Chinese Political Science Review

https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-021-00190-5

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The Political Development of Contemporary China

from the Perspective of Historical Political Science

Guangbin Yang1

Received: 13 August 2021 / Accepted: 19 August 2021

© The Author(s) 2021

Abstract
The political development of contemporary China defies existing political theories.
The framework of “political science” based on the ‘rational man hypothesis’ has
proven to be fallible in terms of correctly envisioning China’s future. Appertaining
to the Chinese political history, historical political science offers not only epistemol-
ogy and methodology of the subject, but also an ontological element, for observa-
tion. With respect to historical political science, contemporary Chinese politics is
considered to be the natural genetic extension of the Chinese civilization as well as
a continuous and unified development process spanning over a period of 70 years
ever since the People’s Republic of China was founded. Historical political science,
deemed to be a tailored research approach for the development of contemporary
Chinese politics, essentially adds further value and significance to this discipline.

Keywords The genetic community of Chinese civilization · Historical continuity ·

Historical political science · Political development of contemporary China

This article is a review of how the political development of contemporary China

appears as a major agenda in both, Chinese and foreign political sciences, as well
as a substantial challenge to the existing political theories. Since the founding of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over 70 years ago, the West has been assess-
ing China’s prospects by virtue of their own ideas and set paradigms, but were all
proven wrong (Huang and Huang 2013). The apparent reason behind this outlook is
that the Western press and academia strongly endorse the dichotomy of “democracy
and non-democracy”, and believe that any political path or system that does not con-
form to the Western democratic ideology is certain to encounter problems sooner
or later and even lead to the failure of the state, along with the inevitable “demo-
cratic transition”. In that sense, Westerners have long been convinced of the “end

* Guangbin Yang
yanggw@ruc.edu.cn
1
Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Dean of School of International Studies
at Renmin, University of China, Beijing 100872, China

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of history”, and Fukuyama proclaims it publicly (Fukuyama 1992). Global political

realities such as the evolution of the “Arab Spring” into the “Arab Winter” and the
“democratic resurgence” realized by many countries challenged the “common view”
originated from the dualistic world view. For that reason, numerous pragmatic West-
ern political scientists have called for an “end to the transition paradigm” (Caroth-
ers 2015), i.e., to stop assessing global politics through the prism of the dichot-
omy-based “democratic transition”. However, it is difficult for Western scholars to
cease this practice because the capitalist or market society in which they reside is
essentially the product of self-interested individualism, which makes it impossible
for them to avoid using individualism as a measure of all political relations. Hence,
Western social science is primarily based on Hobbes “rational man” hypothesis
(Hobbes 1688/1994). According to Hobbes, man is the most elementary component
of a country. Understanding a country first requires understanding “human nature”;
and when that is comprehended, everything else becomes comprehensible. The sci-
entific analysis of human nature describes man as rational and self-interested; hence
“political science” is predominantly predicated on the hypothesis of rational man.
Hobbes’ “political science” not only deviates from the classical political tradi-
tions adopted by various Western countries, but also bears no relation to the politi-
cal traditions of several other non-Western countries. If the understanding of human
nature makes politics a science, then it does not justify the various irrational politi-
cal catastrophes brought about by human beings who are in favor of science. The
rational man hypothesis can illustrate, to a certain extent, the economic life in which
individuals are the subject, but fails to explain the political life in which groups
become the subject. The sum of individual rationalities is not equal to the ration-
ality of the group. That is why there exist events such as the genocide of Ameri-
can Indians by the white settlers, the election victory of Mussolini and Hitler, and
the referendum supporting the UK’s Brexit. “Political science” that stems from the
hypothesis of rational man can neither explain the multiple political misfortunes
experienced by humanity till date, nor can it direct humanity’s future. In the theory
of international relations, the realist hypothesis of “anarchy” is deemed to be derived
from Hobbes’ “state of nature”, but realist theorists disagree with his postulation
of “rational man”. According to Waltz, “If man is a completely rational animal, he
will always act in accordance with the absolute precepts. But he is not. Conflict and
violence arise from the secular nature of man”. “The behaviors of bees and otters,
which are dominated by their instincts, show regular patterns and predictable results.
On the other hand, citizens of a purely rational world will act according to pre-made
plans. Since human behavior does not belong to either of these two categories, the
‘systematic human history’ seems impossible.” (Waltz 2008: 4, 8).
The ‘rational man hypothesis’ based political science tends to completely aban-
don history. After World War II, in particular, waves of behavioralism and rational
choice theories became widely popular, “scientization” was intensified, and quanti-
tative research based upon this hypothesis became an elusive game of symbols that
was completely unrelated to the real key issues. By and large, political studies were
not really about political realities of the time.
Against this backdrop, Habermas tracks the origins. If Aristotle represents con-
textuality, i.e., historicity, of practice under the classical political view, Hobbes is a

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representative of the modern political view—whose first principle is non-historicity.

Hobbes’ claim is that “scientifically grounded social philosophy aims at establish-
ing, once and for all, the conditions for the correct order of the state and society as
such. Its assertions are valid independently of place, time, and circumstances, and
permit an enduring foundation for communal life, regardless of the historical situ-
ation” (Habermas 1973). Habermas contends that social philosophy, even though
originating from history, has renounced history; and social science originates from
classical politics, but has evidently deviated from classical politics. Therefore, his-
torical traditions remain essential for the suitable development of social science.
According to Habermas, social science represents the unification of history, theory,
and practice; and does not merely deal with the relationship between theory and
reality.
History is regarded as a “religion” for the Chinese people. With such a long
and rich history of civilization, the Chinese people possess a tendency to be nearly
innate historians. Hence, it seems only natural for them to “look at issues from a
historical perspective”, and the political view based on the perspective of histori-
cal political science therefore appears to be quite different from that of the rational
man hypothesis. Therefore, what is historical political science? In addition, from the
perspective of historical political science, what is the relationship between China’s
political development before and after the reform? What is the relationship between
the political development of the PRC and the history of China? What does historical
political science mean for the indigenous knowledge system? These are some of the
major issues that this article tries to address.

