ‘10 questions for Silvio Berlusconi’, Time, 28 July 2003, p. 8.
36. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 658.
37. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘The BBC row has been got up to obscure the ugly
truth’, Guardian, 28 June 2003.
38. ibid.
39. There are elements of this even in UK law (‘loitering with intent’), but it is
unusual.
40. Keen, The Kurds in Iraq; see also, Makiya, Republic of Fear.
41. On Rwanda, see especially, Mamdani, When victims become killers.
[ 242 ]
NOTES
42. This is discussed by Arthur Miller in the introduction to his play The
Crucible.
43. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 696.
44. Saddam Hussein’s aggression, notably against Kuwait, had led to sanc-
tions in the first place; and Saddam for a long time rejected any oil-for-food
deal.
45. Blair cited the numbers of Iraqis killed by sanctions in the context of a
March 2003 discussion on humanitarian justifications for the war
(Stothard, 30 Days, p. 139).
46. Kathryn Hughes, ‘In league with the devil’, Guardian, 13 November 2004,
citing Lyndal Roper’s ‘Witch craze: terror and fantasy in baroque Germany’.
47. For example, Bush: ‘The terrorists are fighting freedom with all their
cunning and cruelty because freedom is their greatest fear’, Republican
National Convention, New York, 2 September 2004.
48. Lewis Lapham, Theater of War: In which the republic becomes an empire (New
York: New Press, 2003).
49. Roy, The Ordinary Person’s Guide to Empire, p. 105.
50. Allen, ‘The violence of healing’.
51. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 18.
52. ibid, p. 16.
53. Robins and Post, Political Paranoia.
54. Jonathan Steele, ‘War crimes charge for Liberian leader’, Guardian, 5 June
2003.
55. ICG, ‘After Arafat?’, New Briefing, 23 December 2004, Amman/Brussels.
56. Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Right Nation, p. 223.
58. Brian Urquhart, ‘A cautionary tale’, New York Review of Books, 10 June 2004,
pp. 8–10.
59. Conetta, Strange Victory.
60. ibid, p. 24.
61. ibid, p.9.
62. James Fallows, ‘Bush’s lost year’, Atlantic Monthly, October 2004. As Robin
Cook noted, US troops lack training in peacekeeping and tend to bring
with them a culture of using overwhelming military force (Robin Cook,
‘Deeper into the Iraqi quagmire’, Guardian, 22 October 2004).
63. James Astill, ‘Plea for security rethink as French aid worker is buried’,
Guardian, 21 November 2003.
66. Rory McCarthy, ‘US soldiers attack mountain hideout in biggest battle for
a year’, Guardian, 29 January 2003.
67. British agencies Afghanistan Group, Afghanistan: Monthly review, April
2003, London, p. 4.
68. Isabel Hilton, ‘Now we pay the warlords to tyrannise the Afghan people’,
69. ibid.
70. British agencies Afghanistan Group, Afghanistan: Monthly review, ibid, p. 3.
[ 243 ]
71. Amnesty, ‘Afghanistan: Report 2003’.

72. Eric Schmitt, ‘Training an Afghan army, slowly’, International Herald
Tribune, 25 September 2005.
73. Amnesty, ‘Afghanistan: Report 2003’, covering 2002; Jim Lobe, ‘Army
peacekeeping institute sent packing’, tompaine.com, 17 June 2002.
74. Isabel Hilton, ‘Now we pay the warlords to tyrannise the Afghan people’, ibid.
75. Nicolas de Torrente, ‘Humanitarian action under attack: reflections on Iraq
war’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17, spring 2004: 18.
76. Giles Foden, ‘The good, the bad and the hypocritical’, Guardian Weekend, 14
June 2003.
77. Jonathan Steele, ‘Why didn’t Blair prepare for post-Saddam Iraq?’,
Guardian, 29 August 2003.
78. Mark Danner, ‘Delusions in Baghdad’, New York Review of Books, 18 December
2003, p. 97. Perhaps feeding into the failure to understand ‘bottom up’
processes among their enemies was what Goff calls a ‘ruling class myopia’ in
the Bush administration: ‘They are constitutionally incapable of understand-
ing history as a process that involves the masses’, Goff suggests (Full Spectrum
Disorder, p. 112).
79. For example, Jon Lee Anderson, ‘Out on the street’, New Yorker, 15
November 2004.
80. Rory McCarthy, ‘UN chief warns of anti-American backlash in Iraq’,
81. See, e.g. Sidney Blumenthal, ‘Katrina comes home to roost’, Guardian, 2
September 2005.
82. ICG, ‘Iraq’s Shiites under occupation’, 9 September 2003, p. 3.
83. Naomi Klein, ‘An Iraqi intifada’, Guardian, 12 April 2004.
84. Ed Vulliamy and Kamal Ahmed, ‘When the shooting stops’, Observer, 6
April 2003.
85. David Teather, ‘Pentagon was warned of Iraq chaos after war’, Guardian, 20
October 2003. UN official Lopes de Silva also questioned the de-Ba’athifi-
cation programme of the US-led authority in Iraq (Rory McCarthy, ‘UN
chief warns of anti-American backlash in Iraq’, Guardian, 27 May 2003).
86. There were physical warnings too: when newly unemployed soldiers
didn’t get the promised one-off payment of $50, hundreds poured towards
the gates of the US-led authority; two Iraqis were killed when US soldiers
opened fire (Rory McCarthy, ‘Just another day in Baghdad’, Guardian, 19
June 2003).
87. Jon Lee Anderson, ‘Out on the street’, New Yorker, 15 November 2004, pp.
73–4.
88. In: Moore, Will They Ever Trust Us Again?, p. 34, 27 August 2004.
89. Zaki Chehab, ‘Inside the resistance’, Guardian, 13 October 2003.
90. See, e.g. Short, An Honourable Deception?
91. Barry, ‘How things have changed’, in: Feffer (ed.) Power Trip, p. 29.
92. Ed Vulliamy and Kamal Ahmed, ‘When the shooting stops’, Observer, 6
April 2003.
93. Rory McCarthy, ‘UN chief warns of anti-American backlash in Iraq’,
[ 244 ]
NOTES
94. Julian Borger, ‘Pentagon was warned over policing Iraq’, Guardian, 28 May
2003.
95. Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Iraq gets fraction of US aid billions’, Guardian, 5 July
2004.
96. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘SIGIR
reports to Congress’, 30 January 2005, globalsecurity.org.
97. In: Moore, Will They Ever Trust Us Again?, p. 35.
98. ibid, p. 35.
99. Peter Galbraith, ‘Iraq: the bungled transition’, New York Review of Books, 23
September 2004, p. 71.
100. Paul Krugman, ‘The price of ideology and cronyism’, Guardian, 6
September 2005.
101. Some other estimates put it higher.
102. Peter Galbraith, ‘Iraq: the bungled transition’, ibid.
103. On Afghanistan, see Duncan Campbell and Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Inside
America’s secret Afghan gulag’, Guardian, 23 June 2004. The photographs
of Abu Ghraib abuses themselves suggest some degree of official approval:
a feeling that there was little to hide.
104. See, e.g. Robert Barr, ‘World view: calls for Rumsfeld’s resignation amid
outrage over photos’, Association Press, http://www.southcoast today.
com/daily/05-04/05-08-04/a02wn042.htm.
October 2004.
106. Anthony Lewis, ‘The election and America’s future’, New York Review of
Books, 4 November 2004.
107. Mark Danner, ‘Abu Ghraib: the hidden story’, ibid, p. 48; cf George
Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which interrogators exploit
Winston Smith’s fear of rats.
108. Sidney Blumenthal, ‘Bush takes refuge in history’, Guardian, 3 June 2004.
Chapter 6: The retreat from evidence-based thinking
1. ‘Je ne regrette rien’, leader, Economist, 28 August 2004, p. 9.

2. Even the focus on Iraq was itself a construction in the run-up to war. Brian
Eno noted the media focus on Iraq and WMD and commented, ‘It isn’t just
propaganda any more, it’s prop-agenda. It’s not so much the control of
what we think, but the control of what we think about’ (Eno, ‘Lessons on
how to lie about Iraq’, tompaine.com, 15 August 2003).
3. This was in some ways mirrored in some right-wing approaches to evolu-
tion. Some observers felt the new drive to highlight evolution (e.g. in
schools) might be part of a stealth assault on the entire body of scientific
thought (e.g. Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Religious right fights science for the
heart of America’, Guardian, 7 February 2005).
4. G. John Ikenberry, ‘American’s imperial ambition’, Foreign Affairs, 81(5),
September–October 2002, p. 51.
5. Barry and Lobe, ‘The people’, in: Feffer, Power Trip, p. 39.
[ 245 ]
7. Suskind, The Price of Loyalty; Clarke, Against All Enemies.

9. Barry and Lobe, ibid, pp. 39–40.
10. ibid, pp. 42–3.
11. Suskind, ibid, p. 75.
12. ibid, p. 76.
13. The nearest thing to a ‘why’, he suggested, may have been a desire to send
a message to other countries that were considering developing weapons of
mass destruction (ibid, p. 86).
14. Seymour Hersh, ‘Selective intelligence’, New Yorker, 12 May 2003, available
at www.newyorker.com.
15. Julian Borger and Ian Traynor, ‘Now US ponders attack on Iran’, Guardian,
18 January 2005.
16. Neil Mackay, ‘Revealed: the secret cabal which spun for Blair’, Sunday
Herald, 8 June 2003.
17. Hersh, ibid.
18. Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, p. 94, citing Wolfowitz
interview with the San Francisco Chronicle, transcript, US Department of
Defense, 23 February 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/
t02272002_t0223sf.html.
19. Rampton and Stauber, ibid, p. 93.
20. Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 290; see also Clarke, Against All Enemies, p.
232. Andrew Murray describes this as ‘a logic familiar to any parent who
has tried to maintain a toddler’s belief in Father Christmas’ (Andrew
Murray, ‘Do mention the war’, Guardian, 27 September 2003).
21. Richard Perle, ‘Why the West must strike first against Saddam Hussein’,
Daily Telegraph, 9 August 2002, in: Dunn, ‘Myths, motivations and
“misunderestimations”’, p. 295.
22. Quoted in Stanford, The Devil, p. 162.
26. Gary Younge, ‘Wish you weren’t here’, Guardian Weekly, 17–23 July 2003.
27. Singer, The President of Good and Evil, p. 222; Hitchens, Regime Change, p. 17.
28. Seymour Hersh, ‘Selective intelligence’, New Yorker, 12 May 2003, http://
www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030512fa_fact.
29. Hersh, ibid.
30. Leo Strauss, in: Singer, ibid, p. 221.
31. Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicaco: University of Chicago Press,
1958), pp. 227–31.
32. ‘The power of nightmares’, BBC2 TV, broadcast October 2004.
33. Ron Suskind, ‘Without a doubt’, New York Times Magazine, 17 October 2004,
accessed via LexisNexis.
34. Mark Danner, ‘The logic of torture’, New York Review of Books, 24 June 2004,
p. 72.
35. Helena Smith, ‘Blix: I was smeared by the Pentagon’, Guardian, 11 June 2003.
36. Michael Smith, ‘Blair planned Iraq war from start’, Sunday Times, 1 May
[ 246 ]
NOTES
2005, citing civil service paper prepared for 23 July 2002 Downing Street
meeting.
37. Robert Dreyfuss, ‘The Pentagon muzzles the CIA’, American Prospect,
13(22), 16 December 2002, http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/22/drey-
fuss-r.html.
38. The failure to impede the planning and execution of 9/11 is documented in
Kean and Hamilton, The 9/11 Report.
39. Goodman, ‘Intelligence’, in: Feffer, Power Trip, pp. 97–100.
40. Goodman, ibid, p. 99. Blix notes the lack of US intelligence agents inside
Iraq after the end of the Cold War (Blix, Disarming Iraq, p. 261).
41. Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, p. 210.
13(22), 16 December 2002, http://www.prospect.org/print-friendly/
print/V13/22/dreyfuss-r.html.
43. Seymour Hersh, ‘Selective intelligence’, New Yorker, 12 May 2003,
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030512fa_fact.
44. Hersh, ibid. Top-ranking Iraqi official and exile Hussein Kamel told US and
UK intelligence officers and UN inspectors in 1995 that after the 1991 Gulf
War Iraq had destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons and the
missiles to deliver them (John Barry, ‘The defector’s secrets’, Newsweek, 3
March 2003).
46. ibid, p. 87.
47. ibid, p. 88.
48. ibid, p. 87.
49. Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘10 ways to sex up a dossier’,
Guardian, 27 September 2003.
50. Singer, The President of Good and Evil, pp. 164–5.
52. Rampton and Stauber, ibid, p. 97. The dossier came complete with the orig-
inal typographical errors in the plagiarized paper, and had several differ-
ent spellings of Ba’ath, depending on which unacknowledged source was
being copied at the time. (‘Leaked report rejects Iraqi Al-Qaeda link’, BBC,
6 February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2727471.stm; see
also Raymond Whitaker, ‘MI6 and the CIA: the enemy within’, New
Zealand Herald, 9 February 2003, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydis-
play/cfm?storyID=3100174.)
53. ‘The decision to go to war in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs Committee Report,
extracts in: Guardian, 8 July 2003.
54. Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Transforming the military’, Foreign Affairs, 81(20), 2002,
pp. 20–32.
55. Kenneth Adelman, ‘A doctrine is born’, Fox News, www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,54469,00.html. The US National Security Strat-
egy articulated in September 2002 noted, ‘America will act against emerg-
ing threats before they are fully formed’ (US Department of State, ‘The
national security strategy of the United States of America’, September 2002,
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.htm).
[ 247 ]
56. Brian Massumi, ‘Perception attack: pre-emptive power and the image’,
Security Bytes conference, Lancaster University, 17–19 July 2004.
58. G. John Ikenberry, ‘American’s imperial ambition’, Foreign Affairs, 81(5),
September–October 2002, p. 50.
60. Helena Kennedy, ‘Take no comfort in this warm blanket of security’,
61. Ron Suskind, ‘Without a doubt’, New York Times, 17 October 2004.
62. Hendrik Hertzberg, ‘Comment’, New Yorker, 15 November 2004.
63. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 342; see also, Suskind, pp. 165–6; Naughtie, The
Accidental American.
64. Woodward, ibid, p. 342. The helmet of a crew member of a US tank parked
outside the Palestine Hotel, Baghdad, bore the message, ‘I do what the
voices in my head tell me to’ (photograph by Simon Norfolk, Guardian
Weekend, 24 May 2003).
65. Sidney Blumenthal, ‘Bush and Blair: the betrayal’, Guardian, 14 November 2003.
66. Tony Blair, ‘Now we must usher in a new political era of fairness’, from
speech to Labour Party Conference, Guardian, 1 October 2003.
68. ibid, p. 92.
69. Clare Short, ‘How Tony Blair misled Britain in the run-up to war in Iraq’,
Independent, 23 October 2004.
70. Short, An Honourable Deception?
71. Robin Cook, ‘Tony knows best’, Newsweek, 26 July 2004, p. 22.
72. David Clark, ‘The sofa of total power’, Guardian, 13 December 2004.
73. Stothard, ibid, p. 93.
74. See, e.g. Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, pp. 248, 385.
76. Kampfner, ibid, p. 169, comments that, ‘war with Iraq was a price well
worth paying for demonstrating his credentials to the White House’.
77. Frank Bruni, Ambling into History: The unlikely odyssey of George W. Bush
(New York: Perennial, 2002), p. 6.
79. Ron Suskind, ‘Without a doubt’, New York Times, 17 October 2004, accessed
via LexisNexis.
80. Blair told journalist Peter Stothard that he was ‘ready to meet my maker’
and answer for ‘those who have died or have been horribly maimed as a
result of my decisions’ (2 April 2003, Stothard, ibid, p. 189). Clearly moved,
Stothard commented, ‘if I meet that man from this morning again, and if I
am asked whether the Prime Minister, as well as feeling the political risk of
war, feels powerfully and personally its worst individual results, I will say
that he does’ (ibid, p. 190).
81. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 256, p. 259; see also Clarke, p. 243.
[ 248 ]
NOTES

