1

Colonialism is the violent negation of the worthy of those who are conquered. The
colonial project seeks to render the colonized invisible in order to hide and justify its
violent exploitation of the colonized.
Hayes 96 [Floyd W. Hayes III, senior lecturer and coordinator of programs and undergraduate studies
in the Center for Africana Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Fanon: a critical reader. Ed. Lewis Ricardo
Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. “Fanon, Oppression and Resentment: The Black Experience In the
United States.” 1996.] CT

Fanon points out that in the colonial situation the primary thrust of the Master in relation to the Slave is
not for the sake of recognition but for work. The colonized are dehumanized, their humanity effaced,
not simply for the sake of the colonizer's ego satisfaction but for the purpose of the colonized's
exploitation (Pn 179 / BS 220). What colonialism seeks to hide from view, to render invisible about
itself, is the grounding fact of its possibility: that colonialism is predicated only on force and fraud.
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all exemplify their states of nature in terms of non-European states of
being. The fact that force and fraud are the only virtues necessary in the Hobbesian state of nature (the
state of "warre') reveals rather that a readier representation of the contractualists' "natural state" is not
"the savage peoples of the Americas" and the like (Hobbes: ch. 13) but the colonial condition imposed
by Europeans (geographically or racially) upon those deemed non-European. Colonialism is
operationalized at both the material and the representational levels. Materially colonialism seeks to
strengthen domination for the sake of human and economic exploitation. Representationally, it seeks
to sustain the identity of the ideological or discursive image it has created of the colonized and of the
depreciated image the colonized have of themselves. Colonialism thus undertakes at the latter level
to extend and maintain a veiling, to affect a strategic invisibility on the pan of the colonized: to
maintain invisibility socially and politically so as to minimize the costs of economic reproduction and
labor enforcement. Through normalization, colonialism is able to hide from view its constitutive forms
of domination and exploitation. By making the relations and practices of dominance seem standard,
normal, and given, colonialism creates as "acceptable" its central social expressions of degradation
and dehumanization, rendering unseen the fact that it makes people what they are not. Colonialism is
quite literally untruth, an untruth which to sustain itself must be hidden from view. Fanon speaks of
this as "the lie of the colonial situation" (Sr 115 / ADC 128), a lie that infects the colonized who to survive
find that they are "hardly ever truthful before the colonizer" (114 /127). Thus, like modernity more
generally, colonialism is a condition of extreme ambivalence, imposing a structure, an order of things, it
inevitably is incapable of sustaining. Drawn to an order, a scheme of classification, it at once cannot
sustain because it is both mis- and unrepresentative of a people the very being of whom it negates,
the colonial condition faces (off) its impending disorder with differentiation and division, separation
and subordination, manipulation and mystification - in short, with fraud and force (sec ch. 4 of Black
Skin; see also Bauman). It is in this sense that Fanon sees himself as engaged analytically, critically, in a
form of unveiling.
Representations of Kant cannot be separated from the deeply rooted colonialist and
imperialist hierarchical complexes. Voting affirmative serves as a justification of these
hierarchical complexes in scholarship which has a direct relationship into material
violence.
Pauline Kleingeld 19 [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands.] -
("Pauline Kleingeld, On Dealing with Kant's Sexism and Racism," SGIR Review2 (2):3-22 (2019), published
11-18-2019, accessed 9-24-2023, https://philarchive.org/rec/KLEODW)//olivia

Whereas Kant attributes to women characteristics that contrast with those of men, while also asserting
their equality, until the mid 1790s he explicitly describes the “yellow,” “Negro,” and “copper-red” races
as having increasingly serious deficits compared to “whites” and as lacking the capacity to govern
themselves. On this basis, Kant defends white colonial rule over the rest of humankind, including the
exploitation of non-white slaves. (It is worth noting here that Kant does not restrict the original region
of “whites” to Europe but includes Africa north of the Sahara and large parts of Asia, see DCHR 8:92.)

Kant portrays whites as occupying the highest rung of the racial ladder and as entitled to give laws to
all other parts of the world. In his 1782 lectures on Physical Geography, Kant claims that the peoples of
India would be much happier under European rule (LPG Doenhoff, 178–178’). In drafts of his
anthropology lectures, he notes that “Americans and Negroes cannot govern themselves. Thus, [they]
serve only as slaves” (R 15:878). In the lectures, he is reported as having said that [Native] Americans
are the lowest of the four races because they are weak and incapable of being educated. He places
Negroes above them because they can be trained to be slaves (but are incapable of other forms of
education), and he remarks that although the inhabitants of India can be educated, this does not extend
to the use of abstract concepts (LA Menschenkunde, 25:1187), and hence they are incapable of being
magistrates (R 15: 877). Kant also refers to this hierarchy in his published works, such as the 1788 essay
“On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” which appeared just months after the Critique of
Practical Reason (UTP 8:176). Kant’s discussions of chattel slavery until the mid-1790s are strikingly
matterof- fact.5 He reports on the types of slaves needed for various types of labor (VRM 2:438n.),
endorses an anti-abolitionist tract (UTP 8:174n.), and remarks that Negroes “seem to be made to serve
others” (LA Ko 363) and “were created for” the harsh labor conditions on the so-called [Caribbean]
“Sugar Islands” (LPG Dohna, 421). The 1780s lecture transcripts include passages such as the following:

The Mandinka are the very most desirable among all Negroes up to the Gambia river, because they are
the most hardworking ones. These are the ones that one prefers to seek for slaves, because these can
tolerate labor in the greatest heat that no human being [Mensch] can endure. Each year 20,000 of this
Negro nation have to be bought to replace their decline in America, where they are used to work on the
spice trees … One gets the Negroes by having them catch each other, and one has to seize them with
force. (LPG Doenhoff: 189) Note in this passage the implicit contrast between “slave” and “human
being” and Kant’s adoption of the perspective of the slave owner when explaining to his students which
kinds of slaves “one prefers” and which “have to be bought.”
Ideal theory cannot guide action – it assumes away racist violence. This is an
independent answer to their framework – even if Kant’s ideals are good, nonideal
theory is key to application.
Charles W. Mills 9 [former prof @ Northwestern, director of grad studies @ CUNY], “Rawls on
Race/Race in Rawls”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2009) Vol. XLVII, BE
But there is a deeper criticism that hinges on the distinction I drew at the start between an ideally just society in the sense of a society with no past history of
injustice and an ideally just society in the sense of a society whose past unjust history has been corrected for. Let
us demarcate these as the
ideal ideal (ideal theory in ideally just circumstances) and the rectificatory ideal (what is ideally required
to remedy past injustices). I suggest that if we think of ideal theory as being able to play an adjudicative role in determining which public policy
option is morally superior, it is because we really have the second in mind. In other words, the rectificatory ideal is a goal to be approached, if only asymptotically,
and used as a criterion in determining whether option A or option B more closely approaches it. Thus Rawls writes, in seeming support of this interpretation:
“[N]on- ideal theory presupposes that ideal theory is already on hand. For until the ideal is identified, at least in outline ... nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim,
by reference to which its queries can be answered” (Rawls 1999b, 89–90). But as earlier emphasized, this claim of his is problematic since by his own earlier avowal,
he is talking about the ideal ideal. And the problem, I would claim, is that the
ideal ideal cannot in general play this role because it
represents a goal located in a different conceptual space, on an alternate timeline to which we have no
access. We would have to abandon our present social order and build a new “basic structure” from
scratch, from the ground up. (And not merely with reference to social structures and political insti- tutions, but with new people, unmolded by the
previous unjust order.) We can see this simply by considering how the ideal ideal would play itself out in the

