The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy Seals: Peterson, Erick

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2009-06
The strategic utility of U.S. Navy Seals
Peterson, Erick.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4684
NAVAL
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THESIS
THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF U.S. NAVY SEALS
by
Erick Peterson
June 2009
Thesis Advisor: Hy Rothstein

Second Reader: Brian Greenshields
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Strategic Utility of U.S. 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the overwhelming use of special
operations forces (SOF) in operational and tactical roles. With an expected draw down
in Iraq, it is time to refocus SOCOM on the strategic utility of SOF, specifically on
the Maritime arm of SOCOM, the Sea Air Land (SEALs). SEALs bring unique capabilities
based on their comparative advantage in direct action and their familiarity with the
maritime domain. This comparative advantage contributes to their strategic utility as
a short duration, direct action force working from land and sea.
The SEAL culture, based on the history of the organization, their recruitment,
selection and training, has historically focused on direct action operations.
Insistence of indirect action will atrophy the skill sets of these maritime commandos.
Historic research will illustrate successful strategic uses of SEALs in an effort to
provide guidelines to decision makers. These decision makers must incorporate a
balanced approach to the war, where an over-reaction and over commitment of forces to
one mission set will likely imperil, not help, U.S. strategy. The Navy SEALs have an
historic and proven comparative advantage in direct action based operations and best
serve SOCOM’s strategy fulfilling their strategic utility.
14. SUBJECT TERMS U.S. Navy SEALs, SEALs, Naval Special Warfare, 15. NUMBER OF
NSW, Special Operations Forces, SOF, SOCOM, SOF Culture, Comparative PAGES
Advantage, Strategic Utility. 121
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Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i
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THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF U.S. NAVY SEALS
Erick Peterson
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., California State University, Long Beach, 1994
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 2009
Author: Erick Peterson
Approved by: Hy Rothstein

Thesis Advisor
Brian Greenshields
Second Reader
Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis
iii
iv
ABSTRACT
The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the

overwhelming use of special operations forces (SOF) in
operational and tactical roles. With an expected draw down
in Iraq, it is time to refocus SOCOM on the strategic
utility of SOF, specifically on the Maritime arm of SOCOM,
the SEALs. SEALs bring unique capabilities based on their
comparative advantage in direct action and their
familiarity with the maritime domain. This comparative
advantage contributes to their strategic utility as a short
duration, direct action force working from land and sea.
The SEAL culture, based on the history of the

organization, their recruitment, selection and training,
has historically focused on direct action operations.
Insistence of indirect action will atrophy the skill sets
of these maritime commandos.
Historic research will illustrate successful strategic

uses of SEALs in an effort to provide guidelines to
decision makers. These decision makers must incorporate a
balanced approach to the war, where an over-reaction and
over commitment of forces to one mission set will likely
imperil, not help, U.S. strategy. The Navy SEALs have an
historic and proven comparative advantage in direct action
based operations and best serve SOCOM’s strategy fulfilling
their strategic utility.
v
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1
A. THESIS OVERVIEW ....................................1
B. STRATEGIC UTILITY ..................................4
C. SOCOM AND SOF ......................................5
II. INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND .............11
A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM) TASKS ..........11
B. THEORY BEHIND SOF .................................12
C. EVOLUTION OF SOF MISSIONS .........................14
III. SEALS ..................................................15
A. THE CULTURE CREATED ...............................15
B. SEAL ETHOS ........................................18
C. TRAINING ..........................................21
1. Recruitment ..................................21
2. BUD/S ........................................25
D. SEAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING .......................27
1. Pre-deployment Work Up / Task Unit Training ..28
a. Land Warfare ............................28
b. Close Quarters Combat (CQC) .............28
c. Special Operations in Urban Combat
(SOUC) ..................................29
d. Mobility ................................29
e. Air Week ................................29
f. Dive Training ...........................29
g. First Aid / Trauma ......................30
h. Close Quarters Battle (Hand to Hand) ....30
2. Pre-Deployment Individual Training ...........30
E. HISTORY ...........................................31
F. UNIT ORGANIZATION .................................36
G. WHERE TRAINING AND CULTURE HAVE BROUGHT THEM ......39
IV. CASE STUDIES—HISTORIC EMPLOYMENT OF SEALS ..............41
A. CASE STUDIES ......................................43
1. Vietnam—March 1962—March 1973 ................43
2. Panama—Operation Just Cause—20 December 1989 .46
3. Panama—Operation Just Cause—20 December 1989 .49
4. Grenada–Operation Urgent Fury–25 October
1983 .........................................51
5. El Salvador ..................................53
6. Desert Storm—Deception Operation—24 February
1991 .........................................55
7. Afghanistan–Operation Red Wings—28 June 2005 .56
8. Iraq–Ramadi–Combat FID–Sniper Overwatch ......58
vii
9. Iraq–Habbaniyah ..............................60
B. MISUSES ...........................................61
C. SUMMARY ...........................................63
V. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE; SYNTHESIS OF CULTURE, HISTORY
AND TRAINING ...........................................65
A. SOF AND DIRECT ACTION .............................65
B. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE .............................66
C. LEADERSHIP MUST RECOGNIZE THE COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE .........................................68
VI. STRATEGIC UTILITY AND FUTURE EMPLOYMENT ................71
A. THE SEAL STRATEGIC UTILITY ........................71
B. RETAIN DA/SR AS PRIORITY MISSION ..................72
C. THE MARITIME NICHE ................................74
D. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE (SFA), TRIBAL
ENGAGEMENT AND INDIRECT ACTION ....................76
VII. CONCLUSION .............................................81
A. A TEMPERED APPROACH ...............................82
B. WHAT SEAL LEADERSHIP HAS LEARNED ..................82
C. THE ROAD AHEAD ....................................82
APPENDIX ....................................................85
A. DIRECT ACTION .....................................85
B. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE (SR)WASN’T FORMATTED .......87
C. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE ..........................88
D. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) .......................88
E. COUNTERTERRORISM (CT) .............................90
F. COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION (WMD) .................................91
G. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (CAO) ....................91
H. PSYOP .............................................92
I. INFORMATION OPERATIONS ............................92
LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................93
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................105
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Spectrum of Special Operations...................7

Figure 2. Spectrum of Special Operations...................8
Figure 3. U.S. Navy Seal Code(From Navy SEAL home page,
2008)...........................................20
Figure 4. Naval Warfare Information Publication 29–1
(From Dockery, 1991)............................35
Figure 5. NSW SEAL Team Chain of Command..................37
Figure 6. NSW Chain of Command............................38
ix
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the

overwhelming use of special operations forces (SOF) in
operational and tactical roles. With an expected draw down
in Iraq, it is time to refocus SOCOM on the strategic
utility of SOF, specifically on the Maritime arm of SOCOM,
the SEALs. SEALs bring unique capabilities, based on their
comparative advantage in direct action, and their
familiarity with maritime domain. This comparative
advantage contributes to their strategic utility, as a
short duration, and direct action force working from land
and sea.
The SEAL culture, based on the history of the
organization, their recruitment, selection and training,
has historically focused on kinetic operations. Insistence
of indirect action will atrophy the skill sets of these
maritime commandos.
Historic research will illustrate successful strategic
uses of SEALs in an effort to provide guidelines to
decision makers. These decision makers must incorporate a
balanced approach to the war, where an over-reaction and
over commitment of forces to one mission set will likely
imperil, not help, U.S. strategy. The Navy SEALs have an
historic and proven comparative advantage in direct action
based operations and best serve SOCOM’s strategy fulfilling
their strategic utility.
xi
xii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank first and foremost my

brothers-in-arms for their tireless devotion in protecting
our country. Also, the author would like to thank the
Naval Special Warfare community for giving me the
incredible opportunity over the past eleven years to serve
my country. The actions of past leaders and the words of
today’s warrior down range inspired the topic of this
thesis.
The author would also like to thank the entire staff
of Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, for their
inspiration in this endeavor. Information, thoughts and
concepts from almost every class attended were used in the
formulation of this thesis.
Finally, the author would like to give considerable
thanks to Dr. Hy Rothstein and Colonel Brian Greenshields
(USAF) for their tireless mentorship and guidance in the
production of this thesis.
xiii
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THESIS OVERVIEW
Since their inception in 1961, Navy Sea Air Land

(SEAL) commandos have proven themselves a capable and
formidable fighting force. From the actions of the SEALs’
forefathers, the Scouts and Raiders in World War II and the
UDT (Underwater Demolition Teams) Frogmen of World War II
and Korea, to the harrowing and heroic experiences in
Vietnam, Grenada and now Afghanistan and Iraq, Navy SEALs
have proven successful at engaging and killing the nation’s
enemies. Today the SEALs are part of a bigger Naval
Special Warfare (NSW) community, which includes Special
Boat Teams (SBTs) and SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV). Since
1987, NSW has fallen under the operational command of
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which has purview over
all of the United States’ special operations forces (Army
Special Forces, Army Civil Affairs, Army Psychological
Operations, Army Rangers, Army 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (SOAR), Air Force Para-rescuemen, Air
Force Combat Controllers, Special Operations Air Force
fixed and rotary wing assets, Marine Special Operations
Forces and NSW). With these forces all contending for
SOCOM’s missions, competition is unavoidable. In an effort
to remain relevant and competitive for missions, forces
have expanded their historic mission sets. In the current
battle spaces of Afghanistan and Iraq, the thin line
separating the responsibilities of various Special
Operations Forces (SOF) has been increasingly blurred.
What was once seen as historically Special Forces (SF)
1
missions (organizing and leading irregular forces and the
long-term engagement of these forces) has been taken on by
U.S. Navy SEALs. In like manner, Special Forces are
routinely conducting missions where SEALs have a
comparative advantage, such as direct action raids and
enemy snatches. The blurred “division of labor” brings
pointed questions as to what missions individual SOF should
be doing. The SF historic model of working with local
forces fits well in the proposed “by, with, and through”
indirect strategy, but does not comfortably mesh with
understood strengths of the Navy SEALs.
With the relatively new emphasis on indirect action,1

SEALs are being called upon more often to conduct indirect
action missions. This begs the question, “Is this what
they should be doing, or are they doing it merely because
they can?” Or more to the point, what is the strategic
utility of the U.S. Navy SEALs?
This paper goes into detail on how the factors that

surround the SEALs, from culture and training to their
operational history, as well as the need for a balanced
approach for the U.S. military, defines their strategic
utility. The paper also illustrates how using SEALs in
the indirect action role, while possible, is not the most
efficient or effective use of the force. Based on history,
1 Indirect action are efforts to enable others to combat a defined

enemy (in the GWOT, it is global extremism) by providing training,
equipment, transfer of technology and ideas, humanitarian aid to the
populace and support to the favored government. Unconventional War
(UW) is fought this way; defined as “Operations conducted by, with or
through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement,
insurgency, or conventional military operations” (FM 3-05.103).
2
the SEAL ethos, normative culture and comparative
advantage, the SEALs strategic utility is primarily as a
direct action unit for SOCOM.
The methodology of this paper employs case studies and

interviews with senior NSW personnel. This paper
investigates the genesis of the unit, reviews its
recruitment and training, highlights successful employment
throughout history and the results of this employment, as
well as misemployment of SEALs and the results, and
validates the proposition that the comparative advantage of
SEALs is in conducting direct action (DA) missions. This
comparative advantage will be established by examining SEAL
recruitment, training, equipping, ethos, culture, and
historical employment.
Through a literature review and interviews with senior

SEAL personnel, this thesis explores the best employment of
SEALs. Chapter II presents a brief overview of SOCOM.
Chapter III focuses on U.S. Navy SEAL culture, and how

this culture is a product of their ethos, recruitment,
training, and history. The description of training
includes selection training, also known as BUD/S (Basic
Underwater Demolition / SEAL school), the training required
to qualify as a SEAL (SEAL Qualification Training or SQT)
once a service member graduates BUD/S, and the training
SEAL Task Units go through to prepare them for deployment.
Chapter IV analyzes case studies of historic

employments of SEALs—both successful and unsuccessful.
These case studies will reveal the reasons for success or
failure of SEAL operations.
3
Chapter V synthesizes the information presented in
Chapter III (culture and training) with information from
Chapter IV (case studies) in order to show the comparative
advantage NSW forces have in Direct Action missions.
Chapter VI discusses the strategic utility of SEALs

and recommendations for future SEAL employment. It looks
at the SEALs’ maritime niche and provides prioritization of
SEAL missions.
Chapter VI is the conclusion and addresses the future

for Naval Special Warfare. Also discussed are the lessons
learned by SEAL leadership over the past eight years. The
chapter concludes with a discussion about the United
State’s need to retain a single-focused direct action unit
within SOCOM and how the U.S. Navy SEALs are a force born
and bred for this mission
B. STRATEGIC UTILITY
Strategic utility is how a military directly

contributes to the strategic outcome of a war (C. Gray,
1996). It is where a force can provide the most beneficial
impact in support of their nation’s strategy. This impact
may be in the SOF’s ability to facilitate others to
military success or as an effective deterrent against
hostilities (C. Gray, 1996).
The strategist, Colin Gray, studied the strategic

utility of specific actions within a larger conflict. For
this paper, we will study strategic utility as related to
the U.S. Navy SEALs as a force.
4
C. SOCOM AND SOF
After the abortive and disastrous attempt to rescue

the 53 hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran on
April 24, 1980 legislation was passed to ensure the Army,
Air Force and Navy paid due attention to the requirements,
manning, training and equipping of special operations
forces. The resulting legislation was the Cohen-Nunn
Amendment to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act. This amendment resulted in the
creation of the Special Operations Command, more commonly
referred to as SOCOM. As directed by the Cohen-Nunn
amendment, SOCOM was given responsibility for, among other
things, training assigned forces; developing strategy,
doctrine, and tactics; ensuring combat readiness; and the
preparedness of special operations forces assigned to other
unified combatant commands to carry out assigned missions
(Cohen-Nunn, 1987). The amendment also directed Special
Operations to be responsible for ten distinct missions.
The directed missions were: Counter Terrorism, Special
Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare,
Psychological Operations, Foreign Internal Defense,
Humanitarian Assistance, Theater Search and Rescue and
“Such other activities as may be specified by the President
or Secretary of Defense” (Cohen-Nunn, 1987). These
requirements have since been modified as reflected in SOF’s
nine core tasks published in Joint Pub 3–05. These
slightly modified Core Tasks are: Counter Terrorism,
Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, Unconventional
Warfare, Psychological Operations, Foreign Internal Defense
(FID), Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Civil Affairs, and Information Operations (see
5
Appendix for further descriptions of each mission). The
tenth tenet is no longer stated but inherently applies.
What had been a secondary effort by the parent