1 What is Historical Political Science?

Before discussing this proposition, we first need to answer this question: why do we
need historical political science? China abolished political science as an independ-
ent discipline in the 1950s, but scientific socialism, one of the three major princi-
ples, actually belongs to Marxist political theories. After the reform and opening-
up, political science was resumed in China and was basically deemed equivalent to
scientific socialism, focusing primarily on the theories concerning class, state, gov-
ernment, party, revolution, nation, etc. Objectively speaking, these topics undoubt-
edly remain evergreen and will never be outdated, but they also need to evolve with
the changing times. During the early 1980s, Western political science, particularly
political science in the US, began to be introduced in China extensively. American
political science was sort of a “revolution” against the political science in Europe:
conceptually, it shifted from “high politics”, which covered areas such as state and
constitution, to “low politics”, which encompassed society, interest groups, and
even relevant individuals; methodologically, it established the non-historical struc-
tural functionalism to evaluate the political modernization in various cultures and
regions, attaining the highest level of non-historicity (Almond and Coleman 1960).
In the 1970s, Rational choice theories had replaced the declining structural function-
alism, a more non-historical belief based on rational man hypothesis began to domi-
nate the main political science. When the non-historical methodology encountered

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the “third wave of democratization”, it became inevitable for rational self-interested

people to pursue democratization, thereby causing the popularity of the “transition
paradigm”. In this context, scholars who opted for historical thinking seemed to lose
their faith and began pursuing liberal democracy as a “universal value”, which signi-
fies unconditional feasibility and applicability.
The value of theory and methodology lies in their power of elucidating real poli-
tics. The crises both in Western countries and non-Western transition countries had
proven to be gravely detrimental for the non-historical modernization and democ-
ratization theories. Liberal politics needs to find a solution while American poli-
tics demands “bringing history back”.1 In Why and How History Matters, Charles
Tilly, a famous historical sociologist, claimed that it would be highly problematic
for interpretive political science to make any progress without undertaking careful
historical analysis, since history is filled with a number of critical political phenom-
ena, and political interpretation must be conducted in accordance with history (Tilly
2006).In fact, as early as the 1980s, historical institutionalism emerged as an oppo-
sition to the mainstream rational choice theories, with the latter being an approach
that dealt only with institutions and did not involve history (Eckstein 1998). At the
same time, the Western theoretical systems and research methods evidently failed at
explaining the unique development path and mode in China, which stemmed from
the wisdom incorporated from historical practice and institutional autonomy. New
methodologies were required to effectively describe the Chinese model. With such a
long and rich history and profound historical political science integrated in the road
and the mode in China, it is firmly believed that the Chinese people do not require
an external political interpretation for their development.
Now, what exactly is meant by historical political science? In a way, historical
political science, an integral part of historical sociology, is a historical social science
in itself. Historical sociology entails the study of politics, economy, and culture, i.e.,
the “total society” seen from the perspective of history and for achieving theoretical
findings; or for applying existing theories in a historical context, to test their authen-
ticity. Historical sociology is a field that deals with the discovery and testing of the-
ories. Historical political science is quite closely related to historical sociology, but
principally, as an approach in the Chinese context, it possesses a specific scope and
characteristics. The significance of historical sociology is primarily reflected in the
approach or methodology, and to begin with, historical political science is quite piv-
otal ontologically, as well as epistemologically and methodologically. That remains
the fundamental reason for the proposal of historical political science under the con-
dition of mature and developed historical sociology. Fortunately, China’s political
circle has achieved results in line with the similar approach of historical political

1
In 2000, an email sent by Mr. Perestroika criticizing the excessive scientization of the American Politi-
cal Science Review raised great concern in the American political science community, which began to
pay attention to the role of history. Some used history as background information to enrich their quan-
titative research, and some proposed the “historical turn”, as in Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt’s
The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies (Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 8/9, 2010).
However, the research environment in the United States determines that “history” can hardly become an
agenda for normal scientists in American political science.

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science, such as the idea of “rights from ancestors” proposed by Professor Xu Yong
and rural investigations from the perspective of historical continuity (Xu 2018a, b).
An academic community is required for research based on historical political sci-
ence. But before that, we should first try to comprehend the essence of historical
political science.

1.1 Historical Political Science as Ontology

“History” in historical political science is ontological in nature. Compared to the

history of other countries, the history of China, above all, is the history of politics,
which includes political thoughts, political institutions, and dynasties. The “politi-
cal nature” of Chinese history is unparalleled. Therefore, how should we understand
the Chinese history as political history? According to Kozo Mizoguchi, the famous
Japanese expert on Chinese issues, China possesses its own historical reality and
development, which is very clearly reflected in the slow and constant changes occur-
ring in various phenomena taking place in different eras spread over a long period
of time. Therefore, we should understand China’s modernity from the relationship
between its contemporary, modern, and pre-modern times. That is the “basal body
of China” (Mizoguchi 2011).
It is nothing short of a miracle that China is the only civilization that has lasted
for 5000 years without interruption. One cannot call Chinese civilization an “ancient
civilization”, since ancient civilizations are those that have either been interrupted or
have died out. Therefore, what are the exceptional “genes” that support the constant
institutional changes? In my opinion, the unique “genes” of Chinese civilization
include the following at any rate: the Chinese nation, the fundamental unaffected
Chinese characters, the territory with the Yangtze River and the Yellow River as the
core, the idea of unification at the national level, the people-oriented governing phi-
losophy, the bureaucracy at the government level (including the county system and
the imperial examination system), the inclusiveness and the golden mean at the cul-
tural level, the freedom and autonomy of social life, the focus on family ethics, and
the Tianxia (world) system in foreign relations. These “genes” are internalized and
instilled in the Chinese nation inhabiting in a fixed territory and form the Chinese
civilized community that has spanned over thousands of years. Such a community,
composed of civilization genes, is termed as the “genetic community of Chinese
civilization”. A civilized-genetic community is a community created by populaces
inhabiting in a fixed territory, possessing constant integral civilization beliefs and
lifestyle in addition to other genes, over thousands of years (Yang 2016a). On the
political level, the core elements of the “genetic community of Chinese civilization”
can be summarized as: the view of a unified state, the view of a people-oriented gov-
ernment, the benevolence-based social relationship, and a global approach to foreign
relations.
The genetic community of Chinese civilization in itself is deemed a political sci-
ence worth studying. That is the political significance of “history”. Therefore, what
does political science cover? It covers a range of issues such as a country’s political
values, political institutions, and political behavior (choice of interest). The genes of

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a country obtained from historical civilization may be strong or weak, but majority
of the countries must be endowed with appropriate political values, political insti-
tutions, and corresponding behavior. As far as Chinese politics is concerned, the
selection of values, the design of institutions, as well as the behavioral patterns are
all subject to the established “genetic community of civilization”, which is elabo-
rated in Sect. 2. In the same context, “historical political science” is not only politics
of the past, but also of the present. The fundamental difference between historical
political science and historical sociology lies in its ontological nature.

1.2 Historical Political Science as Epistemology

Habermas interprets the historicity of the Aristotelian political science as contex-

tualism, which is generally known as ‘conditionalism’. When Chinese people say,
“looking at the problem from a historical perspective”, we in fact mean, to look at
the conditions in which the problem arises. That is historical political science in
the epistemological sense. Aristotle came up with the three best constitutions, three
perverted constitutions, and various “sub-constitutions” based on the population
structure, industrial changes, and class composition. He argued that the best form
of government in one city-state may prove to be a bad one in another city-state. In
modern times, with the formation of world politics promoted by trade, technology,
and cultural exchanges, intellectuals have broadened the spectrum of political con-
ditionalism. The ‘theory of moeurs’ that was popular in France and Marx’s famous
axiom stating “base determines superstructure” both are the continuation of Aris-
totle’s theory of conditions. Even during the Cold War, scholarly democratic theo-
rists, such as Robert Dahl, summed it up profoundly, “I have suggested yet again
that certain underlying or background conditions in a country are favorable to the
stability of democracy and where these conditions are weakly present or entirely
absent, democracy is unlikely to exist, or if it does, its existence is likely to be pre-
carious.” (Dahl 1998). This is similar to a Chinese idiom stating, “the climate (soil
and water) not agreeing with someone”. Here, the “basic conditions” are the “soil”
in reality and the “background” is “water” from historical sources, hence the idiom
talks about the historical and realistic conditions. The Chinese people are quite pru-
dent to understand the philosophy behind this idiom and use it to their benefit, while
the conclusion of “the end of history” based on the rational man hypothesis suggests
arrogance and ignorance, hence the countless political catastrophes.

