IMPACT OF COALITION POLITICS ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA

Author(s): Anurag Ratna

Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science , APR. - JUN., 2007, Vol. 68, No. 2 (APR.
- JUN., 2007), pp. 337-354
Published by: Indian Political Science Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41856331

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The Indian Journal of Political Science
Vol. LXVIII, No. 2, Apr.-June, 2007

IMPACT OF COALITION POLITICS ON CONSTITUTIONAL

DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA

AnuragRatna
Coalition politics is not something very unique for students of parliamentary government.
Wherever no political party gets majority in the elections to the Lower or popular house
of legislature, a number of political parties join hands to form a coalition government.
This type of government is very common in Europe.' The political factors responsible
for formation, shape, politics, continuation, dissolution, success and failures etc. of
coalition government are broadly referred to as coalition politics. Coalition politics
takes different form and makes different impact on various countries constitution
according to their social, cultural and economic conditions. It is therefore necessary
to have a prehand knowledge of the circumstances in which coalition politics started in
India and through which it passed.

Introduction

Constitution of a country sets limits within which politics can be practiced but it does
not determine the actual nature of politics which is determined by a number of social, economic
& cultural factors which is why the same type of constitution gives birth to different types of
politics in countries with different socio-cultural milieu. On the contrary the politics of every
country has its impact on the course of its constitutional development, directly or indirectly,
formally or informally. The aim of this paper is to analyze the changes introduced by coalition
politics and assess their impact on constitutional developments.

Brief History :

Coalition politics is not something very unique for students of parliamentary government.
Wherever no political party gets majority in the elections to the Lower or popular house of
legislature, a number of political parties join hands to form a coalition government. This type of
government is very common in Europe.1 The political factors responsible forformation, shape,
politics, continuation, dissolution, success and failures etc. of coalition government are broadly
referred to as coalition politics. Coalition politics takes different form and makes different
impact on various countries constitution according to their social, cultural and economic
conditions. It is therefore necessary to have a prehand knowledge of the circumstances in
which coalition politics started in India and through which it passed.

The history of coalition politics is closely associated with the downfall of the Congress
Party in Indian politics because it stated in the states and at centre both when the Congress
was defeated at polls perhaps explains why Congress was against participating in coalition
government at the Centre till 2004.

Coalition governments were first formed in states like UP, Haryana, M. P., Bihar etc.
after the downfall of the Congress in these states in the election held in 1 967. These coalition

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 338

governments were popularly known as S.V.D.

coalition governments ended the domination o
the opportunities for governance to opposite
managed by the leaders of opposition parties
Hence very soon these coalition government
equated in popular perception with indecision
sale and purchase of M.L.A.'s. They became the
erosion of chief minister's authority, decline in

Just as in the states, the coalition politics beg

Party in the 1 977 elections when the first Non
was formed in New Delhi. Although technic
Party) government, actually it was a coalition go
a conglomeration of five political parties, i.e.
(BLD), Jana Sangh and the Congress fro Demo
problems and died as a coalition government.
Congress government with the outside suppor
month necessitating mid-term poll in 1980 in
returned to power. Again the Congress return
Rajiv Gandhi got % majority due to sympathy w
in 1 984. V.P. Singh formed another Non congre
left parties and BJP and Chandra Shekhar form
Both these governments were technically one
outside support of one or another political party

The real coalition era dawned in 1 996 when t

resulted in a hung Lok Sabha in which no party

As no party or combination of parties got

Sharma invited Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the leader
and prove his majority on May 31 . He was swor
of confidence moved by him on 27th May wa
motion was, however, not put to vote as Vajp
was going to resign. He went straight from P
submitted his resignation to the President on
Bihari Vajpayee government worked as careta

After the resignation of Atal Bihari Vajpa

P.V. Narsimha Rao the leader of the second l

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 339
declined.3 Thereafter the President turned to the National front and the
alternative government.

