2014 IAP HandBook LOW RES Spreads

INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT
AND
PLANNING
HANDBOOK
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank all the staff who contributed to the Handbook, including the United
Nations colleagues across the world who took the time to share their experiences and
provide their input to ensure that the document remains grounded in the realities of
conflict and post-conflict contexts. Their commitment to the United Nations having a
greater impact in these difficult situations is appreciated and valued across the entire
Organization. This publication would not have been possible without the willingness
of the following individuals to share their knowledge and time.
Alexander Costy Mari Warne-Smith

Bautista Logioco Marlies Bull
Christina Bennett Marta Cali
Colin MacInnes Michael Lund
Ekaterina Pischalnikova Michelle Glasser
Elisabeth Diaz Natalia Miller
Elizabeth Rolando Nicholas Aarons
Gary Love Oliver Ulich
Gerald Bourke Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg
Hannah Cao Rebecca Worner
Huria Ogbamichael Renata Dwan
Jonathan Robinson Sebastien Lapierre
Joya Rajadhyaksha Sibi Lawson-Marriott
Karin Sorensen Sivanka Dhanapala
Kay Schwendinger Sofia Carrondo
Kimberly Deni Sumie Nakaya
Kyoko Ono Vanessa Howe-Jones
Marc Jacquand Vincent Pasquini
A special word of thanks to Her Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom and
the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations for their generous support
to the Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning.
IAP Working Group

December 2013
[3]
Table of Contents II.2.1 The Senior Leadership Forum ........................................................................ 57
II.2.2 Joint Analytical and Planning Capacity...................................................... 58
II.2.3 Leveraging Existing Coordination Structures .......................................... 60
Toolbox: Integrated Mechanisms ........................................................................................ 63

Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 7
A. Template Terms of Reference for ITFs ................................................................... 63
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... 9
B. Template Terms of Reference for Integrated Analytical and
Section I: Integrated Assessments....................................................................................... 13 Planning Capacity......................................................................................................... 64
I.1 The Definition of Integrated Assessments .......................................................... 15
Section III: Integrated Planning ............................................................................................ 69
I.2 The Joint Conduct of Strategic Assessments...................................................... 17 III.1 Directive to S/ERSG, RC and HC ............................................................................... 70
I.2.1 Overview of the Strategic Assessment Process ........................................ 17 III.1.1 Purpose and scope ............................................................................................ 70
I.2.2 The Strategic Assessment Process ................................................................ 19 III.1.2 Process................................................................................................................... 70
I.2.3 Methodology of the Strategic Assessment................................................ 24 III.1.3 Structure of the Directive ............................................................................... 71
I.3 Integrated Technical Assessments ......................................................................... 30 III.2 Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) ................................................................... 71
I.3.1 Timing ...................................................................................................................... 31 III.2.1 Policy Framework and Purpose .................................................................... 73
I.3.2 Composition and Leadership.......................................................................... 31 III.2.2 Scope of an ISF ................................................................................................... 74
I.3.3 Finalization and Authority ............................................................................... 31 III.2.3 The Process of Developing the ISF ............................................................. 78
I.4 Risk Analysis.................................................................................................................... 32 III.3 Transition Planning in the Context of Mission Drawdown
I.4.1 Considerations for Risk Analysis ..................................................................... 33 and Withdrawal ............................................................................................................. 84
I.4.2 Humanitarian Considerations ......................................................................... 34 III.4 Aligning with National and International Planning Processes ..................... 88
I.5 Options and Models for Structural Integration ................................................. 35 III.4.1 Improving Linkages with National Planning Processes ....................... 88
Toolbox: Integrated Assessments ........................................................................................ 41 III.4.2 Improving Linkages with International Planning Processes ............. 91
A. Template Terms of Reference for a Strategic Assessment ............................. 41 III.5 Comparative Advantage and Integrated Planning .......................................... 92
B. Template for a Strategic Assessment Report ...................................................... 41 III.5.1 Assessing Comparative Advantage ............................................................ 92
C. Methodologies and Tools for Conflict Analysis III.5.2 Transfer of Mandated Tasks ........................................................................... 94
and Priority Objectives ............................................................................................... 42 III.6 Joint Sectoral Planning............................................................................................... 96
D. Template Terms of Reference for a Technical Assessment Mission ............ 46 III.6.1 Outline of Joint Planning Process and Document ................................. 97
Section II: Integrated Mechanisms ...................................................................................... 49 III.6.2 United Nations Integrated Support for Government
II.1 Headquarters Structures: Establishing and Managing Sectoral Planning.......................................................................................................... 97
Integrated Task Forces ................................................................................................ 50 III.7 Integrated Support Planning ................................................................................... 99
II.1.1 Main Roles.............................................................................................................. 50 III.7.1 Common Services .............................................................................................. 100
II.1.2 Establishment of an ITF .................................................................................... 51 III.7.2 Limitations ........................................................................................................... 101
II.1.3 Management and Composition .................................................................... 51 III.8 Joint Resource Mobilization ..................................................................................... 101
II.1.4 Objectives of the ITF .......................................................................................... 53 Toolbox: Integrated Planning ................................................................................................ 105
II.1.5 Roles Across Mission Life-cycles.................................................................... 54 A. Template for Directive to SRSG, RC and HC......................................................... 105
II.2 Field Structures: Establishing and Managing Joint Structures for B. Template for Military Directive to the United Nations Force
Decision-Making, Planning, Programming and Operations ......................... 56 Commander for the Military Operations in [Name of Mission] .................... 106
[4] [5]
C. Key Questions in Preparation for Developing an ISF ....................................... 110 Introduction
D. Sample Outline for ISF Document .......................................................................... 111
E. Mapping of Planning Frameworks and Tools ..................................................... 112
F. United Nations Guidance on National Capacity-Building
The United Nations Secretary-General’s endorsement of the Policy on Integrated As-
and Institution-Building ............................................................................................. 114
sessment and Planning1 reaffirms the Organization’s commitment to integration as
G. Support Services and Goods to be Considered for Integration................... 115 a way of maximizing the individual and collective impact of the United Nations in
Section IV: Integrated Monitoring and Reporting ........................................................ 121 conflict and post-conflict situations. Now more than ever, when the sources of in-
IV.1 Monitoring and Reporting on Integrated Plans ................................................ 122 stability and conflict are increasingly multidimensional and the environment is one
of significant resource constraints, the United Nations family must maintain unity of
IV.1.1 Frequency of Reporting .................................................................................. 122
purpose and work together to do “better with less”, if it is to be effective in meeting
IV.1.2 Format ................................................................................................................... 123 the needs of war-torn societies. The diversity of mandates and the need to respect
IV.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities .............................................................................. 124 agreed principles across the range of political, security, humanitarian, human rights
IV.2 Benchmarking ............................................................................................................... 126 and development responses is not a barrier to integration. In fact, this diversity is an
asset, which can be harnessed by the Organization in a manner that enhances, rather
IV.2.1 Purpose ................................................................................................................. 126
than undermines, each response.
IV.2.2 Different Benchmarks for Different Uses ................................................. 126
The mandatory minimum requirements established by the IAP Policy have been de-
IV.2.3 Benchmarking Steps ........................................................................................ 127 signed – and subsequently agreed by the leadership of the United Nations – to en-
IV.3 Mainstreaming Integrated Plans into United Nations sure that the purposes of integration can be achieved. The IAP Policy does not, how-
Reporting Mechanisms............................................................................................... 128 ever, over-prescribe how to meet each requirement, which must be adapted to the
IV.3.1 Purpose ................................................................................................................. 128 specific characteristics of each situation by those directly involved in the response in
the field and at Headquarters.
IV.3.2 Best Practices...................................................................................................... 128
It is in the same spirit that the following Handbook on the implementation of the
Toolbox: Integrated Monitoring and Reporting ............................................................ 131 IAP Policy has been developed. The Handbook captures – and celebrates – the cre-
A. Example of Monitoring Scorecard (DRC) ............................................................. 131 ativity and breadth of innovation already on display in contexts as varied as Leba-
B. Deliverable Scorecard Model (Libya) ..................................................................... 136 non, Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti, and across all
levels and areas of United Nations support. Under the framework of the IAP Policy,
C. ISF M&E Report UNSMIL Sample (March 2013) ................................................... 139
the ability of United Nations staff, from missions, the UN country team (UNCT) and
References....................................................................................................................................... 141 Headquarters, to apply the requirements in a manner that makes the United Nations
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. 143 system as a whole more coherent, more effective and more efficient, remains our
greatest asset.
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... 143
The Handbook provides guidance on methodologies, tools and approaches that may
Appendix: Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning...................................... 145 be used to meet the IAP Policy’s mandatory requirements and minimum standards.
It combines elements from various sources, including previous guidelines, 2 with up-
dates as necessary. Some sections of the policy have also required the development
of new guidance by relevant parts of the United Nations system, in consultation with
a number of United Nations mission and UNCT strategic planners, who also contrib-
uted specific sections or experiences. Such inputs have been instrumental in recog-
nizing the diversity of contexts and conditions under which the United Nations is
called to undertake integrated assessment and planning processes, and the Hand-
1 IAP, Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013).

2 For example, IMPP Guidelines on Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences: Role of the Field
(2009) and Role of Headquarters (2010).
[6] [7]
book has therefore been developed on the basis of accumulated experiences and List of Abbreviations
past practices, and offers flexible tools and critical questions to be asked rather than
fixed templates.
As such, we see this Handbook as a source of guidance, but also as an on-going pro-
cess of knowledge sharing where good practices, as well as less successful ideas, can ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
be recorded and disseminated. We encourage regular feedback on the implementa- ADF Allied Democratic Forces, Uganda
tion of the IAP Policy, on the usefulness of the examples and tools provided, and on
BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
all other examples of integrated approaches that do or do not work.
(renamed BNUB January 2011)
For ease of reference and application, the structure of the Handbook closely mir-
BNUB United Nations Office in Burundi
rors that of the IAP Policy. However, while each section contains references to other
sections, the Handbook can be used in a modular manner. Different sections can be CAF Country Assistance Framework
read as stand-alone guidance according to need, including for contexts that do not CAP Consolidated Appeal Process
include integrated presences. The Handbook should be read in conjunction with the CCA Common Country Assessment
IAP Policy as well as other recently adopted policies and handbooks, including the CHAP Common Humanitarian Action Plan
Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal3 and the
CNDP National Congress for the Defence of the People, DRC
Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one”
Approach,4 which present guidance and practices across a range of themes including CPAP Country Programme Action Plan
programmes, operations, funding and communication that are highly relevant to in- DDR disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
tegrated assessment and planning. DDRRR disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and
resettlement
DFS Department of Field Support
DOCO Development Operations Coordination Office
DPA Department of Political Affairs
DPET Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, DPKO
IAP Working Group
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
December 2013
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ECHA Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ERSG Executive Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EU European Union
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
FRPI Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri, DRC
GNC General National Congress, Libya
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT humanitarian country team
HLC High-Level Committee
IAP Integrated Assessment and Planning
3 Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013).
4 UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the IDP internally displaced person
“Delivering as one” Approach (2013).
[8] [9]
IMF International Monetary Fund RCO Resident Coordinator Office
IMPP Integrated Mission Planning Process SA Strategic Assessment
IMTF Integrated Mission Task Force SOP Standard Operating Procedure
ISF Integrated Strategic Framework SPG Strategic Policy Group
ISPT Integrated Strategy and Planning Team SPM Special Political Mission
ITF Integrated Task Force SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre SSR security sector reform
JSJP Justice and Security Joint Programme SSSS Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
JTP Joint Transition Plan TAM technical assessment mission
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army TOR terms of reference
M&E monitoring and evaluation UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets UNAMID African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti UNCT United Nations country team
MLT Mission Leadership Team UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
MOB mobile operating base UNDG United Nations Development Group
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of UNDP United Nations Development Programme
the Congo (renamed MONUSCO in July 2010) UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic UNEST United Nations Electoral Support Team
Republic of the Congo
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
NALU National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
NGO non-governmental organization
UNIPSIL United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
NJP National Justice Programme
UNMAS Mine Action Service, DPKO
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan (ended July 2011)
OROLSI Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
PAD Political Affairs Division
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
PARECO Patriotes Résistants Congolais
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
PBC Peacebuilding Commission
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
PBF Peacebuilding Fund
UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya
PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office
UN WOMEN United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
PCNA Post-Conflict Needs Assessment Women
PNDDR National Programme of DDR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo VTC video teleconferencing
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper WHO World Health Organization
RBB Results-Based Budgeting
RC Resident Coordinator
[ 10 ] [ 11 ]
Section i
Integrated Assessments
This section presents guidance on the conduct of

integrated assessments in line with the requirements
articulated in the IAP Policy. Under the IAP framework, this
guidance applies to any type of assessment of a strategic,
programmatic or technical nature, when it must be
carried out in an integrated manner because its scope and
operational implications extend beyond one entity.
As such, this section covers strategic assessments, which,
as UN system-wide assessments, must be integrated. It
also addresses technical assessments that may require an
integrated approach, if their outcome is expected to affect
multiple UN entities.
The guidance is supplemented by a toolbox at the end of
the section, containing information on various analytical
tools that may be used in the conduct of integrated
assessments.
UN Photo/Patricia Esteve
Kids take part in a cross country race in Bonoua, Côte d’Ivoire, organized by
the UN mission, UNOCI, as part of its “sports and peace” activities with local
communities.
20 April 2012
Bonoua, Côte d’Ivoire [ 12 ]
Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook
I.1 The Definition of Integrated Assessments
= Integrated Planning
Products/Processes
UN-Wide Strategic
Entity-Specific
Strategic and
What the IAP Policy says:
Operational
Planning
Planning
16. An integrated assessment is defined as any UN analytical process at the stra-
tegic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple
UN entities, and which therefore requires participation by concerned UN entities.
The Strategic Assessment is the analytical process used to undertake integrated
assessment at the UN system-wide level for the purpose defined in paragraph
28 of this policy. Assessments of a technical nature, such as technical assessment
Agency Funds and

Sec tion I
Sec tion I
missions (TAMs) and sector assessments initiated by either Secretariat depart-
Country Project
Programmes’
Documents
Planning Framework for Integrated UN Presences
ments or agencies, funds and programmes, are integrated if and when their
UNDAF
scope and operational implications relate to multiple entities of the UN system.
28. The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to bring the UN political, security,
Recommendation to SG/PC, SG/PC Decision and Recommendation to
Integrated Strategic Framework or Equivalent development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a
shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders
and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engage-
ment on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities. Ahead of Mission
Directive to S/ERSG, RC and HC
Mission Component CONOPS

(military, police, support etc.)
start-up planning or during the life-cycle of established integrated presences,
Peace Consolidation
Strategic Assessment
Results-Based Budget
the Strategic Assessment provides a basis for the development of recommenda-
Figure 1: Overview of Planning Framework for Integrated UN Presences

Mission Concept
Span of Activities
the Security Council
(e.g. UNDAF+)
Security Council
tions on the nature and (re)configuration of UN engagement for the consider-

Mandate
ation of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security

Council.
29. The decision to launch a Strategic Assessment is made by:
a. The Secretary-General; or
b. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security; or
c. An Integrated Task Force at Director level or above
30. Strategic Assessments can be proposed by a number of UN entities including:
a. A member of the Policy Committee
Humanitarian
Programmes
b. A member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security

CAP
c. A member of the Integrated Task Force

d. The head of a UN peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political
Mission
e. The RC and/or HC, representing the UNCT
31. Strategic Assessments should complement, and draw on, any other analyti-
International
National and
Framework
cal processes that components of the UN system may have undertaken on the
Planning
ground.
32. Relevant interlocutors should be consulted including, to the extent possible,
national authorities, civil society and other local representatives, as well as rel-
[ 14 ] [ 15 ]
Until recently, much of the focus, at the policy level and in practice, had been on mis-
evant regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions
sion start-up. While integrated assessments obviously have great significance and
and key member states.
value at that time, there are also valid reasons to conduct integrated assessments at
33. Strategic Assessments are mandatory in all cases where the deployment of a subsequent stages.
multidimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mis-
sion is being considered. 3. Risk analysis constitutes an essential dimension of all integrated
34. Where no integrated UN presence is in place, a Strategic Assessment is under-
assessments.
taken by a Headquarters-based Integrated Task Force, which may already exist In crisis and post-conflict settings, it is important that a careful consideration of risks
or may need to be established. The Strategic Assessment is then undertaken in (to a specific entity, to the United Nations as a whole, to populations affected by
consultation with the UNCT. the crisis, to national and external actors, including civil society organizations) be
35. Where an integrated UN presence is in place, Strategic Assessments should included in Strategic Assessments and most technical assessments (some exercise of
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
be carried out following a significant change in the situation or prior to a sub- a highly technical nature may not always need such considerations). For the type of
stantial change in a Mission’s mandate. In these settings, Strategic Assessments assessments considered by the IAP Policy, a comprehensive approach to risk analysis
can be initiated at field or HQ level. (nature, probability, mitigation measures, etc.) makes it therefore necessary for such
36. Strategic Assessments result in a report and, where required, a recommenda- assessments to be “integrated”.
tion to the Secretary-General through the Policy Committee. Strategic Assess-
ments do not necessarily result in a recommendation to initiate planning for the
I.2 The Joint Conduct of Strategic Assessments
establishment of a peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mis-
sion or changes to existing arrangements. In all cases, the chair of the Integrated The Strategic Assessment is a form of integrated assessment with the specific aim of
Task Force has the obligation to reflect any disagreements over findings and/ identifying key challenges, strategies and options for United Nations engagement on
or proposed options when finalizing the report and recommendations to the peace consolidation priorities, as well as proposals for United Nations (re)configura-
Secretary-General and/or the Policy Committee. tion in a given context.
Strategic Assessments should be undertaken whenever there is a need to formulate
The IAP Policy makes three critical points in particular: (or reformulate) the UN’s strategy for engagement on peace consolidation priorities
1. All assessments, regardless of title, level of focus and institutional in a particular country. They may be triggered by several factors, including a dramatic
leadership (mission or United Nations agency, fund or programme) must be change in the conflict or post-conflict crisis situation, and/or significant progress to-
conducted in an integrated manner if they have operational implications for wards peacebuilding objectives. Strategic Assessments may also be undertaken as
multiple entities. part of a broader United Nations transition triggered by a surge, drawdown or with-
drawal of a Security Council mandated presence, in order to determine the most ap-
While this is straightforward for system-wide assessments at the strategic level, the
propriate configuration for a follow-on United Nations presence.
policy applies as well at the technical level. For example, if an agency is carrying out
To this end, the Strategic Assessment is designed to:
a technical assessment of its rule of law portfolio in a post-conflict country where
a mission and/or other agencies also manage rule of law programmes, this agency (a) Present a shared analysis of the conflict situation including its key factors and
should engage with United Nations partners involved in rule of law activities for the dynamics;
conduct of the assessment process. Similarly, if a peacekeeping mission conducts a
(b) Identify the main priority objectives to address those key factors;
review of its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) operations in a
(c) Identify the strategic options for the United Nations in order to respond
country where United Nations agencies also run DDR projects, then the assessment
to the situation on the ground (and potentially revisit the United Nations
must include these agencies.
configuration).
The details of the integrated approach (how many entities and which to include, etc.)
will vary depending on the context.
I.2.1 Overview of the Strategic Assessment Process
2. The requirement applies throughout the life-cycle of the integrated United The following diagram summarizes the Strategic Assessment process, the range of
Nations presence. settings in which it may be conducted, and the documents it will generate.
[ 16 ] [ 17 ]
I.2.2 The Strategic Assessment Process
and implementation
integrated planning
Depending on SA
Convening the ITF
New/revised UN
appropriate UN
setting, select
instruments
Change UN
strategy
strategy
The Strategic Assessment is undertaken by an Integrated Task Force (ITF) in close con-
sultation with existing in-country United Nations management, combining field-level
Policy Committee
and Headquarters expertise. Depending on the country situation to be assessed, an
strategic options
ITF may already exist or one may need to be established. The establishment of an ITF
Considers
for the purpose of a Strategic Assessment does not presume the deployment of an
integrated United Nations presence on the ground, or whether such a presence, if it
is to be deployed, should be structurally integrated. The ITF is chaired, on behalf of
the United Nations system, by the lead department for the relevant country in the
Status quo
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
in countries where conflict is present, imminent or could reoccur.
United Nations Secretariat (DPA or DPKO). 5 Various agencies, funds and programmes
For formulation or reformulation of UN strategic engagement
(based on the “2+4” formula6), and United Nations field presences (i.e. the UNCT and
United Nations peace operation if one is present in the country) should be members
of the ITF and therefore heavily involved in the shaping, conduct and endorsement
of the Strategic Assessment.
Strategic Assessment Terms of Reference and Workplan

UN Strategic Assessment (SA)
The Strategic Assessment terms of reference (TOR) articulate the objectives for the
Strategic Assessment, as well as how and when it is to be carried out. The objective/
Strategic Assessment TOR
Assessment report
Produces Strategic
Strategic options
(existing or new)
aim in the TOR should include:

Conduct desk review
which includes
Undertake field visit
UN priorities
(a) A brief articulation of the situation and the necessity/opportunity it presents
ITF
Analysis
for a potential change in the United Nations strategy;
and workplan
(b) The identification of specific areas of concern;

•Produce
•
•
•
(c) Consideration of prior engagements/actions in the country as well as current
United Nations presence, plans and mandates;
•
•
(d) The specific output(s) of the Strategic Assessment.
Figure 2: United Nations Strategic Assessment

The ITF should develop a Strategic Assessment workplan as soon as possible. This
should be a working document, with a matrix of activities, timeline and division of
labour. Updated versions should be distributed regularly to ITF members including
field counterparts.
Members of Policy Committee
Organization and Roles and Responsibilities

UN system-wide strategy
to formulate/reformulate
political crisis situations
conflict/post-conflict/
Dramatic change in
An ITF conducting a Strategic Assessment should ensure senior participation at

Can be requested by:
and/or need
Trigger
Members of ECPS
Headquarters and field levels for decision-making. ITF members should be empow-
Heads of Mission
5 DPA: Department of Political Affairs; DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

UNCT
6 Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by the Office for
IMPT
ITF
SG
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Development Operations Coordination
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Office (DOCO), respectively. In addition to these two, four representatives from the UN agencies,
funds and programmes may participate based on their involvement in the country in question,
their ability to participate and the relevance of their mandate. Entities not based at United Nations
Headquarters (e.g. Geneva or Rome) are encouraged to participate by video teleconferencing or
through other means.
[ 18 ] [ 19 ]
•
ered to represent their respective departments and agencies in the assessment. They Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAPs) and Humanitarian Situation Reports (OCHA
should possess the requisite analytical skills and have an expert understanding of online)
the assessment and planning modalities of their department or agency, as well as a • Previous Strategic Assessments (contact relevant desk officer)
thorough understanding of the principles of integration.
• Integrated Strategic Frameworks (ISFs)
The ITF could also consider consultant expert advisers in areas where United Nations
capacity is deemed insufficient and/or to provide an external perspective, and/or one
• Transition plans
or two dedicated lead drafters. The ITF could also consider bringing in specific the- • United Nations human rights reports (OHCHR11 online), reports by special mecha-
matic expertise from non-resident and specialized agencies not represented in the nisms of the Human Rights Council (online) and concluding observations by treaty
ITF, when a particular thematic issue is salient for the country situation. bodies
The ITF may decide to create a subgroup or task team to develop an initial draft, us- • New Deal Fragility Assessments (where available/relevant)
ing the full ITF for consultations, revisions and sign-off on a final draft. In addition, the Strategic Assessment should draw upon relevant non-UN analyses,
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
including those providing fragility assessments. This should include analyses pro-
Duration
vided by important players on the ground, including Member States, regional or-
There is no strict guideline on the duration of a Strategic Assessment and each case ganizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in order to ensure coher-
will be determined based on its merits. At the same time, the ITF should normally ence with their action. An indicative list of documents and reports to be considered
ensure the substantive nature of the Strategic Assessment by dedicating about 2–3 includes those produced by:
months from inception to conclusion. If required, Strategic Assessments can also • Governments, including national plans and related documents
be conducted on an accelerated basis, sometimes within a few weeks. The ITF also
needs to bear in mind any external deadlines, such as requests from the Security
• Think tanks, academic institutions, research organizations
Council for recommendations/reports. The ITF should liaise with the Policy Commit- • Human rights organizations
tee Secretariat to align the timing of the Strategic Assessment with the scheduled • Civil society organizations
meetings of the Policy Committee. • Member States
Desk Review As part of the desk review, a stakeholder mapping exercise should be undertaken
(see methodologies in the toolbox at the end of this section). This would ideally be
The Strategic Assessment, to the extent possible, should draw upon existing United
conducted by the field presences and would map the various actors (national/sub-
Nations analyses and country strategies. The following is an indicative list of the pos-
national government, donors, United Nations, international and national civil society
sible existing analyses:
groups, women’s groups, youth groups, regional actors, etc.) and their activities as
• Secretary-General reports and Security Council resolutions (Security Council on- they relate to peace consolidation in the country.
line)
Field Visit(s)
• United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and Common
Country Assessments (CCAs) (UNDG7 online) A Strategic Assessment may involve a field visit by the ITF or by the subgroup de-
• Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (IMF and World Bank online)
8 veloping the initial draft. The field visits should be of sufficient duration to ensure
proper consultations as well as time for drafting/redrafting of the Strategic Assess-
• Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) (UNDG online)
ment report.
• Peacebuilding Commission reports and Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks
In some cases a field trip may not be possible, for example when time is short or
(PBSO and PBC9 online)
where the security situation on the ground does not permit a visit. When a field trip
• Peacebuilding Fund documents, including Peacebuilding Priority Plans (PBF10 on- is not possible special measures should be taken to fully capture field-based assess-
line) ments from all appropriate national, regional and international actors. In all cases,
and even if a field mission does not take place, country-based United Nations leader-
ship should be involved in the establishment of United Nations priorities and strate-
7 UNDG: United Nations Development Group. gic options.
8 IMF: International Monetary Fund.
9 PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office; PBC: Peacebuilding Commission.
10 PBF: Peacebuilding Fund. 11 OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
[ 20 ] [ 21 ]
Consultations with External Stakeholders Internal Consultations and Endorsement of Report

While the Strategic Assessment is an internal United Nations process, consultations Following the development of the draft Strategic Assessment report, the ITF should
with external stakeholders and other actors are essential for a number of reasons: review the document and make any necessary changes. The draft should then be
• To ensure that the Strategic Assessment is developed on the basis of the best circulated for comments within each ITF member entity, keeping in mind the require-
available expertise and information; ment that members keep their respective entities informed throughout the process,
with input consolidated by the relevant ITF representative. These internal consulta-
• To ensure that the recommended options for United Nations engagement are
tions on the draft facilitate institutional buy-in to the conclusions of the Strategic As-
properly coordinated with national, regional and international initiatives, and as-
sessment exercise. These consultations shall also be mindful of the need to consoli-
sess the level of support from key actors for these options;
date views between the field and Headquarters, which is the responsibility of each
• To secure close involvement of international financial institutions, such as the entity in the ITF.
World Bank12 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional develop-
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The Strategic Assessment is a collective product of the ITF. Therefore, the ITF has a
ment banks as appropriate, as well as bilateral donors, in order to link options for
shared responsibility to ensure that consultations are undertaken with sufficient time
United Nations engagement with funding and resource mobilization discussions,
and care to promote substantive improvements in and institutional commitment to
and access relevant analysis and expertise from these institutions;
the Strategic Assessment. Following these consultations, the ITF prepares a revised
• To ensure that government, local civil society leaders, including women, as well as draft, which is then endorsed by the ITF at the Director level. On the basis of the re-
private sector associations are engaged. In situations where the Strategic Assess- port, the ITF develops the Policy Committee submission paper.
ment is undertaken alongside broader consultations between the national and
international community on post-conflict priorities (including, for instance, joint Administration, Logistics and Budget
or technical assessments by humanitarian actors, and with the Protection Cluster Each participating entity shall cover the cost of its representative for the Strategic
in particular, the PCNA process, fragility assessments and other New Deal related Assessment, including field visits. The hiring of consultants should be undertaken by
plans, or discussions within the Peacebuilding Commission), it is critical to make the lead department.
all efforts to ensure that these different processes are linked and coordinated, in
order to avoid lack of coherence and fragmentation of efforts.
Factors Contributing to Successful Strategic Assessments
The Strategic Assessment Report
Based on experience to date, there are a number of factors that contribute to the
Following the field visit(s), the ITF (or subgroup) finalizes the draft Strategic Assess- successful conduct of Strategic Assessments. Conversely, the absence of these
ment report. The report should be structured along the following lines (a template conditions may result in processes and outcomes that do not meet the basic pur-
outline is provided in the toolbox at the end of this section): pose of a Strategic Assessment, resulting in a significant waste of human and fi-
• Executive Summary nancial resources and, in some cases, loss of trust among United Nations entities
• Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment
participating in the process. It is therefore critically important that these factors
are taken into account in the planning and conduct of a Strategic Assessment.
• Key conflict factors They include:
• Analysis of priority objectives • A strong focus on substantive and strategic priorities for the United Nations
• Existing capacities and an analysis of risks and opportunities in the relevant country, based on the country’s needs. The analysis should
• Strategic options for United Nations engagement on peace consolidation pri- be needs-driven rather than supply-driven. Any discussions about how the
orities, including one recommended option (if there is agreement), or a limited United Nations presence on the ground should be organized (or reorganized)
number of options (if there are dissenting views) and recommendations on broad should be driven by this analysis (form has to follow function) and should not
(re)configuration of United Nations presence (if any), with associated risks and op- be the primary focus of a Strategic Assessment.
portunities, including the risks of strategic options for the United Nations as well • Very close collaboration between Headquarters and the field throughout the
as for affected populations. process, as well as between the members of the ITF and the senior leadership
of their respective departments and agencies.
• A clear understanding on the part of the lead department and all its relevant
12 The World Bank is given a standing invitation to join a Strategic Assessment. The ITF lead entity staff that the Strategic Assessment process is intended to be inclusive, trans-
should formally contact the World Bank when the Strategic Assessment is being developed.
[ 22 ] [ 23 ]
(d) A risk assessment for each strategic option, with references to challenges and
parent and conducted in a manner that fully takes into account the views ex- potential risks to affected populations and United Nations partners.
pressed by all participants. Ideally, a maximum of two to three strategic options should be presented at the end
• A clear understanding by all participants that, while the Strategic Assess- of the Strategic Assessment report. Of these, one strategic option for a United Na-
ment is a joint product, the process is not necessarily intended to generate tions approach to peace consolidation in the country may be recommended based
a consensus or a product that incorporates everybody’s inputs in verbatim on the analysis of possible scenarios and timelines for future developments (if there
form. While the lead department is responsible for producing and present- is agreement on the recommendation). It should be kept in mind that the status quo
ing the final Strategic Assessment report, it also has to ensure a strong sense could be one of the strategic options presented.
of joint ownership and participation, including by reflecting any substantive
disagreements on the analysis or recommendations of the report. The following diagram gives an overview of the analysis process.
• A concerted effort by all participants to ensure that the best possible exper-
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Aim of Strategic Assessment
tise is available to the Strategic Assessment process, including among the
personnel participating in the ITF and at the country level, as well as in the
external resources to be consulted, particularly by the lead department. Ef-
forts should be made to systematically include expertise on human rights and
gender. Priority
•
Problem “SWOT” UN strategic
The leadership of a senior staff member to chair the ITF and lead the field Conflict analysis objectives for
tree analysis options
the country
visit. The leader should have extensive and successful experience with run-
ning inter-departmental/agency processes and be highly regarded by the
main entities involved. The leader should also be well versed in the princi-
ples of integration and its supporting guidance. If the lead department can- Part of the
SA report
not make a suitable senior staff member available, it should request other ITF
members to propose candidates for this role. Analytical
• A clear understanding by all participants that the Strategic Assessment