86. ibid, p. 292.
86. ibid.
87. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Both the military and the spooks are opposed to
war’, Guardian, 24 February 2003.
88. James Fenton, ‘Blair in trouble’, New York Review of Books, 23 October 2004,
p. 47, citing Report of the Intelligence and Security Committee set by Blair
to look at the security agencies.
90. ibid, p. 332.
92. Sidney Blumenthal, ‘Happy talk’, Guardian, 14 January 2005.
94. Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes, p. 123. Israel’s General Moshe Dayan
once said, ‘Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother’
(David Hirst, ‘The war game’, Observer, 21 September 2003). In Mozam-
bique, those orchestrating the violence of Renamo rebels seemed to
understand that violence, to be maximally disorienting, must be beyond
comprehension (Ken Wilson, ‘Cults of violence and counter-violence in
Mozambique’).
95. See, e.g. Makiya, Republic of Fear.
96. David Hare, ‘Don’t look for a reason’, Guardian, 12 April 2003.
13(22), 16 December 2002, http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/22/drey-
fuss-r.html.
98. For text, see, Reuel Marc Gerecht, ‘Crushing al Qaeda is only a start’, 1
February 2002, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
www.aei.org/publications/pubID.13538,filter./pub_detail.asp.
99. Cohen, States of Denial, p. 19.
100. Quoted in Caro Baroja, The World of the Witches, p. 212.
Chapter 7: Action as propaganda

2. ibid, p. 352.
3. ibid.
4. Cohen, States of Denial, p. 16, citing Mervin Lerner, The Belief in a Just World
(Plenum Press, 1980).
5. Arendt, ibid, p. 446. Omer Bartov writes of the search, in Germany after the
First World War, for ‘an enemy … whose very persecution would serve to
manifest the power and legitimacy of the victimizer’ (Mirrors of Destruc-
tion, p. 99).
6. Cohen, ibid, p. 96.
7. Speech therapist Agnie Yates (planning to vote for Kerry) still said that
presidents don’t lightly send young soldiers to war, and that Bush must
have acted in good faith (Joseph Lelyveld, ‘The view from the heartland’,
New York Review of Books, 4 November 2004).
[ 249 ]
8. Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, pp. 78–9, citing poll by
the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.
9. Seymour Hersh, ‘Selective intelligence’, New Yorker, 12 May 2003.
10. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 338
11. Adolf Hitler, speech to Wehrmacht commanders-in-chief, 22 August 1939,
http://www.union.edu/PUBLIC/HSTDEPT/walker/OldNSChronol-
ogy/3686Walker02.html. I am grateful to Edward Balke for bringing this
statement to my attention.
12. Dunn, ‘Myths, motivations and “misunderestimations”’, p. 294, cites
Johanna McGreary, ‘6 reasons why so many allies want Bush to slow
down’, Time, 3 February 2003.
15. George Monbiot, ‘Our fake patriots’, Guardian, 8 July 2003.
17. Phillip Knightley, ‘The disinformation campaign’, Guardian, 4 October
2001.
19. Nicolas Lemann, ‘How it came to war’, New Yorker, 31 March 2003, citing
Richard Haass, then director of the policy-planning staff at the State
Department.
20. Mary Wiltenburg, ‘After the genocide, redemption’, Christian Science
Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0407/p01s03-woaf.html.
21. Isabel Hilton, ‘Need to build a case for war? Step forward Mr Chalabi’,
23. Michael Smith, ‘Blair planned Iraq war from start’, Sunday Times, 1 May
2005, citing civil service paper prepared for 23 July 2002 Downing Street
meeting.
24. ‘So clear was he in his mind on his return from Crawford [Texas] that he
asked Gordon Brown to redraw his financial calculations for the budget he
was due to give later in April. Secretly, officials from the Treasury and Down-
ing Street got down to work immediately on ‘the numbers’ – the amount of
extra money that would be required to pay for the war preparations.’
(Kampfner, ibid, p. 169).
25. Kampfner, ibid, p. 168. Stothard also mentions Blair and his aides believed
George Bush would go to war with Iraq whatever anyone else said or did
(a view they shared, incidentally, with most of the war’s critics).
26. ‘Full text: Tony Blair’s speech’, Guardian Unlimited, 18 March 2003,
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,916790,00.html.
27. See, Stothard, 30 Days, p. 85.
28. Robin Cook, ‘Not even in his worst nightmares’, Guardian, 25 March 2005.
After the July 2005 bombings, Blair argued that changing policy would
give the terrorists a victory.
29. Kampfner, ibid, p. 387.
30. Beatrix Campbell, ‘An infantile disorder’, Guardian, 26 July 2004.
31. Frum and Perle, An End to Evil, pp. 271–2.
[ 250 ]
NOTES
32. Richard Perle, The Spectator, 22 March 2003, www.benadorassociates.

com/article/287.
33. For example, Mark Curtis, The Great Deception.
34. Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Bush’s America loses hearts and minds’, Guardian, 4
June 2003, citing Pew Global Attitudes Project.
35. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 269. Adolf Hitler himself noted in
Mein Kampf (chapter 6), ‘When the nations on this planet fight for existence
… then all consideration of humanitarianism and aesthetics crumble into
nothingness. … [T]hey become totally irrelevant to the forms of the strug-
gle as soon as a situation arises where they might paralyze a struggling
nation’s power of self-preservation’ (accessed at http://www.hitler.org/
writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch06.html).
36. Robert Kaplan, ‘Five days in Fallujah’, Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2004,
p. 118.
37. ibid.
38. Mailer, Why Are We at War?, p. 105.
40. When we are sufficiently anxious (the mortgage, the health and safety of
ourselves and families), we find it difficult to think clearly, and we find it
difficult to think for ourselves. For a while at least, TV can drown out anxi-
ety, piping in other people’s definitions of what we are lacking, what we
should be worried about, and whom we should hate. One of the best ways
of drowning out worries may be to drink in some more (cf Arendt, ibid.)
42. ‘President sworn-in to second term’, The White House, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html. Interest-
ingly, Bush also distanced himself from some of his own rhetoric. The
‘eventual triumph of freedom’ was ‘not because history runs on the wheels
of inevitability; it is human choices that move events. Not because we
consider ourselves a chosen nation; God moves and chooses as He wills.’
Then he ends with, ‘May God bless you, and may He watch over the
United States of America’.
43. Remarks by President Bush at the United States Chamber of Commerce, 6
November 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/
print/20031106-2.html.
44. Max Rodenbeck, New York Review of Books, 11 August 2005, citing Jonathan
Randal, Osama: The making of a terrorist (Knopf).
45. Tom Paine argued that revolutionary action against the British Crown
could overcome anxieties about God having ordained existing authorities:
if the King were overthrown, then clearly that would have been God’s will
(Tom Paine, Common Sense, first published 1776).
46. James Langton, ‘Iraq is at the centre of terror war, says Bush’, Evening
Standard, 8 September 2003.
47. Commenting on the best-selling evangelical novel, Glorious Appearing (in
which Jesus returns to earth to wipe all non-Christians from the planet),
Nicolas Kristof notes that this is surely unhelpful in relation to abuse of
Muslims in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, ‘It’s harder to feel empathy for
[ 251 ]
such people if we regard them as infidels and expect Jesus to dissolve their
tongues and eyes any day now’ (Nicholas Kristof, ‘Jesus and jihad’, New
York Times, 17 July 2004, www.nytimes.com). Many Christian evangelists
believe that the Second Coming will take place in Israel, and that the pres-
ence of Jews there is a precondition for the fulfilment of biblical prophesy
(e.g. Micklewait and Wooldridge, The Right Nation; Karen Armstrong, ‘Root
out this sinister cultural flaw’, Guardian, 6 April 2005).
48. ‘Blair calls for new law to tackle rogue states’, Times Online, 5 March 2004,
www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1-1027157,00.html.
50. Gary Younge, ‘God has a plan. Bush will hold back the evil’, Guardian, 9
October 2004.
51. Michael Ignatieff, ‘Who are Americans to think that freedom is theirs to
spread?’, New York Times Magazine, 26 June 2005, accessed at http://
www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/062605_ignatieff.htm.
52. Frank, What’s the Matter with America?, p. 229.
53. Jonathan Freedland, ‘Faith against reason’, Guardian, 20 October 2004.
54. Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 270–1.
56. Jason Burke, ‘Theatre of terror’, Guardian, 21 November 2004. Chechen leader
Shamil Basayev commented in early 2005 that his fighters would carry out
more attacks like that on the school at Beslan, Russia, ‘if only to show the
world again and again the true face of the Russian regime’, perhaps in part
through their brutal reaction (Channel 4 News Special Report, Jonathan
Miller, ‘Another Beslan?’, 3 February 2005, www.channel4.com).
57. Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘Religious terror and global war’, Global and
International Studies Program, University of California, Santa Barbara,
2002.
58. Roberts, ‘North African Islamism in the blinding Light of 9-11’; Mann,
Incoherent Empire.
59. First pre-election debate, 2004. Many of the suicide bombers in Iraq have
come from Saudi Arabia (Robert Scheer, ‘US is its own worst enemy in
Iraq’, Los Angeles Times, 17 May 2005, accessed at www.globalpolicy.org).
60. Michael Massing, ‘The unseen war’, New York Review of Books, 29 May 2003,
nybooks.com.
61. Iraqi insurgent attacks on civilians clearly cannot be justified, but the prac-
tice of creating a perceived ‘other’ acquired another predictable dimension
when Iraqi insurgents confronting superior military capability were
condemned as deceitful and cowardly. Indian novelist and activist Arund-
hati Roy observed wryly that ‘Deceit is an old tradition with us natives’.
(Arundhati Roy, ‘A strange kind of freedom’, Guardian, 2 April 2003, p. 2.)
62. See, Jonathan Steele and Dahr Jamail, ‘This is our Guernica’, Guardian, 27
April 2005.
63. ‘Blind to the truth’, leader, Guardian, 18 June 2004.
64. Jason Burke, ‘Ghost of al-Qaeda left out of story’, Observer, 27 July 2003.
65. Andrew Green, ‘Why Syria is American’s new target’, Guardian, 17 April 2003.
66. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, ‘From here to eternity’, Guardian, 8 June 2005.
[ 252 ]
NOTES
67. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Al-Qaida will retreat to Africa, says general’,

Guardian, 25 August 2005.
68. Julian Borger, ‘Bush threatens Syria over Iraq policy’, Guardian, 14
September 2005.
69. Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, pp. 169–70, citing ‘GE,
Microsoft Bring Bigotry to Life’, FAIR Action Alert, 12 February 2002,
http://www.fair.org/activism/msnbc-savage.html; cf also, Omer Bartov,
Hitler’s Army.
October 2004, p. 49, citing ‘AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib
Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade’.
71. See Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1999).
72. Tania Branigan, ‘Sister fears Guantanamo detainee may “confess”’,
Guardian, 17 June 2004.
73. In Sierra Leone, for example, electoral victory may suggest a chief has
access to hidden powers, and defeat that they have deserted him (William
P. Murphy, ‘The sublime dance of Mende politics: an African aesthetic of
charismatic power’, American Ethnologist, November 1998, 25(4): 563–82).
Chapter 8: Warding off the shame of powerlessness
1. Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on Our Deadliest Epidemic. We often imagine

that inducing shame will improve behaviour, but this is not necessarily so.
Braithwaite and Braithwaite suggested that shame could improve behav-
iour if it was clear that certain actions were being condemned rather than
the person performing the actions. Eliza Ahmed, Nathan Harris, John
Braithwaite, Valerie Braithwaite, Shame Management through Reintegration
(Cambridge University Press, 2001).
2. Hobsbawm, Bandits, p. 65. Compare Arendt, On Violence; and Michael Jack-
son, In Sierra Leone, pp. 37–8. Even at the level of bullying among children,
one can see how humiliation feeds into aggression. Camilla Batmanghe-
lidjh, founder of a charity for deprived children (Kids Company) in South-
wark, London, has observed, ‘If a child has done something wrong, try not
to make them feel all is lost. Credit them with the positive, ‘You are a
friendly person, so I don’t understand why you had to pinch her’. Then
you can negotiate. Or again, ‘Never tell a child off in front of other people
– it makes them feel powerless and ashamed. They feel forced to regain
power and will doubly humiliate you in return’ (‘This much I know’,
Observer Magazine, 10 August 2003).
3. For example, Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy.
4. Hobsbawm, Bandits.
5. See e.g. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone; Richards, Fighting for the
Rainforest.
6. See also Jackson, Inside Sierra Leone.
7. Diana Lary, ‘Warlord Soldiers’: Chinese common soldiers 1911–1937
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
[ 253 ]
8. Lary also tells us that wars in early twentieth-century China were

frequently dismissed by Chinese people at the time as the result of soldiers’
‘tiny, evil minds’: a reminder, incidentally, that there is nothing new in the
resort to ‘evil’ as an explanation for atrocity.
9. Rumsfeld himself felt the building shudder (Woodward, Bush at War, p. 24).
October 2004; on under-resourcing, see also Jones and Fay.
12. Gerges, The Far Enemy, p. 9.
13. For example, Ahmed Rashid ‘The rise of Bin Laden’, New York Review of
Books, 27 May 2004, reviewing Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars.
14. Amanda Ripley, ‘The rules of interrogation’, Time, 17 May 2004.
15. Human Rights Watch, ‘Coercive interrogation’, January 2005,
http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/3.htm.
16. Mark Danner, ‘The logic of torture’, New York Review of Books, 24 June 2004,
http://www.markdanner.com/nyreview/062404_Road_to_Torture.htm.
17. Barstow, Witchcraze, p. 132.
19. Mark Danner, ‘The logic of torture’.
20. ibid.
23. David Leigh, ‘UK forces taught torture methods’, Guardian, 8 May 2004.
24. Profile by Adam Sweeting, ‘“Will I be deported?”’, Guardian, 22 May 2003.
25. Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere, Love, Hate and Reparation (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1964), p. 8.
26. Joan Riviere, ‘Hate, greed and aggression’, in: Klein and Riviere, ibid, p. 9.
27. Stephen Mulhall, ‘Decay prone’, London Review of Books, 22 July 2004, citing
Martha Nussbaum, ‘Hiding from humanity: disgust, shame and the law’.
28. Ehrenreich, ‘Preface’.
29. Magical thinking is often most pronounced in children, whose fantasies of
changing the world through willpower and wishful thinking probably
reflect a certain powerlessness (see, e.g. Kernberg, ‘Sanctioned social
violence’, p. 689).
30. See e.g. Elizabeth Drew, ‘Hung up in Washington’, New York Review of
Books, 12 February 2004.
31. Gold, ‘Some economic considerations in the U.S. war on terrorism’, p. 4.
32. Bob Herbert, ‘Shirking America’s problems’, International Herald Tribune, 3
August 2004.
33. Justin Cartwright, ‘Rise of the new infantilism’, Guardian, 5 July 2003.
34. Edward Said, ‘A window on the world’, Guardian [G2], 2 August 2003,
http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,12084,1010417,00.html.
35. ibid.
36. There has been a failure to understand that Iraq is a country with national
pride and national sympathies, just like their own. One blogger (an Iraqi
[ 254 ]
NOTES
woman in her mid-twenties): ‘Why do Americans think that people in

