G.R. No.

132344 February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

FACTS:
• May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not
the case?
• Plaintiff was enrolled in the UE College of Law from 1984 up to 1988.
• In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular
final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He
enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he
filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos
Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required
fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos
Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5)
• In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to
deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The
plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree
of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988)
• The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of
Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the
invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates.
However, at the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared that it was
only a tentative list and degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily
complete requirements
• The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called and

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 he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of
the Law Diploma
• He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar
review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his
review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
• Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the
latter's negligence
• In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led
respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree
when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students
• After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Which on appeal by
both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification ordering
defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages
• Petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering
that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose
out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his
removal exam.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner UE is liable to Romeo Jader for damages for misleading him into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation

RULING:
Yes.

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The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the
professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the
school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as
to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree
or whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Prior or subsequent to the
commencement exercises, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any
problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures
for remedying the same.

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly
at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have
acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its
professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation
and the prompt submission of grades.

The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program,
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. He must
see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the
university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails
to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not
only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.

Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged
in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the
essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign

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ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner
cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain
deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar.
Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for
the course

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the
delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he
through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity
for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable.

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's
actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. As a senior
law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. If respondent was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has
satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar
examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on
the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements
which the prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand
Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from
the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.

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G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE, respondents.

FACTS:
• Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos (USC),
during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that
school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of
"5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123
• The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC.
Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then
carried over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good
grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture
and that the same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall
academic performance to determine if she could graduate with honors.
• She wrote to the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in
Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade
average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS
in Region VII
• However, the President of the USC informed the MECS that the university policy was that
any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student for
honors
• On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote to
the USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar
referred her letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th
indorsement of March 22, 1982. Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed
to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and
Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn).

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 • On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent
graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting,
without honors. On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel, demanded
from Dean Victoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to graduate, cum laude. Dean Satorre
explained that the matter was held in abeyance pending compliance with certain
requirements of the MECS through the memo of Mr. Bacalso.
• On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class records,
reported he could not produce the same. Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wrote to
the MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change of grades
of private respondent.
• Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against
petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre asking that petitioners be
compelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in
Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all
necessary credentials evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages
in the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00
• The lower court rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff and said defendants are ordered
to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P75,000 as moral damages, the sum of
P20,000 as exemplary damages, with interest thereon at 12% per annum beginning July
22, 1982, until said amounts are fully paid: and the sum of P15,000 as attorney's fees
• Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, however the appellate court
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the refusal of that university to confer honors would constitute bad faith so as to
make it liable for damages.

RULING:
No.

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It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate rules
and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic
freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and
colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its
discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.

In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested
parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements.
Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in
the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. For an
incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period
announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically
becomes final. A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a
student from receiving honors. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors.

Private respondent knew of these rules since she exerted all efforts to have her final grades of "5's"
in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be disregarded in the computation of honors. When her
request was denied by the university, she did not ask for a reconsideration thereof. Instead, in the
middle part of March 1982 when the USC President was out of town, she wrote another letter to
the USC registrar asking her failing grades be changed as above related.

However, when it was discovered thereafter that the change of private respondent's grades from
"IC" TO "1.9" was not supported by the corresponding class records and its production was
required the same could not be produced. There is thus no justification for said change of grade.
Moreover, the request for the change of the grade of incomplete was not made by private
respondent within one (1) year so that it became final according to the rules. By the same token,
the change of the grades of private respondent from "5" to "W" (Withdrawn) in Architecture 122
and Architecture 123 was without the written permission of her parents or guardian.

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Private respondent employed undue and improper pressure on the MECS authorities to approve
the change of her grades to remove all obstacle to her graduation with honors. Petitioners' claim
that the change of grades of the private respondent was attended with fraud is not entirely
misplaced. Petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors demanded of them by the
private respondent. One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her but she had one
incomplete and two failures. Her only change was to reverse her failing grades. This she
accomplished thru the back door.

Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still within the sound
discretion of the petitioners to determine whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with
honors. The Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
honors sought by private respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the aforesaid change of
grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of honors. Private respondent not having
demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to the honors sought, her claim for damages must
necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject decision of the respondent court of May
28, 1987 and its resolution of July 7, 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

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G.R. No. 185559

JOSE G. TAN and ORENCIO C. LUZURIAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO H. VALERIANO,, Respondent.

