A

INDIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
This book provides an authoritative account of the evolution and application of private inter-
national law principles in India in civil commercial and family matters. Through a structured
evaluation of the legislative and judicial decisions, the authors examine private international
law in the Republic and whether it conforms to international standards and best practices as
adopted in major jurisdictions such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States, India’s BRICS partners – Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa – and other common law
systems such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Nepal.
Divided into 13 chapters, the book provides a contextualised understanding of legal
transformation on key aspects of the Indian conflict-of-law rules on jurisdiction, applicable
law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards. Particularly
fascinating in this regard is the discussion and focus on both traditional and contemporary areas of
private international law, including marriage, divorce, contractual concerns, the fourth industrial
revolution, product liability, e-commerce, intellectual property, child custody, surrogacy and the
complicated interface of ‘Sharia’ in the conflict-of-law framework.
The book deliberates the nuanced perspective of endorsing the Hague Conference on Private
International Law instruments favouring enhanced uniformity and predictability in matters of
choice of court, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The book’s international and comparative focus makes it eminently resourceful for legislators,
the judges of Indian courts and other interested parties such as lawyers and litigants when they
are confronted with cross-border disputes that involve an examination of India’s private interna-
tional law. The book also provides a comprehensive understanding of Indian private international
law, which will be useful for academics and researchers looking for an in-depth discussion on the
subject.
Volume 6 in the series Studies in Private International Law – Asia

Studies in Private International Law – Asia
Editor: Anselmo Reyes
Advisory Editor: Paul Beaumont
Much has been written about private international law in the EU and the US. Less is known about
the conflict of laws in Asia. Thus, little attention has been paid so far to the modernisation of
private international law codes and rules that has been taking place over the last decade all over
Asia. That trend continues. Now is the time to take stock of those reforms that have already taken
place and suggest further improvements for the future.
Published under the celebrated series Studies in Private International Law, this monograph
sub-series provides a forum for discussion and analysis of private international law in Asia. The
series is not solely a survey of jurisdictions for practitioners. Comprising in-depth thematic and
country-specific studies, each volume considers the private international law of Asian countries
from a variety of perspectives. An underlying assumption is that private international law in
different jurisdictions follow broad discernible patterns. Each volume in this sub-series highlights
those patterns and discusses how rules in different Asian jurisdictions are either converging with,
or diverging from, the patterns identified. Such an analytical framework will assist academics,
judges, lawyers and legislators to envisage ways in which laws affecting cross-border relationships
can be harmonised across jurisdictions and be made more responsive to the needs of citizens in
Asia and elsewhere.
Volume 1: Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
Edited by Anselmo Reyes
Volume 2: Indonesian Private International Law
Afifah Kusumadara
Volume 3: Chinese Private International Law
Edited by Xiaohong Liu and Zhengyi Zhang
Volume 4: Direct Jurisdiction: Asian Perspectives
Edited by Anselmo Reyes and Wilson Lui
Volume 5: Japanese Private International Law
Kazuaki Nishioka and Yuko Nishitani
Volume 6: Indian Private International Law
Stellina Jolly and Saloni Khanderia
Indian Private International Law
Stellina Jolly
and
Saloni Khanderia
HART PUBLISHING
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Series: Studies in private international law – Asia ; volume 6 | Includes bibliographical references and index.
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FOREWORD
India has become an important role player on the international (commercial) scene. The law of
the Republic, therefore, now more than ever, needs a lively and sophisticated branch of conflicts
law, or private international law, to provide for, and support, the ever-increasing entanglement
of national, regional, and international affairs in the private sphere. Development of case law
(and legislation) in this regard is naturally preceded by academic curiosity. The Indian academic
tradition in private international law has already been established for some time. Recently,
however, there seems to have been an upsurge in scholarly activity in the field, including this
fine book by two distinguished conflicts authors. A commendable openness to international,
regional, and supranational instruments and the comparative study of a wide variety of national
legal systems are the hallmark of their academic endeavours. Nevertheless, their commentaries
and suggestions are well integrated into the current framework of Indian private international
law in a way that facilitates the reception of valuable and suitable ideas from other traditions. The
authors, from South Asian University and Jindal Global Law School, respectively, are both also
much-appreciated associates of the Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging
Countries at the University of Johannesburg. Together with other emerging conflicts lawyers,
they constitute the embodiment of our hope for the future innovative development of Indian
private international law along rigorous intellectual lines. The authors, the series editor, and the
publisher deserve our heartfelt congratulations.
Jan L Neels
Professor of Private International Law, University of Johannesburg
Honorary Member of the Governing Council of UNIDROIT
March 2021
vi
FOREWORD
This book closes a gap in the literature on private international law from a comparative
perspective by exploring a legal system which, so far, has not been very present in the global
private international law discourse: India – a legal system which covers a vast (and partly interna-
tionally most mobile) population of great cultural diversity. Tushar Kumar Biswas comes in the
Encyclopaedia of Private International Law to conclude that legal practice in India mainly relies
on English literature as in India ‘there has not been much doctrinal development’ in this area
of law.
It is rather surprising that India is a blind spot of private international law doctrine. Although
India clearly belongs to the common law world, it had to react to the fact that English private
international law has for decades been influenced by the legislation of the European Union and
the case-law of the European Court of Justice. Hence, India, as other common law jurisdictions
had to find their own solutions and had to emancipate from the jurisprudence of the English
courts. The Indian solutions could, after the exit of the United Kingdom from the European
Union, even serve as an inspiration for the new role of the English common law in the area of
private international law.
Against this background, this volume of the Studies will be an important source not only for
academics and practitioners in India but also a valuable contribution to the private international
law community worldwide. The authors do not restrict themselves to thoroughly document the
current state of Indian private international law, covering all areas of this branch of law and gath-
ering the relevant case-law of the Indian courts. They also explore a potential reform of the Indian
rules defining jurisdiction, determining the applicable law and dealing with the recognition and
enforcement of foreign decisions in the light of international developments.
The effort of both authors commands the most tremendous respect and should be rewarded
by many interested readers.
Anatol Dutta
Professor of Private Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law,
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, München
March 2021
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The beginning of this enriching knowledge collaboration began in the 8th Journal of Private
International Law Conference room in Munich, 2019. Prof. Paul Beaumont, University of
Stirling, introduced us to each other. Professor Beaumont proposed the idea of a book on Indian
Private International Law.
We were excited about the idea, as it was a substantial opportunity to contribute to the
research on Indian private international law, which remains a domain under-researched and
underdeveloped. We also felt that a book showcasing the Indian private international law in the
global context could significantly reduce the academic void and lack of material faced by the facul-
ties and students all over India. As far as the content of the book is concerned, it emanated and
emerged out of our experience of teaching the courses of Conflicts of laws / Private International
law at South Asian University (SAU), New Delhi, and OP Jindal Global Law School (OPJGU),
Haryana, India. The curious questions and the vibrant deliberation with the dynamic minds in
and around the classroom gestated the content for this book.
After this initial stage of fruition, many rendered their assistance in putting together
the current version. Reviewers of this volume deserve a special mention for their valuable
suggestions and comments. We would also like to thank the entire Hart team, especially Prof.
Anselmo Reyes, International Judge of the Singapore International Commercial Court and Series
Editor, Prof. Paul Beaumont, University of Stirling, and Ms Roberta Bassi, Commissioning Editor
(Hart Publications) and Ms Rosemarie Mearns, Editorial Assistant (Hart Publications), for their
encouraging response to our project, the constant cooperation, and for ensuring an accelerated
publication process.
We would also like to acknowledge the support of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung,
Bonn, Germany. Half of the research for this book has been funded through the Alexander
von Humboldt Fellowship that was granted to Saloni to pursue research as an Experienced
Researcher at the Chair for Private Law, Private International Law and Comparative Law, Ludwig
Maximilians University, Munich.
Special thanks are extended to Professor Jan Neels and Professor Anatol Dutta for
contributing the foreword to this book. We are sure the endorsement and support provided by
them will increase the credibility and visibility of our work. We also express our gratitude to our
colleagues and University functionaries at SAU and OPJGU for their constant encouragement.
We take this opportunity to acknowledge the research assistance rendered by Nikita
Mohapatra, Sayan Kumar Panda, students at Maharashtra MNLU, Aurangabad and Ms Upasna
Agrawal, an alumnus of OPJGU. We thank Prakriti Malla, LLM student at South Asian University,
who became the first reader of the manuscript. She provided valuable feedback and materials to
incorporate references to Nepal, which otherwise would have been overlooked.
In particular, we would like to express our most sincere gratitude to the Lord for His constant
grace in helping us with this auspicious book-project. We also want to express our appreciation
to all the teachers who have shaped our careers. We are incredibly grateful to our parents for their
love, blessings, caring, and sacrifices for making us what we are today.
x Acknowledgements
I (Stellina) want to thank my husband and son Agastya (my lifeline), for supporting and
encouraging me in this academic journey.
I (Saloni) would like to thank my mother and my friends at OPJGU and Ludwig Maximilians
University, München for being my pillar of strength with their tireless words of encourage-
ment. I am extremely grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for awarding me
a fellowship and Prof Anatol Dutta, Professor of Private Law, Private International Law and
Comparative Law, Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich for hosting me as a Humboldt
Fellow for the successful completion of this book.
CONTENTS
Foreword by Prof Jan L Neels�� v

Foreword by Prof Anatol Dutta�� vii
Acknowledgements�� ix
List of Abbreviations�� xvii
Table of Cases�� xix
Table of Conventions�� xxix
Table of Legislation�� xxxiii
PART I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Introduction�� 3
2. Basic Concepts and Status of Private International Law in India�� 8
I. Introduction�� 8
II. Overview of Indian Legal Framework�� 8
III. Conceptual Foundations of Private International Law�� 10
A. Nature of Private International Law�� 10
B. Private International Law or Conflicts of Laws �� 12
C. Scope of Private International Law�� 13
IV. Genesis of Private International Law in India�� 16
A. Gradual Evolution Beginning with the British Rule�� 16
B. Underdeveloped Status of Private International Law in India�� 18
C. Sources of Private International Law in India�� 19
V. Operationalisation of Private International Law: Classic Concepts�� 21
A. Characterisation�� 22
B. Connecting Factors�� 25
C. Renvoi�� 27
VI. Conclusion�� 32
3. Domicile, Nationality, and Residence�� 33
II. Domicile�� 34
A. Types of Domicile�� 34
III. Nationality and Residence�� 39
IV. Ascertaining Domicile under Indian Private International Law Rules�� 40
A. Statutory Framework�� 40
B. Judicial Statements on Domicile�� 41
V. Conclusion�� 45
xii Contents
4. Proving, Pleading, and Excluding the Foreign Laws�� 46

II. Substantive and Procedural Law�� 46
A. Categorising Substance and Procedure�� 47
III. Pleading Foreign Law�� 48
A. General Practice in Other Jurisdictions�� 48
B. Proof and Application of Foreign Law in India�� 49
IV. Exclusion of Foreign Law�� 53
A. Categories of Exclusion�� 53
B. Indian Judicial Decisions on Exclusion of Foreign Law�� 54
V. Overriding Mandatory Norms and Public Policy (Ordre Public)�� 55
A. Public Policy and Ordre Public: Conceptual Dimension�� 55
B. Approach of Indian Courts in Clarifying the Public Policy of India�� 56
PART II
JURISDICTION
5. Jurisdiction: Which Court will Adjudicate a Matter?�� 61
II. Persons who may File a Suit before an Indian Court�� 62
A. Suits by Alien Enemies�� 62
B. Suits by a Foreign State�� 63
C. Sovereign Immunity�� 63
III. Jurisdiction in personam�� 68
A. When is a Suit Considered to be of a Civil or Commercial Nature?�� 68
B. Grounds on Which an Indian Court May Assume Jurisdiction
in a Civil or Commercial Matter�� 69
C. Service of Summonses�� 81
D. Limitations to the Court’s Jurisdiction�� 84
IV. Jurisdiction in Actions in rem�� 97
V. Reflections on Indian Law: Some Insights based on Global Trends�� 99
A. General Remarks on Indian Law�� 99
B. Should India Ratify the HCCCA?�� 103
PART III
FAMILY LAW
6. Private International Law Practice in Marriage�� 109
II. Indian Legislative Framework on Marriage and its Religious Base�� 110
A. Determination of the Applicable Law in Marriage under
the Principles of Indian Private International Law�� 111
B. Inter-Religious Marriages and Private International Law in India�� 115
C. Polygamous Marriages�� 117
III. Same-Sex Marriage: Legal Analysis of Private International Law Principles�� 121
A. Legal Approach to Same-Sex Marriage in India�� 122
Contents xiii
B.
Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriage and Application
of Public Policy�� 126
IV. Hague Conference on Private International Law and Matrimonial
Conventions�� 127
7. Private International Practice in Divorce and Related Matters�� 130
II. Conflict of Laws Issues in Divorce�� 130
A. Statutory Framework and Judicial Statements on Jurisdiction�� 130
B. Statutory Framework and Judicial Statements on Applicable Law�� 133
III. Recognition of Foreign Divorce in India�� 135
A. Statutory Framework for Recognition of Foreign Divorce�� 135
B. Judicial Position on Recognition of Foreign Divorce�� 136
C. Recommendations of the Law Commission�� 141
D. Gender in the Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees�� 142
E. Comparison with South Asian Jurisdictions�� 143
IV. Ancillary Financial Orders and Nullity of Marriage�� 144
A. Rules on Recognition of Ancillary Orders�� 144
B. Enforcement of Dower�� 145
V. Annulment and Nullity of Marriages�� 147
A. Statutory Provisions and Judicial Decisions on Nullity of Marriage
in India�� 147
B. Extrajudicial Divorces and Recognition in Foreign Jurisdictions�� 149
8. Private International Law Practice and Children: Issues of Custody and Abduction�� 152
II. Jurisprudence on the Well-Being of the Child: An Interplay of Public
and Private International Law�� 153
A. Fundamental Concept: The Best Interests of the Child�� 153
B. Private International Law Responses to Child Abduction�� 153
III. Indian Legal Framework Relating to Intercountry Child Abduction�� 157
A. Legislative Framework�� 157
B. Judicial Position before Surya Vadanan�� 159
C. Legal Position after Surya Vadanan�� 160
D. Concepts Employed in Child Abduction Cases�� 162
E. Indian Opposition to the 1980 Convention�� 163
F. Legislative Initiatives on Intercountry Child Abduction: Civil Aspects
of the International Child Abduction Bill 2016 and the Protection
of Children (Inter-Country Removal and Retention) Bill 2016�� 164
G. Comparison with Global Standards�� 167
IV. Recognition of Foreign Custody Orders�� 173
A. Indian Legal and Judicial Position�� 173
B. Comparison of South Asian Positions on Foreign Custody Orders�� 173
C. Recognition of Foreign Custody Order in the US�� 175
D. Recognition of Foreign Custody Orders in the EU�� 176
xiv Contents
9. Cross-Border Surrogacy and Private International Law�� 178

II. Private International Law Issues in Cross Border Surrogacy�� 179
A. Legal Parentage�� 179
B. Nationality�� 180
III. Legal Status of Commercial Surrogacy in India�� 180
A. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions�� 180
B. ICMR Guidelines�� 181
C. Evolution of Surrogacy Regulation Bills�� 182
D. Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019�� 183
IV. Judicial Statements on Surrogacy: Public Policy Narratives�� 185
A. The Baby Manji Case�� 185
B. The Jan Balaz Case�� 186
C. Reflections from Nepal�� 188
V. Legal Initiatives for Harmonisation and India’s Role�� 189
PART IV
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
10. The Applicable Law in Contractual Obligations�� 195
II. Identification of the Applicable Law in Contractual Obligations in India�� 196
A. Development of the Doctrine of the Proper Law of the Contract:
An Overview�� 196
B. Identification of the Proper Law of the Contract�� 198
III. Scope of the Proper Law of the Contract�� 213
IV. Reflections on Indian Law: Some Insights based on Global Trends�� 215
11. The Applicable Law in Non-Contractual Obligations�� 228
II. Identification of Applicable Law in Non-Contractual Obligations in India�� 229
A. Double Actionability Rule�� 229
B. Application of Double Actionability as a Uniform Principle?�� 233
III. Reflections on Indian Law: Some Insights Based on Global Trends�� 239
A. General Remarks�� 239
B. Moving Past the Obsolete Double Actionability Rule�� 248
IV. Conclusion�� 253
PART V
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
12. The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments�� 257
II. The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments�� 258
A. The Statutory Framework�� 258
B. The Relevance of the ‘Doctrine of Obligation’�� 259
Contents xv
III. Determining Eligibility of a Foreign Judgment�� 261

A. International Competency of a Foreign Court: An Overview�� 261
B. The Grounds on which a Foreign Court is Considered
as ‘Internationally Competent’�� 262
IV. The Disqualification of a Foreign Judgment from Recognition or Enforcement�� 267
V. Reflections on Indian Law: Some Insights Based on Global Trends�� 270
A. General Remarks�� 270
B. Should India Accede to the Hague Conventions on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments?�� 274
13. The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards�� 280
II. The Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards�� 281
A. The Statutory Framework�� 281
B. The Scope and Meaning of a ‘Foreign Arbitral Award’�� 282
C. Foreign Arbitral Awards Given Following Reference by an Indian Court�� 284
III. The Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards in India�� 286
A. The Prohibition of the Annulment of an Award�� 286
B. The Procedure for Execution�� 288
IV. Disqualification of a Foreign Arbitral Award from Recognition
or Enforcement in India�� 289
A. Disqualification of Foreign Awards under the New York Convention�� 289
B. Disqualification of Foreign Awards under the 1927 Geneva Convention�� 294
PART VI
FINAL REMARKS
14. Looking Forward�� 299
Bibliography�� 306
Glossary�� 325
Index�� 329
xvi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACA The Arbitration and Conciliation Act

APPIL Asian Principles of Private International Law
ART Assisted Reproductive Technology
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CA The Competition Act 2002
CCA Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division
of High Courts Act 2015
CISG United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
CPA The Consumer Protection Act 1986
CPC The Code of Civil Procedure 1908
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CAWC Crime Against Women Cell
CGAP Council on General Affairs and Policy
EU European Union
HCCCA Hague Principles of Choice of Court Agreements
HCCH Hague Conference on Private International Law
ICA Indian Council of Arbitration
ICA The Indian Contract Act 1872
ICMR Indian Council of Medical Research
IPC Indian Penal Code
ICC International Chamber of Commerce
ICARA International Child Abduction Remedies Act
UNIDROIT International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
ISA International Surrogacy Agreements
KAC Kuwait Airways Corporation
NSB National Surrogacy Board
xviii List of Abbreviations
NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation of India

NRI Non- Resident Indians
MIC Methyl Isocyanate
MWCD Ministry of Women and Child Development
OPC Overseas Projects Corporation
PKPA Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
PETL Principles of European Tort Law
SSB State Surrogacy Boards
SEBI The Securities and Exchange Board of India
TMA The Trade Marks Act 1999
UCCJA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
UCCJEA Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
UCIL Union Carbide, India, Ltd
UK United Kingdom
USA The United States of America
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
TABLE OF CASES
A.T. Raghava Chariar v O.A Srinivasa (1916) 31 MLJ 575�� 214

ABC Laminart (P) Ltd v AP Agencies (1989) 2 SCC 163�� 72, 74–75, 91, 93
Abdur Kadar v Salima (1886) ILR 8 All 149�� 145
Abdur Rahim Undre v Padma Adbur Rahim Undre AIR [1982] Bom 341�� 117
Abouloff v Oppenheimer, (1882-83) LR 10 QBD 259��261, 268
Abraaj Investment Management Ltd v Neville Tuli AIR 6 [2015] Bom R 555�� 268
Afghani v Ghafoorian, Unpublished, No. 1481–09–4, WL 1189383
(VA Ct. of Appeals 2010)�� 146
Ahmad v Ahmad No L-00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116�� 146
Alchemist Ltd & Anr v State Bank of Sikkim & Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 335�� 90
Aleem v Aleem 175 Md. App. 663 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007)�� 149
Ali v Ali [1966] 2 WLR 620�� 119
Ameet Lalchand Shah & Ors v Rishab Enterb & Anr. SC Civ Appeal No 4690 of 2018�� 286
Amin Rashid Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1983] 2 All ER 884 (HL)��206, 208
Andhra Bank Ltd v R Srinivasan & Ors (1962) 3 SCR 391��80, 262–63, 265–66
Ansal Buildwell Ltd v North Eastern Indira Gandhi Institute of Health
and Medical Science ILR (2005) 1 Del. 751�� 89
Anubha v Shri Vikas Aggarwal And Ors AIR [2003] Delhi 175�� 140
Arun Kumar v The Inspector General of Registration &Ors. WP (MD) No 4125
of 2019 and WMP (MD) No 3220 of 2019�� 125
Ashfaq v Ashfaq 467 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. App. 2015)�� 150
Asokan Nee Kandasamy v Asokan (1994) 1 SLR 413�� 132
Attorney General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [1988] 165 CLR 30�� 54
Attorney General (UK) v Wellington Publishers Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 129�� 54
Attorney General for Ceylon v Reid [1965] 2 WLR 671�� 119
Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1 (HL)��53–54
Baby Manji Yamada v Union Of India (2008) 13 SCC 518�� 180
Baccus SRL v Servicio Nacional Del Trigo (1957) 1 QB 438 (CA)�� 64
Banco De Vizcaya v Don Alfonso De Borbon Y Austria [1935] 1 KB 140�� 53
Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v A. Murali Krishna Reddy
and Anr. 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780�� 76–78, 303
Baroda Oil Cakes Traders v Parshottam Narayandas Bagulia AIR [1954] Bom 41�� 75
Basiouny v Basiouny 445 So. 2d 916 (Ala. Civ App. 1984)�� 141
Bell v Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307 (HL) 322��34, 44
Bempde v Johnstone (1796) 3 Ves. 198�� 35
BGS SGS Soma JV v NHPC Ltd Civil Appeal No 9307 OF 2019��287, 290
Bhagwan Shankar v Rajaram Bapu Vithal AIR [1951] Bom 125�� 16
Bhanu Constructions Company Ltd and Ors. v A.P. State Electricity Board
and Ors. [1997] (6) ALT 328�� 31
xx Table of Cases
Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc

(2012) 9 SCC 552�� 97, 286–87, 290, 293–94
Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA (2002) 4 SCC 105��286–87
BNP Paribas v Atit Omprakash Agarwal [2017] SCC Online Bom 9063�� 267
Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201�� 207–08, 221
Boswell v Cloaks (1884) 27 Ch D 424��261, 268
Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356�� 48, 230, 233, 244
Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia, Bermuda v Orient Middle East Lines Ltd &
Ors 12 October 1993, Civil Appeals Nos 5438-39 of 1993�� 282
Brahmani River Pellets v Kamachi Industries Civil Appeal No 5850 of 2019�� 287
Brijraj Marwari & Ors v Anant Prasad AIR [1942] Cal 509�� 209
British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries
(1990) (3) SCC 481�� 27, 56, 91, 104,
198–99, 211, 301
Brook v Brook [1861] 9 HL Cas 193�� 112
Cairn India Ltd & Ors v Government of India O.M.P.(EFA)(COMM.) 15/2016 & I.A.
Nos. 20459/2014 & 3558/2015�� 288, 291–94
Carey v Bahama Cruise Lines (1988) 864 F.2d 201 (1st Cir.) 205�� 49
Casio India Co. Ltd v Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del)��77, 303
Central Bank of India v Ram Narain AIR [1955] 36��41, 299
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd v Brojo Nath Ganguly
(1986) 2 SCR 278�� 205
Chaplin v Boys [1971] AC 356�� 244
Charan Singh v Dewan Singh AIR [1972] Punj & Har 288�� 83
Chaudhary v Chaudhary [1985] FLR 476�� 150
Chaudry v Chaudry 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1978)�� 146
Cheni v Cheni (1962) 3 All ER 873�� 119
Cheran Properties Ltd v Kasturi & Sons Ltd & Ors. Civil Appeal Nos 10025-10026
of 2017��282, 288
Chintamoni Padhan v Paika Samal AIR [1956] Ori 136�� 267
Chiranjeevi Rathnam v Ramesh C.R.P(PD)(MD)No.870 of 2017�� 88
Chloro Controls (I) Pvt. Ltd v Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. (2013) 1 SCC 641�� 288
Chormal Balchand Firm v Kasturi Chand Seraoji and Anr. (1936)
63 Cal 1033�� 80, 261–64, 266
Club Resorts v Van Breda [2012] SCC 17 [19]��100, 272
Col. DI Macpherson v MN Appanna & Anr. AIR [1951] SC 184�� 213
Collier v Rivaz (1841) 2 Curt. Ecc. 855�� 29
Compagnie de Saint Gobain v Fertiliser Corporation of India Ltd ILR (1970) II Delhi�� 210
Consulate General of Islamic Republic of Iran, Mumbai v Baldota Brothers
[2013] 3 Mh. L.J [37, 38]�� 63
Creutzburg v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd [2006] 4 All SA 327, 330�� 216
Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Limited (2017) 239 DLT 649�� 56
Ct A.Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar v Ct A.Ct. Subramama Chettiar AIR [1960] SC 307�� 14
CV Kunhiman v PMK Idrosekutty AIR [1958] Ker 126�� 210
Cybersell Inc v Cybersell Inc, 130 F.3d 41 (1997)�� 77
D. P. Joshi v The State of Madhya Bharat AIR [1955] 334��41, 299
Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co [1916] 2 AC 307�� 38
De Beeche v South American stores Ltd and Chilean Stores Ld [1935] AC 148�� 51
Table of Cases xxi
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd v Harnam Singh and Others AIR
[1955] SC 590�� 25, 27, 197–99,
207–08, 301
Dell Computer Corp v Union Des Consummators [2007] SCC 34�� 11
Dhanwanti Joshi v Madhav Unde (1998) 1 SCC 112��159–60
Dhirajlal v Navinbhai Dave [2011] (4) Mh.L.J�� 267
Dhodha House v SK Maingi & Patel Field Marshal Industries & Ors v PM Diesel Ltd
(2006) 9 SCC 41��73–74
Dhondiram Chatrabhuj Marwadi v Sadasuk Sawattram Marwad (1918) ILR 42 Bom 522�� 54
Dhulabhai v State of MP AIR [1969] SC 78��87–88
Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 458��240, 251
Dr. Yogesh Bhardwaj v State of U.P. AIR [1991] 356�� 21
Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones S A v Deutsche Bank AG [2010]
1 All ER (Comm) 649�� 55
Endoris v Kiripetha (1968) 73 NLR 20�� 174
Enercon (India) Limited & Ors. v Enercon GmbH & Anr. Civil Appeal No 2806
of 2014�� 283–84, 287
Ertel Beiber & Co v Rio Tinto Co Ltd [1918] AC 260�� 51
Eva Drdakova v M/s Khemka Exports Private Ltd (2012) 114 (1) Bom LR 67��66–68
Fazal Rab Choudhary v State of Bihar AIR [1983] SC 323�� 123
Fernandez v Gonsalves AIR [1925] Bom 97�� 214
Fertiliser Corporation of India v Chemical Construction Corporation
(1973) 75 Bom LR 335�� 211
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd
[1942] 2 ALL ER 122 (HL)�� 237
Firm Seth Radha Kishan v Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana AIR
[1963] SC 1547�� 88
Gabelsberger v Babl [1994] (2) SA 677�� 274
Gas Authority of India Ltd v SPIE CAPAG, SA & Ors [1993] (27) DRJ�� 195, 283–84
Gaytri Bajaj v Jiten Bhalla (2012) 12 SCC 471�� 158
Githa Hariharan & Another v Reserve Bank of India & Another AIR [1999] 2 SCC 22�� 142
Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd & Ors. v Heinz India (P) Limited
[2019] SCC OnLine Del 9��89–90
Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V v Shivnath Rai Harnarain (India) Co. C.S. (O.S.)
541 of 1998�� 289
Globe Transport Corpn v Triveni Engineering Works (1983) 4 SCC 707��75, 80
Golian Consultants Ltd v Jagdarshan Singh (2014) SCC Online P&H 16406�� 267
Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491�� 54
Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay & Co [1918] 2 KB 623�� 51
Guggenheim v Rosenbaum (2) [1961] (4) SA 21 (W) [31A]�� 216
Gujarat State Road Transport Corpn v Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [1987] (3) SCC 234�� 235
H Srinivas v HV Pai (2010) 12 SCC 521�� 96
Haji Mohd Haji Jiva v E Spinner ILR (1900) 24 Bom 510�� 212
Hanil Era Ltd v Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd (2004) 4 SCC 671�� 80
Hansalaya Properties v Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd [2008] 106 DRJ 820 (DB)�� 202
Harbhajan Singh Dhalla v Union of India AIR [1987] SC 9�� 63
Harding v Wealands [2006] UKHL 24�� 47
Hari Narayanan v Meenakshi Narayanan [2007] SCC OnLine Mad 1525�� 43–44, 264
xxii Table of Cases
Harishanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233��50–51

Harmeeta Singh v RajatTaneja 102 (2003) DLT 822�� 140
Harrison v Harrison [1953] 1 WLR 865�� 34
Haryana Telecom Ltd v Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd (1999) 5 SCC 688�� 96
Hemavathi Shivashankar v Dr.Tumkur S Shivashankar II (2010) DMC 854�� 140
Henderson v Jaouen [2002] 2 All ER 705�� 47
Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113�� 259
Hindustan Copper Ltd v Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc. [2004] SCC
OnLine Cal 446�� 31
Hodgson v De Beauchesne (1858) 12 Moo. P.C.C. 285�� 35
Hopkins v Hopkins [2015] EWHC 812�� 145
Huber v Steiner [1835] Bing NC 202�� 46
Huntington v Attrill (1892) 146 U.S. 657�� 53
Hussain v Hussain [1982] 1 All ER 369�� 119
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 130��109, 119
IFB Automotive Seating and System Ltd v Union of India AIR [2003] Cal 80�� 74
Iglesias Gi and A.U.I v Spain (2003) 40 EHRR 36�� 169
Impresario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt Ltd v S & D Hospitality [2018] SCC
OnLine Del 6392�� 78
Imran Ali v Mst. Iffat Siddiqui and two others PLD 2008 Karachi 198�� 172
In re Beaumont [1902] 1 Ch 889�� 36
In re Estate of Jones [1921] 192 Iowa 78�� 36
In re Marriage of Zadorozny 70 Wash. App. 464, 853 P.2d 960 (1993)�� 141
In re State of Norway’s application (Nos 1 and 2) HL [1990] 1 AC 723�� 54
In Sottomayor v De Barros (No 2) [1879] 5 PD 94�� 112
In Szecheter v Szecheter [1970] 3 All ER 905�� 112
Indian And General Investment Trust, Ltd v Sri Ramchandra Mardaraja Deo,
Raja of Khalikote AIR [1952] Cal 508�� 11–12, 21, 197
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 161�� 237
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India (2011) 12 SCC 745�� 237
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt v Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd,
Civil Appeal Nos 5370-5371 of 2017�� 287
International Development Research Centre v Durgeshwarisahi ILR (2007) 1 Delhi 640�� 64
International Woollen Mills v Standard Wool (UK) Ltd (2001) 5 SCC 265�� 267
Iran v The Barakat Galleries Ltd QBD [2007] EWHC 705 (QB)�� 54
Iran v Berend [2007] EWHC 132 (QB)��29–30
Jacqueline Kapoor v Surinder Pal Kapoor [1994] SCC OnLine P&H 499��159–60
Jan Balaz v Anand Municipality AIR [2010] Guj 21��180, 186–88, 190
Joao Gloria Pires v Mrs. Ana Joaquina Rodrigues e Pires AIR [1967] Goa 113�� 127
Joffe v Salmon [1904] TS 317�� 274
John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503�� 239–40, 251
Johnson v Coventry Churchill International [1992] 3 All ER 14�� 230
Jose Paulo Coutinho v Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira [2019] (10) SCJ 158�� 32
Juma v Aomo 68 A.3d 148 (2013)�� 141
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1��124–25
Jyoti Sateeja v International Committee of the Red Cross & Ors [2015] SCC
OnLine Del 7996�� 66
Kaddoura v Hammoud (1998) 168 DLR (4th) 503�� 146
Table of Cases xxiii
Kalyan Nigam Limited and Union of India v Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd
ARB.P. 588/2019�� 291
Kashmira Kale v Mr.Kishorekumar Mohan Kale AIR [2006] Delhi 81�� 140
Kaushnuma Begum and Ors v The New India Assurance Co. Ltd AIR [2001] SC 485�� 235
Kedar Pandey v Narain Bikran Sah AIR [1966] 160��43, 299
Kevin George Vaz v Cotton Textiles Exports Promotion Council (2006) 5 Bom CR 555�� 260
Khambatta v Khambatta (1934) 36 BOMLR 11�� 116
Khan v Khan [1963] VR Law Commission (1982) LCCP 83�� 118
Kohnke v Karger [1951] 2 KB 67�� 47
Kotah Transport Ltd v Jhalawar Transport Services Ltd AIR [1960] Raj 224�� 231, 253, 301
Krishna Aiyar v Balammal (1911) ILR 34 Mad 398�� 145
Krishnaji Panduran Sathe v Gajanan Balvant Kulkarni [1909] ILR 373�� 55
Kulathil Mammu v The State of Kerala AIR [1966] 1614�� 45
Kumarina Investment Ltd v Digital Media Convergence Ltd & Anr.
[2010] TDSAT 73 [27]�� 95–96, 200, 202,
204, 213, 219
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd v Union of India & Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 254�� 74–75, 89
Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25�� 57
Lakshmi Sanyal v SK Dhar AIR [1972] Goa 2667�� 114
Laxmichand and Ors. v Mst. Tipuri AIR [1956] Raj 81�� 21
Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier (1895) AC 517�� 132
Lee v Lau [1967] P 14�� 119
Lendrum v Chakravarti [1929] SLT 416�� 118
Linton v Guderian AIR [1929] Cal 599�� 132
LN Gupta & Anr v Smt Tara Maini ILR [1984] I Del��210–11
Lohia Starlinger Ltd v Govt of NCT of Delhi [2006] VAD (Del) 732�� 90
Louchs v Standard Oil Co. of New York 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198�� 203
Louis De Raedt v Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 554�� 43
Lynch v Provisional Government of Paraguay [1871] LR 2 P&D 268�� 53
M/S Lachman Das Sat Lal AIR [1958] Punjab 258�� 210
M/s Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd v Northern Coal Field Ltd,
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11476 of 2018�� 291
Magma Leasing & Finance Ltd v Potluri (2009) 10 SCC 103�� 96
Malik v Malik 638 A.2d 1184 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)�� 176
Mandal v Mandal ILR (1956) Punj. 215�� 42
Mandeep Kaur v Dharam Lingam[2017] 1 DMC 124 P&H�� 134
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248�� 268
Manohar Law Chopra v Seth Hiralal AIR [1962] SC 527�� 85
Marggarate Maria Pulparampil Nee Feldman v Dr. Chacko Pulparampil And Ors.
AIR [1970] Ker 1�� 136
Marine Geotechnics LLC v Coastal Marine Construction & Engineering Ltd
(2014) 2 Bom CR 769�� 267
Masterbaker Marketing Ltd v Noshir Mohsin Chinwall (2015) SCC Online Bom 559�� 268
Mathai v Joseph Mary (2015) 5 SCC 622�� 214
Max India Ltd v General Binding Corporation [2009] (112) DRJ 611 (DB)�� 200
Mayan (HK) Ltd & Ors v Owners & Parties, Vessel MV Fortune Express & Ors
(2006) 3 SCC 100�� 72
Mc Kain v R.W. Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 1�� 48
xxiv Table of Cases
MC Mehta v Union Of India (1987) SCR (1) 819�� 18

McKee v McKee [1951] AC 352�� 160
McLeod &Co. Ltd v State of Orissa (1984) 1 SCC 434�� 38, 264–65
Mehta v Mehta [I945] 2 All E R 690�� 119
Michael Antony Rodrigues v State of Bombay AIR [1956] Bombay 729��42, 299
Milk Food Ltd v Union Bank of India [2007] (2) CTLJ 362 (Del) [28]�� 90
Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v Aryans Plaza Services
Private Limited & Ors. [2018] SCC OnLine Del 8260�� 79
Mirza Ali Akbar Kasani v United Arab Republic AIR [1966] 230�� 63
Modi Entertainment Network v WSG Cricket PTE Ltd (2003) 4 SCC 341�� 4, 85, 92–95, 104,
200, 212, 221, 266, 301
Mohri Bibi v Dhuromdas Ghose [1903] 30 IA 114�� 214
Monica Variato v Thomas Variato2000[2] Goa LT 149�� 113
Morgan v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd [1973] 43 DLR (3d) 239 (SCC)�� 241
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye (1990) 3 SCR 1077�� 272
Moser Baer India Ltd v Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV [2008] (102) DRJ 713�� 89, 93–95
Moses v Macferlan [1760] 2 Burr 1005�� 236
Most Rev PMA Metropolitan v Moral Mar Marthoma [1995] Supp (4) SCC 286�� 84
Mount Albert Borough Council v Australasian and G Mutual Assurance Society Ltd,
[1937] 4 All. E.R 214 ��207, 209
Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v Arvand M. Dinshaw and Anr (1987) 1 SCC 42�� 160
Mrs. Kuldeep Sidhu v Chanan Singh and other AIR [1989] P&H 103�� 160
Mrs. M. v Mr. A. (1993) 1 DMC 384��140, 148
Mrs. Veena Kalia v Dr. Jatinder Nath Kalia AIR [1996] Delhi 54�� 140
Mullane v Central Hanover Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306 (1950)�� 141
Munro v Munro (1840) 7 Cl & Fin 842�� 35
National Highways Authority of India v Sheladia Associates INC [2009] 113 DRJ 835�� 201
National Textile Corporation Ltd v Haribox Swalram (2004) 9 SCC 786�� 90
National Thermal Power Corporation v Singer Company (1992) 3 SCC 551��27, 30, 56,
197–200, 202, 204,
206–09, 211, 213–14,
219, 226, 285–86, 290, 301
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors v Union of India & Ors AIR [2018] SC 4321��125, 127
Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi &Ors [2009] (160) DLT 277�� 123
Neerja Saraph v Jayant (1994) 6 SCC 461��140, 148
Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54��29, 52
New Central Jute Mills v VEB Deutr-Frachit Seerederai Rostock AIR [1983] Cal 225�� 64
New Moga Transport Co. v United India Insurance Co. Ltd & Ors
(2004) 4 SCC 677�� 76, 79–80
New Zealand Basing Ltd v Brown [2016] NZCA 525�� 55
News Nation Networks Private v News Nation Gujarat & Ors C.S. (COMM) 334/2016,
IA No 4525/2016 & 6625/2016�� 78
Noor Jahan Begum v Eugene Tiscenko AIR [1942] Cal 325�� 132
Noordin v Abdulla (In re Custody of R) 947 P.2d 745 (1997)�� 176
NTPC v Singer Co (1992) 3 SCC 551�� 30
O.C.I. And Others v Romania App no 49450/17 (ECHR, 21 May 2019)�� 171
Obergefell v Hodges [2015] 135 S Ct 2584�� 122
Ogden v Ogden (1908) 1 P 46�� 24
Table of Cases xxv
Ogden v Ogden [1928] 44 L. Q. Rev 217�� 24

Oil & Natural Gas Corpn.Ltd v Western Geco International Ltd (2014) 9 SCC 263�� 56
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v Western Company of North America
[1987] SCR (1) 1024�� 288
ONGC Ltd v Saw Pipes Ltd (2003) 5 SCC 705�� 56, 291, 293–94
ONGC v Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711�� 90
P.K. Srikumar v Harshitha Gopinathan [2015] SCC OnLine Mad 10343�� 173
Panchapakesa Iyer and Ors v K.M. Hussain Muhammad Rowther and Ors AIR
[1934] Mad 145��16, 299
Parkasho v Singh [1967] 1 All ER 737�� 119
Parwathawwa v Channawwa AIR [1966] Mys 100�� 113
Pemberton v Hughes (1899) 1 Ch 781 (CA), 790�� 261
Phillips v Eyre [1970] LR 6 QB 1�� 229, 232, 248, 253
Piramal Healthcare Ltd v Diasorin S.P.A. 172 (2010) DLT 131�� 95
Pires v Pires AIR [1967] GDD 113�� 136
Poyser v Minors (1881) 7 QBD 329, 333�� 46
Pradeep Jain v Union of India AIR [1984] 1420�� 42
Premawathie v Kudalugoda Aratchiew (1970) 75 NLR 398�� 174
Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili [2007] UKHL 40�� 284
Pulaniappa Chetty v Nagappa Chettiar AIR [1930] Mad 146�� 51
Pulido v RS Distributions Pty Ltd (2003) 177 FLR 401�� 240
Puttick v Attorney General [1979] 3 All ER 463�� 35
Qazi v Qazi [1979] 3 WLR 833�� 150
Qureshi v Qureshi [1971] 1 WLR 518��118, 146
R Gajambal & Ors v Rukn Ul Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid AIR [1963] SC 1�� 261
R v Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, ex parte Arias [1968] 2 QB 956�� 29
R. Viswanathan v Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid AIR [1963] SC 1��17, 54, 68
R.M. Investment and Trading Co. (P) Ltd v Boeing Co [1994] SCC (4) 541�� 283
Rabindra N Maitra v Life Insurance Corporation of India AIR [1964] Cal 141�� 27, 198, 207–08
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42�� 145
Radwan v Radwan [1973] Fam 35�� 150
Raj Rani v Prem Adib AIR [1949] Bom 215�� 214
Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v Union of India [1988] 171 ITR 254�� 87
Rajiv Tayal v Union Of India And Ors AIR [2006] Delhi 81�� 140
Ram Naresh v Delhi Administration & Ors ILR (2005) II Delhi 1041��65–66
Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] SC (HL) 8�� 35–36, 45
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd v Verma Transport Co (2006) 7 SCC 275�� 96
Re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692��26–28
Re Askew [1930] 2 Ch 259��28–29
Re Goods of D McIntyre (1918) ILR 41 All 248�� 51
Re Maldonadao [1954] P 223�� 24
Re Ross [1930] 1 Ch 377��28–29
Red Sea Insurance Company Limited v Bouygues SA and Other [1995] 1 HKLR 224�� 230
Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491�� 239
Reliance Industries Ltd v Union of India (2014) 7 SCC 603�� 287
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd v General Electric Co 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644�� 203, 211, 291, 294
Representative of Lloyds v Classic Sailing Adventures (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 90 (SCA)�� 216
Reva Electric Car company Pvt Ltd v Green Mobil (2012) 2 SCC 93�� 284
xxvi Table of Cases
Rhodia Ltd and Others v Neon Laboratories Ltd AIR [2002] Bom 502��51, 200
Rita Solomon & Ors v Republic of Italy & Anr [2019] 260 DLT 331��63, 65
Roger Shashoua & Ors. v Mukesh Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm)�� 287
Roshni Desai v Jahanzeb Niazi [2011] PLD 423 Lahore High Court�� 172
Rosy Jacob v Jacob A. Chakramakkal (1973) 1 SCC 840�� 158
Roxann Sharma v Arun Sharma (2015) 8 SCC 318�� 158
Royal Nepal Airlines Corp v Manorama Meher Singh Legha AIR [1966] Cal 319�� 64
Ruchi Majoo v Sanjeev Majoo (2011) 6 SCC 479�� 300
Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1�� 18
S.P. Ghosh v Deputy Collector, Reserve Bank of India AIR [1964] Cal 422�� 42
S.R Bommai v Union of India AIR [1994] SC 1918�� 9
Saeesh Subhash Hegde v Darshana Saeesh Hegde AIR [2008] KAR 142�� 113
Sainapatti v Sainapatti AIR [1932] Lah 136�� 115
Sajjad Ahmed Rana v Louise Ann Fairely PLD [2007] Lahore 300�� 155
Sandvik Asia Pvt Ltd v Vardhman Promoters Pvt Ltd (2007) 94 DRJ 762�� 202
Sankaran Govindan v Lakshmi Bharathi (1975) 3 SCC 351�� 261
Sarita Sharma v Sushil Sharma (2000) 1 SCRC 915��5, 300
Satya v Teja AIR [1975] SC 105�� 17, 20–21, 136,
138–39, 142–43, 300
Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneeram Bangur & Co (1954) SCR 310�� 212
Sayed Sabir Hussain v Farsand Hussain AIR [1938] PC 80�� 145
Sayers v International Drilling Co NV [1971] 1 WLR 1176�� 228
Schemmer v Property Resources Ltd [1975] Ch. 273�� 54
Schwartz v Zik, 273 N.J. Super. 78, 640 A.2d 1212 (Ch. Div 1993)�� 141
Secy of State v Mask & Co AIR [1940] PC 105�� 88
Seema Kapoor v Deepak Kapoor (2016) SCC OnLine P&H 1225�� 164
Seth v Seth 694 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App. 1985)�� 149
Shafin Jahan v Asokan K M (2018) 5 SCALE 422��123, 125
Shakti Vahini v Union of India (2018) 7 SCC 192�� 125
Shamrao Krishnaji Honnali v United Home Building & Engineering Society (India)
Ltd of Bangalore (1935) 38 Bom LR 1092�� 63
Shanmugham Chettiar v Annamalai Chettiar AIR [1974] Mad 305�� 210
Shanno Devi v Mangal Sain 1961 AIR [1961] 58��44–45
Shaw v Gould [1868] LR 3 HLC [55]�� 109
Shenaz v Rizwan [1965] 1 QB 390�� 146
Sheoli Hati v Somnath Das (2019) 7 SCC 490�� 158
Shilpi Gupta v Union of India & Ors [2016] SCC Online Del 2561�� 173
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd v Aksh Optifibre Ltd (2005) 7 SCC 234�� 97, 284–85, 291
Shree Precoated Steels Ltd v Macsteel International Far East Ltd & Anr
(2008) 2 Bom CR 681�� 200
Shreejee Traco (I) Pvt Ltd v Paperline International Ltd (2003) 9 SCC 79��212, 221
Shri Lal Mahal Ltd v Progetto Grano Spa (2014) 2 SCC��291, 294
Smita Conductors Ltd v Euro Alloys Ltd AIR [2001] SCW 3517�� 282
SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd v Chandmari Tea Co (P) Ltd (2011) 14 SCC 66�� 284
SNI Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] UKPC 12�� 93
Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch, Judgment in Case C-372/16�� 135
Sona Devi v Anil Kumar [2011] 3 TAC 552��231–32, 248, 253, 301
Sondur Gopal v Sondur Rajini (2013) 7 SCC 426�� 126
Table of Cases xxvii
Sonic Surgical v National Insurance Co. Ltd (2010) 1 SCC 135�� 74

Sophy Auerbach v Shivaprosad Agarwalla AIR [1945] Cal 484��115, 299
SP Consolidated Engineering Co (P) Ltd v Union of India & Anr AIR [1966] Cal 259�� 211
Spycatcher case, Att-Gen (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty. Ltd
(1988) 165 CLR 30�� 54
Srini Vasan v SriniVasan [1946] P 6�� 118
State Aided Bank of Travancore v Dhrit Ram AIR [1943] PC 6�� 206
State of Maharashtra v Ghoreishi (Qureshi) Sayed Mahomed Sayed Hasan AIR
[1964] Bom 235�� 42
State of Punjab v AK Raha (Engineers) Ltd AIR [1964] Cal 418�� 211
State of Rajasthan and others v Union of India AIR [1963] 1241�� 9
State of West Bengal v Union of India [1964] SCR(1) 371�� 9
State Trading Corporation v CIT AIR [1963] SC 1811��38, 263
Stawski v Stawski, 843 N.Y.S.2d 544 (App. Div 2007)�� 145
Sterling Agro Industries v Union of India AIR [2011] Del 174��89–90
Suchita Srivastava & Anr. v Chandigarh Administration (2009) 14 SCR 989�� 180
Superintendence Company of India (P) Ltd v Krisha Murgai AIR [1980] SC 1717�� 212
Supreme Court in Official Trustee v Sachindra Nath AIR [1969] SC 823�� 61
Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation AIR [2014] SC 563�� 124–25, 127
Surinder Kaur Sandhu v Harbax Singh Sandhu (1984) 3 SCC 698�� 159
Surya Vadanan v State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 5 SCC 450�� 158–62, 300
Swatch Ltd v Priya Exhibitors Pvt. Ltd 2008 (101) DRJ 99��94, 200
Syrian Arab Republic v AK Jajodia ILR (2004) 2 Del 704�� 67
Taczanowska v Taczanowski (1957) CA 30�� 111
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v St CMS Electricity Co Ltd [2007] EWHC 1713 (Comm)�� 51
Taprogge Gesellschaft MBH v IAEC India Ltd AIR [1988] Bom 157�� 96, 204, 213, 269
TDM Infrastructure (P) Ltd v UE Development India Pvt. Ltd (2008) 14 SCC 271��38, 264
Technip SA v SMS Holding (Pvt) Ltd (2005) 5 SCC 465�� 38, 51, 56, 214, 290
Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v Basanta Kumar Singh (1901) ILR 28 Cal 751�� 145
The Hollandia [1982] 1 All ER 1076�� 203
The Sinha Peerage Claim [I946] I All ER 348 n. (I93)�� 119
The State of Bihar v Kumar Amar Singh And Others AIR [1955] SC 282�� 38
Times of Money Limited v Reminthome Corporation & Anr [2012] 193 DLT 30�� 93
Tolofson v Jenson [1994] (3) SC R 1022��48, 239–40, 248, 251
Toonen v Australia, No 488/1992, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992�� 124
Toys “R” Us v Step Two 310 F.3d 446 (2003)�� 77
Trafigura Beheer v Kookmin Bank [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 455�� 230
Trenwick Am. Reinsurance Corp. v IRC, Inc (2011) 764 F. Supp. 2d 274�� 49
Turner Morrison & Co. v Hunaerford Investment Trust Ltd AIR [1972] 1311�� 38
U. Can Migrate Consultants Pvt. Ltd v Canadian Connections Groups Ltd
[2007] 144 DLT 863�� 94
Uddin v Choudhury [2009] EWCA Civ 1205�� 146
Udny v Udny 1869 Lr 1 SC & Div 441 (HL)��34, 43
Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India Etc AIR [1992] 248�� 18
Union of India & Ors v Lief Hoegh & Co. & Ors 4 May 1982�� 283
Union of India and Anr v Bilash Chand Jain & Anr (2009) 16 SCC 601�� 65
Union of India v Andani Exports Ltd [2002] 1 SCC 567�� 74
Union of India v Dabhol Power Co, IA No 6663/2003 Suit No 1268/2003�� 288
xxviii Table of Cases
Union of India v Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC.

Civil Appeal No 4628 of 2018��212–13, 221, 287, 290
Union of India v Ram Chand AIR [1955] Punj 166�� 86
Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad (2000) 2 SCC 20��44, 264
Unique Pharmaceuticals Laboratories Ltd v Stalco Freight International
(2005) SCC OnLine Bom 1082�� 94
United Arab Republic and Anr. v Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani AIR [1962] Cal 387��17, 299
UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd v Indure Pvt Ltd & Ors (1996) 2 SCC 667�� 213
V Bhagat v Mrs. D. Bhagat AIR [1994] 710�� 140
V Ravi Chandran v Union of India (2010) 1 SCC 174��5, 160
Vadala v Lawes (1890) 25 QBD 310��261, 268
Van Kipnis v Van Kipnis, 872 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2008)�� 145
Veb Deutfract Sccieederei Rostock v New Central Jute Mills Co Ltd AIR
[1994] SC 516��63–65
Venture Global Engineering v Satyam Computer Services Ltd & Anr
(2008) 4 SCC 190�� 286
Vijay Karia & Ors v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL & Ors (2020) SCC Online SC 177��56, 294
Vincent Joseph Konath and etc. v Jacintha Angela Vincent Konath AIR [1994] Bom 120�� 133
Viswanathan R v Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid AIR [1963] SC 1�� 54
Viswanathan v Abdul Wajid AIR [1963] SC 1�� 17
Vita Food Products Inc. v Unus Shipping Company Limited in liquidation
[1939] AC 277�� 196
Warrender v Warrender [1835] 6 ER 1239�� 37
Weragoda v Weragoda (1961) 59 CLW 59�� 174
Whicker v Hume [1858] 7HLC 124�� 34
White Industries Australia Ltd v Coal India Ltd [2004] 2 Cal LJ 197��200, 301
White v Tenant (1888) 31 West Virginia 790�� 35
Winans v Attorney-General [1904] AC 287��35–36
Wong v Lee [2002] OJ No 885�� 239–40, 251
World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd v MSM Satellite (Singapore) PTE Ltd
Civil Appeal No 895 of 2014�� 97, 284–85, 294
World Wrestling Entertainment v M/s Reshma Collection and Ors
(2014) SCC OnLine Del 2031�� 74–75, 302
Y Narasimha Rao & Ors v Y Venkata Lakshmi & Anr (1991) 3 SCC 451�� 4, 266, 268–69
Yogesh Bharadwaj v State of Uttar Pradesh (1990) 3 SCC 355��71, 264
TABLE OF CONVENTIONS
1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability�� 246

Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 27 September 1968��20, 85, 272
Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (1 June 1970)��20, 26, 33,
137–38, 144, 151
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents
(5 October 1961)��50, 304
Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages
(14 March 1978)��26, 111–13, 127–28
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June 2005)��15, 62
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (2007)��100, 272
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating
to Adoptions (15 November 1965)�� 304
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement
and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures
for the Protection of Children (19 October 1996)��15, 156
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption (29 May 1993)��19, 179, 304
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(adopted 25 October 1980 entered into force 1 December 1983) 1343 UNTS 89��26, 40,
153, 171
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations towards Children
(24 October 1956)�� 153
Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes (14 March 1978)��26, 33
Convention on the law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons
(1 August 1989)�� 40
Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents adopts the law
of the place of the accident as the connecting factor (4 May 1971)�� 246
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating
to Maintenance Obligations (2 October 1973)��15, 26
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(adopted 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959)�� 7, 15, 19–20, 97,
280–84, 286–96, 300
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (1 February 1971)�� 15
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil or Commercial Matters (2 July 2019)��7, 15, 39–40, 258–59,
274–79, 304
xxx Table of Conventions
Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations

(adopted 1 June 1970, entered into force 24 August 1975)��20, 26, 33,
137–38, 144, 151
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989,
entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC)�� 153, 171, 180
Convention relating to the settlement of the Conflicts between the law
of nationality and the law of domicile (15 June 1955)�� 30
Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters OJ L351/1��16, 33, 39
Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters
and the matters of parental responsibility modified by Council Regulation
(EC) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L351/1��16, 132, 169
Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ L177/6��30, 57
Council Regulation (EU) 1259/2010 on implementing enhanced cooperation
in the area of separation the law applicable to divorce and legal Separation
(EU Council Regulation) [2010] OJ L 343/10�� 134
Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement
of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility,
and on international child abduction (recast) (Brussels II bis Recast)
(EC Council Regulation) [2019] OJ L 178/1�� 170
European Convention on Information of Foreign Law (7 June 1968)�� 52
European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning
Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children (1980)�� 168
Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act 1972�� 62–63, 66–68
Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (adopted 26 September 1924,
League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 21)�� 153
1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards��7, 97, 280–82, 284,
286, 288–89, 294–96
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005�� 6–7, 62, 92–93,
103–06, 195, 217, 258,
274–76, 278–79, 304
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
(25 October 1980) �� 153, 157, 170, 303
Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International Commercial
Contracts, 2015��7, 30, 195–96, 211, 215,
217, 220, 225–27
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts��216, 218, 220–21,
223–24, 227
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966,
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)�� 153
International Chamber of Commerce’s 1958 Convention Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ��7, 295
Table of Conventions xxxi
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts

(adopted November 2012, entered into force 19 March 2015)��30, 211
Principles on International Commercial Contracts (first published 1994,
revised in 2004, 2010 and 2016)�� 15, 201–02, 216,
224, 227, 292
Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations,
[2007] OJ L/199/40 ��18, 230–31, 243–46,
249–52, 254
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations ��215, 323
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of The European Parliament and of the Council
of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters�� 85–86, 100–03, 272–73
The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (adopted 29 May 1993, entered
into force 1 May 1993) 33 UNTS�� 153
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration (adopted 21 June1985)
UN Doc A/40/17, Annex I��201, 280–81, 283
United Nations (Privileges and Immunity) Act 1947�� 61, 63, 65–66
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(1 January 1988)�� 15
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA
Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)�� 180
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961��66–67
xxxii
TABLE OF LEGISLATION
Act of Private International Law 2016 (South Korea)��215, 216, 218, 220, 222, 246
Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act 2017,
Act No 22 of 2017�� 98
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Act No 26 of 1996��7, 19–20, 31, 51, 70,
96–97, 201, 203, 219,
281–90, 293–96, 300
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015��69, 285, 287
British Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973�� 37, 121, 131, 149
Citizenship Act 1955, Act No 57 of 1955��180, 182, 186–87
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act 200, Act No 10 of 2001�� 174
Civil Code of the Russian Federation 2015�� 215–16, 218, 220, 222–23,
241–42, 249, 250–52
Civil Procedure Code 1990 (Afghanistan)��37, 114
Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Act No 5 of 1908�� 7, 14, 16, 50, 61–65, 67–68,
70–72, 74–75, 77–86, 89, 91–92,
95, 100, 102–03, 105–06, 135–36,
257–58, 260–62, 267–69, 278, 293, 303
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973��8, 136
Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division
of High Courts Act 2015, Act No 4 of 2016��68–70, 84, 97, 285
Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division
of High Courts Amendment Act 2018, Act No 28 of 2018�� 70
Companies (Incorporation) Rules 2014�� 82
Competition Act 2002, Act No 12 of 2002��117, 238
Consumer Protection Act 1986, Act No 68 of 1986�� 238
Copyright Act 1957, Act No 14 of 1957�� 72–74, 303
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939��123, 131
Divorce Act 1869, Act No 4 of 1869�� 20, 37, 130–31,
133, 157–58
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973�� 37, 121, 131, 149
English Act of 1871�� 144
Environmental Protection Act 1986, Act No 29 of 1986�� 18
Family Law Act (United Kingdom) 1986�� 141, 149–50
Family Proceedings Act 1980 (New Zealand)�� 121
Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (United Kingdom)�� 48
Foreign Marriage Act 1969, Act No 33 of 1969�� 17, 110–11, 115,
117, 123, 147–48
Guardian and Wards Act 1890, Act No 8 of 1890��142, 157–58, 174
Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act 1956, Act No 78 of 1956�� 10
xxxiv Table of Legislation
Hindu Marriage Act 1955, Act No 25 of 1955��5, 10, 20, 32, 41, 110–11,
117, 119, 123, 125–26, 129–31,
134, 137, 139–40, 142, 147,
152, 157–58, 160, 269
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, Act No 32 of 1956�� 10, 142, 157–59
Hindu Succession Act 1956, Act No 30 of 1956��10, 14
Immigration Act 1993 (France)�� 120
Indian Contract Act 1872, Act No 9 of 1872��19, 75, 80, 95–96, 145,
181, 201, 204–06, 210, 212–14,
238, 249, 254, 269, 284, 290, 301
Indian Divorce Act 1869, Act No 4 of 1869��20, 37, 130–31, 133–34, 157–58
Indian Evidence Act 1872, Act No 1 of 1872�� 18, 50, 135, 173, 179
Indian Penal Code 1860, Act No 45 of 1860�� 123–25, 163
Indian Succession Act 1925, Act No 39 of 1925�� 14, 19–20, 27,
32–34, 36–38, 41
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (1988) 22 USC 9001��167, 175
Japanese Act on the General Rules on the Application of Laws 2007��215–16, 218–19,
223, 247, 252
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations
(Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019��215, 231
Law of Introduction to the Brazilian Civil Code 1942�� 217
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-Related
Civil Relations 2010��215–16, 218, 220,
222, 241–42, 249–53
Law on the implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction 2013, Act No 48 of 2013�� 171
Limitation Act 1950 (New Zealand)�� 48
Limitation Act 1963, Act No 36 of 1963�� 48, 61, 260, 289
Madya Bharat Sales Tax Act 1950�� 87
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973�� 119, 121, 145
Motor Vehicles Act 1988, Act No 59 of 1988�� 235
Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2014, Act No 7 of 2070 (2014) (Nepal)��52, 270–71, 273–74
National Civil Code Act 2017 (Nepal)�� 100, 216, 221,
242–43, 252
National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART Clinics
in India 2005��181–82
Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936, Act No 3 of 1936��110, 123, 131, 157–58
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK)�� 121, 230–31,
239, 241, 253
Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act 2017 (New Zealand)��239, 241
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, Act No 3 of 2005�� 166
Public Liability Insurance Act 1991, Act No 6 of 1991�� 18
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Bill 1976, Law Commission of India�� 138
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (American Law Institute, 1965)�� 131
Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(American Law Institute Publishers, 1987)�� 141
Table of Legislation xxxv
Rules of the Supreme People’s Court on Related Issues Concerning the Application
of Law in Hearing Foreign-Related Contractual Dispute Cases Related to Civil
and Commercial Matters (China)�� 215, 222–23
Same Sex Couples Act (Marriage) UK 2013�� 122
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992 Act No 15 of 1992�� 269
Special Marriage Act 1954, Act No 43 of 1954�� 20, 110–11, 117, 123, 129,
131, 133, 142, 147–48, 157
Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone
and Other Maritime Zones Act 1976, Act No 80 of 1976�� 98
The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulations) Bill 2010�� 182
The Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Bill 2016��164–67
The Constitution of India 1950��9, 19, 40–41, 45, 87, 94,
123, 125, 158, 180–81,
200, 216, 231, 248, 268
The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 SI 1961/6(Pakistan)�� 150
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937�� 123
The National Civil (Code) Act 2017 (Nepal)��20, 40, 100, 114, 144, 189,
216, 221, 242–43, 252, 303
The Protection of Children (Inter-Country Removal and Retention) Bill 2016��164–67
The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016 Lok Sabha (2018), Bill No 257 of 2016�� 183
The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019, Bill No 156-C of 2019��183–85
Trade Marks Act 1999, Act No 47 of 1999�� 72–74, 83, 85
Transfer of Property Act 1882, Act No 4 of 1882 �� 14
Turkish Code on Private International Law and International Civil Procedure 2007��215, 220,
222–23, 246–47,
249, 251–53
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 1997��175–76
Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitation Act 1982 (U.S.)�� 48
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 1983�� 145
United Nations (Privileges and Immunity) Act 1947, Act No 46 of 1947�� 61, 63, 65–66
xxxvi
part i
General Principles
2
1
Introduction
Conflict of Laws, also referred to as private international law, is premised on the assump-
tion that human interactions across borders cannot be determined by reference to one set
of laws. Global contracts, e-commerce transactions, cross border marriages, divorces, and
insolvency are some of the glowing examples, the effects of which travels to more than one
jurisdiction. If diverse municipal legal systems have contributed to the conflicts, the situation
is further complicated by contrasting approaches to conflict of laws followed by jurisdictions.
The challenges presented by the various national laws and conflict of laws have sought to be
remedied by active, broad, and reinvigorated international legal responses aimed at codifying
and harmonising the process and principles of private international law. Simultaneously, the
increased interactions aided by globalisation, migrations, and the internet in the personal and
commercial domain have given it a new boost and fillip. However, the scenario has presented
new challenges to private international law with its role and character undergoing rapid
transformations. Moving away from its exclusive focus on jurisdictional concerns, the appli-
cable law, and the enforcement of foreign court orders, today, the subject navigates through
a strenuous and ongoing determination to produce legal responses in areas much beyond
the contracts and family matters. As a result, the harmonisation effort is likely to increase in
the coming times to embrace new domains and challenges, including issues of intellectual
property, the internet, etc. Despite the many codification attempts furthered by international
cooperation, mainly under the aegis of the Hague Conference of Private International Law,
the discipline has not attained the desirable certainty and predictability.
India is no exception to this legal predicament. India provides an exponentially expanding yet
unripe territory for the study of this subject. Under the forces of globalisation, there is an expan-
sion of economic interaction between India and other countries. The increased financial business
is reflected in the number of bilateral commercial agreements and investment treaties signed
between India and other countries. Further, the ever-growing Indian diaspora settled mostly in
America, Europe, and Australia has thrown innumerable challenges to the operation of private
international law in India. Questions frequently arise whether western nations would recognise
a marriage celebrated in India. There have been similar questions on the validity of a divorce or
a custody order obtained in jurisdictions outside India. Where should the enforcement of such
orders be sought?
A matured private international law principle is crucial for the legal infrastructure to
facilitate international transactions. Nevertheless, unfortunately, private international law is
still in its infancy in India, despite increasingly being called upon to address new legal chal-
lenges. Further, though a party to some of the Hague Codification Conventions, India has
steadfastly opposed the accession to most of the Hague Conventions, which has furthered
complications and uncertainty in transactions having a foreign element. Research into India’s
4 Introduction
state practice is still developing, and judicial statements are evolving the jurisprudence of
private international law. There has been no systematic attempt done to present an Indian
perspective on private international law. Several reasons are attributed to the underdevel-
oped state of private international law in the country.
In most civil law jurisdictions, matters of foreign law are treated as a question of law which
obligates the judges to take cognizance of the presence of the foreign law. In contrast, under the
Indian legal framework, foreign law is treated as a question of fact, which needs to be proved by
expert evidence. There is no judicial obligation to take cognizance of the application of foreign
law. For this reason, even in those cases with a definite presence of a foreign element, parties to the
case prefer to rely on domestic law, and the court inevitably applies domestic laws. For instance,
in the Union Carbide and Others v Union of India and Others,1 which is popularly referred to as
the Bhopal Gas Case, the most significant industrial tragedy in the country, the parties argued
the case according to the principles of domestic law – despite the fact that the company and its
principal office was located in the US.
Though labelled as the Federal Republic, the Indian legal system is governed by a single
unified system of law, with a unified system of judicial administration, notwithstanding the
constitutional distribution of legislative powers between the centre and the states. Thus, there
has been no scope for developing private international law principles even when matters span
across state borders within the Federal set-up. However, the ever-increasing diaspora and the
growing commercial interdependence and transactions have provided a platform for expanding
the doctrines and principles of private international law. Further, the innumerable cross-border
subjects raised before the domestic courts and the inevitability of evaluating foreign judgments
have created a compulsion for increased attention to the subject.
The Indian legal system, with its fledgling and highly insufficient apparatus on private inter-
national law, has on many occasions presented an ad hoc response towards the three primordial
conflict of laws questions – jurisdictional, choice of law, and enforcement concerns – within the
dispute domains of commercial law as well as family law. The pattern is often seen as evolving,
where the legal system has attempted to read in a few features that were otherwise the prevalent
methodology adopted in the English, US, and European systems for disputes with a foreign
element. In Lalji Raja and Sons v Hansraj Nathuram2 reliance was placed on private interna-
tional law to support the contention that in a personal action, a decree pronounced in absentia
by a foreign court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant had not in any way submitted
himself, was an absolute nullity. The courts also differed from other South Asian jurisdictions in
interpreting an exclusive jurisdiction clause. They stressed that the validity of such agreements
was not violative of public policy and the notion of national sovereignty. In the seminal case of
Modi Entertainment Network and Another v WSG Cricket PTE. Ltd,3 the Supreme Court of India
espoused the principle of a ‘sliding scale’ developed in the internet jurisdiction case of Zippo
Manufacturing by the courts in the US. Simultaneously, Indian legal systems also developed
their unique practices, founded within domestic law. In Y Narasimha Rao and Ors. v Y Venkata
Lakshmi and Anr,4 the Supreme Court observed that ‘the marriages which take place in this
country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country.
1 [1991] 4 SCC 584.

2 [1971] AIR 974.
3 [2003] 4 SCC 341.
4 [1991] 3 SCC 451.
Introduction 5
Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the one under which
the parties are married and no other law.’5 In Sondur Rajini v Sondur Gopal, the court further
observed that
the time at which the domicile is to be determined is when the parties tie the nuptial knot under the
Hindu Marriage Act and not the date when an application is made for matrimonial reliefs. As a natural
corollary thereof, even if a party to the matrimonial petition establishes that after marriage he acquired
domicile of some other country, it would not take away the jurisdiction of the court in India if on the
date of the marriage he was domiciled in India. It is unjust that a party to the marriage can change his
entire system of personal law by his or her unilateral decision.6
In a related vein, in cases of intercountry child abduction, judicial statements have relied on
the concept of ‘intimate contact’ as the basis of jurisdiction.7 Judicial opinion on the applicable
law on contractual issues has demonstrated a well-defined shift from its former position, which
obligated commercial contracts, enforceable in India, to choose an applicable law with a close
relation to the facts of the case. This book presents the unique features of Indian States’ practice
in disputes with the foreign element being addressed within the country’s legal system.
Thus, this book is an effort to infuse and sustain research in the domain of private inter-
national law in India. It provides a critical analysis of India’s legislative and judicial practice
and the development of private international law. Traversing through the historical evolution
of private international law in India, the book highlights the unique features meticulously
and systematically evolved by the legislative and judicial approaches. The book addresses the
three major pillars of private international law – jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement
as they are applied and developed by the Indian courts in the domain areas of family law and
commercial law. The research in the family law domain addresses the traditional research areas
of the institution of marriage, divorce, and some of the contemporary concerns affecting the
nations at large – inter-country child retrieval and the country statement on accession to the
Hague Conventions related to this domain. In commercial law, the book addresses the concerns
raised regarding the choice of law issues in transnational contracts and enforcement of foreign
judgment/arbitral awards in the country. The work evaluates India’s engagement and disengage-
ments with international instruments and conventions, especially the Hague Conference on
private international law.
This book is divided into six parts.
Part I consist of four chapters and provides an overview of the structure and functioning of
the Indian legal framework. Chapter two discusses the historical imperatives and evolution of the
basic principles of private international law with a focus on the sources of private international
law. Chapter three discusses the foundational concepts of domicile, nationality and residence
as a connecting factor. Navigating through the statutory provisions, judicial statements, and
juristic narratives, concepts such as characterisation, connecting factors, and renvoi are elabo-
rated. Chapter four delves into India’s statutory position of pleading and proving foreign law and
explores the exclusion of foreign law while emphasising the judicial approach towards developing
an international public policy.
5 ibid [17].
6 Sondur Rajini v Sondur Gopal [2005] [4] MhLj 688.
7 Surindar Kaur Sandhu v Harbax Singh Sandhu & Anr AIR [1984] 1224; Sarita Sharma v Sushil Sharma [2000]
1 SCR 915; V Ravi Chandran v Union of India [2010] 1 SCC 174.

6 Introduction
Part II of the book focuses on the rules of jurisdiction in cross-border civil and commercial
disputes before Indian courts. Chapter five discusses the private international law of jurisdic-
tion in India. In particular, this chapter examines the statutory provisions concerning: (1) the
persons who may file a suit before the Indian courts; (2) the rules on immunity from suits; and
(3) the circumstances in which the courts in India will assume jurisdiction in transnational
disputes – and, in particular, those relating to civil and commercial matters. The chapter also
examines certain contemporary issues that have compelled the Indian courts to re-visit tradi-
tional rules on jurisdiction while adjudicating transnational disputes. Of particular relevance
in this respect has been the regulation of choice of court agreements (also referred to as exclu-
sive forum-selection clauses) concluded in favour of a foreign court. While scrutinising the
prevailing case-law, the chapter additionally provides a comparative analysis of the rules in this
regard in some major jurisdictions such as the EU, the UK, Canada and Australia. The chapter
also discusses the provisions of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 2005
(the HCCCA) and whether India would benefit from its endorsement.
Part III of the book is divided into four chapters. This part explores the private international
law concerns of marriage and divorce. Chapter six traces the statutory position and judicial state-
ments applicable to marriage with its exposition of formal and essential validity of a marriage.
The chapter also addresses the conflicts of law concerns of same-sex marriages and critically
evaluates the Indian legal response concerning the recognition of foreign same-sex marriage.
Chapter seven investigates the rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, and the complexity surround-
ing the recognition of foreign divorce, nullity, and ancillary financial orders. Both chapters
examine the reception and acceptance of the Indian legal systems in western jurisdictions with
particular reference to polygamous marriages and extrajudicial divorce, mainly in the form of
talaq. One may wonder why incorporating the response of other jurisdictions to Indian marriages
and divorce is in a book dealing with Indian private international law. It is partly influenced by
the author’s experience of teaching private international law at the South Asian University and
the growing significance of the topic at the global level in private international law disputes.
Considering the large Muslim population, the issue is of utmost importance. The chapters also
provide an overview of India’s position and its engagement with Hague Conventions on family
law matters. Chapter eight evaluates the judicial pattern in dealing with intercountry child abduc-
tion, focusing on its compatibility with the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. Unlike the
other domains of private international law, the area of child abduction has received significant
legislative attention with the draft Bills prepared by the Ministry of Women and Child Welfare
and Law Commission of India. The chapter critically analyses the provisions of the Bills while
evaluating India’s reasons concerning its decision to refrain from accession. The chapter draws
parallels with India’s neighbouring countries Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which have acceded to
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. Chapter nine focuses on the private international law
concerns surrounding cross-border surrogacy since India occupies a core position in the global
landscape of surrogacy.
Part IV of the book contains two chapters and focuses on the principles of Indian private
international law vis-à-vis the applicable law in contractual and non-contractual matters.
Accordingly, chapter ten examines the mechanism to decipher the applicable law in cross-
border disputes in matters of contract under the principles of Indian private international law.
It provides an in-depth discussion on judicial dicta on the subject, considering the absence of
the codification of the rules in this regard. The chapter, thus, analyses the diverging interpreta-
tions given by the Indian judiciary to the common law doctrine of the ‘proper law of contract’,
which is employed to ascertain the governing law in such disputes. The chapter draws parallels
with the practice adopted in some other jurisdictions such as the EU, the UK, China, Russia,
Introduction 7
Australia, Canada and Nepal to provide the readers with an insight into how the application
of the proper law of contract theory is problematic. The chapter also explores possible uses of
the Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts to develop
and supplement the Indian conflict-of-law rules on the applicable law in contractual matters.
Chapter eleven examines the principles of Indian private international law in non-contractual
matters. Reminiscent of the approach in contractual obligations, the mechanism to ascertain
the applicable law in non-contractual obligations, namely those involving tortious claims, has
not been codified. This chapter accordingly analyses judicial trends in this regard. In particular,
the chapter examines the various facets of non-contractual disputes such as product liability,
unjust enrichment, defamation, unfair competition and the infringement of intellectual prop-
erty, to name a few and the mechanism to identify the applicable law in such matters. In doing
so, it highlights the excessive influence of English common law on the subject in India and the
predicaments that it creates. The chapter analyses global trends to demonstrate the apparent
flaws in the Indian rules in this regard.
Part V of this book focuses on the last pillar of private international law, viz., the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. It is divided into two chapters.
Chapter twelve examines the grounds on which a foreign judgment is eligible for recognition
and enforcement in an Indian court. The chapter discusses the relevant provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908, which regulate the procedural rules in this regard. In this respect,
the chapter discusses the relevance of the ‘doctrine of obligation’ in determining the extrater-
ritorial effect of foreign judgments in India. Like the approach of the previous chapters, this
chapter, too, analyses the global trends as regards the law on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments in jurisdictions such as the EU, UK, Australia and Canada. Further, the
chapter discusses the provisions of the HCCCA and the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(the Judgments Convention), which stipulate the rules on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, and deliberates whether India should endorse them. Chapter thirteen exam-
ines the principles of Indian private international law on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. In doing so, it highlights the statutory requirements in the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996 on the subject which give effect to the provisions of the 1927
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1927 (the 1927 Geneva
Convention) and the 1958 Convention Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(popularly known as the New York Convention).
Part VI (comprising) Chapter fourteen offers concluding observations.
In short, this book focuses on delineating the principles of the Indian private international
law and examining whether these conform to the internationally accepted standards. In doing
so, and as aforementioned, each of the chapters in the book delves in detail into the present
private international law rules of some other major jurisdictions and, in particular, the EU, but
also other common law jurisdictions such as the UK, Australia, and Canada. In addition to the
fact that the Indian rules on the subject remain uncodified, the Republic has expressed certain
skepticism in ratifying treaties and conventions aimed at harmonisation to foster predictability
and certainty vis-à-vis its private international law, the book chiefly intends to make a case for
the development of its principles in this regard. However, it needs to be pointed out that the
authors do not advocate for the country’s accession to all Hague Conventions but advocate for
the evolution and development of a transparent and robust system of private international law to
suit the sensibilities of Indian legal systems and social reality. This book is an earnest attempt on
the authors’ part to contribute to a systematic study of Indian private international law and place
it in the global context and hopefully it will be a significant contribution.
2
Basic Concepts and Status of Private
International Law in India
I. Introduction
A and B, domiciled Indian citizens, were married in Delhi, India, according to the Hindu rites.
Two children were born of the marriage. Later, the husband left for the US. The wife continued
to live in India with her minor children. The wife moved an application under section 488 of
the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, India alleging that the husband had neglected to maintain
her and the two minor children. The husband contended that his marriage with the petitioner
(wife) was dissolved by a decree of divorce granted by the Second Judicial District Court of
Nevada in the US. The case raised several legal questions, including the competence of the US
courts in entertaining a divorce petition of a marriage solemnised in India and the broader
question of recognition of foreign divorce decrees.
A dispute involving a well-defined foreign element cannot be resolved by exclusively
relying on the domestic legal framework. In scenarios where the matters before the judiciary
have a strong foreign element, the disputes must be resolved by reference to private international
law. This chapter explores the historical and conceptual foundation of the subject.
This chapter is divided into six parts (including the Introduction). Section II provides a
brief synopsis of the Indian legal framework. Section III explores the nature and scope of the
subject, focusing on the subject’s core fundamentals, namely: jurisdiction, recognition, and
enforcement of foreign judgments, and choice of law. Section IV discusses the legal sources and
framework of private international law in India. Section V explains the meaning and application
of fundamental concepts embedded in private international law focusing on characterisation,
connecting factors, and renvoi.
II. Overview of Indian Legal Framework

In India, private international law has evolved gradually responding to the varied social,
political and legal structures in operation. The country’s legal infrastructure is primarily
shaped by the common law system and carries the influence of British colonial rule.1 India
became an independent nation along with other South Asian countries in 1947 and adopted a
1 KM Sharma, ‘Civil Law in India’ (1969) 1(1) Washington University Law Quarterly, 1–39, 2.
Overview of Indian Legal Framework 9
Constitution profoundly centred on the Government of India Act 1935 passed by the British
Parliament.2 The Constitution of India declares India to be a Socialist, Secular, and Democratic
Republic.3 Though Article 1 of the Constitution describes India as a ‘Union of States’, the
country has adopted a quasi-federal structure.4 A catena of cases have provided precision
on the specificities of the quasi-federalist structure of India. The Supreme Court in State of
West Bengal v Union of India has observed that the Constitution of India does not fit into the
traditional prototype of the federation.5 An analogous view was echoed in State of Rajasthan
and others v Union of India.6 In the seminal case of SR Bommai v Union of India, the court
observed that ‘democracy and federalism are the essential features of the Indian Constitution
and part of its Basic Structure’.7 The Constitution of India encompasses the following classi-
cal features of federalism: a division between federal and state governments, the supremacy
of the Constitution, an independent judiciary, and bicameralism.8 However, unlike a classical
federation, the Indian federal structure is not the outcome of a compact between several sover-
eign units, but a product of the transformation of a unitary system into a federal system.9
Article 3 of the Constitution not only allows the union government to change the boundaries of
a State but even to extinguish a State.10 The fact that India is not a federation in the traditional
sense of the term is of paramount importance to private international law as there is no exist-
ence of a separate legal system among States in the Indian framework. Private international law
treats the Indian legal system as a single entity.
The fundamental postulate under the Indian Constitution enjoins that power has been
strewn on the legislature to make the law, the executive to implement the law, and the judiciary
to interpret the law within the limits set down by the Constitution.11 The President is the head
of the union executive.12 Article 74(1) of the Constitution of India provides that there shall be a
Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister as its head to aid and advise the President.13 The
country has a bicameral Parliament whose upper house is the Council of States (Rajya Sabha),
and the lower house is the House of People (Lok Sabha).14 State legislatures elect Rajya Sabha
members, and Lok Sabha members are elected directly by the people in general elections.15
As far as the legislative division of power between the union government and state governments
are concerned, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution contains three lists on which the central and
the state governments can make the laws.16 On the Union List, Parliament has exclusive powers to
legislate.17 While the state has exclusive powers to legislate on the State List, Parliament can also
do so in certain situations.18 On matters in the Concurrent List, both the union and States are
2A Glendhill, The Republic of India: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution (Greenwood, 2013) 15.
3 Constitution of India 1950, Preamble.
4 ibid, Art 1.
5 State of West Bengal v Union of India [1964] SCR [1] 371.
6 State of Rajasthan and others v Union of India etc. AIR [1963] 1241.
7 SR Bommai v Union of India AIR [1994] SC 1918 [90].
8 BN Schoenfeld, ‘Federalism in India’ (1959) 20(1) The Indian Journal of Political Science 52–62, 52.
9 AK Ghosal, ‘Federalism in the Indian Constitution’ (1953) 14(4) The Indian Journal of Political Science 317–332, 318.
10 Constitution of India (n 3) Art 3.
11 ibid: See AK Thiruvengadam, The Constitution of India: A Contextual Analysis (Bloomsbury Publishers, 2017) 77.
13 ibid, Art 74(1).
14 ibid, (n 3) Art 79.
15 ibid, Arts 80, 81.
16 ibid, seventh schedule.
17 ibid, Art 246.
18 ibid, Arts 249, 250, 252, 253.
10 Basic Concepts and Status of Private International Law in India
competent to enact legislation. In case of a conflict between a State and central legislation on a
subject matter under the Concurrent List, the parliamentary legislation shall prevail. In addi-
tion, residuary powers of legislation are vested in the union, and that provides a protuberant
unitary feature to the federalism in India.19 In the judicial sphere, the Supreme Court of India
is the guardian and interpreter of the Constitution,20 and is followed by High Courts at the state
level.21 The Supreme Court and High Courts exercise extraordinary constitutional powers to
issue prerogative writs in cases of infringements of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.22 The judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are legally binding on the lower
courts and tribunals of India underlining the operation of the doctrine of stare decisis.23 India’s
legal system follows the adversary system of legal procedure wherein the judge acts as a neutral
arbiter safeguarding the balance between the contending rivals without actively taking part in
the forensic debate in the court.
Though the Indian Constitution is based on a secular framework, in matters of concerns
such as marriage, divorce, etc, the legal system is intensely influenced by the cultural and
religious norms of the population.24 The existence of personal laws based on religious beliefs
impacts the private international law practices of India and in its reception in other jurisdictions.
The succeeding section provides an overview of nature; scope and conceptual foundations of
private international law in general and then discusses the subject in the context of India.
III. Conceptual Foundations of Private International Law

A. Nature of Private International Law
Private international law is that part of the domestic legal system which comes into operation
whenever the court is confronted with a dispute that comprises a specific and clear foreign
element.25 The manifestation of a foreign element is a sine qua non for the invocation of private
international law, and the primary function of private international law is to indicate how
a dispute needs to be addressed in the presence of foreign elements. Foreign elements in a
dispute can be presented in numerous ways, ranging from the parties’ different nationalities
or domicile, to the cause of action originating in more than one jurisdiction. For example,
A domiciled in India files a suit against B domiciled in Britain for breach of an employment
contract to be performed in France. The scenario presents foreign elements in the form of the
domicile of B and the contract’s place of performance. In such situations, exclusive reliance on
domestic legal systems results in the prospect of the forum’s laws coming into conflict with the
legal system with which the case’s facts are intimately connected. Correspondingly, in a case
19 ibid, Art 248.

20 ibid, Art 124.
21 AK Thiruvengadam (n11) 118; see also MP Jain, Indian Constitutional law 8th edn (Lexis Nexis, 2018).
22 Constitution of India (n 3) Arts 32, 139, 226.
23 ibid, Art 141.
24 The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, India; The Hindu Adoption & Maintenance Act 1956, India; The Hindu Succession
Act 1956, India; The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, India; See F Ahmad, ‘The Problem with Personal
Laws in India’ in S Choudhry and J Herring (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Family Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2019) 225–253.
25 K Trimmings, P Torremans, A Mills, U Grusic, C Heinze, Cheshire, North, and Fawcett: Private International
Law 15th edn (Oxford University Press, 2017) 3; JO Brien, Conflict of Laws (Cavendish Publishing, 1989) 3; See also
RH Graveson, Conflict of Laws 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 1974).
Conceptual Foundations of Private International Law 11
involving the determination of the validity of a marriage between two domiciled French citi-
zens before the Indian court, the application of Indian laws would result in flagrant injustice as
the facts underlying the case are substantially connected to the French legal system. However,
it is critical to note that the presence of foreign elements must be real and specific.
In Dell Computer Corp v Union Des Consummateurs26 the Dell company sold computer equip-
ment retail over the internet. It had its Canadian head office in Toronto and a place of business in
Montreal. On 4 April 2003, the order pages on its English-language website indicated incorrect
prices for two models of handheld computers.27 On being informed of the errors, Dell blocked
access to the erroneous order pages through the usual address. D, circumventing Dell’s measures
by using a deep link that enabled him to access the order pages without following the usual route,
ordered a computer at the incorrect price indicated there.28 When Dell refused to honour D’s order
at the lower price, the Union des consommateurs and D filed a motion for authorisation to institute
a class action against Dell. Dell applied for referral of D’s claim to arbitration pursuant to an arbi-
tration clause in the terms and conditions of sale, and dismissal of the motion for authorisation to
institute a class action.29 The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal in Quebec held, that
the foreign element must be a point of contact that is legally relevant to a foreign country, which means
that the contact must be certain and clear to play a role in determining whether the dispute comes under
the category of private international law.30
The court refused to accept an arbitration clause as automatically indicating the presence of a
foreign element warranting the application of the rules of private international law.
The raison d’être of private international law is the existence of a number of municipal systems
of law that differ critically from each other in the rules by which they regulate the legal relations.31
The point has been elaborated by Savigny when he stated
it is the diversity of positive laws [in different territorial units] which makes it necessary to mark off for
each in sharp outline, to fix the area of its authority, to fix the limits of different positive laws in respect
to one another.32
Savigny traced the foundation of the private international law obligations to the law of nations
and believed that private international law disputes need to be adjudicated in the same way
irrespective of the state where a suit is filed.33 Civilised nations constitute one unit, and
private international law matters must be adjudicated in the same way everywhere.34 Though
some continental scholars took up the idea, the overriding view of jurists and the practice of
the states imply that private international law is treated as part of domestic legal systems, and a
sizeable variation in approaches is found in legislations of nations. Franz Khan attributed
that the dispute in private international law starts from the title page itself.35
26 Dell Computer Corp v Union Des Consummators [2007] SCC 34.

27 ibid [4].
28 ibid.
29 ibid [5].
30 ibid [3], [26], [50]–[53], [56]–[58].
31 Cheshire, North and Fawcett (n 25) 3 See also AK Kuhn, ‘Doctrines of Private International Law in England and
America Contrasted with those of Continental Europe’ (1912) 12(1) Columbia Law Review 44–57.
32 FKV Savigny, Private International Law and the Retrospective Operation of Statutes: A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws
and the Limits of Their Operation in Respect of Place and Time cited in Cheshire, North and Fawcett (n 25) 5.
33 FKV Savigny, System of Modern Roman Law (Hyperion Press 1867) 23, 27. This proposition appeared in the
final volume of his System of Modern Roman Law published in German. W Guthrie translated it into English in 1869;
see also Cheshire, North, and Fawcett (n 25) 23.
34 ibid (Mancini followed this theory in Italy).
35 Quoted by Supreme Court of India in Indian and General Investment Trust, Ltd. v Sri Ramchandra Mardaraja Deo,
Raja of Khalikote AIR [1952] Cal 508 [20].

Private international law is primarily a procedural law that identifies which legal system
possesses jurisdiction and which laws would apply to a particular dispute.36 In that sense, private
international law is not a specific branch of a legal system such as contract or criminal law.
However, it has a distinct flavour of its own since the subject, through specifically identified legal
mechanisms, guides the ascertainment of the legal system applicable to a case.37 It needs to be
highlighted that the reference to a foreign system of law with a federal legal structure is not to be
understood in the sense of ‘state’ in international law but to specific federal units. For instance,
a reference to the law of the US indicates relevant laws of California, Texas, etc.38 The hybrid
nature of the subject involving international elements and the domestic legal system has given
rise to several narratives on the subject’s nomenclature.39 Despite the presence of a large diaspora
spread across jurisdictions and the enlarged cross border economic transactions, India has not
enacted precise legislation to deal with private international law. The subject matter of private
international law is addressed through statutory provisions scattered in numerous legislations.
Judicial statements also constitute a significant source of private international law. The courts
have elaborated on the nature of the subject in numerous conflict of law cases.
In Mrs. Santi Singh v Governor of Punjab and Anr40 it was held that ‘the rules of conflict of
laws or private international law are adumbrated by various writers not to have any statutory
force of universal application in all countries’. The court traced the development of the subject to
the judicial decisions determined from time to time in different countries. The judgment empha-
sised the domestic nature of the subject. The nature of the subject was also discussed in the case
of Indian and General Investment Trust, Ltd. v Sri Ramchandra Mardaraja Deo.41 The subject
matter of the dispute concerned the recognition and execution of foreign judgment. The court
observed that ‘the peculiar difficulties of this case arise from the fact that it is not entirely
governed by the municipal law of any particular country; it is also governed by that branch of
law called “private international law”’.42 The court quoting from Hibbert’s work observed that
the name ‘private international law’ is rather unfortunate because it is difficult to conceive of a law that
is both international and, at the same time, private.43 It is called ‘private’ inasmuch as it deals with the
legal relations of individuals and not of states; it is ‘international’, in as much as it deals with conflicts of
laws of different nations. It is properly called law, inasmuch as its rules are enforced by courts, and in that
respect, it is a branch of the ordinary law of the land.44
The judgment highlighted the complexities of the subject involving both an international and
a private character.
B. Private International Law or Conflicts of Laws

The three different nomenclatures – conflict of laws, private international law, and international
private law – are employed interchangeably, although none are wholly accurate or adequately
36 JG Castel, ‘Procedure and the Conflict of Laws’ (1970) 16(4) McGill Law Journal 603–632, 604; J P George and
AK Teller, ‘Conflict of Laws’ (2004) 57 SMU Law Review 719–758.

37 JG Collier, Conflict of Laws 3rd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 7.
38 ibid.
39 WE Beckett, ‘What is Private International Law’ (1926) 7 British Year Book of International law 73–96.
40 Mrs. Santi Singh v Governor of Punjab and Anr AIR [1959] P H 375 [3].
41 Indian and General Investment Trust, Ltd (n 35).
42 ibid [20].
43 ibid citing WN Hibbert, International Private Law or Conflict of Laws (University of London Press, 1918).
44 ibid.
descriptive of the domain’s scope and nuance.45 The term ‘private international law’ was first
employed by Story in his formative work of Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws.46 The term
private international law is followed in civil law jurisdictions, including France, Italy, Greece,
etc.47 Jurisdictions and juristic opinions employ the term ‘private international law’ to highlight
the subject’s cross border and international character.48 Despite its name, private international
law is not international in the real sense as every country has its own domestic system of conflict
of laws rules and its sources are the same as other municipal law subjects.49 The existence of a
distinct domestic system of private international law distinguishes it from public international
law, which regulates the sovereign relationship between nations and has its sources in treaties,
customs, and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations50 The phrase ‘conflict of
laws’ originated from the work of Ulrich Huber51 and is employed to highlight the divergent and
competing nature of municipal laws and the core interrelationship with domestic legal systems.
This is comprehensible since most of federal countries like the US and Australia are character-
ised by the presence of different legal systems within their federal set-up. In such scenarios, a
reference to the term conflict of laws is desirable as the subject matter does not have an interna-
tional connection; instead, the issue is about applying conflicting legal systems.52 However, the
term is misleading as the subject aims to avoid or minimise conflicts between legal systems.53
AV Dicey, who wrote the first treatise on the subject from an English perspective, employed
the term conflict of laws, and common law countries have largely preferred to use the term
conflict of laws.54 The term ‘international private law’ is applied in selected jurisdictions to
emphasise the private nature of legal relations in contrast to the public relations regulated by
public international law.55 Judicial statements in India do not reveal a specific preference of
nomenclature either in favour of private international law or conflict of laws. For clarity and
alignment with the title, this book will employ the term ‘private international law’.
C. Scope of Private International Law

Identification of a foreign element in a dispute indicates the supplication of private interna-
tional law and the need to ascertain the applicable law. The function of private international
law is primarily to pinpoint the system of applicable law, and this function has been compared
to an office at a railway station where the passenger can learn the specific platform in which
45 FK Juenger, ‘Private International Law or International Private Law’ (1994) 5 Kings College Law Journal 45–64, 45.
46 J Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 2nd edn (Little Brown, 1841) 11; J Westlake, A Treatise on Private
International Law 7th edn (Maxwell & Sons, 1925) 5.
47 TK Saha, Textbook on Legal Methods, Legal Systems and Research (Universal Law Publishers, 2010) 54.
48 Juenger (n 45) 46.
49 Collier (n 37) 6.
50 ibid 5; JR Stevenson, ‘The Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law’ (1952) 52 Columbia
Law Review 561–588; A Nussbaum, ‘Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws’ (1942)
42 Columbia Law Review 189–192.
51 Quoted in EG Lorenzen, ‘Huber’s De Conflictu Legum’ (1919) 13 Illinois Law Review 375, 401–418; DE Childress III,
‘Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws’ (2010) 44 University of California Davis Law
Review 12, 18.
52 L Weinburg, ‘The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: Actual Conflicts’ (1992) 70 Texas Law Review 1743–1796, 1753.
53 Collier (n 37) 5.
54 AV Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (Stevens and Sons Limited, 1896);
Brien (n 25) 3–4.

55 Germany, Austria, Switzerland, etc employ this nomenclature; see A Nussbaum, Principles of Private International
Law (Oxford University Press, 1945).

the train is arriving. The court, in the case of Indian and General Investment v Sri Ramchandra
Mardaraja Deo, observed that ‘the function of private international law is complete when it
has chosen the appropriate system of law’.56 In the process of identifying the applicable law to a
dispute, what exactly comes under the domain of and scope of private international law is still
a debatable topic.57 Some jurisdictions provide prominence to the question of choice of law as
constituting the major subject matter.58 Jurisdictions like Afghanistan include issues of nationality
and domicile as part of its private international law,59 whereas, many jurisdictions provide
for issues of domicile and nationality as part of administrative law or constitutional law. For
some jurisdictions, all three areas – jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement of judgments –
remain at the heart of most private international law endeavours in one way or another.60 The
authors of this book have approached the scope of the subject as covering issues of jurisdiction,
choice of law and enforcement of foreign judgments.
i. Jurisdiction
Private international law confronts issues of jurisdiction in two scenarios. First, to determine
whether the court before which a matter is filed possesses personal and subject matter juris-
diction to entertain the case.61 Second, in deciding whether to recognise a foreign judgment,
a court will be called on to address whether the foreign court that rendered the judgment was
a court of competent jurisdiction.62 It is the common practice among nations that jurisdic-
tional matters are determined by reference to domestic statutory provisions except in situations
where there has been the codification of rules on jurisdiction.63 In India, the subject matter of
jurisdiction is detailed under the general statute of Civil Procedure Code 1908,64 and specific
issues under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955,65 the Hindu Succession Act,66 the Indian Succession
Act 1925,67 the Transfer of Property Act 1882, etc.68 The courts in India have supplemented
and clarified the contours of jurisdiction principles. In Ct A Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar v Ct ACt.
Subramama Chettiar69 concerning the division of certain immovable properties situated in
Myanmar, it was pointed out that courts in India have no jurisdiction to determine questions
of title in respect of immovable properties in foreign countries or to direct division thereof.70
The Supreme Court relied on Dicey’s opinion to highlight that the courts of a country have
no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title or the right to the possession of any immovable
property not situated in such country.71 The courts have unswervingly ruled that jurisdictional
56 ibid.
57 ibid.
58 M Martinek, ‘The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in Private International Law – The German and the Swiss Experience with
the Codification of Conflicts Law Rule’ (2001) Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law and Comparative Law 15–54.
59 WM Naseh, ‘Conflicts of Laws: State Practice in Afghanistan’ in in SR Garimella and S Jolly (eds), Private International
Law (Springer, 2017) 63–88.

60 Cheshire, North, and Fawcett (n 25) 7.
61 Brien (n 25) 175.
62 ibid 181.
63 A Mayss, Principles of Conflicts of Laws 3rd edn (Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 1999) 13.
64 The Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
65 The Hindu Marriage Act (n 24).
66 ibid.
67 The Indian Succession Act 1925, India.
68 The Transfer of Property Act 1882, India.
69 Ct A.Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar v Ct A.Ct. Subramama Chettiar AIR [1960] SC 307.
70 ibid [44].
71 ibid [17] citing AV Dicey and JHC Morris, Conflict of Laws 6th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 1949) 141, 348.
issues in personal law matters are largely based upon lex domicilii.72 In cases involving child
custody, the courts have relied on the child’s habitual residence and the indigenous innovation
of ‘most intimate contact’ as the bases of jurisdiction.73 The rules and practice on jurisdictions
will be dealt with in detail in chapter five of this book.
ii. Choice of Law

Choice of law arises in the second stage of disputes encompassing a foreign element, once the
court has pronounced on jurisdictional matters. Legal systems have developed a system of rules
and principles, and codification work has been undertaken by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law (HCCH)74 and other international bodies,75 to guide the courts in select-
ing the applicable law. The underlying rationale underscoring choice of law is the interest of
justice76 and the principle of comity77 in maintaining harmonious relations between nations.
Besides the reference to comity and justice, scholars have propounded several other rationales
for private international law.78 Specific rules on choice of law governing family, contractual and
non- contractual matters are dealt with in detail in chapters six to eleven of this book respectively.
iii. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgment

This question is concerned with whether and in what scenarios a country is bound to give effect
and recognise the laws of another country. Similar to the issue of jurisdiction, the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments are roughly determined by the domestic legal system.
However, meaningful efforts on codifying jurisdictional rules have been undertaken by the
HCCH79 and other international bodies.80 Prominent among the regional codification efforts
72 L Jhambolkar, ‘Conflict of laws’ in SK Varma and K Kusum (eds), Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp
and Reach (Indian Law Institute 2000) 651–684, 654.

73 Surinder Kaur Sandhu v Harbax Singh Sandhu & Anr AIR [1984] 1224.
74 Hague Conference on Private International Law has been established with the aim of progressive unification of
Private international law. for more information can be accessed at www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions.

75 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); The International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law in Rome (UNIDROIT). The codification attempts of these bodies have been elaborated in the
chapters dealing with contractual matters.
76 P Diwan and P Diwan, Private International Law: Indian and English 4th edn (Deep Publishers, 1998) 45.
77 JK Bleimaier, ‘The Doctrine of Comity in Private International Law’ (1979) 24(4) Catholic Lawyer 327–332.
78 WW Cook propounded the local law theory see WW Cook, ‘The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws’
(1924) 33(5) Yale Law Journal 457–488; U Huber propounded vested rights theory see L Davies, ‘The Influence of Huber’s
De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law’ (1937) 18 British Yearbook of International Law 49, 59;
FE Noronha, Private International Law in India 2nd edn (Universal Law Publishing, 2013) 22–26.
79 Some of the notable conventions include Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1971; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Relating to Maintenance Obligations 1973 (hereinafter Maintenance Convention 1973); Convention on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement, and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures
for the Protection of Children 1996) (hereinafter 1996 Protection Convention); The Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements 2005); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial
Matters 2019) (hereinafter Convention Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 2019), available at www.hcch.net/
en/instruments/conventions.
80 Foremost among the legal instruments initiated by the UNCITRAL include the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (January 1988) U.N. Doc A/CONF 97/18, (hereinafter cited as CISG);
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (adopted 10 June 1958, entered into force
7 June 1959) 330 UNTS 3(hereinafter cited as New York Convention); Among the effort of the UNIDRIOT, Principles on
International Commercial Contracts (first published 1994, revised in 2004, 2010 and 2016) is significant.
are the conventions and regulations passed by the EU enforceable in the member countries.81
The Civil Procedure Code under sections 13, 14 and 44A lay down the core provisions relat-
ing to recognising foreign judgment in India.82 Comity and reciprocity form the foundation
of Indian statutory provisions.83 In Bhagwan Shankar v Rajaram Bapu Vithal84 the applicant
obtained a money decree in the Joint Second-Class Subordinate Judge’s Court at Sholapur. The
decree was transferred to the Court of Nyayadhish, Akalkot for execution.85 The respondent
contended that he was a foreigner and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court at
Sholapur. Hence the Court at Sholapur was not competent, and therefore the Akalkot Court
could not execute a foreign judgment within the meaning of section 13 Civil Procedure Code.86
The judgment espoused the general principle that a court’s jurisdiction is not attracted against
a foreign defendant unless the defendant has submitted to its jurisdiction.87 The recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards are dealt in detail in chapters twelve
and thirteen of this book.
IV. Genesis of Private International Law in India

A. Gradual Evolution Beginning with the British Rule
Compared with other branches of municipal law, a systematic body of rules of private interna-
tional law is comparatively absent in India.88 Since the country’s legal system is solidly built on
common law foundations, the court’s decisions are the primary source of private international
law.89 During British times, the presence of various personal laws gave rise to an interpersonal
conflict of laws. Since India was a federation between British India and princely States with
distinct legal systems, a princely State’s judgment was considered a foreign judgment. Thus, the
genesis of private international law in the country was mainly the English law narrative applied
to conflict of law cases.90
Professor Baxi notes that most private international law disputes in India relate to peripheral
conflicts decisions concerning mainly the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.91
Panchapakesa Iyer and Ors. v KM Hussain Muhammad Rowther and Ors. was one of the
first cases decided on private international law.92 The case was concerned with the validity of a
judgment passed at Penang, Malaysia, regarding the execution of a will. The facts showed that
Kawana Nayana Noor Muhammad died in Penang on 16 October 1918.93 The bulk of Noor
81 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters OJ L351/1; Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003,
concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the matters of
Parental Responsibility repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000.
82 Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (n 64).
83 ibid, s 13.
84 Bhagwan Shankar v Rajaram Bapu Vithal AIR [1951] Bom 125.
85 ibid [1].
86 ibid [2].
87 ibid [6].
88 Noronha (n 78) 26–27; Diwan and Diwan (n 76) 59–60.
89 Noronha, ibid.
90 ibid 26–27.
91 U Baxi, ‘Conflict of Laws’ in Annual Survey of Indian Law 1967 and 1968 (Indian Law Institute) 227–285, 227.
92 Panchapakesa Iyer and Ors. v KM Hussain Muhammad Rowther and Ors AIR [1934] Mad 145.
93 ibid [1].
Genesis of Private International Law in India 17
Muhammad’s property was in Penang, but a part of it consisted of immovable property in

the Tanjore District. In October 1919, Noor Muhammad’s widow started proceedings in the
Supreme Court at Penang to administer her husband’s estate claiming an account against the
defendants.94 The Registrar of the Supreme Court inquired into the assets and liabilities of
the estate and, after taking into account immovable property in Tanjore District and property in
Penang, concluded that the widow was entitled to a one-third share.95 The Madras High Court
observed that the court in Penang had adopted an incoreect interpretation of international law
regarding a court’s jurisdiction over immovable property situated in another country. The High
Court further observed that the applicable law in the case should have been based on the place
where the property was situated.96
While grappling with private international law cases, courts in India have deliberated on
the rationality of applying private international law and their positions have oscillated between
‘comity’ and ‘justice’.
In United Arab Republic And Anr. v Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani,97 the plaintiff instituted a suit
for recovery of damages against the defendant United Arab Republic for breach of a contract
for the supply of tea by the plaintiff.98 The defendant entered an appearance in the suit through
the Vice-Consul in charge of the Consulate General of the United Arab Republic in Calcutta
and took out a Master’s Summons for an order, inter alia, that the plaint be rejected.99 At the
time of the hearing, it was admitted that the defendant was a sovereign state recognised by the
Central Government of India.100 The Calcutta High Court relying on Oppenheim observed that
the doctrine of immunity was based on the comity of nations which recognises the equality of
all states.101 The Court further stated that the general rule of par in parem non habet imperium
prevents a state from claiming jurisdiction over another. Hence, although states can sue in a
foreign court, they cannot as a rule be sued unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of
the court concerned.102
Legislation has also referred to comity as a reason for invoking foreign law. The Foreign
Marriages Act 1969 empowers diplomatic and consular offices to perform the marriages of
persons, one of whom is a citizen of India, abroad but provides that no such marriage can be
performed if such a marriage is prohibited in the country where it is to be performed.103 The
case of Viswanathan v Abdul Wajid involved the question of recognition of foreign judgments.
The court not only traced the foundation of private international law to comity but also high-
lighted the domestic nature of the subject by clarifying that private international law is not a law
governing relations between independent states.104
The court’s position gravitated to consideration of justice in Satya v Teja, also involving the
question of recognition of a foreign judgment. The court opined that the Indian conflict of laws
may require that the law of a foreign country be applied in a given case which contains a foreign
element based on considerations of justice.105
94 ibid [3].
95 ibid [3].
96 ibid [9].
97 United Arab Republic and Anr. v Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani AIR [1962] Cal 387.
98 ibid [1].
99 ibid.
100 ibid.
101 ibid [12] see also R Higgins and others, Oppenheim’s International Law 8th edn (Green and Co. Ltd, 1955) 264.
102 ibid [12].
103 Foreign Marriages Act 1969, India s 11.
104 Viswanathan v Abdul Wajid AIR [1963] SC 1 (SC) 14–15.
105 Satya v Teja AIR [1975] SC 105 [8].
B. Underdeveloped Status of Private International Law in India

As stated earlier, compared to other branches of municipal law, the subject of private inter-
national law has been sluggish to evolve. An archetypal example was seen in the legal battle,
which followed the ghastly Bhopal gas tragedy. On 2 December 1984, a massive leak of toxic
methyl isocyanate (MIC) occurred from the plant of Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL), a
subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation, a New York corporation with headquarters in
Danbury, Connecticut.106 Immediately after the incident, the Government of India filed
a suit against Union Carbide in the US, mainly due to the possibility of being awarded a
massive sum of damages.107 However, the Southern District Court of New York dismissed the
case based on forum non conveniens.108 Subsequently, a case was filed against Union Carbide
in Bhopal, India. From the point of legal perspective, the case saw the application of the
rule of ‘absolute liability’109 developed in MC Mehta v Union of India110 which modified the
strict liability rule developed in the historical case of Rylands v Fletcher.111 In comparison
to the principle of strict liability, the invocation of absolute liability entails no defence for
the torts committed. Following the incident, India enacted several statutes including, the
Environmental Protection Act 1986, Public Liability Insurance Act 1991, etc.112 Even though
the defendant company was headquartered in a foreign country, no discussion or arguments
were raised about the possibility of invoking the law of the place of the company’s headquar-
ters based on the doctrine of control. All the evidence suggested that it was a decision to shut
down a refrigeration unit designed to keep the methyl isocyanate cool and inhibit chemi-
cal reactions that led to the catastrophic incident.113 The decision to shut down the coolant
was taken by the company’s headquarters based in Connecticut.114 Indian courts that have
frequently borrowed from the practices of international jurisprudence could have relied on
the Rome II Regulation provisions which enable parties seeking compensation to rely on the
law of the place which gave rise to the incident causing the damage.115 The central reason for
the lack of investigation into the application of foreign law in the Bhopal case and other cases
involving foreign elements lies in the country’s legal structure. An Indian court is not obliged
to look into foreign law unless proved by the parties.116 Foreign law needs to be proved by
expert evidence as a question of fact.117 The complexity involved in establishing the content
of foreign law dissuades parties from pleading foreign law and consequently leads to the
application of and reliance on domestic law.
106 S Rajagopalan, ‘Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Paternalism and Filicide’ (2014) 5 Journal of Indian law and Society 201,
205–206.
107 ibid.
108 ibid; S Rajagopalan, R Schwadron, ‘The Bhopal Incident: How the Courts Have Faced Complex International
Litigation’ (1987) 5(2) Boston University International Law Journal 445, 451–454.
109 Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India Etc AIR [1992] 248 [82]–[83] see also MK Sinha, ‘The Bhopal Gas Leak
Disaster Case: Union Carbide Corporation, etc. v Union of India, etc.’ (1992) 1 (1) Asia Pacific Law Review 118–125.
110 1987 SCR [1] 819.
111 [1868] UKHL 1.
112 The Environmental Protection Act 1986, India; The Public Liability Insurance Act 1991, India.
113 VP Nanda, ‘For Whom the Bell Tolls in the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on Forum Non Conveniens
and Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute’ (1987) 15(2) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy
235–254.
114 ibid, Nanda, 236–237.
115 Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to Non-Contractual obligations (Rome II) Art7.
116 Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 101.
117 ibid, s 45.
Genesis of Private International Law in India 19
Professor Baxi points out that matters become further convoluted because the Indian legal
system combines private international law principles with substantive law, thus obscuring private
international law’s remit.118 He cites examples from Indian statutes, including provisions of capac-
ity and limitations under the Indian Contract Act 1872119 and lex domicilii principles under the
Indian Succession Act 1925.120 He further elaborates that matters of domicile are addressed as part
of constitutional matters leading to the overlooking of private international law concerns.121 The fact
that the country lacks specific legislation in the field acts as a strong deterrent to the development
of private international law in India. Professor Baxi cites the non-existence of academic engage-
ment in the subject as a major causative factor leading to the starvation of the subject.122 Academic
and juristic work detailing Indian private international law was virtually absent until the late
twentieth century. As part of course curriculums at law schools, great treatises of Dicey, Cheshire,
and Graveson were prescribed and taught to students without contextualising the socio-political-legal
scenario.123 Paras Diwan undertook the first methodical attempt to present an Indian perspec-
tive on the subject for law students and his book has profoundly borrowed from the common law
tradition.124 Due to the stimulus afforded by increased cross-border transactions and an enormous
and widespread Indian diaspora, the subject has been enduring concrete transformations. These impe-
tuses have provided a foundation for a renewed academic interest in the subject with endeavours
to deliberate on the Indian practice of private international law. However, a general framework and a
robust theoretical foundation for the subject have not been investigated much.125
C. Sources of Private International Law in India

The existence of private international law owes much to the presence of divergent municipal
systems of law that differ significantly from each other in regulating cross-border legal relations.
The conflicts between these laws are steadily increasing and as a consequence several codifica-
tion attempts have been made at the international level through conventions and regulations.126
India has been engaging with attempts at codification and unification of private international
law. India has ratified the 1993 Hague Convention on Inter-Country Adoption of Children.127
The country has enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to implement the 1958 New York
Convention.128 However, the country has steadfastly opposed and has refused to accede to
the 1980 Hague Inter-county Child Abduction Convention and the 1980 UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).129 Besides these international conventions,
national laws and domestic judicial decisions are the primary sources of private international law.
118 Baxi (n 91) 227.

119 ibid 227; Indian Contract Act 1872, ss 1, 28.
120 Indian Succession Act (n 67) s 5.
121 Baxi (n 91) 229; Domicile provisions are also covered under Part XI of the Constitution of India 1950, Arts 5–11.
122 Baxi (n 91) 227, 228.
123 ibid 228.
124 Diwan and Diwan (n 76).
125 Baxi (n 91) 228.
126 The Conventions and legal instruments adopted by the Hague Conference of the Private International Law can be
accessed at www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions.
127 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (29 May 1993)
(hereinafter cited as Adoption Convention).

128 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, India Part II Chapter 1 deals with enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
under the New York Convention 1958.

129 S Jolly, ‘International Parental Child Abduction: An Explorative Analysis of Legal Standards and Judicial Interpretation
in India’ (2007) 31 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 20–40.
i. Statutes
A lack of legislative interference historically characterises Indian private international law.
The point was highlighted by the court in Y Narasimha Rao and Ors v Y Venkata Lakshmi
which observed that
the rules of private international law in this country are not codified and are scattered in different enact-
ments such as the Civil Procedure Code, the Contract Act, the Indian Succession Act, the Indian Divorce
Act the Special Marriage Act, etc. In addition, some rules have also been evolved by judicial decisions in
matters of status, legal capacity of natural persons, matrimonial disputes, custody of children, adoption,
testamentary and intestate succession, etc.130
The Civil Procedure Code 1908, passed during the British period, codified the rules on jurisdic-
tion and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. However, the Civil Procedure Code
did not provide any guidance on choice of law rules. Reference to jurisdiction, but an absence of
provisions on choice of law, is also characteristic of statutes dealing with specific subjects such as
marriage and divorce. The Hindu Marriage Act 1954,131 the Special Marriage Act 1954,132 and the
Indian Divorce Act 1869133 have only provided for rules on jurisdiction. The sole exception seems
to be in the commercial field. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 has detailed provisions
on jurisdiction, choice of law, and the enforcement of arbitral awards.134 The incorporation of
choice of law and jurisdiction clauses in arbitration was done in the context of the country’s inter-
national obligations under the New York Convention.135 In this regard, India can learn valuable
lessons from its neighbouring country Nepal. Nepal has drafted its new Code of Civil Procedure
that has a specific chapter dealing with private international law concerns. It provides for rules
on jurisdiction, choice of law and the recognition of judgment, thereby providing much-needed
clarity in legal disputes.136
ii. Domestic and International Judicial Decisions

In the absence of a specific legislative mandate, most of the evolution of private international
law in the country was achieved through judicial decisions. The judicial decisions bear strong
inspiration from international conventions137 and juridical statements of other jurisdictions.
An analysis of private international law decisions shows the strong indefinable impression of
common law in the country’s legal practice.138 Reference to common law was unavoidable, with
the Privy Council being the country’s highest appellate authority until independence. A more or
less similar approach of reading common law provisions into the domestic arena continued even
130 Y Narasimha Rao and Ors v Y Venkata Lakshmi And Anr [1991] SCR (2) 821 [3].
131 Hindu Marriage Act (n 24) s 19.
132 The Special Marriage Act 1954, India s 31.
133 The Indian Divorce Act 1869, India s 4.
134 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act (n128).
135 India ratified the New York Convention on 13 July 1960. Status available at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/
arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2.
136 The National Civil (Code) Act 2017 (Nepal) ss 692–721.
137 Satya v Teja (n 105) the Supreme Court referred to the Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal
Separations (adopted 1 June 1970, entered into force 24 August 1975) (hereinafter Divorce and Separation Convention
1970); in Narasimha Rao (n 130), the Supreme Court referred to the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters (27 September 1968) OJ L388/1.
138 Noronha (n 78) 7.
Operationalisation of Private International Law: Classic Concepts 21
after independence.139 In Indian and General Investment v Sri Ramchandra Mardaraja Deo140
the court expressly referred to the common law principle which conferred jurisdiction on the
English courts from the mere transient presence of a defendant on English soil and held that
such principle could not be considered adequate and ‘foreign courts can scarcely be expected to
recognise a jurisdiction based upon mere transient presence’.141 The court explicitly stated that
the courts in India are at liberty to lay down and follow their own rules with regard to private
international law. Such liberty to lay down rules equips the judiciary not only to adopt the best
practices of other jurisdictions based on a sense of justice, equity, and good conscience, but also
to build up an indigenous jurisprudence.142 Similar observations were made in Satya v Teja,
involving the recognition of foreign divorce. The court ruled against the mechanical adoption of
the rules of private international law as they have evolved in other countries.143 Consequently,
while judicial decisions reveal strong traces of common law influence, courts are gradually
developing a body of Indian private international law.
iii. Juristic Writings

Judicial statements have referred to and engaged with scholastic writings by Dicey, Morris and
Cheshire, to name a few.144 However, indigenous writings on the subject have been far less in
number and theoretical engagements or a broader private international law framework have not
been focused.145 Many reasons can be attributed to this underdeveloped status. The legal structure
of India is based on strong unitary features. Hence, unlike federal jurisdictions like the US, Canada,
and Australia, no opportunity exists to develop private international principles as between Indian
States. Compared to other jurisdictions, until the 1980s the number of private international law
disputes that had come up before the judiciary has been far less in number. However, the open-
ing up of the economy and the increased Indian diaspora has facilitated a growth in cross border
transactions. As a result, the number and magnitude of disputes having foreign elements began to
swell prompting the judiciary into making private international law more operational.146
V. Operationalisation of Private International Law:

Classic Concepts
The following sections will deliberate on the three essential stages of selecting applicable law,
including the characterisation, connecting factors, and renvoi.
139 ibid.
140 Indian and General Investment Trust, Ltd (n 35) [21].
141 ibid.
142 ibid [22].
143 Satya v Teja (n 105) [9].
144 In Laxmichand and Ors. v Mst. Tipuri AIR [1956] Raj 81 [7] involving the recognition of a foreign judgment; in
Sankaran Govindan v Lakshmi Bharathi AIR [1974] 1764, and Dr. Yogesh Bhardwaj v State of UP AIR [1991] 356, involv-
ing the question of domicile, the court referred to the writings of Dicey and Morris and Cheshire.
145 Some of the early writings on the subject include Justice PV Rajamannar, ‘The Future of Private International Law in
India’ (1952) 1 Indian Yearbook of International Affairs 20; TS R Rao, ‘Private International Law in India’ (1955) 3 Indian
Yearbook of International Affairs 219; YS Chittale, ‘First Decision of Supreme Court Involving Conflict of Law’ (1956) 5(4)
American Journal of Comparative Law 629; TSR Rao, ‘Conflict of Laws in the Indian Tax System’ (1959) 8 Indian Yearbook
of International Affairs 215; VC Govindraj, ‘Foreign Arbitral Awards and Foreign Judgments Based on Such Awards’
(1964) 13(4) International Comparative Law Quarterly 1465.
146 Baxi (n 91) 228.
A. Characterisation
Characterisation denotes the method through which the court assigns the nature and legal
category of claims.147 Characterisation is technically not unique to private international law,
but is an inherent feature of all domestic and international judicial processes.148 However, in
private international disputes, the scenario can become complicated as jurisdictions differ in
their approaches to legal concepts and issues.149 For example, A from Pakistan, boarded a bus at
Lahore, Pakistan. The bus is scheduled to go to Delhi, India. A is injured on the way in Amritsar,
India. If a case is filed in Pakistan or India, the court must determine whether the subject matter
should be considered part of contract or tort. Similarly, if the question before the Indian court
concerns the succession to the specific property of a person domiciled in India but a national
of the UK, the court should first determine the nature of the relevant properties as movable
or immovable. The determination and assignment of specific categories become vital as the
connecting factor applied in choosing the relevant law depends on the precise characterisation.
If characterisation leads to a determination that the property is movable, the applicable law
will depend on the connecting factor of domicile. Whereas, if the property is immovable, the
applicable law will depend on the location of the property.
Numerous approaches have been developed by jurists and followed by different jurisdictions:
• Characterisation by the lex fori.
• Characterisation by the lex causae.
• Two-stage characterisation: primary characterisation following the lex fori and secondary
characterisation the lex causae.
• Characterisation based on comparative law and analytical jurisprudence.150
i. Characterisation based on the lex fori

The first generalised proposition on characterisation was formulated by Bartin, who propounded
that, in the absence of a unified approach among jurisdictions, the law of the forum should deter-
mine the nature of relationship.151 Cheshire supported the idea in England,152 Falconbridge in
Canada, and Lorenzen in the US.153 The proposition dealt a severe blow to the internationalisa-
tion of private international law. Bartin admitted two exceptions to the characterisation theory
based on lex fori. First, determining whether the property is movable or immovable is to be
determined by the lex situs (location of the property).154 Second, the formation of a contract by
147 CMV Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Laws 4th edn (Oxford Press, 2011) 20.
148 V Allarousse, ‘A Comparative Approach to the Conflict of Characterization in Private International Law’ (1991) 23(3)
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 479–516, 479.

149 D Falconbridge, ‘Characterization in the Conflict of Laws’ (1937) 53(2) Law Quarterly Review 235–258.
150 J Unger, ‘The Place of Classification in Private International Law’ (1937) 19 Bell Yard Journal of the Law Society’s
School of Law 3–21.

151 Bartin, ‘De I’Impossibilite d’Arriver d’la Suppression Definitive des Conflits de Lois (1897) 24 Clunet 255, 255–68,
466–95, 720–60 quoted in V Allarousse (n 148) 482; Kahn supported this proposition.
152 GC Cheshire, Private International Law 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 1938) 24–45.
153 EG Lorenzen, ‘The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws’ (1920) 20 (3) Columbia Law Review 246–282;
EG Lorenzen, ‘The Characterisation, Classification, or Characterisation Problem in the Conflict of Laws’ (1941) 50(5)
Yale Law Journal 743–761; RA Pascal, ‘Characterization as an Approach to the Conflict of Laws’ (1940) 2(4) Louisiana
Law Review 715–728.
154 Bartin (n 151).
correspondence (not face-to-face) should be determined by reference to the law which postpones
its formation for the longest period.155 The theory is supported on the basis that otherwise the
law of the forum would lose all control on a case. The application of the lex fori is also supported
based on sovereign necessity.156 However, the theory fails to articulate the accurate nature of
private international law, as the choice of characterisation is innate in private international law
and a mechanical application of the lex fori in most cases gives rise to legal isolation.157 It is also
criticised as a flagrant contradiction to use the forum’s characterisation and to validate that it in
accordance with conflict of laws principles.158
ii. Characterisation based on the lex causae

Despagnet and Wolff advocated the application of lex causae in opposition to Bartin’s theory of
lex fori.159 According to Wolff, ‘every legal rule takes its classification from the legal system to
which it belongs’.160 Despagnet proposed that the applicable law governing the legal facts deter-
mine their characterisation. He stated that reliance on the law of the forum was against the spirit
of private international law. However, the theory suffers from a vicious circle issue.161 In the
words of Cheshire, ‘If the law which is finally to regulate the matter (i.e., the lex causae) depends
upon classification, how can classification be made according to that law.’162 The point is that
if the applicable law is to be selected based on characterisation, how the applicable law cannot
govern characterisation.
iii. Characterisation based on Comparative Law

Rabel and Beckett advanced the outlook that analytical jurisprudence based on the comparative
study of laws should govern characterisation.163 Though the theory appears to be comprehensive,
it has been criticised for being impractical as it imposes a heavy burden on a court to assess and
evaluate different legal systems. Morris observed ‘this view is superficially attractive because the
judicial technique in conflict cases should be more cosmopolitan and less insular than in domestic
cases’.164 However, this approach puts a heavy burden and responsibility on the judicial system.
iv. Two-stage Characterisation
Falconbridge popularised the idea.165 It was suggested that, in the first stage of the dispute, the legal
category of the dispute should be determined by reference to the lex fori. In the second stage, the
function of the courts would be to examine a relevant foreign law and its applicability to the facts.
155 ibid.
156 WE Beckett, ‘The Question of Classification (“Qualification”) in Private International Law’ (1934) 15 British Year
Book of International Law 46–81, 51; EG Lorenzen (n 153) 281.

