Hazard Taxonomy Examples

July 2018
This paper was prepared by the Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SM ICG). The
purpose of the SM ICG is to promote a common understanding of Safety Management System
(SMS)/State Safety Program (SSP) principles and requirements, facilitating their application across the
international aviation community. In this document, the term “organization” refers to a product or
service provider, operator, business, and company, as well as aviation industry organizations; and the
term “authority” refers to the regulator authority, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), National Aviation
Authority (NAA), and any other relevant government agency or entity with oversight responsibility.

The current core membership of the SM ICG includes the Aviation Safety and Security Agency (AESA) of
Spain, the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) of Brazil, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Netherlands
(CAA NL), the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA NZ), the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
(CAAS), Civil Aviation Department of Hong Kong (CAD HK), the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of
Australia, the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) in France, the Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione
Civile (ENAC) in Italy, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Federal Office of Civil Aviation
(FOCA) of Switzerland, the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi), the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA),
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB), the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation
Safety Organization, Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation
Authority (UAE GCAA), and the Civil Aviation Authority of United Kingdom (UK CAA). Additionally, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is an observer to this group.

Members of the SM ICG:

 Collaborate on common SMS/SSP topics of interest

 Share lessons learned
 Encourage the progression of a harmonized SMS/SSP
 Share products with the aviation community

 Collaborate with international organizations such as ICAO and civil aviation authorities that have
implemented or are implementing SMS and SSP

For further information regarding the SM ICG please contact:

Claudio Trevisan Sean Borg Mark Liptak

EASA TCCA FAA, Aviation Safety
+49 221 89990 6019 (613) 990-5448 (202) 510-8010

claudio.trevisan@easa.europa.eu sean.borg@tc.gc.ca Mark.Liptak@faa.gov

Neverton Alves de Novais Ash McAlpine

ANAC CASA
+55 61 3314 4606 + 07 3144 7411
Neverton.Novais@anac.gov.br Ashley.Mcalpine@casa.gov.au

SM ICG products can be found on SKYbrary at: http://bit.ly/SMICG

To obtain an editable version of this document, contact smicg.share@gmail.com.

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PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to introduce a hazard taxonomy and provide examples of specific
aviation sector hazards in each of the taxonomy categories. This document is intended to be used by civil
aviation authorities (CAAs) and service providers that are in the initial stages of safety management
development/ implementation. This document only introduces basic taxonomy examples; therefore, use
of additional sources in conjunction is recommended. Additionally, this document will be provided to the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) for further
consideration.

BACKGROUND
In 2010, the SM ICG published Development of a Common Taxonomy for Hazards, which proposed a
process for the development of a common taxonomy for hazards related to civil aviation. That document
provided the rationale for developing a hazard taxonomy, proposed general definitions of a hazard, and
also proposed a near term and far term approach to developing a taxonomy and categorizing hazards.
However, since the publication of that document ICAO had defined hazard in Annex 19 Edition 2 and
CICTT has accepted the high level hazard categories established by SM ICG. Thus, this document
supersedes the SM ICG “Development of a common Taxonomy for Hazards” document.

In coordination with the CICTT, the following high level hazard taxonomy categories have been
established:

a. Organizational – Management or documentation, processes and procedures

b. Environmental – Weather or Wildlife
c. Human – Limitation of the human which in the system has the potential for causing harm
d. Technical – Aerodrome, Air Navigation, Operations, Maintenance, and Design and
Manufacturing

Note: ICAO Annex 19 Edition 2 has defined hazard to be a condition or an object with the potential to
cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.

SCOPE
The CICTT hazard taxonomy development effort was supported by the SM ICG. The initial focus was to
develop a classification methodology to group the types of hazards into broad categories that would apply
to all aviation sectors. As stated above, the SM ICG recommended that the CICTT categorize the hazard
taxonomy into the following general categories: Environmental, Technical, Organizational, and Human.
The CICTT agreed to this categorization schema. This document contains specific taxonomy examples
that the SM ICG is proposing for each of the categories applicable to Aerodrome, Air Navigation, Air
Operation, Maintenance, and Design and Manufacturing aviation sectors. The examples align with the
specific hazard definition stated above.