tool
process involves a critical and honest analysis of the main on-going United
Figure 3: Analysis Process Flowchart
Nations activities. This analysis should include consultations with non-UN
stakeholders such as the government of the relevant country, civil society, Each of the components and tools is described in detail below:
including women’s groups, donors and international NGOs with a significant
presence in the country.
Conflict Analysis
The development of a shared understanding of the causes, dynamics and conse-
quences of a given conflict provides an important basis for determining the appropri-
ate content and form of United Nations support. As such, the conflict analysis consti-
I.2.3 Methodology of the Strategic Assessment
tutes the starting point and the foundation for integrated assessment and planning.
The following is a recommended methodology and process for drafting the Strate-
There are a number of conflict analysis methodologies that have been developed by
gic Assessment report. The Strategic Assessment TOR will specify the methodology,
various actors, including United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, donors,
but the end product of a Strategic Assessment must include:
NGOs, think tanks and academic centres. The toolbox at the end of this section pro-
(a) A conflict analysis centred on the aim of the Strategic Assessment, including vides a non-exhaustive list of such tools, including the Power Analysis, the Country
key conflict factors, their dynamics and risks including, as appropriate, the de- at Risk of Instability approach, the Strategic Conflict Assessment, the Stability Assess-
velopment of scenarios; ment Framework, the Country Analysis Framework, etc.
(b) The analysis of priority objectives for peace consolidation; While each methodology or tool may have its own institutional origin and its specific
(c) The articulation of United Nations strategic options to address the situation features, it is important to note that (i) they all more or less share a number of central
in the country (including, where appropriate, proposals for United Nations attributes (see next paragraph); and (ii) one may choose, as many actors do, to com-
reconfiguration); bine tools in order to have the most comprehensive analysis possible.
[ 24 ] [ 25 ]
Regardless of the specific methodology used, the conflict analysis should at a mini- The analysis of capacities should also include an assessment of the strengths and
mum include the following elements: weaknesses in the capacity and accountability of national institutions. Questions to
consider include:
(a) A situation, context or profile analysis (i.e. a snapshot of the conflict context,
including historical, political, economic, security, sociocultural and environ- • In national institutions, what are the main strengths and weaknesses in terms of
mental context). The analysis should focus in particular on the nature of the (i) capacity and (ii) accountability? (Start with those often related to a relapse into
political settlement, its legitimacy (is it disputed? if so, by whom, and why?) as conflict or crisis: safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core gov-
a key starting point. ernment functionality and economic revitalization.)
(b) A causal analysis of conflict factors, which identifies and distinguishes be- • Which factors have been conflict factors or are closely linked to the causes of con-
flict? (For example, un-accountable judicial system, corrupt police force, overly-
tween root/structural causes, intermediate/proximate causes, and immediate
centralized government, laws discriminating against minorities, etc.)
causes/triggers. The causal analysis should attempt to establish causal pat-
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terns between various causes of conflict (a problem tree may be used – see There may not always be enough time or resources for a full capacity assessment. If
toolbox). The following is an example list of conflict factors: unequal access to so, there should be a brief, targeted assessment based on desk reviews and informa-
resources, poor governance, inter-ethnic tensions or strife, separatist ambi- tion-sharing with other actors, focusing on the two or three key areas (derived from
tions, rising food insecurity, lack of national strategies, incomplete reintegra- the conflict analysis) where it is most important to understand national capacities,
tion of ex-combatants, displacement, human rights abuses and a culture of before conducting an in-depth assessment at the later planning stage.
impunity, land conflicts, nationality questions, inconclusive elections, gender Some conflict analyses also contain a mapping of peacebuilding activities and im-
inequalities in accessing resources, high levels of sexual and gender-based pact (or lack thereof), along with an analysis of international engagement (history,
violence including that perpetrated as a warfare tactic. effectiveness, negative and positive impact, perceptions).
(c) A stakeholder or actor analysis (i.e. analysis of those engaged in or being af- Finally, when conducting a conflict analysis, the assessment team(s) should bear in
fected by conflict, including their interests, positions, capacities and relation- mind a number of constraints and challenges, namely (i) time, (ii) capacities, (iii) ac-
ships). In particular, the stakeholder analysis needs to map patterns of influ- curacy and (iv) acceptance (internally and by other actors). These factors at times
ence among the various actors, and identify the resources required for each conspire to turn the conflict analysis into a disputed process. As such, it is a required,
actor to realize his or her agenda. necessary and indispensable step in the integrated assessment and planning pro-
cess, but one that requires significant investment and careful stewardship.
(d) A conflict dynamics analysis, which synthesizes the resulting interaction be-
tween the conflict profile, the causes and the actors, including potential sce- Priority Objectives for the Country
narios and drivers of change. From the conflict analysis, the Strategic Assessment should then identify the key fac-
Recent practice also indicates the need to build the following considerations into the tors that need to be addressed as priorities in the near term.
analysis: What is important here is to focus the analysis and the discussions on the elements
that are required to achieve peace consolidation in the country, and/or prevent a re-
• Define contextually, and agree on the definitions for, the terms used in the analy-
lapse into conflict, regardless of the United Nations presence and capacities. There-
sis (conflict, fragility, etc.) and the scope of the analysis (national, regional, local,
fore, it should be kept in mind that the priority objectives should not be limited to
and/or all);
the scope/mandate of United Nations entities.
• List all potential shocks (political, economic, social, etc., including regional where The following table shows an example of how conflict factors can be translated into
relevant) and explore how each one may alter the causal patterns and the conflict priority objectives:
dynamics;
• Identify capacities for peace, and spoilers, within the stakeholder mapping, as
well as mechanisms for conflict resolution, remembering that it is often not an ei-
ther/or situation, and that capacities for peace can turn to spoilers, and vice versa
depending on incentives and other factors, and that the presence of spoilers can
also indicate deep flaws in the political settlement.
[ 26 ] [ 27 ]
It is then useful to map out the priority objectives and explore how they are linked to
Conflict factor Priority objective determine priority interventions (sequencing) and understand who is best placed to
Unequal participation in political repre- Support an inclusive form of govern- do what and when in the peace consolidation process.
sentation or access to power ment as a key component of a negoti-
ated settlement
Peace consolidation
Militarization of politics perpetuates Establish a comprehensive process of
violent conflict and impedes peaceful disarmament, demobilization and re-
resolution of disputes integration of armed groups following Priority
objective Immediate
a ceasefire, including community work Priority Priority causes
objective objective
and social cohesion activities to ensure
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social reintegration
High level of impunity for sexual vio- Develop security and justice sector Priority Priority
Objective Objective Root causes
lence used as a tactic of warfare or as a strategies to prevent and respond to objective objective
means of destabilizing communities sexual violence, as well as to contribute

to behaviour change (personal, institu-
tional) Figure 4: Priority Objectives
Political and social inequality in ac- Establish an inclusive system of govern-
cess to economic and social rights fuels ment; provide population with equal ac- Development of United Nations Priorities and Strategic Options
grievances and conflict cess to services and entitlements From the mapping of country priorities, the Strategic Assessment derives the formu-
Massive population displacement pre- (Re)integration in secure and durably lation of United Nations priorities, or priority objectives, for an integrated effort by
venting economic recovery and creating stable areas of return and/or relocation the United Nations system, keeping in mind that the United Nations should not and
new causes of conflict cannot address all peace consolidation challenges.
The Strategic Assessment should then develop up to three possible strategic options
Weak civil society leading to lack of Support the strengthening of civil so-
for United Nations engagement to address the identified priority objectives for peace
progress in local reconciliation and ciety in conflict resolution and peace-
consolidation. In doing so, rather than focusing on the activities of individual United
peacebuilding efforts building efforts
Nations actors, the Strategic Assessment should review clusters of priority actions
Unaccountable judicial system perpetu- Support reform of judicial system to en-
within priority objectives. It should also take into account the likelihood of scenarios
ates discrimination against minorities sure equal access to justice and contri-
and focus on the needs of the country as well as the comparative advantage and ca-
and fuels conflict butions to national reconciliation pro-
pacity of the United Nations.
cesses
The different strategic options can be based on different scenarios or timelines or on
Police corruption fuels grievances and Address police corruption as part of se- differences in the interpretation of the analysis of opportunities and threats for the
conflict curity and justice sector reform United Nations. Each strategic option should frame the broad strategic orientation of
United Nations engagement, with the understanding that subsequent planning pro-
cesses will provide further details on how the selected strategic option will be opera-
tionalized, including respective roles for different parts of the United Nations system.
Each strategic option should include the following elements:
(a) Overall approach and expected impact of the United Nations in helping to achieve
the priority objectives: This is the main part of the strategic option. It provides
the “function” part of the “form follows function” principle. The overall ap-
proach should be developed on the basis of a realistic appraisal of existing
United Nations capacities and expertise, as well as those which can be de-
ployed in short order. It should also take into account the role of other actors
[ 28 ] [ 29 ]
(national, regional and international) undertaking related peace consolidation clude several United Nations entities – will depend on its purpose, scope and opera-
efforts. Finally, the approach should include consideration of key assumptions tional implications.
and risks related to the strategic option and adequately reflect the existing The process for conducting technical assessments contains elements and tools that
obligations of the State, including human rights obligations. are similar to those employed for a Strategic Assessment, including the definition of
(b) Implications for alignment and coordination of the various elements of the United the scope and the development of TOR, and the integration of risk analysis. This sec-
Nations response: The effectiveness of United Nations engagement will de- tion focuses on issues that are specific to technical assessments.
pend to a significant extent on effective coordination between individual
United Nations entities based on a clear understanding of key priorities. The I.3.1 Timing
strategic option should articulate the coordination implications of the United
While Strategic Assessments take place when an integrated presence is being con-
Nations response, keeping in mind that planning processes and instruments
sidered and/or at critical moments in the life-cycle of an integrated United Nations
developed by humanitarian, development and other entities of the United
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
presence, integrated technical assessments may be undertaken at any point in time.
Nations system cover priorities specific to their individual mandates.
They are undertaken in order to review, strengthen or amend existing interventions
(c) Proposals for the form and structure of United Nations engagement: The strate- and programmes, even when the overall positioning and strategic objectives of the
gic options should provide preliminary indications on the required form of integrated United Nations presence (or any particular United Nations entity) remain
United Nations engagement, which refers to how the United Nations, as a unchanged.
system, could organize its country presence and capacities to implement its
overall peace consolidation approach in an integrated and coherent manner. I.3.2 Composition and Leadership
This should be driven by the analysis and the resulting overall approach of
the United Nations, and should consider the potential risks and benefits for The TOR of a technical assessment– and especially the scope of the assessment –
other country-specific United Nations priorities including any humanitarian dictate its composition. Assessments of a technical nature should only include rep-
response. Examples of organizational configurations include, but are not lim- resentatives of the entities concerned by the scope of the assessment as defined in
ited to, a UNCT configuration, a Special Political Mission (SPM), a structurally the TOR.
integrated peacekeeping operation, the deployment of a human rights pres- As a general rule, the composition of a TAM, in cases where a field visit is required,
ence, and the reduction or withdrawal of the United Nations presence. Differ- should be small (and smaller than a Strategic Assessment), in order to avoid overbur-
ent options and models for structural integration are found in the toolbox at dening stakeholders on the ground. Where integrated presences have already been
the end of this section. deployed, existing expertise and capacities on the ground should be leveraged as
much as possible. Participants from Headquarters and the field should be at a suf-
ficiently senior level to ensure that they have authority to take decisions on behalf of
I.3 Integrated Technical Assessments their parent office on a broad spectrum of issues.
For the purpose of the IAP Policy and this Handbook, a technical assessment is de- TAMs are generally led at the Director level and may be co-led in certain circum-
fined as a Headquarters and field-based analytical exercise focusing on United Na- stances. Consultants may also be engaged to provide expertise or to assist in drafting
tions programmes and operations (staffing, budgets, funding, systems, etc.) for one the final report.
entity and/or one sector. By nature, technical assessments will vary greatly in scope,
duration, purpose, composition, etc. They include technical assessment missions I.3.3 Finalization and Authority
(TAMs), usually conducted by Secretariat entities in support of a field mission (peace-
keeping or political), and sector-specific programming reviews carried out by indi- Whereas the Strategic Assessment is a collective, United Nations system-wide prod-
vidual agencies (for example, a review or support mission for an agency’s rule of law uct, reviewed and endorsed by the ITF, an integrated technical assessment may not
or child protection activities). always require such a level of consensus. For example, if a mission decides to un-
dertake, with Headquarters support, a review aimed at strengthening its child pro-
Technical assessments should be conducted in an integrated manner, as per the IAP tection and gender interventions, such an assessment may have implications for
Policy’s requirements on integrated assessments, if and when their purpose and their the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Women and/or the United Nations
outputs have operational implications that extend to more than one entity. Population Fund (UNFPA), and should therefore engage them in the process. How-
Hence, while all Strategic Assessments must be conducted in an integrated manner, ever, the conclusions and recommendations, while including input from each of the
the composition of a technical assessment – and the extent to which it should in- agencies concerned, may not require agreement before finalization and mission en-
[ 30 ] [ 31 ]
dorsement. Likewise, technical assessments from UNFPA and UN Women should be regardless of, and above and beyond, structural considerations. As mentioned above,
conducted in an integrated manner with the mission’s relevant components but the in the absence of system-wide agreed methodologies for risk assessment, several
decisions emerging from the exercise may be at the sole discretion of the particular entities (Department of Field Support (DFS), agencies, etc.) have developed and use
agency’s leadership. specific approaches that share some common attributes but remain fairly specific to
Where mandated agencies such as the Office of the United Nations High Commis- their institutional mandates, priorities and operational requirements.
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) undertake technical assessments relevant to their legal For each area of agreed integration, the proposed integration arrangements should
mandates, it is suggested that they communicate the resulting information as appro- include agreement on risk mitigation measures, which can range from agreed com-
priate (with due respect for confidentiality). munication/messages to physical separation (or co-location) to tactical and opera-
In any case, it is always important to ensure that ITFs are informed about technical tional decisions.
missions, even if they do not need to be conducted in an integrated manner.
I.4.1 Considerations for Risk Analysis
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I.4 Risk Analysis This guidance proposes a series of questions to consider:
The Strategic Assessment and/or other integrated technical assessments should • What is the perception of the various parts of the United Nations in the country
always include a risk analysis. Beyond the assessment, risk analysis should be con- (including before the arrival of a Security Council-mandated mission)?
ducted as part of every step of the integrated assessment and planning process, in-
cluding when analysing the context, defining priorities, assessing the right mode of
• Is armed conflict highly likely or on-going? In particular, do non-State armed ac-
tors exercise de facto control and/or have a significant extended presence and/
integration, and planning for contingencies, such as crisis management.
or influence in part of the territory? How much territory is not under government
At this time, however, there is no agreed United Nations system-wide methodology control?
for comprehensively assessing risks to the United Nations in post-conflict and con-
flict settings. What is common to all risk assessment methodologies developed by
• Is the United Nations perceived as closely associated with a government or any
other party whose credibility is significantly challenged, or which holds power
different parts of the United Nations system, is that risks fall under several categories:
through an election process that is not generally perceived as legitimate, or which
political/reputational, legal, operational (including staff safety), programmatic and
is committing or complicit in human rights violations or widespread violence
fiduciary (which results in the loss of assets/resources). These risks can be mutually
against civilians?
reinforcing, for example risks to staff or loss of resources would lead to reputational
risks. • In the event that a peace process is underway, or recently concluded, are there
significant constituencies remaining outside the process or who challenge its le-
What the IAP Policy says: gitimacy?
24. Integrated assessment and planning processes must include an analysis • Has the reputation of any United Nations entity on the ground been adversely
of the risks and benefits that integration arrangements may result in, particu- affected (through, for example, significant civilian casualties, association with a
larly for humanitarian activities. Integrated assessment and planning processes flawed electoral process or unpopular peace agreements, association with na-
should provide a forum to assess these risks and benefits and decide on ways to tional armed forces with a poor human rights record, or through corruption), re-
manage them in a manner satisfactory to all UN entities involved. sulting in knock-on reputational risks for other United Nations entities, and for the
United Nations as a whole?
• Which of the United Nations mandates and activities are being or likely to be chal-
The analysis of risks and benefits required by the IAP Policy should start with the lenged by State and non-State parties to the conflict and other armed actors on
identification of priorities and an agreement on the nature and depth of integration
the ground?
in each relevant area, followed by an assessment of contextual, institutional and pro-
grammatic risk factors. It is important to emphasize that such an analysis is not just • Are local and/or regional non-State armed actors linked to international ideologi-
about the risks of “structural integration”. First, not all integration arrangements are cally motivated armed groups who have taken an anti-Western stance?
primarily structural in character and the visibility of association between political • In a mission context, is the mission engaged in, or does it support entities (such as
and other diverse mandates of United Nations entities may carry risks irrespective of the national army, regional peace enforcement mission) that are engaged in, mili-
structure. Second, while decisions regarding structures do carry specific risks, United tary operations against armed groups, which could jeopardize the effectiveness,
Nations engagement in conflict and post-conflict contexts entails a number of risks, acceptance, access and safety of its personnel and of other United Nations actors?
[ 32 ] [ 33 ]
•
While such questions apply to any United Nations configuration in sensitive envi- What are the views of implementing partners of United Nations agencies and
ronments, the analysis they generate should be of particular relevance when a local/international NGOs on the potential mission roles and configuration?
multidimensional United Nations mission is approved or under consideration and as • Are there indications that government, local populations and/or armed groups
part of a regular review process in existing integrated presences. This will help to can and do make a distinction between United Nations humanitarian agencies,
ensure that the form and modalities of the mission–UNCT partnership are appropri- non-UN international humanitarian actors and political/peacekeeping actors?
ate to the context, in the case of a new mission, or are sufficiently agile to respond to
shifts in the operating environment where an integrated presence is already in place.
• Are there situations in which humanitarian operations and access would benefit
from using mission assets in accordance with relevant humanitarian civil–military
This will also offer an opportunity to incorporate mitigation measures to address any
coordination guidance14 and how would the use of mission assets by United Na-
potential risks.
tions humanitarian actors affect the perception (by conflict actors, by population,
and by donors) of the humanitarian community? What are the consequences for
I.4.2 Humanitarian Considerations the beneficiaries and humanitarian operations in the medium to long term (in-
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
In addition to these United Nations system-wide considerations, the assessment cluding possible dependency on mission assets)?
and planning process also carries implications that are specific to the conduct of • Are there country-specific civil–military coordination guidelines that already de-
humanitarian operations. In this regard, integration policy states that “integration scribe relations between United Nations and NGO humanitarian actors and the
arrangements should take full account of humanitarian principles, protect humani- military in-country, and provide an indication on coordination arrangements and
tarian space and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian the appropriate use of mission assets? Are these guidelines implemented and re-
actors”.13 The following provides a sample of key questions that should be considered spected in practice?
when assessing the potential impact of modes of United Nations structural integra- This checklist should also include the following two questions specific to structural
tion on humanitarian operations, including opportunities and risks. These should be arrangements:
addressed on the basis of relevant existing policy, including the IAP Policy, and the
approaches of different United Nations agencies, funds and programmes related to
• To the extent that this can be determined, how would structural integration (for
example DSRSG/RC/HC15 and/or visible association between the mission and hu-
integration.
manitarian actors) affect the perception (by conflict actors, by population and by
The analysis should engage the Humanitarian Coordinator, the humanitarian country donors) of the humanitarian community?
team and the broader humanitarian community, and should help to identify any ad-
verse consequences (or potential benefits) to the United Nations and NGO humani-
• Overall, and to the extent that this can be determined, how would other dimen-
sions of integration (for example co-location, shared assets, military escorts, joint
tarian coordination and response, including possible mitigation measures. The result
communication) affect the perception (by conflict actors, by population and by
of this analysis should be reflected in United Nations decision-making processes, in-
donors) of the humanitarian community?
cluding through corrective action where necessary.
This guidance proposes a series of questions to consider:
I.5 Options and Models for Structural Integration
• If the government does not control the whole country’s territory, how many hu-
manitarian programmes are being conducted in areas which are not under the The IAP Policy specifies that the depth and form of integration between United Na-
control of the government, or are under the control of armed groups hostile to the tions missions and agencies at the programmatic and operational level will vary and
government or peace process? How many people are they supporting? Are there should follow a differentiated, needs-based approach and presents a set of standard
populations and/or areas that face particular risks? parameters for the form that structural arrangements, or “structural integration”,
should take. In short, the policy is predicated on the principle that “form follows func-
• What implications (positive and negative) would United Nations integration have
tion”.
for humanitarian engagement with State authorities and non-State actors?
Decisions on structural integration derive from the joint analysis, including the joint
• Is there a risk that the profile and public messaging of humanitarian actors could
risk assessments conducted during a Strategic Assessment. Options on whether, how
be affected by a broader United Nations political and/or security agenda or the
association thereto?
14 For example, Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations
Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (“MCDA Guidelines”) (2006) and Guidelines on
the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (“Oslo Guidelines”) (2007).
15 DSRSG/RC/HC: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/
13 Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008). Humanitarian Coordinator.
[ 34 ] [ 35 ]
and to what extent the mission and the UNCT should be structurally linked can be
influenced by a combination of factors, including the needs on the ground, the po- Structural Integration in Burundi
litical and security context (stage/inclusiveness of the peace process, active combat,
On 1 January 2008, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), a peace-
post-conflict, likelihood of United Nations engaging in combat operations, presence
keeping mission, was transformed into the United Nations Integrated Office in
of significant spoilers, linkage with ideologically driven armed groups, existence or
Burundi (BINUB), as an integrated DPKO-led mission.
likelihood of United Nations support to a party to conflict in a context that continues
to be insecure), presence and influence of non-State armed actors, the humanitarian BINUB shifted from a standard Special Representative of the Secretary-General
situation and access, perceptions (local population, non-State actors), the reputation (SRSG) and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Co-
of the United Nations, the type of mandate of the United Nations mission (e.g. Chap- ordinator (DSRSG/RC) model to an Executive Representative of the Secretary-
ter VII, engagement in combat operations, etc.), resources, the international configu- General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (ERSG/RC/HC) struc-
ration (including presence of other international military missions), and the degree of ture (initially launched in Sierra Leone). This was supported by a range of mission
sections, including three integrated structures to implement joint mission and
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
overlap between the mission mandate and agency programmes.
UNCT programmes in the areas of security sector reform (SSR), governance and
Reference should also be made to any existing country-specific civil–military coor-
justice.
dination guidelines, as these would provide useful reflections on issues such as co-
location, use of United Nations logos and mission assets, which are salient to possible The three integrated structures included staff from mission and staff from se-
integration levels and structures. lect UN agencies. The SSR and justice structures were both headed by a BINUB
staff member, while the governance structure came under the responsibility of a
What is called “structural integration” generally refers to the leadership structure
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) staff member.
of the mission. However, in discussions over structural integration, planners should
keep four important ideas in mind: Each of the three integrated structures implemented their respective joint pro-
grammes, developed under the framework of the UNDG Joint Programming
1. There are multiple models and options (see below).
framework, combining mission-assessed budget resources with agency re-
2. Structural integration can shift over time, especially at the time of mandate resources, later complemented by allocations from the Peacebuilding Fund (using
newal and/or mission transformation (for example from a peacekeeping opera- agency project management capacities and mission technical advisory capaci-
tion to an SPM) but, in some models, changes can be implemented at any other ties).
point, as needed, within existing mandates, lines of authority and budgets.
The BINUB staffing table presented to the Advisory Committee on the Adminis-
3. The form of structural integration influences, but does not fully determine, the trative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) included the agency staff planned for
depth of integration more broadly. For example, the absence of structural inte- the integrated structures, which allowed their inclusion in the calculations for
gration at the leadership level does not mean that IAP structures should not be mission support capacity and assets.
established (remember, the IAP applies to integrated presences, regardless of
This experience of structural integration lies at the root of the UN’s commitment
whether they are structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC) and it does
to integrated approaches in Burundi, which over time has also been translated
not preclude the possibility of joint structures, units or teams in select sectors
into merged planning frameworks (with the UNDAF serving as the strategic doc-
or joint assessments and integrated planning between a mission and a UNCT.
ument for both the mission and the UNCT) and common monitoring and evalu-
4. More broadly, the IAP requirements apply to integrated United Nations pres- ation (by harmonizing Security Council reporting on benchmarks, Results-Based
ences regardless of the structural arrangements. So even in contexts where the Budgeting (RBB) performance measures, and UNDAF outcome and output indi-
mission and the UNCT are not structurally linked, integrated assessment and cators).
planning should be undertaken, and integrated coordination mechanisms es-
tablished. Examples of models of structural integration include:16
• No structural integration: Formal integrated structures at the leadership level have

not been established and the RC/HC does not have any mission-related functions.
16 While all of the following examples assume a combined RC/HC, there is not an HC designation
in all contexts, in which case only the DSRSG and RC functions would be under consideration. In
addition, in recent years, and in specific contexts, a regional Humanitarian Coordinator has been
appointed. This would factor into consideration of integration arrangements.
[ 36 ] [ 37 ]
Integrated assessment and planning and coordination mechanisms should none-

“Word from the Field”
theless be in place, as required by the IAP Policy.
Fidele Sarassoro, DSRSG/RC/HC
• The DSRSG and RC function are brought together but the HC function remains sepa- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)
rate, for example in cases where conditions require complete independence of – 7 February 2010–30 September 2012
and separate physical offices for – the HC function.
“The Integrated Office (IO) has been at the forefront of leading integration ef-
• The DSRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together but the offices remain separate:
forts: the Integrated Office was established in December 2005. It operates under
The RC and OCHA offices (supporting the RC and HC functions, respectively) are
the leadership of the DSRSG/RC/HC/UNDP RR (Resident Representative) and aims
either co-located with the DSRSG office or physically separated, depending on
to strengthen joint strategy-building between MONUSCO and the UN agencies
a range of factors including security and perception issues (OCHA offices are lo-
and among the UN agencies. In line with the Secretary-General Directives on
cated separately in most current missions with DSRSG/RC/HCs).
Integration,17 the office has worked with UN agencies and MONUSCO sections to
•
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
The DSRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together, supported by an integrated identify concrete objectives that can better be achieved through joint actions. In
DSRSG/RC office established to support the DSRSG and RC functions, with an the past years, the office has focused on maintaining these objectives while add-
OCHA supporting the HC function. ing greater focus on transitional activities and supporting the planning mecha-
• The SRSG, RC and HC functions are brought together, under the title of ERSG (Ex- nisms leading to the transfer of strategic activities linked to the future and even-
ecutive Representative of the Secretary General): This option has been used so tual withdrawal of the DPKO-led mission.”
far for the integrated peacebuilding offices, usually following the withdrawal of
a DPKO-led mission in settings where the peacebuilding and recovery process
These different models are not mutually exclusive. Combinations and shifts are pos-
was fairly advanced, and where concerns over humanitarian space had been at-
sible. In certain settings, the United Nations presence includes an ERSG/RC/HC, with
tenuated but where comprehensive support, including political, was still required.
an integrated support office, a number of integrated structures (with mission and
Where humanitarian concerns may be higher, this option can include a separate
agency staff working together under a mission or agency Director), and agency sec-
OCHA office.
ondments into other mission-specific sections.
• In addition to, or independent of the decisions on the ERSG, DSRSG, RC and HC
A final and critical consideration in selecting and designing the context-appropriate
functions, the mission and the UNCT form integrated structures, e.g. joint units,
model of structural integration relates to budgetary implications. Some models are
around particular thematic or geographical issues (elections, DDR, justice, etc.).
more straightforward than others when it comes to sources of funding. In most cases,
Each staff in the integrated structure remains under the administrative frame-
functions and structures can be integrated but the underlying sources of funding re-
work of his/her respective entity (mission or United Nations agency) but shares
main separate, especially for salaries and benefits. Specific rules regulate certain as-
the same programmatic reporting line to the integrated structure leadership. In
pects, for example how the DSRSG, RC and HC functions are financially accounted for
these instances, administrative arrangements can ensure the sharing of assets (ve-
when they are brought together. One important issue to keep in mind is that when
hicles, computers, etc.). These function-driven structures can also be developed
integrated structures are developed under a mission framework, and/or agency staff
to support integrated analysis, planning and/or monitoring and evaluation, where
are seconded to a mission, it is critical to account for their presence in the mission
capacities from both the mission and the UNCT are brought together under one
staffing tables that are presented to the ACABQ. Aside from demonstrating unity of
roof (albeit with separate reporting lines).
effort, their inclusion in the staffing table, even if they are paid for by agencies (and
• Finally, structural arrangements can also involve staff secondment, for example of not the assessed budget) is necessary to secure their access to the necessary support
United Nations agency staff in a mission section. Similarly, mission staff can be capacity and assets.
temporarily co-located in an agency.
17 Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008).
[ 38 ] [ 39 ]
Structural Integration in UNSMIL–Libya Toolbox: Integrated Assessments

In Libya, the goal from the start was to ensure that strategic analysis and planning
should be a shared product of the whole UN system, both the mission (United Na-
tions Support Mission in Libya/UNSMIL) and the UNCT. The process in Libya is driven
by a small planning cell composed of the mission Chief of Staff, the Head of the RC
Office, as well as UNSMIL and UNCT Strategic Planners that support United Nations A. Template Terms of Reference for a Strategic Assessment
managers to come together to identify peace consolidation targets and deliver-
ables, as well as to monitor the Organization’s success in achieving those goals. In 1. A Strategic Assessment TOR should have the following:
areas where joint planning and coordination of activities are essential, fully inte- (a) Background: Explain why the Strategic Assessment is being done at that time,
grated UNSMIL–UNCT structures have been created. The United Nations Electoral and which United Nations body requested it.
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
Support Team is an integrated team comprising UNSMIL, UNDP and UNOPS (United (b) What: The objectives of the Strategic Assessment. This should include: (i) a
Nations Office for Project Services) electoral officers under the leadership of
brief articulation of the situation and the necessity/opportunity it presents
UNSMIL’s Director of Electoral Affairs. The Security Sector Advisory and Coordina-
for a changed United Nations strategy; and (ii) the identification of specific
tion Division of UNSMIL, incorporating the Arms Proliferation Team, also comprises
areas of concern.
staff from UNSMIL, UNMAS (Mine Action Service), UNDP and UNICEF to streamline
all United Nations support in this area. DDR is a joint effort involving several (c) Who: List the participating entities, noting the lead department for the exer-
UNSMIL sections, UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, UN Women, the World Health Orga- cise and articulating the role of the field. It is useful to specify that the exer-
nization (WHO) and the World Bank, among others, each of which has its own cise should be conducted at the senior level.
Libyan counterpart. (d) How: The process selected for the conduct of the Strategic Assessment. Any
major deviation from the policy and guidelines should be noted here.
(e) When: Provide a timeline and an indicative report submission date or a strict
deadline for the Strategic Assessment report. The latter will be necessary if
the Strategic Assessment is bound by an external deadline, such as finaliza-
tion of a Report of the Secretary-General or a mediation process etc.
2. While the preference is for the Strategic Assessment TOR to be concise, they may
provide guidance on additional issues, and may also explicitly refer to:
(a) A more detailed summary of the situation, and an outline of the United Na-
tions institutional setting;
(b) The methodology to be used for the required conflict analysis, and the exist-
ing United Nations or non-United Nations assessments to be used;
(c) The scope of United Nations priorities to consider, as included in existing of-
ficial UN documents (for example in UNDAFs, CAPs, reports of specialized
mandates, Reports of the Secretary-General, and General Assembly or Secu-
rity Council statements or resolutions).
B. Template for a Strategic Assessment Report

