Frost and Stevens What To Make of A Diminished Thing
Frost and Stevens What To Make of A Diminished Thing
Frost and Stevens What To Make of A Diminished Thing
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American Literature
TODD M. LIEBER
Simjpson College
2 Dionysuis and the City: Modernism in Twentieth-Centtury Poetry (New York, I970),
P. 33.
3 The Poetty of Robert Frost, ed. Edward Cpnnery Lathem (New York, I969), p. I20.
All further references to this edition wvill be found in parentheses in the text, preceded by the
notation PRF.
4 James P. Dougherty, "Robert Frost's 'Directive to the Wilderness," American Qularterly,
XVIII (Summer, I966), p. 2II.
5 J. Hillis Miller, "Wallace Stevens' Poetry of Being," in The Act of the Mind, ed. Roy
Harvey Pearce and J. Hillis Miller (Baltimore, I965), p. I45.
II
Frost was no more eager than any other poet to define poetry, but
when he spoke about it he generally used such phrases as: "a way of
grappling with life," "a little voyage of discovery," "a way out of
something."6 All these phrases represent poetry not as entity but
activity, and, more specifically, as "a way," that is, as method. In the
essay "Education by Poetry," Frost suggests that in coming close to
poetry the student enters the world of metaphor and, through meta-
phor, learns what it is to think: "it is just putting this and that
together; it is just saying one thing in terms of another."7 He is not
speaking of trivial comparisons but the most profound thinking
humans engage in. "Unless you have had your proper poetical educa-
tion in metaphor," he writes, "you are not safe anywhere. Because
you are not at ease with figurative values: you don't know the meta-
phor in its strength and its weakness. You don't know how far you
may expect to ride it and when it may break down with you. You are
not safe in science; you are not safe in history" (SP, p. 39). The fig-
ure Frost uses to describe metaphor in this sentence is itself worth
attending to: we "ride" our metaphors. Metaphor should be con-
strued not merely as an identification of resemblance but as an instru-
ment used to get somewhere, a tool for thinking, the vehicle, perhaps,
on which the poet undertakes his "voyages of discovery." Poems
become methods of moving toward new insights on the strength of
the poet's figures, dynamic activities in which, to quote Elizabeth
Sewell, "the mind unites with a figure of its own devising as a means
toward understanding the world."8 The process is that used by Frost's
"God" in "A Masque of Reason." He says to Job: "You helped me /
Establish once and for all the principle / There's no connection man
can reason out / Between his just deserts and what he gets. . . . I
6 Lathem, Interviews with Robert Frost, pp. 58, I I7, I73. See also p. 202.
7 Selected Prose of Robert Frost, ed. Hyde Cox and Edward Connery Lathem (New York,
I966), p. 4I. All further references to this edition will be found in parentheses in the text
preceded by the notation SP.
8 E. Sewell, The Orphic Voice: Poetry and Natural History (London, I960), p. 20.
9 Opus Posthumous, ed. Samuel French Morse (New York, I966), p. I59. All further
references to this edition will be found in parentheses in the text preceded by the notation
OP.
10 The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination (New York, I95I), pp.
I I7-I8.
11 It should be noted that by "unreal" Stevens does not mean "non-existent." He gives
as examples of such poetic acts, "looking at a photograph of someone who is absent," "writ-
ing a letter to a person at a distance," or, for a member of the middle class, "the act of
thinking of the life of the rich" (OP, pp. 239-240).
One is always writing about two things at the same time in poetry and
it is this that produces the tension characteristic of poetry. One is the
true subject and the other is the poetry of the subject. The difficulty of
sticking to the true subject, when it is the poetry of the subject that is
paramount in one's mind, need only be mentioned to be understood. In
a poet who makes the true subject paramount and who merely em-
bellishes it, the subject is constant and the development orderly. If the
poetry of the subject is paramount, the true subject is not constant nor its
development orderly. This is true in the case of Proust and Joyce, for
example, in modern prose. (OP, p. 22I)
An absence in reality,
Things as they are. Or so we say.
12 The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York, I969), pp. I76-I77. All further
references to this edition will be found in parentheses in the text preceded by the notation
CP.
III
13 This speculation is central to the whole poem. In the early cantos of the poem the
audience requires the guitarist to play "a tune beyond us, yet ourselves" (CP, p. I65).
This, Stevens explained to Hi Simons, is "because that is exactly the way they are" (Letters o
Wallace Stevens, p. 359). Throughout, Stevcns develops the idea that man exists fully in his
figurative extensions of himself.
14 Cf. "Authors are actors, books are theatres' and "The reading of a poem should be an
experience. Its writing must be all the more so" (OP, pp. 157 and I70).
15 Sewell, P. 4.
subject and object, mind and body, knowledge and belief, thought
and feeling. The key lines in the poem are these:
In the activity of the singer, self and sea become one reality. Her song
embodies the sea, making it intelligible, something more than "the
heaving speech of air." In the poem, phenomena themselves, not, as
philosophic idealism would have it, a subjective image, are sensed
clearly and directly. But they are not objects to be sensed or con-
templated simply. In the poem they become instruments for shaping
human reality. As Elizabeth Sewell writes, "a mind speculating in
the poetic mode . . . draws into itself the very facts it is thinking
about, so that it can not only think about them, but think with them.