The National Front and Left front made hectic efforts to find out
Prime Minister ship. First they tried to persuade V.P. Singh and J
combination. When they refused, they agreed only on the name of H
member of any house at that time. The congress also offered it support
writers have criticized the president for appointing Deve Gowda the lead
comprising 1 3 parties was sworn in as Prime Minister of the second coa
June 1 , 1 9964 as asked by the president, he proved his majority in the
through a motion of confidence.5

In very dramatic circumstance the Congress withdrew support

government. As a result the government fell in a vote of confidence an
11,1 9976. Deve Gowda worked as care-taker Prime Minister for April 1
Deve Gowda government was the first government at the centre to repr
and anti-Brahmin forces. All parties moved away from their declare
government in which no upper caste people found any places. Sou
people dominated. It was really a federalist government, however, becau
as the council of ministers, much was not expected.7

Deve Gowda government truly represented the composition of t

there was dominance of backward classes, dalits and Muslims in the
of Minister both, However, since the government depended on Congress
people in general did not hope much from this government.9 Thi
government fell on April 1 1 . The Congress President Sita Ram Kesari w
Deve Gowda for some personal reasons, offered to support U.F. governm
the leader. The Congress had nothing against the government or its
the leader.

After this offer of the Congress, United Front once again started the search for another
suitable candidate for Prime-Ministership. Again the process of elimination started. Several
names such as those of Y.K. Moopnar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav were
considered but each of them was opposed by strong groups and persons. Ultimately they all
agreed on the name of I.K. Gujaral who was foreign minister in the outgoing ministry of Deve
Gowda. Gujaral took oath of office on April 21 , 1997 and formed the third coalition government
at the centre with outside support of the Congress.10

Prabhu Chawla, editor of "India Today" is of the opinion that Gujaral was never an
independent prime-minister and he had always to bow down before the allies in various matters

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 340

like constitution of ministers, allotment of port

good a man to be prime minister at that time
prime minister who had no right to constitute h
bonded Prime Minister.14 According to Bhaw
Ministership was thrust upon him. He lacked

Still he could not satisfy Sita Ram Kesari who

November 1 997. Gujaral resigned on Novemb
the government, the President dissolved the
a mid-term poll which was held on February

For fighting the mid term poll three politica

into alliance with Akali Dal, Shiv Sena, Harya
Janta Party, Samta Party, Biju Janta Dal etc.,
Kerala Congress, IUML and Republican Party of
Janta Dal, Tamil Manila Congress, D.M.K. Telg
Party, etc.

The election to the 12th Lok Sabha again resulted in a hung Lok Sabha. No Party or
alliance gained majority. However the B.J. P. led alliance emerged with 264 seats, as the
largest alliance in which B.J. P. had the largest number of seats (197). After hectic political
activities, it became clear that B.J. P. alliance had more support and could form a stable
government. Hence the President invited Atal Bihari Vajpayee to form the government.

Vajpayee was sworn in as prime minister for the second time on March 19,1 9981 7 to
lead the fourth coalition government at the centre. Immediately thereafter Atal Bihari Vajpayee
started feeling the pangs of a coalition government. President, too was in a difficult position.
Jayalalita started troubling Vajpayee from the day 1 and kept him on his toes on the one
pretext or another. The whole year 1 998 passed as a period of black-mailing by allies supporting
Atal Bihari Vajpayee from inside or outside.18

All parties supporting the government were putting one demand or another everyday
forcing Vajpayee for taking unworthy decisions or deferring decisions. However, when Jayalalita
put three demands i.e. to sack defence minister George Fernandes, reinstatement of sacked
Navy Chief Vishnu Bhagwat and setting up a joint parliamentary committee to probe into
allegation made by George Fernandes against Bhagwat19. Vajpayee did not yield and the
result was obvious. Jayalalita (the AIADMK) withdrew support from the government in the first
week of April. Hence the President asked Atal Bihari Vajpayee to seek fresh vote of confidence.
Vajpayee government was defeated by one vote to April 1 7, 1 999 (269 votes in favour and 270
votes against the motion of confidence) 20. The remark of Church bill that one is enough was

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 341
proved true in this voting.21 The Vajpayee government resigned immed
the President to continue till the new government was formed.

