Berman - Wittgenstein and General Semantics

WITTGENSTEIN AND GENERAL SEMANTICS
Author(s): Sanford I. Berman

Source: ETC: A Review of General Semantics , Spring 1988, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 1988),
pp. 22-25
Published by: Institute of General Semantics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42579411
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WITTGENSTEIN AND
Sanford I. Berman* GENERAL SEMANTICS
No centurycentury
other Anglo-American
Anglo-Americanthought
philosopher has thought
than Ludwig exertedAlfred
Wittgenstein. than a greater Ludwig influence Wittgenstein. on twentieth- Alfred
Korzybski had only a few references to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus in his Science and Sanity. And yet., there is a much greater
relationship between the thinking of Wittgenstein and Korzybski than these
references might suggest. I am sure that Korzybski would have considered some
of the Tractatus as ambiguous or meaningless, as many of the analytic
philosophers have done. But an analysis of Wittgenstein's philosophy should
be of interest to the general semanticist.
Wittgenstein said that all philosophy is "Critique of language" (4.0031) and
that philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The object of philosophy
is the logical clarification of thoughts. It is not a body of knowledge or a theory
about the world based upon empirical investigation. Moreover, it is not a special
knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality obtained a priori or by some extra-
empirical revelation. It is a language-clarifying activity. In other words, says
Wittgenstein, philosophy is a pursuit of meaning and sense, and not of truth.
The task of a philosopher is to see that all discourse complies with the
following two conditions: (a) that it contain only the terms which have unique
and unambiguous meaning being assigned either by explicit definitions or by
pointing; and (b) that its propositions be constructed according to the rules
of our language, so as to make determinate sense. It is the duty of a philoso-
pher to see that these conditions are complied with in all actual uses of
language, in everyday life, and in science, science being but an extension of
everyday life to more difficult and general cases.
The unchanging purpose of all philosophizing is to make our language clear
and unambiguous; to reject as meaningless all the statements for which we can
*Sanford I. Berman, Ph.D., is Vice President of the International Society for General
Semantics. An educator, President of Educational Cassettes, Inc., and author of a number
of books on general semantics, he lives in La Jolla, California.
22

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Wittgenstein and General Semantics 23
find no determinate meaning, and to mak

statements which are vague and ambigu
The practice of Socrates was essentially in
of Wittgenstein. Socrates' method was not
clear what was meant by asking certain qu
and conduct. This method consisted of a
the propositions under consideration.
For Wittgenstein, the pursuit of truth is
everyday life and of its refined extension
to ascertain the truth or falsehood of a pr
everyday life, we must understand what t
able to say 'p' is true (or false) I must hav
I call 'p' true, and thereby I determine t
It is the proper and the only business
understand the terms and propositions we
proceed to try to verify a proposition wit
as to what it says. Wittgenstein pointed o
even in scientific investigations, for examp
Thus Einstein was engaged in philosophic
meaning to the term "simultaneity." In su
as mathematics much depends on clarif
Wittgenstein said that whenever and whe
two things is possible: either (a) we unders
understand it. In the first situation there
the problem is to be solved by scientific m
have to investigate the statement of the pr
at either of two results: (1) The problem a
ine or real problem, which can be referred
or (2) it becomes no problem at all but a
that makes no sense to us.
Wittgenstein pointed out that philosophe
always seen clearly the distinction betwee
on the one hand, and the pursuit of tr
and the confusion of the two has resu
disputation and literature.
He believed that this confusion very pro
fact that in ancient times philosophy was
the times. Ancient science was in an embr
ambiguous, and therefore the activity of s
clarification of the meanings of these con
activity. It was natural that philosophy
science of the essential nature of things.
tion to the special empirical truths of scie
general or universal and more essential

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24 Et cetera • SPRING 1988
to science; and these ultimate

as contrasted to scientific met
tical" or logical demonstration
persisted throughout the whol
Wittgenstein felt that in add
contemporary science and ever
is essentially a negative task o
philosophers, of sifting out scie
philosophical work of clarifica
less terms and nonsensical pr
cally condemn as senseless al
philosophers. If a man pursues
the world, then his work give
world, even if the author has
The works of great philosopher
cal work of clarification of lan
the properly philosophical acti
activity of pursuing truth, th
philosophical pursuit of truth
science, and therefore we mus
cal problems" of traditional p
Most propositions and questio
cal matters, are not false, but
of this kind at all, but only
propositions of the philosopher
the logic of our language . . . A
problems are really no probl
Immanuel Kant held that th
lems, that is, problems conc
because the things-in-themselv
Wittgenstein, as we see, goes f
are in principle not solvable by
cal and due to the misuse of lan
cal, something that neither s
to Wittgenstein, "but a solemn
of philosophy by the special ja
He says that the history of ph
tendency to certain kinds of l
but nevertheless deeply seated
tive portion of mankind seem
largely the history of the inte
to get out of their intellectual
is the history of widely sprea
Philosophy, for Wittgenstein,

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Wittgenstein and General Semantics 25
of clarifying our language; and instead

Ramsey puts it, at curing headaches. We a
feeling of intellectual discomfort which w
is not clear and unambiguous, and the p
as the linguistic confusion we meet with
Wittgenstein says of his Tractatus , "My
way: he who understands me finally re
has climbed out through them, on them, o
away the ladder, after he has climbed up o
sitions; then he sees the world rightly." (6
While pointing out the tautological limit
ble, the Tractatus also points out some
knowable does not exhaust reality, and th
be discussed. As Wittgenstein says, "Wh
must be silent." (7)
Ambiguity
yj.^'

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WITTGENSTEIN AND GENERAL SEMANTICS

Author(s): Sanford I. Berman

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42579411

This content downloaded from

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find no determinate meaning, and to mak

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to science; and these ultimate

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of clarifying our language; and instead

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