IOSJP Course Manual Spring 2024
IOSJP Course Manual Spring 2024
IOSJP Course Manual Spring 2024
SPRING 2024
(AY 2023-24)
COURSE INSTRUCTORS:
Agnidipto Tarafder, Ajita Sharma, Gaurav Shukla, Raabia Abuzer Shams, Sabina Mary
Peters, Satya Prateek, Saksham Shukla, Shuchi Purohit, Subornadeep Bhattacharjee
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CONTENTS
Particulars Page
Part I
General Information 3
Part II
A Course Description 4
B Course Aims and Intended Outcomes 5
C Course Texts 5
D Grading of Student Achievement 5
E A word of caution on Online Resources 6
Part III
A Keyword Syllabus 7
B Academic Integrity and Plagiarism 7
C Disability Support and Accommodation requirements 7
D Course Communication 8
E Weekly Course Outline 9
Part IV
Lecture Programs and Reading Materials 10-16
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PART I
General Information
The information provided herein is by the Course Coordinator. The following information
contains the official record of the details of the course.
The above information shall form part of the University database and may be uploaded to
Dspace into the KOHA Library system and catalogued and may be distributed amongst Law
students for B.A.LL.B. (Hons), B.B.A.LL.B., (Hons) B.Com. LL.B (Hons), B.A. (Hons) in
Legal Studies; B.A. (Hons) in Criminology and Criminal Justice; LL.B.; LL.M. courses if
necessary.
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PART II
A. Course Description
This course is shaped by and around three key features of the legal system – the search for
meaning, the fact of disagreement and the yearning for justification. The search for meaning
takes various forms and approaches, with some looking for an appropriate meaning, while others
keen on a ‘true’ meaning. Some philosphers describe this interpretive quest as the search for the
‘right answer’. But no matter how we describe this quest, the various presuppositions and values
we bring to this quest leave us with more than one right answer. The plurality of meanings is a
core feature of our legal universe just as the desire to use reason, values, legal and linguistic
constraints to choose among these multiple meanings and publicly justify our choice. In any
debate over competing meanings, students should be able to justfy their choice of meaning with
reference to public standards and features of reasoning, value, language, legal systems etc The
aim of the course is to help students understand this process of choosing or ascribing meaning to
a legal text from among various choices that exist, and familairise them with the structure and
standards of legal reasoning that make it possible. In other words, this is a course about nature
and limits of interpretation as well as its debates and difficulties. The course engages with
various judicial approaches to interpretation as well as the assumptions and implications of these
approaches.
The course will also engage with various components of a legislation. Internal and
external aids, that serve as an interpretive keys to legislative text, will be studied in detail with
the help of judicial precdents. The study of legislation, and its various aids, will help students
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navigate the legal text adroitly and understand the hierarchy and relationship between the
different parts of a legislation. There are inherent limitations in language and the law-making
process that are further compounded by the uneven journey of law through a changing
social and political landscape. Aiming to develop an awareness of these limitations, the course
will encourage students to think deeply about better ways of drafting legislative provisions so as
to give better and precise guidance to prospective litigants, lawyers and judges.
The various theories of judicial process and interpretation will be introduced through the
study of scholarly articles. The cannons of interpretation will be taught through a case-based
study. The specific canon will be introduced followed by an examination of select cases as
examples of the application of the canon. The emphasis will be on logical and critical reasoning
and the ability to apply the canons to reach a conclusion that can be justified within the
boundaries of law. In many ways, this is in equal parts a course on philosophical debates about
legal reasoning and interpretative principles as well as the practice of these principles in hard
cases.
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B. Course Aims and Intended Outcomes
The course seeks to:
1. Make students aware of the need for statutory interpretation given the imprecision of
language and impossibility of anticipating all future events.
2. Introduce students to various theories of interpretation and familiarize them with
assumptions and frameworks within which statutory interpretation operates.
3. Enable students to understand and apply various canons of statutory interpretation
followed in the common law legal system.