157 V Allarousse (n 148) 484.
158 ibid. See generally Beckett (n 156) 55.
159 M Wolff, Private International Law 2nd edn (Clarendon Press, 1950) 154.
160 ibid.
161 cited in Pascal (n 153) 719.
162 Diwan and Diwan (n 76) 79.
163 Beckett (n 156) 58–60; See also T Remus, ‘Revival of Rabel’s Transnational Characterisation for Rules of Conflict:
Some Answers in a European Convention’ (2017) International Business Law Journal 439–460.
164 Dicey, Morris & Collins, Conflict of Laws, 15th edn (3rd Supp, Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 40.
165 Falconbridge (n 149) 236; see JM Cormack, ‘Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in
the Conflict of Laws: A Study of Problems Involved in Determining Whether or Not the Forum Should Follow Its Own
Choice of a Conflict-of-Laws Principle’ (1940) 14 Southern California Law Review 221–275.
An assessment of the practice of jurisdictions reveals that initially both the lex fori and the
lex causae have been followed in the process of characterisation.
v. Judicial Statements on Characterisation

Ogden v Ogden166 is a classic case illustrative of the complexities of the characterisation process.
The facts of the case are recapitulated here. A ceremony of marriage in English form was cele-
brated in England without the knowledge of the parents between a domiciled Englishwoman and
a Frenchman domiciled in France.167 A French court annulled the marriage on the ground that
the parental consent required under the French law had not been obtained.168 Subsequently, the
Frenchman contracted another marriage in France. The Englishwoman petitioned in England to
dissolve her marriage on the ground of her husband’s desertion and adultery. The petition was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction as her domicile had changed to France after the marriage. The
woman subsequently married an Englishman named William Ogden. Ogden filed a suit asking
for a decree of nullity on the ground that, at the time of marriage, she was already a married
woman. The English court held that the second marriage was bigamous and void, as the court
would not recognise the nullity decree pronounced by the French court. The English court char-
acterised parental consent based on the lex fori as a matter relating to formality and the law of
the place of marriage (lex loci celebrationis) (England) applied to formalities of marriage.169 As
a practical consequence, the Englishwoman was considered married under the English law, but
unmarried under French law.170
In Re Cohn, a mother and her daughter domiciled in Germany and residing in London died
there during an air bombing raid. According to the mother’s will, the daughter would inherit the
mother’s movables if the daughter survived her.171 According to English conflict rules, succession
to movables is governed by the law of the domicile, but procedural matters are governed by the
lex fori.172 According to the English statute, the legal presumption was that the elder died first,
but according to the German one both died simultaneously. Though the method of proof was a
matter of procedure, that was of no use as it was impossible to resolve who died first.173 The judge
decided that the lex causae was German and under German law the issue was substantive.174
An analogous perspective was adopted in the case of Re Maldonado.175 The fact that there are
no universal criteria for characterisation might result in judgments being contingent on how the
characterisation is achieved and this might embolden forum shopping. Savigny proposed that,
in order to sidestep forum shopping, courts need to find the ‘natural seat’ or ‘centre of gravity’ by
distinguishing the cluster of connecting factors for characterisation.176 Categorising the centre
of gravity would result in the same choice of law, no matter where the case was filed. However,
the solution has not found much support owing to differing national approaches and as a result
166 Ogden v Ogden (1908) 1 P 46 [Eng CA].

167 ibid; JDI Hughes, ‘Judicial Method and the Problem in Ogden v Ogden’ (1928) 44 Law Quarterly Review 217–226.
168 Collier (n 37) 14; A Reed, ‘Essential Validity of Marriage: The Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to
Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules’ (2000) 20(3) New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law
387–450, 392.
169 T Baty, ‘Capacity and Form of Marriage in the Conflict of Laws’ (1917) 26(6) Yale Law Journal 444–463, 456.
170 PK Agarwal, ‘The Theory of Characterization: A Critical Legal Study Perspective’ (2015) 4(3) Voice of Research 45.
171 Re Cohn [1945] 1 ch 5; see V Allarousse (n 148) 494.
172 ibid.
173 ibid.
174 Collier (n 37) 18.
175 Re Maldonadao [1954] P 223.
176 Savigny (n 33) 67–68.
forum shopping continues unabated. Generally, the process of characterisation following the
lex fori and recognising the inescapable conceptual nature of the forum law has been adopted
by most courts around the world.177 Cormack, who supports the lex fori approach, writes that it
may sound absurd to advocate that the forum apply the domestic law of another jurisdiction to
a case when a court of that jurisdiction would not do so because it would characterise the ques-
tion differently.178 On practical grounds, the reliance of lex fori is supported as there is a burden
placed on the judicial system when there is a reliance on foreign law.179
The classical debate regarding which law characterises the matters submitted – lex fori or
lex causae – has hardly ever been examined under Indian case law. However, selected elements of
characterisation were seen in the first case of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills and Ors. v Harnam
Singh and Others decided by the Supreme Court of India.180 The plaintiffs were the partners
of a firm known as Harnam Singh Jagat Singh. The firm carried on the business of producing
cotton cloth at Lyallpur, which became part of Pakistan after the partition. The defendants, Delhi
Cloth and General Mills Ltd, with headquarters at Delhi, carried on business at Lyallpur before
partition.181 The plaintiffs purchased cloth from the defendants from time to time and made
advance lump-sum payments against their purchases. After the partition, the plaintiffs fled from
Pakistan to India and became evacuees from Pakistan.182 The Pakistan Government froze all
evacuee assets and transferred the assets to a custodian of evacuee property. The plaintiffs sued
the defendants in India to recover the balance amount and the Punjab High Court delivered a
judgment in their favour against which the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.183 The
plaintiffs took the position that the custodian did not pay them in Pakistan and that Pakistani
law did not apply to the debt because of the plaintiff ’s presence in India and, if it did apply, it
was confiscatory and therefore against the public policy of the forum.184 The Court charac-
terised the claim as one for debt involving contractual questions. Based on the test of real and
substantial connection, the Court invoked Pakistani law as the applicable law. The applicable
law would be living and changing even though Lyallpur was part of India when the transaction
took place.185 This sole judgment is, however, no indication of trends of Indian courts towards
characterisation.
B. Connecting Factors
Once the court has characterised the legal dispute under consideration, the next concern is
identifying the applicable law to the dispute.186 For instance, A and B domiciled in India and of
Indian nationality marry in England. The court is called upon to determine the validity of their
marriage. Private international law postulates that the applicable law concerning the validity of a
177 R Baratta, ‘The Process of Characterisation in the EC Conflict of Laws: Suggesting a Flexible Approach’ (2015) 6
Yearbook of Private International Law 155–170.

178 Cormack (n 165) 227.
179 ibid.
180 The Delhi Cloth and General Mills & Co Ltd. v Harnam Singh and Others AIR [1955] 590.
181 ibid [3].
182 ibid [8].
183 ibid [7]. YS Chitale, ‘India: First Decision of Supreme Court Involving Conflict of Laws; Law Applicable to Debt’
(1956) 5(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 629, 631.

184 ibid [41].
185 ibid [46].
186 S Szászy, ‘The Basic Connecting Factor in International Cases in the Domain of Civil Procedure’ (1966) 15(2)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 436–456, 436.

marriage is determined by the place of closest connection based on a factual assessment of each case.
In terms of the validity of a marriage, two questions are identified; the formal and material
aspects. The law of the place of the celebration determines the formal validity of a marriage. In the
example cited above, since the marriage was contracted in London, the connecting factor being
the place of celebration, the applicable law for formal validity would be English law.
Some of the commonly identified connecting factors are listed below.
• The law of the place of celebration determines the formal validity of the marriage.187
• The lex situs governs succession to immovable property.188
• Procedural matters are governed by the lex fori.189
The function of connecting factors is to link legal categories to the applicable law. Though the
number of connecting factors under private international law is small, a consensus on connecting
factors has materialised between civil law systems and common law jurisdictions only regard-
ing specific factors. The unanimity on connecting factors have evolved through the historical
development as evidenced through judicial statements and have subsequently been codified by
international conventions and regulations.190 As a result, conflict and indeterminacy associated
with private international law persist at multiple levels. First, the approaches of the common law
and civil law differ on connecting factors. According to common law countries, the law of the
parties’ domicile at the time of marriage or the law of the intended matrimonial home determines
the material aspects of the marriage.191 For civil law countries, the law of the parties’ national-
ity at the time of marriage determines the material aspects of their marriage.192 Similarly, for
common law countries, succession to movable property is governed by the law of the last domi-
cile of the deceased, but for civil law countries the same is determined by the law of nationality
of the parties.193 Second, specific issues are associated with more than one connecting factor,
even under one legal system. A contract’s formal validity is either governed by the law of the
place of contracting or by the proper law of the contract.194 Lastly, the understanding of connect-
ing factors varies among jurisdictions. For instance, if an Indian court identifies the connecting
factor as domicile, the question persists as to the meaning of domicile, whether it needs to be
understood based on the forum’s law or foreign law.195
In the case of Re Annesley, A died domiciled in France according to English law and in
England according to French law. Russell J held that A died domiciled in France according to
187 Clarkson & Hill (n 147) 33.

188 ibid.
189 ibid.
190 Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages provided a place of marriage as the
connecting factor to determine the formal aspect of marriage (hereinafter 1978 Validity of Marriages Convention
1978); Maintenance Convention 1973 (n 79) provides internal law of the habitual residence of the maintenance credi-
tor shall govern the maintenance obligations; Divorce and Separation Convention 1970 (n 137) and Convention on the
Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes 1978 (hereinafter Matrimonial Property Convention 1978) provides,
habitual residence and nationality as the connecting factor; Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction adopts habitual residence as the connecting factor.
191 Clarkson & Hill (n 147) 356–357.
192 M Raiteri, ‘Citizenship as a Connecting Factor in Private International Law for Family Matters’ (2014) 10(2) Journal
of Private International Law 309, 312; see also V Gaertner, ‘European Choice of Law Rules in Divorce (Rome III): An
Examination of the Possible Connecting Factors in Divorce Matters against the Backgrounds of Private International Law
Developments’ (2006) 2(1) Journal of Private International Law 99–136.
193 Clarkson & Hill (n147) 506.
194 ibid 33.
195 Diwan and Diwan (n 76) 95.
the law of the forum.196 Under Indian private international law, judicial statements and statutory
provisions have elaborated on few connecting factors. In Delhi Cloth Mills v Harnam Singh, the
court observed that the applicable law in the case of a contract is the place with which the trans-
action has its closest and most real connection and can be based on the parties’ choice, which
is restrictive in nature.197 However, restrictive party autonomy has been modified in subsequent
cases.198 Under the Indian Succession Act 1925, section 5(1) provides that succession to immov-
able property in India of a deceased shall be regulated by the law of India wherever such person
may have had his domicile at the time of his death.199 Further, succession to movable property
of a deceased is regulated by the law of the country in which such person was domiciled at the
time of death.200
C. Renvoi
Renvoi, as a vexed legal question, has puzzled academics and practitioners of private interna-
tional law.201 The application of renvoi comes into operation in the last stages of the conflict of
law process, once the law of the forum court identifies a foreign law as the applicable law in the
dispute.202 Beaumont and McEleavy define renvoi thus:
[A] question of renvoi arises where the choice-of-law rules of the forum refer an issue to the courts of
another country which, under its rules of choice of law, in turn, refers the issue back to the law of the
forum or on to the law of a third country.203
For instance, consider a legal dispute before an Indian court relating to the validity of a marriage
celebrated in India between two Indian nationals domiciled in France. The Indian court, based
on domicile as the connecting factor on issues concerning capacity to marry, will identify French
law as the applicable law. The question then would be the meaning and scope of the applicable
French law. The term ‘French law’ can be given either a narrow or a broader interpretation. In the
narrow interpretation, the reference to French law indicates the country’s internal law referring
to French domestic substantive laws on marriage. In the broader sense, a reference to French law
indicates the whole of French law, including its conflict of laws. It could be that both Indian law
(lex fori) and French law (lex causae) identify ‘domicile’ as the connecting factor but interpret
‘domicile’ to mean different things. It could also be that Indian law (lex fori) and French law
(lex causae) differ on the applicable connecting factor – domicile and nationality, respectively.204
In such a scenario, the Indian court may apply Indian law on the ground that a French court
would apply Indian law.205 This process is known as renvoi by remission. Renvoi can also arise
196 Re Annesley [1926] ch 692.

197 British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries [1990] 3 SCC 481, Rabindra N Maitra v
Life Insurance Corporation of India AIR [1964] Cal 141 (CHC) [16]–[18].
198 National Thermal Power Corporation v Singer Company [1992] 3 SCC 551 [14].
199 Indian Succession Act (n 67) s 5(1).
200 ibid.
201 LT Bates, ‘Remission and Transmission in American Conflict of Laws’ (1931) 16(3) Cornell Law Quarterly 311–319,
313; AEV Overbeck, ‘Renvoi in the Institute of International Law’ (1963) 12(4) American Journal of Comparative Law
544–548; W Raeburn, ‘The Open Offer Formula and the Renvoi in Private International Law’ (1948) 25 British Year Book
of International Law 211–235.
202 M Shava, ‘Choice of Law and the Doctrine of Renvoi in Israeli Law – A Comparative Commentary’ (2000) 15 Tel Aviv
University Studies in Law 123–146.

203 PR Beaumont and PE McEleavy, Antons Private International law 3rd edn (W Green, 2011) 105.
204 Collier (n 37) 20.
205 ibid.
through transmission, if instead of referring the matter back to Indian law, French conflict law
rules point to the application of the law of a third country.206
The concept of renvoi was employed in the classic case of Forgo.207 Forgo was a Bavarian
national who lived his life mostly in France. He died, leaving substantial movable property in
France. The French court resolved the succession to movables based on the law of the nationality
and referred to Bavarian law. Bavarian law provided for inheritance by collateral relatives of the
maternal lineage. However, under Bavarian conflict of law rules, the applicable law was the law of
the deceased’s domicile. Consequently, the Bavarian legal system remitted the matter back to the
French legal system. Accepting the renvoi, the French court applied French law to the case and, as
a result, the entire of the deceased’s property passed to the state to the detriment of his collateral
relatives.208
i. Types of Renvoi

Scholars have discussed many scenarios of renvoi, which can be presented through an illustra-
tion. A, a British subject (UK citizen) domiciled in France, dies without a will. The English court
has to decide on the distribution of A’s movable property. In the first scenario, the English court
(lex fori) applying its choice of law rules, decides that the law of the domicile governs intestate
succession to movables and hence the applicable law is the French law. The English court would
interpret French law to mean the substantive law of France, excluding its private international
law rules. In this scenario, there would be no application of renvoi.209 In the second scenario,
the English court interprets the applicable French law (lex causae) to include its conflict of
laws and applies the law that would be chosen under French law’s conflict process. The French
choice of law process refers the matter back to the law of nationality and the English court
would accept the remission back and apply English law in a process known as single renvoi or
partial renvoi.210 Single renvoi was followed in Forgo but repudiated in Re Askew.211 In the third
scenario, the English court interprets the lex causae to include its conflicts of laws and rules of
renvoi. English court would attempt to evaluate the situation from a French judge’s perspective.
The French court would refer the issue to English law as the law of nationality. While English
law would refer the issue back to French law as the legal system of the deceased’s domicile.
France’s legal system would accept the English remission. The English court would then apply
French internal law. This is known as double or total renvoi.212 Double renvoi was followed in
the case of Re Annesley213 and Re Ross.214
206 EW Briggs, ‘“Renvoi” in the Succession of Tangibles: A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis’ (1954) 64 Yale Law
Journal 195–219, 219; EG Lorenzon, ‘Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law: Renvoi in General (1910) 10(3)
Columbia Law Review 190–207.
207 L’Affaire Forgo [1932] 59 Clunet 281.
208 A Frederick, ‘The Problem of Renvoi in Private International Law’ (1926) 12 Transactions of the Grotius Society
63–79, 65.
209 SB Stein, ‘Choice of Law and the Doctrine of Renvoi’ (1971) 17 Mc Gill Law journal 582, 584.
210 ibid 585.
211 [1930] 2 ch 259.
212 Stein (n 209) 586.
213 [1926] ch 692.
214 [1930] 1 ch 377.
ii. Reflections from Other jurisdictions

Besides judicial practice, the idea is supported by voluminous literature, which has developed a
strong theoretical foundation and an excessive academic obsession with the doctrine of renvoi.215
The idea has been invoked, primarily in matters concerning title to foreign land,216 formalities of
a will,217 and the status of marriage.218 Along with the fervent academic obsession, the doctrine
has also been criticised as impractical and imposing a high threshold on the judiciary. Notably,
a substantial part of criticism has stemmed from American jurists who considered that renvoi
was not part of American conflict of laws.219 Falconbridge had expressed the fear that, if the
court is misinformed as to foreign law or fails to interpret accurately the evidence of foreign
law, the potential application of the doctrine of total renvoi may lead to a grotesque result or
a miscarriage of justice.220 Further, in addition to evidentiary problems and a high threshold,
renvoi allows judges to interpret foreign law according to their personal view and circuitously
bring in their public policy notions.221 Because of these criticisms, the doctrine has not been
invoked uniformly across jurisdictions.
The case of Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd222 saw the revival of
renvoi in international torts. The case involved a claim made by the appellant against Overseas
Projects Corporation (OPC) for damages for personal injuries sustained due to OPC’s negli-
gence in China.223 Under Australian choice of law rules, the law of the place of harm (lex loci
delicti) governed the claim. The reference to the place of harm would have meant that Chinese
law would apply, but a one-year statute of limitations barred that claim.224 The High Court,
however, found in favour of Neilson under the doctrine of total renvoi. The Court relied on
Article 146 of the General Principles of Civil Law of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC),
which states that, in a claim for compensation for damages resulting from any infringement
of rights, the law of the place where the infringement occurred should be applied. Article 146
provides that where both parties are nationals of the same country, their own country’s law may
be applied.225 The High Court referred back to the law of Australia, meaning that Australia’s
limitations period applied, and Neilson triumphed.226
In Islamic Republic of Iran v Denyse Berend,227 Iran sought the return of a fragment of an
Achaemenid limestone relief as a part of a national monument that was taken from its terri-
tory in 1932. A French citizen had purchased the property through an auction in New York.
215 Several theories supporting renvoi have been propounded, including the mutual disclaimer theory, the theory or
renvoi proper, and the foreign court theory. For a general discussion see generally E Lorentzen, ‘The Renvoi Doctrine
in the Conflict of Laws: Meaning of “the Law of the Country”’ (1917) 27 Yale Law Journal 510–534; E Griswold ‘Renvoi
Revisited’ (1938) 51(7) Harvard Law Review 1165–1208, 1183; A Briggs, ‘In Praise and Defense of Renvoi’ (1998) 47(4)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 877–884, 881.
216 Re Duke of Wellington [1947] LR Ch 506.
217 Collier v Rivaz (1841) 2 Curt. Ecc. 855 Re Ross [1930] 1 ch 377.
218 Re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259; R v Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, ex parte Arias [1968] 2 QB 956.
219 Lorenzen (n 206); LT Bates, ‘Remission and Transmission in American Conflict of Laws’ (1931) 16(3) Cornell Law
Review 311–319.
220 JD Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflicts of Laws 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 51.
221 Stein (n 209) 582; RA Leflar, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law’ (1996) 41 New York University
Law Review 267, 299.

222 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54.
223 ibid [20].
224 ibid [4]–[7]; A Gray, ‘The Rise of Renvoi in Australia: Creating the Theoretical Framework’ (2007) 30(1) University of
New South Wales Law Journal 103–126,106.

225 ibid [277].
226 ibid [278].
227 Iran v Berend [2007] EWHC 132 (QB).
To overcome the lex situs rule in property matters, Iran relied on the invocation of renvoi, which
would have meant the application of Iranian law to the dispute.228 The court observed that the
application of renvoi was a question of policy. The doctrine allows judges to further the public
policy of a particular choice of law rule. Based on the fact that renvoi had never been invoked in
the case of movable property in England, Eady J said: ‘Millett J saw no room for the doctrine of
renvoi, in the share context, and I see no room either as a matter of policy for its introduction in
the context of a tangible object such as that in contention here.’229
One of the impetuses for the invocation of renvoi arose due to the divergent approaches of
jurisdictions with respect to the application of the connecting factors of domicile and nationality.
The 1955 Convention Relating to the Settlement of the Conflicts between the Law of Nationality
and the Law of Domicile attempted to resolve the conflict. Article 1 of the Convention provides
that when the state where the person concerned is domiciled requires the application of national
law, but the state of which that person is a citizen requires the application of the law of domi-
cile, all contracting states are to apply the provisions of the law of domicile. Article 2 states
that when both the state where the person concerned is domiciled and the state of which that
person is a citizen require the application of the law of domicile, all contracting states are to
apply the provisions of the law of domicile.230 Article 3 provides that when the state where the
person concerned is domiciled and the state of which that person is a citizen both require the
application of national law, all contracting states are to apply the provisions of national law.231
The Convention has not come into force until now. Most of the international conventions which
have attempted to codify the rules on private International law have excluded the application
of renvoi.232 However, the cases discussed above reveal that, despite voluminous criticism, the
doctrine has endured and appears from time to time.233
iii. Application of Renvoi under Indian Private International Law

This section endeavours to identify the issues of renvoi in private international law that have
been presented before the judiciary in India. An assessment of the Indian judicial scenario
reveals that not many cases exist which have examined the concept of renvoi.
In NTPC v Singer Co,234 the National Thermal Power Corporation of India (NTPC) entered into
a contract with the Singer Company (Singer), a British entity, to supply equipment and erect certain
projects in India. A dispute arose and Singer sought arbitration under the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) rules in London, as provided in the contract. Singer won the arbitration and
was granted an award by the ICC tribunal.235 Singer then sought to enforce the award in India
under the Indian Foreign Awards Act, limiting Indian courts’ role in recognising and enforcing
228 D Fincham, ‘Rejecting Renvoi for Movable Cultural Property: The Islamic Republic of Iran v Denyse Berend’ (2007)
14(1) International Journal of Cultural Property 111–120, 113.

229 Iran v Berend (n 227) [23]–[24].
230 ibid, Art 2.
231 ibid, Art 3.
232 The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (adopted November 2012, entered
into force 19 March 2015) Art 8: ‘Exclusion of renvoi; A choice of law does not refer to rules of private international law
of the law chosen by the parties unless the parties expressly provide otherwise’; Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of
17 June 2008, on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation) OJ L177/6 Art 20: ‘Exclusion of renvoi
The application of the law of any country specified by this Regulation means the application of the rules of law in force in
that country other than its rules of private international law unless provided otherwise in this Regulation.’
233 L Kramer, ‘Return of the Renvoi’ (1991) 66 New York University Law Review 979, 1016.
234 National Thermal Power Corporation v Singer Company (n 198).
235 ibid [2].
the foreign arbitral award. NTPC argued against enforcement, claiming that since the contract was
governed by Indian law it was not a ‘foreign award’ under the Act.236 NTPC argued that as a result,
despite the contract’s explicit submission to ICC arbitration, the whole case should be retried in
India under the Indian Arbitration Act. The Delhi High Court dismissed NTPC’s application and
NTPC appealed to the Supreme Court of India.237 The Court held that the parties have the free-
dom to choose the law governing an international commercial arbitration agreement. They may
choose the substantive law governing the arbitration agreement and the procedural law governing
the conduct of the arbitration. Such choice is exercised either expressly or by implication.238 Where
there is no express choice of the law governing the contract as a whole or the arbitration agreement
in particular, there is in the absence of any contrary indication a presumption that the parties have
intended that the proper law of the contract, as well as the law governing the arbitration agreement,
are the same as the law of the country in which the arbitration is agreed to be held. On the other
hand, where the proper law of the contract is expressly chosen by the parties, as in the present case,
such law must in the absence of an unmistakable intention to the contrary govern the arbitration
agreement which, though collateral or ancillary to the main contract, is nevertheless part of such
contract.239 The Court relied on Dicey and observed that the ‘proper law is thus the law which the
parties have expressly or impliedly chosen, or which is imputed to them by reason of its closest
and most intimate connection with the contract’. However, it must be clarified that the expression
‘proper law’ refers to the substantive principles of the domestic law of the chosen system and not to
its conflict of laws rules. The law of contract is not affected by the doctrine of renvoi.240
In Hindustan Copper Ltd. v Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc.241 the parties had entered
into a contract for the sale of copper concentrate. A dispute between the parties arose regarding
the dry weight of the goods and Centrotrade invoked the arbitration clause before the ICC. The
arbitral tribunal upheld the validity of the arbitration clause and Centrotrade’s claims. Centrotrade
applied to enforce the foreign award under section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act 1996. The same was allowed by a single bench of the Calcutta High Court.242 The High Court
held that in the handful of cases where parties might choose and agree to apply Indian law to their
contract and nonetheless confer jurisdiction on a foreign court to supervise the arbitral proce-
dure (such as in matters like setting aside an award), only in that small number of cases will the
award be a foreign award under Part II of the 1996 Act. However, it would not have been a foreign
award under the now-repealed Foreign Awards Enforcement Act provisions.243 These judgments
reveal the exclusion of the doctrine of renvoi in commercial matters.
In Bhanu Constructions Company v AP State Electricity Board and others244 the Government of
India (the ‘Borrower’) entered into a loan agreement with the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund
(the ‘Fund’) for obtaining funds for the implementation of the Srisailam Power Transmission System
Project.245 The validity, interpretation, and performance of the loan agreement and the supporting
guarantee were governed by the laws and regulations of Japan.246 The Fund refused to award the
contract to the Borrower on the ground that it had not satisfactorily met the bid specifications.
236 ibid.
237 ibid.
238 ibid [24].
239 ibid.
240 ibid [18].
241 Hindustan Copper Ltd. v Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc [2004] SCC OnLine Cal 446.
242 ibid [4], [23].
243 ibid.
244 Bhanu Constructions Company Ltd. and Ors. v AP State Electricity Board and Ors [1997] (6) ALT 328.
245 ibid [2].
246 ibid [2].
The Borrower challenged the rejection and argued that it was arbitrary and denied its legitimate
expectation of fair treatment when it was admittedly the lowest bidder.247 The Borrower contended
that the loan agreement must be tested under Indian law or the Indian Constitution. The court
observed that the agreement was governed by general terms and conditions which provided that
the laws and regulations of Japan were to govern it. The court stated that ‘one of the clearest rejec-
tions of any renvoi doctrine is to be found in the field of contract, it being thought that no sane
businessman or his lawyers would choose the application of renvoi’.248 The court quoted the obser-
vations of Lord Diplock on renvoi and stated that the term ‘proper law of contract’ indicated the
substantive law of the country which the parties had chosen or to which the facts were closely
connected. The reference to proper law is taken as excluding any renvoi, whether of remission or
transmission.249 The court went on to provide scenarios which examined the exclusion of renvoi.
For example, if a contract made in England were expressed to be governed by French law, the
English court would apply French substantive law to it, notwithstanding that a French court apply-
ing its own conflict rules might accept a renvoi to English law as the lex loci contract if the matter
were litigated before it.250
Thus, the existing Indian jurisprudence shows a clear rejection of renvoi in the commercial
field and conforms with global conventions, which have rejected the application of renvoi in
the commercial field. In Jose Paulo Coutinho v Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira,251 the question of
succession and applicability of the Portuguese Civil Code was under consideration. The ques-
tion was whether succession to the property of a Goan situated outside Goa in India will be
governed by the Portuguese Civil Code 1867 as applicable in the State of Goa or the Indian
Succession Act 1925. The petitioner argued that, since Portuguese law was applicable, the prin-
ciples of private international law should apply. He invoked the doctrine of renvoi to urge that,
since the citizens of Goa were governed by foreign law, the court should apply foreign law to the
citizens of Goa. However, the argument was not sustained by the court. Besides these judicial
statements, no dispute has arisen before the Indian courts on the application of renvoi in the
field of family law or non-contractual matters.
VI. Conclusion
Private international law in India has had a gradual evolution beginning from British rule,
wherein disputes principally dealing with interpersonal conflicts came up for judicial resolu-
tion. After independence, the scattered and limited statutory provisions of the Civil Procedure
Code, Indian Succession Act, Hindu Marriage Act, Guardians and wards Act, etc, and judicial
statements provided the foundation for, and acted as a source of, private international law in
the country. Thus, adequacy or inadequacy of the principles of private international law in India
essentially turns out to involve a critical assessment of the law laid down by the courts. Judicial
statements have traced the rationale of the subject to comity and the promotion of justice as
founded on English notions of private international law. Despite an increased number of cases,
private international law in India is not backed by explicit legislation and the principles of English
law have traditionally guided the courts.
247 ibid [5].

248 ibid [10].
249 ibid.
250 ibid.
251 Jose Paulo Coutinho v Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira [2019] (10) SCJ 158 [13]–[18].
3
Domicile, Nationality, and Residence
I. Introduction
Applicable law in private international law is determined by supplicating the connecting factor.
In personal matters, this connecting factor is decided by a person’s fundamental relationship
with a specific state or nation. Conflicts of law scholars have struggled to understand what that
legal system should be. Two options were available: nationality (lex patriae) and the law of domi-
cile (lex domicili). Classically, domicile acted as the primary connecting factor in questions of
status in matters of family law issues for common law jurisdictions, and nationality for civil law
jurisdictions.1 For instance, under the Indian Succession Act, the law of a person’s domicile at the
time of death would govern succession to movable and immovable property in India.2 In recent
times, codification attempts aimed at harmonising private international law rules have shown a
preference for the invocation of habitual residence as a connecting factor. The connecting factors
of domicile, nationality, and habitual residence also act as the bases of jurisdiction, which is the
first stage of the conflicts of law process.3
This chapter deals with the conceptual foundations of the connecting factors of domicile,
nationality and residence. The chapter is divided into five parts (including this Introduction).
Section II discusses the concept, categorisation, and requirements of proving domicile.
Section III addresses the connecting factors of nationality and residence. Section IV explores
the statutory framework and judicial statements on ascertaining domicile under Indian
private international law rules. While scrutinising the prevailing Indian legal position, this
chapter provides a comparative analysis of relevant rules with the harmonised regimes devel-
oped by other jurisdictions. For the sake of clarity, this chapter first explores conceptual
foundations as evolved by juristic opinion and other jurisdictions and then goes on to analyse
the Indian legal scenario.
1 GC Cheshire, ‘Nationality and Domicile in Swedish Private International Law’ (1951) 4 International Law Quarterly
39–59.
2 Indian Succession Act 1925, ss 5–6.
3 See A Iyer, ‘Domicile and Habitual Residence’ (1985) 6 Singapore Law Review 115; Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012
of 12 December 2012, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters OJ L351/1 Art 4 (ascribes domicile as the primary base of jurisdiction). However the regulation does not define
the domicile and leaves it to the domestic jurisdictions to define the same; Convention on the Recognition of Divorces
and Legal Separations (adopted 1 June 1970, entered into force 24 August 1975) (Art 2 provides for habitual residence and
nationality as the basis of jurisdiction); Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes 1978) Art 3
(provides for habitual residence and nationality as the applicable law).
34 Domicile, Nationality, and Residence
II. Domicile
In 1858, Lord Cranworth famously articulated the meaning of domicile as indicating a perma-
nent home and observed: ‘[I]f you do not understand your permanent home, I am afraid that no
illustration drawn from foreign writers or cases will be of help.’4 However, this formulation has
been objected to as too simplistic. Morris observed that a person may be domiciled in a country
that is not his home, and may even be homeless, while still possessing domicile.5 Subsequent
cases have clarified the contours and application of the principle of domicile. The fundamental
principles of domicile include the following:
• No person can be without a domicile.6
• No person can, at the same time, have more than one domicile.7
• An existing domicile is presumed to continue until it is proven that a new domicile has been
acquired.
A. Types of Domicile
Case jurisprudence and statutes have identified several types of domicile.
i. Domicile of Origin

Every person is born with a domicile that is ascribed by law as the domicile of origin. For this
purpose, the law attributes to every individual at birth, the domicile of the father if the child
is legitimate8 and the domicile of the mother if the child is illegitimate.9 Domicile of origin
is presumed to endure until a new domicile known as ‘domicile of choice’ is acquired.10 The
persistence of the domicile of origin is seen in the case of Bell v Kennedy.11 Bell had a Jamaican
domicile of origin, but he was uncertain whether to settle in Scotland or England after leaving
Jamaica. Therefore the House of Lords held that he had not lost his Jamaican domicile of origin.
Since, the domicile of origin is a creation of law, the domicile of origin is never permanently
lost but can be abandoned. The domicile of origin remains in abeyance or lies dormant until a
domicile of choice is lost. The moment a domicile of choice is lost, the domicile of origin revives
unless the domicile of choice is replaced by another domicile of choice.12
4 Whicker v Hume [1858] 7HLC 124 [160].

5 JHC Morris, The Conflict of Laws 2nd edn (Stevens and Sons, 1980) 18.
6 Bell v Kennedy [1868] LR 1 Se & Div 307 (HL); S Symeneoids, American Private International law (Kluwer Law
International Law 2008) 88.

7 Udny v Udny [1869] LR 1 Sc & Div 441 (HL) 448.
8 A Hutchinson, ‘Domicile of Origin and Domicile of Choice’ (1977) New Law Journal 879; DM Stone, ‘The English
Concept of Domicile’ (1954) 17 Modern Law Review 244. See also Indian Succession Act (n 2) s 7.
9 ibid, s 7. See K Trimmings, P Torremans, A Mills, U Grusic and C Heinze, Cheshire, North, and Fawcett: Private
International Law 15th edn (Oxford University Press, 2017) 147.

11 Bell v Kennedy (n 6).
12 Udny v Udny (n 7); Harrison v Harrison [1953] 1 WLR 865.
Domicile 35
ii. Domicile of Choice

The two basic elements for obtaining a domicile of choice are the fact of residence (corpus) and
the intention of remaining (animus manendi et revertendi).13 Domicile of choice is acquired by
free will when one resides in a particular place with the intention of making it a permanent
home.14 The question of who has the capacity to acquire a domicile of choice is determined by the
law of a person’s existing domicile.15
Unlike the domicile of origin, which is ascribed by law, the domicile of choice is a question of
fact, not of law, and it requires the co-existence of residence in a country and a bona fide intention
to make a home in that country permanently. An initial line of cases has given preference to the
fact of stay over the intention.16 However, later decisions have tilted more in favour of assessing
intention and have taken the position that, although length of residence is essential, even a short
stay at a place coupled with an intention to make that place a permanent home may confer a
domicile of choice.
In Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary17 the House of Lords held that even though a man of
Scottish origin spent 36 years of his life in Liverpool he had not acquired a domicile of choice
in England and retained his Scottish domicile of origin. In Puttick v Attorney General,18 it was
held that a domicile of choice could not be acquired by illegal residence. Though residence
and intentions are to be proved by evidence, intention is difficult to prove. Cheshire and North
state that: ‘[N]othing must be neglected that can possibly indicate the bent of the residents
mind. His aspirations, whims, amours, prejudices, health, religion, financial expectations.’19
In Winans v AG,20 the court stated that the burden of proving the acquisition of a new domicile
of choice lies upon those who assert that the domicile of origin has been lost.21 The domicile of
origin continues until a fixed and settled intention of abandoning the first domicile and acquir-
ing another as sole domicile is clearly shown. In Munro v Munro,22 Lord Cottenham made it
clear that the domicile of origin will prevail until a party manifestly intends to abandon one’s
former domicile and acquire another as one’s sole domicile. However long, residence alone may
not confer a new domicile, though it may be the most important ground from which to infer
intention.23 In White v Tenant,24 White moved his home from West Virginia to Pennsylvania,
but on the same day crossed back to take care of his wife who was sick with typhoid. He then
caught the disease and died in West Virginia. The question arose as to which state should
be considered to have been his domicile for purposes of intestate succession. The court held
that White had left his West Virginia residence with no plans to return and with the intent
and purpose of making his permanent home in Pennsylvania.Therefore, when he and his wife
arrived at their new home, their domicile became Pennsylvania.
13 ibid.
14 D Hill, Private International law (Edinburgh University Press, 2014) 14–15.
16 ibid 5; Bruce v Bruce [1790] 2 Bos & P 229, 231; Bempde v Johnstone [1796] 3. Ves. 198, 201; Hodgson v De Beauchesne
(1858) 12 Moo PCC 285, 329.

17 Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] SC (HL) 8.
18 Puttick v Attorney-General [1979] 3 All E R 463, 469.
20 Winans v Attorney-General [1904] AC 287.
21 ibid.
22 Munro v Munro [1840] 7 Cl & Fin 842.
23 ibid.
24 White v Tenant [1888] 31 West Virginia 790.
a. Doctrine of Revival
The domicile of choice is less tenacious; as soon as the domicile of choice is abandoned, the domi-
cile of origin revives under the English legal system.25 The stringent requirement of the revival of
domicile of origin has led to many unfortunate scenarios, as depicted by case jurisprudence.26 It
needs to be stressed that the US (in contrast to England) does not subscribe to the presumption
of the continuance of a domicile of origin as a domicile of revival. Under the US legal system, a
domicile of choice continues until a new one is acquired.27 Collier explains that the differences
of both legal systems can be attributed to the fact that the US was a country of immigration,
whereas the UK has been a country of emigration.28 Hence, it was easy for US courts to presume
an intention on the part of persons who immigrated there to intend to make that country their
permanent home. Similarly, Collier explains that, where a person having an English domicile of
origin acquires a domicile of choice in another country and then decides to leave that country,
it makes sense to presume that the person decided to return home. By contrast, Collier explains
in the case of an Italian who acquired a domicile in Iowa and then died in the course of moving
home to California, it would be preposterous to presume that the person dies domiciled in Italy.29
Animus non revertendi (the intention of not returning), which plays a significant role in acquir-
ing a domicile of choice, also influences the displacement of a domicile of choice.30 However, the
standard of proof is much less intense than in the situation of acquiring a domicile of choice by
displacing the domicile of origin.31
iii. Domicile of Dependency

A domicile of dependency generally operates in three cases:32
(1) Infants.
(2) Married women.
(3) Mentally incapacitated persons.
Infants. Children below the age of majority are incapable of acquiring a domicile of choice and
follow the domicile of their parents on whom they are legally dependent.33 The law dictates that
a legitimate child has a domicile of origin in the state of the father’s domicile at the time of the
child’s birth. An illegitimate child has a domicile of origin in the state of the mother’s domicile at
the time of the child’s birth.34 Moreover, an orphan child has a domicile of origin in the state in
which the orphan is found.
25 R Fentiman, ‘Domicile Revisited’ (1991) 50(3) The Cambridge Law Journal 445–463, 450; Cheshire, North and Fawcett
(n 9) 163.
26 Ramsay v Liverpool (n 17).
27 Winans v Attorney-General (n 20); In re Estate of Jones [1921] 192 Iowa 78.
28 Collier (n 15) 51.
29 ibid 52; see J Wade, ‘The English Concept of Domicile: A Re-evaluation’ (1974) 21(3) Netherlands International Law
Review 265–288.
30 P Diwan, Indian and English Private International Laws 4th edn (Deep & Deep Publications, 1998) 142.
31 VC Govindaraj, The Conflict of Laws in India: Inter-Territorial and Inter-Personal Conflict 2nd edn (Oxford University
Press India, 2019).

32 L Collins, CGJ Morse and D McClean, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws 14th edn (Sweet and Maxwell,
2006) 153.
34 In re Beaumont [1902] 1 Ch 889; See ‘The Power to Change the Domicile of Infants and of Persons Non Compos
Mentis’ (1930) 30(5) Columbia Law Review 703–714.

Domicile 37
Married women. Traditionally, the domicile of a married woman followed that of her
husband.35 This notion was primarily due to the legal conception of a married couple as one
person. However, legal reforms have altered most jurisdictions’ position.36 A married woman
now has the capacity to acquire a domicile of choice. For instance, if we analyse the legal position
in Nepal as revealed through the Sabina Pandey case, the court took the position that the wife’s
domicile was not dependent on that of her husband. The court used Sabina Pandey’s residence and
intention to assess her domicile independently of her husband’s domicile. It held that, although
the husband Puskar Raj Pandey may be considered to have a domicile in the US, since Sabina
Pandey’s actual residence and intention to reside in the US had not been proven, Sabina Pandey
could not be said to be domiciled in the US.37 However, jurisdictions such as Afghanistan still do
not grant a woman the right to choose a domicile. Article 82 of the Afghan Civil Procedure Code
states: ‘If the defendant is a married woman, the hearing of the case shall be within the jurisdic-
tion of the court located in the place of residence of the husband.’38 Article 83 states:
If the defendant is an unmarried woman and has attained the age of marriage (age of majority) or who
possesses the full legal capacity, the court which is located in the place of residence of her father or her
close relatives i.e. whoever is responsible for her feeding and upbringing shall have jurisdiction to hear
the claim.39
Similarly, section 15 of the Indian Succession Act specifically discusses the mode of acquisition
of a new domicile by a woman on her marriage. It provides that by marriage a woman acquires
the domicile of her husband if she had not the same domicile before.40 Section 16 is an explana-
tion to section 15 and provides that a wife’s domicile during her marriage follows the domicile of
her husband.41 However, an exception to section 16 stipulates that the wife’s domicile no longer
follows that of her husband if the sentence of a competent court separates them or if the husband
is undergoing a sentence of transportation.42 The principles set out under sections 15 and 16
have limited application as they only apply to the succession of movables possessed by Parsis and
Christians. Section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act applicable to Christians provides that the courts
in India will be able to entertain the proceedings for dissolution of a marriage only where the
parties to the marriage are domiciled in India at the time when the petition is presented.43 This
created hardships for wives whose husbands migrated to another country, permanently leaving
behind their wives in India. The problem is that, in determining the domiciles of the parties to
proceedings for the dissolution of marriage, it is the domicile of the husband alone which is to be
considered since a wife takes the domicile of her husband upon marriage.
While recommending a suitable amendment to section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act, the Law
Commission of India recommended a change in the rule of private international law regard-
ing a wife’s domicile, that is, to abolish the wife’s dependent domicile, as has been done in
England.44 Indian decisions have followed the common law principle of domicile of dependency
35 Warrender v Warrender [1835] 6 ER 1239.

36 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (UK).
37 S Regmi, ‘Foreign Judgments in Matrimonial Disputes: Recognition in Nepal and Public Policy Considerations,’ in
SR Garimella, S Jolly (eds), Private International Law: South Asian State Practice (Springer 2017) 133–151.
38 Civil Procedure Code 1990, Art 82 (Afghanisthan); N Abdullah, Private International Law of Afghanistan 6th edn
(Saed, 2016) 62–67.

39 ibid, Art 83 (Afghanistan).
41 ibid, s 16.
42 ibid.
43 Indian Divorce Act 1869, s 2.
44 Law Commission of India, Amendment of Section 2 of the Divorce Act 1869 Enabling Non-domiciled Estranged
Christian Wives to Seek Divorce (Report No 224, 2009).

in determining a wife’s domicile. In State of Bihar v Kumar Amar Singh,45 the court held that the
domicile of the wife remained in India, even though she had migrated to Pakistan, because her
husband remained in India. In Kashiba Bin Narsapa v Shripat Narhiv,46 the Bombay High Court
held that the domicile of a widow remained that of her husband, unless she acquired a domicile
of choice. Most of these cases are related to the determination of citizenship and can be distin-
guished from typical conflict of law scenarios.
Mentally incapacitated persons. A mentally disabled person cannot acquire a domicile of
choice. The person’s domicile continues to be the same and follows the domicile of the individual
on whom the person is dependent.47 This position is different from the English position where the
law says that a mentally disables person continues to have the same domicile prior to becoming
incapacitated.48
iv. Domicile of Corporations

Under the English legal system, the domicile and nationality of a company are determined by the
place of its incorporation, and that law determines the capacity to contract and the law applicable
to the company’s dissolution.49 In comparison, the residence of a company is attributed to its
main centre of business, where management and control are exercised.50 The theory of incorpo-
ration was revised during the First World War in Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber
Co, where all the shares of a company were held by German nationals, though the company had
been incorporated in Britain. The court applied the effective control test and concluded that the
company possessed German nationality.51 In McLeod &Co. Ltd. v State of Orissa,52 the court,
relying on Palmer’s Company Law, reiterated the same principle of English law with regard to a
corporation’s domicile, nationality, and residence.53 However, in TDM Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v
UE Development India Pvt. Ltd.,54 it was held that, a company being an artificial person, its domi-
cile would depend on the nature and purpose of the statute. The place of registration determines
the nationality of a company. Indian cases have also taken the position that any corporation
doing business in India has its residence in India, which need not be the place of its central
management.55 Since corporations are artificial entities, they may be considered domiciled or
residents in a country for one purpose and not for another.56 This position also means that a
company can have multiple residences. It should be mentioned that international conventions
that have codified private international principles have taken a broader approach when ascrib-
ing domicile, nationality, and residence to companies. Brussels Regulation I (Recast), which has
45 AIR [1955] SC 282.

46 [1891] ILR 19 Bom 697.
48 Cheshire, North and Fawcett (n 9) 156.
49 Collier (n 15) 57. See generally Civil Code of Nepal. Section 697 states that questions as to the nature of the company
is determined by the law of the country of incorporation, if that cannot be ascertained it shall be decided by the law of the
country where the company is of registered or headquartered.
50 ibid 58.
51 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co [1916] 2 AC 307.
52 McLeod & Co. Ltd. v State of Orissa [1984] 1 SCC 434 [7].
53 State Trading Corporation v CIT AIR [1963] SC 1811. Reiterated in Technip SA v SMS Holding (Pvt) Ltd (2005)
5 SCC 465.
54 TDM Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v UE Development India Pvt. Ltd [2008] 14 SCC 271 [35].
55 Turner Morrison & Co. v Hunaerford Investment Trust Ltd AIR [1972] AIR 1311.
56 ibid.
Nationality and Residence 39
codified rules on jurisdiction on civil and commercial matters, has provided for domicile as
the main connecting factor. Unlike the classical approach, the Regulation has not equated the
domicile of a company solely with its place of registration, but has also ascribed the domicile of
a company to either its statutory seat, central administration, or principal place of business.57
Similarly, the recently concluded 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters elevates habitual residence as the main
connecting factor.58 The 2019 Convention defines the habitual residence of a company broadly
to include either its statutory seat (under the law of which it was incorporated or formed), its
central administration, or the state where it has its principal place of business.59
Domicile plays an essential role in determining the substantive validity of a marriage, divorce,
and family matters. Domicile is also used to define jurisdiction.60 The connecting factor of domi-
cile is useful in countries where multiculturalism persists, as it helps the adoption of law close to
the parties.61 Though an essential connecting factor, the concept has been profoundly criticised.
The criticisms mainly stem from the two parameters of domicile. The difficulty of proving an
intention permanently to reside despite a long stay is evident in multiple cases. Second, there is
the persistence of the domicile of origin and its revival. England, where the dominant connect-
ing factor in choice of law is domicile, has attempted major reforms mainly concentrating on the
domicile of origin. From the 1950s onwards in England, there have been several proposals for
abolishing the doctrine of the revival of the domicile of origin and replacing it with the doctrine of
the continuance of a domicile of choice until a new one is acquired (as in the US).62 Nevertheless,
the proposals have been rejected by Parliament and have not become a part of legislation.
III. Nationality and Residence

Cheshire and North observed that ‘nationality is a possible alternative to domicile as the crite-
rion of the personal law’.63 Nationality represents a person’s political status, by virtue of which
one owes allegiance to some particular country.64 As a connecting factor, nationality has domi-
nated the scene in the private international law of Continental Europe. Virtually all choice-of-law
rules concerning personal and family affairs are determined by reference to the law of nationality.
Nationality is determined by birth, parentage, registration, and naturalisation, whereas domicile
is acquired by residence in a particular country with the intention of residing there perma-
nently. It follows that a person may be a national of one country, but be domiciled in another.
57 Council Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters OJ L351/1 (recast) Art 63.

58 ibid.
59 ibid, Art 3(2).
60 A Dutta, ‘Domicile, Habitual Residence and Establishment’ in J Basedow and others (eds) Encyclopaedia of Private
International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 556.

61 RH Graveson, Conflict of Laws 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 1974)185; WLM Reese, ‘Does Domicile Bear a Single
Meaning?’ (1955) 55(5) Columbia Law Review 589–597.

62 The Law Commission had recommended against the revival of domicile of origin and proposed replacing the domi-
cile by the concept of habitual residence or nationality. See The Law Commission, The Law of Domicile (Report No 88,
1986) and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: The Law of Domicile (Scot Law Com No 63, 1985);
JJ Fawcett, ‘Law Commission Working Paper No. 88: The Law of Domicile’ (1986) 49(2) Modern Law Review 225–234;
P McEleavy, ‘Regression and Reform in the Law of Domicile’ (2007) 56(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly
453–462.
63 Cheshire, North and Fawcett (n 9) 170.
64 ibid.
Nationality is a more stable concept than domicile as it cannot be changed without the formal
consent of states.65 However, the concept is not much used in genuinely federal states where the
legal system differs between states. Further, the fundamental principle of domicile dictates that no
person can be without a domicile and that no person can have more than one domicile at the same
time. But a person may be stateless or simultaneously be a citizen of more than one country.66
The difficulties associated with the application of nationality and domicile as connecting factors
have prompted a shift to habitual residence as a connecting factor in recent years. Alternatively,
while retaining the connecting factor of nationality, states may provide that, in the case of dual
nationality, the law of the country of habitual residence is to be applied.67
Habitual residence is employed as a connecting factor in many international conventions.68
The application of habitual residence is advantageous as it is easier to establish than the complex
intention associated with domicile. Habitual residence is a question of fact and does not need
to be established through the legal presumptions associated with a domicile of dependency.
For instance, unlike the domicile of children, who follow that of their legal guardians, a child’s
habitual residence is determined by the fact of a child’s stay.69 However, the concept has
also been criticised as a weak link to determine a person’s civil status. Hence, the practice of
jurisdictions and codifications reveals the co-existence of all three connecting factors.
Brussels Regulation I (Recast), in dealing with jurisdictional regimes, retains the domicile of
a defendant as the primary basis of jurisdiction.70 Whereas, the 2019 Hague Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters provides
for habitual residence as the basis of recognition.71
IV. Ascertaining Domicile under Indian Private

International Law Rules
A. Statutory Framework
The legal framework of domicile in India can be located in statutory provisions and judicial
statements. Article 5 of the Constitution of India makes domicile an essential requirement for
65 Hill (n 14) 16.

66 ibid.
67 See The National Civil (Code) Act 2017, Nepal (2074) part 6 Provisions relating to Private International Law, s 715.
In case of double nationality, law of country of habitual residence to be applied: (1) If this Part contains a provision to the
effect that any matter is determined according to the law of the country of nationality and a person is having nationality
of two or more countries at the same time, his or her nationality shall be determined according to the law of the country
of his or her nationality, where he or she habitually reside. (2) If such matter cannot be determined according to the law of
the country referred to in sub-section (1), it shall be determined according to the law of the country of his or her national-
ity, to which he or she has the closest connection.
68 G Zohar, ‘Habitual Residence: An Alternative to the Common Law Concept of Domicile’ (2009) 9 Whittier Journal
of Child and Family Advocacy 169–204; P Rogerson, ‘Habitual Residence: The New Domicile’ (2000) 49 International
law and Comparative Law Quarterly 86–107; P Stone, ‘The Concept of Habitual Residence in Private International Law’
Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (2000)
29(3) Anglo-American Law Review 342–367.
69 Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Art 4 (adopts habitual
residence as a connecting factor) Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons
1989, Art 3 (provides habitual residence as the applicable law). See also E Gallagher, ‘A House is Not (Necessarily) a
Home: A Discussion of the Common Law Approach to Habitual Residence,’ (2015) 47(2) New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics 463–500.
70 Brussles Regulation 1(recast) (n 57) Art 4.
71 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters 2019 Art 5.
Ascertaining Domicile under Indian Private International Law Rules 41
acquiring citizenship.72 Along with the provisions in the Constitution, the Indian Succession
Act gives detailed provisions on the determination of domicile in the case of succession to the
movables of Parsis and Christians. The Act mainly borrows the principles of domicile developed
under English jurisprudence. Section 6 of the Succession Act provides that a person can have
only one domicile for the purpose of succession to movable property.73 Section 7 prescribes that
the domicile of origin of every person of legitimate birth is the country in which at the time of
birth the person’s father was domiciled or, if the person is a posthumous child, in the country
in which the child’s father was domiciled at the time of the father’s death.74 The domicile of
origin of an illegitimate child is the country in which, at the time of birth, the child’s mother
was domiciled.75 Section 9 espouses that the domicile of origin prevails until a new domicile
has been acquired.76 A new domicile can be acquired by taking up a habitation in a country
which is not that of the domicile of origin.77 Although these provisions do not apply to Hindus,
Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs or Muslims,78 the principles have often been applied by courts as a part of
the common law. There are references to domicile in other statutes as well.79 However, none of
these legislative provisions provide a clear definition of the concept of domicile. In the absence
of an explicit definition of the concept, successive judicial statements have clarified the meaning
and contours of the application of domicile in the domestic context and private international
law. Most judicial statements on domicile have arisen under cases involving citizenship laws
and constitutional matters, with only a few private international law issues. The cases show an
unflinching loyalty to English jurisprudence.
B. Judicial Statements on Domicile
i. Meaning of Domicile

In DP Joshi v State of Madhya Bharat,80 the term domicile was interpreted to indicate a perma-
nent home. In Central Bank of India v Ram Narain81 the court referred to Craignish v Craignish
wherein Chitty J stated that ‘a place is properly the domicile of a person in which his habitation is
fixed without any present intention of removing therefrom’.82 Residence need not be continuous.
However, there must be an intention to reside forever in the country where residence has been
taken up. An intention of never returning to the country of origin leads to a change in domicile.
Post-independence, an initial question addressed by the judiciary was on the nature of domicile
72 Constitution of India 1950, Art 5 – ‘At the commencement of this Constitution, every person who has his domicile
in the territory of India and – (a) who was born in the territory of India; or (b) either of whose parents was born in the
territory of India; or (c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately
preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India.’
73 Indian Succession Act (n 2) s 6. It is to be mentioned that Bangladesh and Pakistan neighbouring countries of India
has also retained the same pre–independence legislation on succession. The Succession Act (Bangladesh) 1925 retains the
same provisions as the Indian Act.
74 ibid, s 7.
75 ibid, s 8.
76 ibid, s 9.
77 ibid, s 10.
78 ibid, s 4.
79 Hindu Marriage Act 1955, s 1(2) – ‘It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and also
applies to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said territories.’
80 DP Joshi v State of Madhya Bharat AIR [1955] 334.
81 Central Bank of India v Ram Narain AIR [1955] 36.
82 ibid [13].
in a federal jurisdiction like India. In Pradeep Jain v Union of India,83 the court held that the
word ‘domicile’ identifies the personal law by which an individual is governed in respect of vari-
ous matters. The court noted that Article 5 of the Constitution is clear and explicit on this point.
It only refers to one domicile, namely, ‘domicile in the territory of India’.84 In comparison, the
legal position during the pre-Independence period was different. Princely States enjoyed legal
personality under international law. As a consequence, numerous domiciles existed. The court
further observed that there are two main categories of domicile, namely, domicile of origin
and domicile of choice. While the former attaches to a person by birth, the latter is acquired by
residence in a territory with the intention to settle there permanently.85
ii. Criteria for Acquiring Domicile

Judicial statements have clarified the intentional and residential requirements of domicile. In
Michael Antony Rodrigues v State of Bombay,86 Michael’s father was of Goan nationality and had
been carrying on business as a tailor in Bombay. Michael was born in Goa in 1918 and came
to Bombay in 1927.87 He was educated in Bombay and completed his school education there.88
In 1942 when war broke out, he served in the Royal Indian Force and in 1948 reverted to his
father’s business. He appears on the municipal roll as a voter. On these facts, the Bombay High
Court ruled that he had acquired a domicile of choice in Bombay.89 The Court, in the instant
case, differentiated between the concepts of domicile and nationality. The Court observed
that ‘in private International law a man may have one nationality and different domicile’.90
In SP Ghosh v Deputy Collector, ten years of residence in England was not considered enough to
confer a domicile of choice.91 The court held:
nationality depends, apart from naturalisation, on the place of birth or on parentage; domicile, as’ we
have seen, is constituted by residence in a particular country animo manendi. It follows that a man may
be a national of one country but domiciled in another.92
In Mandal v Mandal, in the wake of the Nazi invasion in 1937, an Austrian-domiciled couple
fled to India and lived in India from then on. The Panjab and Haryana High Court held that long
residence and an intention to stay in India permanently were reflected in the facts and the couple
had acquired domiciles of choice in India.93 Applying the same standard, in State of Maharashtra
v Ghoreishi (Qureshi) Sayed Mahomed Sayed Hasan, the court observed that, in the absence of
evidence of long residence and a positive and absolute intention of making India a permanent
home with the further intention never to leave, an inference of acquisition of domicile from the
mere fact of long residence could not follow.94
83 Pradeep Jain v Union of India AIR [1984] 1420.

84 ibid. See also Yogesh Bharadwaj v State of U.P. AIR [1991] 356 [9], [12].
85 ibid [7].
86 Michael Antony Rodrigues v State of Bombay AIR [1956] Bombay 729.
87 ibid [2].
88 ibid.
89 ibid [11].
90 ibid.
91 SP Ghosh v Deputy Collector, Reserve Bank of India AIR [1964] Cal 422.
92 ibid [5].
93 Mandal v Mandal [1956] ILR Punj. 215.
94 State of Maharashtra v Ghoreishi (Qureshi) Sayed Mahomed Sayed Hasan AIR [1964] Bom 235 [11].
Ascertaining Domicile under Indian Private International Law Rules 43
iii. Characteristic Features of Domicile

Kedar Pandey v Narain Bikran Shah is a vital judgment for clarifying the contours of domicile.95
The appellant Kedar Pandey and respondent Narain Bikram were candidates for the Bihar State
Legislative Assembly elections in 1962. The respondent was declared elected. The appellant filed
a petition challenging the election on the ground that the respondent was not duly qualified
under Article 173 of the Constitution as he was a citizen of Nepal and not a citizen of India.96
The High Court found that the respondent had been born in Banaras on 10 October 1918, had
been living in India from 1939 to 1949 and had acquired an Indian domicile.97 While upholding
the High Court decision, the Supreme Court succinctly summarised the principles of domicile as
developed in England through caselaw and held applicable in India:
(1) The law attributes to every person at birth a domicile, which is called a domicile of origin.98
A legitimate child born in wedlock to a living father receives the father’s domicile at the time
of birth; a legitimate posthumous child receives that of the mother.99
(2) This domicile may be changed, and a new domicile, called a domicile of choice, can be
acquired. The domicile of origin is received by operation of law at birth; the domicile of
choice is acquired by the residence of an individual in another country accompanied by an
animus manendi [intention of remaining].100 For this purpose, residence is a mere physical
fact. If the required state of mind accompanies this physical fact, neither its character nor its
duration is material. The state of mind, which is required, demands that the person should
have formed a fixed and settled purpose of making a principal or sole permanent home in
the country of residence.101
(3) The onus of proving that domicile has been chosen in substitution for the domicile of origin
lies upon those who assert that the domicile of origin has been lost. The court relied on the
decision in Udny v Udny102 and held that what is required to be established is that the person
alleged to have changed domicile of origin has voluntarily fixed one’s habitation and that of
one’s family in a new country, not for merely special or temporary purposes, but with the
intention of making it one’s permanent home.103
(4) The domicile of origin continues unless a fixed and settled intention of abandoning the first
domicile104 and acquiring another as sole domicile is clearly shown. The tenacity and revival
of the domicile of origin were reiterated in Louis De Raedt v Union of India.105
India’s position on determining domicile of choice is well illustrated in the case of Sankaran
Govindan v Lakshmi Bharathi & Others.106 This case dealt with succession to the sale of the
movable property of Dr Krishnan, who had been born in India. Dr Krishnan went to England for
higher studies in 1920, became a doctor there, and was employed there by the National Health
Service (NHS). He died in England.107 The English High Court declared that Dr Krishnan had
95 Kedar Pandey v Narain Bikram Shah AIR [1966] 160.

96 ibid [2].
97 ibid [3].
98 ibid [10]; See also Hari Narayanan v Meenakshi Narayanan [2007] SCC On Line Mad 1525.
99 ibid.
100 ibid.
101 ibid.
102 ibid [12].
103 ibid [10], [14].
104 ibid [10].
105 Louis De Raedt v Union of India [1991] 3 SCC 554.
106 AIR [1974] SC 1764.
107 Sankaran Govindan v Lakshmi Bharathi & Others AIR [1974] SC 1764 [2]–[3].
been domiciled in England and accordingly English law applied in matters of his succession.
Only the next of kin were eligible to succession and thus the proceeds from the sale of his mova-
bles were given to his two brothers, who were the appellants.108 The defendants, who were the
children of the appellants, filed a partition suit in Kerala and prayed for distribution of the sale
proceeds among all the parties. The trial court held that Dr Krishnan had been domiciled in
India, and hence partitioned the amount to be distributed according to the Travancore Ezhava
Act.109 The Kerala High Court partially modified the order, but also held that Dr Krishna had
been domiciled in India.110 The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court. The latter Court
referred to the case of Bell v Kennedy111 and stated that domicile is a mixed question of law
and fact. To establish domicile, there needs to be an intention of permanent residence at the
appropriate time. The appropriate time varies with the nature of an inquiry. It could be past or
present. If the person is deceased, it has to be ascertained as if one had formed and retained
a permanent intention of residence in a given country at some point in one’s life.112 The key
factors to be considered in determining intention include a person’s tastes, conduct, actions,
ambitions, health, hopes, and projects.113 Accordingly, although until 1939 Dr Krishnan had
an intention to return to India, his intention changed when he had a comfortable practice in
England. He therefore died domiciled in England as he was a resident in England and his acts
and conduct were only consistent with the intention to make England his permanent home.114
iv. Differentiating Domicile, Nationality and Residence

Judicial statements have further clarified and differentiated the concept of domicile, nationality,
and residence. In Yogesh Bharadwaj v State of UP,115 the court differentiated between domicile
and residence and held that ‘a residence is a fact’. Unlike the acquisition of a domicile of choice,
intention is not necessary for acquiring residence. In Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad,116 the
court held that etymologically both ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ mean the same thing. However,
there is a slight difference between them under private international law. ‘Domicile’ serves as a
basis for jurisdiction in cases involving private laws, whereas ‘residence’ serves as a basis for juris-
diction in relation to taxation, voting rights, etc.117 In Hari Narayanan v Meenakshi Narayanan,
the court interpreted nationality to denote allegiance to a country and domicile to owe allegiance
to the place of one’s permanent home.118
v. Domicile and Migration

The Indian judiciary has often been faced with the issue of migration and its relevance in ascer-
taining domicile. In Shanno Devi v Mangal Sain,119 the respondent was a successful candidate at
the general election held in March 1957 for the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The election was
108 ibid [6].

109 ibid [9].
110 ibid [12].
111 Bell v Kennedy (n 6) 322.
112 ibid [20].
113 ibid [19].
114 ibid [32]–[35], [53].
115 Yogesh Bharadwaj (n 84) [11].
116 Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad (2000) 2 SCC 20.
117 ibid [26]–[27].
118 Hari Narayanan (n 98) [11], [13].
119 Shanno Devi v Mangal Sain AIR [1961] 58.
Conclusion 45
challenged on the ground that the latter was not a citizen of India and therefore not qualified
to stand for election.120 It was found that he had been born sometime in 1927 to Indian parents
in India (as defined in the Government of India Act 1935). However, the village in which he
was born became part of Pakistan on 15 August 1947. In 1944 he had moved from his home
district to Jullunder in what is now part of India.121 The question was whether the respondent
could be deemed to be a citizen of India within Article 6 of the Constitution of India.122 The
court imported a narrow definition to the term ‘migrate’ and held that ‘migration’ by itself
could give rise to a new domicile.123 However, the dictum was overruled in Kulathil Mammu v
State of Kerala,124 where the word ‘migrate’ was interpreted to include both intention and fact.
Hence, if migration is to give rise to a new domicile, an intention to reside permanently must
be established. Thus, most judicial decisions on domicile have been adjudication in connection
with citizenship and constitutional rules. Disputes concerning direct conflict of law ques-
tions have been absent. That perhaps explains the absence of any judicial discussion on Hague
Conventions which codify the connecting factors applicable to specific areas. In addition, due
to the strong undercurrent of English jurisprudence, inadequate attention has been paid to
the concepts of nationality and residence.
V. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the concepts, characteristics, and challenges surrounding the oper-
ationalisation of the principles of domicile, nationality, and residence. Particular focus has
been paid to the concept of domicile as it constitutes the singular most used connecting factor
in Indian private international law. For the sake of clarity, the chapter adopted an approach
wherein it first explained the characteristics and operationalisation of the concept of domicile
as developed in English jurisprudence and then went on to explore the Indian legal position.
The chapter highlighted the ‘doctrine of revival’ which forms the backbone of the English
concept of domicile. The principle is based on the need to attach a domicile to every individual
in all circumstances and reflects the strong premise of the domicile of origin, its tenacity and
persistence. However, the operationalisation of the doctrine of revival has often resulted in
decisions defying logic, as seen in Ramsay in England and in the Shankaran Bharati case at the
High Court stage in India. This chapter demonstrated that Indian decisions have followed the
common law principle of the domicile of dependency in determining a wife’s domicile. This
position is unfortunate. Even after legal reforms have been undertaken in England to abolish
the unity of domicile principle, Indian courts have sadly adhered to the archaic legal princi-
ple causing hardship to the women involved. This chapter evaluated the statutory framework
and judicial decisions on the operationalisation of domicile in India. The case jurisprudence
reflects an unflinching loyalty to English jurisprudence and the adoption of the entire English
jurisprudence as seen in the Kedar Nath case.
120 ibid [1].

121 ibid.
123 Shanno Devi v Mangal Sain (n 119) [13]–[18].
124 Kulathil Mammu v The State of Kerala AIR [1966] 1614.
4
Proving, Pleading, and Excluding
the Foreign Laws
I. Introduction
A, an Indian-domiciled citizen, entered into a contract with B, a Bangladesh-domiciled citizen,
for the performance of a music show in Dhaka. The contract, which was concluded in Dhaka on
1 December 2017, stipulated that all payments had to be made in taka, the Bangladeshi currency.
A refused to perform his side of the contract and B filed a suit against A for specific performance
before the court in Delhi.
The dispute involves a foreign element and attracts the invocation of private international
law. The case raises several questions. Which matters in this dispute can be considered as proce-
dural and which as substantive? What are the principles guiding the selection of applicable law?
What are the mechanisms of pleading and proving the content of foreign law? Are there circum-
stances in which the application of foreign law can be excluded? The issues of pleading, proving,
and excluding foreign law are largely treated as peripheral areas of private international law and
academic focus on them has been less. Nevertheless, these matters play a pivotal part in influenc-
ing the outcome of a dispute and the overall operation and development of private international
law. This chapter examines issues of pleading, proof and the exclusion of foreign law. This chapter
is divided into five parts, including the Introduction. Section II discusses the issues involved
in characterising matters as substantive or procedural. Section III explores global and Indian
approaches to the proof and pleading of foreign law. Section IV examines global and Indian judi-
cial practice on the exclusion of foreign law, focusing on the application of public policy.
II. Substantive and Procedural Law

In legal disputes, matters are classified as substantive or procedural. The lex causae decides
substantive matters. Procedural matters are determined by the lex fori.1 This distinction between
substance and procedure is crucial in private international law. Without identifying issues as
substantial, the applicable law to a particular issue cannot be determined.2 However, the difficulty
is determining what questions are procedural matters and how the law of the forum characterises
issues as substantive or procedural in nature.3 There is a general understanding that it is the law
1 RGarnett, Substance and Procedure in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 1, 5–6; Poyser v
Minors [1881] 7 QBD 329, 333; Huber v Steiner [1835] Bing NC 202.
2 J M Carruthers, ‘Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages’
(2004) 53(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 691–711.

3 RH Graveson, Conflict of Laws 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 1974) 590.
Substantive and Procedural Law 47
of the forum (lex fori) that characterises issues as procedural or substantive. The power of the
law of the forum to characterise an issue as substantive or procedural has been justified based
on necessity, convenience,4 justice, and equality.5 The categorisation of substance and procedure
and the wide variation followed by different jurisdictions have attracted criticism from scholars
as encouraging forum shopping and undermining the choice of law process by favouring the
application of the law of the forum in which a dispute is being heard.6 Judicial dicta have laid
down specific criteria to differentiate between substance and procedure. In Pfeiffer v Rogerson,
the court stated that matters that affect the existence and extent of the parties’ rights should be
categorised as substance and the method and means of enforcing a right should be treated as
procedural.7 However, this differentiation based on a right-remedy8 paradigm has been criti-
cised for being artificial. In the place of a right-remedy approach, some jurists have suggested
an outcome-determinative method where matters that might affect the outcome of litigation are
classified as substantive.9 But it would be wrong to assume that only substantive issues can affect
the outcome of a case. Procedural issues, such as methods of proof and what constitutes admissi-
ble evidence, can also affect outcome.10 Based on judicial statements, certain identified categories
fall under procedural matters.
A. Categorising Substance and Procedure
i. Rights and Remedies

Matters affecting the rights of parties are classified as substantive and matters relating to their
remedies are categorised as procedural.11 Thus, a party can only obtain a remedy available under
the law of the forum and not under the lex causae. For instance, A (an Indian national) enters
into a contract with B (a Brazilian national) for a dance performance in Brazil. The parties have
chosen Brazilian law as the applicable law of their agreement. A refuses to perform his part of
the contract and B sues A before the Indian court. Assume that under the contract law of Brazil,
there is no provision for specific performance, whereas specific performance is allowed under
Indian law. Even though the applicable law is Brazilian law, a decree of specific performance
can be granted by the Indian court. In respect of damages, heads of damage and remoteness of
damage are considered substantive12 and the arithmetical calculation of damages is treated as
procedural.13 At the same time, complexities surround the categorisation of damages, especially
4 L Collins, CGJ Morse, D McClean, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws 14th edn (Sweet and Maxwell,
2006) [7-002].
5 M Wolff, Private International Law 2nd edn (Clarendon Press,1950) 232.
6 B Currie, ‘Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws’ in Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke
University Press, 1963) 181; JD Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflicts of Laws 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2009);
RA Leflar, American Conflicts Law 3rd edn (Indiana Polis, 1977) 252–9; EG Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of
Laws (Yale University Press, 1947); WE Beckett, ‘The Question of Classification (“Qualification”) in Private International
Law’ (1934) 15 British Year Book of International Law 46–81.
7 Harding v Wealands [2006] UKH. 24; see EB Crawford ‘The Adjective and the Noun: Title and Right to Sue in
International Private Law’ (2000) Judicial Review 347, 348.

8 S Peari, The Foundation of Choice of Law: Choice and Equality (Oxford University Press, 2018) 216.
9 Garnett (n 1) 20–24.
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 Carruthers(n 2) 697.
13 JG Collier, Conflict of Laws 3rd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 60; Kohnke v Karger [1951] 2 KB 67;
Henderson v Jaouen [2002] 2 All ER 705.

48 Proving, Pleading, and Excluding the Foreign Laws
in tort. The complications were evident in the case of Boys v Chaplin,14 a case of negligence that
happened in Malta between two British soldiers stationed there. It was held that the law relat-
ing to damages was partly procedural and partly substantive.15 Questions of what constitutes
evidence and the method, quality, and burden of proof are procedural.16 Presumptions of law are
treated as substantive, while presumptions of fact are treated as procedural.17
ii. Law of Limitation

Traditionally, common law jurisdictions characterise limitation as procedural, whereas in civil
law jurisdictions it is treated as substantive.18 When limitation is treated as procedural, the legal
remedy is barred while the right remains. However, the treatment of limitation as substantive
has the effect of extinguishing the right itself. Statutory reform19 and judicial decisions20 have
clarified the discrepancy in the approaches of common and civil law jurisdictions concerning
limitation.21 Despite writers’ eloquent criticism and statutory reforms in other jurisdictions,
India still treats limitation as procedural under section 11 of the Limitation Act of 1963.22 In
its report, the Law Commission of India clearly stated that the law in India encourages forum
shopping and recommended that the country make limitation substantive for contractual and
non-contractual matters.23 It is to be noted that all other South Asian countries consider limita-
tion as a procedural matter.24 In Tung Sumser JBR v Indian Airline Corporation25 which came
before the Nepalese court, there was a chance to address the issue of limitation. In this case,
the plaintiff, who lost six of his family members in a plane crash, filed a petition against Indian
Airlines for compensation. The matter was held to be inadmissible under the law of Nepal due to
the expiry of the statutory period of limitation and the absence of a specific domestic law govern-
ing compensation in the specific circumstances. The case was a lost opportunity for the Nepalese
court to evaluate the issue from the lens of private international law. It should be emphasised that
there are no Indian judicial statements that have deliberated on the categorisation of matters as
substantive and procedural under private international law.
III. Pleading Foreign Law

A. General Practice in Other Jurisdictions
Once the court has selected the application of foreign substantive law as the applicable law, a
question arises as to the manner of proving the content of foreign law. The issue of foreign law is
14 Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356.

15 ibid.
16 Collier (n 13) 61–62.
17 ibid61.
18 E Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 2nd edn (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 964) 512.
19 See Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (UK); Limitation Act 1950 (NZ); Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitation Act
1982 (US).
20 Mc Kain v R.W. Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd [1992] 174 CLR 1; Tolofson v Jenson [1994] 3 SCR 1022.
21 G Panagopoulos, ‘Substance and Procedure in Private International Law’ (2005) 1(1) Journal of Private International
Law 69–92.
22 Limitation Act 1963, (India) s 11.
23 Law Commission of India, The Limitation Act, 1963 (Report No 89, 1983).
24 See The Limitation Act (Bangldesh) 1908, s 11; The Limitation Act (Pakistan) 1908, s 11.
25 Tung Sumser JBR v Indian Airline Corporation [NKP 2024 BS] decision No 389 [SC].
Pleading Foreign Law 49
pivotal in private international law. Without understanding and applying the content of foreign
law, the very concept of private international law becomes meaningless. The lex fori has to deter-
mine whether foreign law is to be treated as a question of fact or law. If it is a question of fact,
what are the rules through which the relevant facts are to be ascertained? Similarly, if the lex fori
considers foreign law to be a question of law, the issue arises whether judges are required apply
foreign law ex officio and (if so) how do they ascertain the content of the lex causae.26 A differenti-
ation between questions of fact and questions of law is significant in legal proceedings. Questions
of law are governed by the principle iura novit curia (the court knows the law). Questions of fact
have to be proven by the parties.27 In common law jurisdictions (such as England and the US),28
foreign law is treated as a question of fact. Thus, courts will not take judicial notice of foreign
laws.29 The pleading and proof of foreign law are matters of procedure. If the parties fail to estab-
lish the content of foreign law, the law of the forum will apply by default. The rationale for the rule
seems to be a general notion that, since the only law applied is domestic law, every other element
has to be considered as a fact.30 In civil law jurisdictions, the general position is that foreign law
is a question of law31 and has to be applied by the judge ex officio.32 This is based on the notion
of equality of nationals and foreigners and justifies the imposition of foreign law as a matter of
obligation.33
Whether treated as a question of ‘law’ or ‘fact’, foreign law is of a peculiar kind.34 The courts
across jurisdictions have thrown light into the specificities of proof of foreign law. In jury trials,
questions of foreign law are decided by the judge. In common law countries, even though foreign
law is treated as a fact, appellate courts are allowed to overrule a judgment on the ground that
foreign law has not been applied correctly.35 In civil law countries, even though foreign law is
treated as a question of law, an appeal on points of law is allowed based on the reason that the
contested decision is a violation of the law. Despite codification reforms favouring party auton-
omy in the choice of law, nations differ on whether precedent may be used in determining the
content of foreign law. As a result, a lack of certainty persists and has resulted in conflicting
decisions.
B. Proof and Application of Foreign Law in India

Very little has been written on the subject of proof of foreign law in India from the point of
view of private international law. The materials are primarily reliant on the literature on the
26 R Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative Analysis’ (2008) The European Legal Forum 1–13.
27 ibid 1–2.
28 Carey v Bahama Cruise Lines [1988] 864 F.2d 201 (1st Cir.) 205; Trenwick Am. Reinsurance Corp. v IRC., Inc [2011]
764 F. Supp. 2d 274, 302–03.
29 R Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press, 1998) A Nussbaum, ‘The Problem of Proving
Foreign Law’ (1941) 50(6) Yale Law Journal 1018–1044; WB Stern, ‘Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof ’
(1957) 45(1) California Law Review 23–48; JG Sprinkling and GR Lanyi, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American
Courts’ (1983) 19 Stanford Journal of International law 3–98.
30 J H Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Baker Woorhis &Co 1935) 53; OC Sommerich and B Busch, ‘Expert
Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law’ (1953) 38(2) Cornell Law Review 125–160, 127.
31 German Code of Civil Procedure 2005, s 293 states that the laws applicable in another state, customary laws, and
statutes must be proven only insofar as the court is not aware of them. In making inquiries regarding these rules of law,
the court is not restricted to the proof produced by the parties in the form of supporting documents; it has the authority
to use other sources of reference and issue the required orders for such use.
32 Sommerich and Busch (n 30) 128.
33 Hausmann (n 26) 1, 3.
34 P Hay, ‘The Use and Determination of Foreign Law in Civil Litigation in the United States’, (2014) 62 American
Journal of Comparative Law 213, 240, 223.

35 ibid.
law of evidence.36 Statutory provisions on pleading and proof of foreign law are contained in
section 45 of the Evidence Act. Section 45 states that when the court has to form an opinion
upon a point of foreign law, science, art or as to handwriting, the opinions on that point of
persons specially skilled are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts.37 Further, section 84
contains a presumption of the genuineness of documents, laws, and decisions printed under the
government’s authority.38 Under section 38, when forming an opinion on the law of a country:
(1) any statement of such law contained in a book purporting to be printed or published under
the authority of the government of that country and to contain any such law; and (2) any report
of a ruling of the courts of that country contained in a book purporting to be a report of such
rulings are relevant.39 Official copies of British parliamentary statutes are presumed genuine.40
It can also be mentioned that the 1961 Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalisation of Foreign Public Documents removes the requirement of diplomatic agents (of the
country where the public document is produced) to certify the provenance of public documents.41
It provides for certification of a document by the attachment of an apostille. India acceded to the
1961 Convention in 2005.42 However, its provisions have not been incorporated into the Indian
Evidence Act 1872, and section 78 still requires certification by diplomatic agents which increases
the procedural burden with regard to the certification of documents.
Concerning the proof of foreign law, India’s position follows the general practice of other
South Asian nations that consider it as a question of fact proved by adducing expert evidence.43
For instance, section 23 of the Evidence Act 1974 (2031BS) of Nepal44 states: ‘If the court has to
reach to a conclusion of any opinion, regarding law of a foreign country, science, art, signature or
finger impression, opinion of the expert may be taken as evidence.’
Case jurisprudence has clarified the rules on pleading and proof of foreign law. In Harishanker
Jain v Sonia Gandhi,45 the petitioner challenged the election of the respondent on the ground
that the respondent was not an Indian citizen at the date of the election. The petitioner made
averments relating to Italian law to build a case that the respondent could not have renounced
Italian citizenship and become a citizen of India when she applied for and was issued a certificate
of citizenship under the Citizenship Act. The court observed that Italian law is a foreign law so
far as India’s courts are concerned. A point of foreign law is a matter of fact and a plea based on
foreign law must satisfy the requirement of pleading a material fact.46 Under section 57(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act 1872, the court shall take judicial notice of, inter alia, all laws in force in
India’s territory.47 This does not apply to foreign law. The court reiterated that sections 45 and 84
of the Evidence Act permit evidence of foreign law to be being tendered and the opinion of
an expert to be adduced in proof of foreign law.48 Under Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure 1908, every pleading shall contain a statement in a concise form of the material facts
relied on by a party, but not the evidence nor the law of which a court may take judicial notice.
36 A Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 1943) 248.
37 Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 43.
38 ibid, s 84.
39 ibid, s 38.
40 ibid, s 81.
41 Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (5 October 1961).
42 ibid, Status Table.
43 Bangladesh and Pakistan inherit the same Evidence Act – See The Evidence Act (Bangladesh) 1872; The Evidence
Act (Pakistan) 1872. See also Evidence Act (Nepal) 1974 (2031 BS), ss 23, 6(f), 6(g), 52; Evidence Ordinance (Sri Lanka)
ss 45, 38, 84.
44 Evidence Act 1974 (2031 BS), s 23.
45 Harishanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi [2001] 8 SCC 233.
46 MN Venkatachalaih, Halsbury’s Laws of India- Evidence 2nd edn (Lexis Nexis, 2019) 97.
47 Harishanker Jain (n 45) [27]; Indian Evidence Act (n 37) s 57(1).
48 Harishanker Jain (n 45) [28]; Indian Evidence Act (n 37) ss 45 and 84.
Pleading Foreign Law 51
However, the rule against pleading law is restricted to the law of which a court is bound to take
judicial notice. As the court does not take judicial notice of foreign law, it should be pleaded like
any other fact if a party wants to rely on the same. In Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v Aksh Optifibre
Ltd,49 it was held that foreign law cannot be proved by affidavit and requires evidence to be led
in a trial. The matter was regarding section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, in
which the Supreme Court had to look at an arbitration clause governed by Japanese law. The
courts accepted expert evidence over a treatise on foreign law.50 In contrast, in Pulaniappa Chetty
v Nagappa Chettiar51 the court interpreted the Code of Civil Procedure of Ceylon without calling
for expert evidence. Once foreign law is proved, the interpretation of the law is left for the Indian
courts to determine.52
The burden of proving foreign law and its application lies on the party contending its
application.53 If the party fails, the court applies the lex fori.54 In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v St
CMS Electricity Co Ltd, foreign law was not applied as the party contending foreign law did not
explain foreign law or lead expert evidence on foreign law.55 There are no Indian cases on failure
in proving foreign law. However, as the Indian rule of burden of proof is similar to English law,
a similar approach might be taken.56 In Rhodia Ltd. v Neon Laboratories Ltd,57 the plaintiff was a
company incorporated under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act 1956 with its registered
office in Mumbai. The defendants were an English public limited company incorporated under
English law and an Indian company having its office in Mumbai.58 The parties agreed to give
the plaintiff an exclusive right to market and distribute the products Isoflurane, and Halothane
in India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal for an initial period of three years from 1997. The
agreement dictated English law as the applicable law and provided for the English court to settle
disputes.59 The court noted that the parties had pleaded that the English law governed their
agreement and the English court had exclusive jurisdiction. However, no evidence was adduced
to prove what the settled legal position in England was in relation to exclusive jurisdiction.60 In
other words, the question of foreign law, which ought to have been proved as a fact, has not been
properly addressed in the case. There being no evidence of the effect of an exclusive jurisdiction
clause under English, the jurisdiction of the Indian court could not be ruled out.61 The court
placed reliance on the following passage from Halsbury’s Laws of India:62
Mode of proof: In general, an Indian court will not research into foreign law or the concepts which
have a foreign origin. The foreign law or the concepts must be proved in civil proceedings by properly
qualified witnesses, that is a person who is suitably qualified to do so on account of his knowledge or
experience and who is competent to give expert evidence as to the law of any country, irrespective of
whether he has acted or is entitled to act as a legal practitioner there. If his evidence is not contradicted,
the court will typically accept it unless unreliable or extravagant.63 Because foreign law or concepts of a
49 Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v Aksh Optifibre Ltd AIR [2005] SC 3766.
50 Re Goods of D McIntyre [1918] ILR. 41 All 248; Rhodia Ltd v Neon Laboratories Ltd AIR [2002] Bom 502.
51 AIR [1930] Mad 146.
52 De Beeche v South American stores Ltd and Chilean Stores Ld [1935] AC 148, Technip (n 308).
53 Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay & Co [1918] 2 KB 623.
54 Ertel Beiber & Co v Rio Tinto Co Ltd [1918] AC 260.
55 Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v St C.M.S. Electricity Co Ltd [2007] EWHC 1713 (Comm).
56 A Setalavad, Conflict of Laws 2nd edn (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, 2011) 100.
57 Rhodia Ltd. v Neon Laboratories Ltd [2002] SCC OnLine Bom 626.
58 ibid [1].
59 ibid.
60 ibid [5].
61 ibid [12] see Harishanker Jain (n 45).
62 ibid.
63 ibid, 75.238.
foreign origin are questions of fact, courts may not generally at common law rely upon a previous Indian
decision on foreign law.
Thus judicial decisions reveal overwhelming support for proving the content of foreign law by
adducing evidence.
i. Problem of Proving Foreign Law

The application of foreign law constitutes a central element of private international law. However,
there are inherent problems associated with the pleading and proof of foreign law. The meaning
and spirit of the content of the foreign law may not be apparent to judges and their understanding
may be characterised by differences in an alien legal system. For instance, if a German court has
to decide on the validity of a marriage based on an unfamiliar Afghan law, it will impose a heavy
burden on the German judge to gather material on the content and context of the applicable
law. A bare reading of a statute may not always present a comprehensive picture.64 The problems
become attenuated when we consider the existence of translated texts and whether the transla-
tions convey the real intention of statutory provision. The issue was raised in Neilson v Overseas
Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd.65 before the Australian courts (the case has been discussed
earlier in the chapter on renvoi). The case raised a cross-border tort claim. Chinese law barred the
petitioners’ claim where the cause of action arose, whereas the action was permitted by the law
of the forum – Australian law. The Australian courts, relying on the translated text of the General
Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, ruled that the provision of Chinese
law allow the court to apply the law of Australia. However, jurists have criticised the method and
understanding of the Australian court in interpreting Chinese law, which many have felt wrongly
decided.66
The process of proving foreign law through expert opinion is time-consuming and expensive.67
The burden placed on the parties to adduce expert evidence adversely affects the parties who rely
on the invocation of foreign law. Further, since parties must adduce evidence through experts,
the evidence adduced may be partisan and will need to be tested by cross-examination. The situ-
ation calls for increased judicial cooperation. Under the European Convention on Information of
Foreign Law, when issues of foreign law arise in legal proceedings, the Parties undertake to supply
information concerning the applicable civil law and procedure and the relevant judicial system.68
Each Party is to set up or appoint a ‘receiving agency’ to receive (and take action on) requests
for information from the other party and a ‘transmitting agency’ to receive requests for infor-
mation from judicial authorities and transmit them to a competent foreign receiving agency.69
The names and addresses of these bodies are communicated by the Contracting Parties to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.70 The Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2014 (2070BS) of
Nepal provides mechanisms of mutual legal assistance between Nepal and foreign states in legal
proceedings based on reciprocity and bilateral treaties.71 The subject matter of legal assistance
64 GS Alexander, ‘The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of Conflicts: Variations on a Theme of
Alexander Nekam’ (1975) 70(4) North Western University Law Review 602–638, 604.
65 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54.
66 M Davies, ‘Renvoi and Presumptions about Foreign Law: Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd’
(2006) 30(1) Melbourne University Law Review 244.

67 J Mc Comish, ‘Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in Australia’ (2007) 31(2) Melbourne University Law Review 400.
68 European Convention on Information of Foreign Law [1968] ETS No 062 Art 1.
69 ibid, Art 2.
70 ibid.
71 Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2070 (2014), (Nepal).
Exclusion of Foreign Law 53
includes providing documents and evidence, freezing property, and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.72 Such mechanisms help courts with easy access to foreign law.
IV. Exclusion of Foreign Law

A. Categories of Exclusion
A central element of private international law is determining when foreign law is to be applied.
However, most legal systems have specific rules, which exclude the application of foreign law in
certain circumstances.73 Dicey, Morris & Collins observes that ‘courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain an action … for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or
other public law of a foreign State’.74
i. Penal Laws
Penal laws represent the act of a sovereign and as such can have no effect on the territory of
others. The principle was stated in The Antelope in 1825 when Chief Justice Marshall held that
the courts of no country enforce the penal laws of another.75 Since then, writers76 and case juris-
prudence has painstakingly attempted to define the term ‘penal’, but no consensus has emerged.
The general understanding is that the term ‘penal’ is not to be understood in the sense of being
criminal laws.77 In the seminal case of Huntington v Attrill,78 Huntington sued in Maryland to
enforce a New York judgment obtained under a statute making directors liable for corporate
debts. The court refused to enforce the judgment as being penal. The court stated that the ques-
tion of whether a statute of one state which in some aspects may be called penal is in actuality
a penal law in the international sense, so as not to be enforceable in the courts of another state,
depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice
of the state or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.79 In Lynch v
Government of Paraguay,80 the English court held that Paraguayan law, which vested the property
of the deceased in the government, was a penal law and hence inapplicable to property left in
England. In Banco De Vizcaya v Don Alfonso de Borbon Y Austria,81 the petitioner bank claimed
the property of the king of Spain based on Spanish law, which had classified the king as a trai-
tor and directed the seizure of his property by the state. The English court classified the Spanish
law as penal. Hence, the petitioner’s claim failed. In Attorney General of New Zealand v Oritz,
72 ibid, s 5.
73 WW Yee, ‘The Exclusion of Foreign Law: Public Policy in Choice of Law Process’ (1995)16 Singapore Law Review
286–318.
74 Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (n 4) 5R-01.
75 The Antelope [1825] 23 US (10 Wheat.).
76 MW Janis, ‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Law: The Antelope’s Penal Law Exception’ (1986) 20(1)
The International Lawyer 303 308; RA Leflar, ‘Extra State Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims’ (1932) 46(2)
Harvard Law Review 193–225.
77 Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1 (HL).
78 Huntington v Attrill [1892] 146 U.S. 657; PB Kutner, ‘Judicial Identification of Penal Laws in the Conflict of Laws’
(1978) 31(3) Oklahoma Law Review 590–634.

79 ibid 602.
80 [1871] LR 2 P&D 268.
81 [1935] 1 KB 140.
the petitioner sought to apply New Zealand law, which sought seizure of an article and penal
consequences for the illegal export of a Maori carving.82 The Court of Appeal classified the law
as penal and thus unenforceable. The House of Lords affirmed the decision on the ground that
New Zealand had acquired no title to the carving and the conclusions of the Court of Appeal were
held to be merely obiter.83
ii. Revenue and Public Laws

In Government of India v Taylor,84 the Government of India sought to prove in the voluntary
liquidation of a company registered in the UK but trading in India, for a sum due in respect of
Indian income tax, including capital gains tax, which arose on the sale of the company’s under-
taking in India. The claim was not maintainable because it was a claim by the Government of
India to recover Indian tax. English law generally does not permit the direct or indirect enforce-
ment of foreign revenue laws. Lord Keith explained the position by stating that the enforcement
of taxes would be an assertion of sovereignty by one state in the territory of another.85 An expan-
sionist interpretation has been followed in the field of public law, so as to include the enforcement
of security laws86 and matters vindicating the governmental interest of a state.87 Cases from
Australia and New Zealand provide illustrations. The UK Government attempted to prevent the
publication of the book Spycatcher written by a former member of British secret intelligence. The
Australian High Court held that the UK Government was trying to protect its sovereign interest
in the defence of the nation, which the Australian court could not enforce.88 In New Zealand, the
publication was not prohibited as the book’s material was in the public domain and the restriction
on publication would be opposed to the public interest.89
B. Indian Judicial Decisions on Exclusion of Foreign Law

In the Indian context, no judicial statements have clarified the criteria for excluding foreign
penal laws. The Supreme Court has observed that, in general, foreign revenue laws will not
be enforced.90 In Dhondiram Chatrabhuj Marwadi v Sadasuk Sawattram Marwadi,91 a pre-
Independence case, the Bombay High Court admitted a promissory note executed in the state
of Hyderabad as evidence, despite it being inadmissible under the law in Hyderabad because
foreign revenue law cannot be enforced. In another case, the court suggested that an Indian court
will not entertain a suit to recover a toll on exports as it would imply the application of foreign
82 Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz (n 77).

83 ibid[46].
84 Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491; WE Holder, ‘Public Policy and National Preferences: The Exclusion
of Foreign Law in English Private International Law’ (1968) 17(4) International Law and Comparative Law Quarterly
926–952, 931.
85 Approved in re State of Norway’s application (Nos 1 and 2) HL [1990] 1 AC 723; Iran v The Barakat Galleries Ltd
[2007] EWHC 705 (QB).

86 Schemmer v Property Resources Ltd [1975] Ch. 273; FD Strebel, ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Foreign
Public Law’ (1999) 21 Loyola Los Angeles International Law and Comparative Law Journal 55–129, 69.
87 Spycatcher case, Att-Gen (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty. Ltd [1988] 165 CLR 30.
88 Attorney General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [1988] 165 CLR 30.
89 Attorney General (UK) v Wellington Publishers Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 129.
90 Viswanathan R v Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid AIR [1963] SC 1.
91 [1918] ILR 42 Bom 522.
Overriding Mandatory Norms and Public Policy (Ordre Public) 55
revenue law.92 Similarly, in the Government of India, Ministry of Finance v Taylor & another,93
the court stated that the enforcement of a claim for taxes is an extension of a state’s sovereign
power which imposed the taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign authority by one state within
the territory of another … is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent
sovereignties. In comparison to the lack of jurisprudence on the exclusion of foreign laws, Indian
courts have elaborated on the public policy exception underlying the application of foreign law.
V. Overriding Mandatory Norms and Public Policy (Ordre Public)

A. Public Policy and Ordre Public: Conceptual Dimension
The doctrine on the basis of which otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded is known
as ordre public in civil law jurisdictions and ‘public policy’ in common law countries. The concept
is of historical origin and one of the fundamental elements of the operationalisation of private
international law. The doctrine is mandated by local exigencies94 and is applied in the case
of choice of law and the enforcement of foreign judgments.95 Although the doctrine is part
of all codified conventions of private international law, formal definitions of public policy are
elusive, and lack of consensus persists as far as the definition and contours of public policy
are concerned.96
Ordre public is based on statutory developments. Being of statutory origin, the judicial discre-
tion enjoyed by the judges in determining the contours of ordre public is limited.97 At common
law, judicial discretion has led judges to interpret public policy in a variety of ways, leading in
some cases to concerns of parochialism undermining the entire private international law system.98
The current conceptualisation of public policy demands that it is not enough to show that foreign
law differs from domestic law, but it is also necessary to show that applying foreign law would
be wholly alien to fundamental notions of local justice.99 It follows that the application of public
policy in private international law cannot be extended to all situations where the foreign law
conflicts with the domestic law.100 It has also been argued that public policy is an exception as it
affirmatively directs the application of the law of the forum and has to be narrowly constructed.101
Public policy has been invoked in situations of violations of human rights.102
92 Krishnaji Panduran Sathe v Gajanan Balvant Kulkarni [1909] ILR 373.

93 Government of India, Ministry of Finance v Taylor & Anr [1955] 2 WLR 303.
94 A Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4(2) Journal of Private International
Law 201–236.
95 A Briggs, ‘Foreign Judgments and Human Rights; Note on USA v Montgomery’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 185.
96 K Chng, ‘A Theoretical Perspective of the Public Policy Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws’ (2018) 14(1) Journal of
Private International Law 130–159.

97 H Meidanis, ‘Public Policy and Ordre Public in the Private International Law of the E.U.: Traditional Positions and
Modern Trends’ (2005) 30(1) European Law Review 95.

98 O Kahn-Freund, RH Graveson, W Raeburn et al., ‘Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws’ (1953)
39 Transactions of the Grotius Society 39–83.

99 New Zealand Basing Ltd v Brown [2016] NZCA 525, [65]; K Murphy, ‘The Traditional View of Public Policy and Ordre
Public in Private International Law’ (1981) 11(3) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 591–615, 591.
100 Chng (n 96) 133.
101 PB Carter, ‘The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law’ (1993) 42 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 1–10, 9.

102 Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones S A v Deutsche Bank AG [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 649, [22].
B. Approach of Indian Courts in Clarifying the Public Policy of India

The jurisprudence evolved by the Indian courts has broadly followed the restrictive approach
to public policy followed by other jurisdictions. A majority of the cases where the public policy
has been defined deal with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India. In the landmark
case, Renusager Power Co Ltd v General Electric Co,103 the court held that foreign arbitral awards
under the Foreign Awards Act 1961 can be refused enforcement only if it is against the funda-
mental principles of public policy, the interests of India, or morality.104 Blatant illegality was used
as a ground within the purview of public policy in ONGC Ltd. v Saw Pipes.105 In explanation,
the court stated that a violation of statutory laws could not be in the public interest. In ONGC
v Western Geco,106 the court went into a further analysis of what constitutes public policy in
Indian law and added some new components to it, such as judicial approach,107 respect for the
rights of the parties, principles of natural justice, and avoiding perverse and irrational decisions.
The fundamental policy of Indian law was held not to amount to every Indian statutory enact-
ment, but only breaches of foundational principles of Indian law like the principles of natural
justice and Wednesbury reasonableness principles.108 In Technip SA v SMS Holding (Pvt) Ltd,109
Technip (a French company) acquired Coflexip (another French firm that had acquired control
of a listed Indian company, Seamec, through a convoluted route) in April 2000. Issues arose as
to the date on which Technip acquired control of Seamec and the applicable law to the dispute.
The Supreme Court decided the matter in favour of the application of the French law.110 It was
contended that such applicability was contrary to the Indian takeover code and against public
policy. The court held that, since French law differed only marginally from the Indian law, the
differences did not make the French provisions opposed to public policy. Accordingly, French law
was applied.111 The court observed that the power to discard a provision of foreign law must be
exercised exceptionally and with great circumspection. Otherwise, the purpose of private inter-
national law would stand defeated. Recently, in Vijay Karia and Ors v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Srl
and Ors,112 the Supreme Court reiterated the judgment in Cruz City113 and the definition given in
the Renusagar114 judgment to state that fundamental policy refers to legislation so basic to Indian
law that it cannot be compromised.
103 AIR [1994] SC 860; Reiterated in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v Unitech Limited [2017] 239 DLT 649.
104 British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries [1990] 3 SCC 481; National Thermal Power
Corporation v Singer Company [1992] 3 SCC 551 [14]; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd v General Electric Co AIR [1994] 860.
105 [2003] 5 SCC 705.
106 [2014] 9 SCC 263.
107 ibid [27] the court explained judicial approach as an approach that ensures that the authority acts bonafide and deals
with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its decision is not actuated by any extraneous consid-
eration. Judicial approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws and faults that can render the decision of a court,
Tribunal or Authority vulnerable to challenge.
108 GL Peiris, ‘Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Expanding Canvas’ (1987) 46 Cambridge Law Journal 53–82. The
‘Wednesbury’ principle is a standard of unreasonableness. It is attracted if a reasoning or decision is so unreasonable that

no reasonable person acting reasonably could have made it. The test was down in the case of Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223). The case espoused the standard of reasonableness.
109 [2005] 5 SCC 465.
110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 2020 S.C.C. OnLine SC 177. See C Jayaraj, ‘Conflict of Laws’ (2005) XLI Annual Survey of Indian Law Indian Law
Institute 71–87, 83.

113 Cruz City (n 103).
114 Renusagar (n 103).
Conclusion 57
The Indian courts’ approach to the interpretation of the public policy is broadly aligned
with the approach of other jurisdictions. Most of the cases decided by the Indian judiciary have
addressed the interpretation of foreign domestic law. No deliberation has taken on the inter-
action between international law and public policy. In this regard a reference to the case of
Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co provides an interesting illustration of how public policy
is linked to international law. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait115 and seized aircraft belonging to
Kuwait Airways Corporation (KAC). The Iraqi Government passed a resolution transferring all
of KAC’s property to Iraq Airways Corporation (IAC). The UN Security Council passed a resolu-
tion, based on which military action was taken against Iraq. The aircraft were damaged during
the air strike.116 After the liberation of Kuwait, KAC commenced legal proceedings against the
Republic of Iraq and IAC, claiming the return of its ten aircraft or payment of their value and
damages. Because the alleged wrongs were committed in Iraq and also given the absence of any
particular connection with another country, it was held that the applicable law in the case would
be the law of Iraq.117 However, the Iraqi Government’s action in nationalising Kuwait property
was justified and legal under the applicable Iraqi law. Nonetheless, the House of Lords held
that the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent nationalisation constituted a ‘gross violation of
established rules of international law’ and enforcement of Iraqi law would be ‘manifestly contrary
to the public policy of English law’.118
Along with the operation of public policy, currently jurisdictions are emphasising the
overriding mandatory rules exception. Mandatory rules touch on the core economic, social, and
political policies of a nation. Mandatory rules can be of the lex fori, the lex cause or the law of a
third country (for example, where a contract is to be performed).119 The best categorisation of
mandatory rules is contained in Article 9(1) of the EU’s Rome I Regulation on the law applicable
to contractual obligations. That defines overriding mandatory rules as:
provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests,
such as its political, social, or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any
situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable.120
Some prominent examples of mandatory policies are concerning foreign exchange, the environ-
ment, and defence, which require absolute compliance. Invoking overriding mandatory rules
would lead to the absolute application of the law of the forum. Whereas, in the case of public
policy, whether the foreign law will prevail or it will lead to applying the law of the forum depends
on the effect of public policy on the forum.121
VI. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the general principles governing categorisation of substantive and
procedural matters in private international law. For the sake of clarity, this chapter has adopted
115 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25, [1]; M Davies, The Effect in Private International
Law of a Breach of Public International Law by a State Actor’ (2001) 2(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 523–534.
116 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (ibid).
117 ibid [1].
118 ibid [29].
119 A Chong, ‘The Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries in International Contracts’ (2006) 2(1) Journal
of Private International law 27–70.

120 Council Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008, on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I
Regulation) OJ L177/6 Art 9(1).

121 JJ Fawcett, ‘Evasion of Law and Mandatory Rules in Private International Law’ (1990) 49(1) The Cambridge Law
Journal 44–62.
an approach wherein it first explains the characteristics and operationalisation of the concepts
and principles as evolved in other jurisdictions and then goes on to explore the Indian legal posi-
tion. The categorisation of issues as substantive and procedural has a direct consequence on the
invocation of applicable law in private international law. This chapter illustrates that the Indian
position treating limitation as procedural is not in conformity with the practice of other jurisdic-
tions, undermines the objectives of private international law, and encourages forum shopping.
This chapter highlighted that ostensible statutory reliance on proving the content of foreign law
as a question of fact and the burden placed on the parties to plead foreign law have had the effect
of hampering the growth of the subject by forcing parties in a dispute to rely on domestic law.
Where the content of foreign law has not been proved, foreign law is presumed to be the same
as the lex fori and the latter is applied. Case jurisprudence has been sparse as to the meaning of
penal and revenue laws; However, cases have richly deliberated on public policy and have laid
down the broad contours of its application. The cases have insisted on public policy as excluding
foreign law only if the latter is contrary to the fundamental principles of Indian law, the interests
of India, or morality.
part ii
Jurisdiction
60
5
Jurisdiction: Which Court
will Adjudicate a Matter?
I. Introduction
According to the Latin maxim ubi ius ibi remedium, every right must be accompanied with a
corresponding remedy. A legal right must be vindicated by initiating proceedings before an
appropriate court which has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate on the matter. The term ‘juris-
diction’ is derived from the Latin words ius (right) and dicere (to say or pronounce).1 It refers to
the power and authority of a court to administer (pronounce) justice (right) in a litigant’s case2
and denotes the competence of a court to hear a matter before it and pass requisite orders.3
In other words, jurisdiction includes every act of the court from inquiring into the facts to
applying legal principles, pronouncing judgment, and ensuring the execution of its decision.4 In
private international law, determination of a court’s jurisdiction is the chief pillar and a pivotal
factor from which flow all other aspects in the adjudication of a dispute with a foreign element
in a civil or commercial matter. A dispute may involve a foreign element in numerous circum-
stances. This may be the position when immovable property is located within the territory of the
court but is sold to a foreign national; when the performance of a contract occurred overseas;
or when persons who were residing or domiciled within the territorial limits of the court were
injured overseas. Once its jurisdiction has been established, a court will determine the mecha-
nism that will be employed to identify the applicable law governing a dispute. The competence
of a court in adjudicating on a matter will also determine whether its judgment is capable of
being recognised and enforced abroad.
This chapter deals with Indian conflict of law rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial
matters. Suits of a civil nature which arise in family matters are subject to special rules which will
be discussed in the next chapter. Section II examines rules on who may sue and be sued before
an Indian court in civil and commercial matters. It discusses the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure 19085 (CPC), the UN (Privileges and Immunity) Act 1947 (UN Privileges Act),6 and
1 Halsbury’s Laws of India, Civil Procedure Vol 5, 2nd edn (Lexis Nexis, 2008) 65.042.
2 ibid.
3 ibid; CK Takwani, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act 1963 8th edn (Eastern Book Company) 40; JG Collier, The
Conflict Of Laws 3rd edn (CUP, 2001) 71; and A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws 4th edn (OUP, 2019) 44 [Briggs, Conflict of
Laws].
4 ibid and the decision the Supreme Court in Official Trustee v Sachindra Nath AIR [1969] SC 823.
5 Act No 5 of 1908.
6 Act No 46 of 1947.
62 Jurisdiction: Which Court will Adjudicate a Matter?
the Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act 1972 (Diplomatic Relations Act).7 Section III
discusses the Indian court’s jurisdiction in actions in personam. This part contains four sub-
sections. Section A discusses the scope and meaning of suits of a civil and commercial nature.
Section B examines the grounds on which an Indian court can exercise its jurisdiction in such
matters. Section C discusses the procedure for the service of summonses. Section D highlights
the factors which limit the jurisdiction of a court. In so doing, it examines Indian law provisions:
(1) to prevent concurrent proceedings and inconsistent judgments; and (2) the circumstances
in which a court may stay proceedings under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens or pursuant
to a choice of court or arbitration agreement. Section IV focuses on the jurisdiction of an Indian
court in in rem actions, primarily concerning disputes arising from a maritime claim against a
ship or a vessel. Section V reflects on the position of Indian law vis-à-vis global trends to gauge
the level of legal development in the country. In doing so, this part analyses the laws of countries
such as Australia, Canada and the EU. The provisions of the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements8 (HCCCA) which harmonises the law on choice of court agreements among
contracting states are also analysed. Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. Persons who may File a Suit before an Indian Court

In general, every person – whether natural or juristic – may sue or be sued in a court in India,
regardless of whether the person is a resident or a foreigner, provided the grounds on which the
court may assume jurisdiction have been satisfied. Suits by or against a minor must, however, be
instituted by the minor’s guardian.9 Suits by or against artificial (juristic) persons such as compa-
nies may be initiated by its secretary, director or principal officer in the name of the corporation.10
Suits by or against a partnership must be initiated by two or more partners carrying on business
in India – provided that they were partners at the time when the cause of action occurred.11 At
the same time, Indian law imposes restrictions on the right of the persons to sue and be sued
before a court. These restrictions are discussed below.
A. Suits by Alien Enemies

Section 83 of the CPC prohibits the initiation of suits by alien enemies. There is no prohibi-
tion on the initiation of lawsuits against such persons. An alien enemy is a person who is a
national of a country at war with India and residing in the Republic without the permission of
the Indian Government. Therefore, nationals of an enemy country residing in India with the
consent of the Indian Government may commence suit. The limitation under section 83 is not
extended to foreign corporations which enjoy legal personality under the law in which they were
7 Act No 43 of 1972.
8 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter the HCCCA]. The text of the HCCCA is reproduced in (2006) 2 Journal of Private International
Law 270.
9 Order 32 of the CPC.
10 ibid, Order 29.
11 ibid, Order 30, Rule 1.
Persons who may File a Suit before an Indian Court 63
incorporated.12 Accordingly, the secretary, director or principal officer of such company may
initiate a suit in India in the name of the corporation.
B. Suits by a Foreign State

Section 84 prohibits a foreign state13 from initiating a suit before a civil court in India unless it is
for the enforcement of a private right vested in its rulers, ambassadors, envoys or, in the case of a
Commonwealth country, a High Commissioner acting in a private capacity.
C. Sovereign Immunity
Besides the restrictions on the filing of suits by alien enemies and foreign states, there are also
limitations on the initiation of proceedings against foreign states and the former Indian Princely
States due to the principle of sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was devel-
oped during an era of laissez-faire when state entry into trading was not envisaged.14 According
to this principle, sovereign states are immune from the jurisdiction of the courts in another coun-
try. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, therefore, prohibits a sovereign state from being made
a defendant in the courts of another country without the sovereign state’s consent.15 The prin-
ciple is predicated on the policy consideration that the ‘national interest will be better served if
the wrongs to suitors involving relations with a foreign power are righted through diplomatic
negotiations rather than by compulsions to judicial proceedings’.16 In Indian law, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is imbibed from the provisions of the CPC, the UN Privileges Act and the
Diplomatic Relations Act.
i. Section 86 of the CPC

Section 86 incorporates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and prohibits the initiation of suits
against a foreign state without the consent of the Central Government. Section 86 thus gives effect
to the concept of sovereign immunity, albeit in a limited manner, by requiring the permission of
the central government before suing a foreign state in any court in India to prevent frivolous and
unjustified litigation.17 The consent of the Central Government is not required if the plaintiff
initiates the proceedings in its capacity as a tenant of an immovable property which it claims to
hold though the foreign state.18
12 See, Shamrao Krishnaji Honnali v United Home Building & Engineering Society (India) Ltd of Bangalore [1935] 38
Bom LR 1092.
13 See s 87A(a) of the CPC, which states that a foreign state refers to a country which is outside India and has been
recognised by the Central Government.

14 JP Ball, ‘Sovereign Immunity of Governmental Trading Entities’ (1959) Sydney Law Review 143, 143.
15 See, J Hogan, ‘International Law – Sovereign Immunity’ (1961) University of Miami Law Review 450, 451.
16 ibid.
17 See, Mirza Ali Akbar Kasani v United Arab Republic AIR [1966] SC 230, 231-232; Harbhajan Singh Dhalla v Union
of India, AIR [1987] SC 9; Veb Deutfract Sccieederei Rostock v New Central Jute Mills Co Ltd AIR [1994] SC 516 [5];
Consulate General of Islamic Republic of Iran, Mumbai v Baldota Brothers [2013] 3 Mh. L.J [37, 38] and Rita Solomon &
Ors v Republic of Italy & Anr [2019] 260 DLT 331 [3].
18 See, s 86(1) of the CPC.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Veb Deutfract Sccieederei Rostock v New Central Jute
Mills Co Ltd19 illustrates this point. The court was exercising its appellate jurisdiction in a dispute
which arose from a suit against a company incorporated in Germany for allegedly delivering
damaged goods. The company was an agent of the Government of Germany which has been
recognised as a foreign state in India. The court reversed the decision of the Calcutta High
Court which held that the suit against an organ of the German Government was not barred by
section 86 of the CPC.20 In doing so, the Supreme Court referred to the decision of the English
court in Baccus SRL v Servicio Nacional Del Trigo,21 which forms the genesis of the subject under
English common law. The dispute arose between an Italian and a Spanish trading corporation
for an alleged breach of contract by the latter. The parties had agreed on the jurisdiction of the
High Court in London. The defendants claimed to be a department of the sovereign state of Spain
which was headed by the Spanish Minister of Agriculture. In Baccus, the court per Jenkins LJ
confirmed the extension of the principle of sovereign immunity to government-organised trad-
ing corporations.22 It stated that the identification of a department as a government-organised
trading corporation would depend on the nature of its activities and the interests of the foreign
state.23 Such corporations differ from ordinary trading corporations, insofar as the former’s ‘oper-
ations consist of purchasing and selling or importing and exporting staple commodities in the
interest of the public for whom the foreign sovereign State is responsible’.24 Accordingly, if a suit
is initiated against a corporate body which is in truth a department of the sovereign state, the suit
will in effect be considered as one between the plaintiff and a foreign state.25 Further, the court
in Veb Deutfract26 referred to a dictum of the Calcutta High Court Royal Nepal Airlines Corp v
Manorama Meher Singh Legha.27 The court stated that the Nepal Airlines Corporation which had
its office in Calcutta was eligible for limited sovereign immunity under section 86 insofar as it was
a department of the Government of Nepal.28 The Calcutta High Court stated:
[O]ne of the principles of international law is that every sovereign State respects the independence of
every other foreign State. This absolute independence and international comity underline the relation-
ship between sovereign States.29
The limited sovereign immunity conferred by section 86 of the CPC thus extends to the different
departments and organs through which a foreign state carries out business, whether incorporated
or unincorporated bodies.30 In other words, such departments must directly form part of the
activities of the foreign state.31 At the same time, the private activities of a foreign state would
not benefit from the immunity granted under section 86.32 The development of cultural activi-
ties or the facilitating of data centres in India is therefore not construed as a function of a foreign
state in the performance of its sovereign obligations.33 For this reason, disputes arising in such
19 AIR [1994] SC 516.

20 See, New Central Jute Mills v VEB Deutr-Frachit Seerederai Rostock AIR [1983] Cal 225.
21 (1957) 1 QB 438 (C.A.).
22 ibid 466.
23 Ball (n 14) 143–144, referring to Baccus ibid.
24 (n 21) 467; and Ball, (n 14) 144.
25 Ball, (n 14) 143–144.
26 (n 17).
27 AIR [1966] Cal 319.
28 (n 17) [8–9].
29 ibid [5].
30 ibid [8–9].
31 ibid.
32 See, International Development Research Centre v Durgeshwarisahi ILR [2007] 1 Delhi 640 [16].
33 ibid.
matters would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian court without need for the Central
Government’s permission.
Section 86(2) prohibits the Central Government from consenting to suits against a foreign
state unless the dispute falls within the ambit of clauses (a) to (d) of the provision.34 The Central
Government shall accordingly only consent to the initiation of the suit where the foreign state:
(a) initiated a suit against the person desiring to sue it;35
(b) trades within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court where the proceedings have
been initiated;36
(c) possesses immovable property within the local limits of the court and the dispute arises in
relation to such property or the money charged thereon;37
(d) has expressly or impliedly waived the privilege of the immunity conferred.38
Section 86 obligates the Central Government to provide a hearing to the person who makes
the request before refusing to permit the initiation of the suit.39 The Central Government must
thus follow the standards that are stipulated in section 86(2).40 The consent letter of the Central
Government which permits the initiation of the suits must therefore refer to a criterion indi-
cated by section 86(2).41 The law, however, prohibits the High Court from directing the Central
Government to provide its consent even when the High Court finds the Central Government’s
refusal to have been arbitrary or contrary to law.42 In this respect, the Supreme Court in Union of
India and Anr v Bilash Chand Jain and Anr stressed that the High Court, insofar as it is exercising
an administrative order of the Central Government, is not exercising an appellate jurisdiction
over the matter.43 Instead, the High Court is merely exercising a power of judicial review, which is
much narrower than its appellate authority.44 In such circumstances, the High Court may merely
remand the matter to the Ministry of External Affairs with a direction to reconsider the case
under section 86(2) of the CPC.45 In a related vein, section 87-B prohibits suits by or against the
rulers of the former Indian Princely States46 unless a dispute has arisen wholly or partly from a
cause of action which occurred before the commencement of the Constitution.47 In such circum-
stances, the suit may be initiated by or against a former ruler in the same manner as against a
ruler, ambassador or envoy of a foreign state.
ii. UN Privileges Act

The doctrine of sovereign immunity has also been incorporated in the provisions of the UN
Privileges Act which gives effect to the 1946 UN Convention on Privileges and Immunity of the
34 Veb Deutfract (n 17) [5–6]; and Ram Naresh v Delhi Administration & Ors ILR [2005] II Delhi 1041 [7].
35 See, s 86(2)(a) of the CPC.
36 ibid, s 86(2)(b).
37 ibid, s 86(2)(c).
38 ibid, s 86(2)(d).
39 ibid, s 86(6) of the CPC; and Rita Solomon (n 17) [21].
40 Rita Solomon, ibid [22].
41 ibid [22].
42 Union of India and Anr v Bilash Chand Jain and Anr [2009] 16 SCC 601 [4].
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
45 ibid.
46 See s 87(2)(a) of the CPC, which states that a former Indian State refers to an Indian State which has been notified as
such by the Official Gazette of the Central Government. A list of former Indian States is available at: https://highcourtchd.
gov.in/sub_pages/left_menu/Rules_orders/high_court_rules/vol-I-pdf/chap7V1.pdf.
47 See s 87B(3)(b) of the CPC, which clarifies that the commencement of the Constitution refers to 26 January 1950.
United Nations to which India is a signatory. The statute confers immunity against legal proceed-
ings against:
(a) the UN, its property and assets (wherever they are located) of the UN;48
(b) the officials of the UN for acts performed in their legal capacity;49
(c) the representatives of Members of the principal and subsidiary organs, conferences
convened;50
(d) the experts that are performing missions for the Organisation.51
The legislation, however, permits the Secretary-General to waive the immunity expressly.52
Further, it clarifies that such privileges and immunities shall not be exercised for the personal
benefit of the individuals.53 Accordingly, there is a duty on the Member to waive the immunity if
it believes that not doing so is likely to impede the course of justice.54
iii. Diplomatic Relations Act

The provisions of the Diplomatic Relations Act give effect to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations 1961 (the 1961 Vienna Convention)55 to which India is a signatory.
According to the provisions of the legislation, diplomatic agents (heads of missions56 and diplo-
matic staff57) are considered to be representatives of the sending state who perform sovereign
functions of that country in the receiving state.58 A court in India will not entertain civil or
administrative proceedings against diplomatic agents59 and members of the administrative and
technical staff of missions and their families, who are not nationals of the Republic,60 for acts in
the performance of their official duties61 unless the sending state has expressly waived the immu-
nity conferred by the legislation.62 In PS Govindaswamy Naidu & Sons’ Charities v V Prakash, the
Madras High Court clarified that the protection from the jurisdiction of the Indian courts under
the Diplomatic Relations Act is also extended to consular offices of a sending State in India.63 The
legislation prohibits any public servant or agent from entering the premises of a foreign state’s
48 ibid, Art II: s 2 of the 1947 Act.

49 ibid, Art V: s 18(a); and Jyoti Sateeja v International Committee of the Red Cross & Ors [2015]
SCC OnLine Del 7996 [10].
50 ibid, Art IV: ss 11(a) and 12.
51 ibid, Art VI: s 22(a).
52 ibid, Art VIII: s 29(a).
53 ibid, Art IV: s 14; Art V: s 20; and Art VI: s 23.
54 ibid.
55 The text of the 1961 Vienna Convention is available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.
56 Art 1(a) of the 1961 Vienna Convention defines the head of the mission as the person charged by the sending State
with the duty of acting in that capacity.

57 ibid, Art 1(a) which defines the members of the staff of the mission as ‘the members of the diplomatic staff, of the
administrative and technical staff and of the service staff of the mission’.
58 See, Ram Naresh (n 34) [17], [19].
59 Art 31 of the 1972 Act; and Eva Drdakova v M/s Khemka Exports Private Ltd [2012] 114 (1) Bom LR 67 [6]. Also see
Art 1(e) of the 1961 Vienna Convention defines a diplomatic agent a ‘the head of the mission or a member of the diplo-
matic staff of the mission’.
60 ibid, Art 37. Also see Art 1(f) of the 1961 Vienna Convention defines the members of the administrative and techni-
cal staff as ‘the members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission’.
61 See, PS Govindaswamy Naidu & Sons’ Charities v V Prakash [2019] 6 CTC 154 [28].
62 ibid, Art 32 read along with Art 5.
63 PS Govindaswamy (n 61) [48]–[51]. Also see, Art 3(2) of the 1961 Vienna Convention, which clarifies that the func-
tions of the diplomatic mission include the consular functions by the mission.
diplomatic mission to serve legal process without permission.64 However, the immunity under
the legislation is from the jurisdiction of the Indian courts.65 It does not negate the elements
which form a cause of action.
The immunities conferred under the statute commence as soon as the persons indicated
therein enter India to take up a post.66 At the same time, the immunity granted to a diplomatic
agent is based on the principle of reciprocity. The legislation endows the Central Government with
the right to withdraw immunity if a state signatory to the Vienna Convention has breached its
obligations by conferring lesser immunities than those stipulated under the Diplomatic Relations
Act on the members of an Indian mission.67 A person who claims to be protected under the
provisions of the Act must provide proof to this effect.68 A certificate issued by the Secretary to
the Government of India in the Ministry of External Affairs is conclusive evidence of that fact.69
The principle of sovereign immunity under the Diplomatic Relations Act is not absolute and
is restricted. In general, there will be no immunity from legal proceedings if a suit arises from
a dispute in which the diplomatic agent was acting in its private (and not official) capacity. The
Indian court will have jurisdiction over suits involving diplomatic agents or its members in the
following circumstances.
(a) When the lawsuit concerns a real action for private immovable property situated in India,
unless the diplomatic agent holds it on behalf of the sending state.70 In Syrian Arab Republic
v AK Jajodia, the Delhi High Court stated that the immunity available under Article 31 of
the Diplomatic Relations Act does not extend to the renting or the leasing of immovable
property by a representative of a sovereign state from a private individual or the citizen of
India.71 Such properties, having been rented for private purposes, are not considered as invi-
olable under Article 21 of the Diplomatic Relations Act.72 They are not subject to immunity
from search, seizure or arrest.73 For this reason, the permission of the Central Government
is not required for initiation of proceedings under section 86 of the CPC as the underlying
transaction does constitute an act done by the mission or foreign state.74 Such properties fall
within the domain of a landlord-tenant relationship and the relevant property may be taken
back after termination of the lease period or on bona fide requirement of the property by the
landlord.75
(b) When the suit concerns an action relating to succession in which the diplomat is involved
in a private capacity as executor, administrator, heir or legatee.76 There is no reported
case in which an Indian court has refused immunity to diplomatic agents on this ground.
Nonetheless, a diplomatic agent is not eligible for immunity from civil proceedings before
a court in India if the suit concerns succession matters in which the agent acts outside one’s
official capacity.
64 ibid, Art 8; and PS Govindaswamy (n 61) [59], [60].

65 See, R Oppong, Private International Law in Commonwealth Africa (CUP, 2013) 115, 116, referring to the application
of the Vienna Convention 1961 in Nigeria.

66 ibid, Art 39.
67 ibid, Art 4.
68 ibid, Art 9.
69 ibid; and Eva Drdakova, (n 59) [4]–[5].
70 ibid, Art 31(1)(a).
71 ILR [2004] 2 Del 704 [14].
72 ibid.
73 ibid.
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
76 Art 31(1)(b) of the 1972 Act.
(c) When the suit arises from a professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomat in
India outside of official functions.77 As such, there is no general rule to ascertain whether a
particular activity may be construed as commercial or not. In Eva Drdakova v M/s Khemka
Exports Private Ltd, the Bombay High Court stated that an activity would not be considered
as commercial (and would continue to be covered by immunity) if portions of premises
held by employees of an embassy or consulate were leased to an outsider ‘for the benefit
of the principal activity of the Foreign Mission’.78 Conversely, the Indian court would have
jurisdiction over a dispute arising from the lease of a property to an outsider for conducting
activities entirely unconnected with the sovereign functions of a foreign state.79
III. Jurisdiction in personam

A court is said to possess jurisdiction in personam if the dispute relates to a claim initiated to
compel a defendant to do or refrain from doing something or to pay damages for the breach
of law.80 In other words, the dispute must relate to the determination of the rights and interests
of the parties themselves vis-à-vis the subject-matter.81 The effect of such an action is merely
to bind the parties to the suit.82 That said, a court in India possesses jurisdiction in personam
whenever the dispute is of a civil or commercial nature.
A. When is a Suit Considered to be of a Civil or Commercial Nature?
i. Suits of a Civil Nature

A suit is considered to be of a civil nature if it involves the adjudication of private rights and
remedies of persons and thus excludes criminal or political rights.83 Therefore, the determination
of the jurisdiction of an Indian court in a dispute initiated by the survivors of a person whose
death was caused by murder does not fall within the scope of the CPC. Similarly, suits which
primarily concern a person’s religion or caste are outside the scope of the CPC, insofar as such
disputes concern parties’ political rights. Disputes arising in connection with contractual obliga-
tions, torts, the dissolution of marriage and immovable property are examples of suits of a civil
nature.84 The CPC generally regulates the jurisdiction of a court in a suit of a civil nature. The
provisions of the statute are, however, inapplicable to disputes involving family matters. The latter
are regulated by personal laws depending on the religion of a relevant person. The jurisdiction of
an Indian court in family matters will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
ii. Suits of a Commercial Nature

The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High
Courts Act 2015 (CCA)85 regulates the jurisdiction of a court in suits of a commercial nature.
77 ibid, Art 31(1)(c).
78 Eva Drdakova (n 59) [19].
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
81 See the decision of the Supreme Court in R. Viswanathan v Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid 1963 SCR (3) 22.
82 ibid.
83 See Takwani (n 3) 47, 50–51.
84 ibid 51, 52.
85 Act No 4 of 2016.
Jurisdiction in personam 69
According to Section 2(c) of the statute, a suit is considered to be of a commercial nature if it

arises out of any of the following matters – provided that the value of the subject matter is not less
than Rupees 3,00,000 (INR three hundred thousand or more):86
(1) ordinary transactions of merchants, bankers, financiers and traders such as those relating
to mercantile documents, including enforcement and interpretation of such documents;
(2) export or import of merchandise or services;
(3) issues relating to admiralty and maritime law;
(4) transactions relating to aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft equipment and helicopters, includ-
ing sales, leasing and financing of the same;
(5) carriage of goods;
(6) construction and infrastructure contracts, including tenders;
(7) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce;
(8) franchising agreements;
(8) distribution and licensing agreements;
(9) management and consultancy agreements;
(10) joint venture agreements;
(11) shareholders agreements;
(12) subscription and investment agreements pertaining to the services industry including
outsourcing services and financial services;
(13) mercantile agency and mercantile usage;
(14) partnership agreements;
(15) technology development agreements;
(16) intellectual property rights relating to registered and unregistered trademarks, copyright,
patent, design, domain names, geographical indications and semiconductor integrated
circuits;
(17) agreements for sale of goods or provision of services;
(18) exploitation of oil and gas reserves or other natural resources including electromagnetic
spectrum;
(19) insurance and re-insurance;
(20) contracts of agency relating to any of the above; and
(21) such other commercial disputes as may be notified by the Central Government
(22) the recovery of immovable property or the realisation of money from such property which
was given as security; or
(23) contracts with a state or its agencies or a private body which carries out public functions.
B. Grounds on Which an Indian Court May Assume Jurisdiction

in a Civil or Commercial Matter
In actions in personam, the jurisdiction of a court will depend on the existence of certain condi-
tion precedents which are the sine qua non for deciding a matter before it.87 However, there is a
presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of the court.88 A suit of a civil nature must be instituted
within the jurisdiction of the court within whose territorial limits the dispute arose.89
86 See ss 2(c), 3A, 4, 7 and 10 of the CCA read along with s 47 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act
2015 [2015 Arbitration Act].