In general, a Strategic Assessment report should include the following sections:
Executive Summary
1. Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment
[ 40 ] [ 41 ]
2. Key conflict factors and dynamics. This section could include, for example, a
problem tree diagram Power Analysis
3. Priority objectives. This section could include a diagram of the priority objec- Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation, Manual for Conflict
tives, as well as SWOT tables Analysis (2006)
http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/publications/manual-conflict-analysis
4. Existing capacities
5. Strategic options including an analysis of the benefits and risks of each
• The tool maps the informal political landscape, including its rules and structures.
(a) Option 1
• It seeks to understand links between the political landscape and Member States/
donors:
(b) Option 2
• Who sets the policy agenda, with whose ideas and values?
(c) Option 3
• Who gets what, when and how?
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
6. Recommended option and recommendations on United Nations configuration.
• Who knows whom, why and how?
This section must include possible disagreements or differences of opinion on
the options and configuration. • The methodology is a useful corrective to approaches that focus on formal politi-
cal rules and institutions.
Annexes:
• It provides qualitative information for comparison over time in a single country
• List of people interviewed but it needs to be complemented by other approaches.
• List of references (with hyperlinks) • The findings can inform actions at both the macro/national and micro/local level.
• Current United Nations Organizational structure at the country level
• Tables and diagrams on analysis, United Nations priorities and strategic options (if Country at Risk of Instability
not in the body of the report) UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Countries at Risk of Instability: Risk Factors of and
Dynamics of Instability (2005)
C. Methodologies and Tools for Conflict Analysis and Priority Objectives http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=2950
• The methodology focuses on internal and external risks of instability.
Conflict Analysis
• The analysis aims at assessing the country’s capacity and resilience.
The following summarizes the main features of three methodologies used for under-
taking conflict analysis. • It also includes an analysis of external stabilizing factors, with shocks and triggers.
• It can be used at the national and local/community levels.
UN Common Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition (2004)
• The tool brings in (but at times overstates) the role of the international commu-
http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=1252 nity.
• It distinguishes between root causes, proximate causes, immediate causes (trig- • The macro-level findings that are generated are often complemented by sector
gers), and consequences/symptoms. analysis with specific focus (e.g. governance).
• The analysis is organized around thematic dimensions: security (state to personal), Additional tools and resources can be found at the following links:
political/governance, economic and social (including cultural and religious fac-
tors).
• UN System Staff College, Conflict Analysis for Prioritization Tool (2009):
http://www.unssc.org/home/themes/peace-and-security/e-learning-0
• It identifies and organizes (in matrix format) the spoilers and capacities for peace
• UNDP, Conflict-related Development Analysis (currently being revised)
with an analysis of motivations and interests.
• Saferworld, conflict analysis chapter in Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Develop-
• The differentiation between root and proximate causes is not always easy but it is ment, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict
important, as different levels of causes require different responses (with different Impact Assessment (2004): http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/
timeframes, capacities, etc.). chapter_2__266.pdf
• The analysis can be conducted at international, regional, national, subnational
and community/local levels.
[ 42 ] [ 43 ]
USAID, Conflict Assessment and Analysis (2012): http://www.usaid.gov/what-we- the United Nations. The stakeholder mapping exercise as part of the desk review de-
do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications scribed earlier should be taken into account when conducting the SWOT analysis.
• UNDG and the World Bank, Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Plan- For each priority objective, a SWOT analysis will allow the team to assess whether
ning using Post-Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frame- the United Nations should be involved, what type of role (lead versus support) it should
works (2007): https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Joint%20Guidance%20 take and which key actors it should engage with, in order to maximize the likelihood
Note%20on%20Integrated%20Recovery%20Planning.pdf of achieving the priority objective. In some cases, it may result in a recommendation
to support another, better-positioned actor rather than taking the lead for a given
priority objective.
Problem Tree
Many of these tools use a variant of the causal analysis approach, which can be sum- If helpful, the team could include tables for priority objectives. The following is a
marized through a problem tree. The problem tree (see Figure 5) aims at identifying basic example.
Sec tion I
Sec tion I
the various conflict factors, organizing them along different levels and clarifying the
causal patterns. Priority objective: Build local security capability
Strengths of the United Nations Opportunities for United Nations and

Effect Effect Effect Effect Effects non-United Nations actors
• Some operational capacity in • Regional organization with readily
UNCT and field mission available expertise, experience and
• Expertise and experience of de- funding
Crisis Conflict partments, agencies or funds • Capacities and mandates of govern-

• Standards, values and instruments, ment authorities and bilateral actors
including on human rights (e.g. on-going capacity-building pro-
gramme jointly organized by donors,
Immediate regional organization and govern-
Cause
causes ment)
Cause Cause
Weaknesses of the United Nations Threats to the priority objective
• Lack of funding for programmes • Rebel group outside of peace agree-

Cause Cause Cause Cause Root causes • Duration of necessary implemen- ment
tation • Shift in power relations
• Lack of fit with mandates of de- • Other priorities of donors and benefi-
Figure 5: Problem Tree partments, agencies or funds ciaries
• Lack of available human resources,
Priority Objectives institutions, budgets
SWOT Analysis • Likelihood of success low
Once the conflict analysis is finalized, the translation of the priority objectives for the
country (to respond to the various conflict factors) into a coherent United Nations Based on this table, the United Nations should probably assume a support role in this priority
strategy can be guided by a SWOT analysis. This is a method to assess the strengths, objective area (i.e. building local security capability) and work closely with lead actors such as the
regional organization, donors and national government.
weaknesses, opportunities and threats for an organization in a given context, in or-
der to identify its comparative advantages. For each priority objective, the Strate-
gic Assessment could list the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for
[ 44 ] [ 45 ]
Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook
D. Template Terms of Reference for a Technical Assessment Mission
1. Background
The TOR should outline the United Nations policy documents (decisions of the Secu-
rity Council, Secretary-General, Policy Committee, reports of the Secretary-General,
Strategic Assessments), decisions or statements of regional organizations, or consul-
tations that triggered a decision to undertake the TAM. It will also describe national
and regional political developments.
2. Objectives
This section describes the strategic objectives of the mission, linking (as necessary)
Sec tion I
back to specific requests made by Secretariat leadership or governing bodies. It also

identifies the key outputs related to the objectives. These outputs often include tech-
nical and analytical assessments or recommendations regarding the field environ-
ment, such as substantive and logistical resource needs and availability, political will
and local capacity, security situation/threat assessment, the peace process, and po-
litical and technical feasibility analysis.
3. Methodology
Here, the TOR should identify the pre-mission, mission and post-mission tasks (for
example, from initial desk review to final draft), describe the respective roles of Head-
quarters and field staff, including staff from United Nations partners (if involved),
describe the schedule for the mission and identify key interlocutors, data to be col-
lected based on a desk gap analysis, and outputs for each target group to be con-
sulted.
4. Timelines and Results

This section identifies the schedule for debriefings at the field level and Headquar-
ters, and the schedule for drafting the final report (including the individual respon-
sible for this), as well as the vehicle for presentation of the findings (for example Re-
port of the Secretary-General, internal Note to the Secretary-General, etc.). It lists the
key components of the final report. Where relevant, it may also refer to the role of the
report in the wider political negotiations leading to the fielding of the reconfigured
or new United Nations presence.
5. Composition
The TOR should identify the leader or co-leader of the TAM and the entities repre-
sented, including both Headquarters and field staff. (Some members of the TAM may
not go on the mission, but are part of the pre-mission and post-mission workplan
and may be identified as such.) The list of participants is generally a list of offices and
UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe
components within offices, but may include actual staff names.
Additional Elements
The UN flag flies at half-mast in remembrance of the late Nelson
The TOR may also include details on the logistical arrangements, a draft programme
Mandela, former President of South Africa.
for the visit, cost estimates for travel/consultants, and/or an annex of specific tasks/ 06 December 2013
questions for the TAM. United Nations, New York
[ 46 ]
Section II
Integrated Mechanisms
UN Photo/Patricia Esteve
Staff members of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) play
against a local team from Agboville in a “football match for peace”,
organized as part of the mission’s “UNOCI Days” outreach campaign.
17 November 2011
Specific tasks will shift throughout the life-cycle of the integrated United Nations
What the IAP Policy says: presence but an ITF generally has three overarching roles:
57. At Headquarters, Integrated Task Forces (ITF) are the main forum for joint 1. The ITF coordinates and validates, at Headquarters level, integrated assessment
assessments, planning, coordination, sharing of information and analysis, consul- and planning processes and products.
tations and decision-making support. Integrated Task Forces should consider all 2. The ITF ensures consistent information-sharing between the field and Headquar-
issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact in integrated set- ters, and between entities at Headquarters.
tings, including entity-specific planning and reporting processes that may have
3. The ITF provides advice regarding modalities for ensuring adequate, timely and
implications for other entities. […]
complementary resource allocation, in line with the respective mandates of mis-
58. At field level, integrated United Nations presences are required to put in sions and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.
place mechanisms for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-
making, coordination and monitoring. Existing mechanisms should be used
II.1.2 Establishment of an ITF
where appropriate. The configuration of these structures should be tailored to
each context, but in all cases they should include: A new ITF may be triggered in a variety of ways. As soon as an integrated presence is
a. A senior leadership forum for decision-making on joint strategic and opera- being considered, or when a decision is made by the Security Council or the Secre-
tional issues. [...] tary-General to begin planning for a new field mission, when there is a shift in lead
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
department (for example from DPA19 to DPKO or vice versa), the designated lead
b. A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses
department(s) must establish a new ITF.
and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks. […]
ITFs can also be established for countries without a mission. In these cases, the el-
ements of this Handbook, especially the management, composition and template
II.1 Headquarters Structures: Establishing and terms of reference, can be used to guide the lead department and participants.
Managing Integrated Task Forces
The Integrated Task Force (ITF; formerly IMTF or Integrated Mission Task Force for II.1.3 Management and Composition
DPKO-led18 task forces) is the principal Headquarters-based inter-departmental and The ITF should be chaired or co-chaired by a senior representative, usually a Direc-
inter-agency mechanism to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guid- tor or Team Leader, from the lead department. The Chair or Co-Chairs should ensure
ance to United Nations presences, and to coordinate Headquarters participation in that:
integrated assessment and planning processes before and throughout the deploy-
• Meetings are called regularly with a focused agenda distributed well in advance
ment of integrated United Nations presences.
of the meeting;
As such, ITFs provide an important link between Headquarters and the field, aiming
• Levels of representation of the lead department and other participating entities
to provide coordinated guidance and support to the leadership of the field mission,
are appropriate;
UN Secretariat departments and the UN country team (UNCT).
• Field mission and UNCT leadership or representatives are included in the discus-
The role of the ITFs varies in intensity throughout the mission life-cycle, so the guide-
sions;
lines below delineate the key planning roles and products according to the follow-
ing phases: at mission start-up, during implementation, and at drawdown and with- • Processes are inclusive and collaborative;
drawal. • Discussions are focused and decisions are taken; and
• Meeting notes are distributed in a timely manner.
II.1.1 Main Roles The ITF should include representatives from all relevant United Nations entities, in-
The ITF is the formal Headquarters-based body responsible for implementing the cluding DPKO, DFS, DPA, PBSO, OHCHR, OCHA, DOCO and UNDSS, as well as UNDG
Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) for a specific country or context. It is com-
posed of representatives of United Nations departments and agencies from the field
and Headquarters.
18 DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 19 DPA: Department of Political Affairs.
[ 50 ] [ 51 ]
and ECHA20 members based on the “2+4” formula. 21 Mission and UNCT leadership,
including planning staff, should be included in ITF meetings through video telecon- • Ensure appropriate representation from ITF members, who should know the
ferencing (VTC) or teleconferencing facilities. Even if senior mission and UNCT leader- file, their mandate and their role.
ship cannot participate directly in each meeting, it is important that ITFs consistently • Consider bringing in outside experts, on occasion, for sharing knowledge that
include representation from both the field mission and the UNCT. is relevant to the entire ITF membership.
ITF members at the senior officer level (for example senior desk officers, team lead- • Where relevant, use the ITF meeting to provide updates or generate discus-
ers, functional specialists) should participate in all meetings and be empowered to sions on relevant policy developments, especially if the ITF country/context
speak on behalf of their entity. In general, ITF members should nominate officers provides a compelling illustration of the issues related to the policy.
who have country-specific knowledge and expertise. ITF membership should be ad-
justed as necessary, based on changes to on-going objectives and functions, in order
to better respond to mission planning needs and developments on the ground. For
example, ITFs are encouraged to draw upon specialized actors in the United Nations
II.1.4 Objectives of the ITF
system when relevant thematic discussions are held. All ITFs should have active terms of reference (TOR) outlining their primary respon-
ITFs should also consider inviting the World Bank and non-UN system organizations, sibilities. Template TOR are provided for reference in the toolbox at the end of this
including relevant regional organizations, and/or NGOs to their meetings on an ad section. While the role of an ITF will evolve over time, the following lists some of an
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
hoc basis. Regional organizations and NGOs with in-country field operations may be ITF’s typical functions and activities that remain consistent throughout its life-cycle:
particularly well positioned to contribute. • Serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for United Nations inter-agency
coordination of strategic guidance, planning support, information exchange and
monitoring.
Managing ITFs: 10 Best Practices to Make them Effective • Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy and planning pro-
cesses, including, at drawdown, aspects linked to the implementation of the Policy
• Ensure consistent scheduling (same day and time), with consideration for field on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal. 22
colleague constraints.
• Coordinate Headquarters participation in United Nations integrated assessments,
• Manage time scrupulously: start and finish on time. including Strategic Assessments and technical assessments. 23
• Circulate the agenda for input beforehand, allowing sufficient time for coor- • Coordinate Headquarters inputs into various planning products outlined in the
dination with colleagues in the field. IAP Policy, including foundational planning documents such as the Integrated
• At the beginning, provide a brief summary of previous decision points and Strategic Framework (ISF), the Report of the Secretary-General and Directives to
update on follow-up. the SRSG, RC and HC. 24
• At the end, provide a brief summary of decisions reached and present a for- • Review planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General
ward agenda. and heads of departments and agencies (for example Secretary-General reports,
• Ask for concise situation updates with focus on issues of relevance to the en- Policy Committee papers). 25
tire ITF, using previous updates as a starting point. • Identify resource gaps and overlaps to promote the strategic alignment of re-
• Maintain discussions focused on inter-departmental and inter-agency mat- sources.
ters, where decisions are required and/or with United Nations system-wide
implications.
22 Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013).

23 Normally, a DPA-led ITF leads a Strategic Assessment if there is no political or peacekeeping mission
20 DFS: Department of Field Support; PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office; OHCHR: Office of the on the ground. Once a mission is up and running, an ITF can call for a Strategic Assessment,
High Commissioner for Human Rights; OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; especially if there are drastic changes in the situation and/or if there is a joint recognition that the
DOCO: Development Operations Coordination Office; UNDSS: United Nations Department of UN’s strategic vision in a given country needs to be reformulated.
Safety and Security; UNDG: United Nations Development Group; ECHA: Executive Committee on 24 SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General; RC: Resident Coordinator; HC:
Humanitarian Affairs. Humanitarian Coordinator.
21 For details of this formula, see footnote 6 above. 25 This is not to duplicate any field-level coordination in preparation for these documents.
[ 52 ] [ 53 ]
• Maintain a dialogue with field-based Integrated Mission Planning Teams (or simi-
lar field-based working groups) and provide support to them as required. military planning objectives, including protection of civilians and support of hu-
manitarian aims. Moreover, the practice of transferring field staff to Headquar-
• Support coordination with non-UN actors.
ters to serve on the team greatly facilitated the creation of detailed operational
plans based on up-to-date information. Regular use of videoteleconferencing
II.1.5 Roles Across Mission Life-Cycles (VTC) also ensured that field-based staff were included and could provide es-
sential information that would otherwise be difficult to collect. Finally, having
Role of the ITF at Mission Start-Up
dedicated and tailored information management tools (such as a common work-
The ITF coordinates Headquarters participation in the conduct of the Strategic As- space with an online document repository) also facilitated the work of the Darfur
sessment and in the development of the key integrated planning products includ- Planning Team. A similar arrangement was established to coordinate planning
ing the Directive to the Special or Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for an integrated United Nations presence in Libya in 2011.
(SRSG or ERSG), RC and HC, and the ISF.
Some of the key tasks of the ITF at this stage are:
Role of the ITF During the Implementation of Mandates
• Coordinate the conduct of Strategic Assessments to identify strategic objectives
for support within an existing or potential mission context, and, based on the de- The ITF remains active throughout the life-cycle of an integrated presence, but it may
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
cisions of the Secretary-General and the mandate from the Security Council, con- meet more frequently during mission start-up and drawdown or withdrawal. Once a
solidate guidance to the field in the Directive to the SRSG, RC and HC. field mission is operational, the majority of planning efforts shift to the field, with the
• Discuss and agree on practical modalities to maximize the coherence of the UN’s Headquarters-based ITF providing support and guidance to those efforts and linking
security, political, humanitarian, human rights, and relevant humanitarian and de- its activities to the field-based integrated structures.
velopment interventions. Some typical responsibilities of the ITF during this phase are:
• Map existing United Nations capacities to ensure an optimal division of roles and • In consultation/collaboration with the field, review progress on the implementa-
responsibilities between the mission and the UNCT and ensure coherent guidance tion of the ISF, and monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/devel-
from Headquarters to field-based colleagues, based on an analysis of comparative opment and human rights developments in the field.
advantages (see Section III.5). This can be articulated in the form of an “early” ISF,
• Contribute to resolution of policy differences between United Nations entities.
to be further developed and finalized in the field once the mission is deployed
alongside the UNCT. • Coordinate Headquarters participation in Strategic Assessments and technical as-
sessment missions (TAMs).
• Coordinate Headquarters communication with Member States, donors and other
multilateral and bilateral actors on peace consolidation priorities. • Maintain a dialogue with field-based integrated mechanisms and support them
as required.
• Identify other financial, logistics and administrative requirements necessary to
support the overall strategy for an integrated presence, including complemen- • Regularly share and review information.
tary programmatic resources needed to achieve the UN’s peace consolidation or • Consult thematic entities as needed, and support coordination and dialogue with
peacebuilding mandate. key non-UN actors.
• Provide support, through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), to the Peace-
Dedicated Planning Staff: the Darfur Planning Team building Commission’s (PBC) work in cases where the country is on the agenda of
the PBC.
Large peacekeeping missions or Special Political Missions (SPMs) often require a
dedicated planning staff with a dedicated Team Leader for mission start-up. In • Review planning and policy documents for decisions of the Secretary-General
these cases the ITF, rather than serving as a working group that meets occasion- (Secretary-General reports, Policy Committee papers, etc.).
ally, would benefit from a dedicated team of technical planning experts working
Role of the ITF During Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal
under the leadership and coordination of the lead department. The experience
of the Darfur Planning Team in 2006 found that a dedicated inter-departmental An ITF usually becomes more active again as missions plan for or undergo drawdown
and inter-agency team (including representatives of the United Nations agen- and withdrawal. During these adjustment periods, planning between the field and
cies, funds and programmes) promoted the effective integration of civilian and the Headquarters should be closely coordinated through the ITF. Typical tasks for the
ITF during such phases may include:
[ 54 ] [ 55 ]
• In line with the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and b. A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses
Withdrawal,26 coordinate Headquarters inputs as well as Headquarters participa- and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks. All enti-
tion in possible field missions, for the planning of the transformation of the United ties that are part of the integrated presence should either be represented in
Nations presence on the ground and handover of residual tasks (timeline, bench- or seek to otherwise contribute to the joint analytical and planning capacity.
marks, roles, resources, communication, etc.).

• Maintain a dialogue with the mission and UNCT on the timely scaling up of peace- II.2.1 The Senior Leadership Forum
building activities carried out by the UNCT, key international organizations such
A senior leadership forum must be in place to ensure high-level coordination and
as the World Bank and the IMF, and bilateral donors.
decision-making on joint strategic and operational issues. The core functions of this
• Coordinate Headquarters support to ensure the smooth handover of responsi- body include:
bilities, leadership continuity, and joint resource mobilization strategies. This is
particularly relevant in transitions from a peacekeeping operation to a follow-on
• Develop the joint vision and peace consolidation priorities of the United Nations
system based on a common conflict analysis and the comparative advantages of
peacebuilding or integrated office because it implies a shift in the lead depart-
the UN system (as such this forum leads the development or revision of the ISF).
ment (for example from DPKO to DPA). Such transitions require a comprehensive
planning process similar to the mission start-up phase. • Review progress in the implementation of the ISF and provide direction to United
Nations components/agencies on implementation challenges.
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
II.2 Field Structures: Establishing and Managing • Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with the ITF and other Head-
quarters-based bodies as required, in order to take stock of major changes and/or
Joint Structures for Decision-Making, Planning, new requirements (for example transition and drawdown).
Programming and Operations • Facilitate interaction with non-UN actors where there is interdependence related
to common peace consolidation priorities.
Each United Nations field presence should have standing coordination bodies that
bring together the Mission and the UNCT to provide strategic direction, planning • Delineate roles and responsibilities among the United Nations actors, ensuring
oversight, information-sharing, analysis, coordination and monitoring in support of complementarities between mission and UNCT, and minimizing overlap.
the UN’s peace consolidation efforts. The field-based integrated field coordination • Guide and review the work of thematic working groups.
structures also serve as partners to Headquarters-based integrated structures, in par- • Promote synergies and minimize overlap by identifying and commissioning the
ticular the ITFs. development of United Nations system-wide sector or thematic strategies or
In keeping with the principle of “form follows function”, the number, configuration Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs; for example on protection of civilians, sex-
and composition of integrated field coordination structures will vary from country to ual and gender-based violence, security sector reform, early warning).
country based on the scale of the United Nations operations and the level of strategic While the IAP Policy does not specify how often the senior leadership forum should
and programmatic coordination required. meet or when, it does reflect the need for the forum (regardless of its specifics, in-
As such, existing mechanisms should be used where possible and the “form” of these cluding name and numbers) to provide a genuine space for in-depth joint analysis
structures should be tailored to each context. However, based on experience across and decision-making, for identifying and addressing critical issues and for managing
a range of contexts, the IAP Policy27 stipulates that in all cases they should include: potential tensions. This means, in particular, that participation should not be dele-
a. A senior leadership forum for decision-making on joint strategic and opera- gated below the senior management level, that the forum should be actively led and
tional issues. This forum should include the key in-country decision-makers regularly convened, and that discussions should be adequately prepared.
such as the S/ERSG, DSRSG, RC/HC, Civilian Chief of Staff, Heads of Mission
components and Heads of relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes. [At “Word from the Field”
a minimum, it should include representation from the various elements of the Ellen MargretheLøj, SRSG
United Nations integrated presence, e.g. depending on the context, political, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
security, development and humanitarian.] External partners should be invited January 2008–January 2012
to participate when appropriate.
“One of the more useful tools has been the meetings of the Strategic Policy
Group (SPG), which includes all heads of agency and a number of UNMIL section
26 Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal (2013).
27 Para. 58.
[ 56 ] [ 57 ]
the humanitarian country team (HCT). 28 Multidimensional peacekeeping environ-

chiefs. In addition to being a venue where thematic issues and common issues ments usually have an expanded team of three to five planners with at least one
of concern are discussed, the group is a venue for chairs of UN outcome groups planner on the UNCT side. Table 1 provides an example of staffing allocations for
to report on progress or concern regarding their respective groups or their cor- mission and UNCT planning capacities in Sierra Leone, Sudan, Democratic Republic
responding government pillar under the Poverty Reduction Strategy.
of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia.

I believe that both Senior Management Team and Strategic Policy Group meet-
The Mission and UNCT strategic planners must have a shared understanding of their
ings have been useful to create a better sense of what it means to be an inte-
purpose, core tasks, the composition of the team and the organization of work. This
grated mission, including ensuring that we think like an integrated mission.”
joint understanding should be captured in a TOR. All members of the shared analyti-
cal and planning capacity should have some or all of these tasks reflected in their an-
nual performance appraisals. Finally, where possible, it is also advisable to have plan-
II.2.2 Joint Analytical and Planning Capacity ners located in the same building to ease communication and help to build personal
relationships. If not possible, and depending on workload, consideration should be
The functions of this body may vary, but should include, among others: given to co-location for a pre-determined period of time on a regular basis, for ex-
• Consolidate, organize and present United Nations system-wide analytical inputs ample one afternoon a week.
required for the development of shared strategies, plans and related monitoring In most peacekeeping missions, the analytical and planning capacities are designed
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
reports. as separate work units. However, as strategic planning processes require both an-
• Compile inputs and draft shared strategies, plans and related monitoring reports, alytical and planning capacities, the contribution from the mission to the “shared
including coordinating the development and implementation of joint strategic analytical and planning capacity” will typically extend beyond the planning unit and
planning processes such as ISFs. reflect contributions from several mission components (for example the Joint Mission
• Establish effective information-sharing mechanisms and ensure joint analysis be- Analysis Centre (JMAC), political affairs, civil affairs). Key inputs from these other mis-
sion components (for example conflict analysis for an ISF), as well as means/respon-
tween all United Nations entities.
sibility for securing them, should be reflected in the TOR of the joint analytical and
• Provide coordination support to thematic working groups and facilitate linkages planning capacity.
between United Nations internal mechanisms and coordination frameworks that
involve national stakeholders, civil society and/or donors. Table 1: Examples of Planning Staff in Sierra Leone, Sudan, DRC, Somalia (2009)
• Serve as a strategy and planning point of contact for Headquarters and facilitate
linkages between field-based integrated coordination structures and the Head- Sierre Leone Sudan DRC Somalia
quarters-based ITFs.
Mission Joint UNIPSIL/ 1 P5, 1 P4, 1 P5, 2 P3s 1 P4, 1 P3
• Provide Secretariat services to integrated field coordination structures (including
UNCT Strategic 2 UNVs (UNMIS)
the senior leadership forum), which would include preparation of agendas, back-
Planning Unit
ground papers and actual drafting of integrated strategies, plans and monitoring
frameworks. UNCT 1 P5, 1 P4 1 P4 (Integrated 1P5, 1P4
1 P4 (Strategic
This capacity takes the form of dedicated strategic planning resources in both mis- Planning) Office DSRCSG/
sions and UNCTs. Strategic planners are often provided to Resident Coordinators 1 P4 (Peace- RC/HC)
through the UN Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), which funds building Coord)
some strategic planners and coordination officers in the Offices of Resident Coordi- 1 P3 (Coordina-
nators (RCOs) in conflict-affected countries. On the mission side, planning capacity tion)
is funded through the mission’s Results-Based Budgeting. In addition, in situations 3 NPO
with a significant humanitarian presence, humanitarian representatives should be
included in the joint analytical and planning capacity.
The actual structure of a joint planning capacity may vary according to the field re-
quirements, but there should be, at a minimum, at least one permanent planner rep- 28 Smaller integrated peacebuilding offices may have one planner in the integrated office of the ERSG/
resenting the mission and one for the UNCT and, where required, one representing RC/HC, covering both the mission and UNCT.
[ 58 ] [ 59 ]
Thematic Working Groups

The mission and the UNCT may also decide to develop and/or monitor implementa-
& PLANNING CAPACITY

SHARED ANALYTICAL
tion of joint strategies through thematic working groups. In establishing thematic STRATEGIC
groups, care should be taken to leverage existing groups (for example humanitarian POLICY SUPPORT
clusters or UNDAF29 outcome groups or Results Groups in countries following the GROUP
Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the “Delivering as one”
Approach30), as appropriate. United Nations field presences are encouraged to involve
non-UN actors (for example NGOs) in thematic working groups on a case-by-case
basis. For instance, an existing intra-mission working group on rule of law could be
expanded to include UNCT and HCT representatives. Likewise, partners could decide THEMATIC WORKING GROUPS SUPPORT
that UNDAF outcome groups or humanitarian clusters could be expanded with mis-
sion representatives to constitute a thematic working group.
Mission and UNCT leadership should provide strategic direction to these groups and Figure 6: Example of Integrated Peacebuilding Office and UNCT
regularly review progress against their commitments, as reflected in the ISF, to pro-
mote mutual accountability.
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
filling the minimum requirements described herein. The first, as depicted in Figure
II.2.3 Leveraging Existing Coordination Structures 6, could be applied to smaller United Nations field presences with integrated peace-
building offices. It has a Principals-level Strategic Policy Group, which is supported by
Before new structures are constituted, a mapping of existing structures should be
the shared analytical and planning capacity and thematic working groups.
undertaken to identify structures that could be leveraged or adjusted, either perma-
nently or periodically, to fulfil the functions outlined above. For instance, the senior The second model, shown in Figure 7, may be appropriate for United Nations field
leadership forum can be formed by expanding the Mission Leadership Team (MLT)31 presences with large multidimensional peacekeeping operations (including military
periodically and according to an agreed schedule to include the RC/HC (for non- and police components). It has three layers: a Strategic Policy Group at the Principals
structurally integrated missions) and members of the UNCT. Likewise, meetings of level, an Integrated Strategy and Planning Team (ISPT) at the senior officer level, and
the UNCT could be expanded periodically to include mission representatives, while
humanitarian clusters could be expanded to comprise integrated thematic working
groups.32
& PLANNING CAPACITY

SHARED ANALYTICAL
Models STRATEGIC
SUPPORT POLICY
These guidelines provide two possible models building on current field practice.
GROUP
These configurations and titles are not required, but rather provide examples for ful-
29 UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework.