services were now recognized fighting units with the
capability of deploying as versatile, self-contained teams
that provide a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) or
a Joint Forces Commander (JFC) with an extremely flexible
force capable of operating in “ambiguous and swiftly
changing scenarios” (Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,
2003, p.III–1). Doctrine states that these forces can:
• Quickly deploy to provide tailored responses.
• Gain access to hostile or denied areas.
• Provide limited medical support for themselves
and those they support.
• Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.
• Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments
without extensive support.
• Survey and assess local situations and report
these assessments rapidly.
• Work closely with regional military and civilian
authorities and populations.
• Organize people into working teams to help solve
local problems.
• Deploy with a generally lower profile and less
intrusive presence than larger conventional
forces.
• Provide unconventional options for addressing
ambiguous situations.
Sometime after these tenets and capabilities were

published, the units under SOCOM deduced that it was
necessary for each of them to be capable of executing all
of the missions for which SOCOM was responsible. Rather
6
than divide the responsibility among the warfighting units
to ensure SOCOM as a whole had these capbilities, the units
took it upon themselves to ensure they each had these
capabilities. This has created multi-tasked organizations,
that while the title bears the name “Special,” in reality,
the forces were becoming no more than elite general purpose
forces.
Placing the primary and secondary requirements and

capabilities of SOF into a spectrum ranging from indirect
action to direct action highlights the range of tasks
required of our SOF. Denoting the primary missions above
the spectrum line and the secondary missions below, Figure
1 illustrates the spectrum of special operations.
Figure 1. Spectrum of Special Operations
In the 1990s, deploying forces to the combatant

commands was not an overly taxing requirement for SOCOM.
Forces were assigned to combatant commands on a fairly
steady basis to cope with relatively few “hot” wars. To
properly perform their mission SOCOM ensured funding and
equipment reached the various units falling under their
purview (United States Special Operations Command History
7
2007). Also, SOCOM coordinated with the various combatant
commands to ensure the appropriate troops were assigned to
conduct joint exercises.
This changed drastically in 2001. Since September

2001, these forces are among the most deployed U.S. units
in the GWOT. SOCOM was initially designated as the
“Supported Command,” ensuring America’s elite war fighters
had a key role in the war. This increased demand on SOF
over the past eight years has placed a strain on the
relatively small U.S. SOF. With approximately 2,500 active
duty SEALs, 4,500 active duty Special Forces, and 2,800
Army Rangers, it became impossible to deploy these SOF
everywhere to meet all operational requirements.
It would be wise for SOCOM to review the strengths and

weaknesses of each of its subordinate commands to ensure
the efficient use of limited resources. Taking into
account the historic lineage, the cultural proclivity and
the functional differentiation, a “Spectrum of Special
Operations,” along with an appropriate division of labor,
are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Spectrum of Special Operations
8
This specutrum shows an efficient division of labor
based on the specialization of the units under SOCOM.
SEALs have shown an ability to conduct indirect action
missions and SF has shown an ability to conduct direct
action missions but primacy must match their individual
comparative advantages in order to ensure the highest
levels of readiness and force availablility. We must, as
Admiral Olson said, be able to respond to whatever the
enemy throws at us. The U.S. must have a holistic approach
to war, allowing us to defeat our adversaries and deny them
the the environment they need to prosper (E. T. Olson,
Spring 2009).
The information presented in this paper will

illustrate why “capturing and killing adversaries will
always be necessary” (E. T. Olson, Spring 2009) and why the
above division of labor is the most efficient, effective
and appropriate division labor for SOCOM units and
specifically, why SEALs should retain their position on the
right side (Direct Action) of the spectrum.
9
10
II. INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM) TASKS
In 1987, Congress recognized the uniqueness of special

operations (SO) and established SOCOM (Special Operations
Command). It is now one ten Unified Combatant Commands.
Composed of five subordinate commands: USASOC,
NAVSPECWARCOM, JSOC, AFSOC, and MARSOC, its mission is to,
“Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend
the United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize
operations against terrorist networks.” (USSOCOM/SOCS-HO
2008) Congress recognized then the importance of
specialized and appropriately trained and equipped military
units to fight the nation’s war.
Prior to September 11, 2001 the Unified Command Plan

instructed USSOCOM to “organize, train, and equip SOF to
ensure the Geographic Combatant Commander could employ SOF
in their respective areas.” (USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, 2008, p.16)
In this sense, the Commander of SOCOM has historically
acted as a “supporting command.”2 For the first time, in
March of 2005, USSOCOM was assigned the role of “supported
command”3 (United States Special Operations Command
History, 2007, p.16), taking on a role:
2 A supporting command is one that provides necessary personnel or

material to another command which has the lead, or is in some way has
overall responsibility for a specified task.
3 A supported command is one which has the lead or overall
responsibility for a specified task. Among other things they organize,
synchronize and delegate what will be done to accomplish a task. They
are assisted by subordinate or “supporting” commands.
11
as the lead combatant commander for planning,
synchronizing, and as directed, executing global
operations against terrorist networks in
coordination with other combatant commanders.
(United States Special Operations Command History
2007, p.17).
Under this authority Admiral Olson, Commander of

SOCOM, is aggressively pursuing a two-fold mission– first,
to continue the historic role of providing forces for the
regional combatant commanders, and second, to plan and
synchronize the Global War on Terror amongst all Combatant
Commanders (Olson, 2008).
These efforts to plan and synchronize the current war

are proving to be a full-time and exhausting job.
Contributing to the war in a limited, yet critical manner,
SOF provides the strategic and operational war planner with
flexibility and capabilities different from the
conventional military. SOF performs missions that either,
no other forces in the Department of Defense (DoD) can
conduct, or they perform tasks that other forces can
conduct but do so in conditions and to standards not
possible of other forces (Joint Publication 3.5, 2003,
p.24).
B. THEORY BEHIND SOF
Having an understanding of what SOF can do does not

preclude their misuse. Joint Publication 3–05 also makes
mention of the limitations of SOF and puts forth effort to
define their improper employment. As stated in the Joint
Pub 3–05:
12
Improper employment of SO resources in purely
conventional roles or on inappropriate /
inordinately high-risk missions runs the risk of
depleting these resources rapidly. (P.II–3)
The document continues by stating,
SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces

but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional
capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF
can operate independently or in conjunction with
conventional forces. SOF should not be used for
operations whenever conventional forces can
accomplish the mission. (Joint Publication 3–05
2003, p.II–2)
Employment of SOF in conventional roles is being

witnessed more and more as the U.S. fights a war on two
fronts. SOFs have proven themselves capable of executing
short duration conventional operations, but, as stated,
special operations forces are not a substitute for
conventional forces (Joint Publication 3–05 2003, p.II–3).
Limited personnel, increased work load, and increased
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) have necessitated the increased
roles SOF in the varied battle spaces. Still, this should
not deter political or military decision makers from
employing SOF in purely strategic or operational roles for
the nation. SOF should not be used simply to replace
conventional forces.
Special Operations Forces were initially created to

execute tasks that require special training and require
familiarity with a particular type of mission (Cohen,
1978). Because of this specilialization and increased
capability, SOF must be viewed and used as a strategic
asset (Gray, 1999). As pointed out in the military’s
doctrine of Special Operations, Joint Publication 3–05,
13
“success by a small force against a strategic or
operational objective usually has required units with
combinations of special equipment, training, people, or
tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units”
(Joint Publication 3–05 2003, p II–1). In this sense, SOF
should normally be employed against targets with strategic
or operational relevance. To view SOF as anything but a
strategic and/or operational asset, threatens to employ
them outside of their intended utility, with possible
catastrophe ensuing from this misuse.
C. EVOLUTION OF SOF MISSIONS
SOF missions have become diverse and varied as a

result of deliberate legislation, historical accidents and
a general tendency to accept any new task that does not
fall within conventional parameters (Adams, 1998, p.303).
This proliferation of SOF missions can be attributed to
conventional commanders wanting to ensure success by using
the best forces and SOF leaders always feeling a need to
prove their relevance (Kapusta, 2000). But this expansion
of missions made it impossible for any one unit to remain
exceptionally proficient in every area. This presents SOF
commanders with the challenge to determine where to focus
limited resources in order to effectively prepare for the
future (Kapusta, 2000).
Later in this paper, we will examine instances where

SEALs have been properly used as well as misused. Learning
from these cases, and recognizing that SOF is a limited
resource, recommendations will be made on how best to
employ SEALs for the greatest strategic utility.
14
III. SEALS
This chapter will provide a greater understanding of

where SEALs come from, their ethos, their training, their
history and how they are organized as a fighting force.
Taking these factors into account, the reader will begin to
gain an understanding of what is arguably the direct action
“culture” of the SEALs. This chapter highlights the
physical demands, the training and the lineage, which are
all connected to a kinetic, direct action oriented force.
A. THE CULTURE CREATED
Culture is the process of inculcating points of view,

biases, fundamental attitudes, and loyalties (Wilson
1989,p.92). Culture is to an organization as personality
is to an individual. An organization’s culture is
generally passed from one generation to the next, and like
generational culture, it changes slowly if at all (Wilson
1989, p. 91).
SEALs have often been described as having a “direct

action culture.” For years, this depiction was a matter of
pride among SEALs and their leadership. Recently though,
this term has taken on an almost slanderous tone. By
looking at organizational culture and how the SEALs
acquired it, it can be understood why it is so deeply
rooted in their existence.
In his book Organizational Culture and Leadership,

Edgar H. Schein associates organizational culture with
ideas such as norms, values, behavior patterns, rituals,
traditions and symbols (Schein 1992, p.10). Peters and
15
Waterman found that organizations with weak culture,
unclear objectives or divergent aims performed poorly
(Peters and Waterman 1982). Conversely, they espouse that
the dominance of a coherent culture “proved to be an
essential quality of ... excellent companies” and strong
organizational culture permeates the most successful groups
(Peters and Waterman, 1982, p.75).
The elements of selection, training, pre-deployment

preparation, as well the early history of the Navy SEALs
point to an institutional importance, or organizational
culture, of physical capability, proven physical and mental
toughness, violence of action oriented methods and a direct
action operational mind set. Over the years, this action-
oriented mentality has become synonymous with the way SEALs
conduct business. It has become “their way of doing
things.” This further reinforces the idea of the SEAL
culture, as Kotter and Heskett state in Corporate Culture
and Performance:
Firms with strong cultures are usually seen by
outsiders as having a certain “style” and “way of
doing things.” They often make their shared
values known in a creed or mission statement and
seriously encourage their managers to follow that
statement (Kotter and Heskett, 1992, p. 15).
Kotter and Heskett further relate the widely believed
concept that organizations with strong cultures are often
associated with excellent performance (Kotter and Heskett,
1992). Such an academic accolade should give the SEALs
more confidence and determination in retaining this direct
action, centric way of thinking.
Just as those within the military, but outside NSW,

identify SEALs with this culture of battlefield violence,
16
so too do many outside the military. This is, for the most
part, why individuals go through the hellish rigors of
BUD/S. They aspire to be part of this action-oriented
culture. If NSW attempted to institute a community wide
shift in culture, deep frustration and disillusionment
could quickly follow. If one accepts what Kotter and
Heskett claim as essential to “excellent performance,” that
is, a “strong culture,” then it stands to reason that an
organization without a “strong culture” or with divided
cultures will provide less than “excellent performance.”
Similarly, if an individual voluntarily goes through the
rites of initiation to be a member of an organization based
on an espoused culture, that individual will feel roundly
disenfranchised, if the organization alters its culture.
Again, Kotter and Heskett address this need to fit the
culture to the organization and the organization to embrace
the “appropriate” culture. There is no one-size-fits-all
“winning” culture that works well everywhere. They assert
a culture is only successful if it fits its environment,
and the better the fit of the culture to the strategic
goals the better the organization’s performance. This
concept of “fit” and organizational performance is
manifested in the statement, “The better the [cultural] fit
the better the performance; the poorer the fit the poorer
the performance” (Kotter and Hesker, p.28).
When an organization has a widely accepted culture,

that organization has a sense of mission. A sense of
mission gives members a sense of special worth and provides
a basis for recruitment (Wilson, 1989). If NSW was to
adopt a non-kinetic, indirect action oriented mission set,
and therefore, aspire to a non-direct action culture, it
17
would assuredly contribute to an organizational
schizophrenia. If two cultures struggle under this
organization, one will dominate the other, and the
dominated culture will become a subordinated step-child
(Wilson, 1989). As history has shown, it would be
difficult to balance or assimilate the culture of a hunting
society to that of a cultivating society. It may not be
impossible, but it will take generations to purge the
traditions, reinvent the values, and instill the behavior
patterns in order to redirect the deep rooted culture.
B. SEAL ETHOS
United States Navy SEAL

In times of war or uncertainty there is a special
breed of warrior ready to answer our Nation’s
call. A common man with uncommon desire to
succeed. Forged by adversity, he stands alongside
America’s finest special operations forces to
serve his country, the American people, and
protect their way of life. I am that man.
My Trident is a symbol of honor and heritage.

Bestowed upon me by the heroes that have gone
before, it embodies the trust of those I have
sworn to protect. By wearing the Trident I accept
the responsibility of my chosen profession and
way of life. It is a privilege that I must earn
every day.
My loyalty to Country and Team is beyond

reproach. I humbly serve as a guardian to my
fellow Americans always ready to defend those who
are unable to defend themselves. I do not
advertise the nature of my work, nor seek
recognition for my actions. I voluntarily accept
the inherent hazards of my profession, placing
the welfare and security of others before my own.
I serve with honor on and off the battlefield.