In this document, specific hazards have been described at a high level for each aviation sector.
Additionally, it was determined that organizational, environmental, and human hazards are mostly
generic, and apply to all aviation sectors at the high level. Human hazards are described as both hazards
that have a direct safety effect in each aviation sector and hazards with latent effects that could later
surface during aircraft manufacturing, operations and maintenance.

During the development of this document, aviation sector experts determined that specific aviation sector
hazards may have descriptions of absence and/or judgmental adjectives since experience through
accident/incident investigation and subsequent root cause analysis validates those types of specific
hazards.

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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Due to the nature of the incident/accident causal chain, hazards are often described at various points in the
causal chain.1 Thus, risk mitigation strategies can also be applied at various points in the hazard causal
chain. Therefore it is important to understand this causal chain and contributing factors to identify the
opportunities for potential risk mitigation options. For this reason, many of the technical category
hazards are not necessarily independent and could stem from certain common organizational hazards. For
example, a runway incursion could be described as a hazard itself. However, one could also argue that
the runway incursion is not the hazard, but rather the effect (consequence) of lower level hazards, such as
lack of proper runway design and/or lack of runway signage. It can further be argued that lack of proper
runway design and signage is due to mismanagement stemming from an organizational hazard.
Therefore, an organization should strive to develop risk controls to mitigate the runway incursion hazard
risk in all hazard categories. However, it is generally impossible to have risk mitigation strategies to
address every possible point in the incident/accident causal chain, so an organization should strive to
identify all hazards in its organization or activities and develop effective risk mitigation strategies for
those hazards determined to have unacceptable risk.

The following illustration shows an example of this causal chain concept in the Design and
Manufacturing sector:

1
Note that there are many more complex accident/incident models than the one cited here. Over the years, accident models have
moved from linear cause-effect sequences to systemic descriptions of emergent phenomena (e.g., Functional Resonance Accident
Model by Erik Hollnagel, which uses the principle of stochastic resonance in a system context).
SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples
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Due to complexity in the aviation system, it would be very difficult to develop comprehensive hazard
taxonomies for each aviation sector, unless all of the possible causal chains and contributing factors can
be identified, described and documented, and continually updated based on potential future
incidents/accidents, which is beyond the scope of this document. In addition, hazards may be different in
service provider organizations based on their specific business processes. Therefore, the specific hazard
taxonomy elements in this document are only examples of some of the more basic understood hazards in
each aviation sector based on expert opinion. It is anticipated that with more mature safety management
processes in place, these example hazards will be developed further based on aggregate data from
multiple service providers and analysis of systems under consideration to understand causal and
contributing factors for interdependencies.

Finally, the aviation community has recently initiated activities to further develop a more systematic and
comprehensive hazard taxonomy effort. This future development will enable the global aviation
community to share and aggregate information related to hazards.

HAZARD TAXONOMY EXAMPLES2

Organizational
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Lack of, poor or ineffective legislation and/or regulations
Regulator Lack of or ineffective accident investigation capability
Inadequate oversight capability
Limited or lack of management commitment – Management do
not demonstrate support for the activity
Aerodrome,
Lack of or incomplete description of roles, accountabilities and
Air Navigation responsibilities
Service Provider, Limited or lack of resource availability or planning, including
staffing
Air Operation,
Lack of or ineffective policies
Maintenance Incorrect or incomplete procedures including instructions
Management
Organization, Lack of or poor management and labor relationships
Lack of or ineffective organizational structure
Design &
Manufacturing Poor organizational safety culture
Organization Lack of or ineffective safety management processes (including
risk management, safety assurance, auditing, training and
resource allocation)
Lack or ineffective audit procedures
Lack of or limited resource allocation
Incorrect or incomplete or lack of training and knowledge
Aerodrome, transfer.
Management
Note: Training should reflect the needs of the organization.
Air Navigation Accidents have shown that inadequate training is a hazard and
(continued)
Service Provider, may lead to accidents.

