Or Departmental Exam
Or Departmental Exam
Or Departmental Exam
To accompany
Quantitative Analysis for Management, Tenth Edition,
by Render, Stair, and Hanna
Power Point slides created by Jeff Heyl © 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Learning Objectives
After completing this chapter, students will be able to:
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE
ALTERNATIVE MARKET ($) MARKET ($)
Construct a large plant 200,000 –180,000
Do nothing 0 0
Types of Decision-Making
Environments
1. Maximax (optimistic)
2. Maximin (pessimistic)
3. Criterion of realism (Hurwicz)
4. Equally likely (Laplace)
5. Minimax regret
Maximax
Used to find the alternative that maximizes
the maximum payoff
n Locate the maximum payoff for each alternative
n Select the alternative with the maximum
number
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE MAXIMUM IN
ALTERNATIVE MARKET ($) MARKET ($) A ROW ($)
Construct a large
plant 200,000 –180,000 200,000
Maximax
Construct a small
100,000 –20,000 100,000
plant
Do nothing 0 0 0
Maximin
Used to find the alternative that maximizes
the minimum payoff
n Locate the minimum payoff for each alternative
n Select the alternative with the maximum
number
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE MINIMUM IN
ALTERNATIVE MARKET ($) MARKET ($) A ROW ($)
Construct a large
plant 200,000 –180,000 –180,000
Construct a small
plant 100,000 –20,000 –20,000
Do nothing 0 0 0
Maximin
Using QM to Solve Decision
Theory Problems
Using QM to Solve Decision
Theory Problems
Criterion of Realism (Hurwicz)
A weighted average compromise between
optimistic and pessimistic
n Select a coefficient of realism a
n Coefficient is between 0 and 1
n A value of 1 is 100% optimistic
n Compute the weighted averages for each
alternative
n Select the alternative with the highest value
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE ROW
ALTERNATIVE MARKET ($) MARKET ($) AVERAGE ($)
Construct a large
plant 200,000 –180,000 10,000
Construct a small
plant 100,000 –20,000 40,000
Eq ually likely
Do nothing 0 0 0
Minimax Regret
Based on opportunity loss or regret, the
difference between the optimal profit and
actual payoff for a decision
n Create an opportunity loss table by determining
the opportunity loss for not choosing the best
alternative
n Opportunity loss is calculated by subtracting
each payoff in the column from the best payoff
in the column
n Find the maximum opportunity loss for each
alternative and pick the alternative with the
minimum number
Minimax Regret
n Opportunity
Loss Tables
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE
MARKET ($) MARKET ($)
200,000 – 200,000 0 – (–180,000)
200,000 – 100,000 0 – (–20,000)
200,000 – 0 0–0
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE
ALTERNATIVE MARKET ($) MARKET ($)
Construct a large plant 0 180,000
Construct a small plant 100,000 20,000
Do nothing 200,000 0
Minimax Regret
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE MAXIMUM IN
ALTERNATIVE MARKET ($) MARKET ($) A ROW ($)
Construct a large
plant 0 180,000 180,000
Construct a small
100,000 20,000 100,000
plant Minimax
Do nothing 200,000 0 200,000
Decision Making Under Risk
n Decision making when there are several possible
states of nature and we know the probabilities
associated with each possible state
n Most popular method is to choose the alternative
with the highest expected monetary value (EMV)
STATE OF NATURE
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE
ALTERNATIVE MARKET ($) MARKET ($) EMV ($)
Construct a large
plant 200,000 –180,000 10,000
Construct a small
plant 100,000 –20,000 40,000
Do nothing 0 0 0
Probabilities 0.50 0.50
Largest EMV
EMV for Thompson Lumber Using
QM for Windows
Largest EMV
Expected Value of Perfect
Information (EVPI)
n EVPI places an upper bound on what you should
pay for additional information
EVPI = EVwPI – Maximum EMV
n EVwPI is the long run average return if we have
perfect information before a decision is made
$300,000
–$200,000
Sensitivity Analysis
Point 1:
EMV(do nothing) = EMV(small plant)
20,000
0 = $120,000P - $20,000 P= = 0.167
120,000
Point 2:
EMV(small plant) = EMV(large plant)
$120,000P - $20,000 = $380,000P - $180,000
160,000
P= = 0.615
260,000
Sensitivity Analysis
BEST RANGE OF P
ALTERNATIVE VALUES
Do nothing Less than 0.167
EMV Values Construct a small plant 0.167 – 0.615
$300,000 Construct a large plant Greater than 0.615
–$200,000
Decision Trees
n Any problem that can be presented in a
decision table can also be graphically
represented in a decision tree
n Decision trees are most beneficial when a
sequence of decisions must be made
n All decision trees contain decision points
or nodes and state-of-nature points or
nodes
n A decision node from which one of several
alternatives may be chosen
n A state-of-nature node out of which one state
of nature will occur
Five Steps to
Decision Tree Analysis
A Decision Node
1
Unfavorable Market
Favorable Market
Construct
Small Plant
2
Unfavorable Market
Thompson’s Decision Tree
EMV for Node = (0.5)($200,000) + (0.5)(–$180,000)
1 = $10,000 Payoffs
Favorable Market (0.5)
$200,000
Alternative with best
EMV is selected 1
Unfavorable Market (0.5)
–$180,000
$0
Thompson’s Complex
Decision Tree
Suppose John Thompson has two decisions to
make, with the second decision dependent on the
outcome of the first. Before deciding about
building a new plant, John has the option of
conducting his own marketing research survey at
a cost of $10,000.