The ability to control my emotions and my
18
actions, regardless of circumstance, sets me
apart from other men. Uncompromising integrity
is my standard. My character and honor are
steadfast. My word is my bond.
We expect to lead and be led. In the absence of

orders I will take charge, lead my teammates and
accomplish the mission. I lead by example in all
situations.
I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on

adversity. My Nation expects me to be physically
harder and mentally stronger than my enemies. If
knocked down, I will get back up, every time. I
will draw on every remaining ounce of strength to
protect my teammates and to accomplish our
mission. I am never out of the fight.
We demand discipline. We expect innovation. The

lives of my teammates and the success of our
mission depend on me—my technical skill, tactical
proficiency, and attention to detail. My training
is never complete.
We train for war and fight to win. I stand ready

to bring the full spectrum of combat power to
bear in order to achieve my mission and the goals
established by my country. The execution of my
duties will be swift and violent when required
yet guided by the very principles that I serve to
defend.
Brave men have fought and died building the proud

tradition and feared reputation that I am bound
to uphold. In the worst of conditions, the legacy
of my teammates steadies my resolve and silently
guides my every deed. I will not fail.
(Navy SEAL home page, 2008)
Although relatively new, this ethos attempts, and

succeeds, in tying today’s newly “pinned” SEAL to the first
SEAL, and even to the birth of Navy Special Warfare in
WWII. This ethos is an attempt to encapsulate all a SEAL
is and stands for in nine succinct paragraphs. It is an
19
admission of NSW’s direct action-oriented history and
culture using words such as “physically harder and mentally
stronger,” “draw on every ounce of strength,” “tactical
proficiency,” “train for war and fight to win,” “I’m never
out of the fight,” and “execution will be swift and
violent.” These words set the foundation of what a SEAL
believes, who he is and what he strives to be.
Posted throughout the teams and associated NSW

commands is this image:
Figure 3. U.S. Navy Seal Code(From Navy SEAL home page,

2008)
An abbreviated version of the ethos, it is designed to

remind SEALs daily what it means to be a member of this
small community. It is meant to instill pride and
20
responsibility. The SEAL is ever reminded through this
image that his job, both on and off the battlefield, is to
train for war and fight to win.
C. TRAINING
Multiple books, TV shows and articles have been

produced over the years illustrating the rigors of SEAL
basic training. Known as BUD/S (Basic Underwater
Demolition / SEAL), it is lauded as the most physically
demanding military training in the world, a fact from which
every SEAL gains a great deal of pride. The physically
exhausting aspect of BUD/S demands exceptionally fit
personnel. In addition to the physical necessities of the
training, candidates must have the mental fortitude to
persevere through the physical, emotional and psychological
strain to which they are subjected. In an attempt to
increase their numbers, Naval Special Warfare has committed
a great deal of energy and resources to not only training
future SEALs but to finding and recruiting the “right” men.
1. Recruitment
Naval Special Warfare has attempted a number of

refinements in the way they approach recruiting. Ideas,
such as simply increasing the numbers through the door,
have proven ineffective. There have been claims that
recruiting primarily from northern states is the best
course of action, since those individuals are used to being
cold. But this idea, and others like it, has been
debunked, as exceptional men come from all parts of the
United States. The most recent refinement for recruiting
is to increase the quality of recruits coming to BUD/S, not
21
the quantity. This is being done by implementing a battery
of psychological tests and evaluations to determine if the
recruit has the mental fortitude necessary to complete
BUD/S. While these tests may give insight into how an
individual may behave or react to a particular situation,
they cannot measure what may be the most important quality
of a future BUD/S student: his desire. As one senior
enlisted leader within NSW stated, “The best measurement to
determine a good candidate is BUD/S” (Licause, 2009).
Still, the body pool must come from somewhere, so

leaders in the community must concentrate efforts in some
intelligent manner. The age limit to attend BUD/S is 28
years old; it is a young man’s game. Waivers can be
written, but they are rare. To accomplish the desired goal
of recruiting the most capable individuals, recruitment for
enlisted SEALs is focused on young, capable athletes. NSW
is working with the National High School Athletic Coaches
Association, attempting to use this network of coaches and
organizations to get the word out about SEALs, and build
interest in becoming a SEAL (Licause, 2009). Exploiting
demographic data already existing within the community, NSW
recruiters are also working with USA Water Polo, USA
Swimming, rugby organizations and wrestling organizations.
In addition, while the demographics do not fully support
it, the Navy and NSW put a great deal of resources towards
advertising at the 2008 Ironman Triathlon World
Championship held in Kailua-Kona, Hawaii (Licause, 2009).
To further ensure enlisted success, Captain Duncan

Smith put considerable effort into ensuring “candidates
knew, really knew, what becoming a SEAL meant” (Smith,
22
2009). They incorporated the SEAL Ethos into intra-Navy,
also known as “in-fleet,” marketing plans and asked the
Navy's ad agency to do the same.
In the recent past, physical ability has been the

primary focus of recruiters and the prime qualifier of
recruits because it was lacking in most candidates. In
March 2006, the pass rate on the SEALS Physical Screening
Test (PST) at the Navy’s Great Lakes Training Facility was
28%. After a lengthy campaign by NSW flag leadership to
have Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) make the PST mandatory
for SEAL candidates before enlisting in the Navy, the pass
rate rose to approximately 90%.4
Several programs now exist to mentor and encourage

potential SEAL recruits. One very successful program was
created to support the need for enlisted candidates to meet
conditioning standards. This program gave candidates the
opportunity to spend time with SEAL operators is the Navy
SEAL Fitness Challenge. Started in 2006 as an NSW
recruiting directorate initiative, NRC now funds and runs
this as a national event. Key to its success is direct and
ongoing NSW involvement (Smith 2009).
Recruitment for officers is almost unnecessary. A

form of self selection exists within the officer
candidates. Potential commissioned BUD/S students
habitually exceed the standards of selection. They
routinely prove physically and mentally prepared for the
rigors of BUD/S. This exceptional preparation can likely
be attributed to two factors; 1) these potential SEAL
4 SEAL Master Chief Vic Licause was the champion of this effort and
many other SEAL recruiting aims.
23
officers are older and, therefore, more mature and capable
of dealing with the expected hardships, and 2) they have
seen the movies, the advertisements and are at least
nominally familiar with the literature produced about
SEALs, and are attracted by the recognized physical
requirements. This attraction to the SEALs has created a
situation unusual in most of the military. NSW leadership
must make the determination who to turn away as candidates.
In this sense, NSW leadership has come up with criteria to
determine not only which candidate officer can make it
through BUD/S, but also who will be the best officer for
the community. Different people on selection committees
will obviously have different criteria, but after talking
to an O–6 previously in charge of SEAL recruiting, it
became evident what a general list for choosing officer
candidates will likely include: maturity, athletic strength
and team experience, focus5, and exceptional Physical
Screening Test (PST) scores6.
All this effort and the concentration of resources

illustrate NSW’s desire to focus on the physical
capabilities of recruits. Intelligent recruits are common,
5 40 potential officer applicants were interviewed in three years by

the O-6 interviewed. Only eight were endorsed. Two candidates with
many of the right qualifications not endorsed were a former Marine
officer with combat experience but marginal PT scores and a Stanford
quarterback with an Ironman Triathlon background. These were amazingly
talented individuals in their own right, but each was comparing NSW
with other disparate career options.
6 The Captain interviewed saw these scores as different from
“athleticism.” It also incorporates focus. An accomplished college
wrestler is no shoe-in for the 500 yd swim. He needs to work on it.
The Olympic swimmer needs to train hard to run a sub 9 minute 1.5 mile.
There are so many officer candidates that are exceptional; the PST
becomes an effective filter or tool in reducing the applicant pool.
24
many enlisted men are coming in with bachelor’s degrees7,
some even with master’s degrees. But education aside, once
in the SEAL Teams, professional knowledge is gained out of
necessity in order to remain an effective part of the Team.
Above all, physical capability is sought after and
respected throughout the SEAL community.
2. BUD/S
Broken into three phases, this six-month school is a

grueling screening and assessment process that routinely
experiences 70% attrition. First Phase is eight weeks of
intensive conditioning; testing the candidates’ physical
ability and mental toughness. Much of this phase consists
of daily early morning calisthenics, timed beach runs,
timed open ocean swims, and timed obstacle courses. In
addition to these timed activities, there are untimed, but
highly monitored, physical activities such as Log PT,8 rope
climbs, buddy carry races, surf passage,9 and water
competency tests. With morning musters around 0430 and the
morning calisthenics beginning at 0500, the candidates are
active until dinner time at 1800. They must then go back
to their quarters and properly clean and maintain their
gear, clean their rooms and prepare their equipment and
7 One third of enlisted BUD/S graduates have a college degree.Fifty

percent of the enlisted men in a recent graduating class had bachelor’s
degrees.
8 Log PT (Physical Training) consists of a five or six man team
(known as a boat crew) conducting various physical activities, to
include sit-ups, “push-ups” (bench press like exercise), over-head
press, squats, running races, etc., all with a 300 pound, ten-foot long
wooden pole, similar to a telephone pole.
9 Surf Passage is an activity in which the boat crew paddles their
Inflatable Boat, Small (IBS) (an eight foot long inflatable rubber
raft) out past the surf zone (breaking waves) then back up to the
beach, repeated “until the instructors get tired”.
25
uniforms for the next day. This maintenance may go until
2100 or 2200—the next day holds a similar routine for them.
The swan song of First Phase is the infamous “Hell Week,”
five days of physical endurance in which the candidates are
allowed about four hours of sleep total. Hell Week is a
test of physical endurance, mental tenacity and true
teamwork where two-thirds or more of every class quit or
“ring the bell.”10 Physical discomfort and pain causes many
to decide that it is not worth it. The miserable wet-cold,
approaching hypothermia, will make others quit. Some
simply cannot imagine doing the same thing for the next
three or four days. Whatever the individual reasons, BUD/S
students wishing to quit are not encouraged to stay, if
they do not have the tenacity to do it now, no one can say
they will obtain it on the battlefield.
Those determined enough to complete Hell Week proceed

to Second Phase. This phase is eight weeks long and is
where the BUD/S students learn open circuit (SCUBA) and
closed circuit (bubbleless) diving. This training is
ostensibly to prepare future SEALs for a method of
insertion or to conduct assaults against enemy ships or
facilities. While this phase is not as physically brutal
as First Phase, students do fail out, failing dive physics
tests, other academic challenges, or an inability to
perform particular physical and job related requirements.
Combat diving is the focus of the phase, with the last
couple weeks of Second Phase consisting of multiple mock
ship attacks.
10 To “Ring the Bell” is to quit. It is a physical act by the
student conducted by ringing a brass bell hanging in front of the
instructors’ office. The student rings the bell three times signaling
the student’s desire to Drop on Request, or DOR.
26
Third Phase is nine weeks of land warfare/small unit
tactics training. Here BUD/S students learn weapons
safety, marksmanship, land navigation, small unit tactics
and demolitions. The physical nature of BUD/S increases
again, with daily physical training (PT), long runs, ruck
sack runs and various other “creative” activities
administered by the instructors. A portion of the training
is conducted on training grounds at and near Coronado, CA,
the home of BUD/S. For three weeks the students are sent
to San Clemente Island for small unit tactics. All aspects
of the San Diego and San Clemente based training of Third
Phase concentrate on physical fitness, marksmanship, land
navigation and direct action missions against an enemy.
Students may still be dismissed from the program for
weapons and demolitions safety violations.
D. SEAL QUALIFICATION TRAINING
After BUDS is completed, trainees go through the U.S.

Army Basic Parachute Training. From there, they go onto
SEAL Qualification Training (SQT). This is three months of
advanced training, placing a large emphasis on land
warfare, land navigation, close quarters combat, combat
swimmer operations, marksmanship, demolition, urban
warfare, and air operations (parachuting, heli-borne
assaults, helicopter fast roping, helicopter rappelling).
At no point in the initial training of a SEAL does he learn
foreign culture, language, stability operations, Civil
Affairs or other non-kinetic IW skills.
27
1. Pre-deployment Work Up / Task Unit Training
Once formed into a Task Unit (TU), SEALs continue to

receive intensive training to prepare them for the
battlefield. The blocks of training SEAL Task Units take
part in vary in the order they are conducted. This is
primarily because of training cadre and training location
availability. The length of training also varies depending
on the priorities of the community at the time, i.e. during
the initial stages of Afghanistan and Iraq, Task Units
dedicated considerably less time to diving operations
(approximately a third of what was dedicated prior to
September 11 2001). Minor changes are common in the order
of the following training blocks and additions and
deletions of shorter courses, e.g. Advanced First Aid, may
not be scheduled for a specific Team or even a specific
coast (West Coast or East Coast). That being said, the
following is a generic list of the training a SEAL Task
Unit participates in.
a. Land Warfare
This training block is often three to five weeks

long. It consists of marksmanship, mostly rifle, as well
as land navigation, small unit tactics, Immediate Action
Drills (IADs, the actions taken if the unit comes under
enemy fire), raids, ambushes, heavy weapons and stand-off
weapons training.
b. Close Quarters Combat (CQC)
Usually two weeks in length, this is the training

necessary for an individual up to an entire Task Unit to
enter a building and effectively move through and secure
28
it. During this training, Task Units conduct small arms
training, both rifle and pistol, on stationary, moving and
multiple targets.
c. Special Operations in Urban Combat (SOUC)
Often known as Military Operations in Urban

