19

RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Islamic Radicalism and Minorities

in Pakistan

I n the past, as well as in our times, religion in multi-religious and

ethnic societies has polarized more than unified societies. Even within
a single religious denomination one may find numerous strands that
never tie up. Doctrinal differences, political contestation for power,
material gains and territorial space can make the religion itself—and
the question of authenticity—quite explosive. The political question
of majority versus minority becomes salient and troublesome even in
a society with one dominant religion. This question is a greater divi-
sive force in states where religion is the source of political legitimacy
or the basis of a state’s identity. Religion turns out to be a dangerous
political weapon when the majority religious communities attempt to
shape culture, social institutions and the state itself according to a
specific belief system. It was not without some learning from history
of bitter religious feuds that the neutrality of the state became the
central element of theorizing about the modern nation-state. The
Western community of nations has accepted secular liberalism as the
defining ideology of state, and this concept has found a considerable
following even in the post-colonial states. But in some states, such as

447
448 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Pakistan, the role of religion is not a settled issue, which greatly

impacts the statecraft, the status and rights of minorities, and the
larger question of internal peace and security.
Complex historical and social factors have shaped the interaction
between religion and politics in Pakistan. Islam was at the heart of the
political struggle for the creation of Pakistan and has remained at the
center of post-Independence political discourse. Controversy about
the role of Islam in politics continues to trouble the political land-
scape of the country. Even after half a century, the relationship
between religion and state is still as unclear as the nature and direction
of the democratic enterprise. The question of what type of polity
Pakistan should be—liberal democratic or Islamic—evokes different
responses from different social sectors and political interests. Military
leaders, mainstream political parties, and Islamists have all attempted
to define this relationship according to their vision of democratic
development and the role of religion in society and state affairs.1
Among the three main forces in the country, the quest for shaping the
Pakistani state has added yet another dimension to religious and polit-
ical polarization in Pakistan. As a consequence of this unending con-
flict of interests and expedient coalitions, the autonomy of the civil
political sphere and the general question of civil liberties and minor-
ity rights have suffered a severe setback. The central argument of this
paper is that the common political strands of identity politics, state
formation processes, and Islamic radicalism have caused marginaliza-
tion of religious minorities.
True representative democracy and constitutional politics are the
best institutional tools to protect and advance the interests of reli-
gious minorities in any set of social conditions. For various reasons,
Pakistan has never applied any of these tools during most of its his-
tory. The problem lies in the state formation process, in which the bal-
ance of power shifted toward the statist elites, the army and the civil
bureaucracy.2 Historical and geopolitical factors have determined this
shift. At the moment, the army is once again restructuring the politi-
cal system; the indications are that this will further institutionalize the

1. Anwar Syed, Pakistan: Islam and National Solidarity (Lahore: Vanguard Books,
1984), 74–100.
2. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (London: Macmillan
Press, 2000), 1–16.
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 449

army’s power. The disjointed nature of democratic practice and its

structural problems, which is a result of the army-dominated state
formation process, has not produced a social change capable of
empowering minorities and other disadvantaged groups in society.
Their marginalization is as much a result of the failure of democracy
as it is due to deep-seated social and religious attitudes against them.
Another important aspect of the state formation process in
Pakistan is the contested issue of its identity—whether the state
would be neutral among different religious communities or be
Islamic.3 Answers to this fundamental question continue to generate
religious conflict and political confrontations in Pakistan. To explain
this dilemma, it is necessary to touch upon the Pakistani theory of the
state. The movement for the creation of Pakistan, among other
things, was aided by the acceptance of the demand of the Muslims as
a religious minority. Since Muslims were a substantial minority—
about 25 percent of the population in undivided India—the objective
was to have proportionate representation in the elected assemblies
under the British rule. For this, they demanded and achieved a system
of separate electorates under which Muslims electorates voted only
for the Muslim candidates. Among other social and economic forces
that influenced the growth of Muslim nationalism in British India, the
separate electorates further distanced Muslims from integration with
the majority community on the basis of secular Indian nationalism.
While separate electorates worked to the advantage of Muslims in
undivided India—at least in getting larger numbers of their represen-
tatives in the elected assemblies—it was politically divisive and created
a bigger wedge between Congress and the Muslim League. After the
creation of Pakistan, the issue of separate electorates became
enshrined in the character of the Pakistani state. Even though Muslims
became a majority, the state had a formidable task of reassuring reli-
gious minorities and integrating them into mainstream national poli-
tics. In the 1956 Constitution, and later in the amended 1973
Constitution under the Zia ul-Haq regime, Pakistan practiced separate
electorates against the will of minorities. The following sections
explore minority discrimination and marginalization by examining the

