Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: The Foundations of War and Peace in East Asia and the

Middle East
Author(s): Etel Solingen
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 757-780
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 American Political Science Review Vol. 101,No. 4 November 2007
DOI: 10.1017.S0003055407070487

Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina:The Foundationsof

War and Peace inEast Asia and theMiddle East
ETEL SOLINGEN Universityof California Irvine
A Ithough turmoil characterized both theMiddle East and East Asia in the two decades following
/\ World War II, the two regions looked dramatically different at the dawn of the twenty-first
-/A century. Since 1965 the incidence of interstatewars and militarized conflicts has been nearly five
times higher in theMiddle East, as was their severity, including the use of ballistic missiles and chemical
weapons. By contrast, declining militarized conflict and rising intraregional cooperation has replaced
earlier patterns in East Asia. There are no systematic efforts explaining this contrast between Bella
Levantina and an evolving Pax Asi?tica. This article traces these diverging paths to competing domestic
models of political survival. East Asian leaders pivoted theirpolitical control on economic performance
and integration in the global economy, whereas Middle East leaders relied on inward-looking self
sufficiency, state and military entrepreneurship, and a related brand of nationalism. I examine permissive
and catalytic conditions explaining themodels' emergence; their respective intended and unintended
effects on states,military, and authoritarian institutions; and their implications for regional conflict. The
final section distills conceptual and methodological conclusions.

The dawn of the twenty-firstcentury exposes two tion help envision a "Pax Asi?tica" in the East Asian
dramatically different regional circumstances in region.1
East Asia and theMiddle East. Despite a back In sharp contrast, theMiddle East has hardly been
ground of deadly wars (Korea 1950s, Vietnam 1960s), peaceful. The highly conflictive 1940s to 1950s were
enduring resentment over aggression and colonial superseded by more interstate wars, militarized inter
domination (mainly by Japan), and persistent histor ventions and mobilizations, invasions, shows of force,
ical, ethnic, religious, and territorial cleavages, there border clashes, and covert (violent) cross-border sub
have been no major wars in East Asia for several version involving Egypt-Yemen/Saudi Arabia (1962
decades. Indochina has been at peace for two and a 1967), Syria-Jordan (1970), North-South Yemen
half decades, maritime Southeast Asia for four, and (1972), Arab states-Israel (1967,1973), Libya/Algeria
Northeast Asia for five. Existing disputes have been Morocco (1970s), Libya-Chad (1973-1987), Morocco
restrained as never before in recent history, and ma Polisario (1975-2000), Syria-Lebanon (1980s-2005),
jor powers have normalized diplomatic relations de Iran-Iraq (1980-1988), Israel-Lebanon (1980s
spite continued tensions, mainly over Taiwan and the 1990s, 2006), and Iraq-Kuwait/Saudi Arabia
has not among others.2 Arms races despite
Korean peninsula. Military modernization (1990-1991),
undermined macroeconomic and regional stability. dismal economies continued to attract the highest
Military expenditures relative to GNP have de levels ofmilitary expenditures/GNP worldwide, 17.3%
clined from 2.6% (1985) to 1.8% (2001), lower than (1985) and 7.7% (2001) averages, nearly three times
world averages of 5.4% (1985) and 2.5% (2001), the global average. Trade and investment remained
with parallel declines?in most states?in military bleakly low and regional institutions hopelessly
expenditures relative to central government expen marginal; inter-Arab trade has accounted for 7 to
ditures. Extra regional trade and investment ex 10% of total trade since the 1950s (Arab Human
panded dramatically, intra-Asian exports grew from Development Report [AHDR] 2002,126). The region
30% (1970) to 55% (2004), and incipient and also exported terrorism in scales unmatched by other
informal?but inclusive?regional institutions (APEC, regions. Protracted Bella Levantina (Middle East
ASEAN Regional Forum) have emerged. This sus
tained absence of war and deepening of coopera
1
Regional definitions are always contested, but I settle for opera
tional boundaries engulfing Southeast and Northeast Asia for Pax
Asi?tica. The inclusion of Southeast Asia only?where peace ap
pears far more stable?would have made it easier to corroborate
the main argument. Adding Northeast Asia posits a tougher?and
Solingen is Professor, Political Science, University of California
Etel
Irvine, Irvine, CA (esolinge@uci.edu). hence perhaps even more persuasive?test. The stipulated World
I thank the Social Science Research Council Bank regional definitions include comparable numbers of states for
(S.S.R.C.)
S.S.R.C./MacArthur Foundation for a Fellowship on International both regions (Appendix A). The Middle East and North Africa
Peace and Security that spearheaded this comparative project. I (MENA) includes 19 states (excluding Djibouti and Malta but
as does East Asia East Timor and
would also like to acknowledge support from an S.S.R.C. Abe adding Turkey) (excluding
and helpful suggestions from the editor; three anony smaller island-states). For military expenditures/GNP, see ACDA
Fellowship
mous reviewers; Leonard Binder; Miles Kahler; Steph Haggard; Gi http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda; and for trade, see Pempel 2005 and
acomo Luciani; T. J. Pempel; John Ravenhill; Maurice Schiff; Beth theWorld Bank's World Development Indicators.
2
Yarbrough; participants at a Dartmouth seminar sponsored by the Appendix B listsmilitarized conflicts since 1965, subsuming many
Dickey Center for International Understanding; and Wilfred Wan, militarized interstate disputes and militarized crises, but excluding
Maryam Komaie, John Altick; and Phil Potter, for their research minor incidents (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Wilkenfeld and
assistance. Brecher, International Crisis Behavior database).

757
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

wars) have led to its common characterization as a ment levels, and regime type?generated
more cooper
"cauldron of war," holding 7% of global population ation. Much of theMiddle East shares Arabic language
while accounting for 35% of armed violence in the last and culture and an overwhelmingly Islamic character,
55 years (Military Balance 2001-2002). Halliday (2005) despite ethnic, tribal, and communal diversity. Fourth,
stipulates that "the international relations of the as I discuss below both regions faced comparable inter
Middle East have long been dominated by uncertainty national opportunities and constraints during the Cold
and conflict. External intervention, interstate war, War regarding economic and security choices. Given

political upheaval and interethnic violence are these four considerations the dearth of systematic com
compounded by the vagaries of oil prices and the claims parisons across these two regions is baffling, and per
of military, nationalist and religious movements." haps explained by a tendency toward "exceptionalism"
Although turmoil characterized both regions in the in respective regional scholarships.
two decades following World War II, since 1965 the I begin with an overview of conceptual alternatives
incidence of interstate wars and militarized conflicts explaining differential levels of interstate conflict, dis
was nearly five times higher in theMiddle East. There tilled from hitherto disconnected literatures address
were five major Middle East wars with at least 10,000 ingPax Asi?tica and Bella Levantina, respectively. For
casualties since 1965, but only two in East Asia. neorealism, anarchy and self-help lead only to tenu

Excluding U.S. military participation, fourmajor wars ous or

contingent cooperation, blurring cross-regional
were waged between/among local actors in theMiddle differences. Neither can regional institutions explain
East as opposed to only one in East Asia. Moving the emergence of East Asian cooperation
or the per
from to state-level measures, involvement in manence of Middle East war. "Asian values" accounts
regional
militarized conflict becomes even more striking. Dis and theirMiddle East counterparts suffer fromwoolly
aggregating regions into component states reveals that definitions, underspecified theory and causal effects,
five East Asian states (of 19) accounted formost milita inability to explain change, and presumed regional
rized conflicts, whereas every single Middle East state uniqueness. Domestic-politics explanations
are puz
(of 19) was involved in them. Beyond the indicators zlingly
rare or
underspecified
as a
systematic frame
included inAppendix B, many assassination attempts work for comparing these divergent regional trajec
on neighboring leaders in theMiddle East contrast with tories. I undertake the challenge of developing such
their virtual absence inEast Asia. Since 1973, ballistic framework by tracing contrasting interstate relations
missiles have been used in battle 10 times,with Middle to distinctive domestic models of political survival.
East states accounting for eight instances; East Asia, Leaders inmost East Asian states pivoted theirpoliti
for none (Karp 1995, 45). Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and cal control on economic performance and integration
arguably Iran used chemical weapons in inter-state into the global economy whereas most Middle East
wars; no East Asian states are known to have done so leaders relied on inward-looking self-sufficiency, state
sinceWorld War II. Cross-border efforts to undermine and military entrepreneur ship, and nationalism. This

neighboring regimes have been legion in theMiddle core argument compels both backward exploration of
East but rare inEast Asia. All these indicators reflect antecedent?permissive and catalytic?conditions
ex

the actual?rather than potential?higher incidence plaining divergent models of political survival, and for
and severity ofMiddle East interstate conflicts. ward examination of these models' consequences for

Why is this contrast puzzling, and why does it de conflict. Whereas many states within each re
regional
serve attention? First, these differences are perplexing gion shared a common model, I explore some anoma

considering that both regions shared common initial lies and aborted efforts to adopt alternative models
conditions in the 1950s to early 1960s: colonialism as within each region. Both models relied on authoritar
formative experiences, comparable state-building chal ianism, state institutions, and themilitary as key allies
lenges, economic crises, low per-capita GNPs, heavy
for securing political control but differed in the na
handed authoritarianism, low intra- and extra-regional ture of that reliance, with diverging consequences for
economic interdependence, and weak or
nonexisting
interstate relations. Observations for these disparate
regional institutions capable of organizing coopera outcomes span the regional and state levels of anal
tion. Indeed, these initial cross-regional similarities in ysis, different decisions by the same state over time
voke Mill's method of difference where, despite many (under different leaders), and different historical peri
common features, some crucial variables ods. Variance across and within and states, and
explanatory regions
account for differential outcomes. Second, despite across time, provide many observable implications of
enormous intraregional diversity, states in both regions the core argument (George and Bennett 2005; King,
emphasized family, literacy, and community. If these Keohane, and Verba 1994). I end with conceptual and
cultural variables explain East Asia's rapid develop methodological conclusions.
as some
ment, argued, they would have had compa
rable effects in theMiddle East. Instead, East Asia's FOUR CANDIDATE EXPLANATIONS
economic transformation entailed changes in the con
tent of education and the inclusion of women that have Neorealist accounts challenge the very premise of a
dramatically eroded educational gender gaps. Third, Pax Asi?tica. The universal logic of power distribution
whereas intraregional diversity arguably heightens bar reigns
over all regions, leaving
none immune from cycli
riers to
cooperation,
a far more
internally diverse East cal war predicaments. By this logic, the presumed Pax
Asia?regarding language, ethnicity, religion, develop Asi?tica ismerely a hiatus in war-making (Friedberg

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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

1993/94). Robust, bipolar, and symmetric distribution tutions presumed to reduce transaction costs and en
of nuclear it existed?might have ex hance However, Pax Asi?tica le
weapons?had cooperation. preceded
plained a lull, but, in the absence of such conditions, galized institutions envisioned by functionalist frame
they can hardly explain the absence of war. Indeed works, which emerged after the remarkable expansion
changes in power distribution?China's rise, Japan's of markets, investment, and cooperation, and were

normalization, North Korea's nuclearization?should minimalist, informal, and consensus based. Further
have made war more likely. That has not happened more, theArab League's emergence in 1945 as the very
yet. Furthermore, fluctuations between U.S. hegemonic
first regional institutionworldwide did not preclude ex
assertion and defection have not altered East Asia's tensive Middle East conflict. Thus, comparable initial
peaceful progression. One crucial difficultywith power conditions?very low regional economic interdepen
based explanations is stipulating whether East Asia dence and weak or inexistent regional institutions?led
has been multipolar, bipolar,
or under U.S. hege
to different levels of interstate conflict. Regional in
mony. The Middle East has been more straightfor stitutions were neither necessary for the emergence
wardly enmeshed in self-help, with no hegemon capa of cooperation in East Asia nor sufficient to prevent
ble of enforcing a Pax Levantina, and multiple poles of conflict in theMiddle East.4
power?external and internal?fueling security dilem Cultural interpretations are also beset by difficul
mas.
Iraq, Libya, Israel, Egypt under Nasser, and Iran ties. First, both hegemonic religious identities?Islam
arguably sought nuclear weapons with attending asym and Confucianism (in Northeast Asia)?emphasized
metric and destabilizing results. However, in the final family, literacy, and community but they coexisted
neorealist analysis, the same
asymmetries exist in mul with different levels of interstate conflict across re
tipolar East Asia, with several declared nuclear pow gions. Indeed the same cultural construct could not
ers. Different levels of conflict obtained despite both explain both an earlier period of militarized conflict
regions' multipolarity, undermining polarity as an im in East Asia and a subsequent Pax Asi?tica. The an
portant explanatory cient "Oriental wisdom's" for consensus,
category.3 penchant
Other neorealist variants trace East Asia's stability harmony, unity, and community did not produce Pax
(not "peace") to bilateral U.S. commitments; yet these Asi?tica in earlier times. Second, historical memo
mysteriously had different effects in theMiddle East. ries and animosities remain alive in both regions yet
Furthermore, bilateral alliances may partially explain found different mechanisms of expression or sublima
Pax Asi?tica but compete with alternative accounts ir tion. Memories of Japan's World War II cruelty or
reducible to U.S. fiat (discussed below). Nor can the repeated aggressions against Vietnam by successive
vast majority of militarized Middle East conflicts be powers did not preclude extensive economic, political,
traced to Soviet or U.S. initiatives. Although the two and diplomatic rapprochements. Third, better Middle
may have supported different sides, most incidents East endowments in common culture and language
began
as
regional actors' schemes often contrary to have not yielded more cooperation. Indeed, some
superpowers' best interests, from Iraq's major wars, (Barnett 1998) link common culture to conflicts over
to Qaddafi's initiatives and the October 1973 Yom the normative content of Arabism. Conversely,
ex