30 UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the
INTEGRATED
“Delivering as one” Approach (2013). Further to the adoption of these SOPs in February 2013, the SUPPORT
UNDG is developing specific technical guidance to support the implementation.
STRATEGY
31 According to the DPKO/DFS, Guidelines: Mission Start-Up Field Guide (2010), the Mission AND
Leadership Team generally includes: SRSG/head of mission, DSRSGs, head of the police PLANNING TEAM
component, head of the military component, Director/Chief of Mission Support, and the Chief of
Staff. The MLT’s key tasks include providing political guidance and high-level operational direction
to mission components and approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide
effect.
32 Leveraging humanitarian clusters should be handled on a case-by-case basis. Any decision to THEMATIC WORKING GROUPS
leverage humanitarian clusters into an integrated field coordination structure should be taken after
consultation with humanitarian partners and cluster leads through the HCT in the cluster under
consideration, as well as with relevant authorities if involved in the cluster as a co-chair or member. Figure 7: Example of Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operation and UNCT
[ 60 ] [ 61 ]
thematic working groups. The Strategic Policy Group provides the strategic direc-
tion; the ISPT translates that strategic direction into concrete deliverables and co- Toolbox: Integrated Mechanisms
ordinates implementation. Thematic working groups (standing or ad hoc) are also
recommended and should be formed (if they do not exist in some other form) based
on the key peace consolidation objectives of the United Nations presence.
A. Template Terms of Reference for ITFs

The TOR for each Integrated Task Force (ITF) should be tailored to the distinct needs
of the situation/country/integrated presence. The task force should revise its TOR
when the situation changes or the integrated presence enters a new phase (for ex-
ample making a transition at the end of the mandate).
While each task force will have distinct TOR, the following components should always
be included:
1. Background
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
The TOR should start by describing the legislative basis for the peace operation and
the group, including Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions,
Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee on Peace and
Security, among others. It may also describe the purpose of the task force, using lan-
guage from key decisions. It may also refer to any Strategic Assessment or any other
type of assessment undertaken. The section could also include the rationale for an
ITF, particularly in cases where there are no integrated field presences.
2. Purpose and Principal Functions

This section should list the objectives and main functions of the task force. As noted
above, these may change depending on the situation and phase of field presence.
Each task force should seek to define its own key deliverables. Below are some of the
typical functions of a task force:
• Serve as the principal Headquarters mechanism for United Nations inter-depart-
mental and inter-agency coordination of strategic guidance, planning support
and information exchange.
• Support and promote joint and coordinated strategic policy and planning pro-
cesses.
• Coordinate a Strategic Assessment that conducts joint analysis, identifies United
Nations priorities and recommends strategic options for the UN.
• Undertake the coordination of various planning activities outlined in the IAP Pol-
icy.
• Coordinate technical assessment missions (TAMs), where these are integrated.
• Review planning and policy documents for decisions by the Secretary-General
and heads of departments and agencies (for example Secretary-General reports,
Policy Committee papers).
[ 62 ] [ 63 ]
• Provide support, through the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), to the Peace- 2. Background
building Commission’s (PBC) work, in cases where the country is under consider- This section is context-specific and should describe the legislative basis for the mis-
ation in the PBC. sion and the UNCT’s activities, including Security Council resolutions, General Assem-
• Monitor political, security, humanitarian, reconstruction/development and human bly resolutions, Policy Committee decisions or decisions by the Executive Committee
rights developments in the field (the list of sectors will vary from case to case). on Peace and Security, among others. It may also refer back to Strategic Assessments,
• Maintain a dialogue with field-based integrated structures and provide support TAMs, Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies or any other type of joint assessment un-
to them as required. dertaken by the mission and UNCT. This section may also include the rationale for a
• Regularly share and review information.
tailored configuration, as well as the working methods of the integrated analytical
and planning capacity. This is particularly important for missions and UNCTs that are
• Coordinate with non-UN actors at Headquarters level. not structurally integrated through a DSRSG/RC/HC.
3. Principal functions
3. Organization of Work
This section should describe the working modalities of the task force. It should de- This section should list the objectives and main functions of the integrated analytical
fine who chairs meetings and how frequently the task force meets and at what level. and planning capacity. As noted above, these may change depending on the situa-
Some task forces may decide to have two tiers by meeting more frequently at the tion and phase. Integrated analytical and planning capacity should seek to define its
Sec tion II
Sec tion II
working level and less frequently at the Director level. Information about the devel- own key deliverables. Below are some of the typical functions of an integrated ana-
opment of a workplan, the modalities for formation of meeting agendas, and the lytical and planning capacity:
production of action points and/or minutes may also be included in this section. • Coordinate the development and implementation of joint strategic planning pro-
This section should also describe how the work of the task force is linked to similar cesses including ISFs.
field-level groups. It should describe the modalities for the exchange of information • Guide and review the work of thematic working groups.
between these groups (including dedicated online document repositories) and note • Conduct strategic reviews at key milestones, jointly with ITFs and other Headquar-
that the task force provides support to field-based working groups as required. ters-based bodies as required, to take stock of major changes and/or new require-
ments (for example transition and drawdown).
B. Template Terms of Reference for Integrated Analytical and Planning • Promote the development of synergies and minimize overlap by developing
Capacity United Nations system-wide thematic strategies (for example on protection of ci-
Note: The TOR for this capacity should be tailored to the distinct needs of the coun- vilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform, early warning).
try and United Nations presence. This capacity should revise its TOR when the situa- 4. Composition
tion changes or when the United Nations presence enters a new phase (for example
moves from conflict to peacebuilding). This section should define the composition of the integrated analytical and plan-
ning capacity. The capacity should comprise representative members of the United
1. Purpose
Nations presence, including peacekeeping/political, support, humanitarian, human
Suggested generic text for the TOR: This integrated analytical and planning capacity rights and development actors. Military and/or police components should always be
aims to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concen- represented, where present. In some cases, the SRSG and RC/HC may decide to iden-
trating on those activities required to consolidate peace. This capacity responds to tify a representative group of mission and United Nations agencies for inclusion in
the requirement in the Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration33 for UN country- the integrated analytical and planning capacity based on their respective contribu-
level arrangements that promote the development and implementation of a strate- tions to the agreed peace consolidation framework (Integrated Strategic Framework
gic partnership for peace consolidation. It also aims to ensure that all components of or similar) and to limit staff time in meetings. If this is the case, the RC/HC should con-
the UN mission and the members of the UNCT operate in a coherent and mutually sult the UNCT to establish the United Nations agency representatives. Team mem-
supportive manner and in close cooperation with other national and international bers should participate in meetings at the senior officer level in order to maintain
partners. The integrated analytical and planning capacity receives direction from and strategic focus and be empowered to represent their entities.
reports to the Strategic Policy Group and is the field-level counterpart to the [coun-
try] Integrated Task Force chaired by [lead department]. 5. Organization of Work
This section should describe the working modalities of the integrated analytical
33 Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008). and planning capacity. It should define how frequently the team meets. Informa-
[ 64 ] [ 65 ]
tion about the development of a workplan, the modalities for formation of meeting
agendas, and the production of action points and/or minutes may also be included
in this section. This section should also describe how the work of the integrated ana-
lytical and planning capacity is linked to other integrated coordination structures in
the field (Strategic Policy Group, thematic working groups, provincial/regional teams)
and United Nations Headquarters (ITFs). It may also describe how the integrated ana-
lytical and planning capacity interacts with national coordination structures and/or
coordination structures involving the World Bank and non-UN actors (for example
donors, NGOs).
Sec tion II
The National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Com-
UN Photo/Martine Perret
mission of South Sudan and the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
handed over so-called DDR “reinsertion projects” to the Government of
Eastern Equatoria State in Tirrangore.
Close-up of a performer during the hand-over ceremony.
28 October 2013
[ 66 ] Tirrangore, South Sudan
Section III
Integrated Planning
This section relates to the second requirement of the IAP
Policy: “Articulation of a common UN vision, priorities and
responsibilities in support of peace consolidation, including
relationship, if any, to national plans and priorities”. The IAP
Policy stipulates that the following planning documents
are mandatory for United Nations integrated presences:
(i) Directive to the Special or Executive Representative
of the Secretary-General (S/ERSG), Resident Coordinator
(RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), to be issued by
Headquarters, and (ii) an Integrated Strategic Framework
(ISF). Both derive from an integrated assessment process.
The following section provides templates and guidance

on the process for the development of the Directive and
the ISF. It also includes tips on how to realign an ISF with
national plans and other international plans related to
peace consolidation, as appropriate.
The IAP Policy also states that modalities for working

together in integrated settings may include joint
programmes and/or the use of external capacities (for
example non-UN expertise), depending on circumstances,
specific requirements and mandates. The second half of
this section includes examples on joint planning and issues
to consider, such as expected impact, transaction costs and
assessment of risks, as well as guidelines on joint resource
UN Photo/Logan Abassi
Brazilian Peacekeepers stationed with the United Nations Mission in mobilization and information strategy.
Haiti (MINUSTAH) distribute health and hygiene packs during a day of
sport, cultural and educational activities for over 300 schoolchildren
from the volatile slum of Cite Soleil in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The event
was put on by MINUSTAH’s Community Violence Reduction section and
the non-government organization Timoun Bouke (Children in Danger).
01 September 2012
III.1 Directive to S/ERSG, RC and HC III.1.3 Structure of the Directive

A template Directive to the SRSG, RC and HC is found in the toolbox at the end of this
section. In general, all Directives should contain the following elements:
(a) Situation and context, drawing on the Strategic Assessment, comparative ad-
40. Based on the mandate from the Security Council, the Strategic Assessment vantages of the United Nations vis-à-vis partners, threats and opportunities
and decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee, the Directive and United Nations mandate(s).
to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is drafted by Integrated Task Forces as part of the inte-
(b) Strategic objectives and priorities for peace consolidation, including intent for
grated assessment and planning process.
the United Nations system and overall approach to peace consolidation.
41. The Directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibili-
(c) Configuration of integrated presence and roles and responsibilities, including
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
ties, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning

reporting lines, management of diverse mandates in structurally integrated
parameters, including guidance on the development of an Integrated Strategic
presences and risk mitigation measures.
Framework. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC signifies the transfer of re-
sponsibility for subsequent planning of the integrated presence to the S/ERSG (d) Planning parameters, including instructions for the development or review of
and the senior leadership team of the integrated presence. an ISF and monitoring and reporting arrangements.
42. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is issued and updated by the Secre- Headquarters of each entity may issue, as annexes to the Directive, strategic guide-
tary-General upon a recommendation of the Integrated Task Force at Principal lines to their field representatives on the basis of and in alignment with the Directive.
level. Updates will usually result from a significant change in the environment or For example, the Office of Military Affairs in the Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
mandate, supported as required by an updated Strategic Assessment. tions (DPKO) has developed a template for instructions to the military components of
peacekeeping missions (see the toolbox at the end of this section). Other sectors that
Sec tion III
Sec tion III

require concept of operations may follow this example.
III.1.1 Purpose and scope
The purpose of the Directive is to give to the S/ERSG, RC and HC the United Nations III.2 Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF)
system-wide strategic direction, priorities and responsibilities, an outline of coordi-
nation arrangements (which may include structural set-ups), and basic planning pa- What the IAP Policy says:
rameters. This is in order to manage the integrated United Nations presence in the 43. On the basis of mandates, integrated assessments and the Directive to the
specific country/area. S/ERSG, RC and HC the vision, shared objectives and means through which
the UN will promote peace consolidation are further developed and updated
III.1.2 Process through an inclusive analytical and planning process whose conclusions are re-
The Directive is issued by the Secretary-General, following a Strategic Assessment, flected in an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) document.
decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee to propose the estab- 44. The content of the ISF document must include:
lishment or reconfiguration of an integrated United Nations presence and the adop- a. The main findings from integrated assessments of the conflict and challenges
tion or change of a mandate by the Security Council. to peace consolidation, UN role and comparative advantages;
Directives are issued or updated at key moments in the life-cycle of integrated United b. A clear definition and expression of peace consolidation priorities for the
Nations presences (not just at start-up), when the mandate and/or other major plan- UN, including for national capacity development and institution-building;
ning parameters change.
c. An articulation of all programmatic, functions and/or operational ar-
Directives are drafted by the Integrated Task Force (ITF). The ITF adopts the Directive, eas requiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of
which serves as integrated guidance from Headquarters to the field-based UN-wide integration;
integrated planning.
d. Agreed results, timelines, responsibilities and other relevant implementa-
tion arrangements, including coordination mechanisms;
e. A common monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or
benchmarks of progress.
[ 70 ] [ 71 ]
45. Other UN planning frameworks (such as a UN Development Assistance at Headquarters by Integrated Task Forces at the Director-level and signed-off by
Framework (UNDAF)) may serve as Integrated Strategic Frameworks if their con- the USG of the lead department.
tent meets the standards outlined in paragraph 44. The decision to use such 52. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must be reviewed as necessary, especially
frameworks as the Integrated Strategic Framework or have a separate document after any substantial change in the mandate, Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC
is made by the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC and HC in consultation with other or circumstances on the ground, or at least every two years. The review of Inte-
senior managers and Headquarters, and on the basis of a gap analysis of exist- grated Strategic Frameworks is carried out by integrated mechanisms in the field
ing planning processes and products. The opportunity for combining planning and in cooperation with HQ as stipulated in paragraph 58 of this policy.
frameworks and harmonizing planning processes should be regularly assessed,
with due consideration for respective programming and budgetary cycles.
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
46. The title, timing for development, timeframe, structure, content and owner- III.2.1 Policy Framework and Purpose
ship of the process and its product are determined by S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs,
The Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration of June 200835 requires United Na-
RC and HC, in consultation with other senior managers. These parameters vary
tions field presences operating in conflict and post-conflict situations where there is
with context, with particular consideration given to national milestones and UN
a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office and a United
agency planning requirements and timelines.
Nations country team (UNCT) to have an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). This
47. The decision to develop an Integrated Strategic Framework jointly with na- requirement is reinforced in the IAP Policy.
tional authorities and other partners rests with the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC
The purpose of an ISF is therefore to bring together the mission and the UNCT’s man-
and HC following consultation with Integrated Task Forces.
dates around a set of agreed priorities and measures to maximize the individual and
48. Once developed and endorsed, the ISF document serves as a regular refer- collective impact of the United Nations system on the country/context’s peace consoli-
Sec tion III
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ence for an on-going field-based process of joint analysis and review of the UN- dation needs.
wide strategies and arrangements for peace consolidation. As such, its nature
As such, the ISF process is designed to ensure that (i) the mission and the UNCT have
and content may shift over time and may combine elements of strategic, pro-
a common understanding of the crisis and the critical peace consolidation needs; (ii)
grammatic, communication and operational integration. It should also include
the mission and the UNCT jointly define the areas in which increased collaboration
measures to mitigate risks to all UN actors and activities, including to humanitar-
is necessary to increase the individual and collective impact; and (iii) the mission and
ian operations.
UNCT jointly agree on the modes of collaboration required in each area and have a
49. The shared analysis should build on, where relevant, other assessments in- means of monitoring progress towards agreed priority objectives.
cluding Strategic Assessments, humanitarian needs assessments, risk analysis
In thinking about the purpose of an ISF, it is therefore important to keep in mind the
or those led by other national, regional and international institutions such as
following:
Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and Fragility Assessments. National
authorities, civil society, other local representatives, affected populations and • The ISF document reflects the common peace consolidation priorities agreed by
key international partners should be consulted as part of the process to ensure the mission and the UNCT. The ISF is not, however, an end in itself. As stated in the
that, at a minimum, local perspectives are taken into account in the analysis and policy, it must become a living document, supported by a process of regular joint
identification of UN priorities. analysis of the situation and stock-taking of the ways in which the mission and the
UNCT can increase their impact on peace consolidation priorities.
50. The Integrated Strategic Framework must include a monitoring and reporting
framework to track adherence to responsibilities and progress towards results • The ways in which a mission and the UNCT can increase their impact will vary de-
with a view to promoting accountability, making adjustments to activities or re- pending on a range of factors, including country context and needs, the United
vising plans. Nations configuration and the various mandates. While most ISFs focus on pri-
orities of a programmatic nature (for example defining strategic priorities in dis-
51. Integrated Strategic Frameworks are developed, updated and endorsed in
armament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and agreeing on a division
the field under the leadership of S/ERSGs, DSRSGs,34 Resident/Humanitarian Co-
of labour and responsibilities between the mission and relevant United Nations
ordinators and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes. ISFs are also endorsed
35 Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008) established the requirement
for an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), but gives scope and flexibility for different types of
34 DSRSG: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. vehicles or tools to fulfil this requirement.
[ 72 ] [ 73 ]
agencies), it may be necessary for the ISF to articulate joint strategies in the areas inclusion in an ISF to promote a coherent approach and the clear allocation of roles
of communication, policy-making (for example common approaches to address- and responsibilities.
ing root causes, capacity-building or gender-based issues), and/or operations (for
example sharing of assets). In some instances, an ISF may be used to promote
greater geographical collaboration (for example harmonizing and sequencing Humanitarian
UNCT and mission activities in a particular city or region). (CHAP/CAP
• The ISF may in fact combine priorities and agreements of a programmatic, policy
and/or operational nature. As such, the “identity” of the ISF will vary: in the con-
text of limited programmatic overlap between the UNCT and the mission (for ex- Informs &
ample in a small Special Political Mission or SPM), the ISF may be construed as a Updates
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
“Constitution”, laying out the common policies and political messages. In settings
where the UNCT and the mission share significant programmatic responsibilities Peace and Development
(for example in a large multidimensional peacekeeping operation), the ISF may Security (UNDAF, PRSP) Scope of the
be designed more as a “Joint Plan”. The latter may benefit from the existence of (Mandate
ISF
a UNCT “One Programme” in countries implementing the “delivering as one” ap- and RBB)
proach. 36

Robert D. Watkins Figure 8: The Possible Scope of an ISF in a Peace Consolidation or Peacebuilding
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DSRSG/RC/HC, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Context
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative The scope of an ISF may vary greatly in highly volatile environments (for example
22 February 2011 Sudan, Afghanistan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)). For example,
“The Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) exercise has been successful in the Figure 9 demonstrates how the scope of an ISF may shift and narrow considerably in
mission insofar as it has helped bring UNAMA and the agencies together to find such cases. Such a shift is appropriate as the United Nations would be obliged to pri-
areas of common ground for an overarching agenda that contributes towards oritize the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in these
peace and stability in the country. Unfortunately it has started to become the environments. In countries with pockets of conflict, it may also be necessary to tailor
victim of a lengthy consultative process before its formal adoption. The process the scope of an ISF to account for regional differences.
has to be hastened in order to ensure that all stakeholders see it as the useful
tool that it could be.”
Humanitarian
(CHAP/CAP
III.2.2 Scope of an ISF
The scope and content of an ISF will be unique in each country situation. Figure 8
below, for example, represents the possible scope of an ISF in a peace consolidation Informs &
or peacebuilding context. In that regard, a review of current ISFs reveals the follow- Updates
ing thematic priorities: security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, restoration of state
authority, protection and the protection of civilians, return, relocation and reinte- Peace and Development
gration and durable solutions, recovery (including at the early stage), human rights, Security (UNDAF, PRSP) Scope of the
and basic social services. These issues involve potentially political and necessarily se- (Mandate
ISF
quenced inputs from a number of United Nations actors and, thus, could benefit from and RBB)
36 See UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the
“Delivering as one” Approach (2013). Figure 9: The Possible Scope of an ISF in a Volatile Context
[ 74 ] [ 75 ]
In this regard, principled humanitarian action remains an important element of the

United Nations system’s response. However, even though humanitarian response of- Diversity in ISF Scope
ten supports peace consolidation, its primary aim is to respond to needs. Accord- The ISF has been introduced to allow integrated UN presences to maximize indi-
ingly, many humanitarian activities (as reflected in a Common Humanitarian Action vidual and collective impact. In most cases, the means through which such im-
Plan or CHAP) are likely to remain outside the scope of an ISF. Key exceptions may be pact is maximized are programmatic, and the ISF focuses on defining common
activities related to protection of civilians, some support for return and reintegration priorities and the appropriate division of labour along sectoral areas: security
(coordinated with mandated agencies), and early recovery. In the case of the protec- sector reform, elections, rule of law, etc.
tion of civilians, other strategy documents are likely to exist, including mission-wide The ISF need not, however, be restricted to programmatic priorities. Many inte-
protection of civilian strategies where peacekeeping missions are present (called for grated UN presences have also used the ISF to identify other measures that are
under Security Council resolution 189437), and protection cluster strategies covering required to maximize impact. These include:
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
the objectives and activities of United Nations and NGO actors. It is important to en-
sure complementarity across these tools.
• Agreement on messaging and communication, including content and
division of labour
It is also important to recall that certain subjects, including human rights, must be
mainstreamed into the work of all United Nations bodies. For example, according
• Development on common capacity-building approaches, even if
interventions and programmes remain separate
to the Secretary-General’s Decision on Human Rights in Integrated Missions, 38 “all
United Nations entities have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are pro- • Clarity on policies and “rules of engagement” with specific non-UN actors
moted and protected through and within their operations in the field”. The Policy • Common operational measures, including sharing of assets
on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions39 provides
detailed operational guidance on how the mission leadership and mission compo-
“Early ISF” at Mission Start-Up
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nents are expected to comply with and integrate human rights into all aspects of
their work. In addition, the ECOSOC Agreed Conclusions 1997/2 requests “all entities These guidelines may also be used to support the development of an “early ISF” or
of the United Nations system should institute mechanisms for gender mainstream- “early strategy and action plan” at mission start-up. An “early ISF” may require an ab-
ing in their planning and programming for example, through participation of gender breviated development process and would address a smaller number of immediate
specialists in these processes”.40 Within the IAP process at the field level, the form and priorities, with clear roles and responsibilities. Thus, achieving an early ISF will require
structure of integration – and how this is captured in the ISF – should enable the hu- even more involvement of the senior leadership team, more direct support from
man rights and gender components to further mainstream human rights and gender Headquarters (including surge capacity), and be shorter in its duration (for example
across United Nations peace consolidation priorities. 6–9 months). The aim of an early ISF is to deliver an early peace dividend. The content
of an early ISF may also prove useful for the development of resource mobilization
plans for the programmatic elements of a peace consolidation or peacebuilding plan
that are not funded by the assessed budget of a peacekeeping operation or politi-
cal mission/office. This may be presented to the various multilateral sources of pre-
positioned pooled funds, for example the UN Peacebuilding Fund, World Bank State-
building and Peacebuilding Fund, EU Stabilization Fund and UNDP/BCPR41 Trust Fund.
ISF as a Planning Tool for Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal

During mission drawdown and withdrawal, coordination between the mission, the
UNCT, national government and civil society is particularly important. Both the mis-
sion and the UNCT have to ensure that the departure of the former does not under-
mine either the stability in the host country or the ability of the latter to work effec-
tively in this changed context.
The inherent flexibility and integrated nature of the ISF lends itself as a useful instru-
37 Security Council resolution 1894 (2009; S/RES/1894). ment (as both a process and a tool) to coordinate activities between missions and the
38 Decision No. 2005/24 of the Secretary-General on Human Rights in Integrated Missions (2005).
UNCT in the context of mission drawdown and withdrawal.
39 DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS, Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political
Missions (2011).
40 Report of the Economic and Social Council for the year 1997 (A/52/3), Agreed Conclusions 1997/2. 41 BCPR: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.
[ 76 ] [ 77 ]
However, since national ownership and buy-in from the host government are key reason, an ISF should come before the annual development of a mission’s Results-
conditions for successful transition planning processes, efforts need to be made to Based Budgeting (RBB), UNDAF review (when it has been decided that the ISF and the
ensure adequate consultation and buy-in from national partners if the ISF is used as UNDAF should be separate), or CHAP/CAP42 review.
the main planning tool during United Nations transitions. This diagnostics phase provides the key parameters for the ISF development pro-
In some contexts, missions and UNCT partners may find it more useful to develop cess (which instrument to use, timeframe and timelines, actors, etc.). If capacity gaps
a separate transition plan. Where separate transition plans are introduced, these for the preparation, design and development of an ISF are identified, the United Na-
should be aligned with the ISF, or can also replace it. The following table outlines tions field presence may request an ISF Headquarters support mission be mobilized
some considerations that might guide the decision about whether to anchor transi- through the ITF.
tion planning in the ISF or to develop a separate decision plan.
Design
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
Table 2: Considerations for Incorporating Transition Planning into Existing Designing an ISF (new or revised) involves the following steps:
Frameworks • Establish a process for developing or revising the ISF (or using an existing frame-
Incorporating transition planning into Developing a separate transition plan work), with timelines and responsibilities, based on a set of external and internal
an existing frameworks (UNDAF or ISF) parameters. Close consultation with Headquarters in terms of timeline, output
and responsibilities is recommended.
+ Use of existing tools and processes + Increased visibility through separate
plan • Undertake or update a conflict analysis and a review of the UN’s operational en-
vironment (reference to existing analysis, if appropriate, is encouraged). The con-
+ No additional reporting requirements + More flexibility text should determine whether the ISF is an internal United Nations document or
+ More ownership by government one that is aligned with, and endorsed by, the national government.
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• Refine the scope of the ISF, which can focus on programmes, policies, operations,
III.2.3 The Process of Developing the ISF communications, or a combination thereof.
The process of designing or revising an ISF can be undertaken on the basis of the fol-
• Articulate common ISF strategic objectives, results to be achieved, roles and re-
sponsibilities, determination/identification of monitoring mechanisms including
lowing steps:
through the use of thematic working groups if necessary.
Preparation • Finalize the ISF document, which should be a short document (10–15 pages) at the
• Agree on a definition of peace consolidation specific to the country/context and/ strategic level, supported by more specific workplans if necessary.
or revisit previous definition (as developed during mission start-up). To initiate the design phase, a retreat for the senior leadership forum or structure may
• Determine the nature and scope of the ISF in the specific country/context, based also be held43 to (i) discuss the need for the ISF and the value it will add, based on the
on an analysis of what is preventing the United Nations from maximizing its indi- preparatory analysis, in order to secure buy-in for its design as well as for its imple-
vidual and collective impact in support of peace consolidation. mentation; (ii) agree on or validate the ISF design process or roadmap; (iii) identify,
• Map the United Nations planning landscape by reviewing existing national and on the basis of a discussion of the context and the collective mandates of the United
UN frameworks (see separate guidance in the toolbox at the end of this section). Nations, three or four strategic priorities for peace consolidation that are achievable
in the envisaged timeframe (for example 1–2 years); and (iv) establish clear leads and/
• Decide if another framework (for example an UNDAF) could serve as the ISF and, if
or co-leads for further developing the content of the strategic priorities.
so, which changes/edits are required and when, bearing in mind that changes to
the UNDAF are to be agreed upon by the host government. Field teams should maintain a dialogue with the ITF throughout the ISF development
process to ensure consensus around the analysis and the key peace consolidation
The development and finalization of the ISF happens in the field in consultation
priorities (strategic objectives) before elaborating the full strategy. For example, a
with the ITF based on developments in-country (for example mission start-up, peace
schedule of ITF meetings could be elaborated as part of the ISF development road
agreement, elections/new government) and instructions in the Directive. Consulta-
map.
tion with Headquarters should occur throughout development of the ISF, and in par-
ticular when the vision is endorsed, to ensure buy-in/endorsement at all levels. It is 42 CHAP: Common Humanitarian Action Plan; CAP: Consolidated Appeal Process.
also strongly recommended that an ISF exercise be undertaken with a view to har- 43 The senior leadership coordination structure may require expansion in order for the retreat to
monizing and adding coherence to United Nations system planning cycles. For this ensure appropriate representation and buy-in across the United Nations system.
[ 78 ] [ 79 ]
cess must be adjusted to ensure validation by all local partners before referring the
Tips on the ISF Development Process tool to global Headquarters.
1. There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the clarity – and effective-
Thematic Working Groups
ness – of the design process, the clarity of the purpose of the ISF and the useful-
ness and ownership of the ISF itself. Recent experiences confirm that the more Once basic decisions are taken about the strategic peace consolidation priorities
confusion there is about what the ISF is for and how it adds value, the more re- (the strategic objectives) that will be addressed by the ISF, it may be useful to fur-
luctant people are to engage. It is important to invest well at the very beginning ther develop the ISF content through thematic working groups. In most cases, this
in explaining what the ISF is, how it will function and why it is required. will involve senior working-level staff from mission components and members of the
2. The level of engagement in the development process is very much a function UNCT. In this context, it is important to involve those with a direct understanding of
of (i) leadership support, (ii) a shared understanding of the value of the ISF, and programming and budgetary allocations (for example cluster leads, outcome group
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
(iii) expectations of greater impact and/or access to resources (political, financial, leads, mission heads of components) to ensure that commitments in the ISF can be
logistical, etc.) through the ISF. adequately resourced (through RBB, CPAPs,44 etc.). These thematic working groups
should regularly report to senior leadership and should benefit from the coordina-
3. A balanced participation is critical: ISF design processes have often been either
tion and facilitation support of the strategic planners of the mission and RC Office.
very mission heavy or very UNCT focused.
Thematic working groups should be engaged in the development of ISF content,
4. Overall, transaction costs can be reduced by drawing on existing analyses including the political and operational strategy, risk analysis, sequencing of prior-
and using existing structures and indicators that are already being monitored. ity results, linkages to other elements of the ISF, and the partnerships strategy (with
However, when the existing analyses are weak or outdated, or when the existing World Bank, bilaterals, etc.).
structures are dysfunctional, or when the indicators are not sufficiently aligned,
there’s a risk of settling for shortcuts in the name of efficiency, at the detriment
Consulting Non-UN Actors
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of content and rigour. Unlike an UNDAF, an ISF (in case it is separate from the UNDAF) does not require the
direct endorsement of national authorities. The ISF is, first and foremost, an internal
Consultation and Finalization United Nations document. If UN field presences would like to produce a version of
the ISF as a public information tool or for consultation purposes, it may need to be
• Validate the ISF in-country, within the United Nations senior leadership structure. adapted from the original internal document. In this context, it might be necessary to
• Secure government buy-in, where appropriate (and signature if/when the UNDAF exclude sensitive annexes and/or conflict analysis in the public versions.
is used as the ISF). If and when the United Nations has decided to merge its ISF with the UNDAF, UNDAF
• Endorse the ISF with the ITF. procedures should therefore take precedence and the document should be prepared
and finalized in consultation with the host government.
The most senior leadership coordination structure should receive regular updates
on the development of the ISF and review drafts as they are finalized. Senior lead- If and when the United Nations has decided to have a separate ISF and UNDAF and
ership validation of the ISF means that the mission and UNCT agree to pursue the keep the ISF as an internal document, each contributor to an ISF is responsible for
results, timelines and responsibilities as described and they will be mutually account- consulting the appropriate national authorities, non-UN actors (for example NGOs,
able for achieving the results. This concept of mutual accountability takes into con- bilateral donors, other multilateral actors) throughout the ISF development process
sideration that the contributors are also pursuing other mandated priorities outside and should be able to articulate how the ISF’s priorities contribute to national peace
the scope of the ISF. Following endorsement by the senior leadership forum used consolidation strategies (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Transi-
by the mission and the UNCT, the S/ERSG and UNCT (represented by the RC/HC) tional Results Frameworks, National Recovery Strategies, etc.). Agencies are respon-
should present the document for discussion at a Director-level meeting of the Head- sible for consulting with their respective Headquarters.
quarters-based ITF. At this stage, ITFs may call upon the expertise of the IAP Work- The nature of consultations with national actors will vary depending on the context.
ing Group to assist with quality assurance in the ISF process and product. Following For instance, consultations on an ISF being developed in a peacebuilding context
these discussions, the S/ERSG, RC/HC and ITF should formally endorse an ISF. The may be extensive and an ISF may be explicitly linked to existing national peacebuild-
Under-Secretary-General of the lead department should also sign off on the ISF as a ing and development strategies. However, consultations with national authorities for
demonstration of support.
Where the ISF is to be the composite for other planning documents, such as the
UNDAF and part of the CHAP, or where the ISF and the UNDAF are merged, this pro- 44 CPAP: Country Programme Action Plan.
[ 80 ] [ 81 ]
ISFs in conflict situations will require more care, and may involve non-State actors
and civil society.
Example: Elaboration of the 2013–2016 Integrated Strategic Framework in