3. Ayesha Jalal, “Ideology and the Struggle for Democratic Institutions,” in Victoria
Schofield, ed., Old Roads New Highways: Fifty Years of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 121–38.
450 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

legal regimes that sustain discrimination, as well as informal social

structures, values, and culture. The rise of Islamic radicalism during
the past two decades has equally put religious minorities under
tremendous social and political stress, in some cases provoking vio-
lence against their members.

Identity Politics and Marginalization of Minorities

UNTIL THE RECENT CHANGES in elections laws, Pakistan had a system
of separate electorates that was introduced by the military govern-
ment of Zia ul-Haq in 1979. But the political roots of separate elec-
torates go back to the pre-Partition Muslim politics in the subconti-
nent and also to the early debates after the creation of the country
about how to best protect minority rights. One of the most important
planks of Muslim politics under British rule was to ensure that
Muslims scattered around the length and width of India have repre-
sentation in the elected councils proportionate to their numbers. For
this, Muslims demanded separate electorates, meaning they would be
allocated seats in the local, provincial, and central legislative bodies
according to their percentage in the population, and that only
Muslims would vote for Muslim candidates. The British in the Minto-
Marley Reforms of 1909 for India, though vehemently opposed by
the Indian National Congress, finally accepted this demand.4 Muslims
were in fact accorded dual voting rights: to elect their own represen-
tatives and to cast their votes in the general constituencies. All elec-
tions after the introduction of these reforms were held according to
this system. Some historians have rightly argued that the establish-
ment of separate electorates further strengthened the Muslim sepa-
ratism that led to the creation of Pakistan.5
After Independence, some leaders of the Pakistan movement con-
tinued to press for continuation of separate electorates; others
pushed for ideological consistency, while still others aimed to ensure
adequate representation of minorities in the elected bodies of the
country. The question of separate electorates was one of the focal
points of debate and controversy in the Constituent Assembly of

4. Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857–1948, 2d ed., (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 28–33.
5. See, for instance, Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, A Short History of Pakistan (Karachi:
University of Karachi, 1988).
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 451

Pakistan when the first post-Independence constitution was under

discussion. On the issue of separate electorates, the views of leaders
of East Pakistan, where there was a sizeable Hindu minority, were dif-
ferent from those of the leaders of West Pakistan. While the West
Pakistanis stressed the need for separate electorates, the East
Pakistanis insisted on joint electorates. Members of the minority com-
munities were also of the view that separate electorates would cast
them off the mainstream national politics. They demanded equal
political, civic and legal rights that could be guaranteed only under the
joint electorate system.
It is important to probe the reasons for support of the separate
electorates. Why did post-Independence Muslim leaders support sep-
arate electorates for minorities? Was the move to protect their demo-
cratic interests? A scant look at the arguments presented reveals that
most Muslim leaders thought separate electorates would be consistent
with the two-nation ideology of Pakistan.6 This theory was at the
heart of political struggle that resulted in the creation of Pakistan.
Conservative religious leaders—and even some members of the
Muslim League (the dominant political party at that time)—did not
favor the idea of granting equal rights and status to non-Muslims in
the Islamic polity they wished to establish.7 Some of these leaders
even questioned the loyalty of the Hindu minority to Pakistan and
expressed their distrust of them openly. The religious parties and
their supporters in the assembly refused to accept minorities as equal
citizens with equal constitutional rights.
One wonders how separate electorates would have strengthened the
foundation of Pakistan ideology, promoted national integration and
made Pakistan a progressive, moderate and liberal Islamic nation that
its founder, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammed Ali Jinnah wanted to make it.
It is pertinent to mention here the famous and oft-quoted statement
of the founder of Pakistan before the Constituent Assembly: “You
may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do
with the business of the state. We are starting in the days when there
is no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are