Kippur War. Nor did theU.S. presence inEast Asia pre tremely diverse East Asian cultures have not precluded
vent wars Vietnam, Fourth, some norms labeled "Asian val
major (Korea, Sino-Vietnamese) cooperation.
or North Korean military incursions. All these points ues" and the "ASEAN way" are not too different
question exclusive attention to polarity or hegemony in from those characteristic of the Arab League, includ
explaining disparate interstate conflict levels across re ing informality, incrementalism, building on personal
gions. Furthermore, neorealist perspectives differ over and political relations, saving face, emphasizing pro
whether theMiddle East has indeed been more prone cess over substance, constructive ambiguity, and rel
than East Asia to interstate conflict. Above all, a ne egating divisive issues to future resolution once they
orealist account cannot argue both that (1) levels of achieve ripeness or become irrelevant (Almonte 1997
conflict have been comparable across the two regions, 1998). Fifth, even if shared norms do exist in East
and (2) the United States accounts for lower levels of Asia?a contentious premise?they failed to have sim
conflict inEast Asia. Only one statement can be true. ilar (cooperative) effects before the region's economic
Finally, hypotheses based on geopolitical considera transformation.
tions could point to land borders as intensifyingMiddle Finally, domestic political explanations can explain
East conflict, whereas Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina
waterways presumably kept East but studies advanc
Asian adversaries at bay. Waterways, however, did not ing this comparison are uncommon ifnot virtually in
wars in earlier even at lower levels existent. One is
preclude periods approach, "democratic-peace" theory,
of maritime warfare technology, and land borders are inapplicable because Pax Asi?tica preceded a growing
not inevitable precursors of war, as evident in South cluster of democratic states, and indeed still operates
America. in a region hosting major and smaller nondemocracies.
Neoliberal-institutionalist approaches would trace Neither can
"democratic-peace" theory explain Bella
differential interstate conflict levels to regional insti Levantina; joint democratic dyads/clusters?largely

3
For a more elaborate discussion of the doubtful utility of interna
tional power distribution for understanding differences between the 4
On the role of regional institutions in East Asia and the Middle
two regions, see Solingen 2007. East, see Solingen 2008 and Barnett and Solingen 2007 forthcoming.

759
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

absent in theMiddle East?are sufficient but not nec MODELS AND CHOICES: PERMISSIVE
essary for war avoidance. Nor has ephemeral coop AND CATALYTIC CONDITIONS
eration during the Oslo process involved democratic
dyads. Middle East conflicts are often explained by No effective understanding of cross-regional differ
the predominance of autocracies (except for Israel ences is possible without identifying the respective
within 1967 borders, and Turkey more recently) but models of survival and the political-economy on which
a fairly autocratic cluster spearheaded more peaceful they rested. Institutional innovations, as North (1981,
conditions in East Asia. Another approach builds on 32) noted, often come from rulers who seek tomaintain
Rosecrance's (1986, 1999) seminal notion of "trading or legitimize their hold on power. Rulers inEast Asia
states." Without engaging in explicit process-tracing pivoted their political survival on economic perfor
comparisons between these two regions, Rosecrance mance, export-led growth, and integration in the global
indirectly led the way in contrasting Middle East political economy. These required vigorous embrace of
atavisms with growing East Asia cooperation. Forc export-led models capable of both satisfying domestic
constituencies mobilized for this effort and yielding
ing attention to markets and trading states?though
a critical analytical move?also required explaining resources to compensate those disadvantaged by this
how such states came about. Who reads international policy (Campos and Root 1996). East Asian models
incentives and constraints differently and why, and emphasized macroeconomic stability; controlled bud
how does this reading affect the evolution of trad gets and external debt; and high rates of savings, in
ing or territorially oriented war-prone states? Solingen vestments, and literacy (particularly technical educa
(1998) traced the texture of regional relations to "grand tion; Noland and Pack 2005). By contrast Middle East
strategies" of competing domestic ruling coalitions, rulers perfected inward-looking models of survival em
suggesting that internationalizing coalitions favoring phasizing statism and self-sufficiency (AHDR 2002,4).
global economic and political access create conditions Rents from expropriations and closure enabled pop
for regional cooperation, whereas their counterparts ulist patronage initially, but, with their exhaustion,
lead to reverse results. However, neither work focused nationalism and military prowess became core instru
on dedicated, systematic comparisons between these ments of political survival. As a product of competing
two nor into the more remote sources rates in 2000 con
regions probed models, average per-capita growth
of ruling coalitions, trading states, and interstate stant prices for 1950 to 2004 surpassed 3% in 11 of
conflict. 18 East Asian states but only in 3 of 18Middle East
Although building on some of these insights this ar ern states (Lebanon, Tunisia, UAE) despite extensive
ticle goes beyond them, proposing that distinctive do oil endowments throughout much of theMiddle East
mestic models of political survival were critical drivers (Appendix A). Indeed long-run trends in theMiddle
explaining variation in interstate relations.5 It also pro East suggest economic decline since the 1960s for both
vides better specifications of four critical relationships oil and non-oil producers (Sala-i-Martin and Artadi
that have not been the subject of focused, systematic 2003, 22-23). Considering population growth (1975
comparisons across these regions: (1) the permissive 1998), real GDP was stagnant in theMiddle East but
international, regional, and domestic contexts that en rose nearly 6% inEast Asia (AHDR, 86-88). Poverty
abled the rise and blossoming of respective models rates did not decline much in theMiddle East, in con
of survival; (2) the more immediate incentives and trast to East Asia. Trade openness (total trade rela
constraints leaders faced when adopting one model tive toGDP, constant prices) increased dramatically in
over another; (3) the consequences of each model for nearly all East Asian states, but decreased significantly
the nature of states, military, and authoritarian institu or remained the same in several Middle East states,
tions; and (4) the implications of the latter three for particularly in the 1960s (Hakimian 2001, 89-90; Penn
interstate relations. Thus, the article advances the core World Table 2006). Non-oil exports declined or stag
proposition that models of political survival provide nated in at least 10Middle East states but rose inmost
East Asian ones (Appendix A; World Development of
persuasive accounts of contrasting levels of interstate
conflict. Efforts to endogenize models of survival entail Indicators).
subsidiary propositions, as do efforts to derive impli Were these trajectories preordained? Why were
cations of different models for domestic institutions. leaders willing and able to adopt one model over others
Figure 1 maps the complete theoretical structure
or despite common colonialist legacies, state-building
causal sequence that ties all the article's sections challenges, economic crises, and low per-capita GNP
together: permissive and catalytic conditions
as an in the 1950s? The so-called Confucian construct pre
tecedent variables affectingmodels of political survival sumed to underpin the "Asian miracle"? authoritari

(relationships 1 and 2 above); the models' respective

commitment to
anism, family-based entrepreneurship,
implications for states, military and authoritarian in education, and over individualism?had
community
stitutions as intervening variables (relationship 3); and many comparable referents in the Middle East yet
the consequences of these institutional features for the led to different models of political survival. Five cir
fabric of interstate relations (relationship 4). cumstances influenced the fateful choices and re
case
spective viability of models of survival in each
5 (Fig. 1). Two permissive conditions enabled particu
"Political survival" involves efforts by political leaders to gain or
remain in power in the face of domestic and external lar models in each context: (1) international power,
challenges
threats (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, and Siverson 2003). market, and institutional considerations; and (2) the

760
American Political Science Review Vol. 101,No. 4

FIGURE 1. Causal Sequence

political-economy implications of natural resource place, each model reinforced the coalitional networks
availability. Three more immediate, catalytic condi between state and private actors thai benefited from
tions reinforced, magnified, and in some cases stemmed each path. The regional context strengthened these
from those permissive conditions: (1) responses to eco respective models, through hegemonic coercion (for
nomic crises, (2) the nature and strength of available instance Nasserism and Ba'athism in theMiddle East),
domestic political partners, and (3) the influence of diffusion (second-order "Dutch disease" effects in the
modal regional patterns of models of political survival. Middle East, "flying geese" inEast Asia), and emula
Distilling a core argument from these five circum tion (Japan inEast Asia).6
stances provides a point of departure for identify Some East Asian states retained selective import
ing the sources of respective models. Differences in substitution and although clearly not laissez-faire, most
oil resources and land reform led to distinctive op were market-friendly and emphasized performance
tions following the exhaustion of import-substitution, in international markets as the yardstick for success
and to different political coalitions of state and (Haggard 2004; Mclntyre and Naughton 2005; Noland
private interests. Abundant natural resources hin and Pack 2005). The contrast with Middle East patterns
dered the prospects for competitive manufacturing,
enhanced patronage resources for beneficiaries of 6
The emulation of Japan's growth model by others in the region may

import-substitution, and eroded private sector where be interpreted as an instrument for enhancing?through economic
withal in the Middle East. Natural resource scarcity strength?the state's external security and internal efficiency, as well
as the political resources and survival of ruling coalitions. Because the
and effective land reform weakened opponents, and three are largely synergistic, it is difficult to identify which impulse
favored proponents, of labor-intensive manufacturing was stronger, an issue that can be ultimately settled through further
and private entrepreneurship in East Asia. Once in empirical research.

761
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

is clear (Hakimian 2001). The cross-regional compar was

certainly in that direction. Furthermore, U.S. al
ison is applicable to both Southeast Asia and North liances exposed East Asia's partners to significant
east Asia in a general sense, despite differences be threats from Cold War dynamics, but that was also
tween the two (Doner, Ritchie and Slater 2005, Mackie true for Middle East partners (Saudi Arabia, Jor
1988). Space constraints preclude more extensive treat dan, the Gulf sheikhdoms, and Lebanon). Indeed
ment of different cases in Southeast Asia although strategic rents (aid, loans, transit fees) in the Mid
Appendix A highlights some of those differences (see dle East did not evaporate even after the Cold War
also Solingen 2004). Furthermore, the Middle East as they did in East Asia. Additional observations
Southeast Asian comparison is inmany ways an easier question the tendency to reduce models of survival
test of the argument posited here than theMiddle East to U.S. imposition. First, not all U.S. allies embraced
Northeast Asian one. Because the latter constitutes a export-led models. Far from it: most did not, even
harder test, it is also a potentially more fruitful one. in Latin America until the 1990s, presumably un
Neither model characterizes the universe of cases in der tightest U.S. control. Second, even under U.S.
each region but each captures ideal-types, which are occupation Rhee Syngman ignored U.S. conditioning
heuristic devices in the imputation of causality, concep of assistance to South Korea on macroeconomic re
tual constructs rather than historical or "true" realities form, privatization, realistic exchange-rates, ceilings
on

applicable to all cases equally or indeed to any particu armed forces, and anti-inflationary stabilization. Third,
lar case wholesale (Eckstein 1985; Ruggie 1998, 31-32; Park Chung-Hee rejected U.S. pressures too (1961
Weber 1949, 93). 1963) and returned to industrial "deepening" (1970s)
despite U.S. and World Bank opposition. Fourth,
Permissive Conditions Chiang Kai-shek embraced import-substitution in the
Kuomintang's (KMT) early years inTaiwan, supersed
International Power, Institutions, and Markets. Can ing it only in the 1950s with a new model of survival
international circumstances explain why East Asia geared to avoid mistakes perceived to have led to
leaders embraced export-led models in the 1960s Nationalist defeat in 1949. Many have underestimated
(Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) and 1970s the KMT's young technocrats' commitment to this
(Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia) and why model while overestimating the effects of U.S. coer
Middle East ones retained overwhelmingly inward cion (Jacoby 1966, 132; Nordhaugh 1998, 142). Fifth,
looking ones? During the 1960s investment capital theUnited States provided a market for some agricul
was plentiful, Eurodollars easy to borrow, interest tural and industrial goods during theVietnam war and
rates and trade barriers against manufactures from considerable foreign aid toKorea and Taiwan (Stubbs
industrializing states relatively low, and labor-intensive 1999), albeit much less to other East Asia states. Had
competitors fewer (Chan 1990; Koo, 1987,169). Trade U.S. aid constituted the main causal determinant of
grew faster in the 1960s to 1970s than would be the export-led models, Vietnam and the Philippines?as
case
subsequently. Market-based incentives for export the largest per-capita recipients?would have provided
led growth were thus strong. International institutions strong instances of shifts in that direction, but they
and donors promoted state intervention but not sup did not. Finally, theUnited States applied similar pres
pression of private capital. Hence, intervention took sures to encourage export-led growth on Middle East
different forms throughout the industrializing world, states, recurrently but with mixed success. The differ
from regulating and promoting private markets to vir ential (and dynamic) domestic receptivity toUS. in
tually eradicating them. Only in the 1980s the IMF centives and aid is often understated. Five Middle East
and World Bank provided stronger signals to restruc states received over $8 billion in cumulative total aid
ture economies, minimize state intervention and tar (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq) but only two
iffs,and promote exports. But even then international inEast Asia (Vietnam and South Korea). For the same
institutional effects were far from determinative; their period (1956-2005) Sudan's $4.4 surpassed Taiwan's
guidelines were a constant against which industrializing at $4 billion (Appendix A). Notably, Egypt received
states responded variably. The ability to impose reform more foreign economic aid than Israel between 1956
through conditionality agreements was limited and me and 1965, $760 million as opposed to $525 million.
diated by the strength of prior domestic commitments Following 1950s radical nationalist revolutions, Mid
to reform (Al-Sayyid 2001, 168-69,171; Haggard and dle East leaders sought Soviet arms and economic
Kaufman 1995; Kahler 1989). Thus, both regions faced aid which reinforced these revolutions' orientation to
comparable international market and institutional in ward state capitalism, import-substitution, heavy in
centives and constraints. Both models were feasible, dustrialization, and bartering agricultural exports for
and many states?emboldened by the New Interna weapons (Waterbury 1983, 391-404). Soviet terms of
tional Economic Order favoring authoritative mecha economic and military aid were generally far more
nisms and state for favorable than Western offers. U.S. grain shipments
entrepreneurship?opted import
substitution. But others did not, including many inEast fed substantial segments of Egypt's urban population
Asia and subsequently Turkey, Costa Rica, and Chile until the mid 1960s but the United States remained
among others (Krasner 1985; Rothstein 1988). suspicious of Nasser's domestic programs, Soviet court
Were Cold War structures more
constraining, dis ing, and armed intervention in Yemen. Remarkably
couraging states under U.S. or Soviet influence from the value of U.S. economic aid was higher than Soviet
embracing rival models? Each superpower's purpose aid, and Nasser cleverly played off both superpowers