Terrain (MOUT), this two-week block concentrates on house-
to-house fighting and movement though hostile streets.
This training has become of great importance with the
amount of combat operations conducted in Iraq.
d. Mobility
Approximately two weeks in duration, this

training focuses on the operations and maintenance of
HMMWVs. The training is done as individual vehicles and
multivehicle detachments.
e. Air Week
Besides having helicopters throughout the work

up, usually in-land warfare and SOUC, SEALs dedicate a week
to fixed wing air operations. This includes Static Line
and Military Free Fall parachute jumps on to land and into
water. The SEALs also participate in “Duck Drops”, jumps
with numerous men and up to four Combat Rubber Raiding
Crafts (CRRC) or Zodiac rubber boats.
f. Dive Training
For many years, this was a three to five-week

block of training. With the predominance of SEALs fighting
a land war, emphasis on the water operations was shortened,
in some cases down to a week. Recently, the community has
rededicated efforts to this capability and now conducts up
29
to two to three weeks training that focuses on underwater
navigation using a rebreather (bubbless) diving system.
g. First Aid / Trauma
A recent addition to an already over-loaded

schedule, this one week training introduces the SEALs to
advanced battlefield trauma treatment.
h. Close Quarters Battle (Hand to Hand)
A one week training regime (which has one week

advanced courses if time allows) focusing on offensive and
defensive measures of armed and unarmed fighting.
2. Pre-Deployment Individual Training
During the 12 to 18 month predeployment workup, SEALs

also go to individual schools to learn specialized skills,
such as Sniper, out-board motor repair, Range Safety
Office, etc. The classes SEALs go through are designed to
better allow the SEALs to conduct their missions overseas.
At no time does the Task Unit or individual SEAL undergo
“Irregular” or “Unconventional” Warfare training. A few
SEALs have recently been given the opportunity to take
language courses, but the extended time necessary for this
(3–12 months) conflicts with training required to be a
competent member of a SEAL team. Any sort of cultural
awareness or indigenous interaction techniques are usually
learned on the job. It is also important to note that the
training blocks conducted and the emphasis of most all SEAL
training is on short duration operations. SEAL missions
are, by in large, measured in hours, maybe days. Adopting
the adage, “Fight like you train, train like you fight”, it
30
seems SEALs train for, and should therefore fight, short
duration, direct action oriented mission sets.
E. HISTORY
The history of the U.S. Navy SEALs is traced back to
the Scouts and Raiders, Navy Combat Demolition Units,
Office of Strategic Services Operational Swimmers, and
Underwater Demolition Teams of World War II.
The Scouts and Raiders originated as a joint force
responsible for pre-invasion reconnaissance in preparation for
amphibious assaults (Kapusta, 2000). As Rear Admiral Richard
Lyon said in his interview for The Frogmen of World War II:
Our mission was to scout out beaches and

waterways to determine if they were safe for
amphibious landings, and then to lead the troops
into safe channels to the beach. (Cunningham,
2005, p.127)
Later this mission was enlarged to include erecting

markers for the incoming craft, taking offshore soundings,
blowing up beach obstacles and maintaining communications
between troops ashore and forces offshore (Naval Special
Warfare Command, History n.d.). In the Sino-American
campaign in and around China, Scouts and Raiders formed the
core of what was envisioned as a "guerrilla amphibious
organization of Americans and Chinese, operating from
coastal waters, lakes and rivers employing small steamers
and sampans" (Naval Special Warfare Command, History,
2008). This group of Scouts and Raiders conducted
intelligence collection and limited guerrilla warfare along
the coast of occupied China. This set the precedence for
later SEALs to successfully conduct land based operations
(Kelly, 1992, pp.55–58).
31
In the European Theater, Naval Combat Demolition Units
(NCDU) blew eight complete gaps and two partial gaps
allowing access to the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944.
Suffering 52% casualties they managed to clear 700 yards of
beach in two hours, and another 900 yards by the afternoon
(Naval Special Warfare Command, History, 2008).
The exhausting combat operations these forces

conducted made it imperative they could safely use
explosives under the harshest of conditions. To ensure
this was conducted safely and successfully Draper Kauffmann
(later Admiral) was put in charge of NCDU’s explosives
training. Kauffmann placed unparalleled importance on
physical fitness to ensure careless mistakes were not made
out of exhaustion (Kapusta 2000, p.80, Kelly 1992, p.17).
This intensive physical fitness became a cornerstone for
Naval Special Operations, recognizable in today’s SEALs.
The disastrous U.S. Marine amphibious landing at

Tarawa, in which naval landing vessels were stuck on a reef
500 yards off the coast, causing the unnecessary slaughter
of almost 1,000 Marines, illuminated the importance of
hydrographic reconnaissance and underwater demolition in
preparation for amphibious landings. In response, a total
of 34 Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) were formed. These
“naked warriors,” wearing swim suits, swim fins and masks,
saw action throughout the pacific in Eniwetok, Saipan,
Guam, Tinian, Angaur, Ulithi, Pelilui, Leyte, Lingayen
Gulf, Zambales, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Labuan, Brunei Bay, and
Balikpapan on Borneo (Naval Special Warfare Command,
History 2008).
32
With the outset of the Korean War, UDT personnel were
assigned to Special Operations Group, or SOG; their numbers
eventually reaching a combined strength of 300. UDTs
successfully conducted beach and river reconnaissance, mine
sweeping operations, demolition raids on railroad tunnels
and bridges, and infiltrated guerrillas behind enemy lines
from the sea. Harkening back to their original purpose,
UDT personnel conducted pre-invasion preparations for the
landing at Inchon. Scouting mud flats, marking low points
in the channel, searching for mines, and clearing fouled
propellers during the invasion, UDT personnel assisted in
the successful amphibious assault.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy informed The

Department of Defense that he wanted the U.S. Navy to
commission a unit capable of unconventional and commando
warfare (Kelly, 1992). President Kennedy’s purpose for
this force was to have men who “could fight the dirty
guerrilla wars” expected in America’s future (Dockery,
2004, p235). This new group would concentrate, as per
guidance of the President, on a three-faceted mission:
1. Develop a specialized Navy capability in

guerrilla / counter-guerrilla operations to
include training of selected personnel in a wide
variety of skills
2. Development of doctrinal tactics
3. Development of special support equipment
(Dockery, 2004)
The Navy turned to their Underwater Demolition Teams

to act as the cornerstone for this new “commando” unit.
33
From these teams and from those recruited throughout the
active duty Navy, the United States Navy Sea Air Land
(SEAL) Teams were formed.
As Vietnam escalated, SEALs and UDTs were introduced

to the theater in an advisory role. SEAL advisors
instructed the Provincial Reconnaissance Units and the Lien
Doc Nguoi Nhia, the Vietnamese SEALs, in clandestine
maritime operations (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete
History from World War II to the Present 2004, pp.426–427,
523–524). Eventually, in 1966, SEALs arrived in Vietnam
with the sole purpose of conducting direct-action missions.
Operating out of Nha Be, in the Rung Sat Special Zone,
SEALs conducted raids, ambushes and clandestine operations
in what was considered one of the most hostile regions of
South Vietnam (Dockery, SEALs In Action 1991,pp.82–83, 89).
Still, being a separate entity, the UDTs acted

independently of the SEALs, seeing combat in Vietnam while
supporting the Amphibious Ready Groups. When attached to
these riverine groups, the UDTs conducted operations with
river patrol boats and, in many cases, patrolled into the
hinterland as well as along the riverbanks and beaches in
order to destroy obstacles and bunkers.
The post-Vietnam Navy determined it necessary to

severely decrease the number of both UDTs and SEALs. UDTs
felt this reduction in ranks most severely. By 1983, all
remaining Underwater Demolition Teams were decommissioned,
with the remaining UDT warriors being fully incorporated
into the SEAL Teams.
As the SEALs gained notoriety and acceptance within

the Navy, their mission and purpose was modified to more
34
thoroughly define what these naval commandos were to do.
Naval Warfare Information Publication 29–1 was produced to
detail the SEAL Mission Profile:
(1) Primary: To develop a specialized capability to conduct
operations for military, political, or economic purposes
within an area occupied by the enemy for sabotage,
demolition, and other clandestine activities conducted in and
around restricted waters, rivers, and canals, and to conduct
training of selected U.S., allied and indigenous personnel in
a wide variety of skills for use in naval clandestine
operations in hostile environments.
(2) Secondary: To develop doctrine and tactics for SEAL
operations and to develop support equipment, including
special craft for use in these operations.
(3) Tasks: Tasks may be overt or covert in nature.
(a) Destructive tasks-These tasks include clandestine attacks
on enemy shipping, demolition raids in harbors and other
enemy installations within reach; destruction of supply
lines in maritime areas by destruction of bridges,
railway lines, roads, canals, and so forth; and the
delivery of special weapons (SADM) to exact locations in
restricted waters, rivers or canals.
(b) Support tasks-The support tasks of SEAL Teams include
protecting friendly supply lines, assisting or
participating in the landing and support of guerrilla and
partisan forces, and assisting or participating in the
landing and recovery of agents, other special forces,
downed aviators, escapees and so forth.
(c) Additional Tasks:
1. Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence

collection missions as directed.
2. In friendly areas train U.S. and indigenous personnel
in such operations as directed.
3. Develop equipment to support special operations.
4. Develop the capability for small boat operations,

including the use of native types.
Figure 4. Naval Warfare Information Publication 29–1 (From
Dockery, 1991)
Although the SEALs were introduced to Vietnam as

advisors and maintained limited advisory roles throughout,
the majority of mission carried out through WWII, Korea and
35
Vietnam were direct action missions. The tasks dictated in
NWIP 29–1 include training guerrillas, partisans and
indigenous personnel. This is considered UW and the SEALs
did, and continue to do, quite well at it. Using UW the
way they understood it, it was often done as a means, the
ends being to engage the enemy directly. In Vietnam, and
recently in Iraq, SEALs have used UW as a method of entry
into a warzone to allow SEALs to get into the fight; UW is
not an end unto itself (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete
History from World War II to the Present 2004, p.332).
F. UNIT ORGANIZATION
Since their inception, the core element of the SEAL

Teams has been the platoon; a 16–man fighting force that
deploys to forward located Naval Special Warfare Units.11
Recently this has undergone some changes. Now, two
platoons are placed together, working as a single Task
Unit. When deployed, depending on what Area of
Responsibility (AOR) to which they are deployed, a task
unit may have Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel
attached (such as is in CENTCOM) or a Special Boat Team
(SBT) detachment assigned to them (as is common in EUCOM
and PACOM). Each SEAL Team has three task units as well
as headquarters personnel.
11 The three Naval Special Warfare Units (NSWU) are located in Guam
(NSWU-1), Stuttgart, Germany (NSWU-2), and Bahrain (NSWU-3).
36
Figure 5. NSW SEAL Team Chain of Command
Four SEAL Teams are under each of the two Naval

Special Warfare Groups (NSWG): NSWG–1 in Coronado, CA and
NSWG–2 in Virginia Beach, VA.12 These two groups, along
with NSWG–3 (Undersea Command based in Coronado, CA), NSWG–
4 (Special Boat Teams Command based in Virginia Beach, VA)
and Naval Special Warfare Command (training and advanced
training based in Coronado, CA) answer to Naval Special
Warfare Command (WARCOM), currently housed in Coronado, CA.
Naval Special Warfare Group THREE has a very unique

responsibility and capability. Tasked with clandestine
infiltration and undersea operations, NSWG–3 is in charge
of the SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV) or mini–subs, including
the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) (Global
Security.com, 2005).
12 NSWG-1 oversees SEAL Teams 1, 3, 5, and 7. NSWG-2 oversees SEAL

Teams 2, 4, 8, and 10.
37
Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR is tasked with
training and equipping of Special Warfare Combatant-craft
Crewmen (SWCC) as well as development and assessment of
Special Warfare boats (NSWG–4, 2000). Within their
inventory are the Mark V (a large “speedboat”), RHIBs
(rigid hull inflatable boats), Special Operations Craft,
Riverine (SOC-R), with other vessels currently undergoing
testing and evaluation.
Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG) is

NSW’s Research and Development command. It is tasked with
the development of NSW tactics, equipment, and techniques.
Figure 6. NSW Chain of Command
With approximately 2,500 active duty SEALs, Naval

Special Warfare has long been the smallest community in
SOCOM. But the list of supporting personnel, supporting
assets and responsibility has greatly increased the size of
the community. Still perceived as a small command, NSW is
growing its numbers.
38
G. WHERE TRAINING AND CULTURE HAVE BROUGHT THEM
If NSW were to actively move away from their DA-

oriented force, more harm than good would be done. As has
been discussed in this chapter, SEALs are recruited,
trained and organized to be a fighting force. To alter the
organizational culture to something else would, as earlier
stated, create an organizational schizophrenia. Extensive
research has been done on top performing organizations, and
one of the commonalities they all had was a strong, well
defined culture (Peters and Waterman, 1982). To have an
identifiable culture has proven to be a powerful asset.
The SEALs should recognize where the past 48 years have
taken them and continue to capitalize on their strengths.
They should continue to embrace and promote the direct
action culture for which they are specially trained.
39
40
IV. CASE STUDIES—HISTORIC EMPLOYMENT OF SEALS
For the purposes of this paper, it will not be

necessary to draw out intensive details of numerous case
studies. Instead, the cases, some single operations with a
single purpose, others a single operation with multiple
purposes, and still others (Vietnam) presented as an over
arching view of all operations conducted during that time,
will be dissected using seven factors surrounding each
case. These factors are:
• Purpose / Target, Means of Insertion
• Method of Engagement
• Duration of Mission
• Outcome
• Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved
• Reason for Success or Failure of each operation.
By using these criteria as a means of study, the

intent is to give a condensed illustration of what SEALs
have done and currently do. For wars such as Vietnam and
the current War on Terror, the use of case studies is
admittedly faulty. It would be impossible to study each
and every SEAL mission. For Vietnam, the paper will
examine the predominant types of missions executed. For
Afghanistan, it will look at an operation that received
particular attention (Operations Red Wings, which resulted
in the death of 11 SEALs). For the Iraq case studies, it
will investigate two cities, Ramadi and Habbaniyah
referencing the common operations executed in each area.
These two towns were chosen because they are viewed as
successes in the counterinsurgency effort. Hopefully this
41
approach will give a fair breadth of direct and indirect,
as well as successes and failures experienced by the SEALs
over the past 48 years.
Success and failure of Special Operations is often