87 See Takwani (n 3) 46.
88 ibid 54.
89 ibid 47.
As a general rule, all commercial disputes, including those on international commercial

a rbitration90 – where the value of the suit is more than Rs 3,00,000 – must be attempted to be
resolved by mediation prior to seizing the jurisdiction of the court.91 In situations where the
resolution of the dispute by mediation is not feasible, for instance, because urgent interim relief
is required, the plaintiff may directly initiate the proceedings before the appropriate court.92
Such commercial disputes must be initiated before the Commercial Division of the High Court
if it arises in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras or Himachal Pradesh – which possess ordinary
original civil jurisdiction and is, therefore, empowered to adjudicate new matters.93 Commercial
disputes above the aforementioned value in all other states in India must be initiated before the
Commercial Courts that are created at the district level.94
All other civil and commercial matters (i.e. those in which the value of the subject matter is
less than Rs 3,00,000) must be initiated in the court of the lowest grade which is competent to try
the same.95 Disputes arising in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras or Himachal Pradesh must be
initiated before the High Court (but not the commercial division) of that state, which possesses
ordinary original civil jurisdiction and is, thus, empowered to hear new matters.96 Disputes in
civil and commercial (namely those where the value of the subject matter is below Rs 3,00,000)
matters in all other states must be initiated before the District court of that state – before the Civil
Judge or the Additional Civil Judge – depending on the pecuniary limits of the court.97
A court may assume jurisdiction for actions in personam in any civil and commercial matter
according to the rules prescribed in Sections 16 to 20 of the CPC.98 The court may hear the
case and settle a dispute on the fulfilment of these prerequisites after the initial assumption of
jurisdiction.99 The jurisdiction of a court in civil and commercial matters may be divided into
exclusive and permissive jurisdiction. The bases on which an Indian court may establish its
jurisdiction are discussed below.
i. Exclusive Jurisdiction

Sections 16 to 18 of the CPC stipulate the circumstances in which the courts in India will possess
exclusive jurisdiction over a matter. In particular, the provisions regulate the adjudication of
disputes arising in relation to immovable property in India. The jurisdiction of the court will be
mandatory. It will be unaffected by any choice of court agreement (also known as forum-selection
clauses) between the parties which provide that a dispute must be adjudicated in a foreign forum.
90 See s 2(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (ACA) which defines an ‘international commercial arbitration’ as:
‘an arbitration relating to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as commercial
under the law in force in India and where at least one of the parties is – (i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually
resident in, any country other than India; or (ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country other than India;
or (iii) an association or a body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any country other
than India; or (iv) the Government of a foreign country.’
91 Section 12A of the CCA.
92 ibid, s 12A(1) read along with Order XXXIX of the CPC that clarifies the circumstances in which the court may grant
urgent interim relief in the form of a temporary injunction.

93 Sections 4, 7 and 10(1) of the CCA. Also see, s 5(1) of the CCA for the procedure of appeals against the decisions of
the Commercial Division.

94 ibid, s 3. Also see, ss 3A and 13 of the CCA for the procedure of appeals against the decisions of the Commercial Court.
95 Section 15 of the CPC.
96 See ss 2(4) and 3 of the CPC. The procedure for appeals against the decisions may be found in ss 96–109 of the CPC
read along with the rules of the High Court of the state.
97 See s 2(4) of the CPC. The procedure for appeals against the decisions may be found in ss 96–109 of the CPC.
98 See in this respect Explanation to s 6 of the CCA.
Moreover, sections 16–18 prohibit recourse to any other ground, including that based on the
defendant’s residence or place of business (dealt with in sections 19 and 20 as discussed below).
Section 16 of the CPC confers exclusive jurisdiction over a court in which immovable property is
situated whenever the suit relates to the following matters:
(1) recovery of immovable property with or without rent;
(2) partition of immovable property;
(3) foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage or charge on immovable property;
(4) determination of any right or interest in immovable property;
(5) compensation of a wrong to immovable property; or
(6) recovery of movable property under restraint or attachment.
According to section 17 of the CPC, if the suit relates to relief or compensation for a wrong
done to immovable property situated within the jurisdiction of different courts, the court within
whose local limits a portion of the property is located will have exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter, provided that the entire claim arose in its territory. In certain circumstances, however, the
local limits of the jurisdiction of the court may be uncertain and cannot be identified. Section 18
permits any one of the courts which possess territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to adjudicate
on the matter, after recording a decree to that effect. The decree will have the same effect as if the
property was situated within the court’s jurisdiction.
ii. Permissive Jurisdiction

Sections 19 and 20 confer permissive jurisdiction on a court in India. Subject to certain limita-
tions as indicated in section III.D of this chapter, a plaintiff may seise the jurisdiction of the court
if the criteria below are met.
a. Residence
The term ‘residence’ refers to a natural and not juristic person.100 In general, it is the residence of
the defendant that is relevant in establishing the jurisdiction of a court in India. Section 19 of the
CPC regulates the jurisdiction of a court for disputes arising in matters of tort or delict. It permits
a court in India to assume jurisdiction in a dispute which arises from a wrong done to movable
property or a person if the defendant was ‘actually or voluntary’ residing in its territory at the
time of commencement of the suit.101 Section 20 confers a similar right on the court for actions
arising from residual matters which are not governed by the provisions of sections 16 to 19. In a
suit against more than one defendant, the court may assume jurisdiction if each of such persons
was actually or voluntarily residing in its territory at the time of commencement of the proceed-
ings. A person is considered as ‘actually and voluntarily’ residing in the territory of a court if
one has one’s permanent abode in that place or has lived there for a considerable period.102 The
Supreme Court in Yogesh Bharadwaj v State of U.P103 has clarified that in Indian private interna-
tional law the term ‘residence’ connotes a physical fact and refers to a person’s ‘bodily presence as
an inhabitant’ of a place.104 The Court added:
100 See, Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.068].

101 See s 19 of the CPC.
102 See Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.068].
103 (1990) 3 SCC 355 [17]–[21].
104 ibid [11].
[A]ny period of physical presence, however short, may constitute residence provided it is not transitory,
fleeting or casual. The intention is not relevant to prove the physical fact of residence except to the extent
of showing that it is not a mere fleeting or transitory existence.105
Accordingly, the mere presence of a defendant (or a plaintiff in suits arising from the infringe-
ment of a trademark or copyright) within the territorial limits of a court would not suffice in
conferring the latter with jurisdiction. Further, the residence must be voluntary and must not
be the result of imprisonment or the violation of immigration laws.106 The Explanation to
section 20 indicates that the CPC does not distinguish between habitual and ordinary residence
of a defendant to establish the jurisdiction of a court in India.107 Therefore, a court in India is
considered to possess jurisdiction over tortious matters if the defendant has a permanent dwelling
or a temporary residence in a place.108 A defendant is deemed to be a resident of his or her place
of permanent dwelling or temporary residence.109 The provisions of the Copyright Act 1957110
and the Trade Marks Act 1999 (TMA)111 would additionally apply when the dispute concerns
the infringement of a copyright or a trademark. In such circumstances, sections 62(2) of the
Copyright Act 1957 and 134(2) of the TMA permit a court to assume jurisdiction if the plaintiff
was ‘actually and voluntarily’ residing in its territory at the time of the commencement of the
proceedings.
b. Place of Business
According to sections 19 and 20 of the CPC, a court may assume jurisdiction if the defend-
ant was carrying on its business or personally working for gain in the court’s territory at
the time of the commencement of the proceedings.112 The identification of the residence is
irrelevant in suits against companies because such entities have no real existence in India.113
In such circumstances, a court may assume jurisdiction when a corporation carries on busi-
ness in its territory.114 The term ‘carry on business’ refers to the place where a person carries
out ‘some real, substantial, and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with
a set purpose’.115 In this respect, the Explanation to section 20 states that a corporation is
deemed to carry on its business at the place of its sole or principal office in India.116 In Mayan
(HK) Ltd. & Ors v Owners & Parties, Vessel MV Fortune Express & Ors the Supreme Court
clarified that the principal place of business of a corporation could be: (1) the place where
the governing power of the corporation is exercised; (2) the place where the chief execu-
tive’s offices are located; or (3) the place designated as such in its incorporation statutes and
articles of association.117 Likewise, a person who personally works for gain within the terri-
torial limits of a court will also be subject to the latter’s jurisdiction. There is no reported
105 ibid [17].

106 ibid [20]; and Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.068].
107 See Explanation I to s 20 of the CPC.
108 ibid.
109 ibid.
110 Act No 14 of 1957.
111 Act No 47 of 1999.
112 Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.070].
113 See Collier (n 3) 82 (2001), referring to English common law on jurisdiction.
114 ibid.
115 See Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.069].
116 See also, Patel Roadways Ltd, Bombay v Prasad Trading Company, [1991] 4 SCC 270 [9], [12]; and Hakam Singh v
Gammon (India) Ltd, [1971] 1 SCC 286.

117 [2006] 3 SCC 100 [32], referring to ss 4 and 10 of the Companies Act, 1956; and ABC Laminart (P) Ltd v AP Agencies
[1989] 2 SCC 163.

case on the circumstances in which persons ‘personally work for gain’ in a place. However,
the expression connotes the circumstances in which one performs work for a sum of money.
By this principle, a solicitor is considered as ‘personally working for gain’ in Delhi if the
solicitor represents clients in judicial proceedings for a sum of money in that state’s courts.
Likewise, a professor is considered as ‘personally working for gain’ in a Mumbai university
if the educational institution that the professor is associated with is located in that state.
However, the professor is not considered as ‘personally working for gain’ in Delhi if the profes-
sor was merely visiting Delhi to participate in a conference or seminar. Sections 62(2) of the
Copyright Act and 134(2) of the TMA permit a court to assume jurisdiction if the plaintiff has
carried on business or personally worked for gain in its territory at the time of commencement
of proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Dhodha House v SK Maingi & Patel Field Marshal Industries & Ors v PM
Diesel Ltd118 has clarified the parameters of the expression ‘carry on business’ in the infringement
of intellectual property. The proceedings arose in the form of an appeal from the decision of the
High Court.119 The appellant-defendant and the respondent-plaintiff were in the business of diesel
engines in Rajkot, a state in Gujarat.120 The plaintiff had filed a suit before the Delhi High Court
seeking a perpetual injunction against the defendant which had allegedly infringed its trademark,
copyright and trading style.121 The plaintiff contended that the act of the defendant selling its
goods in Delhi conferred jurisdiction upon that court for the reason that it violated the plaintiff ’s
rights in that territory.122 The Delhi High Court rejected the contention on the ground that it
did not possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter since the parties ‘are resident and
working for gain at Rajkot and no sale was effected by them within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court’.123 The question before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs could be regarded
as having carried on their business within the parameters of section 62(2) of the Copyright Act.
Answering in the negative, the court stated that the expressions ‘carry on business’ and ‘personally
works for gain’ ‘connote two different meanings’.124 The Court added that the presence of a person in
a place is not necessary to establish that one is carrying on a business at that location.125 Therefore,
in certain circumstances, the jurisdiction of a court may be attracted under section 62(2) of the
Copyright Act when a person is engaging in business through an agent in the territory.126 This will
be the position when the plaintiff in its capacity as a principal, is conducting business through a
special (and not a general) agent who works exclusively for the former in that territory.127
The person who is ‘acting as [an] agent, must be an agent in the strict sense of the term’.128
Accordingly, a manager of a joint Hindu family will not be regarded as an ‘agent’ within the
meaning of section 62(2) of the Copyright Act.129 The agent must necessarily carry out an
essential part of the business in that place and possess the power to conclude contracts and
receive money on behalf of the principal in that territory.130 As a result, the services of a
118 2006 (9) SCC 41.

119 ibid [9].
120 ibid.
121 ibid [10]–[13].
122 ibid.
123 ibid [14].
124 ibid [46].
125 ibid.
126 ibid.
127 ibid.
128 ibid.
129 ibid.
130 ibid.
commission agent to sell goods for the principal on a commission in that territory would not
attract the provisions of section 62(2) of the Copyright Act for the reason that the person is not
considered as ‘carrying on business’ in that place.131
In online transactions, it has been held that a plaintiff carries on business at every place from
where it can conclude contracts with customers through a website. This was the position in
World Wrestling Entertainment v M/s Reshma Collection and Ors132 which concerned a dispute
arising from the defendant’s alleged infringement of the plaintiff ’s copyright and trademark. The
plaintiff (a US company incorporated) was in the business of selling merchandise such as posters,
calendars, and apparel to customers in Delhi through its website.133 The defendants, on the other
hand, were residents of Mumbai and were allegedly engaged in the business of manufacturing
infringing goods.134 The court per Badar Durrez Ahmed J rejected the defendant’s contention
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant did not reside in its territory and that the
plaintiff ’s hosting of a website to sell its products in Delhi would not amount to ‘carrying on busi-
ness’ within the meaning of sections 62(2) of the Copyright Act and 134(2) of the TMA.135 The
court equated transactions which have been concluded in the physical realm with those which
have been entered into online through a website.136 It stated:
[I]t is possible for an entity to have a virtual presence in a place which is located at a distance from the
place where it has a physical presence. The availability of transactions through the website at a particular
place is virtually the same thing as a seller having shops in that place in the physical world.137
In doing so, the court referred to a dictum of the Supreme Court in Dhodha House138 to ascertain
whether the act of sale done through another (in this case, a website) would indicate that the
plaintiff was carrying on a business in the territory.139 Answering in the affirmative, the court
stated that the plaintiff ’s decision to host a website in Delhi through which it was able to sell its
products would be regarded as carrying on business in that territory because the essential part of
online transactions occurred in that place.140
c. Cause of Action
Judicial dicta clarify that ‘cause of action’ constitutes ‘the bundle of facts which gives rise to the
right or liability’.141 It refers to the plaintiff ’s right to sue.142 It is ‘imperative for the suitor to allege
and prove’ the cause of action without which the plaint would be rejected summarily and the law
would confer the defendant with an immediate right to judgment.143 In Kusum Ingots & Alloys
Ltd v Union of India & Anr, the Supreme Court clarified that a court might assume jurisdiction
even when a small fraction of the cause of action has accrued in its territory.144 CPC section 19
131 ibid.
132 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031.
133 ibid [2]–[4].
134 ibid [5].
135 ibid [11], [12], [21].
136 ibid [21].
137 ibid [21].
138 (n 118) [46].
139 ibid [21].
140 ibid [13], [14], [21].
141 ABC Laminart (P) Ltd v AP Agencies [1989] 2 SCC 163 [11]. Also see Union of India v Andani Exports Ltd [2002]
1 SCC 567 [16]; and Sonic Surgical v National Insurance Co. Ltd [2010] 1 SCC 135, [3]–[6], referring to IFB Automotive
Seating and System Ltd v Union of India AIR [2003] Cal 80; and Dhodha House (n 118) [19].
142 Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd v Union of India & Anr [2004] 6 SCC 254, [12].
143 ibid.
144 ibid.
impliedly confers jurisdiction on a court which is in the place where the cause of action arose.
The provision permits a court to assume jurisdiction in a suit for a wrong done to movables if the
harmful act was committed in its territory.145 However, if the harmful act consists of a series of
acts and the act was committed at one place but its consequences were felt in another, the plaintiff
may initiate the proceedings either of the two places.146 Likewise, in a suit for tortious liability
for a wrong done to a person, a court may assume jurisdiction when the act was committed in its
territory.147 In such circumstances, the plaintiff has a choice of initiating proceedings in the place
where the defendant resides or the place where the wrongful act was committed.148
Section 20 of the CPC permits a court to assume jurisdiction when the cause of action occurred
in its territory. The circumstances which constitute the cause of action have, however, not been
defined by statute.149 The Supreme Court in ABC Laminart (Pvt) Ltd v AP Agencies, Salem devised
detailed guidelines to identify the place where the cause of action arises in disputes on contractual
matters.150 Suits for damages arising from the breach of a contract may be initiated at the place
where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed, and the breach
occurred.151 A court in India may, therefore, assume jurisdiction if it is situated in the place where
the cause of action occurred, if it was the locus contractus (the place where the agreement was
concluded), or the locus solutionis (the place where the contract was performed by delivery or
payment). According to section 4 of the ICA, as a general rule, a contract is considered to have
been concluded at the place at which the offeror has received a communication of acceptance from
the offeree.152 The general rule is applicable to identify the place of the conclusion of a contract
which has been using instantaneous communication, such as over the telephone or electronically
(through e-mail).153 In Baroda Oil Cakes Traders v Parshottam Narayandas Bagulia, the Bombay
High Court stated that contracts concluded by post or telegram would not be subjected to the
general rule stipulated under section 4 of the ICA.154 This is because such agreements essentially
depend on the intervention of a third party to transmit a message and are susceptible to being lost
in transit.155 The place of conclusion for such contracts will be the place from where ‘the acceptance
is put in the course of transmission by the offeree by posting a letter or dispatching a telegram’.156
For example, the place of conclusion of a contract for the sale of goods between a seller in Delhi
and a buyer in Sydney which has been negotiated telephonically will be Sydney if the latter makes
an offer to the former to buy a certain product. Sydney is the place at which the offeror received
the communication of the acceptance. However, suppose the (same) contract was negotiated by
post. In that case, the place of conclusion of the contract will be Delhi which is the place from
where the offeree (the Indian seller) communicated its acceptance to the Australian buyer. The
court in ABC Laminart, however, stated that if the place of the conclusion and the performance
coincide, then the suit cannot be initiated before any other forum in India. In such circumstances,
145 Takwani (n 3) 143.

146 ibid.
147 Section 19 of the CPC.
148 ibid; and Globe Transport Corpn v Triveni Engineering Works [1983] 4 SCC 707 [3].
149 See Kusum Ingots (n 142) [12].
150 AIR [1989] SC 1239.
151 ibid [15]. Also see, Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.077].
152 ABC Laminart ibid; and Baroda Oil Cakes Traders v Parshottam Narayandas Bagulia AIR [1954] Bom 41 [38].
See also N Bhadbhade (ed), Pollock and Mulla on the Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts: Volume 1 14th edn
(Lexis Nexis Publications 2014) 137.
153 See in this respect, ABC Laminart, ibid; and Baroda Oil Cakes, ibid.
154 (n 152) [47].
155 ibid. Also see World Wrestling Entertainment v M/s Reshma Collection and Ors 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031; and
Bhadbhade (n 152) 137.

156 ibid.
the plaintiff is precluded from filing a lawsuit before any other Indian court which may possess
jurisdiction by being the place where the defendant resides or carries on business.157 Similarly, in
suits for agency, proceedings may be initiated at the place where the contract was made or at the
place where the actions are rendered, and the payment is to be made by the agent.158
Suits for the termination of a contract should be initiated within the territorial limits of the
court within whose jurisdiction the notice to repudiate the agreement is received.159 In suits
against corporations, a court may assume jurisdiction when a principal office is located within
its territorial limits. The Explanation to section 20, however, clarifies that the court’s jurisdiction
would be ousted (and the location of the principal business of the corporation would be irrel-
evant) if the cause of action arose in another territory in India which coincides with the place
where the subordinate office of the company is located. The decision of the Supreme Court in
Patel Roadways Ltd, Bombay v Prasad Trading Company160 succinctly illustrates this aspect. The
dispute arose from the alleged breach of a contract which was concluded between the appellant
(a corporation in the transport business) and the respondent (which had hired the services of the
former).161 The appellant had its principal place of business in Bombay and a subordinate office
in Tamil Nadu.162 The respondent hired the appellant to send consignments to Delhi from Tamil
Nadu, the place where the latter’s subordinate office was located.163 The court stressed that:
the linking together of the place where the cause of action arises with the place where a subordinate
office is located clearly shows that in case of a corporation … the location of the subordinate office,
within the local limits of which a cause of action arises is to be the relevant place for filing of a suit and
not the principal place of business.164
The court added that the intention of the legislature in limiting the place of jurisdiction in the
manner indicated above was to alleviate the hardship caused to the plaintiff who would be
compelled to travel to the location where the company had its principal place of business.165
The intention of the legislators, as expressed in section 20 is therefore to level the playing field
between the plaintiff and the defendant.166 This factor will remain an indispensable criterion,
even in circumstances when the principal place of business of the plaintiff and the defendant are
located in the same place but the cause of action arises in the place where the latter has a subor-
dinate office.167 The court will presume that the plaintiff had some nexus or connection with that
place since the cause of action arose there.168
The identification of the place of the cause of action often involves several complexities in
disputes arising from transactions which have been concluded online. Although the plaintiff may
sue a defendant(s) at the place where the latter resides, carries on business or personally works
for gain, the plaintiff may prefer to initiate proceedings at the place where the cause of action
occurred to avoid the hardship involved in travelling to another place.
The Delhi High Court in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v A. Murali Krishna Reddy and
Anr169 has stipulated guidelines to determine the circumstances in which a court in India may
157 (n 150).
158 ibid [15].
159 ibid.
160 (n 116).
161 ibid.
162 ibid.
163 ibid.
164 ibid [9]. See also, New Moga Transport Co. v United India Insurance Co. Ltd & Ors [2004] 4 SCC 677 [9]–[12].
165 Patel Roadways (116) [13].
166 ibid.
167 ibid [14].
168 ibid.
possess jurisdiction by being the place of a cause of action under CPC section 20. The plaintiff
was a corporation in the hospitality business that had adopted the mark ‘Banyan Tree’ to operate
inter alia several spas under that name in India.170 However, its registered office was in Singapore.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was guilty of passing-off its trademark by creating a
website which was deceptively similar to the one maintained by the plaintiff.171 The defendants
had their registered office in Hyderabad.172 However, the plaintiff argued that the proceedings
could be initiated in Delhi on the ground that the hosting of a universally accessible website
(by the defendant) conferred the court with jurisdiction under section 20 of the CPC even though
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was residing in its territory.173 The court per Murliadhar J
referred to the legal position in the US,174 Canada,175 Australia176 and the UK.177 It stated that,
in a dispute for the violation of a trademark through a universally accessible website, the cause
of action is considered to have occurred within a court’s territory if the conduct (in the case, the
passing off) satisfied the ‘tighter version of the effects test’ which is also known as ‘targeting’.178
The court rejected an application of the ‘effects test’ which merely mandates the plaintiff to
demonstrate an injurious effect on its goodwill and reputation as being too broad.179
Under the ‘tighter version’, the law imposes an onus on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
website ‘specifically targeted’ the viewers in that jurisdiction in addition to causing an injurious
effect on the plaintiff ’s business, goodwill and reputation.180 The fact that the defendant hosted a
‘passive website’ which lacked any interaction with consumers would not suffice to confer juris-
diction on an Indian court.181 At the same time, ‘the mere hosting of an interactive web-page
without any commercial activity being shown as having being conducted within the forum-State,
would not enable the court to assume jurisdiction’.182 The plaintiff must show that the defendant
had ‘purposefully availed’ of the jurisdiction of the forum state by specifically targeting custom-
ers to conclude a commercial transaction through the website.183 The transaction must therefore
not be in the form of a ‘trap transaction’ which has been set-up by the plaintiff.184 In doing so,
the court reversed its earlier decision in Casio India Co. Ltd v Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd.185 It
stated that the ‘mere likelihood of deception, whereby an average person is likely to be deceived
or confused, was sufficient to entertain an action for passing off ’.186 The dictum did not impose
any onus on the plaintiff to prove that the act of the plaintiff had deceived the consumers.187
The Delhi High Court’s dictum in Banyan Tree represents the judicial position in India in iden-
tifying the place where the cause of action wholly or partially occurred under section 20 of the
CPC for transactions concluded online. In subsequent decisions, the courts had the opportunity
to demonstrate further that the defendant’s mere intention to target the customers of the plaintiff
170 ibid [3]–[5].

171 ibid.
172 ibid [7].
173 ibid [7].
174 ibid [11]–[28].
175 ibid [29]–[31].
176 ibid [33]–[34].
177 ibid [32].
178 Ibid [22], [26], [42]–[45], referring to the decision of the American courts in Cybersell Inc v Cybersell Inc 130 F.3d 41;
and Toys “R” Us v Step Two, 310 F.3d 446 (2003).

179 ibid.
180 ibid [42].
181 ibid [45].
182 ibid [28].
183 ibid [28], [40]–[44].
184 ibid [43]–[57].
185 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del).
186 Banyan Tree (n 169) 34.
187 ibid.
by hosting a universally accessible website would not suffice in conferring a court with jurisdic-
tion under section 20 of the CPC. It is significant for the plaintiff to prove that the commercial
transaction has been completed through the defendant’s interactive page.
In News Nation Networks Private v News Nation Gujarat & Ors, the Delhi High Court referred to
the principles espoused in Banyan Tree188 to determine whether it possessed jurisdiction by being
the place where the cause of action occurred while adjudicating a claim in a similar matter, namely,
the violation of a trademark in a suit for passing off.189 The plaintiff was a corporation which oper-
ated a Hindi news channel across India under the trade name ‘News Nation’ along with a website
for the distribution of news.190 It alleged that the defendants, who operated a newspaper with a
deceptively similar name, had caused damage to it by operating a website with a similar domain
name.191 Besides the website, the defendants also maintained an interactive page on Facebook to
distribute a newspaper.192 The court relied on the ‘tighter version of the effects test’ established
in the Banyan Tree193 dictum to state that it had no jurisdiction on the matter since the cause of
action did not occur in its territory.194 It clarified that, although the maintenance of the Facebook
page would be considered as interactive, it can ‘at best be representative of the defendants issuing
an advertisement of their product, i.e. the newspaper’.195 The act did not result in the completion
of a commercial transaction.196 Therefore, the court would not possess jurisdiction regardless of
whether the defendant’s act of passing off had injured the plaintiff ’s business and reputation.197
Subsequently, in Impresario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt Ltd, v S & D Hospitality,198 the
Delhi High Court examined whether the defendant’s promotion and sale of goods and services
which were allegedly infringing another person’s trademark or copyright on a third-party website
would confer jurisdiction under Indian law. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant who was oper-
ating a restaurant in Hyderabad under a similar trade name had targeted the former’s customers
in Delhi by advertising and promoting its services on websites such as Zomato, Facebook and
Dine-Out.199 The defendant’s act had consequently led customers to believe that the restaurant in
Hyderabad was a part of the plaintiff ’s brand.200 The court referred to its earlier dictum in Banyan
Tree201 to determine whether the defendant had purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of the
forum court.202 Answering in the negative, the court stated that the allegation did not pass the
test stipulated in Banyan Tree.203 The act of the defendant of advertising its services on a website
like Zomato was merely an invitation to offer.204 The commercial transaction would be completed
when customers made an offer by expressing their intention of dining in the restaurant, book-
ing a table through the website, and going to Hyderabad for that purpose.205 For this reason, the
defendant’s act did not confer jurisdiction upon the court since the maintenance of the webpage
188 (n 169).
189 C.S. (COMM) 334/2016, IA No 4525/2016 & 6625/2016, [9].
190 ibid [4]–[5].
191 ibid [6].
192 ibid [11], [12].
193 (n 169) [22], [26], [42]–[45].
194 ibid [22].
195 ibid [15].
196 ibid.
197 ibid [25].
199 ibid [7], [18].
200 ibid.
201 (n 169).
202 Impresario Entertainment (n 198) [37]–[42].
203 ibid [19].
204 ibid.
205 ibid.
on Zomato did not result in the culmination of a commercial transaction even though it may
have targeted the plaintiff ’s customers and adversely impacted its reputation.206
However, in Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v Aryans Plaza Services Private
Limited & Ors,207 the Delhi High Court seemed to adopt a slightly different position when
compared to its earlier dictum in Impresario.208 The plaintiff (a corporation in the hotel business
with a registered office in Singapore) had instituted proceedings on the ground that the defend-
ant had passed-off the plaintiff ’s services as those of the defendant.209 The defendant operated
some hotels in Haryana under a deceptively similar trademark, which were listed on third party
websites such as TripAdvisor, Goibibo and MakeMyTrip across India (including Delhi).210 The
defendants argued that the Court did not possess territorial jurisdiction over the matter and filed
an application for the rejection of the plaint.211 The court per Rajiv Sahai Endlaw J stated that the
ability the customers to make a booking in the defendant’s hotels in Haryana from Delhi was an
act of carrying on business in Delhi, regardless of whether a reservation materialised.212 It is irrel-
evant whether the hotel received payment for the booking considering that it would be ‘unable
to turn back a customer if [he or she] shows up in pursuance to such booking’.213 The Court took
judicial notice of the fact that in the present era a large volume of bookings and reservations for
hotels, resorts and spas are conducted online through third party websites, as against directly or
with the help of agents.214 Therefore, the Court saw no reason to differentiate between the circum-
stances when a defendant had: (1) maintained an interactive webpage directly; and (2) employed
the services of a third party to carry on its business in another place.215 The dicta indicate that
a court will not assume jurisdiction in circumstances where the advertisement merely promotes
the defendant’s business, which leads consumers to believe that it is the same as the plaintiff ’s, but
does not culminate in any form of contract between the consumer and the defendant.
d. Submission
The provisions of the CPC implicitly indicate ‘submission’ as a valid base to confer the court with
jurisdiction. The parties to a suit may confer jurisdiction on a court through submission. The
submission may be express or implied (tacit), and may occur in several forms. CPC sections 19
and 20 delineate grounds on which a court may exercise permissive jurisdiction. The plaintiff
may seize the jurisdiction of a court based on any of the factors identified. Judicial dicta clarify
that sections 19 and 20 of the CPC do not compel the parties to adjudicate their dispute at any
particular place, provided that the requisite factors in the provisions are satisfied.216
In New Moga Transport, the court illustrated that the law does not require a party to initiate
legal proceedings before a court in India simply because the cause of action occurred within the
court’s territory.217 Likewise, there is no obligation on a plaintiff to initiate proceedings before
a court within whose territorial limits the defendant resides. Instead, the plaintiff may seize the
jurisdiction of a court based on the place where the defendant personally works for gain. A plaintiff
206 ibid.
208 (n 198).
209 Millennium (n 207) [3].
210 ibid [22].
211 ibid [1], [9].
212 ibid [24].
213 ibid.
214 ibid.
215 ibid.
216 ibid.
217 (n 164) [9].
is said to have impliedly submitted to the jurisdiction of an eligible court by the act of filing a
plaint and instituting proceedings before that forum. The plaintiff may institute the suit at the
place where the defendant resides, carries on business, or works for gain.218 In a dispute where
there is more than one defendant, the CPC permits a court to assume jurisdiction if each of them
resides, carries on business or personally work for gain at the commencement of proceedings
within the court’s territory. The plaintiff may institute a suit in a court where any of the defendants
resides, carries on business, or works for gain at the time of the commencement of proceedings,
if the others defendants who are outside the territorial limits of the forum have consented to the
institution of the suit.219 A defendant’s acquiescence or submission for the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction on a court under section 20 may be inferred from the acceptance of a summons.
Likewise, the submission of a defendant may also be inferred through his or her voluntary and
unconditional appearance before the court to argue a case on the merits.220 An appearance solely
to contest the jurisdiction or to request the stay or dismissal of the proceedings would not consti-
tute voluntary submission on the part of a defendant.221
Express submission takes place when the parties to the dispute have concluded a choice of
forum agreement to confer jurisdiction on any of the courts in a place where the cause of action
occurred or where a defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain.222 Parties
may explicitly opt-out of the jurisdiction of a court through an exclusion clause and instead initi-
ate legal proceedings before another forum in India if it satisfies the prerequisites stipulated in
sections 19 and 20 of the CPC.223 The courts have held that such an agreement (to exclude the
jurisdiction of one court and confer it on another eligible forum under sections 19 or 20 of the
CPC) is not contrary to public policy or section 28 of the ICA which prohibits and declares
null and void all agreements in restraint to legal proceedings.224 It must be noted that the CPC
prohibits parties from initiating legal proceedings before a court which would not otherwise
have jurisdiction and the freedom within sections 19 and 20 to choose a forum must be strictly
confined to the parameters stipulated therein. Judicial dicta confirm that ‘it is not open to the
parties by agreement to confer jurisdiction on any court which it does not otherwise possess’
under the CPC.225
However, as provided in the Explanation to section 20 (discussed above), in suits against
corporations, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be ousted in circumstances where the place
of the cause of action coincides with the location of the company’s subordinate office.226 In such
circumstances, such a court alone will possess jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The plaintiff
cannot be expected to travel to the place where the company has its principal place of business
when the corporation carries on business in the territory of the court where the cause of action
arose. It is unclear whether this rule (that the jurisdiction of any other court will be ousted)
applies if the place of the cause of action coincides with the place of the company’s principal office
and not the subordinate office. A close examination of the intention of Explanation 20 indicates
218 See ss 19 and 20(a) and (b) of the CPC.

219 ibid, s 20(b).
220 See Chormal Balchand Firm v Kasturi Chand Seraoji and Anr [1936] 63 Cal 1033, 1043 [9], [10], [12]; and Andhra
Bank Ltd v R Srinivasan & Ors [1962] 3 SCR 391 [9], [11] referring to submission of the defendant to establish the inter-
national jurisdiction of a court.
221 ibid.
222 See, Patel Roadways (n 116) [7], referring to Hakam Singh (n 116); Hanil Era Ltd. v Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd [2004] 4
SCC 671, [7]–[9]; New Moga Transport (n 164), [9], [14], [19]; and Globe Transport (n 148) [3].
223 Patel Roadways ibid.
224 ibid.
225 ibid [7], referring to Hakam Singh (n 116).
226 See also, Patel Roadways (n 116) [5].
that the principle will extend to situations where the place of the cause of action coincides with
the location of the company’s principal office in the interest of convenience to both the parties.
An express submission may also take place if the parties to a civil or commercial dispute
have concluded a choice of court agreement through which they have agreed to confer jurisdic-
tion on the courts in India. Whether or not the parties or their transaction have some nexus
or connection with India would generally be irrelevant, provided that the principles of private
international law to which the parties are subject permit the choice of any foreign court. There is,
however, no reported case-law in which a court in India has adjudicated a dispute arising from
an international contract in which jurisdiction was conferred upon the forum by a choice of
court agreement and in which the Indian court would not otherwise have had jurisdiction under
sections 19 or 20. Existing dicta chiefly concern the validity of choice of court agreements where
the parties have opted out of the jurisdiction of an Indian court and instead conferred jurisdiction
on a foreign forum. The parties’ minimum preference for conferring jurisdiction on an Indian
court when it does not otherwise possess the same (according to the principles indicated above)
speaks volumes about the perceptions and public faith in the Indian judiciary.
C. Service of Summonses
Upon the determination of jurisdiction, the court will issue a summons on the defendant to appear
and answer the claim of the plaintiff within 30 days from the date of service.227 The service of a
summons marks the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court. The process for issuing a summons
to initiate a suit before an Indian court is regulated by sections 27–29 read along with Order 5 of
the CPC. Although the CPC does not define the term ‘summons’, it refers to a document issued
from the office of a court of justice calling upon the person to whom it is directed to attend before
a judge or officer of the court for a certain purpose.228 The summons must necessarily indicate
whether the date fixed is for the settlement of issues or the final disposal of the proceedings.229 The
summons must be signed and sealed by the judge or an authorised officer230 and shall be accompa-
nied by the plaint.231 Nonetheless, Indian law does not obligate the court to serve a defendant with
the summons if the latter is present and admits to the plaintiff ’s claim as indicated in the plaint.232
i. Service of Summonses in India

The provisions of sections 27 and 28 of the CPC govern the procedure to serve a summons on a
defendant who resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain within the local limits of a
court’s jurisdiction. The court may serve the summons employing any of the means discussed below.
a. Service by the Court

According to Order 5 of the CPC, a service of summons on a defendant who resides within
the jurisdiction of the court must be effected through a court officer or by other means of
227 See s 27, Order 5, Rule I(I) of the CPC.

228 See Takwani (n 3) 244, referring to E Jowitt, The Dictionary of English Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 1972) 1700; and
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (OUP, 2002) 1435, ff 134.
229 ibid, Rule 5.
230 ibid, Order 5, Rule I(3).
232 ibid, Order 5, Rule I(I): First Provisio.
communication such as by registered post, speedpost, approved courier service, telefax or

e-mail.233 Likewise, the service of a summons on a defendant who resides in another State in
India must be effected by sending it to the court within that State.234 The service of a summons
on a defendant residing within the Presidency Towns of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta must,
however, be effected through the Court of Small Causes in that jurisdiction.235 The refusal of
acceptance of the summons by the defendant or its authorised agent is treated as a valid accept-
ance under Indian law.236
b. Service by the Plaintiff

The court may at its discretion additionally permit the plaintiff to serve a summons on a
defendant.237
c. Personal or Direct Service

In general, a summons must be served by delivering a copy of the same to the defendant.238 In
such circumstances, a court officer may, however, serve the summons on an authorised agent or
on an adult family member of the defendant if the latter is absent from his or her residence at
the time of service and there is no likelihood of being found.239 Likewise, in a suit relating to the
defendant’s business, work or immovable property, a summons may similarly be served on an
authorised agent if the defendant resides outside the jurisdiction of the court. In a suit against a
corporation, the court must ordinarily serve a summons on the company’s secretary, director or
principal officer by leaving it at (or sending it by registered post, speedpost or electronic mail)
to the company’s registered office.240 In the absence of a registered office, the summons may be
served by sending it to the place where the corporation ‘carries on its business’ according to the
criteria mentioned above.241 In a suit against a partnership which carries on a business within
the territorial limits of the court’s jurisdiction, the summons must be served on any of the part-
ners. In circumstances where the partnership has its principal place of business in India, the
summons may be served on any person having control or management over the partnership.242
The summons should, however, be served on each of the partners if the plaintiff is aware of the
dissolution of the partnership at the time of the institution of a suit. In the case of suits concern-
ing immovable property, the CPC authorises a court officer to serve the summons on an agent
of the defendant who is in charge of the property in the absence of an agent authorised to accept
service.243
233 ibid, Order 5, Rule 9(3).

234 ibid, s 28 read along with Order 5, Rules 21 and 23.
236 ibid, Order 5, Rule 9(5).
237 ibid, Order 5, Rule 9A.
239 ibid, Order 5, Rules 12 and 15.
240 ibid, Order 29, Rules 2(a) and (b) read along with s 20 of the Companies Act 2013 and Rule 35 of Companies
(Incorporation) Rules, 2014.

241 See section III.B.ii.b of this chapter.
242 ibid, Order 30, Rules 3(a) and (b).
d. Substituted Service
In exceptional circumstances, a summons may be served by affixing a copy on the door or other
conspicuous part of the defendant’s residence or place of business.244 The CPC authorises a court
officer to serve a summons in such a manner if the defendant or agent: (1) has refused to sign the
acknowledgement of service; or (2) cannot be found within a reasonable period.245
ii. Special Rules for Service of Summonses in India

The CPC stipulates special rules for the service of summonses whenever a suit is initiated against
certain persons as discussed below.
a. Soldiers, Sailors and Air Force Personnel

Service must be effected on the individual’s commanding officer.246 In such situations, the service
may, however, be effected personally.247
b. Prisoners
The summons must be served on the officer in charge of the prison through post, fax, electronic
mail, courier service or any other means authorised by the High Court.248
c. Public Officers (not Belonging to the Indian Military, Navy or Air Force)
and Servants of a Railway or Local Authority
Service should be effected through the head of the office the person is employed.249
iii. Service of Summonses Abroad

In certain circumstances, the court may permit serve of a summons outside India provided that
it possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate on the relevant matter. Section 29 read along with Order 5
of the CPC prescribes the procedure for service of a summons on a defendant residing outside
India. The service of a summons outside India would be necessary whenever a dispute arises in
relation to: (1) immovable property which has its situs within the territorial limits of the court’s
jurisdiction’; (2) the infringement of a trademark or copyright – where the court possesses juris-
diction under sections 62(2) of the Copyrights Act or 134(2) of the TMA, by being the place
where the plaintiff resides; (3) a cause of action which occurred wholly or partly within its terri-
tory. There is no general rule for the service of a summons in such circumstances. Service must
be effected depending on the peculiarities of each case. The court may cause the summons to be
served abroad according to a number of means.

245 ibid.
246 ibid, Order 5, Rule 28; and Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.301].
247 Halsbury’s Laws of India, ibid, referring to Charan Singh v Dewan Singh AIR [1972] Punj & Har 288, at ff 3.
248 ibid, Order 5, Rule 24; and Halsbury’s Laws of India ibid, [65.298].
a. Service on a Defendant Residing in a Foreign Territory to which the Provisions

of the CPC Apply or within the Jurisdiction of a Civil or Revenue Court Outside India
Established with the Central Government’s Authority
In such circumstances, service should be through the relevant court and effected as though the
summons emanates from the latter.250
b. Service of Summons on a Defendant with No Agent

if the defendant has no authorised agent to accept service,251 the summons should be sent to the
defendant’s residence by post, fax, email, approved courier service or other authorised manner.252
c. Service of Summons on a Defendant Residing in Pakistan or Bangladesh

For services on a defendant residing in Pakistan or Bangladesh, service of the summons or a
copy thereof must be effected through a court in the latter countries.253 However, service on a
defendant who is a public officer (not belonging to the military, navy or air force) or a servant of
a railway company or a local authority in either of those countries must be effected through an
officer authorised by the Central Government of India.254
d. Service through a Political Agent or a Foreign Court

In some instances, the Central Government of India may, in the exercise of its foreign jurisdic-
tion, appoint a political agent or establish a court in another country.255 Service of a summons on
a defendant who is actually or voluntarily residing, carrying on business or personally working
for gain in the foreign country must be effected through that political agent, the court of that
country, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that government, by post or any other means which
has been authorised by the Central Government.256
D. Limitations to the Court’s Jurisdiction

In general, there is a presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of the court.257 Therefore, no
court can refuse to exercise jurisdiction ‘if it is of the description mentioned in the Section’.258
Nonetheless, this right is not unlimited. The jurisdiction of an Indian court may be limited in
certain circumstances.
i. When there is an Express or Implied Bar to Jurisdiction

Section 9 of the CPC and section 11 of the CCA prohibit a court from assuming jurisdiction in
a matter if it has expressly or impliedly been barred to take cognisance of such issues by the law.
250 ibid, s 29; and Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.299].

251 ibid, Order 5, Rule 25; and Halsbury’s Laws of India ibid, [65.299].
252 ibid.
253 ibid.
254 ibid.
255 ibid, Order 5, Rule 26; and Halsbury’s Laws of India (n 1) [65.299].
256 ibid.
257 See,Takwani (n 3) 54.
258 ibid
51, referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan v Moral Mar Marthoma 1995
Supp (4) SCC 286, 318–319.
A decision of a court which lacks jurisdiction will be male fide, ultra vires and dehors the provi-
sions of the CPC.259
a. Express Bar
A provision in a statute which prevents the court from taking cognisance is an express bar on its
jurisdiction. Such provisions must, however, be strictly construed.260 In this respect, section 10 of
the CPC adopts the principle of res sub judice (a matter being under adjudication) and expressly
prohibits a court from proceeding from the trial of a suit in the following circumstances:
(1) The subject-matter of the dispute before the court is also directly and substantially in issue in
a previously instituted suit between the same parties who are litigating under the same title;
and,
(2) Such suit is pending: (a) in the same or any other court in India having jurisdiction to grant
the relief claimed; (b) any other court beyond the limits of India which has been established
or constituted by the Central Government and which has like jurisdiction; or (c) before the
Supreme Court.
The provision aims to prevent concurrent proceedings and inconsistent judgments in circum-
stances where two or more courts in India are eligible to adjudicate on the matter. To illustrate, in
a suit for the infringement of a trademark, the plaintiff may initiate the proceedings at: (1) Delhi
as the place where it carries on business under section 134(2) of the TMA; and (2) Calcutta as
the place where the defendant carries on business under section 20 of the CPC. In such circum-
stances, the law imposes a duty on the court in Calcutta to stay the matter if the proceedings are
already pending before a court in Delhi.261 The Explanation to section 10 states that the provision
is applicable only in situations when there are concurrent proceedings before two courts in India.
As a result, there is no bar on an Indian court assuming concurrent jurisdiction if the previously
instituted suit is before a foreign forum.
Judicial dicta demonstrate that the freedom available to an Indian court under section 10 to
proceed to hear a matter which is pending before a foreign forum is inapplicable when the parties
have concluded a choice of court agreement in favour of the foreign forum.262 In such circum-
stances, the jurisdiction of the Indian court would be ousted, save in exceptional circumstances.
A detailed discussion of this aspect is dealt with below. The provisions of section 10 are, therefore,
restricted to circumstances in which a foreign court possesses jurisdiction in some other way
according to the provisions of its private international law.
To illustrate: A (a plaintiff who is carrying on a business in Delhi) sues B (a defendant who is
domiciled and residing in France) for the infringement of copyright owned by the former. Two
courts would have concurrent jurisdiction in such matters. The court in Delhi would possess
jurisdiction under section 134(2) of the TMA. The court in France would also be eligible to
adjudicate the matter under Article 4 of the Brussels I bis Regulation263 as the place where the
259 ibid 56.

260 ibid.
261 See the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Law Chopra v Seth Hiralal AIR [1962] SC 527.
262 See the decision of the Supreme Court in Modi Entertainment Network and Another v W.S.G. Cricket PTE Ltd [2003]
4 SCC 341.
263 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
27 September 1968 [the Brussels Convention], which is now replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of The European
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters [the Brussels I bis Regulation].
defendant is domiciled.264 There is no bar on the court in Delhi to stay the matter if it has been
subsequently seised of the action. There is no reported case-law to clarify how the Indian court
would deal with the predicament of inconsistent judgments when it is called upon to recognise
and enforce the decision of a foreign court. Nonetheless, it is likely that the Indian court would
give preference to its own judgment at the time of recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
The jurisdiction of an Indian court will also be barred if the decision constitutes a res judicata.
Section 11 of the CPC prohibits an Indian court from assuming jurisdiction if ‘a matter directly
or substantially in issue between the same parties’ has already been decided in another suit.265
It is irrelevant whether the case was initiated previously or subsequently. Section 11 accordingly
rests on the principle of public policy that judicial decisions must be accepted as correct and that
there must be an end to litigation.266 Referring to the dictum of Sir William de Grey in Duchess
of Kingstone,267 the Supreme Court in Daryao v State of UP stressed two aspects for the principle
of res judicata to be applicable. First,
a judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence
conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question
in another court.268
Second,
the judgment of a court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly on the point, is, in the like manner, conclusive
upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, for
a different purpose.269
Explanation IV to section 11 clarifies that the principle extends to ‘every matter which might or
ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit’. In circumstances where
the court has decided on several issues, each of the findings will operate as res judicata between all
parties and bar the jurisdiction of all other courts from adjudicating on the matter.270 Conversely,
a question which has not constituted an issue in the previous suit will not operate as res judicata
to bar the jurisdiction of a court in another hearing.271
b. Implied Bar
A court would be impliedly barred from exercising jurisdiction if it is prevented from taking
cognisance according to the general principles of the law and the public policy of India.272 The
decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Union of India v Ram Chand273 sheds light
on this aspect. The court was seised of a dispute while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, which
264 Art 4 of the Brussels I bis Regulation confers mandatory jurisdiction on the courts of the Members States. It provides
that:
subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the
courts of that Member State.
265 See in this respect Explanations I and IV to s 11 of the CPC.
266 Takwani (n 3) 68, 71.
267 Smith’s Leading Cases vol 2, 13th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1929) 644, 645.
268 AIR [1961] SC 1457 [10].
269 ibid.
270 Takwani (n 3) 87, 92–93.
271 ibid.
273 AIR [1955] Punj 166.
arose from the alleged wrongful discharge of the respondent by an army commander under the
Indian Army Act.274 However, the court refused to adjudicate on the matter on the ground that
such disputes are opposed to the public policy of India.275 The court reasoned refusal that the
Government of India Act 1935 provides for Crown servants (including soldiers) to hold office
at pleasure and their services may be terminated at any time without notice.276 Thus, although
section 9 did not expressly bar civil courts from taking cognisance of such suits, ‘public policy is
a good ground which impliedly bars suits of a civil nature’.277 It would be against the public policy
of India for the court to assume jurisdiction in such circumstances by being ‘injurious to and
against the public weal’.278
The decision of the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai v State of MP279 and Raja Ram Kumar
Bhargava v Union of India280 further illustrate the circumstances in which the jurisdiction of a civil
court would be impliedly barred for being against the general principles of law. In Dhulabhai,281
the court, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, was seised of a dispute which arose from the
State Government of Madhya Pradesh’s alleged illegal levy of tax from the appellants who were
tobacco dealers. The appellants sought a refund of the tax on the ground that the levy was consti-
tutionally prohibited under the provisions of the Constitution of India 1950.282 The provisions
of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act 1950, however, prohibited any court from questioning an
assessment made or order passed under the statute.283 The Supreme Court clarified that the juris-
diction of the civil courts would be impliedly barred in situations where a statute gives finality to
the orders of special tribunals.284 In such circumstances, the special tribunal will have exclusive
jurisdiction on the dispute unless it has ‘not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles
of judicial procedure’.285 The court added that the jurisdiction of a court would also be impliedly
barred if a statute creates a special right and liability and further empowers a tribunal to adjudi-
cate all questions concerning that right or liability.286
In Raja Ram Kumar, the court added that the jurisdiction of the civil court would be ousted if
a statute creates a right which has not been recognised under common law and further provides
a machinery for the enforcement of the right before some other competent authority.287 In such
cases, the right and the remedy are created at the same moment by legislation.288 The situation
would, however, be different when a statute specifies a right which pre-exists at common law, but
stipulates a new remedy for its violation and does not expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the
civil court.289 In such cases, the civil court will possess concurrent jurisdiction and the parties
may elect the forum in which to adjudicate their disputes.290 A subsequent decision of the Madras
274 ibid.
275 ibid [53].
276 ibid [40].
277 ibid [53].
278 ibid [31].
279 AIR [1969] SC 78.
280 1988 171 ITR 254.
281 (n 279).
282 ibid referring to Art 301 of the Constitution of India 1950, which states that ‘subject to the other provisions of this
Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free’.
283 ibid [1], referring to s 17 of the Madya Bharat Sales Tax Act 1950, Act 30 of 1950.
284 ibid 682 [A]–[C].
285 ibid.
286 ibid 89–90 [32].
287 Raja Ram Kumar (n 280) [19].
288 ibid.
289 ibid.
290 ibid.
High Court in Chiranjeevi Rathnam v Ramesh291 illustrates this point. The dispute was initiated
by the members of a private limited company alleging that indoor management was allegedly
oppressive.292 The question before the court was whether a civil court had jurisdiction to declare
the appointment of some directors as void and grant a permanent injunction to restraint the
company from conducting an extraordinary annual general meeting.293 The court referred to
the dicta of the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai294 and Raja Ram.295 It stated that the appointment
of the directors of a company is a statutory right created by the Companies Act 2013.296 Thus,
it was not a common-law right.297 Section 430 of the Companies Act 2013 bars the intervention
of the civil court in proceedings in which jurisdiction has been conferred on a special tribunal
or appellate tribunal298 by sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act 2013.299 In such circum-
stances, the civil court will have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter.300
Academic writings clarify that the jurisdiction of a court will be ousted if a statute confers
the decision of the tribunal with finality and provides an ‘adequate remedy to do what the civil
courts would normally do in a suit’.301 However, ‘the mere conferment of special jurisdiction on
a tribunal’ in a matter has been held not to oust the jurisdiction of a civil court.302 A court would
continue to have jurisdiction if the tribunal had ‘not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure’.303
ii. Forum Non Conveniens

The doctrine of forum non-conveniens permits a court to stay proceedings on the ground that
some other forum is more appropriate to adjudicate the matter in the interests of justice. The
doctrine was developed by the courts in Scotland and was later adopted with minor modifica-
tions in the US.304 The principle has also been adopted in Indian law.
The development of the principle of forum non conveniens can be traced back to the decision
of the House of Lords in The Atlantic Star305 in which the courts began to develop guidelines
for invoking the doctrine and permitting a stay of the proceedings before them. In The Atlantic
Star,306 the dispute arose as a result of a collision of a Dutch vessel with a Dutch-owned barge
anchored against a Belgian-owned barge in the territorial waters of Belgium. The owners of the
Dutch barge initiated an action in the English Admiralty court. At the same time, the owners
of the Belgian barge initiated proceedings before the Belgian court. In due course, the owners
of the Dutch vessel also initiated proceedings before the Belgian court and sought a stay of the
proceedings before the English court. The court refused to grant the stay and held that, although
291 C.R.P(PD)(MD) No 870 of 2017.

292 ibid [16].
293 ibid [1].
294 (n 279).
295 (n 280).
296 Chiranjeevi Rathnam (n 291) [14], [15], [18].
297 ibid.
298 ibid [18].
299 ibid [20]–[24].
300 ibid [28].
301 See Takwani (n 3) 56–57, referring to Dhulabhai (n 279) 89–90.
302 ibid 56, referring to Firm Seth Radha Kishan v Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana AIR [1963] SC 1547,
1551.
303 ibid 55–56, referring to Section y of State v Mask & Co AIR [1940] PC 105, 110.
304 See L Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws Volume 1 (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2012) 538.
305 [1974] AC 436.
306 ibid.
the action before the English court could be construed as inconvenient, the plaintiff could not
be denied the right to sue unless the proceedings were ‘oppressive or vexatious’.307 The court
added that the terms ‘vexatious’ or ‘oppressive’ were not statutory but descriptive words to illus-
trate and indicate the boundaries of the court.308 Thereafter, the House of Lords in the seminal
case of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd,309 stated that, although the application
of the doctrine of forum non-conveniens was a matter of judicial discretion, the stay could only
be granted after the court has weighed all the relevant factors.310 Thus, the court would stay the
proceedings when:
(1) There is another forum which is clearly more appropriate for the trial of the suit and bears a
real and substantial connection with the dispute, and
(2) It is more suitable to try the matter before the other forum in the interests of the parties and
the ends of justice.311
The position of the English court in Spiliada312 has also been accepted in Indian law. A court
may stay a matter if there is another forum which is more appropriate to hear the case.313 The
application of the doctrine is limited to matters in which the court has discretionary or permis-
sive jurisdiction under sections 19 or 20 of the CPC.314 In such circumstances, the court may
decline the matter when there is another court which also has jurisdiction under the provisions
mentioned earlier, which may be more appropriate to adjudicate the matter. However, the prin-
ciple is sparingly invoked and only when ‘valid, sound and good reasons’ permit the court to
decline the matter before it.315
The decision of the Supreme Court in Mayar (HK) Ltd. v Owners and Parties, Vessels MV
Fortune Ltd,316 illustrates this point. The Court upheld the decision of the High Court, which had
refused to decline jurisdiction on the ground that a forum in Singapore was more appropriate.
The dispute arose as a result of an alleged breach of a contract between the plaintiff (a company
incorporated in Hong Kong) and the defendant (a company incorporated and carrying on busi-
ness in Singapore).317 The defendant undertook to supply timber logs to the plaintiff at the port
in Calcutta.318 The plaintiff initiated the proceedings before the Calcutta High Court, which was
the place where the cause of action arose, on the ground that the defendant breached the contract
by supplying quantities which were less than those agreed under the contract.319 The defendant,
however, contended that the Singapore Court was more appropriate to adjudicate the dispute as
its principal place of business was in Singapore.320 The Court refused to stay the proceedings.
307 ibid 468.

308 ibid.
309 [1987] AC 40 HL.
310 C Schulze On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgements (Edinburgh University
Press 2005) 67 referring to Spiliada ibid.
311 Spiliada ibid. For a detailed discussion on the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in English law, see
Collier (n 4) 84–108; Briggs (n 4) 101–105.

312 ibid.
313 See Moser Baer India Ltd. v Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 2008 (102) DRJ 713 [7].
314 See Kusum Ingots (n 142); Ansal Buildwell Ltd. v North Eastern Indira Gandhi Institute of Health and Medical Science
ILR [2005] 1 Del. 751 [25]; and Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd. & Ors. v Heinz India (P) Limited 2019 SCC
OnLine Del 9 [16].
315 See Sterling Agro Industries v Union of India AIR [2011] Del 174 [29]; and Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare
Ltd. & Ors. v Heinz India (P) Limited 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9 [24].
316 AIR [2006] SC 1828.
317 ibid [3].
318 ibid.
319 ibid.
320 ibid [32].
It referred to the dictum of the House of Lords in Spiliada.321 It held that the burden was on the
defendant who is seeking a stay to place relevant material before the court to demonstrate that
there is another available forum which is ‘clearly more appropriate’.322 The defendant must prove
two factors when requesting the court to decline its jurisdiction. First, that the proceedings before
the court which has been seised would result in injustice by being vexatious or oppressive.323
Second, that a stay would not deprive the other party of any ‘legitimate personal or juridical
advantage’ otherwise available to it.324 The Court did not clarify the factors that would be consid-
ered in analysing the ‘legitimate personal or juridical advantage’. However, Collier, referring to the
expression under English law, suggests that the Court will consider factors such as the damages
that would be awarded to the other party, the limitation period, the interest-rate, the procedure
for disclosing evidence, and other advantages such as the relative ease of enforcing a decision,
before determining whether that party would be deprived of a ‘legitimate personal or juridical
advantage’ if a stay is granted.325
The law, consequently, places an obligation on the court to balance the convenience of both
the parties before declining jurisdiction.326 In Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd. &
Ors. v Heinz India (P) Limited, the Delhi High Court commented that the principle must be
invoked
with caution when advantages and interest of justice clearly outweigh proceedings before a court which
in law has jurisdiction but another court having concurrent jurisdiction is the more ‘natural’ and the
plaintiff has deliberately avoided the said forum.327
In such circumstances, the court may refrain from assuming jurisdiction to prevent the proceed-
ings from becoming oppressive or vexatious.328 Although there are no fixed criteria, the courts
have stated that they would assess connecting factors such as the existence of a more appropriate
forum, the expenses involved, the law governing the transactions and other ancillary aspects.329
In certain circumstances, the court may also examine the plausibility of multiple proceedings and
conflicting judgments before invoking the principle.330 Existing dicta demonstrate that the courts
will decline to exercise jurisdiction if they have been seised of a matter by reason of their being in
the place where the cause of action arose, if such place does not constitute a material, essential or
integral part of the dispute.331 It is irrelevant whether only a small fraction of the cause of action
occurred within a court’s territory provided that it constitutes a material part of the dispute.332
Accordingly, only those facts which are necessary to adjudicate the lis would determine whether
or not a court declines jurisdiction.333
321 (n 309).
322 Mayar (n 316) [29], [30], [32].
323 ibid.
324 ibid.
325 Collier (n 4) 88, 89.
326 Sterling Agro (n 315) [31].
327 See Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare (n 315) [30].
328 ibid.
329 See Milk Food Ltd v Union Bank of India 2007 (2) CTLJ 362 (Del) [28], [41]; Sterling Agro (n 315) [31]; Glaxosmithkline
Consumer Healthcare (n 315) [21].

330 Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare ibid, [30].
331 Sterling Agro (n 315) [16], [20], and [24]. Also see the decisions of the Supreme Court in ONGC v Utpal Kumar Basu
[1994] 4 SCC 711; National textile Corporation Ltd v Haribox Swalram [2004] 9 SCC 786; and Alchemist Ltd & Anr v State
Bank of Sikkim & Ors [2007] 11 SCC 335; and the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Milk Food (n 329) [28], [41]; and
Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare (n 315).
332 ibid.
333 See Lohia Starlinger Ltd v Govt of NCT of Delhi [2006] VAD (Del) 732.
iii. When the Parties have Concluded a Choice of Court Agreement

in Favour of a Foreign Forum
The conclusion of a choice of court agreement or a forum selection clause through which the
parties agree to adjudicate their disputes before a foreign forum may also oust the jurisdiction
of the court. The CPC is silent on the operation of choice of court agreements in favour of a
foreign forum. In such circumstances, the legal principles to govern forum selection clauses
are developed by judicial dicta. Historically, parties to a contract were prohibited from ousting
the jurisdiction of the courts in India. Such ouster clauses were construed as contradictory to
the public policy of India. As indicated in the preceding section, the CPC merely permitted the
parties to conclude a choice of court agreement through which they could confer jurisdiction
on any forum under sections 19 and 20 to the exclusion of all others.334 For instance, a dispute
between A (the plaintiff, a resident of Rome) and B (the defendant, a resident of Mumbai) cannot
be initiated before the courts in Delhi unless the cause of action which is material to the claim
arose or the defendant carried on its business there. In this respect, the Supreme Court in ABC
Laminart (P) Ltd v AP Agencies had stated:
[S]o long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jurisdiction of all the courts which would otherwise
have jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law, it cannot be said that the parties have by
their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the court. Where there may be two or more competent courts
which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen there within, if
the parties agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between
themselves, the agreement would be valid.335
The Court further enunciated that:

an agreement which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the court absolutely is contrary to public policy
and, hence, void.336
However, under the present principles of private international law, the parties may oust the juris-
diction of the courts in India by concluding a choice of court agreement in favour of a foreign
forum.
The Supreme Court’s dictum in British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v Shanmughavilas
Cashew Industries337 paved the way for the acceptance of choice of court agreements in inter-
national civil and commercial matters. The parties had concluded a choice of court agreement
in favour of the English courts to adjudicate the disputes which might arise from their contract,
which was evidenced by a bill of lading.338 The Court stated:
[T]he parties to a contract in international trade or commerce may agree in advance on the forum,
which is to have jurisdiction to determine disputes which may arise between them. The chosen court
may be a court in the country of one or both the parties, or it may be a neutral forum. The jurisdiction
clause may provide for a submission to the courts of a particular country, or a court identified by a
formula in a printed standard form, such as a bill of lading referring disputes to the courts of the carrier’s
principal place of business.339
334 See the text accompanying notes 223–225.

335 [1989] 2 SCC 163 [16].
336 ibid [8].
337 [1990] 3 SCC 481.
338 ibid, 482.
339 ibid [17].
In Modi Entertainment Network and Another v. W.S.G. Cricket PTE Ltd,340 the Supreme Court
enunciated the principles to grant an anti-suit injunction when the parties to an international
contract had ousted the jurisdiction of an Indian court, which was the natural forum and instead
conferred it on a foreign forum. The parties had concluded a contract which was evidenced by a
licensing agreement through which the respondent granted the appellant an exclusive licence to
telecast the ICC tournament, which was taking place in Kenya, on an Indian television channel.341
As a part of the agreement, the appellant could sell advertising slots. The parties expressly agreed
to confer non-exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts to adjudicate any disputes arising
from the contract.342 After the commencement of the telecast, the respondent complained to the
television channel that the signals of the cricket tournament were being received in the Middle
East.343 The respondent requested the appellant to rectify the same, failing which it would discon-
tinue the transmission.344 The respondent sent the appellant a notice when the latter ignored the
complaint.345 The respondent initiated proceedings before the English court. In retaliation, the
appellant filed a suit before the Bombay High Court to claim damages from the loss of advertis-
ing revenue.346 The appellant also sought an anti-suit injunction against the respondents claiming
that suit should be initiated before the Bombay High Court, which was the natural forum under
section 20 of the CPC.347 The Court granted an interim injunction on a prima facie finding that
proceedings before the English court would be vexatious and oppressive.348 The Supreme Court
on appeal rejected the appellant’s application for an anti-suit injunction to prevent the respond-
ent from resolving the dispute before the English court as the chosen forum.349 The Court stated
that courts in India are courts of equity and exercise jurisdiction in personam. Therefore, they
are empowered to grant an anti-suit injunction against a party over whom they have personal
jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
having regard to the rule of comity, this power will be exercised sparingly because such an injunction
though directed against a person, in effect causes interference in the exercise of jurisdiction by another
court.350
The Court clarified that the principles of Indian private international law permit parties to confer
exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction over any foreign forum, including a neutral one, to adju-
dicate their international contracts.351
An exclusive jurisdiction agreement is one where the parties agree to adjudicate their
disputes only before the court or courts indicated in the contract to the exclusion of all other
forums. An agreement of this kind, therefore, precludes the parties from initiating actions
arising out of their contract before another court.352 For instance, a contractual clause which
reads: ‘Proceedings under this contract shall be initiated only before the District Court of
Seoul or the District Court of Beijing’ indicates that the parties have conferred exclusive
340 (n 262).
341 ibid [25].
342 ibid 342.
343 ibid.
344 ibid.
345 ibid.
346 ibid.
347 ibid.
348 ibid.
349 ibid [11].
350 ibid [10].
351 ibid [11].
352 See T Hartley and M Dogauchi, ‘Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’
(HCCH Publications, 2007) [247] www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf [HCCCA, Hartley-Dogauchi Explanatory Report].

jurisdiction on the courts named in the agreement.353 Conversely, a non-exclusive or permis-

sive jurisdiction agreement is one where the parties agree to adjudicate the dispute before any
one of the courts indicated in their contract.354 Such clauses do not oust the jurisdiction of
any of the courts indicated in the agreement.355 For instance, a clause in the contract which
reads: ‘Proceedings under this contract may be initiated before the courts in London or any
other court which has jurisdiction under the law of the state in which it is located’ is an exam-
ple of a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement.356 Whether a forum-selection clause confers
exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction on a court will depend on the law which governs the
clause. Judicial dicta suggest that the use of the words ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘solely’ or ‘exclusive’ will
generally lead to an inference that the parties intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the
chosen forum.357 The dictum of the Supreme Court in Modi Entertainment358 demonstrates the
extreme caution that the Indian judiciary will exercise before disregarding a forum-selection
clause favouring a foreign court. In Modi Entertainment, the Court stated that it would not
disregard the parties’ forum selection clause because it would amount to a breach of contract
and the court would not abet such a violation.359 The mere fact that the dispute will be adju-
dicated before a foreign court which is neutral and does not otherwise possess jurisdiction
would not of itself indicate that the foreign court is forum non conveniens or that its proceed-
ings are vexatious or oppressive.360 The Court rejected the contention of the appellant that
the English court is forum non conveniens because the fact that the parties had concluded a
forum-selection clause showed that they had thought about the matter and had foreseen the
possible breach of the agreement.361 The parties would have, accordingly, considered litiga-
tion expenses in England versus those in India before they agreed the jurisdiction clause.362
The Court stated that whether proceedings before a foreign forum are to be regarded as vexa-
tious and oppressive will depend on an assessment of the injustice that would be done to both
parties.363 The Court would assess the injustice to the defendant if it allowed the plaintiff to
pursue the foreign proceedings; but also to the plaintiff if it was prohibited from doing so.364
The party that is applying for an anti-suit injunction must provide the court with ‘good and
sufficient reasons’ to disregard a choice of court agreement and commence proceedings before
another court.365 The existence of strong reasons to displace the terms of the contract will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case.366 In ordinary circumstances, a court in India will
not grant an anti-suit injunction unless it is to prevent
injustice in circumstances such as [those] which permit a contracting party to be relieved of the burden
of the contract; or since the date of the contract the circumstances or subsequent events have made
it impossible for the party seeking injunction to prosecute the case in the court of choice because the
353 ibid [109], [246]. Also see generally J Fawcett ‘Non-exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements in Private International Law’
[2001] Lloyd’s Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly 234.

354 ibid, HCCCA, Hartley-Dogauchi Explanatory Report.
355 Collier (n 4) 96.
356 HCCCA, Hartley-Dogauchi Explanatory Report (n 352) [109], [246].
357 See for instance ABC Laminart (P) Ltd v AP Agencies [1989] 2 SCC 163 [20], [21]; Moser Baer (n 313) [11]; and Times
of Money Limited v Reminthome Corporation & Anr [2012] 193 DLT 30 [33].
358 (n 262).
359 ibid [24].
360 ibid.
361 ibid.
362 ibid.
363 ibid [17] referring to the decision of the Privy Council in SNI Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] UKPC 12.
364 ibid.
365 ibid [27].
366 ibid [26].
essence of the jurisdiction of the court does not exist or because of a vis major or force majeure and the
like.367
Consequently, a court in India may assume jurisdiction to prevent injustice if the chosen court
lacks jurisdiction over the dispute under its law for some reason.368 For instance, this may be the
position when the choice of court agreement is null and void under the law of the foreign court –
such as when one (or both) of the parties lacked the capacity to conclude the contract.
In certain circumstances, the pendency of a multi-party action before a court in India may
qualify for the grant of an anti-suit injunction to prevent the opposite party from continuing the
proceedings before the foreign forum and to avoid conflicting judgments.369 Referring to the
position in English common law, the court in Modi Entertainment accordingly stated that:
where the dispute was between two contracting parties, one of which sued the other in a non-contractual
forum, and the claims fell within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in their contract, and
the interests of other parties were not involved, effect would in all probability be given to the clause.
However, the court might well decline to grant an injunction or a stay where the interests of parties
other than parties bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause were involved, or grounds of claim not the
subject of the clause were part of the relevant dispute so that there was a risk of parallel proceedings and
inconsistent decisions.370
The decision in Modi Entertainment371 represents the judicial position in India by the constitu-
tional mandate under Article 141 which states that ‘the law declared by the Supreme Court shall
be binding on all courts within the territory of India’.372 The decision has been adopted by courts
across India whenever they have been presented with the opportunity to adjudicate a dispute in
which the parties have conferred jurisdiction on another foreign forum.373
For instance, the Delhi High Court in Moser Baer India Ltd. v Koninklijke Philips Electronics
NV refused to disregard the parties’ forum-selection clause and adjudicate a dispute which arose
from a contract evidenced by several Disc Patent License Agreements (DPLAs).374 The parties
had conferred exclusive jurisdiction over the courts of The Hague in the Netherlands.375 The
Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Modi Entertainment.376 It stated that
although such agreements were not ‘determinative’, but a ‘relevant factor’ as to the nature of juris-
diction, it would not dismiss the proceedings before it ‘save in an exceptional case for good and
sufficient reasons’.377 A party seeking an anti-suit suit injunction must, therefore, demonstrate
that the conditions precedent stipulated in Modi Entertainment378 have been satisfied. The Court
added that the mere fact that proceedings in the foreign court would be expensive and incon-
venient for the witnesses travelling from India would not in itself mean that they are oppressive
367 ibid [24.4].

368 ibid [24.1.a].
369 ibid [22] referring to the decision of the English court in Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 All ER 749 (HL).
370 ibid.
371 ibid.
372 See Art 141 of the Constitution of India 1950.
373 See for instance, the decisions of the Delhi High Court in U. Can Migrate Consultants Pvt. Ltd v Canadian Connections
Groups Ltd [2007] 144 DLT 863; Max India Ltd. v General Binding Corporation FAO (OS) No 193/200; and Swatch Ltd.
v Priya Exhibitors Pvt. Ltd 2008 (101) DRJ 99. See also, the decision of the Supreme Court in Unique Pharmaceuticals
Laboratories Ltd. v Stalco Freight International 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 1082.
374 2008 (102) DRJ 713.
375 ibid [2].
376 (n 262).
377 Moser Baer (n 313) [6], referring to the conditions precedent stipulated in the Modi Entertainment Network ibid, [24].
378 (n 262).
or vexatious to the parties.379 Likewise, in Piramal Healthcare Ltd. v. Diasorin S.P.A.,380 the Delhi
High Court refused to disregard the parties’ forum-selection clause which conferred exclusive
jurisdiction on the courts of Milan when it was called upon to adjudicate distributorship agree-
ment for the sale of diagnostic products.381
It must be noted that the right to exclude the jurisdiction of a court in India is, however,
limited to disputes which are governed by sections 19 and 20 of the CPC. The parties are prohib-
ited from concluding a choice of court agreement which excludes the jurisdiction of the Indian
court under section 16 to 18 of the CPC, which govern the adjudication of disputes arising in
relation to immovable property in the Republic. This is for the reason that sections 16 to 18
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Indian courts in such matters. Although there is no dictum
to this effect, it is unlikely that a judgment of a foreign court which has assumed jurisdiction on a
disputed regulated by sections 16 to 18 will be recognised or enforced in India.
A forum-selection clause in favour of a foreign (including a neutral) forum is not per se
construed as opposed to the public policy of India under section 23 of the ICA. Such clauses are
not agreements in restraint of legal proceedings and therefore do not fall within the scope and
ambit of section 28 of the ICA, which declares such contracts as contrary to the public policy
of India and so void. The decision of the Telecom Dispute Settlement and Appellate Tribunal
(TDSAT) in Kumarina Investment Ltd. v Digital Media Convergence Ltd & Anr illustrates this.382
In the case,383 the TDSAT stated that the parties’ choice of court agreement in favour of a foreign
forum is not prohibited by the common law of India or any Parliamentary Act. The petitioner
(a company incorporated in Cyprus and operating in Israel) and the respondent (a company
incorporated in India) agreed to have disputes arising from their contract adjudicated by the
English court.384 The Indian company agreed to transmit specific television channels to the
company in Israel, which would then re-transmit those channels throughout the world.385
A dispute arose between the parties when the Indian company discontinued transmission of
specific channels without prior notice.386 The Israeli company initiated suit in India for the
respondent’s breach and challenged the validity of the choice of an unconnected forum.387
The TDSAT referred to the Supreme Court’s dictum in Modi Entertainment388 and stated that
the parties’ choice of court agreement in favour of the English court was not prohibited by the
common law of India or any Parliamentary Act.389 Accordingly,
agreements to refer any dispute that may arise to the courts of a country to which one of the parties
belongs or on the courts of a third or ‘neutral’ country are valid as they do not violate either Sections 23
or 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872; the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the principle
that parties cannot by consent confer jurisdiction on a court which does not have jurisdiction do not
apply to courts outside India.390
379 Moser Baer (n 313) [6], [9].

380 172 [2010] DLT 131.
381 ibid [2.6], [4].
382 2010 TDSAT 73 [28].
383 ibid.
384 ibid.
385 ibid.
386 ibid.
387 ibid.
388 (n 262).
389 Kumarina Investment (n 382) 85.
390 ibid [14].
Existing dicta do not clarify the circumstances in which a court in India will disregard a forum
selection clause as opposed to the public policy. Nonetheless, it is likely that such clauses in favour
of a foreign forum will not be given effect as they constitute agreements in restraint of trade.
Section 27 of the ICA prohibits such contracts and declares them as void for being opposed to
the public policy of India.391 This would be analogous to the position where the parties designate
a foreign law as the governing law of their contract and the application of such law in a matter
would constitute a restraint of trade. The principles of Indian private international law disregard
the parties’ choice of law agreement in favour of foreign law if the application of the foreign law
will contravene the provisions of section 27 of the ICA.392
iv. When the Parties have Concluded an Arbitration Agreement

The provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996393 (ACA) prohibit a court from
assuming jurisdiction in a dispute in relation to which the parties have concluded an arbitration
agreement. It is irrelevant whether the dispute is of a civil or commercial nature.394 Section 8 of
the ACA regulates matters of a civil nature in respect to which the parties have concluded an
arbitration agreement. A court is accordingly obligated upon being seized of a matter in a dispute
between the same parties and the same subject matter to which the agreement relates, to refer
the parties to arbitration unless it prima facie finds that the agreement is invalid. Judicial dicta
clarify that section 8 of the ACA is a legislative command to the court to refer the parties to arbi-
tration upon an application by the other party.395 Such an application must, however, be made
before the latter has submitted its first statement on the substance of the dispute.396 The court
would have no option but to refer the parties to arbitration if a party has made such application
before filing its first statement.397 The expression ‘first statement on the substance of the dispute’
must be distinguished from the filing of a written statement.398 Instead, the phrase connotes a
submission to judicial authority by the party making the application under section 8.399 A party
is not considered to have waived its right to invoke an arbitration clause or submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court before it has filed its first statement on the substance of the dispute.400
At the same time, the competence of the court will be unhindered, if the subject matter of the
arbitration agreement relates to a dispute which the arbitrator is not competent or empowered
to decide.401
391 Section 27 of the ICA states:

Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind,
is to that extent void. – Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade
or business of any kind, is to that extent void.” Exception 1. – Saving of agreement not to carry on business of which
goodwill is sold. – One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a
similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from
him, carries on a like business therein, provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to
the nature of the business.
392 See, the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Taprogge Gesellschaft MBH v IAEC India Ltd AIR [1988] Bom 157;
and the TDSAT in Kumarina Investment (n 382) [11], [14], [16], [17].
393 Act No 26 of 1996.
394 H Srinivas v HV Pai [2010] 12 SCC 521 [6], [8].
395 Magma Leasing & Finance Ltd v Potluri [2009] 10 SCC 103 [17], [18].
396 ibid.
397 ibid [17].
398 See Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd v Verma Transport Co [2006] 7 SCC 275 [36].
399 ibid.
400 ibid.
401 See the decision of the Supreme Court in Haryana Telecom Ltd v Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd [1999] 5 SCC 688, [4], [5].
Jurisdiction in Actions in rem 97
Likewise, the conclusion of an international commercial arbitration agreement402 will oust

the jurisdiction of the Commercial Division of the High Court or the Commercial Court
(as the case may be).403 An international arbitration agreement is regarded as ‘commercial’ if it
satisfies the prerequisites of the CCA, as indicated in the preceding part of this chapter. Section 45
of the ACA obligates the court to refer the parties to arbitration at the request of any one of
the parties or any person claiming though him, unless the arbitration agreement is ‘null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’. The jurisdiction of an Indian court will not
be precluded if consent to the arbitration agreement was obtained by fraud, coercion or misrep-
resentation; if the time limit to refer the matter to arbitration has passed; or if the agreement is
vaguely worded and it is impossible to refer the matter to arbitration.404
The court’s decision to retain jurisdiction in commercial matters is similarly based on a prima
facie (as opposed to a final) finding as regards the validity of the arbitration agreement.405 In
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd v Aksh Optifibre Ltd, the court demonstrated a preference in favour
of a prima facie finding to eliminate the need for elongated proceedings by recording neces-
sary evidence, which is essential for a full-fledged hearing.406 A court’s refusal to refer parties to
arbitration is appealable to ‘a court authorised by law to hear appeals from such an order’.407 If
the appeal is successful, the court will lose jurisdiction over the matter, and the dispute will be
decided by arbitration according to the agreement of the parties.408 However, the court’s decision
that an arbitration agreement is valid is not appealable.409 In such circumstances, the jurisdiction
of the court in India would be ousted.
The provisions of the ACA prohibit the court from annulling a foreign award which has been
conferred under a valid agreement, regardless of whether it is patently illegal or has not been
given on the merits of a dispute.410 A court in India may, in such scenarios, merely refuse to
recognise and enforce foreign awards under the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) or the 1927 Geneva
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1927 Geneva Protocol)411 where one
or more of the circumstances set out in sections 48 and 57 of the ACA is present.
IV. Jurisdiction in Actions in rem

A court is considered to possess jurisdiction in rem if it is called upon to adjudicate upon the
status of a person or a thing, as opposed to merely determining the interest of a party to a suit in
the subject matter.412 In such circumstances, the decision of the court will be ‘conclusive evidence
for and against all persons whether parties, privies or strangers of the matter actually decided’.413
402 See s 10(1) of the CCA read along with s 47 of the 2015 Arbitration Act.
403 See s 10(1) of the CCA read along with s 47 of the 2015 Arbitration Act.
404 World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd. v MSM Satellite (Singapore) PTE Ltd Civil Appeal No 895 of 2014 [26]–[29].
405 Section 50(1)(a) of the ACA; and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd v Aksh Optifibre Ltd [2005] 7 SCC 234, 238.
406 Shin-Etsu ibid, 240 et seq.
407 Section 50(1)(a) of the ACA; and Shin-Etsu ibid, 238.
408 ibid.
409 ibid.
410 See, Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc [2012] 9 SCC 552, [135]–[142] [BALCO], read
along with s 48: Explanation 2 of the 2015 Arbitration Act.

411 The official text of the 1927 Protocol may be accessed in the League of Nations, ‘Treaty Series’ vol 92, 301, available at:
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2092/v92.pdf.
412 ibid.
413 ibid.
The action in rem is intended to ‘settle the destiny of the res itself ’.414 The judgment will
affect not merely the parties to the dispute or those claiming through them, but the world
at large.415
According to the provisions of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime
Claims) Act 2017 (Admiralty Act),416 a court in India possesses jurisdiction in rem when the
dispute concerns a maritime claim against a vessel.417 The statute, which came into force on
1 April 2018, repealed and replaced the Admiralty Courts Act 1840, the Admiralty Courts
Act 1861, the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890, and the Colonial Court of Admiralty
(India) Act 1891. The Admiralty Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on all maritime claims on the
High Court within whose territorial waters418 a vessel is found,419 regardless of the residence or
domicile of the owner of the ship.420 According to section 5, the jurisdiction of the High Court
extends to adjudicating on disputes arising inter alia in the following matters:
(1) the possession or ownership of the vessel or any share of the same;
(2) the employment or earnings of the vessel which arises between the co-owners;
(3) the mortgage or the charge on the vessel;
(4) loss or damage caused by the operation of the vessel;
(5) agreement concerning the carriage of goods or passengers or the hire or use of the vessel;
(6) construction, reconstruction or repair; dues in connection to any port, harbour, canal or dock;
(7) the contract for the sale of the vessel;
(8) damage or threat caused by the vessel to the environment or coastline;
(9) the cost that arose from the removal, recovery or destruction of a vessel which has sunk;
maritime lien.
Sections 6 and 7, nonetheless, empower the High Court to exercise jurisdiction in personam over
claims concerning the collision of vessels or related matters which have resulted in damage, loss
of life or personal injury provided that:
(1) the cause of action arose wholly or in part within India;421 or
(2) the defendant was actually and voluntarily residing, carrying on business or personally
working for gain in India at the time of the commencement of the proceedings;422 and
(3) proceedings which may have previously been initiated before a foreign court against the
same defendant on the same subject matter have been discontinued or have come to an
end.423
414 ibid.
415 Collier (n 4) 71–72.
416 Act No 22 of 2017.
417 See s 2(1) of the Admiralty Act which states that a ‘vessel’
includes any ship, boat, sailing vessel or other description of vessel used or constructed for use in navigation by water,
whether it is propelled or not, and includes a barge, lighter or other floating vessel, a hovercraft, an off-shore industry
mobile unit, a vessel that has sunk or is stranded or abandoned and the remains of such a vessel.
Explanation. – A vessel shall not be deemed to be a vessel for the purposes of this clause, when it is broken up to such
an extent that it cannot be put into use for navigation, as certified by a surveyor.
418 ibid, s 2(k) which states that
territorial waters shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive
Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (80 of 1976).
419 ibid, s 4.
420 ibid, s 1(2).
421 ibid, s 7(iii)(a).
422 ibid, s 7(iii)(b).
423 ibid, s 7(2).
Reflections on Indian Law: Some Insights based on Global Trends 99
V. Reflections on Indian Law:

Some Insights based on Global Trends
A. General Remarks on Indian Law
In general, Indian conflict of law rules on jurisdiction in an international civil or commercial matter
resonates with the law on the subject in jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada and the EU. These
jurisdictions similarly recognise factors such as the residence or the submission of the defendant,
the place where a cause of action arose, the situs of immovable property, which has been recognised
in Indian private international law as conferring jurisdiction on a court.424 Under Australian law,
the grounds on which a court may assume jurisdiction resonate with those prescribed in India. This
can be explained by their common-law heritage. In Australia, the rules on the subject are ‘defined
by common law and partly by reference to statute’.425 Although the rules on jurisdiction are not
uniform between Australia and India, there are similarities in the grounds on which the courts in
both countries may adjudicate a dispute on an international civil or commercial matter.426
An Australian court may assume jurisdiction in the following situations:
(1) When the defendant is domiciled or ordinarily resident in its territory.427 A company which
is incorporated or has its principal place of business in its territory is considered to be a
‘resident’ of that place.428
(2) When the cause of action which gave rise to the claim occurred in its territory.429 Accordingly,
the court will be eligible to adjudicate a dispute arising from the breach of a contract if it is
the place where the contract was concluded.430 As a general rule, a contract is considered to
be concluded at the place where acceptance was communicated to the offeror.431 However,
the breach of a contract that is concluded by telephone would be the place where the words
are spoken.432 In a related vein, claims arising from tortious liability are subject to the juris-
diction of the court in the territory where the tort was committed or the where damage
occurred wholly or in part.433
(3) When immovable property is situated in its territory.434 Whether the situs of the property will
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the court in whose territory it is situated remains unclear.
(4) When the defendant impliedly or expressly submitted to its jurisdiction.435 The appearance
of the defendant before the court to defend a case on its merits would result in an implied
submission to the jurisdiction of that forum.436 Likewise, the conclusion of a choice of court
agreement would result in an express submission to the jurisdiction of that forum.437
424 See for instance Oppong, (n 65) 47 et seq; Davies et al, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia 9th edn (LexisNexis
Butterworths, Australia 2020) 25 [Nygh’s Conflict of Laws]; Walker Halsbury’s Laws of Canada: Conflict of Laws (Lexis
Nexis, 2011) 291 et seq; and C Tiburcio and J Dolinger, Private International Law in Brazil 2nd edn (Wolters Kluwer, 2017)
299 et seq.
425 Nygh’s Conflict of Laws, ibid 25.
426 ibid 40.
427 ibid 54.
428 ibid 54.
429 ibid 42.
430 ibid 44–49.
431 ibid.
432 ibid 48.
433 ibid 49–51.
434 ibid 56–57.
435 ibid 54.
436 ibid 62–64.
437 ibid 62.
In a related vein, the private international law of common law Canada also empowers its courts
to adjudicate a civil or commercial matter if the defendant was residing,438 domiciled439 or
carrying on business in its jurisdiction440 or had otherwise expressly or impliedly submitted to
its jurisdiction.441 The jurisdiction of a Canadian court in a dispute arising from the breach of
a contract is determined by looking at: (1) the place where the contract was made;442 (2) the
place where the contract was performed;443 or (3) the law governing the contract.444 Likewise, in
matters of tort, the jurisdiction of the court will depend on the place of occurrence of the tort.445
Disputes arising from an immovable property will be subject to the jurisdiction of a Canadian
court if the property has its situs within the territory of that forum.446
Australian447 and Canadian448 law similarly permit an eligible forum to stay proceedings on
account of forum non conveniens when it is ‘clearly inappropriate’ and there is another forum
which should adjudicate the matter in the interests of justice.
In contrast, the principles of Nepalese private international law, which have been codified
by the enactment of the National Civil Code Act 2017, do not seem to make room for party
autonomy in the choice of courts.449 The jurisdiction of a court in Nepal instead depends inter
alia, on the residence of the defendant, the situs of movable or immovable property, the place
of the conclusion or performance of a contract, and the place of payment on a financial trans-
action or dealing.450 A court in Nepal will accordingly adjudicate a cross-border dispute in a
civil or commercial matter if the defendant resides within its territory; the property is located
within its jurisdiction; the contract was concluded or performed in Nepal; or if payment was
made in Nepal.451 In this manner, Nepalese private international law does not refer to the ques-
tion of submission of the parties to the jurisdiction of the court. The provisions of the statute
imply that a Nepalese court is empowered to exercise parallel jurisdiction regardless of whether
the parties have conferred jurisdiction on a foreign forum in situations such as those where
the contract was concluded or performed in Nepal. In this context, the principles of Indian
private international law on jurisdiction, which are codified in the CPC, offer more clarity on
the subject.
The conflict of law rules in the European Union (EU) stipulate similar grounds to those found
under Indian private international law. The EU rules on the jurisdiction of a court in civil and
commercial matters in the EU have been harmonised by the promulgation of Regulation (EU)
No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Brussels I bis Regulation).452 The provisions of Brussels I bis Regulation extend to all
438 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (n 424) 302.

439 Club Resorts Ltd v van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 per LeBel J.
440 ibid [120]; and Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (n 424) 305.
441 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, ibid, 299–300.
442 ibid 317–320; and Club Resorts (n 439) [88].
443 ibid 424.
444 ibid 318.
445 ibid 321–322; and Club Resorts (n 439).
446 ibid 314.
447 Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 424) 33, 39.
448 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (n 424) 341–351.
449 See Art 718 of the National Civil Code Act 2017 [Nepalese PIL].
450 ibid.
451 ibid.
452 See Recital 8 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Also see the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (2007) www.ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=13041

[Lugano Convention]. The Lugano Convention facilitates closer cooperation in the European Economic Area and, thus,
supplements the Brussels I bis Regulation.
the Member States (except Denmark), unless the subject-matter does not fall within the scope
of its application.453 The provisions of Brussels I bis Regulation were applicable to the UK until
the transition period of Brexit, which came into effect on 31 January 2021. In the absence of any
clarity at the moment regarding the conflict of law rules on jurisdiction that will be applicable in
the UK, it is likely that traditional principles of English common law will come back into effect.
Brussels I bis Regulation will likely continue to be applicable in the UK by its former membership
to the EU, during the transition period of Brexit.
Unlike common law systems, the procedure to assume jurisdiction in civil law systems such as
the EU may be described as a closed system.454 This is because, unlike the conflict of law rules on
jurisdiction in common law countries such as India, the grounds on which a court may assume
jurisdiction are strictly defined in the civil law systems and the courts have little or no discre-
tion on whether or not to hear a matter.455 For this reason, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
finds no place in a legal system such as the EU. In contrast, as has been shown above, in India the
grounds on which a court may assume jurisdiction are broad, and the courts have the discretion
to accept or decline jurisdiction if there is another more appropriate forum to adjudicate the
matter.456
The Brussels I bis Regulation stipulates five grounds on which a court in a Member State
shall possess exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, a court has exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute which
concerns:
(1) a right in rem immovable property which has its situs in its territory;457
(2) the validity of the constitution, the nullity of the constitution or the dissolution of the
company;458
(3) the validity of the entries in public registries;459
(4) the registration or validity of a patent, trademark, design or any other similar right;460
(5) the enforcement of a judgment of another court.461
In all other disputes of a civil or commercial nature, the Brussels I bis Regulation confers manda-
tory jurisdiction on the court of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled.462
Although the residence of a defendant is irrelevant, the rules to determine the domicile
of a defendant are akin to those which are applicable to identify residence. The domicile of a
defendant who is a natural person is to be determined according to the provisions of the inter-
nal law of the forum.463 On the other hand, a juristic person is considered to be domiciled at
its principal place of business, statutory seat, or the place from which its central administration
is conducted.464 In certain circumstances, a court in another Member State (which is not the
defendant’s domicile) may, however, assume jurisdiction over the dispute if the cause of action
occurred in its territory.465 This will be the position when: (1) delivery of a product in a sale of
453 see Arts 1 and 2 for a list of subject-matters which are excluded from the scope of the instrument; and Briggs (n 4)
52–53.
454 See Schulz (n 310) 70 referring to the civil law rules on jurisdiction.
455 ibid.
456 ibid referring to the common law rules on jurisdiction.
457 Art 24(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.
458 ibid, Art 24(2).
459 ibid, Art 24(3).
460 ibid, Art 24(4).
461 ibid, Art 24(5).
462 ibid, Art 4. For a detailed discussion on the ‘domicile’ of the defendant under Art 4 see Briggs (n 4) 55–57.
463 ibid, Art 62.
464 ibid, Art 63.
465 ibid, Art 7.
goods took place; or (2) services were rendered, within the territory of another Member State
pursuant to the relevant contract.466 Unlike Indian law, the Brussels I bis Regulation does not
prescribe complicated rules to identify the place where the cause of action arose in claims for
breach of contract. The place of the conclusion of the contract is irrelevant and performance is
understood as delivery or the place where services were rendered for the purpose of determining
the eligibility of an adjudicating forum. A court in a Member State which is not the defendant’s
domicile may assume jurisdiction over disputes concerning tortious liability if the harm occurred
or may occur in the latter’s territory.467 In this respect, EU law is similar to Indian law. Likewise,
the submission of a defendant is another ground which confers jurisdiction over the courts of a
Member State. The defendant’s appearance before a court impliedly confers jurisdiction on the
court, unless the defendant’s appearance is solely to contest the jurisdiction of that forum.468
The conclusion of a choice of court agreement in a civil or commercial matter in favour of
a court in the EU will expressly confer jurisdiction on that forum.469 In such circumstances,
the chosen forum is obligated to adjudicate the dispute regardless of the domicile of the parties
unless the agreement is null and void as regards its substantive validity under the law of the state
in which the court is situated.470 The parties may not, however, oust the jurisdiction of a court
in matters which are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that forum, as indicated above.471
The courts in a Member State may, nonetheless, stay the proceedings in certain exceptional
circumstances to avoid concurrent jurisdiction over a matter and inconsistent judgments. This
will be the position when the court has been seised of an action which falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of another Member State. A court in a Member State will also be obliged to stay
proceedings when the parties have agreed to confer jurisdiction on another forum through a
choice of court agreement, unless the chosen forum confirms that it does not possess jurisdiction
in the matter.472
In all other circumstances (which do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court
or when the parties have not concluded a choice of court agreement), a court is obligated to
stay proceedings if a dispute between the same parties and the same cause of action is pend-
ing in a court of another Member State.473 In this respect, EU law on the subject resonates with
the principle of res sub judice which finds a place in Indian law.474 The court which has been
seised subsequently must wait for the other court to establish its jurisdiction before dismissing
the proceedings before it. However, unlike Indian law, the Brussels I bis Regulation permits a
court in a Member State to exercise its discretion and stay proceedings when a dispute between
the same parties and the same cause of action is pending before a court in a non-Member
State.475 In contrast, the principle of res sub judice stipulated by section 10 of the CPC does not
require Indian courts to stay proceedings when a dispute between the same parties concern-
ing the same cause of action is pending before a foreign court.476 In such circumstances, the
Indian court is authorised to assume concurrent jurisdiction. The Brussels I bis Regulation
instead authorises a court in a Member State to give ‘reflexive effect’ to Articles 24 and 25 of
466 ibid, Art 7(1).

467 ibid, Art 7(2).
468 ibid, Art 26.
469 ibid, Art 25.
470 ibid.
471 See Briggs (n 4) 61–62.
472 See Art 31(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.
473 ibid, Art 29.
474 See s 10 of the CPC and text accompanying notes 260–265.
475 Art 33 of the Brussels I bis Regulation.
476 See Explanation to s 10 of the CPC.
the Brussels I bis Regulation477 and stay proceedings if: (1) the court in a third country will
render a judgment capable of recognition or enforcement in that Member State; and (2) it is
necessary for the proper administration of justice.478 The court in the Member State shall dismiss
proceedings when the forum in the third country has pronounced its decision.479 The Brussels
I bis Regulation permits a court in a Member State to refuse to stay proceedings if a court in
a non-Member State: (1) has (itself) stayed or dismissed the matter:480 or (2) is unlikely to
adjudicate the dispute within a reasonable period.481 The EU law on the subject thus provides
a valuable source of inspiration for the development of Indian law. Legislators should therefore
consider an amendment of the CPC to authorise its courts to stay a matter when a dispute is
pending before a foreign forum to prevent inconsistent judgments. In doing so, lawmakers may
consider the factors prescribed under the Brussels I bis Regulation482 permitting courts to stay
matters in such circumstances.
B. Should India Ratify the HCCCA?

India has not ratified the HCCCA which came into effect on 1 October 2015.483 In such circum-
stances, the principles on Indian private international law vis-à-vis the operation of choice of
court agreements has been developed by case law, thereby rendering the law on the subject
unpredictable and uncertain. As the name suggests, the HCCCA regulates the operation of
exclusive choice of court agreements484 in civil and commercial matters among its contracting
parties.485 To date, the HCCCA has been ratified by the EU,486 Denmark, Mexico, Montenegro
and Singapore.487 China, the Republic of North Macedonia, the Ukraine, the US and Israel have
signed the HCCCA, but have yet to ratify or accede to it.488 In 2017 scholarly writings reported
that Australia was likely to ratify the HCCCA,489 but it is not yet a signatory to the convention.
The HCCCA stipulates the duties of the chosen and the non-chosen court in contracting
states when called upon to adjudicate a dispute in respect of which the parties have concluded
an exclusive choice of court agreement.490 Article 5 of the HCCCA prohibits the chosen forum
from declining to assume jurisdiction unless the agreement is null and void under the provisions
of its substantive law.491 A court in a Contracting State which has been chosen by the parties
477 Briggs (n 4) 91–92; and P De Verneuil Smith et al. ‘Reflections on Owusu: The Radical Decision in Ferrexpo’ (2015)
Journal of Private International Law 389, 397.

478 Art 33(1)(b) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.
479 ibid, Art 33(3).
480 ibid, Art 33(2)(a).
481 ibid, Art 33(2)(b).
482 ibid, Art 33.
483 See Art 31(1) of the HCCCA.
484 See HCCCA, Hartley-Dogauchi Explanatory Report (n 352) [247].
485 Art 1(1) of the HCCCA.
486 The provisions of the Brussels I bis Regulation will govern the duties of the chosen and the non-chosen court when
it is situated in a Member State. The provisions of the HCCCA will regulate the duties of the chosen and the non-chosen
court when it is situated in one of its Contracting States.
487 See www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98.
488 ibid.
489 See A Mills, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention and Cross-Border Commercial Dispute Resolution in Australia
and the Asia-Pacific’ (2017) 18(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 1; and BA Marshall and M Keyes, ‘Australia’s
Accession to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ (2017) 41 Melbourne University Law Review 246.
490 See Arts 1(1), (2), 2(1)(a) and 3(a) of the HCCCA.
491 ibid, Art 5; and P Beaumont and B Yüksel, ‘The Validity of Choice of Court Agreements under the Brussels I
Regulation and the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention’ in K Boele-Woelki et al (eds), Convergences and
Divergences in Private International Law Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (Eleven Publishers, 2010) 575–576.
by agreement may, therefore, decline jurisdiction if the contract has been concluded by fraud,
duress, misrepresentation, or when the parties lacked capacity to conclude the same.492 Article 6
imposes a corresponding duty on the courts of Contracting States which have not been chosen,
to suspend or dismiss proceedings when seised of a matter to which the agreement relates, save
in exceptional circumstances.493 The non-chosen court is consequently prohibited from grant-
ing an anti-suit injunction to prevent the other party from commencing or proceedings before
the chosen forum. A non-chosen court situated in a Contracting State may, nonetheless, assume
jurisdiction if enforcement of the agreement is not feasible for any one or more of the following
reasons:
(1) The choice of court agreement is null and void under the law of the chosen court and the
latter has declined to adjudicate on the matter.494
(2) Any party to the choice of court agreement lacked the capacity to conclude the same.495
(3) Enforcement of the choice of court agreement it would lead to manifest injustice to a party.496
(4) Enforcement of the choice of court agreement would be manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the state in which non-chosen court is situated;497
(5) The choice of court agreement is incapable of performance for a reason which is beyond
the control of the parties (for instance, due to the occurrence of a vis major or force majeure
event).498
Despite India’ resistance to ratifying the HCCCA, its principles of private international law on
choice of court agreements in favour of foreign forums corresponds with the instrument to a
significant extent. Although there is no reported case in which a court in India has assumed
jurisdiction in an international dispute on a civil or commercial matter because the parties have
expressly chosen it, the Supreme Court’s dicta in British India Steam Navigation499 and Modi
Entertainment500 demonstrate the sanctity of choice of court agreements in Indian private inter-
national law. An Indian court would not assume jurisdiction when it has not been chosen. It is
unlikely that an Indian court would decline to adjudicate a dispute in an international civil or
commercial matter when it has been selected. Likewise, the grounds stipulated by the Supreme
Court in Modi Entertainment501 concerning the circumstances in which a court may disregard
a forum selection clause resonate with those prescribed under the HCCCA. As has been shown
above, the courts in India would not assume jurisdiction in a matter in respect to which the parties
have concluded a choice of court agreement in favour of a foreign forum, unless it would result in
injustice to the parties in some manner or when the contract is incapable of being performed for
some reason such as the occurrence of force majeure or the like.502
492 See, HCCCA Hartley-Dogauchi Report (n 352) 55 [125], [126].

493 Art 6 of the HCCCA.
494 ibid, Art 6(a).
495 ibid, Art 6(b).
496 ibid, Art 6(c).
497 ibid.
498 ibid, Art 6(d).
499 (n 337).
500 (n 262).
501 ibid.
502 ibid [24.4]. Also see generally S Khanderia, ‘The Hague Judgments Project: Assessing its Plausible Benefits for the
Development of the Indian Private International Law’ (2019) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 452 [Khanderia, The Hague
Judgments Project]; and S Khanderia, ‘The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the Enforcement
of Forum-Selection Clauses in Indian Private International Law’ (2019) 9(3) International Journal of Private Law 125.
[Khanderia, The Hague Convention].
Conclusion 105
Although the HCCCA merely regulates the duty of a court in a Contracting State, India’s
ratification of the convention would play a significant role in augmenting the development of
the Republic’s private international law. First, the HCCCA would introduce certainty that the
Indian courts would not decline jurisdiction when there is none under CPC sections 19 and 2,
and when jurisdiction has been conferred through a choice of court agreement. At present, this
factor is merely speculative. Second, India’s ratification to the HCCCA would improve interna-
tional trade in the country by introducing predictability concerning the duty of Indian courts to
refrain from adjudicating on a matter when their jurisdiction has been ousted and conferred on
another forum in a Contracting State, save on the satisfaction of the limited circumstances identi-
fied in the HCCCA. At present, in the absence of black letter law, interested parties are expected
to peruse a jungle of judicial dicta to be apprised of the current legal position in India. Third,
India’s ratification to the HCCCA would provide certainty on the former’s stance on choice of
court agreements in favour of a foreign forum when it contravenes the public policy of the coun-
try. At present, there is no clear indication if the Indian courts will assume jurisdiction when the
forum selection clause is contrary to the public policy of the Republic.503 India’s ratification of the
HCCCA would, therefore, provide significant clarification to this effect.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter examined Indian conflict of law rules on jurisdiction in international civil and
commercial matters. An analysis was made of the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the
Indian courts. It was seen that in general Indian law permits every person to sue and initiate
proceedings before the courts in civil or commercial matters. The right to sue is, however, not
unrestricted and may be limited due to immunities from legal proceedings that may be conferred
by the law on the defendant. This chapter explored the grounds on which an Indian court would
assume jurisdiction in a civil or a commercial matter. In doing so, it differentiated between a
claim of a civil and commercial nature under Indian law and the mechanism for determining the
jurisdiction of the courts. It demonstrated the supremacy of the provisions of the CPC in deter-
mining the eligibility of an Indian court to adjudicate on a matter, regardless of whether it is of a
civil or commercial nature. It was seen that, although Indian law does not explicitly categorise the
jurisdiction of its courts as exclusive or permissive, these have implicitly been dealt with under
the provisions of the CPC.
In matters concerning immovable property, the jurisdiction of the court will be exclusive.
Thus, all disputes arising from immovable property (including those concerning the liability in
tort for damage caused to immovable property) shall be mandatorily initiated before the court
within whose territory the property has its situs. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be ousted
through a choice of court or an arbitration agreement. The court may, if necessary, serve the
defendant with a summons abroad. However, all other civil and commercial matters are subject to
the permissive jurisdiction of the court. The court may, therefore, decline to exercise jurisdiction
at its discretion by invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens if there is another forum which
is clearly more appropriate to adjudicate on the relevant matter in the interest of justice. The eligi-
bility of the court, in matters which are subject to its permissive jurisdiction, will depend on the
place where the defendant resides, carries on business, or works for gain. In suits arising from the
infringement of a trademark or copyright, Indian law additionally permits its courts to assume

jurisdiction if the plaintiff resides, carries on business or works for gain within its territory. The
occurrence of a cause of action within the territory of the court is another factor which confers
jurisdiction on the courts. Thus, in disputes arising from a tortious matter, the court may assume
jurisdiction if the damage to the person or movable property occurred in its territory. Likewise, in
disputes concerning the breach of the contract, the court may assume jurisdiction if the contract
was concluded or was performed in its territory. The place of the cause of action in online trans-
actions will be every place from where the defendant was able successfully to conclude a contract
with a customer, thereby causing loss to the plaintiff. At the same time, the chapter highlighted
a tendency among Indian courts of staying proceedings by invoking the doctrine of forum non
conveniens when the cause of action does not form an essential part of a claim.
Lastly, submission before the forum also forms a valid base of jurisdiction. Thus, the parties’
express or implied submission to the jurisdiction of the court would suffice in conferring jurisdic-
tion on an Indian forum in a civil or commercial matter. It was seen that the express submission
of the parties to the jurisdiction of another Indian court is permitted within the parameters of the
CPC. Put simply, the parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of a court and confer it on another Indian
court when the latter does not otherwise possess jurisdiction through any of the means indicated
above. At the same time, globalisation and the advent of international trade have prompted the
development of the principles of Indian private international law. The parties may, under present
principles, oust the jurisdiction of an Indian court in matters which are subject to its permissive
jurisdiction and instead confer it on a foreign (including a neutral) forum. Likewise, the parties
may also oust the jurisdiction of the Indian court by concluding an arbitration agreement. In such
circumstances, the Indian court would not, save in exceptional circumstances, assume jurisdic-
tion on the matter.
The chapter highlighted that Indian conflict of law rules on jurisdiction in civil and commer-
cial matters substantially correspond with global practices. It, however, suggested that India
should ratify the HCCCA in the interests of predictability and certainty and to improve interna-
tional trade.
part iii
Family Law
108
6
Private International Law Practice in Marriage
I. Introduction
Having discussed the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of private international law in India
and the rules regulating jurisdiction in Part II, the current chapter will focus on the matrimonial
issues of private international law in India.
Marriage is the very foundation of civil society, and laws and definitions have been evolved
in response to its religious, social, political, and cultural imperatives.1 Religion, as a social insti-
tution, has profoundly impacted marriage and the laws regulating marriage.2 The Christian
concept of marriage has influenced many western jurisdictions.3 In Hyde v Hyde, Lord Penzance
described that marriage, as understood under by Christendom, may be defined as ‘the voluntary
union for life of one man to one woman to the exclusion of all others.’4 Hindus consider marriage
as a sacrament and union between men and women for seven lives.5 Islam looks at the concept of
marriage as a contract between men and women with permission to have more than one spouse.6
Under the Indian legal framework, questions of marriage and divorce are strongly influenced by
cultural and religious norms. The existence of personal laws based on religious beliefs impacts on
private international law practices of India and their reception in other jurisdictions resulting in
legal imbroglios.7
This chapter is divided into five parts including the Introduction. Section II traces the statu-
tory position of marriage, as well as judicial statements on the subject, with an exposition on the
formal and essential elements of a valid marriage. The chapter focuses on interreligious marriages
and discusses the reception and acceptance of Indian legal systems in western jurisdictions with
particular reference to polygamous marriages. Section III addresses conflict of law concerns aris-
ing out of same-sex marriages and critically evaluates the Indian legal response to recognition of
foreign same-sex marriage. While scrutinising prevailing Indian legal positions, the chapter also
analyses the rules codified by the EU and Hague Conventions on family law matters. Section IV
deliberates on Indian engagements with Hague Conventions operating in matrimonial matters.
Section V provides concluding remarks.
1 Shaw v Gould [1868] LR 3 HLC [55].

2N Tebbe, ‘Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes’ (2015) 9(1) Harvard Law & Policy Review 25–62, 16.
3 NA Joel, ‘Religious and Legal Pluralism in Global Comparative Perspective’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law
Review 967–986.
4 Hyde v Hyde 1 P & D 130; P Diwan, Private International Law (Deep and Deep Publications, 1993) 121.
5 Diwan (n 4) 121.
6 N Akhtar, Family Law on Divorce and Judicial Separation (Deep and Deep Publications, 2003) 192.
7 AL Estin, ‘Marriage and Divorce Conflicts in International Perspective’ (2017) 27 Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law 485–517, 485.

110 Private International Law Practice in Marriage
II. Indian Legislative Framework

on Marriage and its Religious Base
Marriages in India are governed by different sets of personal laws. This situation implies an
absence of a uniform civil code on marriage applicable to all religious communities (except
Goa and Pondicherry).8 The reliance on personal laws has been in practice since the beginning
of British rule in India which did not attempt to adopt uniform rules governing all religious
communities.9 In the post-Independence era, existing laws on personal laws were modified and
transformative changes were brought into existence.
The Hindu Marriage Act was enacted in 1955 and applied to all Hindus as well as persons
from other religious communities, namely, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists.10 In the Act, the condi-
tions of a valid marriage between two individuals of the Hindu faith are given under section 5.
These conditions are as follows:
(i) Neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage.
(ii) At the time of marriage, neither party is incapable of giving a valid consent as a result of
unsound mind, a mental disorder making the person unfit for marriage or the procreation
of children, or suffering from recurrent attacks of insanity or epilepsy.
(iii) A minimum of 21 years of age for the bridegroom and 18 years of age for the bride.
(iv) The parties are not within the prohibited degrees of relationship unless custom or usage
permits such marriage.
(v) The parties are not sapindas11 of each other unless custom or usage permits such marriage12
The Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872 regulates marriages among Christians. The essential
requirements in this Act are similar to those of the Hindu Marriage Act and, in addition, at least
two witnesses must be present at the time of the marriage. The marriage has to be solemnised
by a person licensed to grant a certificate of marriage.13 Under Muslim law, marriage consists of
an offer, a subsequent acceptance, and the provision of dower. Such a marriage is regulated by
religious precepts and not by laws per se because there is no consolidated act to validate these
marriages.14 The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 prescribes the conditions for a valid
marriage among Parsis, such as the age of the groom and bride, the solemnisation of marriage
by an Ashirvad ceremony performed by a Parsi priest, and the need for two witnesses.15 The
Special Marriage Act 1954 was enacted to give a choice to marry beyond one’s religion or caste.
The marriage can take place between Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs.
The Act extends not only to citizens in India but also to foreign nationals.16 The Foreign Marriage
Act 1969 governs marriages in which at least one of the parties is an Indian citizen and such
marriage can be solemnised abroad and later registered under the Act.17 Unlike the cross-border
8 S Shetreet and HE Chodosh, Uniform Civil Code for India: Proposed Blueprint for Scholarly Discourse (Oxford
University Press, 2015) 45.

9 T Mahmood, ‘Religion, Law, and Judiciary in Modern India’ (2006) (3) BYU Law Review 755–776, 765.
10 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (India) s 2.
11 ibid. The term sapindas is unique to Hindu law. Two persons are sapindas if they have a common ancestor.
12 ibid, s 5; See PP Saxena, Family Law Lectures: Family Law 3rd edn (Lexis Nexis, 2011) 11.
13 ibid, s 25; See K Sharma, Family Law Lectures: Family Law 4th edn (Lexis Nexis, 2015) 1.
14 Mehr (dower) means money or property which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of
the marriage.
15 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936, India s 3(b).
16 Special Marriage Act 1954 (India) s 4.
17 Foreign Marriage Act 1969 (India) s 4.
Indian Legislative Framework on Marriage and its Religious Base 111
child abduction and adoption issues, where global conventions have attempted to establish a
uniform approach, cross-border marriage and divorce are primarily left to the traditional conflict
of laws approaches of each jurisdiction. Marriage regulation is thus a battleground over which
conflicts between religious communities and states have been fought.
A. Determination of the Applicable Law in Marriage under

the Principles of Indian Private International Law
i. Formal Aspects of Marriage

With respect to marriage, a fundamental distinction is followed in legal discussion regarding
material and formal requirements.18 Formal aspects include matters of less vital social interest,
such as the length of public notice to be given before solemnisation of a marriage, the number
of witnesses whose presence is required at a marriage ceremony, etc.19 Formal matters are exclu-
sively governed by the law of the place of celebration (lex loci celebrationis).20 The 1978 Hague
Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages codified rules on
formalities of marriage.21 Article 2 of the 1978 Convention declares that formal requirements for
marriages shall be governed by the law of the state where the marriage celebration took place.22
The applicable law can be refused on the ground of public policy.23 However, like many Hague
instruments on family matters, the 1978 Convention has only been ratified by three countries and
has not influenced the evolution of the law on a serious scale.
As far as Indian legislation is concerned, the statutes enumerated above, that is, the Hindu
Marriage Act, the Special Marriage Act, and the Indian Marriage Act, do not have an explicit
provision on the applicable law to regulate the formal aspects of marriage. However, the Foreign
Marriage Act 1969 provides that the ‘Central Government … may declare that marriages solem-
nised under the law in force in such foreign country shall be recognised by the courts in India
as valid.’24 Section 27 of the Foreign Marriage Act also states that the statute would not affect the
validity of a marriage solemnised in a foreign country under a foreign law.25 Section 11 of the
Act authorises a marriage officer to refuse to solemnise a marriage if the marriage is prohibited
by the law of the foreign country in which the marriage is to be solemnised.26 This indicates that
there is recognition of the principle of lex loci celebrationis in respect of formal validity. However,
the statute also provides a general exception to the lex loci celebrationis rule on formal aspects of
marriage. Section 13 of the Act permits the parties to choose the applicable form of marriage.27
There are not many examples of cases wherein the court has decided questions regarding the
18 Dicey Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws 14th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 285; MH Hoffheimer, Conflict of
Laws (Aspen Publishers, 2010) 56.

19 ibid 285.
20 RH Graveson, Conflict of Laws 7th edn (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 1974) 251; Taczanowska v Taczanowski [1957] CA 30;
Ogden v Ogden [1908] CA [46].

21 Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages (adopted on 25 March 1978 entered into
force on 1 May 1991).

22 ibid, Art 2.
23 ibid, Art 5.
24 Foreign Marriage Act 1969 (n 17) s 23.
25 ibid, s 27.
26 ibid, s 11(1).
27 ibid, s 13(2).
validity of a marriage under foreign law. In Noor Jahan Begum v Eugene Tiscenko,28 the main
question was the validity of a marriage in the event of the religious conversion of one of the
parties. The court stated that the English law position is usually adopted in private international
law matters in India. Based on this, it can be presumed that the formal validity of marriages will
be decided based on the lex loci celebrationis.
ii. Essential Aspects of Marriage

Material aspects are considered to be of considerable significance to a marriage and include
capacity, consanguinity, religion, etc.29 Several connecting factors have been advanced for the
applicable law governing material aspects of marriage including the domicile of the parties,30
the lex loci celebrationis,31 and the intended matrimonial home.32 According to the domicile
approach, a valid marriage between persons domiciled in India and Nepal has to satisfy the
material requirements of both legal systems.33 The intended matrimonal home theory dictates
that the material validity of the marriage is governed by the law of the matrimonial home of
the parties. The intended matrimonial home approach has been criticised as it gives preference
to the husband’s domicile and has an uncertainty factor, as one has to follow a wait-and-see
approach to ascertain the parties’ matrimonial home.34 Countries following the civil law system
have adopted the law of nationality as the connecting factor in determining matters of essential
validity.35 In recent times there has been an attempt to consider the relevant factor as that of a real
and substantive connection, in which both domicile and intended matrimonial home can play
a part.36 Under the First Restatement, the US does not distinguish between formal and essential
elements of marriage. The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law
of the place where it is contracted or solemnised. If valid there, it is valid everywhere. The test of
real and substantial connection is followed in the US in the Second Restatement.37 The European
approach towards matrimonial issues exhibits broad flexibility.
28 Noor Jahan Begum v Eugene Tiscenko AIR [1941] Cal 582.

29 Graveson (n 20) 251. Consanguinity and prohibited degrees of marriage comes under material validity in India.
30 Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages (n 21) Art 2; See AJE Jaffey, ‘The Essential
Validity of Marriage in the English Conflict of Laws’(1978) 41 Modern Law Review 38–50; Brook v Brook [1861] 9 HL Cas
193; Sottomayor v De Barros (No 2) [1879] 5 PD 94; Szecheter v Szecheter [1970] 3 All ER 905; See also T Baty, ‘Capacity
and Form of Marriage in the Conflict of Laws’ (1917) 26(6) The Yale Law Journal 444–463.
31 R Fentiman, ‘The Validity of Marriage and the Proper Law’ (1985) 44(2) Cambridge Law Journal 256–279, 259;
C M Schmitthoff, ‘Validity of Marriage and the Conflict of Laws’ (1940) 56 Law Quarterly Review 514–518.
32 K Trimmings, P Torremans, A Mills, U Grusic and C Heinze, Cheshire, North, and Fawcett: Private International Law
15th edn (Oxford University Press, 2017) 910. Many cases have followed the dictum propounded by Cheshire. Radwan v
Radwan (No2) [1972] 3AII ER1026.
33 ibid 912.
34 JD Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflicts of Laws (Canada Law Book, 1947) 641; EI Sykes, ‘The Essential Validity of
Marriage’ (1955) 4(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 159–169.

35 D Hill, Private International Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2014) 7.
36 S Symeonides, American Private International Law (Kluwer Law International, 2008) 234.
37 ibid 235–236; See also L Silberman, ‘Same Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis’ (2005) 153(6)
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2195–2214; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (American Law Institute,
1971) s 283(1); s 6 of the Second Restatement states that when no statutory directive exists, the court should consider
several factors to determine which state has the ‘most significant relationship’ to the marriage. Those factors include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies
of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issues; (d) the
protection of the parties’ justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
The 1978 Hague Convention lays down basic rules on the substantive requirements of
marriage.38 Article 3 lays down that a marriage shall be celebrated: (1) where the future spouses
meet the substantive requirements of the internal laws of the state of celebration and one of them
has the nationality of that state or habitually resides there; or (2) where each of the future spouses
meets the substantive requirements of the internal law designated by the choice of law rules of the
state of celebration.39 Thus Article 3 provides alternative possibilities. If one of the future spouses
is connected to the place of celebration, by nationality or residence, the law of the place of celebra-
tion will be the applicable law.40 If the second alternative is used, substantive requirements for
both the parties to the marriage would be different. The application of Article 3 can be illustrated
through an example. The minimum age of marriage in England is 16. A (an English male aged 17)
marries a French female aged 14 in England. The applicable law of marriage for both the parties
would be English law as the parties meet the substantive requirements of the internal law of the
state of celebration and one of them has the nationality of that state.41 The applicable law can be
refused where it is ‘manifestly incompatible with the public policy’ (ordre public) of the state of
celebration.42 The reference to ‘manifestly incompatible’ shows the drafter’s intent that the excep-
tion should have a narrow application.43 Article 13 specifies that contracting states may apply
‘rules of law more favourable to the recognition of a foreign marriage’.44 This provision allows the
parties to adopt liberal rules concerning the recognition of foreign marriages.
Similar to the rules on the formal aspect of marriage, Indian matrimonial statutes do not
contain rules governing essential aspects of marriage. A specific approach is also missing in judi-
cial decisions concerning the material aspect of marriage. In Parwatawwa v Channawwa,45 the
plaintiff was the second wife of the defendant who was domiciled in Hyderabad. The parties
married in Bombay and resided in Hyderabad. According to the then existing laws in Bombay,
polygamous marriages were prohibited, whereas the same was allowed by laws in Hyderabad. The
court summed up the theories of private international law and held:
What emerges from this discussion is that on the question as to what law should govern capacity for
marriage, there are at least three streams of thought. One view is that it is the law of the place of celebra-
tion which overlooks the distinction between formality and capacity. The second is that it is the law of
the domicile of each party before the marriage which is demonstrated by the later pronouncements to
be a conservative and orthodox view. The third is that the law of the intended matrimonial home is what
governs capacity which has been explained as the best.46
Two factors favoured the application of the intended matrimonial home theory, namely, the desire
to validate the marriage and the application of the doctrine of the wife’s domicile of dependency
38 WLM Reese, ‘The Hague Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages’ (1979) 20 Virginia
Journal of International Law 25–36, 25.