n There is a 45% chance that the survey results will
indicate a favorable market (hence, 0.55 is the
probability that the survey results will be
negative).
n There is a 78% chance of a favorable market
given a favorable result from the market survey.
n There is a 27% chance of a favorable market
given that the survey results are negative.
Thompson’s Complex Decision Tree
First Decision Second Decision Payoffs
Point Point
Favorable Market (0.78) $190,000
2 Unfavorable Market (0.22) –$190,000
Favorable Market (0.78)
Small $90,000
Plant 3 Unfavorable Market (0.22)
–$30,000
No Plant
–$10,000
1 Favorable Market (0.27) $190,000
4 Unfavorable Market (0.73) –$190,000
Favorable Market (0.27)
Small $90,000
Plant 5 Unfavorable Market (0.73)
–$30,000
No Plant
–$10,000
$106,400
$63,600 Favorable Market (0.78)
Small $90,000
Unfavorable Market (0.22)
Plant –$30,000
No Plant
$49,200 –$10,000
–$87,400 Favorable Market (0.27)
$190,000
Unfavorable Market (0.73) –$190,000
$2,400 Favorable Market (0.27)
$2,400
Small $90,000
Unfavorable Market (0.73)
Plant –$30,000
No Plant
–$10,000
$49,200
To accompany
Quantitative Analysis for Management, Eleventh Edition,
by Render, Stair, and Hanna
Power Point slides created by Brian Peterson
Learning Objective
After completing this chapter, students will be able to:
3-2
Utility Theory
n Monetary value is not always a true
indicator of the overall value of the
result of a decision.
n The overall value of a decision is called
utility.
n Economists assume that rational
people make decisions to maximize
their utility.
3-3
Utility Theory
Your Decision Tree for the Lottery Ticket
$2,000,000
Accept
Offer
$0
Heads
Reject (0.5)
Offer
Tails
(0.5)
EMV = $2,500,000
$5,000,000
3-4
Utility Theory
n Utility assessment assigns the worst outcome a
utility of 0, and the best outcome, a utility of 1.
n A standard gamble is used to determine utility
values.
n When you are indifferent, your utility values are
equal.
3-5
Standard Gamble for Utility
Assessment
(p)
Best Outcome
Utility = 1
(1 – p) Worst Outcome
Utility = 0
Other Outcome
Utility = ?
3-6
Investment Example
n Jane Dickson wants to construct a utility curve
revealing her preference for money between $0
and $10,000.
n A utility curve plots the utility value versus the
monetary value.
n An investment in a bank will result in $5,000.
n An investment in real estate will result in $0 or
$10,000.
n Unless there is an 80% chance of getting $10,000
from the real estate deal, Jane would prefer to
have her money in the bank.
n So if p = 0.80, Jane is indifferent between the bank
or the real estate investment.
3-7
Investment Example
p = 0.80 $10,000
U($10,000) = 1.0
(1 – p) = 0.20 $0
U($0.00) = 0.0
$5,000
U($5,000) = p = 0.80
3-8
Investment Example
n We can assess other utility values in the same way.
n For Jane these are:
3-9
Utility Curve
1.0 – U ($10,000) = 1.0
0.7 –
0.6 –
Utility
0.4 –
0.3 –
0.2 –
0.1 –
U ($0) = 0
| | | | | | | | | |
$0 $1,000 $3,000 $5,000 $7,000 $10,000
Monetary Value
3-10
Utility Curve
n Jane’s utility curve is typical of a risk avoider.
n She gets less utility from greater risk.
n She avoids situations where high losses might occur.
n As monetary value increases, her utility curve increases
at a slower rate.