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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

against each other to extract concessions while ad Arab states despite different endowments, including
vertising his independence from theWest. However, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Sudan as
when theWorld Bank refused to finance the Aswan recipients of aid or remittances from oil states. I refer
Dam, Nasser nationalized Suez and foreign firms to these as "second-order" effects of "Dutch disease"
on non-oil
(Al-Sayyid 2001, 171). Egypt's agricultural exports producers. Only Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey,
shifted to Eastern European markets without alter and Lebanon (until recently) derived little or no rents
ing Egypt's overall reliance on raw materials exports. from oil. Structural differences in oil resources across
South Korea's Park was no less sensitive to dependence the two regions affected the proximate context within
on U.S. aid than his Middle East counterparts but cre which leaders formulated their models of survival. I
ated alternative sources of foreign exchange through turn to that
proximate context now.

exports, foreign direct investment (FDI), and normal

ization with Japan (Haggard 1990). Domestic receptiv
Catalytic Conditions
ity toU.S. incentives was much higher inEast Asia than
theMiddle East due to respective models of survival. Responses to Economic Crises. Crises of import
Thus, Middle East states were not coerced into inward substitution afflictedMiddle East and East Asia states
looking models by Soviet hegemony. Rather, inward alike. Chiang Kai-shek's import-substitution led to an
looking praetorian revolutions propelled leaders to expansion of private firms but the crisis became evi
ward policies attuned to Soviet models (Heikal 1978). dent by the mid-1950s, with saturated markets, slug
As Halliday (2005,286) suggested, "if thiswas amaster gish growth and investment, and balance-of-payments
client relationship, it was not clear which one was difficulties (Chan and Clark 1992; Haggard 1990). Al
the master." Nasser's Free Officers adopted import though some KMT officials favored state entrepreneur
substitution "in the name of national independence ship and deepening of import-substitution to stem the
and economic to crisis, an model small
sovereignty," platforms responsive export-oriented emphasizing
militant political forces on left and right (the mil medium private enterprise was in place by 1960. The
itary, import-substituting and petite-bourgeois inter foreign-exchange crisis helped younger KMT tech
ests, civil servants, rural notables, peasants),
some of nocrats empowered by Chiang Kai-shek push for tight
which had helped triggered the 1952 military revolution fiscal and monetary policy, high real interest rates,
(Binder 1988, 339; Waterbury 1983, 9). Domestic and stable foreign-exchange rates, export promotion and
external vectors pushed in the same direction, toward fewer import restrictions. South Korea's Park had pro
export-led growth in East Asia and inward-looking moted import licenses, high tariffs, and multiple ex
models in the Middle East (Cooper 1994; Cumings change rates in 1961 but responded to severe inflation
1984; Evans 1995, 245; Haggard et al. 1994; Haggard ary and balance-of-payments crises in 1963 with the
and Moon 1993). Both regions faced roughly compa inception of a new model. Throughout most of East
rable international market and institutional opportu Asia?in the absence of oil resources?the exhaustion
nities and constraints, and neither superpower could of import-substitution provided few options. Stagna
impose models in the absence of domestic receptivity. tion, slow growth, and unevenly distributed benefits
Reducing choices to superpower designs is thus fraught from growth increased poverty, left intractable prob
with difficulties; only a proper understanding of do lems of nation-building unresolved and contributed
mestic backdrops can help explain choices of models to foreign aid fatigue (Rothstein 1977, 1988). Else
of political survival. where (Latin America, South Asia, theMiddle East)
leaders were slow in recognizing the end of the brief
Natural Resource Endowments. Natural Resource "easy" period of expansion under import-substitution,
Endowments provided a second set of permissive and continued to spend heavily leading to inflation,
conditions. In oil-abundant Middle East economies, balance-of-payments crises and further economic de

high wages, high imports, high inflation, and overvalued cline (Hirschman 1968). Natural resources, where
currencies constituted structural barriers favoring available, provided both cushions against weak perfor
nontradable goods and investments in consumption mance in other sectors and patronage resources for
and infrastructure. Agriculture and manufacturing beneficiaries of import substitution. Not so in East
were thus subsidized and protected (Owen and Asia, where choices were constrained, with balance
Pamuk 1998). In classical "Dutch disease" fashion, of-payments deficits and accelerating inflation forcing
resource abundance sometimes reduced economic different responses (Chan 1990). Park (1979, 72) could
growth, eliminating export competitiveness in other read his regime's survival script on the wall: "For a
goods (Chan 1982; Krugman 1987). "Rentier states" country likeKorea, un-endowed by nature and saddled
used abundant oil revenues to coopt populations with minuscule markets, only
an external-oriented de
without taxing them, turning many into rent-seekers velopment strategy, making full use of the abundant
dependent on state subsidies in exchange for political human resources but aimed at exports,
appeared rele

acquiescence. This model had detrimental effects for vant." Park thus popularized his strategy with themotto
democratic institutions. The expansion of omnipotent "Nation Building through Exports" and "Think Export
states with uncompetitive industries, suppressed First!" (Ogle 1990,40). Singapore's Lee K wan-Ye wand
labor, and undemocratic structures fueled by oil other East Asia leaders echoed similar calculations.
windfalls is at the heart of the "oil curse." Beblawi and Because oil endowments offered broader op
Luciani (1987,16) found that rentierism afflictedmost tions for Middle East leaders weathering crises of

763
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

import-substitution (1950s-1960s), their responses Middle East states might have arguably opposed al
"deepened" statist inward-looking models instead of ternate models more forcefully. Luciani (2007) finds
replacing them. Acute balance-of-payments
and finan Arab middle classes?largely public sector employ
cial crises forced King Saud to yield power to Faisal ees ("the scribes")?to have been the strongest oppo
who expanded the size and nature of state intervention nents of open economies. Because liberalization would
through state enterprises in oil and subsidiary indus have affected them adversely, they adopted a strong
tries, leaving local industry and agriculture behind pro populist-nationalist discourse. Borrowing from Binder
tective barriers. In Egypt paltry exports did not resolve (1978), Luciani defines "the scribes" as the "second
balance-of-payment crises resulting from exhausted stratum," co-opted and mobilized to support the reign
windfalls fromNasser's nationalizations, capital goods ingmodel; without them, regimes could not effectively
adventurism in Yemen, and Small and medium remained no
imports, military perma govern. enterprises
nent war preparations against Israel (Barnett 1992). toriously minute, with very limited economic or polit
Throughout most Arab states, subsequent crises rarely ical influence, and so intertwined with the state that
led to reversals of the model that had entrenched its many state bureaucrats had their own small business
beneficiaries ever more deeply against reform (Wilson (Luciani).
2002). This point leads directly into the second set of Regarding the rural sector, theUS. military occupa
catalytic conditions shaping responses to crises and the tion ended large landholders in Japan, and land reform
following decolonization from Japan eliminated large
adoption of differentmodels of political survival.
landholders as a powerful class inKorea and Taiwan
Available Political Partners. Adopting or maintain (Haggard 1990; Woo-Cumings 1998). The KMT's sub
ing a given model, or shifting from one model to sequent reforms (1950s), designed to coopt peasants,
another, alienates some constituencies and attracts oth stimulated agricultural production and undermined
ers. The relative strength of groups endorsing
or op indigenous (Taiwanese) landlords, steering them to
posing models at critical junctures are thus decisive ward manufacturing (Chan and Clark 1992; Cumings
factors influencing such decisions (Chan 1990). East 1984). North Korea's invasion of the South reduced the
Asian leaders could promote private capital oriented economic base of landowners pushing them to urban
to the global economy because potential opponents of activities, whereas landed aristocracies from Iraq to
that model were weakened. World War II decimated Egypt lingered. Nasser's land reform aimed at empow
agrarian elites and undercapitalized and disorganized ering poor and landless peasants but benefited mid
industrial groups (Evans 1995, 245; Stubbs 1999). dle and rich ones, achieving limited redistribution and
Taiwan's brief import-substitution prevented en failing to eliminate landed wealth politically (Binder
croachment by beneficiaries, facilitating export promo 1978; Migdal 1988). State monopolies controlled all
tion and unified exchange-rates in the absence of strong agricultural inputs and marketing of major crops at
fixed prices. State accommodation with rural strong
agrarian or import-substituting opposition (Chan 1988;
Cheng 1990,154; Gereffi 1990). An evolving and trans
men enabled resource transfers from rural to urban, a

parent KMT consensus could disable the opposition pattern common throughout theMiddle East (Owen
and decrease domestic and international uncertainty and Pamuk 1999). By 1960 inequality in land distri
about its new program (Jones and Sakong 1980; Ogle bution was much higher in Egypt than in South Ko
1990, 33-34). The military, initially threatened by the rea, with Gini coefficients of 0.67 versus 0.39 (Rivlin
new model on grounds of economic sufficiency and 2001,24). Nasser's reforms excluded nearly all landless
war was subordinated to the wage earners whereas South Korea's landless peas
preparedness, completely
KMT, whose overriding
concern with macroeconomic ants were eliminated by the 1940s. Land reform after
stability curtailed rabid militarism and channeled it into Iraq's 1958 revolution failed to attain economic objec
"an evermore interest in economic growth"
tives. Only in oil-poor Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia
absorbing
(Amsden 1985; Cheng, 155). Rhee Syngman's unim
were market- and farmers
export-oriented capitalist

pressive import-substitution in South Korea created stronger and politically more influential (Waterbury
1989). In sum, whereas East Asia's leaders sought ru
nascent capitalists weakened by stagnation and un
certainty. Park's 1964 shift to export-led growth faced ral support through effective land reform, investment
in agriculture and rural infrastructure, theMiddle East
powerless import-substituting interests pliable to his
new agenda (Haggard 1990). Groups coopted by Park countryside?particularly
in revolutionary states?was
forced to support and subsidize narrow urban coali
reaped favorable results, reinforcing support for the
model. Repression of weak labor movements facil tions (Campos and Root 1996, 3-6; Noland and Pack
itated steadfast implementation and macroeconomic 2005). Hence, rural interests placed no political barri
itwas common to both models, la ers to East Asia's export-led models and land reform
stability. Because
bor repression lacks significant explanatory content helped level income distribution (Chan 1990; Haggard
for our purposes. Nasser hanged workers following 1990;Wade 1990). Middle East regimes diffused threats
the first strike after the revolution, his indirect taxa of peasant insurgency through state monopolies; East
tion burdened the masses more than the upper classes, Asia's through effective land reform and export-led
and a highly paid and corrupt state bourgeoisie im growth.
plemented his model (Barnett 1992, 98; Hinnebusch
2001, 123; Migdal 1988). Nonetheless labor mobilized Regional Effects. Small internal markets reinforced
under longer and deeper import-substitution inmany export-led models inEast Asia but less so in theMiddle

