112 • LIVING WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

Thus my target in this chapter is pedigree-breeding specifically and not selective

breeding more generally.
O U R W H I M S Y , T H E I R W E L F A RE Historically, humans developed pedigree-breeds o f dogs for two main pur-
poses: work and entertainment. Work-related purposes inelude hunting, guard-
O N T H E E T H I C S O F P E DI C R E E-B R E E DI N G ing, and herding; entertainment-related purposes inelude aesthetics and fighting
(Farrell et al. 2015). Pedigree-breed cats seem to have been uniformly developed
John Rossi for aesthetic purposes. Today, most purebred companion animáis are not used
for work purposes, and the decisión to specifically seek out a particular breed
(as opposed to a mixed-breed), while sometimes based on temperament, often
appears to be based partly or wholly on aesthetic enjoyment, a term that I under-
stand to inelude both sentimental attachment to a particular breed and the hobby
o f breed showing. There are presently hundreds o f dog and cat breeds in existence
Pedigree-breeding (used interchangeably here with “pure-breeding”) (Farrell et al. 2015; Gough and Thomas 2004). It is not known how many o f the
is the practice o f selectively breeding animáis so as to produce, and eighty-three million dogs and ninety-five million cats kept as companions in the
then maintain, distinct species sub-types, commonly known as breeds. U S are pedigree-breeds, but the Humane Society o f the United States (H SU S)
These breeds are usually defined by a combination o f distinct physi- estimates that 25 percent ofdogs in shelters are pedigree-breeds (H S U S 2014). If
cal appearance, ancestry, and (sometimes) behavior. Pedigree-breeds this statistic is taken to reflect overall companion-animal composition, then there
o f múltiple species have been developed, including companion ani­ are approximately twenty million pedigree dogs in the US.
máis and livestock. Well-known examples o f dog breeds inelude the It has long been known in veterinary medicine that pedigree-breeds o f dogs
English Bulldog, Golden Retriever, Beagle, and Germán Shepherd; and cats suffer from “breed-associated diseases,” which are diseases seen exclu-
well-known cat breeds inelude the Persian, Siamese, and Maine Coon. sively in one or more breeds, or for which pure-breeds are at an elevated relative
Pedigree-breeds were (and are) created and maintained through risk as compared to mixed-breeds. Veterinary textbooks often devote substan-
inbreeding within a closed subpopulation o f animáis. When an ani­ tial space to such breed-associated diseases, with some textbooks being entirely
mal shows desirable physical or behavioral characteristics, it is bred devoted to them (e.g., Gough and Thomas 2004), and the diagnosis and treat-
with another animal that shows the same characteristics and/or that ment o f such diseases are a routine part o f veterinary medical practice. Concern
is expected to produce offspring showing these characteristics. This about the adverse welfare effeets o f breed-associated diseases has been building
process o f breeding related individuáis continúes as breed character­ for some time, with a sharp uptick in recent years due to increased media atten-
istics are “fixed” and as the breed population expands, and continued tion to this problem. Despite this, the ethical defensibility o f pure-breeding
propagation o f the breed over time then occurs within a “closed” sub­ seems to be assumed by most parties to the debate. Here I oífer an argument
population o f the species, that is, a population that (generally) does against the pedigree-breeding o f companion animáis: not only has pedigree-
not introduce new genetic variation from individuáis outside o f it breeding caused harm to companion animáis, but in addition it seems unavoid-
(Rooney and Sargan 2009; Gough and Thomas 2004). able that it should do so as compared to “mixed-breeding” or “outbreeding”
Pedigree-breeding can be contrasted with outbreeding (used (when properly undertaken). Further, the harm caused by pedigree-breeding
synonymously in this chapter with “mixed-breeding”), in which the cannot be defended on any reasonable view o f animáis’ moral standing, since the
animáis that are mated to each other are unrelated or very distandy human interest in pedigree-breeding is morally insignificant. W hile most o f my
related. Though pedigree-breeding is a form o f selective breeding, it discussion focuses on dogs, the arguments elaborated below apply to pedigree-
is not synonymous with selectíve breeding: animáis may be bred with breed cats and to other species o f companion animáis as well. There appear to be
any number o f selection goals, such as improved health, and such selec- no philosophical defenses o f pedigree-breeding in the literature, so in consider-
rion need not entail the crearion or continuarion o f pedigree-breeds. ing this issue I have tried to anticípate and respond to what I think the major
arguments might be.