6. See the views of the ulema (scholars of Islamic religion) in Sharif Al Mujahid,
Ideological Orientation of Pakistan (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1976).
7. Government of Punjab, Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act
II of 1954 to Inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Superintendent of
Government Publications, 1954).
452 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and
equal citizens of one state. You will find that in the course of time,
Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith
of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.”8
There cannot be a more lucid and forceful expression of the
founder’s political ideology than this address to the Constituent
Assembly. The occasion of entrusting the assembly with framing a
constitution—and the forum itself—makes Jinnah’s intent very clear
about the direction and nature of Pakistan’s polity. The liberals and
minorities in Pakistan have taken this statement as the fundamental
principle of the country’s political structure. Those who believe in lib-
eral, secular and democratic values cite this historic address to support
their vision of Pakistan.
Others have taken a long u-turn in reading the history of the
Pakistan movement and have reached opposite conclusions about the
political character of the post-Independence Pakistani nation and
state. In the formative phase of the country, some members of
Jinnah’s own party began to present a distorted, illiberal and retro-
gressive political map for the country. The argument that minorities
could not be treated as equal citizens in the Islamic republic found a
lot of support among the lawmakers from West Pakistan, many of
whom hid their ideological bias in pleading that in a system of joint
electorates minorities might not get representation in the national par-
liament and provincial assemblies. The members of the Constituent
Assembly from East Pakistan vociferously contested this view.9 They
were right in arguing that separate electorates would leave minorities
in both wings of the country disenfranchised, and that the system
would work against national integration.
The Constituent Assembly, in the very contentious atmosphere of
framing the 1956 Constitution, failed to reach any agreement on
whether to have separate or joint electorates. After ascertaining views
of the provincial assemblies, the assembly left the matter for the
future parliament to settle. The issue kicked up lot of public debate

8. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan

1947–1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), 8–9.
9. The members of the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan had vehemently
argued in support of joint electorates, a political battle they later won.
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 453

and controversy, and lines were drawn between liberal politicians and
regional parties on one side and religious parties on the other. The
Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic party) and its founder and prominent leader,
Maulana Abul Ala Mauddudi, were at the forefront of opposition to
the joint electorates.
Other religious political parties and, as mentioned above, some sec-
tions of the Muslim League, also supported separate electorates.
Their reasons were as diverse as the leaders and groups themselves.
They argued that some pro-India parties and groups would capture
power with the support of the Hindu minority in a system of single-
member electoral constituencies, mainly in East Pakistan. In their
judgment, more Hindus would get elected to the provincial assembly
in East Pakistan and to the national assembly than would be justified
under joint electorates. They also argued that with the influence of
Hindu lawmakers and their prominence in the political arena, Bengali
nationalism would gain strength, undermine Pakistan’s position on
Kashmir and gradually erode the country’s ideological foundations.10
These arguments were flimsy, unconvincing and evasive of the real
issues. The central principle of democracy is equality among all citi-
zens with equal rights and duties. But a true democracy based on such
principles was the last thing on the minds of many of these politi-
cians, who were more interested in how to prevent religious minori-
ties from becoming equal citizens and how to exclude them from elec-
toral politics.
Why the religious and political parties wanted to build a political
system in Pakistan where minorities would be marginalized and alien-
ated is a question that has bothered true democrats from the begin-
ning of the controversy to its end in 2002. All the major political par-
ties in then East Pakistan supported joint electorates, except for the
Muslim League, which had lost its influence there since the 1954
provincial election. After the adoption of the 1956 Constitution,
when the issue was referred to the two provincial assemblies (East
and West), a different resolution was passed: East Pakistan for joint
electorates and West Pakistan for separate electorates. The national
assembly, feeling the political pulse and opposition from East

10. For details, see M. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947–58, vol. 1
(Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986), 185–89.
454 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Pakistani parties, decided to approve two different methods: joint