The President tried to find out a leader who could form the ne
miserably failed in this attempt. The opposition parties which were
from power, could not form an alternative government because the
should lead the new government. Hence the President dissolved the
26,22 as no government could be formed, Vajpayee continued work
Minster till the formation of next government in October 1 999.

After the dissolution of the 1 2th Lok Sabha, political parties start
election for the 1 3th Lok Sabha. There was clear indication since 1
party dominance in parliament were over and the days of hung Parliam
main claimants of to the power, the B.J. P. and the Congress, se
coalition politics, the B.J. P. with full vigour and the Congress only ha
formed a grand alliance of political parties as National Democratic
15, 1999. 23 Atal Behari Vajpayee was elected leader of N.D.A. The
forming the alliance were Janta Dal (United) Samta Party, Lok Shak
Dal, Indian National Lok Dal (Haryana), D.M.K., MDMK, PMK, IMC
Biju Janta Dal (Orissa), Shiv Sena (Maharastra), Himanchal Pradesh
Some other parties Telugu Desam and Trinamool Congress (West B
from outside. The Congress reached electoral understanding with some
Rastriya Janta Dal (Bihar), Rastriya Lok Dal (U.P.), Kerala Congress
third alliance of left parties was already there. Some other parti
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) etc. de
on their own without any alliance or understanding with other parties

The election to the 1 3th Lok Sabha was held on September 5,1 1 ,1
The seats won by different alliance and parties were as follows:

1 NDA 299 (including 182 of BJP)

2 Left Alliance

3 Congress Led Alliance 1 37 (including 1 1 2 of Congress)

4 Others and independents 64 (including 26

Total 543

This tim
Atal Biha

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 342

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in as prime m

1 99924 and formed the fifth coalition governme
five year term as prime minister of a coalition g
Atal Bihari Vajpayee got the Lok Sabha dissolv
than due.25

Atal Bihri Vajpayee successfully leading a coalition government for a full term performed
the rarest of rare feat in the annals of parliamentary government. He proved that coalition
government can be stable provided the parties forming the coalition observe coalition culture
and work within the limits set by the agenda of coalition government better known as Common
Minimum Programme (CMP). This besides several other factors led the Congress to think
and feel that coalition politics was the need of the hour. Hence it declared its willingness and
readiness to form coalition government. It, in fact, formed a coalition known as United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) to fight the 2004 parliamentary poll as an alliance.

In the 2004, election, UPA won the majority. Shortly, thereafter Sonia Gandhi was
nominated by the 1 9 Congress allies to be the next prime minister. But she declined to take
the national top post and instead nominated n eminent economist, former Union Finance
Minister and senior Congress leader, Dr. Man Mohan Singh for the post.26 This was approved
by the Congress parliamentary party and UPA partners. Hence he was sworn in as prime
minister on May 22, 2004 to lead the sixth coalition government at the centre 27

Thus in all six coalition governments have been formed till this day, the sixth one led by
Man Mohan Singh is still working.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

If we look at the working of coalition governments at the centre from 1 996 to 2006, we
shall not fail to identify certain political developments which have had deep influence on the
course of constitutional development and working of constitutional agencies and institutio
Some of the very important among them are described below:-

(A) The tradition of outside support to a minority government started with Indira Gandhi who
took outside support from C.P.I, and others when her government became a minority governmen
after the Congress split in 1969. Since then different prime minister from Indira Gandhi to M
Mohan Singh who headed minority governments, took outside support from different parties
and dealt differently with the parties supporting from outside. Different political parties supporti
the minority government dealt with different prime minister differently according to the politi
situations in which they (P.M.) were placed.