2
Security issues can certainly effect safety; however, the SM ICG has intentionally left out potential security hazards since this
group does not possess the expertise to address this topic.
SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples
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 Organizational
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Unofficial organizational structures
Note: These structures may be of a benefit but also may lead to
a hazard.
Growth, strikes, recession or organizational financial distress
Mergers or acquisition
Changes, upgrades or new tools, equipment, processes or
facilities
Incorrect or ineffective shift/crew member change over
procedures
Changes or turnover in management or employees
Air Operation, Informal processes (Standard Operating Procedures)
Lack of or poor or inappropriate materials/equipment
Maintenance acquisition decisions
Organization,
Lack of, poor staffing recruitment/assignment
Design & Note: Staff should be hired or assigned according to
Manufacturing organizational needs but also according to their skills,
Organization qualifications and abilities. An employee with the wrong skill set
can be a hazard. This includes management.
(continued) Incorrect, poor or lack of internal and external communication
including language barriers
Lack of, incorrect or incomplete manuals, or operating
procedures (including maintenance)
Documentation, Lack of, incorrect or incomplete employee duty descriptions
Processes and
Lack of, incorrect, incomplete or complicated document update
Procedures
processes
Lack of, incorrect or incomplete reports and records
Lack of, incorrect or incomplete control of necessary documents
for personnel (licenses, ratings, and certificates)

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Environmental
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Thunderstorms and lightning
Hail
Heavy rain
Fog (reduced visibility)
Aerodrome, Wind shear
Sand storm
Air Navigation Weather/Natural
Service Provider, Snow or ice storms
Disasters
Excessive or cross winds
Air Operation, Hurricane, Tsunami, or tornado
Floods
Maintenance
Organization Ash (including volcanic or forest fire)
Earthquake
(Effects may not Extreme temperatures
be all
encompassing) Icing conditions (Impact on aircraft surfaces)
Mountains or bodies of water
Geography
Altitude at the aerodrome
Wildlife on airfield
Wildlife
Flying wildlife

Human
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Aerodrome, Sudden Heart attack, Stroke, Kidney stone, Seizure
Incapacitation
Air Navigation
Subtle Nausea, Diarrhea, Carbon monoxide, Medication, Fatigue
Service Provider,
Incapacitation/
Air Operation, Impairment
Illness Influenza, Upper Respiratory Tract Infection (TI), Urinary TI
Maintenance
Organization, Color vision, Visual field limitations, Mobility limitations,
Static Limitations
Colostomy bag, Hearing loss
Design & Fatigue (lack of sleep), Alcohol and substance abuse,
Self-Imposed
Manufacturing Medications, Complacency
Stresses
Organization

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Human
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Financial, Birth of child, Divorce, Bereavement, Challenging
Aerodrome, Psycho-Social timelines, Inadequate resources
Stresses
Air Navigation
Service Provider, Inflight turbulence cabin crew injury, injury caused to
Trauma personnel during ground aircraft operations or luggage
Air Operation, handling
Jet lag, Paint shop, Solvents, Chemical/Biological exposures,
Maintenance Environmental/ Noise, Vibrations, Distractions
Organization, Occupational

Latent Failures
Design &
Related to Man/ Human factors related to design, manufacturing, maintenance
Manufacturing
Machine/ Process and operations.
Organization
Interface
(continued) Cognitive Excessive number of aircraft in a controller's area; Varying
Capacity multi-tasking actions; Over saturation of digital information

