Unrisd: Gender, Religion and The Quest For Justice in Pakistan

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UNRISD

UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Gender, Religion and the Quest for Justice


in Pakistan

Farida Shaheed
Shirkat Gah – Women’s Resource Centre, Lahore, Pakistan

Final Research Report


prepared for the project
Religion, Politics and Gender Equality

September 2009
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) is an autonomous
agency engaging in multidisciplinary research on the social dimensions of contemporary devel-
opment issues. Its work is guided by the conviction that, for effective development policies to be
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better understanding of how development policies and processes of economic, social and envi-
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Introduction
This paper explores how Islam in Pakistan metamorphosed from the religious identity of
the majority population (the raison d’être of its existence as a nation for Muslim Indi-
ans), to become the central defining parametres for state and society. This privileging of
religion as the yardstick for all activities from politics to judicial structures, from enter-
tainment to women’s rights in the 1977-88 decade seriously undermined women’s al-
ready weak position in society and even today challenges the quest for gender equality.
Frequently, the impact on women of fusing politics and religion is considered as a self-
contained matrix. This paper starts from the premise that the ultimate aim of politico-
religious elements is to capture state power in which disempowering women is only one
effective tool in seeking legitimacy and asserting influence; women becoming markers
of appropriated territory in wider power contestations. It is therefore not possible to un-
derstand the impact of fusing politics and religion on women, without understanding the
context within which this takes place. The paper suggests that in culturally traditionalist
societies like Pakistan, already subject to constrictive gender rules, women become easy
victims of retrogressive socio-political religious projects but, at the same time, that
women are not an undifferentiated unit. The usage of Islam by diverse regimes has not
impacted women in like manner. Women were victims of gross negligence and pater-
nalistic attitudes but rescinding women’s rights was never a main objective until Gen-
eral Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). Under Zia the systematic and aggressive inscription of
Islam into the body politic and social fabric had devastating consequences for the polity
in general and women and non-Muslims in particular. His era thus marks a qualitative
realignment of forces. Gender cross-sects other deeply entrenched social inequalities so
that ‘Islamization’ measures have impacted diverse groups of women differently. Fur-
ther, the pursuit of gender equality is greatly impeded by the vast chasm separating de
facto from de jure rights in Pakistan thanks to which only a small minority of women
knows of their rights. The fewer the people who enjoy rights, the more vulnerable they
become. The state’s failure to deliver on its promises of equal opportunities, benefits
and justice has created a vacuum into which the religious right inserted itself and was
able to project itself as the harbinger of justice in a visibly unjust world. In the final
analysis, regardless of the claims to the moral high ground of authenticity, the para-
mount concern of religious political projects is power – not religion, or ethnicity, or cul-
ture.
Section 1 gives the political context: the political actors and forces involved in
the fusing of religion and politics from 1947 to 1988. Section 2 provides an overview of
women’s disparate realities and goes to explore the implications of this interfacing for
women’s rights and gender inequality during the Zia years and subsequent develop-
ments. Section 3 problematizes the role of civil society in this process and questions
some of the facile assumptions that are often made about the socially-progressive role of
civil society actors. The final section provides some overarching conclusions.

1. Inserting the Islamic into the Republic of Pakistan (1947-


1988)
A Homeland for Muslims
Created as a homeland for Indian Muslims, Pakistan was still very much a nation-in-
becoming at independence, August 14th 1947. It would have required a territorially-
rooted nation-building to meld together the half dozen linguistic and many more ethnic
populations.(Alavi 2004) Instead, successive elites in central power have “played upon

3
religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity.”(Haqqani
2005:2) The contours and contents of Pakistan’s ‘Muslim nationhood’ – with debates
over ‘womanhood’ a recurrent motif – have been incessantly contested in the discourses
verbalising political tussles for power.
Initially, counter-posing a ‘Muslim Pakistan’ to a hostile ‘Hindu India’ was fa-
cilitated by the acrid legacy of partitioning the sub-continent: the two-sided butchery
caused one million deaths and many more injured.(Nawaz 2008: xvii) Women, as the
symbol of the ‘other’, became special victims: countless were raped, mutilated, forcibly
captured and sold into prostitution, hundreds of thousands became untraceable.(Jillani
2007:xiv)1 The trauma, especially severe in Punjab, left indelible scars in the psyche of
state and society. Overnight, the largest recorded transmigration of some 14 million
people, blanched Pakistan to a religiously monochromatic population. From comprising
almost a fifth of the population (18.5%), non-Muslims were reduced to an insignificant
1.6%. Change was most dramatic in urban centres where almost half the residents had
been non-Muslims.2
The resort to Islam was convenient for entirely secular reasons. For most of
Pakistan’s history the real power contestation has been between the military-dominated
centre and the sub-national political elites. In this, the arithmetic of democracy did not
suit those acceding to central power: the Punjabis and Urdu-speaking migrants or Moha-
jirs in West Pakistan who even together did not constitute the majority. In a typical post-
colonial state with a relatively over-developed state structure, a weak political frame-
work and a comparatively powerful military and civil bureaucracy, (Alavi 1973) a
dominant presence in the civil and military bureaucracies enabled the Punjabi-Mohajir
elite to wield power to the detriment of the severely under-represented Bengali-speaking
majority. Democracy became ‘unsuited to Pakistan,’ and considerable time and effort
was spent in devising ways to circumvent the logic of universal franchise. Religion pro-
vided a convenient cover. The invented parameters and imperatives of a ‘Muslim na-
tionhood’ were regularly flourished to deny greater autonomy and share in power to the
ethnically diverse units constituting Pakistan. As early as 1966 the federal law minister,
a Punjabi, warned East Pakistanis that “demanding greater provincial autonomy” would
be considered “a treasonous act;” protagonists “would be identified, hunted, crushed
and destroyed.”3 Discontent at Punjabi-Mohajir domination was expressed first by Ben-
gali East Pakistan, and then by Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baloch4, that is by all those ex-
cluded from central power. Islam was also used to counter largely imaginary socialist
threats, especially after the failed 1951 military conspiracy. Successive governments
tasked intelligence agencies with infiltrating and disrupting socialist-leaning as well as
sub-nationalist groups. Religiously defined groups were supported to attack “unIslamic
and foreign-inspired” left-leaning groups. (Haqqani 2005, Abbas 2005, Hussain).

1
Some 33,000 Hindu and Sikh women were located and repatriated to India, some 50,000 Muslim
women from India to Pakistan. (Jillani Partition, xiv). Pakistan continued to receive migrants well into
the 1960s, by mid-1960, some 10 million people had relocated from India to, largely, West Pakistan. In
the initial years 6.5 million of the migrants settled in West Pakistan compared with 0.7 million in East
Pakistan.
2
In Lahore, for example, only 1,000 of the 500,000 Hindus and 100,000 Sikhs remained.
3
S. M. Zafar speaking in Dhaka on 15 December 1966 (Abbas: 58).
4
Sindhi language riots erupted in the 1970s, the demand to rename the Pakhtun-dominated North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) to Pakhtunkhwa remains an unresolved contentious issue; while the 1970s
armed insurrection in Balochistan was crushed by brute military force, there is a movement for independ-
ence Balochistan today.

4
Without the consistent - often cavalier - use of Islam in the pursuit of power by
more secular elements, politico-religious groups would not have been able to so steadily
push their agenda, progressively inscribing religion into the body text of politics, state
and society. Religiously defined political parties have been decisively rejected by the
electorate.5 Elections have been rare, however, and Pakistan has spent more time under
military dispensations than civilian ones. Furthermore, independence saw the “uncertain
liberalism” of those acceding to power immediately confronted by strong willed “reli-
gious orthodoxy.” (Rashid 1985) So that the question became: how ‘Islamic’ should the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan be, and, of course, who would determine this? Political
manoeuvring and manipulations seeking to concentrate centralised power and side-step
the logic of democratic processes, have left the country osculating between a presiden-
tial and parliamentary form of government, between long periods of martial law and
short bursts of unstable civilian rule; currently it is more presidential than parliamen-
tary.6 Pakistan’s third, extant, 1973 Constitution has been so frequently and radically
amended as to raise the question of whether it can still reasonably be called the same
constitution.
The assertiveness of religious orthodox political parties (as opposed to today’s
armed militants) has never been directed against the military per se. The military has
alternatively countered religious groups and parties by force and re-configured them as
allies as suited its purpose at a particular moment. The emphasis throughout has been on
keeping society under control through a strong militarised state, with every military
ruler making use of Islam. It is important to clarify that if, until General Zia-ul-Haq
(1977-1988), the Pakistani army never assumed the role of ‘defender of the faith,’
unlike its counterpart in Turkey, it also never played the role of the ‘upholders of secu-
larism’ even though the officer corps tended to have a secular outlook. The Turkish
army’s defence of secularism derives from its Kemalist roots and Ataturk’s radical, sys-
tematic, and wide-ranging measures to eliminate religion from state and society. This
has never been the agenda of the Pakistani armed forces.
Finally, the hasty division of assets between Pakistan and India, that gave Paki-
stan 30% of the British Indian army but only 17.5% of the total assets and liabilities of
undivided India (Jalal 1991: 42, 47) had serious repercussions. The perceived impera-
tive to fill this financial deficit, an obsession of each successive military commander,
became a driver of both foreign and internal policy. (An early dispute with India over
Kashmir guaranteed public support for a strong military.) Fuelled by a primordial and
antagonistic relationship with a far larger and militarily better equipped India, and a de-
sire to achieve ‘strategic depth’ by exerting influence over neighbouring Afghanistan,
the quest for military funds led Pakistan’s military rulers to peddle the idea of an “Is-
lamic barrier” against communism and the USSR, especially to the US. (Jalal 1991)
Ayub was to go so far as to tell the US “[o]ur army can be your army if you want us.”7
Of course, the defense against India plea partly functioned as a defense against internal
threats to central authority (Jalal 1991: 49). The conflation and intricate interweaving of
Pakistani nationhood with Islam facilitated the condemnation of any questioning of of-
ficial doctrine as subversive, even treacherous, and quite possibly sinful. The perceived

5
Exceptionally, religiously defined political parties won substantial seats in the 2002 elections. But this
victory has to be seen as one fall out of the US-led bombardment of Afghanistan and the supportive role
of Pakistan’s military-run government in late 2001.
6
The first 1956 constitution provided for a parliamentary system but empowered the president to dissolve
the National Assembly and to appoint the prime minister at will (Article 50) – a feature which kept re-
surfacing in Pakistan’s chequered history.
7
General Ayub Khan cited in Abbas 2005, p26.

5
funding deficit is also credited for the later development of a conscious strategy to train
and use non-regular combatants, justified as the religious duty of jihad (holy war)
(Abbas 2005, Haqqani 2005, Z. Hussain 2007). The net result is that “rulers have at-
tempted to ‘manage’ militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it to serve nation-building
without destabilizing internal politics or relations with the Western countries,” (Haqqani
2005: 2-3) a task that has proved to be impossible.
If Pakistan’s genesis ensured Islam’s early inscription into politics, Islam’s shift
from merely being the religious identity of its majority population to becoming the ref-
erence point for all political discourse came later. The mostly politically motivated use
of Islam peaked under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88): legislative changes negated state
promises of an equal footing for female and non-Muslim citizens and simultaneously
encouraged the most bigoted sections of society. But, the ground had been prepared by
others who, using Islam instrumentally, paved the way for politico-religious forces to
assert hegemonic control over the political discourse.
The state envisaged by Pakistan’s founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah, popularly
known as Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader) was a secular not a theocratic one. This he
elaborated in his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947,
the full text of which was subsequently suppressed:
You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the
business of the state… there is no discrimination, no distinction between one caste or
creed and another…[The] fundamental principle [is] that we are all citizens and equal
citizens of one state… in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims
would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith
of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.8
The difference between an Islamic state and one for Muslims may have been
self-evident to Jinnah, but the inevitable connection between Muslims and their religion
enabled politico-religious groups to subsequently elide ‘the creation of a state for Mus-
lims’ into the creation of an “Islamic” society and state with some semblance of credi-
bility. (Rashid 1985, Shaheed 2002) Significantly, this eliding was managed despite the
fact that, in the early years, most politically active ulema (religious scholars) having op-
posed the creation of Pakistan, enjoyed little credibility.
Maulana Abul A’la Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), was a key
protagonist. His political acumen and intellectual abilities,9 combined with the organisa-
tional strength of the JI and a dedicated cadre enabled Maududi to play a key power-
broker role.(Abbas 2005:30) Having disparaged Jinnah as the Qafir-e-Azam (leader of
the infidels), bare months before independence, Maududi reversed his opposition to
Pakistan as against the interests of Indian Muslims. He redefined his objective as mak-
ing the shariah which “Muslims consider to be divine” the foundation of the state’s
constitution and laws, and set out to occupy “a significant position in the effort to pro-
vide the specifics of an Islamic state.” 10
Over the years, the JI and other religiously defined actors created sufficient con-
fusion over the raison d’étre of Pakistan to enable minority elements to override major-
ity views. The adoption, soon after Jinnah’s death, of the Objectives Resolution as a

8
Quaid-e-Azam’s Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in Abbas Rashid (ed)
Pakistan: Perspectives on State and Society, 79-84
9
Maududi laid out his ‘religious’ ideological agenda in political terms in his 1960 book: First Principles
of the Islamic State, still required reading in many madrassahs.
10
Maududi quoted in Abbas Rashid “Pakistan: the Ideological Dimension” page 83