For poetry, all objects and happenings in the universe are for think-
ing with, and phenomena or events are always available to poetry
as method, at the same time as they are available as objects of
contemplation."'
Furthermore, the instrument-the song that figures the sea-is one
into which the singer has so extended herself that it has become par
of her own person, "the self that was her song." The singing involve
passionate commitment on the part of the singer. Michael Polanyi
suggests that this sort of commitment is present whenever a man uses
a tool or an interpretative framework. He writes: "We pour ourselves
into them and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We
accept them existentially by dwelling in them."'8 Polanyi's choice of
"personal" as a better term than ''objective" or ''subjective" to describe
the nature of the understanding that derives from this process seems
an appropriate description of Stevens's figure in this poem. Polanyi
writes: "In so far as the personal submits to requirements acknowl-
edged by itself as independent of itself, it is not subjective; but in so
17 The Human Metaphor (South Bend, Ind., I964), p. 68. This seems to me to be
what Stevens implies in identifying his concern with "the poetry of the subject' as para-
mount to a concern with "the true subject."
18 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towa-ds a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York.
I964), p. 59. There is no evidence that either Frost or Stevens was familiar with Polanyis
work, but through poetry each came to an epistemological position essentially the same as
Polanyi's.
IV
19 Ibid., p. 300.
20 The Necessary Angel, p. 96. Stevens is paraphrasing H. D. Lewis's essay "On Poetic
Truth." See OP, p. 236.
21 Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 293.
Though this idealist could not avoid living in the world of sense,
he refused to accept it as part of his thinking: "He received what
he denied. / But as a truth to be accepted, he supposed / A truth
beyond all truths. . . . He never supposed / . . . that if nothing
was the truth, then all / Things were the truth, the world itself was
the truth" (CP, p. 242). Consequently he became "like a phantom
in an uncreated night . . . projected by one void into / Another"
(CP, p. 242).
Frost's later poetry offers a parallel version of the loss of the world
that results when man divorces thought from physical phenomena,
particularly from the body itself. The poem is "Etherealizing":
A theory if you hold it hard enough
And long enough gets rated as a creed:
Such as that flesh is something we can slough
So that the mind can be entirely freed.
Then when the arms and legs have atrophied,
And brain is all that's left of mortal stuff,
We can lie on the beach with the seaweed
And take our daily tide baths smooth and rough.
There once we lay as blobs of jellyfish
At evolution's opposite extreme.
But now as blobs of brain we'll lie and dream,
With only one vestigial creature wish:
Oh, may the tide be soon enough at high
To keep our abstract verse from being dry.
(PRF, pp. 394-395)
The blob of jellyfish and the blob of brain reflect the same impotence.
In the first figure man is an organism without spirit; in the second
he is a disembodied mind. Frost suggests that either condition re-
moves poetic thought from its essential center. The final "creature
wish" is to be touched again and redeemed by the physical world.
"To keep our abstract verse from being dry," mind and phenomena
must be accepted equally as instruments of thought and used to
interpret one another.
Frost has not belabored the point in prose like Stevens, but it is
often manifest in his poetry. One of the clearest examples is "West-
Running Brook." The theme of the poem, baldly stated, is that love
depends upon a balanced union of contraries. But the central drama
of the poem presents the attempt of a young couple to better under-
stand their relationship to one another and their uses of the brook
as a figure to help them understand. The brook figures contrariness
in three ways: in running west, while the other brooks run east; in
the standing wave where it seems to run counter to itself; and, most
importantly, in the contrary manner in which the husband and wife
use it. The wife uses herself to think about the brook: "It must be
the brook / Can trust itself to go by contraries / The way I can
with you. . ." (PRF, p. 258). Conversely, the husband uses the brook
to think about human life: "It is this backward motion toward the
source, / Against the stream, that most we see ourselves in. . ."
(PRF, p. 260). Their temperaments lead them to almost opposite
interpretations, hers romantic, his nearly nihilistic. But as in each case
the brook leads to a figuring of balanced contraries, so the activity
of thinking with and about it together leads the couple to a clarifica-
tion of their relationship with one another and acceptance of their
own contrariness.
27 The reference is to Mark 4.10-25. Jesus has preached the parable of the sower and
the disciples ask him why he speaks to the people in parables. He replies: "To you has been
given the secret of the kingdom of God, but for those outside everything is in parables; so
that they may indeed see but not perceive, and may indeed hear but not understand; lest they
should turn again and be forgiven." This was a passage that Frost often referred to in dis-
cussions of poetic method. See, for example, Interviews with Robert Frost, p. I62, and
Selected Prose, p. 78.
VI
The malaise that manifests itself in the waste land vision of the
modern world is closely related to the modern conception of thought
and knowledge, to the modern notion of inquiry. Polanyi has written:
It has been taken for granted throughout the critical period of philosophy
that the acceptance of unproven beliefs was the broad road to darkness,
while truth was approached by the straight and narrow path of
doubt. . . . In its stricter formulations the principle of doubt forbids us
altogether to indulge in any desire to believe and demands that we should
keep our minds empty, rather than allow any but irrefutable beliefs to
take possession of them. . . . The method of doubt is a logical corollary
of objectivism. It trusts that the uprooting of all voluntary components of
belief will leave behind unassailed a residue of knowledge that is com-
pletely determined by the objective evidence.28