Technical - Aerodrome
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Construction, vehicles and people on movement area
Poor aerodrome design (Intersecting runways; Obstacle
clearance; Taxiway crossing runways)
Runway Distracting lights
Operations Lack of coordination with Air Traffic Control (ATC)
Improper, inadequate, or lack of Notices to Airmen
Aerodrome (NOTAMs) issuance
Laser beams
Poor condition or improper runway surface

Runway Inadequate runway length

Condition
Lack of, or inadequate runway protected areas

Aerodrome Airfield Apron Jet blast

Operation Lack of, limited or incorrect type of aircraft parking

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Technical - Aerodrome
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Improper marshaling
Lack of, or insufficient protective pylons around aircraft
Lack of, or inadequate chalks when aircraft parks
Lack of, or improper foreign object debris (FOD) control
Airfield Apron
Lack of, or improper ramp control tie down procedures
Operation
Improper fuel or hazardous material spill containment and
(continued) cleanup
Poor refueling procedures
Vehicle failure during aerodrome services
Poor mechanical condition
Poor radio or communication equipment condition
Oil spills on apron and/or in passenger areas
Lack of vehicle maintenance
Poor Emergency Reponses Planning
(continued) Airside Vehicle Erratic driving or not complying with flight line driving
Operations regulations
Driving too fast
Improper parking
Failure to chalk vehicles
Leaving engine running while vehicle is unattended
Lack of coordination between vehicles during aircraft
servicing
Pedestrians on apron areas
Ignoring aircraft hazard beacons
Improper checking around aircraft during departure
Action of marshaling
Individuals
Misinterpreting apron markings
Smoking on the apron
Passenger failure to follow guidance
Aerodrome Action of Use of cell phone within 15 meters of a refueling operation
Individuals Littering on ramp
(continued)
(continued) Running on apron
Facilities Faulty electrical power supply systems on airport or
navigational aids (radars, satellites, very high frequency
(VHF) omni-directional radio range (VOR), Automatic

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Technical - Aerodrome
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B), etc.)
Faulty, incorrect or incomplete airfield markings (especially in
movement areas)
Faulty, incorrect, or incomplete airfield lighting (especially in
movement areas)
Faulty, incorrect, or incomplete approach lighting
Poor condition or inappropriate runway surface
Poor condition or inappropriate apron surface
Taxiway and runway system complexity
Inadequate airfield or terrain drainage
Insufficient equipment, radios, infrastructure, or personnel
Issues that attract wildlife (high grass, proximity of landfills,
nearby water bodies)
Inadequate or inappropriate firefighting equipment
Lack of or limited parking areas
Lack of safety protective equipment

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Technical - Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP)
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Traffic complexity (mixture of aircraft type)
Excessive aircraft in pattern or given airspace
Ineffective design and flow of traffic pattern
Runway incursions by aircraft or vehicles
Traffic Pattern
Unauthorized flights entering into traffic pattern
Unauthorized procedures by aircraft
Similar sounding or confusing call signs
Lack of or poor procedures for aircraft in distress.
Insufficient airspace for typical traffic
Improperly distributed airspace
Airspace combined during excessive traffic
Confusing labeling of fixes or way points
Airspace
Improperly developed instrument procedures
Aircraft incorrectly performing missed approach procedures
Intermingling of ICAO and national instrument procedure
criteria
ANSP
Incomplete clearances
Misidentification of aircraft or targets (radar)
Improper reading of clearance instructions
Controller
Loss of separation between aircraft
Actions
Loss of separation between aircraft and terrain or obstacles
Misinterpretation of pilot desires
Incorrect judgment of aircraft characteristics
Incorrect, confusing, or incomplete communications between
ATC and aerodrome personnel
Incorrect, confusing, or incomplete communications between
ATC and aircraft
Communications Incorrect, confusing, or incomplete coordination between or
within ATC facilities
Radio/Frequency failures or anomalies

Navigational aid (radars, satellites, VOR, ADS-B, etc) failures

or anomalies
ANSP Communications Differences in ICAO and national Air Traffic Control
phraseology
(continued) (continued) Not using the standard international aviation language
Language barriers (Multiple languages)