 OurWhimsy, Their Welfare • 113 114 • LIVING WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

Breed-Associated Disease: A Very Short OverView some cases we can base this judgment on prevalent data, but since these data are
often unavailable, in other cases the judgment is based on the clinical experience
The first step in my argument will be traversed the most quickly: my claim is that
o f many veterinarians, including my own when I was in practice. We also know
pedigree-breeding produces comparatively more disease than outbreeding. As a
that relative risks for breed-associated diseases are often significantly elevated in
historical claim this seems almost indispucably true, and I strongly suspect that it
pure-breeds compared to mixed-breeds. Further, when mating two purebred ani­
is true o f necessity.
máis, knowledge o f the parents’ ancestry and genetics, as well as the anticipated
Pedigree-breeding causes disease in two ways. First, the various physical attri-
anatomy o f the offspring, will sometimes give us more specific reason to think that
butes for which we have selectively bred dogs and cats—large heads; excessive
breed-associated disease will occur. These points are worth emphasizing because
skin folds; short, stubby legs; corkscrew tails; short, “smushed” faces; distinctive
some stakeholders have called for more research on the incidence and prevalence
coats; and so on—can directly cause disease or predispose the animal to disease.
o f these diseases before action is taken. According to the argument presented in
One recent review classifies these as “conformation-related” diseases and identi-
the next section, additional research would be helpful but not necessary.
fies a total o f eighty-eight distinct conformational attributes in the top fifty U K
Two further notes are in order. First, the availability o f medical and surgi-
breeds o f dog causing or predisposing animáis to disease (Asher et al. 2009). An
cal treatments for breed-associated diseases does not compénsate for or nullify
example o f a conformation-related disease in dogs is Brachycephalic Airway
the added harm associated with pedigree-breeding. Treatments are not always
Obstruction Syndrome (BA O S), seen in brachycephalic (“short-faced”) breeds
available, and are often o f variable efficacy when available. Treatments (e.g., sur-
such as English Bulldogs and Pugs. In BAOS, a constellation o f common ana-
gery) often add morbidity to an animáis condition, and even if a condition is
tomic features in the animal’s upper airway makes it difficult for them to breathe
corrected, it does not make up for the welfare cost imposed by the disease before
comfortably; these features are a direct result o f selection for these breeds’ char-
it was treated. And, perhaps most importandy, treatment is often not pursued.
acteristic facial appearance. At the milder end, BA O S can result in uncomfort-
Second, some commentators (e.g., Jeppsson 2014) have argued that pedigree-
able breathing and exercise intolerance. At the more severe end, BA O S can result
breeding is desirable on health grounds as compared to outbreeding because
in respiratory distress, loss o f consciousness, and occasionally even death, either
pedigree-breeds sometimes receive the added benefits o f additional health
spontaneously or because o f euthanasia (Gough and Tilomas 2004; Lodato and
screens and/or selection against health problems. But this argument is mislead-
H edlund2012).
ing, because it conflates the question o f whether pedigree-breeding increases
The second mechanism underlying breed-associated disease arises from the
disease with the question o f what quality medical care we choose to provide to
fact that pedigree-breeds are created and maintained through inbreeding in a
pedigree- versus mixed-breed dogs. There is no reason why we cannot or should
closed population. It is well known that inbreeding increases the chance o f an
not provide outbred dogs with the same quality o f medical care that is sometimes
individuáis developing recessive genetic diseases, and this has been seen with
provided to pedigree-breed animáis.
pedigree-breeds. A recent review identified over three hundred breed-associated
inherited diseases in dogs that were not conformation-linked, that is, that were
due to the tendency o f pedigree-breeding to cluster disease-causing genes. These An Argument against Pedigree-Breeding
diseases inelude heart defeets, skin problems, cancers, neurologic diseases, and
Pedigree-breeding causes significant and avoidable harms to animáis. These harms
many others. By definition, these are diseases for which pedigree-breeds are at an
are avoidable because they would not occur, or would occur to a lesser extent, in
increased risk as compared to mixed-breeds (Summerset al. 2010; seealso Gough
a general outbreeding scheme. This avoidable harm cannot be justified on any
and Thomas 2004).
reasonable assumptions about animáis’ moral standing.