3-11
Preferences for Risk
Risk
Avoider
Utility
Risk
Seeker
Figure 3.10
Monetary Outcome
3-12
Utility as a
Decision-Making Criteria
3-13
Utility as a
Decision-Making Criteria
Tack Lands
Point Down (0.55)
–$10,000
3-15
Utility as a
Decision-Making Criteria
3-16
Utility Curve for Mark Simkin
1.00 –
0.75 –
Utility
0.50 –
0.30 –
0.25 –
0.15 –
0.05 –
0 |– | | | |
–$20,000 –$10,000 $0 $10,000 $20,000
Monetary Outcome
3-17
Utility as a
Decision-Making Criteria
Tack Lands
Point Down (0.55)
0.05
Don’t Play
0.15
3-18
IE 12 2
OPERATIONS RESEARCH 2
M od u l e 2 – Pa r t 1
Deterministic Dynamic Programming (DP)
Contents
I. Nature of Computations
II. Resource Allocation Problem
III. Workforce Size Problem
IV. Cargo Loading/ Knapsack Problem
Puzzle
Given the two containers above, fill the 8- liter container with exactly 7 liters of
water.
He used the term dynamic since the nature of his work was
dynamic, multi- stage, and time-varying.
Richard Ernest Bellman (1920-1984)
• received his PhD at Princeton University at the age of 25
• associate professor of mathematics at Stanford University
• published 619 papers and 39 books
• the Father of Dynamic Programming
General Description
• an optimization procedure that is particularly applicable to
problems requiring a sequence of interrelated decisions
2. Each stage has a number of states associated with it. State is the
information needed to any stage to make an optimal decision.
Characteristics of DP Applications
3. The decision chosen at any stage describes how the state at the
current stage is transformed into the state at the next stage.
4. Principle of optimality
Given the current state, the optimal decision for each of the
remaining stages must not depend on previously reached states or
previously chosen decisions.
Characteristics of DP Applications
5. If the states for the problem have been classified into one of T
stages, there must be a recursion that relates the cost or reward
earned during stages t, t+1, t+2, …, T to the cost or reward earned
from stages t+1, t+2, …, T.
General Process
1. Divide the bigger or complex problems into a number of smaller
problems (or subproblems).
2. Solve recursively each subproblem optimally.
3. Use these optimal solutions to construct an optimal solution for
the original problem.
Applications
• Capital budgeting
• Resource allocation
• Cargo loading / Knapsack problem
• Traveling salesman
• Reliability
• Production scheduling
• Inventory control
• Etc.
Resource Allocation
Example 1: Budget Co. company is tasked to optimize the
maximum return from allocating a total 8 million pesos budget to
one or more projects among 1, 2, 3 and 4. The table below shows
the return per budget allocated in each project.
𝒙𝒊 𝒓𝟏 (𝒙𝟏 ) 𝒓𝟐 (𝒙𝟐 ) 𝒓𝟑 (𝒙𝟑 ) 𝒓𝟒 (𝒙𝟒 )
0 0 0 0 0
1 3 1 2 1
2 7 2 4 3
3 10 4 6 6
4 12 8 8 9
5 13 13 13 12
6 14 17 17 14
7 14 19 19 16
8 14 20 20 17
Workforce Size Model
Example 1: A construction contractor estimates that the size of the
work force needed over the next 5 weeks to be 5, 7, 8, 4, and 6
workers, respectively. Excess labor kept on the force will cost
P3,000 per worker per week, and new hiring in any week will incur
a fixed cost of P4,000 plus P2,000 per worker per week.
HW: Resource Allocation
The owner of a chain of four grocery stores has purchased six
crates of fresh strawberries. The table below gives the estimated
total expected profit (in ten thousands of pesos) at each store
when it is allocated various number of crates. For administrative
reasons, the owner does not wish to split crates between stores.
However, he is willing to distribute zero crates to any of his stores.
Find the allocation of six crates to four stores as to maximize the
expected profit.
HW: Resource Allocation
The table below gives the estimated total expected profit (in ten
thousands of pesos) at each store when it is allocated various
number of crates.