For example, Indira Gandhi, whose minority government heavily depended upon th

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 343
outside support of the C.P.I, and others, had to make compromises on
and programmes for surviving as prime minister. Ultimately, fed up wi
by these parties she dissolved the Lok Sabha in 1 970 and ordered fr
in 1971 , instead of 1972. Charan Singh, V.P. Singh, Chandra Shekhe
Gujral had to resign from the prime ministership when the parties s
withdrew their support from the government, B.J. P. in the case of V.P
the case of others. Narsimha Rao converted his minority government into

by persuading, pressurizing or purchasing some MP's belonging to

Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. According to Dr. Subhash Kashyap, the t
(1 989-91 ) in which two minority governments were installed, was the
institution of Lok Sabha sank to the lowest depths and rules and regulat

ignored. 28 However the ugly face of the outside support was visibl
prime ministers were forced to resign or make unhealthy compro
supporting from outside. Outside support has emerged as an institution
politics. Man Mohan Singh is surviving as prime minister on the outside

As an institution, the outside support has proved a bane in Indi

affected the position of prime minister and functioning of government
outside support has not been very encouraging. In fact the aim of exten
a minority government was never pure. For example the aim behind
to the Indira Gandhi government in 1 969 was to strengthen the leftist
led by Indira Gandhi. Similarly Indira Gandhi's aim in giving outside sup
was not to enable Charan Singh to run the government but to make way

Outside support has not had a good record in our parliamentary his
says that "Indira Gandhi's support to Charan Singh and her withdrawal o
weeks were ugly precedents in our parliamentary history."30

President Venkataraman was very cautious when Rajiv Gandhi of

to Chandra Shekhar in 1990 in forming a minority government. He
Shekhar to form the government, when Rajiv Gandhi gave an assur
withdraw support at least for a year. It was only after this assurance th
convinced that Chandra Shekhar would form a viable government.31 Hen
withdrew support from the government just after three months, the Pre
Chandra Shekhar. After the resignation of Chandra Shekhar in 199
constitute new government with the outside support but he President d

According to Madhu Limaye Charan Singh's biggest mistake w

Gandhi's treacherous support in 1997. Chandra Shekhar committed

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 344

1 990.33 History repeated itself when Deve Gowd

of the Congress in 1 996 and 1 997 respectively
still continuing through Vajpayee government t
outside support from T.D.P. and left parties r

(B) Coalition politics has brought about signi

parties by forcing national parties like the Co
and state parties like the D.M.K., the Akali Da
purpose of forming government. This has, on
better understand the local aspirations of the
represent and promote and on the other, off
participate in decision making at the nationa
parties have been benefited. Both have becom
This has led to politics of compromise concili

(C) Coalition politics has been a cause and an

of hung Lok Sabha has influenced the functionin
and created many administrative problems.34

(D) For historical reasons, coalition politics w

Since no political party found itself able to d
Congress like Congress (O) etc. joined hands o
Party There was nothing common among thes
Congress party and Indira Gandih. So they follo
nine Congress ruled states, dismissing govern
U.P.A. was born out of anti N.D.A. plank the o
N.D.A. plank. This negative politics has given bir
Politics such as political vendetta, witch hunt
and closing of criminal cases against political
and renaming of the schemes and institution
the former government. The list is unending be
time. Moreover, the trend has percolated the
to the people.

IMPACT ON THE WORKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

The above changes introduced in our body politic by coalition politics have influenced
the working of our Constitution in several aspects. We discuss below some of the most
important among them:

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 345
1 . Our Constitution makers had hoped that in due course of ti
conventions would be developed which would fill the gaps in the c
smooth working of our parliamentary system. Only a few conventions w
one party Congress rule regarding the appointment of governors or con
of ministers such as consultation with state governments regarding appo
or minister's resignation due to some wrong done by his ministry. All t
been thrown to winds; persons with criminal records have been made m
leaders have been appointed governors without any consultation with
But coalition politics has led to the emergence of some new conventions
Vajpayee and Man Mohan Singh have followed certain principles abou
parties and coalition allies on policy issue which had led to the em
consensus. Side by side speakers, opposition parties and President have h
of some healthy conventions. Our President have been able to lay certain
in this era. The Presidents strictly followed the practice of inviting the l

government. This was done in 1 989, 1 991 , 1 998 and 1 999, then it has a
of our constitutional arrangement to allow a care-taker government to g
passed and all opposition parties pass them without any cut motion
healthy convention developed during this era is that we allow a car
function as a full fledged government if the country is facing any eme
government of Atal Behari Vajpayee fought Kargil war with full vigour
facing any disability of a care-taker government.