This is not the place to discuss in detail the welfare impaets o f breed-associated
My (unargued) starting point is that essentially all moral theories recognize
diseases or their risk assessment, but two important points will be made. First,
and grant significant weight to a principie o f non-maleficence as concems other
though the severity o f breed-associated diseases is variable, they often impose
humans, which holds that we ought not to harm others and should keep unavoid-
a substantial welfare burden on affected animáis, in terms o f discomfort, pain,
able harms to a minimum. Allowable harms tend to be very limited, including,
impaired functioning, and early death (Rooney and Sargan 2009; Gough and
for example, harms committed in defense o f one’s life and safety or small harms
Thomas 2004). Second, many breed-associated diseases occur commonly. In
imposed by the State in the Service o f an important public health goal (e.g.,
 OurWhimsy, Their Welfare • 115 116 • LIVINC WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

required vaccination)—but not much else. Notably, perpetrating harms upon a lucky good outeome does not negate the fact that the decisión, when it is
others for one’s own personal benefit (e.g., financial benefit, sexual gratification, undertaken, is riskier than another decisión that one could have made (driving
entertainment) is generally considered unjustified, especially when che harms in only when sober, mating mixed-breeds instead o f pedigree-breeds). Further, the
question are not trivial. Even committed utilitarians—whose preferred theory appropriate frame o f ethical analysis is not merely (and probably not even pri-
might seem to sanction various harms to individuáis if such harms maximize marily) with individual breeding decisions; it is with the avoidable harm inher-
population welfare— often expend much argumentative effort in attempting to ent in perpetuating a breed as a whole. Two pedigree-breed animáis can only be
preserve the stringeney o f non-maleficence, for example, by appealing to indirect mated if the breed as a whole is maintained, and as long as some members o f
effeets or by adopting rule-utilitarianism. the breed are affected by breed-associated disease, then pedigree-breeding causes
Second, powerful arguments have been provided for granting many sentient avoidable harm. Furthermore, the preceding discussion shows that the EC-based
animáis’ interests equal moral consideration (E C ) to humans’ interests (e.g., conclusión against pedigree-breeding does not depend on the harms o f breed-
DeGrazia 2002), and certainly most mammals, which would inelude many spe- associated disease’s being frequent or severe (though they often are); the strength
cies o f companion animáis. This means not only that these animáis’ interests o f our obligation o f non-maleficence to companion animáis is sufficiendy high
should be given equal moral weight to comparable human interests, but also that harm in general will not be permissible unless for very important reasons.
more generally that it is wrong to morally “discount” animáis’ interests. Such I might rest my case with the argument from E C , but it will be useful to show
arguments are motivated by the claims that sentient animáis have interests and that pedigree-breeding is not justifiable on any plausible versión o f an unequal
thus moral standing; that species per se is a morally arbitrary characteristic moral consideration (U C ) view, either— especially since many readers might be
according to which to assign moral standing; and that other possible criteria for inclined toward such a view. According to U C views, animáis’ interests deserve
morally discounting animáis’ interests, such as their lesser intelligence, inability some moral consideration, but less so than humans’ interests. U C views might
to use language, inabihty to form contracts, or inability to robustly particípate take a number o f forms, but the most plausible form is the sliding-scale view,
in the “moral community” (however this is defined) all fail for one reason or according to which a being’s level o f moral considerability is a function o f its
another. Usually these arguments fail because they also have the consequence that mental complexity. At the top o f the hierarchy stand humans, who deserve full
certain members o f the human community do not deserve equal moral consid­ moral consideration. As one moves “down” the phylogenetic scale, animáis
eration o f their interests, a conclusión that most persons find counterintuitive o f progressively lesser cognitive, affective, and social complexity are granted
and unacceptable. In addition, arguments against E C run into other difficulties. progressively lesser moral consideration (DeGrazia 2002). According to the
For example, our special obligations to other persons with whom we have cióse sliding-scale view, the permissibility o f harming an animal will depend on three
relationships are invariably positive in nature; the lack o f a cióse relationship does things: (1) thedegree o f harm involved, (2) the animal’s place on the sliding scale,
not relax the stringeney o f our negative obligations in human-human morality, so which will determine how much moral weight we give to this harm, and (3) the
it is unclear why it should do so in human-animal morality, as the “moral com- significance o f the human interest that is being advanced by harming the animal.