electorates for East Pakistan and separate electorates for West
Pakistan.
When elections were about to be held under the 1956 Constitution,
the military imposed martial law for the first time in the country, abro-
gated the constitution and set out to make a new one that would be
“appropriate to the genius” of the people of Pakistan. The issue of
separate or joint electorates lingered on in political debates. The com-
mission that was set up to frame the 1962 Constitution recommended
separate electorates for minorities. General Muhammed Ayub Khan,
the military ruler, did not accept the recommendation and decided for
joint electorates. Pakistan held all subsequent elections under joint
electorates, and formal marginalization of minorities in elections
ended.
After the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, Parliament framed a new
constitution more or less along the same lines as the 1956
Constitution, putting an end to the presidential system that Ayub
Khan had earlier introduced. Pakistan was back to the parliamentary
system but this time around, even in the face of opposition from the
religious parties, procedures for joint electorates were adopted.
After the separation of East Pakistan, the population of religious
minorities shrank to nearly 5 percent of the Muslim population. The
new government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto introduced additional safe-
guards into the 1973 Constitution for representation of minorities
in national and provincial assemblies. Six seats were reserved for
minorities in the national assembly. For provincial assemblies, five
seats were reserved in Punjab, two in Sindh, two in Baluchistan, and
one in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). However, minor-
ity legislators were not elected directly, but by the electoral college
of their provincial assemblies. To further prove to the world that
minorities were well represented in the power structure of Pakistan,
the Bhutto administration—and almost all subsequent govern-
ments—recruited from the minority community for at least one fed-
eral minister of some unimportant ministry. With this system,
minorities had a better sense of participation but were far from
being treated with equality as discrimination continued in many
other forms.
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 455

A New Religious Minority

AHMADIS WHO CLAIM to be Muslims are a relatively new religious
minority. Mainstream Muslims—both Shia and Sunni—do not accept
Ahmadis within the fold of Islam. The controversy over the Ahmadi
sect is about one hundred years old. At the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, Muslim cleric Mirza Ghulam Ahmad from Qadian in Punjab
declared himself a new prophet of Islam. He made many other con-
troversial assertions, such as the claim that he was Jesus Christ resent
to reform the world. People generally regarded Ahmad as an insane
person and ignored him. When the ranks of his followers began to
swell in numbers, mainly after his death, the leaders of Jamiat-i-
Ulema-i-Hind (Association of the Islamic Religious Scholars of
India) took serious notice of the new prophet from Punjab. Maulana
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, a noted religious scholar, wrote one of the
first comprehensive theses against the Ahmadi sect in 1935. He
declared Mirza Ghulam Ahmad a false prophet and an apostate and
said any person who accepted him as a prophet, or even a religious a
heretic, was liable to be stoned to death. After his decree a number of
Ahmadis were stoned to death in the NWFP. The Deobandi ulema
(religious forefathers of the Taliban) launched a nationwide move-
ment against the Ahmadis by declaring them as non-Muslims and bar-
ring them from using Islamic symbols.
After the creation of Pakistan, the efforts of the Deobandi ulema
gained considerable steam, particularly in Punjab, which had begun to
emerge as the center of Ahmadi preaching. The Majlis-i-Ahrar (coun-
cil for liberation) and the Majlis e Khatme Nabuwwat (council for the
finality of prophethood) were at the forefront of this movement.
They put forward three demands to the government in 1951 when the
constitution of the country was being debated: (1) that Ahmadis be
declared as non-Muslims in Pakistan’s constitution; (2) that Sir
Zafarullah Khan, the first foreign minister of Pakistan, be removed
from his position because he was an Ahmadi; and (3) that no Ahmadi
be allowed to retain any key position in the country because Pakistan
is an Islamic state. So strong was this movement that Mr. Daultana, a
Muslim League leader and chief minister of Punjab, endorsed these
demands. As the central government was unwilling to accede to these
demands, the anti-Ahmadi groups began to agitate in the streets of
456 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Lahore. The state of lawlessness and violence in 1953 provoked the