4. Encourage students to engage critically with court judgments and examine them for the
strength of their reasoning rather than the outcomes. Students will be expected to rewrite
landmark judgments to make them more coherent and persuasive.
5. Develop among students the skills to analyze labyrinthine legislations and court
judgments and distinguish precedents from similar cases, ratio decidendi from obiter
dicta etc.
C. Course Texts:
There is no compulsory core text for this course. This is partly as the course combines both
theory and assumptions and frameworks within which statutory interpretation. If students would
like a more in-depth resource here are some recommendations below:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th edition, 2022)
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes (5th ed., 2010)
All of the core course readings will be available for download on One Drive – the hyperlink
will be shared with students separately by the respective Course Instructor.
D. Grading
To pass this course, students must obtain University mandated passing grades i.e. a minimum of
40% in the cumulative aspects of coursework and end-semester exam. Coursework for this
purpose means those ways in which students are assessed otherwise than by the end of session
examination. These could include reaction papers, class participation, presentations, group work,
research paper.
Online sources can be classified into reliable, unreliable and outright bogus. Therefore, caution
must be exercised before relying on online resources. Academic journals are reliable for
arguments whereas newspapers and magazines might exhaust their utility beyond facts.
Websites such as Wikipedia are not always reliable. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is a
credible online resource for conceptual debates on law, language, interpretivism and meaning.
Students should always consult with the instructors about the veracity and authenticity of a
particular website and its suitability for researching topics covered in this syllabus.
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PART III
A. Keyword Syllabus:
Statutory Interpretation, Making Sense, Coherence, Truth, Meaning, Intent, Discretion, Bias,
Consequences of Interpretation, Hermeneutic Circle, Web of Beliefs, Part and Whole Dynamic,
Aharon Barak, Originalism, Separation of Powers, Statutory Purpose, Golden Rule,
Constitutional Interpretation, Mischief Rule, Ronald Dworkin, Ejusdem Generis, Presumptions,
Internal Aids, External Aids, Foreign Precedents, Disagreement in Interpretation, Chain Novel,
Definitions, Provisos, Practical Reasoning, William Eskridge, Comparative Borrowing
JGU endeavors to make all its courses accessible to students. All students with any known
disability needing academic accommodation are required to register with the Disability Support
Committee dsc@jgu.edu.in. The Committee has so far identified the following conditions that
could possibly hinder student’s overall well-being. These include: physical and mobility related
difficulties; visual impairment; hearing impairment; medical conditions; specific learning
difficulties e.g. dyslexia; mental health.
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The Disability Support Committee maintains strict confidentiality on the matters under its
purview. Students should preferably register with the Committee during the month of June/January
as disability accommodation requires early planning. DSC will coordinate all disability related
services such as appointment of academic mentors, arranging infrastructural facilities, and course
related requirements such as special lectures, tutorials and examinations.
All faculty members are requested to refer students with any of the above-mentioned
conditions to the Disability Support Committee for getting them disability-related accommodation.
Faculty members are also requested to be sensitive to the needs of such students and cooperate with
the Disability Support Committee and the School, extending students the necessary support by
maintaining utmost confidentiality of the matter.
It is incumbent upon all within the classroom to pledge to maintain respect towards our peers.
This does not mean that you need to feel restrained about what you feel and what you want to say.
Conversely, this is about creating a safe space where everyone can speak and learn without
inhibitions and fear. This responsibility lies not only with students, but also with the instructor. All
course instructors are requested to have a conversation within the first two classes on what
approaches and practices can be imbibed to make the classroom more inclusive, expressive,
participative and relaxed. No one should feel bullied, harassed, targeted or invisibilised for either
their identities, or their ideas. A code of conduct for navigating through differences in views
should be evolved inc consultation with students and their representatives.
D. Course Communication
We are happy to meet with students during our office hours, which will be set in the first week
of the course. We are available to discuss issues relating to the course, as well as your academic
career more generally.
Please feel free to write to us to schedule meetings on MS Teams outside of office hours;
please address emails to the course instructor(s) for your class only. Mention your batch and
section in all emails addressed to the instructor.