FACTS:
• Present case arose from a damages suit for malicious prosecution filed by respondent
Romeo H. Valeriano (Valeriano) against petitioners Jose G. Tan, and Orencio C. Luzuriaga
(petitioners), as well as Toby Gonzales (Gonzales) and Antonio G. Gil an a (Gilana)
• On 4 January 2001, the Holy Name Society of Bulan, Sorsogon (Holy Name Society), held
a multi-sectoral consultative conference at the Bulan Parish Compound. Valeriano, the
president of the religious organization, delivered a welcome address during the conference.
In his address, Valeriano allegedly lambasted certain local officials of Bulan, Sorsogon,
specifically Municipal Councilors petitioners, Gilana and Vice Mayor Gonzales.
• On 5 January 2001, petitioners, together with Gilana and Gonzales, filed before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) an administrative complaint against Valeriano who was an
incumbent resident auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA). Petitioners, Gilana and
Gonzales, charged Valeriano with acts of electioneering and engaging in partisan politics.
They were convinced that, through his opening remarks, Valeriano had set the political
tone of the conference. They also claimed that Valeriano did not advise or prevent the other
speakers from criticizing the local administration with which they are politically aligned or
identified
• Petitioners and Gilana filed on 22 March 2001 another administrative complaint dated 13
March 2001 before the Office of the Ombudsman however the complaint was dismissed
by the Ombudsman on 21 June 2001 for want of evidence
• Aggrieved by the turn of events, Valeriano filed before Branch 65, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Sorsogon City, a complaint for damages against the petitioners.
• The RTC decided in favor of Valeriano. By reason of his physical suffering, mental
anguish, and social humiliation, the RTC awarded Valeriano ₱300,000.00 as moral

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 damages; ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and ₱30,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
o The RTC ruled that the act of filing of numerous cases against Valeriano by
petitioners, Gilana, and Gonzales was attended by malice, vindictiveness, and bad
faith. The RTC noted that the fact that Valeriano was singled out by petitioners,
Gilana, and Gonzales, although his participation was only to deliver the Welcome
Address, is indicative of malice.
o Also, the RTC held that the act of filing numerous cases before the CSC, COA, and
the Ombudsman, which cases were subsequently found to be unsubstantiated, is
reflective of ill will or the desire for revenge.
• In the assailed decision, the CA reversed the trial court's ruling insofar as Gonzales and
Gilana were concerned, but affirmed that petitioners should be held liable for damages.
o The CA held that petitioners' act of refiling their complaint with the CSC in April
2001, notwithstanding the pendency of the administrative case with the
Ombudsman, shows bad faith.
o The CA further held that petitioners' intent to prejudice and injure Valeriano was
revealed when they did not inform their lawyer of the pending case with the
Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted with malice or bad faith in filing the administrative complaints
against Valeriano.

RULING:
No.

Article 19 of the Civil Code contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights which requires that everyone must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The law recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because it
is recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.

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When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible.

The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) with the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

The existence of malice or bad faith is the fundamental element in abuse of right. In an action to
recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was
impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was patently malicious as to
warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code or that the suit was
grounded on malice or bad faith. There is malice when the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The award of damages arising from malicious
prosecution is justified if and only if it is proved that there was a misuse or abuse of judicial
processes.

Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution. In this case, what prompted petitioners to initiate the complaint
against Valeriano was his vital participation in the multi-sectoral conference that was held wherein
certain local officials were the subject of criticisms.
During the consultative conference held by the Holy Name Society, speakers were allowed to
criticize certain incumbent local officials. The conference was held at a time so close to the holding
of the 2001 elections. Valeriano, an employee of the COA, was, incidentally, the president of said
religious organization. Given the law's prohibition on public officers and employees, such as
Valeriano, from engaging in certain forms of political activities, it could reasonably be said that
those who had filed the complaints against Valeriano before the CSC and the Office of the
Ombudsman had done so as they had reason to believe that Valeriano was violating the prohibition.
Given the circumstances of the conference, it can reasonably be said that the complaints were filed
out of a belief in a viable cause of action against Valeriano. Put in another way, it cannot be said,
for certain, that the complaints against Valeriano were filed simply out of malice.