6
preamble to the 1949 Constitution marks a crucial first victory of politico-religious ac-
tors. The resolution affirms that “sovereignty belongs to God Almighty alone” with au-
thority delegated to the State of Pakistan to be exercised through chosen representatives.
Stipulating that “Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and col-
lective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the
Holy Quran and Sunnah,” it stipulates “adequate provision...for the minorities freely to
profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures”11 and safeguarding the
“legitimate rights of minorities and backward and depressed classes.” (Inserting the
qualifier “legitimate” automatically limits the scope of such rights.) Adopted despite
opposition by all non-Muslim members (and a solitary Muslim parliamentarian), the
preamble was retained in all subsequent constitutions. It became a substantive part of
the Constitution in 1985. 12 The Resolution’s adoption is not reflective of the ulema’s
power, which was negligible at the time. Rather it suggests the inability – or unwilling-
ness - of “uncertain liberalism” to directly confront and question the authority of relig-
ion in the political sphere. In any case, as was to become evident, political leaders were
far from averse to using religion to further their own non-religious ends as illustrated in
the following examples.
Behind the first religious riots in 1952-1953, for instance, lay the political ambi-
tion of the western-educated Punjab Chief Minister, who helped to convert the entirely
secular issue of food scarcity into a religious crisis. Seizing the opportunity to flex po-
litical muscle, the JI vociferously supported the demand that a minority sect, the Ah-
medis, be declared non-Muslims. Riots led to the imposition of the first-ever martial
law. The initial problems were hardly insurmountable: similar protests in Karachi in the
Sindh province had been quickly curtailed. The report of the court of inquiry established
to investigate the causes and consequences (commonly referred to as the Munir Com-
mission after the presiding judge) makes excellent, if sobering, reading. Riots, it con-
cludes were “encouraged by the Chief Minister’s public utterances supporting the view
that the Ahmadis were not Muslims.” (Government of Pakistan 1953: 386) Of deep
concern was that the Objectives Resolution, intended in the court’s view to guarantee
equality, was being used by the ulema to argue that non-Muslims were not equal citi-
zens. Further, no ulema accepted the framework of a modern nation-state which, in the
view of the Jama’at-i-Islami “is the creature of the devil… [and no] ulama can tolerate a
State which is based on nationalism and all that it implies.” (page 249) Neither the in-
cumbent nor subsequent governments paid heed to the Court’s urgent warning that noth-
ing short of a “bold reorientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can pre-
serve it as a world idea and convert the Mussalman into a citizen of the present and fu-
ture world from the archaic incongruity that he is today.” The Chief Minister had to re-
sign, but no attempts were made to even censure the ulema for inciting people to vio-
lence in the name of Islam.
Assuming power in 1958, the socially liberal General Ayub Khan (1958-1968)
who briefly removed “Islamic” from the official state name still used Islam when it
suited his purpose. Having promulgated the 1961 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance that
gave women key rights in marriage, he responded to the vociferous protests of religious
elements by banning their parties, freezing their funds, closing their offices and publica-
tions and unceremoniously throwing leaders into jail. Social liberalism evaporated,

11
Under General Zia-ul-Haq the “freely” was deleted.
12
Hassan Abbas considers that Maududi astutely settled for inserted the ‘Islamic nature,’ ‘Islamic Repub-
lic’ and ‘nothing repugnant to Islam’ rather than risk his suggestions being completely rejected and re-
placed by constitution drafted by the Law Minister, Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigarh, assisted by the British
parliamentary consultant, John Rowlatt (Abbas: 31).

7
however, when it came to basic issues of power as evidenced in the 1965 Presidential
elections. Opposing Ayub was a coalition led by politico-religious parties that, on the
sudden death of their candidate, fielded a woman: Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Pakistan’s
founder, commonly referred to as the madre-e-millat, or ‘mother of the nation.’ Over-
turning their previous censure of women in public spaces, let alone politics, politico-
religious parties issued post-haste fatwas (religion opinions) to the effect that, in excep-
tional circumstances, a woman could become head of state. Ayub responded by mobiliz-
ing his own fatwa, promptly declaring it unIslamic for a woman to be head of state.
In the 1970s, Islam’s presence started to be institutionalised. Z.A. Bhutto’s rule
in a truncated Pakistan (1971-1977) heralded a time of progress for women, but in the
name of ‘Islamic socialism’. A 1976 Declaration on the Rights of Women of Pakistan
launched in 1976 averred in its first article that “Discrimination against women is con-
trary to the injunctions of Islam, violates Constitutional guarantees and constitutes an
offence against human dignity.” Z.A. Bhutto was the last politician able to casually
brush aside accusations of not being a good Muslim, famously retorted in a massive
public rally, “they say I drink, but I only drink alcohol; not the blood of the people.”
But, the 1973 Constitution privileges Muslims: Islam is the state religion (Article 2); the
presidency reserved for Muslims (Article 41); the state required to ensure that Muslims
are able to live according to Islam (Article 31).
Moreover, for reasons that remain unfathomable, what the religious right failed
to achieve through the 1953 riots, i.e. declaring Ahmedis non-Muslims, was instigated
by the popularly elected government through its first constitutional amendment in 1975.
Equally inexplicably, Bhutto instituted a Ministry for Religious Affairs. Separately, see-
ing in the petrodollar power a means of diversifying Pakistan’s financial support base,
Bhutto acted to forge an alternative Muslim axis of international alliances through
stronger linkages with the oil-rich Middle-East.13 Within Pakistan this unhelpfully cre-
ated space for people to refashion a collective identity in the likeness of those with oil
power. Avoiding direct confrontation with the military establishment, Bhutto by-passed
several senior generals to appoint Zia-ul-Haq as his chief of army staff, perhaps believ-
ing that with a more modest class background, Zia was less likely to conspire against
him. It was a mistake Bhutto paid for with his life; and Pakistan’s women and minorities
paid for in rights.
Convinced of his popularity, Bhutto held early elections in 1977 only to be con-
fronted with allegations of rigging followed by mass agitation under the banner of the
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA was a motley collection of political par-
ties; some defined as secular, others in religious terms, with most defying such a clear
classification. Despite diversity, it was the politico-religious parties that supplied the
movement with its slogans and organisational underpinnings. Calling for Nizam-i-
Mustafa (system of the Prophet of Islam) they coined the phrase that has subsequently
become such a mantra, equating Pakistan with the Muslim creed (Pakistan ka matlab
kia: la i’llallah il’allah What does Pakistan mean? There is no God but Allah.) Perhaps
believing he could out-manoeuvre and placate the religious rights, Bhutto hastily passed
a series of cosmetic ‘Islamic’ measures: alcohol, gambling and betting on horse racing
were banned, Friday made the weekly holiday. In the event, just when an agreement
amongst the political parties seemed likely, the army stepped in.

13
Bhutto organised the widely acclaimed 1974 Islamic Summit as a means to both launch the Muslim
alliance axis internationally and to recognize Bangladesh, closing that chapter.

8
Islamization according to General Zia
Under General Zia (1977-1988), aggressive state measures and state-supported non-
state actors working in tandem reconfigured the social environment as well as the legal
and political systems. The far more rigorous inscription of religion into all fields consti-
tuted a virtual paradigm shift. Previous governments had tended to neglect rather than
actively engage in the social sector and kept political manipulations and manoeuvring
more or less out of public view. In contrast, on taking over on July 5th 1977 Zia in-
formed the people that “Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and will continue to
survive only if it sticks to Islam…I consider the introduction of [an] Islamic system as
an essential pre-requisite for the country.”14 All state institutions were re-shaped to-
wards this end. Human rights were suspended, military courts displaced civilian ones,
political activists were unceremoniously jailed and tortured, including for the first time,
women political activists. Growing intolerance marked the era. Legal changes accom-
panied by social rules and strictures seemingly unleashed the most base instincts of
marginal groups, encouraging acts of wanton violence and intolerance by bigoted sec-
tions of society, while paralysing the saner elements.
Religiosity - overt and usually public acts and signs of piety - became a govern-
ment hallmark, profoundly altering the socio-political and judicial landscape: from
Qur’anic recitations on the national carrier before take-off and the start of every state
function, to the establishment of the parallel ‘shariat’ court system and so-called Islamic
laws largely relating to criminal and sexual offences; from making Islamiyat a compul-
sory subject and changing all the textbooks and course curricula, to the official projec-
tion that to be a ‘good Pakistani’ was to be a ‘good Muslim’ as defined by the state. To-
day, Pakistan’s political, social and judicial systems remain firmly chained to this leg-
acy; the greatly increased space for Islamised discourses in politics and society, intact.
Importantly, the 1978 ban on all political parties did not apply to the Jamaat-i-
Islami. Exempted from media censorship and inducted into the government as junior
partners, the JI was given free rein and full access to, and influence over, the influential
state controlled television and radio. The arrangement suited both sides: it gave the mili-
tary rulers a modicum of political credibility and the JI access to power consistently de-
nied it through the ballot box. Even as other voices were silenced, the JI’s ideological
take on Islam – self-serving, misogynistic and bigoted – flourished, dominating the air-
waves and progressively tranforming state institutions. In terms of social configuration,
this was an opportunity for the emerging class of traders and entrepreneurs to make their
mark on the political power structures and it is amongst this class and rural-to-urban
migrants that the religious idiom, intersecting with political ambitions, found the great-
est resonance and support. The regime adopted a number of JI agenda points, notably
with respect to dress codes and gender segregation.
The JI student wing, the Islami Jamiat-Tuleba (IJT), also exempt from the ban
on student unions, set about establishing a stranglehold in colleges and universities, em-
ploying physical force and weaponry with varying degrees of success. Wherever it
managed to establish its writ, such as in the Punjab University, the IJT brushed aside
official authorities to enforce its own ‘morality’ rules in which strict gender segregation
(on and off campus) and dress rules for female students figured prominently. Contra-
ventions were frequently dealt with physically.15 The significance of the IJT extends
beyond the collegiate population. It provides training for future JI cadre: the majority of

14
Cited in Hassan 2005, page 92.
15
Only in 2007 was the IJT hold over the Punjab University finally challenged through the lawyers’
movement for the restoration of the judiciary.

9
the JI members elected in 2002 had IJT training.16 Such recruitment was denied other
parties that were banned.

The Military-Mosque Nexus & Trans-national developments


It is impossible to understand the inscription of Islam in state and society without taking
into account the military-mosque nexus in Pakistan and the reorientation of the armed
forces that left the military high command sounding “more like a high priests than sol-
diers”17 even before Zia. The military is the state’s most powerful institution; the armed
forces have ruled Pakistan directly or indirectly for most of its history; and the sheer
number of armed forces personnel (the sixth largest in the world with more than half a
million people18) means that changes in the armed forces inevitably filter through into
societal changes. The soft-pedalling discourse on Islam sold to northern states with the
purpose of mobilising financial and military support assumed more virulent dimensions
within national boundaries. Linkages forged with religiously defined actors – both
mainstream political entities and para-state armed militias – have helped to re-orient at-
titudes amongst the armed forces’ rank and file.
Short-sighted attempts to harness the emotive appeal of religion completely
failed to foresee how much more effectively religiously-defined political elements could
use this strategy than those who opened the doors, such as the whiskey drinking General
Yahya Khan (1969-1971). As early as July 1969, Martial Law Regulation 51 introduced
7 years rigorous imprisonment for publishing or possessing any material offensive to the
religion of Islam. The military was re-invented as defenders of ‘the ideology of Paki-
stan,’ an utterly ambiguous if patriotic sounding term used to victimize all sorts of po-
litical and social activists. When the first elections based on universal franchise in 1970
rejected the establishment’s favorites wholesale19, ham-fisted interventions attempted to
deny victory to the East Pakistan based Awami League. The resultant Bangladesh war
of independence led to “privatising jihad,” (Z. Hussain 2007) with the state supporting
autonomously run militias to function as ‘irregular forces.’ Yahya proclaimed that the
“duty of self-defense (jehad) which Islam ordained” justified the creation of irregular
forces because “[i]rregular warfare can help in reducing the critical nature of initial bat-
tles of Pakistan.”20
Zia’s tenure (1977-1988) is usually reviewed from the lens of democracy and
human rights (especially those of women and minorities). More recent work brings into
sharp relief concerted efforts to transform the armed forces. (Abbas 2005, Haqqani
2005, Z. Hussain 2007) The army’s secularist tradition, carried forward from the days of
the British Indian Army, was effectively dismantled. Previously, army officers had re-
tained their personal secular outlook regardless of their selective public use of Islam. On
becoming Chief of Army Staff, Zia immediately changed the army creed to Iman,
Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabil Allah (faith piety and jihad for the sake of God). Later, he

16
See “New Men In” Newsline November 2002
17
Brig. (retd) Aziz Siddiqi, quoted in Haqqani page 55
18
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_arm_for_per-military-armed-forces-personnel
19
All Muslim League factions were routed; East Pakistan massively endorsed the full autonomy platform
of the Awami League; West Pakistanis voted in the newly emerged Pakistan People’s Party of Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto; Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) brought in the strange alliance of
the left-leaning National Awami Party and the politico-religious Jamiat-e-Ulema-Pakistan (JUI).
20
Yahya Khan cited in Haqqani 2005, page 56.

10
launched an all-out offensive to institute a conservative religious-minded officer corps:
Friday prayers became compulsory with officers encouraged to lead their men in
prayers;21 religious credentials deemed essential for selection and promotions, bye-
passing more secularly-inclined men. Recruitment patterns changed. The military
stopped attracting - or possibly refused to accept - the sons of the urban and rural elite,
traditionally the mainstay of the officer corps;22 the JI influence grew especially
amongst officers from rural or semi-rural areas (Hussain 2007, Abbas 2005).
In parallel and of equal long-term impact, the state extended support to madras-
sahs, or seminaries; the focus of so much anxious attention as training grounds for
armed militants today. Madrassahs have always been part of the landscape in Pakistan
(and South Asia more generally); Jinnah himself studied in one,23 but their salience
changed under Zia. In the pursuit of non-religious aims centred on Kashmir and Af-
ghanistan, intricate connections were forged between specific madrassahs, armed mili-
tant groups, the mujahideen and the military state during and after the Afghan war, as
effectively documented by several authors.24 Under Zia, madrassahs erupted across the
country. Official patronage (e.g. financial infusions, land endowments, bachelor’s de-
gree equivalency to madrassah graduates, making many teachers government employ-
ees) radically changed the status of the average mullah, or preacher, from being a person
dependent on social charity and occasional government honoraria whose company was
suffered rather than welcomed, to being far better resourced and linked to circles of in-
fluence. Since then systematic linkages have grown rather than abated. It was fortuitous
for Zia – and disastrous for Pakistan – that his tenure coincided with the US-USSR
proxy war in Afghanistan.
It is hard to over-state the impact of Pakistan playing cat’s paw in the US proxy
war with the USSR. The paramount objective of the US being to ”draw the Soviets into
the Afghan trap,”25 human rights were irrelevant and inconvenient truths disregarded.
Amongst the inconvenient truths swept under the carpet by the international community
was Zia’s wide-ranging use of Islam to justify his illegal regime, to rescind women’s
rights, to introduce undemocratic and barbaric punishments. Similarly over-looked was
the rampant abuse of human rights by the mujahideen or ‘holy warriors,’ their utter dis-
dain for democracy and its principles, and their total contempt for women. Also ignored
was sporadic news coverage of the resurrection of the horrific treatment of ‘enemy’
women as spoils of war (mal-e-ghanimat) (justified as an Islamic license) to be distrib-
uted and used at will and of prostitution slave camps set up in Jalalabad by these ‘free-
dom fighters.’ Instead, led by the US, the international discourse promoted, lauded and