context of trying to correct for racial injustice. The Rawlsian ideal, starting from ground zero, is a society
with no history of racial (or any other kind of) injustice. So all we need is appropriate antidiscrimination
legislation to make sure that this injustice does not enter the basic structure. But not only would this
produce a racism-free polity, it would produce a race-free polity. As the huge and ever-growing body of literature over the last
decade in critical race theory and criti- cal white studies demonstrates, race is socially constructed, and without systemic discrimination, race would not even have
come into existence in the first place. So it is not merely that we would have a basic structure without systemic racism, we would have a basic structure without
races existing as social entities at all. It is not merely that there would be no need for rectifica- tory public policy measures like affirmative action and, more radically,
reparations, but that there would be no identifiable groups to whom these policies could even be targeted. By contrast, Rawls’s ignorance and naivety about race
are manifested in the fact that both in Theory and Justice as Fairness he repre- sents race—and even culture!—as “fixed” and “natural.” Admittedly, when he wrote
Theory he did not, as we do, have the benefit of the aforementioned huge body of literature in the left academy on the construction of race. But even so, Ashley
Montagu’s well-known Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (1997) had been around since 1942, and has gone through numerous editions ever since. It
would have been available to Rawls, making clear to him that race is not natural at all but social. Now how
can this ideal ideal—a society not
merely without a past history of racism but without races themselves—serve to adjudicate the merits of
competing policies aimed at correcting for a long history of white supremacy manifest in Native Ameri-
can expropriation, African slavery, residential and educational segregation, large differentials in income and huge differentials in wealth,
nonwhite underrepresentation in high-prestige occu- pations and overrepresentation in the prison system, contested national narratives and cultural
representations, widespread white evasion and bad faith on issues of their racial privilege, and a corresponding hostile white backlash against (what remains of)
those mild corrective measures already implemented?
Obviously, it cannot. As Thomas Nagel concedes: “Ideal theory enables you to
say when a society is unjust, because it falls short of the ideal. But it does not tell you what to do if, as is
almost always the case, you find yourself in an unjust society, and want to correct that injustice” (2003a,
82). Ideal theory represents an unattainable target that would require us to roll back the clock and start over. So in a sense it is an ideal with little or no prac- tical
worth. What is required is the nonideal (rectificatory) ideal that starts from the reality of these injustices
and then seeks some fair means of correcting for them, recognizing that in most cases the original prediscrimination situation (even
if it can be intelligibly characterized and stipulated) cannot be restored. Trying to rectify systemic black disadvantage through

affirmative action is not the equivalent of not discriminating against blacks, especially when there are no
blacks to be discriminated against. Far from being indispensable to the elaboration of non- ideal theory, ideal theory would have been revealed
to be largely useless for it. But the situation is worse than that. As the example just given illustrates, it is not merely a matter of an ideal with

problems of operationalization and relevance, but of an ideal likely to lend itself more readily to
retrograde political agendas. If the ideal ideal rather than the rectificatory ideal is to guide us, then a
world without races and any kind of distinction- drawing by race may seem to be an attractive goal. One
takes the ideal to be colorblind nondiscrimination, as appropriate for a society beginning from the state of nature, and then—com- pletely ignoring the nonideal
history that has given whites a systemic illicit advantage over people of color—conflates together as “discrimination” all attempts to draw racial distinctions for
public policy goals, no matter what their motivation, on the grounds that this perpetuates race and invidious differential treatment by race. In the magisterial
judgment of Chief Justice John Roberts in the June 2007 Supreme Court decision on the Seattle and Louisville cases where schools were using race as a factor to
maintain diversity, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,”6 a statement achieving the remarkable feat of
depicting not merely as true, but as tautologically true, the equating of Jim Crow segregation and the attempt to remedy Jim Crow segregation! What
is
ideally called for under ideal circumstances is not, or at least is not necessarily, what is ideally called for
under nonideal circumstances. Claiming that all we need to do is to cease (what is here characterized as) discrimination ignores the differential
advantages and privileges that have accumulated in the white population because of the past history of discrimination.

The 1AC’s framing of land and resource management perpetuates continued

exploitation and domination of indigenous peoples
Tai Kondo Koester and Joseph Bryan 22— [University of Colorado Boulder, USA, “The cartographic
dispossession of Bears Ears: Confronting settler colonialism in contemporary struggles over “public
land”,” Nature and Space, 2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/25148486211045358?
casa_token=HDgQatksc2gAAAAA:17IXiAyZ3I91__DU_1MhYkC6rApArca7bBI-auk2E-
6CaWBCwMikZksAq_XHRl7kBB5l-LFhMz6Lgw, accessed 10-17-2023; marlborough-mjen]

In the United States, public lands are legally defined as federally owned lands managed in trust for the
benefit of and access by the public (Wilkinson, 1980). Often contrasted with private property, public lands
offer normative claims to inclusion and belonging that echo other kinds of public spaces. As such they are
often contrasted against private property, a distinction that obscures as much as it reveals. In much of what is now
the United States, federally owned lands were generative of private property producing a public
racialized from its inception. The 1862 Homestead Act provides a notable example. The Act was passed at the height of the Civil War
in an effort to ensure settlement of lands west of the Mississippi River by “free” individual farmers, rather than Southern slave owners, in an
effort to staunch the spread of slavery. Under the Act, farmers who were U.S. citizens could settle land by improving it for economic production,
establishing rights to property on land previously “cleared” by federal policies directing the “removal” of Native Americans (Williams, 1990,
351). Neither Blacks nor Native Americans could own property at the time the Homestead Act was passed. Though both groups would later
become eligible for homesteading, the Act benefited whites disproportionately, subsidizing settlement through a transfer of land from federal
to private ownership. Much of what are now considered public lands are lands where settlement never
occurred or failed, remaining under federal ownership. Unproductive land was therefore empty land and available for
settlement, linking white supremacy with the expansion of private property and capitalism (Estes, 2019). In turn, the very idea of the
public relied on the idea of empty land to establish itself.

Legal definitions reinforce that approach. The majority of the 650 million acres of public lands –
including much of Bears Ears – are managed by the Department of the Interior through the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM). Federal ownership underpins the BLM’s jurisdiction, giving the agency the
authority to manage lands for public benefit “without regard to how the United States acquired
ownership” (emphasis added) (Mineral Lands and Mining, 30 U.S.C. § 1291, p. 289). The BLM’s definition braids law and
space together, deflecting attention from public land’s imperial origins. At the same time, their claim to
safeguard the public interest presumes a public that is predominantly white. Indigenous Peoples are
subsumed within that logic, treated as a racial minority and cut off from their historical relationships to
land claimed as public. What’s more, that interest is often defined in ways that marginalize or exclude
Indigenous peoples as members of the public, reducing their interest in public lands to “religious
attachment” and “cultural resources” (Tsosie, 2003). Both are treated as resources to be managed and
conserved accordingly, subject to the same logic of resource management that dominates approaches
to public lands.