764
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

East due to first- and second-order effects of "Dutch (Maclntyre and Naughton 2005). Cooperative regional
disease" but also to three regional factors: institutions like APEC reinforced the model infor
(1) Portraying Jordan as an enemy of Arabism and mally, taming or coopting protectionist forces while
decrying King Abdullah's association with Western accommodating newcomers (Ravenhill 2000). APEC
powers, Egypt recommended Jordan's expulsion from advocated "open regionalism" compatible with global
the Arab League. Abdullah was assassinated in 1951. trading rules and inclusive membership while ASEAN
Nasser threatened and subverted liberalizing efforts encouraged mutual support for domestic and regional
by small, resource-poor Jordan and Lebanon among stability to attract FDI and secure access to export
others. On learning of the proposed "Baghdad Pact" markets. Economic growth and common resilience
between Western powers and Iraq, Nasser mobilized (ketahanan) was the foundation of thismodel. No com
nationalism throughout the Middle East, leading to parable "open regionalism" emerged fromMiddle East
young King Hussein's imprisonment in Amman. In models.
1960 Nasser declared that theUAR would not rest un (3) A third regional effect related to defeat in war
til it destroyed Hussein, adding that all Arabs wanted and severe external threats which could potentially
to
poison him. Riots, unstable governments, and near fuel crises and catalyze departures in models of po
civil war compelled King Hussein to yield to em litical survival. Leaders from South Korea to Taiwan
boldened Nasserism writ-large throughout the region. to major Arab states endured war experiences in the
Syria's and Iraq's Ba'ath often threatened Jordan as a late 1940s to early 1950s. In the wars' immediate af
monarchical vestige inimical to their own revolutions. termath import-substitution ensued in both cases, al
Jordan's Premier Wasfi al-Tall's economic reform ef
though East Asian leaders later introduced export
forts (1960s) to contract the state bureaucracy and mil led growth. Beyond the cited political-economy and
itary expenditures were also suppressed via subversion resource-related conditions explaining that shift, lead
by neighbors. Tall was assassinated inCairo, thwarting ers also learned different lessons from defeat in war.
once again King Hussein's preferred model. Lebanon's The KMT associated its 1949 defeat by mainland Com
export-orientation steered mainly by dominant munists with its own record of hyperinflation, hyper
Christian (Maronite) elites also faced Nasserite and inequality, and hypercorruption. Hence the KMT's
Syrian challenges. Lebanon's foreign trade to GDP new model of survival inTaiwan was pivoted on price
ratio was much higher than Egypt's or Syria's. By stability, egalitarian income distribution, and decen
the 1970s, internal defiance by radical Palestinian tralized (small-medium) private entrepreneurship. In
groups, intercommunal strife, and Israel's interven South Korea, Park's lessons from North Korea's 1950
tions facilitated Syria's occupation, lasting nearly 30 overrun led him to reject the coalition of absentee
years. Lebanon's 1990s efforts to reconstitute an ex landlords and corrupt import-substituting industrialists
port model were undertaken under Syria's oversight backing Rhee's model. The KMT's complete ejection
and limitations. Reported Syrian involvement in the as from themainland and South Korea's nearly complete
sassination of Rafiq Hariri, the architect of Lebanon's invasion by the North were arguably farmore devas
economic revival, reflected the continuity of old cross tating territorially than the Arab states' 1948 defeat,
border subversion patterns. Morocco was less subject which could partly explain the need formore robust
to Nasserite diktats than Jordan and Lebanon, which states in theEast Asian cases. By contrast, the 1948 war
were more
proximate to competing
hegemons. initiated by Arab states after rejecting UN partition of
(2) Regional diffusion of "Dutch disease" from Palestine, did not result in their nearly complete territo
oil-rich to
oil-poor states?second-order rentier rial defeat as with Taiwan and South Korea. However,
effects?reinforced inward-looking models pivoted on the Nakba (cataclysm) dealt a severe blow to Pales
state entrepreneurship. Petrodollar transfers strength tinian and pan-Arab aspirations, coloring themodels of
ened protectionism, industrial, and exchange-rate dis survival which emerged in the 1950s. Despite its depic
tortions among recipients while weakening political tion as a "victory," the loss of 1% of Israel's population
incentives to introduce alternative models. By themid in a war fought under an arms boycott also left a legacy
1970s oil transfers steered Jordan in inward-looking of inward-looking self-reliance among first-generation
directions. A decade later 60% of the labor force Israeli leaders. Sadat portrayed the 1973 October/Yom
was employed by the state. After the 1991 Gulf War, Kippur War as an Egyptian victory, which enabled him
dissipation of Gulf oil transfers and containment of to launch infitah (economic opening) in 1974, reversing
inward-looking, statist, rentier and hegemonic Iraq,
re Nasser's model. In sum, all leaders defined victory and
vived alternative options. Regional influences in East defeat in self-serving ways. Defeat in war was com
Asia were themirror image of those operating in the mon to states across both regions and not necessarily a
Middle East. Progressive diffusion of export-oriented precursor of inward-looking models or
perennial
con

models?beginning with Japan?predisposed succes flict. Leaders manipulated external debacles in ways
sive East Asian regimes to embrace
analogous mod that reinforced domestic conditions driving toward one
els adapted to local circumstances by Taiwan, South model or another. Finally, threats of peasant-based
Korea, Hong-Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Communist revolutions emanating from neighboring
China, Indonesia, and Vietnam. This diffusion was states (mainly China) are sometimes invoked to ex
famously captured by the "flying geese" analogy led plain East Asian leaders' economic choices (Amsden
by Japanese capital and technology through FDI and 1989). Rural reform and broad economic growth would
bank loans, and succeeding "tigers" and "dragons" deflate such threats and help leaders survive in power.

765
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

FIGURE 2. Permissive and Catalytic Conditions

PERMISSIVE CONDITIONS
Comparable International
Conditions(constrained domesticmodels
butdidnotdetermine
ofsurvival)
o Power
o Markets
o Institutions
NaturalResourceAvailability
Different
non-oil
o MiddleEast:Oil and "Dutchdisease" (createdbarrierstodiversification,
and
growth exports, reinforcedrentier
constituencies)
o East Asia: Natural resource scarcity narrowed down options for industrialization

DOMESTIC MODELS OF
POLITICALSURVIVAL
*
EastAsia: Export-led
growth
*
<^ MiddleEast: Inward-looking
CATALYTICCONDITIONS
Responses toEconomicCrisis
o East Asia: exhaustion of "easy" import-substitution provided few options
constituencies
o MiddleEast: oilenabledcontinuedcushionforimport-substituting
AvailablePoliticalPartners
of ISI;regimeschanneled
o East Asia: Briefperiodof ISI=>weaksupporters
weakened private capital towards exports; urban=>rural transfers
o MiddleEast: Longerexposure to ISI=>strong of ISI;regimes
supporters
replaced private with state capital; rural=>urban transfers

RegionalEffects
ofJapanesemodel+ capitaland technology;
o East Asia: Regionaldiffusion
defeat inwar reinforced export-led model
o Middle East: Regional diffusionof "Dutch disease" effects fromoil-richstates to oil-poor
ones; defeat inwar reinforced regimes' proclivities to ISImodel

Notes: ISI = import-substitution-industrialization.

Similar revolutionary pressures (enhanced by Soviet PATH DEPENDENCY, ANOMALIES, AND

encroachment in some cases), however, did not lead to ABORTED SHIFTS INDMPS
similar choices in theMiddle East.
The relative incidence of particular models in each re
Figure 2 disaggregates the causal sequence outlined one
in Figure 1, focusing on permissive and catalytic con gion cast its shadow on domestic decisions favoring
model over another, through emulation, socialization,
ditions leading to alternative models of political sur
and/or coercive external interventions. The political
vival. Two main propositions sum up these conditions.
and economic successes of East Asia's model rein
Early and effective land reform, relatively brief import forced their progressive diffusion tomost states in the
substitution, and natural resource scarcity weakened
domestic political opposition to export-led growth in region. Conversely, entrenched inward-looking Middle
Eastern models reinforced domestic barriers against
East Asia. Regional effects reinforced export-led strate
alternative models that would have entailed appeals
gies. By contrast, late, inefficient or nonexistent land to different sources of legitimacy?and new relations
exposure to import-substitution under
reform, longer
with international markets and institutions?hardly
pinned by extensive statist and military entrepreneur
and abundant oil resources opponents
countenanced by 1950s to 1960s-style pan-Arabist
ship, empowered exter
politics. Some trace this profound suspicion of
of export-led growth throughout much of theMiddle nal influences to colonial domination and exploita
East. Regional effects reinforced inward-looking mod
tion but these did not preclude East Asia's trans
els. Put differently, in theMiddle East stronger ben
formation, including China's (a victim of unequal
eficiaries of relative closure, import-substitution, and
natural resource within the state
colonial arrangements) and Vietnam's (a victim of
monopolies?mostly even more recent colonial brutality by Japan, China,
itself?constituted powerful barriers against shifts into
alternative models. France, and theUnitd States). Clearly, political forces

7 class (Richards and Waterbury

Major beneficiaries of import-substitution included middle- and industries, and the state's managerial
upper income consumers, organized labor in state and protected 1990, 37,223-24).

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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

unleashed by Nasserism and rentier economies con

promoting private sectors in the 1980s and signing
stituted formidable barriers to change. Beblawi and bilateral investment treaties to promote and protect
Luciani (1987,16) trace reluctance to change to "a per foreign investments. By 1996 fourMiddle East states
ception of a lack of any politically accepted alternative, (Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Egypt) had signed at
or sheer shortsightedness." Chatelus (1987, 111) em least 11 such treaties, half of the eight East Asian
phasized overwhelming incentives by dominant groups states that had done so (http://www.worldbank.org).
to retain rents and disincentives to shift to productive Monarchies had experienced less intense and pro
activities. Path-dependent politics, lasting legacies in tracted colonial influences than praetorian states
cluding reproduction of political forces invested in ex like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which mobilized revolu
tant institutional arrangements, and self-perpetuating tionary, nationalist-populist zeal and swept compet
mechanisms of exclusion go far in explaining sta itive private capital more forcefully, creating higher
sis. Path-dependency entails self-reinforcing feedback barriers to reform beyond those imposed by ren
loops or "increasing returns" whereby actors reinforce tierism (Henry and Springborg 2001). By 2000 Jordan,
the model's logic, alternatives are dismissed, and in Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, and five gulf king
stitutions magnify existing patterns of power distribu doms had joined the WTO, but not Syria, Iraq,
tion (Krasner 1999, 61-62; Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999). Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Yemen, and Syrian-controlled
Thus, temporal sequences in the intersection of do Lebanon. Even WTO members retained high tariffbar
mestic and international politics have long-term effects riers and state enterprises.
that are harder?but not impossible?to
reverse. Fur Although Turkey and Israel had embraced import
of models creates substitution for many years, were neither sub
thermore, regional agglomeration they
effects" or network externalities, in ject to pan-Arab pressures to retain the model nor
"neighborhood
fusing new life into prevailing models. influenced by second-order effects of "Dutch disease."

One might argue that rejecting export-led growth in Israel's departure from import-substitution and statism
the 1960s was not unusual, and that East Asia was began only in the late 1960s, and not without difficulty
the anomaly. Although this may be the case, most given strong protectionist constituencies represented
Middle East leaders declined subsequent opportunities by the powerful labor-union Histadrut (concentrating
about 90% of the eligible labor force), the inward
including the 1980s crises and the 1990s widespread
transformation of planned into market-oriented looking Manufacturers Association and theMinistry of
economies (Halliday 2005, 264; Owen and Pamuk Commerce and Industry (Kahane 1992). Isolated in its
1998). Capital flows in the 1990s "became almost in region, and with neither oil nor a large internal market,
discriminate torrents in search of emerging markets," free-trade-areas with Europe and theUnited States be
with FDI to developing countries growing from about came ever more vital to the
political-economy strategy
$20 billion (1990) to $170 (1998) (Henryand Spring of Israeli leaders. The crisis of the mid-1980s forced
more decisive reforms. According to Owen
borg 2001, 44-5). Extraordinary world trade expan (2001,
sion offered unprecedented incentives often met with 236) Israel was one among fewMiddle East states to
lethargic reform in the Middle East, whose share of reduce government consumption significantly?from
FDI to developing countries (excluding Turkey) de 39 percent of GDP (1970s) to 27 (1990s)?largely due
clined from 11.6% (1990) to 2.1% (1994-1996) and 1% to reduced military expenditures. Following decades of
(2001) (AHDR 2002, 87; Hakimian 2001, 89). Politi public sector expansion and import-substitution, and
cal instability, bad governance, and inadequate educa high inflation, mounting external debt, and political
tional levels thwarted FDI inflowswhile $1.5-$4 trillion violence in the 1970s, Turkey's military brutally altered
was invested overseas (Halliday, 295). Capital flight the relative strength of societal forces in the early 1980s,
from rentier states sharply contrasted with Japan's FDI enabling civilian Premier Turgut ?zal to consolidate
investments throughout East Asia. Although declin support for a new model based on export-led growth
ing oil windfalls since the early-1980s denied Middle (Waterbury 1983). The European market was a prime
East leaders resources erstwhile available to avoid ad incentive (as was the absence of oil) and Turkey could
justment, path-dependent legacies burdened change. count on a more robust business class fostered under

Despite unique natural resources, theMiddle East re Kemal Atat?rk. Government consumption shares of
mains least integrated into global trade and finance GDP were much lower than inmost other Middle East
after sub-Saharan Africa. states (UN National Accounts 1982-2004).
Yet some Middle East leaders slowly began em An anomaly amidst rentier states, Dubai's more lim

bracing alternative models, suggesting that "critical ited oil endowments led the ruling family to early di
junctures" and learning
can
provide mechanisms for versification away from oil in the 1970s. Crown-prince
change even in processes heavily burdened with path Sheikh Mohammed bin-Rashid al-Maktoum and his
dependency. Sadat used crisis to introduce infitah fac three businessmen-advisors emulated Singapore and

ing incalculable political risks, struggling to reverse Hong-Kong, turning Dubai into a regional trade hub;
Nasserism and stressing growth, foreign investment, financial, shipping, and media center; and tourist des
conversion, and new relations with tination with an open stock and outward
exports, military exchange
international markets and institutions. Sadat's assas oriented appeal to foreign companies (800 from the
sination and the political landscape he inherited con United States alone by 2006). Dubai developed 13 free
tinued to trump Egypt's transition. Nonoil producers trade zones, welcomed 5 million annual tourists, and re
with fewer choices (Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey) began duced oil dependence to 6% of state income; yet nearly

767
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

FIGURE 3. Domestic Institutions and Regional Effects

IMPLICATIONS
FOR DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS
*
States
CONSEQUENCES FOR REGIONAL
EA: Developmental states as supple, agile,mechanisms
CONFLICTAND COOPERATION
connectingdomesticwithglobal economy and promoting
privateentrepreneurship,foreigninvestment.
EA: Developmental states required(a) Contained MICs
ME: Predatorystates depleted and ossified afterreplacing
and limited militarycompetition(b) Regional stability;(c)
privateentrepreneurshipand foreigninvestment.
* Domestic stability, and foreign
predictability,
MODELS OF Militaryinstitutions investments;(d)Avoidingarms races. Each of these
EA: Repressive militariesbutcommittedtoprivateenterprise;
POLITICAL diminishedtheprospects forwar and
individually
export-ledmodel stymied demand forexpanded MICs (low
SURVIVAL militarizedincidents.Collectivelytheymade themeven
i> expenditures/GDPand CGE)
military i> less likely.
ME: Repressive militariesengaged in,or alliedwith, ISI
?interests;ISI facilitatedexpansive MICs (highmilitary ME: Economicallydepleted and deligitimizedregimes
expenditures/GDP-CGE) with largeMICs tended to (a) Emphasize nationalism
*
Authoritarianism and militaryprowess; (b) Externalizeconflict,(c)
EA: Export-ledmodel encouraged democracy via economic Exacerbate arms races; (d)Wield transnational
growth,strongerprivatesectors and civilsocieties, and allegiances, (e) Underminethe regionalstate-system.
containedMICs. Each of these individuallyenhanced theprospects for
ME: State-based ISI, includingthemilitary'sstrongembrace of war and militarizedincidents.Collectivelytheymade
ISI,created barrierstodemocratizationviaweaker private themeven more likely.
sectors (also oriented to ISI) and civilsocieties, and powerful
MICs resistanttodemocraticchange.