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Technical - Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP)
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Lack of, or wrong aeronautical information
Faulty electrical power supply systems on airport or
navigational aids (radars, satellites, VOR, ADS-B, etc)
Faulty, incorrect or incomplete airfield markings or lighting
Facilities Faulty, incorrect, or incomplete approach lighting
Taxiway and runway system complexity
Inadequate airfield or terrain drainage
Insufficient equipment, radios, infrastructure, or personnel

Technical - Air Operation and Maintenance

Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Faulty electrical power supply systems on airport or
navigational aids (radars, satellites, VOR, ADS-B, etc)
Faulty, incorrect or incomplete airfield markings and lighting
Faulty, incorrect, or incomplete approach lighting
Taxiway and runway system complexity
Inadequate airfield drainage
Facilities
Insufficient equipment, radios, infrastructure, or personnel
Air Operation Lack of, limited or incorrect type of aircraft parking
Poor HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning)
Noisy environment
Lack of or poor Lighting
Poor facilities (inadequate space)
Lack of or poor airworthiness verification
Preflight
Preparation Lack of or poor verification of equipment and instruments
necessary to a particular flight or operation
Air Operation Lack of, incorrect or incomplete aircraft performance
limitations verification
Preflight
(continued) Lack of, incorrect or incomplete flight planning
Preparation
Poor fueling processes
(continued) Lack of or poor aircraft dispatch or release
Lack of or poor maintenance release
Aircraft Loading Incorrect cargo loading and distribution
Improper or unauthorized hazardous materials carriage
SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples
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 Technical - Air Operation and Maintenance
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Poor cargo and baggage stowage
Incorrect information on cargo or baggage loaded
Improper stowage of carry-on baggage
Improper weight and balance calculations
Use of obsolete documents
Absence of or incorrect flight and cabin crew manuals or
charts on board
Improper response to flight route changes
Lack of, or poor crew resource management
Lack of or poor flight following
Flight Operation Improper execution of procedures in all flight phases
(including taxiing and parking)
Inadequate or complicated procedures
Equipment and instruments necessary for a particular flight or
operation not available or malfunctioning
Lack of, or poor communication (ATC, ramp, maintenance,
flight Ops, cabin, dispatch, etc)
Language barriers (Multiple languages)
Poor HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning)
Noisy work environment
Facilities
Lack of, or poor Lighting
Poor facilities (inadequate space, equipment or infrastructure)
Maintenance
Lack of, or poor maintenance release
Maintenance Lack of, or poor maintenance programs (Including imprecise
Activity maintenance data or transcription errors when creating
job-cards)
Maintenance Maintenance SUPS (Suspected Unapproved Parts)
activity Maintenance movement of aircraft/run-ups
(continued)
Lack of, or poor communication (ATC, ramp, flight Ops,
(continued)
cabin, dispatch, etc)
Language barriers in maintenance teams (Multiple languages)
Poor control of outsourced maintenance (any maintenance
completed outside the maintenance facility or organization
including third party maintenance)
Lack of or, inappropriate specialized processes (including
NDT, plating, welding, composite repairs etc…)
Lack of or, improper Airworthiness Directive Control
Ineffective or lack of procedures to ensure materials, parts, or
assemblies are worked or fabricated through a series of
SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples
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 Technical - Air Operation and Maintenance
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
precisely controlled steps, and that undergo physical,
chemical, or metallurgical transformation (some examples are
heat-treating, brazing, welding, and processing of composite
materials).
Lack of or, inadequate reliability program
Lack of, or poor tool accountability (Including traceability or
registration)
Lack of or unsafe or unreliable equipment, tools, and safety
equipment;
Tooling Inappropriate layout of controls or displays
Mis-calibrated tools
Inappropriate or incorrect use of tools for the task
Lack of, or inadequate instructions for equipment, tools, and
safety equipment
Complex design (Difficult fault isolation, multiple similar
connections, etc)
Maintainability Inaccessible component/area
Aircraft configuration variability (Similar parts on different
models)