Scholarship in environmental justice and indigenous studies further informs our understanding of how a
narrow fixation on environment as something natural to be conserved deflects questions of conquest,
racialized exclusion, and domination that helped create it (Cronon, 1996; Holifield, 2001; Pulido, 2015, 2017).
Environmental justice movements have further worked to expand the idea of the environment beyond
“natural” landscapes. Those efforts have expanded the range of “environmental” concerns to include urban pollution, labor conditions,
and housing in ways that have given rise to new understandings of what “justice” can be in a public stratified by race, class, and gender.
Indigenous peoples’ involvement in environmental justice has contributed directly to this approach through drawing attention to a broader set
of relations not structured by a strong distinction between nature and society, the geos and the bios (Povinelli, 2016; Simpson, 2011). If
scientific surveys helped produce that split, maps helped naturalize it, displacing indigenous presence into the past while treating any lingering
evidence of it as a matter of culture. As
the struggle for Bears Ears makes clear, an emphasis on resource
management and conservation narrows uses of the environment to matters of science and economy. A
second point concerns the role that science plays in making the distinction between nature and society visible, as
an object of demarcation and inquiry. For that, we turn to mapping.

Thus, the alternative is to reject the affirmative mode of thinking, and instead be open
to and engage with radical subjectivity that endorses a praxis of decolonization that
returns “federal” lands. The role of the ballot is to reject a prior investment in the
colonialist project.
Minnich 90 [Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich, Senior Scholar, the Association of American Colleges &
Universities. Transforming Knowledge. 1990. Pg. 184-187] CT

Visions of where we may go emerge from critique of where we are and have been. When we recognize
that our predecessors generalized too far from too few, and too often not only generalized but
universalized with only the few in mind, we open ourselves to diversity that can be arrayed before us
in all its challenge to our minds, our imaginations, our hearts, our dreams with and for humankind. In
particularizing what was universal, we make it possible to cease turning difference into deviance; we
stop confusing equality with sameness; we learn to think much more subtly and to live and work with
more complexity and fineness of feeling and comprehension, taste and judgment. We begin again to
create ways of thinking that support democracy rather than undermining it, as the old hierarchically
invidious monism has done for so long.

When we recognize that we have been trapped in circular definitions, using definitions, key concepts,
and standards to justify the very systems of meaning‚--and living‚--from which they were derived, we
can stop accepting hierarchical ordering that continues the dominance of the few. We are challenged
to immerse ourselves again in what we are studying, to suspend judgment for a while, to learn to hear
new voices, and hence to emerge with new definitions and Concepts and judgments that are, again,
finer, more complex, more subtle, and much more adequate to the interrelated world in which we
must, now, live- We can stop pitting excellence against equity as we come to realize that without equity,
we necessarily confuse excellence with exclusivity. We become able to see art in quilts as well as on
canvas; to feel respect for those we may not yet understand; to admire thinking in entirely different
systems of logic and meaning; to find spiritual wisdom in forms of worship unlike the dominant Western
forms; to hear the poetry in spirituals and the literature in diaries and letters. We expand the range of
human expressiveness and meaning from which all can and should learn. When we give up mystified
concepts, we become able to create new concepts that, like touchstones, help us find important
knowledge where before we did not even look. We can give up, for example, the depressing notion that
we all derive from Man the Hunter, and remember that we also come from Woman the Gatherer--and
from societies in which the one was not more important than the other. We can remember that
Economic Man, the great rational decision- maker whose 'rationality' is measured by how well he plans
to "maximize profits" in a capitalist economic system, is by no means universal even within capitalist
systems. Then we can not only study but learn from others, from those who make decisions about
resources out of concern for ancestors, or children, or respect for the land, or the collective good of all,
rather than narrowly construed, competitively sought self-interest. We become open to noticing that
some people make moral decisions by considering the needs and values of particular individuals in the
contexts of real lives that preceded and will continue after the decision, rather than by invoking
supposedly timeless, falsely abstracted moral principles that cannot adequately connect with the
interdependent particularity of the world in which we must, after all, strive to be moral. If we uncover
in order to discard or correct partial yet self-justifying epistemologies , in as well as across fields, we
become better able to comprehend many modes of knowing and knowledge systems. For example, if
we relinquish the notion that we 'cover' the subject matter our fields name, and remember that we
teach what has been agreed on by those who won out in intellectual and professional battles already
restricted to the few‚--battles whose outcome often depended on availability of money, prestige, and
access to intellectual community‚--we become able to teach our subjects as human constructs that are
both defined and open to redefinition. We become able to live up to our own best promises/ to see
again that philosophy is not a list of texts or familiar problems from one tradition, but a quest for
wisdom, an effort to find meanings as well as truths, and to think about what that effort itself means,
and might be; that history is not the story only of the hegemonic few, the record-keepers and those
the record-keepers recognized, but constructed human stories that shape the life-conditions of all of
us; that literature is not a particular collection of canonical works, falling into a few schools and periods
that are in conversation only with each other, but the effort of human minds and spirits to shape
experience and feeling and thought into imaginative forms that speak across the boundaries that both
relate and divide us. With these realizations, new questions, emergent revelatory tools and methods,
and the vast resource of all that has been excluded, we begin again the quest for knowledge, for self-
knowledge. We recognize some things so obvious once seen that, like the child who said, "But the
Emperor is naked!" we make others uncomfortable--because it is dangerous to see power unclothed
rather than accept it so thoroughly on its own dictated terms that we actually skew our perceptions. (I
have always thought that the realistic end to that story would have the child shushed and sent to bed
without supper, and the parents suddenly suspect in their community as humorless trouble-makers,)
We insist on paying very serious attention to phenomena long 'explained' as ''natural," especially one of
the most obvious and all-permeating facts of almost every society, the mutually implicated construction
of sex and gender that gives men power over themselves and over women that women do not have-
Gender becomes a subject matter, a key to significations otherwise locked, a primary critical and
revelatory tool of resistance and re-creation. In the long-familiar list of givens about Mankind, we find
Man identified as the creature with speech, the creature with rationality , the political animal, and,
looming large, the being who is aware of his mortality All these categories are limited without
consideration of all of us, of how gender is shaped by and shapes them differently at different times
and across cultures, but shapes them. All these, and more, can be reconsidered, transformed, when
we open to understanding not hobbled, blinded, by lack of recognition of gender, race, and class, of
real historical and cultural meaning/power contexts and construct s. What speech has meant and
means to women, to men of nonprivileged groups, in different cultures, becomes available to us to
study and learn from. What reason can mean is expanded, enriched. What is political can be more
accurately defined so we see the pervasive workings of power and its multiple meani
 2
The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Prefer it:
a. No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it
becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we
intend it to happen.
b. I’ll concede evaluating state intentions is impossible – 1AC said “states
lack intentionality” – means Kant is nonsense
c. Use epistemic modesty – view framework indicts as impact defense.
They have to win 100% of their framework to exclude 100% of our impacts.
d. Prefer it – util is impartial, specific to public actors, and resolves infinite
regress which explains all value.
Greene 15 — (Joshua Greene, Professor of Psychology @ Harvard, being interviewed by Russ Roberts, “Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism”, The
Library of Economics and Liberty, 1-5-15, Available Online at https://www.econtalk.org/joshua-greene-on-moral-tribes-moral-dilemmas-and-utilitarianism/#audio-highlights, accessed 5-17-20,
HKR-AM) **NB: Guest = Greene, and only his lines are highlighted/underlined