munity” argument often holds (see DeGrazia 2002). If we accept E C , as I think It has already been argued that the harms o f breed-associated diseases are often
we should, then we can only justifiably harm animáis in the very limited kinds o f significant and that they occur frequendy. As concerns the issue o f moral stand­
scenarios in which similar harm would be justifiable to other humans. Pedigree- ing, common companion animáis, such as dogs and cats, possess relatively com-
breeding does not even come cióse to meeting the test o f stringeney we impose plex mental lives—not as complex as those o f some other nonhuman animáis,
on allowable harms to other humans: it causes harm that is nontrivial and easily including numerous primate species and dolphins, but complex enough that we
avoidable, and does not serve a vital human interest (e.g., individual self-defense can reasonably expect that our companion animáis will sit fairly high on the scale
or safeguarding the welfare o f the entire community). Thus pedigree-breeding is o f moral considerability. This means that strong reasons will have to be provided
not justifiable on an E C view. to justify harming them.
It might be observed that not all pedigree-breed animáis suffer from breed- Pedigree-breeding does not seem to serve a significant human interest. In fact,
associated disease, and while this is true, it does not affect the moral conclusión. in the vast majority o f cases it seems to serve a trivial interest, namely an aesthetic
W hat matters from the standpoint o f a person creating more purebred animáis is interest, and not o f the deep kind that we might associate with art, but rather o f
ex ante risk, not expost harm. As with other risky decisions (e.g., drunk driving), the more shallow kind that we associate with “faneying” something, which can
 Our Whimsy, Their Welfare • 117 118 • LIVINC WITH COMPAIMION ANIMALS

reasonably be described as entertainment. This conclusión seems rather obvious and serve the larger human need for entertainment, purposive activity, and the
co me, but in conversation with some veterinarians and breeders I have encoun- formation o f a personal identity. However, many persons are interested in many
tered substantial resistance to the preceding claim. It is argued that persons who things, with the intensity o f interests waxing and waning over time. An identity
cake an interest in pedigree-breeds sometimes devote significant time, money, built around one interest may instead be built around another. What is more,
and energy to breeding, showing, and general “breed fancying.” They may even hobbies often have instrumental valué, for example, because they allow people to
base their careers and personal identities on it and form deep attachments to a find support in a community, but again such valué can be served by any number
particular breed. Are their interests in pedigree-breeding morally significant? o f hobbies.
I would answer “no” for several reasons. Further, even i f we accept the claim that some persons’ lives would genuinely
First, we should resist the view that something qualifies as a significant human be impoverished by the elimination o f pedigree-breeds, this only holds true o f
interest simply in virtue o f being proclaimed as such. This view implausibly col- persons who have previously built a personal identity around such breeds. Were
lapses all critical distance between what we valué and what we ought to valué. we to do away with pedigree-breeding, future persons would never develop such
Even more implausibly, it also prevenís us from making judgments o f the relative an interest in the first place and would develop other interests instead. Nothing
importance o f interests, but we do this sort o f thing all o f the time: we do not o f independent moral valué would appear to be lost in this scenario (if anything,
view things like having adequate food, shelter, and medical care, or an ability to it would be morally preferable on account o f the harm that pedigree-breeding
exert some measure o f control over our lives, as o f similar importance to getting a causes and its implicit commodification o f animáis); rather, all that would be
n e w T V or even acceptingajob with aslighdy shorter commute. lost would be someone’s particular interest in pedigree-breeding. Hius, any loss
Second, while human interests in entertainment and the development o f hob- to human interests entailed by the elimination o f pedigree-breeding would be
bies are o f some moral significance at the categóricai level— after all, who would transient.