21
Islamic teachings were inserted into the Pakistan Military Academy and the Command and Staff Col-
lege; a Directorate of Religious Instructions instituted for the officer corps, religious questions added to
all promotion examinations. Preachers were appointed to work among the troops. See Hussain op. cit. 19-
20
22
The principal of the country’s premier male school in Lahore complained at one point that every single
applicant from the institution had been rejected.(Abbas__)
23
Madrassah previously a generic term for a school, is now used to denote seminaries. Substantial growth
in numbers notwithstanding, madrassah students account for only an estimated 3 percent of the student
population. 
24
Amongst these: Hassan Abbas Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War
on Terror; Hussain Haqqani: Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military and Zahid Hussain: Frontline Paki-
stan: The Struggle with Militant Islam.
25
Human Rights Watch Report “All Our Hopes are Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western Af-
ghanistan” Afghanistan Vol. 14, No. 7(C) October 2002 www.hrw.org/rdeports/2002/afghan3 – page 1 of
summary Printer-friendly copy [pdf, 54 pages]

11
legitimised the mujahideen as freedom fighters. Overthrowing Hafizullah Amin’s “god-
less” (la-deeni) Marxist government seamlessly transmuted into eradicating the “god-
less” Soviets and their Afghan “puppets.” The rhetoric remained constant because the
‘fight against the godless’ was such as an effective mobiliser. In Pakistan, the call for
holy war against the godless enemies of Islam in Afghanistan was to inspire a whole
generation of born again Islamist army men (Z. Hussain 2005).
International support came with serious money: Between 1980 and 1985 covert
CIA controlled money grew from a small $500,000 to $1 billion. (Crile: 22, 277-278) In
the end it is estimated that the amount funnelled by the USA and Saudi Arabia into Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan for this war was US $3.5 billion.26 With much of the arms find-
ing their way back into the local domestic market, military aid left Pakistan awash in
state-of-the-art weaponry, accentuating the militarised and violent nature of the state
(Khattak 1997). Groups armed and trained by the US and Pakistan never handed in their
weapons and, far from giving up their agenda for Islamisation after the defeat of the So-
viet Union, they expanded their scope to encompass the state of Pakistan (Stern 2000).
With respect to women, religion and the body politic, in some ways, the resul-
tant shift in discourse and legitimacy granted by postulating the mujahideen as jihadists
fighting a ‘just war’ was even more significant than the actual fighting, entrenching it-
self well beyond the cessation of the financial influx from foreign countries replaced by
funds mobilised from non-state actors (Bhatt 2007, Haqqani 2005, Hussain 2007). To-
day, the vast majority of Pakistan’s women are caught between the rigid controls of so-
cial customs imposed in the name of tradition by family and community gatekeepers on
the one hand, and the new restrictive hegemonising discourses of the religious right,
sometimes supported by state laws and policies, on the other. Finding or creating the
space and means to resist both simultaneously is an enormous challenge. Given that
armed militants using Islamist rhetoric are strewing havoc throughout the country, mov-
ing it ever closer to a war zone, it will be a major challenge simply to maintain previous
gains, much less make progress as a whole.

2. Contested Rights: Women, State and Islam


Disparate lives, disparate impact
During the independence movement, Jinnah described the closeting of women “within
four walls of the houses as prisoners” as “a crime against humanity.”27 Sadly enough,
the situation for the vast majority of Pakistan’s women remains unchanged despite a
host of de jure rights at par with men conferred at independence: to vote and run for of-
fice, to employment and education, constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights. The
constitution upholds non-discrimination on the basis of “sex alone” and provides af-
firmative action (e.g. reserved seats in parliament for specified groups, including
women),28 but discriminatory sub-constitutional laws privilege men over women and a
vast chasm separates de jure from de facto rights.

26
Figure according to Milt Bearden, CIA station chief for Pakistan from 1986-1989, quoted in Jessica
Stern 2000.
27
1942 public meeting.
28
Article 25 guarantees equality of all citizens, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex alone, and
states that ‘nothing shall prevent the state from making special measures for the protection of women and
children;’ Article 27 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place
of birth in government appointments and employment and provides special quotas/reserving parliamen-

12
The reconfiguring of gendered boundaries during the independence movement
that had enabled women to change their everyday lives “to an extent hardly credible”
(Cousins: 57-58), faltered at independence. Until the 1970s, largely absent from the civil
bureaucracy, poorly represented in the political process, and with little organisational
strength, women leveraged change through personal connections to powerful males.
Success depended on negotiating rights through personal channels of influence and ef-
fective mobilization of political allies, but eventually on the responsiveness of policy-
makers. Such benefits and rights as were achieved accrued to only a very few. In gen-
eral, a deficit of political will coupled with poor governance has impeded any effective
tackling of deep rooted systemic and structural problems.29 The net result is women’s
disparate realities.
Sharing the disadvantages stemming from gender, women are divided by the
disadvantages/privileges and social exclusion/inclusion conferred by their non-gender
identity. In Pakistan this includes not only specific class but also, ethnicity, religion or
sect, as well as rural/urban location and province. Non-gender identities, mediate citi-
zens’ access to legal entitlements and state benefits. Hence urban based market savvy
young professionals and high profile politicians in Pakistan contrast with the majority:
rural women whose lives seem petrified in another century - untouched by events and
developments outside their immediate circles tightly controlled by traditional family and
community male gatekeepers. Exceptional women occupying preeminent positions in
public office30 and those who break through glass ceilings are tolerated because they are
exceptions who do not affect a structural configuration that only enables a miniscule
minority to excel and condemns the majority to a life of unchanging deprivation.
All too frequently, policies, affirmative action measures and laws supporting
women have remained paper statements without substance. Frequent martial law re-
gimes, causing women to disappear altogether from the ranks of policy-shapers and de-
cision-makers for extended periods of time, have not helped. Periodically, commissions
on women have been appointed but their recommendations largely ignored. The perma-
nent National Commission on the Status of Women promulgated overnight in 2000
lacks the powers and resources to be effective. A 5% quota introduced for women in the
public sector is poorly complied with; women’s police stations have been established,
but their authority remains unclear, the number of police women abysmally low and the
police institution largely unchanged. The women’s ministry (previously cabinet divi-
sion) has never enjoyed the political backing, financial resources and personnel that
would make it effective. Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996, launched a National Plan of
Action (NPA) to give effect to the Beijing Platform for Action (1998), and a National
Policy for Women’s Development and Empowerment in 2002), but few steps have been
taken to give effect to the Convention or to implement the NPA. This is reflected in a
GEM value of 0.377 that puts Pakistan at number 66 out of 75 countries (UNDP 2006).
The complex intersections of formal and non-formal decision-making in which
women’s lives are embedded prevent supportive policies and improved legal rights
theoretically achieved through women’s activism and offered by state measures from
reaching the general populace. Further, complicating matters, non-state dispute resolu-
tion and governance mechanisms parallel - and often override - the state’s mechanisms;

tary seats for specific classes, areas and women; Article 26 reserves the state’s right to make special pro-
visions for women and children.
29
NGO Coordinating Committee for Beijing +5 (2000) and Shaheed & Zaidi
30
Women have served as ambassadors since the 1950s, twice as Prime Minister and been leaders of large
all male trade unions (steel mills, railway and textile workers).

13
patronage systems premised on kinship, tribal and ethnic affiliations discriminate
against women, and now, militant often armed political groups outside the electoral
process have been targeting women.
Gendered rules in the family and community most immediately control women
through local customs and practices that override state laws and religious tenets alike.
Importantly, decades of grassroots work by Shirkat Gah–Women’s Resource Centre in-
dicate that even customs diametrically opposed to the tenets of Islam are inevitably pre-
sented, perceived and internalized by women as well as men, as being ‘Islamic’, that is
ordained by religion. Furthermore, decision-makers in traditional community dispute-
resolution/self-governance mechanisms help to perpetuate such misconceptions by
blocking knowledge of legal entitlements and access of the poor and less powerful to
state benefits (Tambiah 2002). Still, Shirkat Gah’s legal consciousness work across the
country as well as empirical research provide compelling evidence that despite critiques
of Pakistan being a fragile state, the state and the norms and rights it sets out are impor-
tant influences in people’s lives. Research suggests that what people want is not so
much the imposition of religious laws but an assurance that existing and proposed laws
are not against their religion (Shaheed 2002). The fact that customs are often far worse
than the state laws - inadequate and imperfect as these may be - makes it all the more
frustrating that state authorities and institutions fail to inform people about their entitle-
ments under the law. Widespread ignorance about state laws as well as religious pre-
cepts allows players using the rhetoric of ‘Islamic justice’ to silence potential opposition
while mobilising support. The struggle for gender equality has been waged from a nar-
row class-base of the relatively more privileged, and although robust and vociferous, is
numerically small.
For the majority, rigidly upheld customs in a gender-segregated society continue
to impede women’s mobility, blocking access to information, health, education and em-
ployment opportunities. Female life expectancy now marginally exceeds that of males
(63.6 years vs. 63.2), but the Planning Commission of Pakistan estimates that maternal
mortality actually increased from 350 in 2000-2001 to 400 per 100,000 live births in
2004-2005.31 One out of every twenty women in the world who die in childbirth and
related complications is a Pakistani. Rampant neglect and gender-segregated schooling
means only 36% of girls and women are literate (almost half the male literacy rate of
63%) and that sparse, grossly inadequate, funds are funnelled into male institutions.
Calls to integrate primary schooling and to staff all primary schools with women teach-
ers - starting in 195532 and regularly reiterated - have just as regularly been ignored. Ac-
tions have never matched stated policies, and “programs expected to benefit women
most have been subject to the most drastic cuts.”33 Zia’s military rule with its retrogres-
sive ‘Islamic’ rhetoric saw a drop in girls’ education.
Economic disparity is even starker. A bare 2 percent of women own land; female
earnings are estimated to be less than one third of male earnings.34 Of the 32.0% eco-
nomically active women, the vast majority is occupied in agriculture (73%); one third
comprises family workers with little access to cash income. Only 9% are in the indus-
trial sector, 18% in services. The majority of rural women contribute directly to house-
hold income but few receive cash in hand; fewer still are counted as employed so that

31
Pakistan Millennium Development Goals Report 2005. pp. 45.
32
Pakistan’s first Five Year Development Plan (1955-1960).
33
L. Qureshi; p. 61 Development Planning and Women, Development Studies Institute, Lahore. 1984.
34
$977 per annum for women and $3,403 for men.

14
Pakistan’s female labour force participation rate is one of the lowest in the world,
though slowly increasing. Paradoxically enough under Zia, despite exhortations for
women to return to their homes, economic imperatives pushed an unprecedented num-
ber of women into the formal labour market while profit motives propelled some facto-
ries to end segregated work floors for men and women workers.
Marginalised, women exercise little influence over the state of affairs in either
the bureaucratic or judicial arenas. Women only comprised 5.4% of federal civil ser-
vants in 2000; a 5% quota introduced in September 1989 failed to ensure women’s pres-
ence in all sectors and levels. Only 20% were employed in professional grades. Few
women reach decision-making posts in the health and education departments which em-
ploy half of all female federal employees.35 Provincial bureaucracies have even fewer
women; a maximum of a bare three percent in Sindh (NCSW 2003). In 2006, women
accounted for only 26% of professional and technical workers (UNDP 2006). No
woman has served as a Supreme Court or Federal Shariat Court judge; there are 4 fe-
male High Court judges out of a total of 113.
Pakistan’s GEM ranking would have been worse still had relatively recent
measures not boosted women's presence in all legislative assemblies from less than 3
percent at the national level and 0.4 percent in the provinces.36 In 2008, women consti-
tuted almost 22 percent of the 342-seat National Assembly (15 women on general seats
and 60 on reserved seats). But the reserved seats, filled by an electoral college of di-
rectly elected assembly members, render such women accountable not to the female
citizenry but to the mostly male party members who voted them in. Without vote banks
in the general population, women are usually side-lined within their own party struc-
tures. Often reduced to tokens, they pose no serious threat.
Given disparate realities, it is less surprising that the political use of Islam has
not impacted women in like fashion. Diverse regimes’ views and use of Islam were also
dissimilar. Before Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law, the use of Islam to further political agendas
had not focused particularly – or at all – on women. Women’s issues were victims of
gross negligence and paternalistic views, but there is little evidence to suggest purposive
intent to systematically rescind women’s rights or curtail their activities. Still, religion
has always been the basis of gender inequality as, for instance, in personal status law
derived from religion and as early 1954, an outcry by politically peripheral, conserva-
tive religious elements led to the closure of the Women’s National Guard and Women’s
Naval Reserve. This heralded in the pattern of leaders regularly sacrificing women’s
rights, not out of theological convictions, but as a means of appeasing or side-stepping
conservative forces with a propensity to use the religious idiom.
Under Zia, sporadic back-sliding was replaced by the systematic and aggressive
inscription of Islam into the body politic and social fabric with devastating conse-
quences. Consequently, while the usage of religion by Zia may have continued an ear-
lier tendency as argued by some (Haqqani 2005), his tenure marks a qualitative, not
merely incremental, change. Unlike the earlier sporadic, almost whimsical, use of Islam,
Zia unleashed a full scale ‘Islamisation’ campaign to revamp state and society. The
campaign, with a particular focus on women, progressively reversed gains, many con-

35
Amongst the ‘professional’ category of employees, in 2000, women accounted for 52% of the educa-
tion department; 28% of those in health and 34% in population welfare in federal services.
36
Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Centre. Newsheet, 2002, vol. xiv, no. 4, pp. 1. There are 60 reserved
seats in the National Assembly, 128 in the provincial assemblies and 17 in the Senate. Ministry of
Women Development, Social Welfare & Special Education, GoP. Implementation Matrix Pakistan’s Na-
tional Policy for Development & Empowerment of Women 2002. pp. 27