ISI = EA = East Asia, ME = Middle =

Notes: import-substitution industrialization, East, MIC military-industrial complex.

85% of itspopulation is foreign-born, largely unskilled, Yet the cases in this section suggest that difficulties are
sometimes indentured, and denied citizenship (Dore not insurmountable. As Waterbury's (261) study of the
2006; Fattah 2006). Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait have transformation of state power inEgypt and Turkey sug
attempted to follow Dubai's path. Even Saudi Arabia, "economic and class structures ... acted as retar
gest,
with 90% of government revenue derived from oil, dants to processes of change but did not determine or
recently joined theWTO and begun diversifying and cause them ...
Rather, narrowly based political leader

privatizing its economy while relaxing foreign owner ship, assisted by insulated change teams, drove forward
ship rules. both the import-substitution strategy and the subse
These experiences weaken deterministic views that quent introduction ofmarket-conforming policies."
domestic configurations pose insuperable barriers to
introducing alternative models. Differences in oil
endowments and private-firm incentives to endorse MODELS OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL:
openness shape different contexts and opportunities IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES,
for different leaders. Sadat forged new opportuni THE MILITARY, AND AUTHORITARIAN
ties and advanced them in a fairly constraining con INSTITUTIONS
text that outlived him. Ozal leaned on his allies in
The two competing models shared three important fea
state and
key agencies Korean-style private conglom tures. First, both relied on state institutions as key allies
erates to launch an export-drive, largely supported
in securing political control, although differences in the
by a population wary of the 1970s political violence nature of that reliance would have diverging effects on
and economic disarray (Waterbury 1983, 150). Sheikh
the respective evolution of states. Second, both models
al-Maktoum used oil endowments to replicate
relied on authoritarianism but each would foreshadow
Singapore in Dubai. Ironically, East Asia's competi differential paths regarding democratization. Third,
tiveness stemming from earlier decisions compounds
the difficulties Middle East leaders confront today although military institutions played important roles
in both models, the military itself endured different
(Noland and Pack 2005). Amsden's (2001, 286) re transformations under each model's political-economy.
formulation of Gerschenkron's theory has potentially 3 summarizes the implications of alternative
ominous implications for nationalist models: "the later Figure
models for evolving institutions?states, the military,
a country industrializes in chronological history, the
and authoritarianism?in each case.
greater the probability that itsmajor manufacturing
firms will be foreign-owned." Though such prospects
have not deterred Eastern European states or East
States
Asia's newcomers as Vietnam, are far more
they polit
ically menacing forMiddle East leaders struggling to Although states played central roles in both models,
transcend inward-looking models of political survival. the extent to which states replaced or enhanced pri
As Binder (1988, 83) noted about the Middle East, vate capital differed significantly. East Asian leaders
"no other cultural region is so deeply anxious about mandated state institutions to provide lending, sub
the threat of cultural penetration and westernization." sidies, and other incentives to private firms that met

768
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

performance goals. Although certainly not laisse-faire, Nasserism, reached comparable levels of statization.
themodel's dependence on export-led growth steered State enterprises accounted for 48% and 57% of eco
state intervention toward ensuring macroeconomic nomic activity in Sudan and Algeria (1980s). Most
stability,
new markets, investment in growth areas, Middle East states displaced private firms, but prae
and stable political-economic environments for for torian regimes in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Sudan,
eign investment (Noland and Pack 2005). Japan's Yemen, and Libya decimated private capital more thor
model?with its "minimalist state" in overall size oughly than the monarchies or Lebanon (Henry and
despite extensive intervention in the economy?was Springborg 2001). The oil bonanza (1970s) strength
significantly different from subsequent applications ened state sectors throughout the region even further.
in Taiwan, Hong-Kong, South Korea, Singapore, East Asian leaders vigilantly steered states into
Malaysia, Thailand, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam macroeconomic stability and proper conditions for
(Okimoto 1989; Pempel 1998). The KMT exposed sustained export-led growth. States thus developed
"greenhouse capitalists"
to the rigors of the mar into relatively supple, agile mechanisms connecting
ket, phasing out protection, enforcing export quotas, the domestic and global economies. Middle East lead
and limiting state entrepreneurship (Evans 1995, 57). ers crafted states bound to deplete and ossify, pre
The private sector's share of industrial production siding over current account and budget deficits, in
reached 80% by the early-1970s (Chan and Clark 1992). flation, scarce foreign exchange, and ultimately, too
Extensive consultations between businesses and gov weak to exert control over society except through force.
ernment were common in most East Asian cases, East Asia approximated ideal-typical developmental
although leaders enjoyed significant autonomy from states, whereas theMiddle East epitomized predatory
private firms in the initial phases 1990, states. states were handmaidens of
(Haggard "Developmental"
2004; Maclntyre 1994). Subsequently, as Stiglitz (1996) industrial transformation whereas "predatory states"

notes, firms?not states?made most decisions about undercut development

even in the narrow sense of
resource allocation. States were not heavy-handed, capital accumulation (Doner, Ritchie and Slafer 2005;
supporting export-oriented industries without micro Kohli 2004; Evans 1995, 12). The former relied on
managing them, providing credit and promoting tech Weberian-style meritocratic bureaucracies effectively
nical skills transferable across industries, selecting ini extracting resources from society, which were largely
tial industries and subsidizing declining ones but not absent in the latter due to rentierism. Both types could
thwarting private enterprise. East Asian states were tolerate cronyism and corruption but only the former
active lenders and regulators but dramatically less ac delivered collective goods from resources extracted
tive entrepreneurs thanMiddle East states. from society. Southeast Asian states circa 1950s were at
Massive nationalizations of oil, banking, industry, comparable or lower developmental levels than most
and the Suez Canal accompanied import-substitution Middle East states. Yet export-led models drove gov
in theMiddle East. Proceeds channeled to states as ernment consumption in Southeast Asian states to
monopoly rents enabled leaders to introduce expan 10%-11 % ofGDP (early 1970s) in contrast to thrice as
sive yet unsustainable populist programs. Redistribu high forMiddle East states (1970s-1980s).8 East Asian
tion dissipated within a decade after Egypt's revolu government deficits of 3% of GDP (1970s) became
tion (Waterbury 1983, 8). Import-substitution, with its surpluses (1980s), contrasting sharply with Middle East
compelling logic and inherent weaknesses (Hirschman deficits. Military expenditures?discussed next?help
1968), also involved income transfers from agricul explain some of these differences. Finally, both models
ture to infant industries under state sponsorship. State made states vulnerable, albeit to different challenges.
expansion and forceful suppression of private firms East Asian states were more susceptible to global sup
eliminated economic and political competitors to the ply and demand and evolving risks of capital liberaliza
state (Anderson 1987; Binder 1988). Referring to ren tion. The 1997 crisis?a major test?also offered proof
tier states, Halliday (2005, 278) argued that "there of states' resilience. Middle East states became vulner
was, in effect, no such thing
as a
private sector in able to the exhaustion of import-substitution (1960s),
these societies." States?not exposure to the balance-of-payments, inflation, unemployment, ineffi
global
economy?sapped private capital of economic and po cient industries, growing inequality, and weak private
litical strength, albeit to a lesser extent in Jordan, enterprise.
Morocco, Lebanon, and Turkey than in Egypt, Syria,
and Iraq. The former had the lowest percentages
of public employment, whereas rentier and import Military Institutions
substituting states had the highest. Many states
Military institutions played important roles as repres
adopted import-substitution in the 1950s to 1960s, but sive mechanisms of political control in both cases
few embraced as
comprehensive statist controls, en and military expenditures were overall high during
trepreneurship, and large bureaucracies as theMiddle the Cold War. Yet each model bore different impli
East did (Waterbury 1990). The Egyptian state owned cations for both the relative size and the short- and
longer term viability of expansive military-industrial
most modern sectors of the economy under Nasser,
contributing 90% of value-added by plants employing
10 or more workers (Owen and Pamuk 1999), account
ing for 91% of gross fixed investment, and consum
8 For data on individual see World
countries, Development Reports
ing nearly 50% of GNP. Syria and Iraq, emulating 1991-1997.

769
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

complexes which?though ubiquitous?vary widely in size militaries relative to population (ACDA; Bill and
size and in the extent to which they replace private Springborg 2000, 171-72; Richards and Waterbury
enterprise. These complexes entailed far more than 1990, 354, 362). Average military expenditures relative
armament production in the Middle East. Sprawling to GNP reached 15% to 25% (1970s-1980s), several
networks of military-controlled state enterprises
en times the industrializing world's mean (5%), and much
gaged in activities well beyond military purpose or higher than any state inEast Asia except North Korea.
natural resource exploitation, replacing private firms, Egypt's averaged 18% (1970s), Iraq's 44% (1980s),
creating captive import-substituting sectors, supply and Syria's 17.5% (1980s) of GDP and reached over
ing inputs to military-controlled and civilian enter 32% of budgets on average for Iraq and Syria and
prises, and maintaining high tariffs and protection over 21% for Egypt (1960s-1980s). Israel's military
(Waterbury 1993). North Korea and Burma resembled expenditures/GDP averaged 20% (1960s-1970s) de
this model. By contrast, export-led growth required clining to 9% under the Labor-Meretz new model,
stable macroeconomic policies, predictable environ and nearly halved from 40% to 22% of budgets for
ments, and minimizing inflationarymilitary allocations the same period. Jordan's military expenditures/GNP
that could endanger the model's core objectives. Mil halved from 16% average (1960s-1970s) to 8% (1990s)
itary expenditures relative to GNP and in particular with economic reform. Iran's averaged 8% under the
to central government expenditures, provide
measures Shah. Lower ratios under the Islamic Republic un
of sensitivity to such concerns (Appendix A). Mili derestimate bonyad (state foundations) expenditures
tary expenditures/GNP in Southeast Asia (excluding and Revolutionary Guards contributions beyond bud
Indochina) reached 5% average (1970s) during the getary control (SIPRI Yearbooks 1986-99). Notably,
Cold War but export-led models reduced them to the few Middle East states with lower military ex
2.8% (1990).9 Military expenditures relative to budgets penditures also pursued export-led models, including
reflect similar declines for all states with export-led Morocco (averaging 4% of GNP, 16% of budgets) and
models. Japan's military expenditures/GDP remained Tunisia (below 2% and 7%, respectively). Mubarak re
capped at 1% since 1976. Except for North Korea, duced military expenditures/GNP from historical highs
Northeast Asian states were
relatively restrained. A of 18% (1970s) to 3% (1990s), and from 34% to 9%
decade after barely surviving North Korea's attack, of budgets. Middle East states still account for six of
South Korea reduced military expenditures/GNP from the highest eight military expenditures/GNP spenders
6% under Rhee (1960-1961) to 4% (1963-1975) un worldwide, with average military expenditures/GNP
der Park's export-led model. Extensive U.S. military twice those of East Asia (Halliday 2005, 337). North
assistance declined to less than 50% of total military Korea's military expenditures/GNP approached Mid
expenditures (early 1970s) and military grants ceased dle East levels?25% (1985-1994)?despite itsworld's
completely in 1978. Military expenditures/GDP halved bottom credit standing. The military-industrial com
between 1980 and 2000, and declined from 27% to plex remains Kim Jong-Il's most important partner in a
17% of government budgets. Taiwan's military expen model that provides the starkest anomaly inEast Asia.
ditures declined from about 10% of GDP (1960s) to In sum, both models relied on the military for
about to 2.5% (2000s), and from 50% to 31% of bud political control but their partnerships underwrote
gets during that period. The United States was reluc fundamentally different political-economies. Export
tant to build Taiwan's military to discourage it from led growth stymied demands for expansive military
challenging China. KMT leaders?controlling themil industrial complexes or, at the very least, enabled com

itary in Leninist fashion?were reluctant to finance pensatory transfers to themilitary. Backed by a "sword
expensive indigenous weapons' industries that might wori" coalition of military and civilian technocrats
imperil export-led growth (Chan 1988, 1992; Cheng and industrialists, Park suppressed military segments
1993). Taiwan's military expenditures/GDP played mi demanding a large-scale import-substituting complex
nor and indirect roles on
growth, export expansion, thatmight jeopardize export-led growth (Cheng 1990,
and improving income equality. Despite its existen 158-9). Park (1971, 107) relied on technical and eco
tial predicament Taiwan ranks 52 in military expen nomic experts able to scrutinize "the arbitrariness
ditures/GDP worldwide. Growing economies enabled and rashness of the military officers." The model's
higher absolute military expenditures yet East Asia's success
yielded
more resources for military modern
moderation is suggested by their lag afterGNP growth, ization without risking mainstay economic objectives
lower percentages of GDP and budgets than averages or
imposing Draconian guns-versus-butter tradeoffs.
for industrializing states, and typically onlyone fourth The military thus joined other beneficiaries of dra
of those ofMiddle East ones. matic growth, purged antagonistic elements, and sup
The Middle East exhibited the highest levels ofmili ported private enterprise as the engine of export-led
tary expenditures relative toGDP and government ex growth (Amsden 1989,48-52; Cumings 1984,26). Min
penditures in the industrializing world, and the largest istries of finance "review(ed) defense budgets with
a much more skeptical eye than has probably ever
been true in theMiddle East" (Calder 1996, 2), where
9
See Appendix B. Indonesia's military expenditures/GNP plum vast complexes replaced private capital as part of
meted from 5.4% (under Sukarno) to 1.2% under Suharto, and
states' evisceration of political-economic competitors.
Vietnam's from 19% during import-substitution to 3% with export
led growth. For military expenditures/GNP see Import-substitution facilitated these complexes' ex
rankings worldwide,
World Factbook 2006. into many realms of economic life. Leaders
pansion