Haiti
The ISF in Haiti, which includes MINUSTAH45 and 18 agencies, funds and programmes,
replaces the UNDAF and constitutes the strategic umbrella under which MINUSTAH
undertakes its consolidation plan and United Nations agencies, funds and pro-
grammes elaborate their respective country programme documents.
As with the previous ISF in Haiti, the 2013–2016 ISF is fully aligned with the National
Integrated Planning
Development Strategic Plan along its four pillars (institutional, territorial, social and
economic rebuilding).
The document was elaborated over an eight-month period in close consultation
with the government and is signed by the SRSG and the Minister of Plan and Ex-
ternal Cooperation. In addition, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have aligned their new country pro-
grammes with the ISF results, while some MINUSTAH sections (such as rule of law)
have used the ISF results as the basis for their annual workplans. The 2013–2016 ISF
is also taken as a reference for the development of the mission consolidation plan.
Sec tion III
Merged UNDAF–ISF and Links with Other United Nations Planning Processes
The purpose of an ISF process is to achieve an overarching strategy for the role of the
United Nations in peace consolidation in a given country. Whereas existing United
Key Steps of the Elaboration Process Key Outcomes
Existing joint planning team (SRSG Of- Joint vision on the objectives and pro-
fice’s planning officer and DSRSG/RC/ cess for the 2013–2016 ISF
HC’s planning officer), who had worked
on the previous ISF 2010–2011 and its
2012 extension
Agreement within the UNCT and within Increased buy-in and rationalization of
the UNDG LAC46 that the ISF is the only the planning process in-country
inter-agency strategic document and re-
places the UNDAF
Senior-level retreat with MINUSTAH and Validation of the 10 principles guiding
UNCT senior management and high- the elaboration of the document by
level participation of the government technical teams
45 MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
46 UNDG LAC: United Nations Development Group for Latin America and the Caribbean.
[ 82 ]
Key Steps of the Elaboration Process Key Outcomes
Creation of a group of focal points in Buy-in from relevant ministries and gov-
the government to follow and guide the ernment entities, especially the Ministry
elaboration of the document. Two con- of Planning and External Cooperation as
sultation meetings organized (hosted the lead for development planning and
in the Ministry of Planning and External aid coordination
Cooperation) and various drafts of the
document circulated for comments
Integrated Planning
Creation of four groups, one for each Buy-in from mission and agency staff on
pillar of the ISF, to elaborate each of the the development of the document
four result matrixes. A lead and co-lead
for each of the pillar was jointly agreed
upon
Internal validation by MINUSTAH and ISF document validated internally
UNCT senior management through the
Integrated Strategic Planning Group
Validation meeting with the govern- ISF document validated by the govern-
Sec tion III

ment hosted in the Ministry of Planning ment. The document was then signed
and External Cooperation by both the Minister of Plan and the
SRSG
Nations planning processes (for example UNDAF for development, CHAP/CAP for hu-
manitarian action, RBB for the mission) are specific to development, humanitarian, or
peace and security sectors, the ISF is unique in that its primary purpose is to reflect
the collaborative objectives of the United Nations system for peace consolidation. In
order to foster synergies and avoid duplications, whenever possible, a coherent pro-
cess should be used for the different United Nations planning tools and instruments.
If the ISF follows other planning processes and instruments it should draw upon ex-
isting analysis, while allowing senior managers to step back and have a strategic dis-
cussion about current peace consolidation priorities. The ISF process is likely to reveal
gaps and suggestions regarding how current plans could be revised in order to con-
tribute more effectively to peace consolidation. Different processes will have differ-
ent scopes and a different hierarchy of results. This is not necessarily problematic, so
long as there is an overall coherence among them.
When examining the linkages between the ISF and existing United Nations sys-
tem planning tools, some United Nations field presences may consider whether
an existing in-country tool could be adapted to fulfil the minimum standards for
ISFs described herein. This is often the case with the UNDAF, which has been used
as the UN’s ISF in countries such as Burundi, Liberia and Haiti (and in these places,
the UNDAF is at times referred to internally as “UNDAF+” to indicate that it serves as
the ISF, following, usually, slight revisions to meet the ISF minimum requirements).
[ 83 ]
If the mission and the UNCT decide to use another planning framework currently in
use, in lieu of a separate ISF, the framework should be reviewed against these guide- toring of activities, their scoring and use in dashboards for senior managers are
lines. central elements of decision-making in UNMIT. It will be important to continue
this monitoring through to the end of the mandate, to ensure that we deliver
However, in certain situations adapting an existing tool may not be sufficient. For
on what is set out in the plan, and that activities are effectively concluded or
instance, complex United Nations architectures with multiple mandated presences
handed over.
would benefit from developing an ISF (as described in these guidelines) that effec-
tively brings together the United Nations presence around a set of agreed priorities. Lesson learnt: A seamless transition to a new form of United Nations engagement
Likewise, multidimensional operations (for example those that include police and/ is only possible if UN Headquarters, both the Secretariat and agencies, funds and
or military components) would require an ISF so as to adequately reflect the scale programmes, commit to planning early for the shape and scope of the post-peace-
of mission resources and/or allow for a short-term planning horizon suited to these keeping presence. ITFs can provide useful forums for such planning, and ensure in-
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
typically volatile environments. clusiveness, but a smaller group of the most concerned stakeholders needs to take
responsibility for moving the process forward.
Once developed or revised, the ISF needs to be translated into concrete resources
and actions, by updating the relevant programmatic elements and/or projects in the By aligning our own planning with the New Deal, as we have done with the
RBB, UNDAF and CAP frameworks to ensure that the ISF’s objectives are adequately UNCT’s transition portfolio, the United Nations has an opportunity both to
resourced. Thus, an ISF should form the basis for the revision of peace consolidation provide credibility to Timor-Leste’s leadership of this initiative and thereby
aims within other United Nations system planning tools (such as UNDAF and country strengthen our relations with the government, and to ensure that the UN is well-
programme documents, CHAP/CAP and RBB). positioned as this major policy initiative in post-conflict countries becomes in-
creasingly operational.
III.3 Transition Planning in the Context of Mission Lesson learnt: Having a national ‘champion’ who understands the importance of
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early transition planning – in our case President Ramos-Horta – helps to secure na-
Drawdown and Withdrawal tional engagement at the early stages of the process.”

In addition to guidance provided in the IAP Policy and Guidelines, the Policy on UN
Ameerah Haq, SRSG and Head of United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor- Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal47 provides strategic
Leste (UNMIT) guidance to United Nations Headquarters offices and field presences specifically on
January 2010–June 2012 how to plan and manage the transition of UN operations triggered by the significant
“Together with the government, we decided on seven focus areas for the tran- drawdown or withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission or SPM.
sition, reflecting UNMIT’s key areas of work, and the cross-cutting concern of The IAP Policy clarifies the roles and responsibilities of United Nations actors at Head-
building capacity for Timorese staff in UNMIT and national institutions. The gov- quarters and in the field, illustrates links between transitions and other related policy
ernment and the UN family appointed overall transition focal points – the Dep- stream, and establishes the following key principles that apply across all UN mission
uty Prime Minister and the mission’s Chief of Staff – as well as focal points for transition processes:
each area, who set about drafting a Joint Transition Plan (JTP). The JTP, which
(a) Early planning: Planning for United Nations transitions needs to begin
turned out to be the first of its kind by a peacekeeping mission, sets out UNMIT’s
early, take into account different potential scenarios, and remain flexible
activities in each focus area, and identifies when the activity will either be com-
throughout.
pleted, or when and how it will be handed over to a national institution or a
bilateral or multilateral partner. The plan listed a total of 129 activities, one third (b) United Nations integration: United Nations transitions involve the reconfigura-
of which will be completed by December 2012, and two thirds of which will be tion of the overall UN presence and objectives, not only the drawdown and
handed over. withdrawal of a mission. As such they must be planned, coordinated and man-
aged jointly by all UN actors present in the country from the outset, at both
Progress on UNMIT’s transition activities is monitored by the transition focal
the field and Headquarters level.
points, supported by the UNMIT transition team, and reported every quarter in a
dashboard report, which tracks completion levels, activity status and handover
progress, and thereby enables the High-Level Committee (HLC) to identify gaps,
focus on priorities and effectively steer UNMIT’s transition. The systematic moni- 47 Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013).
[ 84 ] [ 85 ]
(c) National ownership: The success of United Nations transitions hinges on na- and resource assessments for each task to be handed over, as a reality check (can
tional ownership, leadership and political will in the host country, which the “recipient” entity actually take it on?) and to inform resource mobilization ef-
should be secured through high-level political engagement, as well as sup- forts (what does the “recipient” entity need to take it on?). This common under-
port from a broad and representative range of national stakeholders. standing of the challenges will form the backbone of the transition process and
(d) National capacity development: The existence and development of relevant inform and be informed by strategic-level assessments undertaken to determine
national capacities is critical to ensure an effective and sustainable handover the nature of the reconfigured follow-on United Nations presence.
of mission responsibilities to national partners. • Take time to assess the pros and cons of reflecting transition plans and agree-
(e) Communication: United Nations transitions can cause anxieties and diverging ments (which tasks? to whom? when and how?) in existing United Nations plans
expectations among national and international stakeholders, including mis- (UNDAF+ or separate ISF) versus developing a separate transition plan and the
impact of either option on national ownership as well as planning and monitor-
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
sion staff and UNCT members. UN leadership in the field and at Headquarters
needs to manage expectations carefully through clear and consistent messaging costs.
ing, among other things. • Include updates on handover in regular United Nations reports (internal and ex-
ternal), including capacity status of recipient entity, timing of handover, and re-
Key Dos (and Don’ts) sidual handover tasks.
• Plan jointly for the transition with the host government and the UNCT. This is a
• Prioritize and dedicate sufficient resources, time and senior-level involvement to
communication with both internal and external actors, as many constituencies
time-intensive process but it is essential.
will have various concerns regarding the transition (for example employment for
• Establish dedicated capacity internally, chaired jointly by mission and RC/UNCT, mission staff, loss of support for external actors). A range of communication tools
to oversee transition planning. Adequate and consistent participation by opera- may be used simultaneously (web pages, radio messages, town hall meetings).
Sec tion III
Sec tion III

tional, administrative and security officers from the mission and the United Na-
• Design joint resource mobilization strategies between the mission and UNCT with
tions agencies should be ensured.
the full support of United Nations Headquarters offices to ensure that the latter
• Identify benchmarks and indicators from the outset to monitor progress in the will have additional means to address some of the gaps that are being created by
overall peacebuilding effort, in dialogue with national and international partners. the mission’s departure.
Regular assessments of progress towards benchmarks should inform the gradual • Factor in externalities associated with the mission drawdown and withdrawal, in-
adjustment of a mission’s presence over time, taking into account the changing cluding local economic impact (and ways to mitigate).
situation on the ground as well as the evolving capacities, resources and compara-
tive advantages of national and international partners. Lessons: Transition from UNIOSIL to UNIPSIL
• In addition to benchmarks, introduce a transition timeline when mission draw-
In 2008, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), led by
down is anticipated, in order to keep the plan on track and sustain momentum
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was handed over to the De-
with national and international partners throughout the transition process.
partment of Political Affairs (DPA) and renamed the United Nations Integrated
• Take the opportunity of the transition to (re)assess whether new or other peace- Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). This transition highlighted areas
building needs not included in the mandate of the mission have arisen and should that required further work at Headquarters, including through the use of Inte-
be the focus of United Nations support after mission withdrawal. grated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs).
• Develop criteria for handover, to decide, among other things, which entity (UNCT, Some key lessons included the importance of transition planning processes, the
national or international partner) will take on selected tasks. Such criteria should timely appointment of senior leadership, effective linkages between depart-
be agreed in conjunction with the host government, after consultation with other ments, support for integration, and arrangements to ensure continuity of key
national actors, and be informed by recent policy developments on international staff in the field. At the mission level, the importance of risk assessment and the
assistance, including the New Deal where/when relevant. development of strategies to mitigate risk were also underscored. Finally, the
transition from UNIOSIL to UNIPSIL also highlighted the important role that
• Based on the above criteria, carry out a joint mapping exercise to determine (i)
which tasks the mission has carried out; (ii) which of these tasks should be contin- leadership and vision play in such situations and provided a best practice for
ued beyond the end of the mission and which should be concluded or discontin- knowledge transfer that should be emulated by other missions.
ued; and (iii) who will take over those tasks. The analysis should include capacity
[ 86 ] [ 87 ]
III.4 Aligning with National and International processes. Use the substance (analysis, selection of priorities, etc.) of the national
planning process as a reference for the UN planning processes.
Planning Processes
• Use existing national sources of data and analysis to support joint United Nations
planning processes (even if, in some instances, the UN may need to carry addi-
tional analysis to cover gaps or address sensitive issues). This is particularly impor-
21. National ownership: National ownership is an essential condition for the sus- tant when Post-Conflict Needs Assessments have been undertaken, since these
tainability of peace. Where and when clear national peace consolidation priori- are nationally led and owned but benefit from structured international support.
ties have been developed on the basis of broad-based consensus, integrated as-
sessment and planning processes should aim to specify how the UN will support • Where relevant, explicitly identify the national priorities, as articulated in national
a diverse range of stakeholders in the implementation of these priorities. plans or compacts with the international community, that the ISF and other joint
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
United Nations plans will either contribute to (at the outcome level) or directly
53. A shared understanding of other existing planning processes, including con-
execute on behalf of national partners (at output level). This is especially relevant
tent, timeframes, budgetary implications and degree of national ownership,
must inform the development or revision of Integrated Strategic Frameworks. for national priorities that have the buy-in from a wide range of actors and that
have been developed on the basis of a genuinely inclusive consultative process.
54. Whenever possible and appropriate, the ISF must take into account and re-
flect existing national and international planning frameworks and articulate to • Likewise, where possible, especially when the United Nations plans designate spe-
which national peace consolidation priorities the United Nations will collectively cific national priorities as areas of UN support, the UN plans should use the same
contribute. To the extent possible and appropriate, planning timelines should be monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approaches, including the indicators and tar-
aligned and ISF monitoring systems should seek to use and strengthen national gets, and seek to support national actors in collecting the relevant data (instead
monitoring indicators. of creating parallel structures/efforts).
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• However, when aligning United Nations M&E processes with national planning
processes, the UN should clearly distinguish measures of United Nations perfor-
III.4.1 Improving Linkages with National Planning mance from indicators of country performance.
Processes • In certain settings (of increased stability and sufficient government legitimacy),
National planning processes refer to instruments developed under national lead- consider merging the United Nations planning process (for example an UNDAF+)
ership to define the needs, priorities and strategies of the country/context in the with a national planning process, whereby one analytical process, led by national
crisis or post-conflict period. They may be national in their thematic and geographi- actors with international support, will yield national priorities and plans. There
cal scope, or focused on specific issues or regions. They may be political in nature should be an agreed presentation of how the United Nations (and other interna-
(for example a vision), policy-oriented (for example a PRSP), programmatically driven tional actors) will contribute to such priorities and plans.
(for example recovery plans or sector plans), or analytical (for example Post-Conflict
Needs Assessment). They may also include, in some instances, specific roles for inter-
• In an unstable context, where there is more than one party to the conflict, includ-
ing the authorities, caution should be exercised in merging the ISF with national
national actors.
plans and seeking government endorsement, as this could jeopardize perceptions
To ensure that the ISF (or equivalent) coheres with national planning processes,
of the impartial role of the United Nations within the country. There are other
where relevant, the following practices are suggested:
mechanisms that are jointly coordinated with national authorities; this is not a
• Align, where possible, the parameters of the ISF and other joint planning pro- requirement for the ISF.
cesses with national parameters, especially timeframes (start date and end date • When, for various reasons, the planning processes need to remain distinct, joint
of the plan/framework).48
United Nations planning processes should nonetheless, at the outset, articulate
• Sequence the design of United Nations plans flexibly and, to avoid “competition” the various principles and concrete ways in which the UN will seek to align (over
with national planning processes, ensure that relevant national actors will have time) with national planning processes and support national planning/implemen-
the capacity (including time) to input into the ISF and other joint UN planning tation capacity. Integrated planning processes (such as ISFs or joint sector plans)
present particularly important opportunities for such thinking, as they allow for
48 The level of alignment of an ISF with national plans is based on the contextual analysis, in particular UN consolidation of various resources and capacities (political, programmatic and
stage/inclusivity/stability of the peace process. operational) in support of national capacity development.
[ 88 ] [ 89 ]
• See also the guidance on mapping existing plans and frameworks in the toolbox
and the Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) of the mission. It is also aligned with the
at the end of this section.
peacebuilding and state-building goals of the New Deal for Engagement in Frag-
In practice, the level of alignment between an ISF and national plans will vary ile States, which South Sudan has self-nominated to pilot. The alignment of plan-
from one context to the other, and can take on one or a combination of the fol- ning frameworks allows for streamlined monitoring and reporting mechanisms
lowing options: and improved coherence during their implementation.
(a) Fully aligned: The timeframe is the same, and all ISF strategic objectives (ex-
cluding any internal objective) express a United Nations contribution to Finally, the alignment with national plans is not merely a process issue. The ISF
national results. provides the opportunity for the United Nations system to analyse local and na-
(b) Partially aligned: For example, because national governments do not fully tional capacities and develop common approaches to enhancing such capacities.
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
share core United Nations values and standards, or because participatory pro- The toolbox at the end of this section provides a list of recent United Nations policies
cess has not been fully inclusive – the ISF may therefore contain contributions and guidance notes developed for such a purpose.
to several national objectives as well as additional objectives.
(c) Time-dependent: For example, aligned either up to an election or after an III.4.2 Improving Linkages with International Planning
election.
Processes
(d) Additional process: ISF is not aligned with national planning, either because
there is no national plan to which the ISF can be linked or because the nature International planning processes refer to instruments developed by the international
of the ISF is purely internal. community to define its engagement in a particular country. They include bilateral
frameworks of assistance (donor strategies, etc.) and collective frameworks (such as
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Sec tion III

compacts). Coordination between international actors is particularly important in in-
Alignment with National Plans in South Sudan stances where national ownership is weak and capacity to coordinate international
The South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013 was prepared in the lead-up to support and implement plans is deficient.
South Sudan’s independence through a government-led process in which the The following recommendations have emerged from recent experiences:
UNCT and other multilateral and bilateral partners actively participated. The de- • Align, where possible, the parameters of the ISF and other joint United Nations
velopment plan structures the government’s development objectives and prior- planning processes with international planning processes, especially timeframes
ity programmes under four pillars: (i) governance, (ii) economic development, (start date and end date of the plan/framework), and encourage international
(iii) human and social development and (iv) conflict prevention and security. The alignment behind national plans and parameters where appropriate.
development plan was formally adopted by the new Government of the Repub-
lic of South Sudan following the country’s independence in July 2011. • Where possible, the United Nations should lead other international partners in
collaboration on the analytical phase (needs assessments, conflict analysis), on
Both the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and
the selection of priorities (to bring clarity to the division of labour) and in the
the UNCT have aligned their key strategic frameworks with the South Sudan De-
monitoring phase (to reduce transaction costs) by undertaking joint field mis-
velopment Plan, including the UNDAF, the benchmarks for measuring the mis-
sions/reviews, and sharing data collection efforts/capacities.
sion’s progress, and the UN’s integrated framework for support for peace con-
solidation: the United Nations South Sudan Peace-Building Support Plan. Both • In certain settings (where there is limited United Nations leverage and/or donor
the benchmarks and the Peace-Building Support Plan have been prepared in ac- fragmentation), consider merging the United Nations planning process (for ex-
cordance with Security Council resolution 1996.49 ample an UNDAF+) with other donor planning processes, whereby a set of inter-
national actors (including the United Nations) presents one vision, one approach
With the advent of the new nation, the United Nations and other development
and one, agreed, division of labour to support the country/context. This option
partners in South Sudan have had a unique opportunity to align their planning
was used in the DRC (with the Country Assistance Framework or CAF) to maximize
frameworks with those of the government. The simultaneous development of
the UN’s first set of national planning frameworks for South Sudan also provided the impact of the international community, reduce transaction costs and increase
an opportunity to ensure that there were close linkages between them. In par- leverage on the government.
ticular, the Peace-Building Support Plan is harmonized with both the UNDAF When the planning processes need to remain distinct, joint UN plans should none-
theless be based on an accurate knowledge of what other international actors are
49 Security Council resolution 1996 (2011; S/RES/1996). doing, and where the United Nations adds real value above and beyond these other
[ 90 ] [ 91 ]
actors. This is as relevant for missions as it is for UN agencies; even in mandate areas, the United Nations entity best equipped to carry them out and resources mobilized
there is scope for the United Nations to further define its unique contribution, devise accordingly.
effective ways of coordinating and collaborating with other actors, and, as a result, It is important for participants in the assessment and planning process to have a
reduce the costs of engagement for all national partners. shared definition of what constitutes a comparative advantage, and a shared under-
standing of how and when to assess comparative advantage within the process.
“Word from the Field” Definition
Lise Grande, DSRSG/RC/HC and UNDP Resident Representative in India A comparative advantage combines three basic elements:
End of Assignment Report
1. A legal mandate; and
July 2012
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
2. A demonstrated capacity; and

“Uncoordinated, parallel planning and financing result in competing objectives,
contradictory priorities and strategic incoherence, which impede the transition 3. A unique contribution in the selected areas of intervention.
to recovery and development. International actors need to agree on a strategic Comparative advantage must always be context specific. A verifiable comparative
framework that is driven by national strategies and based on harmonized needs advantage in another country does not directly translate into a similar comparative
assessment and planning.” advantage in the country under consideration. They are also intervention specific – a
comparative advantage is not in a sector, but rather a specific and concrete type of
intervention in that particular sector.
A comparative advantage is, by definition, relative. One’s recognized strength in a
III.5 Comparative Advantage and Integrated specific type of intervention does not necessarily result in a comparative advantage;
Planning
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another entity may be able to respond more effectively and more efficiently to the
demands of this particular task in this specific country context.
Defining Capacity
19. Comparative advantages: Tasks should be allocated to the UN entity best
Capacity should be assessed as the combination of the following elements:
equipped to carry them out and resources requested accordingly.
22. Clear UN role in relation to other peace consolidation actors: While integrated (a) Adequate resources: Does the organization have access to all financial,
assessments and planning are internal UN processes, they have to define the human and other resources required for delivery of tasks and/or can they
mobilize the funds needed?
strategic positioning and role of the UN vis-à-vis national and international ac-
tors on the basis of UN comparative advantages and the activities being carried (b) Leverage and acceptance: Does the organization have the support of other
out by these actors. external actors, and/or the access (political, physical) to decision-makers
and beneficiaries to secure support, address constraints and/or develop
partnerships for more effective implementation?
(c) Effective and efficient programme delivery approaches: Are the interventions
III.5.1 Assessing Comparative Advantage designed and implemented in accordance with project management and
sector best practice, and tailored to context-specific factors? Do they mini-
Leveraging comparative advantages to maximize impact and reduce overlaps con-
mize resource use?
stitutes one of the core principles of the IAP Policy. Designing the UN’s peace con-
solidation responses based on the individual comparative advantage of each United (d) Accountability for results: Does the organization have the monitoring and
Nations entity yields complementarities and increases the efficiency and impact of evaluation systems to assess and communicate its performance transpar-
the United Nations. ently, and translate findings into corrective measures?
(e) Back office support: Does the organization have the administrative, logistical
The definition of priorities for the United Nations and the related allocation of re-
and legal systems (procurement, contracts, etc.) required to quickly imple-
sponsibilities must be based on carefully identified and agreed comparative advan-
ment activities, including the ability to enter into partnerships with a range
tages, both within the United Nations and between the United Nations and other
of actors (private companies, NGOs, etc.)?
actors. Once United Nations priorities have been agreed, tasks should be allocated to
[ 92 ] [ 93 ]
(f) Capacity of implementing partners: Does the organization’s network of imple- Examples
menting partners (where relevant) have the required capacity to perform
As the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) began to draw
effectively?
down in 2012, it made arrangements with UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and UN Women
to carry out a small set of mandated capacity-building work, primarily in relation
Timing: When to Assess Comparative Advantage to support for the national police and the rule of law.
Comparative advantage should be an on-going consideration for planners, but it is

especially important to consider it at two moments: Info Box: CAPMATCH
1. At the early stage of integrated planning, when a Strategic Assessment is carried CAPMATCH is an online platform that matches up providers and requesters of
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
out and the ISF developed. This is the moment when priorities, responsibilities and civilian expertise. It can be used by planners as part of a comparative advantage
programmatic and other functions requiring an integrated approach are defined, analysis focusing on matching expertise with tasks, at various stages of the inte-
and it is a critical stage at which to consider who is best equipped to carry out grated presence’s life-cycle.
which peace consolidation tasks, taking all sources of funding into account. Uses of CAPMATCH
2. In the mission-specific assessments and the formulation of the Mission Concept CAPMATCH can help planners and missions provide stronger support to national
and resulting concepts of operation, structure and RBB. This phase relates to how institution-building, as follows:
the mission can best deliver on mandated tasks, deploying the resources that
• To support national authorities in producing clear priorities and plans in criti-
would be proposed for the mission. It is important to consider comparative advan-
cal institution-building areas, use CAPMATCH to request advice/input/exper-
tage within the mission planning and budgeting cycle, not off-cycle, because the
Sec tion III
Sec tion III

tise from reformers from other countries which have faced comparable chal-
mission budget proposal to the General Assembly is the main vehicle for setting lenges.
out the resources, structures and implementation arrangements required to carry
out the mandate (see below).
• To find the right people to advise national authorities or respond to their re-
quests, use CAPMATCH to:
• dentify a stronger pool of potential candidates for approved mission posts
III.5.2 Transfer of Mandated Tasks (government-provided personnel, mission-specific vacancies);
A comparative advantage exercise, undertaken within the framework of an inte- • identify expertise for country team programme needs
grated assessment and planning process, may reveal that an agency, fund or pro- • request expertise directly – governments can register on CAPMATCH too.
gramme may be best placed to carry out a mandated task. In such instances, mission
leadership and planners in particular should keep in mind the following consider-
• To provide national institutions with technical and financial support beyond
the advice the mission can provide, register needs on CAPMATCH.
ations:
Key Features of CAPMATCH
• Implementation of mandated tasks by United Nations partners on behalf of a mis-
sion may be considered when it can be demonstrated to be a more cost-effective • Government entities, regional organizations, UN missions and country teams,
way of carrying out the mandate than direct mission implementation, within the NGOs and civil society can participate.
framework of the ISF. • Focuses on the five areas most commonly identified as the critical capacity
• Mission planning and organizational design should reflect tasking to other enti-
gaps for countries emerging from conflict or crisis: safety and security, justice,
inclusive political processes, core government functionality and economic re-
ties, so as to avoid duplication of structures for the implementation of the related
vitalization.
body of work.
• Aimed at governments and organizations, not individuals. Participants may
• It is necessary to consider whether certain tasks are of a specific political or moni-
register as a requestor of capacities/exchange of experience, a provider of ca-
toring character, such that only the mission itself, with its reporting line to the pacities, or both.
Security Council, can appropriately carry them out.
• Designed to foster greater cooperation among government and
• Provision for accountability for the resources provided needs to be clear and spe- non-government entities with direct experience of institutional reform for
cific.
[ 94 ] [ 95 ]
In addition to ensuring coherence of support, joint sectoral plans are also useful re-
post-conflict peacebuilding or conflict prevention. A mechanism for identi- source mobilization instruments, in line with “delivering as one”51 expectations from
fying new sources of experience and expertise, particularly from the global many donors.
south.
• Not a roster, nor a site for UN recruitment. Once CAPMATCH has suggested
III.6.1 Outline of Joint Planning Process and Document
potential matches, it is up to the participants to make contact and go forward,
using the usual processes of selection and deployment. UN procedures for The following list provides suggested outlines for both the process of developing a
recruitment, selection and vetting remain unchanged. joint sectoral plan and the plan itself.
How to Register (a) Analysis
• Visit https://capmatch.dfs.un.org • Clarity of purpose: Why this intervention, and coherence between mission
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
and United Nations agency plans?