Baghdad or the south or north aren’t going to care what happens in Falloo-
jeh [Fallujah] or Ramadi or Nassiriyah or Najaf? Would Americans in New
York disregard bombing and killing in California?’ (‘Baghdad burning’, 7
April 2004, http://riverbend.blogspot.com/).
39. Renowned child psychologists Jean Piaget and Barbara Inhelder refer to a
notion of causality called ‘magical-phenomenalist’; this is adhered to by
infants who attribute events to their own thoughts and actions, rather than
to relationships between external objects or people. Assimilation of new
data on relationships in the external world depends on the existing mental
structures, which in turn are modified and enriched when the subject’s
behaviour accommodates the demands of reality.
40. Transcript at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/
20050628-7.html.
41. Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire: The breakdown of the American order; see
also, James Putzel, ‘The “new” US imperialism and possibilities for co-exis-
tence’, Crisis States Research Center, paper for annual workshop, 30
August–1 September 2005; David Harvey, in conversation with Harry
Kreisler, 2004, UC Berkeley, http://globetrotter/berkeley.edu/people4/
Harvey/harvey-con0.html.
42. Putzel, ibid.
43. ibid.
44. Putzel, ibid; cf Arendt, The Human Condition, on violence springing from
weakness rather than strength; Gerges, The Far Enemy.
46. Feffer, ‘Introduction’, p. 15.
47. ‘The power of nightmares’, BBC2 TV, broadcast October 2004.
48. Emphasis in original.
49. Jessica Stern has written, ‘Many irregulars who fought in Afghanistan are
now fighting in Kashmir and are likely to continue looking for new ‘jihads’
to fight – even against Pakistan itself. She quotes a man called Khalil, a
‘mujahid’ for 19 years who can no longer imagine another life, “A person
addicted to heroin can get off it if he really tries, but a mujahid cannot leave
the jihad. I am spiritually addicted to jihad” (‘Pakistan’s jihad culture’,
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000).
50. I am grateful to Dominique Jacquin-Berdal for conversations in this area; the
idea was also taken up by Michael Ignatieff in his ‘Blood and belonging’.
51. Karen Armstrong, ‘Our role in the terror’, Guardian, 18 September 2003.
52. Some of the influence of the United States is subtle: a case of ‘soft power’
(Nye). Britain’s youth idols are still mostly singing in American accents. Or
consider 9/11 itself. According to the normal British shorthand for dates,
the Twin Towers attacks took place on 11/9/2001, or 11/9 for short.
However, nobody finds it at all odd that everyone adopts the American
order (as I have here) of 9/11.
53. As Humera Khan, a community worker in the UK, commented, ‘we are
[ 255 ]
dealing with people that are at the end of their empires. The Muslims have
not got to terms with the fact that they are no longer the ruling power.’
(‘What happened? What changed? What now?’, transcript of an open-
Democracy/Q-News meeting at Chatham House, 4 August 2005,
www.opendemocracy.net); see also, Bernard Lewis, ‘The roots of Muslim
rage’, Policy, 17(4), summer 2001–02.
55. Christopher Meyer, ‘Tony Blair and the wooing of America’, Guardian, 7
November 2005.
57. Even Alastair Campbell joked that Blair should begin a British TV address,
‘My fellow Americans’, but Blair was not laughing (Stothard, 30 Days, p. 106).
58. One small example of the concern with presentation, after Clare Short
denounced his Iraq policy as ‘reckless, reckless, reckless’, Blair was about
to go on television and asked his advisers, ‘Am I frustrated by Clare Short’s
action, or distracted?’ (Stothard, 30 Days, p. 10).
59. Tony Blair, ‘Now we must usher in a new political era of fairness’, from
speech to Labour Party Conference, Guardian, 1 October 2003.
Chapter 9: Shame, purity and violence
1. Tim Allen, ‘Understanding health’.

2. Religious leaders associated with the civil defence in Sierra Leone prom-
ised some kind of immunity to violence as long as recruits refrained from
sexual intercourse and a range of abuses against civilians (Patrick Muana,
‘The Kamajoi militia’, pp. 77–100; Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra
Leone). On Mozambique: Ken Wilson, ‘Cults of violence and counter-
violence in Mozambique’. On Uganda: Tim Allen, ‘From the Holy Spirit
Movement to the International Criminal Court’.
3. Getting women out of the workplace was part of this project.
4. Of course, blaming the Jews for calamity goes back for centuries, and
included accusations that Jews had ‘poisoned the wells’ during the Black
Death.
5. Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction, pp. 60–1.
6. See, e.g. Philip Short, Pol Pot; Ben Kiernan, ‘The Pol Pot regime’.
7. See, e.g. Mamdani, When victims become killers.
8. Thomas Friedman, ‘Smoking or non-smoking’, 14 September 2001, in:
Friedman, Longitudes and Attitudes, p.37. Two weeks later, Friedman added,
‘The more frightened our enemies are today, the fewer we will have to fight
tomorrow. … [R]ight now is the season of hunting down people who want
to destroy our country. … Every state has to know that after September 11,
harboring anti-US terrorists will be lethal.’ (‘Talk later’, 28 September 2001,
in: Friedman, ibid, pp. 44–5.)
10. ibid, p. 38.
11. ibid, p. 38-39; cf also Theweleit, Male Fantasies.
[ 256 ]
NOTES
12. Transcript at, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/

20050628-7.html.
13. ‘The power of nightmares’, BBC2 TV, broadcast October 2004. An example
of the fear of the ‘anti-war’ protestors is David Horowitz’s, Unholy Alliance.
14. See, e.g. Oliver Burkeman, ‘Religious right relishes chance to push agenda’,
Guardian, 5 November 2004.
15. Norman Mailer, ‘The election and America’s future’, New York Review of
Books, 4 November 2004, p. 13.
16. Interview with Tariq Ramadan, in: Paul Vallely, ‘We Muslims need to get
out of our intellectual and social ghettos’, Independent, 25 July 2005.
17. Robert Fisk, ‘Something happened between “I love you” and the click of
the phone: Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq turn it incendiary’, counter-
punch.org, 23–24 July 2005.
18. CNSNews.com, Information Services, ‘President Bush’s remarks to
national prayer breakfast’, 7 February 2002, http://www.cnsnews.com/
Culture/archive/200202/CUL20020207b.html.
19. Hilton, The Age of Atonement.
20. On HIV/AIDS, see, de Waal, ‘A disaster with no name’, pp. 238–67.
21. Clifford Longley, Chosen People, p. 279.
22. My own argument might be seen as falling into this category, but I hope I
have given evidence to support it!
23. Otto F. Kernberg, ‘Sanctioned social violence’, pp. 683–98. Perhaps the
strange convergence of religious interpretations of 9/11 added vehemence
to the labelling of ‘Islamic terror’ as total madness and irrevocably ‘other’.
24. ‘I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and
the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative
lifestyle, the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union], People for the American
Way, all of them who have tried to secularise America. I point the finger in their
face and say “you helped this happen”.’ (‘Falwell apologizes to gays, feminists,
lesbians’, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/14/ Falwell.apology/).
25. Alan Cooperman, ‘Some say natural catastrophe was “divine judgement”’,
Washington Post, 3 September 2005. New Orleans’ reputation as an oasis of
‘sin’ in the Bible belt seems to have fed into this.
26. See e.g. Douglas Kellner, From 9/11 to Terror War.
27. Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction, p. 61.
28. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, pp. 32–3.
29. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 2nd edn
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976).
31. Clifford Longley, Chosen People, p. 276.
34. ibid, p. 241.
35. David Hare, ‘Don’t look for a reason’, Guardian, 12 April 2003.
36. At the 2004 Republican convention, Purple Heart band-aids were distrib-
uted to ridicule Kerry’s Vietnam wounds (Joe Klein: ‘Tearing Kerry down’,
Time, 13 September 2004, p. 29).
[ 257 ]
37. Norman Mailer, ‘The election and America’s future’, p. 13.

38. David Halberstam, ‘War in a time of peace’, quoted in: Stephen Holmes,
‘Looking away’, London Review of Books, 14 November 2002, http://
www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n22/print/holm01_.html.
39. Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Anti-Europeanism in America’, Hoover Digest,
www.hoover.Stanford.edu/publications/digest/032/ash2.html, earlier
version in: New York Review of Books, 13 February 2003.
40. Robert Kagan, ‘Power and weakness’, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, June 2002, http:/www.ceip.org/files/print/2002-06-02-policy
review.htm.
41. Timothy Garton Ash, ibid.
42. ibid.
43. Gary Aldrich, ‘Death by liberal’, WorldNetDaily.com, 2001,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/526269/posts.
44. Quoted in Frank, What’s the Matter with America? p. 278.
45. Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 47, 208.
47. ibid, p. 25.
48. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 245; Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 249.
49. Stothard, ibid, pp. 146–7.
50. MSNBC News, ‘The Mohamed Atta files’, 31 October 2005.
51. See, e.g., Evan Wright, Generation Kill.
52. Allen Feldman, ‘Abu Ghraib: ceremonies of nostalgia’, 18 October 2004,
opendemocracy.net; see also, Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, ‘One
huge US jail’, Guardian Weekend, 19 March 2005.
53. James Sturcke and agencies, ‘US soldiers “desecrated Taliban bodies”’,
Guardian, 20 October 2005.
54. Cf also Faludi, Stiffed.
55. Timothy McVeigh, executed for his role in the Oklahoma bombing, would
carry copies of The Turner Diaries with him, often selling them at bargain
prices. Though The Turner Diaries author William Pierce denies it,
McVeigh’s phone records suggest he spoke several times with the author
shortly before the Oklahoma attack (Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of
God, pp. 31, 248–9). The Turner Diaries describes an attack on a Federal
building, using a truck and a similar quantity of ammonium nitrate fertil-
izer and fuel oil to that used in the Oklahoma bombing (ibid, p. 32).
56. The Turner Diaries, p. 42, in: Juergensmeyer, ibid, p. 205.
57. Juergensmeyer, ibid, p. 205. British colonial rhetoric frequently referred to
Indians in effeminate terms and India’s nationalist movement reacted against
perceived emasculation (ibid). For example, when the Hindu nationalist BJP
(Bharatiya Janata Party) conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the Hindu chauvin-
ist and leader of the Shiv Sena party, Balasaheb K. Thackeray, said the 1998
nuclear tests proved that Indians were ‘not eunuchs’ (ibid). Cf Goopta.
58. ibid, p. 34.
59. Barry and Lobe, ‘The people’, in: Fetter, Power Trip, p. 41. On the influence
of these think-tanks, see particularly, Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The
Right Nation.
[ 258 ]
NOTES

61. Rory McCarthy, Patrick Wintour and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Bomb critics
are emotional says Short as war intensifies’, Guardian, 19 October 2001.
62. Polly Toynbee, ‘Limp liberals fail to protect their most profound values’,
63. Gilligan, Violence.
64. See, e.g. Zur, Violent Memories; Summerfield, ‘The social experience of war’.
This is something regularly encountered by counsellors dealing with grief
and trauma. In Guatemala, victims of the US-backed genocidal counterinsur-
gency in the early 1980s often asked what they had done, either as individu-
als or as villagers, to bring such violence down upon them. As one
human-rights researcher told me, ‘People didn’t understand. They said, “We
must have committed a very bad sin, but what sin could that be?”’ A sense of
guilt among the victims of violence was actively promoted by the
Guatemalan government; it used a system of sticks and carrots to get indige-
nous people to participate in violence against each other; and it put tight
controls on flows of information so that isolated villages would ask why it
was that they had been singled out for retribution (Keen, ‘Demobilising
Guatemala’).
66. Barbara Kingsolver, Los Angeles Times, 23 September 2001, cited in: David
Held, ‘Violence, law and justice in a global age’, 1, www.polity.co.uk/
global/sept11.htm.
67. David Held, ibid, says he was initially angered by the statement but then
found it helpful in connecting to his own cosmopolitan leanings.
68. www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A55511-2002Aug23; Rampton
and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, p. 151.
69. Horowitz, Unholy Alliance, p. 123.
70. ibid, p. 165.
71. ibid, p. 229.
72. Rampton and Stauber, Banana Republicans, p. 3.
73. ibid, p. 15.
74. Stanford, The Devil: A biography, p. 91.
75. Miller’s play The Crucible brings out the role in persecution of projection:
your own violent thoughts can be projected onto others.
76. Karen Armstrong, ‘Our role in the terror’, Guardian, 18 September 2003;
Dan De Luce, ‘The spectre of Operation Ajax’, Guardian, 20 August 2003.
77. Noam Chomsky, ‘One man’s just war is global terror’, Sunday Independent
[South Africa], 13 July 2003.
78. See, e.g. Mahmoud Mamdani on his own study ‘Good Muslim, bad
Muslim’, www.ssrc/org/sept11/essays/mamdani.htm.
79. Federation of American Scientists, ‘Fast facts: US arms exports’,
Washington, 2005, http://www.fas.org/asmp/fash_facts.htm.
80. Kepel, Jihad.
81. Kepel, ibid, p. 315. By 1982, the Afghan jihad was getting US$600 million
in US aid per year (Kepel, ibid, p. 143).
82. Kepel, Jihad.
[ 259 ]
83. Felicity Lawrence, ‘Aid against terror’, Guardian, 28 September 2001.