15
sidered secure. The sudden shifting of ground, like quicksand under their feet caught
women unawares. Past experience had not prepared women for the lethal military-state-
religion combo and, marginalised in the power matrix, women were severely handi-
capped in countering this onslaught. It did not help that hardly any women were even
aware of the state-granted rights now under threat. The sheer speed with which rights
considered secured were over-turned attests to the vulnerability of rights when these are
only enjoyed by a miniscule proportion of those affected and, of course, the generally
disempowered position of women.
Previously, women from the middle and upper classes had been able to largely
ignore the normative prescriptions articulated by the religious right since the latter had
little leverage with those in state power. By the late 1970s, urban middle and upper
middle class women had managed to substantially alter the gender rules applicable to
them. This was achieved largely through slow processes of change, rather than as the
outcome of collectivized demands for rights. Women’s demands for rights and more
women-appropriate development interventions were sometimes ignored, but more usu-
ally paid at least lip service, particularly as those articulating demands tended to be con-
nected to those in power by family and social networks. For instance, demands for re-
forms in Muslim family laws were sparked off by the incumbent Prime Minister second
polygamous marriage in 1955 and started as a social boycott by his first wife’s well-
heeled friends who refused to attend any functions where the second wife was present.
Eventually, popular support from women of diverse classes led to a sizeable public
demonstration demanding an end to polygyny. The combined outcome of social boy-
cott, public protest and private lobbying was the establishment of the Commission on
Marriage and Family Laws that culminated in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance
(MFLO) under General Ayub Khan (based on only some of the Commission’s recom-
mendations), 37 despite protests from religious elements. The broader underlying prob-
lem was that the introduction of an official marriage form (the nikhanama) and the ap-
pointment of state officials as marriage registrars, provided for under the MFLO, effec-
tively rendered the average preacher redundant. This threat to the social power base of
the ulema, I believe, is the root cause of the religious elements opposition to this legisla-
tion, rather than any concern for whether or not men marry more than one wife, or
whether grandchildren inherit from pre-deceased parents, the ostensible cause of protest.
The threat to their power base explains the persistence arduous attempts to overturn the
MFLO, starting with the very first assembly session following its promulgation.38 The
MFLO survived only because the law enjoys constitutional protection.
Two final points: In the early decades of independence, those responsible for de-
cisions, the opinion-makers as well as the trend-setters belonged to fairly narrow and
intersecting circles in which the influence of the ulema was minimal. This configuration
changed in the 1970s. Pockets of economic prosperity threw up new classes; traders in
particular acquired more economic clout than ever before. The petrodollar Middle-East
boom in the 1970s opened up unprecedented large-scale migrant work opportunities;
migrant workers returned with money and new ideas borrowed from the more socially
conservative societies they worked in. Second, it has to be said the battle over women’s
rights, usually couched in religious terminology on the one hand and that of human
rights on the other, has seen women of one class pitted against the men of a different

37
See On the Path of Women’s Empowerment- A Synthesis of Reports of Commissions/Committee on the
Status of Women, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Women Development, Social Welfare and Spe-
cial Education: Islamabad. 2003
38
For a review of the arguments within parliament see Khawar Mumtaz: “Political Participation: Women
in National Legislatures”

16
class – an issue that deserves greater attention. The religious right organisations draw its
leaders and cadre from the lower middle class desirous of upward mobility, while
women’s rights activists belong largely to the professional middle and upper middle
class. This divide was thrown into sharp relief during Zia era that saw intense polarisa-
tion around the issue of Islam and women, as discussed below.

Rescinding women’s rights & undermining justice under Zia


Under Zia, the state “arrogated to itself the task of Islamising the country’s institutions
in their entirety” (Khan: 127). It was the first time that a government adopted an aggres-
sive anti-women stance on all fronts. A series of highly publicized measures rescinded
or curbed women’s legal rights, reduced their public visibility, and made an all-out ef-
fort to restrain women within the strict confines of chador and chardiwari (the veil and
four walls of the home). Targeting women, who are politically unorganized and
amongst the least powerful groups in society was easy. Given deeply entrenched patri-
archal norms, it was unlikely that such moves would evoke any significant political or
social opposition.
Zia’s version of Islam was “regulative, punitive and extractive.”39 The new
‘Islamized’ laws lent religious gravitas to brute force. Legal changes commenced in
February 1979, with a few ‘religiously inspired’ criminal laws banded together as the
infamous Hudood Ordinances that introduced inhuman punishments: amputations, pub-
lic whipping, and stoning to death. The laws criminalised consensual sex (zina) and also
covered a number of sexual crimes including rape and abduction; theft, drunkenness
(newly criminalised) and perjury. The most widely applied Zina (Enforcement of Hadd)
Ordinance section was also the most problematic.
Fundamentally flawed, the law caused immense injustice. Rape and other sexual
crimes were confounded with zina, that is consensual sex outside marriage, and the po-
lice authorised to decide which section to register a complaint under. Hence, parents
attempting to annul their daughter’s ‘unsuitable’ marriages by filing complaints of ab-
duction, found their daughter instead accused of having committed zina and jailed when
police failed to find documentary proof of marriage and any evidence of coercion.40
Zina became a crime against the state and the principle of presumptive innocence was
overturned. Anyone could register a complaint and, as no prima fasciae evidence was
required, all those accused were automatically punished: by the time superior courts
over-turned sentences, the accused had been jailed, socially condemned and stigma-
tized. The law guaranteed that no rapist could ever receive the maximum punishment by
applying rules meant to safeguard women from false accusation of adultery (derived
from the Quran), to rape. The death by stoning punishment could only be awarded in
two circumstances: either a non-coerced confession by the accused before a competent
court (implying a driving death-wish); or the eye-witness evidence of “four Muslim
male adults of good repute” to the act of penetration, beggaring the question of how so
many respectable men could ever be mere spectators to such a crime.41 The strict re-
quirements ensured that the punishment of stoning was never carried out by the state.
But, attesting to how state measures legitimise norms, two cases were reported during

39
Askari Rizvi cited in Abbas, Chapter 6 footnote 32
40
For detailed discussion and specific cases see Mumtaz and Shaheed, Jahangir & Jilani, Hussain
41
In the case of consensual sex, death by stoning only applied to married persons. After the Women Pro-
tection Act 2007, the sentence no longer applies in cases of rape.

17
the Zia period of people taking the law into their own hands, and applying the punish-
ment. Alarmingly, in 2007-2008, media reported several such incidents.
In a travesty of justice, rape survivors unable to provide sufficient evidence to
convict the accused, were themselves sentenced for zina because they had ‘confessed’
to the sexual activity, or because they were pregnant (see Jahangir & Jilani, Mumntaz &
Shaheed). Disturbingly, the laws eliminated the provision of statutory rape42and, be-
cause girls were held to be liable as of ‘puberty or 16 years for girls’, girls as young as
nine were prosecuted as adults.43
The laws were promulgated in great haste, essentially to establish the ‘Islamic’
credentials of Zia’s regime since ‘Islamisation’ was forwarded as the excuse for reneg-
ing promises of elections. No consideration was given to any potential conflict with ex-
isting laws. Inconsistencies between the zina laws and the provisions of Muslim family
law enabled men to use the zina laws to penalise and persecute women they had orally
divorced (as well as their new husbands).44 Misuse was rampant and the Chief Justice of
Pakistan estimated that some 95% of the cases implicated “wrongly accused women.”45
By 1991, a superior court observed that “such reckless allegations are being brought so
frequently that something should be done to stop this unhealthy practice.” (1991 Paki-
stan Criminal Law Journal: 568 FSC) As most laws promulgated by Zia in Islam’s
name, the hudood laws undercut the basic principle of equality before the law. The law
was no longer indifferent to the identity of the accused and accuser, the law varied de-
pending on the gender and religious identity of the accused, the victim as well as those
providing evidence. Maximum punishment could not be awarded, for instance, if the
accused was a Muslim while evidence was provided by non-Muslims, or if the wit-
nesses were all female.46
Zia restructured the judiciary. A new Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was mandated
to decide whether laws and provisions were in accordance to Islam. Deeming himself
the ultimate authority however, Zia was not pleased when the FSC immediately took
suo motto notice and declared death by stoning punishment unIslamic. The government
appealed, but not to the Supreme Court as would have been the normal course of action.
The decision was returned to the FSC that, henceforth, included ulema with the status of
judges. A parallel judicial system was erected to administer new ‘Islamic’ laws. The
lower tier of magisterial and sessions courts remained integrated but the appeals proce-
dures were bifurcated. Civil and most criminal matters proceed in the regular High
Courts, followed by the Supreme Court. Appeals under ‘Islamic’ laws go to the shariat
benches of the high courts, from there to the Federal Shariat Court, and, eventually to
the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. (Only Muslims can serve on the
FSC and the Shariat Benches.)
Reviewing FSC case law on zina, Nausheen Ahmad noted the “disturbing…
moral judgment which the court seems to be making about the woman victim/accused.”

42
Statutory rape makes any intercourse with a minor a criminal offence, regardless of circumstances and
consent.
43
The equivalent age for males was 18 years; no mention was made of puberty.
44
The MFLO requires registration of marriage but does not render invalid unregistered marriages. See
Why the Hudood Ordinances Must be Repealed Shirkat Gah: Lahore.
45
Mohammad Afzal Zullah stated that 95% of the cases were overturned in favour of wrongly accused
women. The Muslim, Islamabad, March 9, 1993.
46
Non-Muslim judges were barred from hearing cases under these laws and non-Muslim lawyers could
no longer appear for Muslim clients.

18
(Ahmad: 13) The new laws, she notes, led to confusion: in one judgment the FSC held
that the fact of living together was sufficient proof of marriage, in another that it was
not. Confusion was not limited to the FSC; it permeated all courts. Legal text and legal
precedent were overtaken as touchstones for judgments and replaced by individual
judges’ personal interpretations and views on Islam. The situation was compounded af-
ter the Objectives Resolution was made a substantive part of the Constitution in 1985.47
The unprecedented primacy granted to an undefined shariah opened a Pandora’s Box as
exemplified in the famous 1996 Saima Waheed case in the Lahore High Court on a
woman’s right to marry regardless of parental approval. Technically, the case should not
even have been entertained for, as one judge stated without further elaboration, as a le-
gal major Saima was entitled to marry anyone she pleased. But, a second judge opined
“We are national Judges and as such custodian (sic) of the morals of the citizens,” and,
in complete contradiction of the law, insisted that a marriage contracted without the
consent of a male guardian had “no legal or moral purchase in Islam.” The third judge
granted she was entitled to marry whom she pleased under current law, but proposed in
his ruling that the law be amended to make parental guidance mandatory (see N. Hus-
sain 1997).
The Hudood laws had the most damaging ramifications in practical terms; other
new laws had less visible impact but carried the message that the status of Muslim
women and all non-Muslims was half that of Muslim men. In 1984, a new Law of Evi-
dence applicable to civil and criminal matters was introduced, holding that whenever
future financial obligations were involved the testimony of two men or four women was
required.48 This was followed by introducing a law for bodily harm, murder and abor-
tion that provided an ‘eye-for-an-eye’ type retribution or monetary compensation (Qisas
and Diyat). Incredibly, the original proposal priced human life: adult male Muslims
weighed in at 30.63 kilograms of silver; Muslim women and all non-Muslims were val-
ued at precisely half that amount. This was later amended but the message was clear:
only Muslim men were truly human, all others ‘half a human.’ Underlying these laws
was the intent to terrorise the populace and to brutalise their sensibilities.
Legal changes effectuated two critical shifts. First, by obfuscating legal parame-
ters changes allowed personal views on Islam to over-ride the text of the law. Second,
the changes shifted the onus of (a) determining and (b) enforcing what was legally
licit/illicit and socially acceptable/unacceptable from textual law and state institutions to
the public at large. Supported by the state turning a blind eye to violence-prone bigotry,
new provisions seemed to imply that to uphold so-called Islamic laws and values it was
acceptable for people to take the law into their own hands. Ahmedis were targeted when
the erstwhile paper law declaring Ahmedis non-Muslims was given nasty teeth by
criminalizing everyday actions.49 Amended blasphemy laws making it possible for any-
one to construe anything as blasphemous,50 led to numerous attacks and the murders of
several Christians and at least two Muslims. Bigotry and violence continued long after

47
Presidential Order No 14 of 1985 as Article 2(A)b.
48
In practical terms this has meant that senior lawyers and bankers, for instance, stopped signing con-
tracts for fear they could later be challenged.
49
Pakistan became the only Muslim society that made it a crime for some people to recite the kalma
(Muslim creed), to call their places of worship ‘mosques’, to invoke the name of Allah.
50
The new Section 295(c) reads “Whosoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representa-
tion, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the
Holy Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death.” The law is inherently un-
just because it fails to define the boundaries of law within which citizens are expected to live and also
fails to attribute significance to motive.

19
the demise of Zia and his regime. Thus, in retrospect, the most damaging legacy of the
Zia period may not be the laws, but the reshaping of the social fabric that reconfigured
people’s psyche and everyday norms, such as the premise that all citizens were not
equal.
Permeating the entire state edifice, changes simultaneously seeped into society
to water the roots of the worst bigotry. If previously, open discrimination - to say noth-
ing of violence - was at least considered politically incorrect, that modicum of restraint
was swept away thanks to state measures that lent legitimacy to the worst elements of
civil society. The laws, directives and propaganda proposed in the name of Islam, in-
cluding ostensibly gender-neutral measures, ricocheted through society producing an
ever tighter web of control over the state’s female population and non-Muslims. Seeing
women’s rights directly threatened by any measure proposed in the name of Islam
whether gender-specific or not, women’s rights activists made common cause with non-
Muslims. Women initiated the Joint Action Committee for People’s Rights that brings
together diverse human rights groups and is still active today.
A number of seemingly cosmetic ‘Islamisation’ measures, e.g. propagating dress
codes for women and mandatory recitations from the Qur’an at every function, were
critical to a reorientation of society. Accompanying the laws, this apparent ‘window
dressing’ imperceptibly but inexorably tweaked society into a new state-sponsored
‘look:’ readjusted societal norms fit ever more constrictive rules of appropriateness that,
forwarded as religious, put non-conformists on the defensive. A severe clampdown on
the independent print media through heavy censorship and intimidation helped muffle
and muzzle dissent and alternative views (Niazi 2004).
Islamiyat was made compulsory in all schools,51 passing an oral and written
Islamiyat test a requirement for higher education (including for technical and science
subjects) and for all public sector jobs. Rewritten textbooks ensured a ‘correct’ perspec-
tive: the founder’s speeches were censored; history refashioned as an ‘Islamic’ narrative
overriding inconvenient truths. The ulema’s wholesale opposition to Pakistan, for ex-
ample, was omitted and religious actors were instead projected as the country’s standard
bearers. (These textbooks remain largely unchanged.)
Sexual mores were a particular focus: from the Hudood laws to apparel; from
decision-making on marriages to the imagery of women, tightening controls were justi-
fied by Islam. Early on, the government questionnaire solicited opinions on the ‘correct’
status of women in an ‘Islamic society’ and licit illicit activities. The notion of a ‘Paki-
stani woman’ was replaced by that of an ‘Islamic woman’ who dressed in a particular
manner, was educated - if at all - in certain subjects and preferably in segregated institu-
tions, and who was largely silent as well as invisible. ‘Islamic dress’ was prescribed for
women, a ‘national dress’ for men. Disregarding that Pakistani women (and men) are
covered from neck to ankle, chadors became mandatory for all female students, their
teachers and women government servants. The media harangue and harassment in pub-
lic spaces led Parsees and Christians to abandon skirts and dresses (until then common
in Karachi), and peasant women in south Punjab to abandon their traditional sarong like
apparel. Bleaching out diversity, the official discourse on Islamic dress transformed into
a cultural norm.
Gender segregation was a central pillar: ranging from prohibiting joint male-
female stage shows and performances in colleges, to seeking to ban male gynaecologists
and male doctors from autopsying female cadavers. Female athletes were prohibited