want to live a life devoid o f leisure pursuits ?— there are many alternative ways to Finally, it might be argued that the moral significance o f human interests is
satisfy these interests apart from pedigree-breeding. Since taking animáis seriously a function not just o f their strength for the persons who hold them, but also o f
means that we should look for ways to avoid conflicts between our interests and the kind o f interests that they are. For example, we might discourage a persons
theirs (see Zamir 2007), we should look for ways other than pedigree-breeding to development o f certain interests, such as an interest in psychologically manipu-
satisfy our interests in entertainment and hobby-building. Some persons might lating others or engaging in an environmentally destructive hobby, not just on
press by asserting a significant interest in pedigree-breeding specifically, arguing the grounds that these activities result in harm to others, but also on the grounds
that it provides something irreplaceable to their lives, which would be impov- that our own moral development is hindered by the adoption o f such interests,
erished without it. But it just seems very unlikely, to this author at least, that exactly because o f their consequences for others. Said another way, we should not
such persons would not be able to find equivalent satisfaction in other activities. be the kind o f people who develop such interests. While U C views do justify com-
Some o f the perceived significance in the human interest in pedigree-breeding paratively more harms to animáis than E C views, the purpose for which we are
likely stems from the meaningful relationships that persons form with individual harming animáis still matters very much to the justification o f such harm. Harms
animáis o f a specific breed, but such meaningful human-animal relationships can perpetrated to advance an important social goal, such as curing a disease, might
and do often exist with mixed-breed animáis as well. sometimes be justified on a U C view, but pedigree-breeding does not serve an
This perceived significance might also arise from the way in which some interest this important. Further, in the case o f research, someone who harms an
people build a personal identity around one or more o f such breeds. Once a spe­ animal does so only as a means to the larger end o f a social benefit that is other-
cific personal identity is formed, it might seem daunting to contémplate giving wise unobtainable (or so at least the scientists conducting the research tend to
up something crucial to that identity, as though a part o f oneself would be lost. assume), but in the case o f pedigree-breeding, the harms are a function o f the
Flowever, reflection on the complexity and variety o f human interests and hob- ends themselves. These differences between the harms o f research and those o f
bies suggests to me that a significant part o f the valué o f many hobbies lies in pedigree-breeding help to show why an interest in the latter might be negatively
building a persons identity, apart from the valué o f the specific hobby/interest evaluated from the standpoint o f moral virtue, even on a U C view allowing some
in question. Many (though certainly not all) hobby-based interests do not in harms to animáis.
themselves appear to have much intrinsic moral significance. They are enjoyed
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The preceding discussion has focused on pedigree-breeding as an aesthetic animáis from the breeding pool on account o f their carriage o f disease-causing
interest; what o f pedigree-breeding for other purposes, such as herding, hunt- genes, and not further reducing already-small eífective breeding population sizes
ing, or other sport? The first thing to say regarding these other uses o f purebred (Bateson 2010). Similarly, the availability o f various screening tests and breeding
animáis is that they are far less common than the keeping o f such animáis for strategies to reduce disease does not mean that they will be routinely and aggrcs-
aesthetic purposes. Second, some such uses—particularly sporting— can be sub- sively used. Any discussion o f the ethics o f pedigree-breeding needs to acknowl-
sumed under entertainment and so require no further argument. Activities such edge not only what is possible, but also what is likely. If a nontrivial percentage o f
as hunting and herding might at one time have served a significant human inter­ breeders will be tempted to “cut corners” (e.g., for economic reasons), then the
est, but since humans no longer need to rely on either hunting or animal agri- question o f whether breed-associated disease can in principie be eliminated will be
culture more generally (even though many choose to utilize the producís o f the moot. Since pedigree-breedingitself seems to represent akind ofcommodification
latter), this significance can no longer be claimed. At most, this need might jus- o f animáis, and since animáis are classified as property and are used in economic
tify the keeping o f some herding animáis in non-industrialized pastoral societies transactions (i.e., they are bought and sold), such corner-cutting seems likely.
relying on animal agriculture, but for all intents and purposes it would still result To avoid misunderstanding, the preceding discussion is not meant to suggest
in the abandonment o f herding breeds. that mixed-breed animáis never develop disease (they do) or that mixed-breeding
In sum, we have a number o f reasons to conclude that the human interest in is always ethically unproblematic (it is not). For example, cióse inbreeding o f
pedigree-breeding is not morally significant, which means that pedigree-breeding mixed-breed dogs (as might occur, for example, in “backyard breeding”) will tend
is not justifiable on a plausible U C view. to produce the same kinds o f genetic disease that we see with pedigree-breed ani­
máis, and this is ethically problematic. But the difference between the two is that
mixed-breeding can be maintained without inbreeding while pedigree-breeding
Is Pedigree-Breeding Inherently Risky? cannot. Similarly, mixed-breeding can be maintained without selecting for the
Might pedigree-breeding be reformed to the point where it does not impose kinds o f conformational attributes that produce disease, while pedigree-breeds
additional harm as compared to outbreeding? Probably not. Breeding for less would cease to exist if not for their unique appearance.