770
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

endowed military-security apparatuses with gargan By contrast, Middle East models created two built
tuan budgets and perks as key pillars of mukhabarat in barriers to democratic development. First, by un
(intelligence) states. Massive armies consumed vast dermining independent private sectors they deprived
resources, 15 soldiers per 1,000 people?as opposed democratic movements from key potential allies; weak
to 5 in East Asia?and attracted nearly 15% of GNP ened civil societies could not rely on capitalists' de
and 37% of budget averages?as opposed to 2% and mands for political reform. Furthermore, Binder's
11% inEast Asia, respectively (ACDA1984-1994). As (1988, 343) statement that "the rhetoric of political
chief guarantors of thismodel, Middle East militaries liberalism in Egypt does not include capitalism" ap
were most resolute opponents of change.10 Egyptian plied more broadly. Consequently, efforts by Middle
economist Amin (1980)?although critical of economic East leaders to adopt export-led models, as Sadat's
liberalization?listed military expenditures as the fore infitah, had to contend with well-entrenched protec
most source of Egypt's development failure. tionist private interests resistant to overturn partner
ships with military and state enterprises, particularly
strong in Syria and Iraq. Second, import-substitution
involved a farmore fatal embrace with the military,
Authoritarian Institutions
endowing the latter with vast economic fiefdoms and
relied on authoritar resources beyond those derived from state budgets. Re
Finally, although both models
ian institutions, the implications of each for the role pressive militaries thus remained staunch guardians of
of themilitary and private entrepreneurship differed, the authoritarian status-quo (Bellin 2004). Unsurpris
and with them the implications for authoritarianism. ingly, the only modest steps toward democratization
materialized where both protected entrepreneurs and
East Asia's export-led models were not designed to
to curb were weakest Morocco,
advance but democracy, fueling unsound theo military complexes (Jordan,
ries that authoritarianism was better at implementing Lebanon, and recently some Gulf states). These cases
painful reforms through repression.11 However, the provide some support for "democratic efficiency" the
models' unintended effects encouraged democracy via ories asserting that authoritarian leaders are better-off
three mechanisms. First, they fostered stronger pri democratizing?even if at slow rates?as they reform

vate sectors and civil societies that eventually over economic models of political control (Maravall 1994;
turned authoritarianism in most cases. the Remmer 1989).
Second,
In sum,models of political survival adopted by most
need for macroeconomic stability and reduced state
Middle East leaders decades ago had distinct impli
entrepreneurship limited military complexes and un
dermined themilitary's ability to develop independent cations for the nature and evolution of states, mili
resources, forcing it to evolve into more professional tary,and authoritarian institutions. They also magnified
other barriers to transformation, much lower
forces, less hostile to groups underwriting outward creating
oriented growth. Third, the models led to unprece employment, literacy (particularly female), and educa
dented economic Because is as tional levels inmost MENA states than inEast Asian
growth. democracy
sumed to be least reversible where annual per-capita ones (AHDR 2002, 25).
income rises above $6,000 (Przeworski et al. 1996),
growth may help explain democracy's resilience in
these cases. At lower income levels, economic growth MODELS OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL:
with low/moderate inflation?an important ingredient IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL
in East Asian models?heightens democracy's prob CONFLICT
ability of survival. These three mechanisms operated
in Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and The intended and unintended consequences of polit
which evolved into whereas ical survival models for states, military, and author
Indonesia, democracies,
remained truncated under the "Asian itarian institutions had, in turn, important implica
Malaysia's
In Matahir tions for regional conflict, summarized in Figure 3.
way" banner justifying authoritarianism.
Mohamad's terms, "Should we enforce democracy
on First, recapitulating, Middle East states became in
struments of import-substitution intended to achieve
people who may not be able to handle it and destroy
stability?" (quoted inMaravall 1994, 18). China and rapid industrialization, robust entrepreneurial states,
on
(Indochinese states
remained chief outliers and decreased reliance international markets. Yet
Singapore
have resorted to export-led models more recently and import-substitution unintendedly also depleted states'
their effects may not be evident yet). Despite these resources and ossified the political machinery that con
anomalies, East Asia's modal has trolled them. Leaders of drained and entropie states
trajectory helped
transform export-led growth into democratic polities. were unable to deliver resources and services to con
stituencies previously mobilized through revolutionary
or nationalist fervor. External conflict and national
10
On the relationship between the armed forces, state-controlled ism became effective substitutes for maintaining po
economies, and import-substitution in the Arab world, see Picard litical support and deflecting opposition. As Dodge
1990.
11 (2002, 177) argued, Middle East states were "cer
Authoritarian advantage theories looked at economic success
tainly 'fierce' states, but not necessarily strong ones."
cases only. However, as Przeworski et al. (1996) argue, one must
compare average rather than best practices. Many authoritarians They could deploy violence at home and abroad but
tried, but few succeeded. lacked institutional power and legitimacy domestically

771
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

and regionally. This fragility,hidden behind pan-Arab tary institutional interests around import-substitution
rhetoric, fueled mutual assaults on sovereignty. Acting perpetuated sprawling and inefficient industrial com
in the name of state sovereignty (wataniya), argued plexes. Import-substitution also facilitated these com
Barnett (1998), was bad form and bad politics. Colo plexes' expansion under the aura of nationalism and
nialism was blamed not for incorrect border demarca pan-Arab symbols (Bill and Springborg 2000). Lead
tion but for conceiving of borders at all (Gause 1992). ers used pan-Arabism (qawmiyya
or raison de la na
Yet unsuccessful drives for unity as means to counter
tion) and state nationalism (wataniyya or raison d'etat)
perceived external threats (theWest, Israel) paradox as convenient tools for camouflaging minority con
ically weakened the Arab state-system, and struggles trol of military and state institutions, as with Syria's
for pan-Arab leadership unintendedly increased op Alawi, Saudi Arabia's Sudairi, Jordan's Hashemite,
portunities for conflict (Kerr 1971). States exhausted and Iraq's Tikriti minorities. Strong partnerships across
by import-substitution and militarization were not the import-substituting military, state, and private indus
highest locus of political identification and legitimacy trial complexes unsurprisingly led to higher military
(Ibrahim 1995). Hence, violations of state sovereignty expenditures?relative to both GNP and government
were more
frequent, from militarized border con
expenditures?in the Middle East than in all other
flicts and intervention in neighbor's domestic affairs regions, both during and after the Cold War, leading
to calls for political unification that undermined exist to recurrent arms races. Arms races are estimated to

ing state boundaries, to violent efforts at ideological lead to war within five years (Sample 1997) and to
homogenization. efforts to display military capabilities at border inci
Second, entropie states could only engage in beggar dents. Furthermore, Glaser (2000) argues that when
thy-neighbor economic exchanges compatible with domestic interests rather than external threats lead
eco states to build up military resources, arms races
import-substitution, severely restricting regional ensuing
nomic exchange (Halliday 2005, 280). Efforts at com are more likely to lead towar.
mon markets and integrative schemes among Egypt, A fourth vector emphasizes external conflict as en

Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, and Tunisia re hancing themilitary's raison d'?tre and itsprerogatives
mained largely declaratory. Regional economic barri to gargantuan resources, trumping alternative socio
ers remained among the highest worldwide, with inter economic objectives. Nasser prompted
war on Yemen
Arab trade never rising above 7% to 10% of total amidst severe economic crisis to justify a 30% increase
trade since the 1950s. Dodge and Higgott (2002, 24 inmilitary budgets (1963-1965). Oil-rich monarchies
5) connect this lack of regional economic integration were chief targets of Nasser's internal and external
to the historical fragility of state sovereignty due to revolutionary order; Yemen?he and his military ad
leaders' calls for supra-national schemes. Regional
co visors thought?provided an opportunity for weak
operation, their study suggests, "foundered on the fears ening internal and external competitors. Sadat justi
of each state for itsnational sovereignty," a legacy that fied gargantuan military budgets in the early 1970s
offers "a partial explanation
as to
why
war continues on war preparations against Israel. The October 1973
to be so prevalent in the region." Finally, they sur war enhanced Sadat's legitimacy at home, enabling
mise, the Arab-Israeli conflict itself "is rooted in the him to introduce a new model to replace Nasserism.
lack of acceptance both of the norm of sovereign non Saddam Hussein pointed to external threats to de
interference, and of borders themselves across the re
velop theArab world's largest military-industrial ma
gion. Territorial disputes between Israel and its neigh chine, putting it to work against Iran and Kuwait
bors, and also between states in theArabian Peninsula with the expectation that these wars would enhance
and on either side of the Gulf, all point to the contin his domestic survival while expanding control over
uous prominence of territory and military force in the the Arabian Peninsula. Hafiz el-Asad protected mil
region." Noble (1991, 75) summarizes the texture of itary expenditures while threatening Jordan militar
regional relations: "Arab governments relied primar ily (1970, 1980), attacking
Israel (1973), and occup
ily on unconventional coercive techniques," including ping Lebanon for nearly 30 years. Praetorian states
"strong attacks on the leadership of other states, propa (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Libya, Sudan) decimated
ganda campaigns tomobilize opposition, and intense private capital, built more massive military complexes,
subversive pressures, including cross-frontier alliances and were far more involved in instigating milita
with dissatisfied individuals and groups. The aim was rized threats than were Arab monarchies. Libya and
to destabilize and ultimately overthrow opposing gov Egypt were involved?mostly proactively?in at least
ernments." Many among the 46 cases of militarized 10 militarized conflicts of the 46 inAppendix A; Iraq
conflict (Appendix B) fit well within this compelling and Syria in 7, including protracted ones. Jordan,
analysis. Morocco, Kuwait, and smaller Gulf sheikhdoms were
A third vector fueling external conflict involved involved?mostly reactively?in 1 to 3 of those con
military-industrial complexes that remained strongly flicts, Saudi Arabia in 5.
wedded to
import-substitution and state entrepreneur The military as guarantor of leaders' political sur
ship, replacing private capital as economic and po vival and of authoritarian mukhabarat states was a re
litical competitors. Inward-looking private sectors lated, final vector contributing toMiddle East propen
protected their partnerships with those complexes, sity to externalizing conflict. Tripp (2001, 225) notes
without which their own viability was at stake. This that "national security" states protected primarily
strong convergence among state, private, and mili domestic regimes but were portrayed as responses