2. , Some of the practices and conventions developed during coalit

the role and status of several legal and constitutional agencies in t
President, Governor. Leader of the House etc. For example they hav
between the President and the Prime Minister. In Pre-coalition era

powerfull and the President behaved as a constitutional head of state

weak and uncertain position of Prime Minister, Presidents have h
Prime Ministers. For example, President Reddy did not allow Prime Min
address the nation after he failed to get majority support in the Lok Sa
Venkatraman did not allow care-taker Prime Ministers. V.P. Singh
use many a privilege of a regular Prime Minister36 and he also di
discussed. Rajiv Gandhi to form government with outside support
Chandra Shekhar in 1 990.

3. The Coalition politics has changed the nature of our parliamentary government. There
has emerged a new model of parliamentary government in which Prime Minister. Man Mohan
Singh is looking after administrative affairs and party president. Sonia Gandhi after political

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 346

affaris.37 This has weakened the position of P

suffers from many limitations in matters rel
council of ministers. This process of weakening t
when Deve Gowda had to appoint the nominee
and continued through Gujral and Vajpayee. In
Congress, the position of Prime Minister has suf
Prime Minister's authority between the Congr
Man Mohan Singh in which Sonia Gandhi occu
of Sonia Gandhi has been variously referred
Minister40 maximum prime minister's autho
parliamentary government which is purely India

4. Coalition politics has highlighted some of

arrangement. For example, firstly it has been
the president is utterly helpless to check the pol
the President can do no more than forming min
There is no end to the problem. Secondly the C
governments to go on ignoring, even challenging
any punishment. Many state governments ref
Thirdly article 365 (no doubt misused on cer
hitherto, to discipline a recalcitrant state govern
developments. The union government imposed pr
opposition from the President and Rajya Sabh
rule had to be withdrawn. In these circumst
irresponsibly. That is why it has been observed t

5. Coalition politics has reemphasized the

above, a coalition government may cobble disp
may not be able to sail smoothly in the Rajya Sab
Gujral and Vajpayee governments did in the c

6. Coalition politics has started new constitu

government run successfully. Notable among
Coordination Committee, National Advisory Coun
and practices have had important bearing on
between the parliament and P.M. and between
government.

7. Coalition politics has clarified the position

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 347
care taker government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee fought Kargil w
a regular government. Now it is accepted that a care-taker government s
and can face any emergency like a regular government.

8. Coalition politics has strengthened our federal polity. State gov

one party Congress rüle, were treated like municipalities and their chi
or appointees of central government acquired a new sense of impo
identity as envisaged under the Constitution. Now the Union governme
dictate to the state governments and change chief ministers at wil
are in a position to discuss various issues with the union government w
force it to abandon its dictatorial attitude and reach compromise w
run by its allies or opposition parties. And when due to rigid or unben
union government or the state government a compromise could no
Pota or school text books, the state governments followed a different
Union government.

PROBLEMS AND DANGERS

The coalition politics has created a number of problems for politics and administration
like delay in decision making and implementation, poor coordination at political level, erosion
of ministerial responsibility, wastage of time and resources in managing unmanageable ministers
and parties, instability, confusion in centre state relation, growth of extra constitutional centres
of power etc. Some of these are fraught with grave dangers for the future.

The growth of extra constitutional centres of power during coalition era R.S.S. during
Vajpayees period and chairman of the National Advisory Council during Man Mohan Singh's
period has led to the weakening of Prime Minister's authority. This is evident from the fact that
Man Mohan Singh is just a dignified proxy without enjoying the right to appoint or remove
members of either the prime minister's office or the council of ministers.43 He is reported to be

helpless not only before the party President Soina Gandhi whose wishes he carries out most
faithfully but he also accepts the decisions and diktats of those said to have Sonia's era.44
This is pathetic and humiliating for any prime minister more so far an honest and efficient
prime minister like Man Mohan Singh. Moreover, it is dangerous for the country because now
major decisions are no longer in the domain of P.M.O., they are taken by U.P.A. chairperson.
45 A clash between the constitutional and the unconstitutional centres of power, which is not

unlikely would prove disastrous for governance.