hinged on the minutest of details. Chance and luck can
often determine a mission’s outcome reflective of the
universal acceptance of “Murphy’s, Law” among military
personnel. But through careful analysis of missions, one
can often find steps or missteps in planning, breakdowns or
breakthroughs in communications or the availability of
vital resources that proved the key to success or by its
absence resulting in failure. In an effort to quantify
what these factors are Lucien Vandenbroucke and William
McRaven each wrote a book asserting the factors that cause
failure or success, respectively.
In his book Perilous Option, Lucien Vandenbroucke

describes the factors associated with Special Operations
that cause failure. Vandenbroucke asserts that five
factors: faulty intelligence, insufficient interagency or
interservice coordination and cooperation, inadequate
information and advice provided to decision makers, wishful
thinking by decision makers, and over control by leadership
far removed from the theater (Vandenbroucke, 1993, p.8),
are responsible for the failure of SO. He makes this
determination by examining four strategic special
operations which exacted a heavy toll in human life and
damage to U.S. prestige (Vandenbroucke 1993, p152). He
hypothises that if a mission can eliminate all of these
shortfalls the likelihood of success increases
42
significantly. Many of the failures presented in the
following case studies reflect Vandenbroucke’s elements of
failure
In his book SPECOPS, William McRaven explains the

factors that ensure Special Operations (particularly raids)
succeed. These factors are: Surprise, Speed, Security,
Repetition, Sense of Purpose, and Simplicity. Only when
these factors are present can a small group of men obtain
relative superiority over the enemy (McRaven, 1995).
McRaven states that if we understand these factors for
mission success we can better plan special operations to
improve the chances of victory (McRaven, 1995, p2). By
using case studies from the beginning of the SEALs
(Vietnam) to present day (Afghanistan and Iraq) a “trend”
reflecting the type of operations SEALs most often engage,
successfully, will hopefully become apparent. Peter Paret
outlines qualities that are necessary for an effective
theory in his book Understanding War. One of the qualities
is using examples from the past that can be understood, and
remain relevant, today (Paret 1992,p103) (McRaven
1995,p381). Using these factors as a foundation of
analysis, nine case studies will be analyzed. If the
military understands the successes and failures of the
past, it will better understand what is happening today,
with the goal of better preparing for the future.
A. CASE STUDIES
1. Vietnam—March 1962—March 1973
• Purpose/Target. The initial mission for SEALs in

Vietnam was military advisor to South Vietnamese
special forces, the LDNN (Vietnamese equivalent
43
to the UDT or SEALs) and Provisional
Reconnaissance Units13 (PRUs) (Dockery, Navy
SEALs, A Complete History from World War II to
the Present, 2004) (Edwards, 1991) (Nadel and
Wright, 1994). The PRUs fell under the much
debated, criticized and misunderstood Phoenix
Program, a program to use locals to identify and
neutralize the leadership and infrastructure of
the National Liberation Front of Vietnam, or the
Viet Cong. The emphasis on this mission quickly
fades and SEALs primarily conducted direct action
missions to include ambushes, reconnaissance
missions, enemy personnel abduction (snatches, or
as LCDR (Ret) Scott R. Lyon calls it, “flat-out
kidnap the Viet Cong Leadership” (Dockery, Navy
the Present, 2004, p.269)), raids, and prisoner
rescue operations (Edwards, 1991) (Nadel and
Wright, 1994).
• Means of insertion. Working out of firebases

(today often called the SEALs most often inserted
by foot patrol or helicopter. Holding to their
maritime roots, and working in predominately
riverine environment the SEALs also made great
use of patrol boats and indigenous craft.
13 PRUs were paramilitary organizations made up of local militia and

foreign mercenaries from Cambodia and Laos. They were funded by the
CIA and trained by U.S. military personnel. They were assigned to a
province, preferably their home province; the idea being they would
fight harder for their own turf (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete
History from World War II to the Present 2004, p.427).
44
• Method of engagement. Usually working with what
they could carry in such a harsh environment, the
SEALs typically engaged the enemy with small arms
and claymore mines
• Duration of mission. As mentioned, the SEALs

worked out of fire bases. They would typically
patrol out to an ambush site and lie up and wait,
or they would conduct raid operations against a
specified target. The missions were usually 6–12
hours in duration
• Outcome. Out of the hundreds of missions the

SEALs conducted in Vietnam, it would be difficult
to list every success and failure, but throughout
the war they had mixed results. Even some of
their “successes” consisted of days of planning
netting only one or two enemy KIA or a weapons
cache with a couple rifles (Hoyt 1993).
• Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved. As

previously mentioned SEALs initially entered
Vietnam as military advisors to the South
Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units, Hoi
Chan (Edwards, 1991) from the Chieu Hoi Program,14
and the Lien Doc Nguoi Nhia, or LDNN, the
Vietnamese SEALs.
14 Chieu Hoi Program allowed Viet Cong and ex-North Vietnamese Army
members to receive amnesty from South Vietnam. These individuals
usually provided intelligence or armed resistance against the enemy
(Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete History from World War II to the
Present, 2004).
45
• Reason for success or failure. SEAL successes in
Vietnam are usually attributed to violence of
action (Wright, 1994), surprise, tenacity, and
audacity. In addition, the SEALs consistently
displayed an uncommon will to succeed, they used
unorthodox approaches (everything from dressing
as the enemy, or dressing in blue jeans and no
shoes, to the way they conducted ambushes) and
they were given unorthodox equipment (Stoner
machine guns, silenced weapons) and unorthodox
training. These last three attributes are
pointed out by Lamb and Tucker in United States
Special Operations Forces as being significant
requirements for successful SOF. Intelligence
collection by the SEALs for the SEALs has been
pointed to as a success. But, oddly, while SEALs
were able to collect effective intelligence many
failures are attributed to a lack of, or flawed,
intelligence, provided to them; a factor noted by
Vandenbrouke in SO failures. More Vandenbrouke
factors relevant to the overall war effort was
inadequate information and advice provided to
decision makers and micromanagement by leadership
far removed from the theater, as well, this
factor can not be directly attributed to
individual SEAL failures.
2. Panama—Operation Just Cause—20 December 1989
• Purpose / Target. Three sixteen-man SEAL

platoons with Air Force Combat Control Team (CCT)
members, plus a seven-man C3 element, were tasked
46
with disabling (explicitly told not to destroy)
Manuel Noriega’s private Lear jet at Paitilla
Airport, Panama City, Panama. The disabling of
the aircraft was to deny Noriega one of the many
escape routes available to him. Also, the SEALs
were tasked with placing obstacles on the runaway
in order to deny it being used by any other
aircraft (Nadel and Wright 1994).
• Means of insertion: The SEALs inserted on 14 x

CRRCs (Combat Rubber Raiding Craft, or Zodiac F–
470s), towed and escorted by a Special Boat Unit
26 Patrol Boat. This is a much larger force than
SEALs typically work with. Originally, the force
was designed to be smaller, but additional tasks
and security concerns encouraged the assault team
to grow to its considerably large size.
• Method of engagement: As the SEALs conducted a

hasty patrol (run) from the south to the north
end of the runway they were ambushed from
Noriega’s hanger. Small arms fire was directed
at them. They returned fire with small arms and
AT–4 anti-tank weapons. A C–130 was dedicated to
the mission, but for unknown reasons the AFCCT
was unable to establish radio communications
(Nadel and Wright, 1994).
• Duration of mission: The mission was intended to

be five hours. It turned out to be 37 hours long
(Nadel and Wright, 1994).
47
• Outcome: Three SEALs were killed on the runway
with a fourth dying in route to medical care in
the U.S. Seven SEALs were wounded, five
seriously (Nadel and Wright, 1994).
• Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved:

None, the SEALs (and CCT) conducted the mission
unilaterally.
• Reason for success or failure: With such a large

force (55 SEALs plus Air Force Combat Control
Team members), surprise was virtually impossible
for the force. Paitilla airfield is in downtown
Panama City. Such a large assault force, moving
in such a confined area, made it impossible to
assure surprise. It is believed several
Panamanians saw this large force land at the
beach and begin their patrol across the airfield
(Nadel and Wright, 1994,pp.207–208). In addition
to the loss of surprise, poor planning
contributed to the failure. Decision makers
placed a higher premium on ensuring Noriega’s
aircraft was not damaged than on the lives of
U.S. military on the ground. Originally told
they would execute the mission at 0100, the
execution timeline was moved one hour earlier,
negating the option for a more cautious approach
that would have otherwise been used as per SEAL
doctrine (Nadel and Wright, 1994). Another
possible reason for failure is misuse of force.
U.S. Army Rangers rehearse, and routinely
conduct, airfield assaults. They should have
48
been used. Use of a SOF to conduct a relatively
large scale conventional (perhaps hyper-
conventional15) mission should be avoided at all
times. Vandenbroucke’s factor of wishful thinking
(or as Nadel and Wright address it, “poor
assumptions”) on the part of military decision
makers can also be attributed to the outcome of
the mission. There was an underestimation of the
enemy’s resolve to fight and knowledge of the
terrain (Nadel and Wright 1994). The SEALs were
put at a terrible disadvantage before they ever
launched on the mission.
3. Panama—Operation Just Cause—20 December 1989
Purpose/Target: The SEALs were tasked with

conducting a combat swimmer operation against the
Panamanian Patrol Boat Presidente Poras in Balboa
Harbor. The purpose of destroying this vessel
was to deny Noriega a means of escape (Hoyt
1993). (Later in the military action this group
was tasked with the capture of Noriega’s private
yacht (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete History
from World War II to the Present, 2004).
Means of insertion: The combat swimmer operations

was conducted by 4 SEALs, split into two swimmer
pairs.
15 Hyperconventional is a term coined by Dr. Hy Rothstein. The term

references forces that conduct conventional operations, specifically
DA, with exceptional skill and / or precision (Rothstein 2006).
49
Method of engagement: Each swim pair had MK 138
“Haversacks” containing 20 pounds of C4 explosive
(Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete History from
World War II to the Present, 2004).
Duration of mission: The mission consisted of a

two-hour dive, with an additional two hours’
surface transit.
Outcome: The Presidente Porras was destroyed and

Noriega’s yacht captured.
Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved:

None, the mission was conducted solely by SEALs.
Reason for success or failure: There were a

couple factors responsible for the SEALs success.
One was stealth and use of an unexpected avenue
of approach; underwater; in McRaven’s words
surprise. This avenue of approach, unlike the
airfield approach, did not allow any observation
of the mission execution. Also present was a
sense of purpose (after all, everyone knew Manuel
Noriega was evil) and simplicity. The dive
profile for the mission was far easier than any
dive profile encountered during the SEALs’ combat
swimmer training. As one member of the dive team
described, “Our mission lasted about four hours
and was the exact type of mission SEALs train for
every day” (Nadel and Wright, 1994, p.205).
Repitition can also be credited for the success.
At the time, SEALs placed a great priority on
combat swimmer training. The countless dives of
50
greater difficulty before this actual combat
swimmer operation greatly contributed to the
successful outcome.
4. Grenada–Operation Urgent Fury–25 October 1983
Purpose/Target: In Operation Urgent Fury SEALs

were assigned three missions:
1) Secure the Governor’s residence in order to

rescue Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, and
evacuate him.
2) Capture Radio Free Grenada.
3) Conduct beach reconnaissance in support of the

U.S. Marine Corps landing at Pearls Airfield.
Means of insertion: Eight SEALs were parachuted

into the ocean with two Boston Whaler fiberglass-
hulled boats in order to link up with a U.S. Navy
destroyer (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A Complete
History from World War II to the Present, 2004).
Sixteen SEALs fast roped out of Blackhawk
helicopters on to the Governor’s Residence. The
beach reconnaissance in support of the USMC
landing was conducted from CRRC “Zodiacs” and two
SEAFOX speedboats (Adkin, 1989).
Method of engagement: As is typical with SEAL,

and SOF, operations, they only brought what they
could carry or fast rope. This limited their
fire power to small arms and grenades. They were
able to call in close air support from AH–T1
51
SeaCobras. The element assigned to capture Radio
Free Grenada conducted an uneventful helicopter
insertion.
Duration of mission: The Governor’s Residence was

expected to take one to two hours. In actuality,
because of underestimating the Grenadians will to
fight and the fire power the Grenadians were able
to mass, the Governor’s Residence mission took 26
hours. The beach reconnaissance mission took
four hours from launch to mission complete. The
Radio Free Grenada mission was expected to take
approximately two to three hours (author’s
approximation based on mission objectives). In
actuality, SEALs stayed on target for nearly 24
hours (Nadel and Wright, 1994).
Outcome: Four SEALs died in initial water jump,

due in part to their predicted day jump becoming
a night jump and in part to an unexpected squall.
The Governor was rescued after a considerable
fire fight with Grenadian Defense Forces. In
turn, the SEALs were rescued by a Marine armor
element. The SEALs conducted successful beach
reconnaissance missions which diverted 400
Marines from an amphibious landing to a heli-
borne assault (Adkin, 1989). The SEALs who were
sent to the radio station discovered it was, in
fact, a radio transmitter site. After repelling
numerous enemy forces the group evaded to the
water. Four out of the eight sent to capture the
radio tower were injured. Three additional beach
52
recons were conducted and several shipboardings
were conducted in support of Admiral Metcalf’s
desire for sea dominance.