HW: Workforce Size Model
Luxor Travel arranges 1-week tours to southern Egypt. The agency
is contracted to provide tourist groups with seven, four, seven, and
eight rental cars over the next four weeks, respectively. Luxor
Travel subcontracts with a local car dealer to supply rental needs.
The dealer charges a rental fee of $320 per car per week, plus a
flat rate of $400 for any rental transaction. Luxor, however, may
elect not to return the rental cars at the end of the week, in which
case the agency will be responsible only for the weekly rental
($320). What is the best way for Luxor Travel to handle the rental
situation?
Cargo Loading/Knapsack Problem
Consider the following data:
Max Weight W= 5
Markov Analysis
To accompany
Quantitative Analysis for Management, Tenth Edition,
by Render, Stair, and Hanna
Power Point slides created by Jeff Heyl © 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Learning Objectives
After completing this chapter, students should be able to:
where
n = number of states
p1, p2, … , pn = probability of being in state 1,
state 2, …, state n
States and State Probabilities
n In some cases it is possible to know with
complete certainty what state an item is in
n Vector states can then be represented as
p (1) = (1, 0)
where
p (1) = vector of states for the machine
in period 1
p1 = 1 = probability of being in the
first state
p2 = 0 = probability of being in the
second state
The Vector of State Probabilities for
Three Grocery Stores Example
n States for people in a small town with three
grocery stores
n A total of 100,000 people shop at the three
groceries during any given month
n Forty thousand may be shopping at American
Food Store – state 1
n Thirty thousand may be shopping at Food Mart –
state 2
n Thirty thousand may be shopping at Atlas Foods
– state 3
The Vector of State Probabilities for
Three Grocery Stores Example
n Probabilities are as follows
State 1 – American Food Store: 40,000/100,000 = 0.40 = 40%
State 2 – Food Mart: 30,000/100,000 = 0.30 = 30%
State 3 – Atlas Foods: 30,000/100,000 = 0.30 = 30%
0.1 #1 0.03
Food Mart #2 0.7
#2 0.21
0.3 0.2
#3 0.06
0.2 #1 0.06
Atlas Foods #3 0.2
#2 0.06
0.3 0.6
#3 0.18
Matrix of Transition Probabilities
…
Pm1 … Pmn
Row 1
0.8 = P11 = probability of being in state 1 after being in state 1 in the
preceding period
0.1 = P12 = probability of being in state 2 after being in state 1 in the
preceding period
0.1 = P13 = probability of being in state 3 after being in state 1 in the
preceding period
Transition Probabilities for the
Three Grocery Stores
0.8 0.1 0.1
P = 0.1 0.7 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.6
Row 2
0.1 = P21 = probability of being in state 1 after being in state 2 in the
preceding period
0.7 = P22 = probability of being in state 2 after being in state 2 in the
preceding period
0.2 = P23 = probability of being in state 3 after being in state 2 in the
preceding period
Row 3
0.2 = P31 = probability of being in state 1 after being in state 3 in the
preceding period
0.2 = P32 = probability of being in state 2 after being in state 3 in the
preceding period
0.6 = P33 = probability of being in state 3 after being in state 3 in the
preceding period
Predicting Future Market Shares
p (1) = p (0)·P
p (n + 1) = p (n) ·P
Predicting Future Market Shares
p (1) = p (0) ·P
p (2) = p (1)·P
Predicting Future Market Shares
n Since we know that
p (1) = p (0)P
n We have
n In general
p (n) = p (0)Pn
n The question of whether American and Food Mart
will continue to gain market share and Atlas will
continue to loose is best addressed in terms of
equilibrium or steady state conditions
Markov Analysis of
Machine Operations
n The owner of Tolsky Works has recorded the
operation of his milling machine for several years
n Over the past two years, 80% of the time the
milling machine functioned correctly for the
current month if it had functioned correctly
during the preceding month
n 90% of the time the machine remained incorrectly
adjusted if it had been incorrectly adjusted in the
preceding month
n 10% of the time the machine corrected to
problems and operated correctly when it had
been operating incorrectly
Markov Analysis of
Machine Operations
n The matrix of transition probabilities for this
machine is
0.8 0.2
P=
0.1 0.9
where
P11 = 0.8 = probability that the machine will be correctly functioning
this month given it was correctly functioning last month
P12 = 0.2 = probability that the machine will not be correctly
functioning this month given it was correctly functioning
last month
P21 = 0.1 = probability that the machine will be correctly functioning
this month given it was not correctly functioning last
month
P22 = 0.9 = probability that the machine will not be correctly
functioning this month given it was not correctly
functioning last month
Markov Analysis of
Machine Operations
n What is the probability that the machine will be
functioning correctly one and two months from
now?