If getting in touch by email, please note that we will try to respond within two business days.
Students should check the course One Drive on a regular basis, as items such as the following may
be posted throughout the year: additional tutorial readings, grading rubrics for essays, further
instructions for assignments, notifications of any changes in lecture or tutorial schedules, etc.
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E. Weekly Course Outline
Week 9 Presumptions
Week 14 Review
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PART IV: Detailed Readings
Essential Readings:
Case Discussion from Chapter 1 of Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire – Elmer’s Case,
Snail Darter’s Case and McLoughlin Case.
Andrew Morisson Stumpff, The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate Everything,
44 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 649 (Spring 2013).
Audio/visual resource:
Watch: Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer debate the Constitution (15 May, 2012)
Questions:
1. What is meant by ‘interpretation’?
2. Is there a difference between interpretation of ‘statutes’ and ‘law’?
3. Do we have the same ideas about how we should be interpreting statutes?
4. How do Scalia J. and Breyer J. justify their positions on resolving disputes of interpreting
statutes? What are their criteria/tools to resolving such disputes?
5. Why does A. Stumpff argue that law in many senses is fractal? What is a fractal?
6. Based on the readings, what are some ways to think about ‘rule-specificity’?
7. Is the role of judges and ideas about justice relevant in the exercise of interpretation?
8. What is Dworkin’s critique of legal pragmatism? and what is the relevance of chain novel
in interpretation?
Essential Readings:
Paul Armstrong, The Conflict of Interpretations and the Limits of Pluralism, PMLA,
Volume 98, No. 3, (May 1983), pp 341-52.
Arie Rosen, Statutory Interpretation and the Many Virtues of Legislation, Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, (2017) 37 (1), pp 134-62.
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Questions:
1. Is there such a thing as one true or correct meaning of any written text?
2. What do radical relativists and monists say on one true or correct meaning of any written
text?
3. How should one deal with disagreements in interpretation? Is there a workable set of
criteria for legitimizing divergent interpretations?
4. Whether dissenting opinions have any value?
5. How does P. Armstrong respond to the question of disagreements in interpretation, utility
and futility of dialogue?
6. What are the different approaches/frameworks to statutory interpretation that give deference
to statutes?
7. Why is A. Rosen making a case for a correctness-oriented approach? What standards does
he give for ‘correctness’? Do you think there are problems with his approach?
Essential Reading:
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 9, No 1, (The Politics of
Interpretation), September 1982, pp 179-200.
Further Reading:
William Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 3,
pp 609-81.
Audio/visual resource:
Watch: Ronald Dworkin, Is There Truth in Interpretation? Law, Literature and History (22
December 2013).
Discussion: The Evolution of Basic Structure Doctrine and Substantive Due Process in Indian
Constitutional Law
Questions:
1. Why do we need to find the true and correct meaning in interpretation of law? Are the
existing frameworks meeting this objective?
2. What are the principles Dworkin lays down to address complexities that arise in
interpretation of the text of the statute and lawmakers’ intention?
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WEEK 5: Judges and Judicial reasoning and Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes
Essential Readings:
William Eskridge Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,
Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, January, 1990
Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. CT. Hist. 33 (1994).
Aharon Barak, “What is Interpretation About?” & “Purpose in Law” in Purposive
Interpretation in Law, Universal Publishing (2008) (Chapter 9- judicial discretion)
F u r t h e r Reading:
Nathaniel L. Nathanson, 'Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes' (1950) 3
Vand L Rev 470
Questions:
1. How do theories of statutory interpretation restrict judicial and administrative discretion?
2. Which one of these theories provides the most satisfactory account of discretion?
Essential Reading:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, pages 64-120(15th ed. 2022)
F u r t h e r Reading:
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, pages 44-45, 137-152 (2006
edition)
Illustrative cases:
Literal Rule
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B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi, (1979) 1 SCC 361
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Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1325
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Motipur Zamindary Co. (Private) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660
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State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed, (1977) 2 SCC 246
Golden Rule
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G. Narayanaswami v. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717
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S.R. Batra & Anr. v. Smt. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169 (overruled)
Mischief Rule and Purposive Interpretation
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-
Heydon’s case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7
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R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628
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Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661
Essential Reading:
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, pages 30-236 (5th ed. 2010). Some of the
illustrative cases are also mentioned here.