The constitutional practices and institutions like Coordination Committee, National

Advisory Council have adversely affected the authority and functioning of Prime Minister and
his council of ministers. Most of the principles on which a parliamentary government functions

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 348

such as leadership of prime minister, compa

parliament, collective responsibility etc. ha
Many a time the decisions taken by the counci
various quarters, notably coalition partn
disinvestments in PSU is a pointer in this re

As prime minister of coalition government

coalition partners, he finds little time to atten
result that judicial intervention has increased
recent judicial pronouncements on matte
commercial establishments, etc may be cited
in the government, the coalition partners hav
constitutional and legal authorities like Electio
of India (CAG), CBI etc. and charges of mala
against them. Members of council of minist
authority of Supreme Court when the latter t
Governor regarding his role in government fo
denigrate the independent constitutional agenc
a grave danger not only to parliamentary go
ministers like Lalu Prasad Yadav are certain to
politics seems to be heading to an era of confr
Some of the recent observations and judgm
IMDT Act, Governor's role in Jharkhand and Bi
colleges have created situations of confrontatio
to its anguish the Supreme Court went to t
incapable of understanding the importance of
Lahoti told Attorney General Milan K. Banerje
whatever you want."48 Similarly, feeling hurt
Yadav regarding their impartiality and fair
register their protest and seek President's h
Commissioner, expressed concern over such
Commission.50 Undesired and uncalled for c
initiated by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha him
made and orders issued in respect of sitting
been a tendency on the part of government to
to continue, every new government will iss
result in chaos and poor governance.52

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 349
WAT OUT

One party rule has become a thing of the past and we have to carry on with coalition
governments in future. Coalition governments, as we have discussed above, have created
many problems, which may prove dangerous, even catastrophic in certain situations In this
situation we are left with no choice but to find out ways and means to ensure smooth working
of coalition government in future. Various constitutional experts and leaders have come up
with a number of suggestions in this regard. A few of them are discussed below:-

1- The Lok Sabha should have a fixed term so that it may not be dissolved before the due
date.53 This would solve many problems- political administrative, financial and others which
are created by the uncertainty associated with likely dissolution of Lok Sabha.

2- Smaller regional political parties should be kept out of national politics because they
have more than often posed problems for good governance.54 As a factor the regional parties
create such individualistic syndrome as Karunanidhi-Jayalalita, Lalu Yadava-Mulayam Singh
Yadava, Mayawati and Mulayam Singh Yadava, Bal Thakre etc. who try to protect their individual
interests without any consideration for larger national interests. The regional parties moreover
always promote their regional agenda at the cost of national agends.55

3- The President should stop the practice of asking a newly appointed Prime Minister to
seek vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha within a stipulated period of time. Experts are of the
view that there is no mention of vote of confidence in the Constitutior. or Law or even in the

Rules of Procedure and Conduct of business in the Lok Sabha. It is harmful in that it gives
unnecessary authority to the President to meddle in the organization and working of government.
Had the President not asked the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to seek vote of confidence
in 1 999, the fall of government by one vote and all that followed there after could have been
avoided. Constitutional experts feel that the President's job is to appoint a Prime Minister who
in his opinion has majority in the Lok Sabha and is likely to give a stable government, it is not
his job to ask him (P.M.) to prove his majority in the Lok-Sabha and that it is right and duty of
the opposition to move a motion of no-confidence against a Prime Minister if it feels that h
does not have majority. A former President R. Venkatataman holds that the President should
not have asked Vajpayee to seek vote of confidence.56

4- No-confidence motion should accompany with the name of the new Prime Minister in
case the motion is carried. Alarmed at the fall of Vajpayee government by one vote in 1999
and failure of the opposition to be able to form an alternative government many eminent
people have come with such a suggestion, on the lines of such a practice in some of European
countries to ensure stability in the era of coalition politics The Law Commission in a radical
proposal has suggested that if a government falls by no confidence vote, the opposition leader

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 350

automatically becomes the prime minister and

former chairman of law Commission, told re
recommendation on the German model, has sugg
motion moved by opposition should be accompan
in the leader of the opposition. He said that the sy

as it would not require any change or amendm

requires a minor change in Rule No. 1 98 of th
in the Lok Sabha.57

5- The practice to extend outside support to

discouraged. The cause of untimely death of
Singh, Chandra Shekhar, Deve Gowd and I.K. G
support by B.J. P. in case of V.P. Singh and
withdrawal of outside support by the Congr
governments of Deve Gowda and Gujral, the cont
Mohan Singh is disastrous particularly to the e
take India forward as a global power.