39 Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages (n 21) Art 3.
40 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Explanatory Report on the 1978 Marriage Convention 291 (1978)
Draft Convention adopted by the Thirteenth Session and Explanatory Report by A Malmström (hereinafter A Malmström
Explanatory Report) https://assets.hcch.net/docs/af508de1-0674-4689-b127-cde2280dddf3.pdf.
41 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law: Choice of Law Rules in Marriage
(Com No 165; Scot Law Com No 105, 1987) Part II, [2.1–2.11].
43 A Malmström Explanatory Report (n 40) 29.
45 Parwatawwa v Channawwa AIR [1966] Mys 100.
46 ibid [63]; See also Monica Variato v Thomas Variato 2000[2] Goa LT 149[12]; Saeesh Subhash Hegde v Darshana
Saeesh Hegde AIR [2008] KAR 142.

on the husband.47 In Lakshmi Sanyal v SK Dhar,48 the appellant Lakshmi filed a suit for a declara-
tion that her marriage with the respondent was null and void. The parties were Roman Catholics.49
The appellant claimed that she was a minor when the marriage was solemnised and her father
or guardian’s consent had not been obtained. Further, she contended that the marriage was void
because the parties were within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity.50 The High Court held
that, from the standpoint of the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, objection to the valid-
ity of the marriage on the ground of lack of consent could not be sustained.51 On the question of
the marriage being within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, it was found that, since the
consanguinity between the parties was of the second degree, it was undoubtedly an impediment
in the way of the marriage under canon law. However, the impediment could be removed by a
dispensation which had been granted by the competent authorities of the church. For that reason,
the marriage could not be held null and void.52 The Supreme Court held that the marital matters
would have to be resolved by referring to the law of the parties’ domiciles.53
The Indian courts’ stand shows a preference towards the dual domicile rule in the case of mate-
rial validity and the lex loci celebrationis rule in the case of the formal aspects of marriage. The
approach is compatible with the broad standard followed in private international law. A reference
to the legal position of Nepal illustrates a change from domicile to nationality as a connecting
factor.
Unlike Indian personal law which is scattered among different statutes, Nepal has adopted
two uniform codes to govern the personal matters of persons of all religious groups:54 (1) Muluki
Dewani (Samhita) Ain 2017 (Civil Code); and (2) Muluki Dewani Kariyabidhi (Samhita) Ain
2017 (Civil Procedure Code). While the first deals with substantive matters, the latter deals with
procedural aspects. Nepal does not have different personal laws for different religious communi-
ties. Its laws on marriage, divorce, partition, adoption, and succession are uniform for all religious
groups. Its new Civil Code provides that a citizen celebrating a marriage in a foreign country
should comply with the rules on competence, qualification and the conditions for marriage speci-
fied by the law of Nepal. It further specifies that the law of the country where the marriage is
concluded shall govern formal aspects of the marriage.55 It prescribes that, in marriages between
foreign nationals or between a foreign national and a citizen of Nepal celebrated in Nepal, each
spouse shall comply with the rules on capacity, qualification and marriage conditions specified
by the law of his or her nationality. Nepal being the place of marriage, its law would govern the
formalities of marriage.56 Such a clear position would alleviate judicial uncertainty and provide
the foundation for a strong private international law.
47 VC Govindaraj, The Conflict of Laws in India: Inter-Territorial and Inter-Personal Conflict 2nd edn (Oxford University
Press, 2019); FE Noronha, Private International Law in India: Adequacy of Principles in Comparison with Common Law
and Civil Law Systems (Universal Law Publishers, 2010) 110.
48 Lakshmi Sanyal v SK Dhar AIR [1972] Goa 2667.
49 ibid [12].
50 ibid.
51 ibid [11].
52 ibid.
53 ibid; KB Agarwal and V Singh, Private International Law in India (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 305.
54 Muluki Dewani (Samhita) Ain (adopted 16 October 2017, entry into force on 17 August 2018) [hereinafter referred
as54 The National Civil (Code) Act, (Nepal) 2017) and Muluki Dewani Kariyabidhhi (Samhita) Ain (adopted 2017, entry
into force 2018) [hereinafter referred as Civil Procedure Code].
55 ibid, s 699; Similar provisions can be found in Afghanistan. See Afghanistan Civil Code, Official Gazette, Issue No
353, 1355/1977. Section 19 deals with essential aspects of marriage governed by the national law of the parties and s 23
regulates formal aspect of marriage as per the law of the place of celebration of marriage.
56 ibid, s 700.
iii. Recognition of Foreign Marriages

India currently has no legislation governing the recognition and validity of foreign marriages.
Section 23 of the Foreign Marriage Act 1969 provides that the ‘Central Government may declare
that marriages solemnised under the law in force in such foreign country shall be recognised by
the courts in India as valid.’57 Two points are noteworthy in this context. First, the term ‘may’ in
section 23 denotes that recognition is discretionary. Second, the discretion is exercised only if the
law enforced in a foreign country is similar to the laws under the Act for the solemnisation of
marriages.58 Further, the Foreign Marriage Act does not govern the validity of a marriage between
two foreigners. It is expected that Indian courts would apply the lex loci celebrationis to determine
formal validity and the lex domicilii to determine the material validity of marriages subject to the
overriding rule of public policy. In the Indian context, most conflict of law questions have been
about the validity of marriages between spouses of different religious communities and the prac-
tice of polygamy and its recognition in other jurisdictions.
B. Inter-Religious Marriages and Private International Law in India

In Chetti v Chetti a Hindu resident in England but with an Indian domicile, married an English
lady with a domicile in London. Under the law of his domicile, as a Hindu, he could not contract
a marriage with a non-Hindu. After the marriage, the husband returned to India and deserted his
wife. She filed a case for judicial separation in England and the court granted the same.59 Although
the conventional rules of private international law dictated that the validity of the marriage has to
be determined by the domicile of the parties, it was held that a Hindu who contracted a marriage
with an English woman in England in due form according to the laws of England could not repu-
diate the marriage on the ground of an incapacity under his law that the courts of England refuse
to recognise. It should be noted that the marriage would not have been recognised in India. In
the instant case, the recognition of marriage was prompted more by the desire to do justice than
by adherence to established principles of private international law.
The same dictum was followed by the Indian court in Sainapatti v Sainapatti60 wherein a
marriage between a Hindu and a Christian solemnised in England was held to be valid. The
Indian court looked at the case from an English court’s perspective. However, as pointed out
by TS Rao, instead of analysing the case from an English perspective, the Indian court should
have examined the laws of the parties’ domiciles and assessed whether the courts in their respec-
tive domicilse would have recognised such a marriage.61 This case shows the blind adherence to
the English legal system of the Indian courts. The decision also suggests that the validity of
cross-border and inter-religious marriages will be decided based on the lex loci celebrationis
rather than by resorting to the laws of the parties’ domiciles.
In Sophy Auerbach v Shivaprosad Agarwalla,62 a Hindu male (who was domiciled in India
and had a Hindu wife in India) married the plaintiff Sophie Auerbach (who was domiciled in
57 Foreign Marriage Act 1969 (n 17) s 23.

58 ibid.
59 Chetti v Chetti (1909) 25(2) Law Quarterly Review 202–205.
60 Sainapatti v Sainapatti AIR [1932] Lah 136; SS Singh, Unification of Divorce Laws in India (Deep and Deep Publishers,
1993) 57.
61 TSR Rao, ‘Conflicts of Laws in India’ Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Und Internationales Privatrecht (1958) 23(2)
259–279, 267.
62 Sophy Auerbach v Shivaprosad Agarwalla AIR [1945] Cal 484; AM Setalvad, Conflict of Laws (Lexis Nexis,
Butterworths, 2009) 384.

Britain and of the Jewish religion) in Paris under French law.63 The plaintiff filed suit in the
Calcutta High Court for a declaration that her marriage with the defendant was null and void as
contrary to the lex loci celebrationis.64 It was argued that the marriage in Paris was a nullity under
French law because the defendant already had a wife living when he went through the marriage
with the plaintiff and that the marriage was also a nullity under Indian marriage laws.65 Two
questions arose: (1) Was the marriage a nullity under French law? (2) If so, was the marriage a
nullity under the Indian law applicable to the parties?66 The court analysed the English case law
and held that the French legal system would not recognise a potentially polygamous marriage
as valid. Hence, French law would not have recognised the defendant’s first marriage.67 The
court further pointed out that fundamental issues relevant to the case had not been argued by
the parties. These included questions such as whether a domiciled Hindu male in India could
contract a valid marriage of the Jewish faith and, if so, how was the marriage to be contracted
and what forms and ceremonies were required.68 The court found that English marriage law
and cases threw no light on these questions. The court stated that marriage as recognised by
the courts in India was not the monogamous relationship recognised by the courts in England,
nor was marriage laws uniform for all persons in India. There was instead a heavy reliance on
personal laws among the different religious communities in India.69 In those circumstances,
it was meaningless to speak of a lex domicilii, a lex loci celebrationis or a lex loci contractus in
connection with Indian marriages in general.70 The determining factor in most cases would be
the personal law of the parties. However, the parties in the case had not attempted to show that
a marriage in Paris between a Hindu domiciled in India and a foreign national, which was void
under the French law, was also void under the Indian law applicable to the parties. Hence, the
suit was dismissed.71
The effect of conversion on the law applicable to marriage was raised in khambatta v
Khambatta (discussed in detail in the chapter 7 dealing with divorce).72 The petitioner, a Scottish
national married Gulam Ibrahim in Scotland, fulfilling Scottish law requirements. At the time of
the marriage, the husband was a Muslim domiciled in British India and the wife was a Christian
domiciled in Scotland.73 After the marriage, the wife embraced Islam and she remained of that
faith.74 After some time, Gulam Ibrahim pronounced a talaq divorce pursuant to Islamic law. The
court observed:
[C]ertain principles of law relevant to the determination of this question are, in my opinion, firmly
established in the realm of private international law: (1) the forms necessary to constitute a valid
marriage and the construction of the marriage contract depend on the lex loci contractus, that is, the law
of the place where the marriage ceremony is performed; (2) on marriage the wife automatically acquires
the domicile of her husband; (3) the status of spouses and their rights and obligations arising under the
marriage contract are governed by the lex domicilli, that is, by the law of the country in which for the
63 ibid [2].
64 ibid.
65 ibid [11].
66 ibid.
67 ibid [13].
68 ibid [24].
69 ibid.
70 ibid [26].
71 ibid [28].
72 Jessie Grant Khambatta v Mancherji Cursetji Khambatta [1934] 36 BOMLR 11.
73 ibid [2].
74 ibid.
time being they are domiciled (4) the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the dissolution
of the marriage do not form part of the marriage contract, but arise out of, and are incidental to, such
contract, and are governed by the lex domicilii.75
The court held that, in the absence of an express contract, rights under the marriage are governed
by the law of the parties’ domicile at the time of divorce.76
In Abdur Rahim Undre v Padma Adbur Rahim Undre,77 the plaintiff Abdur Rahim Undre
married Smt. Padma in the UK in 1966 according to the formal rites prescribed by English
marriage law. Later the parties came to India and the wife converted to Islam.78 Thereafter relations
between the parties became strained and the plaintiff alleged that he pronounced a talaq upon
Padma in 1978. The court held that the parties’ marriage was governed by the Special Marriage
Act 1954 and the Foreign Marriage Act 1969. Hence the marriage could not be dissolved by the
religious performance of talaq.79 Thus, the decisions on the interreligious marriages illustrate
uncertainty and divergent positions, ranging from the application of the lex loci celebrationis to
the application of the lex domicilii.
C. Polygamous Marriages
Polygamous marriages were permitted for Hindus and Muslims during the British period.80 The
Hindu Marriage Act enacted in 1955 prohibited polygamous marriages among Hindus81 but
allowed them among Muslims. Case jurisprudence has thrown light into the position of legal
systems concerning the validity and recognition of polygamous marriages.82 Jurisdictions that
follow monogamy have adopted a general prohibition on polygamous marriage in their territory.83
For instance, England, Germany, the US and France do not allow polygamous marriages.84 The
interaction of these jurisdictions to polygamous marriage has arisen in two ways. First, a party to
a marriage is domiciled or a national of these jurisdictions. Second, there has been the question
of whether a polygamous marriage contracted in a foreign jurisdiction (such as India) should be
recognised. Following the Christian concept of monogamy, English law initially rejected actual
and potentially polygamous marriages, even when a spouse never contracted a second marriage.85
In consequence, a party to a polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage was not allowed
75 ibid [3].
76 ibid [8].
77 Abdur Rahim Undre v Padma Adbur Rahim Undre AIR [1982] Bom 341; V Saijwani, ‘Personal Laws of Divorce in
India with a Comment on Chaudry v Chaudry’ (1989) 11 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 41, 52.
78 Abdur Rahim Undre (n 77) [1].
79 ibid [3].
80 W Menski, Modern Indian Family law (Routledge, 2013) 9, 144.
81 ibid.
82 GW Bartholomew, ‘Polygamous Marriage’ (1952) 15 (1) Modern Law Review 35–47; CA Esplugues, ‘Legal Recognition
of Polygamous Marriages’ (1984) 17 (3) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 302–321; W Kieran
‘Polygamous Marriages and Potentially Polygamous Marriages in Irish Law: A Critical Reappraisal’ (2013) 36 Dublin
University Law Journal 249–276.
83 In order to be recognised as legally valid, all marriages which take place in the UK must be monogamous and must
be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Marriage Act 1949.
84 Bigamy is a crime in 49 states and the District of Columbia; See CA Smearman, ‘Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the
Impact of Polygamy in US Immigration Law’ (2009) 27(2) Berkley Journal of International Law 382, 429; MM Ertman,
‘Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy’(2010) 19(2) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 287,
355–356; MD Costa, ‘Polygamous Marriages in the Conflict of Laws’ (1966) 44(2) Canadian Bar Review 293–335, 297.
85 Esplugues (n 82) 303.
any relief or remedies in matrimonial proceedings before the English court.86 However, countries
like Germany did not follow this approach. A potentially polygamous marriage was recognised
as valid in Germany based on the right to marriage in Article 6 of the Civil Code.87
i. Nature of Marriage

The positions of judges and jurists on the appropriate connecting factor for determining the
nature and character of the polygamous marriage has vacillated among the lex loci celebrationis,
the laws of the parties’ domicile, and the law of the intended matrimonial home. According to
Dicey, Morris and Collins, a marriage celebrated in monogamous form under the law of the place
of celebration is monogamous regardless of the parties’ personal law.88 Thus, a Muslim or Hindu
domiciled in India who marries in England following English formalities contracts a monoga-
mous marriage.89 In Qureshi v Qureshi, two Muslims respectively domiciled in Pakistan and India
married in England. Even though the parties’ lex domicilii allowed polygamy, the court applied
the lex loci celebrationis and determined that their marriage was monogamous. In contrast, in
Lendrum v Chakravarti90 involving the marriage of an Indian male and a Scottish woman in
Scotland, the court observed that a person domiciled in a monogamous country could not enter
in a polygamous union. It is submitted that the lex loci celebrationis approach adopted in Qureshi
is not only problematic but difficult to sustain rationally. If the argument is accepted, an English
domiciled woman marrying an Indian Muslim male according to religious rights in India would
be considered as giving rise to a potentially polygamous union based on the lex loci celebrationis.
In the same vein, a marriage between an English domiciled woman and an Indian domiciled
Muslim male in England would be considered as monogamous based on the lex loci celebra-
tionis. The approach ignores a fundamental principle of the conflict of laws as matters of status
in general and capacity to marry in particular should be governed by the law of the domicile or
nationality and not by the lex loci celebrationis.91 Cheshire, North and Fawcett have reasoned in
favour of the application of the intended matrimonial home to determine whether a marriage is
potentially polygamous.92 In Radwan v Radwan, the capacity to contract a polygamous marriage
was held to be determined by the intended matrimonial home and the domicile of the parties
was said to be irrelevant. However, the approach was criticised for bringing uncertainty in the
determination of the validity of a marriage. For instance, if an English domiciled woman marries
a Hindu domiciled in India, the marriage takes place in India and the parties reside in England
after the marriage, the marriage will be treated as valid, whereas if the parties settle down in India
after the marriage, the marriage will be declared as polygamous.93
86 Khan v Khan [1963] VR 203; See also Law Commission, Polygamous marriages – Capacity to Contract a Polygamous
Marriage and the Concept of the Potentially Polygamous Marriage (Scotland Law Commission Working Paper No 83,
1982).
87 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Law Gazette, Part 111 Classification number 100-1, Art 6(1)
states that marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.
88 Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 18) 287.
89 Srini Vasan v Srini Vasan [I946] P [6].
90 Lendrum v Chakravarti [1929] SLT 416; L Paisson, Marriage in Comparative Conflict of Laws: Substantive Conditions
(Brill, 1981) 174.

91 PD Maddaugh, ‘Validity of Marriage and the Conflict of Laws: A Critique of the Present Anglo-American Position’
(1973) 23(2) The University of Toronto Law Journal 117–147, 120.

93 JA Wade, ‘Capacity to Marry: Choice of Law Rules and Polygamous Marriages’ (1973) 22 (3) International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 571–575; RD James, ‘Polygamy and Capacity to Marry’ (1979) 42(5) Modern Law Review
533–543, 535.
ii. Effect of a Change of Domicile on the Nature of a Polygamous Marriage

In Hussain v Hussain,94 a British domiciled Muslim married a Pakistan domiciled Muslim in
Pakistan. The parties resided in England after the marriage. The wife sought a judicial separa-
tion before the English courts. The husband argued that, following Lee v Lau,95 the marriage
was void as being potentially polygamous under the lex loci celebrationis. The court relied on
section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which prohibits an English domiciled person
from contracting a polygamous marriage, and declared the marriage to be monogamous.96 The
case took the position that the parties’ domiciles, based on the English statutory position, deter-
mined the capacity of the parties to contract a marriage.
Initially, the English courts adopted the position that the polygamous or monogamous char-
acter of a marriage must be determined at the time of marriage, so that a subsequent change of
religion or domicile on the part of the spouses would not affect the nature of their marriage.97
However the position underwent a change from the case of The Sinha Peerage.98 This concerned
a marriage between two Hindus domiciled in India which was at first potentially polygamous
under Hindu law but which became monogamous when the spouses joined a religious sect prac-
ticing monogamy. The eldest son of the marriage, born after the parents’ conversion, successfully
claimed the right to succeed to his father’s peerage as a lawfully begotten son. This formulation
in respect of marriages that are potentially polygamous at the time of inception is supported by
Mehta v Mehta where a marriage celebrated in India between an English woman and a Hindu
male of the monogamous Arya Samaj sect was held to be monogamous.99 In Parkasho v Singh,100
confirming the previous position, the court ruled that a potentially polygamous marriage can be
converted into a monogamous marriage by subsequent changes in the law. The wife filed a petition
for maintenance, which was challenged because the marriage in India would not be recognised
in England as potentially polygamous.101 However, the court found that the Hindu Marriage
Act 1955 prohibited polygamous marriages retrospectively and, as such, marriages were converted
into monogamous unions. This validated the marriage for the purposes of maintenance.102
Courts have a similar rationale to cases involving a change of the parties’ domiciles. In Ali v Ali,103
the marriage was contracted between two domiciled people in India. Subsequently, the couple
migrated to England and the husband acquired a domicile in England. The husband filed a
divorce petition and the court had to determine the validity of the marriage. The court observed
that, even though the marriage had been potentially polygamous, the change of the parties’ domi-
cile converted the marriage into a monogamous marriage.104 Judicial support can be found in the
94 Hussain v Hussain [1982] 1All ER 369; A Briggs, ‘Polygamous Marriages and English Domiciliaries’ (1983) 32(3)
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 737–741.

95 Lee v Lau [1967] P 14; Briggs (n 94) 737.
96 ibid, Briggs.
97 Hyde v Hyde (n 4); JHC Morris, ‘The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in English Law’ (1953) 66 Harvard Law
Review 961–1012, 962; L Carroll, ‘Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in English Matrimonial Law: The Statutory
Reversal of “Hyde v Hyde” in 1972’ (1984) 5(1) Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal 81–98.
98 [I946] I All E R 348; Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 18) 972.
99 [1945] 2 All E R 690; Cheni v Cheni [1962] 3 All E R 873.
100 [1967] 1 All ER 737.
101 ibid; See also P Shah, ‘Attitudes to Polygamy in English Law’ (2003) 52(2) The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 369–400, 372.

102 P Shah, Legal Pluralism in Conflict: Coping with Cultural Diversity in Law (Routledge, 2016).
103 Ali v Ali [1966] 2 WLR 620.
104 T Dimitry ‘The Conversion of a Polygamous Union into a Monogamous Marriage’ [1968] 17(3) The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 721–729, 722; Cheni v Cheni [1962] 3 All ER 873; Attorney General for Ceylon v Reid [1965]
2WLR 671.
case of Sara v Sara where the potentially polygamous marriage of an Indian couple was held to
have been converted into a monogamous marriage by the parties acquiring a domicile in British
Columbia.105
iii. Recognition of Polygamous Marriages

Although many jurisdictions prohibit the celebration of polygamous marriages on their soil, a
polygamous marriage concluded abroad between non-nationals under foreign law will generally
be recognised as valid.106 When the personal law and the lex loci celebrationis permit polygamy,
there should be no impediment to recognition as a matter of principle.107 However, in jurisdic-
tions such as France and Germany which generally recognise foreign polygamous marriages not
connected, reunification of the members of a polygamous family may be restricted. For example,
the French Law Reform on the Right of Asylum 2015 states:
[W]hen a polygamous foreigner resides in French territory with his/her first spouse, the benefit of
family reunification cannot be granted to another spouse. Unless this other spouse is deceased or has
lost her parental rights, her children cannot benefit from family reunification.108
In Ireland, the question of the recognition of a polygamous marriage was raised in HAH v SAA.109
The husband, a refugee and naturalised Irish citizen, was originally from Lebanon. While domi-
ciled there, he contracted two marriages, the first in 1975 and the second in 1988. Both were
valid according to the parties’ religious and domicile laws at the time of marriage. After he was
recognised as a refugee, his second wife was admitted to Ireland.110 In 2002, an application for
the admission of his first wife to Ireland was rejected. The trial judge concluded that interpreting
the word ‘marriage’ to include polygamous marriage was against Ireland’s public policy based
on culture, tradition, and the Irish Constitution.111 The Supreme Court on appeal held that the
second marriage could not be recognised, but that did not compel the state to ‘deny all legal effect
to polygamous marriages in all contexts’.112 A similar position was taken by the US Board of
Immigration of Appeal in the Matter of H where it was observed that the general rule is that the
validity of a marriage is determined by the laws of the place where it is contracted or celebrated.
If valid in those places, it is valid everywhere. An exception to the general rule, however, arises in
the case of marriages opposed to public policy. The exception is ordinarily applied in cases where
a marriage is repugnant to the public policy or laws of the parties’ domicile, such as may be the
situation with polygamous marriages.113
An increase in migration and the number of cross-border marriages has pushed jurisdictions
to deal with polygamous marriages and has brought about changes in attitude as exemplified by
statutory modifications and judicial statements. As stated by Kahn ‘none of our laws, however
105 Z Cowen, ‘A Note on Potentially Polygamous Marriages’ (1963) 12(4) The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 1407–1411, 1408.

106 N Chigozie, ‘Recognition of Polygamous Marriages under the English Law’ (2014) 26 Journal of Law, Policy and
Globalization 13–19, 16.

107 Shah (n 102) 377.
108 Law no 2015-925 of 29 July 2015 on the Reform of the Right of Asylum, www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/
JORFTEXT000030949483/; see Immigration Act (France) 1993, s 30.

109 Ireland: Supreme Court, HAH v SAA and Others, 12 December 2017, www.refworld.org/docid/5a2fb7814.html.
110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 ibid; See also for Ireland’s Position on Polygamous Marriages, K Walsh, ‘Polygamous Marriages and Potentially
Polygamous Marriages in Irish Law: A Critical Reappraisal’ (2013) 36 Dublin University Law Journal 249–276.
113 Matter of H –, 9I & N. Dec. 640, 641 (BIA 1962).
Same-Sex Marriage: Legal Analysis of Private International Law Principles 121
fundamental it may be, requires exclusive, absolute application. No foreign legal institution,
however much we may disapprove of it, can be simply ignored.’114
Conflicts arising from polygamous marriages have been reduced in England with the statu-
tory reforms adopted in 1973. Section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that
a polygamous marriage shall be void if either party was at the time of the marriage domiciled in
England.115 According to section 11, the avoidance of marriages pursuant to section 11(d) will
only apply to marriages entered into after 31 July 1971.116 The view at common law on marriages
concluded up to 31 July 1971 is that a person domiciled in England cannot enter into a potential
or actual polygamous marriage.117 The position was further modified in respect of potentially
polygamous marriages by the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995.
Section 5(1) of the 1995 Act expressly provides that a marriage contracted outside England and
Wales is not void on the ground that it was entered into under a law which permits polygamy,
where at the time of marriage either spouse was domiciled in England or Wales and both were
single.118 Similar changes in legislation were carried out in New Zealand and other jurisdictions.
Section 2 of the New Zealand Family Proceedings Act 1980 defines ‘marriage’ to include a union
that is: (1) entered into outside New Zealand; and (2) at any time polygamous, where the law of
the country in which each spouse was domiciled at the time of union permitted polygamy.119
The laws of other jurisdictions thus reveal a transformative change concerning polygamous
marriages. Whereas global marriages and polygamous marriages dominated family law conflicts
disputes in the twentieth century, the twenty-first century is faced with conflict arising out of
same-sex marriages.
III. Same-Sex Marriage: Legal Analysis

of Private International Law Principles
As a social institution, marriage has been a focal point of society’s contemplation throughout
history.120 Though individuals are expected to be bound to each other within the contours of
marriage, the institution of marriage has been observed to implement exclusionary treatment
towards certain communities of people.121 Traditionally, marriages have been understood to be
the union of men and women, indicating a strictly heterosexual union.122 However, with time,
same-sex marriages have come to the forefront of sociopolitical discourse.123 Varied and diverse
114 Kahn, Treatise on Private International Law 1st edn (1898), cited in EGL, ‘Polygamy and the Conflict of Laws’ (1923)
32(5) Yale Law Journal 471–477, 473.

115 Domicile and Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (UK), s 11 (d).
116 ibid, s 11.
117 TC Hartley, IGF Karsten, ‘The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973’ (1974) 37(2) Modern Law Review
179–186, 183.
118 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK), s 5.
119 Family Proceedings Act 1980, New Zealand; PRH Webb and FM Auburn, ‘New Zealand Conflicts of Laws: A Bird’s
Eye View: in Contemporary Problems in the Conflict of Laws’ in KR Simmonds (ed), Essays in Honour of John Humphrey
Carlile Morris (AW Sijthoff, 1978) 271–298.
120 E Scott, ‘A World Without Marriage’ (2007) 41(3) Family Law Quarterly 537–566, 538; WD Manning, MA Longmore
and PC Giordano, ‘The Changing Institution of Marriage: Adolescents’ Expectations to Cohabit and to Marry’ (2007)
69(3) Journal of Marriage and Family 559–575, 562.
121 Scott (n 120) 538.
122 JA Redding, ‘Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage’ (2010) 75(3) Brooklyn Law Review 791–863, 795.
123 ibid 801.
approaches characterise the legal response to same-sex relationships.124 Some jurisdictions

have exhibited a complete negation of same-sex relationships and the criminalisation of same-
sex relationships, mainly due to religious and public policy perspectives.125 Other jurisdictions
have decriminalised same-sex relationships even though they have not legally permitted same-
sex relationships.126 Yet other jurisdictions have accorded different degrees of protection and
acceptance to same-sex relationships, ranging from partnerships and civil unions to full-fledged
marriages.127
In Asia, except for Nepal and Taiwan, no country recognises same-sex marriages.128 Israel
recognises same-sex marriages performed outside its borders.129 The diverse approaches of juris-
dictions to same-sex relationships presents challenges to traditional family laws and brings into
conflict laws that relate to jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of foreign same-sex
marriages. No convention has been adopted at a global level to harmonise the rules on same-sex
relationships, instead the issue has so far been left to be determined by the rules of private inter-
national law of different jurisdictions.
A. Legal Approach to Same-Sex Marriage in India
i. Statutory Framework
In Hinduism, many mythological stories pave the way for accepting same-sex relationships,
but the same is fervently contested by religious texts that forbid such unions.130 Nevertheless,
in recent times, several scholars have acknowledged same-sex marriage as natural instead of
immoral.131 In Islam, same-sex relationships have been considered as a revolt against God’s rules
and, therefore, the death penalty is prescribed for the same.132 From a Christian perspective,
same-sex marriage is not acceptable as it is against the ‘traditional’ form of marriage, which is
limited to the union of a man and a woman.133 India’s matrimonial statutes, including the Hindu
124 JM Scherpe ‘The Legal Recognition of Same Sex Couples in Europe and the Role of the European Court of Human
Rights’ (2010) 10 Equal Rights Review 83–96, 84.

125 WN Eskridge Jr, ‘A History of Same Sex Marriage’(1993) 79 Virginia Law Review 1419–1513, 1469; WS Johnson, Time
to Embrace: Same-Gender Relationships in Religion Law and Politics 2nd edn (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2006) 197;
PD Young, Religion Sex and Politics: Christian Churches and Same-Sex Marriage in Canada (Fernwood Publishing & Co.,
2012) 66; LD Wardle, ‘Marriage and Religious Liberty: Comparative Law Problems and Conflict of Laws Solutions’ (2010)
12 Journal of Law and Family Studies 315–364, 333.
126 O Neill and R Allison, ‘Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the European Community: The European Court of
Justice’s Ability to Dictate Social Policy’ (2004) 37(1) Cornell International Law Journal 200, 212; J Gardiner, ‘Same-sex
Marriage – A Worldwide Trend?’ in P Gerber and Safaris (eds), Current Trends in the Regulation of Same-sex Relationships
(Federation Press, 2011) 28–42.
127 Obergefell v Hodges [2015] 135 S Ct 2584 (2015) saw the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court grant-
ing the right to marry same sex couples. Same Sex Couples Act (Marriage) UK 2013, Part 1 Extension of Marriage to
the same-Sex Couple (1) The marriage of same sex couples is lawful www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/30/contents/
enacted.
128 MS Hu, ‘Taiwan’s Road to Marriage Equality: Politics of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage’ (2019) 238 The China
Quarterly 482–506.
129 AB Pregat, ‘Same Sex Relationships and Israeli Law’, in M Saez (ed), Same Sex Couples – Comparative Insights on
Marriage and Cohabitation (Springer, 2015) 131–162.

130 N Bonvillain, Women And Men: Cultural Constructs Of Gender 3rd edn (Prentice Hall, 2001) 281.
131 R Vanita, ‘Same-Sex Weddings, Hindu Traditions, and Modern India’ (2009) 91 Feminist Review 47–60.
132 J Wafer, ‘Muhammad And Male Homosexuality’ in SO Murray and W Roscoe (eds), Islamic Homosexualities: Culture,
History, And Literature (NYU Press, 1997) 89.

133 R McVeigh and DD Maria-Elena, ‘Voting to Ban Same-Sex Marriage: Interests, Values, and Communities’ (2009)
74 (6) American Sociological Review 891–915.

Marriage Act 1955, the Special Marriage Act 1954, the Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872, the
Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936, and the Foreign Marriages Act 1969, have been drafted
in a gender-neutral language. The legislative conditions have laid down age parameters for the
solemnisation of a marriage. The important fact to be noted here is the usage of the word ‘bride’
and ‘bridegroom’ which has been interpreted to have a heterosexual approach. For instance, the
Hindu Marriage Act prescribes 18 years for the bride and 21 years for the bridegroom which
means that the marriage union has to be between a man and a woman.134 It is essential to note
that many consider marriage as an institution that contemplates procreation and the same has
been mentioned under the Hindu Marriage Act and Special Marriage Act.135 Owing to an impos-
sibility of same-sex couples being able to engage in procreation due to physical constraints, the
possibility under this Act is further reduced. Despite all the arguments against same-sex marriage,
an important aspect should always be considered, which is the ‘right to choose one’s partner’.136
Further, the Hindu Marriage Act provides special grounds for divorce in the case of wives.137
Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, sets out that, if the husband is suffer-
ing from a virulent venereal disease, a woman married under Muslim law to such a person shall be
entitled to a decree for dissolution of her marriage.138 Muslim personal laws governing marriages
are largely based on shariah, which prescribes the death penalty for same-sex marriage.139 Thus,
considering the above scenarios, a bleak possibility of recognising same-sex marriages exists in
Hindu, Christians, and Parsi personal laws, if the principles of statutory interpretation are applied
and the need for allocation of civil rights to every individual is considered.
ii. Judicial Response to Same-Sex Marriages

A walk through case jurisprudence clarifies that the first breakthrough in same-sex relationships
was the 2009 decision of the Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation v Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors,140
where the Court interpreted the Constitution of India by reading down Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC), which termed same-sex activities as against the order of nature and thus a
criminal offence.141 Section 377 of the IPC is a residue of English criminal law and this relic of
British rule was held to dictate same-sex conduct as acts of ‘sexual perversity’ where consent was
immaterial.142
In Naz Foundation v Govt of Delhi and Ors,143 Naz Foundation (NGO) working towards inter-
vention and prevention of HIV/AIDS brought forward a petition in light of the public interest to
safeguard the rights of homosexuals. Section 377 was challenged as violating Articles 14, 15, and
21 of the Constitution of India by interfering with the fundamental rights of homosexuals and
obstructing the work of NGOs in curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS, since it drove homosexuals
134 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (n 10) s 5(iii); Section 4(c) of the Special Marriage Act (n 16); Section 3 of the Parsi Marriage
and Divorce Act (n 15).

135 ibid, s 12.
136 Shafin Jahan v Asokan K M [2018] 5 SCALE 422. Many legal systems recognise the right of people to marry.
137 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (n 10) s 13(2).
138 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, s 2.
139 Wafer (n 132).
140 Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. [2009] DLT 277 [160].
141 Indian Penal Code 1860, s 377: ‘Unnatural offenses: Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of
nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either
description for the term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.’; See also SK Sarkaria, RA Nelson’s
Indian Penal Code 9th edn (Lexus Nexis, 2003) 3738.
142 Fazal Rab Choudhary v State of Bihar AIR [1983] SC 323.
143 Naz Foundation (n 140).
underground due to a fear of being persecuted or harassed.144 A plain reading of the judgment
strikes a chord of curiosity since the reply by the Union of India is peculiar. The reply provided
by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare were strikingly
different. The affidavit of the Ministry of Home Affairs was based on the premise that retention
of section 377 was essential to curb child sexual abuse cases. The retention of section 377 was
contended on the grounds of the morality of Indian society; for this purpose, reliance was placed
on the 42nd Law Commission Report, where it was asserted that Indian society perceived such
unnatural conduct as a criminal offence.145 The affidavit of the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare reinforced the argument that, due to the lack of an enabling environment, homosexuals
hide away after engaging in risky sexual practices.146 Due to the fear of law enforcement mecha-
nisms and systemic abuse and harassment, they mostly remained underground, posing a huge
obstacle to tackling the spread of HIV/AIDS. Therefore, in order to do away with such precari-
ous circumstances, it was submitted that decriminalisation was an important step forward. The
Delhi High Court’s judgment suggested reading down section 377 to uphold the Constitution’s
role in safeguarding the rights of the people. The Court relied on Indian and international human
rights jurisprudence to conclude that section 377 hits at the core of an individual’s identity by
criminalising acts solely because of sexual orientation and therefore violates Article 15 of the
Constitution.147 It also held that popular morality could never be a weapon to dismantle the
foundation of Article 21.148 The Court referred to Toonen v Australia149 and held that the inter-
pretation of ‘sex’ under Article 15 included ‘sexual orientation’ since the terms were analogous.
The decision of the Delhi High Court was appealed to the Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar
Koushal &Anr. v NAZ Foundation &others.150 The Supreme Court overturned the decision of
the Delhi High Court and held that reading down section 377 of the IPC to permit homosex-
ual activities was wrong and unsustainable.151 It stated that decriminalising section 377 would
instigate youth to engage in same-sex activities, thereby undermining society’s morality.152 On
reading down section 377, the Court observed that the misuse of a law does not mandate uncon-
stitutionality and is only a factor for Parliament to consider if the question of amending the
provision arises.153
In the wake of the Aadhar dispute, a petition was filed by Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd.) chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Aadhar on the grounds of inclusion of the right to privacy within
the four walls of Article 21.154 Though the case largely revolves around the implicit presence of
144 ibid [6].

145 ibid [12]; See also Law Commission of India, Indian Penal Code, (Report No 42, 1971) [16.124–16.127].
146 ibid [15].
147 ibid [144]; See also S Jolly and R Vohra, ‘Recognition of Foreign Same Sex Marriage In India A Legal Exploratory
Analysis’ (2017) 59(3) Journal of Indian law Institute 302–326.

148 ibid [79], see also N Ravichandran, ‘Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in India’ (2014) 5 Journal of Indian
Law and Society 95–109.

149 Toonen v Australia No 488/1992, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992.
150 Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation AIR [2014] SC 563.
151 ibid; T Khaitan, ‘Koushal v Naz: Judges Vote to Recriminalise Homosexuality’ (2015) 78(4) Modern Law Review
672–694; S Subramanian, ‘The Indian Supreme Court Ruling in Koushal v Naz: Judicial Deference or Judicial Abdication’
(2015) 47(4) George Washington International Law Review 711–762.
152 Koushal (n 150) [10]; See S Narrain, ‘Lost in Appeal: The Downward Spiral from Naz to Koushal’ (2013) 6(4) NUJS
Law Review 575–584, 582; U Baxi, ‘Demosprudence versus Jurisprudence: The Indian Judicial Experience in the Context
of Comparative Constitutional Studies’ (2014) 14 Macquarie Law Journal 3–23, 22.
153 Koushal (n 150) [47]. See N Brankle, ‘Gay Rights in India: Matter of Naz Foundation Decision’ (2015) 15 Chicago-Kent
Journal of International & Comparative Law 1.

154 Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India [2017] 10 SCC 1. Aadhar is a unique identification number for Indian
citizens.
privacy in the constitutional mandate, the judgment also lays emphasis on sexual orientation
being an indisputable part of privacy.155 The Court revisited Suresh Kumar Koushal & Anr v Naz
Foundation & Others156 and held that sexual orientation forms an essential base of an individual’s
identity, life and liberty and thus should be protected at all times on an even platform.
In Navtej Singh Johar & Others v Union of India & Others,157 the petitioner sought a decla-
ration that the rights to sexuality, sexual autonomy, and choice of a sexual partner were a
part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and section 377 was inconsistent with the
Constitution of India. The Court overruled the decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal &Anr v
Naz Foundation &Ors158 and held section 377 to be unconstitutional to the extent that it
criminalised consensual sex between same-sex couples. The court relied on Shafin Jahan v
Asokan KM159 and Shakti Vahini v Union of India160 to observe that the right to choose one’s
partner is intrinsic to every individual. It also emphasised that sexual orientation was within
the ambit of the right to privacy under Article 21 by referring to Justice KS Puttaswamy
(Retd.) v Union of India.161 The Court also took into consideration the legislative history of
section 377 and the principles of transformative constitutionalism and progressive realisation
of rights to hold that archaic concepts of morality were long gone and thus with time it was
important to safeguard fundamental rights.162 But the judgment did not delve into the ques-
tion of civil rights of same-sex couples. A review petition regarding civil rights of the same-sex
couples was filed in April 2019 before the Supreme Court of India. This was later dismissed.163
Regardless of the dismissal, the Madras High Court struck a positive note when the Court
allowed the marriage between a man and a transwoman in Arun Kumar v The Inspector General of
Registration &Ors.164 In its decision, the Court relied upon Justice GP Singh’s Principles of Statutory
Interpretation165 to decode the meaning of ‘bride’ under section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955
and stated that every statute should be interpreted following the current legal system.166 Further,
in January 2020 the Kerala High Court requested the centre and state government to respond to
a writ petition which demanded the recognition of same-sex marriages.167 The decriminalisa-
tion of section 377 of the Indian Penal Code served as a turning point for this battle to secure
the rights of homosexuals, as without the allocation of civil rights these relationships continue to
go through nightmares every single day. Owing to the lack of recognition of same-sex marriage,
these relationships are tormented with guilt, insult and indignity from the law itself, which is
supposed to guarantee basic human rights, equality, and non-discrimination.
155 P Thaorey, ‘Informational Privacy: Legal Introspection In India’ (2019) 2(Winter) ILI Law Review 160–179,167;
See also RV Rao and S Rao (eds), A Public Disclosure on Privacy – An Analysis of Justice KS Puttaswamyv. UOI (NLSIU,
Bangalore, 2018).
156 Koushal (n 150).
157 Navtej Singh Johar &Ors v Union of India &Ors AIR [2018] SC 4321.
159 Shafin Jahan (n 136).
160 Shakti Vahini v Union of India [2018] 7 SCC 192.
161 Puttaswamy (n 154).
162 Navtej Singh Johar (n 157) [94].
163 Press Trust of India, ‘Supreme Court Dismisses Petition Seeking Civil Rights for Homosexuals’, Business Standard
(New Delhi, 15 April 2019) available at www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/sc-dismisses-plea-seeking-civil-

rights-for-homosexuals-119041500965_1.html.
164 Arun Kumar v The Inspector General of Registration &Ors WP (MD) No 4125 of 2019 and WMP (MD) No 3220 of
2019.
165 Justice GP Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Lexis Nexis, 2016).
166 Arun Kumar (n 164) [10].
167 D Jyoti, ‘Plea in Kerala High Court Seeks Recognition for Same-Sex Marriages’, Hindustan Times (New Delhi,
28 January 2020) www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/plea-in-kerala-hc-seeks-recognition-for-same-sex-marriages/

story-usG9x12oM4urkZPQK99aHP.html.
B. Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriage and Application

of Public Policy
Even though section 377 has been decriminalised, in the absence of an explicit verdict or statu-
tory provisions, no same-sex marriage can be celebrated in India whether involving an Indian
domiciled person or foreign nationals. Owing to the extraterritorial operation of the Hindu
Marriage Act,168 a marriage celebrated between an Indian domiciled and a Dutch domiciled
gay couple in the Netherlands would not be recognised in India, even though the place of
celebration permits same-sex marriages. Such an approach in extending statutory laws to out-
of-state marriages of Indian domiciled persons resonates with the governmental interest analysis
adopted by Currie.169 Thus, the statutory framework in India would not recognise a same-sex
marriage involving an Indian domiciled person regardless of the place of celebration. The real
concern for the Indian legal system would be the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages
involving foreign domiciled persons celebrated outside India. In the absence of specific legisla-
tion on recognising foreign marriages, the question would be whether the traditional principles
of lex domicilii and lex loci celebrationis can be invoked to enable recognition to a foreign same-
sex marriage.
The general rule as to the recognition of marriage is to validate marriages. However, it has
been noted that when the domestic laws do not permit same-sex marriages, countries often
invoke the concept of strong public policy based on which a forum can refuse to recognise foreign
same-sex marriages even if the marriage fulfils accepted principles of dual domicile and the lex
loci rule as far as the validity of marriages is concerned. The idea is that the invocation of a forum’s
public policy protects the interests of the forum with which the parties to the marriage have a
significant connection. Almost all choice of law theories ranging from Currie’s governmental
interest analysis and Robert Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations170 favours the invocation
of public policy. Leflar has identified numerous parameters influencing choice of law and public
policy in the conflict process. These considerations include predictability of result, maintenance
of international order, promotion of governmental interest, and promotion of the rule of law.171
Public policy is invoked to exclude the application of foreign law when the application of foreign
law violates the fundamental principles of the lex fori.172 Public policy has played a prominent
part in the conflict process involving marriage, recognition. However, the question is what is the
yardstick for invoking public policy in the recognition or non-recognition of foreign marriages?
An absolute preference for the law of the domicile of the parties over an application of foreign
law will nullify comity among nations.173 If Indian judicial statements are any indication, public
policy has been interpreted in a divergent manner. Although there is no judicial decision directly
on foreign marriages, an assessment in the contest of recognition of foreign divorces offers some
guidelines.
168 Sondur Gopal v Sondur Rajini [2013] 7 SCC 426.

169 B Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke University Press, 1963) 187.
170 RA Leflar, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations In Conflicts of Law’ (1996) 41 New York Law Review. 267, 282.
171 ibid; See also B Cox, ‘Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist?’ in
Symposium Issue on ‘Federalism Revisited: Extraterritorial Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage’ (1996) 16 Quinnipiac Law
Review 61–103, 65.
172 ibid.
173 B Cox, ‘Same Sex Marriage and Choice of law: If we Marry in Hawai, Are we Still Married When we get Home’ (1994)
Wisconsin Law Review 1065; AC Adam and M Kuykendall ‘Modernising Marriage’ (2010) 44 University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 765; L Kramer, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 1965.
Hague Conference on Private International Law and Matrimonial Conventions 127
In Pires v Pires,174 in refusing to recognise a foreign divorce, the court stated that the foreign
divorce would not be recognised as it was different from the forum law. By analogy, foreign same-
sex marriages will not be recognised as the forum’s laws do not permit same sex marriages. The
65th Report of the Law Commission of India has elaborated on public policy in the context of the
recognition of foreign divorces and stated that public policy does not denote what the law ought
to be. Instead, it focuses on what the current public perception of the law is.175 The application of
the current public perception as the yardstick of public policy brings uncertainty in the invoca-
tion of public policy, as it is difficult to assess the public sentiment of the majority. One could,
for instance, argue for the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages as a matter of public policy,
citing the decriminalisation of section 377 in support. When decriminalising section 377, the
Supreme Court distinguished between social and constitutional morality.176 The Court observed
that Suresh Kumar Koushal177 had been guided by the majority’s perception based on social
morality and therefore the case stood on a distinct platform from constitutional morality.178 The
fundamental facet of the rule of law in a democracy hinges on the fulcrum of constitutional
provisions. Where constitutional supremacy prevails, contrary social principles should not be
allowed to come in the way.179 Public policy has to be interpreted not merely by looking into the
social and moral perceptions of the majority. It also has to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
India’s legal positions show a lack of clarity as far as the recognition of foreign same-sex
marriages. The application of public policy to refuse a foreign same sex marriage would lead
to a situation where a marriage that is recognised in one jurisdiction is considered invalid in
another.180 A possible solution could be to adopt a similar approach to that followed by jurisdic-
tions recognising polygamous marriages. While rejecting the absolute rejection of polygamous
marriages, such jurisdictions accord recognition to foreign polygamous marriages validly cele-
brated according to the laws of the parties’ domiciles, while retaining a general prohibition on the
contracting of polygamous marriages within their territories.181
IV. Hague Conference on Private International Law

and Matrimonial Conventions
Since its inception, the HCCH has been attempting to harmonise private international rules.
Marriage and divorce issues were one of the first focal areas of the HCCH’s codification attempts.
In 1978, the HCCH adopted the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of
Marriages.182 Structurally, the 1978 Convention is divided into four chapters: (I) the celebration of
marriages, (II) the recognition of the validity of marriages, (III) general clauses, and (IV) final clauses.
174 Joao Gloria Pires v Mrs. Ana Joaquina Rodrigues Pires AIR [1967] Goa 113; See U Baxi, ‘Conflict of Laws, Annual
Survey of Indian Law’ (1967–1968) Indian Law Institute 227–285.

175 Law Commission of India, The Recognition of Foreign Divorces (Report No 65, 1976).
176 Navtej Singh Johar (n 157) [10].
178 ibid [10].
179 ibid [90].
180 A Koppleman, ‘Against Blanket Interstate Non-recognition of Same-Sex Marriage’ (2005) 17(1) Yale Law Journal and
Feminism 205–219, 217. See also A Koppleman, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy’ (1997–1998) 76(5)
Texas Law Review 921–1002, 987.
181 Jolly &Vohra (n 147) 320.
182 LD Wardle ‘International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition: A Survey’ (1995) 29(3) Family Law
Quarterly 497–517, 507.

The acceptance of chapter II is mandatory for becoming a member of the Convention, whereas
chapter I is optional.183 The 1978 Convention does not define ‘marriage’ and instead applies in
the broadest sense to unions in the form of marriage.184 Article 1 states that chapter I shall apply
to the requirements in a contracting state to celebrate marriages. Even though the term require-
ments cover formal and substantive aspects, separate rules are provided for formal and substantive
requirements.185 The 1978 Convention provides that the law of the place of celebration of marriage
governs the formal aspect of marriage.186 Article 3 deals with the substantive requirements of
marriage and provides an obligation to celebrate a marriage where both spouses meet the substan-
tive requirements of the internal law of the state of celebration, and one of them has the nationality
of that state or habitually resides there or where the spouses meet the substantive requirements of
the internal law designated by the choice of law rules of the state of celebration.187 Article 4 provides
a right to the state of celebration to require intending spouses to furnish any necessary evidence
about the content of any foreign law which is applicable under the preceding Articles.188 The 1978
Convention in chapter I (Article 5) and chapter II (Article 14) refers to overriding public policy as
a ground for refusing foreign law application.189 Article 6 was proposed by the Federal Republic of
Germany and permits the possibility of not applying the internal law of a state to the substantive
requirements for marriage in respect of a spouse who is neither a national of the state nor habitually
resides there.190
The Convention’s fundamental features are found in chapter II, which deals with the recogni-
tion of the validity of marriages and is based on the fundamental principle of favor matrimonii.191
By adopting the lex loci celebrationis, the 1978 Convention provides under Article 9 a general rule
on recognition.192 The legal consequence of Article 9 would be the recognition of marriage in all
Contracting States.193 The 1978 Convention does not define the term ‘recognition’ but provides
that the rules of chapter II will be applied even in situations where the question of the validity of
marriage has arisen as an incidental matter.194 The general obligation under Article 9 is qualified
by a number of limited restrictions under Article 11.195 Only three countries are party to the 1978
Convention.196 The Law Commission of India has emphasised the need to examine the relevance
and adaptability of the 1978 Hague Marriage Convention and has indicated that India should
sign it.197
185 ibid, 295; see HP Glenn, ‘Comment: The Conflict of Laws – the 1976 Hague Convention on Marriage and Matrimonial
Property Regimes’ (1977) 55 Canadian Bar Review 586, 600–603.

187 ibid, Art 3; See also U Tandon, ‘Validity of Marriage under International Private Law with Special Reference to 1978
Hague Marriage Convention: Towards Harmonization and Unification of the Rules of International Private Law Relating
to Marriage’ (2013) 1 Journal of Campus Law Centre 32, 47.
188 ibid, Art 4.
189 ibid, Art 5, 14.
190 ibid, Art 6, see also A Malmström Explanatory Report (n 40) 297.
191 Reese (n 38) 25; A Malmström Explanatory Report (n 40) 289.
194 Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages (n 21) Art 12; see A Malmström Explanatory
Report (n 40) 298.

196 Australia, Egypt and the Netherlands are the only three countries party to the Convention. www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=88.
197 Law Commission of India, Need For Family Law Legislations For Non-Resident Indians (Report No 219, 2009) 19.
Conclusion 129
V. Conclusion
In this era of globalisation, and movement of people, transnational marriages are on the rise.
With the increasing number of foreign marriages, it is not unusual to come across cases involving
connections with numerous jurisdictions. This chapter has evaluated Indian statutory provisions
and judicial statements on the formal and essential validity of marriages and the recognition of
foreign marriages. It observed that personal laws govern matrimonial relations among various
religious communities. The analysis of matrimonial statutes noted that the Hindu Marriage Act,
the Special Marriage Act, and the Indian Marriage Act do not have explicit provisions on the
applicable law regulating formal and essential aspects of marriage. The limited case law suggests a
preference towards the dual domicile rule in cases of material validity and the lex loci celebrationis
rule in the case of formal aspects. The evaluation pointed out that India currently has no legisla-
tion governing the recognition and validity of foreign marriages. In the numerous cases which
have come up concerning the validity of interreligious marriages, the position of the court has
not been uniform and has deviated between application of the laws of the parties’ domiciles and
the lex loci celebrationis. This chapter also examined the problematic aspects of the recognition of
polygamous marriage and the slow transformation of other jurisdictions towards the recognition
of polygamous marriages. This chapter analysed the gradually evolving position of the Indian
judiciary towards the recognition of same-sex marriage. However, uncertainty still surrounds
the recognition of foreign same-sex marriage and the deployment of public policy as a basis for
refusing recognition. India has not acceded to any Hague Conventions governing matrimonial
matters The Law Commission of India has emphasised the need to examine the relevance and
adaptability of the 1978 Hague Convention and has indicated that India should sign it.
7
Private International Practice in
Divorce and Related Matters
I. Introduction
This chapter continues the deliberation on matrimonial subjects, this time engaging in divorce
and interrelated topics. Marital disputes were among the initial concerns agitated under the
domain of private international law in India. However, the force of globalisation, and the snow-
balling movement of people across borders have elevated matters of the family to a complex
subject area of private international law. The scenario presents particular challenges to the Indian
legal system, given the absence of uniform civil laws and the operation of the personal laws of
each religious community.
This chapter is divided into six parts, including the Introduction. Section II explores rules
on jurisdiction and applicable law guiding divorce cases in India. The Indian legal positions are
analysed in the context of the legal practice adopted in other jurisdictions. Section III traces the
judicial position and recommendations of the Law Commission of India concerning the recogni-
tion of foreign divorce decree. Emphasis is given to judicial narratives in respect of the recognition
of foreign divorce decrees, given the absence of a statutory position of no-fault divorce and leading
to scenarios of limping marriages. Section IV concentrates on conflicts of law issues concerning
ancillary financial orders and the nullity of marriages. Section IV also examines the reception and
acceptance of extrajudicial divorce in western jurisdictions with particular reference to talaq. The
issue of recognition of talaq is significant, given the considerable Muslim population in India. While
scrutinising the prevailing Indian legal positions, the chapter will provide an analysis of the rules
developed in other jurisdictions, including the EU and in Hague Conventions on family law matters.
II. Conflict of Laws Issues in Divorce

In divorce disputes involving a foreign element, the following contours of private international
law are to be addressed: jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of foreign divorce decrees.
A. Statutory Framework and Judicial Statements on Jurisdiction

In the personal law sphere, we find the concurrent existence of personal laws applicable to various
communities in India. For Hindus, divorce was not conceivable until the passing of the Hindu
Marriage Act 1955.1 The Indian Divorce Act 1869, heavily based on the English Matrimonial
1L Holden, ‘Hindu Divorce: A Legal Anthropology 1st edn (Routledge, 2016) 8.

Conflict of Laws Issues in Divorce 131
Causes Act of 1857, regulates divorce among Indian Christians.2 The Special Marriage Act 1954
governs divorce procedure for marriages contracted under the Act. Divorce for Muslims is
governed by religious practice and not covered by any statute. However, the Dissolution of
Muslim Marriage Act 1939 lays down procedures and grounds on which a Muslim wife can claim
dissolution of marriage from the husband.3
The foregoing matrimonial statutes incorporate jurisdictional rules and illuminate the place
and court in which a petition in a matrimonial cause is filed. According to section 19 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, a divorce petition can be presented in the district court within the local
limits of the place of the solemnisation of marriage, the marital residence, the residence of the
respondent or, if the respondent resides outside India, the petitioner’s residence.4 In case the wife
is the petitioner, the petition can be filed at the place of her residence.5 A comparable jurisdic-
tional mandate operates for the Parsis Marriage and Divorce Act 19366 and the Special Marriage
Act 1954. The applicability of the Special Marriage Act is not restricted to Indians and the parties
need not be domiciled in India to solemnise their marriage under the Special Marriage Act.7
Under the Indian Divorce Act 1869, a petition in a matrimonial cause can be presented in the
district court within the local limits where the parties reside or last resided together.8 The Indian
Divorce Act had also provided for the application of principles and rules, which conform with the
rules for divorce and matrimonial cases in England.9 The statutory provisions illustrate the supple
jurisdictional rules for regulating divorce among the many religious communities.
In this background, an analysis of the practice of other legal systems and in Hague Conventions
will help to appreciate and understand the Indian legal position vis-a-vis other countries.
Traditionally common law jurisdictions, including the US, have followed the connect-
ing factor of the domicile or residence of the parties at the time of filing of proceedings as the
basis of divorce jurisdiction.10 At common law, the English courts only possessed jurisdiction to
grant a divorce if the spouses were domiciled in England.11 The rule caused hardship to wives
whose husbands had deserted them and acquired a domicile abroad. Statutory reforms in 1973
abolished the concept of a unitary domicile for married women.12 Currently, the Domicile and
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 postulates divorce jurisdiction based on either domicile
or habitual residence of the parties for one year in England.13 In the US, sections 70 and 71
of the Second Restatement specify jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage based on either spouse’s
domicile.14 Section 72 provides an exception to the domicile rule when either spouse has
a relationship with the state, making it reasonable for the state to dissolve the marriage.15
2 Indian Divorce Act 1869 (India).

3 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939 (India).
4 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (India) s 19.
6 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 (India) s 29.
7 Special Marriage Act 1954 (India) s 4.
8 Indian Divorce Act (n 2) ss 3(3), 4.
9 ibid, s 7, the provision has now been omitted by the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act 2001 (51 of 2001) s 4
(w.e.f. 3-10-2001).
10 Dicey, Morris & Collins, Conflict Of Laws 15th edn (3rd Supp, Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 46, 285, 291; HF Goodrich,
‘Divorce Problems in the Conflict of Laws’ (1923) 2(1) Texas Law Review 1–29, 1.
12 WR Duncan, ‘The Domicile of Married Women’ (1976–1977) 4 (1) Dublin University Law Journal 36–51, 38.
13 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (UK) s 5(2).
14 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (American Law Institute, 1965) s 71.
15 ibid, s 72. See HW Baade, ‘Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis and
the Restatement (Second)’ (1972) 72(2) Columbia Law Review 329–381, 334.
132 Private International Practice in Divorce and Related Matters
This exception potentially confers jurisdiction based on residence, but leaves out other criteria,
such as the place of marriage with only a negligible connection to the facts.16
For many nations with civil law traditions, the appropriate connecting factor in personal
matters is nationality.17 Article 3(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, which has codified juris-
dictional rules on divorce and legal separations in the EU, provides for seven flexible alternative
grounds of jurisdictions, including the common habitual residence of the spouses, the last
common habitual residence of the spouses, the habitual residence of one of the spouses, as well as
the common nationality of the spouses.18 The grounds of jurisdiction provided in the Regulation
reflect a genuine connection between a person and a Member State, but have been criticised as
encouraging forum shopping.19 The Regulation furthers the jurisdictional rule by stating that a
divorce decree passed by a Member State shall be recognised in other Member States without any
particular procedure being required.20 The Regulation has been entirely superseded by the recast
Brussels II Regulation, which will come into operation in the EU (except for Denmark) in 2022.21
Flexible bases of jurisdiction provided under the Indian matrimonial statutes broadly
conform with other jurisdictions’ current legislative practice. However, this has not been the
historical position. A firm reliance on domicile may be seen in the few judicial statements that
have been reported involving jurisdictional issues. In Noor Jahan Begum v Eugene Tiscenko,22 the
plaintiff, Noor Jehan Begum, was born in Poland. She married the defendant Eugene Tiscenko,
a Russian subject, on 20 May 1931 in Berlin according to civil rights. The plaintiff and defendant
last resided together in Rome. After that, the plaintiff came to Calcutta, while the defendant went
to Edinburgh.23 The plaintiff embraced Islam and took the name of Noor Jehan. The defendant
refused to convert to Islam.24 The plaintiff filed for dissolution of her marriage.25 The court rely-
ing on Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier26 held that the domicile of the married parties affords the only
true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage. The court observed that the wife’s domicile
was that of her husband and the husband had a Russian domicile.27 In Linton v Guderian,28 the
petitioner was born in Poland. When he was very young, his family moved to Berlin and, when
he was about 27, he went to London. In 1914 he was married the respondent.29 For a brief period,
16 AL Estin, ‘Marriage and Divorce Conflicts in the International Perspective’ (2017) 27 Duke Journal of Comparative
and International Law 485–517, 502.

17 P Franzina, ‘The Evolving Role of Nationality in Private International Law’ in S Forlati, A Annoni (eds), The Changing
Role of Nationality in International Law (Routledge, 2013) 193–210.

18 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC)
No 1347/2000 Art 3(1).
19 J Carruthers, ‘Party Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of Adult Relationships: What Place For Party Choice In Private
International Law?’ (2012) 61 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 881–913, 893; L Clarkson, ‘What Effect
Does European Private International Law on Cross-border Divorce Have on National Family Laws and International
Obligations of the Member States?’ (2019) 5(4) Athens Journal of Law 435–456, 440.
20 Brussels II bis Regulation (n 18) Art 21(2).
21 B Musseva, ‘The recast of the Brussels IIa Regulation: The Sweet and Sour Fruits of Unanimity,’ (2020) 21 ERA Forum,
129–142 (with regard to divorce jurisdiction the recast retains the existing provisions).
23 ibid [1].
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
26 Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier [1895] AC 517. In the case, the core legal question was whether the Sri Lankan courts
possessed jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage between a British national and a French lady. Privy Council accorded domi-
cile as the sole basis of assuming jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage. The case was distinguished in the case of Asokan Nee
Kandasamy v Asokan [1994] 1 SLR 413 by adopting residence of the petitioner wife also as the base of jurisdiction.
27 Noor Jahan (n 22) [3]; See also TS Rao, ‘Some Recent Developments And ‘Non-Developments’ In Indian Private
International Law’ (1985) 27(4) Journal of Indian Law Institute 555–563, 558.
28 Linton v Guderian AIR [1929] Cal 599.
29 ibid [1].
Conflict of Laws Issues in Divorce 133
he was in New York and later in Honolulu. For the next ten years, he kept on moving to different
places. In 1926, he decided to go to India and take his wife and two children with him.30 As they
were starting off from Europe, he learned of the possibility of business in Sweden and went to
Stockholm, his wife and children going to India in the meanwhile.31 He expected them to go to
Colombo, but they went to Calcutta and the wife lived in the Grand Hotel. He followed soon after
and arrived there towards the end of November 1926.32 He filed a case for divorce in India. The
question was whether the court in British India had the right to pronounce a decree for dissolu-
tion of the marriage. The court stated that there could be no doubt that the burden of proving that
the petitioner had made up his mind to come to India and treat it as his ultimate and permanent
home was on him. The court held that the power to grant a divorce rested with the court of the
country in which the parties were domiciled at the date of the petition.33 Compared to the current
broad-based divorce jurisdiction, the judgments signal a historical reliance on domicile as the
basis of divorce. The legal reforms in England influenced the shift to a broader base of divorce
jurisdiction in India that are currently part of its matrimonial statutes. However, due to a strong
allegiance to common law traditions, nationality has never been treated as a connecting factor
historically or under the current statutory framework.
In Vincent Joseph Konrath & Ors. v Jacintha Angela Vincent Konrath,34 the moot legal question
was whether a Christian marriage solemnised outside India between Indian citizens domiciled
in India could be dissolved in India. The court held that section 2 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869
provides that the court shall have jurisdiction to grant relief under the Act where the petitioner
and the respondent profess the Christian religion and where the parties to the marriage are domi-
ciled in India at the time when a petition is presented.35
B. Statutory Framework and Judicial Statements on Applicable Law

The Indian matrimonial statutes enumerated in section II.A do not include rules on the appli-
cable law in a divorce. Besides, there are no judicial statements on the applicable law in divorces
having a foreign element.
Khambatta v Khambatta36 offers some guidance. The petitioner, a Scot, married Gulam
Ibrahim in Scotland according to Scottish law. At the time of marriage, the husband was a
Muslim domiciled in British India and the wife was a Christian domiciled in Scotland.37 The
wife embraced Islam, after she became domiciled in British India and she remained in that faith.
The husband pronounced talaq under Islamic law.38 The wife later married Khambatta under
the Special Marriage Act. The wife petitioned for a divorce and the husband took the prelimi-
nary point that, at the date of the marriage, the petitioner was already married, so that the wife’s
second marriage was a nullity and could not be dissolved.39 The main question was whether the
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid [3].
34 Vincent Joseph Konrath v Jacintha Angela Vincent Konath AIR [1994] Bom 120.
35 ibid [9].
36 khambatta v Khambatta AIR [1994] Bom 120 [10].
37 ibid [2]. See SVF Gerald, ‘Indian and Far Eastern Cases on the Conflict of Laws’ (1934) 17(4) Journal of Comparative
Legislation and International Law 220–226.
38 Khambatta (n 36) [2].
39 ibid [ 2].
first marriage had been validly dissolved. The petitioner argued that the lex domicilii determines a
husband’s right to dissolve a marriage by talaq and Islamic law admits divorce by such method.40
The respondent contended that, the marriage having been solemnised in Scotland, it must be
recognised and treated as a Scottish marriage and, being monogamous, could not be terminated
by the mere will of the husband.41 The court held that in the absence of an express contract, rights
under marriage are governed by the law of the domicile.42 There was no matrimonial law in
British India applicable to the inhabitants generally. The court stated:
[A] Muhammadan husband might claim that by the law applicable to him, he is entitled to divorce his
wife by talaq; the wife, being a Christian, may affirm that, though by marriage she acquired the domi-
cile of her husband, she did not acquire his religion, and that by the law of his domicile applicable to
Christians, she is not liable to be divorced by talaq. It is, however, not necessary in this case to determine
what the position was while the wife remained a Christian because, at the time when the talaq was given,
she had embraced the Muhammadan faith.43
The decision favours the application of the parties’ lex domicilii at the time of divorce to deter-
mine their rights under a marriage.44
However, some judicial decisions favour the application of the lex fori. In Giardano’s case, the
husband (an Italian subject and domiciled in Italy) instituted divorce proceedings in India on
the basis of residence. Based on the Indian Divorce Act, the divorce was granted on the ground
of adultery committed by the wife. The court did not evaluate the position of Italian law as
Italy had no provision for divorce.45 In Mandeep Kaur v Dharam Lingam,46 the respondent was
a Canadian citizen. The wife petitioned to dissolve their marriage under the Hindu Marriage
Act 1955. The court held that the Act would apply to a Hindu outside India only if the latter is
domiciled in India. These decisions point to the application of the law of the domicile and the
lex fori to divorces and illustrate the staunch influence of the English law.
Traditionally, English courts have preferred the application of the lex fori.47 This approach is
understandable and justified when domicile or nationality is the sole basis for the divorce juris-
diction and the inherent interest of the forum in regulating the life of the domiciliary. Similarly,
section 285 of the Second Restatement provides that ‘the local law of the domiciliary state in
which the action is brought will be applied to determine the right to divorce’.48 However, reli-
ance on domicile or nationality does not offer autonomy to the parties. Slowly, statutes and case
law in the US and England have begun to recognise some degree of party autonomy in marital
relations.49 A concept of party autonomy that allows parties to choose the law applicable to their
divorce has been incorporated in the Rome III Regulation on the law applicable to divorce and
legal separations.50
40 ibid [5].
41 ibid.
42 ibid.
43 ibid[9].
44 JAC Smith, ‘Eastern Marriages in English Law’ (1952) 1(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 301–312, 311.
45 Giardanos case [1912] ILR 40 Cal 25 5; same dicta were followed in Shireen Mall AIR [1952] Pun 277 Quoted in Law
Commission of India, The Recognition of Foreign Divorces, (Report No 65, 1976) ch 3.14, 29.
46 Mandeep Kaur v Dharam Lingam 1 [2017] DMC 124 P&H.
47 K Trimmings, P Torremans, A Mills, U Grusic and C Heinze, Cheshire, North, and Fawcett: Private International Law
15th edn (Oxford University Press, 2017) 967; Collier (n 11) 320.
48 Second Restatement (n 14) s 285; PM North, Essays in Private International Law (Clarendon Press, 1993) 161.
49 Estin (n 16) 487.
50 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 on implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of separation the law
applicable to Divorce and Legal Separations (EU Council Regulation) [2010] OJ L343/10, Art 1.
Recognition of Foreign Divorce in India 135
Article 5 of the Rome III Regulation provides the parties with the option to choose from the
following connecting factors:
(a) The law of their common habitual residence at the time of the choice.
(b) The law of the last common habitual residence, if one of the spouses still resides there at the
time of the choice.
(c) The law of the nationality of either of the spouses at the time of the choice or
(d) The law of the forum.51
The Rome III Regulation further provides that the choice needs to be in written form52 and can
be made at any time up to when the court is seised of the matter.53 The application of renvoi is
expressly excluded from the ambit of the chosen law.54 Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation
provides that, if the chosen law does not provide for divorce, the lex fori will apply.55 This is
consonant with a person’s right to obtain a divorce. The Rome III Regulation incorporates the
fundamental notion of public policy as a ground for excluding the application of chosen law.56
The Regulation espouses habitual residence, last residence, common nationality, or the lex fori as
the applicable law in the absence of choice by the parties.57 Article 13 of the Rome III Regulation
clarifies that parties can only choose a state law as the applicable law and there cannot be a choice
of non-state law.58 This means that parties cannot choose sharia or religious laws as the applica-
ble law. However, they can refer to a religious law if it coincides with the law of their domicile.59
Article 8 of the Rome III Regulation provides that in the absence of a choice of law by the parties,
the courts are to choose the applicable law based on habitual residence, nationality, or the law of
the forum.60 Given the strong religious base of matrimonial laws in India, it is unlikely that the
Indian legal system will incorporate provisions of party autonomy in the choice of law process
in divorce.
III. Recognition of Foreign Divorce in India

A. Statutory Framework for Recognition of Foreign Divorce
There is no specific legislation addressing the grounds of recognition of foreign divorce decrees
in India. Recognition of foreign divorce decrees is dealt with under section 13 of the Code of
Civil Procedure 1908 (CPC) and section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act.61 Section 13 of the CPC
51 ibid, Art 5.
52 ibid, Art 7.
53 ibid, recital 20.
54 ibid, Art 11.
55 ibid, Art 10.
56 ibid, Art 12.
57 ibid, Art 8.
58 ibid, Art 13.
59 Soha Sahyouni v Raja Mamisch Judgment in Case C-372/16; See SL Gössl, ‘Open Issues in European International
Family Law: Sahyouni, Private Divorces and Islamic Law Under the Rome III Regulation’ [2017] The European Legal
Forum 68–74.
60 Rome III Regulation (n 50) Art 8. See S Rutten, ‘Recognition of Divorce by Repudiation (talaq) in France, Germany
and the Netherlands’ (2004) 11(3) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 263–285.
61 Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 41 deals with the relevancy of certain judgments.
specifies that a foreign judgment shall be conclusive on any matter directly adjudicated between
the same parties except in the following situations:
(a) where a court of competent jurisdiction has not pronounced judgment;
(b) where a decision has not been given on the merits of a case;
(c) where a decision was founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recog-
nise the law of India;
(d) where the proceedings are opposed to natural justice;
(e) where a decision has been obtained by fraud;
(f) where a decision sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.62
The High Courts and Supreme Court clarified the contours of the statutory provisions in a catena
of cases. Among their judicial statements, the decision in Y Narasimha Rao v Venkata Lakshmi63
marks a turning point in the approach of the Indian judiciary. Hence, the analysis below of the
judicial position on recognition of foreign divorce decrees is divided into the that before and after
Y Narasimha Rao.
B. Judicial Position on Recognition of Foreign Divorce
i. Legal Position before Y Narasimha Rao

In Pires v Pires,64 the High Court of Goa clarified the principles applicable to a foreign divorce
decree. The husband sought to enforce a divorce decree obtained from the High Court of Uganda.
The petition was opposed because, the parties being Roman Catholic and the marriage having
being solemnised in Goa, their marriage was said to be indissoluble. It was submitted that a
divorce decree against existing legal provisions in India could not be recognised.65 The Court
refused to confirm the divorce because under existing laws in Goa a Roman Catholic marriage
is not dissoluble. Hence, the divorce decree of the High Court of Uganda was against the public
policy embodied in the Portuguese Civil Code applicable in Goa.66 However, in Marggarate v
Chacko, involving the validity of a divorce granted by the German court against the husband, the
Kerala High Court recognised the German decree based on the real and substantial connection
the petitioner wife with Germany.67
Satya v Teja Singh68 was a landmark decision and instrumental in influencing the 65th Law
Commission Report. The appellant and respondent, both Indian citizens, were married in India
in 1955. The respondent husband left for the US in 1959 and from 1960 to 1964 lived in Utah
as a student and later took on employment there.69 In 1965 the appellant applied for a mainte-
nance under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code.70 The respondent relied on the divorce
62 Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (India) s 13.

63 Y Narasimha Rao v Y Venkata Lakshmi [1991] SCR (2) 821.
64 Pires v Pires AIR [1967] GDD 113.
65 ibid. See also TSR Rao, ‘Some Recent Developments And ‘Non-Developments’ In Indian Private International Law’
(1985) 27(4) Journal of Indian Law Institute 555–563, 558.

66 ibid. See also KA Sharma ‘Limping Marriages and Holidays Wives’ in K Sharma, A Pal and T Chakrabarti (eds)
Critiquing, Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Indian Diaspora (Creative Books, 2006).

67 Marggarate Maria Pulparampil Nee Feldman v Dr. Chacko Pulparampil And Ors AIR [1970] Ker 1.
68 Satya v Teja Singh AIR [1975] SC 105.
69 ibid [2].
70 ibid [3].
decree of the Nevada court as a complete answer to the appellant’s claim.71 The High Court held
in favour of the respondent, applying the unity of domicile principle.72 On appeal, the Supreme
Court observed that in determining whether a divorce decree should be recognised in another
jurisdiction as a matter of comity, public policy and good morals might be considered.73 The
court observed that the respondent had only gone to Nevada to establish a jurisdictional base for
divorce. To confer jurisdiction on the ground of the respondent’s residence and entitle a decree to
extraterritorial recognition, the residence must be actual, genuine and accompanied by an intent
to make the place of residence one’s home.74 Thus, the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction and its
decree should not be recognised by the Indian court. The court held that the husband had perpe-
trated a fraud on the foreign court by claiming that he was domiciled within its jurisdiction.75 The
Supreme Court extended the meaning of ‘fraud’ in section 13(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure
to cover not just fraud on the merits, but also as to jurisdiction.76 The Court stated that the
legislature ought to find a solution to the unsatisfactory situation in respect of the recognition of
foreign divorces in Indian law. The Court noted that the British Parliament had, to a large extent,
reformed English law by passing the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971.
The 1970 Hague Convention of 1970, which contains a comprehensive scheme for relieving the
confusion caused by differing systems of laws, could serve as a model.77 Even though the decision
ultimately upheld the wife’s prayer for maintenance, it was based on the factual scenario where
the husband could not prove genuine residence or domicile in Nevada. The legal basis of the
judgment otherwise adhered to the common law principle, according to which the wife’s domicile
follows that of the husband.78
In light of the court’s observations about the utility of the 1970 Hague Convention, a brief
overview of the main elements of the Convention is apposite.
a. 1970 Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations

The 1970 Hague Convention attempted to facilitate the recognition of divorces and legal separa-
tion obtained in states through officially recognised judicial or other proceedings.79 The reference
to other proceedings indicates that the scope of the 1970 Convention is broad enough to cover
divorces or legal separations resulting from legislative, administrative, and even religious acts.80
71 ibid [4].
72 ibid [6]; See P Rana, ‘Distant Silences and Default Judgments: Access to Justice for Transnationally Abandoned
Women in India’ (2014) 1(2) Indian Journal of Law & Public Policy 122–138, 137; see R Jagota ‘Executability and
Enforceability of Foreign Judgments and Decrees in India: An Analysis of Judicial Trends’ (2015) 6(2) Indian Journal of
Law & Justice 15–34, 24.
73 ibid [22], see Jagota (n 72) 21.
74 ibid [23].
75 ibid [55]; A Malhotra and R Malhotra, ‘Divorce Nullity and Related Matters under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955’ [2005]
International Survey of Family Law 275–310.

76 See K Singh and Dr P Rajput, ‘Laws Relating to NRI Marriages and their Impact on Women’, (National Commission
for Women) 25 http://ncwapps.nic.in/ExpertCommitteePDFFiles/EC_NRIMarriages.pdf; A Malhotra and R Malhotra,

‘Marriage and Divorce-Complete Constitutional Justice’ [2015] International Survey of Family Law 121, 149.
77 ibid [57].
78 L Jambholkar, ‘Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in India: A Case for Contextual Interpretation’ (1991) 33(3)
Journal of Indian Law Institute 432, 438.

79 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (adopted on 1 June 1970 effective from
24 August 1975) Art 1.

80 P Bellet and B Goldman, ‘Explanatory Report on the 1970 Hague Divorce Convention’, 7 https://assets.hcch.net/
docs/99ce43e1-b580-4009-9b75-5d88fa4e12f2.pdf; See also S Maidment, ‘The Legal Effect of Religious Divorces’ (1974)
37 Modern Law Review 611–626.
The possibility of religious divorce is significant, as the recognition of talaq has often presented
difficulties in several jurisdictions. However, insistence on ‘proceedings’ and official recognition
also allows enough leverage for nations to exclude the religious divorces based on lack of adher-
ence to proceedings and official recognition.81 Further, the 1970 Convention only applies between
Contracting States. The 1970 convention insists on a sufficient claim and relation to jurisdiction
by the connecting factor of habitual residence or nationality.82 The reliance on habitual residence
was added specially to protect the interest of abandoned wives who are allowed to file the petition
for divorce in their habitual residence and enjoy the benefit of the 1970 Convention.83 In order to
accommodate the interest of the countries that relied on domicile, the 1970 Convention provides
that the term habitual residence is deemed to include domicile as well.84 Recognition of divorce
can be refused on the ground of public policy85 and in situations where the parties’ common
national law does not provide for divorce and do not recognise the divorce from other states.86
Although the 1970 Convention allows for a public policy exception to the recognition of divorces,
it does not attempt to explain or illustrate the possible essential components of this exception. It
is feared that the application of this provision may lead to Member States avoiding recognition
of a Muslim divorce pronounced in a third country. In line with the accepted principle of favour-
ing recognition of foreign divorce decree, the 1970 Convention provides that Contracting States
can adopt more favourable rules to recognise foreign divorces and legal s eparations87 Twenty
countries, including the UK, are parties to the 1970 Convention. India is not a party.88 The 1970
Convention has inspired the Brussels II bis Regulation providing for recognition of foreign
divorce decree.89
The large diaspora spread across jurisdictions has presented myriad challenges for the
Indian legal system. At the Central Government’s request, the Law Commission of India in
its 65th Report examined the decision of the Supreme Court in Satya v Teja and recommended
separate and self-contained legislation on foreign divorces and legal separation.90 The Commission
believed that such legislation should adopt a perspective of advancing substantial justice to both
the parties. The Commission also considered ancillary orders passed by the foreign courts in
matrimonial proceedings and recommended that such ancillary orders should not be treated
as binding by Indian courts even though foreign decrees of divorce may be recognised.91 The
Commission also prepared a draft Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Bill. Section 4
of the draft Bill provided for recognition of a decree based on either spouse’s habitual residence
or nationality.92 Section 6 provided that the court’s jurisdiction should be treated as conclusive if
both parties take part in the proceedings.93 However, the recommendations of the Commission
have not been implemented.
81 ibid (Bellet & Goldman Explanatory Report).

82 ibid 10.
83 ibid 11.
84 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (n 79) Art 3.
85 ibid, Art 10.
86 ibid, Art 7.
87 ibid, Art 17.
88 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions/status-table/?cid=80.
89 Brussels II bis Regulation (n 18) Art 21, All EU members except Denmark are party to the Convention.
90 Law Commission, 65th Report (n 45) 135.
91 ibid, ch 19.27, 126.
92 Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Bill 1976, Law Commission of India, s 4.
93 ibid, s 6.
ii. Legal Position Post Y Narasimha Rao

The decision in Y Narasimha Rao deeply engaged with the private international rules on the
recognition of foreign divorces in India.94 The appellant (Narasimha) married the respondent
(Venkata) in Tirupati in accordance with Hindu law as it was in 1975. The couple last resided
together in New Orleans.95 In 1978 the appellant filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in
Missouri and obtained the decree on the ground of the irrevocable breakdown of the marriage
by technically satisfying the 90-day residence requirement in Missouri.96 The appellant married
another women and the respondent filed a criminal complaint against the appellant for bigamy.97
The Supreme Court observed that it could simply rely on Satya v Teja and decree on a narrow
basis that the appellant fraudulently claimed residence in Missouri to obtain a divorce there.
However, the Court instead proceeded on the assumption that the Missouri court rightly assumed
jurisdiction and framed the real issue as whether, even in cases where a foreign court has properly
assumed jurisdiction, an Indian court should recognise a foreign divorce decree.98 The Court
lamented the state of private international law in India and pointed out that, despite over 43 years
of independence, no legislation has been passed dealing with private international law.99 The
Court put forward a fresh interpretation of section 13(a) to the effect that a foreign judgment
should not be recognised if a court of competent jurisdiction has not pronounced it. The Court
held that section 13(a) should be construed as meaning that a court will only be regarded as
having competent jurisdiction, if the statute or law under which the parties were married recog-
nises such court as competent to entertain the parties’ matrimonial dispute. Any other court
should be regarded as lacking competence in the dispute, unless both parties voluntarily and
unconditionally subject themselves to the jurisdiction of that court.100
Section 13(b) was held to mean that: (1) the decision of the foreign court should be on a
ground available under the law under which the parties were married; and (2) the decision should
be the result of a judicial process where the respondent has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdic-
tion and contested the claim.101 For instance, where the parties were married in India, if a foreign
divorce decree is granted based on the respondent’s adultery, the decree would be accepted, since
‘cruelty’ is a ground under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. On the other hand, a divorce on the
ground of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ would not be accepted as this is not a ground
under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955.102
The second part of section 13(c) was held to mean that marriages in India could only be
contracted under either the customary or statutory law in force in India. Hence, the only law
that can apply to matrimonial disputes is the one under which the parties were married and no
other law.103 While interpreting the requirement of natural justice under section 13(d), it was
held that the principle of natural justice has to be extended to mean something more than mere
compliance with the technical rules of procedure.104 The Court espoused the final position as
94 Narasimha Rao (n 63); See generally Jhambolkar (n 78).

95 ibid [1].
96 ibid.
97 ibid [3].
98 Narasimha Rao (n 63) [8]; See also Jhambholkar (n 78) 432.
99 Narasimha Rao (n 63) [10].
100 ibid [12]. See L Jhambolkar, ‘Conflict of Laws’ in SK Verma and Kusum (ed), Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India:
Its Grasp’ (Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, 2000) 664.

102 ibid.
103 ibid.
104 ibid.
‘the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted
must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married’. But the
Supreme Court laid down three exceptions to this rule.
(1) The matrimonial action was filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitu-
ally reside and the relief was granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under
which the parties were married.
(2) The respondent voluntarily and effectively submitted to the jurisdiction of the forum and
contested the claim on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the
parties were married.
(3) The respondent consented to the grant of the relief, although the jurisdiction of the forum
was not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.105
The Court explained that its decision was founded on just and equitable principles. The parties
are entitled to (and should) know in advance their rights and obligations when they marry
under a particular law. Adherence to the parties’ matrimonial law would rescue the institution
of marriage from an uncertain maze of private international law rules.106 The significance of
the rules lies in their ability to protect women, the most vulnerable sector of Indian society, by
removing strict adherence to domicile-based jurisdiction.107
Jhambolkar has remarked that the judgment attempted to provide a minimum standard for
bringing certainty to the recognition of foreign judgments. She eloquently brings out the back-
ground of the judgment wherein previous decisions blindly relied on the common law principle
of unity of domicile even after English law on the subject had changed.108 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s judgment made a departure from a law of divorce based on domicile to the matrimonial
law of the parties. A catena of decisions have followed Narasimha Rao and applied the matrimo-
nial law of the parties.109 In Neeraja Saraph v Jayant V Saraph,110 the Supreme Court undertook
an extensive assessment of problems introduced by an increased number of non-resident Indian
marriages and a growing Indian diaspora. It recommended that the country enact legisla-
tion along the lines of the UK’s Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.111 In
Anubha v Vikas Aggarwal,112 the question concerned the enforceability of a foreign decree
obtained on the ground of ‘no fault’ divorce in respect of parties whose marriage had been solem-
nised under the Hindu Marriage Act. Reviewing the precedents, the Court held that the ground
on which the marriage had been dissolved was not available under the Hindu Marriage Act.
The majority of judicial decisions after Narasimha Rao have insisted on recognising only those
divorces, which was granted based on the matrimonial law of the parties. The position is not in
conformity with the practice of major legal systems. The practice of selected jurisdictions as to the
recognition of foreign divorce decree is discussed below.
105 ibid [13]; See P Dommaraju, ‘Divorce and Separation in India’ (2016) 42(2) Population and Development
Review 195, 223.

107 ibid.
108 Jhambholkar (n 78) 434.
109 V. Bhagat v Mrs. D. Bhagat AIR [1994] 710; Mrs. M. v Mr. A. (1993) 1 DMC 384; Mrs. Veena Kalia v Dr. Jatinder Nath
Kalia AIR [1996] Delhi 54; Harmeeta Singh v. Rajat Taneja 102 [2003] DLT 822; Rajiv Tayal v Union of India And Ors
AIR [2006] Delhi 81; Kashmira Kale v Mr.Kishorekumar Mohan Kale AIR [2006] Delhi 81; Hemavathi Shivashankar v
Dr.Tumkur S Shivashankar II [2010] DMC 854; Sonder Gopal v Sondur Rajini [2013] 7 SCC 426.
110 Neerja Saraph v Jayant V. Saraph [1994] SCC (6) 461.
111 ibid [4].
112 Anubha v Shri Vikas Aggarwal And Ors AIR [2003] Delhi 175.
a. Reflections from Other Jurisdictions

Until 1953, English common law strictly adhered to domicile and recognised only divorce decrees
granted by the country of the parties’ domicile.113 The condition of reciprocity as a ground for
recognition of divorce was added in 1953.114 It was supplemented by the real and substantial
connection test in the famous case of Indyka v Indyka.115 The current rules on recognition and
enforcement of foreign divorce are codified under the Family Act 1986 and are based on numer-
ous connecting factors, including domicile, nationality, and habitual residence.116 Traditionally,
the US courts recognised foreign divorces based on the principle of the comity of nations and
recognised only those divorces granted by the parties’ domicile.117 In keeping with the due process
clause of the US Constitution, the courts have also required that reasonable notice be given of
proceedings.118 Section 484 (1) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law suggests that
the US is not bound to recognise a foreign divorce granted in a country that was not the domi-
cile or habitual residence of both spouses at the time of divorce, even when one or both spouses
are nationals of that country.119 However, section 484(2) permits exceptions. Recognition may
be granted on a broader basis than the parties’ domicile, including where: (1) a divorce has
been obtained in the country of domicile or residence of one of the parties; or (2) a divorce has
been obtained from a court with personal jurisdiction over both parties and at least one spouse
appeared in person before such court.120 The Indian position does not conform with global prac-
tice. The disparity is leading to a situation of limping marriage where the divorce granted in one
jurisdiction is not recognised in another jurisdiction. It is submitted that, based on the recom-
mendations of the Law Commission, concrete legal reforms need to be undertaken urgently to
bring justice to the parties. As proposed by the Supreme Court, the 1970 Hague Convention can
be a template for the legal reforms.
C. Recommendations of the Law Commission

The increased number of legal disputes involving non-resident Indians highlighted in numerous
judicial decisions has prompted the Law Commission of India to undertake a detailed analysis of
the subject. The Commission in its 219th Report made a number of recommendations.121 Relying
on the earlier work of the Law Commission in its 211th Report,122 it proposed the compulsory
registration of marriages, especially in cases where one of the spouses is a non-resident Indian.
This would ensure compliance with conditions of a valid marriage, provide proof of marriage,
and deter bigamy.123 The Commission repeated the proposal in its 217th Report to add the
113 Collier (n 11) 322.

114 ibid.
115 [1969] 1 AC 33.
116 Family Law Act 1986 (UK) s 46.
117 Basiouny v Basiouny 445 So. 2d 916 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); See also Schwartz v Zik 273 NJ. Super. 78, 640 A.2d 1212
(Ch. Div. 1993); In re Marriage of Zadorozny 70 Wash. App. 464, 853 P.2d 960 [1993].
118 Mullane v Central Hanover Trust Co [1950] 339 US 306.
119 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, (third) (American Law Institute Publishers,
1987) s 484.
120 ibid, s 484(2). See also Juma v Aomo 68 A.3d 148 (2013); Matter of Ramadan, 891 A.2d 1186 (NH 2006); Farag v Farag
772 NYS.2d 368 (NYApp. Div. 2004); Estin (n 216) 505.

121 Law Commission of India, Need for Family Law Legislations for Non-resident Indians (Report No 219, 2009).
122 Law Commission of India, Laws on Registration of Marriage and Divorce – A Proposal for Consolidation and Reform
(Report No 211, 2008).

123 ibid [23]. See also, V Nimushakavi, ‘Cross-Border Divorce Decrees – Recognition in India and Public Policy
Considerations’ in SR Garimella and S Jolly (eds), Private International Law: South Asian State Practice (Springer, 2017) 111.
irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act and
Special Marriage Act.124 The Commission felt that such a ground would provide non-resident
Indians with an incentive to petition the Indian court for a divorce rather than seeking divorce on
the ground of the irretrievable breakdown of marriage before a foreign court. This would enable
Indian spouses to contest divorce petitions on just and equitable terms before Indian courts.125
In the case of non-resident Indians, the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and the Special Marriage
Act 1954 should be amended to enable the court to make orders for maintenance and alimony,
child custody, child support and the settlement of matrimonial property. This will ensure that
a spouse and children on Indian soil are maintained and provided for in accordance with the
income and living standard of a non-resident Indian spouse.126 In matters of succession; the
transfer of property; the making, execution and implementation of wills; the repatriation of funds
by a non-resident Indian, state governments must simplify and streamline their procedures.
Fast-track courts should be set up to deal with such cases expeditiously following a time-bound
schedule.127 Both judicial statements and Law Commission Reports have stressed the importance
of updating India’s laws in relation to the recognition of divorce in order to minimise the risk of
limping marriages.
D. Gender in the Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees

An analysis of matrimonial disputes involving private international law concerns before the
Indian courts reveals the hardships that Indian women face, including abandonment, deser-
tion, lack of maintenance, etc. This situation is perpetuated by structural inequality and a lack of
understanding of the impact on women of the differential treatment institutionalised by the legal
system.128 Few legal reforms and judicial statements have attempted to abolish discriminatory
provisions on gender in the family law sphere.129
In Githa Hariharan & Another v Reserve Bank of India & Another,130 the Supreme Court inter-
preted the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956131 and the Guardian
and Wards Act 1890 that provide for the father to be the natural guardian of the child. The Court
affirmed that the mother is also the natural guardian of the child. However, even after abolition
of the concept of unity of domicile in England, Indian courts steadfastly adhered to the archaic
principle and reiterated that the matrimonial domicile is the only reasonable option for assum-
ing jurisdiction in a divorce suit.132 In this scenario of prevalent discrimination, there has been
a growing realisation of the need to examine private international law principles more closely.133
124 Law Commission of India, Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Another Ground for Divorce (Report No 217, 2009).
125 ibid.
126 ibid [25].
127 ibid [25], [26].
128 DL Bowen, VM Hudson and PL Nielsen, ‘State Fragility and Structural Gender Inequality in Family Law: An
Empirical Investigation’ (2015) 4 Laws 654–672; D Rosenblum, ‘Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based
Inequality Remedies’ (2008) 76(6) Fordham Law Review 2873–2893, 2879.
129 See N Subramanian, ‘Legal Change and Gender Inequality: Changes in Muslim Family Law in India’ (2008) 33(3)
Law & Social Inquiry 631–672; Heaton Jacquelin, ‘Striving for Substantive Gender Equality in Family Law: Selected
Issues,’ (2005) 21(4) South African Journal on Human Rights 547–574.
130 Githa Hariharan & Another v Reserve Bank of India & Another AIR [1999] [2] SCC 22.
131 Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 (India) s 6.
132 Satya v Teja (n 68) [14]. See FE Noronha, Private International Law in India: Adequacy of Principles in Comparison
with Common Law and Civil Law Systems (Universal Law Publishers, 2010) 110.
133 K Knop, R Michaels and A Riles, ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws
Style’ (2012) 64(3) Cornell Law Faculty Publications 589–656, 643.

It has been argued that a specific focus on public policy in connection with social, religious, and
cultural practices may help address discrimination and inequality issues. Public policy has been
invoked in relation to the recognition of foreign divorces. In Satya v Teja, the court observed
that ‘notions of a genuine divorce and substantial justice and the distinctive principles of our
public policy must determine the rules of our private international law’.134 The court questioned
the validity of a foreign divorce obtained on the basis of a fraud on the foreign court and linked
the issue with public policy, holding that such decrees ‘offend against our notions of substantial
justice’.135 In Y Narasimha Rao, the court observed that family law is primarily determined and
influenced by social, moral, and religious considerations and public policy plays a unique role in
shaping the same.136 Such interpretation was motivated by the desire to do justice to all parties,
especially the wife in the case. The practical implication of the judgment was the incorporation of
gender mainstreaming into the recognition of foreign divorce.
The linking of public policy with social considerations signals that social morals profoundly
influence the definition of public policy in the matrimonial legislation. The 65th Report of the
Law Commission of India has expounded on public policy in the context of the recognition
of divorce and stated that public policy does not connote what the law ought to be. Instead, it
focuses on what the current public perception of the law is.137 The application of current public
perception as a yardstick for public policy introduces ambiguity into the invocation of public
policy, as it is difficult to gauge mainstream public sentiment. Public policy, as found in existing
private international law conventions, can be adopted as a valuable tool in promoting gender
mainstreaming in cross-border family law affairs. However, a word of caution needs to be added
in terms of public policy. Public policy can be interpreted as a mechanism to promote gender
equality and ameliorate the hardships faced by women concerning serious infringements of
fundamental human rights. But public policy can also be a mechanism to prioritise local discrim-
inatory domestic laws over the adoption of foreign legal systems. For instance, country A permits
interfaith marriages and country B prohibits interfaith marriages. In a case involving the recogni-
tion of marriage between persons domiciled in country A, country B may invoke public policy to
refuse recognition of the marriage.
E. Comparison with South Asian Jurisdictions

Indian judicial practice has influenced the legal evolution of private international law practice
on the recognition of foreign divorces in other jurisdictions. Sabina Pandey v Pushkar Pandey
laid down the rule for the recognition of foreign divorces in Nepal. Sabina Pandey and Pushkar
Pandey married in Nepal. Sabina later filed a case in the Kathmandu District Court claiming her
share in her husband’s property.138 Nepalese law requires property matters to be settled before
proceeding under a divorce petition. Meanwhile, the Oklahoma Court granted a divorce on a
petition filed by the husband. The Kathmandu District Court rejected Sabina Pandey’s applica-
tion on basis of the foreign divorce decree.139 The Supreme Court of Nepal refused to recognise
the divorce decree of the Oklahoma Court in light of a lack of connection between Sabina Pandey
134 Satya v Teja (n 68) [38].

135 ibid.
137 Law Commission, 65th Report (n 45) ch 17.3 102.
138 S Regmi, ‘Foreign Judgments in Matrimonial Disputes: Recognition in Nepal and Public Policy Considerations,’ in
SR Garimella and S Jolly (eds), Private International Law: South Asian State Practice (Springer 2017) 133–151.
139 ibid 143.
and Oklahoma. The court declared that Sabina Pandey was not domiciled in the US and had not
submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. It is pertinent to note that, unlike Indian judicial statements,
the court in Sabina Pandey used residence and intention to assess her domicile independently of
her husband’s domicile. Relying on international human rights documents, the Supreme Court
cited the violation of natural justice, as Sabina was not able to defend the judicial proceedings in
the US, hence violating Nepal’s public policy.140 The Supreme Court also looked into the parties’
matrimonial laws and held that the grounds of divorce under Oklahoma law were different from
those recognised by Nepalese law. Two fundamental aspects of Nepalese public policy were
invoked, a woman’s right to property and access to justice.141 The ratio of the decision closely
follows the Indian decision in Narasimha Rao.
Unlike the Indian legal framework, the new Civil Code of Nepal has incorporated private
international law principles. The Code prescribes that the law of the parties’ nationality shall
determine the capacity of the parties to marry and the lex loci celebrations determines the formal
validity of a marriage.142 The Code further states that legal separation shall be governed by the
law of the country of the couple’s habitual residence. The Code has limited provisions applicable
to divorce. It states that divorce between Nepalese citizens or between a Nepali and a foreign
national granted by a foreign court based on the lex fori will be recognised and enforced by
Nepal’s courts.143
IV. Ancillary Financial Orders and Nullity of Marriage

A. Rules on Recognition of Ancillary Orders
It is a common statutory provision that, when a court orders the dissolution of a marriage, the
court also passes orders for maintenance, alimony, and similar matters. The question is whether
and how far foreign ancillary orders are to be recognised. Under section 8(3) of the English
Act of 1871, the courts were not required to recognise: (1) findings of fault made in divorce or
separation proceedings; or (2) any maintenance, custody, or ancillary order made in any such
proceedings.144 The rationale was that a divorce decree determines status and the application
of foreign law as to status does not involve the application of foreign law as to obligation.145
American courts have also assumed that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim unless it has
jurisdiction over the defendant.146 Similarly, the 1970 Hague Convention on the Recognition of
Divorces and Legal Separations explicitly states that it does not apply to findings of fault or ancil-
lary orders pronounced on the making of a decree of divorce or legal separation. In particular, it
does not apply to orders relating to pecuniary obligations or the custody of children.147
The Law Commission of India in its 65th Report examined the practice of other jurisdictions
concerning the recognition of ancillary orders. The Commission recommended that ancillary
orders should not be treated as binding on Indian courts even when foreign decrees of divorce
are recognised. The Commission noted that ancillary orders concern the custody of children and
140 ibid.
141 ibid 144.
142 ibid 146. See also the National Civil (Code) Act 2017 (Nepal) (BS (Bikram Sambat) 2074) s 699.
143 ibid, s 706 provides for divorce and s 705 deals with judicial separation.
144 English Act of 1871, s 8(3) stated in Law Commission 65th Report (n 45) ch 19.4, 118.
145 ibid.
146 ibid, ch 19.7, 119.
147 Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorce and Legal Separations (n 79) Art 1.
Ancillary Financial Orders and Nullity of Marriage 145
allied questions and it would be juristically imprudent to treat them as binding. The Commission
recommended that, where a foreign divorce is recognised, regardless of whether the foreign
court has also made ancillary orders, either party can apply to the competent court for ancillary
orders.148 No judicial statements have dealt with the recognition of foreign ancillary financial
orders.
A discussion on the legal status of nuptial agreements is apposite in this context. Indian law
concerning pre-and postnuptial agreements is not fully evolved. Such agreements may be char-
acterised as contracts. If so, they would need satisfy the requirements for a valid contract in the
Indian Contract Act 1872. However, judicial statements have found domestic prenuptial agree-
ments to be contrary to public policy and therefore not binding.149 In Sandhya Chatterjee v Salil
Chandra Chatterjee, there was a possible deviation from an earlier trend of routinely rejecting
pre- and post-nuptial agreements. There the court observed that, although the subject contract
was found to be invalid for being contrary to public policy, when determining the enforceability
of pre- and post-nuptial agreements, judges should take account of a paramount public policy
of respecting contracts which have been freely and voluntarily entered into by two adults.150
Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether Indian courts will recognise a foreign pre-nuptial agreement
in the absence of a precise working out of the Indian position on the matter.
The Indian position has been influenced by traditional English law which regards pre-nuptial
agreements as non-binding.151 The idea was that the authority to decide on ancillary matters
associated with matrimonial disputes should reside with the courts and any deviation from the
court’s authority152 would encourage separation and be against public policy.153 Thus the concept
of a pre-nuptial agreement has not been fully incorporated into English law,154 even though tradi-
tional reliance on public policy has undergone a transformation.155 In comparison, the US has a
favourable position in terms of the enforcement of pre- and post-nuptial agreements, including
foreign pre-nuptial agreements, provided they are not violative of the public policy of the forum
and are not against due process.156 In Stawski v Stawski,157 the New York court upheld the validity
of a German pre-nuptial agreement considering it as fair and based on due process.
B. Enforcement of Dower
In discussions of pre- and post-nuptial agreements, dower (mehr) in Islamic law needs to be
considered. Mehr refers to money or property which a bride is entitled to receive from a groom
in consideration of their marriage.158 This is an inherent component of a marriage contracted
148 Law Commission 65th Report (n 45) ch 19.4, 122.

149 Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v Basanta Kumar Singh (1901) ILR 28 Cal 751; Krishna Aiyar v Balammal [1911] ILR 34
Mad 398.
150 Sandhya Chatterjee v Salil Chandra Chatterjee AIR [1980] Cal 244, [14].
151 Law Commission, Marital Property Agreements (Law Com CP No 198, 2011) Part 4.
152 Domicile Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (n 13) ss 21–25.
153 A Ghosh and P Kar, ‘Prenuptial Agreements in India: An Analysis of Law and Society’ (2019) 12(2) NUJS Law Review
http://nujslawreview.org/2019/12/13/pre-nuptial-agreements-in-india-an-analysis-of-law-and-society/.
154 Legislative initiatives are underway to provide proper financial settlement provisions under the law by amending the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

155 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42; Hopkins v Hopkins [2015] EWHC 812.
156 A Curry, ‘The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and its Variations throughout the States’, (2010) 23 Journal of The
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 355; See also Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 1983.
157 Stawski v Stawski, 843 NYS 2d 544 (App. Div. 2007). See also Van Kipnis v Van Kipnis, 872 NS2d 426 [2008].
158 RK Singh, ‘Law of Dower (Mahr) in India’ [2010] 12(1) Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 58, 73; Abdur Kadar v
Salima [1886] ILR 8 All 149; Sayed Sabir Hussain v Farsand Hussain AIR [1938] PC 80.
according to Islamic law and prescribed by the Quran.159 Mehr becomes legally due to the wife
immediately upon marriage. It is either payable on demand to the wife at the time of marriage
(prompt muajjal dower) or deferred until the wife claims it (deferred muajjal dower).160 The wife
can claim deferred dower at the time of divorce, after the husband’s death, or during the marriage
itself.161 Numerous conflict of law cases involving the recognition of dower have been reported
and judicial treatment of the institution has been inconsistent. The issue is relevant for India,
which has a sizeable Muslim population. The main question is as to the treatment by foreign
jurisdictions of dower agreements entered in India.
In Shenaz v Rizwan,162 the parties were married in India under Islamic law. The marriage
contract provided that the wife was to have deferred mehr, payable in the event of the husband’s
death or divorce. The wife petitioned for dower after the dissolution of their marriage. The
husband argued that the wife’s claim was essentially one for matrimonial relief and thus unen-
forceable, since the contract of marriage and the dower provision were contrary to the policy
and good morals of English law.163 The court held that the wife was seeking to enforce a right
in personam, arising not out of the relationship of husband and wife, but from a contract entered
into in contemplation and consideration of marriage. It was therefore not a matrimonial right
which the court would refuse to enforce.164 The court taking a strict contractual interpretation,
observed that the fact that the English courts had hitherto not recognised such a claim was
insufficient reason for the court to decline jurisdiction.165 In contrast, US practice suggests that
dower is equated with pre-nuptial agreements166 or contracts.167 However, there is a fundamental
fallacy in equating dower with pre-nuptial agreements as dower is an essential element of Islamic
marriage and not intended as a settlement of the parties’ assets.168 The fallacy was exposed in
Chaudry v Chaudry,169 where the court equated a Pakistani dower of US$1,500 with a prenuptial
agreement and decreed that the wife was only to receive the amount specified in the dower, even
though she had been married to a doctor for 12 years and had no substantial assets of her own.170
Despite numerous cases where dower has been recognised, uncertainty and inconsistency still
prevail, as seen in cases where dower has been unenforceable on grounds of vagueness, religion,171
unfairness, or public policy.172 The main reason for inconsistency has come from attempts in
western jurisdictions to draw an analogy between dower on the one hand and prenuptial agree-
ments or contractual provisions on the other. The point is that, even if the courts attempt to frame
159 K Ali, ‘Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrines’ in F Vogel and A Quraishi (eds), The
Islamic Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law (HUP, 2008) 11–45.
160 ibid.
161 D Schawlowski ‘The Islamic Mahr in German and in English Courts’ (2010–11) 16 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle
Eastern Law 147–166, 148.

162 Shenaz v Rizwan [1965] 1 QB 390.
163 ibid.
164 ibid.
165 Qureshi v Qureshi [1971] 1 WLR 518; See also Uddin v Choudhury [2009] EWCA Civ 1205.
166 Afghani v Ghafoorian, Unpublished, No 1481–09–4, WL 1189383 (VA Ct. of Appeals 2010).
167 P Fournier, ‘Flirting with God in Western Secular Courts; Mahr in the West’ (2010) 24(1) International Journal of
Law, Policy and the Family 67–94.

168 T Siddiqui, ‘Interpretation of Islamic Marriage Contracts by American Courts’ (2007) 41(3) Family Law Quarterly
639–658, 647.
169 Chaudry v Chaudry 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); see also Ahmad v Ahmad, No L-00-1391, 2001
WL 1518116.
170 V Saijwani, ‘Personal Laws of Divorce in India with a Comment on Chaudry v. Chaudry’ (1989) 11(1) Women’s Rights
Law Reporter 41, 60.

171 Kaddoura v Hammoud [1998] 168 DLR 503.
172 K Spencer ‘Mahar Contract: Internal Pluralism And External Perspectives’ (2011) 1(2) Onati Socio-Legal Series 1–19,
1 http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/view/70/0.
Annulment and Nullity of Marriages 147
the contours of dower through secular contract law, the foundation of dower is based on religion
and the institution was established for a purpose which mere recourse to contract law may not
be able to meet.
V. Annulment and Nullity of Marriages

A. Statutory Provisions and Judicial Decisions on Nullity of Marriage
in India
Unlike divorce, which terminates a lawful marriage, relieves parties from their future obligations
as husband and wife and leads to consequences in the form of maintenance and joint custody of
children, an annulment decree declares that a marriage never existed. Even in those legal systems
and religious laws which do not permit divorce, annulment is permitted. The question is whether
the rules of jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition that apply to foreign divorces should also
apply to annulment cases.
Indian statutes dealing with marriage contain special provisions on the annulment of
marriages. Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with the annulment of void marriages.
It states that a marriage solemnised after commencement of the Act shall be null and void if it
contravenes any of the conditions in sections 5(i), (iv), and (v).173 Section 5(i) deals with the
prohibition of bigamy. Section 5(ii) deals with prohibited relationships in marriage. Section 5(iii)
concerns prohibition on sapinda relationships. Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with
voidable marriages and states that a voidable marriage may be annulled by a decree of nullity on
any of the following grounds:
(a) The marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent.
(b) The marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in section 5(ii).174
(c) The consent of the petitioner or a guardian was obtained by force or by fraud.
(d) The respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the
petitioner.175
The Act prescribes that no petition for annulling a marriage shall be entertained if the petition
is presented: (1) more than one year after any coercion had ceased to operate or fraud been
discovered; or (2) if the parties with full consent have lived together as husband or wife after any
coercion had ceased to operate or fraud been discovered.176 The Act prescribes the same jurisdic-
tional rules for petitions dealing with divorce, annulments and judicial separation, etc. Similar
provisions on the annulment of marriage are incorporated into the Special Marriage Act177 and
Foreign Marriage Act.178
173 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (n 4) s 11, Nullity of marriage and divorce – Void marriages. Any marriage solemnised
after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto, against
the other party be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i),
(iv) and (v), s 5.
174 Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (n 4) s 5 lays down the conditions of a valid marriage.
175 ibid, s 12(1).
176 ibid, s 12(2).
177 Special Marriage Act 1954 (n 7) ss 24, 25, 31.
178 Foreign Marriage Act 1969 (India) s 18.
As far as judicial statements are concerned, there are no cases that have dealt with the recog-
nition of a foreign annulment decree. Neerja Saraph v Jayant Saraph is a glaring example of the
misuse of foreign matrimonial processes. Neeraja was married to the respondent, a doctor in
computer hardware, on 6 August 1989. Less than a month after their marriage, the husband
returned to the US, leaving Neeraja in India.179 In December 1989, she received a petition brought
before the US court for the annulment of their marriage. She was forced to file a suit for damages
before the Indian courts, and the suit was decreed ex parte for Rs 22 lakhs (Rs 2,200,000).180 The
respondent appealed and the High Court ordered a stay of execution. The Supreme Court high-
lighted the necessity for appropriate steps to be taken to safeguard the interests of women. The
Court observed:
[A]lthough it is a problem of private international law and is not easy to resolve, but with the change in
social structure and rise of marriages with NRIs [non-resident Indians] the Union of India may consider
enacting legislation safeguarding interests of women which may be examined by incorporating such
provisions as–
(1) No marriage between an NRI and an Indian woman that has taken place in India may be annulled
by a foreign court;
(2) Adequate alimony to the wife in the husband’s property both in India and abroad.
(3) The decree granted by Indian courts may be made executable in foreign courts both on the princi-
ple of comity and by entering into reciprocal agreements like Section 44-A of the Civil Procedure
Code, making a foreign decree executable as it would have been a decree passed by that court.181
In Mrs. M. v Mr. A182 the appellant sought a decree of nullity of her marriage which had been
solemnised in Texas. Alternatively, she prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty.
The petition had been filed before the City Civil Court in Bombay under the Special Marriage
Act 1954, which applied to the parties by virtue of section 18 of the Foreign Marriage Act 1969.183
Section 18(3) of the 1954 Act reads:
Nothing contained in this Section shall authorise any court–
(a) to make any decree of dissolution of marriage, except where–
(i) the parties to the marriage are domiciled in India at the time of the presentation of the
petition; or
(ii) the petitioner, being the wife, was domiciled in India immediately before the marriage and
has been residing in India for not less than three years immediately preceding the presenta-
tion of the petition.184
The trial judge dismissed the petition on the ground that the court was not vested with the requi-
site jurisdiction.185 The appellant contended that the trial judge was in error in holding that the
law required that the petitioner should have been residing in India continuously for three years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, whereas the section only referred to a
period of not less than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and
did not refer to continuous residence.186 Accepting the appellant’s contention and permitting
the appeal, the High Court held that the Foreign Marriage Act confers jurisdiction if a party is
179 ibid [3].

180 ibid.
181 ibid [4].
182 Mrs. M. v Mr. A. [1993] DMC 384.
183 ibid [2].
184 ibid [4]
185 ibid [2].
186 ibid.
Annulment and Nullity of Marriages 149
resident for a reasonably long time – the minimum being three years. It would be entirely unrea-
sonable to hold, particularly when interpreting a matrimonial statute, that a break in the period
of residence would be fatal to a petition since, in that event, the section would have used the
word ‘continuous’ or ‘unbroken’.187 In the absence of specific legislation, it is expected that Indian
courts will apply Y Narasimha Rao by analogy on the annulment of marriage.
The principles of Indian private international law on the nullity of marriage generally resonate
with English law and the EU practice. The UK Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973
provides for similar grounds of jurisdiction in divorce and nullity of marriage.188 Rules for the
recognition of foreign annulments may be found in the Family Law Act 1986 and are the same as
the divorce rules discussed earlier in this chapter.189 A similar approach is seen in the Brussels II
Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgment in Matrimonial Matters.190 However,
with regard to applicable law, the Rome III Regulation applicable to divorce and legal separa-
tion excludes the annulment of marriage from its scope, indicating the application of traditional
private international law principles within the EU.191
B. Extrajudicial Divorces and Recognition in Foreign Jurisdictions

Divorce under Islamic law operates in the following ways: (1) by the pronouncement of talaq by
the husband; (2) by mutual agreement between the parties through khula or mubarat; or (3) by
judicial separation requested by either party. The controversial aspect of Islamic divorce pertains
to the talaq as it provides a unilateral power on the husband.192
Case law across jurisdictions reveals divergent practices with regard to the recognition of
extrajudicial divorces.193
US practice treats talaq divorces that have taken place in other countries as valid on the basis
of principles of comity and substantial connection.194 In Seth v Seth,195 a court in Texas refused
to uphold a divorce performed by talaq in Kuwait by relying on a lack of ‘most significant rela-
tionship’. Though the parties were citizens of India, the court held that Texas law applied based
on their ten years of residence there. Since Texas law does not allow talaq, the divorce could not
be recognised. In Aleem v Aleem,196 husband and wife, both of Pakistani descent, were married
in Pakistan. The couple moved to the US and had been living in Maryland for over 20 years.
The husband went to the Pakistani embassy in Washington DC and performed talaq in accord-
ance with the Pakistani law. The court held that a talaq divorce obtained according to Pakistani
law could not be enforced by comity because it was contrary to Maryland public policy.197
187 ibid.
188 Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (n 13) s 5(3).
189 ibid. Family Law Act 1986 (n 116) ss 44(2), 45, 46.
190 Brussels II bis Regulation (n 18) Art 1 states that this Regulation shall apply, to whatever is the nature of the court or
tribunal, in civil matters relating to divorce, legal separation, or marriage annulment.
191 Rome III Regulation (n 50) Art 2.
192 SM Fallon ‘Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and Maintaining Comity with American Jurisprudence’
(2013) 36 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 153, 160.
193 J Macfarlane, ‘Islamic Divorce in North America: A Shari’a Path in a Secular Society (Oxford University Press
2012); see generally P Shah, ‘Distorting Minority laws, Religious and European Minority legal Systems’ in P Shah and
MC Foblets (eds), Family, Religion and Law: Cultural Encounters in Europe (Routledge, 2015) 25.
194 Editorial Board, Minnesota Law Review ‘United States Recognition of Foreign, Non judicial Divorces’ (1969) 53
Minnesota Law Review 612–640, 616–617.

195 Seth v Seth 694 SW 2d 459 (Tex. App. 1985).
196 Aleem v Aleem 175 Md. App. 663 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
197 ibid.
Multiple factors influenced the judgment. Based on the substantial connection, Maryland law
qualified as the applicable law.198 In addition, even though the talaq had been pronounced in
the Pakistani Embassy, it could still constitute pronouncing talaq within US territory thus being
contrary to US public policy.199 Further, Maryland law dictates the equal division of property.
Similarly, in Saida Banu Tarikonda v Bade Saheb Pinjarra,200 the Oakland court refused to recog-
nise a triple talaq pronounced in India based on the violation of the public policy of due process.
Under English law, the rules on extrajudicial recognition are part of codified statutes rather
than judicial decisions. Under the Family Law Act 1986, a distinction is made between divorce
obtained through ‘proceedings’ and otherwise than by means of proceedings.201 A procedural
talaq is recognised in the UK if the divorce or legal separation is effective in the country where it
is obtained and parties to the divorce have a connection with the place of divorce at the relevant
date of divorce in the form of habitual residence or domicile there.202 An extrajudicial divorce is
recognised:
(1) if it is effective in the country where divorce is pronounced; or
(2) if the parties to the divorce were domiciled in that country or, if only one of the parties was
domiciled in that country, the other parties’ domicile recognises a bare talaq.203
There will be no recognition if one of the parties has been habitually resident in the UK through-
out the period of one year immediately preceding the pronouncement. The Act lays down that
a foreign embassy or consulate cannot be regarded as a part of a country for the purposes of
section 45 of the Family Law Act 1986.204
A divorce granted in Bangladesh and Pakistan following the formalities under the Muslim
Family Laws 1961 Ordinance would fall under the category of a procedural talaq.205 However,
since India has not enacted legislation and no standard procedure for talaq has been laid down,
Muslim divorce pronounced in India would only qualify as a bare talaq.
With growing Muslim populations, jurisdictions will have to face increased Islamic legal issues
before them. Adequate rules must be put in place so that certainty is achieved in legal relations.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the legal framework governing jurisdiction, applicable law, and the
recognition of foreign divorces in India. The analysis illustrated the existence of concurrent
198 G Robinson, ‘United States: Maryland High Court Holds Islamic ‘Talaq” Divorce Unconstitutional’ (2008) Global
Legal Monitor, www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/united-states-maryland-high-court-holds-islamic-talaq-divorce-

unconstitutional/; see also Ashfaq v Ashfaq – 467 SW3d 539 (Tex. App. 2015).
199 ibid.
200 Saida Banu Tarikonda v Bade Saheb Pinjarra case No 287403 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC
No. 2008-746484-DM https://cases.justia.com/michigan/court-of-appeals-unpublished/20090407_C287403_53_287403.

OPN.PDF?ts=1396125828.
201 Family Law Act 1986, (UK) (n 116); See also P Shah, ‘In Pursuit of the Pagans: Muslim Law in the English Context’
(2013) 45(1) Journal of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 58–75.

202 Family Law Act 1986 (UK) 1986 (n 116) s 46(1); see Chaudhary v Chaudhary [1985] FLR 476; Qazi v Qazi [1979]
3 WLR 833.
203 ibid, s 46(2).
204 This modification was undertaken after the case of Radwan v Radwan [1973] Fam.35.
205 S Hossain, ‘Cross Border Divorce Regime in Bangladesh’ in SR Garimella and S Jolly (eds), Private International
Law: South Asian State Practice, (Springer, 2017) 89, 110; The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance Pakistan (V111 of 1961);
The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance Bangladesh (V111 of 1961) Bangladesh was part of the Pakistan in 1961 before its
independence and inherited the same law.
Conclusion 151
personal laws on matrimonial matters applicable to many religious communities. The religion-
based statutes depict a flexible and broader base of divorce jurisdiction and an absence of a precise
position on applicable law. The Judiciary has played a dynamic role in evolving an ingenious
jurisprudence on the recognition of foreign divorce decree. The current legal position dictates
that the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the divorce
has been granted must be in accordance with the law under which the parties were married.
This scenario is leading to a situation of limping marriages. The Law Commission of India, in its
65th Report, has recommended that the country accede to the 1970 Hague Convention on the
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations or enact legislation dealing with the recognition
of foreign divorce decrees. In its 219th Report, the Law Commission made further recommen-
dations, including the registration of marriages and the inclusion of the ground of irretrievable
breakdown of marriage to avoid forum shopping and limping marriages. The recommendations
of the Law Commission have not been implemented.
This chapter also reflected on the position of Indian law vis-à-vis trends in other jurisdic-
tions concerning the non-recognition of ancillary financial orders and adopting the same rules
to nullity of marriage as apply to divorce. Here Indian practice resonates with the global trend.
The chapter drew attention to the problems encountered by foreign courts in recognising
dower and talaq. The scenario is beset with uncertainty, especially because of the absence of judi-
cial or quasi-judicial proceedings governing the process of talaq in India. This situation points
to the need for diplomatic deliberations and judicial cooperation for evolving more inclusive
conventions at the global level in the interests of promoting justice.
8
Private International Law Practice and
Children: Issues of Custody and Abduction
I. Introduction
Anand and Nandini, citizens of India, married in Delhi according to Hindu rites and
customs. Their marriage was registered under the Hindu Marriage Act. After marriage, the
parties shifted to the US and obtained citizenship there. The couple gave birth to a child
named Namrata. After marriage, disputes and differences arose between the spouses. Nandini
contended that the disputes were often violent and she was physically, mentally, and psycho-
logically abused. Nandini visited her parents in India. She took Namrata with her to India.
During her stay in India, Nandini decided not to return to the US. Anand commenced an
action before the New York court for custody of the child. The court awarded sole custody of
Namrata to Anand. Armed with the custody order, Anand came to India and filed a habeas
corpus petition before the Delhi High Court. Anand argued that Namrata, having been born
in the US, was a US citizen and hence he was seeking the child’s return to her habitual resi-
dence and the recognition of the foreign custody order. In defence, Nandini contended that
Namrata’s removal to India had been due to the persistent domestic violence committed by
Anand. The fact that the US is a party to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention while
India is not, gives rise to uncertainty as to what will happen in the foregoing scenario which,
while not uncommon, poses challenges on how best to safeguard the interests of a child in
Namrata’s position.
This chapter will therefore examine international initiatives to harmonise the conflicts of laws
issues underlying the removal of a child from one jurisdiction to another. This chapter is divided
into five parts, including this Introduction. Section II introduces basic concepts of the jurispru-
dence relating to the well-being of the child and contextualises intercountry child abduction by
tracing the main elements of the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention. Section III discusses Indian
judicial narratives dealing with intercountry child abduction. The focus here will be on custody
laws, legislative initiatives, and judicial statements on child abduction and the recognition of
foreign custody orders. Section IV critically analyses the provisions of the Bill initiated by the
Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD) and the Law Commission of India while
evaluating India’s reasons for not acceding to the 1980 Hague Convention. Section V addresses
the recognition of foreign custody orders and compares the practices developed in the US, EU
and other jurisdictions.
Jurisprudence on the Well-Being of the Child 153
II. Jurisprudence on the Well-Being of the Child:

An Interplay of Public and Private International Law
A. Fundamental Concept: The Best Interests of the Child
International law, in the form of conventions and customary law, has seen a greater appreciation
of the importance of safeguarding children’s rights. It has laid down a comprehensive framework
for ensuring that the rights of children, as a vulnerable sector of society dependent on adults
to enforce their rights, are respected and protected.1 The UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) attempted a complete statement of children’s rights under international law.2 With
the coming into force of the CRC, the study of children’s rights expanded to areas beyond the
traditional boundaries of international law, including the private and family spheres.3 The CRC
and the efforts of human rights organisations were strengthened by the private international law
legal instruments promulgated by the HCCH, focusing on the well-being of the child.4 The best
interests or welfare of the child serves as the determinative consideration in public and private
international law underlying the implementation of the international framework for the safe-
guarding of children’s rights.5 However, none of the legal instruments have identified the key
elements that constitute the best interests of the child. As a result, a lack of clarity shrouds the
principle’s interpretation in specific cases.6
B. Private International Law Responses to Child Abduction

The increase in the cross-border abduction or wrongful removal of a child by a parent finds
its root in the growth in the number of transnational marriages. It has become a problem that
plagues many countries. As an international collaborative response, the 1980 Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was adopted by the HCCH on 24 October
1980.7 As of March 2021, 103 states have ratified or acceded to the 1980 Convention.8 India has
not acceded to the 1980 Convention.
1 JJ Garman, ‘International Law and Children’s Human Rights: International, Constitutional, and Political conflicts
Blocking Passage of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2007) 41(2) Valpaisio University Law Review, 659–696;
See also A Skelton, ‘International Children’s Rights Law: Complaints and Remedies’ in U Kilkelly and T Liefaard (eds),
International Human Rights of Children (Springer, 2019); Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (adopted
26 September 1924, League of Nations OJ Spec. Supp. 21) Art 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); Convention on the Rights of the
Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC).
2 CRC (n 1).
3 ibid, Art 18.
4 Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards Children (Adopted 25 October 1956 entered
into force January 1962); Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (adopted 25 October 1980
entered into force 1 December 1983) 1343 UNTS 89; The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (adopted 29 May 1993, entered into force 1 May 1993) 33 UNTS.
5 P Alston, ‘The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights’ (1994) 8(1)
International Journal of Law, Policy and Family 1–25, 1.

6 S Parker, ‘The Best Interests of the Child – Principles and Problems’ (1994) 8(1) International Journal of Law, Policy
and Family 26–41, 27; JA Drobac, ‘For the Sake of the Children: Court Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases’
(1998) 50(5) Stanford Law Review 1609–1690.
7 Abduction Convention (n 4); EP Vera, ‘Explanatory Report by Elisa Perez-Vera’ (HCCH 1981) https://assets.hcch.
net/docs/a5fb103c-2ceb-4d17-87e3-a7528a0d368c.pdf.
8 The International Child Abduction Database, www.incadat.com/index.cfm?act=text.text&.
154 Private International Law Practice and Children: Issues of Custody and Abduction
i. Hague Abduction Convention 1980

The 1980 Convention aims to ensure the prompt return of the wrongfully removed child.9 Its
stated objectives are:
(a) to secure the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained in a
contracting state; and
(b) to ensure that rights of custody and access under the law of one contracting state are
respected in other contracting states.10
Notwithstanding the reference to ‘abduction’ in its title, the substantive provisions of the 1980
Convention do not refer to abduction and deal with situations where the custodial rights of a
parent have been violated. The instrument provides a mechanism for obtaining the return of a
child who has been taken to another country in violation of such custodial rights.11 The 1980
Convention provides a procedural mechanism for restoring the status quo by requiring the child
to be returned to his or her habitual residence immediately preceding wrongful removal to or
retention in another country.12 The removal or retention of a child is to be considered wrongful
where it is in breach of the rights of custody of the left-behind parent in the habitual residence of
the child.13 The emphasis on prompt return aims to minimise the adverse psychological effects of
abduction by quickly returning the child to his or her habitual residence and allowing the juris-
diction with which the child has the closest connection (that is, the competent authority in the
habitual residence) to determine custody and related matters consequent upon the breakdown
of a marriage.14 Therefore, the 1980 Convention is a return mechanism that does not determine
custody and related issues, but which will prevent an abducting parent from seeking a custody
order in a different contracting state from the child’s habitual residence.15
Two conditions need to be satisfied before the 1980 Convention applies: (a) the child must be
under 16 years of age; and (2) the child must have been habitually resident in a Contracting State
immediately before any breach of custody or access rights.16 The breach of custody rights and the
determination of habitual residence therefore become the decisive points in assessing the legality
of a child’s removal from one jurisdiction to another.17 In the absence of a definition of habitual
residence under the 1980 Convention, jurisprudence has evolved fact-intensive standards to be
followed in the determination of habitual residence.18 Contracting States are required to establish
9 L Siberman, ‘Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence’ (2005) 38(4)
UC Davis Law Review, 1049–1086, 1063–1064; A Dyer, ‘The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction-towards Global Cooperation: It’s Successes and Failures’ (1993) 93(1) International Journal of Child
Rights 273–292.
10 Abduction Convention (n 4) Art 1; See also PR Beaumont and PE McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction (Oxford University Press, 1999).

11 L Silberman, ‘Hague International Child Abduction Convention: A Progress Report’ (1994) 57(3) Law and
Contemporary Problems 210–269, 211.

12 RJ Frank, ‘Note, American and International Responses to International Child Abductions’ (1984) 16 New York
University Journal of International Law and Policy 415–474, 415.