1.3 Historical Political Science as Methodology

Historical continuity is the essence of historical political science in terms of meth-

odology. Historical continuity comes across as the common sense of history, which
in turn forms the common sense of life. How is it established? The answer lies in
the internal mechanism of historical continuity. After the birth of historical insti-
tutionalism, people perceived historical continuity as something closely related to
the historical truth, and historical analysis transpired to be more logical and even
“theoretical”. That is because historical institutionalism provides some concepts for

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the analysis of the causal mechanism (Yang 2016b). For starters, it offers the con-
cept of “sequence”, which is composed of “timing” and “critical juncture”. In the
sense of timeliness, the earlier a key event occurs, more profoundly it influences
the subsequent institutional changes, like the thoughts and institutions established in
the Axial Age determining the path for future thoughts and institutions. Second, the
reason is that a key event occurring at an earlier time would become an institutional
arrangement, and through self-reinforcing, the result would increase the returns. In
the end, it would transpire into something on which the path depends and could even
fixate the path. Thirdly, historical continuity is not only a part of gradual institu-
tional changes. Even with the abrupt changes in institutions, such as revolutions and
reforms, it gets difficult to exclude institutions, thoughts, and even behavior by vir-
tue of “the genetic community”. These have been validated by a large number of
comparative historical studies and are also accepted as common wisdom.
Historical political science in terms of ontology, epistemology, and methodology
is undoubtedly a novel approach to understand in general how rational and legiti-
mate China’s political development is. It can also be implemented to theoretically
describe the historical continuity before and after the reform since the founding of
the PRC.

2 The Political Development of Contemporary China

as the Continuation of the Basal Body of Chinese Civilization

The past century has witnessed tremendous changes in China’s political and social
forms, but the people did not sever the country’s historical bloodlines and genes.
Despite the institutional mutations, China’s 5000-year-old history of civilization
remains intact. What General Secretary Xi Jinping mentions below are the ideologi-
cal propositions or chief political agendas that require in-depth study.2 Mr. Xi sug-
gested that “in promoting and interpreting the Chinese characteristics, we should
make it clear that each country and nation has their own historical traditions, cul-
tural legacies, and basic conditions, and their development path must have their own
characteristics; that the Chinese culture contains the greatest spiritual pursuit of
the Chinese nation and continuously nurtures the Chinese nation for its growth and
prosperity; that the outstanding traditional Chinese culture constitutes an outstand-
ing advantage of the Chinese nation and our strongest soft power; and that socialism

2
In every country, the official proposition is a political agenda worthy of attention and research, because
there is a powerful ruling group behind it. The official proposition either reflects the wisdom of the ruling
group or the questions that need to be answered or resolved by it. Therefore, social science should not
stay away from the “official” on the grounds that it is a part of academic research only. It must be realized
that social science is essentially policy science because social science is the science of answering major
practical questions, and official propositions are often the most important practical questions. Regarding
the major real agendas, either criticism based on idealism or defense based on realism can be adopted,
but both should be constructive, not negative. American politics after World War II, in fact, entails stud-
ies of the Cold War, which is about the defensive theory. Chinese social science, especially political sci-
ence, should not deviate from the defensive theory.

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with Chinese characteristics, which is rooted in the fertile soil of the Chinese cul-
ture, reflects the wishes of the Chinese people and meets the demand for the devel-
opment and progress of China and the times, has a profound historical origin and
a broad practical basis” (Xi 2014). He also expressed that “a country’s choice of
governance system is determined by its historical heritage, cultural traditions, and
the level of economic and social development. It is determined by the people of
the country. Today, China’s national governance system is the result of long-term
development, gradual improvement, and endogenic evolution on the basis of China’s
historical heritage, cultural traditions, and economic and social development” (Xi
2014).
These propositions and agendas can be evaluated and understood from various
perceptions, especially from that of historical analysis. We believe that historical
political science is a more appropriate perspective and approach. China’s current
development path and institutions and the modernization of national governance that
it is engaged in represent the political sections and emerge as a natural continuation
of the basal body of Chinese civilization. This is clearly reflected in the national
unity, political values, political institutions, social forms, and foreign relations of the
country. The last two topics are not covered in this article as they are irrelevant to
the topic.

2.1 National Unity

The civilization system is an integral part of the civilization carrier, i.e., the core
country. Without the support of a core country, the civilization would just die out,
just as multiple ancient civilizations in history did. In other words, the fate of the
genetic community of Chinese civilization depends on the country of China, the
cultural and educational tradition3 of “using culture to express and convey philos-
ophy”, and the entity of the state. As an entity, China must be unified historically.
The history and contemplation of China’s unity has provided valuable expertise
and a pivotal model for world peace. As Daisaku Ikeda and Toynbee suggest, “As
far as the Chinese are concerned, for thousands of years, they have been more
successful than any other nation in the world in bringing together hundreds of
millions of people politically and culturally. Their prowess to unite politically and
culturally has proven to be an unparalleled experience. Such unity is an absolute
requirement of today’s world. The unity of the world is the way to avoid collec-
tive suicide of mankind. In this regard, the most fully prepared nation among all
nations is the Chinese nation that has cultivated a unique way of thinking over the

3
The cultural and educational traditions in the Chinese civilization are the profoundest force to main-
tain the unity of China, hence, even the Manchu rulers themselves eventually were sinicized through the
cultural and educational traditions. In The Emperor’s Guide to Senior Ministers by Emperor Shunzhi,
the first emperor of the Qing dynasty, officials are encouraged to observe the Confucian norms. (Zurong,
Wang, 2019. Several Arguments on and Origins of the New Qing History, Dongfang Journal Spring
Issue 3.) For that reason, it is unconventional nonsense that the New Qing History argues about the non-
Chineseness of the Qing dynasty based on the subject of the nation.