• Submit a registration request which is vetted by the UN team that manages
CAPMATCH. Once approved, you can make a posting to request and/or pro- • Value of common approach: What is gained from developing a common
vide civilian capacities. strategy in this particular sector?
(b) Results
• Results to be achieved, timelines and sequence
III.6 Joint Sectoral Planning • Conflict sensitivity
(c) Resource requirements and gaps
(d) Implementation arrangements
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• Structural arrangements (for example integrated teams) and roles and re-
18. Form follows function: The structural configuration of the UN integrated sponsibilities within the United Nations
presence should reflect specific requirements, circumstances and mandates • Internal coordination mechanisms (where relevant)
and can therefore take different forms. Under the same principle, decisions on (e) Approach to the joint endeavour: how to work with partners (including a com-
modalities for working together in integrated settings, which may include inte- mon capacity-building approach where relevant) and shared messaging/com-
grated or joint structures, joint programmes and/or the use of external capacities munication and M&E
(e.g. non-UN expertise), should be based on criteria of expected impact, transac-
• Indicators, baselines and targets
tion costs and assessment of risks.
• Data collection plan: responsibilities, frequency, format
• Resources required
Joint planning at the strategic level may also be supported, where relevant, by joint
• Corrective measures: decision-making process
sector planning and programming between a mission and one or more United Na-
tions agencies. Such joint sector planning is often used to coordinate United Nations
support in areas such as security sector reform, DDR, rule of law, 50 elections, protec- III.6.2 United Nations Integrated Support for
tion of civilians, institution-building and/or constitution-making. Government Sectoral Planning
In certain circumstances, the mission and country team are mandated or requested
to support governments in developing their own sector planning. The box below
contains a resource note, to help missions and country teams in undertaking such
exercises.
50 Joint programmatic responses in the area of rule of law constitute one of the main purposes of
the Global Focal Point arrangement between DPKO/OROLSI (Office of Rule of Law and Security
Institutions) and UNDP. One of the most recent examples of joint rule of law programmes can be
found in Somalia, where UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia) and UNDP have
developed a joint programme, implemented by an integrated team, with resources for UNDP staff 51 See UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the
provided by the mission budget. “Delivering as one” Approach (2013).
[ 96 ] [ 97 ]
Examples: Sector Planning for Police, Justice and Corrections

For Further Reading: Sector Planning for Police, Justice and
Corrections
Liberia
The Resource Note on Sector Planning for Police, Justice and Corrections in Post-
Liberia’s Justice and Security Joint Programme (JSJP) is a sector-wide programme de-
Crisis and Transition Situations (under development; by the Global Focal Point
veloped in May 2011 by the Government of Liberia in partnership with the interna-
for Police, Justice and Corrections in the Rule of Law, supported by the Civilian
tional community. The JSJP is designed to respond to the rule of law and security sec-
Capacities Initiative) is intended as a resource for national decision-makers en-
tor reform needs identified by the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan that was developed by
gaged in building and reforming security and justice systems in the aftermath of
the government with the United Nations family, national and international partners,
conflict or during democratic transitions.
including the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The three-year programme is led by
The note describes how the security and justice sector is often overlooked and
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
the Government of Liberia and supported by the international community, including

DPKO, UNDP, the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) working in concert. In antici- underfunded in national reconstruction and development plans. It sets out the
pation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) transition and the need for need to recognize that police, justice and corrections are closely linked and, as
a subnational presence of justice and security actors, the JSJP has four main areas of such, require an inter-agency approach. Success in this regard will require not
focus: (i) establishment of five regional “Justice and Security Hubs” for decentralized only addressing capacity issues and improving conditions of service, but may
service delivery; (ii) capacity-building of justice and security personnel; (iii) local com- also extend to addressing the legacies of corruption and human rights abuses.
munity-responsive service provision; and (iv) enabling legal and policy frameworks in The note describes how this goes far beyond training to involve a comprehensive
place. To more effectively deliver in these areas, the JSJP captures the financial con- institution-building approach, including legal and organizational reform, incen-
tributions made by the United Nations, bilateral donors and international entities, as tives, professionalization and community relations.
well as those non-financial/in-kind contributions made by the Government of Liberia
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Sec tion III

The note considers lessons on how to prioritize action, such as:
and United Nations entities, in a single results and resources framework within the
JSJP document. This framework is considered an overarching document for the jus- • Linking police, justice and corrections and ensuring that the right resources
tice and security sector in Liberia, providing coherence and coordination to sectoral are secured;
engagement for better results in a nationally owned process. • Getting the right balance between quick wins and long-term approaches;
Afghanistan
• Involving the public in consulting on needs, priorities and implementation.
In 2008, the National Justice Sector Strategy and National Justice Programme (NJP) The note includes resources on the process that national governments can use
was finalized in Afghanistan, identifying six main components of work in the justice to develop a sector plan:
sector: accountability, infrastructure, training, law reform, institutional cooperation
and public awareness. The Programme Unit (PU) had responsibility for overseeing the
• Short-term or emergency planning for immediate quick wins and
confidence-building measures;
NJP, and included the Programme Oversight Committee (POC) and the Programme
Support Unit (PSU). The POC consists of the three justice institutions (police, justice • Establishing a sector coordination mechanism;
and corrections), the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and is respon- • Gathering and using the data needed for longer-term planning;
sible for overall policy direction and guidance, interacting with donors at a high level, • Assessing the evidence;
and overseeing implementation of justice sector activities. To assist the POC in its ef-
forts to coordinate donor activities, donors established the Board of Donors, chaired
• Drafting the national strategy and plan for police, justice and corrections;
by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), with a rotating co- • Developing the budget;
chair to allow for quarterly interaction between international donors and the justice • Monitoring implementation of the plan.
institutions. This structure provided an opportunity to address rule of law assistance
in a positive and proactive way, consolidating a core, high-level mechanism for coor-
dination and monitoring in this sector.
III.7 Integrated Support Planning
United Nations entities working in the same geographical locations have long rec-
ognized that their respective activities may include areas of common interest. In
these areas, they understand that closer cooperation and collaboration with re-
[ 98 ] [ 99 ]
gard to support services could increase their efficiency in fulfilling their man- Short of common services, services and goods can be provided by one entity
dates, and maximize the collective impact and capacity of the United Nations at and used by others to limit duplication and maximize economies of scale. Ex-
country level. amples are bulk procurement (e.g. of fuel), use of aircraft, or access to a medi-
Integrated support planning, rather than the actual integration of support ser- cal clinic. Such use of goods and services are usually paid for on a fee-for-ser-
vices, is regulated by binding frameworks or mecha- vice (“cost recovery”) basis.
Liberia: Fully
nisms. The impetus to provide timely, sound and These types of arrangements, including the use of World Food Programme
Integrated Services
comprehensive integrated support planning, there- (WFP) trucks to move mission equipment, should be reviewed and approved
A joint effort from fore, is on the desk officers assigned to the mission in
by the humanitarian country team to ensure that no adverse effects on hu-
UNMIL and the UNCT
question. The key guiding docu- manitarian actors results from the service. Humanitarian vehicles should not
to integrate the Inter-
ment in this regard is the Frame- Access to System Con- carry military equipment or personnel.
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
net networks of 11 UN
agencies and field of- work Memorandum of Under- tracts Key considerations with regard to this level of integration
Sudan: Asset Sharing
fices in 20 locations standing on Cooperation and A Security Trauma Bag, of goods and services are (i) the need for the providing en-
in Liberia resulted in Collaboration in Respect of Sup- jointly developed by WFP truck s were
tity to plan for a larger client base than if it were providing
some of the fastest, port Services. the United Nations De- used for movement
of equipment from
these goods and services only to its own organization, and
most reliable and cost- Planning for integrated support partment of Safety &
the African Union– increase its capacity accordingly; and (ii) the need for the
effective Internet ser- should happen as early as possible Security (UNDSS) and
United Nations Hybrid receiving entity to estimate its use and budget accordingly.
vices in West Africa. the Department of
in the integrated planning process Operation in Darfur
Field Support (DFS), is
to allow for maximum consider-
available in the Equip- (UNAMID) to the III.7.2 Limitations
ation of integrated support before support elements of in- United Nations Interim
ment Systems Contract
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dividual United Nations entities are locked into place. The United Nations financial and procurement rules and
Security Force for Abyei
catalogue for ordering
by any UN entity. (UNISFA). regulations limit the possibilities for the integration of sup-
III.7.1 Common Services port arrangements across the UN system. One outstanding
question continues to be the level of programme support costs that can or should be
Which Areas of Goods and Services? charged when providing goods or services to United Nations entities working in the
same geographical area. Guidance on this issue is awaited from the Department of
There are many goods and services that could, to a greater or lesser extent depend-
Management.
ing on the specific situation, be integrated. A list of support areas that could possibly
be integrated is found in the toolbox at the end of this section. Irrespective of the Notwithstanding the desirability of integrated support planning, care has to be taken
final determination, all of these should be considered in order to maximize system- to maintain the autonomy of individual entities with respect to, including but not
wide efficiencies and use of limited resources. limited to, staffing structures and levels and Results-Based Budgeting.
Integration to What Extent?

III.8 Joint Resource Mobilization
(a) In case of common services:
While United Nations missions (peacekeeping operations or SPM) and United Na-
The greatest level of integration of support is the establishment of common
tions agencies, funds and programmes have different funding structures, recent re-
services, for example office premises, accessible by all participating United Na-
forms have increased opportunities for funding inter-operability (for example using
tions entities and usually paid for and/or staffed pro rata, based on staffing size
assessed contributions for delivery by agencies, or missions accessing UNDG trust
or projected use (“cost sharing”).
funds).
Key considerations with regard to common services are appropriateness to the
Even when the sources of funding are separate, unity of effort is critical to increase
context, for example potential programmatic impact, the organization of the
individual and collective fundraising opportunities. Especially in times of financial
service (e.g. will there be a lead executing or managing entity?) and funding/
constraints, donors expect sound resource stewardship and coherence in resource
staffing modalities. Pro-rata costs need to be included in participating entities’
allocation. Joint resource mobilization approaches increase the chance of donor sup-
budgets.
port (even if the resource allocation is “individual”, i.e. specifically for the mission or
(b) In case of provision of services by one entity to others: one UN agency, fund or programme). In addition, integrated plans (ISF or sectoral
[ 100 ] [ 101 ]
plans) may often benefit from joint resource mobilization approaches to ensure con- integrated mission partners as well as the strategies of the missions for enhanc-
sistent implementation,52 in parallel with or to complement bilateral funding streams. ing coordination and collaboration with United Nations country teams in order
Joint resource mobilization strategies can vary in scope and depth, but the following to achieve better results”. Integrated assessment and planning structures should
elements should be considered: therefore regularly monitor the “whole of United Nations” resources and capaci-
ties, to be able to quickly update Member States and/or launch joint resource mo-
• Costing each strategic objective articulated in the ISF and other sectoral plans,
bilization strategies that address these concerns/questions.
and consolidating the different sources of funding being mobilized (assessed
budget, agency core funding, extra-budgetary/non-core funding) to identify gaps • Aligning resource mobilization messages with ISF and other common plans. For
and the most appropriate source of potential funding. Donors now expect to see example, it is important, even in “individual” fundraising efforts, to describe how
a comprehensive picture of United Nations funding needs, and how the various an agency project contributes to the result/objective of an ISF or UNDAF+.
sources are being brought together and leveraged to minimize costs and increase • Conducting joint donor stewardship exercises. For example, in many contexts,
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
impact. donors have indicated strong appreciation for regular SRSG and DSRSG/RC pre-
• In this regard, the United Nations may consider developing a Common Budgetary sentations on UN strategies and funding needs, and how the United Nations as
Framework, which has been used by UNCTs in “delivering as one” approaches. The a system is addressing these priorities (and looking to maximize existing mission
“delivering as one” Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) document53 describes and agency resources). Such briefings can include thematic presentations from
the Common Budgetary Framework as “an agreed, joint source of financial infor- select heads of agencies.
mation on available resources and expected funding and as a basis for joint re- • Using pooled funds to promote coordinated resource allocation (across strate-
source mobilization and allocation of resources from the One Fund (if applicable)”. gies and programmes, or within strategies and programmes when implemented
It states: “The Common Budgetary Framework will include (a) estimated agency jointly by mission and agencies). The pooled funds can be strategy specific (e.g.
contributions, with disaggregation by core and non-core resources; (b) the gov- Trust Fund for elections in country X, or Trust Fund for National Dialogue in Ye-
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ernment contributions; and (c) the funding gap. When other UN actors (Peace- men) or United Nations system wide. The use of pooled funds to implement joint
building Commission, Peacebuilding Fund or UN mission) are present, the Com- resource mobilization strategies is increasingly valuable now that missions are
mon Budgetary Framework should, as relevant, reflect these other resources. [...] directly eligible to receive funds from the Peacebuilding Fund and UNDG Trust
In countries where the principle of integration applies, the Common Budgetary Funds as administered by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund office.
Framework captures the contributions made by the UN mission to the areas cov- These elements dovetail with other elements of the UNDG SOPs on “delivering as
ered. In transition countries where humanitarian activities are on-going, the Com- one”, which focus on the need to “agree on a coherent approach to joint resource
mon Budgetary Framework should be coordinated with the applicable human- mobilization”. 55 The SOPs highlight the following considerations, which can be ex-
itarian processes and instruments in order to ensure continuity and coherence tended to a joint approach with the mission, with appropriate modifications:
between humanitarian and development assistance.” Furthermore: “In transition
countries, the One Fund should take into account and be coordinated with the
• “The mapping of donor priorities and approaches to financing is undertaken in
order to facilitate a clear delineation of resource-mobilization opportunities at the
resources channelled through the UN mission, Peacebuilding Fund and humani-
country level, including opportunities for One Fund utilization.
tarian funding mechanisms. This will strengthen the transparency of resources
managed and implemented by the UN in the country.” • If so decided by the UN Country Team and based on the principles agreed during
medium-term planning, a joint resource-mobilization strategy is developed. The
• For missions, presenting the overall United Nations budgetary picture in submis-
UN is currently operating in an environment with increasing challenges to mo-
sions to the Advisory Committee on the Administrative and Budgetary Questions
bilizing the required resources at the country level. Joint resource-mobilization
(ACABQ)/5th Committee. Member States increasingly request information on
strategies must be country specific, flexible and pragmatic and take into account
the budgets of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and capacities
innovative sources of funding and partnerships.
before approving mission budgets. For complex integrated peacekeeping op-
erations, General Assembly resolution 61/27654 requests the Secretary-General • The strategy will ensure that the Resident Coordinator-led joint mobilization of re-
to provide “a clear description of the role and responsibility of missions vis-à-vis sources to cover the identified funding gap is supplemented by individual agency
resource-mobilization efforts, thus ensuring transparent, effective inter-agency
coordination of resource-mobilization efforts. [...]
52 Tailored approaches are required when an ISF is an internal UN document.
53 UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the
“Delivering as one” Approach (2013). 55 UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the
54 General Assembly resolution 61/276 (2007; A/RES/61/276). “Delivering as one” Approach (2013).
[ 102 ] [ 103 ]
• Information on new resources mobilized or any changes in expected resources

must be shared on a timely basis with the Resident Coordinator/Resident Coor- Toolbox: Integrated Planning
dinator’s Office for realistic monitoring and updating of the Common Budgetary
Framework.”
Joint Resource Mobilization Example: the Sierra Leone MDTF

2009–2012 A. Template for Directive to SRSG, RC and HC
The Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was set up to fund the Joint Vision, 1. Context
the Integrated Strategic Framework for 2009–2012. In keeping with the international • Summary of findings of the Strategic Assessment
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
aid effectiveness agenda, emphasizing national ownership, alignment and harmoni- • Assessment of key threats and opportunities, and role and comparative ad-
zation, the Trust Fund was designed to improve coherence and efficiency in the fund- vantage of the United Nations vis-à-vis national, regional and other interna-
ing of the UN’s contribution to Sierra Leone’s national priorities. Allocation decisions tional or multilateral partners
were made, following consultations within the UNCT (comprising agencies, funds and
programmes as well as mission representatives) and with its national counterparts,
• Summary of applicable United Nations mandates (mission and UNCT)
by the Development Partners Committee, co-chaired by the Minister of Finance, the 2. Strategic Objectives, Priorities and Approach
World Bank Country Manager and the ERSG in his capacity as Resident Coordinator. • Strategic intent and end state that the United Nations system will pursue for
Launched at a session of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Sierra Leone MDTF en- peace consolidation
abled the UNCT/RC and the government to oversee the transparent channelling of • Outline of approach for the United Nations system in the country/area
funds towards the Joint Vision. With its harmonized reporting procedure and en-
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couragement of non-earmarked funding, the MDTF was promoted as the preferred
• Specific common objectives and priorities for the United Nations system as
funding mechanism, even over bilateral funding, in line with agreed United Nations identified in the mandate from the Security Council and through the process
reform. of the Strategic Assessment
In practice, however, donors did not reroute their bilateral support through the MDTF • Key partnerships
to the extent hoped for. About 15 per cent of the $30 million (approximately) that was 3. Configuration of Integrated Presence and Roles and Responsibilities
deposited in the fund between 2010 and 2012 came from resident and non-resident • Structural or other arrangements between the mission and UNCT, as appli-
donors, all of whom earmarked the contributions for specific UN agencies and/or cable
Joint Vision programmes.
• Roles and responsibilities of the mission and UNCT leadership (including TOR
Nearly 85 per cent of the funds deposited in the MDTF were non-earmarked con-
of DSRSGs, where missions are structurally integrated) including delegated
tributions from the Expanded Delivering as One Funding Window for the Achieve-
authority and internal reporting lines
ment of the Millennium Development Goals. Because a joint fund was among the
requirements to be considered under that funding window, the MDTF necessitated • Reporting lines to Headquarters
collaboration between UNCT members both in applying and in allocating the funds: • Guidance on the management of diverse mandates in structurally integrated
the UNCT had to jointly agree with the government which funding gaps to prioritize. entities (for example implications of robust mission mandates for the United
Although this procedure at times could have been smoother, it provided an excel- Nations presence)
lent opportunity for the UNCT with support from its Joint Strategic Planning Unit, to • Summary of risk assessment and mitigation measures (including humanitar-
oversee, if not all, at least some of the funding of the ISF. UNIPSIL at the time could not ian consequences)
receive these funds directly, but it provided technical and management support in
one of the projects funded by the MDTF, as it also did in several PBF-funded projects. • Relations with the media and information strategy
4. Planning Parameters
• Instructions for the development or review of an Integrated Strategic Frame-
work (timeline, prioritization, sequencing, synchronization of activities be-
tween the mission and UNCT in support of the objectives identified above,
and links with other national and international planning processes)
[ 104 ] [ 105 ]
• Monitoring and reporting on implementation of United Nations-wide priori- M. (Strategic Framework and Results-Based Budgeting)
ties through respective reporting lines (for example reports of the Secretary- N. (Rules of Engagement)
General to the Security Council, UNDAFs)
O. (SOMA/SOFA)56
• Areas of operation and priority locations
P. (Command and Control Policy)
◊ Mission and UNCT deployment priorities
Q. (Troop Contributing Country Guidelines)
◊ Hot spots
R. (any other relevant documents)
5. Specific Instructions
Example: A. Security Council resolution1923 (S/RES/1923/2010), dated 25 May 2010.
• Mainstreaming of various policy issues
• Conduct and discipline
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
SITUATION
6. Monitoring of Implementation 1. General: Brief summary. Background to the conflict, regional situation and
• How implementation of the Directive will be monitored other aspects as well as the current situation. (Full details in Annex A.) This part
should include the relation to the strategic lines of operation and could in-
• Schedule of update
clude information about the political, security, information, humanitarian and
Annex to the Directive (e.g. Component-level Directive), if required socio-economic situation.
Headquarters of each entity may issue strategic guidelines to their field representa- a. Political situation
tives on the basis of and in alignment with the Directive. For example, the Office of b. Security situation
Military Affairs in DPKO is developing the template that follows for instructions to
c. ….
the military components of peacekeeping missions (see below). Other sections that
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Sec tion III

require concepts of operation may follow this example. 2. Threat(s)/risk assessment: Provide a concise summary of major threats to the
mission. (Complete assessment in Annex B.)
B. Template for Military Directive to the United Nations Force 3. Own forces
Commander for the Military Operations in [Name of Mission] 4. Friendly forces (may include host nation, bilateral presence and regional
organizations)
REFERENCE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
This is a list of pertinent documents that provide a foundation for the Military Strate-
gic Directive. References will be made in descending chronological order according Text taken directly from the Directive to SRSG. (Annex C)
to the IAP and Mission Planning Process (MPP). 5. Political objectives
A. (peace agreements) 6. Military objectives
B. (Strategic Assessment)
C. (Decision on Strategic Option) STRATEGIC END STATE
(Annex C)
D. (Planning Directive)
7. Overall end state: Text taken directly from the Directive to SRSG.
E. (Technical Assessment Mission Report or equivalent)
8. Military strategic end state: This is a description of the mission’s end state
F. (Military Capability Study)
which defines the environment that would indicate successful completion of
G. (Secretary-General’s reports and/or recommendations) the military aspects.
H. (Security Council resolutions)
I. (Directive to SRSG, RC and HC)
J. (Information Strategy)
K. (UN Police Directive)
L. (UN Logistic Directive) 56 SOMA: status-of-mission agreement; SOFA: status-of-forces agreement.
[ 106 ] [ 107 ]
PLANNING PARAMETERS BUDGET

9. Assumptions: Used in place of unknown facts and to be plausible, necessary 27. Operational budget
and realistic. These should be assumptions without which planning cannot pro-
ceed. COMMAND AND CONTROL
10. Constraints and restraints: Political and military constraints (things that must (C2 and liaison architecture in Annex F)
be done) and restraints (things that must not be done). 28. Authority
11. Theatre of operations: Clearly identify the Area of Operation (AOO) and Area of 29. Transfer of authority
Responsibility (AOR). (Full details in Annex D.)
30. Task organization and command relationships
12. Information strategy: This should follow the overall Information Strategy as ex-
31. Documentation, records and reports (Annex G)
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
pressed in the Directive to SRSG.

32. Liaison and coordination
MILITARY MISSION 33. Communication (communication infrastructure in Annex H)
13. The output of the mission analysis: who, what, where, when and why. The 34. Conduct and discipline (Annex J)
statement should be concise and end with a unifying purpose.
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND FORCE COMPOSITION

14. Strength (As per Security Council resolution)
15. Composition (Annex I)
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DIRECTION
Military Adviser Under-Secretary General for
16. Planning tasks: OPLAN, SOP, IMC, LI/LL,57 gender, training, environment
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping Operations
17. Military tasks
(date) (date)
18. Supporting tasks: Tasks in support of other components in the mission
19. Use of force: Military and legal aspects
Annexes:
20. Civil–military interaction: Multidimensional setting requirement, interaction
with elements within the United Nations mission as well as outside actors The following annexes, and others as required, may be included:
21. Military–Police joint operations Annex A – General situation
22. Public information and relations to media Annex B – Threat/risk assessment
Annex C – Strategic design
SUPPORT
Annex D – Area of Operation and Area of Responsibility
(Annex E)
Annex E – Support
23. Logistic concept
Annex F – Command and Control and liaison architecture
24. Movement
Annex G – Reporting
25. Medical
Annex H – Communication infrastructure
26. Host nation support
Annex I – Statement of force requirements
Annex J – Conduct and discipline
57 OPLAN: Operations Plan; SOP: Standard Operating Procedure; IMC: inter-mission cooperation; LI/
LL:Lesson Identified/Lesson Learned.
[ 108 ] [ 109 ]
C. Key Questions in Preparation for Developing an ISF Willingness and Capacities

In light of recent experiences with ISFs in several countries/contexts, the preparation • Do all actors understand the role and significance of an ISF? Is training/sensitiza-
for initiating or revising an ISF must begin with the foundational question that is at tion required? Also consider this for external partners.
the core of the integration agenda: What is preventing the United Nations in a given • Are all actors ready to participate? Should national authorities, NGOs, major inter-
country/context from maximizing its individual and collective impact on the country/con- national and bilateral donors take part? Do those non-UN actors have the neces-
text’s peace consolidation goals? sary capacity to participate in an ISF?
On the basis of this initial question, the preparation for developing or revising an ISF • How much staff time (including senior management) will be needed? From whom
should then aim at addressing the following key questions: (for example senior leaders, strategic planners, mission/UNCT analysts)?
Purpose and Content • Are there integrated field coordination structures at senior and working levels? If
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
not, can other mission/UNCT coordination mechanisms be adapted for this pur-
• What is the definition of peace consolidation in your context? What value is added pose? Is the requisite planning expertise in place?
by a framework that brings together the efforts of the mission and the UNCT? For
the mission? For the UNCT?
• Is assistance required from Headquarters for the process, technical or substantive?
Are there regular meetings of the Headquarters-based IMTF/ITF that can be used
• What kind of ISF is needed? Of what scope, nature and duration? Based on the to liaise with Headquarters on the ISF development?
context, should it be an internal or external document?
• Is there a mapping of existing United Nations strategies and frameworks in-country? D. Sample Outline for ISF Document
If not, could one be undertaken?
The following components and sample outline for an ISF account for the differences
• Can other plans or frameworks be used? Can the ISF be merged with the UNDAF
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in the scope and nature that ISFs may present, depending on country requirements.
or other existing plans? (Here, the United Nations needs to consider if it is an inter-
1. Situation Analysis
nal or external document before deciding on merging with the UNDAF.)
• Summary of conflict analysis and current conflict triggers identified in the
• How will the various planning tools of the United Nations system be linked/inform preparatory phase (or most recent Strategic Assessment), including diver-
each other and relate to the national planning processes? Will the ISF form the gent trends within the country, risks and assumptions
basis for the peace consolidation aspects of an UNDAF review? CHAP/CAP review?
• Operational environment in which the United Nations is expected to fulfil
Next RBB?
its mandates
Process Design • Description of the UN’s combined mandates and partnerships in-country
• When should the process be initiated? Should the ISF be delayed – or speeded and expectations regarding its future strategy
up – to take account of internal or external factors (other United Nations planning 2. Vision and Role of ISF
requirements, government planning cycles, elections, etc.)? • End state that the United Nations seeks to achieveor contribute to over the
• On this basis, can a phased approach to the ISF be planned (initially a short-term ISF timeframe
ISF followed by a longer-term ISF after a major internal/external milestone)? • Scope and nature of ISF, and value the ISF will add in relation to the end state
• If another strategic planning exercise is already underway, can it be used to de- • Link between ISF and other United Nations strategic frameworks/plans, na-
velop an ISF? tional plans (as relevant)
• Can a process be designed that meets the requirements of multiple planning pro- 3. Strategic Objectives, Results, Timelines, Responsibilities
cesses simultaneously? • Scope of ISF strategic objectives, reasons for the prioritization. The strategic
• Is conflict analysis required or does it exist already? If not, is there dedicated ca- objectives may relate to programmatic goals, and/or matters of operations,
pacity to complete it? communication, positioning, common policy, etc.
• Who should participate (internal and external actors)? How can the transaction • Narrative strategy for each strategic objective: Each strategic objective has a
costs be lowered for all involved? unique narrative explaining what is to be achieved, why it is a priority, how
it will be done, and who is/are the responsible leads/co-leads, as well as the
risks to achievement
[ 110 ] [ 111 ]
• Results: Set of results pitched at the strategic level (for example using a simi- This then allows the United Nations to answer foundational questions including:
lar methodology as an UNDAF “outcome” or RBB “expected accomplish- • Is an additional framework needed or can an existing framework meet the needs
ment” for programmatic objectives); special or joint implementation ar- of the context or be adapted to do so?
rangements may also be presented • If not, what will be the added value of the ISF?
• Timelines: Explanation of how the strategic objectives and related results will • What is the most appropriate start date for the ISF? Its duration?
be phased to take into consideration the synergies in the plan (may split re-
sults into phases, use critical path methodology, etc.)
• What will the relationship of the ISF to the other frameworks be? Will it com-
plement and align with national planning processes – which are dynamic, not
• Summary results framework: A summary of the ISF results framework may static – in terms of objectives, content, timing? If not, what is the justification for
also be presented graphically as part of the ISF document not doing so?
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
4. Coordination and Implementation Arrangements Mapping Exercise

• Brief description of coordination arrangements (such as a visual graphic) and
When mapping existing plans and strategies, it is important to take into account
any integrated approaches to be employed in implementation of the ISF
the distinction between (i) overall national/multi-stakeholders’ plans (such as a plan
• Expectations for implementation (for example revision of RBB, UNDAF, Coun- emerging from peace negotiations, or developed by the government for the imple-
try Programme Document if relevant; development of workplans, joint sec- mentation of the peace agreement; (ii) thematic planning processes (such as a rein-
tor strategies, etc.) tegration action plan and/or policy); (iii) plans which represent the response of the
5. Monitoring United Nations (and/or other parts of the international community) to national priori-
ties; and (iv) United Nations internal planning processes. This helps to identify which
• Frequency of reporting
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other plans can be replaced by the ISF and which cannot (based on their mandatory
• Actual reporting format nature and/or the purpose they serve).
• Roles and responsibilities in data collection, analysis, information-sharing Moreover, it is important to consider all foundational processes or documents (such
and decision-making as peace agreements, Security Council mandates) for inclusion in the mapping, as
6. Description of the ISF Development and Endorsement Process they are a key part of the planning parameters.
Examples: National plans, such as PRSP, peace agreements; international/United Na-
E. Mapping of Planning Frameworks and Tools tions plans, such as UNDAF, mission mandate and planning frameworks (Mission Im-
plementation Plan, RBB etc.), CHAPs (humanitarian plans), or national/international
When initiating a process of in-country joint United Nations planning, such as the ISF, cross-cutting sectoral strategies, and frameworks that have geographical focus.
a mapping of existing analyses, planning frameworks and strategies provides a use-
ful first step towards building consensus and clarity on the added value of the ISF and
What To Look For
reducing the transaction costs of the ensuing ISF process. Different planning processes will have different scopes, durations and constituencies,
As such, a mapping of existing planning frameworks serves the following purposes: and a different hierarchy of results. As such, all of them will provide a set of param-
eters that inform the process for developing an ISF, as well as its content.
• Identify the different analytical and strategic frameworks that are in place both at
Those parameters include:
the national level and within the international community, including the United
Nations family.
• Purpose, including constituencies (who is this plan for? why? national or United
Nations?)
• Provide an overview on how the various frameworks complement and build upon
• Thematic and geographical coverage
each other (or not).
• Assist in identifying any inconsistencies, overlaps or gaps among the existing
• Timeframe (when it starts/ends)
planning processes and the results articulated therein. • Level (strategic, programmatic, operational)
• Assist in identifying areas where other actors are already engaged, where the
• Implications/links (is the United Nations bound to this plan?)
United Nations might not have a comparative advantage, and where UN involve- • Level of implementation and follow-up (is the plan being used?)
ment might be reduced or not required. • Lessons learned, where relevant (in its design, implementation, etc.)
[ 112 ] [ 113 ]
• Are there data and/or indicators that are already being tracked that can be used • CAPMATCH (https://capmatch.dfs.un.org/Capmatch/): Online platform to match
in the ISF? up suppliers and requesters of civilian expertise in the five key gap areas (safety
and security, inclusive political processes, justice, core government functionality
Process
and economic revitalization) (see page 94 for more information).
The process of mapping will depend on the specific context and the number of ana-
lytical and planning processes and documents that need to be considered. However,
G. Support Services and Goods to be Considered for Integration
in general, such a process would entail:
1. Miscellaneous Services
• Listing and review of existing frameworks
a. Procurement of goods and services
• Determination of planning coverage (national, United Nations, geographical, the-
matic, strategic, programmatic, operational, etc.) and linkages between frame- b. Access to global/systems contracts or blanket purchase order agreements
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
works c. Lease of premises/facilities and land, parking, provision of living and office
• Identification of gaps (at what level: strategic, operational, thematic, geographi- accommodations
cal, etc.) d. Provision of petroleum, oil & lubricants, fuel & fuel stations, cooking gas; ac-
• Positioning of ISF in this planning universe and the nature of the links between cess to fuel supplies and use of common fuel contracts
the ISF and other planning frameworks, including justification of areas where ISFs e. Provision of water (bottled and bulk), sharing of water resources, well drilling,
are not aligned with national planning processes bottling plants
f. Cafeteria and post exchange services
F. United Nations Guidance on National Capacity-Building and g. Provision of power services, sharing of electricity generation capacities, gen-
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Institution-Building erators and maintenance
Planners may find useful tools and approaches developed within the Civilian Capaci- h. Implementation of environmentally sustainable practices
ties Initiative (CivCap) for better supporting post-conflict institution-building:
i. Asset management
• Means to enable United Nations peacekeeping or political mission management
j. Customs clearance, tax exemption
to support national ownership and respond to evolving national needs (see ISF
M&E Report UNSMIL Sample, page 138). k. Sharing of equipment (generators, light- and heavy-duty vehicles and
machinery)
• United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Ca-
pacity in Post-Conflict Contexts (2013, http://bit.ly/I1RXgK): Designed to guide ca- l. Non-staff recruitment (interns, consultants, labour contracts, stand-by ar-
pacity development programming and inform dialogue and planning exercises rangements, etc.)
with national actors and other partners. The Guidance Note lays out 10 system- m. Training, including country induction
wide principles, with advice and resources, to ensure that United Nations support 2. Aviation Services
is based on national ownership and priorities, while acknowledging its mandates
a. Passenger seats on aircraft
and norms.
b. Aircraft chartering and ground handling services
• Resource Note on Sector Planning for Justice, Police and Corrections (under de-
velopment, http://civcapreview.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3769&language=en-US): c. Passenger aircraft chartering (including VIP charters) and handling services
A resource for national decision-makers engaged in building and reforming secu- d. Airfield support services: terminal management, fire trucks, cargo handling,
rity and justice systems in the aftermath of conflict or during democratic transi- security, etc.
tions (see page 98). e. Emergency evacuations and search & rescue services
• Support on financing for institution-building programmes and donor coordina- f. Flight following
tion approaches, provided through (i) tailored support on designing financing
g. Management of air traffic control and aircraft tracking systems
mechanisms and coordination with donors, based on requests from the field, and
(ii) options for innovative engagement modalities to support south–south and h. Meteorological assistance, flight briefing, integrated threat and security as-
triangular cooperation in institution-building and reform (work under develop- sessment
ment ).
[ 114 ] [ 115 ]
3. Movement Services d. Ambulance

a. Consignment movements on door-to-door basis e. Staff counselling
b. Overland transport (inland freight) f. Testing
c. Storage and warehousing, including inventory management and tracking g. Vaccines and cold chain
services h. Medications
d. Container and handling services i. Blood
e. Chartering of ships and boats j. Oxygen
f. Strategic analysis of movements in theatre of operations k. Medical services contracts with clinics, laboratories, Level IV hospitals, etc.
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
g. Money and payments 7. ICT (Information and Communications Technology)