13 Abduction Convention (n 4) Art 3.
14 EA Schnitzer-Reese, ‘International Child Abduction to Non-Hague Convention Countries: The Need for an
International Family Court’ (2004) 2(1) Northwest Journal of International Human Rights 1–19, 5.
15 L Nakdai, ‘It’s 10 PM, Do You Know Where Your Children are?: The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction’ (2002) 40(2) Family Court Review 251–264, 253.
17 J Atkinson, ‘The Meaning of “Habitual Residence” under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction and The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children’ (2011) 63(4) Oklahoma University Law
Review, 647–662, 634.
18 T Vivatyaraphol, ‘Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in International Child Abduction Cases
Under the Hague Convention’ (2009) 77(6) Fordham Law Review 3332–3369.
Jurisprudence on the Well-Being of the Child 155
a Central Authority.19 Article 8 provides that a person may apply to the Central Authority of the
child’s habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance
in securing the return of a wrongfully removed child.20 Once the wrongful removal is proved, a
few grounds exist to prevent the return of the child to his or her habitual residence. These include:
(1) The person or institution having the care of the child was not exercising custody rights at the
time of removal or retention.21
(2) The left behind parent consented or acquiesced to the removal or retention.22
(3) The petition for the return of the child was filed a year after the wrongful removal with the
result that the child has become settled within his or her new environment.23
The defences under the 1980 Convention are fact-based. Evidence must be furnished of the
child’s connections and proof of settlement in the new country. Only limited defences are envis-
aged based on which a child’s return may be denied.
a. Grave Risk to the Child

Under Article 13 of the 1980 Convention, courts will not order the return of the child, when it
can be established that return would expose the child to a ‘grave risk’ of physical or psychologi-
cal harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.24 However, the term ‘grave risk’
has not been defined. Jurisprudence shows that there is a wide variation in the approach taken
by courts in dealing with allegations of grave risk.25 Overall, courts have given a restrictive inter-
pretation to Article 13 for the fear that to do otherwise would defeat or dilute the convention’s
purpose of ensuring the prompt return of a child to his or her country of habitual residence.26
b. Objection to Return
Courts will not order the return of a child who is of a sufficient age and maturity to understand his
or her circumstances and objects to being returned to his or her habitual residence.27 This is a fact-
based analysis. It is not based on the preference of the child to be with either parent. The defence
will only be applicable in cases where the child explicitly objects to being returned. Such a defence
was raised in Louise Ann Fairley v Sajjad Ahmed Rana28 although Pakistan had not acceded to
the 1980 Convention at the time of the petition. The respondent, (a Pakistan citizen) married the
petitioner (a UK citizen) in the UK. A child named Misbah Irum Rana was born to the couple.
The father removed the child to Pakistan in violation of a court order. The mother petitioned the
Lahore High Court to declare the father’s exercise of custody over the child in Pakistan to be ille-
gal and improper given the foreign court order. The Lahore High Court allowed the petition and
held that the child should be handed over to her mother’s custody. The respondent appealed to the

20 ibid, Art 8.
21 ibid, Art 13(a).
22 ibid.
23 ibid, Art 12.
24 ibid, Art 13(1)(b).
25 N Bala and J Chamerland, ‘Family Violence and Proving “Grave Risk” for Cases under the Hague Convention
Article 13(b)’ (2017) Queen’s University Legal Research Paper 091/2017, 1–19, 4–5. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2987207.
26 K Yoko, ‘A Haven for International Child Abduction: Will the Hague Convention Shape Japanese Family Law?’ (2015)
46(1) California Western International Law Journal 40–68, 60.

28 Sajjad Ahmed Rana v Louise Ann Fairely PLD [2007] Lahore 300.
Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the proceedings, the child objected to being returned to his mother.
After prolonged hearings, the parties reached a compromise, which disposed of the petition.29
ii. Violation of Principles of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

The return of the child may be refused under Article 20 of the 1980 Convention, if it would not
be permitted by the principles of the requested state relating to the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms.30 Similar to the factual assessment associated with other defenses,
Article 20 raises questions of whose human rights are affected and what constitutes fundamental
freedoms. Courts have taken differing positions, with some insisting on the child’s human rights
and others insisting on parental rights.31 In both cases, a limited application was preferred to
prevent the gross violation of human rights.
Among private international law instruments, the 1980 Convention has been one of the most
successful with more than 100 Contracting States. It has resulted in the return of hundreds of
children to their habitual residence. As noted, the 1980 Convention does not deal with issues of
jurisdiction, recognition, or custody. The recognition and enforcement of custody orders are instead
covered by the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement,
and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children.
iii. 1996 Hague Convention on Parental Responsibility and Protection

of Children
The convention was adopted by the HCCH in 1996.32 It provides uniform rules on jurisdiction
and recognition in relation to child protection issues not contained in the 1980 Convention. First,
the 1996 Convention ascribes jurisdiction and applicable law to the states in which the child is
habitually resident.33 However, in exceptional situations, the law of another Contracting State
with which the situation has a substantial connection may apply.34 Second, the 1996 Convention
ensures the return of a child to his or her designated custodial parent by enforcing custody and
access orders.35 Thus, it complements the 1980 Convention by providing an alternate way to
secure a child’s return when both states are parties to both conventions and a return remedy in
itself for states that are not parties to the 1980 Convention.36 The 1996 Convention also fills in
the gap in relation to rights of access by recognising such rights.37 It has been generally observed
29 S Ali, ‘Intercountry Child Abductions, – Pakistan Legal Response’ in SR Garimela and S Jolly (eds), Private
International Law: South Asian States’ Practice (Springer, 2017) 221–241.

30 Abduction Convention (n 4) Art 20; K Trimmings and PR Beaumont, ‘Article 20 of the 1980 Hague Abduction
Convention’ (2014) 9(1) Journal of Comparative Law 66–88.

31 MH Weiner, ‘Using Article 20’ (2004) 38(3) Family Law Quarterly 583–622.
32 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (adopted 19 October 1996, entered into force 1 January 2002)
35 I.LM. 1391, 1396 [Protection Convention].
33 ibid, Arts 5 and 15 (this provision abandoned the previous reliance on nationality); N Lowe, ‘The 1996 Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children – A Fresh Appraisal’ (2002) 14(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 191–206.
34 ibid, Art 15.
35 ibid, Art 23; GF De Hart, ‘The Relationship between the 1980 Child Abduction Convention and the 1996 Protection
Convention’ (2000) 33(1) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 83, 85.
36 ibid, Art 50.
37 M Groff, ‘The Hague Conventions: Giving Effect to Human Rights through Instruments of Private International Law,’
in J Handmaker and K Arts (eds), Mobilising International Law for Global Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2018)
89–118.
Indian Legal Framework Relating to Intercountry Child Abduction 157
that, when courts have refused a return order under the 1980 Convention, they have automati-
cally assumed jurisdiction to determine custody rights.38 Removing this misconception, the
1996 Convention stresses that, if the child has been wrongfully removed from his or her habit-
ual residence, jurisdiction cannot be exercised until the conditions under Article 7 of the 1996
Convention have been met.39 The 1996 Convention provides authorities with the power to take
measures to protect the person or property of the child.40 It also ensures that measures taken are
recognised in other states, stipulating only limited grounds for the refusal of recognition.41 Thus,
the 1996 Convention supplements the 1980 Convention. The two instruments together estab-
lish a system of international cooperation. India has not acceded to either convention. The next
part of this chapter will deal with the legal framework in India for handling cross-border child
abductions.
III. Indian Legal Framework Relating

to Intercountry Child Abduction
A. Legislative Framework
The term ‘custody’ is not defined in any Indian statute. The law governing custody is instead
addressed as part of the law on guardianship. The main statute dealing with guardianship is
the Guardian and Wards Act 1890 (GWA).42 Besides the GWA, provisions on custody matters
are scattered among statutes dealing with personal matters, including the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act 1956, the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936,
the Indian Divorce Act 1869 and the Special Marriage Act 1954.43 The GWA is secular legisla-
tion which applies to all persons irrespective of religion. The GWA specifies the procedures for
the appointment of guardians, their powers, and responsibilities.44 A guardian can be appointed
by the court (in the case of a parent’s death or where parents have abandoned their child) or by
will where parents wish someone to act as guardian of their children after their death.45 The
GWA defines a guardian as a person having the care of a minor (that is, a person under 18 years
of age) and his or her property.46 The GWA dictates that the welfare of a minor regulates the
appointment of a guardian.47 Section 17(2) details the factors to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether it would be appropriate to appoint a particular person as the guardian of a minor.
Courts can take into consideration the minor’s age, sex, and religion; the character and capacity
38 ibid.
39 Protection Convention (n 32) Art 7. The conditions include acquiescence of the person having custody, the child
residing in another state for more than one year after knowing of the wrongful removal, and the child settling into his or
her new environment.
40 ibid, Arts 12, 13.
41 ibid, Art 23
42 Guardian and Wards Act (India) 1890 (Act No 8 of 1890).
43 Law Commission of India, Need to accede to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (1980) (Report No 218, 2009) [2.10]; S Jolly, ‘International Parental Child Abduction: An Explorative Analysis
of Legal Standards and Judicial Interpretation in India’ (2017) 31(1) International Journal of Law Policy and the Family
20–40, 25.
44 Guardian and Wards Act (n 42) s 17(2).
45 ibid, s 7.
46 ibid, s 4(2).
47 ibid, s 7.
of the proposed guardian; the guardian’s relationship with the minor; and the wishes of deceased
parents.48 The GWA specifies that the District Court where the minor ordinarily resides is to have
jurisdiction on matters concerning the guardianship of a minor.49 Reliance can also be placed
on section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, which requires a court to decide applications for
the custody, maintenance, and education of minors as expeditiously as possible.50 Similar provi-
sions are found in the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 193651 and the Divorce Act 186952 which
authorise courts to issue interim orders for the custody, maintenance and education of minors in
proceeding under these Acts.
Statutory provisions favour the father as the natural guardian of a minor.53 The Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 confers primary guardianship on the father in the case of
a boy or unmarried girl.54 The Act also lays down that custody of a minor below the age of five
should ‘ordinarily’ be with the mother.55 In Gita Hariharan v Reserve Bank of India,56 the court
construed section 6 of the Act (providing that in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl, the
father and (after him) the mother should be the guardian) as meaning not merely referring to
what happens after the father’s lifetime, but also to situations where the father has gone absent.57
As early as 1980, the Law Commission of India submitted a report to the Government of India
recommending that section 6 of the GWA be amended ‘to allow the mother the custody of a
minor till it completes the age of 12 years’.58 Similarly, under Islamic law, the father is the natural
guardian of a minor, but custody is vested in the mother until the son reaches the age of seven and
the daughter reaches puberty.59 The paramount consideration in the custody and guardianship
of children is the welfare of the minor.60 A catena of cases has elucidated the factors determining
the welfare of the child and emphasised that it is not the welfare or the interests of the parents or
the statutory preference for fathers’ rights that should require adjudication but the welfare of the
minor.61
In intercountry child abduction cases, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, which
has extra-territorial operation,62 is often invoked by parents seeking guardianship rights over
their child. Distressed parents also resort to the constitutional remedy of habeas corpus under
Articles 22663 and 3264 of the Indian Constitution.65 Judicial decisions may be classified into two
categories based on a timeline, ie, those before the decision in Surya Vadanan and those after.
48 ibid, s 17(2).
49 ibid, s 9.
50 Hindu Marriage Act 1955, India (Act No 25 of 1955) s 26. See also Law Commission of India Report (n 43) [2.11].
51 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936, India (Act No 3 1936) s 49.
52 Indian Divorce Act 1869 (Act No 4 of 1869) s 41.
53 SA Desai and Sir D F Mulla, Mulla Hindu Law 21st edn (Lexis Nexis, 2013); MP Jain, Outlines Of Indian Legal And
Constitutional History 7th edn (Lexis Nexis, 2014).

54 The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 (Act No 32 of 1956) s 6.
55 ibid, s 6(a); See also Roxann Sharma v Arun Sharma [2015] 8 SCC 318.
56 Gita Hariharan v Reserve Bank of India [1999] 2 SCC 228.
57 ibid.
58 Law Commission of India, The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and Certain Provisions of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 (1980) (Report No 83, 1980).

59 Law Commission of India, Reforms in Guardianship and Custody Laws in India (2015) (Report No 257, 2015) [2.2.13].
60 Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (n 55); See also Sheoli Hati v Somnath Das [2019] 7 SCC 490.
61 Gaytri Bajaj v Jiten Bhalla [2012] 12 SCC 471; Rosy Jacob v Jacob A. Chakramakkal [1973] 1 SCC 840.
62 Desai and Mulla (n 53) 26.
63 The Constitution of India 1950, Art 226.
64 ibid, Art 32.
65 Law Commission of India Report 218 (43) [2.13].
B. Judicial Position before Surya Vadanan

Surinder Kaur Sandhu v Harbax Singh Sandhu66 was one of the first cases where the issue of inter-
country child abduction came up before a judicial forum in India. In this case, the parties were
married in India and moved to England, where a child was born to them. Marital discord resulted
in the husband criminally assaulting the wife, leading to his conviction and imprisonment. The
husband, while on probation, removed the child from England to India.67 The wife, in possession
of a wardship order from the English court, arrived in India and petitioned the judicial magis-
trate for custody. The husband successfully argued that the Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act considered the father as natural guardian.68 The wife sought special leave to appeal from the
Supreme Court. Taking account of the child’s best interests, the Supreme Court awarded custody
to the mother. The Court held that the welfare and best interests of the child were the fundamen-
tal considerations in international parental child abduction cases.69 The Court considered that
‘the modern theory of conflict of laws prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the most
intimate contact with the issues arising in the case’.70
In Jacqueline Kapoor v Surinder Pal Kapoor71 Jacqueline Kapoor (petitioner) was a German
national and Surinder Pal Kapoor (respondent) was an Indian national. The parties married
in India. Thereafter both left for Germany and became domiciled there in Dusseldorf. A child
Navdeep Kapoor was born to them in Dusseldorf.72 Their marriage was dissolved by an order
dated 5 March 1993 of the Dusseldorf Family Court. The order gave custody to the mother and
access rights to the father. The respondent father removed the child to India without his wife’s
consent.73 The Indian court accepted the principle of intimate contact laid down in Surinder Kaur
Sandhu v Harbax Singh Sandhu74 as the basis of jurisdiction. It held that all relevant matters,
including the birth of the child in Germany, her living there for about eight years, her knowledge
of German, and her education at school and up-bringing by the mother and father, established an
intimate connection between the child and the German legal system.
The law on international child abduction was substantially modified by the Supreme Court
decision in Dhanwanti Joshi v Madhav Unde.75 It was one of the first cases where the Supreme
Court had to deal with a wrongful removal by a child’s mother. In this case, the respondent
Mr Madhav married the appellant (then in the US) in Omaha. The appellant Dhanwanti lived
with the respondents in the US for ten months after her marriage. A male child was born to
them in the US. Due to compelling circumstances, the mother (appellant) and the child left the
respondent when the child was 35 days old.76 Thereafter, the husband had no occasion to live
with his wife and the child. The Supreme Court had to decide the custody of the child when
he was more than 12 years old. It held that, even though the father may have obtained custody
from the US court, the best interests of the child pointed to the child continuing to live with
his mother who had brought up the child single-handedly since the child’s removal to India.77
66 Surinder Kaur Sandhu v Harbax Singh Sandhu [1984] 3 SCC 698.

67 ibid [3].
68 ibid [7].
69 ibid [8].
70 ibid [10].
71 Jacqueline Kapoor v Surinder Pal Kapoor [1994] SCC OnLine P&H 499.
72 ibid [1], [2].
73 ibid [2].
74 ibid [9].
75 Dhanwanti Joshi v Madhav Unde [1998] 1 SCC 112.
76 ibid [3].
77 ibid [31].
This was, however, made subject to the father having visitation rights. The Supreme Court in
cases declined to exercise a summary jurisdiction and refused to return the child.78 The Court
further held that:
so far as non-Convention countries are concerned, or where the removal related to a period before
adopting the Convention, the law is that the court to which the child is removed will consider the ques-
tion on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of
the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration as stated in McKee v. McKee79 unless the
court thinks it fit to exercise in summary jurisdiction, in the interests of the child and its prompt return
for its welfare.80
The case of V Ravi Chandran v Union of India81 further clarified the criteria to be adopted by
courts in cases of child abduction. The court observed that comity and the best interests of the
child were the two primary legal considerations in international child abduction.82 Comity did
not require the mindless enforcement of a foreign judgment but merely that due consideration be
given to it. For this purpose, the court could order a summary or elaborate inquiry. In a summary
inquiry, the court would return custody to the country from which a child has been removed
unless such return could be shown to be harmful to the child. In an elaborate inquiry, the court
can delve into the merits of where a child’s permanent welfare lies and refuse to enforce the
order of a foreign court as appropriate. It can treat the removal of a child from another country
as only one of a number of relevant factors to be taken into account.83 The question of whether
to conduct a summary or elaborate procedure would be determined by considerations of the
child’s welfare. The summary jurisdiction to return the child would be invoked, for example, if a
child had been removed from his or her native land and removed to another country where his
or her native language is not spoken or the child has been detached from the social customs and
contacts to which he or she has been accustomed. This is because such circumstances could be
psychologically detrimental to the child’s well-being.84
C. Legal Position after Surya Vadanan

In Surya Vadanan v State of Tamil Nadu,85 the custody of two minor girls, both UK citizens, was
in question. The appellant (Surya) and respondent (Mayura) were married in Chennai. While
both were of Indian origin, Surya was a resident and citizen of the UK at the time of marriage and
afterwards, Mayura acquired UK citizenship. Two girls were born to them in the UK and there-
fore were UK citizens. The couple’s marital problems forced Mayura to return to India with the
children.86 On reaching India, Mayura petitioned under section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage
Act for a divorce from Surya in the Coimbatore Family Court. Mayura also filed an application
for custody of her daughters, but no orders were made on that application.87 In response, Surya
78 Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v Arvand M. Dinshaw and Anr [1987] 1 SCC 42; Mrs. Kuldeep Sidhu v Chanan Singh and
other AIR [1989] P&H 103; Mrs. Jacqueline Kapoor (n 71) (In all these cases, the abduction was carried out by fathers).
79 McKee v McKee [1951] AC 352.
80 Dhanwanti Joshi (n 75) [29].
81 V Ravi Chandran v Union of India [2010] 1 SCC 174.
82 ibid [35].
83 ibid [27].
84 ibid.
85 Surya Vadanan v State of Tamil Nadu [2015] 5 SCC 450.
86 ibid [6].
87 ibid [9].
petitioned the English High Court to make the children wards of the Court. On 13 November 2012
the English High Court made the children wards of the Court and ordered Mayura to return the
children to the UK.88 Surya petitioned the Madras High Court for habeas corpus, but the peti-
tion was dismissed. Surya applied for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Ordering
the return of the two children to the UK for a determination of custody by the UK Court,89 the
Supreme Court summarised the legal principles applied by the Indian judiciary in intercountry
child abductions until then:90
(1) The comity of nations does not require a court blindly to follow an order made by a foreign
court but requires that the foreign order be given serious consideration.
(2) The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration.
(3) When considering the return of a child, the domestic court may conduct a summary or
elaborate inquiry.
(4) The modern theory of conflict of laws recognises and prefers the jurisdiction of the state
which has the most intimate contact with the issues arising in a case.91
The Supreme Court then commented on the principles summarised. The Court stated that the
High Court had erroneously treated comity and the best interests of the child as ‘contrasting prin-
ciples of law’. They are not ‘contrasting’ in the sense of one being the opposite of the other, but are
contrasting in the sense of being different principles that need to be applied to the facts of a given
case.92 The Court opined that the ‘most intimate contact’ and the ‘closest concern’ doctrines were
very much alive and cannot be ignored only because their application might be uncomfortable
in certain situations.93 The Court did not elaborate on situations where the application of these
doctrines would be uncomfortable. It was not appropriate that a domestic court having much less
intimate contact with a child and having much less immediate concern with a child and his or
her parents (in contrast to a foreign court) should take upon itself the onerous task of determin-
ing the best interests and welfare of the child.94 The Court expressed the view that the principle
of ‘comity of courts’ should not be jettisoned except for extraordinary and compelling reasons.95
When deciding whether a summary or elaborate inquiry is to be conducted, the domestic court
should take into account the following:
(1) The nature and effect of an interim or interlocutory order made by a foreign court.
(2) The existence of special reasons for or against repatriating a child to the foreign court’s
jurisdiction.
(3) The harm that might be caused, in particular, whether repatriation may cause moral, physi-
cal, social, cultural or psychological harm to the child; whether repatriation may cause harm
to the parent with whom the child is in India; and whether there may be a threat to the
latter’s physical safety.96
The Court felt that, if the jurisdiction of the foreign court was not in doubt, the ‘first strike’ princi-
ple would be applicable. That is to say that due respect and weight must be given to a substantive
88 ibid [13].
89 ibid [69.1].
90 ibid [46]–[56].
91 ibid [24.1].
92 ibid [48].
93 ibid [49].
94 ibid [49].
95 ibid [54].
96 ibid [56].
order prior in point of time to a substantive order passed by another court (whether foreign
or domestic).97 The first strike principle may provide certainty in terms of the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. However, unfortunately, it has the effect of favouring the party
who can approach a favourable court first. In child abduction, the question should not be about
who has approached which court first, but the welfare of the child.98 The Court noted that noth-
ing prevented Mayura from contesting the correctness of the interim and interlocutory orders
and having them vacated or modified or even set aside.99 The Court concluded that it could see
no reason for refusing to repatriate the children and so ordered. A final order was in fact made
by the English Court granting Mayura final custody rights. The case is a clear indication that
repatriating a child to his or her habitual residence does not prejudice the rights of a parent who
wrongfully removed the child.
The case supports the position of those who arguing for India’s accession to the 1980
Convention. The Court favoured comity and contextualised the welfare of the child principle
in ordering the return of the child. However, the judgment stressed that the foreign court order
was only interlocutory and there was every possibility that Mayura could obtain final custody of
the child (as she eventually did).100 Thus, the judgment leaves open the question of whether the
Indian courts would still have relied on comity and ordered the return of the child if the foreign
court order had been final in Surya’s favour.101 Surya Vadanan has generally been followed in
subsequent cases.102
The Law Commission of India has flagged that courts in India have not adhered to a consist-
ent trend while adjudicating on abduction cases.103 The cases reveal that a number of concepts are
typically employed in child abduction cases.
D. Concepts Employed in Child Abduction Cases
i. Welfare of the Child

Indian judicial statements on child abduction have been fundamentally guided by the principle
of the child’s ‘welfare’.104 However, in the absence of legislative guidance regarding what factors
should be used to assess the best interests of a minor, indeterminacy prevails and courts have
given varied interpretations based on their personal ideas about what was best for the children in
the cases before them, including idealised notions of parenthood coloured by varying degrees of
gender bias and cultural preconceptions.105 The emphasis of the Indian courts on the welfare of
the child principle is problematic because Article 16 of the 1980 Convention prohibits judicial or
administrative authorities of a Contracting State to which a child has been removed or retained
97 ibid [52].
98 ibid [39.1].
99 ibid [62].
100 M Sharma, ‘Inter-Country Child Abduction: Indian Legal Response’ in SR Garimella and S Jolly (eds), Private
International Law: South Asian States’ Practice (Springer, 2017) 199–220.

101 ibid.
102 Tippa Srihari v State of Andhra Pradesh [2018] SCC OnLine Hyd 123; Chandan Mishra v Union of India [2017] SCC
OnLine Del 827.

103 AC Lakshmanan, ‘International Child Abduction – Parental Removal’ (2008) 48 Indian Journal of International Law
427–434.
104 L Jambholkar, ‘Conflict of Laws’ in SK Verma and K Kusum (eds), Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp
and Reach (Oxford University Press, 2000) 650–681, 667.

105 A Parashar, ‘Welfare of Child in Family Laws – India and Australia’ (2003) 1(1) NALSAR Law Review 49–72, 56.
from deciding on the merits of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be
returned or an application for return has not been lodged within a reasonable time.106 Not being a
party to the 1980 Convention, India is not bound to adhere to its principles. However, the empha-
sis on the welfare of the child principle as articulated in specific cases introduces uncertainty in
child abduction cases.
ii. Intimate Contact and Habitual Residence

In contrast to reliance on habitual residence as the basis of jurisdiction under the 1980
Convention, courts in India have steadfastly invoked the doctrine of ‘intimate contact’ as the
basis of jurisdiction in child abduction cases.107 Decisions suggest that the intimate contact anal-
ysis is contextualised on the basis of the law of the place, which promotes the well-being of the
spouses and children.108 Habitual residence is considered only as a factors in the determination
of intimate contact. Thus, reliance on intimate contact allows judicial forums to reject habitual
residence as a suitable basis of jurisdiction in a given case.
a. Comity
Along with the focus on the welfare of the child principle, courts in India have also relied on
‘comity’ as a fundamental legal principle in child abduction cases and ordered the return of the
child to his or her habitual residence. However, even in those cases where the judiciary has relied
on the comity principle, it has always contextualised the issue based on the welfare of the child
and stated that the ‘comity of courts’ does not require automatic enforcement of foreign judg-
ments, but due consideration of the latter depending on the facts and circumstances in separate
cases.109 Such an interpretation brings uncertainty to the entire procedure. Even if equipped with
a valid foreign custody order in one’s favour, an aggrieved party cannot be guaranteed that such
order will be recognised in India.
E. Indian Opposition to the 1980 Convention

India contemplated that acceding to the 1980 Convention would be an obstruction in protect-
ing Indian women and children from inhospitable living conditions.110 Numerous jurisdictions
regard child abduction by a parent as an offence.111 Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC),
dealing with kidnapping, does not cover the situation where a parent abducts his or her child.112
The general position of the Indian Government is that the rule of treating abduction as a crime
can put Indian women in danger if they have taken the child out of India.113
107 P Anand, ‘India’ in J Stewart (ed), Family Law: Jurisdictional Comparisons (Sweet and Maxwell, 2011) 181–200, 195.
108 ibid.
109 FE Noronha, ‘Private international law in India: Adequacy of Principles in Comparison with Common law and Civil
Law Systems’ (Universal Law Publishing, 2010) 118–119.

110 Press Trust of India, ‘Law Min Opposed to Ratifying Child Abduction Treaty’ Hindustan Times (Delhi, 5 September 2010)
www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/law-min-opposed-to-ratifying-child-abduction-treaty/story-0vCTaReaNu928QibETd
c7K.html; See also S Jolly and AV Sharma, ‘Domestic Violence and Inter-country Child Abduction: An Indian Judicial
and Legislative Exploration’ (2021) 17(1) Journal of Private International Law 114–146.
111 Silberman (n 11) 212.
112 The Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act No 45 of 1860) s 361.
113 L Jambholkar, ‘Domestic Violence and the Hague Abduction Convention: The Indian Perspective’ (2017) 57(1–2)
Indian Journal of International Law 179.

F. Legislative Initiatives on Intercountry Child Abduction: Civil Aspects

of the International Child Abduction Bill 2016 and the Protection of
Children (Inter-Country Removal and Retention) Bill 2016
The mounting number of child abduction cases has resulted in a slew of legislative activity
concerning intercountry abduction. The first initiatives began in 2007 through the Indian Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction Bill 2007.114 However, the text of the Bill was not made
public. An Indian Law Commission Report in 2009 pointed to the absence of progressive devel-
opment on the subject and the absence of a uniform approach by the Indian judiciary. It strongly
recommended that India accede to the 1980 Convention. The issue of child abduction came
before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of an outbound child abduction from
India.115 The Court acknowledged that the welfare of the child had been compromised due to
India not being a party to the 1980 Convention. The Court commented that until India acceded
to the 1980 Convention and enacted legislation to give effect to it by creating a Central Authority,
inconsistency in judicial decisions would remain.116 The Court referred the matter to the MWCD
and the Law Commission ‘to examine multiple issues involved in inter-country, inter-parental
child removal and thereafter to consider whether recommendations should be made for enacting
a suitable law for signing the Abduction Convention on child abduction’.117
In pursuance of the reference, the MWCD drafted the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction Bill 2016 (the 2016 Child Abduction Bill).118 The Law Commission in turn submitted
its 263rd Report with a draft Bill entitled ‘The Protection of Children (Inter-Country Removal and
Retention) Bill 2016’ (the 2016 Protection of Children Bill).119 The Bills drafted by the MWCD
and Law Commission were modelled on the 1980 Convention. Both stress that the best interests
of the child should be the paramount consideration in child abduction disputes. The main objec-
tives of the 2016 Child Abduction Bill are to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully
removed to or retained in any Contracting State to the 1980 Convention and to ensure that rights
of custody and access are respected.120 In contrast, the 2016 Protection of Children Bill deals with
the detailed functions of the Central Authority to provide assistance to help locate such children,
encourage amicable solutions, and help the process of requests for the return of children.121
The 1980 Convention limits its application to abduction cases where the child is below
16 years of age.122 The 2016 Protection of Children Bill explicitly states that it only applies to
children who are below 16 years of age and have either been wrongfully removed to or retained
in India, irrespective of nationality, religion, or status.123 However, the 2016 Child Abduction
Bill does not prescribe an age bar for abducted children. What constitutes wrongful retention
114 A Malhotra and R Malhotra, ‘India’ in EE Sutherland (ed), The Future of Child and Family Law: International
Predictions (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 144–177.

115 Seema Kapoor v Deepak Kapoor [2016] SCC OnLine P&H 1225.
116 ibid [49].
117 ibid [11].
118 The Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Bill (India) 2016, https://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/Draft_
Implemnting_Legislation_Hague_Convention_0.pdf.
119 The Protection of Children (Inter-Country Removal and Retention) Bill (India) 2016 https://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/
files/%2C%20Annexure%20III_0.pdf.
120 Child Abduction Bill (n 118).
121 Protection of Children Bill (n 119).
122 Hague Abduction Convention (4) Art 4.
123 Protection of Children Bill (n 119) s 1.
or removal remains the same under both Bills and follows the 1980 Convention.124 The Bills go
further than the 1980 Convention in providing a definition of ‘habitual residence’:
‘[H]abitual residence’ of a child is defined as the place where the child resided with both parents; or, with
one parent when they are living separately under a separation agreement or with the implied consent of
the other parent or under a court order; or with a person other than a parent on a permanent basis for a
significant period of time, whichever last occurred.125
The cultural practice prevalent in India of leaving children with grandparents has also been
accounted for in the Bills. However, the invocation of the latter provisions depends on whether
the child stays with someone, other than a parent, on a permanent basis for a significant period of
time.126 What constitutes a significant amount of time will depend on specific factual scenarios.
i. Institutional Mechanism

Following the 1980 Convention, both Bills provide for the constitution of a Central Authority.127
Under the 2016 Child Abduction Bill, the Central Authority would be a person not below the
rank of Joint Secretary appointed by the Central Government.128 In the 2016 Protection of
Children Bill, the Central Authority would not be a single member body, but a body with a chair-
person and two others.129 The functions of the Central Authority would include: discovering the
whereabouts of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained, taking measures to prevent
further harm to the child, and securing his or her voluntary return, eliciting information about
the wrongfully removed child with the appropriate authorities of a Contracting State.130
ii. Procedure for Application to Central Authority and Judicial Proceedings

Section 7 of the 2016 Child Abduction Bill and section 8 of the 2016 Protection of Children Bill
lay down procedures for seeking assistance from the Central Authority to secure the return of a
child who has been wrongfully removed or retained in India.131 Both Bills put forward grounds
whereby the Central Authority can refuse assistance. The grounds in the 2016 Child Abduction
Bill include situations where it is manifest that the requirements of the 1980 Convention are not
fulfilled or an application is not well founded.132 The 2016 Protection of Children Bill does away
with the term ‘well founded’ leaving the only grounds for refusal as the non-fulfilment of the
requirements of the 1980 Convention or an incomplete application.133 This will ensure that no
application will be rejected at the preliminary stages for lack of foundation. In case of refusal, the
appropriate authority or person or any other body will be informed by the Central Authority of
the reasons for the same. Both Bills state that the Central Authority should not reject an applica-
tion solely on the ground of lack of documents or information.134 The Central Authority may
124 Protection of Children Bill, s 3(1); Abduction Bill, s 3(1).

125 Protection of Children Bill, s 2(f); Child Abduction Bill, s 2(f).
126 Protection of Children Bill, s 2(f); Child Abduction Bill, s 2(f).
127 Protection of Children Bill, s 4; Child Abduction Bill, s 4.
128 Child Abduction Bill, s 4(1).
129 Protection of Children Bill, s 4(2).
130 Child Abduction Bill 2016, s 5(b)(c)(d)(e); Protection of Children Bill, s 6(b)(c)(d)(e).
131 Child Abduction Bill, s 7; Protection of Children Bill, s 8.
133 Protection of Children Bill, s 10.
134 Protection of Children Bill 2016, s 12; Child Abduction Bill, s 11.
instead ask an applicant to provide the required documents or information. No specific time
frame has been provided. The Bills have also incorporated provisions for appeal against the
refusal of the Central Authority to accept an application.135
iii. Exceptions to Return

The 2016 Child Abduction Bill states that the court shall order the child’s return to the
Contracting State in which the child had his or her habitual residence provided the return appli-
cation has been filed within one year from the date of removal.136 The 2016 Protection of the
Children Bill replaces the word ‘shall’ with ‘may’, making the court’s decision discretionary rather
than mandatory.137 The Bills further provide that the court may pass an order for return, even it
has been more than a year since the date of removal if the court is convinced that the child has
not settled in his or her new environment.138
The grounds of exemptions provided under the Bills for returning the child to his or her habit-
ual residence follow those of the 1980 Convention.139 The 2016 Child Abduction Bill provides
that the child need not be returned if there is a grave risk that return would expose him or her
to physical or psychological harm or place the child in an intolerable situation.140 In the 2016
Protection of Children Bill, the word ‘intolerable’ has been replaced with ‘non-conducive’.141 The
inclusion of the term ‘non-conducive’ ensures that a child will not be returned to a hostile envi-
ronment even though it may be tolerable. Neither Bill provides clear guidelines for this provision
and India has no statute or guiding principles on ascertaining whether there is a ‘grave risk and
intolerable situation’. The 2016 Protection of Children Bill has additional safeguards. It provides
that the child need not be returned if the person involved in the removal was fleeing from an
incident of domestic violence as defined by section 3 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act 2005.142 This is significant given that one of the major reasons for India’s opposition
to the 1980 Convention is the absence of specific reference to domestic violence as a ground for
refusal of the return of a child.
iv. Application in Respect of Child Removed from India

The Bills have provisions for ensuring the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed
from India.143 Unlike the 1980 Convention, section 28 of the 2016 Protection of Children Bill
prescribes the punishment for the wrongful removal or retention of a child.144 The punishment is
imprisonment for a term of up to one year or a fine of up to Rs 10,000 or both.
In spite of the public debate following the drafting of the Bills, the Indian Government has
taken the position that it is not in India’s interest to sign the 1980 Convention. The MWCD
constituted a Committee chaired by Justice Rajesh Bindal of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
135 Protection of Children Bill 2016, s 13; Child Abduction Bill, s 12.
136 Child Abduction Bill, s 15.
140 Child Abduction Bill 2016, s 16(1)(b).
141 Protection of Children Bill, s 17(1)(b).
142 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (Act No 3 of 2005) s 3.
143 Child Abduction Bill (n 118) s 23(1). Protection of Children Bill (n 119) s 24.
to draft new model legislation and advise whether India should accede to the 1980 Convention.145
Justice Rajesh Bindal’s Committee submitted its report in April 2018. The report highlighted
that domestic violence and intercountry child abduction were related concepts and could not
be seen in isolation.146 It did not recommend that India sign the 1980 Convention.147 However,
the Committee recommended the creation of an Intercountry Parental Child Removal Disputes
Resolution Authority.148 The Committee gave details on global practices and the Indian situa-
tion vis-à-vis child abduction and drafted the Protection of Children (Inter-Country Removal
and Retention) Bill 2018.149 In July 2018, the MWCD formed a Committee under the National
Commission for Protection of Child Rights and set up a mediation cell to solve issues of child
abduction.150 The Committee is supposed to work in tandem with the Integrated Nodal Agency,
which was established by the MWCD to discuss all issues pertaining to the marital disputes of
Indian citizens residing outside India.151 At present, no legislation is pending and the courts are
using the precedents discussed above to resolve child abduction disputes.
G. Comparison with Global Standards

The 1980 Convention has been one of the most successful among private international law
legal initiatives and has helped to facilitate the safe and prompt return of wrongfully abducted
children.152 Major jurisdictions have put in place legal mechanisms to implement the 1980
Convention in their domestic law. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA)
was passed in 1988 to implement the 1980 Convention in the US.153 According to ICARA, state
and federal courts have original concurrent jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the 1980
Convention.154 ICARA states that the remedies established by the 1980 Convention and ICARA
are to be in addition to remedies available under other laws or international agreements.155
ICARA provides for the designation of a Federal agency to serve as the Central Authority for
the US under the 1980 Convention.156 ICARA also sets the structure for hearing return cases,
the burdens of proof applicable to return cases and to defences, relaxed rules for admissibility of
documents, and guidelines for the award of fees and costs.157
145 Ministry of Women and Child Development, ‘Concept Note on Legislation to Address issue related to Civil Aspects
of International Child Removal’ (2017) https://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/MEENAXEE%20RAJ%20HAGUE_0.pdf;

Chandigarh Judicial Academy, ‘Events of the Month and Forthcoming Events’ e-Newsletter (February 2017)
http://cja.gov.in/E%20newsletter/e-Newsletter%20February%202017.pdf.
146 Report of Justice Rajesh Bindal Committee to Examine Vol. I and The Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Bill, 2016 and The Protection of Children (Inter-Country Removal and Retention) Bill 2016 (Chandigarh Judicial
Academy, 21 April 2018) 78 http://cja.gov.in/Articles/Volume%20I%20HMJ%20Rajesh%20Bindal.pdf.
147 S Nair, ‘Inter-Country Child Abduction: Government Panel against Hague Treaty’ Indian Express (9 May 2018)
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/inter-country-child-abduction-govt-panel-against-hague-treaty-5169074/.
148 Justice R B Committee Report (n 146) 192.
149 ibid 205.
150 Press Information Bureau, ‘National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) to Constitute
‘Mediation Cell’ for cases of Child Custody Dispute in NRI Marital Discord’ (Press Information Bureau, 1 August 2019)
https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=181332.
151 ibid.
152 Silberman (n 9) 1052–1053.
153 International Child Abduction Remedies Act (1988) 22 USC 9001.
154 ibid, s 9003.
155 ibid, s 9003(g).
156 ibid, s 9006.
157 ibid, ss 9001–9011.
i. Implementation in the EU

a. Custody Convention
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Custody of Children and on Restoration
of Custody of Children (Custody Convention)158 was signed by the Member States of the Council
of Europe in the same year as the 1980 Convention and is modelled on and complements the
latter. It attempts to protect custody and access rights in international situations and facilitates
the prompt restoration of the custody of a child improperly removed.159 A party can choose to
apply either under the 1980 Convention or the Custody Convention.160 The functions of Central
Authorities are elaborated as it was felt that the practical difficulties in tracing children were more
complicated than the issue of divergent jurisdictional rules or applicable law.161 It is important
to mention that the Custody Convention does not lay down rules on jurisdiction and broadly
provides that a decision relating to custody shall be recognised and made enforceable in every
Contracting State unless the state addressed chooses to avail itself of one of the specified grounds
for refusal of recognition and enforcement.162 This is a modification in comparison to the 1980
Convention which does not provide for the recognition of custody orders. This provision is
further strengthened by Article 9(3) which states that under no circumstance can a foreign deci-
sion be reviewed as to its substance.163
Unlike the 1980 Convention, the Custody Convention allows countries to opt for an auto-
matic return and the restoration of a custody order with few exceptions or a rigorous process for
a return order with more stringent exceptions. An automatic return order with few exceptions
is provided under Article 8 which states that, if an application is made within six months of the
improper removal of a child, the restoration of custody is to be immediate upon establishing
the wrongful removal of the child, the child’s connection based on nationality and habitual resi-
dence, and the parents’ connection based on the nationality of the state in which the decision on
custody was made.164 The countries which consider that the state addressed must always retain
an ultimate discretion to refuse the restoration of a child’s custody, preserve their position by
invoking Articles 9 and 10 and by relying on the reservation under Article 17. In these situations,
return would be subject to rules of public policy, an assessment as to whether a change of circum-
stances has resulted in the original decision no longer being in accordance with the welfare of
child,165 and whether the child had any real connection with the state where the proceedings
have been instituted.166 Rhona Schuz notes that this Convention ‘has little to commend itself to
a left-behind parent who can choose between using the Custody Convention or the Abduction
Convention’.167 Further the abducting parent needs to be in violation of a custody order or deci-
sion for this instrument to be applied. This condition is not present in the 1980 Convention.168
158 European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on
Restoration of Custody of Children [1980] European Treaty Series No 105.

159 Council of Europe, ‘Details of Treaty No. 105’ (Council of Europe) www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/
conventions/treaty/105.
160 R Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis 1st edn (Hart Publishing, 2013) 19.
161 RL Jones, ‘Council of Europe Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to the Custody of
Children’ (1981) 30(2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 467–475, 469; Custody Convention (n 158) Art 5.
162 ibid, Art 7.
163 ibid, Art 9(3).
164 ibid, Art 8.
165 ibid, Art 10 (1)(b).
166 ibid, Art 10(1)(c).
167 Schuz (n 160) 18.
168 ibid 7.
b. Brussels II bis Regulation

The Brussels II bis Regulation (Brussels II Regulation) adopted in 2003 provides additional rules
applicable to child return cases for courts within the EU.169 Similar to the 1980 Convention, the
court of habitual residence of the child retains jurisdiction to decide questions of custody notwith-
standing an abduction.170 In the absence of a formal definition of habitual residence, courts have
interpreted the term in light of the best interest of the child.171 The Brussels II Regulation is built
on the prompt return of the child. It states that in cases of wrongful removal or retention of a
child, the return of the child should be obtained without delay.172 A failure to make such effort
constitutes a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).173 If
the court of a Member State of origin decides that the child should be returned, the requirement
of an exequatur is abolished for the enforcement of such decision and it is directly enforceable in a
requested Member State. The courts of the Member State to which the child has been wrongfully
removed or retained may oppose his or her return in specific cases. However, such a decision can
be replaced by a subsequent decision by the court of the Member State of the habitual residence
of the child prior to the wrongful removal or retention.174 Should that judgment entail the child’s
return, the return should take place without any special procedure being required for recognition
and enforcement of that judgment in the Member State to or in which the child has been removed
or retained.175
The Brussels II Regulation differs from the 1980 Convention with regard to the inquiry into
the child’s view as to return. The 1980 Convention does not place an obligation on (and leaves it
to the discretion of) the trial court to inquire whether the child objects to return.176 However, the
Brussels II Regulation reverses the burden of proof regarding the child’s objections by requiring
that the child be given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity.177 The Brussels II Regulation
does not lay down criteria for determining the age or degree of maturity required or the proce-
dure for hearing the child. As a result, the decision to return a child depends upon the child being
given an opportunity to be heard.178 It also provides that the court cannot refuse to return the
child unless the person who requested the return has been given an opportunity to be heard.179
Notably, the Brussels II Regulation circumscribes application of the 1980 Convention by provid-
ing that a court cannot refuse to return a child based on Article 13b of the 1980 Convention if it
is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the protection of the child
after his or her return.180
169 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, Repealing Regulation (EC)
No 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338/1.
170 ibid, Art 10; Art 13 provides that where a child’s habitual residence cannot be established, the courts of the Member
State where the child is present shall have jurisdiction.

171 R Lamont, ‘Habitual Residence and Brussels II bis: Developing Concepts for European Private International Family
Law’ (2007) 3(2) Journal of Private International Law 261–281, 264.

172 Brussels II Regulation (n 169) Art 11.
173 Iglesias Gi and AUI v Spain [2003] 40 EHRR 36 [62].
174 Brussels II Regulation (n 169) Art 11(8).
175 ibid, Art 21.
176 Abduction Convention (4) Art 13 (b)
178 JD Garbolino, ‘The Impact of the Brussels II Regulation on Hague Convention Proceedings in the European Union’
(Federal Judicial Center, March 2016) www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Impact%20of%20Brussels%20II_0.pdf.

180 ibid, Art 11(4).
While the Brussels II Regulation is a coordinated document, the EU Commission consid-

ered a comprehensive modification and recast the instrument completely. The recast regulation
known as Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 deals with jurisdiction, the recognition
and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters, matters of parental responsibility and
international child abduction. Brussels II bis Recast was adopted by the European Council on
25 June 2019 and will apply in all EU Member States, save Denmark, from 1 August 2022.181 The
Recast Regulation modified the previous law by focusing on the voice of the abducted child.182
Article 21 of Brussels II bis Recast requires that member states provide a child who is capable
of forming his or her own mind with a genuine and effective opportunity to express a view,
either directly or through a representative. This obligation extends to all proceedings concerned
with matters of parental responsibility.183 Article 26 stipulates that the requirements in Article 21
also apply in 1980 Convention proceedings concerned with the summary return of the child.184
The Recast strengthens the expeditious return process which was already part of the old regula-
tion. It stipulates that a court of first instance shall give its decision no later than six weeks after
it is seised of a matter.185 The need for expeditious proceedings is also stressed in the recitals.
Recital 41 stipulates that in order to quicken the 1980 Convention process, Member States should
limit the jurisdiction to hear proceedings to as few courts as possible.186 Further, Recital 42
requires Member States to consider limiting the number of appeals to one. These measures are
expected to encourage and ensure the prompt return of the child.187
ii. The 1980 Convention and Non–convention Countries

India’s major objection to the 1980 Convention is the absence of specific provisions to protect the
interests of women. India is not the only jurisdiction that has raised gender concerns regarding
implementation of the 1980 Convention. Gender concerns have been elevated to the central stage of
discourse in child abduction.188 It has been pointed out that emphasis on the prompt return of the
child and the restrictive interpretation of exceptions to return mechanisms have seriously affected
the growing number of child abduction cases perpetrated by women owing to domestic violence.189
Growing gender concerns have been clear from statistical data related to the 1980 Convention.190
181 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on Jurisdiction, The Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in
Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, and on International Child Abduction [2019] OJ L178/1.
182 The recast defines the child as any person below 18 years. See Art 2(6). This is different from the Hague Abduction
Convention, European Custody Convention and Brussels II bis Regulation which provides for 16 years of age.
183 Brussels II Recast (n 181) Art 21.
184 ibid, Art 26.
185 ibid, Art 24.
188 In 2011 the Special Commission of the HCCH identified domestic violence as one of its themes. The Commission
recommended the establishment of a group of experts to develop principles on the management of domestic violence
allegations in return proceedings. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Report of Part I of the Sixth
Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1996
Hague Child Protection Convention, 4–6 Judges Newsletter on Child Protection, Vol. XVIII (2012), available at https://
assets.hcch.net/docs/26ef0df8-c8cc-445f-8971-9a33a37ce216.pdf; Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the
1980 and 1996 Hague Conventions (25–31 January 2012), Conclusions and Recommendations (Part II), Nos 80–82, 1–3,
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2012concl_e.pdf.
189 J Johnston, IS Edwards, M Blomquist and L Girdner, ‘Prevention of Family Abduction through early Identification of Risk
Factors’ (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 2001) 1–11.
190 N Lowe and V Stephens, Part I ‘A Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 2008 under the Hague Convention of
25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction’ (HCCH Permanent Bureau and the International
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children, February 2018) 1 https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d0b285f1-5f59-41a6-ad83-
8b5cf7a784ce.pdf.
In the absence of explicit provisions in the 1980 Convention to address domestic violence concerns,
many jurisdictions have resorted to domestic legal mechanisms to protect the interest of women
involved in child abduction. For instance, Japan which acceded to the 1980 Convention, by its domes-
tic law191 exempts the return of the child to its habitual residence if ‘there is a risk that the respondent
would be subject to violence, etc. by the petitioner in such a manner as to cause psychological harm
to the child’.192 Similarly, Switzerland has provided a system for raising domestic violence as a defence
through the definition of ‘intolerable situation’ in Article 13(b) of the 1980 Convention.193
Recent decisions of the European Court of Justice reveal the heavy scrutiny paid by the Court
to the interlinkage between domestic violence and child abduction.194 Thus, international devel-
opment reveals that, India’s objections are based on a well-founded rationale.195 In this situation,
one option for India is to pursue international diplomacy and negotiations to highlight the issue
of domestic violence in child abduction. Such an effort is significant because the HCCH has
recognised domestic violence as a recurrent theme in child abduction, and the Guide to Good
Practice adopted by the HCCH has stressed the need to address and develop a practice to deal
with domestic violence and child abduction.196 Alternatively, India can incorporate safety mecha-
nisms to protect women under its domestic legislation as done by many other jurisdictions before
acceding to the 1980 Convention.
iii. Muslim Countries and 1980 Convention

At this juncture, it is also important to discuss the fact that the 1980 Convention was adopted as a
response to the increased number of marriages between different ethnic and religious communi-
ties and to protect the rights of children abducted by parents to a foreign country.197 Though it has
been ratified by 103 countries, most Muslim countries have not acceded to the 1980 Convention.
Morocco, Iraq and Pakistan only became parties to the 1980 Convention in 2010, 2014 and 2017,
respectively.198 Concerning Asian and South Asian countries, even though all Asian nations are
parties to the CRC, only South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, Japan, Pakistan, Thailand, and
Sri Lanka have acceded to the 1980 Convention.199
The religious specificities followed in Muslim countries regarding marriage, divorce, and
custody matters and a presumed incompatibility with Islamic law (sharia), specifically its child
custody rules, stand in the way of Muslim countries becoming party to the 1980 Convention.200
191 Law on the implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 2013
(Act No 48 of 2013).
192 ibid, Art 28(2)(ii). See also S Yamaguchi and T Lindhorst, ‘Domestic Violence and the Implementation of the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Japan and US Policy’ (2016) 17(4) Journal of
International Womens Studies 16.
193 B Bernadet, ‘Regulation 2201/2003 (Brussels II bis) on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matters of
Parental Responsibility’ (2012) 46(1) Zbornik Radova 239–260.

194 OCI and Others v Romania App no 49450/17 (ECrtHR, 21 Maxy 2019).
195 K Singh, ‘Child custody Cases in the Context of International Migration’ in P Rajni and U Patricia (eds), Marriage,
Migration and Gender (Sage Publications, 2008) 344.

196 Guide to Good Practice under the Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction Part VI, Art 13(1)(b), The Hague Conference on Private International Law – HCCH, 2020, Glossary, 9,
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/225b44d3-5c6b-4a14-8f5b-57cb370c497f.pdf. See also HCCH Permanent Bureau, ‘Draft
Guide to Good Practice on Article 13(1)(b) of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction’ (2017), 1 https://assets.hcch.net/docs/0a0532b7-d580-4e53-8c25-7edab2a94284.pdf.
197 MR Walsh and SW Savard, ‘International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention’ (2006) 6 Barry Law Review
29–60, 29–30.
198 International Child Abduction Database (n 8).
199 ibid.
200 AM Emon and U Khaliq, ‘Private International Law, Islamic Law, and Cross-Border Child Abduction A Historico-
Legal Analysis’ (Anver M. Emon, 2016) 37–42.

Under Islamic law, the father has priority as far as custody and guardianship are concerned.
Further, the best interest or welfare of the child frequently correspond with upbringing under the
principles of sharia.201 This religious-based inquiry has pointed ramifications in child abduction
and custody cases and leads courts to conclude that it falls within the child’s best interests to be
raised in a Muslim community, which can protect the religious upbringing of the children.202
With its emphasis on prompt return, the 1980 Convention does not provide a mechanism for
Muslim countries to uphold their custody laws and religious practice.203
However, some cases decided in Muslim countries show that the latter have adopted the
welfare of the child principle even to the point of overriding historical doctrines of sharia. For
instance, in Amina Tarar,204 involving a custody petition filed by the mother of a female child
against the father who removed the child to Pakistan, the Lahore High Court ordered the hand-
ing over of the child to the mother’s custody. Similarly, Roshni Desai v Jahanzeb Niazi205 handed
custody of the minor, born of a common law marriage, to the mother. However, these limited
cases cannot be considered to be determinative of future legal outcomes in all jurisdictions.206 As
a solution, some scholars have suggested greater use of Article 20 of the 1980 Convention, which
incorporates fundamental freedoms and human rights as an exception to return if countries with
non-western religious and cultural norms join the 1980 Convention.207 Muslim countries have
also raised objection to the employment of the term ‘abduction’ contending that a parent cannot
abduct his or her child.208 The HCCH’s Malta Process was convened to discuss the obstacles
to accession by Muslim countries and to explore possible alternatives. But the Malta Process
has not yielded results and differences of opinion remain with regard to law and jurisdiction in
child abduction cases.209 Thus, the implementation history of the 1980 Abduction suggests that,
although it is one of the most successful private international law instruments, given the changed
profile of abductions and concerns of Muslim jurisdictions, changes needs to be brought in if
the 1980 Convention is to grow in its ambit and scope.210 It should also be stressed that although
the 1980 Convention has facilitated the process of the prompt and safe return of the wrongfully
removed children to their habitual residence, it does not determine custody rights. Thus, one
of the complex issues faced by the countries dealing with child abduction cases is the question
of the recognition of foreign custody orders, especially if the foreign state is a non-signatory to
the 1980 Convention. A look at the recognition and enforcement of a foreign custody order,
especially among non-convention countries, is required since in many cases of child abduction a
formal custody order is breached and a resort to classical principles of private international law
is needed.
201 DM Andrews, ‘Note, Non-Muslim Mothers v. Egyptian Muslim Fathers: The Conflict Between Religion and Law in
International Child Custody Disputes and Abductions’ (2000) 23 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 595–632, 608.
202 Andrews ibid. See also DSL Ong, ‘Parental Child Abduction in Singapore: The Experience of a Non-Convention
Country’ (2007) 21(2) International Journal of Law Policy and Family 220–241, 232.
203 CS Bruch, ‘Religious Law, Secular Practices, and Children’s Human Rights in Child Abduction Cases under the
Hague Child Abduction Convention’ (2000–2001) 33(1) New York University Journal of International Law Policy 49–58.
204 Imran Ali v Mst. Iffat Siddiqui and two others PLD 2008 Karachi 198.
205 Roshni Desai v Jahanzeb Niazi [2011] PLD 423 Lahore High Court.
206 Emon and Khaliq (n 200).
207 Beaumont and McEleavy (n 10).
208 AG Hamid, N AHak, N M Zina and H M Jan, ‘The Applicability of the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention in Muslim
Countries: Particular Reference to the Malaysian Position’ (2018) 32(2) Arab Law Quarterly 99–128, 110 https://brill.com/
view/journals/alq/32/2/article-p99_99.xml?language=en#d1768962e1189.
209 W Duncan, ‘Purpose of the Malta Process’ (The Judges’ Newsletter, 2010) 12 https://assets.hcch.net/docs/8a903d7
5-7364-47bf-85e0-dc777d602277.pdf.
210 CS Bruch, ‘The Hague Child Abduction Convention: Past Accomplishments, Future Challenges’ (1999) 1(1–2)
European Journal of Law Reform 97–118, 114.

Recognition of Foreign Custody Orders 173
IV. Recognition of Foreign Custody Orders

A. Indian Legal and Judicial Position
It has been noted in chapter two that based on the comity of courts principle, section 13 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment of a foreign court is conclusive in India under
normal circumstances, in a lis between the same parties. Similarly, section 41 of the Indian Evidence
Act provides that a competent court’s final judgment in the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction is
conclusive proof that the legal character which it confers or takes away accrued or ceased at the time
declared in the judgment for that purpose.211 However, there are certain exceptions to this general
principle, where a foreign judgment is not taken to be conclusive and may not be recognised by
Indian law. Such exceptions are laid down in the six clauses (a) to (f) of Section 13.212 Those grounds
include a foreign judgment delivered by an incompetent court; a foreign judgment not on merits; a
foreign judgment against international or Indian law; a foreign judgment opposed to natural justice;
a foreign judgment obtained by fraud; and a foreign judgment founded on a breach of Indian law.213
Despite statutory certainty, while dealing with issues of a foreign judgment regarding child custody,
the Supreme Court of India has often overlooked the statutory principle and accorded primacy
to the principle of welfare of the child.214 In PK Srikumar v Harshitha Gopinathan,215 the plaintiff
husband married the defendant wife. At the time of marriage, the plaintiff was a US permanent resi-
dent. After marriage, both parties were employed and settled in the US. A child, Srihari Srikumar,
was born in the US. After the minor was taken from the US by the wife, the husband initiated
proceedings before the Superior Court of California, seeking custody of the child and obtained an
ex parte order for interim custody. The Indian court observed that, having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that the child has been brought up by the mother
from 2011, the wife would be the proper person to have permanent custody of the child. Therefore,
the judgment passed by the foreign court was not conclusive and binding on the defendant and was
not enforceable against her within the jurisdiction of Indian courts.216
No specific legal criteria for the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody decrees exist
in India. Such criteria are important because courts subordinate to the Supreme Court can abide
by them.217 In their steadfast reliance on the welfare of the child principle, courts have often
discounted the statutory provisions of the Civil Procedure Code with respect to the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments. Further, unlike foreign divorce decrees where the Supreme Court has
elaborated clear principles, the field of foreign custody orders operates without clear-cut judicial
decisions and is decided based on the specific facts of each case leading to a situation of uncer-
tainty. This situation is in stark contrast to the clear and detailed provisions on recognition of
foreign custody orders in other jurisdictions such as the US and EU.
B. Comparison of South Asian Positions on Foreign Custody Orders

The preceding section revealed the lack of legal clarity in India concerning the recognition of
foreign custody orders in child abduction cases. An examination of the recognition of foreign
211 The Indian Evidence Act 1872 (Act No 1 of 1872) s 14.

212 ibid, s 13 (a)–(f).
213 ibid.
214 Noronha (n 109) 122.
215 P K Srikumar v Harshitha Gopinathan [2015] SCC OnLine Mad 10343.
216 ibid [63].
217 Shilpi Gupta v Union of India & Ors. [2016] SCC Online Del 2561.
custody orders in other South Asian jurisdictions suggests a similar predicament and ambiguity.
For instance, even though Pakistan became a party to the 1980 Convention in 2017,218 it has not
enacted legislation to implement the same. Similar to the Indian colonial legislation, Pakistan’s
Guardian and Wards Act regulates issues of guardianship, while the Civil Procedure Code 1972
deals with the enforcement of foreign judgments. The preferred method of enforcing foreign
custody orders is by filing a writ of habeas corpus.219
Sri Lanka acceded to the 1980 Convention in 2011220 and enacted domestic legislation enti-
tled Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act No 10 of 2001 to implement the 1980
Convention.221 Under the Act, as between parties to the 1980 Convention, foreign court orders
will automatically be recognised and the child’s return ordered. However, for non-Convention
countries, the situation is different.222 Sri Lanka has not entered into any conventions or agree-
ments dealing with the reciprocal enforcement of foreign custody orders. The Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance No 41 of 1921223 provides for the enforcement of the
foreign judgment, but it is limited to money judgments obtained in the UK and Commonwealth
countries.224 Applications for enforcement must be made to the registering court at any time
within twelve months of the date of the foreign judgment or such longer period as may be allowed
by the court.225 There is no automatic recognition or enforcement of the custody orders of foreign
courts. When there is a foreign custody order in place, and the parent who has been granted the
custody order wants to have the order enforced in Sri Lanka, the parent would have to institute
proceedings in the District Court of Sri Lanka where he or she resides, seeking an order that he
or she is entitled to legal and physical custody of the child. If the parents reside abroad, they will
have to come and stay in Sri Lanka and fulfil the required number of days to qualify as a resident.
The other parent would be named as respondent and have a right to be heard in the proceedings.
If an order of custody is granted in favour of the applicant, he or she can remain in Sri Lanka
with the child based on the rights conferred on her or him by the custody order or move back to
their place of habitual residence.226 It should also be mentioned that, the Roman-Dutch law of
Sri Lanka favours the custodial right of the father during the subsistence of the marriage subject
to the welfare of the child.227
Thus, South Asian jurisprudence is characterised by an absence of specific legal provisions
concerning foreign custody orders. Each case is decided on its merits and therefore an inherent defect
exists when recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments are to sought. The uncertain
position is in stark contrast to the explicit statutory provisions operating in the US and EU.
218 Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘Pakistan Joins the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention’ (Hague
Conference on Private International Law, 22 December 2016) www.hcch.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=532.

219 Ali (n 28) 240.
220 Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘HCCH Details-Sri Lanka’ (Hague Conference on Private International
Law) www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members/details1/?sid=70.
221 Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act 2001 (Act No 10 of 2001). See also R Wijeyeskera, ‘Inter-country
Child Abduction – Sri Lankan Legal Response’ in SR Garimella and S Jolly (eds), Private International Law: South Asian
States’ Practice (Springer, 2016) 243–261.
222 S De Soysa, ‘Custody Disputes between Parents and Third Parties- An Evaluation of the Sri Lankan Law’ (1985)
University of Colombo Review 123; In cases involving minor children, Sri Lankan courts consider the best interests
of child principle. See also Weragoda v Weragoda [1961] 59 CLW 59; Endoris v Kiripetha [1968] 73 NLR 20; Premawathie
v Kudalugoda Aratchiew [1970] 75 NLR 398.
223 The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance 1921 (Act No 41 of 1921).
224 The foreign judgment can be challenged on the ground that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction, the original judg-
ment was obtained by fraud; that the foreign judgment was obtained in contravention of public policy and natural justice.
225 The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance 1921 (n 248) s 3(1).
226 R Dantanarayana and J Wilson, ‘Child Custody and ‘Enforcement’ of Foreign Child Custody Orders in Sri Lanka’ (2017)
10(1) Family Law Update 11–14 www.esthersusin.com/.cm4all/mediadb/Family-Law-Newsletter-December-2017.pdf.

227 ibid.
Recognition of Foreign Custody Orders 175
C. Recognition of Foreign Custody Order in the US

Historically, US courts have been reluctant to decide on the applicability of the full faith and
credit clause in custody matters and courts have manifested differing positions.228 The 1980
Convention has been implemented in the US through ICARA. The latter includes a full faith and
credit clause that requires states to recognise the judgments of other courts ordering the return
of a child pursuant to the 1980 Convention.229 However, in the US, the 1980 Convention is not
an exclusive remedy. The parties involved in child abduction may use other domestic laws to seek
the return of or access to a child in the US.
As far as the non-signatories are concerned, the US does not follow a uniform approach in
dealing with international child abduction cases. Such situations require reference to the classical
doctrine of comity, subject to considerations of due process.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) adopted in 1968 was intended to settle
the question of the applicability of the full faith credit clause in custody disputes.230 The UCCJA
purported to reduce jurisdictional competition and provided that custody litigation should take
place in a state based on factors such as whether the parties’ home was in the state, emergency,
significant connection, and appropriate forum.231 The UCCJA also aimed to deter the wrongful
removal of children, facilitate enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees and unify the law of
states.232 Significantly, the UCCJA provided that a custody decree rendered under proper juris-
dictional requirements would be binding on all the parties and be recognised and enforced in
other states in inter-state custody disputes.233
Section 23 of the UCCJA extends this provision to transnational custody disputes and
provided that:
the provisions of this Act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other States
apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody institutions
rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard
were given to all.234
Although the UCCJA generated considerable optimism, it did not produce a discernible change
and the need was felt for other federal legislation.
In 1997, the UCCJA was replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).235 The UCCJEA is not a substantive statute dealing with custody
issues and only determines which state courts have jurisdiction. The jursidictional rules
broadly follow the earlier UCCJA. However, the court which has jurisdiction under UCCJEA
may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum and
228 M Blair, ‘International Application of the UCCJEA: Scruntinizing the Escape Clause’ (2004) 38/3 Family Law
Quarterly, 547–581, 551.

229 International Child Abduction Remedies Act (n 153) s 9003(g).
230 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (US) 1968, Prefatory Note.
231 ibid, s 3; BM Bodenheimer, ‘The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act’ (1969) 3(4) Family Law Quarterly 304–316.
232 ibid; EM Trapnell, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1978) 12(4) University of Richmond Law Review
745–748, 745.
233 PM Hoff, ‘The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act’ (National Criminal Justice Reference
Service, December 2001) 5 www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/189181.pdf; ME Moraza Choisne, ‘Juridical Solutions in the

U.S.A. for Parental Kidnapping in Child Custody Cases’ (1990) 24(2) Revista Juridica de la Universidad Interamericana de
Puerto Rico 309–353, 316.
234 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 1968 (n 230) s 23. See also MI Bodzin, ‘International Parental Child
Abduction: The Need for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Custody Decrees’ (1988–1989) 3(2) Emory Journal of
International Dispute Resolution, 205–219, 207.
235 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (US) 1997.
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The UCCJEA incorporates domestic
violence as well as the financial positions of parties as a factor in determining the appropriate
forum.236 This is not only a great improvement but will assist battered women. The UCCJEA
specifically provides for the enforcement of 1980 Convention return orders and authorises
public officials to locate and secure the return of children in 1980 Convention cases.237 The
UCCJEA contains provisions that clarify when foreign custody determinations are entitled
to enforcement and when courts in the US must defer custody matters to the jurisdiction of a
foreign court.238
Section 105 of the UCCJEA addresses the international application of the Act. It provides that
US courts are to treat a foreign state as a state of the US and requires that child custody determi-
nations made by foreign states in conformity with the UCCJEA must be recognised and enforced
as mandated in Article 3.239 However, the section contains an escape clause, providing that the
UCCJEA need not be applied if the ‘child custody law of the foreign country violates fundamen-
tal principles of human rights’.240 In the absence of a definition of what constitutes a violation of
fundamental principles of human rights, courts have adopted differing interpretations. In Anwar
Malik v Joohi Malik,241 the Maryland intermediate appellate court held that a custody order of a
Pakistani court would be valid unless:
(1) the ‘best interests of the child’ standard had not been applied; or
(2) the order had been obtained by applying a law contrary to Maryland public policy.
In Noordin v Abdulla (In re Custody of R),242 the Washington court held that it could deny recog-
nition and enforcement of a foreign custody decree even if the foreign court was competent.
A foreign decree would not be recognised if the foreign proceedings had been conducted in a
manner contrary to Washington state law and public policy and if the best interests of child had
not been considered.
D. Recognition of Foreign Custody Orders in the EU

The Brussels II bis Regulation covers the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody orders in
the European Union.243 Article 21 states that ‘a judgment given in a Member State shall be recog-
nised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required’.244 Importantly,
under Article 2(4), the term ‘judgment’ refers to a decree, order or a decision of a court of
any Member State.245 No reference is made as to whether an order should be interim or final.
Article 23 provides for restricted grounds for non-recognition of judgments relating to parental
responsibility. These include the following:
(a) Recognition would be contrary to the public policy of the Member State where recognition
is sought. The principle of the best interests of the child would be applied instead.
236 ibid, s 207.

237 ibid, s 302. See also Hoff (n 233) 4.
238 ibid, s 303.
239 ibid, s 105.
240 ibid, s 105(c). See also Blair (n 228) 556.
241 Malik v Malik 638 A.2d 1184 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
242 Noordin v Abdulla (In re Custody of R) 947 P.2d 745 (1997).
243 Brussels II bis Regulation (n 169).
244 ibid, Art 21. See Also PE McEleavy, ‘Brussels II bis: Matrimonial Matters, Parental Responsibility, Child Abduction
and Mutual Recognition’ (2004) 53(2) International Comparative Law and Quarterly 503–512, 511.
245 ibid, Art 2(4).
Conclusion 177
(b) The judgment was given without the child being heard, except in cases of urgency.
(c) The judgment was given in default of appearance without proper notice of the relevant docu-
ments having been given, unless the respondent unequivocally accepted the judgment.
(d) No opportunity of being heard was given to the respondent.
(e) The judgment is irreconcilable with a later judgment relating to parental responsibility given
in the Member State in which recognition is sought.246
The Recast Regulation reiterates similar rules on recognition of custody orders to those which
formed part of the Brussels II bis Regulation.247 The assessment suggests that, in comparison to
the Indian position, the US and the EU have enacted specific statutory position to facilitate the
issue of the recognition of foreign custody orders.
V. Conclusion
This chapter analysed the complexities of intercountry parental child abduction and the interna-
tional community’s response through the 1980 Convention. The latter attempted to ensure the
prompt return of a wrongfully removed child to his or her habitual residence. However, there are
growing concerns regarding the correlation between incidents of child abduction and the pres-
ence of domestic violence. The 1980 Convention does not give due consideration and sufficient
weight to such circumstances in the context of a ‘grave risk’ argument. This chapter explored the
statutory and Indian judicial responses and highlighted the legal concepts developed by the Indian
courts. In the absence of a legislative framework dealing with intercountry child abduction, the
courts have applied domestic law to address wrongful child removal disputes as custody disputes
based on the criteria of the best interests of the child or the welfare of the child, in contrast to
the return-based approach of the 1980 Convention. India has steadfastly opposed accession to
the 1980 Convention, claiming that signing it would seriously jeopardise the interests of women
fleeing from domestic violence. There has been extensive legal activity on the subject, beginning
with the Law Commission Report in 2009 recommending accession to the 1980 Convention.
This was followed in 2016 by a reference of the High Court of Panjab and Haryana to the Law
Commission of India and the MWCD to look into intercountry child abduction. As a response,
Bills were drafted by the Law Commission and the MWCD as precursors to the country’s acces-
sion to the 1980 Convention. These have been hotly debated by the public. However, despite these
legal developments, the government decided against accession, leaving the judiciary to evolve
practices based on the welfare of the child.
The situation presents further complications as the country also lacks an adequate mecha-
nism for recognising foreign custody orders, which are often violated in child abduction cases.
However, it needs to be mentioned that the domestic violence concerns advanced by India in
opposing the 1980 Convention are not unique to India, as many jurisdictions facing similar
scenarios have responded by incorporating domestic mechanisms specifying several conditions
that would allow refusing the return of the child. Besides, many Islamic countries also oppose
the 1980 Convention based on its conflict with principles of their custody laws and sharia. The
discussion shows that, despite the 1980 Convention being one of the most successful private
international law instruments, considering the changed profile of abductions and the concerns of
jurisdictions, changes need to be introduced to grow the instrument’s ambit and scope.
246 ibid,
Art 23.
247 BrusselsII Recast (n 181) Arts 30 and 39; Compared to the provisions of Brussels II bis Regulation under Art 23
which talks of the general obligation of considering the views of the child, Art 39 of the Recast provides for refusal of
recognition of decisions in matters of parental responsibility only in cases where the child who is capable of forming his
or her own views was not provided that opportunity.
9
Cross-Border Surrogacy and Private
International Law
I. Introduction
Surrogacy is a method of reproduction where a woman carries the child of another pursuant to
a contract. The understanding is that, at birth, the child will be handed over to the other party
and the surrogate mother will relinquish all rights to the child.1 Surrogacy can be categorised
into traditional and gestational surrogacy based on the method used. In traditional surrogacy,
the child is genetically related to the surrogate mother.2 In gestational surrogacy, the surro-
gate mother is not genetically linked to the child and only acts as a gestational carrier.3 Based
on the financial considerations involved, surrogacy may be further divided into altruistic and
commercial surrogacy. In altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate mother does not receive financial
compensation and is motivated by emotional and humanitarian considerations.4 Commercial
surrogacy involves monetary consideration.5
Surrogacy may be an appealing option for infertile couples that would not otherwise be able
to fulfil their dream of parenthood and for surrogate mothers who would obtain financial remu-
neration. However, it raises critical ethical and legal issues.6 Data from across the world reveals
the rampant exploitation of marginalised and vulnerable women. The financial vulnerability of
women in many developing nations forces them to act as surrogates to the detriment of their
emotional and physical health.7 In such a situation, it is doubtful whether a woman’s ‘consent’ to
act as a surrogacy can be said to have been freely given, rather than to have been forced by their
economic circumstances.8 On an ethical level, there is the fear that surrogacy will lead to the
1 C Carr, Unlocking Medical Law and Ethics 2nd edn (Routledge, 2015) 263; K Trimmings and P Beaumont, ‘General
Report on Surrogacy’ in K Trimmings and P Beaumont (eds), International Surrogacy Arrangements: Regulation at the
International Level (Hart Publishing, 2013) 444.
2 K Brugger, ‘International Law in the Gestational Surrogacy Debate’ (2012) 35(3) Fordham International Law Journal
665–697; A Hofheimer, ‘Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy’ (1991–92) 19(3)
New York University Review of Law & Social Change 571–616, 573; K Yamamoto and SAD Moore, ‘A Trust Analysis of a
Carriers Right to Abortion (2001) 70 Fordham Law Review 93, 95.
3 Hofheimer (n 2) 574.
4 ibid. See also V Rozée and S Unisa, Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the Global South and North 1st edn
(Routledge, 2016) 16.

5 Hofheimer (n 2) 574.
6 B Steinbock, Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Reproduction (Ashgate, 2002) 66; P Gerber and K O’Byrne, Surrogacy,
Law and Human Rights 1st edn (Routledge, 2016); AP Kumar, D Inder and N Sharma, ‘Surrogacy and Women’s Right
to Health in India: Issues and Perspectives’ (2013) 57(2) Indian Journal of Public Health 65–70; P Saxena, A Mishra and
S Malik, ‘Surrogacy: Ethical and Legal Issues’ (2012) 37(4) Indian Journal of Community Medicine 211, 213.
7 CP Kindregan Jr. and D White, ‘International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless Children in Cross-Border
Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements’ (2013) 36(3) Suffolk Transnational law Review 527–626, 605.
8 A Bailey, ‘Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice Account of Indian Surrogacy’ (2011) 26(4) Hypatia
7 15–741.
Private International Law Issues in Cross Border Surrogacy 179
commodification and de-personalisation of reproduction since there will be a divide between a

child’s birth and legal parents.9 Along with legal and ethical concerns, the conflicting approaches
of jurisdictions to surrogacy gives rise to a host of private international law issues in relation
to legal parentage and nationality.10 So much was acknowledged by the General Council of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2010, when it enumerated the complex issues
of private international law arising from the growth of cross-border surrogacy arrangements.11
The Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption in June 2010 inter alia noted that
the rapid increase in the number of international surrogacy arrangements and expressed concern
over the uncertainty surrounding the status of children born as a result of these arrangements.12
This chapter evaluates Indian legislative and judicial responses to cross-border surrogacy. It
is divided into six parts, including this Introduction. Section II explains private international law
concerns in cross-border surrogacy. Section III evaluates the legal response to surrogacy in India.
Special emphasis is given to the evolution of the Surrogacy Bills with a focus on the 2019 Bill.
Section IV appraises the judicial narrative on surrogacy and compares it with the legal position in
Nepal. Section V examines the HCCH’s efforts in highlighting legal challenges and harmonising
conflict of law approaches to cross-border surrogacy.
II. Private International Law Issues in Cross Border Surrogacy

A. Legal Parentage
Domestic laws determine rules on legal parentage. Jurisdictions assign legal parentage based
on the operation of law, on the fact of birth, or by agreement between the putative parents.13
Generally, if the mother who gives birth is married, the legal presumption is that the husband is
the child’s legal father.14 For instance, section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 states:
[T]he fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and
any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried,
shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties
to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.15
9 LB Andrews, Between Strangers: Surrogate Mothers, Expectant Fathers, & Brave New Babies (Harper & Row 1989)
101; D DeMarco, Biotechnology and the Assault on Parenthood (Ignatius Press, 1991) 75; S Allan, ‘The Surrogate in
Commercial Surrogacy: Legal and Ethical Considerations’ in Paula G and K O’Byrne (eds) Surrogacy, Law and Human
Rights (Routledge, 2016) 113–143.
10 CF Glynn, ‘Review Article: Human Rights and Private International Law: Regulating International Surrogacy’ (2014)
10(1) Journal of Private International law 157–170, 159.

11 Permanent Bureau, ‘A Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements’
(Hague Conference on Private International Law, March 2012) https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d4ff8ecd-f747-46da-86c3-

61074e9b17fe.pdf; Permanent Bureau, ‘Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including
Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements, (Hague Conference on Private International Law, March 2011)
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff20llpdlle.pdf; Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, ‘Conclusion
and Recommendations adopted by the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference’ (Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 7–9 April 2010) https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010concl_e.pdf.
12 Permanent Bureau, ‘Conclusions and Recommendations and Report of the Special Commission on The Practical
Operation of The 1993 Hague Inter-country Adoption Convention’ (Hague Conference on Private International Law,
17–25 June 2010) https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/adop2010_rpt_en.pdf.
13 Kindregan and White (n 7) 604–619.
14 ibid.
15 The Indian Evidence Act 1872 (Act No 1 of 1872) s 112.
180 Cross-Border Surrogacy and Private International Law
Thus, the presumption of paternity in the case of a child born through surrogacy holds in favour
of the surrogate mother and her husband and not to the would-be parents. However, where
surrogacy is permitted, the paternity of the child will lie with the intended parents. Since the
determination of legal parentage is based on domestic parameters and varies from one state to
another, cross-border surrogacy gives rise to legal complications as is apparent from judicial
statements.
B. Nationality
The right to nationality is a recognised human right under various international conventions16
and domestic jurisdictions have enacted constitutional and legislative provisions dealing with
nationality. Nationality rules follow the principle of birth or descent.17 Differing reliance on
birth or descent and contradictory approaches to surrogacy lead to complications in determin-
ing the nationality of children born through cross-border surrogacy. For instance, the Ukraine,
which permits commercial surrogacy,18 assigns the would-be parents’ nationality to a child born
through surrogacy. However, if the intending parents are from Japan, which does not permit
surrogacy, the child will not be granted Japanese nationality. The legal complications involved
and the consequent risk of statelessness arising from cross-border surrogacy have been stressed
in judicial statements in the Baby Manji19 and Jan Balaz20 cases.
III. Legal Status of Commercial Surrogacy in India

A. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
A key constitutional question about surrogacy is whether it is part of a right to reproductive
liberty. The provisions germane to the discussion are Articles 21 and 23 of the Indian Constitution.
Article 21 guarantees the right to life and liberty to citizens and non-citizens.21 Judicial dicta
have consistently expanded the scope and applicability of Article 21.22 In Suchita Srivastava v
Chandigarh Administration,23 in the context of abortion, the court observed:
There is no doubt that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of ‘personal
liberty’ as understood under Article 21 of India’s Constitution. It is essential to recognise that reproduc-
tive choices can be exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial consideration
is that a woman’s right to privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity should be respected.
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) Art 15;
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3
(CRC) Art 7.
17 Citizenship Act 1955 (Act No 57 of 1955) ss 3, 4.
18 SN Kirshner, ‘Selling a Miracle: Surrogacy through International Borders: Exploration of Ukrainian Surrogacy’
(2015) 14(1) Journal of International Business and Law 77–98, 85.

19 Baby Manji Yamada v Union of India [2008] 13 SCC 518.
20 Jan Balaz v Anand Municipality AIR [2010] Guj 21.
21 The Constitution of India 1950, Art 21.
22 Suchita Srivastava & Anr. v Chandigarh Administration [2009] 14 SCR 989; Laxmi Mandal v Deen Dayal Harinagar
Hospital & Ors [2010] 8853/2008; Jaitun v Janpura Maternity Home & Ors [2010] 10700/2009 (High Court of Delhi,
4 June 2010); Sandesh Bansal v Union of India and others Writ Petition No 9061/2008).
23 Suchita Srivastava (n 22) [11].
Legal Status of Commercial Surrogacy in India 181
In KS Puttaswamy v Union of India,24 the constitutional right of women to make reproductive

choices as part of their personal liberty under Article 21 was recognised. However, the position
of surrogacy in the context of reproductive liberty has not been clarified by the court.25 Questions
have also been raised about the validity of surrogacy agreements in the context of Article 23,
which prohibits forced labour and trafficking in human beings.26 Surrogacy is a contractual
arrangement to transfer a baby in the future. It could be interpreted as the sale of a baby for
consideration, thus qualifying as trafficking.
The enforceability of surrogacy agreements under the Contract Act is a complex one. The
conditions for a valid contract are offer, acceptance, free consent, a lawful object, a lawful
consideration, and the absence of a vitiating factor (such as illegality).27 In the context of surro-
gacy, where most surrogate mothers belong to the economically disadvantaged sectors of society,
the question of free consent assumes complexity.28 Although a surrogacy contract is essentially
concluded between two individuals, it involves larger public concerns such as ensuring the best
interests of the child and preventing the exploitation of women. Hence, whether surrogacy
contracts are forbidden by law or opposed to public policy needs to be answered separately.
Judicial decisions have not elaborated on the public policy or the enforceability of surrogacy
agreements. In the wake of the booming number of surrogacy transactions, (now valued in the
billions29), numerous reported instances of the exploitation of surrogates, and a lack of clarity
regarding the rights of parties,30 the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) felt that it was
imperative to put in place guidelines regulating the practice of Assisted Reproductive Technology
(ART) in India, especially in the absence of any legislation.31
B. ICMR Guidelines
The ICMR Guidelines of 2005 define surrogacy as an agreement between a woman and expect-
ing parents whereby the woman consents to carry a pregnancy, which is genetically unrelated
to her or her husband, with an ultimate understanding that the child will be handed over to the
party commissioning the pregnancy.32 It restricts surrogacy to those who cannot physically or
medically carry a baby to term.33 The Guidelines prescribe financial agreements for surrogacy
and dictate that the same shall cover all associated costs of pregnancy.34 Under the Guidelines,
the upper age limit for surrogates is 45 years of age35 and a woman cannot be a surrogate more
than three times in her life.36 The surrogate mother cannot be genetically related to the child
24 KS Puttaswamy v Union of India [2019] 1 SCC 1.

25 A Ghosh and N Khaitan, ‘A Womb of One’s Own: Privacy and Reproductive Rights’ (2017) 52 Engage Economic and
Political Weekly 42–43 www.epw.in/engage/article/womb-ones-own-privacy-and-reproductive-rights.
26 The Constitution of India 1950 (n 21) Art 23; See also G Palattiyil, E Blyth, D Sidhva and G Balakrishnan,
‘Globalization and Cross-Border Reproductive Services: Ethical Implications of Surrogacy in India for Social Work’
(2010) 53(5) International Social Work 686–700.
27 Indian Contract Act 1872, s 10.
28 ibid, ss 13, 14,16, 19, 23.
29 S Jolly, ‘Cross Border Surrogacy: Indian State Practice’ in SR Garimella and S Jolly (eds), Private International Law:
South Asian States’ Practice (Springer, 2017) 175–197, 178–179; see also I Jargilo, ‘Regulating the Trade of Commercial
Surrogacy in India’ (2016) 15(2) Journal of International Business and Law 337–360.
30 Jolly (n 29) 179.
31 National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision, and Regulation of ART Clinics in India 2005.
32 ibid, 13 R 1.2.33.
33 ibid, R 3.10.2.
34 ibid, R 3.10.3.
35 ibid, R 3.10.5.
36 ibid, R 3.10.8.
and must relinquish in writing all parental rights over the child. The child born out of surrogacy
is presumed to be the legitimate child of the commissioning couple, born within the wedlock,
with the consent of both spouses, and with all the attendant rights of parentage, support, and
inheritance.37 It is essential to point out that these Guidelines have no legal force. Nonetheless,
they have been referred to by the Indian Judiciary as a guide in a few cases involving ART.
C. Evolution of Surrogacy Regulation Bills

The Law Commission, which conducted a detailed study of the legal issues arising out of surro-
gacy, opined in its 228th Report38 that surrogacy agreements would continue to be governed by
the contract between the parties. The contract is supposed to contain all the terms of the relation-
ship, including the surrogate mother’s consent to bear the child, the reimbursement of all her
expenses for carrying the child, and her willingness to hand over a child commissioning parents,
etc. The Report provided an elaborate framework for legislation that comprehensively deals with
the difficult issues of surrogacy. As a result, the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation)
Bill and Rules 2008 was introduced. It was subject to much modification and was followed by
the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill and Rules 2010, which imposed severe
restrictions on foreign nationals seeking to engage Indian surrogates. Arrangements with foreign
nationals would only be allowed where their countries recognised surrogacy and the child born
through such surrogacy arrangement would be granted the citizenship of the commissioning
couple.39 Owing to the lapse of the earlier ART Bill 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs circulated
the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill 2014.40 The Bill proposed that surro-
gacy should only be available to infertile married heterosexual couples. This would effectively
debar single individuals and homosexual couples.41 The Bill also proposed to disallow surrogacy
for foreign nationals, but to permit it for Overseas Citizens of India (OCIs,) persons of Indian
Origin (POIs), non-resident Indians (NRIs), and foreign nationals who have been married to
Indian citizens for at least two years and have obtained a medical visa for surrogacy in India.42
Regarding the rules on nationality and citizenship, the Bill stated that children born through
surrogacy in India to OCIs, POIs, and foreigners married to an Indian should not be given Indian
citizenship under the Citizenship Act 1955.43 The ART Bill 2014 further provided that a child
born through ART shall be presumed to be the legitimate child of the commissioning couple
and have the same rights as a biological child of such couple.44 The birth certificate would thus
be issued in the name of commissioning parents. As far as regulatory authorities are concerned,
the Bill suggested the establishment of a National Advisory Board, a State Advisory Board, and a
National Registry for the accreditation, regulation, and supervision of clinics to prevent misuse
of ART and promote ethical and safe ART practices.45 Most importantly, the Bill espoused the
37 ibid, R 3.5.4. See also J Rimm, ‘Booming Baby Business: Regulating Commercial Surrogacy in India’ (2009) 30(4)
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1429–1462, 1440.

38 Law Commission of India, Need for Legislation to Regulate Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics as Well as Rights
and Obligations of Parties to a Surrogacy (Report No 228, 2009).

39 The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulations) Bill 2010, s 35.
40 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Government of India, ‘The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation)
Bill, 2014’ (2015, No V.25011/444/2011 – HR (Vol II) (Part)).

41 ibid, s 2(p).
42 ibid, s 60(11)(a).
43 ibid, s 61(7); See also Jolly (n 29) 191.
44 ibid, s 61(1).
45 ibid, ss 3, 18, 22.
Legal Status of Commercial Surrogacy in India 183
legalisation of commercial surrogacy by recognising financial transactions for surrogacy, ie,

arrangements between the commissioning parents and surrogate mother.46
The Surrogacy Regulation Bill 2016 altered the positions adopted in the earlier Bills by only
allowing altruistic surrogacy for Indian citizens47 and prohibiting commercial surrogacy.48 The
Surrogacy Bill 2016 prescribed altruistic surrogacy only for heterosexual couples who have been
married for at least five years and who have been proven to be infertile.49 The Bill specifically laid
down that a surrogate mother should be a close relative of the intending couple and a married
woman between the ages of 25 and 35 years with a child of her own. This seriously restricted the
usage of surrogacy.50 However, the Bill did not define who constituted a close relative. Any child
born out of surrogacy would be deemed to be a biological child of the intending couple and enti-
tled to all rights and privileges of a natural child under any law.51
D. Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019

The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019 was introduced after the 2016 version lapsed following
dissolution of the Lok Sabha.52 The 2019 Bill, for the most part, is identical to the 2016 Bill.
This means that commercial surrogacy will be impermissible and only Indian citizens who have
been married for at least five years, with one or both being infertile, can apply for an eligibility
certificate, assuming that a close relative will be willing to help them out by acting as a surrogate.53
Just as the 2016 Bill, the 2019 Bill does not allow homosexuals couples to apply for surrogacy. The
Bill only recognises a legally married man and woman as a couple. The Indian Judiciary having
accepted same-sex marriages,54 the intentions of the drafters of the Bill are difficult to understand
as the Bill’s terms fail to accommodate the legitimate concerns of a large sector of society which
is the most likely to avail itself of the benefits of ART.55
i. Procedure and Eligibility Criteria for Surrogacy

A certificate of eligibility is essential for availing the service of surrogacy. The certificate will be
issued upon fulfilment of the following conditions:
(1) Production of a certificate from a District Medical Board of the proven infertility of one or
both spouses.
(2) Acquisition of an order of parentage and custody of the surrogate child from the Magistrate’s Court.
(3) Proof of insurance coverage for 16 months covering postpartum delivery complications for
the surrogate.56
46 ibid, s 60(3), 60(31).

47 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016, Lok Sabha (2018) [Bill No 257 of 2016] s 2(b) ‘altruistic surrogacy’ means the
surrogacy in which no charges, expenses, fees, remuneration or monetary incentive of whatever nature, except the medi-
cal expenses incurred on surrogate mother and the insurance coverage for the surrogate mother, is given to the surrogate
mother or her dependants or her representative.
48 ibid, ss 3, 35, 37.
49 ibid, s 4(ii)(a).
51 ibid, s 7.
52 Parliament of India, (17th Series, Vol III, First Session, 2019/1941 (Saka) No 21, Monday, 15 July 2019/Ashadha 24,
1941 (Saka) 78.

53 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019 (Bill No 156-C of 2019).
54 Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v Union of India [2018] 10 SCC 1.
55 ibid; BBC, ‘India has 2.5m Gays, Government tells Supreme Court’ (BBC, 14 March 2012) www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-india-17363200.
56 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019 (n 53) s 4(iii)(a).
The 2019 Bill lays down the following eligibility criteria for intending couples:
(1) They must be Indian citizens who have been married for at least five years.
(2) The wife must be between 23 and 50 years old and the husband between 26 and 55 years old.
(3) They should not have any surviving child (biological, adopted, or surrogate), excluding a
child who is mentally or physically challenged or suffers from a life-threatening disorder or
fatal illness.
(4) They must meet any other conditions specified by regulations.57
The 2019 Bill prescribes a number of qualifications for the surrogate mother. She must be
between 25 and 35 years old, a close relative of the intending couple, and a married woman with a
child of her own. She must not have acted as a surrogate previously. She must possess a certifi-
cate of medical and psychological fitness for surrogacy.58 She cannot provide her gametes for
surrogacy.
ii. Legal Parentage

The 2019 Bill deals with the parentage by prescribing that no surrogacy procedure shall take
place unless the intending couple has a certificate of eligibility issued by the appropriate author-
ity. This will only be issued if a magistrate has made an order, in favour of the intending parents,
concerning the parentage and custody of the child to be born through surrogacy.59 It is easy
in this case to see that deciding parentage will not be a struggle given the criminalisation of
non-altruistic surrogacies. Further, the Bill states that a surrogate child will be deemed to be
the biological child of the intending couple.60 An abortion of the child requires the surrogate
mother’s written consent and the permission of the appropriate authority. This authorisation
must comply with the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971.61 The surrogate mother
can choose to withdraw from surrogacy before the embryo is implanted in her womb.62 Since
foreign nationals, NRIs, POIs, etc are not allowed to opt for surrogacy in any form, the ques-
tion of citizenship does not arise. The omission of foreign nationals is controversial because
according to various accounts almost a third of the total commissions for surrogacy are from
foreign-based couples.63
iii. Institutional Mechanism

Like the 2014 and 2016 Bills, the 2019 Bill envisages the creation of a National Surrogacy
Board (NSB) and State Surrogacy Boards (SSB) to advise the Central Government on policy
matters, lay down codes of conduct for surrogacy clinics, and supervise the functioning of SSBs.64
The 2019 Regulation does not deal with surrogacy contracts within the Indian Contract Act 1782.
It merely requires that a written consent from a surrogate is needed to conduct the procedure.65
57 ibid, s 4(iii)(c).
60 ibid, s 7.
61 ibid, s 3(vi).
62 ibid, s 6(2).
63 A Pande, ‘Cross-Border Reproductive Surrogacy in India’ in ES Sills (ed) Handbook of Gestational Surrogacy:
International Clinical Practice and Policy Issues (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 143–148; See generally AL Burpee,
‘Momma Drama: A Study of How Canada’s National Regulation of Surrogacy Compares to Australia’s Independent State
Regulation of Surrogacy’ (2009) 37 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 305–338.
64 The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019 (n 53) ss 14, 22.
65 ibid, s 6
Judicial Statements on Surrogacy: Public Policy Narratives 185
The Surrogacy Bill 2019 was passed by the Lok Sabha and referred to a Select Committee of
Rajya Sabha.66 The Select Committee report made recommendations and stated that considera-
tion should be given to commercial surrogacy as it would be challenging in practice for intending
parents to find a close relative who is willing to go through the commitment of acting as a surro-
gate.67 It was asserted that an absolute prohibition would only lead to greater exploitation of
women as the current magnitude of the surrogacy industry was such that would be unlikely
to vanish. On the contrary, it was likely to find its way underground, leading to more rampant
exploitation.68 Similarly, it was also too rigid to mandate a five-year waiting period for an intend-
ing couple before being eligible to try the surrogacy route. The five years should be reduced to a
lesser number.69 The Select Committee recommended that consideration be given to the interests
of widows and divorcees, as that had been overlooked. If surrogacy applications are rejected, a
review or appeal procedure should be in place. The Union Cabinet on 26 February 2020 approved
the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2020, incorporating the recommendations of the Rajya Sabha
Select Committee. The 2020 Bill allows a ‘willing’ woman to be a surrogate mother and proposes
that the law benefit widows and divorced women in addition to infertile Indian couples.70
However, the full text of the 2020 Bill has not been made public. The legislative effort of the
government has been supplemented by judicial statements on surrogacy revealing the complex
legal and social issues involved.
IV. Judicial Statements on Surrogacy: Public Policy Narratives

A. The Baby Manji Case
Baby Manji Yamada was born through a surrogacy agreement between a Japanese couple and an
Indian surrogate mother in 2007. Dr Yuki Yamada and Dr Ikufumi Yamada were the biological
parents of baby Yamada.71 There was matrimonial discord between the biological parents and
the couple separated. The child was born on 25 July 2008. As Japan bans commercial surrogacy,
the Japanese authorities, informed Dr Yuki Yamada that the birth mother would be regarded
as the legal mother and Dr Yki Yamada would only be able to bring the child to Japan by adopt-
ing her under Japanese and Indian laws and obtaining an Indian passport.72 The adoption was
problematic. Indian law does not allow a single father to adopt a baby girl.73 Dr Yamada applied
for an Indian passport for Manji, a document that requires an Indian birth certificate. A birth
certificate can only be issued with the names of both parents. Dr Yamada could be identified as
the father. However, the authorities were unsure about who should be classified as the mother.
66 ibid.
67 Select Committee, ‘Report of the Select Committee on The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2019 Presented to the
Rajya Sabha’ (PRS, 5 February 2020) 3 www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/bill_files/Select%20Comm%20Report-%20

Surrogacy%20Bill.pdf.
68 ibid 14.
69 ibid 25
70 Special Correspondent, ‘Cabinet Approves Surrogacy Bill’ The Hindu (26 February 2020) www.thehindu.com/news/
national/cabinet-clears-surrogacy-regulation-bill/article30921456.ece.
71 Baby Manji (n 19) [4]; See also J Reddy, ‘Indian Surrogacy: Ending Cheap Labor’ (2020) 18(3) Santa Clara Journal of
International Law 92–123, 101.

72 ibid [4]. See also S Jolly, ‘Surrogacy and Family Ties: A Comparative Analysis of Indian and Japanese Legal Framework’
(2010) 2 University Institute Legal Studies Journal 299.

73 Central Adoption Resource Authority, ‘Eligibility Criteria for Prospective Adoptive Parents’ (CARA, Ministry of
Women & Child Development) http://cara.nic.in/Parents/eg_ri.html.

On these grounds, the municipal council refused to grant a birth certificate for Manji.74 Meanwhile,
an NGO called Satya petitioned the Rajasthan High Court to prevent Manji from being taken out
of India. The Rajasthan High Court required Manji to be brought to them within four weeks. In
response, Dr Yamada’s mother filed a writ petitioning on Manji’s behalf to the Supreme Court of
India.75 After a lengthy discussion on surrogacy, the Supreme Court granted temporary custody
of Manji to the petitioner.76 The Court disposed of the petition with a direction that, if any
person has any grievance, it should be ventilated before the Commission constituted under the
Act.77 After the judgment, the Jaipur passport office granted a special dispensation and issued
Manji with an identity certificate. The Japanese Embassy in New Delhi granted Manji a one-year
Japanese visa on humanitarian grounds and Manji’s grandmother was able to take her to Japan.78
B. The Jan Balaz Case

In Jan Balaz v Anand Municipality and ors.79 the Balaz couple entered into a surrogate agreement
with Martha Immanuel Christi. The child was biologically related to the father Jan Balaz and the
surrogacy resulted in the birth of twins.80 Jan Balaz applied to the Anand Nagarpalika munici-
pality for the registration of the birth of the children. The municipality issued birth certificates
for the children in accordance with the Registration of Birth and Deaths Act 1969. In the birth
certificates, the surrogate’s name was given as the mother of the children.81 Although German
nationals, Jan Balaz and his wife were working in the UK. They had to obtain a visa from the
UK consulate in India to take their children to the UK. Since the babies were born in India and
are Indian citizens, the petitioner applied for an Indian passport.82 The petitioner was shown
as the father, and the surrogate’s name was given as the mother.83 The children were issued a
passport on that basis. Later, Jan Balaz received a notice from the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs’ Regional Passport Office, requesting the surrender of the children’s passports as the issue
of the passport had been queried before the High Court of Gujarat.84 Jan Balaz petitioned the
High Court of Gujarat for an order that the passport office return the passports to enable the
twins to fly to Germany and apply there for German citizenship. Jan Balaz contended that, as
Indian citizens, the twins’ right to travel could not be violated under Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution.85 The passport office argued that the surrogate could not be treated as the twins’
mother for under section 3 of the Citizenship Act 1955. They argued that section 6(2)(a) of the
Passports Act 1967 only allowed Indian citizens to apply for a passport to visit a foreign country.
The petitioners argued that surrogacy was not prohibited in India and the children were born
74 TNN, ‘Japanese Baby Finally Gets Birth Certificate’ The Times of India (Jaipur/Vadodra, 10 August 2008)
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/Japanese-baby-finally-gets-birthcertificate/articleshow/3346424.cms.
75 Baby Manji (n 19) [2]; see also S Rajan, ‘Resolving Statelessness Arising out of Surrogacy in India: A Legal Analysis’
(2014–2015) 14 ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law 14 177–198, 187.
76 K Points, ‘Commercial Surrogacy and Fertility Tourism in India: The Case of Baby Manji’ (The Kenan Institute for
Ethics at Duke University) 6 https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/BabyManji_Case2015.pdf.

77 Baby Manji (n 19) [18].
78 ‘Surrogate Baby Born in India Arrives in Japan’ Hindustan Times (3 November 2008) www.hindustantimes.com/
world/surrogate-baby-born-in-india-arrives-in-japan/story-clfjpEmKM0wORsHNmwG7CP.html.
79 Jan Balaz (n 19).
80 ibid [2].
81 ibid [3].
82 ibid [4].
83 ibid.
84 ibid.
85 ibid [5].
Judicial Statements on Surrogacy: Public Policy Narratives 187
to a surrogate who was an Indian citizen.86 It should be noted that Germany does not recognise
surrogacy and the children could not obtain direct citizenship there.
The court identified the ethical and legal issues and stressed the need for certainty as it would
impact the lives of children if they were held not to have a legal parentage or identity and to be
‘stateless’. The court relied on the 228th Law Commission Report and referred to the legal systems
of the Ukraine, Japan, and Germany before reaching a conclusion.87 The court pointed out that
commercial surrogacy has never been considered illegal in India and the 228th Report proposed
legislation to regulate ART clinics as well as the rights and obligations of parents to a surrogacy.
The court also considered the flip end of things by examining how other jurisdictions handled such
situations. In California, surrogacy agreements are accepted, but no statute exists to regulate them
and the courts rely on the Uniform Parentage Act to deal with surrogacy agreements.88 The court
noted that the Supreme Court of Japan in interpreting the Civil Code of Japan held that a mother
who physically gave birth to a child should be considered as the legal mother. This effectively
denied the recognition of surrogacy altogether.89 In Germany, where the law was stricter, artificial
insemination and embryo donations were classified as criminal and not permitted by law.90
The court recognised the gestational mother as the real mother due to a lack of a law on the
subject. The ova donor was not considered a mother at all. However, she has other rights, such as
the right to privacy and cannot be forced to disclose her identity. Until legislation was enacted, the
wife of the biological father could not be treated as the legal or natural mother.91 Since both the
egg donor and the gestational mothers were Indian and the children had been born an Indian
national, they were also Indian nationals.92 Even if the babies were considered illegitimate, they
had been born in India and for that reason were entitled to Indian citizenship by birth under
section 3(1)(c)(ii) of the Citizenship Act 1955.93 With respect to the passports, the court held that
they had been issued under section 4(2)(b) of the Passports Act. A passport only established a
person’s identity. But identity was not an issue in the case, as the mother was known and the chil-
dren were Indian nationals.94 The court stressed the urgent need for a detailed law on surrogacy
and commented that the ICMR guidelines were insufficient.95 The Union of India appealed against
the decision.
The Supreme Court explored the possibility of adoption on humanitarian grounds by the
Central Adoption Research Authority of India.96 The Authority informed the Court that they
were only concerned with issues relating to abandoned children.97 The Supreme Court ordered
the Authority to reconsider, even if that would give rise to a precedent.98 Germany offered to
issue a German visa to the children for adoption in Germany and the Balaz couple was allowed to
adopt the children under German law.99 Though the diplomatic dialogue between Germany and
86 ibid [6].
87 ibid [10].
88 ibid [11].
89 ibid [12], [14], [16].
90 ibid [13].
91 ibid [16].
92 ibid [16], [17].
93 ibid [17].
94 ibid [18].
95 ibid [21].
96 Y Ergas, ‘The Transnationalization of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Reproductive Surrogacy, Human Rights and the
Re-Visioning of International Law’ (Deconstructing and Reconstructing “Mother” Workshop, Columbia University,
12 March 2012) 20 http://claradoc.gpa.free.fr/doc/444.pdf.
97 See T Lin, ‘Born Lost: Stateless Children in International Surrogacy Arrangements’ (2013) 21(2) Cardozo Journal of
International and Comparative Law 545–588, 573–574.

98 ibid.
99 S Mortazavi, ‘It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for International Surrogacy’ (2012) 100(6)
Georgetown Law Journal 2249–2290, 2275–2276; See also A Guha and N Chauhan, ‘Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy
in India: Some Suggestions’ (2015) 6(2) Indian Journal of Law and Justice 92–99, 95.
India allowed the Balaz couple to take the children to Germany, this did not resolve the questions
of legal parentage and nationality.
C. Reflections from Nepal

It is essential to understand that one nations’ policy on surrogacy directly impacts other nations’
positions and attitudes to surrogacy. India’s laws have influenced Nepal’s position on s urrogacy.
Nepal’s encounter with surrogacy arose following the Cabinet’s decision on 2 June 2014 (2071BS)
allowing surrogacy services for foreign couples.100 Nepal emerged as a hub for commercial
surrogacy in Asia after surrogacy was banned in Thailand and legal complications arose in
India. Advocates Pushpa Raj Pandey101 and Prabin Pandak102 filed two different writ petitions
for declarations that the Cabinet decision was void and surrogacy was contrary to public policy
and Articles 12(1), 12(2), 13(1), 20(3), 22, 27 and 29(3) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal
2063(BS). Since the two writs were filed on the same date, raising the same subject matter, the
Supreme Court delivered a single judgment for both cases.
The petitioners contended that the absence of a proper law harmed the reproductive right of
women guaranteed by the Constitution and forced women who were illiterate, poor and disad-
vantaged to work as surrogates. The Supreme Court held that the relationship of father, mother,
and child could be established biologically or legally. Unregulated surrogacy could violate public
policy and the public interest. The Supreme Court thus laid down 15 guidelines, including the
following:
(1) As the mother’s womb can never be commercialised, commercial surrogacy has to be banned
entirely.
(2) If a medical board has certified that a Nepali married couple is incapable of producing
children because of infertility or a weak health condition, they can seek a surrogacy.
(3) Foreign nationals, same-sex couples, or single men and women should not be eligible to seek
a surrogacy.
(4) Women can be surrogates only out of altruistic feelings with full and free consent.
(5) In order to be a surrogate, a woman has to meet specific criteria as to age and her capability
of producing a child from a health perspective. She should be married and have a child. She
should not be permitted to be a surrogate more than once and consent from her husband or
at least a leading member of her family.
(6) The surrogacy service is only to be provided by health institutions which fulfil the criteria
prescribed by law.
(7) A married infertile couple wishing to engage a surrogacy service and a woman who wants
to be a surrogate should first apply to a prescribed authority and they will only be allowed
to make use of a surrogacy service after necessary inquiries have been undertaken by the
authority.
(8) Clarity is needed in determining the legal parents of the child born from surrogacy, as well
as their rights and duties. The Evidence Act of Nepal provides for a presumption of paternity
in favour of the surrogate mother and spouse, rather than the intended parents.103
100 R Prajuli, ‘Surrogacy in Nepal: Threat to Reproductive Right’ The Himalayan Times, 18 August 2015.
101 Pushpa Raj Pandey v office of Prime Minister, Ministry of Health and Population including others, Writ
No 072-WO-0119 (2073 BS).
102 PrabinPandak v Office of Prime Minister and others, Writ No 072-W0-0120 (2073 BS).
103 Evidence Act 1974, (Nepal) s 6(d) and 6(d1) – Unless proved otherwise. The following children born in a wedlock
situation shall be presumed to be born from a married husband: (1) child born within 180 days of their marriage;
Legal Initiatives for Harmonisation and India’s Role 189
(9) The law has to prescribe the forum having jurisdiction to hear cases related to surrogacy.
(10) The law should stipulate a penalty by way of a fine, imprisonment or both, for the violation
of surrogacy laws.104
As far as the petitions were concerned, although the Court affirmed the applicants’ claims, it
became unnecessary to issue a prerogative writ because the Cabinet had itself overruled its earlier
decision to allow foreign nationals to seek surrogacy in Nepal.
Despite the judicial guidelines, Nepal’s legislature failed to address concerns over surrogacy in
the new Civil Code. While the Civil Code deals with artificial insemination and the related ques-
tion of paternity,105 it is silent on surrogacy. It can be observed that the public policy dimension
is likely to be a hindrance to legalising surrogacy practices in Nepal. If one sees the interpretation
of public policy from the perspective of private international law, the court has adopted a very
broad approach in defining public policy and, by conflating it with the public interest, it has laid
the possibility of invoking public policy whenever it finds anything new contrary to traditional
practices, thereby narrowing the possibility of applying the rules of private international law. This
has to be seen against the background of existing uncertain judicial decisions on public policy. In
Suman Panta v Immigration Department,106 the court impliedly recognised same-sex marriage by
ignoring the potential public policy concerns. On the other hand, it interpreted the public policy
widely to restrict the practice of surrogacy without trying to reconcile the situation by applying
rules of private international law. If we see both issues together, the degrees of social sensitivity
involved are similar, but the invocation of public policy led to different outcomes; one to recogni-
tion, the other to non-recognition. Thus there is a need to bring more clarity and direction to the
operationalsation of public policy to bring judicial certainty.
V. Legal Initiatives for Harmonisation and India’s Role

There is no convention regulating surrogacy at the international level. Owing to the legal
inconsistencies in the practice of domestic jurisdictions, international surrogacy arrangements
have thrown up a host of legal issues, including in respect of nationality and legal parentage.
In 2015 the HCCH formed a Working Group to look into the legal issues and implications of
cross-border surrogacy. The Working Group met in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019.107 India has
been a member of the Working Group and has been actively engaging in its discussion.108 The
Working Group has identified the question of parentage as one of the complex issues arising out
of s urrogacy. The group defined parentage as ‘the relation between the parent and the child such
(2) child born within 282 days from the date of dissolution of marriage. A child born out of artificial insemination based
on the consent of husband and wife shall be presumed to belong to a married husband.
104 On file with the authors.
105 The National Civil (Code) Act 2017 (2074)(BS) Nepal, s 109. If any child is born by using the sperm of another
person, upon the consent of the married couple, such child shall be considered to belong to the husband within the
marital relationship, and therefore paternity shall be determined accordingly.
106 Suman Panta v Immigration Department and others, NKP [2074] decision No 9921 [SC]. Applicant a Nepali national
contracted gay marriage with a US National in 2015. Supreme Court of Nepal, based on the equality clause, held that the
Constitution of Nepal prevents discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation.
107 ‘The Parentage/Surrogacy Project’ (Hague Conference on Private International Law) www.hcch.net/en/projects/
legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy.
108 Council on General Affairs and Policy, ‘Report of the Experts’ Group on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project
(meeting from 29 October to 1 November 2019)’ (Hague Conference on Private International Law, March 2020) Annex
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d435cffc-65ce-4047-b603-ff63ed20591c.pdf.
as established by law’.109 The Working Group concluded its March 2020 meeting by endorsing
the formulation of a convention dealing with the recognition of foreign judicial decisions on
legal parentage and a protocol on the recognition of foreign judicial decisions on legal parentage
rendered as a result of an international surrogacy arrangement.110 However, the Working Group
opined against articulating a position for or against surrogacy. The Working Group has already
made significant progress in developing draft provisions for a possible future protocol dealing
with the recognition of foreign judicial decisions on legal parentage.
The Working Group recommended that the protocol only apply to the recognition of
judgments on legal parentage and not to the rights and obligations which derive therefrom,
such as maintenance, succession, or nationality.111 It elaborated that, for the recognition of legal
parentage, it should employ jurisdictional requirements based on the child’s habitual residence,
the respondent’s habitual residence,112 and a real and substantial connection.113 The Working
Group also expounded specific grounds of non-recognition, including grounds of public policy,
the best interests of the child, the lack of due process, and inconsistent judgments or parallel
proceedings.114 The Working Group felt that a uniform applicable law at the time of child’s birth
would help ensure the continuity of legal parentage in cross-border cases in the absence of a
foreign judgment on legal parentage.115
The Working Group proposed the adoption of a protocol on legal parentage established as a
result of international surrogacy agreements (ISA). Most experts in the Working Group agreed
that judgments rendered post-birth in the state of origin of the ISA should be recognised by
operation of law in all other Contracting States. The Working Group reaffirmed the central
importance of the surrogate mother’s free and informed consent as a condition for recognition of
the judgment on legal parentage.116 It underlined the desire to prevent the abduction, sale, or traf-
ficking of women and children in the context of ISAs, taking into account the Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and
Child Pornography of 20 May 2000. These discussions are still at an initial stage and the Working
Group is expected to submit its report to the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) by
2022 in order for CGAP to make a final decision on whether to proceed with the project.117
VI. Conclusion
This chapter analysed the booming cross-border surrogacy industry and the differing standards
followed by jurisdictions in respect of legal parentage and nationality. This chapter evaluated
the legal status of surrogacy in India. The assessment revealed that the legal position under the
Constitution and the Contract Act vis-a-vis surrogacy was unclear and has not been agitated
before the courts. However, the limited judicial statements in the Baby Manji and Jan Balaz cases
have highlighted the painful saga of children born through surrogacy caught in legal imbroglios.
For instance, in 2008 Manji Yamada born through surrogacy could not leave India for 12 months
109 ibid.
110 ibid [1].
111 ibid [4].
112 ibid noting that the state might be the respondents in certain jurisdictions.
113 ibid [2].
114 ibid [3].
115 ibid [4].
116 ibid [5].
117 ibid.
Conclusion 191
after her birth because of a lack of clarity concerning her nationality. The scenario presents
uncertainty and violates the rights of the parties involved. The chapter traced the legal initia-
tives undertaken by the Government of India through successive Surrogacy Regulation Bills. The
assessment of these Bills showed that the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2014 makes a marked shift
from the pro-surrogacy position articulated by the ART Bill 2010 that allowed foreign nation-
als to access surrogacy with a requirement to follow medical visa rules. Surrogacy Bills in 2014,
2016, and 2019 only recognised the rights of infertile heterosexual couples to access surrogacy
and ignored the rights of single parents. They also sought to prohibit foreign nationals from
availing of surrogacy services. The Surrogacy Regulation Bills of 2016 and 2019 altered the posi-
tions adopted in the earlier Bills by allowing only altruistic surrogacy for Indian citizens and
prohibiting commercial surrogacy outright. Starting from 2008, five Bills have been put forward.
This demonstrates the government’s seriousness in regulating surrogacy. However, the divergent
positions articulated by the Bills and the sudden shift to discouraging of surrogacy gives rise to
ambiguity for the parties involved in surrogacy. There is a strong need to have more deliberation
and the Law Commission’s 288th Report can serve as a useful template.
192
part iv
Law of Obligations
194
10
The Applicable Law in Contractual Obligations*
I. Introduction
As we have seen, private international law deals with disputes arising among private individuals
which contain a foreign (international) element. At the same time, the circumstances in which a
dispute will include a foreign element are not uniformly defined. Its meaning has been reported
to differ across national and international instruments.1 Nonetheless, the expression generally
refers to disputes which are not purely domestic by nature and therefore consist of a transnational
element.2 This may be the position when the parties or their establishments are located in differ-
ent countries or when the agreement is concluded or performed overseas.3
The identification of the law that will govern a contractual obligation will depend on the
conflict of law rules of the forum which is adjudicating a dispute,4 which will be determined once
the court has established its jurisdiction. In doing so, the court will apply its principles of private
international law to identify the applicable law (also known as the governing law). In this respect,
the determination of the applicable law may be referred to as the second pillar in private interna-
tional law, the first being jurisdiction.
The rules on contractual obligations are generally confined to international disputes arising
in connection to contracts on the sale of goods, services, immovable property, insurance, the
transfer or licensing of intellectual property, agency or franchise agreements, to name a few. The
rules on contractual obligations do not extend to disputes arising in connection to family matters,
*This chapter draws extensively on the following articles published by the author on the subject: S Khanderia, ‘Indian
Private International Law vis-à-vis Party Autonomy in the Choice of Law’ (2018) 18(1) Oxford University Commonwealth
Law Journal 1 [Khanderia, Party Autonomy]; S Khanderia, ‘The Ascertainment of the Applicable Law in the Absence of
Choice in India and South Africa: A Shared Future in the BRICS’ [2020] Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal
DOI: 10.1080/14729342.2020.1773019 [Khanderia, The Ascertainment of the Applicable Law]; S Khanderia and S Peari,
‘Party Autonomy and the Choice of Law under Indian and Australian Private International Law’ [2020] Commonwealth
Law Bulletin 1, DOI: 10.1080/03050718.2020.1804420 [Khanderia & Peari, Party Autonomy in India and Australia]; and
S Khanderia, Practice does not Make Perfect: Rethinking the Doctrine of ‘The Proper Law of the Contract’ – A Case for
the Indian Courts’ (2020) 16(3) Journal of Private International Law 423. [Khanderia, Practice does not Make Perfect].
1 See the Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], ‘Commentary on the Hague Principles on
Choice of Law in International Contracts’ (approved 15 March 2015) [1.13] www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/

full-text/?cid=135 [Commentary to Hague Principles].
2 See for instance, ibid, [1.13]–[1.22] referring to Art 1(2) of the Hague Principles; and HCCH Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements (concluded 30 June 2005) 44 I.L.M. 1294 Art 1(2) [HCCA] read along with T Hartley and
M Dogauchi, ‘Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ (HCCH Publications
2007) 33[11] www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf [HCCA, Hartley & Dogauchi Report]; and the decision of the Delhi High
Court in Gas Authority of India Ltd v SPIE CAPAG, SA & Ors [1993] (27) DRJ.
3 ibid.
4 JHC Morris and GC Cheshire, ‘The Proper Law of a Contract in the Conflict of Laws’ (1940) 56 Law Quarterly Review
320, 333, 334; and M Whinchop and M Keyes, ‘Putting the Private Back into Private International Law: Default Rules and
the Proper Law of the Contract’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 515, 517.
196 The Applicable Law in Contractual Obligations
insolvency, the governance of trusts or choice-of-court agreements, all of which are regulated by
special rules. This chapter discusses the principles of Indian private international law vis-à-vis the
identification of the applicable law in contractual obligations (ie matters of contract). What law
will govern a dispute arising from an agreement for the sale of furniture before an Indian court
between a seller (a person residing and domiciled in France) who alleges that the buyer (a person
residing and domiciled in India) has failed to pay for the goods? Or what law will the Indian court
apply to decide the rights and liabilities of contractual parties, if one alleges that the other was a
minor or had misrepresented specific facts at the time of the conclusion of the contract? These are
questions that will be addressed in this chapter.
This chapter is divided into five parts (including this Introduction). Section II will examine
the principles of Indian private international law on applicable law in contractual obligations.
This part is further divided into four sub-sections. Section A will provide an overview of the
development of the doctrine of the proper law of the contract, which is the mechanism to iden-
tify the applicable law. Section B will discuss the means to identify the proper law of the contract
in India. Besides, this section will examine the application of the proper law of the contract to
contracts concluded online (e-commerce transactions). In doing so, it will discuss the choice
of law implications when there are conflicting standard terms in an international commercial
contract. It will accordingly analyse the legal provisions and solutions adopted by the Indian
courts to resolve such predicaments, particularly in this era of heightened e-commerce transac-
tions. Section III will analyse the scope and the extent of the applicable law governing disputes
on the formal, material or essential validity of the contract; the performance of the contract; and
the capacity of the parties. Section IV will reflect on Indian private international law in light of
trends from other jurisdictions, such as the EU, the UK, China, Russia, Australia, Canada and
Nepal. This section will also examine the possible uses of the Hague Principles on the Choice of
Law in International Commercial Contracts (Hague Principles) in developing and supplement-
ing Indian conflict of law rules on applicable law in contractual matters. Section V will provide
concluding remarks.
II. Identification of the Applicable Law

in Contractual Obligations in India
A. Development of the Doctrine of the Proper Law
of the Contract: An Overview
In India, the rules to identify the applicable law in contractual obligations have not been codi-
fied. In such circumstances, the rules to determine the applicable law for disputes arising from
a contractual obligation with a foreign element have been developed by judicial dicta. In this
respect, the principles of English common law have been instrumental in shaping the principles
of Indian private international law. In English common law, the mechanism to identify the appli-
cable law is through the doctrine of the proper law of the contract which was developed in the
seminal case of Vita Food Products Incorporated v Unus Shipping Company.5 The Privy Council
was seised of a dispute which arose from a transportation contract concluded between a Nova
Scotian and an American corporation.6 The agreement was evidenced by a bill of lading which
5 [1939] AC 277.
6 ibid.
Identification of the Applicable Law in Contractual Obligations in India 197
exempted the master from liability from damage that could occur to the products by negligence
in transporting the same.7 The exemption clause contravened the Hague-Visby Rules which were
applicable in Newfoundland – the place from where the products were shipped.8 The parties had,
however, chosen English law to govern the contract.9 The court was, accordingly, called upon to
adjudicate the validity of the parties’ choice of English law. The Privy Council per Lord Wright
referred to the proper law of the contract as:
the law, which the parties intended to apply. That intention is objectively ascertained, and, if not expressed,
will be presumed from the terms of the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances.10
The decision of the Privy Council in Vita Food11 has formed the genesis of development of the
doctrine in India.
The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Indian General Investment Trust v Raja of
Khalikote was the first reported case in which the Court discussed the doctrine of the proper law
of the contract while adjudicating a dispute concerning a loan agreement between the respond-
ent Raja for himself and on behalf of his minor son and the petitioner on the security of a certain
property.12 The Court stated that:
the proper law of a contract means that law which a court is to apply in determining the obligations
under the contract. In deciding these matters, there are no rigid or arbitrary criteria such as lex loci
contractus or lex loci solutionis. The matter depends on the intention of the parties to be ascertained in
each case on a consideration of the terms of a contract the situation of the parties and generally on all
the surrounding facts from, which is to be gathered the intention of the parties.13
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd v Harnam Singh,
upon being seised of a dispute arising from a sale-agreement between two merchants residing in
Lyallpur (Pakistan) and India in which the law of Lyallpur was chosen, defined the proper law of
the contract as:
the law of the country in which the contract is localised. Its localisation will be indicated by what may
be called the grouping of its elements as reflected in its formation and its terms. The country in which its
elements are most densely grouped will represent its natural seat the country with which the contract is,
in fact, most substantially associated and in which lies its natural seat or centre of gravity.14
In National Thermal Power Corporation v Singer Corporation,15 the Supreme Court introduced
greater clarity on the interpretation of the doctrine of the proper law of the contract. Examining
two international commercial agreements between National Thermal Power (an Indian company)
and Singer (an English company) in which the English legal system was selected, the court stated
that the proper law of the contract is:
the legal system, by which the parties intended the contract to be governed, or where their intention is
neither expressed nor to be inferred from the circumstances, the system of law with which, the transac-
tion has the closest and most real connection.16
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 ibid 290.
11 ibid.
12 AIR [1952] Cal 508 [8] per Sinha J.
13 ibid.
14 AIR [1955] SC 590 [36].
15 [1992] 3 SCC 551.
16 ibid [14], referring to A Dicey, J Morris and L Collins (eds), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 11th edn
(Sweet and Maxwell, 1987) Rule 180: Sub-Rule (1), which defines ‘the proper law of the contract’.
In doing so, the Court formally introduced the tripartite hierarchy that the proper law of a
contract would be determined by assessing the express, implied or objective choice, thus, build-
ing on the foundations of Vita Food.17 Besides, the Court clarified that the proper law of the
contract refers to the substantive principles of the domestic law of the chosen system.18 In an
arbitration agreement, the Court stated that the proper law is ‘normally the same as the proper
law of the contract’.19
B. Identification of the Proper Law of the Contract

As has been shown above, the proper law of the contract comprises the express or the implied
choice of the parties. In its absence, the system of law with which the contract has its closest and
most real connection will be applied. This section will examine the interpretation given to each of
these aspects in Indian private international law.
i. Express Choice of Law

a. Parameters of Party Autonomy
Historically, the parties’ autonomy to choose a law was limited to a legal system which bore
a connection to the contract.20 In this respect, Cheshire’s objective interpretation of party
autonomy21 found favour in defining the limits of the parties’ express choice of law to govern
their contract.22 Anzilotti and Batifol’s23 theory of localisation which was endorsed by French
law24 formed the backbone of Cheshire’s interpretation of party autonomy in the choice of law.25
According to Cheshire, parties can select a proper law by localising the contract and grouping
the individual elements of their agreement to find its centre of gravity.26 The legal system with
which the contract is ‘most substantially associated’ after being localised would then govern the
contract.27 For instance, if the parties desire to select English law to govern the contract, they
would have to ‘localise’ the contract by grouping the elements of the agreement (such as the locus
contractus, the locus solutionis, the currency of the transaction, the seat of arbitration (if any)
17 (n 5).
18 National Thermal Power Corporation (n 15) headnote [4].
19 ibid [20]–[22].
20 See Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd v Harnam Singh, AIR [1955] SC 590, [37]; Rabindra N Maitra v Life Insurance
Corporation of India, AIR [1964] Cal 141, [18]–[29]; and British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew
Industries, [1990] 3 SCC 481 [37].
21 GC Cheshire, Private International Law, 6th edn (Clarendon Press, 1961) 215; and M Wolff, ‘The Choice of Law by
the Parties in International Contracts’ (1937) 49 Juridical Review 110, referring to Cheshire’s objective interpretation to
party autonomy.
22 S Khanderia, ‘Indian Private International Law vis-à-vis Party Autonomy in the Choice of Law’ (2018) 18(1) Oxford
University Commonwealth Law Journal 1, 1 [Khanderia, Party Autonomy].