None. Three SEAL elements conducted unilateral
operations.
Reason for success or failure: For the most

part, Grenada was a failure in leadership and
communications. There was extraordinary
overcontrol by leadership far removed from the
area. Also, loss of the element of surprise due
to delays by Atlantic Fleet played a disastrous
role on numerous missions. One of the most
glaring failures was the complete lack of
intelligence, and what little intelligence they
did have was seriously flawed (the radio station
was actually a transmitter site, the Grenadians
had a great will to fight, the Grenadians had
much more weapons and capability than reported).
Grenada brought to light the insufficient
interagency and interservice
coordination/cooperation. This abysmal
interservice performance, from assets not being
able to communicate to units not knowing where
each other are, spawned a concentrated effort to
increase interservice capabilities.
5. El Salvador
Purpose / Target: As part of the U.S. strategy

for Central America, U.S. military personnel,
53
including SEALs, were sent to El Salvador to
train and advise Salvadorian military in counter-
insurgency efforts against the FMLN (Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front).
Means of insertion: Military personnel would be

transported by military or civilian aircraft to
El Salvador. Once in country they would travel
by 4 x 4 SUVs and helicopter throughout their
districts and throughout the country. The
personnel were there to work for the U.S.
Military Group (MILGROUP).
Method of engagement: They were trainers. These

personnel advised on everything from strategy for
senior leaders to small unit tactics for recruits
(Willwerth 1983).
Duration of mission: Personnel would go for one-

year tours. Many personnel would conduct
multiple return tours.
Outcome: LCDR Albert Schaufelberger (one of the

SEALs who participated in this program) was
killed by the Central American Revolutionary
Workers' Party (PRTC), a sub-group of Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). He was
picking up his girlfriend at the University of
San Salvador after her classes. This was a daily
routine he had unfortunately followed.
Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: The

Salvadorian Army and Navy.
54
Reason for success or failure: El Salvador as a
whole is a shining success story. LCDR
Schaufelber’s loss was a tragedy. Complacency can
be blamed in part for his murder (he kept the
same time line and drive pattern, and he removed
the bullet proof window because his car’s air
conditioner was broken). Vandenbrouke’s and
McRaven’s factor do not have relevancy in this
case study, as the tragedy may be viewed as
personal mistakes. Of note, this may point to
the need to have at least two SEALs (or a SEAL
and another SOF member) work together to keep
each other diligent. SF operators pride
themselves on the choice of mature soldiers
capable of performing individually in austere
environments. It is not suggested that SEALs are
not mature enough to accomplish this, but perhaps
they work better with a “swim buddy.”
6. Desert Storm—Deception Operation—24 February 1991
Purpose/Target: SEALs were tasked with deceiving

Iraqi forces into believing the main U.S.
invasion effort would be an amphibious landing
into Kuwait.
Means of insertion: Eight SEALs used CRRCs to get

within a practical distance of the shore. They
then transitioned into the water to swim ashore.
Method of engagement: Each man carried a 20 pound

Haversack full of C4 explosives. The Haversacks
were placed at various intervals on the beach.
55
Once the timed explosions erupted the SEALs swept
the beach with small arms, .50 caliber and 40mm
grenade fire.
Duration of mission: The entire mission took

three hours
Outcome: Several Iraqi divisions were diverted to

counter the “amphibious landing” (Dockery, Navy
the Present 2004). This allowed the actual
invasion force to move more rapidly than expected
and to encounter less resistance than if the
diversion operation was not executed.

None, mission was conducted unilaterally.
Reason for success or failure: The SEALs success

was gained by absolute surprise. Repetition is
another of McRaven’s factors that may be given
credit. SEALs frequently conduct over the beach
rehearsals. While a standard training mission
may not be conducted to emplace explosives on the
beach, the concept of clandestine movement up to
and on the beach is the same.
7. Afghanistan–Operation Red Wings—28 June 2005
Purpose/Target: A four man SEAL element was sent

to provide Special Reconnaissance (SR)in order to
positively identify the enemy personality, Ben
Sharmak—(aka Ahmad Shah) (Luttrell, 2007). This
56
was in order to disrupt enemy activities in the
Kunar Province of Afghanistan.
Means of insertion: The SEALs fast-roped from a
helicopter onto a mountain top above the village
the enemy was expected to be in.
Method of engagement: The SR was conducted using

high powered optics. Once compromised the SEALs
engaged the Taliban forces with their M–4 rifles.
Duration of mission: The mission lasted two days.

For the one survivor, Luttrell, it lasted and
additional five days (Luttrell, 2007).
Outcome: Three of the initial four-man element

were killed in the engagement with the Taliban.
Eight more SEALs responding as the quick reaction
force (QRF) died when their U.S. Army 160th SOAR
helicopter was shot down. Eight U.S. Army 160th
crewmen died in that crash as well. One SEAL,
Luttrell, was recovered.

None
Reason for success or failure: The mission failed

because they were compromised. Another factor
for failure was faulty decision making once the
SEALs encountered three goat herders. It is
believed these goat herders alerted the Taliban
to the SEALs presence. The QRF failed because
the enemy was alerted and was prepared for rescue
helicopters flying in during daylight.
57
8. Iraq–Ramadi–Combat FID–Sniper Overwatch
Purpose / Target: The primary mission was combat

FID. Once the Iraqi force they partnered with
was capable, the SEALs took them on combat
missions within the city. In the SEAL Team’s
approach to fully support the U.S. Army’s
strategy in Ramadi, they undertook a relatively
unique mission. The SEALs began conducting
patrols to contact. This may be considered a
misuse of SOF, but the SEAL Task Unit Commander
felt the unique time called for extraordinary
efforts (Couch 2008). The SEALs also conducted
numerous sniper overwatch missions, providing
sniper cover to patrolling SEALs, Marines and
U.S. Army. The purpose of these patrols to
contact and other missions was to identify and
eliminate armed insurgents.
Means of insertion: The SEAL’s targets were all

within the city which surrounded their base.
Because of this close proximity the SEALs would
insert by HMMWV or, preferably, conduct a foot
patrol right out the gates of the base (Couch
2008).
Method of engagement: The SEALs conducted FID

with the Iraqi Army, training them for a few days
and then go out on combat patrols. When engaging
the enemy the SEALs relied on small arms,
grenades, and Carl Gustav recoilless rifles. If
58
necessary, the SEALs could call in Army armor as
a QRF or as additional firepower (Couch, 2008).
Duration of mission: The FID training took about

three hours a day. When the Iraqis and SEALs
went out on a FID combat patrol, they expected to
be out approximately two to three hours. This
was extended if the patrol was engaged by the
enemy. Sniper overwatch missions typically
lasted eight to 12 hours; in a couple cases they
ended up being 36 hours (Couch, 2008).
Outcome: Over the two years it took to control

Ramadi, two SEALs were killed, Marc Lee and Mike
Monsoor. Working closely with U.S. Army and
Marines, the SEALs eliminated many insurgents,
and permanently disrupted numerous cells. The
Ramadi Police and Iraqi Army Scouts the SEALs
trained proved to be a capable and effective
fighting force. The SEALs’ willingness to
conduct daytime patrols just as their
conventional brethren did effectively developed
very close conventional-SOF bonds.
Host Nation units involved: The SEALs developed

and worked alongside the Iraqi 1st Brigade, 7th
Division, Special Missions Platoon (Couch, 2008).
The SEALs also worked alongside Iraqi Police
elements (Couch 2008).
Reason for success or failure: Flexibility and

cooperation were the keys. In building bonds
with the U.S. Army the SEALs were able to support
59
the conventional strategy and greatly contribute
to the successes. Analyzing McRaven’s tenets, we
see three factors contributed to SEAL successes
in Ramadi. The first was security. Ensuring
their planning and objectives were kept quiet and
only told to their Iraqi counterparts immediately
before departing for the missions ensured
success. Also repetition, in rehearsals and in
similar missions, promoted efficiency and
increased everyone’s capabilities. Working
alongside Iraqi Police and Army, and establishing
a trust and brotherhood directly contributed to
building a sense of purpose, both on the SEALs
part and on the part of the Iraqis.
9. Iraq–Habbaniyah
Purpose/Target: Throughout 2007 the SEALs based

in Habbaniyah, a town southwest of Fallujah, were
given the near exclusive job of training Iraqi
Police recruits.
Means of insertion: There was none. The SEALs

lived on the base the training was performed.
Method of engagement: As trainers, the SEALs

worked with the new Iraqi Police training them in
marksmanship, small unit tactics, patrolling and
close quarters combat. The training was
conducted up to five days a week, around six or
seven hours a day.
Duration of mission: Each training class was

three weeks long.
60
Outcome: In the seven months the author was in
country, when the push for increased numbers was
the biggest, 1,400 police recruits were trained.
Host Nation or Third Nation Parties involved: Al-

Anbar Police
Reason for success or failure: Success was

generated by both the SEALs and Iraqi leadership.
Most of this success can be attributed to a sense
of purpose. The SEALs did not particularly
relish their job as trainers. They would prefer
to have been conducting DA missions, but the
mission from Special Operations Task Force WEST,
the SOF Headquarters for the west of Iraq, was to
train local police forces. Because of this the
SEALs took their task to heart and conducted it
with great success.
B. MISUSES
SEALs have displayed an impressive ability to adapt to

changing environments. This is witnessed in their ability
to train more than 1,400 Iraqi Police. The FID in
Habbaniyah has been heralded as a great success, but using
SOF to conduct basic marksmanship, patrolling and house
clearance comes at a cost. When SEALs conduct operations
they do not have a comparative advantage in, they are used
in a less than optimal way. If the SEALs were unavailable,
or there was too great of a ratio of students to SEAL
instructors, U.S. Marines or U.S. Army personnel were used.
These conventional elements did just as good of a job as
the SEALs. In some cases they may have been less capable,
61
but that could be easily changed by additional preparation.
There is a tremendous opportunity cost for using SOF in a
conventional role, while the missions the SOF could be
doing go undone. As both Christopher Lamb and Elliot Cohen
state, SOF is not a replacement for conventional forces,
and where conventional forces can be used SOF should not be
(Cohen, 1978) (C. Lamb, Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles
and Missions, 1995).
The Paitilla Airfield case study from Operation Just

Cause also illustrates this point. Airfield takedown is
not something SEALs train for. Two SEALs who were sent to
conduct reconnaissance of the airfield prior to the
invasion recommended using stand off weapons to disable
Noriega’s jet.16 For unknown reasons it was mandated that
Noriega’s jet was not to be damaged (Dockery, Navy SEALs, A
Complete History from World War II to the Present, 2004),
an example of micromanagement and unnecessary constraints
put on a force from a far removed decision maker. SEALs
can conduct an airfield takedown, and they did in fact
accomplish their goal, but at an unnecessarily high cost.
The smartest course of action would have allowed the C–130
to simply disable the jet with a single shot. With that
option not being allowed another element, Army Rangers,
could have been used for this, even though it was an
“amphibious operation.” Rangers train for just such a
mission and should have been the choice once the mission
began to grow larger than the capabilities of one SEAL
Platoon.
16 In 1999 the author met one of the two SEALs sent to do this. The
details surrounding this may have been lost over time, as no references
have been found discussing this proposal.
62
The failure of LCDR Schaufelberger and that of
Operation Red Wings were not misuses of SOF, nor were they
failures of the organization. These can be attributed to
“operator error” or, more appropriately, as a success for
the enemy. Since SOF as a whole work in small elements,
the possibility always exists they will encounter or be
surprised by a larger, more prepared adversary.
The cases studied further illustrate that, while SEALs
can do various missions, their tendency and specialty is to
conduct actions aimed at apprehending, engaging or
eliminating an enemy. Short duration, direct engagement is
the culture of the SEALs and what the SEAL community
continues to do better than any other force their size.
C. SUMMARY
These case studies are not all inclusive. SEALs have
done numerous unreported jobs and numerous missions that
cannot be discussed in an unclassified paper. Furthermore,
in Iraq particularly, SEALs are conducting non-kinetic, CA
type operations. What do the case studies examined show as
successful uses of Navy SEALs?
From the case studies analyzed it appears the most
successful missions SEALs conducted were short duration
missions conducted directly against the enemy. Many of
these cases suggest SEALs have greater impact and
operational success when their mission is in support of
conventional forces. From the case studies, and the other
readings surrounding these studies, it is suggested SEALs
are at their best in direct action oriented, physically
demanding, and high-risk missions. These case studies show
that SEALs have a comparative advantage in direct action
over indirect action.
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64
V. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE; SYNTHESIS OF CULTURE,
HISTORY AND TRAINING
A. SOF AND DIRECT ACTION
Undoubtedly for every case study previously mentioned,

another Special Operations Force can be cited as doing a
similar job. But the argument is not that only SEALs can
do SO direct action missions, but that SEALs are the best
SOF to conduct such missions. Chapter III illustrated how
the SEAL heritage is based on physically demanding
operations and DA missions. A preponderance of their
missions have been violent actions directly against the
enemy. From this, as well as their training, the direct
action oriented culture has become a recognized mainstay of
their organization. Other SOFs have established their own
cultures and capabilities over the years as well.
The U.S. Army Special Forces, called “Green Berets”

are unmatched in their level of cultural and linguistic
training (Martinage, 2008). While capable of conducting
almost any of the SOF core tasks, including direct actions,
they are the recognized leaders in Unconventional Warfare
(Martinage, 2008). Special Forces were born out of the
World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Personnel
selected into the OSS were chosen more on their proclivity
to “go native” in Europe than on their physical
characteristics. A primary consideration was language
fluency, since the major tasking was organizing and
interacting with partisan/guerrilla networks within Europe
(Simons). Taking its cue from the OSS, Special Forces were
originally designed to train, advise and lead guerrilla
65
forces mainly against the Soviet Union (Waller, 1994).
Recognizing the successes of the OSS and its ability to
effectively work with partisan groups, language fluency and
cross-cultural ability became defining requisites for SF
(Simons, p.31).
The Army Rangers can trace their heritage back to the

prerevolutionary war period of the King Phillips War and
the French and Indian War. Their modern history is from
World War II, where they were created as a commando unit
based on the British Commandos (David W. Hogan, 1992). The
Rangers were periodically decommissioned and
recommissioned, always as a highly proficient infantry unit
(Kapusta, 2000). In the days of Army draw down, it was
thought the Rangers would be the sole SOF retained by the
Army, as their proclivity for direct, sustained engagement
against the enemy (direct action) was more in line with the
conventional army than SF’s unconventional warfare (Adams,
1998). Whether they are Elite Infantry or Commandos, the
Rangers were recognized as a highly capable U.S. Army
Battalion capable of large scale hyper-conventional
missions.
B. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
A term originating in the Economics realm, Comparative