772
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

to external threats, leading to both internal and exter Quite different states, military, and authoritarian
nal conflict. As Halliday (2005, 291) argued, "in terms institutions developed in East Asia, with different
of the historical sociology of Charles Tilly ... Middle implications for interstate relations. Leaders advanc
Eastern states are in essence ... based on the use and ing export-led models granted primacy to macroeco
threat of force." This brand of authoritarianism rein nomic stability and predictability, which were consid
forced reliance on externalization of conflict as a tool to ered more likely to attract foreign investment. Domes
stifledomestic dissent. With the rapid exhaustion of pa tic instability and regional tensions kept investments
tronage assets due to entrenched import-substitution, away from East Asia (1950s) until the growth of lo
authoritarian leaders emphasized military prowess and cal entrepreneurial expertise and relatively skilled la
nationalist myths as instruments of political survival. bor forces enhanced their appeal to foreign investors
The same mechanisms?delegitimized mukhabarat au
(Chan 1990). Export-led growth also mandated stable
thoritarian states with mammoth military-industrial regional environments unburdened with unproductive
complexes?afflicted both inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli and expansive military budgets that added to deficits,
relations. Yet, from a
pan-Arab viewpoint, Israel pro high costs of capital, depleted foreign exchange, and
vided a farmore legitimate target and its own military investment.14 Thus, no arms races or
stymied foreign
industrial complex, prowess and excesses was skill offensive build-ups threatened stability or investments
and, despite China's military modernization, Taiwan
fully used by neighboring leaders to continue invest
and South Korea's military expenditures/GNP and
ing in their own military complexes.12 Nasser closed
the Tiran Straits to Israeli navigation in 1967 and or budgets declined (Buzan and Segal 1994; Calder 1996;
dered UN troops removed from the common border Mack and Kerr 1994, 131). Leaders vigilantly steer
while threatening war and imminent victory, leading ing export-led models fostered agile states able to
to the Six-Day War. Following Jordan's attack during compensate adversely affected constituencies. Pivoted
the war, Israel Palestinian territories un on economic the model common
conquered growth, encouraged
der Jordanian control, which it has illegally occupied resilience, stability, and "prosper-thy-neighbor" poli
since. In October 1973 (Yom Kippur), Egypt and Syria cies. At the height of their worst collective debacle,
launched surprise attacks on Israel but, since Sadat's ASEAN's summit (1997) adopted plans for "a concert
inception of a new model, Egypt never initiated war of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living
against Israel again. Furthermore, a few Arab lead in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in
ers emphasizing new models of political survival esta partnership in dynamic development and in a commu
blished diplomatic or trade relations with Israel after nity of caring societies..." while reiterating leaders'
1979. Of 48 Middle East militarized conflicts, 7 in resolve "to enhance ASEAN economic cooperation
volved Israel; out of these 7, 3?involving economic ... which
primarily through development strategies
Syria and Hezbolla-occurred after 1973. The remain put emphasis on sustainable and equitable growth,
ing 41 conflicts?from large-scale
wars to massive mo and enhance national as well as regional resilience"
bilizations and cross-border battles?involved inter (www.aseansec.org).
Arab, Arab-Iranian, and Turkish-Cypriot dyads. The The maturation of East Asia's model led?in the
Arabia, and Morocco longer run?to militaries weakened as political insti
Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait/Saudi
Polisario wars accounted for the bulk of totalMiddle tutions and industrial complexes, and coopted into
East casualties and were the only interstate wars with export-led growth, regional cooperation and stability.
more than 10,000 casualties fought since 1973. Gulf Co Internationalizing policies strengthened private sec
operation Council Secretary General Abdalla Bishara tors, middle classes, and labor associated with export
went as far as remarking that the basic threat to Gulf led growth. Invigorated civil societies demanded
states is not from Israel but from other Arab states greater transparency and accountability, pushing the
(Korany 1994, 166). More recently the Council has military further away from politics. In a positive feed
defined Iran as the most serious threat.13 Although back loop, more professionalized militaries extended
Iran was involved in fivemilitarized incidents, only the support for policies underwriting export-led growth.
Iran-Iraq war?initiated by Iraq?resulted in high ca Externalizing conflict would have endangered core
sualty numbers (between 500,000 and 1million deaths). objectives of export-led models and their support
Turkey was involved in 3 militarized conflicts but only ive constituencies within developmental states, pri
the 1974 Cyprus invasion?which pointedly preceded vate sectors, and the military.15 Even declining military
?zal's inception of export-led growth?involved thou
sands of casualties.
14
Stabilization aims at restoring macroeconomic balance through
short-term measures to reduce inflation, balance-of-payments and
government deficits (Przeworski 1991, 144). This involves reducing
12 often ac
This is different from arguing that Arab military-industrial com aggregate demand through fiscal and monetary measures
plexes were mere by-products of this factor, as is clear from the anal companied by devaluation (Nelson 1990, 3-4), forcing restraint in
Such expenditures also deprive the most dy
ysis of permissive and catalytic conditions shaping typical models of military expenditures.
survival reviewed earlier. Even theAHDR (2002,2) states that Israel namic export sectors of important resources and skills. Declines in
"provides both a cause and an excuse for distorting the development export performance can lead to weaker currencies, structural un
employment, chronic trade deficits, and unattractiveness to interna
agenda," serving "to solidify the public against an outside aggressor."
13 States Sense Gravity of tional investments (Adams 1992; Chan 1992).
"Saudi Arabia: Gulf Official Says GCC
15The
Iran Nuclear Armament," MENA January 3, 2005; Khaleej Times links between military expenditures, foreign investments,
Online, May 23, 2006. and conditions for export-led growth in the Middle East are

773
Pax Asi?tica versus Bella Levantina November 2007

expenditures/GDP ratios remained adequate formod rized conflict. Collectively theymade them even less
ernizing professional military forces, without wreck likely.
ing themodel's broader objectives. Declines inmilita
rized conflict began in tandem with export-led growth,
CONCLUSIONS
incepted by regimes spanning democracy and ruth
less authoritarianism. No "democratic-peace" effects Different models of political survival among East Asia
were at work initially; authoritarian leaders were no and Middle East leaders, APEC and the ASEAN
less constrained by the model's requirements and in shifts inmodels of political survival and their implica
centives to cooperate
regionally, enforce noninterven tions for states,military, and authoritarian institutions,
tion in neighbors' affairs, and tame ethnoreligious
re had intended, unintended, and unforeseen effects for
vivalism and border disagreements. Economic growth external conflict. Significant synergies existed among
contributed to the consolidation of more democra state forms, military institutions, and authoritarianism,
cies with even greater incentives to control military and among these three and proclivities toward ex
expenditures and avoid conflict, so that resources ternal conflict. Domestically fragile regimes with low
could be channeled to satisfy new constituencies. No legitimacy?a legacy of enduring import-substitution
tably, major wars in East Asia preceded 1980 and and rentierism?led to a fragile Middle East state
most militarized incidents involved inward-looking, of system and continued violations of sovereignty masked
ten autarkic militarized rivals inVietnam, Cambodia, by pan-Arab
or
pan-Islamic rhetoric. By contrast, more

Laos, Myanmar, and China. Despite historical, ter robust East Asian states?underpinned by export-led
ritorial, and border disputes throughout East Asia, models?led to stronger adherence to state sovereignty
militarized confrontations remained rare as
export and lower incidence of militarized sovereignty viola
led models grew stronger. In contrast to East Asia's tions. Sprawling military-industrial complexes helped
spatial and temporal concentration of militarized block alternative models in the Middle East for
conflicts?five states (of 19) accounted for the bulk of decades, magnifying
arms races, opportunities, and in

them?every single Middle East state (of 19) was in centives to exercise militarized options. By contrast,
volved inmilitarized conflicts during the period under export-led models restrained military burdens on state
study. finances and politics, providing themilitary with incen
In sum, as Figure 3 suggests, in an effort to divert at tives to professionalize and acquire stakes in regional
tention from failed domestic models, economically de stability. Inward-looking Middle East authoritarianism
pleted, entropie, crisis-prone, and de-legitimized Mid created higher barriers to democratization and com
dle East regimes with large military-industrial com pounded leaders' incentives to offset low legitimacy by
plexes were prone to: (1) emphasize nationalism and externalizing conflict. Export-oriented models inEast
military prowess, (2) externalize conflict, (3) exacer Asia improved conditions for democratization and in
bate arms races, (4) wield transnational allegiances centives for external cooperation and stability, pivotal
and regional assertion, and (5) undermine the re ingredients for economic growth, foreign investment,
gional state-system. Each of these vectors individu and electoral viability.Middle East models exacerbated
ally enhanced the prospects for war and militarized and prolonged the incidence of clashes, militarization,
incidents. Collectively they made them even more and conflict-inducing challenges to sovereignty. East
likely.War itselfmight not have been these regimes' Asian models alleviated tensions, tamed militariza

preference, but mobilizations, overt subversions, and tion, and enhanced cooperation and mutual respect for
cross-border invasions were
certainly intended, though sovereignty. These differences also spilled over into the
not always controllable. Logics (1) through (5) cre nature of regional institutions which, while lowly legal
ated a structural tendency toward militarized con ized in both cases, were more attuned to "open region
flict that willy-nilly slid intomilitarized incidents even alism" inEast Asia (at least forAPEC and theASEAN
when these may not have been the preferred out Regional Forum) than in theMiddle East, where the
come.
By contrast, East Asia's developmental states Arab League maintained rigid, identity-based criteria
required: (1) contained military-industrial complexes formembership since 1945 (Solingen 2008).
and limited military competition; (2) regional stability; These contrasts are particularly puzzling because
(3) domestic stability, predictability, and foreign states across both regions shared relatively similar ini
investments; (4) minimizing arms races thatmight af tial domestic conditions in the 1950s to the early 1960s,
fect (1) through (3). Each of these requirements indi including ethnic diversity, state-building challenges,
vidually diminished the prospects for war and milita and involvement inmilitarized conflicts. The Korean
and Indochinese wars, Sukarno's military konfrontasi
campaign against Malaysia, and the latter's expulsion
of Singapore, among others, reveal a higher incidence
evident in Riad Al-Khouri's of such conflicts inEast Asia in earlier times.This points
analysis (1994, 110-11, 115): "Jor
dan's economic hopes are riding on the peace process ... to within-region variation in the dependent variable
A resolution of the conflict with Israel would also allow reduction of and dismiss essentialist penchants forwar or peace in
the country's defense budget (which accounts formore than 30% of
... the background of the lingering
any region. Shifts away from such conflicts inEast Asia,
government spending) Against which correspond with shifts inmodels of political sur
Arab-Israeli conflict, it remains almost impossible to attract [foreign]
investors. But if the peace process flourishes ... Jordan will assume vival, to over-time variation. Most states in each
point
its rightful economic role." conformed to a but there were
region general pattern

774
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 4

also anomalies. All these features, including compara vide enough warnings against temptations to over
ble initial conditions, render theMiddle East and East emphasize invariant common
properties
across all re

Asia particularly useful empirical domains for under gions. Path-dependence illuminates the role of criti
standing evolution away fromwars, militarized conflict cal junctures, why specific patterns of timing and se
and interventions. Latin America presents quite dif quence matter, and why
a wide range of outcomes can

ferent conditions, less relevant to the tight comparison evolve from similar initial conditions (Thelen 1999).
afforded by the other two regions, particularly because "Increasing returns" (self-reinforcing
or
positive feed
scarce wars for over a century
preceded the onset of back processes) point to one form of path-dependence
relevant political-economy variables inLatin America, where preceding steps in one direction induce social
and hence there has been little variation in the de actors to move in the same direction and not others
pendent variable. Inward-looking models of political (Pierson 2000). This results in institutions thatmagnify
survival are certainly not the only precursors of war patterns of power distribution and heighten the costs of
and militarized conflict, as a rich literature in interna switching to alternative models because of large fixed
tional relations suggests, but one that has been largely costs, learning, coordination effects, and adaptive
ex

neglected, particularly in macro-comparisons across

pectations (betting on the right horse). Under such
regions.
conditions the short time-horizon of rulers militates
This retrospective account identifies different mod against change, but does not render it impossible. Small
els of political survival as key sources of Pax Asi?tica but significant steps in that direction are increasingly
and Bella Levantina. The analysis could be reasonably evident from Morocco to Jordan, Tunisia, and some
persuasive in explaining the past yet less applicable in Gulf states.
the future. For instance, the beneficial economic and The presence of those Middle East outliers, and
political circumstances of the 1960s that enabled East anomalies in East Asia such as North Korea and
Asia's experience may not be replicable for theMiddle Burma, provide further support for the relationship be
East 50 years later (Noland and Pack 2005). Nonethe tween models of political survival and external conflict.
less, one can rely
on the broad argument to estimate Outliers strove to adopt alternative models to those
future probabilities. The inception of export-led mod prevailing in their region and exhibited dissimilar con
els in theMiddle East would be expected to enhance flict behavior. Notably Middle East outliers included
the prospects of Pax Levantina, whereas the inception mostly monarchies?rentier and non-rentier?which
of inward-looking models in East Asia?though im experienced less intense and protracted colonial influ
probable in the near future barring a major economic ence than praetorian states. Outliers in each region
shock?should increase the likelihood of Bella Asi also question the scope of micro-phenomenological
?tica. Both circumstances would provide confirming theories emphasizing local cultural origins and regional
evidence of domestic models as important drivers of uniqueness. Above all, the incidence of outliers coun
external behavior, as would the continuation of cur ters deterministic views about inevitable outcomes
rent patterns of a more peaceful East Asia and more in any region. Contrasts between Southeast Asian
conflict-prone Middle East. However, were interna and Middle East states also highlight wide variation
tionalizing models in East Asia be visited by high in among Moslem countries. The former, once labeled
cidence and severity in cross-border militarized con the "Balkans of the East" (under Sukarno's model),
flict, our confidence would be undermined. Leaders were subsequently able to transform rentier political
advancing internationalization in theMiddle East have economies, reinforce a more flexible and "modern"
similar incentives as those observed inEast Asia. Were Islam, and spearhead cooperative regional institutions.
a farmore widespread and serious deepening of inter Future research may probe further the generalizability
nationalizing models throughout the entire region be of East Asia's model as harbinger of peace. As argued,
accompanied by high levels of militarized conflict, or, the favorable global and regional circumstances, po
conversely,
were hardened inward-looking models to litical and economic, that lubricated the inception of
fashion aMiddle East peace comparable toEast Asia's, East Asia's model should not be taken for granted.
the utility of the argument would also be questioned. Such models have been cycled elsewhere in different
This effort to understand contrasting evolutions in temporal and spatial circumstances and with different
the two regions builds on some of Tilly's (1984) strate degrees of success, with major upheavals sometimes
for comparative research, evident in this article's their retrenchment. Indeed, some
gies forcing predicted
different sections. First, a
"variation-finding" strat that the 1997 Asian crisis would have such effect, and
egy calls for locating common permissive and causal although it did not, such potential should not be dis
conditions leading to different outcomes across re counted. The relationship between domestic models of
gions. This analytical path helps transcend strong aca political survival and external conflict could arguably
demic traditions of regional exceptionalism. Second, an hold only up to a certain point. A key quandary in
"encompassing comparative strategy" seems unavoid East Asia iswhether the archetypical model is robust
able to control for world-systemic effects or enabling enough?particularly in China?to reproduce the low
conditions residing in global historical circumstances levels of militarized conflict that led to Pax Asi?tica in
or "world-time." Finally, within-region variation and recent decades. A key quandary in theMiddle East is
anomalies place limits on "universalizing comparisons" whether U.S. intervention in Iraq has made the region's
that assume the same internal causal sequence re archetypical model less robust or whether, instead, it is
curs in all regions. History and path-dependency pro likely to reproduce Bella Levantina.