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There is no showing that defendants-appellants Gonzales and Gilana acted with malice or sinister
design to vex or humiliate plaintiff-appellee Valeriano by the mere act of initiating an
administrative case for electioneering against the latter with the CSC and with the Office of the
Ombudsman after the dismissal without prejudice of the complaint by the CSC

It is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution, of and by itself, does not make one liable for malicious prosecution,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Valeriano failed to
prove that the subject complaints against him were motivated purely by a sinister design. It is an
elementary rule that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon a
party alleging the same. Absent such, petitioners cannot be held liable for damages.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 25 September 2008, and
the Resolution dated 5 December 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88795 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is rendered DISMISSING the complaint
in Civil Case No. 01-176 filed by Romeo H. Valeriano before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Bulan, Sorsogon, for lack of merit.

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G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.

FACTS:
• On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu
Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of
Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans,
a blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00.
Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store
• While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug
Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed
her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed
the employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then suggested that they talk about it at
the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall.
• When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her
to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for
the black jeans. They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she
had, followed by another argument.
• On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu
Pacific Air and Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s but both refused to receive it.
• The Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter and the
latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondent’s Robinson’s
credit card
• With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless
nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock
and social humiliation. She thus filed the Complaint for Damages before the RTC against
petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo

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 (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of
moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
• The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim of the
parties. The RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees
to warrant the award of damages. The trial court concluded that:
o The petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith that respondent
failed to make payment.
o Considering that no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess
employees, the court held that when they demanded payment from respondent, they
merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was made.
o The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation
took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who
put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion.
o As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against
the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to
embarrass or humiliate respondent.
• On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Defendants Michelle Ybañez
and California Clothing, Inc. were ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiñones
jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00)
and attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).
o They agreed with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when
they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-
payment
o The CA found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in
sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer.
o It found respondent’s possession of both the official receipt and the subject black
jeans as evidence of payment
o Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu
Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for
assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule,
humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay.

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 o Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a
taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was not
privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter
contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts
of respondent in trying to evade payment.
o The appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling
respondent to collect moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California
Clothing Inc. was made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in
the hiring and selection of its employees; while Ybañez’s liability stemmed from
her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In view of
Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from
liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the principle of abuse of right.

RULING:
Yes.

Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided
for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners
allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased
from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop.
The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the
exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the
performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith,
with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the

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acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand,
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.

Considering that respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with
the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment
was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial
evidence in the proper forum. It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went
overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of
asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only
informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.

Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that
she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade
payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the
release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention
to evade payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liability
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees.
Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,

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besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the
cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They
should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions,
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.

The Court find that the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable
under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her
interest, attorney s fees in the amount of of ₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.

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G.R. No. 184315 November 28, 2011

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, NOEL CABRERA,
GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO,
THELMA SAN JUAN and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:
• Several allegedly defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila
Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation.
• Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) under three separate causes of action: (1) for damages due to libelous
publication, (2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle
Publishing, and (3) for attorney’s fees and costs against all the respondents
• On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.
• On March 18, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC
• Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the CA reconsider its
earlier decision and reverse the decision of the trial court. On August 28, 2008, the CA
rendered an Amended Decision6 reversing the earlier Decision.
• On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting the petition.
• Respondent Coyiuto, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration with Attached Supplemental Motion, both dated March 17, 2010. In his
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Coyiuto, Jr. raises the following arguments:
o The imposition of moral (₱25 million pesos) and exemplary (₱10 million pesos)
damages against Respondent Coyiuto, Jr. has no basis in law and contrary to the
specific provisions of Articles 2219 and 2229, in relation to Article 2233,
respectively, of the Civil Code

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 o No evidence was adduced on trial in support of the allegation that Respondent
Coyiuto, Jr. was "chairman", "principal owner" and "officer" of Respondent Manila
Chronicle Publishing Corporation

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages.

RULING:
Yes.

The cause of action of petitioner based on "abuse of rights," or Article 19, in relation to Article 20
of the Civil Code, warrants the award of damages.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. In the present case, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as Chairman

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of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous articles in the said newspaper,
thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.

Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner. Such
damages may be awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioner’s anguish. Further,
converse to Coyiuto, Jr.’s argument, although petitioner is claiming damages for violation of
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still such violations directly resulted in the publication of the
libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground for the recovery of
moral damages under (7) of Article 2219.

While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, the same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are
not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of
the defendant. Even petitioner, in his Comment dated June 21, 2010, agree that moral damages
"are not awarded in order to punish the respondents or to make the petitioner any richer than he
already is, but to enable the latter to find some cure for the moral anguish and distress he has
undergone by reason of the defamatory and damaging articles which the respondents wrote and
published." Further, petitioner cites as sufficient basis for the award of damages the plain reason
that he had to "go through the ordeal of defending himself everytime someone approached him to
ask whether or not the statements in the defamatory article are true."
The Court, therefore, finds the award of moral damages in the first and second cause of action in
the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 and ₱25,000,000.00, respectively, to be too excessive and holds that
an award of ₱1,000,000.00 and ₱10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral damages are more
reasonable.

As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in
the first and second cause of action in the amount of ₱500,000.00 and ₱10,000,000.00,
respectively, is reduced to ₱200,000.00 and ₱1,000,000.00, respectively.

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On the matter of attorney’s fees and costs of suit, Article 2208 of the same Code provides, among
others, that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases when exemplary
damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered. In any event, however, such award must be reasonable,
just and equitable. Thus, the award of attorney’s fees and costs is reduced from ₱1,000,000.00 to
₱200,000.00.

Corollarilly, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the person who "caused the publication"
of a defamatory article shall be responsible for the same. Hence, Coyiuto, Jr. should have been
held jointly and solidarily liable with the other respondents in the first cause of action under this
article and not on the basis of violation of the principle of abuse of rights founded on Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code. Because of the exclusion of Coyiuto, Jr. in the first cause of action for
libel, he cannot be held solidarily liable with the other respondents in the first cause of action.
Nonetheless, since damage to petitioner was in fact established warranting the award of moral and
exemplary damages, the same could only be awarded based on petitioner’s second cause of action
impleading Coyiuto, Jr. for violation of the principle of abuse of right.

Also, petitioner intended the liability of Coyiuto, Jr. to be different from the other respondents.. It
can be inferred that if Coyiuto, Jr. was impleaded in the first cause of action for recovery of the
civil liability in libel, petitioner could not have prayed for higher damages, considering that the
other respondents, who are jointly and severally liable with one another, are not in the same
financial standing as Coyiuto, Jr. Petitioner, in effect, had spared the other respondents from
paying such steep amount of damages, while at the same time prayed that Coyiuto, Jr. pay millions
of pesos by way of moral and exemplary damages in the second cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
PARTIALLY GRANTED.1âwphi1 The Decision of this Court, dated November 25, 2009, is
MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

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1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto
Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and
Rodney Diola, to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) as exemplary damages;

2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle
Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

b. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and
severally, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) as attorney’s fee and legal
costs.

Costs against respondents.

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G.R. No. 161188 June 13, 2008

Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA

DUYAN, petitioners,
vs.
ARTEMIO CABANSAG, respondent.

FACTS:
• Artemio Cabansag bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr.
and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot
registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter
from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala),
asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said
property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed against
him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands,
respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty.
Del Prado.
• Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely
acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala
alleged that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late
husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400- square
meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Nala also
claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he occupies.
• The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent.
• Nala and Atty. Del Prado appealed to the CA. However, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision
with modification
• Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her
interests over the property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses
Gomez to respondent when the demand letters were sent. What she was aware of was the

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 fact that spouses Gomez were managing the rentals on the property by virtue of the implied
trust created between them and Eulogio Duyan. When spouses Gomez failed to remit the
rentals and claimed ownership of the property, it was then that Nala decided to procure the
services of legal counsel to protect their rights over the property.
• Petitioners also contend that it was error for the CA to take note of the RTC Decision in
Civil Case No. 91-8821 without further noting that the CA had already reversed and set
aside said RTC Decision and ordered reconveyance of the property to Nala and her children
in a Decision dated March 8, 2000 rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163.
• Petitioners also argue that respondent did not substantiate his claim for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nala and Atty. Del Prado are liable for damages

RULING:
No.