51
Technically, non-Muslims have other options but few schools are equipped to provide such courses.

20
from competing in the presence of males. As in most instances, implementation was
imperfect; authorities conveniently ignored male maintenance crew and judges in
‘women-only’ national games. The primary intent seemed to be the imposition of a new
ethos rather than the enforcement of each particular measure. State monopolised televi-
sion and radio relentlessly promoted the new gendered ethos. The government campaign
to end obscenity and vulgarity (a favourite topic of the religion right) managed to sug-
gest that women per se were somehow obscene. All women on television (newscasters,
hosts and actresses in commercials or television plays etc.) had to cover their heads at
all times – even when shown to be asleep in bed. Women who refused to comply were
dismissed. Directives prohibited TV scripts in which women opted to leave marital
homes. Clearly, ‘good’ women submissively accepted all manner of abuse, be it physi-
cal, mental or emotional. Women’s employment options narrowed. Foreign Office
women were no longer posted abroad, some were actually recalled. Recruitment in na-
tionalized banks slowed down and female bank employees found promotions blocked.
State broadcast media extolled the virtues of the good self-sacrificing woman, domestic
or domesticated and blamed ‘other’ publically visible women (particularly working
women) for the disintegration of societal norms and values. Foreign scholarships were
channelled to male students; the government adopted the JI manifesto promise of a
separate university for women with discussions about limiting the subjects women
could study.52
The resultant oppressive atmosphere insidiously encouraged a public belief that
individuals were entitled to take direct action whenever any woman transgressed their
personal conceptions of ‘Islamic morality.’ With state propaganda seemingly licensing
any male on the streets to admonish, even physically assault any woman he regarded as
being improperly dressed, sexual harassment in public spaces spiralled (see Mumtaz &
Shaheed). Over-zealous teachers refused to teach girls not ‘properly attired’; others seg-
regated their classrooms; a few refused to teach female students at all. An entire genera-
tion grew up on propaganda suggesting that women’s only place was in the home, their
role that of reproduction and motherhood, and their status and rights in all aspects sub-
servient to men.
As strongly entrenched as patriarchy, class cultures dictate sometimes radically
different rules for women, and the impact of Zia’s ‘Islamisation’ was not alike for dif-
ferently situated women. Poor illiterate women experienced the brunt of the Hudood
laws; no case of zina has ever been lodged amongst the urban elite, although several
prominent cases have involved urban middle class families and rural well-off and well-
connected landholding families.53 Sexual and social harassment, on the other hand, tran-
scended class barriers. Variations in the extent, nature and consequences notwithstand-
ing, all women confronted greater hostility in public spaces and all working women ex-
perienced increased obstacles. Urban middle and upper middle class women who had
successfully negotiated the greatest expansion of their space and rights suddenly found
themselves having to confront a barrage of state measures and proposals threatening
rights presumed to have been secured years, even decades, ago. Some issues, e.g. a
woman’s right to drive a car, had never been a point of contention. Led by working pro-
fessionals, resistance emerged from amongst this class of women; in other words
women who had most effectively redefined the gender rules in their own lives and
therefore stood to lose the most. Such women were also better placed to take the risk of
confronting the state. While they prevented the passage of some proposals and managed

52
A separate Women’s University became a reality many years later in the late 1990s.
53
Saima Waheed’s father of the Ropri clan and the family of Humaira Butt were both financially well-off
and the latter had direct connections with the Chief Minister, Shahbaz Sharif.

21
to have others amended to limit the potential damage, they were far too few in numbers
to prevent the revamping of society and the entrenchment of attitudes under Zia.

Post-Zia developments: Democratic Interlude & the Return of the Military


Between 1988, when the sudden death of General Zia-ul-Haq precipitated elections, and
1999, when the military again directly assumed reins of power, Pakistan went through a
quick succession of governments. None of the four elected ones lasted for more than
two-three years. Two governments were under the premiership of Benazir Bhutto
(1988-90 and 1993-1996), two under Nawaz Sharif (1991-1993 and 1996-99). Little
substantive changes were made in terms of Islam’s inscription into the state: heading
minority governments, Bhutto was unable to and Sharif disinclined to.
Against the odds of a greatly strengthened presence of politico-religious parties
and groups (old and new) and eleven years of a misogynistic rule wrapped in Islamist
rhetoric, Pakistan elected a woman, Benazir Bhutto, as Prime Minister in 1988 - the first
woman to head government in Muslim majority countries. Reluctantly asked to form
government, Bhutto’s first tenure was a shift from direct to indirect military rule
(Z.Hussain 2007). Neither term saw any changes in so-called Islamic laws. Not only is
extremely difficult to challenge a law labelled or passed in the name of religion, all legal
measures instituted by Zia were indemnified by the 8th Constitutional Amendment. As
such these required a two-thirds majority in the parliament, something Bhutto’s minor-
ity coalition governments were unable to muster. Moreover, distrusted by the military
that continued to wield the real power, her first government was also beleaguered by
spiraling ethnic violence and obstructive non-cooperation from the largest province,
Punjab, ruled by her rival, Nawaz Sharif. Her party manifesto promise to repeal the in-
famous Hudood Ordinances never materialized, but procedural directives did reduce the
abuse of the law and the number of registered cases. The blasphemy law remained intact
although government support enabled the first-ever acquittal under this law despite
threats to defending lawyers, the accused and judges hearing the cases.54 Armed po-
licemen had to be posted across the rooftops and within the premises of the high court to
enable the hearings to proceed. Sadly, attesting to the changed times, no contempt of
court was served to the prosecuting lawyers and their companions for openly declaring
they rejected the court’s authority or for the disorderly conduct within and outside the
court premises in the name of ‘God’.
More progress was made on non-legal issues, amongst which an all-women’s
bank, a 5% quota for women in all federal services, a tax rebate for women, women’s
police stations and the elevation of several women to high court judges. More important
than the specifics, however, was the transformative impact of a woman head of gov-
ernment that instantly eased the hitherto oppressive atmosphere. Women re-emerged
from relative obscurity. Sharply contrasting with the Zia years, state broadcast media
launched numerous programmes promoting women’s rights and/or highlighted their
problems. These ‘soft’ measures provided relief to women but Bhutto’s short tenures,
less than three years each, could not be expected to make more than a minor dent in the
societal attitudes entrenched under Zia. A re-orientation of the religion-politics-culture
nexus would have required a reorientation of the military that retained real power and
maintained links with politico-religious groups. This was not within her power, nor was
she willing to test the waters at the risk of losing power.

54
This was the Salamat, Rehmat and Mansir Masih case in May 1994. Mansur was killed outside the La-
hore High Court Premise; one of the two judges was subsequently murdered.

22
As the political heir to Zia, Sharif could not be expected to undo Zia’s ‘Islamiza-
tion.’ Sharif first came to power at the head of a coalition cobbled together by the Inter-
Services Intelligence, the Islami Jamhoori Itehad (Islamic Democratic Coalition), in a
victory considered to have been managed by the interim government with ‘remarkable
deftness’. (Newburg: 216) Numerically, the coalition was dominated by Sharif’s Mus-
lim League but, as always, the JI played a key discursive and agenda-setting role that
precluded promoting women’s rights and curtailing the activities of politico-religious
groups. With a two-thirds majority in his second round, Sharif moved to consolidate
absolute power. The media was hounded and journalists arrested, measures sought to
close down thousands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs); intra-party dissent
was gagged through a constitutional amendment.55 The piece de resistance was the 15th
Constitutional Amendment Bill propagated as the ‘Shariat Bill.’ The rhetoric and ac-
tions taken by an elected civilian government to centralize absolute power in the name
of Islam were disturbingly similar to Pakistan’s worst military dictator. Purporting to
enforce Islamic law (as finally interpreted by the prime minister and his government)
the Bill in fact proposed unfettered power for the prime minister whose actions would
be exempted from judicial review.(Lodhi)56 Passed by the assembly on 9, October, 1998
to the consternation of minorities and public protests by moderates and social activists,57
the Bill failed to muster the necessary support in the Senate before General Pervaiz
Musharaf ousted Sharif.
Musharaf took power on 12th October 1999. Stating in his first speech that “Is-
lam teaches tolerance not hatred”, he promised all citizens equal treatment regardless of
province or religion. Referring to the misuse of Islam by politico-religious groups,
Musharaf called upon the clergy to “curb elements which are exploiting religion for
vested interests and bring a bad name to our faith.”58 In the aftermath of Sharif’s ever
closer resemblance to Zia, the speech came as a relief. Relief was short-lived. The tacti-
cal mistake of first announcing then retracting intentions to amend the blasphemy laws
was seen as a sign of weakness; the retraction bolstered the religious right - unarmed
and armed alike. Subsequent speeches started being peppered with favourite expressions
such as “Islamic Moderation” “needing to improve Pakistan’s image abroad”, and, not
to forget, “true and appropriate democracy suited to the people of Pakistan”. The so-
cially liberal personal views of Musharaf did not prevent him from making arrange-
ments with the politico-religious parties. The 2002 elections held under Musharaf re-
turned an unprecedented number of politico-religious elements. Partly this was due to
the huge anger at the US-led military attack on Afghanistan, but at least in some meas-
ure it was facilitated by Musharaf exempting madrassah educated people from his newly
imposed rule that only university graduates could stand for elections. Neither were
armed militants curtailed and the period saw an alarming Talibanisation of Pakistan,
especially in the northern areas where a full-fledged armed insurrection is dangerously
close to becoming a civil war. The violence perpetrated by the Taliban, jihadi outfits
and Al-Qaeda now forming a loose nexus (Z. Hussain 2007) periodically erupts across

55
The 13th constitutional amendment rescinded presidential power to dismiss the Prime Minister and gave
the latter new powers to dismiss and appoint chiefs of the three armed services. The 14th constitutional
amendment bill de-seated anyone voting against the party line.
56
The proposed Bill was so drastic that even Abdul Hamid Jatoi of the ruling party reacted.
57
 Minorities felt increasingly vulnerable and disenfranchised, even though the government said there
would be a clause for non-Muslims, a measure lawyers felt was only eyewash as they would still be sub-
ject to public law.Asma Jahangir News, 3-9-98.
58
http://%20server1.pak.gov.pk/PresidentAddresses/presidential%20addresses%20index.htm

23
the country. In the first eight months of 2008, more people died as a result of suicide
bombings in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world, including Iraq.59
Musharaf did however institute several important changes for women (and mi-
norities). Several long-standing demands of women were addressed.60 Women’s signifi-
cantly increased presence in the assemblies enabled female legislators to successfully
table bills amending family law procedures and introducing legislation addressing so-
called ‘honour’ crimes. Also tabled was a bill to repeal the infamous Hudood Ordi-
nances. In terms of religious inscription, by far the most important legal reform was the
Women Protection Act 2006 which finally removed the teeth, if not the entire text of the
infamous Hudood Ordinances (consensual sex remains technically criminalized but vir-
tually impossible to prosecute). Over and above the specific changes, the Act finally
overturned the belief that labelling a law ‘Islamic’ renders it sacrosanct and unchange-
able. Of course, being President and the head of the armed forces Musharaf was all-
powerful so he could ignore the religious right in parliament. Even the best intentioned
civilian governments have never enjoyed such power.

3. Gender, Justice and Civil Society in Unjust Societies


The blending of religion and politics has to be seen, I believe, within the nation-state
paradigm of a social contract between the state and its citizens: the state promises peo-
ple security of person, rule of law and opportunities and benefits in exchange for a mo-
nopoly over violence and compliance with state laws and regulations, with pre-
determined modalities for expressing dissenting opinions. While there is no written con-
tract, the parameters of governance are usually, though not always, formulated in a con-
stitution which is a legal document. This may explain the concentration on the law and
legal measures by progressive activists as well as those pushing conservative, some-
times retrogressive, agendas, including those articulated in religious terminology. When
official promises of equality, equal opportunities and justice for all as delineated in con-
stitutions and policies remain unfulfilled and people’s lived reality is characterised by
the injustice of deprivation and discrimination, this produces a vital gap. The disjuncture
between promises and reality, particularly in the absence of progressive social move-
ments for change, allows religiously defined political agendas to emerge as significant
forces in people’s lives.
When religion shifts from social private spaces into the public political arena,
the blending of religion and politics has an effect on religion itself. Hence, the prepon-
derant emphasis on religious laws by politico-religious elements pares down the faith of
Islam to Muslim jurisprudence, i.e. shariah. Those politicising Islam actively simulta-
neously seek to de-legitimise and crush the diverse perspectives of the faithful, espe-
cially the mystical Sufi traditions. Ironically in this they have been helped by the mod-
ernization ethos that gives unprecedented, and increasingly exclusive, pre-eminence to
the written word as the only authentic knowledge base. Leila Ahmed eloquently de-
scribes how the pre-eminence of scriptural interpretation displaced women’s traditions
with “their own understanding…that was different from men’s Islam.” As received from
women, Islam was gentle, generous, pacifist, inclusive, somewhat mystical…Religion

59
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india-news/pak-tops-list-of-countries-in-number-of-suicide-
bombing-deaths_10095940.html
60
Amongst these a permanent women’s commission (2000), amendments to the Family Courts Act
(1964) in October 2002, the restoration of greatly increased reserved seats for women, including for the
first time in the Senate(2002), 33 percent reserved seats for directly elected women in the local bodies.