Guest: Okay. So, I think utilitarianism is very much misunderstood. And this is part of the reason why we shouldn't even call it utilitarianism
at all. We should call it what I call 'deep pragmatism', which I think better captures what I think utilitarianism is really like, if you really

apply it in real life, in light of an understanding of human nature. But, we can come back to that. The idea, going back to the tragedy of

common-sense morality is you've got all these different tribes with all of these different values based on
their different ways of life. What can they do to get along? And I think that the best answer that we have is--well, let's back up. In
order to resolve any kind of tradeoff, you have to have some kind of common metric. You have to have
some kind of common currency. And I think that what utilitarianism, whether it's the moral truth or not,
is provide a kind of common currency. So, what is utilitarianism? It's basically the idea that--it's really two ideas put
together. One is the idea of impartiality. That is, at least as social decision makers, we should regard
everybody's interests as of equal worth. Everybody counts the same. And then you might say, 'Well, but okay, what
does it mean to count everybody the same? What is it that really matters for you and for me and for
everybody else?' And there the utilitarian's answer is what is sometimes called, somewhat accurately and somewhat
misleadingly, happiness. But it's not really happiness in the sense of cherries on sundaes, things that make you

smile. It's really the quality of conscious experience. So, the idea is that if you start with anything that you
value, and say, 'Why do you care about that?' and keep asking, 'Why do you care about that?' or 'Why do you care about that?'
you ultimately come down to the quality of someone's conscious experience. So if I were to say, 'Why did
you go to work today?' you'd say, 'Well, I need to make money; and I also enjoy my work.' 'Well, what
do you need your money for?' 'Well, I need to have a place to live; it costs money.' 'Well, why can't you
just live outside?' 'Well, I need a place to sleep; it's cold at night.' 'Well, what's wrong with being cold?'
'Well, it's uncomfortable.' 'What's wrong with being uncomfortable?' 'It's just bad.' Right? At some point
if you keep asking why, why, why, it's going to come down to the conscious experience-- in Bentham's
terms, again somewhat misleading, the pleasure and pain of either you or somebody else that you care about. So
the utilitarian idea is to say, Okay, we all have our pleasures and pains, and as a moral philosophy we
should all count equally. And so a good standard for resolving public disagreements is to say we should go
with whatever option is going to produce the best overall experience for the people who are affected.
Which you can think of as shorthand as maximizing happiness--although I think that that's somewhat misleading. And the
solution has a lot of merit to it. But it also has endured a couple of centuries of legitimate criticism. And one of the biggest criticisms--and now we're
getting back to the Trolley cases, is that utilitarianism doesn't adequately account for people's rights. So, take the footbridge
case. It seems that it's wrong to push that guy off the footbridge. Even if you stipulate that you can save more people's lives. And so anyone who is going to defend
utilitarianism as a meta-morality--that is, a solution to the tragedy of common sense morality, as a moral system to adjudicate among competing tribal moral
systems--if you are going to defend it in that way, as I do, you have to face up to these philosophical challenges: is it okay to kill on person to save five people in this
kind of situation? So
I spend a lot of the book trying to understand the psychology of cases like the footbridge
case. And you mention these being kind of unrealistic and weird cases. That's actually part of my
defense.

d. Non util ethics are impossible

Greene 07 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology:
Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: https://www.gwern.net/docs/philosophy/ethics/2007-greene.pdf, pages 47-50)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine
rational enterprise , that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions ,
which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural.
Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory
that can accommodate our moral intuitions . Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even
part of one, almost certainly doesn't . Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have
somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us
against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism
about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought"
from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the
phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).
Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist
deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments
presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded
deontologists are all about . Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition . It's not
defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously . Above
all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for
reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This
is, no doubt, how many deontologists
see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading . The problem, more specifically, is
that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological , though they may appear
to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to
explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love , really. It's about
looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of
answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless
inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to
love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves.
In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular
humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as
formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though
they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the
standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other
approaches to ethics . (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that
consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons , are against treating people as mere
objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share , etc. A consequentialist respects
other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-
being in the decision-making process . Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to
reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to
everyone's interests , i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do.
It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds
of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such
as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge
cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If
you ask a deontologically-minded person
why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get
characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological : "Because it's murder!" Others will be more

sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But , as we know, these
answers don't really explain anything , because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley
case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment , even though their initial explanation concerning the
footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we
can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves
having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism . Although
these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because

they give voice to powerful moral emotions . But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's
essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question .

e. On their pre-emts:
1. Empirically false and their logic is a performative contradiction - even
opening my mouth to speak requires prediction. If I drop a pen I know it
will hit the ground
2. We are only responsible for reasonably predictable consequences –
solves infinite regress and post-hoc condemnation
3. Yes aggregation – moral equality entails equal weight to everyone’s pain.
Intuition, data collection, and empirics solve their indicts – even if there
are close calls, the affirmative isn’t one
4. Pain and pleasure must be objective and universal – anything else
justifies racism. “Don’t worry – Black people just have thicker skin”
5. Uncertainty is irrelevant – we don’t need precision about individual
variation in experience if the aff is not a close call
f. Extinction comes first – it’s the worst of all evils
Baum and Barrett 18 - Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018.
“Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding,
Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken

literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way
catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event
causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would
be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be
catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten
million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson
1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory
of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that
drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term
“existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all
these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was
perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear
war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would
presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would
be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan,
the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming
humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species.
Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the
evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans
may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are,
then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion
more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse
will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An
open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living
for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g.
Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of
500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng
1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs
from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives
estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion
chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500
trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or,
preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global
catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the
expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner
2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world
population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of
preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars
(Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even
using “just" $600 trillion, society
should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to
being willing to spend at least $1
million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global
catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to
count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected
to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the
stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard
riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit
significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause
permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives
are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than
others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great
debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should
value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is
crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not
be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the
right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position
that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of
Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created
equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of
ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which
member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless
of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or
a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.
 3
CP: The United States ought to substantially increase investments in CCS technology.

Offsetting fossil fuel emissions solves – CPs negate under truth-testing because logical
opportunity costs disprove the truth of the resolution
Anna Novoselov, 4-1-2021, [is a researcher at UCLA and the lead of the aquaponics team of Bruin Home Solutions and a student
researcher in the Hsiao Lab (which studies the microbiome). In the past, the was a leader of the Energy Team of the Sustainability Action
Research Program (SAR), a writer for the science and health section of the Daily Bruin and an intern for Melio Tech, a microbial profiling
startup] "Carbon sequestration: a critical but less-understood piece of the climate puzzle," https://www.ioes.ucla.edu/article/carbon-
sequestration-a-critical-but-less-understood-piece-of-the-climate-puzzle//SMirza

After passing the $1.9 trillion coronavirus relief package, Congress turned its attention to other critical efforts, including comprehensive
legislation to battle climate change. The bill, introduced into the House of Representatives on March 2, aims to fully decarbonize the economy
by 2050 by establishing clean electricity standards, promoting electric vehicles and improving the efficiency of buildings. It
would also
require the Secretary of Energy to establish a carbon capture and sequestration program. Carbon
sequestration removes carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and stores it long-term in geologic
formations, biological systems or industrial products. Without carbon sequestration, it may not be
possible to meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius and
avoid the most dangerous consequences related to temperature increases, sea level rise, extreme
weather and ecosystem loss.