6- The practice to appoint a jumbo cabinet

for political position and power should be ban
government, this objective has been already a
enacted in 2003 which limited the size of Coun

joining the ministry. However politicians have fou

This should be looked into.

7- Since the governors are in very embarrassing position and face cross-firing from state
governments and Union government when they belong to different political parties. It has been
suggested that clear cut rules should be framed regarding their appointment, tenure etc. so
that they do no not function under the threats of Union or State government. Governors like
Dharm Veer, Romesh Bhandari, Sunder Singh Bhandari, Vinod Kumar Pandey, Fatima Beewi
to rìàme just a few, faced very uncomfortable even humiliating situation during their tenures.
We have waited too long for convention. Now it is necessary to frame some rules regarding the
appointment and functioning of governors.

8- It has been suggested that Lok Sabha should be involved in the selection of Prime
Minister. Justice Seervai has suggested that the Prime Minister should be selected by Lok
Sabha by a majority vote. If no candidate gets majority of votes in the first voting, the second
voting should be resorted to select one from the top two persons selected in the first voting.59

9- The government i.e. the executive must realize that it is only one component of the

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 351
state and not the state itself. It must not bypass the Legislature by iss
as and when it wants. Some people say that compulsions of coalition po
since the government does not have the numbers in parliament. Bu
as an excuse for inaction; It must draft and get passed necessary law
problems of the nation.60

10- As none of the suggestions is acceptable to all, a sort of nati

suggestions. This is likely to go on until and unless one, two or ma
of our political system either through constitutional amendment o
established conventions. However, we are sure to find out remed
which our political system is affected at present. It may be advisab
of experts to examine the above suggestions and make its recomm

CONCLUSION :

As may be inferred from the above analysis, the era of coalition government has given
both positive and negative signals. We should catch hold of positive signals like understanding
and cooperation among regional and national political parties, common minimum programme,
coordination committee, politics of consensus, culture of coalition politics etc. and try to
evolve a unique model of parliamentary government something like 'Popular National Government'
which will be most suited to our multi-cultural, multi-religious polity. If however, God forbid, we

succumb to the degenerating forces unleashed by the era of coalition politics like pressure
tactics, black-mailing, criminalization of politics, politicization of criminals, misuse of power
for economic and political gains, nepotism, casteism, communalism etc. then not only
democracy is doomed in the country but our survival as a constitutional state will be also in
doubt. Thus our political system is on trial. We have to prove that we are fit for democracy and
constitutional government.

References :

1. S. Jaipal Reddy 'Rog Se KHATARNAK UPCHAR' Sahara Samay/ (Lucknow) 14th

February 2004, p.22.

2. Times of India, Lucknow, 29th May, 1 996.

3. Sayeed, S.M. Bhartiya Rajnitik Vyavastha, Sulabh Prakashan, Lucknow 2000, p. 147.

4. Times of India, Lucknow, 2nd June, 1 996.

5. Ibid, 1 3th June, 1 996, Lucknow

6. Ibid, 12th June, 1997, Lucknow

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 352

7. Rajni Kothari, Rajniti Nai, Sarkar Nai Aur

Hastakshep, June 8th 1996, p.1 .

8. Arun Kumar Pandey, 'Punch Tathya Aur P

9. Vibhanshu Dival. 'Bahut ummed Nahi' in I

1 0. Times of India, Lucknow 22nd April, 1 9

1 1 . Rashtriya Sahara, Hastakshep, op. cit, 6

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Times of India, Lucknow, 5th December, 1997.