84. Kepel, ibid, p. 298; Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, p. 19.
86. Norm Dixon, ‘How the US armed Saddam Hussein with chemical
weapons’, Green Left Weekly, 28 August 2002, www.greenleft.org.
87. Michael Dobbs, ‘US had key role in Iraq buildup’, Washington Post, 30
December 2002, cited in Rampton and Stauber, ibid, pp. 19–20.
89. Nick Cohen, ‘A time for friends’, Observer, 6 April 2003.
90. Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby.
91. Human Rights Watch, ‘Genocide in Iraq: the Anfal Campaign against the
Kurds’, 1993, http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALINT.htm.
92. For example, Keen, The Kurds in Iraq.
93. Rampton and Stauber, ibid, pp. 76–7.
94. Seumas Milne, ‘Barbarity is the inevitable consequence of foreign rule’,
Guardian, 27 January 2005.
95. Quoted in Jonathan Steele’s ‘Shaper of a nation’s conscience’, Guardian, 8
March 2003.
96. Nicholas Pye, ‘Schools ignore it – but is it time for the empire to strike
back’, Guardian, 5 July 2003.
97. Richard Drayton, ‘An ethical blank cheque’, Guardian, 10 May 2005.
98. Jonathan Raban, ‘The greatest Gulf’, Guardian, 19 April 2003.
99. Jonathan Glancey, ‘Our last occupation’, Guardian, 19 April 2003.
100. Quoted in: Mark Danner, ‘The logic of torture’ New York Review of Books, 24
June 2004.
101. Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam: The war
correspondent as hero, propagandist and myth maker (London: Pan, 1989).
102. Massing, ‘Now they tell us’, New York Review of Books, 26 February 2004, p. 45.
104. ibid, p. 192.
105. The military contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq came overwhelm-
ingly from the United States and the United Kingdom (with a bit from
Australia, Poland, Denmark and South Korea). By the time the war began,
the United States had 30 nations willing to be publicly named as support-
ing the war, and claimed to have 15 more that secretly supported it. These
15 represented a bizarre form of ‘support’ and were quickly dubbed the
‘coalition of the unwilling to be named’. It was hardly the most ringing
endorsement. Within the UN Security Council, a variety of sticks and
carrots were used in attempts by US and UK officials to get agreement to
an attack on Iraq; a new resolution would require agreement from 9 of the
15 members. Permanent members Russia and France were wooed with the
promise of oil contracts and financial compensation. Russia was appeased
with blacklisting Chechen rebel groups. Other Security Council members
received various inducements and threats. However, the USA never
managed to secure the votes necessary even on the Security Council to
authorize war with Iraq (see, e.g. Rampton and Stauber, ibid).
106. One intriguing and disorienting implication of James Gilligan’s argument
[ 260 ]
NOTES
– not fully spelled out by him – is that our most immoral actions may stem
precisely from our moral impulses, since without these we would have no
sense of shame in the first place. In this context, Bush’s and Blair’s appar-
ently deep sense of their own morality might be expected to bring a height-
ened threat of shame, and an unusually aggressive response to criticism, of
the kind we have seen.
108. Bush promoted Rice to Secretary of State instead of Powell. Rumsfeld kept
his job. Wolfowitz became President of the World Bank. Alberto Gonzales,
who commissioned the memos justifying torture, became Attorney
General (Seymour Hersh, ‘The unknown unknowns of the Abu Ghraib
scandal’, Guardian, 21 May 2005).
110. In her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt shows how opposition
to the Nazi project of expulsion and extermination – though relatively rare
– could be remarkably effective, as in the case of Danish officials working
under Nazi occupation. The Nazis (including Eichmann himself) were
always emboldened by lack of opposition to their world view, but they
were not all-powerful.
111. Timothy Garton Ash, ‘No more Jeeves’, Guardian, 30 September 2004; see
also, Short, An Honourable Deception?, p. 159; Christopher Meyer, ‘How
Britain failed to check Bush in the run up to war’, Guardian, 7 November
2005.
113. See also, Short, ibid.
115. Kernberg, ‘Sanctioned social violence’, p. 693.
116. Another (and few have taken this process to a more bloody extreme) was
the persecution of internal enemies by the Khmer Rouge in their policy of
perpetual revolution.
117. Minimal and shrinking black support for the Republican Party.
118. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Research Institute, 2003,
‘Report on hate crimes and discrimination against Arab Americans,
September 11 2001 to October 11 2002’, Washington D.C.
119. Nigel Morris, ‘Muslims made to feel like an enemy within by Islamopho-
bic attitudes, report concludes’, Independent, 3 June 2004.
120. Hugh Muir, ‘British Council official sacked over anti-Islam articles’,
121. Anthony Browne, ‘The triumph of the East’, Guardian, 27 January 2005,
frontpagemag.com.
122. Three out of four were born in Britain.
123. William Bennett, Open letter, New York Times, 10 March 2002, quoted in:
Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, p. 150.
124. Elizabeth Drew, ‘Hung up in Washington’, New York Review of Books, 12
February 2004.
125. Michael Massing, ‘Now they tell us’, New York Review of Books, 26 Febru-
ary 2004, p. 45. By contrast, a kind of pack mentality encouraged more
[ 261 ]
feisty criticisms of Bush once the main Iraq offensive was over (Massing,
ibid).
126. William Kristol, ‘The axis of appeasement’, Weekly Standard, 26 August–2
September 2002.
127. Barry and Lobe, in Feffer, Power Trip, p. 46. See, e.g. Michelle Goldberg,
‘Osama university?’, 6 November 2003, www.salon.com.
128. See, e.g. Paul Harris, ‘Besieged Bush faces attacks from friends as well as
foes’, Observer, 30 October 2005.
129. Andrew Sparrow, ‘New law to stop flow of volunteers to terror camps’,
News Telegraph, 16 July 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.
jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/16/ncleric16.xml.
130. Simon Jenkins, ‘This is an act of censorship worthy of Joseph Goebbels’,
131. Joan Didion, 2003, ‘Fixed ideas: America since 9.11, New York’, New York
Review Book, p. 14.
132. Antonius Robben ‘The fear of indifference’.
133. Extracts from letter to Alastair Campbell, Guardian, 28 June 2003.
134. Ewen MacAskill, ‘”It was a slip of the tongue”’, Guardian, 18 September
2003.
135. Ramani Chelliah, letter to the Guardian, 28 June 2003.
136. Matt Wells, ‘Study deals a blow to claims of anti-war bias in BBC news’,
Guardian, 4 July 2003).
137. See, e.g. Sidney Blumenthal, ‘Bush’s other war’, Guardian, 1 November
2003.
138. Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Anti-Europeanism in America’, Hoover Digest,
www.hoover.Stanford.edu/publications/digest/032/ash2.html, earlier
version in New York Review of Books, 13 February 2003.
139. Steve Dunleavy, ‘How dare the French forget’, New York Post, 10 February
2003.
140. Thomas Friedman, ‘Take France off the Security Council’, New York Times,
in: Guardian, 11 February 2003.
142. Thomas Friedman, ‘Take France off the Security Council’.
143. Joe Klein: ‘Tearing Kerry down’, Time, 13 September 2004, p. 29.
144. Author’s own research, www.crisistates.com.
145. See, e.g. Faludi, Stiffed.
146. Ewen MacAskill, ‘What happens now inside Iraq?’, Guardian, 15 December
2003.
147. Paul Rogers, ‘Iraq’s end to optimism’, 28 April 2005, opendemocracy.net.
148. Rory McCarthy, ‘Just another day in Baghdad’, Guardian, 19 June 2003.
149. See, e.g. Wright, Generation Kill.
150. Mark Franchetti, ‘Slaughter at the bridge of death: US Marines fire on civil-
ians’, CounterPunch, 31 March 2003, www.counterpunch.org/franchetti
03312003.
151. Scott Johnson, ‘Inside an enemy cell’, Newsweek, 18 August 2003, p. 17.
152. Julian Borger, contribution to ‘Iraqis wait for US troops to leave … as wives
clamour for their return’, Guardian, 5 July 2003.
[ 262 ]
NOTES
153. ibid.
154. See e.g. Naomi Klein, ‘Die, then vote. This is Falluja’, Guardian, 13
November 2004.
155. See e.g. CNN, ‘U.S. forces raid al-Sadr home in Najaf’, 12 August 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/08/12/iraq.main/.
156. Seumas Milne, ‘The right to resist’, Guardian, 19 June 2003.
157. Anger towards senior officers was also obvious, Bob Graham reported
from Iraq. Specialist Anthony Castillo: ‘We’re more angry at the generals
who are making these decisions and who never hit the ground, and who
don’t get shot at or have to look at the bloody bodies and the burnt-out
bodies’ (Bob Graham, ‘I just pulled the trigger’); see also, Michael Moore,
Will They Ever Trust Us Again?, as well as Institute for Policy Studies and
Foreign Policy in Focus, 2004, ‘A failed transition’, www.globalpolicy.org.
158. These tensions are mentioned in Wright, Generation Kill, p. 249.
159. Naomi Wolf, ‘We Americans are like recovering addicts after a four-year
bender’, Guardian, 7 November 2005.
160. Kampfner, Blair’s Wars.
161. Michael Quinlan, ‘Blair had taken us towards an elective dictatorship’,
162. Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Low key tactics under review’, Guardian, 25 June
2003.
163. Cohen, States of Denial, e.g., p. 103.
Chapter 10: Culture and magic
1. See e.g. Sidney Blumenthal, ‘The Bush nemesis’, Guardian, 20 October 2005.
2. Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Right Nation.
3. Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776), http:///gppsk.ab.ca~rgilson/
courses/ss23/t_paine_commonsense.html.
4. Owen Harries, ‘Understanding America’, CIS Lectures, Center for Inde-
pendent Studies, 222.cis.org.au/Events/CISlectures/2002/Harries 030402.
htm.
5. Godfrey Hodgson, ‘Bush vs Kerry: what sort of people do we want to be?’,
27 October 2004, opendemocracy.net.
6. ‘The power of nightmares’, BBC2 TV, broadcast 27 October 2004. (Of
course, if the world were like that, we might be more secure; but how do you
get to there from here?)
7. The bit of Tom Paine he didn’t quote: ‘Even the distances at which the
Almighty hath placed England and America, is a strong natural proof, that
the authority of the one, over the other, was never the design of Heaven.’
(Thomas Paine, ibid.)
8. American singer-songwriter Steve Earle has made this point eloquently
(‘Pop and politics: Steve Earl’, BBC2 TV, broadcast 11 April 2005).
9. See, e.g. Zinn, A People’s History of the United States; Stannard, American
Holocaust. It seems possible that this has fed into sympathy for Israel,
another frontier society where some have seen themselves as bringing
fertility to the desert and expanding at the expense of an inferior people.
[ 263 ]
10. Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics.

12. Contemporaries at Yale report Bush as like the John Belushi character in the
1978 film Animal House, a drink-fuelled fun-seeker. Bush ‘was aggressively
anti-intellectual and hostile to east-coast preppy types like his father’
(Oliver James, ‘So George, how do you feel about your mom and dad?’,
Guardian [G2], 2 September 2003, p. 6).
15. ibid, p. 17.
16. Thomas Frank, ‘What’s the matter with liberals?’ New York Review of Books,
12 May 2005.
18. As the character played by Johnny Depp says at the end of the film Pirates
of the Caribbean, ‘sometimes it takes a pirate to catch a pirate’.
19. There are other films which present a different picture – for example,
Insomnia with Al Pacino (a re-make of a Norwegian film) where a
murderer plays on the tortured, sleepless conscience of a cop who fabri-
cated evidence against someone he ‘knew’ (but could not prove) was a
child murderer. In the final scene, the cop warns a young female
detective of the price she will pay if she too presumes to know better
than the law.
20. See also Denzel Washington in Man on Fire (Alex Cox, ‘Column’, Guardian,
6 August 2004). Torture-with-a-point also features in the popular US TV
show Lost.
21. Mailer, Why Are We at War?, p. 54.
24. Noy Thrupkaew, ‘Culture’, in: Feffer, Power Trip, p. 109.
25. Adekeye Adebajo, ‘Time to stand up to the Wild West’ Sowetan, 14 October
2002; Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception.
27. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (chapter 6), accessed at: http://www.hitler.org/
writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch06.html.
28. ibid.
30. Al Gore, ‘Democracy itself is in grave danger’, Common Dreams News
Center, http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0624-15.htm.
32. ibid, p. 102.
33. Mark Duffield refers to the ‘magical nature’ of the belief that relatively
small amounts of aid (at a time when development aid to war-torn soci-
eties has all but disappeared) can have a major influence over peace and
good governance (Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, p. 98).
34. For example, Lenor, Volkswagen, Twix. The more unreliable people
become in a fickle and materialist world, the more plausible this sales-pitch
becomes.
[ 264 ]
NOTES
36. Robert Scheer, ‘Fiddling while crucial programs starve’, Los Angeles Times,
www.latimes.com.
37. Washington Post, editorial, 4 August 2003, in: Guardian, ‘The editor’, 5
August 2003. Iraq was part of forgetting Afghanistan, where ‘The goal has
never been to get bin Laden’ (General Richard Myers, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2002). Donald Rumsfeld commented helpfully,
‘[bin Laden] is alive or dead. He’s in Afghanistan or somewhere else’,
(Brendan O’Neill, ‘War against what?’, tompaine.com, 10 July 2002).
39. Scheer, ibid.
40. Matthew Engel, ‘Pentagon hawk at war with his own side’, Guardian, 13
March 2003. Internal Pentagon plans assumed an occupation force of only
around 30,000 troops (Clarke, Against all Enemies, p. 270).
41. On this, see, Dan Plesch, ‘Shock, awe – and tanks’, Guardian, 18 April 2003.
42. Jonathan Steele, ‘Fighting the wrong war’, Guardian, 11 December 2001. A
similar point is made by Conetta, Strange Victory.
43. Richard Doyle, ‘Minding the globe or making a mesh of it’, 17–19 July 2004,
Security Bytes conference, Lancaster University.
44. American writer Naomi Wolf commented after Hurricane Katrina, ‘Like
recovering addicts who have taken a step into a 12-step programme, we are
ready at last to hear how we have harmed others – and to try to make
amends’ (Naomi Wolf, ‘We Americans are like recovering addicts after a
four-year bender’, Guardian, 7 November 2005).
47. ibid, p. 180.
48. Franken, Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them, p. 374.
50. Natasha Walter, ‘In pursuit of spotless minds’, Guardian, 26 April 2004.
51. Michael Duffy and Nancy Gibbs, ‘Defender in chief’, Time, 5 November 2001.
53. Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place.
54. Paul Rogers, ‘A jewel for al-Qaida’s crown’, 11 August 2005, opendemoc-
racy.net.
55. Max Rodenbeck, New York Review of Books, 11 August 2005.
58. Ron Fournier, ‘Bush heads for Asian summit, says world behind U.S.’, Tulsa
World, 18 October 2001.
59. Shortly after Bush took office, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer
rejected calls for drivers to reduce fuel consumption, saying, ‘The President
believes it’s an American way of life. … The American way of life is a
blessed one’ (Singer, The President of Good and Evil, p. 135).
60. See e.g. Hanif Kureishi, ‘The arduous conversation will continue’,
61. CNN, ‘Bush makes historic speech aboard warship’, 1 May 2003.
[ 265 ]
www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript/; Goff, Full Spectrum