“People mostly talk about climate change and an energy transition, but not about what to do about the
carbon already in the atmosphere,” said UCLA chemical and biological engineer Emily Carter. A 2019 Nature paper coauthored by
Carter, who is also UCLA’s executive vice chancellor and provost, analyzed 10 carbon sequestration pathways. It found each
could sequester at least 550 million tons of carbon dioxide per year — a combined effect comparable to
removing over 1 billion passenger vehicles from roads. The pathways include forest restoration,
agricultural techniques that increase soil carbon storage, bio-energy with carbon capture and storage,
and use of carbon dioxide in chemical polymers, biofuels and building materials . There is also enhanced oil
recovery, by which oil and gas companies inject high-pressure carbon dioxide deep into reservoirs to increase the amount extracted. It is
currently the only industrial process that uses carbon dioxide at a significant scale, accounting for 88 percent of global CO2 use. If
enhanced oil recovery was optimized for maximum carbon storage rather than the amount of oil and
carbon dioxide recovered, upwards of 154 billion tons of CO2 could be sequestered in the world’s oil
reservoirs, according to the Nature paper. Currently, 85% of the carbon dioxide used for enhanced oil recovery is extracted from naturally
occurring reservoirs (where the carbon is already sequestered) rather than from the atmosphere. In other words, oil companies dig up more
CO2 to increase oil recovery — resulting in a net increase of atmospheric carbon even before the fuels are burned. Regulations could require
companies to utilize carbon dioxide directly captured from the air. While this would not make up for emissions from
burning fossil fuels, it would help offset some of them. Direct air capture removes carbon dioxide from the air by passing it
through liquid chemical solutions or by chemically binding it with solid filters. However, the 15 facilities currently in operation globally capture
only 9,900 tons of carbon dioxide each year. (Compare that to an estimated 5.6 billion tons of global carbon emissions each year by the United
States alone). Carbon taxes or requirements for companies to offset fossil fuel emissions by sequestering carbon could help direct air capture
technologies scale up, Carter said. Concentrated carbon dioxide produced by direct air capture can also be used to produce chemical polymers,
fuels or building materials. As of now, carbon dioxide derived products tend to be more expensive than conventional counterparts, for they
require a pure carbon dioxide source, infrastructure, transportation and energy — numerous upfront and variable costs that disincentivize
investments in them. But that can change. “Right now, carbon utilization in products is not practical in terms of its cost,” Carter said. “But the
cost will come down with breakthroughs and mass production.” Implementing a carbon tax would create a level playing field by increasing the
price of fossil fuel intensive goods, making carbon sequestration in products more competitive, she added. Camly Tran, executive director for
UCLA’s Institute for Carbon Management, said utilizing carbon dioxide in building materials like cement and concrete has high potential. For
example, the startup CarbonBuilt, who’s core technology emerged out of UCLA studies led by civil engineer Gaurav Sant, converts waste carbon
dioxide from gases exiting to the atmosphere into solid mineral carbonates (e.g. calcium carbonate) that are then sequestered within concrete
products. “In the future, we are going to hopefully start seeing some implementation of carbon removal solutions on a wider scale,” Tran said.
“That’s the key.” To meet Paris Agreement targets, financial and regulatory incentives would need to stimulate carbon sequestration to 550
million tons per year by 2030 and 5,500 million tons by 2050, according to a 2017 report published in Science. “We need to work with
policymakers, with capital providers to not only get your solutions commercialized, but actually deployed,” Tran said. “ Commitment,
follow-through, and accountability are required to transition to a lower-carbon economy.” Thus , the
biggest hurdles to deploying carbon sequestration technologies are n’t technical — they’re political
and economic. Holly Buck is an expert on the social and political implications of environmental policies at University of Buffalo. She said
federal subsidies or taxes combined with leadership from the Biden administration could push carbon
sequestration forward. “In many places you can put carbon pollution into the atmosphere for free, so unless there’s a regulation
against that, people aren’t going to be cleaning it up,” said Buck, a former researcher with UCLA Institute of the Environment and Sustainability.
“That’s the main reason why these technologies aren’t mainstream, but that picture is changing.” Individual philanthropists, research
associations and prominent organizations, including Occidental Petroleum, United Airlines and Microsoft, are investing in technologies that
capture carbon dioxide directly from the air. The sequestration tax credit of the Internal Revenue Code Tax currently provides per-ton tax
credits for CO2 that is permanently sequestered in products or in geologic formations. A revised version became effective on January 13. In
addition, the Department of Energy announced on March 5 that will provide $24 million for carbon capture technology research. The
challenge now is passing policies that are not just effective, but equitable, Buck said. “Capturing carbon
would have the obvious benefit of less CO2 going into the air,” she said. “However, it is important to
design policies for pricing carbon that does not make energy or other goods expensive for economically
disadvantaged people.”
CASE
 Theory
1. 1AR theory is not automatically drop the debater –
encourages frivolous theory that crowds out substantive
education. Every aff win on condo disproves their offense
2. The negative does not have to concede that either
permissibility or presumption affirms.
a. Both are untrue, which means their framework incentivizes artificial debate
grounded in nonsense. Permissibility negates – the aff hasn’t proven an active
obligation as indicated by ought. Presume neg – we default to statements being
false which is why we don’t believe conspiracy theories.
b. Hard debate is good debate – forces creative thinking and strategic time trade
offs. Portable skills outweigh
c. Use reasonability – competing interps incentivizes frivolous theory and causes
substance crowd-out
3. Counter-Interp – the ballot represents a normative
endorsement or rejection of the plan
This is proven by “resolved” in the resolution, which takes out their “affirm” definition
since that word isn’t in the rez
Parcher 1 — Jeff Parcher, Former Director of Debate at Georgetown University, 2001 ("Re: Jeff P--Is
the resolution a question?," Post to the e-Debate List, February 26, Available Online at
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/ 0790.html, Accessed 09-10-2005)
> Jeff, I don't think debaters' relation to the resolution is nearly as clear as it you make it out to be in your recent posts. 1. The resolution > is
not a question. It is a statement that has "resolved" on one side and a normative statement on the other separated by a colon. What > is the
meaning of "resolved?" I know Bill Shanahan has made the argument that "resolved" means "reserved," in which case the > resolution doesn't
require you to arrive at any certainty about the truth of the normative statement. (1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American
Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3.
To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in
original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the
word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a
deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The
debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The
committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue.
There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic
community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on
issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which
will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution . That's not only what they do, but it's what
we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a
resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context:
the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the
adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body.
Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view.
One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which , of course, are
answers to a question.
Don’t allow neg paradigm framing args – moots 6 minutes of 1ac offense – they have
infinite prep for the 1ac but we have 4 min in round, so default to ac framing of
comparative worlds

Prefer our interp

a. Their Bindingness trick is nonsense and has no warrant – don’t vote on it,
once they give a warrant for it I get new answers
b. NIBs Bad: They encourage intellectual dishonesty and are ableist by hiding
arguments and encourage recyclicing tricks rather than engaging in
substantive education means this flow is an IVI
c. Intuition – its key to navigating our daily lives – reject hyper line-by-line drops
because they justify voting on things like racism good.
d. Plans are more intellectually rigorous. The resolution is a generalization, so the
truth is always that in some cases it's true and some cases it's false. Plans allow
us to focus on a single example where it makes sense to categorically endorse
or reject.
 Offense
No property rights – people get to decide who extracts on their land, that’s leasing
The duty to exit the state of nature does not end with the foundation of the state, but
justifies a continual effort to gradually move toward a state of strong property rights.
Verhaegh 04
Marcus Verhaegh (Research Fellow, Ludwig von Mises Institute), “Kant and Property Rights,” Journal of
Libertarian Studies Volume 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 11–32. https://cdn.mises.org/18_3_2.pdf
Brackets in original.