4. Road Transport a. Sharing of ICT resources (hardware, software and services) for voice, data,
a. Light vehicle fleet or staff ground transportation services (dispatch, shuttle Internet such as, but not limited to, VSAT,59 microwave, WiFi, WiMAX,60 terres-
bus, local staff transport) trial, GSM61 and communications systems (HF, VHF62) supporting safety and
b. Maintenance, repair and recovery of light vehicles security
c. Body shop b. Sharing of data centre and/or server room facilities and services
d. Armoured vehicles related services c. Sharing of communications centre (COMCEN) facilities and services
e. Car washing d. Video teleconferencing (VTC) services

Sec tion III
Sec tion III

f. Driver testing, licensing e. Help desk
g. Maintenance/repair and recovery of ground transportation equipment f. Internet and BlackBerry connectivity
h. Strategic analysis of repair and recovery plan g. CITS63 peripherals – cartridges, memory storage, cables
i. Vehicle registration h. Telephone billing
j. Airport pick-up i. United Nations Directory
k. Vehicle lending with/without driver 8. GIS (Geographic Information Service)
5. Engineering Services a. Data
a. Project planning and design services i. Vector GIS data (Vmap-1, Vmap-2 and MGCP64 format)
b. Management of construction project ii. Satellite imagery
c. Airfield maintenance and construction iii. Gazetteer
d. Common and shared premises iv. Scanned and geo-referenced maps
e. Living and office accommodations b. GIS systems contract (or blank purchase agreement) for supplying satellite
imagery, GIS software and GIS hardware
i. Warehousing
c. GIS and map production service
ii. Engineering services
d. GIS and terrain analysis service (hosting GIS servers)
iii. Sanitation and drainage
6. Medical Services
a. Medical services: Sharing/use of medical facilities and services 59 VSAT: very small aperture terminal.
b. Medical evacuation: Sharing resources for CASEVAC/MEDEVAC 58 60 WiMAX: Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access.
61 GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications.
c. Mass evacuation/casualties management under catastrophic conditions 62 HF: high frequency; VHF: very high frequency.
63 CITS: complete information technology solutions.
58 CASEVAC: casualty evacuation; MEDEVAC: medical evacuation. 64 MGCP: Media Gateway Control Protocol.
[ 116 ] [ 117 ]
e. GIS training m. Cleaning services

f. GIS joint projects n. Vector control
9. Security Services o. Maintenance services (carpentry, masonry, electrical, plumbing, painting,
a. Security guard services heat/air)
b. Radio room with staff tracking p. Conference/workshop services
c. ID cards q. Welfare – crèche, gym, classes
d. Operations and crisis centre (situational awareness, crisis response, executive

communications, rapid reaction force)
Integrated Planning
Integrated Planning
e. Blast film
f. Body armour
g. X-ray and metal screening devices and maintenance contracts
h. Fire-fighting equipment and servicing
i. MOSS and MORSS related services65
j. Close protection (visiting VIPs, immediate threat)
k. Security risk assessment
l. Security trainings (staff, guards, fire, emergency medical, security officers,
Sec tion III
Sec tion III

VIP drivers, communications, weapons, non-lethal weapons)
m. Security investigations
n. Travel clearances
o. Key control
p. DSS asset sharing
10. General Services
a. Camp management
b. Printing
c. Reproductions
d. Office machinery rental (photocopiers, scanners, shredders, faxes)
e. Office furniture
f. Pouch/overnight/provincial mail
g. Travel services, ticketing, visas (transit/arrival), hotels
h. Protocol, VIP airport, inbound visas
i. Office supplies
j. Cleaning supplies
k. Waste (liquid, solid, construction, recycling) services
l. Grounds maintenance
65 MOSS: Minimum Operating Security Standards; MORSS: Minimum Operating Residential Security
Standards.
[ 118 ] [ 119 ]
Section iV
Integrated Monitoring and
Reporting
UN Photo/Mark Garten
Children inside a classroom at Za’atri refugee camp, host to tens of thousands
of Syrians displaced by conflict, near Mafraq, Jordan.
07 December 2012
Mafraq, Jordan
some occasions, the reporting may be very short because there is little to flag up of
What the IAP Policy says: any significance to senior leadership. Similarly, the ISF should be a regular agenda
60. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must include from the start a monitoring item for the Integrated Task Force (ITF), as a way of, among other things, systematiz-
and reporting mechanism, including measurable and meaningful benchmarks ing Headquarters support for the implementation of the ISF.
and risk indicators, as part of their implementation arrangements to support In addition to regular reporting, for first-time ISFs the Integrated Steering Group 66
decision-making. Other existing monitoring and reporting frameworks may be requires that integrated United Nations presences report on implementation within
used where relevant. one year.
Integrated Monitoring and Repor ting

Integrated Monitoring and Reporting
61. The joint analytical and planning capacity tracks progress and reports to The content of the reporting can follow a differentiated approach: some elements
the senior UN leadership forum and, through this forum, to Headquarters on of the ISF may require very frequent reporting (such as operational objectives, often
progress towards common objectives agreed to and articulated in the Directive those with military or police dimensions), while others may only necessitate report-
to S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Frameworks. When appropriate, ing at longer intervals in order to adequately measure impact (for example, objec-
it provides recommendations for changes in strategy or objectives based on this tives related to institution-building). Others, such as communication objectives (for
analysis. example, harmonizing key political messages, outreach to certain constituencies)
may combine short-term and long-term reporting cycles.
62. Additionally, progress against the UN priorities outlined in integrated plans
must be reflected in the regular reports of the entities engaged in the imple- Finally, the reporting processes should allow for the production of data and analysis
mentation of these plans, as appropriate for the reporting format. This includes prior to major external and internal milestones, including Secretary-General reports,
reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and UNDAF reporting mandate renewals, United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) re-
mechanisms. views and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) developments. This is not to say that
Secretary-General reports or the rest should report on the ISF per se, in particular if
the ISF is an internal United Nations document, but that the information generated
and agreed at the senior leadership level could inform the preparation of key prod-
IV.1 Monitoring and Reporting on Integrated Plans ucts.
Each Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) must contain a monitoring and reporting
Sec tion IV
Sec tion IV
framework when it is presented for endorsement. IV.1.2 Format
Whatever its shape or form, a monitoring and reporting framework should therefore The monitoring framework should use, if possible, existing data collection and mon-
seek to answer the following questions: itoring formats, capacity and experience within the mission and UN country team
• Are the joint strategic objectives being realized? (UNCT), for example UNCT monitoring and evaluation (M&E) working group, the Joint
Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) performance moni-
• What is preventing progress towards the joint strategic objectives?
toring reports. There is no need to establish new monitoring systems if existing ones
• What corrective measures could be taken? can be used effectively.
• Are the entities participating in the ISF abiding by the commitments/agreements? Potential tools include:
• Is the underlying analysis (of the conflict, of the operational environment) still
• Scorecards, as used, for example, for the UN Security and Stabilization Support
valid and are the strategic objectives still relevant (if the situation on the ground Strategy (UN SSSS) for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or for
has changed)? the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The scorecard measures
Unlike purely quantitative monitoring tools, the ISF monitoring tool should provide progress towards joint objectives according to a simple colour-coded methodol-
scope for quantitative and qualitative analysis. The target audience of the monitoring ogy that allows for rapid review and decision-making for results deemed “yellow”
tool is the senior leadership team, who should review the monitoring reports regu- (some progress but with obstacles) or “red” (progress stalled).
larly and take appropriate actions to correct shortcomings or revise plans.
IV.1.1 Frequency of Reporting

66 Inter-agency and inter-departmental level mechanism chaired by the Under-Secretary-General of the
It is recommended good practice to include ISF status reports as a regular agenda Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), established to oversee integration-related mat-
item for joint senior leadership meetings at Headquarters and in the field, even if, on ters, including policy development/revisions and field-level support.
[ 122 ] [ 123 ]
• Web-based platforms, as used for example by the United Nations in Timor-Leste, • Indicate how the results identified relate to the strategic objectives of other the-
allowing on-time and standardized reporting on key indicators, including policy matic pillars
commitments, and easy comparison/trend analysis over time. • Where relevant, ensure the participation of the appropriate government
• Standard M&E frameworks, derived from United Nations agency and/or mission counterpart(s) in the planning exercise and their endorsement of the results ma-
reporting instruments, such as the UNDAF M&E plan, especially in those instances trix for the respective thematic area
where the UNDAF and the ISF have been merged. • Describe what other international partners are doing in this area
•

Regardless of the format used, a common feature of robust monitoring tools is the Describe how cross-cutting themes will be addressed
provision of concrete options for decision-making when and if progress on ISF objec- • Establish a working-level coordination mechanism for its thematic pillar to moni-
tives and commitments is stalled. tor and evaluate progress towards the strategic objective and expected results.
Examples of monitoring and reporting tools are found in the toolbox at the end of Thematic coordination mechanisms should include, at a minimum, all the rele-
this section. vant mission sectors and UN agencies, funds and programmes contributing to the
objective. Where relevant, the mechanism will also include relevant government
IV.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities counterparts
• Monitor progress towards strategic objectives and prepare reports for the Joint
To ensure momentum and commitment to regular and sound ISF reporting, it may Analytical and Planning Capacity
be useful to include the following roles and responsibilities in the terms of reference
(TOR) of each function, and for strategic planners in particular to regularly promote Role of Mission Components and Individual Agencies, Funds and Programmes
them. • Provide inputs to ISF reporting framework
Role of the Senior Leadership • Participate in and review analysis on progress made and options for corrective
measures
• Decide and agree on reporting mechanisms and frequency
• Demand reports as a tool to support decision-making
• Follow up on decisions made by senior leadership
•
Sec tion IV
Ensure United Nations system-wide participation in reporting and analytical
Sec tion IV
efforts
From Monitoring to Action: Four Tips to Strengthen Links Between
• Review reports and make decisions on corrective measures Results Monitoring and Decision-Making
Role of Joint Analytical and Planning Capacity The purpose of monitoring and reporting systems is to inform and support se-
• Develop reporting templates/frameworks, using or building on existing systems nior decision-making with relevant data and analysis. A review of United Nations
where possible experience with results monitoring systems suggests that four practices can be
helpful to maximize the impact of monitoring on decision-making:
• Support generation and consolidation of inputs
1. Develop the approach to monitoring and reporting while developing in-
• Develop analysis and options for corrective action, in consultation with relevant
tegrated plans (not after), and ensure senior leadership buy-in for this ap-
thematic working groups, mission sections and agencies
proach.
• Present to senior leadership 2. Establish ISF monitoring as a regular agenda item for senior leadership con-
• Follow up on decisions sideration.
Role of Thematic Working Groups, where established 3. Pool monitoring and reporting capacity under the joint authority and chair-
manship of the mission Chief of Staff and Head of the Office of the Dep-
• Based on the United Nations strategic objectives, identify results uty Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator
• Establish clear responsibilities for each participating United Nations entity with (DSRSG/RC), with TOR endorsed by United Nations senior leadership.
regard to results 4. Develop simple monitoring and reporting templates with consolidated anal-
• Identify risks and mitigating measures ysis and clear, concrete options for decision-making.
• Formulate indicators of achievement
[ 124 ] [ 125 ]
IV.2 Benchmarking The ISF, which is meant to increase the impact of the United Nations in-country, can
serve as a link between these two levels by identifying how the UN’s performance
As defined in the United Nations Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmarking, 67 a benchmark can better support the peace consolidation needs of the country/context.
is a “point of reference against which change and progress can be measured [...] a
Therefore, it is always useful to keep this distinction clear and introduce benchmarks
target that has been defined by an existing standard, a minimum requirement for
at the two levels.
something to work, the performance of a leading actor in a field of competition (i.e.
a best practice), etc.” National benchmarks are often used in the development of national strategies and
mutual accountability frameworks between the country and the international com-

For example, US$2/day/person is a standard benchmark for defining poverty levels,

munity (such as compacts). In such cases, the national government has the lead in
set as the “amount of money needed per capita in a particular area to purchase food
selecting and reporting on the benchmarks. The United Nations plays a support-
containing the minimum requirements of energy (kilocalories) fulfilling the meta-
ing role but may be asked, by the Security Council, to report as well on some of the
bolic requirements of an adult human being to stay healthy”.
benchmarks related to the mission mandates and/or provide technical assistance to
Under this definition, benchmarking is the component of monitoring whereby a value national structures set up to coordinate the benchmarking process.
for measuring progress on a particular activity is set against an agreed reference.
Given the diversity of scope and uses of benchmarks, accountability for meeting a
benchmark must be clearly identified from the outset.
IV.2.1 Purpose
Benchmarking is used to avoid analysing performance in a vacuum. Through the use IV.2.3 Benchmarking Steps
of set references, benchmarking supports more robust and credible monitoring and
A practical tool is Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners’ Guide
decision-making. Benchmarking is increasingly being used by the United Nations
to Benchmarking (2010), available from:
Security Council to inform decisions on mandate renewal and overall international
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf.
strategies of assistance. Internally, it is also used to measure and monitor the perfor-
The guide provides detailed information on the various benchmarking steps:
mance and impact of a project, programme or activity.
In the context of mission transitions, for instance, benchmarks provide important
• Preparation
“signposts” that need to be reached in order for the missions to draw down. Basing • Selection of benchmarks
Sec tion IV
Sec tion IV
decisions on the pace of mission drawdown and withdrawal on established bench- • Data collection system
marks increases objectivity and reduces the level of uncertainty. • Attribution of indicators to the benchmarks
• Aggregation and data analysis
IV.2.2 Different Benchmarks for Different Uses • Reporting system
Broadly speaking, the United Nations uses benchmarks to measure progress on two • Evaluation and adjustments
different kinds of issues:
• Benchmarks developed to measure the performance of the country/context, which
indicate the progress of a country/context towards a defined end state Quick Tips on Selecting Benchmarks
• Benchmarks developed to measure the performance of the United Nations (the mis- A number of methodologies for selecting performance measures (indicators,
sion or the UNCT or both) in the country/context benchmarks) are readily available, each with its specific set of criteria and respec-
While the two uses are related, they reflect distinct levels of accountability. In some tive acronyms (SMART, etc.). A consolidation of these various approaches sug-
instances, the United Nations may perform well in realizing its mandated tasks but gests that the four most important aspects to consider when selecting bench-
the country/context itself may be facing severe constraints in progressing towards its marks are:
goals due to a number of factors beyond the UN’s control. Conversely, a country may 1. Clarity: The benchmarks are easily understandable by all relevant actors, with
achieve significant progress despite suboptimal United Nations performance. a common understanding of what the benchmarks mean, how they will be
measured, to whom they apply and in what timeframe.
2. Realistic: The benchmarks reflect a best-case scenario based on the actual
context, not an ideal but impossible to reach situation.
67 Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmarking (2010).
[ 126 ] [ 127 ]
• Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

3. Accuracy: The benchmarks effectively describe the change or end state being • RBB reporting
pursued, and associated indicators are a sound measure of this change.
• UNDAF reviews
4. Measurability: Data to track progress towards the benchmarks is easily acces-
• Resident Coordinator annual reports
sible, interpretable and manageable with existing capacity (for example the
data is already collected by someone, and/or the time to access/develop the • One UN country results report (in “delivering as one” countries)
data is manageable, and the responsibility to collect is clear and accepted). • National reporting (for example compacts)

3. Develop a simple dashboard consolidating the various results, indicators and

reporting requirements of all the plans, and update as needed, to monitor gaps
IV.3 Mainstreaming Integrated Plans into United and redundancies and highlight inconsistencies.
Nations Reporting Mechanisms 4. Pool monitoring and reporting capacity for improved consistency, harmoniza-
tion of reports and lower transaction costs. This also allows for faster and more
Unlike many entity-specific planning documents (e.g. RBB or UNDAF), integrated in-depth dissemination of information and analysis across the United Nations
plans do not have formal institutional governance frameworks. Accountability for, system.
and visibility of, integrated plans need to be manufactured, encouraged and sus-
5. Joint Trust Funds, linked with the implementation of integrated plans, provide a
tained as part of efforts to maximize the coherence of United Nations interventions.
real incentive for harmonized monitoring and reporting and the mainstreaming
The IAP Policy states: “UN priorities outlined in integrated plans must be re- of integrated plans (and their commitments) into mission and agency reporting
flected in the regular reports of the entities engaged in the implementation of mechanisms. In addition, when established through the UN Multi-Partner Trust
these plans, as appropriate for the reporting format. This includes reports of the Fund Office, these trust funds benefit from state-of-the-art reporting backstop-
Secretary-General to the Security Council and UNDAF reporting mechanisms.” This is ping.
not to say that Secretary-General reports should include details on the ISF per se, in
particular if the ISF is an internal United Nations document, but that the information
generated and agreed within the United Nations presence should inform the prepa-
Sec tion IV
Sec tion IV
ration of key products.
IV.3.1 Purpose
The purpose of mainstreaming integrated plans into United Nations reporting mech-
anisms is threefold:
1. Maximizing the utility, and in some cases the visibility of integrated strategies
and plans;
2. Ensuring consistency across plans and reports, and strengthening the analytical
content of these reports through the use of integrated results reporting;
3. Streamlining reporting requirements.
IV.3.2 Best Practices

1. Where relevant and feasible, harmonize results and indicators between the in-
tegrated plans and the RBB, UNDAF, agency plans and other United Nations re-
porting mechanisms.
2. Align timing of integrated plans (ISF, joint sectoral plans) and their reporting
schedules with standard United Nations reporting mechanisms (mission and
agencies), including in particular:
[ 128 ] [ 129 ]
Timor-Leste: Integration and Harmonized Reporting Toolbox: Integrated Monitoring

Among the United Nations presence in Timor-Leste, plans and reporting mech- and Reporting
anisms were established for every policy and situation. The United Nations In-
tegrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) itself was responsible for reporting
against five planning frameworks, not including section, collaborative or the-

matic plans. A common complaint from management and leadership concerned
the duplication of effort and quality of information. Technical advisors and staff
responsible for liaising with national authorities were spending precious time
A. Example of Monitoring Scorecard (DRC)
copying and pasting narratives from one matrix to another. The resulting mish-
DRAFT September 2008 Update
mash required significant redrafting and editing for approvals and distribution,
multiplying the effort/cost of reporting. Yet, valuable programmatic information Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Eastern DRC
was often not available when needed. Goma Process and Nairobi Communiqué:
Introducing harmonized reporting aimed to (i) reduce duplication, (ii) simplify
• The Goma process is seriously challenged since the resumption of military con-
communications and reporting lines, and (iii) improve the quality and timeliness
frontations on 28 August. A unilateral CNDP68 commitment to pull back to its origi-
of information in reports. To this end, the UNCT and UNMIT agreed to synchro-
nal positions (pre-28 August) was followed by a Minister of Defense Communiqué
nize the highest level of goals across the planning frameworks. Reporting of-
also committing to a ceasefire for the FARDC.69 Yet, throughout the month of Sep-
ficers, working group participants, managers and leadership were able to use
tember, CNDP and FARDC continued to confront each other along several axes
a single online input-gathering structure to produce all necessary reports. The
and proximity points in North Kivu and along the fringes of South Kivu Province.
immediate accessibility of information permitted UNCT and UNMIT offices to en
• Despite this phase of escalation, the GoDRC70 remains committed to the Amani
gage in substantive discussions and align messaging. The reporting timeframe
program, but CNDP now openly started rejecting Amani and insists on direct talks
was reduced, so that instead of a single report being produced in 4–5 weeks, 4
with the GoDRC.
reports were produced in 3 weeks, and some reports were produced in as little
•
Sec tion IV
Sec tion IV
as 1 week. The quality, timeliness and participation in reporting for joint UNCT– MONUC,71 backed by the International Facilitation, imposed a Separation and Dis-
UNMIT–government policy-level decision-making improved drastically. engagement Plan for all signatories of the Actes d’Engagement. The SRSG72 will
approach the Security Council to ask for formal approval of this new approach,
which is dubbed Amani Plus.
• Following the Comite d’Pilotage for the Amani Program, fast-tracking DDR,73 open-
ing the strategic axes, deploying the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) and ex-
tending state authority in South Kivu, in the Grand Nord and in Maniema have
been prioritized in coordination with the PNDDR.74
• The fighting in North and South Kivu is a temporary setback for the Nairobi Com-
muniqué and especially Operation Kimia, after the Integrated and Trained Battal-
ions of the FARDC are drawn into the combat zone in North Kivu and are moved
away from the Triangles. No new FARDC battalions have joined the training cen-
ters.
68 CNDP: National Congress for the Defence of the People.

69 FARDC: Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
70 GoDRC: Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
71 MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
72 SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
73 DDR: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.
74 PNDDR: National Programme of DDR.
[ 130 ] [ 131 ]
• There is not much progress on the 70 Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
ions to MONUC training

SRSG and FC78 to persuade
Major to commit battal-
the international commu-

nity for bi-lateral equip-
ment support to FARDC
(vehicles and communica-
Management Intervention
MoD and Chef de l’Etat
and to site garrisons along
SRSG to seek support from

(FDLR/RUD) combatants in the regroupment center in Kasiki although MONUC
reaches an agreement in principle with the GoDRC representatives for the Kisan-
gani Road Map on an incentive package for FDLR who repatriate/relocate under
the strategic axes.
tion equipment).
the Program.
• Relations between Rwanda and DR Congo did not improve during the month and
mutual accusations are exchanged in media articles; President Kagame and Presi-

dent Kabila accuse one another through media channels as well.

Security:
Yellow: Some
progress has
been made but
intervention is
• The security situation is far from stable as long as there is no ceasefire in North
Kivu and Separation and Disengagement are not implemented. A flaring up of
required
attacks by the FRPI75 in Ituri against the FARDC forces MONUC to use its attack
Status
helicopters and puts more strains on the FARDC, after Ituri zone Operations Com-
mander Kinkela left to North Kivu to reinforce the 8th Military Region.
•
and post Military Training Program (MTP)

training facilities expected to take place
October due to the non-arrival of FARDC
The FARDC Command and control struc-

ture was tested by CNDP operations in
North Kivu during the month of Septem-
The lack of bi-lateral agreements to pro-
battalions remains a key limitation on ca-

The courses planned at MONUC’s two
going operations are having the positive

effect of permitting an identification of
capable FARDC commanders and experi-
pability improvement of the FARDC in the

in September had to be postponed until
ber with some set backs. However, on-
vide vehicles and radios for post-brassage

The LRA76 are changing their modus operandi in DR Congo and stage a series of
raids against soft targets in Dungu, west of the Garamba Park. The FARDC experi-
ences serious delays in the deployment of FARDC to the Dungu. 2 Battalions of
reinforcements arrive in Kisangani but their transportation to Dungu is hampered
battalions to the training site.

by financial constraints.
• Demonstrations and violent mob attacks against MONUC peacekeepers become
September Developments
routine and spread from Rutshuru to Goma and other parts of the Kivu Provinces.
ence is being gained.

Country-wide, politicians campaign against MONUC and voice their disappoint-
Sec tion IV
ment with the slow pace of the Amani Process.
Sec tion IV
State authority, return and recovery:
Kivus.
Activities for the rehabilitation of roads and infrastructure have had to be par-
tially suspended in North Kivu due to the security situation along those areas.
Meanwhile, focus is turning to South Kivu where road rehabilitation is expected
•
to commence in the coming weeks. Efforts to link DDR activities in the province
battalions in TTF Fa-

Number of FARDC
Number of effective
FARDC battalions in
with the extension of state authority and community reintegration activities are
being made.
Impact Indicators
• The police and border police components continue to make progress in the plan-
the Kivus
ning and preparedness for the deployment of the PNC, including the possibility
cility77
of deployment in the non-militarized zones that will need to be created as part of
the disengagement plan.
TTF: Troop Training Facility.

•
•
The fourth component is being revised to extend conflict resolution and recovery
FC: Force Commander.

FARDC capability
activities along the axes. This re-conceptualization is intended to quickstart fourth
Sub-component
component activities in a more synchronized, rather than sequential manner, with
activities implemented in the other components and therefore accelerate peace
dividends for the population living in those areas.
improves
75 FRPI: Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri.
76 LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army.
77
78
[ 132 ] [ 133 ]
Sec tion IV Integrated Monitoring and Reporting
Sub-component Impact Indicators September Developments Status Management Intervention
Armed groups are • Number of FARDC • LRA: One FARDC battalion is currently in Yellow: Some
encouraged to ne- battalions actively Dungu and patrolling further afield, which progress has
gotiate engaged in opera- has sparked an increase in LRA violations. been made
tions against armed The remaining two GoDRC battalions
groups in the Kivus are currently held in Kisangani for lack of
transport means.
• ADF/NALU:79 Operations against the ADF/
NALU were delayed due to the transfer of
FARDC commander and the battalion that
had been allocated to the North being re-
directed to other areas in North Kivu.
• FDLR: There were almost no operations
[ 134 ]
carried out against the FDLR as three out
of the eight FARDC battalions have been
reassigned to operations against CNDP.
The three additional battalions due to join
the operations in September have not yet
arrived.
Armed militia enter • Number of • Since the implementation of the Nairobi Yellow: Some SRSG and DSRSG to meet
brassage or DDR/ ex-combatants Communiqué, 862 FDLR including depen- progress has with the Chairman of
DDRRR80 entering DDR or dents, have been repatriated to Rwanda by been made the Amani Program and
DDRRR MONUC. with the Head of the
• Number of • 1109 militia are assembled at Kitona, 2896 at UE82/PNDDR to coordinate
ex-combatants Kamina and 1766 at Lukusa brassage centres and align efforts on the re-
awaiting brassage awaiting training. Training is said not to be sumption of DDR activities.
able to start until the number of candidates
in the centers reaches 3000.
• Number of chil- • 932 FARDC are at Mura undergoing train-

dren released from ing by RSA81 for the Rapid Reaction Force
armed groups with postponed date of completion fixed
on the 3 October 2008.
• The launching of PNDDR is expected to
commence on the 3 October 2008. In-
tense discussions have been taking place
to link the need of accelerating DDR activi-
ties with decisions being made in Amani
Steering Committee. Focus is placed on
prioritizing South Kivu and Maniema. A
mapping of on-going reinsertion and re-
covery activities for non-eligible combat-
ants is underway.
A t- r i s k p o p u l a - • Number of cease- • Continued, extensive ceasefire violations Yellow: Some
[ 135 ]
tions are protected, fire violations were registered throughout September as progress has
ceasef ires moni- • Number of check- the FARDC and CNDP both seek tactical ad- been made but
tored and check- points dismantled vantage and ignore the ceasefire. FDLR and intervention is
points dismantled PARECO83 have also, but to a lesser extent, ex- required
ploited the instability.
• Firm MONUC action has protected the main
population centers and MONUC MOBs84

have provided a haven for IDPs.85 Neverthe-
less CNDP and FARDC actions have resulted
in an increase in IDPs populations in the Petit
Nord.
79 ADF: Allied Democratic Forces; NALU: National Army for the Liberation of Uganda.
80 DDRRR: disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement.
81 RSA: Republic of South Africa.
82 UE: Unité d’Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion.
83 PARECO: Patriotes Résistants Congolais.
84 MOB: mobile operating base.
85 IDP: internally displaced person.
Sec tion IV Integrated Monitoring and Repor ting

B. Deliverable Scorecard Model (Libya) Guidelines on Use of Scorecards

Question 1
1. Deliverable is on track: FULLY ON TRACK – all processes are under way and good progress is being made
FULLY ON TRACK PARTIALLY ON TRACK WILL SOON BE ON TRACK UNDER DISCUSSION NOT ON TRACK
PARTIALLY ON TRACK – all processes have been established and implementation
has commenced

WILL SOON BE ON TRACK – process has been developed and is ready for implemen-
2. Principal counterpart has been delivered: tation
YES NOT YET
UNDER DISCUSSION – process in development
NOT ON TRACK – no progress has been made or has been made in the wrong direc-
tion
IDENTITY OF COUNTERPART:
Question 2
3. Cooperation has: Principal counterpart should be at the level of a department, institution, agency or
STARTED BEEN AGREED IN DISCUSSION PENDING organization, e.g. Ministry of Information department of planning or Ministry of So-
cial Affairs department of family development not “government”, “ministry x”, “civil
society” or “Mr. X”
In those cases where more than one principal interlocutor is essential for success,
4. Results have been:
e.g. for resolution of local conflicts, all interlocutors should be listed. Subsequent
SIGNIFICANT PARTIAL LIMITED
questions, e.g. access and counterparts, should then be targeted at the level of the
most recalcitrant of identified counterparts.
Question 3
Sec tion IV
Sec tion IV
WHAT HAS BEEN DELIVERED:
STARTED – activities are being implemented on the basis of a process that has been
5. National capacity to implement is: agreed with counterparts
STRONG MEDIUM LIMITED ABSENT
AGREED – an agreement has been reached with the counterpart and a timeframe has
been established for implementation
IN DISCUSSION – counterparts engaged in subject area and need for cooperation
6. UN capacity to provide support is: process agreed on both sides
STRONG MEDIUM LIMITED ABSENT PENDING – no action taken
Question 4
SIGNIFICANT – planned results have been broadly achieved

7. Access to identified counterparts(s) is:
PARTIAL – some aspects of planned results achieved
SUFFICIENT OCCASIONAL RARE NEVER
NOT YET – results have not been achieved
List activities and/or results achieved, e.g. workshop on transitional justice, training
on strategic planning
8. Counterpart feedback on UN support for deliverable is:
Question 5
VERY POSITIVE POSITIVE MIXED NEGATIVE UNAWARE
STRONG – human, structural and financial resources to assume full technical owner-
ship and leadership
MEDIUM – human, structural and financial capacity gaps exist
[ 136 ] [ 137 ]
LIMITED – limited human, structural and financial capacity in place
Progress
ABSENT – no human, structural and financial resources in place
score
26
97
55
Question 6
STRONG – human and financial resources to provide assistance in place
Feed-
back
MEDIUM – human and financial gaps exist

5
LIMITED – limited human and financial capacity in place
Access
ABSENT – no human and financial resources in place
This sample is taken from the full ISF M&E Report UNSMIL for March 2013, which includes 20 deliverables. Available online at DPKO:
10
Question 7
3
capacity
SUFFICIENT – adequate level of access to engage counterpart on issues relating to
necessary support
UN
10
10
7
OCCASIONAL –limited level of access to engage counterpart on issues relating to
necessary support
National
capacity
RARE –insufficient level of access to engage counterpart on issues relating to neces-
sary support
10
3
7
NEVER – no access to engage counterpart on issues relating to necessary support
Coopera- Results
Question 8
10
0
0
VERY POSITIVE – counterpart considers UN engagement on this deliverable to be
essential
tion
POSITIVE – counterpart considers UN engagement on this deliverable to be useful
Sec tion IV
Sec tion IV
10
3
3
MIXED – counterpart has at different times stated both positive and negative views
of UN engagement
terpart
C. ISF M&E Report UNSMIL Sample86 (March 2013)
Coun-
NEGATIVE – counterpart considers that UN engagement could be rendered more
10
10
0
appropriate
track
UNAWARE – prior to conversation on evaluation, counterpart was unaware of UN
Code On
10
support
UNEST: United Nations Electoral Support Team.