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past two thousand years.” (Toynbee and Ikeda 1976) World history is a testament
that unitary control generates peace while multiple control brings war and chaos.
It is widely known that after the late Qing dynasty, the national unity faced sev-
eral fundamental challenges. The colonial and semi-colonial state and the politi-
cal turmoil caused by the Beiyang warlords tore China apart. In fact, it is believed
that when the emperor, the traditional state organizer, no longer functioned, the
warlords would not guarantee national unity either. During such an event, the
state needs a new organizer. In the context of comparative politics, there are
known cases of the United Kingdom and the United States organized by merchant
groups and Germany and Japan organized by bureaucracy. These two political
forces were absent in China in the first half of the twentieth century. That is why
political parties became the organizer of the country. However, due to the contin-
uation of warlord politics in effect, the Kuomintang was unable to serve as organ-
izer of the country due to its internal fragmentation. Thus, this historic task fell
on the shoulders of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The CPC fulfilled its
mission and accomplished the great task of state-building and unity on the main-
land through its armed group with special political ideals. Compared to the early
developed nation-states (one nation for one state), late-developing countries, such
as China, are multi-ethnic communities, which encounter a trickier task of organ-
izing the state and an even greater demand for the ability to organize or govern
the state. Without the CPC, there would be no PRC; without the CPC, the idea of
a unified China would be impossible. From this viewpoint, the biggest challenge
that China is facing in the twenty-first century is how to maintain national unity.
Without the CPC, the chances of national division are very likely (Ma 2011). The
destiny of the party determines the destiny of the country as well, or the destiny
of the country is tied to that of the party. That is the theoretical connotation of the
state in the “leadership system of the party and the state”.
Essentially, the process of CPC founding the PRC has two theoretical mean-
ings. One is party-centrism in the context of social science: the path adopted by
the UK and the US gave rise to society-centrism, the path taken by Germany
and Japan created state-centrism, and the path taken by Russia and China natu-
rally generated party-centrism (Yang 2011). The other meaning is in the sense
of traditional Chinese political thought: the “leadership system of the party and
the state” inferring that the CPC has become the inheritor of the orthodoxy of
national unity. In his political report On the New Stage, which was delivered at
the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Party Central Committee, Mao Zedong
said, “Today’s China is a development of historical China. We are Marxist his-
toricists, and we should not cut off history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, we
should summarize and inherit the precious legacy” (Mao 1991). That is why
General Secretary Xi Jinping attributes a great deal of importance to the tradi-
tional Chinese culture. He has visited the Confucius Research Institute of China,
spoken at the World Confucian Conference, and spoken multiple times about the
significance of traditional culture. Mr. Xi regards China as a continuum of the
5000 years of civilization history and 170 years of modern history.

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2.2 Political Values

A country is founded on certain political values, which are also called the “fun-
damental values of the country”. For China, its fundamental values are the core
socialist values, which comprise of the value principles at the national, social,
and individual levels. The core socialist values are extremely inclusive, wherein
they include not only the consistent Marxist values that the CPC has been adher-
ing to, but also certain elements from traditional Chinese culture, as well as the
outstanding achievements of human civilization. They portray the ever-inclusive-
ness of the Chinese culture, just like the fusion of Confucianism, Buddhism, and
Taoism in history, and implies that the localization of Marxism must be a pro-
cess featuring the integration of the Chinese culture with the outstanding achieve-
ments of human civilization. The reason why Marxism could quickly take root
in China lies in the accommodating nature of socialism and traditional Chinese
political thought, especially the people-oriented thought. Socialism focuses on
“society”, which is essentially related to people; and the people-oriented thought,
as the name suggests, also centers around people. Both, socialism and traditional
Chinese political thought, are based on the people and the masses, in essence.
In fact, theorists in China and abroad have long viewed China’s traditional
political forms from the perspective of socialism. If liberal economics was born
in China, as someone argues that the “Taoists were the world’s first libertar-
ians” (Rothbard 2006) then socialism appears to have a long history in China as
well. The earliest socialism can be found in Guan Zi: Interpreting the Situation,
in which Guan Zhong advocates the people-oriented thought, fairness, and self-
less in governing the State of Qi. “When the ultimate political ideals are imple-
mented, the state is for the public”—a 1000-year-old popular saying can also be
regarded as the earliest simple socialist thought. Researchers in China and abroad
believe that the socialist policy enabled Emperor Wu’s Han dynasty to reach its
heyday. Dr. Chen Huanzhang, who graduated from Columbia University and was
supervised by Kang Youwei, a leading figure in the earliest and the most system-
atic study of socialism since modern times, argues that Sang Hongyang “made
it possible for Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty to expand the Chinese empire
without financial constraint. His contribution to the country on the whole is huge
and eternal. He is the first person to successfully practice national socialism on
such a huge scale” (Chen 2009). Will Durant, author of The Story of Civiliza-
tion, believes that it was socialism that made China prosper. To solve the increas-
ingly severe issues concerning people’s livelihood and the economy, Emperor
Wu implemented economic reforms. “Wu Ti [Emperor Wu] experimented with
socialism by establishing national ownership of natural resources, to prevent pri-
vate individuals from ‘reserving for their sole use the riches of the mountains
and the sea in order to gain a fortune, and from putting the lower classes into
subjection to themselves’. The production of salt and iron, and the manufacture
and sale of fermented drinks, were made state monopolies… Great public works
were undertaken in order to provide employment for the millions whom private
industry had failed to maintain…; for a time the new system flourished… China
had never prospered so much before” (Durant 1963).

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Sun Yat-sen, the forerunner of the Chinese revolution, regarded himself as

a socialist and the realization of socialism in China as his goal. As Mr. Sun says,
“China is a solid advocate of socialism… It shows that the idea of socialism has
been etched on the minds of our people. It is appropriate that socialism should pro-
ceed as fast as it can.” (Sun 2011), “I really welcome socialism because it benefits
the country and the people, contains the truth about society, puts everything pro-
duced into public ownership, and reaps the benefits. The day when socialism is real-
ized, our children will have access to education, the elderly will be taken care of,
and each industry will run separately and smoothly. The Republic of China will be a
socialist country.” (Sun 2011).At the same time, Mr. Sun acknowledged and warned
that “if we don’t consider how to prevent the possible rise of capitalism in the near
future from the first day the Republic of China, what awaits us is a new tyranny
that is a hundred times fiercer than the tyranny of the Qing dynasty” (Sun 2011).
Like Mr. Sun, the early CPC members and scholars in the Republic of China also
believed that China has an innate sense of socialism and that capitalism is a cruel
approach.
Mr. Sun and other pioneers recognized that there are two “leviathans” in the
world—one is the national or political leviathan and the other is the capital levia-
than, and the harm inflicted by the latter is by no means lesser than the former. This
is the world that Mr. Sun comprehended, and it is also the truth of capitalist politics
in the world today. Therefore, unswervingly adhering to the socialist path and the
core socialist values has emerged as a huge test for China, which is still placed in the
capitalist economic system, and the Chinese model. If China, like other developing
countries, integrated into the capitalist economic system and became a part of it, its
fate would never be anything better than the other developing countries.