city’s first occurrence of martial law. Although the movement was
suppressed, it continued to propagate against the Ahmadi sect in the
following decades. A more violent form of the controversy revisited
the country in the early 1970s.
Among the many controversies created by the Bhutto government,
one of the most crippling was the move to declare the Ahmadi sect
as non-Muslims via constitutional amendment. The events during the
debate in the national assembly and later in the cities, towns, and
remote villages would not make any Pakistani proud. While the
national parliament was determining the religiosity of a community
whose following was gaining in strength, the religious parties and
groups pounced on the known Ahmadi families and prominent fig-
ures, burning down their houses and businesses. With the state taking
the lead in branding a section of the population as non-Muslims, the
religious groups became emboldened to the point of physically
attacking, harassing and persecuting the suspected Ahmadis.
Thousands lost their lives, and Pakistan created yet another marginal-
ized community despite that community’s following of millions and
well-funded, well-organized religious and social networks. The
Ahmadis’ mosques were closed down and they were debarred from
congregational prayers or showing any sign of being a Muslim in their
places of worship. Ahmadis were added to the list of minorities—
along with Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs—and were required by law
to declare their status as Ahmadis in all official documentation.
Although the anti-Ahmadi movement is a perennial problem that
has occasionally led to civil disturbances, the real persecution of this
community started with the declaration that Ahmadis were non-
Muslims. Since then, Ahmadis have been barred from naming their
places of worship as mosques or even making them look like mosques.
They are not allowed to make prayer calls or to display Islamic sym-
bols or Islamic religious inscriptions in places of worship. These meas-
ures marked the beginning of official religious intolerance.
Persecution of religious minorities—particularly against Ahmadis—
increased with late general Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization project. A per-
vading sense of Islamic revival in the country fueled another anti-
Ahmadi wave around 1984. To placate the religious right of the
country and keep them on his side of the country’s political divide, Zia
further amended the Pakistan Penal Code by adding sections 298-B
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 457

and 298-C. These provisions made it a criminal offence for Ahmadis

to pose as Muslims, to preach or propagate by words (either spoken
or written) and to use Islamic terminology or Muslim practices of
worship. Once again, the state took the lead in implementing the
political agenda of the religious political parties. In doing so, Pakistan
has ignored its commitments to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and violated its social contact with the minorities that sup-
ported the Pakistan movement.11
The wave of religious bigotry and extremism began with Zia court-
ing the religious constituency for political support and legitimacy.12
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the Mujahideen
resistance based in Pakistan were also factors that influenced the
growth of religious militancy. The flow of arms and money from the
oil-rich Middle Eastern countries to the Islamic madrassa (religious
school) network further contributed to the power and influence of
religious organizations.

Table 1. Population and minorities in Pakistan

Number Percent
Total population 132,352,279 100
Muslims 127,433,409 96.28
Christians 2,002,902 1.58
Hindus 2,111,271 1.60
Ahmadis 289,212 0.22
Scheduled castes 332,343 0.25
Others 96,142 0.07
Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, No. SD. PER.E
(53)/99-449, Islamabad, 16 July 2001.

11. Tayyab Mahmud, “Protecting Religious Minorities: The Courts’ Abdication,” in

Charles H. Kennedy and Rasul Bakhsh Rais, eds., Pakistan: 1995 (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995), 84.
12. Mumtaz Ahmad, “Revivalism, Islamization, Sectarianism and Violence in
Pakistan,” in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy, Pakistan: 1997 (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1998), 118.
458 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Separate Electorates
AFTER HANGING an elected prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia
appeared desperate to cultivate a support base among the religious
groups to end his political isolation. He took two drastic measures at
that time to bring himself closer to the religious groups: separate elec-
torates and blasphemy laws, two demands voiced by the religious
groups for some time. Zia’s actions are partly explained by his politi-
cal need to have religious allies with street power on his side. Equally
important is the fact that his vision of Pakistan was not much differ-
ent from that of most religious political parties. Zia had plans to
remain in power; his only bit besides the military was the religious
establishment of the country. Zia gave the personal image of a pious,
God-fearing, patriotic Pakistani. His Islamization agenda of the
Pakistani state would have little credibility without acceding to the
long-standing demands of the religious right for making provision for
a separate system of elections for minorities. As an unchallenged mil-
itary ruler, Zia began to give an altogether different orientation to
Pakistan’s political system, which was Islamic in the most conservative
tradition. His ordinances, laws, actions, and acts of omission and
commission were passed through the Eighth Amendment into the
Constitution when the national assembly convened after the 1985
non-party elections. This way the separate electorates became part of
the 1973 Constitution.
The Zia regime increased the number of seats for minorities in the
national assembly from five to ten, but maintained the same numbers
in the provincial assemblies. There was also a change in how seats in
the legislatures would be filled. The entire country was divided into
ten constituencies for minorities, which made it utterly impossible for
them to effectively contest or cast their votes. Since religious minori-
ties are dispersed throughout the length of the country, drawing long
territorial constituencies reduced the exercise of separate electorates
to a mockery. A few influential, wealthy and well-connected minority
figures could win in such a rough and unleveled electoral field.
After the restoration of democracy in the country with the death of
General Zia ul-Haq and fresh elections in 1988, leaders from the
mainstream political parties did not bother to address the issue of
marginalization of minorities in electoral politics. Even with the
unanimous removal of some parts of the Eighth Amendment
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 459

through the Thirteenth Amendment in 1997, the issue of joint elec-

torates was not touched. Most politicians have not been keyed in to
the issue or have never felt the need to understand the plight of reli-
gious minorities. Another reason could be the hesitation to offend the
clamorous religious groups or to kick up a fresh controversy over an
issue that to them seemed politically insignificant.