Still, we can find some additional support for the claim that the state cannot determine property-ordering by fiat,
democratic or otherwise. The following passage from the Metaphysics of Morals is key to understanding Kant’s
account of the gradualist nature of the move out of the state of nature:

No one is bound to refrain from encroaching on what another possesses if the other gives [one] no equal assurance that he will
observe the same restraint toward [one]. . . . [It is] not necessary to wait for actual hostility; one is authorized to use coercion
against someone who already, by his nature, threatens [one] with coercion. (Quilibet praesumitur malus, donec securitatem
dederit oppositi. 43) Given the intention to be and to remain in [the] state of externally lawless freedom, human beings do one
another no wrong at all when they feud among themselves; for what holds for one holds also in turn for the other, as if by
mutual consent (uti partes de iure suo disponunt, ita ius est).44 But in general they do wrong in the highest degree by willing to
be and remaining in a condition that is not rightful, that is, in which no one is assured of what is his against violence.45

This Metaphysics passage is fascinating in that we find Kant allowing for the use of violence against the other even before
violence has been initiated against one. The view is conjoined with the Latin motto: “The party who displaces another’s right,
has the same right himself.” But more central are Kant’s emphases that: 1) it is the intention to remain in the state
of nature that is wrongful, and not necessarily the use of violence against threatening agents; and 2) one’s motive
for leaving the state of nature is to assure a situation where “what is one’s own” can be protected
against unjust coercion. From these points, we see that it is not rational or just on Kant’s account to give up
one’s property claims merely for the sake of having external laws in place. The rationality of such a
“bargain”—submitting to state adjudication of property claims—hinges on the claim that this is the only way to
keep what property one controls.

The justness of this bargain follows from this claim, and the corresponding claim concerning the
property of all others. As such, it is evident that the duty to move away from the state of nature does not
end the very moment that external laws are in place. We are all duty-bound to continue with an
ongoing project, one which has telos of peaceful, cosmopolitan society. Before this goal is reached, it is
always the case that one might have reason to question the justness of the property arrangements
forced upon one by the sovereign. Even apart from the details of Kant’s account of the republican ideal, we have to allow that
some rulers and forms of rulership will better approximate the civil condition than others, with movement toward such better
kinds of rule being possible as gradual improvements. Greater movement toward a civil condition occurs as a
republican ideal is achieved, where this republican ideal is to allow for a government that never
sacrifices the property of the individual citizen for the sake of other citizens.
Because resources are finite, the right to property must be understood as a negative
right rather than a potentially limitless positive right. This justifies limits on the form
of government. Verhaegh 04
Marcus Verhaegh (Research Fellow, Ludwig von Mises Institute), “Kant and Property Rights,” Journal of
Libertarian Studies Volume 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 11–32. https://cdn.mises.org/18_3_2.pdf