2.3 Political Institutions

If political values, which are considered as the fundamental values of the country,
are related to the direction of a country and the mental state of a nation, political
institutions, which embody the political values, become organizational principles
and structures in the political value system, which are accomplished through the
organization of a country. The widely known “Four Great Inventions” are related
to technologies or instruments. China’s greatest invention should be the earli-
est establishment of a bureaucratic or administrative system that unites mankind.
Westerners regard the emergence of nation-states and the bureaucracy of organizing
nation-states in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries as a major sign of “moder-
nity”. From that perspective, the states, politics, and administration of the pre-Qin
period were inherently modern. Not only did they have the bureaucracy and the pre-
fecture-county system based on which a state was organized, but the systems imple-
mented were based on performance rather than kinship. As Weber sees it, the mili-
tary and the bureaucracy are the foundations of European feudal countries (Weber
1921/1978), while the countries in China’s history primarily functioned based on
their cultural and educational traditions as well as the bureaucracy, which act as the

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carrier of those traditions. Values and institutions were highly unified, which could
be attributed to the country’s scholar-officials’ tradition.
Currently, the organizational principle of the leadership system of the party and
the state is considered democratic centralism. “Democracy” refers to the rights of
the masses, and this is a new system introduced by the CPC into the revolution.
Institutional systems established in accordance with the principle of democratic cen-
tralism, such as the discipline inspection and supervision system or the organization
and personnel system in the leadership system of the party and the state, can be
traced back to the “Six Ministries” in ancient China. As a scholar revealed, “The
Organization Department and the Disciplinary Committee are absent in the West-
ern political system, but they are critical for China’s political system as these two
organs deal with the promotion and supervision of officials, respectively. These also
originate from the profound historical and cultural traditions of China, inheriting
and transforming the Ministry of Official Personnel Affairs and the supervisory cen-
sorship system in feudal China.” (Xie 2019).
More importantly, China’s administrative system appears to be impersonal, hier-
archical, and performance-oriented, which are the basic organizational features
defined in Max Weber’s bureaucracy theory. The values are also deeply integrated
with it. Both party and administrative organizations regard the practice of core
socialist values as an indispensable part of administrative work and administrative
procedures. For example, it is the responsibility of governments at all levels to eradi-
cate poverty and guarantee social justice; and the rule of law and democratic proce-
dures must be transparent, which should reflect in all the decision-making methods.
This is the reason behind China’s widely acknowledged “administrative democracy”.
The values, which are internalized in the institutions, allow the various administra-
tive institutional reforms and advancement of the reforms and opening-up across the
board, even after 40 years of reform. How should we understand this peculiar phe-
nomenon in the history of humanity’s politics? The answer lies in the endogenic
background of China’s scholar-official tradition, which follows the people-oriented
governance philosophy.
The value of institutions is not only reflected in the institutions themselves, but
also instilled in the institutional matrix. In the party schools at all levels, officials
are offered not only the knowledge on how to deal with a situation, but also on how
to look at it. That is the input of worldview and epistemology. In these two senses,
for Chinese officials, value takes a higher priority than responsibility, and often con-
cerns the political order, especially the world order. This demonstrates the actual
significance of the country’s organizational and institutional system, and also formu-
lates China’s political system to not only be organizational, but also pragmatic and
valuable to keep up to pace with the times.
In short, when looking at the attributes of national unity, political values, and
political institutions, people probably acknowledge that the political development
of contemporary China is a natural continuation of the genetic community of Chi-
nese civilization. However, the vitality and legitimacy of China’s political path
and political institutions do not only stem from its historical and civilized genes,
but also from institutional innovations, which are suitable for the national condi-
tions and the real-time situations. We know that there are two biggest problems

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with traditional Chinese politics. One concerns the degree of organization, i.e.,
national governance capacity, and the other is about underrepresentation. The
most unique feature of the political development of contemporary China is the
national governance capacity guaranteed by the principle of democratic central-
ism. In the late Qing dynasty, the biggest challenge China faced was the ability to
integrate the institutions, and its poor performance in doing so made it vulnerable
to foreign powers. The principle of democratic centralism addresses the coordina-
tion between departments, central and local governments, and local governments
themselves, thereby maximizing the national governance capacity. The compe-
tition among major powers today is fundamentally over institutions, and insti-
tutional competitiveness is reflected in governance capabilities, which include
capabilities of institution integration, policy formulation, and policy implementa-
tion. In that sense, China’s comparative advantages are quite evident, and that is
one of the prominent reasons for it to become the world’s second largest economy
in such a short period of time.
In addition, the fundamental system of contemporary China is representative
and consultative. Before 1949, a key problem in Chinese politics was insufficient
representation. The people’s congress system ensures the representation of local
governments and ethnic groups, the political consultation system ensures the rep-
resentation of different sectors and industries, and the “two sessions” addresses
the tiao-kuai (branch and lump) system. In terms of participating in and discuss-
ing the government and political affairs, consultative democracy is embedded in
the whole process. Consultative democracy is not solely possessed by the politi-
cal consultation system; it is also a part of the people’s congress system.
The institutional capacity, representativeness, and consultation manifested in
the political development of contemporary China constitute the superiority and
competitive advantage of China’s political system. Political science should under-
take comprehensive comparative research in that regard, as it is more valuable in
comparative political research.

3 The Continuity and Unity of China’s Political Development Before

and After the Reform and Opening‑Up

While observing the continuity of contemporary China as a civilized genetic

community in its long-term history, the continuity and unity of the 70-year-old
PRC appear to be more explicit and self-evident. Continuity and unity existed in
history before and after the reform and opening-up: the post-reform period is not
a denial of the pre-reform period and vice versa. In historical political science,
the history before and after the reform and opening-up is on a continuous track.
The institutional arrangements made in the pre-reform period identify the basic
track and direction of institutional changes in the post-reform period, which, in
turn, strengthen the institutional structure and basic system established during the
30 years before the reform and opening-up.

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3.1 The Stability of the Constitutional Structure