Blasphemy Laws
NO OTHER LAW has had as grave of social and psychological implica-
tions for religious minorities as have the blasphemy laws. These laws
have wide-blanket coverage of acts that may fall within the offences
of blasphemy, the violation of which carries long prison sentences
and death by hanging. Offences include injuring or defiling places of
worship with the intent to insult the religion of any class; deliberate
and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class
by insulting its religion or religious beliefs; defiling a copy of the Holy
Quran; use of derogatory remarks with respect to the Holy Prophet
of Islam; uttering words with deliberate intent to wound religious
feelings; use of derogatory remarks with respect to holy personages;
misuse of epithets, description and titles reserved for certain holy per-
sonages and places; a person of the Quadiani group or Ahmadi call-
ing himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith. In almost
all cases, the law does not require any solid written proof, just the
offensive remarks and few witnesses to get a conviction. More dra-
conian is the procedure to file a complaint against an accused person.
In addition to the state functionaries, any private person can file a case
in the police station against any person under these laws. For this rea-
son, blasphemy laws have been repeatedly misused against religious
minorities and Muslims. In almost all cases the complainants have
been private individuals with a personal grudge or religious zeal.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) monitored the
blasphemy cases registered from January to October 2000. The com-
mission’s newsletter listed fifteen cases against the Ahmadis, five
against Christians and eighteen against Muslims.13 Common accusa-
tions against Ahmadis included posing as Muslims, preaching, possess-
ing Ahmadi literature, and building minaret in the place of worship.

13. HRCP Newsletter 11, no. 4 (October 2000): 13–14.

460 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Christians and Muslims were booked for making derogatory remarks

about the Prophet of Islam, writing provocative slogans on the walls,
desecrating Holy Quran or claiming to be prophets. The case of M.
Yusuf Ali from Lahore is worth mentioning. Ali was sentenced to
death in March 1997 for claiming to be a prophet. While his appeal to
higher courts was still pending, a man convicted of sectarian terror-
ism and on death row himself shot Yusuf Ali dead in May 2002. This
is not the first time a person accused of blasphemy has been mur-
dered. The blasphemy laws have not only increased religious intoler-
ance but have failed to provide any legal or institutional safety net for
religious minorities.14

Religious Intolerance and Violence

THE RISE OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM in Pakistan has greatly contributed
to the growth of religious intolerance even among various sects of
the Islamic faith, and more so against non-Muslims, particularly
Ahmadis and Christians. In recent years, religious extremists based in
the country and outside Pakistan have also questioned the Islamic reli-
gious identity of the Isamelis or Agha Khanis. These extremists send
out derogatory material insulting the community and its leader, Karim
Agha Khan. It is interesting to note that only the Deobandi faction of
the Sunni Islam in Pakistan has raised militant outfits such as Lashkar-
i-Jhangvi, and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The Shia sect responded
to the sectarian challenge of the SSP by organizing Sipah-i-
Muhammed (SP). Both have been brutally murdering religious schol-
ars, political activists and young professionals of the rival sect.
Thousands of Pakistanis have perished in the sectarian violence.
Both the SSP and SP have exclusivist religious imagination and con-
flicting interpretations of the history of Islam and its doctrines.15
Both question the religious authenticity of the other, each proclaim-
ing the other is out of the pale of Islam. The majority of the mem-
bers of the Shia and Sunni communities have watched the sectarian
killings with awe and disgust. But the frequency and persistence of
sectarian violence during the last fifteen years cannot be explained