24
was above all about inner things. The outward signs of religiousness, such as prayer and
fasting… were certainly not what was important about being Muslim. What was impor-
tant was how you conducted yourself and how you were in yourself and in your attitude
toward others and in your heart. (Leila Ahmed, 2003: 2)
In contrast, the men’s mosque centred and institution-based religious tradition
was more narrowly focused on the word of scriptures, propelling a more literalist inter-
pretation of faith. Reinforced by the modernist ethos, this literalist interpretation has
steadily gained ascendancy, bolstering politico-religious groups commonly referred to
as ‘fundamentalist.’ These are modern political forces seeking to capture state (and/or
world) power. Such movements (whether within Islam or other religious traditions) are
bent upon forcing people into accepting ever more narrow definitions of self, in which
their multiple, non-antagonistic identities based on gender, citizenship, class, religion,
ethnicity etc. are replaced by one single identity: the one imposed by actors who have
usurped the right to speak for the willing or unwilling ‘members’ of that group(Helie-
Lucas). And the issue is not limited to male vs female interpretations of Islam. These
groups are antithetical to mysticism-centred Sufi traditions that dominated many parts
of Pakistan but are now being eroded by the inroads made by political Islamists. Indeed
any and all versions of Islam that do not fit the orthodoxy of political groups are tar-
geted for elimination, as are their adherents.
Another insight from Ahmed is that alphabetization has not necessarily played a
positive role. In countries like Pakistan the focus on literacy has tended to reduce the
education to alphabetization and skill acquisition. The very ability to read has enabled
the prolific writings of religious conservatives to reach ever-wider audiences. Signifi-
cantly, in Pakistan religious materials, for the most part narrow minded and conserva-
tive, if not outright bigotry, and almost uniformly misogynistic, have replaced the thrill-
ers, Reader’s Digest-style publications and fashion magazines of yesteryear at corner
shops, bus-depots, railway stations and airport lounges.

Fractured Civil Society & the Search for Justice


Bridging the social and political arenas, civil society institutions are “civic associations”
or un-coerced, voluntary associational life not limited to engagements in overtly politi-
cal activities (Young 2002). The dividing line between the social and political is porous,
and actors mainly located in one sphere or the other can transmigrate more easily than is
usually acknowledged (see Philipps 2002 and WEMC 2008). Before the Jamaat-i-Islami
entered electoral politics it would have qualified as a civil society organization. Second,
there is a need to question the current tendency in development discourse, as also in
much of human rights discourses, to view civil society organizations as uniformly pro-
gressive: democratically inclined, firmly founded on principles of equality and striving
to eliminate all forms of inequality including those based on gender. This is not true in
Pakistan where a substantial portion of civil society is concerned with carving out
niches of influence and privilege at the expense of other people’s rights. Hence, many
politico-religiously defined groups refute the rights of women and people of other faiths
and exclude them from the purview of ‘the community’ deserving benefits. And, of
course, civil society is shaped by the society in which it is embedded. It is to be ex-
pected therefore that it will reflect hegemonic contestations over cultural and social
meanings, to which gender relations are a vital component.
Some religiously defined civil society institutions have an essentially social and
not political agenda. Religious instruction (dars) is the objective of both traditional in-
formal social groups and new dars academies (e.g. Al-Huda) both of which have prolif-

25
erated since Zia and are extremely popular amongst urban women of different classes.
Following a liberalization of policy and the advent of cable networks, a substantial
number of channels are devoted to religious instruction. Though socially active groups
are not examined here, it is important not to factor them out of the framework. Such
groups play an important complementary role to more politically engaged groups, to
which they are connected by actual or discursive links. For instance, while the vast ma-
jority of madrassahs are not directly involved in militant activities, they impart an edu-
cation which produces narrow-mindedness and a propensity to view anyone from other
perspectives as suspect. Brought up with a particular worldview, madrassah graduates
are likely to be more receptive to similar-sounding, albeit more radical, views expressed
by other more militant groups. The new Muslim preachers on television - some with
styles resembling those of Christian televangelists - and women’s dars institutions like-
wise help to promote a religiously defined discursive environment in which issues are
projected as sins and evils, not merely rights, laws and social norms. Situated in the so-
cial rather than political sphere, these components of civil society influence and shape
the cultural environment in which the political and legal discourses and battles are em-
bedded. As such, they form a vital part of the dynamics of religion and politics. In my
view, they are indeed a part of civil society, and a significant part at that. The tension
between this part of civil society and those groups normally referred to as ‘civil society’
in Pakistan needs to be examined in greater depth.
While social and economic disparities and deprivations underlie discontent and
propel a desire to change ground reality, I focus on the justice system since discontent
often finds expression as demands for changes in the law and legal framework as well
as polices. Implicit in this contestation are issues of governance. Politico-religious ele-
ments contest the basis of a legal governance framework and the basis of rights, as seen
in the history outlined in Section 2. Human rights activists tend to focus on realigning
and redefining rights towards greater equality within the current governance framework;
grinding poverty, class and other discrimination tend to receive less attention that is cri-
tique rather than concrete proposals. The law, both as a means of setting universal stan-
dards and a system for delivering such entitlements, has always been the principle
framework for human rights activism and, for many years, the women’s rights move-
ment in Pakistan has tended to focus rather narrowly on legal rights. The law is also a
focus of politico-religious parties and, interestingly enough, of militant armed groups
Chetan Bhatt terms ‘religious absolutist groups’ (Bhatt 2007:1091). Bhatt suggests that
rights activists and ‘religious absolutist groups’ both tend to view people in narrowly
juridical terms. Whether articulated or implicit, notions of conceptual frameworks for
justice underpin this focus. In Pakistan, the basis for a justice and governance frame-
work has been contested from the start; rather than abating, disputations have become
increasingly acrimonious leading to polarized views. The state’s justice system has been
inadequately resourced. Frequent disruptions, suspensions and other tampering by mili-
tary regimes have further impeded effectiveness, growth and institutionalization. More-
over, formal decision-making structures notwithstanding, governance in Pakistan is
based less on laws and rules than on patronage. Traditional systems of self governance
and dispute resolution have continued to function in parallel to the state. In a society
that is visibly unjust both economically and socially, perceptible justice has been nota-
bly absent.
Exemplified by the Jamaat-i-Islami, mainstream politico-religious groups have
arduously pursued the aim of reconfiguring Pakistan’s legal framework, with initial vic-
tory achieved before the Jamaat entered the electoral process. The passage of the Objec-
tives Resolution in 1949, mistakenly considered by many an astute compromise appeas-
ing both the religious elements and the modernists amongst the politicians (see Mehdi),

26
in fact opened the door for the instrumental use of Islam by diverse political forces. This
inevitably privileged religious scholars who were in their own element. Its subsequent
elevation to a substantive clause further expanded space for the ulema and politico-
religious forces – both those inside and outside the mainstream political framework - to
colour the polity with religious discourse.
For political Islamists, especially those outside the electoral process, projecting
the existing social and legal orders as incoherent and ineffectual is an essential counter-
point to their own promises of speedy ‘Islamic’ justice. The strategy is not limited to
‘religious absolutist groups,’ but extends to other actors. The supposedly ‘Islamic’ laws
introduced under Zia that obfuscated legal provisions and enabled personal beliefs to
override the text of law, undermined coherence in the state legal system. Hinting at a
possible need to shift the foundational basis for legal justice and structures, the changes
created a tussle over what should be the basis for existing laws and who was (and ought)
to be the deciding authority permeated society. Exceeding its mandate, in 1991 the Fed-
eral Shariat Court (FSC), arrogating to itself the right to legislate, banned interest as
‘riba’ (usury) to the deep concern of two former justices of the Supreme Court. 61 Dorab
Patel protested that legislation was the prerogative of the parliament not the FSC (The
Nation 25-9-92). Qadeeruddin Ahmed in an extended two-part article pointing out that
the constitution is a secular law, said it was not for the FSC “to assume the role of a de-
fender or promoter of the views of the [Council of Islamic Ideology] or make grievance
that the government did not act on [its] advice.” “Fiddling with the system of secular
law,” he said could not change ingrained attitudes and “will not make the people of
Pakistan better Muslims.” He concluded by noting that “When laws and courts become
inaccessible or become indifferent to the needs of the people, human ingenuity invents
and will continue to invent ingenious ways of self-help”(Dawn 25-7-92 & 26-7-92). The
absence of visibly delivered justice is critical. Promising justice in a patently unjust
world is part of the appeal of the religious militants in Pakistan, whether armed or not; it
forms part of what Chetan Bhatt calls ‘the religious right methodology of social govern-
ance’ (Bhatt 2007). The propensity to focus on ‘Islamic’ justice and shariah comple-
mented by visible forms of marking collective identity, in which gender plays a pivotal
role, may be propelled, as suggested by Samir Amin,62 by the absence of a common po-
litical economy agenda of the diverse actors pursuing power in the name of religion.
The critical role of justice and the focus on legal institutions is reflected in the
large number of supposed ‘shariat courts’ installed by non-state religious right groups,
as an alternative to, and in lieu of, the regular court system. According to a 2007 report,
at least 54 private ‘shariat’ courts were known to be operating in the country; 29 oper-
ated by organizations that were banned or in danger of being banned.63 This excludes
the Taliban style of (in)justice meted out in Pakistan’s northern areas (The Herald May
2007). A side effect of the use of diversely defined ‘religious law’ is that while it is sup-
posed to “to bring order, [it] instead tears apart existing sociality, leaving it fragmented
into antagonistic sectarian enclaves.”(Bhatt 2007) These new adjudication forums fur-
ther confound the existing complexities of parallel justice systems in the country. Their
emergence is made possible by the gulf separating the state judicial system from its in-

61
Justice Patel, an outstanding jurist, refused to take an oath of allegiance to General Zia and gave up his
seat on the Supreme Court. He went on to become only the 2nd Pakistani elected to the International
Commission of Jurists. Justice Qadeeruddin Ahmed was the Chief Justice of the Sindh High Court before
being elevated to the Supreme Court.
62
Amin, Samir. 1989 “Eurocentrism” New York, Monthly Review Press, 1989 cited in Sadia Toor “The
State, Fundamentalism and Civil Society.”
63
24 run by the Jamaatul-Dawa, 5 by the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.

27
tended users, citizens who remain unaware of state laws and therefore unable to access
their rights under these. Until recently, traditional forums of dispute resolution that were
never entirely displaced by the state judicial apparatus, used to fill this gap, especially in
rural areas. Culturally distinct regions have their own self-governance mechanisms such
as the collectivised decision-making of jirgas (tribal assembly) and panchayats (five-
person group), but also individuated decision-making by tribal leaders (sardars,
waderas or maliks). Traditionally, women are excluded from all these forums. More-
over, their decision-making is unrelated to the legal provisions of the country. Such fo-
rums have become infamous for rulings and punishments that both contravene laws and
even the basic modicum of human rights and dignity. Women are regularly bartered off
to appease one party, or retrieve ‘male honour.’64
The gap is now being captured and filled by non-state actors. The new forums
instituted by politico-religious forces, in addition to bringing into question the state’s
prescribed legal framework, simultaneously seek to supersede the earlier authority of
such traditional self-governance mechanisms. Encountering resistance, they try to
eliminate traditional mechanisms altogether sometimes by physical eliminating local
leaders (e.g. in the northern tribal areas of Pakistan) including those who governed the
traditional forums.
In calling for justice, religious defined groups feel no obligation to elaborate the
system of justice they have in mind. Resonating deeply with the cultural lexicon of the
people addressed, the term ‘Islamic justice’ is projected as self-explanatory. In contrast,
human rights activists expend considerable time painfully explaining in lengthy details
the exact phraseology of human rights standards that references an entirely different,
and mostly unknown, world. Largely irrelevant to people’s social belief systems and life
experiences, this referencing is more easily refuted and/or rejected as belonging to the
alien world of ‘others.’
The persistent and increasing attacks instigated by the religious right on civil so-
ciety actors promoting human rights, particularly those promoting women’s rights, have
to be viewed in the context of alternative societal visions but also justice. Rights activ-
ists do not possess the power to present any real threat to the far larger, better resources
and organized politico-religious parties. They are, however, seen as principle opponents
in discursive contestations i.e. the articulation of ideas and visions that accompany ac-
tivism. The purpose of labelling rights activists ‘western agents’ is intended to under-
mine credibility and public support; verbal assaults, backed by physical harassment and
attacks in a repertoire that now includes bombing, are intended to intimidate and si-
lence. Previously, rights activists felt reassured by the lack of public support for poli-
tico-religious parties as reflected in ballot box rejections, and took some comfort from
the sharp rivalries between politico-religious groups. There is no longer any room for
reassurance after the 2002 electoral success of the multi-party Mutehida Majlis-Amal
(United Council of Action) evidences an ability to overcome differences in perspectives
and the details of ideology to unite on a common platform.
The framework and tactics of human rights groups differ sharply from those
promoting an exclusivist vision of religion and state, especially those outside the elec-
toral process. Where the former accord primacy to the state as the principle guarantor of
rights and formulate the legal rights agenda within state structures, the latter question
the legitimacy of the state along with its structures. The former eschew violence and
coercion and speak of freedoms of individual choice; the latter have shown little com-
punction in resorting to coercion and violence, many have a propensity for it, and tend

64
See Nafisa Shah 2001.

28
to posit collective rights as overriding individual rights. Finally, evidence suggests fairly
significant linkages between armed ‘illegal’ militant groups and religious political par-
ties, regardless of whether the latter take recourse to ‘plausible deniability’ or not.
Hence while the Jamaat-i-Ulema Pakistan denies official links with the Afghani Tali-
ban, there is little doubt that links have existed (Z. Hussain 2007, Haqqani 2005, Bhatt
2007). For its part, the Jamaat-i-Islami on occasion even denies connections with its stu-
dent wing, the Islami Jamiat-i-Tuleba, as well as its newer, affiliated youth groups, the
Pasban and Shabab-e-Milli. A pivotal difference of course is the extent to which either
set of contesting groups can exercise (or access) power and state support. In this there is
little contest between under-resourced women’s rights groups and fully armed militants
who often have the tacit, if not overt, support of the state. State reluctance to censure
ulema first evidenced during the 1953 riots, has persisted. Reaching unprecedented lev-
els under Zia, this impunity has emboldened and encouraged groups articulating their
political and social agendas in religious idiom to become ever more strident and un-
compromising in not only their demands but also their actions. (NGO Coordinating
Committee) For their part, while the ‘NGO’65 section of civil society is able to access
funding from bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies, and enjoys the support of
the international community, neither kind of support protects them from attacks within
the country. For this they are dependent on the state apparatus. Separately, the very fact
that such NGOs do have funding from ‘external’ sources is used against them so that
they stand accused of promoting a foreign agenda. The argument sometimes forwarded
by NGOs, that the government itself is dependent on external funding is not terribly ef-
fective given that in popular perception successive governments are considered to be
both corrupt and ineffective. In the midst of NGO-bashing, the fact that religious civil
society groups are also funded, not infrequently from outside, is conveniently forgotten
by the media as well the general population.
This is not to suggest that human rights activists abandon their international hu-
man rights standards and referencing. Rather I am suggesting the need for human rights
activists to embed their messages not only in terms of the UN Charter but equally within
the people’s more liberal social traditions. For this they need to redirect their attention
from a preponderantly state-exclusive focus to exploring and developing means to reach
the general population through socio-cultural intervention, such as the creative arts.
Equally important is for groups to retrieve history from the distortions instituted under
Zia that can help to highlight other rooted realties. During the Zia years, women’s rights
activists found that one of the few tactics they could employ with some effect (other
than more liberal interpretations of religion) was the reference to history, especially
Pakistan’s founder and early leaders. This may not be easy, but without such enterprises
there is a danger that rights activists and those struggling for gender equality will con-
tinue to be increasingly marginalised and de-legitimised within their own societies.
The following case study of the Red Mosque complex illustrates several key as-
pects and different dimensions relating to politicised Islam and gender. Women played a
prominent role in what turned into an armed stand-off between the politically-connected
religious complex and the authorities that turned into an armed conflict. Poor govern-
ance and the lack of law and equal treatment by the law were part of the discourse

65
The term NGO only makes sense in the context of the United Nations and other international bodies to
distinguish government representatives from non-governmental ones. Usually I use the term civil society
groups or CSOs, but will use the term NGO in this paper to distinguish non-religiously defined groups
from religiously defined ones, even though this is somewhat problematic because obviously the latter are
equally non-governmental entities.