extreme physical appearances can mitígate conformation-related diseases, but
as long as we are breeding for physical conformation, it seems likely that some
The Objection from Non-ldentity
conformational disease will continué to occur, especially since it cannot always
be anticipated how physical conformation will produce disease. As concerns One objection to my argument against pedigree-breeding is the “non-identity
genetic disorders, breeding within a closed subpopulation will always increase the problem” (Palmer 2012). According to this objection, the purebred animáis that
risk o f disease. Occasional outcrossing and backcrossing can reintroduce some we create are not harmed, even i f they experience more disease than outbred ani­
genetic variability into a breed, and limiting the number o f times that a sire can máis. This is because the definition o f “harm” is to make an individual worse off
be bred (in order to reduce so-called “popular sire syndrome”) has also been rec- than they otherwise would have been, and when we bring individuáis into exis-
ommended and would be helpful. However, the norm o f pedigree-breeding in tence (as we do when breeding pedigree dogs and cats), they have no prior State
closed populations will still reduce genetic diversity as compared to the norm o f o f welfare with which to compare their present existence. In other words, these
outbreeding.1 Similarly, the aggressive use o f genetic tests for pre-mating screens animáis cannot be worse o íf than they previously were, because they previously
could help reduce the transmission o f disease-causing genes, but such tests are did not exist.
only available for a small number o f genetic conditions, and this is unlikely to The non-identity problem has a significant record o f discussion in moral
change soon. Further, the maintenance ofpedigree-breeds entails that when new philosophy as concerns reproductive ethics and our obligations to future genera-
disease-causing alíeles emerge through mutation, they will be more likely to pro­ tions; it has also been raised as a potential rebuttal to welfare-based criticisms o f
duce disease in the animal population. pedigree-breeding (Palmer 2012). I will not respond in detail to this problem
There are also pragmatic factors to consider. If the preservation o f a breed is here, partly because an adequate response would be lengthy, and partly because
deemed important, then tradeoffs will likely have to be made between removing other authors have advanced potential Solutions to this problem. I will, however,
briefly sketch my favored response.
 OurWhimsy, Their Welfare • 121 122 • LIVING WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

First, I embrace the claim that we do not harm or wrong individuáis by failing But why is this important? The most plausible answer seems to me to be that
to bring them into existence, but we can both harm and wrong individuáis by morality is centrally concemed with the welfare o f others, and the concept o f
bringing them into existence under certain conditions. There are numerous ways “harm” is a way o f making sense o f our own agency and the way that our decisions
to make sense o f this claim, one o f which is that nonexistent individuáis have no affect the interests o f sentient others. Said another way, “harm” is not a meta-
interests and thus cannot be harmed, benefited orwronged, while the individuáis physical concept describing something that exists in the worid independendy o f
that we bring into existence do have interests and therefore moral standing. Thus human experience or judgment. Rather, it is a pragmatic concept that we employ
the way in which our reproductive decisions affect the interests o f the animáis we in moral decision-making. This being the case, showing that our decisions have
create has moral salience and demands moral justification, while our failure to made others worse o ff than they otherwise would have been is sufficient to dem­
bring individuáis into existence does not affect their (nonexistent) interests and ónstrate harm, but it is not necessary. Rather, we need only show that our deci­
thus does not require moral justification. sions have decreased the welfare o f the sentient others affected (and perhaps also
Second, I hold that pedigree-breeding harms the animáis that we create as created) as compared to alternative courses o f action. To insist otherwise appears
compared to the level o f welfare generally enjoyed by outbred animáis (again stipulative and question-begging.