23 Anzilotti, “Il principio dell’autonomia dei contraenti nei rapporti fra l’art. 9 delle disposizioni preliminari al codice
civile e l’art. 58 del codice di commercio”, Scritti di diritto internazionale privato, Vol 3 (Padova 1960) 633 (translated
version).
24 See J Blom, ‘Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of Contract’ (1980) 18 Canadian Yearbook of
International Law 161, 175 referring to H Batiffol, Les conflits de lois en matière de contrats: Étude de droit international
privé comparé (Paris 1938).
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 ibid.
and the language of the contract) in a manner that the agreement becomes ‘most substantially
associated’ with the law of that legal system. Cheshire’s objective interpretation of party autonomy
was adopted by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd v Harnam Singh.28
As indicated, the Court was seised of a dispute arising from a contract for the sale of cloth between
a Pakistani and an Indian merchant and the parties had chosen the law of Lyallpur to govern the
agreement.29 Although the parties had chosen the law of Lyallpur, which was connected to the
contract by the plaintiff ’s residence there, the Court clarified that Indian private international law
prohibits the parties from
picking out whatever laws they like from any part of the globe and agreeing those laws shall govern their
contract.30
The Court rejected the notion that the parties could choose any law as such freedom would
produce ‘strangely unrealistic results’.31 Instead, the Court stressed that the selection should be
restricted to the choice of ‘the law of the country in which the contract is localised’.32
The Supreme Court in British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew
Industries33 similarly adopted Cheshire’s objective interpretation in ascertaining the limitations
to party autonomy under the Indian private international law. The Court was seised of a dispute
arising from a contract evidenced by a bill of lading between a company in India and England in
which the proper law was expressly stipulated as the English legal system.34 The Court empha-
sised that the parties did not have the right ‘to choose a wholly unconnected law which was not
otherwise the proper law of the contract’.35 Accordingly, the Court stated that it could exercise
its ‘residual power to strike down for good reasons’ such clauses if the choice of law was not
connected to the contract.36
The decisions of the courts in Delhi Cloth and General Mills37 and British India Steam
Navigation38 no longer represent the current position on the subject. The current position has
been stipulated in the Supreme Court’s dictum in National Thermal Power.39 The Court per
Thommen and Agarwal JJ referred to Dicey’s subjective interpretation of party autonomy which
permits the parties to choose any foreign law to govern their international contract, regardless of
whether or not it has a nexus with the parties or their transaction.40 The Court stated that:
the expressed intention of the parties is generally decisive in determining the proper law of the
contract.41
The Court further referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Vita Food.42 It enunciated
that the only limitation to the autonomy of the parties to select any foreign law to govern their
28 Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd (n 20) [37].

29 ibid.
30 ibid [37].
31 ibid [36].
32 ibid, referring to Cheshire, Private International Law, 6th edn (OUP, 1961) 203.
33 [1990] 3 SCC 481 [31].
34 ibid.
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
37 (n 22).
38 (n 35).
39 (n 17).
40 ibid [14], referring to Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 12) Rule 180: Sub-Rule (1), which defines ‘the proper law of the
contract’.
41 ibid.
42 (n 5).
contract was that the choice should be bona fide, legal and not opposed to public policy.43 If the
parties have expressly chosen the proper law of the contract, then in the absence of ‘an unmis-
takable indication to the contrary’, such a law will also govern the arbitration agreement.44
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Modi Entertainment Network and Another v WSG Cricket
Pte Ltd45 confirmed the parties’ right to select any law, including that of a neutral legal system.
The parties there had concluded an international contract under which, the respondent granted
a licence to the appellant (an Indian company) to telecast a cricket tournament organised by the
International Cricket Conference (ICC) in Kenya on Indian television. The parties agreed that the
English court would have jurisdiction over, and English law would govern, any dispute arising
from the contract. Referring to the dictum in National Thermal Power,46 the Court per Syed Shah
Mohammed Quadri and Arijit Pasayat JJ accepted the parties’ choice in favour of the neutral
English law and emphasised that the selection would only be disregarded if it was not bona fide,
legal or was in contravention of public policy.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in National Thermal Power47 and Modi Entertainment
Network48 represents the current legal position in India by the constitutional mandate stipulated
in Article 141.49 Courts across the country have consistently accepted the dicta.50
In Kumarina Investment Ltd v Digital Media Convergence Ltd & Anr, the Telecom Dispute
Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) in New Delhi referred to the provisions of the
Rome I Regulation in obiter remarks and stated that the parties to an international contract
could also select different laws to govern parts of the contract that are separable from one
another.51 In doing so, the court impliedly accepted the principle of dépeçage which permits the
parties to an international contract to select different laws to govern parts of the contract that
are separable from one another.
b. Choice of Soft Law or Non-state Law

The terms ‘soft law’ and ‘non-state law’ refer to ‘non-binding legal instruments’,52 which have
‘no legally binding force and can only be applied through voluntary acceptance’.53 Such laws
may be in the form of inter alia model laws, the lex mercatoria used by global merchants,
restatements by scholars, or codifications of customs and usages promulgated by international
43 (n 15) [14].
44 ibid [24].
45 [2003] 4 SCC 341.
46 National Thermal Power Corporation (n 15) [14].
47 ibid.
48 (n 47).
49 See Art 141 of the Constitution of India 1950 which states that ‘[t]he law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all courts within the territory of India’.

50 See for instance Rhodia Ltd and Others v Neon Laboratories Ltd AIR [2002] Bom 502; White Industries Australia
Ltd v Coal India Ltd [2004] 2 Cal LJ 197; Swatch Ltd. v Priya Exhibitors Pvt Ltd (101) DRJ 99; Shree Precoated Steels Ltd.
v Macsteel International Far East Ltd. & Anr [2008] 2 Bom CR 681; and Max India Ltd. v General Binding Corporation
[2009] (112) DRJ 611 (DB).
51 [2010] TDSAT 73 [27].
52 See, HD Gabriel, ‘The Advantages of Soft Law in International Commercial Law: The Role of UNIDROIT,
UNCITRAL, and the Hague Conference’ (2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 658; and MJ Bonell,
An International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(Transnational Publishers, 2005) 200–208.
53 MJ Bonell, ‘Soft Law and Party Autonomy: The case of the UNIDROIT Principles’ (2005) 51 Loyola Law Review
229, 229.
non-governmental organisations.54 The UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial

Contracts (PICC),55 the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,56
and the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) INCOTERMS57 are examples.58 Of their
many benefits, soft or non-state laws have in recent times gained popularity, because they do
away with the ‘inherent difficulties’ present in the harmonisation of positive or binding law,
which may not be feasible given varying legal cultures among jurisdictions adopting civil and
common law traditions.59 Moreover, soft law, unlike the binding character of positive law,
does not need to be ratified and can, therefore, be adopted and applied in a ‘pick-and-choose’
fashion.60 Legislators and judges may selectively borrow provisions of soft law according to
the needs and demands of their legal system as opposed to adopting an entire instrument.61
Besides, the parties to an international contract may select a soft law instrument (in whole or
part) to govern their agreement either because of the neutrality of such instrument or because
its ‘rules reflect their business relationship better than domestic or other international law’.62
Indian private international law permits the parties expressly to select a non-state law to
govern their international arbitration agreements. Section 28 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act 1996 (ACA) accordingly mandates a tribunal to ‘decide the dispute in accordance with the
rules of law designated by the parties’.63 The legislation additionally empowers the tribunal to
refer to and apply such rules when appropriate, provided that the parties have expressly author-
ised the application of those rules.64 An obiter of the Delhi High Court, however, indicates that
lex mercatoria is not considered as soft law in India.65 This was the position in National Highways
Authority of India v Sheladia Associates, INC, where the court was called upon to adjudicate a
dispute arising from a contract to provide construction supervision services. The agreement
contained an arbitration clause.66 The court stated:
[T]he expression ‘lex mercatoria’ is not found in arbitration clauses, and some commentators have
doubted whether it has any meaning. Those who do assign it a meaning differ as to whether it is a
separate body of international commercial law or equivalent to freedom from strict legal constraint.67
The parties are, nonetheless free to select other ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations’.68
The courts have in the past referred to the PICC while adjudicating domestic contracts to
resolve ambiguities that were not addressed by the Indian Contract Act 187269 (ICA). This was
54 Gabriel (n 52) 658, 659.

55 UNIDROIT, ‘UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts, 2016’ www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/principles2016/principles2016-e.pdf [PICC].
56 The text of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is available at: https://uncitral.
un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/19-09955_e_ebook.pdf.
57 For detailed information on the ICC Incoterms, visit: iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/incoterms-rules/
incoterms-2020/.
58 See Gabriel (n 52) 659, 660; and AD Robilant, ‘Genealogies of Soft Law’ (Summer 2006) 54(3) The American Journal
of Comparative Law 499, 500.

59 Gabriel, ibid 660–663.
60 ibid 664–665.
61 ibid 664 et seq.
62 ibid 669.
63 Section 28(2) of the ACA.
64 ibid, s 28(1)(b)(iii).
65 National Highways Authority of India v Sheladia Associates INC [2009] 113 DRJ 835.
66 ibid.
67 ibid [30].
68 ibid.
69 The Indian Contract Act 1872 (Act 9 of 1872) [ICA]. See s 1(1) which states that the legislation applies to the whole
of India – except the States of Jammu and Kashmir.

the position in Sandvik Asia Pvt Ltd v Vardhman Promoters Pvt Ltd70 and Hansalaya Properties
v Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd.71 At the same time, in the absence of a corresponding provi-
sion of a similar nature or of case-law dealing with the question, there is no clarity on whether
the parties to an international contract may expressly select soft law in matters of litigation.
A close look at the Supreme Court’s dictum in National Thermal Power72 indicates that Indian
private international law does not permit parties to choose a non-state law if the dispute is
being adjudicated before a court (and not through arbitration). In the present case, the Court
re-defined the doctrine of the proper law as a ‘legal system’ which the parties may have expressly
or impliedly selected and further elaborated that the expression refers to the ‘substantive prin-
ciples of domestic law’.73 The remarks of the TDSAT in Kumarina Investment74 in this context
further substantiate this interpretation. The TDSAT was called upon to adjudicate the validity of
the parties’ choice of neutral law (that is, the English legal system) to govern their international
agreement. The respondents, being a company incorporated in India, concluded a contract
with the petitioners who were situated in Cyprus and operating in Israel. Under the contract,
the respondents agreed to permit the petitioners to stream certain television channels on a
website in Israel. A dispute arose when the former allegedly discontinued transmission of some
channels. Upholding party autonomy in the choice of law, the TDSAT referred to European
conflict-of-law principles as espoused in the Rome I Regulation, which permit the incorpora-
tion by reference of non-state laws (such as the PICC) as terms of a contract, in contrast to the
selection of non-state laws as applicable law. The TDSAT held that the latter was not possible
because non-state laws do not constitute any national legal system.75
c. Limitations to the Express Choice of Law

The choice must be ‘bona fide, legal and not opposed to public policy’: As indicated above, the
Supreme Court in National Thermal Power referred to the dictum in Vita Food76 and stipu-
lated that the only limitation to the autonomy of the parties to select any governing law for
the disputes arising from their international contract was that the choice should be bona fide,
legal and not opposed to public policy.77 At the same time, the precise connotation of this
expression remains unclear in English common law and under Indian private international
law. Academic writings enunciate that the choice of law would not be considered to be bona
fide if it is not made in good faith.78 For this reason, the examination of a choice as bona fide
70 (2007) 94 DRJ 762. Also see Khanderia, Party Autonomy (n 22) 14; and S Khanderia, ‘Practice does not Make Perfect:
Rethinking the Doctrine of ‘The Proper Law of the Contract’ – A Case for the Indian Courts’ (2020) 16(3) Journal of
Private International Law 423. [Khanderia, Practice Does not Make Perfect].
71 [2008] 106 DRJ 820 (DB). Also see Khanderia, Party Autonomy, ibid 14; and Khanderia, Practice does not Make
Perfect, ibid 433–434.

72 (n 15).
73 ibid [14], referring to Dicey, Morris and Collins (eds), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (n 16) Rule 180:
Sub-Rule (1), which defines ‘the proper law of the contract’. FA Mann, The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws (1987) 36
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 437, 437–438. [Mann, The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws].
74 (n 51) [27].
75 ibid, referring to A Bonomi, ‘Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ (2010) 10
Yearbook of Private International Law 165, 169.

76 (n 5).
77 (n 15) [14].
78 P Kincaid, ‘Rationalising Contract Choice of Law Rules’ (1993) 8(1) Ottago Law Review 93, 112.
is subjective.79 Dicey,80 Morris81 and Kelly82 articulate that the parties’ choice of law will be
regarded to have been made in bad faith if it contradicts the overriding mandatory norms of
the legal system which has the closest connection with the contract. Such a legal system (with
the closest connection) may be the forum state or any other country. The decision of the House
of Lords in The Hollandia83 further substantiates this interpretation. The court disregarded the
parties’ choice of Dutch law for not being bona fide and legal because it contradicted the over-
riding mandatory norms espoused in the Hague-Visby Rules.84 The Hague-Visby Rules were
applicable in the UK under the provisions of the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971.85
The circumstances in which the choice of law will contravene the overriding mandatory
norms of a legal system are similarly nebulous. In this respect, Nygh (1999) demonstrates the
close relationship and interlinkage between mandatory norms and public policy.86 The author
opines that a rule or law will assume a mandatory character when the state desires it to be appli-
cable regardless of the choice of another legal system.87 A provision will generally be mandatory if
it endeavours to protect public interest and values and is, therefore, exceptional yet imperative by
nature.88 Mandatory rules are, consequently, a subspecies of public policy insofar as they perform
certain special functions such as a marriage law which prohibits polygamy.89 Public policy, on the
other hand, seeks to protect the general, yet essential, social concepts of the forum.90 The term
‘public policy’ refers to legislation of the forum state which is intended to have effect regardless of
the choice of the parties.91 Such a statute is therefor, intended to operate in the form of mandatory
law of the forum.92
In Indian private international law, it seems that the criterion to identify if the choice of
the law violates an overriding mandatory norm is the same as that to gauge the contraven-
tion of public policy. The decision of the Supreme Court in Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General
Electric Co93 illustrates this point. The Court clarified that in matters of international commer-
cial arbitration,94 the validity of the parties’ choice of law must be tested against the public
policy of India. The choice would be construed as being against the public policy of India
if it is against ‘some fundamental principle of justice … prevalent concepts of good morals
[or] deep-rooted traditions of the commonweal’.95 Further, in Ssangyong Engineering &
79 ibid, referring to JHC Morris, ‘The Proper Law of a Contract: A Reply’ (1950) 3 International Law Quarterly 197,
202–203 at ff 15 [Morris, The Proper Law].

80 See Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (n 16) 756.
81 JHC Morris, ‘The Scope of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971’ (1979) 95 Law Quarterly Review 59, 66 [Morris,
Scope of Carriage]; and Morris, The Proper Law (n 79) 202–203.

82 Kincaid (n 78) 112, referring to D St L Kelly, ‘Reference, Choice, Restriction and Prohibition’ (1977) 26 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 857, 870–871 at ff 20.

83 [1982] 1 All ER 1076, 1080. Also see, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (n 16) 756; and Morris, Scope of
Carriage (n 81) 66, which state that a choice of law would be disregarded for not being ‘bonafide’ if it contravened the
overriding mandatory norms of the legal system with which the contract has its closest connection.
84 ibid.
85 ibid.
86 PE Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (OUP, 1999) 199 et seq.
87 ibid 199.
88 ibid referring to Savigny, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 2nd edn (Gutherie translation 1880) 76.
89 ibid 199–207.
90 ibid 206–207.
91 Nygh (n 86) 456.
92 ibid.
93 [1994] Supp (1) SCC 644.
94 See s 2(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 [ACA] Act No 26 of 1996, which defines the term ‘interna-
tional commercial arbitration’.

95 ibid [51]–[57], referring to the dictum of Cardozo J in Louchs v Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198.
Construction Co. Ltd. v National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)96 the Supreme Court
clarified that the public policy of India would be violated in an international commercial
arbitration agreement if the choice of the law violates: (1) the fundamental policy or the inter-
ests of the Republic; and (2) the most basic notions of justice and morality.97
In matters of litigation, there are isolated dicta which offer persuasive assistance to ascer-
tain when the parties’ express choice of law will be disregarded for being bona fide, legal, or
against public policy. Existing case law does not stipulate broad guidelines for the courts to follow.
Instead, judicial dicta merely indicate that the parties’ choice will be construed as opposed to
public policy if it is illegal and, therefore, null and void under the provisions of the ICA. For this
reason, agreements in restraint to trade will be construed as opposed to public policy because
they are illegal and, thus, null and void under Section 27 of the ICA.
For instance, the Bombay High Court in Taprogge Gesellschaft MBH v IAEC India Ltd refused
to give effect to the parties’ choice of German law on the ground that the agreement contained
a clause which, if given effect to, would result in the violation of an imperative rule under the
ICA.98 The plaintiff was a company incorporated in Germany and engaged in the business of
manufacturing cooling water filters. The defendants, an Indian company and agents of the plain-
tiffs, were made to sign a declaration with the latter under which they would sell or offer for sale
some of the plaintiff ’s products. Striking down the choice of German law, the Court per Guttal J
stressed that although the agreement and its performance were valid under that law, it operated
as a restraint to trade and was thus unenforceable.99 The Court further elaborated that sections 23
and 27 of the ICA espouse the public policy of India and are therefore imperative and will be
given effect to, regardless of whether the parties have selected another legal system.100 While
section 23 declares as void all agreements which are against the public policy of India, section 27
prohibits agreements that restrain any person from exercising a lawful profession, trade or busi-
ness. In a related vein, the TDSAT in Kumarina Investment Ltd, when called upon to examine
the validity of the parties’ choice in favour of the neutral English legal system elaborated that the
contravention of the public policy of India could be ascertained against the criteria stipulated in
the relevant provisions of the ICA and, in particular, sections 23, 27 and 28.101 Such choice-of-law
clauses will accordingly be considered as illegal when they operate in restraint of trade, restrict
any party from enforcing its rights under the contract, or otherwise extinguish or discharge the
liability of a party.102
d. Protection of Weaker Parties

Indian private international law does not stipulate any special rules to regulate the freedom of the
parties in selecting a foreign law in international contracts which have been concluded between
persons possessing unequal bargaining power. Typical illustrations of such agreements include
consumer, insurance and employment contracts. Considered as vulnerable, consumers, employ-
ees and others with lesser bargaining power need to be protected from party autonomy for several
96 [2019] SCC Online SC 677 [13], [28] and [37].

97 ibid.
98 AIR [1988] Bom 157.
99 ibid [21]–[22].
100 ibid.
101 Kumarina Investment Ltd (n 51) [11], [14], [16], [17], while referring to the Supreme Court’s dictum in the National
Thermal Power (n 15).

102 ibid.
reasons.103 First, such parties are susceptible of being less informed as regards the content of the
chosen law when compared to the stronger party in the agreement, such as a business person,
employer or principal who routinely engages in concluding contracts and is thus more familiar
with the contents of the law that are likely to be advantageous to it.104 Second, weaker parties are
also economically dependent on the other party and are therefore likely to succumb to a choice of
law clause.105 Third, such parties are also likely to be disadvantaged due to the lack of information
and experience (in comparison to the stronger party) and, thus, capable of agreeing on the chosen
law too quickly.106 Judicial dicta indicate that a domestic contract with a weaker party will be
presumed to be unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable and thus opposed to the public policy
of India under section 23 of the ICA.107 In such circumstances, the court will declare the contract
as void for taking advantage of ‘oppressed or depressed people’.
This was the position in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd v Brojo Nath
Ganguly.108 The Supreme Court refused to give effect to a contract which permitted the employer
(a government-owned corporation) to dismiss the employee without cause by giving three
months’ notice or pay in lieu.109 The Court stated that the contract was unconscionable and
opposed to public policy.110 Accordingly, such agreements would be construed as void, illegal
and opposed to public policy.111 They will not be given effect if they result in taking advantage of
‘oppressed or depressed persons’.112 In Amrit Banaspati Co Ltd v State of Punjab,113 the Supreme
Court provided indicia to assess the circumstances in which contracts with weaker parties would
be conceived as a contraventions of public policy under section 23 of the ICA. The Court illus-
trated that an agreement with a weaker party would be presumed to contravene the public policy
of India whenever the
inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the
contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the
creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in the position
in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the
stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful
choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form
or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a
clause in the contract may be.114
A contract with a weaker party will, accordingly, be tested to gauge if:

(1) there is a significant disparity in the economic strength of the parties;115
(2) one party cannot trade in goods or services except on the terms of the other,116 or
103 G Rühl, ‘The Protection of Weaker Parties in the Private International Law of the European Union: A Portrait of
Inconsistency and Truancy’ (2014) Journal of Private International Law 335, 339 et seq.
104 ibid 342.
105 ibid 343, 344.
106 ibid 344, 345.
107 See, Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd v Brojo Nath Ganguly [1986] 2 SCR 278. See also, N Bhadbhade,
Pollock and Mulla on the Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts 14th edn (Lexis Nexis Publications, 2014) 562; and
A Singh, ‘Law of Contract and Specific Relief ’ 12th edn (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow) 285.
108 Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd (n 107).
109 ibid.
110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 ibid.
113 AIR [1992] SC 1075; and Bhadbhade (n 107) 563–564.
114 Amrit Banaspati ibid 1611.
115 ibid; and Bhadbhade (n 107) 563–564.
116 ibid.
(3) one party has no meaningful choice except to accept the terms proposed by the other,
however unreasonable.117
If the court finds any of the above aspects, it will declare the contract void under section 23 of the
ICA. Having regards to the principles just discussed, it is likely that party autonomy in the choice
of law will not be absolutely prohibited or limited in contracts which have been concluded with a
weaker party under Indian private international law. Instead, a choice of law may be disregarded
if the agreement contains terms which are unreasonable or unconscionable and results in the
contravention of public policy.
ii. Implied Choice of Law

The implied choice of the parties operates as the second tier in identifying the proper law of
the contract. The Supreme Court in National Thermal Power confirmed that the implied choice
of the parties would play a prominent role when the parties have not expressly selected the
proper law to govern their contract.118 At the same time, there is no dictum in which the courts
have identified the applicable law by referring to the implied choice of the parties. The exist-
ing judicial dicta are primarily in the form of obiter observations and merely suggest possible
mechanisms that the judiciary will adopt in such circumstances. A close examination of exist-
ing dicta indicates that the courts do not adopt different criteria for the determination of the
implied choice of the parties and the proper law of the contract when the parties have not made
any choice at all. In this respect, the practice of the Indian courts resonates with the principles
of English common law.
The judicial trend in England has been to impute an intention to the parties even when it is
sufficiently clear that the parties did not think about the matter at the time of the conclusion of
the contract. The decision of the House of Lords in Amin Rasheed Shipping Co v Kuwait Insurance
Co119 is pertinent. The standard term contract employed English terminology to govern an insur-
ance policy issued by a company in Kuwait to a Liberian corporation in Dubai.120 The contract
contained no choice of law clause.121 Accordingly, the court per Lord Diplock inferred or instead
imputed English law as the law intended by the parties to govern their contract.122 Lord Simonds
in an obiter, however, stressed that the search for imputed intentions must be prioritised over the
‘closest and most real connection’ test.123 The latter must therefore be employed only when the
former ‘fails that enquiry’.124
A plethora of judicial dicta in India illustrates that the courts in India will similarly impute an
intention on the parties to ascertain whether they have made a tacit choice of law. For instance,
in State Aided Bank of Travancore v Dhrit Ram, the Privy Council stated that, in the absence of
an express choice of law, the judiciary would identify the applicable law by referring to what
‘just and reasonable persons’ would have done ‘if they had thought about the question when
they had made the contract’.125 In doing so, the court would look at the place of the conclusion
117 ibid.
118 (n 15) [13].
119 [1984] AC 50.
120 ibid.
121 ibid.
122 [1984] AC 50.
123 ibid 9.
124 JE Jaffey, ‘The English Proper Law Doctrine and the EEC Convention’ (1984) 33 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 531, 533, referring to Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. (n 119).

125 AIR [1943] PC 6 [2].
of the contract, its performance and the nature of the business or transaction as relevant
factors.126 Further, in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v Harnam Singh and Others, the
Supreme Court stated that the proper law of the contract, in the absence of an express choice
would be identified by imputing an intention on the parties.127 The intention would be imputed
by applying the objective test to determine the country with which the contract has the closest
connection.128 In a related vein, the Calcutta High Court in Rabindra N Maitra v Life Insurance
Corporation of India indicated that the proper law of the contract would be identified by apply-
ing the theory of localisation in the absence of an express choice of law.129 In other words, the
Court made no reference to the implied choice of the parties. Instead, it referred to Cheshire’s
theory of localisation.130 It stated that in the absence of choice, the proper law of the contract
would be identified by looking for the centre of gravity of the agreement.131 The court would,
accordingly, apply the law of the legal system with which ‘the contract appears most prop-
erly to belong’.132 The decision of the Supreme Court in National Thermal Power133 resonates
with the earlier decisions in Delhi Cloth and General Mills134 and Rabindra N Maitra135 which
demonstrates the lack of different criterion to identify the proper law through the parties’
implied choice and when the parties have not made any choice. The court per Thommen
and Agarwal JJ stated that in the absence of an express choice, the implied choice would be
identified by i mputing an intention on the parties
by applying an objective test to determine what the parties would have, as just and reasonable persons
intended as regards the applicable law had they applied their minds to the question.136
The intention of the parties concerning the applicable law would be identified by looking at:
the place where the contract was made, the form and the object of the contract, the place of
performance, the place of residence or the business of the parties, reference to the courts having juris-
diction and some other links are examined by the courts to determine the system of law with which, the
transaction has the closest and most real connection.137
iii. Absence of Choice of Law and the ‘Closest and Most Real
Connection Test’
The decision of the Privy Council in Vita Food merely indicated that in the absence of choice,
the proper law of the contract would be identified by looking at ‘the terms of the contract
and the surrounding circumstances’.138 However, it did not clarify the mechanism for the
same. A subsequent decision of the Privy Council’s decision in Bonython v Commonwealth
126 ibid.
127 (n 20) [43] referring to the decision of the English court in Mount Albert Borough Council v Australasian Temperance,
etc. Society [1937] 4 All ER 214, 240.

128 ibid.
129 (n 20) [22].
130 See text accompanying notes 20–28.
131 ibid.
132 Rabindra Maitra (n 20) [22].
133 (n 15).
134 (n 20).
135 ibid.
136 National Thermal Power (n 15) [16]–[17] referring to Mount Albert Borough Council (n 127).
137 ibid.
138 (n 5) 290.
of Australia139 clarified that, in the absence of choice, the proper law would be identified by
applying the closest and most real connection test.140 The decision of the Privy Council thus
forms the genesis of the development of the ‘closest and most real connection’ test under the
English common law. The closest and most real connection test was propagated by Westlake
and Cheshire.141 The principle involves the application of Batiffol’s theory of localisation as
endorsed by French law,142 which has been discussed in brief in the section discussing the
historical development of party autonomy in Indian private international law. According to
this principle, the court must locate the centre of gravity of a contract to determine its proper
law when the parties have not expressly selected the same.143 As indicated above, the Supreme
Court in National Thermal Power Corporation144 stipulated the application of the test in the
absence of the parties’ express or implied choice. In such circumstances, the court will iden-
tify the proper law of the contract by finding ‘the system of law with which, the contract has
the closest and most real connection’.145 Therefore, the ‘system of law’ as opposed to a place
which bears a close and most real connection to the contract would be relevant. In this respect,
Lord Diplock in Amin Rasheed Shipping Co v Kuwait Insurance Co clarified that the ‘system of
law’ in a contract where the documents use English terminology would be England irrespective
of whether the transaction was more closely connected with Kuwait as a place.146 The crite-
rion which the courts have employed to interpret the closest and most real connection test has
varied over time and may be divided into two categories. These are: (1) the theory of localisa-
tion; and (2) the test of the parties’ imputed intentions.
a. Theory of Localisation
Historically, the theory of localisation played a crucial role while assisting the courts to ascer-
tain the proper law of the contract, even when the parties had expressly chosen the same. Its
application was initially endorsed by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills which
stated that the mechanism to identify the proper law of a contract would be by localising the
contract after searching for its centre of gravity.147 Subsequently, the Calcutta High Court in
Rabindra N Maitra148 stipulated a list of factors that would be relevant in finding the centre of
gravity of the contract. These are:
the domicile and even the residence of the parties; the national character of a corporation and the place
where its principal place of business is situated; the place where the contract is made and the place
where the contract is to be performed; the fact that [a] certain stipulation is valid under one law but void
under another; the nature of the subject-matter or its situs … and in short, any other fact which serves
to localise the contract.149
139 [1951] AC 201.

140 ibid 219.
141 See GC Cheshire, Private International Law (Clarendon Press 1957) 249 et seq; and N Bentwich, Westlake’s Private
International Law 7th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 1925) 299 et seq.
142 J Blom, ‘Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of Contract’ (1980) 18 Canadian Yearbook of
International Law 161, 175.

143 JE Jaffey (n 124) 531, 533, 534.
145 ibid.
146 [1983] 2 All ER 884.
147 Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd (n 20) [37].
148 (n 20) [29].
149 ibid.
Similarly, in National Thermal Power, the court considered:

the place where the contact was made, the form and object of the contract, the place of performance,
the place of business or performance of the parties, the reference to the courts having jurisdiction and
such other links150
to be relevant while identifying the system of law with which the contract has the closest and
most real connection.
b. Test of the Parties’ Imputed Intentions

The test of the imputed intention of the parties has been a disguised method to identify the
parties’ implied choice of the applicable law. Judicial dicta and in particular the decision of the
Supreme Court in National Thermal Power demonstrate that Indian private international law
does not differentiate between the mechanism to identify the parties’ implied choice and their
imputed intention in the absence of a choice of the governing law.151 The criteria which the courts
have employed to discern the imputed intentions of the parties, while identifying the system of
law with which the contract has its closest and most real connection, have been convoluted and
far from uniform. In some decisions, the courts have demonstrated a preference for identifying
the proper law by contemplating what ‘just and reasonable persons’ would have done ‘had they
thought about the matter’.152 In other cases, the courts have invoked certain presumptions to
gauge the imputed intentions of the parties.
iv. The ‘Just and Reasonable Person’ Test

In Brijraj Marwari & Ors v Anant Prasad, which was the first such opinion on the subject in the
pre-Independence era, Edgley J mentioned that imputed intentions should be determined by
contemplating what ‘just and reasonable persons’ would have done ‘had they thought about the
matter’.153 In National Thermal Power, the Supreme Court similarly stated that it would impute an
intention on the parties by looking at what ‘just and reasonable persons intended as regards the
applicable law had they applied their minds to the question’.154 Accordingly, the Court indicated
that the imputed intentions would be identified by looking at factors such as the locus contractus,
the locus solutionis, the parties’ place of residence, the form and object of the agreement, and the
jurisdiction of the court.155
v. Presumptions
Presumptions, which are ‘prima facie inferences’156 that are ‘rebuttable by the surrounding
circumstances of the case’,157 are another mechanism which the courts have employed to discern
150 (n 15) [16], [18] referring to the decision of the English court in Mount Albert Borough Council (n 127) 107.
151 ibid [16]–[17] and text accompanying notes 118–137.
152 See section II.A.ii of this chapter.
153 AIR [1942] Cal 509 [2].
154 (n 15) [16].
155 ibid [17].
156 M Schmitthoff, ‘Doctrine of the Proper Law of the Contract in the English Conflict of Laws’ (1940) 28 The Georgetown
Law Journal 447, 453.

157 ibid.
the imputed intentions of the parties. Their relevance was recognised by the Supreme Court in
Dhanrajamal Gobindram v Shamji Kalidas & Co158 and occasionally by some other lower courts
in India.159 In Dhanrajamal Gobindram, the Court stipulated the following presumptions as rele-
vant to in ascertaining the proper law of the contract in the absence of an express choice:
(1) lex loci contractus: Under this presumption, the courts may assume that the parties intended
to be governed by the law of the place at which the agreement was concluded, even if
the meeting was transitory or fleeting and has no other connection with the contract.160
(2) lex loci solutionis: Under this presumption, the law of the place of the performance of the
contract would be relevant in identifying the applicable law in the absence of choice.161
(3) lex fori: Under this presumption, the parties are treated as having intended that the law of
the place of arbitration or litigation is to govern disputes arising from their contract.
The Court clarified that the lex loci contractus would be applicable only when it coincides with
the lex loci solutionis. It was, therefore, ‘an accepted rule’ that in all other circumstances, the locus
solutionis or the place of the performance would gain priority over the locus contractus.162 At the
same time, there was no clarity on how the place of performance would be identified under the
Indian private international law. Would it be the place from where the goods or services are sold
or rendered or the place where they are delivered? How would the locus solutionis be ascertained
if there is more than one place of performance?
In the absence of any judicial dictum, the use of the locus solutionis remains a contentious
issue under the Indian conflict of law rules on applicable law. There have been isolated cases
where the courts have in an obiter dicta commented on the mechanism to identify the locus
solutionis.163 Nonetheless, these decisions were directly pertinent to the ascertainment of the
proper law. In Shanmugham Chettiar v Annamalai Chettiar, the Madras High Court expressed
that the locus solutionis should be identified within the parameters of sections 47 to 49 of the ICA
which stipulate the principles concerning the place and the time of performance of a contract.164
The Court stated that, as a general rule, the place of the performance of the contract would be
the ‘place where the promise ought to be performed’.165 If the promisee fails to stipulate a ‘proper
place’, then the promisor may ask for a reasonable place.166 The place of the performance would
therefore depend on the type of the contract and the persons who may be regarded as a promi-
sor and promisee in each case.167 For instance, in a dispute for the sale of goods or services, the
promisor may be the buyer if the dispute arises in connection to the non-payment for the goods
or the service. Conversely, in a dispute for non-delivery, the promisor would be the seller or the
service provider.168 The court in Shanmugham Chettiar further indicated that it may at its discre-
tion permit the promisee to avail of the principles of common law which require that ‘the debtor
158 AIR [1961] SC 1285.

159 M/S Lachman Das Sat Lal AIR [1958] Punjab 258; CV Kunhiman v PMK Idrosekutty AIR [1958] Ker 126 [9]; and
Compagnie de Saint Gobain v Fertiliser Corporation of India Ltd, ILR (1970) II Delhi.
160 Dhanrajamal Gobindram (n 158) [28].
161 ibid.
162 ibid [29]. Also see, Compagnie de Saint Gobain (n 159).
163 See, Shanmugham Chettiar v Annamalai Chettiar AIR [1974] Mad 305 and LN Gupta & Anr v Smt Tara Maini ILR
(1984) I Del.
164 Shanmugham Chettiar, ibid [6].
165 ibid.
166 ibid.
167 See Khanderia, Practice does not Make Perfect (n 70) 444–445.
168 ibid.
should seek the creditor’.169 The acceptance of the common law principle that ‘the debtor should
seek the creditor’ has, nonetheless, been far from uniform.
For instance, in Firm Hira Lal Girdhari Lal & Anr v Baij Nath Hardial Khatri, the Punjab
High Court stated that the common law rule was inapplicable in India.170 The courts would
examine the contract as a whole, including the course of dealings between the parties and the
creditor’s ordinary place of business or residence, to identify where the money was paid.171
Conversely, in SP Consolidated Engineering Co (P) Ltd v Union of India & Anr,172 State of Punjab
v AK Raha (Engineers) Ltd,173 and LN Gupta & Anr v Smt Tara Maini174 the High Courts of
Calcutta and Madras indicated acceptance of the common law principle in the interests of
justice, equity and good conscience.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General Electric Co stated
that the lex loci solutionis refers to ‘the law of the place where the debt or liability is payable’.175
The Court in the present case was called upon to clarify the date for the conversion of the money
payable for the performance of the parties’ international commercial contract. It, thus, appears
that the lex loci solutionis will be the place of payment by the constitutional mandate under
Article 141 which states that ‘the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts
within the territory of India’.
In respect of the lex fori, the court in Dhanrajamal Gobindram stipulated that ‘if the courts
of a particular country were chosen, it is expected, unless there be an expressed intention or
evidence, that they would apply their own law to the case’.176 This position was confirmed
by the Supreme Court in British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd.177 However, in National
Thermal Power, the Supreme Court stressed the extreme caution with which, arbitration
clauses should be relied on to ascertain the proper law.178 The Court per Thommen and
Agarwal JJ stated that ‘the mere selection … will not, in the absence of any other relevant
connecting factor with that place, be sufficient to draw an inference’.179 The Court remarked
that having regard to ‘the rest of the contract and the surrounding circumstances’, other
factors should additionally play a crucial role while imputing intention in favour of the
application of the law of the place of the arbitration.180
At present, the exact relevance of the presumption in favour of the lex fori in the conflict
of law rules of India on the applicable law remains ambiguous.181 The Supreme Court has in
169 (n 163) [7].

170 AIR [1960] Punjab 450 [9].
171 ibid.
172 AIR [1966] Cal 259 [14].
173 AIR [1964] Cal 418 [13].
174 ILR [1984] I Del [7].
175 Renusagar Power Co Ltd (n 93) [107], defining the term ‘money of payment’.
176 ibid [29].
177 British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd (n 20). See also, Fertiliser Corporation of India v Chemical Construction
Corporation [1973] 75 Bom LR 335 [21].

178 National Thermal Power Corporation (n 15).
179 ibid.
180 National Thermal Power (n 15) [15], [45].
181 See in this respect, JL Neels, ‘Choice of Forum and Tacit Choice of Law: The Supreme Court of India and the Hague
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (an appeal for an inclusive comparative approach
to private international law)’ in UNIDROIT (ed) Eppur si muove: The Age of Uniform Law. Essays in Honour of Michael
Joachim Bonell to celebrate his 70th birthday (2016) 358, 365 et seq. [Neels, Choice of Forum and Tacit Choice of Law];
JL Neels, ‘The Role of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts in Indian and
South African Private International Law’ (2017) 22 Uniform Law Review / Revue de droit uniforme 443, 446; and JL Neels
‘Indian perspectives on the Hague Principles’ in D Girsberger, T Kadner Graziano and JL Neels (gen eds), Choice of Law
in International Commercial Contracts. Global Perspectives on the Hague Principles (OUP, 2021) 481–483 [24.11]–[24.13].
Modi Entertainment Network and another,182 Shreejee Traco (I) Pvt Ltd v Paperline International
Ltd183 and Union of India v Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC184 stated that the
parties’ choice of an arbitration venue or seat would create a strong prima facie presumption
of the parties’ intentions vis-à-vis the applicable law. In doing so, the Court did not refer to the
selection of the place of arbitration or forum as merely one of the indicators in discerning the
parties’ choice of applicable law. As a result, it appears that the parties’ choice of forum may
exclusively be construed as a presumption of their choice of governing law.
vi. Identification of the Proper Law of the Contract in E-commerce

Transactions
The term e-commerce refers to transactions that take place over the internet. Such transac-
tions often contain contradictory standard terms which are obligations contained at the back
of the contract. The standard terms of a contract are rarely read until litigation arises and are
more susceptible to contradictions if the agreement is concluded between large entities. The
predicament which occurs as a result of contradictory standard terms is known as the ‘battle of
forms’.185 In international contracts which have been concluded over the internet, the parties’
standard terms will often contain their choice of the applicable law, which are likely to be contra-
dictory. For instance, A (a seller which is a company incorporated in Greece) may designate
Greek law in its standard terms while concluding a contract to sell certain products to B (a buyer
who resides in Delhi). However, B may have designated Indian law to govern the contract when
accepting A’s offer to sell the product. Suppose that A wants to sue B for the failure to pay for the
goods. A initiates proceedings against B before the courts in Delhi which is the place of B’s resi-
dence. What law will the Indian courts apply to decide the rights and the liabilities of the parties?
Will it be Greek or Indian law? The answer will depend on whether the parties agreed on the
applicable law. Whether they decided on the applicable law will in turn depend on whether the
contract is valid, considering that it contains contradictory terms. Indian private international
law does not clarify the mechanism to resolve the predicament in contradictory choice of law
clauses. To date, the courts have not been presented with an opportunity to address the matter.
In such circumstances, the courts are likely to refer to domestic principles as enunciated in the
ICA to resolve such ambiguities. The general principles of Indian law of contract prescribe the
last-shot method, which is stipulated in section 7 of the ICA.186 According to this principle,
the terms of the offer and acceptance must be identical.187 Accordingly, the contract would not
be concluded if the offer and acceptance do not constitute a mirror-image of each other.188
Thus, if a person presents new terms to the offeror, instead of accepting the offer, this will
182 (n 45) [16].

183 [2003] 9 SCC 79 [7].
184 Civil Appeal No 4628 of 2018 [2].
185 TK Graziano, ‘Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of Law Clauses in Battle of Forms Situations: The Hague
Solution’ (2013) 14 Yearbook of Private International Law 71, 73.

186 See the decisions of the Supreme Court in Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneeram Bangur & Co, [1954] SCR 310. Also see
Superintendence Company of India (P) Ltd v Krisha Murgai, AIR [1980] SC 1717, 1721–22. For a detailed discussion on
the battle of forms in India see, S Khanderia, ‘International Approaches as Plausible Solutions to Resolve the Battle of
Forms under the Indian Law of Contract’ (2019) 1 8 Global Journal of Comparative law 13–17 [Khanderia, International
Approaches as Plausible Solutions].
187 See, Haji Mohd Haji Jiva v E Spinner, ILR (1900) 24 Bom 510 per Sir Jenkins CJ. Also see, Singh (n 107) 37.
188 See ss 2(b), 2(h), 7 and 9 of the ICA.
Scope of the Proper Law of the Contract 213
constitute a counter-offer under the provisions of the ICA.189 The contract is considered to have
been concluded on the terms of the counter-offer if the person to whom it is made absolutely
and unconditionally accepts the same.190 According to the last-shot method, the court will apply
Indian law to adjudicate the dispute.
III. Scope of the Proper Law of the Contract

This section will examine the scope of the proper law in adjudicating disputes arising from
particular aspects of a contract such as its formal, material or essential validity; its performance;
and the capacity to contract.
i. Formation, Interpretation, and Essential and Material Validity

of the Contract
Historically, the lex loci contractus was applicable in adjudicating disputes arising from interna-
tional commercial contracts on questions of capacity and on formal and material validity. With
the advent of international trade and globalisation, the application of the law of the place of
contracting may no longer be justifiable and may often be fortuitous. Today, the putative proper
law is the relevant yardstick to adjudge most aspects of an international contract. It is the law
that would have been applicable if the contract had come into existence. In this context, the
Supreme Court in National Thermal Power stipulated that the proper law of the contract governs
the entire gamut of the agreement such as its validity, legality, effect, and the interpretation of
ant arbitration agreement.191 The proper law of the contract will decide all questions concern-
ing the arbitration clause.192 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Union of India v Hardy Exploration
and Production (India) Inc. clarified that the proper law of the contract is ‘the law governing the
contract which creates the substantive rights of the parties, in respect of which the dispute has
arisen’.193 Thus, all questions or disputes on whether the contractual obligations are legally bind-
ing or whether they conform to the formal requirements (for instance, if the contract has to be
in writing, must be evidenced by a certain minimum number of witnesses, and if it was actually
formed or concluded) will be determined by the putative proper law.
ii. Performance of the Contract

The Bombay High Court in Taprogge Gesellschaft MBH refused to give effect to the parties’
choice of German law insofar as it operated in restraint to trade and infringed the provisions
of the ICA.194 Consequently, although the putative proper law governs most aspects includ-
ing the essential validity of a contract, the agreement will be void ab initio under the principles
of Indian private international law if its performance is illegal under the law of the Republic.
189 ibid, s 9. See also, the Supreme Court’s decision in UP Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd v Indure Pvt Ltd & Ors [1996]
2 SCC 667.
190 See Col. DI Macpherson v MN Appanna & Anr AIR [1951] SC 184 per Saiyid Fazl Ali J.
191 (n 15) [6].
192 ibid [23].
193 Hardy Exploration (n 184) [7].
194 See in this respect, the decisions in Taprogge Gesellschaft MBH (n 98). See also, Kumarina Investment Ltd (n 51).
In other words, performance of the contract will be tested under the putative proper law
and the lex fori (in this case, Indian law). The proper law of the contract would, nonetheless,
determine whether an arbitration clause binds the parties when one of them alleges that the
contract is void, voidable, illegal or cannot be performed due to frustration.195
iii. Capacity to Contract

Under Indian law, minors (namely, persons below 18 years of age) and persons of unsound
mind lack the capacity to enter into a contract. All agreements which are concluded with
minors or persons of unsound mind are null and void under sections 10, 11 and 12 of the ICA.
A minor is, nonetheless, construed as being capable, if the agreement was for the benefit of the
minor.196 Accordingly, loan agreements under which the minor is a beneficiary are valid.197
Conversely, agreements which obligate a minor to perform a service instead of a sum of money
are not construed as being for the benefit of the money and are thus invalid.198 In a related
vein, a person with an unsound mind is considered as capable ‘if, at the time when he makes
[a contract], he is capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its
effect upon his interests’.199
Indian private international law does not, however, have an exact position as regards the
law that will govern the contractual capacity of a person. The High Court of Madras, while
determining contractual capacity in an older judgment, favoured the application of the lex loci
contractus. This was the position in TNS Chockalingam Chettiar v VPS Mohammad Hussain
and ors where the Court was called upon to decide contractual capacity in a mercantile
contract where one of the defendants had acted as surety for another defendant by endorsing
certain bills of exchange.200 Referring to Dicey’s Rule 158, the Court per Ramesan J articu-
lated that a mercantile contract would be null and void if any party lacks capacity under the
lex loci contractus.201 Subsequently, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum in Technip SA v
SMS Holding (Pvt) Ltd & Ors opined that the lex loci domicilii (the law of the domicile of the
person) should be applicable subject to the public policy of India.202 The Court was called upon
to determine whether a company incorporated in France had acquired a company in India.203
Nonetheless, the opinion does not have binding value being obiter. The stance of Indian private
international law as regards the contractual capacity of a minor is therefore ambiguous. There
is no judicial dictum to clarify the law that will govern disputes concerning the capacity of a
company or other legal persons. In such circumstances, it appears that the English common
law rule will be applied, that is, resort will be made to the law of the place of incorporation of
the company.204

196 See ss 10 and 11 of the ICA. See also, Mohri Bibi v Dhuromdas Ghose [1903] 30 IA 114; Raj Rani v Prem Adib AIR
[1949] Bom 215; and Mathai v Joseph Mary [2015] 5 SCC 622.
197 See, A.T. Raghava Chariar v O.A Srinivasa [1916] 31 MLJ 575; and Fernandez v Gonsalves AIR [1925] Bom 97.
198 See Raj Rani (n 196).
199 Section 12 of the ICA.
200 See EA Fredericks, Contractual Capacity and the Conflict of Laws in Common Law Jurisdictions (Part 2): Australasia,
North America, Asia and Africa (2020) 41(1) Obiter 10, 30–31 referring to TNS Chockalingam AIR [1933] Mad 756.
201 TNS Chockalingam, ibid, referring to Berriedale Keith (ed) Dicey, on The Conflicts of Laws 4th edn (Stevens, 1927) 599.
202 Fredericks (n 200) 31–32 referring to Technip SA, [2005] 60 SCL 249 SC.
203 ibid.
204 See, P Rogerson, Collier’s Conflict of Laws 4th edn (CUP, 2016) 320 at ff 150, referring to Haugesund Kommune v
Depfa ACS Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579, [2011] 1 All ER 190.
IV. Reflections on Indian Law: Some Insights

based on Global Trends
Globally, the applicable law is identified by referring to the parties’ express or implied (tacit)
choice and, in its absence, by determining the legal system with which the contract has the closest
connection. It is a generally accepted rule that the governing law regulates all disputes arising in
relation to consent, material validity, interpretation, performance and legality.205 Indian private
international law essentially adopts a similar position to English common law. However, exces-
sive reliance on English common law principles together with the absence of codified rules has
contributed to uncertainty concerning the method that will be adopted in identifying the proper
law of the contract in India. In comparison, several jurisdictions have codified the rules on the
subject to enhance predictability and certainty in judicial decisions.
The conflict of law rules of the EU serves as a prominent example. The provisions of the
Rome I Regulation, which replaced the Rome Convention, stipulate clearly-defined rules to assist
courts to ascertain the applicable law for contractual obligations. Prior to Brexit, which came
into effect on 31 January 2020, the provisions of the Rome I Regulation206 were applicable in the
UK, to determine the applicable law for contractual obligations. The UK has since enacted the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc)
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to carry forward the provisions of Rome I and II. The conflict of law
rules of the EU have influenced the codifications of several civil law jurisdictions such as Japan,207
South Korea,208 Turkey209 and India’s BRICS210 partners, (that is, Russia211 and China).212 More
recently, the Asian Principles of Private International Law (APPIL), a set of non-binding princi-
ples drawn by academics from ten East and Southeast Asian countries also reflect the experiences
in the EU in this context.213 Among these are some common law jurisdictions such as Hong Kong
and Singapore where the principles of private international law have traditionally been stipulated
by case law and the doctrine of stare decisis.214 The APPIL, albeit recommendatory by nature,
attempt to harmonise the conflict of law rules inter alia on applicable law in civil and commercial
matters.215 The APPIL endeavour to complement and supplement the private international laws
in these legal systems for the benefit of the legislators and the judiciary.216 This section draws on
205 See for instance, Art 12 of the Rome I Regulation; Art 6 and 17 of the Act of Private International Law 2016, South
Korea [South Korean PIL]; Art 1215 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation 2015 [Civil Code of Russia]; Art 32 of the
Turkish Code on Private International Law and International Civil Procedure 2007 [Turkish PIL]; and Art 9 of the Hague
Principles.
206 See Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome I Regulation). The Rome I Regulation superseded the Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, 19 June 1980, 80/934/EEC [Rome Convention]. The Rome I Regulation is applicable to all the
Members of the EU (except Denmark).
207 See Japanese Act on the General Rules on the Application of Laws 2007 [Japanese PIL].
208 See the South Korean PIL.
209 See the Turkish PIL.
210 BRICS is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
211 See Civil Code of Russia.
212 See the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Relations 2010 [Chinese
PIL] read along with the Rules of the Supreme People’s Court on Related Issues Concerning the Application of Law in
Hearing Foreign-Related Contractual Dispute Cases Related to Civil and Commercial Matters [the 2007 Interpretation].
213 See generally, WZ Chen and G Goldstein, ‘The Asian Principles of Private International Law: Objectives, Contents,
Structure and Selected Topics on Choice of Law’ (2017) 13(2) Journal of Private International Law, 411–434.
214 ibid 412–414.
215 ibid.
216 ibid.
the experiences of some major jurisdictions while reflecting on the Indian conflict of law rules on
choice of law. In particular, it urges codification of the principles of Indian private international
law. Pending codification, it is suggested that the Supreme Court by the power conferred through
Article 141 of the Constitution of India draft guidelines that would assist adjudicators and inter-
ested parties in future concerning identification of the proper law of a contract.

In general, the doctrine of party autonomy in choice of law has been adopted in the private
international laws of several countries,217 including common law jurisdictions such as

Australia,218 Canada219 and Hong Kong.220 Likewise, Part 6 of the National Civil Code Act 2017
which codifies the principles of private international law of Nepal, acknowledges the accept-
ance of party autonomy in choice of law in cross-border disputes in matters of contract.221
These legal systems all permit the choice of any foreign law, regardless of whether or not the
chosen law has a connection with the parties or their transaction. Likewise, the principle
has also been widely accepted among civil law countries, especially in the EU.222 The Rome I
Regulation applicable in the EU permits the parties to select any law to govern their contract.223
However, party autonomy in the choice of law does not extend to the selection of soft law.
Instead, the provisions of non-state law such as the PICC may only be incorporated by refer-
ence as terms of the parties’ contract.224 The parties may select different laws for those parts of
their agreement which are separable.225 The applicable law will govern all aspects concerning
interpretation, performance, breach of obligations, consequences of nullity, prescription, and
the limitation period.226 Several other civil law jurisdictions such as Japan,227 South Korea,228
Mexico,229 Venezuela230 and India’s BRICS partners (Russia231 and China),232 have similarly
embraced the doctrine of party autonomy in the choice of law. The principle has also found
favour in South Africa,233 which has a hybrid legal system but whose conflict of law rules have
been shaped by the principles of the common law.234 The private international law of Brazil is,
217 See in this respect, Khanderia, Party Autonomy (n 22) 3–6.

218 See Nygh (n 86) 445–451.
219 See S Pitel and N Rafferty, Conflict of Laws 1st edn (Irwin Law Publishers 2010) 271–274.
220 See G Johnston, The Conflict of Laws in Hong Kong 2nd edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) 189; and LC Wolff,
‘Hong Kong’s Conflict of Contract Laws: Quo Vadis?‘ (2010) 6(2) Journal of Private International Law 465, 471–472.
221 Art 709(1) of the National Civil Code Act 2017 (Nepalese PIL).
222 See Art 3(1) read along with Recital 11 to the Rome I Regulation.
223 ibid.
224 See Recital 13 to the Rome I Regulation.
225 See Art 3(1) read along with Recital 11 to the Rome I Regulation.
226 Art 12 of the Rome I Regulation.
227 Art 7 of the Japanese PIL.
228 Art 25 of the South Korean PIL.
229 Art 7 of the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts [Mexico City Convention].
230 ibid.
231 Art 1210 of the Civil Code of Russia.
232 Art 3 of the Chinese PIL; and PE McEleavy, ‘Current Developments: Private International Law’ (2011) 60 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 1065, 1085.

233 See Guggenheim v Rosenbaum, [1961] (2), (4) SA 21 (W) [31A]; Creutzburg v Commercial Bank of Namibia Ltd
[2006] 4 All SA 327, 330; and Representative of Lloyds v Classic Sailing Adventures (Pty) Ltd [2010] (5) SA 90 (SCA). Also
see, C Forsyth, Private International Law – The Modern Roman-Dutch Law Including the Jurisdiction of the High Courts
5th edn (Juta Publications, 2012) 317–327; R Oppong, Private International Law in Commonwealth Africa 1st edn (CUP,
2013), 133, 135; Van Niekerk and C Schulze, The South African Law of International Trade: Selected Topics (Saga Legal
Publications, 2016) 60–62; EA Fredericks and JL Neels, ‘The Proper Law of a Documentary Letter of Credit: Part 1’ (2003)
South African Mercantile Law Journal 63, 63.
234 See, Forsyth, ibid 316.
however, reported to limit the choice of a neutral legal system to international disputes that
would be resolved by arbitration.235 In matters of litigation, Brazil’s conflict of law rule on the
applicable law permits only an indirect selection of a legal system.236 The choice of a governing
law must therefore be achieved by localising the contract in a particular country.237
Further, the 2015 Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International Commercial
Contracts (Hague Principles)238 also advocate party autonomy in the choice of law. The
Hague Principles are a set of non-binding recommendations that aim to assist inter alia legis-
lators, the judiciary, and arbitrators in interpreting,239 developing240 and supplementing241
the rules of private international law on party autonomy in the choice of law.242 The Hague
Principles encourage the extension of party autonomy to the choice of any law. Article 3 thus
recommends that, unless the private international law of the lex fori provides otherwise, the
parties should be permitted to select rules of law which are ‘generally accepted on an interna-
tional, supranational, or regional level as a neutral and balanced set of rules’.
The principles of Indian private international law vis-à-vis party autonomy in the choice
of law thus resonates with the global practice on the subject to a considerable extent. At the
same time, it is suggested that Indian private international law seek inspiration from the Hague
Principles and extend the principle of party autonomy to the choice of soft law and non-state
rules in matters of litigation, as has been done in arbitration. The Hague Principles have been
implanted by legislation in Paraguay and are likely to be implemented in Australia as well.243
That said, unlike most other civil law jurisdictions, Indian private international law fails to
provide any clarity on the precise limitations to the parties’ selection. What does the expression
‘bona fide’ denote? Is the choice of a non-state law acceptable? Are there special rules to protect
the interests of weaker parties from the dangers of party autonomy?
The courts in India have consistently referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Vita Food,244
to state that the parties’ express choice will be disregarded if it is not bona fide, legal or when it
is opposed to public policy. At the same time, the circumstances in which a choice of law may
be regarded as bona fide have remained nebulous in Indian private international law. In this
manner, the practice of Indian courts resonates with the other common law jurisdictions such as
Australia,245 Canada246 and Hong Kong247 which do not clearly explain the scope and meaning
235 See Art 9 of the Law of Introduction to the Brazilian Civil Code 1942 read along with MM Albornoz, ‘Choice of
Law in International Contracts in Latin American Legal Systems’ 2010 Journal of Private International Law 23; and
N DeAraujo and FGC Saldanha ‘Recent Developments and Current Trends on Brazilian Private International Law
Concerning International Contracts’ 2013 Panorama of Brazilian Law 73.
236 See Albornoz, ibid 37.
237 ibid.
238 See Art 1(2) of the HCCCA; Art 1(2) of the Hague Principles.
239 ibid. Commentary to the Hague Principles (n 1), which defines ‘interpretation’ as ‘the process of explaining, clarifying
or construing the meaning of existing rules of private international law’.

240 ibid. The term ‘development’ has been defined as the ‘addition of new rules, where none existed before, or effecting
fundamental changes to pre-existing ones’.

241 ibid. The term ‘supplementation’ has been defined as ‘the refinement of an existing rule of private international law,
which does not sufficiently or appropriately provide for a particular type of situation’.
242 ibid, para 4 of the Preamble of the Hague Principles, which limits its application to international commercial
contracts. For a detailed discussion the Hague Principles, see JL Neels, ‘The Nature, Objective and Purposes of the Hague
Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts’ (2014) 15 Yearbook of Private International Law 45–56.
243 See Y Nishitani, ‘Party Autonomy in Contemporary Private International Law – The Hague Principles on Choice of
Law and East Asia’ (2016) 59 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 300, 305.
244 (n 5).
245 See Nygh (n 86) 445–451.
246 See Pitel and Rafferty (n 219) 271–274.
247 See Johnston (n 220) 189; and Wolff (n 220) 468–472.
of the expression ‘bona fide, legal and opposed to public policy’. Nepalese private international
law, on the other hand, does not expressly indicate any limitation to party autonomy in the choice
of law in its c odification. At present, in Indian law, it appears that a choice of law will not be bona
fide if it c ontravenes an overriding mandatory provision in Indian law. Interested parties have to
peruse a jungle of case-law to speculate on the possible meaning that the court may attach to these
limitations.
In comparison, civil law jurisdictions such as the EU clearly define the limitations of party
autonomy in the choice of law. In this respect, the Rome I Regulation clearly provides that the
parties’ choice of law will be disregarded when it violates the overriding mandatory provisions
and the contravention of the public policy of the forum operate as limitations to the parties’
choice of law.248 Further, the Rome I Regulation clearly enunciates the relevant factors that the
court would have to take into account to determine whether a norm may be considered as an
overriding mandatory provision.249 A court may, therefore, refuse to give effect to the parties’
choice of law if it is ‘crucial … for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or
economic organisation’.250
Besides, the Rome I Regulation additionally contains certain special rules to regulate the
application of the doctrine of party autonomy for agreements concluded between parties with
unequal bargaining power – such as carriage, consumer, insurance and employment contracts.251
The Rome I Regulation limits the applicability of the doctrine in various ways.252 For instance, in
carriage and insurance contracts, the Rome I Regulation ‘limits the breadth of choice afforded to
the parties’.253 However, in consumer and employment contracts, the Rome I Regulation limits
the parties’ freedom to ensure that the choice of law does not deprive the weaker party of the
protection of a mandatory law which would be applicable in the absence of choice.254
Likewise, the private international laws of Japan,255 South Korea,256 Russia,257 China,258
Mexico259 and Venezuela260 limit the parties’ autonomy to choose a law provided that it does
not derogate the overriding mandatory provisions or the public policy of the forum. Further, the
codifications of Japan,261 South Korea262 and China263 contain special rules for the protection of
weaker parties such as employees, consumers or insurance-policy holders.
The legislators in India must, therefore, keep these global developments in mind while codify-
ing the country’s private international law. In the meanwhile, it is suggested that the courts must
exercise extreme caution in this context, and no reference to the limitations must be made unless
explicitly clarified within the decision itself.
248 See Recital 15 read along with Arts 3(3), 9 and 21 of the Rome I Regulation.
249 ibid, Art 9.
250 ibid.
251 ibid, Arts 5–8.
252 ibid; and Rühl (n 103) 345 et seq.
253 ibid, Arts 5(2) and 7(3); and Rühl, ibid 347.
254 ibid, Arts 6(2) and 8(1); and Rühl, ibid 350–351.
255 Arts 11 and 12 of the Japanese PIL.
256 Arts 7 and 10 of the South Korean PIL.
257 Arts 1192 and 1193 of the Civil Code of Russia.
258 Arts 4 and 5 of the Chinese PIL.
259 Arts 11 and 18 of the Mexico City Convention.
260 ibid.
261 Arts 11 and 12 of the Japanese PIL.
262 Arts 27 and 28 of the South Korean PIL.
263 Arts 16, 42 and 43 of the Chinese PIL.
In doing so, the lawmakers may refer to the codifications of the civil law jurisdictions and,
in particular, the Rome I Regulation, which clarifies the circumstances in which the parties’
choice may be construed as a contravention of the overriding mandatory norms or the public
policy of the lex fori.264
As regards the selection of non-state rules, an examination of the judicial dicta per National
Thermal Power Corporation265 and Kumarina Investment Ltd266 indicates that the parties may
incorporate by reference, the provisions of such a law but not entirely select their application
to govern their international contract. There is, however, no express clarification to this effect.
Having regard to their many benefits as indicated above, it is suggested that the lawmakers
approve of their selection in matters of litigation – as is already the case for arbitration.267

The Indian private international law does not stipulate any clear criteria to identify the proper
law of a contract through the implied choice of the parties. At present, the courts merely impute
an intention over the parties by employing the same set of factors if the parties had not chosen
any law.
Academic and scholarly writings report that, in common law, the implied choice of the parties
is in practice, ‘merely a judicial mode of expressing the rule that the proper law is that of the coun-
try with which, the transaction has the most real connection’.268 This observation holds true for
India. There is, therefore, no real distinction in the methods employed to identify the governing
law when the parties have not expressly selected the same.269
In comparison, an analysis of the codifications of the civil law jurisdictions demonstrates
the requirement of a stringent assessment of the contractual terms before inferring the parties’
choice in favour of any particular legal system.270 In the EU, the promulgation of the Rome I
Regulation increases the level of stringency that was applicable under the Rome Convention to
determine the tacit choice of the parties. Under the Rome Convention, the inferred choice of the
parties had to be ‘demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract and the
surrounding circumstances of the case’.271 In comparison, the Rome I Regulation mandates that
such a choice should be ‘clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances
of the case’.272 Under the Rome Convention, the court was therefore more likely to infer that
the parties intended to select the law of a particular legal system.273 The current conflict of law
rules in the Rome I Regulation, on the other hand, reduce the possibility of judicial discretion
by leaving little scope for inferring the parties’ choice of the applicable law.274 In this respect, the
264 See Recital 28, 34 and 37 read along with Arts 9 and 21 of the Rome I Regulation.
265 National Thermal Power Corporation (n 15).
266 Kumarina Investment Ltd (n 51).
267 See s 28 of the ACA.
268 JD Falconbridge, Selected Essays in the Conflict of Laws, 2nd edn (Canada Law Book Co, 1954) 351. Also see, Morris
(n 81) 198; and BA Marshall, ‘Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International
Law 505, 512.
269 See in this context Lord Collins of Mapesbury and J Harris (eds) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws:
Vol 2, 15th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 2012).

270 But see Art 7 of the Japanese PIL which does not make any room for identifying the parties’ intentions by referring
to their tacit choice.

271 See Art 3(1) of the Rome Convention.
272 ibid.
273 Nygh (n 86) 111.
274 ibid 110.
Giuliano and Lagarde Report suggest, as indicators to decipher the tacit choice of the parties, the
use of standard forms of contract which are known to be governed by a particular legal system
(such as a Lloyds marine insurance policy), as well as the use of previous dealings between the
parties in relation to a contract containing an express choice of law or the incorporation or refer-
ence to provisions of a particular legal system.275
The approach of the Rome Convention continues to find a place in the private interna-
tional laws of Turkey276 and South Korea.277 In the absence of an express selection, the choice
of law must be reasonably (and not clearly) demonstrated under the laws of these legal systems.
Nonetheless, most other civil law jurisdictions have favoured the application of a stricter test
to discern the implied or the tacit choice of the parties. For instance, the Civil Code of Russia
mandates that the tacit choice must ‘clearly ensue from the terms and conditions of the contract
or the complex of circumstances of the case’.278 In China, the conflict of law rule permits the
courts to infer a choice in favour of a particular legal system exclusively when both (or all)
the parties invoke the law of the same region, and neither has objected to its application.279
In a related vein, the private international law of Mexico and Venezuela as stipulated in the
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts (Mexico City
Convention) mandates that the inferred choice ‘must be evident from the parties’ behaviour
and from the clauses of the contract, considered as a whole’.280 Similarly, the Hague Principles
recommend that the tacit choice must ‘appear clearly from the provisions of the contract or
the circumstances’.281 As the Commentary clarifies, the intention must be real and apparent as
opposed to being imputed to the parties.282
The codification of the rules of private international law in India should address the anomalies
that currently prevail on this aspect. The factors to discern the inferred choice must be different
from that adopted when the parties have not made any choice and must confer little leeway on the
courts in speculating whether or not a choice was made.283 Thus, it is suggested that the lawmak-
ers must mandate the adoption of a strict test to identify the implied choice of law, much as has
been adopted in several civil law jurisdictions, including India’s BRICS partners, China284 and
Russia.285 The parties choice in favour of a legal system must appear clearly from the terms of the
contract. This approach has also been endorsed by the Hague Principles.286
iii. Absence of Choice of Law

It was seen that the criteria to discern ‘the system of law with which the transaction has the
closest and most real connection’ has been far from uniform in India. In some cases, the courts
have relied on the theory of localisation, while in more recent decisions, the test of the imputed
intention has found favour among the judiciary. Further, the application of the test of the imputed
275 M Giuliano and P Lagarde (1980) Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations [1980]
OJ C282/1, 23 [Giuliano-Lagarde Report].

276 See Art 24 of the Turkish PIL.
277 See Art 25 of the South Korean PIL.
278 See Art 1210 of the Civil Code of Russia.
279 See Art 3 of the Chinese PIL.
280 See Art 7 of the Mexico City Convention.
281 See Art 4 of the Hague Principles. See also, JL Neels and EA Fredericks, ‘Tacit Choice of Law in The Hague Principles
on Choice of Law in International Contracts’ [2011] De Jure 101, 104.

282 See Commentary to the Hague Principles (n 1) [4.6].
283 See Nygh (n 86) 111.
285 Art 3 of the Chinese PIL.
286 Art 4 of the Hague Principles.
intentions has been inconsistent. In some cases, the courts have relied on presumptions in favour
of the lex loci contractus, lex loci solutionis and the lex fori. An examination of more recent deci-
sions indicates that the excessive reliance on these presumptions has been done away with.287
The lex fori, however, continues to play some role in identifying the proper law in the absence
of choice. The approach of the Indian courts on the matter thus impedes international trade and
hampers access to justice in the country by being unpredictable and uncertain. The practice of
the Indian courts resonates with that of other common law systems which have similarly held
fast to the ‘closest and most real connection’ test that was formulated by the Privy Council in
Bonython.288 The courts do not follow a consistent interpretation of the ‘closest and most real
connection’ test. On some occasions, the test has been interpreted to refer to the imputed inten-
tions of the parties and, on other occasions, to the application of the theory of localisation.289
Regardless of these subtle differences, a set of similar indicators are relevant in the common law
jurisdictions such as Australia,290 Canada,291 Hong Kong292 and South Africa,293 all of which
adopt the ‘closest and most real connection’ test to identify the governing law in the absence of
choice. Among civil law jurisdictions, the conflict of law rules on applicable law stipulated in
the Mexico City Convention, which is applicable in Mexico and Venezuela, resonates with the
common law’s ‘closest and most real connection’ test. These legal systems mandate the court to
invoke the law of the state with which, the contract has its ‘closest ties’.294 In contrast, Nepalese
private international law does not stipulate the application of the ‘closest and most real connec-
tion’ test when the parties have not expressly selected the chosen law to govern their contract.
Instead, the National Civil Code Act 2017 prescribes the application of the lex loci contractus
for all contracts which have been concluded in Nepal.295 For international contracts which have
not been concluded in Nepal, the codification prescribes the application of the law of the place
of performance by the lex loci solutionis rule, unless it cannot be ascertained. In the latter situa-
tion, the lex loci contractus will prevail.296 At the same time, Nepalese private international law
does not clarify whether the place of performance refers to the place where goods are sold or
purchased or where services are supplied.
In comparison, the presumption of the characteristic performance plays a significant role in
determining the governing law in the absence of choice in the codifications of several civil law
systems. Drawing on the Swiss lead,297 the term ‘characteristic performance’ has been understood
to mean ‘performance for which payment is due’.298 As a general rule, the law of the country of
the habitual residence of the characteristic performer would govern the contract in the absence of
an express or tacit choice.299 In some circumstances, the characteristic performer’s chief admin-
istration or principal place of business would apply if the transaction has been entered into in
the course of the person’s trade or profession, would govern the contract in the absence of an
287 See the decisions of the Supreme Court of India in Modi Entertainment Network (n 45); Shreejee Traco (n 183); and
Hardy Exploration (n 184).

288 Bonython (n 139).
289 See for instance, the approach of the South African courts on the subject as enunciated in [Khanderia, The
Ascertainment of the Applicable Law] (n 1) 1, 6–12.

290 See Nygh (n 86) 453–456.
291 See Pitel and Rafferty (n 219) 275–277.
292 See Wolff (n 220) 472–474.
293 See Khanderia, [The Ascertainment of the Applicable Law] (n 1)12–18.
294 Art 9 of the Mexico City Convention.
295 Art 709(2) of the National Civil Code Act 2017 [Nepalese PIL].
296 ibid.
297 Forsyth (n 233) 335.
298 Giuliano-Lagarde Report (n 275).
299 See Art 4 of the Rome Convention and Art 4 of the Rome I Regulation.
express or tacit choice.300 It is suggested that the lawmakers in India should consider the applica-
tion of the presumption of the characteristic performance to identify the applicable law in the
absence of a choice of law, when codifying Indian private international law so that the interested
parties are in a position to know beforehand the law that will govern their contract in the event
that they fail to agree upon the same.
Research demonstrates that applying the law of the habitual residence, the place of chief
administration, or the principal place of business of the characteristic performer is beneficial for
the following reasons. First, as justified in the Giuliano and Lagarde Report by way of the prefer-
ence for this test, the presumption of characteristic performance has the ability to
define the connecting factor of the contract from the inside, and not from the outside by elements unre-
lated to the essence of the obligations such as the nationality of the contracting parties or the place where
the contract was concluded.301
Second, the characteristic performer is the party who is familiar with the law of one’s habitual resi-
dence and who is ‘without a language barrier’.302 Third, the characteristic performer is more likely to
enter into a considerable amount of agreements in his or her professional pursuit and, hence, it should
be more convenient for the same law to govern all contracts without choice of law clauses into which
this party enters.303 Fourth, it is the party who is more interested in the performance of the relevant
obligations and would ‘make more effort and observe more regulations than the one who pays’.304
In the EU, the Rome I Regulation stipulates certain fixed-style rules to decipher the char-
acteristic performance in certain major types of contracts such as those involving the sale of
goods (including those sold by auction), the supply of services, and the transfer of immovable
property.305 The mechanism employed to discern the applicable law in the absence of choice
thus reduces judicial discretion. The conflict of law rules on the applicable law in the absence of
choice in Japan,306 Korea,307 Turkey,308 China309 and Russia310 similarly imbibe the presumption
of characteristic performance to identify the governing law in the absence of choice. The law of
the country of the habitual residence, central administration, or principal place of business of the
characteristic performer would govern the contract in such circumstances. The private interna-
tional laws of Korea,311 China312 and Russia313 stipulate fixed-style rules to reduce the discretion
300 ibid.
301 Giuliano-Lagarde Report (n 275); and O Vondracek, ‘Art. 4 of the Roman Convention on the Law Applicable to Civil
and Commercial Obligations: A Fruitful Compromise: Analysis of the Rules of the Law of Characteristic Performance
and the Property Law of Contract’ (2007) 8 Common Law Review 32, 33.
302 ibid.
303 C Okoli and G Ariste, ‘The Operation of the Escape Clauses in the Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation’ (2012)
8 Journal of Private International Law 513, 516.

304 Vondracek (n 301) 32. Also see, Forsyth (n 233) 335–336.
305 ibid.
308 Art 25 of the Turkish PIL.
312 Art 4 of the Chinese PIL read along with the 2007 Interpretation. For a detailed discussion on the principles of Chinese
private international law on the subject, see G Tu and M Xu, ‘Contractual Conflicts in the People’s Republic of China: The
Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice’ [2011] Journal of Private International Law 179; J Liang, ‘Statutory Restrictions
on Party Autonomy in China’s Private International Law of Contract: How Far Does the 2010 Codification Go?’ [2012]
Journal of Private International Law 77; Q He, ‘The EU Conflict of Laws Communitarization and the Modernization of
Chinese Private International Law’ [2012] Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht / The Rabel
Journal of Comparative and International Private Law 47; and Z Huo, ‘An Imperfect Improvement: The New Conflict of
Laws Act of the People’s Republic of China’ [2011] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1065.
of the courts in interpreting or identifying the characteristic performer. In comparison, the

codifications of Japan314 and Turkey315 have not enumerated any fixed-style rules; and the deter-
mination of the characteristic performer is left to the discretion of the courts. Further, in the
EU, the predictability and certainty created by the fixed-style rules are balanced by an escape
clause. The Rome I Regulation permits the court to invoke the law of another legal system if
it appears from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is ‘manifestly more closely
connected’ with that country.316 In this manner, the escape clause, balances predictability with
flexibility by allowing the application of the rules of another country when the law derived
from the fixed-style rules have no real connection with the parties or the transaction. In certain
circumstances, however, the court may find it arduous to identify the applicable law by invoking
the fixed-style rules or the escape clause. In such scenarios, the Rome I Regulation permits the
court to invoke the law of another country with which the contract is ‘most closely connected’.317
The court may weigh the relevant factors to locate the centre of gravity of the contract.318 The
common law’s ‘closest and most real connection’ test, therefore, operates as a last resort under
the provisions of the Rome I Regulation.319 This mechanism is, however, not applicable to certain
special agreements with weaker parties such as consumer, insurance or employment contracts –
for which there are special rules to discern the applicable law in the absence of choice.320
The legislators in India should, in particular, seek inspiration from the provisions on the
conflict of law rules in the EU (in particular) for the following reasons. First, the Rome I
Regulation reduces the possibility of judicial discretion by incorporating certain fixed-style
rules to precisely identify the characteristic performer for certain popular contracts.321 The
fixed-style rules will eliminate the ambiguities in the interpretation of the lex loci solutionis as it
presently stands in Indian law. However, it is suggested that the reference to the characteristic
performer’s habitual residence, central administration or principal place of business should be
avoided for it is susceptible to being fortuitous in situations when the transaction in question
may not have any connection with the contract.322 Instead, it is suggested that Indian law refer
to the place from where the characteristic performer carried out the obligation in order to iden-
tify the governing law in the absence of a choice of law agreement. Second, the inclusion of the
escape clause in the Rome I Regulation balances predictability with flexibility by permitting
the adjudicator to acknowledge a closer connection of the contract with another country.323
The courts in India should, however, additionally authorise the court to apply the principles of
non-state law in the interest of justice and equity. The Indian courts may seek inspiration from
the private international law of Mexico and Venezuela.324 The Mexico City Convention permits

315 Art 25 of the Turkish PIL.
316 See Art 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation.
317 ibid, Art 4(4); and U Magnus ‘Article 4 Rome I Regulation: The Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice’ in Ferrari
and Leible (eds), Rome I Regulation. The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe (Sellier European Law
Publishers, 2009) 27, 28, 49.
318 ibid.
319 ibid.
320 ibid, Art 5–8.
321 ibid, Art 4(1) and (2).
322 See in this respect, CSA Okoli, Place of Performance: A Comparative Analysis (Hart, 2020) 63–72 [Okoli, Place of
Performance]. Okoli examines the pros and cons of applying the law of the habitual residence/central administration/
principal place of business of the characteristic performer in the absence of a choice under the Rome I Regulation.
323 See Art 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation. See also, Art 1211(2) of the Civil Code of Russia; and Art 5 of the 2007
Interpretation (China), which incorporate an escape clause that resembles the clause in the Rome I Regulation.
324 See Arts 9 and 10 of the Mexico City Convention.
the courts to ‘take into account’ and ‘apply’ ‘the general principles of international commercial
law recognised by international organisations’ (ie soft law or non-binding legal principles such
as the PICC) if the interests of ‘justice and equity’ so demand, while finding the law of the
state with which the transaction has the closest ties.325 Third, the Rome I Regulation is the only
codification to incorporate a provision that is similar to the ‘closest and most real connection’
test as applicable in India and other common-law jurisdictions.326 The instrument, therefore,
accommodates unforeseen circumstances when the applicable law cannot be identified by any
other means. At present, the codification of no other civil law jurisdiction has made room for a
provision of a similar kind.
iv. Applicable Law in E-commerce Transactions

National laws prescribe different solutions to resolve the predicament of the battle of forms
as a result of contradictory standard terms.327 However, none of these solutions is specifically
tailored to resolve the dilemma when the parties have stipulated different governing laws for
their international contract in their standard terms. In other words, the solutions would apply
as a general rule to resolve any predicament which arises as a result of contradictory standard
terms. The last-shot method which finds a place in Indian law is also applicable in other common
law countries such as India, the UK, Australia and South Africa.328 Likewise, China, which is a
civil law system, has also employed the last-shot rule to resolve the predicament in contradic-
tory standard terms.329 In India when there are contradictory standard terms, the terms of the
counter-offer will prevail in total if the offeror has accepted them.330 Among EU countries, the
Dutch courts have adopted the first-shot rule331 according to which the obligations stipulated in
the first set of standard terms will prevail if the contract contains contradictory terms, unless they
have expressly been rejected by the other party.332 These are the first-shot method and the knock-
out rule. The last-shot and first-shot rules are arbitrary, insofar as they fail to justify the basis for
considering the contract to have been concluded on one party’s standard terms. The judiciaries
in other EU countries such as France, Germany, Austria, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland have,
however, favoured the knock-out rule.333 Under the knock-out rule, contradictory clauses are
cancelled and the contract is concluded on terms, which are common in substance.334 The contra-
dictory terms are replaced with default rules as applicable under national law.335 The knock-out
rule, thus, attempts to balance the interests of both parties to the contract as far as practicable.
The application of this rule results in the ‘cancellation’ of contradictory terms in a contract.
325 See, JA Moreno Rodrigues and MM Albornoz ‘Reflections on the Mexico City Convention in the Context of
the Preparation of the Future Hague Instrument on International Contracts’ [2011] Journal of Private International
Law 491, 504–507; and FK Juenger, ‘Contract Choice of Law in the Americas’ (1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative
Law 195, 204. Also, see generally, FK Juenger, ‘The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons’ (1994) 42 The American Journal of Comparative Law 381.
326 See Art 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation.
327 For a detailed discussion on the various solutions to the battle of forms, see Khanderia, International Approaches as
Plausible Solutions (n 186) 3–7.

328 Graziano (n 185) 75–76.
329 ibid.
330 ibid.
331 ibid 76–77.
332 ibid.
333 ibid 77–79.
334 ibid.
335 ibid.
In such circumstances, the court would apply conflict of law rules to identify the applicable law
in the absence of choice. To illustrate, consider a scenario which is similar to the one discussed
above.336 A (a seller which is a company incorporated in Greece) designated Greek law in its
standard terms when concluding a contract to sell certain products to B (a buyer who resides
in Delhi). B designated Indian law to govern the contract when accepting A’s offer to sell the
product. A sues B for failure to pay for the goods, but initiates the proceedings before the courts
in France which was the chosen forum in the parties’ contract. The French court will apply
the knock-out rule and ‘cancel’ or disregard contradictory choice of law clauses. Instead, it
will invoke the provisions of the Rome I Regulation, which prescribe mechanisms for identi-
fying applicable law in the absence of choice. Accordingly, the French court will apply Greek
law to adjudicate the dispute under Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation by being the place of
incorporation of the seller.
The Hague Principles propose a novel solution under Article 6(1)(b) which specifically aims
to address the battle of forms arising from conflicting choice of law clauses insofar as these are
regarded as independent agreements that are separable from the rest of the contract. The solution
attempts to reconcile contradictions to the maximum possible extent. In this respect, it provides
that:
if the parties have used standard terms designating two different laws, and under both of these laws
the same standard terms prevail, the law designated in the prevailing terms applies; if under these laws
different standard terms prevail, or if under one or both of these laws no standard terms prevail, there
is no choice of law.337
Accordingly, Article 6(1)(b) recommends an examination of the type of solution proposed at the
national level in case of a contradiction between terms.338 It encourages the adjudicating author-
ity to analyse whether the parties (whose terms are contradictory) belong to legal systems which
follow the last-shot, first-shot or the knock-out rule.339 If all the parties belong to jurisdictions
which adopt the last-shot rule, Article 6 of the Hague Principles recommends that the adjudica-
tor invoke that method.340 The same principle would apply when all parties belong to countries
adopting the first-shot or the knock-out rule.341 In doing so, it endeavours to reconcile the solu-
tion as far as possible by preventing the arbitrary or unjustifiable application of the resolution
adopted by the legal system where only one party belongs.342 Article 6, however, proposes the
application of the knock-out rule if the parties belong to jurisdictions which imbibe different
solutions to redress the battle of forms.343 Applying this principle, the court or arbitrator would
then cancel or knock-out the contradictory choice of law clauses and identify the governing law
by invoking the conflict of law rule on the absence of choice of the lex fori.344
Unlike the current approach adopted in the domestic realm in India, namely, the last-shot
method as a general rule, the solution under the Hague Principles is not arbitrary. It favours the
formation of the contract as far as possible. As indicated above, the Hague Principles recommends
a reconciliation of the conflicting terms based on the approaches adopted at the domestic level.

337 Art 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles.
338 See Graziano (n 185) 92; and Commentary to Art 6(1)(b) the Hague Principles (n 1).
339 See Graziano, ibid 89–90; and Commentary to Art 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles, ibid, scenarios 2a and b.
340 See Graziano, ibid; and Commentary Art 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles, ibid, scenarios 2a and b.
341 See Graziano, ibid; and Commentary Art 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles, ibid, scenarios 2a, 2b and 4.
342 See Khanderia, International Approaches as Plausible Solutions (n 186) 26.
343 See Graziano (n 185) 97–99; and Commentary Art 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles (n 1) scenario 7.
344 See Graziano, ibid 91.
Where this is not possible, incorporating the solution proposed by the Hague Principles in India
would mandate adjudicators to invoke the knock-out rule and identify the proper law as if the
parties had not made any choice in the first place. Adopting the Hague Principles in Indian
private international law would, however, necessitate a complete reform of the Republic’s conflict
of law rules on applicable law according to the suggestions advanced above.
V. Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the principles of Indian private international law to identify the
applicable law in matters of contract. It was seen that the English common law has been instru-
mental in shaping the principles of Indian law on the subject. The applicable law is determined
through the doctrine of the proper law of the contract. In the absence of codification, the Supreme
Courts dicta in National Thermal Power345 has provided some guidelines concerning the identi-
fication of the proper law of the contract. In India, the applicable law will chiefly depend on the
express choice of the parties. In matters of international commercial arbitration, the parties right
to choose a governing law extends to the choice of soft law or non-state law. However, whether the
parties can select a soft-law or a non-state law to govern their international contract in matters of
litigation remains unknown.
It was seen that the parties’ choice of law would prevail unless it is not bona fide, legal or is
opposed to the public policy of India. However, the courts have not, as a matter of fact, disre-
garded the parties’ choice because it was not bona fide or legal. The parameters within which
those limitations will operate in practice, remain unknown. At present, it appears that the choice
will not be bona fide if it contradicts an overriding mandatory provision in Indian law. It was also
seen that a choice is likely to be considered to contradict an overriding mandatory provision in
India if it violates the public policy of the Republic. In other words, the expressions ‘overriding
mandatory provision’ and ‘public policy’ have been used interchangeably in India.
In the absence of an express choice, the proper law will depend on the implied choice of the
parties. However, a close examination of existing dicta indicates that the identification of the
proper law through the implied choice of the parties is illusory. This is because the courts will in
fact impute an intention on the parties while searching for the proper law. In doing so, the court
will refer to the same indicia as it would if the parties had not made any choice. The ‘closest and
most real connection test’ which is the mechanism to identify the applicable law in the absence of
choice is equally nebulous. The criterion which the courts have employed to interpret the test has
varied over time. Occasionally, the courts have employed the theory of localisation to search for
the centre of gravity of the contract. Accordingly, the applicable law will depend on the individual
factors of the agreement which have the closest connection with the contract.
In some cases, the courts have demonstrated a preference for the test of the imputed inten-
tions of the parties to discern applicable law. It was seen that the court may refer to the intentions
of ‘just and reasonable persons’ or it may invoke the presumptions of the lex loci contractus, lex
loci solutionis or lex fori to discern their imputed intentions. The lex loci solutionis will apply if it
coincides with the lex loci solutionis. When it differs, the latter will prevail. However, the courts
have not sufficiently clarified the mechanism to identify the place of performance if the lex loci
solutionis is presumed to be what the parties intended. The lex fori will apply to the extent that
there are factors to substantiate that the parties intended its application.
345 (n 15).
Conclusion 227
The chapter demonstrated how the lack of codification has contributed to considerable
unpredictability and uncertainty in Indian law. In this respect, it suggested that Indian private
international law should be codified. In the meanwhile, the Supreme Court should stipulate clear
guidelines to identify the applicable law in international disputes in matters of contract. It was
suggested that the lawmakers in India focus on the focus on the following aspects when codifying
the law:
(1) Lawmakers should seek inspiration from the Hague Principles and extend the principle of
party autonomy in the choice of law to the choice of soft law and non-state law.346
(2) The limitations to the parties’ choice should be clearly defined. The courts should refrain from
referring to the expression bona fide unless the term is defined or clarified in the decision. In
this respect, the lawmakers should refer to the private international laws of civil law jurisdic-
tions, in particular the EU, and permit the courts to disregard the parties’ choice of law when
it contradicts overriding mandatory norms or public policy. The law must provide clear indi-
cia to identify the violation of an overriding mandatory norm or the public policy of India.
(3) The law should clearly address how the rights of weaker parties will be protected from
the dangers of party autonomy. Lawmakers should refer to the provisions of the Rome I
Regulation which contain special rules to regulate the application of party autonomy to
agreements between parties with unequal bargaining power, such as may be typical in
carriage, consumer, insurance and employment contracts.347
(4) The law should clearly demarcate mechanisms to identify proper law through the implied choice
of the parties, when the parties have not made any express choice. Lawmakers should seek inspi-
ration from the Rome I Regulation and the Hague Principles which advocate that the parties to
a contract should be considered to have made an implied choice only if the terms of the contract
and the circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate a choice in favour of that law.348
(5) The law should replace the vague and convoluted ‘closest and most real connection test’
with the characteristic performance test which has found a place in the conflict of laws of
several civil law jurisdictions and, in particular, the Rome I Regulation. The law should stip-
ulate certain fixed-style rules to identify the characteristic performer in certain common
contracts. The law of the place from where the characteristic performer performed the
contract as opposed to habitual residence, place of chief administration, or principal place
of business should be applied. These last three connecting factors may not coincide with the
place of characteristic performance and are likely to be fortuitous.349
(6) Predictability should be balanced by an escape clause which permits the law of another
country to apply if the contract is manifestly more closely connected with such country.350
The law should additionally allow courts to consider and apply general principles of interna-
tional commercial law (such as the PICC) in the interest of justice and equity. This approach
finds favour in the Mexico City Convention.351
(7) The law should prescribe mechanisms to address the battle of forms and contradictory choice
of law clauses in standard form contracts.352 The arbitrary last-shot rule, which is currently
the general conflict of law rule in India, should be replaced with the solution prescribed in
the Hague Principles.
346 See Art 3 of the Hague Principles.

347 Arts 5–8 of the Rome I Regulation.
348 ibid,Art 3; and Art 4 of the Hague Principles.
349 See Okoli, Place of Performance (n 303) 63 et seq.
350 See paras 1 and 2 of Art 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation.
351 See Arts 9 and 10 of the Mexico City Convention.
352 See Art 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles.
11
The Applicable Law in
Non-Contractual Obligations
I. Introduction
The term ‘non-contractual obligations’ has not been uniformly defined until late. In the conflict of
laws, such obligations generally refer to cross-border disputes in connection with tortious claims
for damage caused due to inter alia negligence, misrepresentation, nuisance or defamation. The
identification of the applicable law in matters of tort is considered as ‘one of the most vexed
questions in the conflict of laws’.1 This is because unlike the identification of the applicable law
in matters of contract, the question in tortious issues is likely to include ‘far more diverse range
of interests and duties’.2 Moreover, the parties are likely to be strangers who did not predict the
occurrence of harmful behaviour.3 Consider for example a scenario where A (a person in Delhi)
has suffered an injury caused from a faulty hairdryer that was manufactured by B (a company
which has its principal place of business in Paris). The question of whether A can claim damages
for the harm will essentially depend on the applicable law, taking into account that the dispute
contains a foreign element, namely, that the product was manufactured overseas. In a related
vein, what happens when A (resident in Mumbai) has been injured in a motor vehicle accident
in New South Wales while on holiday due to the rash and negligent driving of a taxi driver? Can
the employer be vicariously liable for the employee’s action? All of these questions require the
identification of the applicable law (insofar as the tort is international) to determine the rights
and liabilities of the alleged tortfeasor and the victim. In some cases, the tort or delict may arise
from a contractual obligation, for instance, from an employment contract. What are the remedies
of a person who has waived his or her right to compensation under the agreement, if he or she
is injured abroad in the course of employment by the negligent act of a co-worker?4 Such issues
would necessitate a classification to understand the nature of the dispute, namely, whether it
arises from a contractual or a non-contractual obligation.
This chapter examines the principles of Indian private international law in identifying the
applicable law in non-contractual matters. It is divided into four parts. Section II (section I
being this Introduction) analyses the mechanism to determine the applicable law in such matters.
1 A Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 395 [Mills, Party
Autonomy]; referring to SC Symeonides, ‘Rome II and Torts Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity’ (2008) 56(1) American
Journal of Comparative Law, 173, 188.
2 A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws 4th edn (OUP, 2019) 247.
3 ibid.
4 See Sayers v International Drilling Co NV [1971] 1 WLR 1176.
Identification of Applicable Law in Non-Contractual Obligations in India 229
Sub-section A of section II discusses the strict application of the common law’s ‘double actionabil-
ity’ rule to cross-border disputes involving tortious claims. Sub-section B highlights the nuances
of extending the rule to complex tortious claims in matters such as product liability, defama-
tion, unfair competition, unjust enrichment or intellectual property. Section III reflects on the
position of Indian private international law vis-à-vis global trends on the subject and suggests
possible ways to develop the law. Section III.A, accordingly, considers the legal position in other
common law jurisdictions such as the UK, Australia and Canada. The conflict of law rules in
civil law systems such as those of the EU, Russia, China, South Korea and Turkey will also be
examined. Some suggestions to develop Indian private international law will be suggested in
section III.B. Section IV provides concluding remarks.
II. Identification of Applicable Law in

Non-Contractual Obligations in India
A. Double Actionability Rule
i. Historical Origins of the Rule: An Overview

The principles of private international law on the subject have not been codified in India. In such
circumstances, the means of identifying the applicable law for non-contractual obligations rests
on the doctrine of stare decisis and has been developed by case law. The principles of English
common law have played an instrumental role in shaping Indian conflict of law rules on applica-
ble law in non-contractual obligations. The doctrine of double actionability, which was developed
in the seminal case of Phillips v Eyre,5 was the relevant rule in identifying the applicable law in
non-contractual obligations under the English common law.
In Phillips, the Queen’s Bench was seized of a dispute against the Governor of Jamaica for an
assault committed against an Englishman.6 The act of the Governor was, nonetheless, indemni-
fied under Jamaican law.7 Accordingly, the court had to determine whether the Governor could
be held liable under English law. The court invoked the doctrine of double actionability.8 It stated
that an act which was committed overseas would be considered as a tort if the act was action-
able: (1) as a tort under English law (lex fori); and (2) as a wrong under the law where the act was
committed (lex loci delicti commissi).9
It was irrelevant whether the act constituted a tort under the law of the lex loci delicti.10
It would suffice if the plaintiff could demonstrate that the defendant’s behaviour was a civil wrong
in some way under the legal principles of that country.11
However, the plaintiff ’s claim would succeed if it demonstrated that the defendant was also
liable under the English law of tort. In this manner, the doctrine mandated the ‘concurrent
5 [1870] LR 6 QB 1.
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 ibid 28, 29.
9 ibid.
10 See, JHC Morris, ‘The Proper Law of Tort’ [1951] Harvard Law Review 881, 888; and JG Collier, The Conflict Of Laws
3rd edn (CUP, 2001) 222–223.

11 ibid.
230 The Applicable Law in Non-Contractual Obligations
application’ of two laws to determine the defendant’s liability in any cross-border action based on
tort.12 Torts committed in England would, however, be governed by domestic law.13
Subsequently, in Boys v Chaplin,14 the House of Lords developed a ‘flexible exception’ rule that
resembled JHC Morris’ theory of ‘the proper law of the tort’,15 to avoid the mechanical applica-
tion of the doctrine of double actionability. According to this exception, the court will apply the
legal principles of a system of law which has the most significant relationship with the parties and
the issue, instead of applying double actionability, if there are ‘clear and satisfying grounds’.16 The
court was seised of a dispute between two English soldiers who were involved in a car accident
in Malta.17 The defendant was liable under English and Maltese law. Nonetheless, the quantum of
damages differed, as Maltese law did not permit the plaintiff to claim compensation for pain and
suffering.18 The court applied English law because it had a significantly closer connection with
the dispute. In Red Sea Insurance Company Limited v Bouygues SA and Others, the House of Lords
subsequently clarified that the flexible exception rule permitted the court to displace the lex fori
or the lex loci delicti.19 The law of the legal system derived under the flexible exception would then
govern only particular issues of the claim (for instance, the part concerning damages).20
In the UK, the double actionability rule has been replaced with the enactment of the Private
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (1995 Act) which defines the method
of identify the applicable law in all non-contractual obligations except defamation. Disputes on
defamation with a foreign element would, accordingly, still be regulated by the doctrine of double
actionability. The 1995 Act did away with the obligation of the claimant to prove the liability of
the tortfeasor concurrently under the laws of two legal systems, the lex fori and the lex loci delicti.
Instead, it mandated the sole application of the lex loci delicti. In certain circumstances, a ‘flexible
exception’ could displace the lex loci delicti rule with the law of another country if ‘one or more
of the issues had a substantially more significant relationship’ with the legal system of that other
country.21 When deciding whether to apply the exception, the court would consider factors such
as any common domicile and residence of the parties,22 the place where the harmful effect of the
tort was felt,23 or whether the tort arose from a pre-existing contractual relationship between the
parties.24 Given this latter factor, some scope for the operation of party autonomy in the choice of
law governing a tortious act was indirectly permitted by the 1995 Act.25 But the court would disre-
gard the applicable law indicated by the 1995 Act, if that law violated the public policy of England.26
12 See A Mills, ‘The Application of Multiple Laws under the Rome II Regulation’ in J Ahern and W Binchy (eds),
The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New Litigation Regime (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2009) 140.
13 See Szalatnay-Stacho v Fink [1947] KB 1 CA; Mills, Party Autonomy (n 1) 397.
14 [1971] AC 356.
15 Morris, (n 10) 888.
16 Boys (n 14) 391H.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 [1995] 1 HKLR 224, 229.
20 ibid. See also Briggs, Conflict of Laws (n 2) 263.
21 ibid, s 12.
22 Collier (n 10) 232; and P Stone, ‘Product Liability under the Rome II Regulation’ in J Ahern and W Binchy (eds),
The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New Litigation Regime (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2009) 175.
23 ibid.
24 See Johnson v Coventry Churchill International, [1992] 3 All ER 14; Morin v Bonhams & Brooks, [2003] EWCA Civ
1802; Trafigura Beheer v Kookmin Bank, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 455; Stone (n 32) 174; Mills, Party Autonomy (n 1) 402.
25 See Mills, Party Autonomy, (n 1) 397, 398.
26 Section 14(3)(a) of the 1995 Act; and Collier (n 10) 235.
The 1995 Act was in due course superseded by the Rome II Regulation,27 which applied in the
UK until Brexit. The UK has since enacted the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and
Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to carry forward the
application of Rome I and II post-Brexit. However, matters of defamation are outside the scope
of the Rome II Regulation. Therefore, double actionability continues to be applied in matters of
defamation.28
ii. Application of the Double Actionability Rule in India

Indian courts will likely apply a test of double actionability in all disputes involving tortious
breaches. This last statement, however, is not certain in the absence of explicit endorsement by
the Supreme Court.29 To date, there have only been two reported cases on the law applicable to
tortious claims with foreign elements.30 Both disputes were in respect of the tort of negligence.
Otherwise, existing dicta are merely of persuasive, as opposed to authoritative, value.
The doctrine of double actionability was considered by the Rajasthan High Court in Kotah
Transport Ltd v Jhalawar Transport Services Ltd.31 The case involved an action against a driver for
reckless driving leading to the collision of two buses and injury to the plaintiff.32 The accident
took place in India, but the Court referred to English common law ‘in the interest of justice,
equity and good conscience’ and considered what would happen if the tort had occurred in a
different country.33 In such a situation, the Court suggested that the principle of double action-
ability would apply:34
[W]hether an act done in a foreign country is or is not a tort (in India) depends upon the combined
effect of the law of the country where the act is done (lex loci delicti commissi) and of the law of the forum
(lex fori).35
In Sona Devi v Anil Kumar, the Punjab and Haryana High Court likewise invoked the doctrine
of double actionability.36 The case concerned the accidental drowning of pilgrims due to reckless
driving by a tour operator. The pilgrims were on the way to religious sites in northern India via
Nepal. The issue was whether the defendant’s wrong was actionable in India.37 Kannan J noted
that India had no equivalent to the 1995 Act prescribing the application of the law of the place of
the commission of the tort (lex loci delicti) to a tort with a foreign element.38
The Court observed that ‘in England, the statutory provisions govern and displace
common law’.39 In contrast, in the absence of statutory provisions, ‘India will continue to be
27 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable
to Non-Contractual Obligations [2007] OJ L199/40 [Rome II Regulation].

28 See Briggs, Conflict of Laws (n 2) 275–276.
29 See in this respect Art 141 of the Constitution of India 1950, which provides that ‘the law declared by the Supreme
Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India’.

30 See Kotah Transport Ltd v Jhalawar Transport Services Ltd AIR [1960] Raj 224; and Sona Devi v Anil Kumar [2011]
3 TAC 552.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
33 ibid [31]–[32].
34 ibid.
35 ibid [31]–[32] referring to A Dicey, J Morris and L Collins (eds), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 11th edn
(Sweet and Maxwell, 1987) Rules 180–181.

36 Sona Devi (n 30).
37 ibid.
38 Section 11 of the 1995 Act.
39 Sona Devi (n 30) [6].
governed by the principles of common law themselves’.40 The claimants would therefore have
to prove that the tour operator’s act was actionable: (1) as a tort under Indian law; and (2) as
a wrong ‘though not necessarily as a tort’41 under the law of the place where the act was done.
The Court did not mention the concurrent application of two laws (as under English common
law).42 Instead, the Court held that, if both conditions were satisfied, Indian common law would
mandate the exclusive application of domestic (that is, Indian) law.43 Thus, the Court appears
to have misunderstood how the double actionability rule was applied by the Queen’s Bench in
Phillips v Eyre.44 The Court also cited the respective decisions of the English and American courts
in Harding v Wealands45 and Babcock v Jackson.46 It confirmed the existence of an exception to
the doctrine of ‘double actionability’ in India.47
In Harding, the House of Lords decided applied the lex fori as a flexible exception to the
double actionability rule when adjudicating upon a dispute arising from an accident between
two persons who went on holiday from England to New South Wales.48 The court did so on the
basis that England bore a significant connection with the parties and their claim.49 Similarly,
in Babcock, the New York Court of Appeals applied the lex fori as the law applicable to a motor
vehicle accident involving a couple from New York on holiday in Ontario.50 The court justified
the application of New York law, which was the lex fori, by reference to the close relation-
ship between the parties and New York.51 It rejected the application of Ontario law, the locus
delicti, since Ontario had no other connection with the parties apart from fortuitously being the
place where their accident occurred.52 The court invoked the ‘centre of gravity’ principle which
hinges on the ‘grouping the elements’ to determine applicable law.53
Kannan J thus drew an analogy between the facts in Sona Devi54 and those of Harding55 and
Babcock.56 He elaborated:
The ‘double actionability’ rule has been said to be flexible. If all, or virtually all of the significant factors
so indicate, a particular issue or even the entire question of liability may be governed instead by the law
of the country which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence in question and with
the parties. Thus, a claimant may recover even though the law of the place of the tort would have disal-
lowed some or all of his claim. Likewise, he may recover in respect of a tort actionable under the law
of the place where it occurred even though the conduct would not have been actionable as a tort if it
has occurred in England. For this exception to apply, the connection between the case and the country
whose law is to be denied application must be so weak that the law has no interest in being applied to
the particular dispute, and no other law should be applied instead.57
40 ibid.
41 ibid.
42 See Phillips (n 5).
43 Sona Devi (n 30) [6].
45 [2006] UK HL 32.
46 [1963] 2 LlR 286.
47 Sona Devi (n 30) [6].
48 (n 45).
49 ibid.
50 (n 46). Also see generally TJB, ‘The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson on Conflict of Laws’ (1966) 52(2) Virginia Law 302,
303 et seq; RH Chappell Jr, ‘Lex Loci Delicti and Babcock v. Jackson’ (1966) 7 William and Mary Law Review 249, 250 et
seq; and ME Solimine, ‘The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson: An Empirical Note’ (1993) 56 Albany Law Review 773, 774.
51 ibid.
52 ibid
53 ibid.
54 (n 31).
55 (n 45).
56 (n 46).
57 (n 31) [8].
Whether the application of the flexible exception indirectly extends the doctrine of party
autonomy in choice of law to non-contractual matters remains unknown. As indicated above,
in England, the exception enables the courts to apply the law of another country if a dispute
arose from a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.
It has not been necessary in tortious matters to limit the application of the governing law if
the same contravenes an overriding Indian mandatory norms or public policy. This may be due
to India’s strict adherence to the double actionability rule. The application of the lex fori under
the rule serves as a:
filter whereby the courts can screen out unfamiliar or controversial torts without the need to rely on
spurious characterisations or arguments of public policy.58
B. Application of Double Actionability as a Uniform Principle?

In recent times, the growth of international trade and commerce has given rise to more
complex tortious claims, such as those arising from environmental damage, the infringement of
intellectual property, the use of defective or inherently dangerous products (product liability),
unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. Such eventualities have prompted several legal
systems to develop special rules for the determination of particular types of tortious claims.
Indian private international law will likely resort to the double actionability rule to determine the
applicable law for all tortious disputes before an Indian court. This section will analyse particular
tortious claims and sketch out how double actionability might apply to such matters.
i. Product Liability
There has been no case where the Indian courts have had the opportunity to identify, or even
comment on, the law that will govern a cross-border dispute in connection with product liability.
Product liability is a private law measure which aims to determine the civil liability of the manu-
facturer due to injury caused to a person or property through the use of a defective or inherently
dangerous product.59
Rules on product liability have recently been at the forefront of the news, especially in connec-
tion with innovations such as the introduction of autonomous vehicles incorporating artificial
intelligence (AI)60 in place of human effort. The inclusion of a Global Positioning System (GPS),
Light Detection and Ranging (Lidar), cameras, ultrasonic sensors, parking sensors and automatic
brakes are common features of such vehicles.61 Like most other products, when something goes
wrong, autonomous vehicles may endanger the life or safety of a user (the driver) or third parties
(pedestrians) as a result of a defective component or faulty design.
58 KF Tsang, ‘Double Actionability: An Outdated Rule in Modern Times’ (2017) 86 University of Missouri-Kansas City
Law Review, 73, 81 referring to A Dickinson, ‘Further Thoughts on Foreign Torts – Boys v. Chaplin Explained? (Red Sea
v. Bouygues)’ [1994] Lloyd’s Maritime and Comparative Law Quarterly 463, 463.
59 See M Tulibacka, Product Liability Law in Transition: A Central European Perspective (Ashgate Publishers, 2009) 4.
60 S Pradhan and R Patnaik, ‘Internet and Society: Latest Developments in Cyberspace’ (2018) 6(2) Nirma University
Law Journal 21, 30; M Xu et al., ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Opportunities and Challenges’ (2018) 9(2) International
Journal of Financial Research 90, 93; and K Schwab, ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution’ (2016) World Economic Forum 7,
available at: https://luminariaz.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-2016-21.pdf.
61 See, SH Williams, ‘Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars’ (2016) 38 Cardozo Law Review 121,
137–145; and J De Bruyne and C Vanleenhove, ‘The Rise of Self-Driving Cars: Is the Private International Law Framework
for Non-Contractual Obligations Posing a Bump in the Road?’ (2018) 5(1) IALS Student Law Review 14, 15–16.
Consider the following example: A (a permanent resident of Delhi) is riding in a self-driving

car manufactured by B (a company with a statutory seat in Germany and its principal place of
business in Bangalore) while A is on holiday in Greece. The car collides with a truck. The truck
is being driven by C (a permanent resident of Greece). The accident critically injures A. C is
unharmed, but C’s truck has been damaged. A sues B in Bangalore. C sues A for the damage
caused to C’s truck. What law will govern: (1) A’s action against sues B; and (2) C’s action against
A? The accident was not caused by anyone’s negligence. It was instead caused by a defective
component in the car. Can B be held liable to A for the defect in the car and (if so) to what extent?
Will A be expected to compensate C for the damage to C’s truck even though the accident was
not caused by A’s fault? In cross-border disputes, the ascertainment of such liability is likely to
become more complicated, because it may require the identification of several applicable laws in
order to determine the parties’ respective rights and liabilities.
In India, it appears that the courts will apply ‘double actionability’ to cross-border claims
involving issues of product liability. According to that doctrine, the plaintiff would be under an
onus to prove: (1) that the alleged wrong is actionable under the law of the country where it was
committed or occurred (lex loci delicti); and (2) that the act is simultaneously actionable as a tort
under Indian law. In cases of product liability, the interpretation of the place of the commission
of the wrong may be difficult. Does the locus delicti refer to the place: (1) where the defective or
damaged product was manufactured; or (2) where the accident arose and injured a person?
Consider a second scenario. A (an Austrian tourist travelling to Delhi) is injured by a shock
from an electronic trimmer manufactured by B (a company incorporated in China). How would
the place of commission or occurrence of the tort be identified, assuming that the court in India
has jurisdiction as the place where the cause of action arose? Would the locus delicti be: (1) China
where the electronic trimmer was manufactured; or (2) India where its use injured the tourist? If
the place of the commission of the tort is construed to mean the place of manufacturing (China),
the plaintiff would be under an onus to prove the defendant’s liability under Chinese and Indian
substantive law.
Under the Indian law of tort, the application of the seminal case of Donoghue v Stevenson62
would normally impose a duty of care towards consumers on the manufacturer of a product.
The manufacturer is responsible for damage caused by the sale of a defective product. Donoghue,
which has been instrumental in shaping the English common law of tort and the doctrine of
negligence, concerned damage caused to the person, Donoghue suffered shock and gastroen-
teritis by drinking from a ginger beer bottle which contained a decomposed snail. The House of
Lords per Lord Atkin held the manufacturer to be liable for negligence for the sale of a defective
product. It justified its decision by stating that:
a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show them to reach the ultimate
consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examina-
tion and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the
products will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take
reasonable care.63
However, the substantive principles of Indian law do not hold a manufacturer liable for accidents
caused by a motor vehicle (including an autonomous vehicle). The principles in Donoghue64 have
not been extended to such claims. Instead, claims for accidents from the use of a motor vehicle are
62 [1932] AC 562. See also, WVH Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort 18th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) 498–501.
63 ibid 599.
64 ibid.
subject to a principle of strict liability which holds the user of a vehicle liable for all the damage
resulting from its use. The Indian law of tort which regulates such matters is stipulated by the
Motor Vehicles Act 198865 (MVA). The legislation defines a ‘motor vehicle’ as:
any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is
transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not
been attached and a trailer, but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a
special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less
than four wheels …66
In contrast to the general duty of care in Donoghue,67 the MVA adopts the principle of strict
liability developed in Rylands v Fletcher.68 That means that:
the person who, for his own purpose brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to
[make] mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie answer-
able for all the damage, which is the natural consequence of its escape.69
The Supreme Court in Kaushnuma Begum and Ors v The New India Assurance Co. Ltd70 extended
the principle of strict liability to accidents involving the use of a motor vehicle. The Court was
called upon to determine the liability of the defendant who had allegedly killed a pedestrian when
the wheel of the jeep that the former was driving, burst.71 The Court held the defendant liable for
the death of the plaintiff.72 It justified its position by stating that:
in view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the road may be
regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v Fletcher. From
the point of view of the pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor
vehicles highly dangerous … Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a
motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled
to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet to
some extent, the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents, there
has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of
motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault.73
It would, consequently, be irrelevant whether the accident was caused by the fault or negligence
of the defendant. The Court clarified that the only defence available to the defendant who is
strictly liable for the accident caused by the use of the motor vehicle would be to demonstrate
that it was caused by: (1) the fault of the plaintiff; or (2) an act of God.74 The extension of the
doctrine of ‘double actionability’ to identify the applicable law in product liability cases involv-
ing a motor vehicle such as a self-driving car may therefore result in the failure of a claim as a
result of the claimant’s inability to prove that the relevant act is actionable under the lex fori and
the lex loci delicti.
65 Act No 59 of 1988.
66 ibid, s 2(28).
67 (n 69).
68 (1868) LR 3 HL 330, 339, 340. See also, A Sapre, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: The Law of Torts 28th edn (Lexis Nexis, 2018)
498 et seq.
69 ibid.
70 AIR [2001] SC 485.
71 ibid.
72 ibid.
73 ibid [18], referring to Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai & Anr [1987]
(3) SCC 234.

74 ibid.
The application of the law of the place of the commission of an accident (that is, the lex loci
delicti rule) may not hold the driver liable at all for an accident which has not occurred by his or
her fault. Instead, in a product liability case, where the accident has been caused by the failure
of a component (for instance, because the automatic brakes failed), the lex loci delicti may hold
the manufacturer liable for the defect which has caused the injury. In comparison, under Indian
law, the defendant (driver of the vehicle) would, however, be strictly liable for the ‘non-natural
use of land’,75 regardless of whether a defect in the vehicle caused the accident. To illustrate,
suppose an Austrian tourist is driving a self-driving car manufactured in Ohio while on holiday
in India. The vehicle fails to locate a divider on the road and fatally injures the driver, result-
ing in the driver’s death. The family of the driver sues the car company in India for the tort of
negligence in producing a defective component. The Indian court would have jurisdiction by
being the place where the cause of action arose. Under the doctrine of double actionability, the
plaintiffs would have to prove the liability of the car manufacturer under the substantive law of
Ohio and India. While the car manufacturer may be liable for the tort of negligence under Ohio
law, the substantive law of tort in India would on the contrary hold the driver strictly responsi-
ble for the non-natural use of land. The claim would therefore fail because the plaintiffs would
be unable to prove the liability of the car manufacturer under the lex loci delicti and the lex fori.
The driver of the care may have committed no wrong under the lex loci delicti. Conversely, the
lex fori (Indian law) would hold the driver (and not the manufacturer of the car) responsible
under the law of tort.
ii. Defamation
In cross-border tortious claims in defamation, the place of publication may differ from the coun-
try where the material is printed or issued or the place where a reputation has been damaged.
Identifying the applicable law may not be straightforward. Under the double actionability rule,
the victim would have to prove that the defamatory behaviour was actionable under the law of
the country where it originated and in India.76 Consider the following scenario: A (a permanent
resident of Delhi) sues B (a permanent resident of Sydney) for libellous material published in
Sydney. The place of the occurrence of the tort may be: (1) Sydney (the place where the material
was published); (2) India (where A’s reputation has been damaged); or (3) both. Under present
principles of Indian private international law, A would have to prove that the act is actionable
under the laws of India and New South Wales.
iii. Unjust Enrichment

Unjust enrichment occurs when one person is enriched at the expense of another.77 A claim for
unjust enrichment may arise when a person has received money: (1) by mistake; (2) by taking
advantage of another’s position; or (3) for a purpose that has failed.78 In such circumstances,
the person enriched is under an obligation ‘by the ties of natural justice and equity, to refund
75 ibid.
76 For a detailed discussion on the law of tort on defamation in India, see Sapre (n 68) 269–328.
77 See A Singh, Law of Contract and Specific Relief 12th edn (Eastern Book Company, 2017) 558 referring to the decision
of the English court in Moses v Macferlan [1760] 2 Burr 1005, 1012.

78 ibid.
the money’.79 In other words, the principal remedy for unjust enrichment would be restitution
or disgorgement of the benefit obtained.80 A claim for unjust enrichment may involve a foreign
element where, for instance, a person in India has been enriched in India at the expense of a
person overseas. Such claims would be subject to double actionability where the plaintiff would
have to prove the defendant’s liability to make restitution under Indian law and the relevant
foreign law. In India, the Supreme Court has in Ms Nagpur Golden Transport Co v Ms Nath
Traders & Ors81 and Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India82 observed that
unjust enrichment is neither founded on consent nor wrongdoing. The cause of action not based
on contract or tort, but is a cause of action in its own right.83 Occasionally, however, the Supreme
Court has referred to claims of unjust enrichment as based on ‘implied contracts’. Consequently,
a cross-border claim based on unjust enrichment may fail as a result of the application of double
actionability by not being a tort under the lex fori (Indian law).
iv. Environmental Torts
An environmental tort would give rise to a cross-border claim when nuisance or pollutants cross
boundaries.84 This may be the position when contaminants in a river from an industry in one
country (for example, Bangladesh) adversely affect the health and safety of citizens in another
nation (for example, India) who have access to drinking water drawn from the contaminated
river. There is no clarity on whether the doctrine of double actionability extends to cross-border
claims on environmental pollution under Indian private international law. In this connection,
the Supreme Court’s dictum in Union Carbide and Others v Union of India and Others85 deserves
mention. The decision is considered seminal under Indian law, as the first case in which the Court
was called upon to rule on an international tort. The dispute arose from the leakage of lethal
gas from a plant in Bhopal that was owned and controlled by an American parent corporation.
The leakage resulted in the death of hundreds of Indians.86 The Court applied Indian law to the
dispute.87 However, it did not comment on how it determined the applicable law. It appears that
the Court applied the exception to double actionability. Thus, Indian law may have been applied
because India had the most significant connection to the claim. In all other disputes where the
Court applies double actionability to identify the applicable laws, it will first ascertain whether
the tort was actionable in the foreign country where the cause of action giving rise to the tort
occurred and secondly whether the claim is valid under the Indian law of tort.
Under the Indian law of tort, a claim for environmental damage would generally be actionable
in negligence if the defendant breached a duty of care towards the victims. The injured party may
claim damages caused by the wrongdoer’s negligence. In certain circumstances, the tortfeasor
may be subject to absolute liability, if the environmental damage has been caused by a hazardous
79 ibid.
80 [2011] 12 SCC 745.
81 AIR [2012] SC 357, referring to Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1942]
2 ALL ER 122 (HL).

82 (2011) 8 SCC 161 152–154, 159 and 161.
83 ibid.
84 See S Pitel et al ‘Private International Law in Common Law Canada: Cases, Texts and Materials’ 4th edn (Emond
Publishing, 2016) 684 (Pitel, Private International Law in Common Law Canada).
85 [1991] 4 SCC 584. For a detailed discussion, see U Baxi, Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe: The Bhopal
Case, Bombay 1986.

86 ibid.
87 ibid.
or inherently dangerous activity.88 In such circumstances, the negligence of the tortfeasor would
be irrelevant.89 Cross-border environmental damage will therefore be actionable in India if,
in addition to being tortious under Indian law, the damage was caused by conduct considered
wrongful under the law of the foreign country where the act originated.
v. Unfair and Restrictive Trade Practices

An unfair or restrictive trade practice may have a cross-border effect when it adversely
constrains competition in another country. For instance, the act of a foreign manufacturer who
agrees with a supplier in another country to put a ceiling on the sale of a product to increase
its price would be construed as restrictive under the legal principles of some countries such
as India.90 Likewise, a practice may be unfair when a foreign manufacturer of athletic cloth-
ing falsely represents that the use of a certain type of sweatpants will facilitate weight loss.
A person who has suffered harm or injury as a result of the unfair or restrictive trade practice
of a foreign entity and who is suing before a court in India would therefore have to prove that
the act was: (1) actionable as a wrong under the law of the foreign country where it originated;
and (2) actionable under the domestic provisions of Indian law of tort. In India, such activi-
ties are generally considered as anti-competitive and so are prohibited under the Competition
Act 200291 (CA). Such activities are additionally actionable as torts under Indian law. A restric-
tive trade practice will become a tort. It will be regulated by the provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act 198692 (CPA) when it ‘tends to bring about manipulation in price or its condi-
tions of delivery or to affect the flow of supplies in the market relating to goods or services … to
impose on the consumers, unjustified costs or restrictions’.93 Likewise, an unfair trade practice
would become a tort if ‘promotes the sale, use or supply of any goods or … service’ by adopting
an unfair or deceptive practice.94 Accordingly, cross-border claims which satisfy the prerequi-
sites of the CPA may be actionable under the double actionability rule.
vi. Intellectual Property
The application of the doctrine of double actionability to the infringement of intellectual
property rights would invariably result in the application of Indian law which will be the
lex loci delicti and the lex fori. Consider the following illustrations. A (a company incorporated in
Delhi) allegedly infringes a registered trademark in the name of ‘Sav-n-More’ which is owned
by B (a company incorporated in Singapore) and used by B to sell clothes online across the
globe, including India. A starts a website under the name of ‘Sav-n-More Ltd’ to sell clothes in
India. Accordingly, B sues A in the courts of Delhi for infringement of the trademark. In this
illustration, the lex loci delicti and lex fori are both Indian law. Similarly, consider the infringe-
ment of a geographical indication such as ‘Champagne’ (a form of wine made from grapes
grown in the area by the same name in France) which refers to a sign or symbol to identify
88 See the decision of the Supreme Court in MC Mehta v Union of India, [1987] 1 SCC 395. Also see Sapre (n 68)
509–511.
89 ibid.
90 See s 27 of the ICA.
91 Act No 12 of 2003.
92 Act No 68 of 1986.
93 ibid, s 2(nnn).
94 ibid, s 2(r).
Reflections on Indian Law: Some Insights Based on Global Trends 239
goods originating from a specific region that gives the product a distinct quality, reputation or
characteristic. Assume that A (a manufacture in India) has infringed a geographical indication
by manufacturing wine by the name of ‘Champagne’. The infringement occurred in India. The
lex loci delicti and the lex fori would result in the application of Indian law.
III. Reflections on Indian Law:

Some Insights Based on Global Trends
A. General Remarks
As we have seen, Indian private international law continues to hold fast to the doctrine of ‘double
actionability’. In contrast, global trends demonstrate that the development of conflict of law rules
on applicable law for non-contractual obligations has been revolutionised. The doctrine of double
actionability has been discarded in most jurisdictions, including ‘mature common law systems’95
such as Canada,96 Australia97 and New Zealand98 for being ‘notoriously difficult to understand and
apply’.99 India’s BRICS partners, Russia and China, have also abandoned the double actionability
rule which was historically employed to determine applicable law in disputes100 for operating in
favour of the defendant to the disadvantage of the plaintiff, leading to ‘absurd and anomalous
results’.101 The principles of Australian and Canadian private international law prescribe the strict
application of the lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the occurrence of the tort) which found a
place in the UK’s 1995 Act.102 The 1995 Act’s flexible exception rule does not find any place under
the laws of these legal systems.103 There is no reported case in which the courts have clarified
whether the lex loci delicti rule would be disregarded if it contravenes an overriding mandatory
norm or the public policy (ordrè public) of Australia or Canada.
In Australia, the courts confirmed the strict application of the lex loci delicti in the leading
cases of John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson104 and Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang.105
In both cases, the High Court of Australia rejected the common law’s flexible exception for its
ability to undermine certainty and predictability.106 The dicta underscored the importance of
95 See A Briggs, Private International Law in Myanmar (OUP, 2015) 108. [Briggs, PIL in Myanmar].
96 See Pitel (n 84) 651.
97 See Davies et al, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia 9th edn (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2020) 424 [Nygh’s Conflict
of Laws].
98 See s 10 of the Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act 2017 [New Zealand PIL Act].
99 See Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 97) 424. See also R Mortenson et al, Private International Law in Australia
3rd edn (Lexis Nexis, 2011) 443–445 for other mechanism that were historically employed in Australia to identify the
applicable law.
100 See SC Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: An International Comparative Analysis (OUP, 2014) 83.
101 See Z Huo ‘An imperfect improvement: the new conflict of laws act of the People’s Republic of China’ [2011]
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1065, 1089.

102 See the decision of the Australian courts in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] 203 CLR 503; and Regie Nationale
des Usines Renault SA v Zhang [2002] 210 CLR 491; and the decisions of the Canadian courts in Tolofson v Jenson [1994]
3 SCR 1022; and Wong v Lee [2002] OJ No 885.
103 ibid.
104 [2000] 203 CLR 503.
105 [2002] 210 CLR 491.
106 Also see Australian Law Reform Commission Report [ALRC], ‘Choice of Law’ Report No 58, Ch 6, available at:
www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/other/lawreform/ALRC/1992/58.pdf
which recommended the application of the a flexible exception to displace the lex loci delicti if law of another country was
the proper law of the tort and had a significant relationship with its occurrence and the parties.
exclusively applying the law of the place of the tort for being uniform, respecting territorial
sovereignty and for respecting the parties’ reasonable expectation. In Distillers Co (Biochemicals)
Ltd v Thompson107 the court clarified the mechanism to identify the place of the commission
(or the occurrence) of the tort. Accordingly, it stated the
right approach is, when the tort is complete, to look back over a series of events constituting it and ask,
where in substance did the cause of action occur?108
In the absence of any statutory provisions, there is no special mechanism to identify the appli-
cable law in complex disputes such as product liability and defamation. Over time, the courts
have, however, interpreted the lex loci delicti rule while adjudicating such complex disputes. In
product liability cases, the mechanism to identify the lex loci delicti depends on the type of claim.
The law of the country where the product was manufactured would govern any dispute which
arises from the damage which has been caused by a defect in the good.109 Conversely, the law of
the country where the product was marketed or sold would govern disputes which arise from the
damage that has been caused from the product where the manufacturer has failed to warn the
user of the inherent risks associated therein.110 The place of manufacture would be irrelevant in
the latter type of disputes. In cross-border disputes arising in connection with defamation, the
lex loci delicti refers to the laws of all the countries connected to the claim where the material was
received.111 For instance, in a lawsuit concerning the publication of libelous material, which has
been distributed in India, Australia and New Zealand, the Australian court would individually
invoke the defamation laws of all three countries.112 In common law Canada, the application of
the lex loci delicti has been justified on the ground that people ordinarily presume ‘to be governed
by the law of the place where they happen to be and expect that the concomitant legal benefits and
responsibilities will be defined accordingly’.113
The strict application of the lex loci delicti rule was confirmed by the Supreme Court in
Tolofson v Jenson114 and Wong v Lee.115 Although leading scholars have argued in favour of the
flexible exception rule to prevent injustice when both the parties are residents or nationals of the
forum,116 these opinions have not found favour among the courts.117 The Canadian judiciary has
frowned upon its application given its ability to hamper certainty and create or prolong litiga-
tion with the task of tracing the relevant contacts and weighing them qualitatively against one
another.118 In Wong, the Court accordingly stated the lex loci delicti would apply ‘notwithstanding
a high degree of connection between [the] litigants and the place of the forum’.119 In due course,
the Canadian courts have interpreted the lex loci delicti rule while identifying the applicable law
for certain particular types of torts. In the absence of any statutory provisions, this mechanism
107 [1971] AC 458.