17. Ibid, 20th March, 1998.

18. Janak Raj Jai, 'Commissions and Omissions by India President' Vol. II p. 275, Regency
Publications, New Delhi, p. 1996.

19. See Thakur C.P. & D.P. Sharma, 'India, under Atal Behari Vajpayee The BJP Era,
1 999' UBS Publishers and distributors, New Delhi.

20. Times of India, Lucknow, 1 8th April, 1 999.

21 . Quoted by Wilso Harold, 'A Prime Minister on Prime Ministers' 1 997. Quoted in Thakur
CP and Sharma DP Op. Cit Page. 358.

22. Times of India, Lucknow, 27th April, 1 999.

23. Ibid, 1 6th May, 1 999.

24. Ibid, 1 4th October, 1 999.

25. Ibid, 7th February, 2004.

26. Manisha, 'Profiles of Indian Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru to Dr. Man Mohan Singh'
2004. Mittal Publication, 2005, New Delhi, p. 424.

27. The Times of India, Lucknow, 23rd May, 2004.

28. Subhash Kashyap, 'The Ten Lok Sabhas' 1992, Shipra Publication Shakarpur, New

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Impact of Coalition Politics on Coalition Politics 353
Delhi, p. 223-24.

29. Janak Raj Jai. Op. Cit, p.9.

30. R. Venkatramen, 'My Presidential years' 1 994, p.437. Harper C

New Delhi, p.437.

31. Ibid, p.443.

32. Ibid, p.488.

33. Dr. Janak Raj Jai, Op. Cit. p. 10.

34. A Surya Prakash, 'A Good year Mr. Singh' PIONEER, Lucknow 25th May, 2005, p.6.

35. Sayeed S.M. Op. Cit. p. 10.

36. R. Venkatraman, Op. Cit. p. 404.

37. Bhavadeep Kang, 'Rule of the Two'. 'India Today' 30 August, 2004. pp. 20-21 .

38. Prabhu Chawla, 'Sonia Gandhi Ka Udai'. India Today, Hindu, 1 7 February, 2005, p.27.

39. S. Rama Swami Cho, 'Theatre of the Absurd', Times of India, Delhi 1 st July, 2005, p.
27.

40. Shachi Rainikar, 'Two Roll Back in Twelve Months', Organizer, 12th June 2005, p.13.

41 . Prabhu Chawla and Bhavdeep Kang, 'Couple at odds', India Today', 1 6th May, 2005,
p.26.

42. Narendra Mohan, 'Arajakta Ke Samne Asahai Hai Bhartiya Samvidhan', Dainik Jagran,
14th March, 1999, p.8.

43. Swapan Das Gutpa, 'Faculty Building' Sunday PIONEER (Agenda), 22nd May, 2005,
p.1

44. Debashish Mukarjee, 'Rising to the Challenge', Week May 22, 2005, p. 47.

45. Arun Jaitley, 'Force of a government', Times of India, 31 st May, 2005, p.8.

46. A. Surya Parkash, 'Judicial Co-governance, a Reality, PIONEER, 1 8th January, 2005,
p.4.

47. A. Surya Parkash, 'A Good Year Mr. Singh', PIONEER, 25th May, 2005, p.6.

48. The PIONEER, Lucknow 24th August, 2005.

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 354

49. The PIONEER, Lucknow 10th May, 2005, p

50. Dainik Jagran Lucknow, 1 st June 2005.

51 . Shachin Rainikar, Op. Cit, p. 1 3.

52. Vijai Jindal, 'Path to Good Governance', The

2005, p.7.

53. Shachi Rainikar, Op. Cit, p. 13.

54. The Times of India, (Editorial) Lucknow 1 0t

55. Anshul Chaturvedi 'Big Fish Small Fish', The

56. Dr. Janak Raj Jai, Op. Cit, p. 278.

57. The Times of India, Lucknow, August 1 5, 20

58. Dr. Janak Raj Jai, Op. Cit, p. 21 3.

59. Quoted by Pran Chopra Unto Parliament II' H

p.6.

60. Vijai Jindal Op. Cit, p.7.

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