restricting our focus to genetic and conformational disease). This comparative
judgment appeals to a “species norm,” but this norm is not offered in an essen-
The Best-lnterest Objection
tialist sense, ñor in a purely descriptive statistical sense describing “average” spe­
cies welfare at any given time. Rather, “species norm” as understood here is the A secondpotential objection to my argument against pedigree-breeding acknowl-
historical baseline from which we departed when we created pedigree-breeds, a edges that it results in harm (unlike the objection from non-identity), but goes
baseline that is still approximately represented by the average health o f mixed- on to argüe that it is in the pedigree animáis’ best-interest, all things considered,
breed animáis. Pedigree-breed dogs and cats are the result o f a process by which to be brought into existence. This is because pedigree dogs and cats are brought
domesticated dogs and cats were intentionally bred by humans to accentuate cer­ into existence because they are pedigree animáis, and their increased risk o f dis­
tain morphologic or behavioral features, inadvertendy resultíng in an increased ease is the “price o f admission” to (we are assuming) a good-quality life; thus our
tendency toward disease. This process is reversible, and furthermore, to reverse it creation o f breed-associated disease is morally permissible. Though he does not
we need only to refrain from a particular course o f action: the course o f action address the issue o f pedigree-breeding, Tzachi Zamir provides a general basis for
whereby we perpetúate pedigree-breeds. Against this baseline we can make sense this kind o f argument:
o f the judgment that our breeding practices have resulted in harm, and will con­
tinué to do so should we keep them up. Well-kept pets are a source o f joy to their owners, live a much better life
Stricdy speaking, it is true that the purebred animáis we create are not themselves than they would have lived in the wild, and, as far as I can tell, pay a small
made worse offby their creation, so how can we say that they are harmed? I believe price for such conditions.. . . The [owner-pet] relationship is not fully
that this core aspect o f the non-identity problem is best approached by inquiring paternalistic since, unlike with children, one is not merely a guardián act-
after the moral significance o f the concept o f harm. Both the non-identity prob­ ing with only their interests in mind but is also acting with the interest o f
lem and some Solutions to it (e.g., the so-called “impersonal solution”; see Palmer preserving the relationship as such. Many morally problematic, invasive
2012 for discussion) presuppose a certain conception o f harm, rather than arguing owner actions, such as limiting movement, sterilizing, or declawing, are
for it. This conception o f harm is temporal in nature: an individual must exist on conceptualized (and sometimes justified) inthislight. (2007, 97-98)
“both sides” o f a putative harm in order to say that it has been harmed. That is, the
individual must exist beforehand, so that we have a “baseline” o f its welfare with Though Zamir States that the owner-pet relationship is not based only on what
which to compare its future welfare after the putative harm occurred; this tempo­ is in the animáis best interest, the argument presented in this passage seems to
ral comparison allows us to say that the individual has been made worse off. Since amount to this claim, albeit in two steps: (1) The life o f a domesticated compan-
most o f our moral decisions concern individuáis who already exist, this temporal ion animal is better from the standpoint o f its welfare than the life o f a wild ani­
conception makes sense: by harming them, we typically make them worse off than mal; (2) certain actions that harm companion animáis in the immediate sense will
they formerly were or otherwise would have been had we not acted. nonetheless be morallyjustified because they preserve the owner-pet relationship,
 OurWhimsy, Their Welfare • 123 124 • LIVING WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

which is necessary to the keeping o f domesticated animáis, thus allowing for their will be reasonably bounded at what does not substantially set back the interests o f
enjoyment o f a quality o f life that is better than that o f a wild animal. the owner (e.g., by seriously jeopardizing the owner’s safety)—then some animal-
Let us assume, for the purposes o f this discussion, that claim (1) could be sat- harming actions might be justified if they are necessary to avoid infringing upon
isfied for the species o f animáis under consideration. Whether claim (2) justifies a very important interest o f the owner, if the extern o f harm to the animal is not
pedigree-breeding depends on just how we interpret the idea o f being “necessary” too great, and if there are no less harmful alternatives.
for the preservation o f the relationship between owner and companion animal. Even granting some controversy and fuzziness around the previous argument
On a strict interpretation, an action would be necessary to the preservation o f (e.g., what counts as a “substantial” interest for the owner?), we can see that it
the relationship between owner and animal if this relationship could notplausibly would not justify pedigree-breeding, because in the case o f pedigree-breeding
exist were it not for the action in question. This kind o f necessity clearly does we have a less harmful and clearly viable alternative: outbreeding. Furthermore,
not apply to pedigree-breeding: many people can and do develop stable, mutu- whatever interest a person might have in a specific pedigree-breed does not seem
ally beneficial, long-term relationships with mixed-breed animáis. Furthermore, to come even cióse to the level o f importance that would justify the harms o f
some physical and behavioral characteristics o f specific breeds, such as aggres- breed-associated disease. On an E C view, it is not the owner’s interests that assume
sive tendencies or a predisposition to disease that is cosdy to treat, would (other primacy, but rather the animal’s interests. Harms to companion animáis would be
things being equal) seem to jeopardize the human-animal bond more than they permissible only to the extern that they are necessary to the human companion’s
promote it; people prefer specific breeds o f animáis in spite o f these things and being reasonably able to provide the superior (we are assuming) quality o f domes­
not because o f them. ticated life. A serious threat to one’s own welfare counts as aífecting what a person
On a broader interpretation, an action would be necessary to the preservation is reasonably able to do; a preference for a particular breed does not.