Illustrative cases:
Statute must be read as a whole
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Regional Provident Fun Commissioner, Bombay v. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing
Co., AIR 1962 SC 1536
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Aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369
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Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274
Rule of harmonious construction
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Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044
A statute must be construed to make it effective and workable/Presumption of
constitutional validity/Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
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Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 666
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Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
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Khemka & Co. v. State of Maharashtra, (1975) 2 SCC 22
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Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh, AIR 1957 SC 444
Noscitur a sociis
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State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610
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Pandit Ram Narain v. State of UP, AIR 1957 SC 18
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Raghubans Narain Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1967 SC 465
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State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammad AIR 1967 SC 903
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Gammon India Ltd. v. UOI (1974) 1 SCC 596
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Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Savoy Hotel Ltd., (1966) 2 All ER 299
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Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jordan, (1976) 3 All ER 775
Ejusdem generis
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Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (1989) 2SCC 458
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Hamdard Dawakhana v. UOI, AIR 1965 SC 1167
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Smt Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521
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Attorney General v. Brown, (1920) 1 KB 773
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WEEK 9: Presumptions
Essential Reading:
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, pages 237-331 (5th ed. 2010)
Retrospective Operation of statutes will be discussed using GP Singh’s textbook.
Additional Reading:
P. St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, pages 44-45, 137-152 (2006
edition)
Illustrative cases:
Words in a statute are used precisely and not loosely
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Mayor, Councillors & Burgesses ... v. Taranaki Electric Power Board, AIR 1933 PC 216
Mens Rea is generally required for a criminal act
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Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. State, AIR 1951 SC 204
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Sarjoo Prasad v. State of UP, AIR 1961 SC 631
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Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881
Vested Rights are not taken away without express words, necessary implication or
compensation.
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Radhakrishna Ayyar v. Sundaraswamier, AIR 1922 PC 257
Retrospective operation
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Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, J&K Industries Ltd., (1989) 3 SCC 448
Statutes are not intended to be inconsistent with international law
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ADM, Jabalpur v. Shiva Kant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521
The legislature does not commit mistakes or make omissions
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Nalinakhya v. Shyam Sunder Haldar, AIR 1953 SC 148
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G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam, (1972) 3 SCC 717
Presumptions relating to jurisdiction of courts
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Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, (1960) AC 260 (HL)
Legislature knows the existing law and does not intend to alter it except by
express enactment
-
Abdur Rahim v. Mahomad Barkat Ali, AIR 1928 PC 16
Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient and unreasonable
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Internal aids include Title, Preamble, Headings, Marginal notes, Punctuation, Illustrations,
Definitions, Proviso, Explanation, Schedule
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation , pages 121-170 (15th edition 2022)
This part of the course will discuss some of the external aids that may be used to aid
interpretation of a statute as listed below.
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th edition 2022)
Sujit Choudhry, Globalisation in Search of Justification: Towards a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 74 (3), 1999
Illustrative cases:
Parliamentary history
-
R v. Allen
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Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2007(6) Bom CR 294
Historical facts and surrounding circumstances
Later social, political, scientific and economic developments
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-
o R v. R, (1991) 4 All ER 481
Dictionaries
Foreign decisions
-
MV Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433
Reference to other statutes (Statutes in pari materia)
-
Thiru Manickam & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 1 SCC 199
Effect of Usage and Practice; Contemporanea Expositio
-
N. Suresh Nathan v. UOI, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 584
Essential readings:
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation 637-712 (15th edition 2022)
BB Pande, Limits on Objective Liability for Murder, JILI, Vol 16 (4), 1974, pp 469-482.
Essential reading:
Upendra Baxi, “The Travails of Stare Decisis in India”, in Legal Change: Essays in
honour of Julius Stone (A.R. Blackshield ed.)
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