Disorder, p. 104.
62. Time, index, 26 May 2003, p. 3.
63. See Robert Cooper, ‘The new liberal imperialism’, Observer Worldview
Extra, 7 April 2002, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/
story/0,11581, 680095,00.html; also, ‘Why we still need empires’, The
Observer, 7 April 2002 http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/
0,11581,680117,00.html. Cooper is surely right that there are benefits from
accommodating the desire of Balkan states and Turkey to be part of the
European Union, but the connection with Iraq and Afghanistan is obscure.
64. See e.g. Moore, Will They Ever Trust Us Again?
65. Julian Borger, contribution to ‘Iraqis wait for US troops to leave … as wives
clamour for their return’, Guardian, July 5 2003.
67. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, p. 24.
68. ibid, p.2.
69. ibid, p. 25.
70. Noam Chomsky, ‘Reasons to fear U.S.’, Toronto Star, 7 September 2003,
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20030907.htm.
71. Robert Cooper, ‘Why we still need empires’, Observer, 7 April 2002
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,680117,00.html.
72. Robert Kagan, ‘The healer’, Guardian, 3 March 2003.
73. Robert Kagan, ‘Power and weakness’, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, June 2002, http:/www.ceip.org/files/print/2002-06-02-
policyreview.htm, p. 16.
74. ibid.
75. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 64.
76. ibid, p. 64.
77. ibid, p. 65.
78. Thomas Friedman, ‘Take France off the security council’, New York Times, in:
Guardian, 11 February 2003. Compare also the idea of the ‘domain of Islam’
and the ‘domain of war’, invoked to justify slavery in Sudan, for example
(Keen, The Benefits of Famine). A variation of Friedman’s distinction is the
Manichean distinction between ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’. In probably the
most sophisticated newspaper in the United States, Friedman wrote, ‘If we
are going to be stomping around the world wiping out terrorist cells from
Kabul to Manila, we’d better make sure that we are the best country, and the
best global citizens, we can be. … That means not just putting a fist in the face
of the world’s bad guys, but also offering a hand up for the good guys’ (‘Ask
not what’, New York Times, 9 December 2001, in: Friedman, Longitudes and
Attitudes, p. 87).
79. Barry Buzan, ‘Who may we bomb?’, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds),
Worlds in Collision (Palgrave, New York and London, 2002).
80. Vikram Dodd and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Video of 7/7 ringleader says
policy was to blame’, Guardian, 2 September 2005.
81. Michael Ignatieff, ‘Could we lose the war on terror? Lesser evils’, New York
Times Magazine, 2 May 2004.
[ 266 ]
NOTES
82. ibid.
83. ibid.
84. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
85. Edward Said, ‘The clash of ignorance’, Media Monitors’ Network, 2001,
http://www.mediamonitors.net/edward40.html.
86. Compare the view of British anthropologist David Turton outlined in
Chapter 2, ‘Ethnicity … may be a result of conflict as much as a cause of it’.
87. Berman, Terror and Liberalism.
88. It is worth noting that terrorist attacks have often centred on soft-targets in
places where the Islamic world meets the Western world: as in the Bali
bombings in 2002. As noted, the Nazis successfully redefined assimilation
as pollution, and the implication drawn was that the pollutant or infection
should be eliminated.
89. Huntington later stated, in Who Are We? America’s great debate (2nd edn,
London, Simon and Schuster, 2005), that America had a ‘mainstream’ and
‘core’ Anglo-Protestant culture and a number of ‘subcultures’ which also
shared in this mainstream culture.
90. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, p. 3.
91. ibid.
92. ibid, pp. 131–63.
93. CNN, ‘Dershowitz: torture could be justified’, 4 March 2003, http://
edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz/.
94. Significantly, Dershowitz explicitly sees terrorism as a top-down phenom-
enon where leaders are more important than any followers radicalised by
counter-terror (Dershowitz, ibid, p. 33).
95. Jason Burke, ‘Al-Qaida is now an idea, not an organisation’, Guardian, 4
August 2005.
96. Pratap Chatterjee and Deepa Fernandes, ‘Returning to life’, Alternet, 18
July 2005, www.globalpolicy.org.
97. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 19.
98. ibid, p. 8.
99. ibid.
100. ibid.
Times Magazine, 2 May 2004.
102. Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
103. ibid.
Times Magazine, 2 May 2004. Ignatieff supported the 2003 Iraq war. Paul
Berman, Terror and Liberalism.
105. Stephen Holmes, ‘Looking away’, London Review of Books, 14 November
2002, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n22/print/holm01_.html.
106. Ben Rawlence, ‘Tony Blair is the original neocon’, Guardian, 23 October
2004. Blair’s belief that ‘in the end, values and interests merge’ would be
strongly supported by the neo-cons. The UK government’s mantra has
been that security is best promoted by ‘the spread of our values’.
[ 267 ]
108. ibid, p. 386.
Chapter 11: Conclusion
1. Henry Jenkins, ‘A war of words over Iraq video games’, Guardian, 15

November 2003.
2. Cf Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.
3. Fables de la Fontaine, Jean de la Varende and Felix Lorioux (eds) (Nantes:
Beuchet and Vanden Brugge, 1949), translated for the author by Paddy Keen.
4. See e.g. Chris Mooney, ‘Inferior design’, American Prospect Online, 8
October 2005, http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-view.ww
?id=10084.
5. Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956).
6. See e.g. Caro Baroja, The World of the Witches.
7. David Held, ‘Violence, law and justice in a global age’, n.d.,
www.polity.co.uk/global/sept11.htm.
8. See e.g. Jennifer Schirmer, 1999, ‘The Guatemalan politico-military project:
legacies for a violence peace?’ Latin American Perspectives, March, 26(2):
92–107; Keen, ‘Demobilising Guatemala’.
9. For example, Woodward, Bush at War.
10. Jason Burke, ‘The Arab backlash the militants didn’t expect’, Observer, 20
June 2004.
12. Svante Cornell, ‘Crime without borders’, Axess Magazine, 2004,
http://www.axess.se/english/archive/2004/nr6/currentissue.
p. 34. But see, e.g Global Witness, ‘For a few dollars more’.
15. Michael Duffy, ‘One expert’s verdict: the CIA caved under pressure’, Time,
14 June 2004.
16. Julian Borger, ‘FBI fails to cope with huge backlog of terror tapes’,
17. Human Rights Watch, ‘Violent response: the US army in al-Falluja’, June
2003.
18. Nick Cohen, ‘Come on, you liberals’, Observer, 4 November 2001.
19. Jeremy Seabrook, ‘The making of a fanatic’, Guardian, 20 December 2001;
Maruf Khwaja, ‘Terrorism, Islam, reform: thinking the unthinkable’, 28 July
20. See e.g. Gold, ‘Some economic considerations in the U.S. war on terrorism’.
21. George Monbiot, ‘The victims of the tsunami pay the price of war on Iraq’,
Guardian, 4 January 2005.
22. Grace Livingstone and Owen Boycott, ‘Aid cash diverted to Iraq’,
23. Talk by Ben Wisner, ‘Terrorism and development’ workshop, Development
Studies Institute, LSE, London, 17 October 2005.
24. Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, War Economies in a Regional Context: Chal-
lenges of Transformation (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner), p. 111.
[ 268 ]
NOTES
25. See notably Jo Beall, ‘Cities, terrorism and development’, Journal of Interna-
tional Development, 2006, 8(1).
26. On these dangers, see notably Isabel Hilton, ‘Hearts and minds at any cost’,
27. Madeleine Albright and Robin Cook, ‘We must cut our nuclear arsenals’,
Guardian, 9 June 2004.
28. ibid.
29. Moore, Dude, Where’s My Country?, p. 24.
30. ‘What happened? What changed? What now?’, transcript of an open-
Democracy/Q-News meeting at Chatham House, 4 August 2005,
www.opendemocracy.net.
31. A pioneer in behaviourism was Burrhus Skinner, who showed how you
could change the behaviour of rats through changing the rewards and
punishments you applied to them. Of course, incentives and punishments
can make a difference to human behaviour. But one problem with applying
behaviourism to human beings is that humans are often aware of attempts
to manipulate them, and this awareness itself is likely to affect their
response. For example, many people in Serbia resented the attempt to
manipulate their behaviour through sanctions. As one young Serbian
woman working for an NGO told me, ‘Many people were against Milose-
vic, but then reacted to sanctions by saying, “Don’t tell me what I should
be thinking and doing!”’ She said of NATO’s 1999 bombing, ‘Bombing was
good for Milosevic, and to be anti-Milosevic was to be pro-NATO’.
32. Peter Burnell, ‘Democracy promotion: the elusive quest for grand strate-
gies’, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft (2004), 204(3): 100–16.
33. See, e.g. Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Thinking about developmental states in
Africa’, Cambridge Journal of Economics (2001), 25.
34. Ronan Bennett, contribution to ‘What would you do?’, Guardian, 28
February 2003.
35. Jonathan Steele, ‘It feels like 1967 all over again’, Guardian, 9 April 2003.
36. David Held, ‘Violence, law and justice in a global age’, 1,
www.polity.co.uk/global/sept11.htm.
37. Edward Said, ‘A window on the world’, Guardian [G2], 2 August 2003.
38. ibid.
39. ibid.
41. Manji, The Trouble with Islam Today, pp. 13–14.
42. Said, ibid.
[ 269 ]
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[ 278 ]
Keen14index.qxd 13/02/2006 16:03 Page 279
Index
Note: arabic compounds with al- (Operation Enduring Freedom)
and bin are alphabeticized under (2001), 16–17, 36, 86, 118, 156,
the following component. Notes are 162, 170, 197, 198, 199
indexed in the form, e.g., 222n2-21 connection with 9/11, 16
(page 222, note 21 for chapter 2). continuing US operations in, 19
deaths of civilians, 25–6
9/11, 69, 138, 145–6, 148, 201, 219, humanitarian problems, 29, 108,
256–7n8-52 170
attitudes to responses to, 11, 146 media coverage, 198
cost of mounting attacks, 18 neglect of reconstruction, 107–8
failure to explain, 98 oil pipeline, 70
failure to prevent, 120 and Pakistan, 48, 62
hijackers, 40–2, 43, 117 reconstruction funds, 26
responses to, 16, 34–5, 46, 64, 86, refugees from, 25
90, 118, 145–6, 163–4, 168, 199, resistance/terrorism in, 18–19,
211 224n2-71 (see also al-Qaida)
suggested involvement of Iraq, Taliban rule in, 42 (see also
133, 194 Taliban)
US disproportionate emphasis Transitional Administration, 108
on, 151 war/resistance against Soviet
US shame over, 160–1, 165–6 Union, 12, 32, 44, 174, 187
45-minute claim, 12, 122, 184 Africa
al-Qaida in, 10, 17
A attitudes of Muslims in, 44
Abdullah, King of Jordan, 86 agriculture
Abouhalima, Mahmoud, 43 destruction of crops, 59–60
Abu Ghraib, 6, 27–8, 113–14, 139, in Kansas, 93–4
143, 146, 148, 149, 168, 177, 208, aid see humanitarian aid
213, 252n7-47 Aideed, Mohamed, 106
media coverage, 32, 34, 36, AIDS, 164
245n5-103 Ailes, Roger, 76
Abu Sayyaf, 46–7 Aldrich, Gary, 167
Aburish, Said, 45 Algeria, 45, 60, 175, 214
‘action as propaganda’, 131–44 attitudes to USA in, 13, 55
Adams, Brad, 77 terrorists in, 44, 45
Adebajo, Adekeye, 176, 242n5–19 war of independence, 36, 58
al-Adl, Seif, 46 Ali, Hazrat, 109
advertising, 194–201, 212 Allawi, Prime Minister Iyad, 113,
see also propaganda 186
Afghanistan, 16–18, 25–7, 29–30, Allen, Tim, 105, 160, 231n3-4
45–6, 53, 62–3, 70, 86–7, 174, 205 American Enterprise Institute, 21
army, 26 anger, 55–6
attack by US and allies outside target countries, 31–48
[ 279 ]
INDEX
within countries targeted by Bernhardt, Michael, 83, 179

US/coalition action, 25–31 Beyani, Chaloka, 15
Arab world Big Brother, 195
sense of humiliation and pride, Blair, Prime Minister Tony, 2, 11, 21,
31–48 77, 82, 84, 103, 122, 123, 138, 167,
sense of nationalism, 33–4 178, 182–3, 185, 189, 191, 251n7-
see also Islam, Muslims, Arab 24, 251n7-25, 251n7-28,
countries by name 268–9n10-106
Arafat, Yasser, 106 administration of, 59
Arar, Maher, 76 claimed humanitarianism, 209
Arendt, Hannah, 4, 36–7, 38, 56–7, claimed instincts, 124
89, 91, 100, 131–2, 136–7, 140, comments on Iraq, 134–5
144, 153, 155, 194, 261n9-110 comments on need for more
Argentina, 183 military action, 22
Armitage, Richard, 116 comments on North Korea, 21
arms see weapons comments on terrorist attacks in
Armstrong, Karen, 157 UK, 13
Arquilla, Jon, 110 delusions of grandeur, 157
Arroyo, President Gloria, 78 and entourage, 170, 179, 200–1
Aschcroft, John, 166 meetings with Bush, 135,
Ashley, Jackie, 189 251n7–24
Atta, Mohamed, 117, 168, 222n2–21 relationship with Bush, 158, 179,
‘axis of evil’, 36, 90, 106, 195 180
see also evil, terror personality, 97–8, 125, 168
Ayalon, Ami, 202 preoccupation with personal
Aznar, Prime Minister José Maria, legacy, 24
77, 134, 179, 190 preoccupation with
presentation, 256n8-59
B and religion, 126, 248n6-80
Bagram airbase prison, 27, 118, 207 and wars, 209
Balthazor, Andrew, 111, 112 Blix, Hans, 11, 15, 100–1, 120, 169,
Bamford, James, 215 196, 201
Barstow, Anne, 98 blogs/bloggers, Iraqi, 14, 28,
Bartov, Omer, 160–1, 187, 249n7-5 255n8–36
Basayev, Shamil, 63, 252n7-56 Blumenthal, Sidney, 75–6
Batasuna, 77 Blunkett, David, 13, 77
Batmanghelidjh, Camilla, 253n8-2 bombings, terrorist, 8, 13, 56, 106,
Battle of Algiers, The, 58 222n2-35, 229n2-199, 233n3-46,
BBC, 183–4 240n4-26
Bechtel, 69 see also terror, suicide killers,
Beers, Charlotte, 194 individual countries by name
Begg, Moazzam, 207 bombings, US military, 25
Bennett, Ronan, 61, 218 ‘no decent targets in
Bennett, William, 182 Afghanistan’, 87
Berlusconi, Prime Minister Silvio, see also ‘war on terror’, Iraq
102, 134 Booth, Cherie, 183
Berman, Paul, 206, 209 Borger, Julian, 201, 215
[ 280 ]
INDEX
Bosnia, 64, 175, 206, 209 administration of), 15, 64, 167,
Bouteflika, President Abdenaziz, 45 175
Brazil, 237n3-131 Bush, Jeb, 116
Bremer, Paul, 110, 187 Buzan, Barry, 204–5
Brookings Institution, 10
Brown, Gordon, 135, 251n7-24 C
Browne, Anthony, 181 Calley, William, 88
Burke, Jason, 19, 45–6, 55–6, 213–14 Cambodia, 63, 68, 106, 161, 173,
Burns, John, 42 261n9-116
Bush, President George W. Campbell, Alastair, 166, 168, 179,
administration links with oil 184, 189, 256n8-57
industry, 69–70 Campbell, Beatrix, 135
attitude to history, 24, 137–8, Campbell, Gordon, 60–1
225n2-115 Cannistraro, Vincent, 121
claimed instincts, 124 Card, Andy, 194
comments on al-Qaida, 10, 13, Carlyle Group, 64
155, 172, 194–5, 220n2-5 Cartwright, Justin, 152
comments on humanitarian aid, Caruso, J.T., 18
29–30 Castillo, Anthony, 263n9-157
comments on Iran, 2 casualties
comments on Iraq, 121–2, 127, deaths see deaths
155, 178, 194–5 wounding of troops, 14, 25
comments on politicians, 166 Center for International Policy, 121
comments on pre-emptive Chabal, Patrick, 96–7
attacks, 20, 123 Chalabi, Ahmad, 121
comments on war on terror, 2, 8, chaos/order world split, 202–5
48, 84, 90, 118, 133, 134, 200, Chechnya, 17, 53, 60, 63, 64, 78, 175,
239n4-4, 243n4-47 214, 233n3-46, 252n7-56
criticism of Clinton functions of war in, 75
administration, 162 terrorist attacks in, 13, 222n2-35
entourage, 178–9 Cheney, Vice-President Dick, 64, 68,
as governor of Texas, 85 69–70, 77, 86, 101, 115, 116, 162,
personality, 97, 126–7, 153, 163, 166
167–8, 264n10-12 comments on war on terror, 8
political tactics, 75–6, 223n2–50 Cheney, Lynne, 182
re-election, 162–3, 251n7–42 Chevron (Oil), 64, 70
references to evil, 8 China, 70, 254n8-8
and religion, 163–4 internal repression, 77
response to 9/11, 11 military capabilities, 15
State of the Union speech, US attitudes to, 21
January 2002, 8 Chomsky, Noam, 5, 13, 65, 68, 173
State of the Union speech, Churchill, Winston, 177
spring 2003, 122 CIA, 120–2, 174, 215
tax cuts, 92 funding of radical groups, 19, 174
wrecking non-violent efforts, renditions 27
215 rivalry with FBI, 215
Bush, President George Sr. (and as scapegoat for Bush, 184
[ 281 ]
INDEX
civil war, 51–83, 220n1-4 in the USA, 191