108 ibid 469.
109 See Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd (n 107); John Pfeiffer (n 102); and Pulido v RS Distributions Pty Ltd [2003]
177 FLR 401. See also, Mortenson et al (n 99) 448; and Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 97) 428.
110 See Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd ibid; John Pfeiffer ibid; and Pulido ibid. See also, Mortenson ibid, 448; and Nygh’s
Conflict of Laws ibid 428.

111 Nygh’s Conflict of Laws ibid 452–453.
112 ibid.
113 Pitel (n 84) 650.
114 [1994] 3 SCR 1022. Also see Pitel ibid 651.
115 [2002] OJ No 885.
116 See Pitel (n 84) 658–659, 673–675.
117 ibid, referring to Wong (n 102).
118 ibid 659.
119 ibid 676–675 referring to Wong (n 102).
(to interpret the lex loci delicti) has not been clearly defined and remains open to interpretation.
Nonetheless, a close examination of the interpretation of the lex loci delicti in complex cases on
tortious liability indicates that the place of the commission or occurrence of the tort is under-
stood to mean the place of the damage in such disputes. In product liability cases, the place of the
occurrence of the tort refers to the place of direct (and not consequential) injury, provided that:
(1) the goods have entered through the usual channels of trade; and (2) the manufacturer could
have reasonably foreseen its consumption in the country of harm.120 Likewise, in defamation
cases, the place of tort has been interpreted as the place where the victim has suffered an injury
to his or her reputation.121 The place of publication would be irrelevant if the reputation has been
injured in another country by being the victim’s place of residence or business.122 In case of unfair
competition or restraint of competition, the place of tort will be construed as the place(s) where
the effect has been felt.123 The governing law in claims arising from unjust enrichment will be the
country which is most closely connected with the causal act.124 Thus, for instance, the applicable
law in a claim to restore the benefits of unjust enrichment arising in connection to a person’s
ownership of immovable property will be that of the country where the land is situated.125
In cross-border disputes concerning the infringement of intellectual property in Canada, the lex
loci delicti will be the local law (of the province) provided that the legislation affords protection to
that right.126 For instance, the governing law in a claim concerning piracy occurring in Canada of
copyrighted material, in the form of a software which has been registered in Australia, would be
that of Canada under the lex loci delicti rule. The governing law would not be Australian law, even
though Australia is the place where the right is protected by registration.127
In comparison, the private international law of New Zealand resonates with the provisions
of the 1995 Act insofar as it prescribes the application of the lex loci delicti coupled with the
flexible exception rule.128 There is, however, no reported case on the development of special rules
in particular torts in New Zealand.
Russian and Chinese private international law has similarly displaced the convoluted double
actionability rule in favour of certain clear, predictable rules to identify the applicable law in cross-
border disputes on non-contractual matters. As such, the mechanism to identify the applicable
law depends on whether the claim is of a general or special nature in these legal systems.129 Under
the laws of both these countries, the law expressly chosen by the parties will govern the dispute
under the doctrine of party autonomy, provided that the choice is made ex-post (that is, after the
injury has occurred).130 The restrictions to party autonomy ‘aim to prevent the socially stronger
party from imposing its unilateral choice on the weaker party’.131 Russian private international
120 Morgan v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd [1973] 43 DLR (3d) 239 (SCC); and J Walker, Halsbury’s Laws of Canada:
Conflict of Laws (Lexis Nexis, 2016) 556, 563.

121 See Walker, ibid 566–567 referring to Gorton v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1974] 22 FLR 181; and Maple v
David Syme & Co [1975] 1 NSWLR 97 (Sup. Ct. NSW) ff 4.

122 ibid.
123 See Walker ibid 569.
124 ibid 569–570.
125 ibid 570.
126 ibid 567.
127 ibid 567, ff 1.
128 see ss 7 and 8 of the New Zealand PIL Act.
129 See Arts 1219–1223 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation 2015 [Civil Code of Russia] and Arts 44–47 of the
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Relations, 2010 [Chinese PIL].
130 Art 1219(3) of the Civil Code of Russia; and Art 44(3) of Chinese PIL.
131 See Z Huo ‘An imperfect improvement: the new conflict of laws act of the People’s Republic of China’ [2011]
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1065, 1089.

law, however, further limits party autonomy to the choice of the law of the forum (lex fori).132
In the absence of an express choice, the habitual residence of the parties obtains the pride of
place, provided that it is common.133 In the absence of such commonality, the lex loci delicti will
be applicable as a general rule in these countries to determine the rights and obligations between
the parties.134 However, neither Russian nor Chinese private international law provide any
guidance to resolve the ambiguities that may arise if the event giving rise to the tort and
damage happens to occur in different countries.
In Russia, there are special rules to identify the applicable law for claims arising in connection
to product liability, unfair competition and unjust enrichment. In cases of product liability, the
victim may choose to be governed by the law of the place where: (1) she or he has a residence or
principal place of business; (2) the manufacturer has its residence or principal place of business;
or (3) the place where the goods were acquired.135 Disputes concerning unfair competition and
unjust enrichment will be governed respectively by the law of the country whose market has been
affected and the place where the causal act took place.136
In China, there are special rules to identify the applicable law for claims arising in connection
to product liability, defamation, the infringement of intellectual property, unjust enrichment and
negotiorum gestio (claiming payment for the voluntary management of the affairs of another).
The applicable law in cross-border product liability cases is that of the habitual residence of the
victim. This rule may be departed in two circumstances: (1) when the victim instead prefers
the application of the law of the principal place of business of the manufacturer or the place of
damage; or (2) the tortfeasor (ie manufacturer) has not engaged in any business in the country of
the victim’s habitual residence.137 In a related vein, cross-border disputes on defamation occur-
ring on the internet are governed by the habitual residence of the victim.138 At the same time,
disputes concerning the infringement of intellectual property will be regulated by the law of the
place where the right is protected (lex loci protectionis).139 In the case of unjust enrichment and
negotiorum gestio, the law of the common habitual residence of the parties is applicable; failing
which, the law where the causal fact took place would govern the dispute.140
The codifications of Russia141 and China142 authorise a court to refuse to apply the governing
law if it contravenes an overriding mandatory provision or the public policy (ordrè public) of the
forum.
The doctrine of double actionability does not find a place in the principles of private inter-
national law of India’s neighbour, Nepal. Part 6 of the National Civil Code Act 2017 which
codifies the principles of private international law of this country prescribes the application
of the lex loci delicti as a general rule to govern all tortious claims which involve a foreign
element.143 Therefore, it appears that party autonomy in the choice of law is not recognised
under Nepalese private international law of tort. In certain circumstances, the law of the
place of the occurrence of the consequences would, however, override the application of
132 Art 1219(3) of the Civil Code of Russia.

133 ibid; Art 44(2) of the Chinese PIL.
134 Art 1219(1) of the Civil Code of Russia; Art 44(1) of the Chinese PIL.
136 ibid, Arts 1222 and 1223.
138 ibid, Art 46
139 ibid, Art 50.
140 ibid, Art 47.
141 Arts 1192 and 1193 of the Civil Code of Russia.
142 Arts 4 and 5 of the Chinese PIL.
143 Art 712(1) of the National Civil Code Act 2017 (Nepalese PIL).
the lex loci delicti rule, unless the former cannot be identified.144 In such circumstances, the
lex loci delicti would continue to govern the tortious claim.145 In cross-border disputes on
unjust enrichment, the National Civil Code Act 2017 stipulates the application of the law of
the country where the act was done, as a special rule.146 There apart, the codification does not
prescribe any other special rules for other forms of non-contractual obligations such as prod-
uct liability, unfair competition or the infringement of intellectual property, to name a few.
The doctrine of double actionability has not been reported to have been relevant in identifying
the applicable law in the EU, South Korea or Turkey.
In the EU, the law on the subject is regulated by the provisions of the Rome II Regulation.
The identification of the governing law primarily depends on the express and implied
(or tacit) choice of the parties.147 The parties are free to choose the governing law ex-ante and
ex-post – i.e. before and after the injury occurred.148 The choice of a soft law or a non-state law
such as the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)149 is, however, not permitted under the
Rome II Regulation,150 except if the parties have incorporated the terms of such non-binding
legal provisions by reference into their contract.151 In this manner, the application of the doctrine
of party autonomy under the Rome II is similar to that under the Rome I Regulation.152 In the
absence of an express selection, the tacit choice of the law by the parties will govern the disputes
provided that their intentions of being regulated by that legal system can be ‘demonstrated with
reasonable certainty by the facts of the case’.153
In the absence of an express or tacit choice, the identification of the applicable law
depends on whether the claim is of a general or complex nature. The general rule is prescribed in
Article 4, which stipulates the application of the law of the habitual residence of the parties will
apply provided that it is common.154 The habitual residence, thus, obtains the pride of place.155
In the absence of such commonality, the law of the place where the actual damage occurs would
govern the dispute under the lex loci damni rule.156 The place where the event giving rise to the
tort or the consequential injury occurs is, therefore, irrelevant.157 To illustrate, the law that would
govern a dispute arising between two Australians as a result of a personal injury in a motor
vehicle accident in Rome due to the negligence of the driver would be that of Australia, due to the
144 ibid, Art 712(2).

145 ibid.
146 ibid, Art 713. For the definition of ‘unjust enrichment’ under Nepalese law, see Art 664.
147 TK Graziano, ‘Freedom to Choose the Applicable Law in Tort – Articles 14 and 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation’
in J Ahern and W Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New
Litigation Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 113 et seq.
148 ibid 116–117.
149 See F Busnelli et al, Principles of European Tort Law: Text and Commentary (2005) available at https://link.springer.
com/book/10.1007/3-211-27751-X.
150 Graziano (n 147) 119.
151 ibid.
152 See Recital 13 to the Rome I Regulation.
153 Graziano (n 147) 119–120.
154 See Art 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation. See also, J von Hein, ‘Article 4 and Traffic Accidents’ in J Ahern and
W Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New Litigation Regime
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 160–165 [von Hein, Article 4 and Traffic Accidents]; and J von Hein, ‘Article 4 in
Rome Regulations: Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws’ (Calliess eds) 509–517 [von Hein,
Article 4 Rome II].
155 Art 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation; von Hein, Article 4 and Traffic Accidents, ibid 160–165; and von Hein, Article 4
Rome II, ibid 509–517.

156 Recitals 6 and 18 and Art 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation; von Hein, Article 4 and Traffic Accidents, ibid 158–160; and
von Hein, Article 4 Rome II, ibid 497–509.

157 ibid.
common residence of the persons involved. If, however, the dispute arose between an Australian
and a French driver, the law that will govern would be that of Italy as the place where the damage
occurred. It would, therefore, be irrelevant that the person injured eventually died in Australia
due to the injury.
As a last resort, the Rome II Regulation permits, through an ‘escape clause’, the application
of the law of another legal system provided that the tort in question is ‘manifestly more closely
connected’ with that country.158 The instrument does not stipulate a set of indicative factors
to illustrate the circumstances in which the escape clause may be invoked. The commentaries,
however, clarify that its application would be permitted only when another country is signifi-
cantly more closely connected to the dispute.159 In doing so, the EU’s conflict of law rules
retains the flexibility in identifying the applicable law in non-contractual matters – as was
the case in contractual issues. Unlike the exception developed by the English court in Boys v
Chaplin,160 the Rome II Regulation does not permit the law derived under the escape clause
to apply exclusively to a particular issue of the claim.161 In other words, the law derived under
the escape clause will govern the (entire) dispute and not merely an issue.
Articles 5–12 of the Rome II Regulation operate as lex specialis rules to identify the
applicable law for complex cases for which the general rule may be inappropriate. The special
rules govern disputes arising from product liability,162 unfair competition,163 environmental
damage,164 the infringement of intellectual property,165 industrial action,166 unjust enrich-
ment,167 negotiorum gestio168 (claiming payment for the voluntary management of the affairs
of another) and culpa in contrahendo (the parties’ standard of conduct in pre-contractual
dealings).169 The rules are formulated to balance the interests of the parties and, thus, prevent
injustice. For instance, Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation stipulates the conflict of law rule on
the applicable law for disputes arising from the use of a defective product. In this respect, the
term ‘product’ has been interpreted according to Article 2 of the Product Liability Directive as
all movables, including those incorporated into another immovable.170 The express and inferred
choice of the parties remains as a defining factor to discern the applicable law for disputes on
product liability. In the absence of such choice, the law of the habitual residence of the parties
is similarly applicable (as for general disputes involving tortious claims) to the extent that it is
common to the victim and the tortfeasor.171
158 See Art 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation; Stone (n 22) 196; R Fentiman, ‘The Significance of Close Connection’ in
J Ahern and W Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: A New Litigation
Regime (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 85 et seq.; and C Schmid and T Pinkel, ‘Article 5 Rome II’ in Calliess (ed)
Rome Regulations: Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 562–566.
159 See, Stone, ibid 196. Also see Fentiman, ibid 85; and Schmid and Pinkel, ibid 562–566.
160 [1971] AC 356.
161 Briggs, Conflict of Laws (n 2) 263.
162 Art 5 of the Rome II Regulation.
163 ibid, Art 6. But see Art 6(4) which states that party autonomy does not extend to disputes arising in relation to unfair
competition.
164 ibid, Art 7.
165 ibid, Art. 8. But see Art 8(3) which states that party autonomy does not extend to disputes arising in relation to the
infringement of intellectual property.

166 ibid, Art 9.
167 ibid, Art 10.
168 ibid, Art 11.
169 ibid, Art 12.
170 Schmid and Pinkel (n 158) 544–545.
171 Art 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation. Also see von Hein, Article 4 Rome II (n 154) 509–517.
In the absence of commonality, the Rome II Regulation imbibes a ‘seven-step cascade system
of connecting factors’ to identify the applicable law.172 In such circumstances, the law of the place
where: (1) the person suffering the damage has its habitual residence; (2) the product was acquired;
or (3) the damage occurred (lex loci damni) would govern the dispute provided that the product
in question was marketed in either of these jurisdictions.173 The law of the habitual residence of
the tortfeasor (namely, the manufacturer) would, however, be applicable if the defective prod-
uct in question was not reasonably foreseen to be marketed in those countries.174 Nonetheless,
the law of another country may be invoked in the form of an ‘escape clause’ provided that such
legal system is ‘manifestly more closely connected’ with the dispute.175 To illustrate, the law that
would govern a dispute before a French court adjudicating the liability of the manufacturer of a
self-driving car produced in Ohio, which resulted in an injury to its user (habitually resident in
France) while driving to work in Paris, would primarily depend on the choice of the parties. In the
absence of an express or implied choice, the law that would govern the dispute would be French
law by being the habitual residence of the victim if the car had been marketed in that jurisdiction.
If the car had not been marketed in France, then the law of the place where the car was acquired,
for instance, Scotland would apply if it had been marketed there. The law of the habitual residence
of the manufacturer (Ohio) would, however, apply if the marketing in France or Scotland had
not been foreseeable. In the present scenario, however, the court may at its discretion invoke the
escape clause and apply the French law since it is manifestly more closely connected with the tort
by being the place where the victim habitually resides and the place of injury.
Tortious claims for damages arising from an act of unfair competition and restriction of
competition are governed by the law of the country ‘where competitive relations or the collective
interests of consumers are, or are likely to be, affected’, except when it adversely affects the inter-
ests of a specific competitor.176 In such circumstances, the general rule prescribed in Article 4
would be applicable.177 The doctrine of party autonomy is, however, not extended to claims
for unfair competition.178 Similarly, disputes for environmental damage would be governed by
the law of the country where the event giving rise to the damage occurred.179 Disputes arising
from the infringement of intellectual property shall be governed by the law of the place where
the right is granted under the lex loci protectionis rule.180 At the same time, non-contractual
obligations concerning the liability of a worker or an employer for damages in the course of
an industrial action would be governed by the law of the place where the action has or will be
taken.181 The governing law may be displaced if it contravenes an overriding mandatory norm
or the public policy of the forum-state.182
172 Schmid and Pinkel (n 158) 546.

173 Art 5(1) of the Rome II Regulation; and Schmid and Pinkel, ibid 546 et seq.
174 ibid, Art 5(2); and Schmid and Pinkel, ibid 555–556.
175 See Stone (n 22) 196. Also see Fentiman (n 158) 85; and Schmid and Pinkel, ibid 562–566.
176 Art 6(1) and (2) of the Rome II Regulation; and S Augenhofer, Unfair Competition and Acts Restricting Free
Competition: Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws (Calliess eds) 570–602.
177 ibid, Art 6(2).
178 ibid, Art 6(4).
179 ibid, Art 7. Also see, J von Hein, Environmental Damage: Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws
(Calliess eds) 603–624.

180 See Art 8 of the Rome II Regulation. See also, K de la Durantaye, Infringement of Intellectual Property: Commentary
on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws (Calliess eds) 526–642.

181 ibid, Art 9. Also, Rödl, Industrial Action: Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws (Calliess eds)
643–657.
182 ibid, Arts 16 and 26. See also, Briggs, Conflict of Laws (n 2) 256 which clarifies that the Rome II Regulation does
not follow the trend found in the Rome I Regulation that defines the circumstances in which the applicable law will be
considered to override a mandatory provision of the forum-state in the EU.
In certain circumstances, the provisions of the Rome II Regulation may be replaced by the
1971 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention (1971 Hague Convention])183 or the 1973 Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability (1973 Hague Convention).184 This is
because 12 EU states have ratified the 1971 Convention. On the other hand, six EU states have
ratified the 1973 Hague Convention. Austria, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France, Luxemburg,
Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain
have ratified the 1971 Hague Convention. Finland, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway
and Spain, have ratified the 1973 Hague Convention. The precise relationship between the 1971
and the 1973 Hague Conventions and the Rome II Regulation has been subjected to much
debate.185 Although some academic writings opine that the conflict of law rules of the Rome II
Regulation would undoubtedly take precedence among its signatories,186 others confirm that this
would depend on the Member State before which the claim has been raised.187
As the name suggests, the scope of the 1971 Hague Convention is limited to the determination
of the governing law for transnational disputes arising from traffic accidents. In comparison, the
1973 Hague Convention specifically addresses the conflict of law issues on the applicable law for
cross-border disputes arising as a result of damage caused by the use of a defective product. For
example, consider a French court which has been called upon to decide the rights and liabilities of
the parties arising out of an accident. The accident resulted in an injury to an Australian tourist in
France. The accident was due to the negligent driving of a French driver. The French court would
refer to the 1971 Hague Convention to determine the applicable law. In contrast, the conflict of
law rules on applicable law stipulated in the 1973 Hague Convention would be invoked if the
damage had been caused by the failure of a component of the product, including the car itself.
The private international laws of South Korea188 and Turkey189 recognise party autonomy
in choice of law as a general conflict of law rule.190 However, the parties may choose any law to
govern their dispute arising out of a non-contractual obligation after (ex post) and not before
(ex ante) the injury occurred.
In the absence of an express choice, South Korean private international law prescribes the
application of the law of the place where the tort occurred (lex loci delicti) as a general rule.191
However, if the victim and the tortfeasor have a common habitual residence, then the law of that
country will apply.192 The general rule is displaced in disputes arising from the infringement of
intellectual property and unjust enrichment. Such disputes will respectively be governed by the
183 The text of the 1971 Hague Convention on Traffic Accidents is available at: www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
full-text/?cid=81. For a list of signatories to the 1971 Convention, visit: www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/

status-table/?cid=81.
184 The text of the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability is available at: www.hcch.net/en/
instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=84.
185 For a detailed discussion on the relationship between the Rome II Regulation and the 1971 Hague Convention,
see, von Hein, Article 4 and Traffic Accidents (n 161) 157; CI Nagy, ‘The Rome II Regulation and Traffic Accidents:
Uniform Conflict Rules with Some Room for Forum Shopping – How so?’ (2010) 6(1) Journal of Private International Law
93, 108, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737713; AE Menendez, ‘Road Traffic Accidents: From the Hague
Convention of 4 May 1971 to Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 (Rome II)’ (2007) 7 Anuarioespanol Derecho International
Private 505; and M Krvavac, ‘The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents and Rome II Regulation’
(2018) 79 Collection of Papers Faculty of Law, NIS 141.
186 von Hein, Article 4 and Traffic Accidents (n 154) 157.
187 Nagy (n 185) 108; and Bruyne and Vanleenhove (n 61) 24.
188 Art 33 of the Act of Private International Law 2016 [South Korean PIL].
189 Art 34(5) of the Turkish Code on Private International Law and International Civil Procedure 2007 [Turkish PIL].
191 ibid, Art 32(1).
192 ibid, Art 32(2).
lex loci protectionis rule (the law of the place where the intellectual property was granted)193 and
the law of the country where the act took place.194 South Korean private international law permits
the courts to refuse to apply the governing law if it contravenes an overriding mandatory norm.195
Whether the contravention of the public policy of South Korea will similarly displace the governing
law, remains ambiguous.
Turkish private international law prescribes the application of the lex loci delicti as a general
rule in the absence of a choice, unless the damage occurred in a different country.196 In the latter
circumstance, the lex loci damni would govern the claim.197 As a last resort, Turkish private inter-
national law balances predictability with flexibility by making provision for an ‘escape clause’.198
In such circumstances, the lex loci damni may be displaced by the law of another country if the
relationship arising from the tort is ‘more closely connected with that country’.199 The general
rule is displaced in certain complex cases. Accordingly, damages arising from the infringement
of intellectual property would be governed by the law of the country where the right is protected
(lex loci protectionis).200 Likewise, cross-border disputes in defamation would be governed by
the law of the habitual residence of the victim, the habitual residence/place of business of the
tortfeasor or the lex loci damni, depending on the choice of the victim.201 These apart, non-
contractual liability for damage arising from the use of a product may be regulated by the law of
the habitual residence of the victim or the place of business of the manufacturer, depending on
the choice of the victim.202 The applicable law for cross-border disputes on claims concerning
unfair competition and restraint of competition would be that of the country whose market is
directly affected.203 Lastly, claims arising from unjust enrichment are governed by the law appli-
cable to the existing transaction or the place where the unjust enrichment occurred.204
In contrast, India has been unmoved by global developments insofar as it continues to
embrace the doctrine of double actionability to identify the applicable law from cross-border
disputes on tort. In the present era, the principle finds a place under the private international
laws of some common law systems such as Hong Kong205 and Singapore.206 Besides, the prin-
ciple continues to find a place in the codification of the Japanese private international law.207
The rule has been severely criticised because it ‘appears to co-mingle the law dealing with
what we would call today jurisdiction and the choice of law’.208 The first criterion which tests
whether the act is actionable as a tort under the lex fori concerns the determination of juris-
diction of the court in an international matter.209 It is only the second criterion which tests
193 ibid, Art 24.

194 ibid, Art 31.
195 ibid, Art 7.
196 Art 34(2) of the Turkish PIL.
197 ibid.
198 ibid, Art 34(3).
199 ibid.
200 ibid, Art 4(3).
201 ibid, Art 35.
202 ibid, Art 36.
203 ibid, Arts 38 and 39.
204 ibid, Art 39.
205 See, Art 8 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
206 See, Goh Chok Tong v Tang Liang Hong [1997] I SLR (R) 811; and Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von
Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR 377.

207 See Art 22(2) of the Japanese Act on the General Rules on the Application of Laws 2007 [Japanese PIL]. Also see
K Takahashi, ‘A Major Reform of Japanese Private International Law’ [2006] Journal of Private International Law 311, 333;
and SC Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: An International Comparative Analysis (OUP, 2014) 84.
208 See Pitel (n 84) 651.
209 ibid.
whether the claim is actionable as a wrong under the lex loci delicti that appears to be the
application of a choice of law rule.210 Thus, the claimant must ‘win twice to win once’ for its
claim to be successful.211 In this manner, the rule is chauvinistic by mandating the application
of the lex fori and prevents access to justice. Moreover, Indian law does not clarify whether
the application of the double actionability rule will result in: (1) the concurrent application
of the lex fori and the lex loci delicti (the original position prescribed in Phillips v Eyre);212
or (2) the claim being exclusively governed by the lex fori after the claimant demonstrates its
actionability under the two laws? As was shown above, in Sona Devi the Court indicated the
exclusive application of the lex fori after the claimant has demonstrated actionability under
the two laws.213 Regardless of its interpretation, legal scholars have criticised the application
of the double actionability rule for its susceptibility to presenting a ‘false conflict’.214 A false
conflict occurs when the laws of the lex fori and the lex loci delicti differ, but only one of them
is more suited to governing a dispute.215
Consider the following illustrations. A (an Austrian tourist travelling to Delhi) is injured in
a traffic accident caused by the reckless driving of B (a permanent resident of Delhi). A sues B
in a court in Delhi. In this situation, one legal system (the Indian legal system) would plainly
be more suitable than the other (the Austrian legal system) in terms of determining the parties’
rights and liabilities in respect of each other. Suppose now that A (an American tourist travel-
ling to Delhi) is injured by a shock from an electronic shaver manufactured by B (a company
incorporated in China). In this situation, one legal system would be plainly more suited for
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties. That would be the Chinese legal system as
the defective product was manufactured in its territory and the injured tourist was not Indian.
The application of Indian law may accordingly not be justified unless the damage occurred in
its territory. The application of the doctrine of double actionability thus presents ‘a needless
complication’.216
B. Moving Past the Obsolete Double Actionability Rule

In light of the foregoing examination of global trends, it is suggested that India abandon the
obsolete double actionability rule in favour of clear predictable rules which promote and do
not impede access to justice in the Republic. Lawmakers should separate the mechanism for
identifying applicable law in disputes on general tortious claims such as nuisance, negligence,
or assault and the mechanism for dealing with applicable law in more complex matters such as
product liability, environmental damage and unfair competition. Although the promulgation of
a statute to this effect is recommended, the Supreme Court of India should in the meanwhile
invoke the power conferred upon it by Article 141 of the Constitution217 to draft guidelines on
the subject.
210 ibid.
211 Briggs, Conflict of Laws (n 2) 274.
212 (n 5).
213 Sona Devi (n 30) [6].
214 See B Currie, ‘The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function’ (1958)
26 University of Chicago Law Review 9, 10; and JHC Morris, The Conflict of Laws 3rd edn (Stevens & Sons, 1984) 527,
529–530; and Tsang (n 58) 88.
215 ibid.
216 Tsang (n 58) 90 referring to the remarks of the Australian court in Breavington v Godleman 169 CLR 41, 77 (Austl.
1988); and the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson (n 62) ff 92 which discarded the principle.
217 See Art 141 of the Constitution of India 1950 which states that ‘[t]he law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all courts within the territory of India’.


It is suggested that Indian private international law recognises the parties’ choice of law as a chief
factor for identifying the governing law in all cross-border disputes involving non-contractual
matters. As has been shown above, the principle has found favour in the laws of a number of
civil law jurisdictions. However, in contrast to the Rome II Regulation,218 the laws of Russia,219
China,220 South Korea221 and Turkey222 merely permit parties to choose the governing law ex-post
(after the dispute has arisen). These legal systems have limited party autonomy to protect the
interest of the victim, especially if the tortfeasor is a big corporation.
The approach found under the Rome II Regulation, which permits parties to choose governing
law ex ante and ex post,223 is more favourable for adoption in Indian private international law. The
exploitation of weaker and more vulnerable parties, such as consumers or insured persons, may
be prevented by limiting an ex ante choice of law when it contravenes the overriding mandatory
provisions or public policy of India.
As we have seen in chapter 10 on ‘The Applicable Law in Contractual Obligations’, party
autonomy in the choice of law in matters of a contract is permitted in India to the extent that it
does not violate the public policy of the forum. In this respect, contracts with weaker parties will
be construed to be unconscionable and opposed to the public policy of India under Section 23
of the ICA if:
(1) there is a great disparity in the economic strengths of the parties;224
(2) one party cannot trade in goods or services except on the terms of the other,225 or
(3) one party has no meaningful choice except to accept the terms proposed by the other
however unreasonable.226
It is suggested that Indian private international law further extend the principle of party auton-
omy to the choice of soft law and non-state law. Parties may prefer the choice of non-binding legal
principles such as soft law and non-state law because ‘such instruments can reflect their business
relationship better than domestic or international law’.227 At the same time, unlike in the field of
contract, there is a dearth of non-binding legal instruments in matters of tort. The PETL seems to
be the only feasible option as of now.

In the absence of an express choice, the courts in India should ascertain if the parties have
impliedly or tacitly chosen a law. It is suggested that India adopt an approach which is simi-
lar to that under the Rome II Regulation and recognise the parties’ implied choice of law as
identifying the applicable law in cross-border tortious disputes. In doing so, however, lawmakers
218 See Art 14 of the Rome II Regulation.

219 See Art 1219(3) of the Civil Code of Russia.
220 See Art 44(3) of the Chinese PIL.
222 See Art 34(5) of the Turkish PIL.
224 Amrit Banaspati Co Ltd v State of Punjab AIR [1992] SC 1075.
225 ibid.
226 ibid.
227 HD Gabriel, ‘The Advantages of Soft Law in International Commercial Law: The Role of UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL,
and the Hague Conference’ (2009) 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 658, 669.
should prefer a strict test (as in the Rome I Regulation228), as opposed to a more lenient yardstick
(as in the Rome II Regulation). The latter would only permit the court to identify the intentions of
the parties if it is ‘demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the facts of the case’.229 In compari-
son, the Rome I Regulation mandates that in matters of contract the implied choice should be
‘clearly demonstrated by the … the circumstances of the case’.230 The incorporation of a stringent
standard will reduce the possibility of discretion the judges by leaving little scope for inferring a
choice of applicable law.231
iii. Absence of a Choice of Law

In the absence of choice, the identification of the applicable law should depend on whether the
claim is of a general or special nature.
a. General Rule
The general rule should extend to all tortious claims of a common nature such as negligence,
nuisance and assault. Although several countries have prescribed a special rule to identify
the applicable law for cross-border disputes arising from tortious claims in defamation, it is
suggested that the general rule should be extended to matters of defamation in India. In general,
it is suggested that lawmakers in India adopt an approach which is similar to that under the
Rome II Regulation when stipulating the mechanism to identify the applicable law in non-
contractual matters. Accordingly, the common habitual residence rule should have pride of place
under the reformed Indian private international law for its ability to strike ‘a fair balance between
the interest of the person claimed to be liable to foresee the applicable law and the interests of
the person sustaining the damage’.232 Besides the EU,233 several legal systems such as those of
Russia,234 China235 and South Korea236 have stipulated the common habitual residence rule as
the chief means of identifying the applicable law in disputes involving general tortious claims.
In the absence of commonality, the application of the lex loci damni or the law of the place where
the damage occurred is suggested for several reasons. First, the application of the lex loci damni
will preserve the legal values entrenched in the domestic principles of tort law, namely, the deter-
rence of tortious acts, the control of delictual behaviour, and the provision of compensation
for wrongs suffered.237 The rule thus complements the chief aim of the law of tort, which is to
compensate the victim for another’s wrongful behaviour.238 The place of direct (as opposed to
indirect or consequential) damage should be considered for reasons of predictability. Second, the
rule does away with inherent difficulties in locating the place of the commission or the occurrence
of the tort, by mandating the application of the law of the place where damage was sustained.239
228 See Art 3 of the Rome I Regulation.

229 ibid, Art 14.
230 ibid, Art 3(1).
231 See PE Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (OUP, 1999) 110.
232 See von Hein, Article 4 Rome II (n 150) 497 referring to the Rome II Regulation.
234 See Art 1219(2) of the Civil Code of Russia.
236 See Art 32(1) of the South Korean PIL.
237 P Jurčys, ‘Applicable Law to Intellectual Property Infringements in Japan: Alternative Lex Loci Protectionis Principle’
(2010) 24(2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 193, 195–196.
238 ibid 195.
239 ibid 497, which discusses the dissatisfaction with the lex loci delicti.
Third, the application of the lex loci damni has several economic benefits because it distributes
the cost of obtaining legal information among the parties.240 Last, it enables the tortfeasor to
predict the likely consequences of his or her act, insofar as the place where the act is likely
to injure another person will normally be foreseeable.241 By contrast, the lex loci delicti rule
which finds favour in the laws of Canada,242 Australia,243 Russia,244 China245 or South Korea246
is undesirable. This is because the latter rule significantly increases the victim’s cost of obtaining
legal information by ‘frustrating the victim’s legitimate desire to structure the insurance of his
protected interests according to the standards of his legal environment’.247
b. Particular Torts
In complex cases, the direct application of the law of the country where the damage occurred
may not be practicable having regard to the special circumstances under which injuries from
such torts occur. Categories of particular torts for which a special conflict of law rule must be
considered are examined below.
iv. Product Liability
The Rome II Regulation’s seven-step cascading system is the most suitable for identifying the
applicable law in cross-border disputes on product liability. The conflict of law rule in the
Rome II Regulation offers a predictable solution where every dispute arising out of a product
liability claim is subjected to a foreseeable set of principles that are known to the parties in
advance. Moreover, the Rome II Regulation balances certainty concerning the identification of
the applicable law with flexibility in the form of the escape clause, which permits the court to
invoke the law of another country provided it is manifestly more closely connected with the tort.
In comparison, the private international laws of other civil law jurisdictions such as Turkey,248
Russia249 and China250 are susceptible of being unpredictable insofar as they confer a choice to
the victim to select a law from the available options indicated therein according to his or her
convenience. The conflict of law rule in common law jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada,
which adopt the lex loci delicti is similarly unpredictable and is not feasible for not being flexible.
Accordingly, India’s convoluted double actionability rule should be replaced with the
common habitual residence rule as the primary mechanism to identify the applicable law in
cross-border disputes on product liability. In the absence of commonality, the applicable law
should be that of: (1) the habitual residence of the victim; (2) the place of acquisition of the
product; or in its absence; (3) the place of damage, provided that the goods were marketed in
these countries. The law of the manufacturer should be applicable only when the product has
not been marketed in any of these jurisdictions. As a last resort, the escape clause should permit
240 ibid.
241 ibid 497–498.
242 See Tolofson (n 102); and Wong (n 102).
243 See John Pfeiffer (n 102); and Distillers (n 107).
244 Art 1219(2) of the Civil Code of Russia.
246 See Art 32(1) of the South Korean PIL.
247 von Hein, Article 4 Rome II (n 154) 502.
248 See Art 36 of Turkish PIL.
the application of the law of another country, which has a significantly close connection with the
damage, for instance when the tort arises from a contractual relationship between the parties.
v. Unfair Competition and Restrictive Trade Practices

It is suggested that the law of the country which has been adversely affected by an unfair or
restrictive trade practice should govern the dispute arising in connection such claim. This conflict
of law rule has presently been accepted in the private international laws of the EU,251 Turkey,252
Russia253 and Canada.254 The means for identifying the governing law for general tortious claims
should, nonetheless, continue to apply if the unfair or restrictive trade practice merely affects the
interests of a specific competitor (and not several competitors).255 This approach finds a place in
the Rome II Regulation.256 Such disputes should, therefore, be adjudicated according to the law of
the common habitual residence of the parties.257 The law of the country where the damage occurs
should be applicable only in the absence of such commonality.258
vi. Unjust Enrichment
Disputes where one person has suffered damage by being unjustly enriched by another are not
presently recognised as tortious under the domestic law in India. Consequently, disputes involv-
ing a claim for unjust enrichment before a court in India will fail the test of double actionability.
It is suggested that claims arising in such matters should be recognised under Indian private
international law and subjected to the law of the country where the causal act occurred. For
instance, the governing law in a dispute relating to unfinished work by a contractor in Paris who
was hired and was paid in advance by a person in New Delhi to paint the latter’s home will be
that of India, the place where the act (of painting) occurred. This approach has been accepted
in the private international laws of the EU,259 South Korea,260 Japan,261 Russia,262 China,263
Canada264 and Nepal.265
vii. Environmental Torts
At present, only the Rome II Regulation prescribes a mechanism for identifying the applicable
law for cross-border torts arising from environmental damage.266 In India, although the injury
arising from environmental damage is recognised as a tort under domestic law, the application

252 See Art 38–39 of the Turkish PIL.
254 Walker (n 120) 569–570.
255 See Art 6(2) of the Rome II Regulation.
256 ibid.
257 ibid.
258 ibid.
259 ibid, Art 10.
261 Art 14 of the Japanese PIL. See also, Takahashi (n 207) 334–336.
262 Art 1223 of the Civil Code Russian Federation.
264 See Walker (n 120) 569–570.
265 See Art 713 of Nepalese PIL.
Conclusion 253
of double actionability is likely to subject a tortfeasor to different liabilities with the concurrent
application of foreign and national law. For instance, a dispute before a court in India arising from
lung injury to persons in Darjeeling due to the escape of poisonous fumes from China would be
subjected to the principles of absolute liability under the Indian law of tort, but may require proof
of negligence under Chinese law. To avoid such complexities, it is therefore suggested that the
present rule be replaced with the application of the law of the country where the damage occurs.
Accordingly, the rights of persons in India experiencing an injury as a result of an environmental
wrong originating in a foreign country should be decided under the Indian law of tort.
viii. Intellectual Property
It is suggested that the law of the place of the protection of the intellectual property (lex loci
protectionis) should govern all cross-border claims. This approach finds a place in the private
international laws of the EU,267 China,268 South Korea269 and Turkey.270 The application of double
actionability is inappropriate because it obligates the claimant to prove the actionability of the act
under the law of the place of the occurrence (lex loci delicti) and the lex fori. However, in disputes
concerning the infringement of intellectual property, the lex loci delicti and the lex fori will
coincide and in an Indian case both refer to Indian law.
IV. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen the methods employed by Indian private international law to identify
the applicable law in cross-border disputes in non-contractual matters. The lack of experience of
Indian courts in adjudicating such disputes was demonstrated. To date, there have only been two
cases in which the courts have discussed the mechanism that will be employed in such matters.271
It was seen that, in the absence of black letter law on the subject, the courts have held firmly to
the traditional yet obsolete principles of English common law which stipulate the double action-
ability rule.272 Although the UK abandoned the rule with the promulgation of the 1995 Act, in
India the courts have explicitly stated that they continue to adhere to the common law principles
and not English statutes.273
The application of double actionability rule presents several problems. In particular, it
seriously debilitates access to justice by requiring the claimant to prove that the act for which it
is claiming damages is actionable under the laws of two legal systems. Thus, the claimant must
prove that the act was prohibited as: (1) a wrong (not necessarily a tort) under the law of the
country where it occurred (lex loci delicti); and (2) a tort under Indian law (lex fori). In India, the
application of double actionability is confusing, to say the least, and unpredictable. The original
intention underlying the doctrine was for the laws of the two countries to be applied concur-
rently once the claimant establishes actionability under the two legal systems. In Indian private
267 ibid,Art 8.
270 See Art 4(3) of the Turkish PIL.
271 See Kotah Transport (n 30); and Sona Devi (n 30).
273 See Sona Devi (n 30) [6].
international law, however, the court has said that the lex fori (that is, Indian law) alone will be
applied once the claimant has shown actionability under the two legal systems. The exclusive
application of the lex fori is parochial and chauvinistic.
On the other hand, an inflexible application of the lex locus delicti does not come without
problems. For instance, consider tortious claims for environmental damage. Is the tort consid-
ered to have occurred at the place where the act resulting in the injuries in the form of pollutants
originated or is the place where the effects were actually felt from exposure to those pollutants?
Similarly, with defamation, is the locus delicti the place where libellous material was published or
spoken or is it the place where the effects of the material were actually felt by an aggrieved party?
The predicament of locating the locus delicti persists in most tortious claims.
This chapter demonstrated that Indian law is far behind global trends. The laws of most
countries (including common law systems such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand) have
discarded the double actionability rule.274 The laws of other countries (such as in the EU, South
Korea and Turkey) have never accepted the convoluted double actionability rule. This chapter
consequently urged legislative reform in India. It suggested that the Supreme Court invoke its
constitutional powers under Article 141 to set out guidelines that define the mechanisms that
the courts will employ to identify applicable law. In this connection, the chapter highlighted the
potential inspiration that India may draw from the Rome II Regulation.
This chapter suggested that new principles of Indian private international law on applicable
law in non-contractual matters must incorporate party autonomy in the choice of law as a
cornerstone. Concerns regarding the exploitation of weaker parties may be addressed by limit-
ing the validity of choice of law to situations in which it does not violate public policy.275 The
adjudicating authority must be able to disregard a choice of law as unconscionable if inter alia the
parties agreed on the law merely because the weaker party had no alternative but to accept what
the party in a stronger bargaining position put forward.276 In the absence of an express choice
of law, the parties’ implied or tacit choice should be ascertained, provided that it can be clearly
inferred from the facts of the case.
The chapter further argued that, in the absence of an express or a tacit choice of law, appli-
cable law should be determined by reference to whether a claim is general or special in nature.
For general claims, the common habitual residence rule should hold pride of place under any
reformed Indian private international law. This will balance the interests of both parties, If the
parties do not have a common habitual residence, the law of the place where the direct damage
(lex loci damni) should govern their dispute. It was also suggested that predictability must be
balanced with a flexible escape clause which will permits the court to apply the law of another
country if it is manifestly more closely connected with a dispute.
Lastly, the chapter proposed choice of law rules to govern special claims in complex areas,
such as product liability, unfair competition, environmental damage and the infringement of
intellectual property.

275 See in this respect s 23 of the ICA.
276 See in this respect Amrit Banaspati (n 220).
part v
Recognition and Enforcement

256
12
The Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments
I. Introduction
Under the traditional concept of sovereignty, every country has exclusive jurisdiction over its
territory and its population.1 For this reason, courts in a state other than where a judgment was
pronounced were not historically permitted to give extraterritorial effect to such decisions.2 In
modern times, however, burgeoning agreements among persons, both natural and artificial,
have resulted in escalating international trade and commerce and rendered these conventional
principles of international law as redundant. A decision arising out of litigation or arbitration
may have an impact outside its national borders when the party against whom it is pronounced
(also known as the judgment-debtor or award-debtor) has assets in another jurisdiction.3 In such
circumstances, the failure to provide a remedy to the plaintiff would render the decision as merely
brutum fulmen.4 The notion of sovereignty does not traditionally prevent a court from refusing
to give effect to the decision of a foreign court. However, states have increasingly accommodated
the changes caused by the free movement of people and acknowledged the outcome of these
judgments by recognising or enforcing them.5 As Edwards articulates, ‘enlightened social values
and the facilitation of international relations [call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments]’.6 A place must, therefore, be found to do justice and ‘foster the free flow of commerce
and community interrelationships in a shrinking world’.7 The recognition and enforcement of
foreign decisions are therefore conceived as the third pillar of private international law.
This chapter discusses the principles of Indian private international law on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. It is divided into six parts. Section II (section I being
this Introduction) provides an overview of the statutory framework on the subject as found in
the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (CPC).8 It sheds light on the significance of the doctrine of
obligation in determining the eligibility of foreign judgments for recognition in India. Section III
examines the grounds on which a foreign judgment will be eligible for recognition and
1 R Michaels ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International
Law’ available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2699&context=faculty_scholarship.

2 ibid.
3 AB Edwards (Updated by E Kahn), ‘Conflict of Laws’, in WA Joubert (ed), The Law of South Africa Vol 2 Part 2
2nd edn (LexisNexis/Butterworths, 2003) 384, fn 10; and C Forsyth, Private International Law 5th edn, (Juta, 2012) 417.
4 Forsyth, ibid 417.
5 See Pitel et al, Private International Law in Common Law Canada: Cases, Texts and Materials 4th edn (Emond
Publishing, 2016) 393 [Pitel, Private International Law in Common Law Canada].
6 See Forsyth, (n 3) 417.
7 ibid.
8 Act No 5 of 1908.
258 The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
enforcement in India. In particular, it discusses the notion of ‘international competency’

which is the chief indicator to determine the validity of foreign judgments under Indian law.
Section IV examines the grounds on which a court may refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign
judgment in India. Section V reflects on the principles of Indian private international law based
on global trends. It considers the practices of other jurisdictions such as the EU, Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and Nepal. Further, this section examines whether India
should accede to the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Agreements (HCCCA)9 and the 2019
Hague Judgments Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (the Judgments Convention),10 which stipulate rules on the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Section VI provides concluding remarks.
II. The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

A. The Statutory Framework
In India, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (including those sounding
in money)11 are regulated by sections 13, 14 and 44-A of the CPC, which extend to the entire
country, except the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, the State of Nagaland and other
tribal areas.12 The CPC defines the term ‘judgment’ as a ‘statement given by the judge of the
grounds of a decree or order’.13 Accordingly, a decision pronounced by a court in a jurisdiction
9 See M Dogauchi and T Hartley, The Permanent Bureau: Hague Conference on Private International Law –
Preliminary Document No. 26, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Explanatory
Report (December 2004) www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=3512 [Dogauchi/ Hartley Report].
10 The text of the 2019 Judgments Convention is available at: https://assets.hcch.net/docs/23b6dac3-7900-49f3-9a94-
aa0ffbe0d0dd.pdf. For a detailed discussion on the events leading up to the draft Judgments Convention, see PH Pfund,
‘The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (1998) 24(1) Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 7; B Smith, ‘The Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments’
(1999) 12(2) Revue Québécoise de Droit International 73; C Kessedjian, ‘The Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on
Private International Law: Preliminary Document No 7 – International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters’ (1997), www.assets.hcch.net/docs/76852ce3-a967-42e4-94f5-24be4289d1e5.pdf; P Nygh and
F Pocar, Hague Conference on Private International Law: Preliminary Document No. 11 – Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2000), www.hcch.net/en/publi-
cations-and-studies/details4/?pid=3494&dtid=35 (Nygh/Pocar Report); The Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference
on Private International Law: Preliminary Document No. 16 – Some Reflections on the Present State of Negotiations
on the Judgments Project in the Context of the Future Work Programme of the Conference (2002), www.hcch.net/
en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=3500; Permanent Bureau & Co-Reporters, Hague Conference on Private
International Law: Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference (6-20 June 2001), www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=3499&dtid=35; ATV Mehren,
‘Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable Worldwide: Can
the Hague Convention Project Succeed’ (2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 191; GF Calliess, ‘Value-added
Norms, Local Litigation and Global Enforcement: Why the Brussels Philosophy Failed in the Hague’ (2004) 5 German
Law Journal 1490; K Woestehoff, ‘The Drafting Process for a Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments with
Special Consideration of Intellectual Property and E-Commerce’ (2005) LLM Theses and Essays, Paper No 54, 13, www.
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/54; RA Brand, ‘Community Competence for Matters of Judicial Cooperation
at the Hague Conference on Private International Law: A View from the United States’ (2002) 21 Journal of Law and
Commerce 191; and S Khanderia, ‘The Hague Judgments Project: Assessing its Plausible Benefits for the Development of
the Indian Private International Law’ [2019] Commonwealth Law Bulletin 452, 452–457 [Khanderia, The Hague Judgments
Project].
11 A money-judgment is a decision which imposes the judgment-debtor with the duty to pay in the form of damages.
A non-money judgment, on the other hand, does not involve any such duty to pay and, instead, merely mandates the
judgment-debtor to perform a certain action as stipulated in the decision of the foreign court.
12 See s 1(2) of the CPC.
13 ibid, s 2(9) read along with ss 2(2) and (14) of the CPC.
The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 259
outside India is a foreign judgment.14 At the same time, the statute does not define the terms
‘recognition’ and ‘enforcement’. However, the ‘recognition’ of a judgment is commonly under-
stood to mean the act of one court (popularly referred to as the requested or recognising court)
of accepting or acknowledging the legal effect of a foreign judgment as was intended by the forum
pronouncing the decision (also known as the court of origin).15 ‘Enforcement’, on the other hand,
is the requested court’s act of compelling the judgment-debtor to comply with the decision of
the foreign forum.16 In other words, while enforcement requires the requested court to order the
judgment-debtor to perform or refrain from performing the act as mandated under the decision
of the foreign forum, recognition merely involves the acknowledgement of the effect the decision
of the court of origin in the recognising state.17 For this reason, while a judgment may be recog-
nised without enforcement, there can be no enforcement without recognition.18
B. The Relevance of the ‘Doctrine of Obligation’

Predicated on English common law,19 the doctrine of obligation ‘retains the pride of place as the
preferred theory,’20 when determining the eligibility of foreign judgments sounding in money for
recognition or enforcement in countries such as India. As such, the doctrine of obligation must
be distinguished from the principles of reciprocity or comity, which are some other justifications
that exist to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment. The principle of reciprocity involves the
willingness and cooperation among nations to conclude mutually accepted agreements whereby
states agree to give effect to each other’s judgments.21 Globally, the doctrine of reciprocity has,
however, lost its relevance by fostering ‘an unwelcome situation’22 and being detrimental to liti-
gants when states have not been able to agree to the enforcement of each other’s judgments.23 In
contrast, the doctrine of comity, which received its theoretical basis in the American decision of
Hilton v Guyot,24 concerns the ‘voluntary deference’25 that states pay to the laws of one another
regardless of any such mutual agreement. Comity is, thus, an act of:
recognition by one nation of the legislative, executive and judicial acts of another nation … having due
regard to the international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its citizens or of other persons who
are under the protection of its laws.26
14 ibid, s 2(5) and (6).

15 H Silberberg, ‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in South Africa’ [1977] Institute of Foreign
and Comparative Law, UNISA, Pretoria 6; and Hague Conference on Private International Law, Judgments Convention:
Revised Preliminary Explanatory Report (Note 10 of May 2018) 22–23 www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/
judgments/special-commission (Explanatory Report to the Judgments Convention).
16 ibid.
17 Forsyth (n 3) 418.
18 ibid.
19 For a detailed discussion on the principles of the English common law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, see Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws: Vol 1 15th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 2012),
663–673 and 689–711.
20 See C Roodt, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Still a Hobson’s Choice among Competing
Theories?’ (2005) 38(1) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 15, 17, referring to the applica-
tion of the doctrine in common law systems.
21 Roodt (n 20) 18.
22 Michaels (n 1). Also, see generally, W Southard ‘The Reciprocity Rule and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’
(1977) 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 327.

23 ibid.
24 159 US 113.
25 Roodt (n 20) 15, 18.
26 Hilton (n 24) 163–164.
The recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment based on comity therefore constitutes an
act of courtesy as opposed to being ‘a matter of absolute obligation’.27 It is the decision to treat the
foreign judgments of another court with respect ‘in the hope that foreign courts would enforce
one’s own judgments’.28 In comparison, the traditional common law rules on which Indian
private international law is based have ‘grown out of the rejection of the principle of comity or
reciprocity’29 and instead prefers the application of the doctrine of obligation.
The doctrine of obligation is perceived as a facet of the theory of vested rights.30 Accordingly,
foreign judgments cannot have any extraterritorial effect in India unless the judgment-debtor
owes an obligation to the judgment-creditor under the law of the state of origin (ie the country in
whose territory the decision was pronounced).31 Accordingly, the judgment-creditor may enforce
a decision of a foreign court against the judgment-debtor if the latter owed an obligation to the
former, by initiating a new legal proceeding based on an action of debt before the recognising
(also known as the requested) forum.32 In other words, the decision of the foreign court will
constitute a new cause of action in proceedings for recognition and enforcement in the requested
forum.33 Such a suit must be initiated within three years from the date on which the foreign judg-
ment was pronounced.34 For this reason, foreign judgments sounding in money do not have any
automatic effect in India. Instead, such judgments merely constitute ‘evidence for the creation of
an obligation’.35
The doctrine of reciprocity has limited application under section 44A of the CPC. The judg-
ments of superior courts36 from foreign countries which have been designated as ‘reciprocal’ will
be recognised and enforced automatically without the need to institute a fresh legal proceed-
ing. The UK,37 Burma, the former British Colony of Aden, Fiji, Singapore, the Federation of
Malaya, Hong Kong, Trinidad and Tobago, New Zealand, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea and
the United Arab Emirates have accordingly been designated as reciprocating territories in the
Official Gazette of the Central Government.38 Proceedings in India for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment must be initiated within twelve years from the date when the foreign judg-
ment was pronounced.39 Accordingly, the rules to determine the eligibility of foreign judgments
27 HL Ho, ‘Policies underlying the Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Judgments’ (1997) 46 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 443, 451.

28 Michaels (n 1).
29 See S Khanderia, ‘Embarking on New Frontiers in the South African Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments – Is Comity Really “Unreliable’’ Festschrift for Prof Christopher Forsyth’, Eleven International Publishing (on
record with author) [Khanderia, Embarking on New Frontiers] referring to A Briggs, ‘Recognition of Foreign Judgments:
A Matter of Obligation’ (2013) 129 Law and Quarterly Review 87 [Briggs, A matter of Obligation].
30 S Harder, ‘The Effects of Recognised Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (2013) 62(2) International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 441, 449; and RD Carswell, ‘The Doctrine of Vested Rights in Private International Law’
(1959) 8 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 268, 279–280.
31 Briggs, A matter of Obligation (n 29) 87.
32 Roodt (n 20) 17.
33 See Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 466–467. Also see Harder (n 30) 449; and Carswell (n 30)
279–280.
34 See CK Takwani, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act 1963 8th edn (Eastern Book Company, 2017) 137.
35 See Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 466.
36 See the decision of the Bombay High Court in Kevin George Vaz v Cotton Textiles Exports Promotion Council (2006)
5 Bom CR 555, which clarifies that a judgment of the Labour Tribunal of Hong Kong, which has not been designated as a
superior court would not be subject to the special procedure as enunciated in s 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
37 See in this context the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.
38 See, the website of the High Court of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh, www.highcourtchd.gov.in/sub_pages/left_
menu/Rules_orders/high_court_rules/vol-I-pdf/chap12pArts.V1.pdf, for a list of the courts of these territories that have

been designated as ‘superior’ for s 44A.
39 See Art 136 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act 1963, Act No 36 of 1963.
Determining Eligibility of a Foreign Judgment 261
sounding in money for recognition or enforcement in countries such as India ‘focus less on the
public relations of comity or duty between States and more on the private law relations between
the parties’.40 The determination of the extraterritorial impact of foreign judgments in a common
law system is thus rooted on the recognising forum’s national law as opposed to any pre-existing
international obligations such as reciprocity or comity.41
III. Determining Eligibility of a Foreign Judgment

A. International Competency of a Foreign Court: An Overview
The eligibility of every foreign judgment in a civil and commercial matter for recognition and
enforcement in India chiefly depends on the determination of the ‘international jurisdiction’ or
‘international competency’ of the court of origin. The prerequisite of a foreign forum’s interna-
tional competency is thus equally relevant for a foreign judgment which has been pronounced
by a superior court in a reciprocating country. Judicial dicta have stressed the significance of the
international competency of the court of origin in assessing eligibility. The court per Mitter J in
the seminal case of Chormal Balchand Firm v Kasturi Chand Seraogi and Anr accordingly enun-
ciated that the competency of the foreign court ‘over the subject-matter and the person brought
before them’ is of utmost importance when determining the jurisdiction of the foreign court in
the ‘international sense’.42 In a related vein, the Supreme Court in Sankaran Govindan v Lakshmi
Bharathi held that ‘unless a court has jurisdiction in the international sense, a judgment delivered
by that court would not be recognised or enforced in India’,43 insofar as it violates the provisions
of the CPC.44 The terms ‘international jurisdiction’ or ‘international competency’ have, however,
not been formally defined anywhere, neither at English common law nor in Indian private inter-
national law. In practice, it has been understood to mean the entitlement of a foreign court to
summon a defendant and subject the latter to its jurisdiction. In the context of the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments sounding in money, it connotes the ‘cumulative effect’ of
the foreign judgment in two legal systems, namely, that of the state of origin and the recognising
state.45 At the same time, the determination of international competency does not involve the
application of any other law except the recognising court’s own domestic law.46 In other words,
the eligibility of the court of origin vis-à-vis its international competency is tested against the
principles of private international law of the recognising state, in this case India.
40 Michaels (n 1) [8].
41 Briggs, A matter of Obligation (n 29) 87; and D Kenny, ‘Re Flightlease: The ‘Real and Substantial Connection’ Test
for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Fails to Take Flight I Ireland’ (2014) 63 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 197, 200.
42 Chormal Balchand Firm v Kasturi Chand Seraoji and Anr ILR [1936] 63 Cal 1033 [8], referring to the decision of the
English court in Pemberton v Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch 781 (CA), 790 per Lindley MR.
43 [1975] 3 SCC 351, 361, referring to the decisions of the English court in Boswell v Cloaks [1884] 27 Ch D 424; Abouloff
v Oppenheimer [1882–83] LR 10 QBD 259; and Vadala v Lawes [1890] 25 QBD 310. See also, R Gajambal & Ors v Rukn
Ul Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid AIR [1963] SC 1.
44 See s 13(a) of the CPC.
45 E Spiro, ‘The Incidence of Jurisdiction in the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ [1978] Acta
Juridica 59, 7.
46 see Chormal Balchand (n 42) [8], referring to the decision of the English court in Pemberton v Hughes [1899] 1 Ch
781 (CA), 790 per Lindley MR. Also see Spiro (n 45) 72.
B. The Grounds on which a Foreign Court is Considered

as ‘Internationally Competent’
The grounds on which a foreign court will be considered to be internationally competent under
Indian law have not been clarified by statute. Instead, section 14 of the CPC merely indicates
that every foreign judgment will be presumed to have been pronounced by a court of competent
jurisdiction. In Chormal Balchand,47 the Calcutta High Court stipulated six grounds on which a
foreign court will be considered as internationally competent under Indian law for the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign monetary and non-monetary judgments48 in personam. There
are no reported dicta which prescribe the factors to assess the eligibility of foreign judgments for
actions in rem. A foreign court is considered to possess international jurisdiction under Indian
private international law if the judgment-debtor:
(1) was a subject (national) of the foreign country (namely the state of origin) at the time of the
commencement of the proceedings;49
(2) was a resident in the territory of the foreign state at the time of the commencement of the
proceedings;50
(3) had chosen the jurisdiction of that (foreign) court in its character as a plaintiff in the original
case;51
(4) had voluntarily appeared before that court;52
(5) had submitted to the jurisdiction of that court in any manner;53 or
(6) owned immovable property, in respect of which the cause of action arose, located in the
territory of that (foreign) forum and the judgment-debtor was present in the territory of the
state of origin at the time when the cause of action arose.54
The acceptance of the sixth ground (relating to the situs of immovable property), has, however,
remained ambiguous. In Andhra Bank Ltd v R Srinivasan & Ors,55 the Supreme Court referred to
a dictum in Emanuel v Symon56 per Buckley LJ. It clarified that a foreign court will be considered
to possess international jurisdiction under Indian law in five circumstances.57 In doing so, it did
not acknowledge the situs of immovable property as a relevant factor to establish the eligibility
of a foreign judgment sounding in money.58 Thus, while the situs of the immovable property
constitutes a ground for internal jurisdiction for the purpose of recognition and enforcement
of domestic judgments,59 the same is not applicable while determining the ‘international
47 Chormal Balchand (n 42) [9]–[10].

48 See in this respect SR Garimella, ‘India’ in A Reyes (ed), Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Hart Publishing, 2019) 303; and A Chong, ‘Moving towards harmonisation in the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment rules in Asia’ (2020) 16(1) Journal of Private International Law 31, 57, DOI:
10.1080/17441048.2020.1744256 which states that the principles of Indian private international law on the recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment do not distinguish between a monetary and a non-monetary judgment.
49 ibid.
50 ibid.
51 ibid.
52 ibid.
53 ibid.
54 ibid. But see Andhra Bank Ltd v R Srinivasan & Ors [1962] 3 SCR 391 [11], in which, the Supreme Court did not
acknowledge this factor as ground to determine the international jurisdiction of a foreign forum.
55 Andhra Bank ibid.
56 [1908] 1 KB 302.
57 Andhra Bank (n 54) [11].
58 ibid.
59 see ss 16–18 of the CPC.
jurisdiction’ of a foreign forum. There is no reported dictum where the Indian judiciary has
recognised or enforced foreign judgments from foreign forums that have based their jurisdiction
exclusively on the situs of immovable property.
The eligibility of foreign judgments sounding in money thus generally rests on the allegiance
or obedience of the judgment-debtor towards the state of origin. As the Supreme Court in Andhra
Bank Ltd v R Srinivasan & Ors indicated:
[J]urisdiction depends on the physical power, and since the right to exercise that power … is exercisable
only against persons who are within the territory of the sovereign whom the court represents, the rule
of common law has always been that jurisdiction is confined to persons who are within the reach of the
process of the court at the time of the service of the writ.60
The significance of the allegiance of the judgment-debtor towards the court of origin plausibly
justifies the requirement of ‘presence’ in that territory in disputes on rights in rem immovable
property – provided this ground is a valid base to establish the international jurisdiction of the
foreign forum under Indian private international law.
Against this backdrop, the grounds on which foreign judgments sounding in money would be
construed as eligible for recognition and enforcement under Indian private international law can
be divided into three broad categories, namely: (1) nationality; (2) residence; and (3) submission.
A fleeting, temporary or transitory presence of the defendant in the state of origin at the time of
initiation of proceedings, (which constitutes a valid base under English common law),61 is not of
any significance under the Indian law on the subject.
i. The Nationality of the Judgment-Debtor

Indian law adopts the principles of English common law as stipulated in Emanuel,62 whereby the
nationality of the defendant as opposed to his or her presence is relevant to establish the interna-
tional competence of a foreign court.63
The decision of the courts in Chormal Balchand64 and Andhra Bank Ltd65 indicates that the
terms ‘subject’ and ‘national’ have been employed interchangeably in the context of recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. The dicta did not, however, clarify the scope and the
meaning of these expressions. In its subsequent decision in State Trading Corporation v CIT, the
Supreme Court clarified that the term ‘subject’ refers to the relation of a person with the state.66
A subject is thus also referred to as an ‘inhabitant’ or a ‘citizen’ in Indian law, depending on the
form of government in the place where the subject lives.67 At the same time, the parameters to
identify the ‘nationality’ and the ‘citizenship’ of a person as a ‘subject’ of a state are not identical,68
but are nonetheless related. While ‘nationality’ concerns the judgment-debtor’s identity in inter-
national law, ‘citizenship’ indicates his or her relation ‘to the State in its national or municipal
aspect’.69 Therefore, ‘citizenship, as distinct from nationality, is a creature solely of domestic law’.70

61 See Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (n 19) 690–696.
62 (n 56).
63 See the decision of the Supreme Court in Andhra Bank (n 54) [11]. See also, Chong (n 48) 42.
64 Chormal Balchand (n 42) [8].
66 AIR [1963] SC 1811 [71]–[72].
67 ibid [72].
68 ibid [73].
69 ibid.
70 ibid [53].
It refers ‘to [the] rights which a State sees fit to confer upon certain individuals who are also its
nationals’.71 In other words, citizenship denotes a person’s ‘highest political status’ in a state and
confers on him or her political and civil rights.72 On the contrary, nationality does not confer any
such civil or political rights. A person is considered to be a national of a country when ‘he owes
allegiance to a particular sovereign authority’.73 For this reason, a person may be a national of a
state but not a citizen because of his or her allegiance towards that country.74 A national will not
necessarily be permitted to participate in its civil and political activities.75 Such a limitation may
stem from the person’s exclusion from the metropolitan territory as defined under the law of that
nation.76 A national may be a citizen if the state allows him or her to participate in the civil and
political rights of the state.77 As regards companies, nationality is determined by their place of
incorporation and the country from where they derive their legal personality.78 By this principle,
a company incorporated in the state of origin will be considered as a national of that territory,
regardless of whether its shareholders hold a different nationality.79
ii. The Residence of the Judgment-Debtor

The ‘residence’ of the judgment-debtor at the time of the commencement of the proceedings,
as opposed to the ‘domicile’ of the judgment-debtor, is relevant in establishing the competency
of the foreign forum for the purpose of the recognition and enforcement of its judgment.80 In
this respect, the Supreme Court in Union of India v Dudh Nath Prasad has clarified that the
terms ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ may be employed interchangeably, because they both refer to
‘permanent home’.81 Nonetheless, they ‘etymologically’ have different connotations in private
international law.82
In Yogesh Bharadwaj v State of UP, the Supreme Court enunciated that ‘residence’ refers to a
physical fact, which connotes a person’s ‘bodily presence as an inhabitant’.83 The residence of a
person is accordingly established by any period of presence in a country, provided that it is not
transitory, fleeting or casual.84 In comparison, domicile, unlike residence, involves more than a
physical presence and refers to a person’s intention to reside permanently in a country, ‘not for
a mere special or temporary purpose’.85 In other words, the domicile is of the whole country.86
Therefore, ‘no one can be without a domicile and no one can have two domiciles’.87
Although the intention of a person is not relevant in establishing his or her residence in a
foreign forum, it must be voluntary and lawful.88 Therefore, a person cannot be considered as
71 ibid [53].
72 ibid [73].
73 ibid [73]. Also see Hari Narayanan v Meenakshi Narayanan [2007] SCC OnLine Mad 1525.
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
76 ibid.
77 ibid.
78 ibid [48]–[52]; McLeod & Co. Ltd v State of Orissa and Ors [1984] 1 SCC 434 [7]; and TDM Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v
UE Development India Pvt. Ltd [2008] 14 SCC 271 [35].

79 ibid.
80 See Chormal Balchand (n 42) [8].
81 [2000] 2 SCC 20 [26].
82 ibid.
83 [1990] 3 SCC 355 [11].
84 ibid [17], [20] and [21].
85 ibid [11].
86 ibid [9], [12] and [14].
87 ibid [9], [12] and [14].
88 ibid [20].
a resident if he or she is staying in a jurisdiction in violation of immigration laws or as a result

of ‘enforced presence by reason of kidnapping or imprisonment’.89 Further, it is the habitual as
opposed to the ordinary residence of a judgment-debtor in the state of origin that is relevant.90
A person may be an ordinary resident in a country if his or her inhabitation there ‘is not casual
or uncertain, but is in the ordinary course of his life’.91 In comparison, habitual residence is of a
longer duration even though there is no minimum requirement in terms of such period.92
There are, however, no clear indicia to determine the residence of artificial persons in Indian
private international law. The Supreme Court in McLeod & Co. Ltd stated that, unlike national-
ity and domicile, residence of a company cannot be ‘easily established’.93 There are no uniform
criteria and the mechanisms employed vary depending on the issues in a dispute.94 However, the
court indicated that a company, like an individual, might have more than one residence at a given
time.95 In the absence of any fixed yardstick to assess a company’s residence in the context of the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the courts will likely refer to the principles of
English common law that have been stipulated by the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries
plc.96 In Adams, the court stated that it would examine the relationship between such person and
the corporation; and whether he had the power to bind the latter contractually to determine the
residence of the corporation.97 Thus, it would assess factors such as the manner of acquisition of
the business premises, the degree of control by the corporation, the display of the corporation’s
name, the payment of the representative and the reimbursement of the expenses.98
iii. The Submission of the Judgment-Debtor

The failure of a judgment-debtor to submit to the jurisdiction of the court of origin, in circum-
stances where he or she is not a subject or resident of the state in which the court is located, would
render the foreign judgment unenforceable in India. Nonetheless, the foreign judgment (which
initially lacks extraterritorial effect in India because the judgment-debtor has not submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court of origin) may become enforceable upon the occurrence of certain
subsequent events. An example is when the court of origin has ceased to be ‘international’ (for
instance, by accession).99 In such a circumstance, the relation of the judgment-debtor is altered
qua the state of origin and she or he is no longer a foreigner under Indian law.100 In all other cases,
the requirement of the judgment-debtor to submit to the jurisdiction of the court of origin either
expressly or implicitly is indispensable. The competency of the court of origin continues to be
unimpaired even with the death of the judgment-debtor – in which case the successor(s) may be
brought on record – without the need for re-submission.101
89 ibid.
90 See Sankaran Govindan v Lakshmi Bharathi and Ors [1974] AIR 1764 [20] and [35].
91 ibid [18].
92 ibid.
93 McLeod (n 78) [8].
94 ibid.
95 ibid.
96 [1990] Ch 433. P North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law 13th edn (OUP, 2006),
409–411, referring to the English common law on the subject.

97 ibid.
98 ibid.
99 Bhagwan Shankar Surdi v Rajaram Bapu Vithal Nanajkar ILR [1952] Bom 65 (FB):(1951) [53]. See also, Khanderia,
The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 468.

100 Bhagwan Shankar, ibid [53].
101 Andhra Bank (n 54).
Express submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign court may occur when the plaintiff has
initiated proceedings against the defendant in the court of origin, as this would indicate accept-
ance of the jurisdiction of that court.102 The plaintiff may not necessarily have many choices as
to whether or not it would like to sue the defendant in the court of origin, having regard to the
conflict of law rules of jurisdiction of that forum. These factors, however limited they may be, do
not diminish the fact that the plaintiff had consented to submit to the jurisdiction of the court of
origin.
The place where the cause of action arose (for example, the place of performance of a contract
or the place of occurrence of a tort) has not explicitly been identified in judicial dicta as a valid
basis for a foreign court to assume international jurisdiction. Nonetheless, such foreign judg-
ments will be recognised or enforced in India if the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction
of the foreign-forum.
To illustrate, suppose A (a resident and domiciliary of state Y (India)) is hit by another car
which is being driven by B (a resident and domiciliary of state Z (New South Wales)), while on
holiday in a state X (Ontario). A suffers injuries and initiates proceedings against B in Ontario,
the place where the accident arose. However, the court declares the decision in favour of B (and,
thus, against A). The court in Ontario awards damages to B. The judgment must be recognised
and enforced in India (the place of A’s residence). The act of initiation of the proceedings demon-
strates the plaintiff ’s (A’s) submission to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court, although A did not
have much choice in doing so, having regard to the rules of direct jurisdiction in Ontario.
Consider another situation. Plaintiff A (a resident of state X (India)) is considered to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of a court in state Z (Germany) if it initiates proceedings against
defendant B (a resident of state Y (New York)) based on the fact that the contract between A and
B had been performed in Munich, the place of delivery of the goods. The decision of the German
court is pronounced against A, who is ordered to pay damages of €500. A now assumes the char-
acter of the judgment-debtor in the recognising court. Here, the court of origin (German court)
assumed jurisdiction and pronounced a judgment sounding in money which is capable of being
recognised and enforced in India, not because of the residence or nationality of the defendant but
by the submission of the plaintiff.
Similarly, the parties’ decision to confer jurisdiction to a foreign court through a choice of
court agreement is an act of express submission.103 It forms a valid base of international compe-
tency.104 As we have seen in chapter 5 on ‘Jurisdiction’, in Modi Entertainment Network and
Another v WSG Cricket PTE Ltd,105 the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of a choice of court
agreement in favour of a foreign forum. The Court did not address the question of recognition and
enforcement of judgments resulting from choice of court agreements. However, it is presumed
that the court of origin, which has assumed jurisdiction on such a ground will be ‘internationally
competent’ under Indian law. In comparison, implied or tacit submission occurs by the conduct
of the parties.106 Thus, the voluntary and unconditional appearance of the judgment-debtor to
argue a case on the merits is an act of implied submission.107 The judgment-debtor cannot subse-
quently deny an act of submission before the foreign forum, unless its appearance was merely to
contest the jurisdiction of the court of origin or request for a stay or dismissal of the proceedings.
102 See Chormal Balchand (n 42) 1043 [9]–[10]; and Andhra Bank (n 54) [9]–[11].
103 See Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 462–464.
104 ibid.
105 [2003] 4 SCC 341.
106 Y Narasimha Rao & Ors v Y Venkata Lakshmi & Anr [1991] 3 SCC 451, 461 [16].
107 Chormal Balchand (n 42) [9], [10] and [12]; Andhra Bank (n 54) [9], [11].
The Disqualification of a Foreign Judgment from Recognition or Enforcement 267
IV. The Disqualification of a Foreign Judgment

from Recognition or Enforcement
Section 13 of the CPC stipulates six grounds on which a foreign judgment will be considered as
inconclusive under Indian law and will, therefore, be denied recognition or enforcement. Besides
being ineligible for not being pronounced by a court of ‘international competence’, Section 13
permits an Indian court to deny recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment (including
those given under section 44-A of the CPC) on the following grounds:
(1) where the foreign judgment has not been given on the merits of the case;
(2) where the foreign judgment appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an
incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise the law of India in cases in which
such law is applicable;
(3) where the proceedings in which the foreign judgment was obtained are opposed to natural
justice;
(4) where the foreign judgment has been obtained by fraud;
(5) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in the States.
The scope of each of these factors will be discussed below.
i. When the Foreign Judgment has not been Given on the Merits108
The Supreme Court in International Woollen Mills v Standard Wool (UK) Ltd clarified that a
foreign judgment would not be regarded as having been given on the merits of the case if the
decision has not been based on evidence and is instead the result of summary proceedings due to
the failure of the defendant’s appearance before the forum.109 Such decisions will be considered
as inconclusive and not final and binding under Indian law.110 Thus, in judgments pronounced
ex parte, the court in India ought to be satisfied that the foreign forum had applied its mind to
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant.111 At the same time, the
mere fact that the judgment is ex parte would not in itself render it inconclusive, if it is apparent
from the decision that the court of origin had considered the oral and documentary evidence
produced by the plaintiff and had applied its mind to the matter.112 Indian private international
law does not, however, permit suo moto investigation into the merits of foreign judgments.113 In
other words, the Indian court would not review the merits unless the judgment-debtor alleges
that the decision was made in default or has not been based on evidence.114 If the judgment-
debtor succeeds in proving that the foreign court did not pronounce its decision on the merits of
the case, then the judgment will be unenforceable in India.
108 s 13(b) of the CPC.

109 [2001] 5 SCC 265. See also, Marine Geotechnics LLC v Coastal Marine Construction & Engineering Ltd [2014] 2 Bom
CR 769 [20]; Chintamoni Padhan v Paika Samal AIR [1956] Ori 136; Dhirajlal v Navinbhai Dave [2011] (4) Mh.L.J;
Golian Consultants Ltd v Jagdarshan Singh [2014] SCC Online P&H 16406; BNP Paribas v Atit Omprakash Agarwal [2017]
SCC Online Bom 9063 [10].
110 ibid.
111 See Chong (n 48) 41.
112 ibid.
113 See Marine Geotechnics (n 109).
114 International Woollen Mills (n 109).
ii. When the Proceedings in which the Judgment was Obtained

are Opposed to Natural Justice115
A foreign judgment which has otherwise been decided on the merits can be rendered inconclu-
sive if it involves procedural abnormalities.116 In such circumstances, it may be vitiated on the
ground that it has violated fundamental principles of natural justice. This may be the position
when the decision of the foreign court has been passed without apprising the judgment-debtor of
the appropriate procedure117 or is one which, albeit based on evidence, has failed to provide the
defendant with a fair chance to be heard and put forward a defence.118
iii. When the Judgment has been Obtained by Fraud119

A foreign judgment will be considered as inconclusive under Indian law if it has been obtained
by practising fraud on the court of origin.120 In other words, the deception must be extrinsic
as opposed to intrinsic (that is, the fraud must have affected the way in which the case was
heard) to create a valid defence. An example of extrinsic fraud would be the suppression of
material facts and evidence from the court of origin.121 The fraud should be of such a nature
that it could only have been discovered after the judgment was pronounced.122 In such circum-
stances, the foreign judgment would not create res judicata or be enforceable and the case
would therefore have to be tried again on the merits.123 A deceitful act, which was within the
knowledge of the judgment-debtor before the pronouncement of the decision would not impair
its enforceability.124
iv. When the Judgment is Pronounced in Violation of a Law in

Force in India125
The CPC prohibits the recognition of a foreign judgment when it appears on the face of the
proceedings to have been founded on an incorrect view of international law.126 Likewise, a foreign
judgment will be denied effect in India if it operates as a refusal to recognise the law of India in
cases in which such law is applicable127 or if it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law
115 Section 13(d) of the CPC.

116 ibid, read along with Art 14 of the Constitution of India 1950; and Maneka Gandhi v Union of India [1978] 1 SCC 248,
as per which, the right to be heard is constitutionally mandated. Also see generally MP Singh, VN Shukla’s Constitution of
India 12th edn (Eastern Book Co, 2013) 67–86.
117 Y Narasimha Rao (n 107) 461 [18].
118 ibid.
119 Section 13(d) of the CPC.
120 Masterbaker Marketing Ltd v Noshir Mohsin Chinwall [2015] SCC Online Bom 559 [19]; and Abraaj Investment
Management Ltd v Neville Tuli AIR [2015] 6 Bom R 555 [59]. Also see Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10)
471–472.
121 Abraaj Investment ibid [59].
122 ibid.
123 See Sankaran Govindan (n 90) 361, referring to the decisions of the English court in Boswell v Cloaks [1884]
27 Ch D 424; Abouloff (n 43); and Vadala (n 43); and Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 471–472.
124 See Sankaran Govindan ibid 361.
125 Section 13(c) and (f) of the CPC.
126 ibid, s 13(c).
127 ibid.
The Disqualification of a Foreign Judgment from Recognition or Enforcement 269
in force in India.128 There is no dictum where the courts have had the opportunity to elaborate
how an incorrect understanding of international law may prevent foreign judgments in civil and
commercial matters from being recognised and enforced in India.
A decision of a foreign court on a matrimonial matter will be unenforceable if it has granted
a divorce on a ground which is not recognised under Indian law. The Supreme Court in
Y Narasimha Rao & Ors v Y Venkata Lakshmi & Anr stressed that:
the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must
be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married.129
Thus, if the parties were married under Indian law, the dissolution of their marriage must be
based on grounds that are recognised under Indian law.130 The Court, consequently, refused to
recognise dissolution of a marriage which was granted by a court in Missouri based on the irre-
trievable breakdown of marriage, a ground which then did not find a place in the Hindu Marriage
Act 1955.131
Similarly, the decision of a foreign court in a contract for the breach of performance must
conform to the provisions of Indian law if the agreement was to be performed in the Republic.
Although there is no direct dictum to this effect, such judgments would ostensibly be regarded
as inconclusive (and thus unenforceable) if they award damages for a breach of a contract which
has to be performed in India but is illegal under the Republic’s law.132 The decision of the Bombay
High Court in Taprogge Gesellschaft MBH v IAEC India Ltd133 sheds some light on this aspect
and could be persuasive in interpreting Section 13(f). As discussed in chapter 10 on applicable
law in contractual obligations, the Court refused to give effect to the parties’ choice of German
law insofar as the agreement operated in restraint of trade and was contradictory to sections 23,
27 and 28 of the ICA.134 The Court held that these provisions have extraterritorial application
regardless of the choice of any other law.135 Likewise, in Securities and Exchange Board of India
v Pan Asia Advisors Ltd and Anr,136 the Supreme Court approved the decision of the Securities
and Exchange Board of India under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992.137 The
Board prohibited non-resident Indian companies from issuing securities outside the Republic
insofar as the same amounted to fraudulent activity and violated the interests and welfare of
investors in India.138 A decision by a foreign court which fails to secure such rights is not recog-
nisable and enforceable in India.139
In this manner, Indian private international law indirectly recognises the contravention of
public policy of the Republic as a valid ground to disqualify a foreign judgment from recognition
and enforcement in the country, even though public policy has not been explicitly indicated in
CPC section 13.
128 ibid, s 13(f).

129 Y Narasimha Rao (n 106) [13].
130 ibid.
131 ibid.
132 Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 472.
133 AIR [1988] Bom 157.
134 ibid; and Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 472–473.
135 ibid.
136 [2015] 14 SCC 71. Also see Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 473.
137 Act No 15 of 1992.
138 ibid.
139 Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 473.
V. Reflections on Indian Law:

Some Insights Based on Global Trends
A. General Remarks
i. Bases of Jurisdiction

The principles of Indian private international law on the subject generally resonate with practice
across other common law systems such as Australia,140 New Zealand,141 South Africa,142 and
Nepal,143 which similarly employ the concept of ‘international jurisdiction’ as the cornerstone
to determine eligibility of a foreign judgment for recognition and enforcement. The doctrine of
obligation underlines this area of the law and a foreign judgment will have no effect in any of
these jurisdictions unless the judgment-debtor conducted himself before the foreign court in a
certain manner,144 which will be assessed according to the lex fori. At the same time, the private
international laws of South Africa145 and New Zealand146 (but not Australia)147 demonstrate
some indication as regards the acceptance of the principle of comity as a factor to determine
the international jurisdiction of the foreign court. As indicated above, comity is a voluntary and
discretionary principle that a state employs with an expectation that the state of origin will recip-
rocate by similarly giving effect to its court decisions.148 Although comity does not constitute
the chief basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it is a crucial factor in
these countries in the determination of the international jurisdiction of a foreign court.149 There
are subtle differences in the practice of Indian courts vis-à-vis other common law jurisdictions
such as South Africa,150 Australia151 and New Zealand,152 where the grounds of international
competency have been predicated on English common law and have similarly been clarified by
140 See Davies, Bell and Brereton (eds), Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia 8th edn (Lexis Nexis, 2010) 895–896 [Nygh’s
Conflict of Laws].
141 M Hook and J Wass, The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis 2020) 368–380.
142 Forsyth (n 3) 417 et seq; and Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 416 et seq.
143 See s 37(a) of the Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2014, Act No 7 of 2070 (2014).
144 see Chong (n 48) 42.
145 PN Okoli, ‘Promoting Foreign Judgments: Lessons in Legal Convergence from South Africa and Nigeria’ (Wolters
Kluwer, 2019) 108–111, referring to the decisions of the South African court in Laconian Maritime Enterprises Ltd.
v Agromar Lineas [1986] (3) 509 (D & LCD) 513; Jones v Krok [1995] (1) SA 677 (A); and Richman v Ben Tovim [2006] (2)
SA 591 (C). Also see, A Morgan and A Kennedy, ‘When Considering whether to Recognise and Enforce a Foreign Money
Judgment, Why Should the Domestic Court Accord the Foreign Court International Jurisdiction on the Basis that the
Judgment Debtor was Domiciled There? An Analysis of the Approach Taken by Courts in the Republic of South Africa’
(2020) Journal of Private International Law 16(3) 549, 562–569, referring to the decision of the Constitutional Court in
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick Case, CCT 101/12 [2013] (5) SA 325. But see Forsyth (n 3) 437, which
criticises the application of comity for being ‘devoid of precise meaning’ and, thus, susceptible to be employed as ‘a veil
for judicial discretion’.
146 Hook and Wass (n 141) 352.
147 See Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 140) 904 which reports that attempts to persuade the Australian courts to recognise and
enforce foreign judgments on the basis of reciprocity or comity have failed.

148 See text accompanying notes 24–28. See also, Okoli (n 145) 84–86; and Morgan and Kennedy (n 145) 566–569.
149 See Okoli ibid 108–111; Morgan and Kennedy, ibid 562–569; and Hook and Wass (n 141) 352.
150 For a discussion of South African law, see Forsyth (n 3) 417 et seq; Van Niekerk and C Schulze, The South African Law
of International Trade: Selected Topics (SAGA Legal Publications, 2011) 319–321; and S Khanderia, ‘The Hague Conference
on Private International Law’s Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Should
South Africa Endorse it?’ (2019) 63(3) Journal of African Law 413, 416 et seq [Khanderia, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in South Africa].
151 For a discussion of Australian law, see Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 140) 895–904.
152 For a discussion on New Zealand law, see Hook and Wass (n 141) 368–380.
judicial dicta.153 The private international laws of these jurisdictions consider a foreign forum
as internationally competent if it based its jurisdiction on: (1) the residence or submission of
the judgment-debtor in the territory of the court of origin at the time of commencement of the
proceedings; or (2) the submission of the judgment-debtor before that forum.154 However, the
laws of South Africa and New Zealand additionally acknowledge the presence of the judgment-
debtor in the territory of the court of origin at the time of commencement of the proceedings as
a valid basis for the international jurisdiction of a foreign forum.155
As we have seen above, the presence of the judgment-debtor does not confer international
competency on a foreign forum under Indian law. The Asian Principles for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Asian Principles), which are a form of soft-law and aim to
promote harmonisation of rules in Asia, however, advocate the recognition and enforcement of
foreign monetary judgments based on inter alia the presence of the judgment-debtor in the state
of origin.156 In comparison, Indian law continues to hold firmly to the traditional principles of
English common law where nationality, as opposed to presence will constitute a valid basis of
international jurisdiction.157 In this respect, the principles of Indian private international law are
more advanced when compared to the laws of South Africa or New Zealand, insofar as Indian
principles effectively prevents the arbitrariness which would occur if its courts were permitted to
recognise and enforce foreign judgments based on the mere presence of a judgment-debtor. The
acceptance of ‘mere presence’ as a ground to confer international jurisdiction has been subjected
to severe criticism in South Africa158 and New Zealand159 as being arbitrary. The ground permits
a foreign forum to assume jurisdiction based on the transitory or fleeting presence of the judg-
ment-debtor. It is, therefore, susceptible to render a judgment unenforceable and ineffective if the
defendant escaped the jurisdiction without any assets to freeze or confiscate.160
As we have seen in chapter 5 on ‘Jurisdiction’, the presence of the defendant does not consti-
tute a valid basis for an Indian court to assume jurisdiction in an international civil or commercial
matter. It is, therefore, only fair that mere presence is not recognised as a ground that confers
international jurisdiction on a foreign forum under Indian law. In contrast, Canada, which is
also a common law country, has embraced the doctrine of comity as a ‘touchstone’, which forms
an ‘informing principle of private international law’.161 Canadian private international law thus
153 Note that Nepalese private international law on the subject, which is stipulated in s 37(a) of the Mutual Legal
Assistance Act, merely indicates the competence of the foreign court as an indispensable factor to give effect to a foreign
judgment – but does not make any mention on the factors which would be considered to ascertain the international
jurisdiction of that court.
154 For a discussion of South African law, see Forsyth (n 3) 417 et seq; Van Niekerk and Schulze (n 150) 319–321; and
Khanderia, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in South Africa (n 150) 416 et seq. For a discussion of
Australian law, see Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 140) 895–904. For a discussion on New Zealand law, see Hook and Wass
(n 141) 368–380.
155 See Khanderia, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in South Africa (n 150) 418–419; and Hook and
Wass, ibid 369–372.

156 See Article 2(a) of the Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 2020, Asian
Business Law Institute, available at https://info.sal.org.sg/abli/ebooks/recognition-enforcement-foreign-judgments/

[Asian Principles].
157 See text accompanying notes 63–79.
158 Forsyth (n 3) 430; R Oppong ‘Mere Presence and International Competence in Private International Law’ (2007) 3
Journal of Private International Law 321; C Schulze ‘International Jurisdiction in Claims Sounding in Money: Is Richman
v Ben-Tovim the Last Word?’ (2008) 20 South African Mercantile Law Journal 61; and GMN Xaba ‘Presence as a Basis for
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments sounding in Money: The “Real and Substantial Connection” Test
Considered’ (2015) 36(1) Obiter 121.
159 Hook and Wass (n 143) 32–33.
160 Forsyth (n 3) 430; and Khanderia, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in South Africa (n 150) 418–419.
161 J Blom ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Goes Forth into the World’ (1997) 28 Canadian Business
Law Journal 373, 374 [Blom, Morguard Goes Forth into the World].
does away with the principle of international jurisdiction, which mandates the assessment of the
jurisdiction of the foreign forum according to principles of domestic law. Canadian courts have
replaced the ‘rigid and outmoded nineteenth-century principles with a flexible test of real and
substantial connection’.162 Although the application of the test is limited to the recognition and
enforcement of inter-provincial judgments,163 it has since evolved into a crucial constitutional
standard which is extended to foreign judgments as well.164 Under Canadian private interna-
tional law, a foreign decision will be eligible for recognition and enforcement in Canada if the
court of origin had a ‘significant connection’ with the cause of action, or ‘when the defendant has
“participated in something of significance or was actively involved in that foreign jurisdiction”’.165
The Supreme Court of Canada has accordingly stipulated a flexible list of presumptive connect-
ing factors to interpret the ‘real and substantial connection’ test.166 Consequently, apart from the
traditional jurisdictional bases of residence and submission (express and implied), foreign judg-
ments which are pronounced by a court where the cause of action occurred will also be eligible
for extraterritorial effect in Canada.167
In a related vein, comity and reciprocity similarly form the backbone of the law on the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the EU, which is largely a civil law jurisdiction.168
The law on the subject on the continent has been harmonised at the supranational level with the
promulgation of the Brussels I bis Regulation169 and the Lugano Convention.170 In general, the
application of the provisions of these instruments is limited to the recognition and enforcement
of judgments from other Member States. The provisions are, therefore, not applicable when a
court in the EU is requested to recognise or enforce a decision from a third party, in which
case the internal law of the requested state will apply. Unlike the practice of most common law
jurisdictions (including India), the Brussels I bis Regulation and the Lugano Convention clearly
define the grounds on which a court may give effect to a foreign judgment from another Member
State. In particular, the instruments abolish the requirement of exequatur171 and thus facilitate the
free movement of judgments by making a provision for the automatic recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters.172 A court in the EU would give effect to
a judgment from another Member State if its jurisdiction was based on the domicile173 or the
162 Kenny (n 41) 197–198. See also, A Briggs, ‘Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Rethinking the Law on Foreign
Judgments’ (2004) 8 Singapore Yearbook of Private International Law 1, 1 [Briggs, Crossing the River]; and S Pitel,
‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Where Morguard Stands after Beals’ (2004) 40 Canadian Business Law Journal 189,
202 [Pitel, Where Morguard Stands after Beals].
163 See the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investments Ltd. v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077
[1098].
164 Blom, Morguard Goes Forth into the World (n 161) 377.
165 [2003] SCC 72 [23]; J Goodman and J Talpis ‘Beals v Saldana and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada’
(2004) 40 Canadian Business Law Journal 227, 228–229; and Pitel, Where Morguard Stands after Beals (n 162) 194.
166 See Club Resorts v Van Breda, [2012] SCC 17 [19].
167 ibid.
168 See H Alavi ‘A Step Forward in the Harmonisation of European Jurisdiction: Regulation Brussels I Recast’ (2015) 8(2)
Baltic Journal of Law and Politics 159, 163; and Chong (n 48) 53–54 which states that reciprocity is a pre-requisite to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in all civil law jurisdictions.
169 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 27 September
1968 (the Brussels Convention), which is now replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of The European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (the Brussels I bis Regulation).
170 In the European Economic Area, the Brussels Recast is supplemented by the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2007) www.ec.europa.eu/world/agree-
ments/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=13041 (Lugano Convention).
171 See in this respect, LJE Timmer, ‘Abolition of Exequatur under the Brussels I Regulation: Ill Conceived and Premature’
(2013) 9 Journal of Private International Law 129.

172 See Art 36 of the Brussels I bis Regulation; and Art 33 of the Lugano Convention.
173 See Arts 4, 62 and 63; and Arts 2, 59 and 60 of the Lugano Convention.
express or implied submission of the judgment-debtor.174 The presence, residence or the nation-
ality of the judgment-debtor is therefore an irrelevant factor in establishing the validity of the
foreign judgment. Likewise, a court is obligated to recognise or enforce the judgment of a court
in another Member State if the cause of action arose in the latter’s territory, either because the
performance of the contract or the occurrence of the delict took place in its territory.175 Besides,
these instruments stipulate some exclusive bases of jurisdiction and judgments pronounced in
violation of these grounds will therefore be denied recognition or enforcement. Accordingly, the
jurisdiction of a foreign court in a dispute arising in connection to a right in immovable property
must be based on its situs,176 while that concerning a dispute on the validity or registration of
intellectual property or an analogous right must be predicated on its locus protectionis (place of
protection).177 In a related vein, the jurisdiction of the foreign court for disputes concerning the
validity of the constitution or dissolution of a company must be based on its seat.178 In contrast,
the court’s jurisdiction in a dispute concerning the validity of an entry in a public registry must
be based on the place where the register is kept.179
ii. Grounds for Denial

In general, the principles of Indian private international law resonate with the trends in other
jurisdictions such as Australia,180 New Zealand,181 Canada182 South Africa183 and Nepal184 which
similarly prohibit the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment if it was obtained by fraud,
contrary to public policy, was opposed to natural justice. Likewise, the Brussels I bis Regulation
and the Lugano Convention similarly prohibit the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment from another Member State if it contravenes the public policy of the recognising state.185
Although fraud has not explicitly been stipulated as a ground to deny the recognition or enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment, it is ‘subsumed under the public policy exception’.186 Besides, EU law
prohibits a foreign judgment from another Member State from being recognised or enforced if it:
(1) is a result of default proceedings or the failure to notify the defendant on a timely basis of the
commencement of proceedings before the rendering court;187 or,
(2) is inconsistent with an earlier judgment between the same parties in the same cause of action
before: (a) the recognising court; or (b) another court.188
Although the rules in common law jurisdictions, including India, do not expressly stipulate that recog-
nition or enforcement of a foreign judgment would be denied if it results in inconsistent judgments, ‘it
174 See Arts 25 and 26 of the Brussels I bis Regulation; and Arts 23 and 24 of the Lugano Convention.
176 See Art 24(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation; and Art 22(1) of the Lugano Convention.
180 See Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 140) 921–935.
181 See Hook and Wass (n 141) 394 referring to s 6(1) and (2) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934.
182 See J Walker, Halsbury’s Laws of Canada: Conflict of Laws (Lexis Nexis, 2011) 477–485.
183 See Forsyth (n 3) 417; and Van Niekerk and Schulze (n 150) 319–321; and Khanderia, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in South Africa (n 150) 420 et seq.

184 Section 37(3) of the Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2014.
186 see Chong (n 48) 49.
187 ibid.
188 ibid.
is a generally accepted practice that a local judgment will prevail over a conflicting foreign judgment
dealing with the same issue between the same parties’ if the former precedes the latter.189
The principles of private international law of common law countries do not, however, clarify
the position if a subsequent local judgment, which concerns a matter between the same parties
and the same cause of action, will similarly gain priority over an existing foreign judgment.190
Scholarly writings opine that, in such circumstances, it is likely that common law countries would
follow the position under English law and prioritise the recognition and enforcement of an earlier
foreign judgment.191 In this respect, the principles of private international law of Nepal on the
subject deserve mention insofar as they provide considerable clarity over the matter, unlike most
other common law jurisdictions discussed above. Section 37 of the Mutual Legal Assistance
Act 2014 clarifies that a local judgment in a dispute between the same parties and the same
subject matter will have precedence over a foreign decision if it was filed or pronounced before
the latter.192 In such circumstances, the foreign judgment will not be recognised or enforced.193
Similarly, a foreign judgment which has already been recognised and enforced or is in the process
of being recognised or enforced, will gain precedence over any other judgment and will prevent
any other judgment, including a local one, from being recognised or enforced in Nepal.194
Unlike the principles of Indian private international law, the rules in other jurisdictions
promote fairness and respect for the courts in other countries by prohibiting a foreign judgment
from being contested on the merits of the case.195 Therefore, a foreign judgment would be recog-
nised even if it is void.196 Judgment debtors aggrieved by the decision of the court of origin may
therefore only initiate appellate proceedings to challenge the findings of the court of origin.197
Besides, these legal systems additionally permit its court to refuse to give effect to a foreign judg-
ment if it is penal by nature.198 This ground does not explicitly find a place in Indian law. In
this respect, the Asian Principles, however, advocate the recognition and enforcement of foreign
money judgments which are penal in nature.199
B. Should India Accede to the Hague Conventions on the Recognition

and Enforcement of Judgments?
At the international level, the HCCCA and the Judgments Convention, which have been negoti-
ated under the auspices of the HCCH, endeavour to harmonise the law on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters.200 However, India is not a
189 Chong (n 48) 52.

190 ibid.
191 ibid 52–53.
192 Section 37(3)(b)-(c) of the Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2014.
193 ibid.
194 ibid, s 37(3)(d).
195 For the principles of the Australian law, see Nygh’s Conflict of Laws (n 140) 907–910; For the principles of the South
African law, see Joffe v Salmon [1904] TS [317], [319]; Gabelsberger v Babl [1994] (2) SA 677; Forsyth (n 3) 468–469;
Oppong (n 158) 332–333; and Khanderia, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in South Africa (n 150) 420.
196 See Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 471 ff, 142.
197 ibid.
198 ibid.
199 See Principle 6 of the Asian Principles.
200 For a detailed discussion on the meaning of civil and commercial matters, see HCCH, ‘Note on Article 1(1) of
the 2016 Preliminary Draft Convention and the Term “Civil or Commercial Matters”’, Preliminary Document No 4
of December 2016 for the attention of the Special Commission of February 2017 on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments.
signatory to either convention. Unlike the vague and convoluted principles on the subject that
exist under Indian law, the HCCCA and the Judgments Convention strive to enhance predict-
ability by enabling interested parties to know in advance the grounds on which a foreign decision
in a civil or a commercial matter which has been pronounced in the court of a Contracting State,
may be recognised or enforced in the territory of another Contracting State.201 The HCCCA
has to date been ratified by the EU, Denmark, Montenegro, Mexico, Singapore and the UK.202
Besides, China, the Republic of North Macedonia, the US, Australia and Israel will shortly enact
the HCCCA into law.203 On the other hand, the Judgments Convention has so far been signed by
Ukraine, Uruguay and Israel.204 The Judgments Convention will come into force on the first day
of the month following ratification by two states.205
The HCCCA, which governs the operation of exclusive choice of court agreements among
its Contracting States206 reinforces access to justice and facilitates the free movement of judg-
ments arising from such contracts.207 Article 8 of the HCCCA mandates the recognising court
in a Contracting State to ‘be bound by the findings of fact on which the state of origin based its
jurisdiction’.208 A court in a Contracting State is generally prohibited from refusing to give effect
to a foreign judgment from the court of another Contracting State, when the latter court has been
designated by the parties’ choice of court agreement as the forum to resolve the parties’ disputes.
Exceptions are stipulated in Article 9. The grounds in Article 9 largely resonate with those found
under Indian private international law. The HCCCA accordingly permits the requested court to
refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment if the latter was obtained in v iolation
of the principles of natural justice209 or by fraud;210 if the judgment contravenes the public
policy of the requested state;211 or if the judgment is inconsistent with an existing judgment in
a dispute between the same parties on the same subject-matter.212 Nonetheless, the HCCCA
provides significant clarification of the position that should be adopted by a requested court in
a Contracting State when deciding whether to recognise or enforce a judgment of a Contracting
State which has assumed jurisdiction in violation of a choice of court agreement. The HCCCA
accordingly permits the requested court to refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment if
the court of origin had assumed jurisdiction when the choice of court agreement was null and
void213 or was concluded among parties who lacked the capacity to enter into the agreement.214
201 But see Art 2(1) and (2) of the HCCCA and the Judgments Convention for a list of matters which are excluded from
the scope of these Conventions.

202 visit www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 for the list of signatories.
203 ibid; and Chong (n 48) 61.
204 See www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=137.
205 Art 29 of the Judgments Convention.
206 Art 2(1)(a) read along with Art 3 of the HCCCA. Also see Art 19 of the HCCCA, which permits the Contracting
States to limit the scope of the HCCA to the choice of courts that have some connection with the parties or their transac-
tion. But see, Art 25 of the HCCCA for the meaning of ‘State’ in case of a non-unified legal system.
207 Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project (n 10) 458. But see Art 22 of the HCCCA, which additionally permits the
Contracting States to reciprocally declare that its courts would furthermore recognise and enforce judgments that pertain
to non-exclusive choice of court agreements from other Contracting State.
208 ibid, Art 8(2) read along with Art 13. See also, T Hartley and M Dogauchi, ‘Explanatory Report on the 2005
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ (HCCH Publications, 2007) 65 www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf

[HCCCA, Hartley-Dogauchi Explanatory Report], which clarifies that the applicability of the concerned provision is
limited to circumstances when the forum of the Contracting State ‘bases its jurisdiction’ under the Convention – ie as a
result of the choice of court agreement. cf Art 8(3) of the HCCCA.
209 ibid, Art 9(c).
210 ibid, Art 9(d).
211 ibid, Art 9(e).
212 ibid, Art 9(f), (g).
213 ibid, Art 9(a).
214 ibid, Art 9(b); and HCCCA, Hartley-Dogauchi Explanatory Report (n 208) 31.
As we have seen above, under Indian law, although submission to a foreign court as a result of
the parties’ choice of court agreement constitutes a valid base of ‘international competency’, there
is no clarity on whether the assumption of jurisdiction in violation of such an agreement would
affect the recognition and enforcement of the decision in India. Consider a scenario when two
parties, A and B, have concluded a forum selection agreement to resolve disputes that may arise
in connection to their international contract on the sale of goods, say, 100 pairs of cotton socks
in favour of the courts in Pretoria, South Africa. Further, assume that the courts in Brazil assume
jurisdiction on the ground that the contract was to be performed within its jurisdiction. The deci-
sion is pronounced against B who has assets in India and is required to pay damages of Rs10,000
to A. Will the judgment of the Brazilian court be eligible for recognition and enforcement in
India even though the court assumed jurisdiction in violation of the choice of court agreement
but on the basis of another valid ground?
The Judgments Convention extends its scope to decisions which do not arise from a
choice of court agreement regulated by the HCCCA.215 As such, the Judgments Convention
mandates requested courts to do away with any special procedures involved in the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments and prohibits the review of the merits of the original
decisions. In doing so, it simplifies processes and reduces the related costs involved in giving
extraterritorial effect to court decisions.216 In particular, Article 5 stipulates 13 ‘indirect’ and
permissible grounds of jurisdictional bases or filters to determine the eligibility of foreign judg-
ments by courts of origin in Contracting States in civil and commercial matters.217 This is to
be contrasted with ‘direct’ jurisdiction, which concerns the rules on which a rendering court
may assume jurisdiction over a matter. Indirect jurisdiction relates to the ‘indirect’ control
that a recognising court is permitted to exercise over the court of origin through the recogni-
tion and enforcement of the latter’s judgments.218 Therefore, grounds of ‘indirect’ jurisdiction
exhibit a power, which the recognising court exercises over the court of origin, through the
process of recognition, by determining whether the jurisdiction was exercised properly or
not.219 In comparison, ‘direct’ jurisdiction is described as a privilege insofar as it provides the
court of origin with the freedom to exert jurisdiction, without conferring the recognising court
with the right to prevent the former from exercising the same.220 The requested court in a
Contracting State is therefore under an obligation to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment
from another Contracting State, if the latter’s courts have based jurisdiction on any one of the
13 grounds indicated in the Judgments Convention.221 In general, the Judgments Convention
prescribes grounds which are similar to those found under Indian law, to establish the inter-
national jurisdiction of the foreign forum. A court in a Contracting State is thus obligated
215 See HCCA, ‘Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters: Explanatory Report’ (2020) Pre-Publication Version, 6 [20], available at: http://assets.hcch.net/
docs/a1b0b0fc-95b1-4544-935b-b842534a120f.pdf [Explanatory Report to the Judgments Convention].
216 Hague Conference on Private International Law ‘Overview of the Judgments Project’: www.hcch.net/en/projects/
legislative-projects/judgments 3 and 17; and ATV Mehren, ‘Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of
Recognition Conventions’ (1998) 24 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 17, 23.
217 See Explanatory Report to the Judgments Convention (n 215) 26 [114].
218 See R Michaels, ‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgments Conventions’ Research
Paper No 123, (August 2006) Duke Law School Legal Studies, Research Papers Series 1, 8 (Michaels, Some Fundamental
Jurisdictional Conceptions).
219 ibid.
220 ibid.
221 See Art 5 of the Judgments Convention.
to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment from another signatory if it based its jurisdiction
on inter alia:
(1) being the place of the habitual residence of the judgment-debtor;222
(2) the submission (express or implied) of the judgment-debtor;223
(3) being the place where the cause of action arose, either because as the place of the perfor-
mance of a contract224 or (in the case of a non-contractual obligation) as the place where an
act or omission that directly caused harm occurred.225
However, unlike the principles of Indian private international law which are ambiguous to this
effect,226 the Judgments Convention unequivocally recognises the jurisdiction of a foreign court
which is based on the situs of the immovable property as a valid ground. In this respect, the
Judgments Convention provides that, in disputes arising from a short-term lease, a tenancy or
a contractual obligation which is secured by a right in rem over immovable property, the juris-
diction of the foreign forum may be based on the situs of the immovable property227 or any of
the other 12 indirect grounds. In other words, such disputes are subject to the rules on indirect
jurisdiction.
However, foreign judgments arising from disputes which solely concern rights in rem over
immovable property or long-term tenancies which exceed six months are subject to the rule of
exclusive jurisdiction stipulated in Article 6. As opposed to the ‘indirect’ bases which are permis-
sible, Article 6 mandates the recognising court to give effect to the foreign judgment (from a court
of another Contracting State) ‘if and only if ’ the latter assumed jurisdiction on that ground.228
In other words, jurisdiction assumed on any other ground would render the judgment invalid
for recognition and enforcement in another Contracting State. In such matters, the requested
court is thus permitted to recognise and enforce such judgments ‘if and only if ’ the forum rei
sitae (the court in which the immovable property is situated) has decided them.229 To illustrate,
suppose A, habitually resident in state X (New South Wales) enters into an agreement with B in
state Z (France) to purchase immovable property situated in state Y (Greece), which is secured
by a mortgage guaranteed by a bank in state Z (New York).230 A defaults in the mortgage. The
courts of state X (Australia) or Y (Greece) may assume ‘indirect’ jurisdiction by being the place of
habitual residence of the judgment debtor and the situs of the property in a dispute concerning a
contractual obligation secured by a right in rem over immovable property. However, a proceeding
against A, who is habitually resident in state Y (Greece) in a dispute arising from his failure to
register the sale deed for immovable property in state Z (New York) may exclusively be initiated
in state Z (New York), by being the situs of the property.
222 ibid, Art 5(a). For disputes arising out of activities carried out by natural persons, see Art 5(b), which regards the
principal place of business of the judgment-debtor at the time of the initiation of the proceedings in the court of origin.
Alternatively, Art 5(d) provides that, the fact that the defendant had a branch, agency or other establishment without a
separate legal entity in the state of origin may also be considered provided that the judgment arose out of the activities of
these establishments.
223 ibid, Art 5(c), (e), (f), (k), (l) and (m).
224 ibid, Art 5(g).
225 ibid, Art 5(j).
227 ibid, Art 5(h) and (i).
228 ibid, Art 6 read along with Explanatory Report to the Judgments Convention (n 215) 53–55.
229 ibid.
230 For a similar illustration, see Permanent Bureau: Hague Conference on Private International Law – Explanatory Note
Providing Background on the Proposed Draft Text and Identifying Outstanding Issues (April 2016), 38 [168], available at
www.assets.hcch.net/docs/e402cc72-19ed-4095-b004-ac47742dbc41.pdf.
The Judgments Convention prescribes grounds which are similar to those under the HCCCA
to permit a requested court in a Contracting State to refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign
judgment from another signatory state. A foreign judgment in a civil or a commercial matter will
therefore be denied recognition or enforcement if it was a result of proceedings which violated
the fundamental principles of natural justice;231 it was obtained by fraud;232 it contravened the
public policy of the forum;233 or if the court of origin had assumed jurisdiction in contraven-
tion to a choice of court agreement.234 At the same time, the Judgments Convention additionally
addresses the predicaments that may arise during the recognition and enforcement of conflict-
ing judgments from parallel proceedings, a factor which is not addressed under the HCCCA.235
The Judgments Convention accordingly permits the recognising court to refuse (or to postpone)
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment, if proceedings between the same parties in
the same cause of action are pending before it, provided that it was seised before the court of
origin.236
It is suggested that India ratifies both Hague Conventions to promote predictability and access
to justice in the Republic. At present, Indian law on the subject lacks transparency or consist-
ency. As a result of the lack of codification, interested parties must peruse a jungle of case law to
decipher the factors which confer a foreign court with the requisite ‘international jurisdiction’
or ‘competency’ when the judgment of that forum would have to be recognised or enforced in
India. In particular, India’s accession to the HCCCA would foster the Republic’s goals of promot-
ing party autonomy in the choice of the court and would accordingly introduce certainty that
the courts in the Republic will not recognise or enforce a foreign judgment in a forum that has
assumed jurisdiction in contravention of a choice of court agreement. These apart, the introduc-
tion of the HCCCA and the Judgments Convention into Indian law will promote predictability as
regards the country’s stance on the ‘public policy’ and ‘inconsistent judgments’ exceptions, both
of which are presently impliedly accepted in the Republic.
VI. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the principles of Indian private international law on the
recognition and enforcement of monetary and non-monetary foreign judgments. The law on
the subject is stipulated in sections 13, 14 and 44-A of the CPC. In particular, we saw that the
doctrine of obligation forms the backbone of the law on the subject. The principle is based on
the premise that the judgment debtor owes an obligation to the judgment creditor under the law
of the state which passed the decision. For this reason, a foreign judgment cannot have an auto-
matic effect in India. Instead, the foreign judgment merely constitutes a cause of action which
must be recognised or enforced by initiating a fresh legal proceeding in India. The principle of
reciprocity thus has a limited effect in the Republic to the extent that Indian law permits foreign
judgments from the superior courts of certain countries which have been notified as such by the
Central Government to have an automatic effect in the country. At the same time, it was seen that
all foreign judgments, regardless of whether or not from a reciprocating country, must conform
231 Art 7(a) of the Judgments Convention.

232 ibid, Art 7(b).
233 ibid, Art 7(c).
234 ibid, Art 7(d).
235 ibid, Art 7(2).
236 ibid read along with the Explanatory Report to the Judgments Convention (n 215) 62–63 [273]–[276].
Conclusion 279
to the requirement of being pronounced by a court which possesses international jurisdiction

and is thus considered as ‘internationally competent’ under Indian law. The principles on which
a foreign court is considered as internationally competent have not been clarified by statute. In
such circumstances, judicial dicta have enunciated that the nationality or the habitual residence
of the judgment debtor will constitute valid grounds conferring international jurisdiction on
a foreign forum. Likewise, the express or implied submission of the judgment debtor will also
confer international competency on the foreign court. This chapter shed light on ‘cause of action’
impliedly being recognised under Indian law.
Further, this chapter demonstrated that Indian law does not adopt a clear position on the situs
of the immovable property as a valid basis, insofar as some decisions have not recognised this
factor to be relevant in establishing the competency of the foreign forum. Any foreign decision in
a civil or a commercial matter which is pronounced by a court of international competency may,
nonetheless, be denied effect in India if the judgment debtor proves that the proceedings violated
the fundamental principles of natural justice, the decision was obtained by fraud, or the judgment
contravenes the principles of international or domestic law. Further, it was seen that public policy
and inconsistent judgments have impliedly been recognised as grounds that permit an Indian
court to deny giving effect to a foreign judgment.
Lastly, the chapter reflected on the position of Indian law vis-à-vis trends in other jurisdic-
tions. In doing so, the chapter took a bird’s eye view in comparing Indian law with the laws
of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Nepal and the EU. The chapter additionally
embarked on India’s position at the HCCH and deliberated whether the Republic should accede
to the HCCCA and the Judgments Convention, two instruments which attempt to harmonise and
unify the law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It was seen that, although the
principles of Indian private international law generally adhere to the provisions of the HCCCA
and the Judgments Convention, the Republic will nonetheless benefit by acceding to these two
instruments, thereby promoting predictability and access to justice in India.
13
The Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards
I. Introduction
Arbitration, which is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, has in recent times increas-
ingly been preferred to litigation by parties for the adjudication of their disputes. This is because
arbitration has the benefits of being flexible and neutral. Unlike proceedings before a court, arbi-
tration is not cumbersome.1 The parties may, accordingly, decide to adjudicate their disputes by
arbitration at a venue of their choice, depending on their convenience. They can also choose the
procedural rules that will govern the arbitration process.2 Moreover, the law regulating arbitration
has evolved at a fast pace, when compared to litigation, with considerable efforts to harmo-
nise the legal principles on the subject.3 The international instruments in the form of the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law)4
have been universally accepted, thus rendering the law on the subject predictable and certain.
In the context of recognition and enforcement, the successful efforts to harmonise the legal
principles with the enactment of the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (1927 Geneva Convention);5 and UNCITRAL’s 1958 Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (popularly known as the New York Convention)6 have
accelerated the free movement of arbitral award and have thereby promoted access to justice.
Most importantly, unlike in the case of litigation, the parties do not have to familiarise themselves
with the vastly differing rules of another jurisdiction or peruse a jungle of case law to ascertain
the legal position in a country. As we have seen in the preceding chapter on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments, the law on the subject obligates the parties to familiarise
themselves with the law of the country where the decision is to be recognised or enforced if it is
1 See G Cuniberti, ‘Beyond Contract – The Case of Default Arbitration in International Commercial Disputes’ (2009)
32(2) Fordham International Law Journal 417, 423–427.

2 ibid 430.
3 For a detailed discussion on the history of international treaties on arbitration, see A Nussbaum, ‘Treaties on
Commercial Arbitration – A Test of International Private-Law Legislation’ (1942) 56 Harvard Law Review 219; and
P Tercier, ‘The 1927 Geneva Convention and the ICC Reform Proposals’ (2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 19.
4 The text of the UNCITRAL Model Law is available at: www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/
07-86998_Ebook.pdf. For a detailed discussion on the UNCITRAL Model Law, see JMH Hunter, ‘The UNCITRAL
Model Law’ (1985) 13 International Business Law 399; and R Sorieul, ‘The Influence of the New York Convention on the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 2(1) Dispute Resolution International 27–42.
5 The official text of the 1927 Geneva Convention may be accessed in the League of Nations, ‘Treaty Series’ vol 92, 301,
available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2092/v92.pdf.

6 The official text of the New York Convention is available at the United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol 330, 3, https://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&clang=_en.
The Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 281
pronounced in their favour so that the judgment does not become brutum fulmen. In compari-
son, the unification of the law of arbitration has effectively addressed the roadblocks that have
prevailed in proceedings before a court. For this reason, scholars recommend the application of
arbitration as a default mechanism to resolve international commercial disputes.7
In India, unlike the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the prin-
ciples that regulate the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards have been predicated
on well-defined grounds and are thus predictable and certain. One of the primary reasons for
these developments in Indian private international law on the subject may be attributed to the
Republic’s pro-activeness in acceding to international conventions on the subject.
This chapter discusses the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
in India. It is divided into six parts. Section II (section I being this Introduction) provides a
general overview of the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in
India. It discusses the statutory framework of the law on the subject in section II.A. Section II.B
subsequently discusses the scope and meaning of foreign arbitral awards as interpreted under
the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (ACA). Section II.C assesses the law
on foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention or the 1927 Geneva Convention,
by reference to Indian case law. Section III discusses the execution of foreign arbitral awards
in India. In doing so, it highlights the statutory requirements in the ACA which prohibit the
Indian court to annul a foreign award which has been given under foreign law in section III.A.
Section III.B discusses the procedural requirements to recognise or enforce a foreign arbitral
award which has been issued under the New York Convention or the 1927 Geneva Convention.
Section IV discusses the grounds on which an Indian court may refuse to recognise or enforce
a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention or the 1927 Geneva Convention.
Section V provides concluding remarks. It has not been deemed necessary to reflect on the posi-
tion of Indian law on the subject, given the country’s ratification of the 1927 Geneva Convention
and the New York Convention, which have been universally accepted and have resulted in the
harmonisation of Indian law on the subject with global trends.8
II. The Law on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
A. The Statutory Framework
In general, in India, the law on arbitration is stipulated in the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act 19969 (ACA), which draws on the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The legislation
consolidates the legal provisions on the subject by repealing the Arbitration (Protocol and
Convention) Act 1937 (which gave effect to the provisions of the 1927 Geneva Convention) and
the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (1961 Act) (which gave effect to
the provisions of the New York Convention). The ACA was thus enacted to foster India’s ability to
meet international standards and best practices concerning the recognition and enforcement of
7 See in this respect, Cuniberti (n 1) 417 et seq.

8 For a list of signatories to the 1927 Geneva Convention, visit: http://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?
src=LON&id=550&chapter=30&clang=_en. For a list of Contracting States of the New York Convention, visit: http://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&clang=_en.
9 Act No 26 of 1996.
282 The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
domestic and foreign arbitral awards.10 The mechanism to regulate the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards is stipulated in Part II of the ACA which implements India’s
obligations under the 1927 Geneva Convention and the New York Convention.
The expressions ‘recognition’ and ‘enforcement’ have not been defined in the 1927 Geneva
Convention, the New York Convention or the ACA. The Official Commentary to the New York
Convention, however, interprets the term ‘recognition’ as the ‘legal force and effect of an award’.11
On the other hand, ‘enforcement’ is ‘the forced execution of an award previously recognized by
the same State’.12 Although some jurisdictions may require a foreign award creditor to seek recog-
nition and enforcement of an award,13 Indian private international law permits an application
for the recognition of the foreign arbitral award to be requested independently, to ‘shield against
re-agitation of issues with which the award deals’.14
Section 44 to 52 of ACA stipulate the requirements for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, which have been rendered under the New York Convention. Likewise,
sections 53 to 60 of the ACA govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
which have been given under the 1927 Geneva Convention. Foreign arbitral awards which have
not been given under either of these international instruments are not regulated under the provi-
sions of the ACA.
B. The Scope and Meaning of a ‘Foreign Arbitral Award’

A ‘foreign arbitral award’ that is given under the New York Convention is defined under
section 44 of the ACA. It is one which has been made in a ‘reciprocating’ territory to settle
disputes ‘on differences between persons arising out of legal relationships’ in an international
commercial15 matter by arbitration16 pursuant to an agreement which is evidenced in writing.17
The parties’ intention to settle their disputes by arbitration must therefore be clearly established
by their conduct since its effect is to exclude the authority of national courts to adjudicate upon
disputes.18 Indian law will consider an arbitration agreement to have been concluded, even when
it has not been signed or when there is no exchange of documents. An example is when the
parties have accepted other aspects of the contract which contains the arbitration clause.19
10 For the development of international commercial arbitration in India, see TS Work, ‘India Satisfies Its Jones for
Arbitration: New Arbitration Law in India’ (1997) 10 Transnational Law 217; and FS Nariman, ‘India and International
Arbitration’ (2009) 41 George Washington International Law Review 367.
11 See UNCITRAL Secretariat, ‘Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards’ (New York 1958), Commentary to Article 1(1), 9 [7]–[8] [Commentary to the New York Convention], available
at: www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/2016_Guide_on_the_Convention.pdf.
12 ibid.
13 ibid, 9 [9]–[10].
14 ibid, 10, [11], referring to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia,
Bermuda v Orient Middle East Lines Ltd. & Ors 12 October 1993, Civil Appeals Nos 5438–39 of 1993.
15 See Art I(3) of the New York Convention.
16 Section 44 of the ACA read along with Art I of the New York Convention. See also, generally, J Gill, ‘The Definition
of Award under the New York Convention’ (2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 114.
17 Section 44(a) of the ACA read along with s 7 of the ACA, which describes the circumstances in which, an arbitra-
tion agreement will be construed to be in writing. See also, generally, L Boo, ‘The Writing Requirement in Contemporary
Practice: Is There Really a Need for Change’ (2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 75.
18 See the decision of the Supreme Court in Cheran Properties Ltd. v Kasturi & Sons Ltd. & Ors Civil Appeal Nos
10025–10026 of 2017, 22, fn 10, referring to C Partasides and N Blackaby, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration
5th edn (OUP, 2009) 89–90; and Commentary to Art II(1) of the New York Convention (n 11) 44, [17], referring to Smita
Conductors Ltd. v Euro Alloys Ltd AIR [2001] SCW 3517.
19 ibid.
The New York Convention does not mandate reciprocity as a fundamental criterion.
Accordingly, a Contracting State is not obligated to limit the recognition or enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards to those made in another signatory.20 A state may, instead, decide to recognise and
enforce a foreign arbitral award from any country (regardless of whether it is a signatory). The
New York Convention, nonetheless, permits Contracting States to make a reservation and only
recognise and enforce arbitral awards made in another signatory.21 India has opted in favour of
the application of the principle of reciprocity. Foreign arbitral awards which have been given in a
reciprocating territory notified as such in the Official Gazette of the Central Government will be
recognised or enforced in the Republic.22 At present, India has notified the following signatories
as reciprocating:23 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Central African Republic,
Chile, Cuba, Czech, Slovak (the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), Denmark, Ecuador, the
Arab Republic of Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy,
Republic of Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malagasy Republic, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, San
Marino, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic
of Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and the US.24 However, the break-
up of a territory which has been notified as ‘reciprocating’ would not affect the enforceability of
awards rendered in that country after its political separation.25 In other words, a state (which has
been politically separated) will therefore continue to be recognised as a reciprocating territory
under Indian law.26
Although the provisions of the ACA do not define the term ‘commercial’, regard may be had
to its interpretation in the UNCITRAL Model Law on which the provisions of the legislation are
predicated.27 In general, the courts in India construe a broad as opposed to a restricted mean-
ing to the term ‘commercial’.28 An agreement would be ‘commercial’ whether or not it arises
from a contract29 and would include transactions for the sale of goods and services,30 factoring
and leasing, to name a few. The ACA provides that a commercial arbitration agreement would
be considered as ‘international’ when any of the parties is a foreign national or habitually resi-
dent outside India. Where party to the arbitration agreement is a body corporate whose central
management and control are outside India, the agreement will also be treated as international.31
Although the statute denotes that the place of performance is irrelevant when determining
20 See Art I(3) of the New York Convention. See also, generally, WW Park, ‘Non-Signatories and the New York
Convention’ (2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 84.

21 ibid.
22 Section 44(b) of the ACA.
23 See the website of the ICC, available at: http://library.iccwbo.org/content/dr/COUNTRY_ANSWERS/CA_
SUPP_0029_31.htm?l1=Country+Answers&l2=India.
24 ibid.
25 See the decision of the Supreme Court in Transocean Shipping Agency Pvt Ltd v Black Sea Shipping & Ors [1998] (2)
SCC 281, 284.

26 ibid.
27 See Art I of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
28 See Commentary to Art 1(3) of the New York Convention (n 11) 33, 34 [85]–[86]; referring to the decision of the
High Court of Gujarat in Union of India & Ors v Lief Hoegh & Co. & Ors 4 May 1982; and M Pryles, ‘Reservations Available
to Member States: The Reciprocal and Commercial Reservations’, in E Gaillard and D Di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May, 2008)
161, 178–79.
29 Section 44 of the ACA read along with ss 2(f) and 7 of the ACA; Gas Authority of India Ltd v SPIE CAPAG, SA & Ors
[1993] (27) DRJ; and Enercon (India) Limited & Ors. v Enercon GmbH & Anr Civil Appeal No 2806 of 2014 [79].
30 See in this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in R.M. Investment and Trading Co. (P) Ltd v Boeing Co., [1994]
SCC (4) 541.