29
adopted by the mosque protagonists. It also illustrates the duplicity of the state regard-
ing militant religious groups (wanting to use them but also control them).

The Red Flag of the Red Mosque


The Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, is situated in the capital city Islamabad at a stone’s
throw from the office of the government’s all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Trouble started when the government issued orders to demolish 11 unauthorised
mosques in late 2006. Protests that started as a demand to retract government orders es-
calated into an armed stand-off that only ended in July 10 2007 after a full scale military
operation that, according to official figures left 80 security personnel and 50 militants
dead. Journalists put the death toll in the hundreds; the politico-religious groups in the
thousands. Many questions were never answered, including: how the mosque’s madras-
sahs expanded from two modest 500 square yard plots to occupying 6,500 square yards,
housing some 10,000 students, half of them female, with no apparent authorization or
payments; how in the heart of the capital the clerics amassed sufficient arms to state
“we have enough weapons to fight for 25 to 30 days;” (Ghazi Newsline July 2007); the
number and role of foreign militants.
Built in 1965, the Lal Masjid was just another mosque until Zia appointed Mau-
lana Abdullah the imam masjid or mosque leader, and granted land for two associated
madrassahs (one each for males and females, the latter abutting the mosque). Under
Abdullah’s tutelage the Lal Masjid apparently served as a base camp for local and inter-
national jihadi outfits and “hosted hundreds of Arab mujahideen on their way to holy
war in Afghanistan and boasted friendship with the likes of Osama Bin Laden and his
associates”(Newsline May 2007). After Abdullah’s 1999 assassination, the mosque and
its two seminaries were ‘inherited’ by his two sons: Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul
Rasheed Ghazi, the former a madrassah trained cleric became the mosque leader; the
latter a university graduate with additional religious schooling, its public face and voice.
Links with jihadi outfits seem to have continued since an explosives-laden car im-
pounded by authorities in 2005 turned out to be the property of the mosque’s clerics.
Disturbingly, it was the incumbent federal Minister of Religious Affairs who arranged
for the clerics release simply on promises of good behaviour.66 Indeed, media reports
attributed the confrontation to a falling out between the government and the mosque’s
clerics after the latter issued a fatwa calling for a boycott of the funeral prayers of sol-
diers killed in the fight with ‘Islamic’ militants in the tribal areas (Newsline July 2007).
But little of this was public knowledge in 2006-2007.
The Lal Masjid came to public notice b assuming leadership of the campaign to
prevent the demolition of unauthorised mosques and madrassahs. Confronting protest,
the state unhelpfully dislocated the discussion from one of law to one of religious tenets.
Instead of categorically stating that illegal actions would – and had to - be dealt with
under the law, state officials engaged in theological debates: first saying that forcibly
occupying land was not permissible under Islam; then suggesting that, actually, the
mosques were not being destroyed (‘martyred’ or made shaheed in religious terminol-
ogy), only relocated. This gave clerics within and outside the Red Mosque an opportu-

66
The incumbent Minister for Religious Affairs, Ejaz-ul-Haq (General Zia’s son) arranged for the broth-
ers’ release on promises of good behaviour. In February 2007 Haq, having negotiated a deal that retracted
the government stand, personally laid the foundation stone for the reconstruction of one of the mosques
the government had demolished.

30
nity to counter the government’s ‘ignorance’ with ‘authoritative’ theological lecturing,
and hectoring.
The female Al-Hafsa madrassah shot into the public eye in January 2007. In the
wake of the demolishment of the first mosque, young madrassah women uniformly
shrouded in all-encompassing opaque black chadors armed with thick bamboo staves
forcibly occupied the state-run children’s library abutting their madrassah and averred
they would remain until the government recanted its orders. Officials ignored news
footage more than one man toting a semi-automatic weapon amongst the women, be-
cause according to the President these ‘young innocent women’ were like ‘our own
daughters.’ Inaction only encouraged male and female students to take direct action to
bring about ‘moral rectitude.’ CDs and tapes were burnt in publicised media-event bon-
fires, vigilante policing started and music and video shops were threatened. In March,
female students supported by male colleagues kidnapped a woman, her daughter and
daughter-in-law along with a six-month infant. When students refused to release the
women, the police picked up two of the seminary’s female teachers and two drivers said
to be intimidating music and video shopkeepers. In an instant tit-for-tat, students kid-
napped two policemen and hijacked two police vehicles. Teachers, drivers and police-
men were released within hours, but the kidnapped women, accused by Al Hafsa
women of running a brothel and immoral activities, were kept in illegal confinement for
several days. They were only released after a press conference in which the older
woman, Aunty Shamim, draped in the Al-Hafsa uniform black chador, was forced re-
pented for her sins. (Government response was more focused when students later kid-
napped several (male and female) Chinese nationals from a beauty parlour they claimed
was providing sexual services.)
In April, amid escalating confrontation, the clerics announced they were opening
a shariah court “because the present system of governance has collapsed and is no
longer working. The present system is the root of all problems. The elite class is benefit-
ing from the system but the majority is being suppressed. The rich are becoming richer
and the poor more penniless. Only an Islamic system can guarantee everyone justice.”
(Ghazi) The first widely publicized case was that of a woman allegedly raped by a po-
liceman said to be enjoying the protection of local officials. But, attesting to how much
more difficult it is to ensure justice than to loudly protest its absence, Ghazi sent the
case to the government “as a test case” in hopes “that justice will be provided to the vic-
tim on a priority basis,” but warned, “Otherwise we will be compelled to take action.”
(Newsline, May 2007) Justifying students taking the law into their own hands he said:
this Shamim has never had an F.I.R. [police report] registered against her! She has
never been sent to jail...because she has links to the Higher-Ups in the government…the
current system of our own government is so corrupt. It is lawless. No one fights for the
rights of the poor and the downtrodden. The Pakistani government today serves the in-
terests of only an elite class (Afzal-Khan 2007).
This position is disconcertingly similar to statements of human rights activists as
for instance “We have a culture of silence. People continue to suffer in silence. No one
gets justice unless someone powerful intervenes.”67
Women militants also picked up the themes of sexual ‘corruption’ and govern-
ment failure to address people’s needs and deliver justice. “It is the duty of the govern-
ment to clear the rubbish,” said a female Al-Hafsa teacher, referring to “whorehouses”

67
Rashid Rehman speaking about the murder of a woman by her family in which the President had to
intervene before the police registered a case. Salman Masood, The Price of Love, Newsline June 2004
page 98.

31
and “brothels” not poor sanitation, “if the government is not doing its job and I’m trying
to clear away the rubbish, I am in a way assisting [the government]. So why are they
creating hurdles for us? We have closed a factory for AIDS” (Newsline May 2007).
The image of hundreds of uniformly black cloaked women brandishing bamboo
staves, riveted the public. Al Hafsa actions evoked a short-lived debate on whether these
women could be called activists, whether they were brainwashed or independent
minded, whether they were expanding women’s rights or undermining them. Crucially
however, “the primary discourse of the Hafsa brigade [was] violence,” (Siddiqa 2007)
and, chillingly, Umm-e-Hassan, Rashid’s wife and unquestionably an influential leader
in the complex and head of Al Hafsa, boasted she had trained many of them to become
suicide bombers”(Newsline July 2007). Taking up arms female students clarified was
“not for ourselves, but for the sake of the women and men in our country who have been
victimized by a corrupt system.” “We will not put down our batons because we do not
have protection in this country and neither does anyone else,” including those “black-
mailed into prostitution”(Karrar 2007).
Reports by female journalists visiting Al Hafsa convey a sense of pride and
achievement, sometimes defiance, of the young women studying there. But equally, the
journalists noted that the donning of their black uniform of the chador transformed the
students from everyday women seen in any college to colder, more distant, as well as a
more strident and uncompromising part of a wider collective, transforming as it were
from autonomous individuated persons into the mass protected anonymity of an army or
mob, depending on your point of view. Veering away from difficult questions, students
steered conversations back to the oft-stated - and therefore unquestioned - positions of
the male clerics. Nonetheless, some did claim to be “proud flag-bearers of women’s
rights and empowerment, freedom, social equality and democracy,” aiming to “end the
exploitation of women” for which they were willing to face bullets (Salahuddin 2007).
That ‘exploited women’ were largely defined as ‘other’ often sexually abused and ex-
ploited women was not discussed; much less the possibility that the mosque complex
leadership may be exploiting the students for their own political agenda, including as
suggested by media as ‘human shields.’ With a violent end increasingly eminent, there
was an element of self-determination in students’ refusal to leave the complex. But there
is also enough evidence of the coerciveness used by those in charge in refusing meeting
with parents anxious to get their children out of the besieged mosque-madrassah com-
plex.
In the context of a system that fails to deliver and where the state and its re-
sources mean one thing for the poor and another for the rich, the rhetoric of politico-
religious elements can be “seductive,” for as astutely observed by one student “Even if
people don’t want Islam, they do want justice.” Shariah becomes a “one-stop window”
that would “provide justice for all, respect of life and property” (Karrar 2007). Hence, in
the absence of an alternate ideology people have begun to see a return to sharia and the
rule of Islam as the only way out for an embattled common citizen…what the common
man in Pakistan is looking for under the garb of the rule of law of Islam is justice, fair
play, better law and order and access to opportunities (Siddiqa 2007).
Rampant and class-biased injustice does enable better connected, more affluent
people to regularly flout the law while penalizing the poor. Siddiqa maintains that this
discrepancy was reflected in the Lal Masjid standoff since the government was propos-
ing the closure of a madrassah servicing people unable to afford the regular education,
while ignoring similarly unauthorised schools servicing the upper classes in the same
city. Surprisingly, while Lal Masjid spokesmen consistently dilated on the injustice
stemming from the selective implementation of the law, they never highlighted this dis-
crepancy. More worrying perhaps, is that this was also not picked up by rights-oriented
32
civil society actors protesting the unfolding events. Their statements focused on the
state’s complicity in allowing the problem to grow into such a catastrophe and its re-
fusal to act to the flouting of the law by those in the mosque complex.
The government’s attitude to Al-Hafsa students was radically different from its
treatment of ‘secular’ women’s rights activists who, had they occupied a government
building would have been promptly and unceremoniously arrested. Two years earlier,
the police manhandled women (and male supporters) and threw them into lock-up for
merely for organising a women’s marathon race to protest an earlier attack by politico-
religious elements on women marathon runners participating in a state-sponsored event
in a small town.
In conclusion, many sections of civil society (in this case the mosque and the
madrassahs) are characterised by decidedly uncivil behaviour with no compunctions
about directly attacking, harassing and threatening other citizens. Coupled with state
support, usually in the form of a refusal to act, these groups have been emboldened in
their propensity to take direct, often violent, action to forcibly impose their thinking and
social parametres on everyone. The tension between these groups and the rest of civil
society is an uneven one. The state’s radically different treatment of civil society groups
who self-identify as religious and those that don’t makes it that much easier for the for-
mer to operate and propagate their views.
Unexpectedly, there is a remarkable resonance between Antonio Gramsci’s defi-
nition of critical civil society as autonomous groups aiming to challenge the state with-
out being a part of this apparatus and Maududi’s self-defined aim to “try to awaken and
guide the popular will to base the foundation of our state on the law and constitution
which we Muslims consider to be divine”68 and to “shape the ideas beliefs and moral
viewpoints of the people into an Islamic mould, reform the system… and revive the Is-
lamic…attitudes in general”(Maududi). That Maududi and his Jamaat-i-Islami opposed
the very basis of the existing state was clear in 1953. The Munir Commission reported
that the Jama’at-i-Islami aim to establish “the sovereignty of Allah throughout the
world” meant the establishment of a religio-political system which the Jama’at calls Is-
lam. For the achievement of this ideal it believes…in the acquisition of political control
by constitutional means and where feasible by force. A Government…not based on the
Jama’at’s conception…[is] a Satanic Government, and…kufr, all persons taking part in
such Government…or willingly submitting to such system being sinners. (252)
Maududi, whose texts are standard reading for both para-state armed groups and
regular politico-religious parties, assiduously pursued these aims. Primacy was placed
on legal measures revamping the political, administration and judicial systems. To gar-
ner support for this project the JI strategically focused on gaining control over educa-
tional institutions (greatly aided by the strong arm tactics of the IJT) and making inroads
and consolidating influence in the civil and, especially, the military bureaucracies.
Maududi viewed Muslims in India (and probably elsewhere) as falling into one of three
categories: ‘oriental occidentals,’ ‘lip-service Muslims’ and the “foolish and thought-
less...who cannot think and form independent opinions”(Maududi 1939). Maududi ig-
nored the ‘foolish and thoughtless’ masses who followed rather than formed opinion,
and as such did not deserve attention. It was the ‘evil’ influence of the ‘oriental occiden-
tals’ (i.e. the Anglophile modern section) “trying their utmost to spread and propagate
[the Western creed] in the Eastern countries” that needed to be countered by converting
‘lip-service’ Muslims into true believers, mostly consisting of the emerging middle
classes of India at the time.