Advantage is often used in the study of Special Operations
Forces, comparing the various forces in order to determine
who is best suited for specific missions.
As defined by the Business 2000, Comparative Advantage

means: A (group) should specialize in producing a good (or
service) at which it is relatively more efficient (Business
2000, 2008). To expound on this idea and emphasize the
66
military aspect of it, the theory holds that organizations
should specialize in the execution of missions they can
conduct more efficiently than another force. An
organization is said to have a comparative advantage in the
execution of those missions.
An additional term often seen and used is Absolute

Advantage. This is when one organization can conduct an
activity more effectively or better than any other
organization (Winters and Paro, 1994).
Although holding an absolute and comparative advantage

does not guarantee mission success, they provide tangible
guidance and conditions for proper use of SEALs or other
SOF. It is not espoused that SEALs have an absolute
advantage at DA. The argument is SEALs do have a
comparative advantage in this mission set.
SEALs and other SOF can all do direct and indirect

action missions. But is it wise for all of these forces to
be doing all the missions along the Spectrum of Special
Operations? Can the likelihood of success increase by an
intelligent division of labor? SEALs are selected and
trained for direct action, violent missions. Because of
their culture, training and history they have a comparative
advantage at DA over other SOFs. SEALs have a comparative
advantage at small unit, precise, surgical special
operations against specific targets. Rangers can do direct
action, but they carry a much larger footprint, with less
“precision” than SEALs. Additionally, Ranger roles and
missions are very much set in standard operating
procedures, contributing to inflexibility. SEALS on the
other-hand have an inherent flexibility, due in part to
67
their small unit size. SF can conduct DA, but their
training in irregular warfare and indirect action gives
them a comparative advantage over the SEALs in UW missions.
While SEALs can conduct UW missions, and have often devised
ways of solving unorthodox problems, their skills and
training are not directly aligned with such action.
If Army Special Forces already exists why should SOCOM

and NSW leadership strive to make the SEALs more “SF-like?”
This would make both SF and SEALs less effective. They
would compete for many of the same resources and missions,
at the same time they could be diluting their unique
capabilities. If both organizations (SF & SEALs) are vying
to be the “Jack of All Trades,” they will in essence be
experts in nothing. The United States military will have
reduced multiple fields of expertise and tactical
proficiency in its attempt to make all forces do all
things.
C. LEADERSHIP MUST RECOGNIZE THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
The enemies of the United States are using more

ingenuity in the ways they attack us. Because of this
variety of threats, it is important for the military to
maintain a variety of specialized capabilities. To
encourage all forces to focus on all threats may result in
not being positioned to counter any threats effectively.
The leadership of the various SOFs must recognize each

unit’s unique comparative advantage and insist that they
excel in it. SF has a comparative advantage at UW
missions. Special Forces leadership should be the vanguard
of reigniting the UW heritage in SOCOM. SOCOM has been
dominated by hyperconventional thinkers in recent years but
68
this should only further motivate Army SF to reinforce
their UW roots and maintain it as their primacy (Rothstein
2006). The Rangers have a comparative advantage at larger
scale DA missions, to include airfield seizure, raids,
movement to contact, and airborne assaults; this should
continue to be their primary focus. The SEALs have a
comparative advantage in small scale, short duration DA
missions. These include raids, ambushes, reconnaissance
and maritime missions. For all the reasons stated in the
previous chapters, SEALs should be focused on these
missions. Having the right force conduct the right mission
is the intelligent approach.
69
70
VI. STRATEGIC UTILITY AND FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
The comparative advantage of an organization gives

insight into the most effective way to employ that
organization. Chapters three, four and five have
demonstrated that the SEALs’ comparative advantage lies in
direct action missions. Taking this comparative advantage
and applying it to the U.S. military strategies of the
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy,
National Military Strategy and National Strategy for
Maritime Security, which all call for U.S. forces to
directly engage an enemy, it is apparent how the highly
disciplined SEALs can strategically contribute to the
defense of the nation.
A. THE SEAL STRATEGIC UTILITY
This study has illustrated how the comparative

advantage of SEALs favors short term direct action
missions. This is based on training, culture and previous
missions conducted by the SEALs. In addition, they were
originally formed to conduct operations around restricted
waters, rivers, and canals (NWIP 29–1) contributing to the
maritime niche they retain as part of their culture and
lineage.
Based on this study, the strategic utility of SEALs is

as a land and sea based short duration DA force, excelling
in raids, ambushes, hostage rescue and HVT abduction. They
have the capability to conduct a broad range of SOs, to
include FID, civil affairs, and tribal engagement, but that
is not where they hold the greatest advantage over other
71
SOFs. As Admiral Olson, Commander Special Operations
Command, stated in his article in Security Affairs, “The
direct approach is decisive in its impact” and “Capturing
and killing adversaries will always be necessary” (Olson
Spring, 2009). There will always a need for DA within
SOCOM. For this purpose it is important for the SEALs to
maintain this precision capability.
B. RETAIN DA/SR AS PRIORITY MISSION
As long as an active enemy remains on a battlefield,

or the United States has adversaries that must be watched
or removed, NSW should retain SR / DA as their primary
mission. In recent years, SEALs have received some
criticism because of their DA focus. This criticism comes
primarily from U.S. Army counterparts and U.S. Marine
elements that have fully, and rightfully, embraced the
indirect efforts of counter-insurgency. As previously
stated, a number of military leaders believe the indirect
approach is the most useful employment of SOF, and should
therefore be the primary mission. But, as discussed
earlier, the SEALs come from a culture based on SR / DA.
This is where the SEALs have historically placed their
efforts, and it is where they should continue to
concentrate their efforts, especially considering the
enduring requirement to conduct DA missions.
Another reason for NSW to retain its direct action

focus is they can provide decision makers with a capable
force to fill the gap between conventional forces and
Special Mission Units (SMU). When decision makers want to
strike an enemy effectively and precisely, but do not want
the large footprint involved with conventional forces they
72
can turn to the SEALs to proficiently execute the mission.
Similar to Special Forces inextremis Force (CIF), SEALs are
prepositioned around the globe at NSW Units. They can
quickly be put into action by COCOMs, without compromising
the very special capabilities of the SMUs. Employing SEALs
in this capacity provides the COCOM with an additional land
and maritime asset quickly to handle important situations
with regularly aligned units.
The current Task Unit composition makes the SEALs an

exceptionally effective forward deployed force, capable of
gathering, analyzing and acting on intelligence. Even
though the SMUs have somewhat greater capabilities, it is
arguable the SMUs are not as readily available and should
be focused on other specific high priority missions. The
greatest example of why SEALs provide a force capable of
bridging the SMU–GPF cap is their flexibility and ability
to respond, which has proven effective in past
circumstances. When it was discovered in the spring of
2002 that Zawahiri would be at a medical clinic in Gardez,
Afghanistan, it was decided to use a SMU to apprehend him.
This decision was made even though a “White SOF” element
was only “five minutes away” from the clinic (Vistica,
2004). The delay, resulting from the perceived need to use
the SMU for the mission, was ample time for Zawahiri to
safely depart the area.
Similarly, a “White SOF” element was denied permission

to go to a mosque in Kandahar, Afghanistan to apprehend
Mullah Omar. While the team was located at a base just
minutes away, U.S. military commanders followed strict
73
protocol and called in a SMU. Based hundreds of miles away,
it took them several hours to arrive in Kandahar. By that
time, Omar had disappeared (Vistica, 2004).
C. THE MARITIME NICHE
Two-thirds, roughly 70%, of the world is covered by

water (Joint Command, 2008). It is estimated that by 2010
80% of the world’s population will live within 60 miles of
the shoreline. Currently three-quarters of the world's
mega-cities (cities of 10 million or more people) are by
the sea (Save the Sea 2006). Such factors make it likely
that future conflict will take place within the vicinity of
the shoreline. Numerous nations important to the United
States have substantial coastlines, to include: North
Korea, China, Somalia, Nigeria, Iran and Indonesia. In
addition, non-state actors occupy this maritime expanse as
well.
Operating within this vast maritime arena are criminal

and terrorist organizations, exploiting the sea lanes for
both movement of illicit cargo and for hijacking cargo
ships. Using fairly simplistic means, such as machine
guns, explosive laden vessels, and vessels used as RPG
(rocket propelled grenade) and missile launching platforms,
terrorist are capable of waging relatively inexpensive and
effective war that can have crippling affects on the global
economy. (The National Strategy for Maritime Security,
2005).
Areas with political and economic instability, such as

coastal regions and littorals in ungoverned or under-
governed regions, provide havens for those conducting
illegal activities. Criminal and terrorist groups
74
understand this, and take full advantage of it (Joint
Command, 2008). In accordance with The National Defense
Strategy, the U.S. military must be prepared to act against
these criminals to ensure global freedom of movement and
support an environment conducive to international order
(Rumsfeld, 2005). With the world’s largest navy, it is
inherent for the United States to act, when possible, as a
regulating force against maritime threats.
One of the tools the U.S. can employ in this fight is

the Navy SEALs. Working from the sea or land, SEALs are
the ideal force to access areas used by the criminal
entities. By conducting SR, emplacing sensors, conducting
tagging and tracking operations, conducting personnel
apprehensions (or removal), or countering pirates to
protect U.S. assets and personnel, SEALs can contribute to
the collection of vital intelligence and the cessation of
illicit activity around the world.
As previously mentioned, the SEALs have moved away

from their maritime roots the past eight years. The
foreseen reduction of forces in Iraq is an opportunity for
the force to reacquaint itself with their water borne
roots. It is possible for the SEALs to retain their
capability as a land force, but it is time for them to
reinvest in their maritime niche, which was once the
essence of their organization.
Early on in their existence, the SEALs established

their niche as the maritime SOF. Recognizing they have an
established maritime niche, it is imperative SEALs continue
to fight to retain that niche (Wilson 1989). To
successfully retain relevancy and strategic utility the
75
SEALs must adhere to James Wilson’s tenets for
organizational survival. “They must seek out tasks that
are not being or cannot be performed by others.” “They
must avoid taking on tasks that differ significantly from
those that are at the heart of the organizations mission,”
and finally they must “fight organization’s that seek to
perform [their] tasks” (Wilson, 1989,p.189–190). The
introduction of Marine Corps Special Operations Command
(MARSOC) and some of their capabilities threaten the
primacy of SEALs as the U.S.’s “go-to” force for special
operations conducted from amphibious platforms or in the
littorals.17
The SDV community has never relinquished the primacy

of this mission, and they are the recognized experts in NSW
undersea warfare. But the majority of SEALs have let this
perishable skill atrophy, and their primacy may come into
question. The niche is theirs to lose if they do not
reconnect with this capability. Now is the time for NSW to
dedicate time and resources to return to their maritime
dominance.
D. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE (SFA), TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT AND

INDIRECT ACTION
The SEALs have demonstrated a capability to

effectively support “By, with and though” mission. SEALs
have executed hundreds of raids against enemy targets in
17 The 1st and 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB), under
MARSOC, are headquartered at Camp Pendleton, CA, and Camp Lejeune, NC.
They are intended for worldwide deployment. Each MSOB is commanded by
a Marine Major and capable of deploying task-organized expeditionary
Special Operations Forces to conduct special reconnaissance, direct
action and missions in support of the geographic combatant commanders
(U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command 2006).
76
conjunction with host nation (HN) Iraqi and Afghan forces.
In fact, they proved such a capacity towards this mission
they were asked to take the lead on training Iraqi forces
throughout the al Anbar region in 2007 and 2008.
Prior to September 11, 2001, and afterwards to a

lesser degree, NSW forces routinely conducted FID (now
being referred to as Security Force Assistance, or SFA)
around the world. This gave SEALs practical training in
various environments, increased the capabilities of nations
friendly to the United States, and proved extremely
valuable in times of conflict18.
Currently in Iraq, SEALs are conducting a great deal

of SFA with Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police in Fallujah,
Ramadi, Habbiniyah and throughout Western Iraq. When the
author was in Fallujah in 2007, U.S. SOF could only conduct
bilateral operations. Only in extreme circumstances were
U.S. forces authorized to conduct unilateral operations.
To meet this criterion SEALs conducted what has been termed
“Combat FID;” training counterparts well enough to take
them into combat. This differs from other FID or SFA
missions the SEALs have done. Previously, SEALs trained HN
forces in peace time to increase that HN’s capabilities.
More recently, SEALs have trained Iraqi forces and sent
them off without going into combat with them (the Police
Academy in Habbiniyah is an example of this).
18 SEALs have been conducting Joint Combined Exchange Trainings