Mao Zedong’s ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’ and the 1954 Constitu-
tion based on it fundamentally establish the constitutional system of the PRC. Seen
as returning to the 1954 Constitution, the current 1982 Constitution has been revised
five times to improve or strengthen the basic provisions of the 1954 Constitution.
There are two key points in China’s constitutional system. One is the nature of the
state, and the other is the organizational principle of the regime. No matter the man-
ner in which China changes, they ensure that it falls within the established political
direction and institutional matrix.
On the nature of the state, i.e., the state system in political science, Article 1 of
the 1954 Constitution stipulates that “The People’s Republic of China is a people’s
democratic country led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers
and peasants”. In the current Constitution, the first paragraph of Article 1 stipulates
that “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s demo-
cratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers
and peasants”; the next paragraph stipulates that “The socialist system is the basic
system of the People’s Republic of China. The leadership of the Communist Party
of China is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Disrup-
tion of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited”. Notice-
ably, while retaining provisions on the nature of the state, the current Constitution
based on the 1982 Constitution has added provisions on how to defend the state
system, that is, implementing the state system of the people’s democratic dictator-
ship through the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system. Then, there arises
the question of how to implement the socialist system, and that is a matter of the
political system.
On the organizational principle of the regime, the first paragraph of Article 2 of
the 1954 Constitution stipulates that “All power in the People’s Republic of China
belongs to the people. The National People’s Congress and the local people’s con-
gresses at various levels are the organs through which the people exercise state
power”; the second paragraph of Article 2 stipulates that “The National People’s
Congress, local people’s congresses at all levels, and other state organs shall all
apply democratic centralism”. In other words, the organizational principle of demo-
cratic centralism is adopted in creating the people’s congress and establishing the
relationship between the people’s congress and the government as well as the rela-
tionship between the central and local governments. The first paragraph of Article 3
of the current Constitution, which is based on the 1982 Constitution, stipulates that
“The state organs of the People’s Republic of China apply the principle of demo-
cratic centralism”. The second, third, and fourth paragraphs of Article 3 provide for
how to apply the principle of democratic centralism. “The National People’s Con-
gress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are constituted through
democratic elections. They are responsible to the people and subject to their super-
vision.” “All administrative, supervisory, judicial, and procuratorial organs of the
State are created by the people’s congresses, to which they are responsible and by
which they are overseen.” “The division of functions and powers between the central
and local state organs is guided by the principle of giving full scope to the initiative

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and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central
authorities.”
The state system and political system constitute the latitude and longitude of
the constitutional system. From the 1954 Constitution to the current Constitution,
the abstract expression of state-government has become more specific, which has
ensured the continuity of China’s political development after the reform and the
opening-up. In a temporal sense, that should be attributed to the “four cardinal prin-
ciples” proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. As Mr. Deng understands it, reform
and opening-up are inevitable, but there is uncertainty about how to reform and then
open-up, and one can only cross the river by feeling the stones; however, it is certain
that reform and opening-up can only be carried out within the established constitu-
tional framework, i.e., in compliance with the “four cardinal principles”. This means
that while the things allowed are not entirely known, the prohibitions are clear. In
that manner, one has to come up with new ideas while maintaining the bottom line.

3.2 The Social Foundation of the Market Economy

Under a stable constitutional structure, many policies or institutional arrange-

ments in place had laid a foundation 30 years ago before the reform and opening-up
started. The achievements that China has accomplished since the reform and open-
ing-up are by no means rootless, nor are they some kind of random magic created by
the market. It should be noted that several developing countries like India are more
market-oriented than China, but they are far less capable in state governance. Amar-
tya Sen, called the “conscience of economics”, has the profoundest understanding
in this regard. In his comparative study of India and China, he points out that “the
‘magic’ of China’s market rests on the solid foundations of social changes that had
occurred earlier, and India cannot simply hope for that magic, without making the
enabling social changes—in education, health care, land reforms, etc., that facilitate
the market functioning in the manner it has for China” (Sen and Drèze 1995). But it
is also more than just those areas. As it is well known, the PRC managed to establish
a modern industrial system in a backward agricultural country within a very short
period of time. This process entails the most pivotal prerequisite for the develop-
ment of the manufacturing industry and the formation of a manufacturing power
after the reform and opening-up. In addition, the socioeconomic policies adopted
in the 30 years before the reform and opening-up, regarding areas such as land and
agriculture, education, women’s liberation, and healthcare, were all conducive to the
subsequent initiative.

1. Land system and agricultural policy. After the reform and opening-up, China’s
agricultural development and rapid modernization that relied on the collective
ownership of land were directly related to the reform of the land system. Amartya
Sen believes that, compared to India, the reason for the viability of the contracting
system in China’s rural areas is that there were no “social problems and economic
inefficiencies of highly unequal land ownership.” (Sen and Drèze 1995) Land
opening caused a lot of social conflicts during the process of urbanization, and

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if China adopted a hereditary land system as several developing countries did,

it would not be possible to accomplish China’s modernization at the pace it has
seen. Therefore, the land system reform, which has been criticized by theories,
such as the new institutional economics, is precisely the instrumental prerequi-
site for the modernization of developing countries. A similar successful experi-
ence has been witnessed in South Korea and Taiwan. A majority of international
authoritative research has found that land reform is a significant factor for the
overall economic development of East Asia. Yet land reform alone is not enough
in agriculture. Without the water conservancy projects in the 30 years before the
reform and opening-up and the thousands of reservoirs, it would be unfeasible
to address the agricultural issues that rely on natural harvests. This is something
that other developing countries are incapable of, and it has effectively ensured
China’s grain harvest in recent decades.
2. Education and women’s liberation. Through the implementation of mandatory
education for all, the PRC greatly enhanced the quality and literacy of the peo-
ple. At the same time, the country promoted the women’s liberation movement
to ensure equality between men and women, and girls enjoyed the same access
to education as boys. According to the census data, the literacy rate of the 15–19
age group in 1982 was as high as 96 percent for men and 85 percent for women,
compared to 66 percent and 43 percent in India during the same period, respec-
tively (Sen and Drèze 1995). Without these efforts, there would be no high-quality
labor force after the reform and opening-up, and there would be no superior
female migrant workers, known as the “working women”. A high-quality labor
force guarantees the manpower that is required in a major manufacturing coun-
try. “Population” does not necessarily guarantee “manpower”, it is education
and women’s liberation, which are the solution to transform the population into
manpower for different factories.
3. Healthcare. “Barefoot doctors” (healthcare providers who receive basic medi-
cal training and work in rural villages in China) and the factual universal free
medical care are the major elements of the fundamental guarantee for China’s
most successful comprehensive healthcare. How do we measure the success? In
1960, China had 150 deaths per 1000 newborns, which was certainly lower than
India’s 165; by 1981, the number had dropped to 37, the same as that of South
Korea, while the number in India was 110. The life expectancy of the Chinese
born in 1960 was 47.1, and in 1981 it reached 67.7, which was higher than South
Korea’s 66 and approached the value of developed countries (Sen and Drèze
1995). China’s achievements in healthcare have garnered massive worldwide
attention and set a model for developing countries. This means that the level of
health is not necessarily proportional to the level of the economy. The key is how
much the government cares for the people and how effective the social policies
are. While on one side the free compulsory education and women’s liberation
provided high-quality labor; on the other side, healthcare featuring “barefoot doc-
tors” guaranteed a healthy labor force for the subsequent reform and opening-up.

It is evident that the eminent achievements accomplished by China since the

reform and opening-up are the product of policy changes, but the social development

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implemented by China before the reform laid the foundation for the market economy.
Therefore, Amartya Sen argues that, compared to India, the “eighties continued that
progress and consolidated China’s lead, but the relative standings had been deci-
sively established before the Chinese reforms” (Sen and Drèze 1995). “We argue, in
particular, that the accomplishments relating to education, health care, land reforms,
and social change in the pre-reform period made significantly positive contributions
to the achievements of the post-reform period. This is so in terms of their role not
only in sustaining high life expectancy and related achievements, but also in provid-
ing firm support for economic expansion based on market reforms.” (Sen and Drèze
1995). Amartya Sen’s judgment is especially enlightening, and he also addresses the
question of continuity before and after the reform in China. In terms of the degree
of marketization, China is no higher than India and other developing countries, but
how has it achieved so much of excellence in governance? The market economy is
not created on the fly. It involves a government system and government functions
at the upper level and social structure at the lower level. The function of the market
can only play a role under the constraints of both government and social structures.
Constrained by their knowledge and vision, people are utilized to uphold a country’s
prospects based on their market standards, which only indicates how ignorant and
arrogant they are epistemologically.