68
Maududi quoted in Abbas Rashid “Pakistan: the Ideological Dimension” page 83

33
Indeed, it is precisely from the educated upwardly ambitious middle class, many
rural-to-urban migrants that the religious right finds its strongest support as reflected in
the backgrounds of the men who came into political office in the 2002 elections. This
includes the current heads of the Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam, respec-
tively Qazi Hussain Ahmed who is the son of schoolteacher, was a lecturer for a short
while before setting up his medical shop, and Fazl-ur-Rehman who is also graduated
form and then taught in a madrassah.69
A final word about the religious right and the politics of sexuality: Maududi’s
1939 Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam makes for interesting reading, setting
out his reasons for the strict gendered division of labour and social organization. It is
important because his opinions are incessantly copied or, echoed, by so many of the cur-
rent protagonists who define their agendas in religious terminology, with only minor
changes. Largely addressed to the same broad audience of the newly emerging middle
classes, the emphasis on controlling sexuality and dress codes, the equation of the West
and selected elements of modernization with decadence, often depicted in terms of sex-
ual mores remain exactly constant in the discourse. It is worth quoting Maududi at some
length because this passage contains the gist of all the current debates. Maududi con-
demned ‘modernists’ who, he said,
“abhor Purdah because the ethics underlying it is radically opposed to the West-
ern ethics which they have accepted blindly…[and] want to mould the social pattern of
their respective homelands also after the same Western pattern. They sincerely believe
that the real aim of education for women is to enable her to earn her living and to ac-
quire the arts of appearing attractive to the male…dance them to the highest pitch of
pleasure and excitement…They think the woman’s role in national life consists of doing
social work, attending municipal councils, participating in conferences and congresses
and devoting her time to tackle political, cultural and social problems...In short she
should do everything outside the home…these people have changed the old moral con-
cepts with the new ones, just as Europe did…[for them] the sense of honor, chastity,
moral purity, matrimonial-loyalty, undefiled lineage and the like virtues, are
…worthless… and antiquated whims which must be destroyed for the sake of making
progress” (Maududi 1987: 72-73).
Maulana Abdul Aziz of the Lal Masjid averred “We will not allow dance and
music in Pakistan, those interested in such activities should go to India.” The difference
with Maududi is the level of direct violence and coercion the present-day leaders are
willing to engage. Hence Aziz asserted “We will not wait any more…it will now be
Shariah or shahadat [martyrdom],” “if a few pious men [the Taliban] can take over Ka-
bul, why can’t we bring about the Shariat law in a country where we number on the
thousands” (Newsline May 2007 page 37). Red Mosque residents likewise declared “If
[immoral sexuality is] what liberal people want, they should… leave Pakistan. Pakistan
is ours, and we will live here. It is our home and we will cleanse it ourselves.”
Significantly, visiting the Lal Masjid complex, women journalists70 were made
acutely conscious of their own sexuality, as one said:
With my head uncovered while I film, I feel the burden of being a woman, of my
morality being under scrutiny. I am extremely conscious of my sexuality which, I learn,
through my interaction with my Hafsa sisters, is a possible threat to a pristine world.
And I thought only men could make me feel so vulnerable! (Salahuddin).

69
For details see “New Men In”, Newsline November 2002.
70
Rubarb Karrar; Aliya Salahuddin; Ayesha Siddiqa; Fawzia Afzal-Khan.

34
As I have argued elsewhere, the definition of gender is integral to the formula-
tion of collective identities simply because, in addition to birth and death, the existence
of sexes is something all societies are obliged to address, regardless of differences in
history, economic and political systems or religion. Because they are applied to all
members of a society, the rules governing gender are all pervasive and, in that sense, lie
at the heart of all social organization. Underlying the virulent attacks by conservative
groups on women’s rights activists trying to change the system is the fear that, by ex-
ample, they will open the doors to change for all women, including the female relatives
of the more conservatives. The subtext of labelling women’s rights activists ‘western’ or
‘westernised’ is that these people are ‘aliens’ and, much as germs diseasing the body,
need to be expunged from society.

Conclusion
The interface of religion, politics and gender illustrates the impossibility of separating
out the realms of the social and the political, the public and the private for, as stipulated
by Dorothy Smith, the “relations of ruling” that govern gender and encompass power,
organization, direction, and regulation are “more pervasively structured than can be ex-
pressed in traditional concepts provided by the discourses of power”.71 Far from being
neatly bounded into self-contained spaces, everyday life flows freely, impacting differ-
ent dimensions simultaneously, blurring the lines dividing conceptual separations of po-
litical from cultural, social and economic. Public political contestations over women are
often provoked by women’s actions in what are defined as social, rather than political
spaces, and conversely, political discourses impact the everyday; both are of course af-
fected by cultural and economic factors.
The political use of religion is part of a wider global challenge: that of identity
based politics replacing ideological political agendas; of force replacing conversation
and discourse in a new world order which actually suggests that effectuating regime
change by war is a legitimate action. Whereas ideological agendas aim to change under-
lying structures and systems, identity politics mostly promise a better deal for a particu-
lar group – defined by religion, ethnicity or language. But this better deal comes with
conditions. It is only available if you give up your agency and let self-appointed
spokespersons appropriate your voice, only if you divest yourself of all other markers of
identity, and only if you buy into the proposition that your interests are threatened by
other identity-based groups rather than by, for example, the capitalist system and patri-
archy. Advocacy for women’s rights, it should be noted, does not fall into ‘identity poli-
tics’ since it is addressing the structural imbalance between the genders, and offers no
benefits or privileges on the basis of female identity.
In essentialist identity politics, symbols and signifiers resonating with people’s
lived realities, or collective identities, are harnessed to promote political agendas fre-
quently couched in religious idiom, but also in the idiom of ethnicity, culture and race.
Partly, people may hesitate to reject this agenda because to do so feels like rejecting es-
sential parts of their own identity (e.g. faith or culture). The silencing is also accom-
plished by the unbridled violence meted out by such groups to those who dare to differ,
and the ensuing fear instilled in society. Such political projects sometimes aim to main-
tain existing power and sometimes to challenge it, but it is power – not religion, or eth-
nicity or culture – which is the paramount concern, regardless of claims to the moral
high ground of ‘authenticity.’

71
Cited in Neelum Hussain, The Narrative Appropriation of Saima, pp204-206.

35
In this paper, I have tried to illustrate how the inscription of religion into the
state apparatus and the legal framework has impacted the social and political contexts.
In this, the nature and role of the state has been pivotal in determining the outcome of
attempts to meld religion and politics. Some academics argue that Pakistan never be-
came a ‘post-colony’ but continued to function under the guiding hands of Anglo-
Americans.72 Less than independent, the state became overdeveloped and dysfunctional,
allowing other non-state actors to assert themselves by delivering on services that are
the responsibility of the state. Primary among these non-state actors, and the best organ-
ised, were religious political parties (that subsequently developed militant wings) and
some ethnocentric militarist parties. The all-powerful military itself may act whimsi-
cally and, as in the case of General Ayub Khan introduce progressive family laws in
1960s, or, in the case of General Zia rescind rights and introduce pre-Islamic tribal cus-
toms as the brutal face of Islam that particularly targeted women and other vulnerable
communities. Meanwhile, the state structure was held in place by successive military
regimes that were acceptable to corporate capital and neo-conservative regimes in
Europe and the USA. So, in a sense, Pakistan never developed as a modern nation-state
and, if anything, over time the thrust towards non-modernity and anti-modernity has
deepened in the social structure.73
While most of the focus on public religion leads with a political perspective, in
the case of Pakistan, evidence suggests that the mere presence of religion in the political
arena would not have sufficed to inscribe religion into the legal apparatus. This required
the active support, or collusion, of groups not necessarily defined as having (or consid-
ered to have) religious agendas. Indeed, perhaps the most long-term damaging impact of
the various ways of inscribing religion into society and state are those seemingly small
insertions into everyday life that oblige, reward, or instigate individuals to become
complicit in the state’s machinations. This is accomplished in a number of ways that
include providing either benefits or punishments.
One example of punitive coercion in the case of Pakistan is obliging all Muslim
citizens to sign their agreement with the state’s demeaning ex-communication of an en-
tire sect from Islam, with failure to comply translating into a forfeiture of basic docu-
ments of citizenry (national identity cards and passports). Other actions inscribing the
‘Muslim’ nature of the state were more subtle as, for example, the incessant airing of
Quranic recitations in airports and other government venues. Government sponsorship
promoted recitations as part of ‘good citizen’ behaviour, and soon the practice was
adopted by private shops and enterprises. The practice of Quranic recitations has even
been adopted by human rights oriented civil society groups in public functions to avoid
appearing ‘alien,’ to pre-empt the audience becoming antagonised and the hosts accused
of being unIslamic. Shaping the dominant discourse such practices enable messages of
what constitute ‘acceptable modes of behaviour’ to be internalised almost subliminally,
sinking into the public psyche. Official textbooks and television programmes, whether
state owned or not play a similar, if less subtle, moulding role. Once norms are changed,
the enforcer need not be the state. Penalties can be – and are – meted out by non-state
actors in consequence of state measures. During Zia’s era, women were penalized more
by men in the public arena than by the state for contravening the ‘Islamic’ dress code
suggested as by the state. An important determinant of the ability to mobilize on the
platform of religion is the extent to which groups receive the support of state authority,
or not.

72
See Rubina Saigol, Colonial Roots, Postcolonial Realities, Simorgh Women’s Resource Centre, Forth-
coming.
73
Based on discussions with Samina Choonara.

36
A separate critical factor is the issue of justice. The inability of the state to de-
liver justice and to educate people about existing laws and citizens’ entitlements has en-
abled traditional structures to continue to operate outside the state structures. The sense
of injustice is profound in regions excluded from the purview of the fundamental rights
clauses of the constitution and the mainstream judicial and political systems, but re-
sentment at the non-delivery of the justice system is widespread across the country.
Ironically enough, the inadequacy of the state apparatus to effectively respond to the
needs of its citizens that would encourage a disengagement from tribal and sub-state
affiliations by offering equivalent opportunities to all citizens, has provided the impetus
for new parallel structures being erected by urban populations. In urban Sindh these
parallel structures have been created by political elements rather than by social organ-
izational engagement (Rashid & Shaheed). Until recently these non-formal structures
relied neither upon Islam or shariah, however that is defined, but on the local traditions
of the tribe, clan or ethnic group in question.
A word of caution: there are of course numerous groups who define their agen-
das in religious terms, but it has to be said that the binary categorization of institutions
as ‘faith-based’ versus ‘non-faith based’ – often used by bi-lateral and international do-
nor agencies- is unhelpful. Imposing such a binary definition feeds into the agenda of
the self-appointed guardians of religion (in this case Islam) who promote themselves as
‘faith-based’ to the exclusion of all others as non-believers. In much the same way that
the term ‘fundamentalist’ has been appropriated in translation as ‘those who adhere to
the fundamentals of religion’, such a false bifurcation automatically relegates all groups
who do not use ‘faith’ in their self-definition into a ‘non-faith-based’ category. It also
feeds the discourse of essentialist identity politics.
Contributors to The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and
World Politics argue that religion is well and alive – and sometimes kicking - in many
parts of the world. In the case of South Asia, and in contrast to Christian Europe, the
traditional pre-colonial state was always a secular institution. Whether pundits or alim,
religious scholars were subservient to the ruler. Religious institutions did not posses in-
dependent means as happened in Europe where one sixth of the land was owned by the
church as an institution allowing it to wield enormous power. It is only in the nation-
state era that religious political actors have seen the possibility and sought to transform
religion into a vehicle for accessing state power. Right up to independence, religious
reform movements tended to focus on the social arena in attempts to reform the society
of the faithful. In some sense what we are witnessing in the attempts to inscribe religion
into the state, is an attempt to convert secular states into a ‘sacred’ state, for the first
time. This may be one factor driving the “religious right methodology of social govern-
ance.”
The ability of women and men to resist the discourse and influence of the relig-
ion-political nexus depends on several key factors. Regardless of how flawed and im-
perfect it may be, democracy is a critical factor for gender equality and women’s inclu-
sion. Military dispensations exclude women from the ranks of decision-makers while
democratic spaces potentially allow space for change. But to be meaningful, democracy
has to go beyond electoral politics to encompass meaningful inclusion in decision-
making in all aspects of life, starting with control over bodily integrity and an equitable
share in family resources and decisions. Resistance is also about power. Women’s defi-
cit of power means that their ability to resist becomes contingent upon borrowed power,
that is, on mobilizing allies. Significantly, at the height of Zia’s ‘Islamization’ pro-
gramme, women’s protests around the proposed qisas and diyat laws were easily dis-
missed by the regime. Such a casual dismissal was not possible, however, when a light-
ning nationwide strike called by transporters brought the country to a halt after the acci-

37
dental death of a pedestrian knocked down by a truck driver led to his facing the death
penalty under the new law (Zia). As a group, regardless of personal connections to
power, women simply do not have this capacity. Strength would be increased by the
number of women engaged in resistance but, of course, ‘women’ is not a real category
of people. Women do not form a homogenous collective: they are divided by class and
privilege and distinguished by culture, upbringing, personal experiences and life
choices, to name but a few differences. It is utterly illogical to presume that a shared
chromosome will propel differently located women to think alike. They don’t think
alike. And, while the majority may feel unable to participate in resistance, a significant
numbers of women themselves subscribe to the views of religiously defined groups. In-
deed many women are active proponents of such views. And, as seen in the Al-Hafsa
case, a number of women experience activism that seeks to control women as a group,
as a personally empowering process. In the final analysis, it is well to remember that
women inhabit the same social political spaces as men (even if with different gendered
rules of belonging, so that their problems are formulated and contested within the reality
of the broader state and society. It seems appropriate, therefore, to conclude with a
comment from the 1953 Munir Commission regarding the tension between theocracy
and democracy in Pakistan.
It is [a] lack of bold and clear thinking, the inability to understand and take deci-
sions which has brought about in Pakistan a confusion which will persist and repeatedly
create situations of the kind we have been inquiring into until our leaders have a clear
conception of the goal and of the means to reach it. It requires no imagination to realise
that irreconcilables remain irreconcilable even if you believe or wish to the contrary.
Opposing principles, if left to themselves, can only produce confusion and disorder, and
the application of a neutralising agency to them can only produce a dead result… as
long as we rely on the hammer when a file is needed and press Islam into service to
solve situations it was never intended to solve, frustration and disappointment must dog
our steps (141).
Had Pakistan’s rulers heeded the important lessons of this early analysis of the
dynamics of religion and politics, we would have been a very different country indeed.

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