One counter-argument here might be that Kant did not have a gradualist view of the exit from the statue of
nature, but in fact embraced an all-or-nothing view, such that civil society is meant to allow one to keep
what one had in the state of nature, but where additional functions of achieving social equality may be
superadded to the original property-rights protective function as the legislature deems appropriate. However,
for one, the limits that Kant places on proper uses of government weigh against such a reading. Kant
clearly thought that the aristocratic rulers of a society could err in how they commanded the commoners, even if their valid
commands are to be obeyed.31 Kant abhors democracy, moreover, favoring instead a republican constitution that
protects the freedom of all members of society, and which is to make it impossible for the people to
use an executive power against “the single individual without his consent.’32 And, of course, Kant has taken great
pains to emphasize the need to respect the individual’s right to property, if the external freedom of each is to be made
compatible with that of all others. (Indeed, the doctrine of right, which deals with external freedom, has its entire, rather
lengthy first part devoted to explaining what right to property the individual has.) One wonders why Kant put such emphasis on
the despotism associated with rule by the demos if it were not the case that Kant is greatly concerned to have the state protect
the right of each to keep what is his own in a more than formal way. If both the aristocratic ruler and a ruling demos
can go wrong in its use of civil law, it must be the case that there are a priori standards that define
what are proper applications of external law. It cannot be the case that the majority’s views of what
constitutes the correct scheme of ownership simply define who owns what, even if this view is expressed
through some representative, deliberative body, as in a republic. Rather, Kant’s desire to see such a body rule must be
understood as a belief in the superior ability of such a body, relative to an aristocrat or to the demos, to arrive at a proper
interpretation of who owns what. In this case, since we are dealing with a moral issue, the ability in question is that of seeing a
noumenally grounded situation. “Who owns what” is ultimately determined by a priori laws, and not just any set of empirical
decisions made by legislatures. All empirical decisions must be in keeping with the a priori. The representative body is to
legislate in accordance with the principle of not hindering my actions, or my condition generally, that “can
coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law.”33 The body is not merely to legislate in
accordance with any non-arbitrary set of principles that reflects majority feeling. Neither is it
appropriate to legislate based on deliberative discovery of a priori laws of morality generally. These laws
are not always about what all individuals can be made to accept (through coercion), but are usually about what all individuals
can choose to accept (through the free exercise of the will). In contrast to these two scenarios of “enlightened”
majority rule and “enlightened” paternalism, the scenario Kant recommends is one is which the
representative body strives to properly interpret the nature and in situ application of the a priori laws
that specifically govern questions of “what is mine or thine.” Concerning these a priori principles, we must
notice that it is a maximal amount of freedom that is not to be infringed : “one’s freedom which can coexist. . . .”
Whatever freedom one happens to have that could properly coexist with whatever freedom others happen to have is not to be
restricted. It is not a question of each individual being made to have equal external freedom. Kant’s point is that it is never just
for either private individuals or agents of the state to use coercion against one, unless doing so is necessary to protect the
freedom that others possess, or to maintain the apparatus that is necessary to protect my own freedom (generally: the state).
Since we are dealing with freedom that could potentially be restricted —otherwise, it would hardly need legal
protection—we have to conclude that Kant is referring to freedom that could, at least theoretically, be possessed
to different degrees by different individuals. Obviously, we could not conclude any such thing if we were talking
about our freedom as beings who are rational and thus free to act from reason instead of mere inclination. Such coexistence of
the noumenal freedom of human beings must be thought always to be possible regardless of empirical circumstances.
Otherwise, the categorical imperative would have to be only a hypothetical imperative, and this is a contradiction in terms. It is
clear, then, that the external freedom with which coercive laws deal is of a very different character than is our noumenal
freedom, despite the fact that the latter kind of freedom founds the former.34 And so we must ask: What sort of freedom is it
that, despite having a noumenal foundation, will vary in extent from individual to individual, and that can be restricted by
coercion? This must be a freedom to make use of what is mine. Something can be mine either innately or externally.35
Although it is empirically possible for another to restrict my right to make use of what is innately mine, such a restriction is
never just. We all must be empirically free to make use of what we possess a priori and innately. Here we have a case in which
different individuals could have different degrees of freedom—for example, if one individual rules over the other as a master
rules over a slave—but where it is never in itself unjust to use coercion to correct such inequalities. These innate freedoms
cannot justly be restricted; all are to possess them equally. Thus, it would be incorrect to claim that it is unjust to use violence
against the slave owner in order to free the slave on the grounds that the freedom of the slave owner to make use of his own
body, and of that of his or her slave, would be violated.36 Of course, freedom from slavery is not the only kind of freedom we
are to possess equally. Kant lists a number of “authorizations” or inalienable rights that flow from the lack of injustice attached
to coercively correcting limitation on innate freedom. For example, all are to enjoy freedom from any type of coercion that one
is not oneself authorized to employ against all others, regardless of the circumstances of one’s birth. Also, all are to be free to
interact with others in all ways that do not diminish what is theirs; this freedom includes, notably, freedom of speech.37
However, when it comes to that which is externally mine, it is necessary for the individual to perform an
act to establish his or her right to the external thing.38 This necessity obtains despite the fact that
human beings can be said to originally own the whole of the globe in common.39 Thus, different individuals
will have different rights depending on what acts they have performed, and under what conditions. Insofar as having a right
implies a degree of freedom, different individuals will have different degrees of freedom. It might be asked: On Kant’s account,
does one have the inalienable right to acquire external things, and, thus, an inalienable “right to acquire rights”? Certainly, no is
one authorized to use coercion to keep you from having property simpliciter (as opposed to this or that particular property).
For, given the kind of equality that humans possess, this would mean that all had a right to use such coercion. As rights to things
are really rights against others (to keep them from using what is yours without your consent), such coercion of a communist
social order would involve a contradiction of the will. The only justification for limiting an individual’s ownership is to allow a
second individual to have ownership. Willing coercive communism, however, is to will limitations on ownership for the
imagined rights of mere things, but mere things have can have no rights.40 Thus, we might say that all individuals have an a
priori right to acquire private property. Still, insofar as the property available for acquisition is of a finite
character, such as, for Kant, follows from the spherical nature of the globe, this right to acquire property must
remain strictly negative in character. Just as the right to free speech does not give the mute license to talk, just as little
does any Kantian right to property give the property-less inhabitant of the globe license to claim as his or her own what another
has already come to possess in accordance with the principles of first control and willingness to adjudicate conflicts civilly
(where we must continue to keep in mind that this willingness need not be infinite in scope). Of course, one may have a duty as
private citizen to gift property to the property-less. Such would follows from one’s wide duty to help those in need.41 But such
gifts may not be coerced. Again, the only forcible transference of wealth that might be permissible is that
done for reasons of state, and so to allow the possessor of wealth to keep what wealth remains to him or her. Thus, not
even a representative legislature may enact policies of wealth redistribution whose real goal is to bring about social equality,
even if these policies are thought to flow from a priori principles governing moral actions. Such policies would be examples of
the will of the people being opposed to the will of an individual who is part of the people, thereby leading to a contradiction in
the general will and a state of nature (i.e., a state of wrong). A representative legislature is to be preferred to a
democratic one because it will involve additional checks against the use of the executive power to
engage in such abuses of the social contract. In rule by the demos, there is little possibility of respecting the rights of
each and every individual, since there is no way to distinguish proper representation of the will of each and every citizen from
the executive decisions that result from the shifting arrays of power present in the mob.42 As such, unless Kant’s account
of republican state is simply dismissed, one has little ground to stand on in claiming that the Kantian
civil condition is one in which ownership is simply to be determined by democracy or the republicanism of
representational, deliberative democracy. Of course, Kant’s account of the superiority of the republican state might very well
be dismissed, or at least downgraded, owing to the vagueness of its presentation.
 Advantage
Didn’t read a terminal impact
US economy strong enough to avoid recession now BUT inflation means it’s fragile
Rachel Siegel 10-31 {reporter} - ("Facing a strong economy, Fed puzzles over how to slow it down,"
Washington Post, published 10-31-2023, accessed 10-31-2023,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/31/fed-inflation-rates/)//marlborough-km/

Inflation is too high, but the economy is growing like gangbusters. The job market shows some signs of
slowing but has clocked 33 consecutive months of gains. There’s no recession in sight

, even though the Federal Reserve has pushed interest rates up faster than it has in decades.

This is the jumbled picture confronting central bankers as they kick off their two-day policy meeting Tuesday. The
widely held view is
that Fed leaders will hold interest rates steady — and they might even be done raising rates altogether.
But in highly technical debates from an ornate board room, a key Fed committee will grapple with
exactly where the economy is headed and how to wade its way through still more uncharted waters for
monetary policy.
“The data is really strong, but these were not things on people’s bingo card,” said Derek Tang, an economist at research firm LH
Meyer/Monetary Policy Analytics. “How do they untangle all of these things?”

U.S. economy grows at blockbuster pace in third quarter

In many ways, the Fed

has been untangling a web of data ever since the pandemic torpedoed through the
economy more than three years ago. Now, officials are trying to understand why major economic
engines like consumer spending, the job market and overall growth have not responded to sharply
higher interest rates as Economics 101 would suggest.

This time last year, for example, an

overwhelming share of economists were convinced that the country would
slump into a recession because of the Fed’s sprint to hoist interest rates. Instead, data released last
week showed a fifth straight quarter of growth, with the economy expanding at an annualized rate of
4.9 percent from July to September, the strongest pace since 2021.
Meanwhile, policymakers expected households and families would pull back on spending, as they buckled under the weight of high prices for
groceries, gas and other essentials. But
consumers have bested those predictions time and again, shrugging off
inflation and higher interest rates alike and spending big on concert tickets, high-end vacations and new
cars. Retail sales in September rose 0.7 percent over the month before, far above expectations.

Americans, especially wealthy ones, are still spending big

fewer job openings and tamer wage growth than

And while the job market may be showing some signs of cooling —
earlier in the pandemic — there’s been nothing resembling massive layoffs or rising unemployment.
Fed officials, then, are left to sort out why.

In remarks before the Economic Club of New York earlier this month, Fed Chair Jerome H. Powell said demand is being driven, in large part, by a
strong labor market,
as wages outpace inflation and people have more money to spend. He also pointed to
groups that just aren’t that hampered by high borrowing costs: homeowners who bought homes when
mortgage rates were still low, or businesses that termed out their debt and now aren’t feeling tighter
financial conditions.
“It really is a story of much stronger demand,” Powell said. “There may be some ways the economy is less affected by interest rates. It’s hard to
know precisely.”