analysed as a system 3 Conetta, Carl, 1, 16–17
economic functions of, 66–7, consumerism
231n3-1 and advertising, 194–201
political functions, 72–5 intensified after 9/11, 199
and terror networks, 54–7 similarities to war on terror, 7,
see also war, individual countries 194–201
by name Cook, Robin, 125, 135, 243n5-62
civilians Cooper, Robert, 200–1, 203–4, 213,
counted as rebels to boost ‘kills’, 266n10-63
83 Corddry, Rob, 177
deaths of see deaths counter-insurgency, 57–67
in targeted countries, 185–7 see also Afghanistan, civil war,
mixed with military as tactic, 26, Iraq war, terrorism
204–5 counter-terror, see ‘war on terror’
radicalised by attacks, 58–9, 60, crime
61 and complicity, 81
targeted in civil wars, 86, 147, 174 as source of terrorist funding,
targeted by terrorists, 252n7-61, 18, 214
267n10-88 toughness on vs toughness on
Clark, David, 63 terrorism, 188, 214
Clarke, Charles, 183 Cuba, 22, 90
Clarke, Richard, 32, 68, 70–1, 90 culture
Clay, Edward, 7 and clash of civilisations, 99,
Clinton, President Bill, 70, 162, 167, 138, 205–6
188, 209 hostility to Western, 42–3
CNN, 32, 71, 187 impact of on worldview, 5–6
Cohen, Stanley, 129, 133, 189 and magic, 190–209
Cold War, 1, 65, 67, 85, 103, 203, 204 mainstream and subcultures,
end of, 99, 191 267n10-89
Collier, Paul, 98, 242n5-17 Muslim attraction to decadence
Colombia, 53, 68, 72–3, 78 of Western, 41, 43–4, 163,
insurgency and counter- 230n2-232
insurgency, 59–60 Cummins, Harry, 181
colonialism, 32, 36, 258n9-57
Iraq war as ‘recolonisation’, 33 D
lack of US experience, 192 Daloz, Jean-Pascal, 96–7
nature of rule, 54–5 Dalrymple, William, 18–19
perceived humiliation of, 32–3 Danner, Mark, 27, 120
‘purging’ of, 161 Dayan, Moshe, 249n6-94
selective memory of, 176 Dean, Howard, 192
see also former colonies by name Dearlove, Sir Richard, 120
communication problems, 184 deaths
of troops, 239n4-19 of aid workers, 30
Communism/Communists, 79, in bombings see bombings
103–4, 174 of civilians, 58–60, 88, 173–4
seen as enemy, 73 of civilians in Afghanistan, 25, 36
[ 282 ]
INDEX
of civilians in Iraq, 13, 26–7, 29, Egypt, 55, 173, 175, 214, 216
223n2-41 executions in, 19
of troops in Afghanistan, 25 terrorists in, 44–5, 224n2-71
of coalition troops in Iraq, 14, torture in, 6, 27
139 war against Israel, 33
of resistance fighters in Iraq, 10 Ehrenreich, Barbara, 151
democracy El Salvador, 68
avoided by war, 72 ELN (Colombia), 72, 78
and consumerism, 199 Elworthy, Scilla, 28, 96
impossible to spread by force, ‘enemy’, the, 84–95, 99, 104–5, 178
15–16, 217–18 arbitrary choice of, 27, 239n4-13
issues in Iraq, 111 choice of accessible, 86, 95,
seen as promotion of security, 11 239n4-14
Democratic Republic of Congo civilians seen as, 185–7 (see also
(DRC), 62, 63, 66, 79, 234–6n3-83 civilians)
Dershowitz, Alan, 89, 201–2, 207–8, dehumanization of, 89, 140, 143
240n4-27, 267n10-94 difficulty of identifying, 87, 88
deterrence, principle of, 85, 89 dissenters seen as, 4, 178
see also United States, claimed ‘easy targets’, 105
right to unilateral/pre-emptive as evil see enemy,
military action dehumanization of; evil;
diamond trading (and al-Qaida), witch-hunt
10, 54 factors shaping definition, 3, 63–4
Didion, Joan, 183 internal, 40, 160, 180, 181–2
discrimination against Muslims, Muslims defined as, 180
40–2, 181, 217 near and far off jihadis, 46, 55
Dixon, Bishop W. Nah, 86 prisoners as, 4
Dobbins, James, 108 as the punished, 132
Dodge, Toby, 12 trading with, 63
‘dodgy dossier’, the, 11–12, 122, see also ‘axis of evil’
222n2–25, 247n6-52 England, Lynndie, 114
Doe, President Samuel, 57, 174 Eno, Brian, 245n6-2
Doyle, Richard, 197 Enron, 92
Dreyfuss, Robert, 120 Ethiopia, 30
drugs ethnic minorities, 217
in Afghanistan, 82 in Iraq, 16, 175–6
links with insurgents/terrorists, see also Muslims
61, 78, 174 Evans-Pritchard, Edward, 97
Duffield, Mark, 99, 144, evidence, attitudes to, 115–30
265–6n10–33 evil, concept of, 6, 25, 52–3, 80, 103,
Dupre, Ryan, 186 170, 172, 183, 266n10-78
evil intentions, 103 (see also
E witch-hunts)
Earle, Steve, 264n10-8 as integral to humans, 172
Eastwood, Clint, 193 and torture, 208
Economist, the, 115 as warding off guilt, 146
EGP (Guatemala), 57 see also ‘axis of evil’
[ 283 ]
INDEX
F Georgia, 17
al-Fagih, Saad, 39 Gerecht, Reuel Marc, 129
Fahim, Mohammed, 109 Gerges, Fawaz, 46, 148, 155
Fallows, James, 11 Germany, 22, 90, 91, 100, 184, 218
Faludi, Susan, 88, 94 Nazi, 22, 89, 91, 103, 140, 160–1,
Falwell, Jerry, 165, 172, 257n9-24 240n4-35, 261n9-110, 267n10-88
Fanon, Frantz, 36–7, 57, 141 GIA (Algeria), 60–1
FARC (Colombia), 59, 72, 78 Gilligan, Andrew, 184
Fay, George, 143 Gilligan, James, 37, 86, 145, 160–1,
Feffer, John, 156 170, 172, 187, 188, 239n4-6,
Feldman, Allen, 168 261n9-106
Finsbury Park mosque, 32 Girard, Rene, 86, 105,
FIS (Algeria), 60 globalisation, 54, 55
Fisk, Robert, 163 Glover, Jonathan, 187
Fleischer, Ari, 166, 266–7n10-59 Gluckman, Max, 212–13, 214
Foden, Giles, 109–10 Goff, Stan, 244n5-78
Food, David, 139 Golan Heights, 33
forged documents on Iraq and Gold, David, 152
uranium from Niger, 11, 122 Goldwater, Barry, 193
Foucault, Michel, 3, 5, 6, 51–2, 65, Gonzales, Alberto, 261n9-108
97, 100, 208–9, 237n3-167 Goodman, Mel, 121
Fox Media, 71, 76, 198 Gore, Senator Al, 75, 77
France, 101, 151, 161, 184–5 Graham, Andrew, 10
and Algerians, 45 Graham, Bob, 263n9-157
Moroccan immigrants in, 40–2 Grass, Gunther, 176
religious attitudes, 165 Green, Sir Andrew, 142
riots, 217 Greenstock, Jeremy, 15
Franchetti, Mark, 186 GSPC, 45
Frank, Thomas, 93–4, 139, 153, 164, Guantanamo Bay, 27, 38, 72, 114,
192, 193 118, 143, 158, 207, 213
Franks, Tommy, 62, 198 Guardian, the, 47, 176, 184
Fredericks, Ivan, 120 Guatemala, 57, 59, 61, 67, 68, 73–4,
free market ideology, 135–6 185–6, 213, 229n2-217, 259n9-64
Friedman, Thomas, 24, 129, 161–2, guilt, sense of, 259n9-64
184, 185, 204, 256n9-8, 266n10-78 and inequality, 104–5
Frum, David, 21, 136 and Muslim ‘corruption’ by
West, 163
G el-Guindi, Sheikh Khaled, 34
Galbraith, Peter, 113 Gulf War (1991), 13, 15, 41, 44–5,
Gandhi, Mahatma, 214 105, 170, 173, 177
Garton Ash, Timothy, 166–7, 179 Gunaratna, Rohan, 18
gays, US attitudes to, 167–8
Geneva Convention, 114 H
genocide, 53, 176, 206 Haass, Richard, 19–20, 108
in Central America, 174 Halberstam, David, 166
prosecutions over, 229n2-217 Hall, W. D., 165
in Rwanda, see Rwanda Halliburton, 64, 69, 112
[ 284 ]
INDEX
Hamas, 37, 60, 215 in Sudan, 7

Harding, Luke, 221n2-21 linked with bombings and
Hare, David, 129, 166 military activity, 29–30
Hassan, Margaret, 31 workers killed, 30
Haven, President Vaclav, 222n2-21 humiliation and shame, feelings of,
Hayden, Michael, 101 1, 4, 28–9, 31–48, 86, 211, 217,
Hearst, David, 60 239n4-6, 253n8-1, 253n7-2,
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 108 261n9-106
Held, David, 213, 259n9-67 avoidance tactics, 189
Herbert, Bob, 152 of British relationship with USA,
Hersh, Seymour, 116–17, 119 158
Hilton, Isabel, 14–15, 48, 59, 109 created by 9/11, 160, 187–8
history deliberate creation of, 28
national attitudes to, 137 difficulty of expressing in USA,
personal legacies and, 24 172
seen as forgiving/unforgiving, warding off, 145–59
24 Huntingdon, Samuel, 99, 138,
US attitudes to, 24, 124, 154 205–6, 218, 267n10-89
Hitchens, Christopher, 71 Hurd, Douglas, 103
Hitler, Adolf, 133, 194, 251n7-35 Hussein, Saddam, 23, 33, 64, 100–2,
see also Germany, Nazi 110, 118, 129, 175–6, 186, 200,
Hizbollah, 39 243n5-44
Hobsbawm, Eric, 39, 146 ‘hero’ status, 39
Hoffer, Eric, 168 human rights record, 103, 175,
Hoffman, Michael, 87 206
Hofstadter, Richard, 165, 191 believed but not known link
Holmes, Stephen, 162, 209 with al-Qaida, 11, 117, 134
honour, Arab concept of, 28–9 plans to remove from power,
see also humiliation and shame 116
Hoon, Geoff, 158 sons of, 23, 186
Horowitz, David, 171 Hutton enquiry, 184
hostages Huze, Sean, 26
murdered in Iraq, 28
used by US forces (to bring in I
suspects), 28 Ignatieff, Michael, 139, 205, 207–8
human rights, 55–6, 217 India, 31, 77, 120, 176, 216, 222n2-
and hypocrisy, 38 35, 258n9-57
of Muslims, 9 Indonesia, 32, 174
Human Rights Watch, 27, 76, 77, 79, arrests of suspected terrorists in,
148, 207 23
humanitarian aid, 265–6n10-33 attitudes to USA, 32
in Afghanistan, 26, 29 separatist movements in, 47, 214
agencies leaving Baghdad, 14 terrorist attacks in, 13, 18, 23,
causes of failure, 7 222n2–35, 239n4-13, 267n10-88
and human rights, 215–16 infantile
in Rwanda, 62 America, 152
in Sierra Leone, 7 US ‘opponents’, 36, 151, 185
[ 285 ]
INDEX
informers, use of, 214–15 international militants in, 39

Inhelder, Barbara, 255n8-39 Kurds, 175–6
insecurity, sense of, 131 murder of captives, 28
economic, 91–5 no weapons of mass destruction
political, 84–90 found, 11
and war, 197 as oil supplier, 70–1, 112, 87,
insurgency see civil war 236n3-115
intelligence Operation Desert Fox, 209
abuse by interrogators, 27 prisoners in, 27–8 (see also Abu
bias in, 119–20 Ghraib)
not based on fact, 115–30 US ignorance about, 198
and propaganda, 121 US policy pre-2003 war, 70–1,
use of information obtained 175–6
through torture, 1, 47, 114 war with Iran, 175
Interahamwe, 63, 66 weapons of mass destruction
International Atomic Energy (presumed), 117, 121–2, 134,
Agency (IAEA), 121–2 135
International Committee of the Red Iraq war (2003) and resistance
Cross (ICRC), 27 (2003–), 110–11, 118, 196
International Crisis Group, 106–7, and anti-Americanism, 13
110 claimed justifications, 11, 12,
International Institute for Strategic 133–7
Studies, 10, 169 Coalition Provisional Authority
International Rescue Committee, 62 (CPA), 112–13
Iran, 2, 90, 142, 175–6 communication problems, 112,
al-Qaida in, 17 239n4-19
attitude to Israel, 2 cost of, 196, 215
and oil, 70, 173 deaths of civilians, 13–14, 26–7,
predicted nuclear capability, 14 29, 87, 223n2–41
US desire for regime change, 21, deaths of coalition troops, 14
228n2-196 deaths of foreign contractors, 27
US support for Shah, 173, 175 deaths of police officers, 14
Iraq, 53, 68, 239n4-13 deaths of resistance fighters, 10
arrests in, 27–8 difficulty of criticising, 139–40
attempts at regime change, 135 dismantling of Ba’athist state,
bloggers from, 14, 28, 255n8–36 110
as British construct, 177 Fallujah, 27, 137, 142
British bombing in 1920s, 177 ‘inevitability’ of, 134–5
democracy in, 16 predicted length of insurgency
destruction of weapons after in, 20
Gulf War, 247n6-44 reconstruction contracts, 69, 112
effect of sanctions, 29, 104, 170, reconstruction issues, 109–12,
243n5-45 196
ethnic tensions, 16, 175–6 resistance, 10, 34, 142, 186–7
Gulf War see Gulf War timing, 101
identification as US enemy, 87, US allies, 79, 261–2n9-105
90 Iraqi National Congress (INC), 121
[ 286 ]
INDEX
ISI, 19 perception of US support for,