p (1) = p (0)P
0.8 0.2
= (1, 0)
0.1 0.9
= [(1)(0.8) + (0)(0.1), (1)(0.2) + (0)(0.9)]
= (0.8, 0.2)
Markov Analysis of
Machine Operations
n What is the probability that the machine will be
functioning correctly one and two months from
now?
p (2) = p (1)P
0.8 0.2
= (0.8, 0.2)
0.1 0.9
= [(0.8)(0.8) + (0.2)(0.1), (0.8)(0.2) + (0.2)(0.9)]
= (0.66, 0.34)
Equilibrium Conditions
n It is easy to imagine that all market shares will
eventually be 0 or 1
n But equilibrium share of the market values or
probabilities generally exist
n An equilibrium condition exists if state
probabilities do not change after a large number
of periods
n At equilibrium, state probabilities for the next
period equal the state probabilities for current
period
n Equilibrium state probabilities can be computed
by repeating Markov analysis for a large number
of periods
Equilibrium Conditions
n It is always true that
p (next period) = p (this period)P
n Or
p (n + 1) = p (n)P
n At equilibrium
p (n + 1) = p (n)
n So at equilibrium
p (n + 1) = p (n)P = p (n)
n Or
p = pP
Equilibrium Conditions
n For Tolsky’s machine
p=pP
0.8 0.2
(p1, p2) = (p1, p2)
0.1 0.9
n Thus
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
P=
0.6 0 0.2 0.2
0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2
Absorbing States and the
Fundamental Matrix
n To obtain the fundamental matrix, it is necessary
to partition the matrix of transition probabilities
as follows
I 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
I= 0=
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
P=
0.6 0 0.2 0.2 0.6 0 0.2 0.2
0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 A= B=
0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2
A B
where
I = an identity matrix
0 = a matrix with all 0s
Absorbing States and the
Fundamental Matrix
n The fundamental matrix can be computed as
F = (I – B)–1
–1
1 0 – 0.2 0.2
F=
0 1 0.3 0.2
–1
0.8 –0.2
F=
–0.3 0.8
–1 d –b
The inverse a b a b r r
is c =
of the matrix c d d –c a
r r
where
r = ad – bc
Absorbing States and the
Fundamental Matrix
n To find the matrix F we compute
r = ad – bc = (0.8)(0.8) – (–0.3)(–0.2) = 0.64 – 0.06 = 0.58
n With this we have
0.8 –(–0.2)
–1
0.8 –0.2 0.58 0.58 1.38 0.34
F= = =
–0.3 0.8 –(–0.3) 0.8 0.52 1.38
0.58 0.58
• The values in the fundamental matrix represent the average number of times
the process visits each of the nonabsorbing states before ultimately
reaching some absorbing state.
• For example,the value of 1.38 in the first column and first row of the
fundamental matrix tells us that if the process starts in state 3 (account is
overdue less than one month), it will return to state 3 an average of 1.38 times.
• Similarly, if the process starts in state 3, it will visit state 4 (account is overdue
between one and three months) an average of 0.34 times.
• If the process starts in state 4, it will visit state 3 an average of .52 times and
revisit state 4 an average of 1.38 times.
Limiting Matrix
where
n = number of nonabsorbing states
M1 = amount in the first state or category
M2 = amount in the second state or category
Mn = amount in the nth state or category
Absorbing States and the
Fundamental Matrix
n If we assume there is $2,000 in the less than one
month category and $5,000 in the one to three
month category, M would be
M = (2,000, 5,000)
n http://wps.prenhall.com/bp_render_qam_10
n Hillier, F.S. and G.J. Lieberman. 2001. Introduction
to Operations Research. New York: McGraw-Hill
Co. Inc.
IE 12 2
OPERATIONS RESEARCH 2
M od u l e 2 – Pa r t 3
Markov Processes in Economic Analyses
Fast-food restaurant selection
• The town of Sandpoint, Idaho has three fast-food restaurants: RallyBurger, Burger Barn,
and Caesar’s.