31 Section 2(f) of the ACA.
whether an arbitration agreement is ‘international’, the dictum of the Delhi High Court in Gas
Authority of India Ltd v SPIE CAPAG, SA & Ors,32 albeit of persuasive value, indicates to the
contrary. The decision, which concerned the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbi-
tral award in India, stipulated that an arbitration agreement would inter alia be construed as
‘international’ if it was performed abroad.33 The Supreme Court in World Sport Group (Mauritius)
Ltd v MSM Satellite (Singapore) PTE Ltd has confirmed that the agreement to arbitrate does not
violate sections 23 or 28 of the ICA which prohibits, as illegal and opposed to public policy, all
contracts which restrict the right to a legal proceeding.34 An arbitration agreement is separable
and severable from the substantive provisions in the main contract, which stipulate the rights and
obligations of the parties regarding performance.35
Section 53 of the ACA defines a foreign arbitral award which has been given under the 1927
Geneva Convention in a manner which is similar to section 48 discussed above. The foreign
arbitral award must be made in a reciprocating territory and must be given under the parties’
agreement in writing to settle their international commercial disputes by arbitration. Unlike
the New York Convention, the provisions of the 1927 Geneva Convention limit recognition
and enforcement to foreign arbitral awards ‘rendered in proceedings “between persons who are
subject to the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting Parties”’.36
C. Foreign Arbitral Awards Given Following Reference

by an Indian Court
In certain circumstances, a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention or the 1927
Geneva Convention may be issued after an Indian court decides to refer the parties to an inter-
national commercial contract to arbitration in a reciprocating territory.37 Sections 45 and 54 of
the ACA empower the court to refer parties to arbitration when it has been ‘seized of an action in
a matter to which the parties have made an such an agreement’ upon a request by one party. The
court may, however, refrain from referring the parties when it finds that the arbitration agree-
ment ‘is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’.38 The court will therefore be
empowered to refer the matter to arbitration even if the main contract is null and void.39 This is
because an arbitration agreement is separable from the rest of the contract.40
In Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd v Aksh Optifibre Ltd, the Supreme Court clarified that the deter-
mination regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement must be based on a prima facie
32 (n 29).
33 ibid, headnote.
34 Civil Appeal No 895 of 2014 [11], [31].
35 Reva Electric Car company Pvt Ltd v Green Mobil, [2012] 2 SCC 93; Enercon (India) Limited (n 29) [79], [80]; and
World Sport Group (Mauritius) (n 34) [23], [24] referring to the decision of the House of Lords in Premium Nafta Products
Ltd v Fili [2007] UKHL 40. See also, K Hober and A Magnusson, ‘The Special Status of Agreements to Arbitrate: The
Separability Doctrine; Mandatory Stay of Litigation.’ (May 2008) 2(1) Dispute Resolution International 56–74.
36 See the Commentary to the New York Convention (n 11) 8 [4].
37 See ss 45 and 54 of the ACA.
38 ibid. See also, Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd v Aksh Optifibre Ltd [2005] 7 SCC 234; SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd v Chandmari
Tea Co. (P) Ltd [2011] 14 SCC 66; and World Sport Group (Mauritius) (n 34) [23], [24] referring to the decision of the
House of Lords in Premium Nafta (n 34).
39 See the decision of the courts in Reva Electric Car company Pvt Ltd (n 35); Enercon (India) Limited (n 29) [79], [80];
and World Sport Group (Mauritius) (n 34) [23], [24].

40 ibid.
examination, as opposed to a final finding.41 In doing so, the court referred to the judicial practice
in major jurisdictions such as France, Switzerland, Hong Kong, the UK and Ontario and thus
frowned upon rendering a final finding on the validity of an international commercial arbitra-
tion agreement for a number of reasons.42 The court indicated that a final finding on the validity
of an international commercial arbitration agreement has the susceptibility of exposing it to the
danger of elongated proceedings due to the need to record the necessary evidence. A final finding
which has relied on affidavits (and not evidence) is considered to have been based on insuffi-
cient material.43 The need to record evidence is, therefore, mandatory in a full-fledged hearing to
eliminate the likelihood of fraud, coercion and other similar acts that may render the agreement
null and void.44 In a related vein, as we have seen, the principles of Indian private international
law obligate a court to apply the proper law of the arbitration agreement, which is usually the
same as the proper law of the contract,45 to test its validity at the time of making a final finding.46
A final finding on the validity of the arbitration agreement may therefore require proof of foreign
law, based on in-depth evidence as opposed to affidavits.47 The obligation to make a final finding
would thus lead to ‘enormous expenditures’ and delays.48
Moreover, a final finding would be counter-productive of the principle of res judicata if that
court was faced with a similar question regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement at the
time of enforcement.49
The court’s decision to refuse to refer the parties to arbitration is appealable to the Commercial
Division of the High Court under section 50(1)(a) of the ACA.50 At the same time, the court’s
decision that the international commercial arbitration agreement is valid is not appealable under
section 50.51 The decision of the Supreme Court in World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd52 illus-
trates the circumstances in which an international commercial arbitration agreement would be
considered as ‘null and void inoperative or incapable of being performed’. The Court was seized
of a dispute which arose after MSM had concluded an agreement with World Sport in which the
latter agreed to relinquish to MSM media rights that it had initially acquired from the Board of
Cricket Control (BCCI) to broadcast a cricket tournament.53 The terms of the contract permit-
ted MSM to re-acquire the rights which it had held over several years from BCCI (before the
latter gave them to World Sport) to telecast the tournament.54 The dispute arose when MSM sued
World Sport before the Bombay High Court and alleged that the latter had relinquished rights
which it did not have by fraudulent misrepresentation.55 The chief issue before the Supreme
Court was whether Indian law permitted the Judiciary to refer the matter to arbitration when
41 (n 38).
42 ibid 240 et seq.
43 ibid 238.
44 (2005) 7 SC 234.
45 See the decision of the Supreme Court in National Thermal Power Corporation v Singer Corporation [1992] 3 SCC
551.
46 Shin-Etsu (n 38) 238, 239.
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 ibid 238.
50 ibid. See also, ss 3A, 4, 7 and 10 of the Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act
2015 [CCA] read along with ss 47 and 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015 [2015 Arbitration
Act].
51 ibid.
52 (n 34).
53 ibid.
54 ibid.
55 ibid.
the claim involved an allegation of fraud.56 The Court stated that an arbitration agreement would
be regarded as null and void when there was no consensus between the parties, for instance,
when the consent was received by misrepresentation, coercion, fraud or undue influence.57 In
such circumstances, the arbitration agreement would be ‘devoid of any legal effect’.58 Likewise,
an arbitration agreement would be considered as ‘inoperative’ when it has ceased to have an
effect, for instance, when the time limit to refer the matter to a tribunal has passed or when there
is already a court decision which operates as res judicata between the same parties on the same
matter.59 An agreement would be ‘incapable of being performed’ when it is not possible to set up
an arbitral tribunal for some reason, such as when the arbitration clause is vaguely worded.60 The
Court, however, refused to hold that the arbitration agreement as vitiated by fraud because of the
doctrine of separability which separates such clauses from the rest of the contract. Accordingly,
the court referred the parties to arbitration.
It must be noted that the mere enquiry into allegations of fraud would not, however, render
an arbitration agreement null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.61 Instead:
it is only in those cases where the court finds that there are serious allegations of fraud, which make a
virtual case of criminal offence … [that] it becomes necessary that such complex issues can be decided
only by the civil court on the appreciation of evidence that needs to be produced.62
III. The Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards in India

A. The Prohibition of the Annulment of an Award
Indian private international law prohibits an Indian court from annulling a foreign arbitral award
under the New York Convention or the 1927 Geneva Convention. Instead, the ACA empow-
ers the Indian courts to refuse to recognise or to enforce a foreign arbitral award that is given
under the New York Convention or the 1927 Geneva Convention if it has violated any criteria
indicated in sections 48 or 57 respectively. The Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Service Inc. (popularly referred to as BALCO) stated that arbitral awards
which have been made in another Contracting State would not be considered as ‘domestic’ under
Indian procedural law.63 For this reason, an award, which is otherwise valid under the law of the
country where it was given, cannot be annulled by the Indian judiciary under section 34, if the
court is not the juridical ‘seat’ of the agreement.64 This is for the reason that section 34 is included
in Part I of the ACA, whose regulation is limited to domestic arbitral awards.65 Thus, only the
56 ibid.
57 ibid [27].
58 Commentary to Art II(3) of the New York Convention (n 11) 70 [104].
59 ibid [29], referring to Kronke, Nacimiento, et al (eds), Recognition and Conferment of Foreign Arbitral Awards:
A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Wolters Kluwer, 2010) 82.
60 ibid [26].
61 ibid [29].
62 Ameet Lalchand Shah & Ors v Rishab Enterb & Anr SC Civ. Appeal No 4690 of 2018 arising out of SLP(C) No 16789
of 2017 [31].
63 (2012) 9 SCC 552 [137]–[138], which overruled the earlier decisions in National Thermal Power (n 45); Bhatia
International v Bulk Trading SA [2002] 4 SCC 105; and Venture Global Engineering v Satyam Computer Services Ltd & Anr
[2008] 4 SCC 190.
64 ibid.
65 ibid.
The Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards in India 287
court in the country which is the seat of the arbitration may annul the decision by applying the
lex loci arbirti, ie, the law of the jurisdiction which is the seat of the arbitration.
Under the principles of Indian private international law, the ‘seat’ of the arbitration is
juridical.66 The ‘seat’ thus refers to the supervisory and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts over
the arbitration process.67 It must be distinguished from the ‘venue’ of arbitration.68 The ‘venue’
refers to the physical place where the arbitration proceedings are conducted for administrative
convenience.69 The courts have clarified that, in the absence of any contrary indicia, the parties’
choice of a juridical seat indicates their desire to apply the arbitration law of that country.70 If
the parties do not choose such juridical seat, the same may be selected by the arbitral tribunal.71
The courts have accordingly held that the venue of arbitration would not assume the position
of the juridical seat, except when the application of the closest connection test ‘concomitantly’
points towards the same.72 By this principle, the venue of an arbitration may assume the position
of a seat when the former is also the place of performance and the law of the venue is the proper
law of the contract.73
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015 (2015 Amendment Act) expressly
prohibits an Indian court from setting aside or annulling any arbitral award arising out of an
international commercial agreement even when it finds it ‘vitiated by patent illegality appearing
on the face of the decision’.74 A foreign arbitral award cannot, therefore, be challenged on the
merits of the dispute.75
The Supreme Court’s ruling in BALCO was, nonetheless, briefly overruled in 2018, in the
case of Hardy Exploration.76 The Judiciary stated that an international commercial arbitral award
which had its juridical seat outside India could be annulled under section 34 of the ACA, unless
the parties had expressly or impliedly agreed to exclude Part I of the legislation.77 The decision
opened the gates for conflicting judgments on the validity of a foreign award which could be
challenged concurrently under two legal systems, namely, the law of: (1) the country of the ‘seat’
of arbitration; and (2) India even when it was not the juridical seat. This led to problems in the
enforcement of the foreign award.78 The Indian position on the subject has since been restored by
the Supreme Court’s ruling in BGS SGS Soma JV v NHPC Ltd, which concerns the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention. The Court confirmed that foreign arbi-
tral awards could only be challenged within the parameters stipulated in section 48 of the ACA.79
66 ibid 598.
67 ibid.
68 ibid; and Reliance Industries Ltd v Union of India [2014] 7 SCC 603; and Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. v Datawind
Innovations Pvt. Ltd Civil Appeal Nos 5370–5371 OF 2017. But see Brahmani River Pellets v Kamachi Industries Civil
Appeal No 5850 of 2019 [19, 20], in which, the Supreme Court stated that the ‘venue’ may be assumed to be the juridical
‘seat’.
69 BGS SGS Soma JV v NHPC Ltd Civil Appeal No 9307 of 2019 [73]–[84].
70 ibid [69], referring to Roger Shashoua & Ors. v Mukesh Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm); and Enercon (India)
Limited (n 29).
71 See s 20(3) of the ACA read along with the 246th Report of the Law Commission, Ministry of Law and Justice vide
(Notification) F.No.A-60011/48/2010-Admn.III (LA); and BGS SGS Soma (n 69) [92].

72 Enercon (India) (n 29) [65]; and Union of India v Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc Civil Appeal No 4628
OF 2018 [29], [33] [Hardy Exploration].

73 Enercon (India) ibid, [112], [121].
74 Section 34(2A) of the 2015 Arbitration Act.
75 BALCO (n 63) [135]–[142], read along with Explanation 2 to s 48 of the 2015 Arbitration Act.
76 (n 72).
77 ibid [34], referring to Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA [2002] 4 SCC 105.
78 BGS SGS Soma (n 69) [94]–[96], referring to BALCO (n 63) [143], [154].
79 ibid.
B. The Procedure for Execution

Every foreign arbitral award given under the New York Convention or the 1927 Geneva
Convention is eligible for recognition and enforcement in India unless it contradicts the require-
ments of sections 48 or 57 of the ACA respectively.
The enforcement of a foreign award is ‘as if ’ it is a decree of the court and is akin (but not
equal) to the enforcement of a decree of a court.80 A foreign arbitral award does not ‘metamor-
phize into a decree [un]till the court is satisfied that it is enforceable’.81 This is because the decree
in the form of an award is passed by the arbitration tribunal, which lacks the power to enforce
the decision.82 An arbitral award is ‘lifeless from the point of enforceability’ ‘until it is made a rule
of the court and a judgment and consequential decree are passed’ in India.83 While the award
usually binds only the parties, it may, in certain occasional circumstances bind third parties, for
instance, when the latter have in their position as agents, assignees, representatives or succes-
sors of a party have claimed ‘through or under’ that party.84 Unlike in the case of recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the Republic, Indian private international law does
not require the determination of the tribunal’s ‘international jurisdiction’ as a pre-requisite to
determining the effectiveness of a foreign award in India. The procedure for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is therefore more straightforward.
Sections 46 and 55 of the ACA clarify that a foreign arbitral award which is capable of execu-
tion in India shall be treated as binding ‘for all purposes on the persons as between whom it was
made’ when the foreign award creditor (ie the successful party) initiates a petition for the same
before a civil court which would have had jurisdiction over the subject-matter if it was seized
of the matter.85 Indian law confers such jurisdiction over the Commercial Division of the High
Court where the assets of the foreign-award debtor are located to enforce foreign awards that are
sounded in money.86 A foreign arbitral award may be recognised and enforced in all the forums
where the assets of the foreign-award debtor are located.87 In all other cases, the Commercial
Division of the High Court where the foreign-award debtor resides or carries on business will
have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign arbitral award if it is not sounding in money.88
It must be noted that the 1927 Geneva Convention, however, obligates the foreign award
creditor to seek a declaration in the country where the award was granted before applying for
its enforcement in another jurisdiction.89 The New York Convention does not stipulate a similar
requirement. In this manner, the process for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards under the New York Convention facilitates international trade and commerce by
80 Cheran Properties Ltd (n 17) [11].

81 Cairn India Ltd & Ors v Government of India O.M.P.(EFA)(COMM.) 15/2016 & I.A. Nos 20459/2014 & 3558/2015
29 [22] fn 2, referring to GB Born, International Commercial Arbitration: International Arbitral Awards: vol III, 2nd edn
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2014), 2980, Chapter 22.03[A].
82 Cheran Properties Ltd (n 17) [11]; and N Blackaby and C Partasides with A Redfern and M Hunter, Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration 5th edn (Oxford University Press, 2009) 632.
83 Oil and Natural Gas Commission [ONGC] v Western Company of North America [1987] SCR (1) 1024, 1043.
84 See Chloro Controls (I) Pvt. Ltd v Severn Trent Water Purification Inc [2013] 1 SCC 641, 664; and Cheran Properties
Ltd (n 17) [23–25].

85 Explanation to Section 47 of the ACA.
86 ibid; and the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Union of India v Dabhol Power Co IA No 6663/2003 Suit
No 1268/2003. Also see RJ Bettauer, ‘India and International Arbitration: The Dabhol Experience’ (2009) 41 George
Washington International Law Review 381.
87 Cairn India Ltd (n 81) [8.1].
88 ibid.
89 See Commentary to Articles I, IV and V of the New York Convention (n 11) 17, 18, 97, 124.
Disqualification of a Foreign Arbitral Award from Recognition or Enforcement in India 289
eliminating the legal and technical bottlenecks caused by the process of double exequatur’ that is
applicable under the 1927 Convention.90
The limitation to file a petition for the recognition or the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award in India is within three years from the date that it became final and binding on the parties
in the jurisdiction where it was made.91 Sections 47 and 56 of the ACA, obligate the party seeking
to recognise or enforce a foreign arbitral award in India to present the following documents in its
petition. These are:
(1) the original award or a copy thereof duly authenticated in the manner required by the law of
the country in which it was made;
(2) the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof; and
(3) such evidence as may be necessary to prove that the award is foreign.92
IV. Disqualification of a Foreign Arbitral Award

from Recognition or Enforcement in India
There are limited grounds on which, a foreign arbitral award may be refused enforcement in
India. As indicated above, the ACA prohibits the court from refusing to recognise or to enforce
a foreign arbitral award, except if it violates one or more criteria indicated in sections 48 or 57 of
legislation. This section discusses the grounds on which a foreign arbitral award may be refused
recognition or enforcement under the New York Convention and the 1927 Geneva Convention.
A. Disqualification of Foreign Awards under the New York Convention

The New York Convention stipulates ‘a “ceiling” or a maximum level of control’, which Contracting
States may exercise for the execution of foreign arbitral and arbitral agreements.93 Accordingly,
section 48 of the ACA which incorporates Article V of the New York Convention into Indian
law permits a court to refuse the recognition or the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if the
award-debtor furnishes the court with the proof of one or more of the following:
(1) The parties subject to arbitration were under some incapacity under the law applicable to
them; or, when the agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it
or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made.94
(2) The foreign-award debtor was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or, of the arbitration proceedings or, was otherwise unable to present his case.95
(3) The award deals with a difference or, contains decisions, which are outside the scope of the
parties’ agreement.96
90 ibid.
91 Article137 of the Limitation Act 1963, Act No 36 of 1963.
92 ibid;and Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v Shivnath Rai Harnarain (India) Co C.S. (O.S.) 541 of 1998.
93 Commentary to the New York Convention (n 11) 190 [5].
94 Section 48(1)(a) of the ACA; and Art 5(1)(a) of the New York Convention.
95 Section 48(1)(b) of the ACA; and Art 5(1)(b) of the New York Convention.
96 Section 48(1)(c) of the ACA; and Art 5(1)(c) of the New York Convention.
(4) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or its procedure was not according to the agreement
of the parties or the law of the country where it was held.97
(5) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended
i) by a competent authority in the country, in which the award was made or, ii) under the law
where the award was made.98
Each of these grounds has been discussed in detail below.
i. Defences Available to the Foreign Award Debtor

a. Incapacity of the Parties or the Invalidity of the Agreement
The term ‘capacity’ indicates ‘the legal ability of a person to act and enter into an agreement in
its own name and on its own behalf ’.99 There is no reported case where a foreign arbitral award
has been refused enforcement due to the incapacity of the parties at the time of the conclusion
of the arbitration agreement. However, the ACA empowers the court to refuse to give effect to a
foreign arbitral award in India if the arbitration agreement has been concluded between parties
who lacked the capacity to contract. The appropriate time to assess the capacity of the parties is
the time of the conclusion of the contract. The capacity of the parties must be tested according to
the law applicable to them.100 As we have seen in the chapter on ‘Applicable Law in Contractual
Obligations’, the law that will govern the capacity of the parties is different from the law that
will govern most other parts of the contract, which includes the arbitration clause. The Supreme
Court in Technip SA v SMS Holding (Pvt) Ltd & Ors indicated in an obiter dictum that the lex loci
domicilii (the law of the domicile of the person) should govern the questions on the capacity of
the parties, subject to the public policy of India.101 Section 10 of the ICA authorises all persons
who are above 18 years of age to conclude contracts. The fact that only one party lacked the
capacity would suffice to invalidate the foreign arbitral award.102 Thus, the law to test the capacity
of the parties and the validity of the parties’ agreement differs.
Similarly, the invalidity of the arbitration agreement ‘under the law to which the parties have
subjected it’ will result in the failure of the foreign arbitral award to be recognised or enforced
under Indian law. As we have seen in chapter 10 on ‘Applicable Law in Contractual Obligations’,
the putative proper law of the contract will govern the question of the validity of the contract.103
Therefore, if the parties have expressly chosen the governing law for their international commer-
cial contract, then the validity of their arbitration agreement will be governed by that law.
Suppose the parties have not expressly or impliedly chosen the law to govern their arbitration
agreement.104 In that case, the ACA empowers the courts to assess the validity of the same under
‘the law of the country where the award was made’.105
97 Section 48(1)(d) of the ACA; and Art 5(1)(d) of the New York Convention. Also see BGS SGS Soma (n 69) [35]; and
Hardy Exploration (n 72) [15, 24].

98 Section 48(1)(e) of the ACA; and Art 5(1)(e) of the New York Convention; and the decision of the Supreme Court in
BALCO (n 63) [135]–[142].

100 ibid 138 [19].
101 See EA Fredericks, ‘Contractual Capacity and the Conflict of Laws in Common Law Jurisdictions (Part 2): Australasia,
North America, Asia and Africa’ (2020) 41(1) Obiter 10, 31–32 referring to Technip SA [2005] 60 SCL 249 SC.
103 See the decision of the Supreme Court in National Thermal Power (n 63) [6].
105 ibid.
As indicated earlier, Shin-Etsu106 clarified that the courts in India are merely empowered to
make a prima facie finding on the validity of the arbitration agreement. It is, therefore, the arbi-
tral tribunal which has the authority to render a final finding on the same.107 Thus, the courts
have held that ‘all issues, including jurisdictional objections’ should be decided by the arbitrator
having regard to the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz which is applicable under Indian law.108
However, just as the Indian court may decline to refer the parties to arbitration if it prima facie
finds that the agreement is invalid for some reason (such as when the parties lacked the capacity
to conclude the agreement or when the consent of the parties is not valid because it was obtained
by fraud or deception the incapacity of the parties), it may refuse to recognise or enforce the
foreign arbitral award for the same reason.109
b. Lack of Due Process

The lack of due process in the form of procedural irregularities will invalidity a foreign arbitral
award in India.110 Such irregularities must, however, be raised by the foreign award-debtor.111
The court is prohibited from raising such issues on its own motion.112 There is no reported case
in which the courts have refused to recognise or enforce an award on this ground. Thus, there are
high standards that the court will adopt before invalidating an award on this ground. A foreign
arbitral award may, nonetheless, be invalidated if the party against whom it is sought has not been
given proper notice of the arbitral proceedings or the appointment of the arbitrator. At the same
time, there are no formal requirements as to the form or service of the notice.113 The court will
generally consider the conduct of the parties, as opposed to the technicalities of the service to
assess whether the party was aware or ought to have been aware of the proceedings.114 Similarly,
the inability of the award-debtor to present its case by not being given an opportunity to be heard
will empower the court to refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign award.115
c. Award Addresses a Dispute Outside Terms of Parties’ Submission to Arbitration

A court may refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign arbitral award if it contains a decision which
is outside the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. Such an award will be conceived as
patently illegal and against the public policy of India insofar as the decision of the arbitral tribu-
nal contravenes the express terms of the parties’ contract.116 As the court in an obiter dictum
in Cairn India Ltd illustrated, a foreign award will be construed as being outside the scope of
106 (n 38).
107 ibid 238 et seq.
108 See the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd v Northern Coal Field Ltd
Special Leave Petition (C) No 11476 of 2018 [9.11]; and the decision of the Delhi High Court in Kalyan Nigam Limited
and Union of India v Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd ARB.P. 588/2019 [6].
109 Shin-Etsu (n 38) 238 et seq; and the Commentary to the New York Convention (n 11) 134 [5].
110 See the Commentary to the New York Convention, ibid 155 [1].
111 ibid 155 [2].
112 ibid.
113 ibid 161 [22], [25].
114 ibid 162 [26].
115 see Shri Lal Mahal Ltd v Progetto Grano Spa (2014) 2 SCC; ONGC Ltd v Saw Pipes Ltd [2003] 5 SCC 705, 723–24 [31]
[Saw Pipes]; and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd v General Electric Co [1994] Supp (1) SCC 644. Also see Commentary to the
New York Convention, ibid 163 [31].
116 Cairn India Ltd (n 81) 39 and 40 referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Saw Pipes (n 115); and Renusagar
Power Co ibid 69.

the parties’ agreement if the arbitral tribunal had awarded an amount which exceeded the sum
agreed in the contract.117
Likewise, the tribunal’s decision to decide the dispute ex aequo et bono, according to the
principles of soft law or non-state law in the absence of an express indication or authorisation
by the parties will be considered as patently illegal and a contravention of India’s public policy.
Such awards will, therefore, not be recognised or enforced in India if the foreign award-debtor
furnishes proof to this effect.118
In Prakash Steelage Ltd v Uzac SA, the French arbitral tribunal applied the UNIDROIT
Principles on International Commercial Contracts [PICC]119 to adjudicate a dispute on the sale
of stainless steel between the respondent, Prakash Steelage Ltd (a company incorporated in India)
and Uzuc SA (a company incorporated in Romania).120 However, the parties had not chosen
the PICC to govern their dispute and had instead, opposed its application.121 The parties indi-
cated their preference for being governed by the substantive laws of their country.122 The tribunal
decided the matter against the Prakash Steelage Ltd which was ordered to pay damages of
€1 million for breach of its contractual obligations.123 The Paris Court of Appeal refused to annul
the decision of the tribunal which had decided according to soft law, even when the parties had
not expressly agreed on the same.124 The decision would be unenforceable in India if the foreign
award debtor (namely, Prakash Steelage Ltd) furnishes proof to the court of the same.
d. Composition of Tribunal or Procedure followed is not

According to Parties’ Agreement or the Law of the Seat
As the Supreme Court in Transocean Shipping Agency P. Ltd has opined, the standard of proof
for alleging that the composition of the arbitral tribunal was irregular and not according to the
parties’ agreement, is high.125 There is no reported case in which the courts in India have refused to
recognise or enforce a foreign award on this ground. The ground concerns a procedural irregular-
ity in arbitration proceedings. For this reason, it prohibits a court to refuse to recognise or enforce
an award unless the person against whom raises the allegation to this effect.126 The requirement
underscores the doctrine of party autonomy, insofar as it empowers the court to refuse to recog-
nise or enforce a foreign arbitral award if the person against whom it is sought proves that the
composition of the tribunal or its procedure violated the agreement of the parties.127 The refer-
ence to the law of the country where the arbitration took place has a subsidiary role in assessing
the validity of the foreign arbitral award. Therefore, the law of the country where the arbitration
took place can only be referred to in the absence of an express or implied agreement between the
parties on the composition of the tribunal.128
117 Cairn India Ltd ibid.

118 ibid.
119 UNIDROIT, ‘UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts, 2016’: www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/principles2016/principles2016-e.pdf [PICC].
120 Cour d’appel de Paris, 25 February 2020, n° 17/18001, available at https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=
fr&u=https://www.dalloz-actualite.fr/document/paris-pole-1-ch-1-25-fevr-2020-n-1718001&prev=search, accessed on
13 May 2020.
121 ibid.
122 ibid.
123 ibid.
124 ibid.
125 Transocean Shipping Agency (n 25).
127 ibid 191 [9].
128 ibid 193 [15].
e. Award not Yet Binding, Set Aside or Suspended

in the Seat or under the Law by which Award Made
In general, an award is considered to have become binding on the parties if it is no longer open
to ordinary means of challenge through a review or an appeal.129 As we have discussed above, a
foreign arbitral award is presumed to be binding on the parties.130 For this reason, the onus lies
on the foreign award-debtor to prove that the award is not binding on the parties.131 A foreign
arbitral award which is not binding or has been set aside by the competent authority in the
place in which it is made or under the law where it was made, is not eligible for recognition or
enforcement in India. The expression ‘competent authority’ refers to the court(s) which have the
jurisdiction to set aside the award.132 In this respect, the Supreme Court in BALCO clarified that
the expression ‘the law of which the arbitral award was made’ refers to the procedural law (and
not the substantive law of the underlying contract) of the arbitration, if it differs from the ‘seat’
of arbitration.133
ii. Additional Factors

In certain circumstances, a court may suo moto refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign arbitral
award under section 48(2) of the ACA. This may be the position in two scenarios.
a. Subject Matter of Award not Arbitrable under Indian Law

The parties’ decision to settle a matter by arbitration when the dispute is not arbitrable under
Indian law will result in the court’s refusal to recognise or enforce such an award. There is no
reported case in which the court has refused to recognise or enforce a foreign arbitral award on
this ground. However, certain issues such as those arising in relation to family law and succession
are not arbitrable under Indian law.
b. Award Contravenes Public Policy of India

Unlike the CPC which regulates the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
India, the ACA expressly empowers the court to refuse to execute a foreign arbitral award
which violates the public policy of India. In this respect, the Supreme Court of India has been
reported to refrain from adopting ‘a transnational definition of the concept of public policy’
on the ground that it is unworkable.134 For this reason, the foreign arbitral award’s violation of
‘public policy’ is assessed against domestic norms.135 Judicial dicta clarify that the term ‘public
policy’ refers to the public good or public interest and its interpretation differs from time to
time.136 A foreign arbitral award will therefore be considered as a violation of the public policy
of India if its enforcement will adversely affect the administration of justice in the Republic.137
129 ibid 201 [7].

130 See s 44 of the ACA.
131 See the Commentary to the New York Convention (n 11) 214 [13], [14].
132 ibid 217, 218 [21].
133 ibid 219 [24], referring to BALCO (n 63).
135 ibid; and Cairn India (n 81) [8.1], [28.1], [29].
136 see Saw Pipes (n 115) 723–724; and Cairn India ibid, [28.1].
137 Cairn India ibid, [8.1], [28.1], [29].
The Explanation to section 48(2)(a) of the ACA which was introduced by the 2015 Amendment
Act clarifies that the public policy of India will be considered to have been violated in four
circumstances. These are when the foreign arbitral award is: (1) affected by fraud or corruption;138
(2) c ontravenes the fundamental policy or the interests of the Republic;139 (3) against justice
or morality; or (4) patently illegal.140 The Supreme Court has in a plethora of cases clarified
that procedural defects, such as inadmissible evidence or rejecting evidence, would not vitiate a
foreign award to prevent its enforceability in India, as these grounds are not considered a breach
of the fundamental policy of Indian law.141
A foreign arbitral award which has not been given on the merits of the case would not be
considered a contravention of the fundamental policy of India.142 In a related vein, judicial dicta
demonstrate that the courts in India have interpreted the term ‘patently illegal’ widely to prevent
the provisions of the ACA from becoming ‘nugatory’.143 The illegality of a foreign arbitral award
must, therefore, not be trivial and must go to the root of the decision and shock the conscience of
the court.144 For this reason, foreign arbitral awards, which have been given in violation of natural
justice insofar as they have failed to provide the foreign award debtor with an opportunity to be
heard, will be construed as being patently illegal and in contravention of the public policy of the
Republic.145 Likewise, foreign arbitral awards which have contravened substantive law in force in
India will also be considered as patently illegal and opposed to public policy of India.146
B. Disqualification of Foreign Awards under

the 1927 Geneva Convention
The ACA similarly empowers an India court to refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign arbi-
tral award given under the 1927 Geneva Convention if it violates the requirements stipulated in
section 57 of the statute. The grounds indicated therein resemble those provided in section 48
applicable for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards under the New York Convention.
The ACA permits a foreign award which is given under the 1927 Geneva Convention to be
enforced if:
(1) it was made pursuant to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate which is valid according to the
law applicable to them;147
(2) the subject-matter was capable of settlement by arbitration;148
138 cf the decision of the Supreme Court in World Sport Group (Mauritius) (n 34) [29], which clarifies that mere allega-
tions into fraud would not render the award illegal.

139 Also see Explanation 2 to s 48 of the 2015 Arbitration Act, which prohibits a foreign arbitral award to be reviewed on
the merits of the decision while assessing if it is against the fundamental policy of India.
140 See also, Cairn India (n 81) [8.1], [28.1], [29].
141 See ibid; Shri Lal Mahal (n 115); Saw Pipes (n 115); Renusagar Power Co. (n 115); and Vijay Karia & Ors v Prysmian
Cavi E Sistemi SRL & Ors [2020] SCC Online SC 177.

142 BALCO (n 63) [135]–[142], read along with Explanation 2 to s 48 of the 2015 Arbitration Act.
143 Cairn India (n 81) [28.1].
144 ibid.
145 See ibid; Shri Lal Mahal (n 115); Saw Pipes (n 115); Renusagar Power Co (n 115); and Vijay Karia (n 141).
146 ibid.
147 Section 57(1)(a) of the ACA.
148 ibid, s 57(1)(b).
Conclusion 295
(3) it was made by the arbitral tribunal provided for in the submission or which has been consti-
tuted in a manner agreed upon by the parties according to the law governing the arbitration
procedure;149
(4) it is final and binding in the country in which it was made;150 and
(5) it is not opposed to the public policy or any law in force in India.151
Unlike section 48 which governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
made under the New York Convention, section 57 does not differentiate between the grounds on
which a court may refuse to give effect to foreign awards on the application of a person against
whom it is sought and on its own motion. The court may thus refuse to recognise or enforce a
foreign award if it is satisfied that:
(1) the award has been annulled in the country in which it was made;152
(2) the foreign award debtor was not provided with a notice of the proceedings in sufficient time
to enable him/her to present his/her case or was not represented properly if s/he was under
a legal incapacity;153 or
(3) the award does not deal with differences falling within the scope of the submission to arbi-
tration, or it contains decisions that are beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement.154
V. Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the principles of Indian private international law on the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The mechanism to give effect to foreign arbitral
awards is governed by the provisions of the ACA which gives effect to the provisions of the
New York and the 1927 Geneva Conventions to which India is a signatory. It was seen that the
determination of whether a foreign arbitral award is eligible for recognition or enforcement in
India is strictly confined to the parameters stipulated in Part II of the ACA. Such arbitral awards
cannot be annulled by an Indian court under the provisions of Part I of the ACA, the application
of which is limited to domestic arbitral awards. Foreign arbitral awards which are found to be
ineligible may be refused recognition and enforcement if and only if they satisfy one or other of
the criteria in sections 48 and 57 of the ACA which govern awards which have been given under
the New York and the 1927 Geneva Convention respectively.
It was seen that the grounds on which foreign arbitration awards made under the New York
Convention or the 1927 Geneva Convention may be denied recognition or enforcement are simi-
lar. At the same time, the denial of the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards which
are given under the New York Convention appears to be more stringent than that for awards
which have been issued under the 1927 Geneva Convention. The former prohibits a court from
refusing to give effect to a foreign award except if the person against whom it is given furnishes
proof that the decision violates one or more of the grounds indicated therein. A court is therefore
149 ibid, s 57(1)(c).

150 ibid, s 57(1)(d).
151 ibid, s 57(1)(e) read along with Explanation 1 and 2 to the section, which provides the criterion to assess the violation
of the public policy of India.

152 ibid, s57(2)(a).
153 ibid, s 57(2)(b).
154 ibid, s 57(2)(c).
prohibited from suo moto refusing to recognise or enforce a foreign arbitral award which is given
under the New York Convention except if the subject-matter was not arbitrable under Indian
law or if the award has contravened the public policy of India. In comparison, section 57 of the
ACA, which stipulates the grounds on which an Indian court may refuse to recognise or enforce
a foreign arbitral award given under the 1927 Geneva Convention, makes no similar distinc-
tion. Foreign arbitral awards which have been issued under the 1927 Geneva Convention may
be refused recognition or enforcement if any of the indicia mentioned in section 57 are satisfied,
irrespective of whether the party against whom it is rendered furnishes proof to that effect or the
court suo moto decides to act.
part vi
Final Remarks
298
14
Looking Forward
The previous chapters have examined the core issues and legal principles that govern jurisdiction,
choice of law, and the enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards in cross-border
disputes before Indian courts. The analysis reveals that compared with other branches of munici-
pal regulations, a systematic body of rules on private international law is absent in India.1
Further, there has not been any detailed study on the origin and development of Indian private
international law. The subject has often been either overlooked or little discussed by academics,
advocates, judges, and legislatures. The legislative vacuum and lack of focus on the subject is not
the result of an absence of legal disputes involving foreign elements. Legal, political, and historical
reasons are attributed to this imbroglio.
In India, the domain of private international law had a quiet beginning starting with the British
rule when disputes involving foreign elements came up before the courts. During the colonial era,
various personal laws gave rise to a plethora of interpersonal conflicts of law. Since India was a
federation between British India and Princely States with different legal systems, judgments from
the Princely States were considered foreign decisions.2 Thus, the genesis of private international
law in originated during British rule and followed the English law narrative applied in the conflict
of law cases.3 During the early phases of British rule, most of the disputes in private international
law touched upon issues such as marriage,4 divorce,5 property6 and the recognition of judgments.7
Disputes were addressed by resorting to common law principles operating in Britain.
The achievement of Independence had a discernible impact on the development of private
international law. Interpersonal disputes, which operated as private international law disputes aris-
ing out of divergent personal laws, came to a standstill. The same pattern was witnessed in respect
of disputes concerning Princely States. However, the phase immediately after Independence was
a dull period for the progression of private international law. Disputes concerning domicile and
citizenship dominated the period.8 At the same time, one may question whether the issues of
domicile that arose pertained to private international law or were simply constitutional matters.
The authors acknowledge the research assistance rendered by Upasna Agrawal: Alumnus, OPJGU; Smita Gupta:
student RGNUL Patiala; Rohan Khatana: student, Symbiosis Law School, Noida; and Varnita Singh: student, GNLU,
Gandhinagar.
1 FE Noronha, Private International Law in India 2nd edn (Universal law Publishing, 2013) 26–27; P Diwan and
P Diwan, Private International Law: Indian and English 4th (Deep Publishers, 1998) 59–60.
2 Noronha, ibid.
3 ibid 26–27.
5 Sophy Auerbach v Shivaprosad Agarwalla AIR [1945] Cal 484.
6 United Arab Republic And Anr. v Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani AIR [1962] Cal 387.
7 Panchapakesa Iyer and Ors. v K.M. Hussain Muhammad Rowther and Ors AIR [1934] Mad 145.
8 Central Bank of India v Ram Narain AIR [1955] 36; Michael Antony Rodrigues v State of Bombay, AIR [1956]
1 Bombay 729; D.P. Joshi v State of Madhya Bharat AIR [1955] 334; Kedar Pandey v Narain Bikram Sah AIR [1966] 160.
300 Looking Forward
The exact parameters concerning the domain and scope of private international law remained a
debatable topic. In the Indian scenario, disputes touching upon domicile were covered mostly as
part of constitutional law.
Among the myriad disputes with a foreign element that the Indian judiciary decided, a
plethora of these have revolved around aspects of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments. Some of the questions included whether there were agreed principles
that regulated the authority of domestic courts to adjudicate cross-border disputes with a foreign
element. In a related vein, the blurring of international borders and the free flow of trade and
commerce escalated the number of cases seeking the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. Although the legislature has attempted to codify the principles for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments, these have been far from perfect and, if anything, have
only contributed to ambiguities in Indian law. Consequently, the courts have attempted to fill
these gaps and clarify the circumstances in which a foreign judgment would possess extraterrito-
rial effect in the Republic. In doing so, the courts have held firmly to the common law doctrine
of obligation and the grounds on which a foreign judgment would be given effect in India are few
and narrow.9 At the same time, it may be said that the principles of Indian private international
law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are not as predictable or certain as
those for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. A chief contributing factor
for this predictability in the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
has been India’s accession to the 1958 New York Convention – the provisions of which have been
incorporated in Part II of the ACA.
That said, there has been a general tendency for the Indian courts to refer to the principles
of common law whenever they have encountered disputes in private international law for which
there were no existing principles in India. However, in the case of Satya v Teja,10 while deciding
on the validity and recognition of a foreign divorce, it was observed that the Indian legal system
is free to deviate from the established notion of the common law and adopt the best practices
from other jurisdictions or decide principles of their own.11 This approach (of deviation) is seen
in cases concerning intercountry child abduction. Over the years, the judiciary has developed a
fleet of jurisprudence based on the overarching welfare of the child principle.12 In this endeavour,
the country has attempted to invoke the practices developed in other jurisdictions and has also
spent conscious intellectual effort to generate a private international law system that responds to
the socio-economic, cultural, and political interests and sensibilities of the legal system in India.
At the same time, statutory efforts aimed at regulating intercountry child abduction have not
been successful.
In due course, the exigencies of international trade in turn increased the cross-border
disputes that have arisen in relation to international contracts and the question of the governing
law assumed a pivotal role. As such, Indian courts have never been reluctant in accepting party
autonomy in the choice of law since the pre-Independence era.13 However, some earlier decisions
9 See generally, S Khanderia, ‘The Hague Judgments Project: Assessing its Plausible Benefits for the Development
of the Indian Private International Law’ [2019] Commonwealth Law Bulletin 452, 452–457 [Khanderia, The Hague
Judgments Project].
10 Satya v Teja AIR [1975] 105.
11 ibid [8].
12 Sarita Sharma v Sushil Sharma JT [2000] (2) SC 258; Ruchi Majoo v Sanjeev Majoo [2011] 6 SCC 479; Surya Vadhan
v State of Tamilnadu and Others [2015] (5) SCC 450.

13 S Khanderia and S Peari, ‘Party Autonomy and the Choice of Law under Indian and Australian Private International
Law’ [2020] Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1, 8 [Khanderia and Peari, Party Autonomy in India and Australia].
Looking Forward 301
of the Supreme Court, such as those in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd v Harnam Singh14
and British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries,15 prohibited the
choice of a neutral foreign law.16 Accordingly, the courts merely permitted a choice of foreign law
insofar as it bore some connection with the parties or their contract, thus forming the centre of
gravity of the contract. The choice should have been of that law which forms the centre of grav-
ity of the agreement, thus indicating a restrictive approach.17 Parties could choose a foreign law
by ensuring that factors such as the place of contracting (locus contractus), place of performance
(locus solutionis), the forum (lex fori), the seat of arbitration, language, and currency were local-
ised within that legal system.18 The approach of the Supreme Court shifted to a broader concept
of party autonomy existing at common law in National Thermal Power Corporation wherein
the Court held that the parties’ freedom to choose the governing law is only subject to being
‘bona fide, legal and not opposed to overriding public policy’.19 The subsequent decisions of the
courts have continued to endorse the broader interpretation of the court.20 The Supreme Court in
Modi Entertainment Network and Another v WSG Cricket PTE. Ltd confirmed that the principles
of Indian private international law permit the choice of any foreign law, including a neutral one.21
It is important to reiterate that, although judicial decisions have evolved the notion of party
autonomy and have succeeded in creating certain predictable rules on choice of law and jurisdic-
tion, the parameters of the phrase ‘bona fide, legal and not opposed to public policy’ continue to
remain nebulous. The ICA does not contain provisions to regulate choice of law and choice of
jurisdiction. Given increased commercial transactions, the contours of party autonomy should
be clarified through statutory reform. Decisions of the Supreme Court have confirmed that party
autonomy in the choice of law similarly extends to international commercial arbitration. The
doctrine has been held as ‘virtually the backbone’ and ‘one of the foundational pillars’.22
At the same time, the Indian courts have had limited experience in handling cross-border
disputes in matters of tort. Thus far, the courts have merely had the opportunity to comment
on governing law in non-contractual matters in two disputes.23 In this regard, the approach of
the judiciary has been conservative and the courts have continued to hold firmly to the obsolete
doctrine of double actionability which has been discarded in most parts of the world. Moreover,
existing dicta are merely of persuasive value, considering that none of these decisions have been
seen by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the time is ripe for lawmakers in India to formulate
coherent principles on the subject that take into account the legal developments across the globe.
The trend of increased private international disputes is expected to grow further, with new areas
of dispute ranging from cross-border torts and other non-commercial conflicts coming into its
ambit. Pending legislation, it is suggested that the Supreme Court develops clear guidelines as
regards the applicable law in non-contractual matters – while at the same time, discarding the
redundant principle of ‘double actionability’ in the interests of justice.
14 AIR [1955] SC 590 [37].

15 [1990] 3 SCC 481
16 S Khanderia, ‘Indian Private International Law vis-à-vis Party Autonomy in the Choice of Law’ (2018) 18(1)
Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 1, 7–8 [Khanderia, Party Autonomy]; and S Khanderia, Practice does not
Make Perfect: Rethinking the Doctrine of ‘The Proper Law of the Contract’ – A Case for the Indian Courts’ (2020) 16(3)
Journal of Private International Law 423, 426–428. [Khanderia, Practice does not Make Perfect].
17 ibid.
18 Khanderia, Practice does not Make Perfect (n 16) 426–428.
19 [1992] 3 SCC 551.
20 Khanderia, Party Autonomy (n 16) 11–12.
21 [2003] 4 SCC 341.
22 See White Industries Australia Limited v Coal India Limited, [2004] 2 Cal LJ 197 (CHC).
23 See Kotah Transport Ltd v Jhalawar Transport Services Ltd AIR [1960] Raj 224; and Sona Devi v Anil Kumar [2011]
3 TAC 552.
302 Looking Forward
Recent times have witnessed areas of judicial scrutiny that have posed conceptual and
ractical challenges to the understanding of traditional principles of private international law.
p
In this regard, the development of the principles of private international law and its application
in the realm of online transactions has been particularly challenging due to gaps in the rules
on jurisdiction. For example, in 2017 Godman to Tycoon – The Untold Story of Baba Ramdev by
Priyanka Pathak Narain, was published. The book garnered controversy because it contained
defamatory material against yoga guru turned entrepreneur Swami Ramdev. The publisher
and the author were sued by Swami Ramdev and the Delhi High Court found that the book
contained material that was prima facie defamatory. The Court accordingly restrained the publi-
cation, distribution, and sale of the book until the defamatory material was removed from it.24
The case is pending an appeal before the Supreme Court and as of now the ban is still operating.
However, the plaintiffs (Ramdev and another) filed an original suit before the Delhi High Court
alleging that the defendant intermediaries (Facebook and others) were disseminating videos and
details which summarised the contents of the book, parts of which have been held as defama-
tory by the Court.25 The Delhi High Court relied on the judgment of the EU Court of Justice
(CJEU) in Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited26 concerning online defamation,
where the CJEU had held that the national courts of a Member State could order blocking of
access to information on a worldwide basis. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Google
v CNIL,27 where the CJEU left it to national courts to determine whether there was any legal
requirement on a data controller to remove internet content on a global basis. The Delhi High
Court ordered the defendants to take down, remove, block, restrict and disable access on a global
basis, to all videos, weblinks and URs on a list annexed to the plaint. These had been uploaded
from IP addresses within India. In the case of those uploaded from outside India, the defendants
were directed to block access and disable them from being viewed on the Indian domain and
ensure that users in India were unable to access the same. The Court held that, if the content were
uploaded from India or were located in India, the Indian courts would have jurisdiction to pass
worldwide injunctions.28 The judgment sets a problematic precedent for future cases as the Court
overlooked the fact that the scope of defamation and defamatory content varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. In particular, the Court imposed the standards of free speech and defamation
applicable in India on other jurisdictions. There are countries where the threshold of free speech
varies significantly from that in India. Also, the procedural and substantive aspects of the law
governing defamation are different in various jurisdictions. For example, the onus of proving that
disputed matter does not amount to defamation, falls entirely upon the defendant under English
law. In contrast, the onus on the plaintiff in the US is high.29 This would result in a conflict of laws.
A potentially significant area of judicial statements pertains to cross-border disputes in the
context of the jurisdiction of the courts for transactions concluded online. A close examination of
the existing dicta demonstrates that the Indian courts have relentlessly attempted to develop the
principles of Indian private international law on jurisdiction to accommodate the changing reali-
ties as a result of increased internet-based trade and commerce. Accordingly, in World Wrestling
Entertainment v M/s Reshma Collection and others,30 the court decided to stretch the parameters
24 Swami Ramdev v Juggernaut Books CM(M) 556/2018 & CM APPL. 19354/2018.

25 Swami Ramdev & Anr. v Facebook, Inc and Ors CS (OS) 27/2019.
26 ibid [69].
27 ibid [64].
28 ibid [88].
29 MA Franklin and DJ Bussel, ‘The Plaintiff ’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity’ (1984) 25 William and
Mary Law Review 825.

30 [2014] SCC OnLine Del 2031.
Looking Forward 303
of section 20 of the CPC read along with the Copyright Act, which stipulate the grounds on
which an Indian court may assume jurisdiction for contracts that have been concluded online.
Consequently, the court stated that, in such disputes, every court within whose territory a website
can be accessed would be eligible to adjudicate on the matter. The mere fact that the defendant
did not reside within the court’s territory would, thus, be irrelevant in determining the place
where the cause of action arose in online transactions. In a related vein, in Casio India Co. Limited
v Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Limited, the court decided to assume jurisdiction in a passing-off action
on the mere fact that the defendant’s website was accessible in its territory, therefore rendering it
eligible to adjudicate on the matter.31 However, in disputes of a comparable nature, namely in the
Banyan Tree case,32 the court deviated from its earlier position. It stated that the mere fact that
a website was accessible in its territory (New Delhi) would not suffice in conferring jurisdiction.
Instead, the plaintiff must clearly demonstrate that the defendant had ‘purposefully availed’ itself
of the court’s jurisdiction by specifically targeting customers there to conclude commercial trans-
actions through the website, thereby causing economic loss to the plaintiff. The court’s dictum in
Banyan Tree has continued to represent judicial opinion on the subject.
The interface between private international law and intellectual property has continued to
remain a pivotal issue that has raised complex problems of legal policy. Disputes such as Tyburn
Productions v Conan Doyle33 have highlighted the complexity of balancing the territoriality
engrained in IPRs with the possibility of multiple suits between the same parties. How will the
Indian courts respond to these legal conundrums? The importance of answering these questions
will only increase in the future.
In a related vein, the efforts of the Law Commission of India, which has played an active role
in examining the principles of private international law, are noteworthy. The Law Commission’s
observations in its Report on the Law of Foreign Marriages,34 its Report on the Law of Foreign
Divorces;35 its Report on Transnational Litigation, Conflict of Laws and the Law of Limitation;36
and its Report on the Need to Accede to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (1980)37 deserve mention.
The increased discussion and case law reveal the slow progress in Indian private international
law. Though the Indian private international law community is small, there is a growing interest
in the study of private international law in India. It is important to stress that a systematic study
of private international law will create the required political will and institutional support for its
evolution. A systematic study becomes significant in an environment of growing international
transactions in family and commercial matters. In this scenario of increasing case laws and devel-
opments, India can learn valuable lessons from Nepal, another developing country, which has
taken the first step towards codifying its principles on private international law rules in its Civil
Procedure Code.38 Such rules can assist in providing clarity on jurisdiction, applicable law, and
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
Predictable legal principles can create avenues for attracting litigation and arbitration.
This, in turn, can lead to economic development and the strengthening of India’s legal system.
31 [2003][27] PTC 265 (Del).

32 Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780.
33 Tyburn Productions v Conan Doyle [1991] Ch 75.
34 Law Commission of India, The Law of Foreign Marriages (Report No 23, 1962).
35 Law Commission of India, The Recognition of Foreign Divorces (Report No 65, 1976).
36 Law Commission of India, Transnational Litigation – Conflict of Laws – Law of Limitation (Report No 193, 2005).
37 Law Commission of India, Need to Accede to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (1980) (Report No 218, 2009).

38 The National Civil (Code) Act, (Nepal) 2017 (2074).
304 Looking Forward
However, along with clarity, it is also important to keep in mind that private international law is
faced with mammoth challenges as a response to globalisation and increased individual move-
ment and interactions. The fact that there is no reported case in which parties have expressly
chosen the jurisdiction of Indian courts or the application of Indian law in civil and commercial
matters, speaks volumes about the faith of the international community in this legal system.
At the international level, India’s association with the HCCH has been slow and gradual. India
only became a member of the HCCH in 2008. However, the country has been involved in inter-
national negotiations and became part of the effort of codification initiated by the HCCH. In
particular, India has acceded to those Hague Conventions, which deal with procedural matters
focused on enhancing cross-border legal cooperation. Prominent among them include the 1961
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (the
Apostille Convention);39 the 1965 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters;40 and the 1970 Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters.41 However, accession to these Conventions is
not surprising as they concern legal co-operation, and it is convenient for jurisdictions to coop-
erate on these matters. Among the Hague Conventions relating to the welfare of the child, India
has only acceded to the 1993 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption.42 India has steadfastly opposed the Convention dealing with inter-
country child abduction. One of the core objections which India has highlighted with regard to
the convention is the absence of explicit mechanisms to protect women who flee with their chil-
dren from the habitual residence due to domestic violence.43 At the same time, the reason behind
the Republic’s resistance to other Hague Conventions, such as the HCCCA or the 2019 Judgments
Convention, remains unknown. Existing dicta confirm that the principles of Indian private inter-
national law vis-à-vis choice of court and the acceptance of party autonomy complement the
provisions of the HCCCA.44 Thus, India would only benefit from accession to the HCCCA in
the form of increased predictability and certainty. This would also be true for India’s accession to
the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters.
At the same time, it is crucial that the legal principles consider mechanisms to balance the
interests of weaker and more vulnerable parties. Legislative reforms must clearly identify and
stipulate mechanisms to ascertain the contravention of public policy. In matters of family and
succession, this will be all the more complex in a country like India where personal laws domi-
nate the formulation of legal principles and result in resistance to reforms.
39 Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (5 October 1961) Status table,
available at: www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=41. The Convention facilitates the circulation

of public documents executed in one signatory to the Convention to be accepted and given effect in another state party to
the Convention.
40 Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, Status Table, available at: www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17.

41 Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, status table www.
hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=82.
42 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (29 May 1993).
43 S Jolly, ‘International Parental Child Abduction: An Explorative Analysis of Legal Standards and Judicial Interpretation
in India’ (2007) 31 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 20–40.
44 See S Khanderia, ‘The Hague Judgments Project: Assessing its Plausible Benefits for the Development of the Indian
Private International Law’ [2019] Commonwealth Law Bulletin 452, 462 et seq. [Khanderia, The Hague Judgments Project];
and S Khanderia, ‘The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the Enforcement of Forum-Selection
Clauses in Indian Private International Law’ (2019) 9(3) International Journal of Private Law 125, 128 et seq. [Khanderia,
The Hague Convention].
Looking Forward 305
At an international level, European and US scholars have dominated the study of private
international law. Their scholarship inspired the codification of the rules in several areas of
private international law by the HCCH. Hence, it has been argued that the development of
private international law is comparable to that of public international law and has followed a
Eurocentric approach, reflected in the rate of the accession of such nations to many of the Hague
Conventions. Consequently, several Hague Conventions lack participation from developing
nations. Thus, although Hague Conventions attempt to codify the principles of private inter-
national law in a manner that ensures a greater degree of legal certainty and predictability in
cross-border transactions, it is essential that the sensibilities and concerns of non-western nations
are considered especially in family matters. A uniform set of legal principles on the subject may
not offer the solution. It is also highly questionable whether universal values exist in the choice
of law. Therefore, it is equally crucial that efforts to codify principles contribute to the progress
of private international laws in those countries lacking the legal infrastructure necessary to
participate fully and effectively in global negotiations.
It is opined that private international law in India deserves to be systematically studied and
researched for the current framework of private international law in the Republic to be improved.
It is hoped that the current book will contribute to this endeavour.
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GLOSSARY
animus manendi et revertendi The intention of remaining; to acquire a domicile a person must
have an abode in one place with the intention of remaining
there
animus non revertendi The intention of not returning
ashirvad Literally, ‘blessings’. An essential ceremony for a Parsi marriage
Bikram Sambat (BS) Nepalese calendar
bona fide In good faith
brutum fulmen A judgment or decision that is void and has no legal effect at all
culpa in contrahendo The parties’ standard of conduct in pre-contractual dealings
dehors To be outside the scope of (something)
dépeçage The right of the parties to an international contract to select
different laws to govern parts of the contract that are separable
from one another
dower (mehr) Money or property which the wife is entitled to receive from
the husband in consideration of marriage. There are two kinds
of dower or mehr: (1) prompt muajjal dower payable at the
time of marriage; and (2) deferred muajjal dower payable
either on the dissolution of the marriage or on the happening
of a specified event
ex aequo et bono According to what is right and good
ex parte A court decision or order made without the appearance of the
opposite party
favor matrimonii Law that favours the recognition of marriage
forum rei sitae The court within whose jurisdiction immovable property is
situated
Jains Adherent of Jainism, an ancient Indian religion
jura novit curia The court knows the law
khula A procedure through which a woman can divorce her husband
in Islam, by returning the dower (mehr) or something else that
she received from her husband
326 Glossary
Kompetenz-Kompetenz The power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own power
lakh 100,000 units
laissez-faire The concept that businesses should be at a liberty to develop
without government control
lex causae The law of the cause
lex fori The law of the forum
lex loci arbirti The law of the jurisdiction that is the seat of the arbitration
lex loci celebrationis The law of the place of celebration of marriage
lex loci contractus The law of the place of the conclusion of a contract
lex loci damni The law of the place where damage occurred
lex loci delicti commissi The law of the place where a wrong was committed or occurred
lex loci domicilii The law of the domicile of the person
lex patriae The law of the nationality of the person
lex loci protectionis The law of the place where the intellectual property right is
protected
lex situs The law of the jurisdiction where property is situated
lex loci solutionis The place of the performance of the contract
lex mercatoria Commercial law as chiefly developed by the international
business community. It is based on customary practices and
the general principles of law
lex specialis Special rules
Lok Sabha Lower House of the Indian Parliament
mala fides Bad faith
mubarat Type of Islamic divorce in which the husband and wife
mutually consent to be freed from their married state
Muluki Dewani (Samhita) Ain Nepalese expression – Muluki (Country) Dewani (Civil)
Samhita (Codification) Ain (Act) – the Nepal Civil Code
Muluki Dewani Kariyabidhi Nepalese expression – Muluki (Country) Dewani (Civil)
(Samhita) Ain Kariyabidhi (Procedural) Samhita (Codification) Ain (Act) –
the Nepal Civil Procedure Code
negotiorum gestio Claiming payment for the voluntary management of the affairs
of another
Parsis Member of a group of followers in India of the Iranian prophet
Zoroaster
Glossary 327
Rajya Sabha Upper House of the Indian Parliament

raison d’être Reason or justification for existence
res judicata A matter that has already been adjudicated by a competent
authority and cannot be pursued again by the same parties
res sub judice A matter that is pending a decision or judgment
sapindas The term sapindas is unique to Hindu law. Two persons are
sapindas if they have a common ancestor
Sikhs Sikhism is a monotheistic religion which originated in the
Punjab region of India
sharia Islamic religious law that regulates the life of Muslims
sine qua non Without which something will not be possible
situs The location of something (usually property)
stare decisis The doctrine of precedent that obligates the courts to follow
the previous decisions of a similar nature
suo moto Action taken by the court on its own motion
talaq Islamic word for divorce
Taka Bangladesh currency
ubi jus ibi remedium Where there is a right, there is a remedy
ultra vires Beyond a person’s legal power or authority
void ab initio Invalid from the beginning
328
INDEX
Note: Alphabetical arrangement is word-by-word, where a group of letters followed by a space is filed before the
same group of letters followed by a letter, eg ‘social morality’ will appear before ‘socialist’. In determining alphabetical
arrangement, initial articles and prepositions are ignored.
abandoned domicile of origin, 34 contradictory standard terms, 224

abduction of children, see children first-shot rule, 224
absence of choice of law, see choice of law knockout rule, 224–25
absolute liability, 18 last-shot method, 224
ACA, see Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 identification of applicable law:
access to justice: proper law of contract, see proper law of contract
prevention, double actionability, 248 reflections on Indian law, insights based on global
accidents: trends, 215–16
places of commission of, 236 absence of choice of law, 220–24
actionability, double, see double actionability applicable law in e-commerce transactions, 224–26
Aden, former British Colony: express choice of law, 216–19
reciprocating territory, 260 implied choice of law, 219–20
administrative law: applicable law in non-contractual obligations, 228–29,
domicile and nationality included, 14 253–54
Admiralty Courts Acts, 98 double actionability, see double actionability
Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime reflections on Indian law: some insights based on
Claims) Act 2017, 98 global trends:
adversary system of legal procedure, 10 general remarks, 239–48
Afghanistan: obsolete double actionability rule, moving past, 248
Civil Procedure Code, 37 absence of choice of law, 250–51
domicile, 37 environmental torts, 252–53
private international law, 14 express choice of law, 249
agreements opposed to public policy, 205 implied choice of law, 249–50
AI (artificial intelligence), 233–34 intellectual property, 253
AIDS, 123–24 product liability, 251–52
air force personnel: unfair competition and restrictive trade
summonses served in India, 83 practices, 252
altruistic surrogacy, 178 unjust enrichment, 252
ancillary financial orders, 144–47 arbitral rewards:
annulment, marriage, 147–48, 149 commercial law choice of law issues, 5
Apostille Convention, 1961, 50, 304 foreign, see foreign arbitral awards
APPIL (Asian Principles of Private International Law), arbitration, 280
215 agreements, parties concluded, 84, 96–97
applicable law: renvoi, 30–31
conflict of laws issues in divorce, 133–35 seat of, 287
identification: venue of, 287
China, 242 see also foreign arbitral awards
European Union, 243–46 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (ACA), 19, 20,
Russia, 242 31, 51, 84, 96–97, 201
see also following entries foreign arbitral awards, 281–90
applicable law in contractual obligations, 195–96, Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)
226–27 Act 2015, 287
330 Index
Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937, 281 best interests of children, 153
artificial intelligence (AI), 233–34 bicameral Parliament, 9
Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement bigamy prohibition, 147
of Foreign Judgments, 271, 274 bilateral commercial agreements, 3
Asian Principles of Private International Law (APPIL), bona fide choice of law, 217–18
215 Botswana:
Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
Bills, 182 Brazil:
Assistive Reproductive Technology (ART), 182 conflict of law rule, 217
Australia: BRICS:
bona fide choice of law, 217–18 EU conflict of law rules influence, 215
closest and most real connection test, 221 Brussels I bis Regulation, see European Union
common-law heritage, 99–100 Brussels II bis Regulation, see European Union
conflict of law rule, 251 Brussels Regulation I (Recast), 38–39, 40
double actionability discarded, 239 brutem fulmen, 257, 281
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 Buddhists:
foreign judgments, 270–72, 273 marriage, 110
forum non conveniens, 100 Bulgaria:
Hague Principles, 217 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
HCCCA ratification likely, 103 burden of proof, 41
international jurisdiction, 270 Burma:
judgment-debtors, 271 reciprocating territory, 260
law, jurisdiction, 99–100 business place, see place of business
lex loci delicti: 239–40, 251
party autonomy in choice of law, 216 CA (Competition Act 2002), 238
private international law, 239, 271, 273 cameras, Lidar, 233
public policy, 239 Canada:
UK security laws, 54 bona fide choice of law, 217–18
Austria: closest and most real connection test, 221
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 comity doctrine, 271
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products common-law heritage, 100
Liability 1973 ratification, 246 conflict of law rule, 251, 252
Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification, double actionability discarded, 239
246 foreign judgments, 270–72, 273
knockout rule, 224 forum non conveniens, 100
autonomous vehicles, 233–34 governing law, 252
autonomy, party, see party autonomy law, jurisdiction, 100
lex loci delicti, 239–41, 251
Baby Manji surrogacy case, 185–86 party autonomy in choice of law, 216
Bangladesh: private international law, 239, 271–72, 273
defendants residing in public policy, 239
summonses served abroad, 84 real and substantial connection test, 272
divorce as procedural talaq, 150 unjust enrichment, 252
Muslim Family Laws 1962 Ordinance, capacity to contract, 214
150 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, England,
reciprocating territory, 260 203
Bartin, F De, 22, 23 case jurisprudence:
basic concepts and status of private international pleading foreign law, 50
law, 8 cause of action:
legal framework overview, 8–10 permissive jurisdiction, 74–79
Baxi, U, 16, 19 Central African Republic:
Beaumont, PR, 27 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
Beckett, WE, 23 Central Authorities:
Belgium: abduction of children, 155
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 Ceylon:
Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification, Code of Civil Procedure, 51
246 see also Sri Lanka
Index 331
characterisation, 22–25 rights, 153

characteristic performance: welfare, jurisprudence, 300
civil law systems, 221–24 well-being, jurisprudence, 153–57
Japan, 223 Chile:
Turkey, 223 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity,
Cheshire, GC, 19, 21, 22, 35, 39, 118, 198, 199, 207, 208 283
chief administration, place of, 222 China:
children: applicable law identification, 242
abduction, 177 conflict of law rule, 215, 220, 222
applications in respect of children removed from defamation, 242
India, 166–67 double actionability displaced, 239
applications to central authority and judicial governing law choice ex-post, 249
proceedings, procedure for, 165–66 habitual residence, 242
Brussels II bis Regulation, 169–70 HCCCA signed, 103
Central Authorities, 155 implied choice of law, 220
Civil Aspects of the International Child Abduction intellectual property, 242, 253
Bill 2016, 164–67 lex loci delicti, 242, 251
comity, 163 lex loci protectionis, 242
concepts employed in cases, 162–63 negotiorum gestio, 242
European Union comparison, 169–70 party autonomy, 216, 218, 249
exceptions to return, 166 private international law, 241–42, 251
global standards comparison, 167–72 product liability, 242
habitual residence, 163 public policy, 242
Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 154–55, 162–63 unjust enrichment, 242, 252
Indian opposition to the 1980 Convention, 163 choice, domicile of, see domicile
institutional mechanism, 165 choice of jurisdiction:
intercountry, 300 Indian Contract Act 1872, 301
Indian legal framework relating to, 157–72 choice of law, 5, 300–301
intimate contact, 163 absence, 220–24,
judicial position before Surya Vadanan, 159–60 ‘closest and most real connection test’,
legal position after Surya Vadanan, 160–62 207–208
legislative framework, 157–58 general rule, 250–51
Muslim countries, 171–72 lex loci damni, 250
objection to return, 155–56 localisation theory, 208–209
private international law responses to, 153 particular torts, 251
Protection of Children (Inter-Country Removal test of parties’ imputed intentions, 209
and Retention) Bill 2016, 164–67 bona fide, 217–18
welfare of children, 162–63 comity principle, 15
best interests, 153 disputes comprising foreign elements, 15
Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN (CRC), express, see express choice of law
153 foreign law, 301
custody, 15, 152, 158 governing law, 301
Custody Convention, 168 Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in
foreign custody orders recognition, 173–77 International Commercial Contracts, 217
grave risks to, 155 implied, 219–20, 249–50
guardians, 157–58 Indian Contract Act 1872, 301
habitual residence, 40 interest of justice, 15
human rights and fundamental freedoms, violation jurisdiction and, co-mingling, 247
of principles of, 156 party autonomy in, see party autonomy
illegitimate, 36, 41 private international law, 14
intercountry abduction, 5 questions, conflict of laws, 4
legitimate, 36, 41 scope of private international law, 15
protection: Christians:
Hague Convention on Parental Responsibility divorce, 130–31
and Protection of Children 1996, 156–57 marriage, 109, 110
Protection of Children (Inter-Country Removal CISG(UN Convention on Contracts for the
and Retention) Bill 2016, 164–67 International Sale of Goods) 1980
332 Index
citizenship: commercial surrogacy, see surrogacy

acquisition, domicile as essential requirement for, common law:
40–41 Australia, see Australia
disputes, 299 Canada, see Canada
more than one country, of, 40 deviation from, 300
surrogacy, 182 England, see England
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction jurisdictions, 99–101
Act No 10 of 2001, Sri Lanka, 174 connecting factors, 26
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction foreign law treated as question of fact, 49
Bill 2016, 164–67 limitation characterised as procedural, 48
Civil Code 2017, Nepal, 114, 144 public policy, 55–57
Civil Code, Russia, 220 legal system foundations, 16
civil law: obligation doctrine, 300
characteristic performance, 221–24 principles:
connecting factors, 26 courts referral to in disputes in private international
European Union closed system, 101 law, 300
foreign law treatment, 4, 49 India governed by, 232, 260
forum non conveniens no place in, 101 systems:
implied choice of law, 220 implied choice of law, 219
limitation characterised as substantive, 48 jurisdiction, 99–101
ordre public, 55–57 private international law principles, 274
party autonomy, 218 unavoidable reference to, 20–21
civil nature, suits of: Companies Act 1956, 51
jurisdiction in personam, 68 Companies Act 2013, 88
Civil Procedure Code 1908 (CPC), 14, 16, 20, 50, 61, companies, 38–39
63–65, 81–86, 89, 91–92, 102, 103, 105–106 comparative law:
foreign divorce decrees recognition, 135–36 characterisation based on, 23
foreign judgments, 258, 261, 262 competency, international, see international
online contracts, 303 competency
Section 86, 63–65 competition:
Civil Procedure Code, Ceylon, 51 restriction, European Union, 245
Civil Procedure Code, Pakistan, 174 unfair, see unfair competition
Civil Procedure Code, Nepal, 20, 114, 303 Competition Act 2002 (CA), 238
CJEU, see Court of Justice of the European Union conceptual foundations of private international law:
classical features of federalism, 9 conflict of law cases, 12
closest and most real connection test, 207–208, 221 judicial statements, 12
codification: nature of private international law, 10–12
attempts, international cooperation, 3 private international law or conflicts of laws, 12–13
Collier, JG, 36 scope of private international law, 13–14
Colonial Court of Admiralty (India) Act 1891, 98 choice of law, 15
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890, 98 foreign judgments, recognition and enforcement,
comity: 15–16
abduction of children, 163 jurisdiction, 14–15
Canada, 271 concurrent jurisdiction:
choice of law, 15 courts, 102
courts oscillation between justice and, 17 Concurrent List, see Constitution
EU foreign judgments, 272 conflict of law, 3, 12, 13
Indian statutory provisions, 16 Australia, 251
New Zealand, 270 Brazil, 217
principle, foreign judgments recognition, Canada, 251, 252
259–60 cases, conceptual foundations of private international
South Africa, 270 law, 12
commerce: China, 215, 220, 222
internet-based, 302–303 choice of law questions, 4
commercial law, 5 enforcement concerns, 4
commercial nature: European Union, 100–103, 215, 244, 252
suits of, jurisdiction in personam, 68–69 issues in divorce, 130–35
Index 333
jurisdiction, 4, 61–106 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN (CRC),

Mexico, 221 153
private international law or, 12–13 Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Russia, 252 Children, Child Prostitution, and Child
Turkey, 252 Pornography, 190
Venezuela, 221 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
connecting factors, 25–27 Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
consanguinity: Commercial Matters 1965 (Hague Service
marriage, 112, 114 Convention), 304
Constitution: Convention Relating to the Settlement of the Conflicts
Concurrent List: between the Law of Nationality and the Law
Union and States competent to enact legislation, 9–10 of Domicile 1955, 30
Council of Ministers, 9 conventions:
democracy as central feature, 9 EU member countries, enforceable in, 16
domicile essential requirement for citizenship, 40–41 Copyright Act 1957, 72, 73–74, 303
federalism as central feature, 9 Cormack, JM, 25
fundamental postulate, 9 corporations, 38–39
habeas corpus, 158 Council of Ministers:
Socialist, Secular and Democratic Republic, 9 Constitution, 9
State List: Prime Minister head of, 9
Parliament power to legislate in certain situations, 9 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU):
states’ exclusive powers to legislate, 9 online defamation, 302
supremacy, 9 courts:
Supreme Court as guardian and interpreter of, 10 comity:
surrogacy, 180 justice and, oscillation between, 17
Union List: concurrent jurisdiction, 102
Parliament exclusive power to legislate, 9 justice:
Union of States, 9 comity and, oscillation between, 17
union residuary powers of legislation, 10 private international law developing, 21
constitutional law, 14, 300 summonses served in India by, 81–82
constitutional morality: CPA (Consumer Protection Act 1986), 238
social morality and distinguished, 127 CPC, see Civil Procedure Code 1908
constitutional provisions: CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child),
commercial surrogacy, 180–81 153
Consumer Protection Act 1986 (CPA), 238 cross-border character of private international law, 13
contracting, place of, 301 cross-border claims, 237–38
contracts: cross-border disputes, 300, 301
essential and material validity of, 213 cross-border divorce, 111
field of, renvoi, 32 cross-border marriage, 111, 120
formation, 213 cross-border subjects, 4
interpretation, 213 cross-border surrogacy, see surrogacy
material validity of, 213 cross-border tort claims, 52
performance, 213–14 cross-border transactions, 21
proper law of, see proper law of contract Cuba:
surrogacy, 181 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
tripartite hierarchy, 198 culpa in contrahendo, EU, 244
contractual capacity, 214 cultural norms, 109
contractual obligations, applicable law, see applicable Currie, B, 126
law in contractual obligations custody, children, see children
contradictory standard terms, 224–25 Custody Convention, EU, 168
Convention on Protection of Children and Czech Republic:
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
Adoption 1993, 304 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification,
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 246
of Custody of Children and on Czechoslovakia:
Restoration of Custody of Children Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification,
(Custody Convention), 168 246
334 Index
damage: gender in recognition of foreign divorce decrees,

place of, India applicable law, 251 142–43
damages: judicial position on, Y Narasimha Rao, 136–41
tortious claims, 245 Law Commission recommendations, 141–42
death, 24–28 South Asian jurisdictions comparison, 143–44
defamation: statutory framework, 135–36
China, 242 Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorces and
cross-border disputes, Turkey, 247 Legal Separations 1970, 137–38
double actionability, 236 Hindu Marriage Act 1955, 130–31, 142
online, 302 Islamic law, under:
procedural and substantive aspects of law, judicial separation, 149
302 mutual agreement through khula or mubarat, 149
defective products, EU, 244 talaq pronouncement, 149–50
defence: jurisdiction:
mandatory rules, 57 residence, based on, 132
democracy: lex fori, 134–35
Constitution central feature, as, 9 lex domicilii, 134
Denmark: Muslims, 131
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 Parsis, 110
HCCCA ratified, 103 procedural talaq, as, Bangladesh and Pakistan, 150
Despagnet, E, 23 religious norms, influencing, 109
development of principles of private international law, Special Marriage Act 1954, 131, 142
302 Diwan, Paris, 19
development of private international law, 305 domain of private international law, 299–300
deviation from common law, 300 domestic courts:
Dicey, AV, 13, 14, 19, 21, 31, 203, 214 cross-border subjects, 4
Diplomatic Relations Act, 66–68 domestic judicial decisions:
Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act 1972, sources of private international law, 20–21
62, 63 domestic law:
discrimination: unique practices, 4
foreign divorce, recognition in India, 142–43 domicile, 19, 33, 43
disputes: acquisition criteria, 42
citizenship, 299 administrative law, included in, 14
cross-border, 300, 301 Afghanistan, 37
jurisdiction, with foreign element, 300 included in private international law, 14
disqualification of foreign arbitral awards, see foreign ascertaining under Indian private international law
arbitral awards rules, 40–45
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, 123, 131 characteristic features, 43–44
divorce, 130, 150–51 choice, of:
ancillary financial orders: fact, question of, 35
dower enforcement, 145–47 illegal residence and, 35
Law Commission on, 144–45 lost, 34
recognition rules of, 144–45 married women, 37
Christians, 130–31 mentally incapacitated persons, 38
conflict of laws issues in, 130–35 widows, 38
cross-border, 111 citizenship acquisition, essential requirement for, 40–41
cultural norms influencing, 109 constitutional law, included in, 14
EU jurisdictions, 132 corporations, 38–39
extrajudicial, 149–50 defendants, EU, 101
Family Law Act 1986, UK, 150 dependency, of:
foreign, 21, 126–27 infants, 36
judgments on grounds not recognised under Indian married women, 37–38
law, 269 mentally incapacitated persons, 38
Nepal, 143–44 widows, 38
foreign, recognition in India: determination, 41
discrimination, 142–43 disputes, 299
Foreign Marriage Act 1969, 131, 142 constitutional law covering, 300
Index 335
England, 36–37 intellectual property, 253

fundamental principle, 40 unfair competition and restrictive trade practices,
Indian Succession Act 1925, 37, 41 252
judicial statements on, 41 unjust enrichment, 252
characteristic features of domicile, 43–44 product liability, 233–36
criteria for acquiring domicile, 42 Singapore, 247
differentiating domicile, nationality unfair and restrictive trade practices, 238
and residence, 44 United Kingdom, 230
domicile and migration, 44–45 unjust enrichment, 236–37
meaning of domicile, 41–42 dower enforcement in Islamic law, 145–47
marriage, 112, 114, 117, 126 dual nationality, 40
meaning, 41–42
migration and, 44–45 e-commerce transactions:
nationality as possible alternative to, 39 applicable law in, 224–26
new: proper law of contract identification in, 212–13
acquisition, 41 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), 169
origin, of: Ecuador:
abandoned, 34 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
abeyance, in, 34 Edwards, AB, 257
dormant, 34 Egypt:
illegitimate children, 36, 41 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
legitimate children, 36, 41 eligibility criteria for surrogacy, 183–84
orphan children, 36 enforcement, 5
revival, 34, 36 conflict of laws, concerns, 4
polygamous marriage, changes effect on, 119–20 foreign arbitral awards, 288–89
renvoi, 27, 30 foreign judgments, 258–61
revival doctrine, 26 disputes with foreign element, 300
statutory framework, 40–41 private international law judgments, 14
United States, 36 England:
see also lex domicilii common law, 215
Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, UK, after Brexit transition, 101
131, 149 domicile, 36–37
Donoghue v Stevenson, 234–35 party autonomy in marital relations, 134
dormant domicile of origin, 34 polygamous marriages, 117–18, 121
double actionability, 301 see also United Kingdom
access to justice prevention, 248 environment:
application in India, 231–33 mandatory rules, 57
application as uniform principle, 233 environmental damage:
Canada discarded, 239 European Union, 244
choice of law and jurisdiction co-mingling, 247 Environmental Protection Act 1986, 18
criticism, 247 environmental torts:
defamation, 236 double actionability, 237–38
environmental torts, 237–38 escape clauses:
false concept presenting, 248 EU, 223
historical origins, 229–31 India applicable law, 251–52
Hong Kong, 247 Turkey, 247
intellectual property, 238–39 Estonia:
Japan private international law, 247 knockout rule, 224
jurisdiction and choice of law co-mingling, 247 EU, see European Union
lex fori, 248 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 169
lex loci delicti, 248 European Convention on Information of Foreign Law,
obsolete, moving past, 248 52
absence of choice of law, 250–51 European Court of Justice, see Court of Justice of the
environmental torts, 252–53 European Union
express choice of law, 249 European Union:
implied choice of law, 249–50 abduction of children comparison, 169–70
product liability, 251–52 applicable law identification, 243–46
336 Index
Brussels I bis Regulation, 100–103, 272, 273 executive:

Brussels II bis Regulation, 132, 169–70, 176–77 Constitutional power to implement law, 9
civil law systems, closed system, 101 President as head of, 9
competition restriction, 245 experts:
conflict of law rules, 100–103, 215, 244, 252 foreign law, 50
conventions and regulations enforceable in member express bar to jurisdiction, 84–86
countries, 16 express choice of law, 198, 216–19, 249
culpa in contrahendo, 244 limitations to, 202–204
Custody Convention, 168 non-state law, 200–202
defective products, 244 party autonomy parameters, 198–200
divorce jurisdictions, 132 protection of weaker parties, 204–206
domicile of defendants, 101 soft law, 200–202
environmental damage, 244 extrajudicial divorce, 149–50
escape clause, 223 extraterritorial impact:
foreign judgments, 272–73 foreign judgments, 261
foreign custody orders recognition, 176–77
forum non conveniens no place in, 101 fact, foreign law as question of, 4
governing law, 243 Falconbridge, D, 22, 23, 29
choice ex ante and ex post, 249 false concept:
habitual residence, 243, 244–45 double actionability presenting, 248
HCCCA ratified, 103 family law, 5
industrial action, 244, 245 Family Law Act 1986, UK:
intellectual property, 244, 253 divorce, 150
lex loci damni, 243, 245 foreign annulments, 149
lex loci protectionis, 245 Family Proceedings Act 1980, New Zealand,
lex specialis rules, 244 121
Member States’ exclusive jurisdiction, 101 Fawcett, James, 118
negotiorum gestio, 244 federal governments:
non-state law, 216 state governments and, division between, 9
party autonomy in choice of law, 216 federalism, 9, 10
private international law, 252 Fiji:
Product Liability Directive, 244 reciprocating territory, 260
Regulation (EU) 2019/1111, 170 financial orders, ancillary, 144–47
res sub judice principle, 102 Finland:
Rome I Regulation, 215, 216, 218–20, 222–23, 225, foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
243 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products
overriding mandatory rules definition, 57 Liability 1973 ratification, 246
Rome II Regulation, 18, 134–35, 149 first-shot rule, 224
conflict of law rules, 251 flexibility:
double actionability, 243–46 predictability balanced with, 223
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to flexible exception rule, 230
Products Liability 1973 replacing, 246 New Zealand, 241
Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 foreign annulments:
replacing, 246 Family Law Act 1986, UK, 149
party autonomy, 243, 249 foreign arbitral awards, 280–81, 295–96
product liability cross-border disputes, disqualification from recognition or enforcement
251 in India, 289
soft law, 216 awards under 1927 Geneva Convention, 294–95
tortious claims for damages, 245 awards under New York Convention, 289–94
unfair competition, 244, 245 enforcement, 56, 288–89, 300
unjust enrichment, 244, 252 execution of foreign arbitral awards in India:
Evidence Act 1974, Nepal, 50 procedure for execution, 288–89
evolution of private international law, prohibition of annulment of awards, 286–87
8–10 law on recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
exclusive jurisdiction, 51, 70–71 awards:
clauses, 4 foreign arbitral awards given following reference by
EU Member States, 101 Indian court, 284–86
Index 337
scope and meaning of (foreign arbitral award)’, principles of private international law, 300
282–84 scope of private international law, 15–16
statutory framework, 281–82 reflections on Indian law, some insights based on
reciprocity principle, 283 global trends:
recognition, 300 denial grounds, 273–74
Foreign Awards Act 1961, 56 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) (HCCA), should India accede, 275–76, 278
Act 1961, 281 Hague Conventions on Recognition and
foreign courts: Enforcement of Judgments, should India
international competency: accede, 274–78
foreign judgments eligibility determination, judgment debtors, 274
262–66 Judgements Convention, should India accede?
summonses served abroad through, 84 276–78
foreign custody orders recognition, 173–77 jurisdiction bases, 270–73
foreign divorce, see divorce South Africa, 270–72, 273
foreign elements: statutory framework, 258–59
disputes comprising, 10–12, 15 voluntary deference, 259
foreign exchange: foreign land:
mandatory rules, 57 title to, renvoi, 29
foreign forum: foreign law, 18
parties concluded choice of Court agreement application:
in favour of, 91–96 public policy exception, 55
foreign judgments, 257–58, 278–79 choice of, 301
Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement civil law jurisdictions in, treated as question of law, 49
of Foreign Judgments, 271 common law jurisdictions, in, treated as question
Australia, 270–72, 273 of fact, 49
Canada, 270–72, 273 exclusion, 53–55
commercial law choice of law issues, 5 experts, 50
disqualification from recognition or enforcement, 267 overriding mandatory norms and public policy
not been given on merits, 267 (ordre public):
proceedings in which obtained opposed to natural approach of Indian courts in clarifying the public
justice, 268 policy of India, 56–57
obtained by fraud, 268 public policy and ordre public: conceptual
violation of law in force in India, in, 268–69 dimension, 55
divorce, 269 pleading:
eligibility determination: case jurisprudence, 50
international competency of foreign courts, 262–66 general practice in other jurisdictions, 48–49
enforcement: proof and application of foreign law in India, 49–53
disputes with foreign element, 300 point of as matter of fact, 50
principles of private international law, 300 procedural, 46–48, 58
private international law, 14 proof and application in India, 49–52
recognising states, cumulative effect in, 261 burden on parties contending application, 51
scope of private international law, 15–16 case jurisprudence, 50
states of origin, cumulative effect in, 261 cross-border tort claims, 52
EU, see European Union problem of proving, 52–53
evaluation, 4 question of fact proved by adducing expert
extraterritorial impact, 261 evidence, 50
marriage dissolution, 269 translated texts, 52
Nepal, 270–72, 273, 274 public documents certification, 50
New Zealand, 270–72, 273 question of fact, as, 49, 50
public policy exception, 273 question of law, as, 49
reciprocity principle, 259 substantive and procedural law, 46–47, 58
recognition: law of limitation, 48
Civil Procedure Code, 16 rights and remedies, 47–48
comity principle, 259–60 foreign marriage, 115, 129
disputes with foreign element, 300 Foreign Marriage Act 1969, 17, 110, 115, 123, 131, 142,
‘doctrine of obligation’ relevance, 259–61 147–48
338 Index
foreign nationals: Goa:

surrogacy, 182 Portuguese Civil Code, 32
foreign same-sex marriage: Godman to Tycoon – The Untold Story of Baba Ramdev
recognition of and application of public policy, by Priyanka Pathak Narain, 302
126–27 governing law, 215
foreign territory: Canada, 252
defendants residing in, summonses served abroad, 84 China choice ex-post, 249
forum, see lex fori European Union, see European Union
forum non conveniens: freedom to choose, 301
Australia, 100 Russia choice, 249, 252
Canada, 100 South Korea, see South Korea
civil law systems no place in, 101 Turkey, 249, 252
Court’s jurisdiction limitations, 88–90, 93 Government of India Act 1935 of British Parliament, 9
doctrine, 62, 105–106 GPS (Global Positioning Systems), 233
EU no place in, 101 gradual evolution of private international law, 8–10
forum shopping, 48, 58 Graveson, RH, 19
France: Greece:
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products guardians:
Liability 1973 ratification, 246 children, 157–58
Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification, Guardians and Wards Act 1890 (GWA), 142, 157–58
246 Guardians and Wards Act, Pakistan, 174
knockout rule, 224 GWA, see Guardian and Wards Act 1890
Law, 27–28
polygamous marriages, 117, 120 habeas corpus, 158
fraud: habitual residence:
foreign judgments obtained by, 268 abduction of children, 163
fundamental policy, 56 children, 40
fundamental postulate, Constitution, 9 China, 242
corporations, 39
gender: European Union, 243, 244–45
recognition of foreign divorce decrees, in, 142–43 India applicable law, 251
genesis of private international law in India: law of, 222
gradual evolution beginning with the British Rule, Russia, 242
16–17 shift to, 40
sources of private international law, 19 South Korea, 246
domestic judicial decisions, 20–21 Turkey, 247
international judicial decisions, 20–21 Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 152, 153, 154–55,
juristic writings, 21 162–63, 170–72
statutes, 20 Hague Codification Conventions, 3
underdeveloped status of private international law, Hague Conference on Private International Law
18–19 (HCCH), 3, 5, 15, 127
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign cross-border surrogacy Working Group, 189–90
Arbitral Awards 1927, 97, 280, 282, 284, 286, General Council on cross-border surrogacy, 179
288, 294–95 India’s association with, 304
Germany: Malta Process, 172
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement
knockout rule, 224 of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents
polygamous marriages, 117, 118, 120 (Apostille Convention) 1961, 50, 304
gestational surrogacy, 178 Hague Convention on Celebration and Recognition
Ghana: of the Validity of Marriages 1978, 111, 113,
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 127–28, 129
Giuliano, M, 220, 222 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
Global Positioning Systems (GPS), 233 (HCCCA), 62, 275–76, 278
global standards: India ratification resistance, 103–105, 304
abduction of children comparison, 167–72 States having ratified, 103
globalisation, 304 States having signed, 103
Index 339
Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Hindu Succession Act:

Child Abduction, Law Commission Report jurisdiction, 14
on Need to Accede to, 303 historical origins:
Hague Convention on Inter-Country Adoption double actionability, 229–31
of Children 1993, 19 HIV, 123–24
Hague Convention on Parental Responsibility homosexuals, 123–25
and Protection of Children 1996, 156–57 Hong Kong:
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and bona fide choice of law, 217–18
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry closest and most real connection test, 221
Adoption, 179 double actionability, 247
Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement EU conflict of law rules influence, 215
of Foreign judgments in Civil or foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
Commercial Matters 2019, 304 party autonomy in choice of law, 216
Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorces reciprocating territory, 260
and Legal Separations 1970, 137–38, 44 Huber, Ulrich, 13
habitual residence, 39, 40 human rights and fundamental freedoms:
Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad violation of principles of, 156
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 304 Hungary:
Hague Conventions, 5 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
Hague Inter-country Child Abduction Convention
1980, 19, 304 ICA, see Indian Contract Act 1872
Hague Judgments Convention, 274–78 ICARA, see International Child Abduction Remedies
Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in Act
International Commercial Contracts 2015, ICMR, see Indian Council of Medical Research
217, 225–26 illegal residence, 35
Hague Service Convention (Convention on the illegitimate children:
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial domicile of origin, 36, 41
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters implied bar to jurisdiction, 86–88
1965), 304 implied choice:
Hague-Visby Rules, 197, 203 law, 206–207, 219, 220, 249–50
Halsbury’s Laws of India, 51–52 proper law of contract, 198
harmonisation: inconclusive judgments, 269
surrogacy legal initiatives for and India’s role, independent judiciary, 9
189–90 India Divorce Act, 20
HCCCA, see Hague Convention on Choice of Court Indian Arbitration Act, 31
Agreement Indian Christian Marriage Act 1872, 110, 123
HCCH, see Hague Conference on Private International Indian Contract Act 1872 (ICA), 19, 95–96, 201
Law choice of law and choice of jurisdiction and,
Hibbert, SN, 12 301
High Courts, 10 public policy, contracts opposed to, 205
Hindu marriage, 109, 110 surrogacy agreements, 181
Hindu Marriage Act 1954, 20 Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR):
Hindu Marriage Act 1955, 111, 129 commercial surrogacy guidelines, 181–82
annulment of void marriages, 147 Indian diaspora, 3, 4, 12
application, 110 Indian Divorce Act 1869, 37, 130–31, 157–58
bigamy prohibition, 147 Indian Evidence Act 1872, 50, 135, 173, 179
custody, 157–58 Indian Foreign Awards Act, 30
divorce, 130–31, 142 Indian Penal Code (IPC), 123, 163
polygamous marriages prohibited, 119, 125, 126 Indian Succession Act 1925, 14, 19, 27, 32, 37, 41
prohibited relationships in marriage, 147 individual interactions:
same-sex marriages, 122–23 private international law challenges, 304
sapinda relationships prohibition, 147 individual movements:
voidable marriages, 147 private international law challenges, 304
Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act 1955: industrial action:
jurisdiction, 14 European Union, 244, 245
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, 142, infants:
157–58 domicile of dependency, 36
340 Index
injunctions, worldwide, 302 Islam:

institutional mechanism: law, see Muslim law
abduction of children, 165 Israel:
commercial surrogacy, 184–85 HCCCA signed, 103
intellectual property: Italy:
China, 242, 253 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
double actionability, 238–39
European Union, 244, 253 Jains:
private international law and, interface between, 303 marriage, 110
South Korea, 246, 253 Jan Balaz surrogacy case, 186–88
Turkey, 247, 253 Japan:
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable characteristic performance, 223
to International Contracts (Mexico City double actionability, 247
Convention), 220, 221, 223–24 EU conflict of law rules influence, 215, 222
inter-religious marriage, 115–17 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
intercountry abduction of children, 5, 157–72, 300 Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC): laws and regulations, 31–32
INCOTERMS, 201 party autonomy in choice of law, 216, 218
international character of private international law, 13 surrogacy not permitted, 180
International Child Abduction Remedies Act unjust enrichment, 252
(ICARA), US, 167, 175 judgment-debtors:
international commercial arbitration: Australia, 271
party autonomy in, 301 foreign judgments, 274
international commercial law: nationality of, 263–64
Mexico City Convention, 223–24 Nepal, 271
international competency, 258 New Zealand, 271
foreign judgments eligibility determination, 262–66 residence of, 264–65
international contracts: South Africa, 271
cross-border disputes, 300 submission of, 265–66
international cooperation: judgments:
codification attempts, 3 definition, 258
international instruments, 5 enforcement, private international law, 14
international judicial decisions: inconclusive, 269
sources of private international law, 20–21 recognition, 259
international jurisdiction: Judgments Convention, 274–78, 304
Australia, 270 judicial administration, 4
nationality as valid basis of, 271 judicial approach to public policy, 56
Nepal, 270 judicial decisions:
New Zealand, 270 foreign law exclusion, on, 54–55
South Africa, 270 Supreme Court binding on lower courts and tribunals,
international jurisprudence, 18 10
international law: judicial practice, 5
public policy and, interaction between, 57 judicial separation:
international private law, 12, 13 divorce under Islamic law, 149
international surrogacy agreements (ISA), 190 judicial statements:
internet-based trade and commerce, 302–303 characterisation, on, 24–25
intimate contact, 5, 15, 163 conceptual foundations of private international law, 12
investment treaties, 3 domicile, on, see domicile
IPC (Indian Penal Code), 123, 163 surrogacy, on, 185–89
Iraq: judiciary:
invasion of Kuwait, 57 Constitutional power to interpret law, 9
Ireland: independent, 9
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 Supreme Court of India as guardian and interpreter
polygamous marriages, 120 of Constitution, 10
irrational decisions: jurisdiction, 5
avoidance, public policy, 56 actions in rem, in, 97–98
ISA (international surrogacy agreements), 190 Australian law, 99–100
Index 341
bases, foreign judgments, 270–73 juristic writings:

Canadian law, 100 sources of private international law, 21
choice of law and, co-mingling, 247 ‘just and reasonable person’ test:
Civil Procedure Code 1908, 14 proper law of contract identification, 209
common law systems, 99–101 justice:
conflict of law, 61–106 courts oscillation between comity and, 17 justice:
issues in divorce, 130–33 interest of, choice of law, 15
court adjudication, see jurisdiction, court adjudication natural, see natural justice
disputes with foreign element, 300
exclusive, 51 Kelly DStL, 203
Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act 1955, 14 Khan, Franz, 11, 120–21
Indian Succession Act 1925, 14 khula, mutual agreement through:
international, see international jurisdiction divorce under Islamic law, 149
Nepal, 100 knockout rule, 224–25
personal law, issues in, 14–15 Kuwait:
personam, in, see jurisdiction in personam foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
private international law, 13, 14 invasion by Iraq, 57
scope of private international law, 14–15
Transfer of Property Act 1954, 14 Lagarde, P, 220, 222
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement last-shot method, 212–13, 224
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Latvia:
Matters Regulation, see European Union: Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification,
Brussels I bis Regulation 246
jurisdiction, court adjudication, 61–62 law:
jurisdiction in actions in rem, 97–98 choice of, see choice of law
jurisdiction in personam, see jurisdiction in personam executive Constitutional power to implement, 9
persons who may file suits before Indian Courts, 62 foreign, see foreign law
sovereign immunity, 63–68 legislature Constitutional power to make, 9
suits by alien enemies, 62–63 reflections on Indian law, insights based on global
suits by foreign states, 63 trends:
reflections on Indian law, some insights based on general remarks on Indian law, 99–103
global trends: HCCCA ratification, 103–105
general remarks on Indian law, 99–103 res sub judice principle, 102
should India ratify HCCCA, 103–105 Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and
jurisdiction in personam, 68 Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment
civil nature, suits of, 68 etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, UK, 215
commercial nature, suits of, 68–69 Law Commission:
grounds for assumption of jurisdiction, 69–70 custody of children, 158
exclusive jurisdiction, 70–71 foreign divorce, recognition in India
permissive jurisdiction, 71–81 recommendations, 141–42
limitations to Court’s jurisdiction, 84 Law of Foreign Marriages, Report on, 303
express or implied bar to jurisdiction, 84–85 Law of Foreign Divorces, Report on, 303
express bar, 85–86 Transnational Litigation, Conflict of Laws and the Law
implied bar, 86–88 of Limitation, Report on, 303
forum non conveniens, 88–90, 93 Need to Accede to Hague Convention on the Civil
parties concluded arbitration agreement, 96–97 Aspects of International Child Abduction,
parties concluded choice of Court agreement in Report on, 303
favour of foreign forum, 91–96 Law of Foreign Marriages:
summonses, see summonses Law Commission Report on, 303
jurisdictional questions: Law of Foreign Divorces:
conflict of laws, 4 Law Commission Report on, 303
jurisprudence: law of habitual residence, see habitual residence
case, 50 law of nations:
international, 18 foundations of private international law obligations
rejection in commercial field, renvoi, 32 traced to, 11
juristic opinions: Leflar, Robert, 126
private international law, 13 legal framework, 8–10
342 Index
legal parentage: South Korea, 247

surrogacy, 179–80, 184 Turkey, 247
legal principles: lex loci solutionis, 210–11, 221, 223
predictable, 303–304 lex mercatoria, 200
legal status of commercial surrogacy in India, lex patriae, 33
180–85 see also nationality
legal structure, 21 lex situs:
legal system: connecting factors, 26
adversary system of legal procedure, 10 lex specialis rules:
common law foundations, 16 European Union, 244
single entity, 9 liability:
single unified system of law, 4 absolute, 18
Legislation strict, 18
union residuary powers of, Constitution, 10 Light Detection and Ranging (Lidar) cameras, 233
legislative practice, 5 limitations to Court’s jurisdiction, 84
legislature: express or implied bar to jurisdiction, 84–88
Constitutional power to make law, 9 forum non conveniens, 88–90, 93
legitimate children: parties concluded arbitration agreement, 96–97
domicile of origin, 36, 41 parties concluded choice of Court agreement in favour
lex causae, 46 of foreign forum, 91–96
characterisation based on, 23, 24–25 Lithuania:
renvoi, 27, 28 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification,
lex domicilii, 15, 19, 33 246
divorce, 134 knockout rule, 224
marriage, 115, 116, 117, 126 local authority servants:
see also domicile summonses served in India, 83
lex fori, 46–47, 49, 210, 211–12, 221, 230, 232, 235–36, local judgments:
238–39, 253, 301 Nepal, precedence over foreign decisions, 274
characterisation based on, 22–23, 24–25 localisation theory, 207, 221
connecting factors, 26 choice of law absence, 208–209
divorce, 134–35 locus contractus, 301
double actionability, 248 locus solutionis, 301
renvoi, 27, 28 Lok Sabha, 9
Russia, 242 Lorenzen, EG, 22
lex loci: lost domicile of choice, 34
renvoi, 32 Lugano Convention, 272, 273
lex loci celebrationis: Luxemburg:
marriage, 111–12, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 126, 129 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products
lex loci contractus, 210, 221 Liability 1973 ratification, 246
marriage, 116 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification,
lex loci damni: 246
choice of law absence, 250
European Union, 243, 245 Malagasy Republic:
Turkey, 247 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
lex loci delicti, 230, 234, 235–36, 238–39, 253 Malaya, Federation of:
Australia, 239–40, 251 reciprocating territory, 260
Canada, 239–41, 251 Malaysia:
China, 242, 251 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
double actionability, 248 Malta Process:
Nepal, 242–43 Hague Conference on Private International Law,
New Zealand, 241 172
Russia, 242, 251 mandatory norms
South Korea, 246, 251 overriding, 55
Turkey, 247 mandatory rules, 57
lex loci protectionis: subspecies of public policy, 203
China, 242 marital relations:
European Union, 245 party autonomy in, 134–35
Index 343
marriage, 4–5 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, England, 130–31

annulment, 147, 149 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, England, 119, 121
Buddhists, 110 matrimonial disputes, 5
capacity, 112 matrimonial homes, 112–14
characterisation, 24 McEleavy, PE, 27
Christians, 109, 110 mehr, 145–47
connecting factors, 25–26 mentally incapacitated persons, 38
consanguinity, 112, 114 merits:
conversion effect of law applicable to, 116–117 foreign judgments not been given on, 267
cross-border, 111, 120 Mexico:
cultural norms influencing, 109 conflict of law rules, 221
definitions, 109 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
divorce, see divorce HCCCA ratified, 103
domicile, 112, 114, 117, 126 party autonomy in choice of law, 216, 218
dower enforcement in Islamic law, 145–47 private international law, 229, 223
essential aspects, 112–14 Mexico City Convention, see Inter-American
foreign, 115, 129 Convention on the Law Applicable to
foreign judgments on dissolution, 269 International Contracts
formal aspects, 111–12 migration:
Hindu, 109, 110 domicile and, 44–45
Indian legislative framework and religious base, 110–11 Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD),
law determination under of Indian private 152, 164, 166–67
international law principles, 112–21 minors:
inter-religious, and private international law in India, capacity to contract lacking, 214
115–17 model laws, 200
Islam, 109, 110 Montenegro:
Jains, 110 HCCCA ratified, 103
lex loci celebrationis, 111–12, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, Morocco:
126, 129 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
lex loci contractus, 116 Morris, JHC, 21, 23, 203, 230
lex domicilii, 115, 116, 117, 126 mubarat, mutual agreement through:
matrimonial home intended, 112–14 divorce under Islamic law, 149
Muslim law, 110 Muslim countries:
nullity decrees, 147, 149 abduction of children, 171–72
nuptial agreements, 145 Muslim Family Laws 1962 Ordinance, Pakistan, 150
out-of-state of Indian domiciled persons, 126 Muslim Family Laws 1962 Ordinance, Bangladesh, 150
Parsis, 110 Muslim law:
polygamous, 117–18 divorce, 131, 149–50
domicile changes effect on, 119–20 Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171–72
nature of marriage, 118 marriage, 109, 110
recognition, 120–21 same-sex marriage, death penalty for, 122, 123
post-nuptial agreements, 145 mutual agreement through khula or mubarat
pre-nuptial agreements, 145 divorce under Islamic law, 149
prohibited relationships in: Mutual Assistance Act 2014, Nepal, 52
Hindu Marriage Act 1955, 147 Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2014, Nepal, 274
religion, 112 MWCD, see Ministry of Women and Child
religious norms, influencing, 109 Development
renvoi, 27, 29
same-sex, see same-sex marriage National Civil Code Act 2017, Nepal, 100, 216, 221
Sikhs, 110 nationality, 33, 45
substantive requirements, 113 administrative law, included in, 14
transnational, 129 Afghanistan included in private international law, 14
validation, 127 constitutional law, included in, 14
voidable, 147 corporations, 38
married women: dual, 40
domicile of choice, 37 international jurisdiction valid basis of, as, 271
domicile of dependency, 37–38 judgment-debtors, 263–64
344 Index
political status, 39 polygamous marriages, 121

possible alternative to domicile, as, 39 private international law, 271, 273
renvoi, 30 reciprocating territory, 260
surrogacy, 180, 182 UK security laws, 54
nations, law of, 11 Nigeria:
natural justice: foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
foreign judgments proceedings in which obtained non-contractual obligations:
opposed to, 268 applicable law in, see applicable law in non-contractual
principles, public policy, 56 obligations
nature of private international law, 10–12 non-resident Indians (NRI):
negligence, 231 surrogacy, 182
negotiorum gestio: non-state law:
China, 242 EU, 216
European Union, 244 express choice of law, 200–202
Nepal: North Macedonia:
Civil Code, 144 HCCCA signed, 103
Code of Civil procedure, 20 North, P, 35, 39, 118
codifying private principles on international law Norway:
in Civil Procedure Code, 303 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
double actionability and, 242–43 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products
National Civil Code Act 2017, 242–43 Liability 1973 ratification, 246
Evidence Act 1974, 50 NRI, see non-resident Indians
foreign divorces in, 143–44 nullity decrees:
foreign judgments, 270–72, 273, 274 marriage, 147, 149
international jurisdiction, 270 nuptial agreements, 145
judgment-debtors, 271 Nygh, PE, 203
jurisdiction, 100
lex loci delicti, 242–43 objective choice:
local judgments precedence over foreign decisions, 274 proper law of contract, 198
marriage, 114 obligation doctrine, 270
same-sex, 122 common law, 300
Mutual Assistance Act 2014, 52 facet of vested rights theory, as, 260
Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2014, 274 foreign judgments recognition relevance, 259–61
National Civil Code Act 2017, 100, 216, 221 obligations of private international law:
party autonomy in choice of law, 216, 218 foundations traced to law of nations, 11
place of performance, 221 OCI (Overseas Citizens of India), 182
private international law, 221, 242–43, 271, 273, 274 Official Gazette, 283
surrogacy reflections, 188–89 online contracts:
unjust enrichment, 252 Code of Civil Procedure 1908, 303
Netherlands: Copyright Act 1957, 303
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 online defamation, 302
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products online transactions, 302
Liability 1973 ratification, 246 operationalisation of private international law,
Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification, classic concepts, 21
246 characterisation, 22–25
New York Convention on the Recognition and connecting factors, 25–27
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards disputes comprising foreign elements, 10–12
1958, 19, 20, 97, 280, 282, 286, 288–94 renvoi, 27–32
New Zealand: ordre public
comity principle, 270 civil law jurisdictions, 55–57
double actionability discarded, 239 overriding, 55
flexible exception rule, 241 see also public policy
foreign judgments, 270–72, 273 orphan children:
international jurisdiction, 270 domicile of origin, 36
judgment-debtors, 271 out-of-state marriage of Indian domiciled persons, 126
law, 53–54 outcome-determinative method, 47
lex loci delicti, 241 Overseas Citizens of India (OCI), 182
Index 345
Pakistan: place of business:

Civil Procedure Code 1972, 174 permissive jurisdiction, 72–74
defendants residing in: principal, 222
summonses served abroad, 84 Turkey, 247
divorce as procedural talaq, 150 place of damage:
Guardians and Wards Act, 174 India applicable law, 251
Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171, 174 place of performance:
Muslim Family Laws 1962 Ordinance, 150 Nepal, 221
Papua New Guinea: plaintiffs:
reciprocating territory, 260 summonses served in India by, 82
Paraguay: pleading foreign law, see foreign law
Hague Principles, 217 POI, see Persons of Indian Origin
law, 53 Poland:
parentage: foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
legal, see legal parentage Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification,
Parliament: 246
bicameral, 9 knockout rule, 224
Constitution State List: political agents:
power to legislate in certain situations, 9 summonses served abroad through, 84
Constitution Union List: political status:
exclusive power to legislate, 9 nationality, 39
Council of States (Rajya Sabha) as upper house, 9 polygamous marriage, see marriage
House of People (Lok Sabha) as lower house, 9 Portugal:
Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936, 110, 123, Civil Code, Goa, 32
157–58 post-nuptial agreements, 145
partial renvoi, 28 pre-nuptial agreements, 145
parties’ imputed intentions: predictability:
test of, choice of law absence, 209 flexibility balanced with, 223, 247
party autonomy, 301 predictable legal principles, 303–304
choice of law, in, 216, 218, 241–42, 246, 249 prerogative writs, 10
civil law systems, 218 President:
international commercial arbitration, in, 301 head of executive, as, 9
marital relations, in, 134–35 presumptions:
parameters, express choice of law, 198–200 lex fori, 210, 211–12
passing-off, 303 lex loci contractus, 210
penal laws: lex loci solutionis, 210–11
foreign law exclusion, 53–54 proper law of contract identification, 209–12
performance, place of, see locus solutionis prima facie inferences, 209
permissive jurisdiction, 71 Prime Minister:
cause of action, 74–79 head of Council of Ministers, 9
place of business, 72–74 Principles of European Tort Law (PETL),
residence, 71–72 243
submission, 79–81 principles of private international law:
personal law: development, 302
jurisdictional issues in, 14–15 foreign judgments recognition and enforcement,
Persons of Indian Origin (POI): 300
surrogacy, 182 prisoners:
perverse decisions: summonses served in India, special rules for, 83
avoidance, public policy, 56 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions)
PETL (Principles of European Tort Law), 243 Act 1995, UK, 121, 230–31
Philippines: Privy Council, 20
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 procedural aspects of law:
Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171 defamation, 302
PICC (UNIDROIT Principles on International procedural foreign law, 46–48, 58
Commercial Contracts), 201, 216 procedural matters:
place of acquisition of products: connecting factors, 26
India applicable law, 251 procedural talaq recognition, UK, 150
346 Index
product liability: China, 242

China, 242 common law jurisdictions, 55–57
Directive, EU, 244 contravention, 269, 304
double actionability, 233–36 foreign judgments, exception, 273
European Union, 244 foreign law application exception, 55
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products international law and, interaction between, 57
Liability 1973, 246 irrational decisions avoidance, 56
Russia, 242 judicial approach, 56
products: mandatory rules subspecies of, 203
defective, UE, 244 natural justice principles, 56
liability, see product liability overriding, 55
place of acquisition, India applicable law, 251 perverse decisions avoidance, 56
progressive realisation of rights, 125 rights of parties, respect for, 56
proof, burden of, 41 Russia, 242
proper law: South Korea, 247
renvoi, 31–32 see also ordre public
proper law of tort, 230
proper law of contract, 32 quasi-federal structure adopted by India, 9
doctrine, overview, 196–98 questions of fact:
identification, 198 foreign law as, 49, 50
absence of choice of law and ‘closest and most real
connection test’, 207–209 Rabel, E, 23
e-commerce transactions, in, 212–13 railway servants:
express choice of law, 198–206 summonses served in India, 83
implied choice of law, 206–207 Rajya Sabha, 9
‘just and reasonable person’ test, 209 real and substantial connection test:
last-shot method, 212–13 Canada, 272
presumptions, 209–12 receiving agencies:
implied choice, 198 European Convention on Information
objective choice, 198 of Foreign Law, 52
scope, 213 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance
capacity to contract, 214 No 41 of 1921, Sri Lanka, 174
formation, interpretation, and essential reciprocating territories, 260
and material validity of contract, 213 reciprocity:
performance of contract, 213–14 EU foreign judgments, 272
tripartite hierarchy, 198 Indian statutory provisions, 16
property: principle:
succession to, 26 foreign arbitral awards, 283
protection of children, see children foreign judgments, 259
public documents: recognition:
certification, foreign law, 50 foreign judgments:
public international law: disputes with foreign element, 300
private international law distinguished, 13 judgments, 259
private international law development comparable reflections from other jurisdictions:
to, 305 renvoi, 29–30
public laws: regulations:
foreign law exclusion, 54 EU member countries, enforceable in, 16
Public Liability Insurance Act 1991, 18 religion:
public officers (not belonging to the Indian military, marriage, 109, 112
Navy or Air Force): religious norms:
summonses served in India, 83 divorce, influencing, 109
public policy: remission:
agreements opposed to, 205 renvoi, by, 27
approach of Indian courts in clarifying the public renvoi, 27–28
policy of India, 56–57 application under Indian private international law,
Australia, 239 30–32
Canada, 239 arbitration, 30–31
Index 347
contract, field of, 32 EU conflict of law rules influence, 215, 222

death, 28 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
definition, 27 governing law choice, 249, 252
domicile, 27, 30 habitual residence, 242
foreign land, title to, 29 implied choice of law, 220
Indian jurisprudence rejection in commercial field, 32 lex loci delicti: 242
Indian private international law, application under, undesirable, 251
30–32 lex fori, 242
lex causae, 27, 28 party autonomy, 216, 218, 241–42, 249
lex fori, 27, 28 private international law, 241–42, 251
lex loci, 32 product liability, 242
marriage, 27, 29 public policy, 242
nationality, 30 unfair competition, 242
partial, 28 unjust enrichment, 242, 252
proper law, 31–32 Rylands v Fletcher, 235
reflections from other jurisdictions, 29–30
remission, by, 27 sailors:
single, 28 summonses served in India, special rules for, 83
transmission, through, 28 same-sex marriage, 121–22
types, 28 foreign, recognition of and application of public
wills, 29 policy, 126–27
reproductive choices of women, 180–81 Islam, death penalty for, 122, 123
Republic of Korea: legal approach in India, 122–25
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 San Marino:
res sub judice principle, 102 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
residence: sapinda relationships prohibition:
corporations, 38 Hindu Marriage Act 1955, 147
divorce, based on, 132 Savigny, FKV, 11, 24
habitual, see habitual residence scope of private international law, 13–14, 300
illegal, 35 choice of law, 15
judgment-debtors, 264–65 foreign judgments, recognition and enforcement,
permissive jurisdiction, 71–72 15–16
restraint of competition: jurisdiction, 14–15
Turkey, 247 Schuz, Rhona, 168
restrictive trade practices: seat of arbitration, 287
double actionability, 238 Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI),
revenue laws: 269
foreign law exclusion, 54 security laws:
revival doctrine: foreign law exclusion, 54
domicile, 26 sexual orientation, 124–25
revival of domicile of origin, 34, 36 sharia, 171–72
right-remedy paradigm, 47 Sikhs:
rights: marriage, 110
children, 153 Singapore:
parties, respect for, public policy, 56 double actionability, 247
progressive realisation of, 125 EU conflict of law rules influence, 215
risks: foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
children, grave risks to, 155 Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171
Romania: HCCCA ratified, 103
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 reciprocating territory, 260
Rome I Regulation, see European Union single entity legal system, 9
Rome II Regulation, see European Union single renvoi, 28
Russia: single unified system of law, 4
applicable law identification, 242 Slovakia:
Civil Code, 220 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
conflict of law rule, 252 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification,
double actionability displaced, 239 246
348 Index
Slovenia: Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance

Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification, No 41 of 1921, 174
246 see also Ceylon
social morality: stare decisis doctrine, 10, 215
constitutional morality and distinguished, 127 state governments:
Socialist, Secular and Democratic Republic: federal governments and, division between, 9
Constitution, 9 State level High Courts, 10
soft law: State List, see Constitution
EU, 216 stateless persons, 40
express choice of law, 200–202 statelessness:
soldiers: risks, cross-border surrogacy, 180
summonses served in India, special rules for, 83 states:
sources of private international law, 19 Constitution State List, 9
domestic judicial decisions, 20–21 status of private international law, 8
international judicial decisions, 20–21 basic concepts and, legal framework overview, 8–10
juristic writings, 21 statutes:
statutes, 20 sources of private international law, 20
South Africa: statutory framework:
closest and most real connection test, 221 foreign judgments, 258–59
foreign judgments, 270–72, 273 statutory provisions:
comity principle, 270 comity, 16
international jurisdiction, 270 commercial surrogacy, 180–81
judgment-debtors, 271 reciprocity, 16
private international law, 271, 273 Story, J, 13
South Korea: strict liability, 18
EU conflict of law rules influence, 215, 222 study of private international law, 303, 305
governing law, 247 submission:
choice ex-post, 249 judgment-debtors, 265–66
habitual residence, 246 permissive jurisdiction, 79–81
Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171 substantive aspects of law:
intellectual property, 246, 253 defamation, 302
lex loci delicti, 246 substantive foreign law, 46–47, 58
undesirable, 251 categorising substance and procedure:
lex loci protectionis, 247 law of limitation, 48
party autonomy, 216, 218, 246, 249 rights and remedies, 47–48
private international law, 229, 246–47 substantive law:
public policy, 247 private international law principles combined with, 19
unjust enrichment, 246, 252 substantive requirements:
sovereign immunity, 63 marriage, 113
Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Section 86, 63–65 substituted summonses served in India, 83
Diplomatic Relations Act, 66–68 suits:
United Nations (Privileges and Immunity) Act 1947, alien enemies, by, 62–63
65–66 foreign states, by, 63
Spain: persons who may file before Indian Courts, 62
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 sovereign immunity, 63–68
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products summonses, 81
Liability 1973 ratification, 246 service abroad, 83
Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971 ratification, defendants residing in foreign territory, 84
246 defendants residing in Pakistan or Bangladesh, 84
law, 53 defendants with no agent, 84
Special Marriage Act 1954, 20, 110, 111, 123, 129, 157 political agents or foreign courts, through, 84
annulment of marriages, 147–48 service in India, 81
divorce, 131, 142 personal or direct service, 82
Sri Lanka: prisoners, special rules for, 83
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction public officers (not belonging to the Indian military,
Act No 10 of 2001, 174 Navy or Air Force) and servants of railways or
Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171, 174 local authorities, 83
Index 349
service by Court, 81–82 Taiwan:

service by plaintiff, 82 same-sex marriage, 122
soldiers, sailors and air force personnel, special talaq:
rules for, 83 divorces, US, 149–50
substituted service, 83 pronouncement:
supremacy of Constitution, 9 divorce under Islamic law, 149–50
Supreme Court: recognition, procedural, UK, 150
guardian and interpreter of Constitution, 10 Tanzania:
judicial decisions binding on lower courts and foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
tribunals, 10 Telecom Dispute Settlement and Appellate Tribunal
prerogative writs, constitutional powers to issue, 10 (TDSAT), 200, 202
surrogacy, 178, 190–91 Thailand:
altruistic, 178 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
citizenship, 182 Hague Abduction Convention 1980, 171
commercial, 178 tort:
constitutional and statutory provisions, 180–81 choice of law absence, 251
evolution of Surrogacy Regulation Bills, 182–83 cross-border, 52
Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) cross-border disputes, 301
guidelines, 181–82 environmental, double actionability, 237–38
institutional mechanism, 184–85 negligence, of, 231
legal parentage, 184 particular:
legal status in India, 180–85 proper law of, 230
Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2019, 183–85 tortious breaches, 231
Constitution, 180 tortious claims for damages:
contracts, 181 European Union, 245
cross-border, 178–79 trade:
HCCH Working Group, 189–90 internet-based, 302–303
private international law issues in: Trade Marks Act 1999, 72, 74, 83, 85
legal parentage, 179–80 traditional surrogacy, 178
nationality, 180 traffic accidents:
statelessness risks, 180 Hague Traffic Accidents Convention 1971, 246
definition, 181 Transfer of Property Act 1954:
eligibility criteria for, 183–84 jurisdiction, 14
foreign nationals, 182 transformative constitutionalism, 125
gestational, 178 translated texts:
harmonisation, legal initiatives for and India’s role, foreign law proof and application in India, 52
189–90 transmission:
institutional mechanism, 184–85 renvoi through, 28
international surrogacy agreements (ISA), 190 transmitting agencies:
judicial statements on, public policy narratives: European Convention on Information of Foreign
Baby Manji case, 185–86 Law, 52
Jan Balaz case, 186–88 transnational contracts:
Nepal reflections, 188–89 commercial law choice of law issues, 5
legal parentage, 179–80, 184 Transnational Litigation, Conflict of Laws and the Law
nationality, 180, 182 of Limitation:
non-resident Indians (NRI), 182 Law Commission Report on, 303
Overseas Citizens of India (OCI), 182 transnational marriage, 129
Persons of Indian Origin (POI), 182 tribunals:
procedure and eligibility criteria for, 183–84 foreign arbitral awards, 292
traditional, 178 Trinidad and Tobago:
Surrogacy Regulation Bills, evolution of, 182–85 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
Sweden: reciprocating territory, 260
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 Tunisia:
Switzerland: foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 Turkey:
Syrian Arab Republic: characteristic performance, 223
foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283 conflict of law rule, 252
350 Index
defamation, cross-border disputes, 247 United Arab Emirates:

escape clauses, 247 reciprocating territory, 260
EU conflict of law rules influence, 215, 222 United Kingdom:
governing law choice, 249, 252 double actionability rule, 230
habitual residence, 247 Brussels I bis Regulation applicability during Brexit
intellectual property, 247, 253 transition, 101
lex loci damni, 247 English common law after Brexit transition, 101
lex loci delicti, 247 extrajudicial divorces, 150
lex loci protectionis, 247 foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
party autonomy, 246, 249 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions)
place of business, 247 Act 1995, 230–31
predictability balanced with flexibility, 247 procedural talaq recognition, 150
private international law, 220, 246, 247, 251 reciprocating territory, 260
restraint of competition, 247 Rome II Regulation, 231
unfair competition, 247 see also England
unjust enrichment, 247 United Nations (Privileges and Immunity) Act 1947,
two-stage characterisation, 23–24 61, 63, 65–66
United States:
UCCJA, see Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction domicile, 36
Act, US foreign arbitral awards reciprocity, 283
UCCJEA, see Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction foreign custody orders recognition, 175–76
and Enforcement Act, US HCCCA signed, 103
UK, see United Kingdom International Child Abduction Remedies Act
Ukraine: (ICARA), 175
HCCCA signed, 103 New York law, 33
surrogacy, 180 party autonomy in marital relations, 134
UN Convention on Contracts for the International polygamous marriages, 117, 120
Sale of Goods (CISG) 1980 talaq divorces, 149–50
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 153 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),
UNCITRAL’s 1958 Convention on the Recognition and 175
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, see Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
New York Convention Act (UCCJEA), 175–76
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial unjust enrichment:
Arbitration, 201, 280, 281, 283 Canada, 252
underdeveloped private international law, 4 China, 242, 252
underdeveloped status of private international law, double actionability, 236–37
18–19 European Union, 244, 252
unfair competition: Japan, 252
European Union, 244, 245 Nepal, 252
Russia, 242 Russia, 242, 252
Turkey, 247 South Korea, 246, 252
unfair trade practices: Turkey, 247
double actionability, 238 USA, see United States
UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial
Contracts (PICC), 201, 216 validation:
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), marriage, 127
US, 175 Venezuela:
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement conflict of law rules, 221
Act (UCCJEA), US, 175–76 party autonomy in choice of law, 216, 218
uniform principle: private international law, 229, 223
double actionability application as, 233 venue of arbitration, 287
Union List, see Constitution vested rights theory:
Union of States: doctrine of obligation as facet of, 260
Constitution, 9 Vienna Convention, see UN Convention on Contracts
unitary feature, federalism, 10 for the International Sale of Goods
Index 351
voidable marriage, 147 well-being:

voluntary deference: children, jurisprudence, 153–57
foreign judgments, 259 Westlake, J, 208
vulnerable parties: widows:
interests, legal principles to balance, 304 domicile, 38
wills:
weaker parties: renvoi, 29
interests, legal principles to balance, 304 Wolff, M, 23
protection of, express choice of law, women:
204–206 reproductive choices, 180–81
websites, 303 surrogacy, see surrogacy
Wednesbury reasonableness principles, 56 worldwide injunctions, 302
welfare of children, 162–63, 300 writs, prerogative, 10
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INDIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Volume 6 in the series Studies in Private International Law – Asia

4. Proving, Pleading, and Excluding the Foreign Laws������������������������������������������������������������������ 46

9. Cross-Border Surrogacy and Private International Law���������������������������������������������������������� 178

III. Determining Eligibility of a Foreign Judgment��������������������������������������������������������������� 261

ACA The Arbitration and Conciliation Act

NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation of India

A.T. Raghava Chariar v O.A Srinivasa (1916) 31 MLJ 575������������������������������������������������������������� 214

Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service Inc

Harishanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233�������������������������������������������������������������������50–51

MC Mehta v Union Of India (1987) SCR (1) 819������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 18

Sonic Surgical v National Insurance Co. Ltd (2010) 1 SCC 135������������������������������������������������������ 74

Union of India v Hardy Exploration and Production (India) INC.

1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability����������������������������������������� 246

Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations

Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts

1 [1991] 4 SCC 584.

1 SCR 915; V Ravi Chandran v Union of India [2010] 1 SCC 174.

II. Overview of Indian Legal Framework

III. Conceptual Foundations of Private International Law

19 ibid, Art 248.

26 Dell Computer Corp v Union Des Consummators [2007] SCC 34.

Raja of Khalikote AIR [1952] Cal 508 [20].

B. Private International Law or Conflicts of Laws

AK Teller, ‘Conflict of Laws’ (2004) 57 SMU Law Review 719–758.

C. Scope of Private International Law

Brien (n 25) 3–4.

Law (Oxford University Press, 1945).

Law (Springer, 2017) 63–88.

ii. Choice of Law

iii. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgment

and Reach (Indian Law Institute 2000) 651–684, 654.

Private international law. for more information can be accessed at www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions.

IV. Genesis of Private International Law in India

Muhammad’s property was in Penang, but a part of it consisted of immovable property in

B. Underdeveloped Status of Private International Law in India

C. Sources of Private International Law in India

118 Baxi (n 91) 227.

(hereinafter cited as Adoption Convention).

under the New York Convention 1958.

ii. Domestic and International Judicial Decisions

iii. Juristic Writings

V. Operationalisation of Private International Law:

i. Characterisation based on the lex fori

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 479–516, 479.

School of Law 3–21.

ii. Characterisation based on the lex causae

iii. Characterisation based on Comparative Law

Book of International Law 46–81, 51; EG Lorenzen (n 153) 281.

v. Judicial Statements on Characterisation

166 Ogden v Ogden (1908) 1 P 46 [Eng CA].

Yearbook of Private International Law 155–170.

(1956) 5(4) The American Journal of Comparative Law 629, 631.

International and Comparative Law Quarterly 436–456, 436.

187 Clarkson & Hill (n 147) 33.

196 Re Annesley [1926] ch 692.

University Studies in Law 123–146.

i. Types of Renvoi

ii. Reflections from Other jurisdictions

4. Proving, Pleading, and Excluding the Foreign Laws�� 46

9. Cross-Border Surrogacy and Private International Law�� 178

III. Determining Eligibility of a Foreign Judgment�� 261

A.T. Raghava Chariar v O.A Srinivasa (1916) 31 MLJ 575�� 214

Harishanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233��50–51

MC Mehta v Union Of India (1987) SCR (1) 819�� 18

Sonic Surgical v National Insurance Co. Ltd (2010) 1 SCC 135�� 74

1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability�� 246