Islam 170
ambitions of global conquest, Shylock, 35
181 targeted by Nazis, 89, 91, 103,
in the clash of civilisations, 140, 160–1
205–6 jihad, 24, 257n8-49
demands of, and surrender to decline and revival in 1990s, 31,
decadence, 41, 43–4, 163, 174–5, 214
230n2-232 in Iraq, 39
fundamental, 10, 45, 47, 138 near and far enemies, 46
fundamentalism growing since see also terror
9/11, 12 Johnson, Paul, 134
Islamic schools, 215, 216 Jordan, 175
radical groups, 16–19 (see also al- media coverage in, 34
Qaida and other groups by torture in, 6, 27
name) war against Israel, 33
as tempering radical tendencies, Juergensmeyer, Mark, 37–8, 43, 91,
33 141, 169, 236n3-123
triumph seen as inevitable, 138 just world thinking, 132–3, 170
US disrespect towards, 168
variants of, 45 K
Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, Kagan, Robert, 167, 203
79 Kaldor, Mary, 225n2-101
Israel, 77, 216, 217, 249n6-94, Kamel, Hussein, 121, 246n6-44
264n10-9 Kamel, Saddam, 121
1967 war, 33 Kampfner, John, 121, 135, 179, 209
abuses of Palestine/Palestinians, Kaplan, Robert, 137, 202
33–4, 37, 43, 60 Karpinski, Janis, 143
Iran’s desire to ‘wipe off the Karzai, President Hamid, 70, 109
map’, 2 Kashmir, 31, 37, 214
most wanted terrorists, 9 Keane, Feargal, 32
occupied territories, 22, 158 Kelly, David, 184
presumed site of Second Kennan, George, 104
Coming, 252n7-47 Kenya, 18, 222n2-35
terrorist attacks in, 222n2-35 US embassy bombing, 10
US support for, 170, 173 Kepel, Gilles, 174–5
weapons of mass destruction, Kephart, Jonathan, 139
216 Kernberg, Otto, 165, 180
Ivanov, Sergei, 15 Kerry, Senator John, 10, 14, 84, 89,
127, 139, 142, 153, 166, 192–3,
J 258n9-36
Jamal Islamiyah, 18, 23 Khalaf, Roula, 218
Japan, 173, 218 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 78, 216
Jarrah, Zaid, 43 Khan, Humera, 256n8-53
al-Jazeera, 32, 148 Khan, Irene, 80
Jenkins, Simon, 83 Khan, Mohamed Siddiq, 205, 214
Jews, 256n9-4 Khattab, Amir, 63
[ 287 ]
INDEX
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 174–5 international, expected to

Khwaja, Maruf, 43 support Iraq war, 136
Kim Jong Il, President, 36 to justify punishment, 132–3
Kingsolver, Barbara, 171 pre-emption and, 22, 205
Kinnock, Neil, 188, 189 US resistance to international,
Kissinger, Henry, 175–6 213, 223n2-50
Klare, Michael, 69 Lebanon, 60
Klein, Joe, 97 Ledeen, Michael, 191
Klein, Melanie, 155 Lessing, Doris, 97
Klein, Naomi, 72–3, 76 Lewis, Bernard, 33
Knightley, Phillip, 134 Libby, Lewis, 115, 116
Kolakowski, Leslek, 172 Liberia, 57, 86, 106, 147, 174
Korea (North), 14, 21, 31, 36, 68, 90, Libya, 21, 68, 90, 216, 229n2-199
216 Liddy, G,. Gordon, 153
Korea (South), 21 Lifton, Robert, 148
Kosovo, 206, 209 Lindner, Evelin, 38, 203
Kristof, Nicolas, 252–3n7-47 Loa, Tania, 217
Kristol, William, 116, 119, 182 Longley, Clifford, 164, 166
Krugman, Paul, 113 looting in Iraq, 12, 111
Kuwait, 33, 175 Lopes de Silva, Ramiro, 111, 244n5-
85
L
La Fontaine, Jean de, 211 M
bin Laden, Osama, 16–19, 38–9, Machiavelli, Niccolò, 119
44–5, 46, 56–7, 127, 153, 162, 165, magical thinking, 4, 145, 254n8–29,
206, 207, 221n2-21 265–6n10-33
description, 8–9 and culture, 190–209
evading capture, 16, 62–3, 82 magical-phenomenalism, 257n8-
reasons for attacking USA, 170 39
relatives of, 64 and witch-hunts, 96–114
attitude to Saddam Hussein, 11 Mailer, Norman, 137, 163, 166, 193
Taliban offers to surrender, 17, Malaysia, 32
62, 86 Mamdani, Mahmoud, 54–5
tapes of, 33, 36, 148 Manji, Irshad, 219
Lancet, the, 13 Mann, Michael, 77, 78, 139, 214
Lary, Diana, 147 Manning, Sir David, 179
law Maresca, John, 70
anti-terrorist in Morocco, Massing, Michael, 178, 182
230n2–246 Massumi, Brian, 123
anti-terrorist in UK, 13, 77, 183 Mazen, Prime Minister Abu, 124
anti-terrorist in USA, 182 McCarthy, Senator Joe, 191, 193
as cornerstone of fight against McKinnon, Mark, 192
terror, 214 McVeigh, Timothy, 49, 169, 258n9-
ignored in war on terror, 74, 55
210–11 Meadows, John, 87
international, disregard of, 1, Médecins sans Frontières, 30
118, 202–3, 205 media
[ 288 ]
INDEX
BBC/UK government dispute, Morocco, 45

183–4 terrorist attacks in, 13, 222n2-35
control in Iraq, 187 torture in, 6, 230n2-246
coverage promoting terrorism, 56 Moussaoui, Zacarius, 40–2
distorted coverage, 143 Mozambique, 249n6-94
distorted coverage as smoke- MSNBC, 71, 134, 143, 198
screen for power, 5 Murdoch, Rupert, 71, 198
embedded journalists, 178 Murray, Craig, 47
lack of information conveyed Musharraf, President Pervez, 17,
and retained, 197–8 48, 63, 77–8
manipulation by New Labour, Muslims, 256n8-53
189 aided by USA, 206
movies, 58, 193, 263n10-19 anti-Americanism, 218
political impact, 75–6 attitude to nations, 33
as pro-war, 71, 177–8, 245n6-2 British, 9, 181
propaganda in see propaganda discrimination against, 40, 217
reality TV, 195 failures of, 219
source of security, 251n7-40 feeling of anger and
use by terrorists and insurgents, humiliation, 1, 31–48, 145–59,
198–9 218
see also al-Jazeera, CNN, Fox generation gap, 43–4
Media, MSNBC human rights of, 9
Meija, Camilo, 82–3 in the Philippines, 46–7
Meir, Prime Minister Golda, 37 rejection of terrorism by
de Menezes, Jean Charles, 129–30 majority, 9
Micklethwait, John, 107 as suicide killers see suicide
migrants, 206, 241n4-53 killers
first and second-generation in viewing themselves as target of
the West, attitudes, 39–40 war on terror, 9
terrorists as, see terrorists, see also Islam
international movement of
to the USA, 42–3, 94 N
as US army recruits, 240n4-40 Nahdi, Fuad, 33
Miller, Arthur, 183, 191, 259n9-75 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 33
Miller, David, 5 neoconservative approach, 2, 107,
Miller, Geoffrey, 143 115–16
Miller, Senator Zell, 185 Nicaragua, 22, 68
Milne, Seumas, 176 Nigeria, 30
Milosevic, President Slobodan, Nixon, President Richard M., 175–6
74–5 non-governmental organisations
Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 43 (NGOs), 30, 216
Monbiot, George, 140, 158–9 see also individual NGOs by
Montaigne, Michel de, 118 name
Montesquieu, Charles de, 130 North Korea see Korea (North)
Moore, Michael, 93, 168, 171, 213 Northern Ireland, 61
Morgan, Sally, 179 Northrop Grumman, 68
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 46 Norton-Taylor, Richard, 103
[ 289 ]
INDEX
nuclear weapons see weapons Post, Jerrold, 106

Nunn, Senator Sam, 231n2-271 poverty
bin Nurhaysim, Amrozi, 85 and deprivation, 38
and fanaticism, 241n4-56
O in the USA, 68, 92–3, 241n4-53
O’Neill, Paul, 116, 118, 119–20, 127, Powell, Colin, 30, 90, 101, 122, 128,
178, 240n4-32 134, 139–40, 154–5, 194, 221n2-
oil 21, 240n4-32
as factor in war on terror, 69–71, Powell, Jonathan, 179
87, 236n3-115 power
and US power, 155, 216 and aggression, 137, 147
see also Iran, Iraq, Russia, Saudi British loss, 157, 176
Arabia discourse as smokescreen for, 5
Olsen, Greg, 88 shaping knowledge, 52
Omar, Mullah, 17 pre-emptive military action,
Orwell, George, 51, 103, 197 doctrine of, 19–22
Osman, Hamadi, 230n2-232 see also Russia, United States
prisoners, 237n3-167
P abuse of, 27–8, 61, 88
Paine, Tom, 190, 251n7-45, 263n10-7 and human rights, 38
Pakistan, 47–8, 62, 174, 215, 216, in Iraq, 27–8 (see also Abu
257n8-49 Ghraib)
attitudes to terror, 37, 44, 77–8 ‘not of war’, 81, 114
attitudes to USA in, 13 shaming of, 149, 168
negotiations over bin Laden, 17 in Soviet Gulag, 51–2
terrorist attacks in, 13, 222n2-35 suspected terrorists as, 23 (see
Palestine, 106–7, 188, 215 also Abu Ghraib, Bagram,
anger at events in, 33–4, 43 Guantanamo Bay)
attitudes to terror, 37 of the United States, 27–8, 118,
attitudes to USA in, 13 149 (see also Abu Ghraib,
Liberation Organization, 201–2 Bagram, Guantanamo Bay)
‘road map’, 158 see also torture
sense of Palestinian people, 37 prisons, run privately, 65
terrorists in, 43 propaganda
Panama, 68, 112 action as, 131–44
Parekh, Bhikhu, 218 and advertising, 194–201
Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), 112 elite’s belief in, 5
Perle, Richard, 21, 116, 117, 136, 166 by insurgents, 198–9
Peru, 10, 61 US government, 5
Philippines, 32, 43, 44, 63, 68, 78, ‘psy-ops’, 137
214 see also propaganda
extremists/terrorists in, 46–7 public relations, 71
US troops in, 47 punishment
Piaget, Jean, 255n8-39 and behaviourism, 269n11-31
Pierce, William, 168–9, 258n9-55 fashions for, 208
Pilger, John, 5, 65 ‘by God’, 165–6, 172
Plame, Valerie, 182 questionable deterrent, 239n4-6
[ 290 ]
INDEX
seen as deterrent, 85 against easy certainty, 128–9

used to imply guilt, 132 and Tony Blair, 126
see also prisoners, torture and G. W. Bush, 124, 126
Putin, President Vladimir, 75 as diversion from radicalism, 74
Putzel, James, 46 evangelical prophecies, 138,
252n7-47
Q fundamentalist traits, 165, 169
al-Qaida, 9–10, 16–19, 23–4, 55, 56 and God’s displeasure with
activities see bombings, terror America, 172
in Afghanistan, 16–18 and history, 138
decentralisation under attack, and immunity from harm,
17–18 256n9-2
estimated membership, 10, 23 justifying action on both sides,
identity and place in wider 155–6
terrorist network, 18 and the right in the USA, 94,
impact of Iraq war, 12 156, 163, 241n4-52, 245n6-3,
informers used against, 214–15 257n9-24
leaders of, 43 (see also leaders by and science in the USA, 255n6-3
name) and Second Coming, 138, 252n7-
nature of members, 31 47
no link with Saddam Hussein, and social order, 119
11, 134, 198, 221–2n2-21 and the USA as ‘chosen people’,
operational requirements, 17 164, 166, 190–1, 200, 212,
recruitment of locally oriented 251n7-42
terrorists, 44 see also Islam
sources of funding, 10, 18, 54, Rendon Group, 71
214 resources, natural and civil war, 66
synthesis of elements, 44–5 revenge
training camps, 18–19, 23, 162, and banditry, 39
224n2-59 and shame as motives, 28–9,
Quinlan, Michael, 189 31–48
Qutb, Sayyid, 10, 32, 207 US soldiers’ desire for, 150
Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
R 35–6, 54, 56, 59, 66–7, 80, 185
Raban, Jonathan, 43 Rice, Condoleezza, 64, 70, 107, 126,
Ramadan, Tariq, 163, 218 134, 169, 184, 261n9-108
Ramadan, impact of, 29–30, 227n2- Richards, Paul, 57
228 Richardson, Michael, 150
Rampton, Sheldon, 5, 143, 171, 178, Riviere, Joan, 151, 155
194 Robben, Antonius, 183
Reagan, President Ronald (and Roberts, Hugh, 13, 44–5, 55
administration of), 68, 85, 99, Robins, Robert, 106
175, 193 Roche, James, 68
refugees Roth, Kenneth, 76, 207
from Afghanistan, 25, 142 Rove, Karl, 76, 92, 94, 134, 182
from Iran, 142 Roy, Arundhati, 105, 252n7-61
religion Rumsfeld, Donald, 20, 30, 69, 71,
[ 291 ]
INDEX
77, 90, 99, 109, 112, 115, 116–17, Schaffer, Bernard, 7