For the Fed,

though, interest rates are the main tool for combating inflation and getting the economy on a
more sustainable path. The Fed’s benchmark rate, known as the federal funds rate, falls between 5.25
and 5.5 percent, the highest level in 22 years. Central bankers have left the door open for another quarter-point rate increase,
possibly at their final meeting of the year in December. But Fed watchers increasingly bet that the central bank is done hiking rates and that
leaders will instead hold borrowing costs high for as long as it takes to get inflation back to 2 percent. (Using the Fed’s preferred gauge, inflation
is running at 3.4 percent. It’s come down a lot from a high of 7 percent in June 2022, using that metric.)
A strong economy is making the Fed’s job harder

The thinking can be somewhat counterintuitive. On the one hand, officials have long said workers, employers and the overall economy
will have to go through “pain” until the Fed finishes its inflation fight. But on the other hand, officials and observers
are starting to wonder if the economy will react to steep rates with what the models predict: subpar growth, a weak job market or a pullback in
spending.

In a speech late last month, Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee said there are risks to “believing too strongly” in the inevitable, large trade-
offs between inflation and the job market.

“Inflation still needs to come down. But we also can’t lose sight of the fact that the Fed has the chance to achieve something
quite rare in the history of central banks — to defeat inflation without tanking the economy,” Goolsbee said. “If we succeed, the golden path
will be studied for years. If we fail, it will also be studied for years.”

He continued: “Let’s be prepared to recognize when historical lessons might not work that well for today’s environment.”

What that means for monetary policy, though, may not be worked out for some time. In the near term, Fed officials said they will make
decisions about rates meeting by meeting, based on how data on inflation, jobs, wages and growth continue to unfold. Zoomed out a bit more,
central bankers still don’t know how much more the economy will slow from their drastic moves over the past 19 months.

The aff collapses the carbon bubble – causes an unprecedented economic decline
overnight
Tara Bernoville 22 {Master's in entrepreneurship and sustainable innovation, from ESCP Business
School} - ("The carbon bubble," Plan A Academy, published 6-29-2022, accessed 10-27-2023,
https://plana.earth/academy/carbon-bubble-financial-crisis)//marlborough-wr/

The carbon bubble might cause the next financial crisis. Over our lifetime, we have experienced many crises:
the internet bubble, the global financial crisis of 2008, the US house market crash, and the recent crypto
market dump. If all these bubbles had adverse effects on our economy, the carbon bubble burst might
send shockwaves to our entire economy.
In this article, we explain what risks fossil fuels pose to the financial market and how we can protect our economic system from them.

What is the carbon bubble?

The “carbon bubble” stems from an overvaluation of fossil fuel companies’ oil, coal, and gas
reserves. The notion of a carbon bubble is based on our knowledge that 2°C is the absolute maximum amount of
temperature rise that humanity can cope with. Any more than that, and we will live on an inhabitable
planet.

The “carbon
bubble” started as a warning from a niche group of climate-minded financiers in the early 2010s but has since become
accepted as orthodoxy by most major regulators and financial institutions.
Like the carbon bubble, financial bubbles occur when the price of an asset increases due to unrealistic
projections of its value. Often, shareholders speculate that their investments will continue to be valuable,
maintaining high stock prices and consumer confidence. Sometimes, however, demand and market conviction
will be met with real-world situations that devalue the asset.
It is precisely the case for fossil fuel companies as the world tries to move away from these carbon-intensive energies to switch to renewables
and low-carbon technologies. And, we are getting there. As evidence, two-thirds of solar and wind farms built in 2020 will provide cheaper
electricity than even the most affordable coal plants – making renewables the cheapest power source today.

The carbon bubble and the overvaluation of fossil fuel companies

The carbon bubble problem arises when we consider that all fossil fuel reserves – every drop of oil and particle of
atmospheric carbon – are currently included in the valuation of the companies that own them. These
companies are massively overvalued unless we want to exceed our carbon budget. All companies on the stock market are
evaluated on the basis that we will burn all of our reserves based on our current economic logic.

The overvaluation of fossil fuel companies is a real issue. Most Wall Street and valuation indexes
analysts are doing their valuations based on misleading data. A recent RethinkX report points out that since 2010, $2
trillion has been invested in fossil fuels and nuclear power based on misleading assumptions about the
value of these industries. The RethinkX report also found that Levelized cost of energy (LCOE) companies
are overvalued by 400%, resulting in a potential market crash.
This carbon bubble situation is leading us to two potential outcomes. On the one hand, fossil fuel companies burn all of our reserves, clearly
blowing our carbon budget and cooking up the planet beyond recognition. On the other hand, governments
implement
regulations to stop companies from extracting unburnable carbon, which would make these companies
drastically overvalued overnight, causing the carbon bubble to burst.

The carbon budget

You might have noticed an increase in temperatures and natural disasters – and before we all become cooked beyond recognition, it is essential to limit the rise of temperatures to 2°C under
the Paris Agreement.

To achieve the Paris Agreement goals, the world can release only a certain amount of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere (caused by burning fossil fuels, oil and gas) – the so-called
carbon budget. Any more than this, and we run over budget.

Carbon Tracker calculated the carbon budget for 2020, which was at 495GtCO2 – as of 2020, this equates to 11.5 years for a 50% probability of a 1.5°C warming outcome.

You get it: Our reserves must stay in the ground to keep the carbon budget. A 2021 study published in Nature proved that to have a 50% chance of staying within a 1.5°C temperature rise
scenario, 60% of remaining oil and fossil methane gas reserves and 90% of coal reserves must remain unextracted by 2050. This so-called ‘unburnable carbon’ creates a fossil fuel overhang
that we cannot use.

Why do carbon budgets matter to businesses?

A carbon budget follows similar lines to a business or country’s typical financial budget. They tell a business how much carbon dioxide they have left to emit to contribute to staying below a
certain level of warming.

Carbon budgets are valuable for companies to develop a decarbonisation plan. A company can set a budget against its target in alignment with the 1.5 °C and, thanks to the budget, can create
visibility around the “low hanging fruit” and leave the rest of the budget to the more complex decarbonisation challenges.

The carbon bubble effect: the financial risk of the century

Similar to the butterfly effect, the carbon bubble effect has investors worried – and they should. Individual investors are
projected to be sitting on a $763 million carbon bubble.
The value of stranded assets will be about $4 trillion, the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change report concluded. Another report stated more optimistically that stranded oil and gas production assets would total $1.4
trillion – if we meet the Paris targets to stay below 1.5 degrees. This figure is likely underestimated as it doesn’t include
many ancillary assets and companies, like oil refineries and gas export terminals.

That cascades – nuclear war

Liu ’18 — Quian; PhD in Economics from Uppsala University, Former Visiting Researcher at the
University of California, Berkeley, Managing Director for Greater China at The Economist Group, Guest
Lecturer at New York University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Fudan
University. “The Next Economic Crisis Could Cause a Global Conflict. Here's Why”; World Economic
Forum; https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-
conflict-heres-why

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in
the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising
income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict.

The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse.
Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary
stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates.
But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural
reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies.

Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining
governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather
than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment.

The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised
global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008.

In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio,
which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929.

As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the

collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger
another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a
tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low
interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy.

If history is any guide, the

consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s
Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterized also by public antipathy
toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even
war.

For example, during

the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act,
intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In
the subsequent five years, global trade
shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II
 Didn’t read

had begun.
To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that
high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict.

According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then
declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number
of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels.

This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic
tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over
globalization, political polarization, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that
could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis.

Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are
offering ill-advised solutions that will
only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented
interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald
Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen.

Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the
next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale
military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it,
because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long
promised, while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be
global conflagration.