(JCETs) with the Polish GROM for many years. So when SEALs found
themselves working near GROM elements in Iraq, it was a natural
decision to conduct combined operations. This improved both forces
capabilities and proved a very useful union.
77
SEALs are capable of this SFA mission, but it is a
difficult mission for SEALs. This is not to say they
cannot do it; however, even NSW leadership will agree, no
SEAL joined to conduct SFA (Williams 2008,p3). Admiral
Winters, Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, admits
“SEALs joined to conduct SR/DA, and NSW must continue to
pursue those important DA mission…but we are going to stay
as flexible as the enemy and do what is most important to
defeat him now” (Williams, 2008), meaning conduct SFA.
From 2006–2008, the author and many of his peers were

assigned to conduct Tribal Engagement activities. Some of
these Tribal Engagements were conducted to help a local
leader improve his tribe’s security or to better defend
against al Qaeda. These engagements proved successful and
where consistent with the SOF UW methodology.
Unfortunately, some of these engagements were solely to
“collect environmentals” or to see “If the Sheik needs
anything.”19 This may be good practice in conducting a
counterinsurgency, but it is not the best use of a SEAL
force. If no other force has previously talked to, or is
currently engaged with, the Sheik, or there is no
possibility for any other coalition force to meet with the
Sheik (due to extreme distances from forward operating
bases, or other hardships other forces are not able to
overcome), then SEALs may be an appropriate force. But to
use SEALs to gather environmentals by talking with local
leaders when other coalition elements have easy access to
the Sheik is a misuse of a limited force.
19 These were reasons given to the author as well as Task Unit
Commanders that worked in Western Iraq after the author left. To
“collect environmentals” means to go gather general information about
an area and “get a feel” of what is going on.
78
Still, SFA and tribal engagement is unavoidable for
SEALs, but NSW leadership should always be mindful of the
SEALs’ comparative advantage for DA and only use SEALs for
these UW missions when DA missions are not needed or other
forces are unavailable. SEALs are a limited force.
Because they can do most things does not mean they should
do all things simultaneously. SOF military leadership must
recognize this and use these specialized forces wisely.
Comparative advantage, specified niches and proven
capabilities should be taken into account before other
peripheral tasks are assigned to a DA focused force. The
question from the introduction to this paper is still
valid, “Is this what they should be doing, or are they
doing it merely because they can?” It is vitally important
not to use precious resources “because you can,” but
rather, use them for their greater strategic advantage.
79
80
VII. CONCLUSION
The current battle the United States is in will

continue to be a long-term irregular campaign (Gates,
2009). In an article to Foreign Affairs magazine,
Secretary of Defense Gates notes the U.S. needs a military
that can kick down doors as well as clean up the mess
afterwards (Gates, 2009). The military must not overly
fixate on the SECDEF’s comment of cleaning up, even
rebuilding, afterwards. They must maintain a balanced
approach and the “ability to kick down the door.” It is
important for policy and decision makers to remember they
should not, and can not, simply exchange a direct
capability with an indirect one (Cropsey, 2009). Our
enemies have shown adroitness at attacking us where we do
not foresee or are unprepared. Because of this, it can be
deduced that a concentrated effort by the military in one
direction would welcome an attack from the other. If the
DoD as a whole overcompensates for their ill prepared
irregular warfare capability, the U.S. will find itself
challenged by enemies (both conventional and
unconventional) who recognize this weakness and are capable
of exploiting it (Cropsey, 2009).
SOCOM must retain balance throughout its forces. They

must not over compensate and completely refocus on indirect
action. Instituting new ideas is not an evil or unwise
thing, but must be done with tempered enthusiasm. To over
steer too sharply in an attempt to modify the dominant SEAL
culture will damage the capacity of SOCOM to expertly
execute DA missions across the globe (Cropsey, 2009).
81
A. A TEMPERED APPROACH
Special operations forces are a strategic asset and must

continue to be treated as such (C. Gray, 1999). SOCOM must
make tough decisions on how to best prepare these strategic
assets for employment. It would be difficult, and
foolharded, to argue that the U.S. military only needs a
direct action strategy. But there must be tempered realism
in the desire to incorporate only indirect action to the
strategic outlook of America. A balanced approach is
needed (Olson Spring, 2009).
B. WHAT SEAL LEADERSHIP HAS LEARNED
The current war has brought a large amount of

attention to the SEALs and has given SEAL leadership a
tremendous education in the preparation and execution of
war. This knowledge can be leveraged by senior SEAL
leadership for future planning. By ensuring they have
unparalleled expertise as the maritime force of choice for
the military, and by retaining their DA capabilities on
land, future campaign and operational planners will have a
clear understanding of how and where to use the SEALs.
With a clear understanding of the concept of strategic
utility, Naval Special Warfare forces will be properly
employed in future military actions. This will ensure the
missions they perform are appropriate SEAL missions and can
have direct and positive effects in support of the United
States’ National Military Strategy.
C. THE ROAD AHEAD
Terror is likely to remain a threat in the foreseeable

future. It may become, like Dick Couch proclaims in
82
Sherriff of Ramadi, that terror will be similar to illegal
drugs, something we never eradicate, but requires constant
attention. For this reason, SEALs will always have a
mission of removing terrorist leaders and tenaciously
chasing terrorists across the globe. This constant
vigilance will systematically erode the terrorists’ ability
to operate (Couch 2008). This task is often seen as the
domain of special mission units (SMUs), but SMUs are
extremely limited. The “vanilla” or “white” SOF assets,
specifically SEALs, can provide a responsive means of
dealing with this threat.
Terrorism is akin to cancer. Like cancer there are

multiple measures that must be taken to eliminate the
disease. Some of the measures are non-invasive. For
cancer these measures are nutrition, rest and
pharmacological. For terrorism these are the activities
surrounding civil affairs, psychological operations, and
“nation building.” But invasive measures must also be
taken and the deadly tumor removed. For cancer this is the
work of the skilled surgeon, armed with the scalpel he uses
with precision. For the military, the highly trained SEALs
are the surgeon and the scalpel. In order to ensure this
capability remains a precision tool, SEAL mission focus
should remain direct action in nature with a very good
understanding of how the "kinetic scalpel of a surgical
operation" should be used (Smith, 2009). And just as
important, they must understand when a not-so-sharp scalpel
can adversely affect the indirect effort. Therefore, this
skill must remain as sharp as possible to ensure success
(Smith, 2009).
83
The U.S.’s approach to all future conflicts must be
balanced, where both indirect, and direct action are used
(Maxwell 2004). The Navy SEALs are a force that has been
bred to conduct direct action missions. To ensure this
capability remains as precise and reliable as possible they
must continue to persue their comparative advantage and
continue to specialize in their DA culture.
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APPENDIX
The mission sets unique to SOCOM, or the tasks which

SOCOM forces can uniquely conduct in certain conditions and
standards are:
A. DIRECT ACTION
These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale

offensive actions conducted as a special operation in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and
which employ specialized military capabilities to seize,
destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated
targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in
the level of physical and political risk, operational
techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use
of force to achieve specific objectives. Activities within
DA include the following:
(1) Raids, Ambushes, and Direct Assaults. These are

operations designed to achieve specific, well-defined and
often time-sensitive results. They are sometimes beyond the
effective strike capabilities of conventional force
elements.
(2) Standoff Attacks. These are attacks by weapon

systems or through IO. When targets can be sufficiently
damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat
forces, these attacks can be performed as independent
actions.
(3) Terminal Attack Control and Terminal Guidance

Operations. Using global positioning systems, laser
designators, beacons or other means SOF personnel provide
85
terminal attack control (TAC) to aircraft to grant weapons
release clearance. Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO)
relay to aircraft additional information regarding a
specific location or target.
(4) Recovery Operations. These are operations

conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and
return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to
national security. These operations employ unconventional
tactics and techniques, clandestine search, possible
indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground
combat elements.
(5) Precision Destruction Operations. These are

operations in which collateral damage must be minimized,
requiring highly sophisticated weapons and/or timed
detonation of specific amounts of explosives placed in
exact locations to accomplish mission objectives. Precision
destruction operations can be conducted against targets
where precision-guided munitions cannot guarantee first
strike success or when the contents of a facility must be
destroyed without damage to that facility.
(6) Anti-Surface Operations. These are operations

conducted against adversary maritime surface targets. These
include, but are not limited to, visit, board, search, and
seizure operations, which are shipboarding operations to
board and seize cooperative, uncooperative, or hostile
contacts of interest (Joint Publication 3–05 2003, pp II–4—
II–6).
86
B. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE (SR)WASN’T FORMATTED
Special Reconnaissance are reconnaissance and

surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to
collect or verify information of strategic or operational
significance, employing military capabilities not normally
found in conventional forces. SOF’s highly developed
capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas,
worldwide communications, and specialized aircraft and
sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other
forces or assets. Activities within SR include the
following:
(1) Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations

conducted to collect and report critical hydrographic,
geological, and meteorological information.
(2) Armed Reconnaissance. These are operations that

involve locating and attacking targets of opportunity,
e.g., adversary material, personnel, and facilities in
assigned general areas or along assigned LOCs. Armed
reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of
attacking specific identified targets.
(3) Target and Threat Assessment. These are operations

conducted to detect, identify, locate, and assess a target
to determine the most effective employment of weapons.
(4) Poststrike Reconnaissance. These operations are

undertaken for the purpose of gathering information used to
measure results of a strike (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003,
ppII–6—II–7).
87
C. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
These are operations that involve participation by

civilian and military agencies of a government to assist
another government to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Both conventional
and SOF units have a role and capability to conduct FID
missions. SOF’s primary role in this interagency activity
is to assess, train, advise, and assist Host Nation (HN)
military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that
require their unique capabilities. Successful FID missions
can lead to strategic successes for U.S. foreign policy
(Joint Publication 3–05 2003, p II–7).
D. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW)
These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of

military and paramilitary operations, normally of long
duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by
indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained,
equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an
external source. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can
either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant
commander’s overall theater campaign, or as an independent
campaign. From the U.S. perspective, the intent is to
develop and sustain these supported resistance
organizations and to synchronize their activities to
further U.S. national security objectives. SOF units do not
create resistance movements. They advise, train, and
assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence
to conduct UW, or guerilla warfare, and when required,
accompany them into combat. UW includes, but is not limited
to, the following activities:
88
(1) Guerrilla Warfare. These are military and
paramilitary operations conducted by irregular,
predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or
hostile territory. It is the military aspect of an
insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerilla
warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the
existing government or an occupying power as well as
destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.
(2) Subversion. These operations are designed to

undermine the military, economic, psychological, or
political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The
clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the
underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.
(3) Sabotage. These are operations that involve an act

or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct
the national defense of a country by injuring or destroying
any national defense or war material, premises, or
utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage
selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile
capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and
material.
(4) Intelligence Activities. These activities assess

areas of interest ranging from political and military
personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and
adversary forces. SOF perform intelligence activities
ranging from developing information critical to planning
and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities
and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.
89
(5) Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR). These
operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating
unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms. UAR operations
are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and
support military and other selected personnel as they move
from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas
under friendly control (Joint Publication 3–05 2003, pp II–
7—II–8).
E. COUNTERTERRORISM (CT)
These are operations that include the offensive

measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to
terrorism. SOF’s role and additive capability is to conduct
offensive measures within DOD’s overall combating terrorism
efforts. SOF conduct CT missions as special operations by
covert, clandestine, or low visibility means. SOF’s
activities within CT include:
(1) Intelligence Operations. These are operations to

collect, exploit, and report information on terrorist
organizations, personnel, assets, and/or activities.
(2) Network and Infrastructure Attacks. These are

operations that involve preemptive strikes against
terrorist organizations with the objective of destroying,
disorganizing, or disarming terrorist organizations before
they can strike targets of national interest.
(3) Hostage or Sensitive Materiel Recovery. These are

operations conducted to rescue hostages and/or recover
sensitive materiel from terrorist control, requiring
capabilities not normally found in conventional military
units.
90
(4) Non-Kinetic Activities. These are actions that are
focused on defeating the ideologies or motivations that
spawn terrorism by non-kinetic means. These could include,
but are not limited to, PSYOP, IO, CA operations, UW and/or
FID (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003, p.II–9).
F. COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION (WMD)
CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy,

render safe, capture, or recover WMD. Major objectives of
CP are to prevent the acquisition and use of WMD and their
delivery systems. SOF focus on counterforce tasks and
conduct CP missions as special operations by covert,
clandestine, or low visibility means (Joint Publication 3–
05, 2003, p. II–10).
G. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (CAO)
These are activities which enhance military

effectiveness by focusing efforts to minimize civilian
interference with military operations and limit the adverse
impact of military operations on civilian populations and
resources. CA give commanders the capability to coordinate
and provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to
meet the life-sustaining needs of a civilian population.
CA activities include establishing and conducting a
military government or civil administration within
operational areas until civilian authority or government
can be restored. These activities are planned and
conducted by CA and involve application of functional
specialty expertise in civil sector disciplines normally
the responsibility of civil government. CA operations are
predominantly joint, interagency, and multinational in
91
nature and are conducted through or with indigenous
populations, authorities and institutions, international
organizations, and NGOs (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003, p
II–10).
H. PSYOP
These are planned operations that convey selected

information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of
PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and
behaviors favorable to the JFC’s objectives (Joint
Publication 3–05 2003, p. II–12).
I. INFORMATION OPERATIONS
IO involve actions taken to affect adversary

information and information systems while defending one’s
own information and information systems. IO may be
conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range
of military operations, and at every level of war. Major
capabilities include computer network operations,
electronic warfare, operational security, PSYOP, and
military deception. Beyond intelligence support, other
capabilities include counterintelligence, physical
security, information assurance, public affairs (PA), and
CMO (Joint Publication 3–05, 2003, p II–12—II–13).
92
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The strategic utility of U.S. Navy Seals

THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF U.S. NAVY SEALS

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF U.S. NAVY SEALS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Author: Erick Peterson

Approved by: Hy Rothstein

The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the

The SEAL culture, based on the history of the

Historic research will illustrate successful strategic

Figure 1. Spectrum of Special Operations...................7

The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the

The author would like to thank first and foremost my

Since their inception in 1961, Navy Sea Air Land

With the relatively new emphasis on indirect action,1

This paper goes into detail on how the factors that

1 Indirect action are efforts to enable others to combat a defined

The methodology of this paper employs case studies and

Through a literature review and interviews with senior

Chapter III focuses on U.S. Navy SEAL culture, and how

Chapter IV analyzes case studies of historic

Chapter VI discusses the strategic utility of SEALs

Chapter VI is the conclusion and addresses the future

Strategic utility is how a military directly

The strategist, Colin Gray, studied the strategic

After the abortive and disastrous attempt to rescue

What had been a secondary effort by the parent

Sometime after these tenets and capabilities were

Placing the primary and secondary requirements and

Figure 1. Spectrum of Special Operations

In the 1990s, deploying forces to the combatant

This changed drastically in 2001. Since September

It would be wise for SOCOM to review the strengths and

Figure 2. Spectrum of Special Operations

The information presented in this paper will

A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM) TASKS

In 1987, Congress recognized the uniqueness of special

Prior to September 11, 2001 the Unified Command Plan

2 A supporting command is one that provides necessary personnel or

Under this authority Admiral Olson, Commander of

These efforts to plan and synchronize the current war

B. THEORY BEHIND SOF

Having an understanding of what SOF can do does not

The document continues by stating,

SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces

Employment of SOF in conventional roles is being

Special Operations Forces were initially created to

C. EVOLUTION OF SOF MISSIONS

SOF missions have become diverse and varied as a

Later in this paper, we will examine instances where

This chapter will provide a greater understanding of