o f the relationship between owner and animal if a particular person would not This conclusión also seems to hold on any reasonable U C view o f companion
maintain the relationship were it notfo r this action. For example, a person might animáis’ moral standing. Such a view would still ascribe significant moral impor­
decide that s/he only wants a dog with cropped ears or a cat that is declawed, tance to animáis’ interests, and in order to justifiably set back their interests we
and if these actions are not undertaken then s/he will relinquish the animal. would need to be able to show that a significant human interest is being advanced
Since it is better for the animal to be well cared for, it might be argued that it and that there is no less harmful alternative to meeting this interest. Pedigree-
is in the animáis “best interest” to be subjected to these procedures, as it pre­ breeding seems to satisfy neither criterion.
serves the human-animal relationship. Analogously, it might be argued that
pedigree-breeding is morally justified because a particular person’s predilection
for a particular breed increases their sentimental attachment to the animal, thus
Conclusión
strengthening the human-animal relationship (something like this argument has I have argued here that pedigree-breeding causes avoidable harm to animáis, and
been put to me in conversation). that this harm is not justifiable on either E C or U C views o f animáis’ moral status.
As my use o f scare-quotes indicates, I am skeptical that this kind o f argument It is not justifiable on U C views because the human interest in pedigree-breeding
can be justified. Zamir also seems to agree, insofar as he labels as “unproblem- does not rise to the level o f significance required to justify nontrivial harms
atically immoral” actions that “cause pain and possible complications to the pet to animáis like dogs and cats. Pedigree-breeding is not justifiable on E C views
without benefiting the animal (e.g., tail docking and ear cropping)” (2007, 98), because only the most important reasons (e.g., self-defense) could ever justify
even though these might strengthen the owner-pet relationship. The question harm to animáis on this kind ofview. Pedigree-breeding can be reformed to cause
is “why?” and the simple (and, in my view, correct) answer is that if we assume less harm to animáis, but it seems unlikely that it can be reformed to the point
that nonhuman animáis deserve equal moral consideration, then it will not be that it causes no added harm as compared to outbreeding. Even in a less harm­
permissible to harm them outside o f very limited circumstances. One such pos­ ful formulation, and even as practiced on other species o f companion animáis, it
sible circumstance is i f we are interested in providing the best possible life for an seems doubtful that pure-breeding will be justified on a U C view, since the harm
animal. If we grant claim (1), then it would be better from the standpoint o f an is easily avoidable and does not serve a significant human interest in almost any
animáis life if that life were a domesticated life. If we also grant a further, seem- case, and since the interest served by pure-breeding in most cases (entertainment)
ingly uncontroversial claim— that the “best possible life” for a companion animal
 OurWhimsy, Their Welfare • 125 126 • LIVING WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

can casily be met through other avenues. Thus, on the argumcnt prescnted herc, Rooney, Nicola, and David Sargan. 2009. Pedigree Dog Breeding in the UK: A Major
pedigree-breeding should not mcrcly be reformed, but abandoned. Welfare Concem?Wcst Sussex: RSPCA.
Summers, Jennifer F., Gillian Diesel, Lucy Asher, Paul D. McGreevy, and Lisa M.
Collins. 2010. “Inherited Defects in Pedigree Dogs. Part 2: Disorders that Are Not
Note Related to Breed Standards.” The VeterinaryJournal 183 (1): 39-45.
Zamir, Tzachi. 2007. Ethics and theBeast: A Speciesist Argumentfor Animal Liberation.
1. Here it is important to distinguish between inbreeding as a practice and inbreed-
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
ing as a descripdon of a breeds lack of genetic variability. Some recent reviews have
identified a few breeds tKat are relatively healthy despite being heavily inbred (see
Farrell et al. 2015). It is speculated that the deleterious disease alíeles in these breeds
developed after domesticación of the dog but before the establishment of the breed.
Regardless, these ñndings do not controvert the claim that inbreeding increases
genetic disease. Once a deleterious gene mutation arises, the practice of inbreeding
will produce more diseased individuáis than the practice o f outbreeding. An inbred
breed that has avoided this outeome has only been lucky—to date.

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