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the
core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty.
Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first
place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her
husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no
knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously
sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for damages
against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the
property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was
done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be
attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the property.

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Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the sole
intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a
material distinction between damages and injury.

Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results
from the injury. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.

Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand
letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the
property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus,
whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him. Also, Nala's acts in
protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact that the property has
already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution
dated October 28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48580 are
NULLIFIED. Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against respondent.

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G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
• Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917 while petitioner was almost ten (10)
years younger than she
• In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu,
where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when
after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot.
• In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon
he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in
a private maternity and clinic.
• However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
• On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said
of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise
• Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter,
but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant
• Upon her motion, the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordered petitioner, on October 27,
1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February
16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. Also sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum
P4,500.00 for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages;
and the further sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees
• On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the
actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively

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 o “Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power,
plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual
desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold
that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages
may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of
the new Civil Code.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry

RULING:
No.

The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines
deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. Provisions were inserted in the Proposed Civil
Code that allows compensation of moral damages for breach of promise to marry. However, these
articles were eliminated in Congress. The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the
more progression trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it
is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence
of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong
direction.

In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for
breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly,
untenable

Moreover, the Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia that "the action for breach of promises to marry
has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . .
upon the faith of such promise". Hence, the breach of promise to marry is not actionable.

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Furthermore, the Court are unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself"
to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit
of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance.
It is so ordered.

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G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
• Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.
• On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note for his bride-to-be stating that the wedding will be
postponed since his mother opposes it.
• However, on September 3, he sends a telegram saying that nothing has changed
• Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
• Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff
adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
• On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut.
But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before
it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving
at an amicable settlement."
• However, on August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court
• Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956
calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
• In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence
as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to
his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's

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 cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous
event and/or circumstances beyond his control."
• On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition
• In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Velez is liable for damages.

RULING:
Yes.

The wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received. However, after sending the two messages on September 2 and 3, respondent never
returned and was never heard from again

Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

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Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable
in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, under the above-
narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner."

This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.

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G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

FACTS:
• Zenaida B. Cirilo contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of
the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was
raped
• On September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along
Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack,
defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion. Plaintiff
and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they
had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited
her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan
de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity
• The car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel.
Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries
and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male
combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature.
Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered
her against her will and consent.
• After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go
home but the latter would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they
were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make any
scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used
had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother
in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening At

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 about ten (10) o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag,
Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday, she and Bunag,
Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they did. They filed their
applications for marriage license and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned
to the house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973
to September 29, 1973.
• On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff.
On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed
an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. He then later compelled
her to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went
home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by defendants-
appellants
• Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had
earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among
them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the
afternoon of September 8, 1973.
• Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over
money and the threats made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married
• A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado
Bunag, Sr.
• On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped
private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to
pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as
well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all
liability.
• Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly
committed by trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in
finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-
appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she

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 would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-
appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage.
• On May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals
and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Bunag Jr. is liable for damages.

RULING:
Yes.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise
to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave
so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising
to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant

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and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.

Moreover, petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial
court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior
dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will
give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and
resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS:
• Marilou T. Gonzales is a twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of
good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Gashem Shookat
Baksh on the other hand is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City
• According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had
a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He
later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his
proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her
hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform
them of their relationship and their intention to get married.
• Sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries
• In the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he
went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship,
plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry
her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City.

Jagolino (3LM2)
• Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in
the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may
be just and equitable
• The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees
• The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that
o (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers,
o (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to sexual advances,
o (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry
private respondent,
o (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be
deflowered by him,
o (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors,
o (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
o (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and
traditions
• On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in
toto the trial court's ruling. The CA concluded:
o In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree
to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And

Jagolino (3LM2)
 as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying
the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in
one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made,
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable to the case and whether or not petitioner
is liable for damages

RULING
Yes.

Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible
for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts.

The Court are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that

Jagolino (3LM2)
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise
to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. In his annotations on the Civil Code,
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had
been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered: if there be criminal or moral seduction,
but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper.

It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on
account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by
him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved
by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even
remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust

Jagolino (3LM2)
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love
and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

Jagolino (3LM2)