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Technical - Design and Manufacturing
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
Non compliance with applicable regulations (For example
FAA 14 CFR part 23, 25, 27, 29, 33).
Safety Inadequate Functional Hazard Assessment.
Requirements
Inadequate structural static and dynamic loads analysis.
Capture
Inadequate Preliminary System Safety Assessment.
Inadequate common cause analysis.
Incomplete or ineffective design reviews, analysis, simulator,
Safety wind tunnel, and flight testing.
Requirements
Validation Ineffective or incomplete structural external, internal, and
elemental loads analysis.
Incomplete structures loads verification, such as static load
tests, ground vibration tests, and flight tests.
Safety
Inadequate System Safety Assessments (SSA) process
Requirement
including lack of, or improper verifying of, failure effects
Verification
using failure performance testing.
Inadequate verification of software and complex hardware
Aircraft Design Inadequate requirements traceability.
Inadequate design requirements control.
Aircraft
Integration Inadequate verification of system/system and system/structure
unintended functions and physical interference, such as lack of
Bench/Sim/Airplane Testing and inadequate zonal inspections
Ineffective in-service monitoring methods such as lack of
failure reporting and tracking.
Continued
Operational Inadequate or no root cause analysis, risk analysis, corrective
Safety action development, corrective action validation, and
incorporation of corrective action and lessons learned into
Design Process
Lack of methods for approving, controlling, and documenting
initial designs and design changes.
Inadequate planning and integration of the facility’s
Design Control procedures for continuously maintaining the integrity of
design data, drawings, part lists, and specifications necessary
to define the configuration and the design features of the
product.
Lack of processes for the control of materials, parts, or
Aircraft Manufacturing
assemblies, how they are accepted, worked or fabricated,
Manufacturing Processes
tested, inspected, stored, and prepared for shipment.
Aircraft Manufacturing Problems with special manufacturing processes and specific
Manufacturing Processes functions and operations necessary for the fabrication and

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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 Technical - Design and Manufacturing
Type of
Type of activity/
Examples of Hazards
operation infrastructure/
system
inspection of parts and assemblies (some examples are
machining, riveting, and assembling).
Ineffective or lack of procedures to ensure materials, parts, or
assemblies are worked or fabricated through a series of
precisely controlled steps, and that undergo physical,
chemical, or metallurgical transformation (some examples are
heat-treating, brazing, welding, and processing of composite
materials).
(continued) Inadequate methods used to accept and protect raw materials,
parts, subassemblies, assemblies, and completed products
during receipt, manufacture, inspection, test, storage, and
preparation for shipment.
Inadequate Airworthiness Determination, which is the
function that provides for evaluation of completed
products/parts thereof, and related documentation, to
determine conformity to approved design data and their
condition for safe operation.
Ineffective methods that are used by the Production Approval
Holder to control product quality by statistical methods, and
(continued) that may be used for continuous improvement and/or product
acceptance. Statistical Quality Control includes techniques
such as statistical sampling, PRE-control, and statistical
process control.
Ineffective control of precision measuring devices (for
example, tools, scales, gauges, fixtures, instruments, and
Manufacturing automated measuring machines) used in fabrication, special
Controls processing, inspection, test of detail parts, assemblies, and
completed products to determine conformity to approved
design.
Lack of functions that provide for static, destructive, and
functional tests of production products/parts thereof to ensure
conformity to approved design.
Ineffective methods of controlling, evaluating, and
dispositioning of any product/part thereof that does not
conform to approved design.
Ineffective methods by which the production facility ensures
Supplier Control supplier materials, parts, and services conform to approved
design. The term “supplier” includes distributors.

SM ICG Hazard Taxonomy Examples

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