14. See, for instance, I. A. Rehman, “A Critique of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws,” in

Tarik Jan et al., Pakistan Between Secularism and Islam: Ideology, Issues and Conflict
(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1998), 196–204.
15. Qasim Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shia and Sunni
Identities,” Modern Asian Studies 32, no. 3: 689–716.
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 461

without sympathy and support of some influential members from

each community. Sectarian violence that includes murdering fellow
Muslims worshipping in the mosques or in religious congregations
speaks volumes about religious hatred and intolerance. In a compara-
tive sense, more Muslims have fallen victim to religious intolerance of
the rival sects than have members of religious minorities; however,
this comparison may not be fair due to the smaller numbers of
minorities in the population.
More than numbers, the rise in Islamic radicalism confronts the reli-
gious community with a sense of exclusion, inferiority, discrimination
and above all, insecurity and fear. Ahmadis, because of their breaking
away from the mainstream Islam and their resourcefulness and orga-
nizational strength, have been the major target of intimidation and
violence. Although Ahmadis have faced hatred and exclusion for a
long time, never were they subjected to mass killings until their decla-
ration as non-Muslims in the early seventies. Even after that brief but
troublesome period, Ahmadis lived in harmony with their neighbors
in villages and towns. It is only in recent years that the incidences of
murders, mostly in places of worship, have increased against the
Ahmadis.16
No other non-Muslim religious community has contributed more to
the social sector development of Pakistan than the Christians have.
Both missionaries and local members of the Christian community have
built splendid educational institutions, hospitals and health facilities
throughout the country. They have been peaceful even in the face of
the worst provocation. Poor Christians have faced social exclusion and
discrimination in both the urban and rural areas of the country. They
have endured social inferiority and humiliation with grace and patience,
hoping things would change with modernization and development.
While Christians have yet to achieve social and economic mobility, they
have increasingly become the victim of religious intolerance and terror-
ism; something this community had previously been spared.
Christians are the new target of terrorism in Pakistan. Lashkar-i-
Jhangvi terrorists attacked Sunday Mass in the Dominican Church on
28 October 2001 in Bahawalpur and massacred twenty-nine wor-
shipers, representing the worst case of terrorism against the

16. Amnesty International, Pakistan: Use and Abuse of Blasphemy Laws (New York:
Amnesty International, 1994), 6–7.
462 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Christians to date. In February 2002, terrorists attacked a church serv-

ice mostly attended by foreigners in the diplomatic enclave in
Islamabad. On 5 August 2002 terrorists attacked a Christian school in
the Murree hills, killing six persons.
How can one explain the rise of violence against the minority Shia
sect of Islam, the Ahmadis and the Christians? Is it due to declining
capacity of the state?
The state’s declining capacity is part of the problem; while religious
bigots have been preaching hatred and violence against minorities, the
state has remained silent. Participatory politics and civic culture with
a focus on citizenship rights have suffered gravely due to the repeated
failure of the democratic process in Pakistan. In this democratic vac-
uum, religious extremism—riding on the wave of jihad in
Afghanistan and with transnational connections with similar
groups—has taken strong roots in society. The war against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda, along with President Pervez Musharraf ’s poli-
cies to root out religious extremism, has produced a new wave of
anti-Western feelings. This sentiment, however, is not new. Muslims
thinkers such as Maulana Mauddudi and Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, the
two powerful ideologues, shrouded Islamic revival in historical griev-
ances of Muslims and Western barbarism.17 This ugly sentiment, cul-
tivated among the Muslim youth, was manifested in the killings of
thousands of innocent people in New York and Washington, D.C. on
September 11, 2001. In Pakistan, anti-Westernism has been turned
against foreigners and local Christians. Christians in Muslim societies
are generally affiliated with foreigners and are regarded by many as an
extension of Western religious influence.

Conclusion
NATION AND STATE BUILDING in any country, including Pakistan, is
not about establishing a majority rule or simply holding elections
(which in Pakistan have been few and mostly controversial), but lay-
ing a true foundation of democratic polity and society. For any stu-
dent of democratic thought, nation and state building includes funda-
mental principles such as institutions and systems, citizenship,