3.3 Institutional Innovation Continues and Strengthens the Constitutional

Structure

China’s reform based on the market economy is conducted under a static consti-
tutional structure. The social policies before the reform provided decisive benefits
for reform and opening-up; and the institutional changes after the reform and open-
ing-up strengthened the established constitutional structure in return, developing a
more competitive institutional system in China. Specifically, the power relationships
formed by institutional innovations centered around the fundamental political sys-
tem, such as central–local, state–society, and government–market relationships, all
possess the nature of democratic centralism. As a result, the democratic centralism
regime appears continuous and strengthened, and the people’s democratic state sys-
tem consolidated.
China’s reform began with the decentralization of powers, including administra-
tive decentralization (i.e., delegation of powers), economic decentralization (i.e.,
change in the ownership of property rights), and fiscal decentralization (i.e., the shift
from the overall rationing system to the tax-distribution system). Decentralization
finally formed a new relationship between the central and local governments, which
was called economic federalism. The central and local governments shared eco-
nomic power, and the local governments gained greater autonomy in economy and
governance. At the same time, the traditional political unity persisted, with the cen-
tral government retaining absolute leadership over local political affairs, especially
personnel matters. The political unity and economic federalism in the relationship
between the central and local governments (Yang 2007) incorporated the relation-
ship between centralization and decentralization. At the same time, they maintained

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the constitutional principle of the central government as the major source of power
and effusively unleashed the vitality of local governments, hence, there exists the
typical principle of democratic centralism in the relationship between the central
and local governments as stipulated by the constitution (Yang 2018).
In the process of decentralization, changes in the economic pattern caused the
transformation of the social structure, which inevitably generated new social organ-
izations. The manner of dealing with the relationship between the state and soci-
ety became a new conflict and focus. By and large, over the past several decades,
China has imposed strict control over political, ethnic, legal, and religious organiza-
tions, because the “color revolutions” in many countries after the Cold War began
with these types of social organizations; and it has provided the de facto freedom
to cultural, economic, and environmental social organizations through the registra-
tion system and allowed them to be autonomous. Autonomy is also included in the
autonomous community organizations such as village committees and neighbor-
hood committees at the primary level. Classified management based on categories,
namely control and deregulation, represents a de facto democratic centralist state-
society relationship, which is known as “state corporatism” in the Western politics
(Yang 2018).
Both decentralization and market-oriented economic reform also fundamentally
altered the integrated political-economic relationship under the planned economic
system. Nonetheless, several institutional arrangements in the state power container
still played an instrumental role, resulting in the political–economic relationship of
what is called a “developmental state”. In such developmental state, Chinese indus-
trial policies such as the Five-Year Plan and the Ten-Year Plan reflect the national
will, national direction, and the country’s capability of institutional integration. This
is the only way for late-developing countries to find their place among the developed
ones. At the same time, the market economy has cultivated the autonomy of the
interests of actors, and various economic interest groups are also competing to influ-
ence the decision-making process (Yang and Li 2008). In this manner, both the state
and the market play a vital role, which can be seen as the concrete embodiment of
democratic centralism in the government–market relationship (Yang 2018).
The relationships of power on various key dimensions derived from a stable con-
stitutional structure are inseparable from the organizational principles of democratic
centralism. Therefore, as a political system, democratic centralism lies at the core
of the Chinese model and is the fundamental guarantee for the country’s govern-
ance capabilities (Yang and Qiao 2015). In other words, this is the great cause of
revival since the reform and opening-up took place under the constitutional structure
in 1954 in China, and has yielded in the continuation and strengthening of the estab-
lished constitutional structure.
China’s constitutional structure can accommodate the two different economic
forms of planned economy and socialist market economy. That makes us wonder:
what is the relationship between politics and economy? Is it possible to address the
political development of contemporary China in the dimension of the political–eco-
nomic relationship? Why is the US Constitution, which was established in the era
of slavery economy, capable of accommodating various economic systems—from
agricultural capitalism to industrial capitalism to financial capitalism? As far as the

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factors affecting politics are concerned, the first one is an economic one, which is
demonstrated by the interaction between political subjects that is initiated by the
choice of people’s interest; behind economy, there are the factors of social relation-
ship and social structure; and behind social structure there is the factor of historical
civilization genes. Therefore, to understand politics, one must consider the influence
of deep-seated civilization genes, as well as the economic and social impacts. In
fact, the analysis variables generated by these mutual influences have made it a chal-
lenge for us to distinguish between the political and the socioeconomical. Besides,
to what extent can political power, as the sum and result of the interaction of eco-
nomic power, cultural power, and military power, remain stable and resilient once
it is created? A singular or simple factor would always fail to answer this question
suitably. It can only be answered through in-depth historical research involving vari-
ous case studies. That is probably a mission that could be appointed to historical
political science.

4 The Mutual Significance of Historical Political Science

and the Political Development of Contemporary China

As a significant country in terms of its history and size, China should not merely
serve as a testing ground for foreign theories. It should develop its own theory and
establish an autonomous Chinese social science discourse system. To achieve that
goal, breakthroughs should be first made in research methods and approaches, which
could be followed by novel concepts, new categories, and fresh expressions. Histori-
cal political science is a concept and approach tailored for Chinese political studies.

4.1 The Significance of Historical Political Science for Chinese Political Studies

Chinese politics is a holistic concept. In the structural sense, it should at least

include: (1) how China transpired—this is the agenda of state-building; (2) how
China is organized—this is the agenda of polity; (3) how China works—this is the
agenda of the political process. “History” is an indispensable element and perspec-
tive in all of three respects. That is to say, each agenda is related to a historical issue,
and the issues can only be comprehended through a historical perspective. At the
level of state-building, modern China is in fact a continuation of the gene commu-
nity of Chinese civilization; at the level of polity, the key elements of China’s politi-
cal system, such as the organization department and the supervision system, are new
expressions of historical continuity. The remarkable changes that have materialized
during the 70 years since the inception of the PRC are internal institutional changes
under mutual reinforcement. Even China’s political process, such as the legisla-
tive and the decision-making process at different levels, is historical with respect to
every part and micro-mechanism. For example, historical continuity is maintained
in relations through dependence on the approach. In foreign relations, from the five
principles of “peaceful coexistence” in Mao Zedong’s time, to “peace and devel-
opment”, “peaceful rise”, and “a community with a shared future for mankind”

