EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.]

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS

and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST.
FISCAL MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal
Court of Manila, JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court
of Manila, JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer & Meer and Juan T
. David for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P.
de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C . Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D.
Quiason and Solicitor C . Padua for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. Â CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHO MAY

CONTEST LEGALITY THEREOF CASE AT BAR. — It is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby (Lewis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22) and that the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties (In. re Dooley, 48 F. 2d. 121: Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d. 916;
Lusco vs. U.S., 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F, 60; Moriz vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d.
444). Consequently, petitioner in the case at bar may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the document, papers, and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporation adverted to, since the right
to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to
the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity U.S., vs. Gaas, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).
2. Â ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. —
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of
these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in the case at bar do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code", — as
alleged in aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determine provision of said laws or coders.
3. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED BY THE
CONSTITUTION. — To uphold the validity of the warrants in question, would
be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the victims,
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision Sec. 1, par. 3 Art. III, Const.) — to
outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels
that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. Such is the
seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122
of the former Rules of Court, by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) that "a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto paragraph, directing
that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
4. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The grave violation of the
Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized, to wit: "Books of accounts, Financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers, showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related
profit and loss statements." Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transaction were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to
be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.
5. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTRAVENES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURES. — Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the
letter, but also to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search
warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with
the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause and only possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause and hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of crime. But when this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a
probable cause.
6. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO SECURE
ILLEGAL SEARCH WARRANT OR MAKE UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE
IS NO EXCUSE. — The theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or
seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed by agents of the party in power, for certainly, those belonging to
the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless
of the handicap under which the minority usually but understandably finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing
their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
7. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; MONCADO DOCTRINE ABANDONED. — The doctrine
adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; the
warrants for the search of 3 residences of petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C .J : p

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the

margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors — several
judges 2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Judges — issued, on
different dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4
and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to any peace
officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:
 "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of

the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things
to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued restraining Respondent-Prosecutors, their agents and or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or any
copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due
course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein,
in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6 (1) that the
contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance
with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the
writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein haveno
cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

". . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of

papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and
thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants.
Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question
of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful
search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken . . ." (A.
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d, 786, 789,
Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the

residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29,
1962, denied the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondent-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)
important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may
be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in
the nature of general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected
upon the authority thereof are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"
— as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection
with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall
not issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,

correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements."

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our
Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent-
Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line
with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory
that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against
the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this
approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence

competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be
 repressed". 18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had
already declared:

"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land." 19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent
decisions of the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional

documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state
intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close
the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all
persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful
conduct. We held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State court.

"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been

declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were
it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words',
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, 'without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as
a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. ' At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was applicable to the
States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we
have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation
of its provisions. Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The
right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction
upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore,
in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was
 logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine —
an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an
essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In
short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not
consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoinment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose
of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter — to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by
removing the incentive to disregard it.' . . .

"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to

destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the
States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of
privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no
longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is
enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforceable itself, chooses to suspend its enjoinment. Our decision,
founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less
than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of
justice." (Emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but,
also, to spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure
an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures
would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by
agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority
could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds
itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing
their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning, power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution
of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81 and
91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No.
1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of
herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged
possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and
effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has been advanced, not in
their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other
words, said theory would appear to be a readjustment of that followed in
said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of
alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted
in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said
petitions and motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said
motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in
the cases relied upon by the petitioners, to warrant application of the views
therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case
must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of
three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of
June 29, 1962 are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made
are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent, that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it
is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
 It is so ordered.
Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ
., concur.

Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J ., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto

Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this
case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. Â All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of
Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore prescribed
by, and in violation of, Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution;
2. Â All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of
the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. Â The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80
Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. Â The search warrants served at the three residences of the
petitioners are expressly declared null and void; the searches and seizures
therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the residences is made permanent; and
5. Â Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the
suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other
than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the
Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the search
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures
made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate
cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the
immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in
accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at
this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the
three residences, and the illegality of the searches and seizures conducted
under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law - not only for this case but as well for future cases and future
generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore
admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches
and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us
a s s u m e in gratia argumenti, have no legal standing to ask for the
suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than
their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic illegality of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality
of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the
petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants are void and remain
void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No
inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal
standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a
search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the
pleadings submitted to this Court, the petitioners have the requisite legal
standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers
and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived
a l m o s t verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of
the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncements made on the Fourth Amendment by federal
courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the
suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits
of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows: (a)
ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing"; (b) ownership
and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises
searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where
the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are
"primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person",
gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show
that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In
some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the
designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate
defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the
said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the
other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of
Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be
made, and were actually made, in the "office/house warehouse/premises"
owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
 Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to
bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at
the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961) (personal and corporate
papers of corporation of which the defendant was president); United States
vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8F. 2d 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the
defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962)
(papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December
12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against
unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile:

"Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the

fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What
the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when
h e places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his homes, or his office, his hotel room or his automobile.
There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And
when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in
his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an
unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the
hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in
Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveillance in Silverman.
Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years
have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the
protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt the future will bring countless others. By nothing we
say here or do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which
the Fourth Amendment may be applicable." Hoffa vs. U.S. 87 S. Ct. 408
(December 12, 1966) See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93
(November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searches gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and
documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and
suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of
the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been
sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be
recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly
or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen
Apts.; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436
Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMS, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid
for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army &
Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the
controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary
interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently
gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and effects seized therefrom.
I n Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated
the nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to
maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the
unduly technical standards of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

"We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the

lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and
ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law, which, more than almost any other branch of law,
has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.
Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to
the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying
out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such
as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee,' and 'guest,' often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning
procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards." See also
Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to have standing
in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp.
48 (1963), a bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United
States vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W. D. N. Y. 1943),
the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression as to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:

"The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property,

either his own or the corporation's, was entitled to protection against
unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case
at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The
motion for the return of seized articles and the suppression of the
evidence so obtained should be granted." (emphasis supplied)

Time was when only a person who had property interest in either the
place searched or the articles seized had the necessary standing to invoke
the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. United States,
336 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson, joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of
the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion". This view finally became
the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United
States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step
further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched, but
the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as
well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premises where the search
occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole
stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud
prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961),
supra. The court concluded that the defendant had standing on two
independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property
seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched
(just in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation's premises and had seized most of the corporation's books and
records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

"Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required to qualify

one as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.' It tells
us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the
Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records, merely because the appellant did not show ownership or
possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory
interest in the invaded premises . . ." Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d at 651.

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680,
683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a
desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself)
used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and
Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed
at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano
vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in
storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the
books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and
because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court
rejected the contention, holding that.
 "Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and
unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable
the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped
through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked
possessor to produce and deliver them." Schwimmer vs. United. States,
232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily

directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs.
Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y. ). The defendant had
stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the
name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the
country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his
(Dunn's) "control and management". The papers turned out to be private,
personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership.
(All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the
search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had
"standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The
court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F.
Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631; Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs.
U.S., supra, pointed out that.

"It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in

question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only
person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell.
The first "search warrant described the records as having been used in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341,
by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . .' The second search
warrant was captioned: 'United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell.
(p. 198)

"Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership,

gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before
Jones." (p. 199)

"If, as thus indicated, Birrell had at least constructive possession

of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any
interest in the premises searched." See also Jeffers vs. United States.
88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.
Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument;
the United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in
Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell,
many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both
types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search.
In the case at bar, the petitioners' connection with the premises raided is
much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all
the warrants regardless of whether these were directed against residences
in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal
papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order
the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects
seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or
corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their various pleadings submitted to this
Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate
offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and
things which were the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit
that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners
wherever they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences, offices,
warehouses and/or premises owned and/or controlled and/or possessed
(actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search warrants and
in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants, and (b)
p u r e l y corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized
papers, documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners or
purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued
the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the
petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of
purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the
corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in
my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the
constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold
the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
Â
Footnotes

1. Â Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in

his capacity as Acting Director of National Bureau of Investigation, Special
Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr., and
Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes, City of Manila.

2. Â Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon.
 Roman Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon.
Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch Hon. Eulogio Mencias. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Quezon City.

3. Â Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

4. Â Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

5. Â U. S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development

Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment
Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation General Agricultural
Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management
Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and
Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The
Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real
Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.

6. Â Inter alia.

7. Â Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to
be rendered in the case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this
case against the use of the papers, documents and things from the following
premises: (1) The office of the US Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg.
Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta
St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts. Port Area, Mla; (4) 527 Rosario St.
Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; 7224 San
Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago and 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9)
Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port
Area, Mla; (10) Investment Inc. 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC. Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San
Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis,
Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts., Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse
Railroad St., between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm 304, Army and
Navy Club, Manila South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port
Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday
Bills, Inc., Trinity Bldg. San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21)
Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila (22) Republic Glass Corp.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila (23) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Trinity Bldg., San Luis,
Manila (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Bldg., 610 San Luis Manila (25) United
Housing Corp. Trinity Bldg., San Luis Manila (26) Republic Real State Corp.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate. Manila; (28)
Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14
Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953
and 955 against petitioners before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted.
the preliminary injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and
things found in the other premises namely: in those of the residences of
petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park Makati, Rizal (2) 15
Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta
Village, Makati Rizal."

8. Â Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

 9. Â Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

10. Â In re Dooley (1931) 48 F. 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d 916; Lusco vs.
U. S. 237 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. 60; Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11. Â U.S. vs. Gass, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384, 394.

12. Â On March 22, 1962.

13. Â Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

14. Â Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

15. Â . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized.

   No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec.
3, Rule 126.)

16. Â People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.

17. Â Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

18. Â Pugliese (1945) 153 F. 2d. 497.

19. Â Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 US 383, 58 L. ed, 652, 34 S. Ct. 341;
underscoring supplied.

20. Â Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed. 647. 41 S. Ct. 261;
Olmstead vs. United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564;
Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed, 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs.
United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs.
Ohio L91961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed 2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.

21. Â Even if remote.

22. Â Particularly, Jones vs. U.S., 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. Republic, 216 Fed.
Supp. 48; U.S. vs. Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93; Villano vs. U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and
Henze vs. U.S. 296 Fed. 2d 650.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

* Â Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.