775
 4.86
21.9
7.365.6620 10.599.84.0228.5 9.32 9.55 9.19 26.5 6.43 47.8
16.830.613.811.2 21.4 15.5 21.6 46.812.317 13.739.725.353.329.9 16.4 24.5
12.5
23.3 4.3
18.8 41.919.2 40.526.9 20.6 17.444.8 41.9 19.2
43.5
28.3
28.6 5.48 4.76 8.9915.3 8.48
(d)
CGE 10.7 16 11.420.5 11.1 26.7 76.1 21.131.7 36 12.4 30.1 20.122.4 42.4
1969
1979
1999
1989
1990
1970
1963
1980 10.3
16.7
9.04
9.3 7.1
40.5 17.9 14.5 10.8 20.6
Expenditures/ 30.3
28.8
67.2 17.36.6345.114.528.65.05 4.3314.628 27.2 19.1 8.03 30.5 40.9 45.8 5.88
Military 39.1 33.8 31.9 12.2 18 16.234.1
9.8 5.3
29.56.8740.7 32.96.97 22.622.849.6 6.17 22.927.4 40 42.27.7 19 6.3 12.2 14.836.7 22.749.9
12.7 14.2 33.6
6.4333I
2004
2000 2.05 4.92 1.36 3.48
1.886.6
2.62
1
1.025 2.281.8 1.12 0.722.28 2.442.44 3.482.784.76 8.828.6 7.765.0333 4.24 3.5 6.6 1.624.263.2
5.0333 11.84
1.33 2.8 4.85 4.88 3.48 7.5 4.05
1 3.028.453.17 5.8810.38.98 3.765.784.4 18.3 6.16 2.25 5.038.39
5.28 8 1.5 24.41.561.77 3.36 2.393.9
11.3
30.2
(d)
(e)
GDP
M.E./
Expenditures/GNP
Military 10.2
4.5 7.43 4.73 3.35 4.3
21.3 11.3 17.53.43 6.81
2.480.986.8 4.313.142.1 1.52 5.2 5.186.313.66 3.175.93 44.2
18 5.9812.85.9423.99.3
1.78 11.4 20.1
1999
1989
1979
1969
1970
1990
1980
1963 2.91
4.28
2.58
2.24
10.8
6.55
12.7
2.53 4.23 1.75 2.015.434.83 2.3 1.854.812.38
4.47
4.32
14.7 3.430.9 9.4 4.54 1.4 8.093.23 3 17.8 15.3 4.513.786.824.53 5.213.11
19.4 11.5 27.223.4 27.7 13.1
2.950.91 1.28 2.36 2.65 2.7 1.852.88 2.489.451.39
3.146.162.0312.8 3.143.9 8.366.04 2.43 4.71
13.6 10.7 11.513.114.2
1.25|5.057.643.22| 1.01 2.86I 2.47 -1.48 2.83I 4.822.753.344.82
1.531 1.841
2.05 0.32 -0.57 2.040.69|
3.07 0.283.131.975.29
1.69
2004
2000 1.77 2.51 2.71 0.74| 2.44|-15.1 0.99| 4.69 1.59
-0.94

2.13 1.932.65 0.155.28 -2.39 4.17 1.19 0.561.861.27 2.77

2.1 9.49 1.29 1.53 3.470.944.365.485.47 4.49 0.06 3.1 3.877.742.89 -0.24
2.437.77 -0.39
3.252.233.050.71
-1.21

-2.16 3.074.093.36 1.25 4.336.25 -1.38 -4.13 -0.15 2.63 --0.65

-1.25
1 1.71
6.6 6.6 5.18 0.54 3.4 2.181.82
Real
GDP (c)
prices)
(%
2000
in
constant
growth
per
capita)
rate
(c) 2.03 -5.81 7.615.543.16 -0.04
-0.77 -1.42 -5.1 -6.61 -5.82
6.38 -4.63 5.874.06-1.35
6.79 7.197.09 3.097.242.472.857.52 -4.81 1.264.894.452.36
2.881.2 -1.09
1959
1950
1980
1960
19701989
1979
1969
19901999 1.76 24.5
-8.18 6.74 0.499.587.9 3.02 8.175.1 2.77
Arms Transfers 1963-1973,1967-1976,1986,1996,1999-2000; (e) Information
-0.89 from the
International
7.9 4.08
1.8
2.93 1.78 5.74 5.541.57
Sources: (a) Greenbook. 1.149.99
0.55 USAID; (b) World 1.59
Bank 5.08
6.495.08
Group. World 3.01
Development Indicators 4.672.922.43 Stockholm
3.57 6.13 http://devdata.worldban
43 Penn World Table 6.2, 6.97
Center 3.33
for 4.47
International -1.12 1.262.45
Comparisons of7.16Production, Income UPenn,
and
Online,
APPENDIX
A:
EAST
THE
AND
MIDDLE
ASIA
EAST
COMPARED 4.82 0.91 0.78 1.474.54 3.42
-0.24
5.4 at
Prices

14 21.2
1.091
1.22
2
27.2
46.6
61.9
45 29.8
9.37
16.6
8.75
19.6
Fuels, Exports
(b)
GDP)
of
(% 5.09 0.18
0.135.87| 9.43|
4.87
8.82
15.9 0.65
13.40.14
0.85
1.71
1.04
2.44
2.04 15.7
43.42.95
1.48
18.7
25.31.38
2.08
1.38|
14.7 24 1.17 1.75 23.3 1.941
1.37|
2.14
0.73
1.62
1.52 5.26
0.62
2.82
1.99
2.98
7.07 0.62
0.39
0.41
0.55
0.47I
6.11
35.1 45.6 0.21 2.6244.8
63.4
27.4
34.9 44.9
36.2
25.1 0.04 3.61
4.03 0.13
10.4
0.14
0.23 8.82
4.12
3.48
9.49
2.3 57.9
52.9
43.2
13.3
0.51 0.8
Metal 1969
1999
1989
1979
2004
1.62
3.31
4.5 1.590.2 1.01
& 1960
1990
1980
1970
2000 0.16 12.3
10.8
14.9
8.79
11.3 1.43 24.6
30.3
34.4
17 0.74
15.5 4.96 4.72 0.81
21.7 2.74 6.14 0.29
Ores 0.16
0.84 0.59 48.9
44.6
56.9
28.7
0.01
0.07
0

2004
2000 42.2138
16.4 30.8
3.1 2.31
40.4
8.77
29.3 2.4 1.15
23
9.97
7.93 3.13
8.98
23
17.9 6.05
4.75
9.68
5.22

8.3
8.58
9.4
7.99
7.2 22.5
6.68
17.5
5.25
7.31 25
30
70.9
36.3
90.7 6.57 22 117
16.69.81
18.1 97.329.4
25.1 13.1
33.2
18.8
52.6 3.05
3.21
4.93
9.46
10.2 2.48 3.840.98 3.3
5.71 10.63.31 18.34.05
3.07
13.8
5.93
5.58 26.5
48.4
16.9
Food 8.42
10.3
8.69
11.2
10.1 0.940.6 9.11 3.65
6.78
18.1
10.7
24.2 1.68 8.78
9.21
24.9
14.311.218.7
28.9
Exports
(%GDP)
of (b) 52.5
62.5
108
82.6
130
18.9
18.6
20.6
20.4
21.1 0.41 12.3
18.3
21.4
22.7
28 0.5315.4
10.3
9.04
Manufacture, 22.8
Agricultural, 1980
1960
19701999
1989
1979
1969
1990 2.23
46.1
14.6 0.157.77
2.58
12.1 4.72
9.92 19.9
9.31
71.5
11
80.5
4.3 1.5 4.8
123.4
0 200.8 887.2 228.5 218.4
US (a)|
$)
(mil 23936.7 61195.4
1849.6 93987.51.7 1026.7
19125.2 4391.5 2237.2
Aid 2005
1956 2849.9 44.7 1362.8
6592
2600.7 25.613366.13486.3
31 7624.8 8826 18718
315.1
372.8 346.3 569.1 628.4 947.4
3983.4 3484.2

Guinea|
N.
Papua
New
Zealand Middle
East
East
Asia Cambodia
Australia Indonesia
Kong Korea
North Korea
South Morocco
Bahrain Tunisia
Hong Japan Malaysia
BruneiChina Myanmar Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan Algeria
Egypt Kuwait
Jordan
Israel Lebanon Oman
Qatar
Syria Turkey
Laos Iran Libya Sudan
Iraq UAEYemen
Vietnam
Thailand

Os
American Political Science Review Vol. 101,No. 4

APPENDIX B: DIFFERENCES INTHE INCIDENCE OF MILITARIZED CONFLICT: EAST ASIA

AND THE MIDDLE EAST (1965-2006)

East Asia Middle East

Vietnam War (1965-75) Egypt-Yemen-Saudi Arabia (1962-67) Libya-Egypt (1980)
Vietnam-Cambodia (1975-79) Jordan/Israel (1966) Libya-Malta (1980)
China-Vietnam (1979) Arab states-Israel (1967) Syria-Jordan (1980)
Vietnam-Thailand (1984) Turkey-Greece, Cyprus (1967) Libya-Tunisia (1980)
China-Vietnam (1984-88) Israel-Jordan (1968) Iran-Iraq (1980-88)
Laos-Thailand (1984-88) Iran-Iraq (1969) Israel-Iraq (1981)
China-Philippines (1995) Egypt-Israel (1969-70) Israel-Syria (1982-1983)
China-Taiwan (1996) Saudi Arabia-South Yemen Libya-Sudan, Egypt (1983)
(1969-70; 1973)
North Korea-South Korea (1996) Syria-Jordan (1970) Sudan-Ethiopia (1984)
Myanmar-Thailand (2002) North-South Yemen (1972; 1979) Libya-Sudan, Egypt (1984)
Oman-South Yemen (1972) Libya-Tunisia (1985)
Libya-Chad (1972-87) Libya-Egypt (1985)
Iraq-Kuwait (1973; 1976) Qatar-Bahrain (1986)
Arab states-Israel (1973) Iran-Saudi Arabia (1987)
South Yemen-Oman (1973; 1976) Iraq-Kuwait and S. Arabia (1990-91)
Turkey-Cyprus (1974) Iran-Iraq (1992)
Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania (1975-80) lran-UAE(1992)
Morocco-Polisario (1975-1983) Iraq-Kuwait (1992)
Syria-Lebanon (1976-2005?) Saudi Arabia-Qatar (1992)
Iraq-Syria (1976) Egypt-Sudan (1992)
Libya-Sudan (1976) Iraq-Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (1994)
Egypt-Libya (1977) Sudan-Egypt (1995)
Israel-Lebanon (1978-2006?) Turkey-Syria (1998)
North-South Yemen (1978-79)_ Syria-Lebanon (2005)_
Sources: This list builds on the International Crisis Behavior Online database (Wilkenfeld and Brecher http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb)
but excludes those entries falling outside the definition of militarized conflict as well as conflicts between regional actors and outside
also eliminated some entries from the Militarized
powers. Only conflicts between two or more regional actors are included. These criteria
Interstate wars with over 1,000 casualties are from the COW database
Interstate disputes database (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).
1965 and 2002 Wilkenfeld and Brecher found 46 interstate crises in the Middle East, 5 inNortheast Asia and
(Sarkees 2000). Between
25 inSoutheast Asia (6 of them connected with the Vietnam War, and 18 involving Vietnam or continental Southeast Asian neighbors).
Notes: Bold: Wars with more than 10,000 casualties. The long listof militarized incidents in the Middle East involved armed attacks,
at the border. The first state
artillery fire, and border-crossing by tanks and aircraft, partial invasions, or major military standoffs
listed is usually imputed with having started hostilities although war initiation is sometimes
hard to assess (such as the long series
of Lebanon/Israel raids and retaliations). There were eight different militarized incidents between Libya and Chad, grouped here as
a single protracted conflict according toWilkenfeld-Brecher criteria because of significant continuity. Similarly, Israel-Lebanon and
conflicts could have been disaggregated further but were included as two protracted conflicts (?=ongoing). The Yemen
Syria-Lebanon
protracted conflict involved six militarized conflicts/war. Disaggregating just these three conflicts and others into discrete crises would
have made the list of militarized conflicts for the Middle East much longer. Furthermore, the list does not include many cross-border
several coups sponsored by Muammar Qaddafi against Anwar el-Sadat and several
coups unless they were militarized (it thus excludes
other Arab and African leaders, a 1981 coup sponsored by Iran inBahrain, coups sponsored by various neighbors against King Hussein
of Jordan, and many others).

Amsden, Alice H. 2001. The Rise of the "The Rest": Challenges to

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