Constraints Identified
UNEST 88 Technical advice on 2A

Provision of techni- 1A
Facilitation of civil 1B
This is a narrative section in which the programme manager should identify what
gal framework for all

cal support to Consti-
and relevant national
advice on procedures,
contentious issues as
well as additional as-
dialogue, inclusive of
establishment of le-
tutional Committee
society participatory
women, minorities
and youth, on consti-
tution and civic edu-
authorities, including
sistance as requested
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping.
constraints have hindered implementation of the deliverable, the corrective mea-
cation programme
sures to be implemented, as well as the strategic decisions required from senior lead-
electoral events
PAD: Political Affairs Division.

by Committee
ership.
Deliverable
Deliverables
UNDP
PAD87
Lead
86
87
88
[ 138 ] [ 139 ]
References
The mission has delivered guidance notes and advisory support to preliminary coun-
terparts (the GNC 89 Legal and Constitutional Committee, Constitutional Outreach
Series of constitutional dialogues 50% completed. Forums have taken place in Tripoli and
Counterpart not yet officially formed. The UN has capacity to provide guidance and some advisory assistance, but requires
Unclear to what extent GNC/constitutional committee will be receptive to recommendations generated by dialogue
Committee). Other deliverables are pending the formation of primary counterparts.
List/links of related resources on integration
• Civil Affairs Handbook (2012);
Sabha. Estimated completion of current round of dialogue is mid-March.

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/policy/civilhandbook.asp
• Civilian Capacities Initiative (CivCap): http://www.civcapreview.org/
• Decision No. 2005/24 of the Secretary-General on Human Rights in Integrated
Missions (2005)
• Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008);
Committee only established in recent weeks. Access to GNC has not always been easy
http://www.undg.org/docs/9898/Integration-decision-SG-25-jun-08.pdf
• Decision No. 2011/10 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2011)
• DPA, Special Political Missions Start-up Guide (2012);
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SPMStartupGuide_UNDPA2012.pdf
• DPKO, Planning Toolkit (2012);
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/Planning%20Toolkit_Web%20Version.pdf
•
Key constraints, corrective measures, decisions to be taken
DPKO/DFS, Guidelines: Mission Start-Up Field Guide (2010)

additional resources to supply specialized technical experts.
•
What has been delivered
D PKO/ D FS Co m p a r at i ve St u d y a n d To o l k i t , Protec tion of Civil-

No significant delivery
ians: Coordination Mechanisms in UN Peacekeeping Missions (2012);

http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Protection%
Sec tion IV
20of%20Civilians%20Coordination%20Mechanisms%20in%20UN%
20Peacekeeping%20Missions,%20DPKO-DFS%20Comparative%20Study%
20and%20Toolkit%20%282012%29.pdf
• DPKO/DFS/DPET, Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or
Withdrawal (2013)
• DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS, Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations
Forum for Democratic Libya
and Political Missions (2011)

GNC Electoral Committee
•
Principal counterpart
Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) (2006);

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/UN%20IMPP%20Guidelines%20(2006).pdf
Not yet identified
• IMPP Guidelines on Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences: Role of the Field (2009)
GNC: General National Congress.
and Role of Headquarters (2010)

• Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS):
http://www.unddr.org
• Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners’ Guide to Benchmark-
ing (2010);
Deliverable
Deliverable
Constraints
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/monitoring_peace_consolidation.pdf
•
Delivery
Secretar y- General Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions (20 0 6);

http://www.undg.org/docs/8483/8039-SG_s_Note_of_Guidance_on_Integrated_
2A
2A
1A
1A
1B
1B
Missions__Feb__2006.pdf
89
[ 140 ] [ 141 ]
• UNDG High Level Group, Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to List of Figures
Adopt the “Delivering as one” Approach (2013);
http://www.undg.org/docs/12968/Standard%20Operating%20Procedures.pdf
Figure 1: Overview of Planning Framework for Integrated UN Presences
• UN Guidelines on Strategic Assessment (2009);
Figure 2: United Nations Strategic Assessment
http://www.undg.org/docs/12293/UN%20Strategic%20Assessment%
20approved%20by%20SG_signed_.pdf Figure 3: Analysis Process Flowchart
• United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity Figure 4: Priority Objectives
in Post-Conflict Contexts (2013); http://bit.ly/I1RXgK Figure 5: Problem Tree
Figure 6: Example of Integrated Peacebuilding Office and UNCT
Figure 7: Example of Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operation and UNCT
Figure 8: The Possible Scope of an ISF in a Peace Consolidation or
Peacebuilding Context
Figure 9: The Possible Scope of an ISF in a Volatile Context
List of Tables
Table 1: Examples of Planning Staff in Sierra Leone, Sudan, DRC, Somalia (2009)
Table 2: Considerations for Incorporating Transition Planning into
Existing Frameworks
Digital version of the IAP handbook is available in English and French in

the Resources/Policy section of the DPKO website (http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/resources/policy.shtml)
[ 142 ] [ 143 ]
APPENDIX
Policy on Integrated
Assessment and Planning
UN Photo/John Isaac
Young girls learning to sew at a Koranic school in Fayum, Egypt.
Approved by: mandates and UN thematic policies.4 This policy is complemented by a set of
Secretary-General on 9 April 2013 guidelines to facilitate implementation of each requirement.
Following endorsement by the Integration Steering Group1 on 15 March 2013 and 6. Compliance with this policy is required by all UN departments, agencies, funds
and programmes.
by the United Nations Development Group on 13 March
C. Scope
A. Purpose and rationale 7. The requirements set out in this policy apply in all cases where a multi-
Polic y on Integrated Assessment and Planning

Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning
1. The purpose of this policy is to define the minimum and mandatory require- dimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission is
ments for the integrated conduct of assessments and planning in conflict and deployed alongside a UN country team, or where such presence is being con-
post-conflict settings where an integrated UN presence is in place or is being sidered.
considered, and to outline responsibilities of UN actors in this process. 8. This policy focuses on the peace consolidation activities of the UN as defined in
2. Integrated assessment and planning processes are intended to maximise the in- each particular context and in line with Security Council mandates and the rel-
dividual and collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activi- evant mandates of UN entities, agencies, funds and programmes. UN activities
ties of the UN system. While there are important systemic constraints to integra- in response to critical needs in areas other than peace consolidation fall outside
tion within the UN, it is crucial that, at a minimum, the political, peacekeeping, the scope of this policy.
humanitarian, human rights and development entities of the organization share 9. While humanitarian action can support peace consolidation, its main purpose
a common analysis and agree on a set of common strategic objectives for peace remains to address life-saving needs and alleviate suffering. Accordingly, most
consolidation as a starting point for planning and implementing their responses humanitarian interventions are likely to remain outside the scope of integration,
in conflict and post-conflict settings. which can, at times, challenge the ability of UN humanitarian actors to deliver
3. Integrated assessments and planning are essential to (i) improve the quality of according to humanitarian principles. Depending on the context, certain activi-
the situational analysis, (ii) design interventions that are tailored to the require- ties related to protection of civilians, return and reintegration and early recov-
ments of each situation, (iii) support the effective management of integrated ery may be included in the UN’s integrated strategic approach. Therefore, in all
presences in line with mandates and the strategic vision of senior UN leadership, cases, shared analysis and coordination among humanitarian and peace consoli-
(iv) avoid gaps and overlaps between different UN activities, (v) identify oppor- dation actors should be supported in UN integration arrangements.
tunities for closer cooperation across different parts of the UN and (vi) make the 10. Integration occurs at several levels within the UN system, necessitating different
UN a more coherent and consistent partner with host governments and other levels of integrated planning. This policy relates primarily to requirements for
national, regional and international partners. integrated assessment and planning at the overall strategic level across missions
Appendix
Appendix
and UN country teams.
B. Status and compliance 11. During the integrated assessment and planning process, the level and depth
of integration required between the different entities in specific areas shall be
4. This policy supersedes the Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Pro-
determined. While this policy does not govern entity-specific operational and
cess (IMPP). 2 All other guidance materials on integration more generally remain
budgetary planning processes, coordination on entity-specific operational and
valid. 3
budgetary planning will be required for operational levels of integration within
5. This policy is consistent with Decisions of the Secretary-General no. 2008/24 and applicable rules and regulations.
2011/10 on integration and no. 2012/1 on Special Circumstances in Non-Mission
12. Where there is no integrated UN presence and none is being considered but
Settings. It does not supersede and should be read in conjunction with related
where a crisis demands closer coordination and a more comprehensive UN re-
sponse, the UN Policy on Special Circumstances in Non-Mission Settings pro-
1 The Integration Steering Group is composed of DPKO, DFS, DPA, OCHA, PBSO, OHCHR, DOCO,
vides the coordination and support arrangements required.
UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, and the EOSG.
2 Including the June 2006 Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), the May
2009 IMPP Guidelines on the Role of Headquarters and the January 2010 IMPP Guidelines on the
Role of the Field.
3 Including the 2006 SG Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions and the UN Guidelines on Strategic 4 For example, on issues such as electoral assistance, protection of civilians, human rights, gender or
Assessments. child protection.
[ 146 ] [ 147 ]
D. Definitions 19. Comparative advantages: Tasks should be allocated to the UN entity best
equipped to carry them out and resources requested accordingly.
For the purpose of this policy and related guidance: 20. Flexibility to context: While adhering to the minimum standards outlined in this
13. An integrated UN presence is the configuration of the UN system in all conflict policy, the design and implementation of assessment and planning exercises
and post-conflict situations where the UN has a country team and a multi-di- should be adapted to each situation.
mensional peacekeeping operation or Special Political Mission/office, regardless 21. National ownership: National ownership is an essential condition for the sustain-
of whether this presence is structurally integrated. ability of peace. Where and when clear national peace consolidation priorities

14. A multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation is a peacekeeping mission compris- have been developed on the basis of broad based consensus, integrated assess-
ing a mix of military, police and substantive civilian components working to- ment and planning processes should aim to specify how the UN will support a
gether to implement a mandate from the Security Council. diverse range of stakeholders in the implementation of these priorities.
15. A field-based Special Political Mission (SPM) is defined as an in-country political 22. Clear UN role in relation to other peace consolidation actors: While integrated
mission or office implementing a mandate from the Security Council or General assessments and planning are internal UN processes, they have to define the
Assembly. For the purpose of this policy, SPMs do not include non-resident en- strategic positioning and role of the UN vis-à-vis national and international ac-
voys and advisers; panels, monitoring groups and similar expert bodies; or re- tors on the basis of UN comparative advantages and the activities being carried
gional offices (SPMs with regional mandates covering multiple countries). out by these actors.
16. An integrated assessment is defined as any UN analytical process at the strate- 23. Recognition of the diversity of UN mandates and principles: Integrated assess-
gic, programmatic or operational level which carries implications for multiple ment and planning processes must take into account all recognized principles
UN entities, and which therefore requires participation by concerned UN enti- of UN engagement across humanitarian, human rights, development, political
ties. The Strategic Assessment is the analytical process used to undertake in- and security areas.
tegrated assessment at the UN system-wide level for the purpose defined in 24. Upfront analysis of risks and benefits: Integrated assessment and planning pro-
paragraph 28 of this policy. Assessments of a technical nature, such as technical cesses must include an analysis of the risks and benefits that integration ar-
assessment missions (TAMs) and sector assessments initiated by either Secre- rangements may result in, particularly for humanitarian activities. Integrated as-
tariat departments or agencies, funds and programmes, are integrated if and sessment and planning processes should provide a forum to assess these risks
when their scope and operational implications relate to multiple entities of the and benefits and decide on ways to manage them in a manner satisfactory to all
UN system. UN entities involved.
25. Mainstreaming: All integrated assessment and planning processes should take
E. Guiding principles for integrated assessment and planning into account relevant UN policies, including on human rights, gender and child
Appendix
Appendix
protection.
The following principles guide the conduct of integrated assessments and planning
processes: F. Overview of minimum requirements
17. Inclusivity: Where an integrated UN presence is deployed, integrated assess-
ment and planning must be undertaken with the full participation of the Mission 26. The minimum requirements set out in this policy apply throughout the life-cycle
and UN country team5 and in consultation and coordination with Headquarters. of integrated presences. Their application starts with the establishment of Inte-
grated Task Forces as soon as an integrated presence is being considered. Their
18. Form follows function: The structural configuration of the UN integrated pres-
application concludes with the withdrawal of a Security Council or General As-
ence should reflect specific requirements, circumstances and mandates and can
sembly authorized mission.6
therefore take different forms. Under the same principle, decisions on modali-
ties for working together in integrated settings, which may include integrated 27. All integrated assessment and planning processes must meet the following re-
or joint structures, joint programmes and/or the use of external capacities (e.g. quirements, which are described in more detail in the sections below:
non-UN expertise), should be based on criteria of expected impact, transaction (1) The joint conduct of Strategic Assessments to ensure a shared under-
costs and assessment of risks. standing of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders and
5 The UN country team will engage with the humanitarian country team in the context of integrated
assessment and planning. 6 See Policy on UN Transition in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal.
[ 148 ] [ 149 ]
core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engage- 32. Relevant interlocutors should be consulted including, to the extent possible, na-
ment on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities; tional authorities, civil society and other local representatives, as well as relevant
(2) The articulation of a common UN vision, priorities and respective re- regional and sub-regional organizations, international financial institutions and
sponsibilities in support of peace consolidation, including relationship, if key member states.
any, to national plans and priorities;
(3) The establishment of integrated mechanisms for joint analysis, planning, Settings where an integrated UN presence has not been established
coordination, monitoring and decision-making on joint strategic and op- 33. Strategic Assessments are mandatory in all cases where the deployment of a

erational matters at both field and Headquarters levels; multidimensional peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mis-
(4) The conduct of integrated monitoring and reporting on the implementa- sion is being considered.
tion of Integrated Strategic Frameworks. 34. Where no integrated UN presence is in place, a Strategic Assessment is under-
taken by a Headquarters-based Integrated Task Force, which may already exist8
or may need to be established. The Strategic Assessment is then undertaken in
G. Requirement 1: Joint conduct of Strategic Assessments
consultation with the UNCT.
28. The purpose of a Strategic Assessment is to bring the UN political, security,
development, humanitarian and human rights entities together to develop a
Settings where an integrated UN presence has already been established
shared understanding of a conflict or post-conflict situation, role of stakeholders
and core peace consolidation priorities, and to propose options for UN engage- 35. Where an integrated UN presence is in place, Strategic Assessments should be
ment on the basis of an assessment of risks and opportunities. Ahead of Mission carried out following a significant change in the situation or prior to a substan-
start-up planning or during the life-cycle of established integrated presences, tial change in a Mission’s mandate. In these settings, Strategic Assessments can
the Strategic Assessment provides a basis for the development of recommenda- be initiated at field or HQ level.
tions on the nature and (re)configuration7 of UN engagement for the consider-
ation of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security Follow up to Strategic Assessments
Council. 36. Strategic Assessments result in a report and, where required, a recommenda-
29. The decision to launch a Strategic Assessment is made by: tion to the Secretary-General through the Policy Committee. Strategic Assess-
ments do not necessarily result in a recommendation to initiate planning for the
a. The Secretary-General; or
establishment of a peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mis-
b. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security; or sion or changes to existing arrangements. In all cases, the chair of the Integrated
c. An Integrated Task Force at Director level or above Task Force has the obligation to reflect any disagreements over findings and/
Appendix
Appendix
30. Strategic Assessments can be proposed by a number of UN entities including: or proposed options when finalizing the report and recommendations to the
Secretary-General and/or the Policy Committee.
a. A member of the Policy Committee
37. The decision on the options proposed in a Strategic Assessment, including
b. A member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security
whether to initiate planning for the establishment of an integrated UN pres-
c. A member of the Integrated Task Force ence or to propose changes to an existing presence, strategy or mandate, lies
d. The head of a UN peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political with the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General’s decision is expressed in a
Mission statement of intent9 containing a designation or reaffirmation of a lead entity
e. The RC and/or HC, representing the UNCT at Headquarters for implementation. If a decision has been made to propose
the establishment of a Mission, the recommendation is articulated in a report
31. Strategic Assessments should complement, and draw on, any other analyti-
cal processes that components of the UN system may have undertaken on the
ground.
8 Such as Inter-Agency Task Forces established under the UN Policy on Special Circumstances in
Non-Mission Settings or other ad hoc inter-agency working groups. See Requirement 3 for further
guidance on Integrated Task Forces.
7 Including the specialised civilian capabilities that may be required and possible partnerships that 9 E.g. Planning Directive, PC Decision or other document spelling out strategic objectives and
should be established to meet such needs. essential modalities for implementation.
[ 150 ] [ 151 ]
of the Secretary-General to the Security Council developed in accordance with a. The main findings from integrated assessments of the conflict and chal-
paragraph 63 of this policy. lenges to peace consolidation, UN role and comparative advantages;
38. The Security Council, based on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, b. A clear definition and expression of peace consolidation priorities for the
decides whether or not to authorize the establishment, reconfiguration or termi- UN, including for national capacity development and institution-building;
nation of a peacekeeping operation or field-based Special Political Mission and c. An articulation of all programmatic, functions and/or operational areas re-
issues a mandate accordingly. quiring an integrated approach, with agreed form and depth of integration;
39. If the Security Council authorizes the establishment of a Mission or changes to d. Agreed results, timelines, responsibilities and other relevant implementa-

an existing mandate, the mandate and Strategic Assessments should be used as

tion arrangements, including coordination mechanisms;
a basis for the development or revision of the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC
and Integrated Strategic Framework as detailed in paragraphs 40-52. e. A common monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or
benchmarks of progress.
45. Other UN planning frameworks (such as a UN Development Assistance Frame-
H. Requirement 2: Articulation of a common UN vision, priorities and
work (UNDAF)) may serve as Integrated Strategic Frameworks if their content
responsibilities in support of peace consolidation, including relationship,
meets the standards outlined in paragraph 44. The decision to use such frame-
if any, to national plans and priorities
works as the Integrated Strategic Framework or have a separate document is
made by the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC and HC in consultation with other senior
i. Directive to the S/ERSG,10 RC and HC managers and Headquarters, and on the basis of a gap analysis of existing plan-
40. Based on the mandate from the Security Council, the Strategic Assessment and ning processes and products. The opportunity for combining planning frame-
decisions of the Secretary-General and/or Policy Committee, the Directive to the works and harmonizing planning processes should be regularly assessed, with
S/ERSG, RC and HC is drafted by Integrated Task Forces as part of the integrated due consideration for respective programming and budgetary cycles.
assessment and planning process.
46. The title, timing for development, timeframe, structure, content and owner-
41. The Directive provides strategic direction and priorities, initial responsibilities, ship of the process and its product are determined by S/ERSG Deputy SRSGs,
an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning pa- RC and HC, in consultation with other senior managers. These parameters vary
rameters, including guidance on the development of an Integrated Strategic with context, with particular consideration given to national milestones and UN
Framework. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC signifies the transfer of re- agency planning requirements and timelines.
sponsibility for subsequent planning of the integrated presence to the S/ERSG
47. The decision to develop an Integrated Strategic Framework jointly with national
and the senior leadership team of the integrated presence.
authorities and other partners rests with the S/ERSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC and HC
42. The Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC is issued and updated by the Secretary-
Appendix
Appendix
following consultation with Integrated Task Forces.
General upon a recommendation of the Integrated Task Force at Principal level.
48. Once developed and endorsed, the ISF document serves as a regular reference
Updates will usually result from a significant change in the environment or man-
for an on-going field-based process of joint analysis and review of the UN-wide
date, supported as required by an updated Strategic Assessment.
strategies and arrangements for peace consolidation. As such, its nature and
content may shift over time and may combine elements of strategic, program-
ii. Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) matic, communication and operational integration. It should also include mea-
43. On the basis of mandates, integrated assessments and the Directive to the sures to mitigate risks to all UN actors and activities, including to humanitarian
S/ERSG, RC and HC the vision, shared objectives and means through which operations.
the UN will promote peace consolidation are further developed and updated
49. The shared analysis should build on, where relevant, other assessments in-
through an inclusive analytical and planning process whose conclusions are re-
cluding Strategic Assessments, humanitarian needs assessments, risk analysis
flected in an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) document.
or those led by other national, regional and international institutions such as
44. The content of the ISF document must include: Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and Fragility Assessments. National
authorities, civil society, other local representatives, affected populations and
key international partners should be consulted as part of the process to ensure
10 For the purpose of this policy, the term S/ERSG is used to refer to the head of a peacekeeping that, at a minimum, local perspectives are taken into account in the analysis and
operation or Special Political Mission and therefore also applies to Special Coordinators. identification of UN priorities.
[ 152 ] [ 153 ]
50. The Integrated Strategic Framework must include a monitoring and reporting I. Requirement 3: Integrated mechanisms
framework to track adherence to responsibilities and progress towards results
57. At Headquarters, Integrated Task Forces (ITF) are the main forum for joint as-
with a view to promoting accountability, making adjustments to activities or re- sessments, planning, coordination, sharing of information and analysis, consul-
vising plans. tations and decision-making support. Integrated Task Forces should consider all
51. Integrated Strategic Frameworks are developed, updated and endorsed in the issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact in integrated set-
field under the leadership of S/ERSGs, DSRSGs, Resident/Humanitarian Coordi- tings, including entity-specific planning and reporting processes that may have
nators and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes. ISFs are also endorsed at implications for other entities. ITFs should be used to resolve policy differences

Headquarters by Integrated Task Forces at the Director-level and signed-off by between UN entities, ensure information-sharing between Missions and UNCTs,
the USG of the lead department. and consult thematic entities as needed. Integrated Task Forces are established
52. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must be reviewed as necessary, especially af- and chaired by lead departments on behalf of the UN system and include rep-
ter any substantial change in the mandate, Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC resentatives of all relevant UN entities, including DPKO, DPA, DFS, PBSO, OHCHR
or circumstances on the ground, or at least every two years. The review of In- and DSS as well as UNDG and ECHA members based on the “2+4” formula ad-
tegrated Strategic Frameworks is carried out by integrated mechanisms in the opted in 2006.11 Field presences should also be represented. Task forces meet
field and in cooperation with HQ as stipulated in paragraph 58 of this policy. at the Director or Principal level as needed or as required by the present policy.
58. At field level, integrated UN presences are required to put in place mechanisms
Linkages between Integrated Strategic Frameworks and other planning processes for joint information-sharing, analysis, planning, decision-making, coordination
53. A shared understanding of other existing planning processes, including content, and monitoring. Existing mechanisms should be used where appropriate. The
timeframes, budgetary implications and degree of national ownership, must in- configuration of these structures should be tailored to each context,12 but in all
form the development or revision of Integrated Strategic Frameworks. cases they should include:
54. Whenever possible and appropriate, the ISF must take into account and reflect a. A senior leadership forum for decision-making on joint strategic and opera-
existing national and international planning frameworks and articulate to which tional issues. This forum should include the key in-country decision-makers
national peace consolidation priorities the UN will collectively contribute. To the such as the S/ERSG, DSRSG, RC/HC, Civilian Chief of Staff, Heads of Mission
extent possible and appropriate, planning timelines should be aligned and ISF components and Heads of relevant UN agencies, funds and programmes.
monitoring systems should seek to use and strengthen national monitoring in- External partners should be invited to participate where appropriate.
dicators. b. A joint analytical and planning capacity to share assessments and analyses
55. Agencies, funds and programmes must ensure consistency between the joint and develop, update, and monitor integrated planning frameworks. All enti-
analysis, strategic priorities and responsibilities agreed to in the Integrated ties that are part of the integrated presence should either be represented in
Appendix
Appendix
Strategic Framework and relevant parts of their various country programming or seek to otherwise contribute to the joint analytical and planning capacity.
frameworks including the UNDAF and the CAP, the country programme docu- 59. It is a responsibility of senior leadership in the field and at HQ to convene inte-
ments and the country programme action plan. Depending on the timing of its grated mechanisms on a regular basis to discuss and make decisions on joint
development and finalization, the ISF informs the development or the revision strategic and operational issues.
of agency frameworks and annual plans, with due consideration for the various
governance and budgetary considerations regulating such internal processes. J. Requirement 4: Integrated monitoring and reporting
56. Peacekeeping and field-based Special Political Missions must ensure consistency 60. Integrated Strategic Frameworks must include from the start a monitoring and
between the joint analysis, strategic priorities and responsibilities agreed to in reporting mechanism, including measurable and meaningful benchmarks13 and
the Integrated Strategic Framework and relevant parts of their strategies for
mandate implementation, including the Mission Concept which articulates the
main objectives and tasks of the Mission for each phase of its operations. These 11 Under this formula, the humanitarian and development actors are represented by OCHA and
DOCO, respectively. In addition to these two, up to four representatives from the UN agencies,
strategies guide other Mission-specific planning processes and products, includ-
funds, and programmes may participate based on their involvement in the country in question and
ing related technical assessments, component and support plans, concepts of
capacity to engage.
operation, administrative plans and results-based budgets. The Mission Concept 12 Examples of field-level mechanisms are included in the How-to Guidelines.
reflects the responsibilities agreed to in the ISF, and is revised when the ISF is 13 Benchmarks should echo those used by the Security Council to monitor progress with peace
revised. consolidation.
[ 154 ] [ 155 ]
risk indicators, as part of their implementation arrangements to support deci- 65. UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators are responsible, respectively, for
sion-making. Other existing monitoring and reporting frameworks may be used ensuring, where relevant, consistency between the Integrated Strategic Frame-
where relevant. work and the UNDAF and the CHAP. They should promote, as appropriate, har-
61. The joint analytical and planning capacity tracks progress and reports to the monization of the underlying analytical and planning processes.
senior UN leadership forum and, through this forum, to Headquarters on prog- 66. Agencies, both at HQ and in the field, are responsible for participating in and
ress towards common objectives agreed to and articulated in the Directive to contributing inputs to all phases of integrated assessment and planning, includ-
S/ERSG, RC and HC and Integrated Strategic Frameworks. When appropriate, it ing integrated assessments and other joint analytical processes.

provides recommendations for changes in strategy or objectives based on this 67. Heads of UN agencies, funds and programmes in the field are responsible for
analysis. ensuring that responsibilities agreed to in Integrated Strategic Frameworks are
62. Additionally, progress against the UN priorities outlined in integrated plans must reflected in agency plans for peace consolidation and prioritised accordingly in
be reflected in the regular reports of the entities engaged in the implementa- terms of resource mobilization and allocation.
tion of these plans, as appropriate for the reporting format. This includes reports 68. The finalization, implementation, and regular review of Integrated Strategic
of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and UNDAF reporting mecha- Frameworks is a joint responsibility of S/ERSGs, Resident Coordinators, Humani-
nisms. tarian Coordinators and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes, including
through cooperation in mobilizing resources against peace consolidation priori-
K. Responsibilities, authority and accountability for integrated ties.
assessment and planning 69. Delivery against priorities outlined in the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HQ
and Integrated Strategic Frameworks must be integrated into existing account-
63. Under the guidance of the Secretary-General and in coordination with field
ability mechanisms, including S/ERSG Compacts and existing performance sys-
leadership and Task Force partners, lead departments at HQ are responsible for:
tems for DSRSGs, RC/HCs and Heads of agencies, funds and programmes.
a. Establishing, convening and chairing Integrated Task Forces where an inte-
grated UN presence is in place or as soon as one is being considered;
L. Implementation of this policy
b. Initiating, organising and conducting integrated assessment and planning
70. Each UN entity is responsible for ensuring the implementation of this policy.
processes in line with the present policy, including ensuring that consulta-
tions and information-sharing take place at all phases of the process, lead- 71. Lead departments, Integrated Task Forces and the senior leadership forum in the
ing integrated assessment missions and coordinating the finalisation of field are responsible for monitoring the implementation of this policy in each
Task Force-approved documents such as Directives to S/ERSGs, RC and HC; particular situation.
Appendix
Appendix
c. Following consultations with relevant UN partners, drafting and finalising 72. Disagreements over the interpretation or implementation of this policy that
Strategic Assessment reports, submissions to the Policy Committee and re- cannot be resolved by Integrated Task Forces at the Director or Principal level
ports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. Lead departments shall be referred to the Integration Steering Group, or the Policy Committee.
must ensure that, where they occur, diverging points of view are reflected in 73. The policy should be reviewed no later than 1 March 2015, on the basis of an
a transparent manner in submissions to the Secretary-General or the Policy evaluation to be commissioned by the Integration Steering Group.
Committee.
64. Special and Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General, supported by
Deputy SRSGs, Force Commanders, Police Commissioners, Chiefs of Staff and
other senior managers, are responsible for initiating, organising and leading in-
tegrated assessment and planning processes at field level, for the establishment
of the required integrated mechanisms and for the conduct of field-level consul-
tations on draft planning and reporting documents. S/ERSGs are responsible for
ensuring that responsibilities assigned to a peacekeeping or field-based Special
Political Mission in mandates, in the Directive to the S/ERSG, RC and HC and Inte-
grated Strategic Framework are reflected in the Mission Concept and prioritised
accordingly in the Results-based Budget and component workplans.
[ 156 ] [ 157 ]

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INTEGRATED

Alexander Costy Mari Warne-Smith

IAP Working Group

Toolbox: Integrated Mechanisms ........................................................................................ 63

1 IAP, Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013).

This section presents guidance on the conduct of

I.1 The Definition of Integrated Assessments

Agency Funds and

Mission Component CONOPS

Figure 1: Overview of Planning Framework for Integrated UN Presences

tions on the nature and (re)configuration of UN engagement for the consider-

ation of the Secretary-General and, when required, subsequently the Security

b. A member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security

c. A member of the Integrated Task Force

I.2.2 The Strategic Assessment Process

Strategic Assessment Terms of Reference and Workplan

aim in the TOR should include:

(b) The identification of specific areas of concern;

(d) The specific output(s) of the Strategic Assessment.

Figure 2: United Nations Strategic Assessment

Organization and Roles and Responsibilities

An ITF conducting a Strategic Assessment should ensure senior participation at

5 DPA: Department of Political Affairs; DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Consultations with External Stakeholders Internal Consultations and Endorsement of Report

• A clear understanding by all participants that the Strategic Assessment

means of destabilizing communities sexual violence, as well as to contribute

• No structural integration: Formal integrated structures at the leadership level have

Integrated assessment and planning and coordination mechanisms should none-

17 Decision No. 2008/24 of the Secretary-General on Integration (2008).

Structural Integration in UNSMIL–Libya Toolbox: Integrated Assessments

B. Template for a Strategic Assessment Report

1. Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment

Strengths of the United Nations Opportunities for United Nations and

Crisis Conflict partments, agencies or funds • Capacities and mandates of govern-

• Lack of funding for programmes • Rebel group outside of peace agree-

D. Template Terms of Reference for a Technical Assessment Mission

back to specific requests made by Secretariat leadership or governing bodies. It also

4. Timelines and Results

18 DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 19 DPA: Department of Political Affairs.

22 Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal (2013).

marks, roles, resources, communication, etc.).

the humanitarian country team (HCT). 28 Multidimensional peacekeeping environ-

of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia.

Thematic Working Groups

& PLANNING CAPACITY

& PLANNING CAPACITY

29 UNDAF: United Nations Development Assistance Framework.

on the key peace consolidation objectives of the United Nations presence.

A. Template Terms of Reference for ITFs

2. Purpose and Principal Functions

The National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Com-

The following section provides templates and guidance

The IAP Policy also states that modalities for working

III.1 Directive to S/ERSG, RC and HC III.1.3 Structure of the Directive

ties, an outline of structural and coordination arrangements, and basic planning

Sec tion III

Sec tion III

“Word from the Field”

Sec tion III