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since the reform and opening-up, the essence of Chinese culture—“harmony” and
a “world view”—is adopted everywhere. Historical political Science is the only
approach available to address these distinguished agendas in institutional changes.
What kind of human nature do the “Chinese” have in the structure? Clearly, it is
not right to simply analyze the political behavior of the Chinese based on the idea
of rational man in the individualist culture. Rational man in the individualistic cul-
ture is not equivalent to man in the ethics-centered ancient times, “man of differ-
ent classes”, or the Chinese, who are impossible to characterize till now. Chinese
rationality must be the product of collectivism culture. The famous British political
scientist Finer says, “This [China’s] polity is completely foreign to anything in the
Western tradition since the Greeks. Indeed, it is antithetical. This polity, the preva-
lent belief systems, and the social structure all came to support one another as never
since the high days of Mesopotamian and Egyptian eras and emphatically as never
in the West, hence the stability and duration of the Chinese social and political sys-
tem and the restlessness and liability of the West. Where the latter reposed on freely
acting and personally responsible individuals, China reposed on collectivities, where
all were responsible for the misdeeds of one another.” The Western tradition embod-
ied the notion of human equality before the law and in the sight of God, whereas the
Chinese state started from the exactly opposite viewpoint on hierarchical relation-
ships, but in China’s political system, there was present “an organic society where
all these unequals were induced to cohere into a harmonious whole” (Finer 1999).
Indeed, in such a hierarchical society, “state” and “family” were always integrated
into the system. As Mr. Li Zehou puts it, as opposed to the Western individualistic
culture, the Chinese culture is “relationalism”, which is based on the ethics observed
in families, and the state is an enlarged version of the family. Therefore, as David
Hall and Roger Ames, the American professors of Chinese philosophy, state, “In
Western tradition, independent individuals occupy an important position. It would
be futile to find such dominant ideas, which western intellectuals espouse, within the
confines of Chinese tradition. More importantly, the values, behaviors and systems
that express these ideological components also do not exist in Chinese tradition”
(Hall and Ames 1999). They also identify that “politics and economy are cultural
expressions, and their effectiveness must be assessed together with other cultural
values. In particular, we believe that liberal, individualistic and rights-based democ-
racy, as well as free enterprise capitalism, are concrete products of the historical
development of western modernity. Therefore, any attempt to make these things uni-
versal in various cultures may be foolish”. “One obvious implication is that moving
all these things that work in China will dramatically change China’s identity and, in
effect, transform the whole of Chinese society into a terminal of foreign historical
narratives.” (Hall and Ames 1999).
The American scholars are right that modernity means more similarities and even
resemblance among the political forms, such as party politics and parliamentary
politics. But why do similar institutional designs bring different results? The factor
of social structure must be decisive. The differences in human nature and people’s
behavior in various social structures lead to different outcomes in the same system.
This in itself is a failure of “political science” based on the rational man hypothesis,
and the alternative paradigm of interpretation should be historical political science.

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In other words, historical political science is not only structural, but also behavioral.
It analyzes people’s value orientation and interest calculation and firmly believes in
the irreplaceable explanatory power of social structure.
All this is because historical political science is not only epistemological and
methodological, but also, above all, ontological in nature. Historical political sci-
ence constitutes an integral part of the Chinese development. This is why we say
that it has an explicit value and is even tailored for the Chinese political studies.
But this does not indicate that historical political science can only be utilized for
the Chinese political studies. In my opinion, where there is a civilization body, such
as Christian civilization or Islamic civilization, historical political science can be
applied to assess the political development anywhere. Pertinently, as China is the
only substantial civilization in the world that has not been interrupted for over thou-
sands of years, its “history” appears to be more ontological in nature.

4.2 The Significance of Chinese Political Studies for Historical Political Science

As is the case with any other research paradigm, historical political science relies on
certain case studies to maintain its vitality and verify its explanatory power. In other
words, modern social sciences basically involve case studies, which means that they
are local knowledge and that political scientists would naturally study the history
and reality they are familiar with first. For example, the legitimacy of bureaucracy
proposed by Max Weber targets the history and politics of Germany, and Lipset
generalizes Weber’s legitimacy as electoral democracy based on the American and
British politics. Some even begin the approaches and paradigms with their familiar
history. Douglas North’s new institutional economics (state theory, property rights
theory, and ideological theory) is also based on the historical experience of several
European countries. In fact, by the virtue of comparative history, as far as bureau-
cracy and state theory are concerned, China is a more valuable case than Germany
and Britain, but it is impossible for scientists to acknowledge it that way as they are
not familiar with the Chinese history. Therefore, the Chinese have received exotic
theories to explain China, which has been made into a testing ground for these west-
centered theories.
With social science training and methodological consciousness, Chinese politi-
cal scientists should use the history and reality they are familiar with to give life
to the appropriate methodology and approach. Revolution-oriented political science
has its special political mission and specific analytical value, and political science
based on the rational man hypothesis is actually being “transgenic” to build an indi-
vidualistic society. Therefore, it is urgent to theorize the historical political science
that explains Chinese politics and endows research value to it. The infinite power
of historical political science will be exploited if Chinese politics is taken as a case
study. At the source, pre-Qin politics has the innate secularization and the bureau-
cratic modernity; during the course of evolution, the two-thousand-year history is
the initial dependence of key nodes upon the approach; and the remarkable changes
of the past century since the end of late Qing dynasty are still materializing in the
sense of historical continuity. No country in the world has such powerful historical

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civilization genes in its political scenario, which means that China’s future politi-
cal development still pertains to the Chinese history. The nature of the Chinese his-
tory will not be changed by external impacts or “modernization”. That would be
determined by the characteristics of the Chinese civilization, i.e., a continuum of
civilization or, the “China basal body theory” proposed by Kozo Mizoguchi. In that
manner, we can understand the last sentence of the book by Philip Kuhn, “… the
Chinese constitutional agenda will still be addressed on China’s terms, not on ours”
(Kuhn 2002).
If history is deemed as a “religion” for the Chinese and historical analysis is the
“original mission” and constant pursuit of the Chinese political scientists, a com-
munity for historical political science is bound to be formed. We can expect the con-
structive contribution of historical political science to China’s autonomous political
discourse system. The comprehensive case study of China’s political development
will also vitalize academic research and even discipline construction in historical
political science.

Declarations

Conflict of interest All Authors declared that they have no conflict of interest.

Ethical statement I certify that this manuscript is original and has not been published and will not be
submitted elsewhere for publication.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
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are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
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not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://​creat​iveco​mmons.​org/​licen​
ses/​by/4.​0/.

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Guangbin Yang Ph.D., distinguished professor of political science and dean of School of International
Studies at Renmin University of China, Changjiang Scholor distinguished professor, founder of Chinese
Political Science, and World Politics Studies, vice president of Chinese Political Science Association.
His areas of study include political science theories and methods, comparative politics, world politics,
contemporary Chinese politics and government, Chinese political economy and international relations.
He has authored and edited more than 10 books and published more than 100 papers in the above areas.

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