122–3, 155–6, 172, 195–7, 199, Schama, Simon, 93, 241n4-50
234n3-76, 261n9-108 Scheff, Thomas, 160–1
approves torture techniques, 114 Scheuer, Michael, 62
‘unknown unknowns’ Schmitt, Gary, 119
statement, 123, 196 Schroeder, Chancellor Gerhard, 184
Russia, 100, 184, 237n3-155, 240n4- Schroen, Gary, 62
39, 260–1n9-105 Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 193
military spending in, 15, 71–2 Scowcroft, Brent, 128
nuclear material in, 49, 216 security
and oil, 70 and certainty, 84, 89
and the pre-emptive doctrine, 22 looseness of notion, 83
tactics in Chechnya, 60, 63, 65, perceived need for, 237n4-1
72, 75, 78 need for international systems,
terrorist attacks in, 13, 22, 60, 75, 216
222n2-35, 233n3-46, 252n7-56 see also insecurity, sense of
see also Soviet Union Serbia, 53, 68, 74–5, 269n11-31
Rwanda, 22, 53, 61–2, 63, 72, 79, Shakespeare, William, 34
134, 136, 151, 161, 202, 209, shame see humiliation and shame
234–5n3-83 Sharon, Prime Minister Ariel, 9, 77,
158, 166
S Shelley, Percy, 156
Sadat, President Anwar, 43 Shining Path, 10, 61
al-Sadr, Moqtada, 111, 113 ‘shock and awe’, 195
Safieh, Afief, 38 Short, Clare, 24, 30, 125, 170, 256n8-
Said, Edward, 154, 218–19 58
Samad, Abd, 40–2 Shukrallah, Hani, 33, 34
Sambrook, Richard, 183–4 Shulsky, 119
Saudi Arabia, 252n7–59 Sierra Leone, 54, 55–7, 185, 209,
attitudes to terrorism, 38, 44 215, 229n2–230, 232n3-13, 253n7-
attitudes to USA in, 13 73, 256n9-2
economic crisis, 45 civil war, 35–6, 51, 54–5, 58–61,
funding of radical/terrorist 66–7, 72, 80, 86, 96, 147
groups, 19 humanitarian aid in, 7
links with 9/11, 16, 45, 71 Sinai, 33
as oil supplier, 70–1, 87, 236n3- Singer, Peter, 8, 22, 49, 124
115 Skinner, Burrhus, 269n11-31
terrorist attacks in, 8, 13, 33, 64, Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 9, 104, 172
222n2–35 Somalia, 106, 174, 206, 239n4-19
torture in, 6 Soros, George, 16, 136, 239n4-3
trade with USA, 63–4 Souaidia, Habib, 58
as US ally, 71, 216 Soviet Union, 49, 51–2
US military presence, 45, 170, persecution tactics, 9
173, 174 see also individual Soviet states
US threats of action in, 21 by name
Savage, Michael, 143 Spain, 77
scapegoating, see witch-hunts terrorist attacks in, 13, 56, 190
[ 292 ]
INDEX
Stallone, Sylvester, 193 rationale and reasons, 2, 32, 36,

Stauber, John, 5, 143, 171, 178, 194 38–9, 170 (see also terrorists,
Steele, Jonathan, 34, 218 recruitment and emergence of)
Stern, Jessica, 33, 257n8-49 as state tactic, 129
Stevenson, Jonathan, 18 and surrender to terrorist
Stoll, David, 59 demands, 201–2, 250n7-28
Stothard, Peter, 31, 124–5, 158, 170, see also 9/11, bombings, individ-
180, 248n6-80 ual countries by name
Strauss, Leo, 119 terror networks, 54–5, 221n2-21,
Straw, Jack, 77 239n4-26
Sudan, 79–80, 206, 219 decentralisation of, 2, 54–5
humanitarian aid in, 7, 30 financing of, 64
People’s Liberation Army, 58 state sponsorship claimed, 20
views of famine, 6 see also al-Qaida and other
war in, 58–9, 66 networks by name
Sugar, Ronald, 68 terrorists
suicide killers, 1, 37, 85, 252n7–59, 22 most wanted, 8
261n9-122 allowed to escape, 61
arguments for incarcerating blending in, 240n4-26
suspected/intended, 123 suspected arrested by USA, 23,
in Iraq, 14 118
see also terrorists elusiveness, 85
Sun, the, 12 envy as presumed motive, 104
Suskind, Ron, 123, 128, 134, 192 international movements of, 17,
Syria, 21, 142–3 39, 142–3, 174–5, 257n8-49
torture in, 27 Israel’s most wanted, 9
war against Israel, 33 key threats from, 13
with local causes, 31, 44
T numbers of, 23
Tajikistan, 175 as opposite of ‘us’, 172–3
Taliban, 16–17, 42, 45–6, 62, 82, 108, perceived motivations/wants,
174, 197, 216 164, 172, 228n2-180
see also Afghanistan recruitment and emergence of,
Tanzania, 10 24, 39–42, 163, 181 (see also
Taylor, President Charles, 57, 106 terror, rationale and reasons)
Tenet, George, 82, 122 seen as discrete and eliminable
terror group, 8, 23–4, 202, 208
acts by USA seen otherwise, 173 seen as fluid group, 9
attacks, 196 (see also 9/11, bomb- see also suicide killers
ings) Thackeray, Balasaheb K., 258n9-57
attacks claimed thwarted, 13 Theeb, Abu, 28
claimed terror states, 21, 86, 99 Theweleit, Klaus, 160
criminalisation of glorification, think-tanks, 169
183 Thomas, Keith, 96, 100, 102, 104,
promoted by counter-insur- 212
gency tactics, 57 Time magazine, 12, 44, 56, 85, 191,
promoted by Iraq war, 127–8 200
[ 293 ]
INDEX
Todd, Emmanuel, 155 Labour Party, 135, 188–9 (see also

torture, 1, 100, 146, 148, 230n2-246 Blair)
in Afghanistan, 109 ‘Operation Rockingham’, 117
creating heroes, 209 relationship with USA, 157–9,
endorsed, 207–9 189
in Guatemala, 74 terrorist attacks in, 13, 56, 130,
in Iraq, 113–14, 148, 177 (see also 181, 240n4-26, 261n9-122
Abu Ghraib) United Nations
in third-party countries, 6, 27, Atomic Energy Agency, 12
65, 76, 207 criticisms of, 209
information obtained through, peacekeeping role, 215, 234–6n3-
use in Britain/USA, 1, 47, 114 83
methods claimed to stop short Resolution 1441, 15
of, 27–8, 208 role in collective security, 15
in Northern Ireland, 61 Security Council, 15, 101, 136,
and pressure to gain confession, 178, 184, 201, 217, 259n9-105
242n5-24 system of weapons inspection,
torturer as hero, 193, 264n10-20 11, 15, 100–1
in Uzbekistan, 47 US attitude to, 136, 193
Toynbee, Polly, 97–8, 170 United States
Truman, President Harry S., 67 agriculture, 93–4
Tunisia, 45, 222n2-35 arrests of known or suspected
Turkey, 174, 176, 219 terrorists, 23
terrorist attacks in, 13 American Council of Trustees
Turkmenistan, 70 and Alumni, 182
Turton, David, 10 anti-intellectualism, 192, 212
army recruitment, 240n4-40
U attitudes to continuing Iraq
Uganda, 61, 66, 79, 160 occupation, 144
United Kingdom, 100, 188–9, budget, 152, 155
259n9-105 Christian militias, 169
anti-poverty programme, 215 CIA, see CIA
Attorney General, 15 claim to have ‘defeated’ the
BBC/government dispute, 183–4 Soviet Union, 156, 191
Defence and Overseas Policy claimed right to unilateral/
Committee, 125 pre-emptive military action,
‘dodgy dossier’, 11–12, 122, 128, 12, 14–15, 19–21, 48–9, 118, 204,
222n2-25, 247n6-52 213, 231n2-265, 247n6-55
Foreign Affairs Committee, consumerism see consumerism
11–12, 122 Democratic Party, 182 (see also
foreign policy stance, 157–9, individual politicians by
176–7 name)
government arguments for pre- dependence on oil, 155
emptive legal action, 123 domestic historical experience of
intelligence sources, 103, 122 dissent, 180
Joint Intelligence Committee, embassy bombings, 10, 162
127–8 FBI, 18, 215
[ 294 ]
INDEX
general immunity to war, 84 secularism in, 165, 257n9-24

gun ownership/use, 169, 217 self-centred worldview, 154,
history of military intervention, 255n8-36
68 ‘softness’ of, 160–70
hurricane Katrina disaster 2005, terrorist attacks claimed
110, 113, 165, 190, 265n10-44 thwarted, 13
immigrants to, 42–3, 94 terrorist attacks in, 49, 120, 169,
inequality and poverty, 68, 92–3, 258n9-55 (see also 9/11)
241n4-53 trade with Saudi Arabia, 63–4
influence of, 256–7n8-52 troops in the Philippines, 47
isolationism, 85, 202, 223n2-50 torture used by, see torture
legal system, 236n3-129 trust in the government, 133,
military, benefits from war on 250–1n7-7
terror, 65–6 view of Europeans, 167
military, characteristics of, University of Massachusetts, 198
243n5-62, 244n5-80, 248n6-64 Uribe, President Alvaro, 73
military spending, 67, 174 (see Uzbekistan, 44, 47, 70, 78–9
also weapons) Islamic groups in, 79
missile shield, 69
moral issues in politics, 162–3 V
National Educational Vandenburg, Senator Arthur, 67
Association, 171 Venezuela, 70
National Energy Policy Vidal, Gore, 49
Development Group, 69 Vietnam (war), 68, 83, 85, 88, 134,
National Security Strategy, 85–6, 161, 173, 179, 186, 191
247n6-55 Vines, Alex, 106
nature of hostility to, 13, 42–3, violence
44–5, 55, 102, 170–7 conditions of growth of, 10
Office of Special Plans, 116–17, deaths from see deaths
119 and dehumanization of victims,
paranoia in politics, 165, 191, 35, 38, 140, 143
202 and double standards, 203, 214
Patriot Act, 182 manifestation of greed, 98
perceived defence needs, 21, perceived differently in friendly
237n3-155 and enemy countries, 6
policy on Chechnya, 78 as power, 146–50
policies of deterrence, 85 practical and psychological
Project on Defense Alternatives, purposes, 57–8
16, 108 randomised as tactic, 74, 129–30
Project for the New American seen as mindless, 202
Century, 116, 119 unlawful used to justify ‘lawful’,
psychological attitudes in, 149–53, 131
166–9, 171–2, 187, 190–209
religion in see religion W
Republican Party, 93, 113, 161, Wallis, Jim, 128–9
192–3, 258n9-36 (see also indi- Wal-mart, 94
vidual politicians by name) Walter, Natasha, 198
[ 295 ]
INDEX
war of mass destruction owned by

civil, see civil war USA, 174
contemporary tactics, 58 trade in, 63–4, 174, 175–6, 234n3-
covert aims, 51 76
declarations forestalling Will, George, 171
criticism, 139 Williams, Raymond, 195
First World, 22 Wilson, Prime Minister Harold, 134
Iraq see Iraq war Wilson, Joseph, 182
notion of, 51–4 Wilson, President Woodrow, 190–1
outdated nature of threat, 1 witch-hunts, 4, 22, 96–114, 130,
political functions, 72–5, 231n3-4 149, 183, 184, 191, 212–13,
Second World, 205 236n3-123
Vietnam see Vietnam war witchcraft, allegations of, 96–7, 102,
war studies, 242n5-20 104
‘war on terror’ Wolf, John, 100
aggression against critics, 146 Wolf, Naomi, 187, 265n10-44
anger in Muslim world, 31–48 Wolfgang, Walter, 77
counterproductive tactics, 58–64, Wolfowitz, Paul, 20, 68, 71, 107,
214 115–19, 128, 162, 195, 196, 198,
and domestic repression, 44 261n9-108
economic benefits, 6, 65–72, 210 women
financial war, 64 accused of envying each other,
hidden functions of, 3 104
made up of civil wars, 53 in Guatemala, 186
political benefits, 6, 75–80, 210 and macho attitudes, 169–70
seen as war on Islam, 9 as witches see witch-hunts
selling of, 194–201 Woodward, Bob, 8, 70, 76, 101,
simultaneously ‘winning’ and 107, 117, 118, 124, 126, 128,
‘losing’, 144, 200, 212 154–5, 158, 167–8, 195, 198,
weapons 227n2-154
and advertising, 198 Wooldridge, Adrian, 107
cheapness in global market, 54
chemical, 175–6, 177 Y
countries with major capacity, 14 Ya-alon, Moshe, 60
gun control, 216–17 Yemen, 17, 55, 222n2-35
high-tech, 69 Young, Neil, 150
inspection see United Nations Yugoslavia, former, 77, 157
in Israel, 216
looted from Iraq, 12 Z
manufacturers, 68 Zaman, Haji Muhammad, 36
nuclear, 14, 48, 69, 216 Zangwill, Israel, 37
nuclear, claimed right of US to al-Zargawi, Abu Masab, 142,
use, 20, 48–9, 103, 231n2-265 221n2-21, 231n2-264
nuclear disarmament, 216 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 44, 46, 207
of mass destruction not found in Zimbabwe, 66
Iraq, 11, 100–2, 134 Zur, Judith, 186
[ 296 ]

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What is the book about?

What is the book about?

What are some of the tactics discussed in chapter 2?

What are some of the tactics discussed in chapter 2?

Keen00_prelims.

qxd 13/02/2006 15:57 Page iii

First published 2006 by Pluto Press

Copyright © David Keen 2006

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

ISBN 0 7453 2416 9 hardback

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data applied for

2. Fuel on the fire: predictably counterproductive tactics

3. War systems: local and global 51

4. Elusive enemies and the need for certainty 84

5. The new witch-hunt: finding and removing the source

6. The retreat from evidence-based thinking 115

7. Action as propaganda 131

8. Warding off the shame of powerlessness 145

9. Shame, purity and violence 160

10. Culture and magic 190

11. Conclusion 210

At LSE, I would especially like to thank Sue Redgrave, Drucilla

Aims and argument of the book

Current tactics in the ‘war on terror’ are predictably counterproduc-

being directly counterproductive, has also taken attention and

hard to give a definitive answer. But I would like to draw on Foucault

Part of my work on civil conflicts has involved extensive study of

The … important question is not why public policy ‘fails’. It

2 Fuel on the Fire: Predictably

Two models of terrorism

US President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney have been

FUEL ON THE FIRE

a cane. A US$25 million reward is offered for information leading to his

If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people

‘further attacks by al-Qaeda or similar organizations on the USA’

FUEL ON THE FIRE

Violence for a safer world?

FUEL ON THE FIRE

FUEL ON THE FIRE

an agreement would require a guarantee that the US will not

imposed solution is one problem. George Soros, who knows something

The Taliban regime, which absorbed most of our attention, bore

When it came to the activities of al-Qaida beyond the region,

FUEL ON THE FIRE

required that the Taliban assume a supine posture. A national-

A third problem was that the attack on Afghanistan prompted signifi-

Whilst some dispersed al-Qaida terrorists will certainly have found

FUEL ON THE FIRE

While al-Qaeda has dominated the news since September 11,

In an important study of al-Qaida, Jason Burke observed that by 9/11,

Even in terms of Afghanistan, the problem of al-Qaida was never

The doctrine of pre-emption

Alongside the apparently serial selection of enemies there has been an

What you are seeing in this [George W. Bush] administration is

territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain

Referring to ‘those terrorist organisations of global reach and any

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the

It’s not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding

All this adds up to a very wide-ranging license to kill and a pretty