17. Amir Taheri, “The Death of bin Ladenism,” New York Times, 11 July 2002.
ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 463

equality, inalienable fundamental rights, and empowerment of all indi-

viduals without any discrimination. In most post-colonial states, ethnic,
linguistic and religious minorities have found themselves at the receiv-
ing end of political distribution. Some saw their decline as a privileged
group, while others found themselves reduced in number or branded
as a new minority in the redrawing of boundaries. The example of
Muslims in India and Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan fits this description.
In Pakistan, the voice of minorities has never touched the heart or
mind of politicians. The tormenting experience of communal violence,
transmigration of religious populations and the young and strident
Muslim nationalism further muted the voice of minorities. In the bouts
of political struggle for power, even liberal politicians remained silent
on the issue of separate electorates. What could be more discrimina-
tory than the classification of the citizen along religious lines? Most of
the political parties decided to push the issue, while the religious groups
feared a reversal of separate electorates would create a backlash. But
the vision of democracy for such politicians was confined to getting to
the assemblies, obtaining ministerial positions and making fortunes,
not laying the foundations for true democracy.
Formal and informal discrimination against minorities has gone
hand in hand; one has encouraged and deepened the other. Separate
electorates have been more than separate electoral constituencies for
religious minorities; they have amounted to the disenfranchisement,
further marginalization and deepening sense among minorities of
being second-class Pakistanis. Mainstream political parties have no
interest in courting minorities and embracing prominent members
and leaders of these groups because they could not vote for them.
Minorities were left to form their own parties, if they so wished. Only
the Christians set up some loosely organized parties. Other minorities
have notable figures but no political organizations.
In a traditional Islamic society such as Pakistan, non-Muslims
hardly enjoy equality of social or religious status. Officially, placing
non-Muslims in another category in the electoral politics further
deepened their alienation. Minority groups never supported separate
electorates and have, for decades, struggled with whatever meager
political capital they had to restore the joint electorates. In a large
number of urban constituencies where mainstream political parties
have traditionally close contests, the balance held by minorities would
make a major difference in joint electorates.
464 RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

Minorities kept the issue alive via the press, seminars and publica-
tions. The explosion of civil society organizations in Pakistan and the
presence of the foreign press and human rights organizations have
maintained a gentle pressure by questioning the authenticity of
Pakistan’s electoral democracy. In the past few years, two issues in
Pakistan have received a lot of foreign attention: the status of women
and the plight of minorities. In examining both these issues, one can-
not escape the conclusion that both of these groups have been widely
discriminated against, have hardly any representation in the power
structure of Pakistan, and that there is official as well as society-based
discrimination against both groups. Self-image has become a big
problem in the globalized world media, and Pakistan has found its
image badly battered on many counts.
The contention of this paper is that the practice of separate elec-
torates was the worst case of disenfranchising religious minorities in
the name of having representation in the Parliament and in the
provincial assemblies. The present government has reversed the prac-
tice of separate electorates.18 Accordingly, national elections in
October 2002 were held on the basis of joint electorates. The consti-
tutional amendments inserted by the chief executive have also pro-
vided for reserved seats for the religious minorities in the Parliament,
as well as in the provincial assemblies. This is the first and most
important step toward empowering minorities and bringing them
back into mainstream national politics.
Another aspect of discrimination against minorities is informal, or
social, which is subtler than the legal, formal process of barring
minorities from the political arena. Pakistan has a long way to go
toward integrating minorities into electoral politics. The next general
elections scheduled for October 2002 will be the first in a quarter of
a century where Muslims and non-Muslims will vote together for the
same candidates. It is a sad commentary on Pakistan’s democracy that
in the 1970 and 1977 elections, which were held on the basis of joint
electorates, not a single member from the minority communities won
any seat. Given the social climate of the country, no political party in
Pakistan in the October 2002 elections offered any ticket to any mem-
ber of the minority community to contest elections on general seat.

18. See Chief Executive’s Order No. 7 of 2002.

ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND MINORITIES IN PAKISTAN 465

Social prejudice is so strong that no party would like to appear to be

supporting a non-Muslim candidate against a Muslim candidate of a
rival party.
The remedy lies in affirmative action and in maintaining reserved
seats for minorities in the provincial and national assemblies. In addi-
tion to this formal political process, much more needs to be done at
the social level. Pakistan has to stem the tide of Islamic extremism
through reforming the madrassa network, cultivating civic culture,
promoting democracy, and reorienting the political discourse on
Islam, state, and national identity. This is a tall order, but these issues
must be faced if Pakistan is to protect its society against indiscrimi-
nate violence, instability and chaos.