• We have observed that, among Sandpoint’s population, the choice of a fast-food
restaurant is influenced solely by the last fast-food restaurant visited. In particular, the
probability that a customer who has last eaten at RallyBurger returns to RallyBurger on his
next visit to a fast-food restaurant is .70; the probability that the customer will next choose
Burger Barn is .20, and the probability the customer will next choose Caesar’s is .10.
• A customer who has last eaten fast food at Burger Barn has a .35 probability that his next
fast-food restaurant visit will be to RallyBurger, a .50 probability that he will return to Burger
Barn, and a .15 probability that he will go to Caesar’s next time.
• Finally, if a customer last ate fast food at Caesar’s, there is a .25 probability that he will go
to RallyBurger, a .30 probability that he will choose Burger Barn, and a .45 probability that
he will return to Caesar’s on his next visit to a fast-food restaurant.
Fast-food restaurant selection
• Caesar’s management would like to estimate its overall market share of the fastfood
business in Sandpoint. To aid in this analysis, it wishes to construct a transition matrix that
describes how customers select fast-food restaurants.
Fast-food restaurant selection
• The steady state probabilities are
• 𝝅𝟏 = 0.51111 for Rally Burger
• 𝝅𝟐 = 0.31111 for Burger Barn
• 𝝅𝟑 = 0.17778 for Ceasar’s
Mean Recurrence Time for Fast-Food restaurant
• The average time required for the process to return to a given state
• It is the inverse of the steady state value: 1/ 𝝅𝒊
• For the fast-food restaurant example, the steady state value corresponding to Rally Burger
is .51111. Thus, a customer who is currently eating at Rally Burger will return to Rally Burger
on the average of every 1/.5111 = 1.9565 visits to a fast- food restaurant.
• Similarly, a customer will return to Burger Barn every 1/.3111 = 3.2143 visits to a fast-food
restaurant and to Caesar’s every 1/.17778 = 5.6250 visits.
Rolley’s Rentals
• Rolley’s Rentals, located in Lahaina, Hawaii, rents bicycles for daily use. The company
estimates that its profit is a function of the weather and has classified weather conditions
into three states: sunny, cloudy, and rainy.
• Based on meteorological studies for Lahaina, Rolley’s estimates that if today is sunny, there
is a 75% chance of sunny weather tomorrow, a 20% chance of cloudy weather tomorrow,
and a 5% chance of rainy weather tomorrow.
• If today is cloudy, the likelihood of sunny weather tomorrow is 45%, of cloudy weather 40%,
and of rainy weather 15%.
• If today is rainy, there is a 35% chance of sunny weather tomorrow, a 45% chance of
cloudy weather, and a 20% chance of rainy weather.
Rolley’s Rentals
• Mr. Rolley would like to determine a transition matrix to assist in estimating his expected
daily profit.
Rolley’s Rentals
• Rolley’s Rentals has estimated that it earns an average profit of $120 on sunny days and
$40 on cloudy days, but it suffers an average loss of $200 on rainy days.
• Mr. Rolley would like to determine his expected profit over the upcoming week if the
weather in Lahaina today is sunny.
• Solution:
• If the weather today is sunny, the probability that tomorrow’s weather will be sunny,
cloudy, or rainy is .75, .20, and .05, respectively.
• Since Rolley’s earns an expected profit of $120 on a sunny day and $40 on a cloudy day
and loses $200 on a rainy day, its expected profit tomorrow is: 0.75($120) + 0.20($40) +
0.05(-$200) = $88
Rolley’s Rentals
• For day 2, 𝜋(2) = (.75, .20, .05)xP = (.6700, .2525, .0775).
• Thus, the expected profit for day 2 is: .6700($120) + .2525($40) + .0775(-$200) = $75
• Therefore, Rolley’s expected profit over the upcoming seven-day period is:
• $88.00 + $75.00 + $70.60 + $69.14 + $68.64 + $68.49 + $68.43 = $508.30
Rolley’s Rentals
• Mr. Rolley is considering selling his business. A business consultant has told him that
businesses such as his are usually valued at six times their expected yearly profit.
• Mr. Rolley would like to determine a fair asking price for the business, should he decide
to sell it.
• Solution:
• The following steady state probability values for weather in Lahaina are obtained:
• Sunny: 0.6298
• Cloudy: 0.2786
• Rainy: 0.0916
• Therefore, Rolley’s expected daily profit is: .6298 ($120) + .2786 ($40) + .0916 (-$200) =
$68.40
Rolley’s Rentals
• Since Rolley’s expected yearly profit should be 365($68.40) = $24,966, the business is
worth 6($24966) = $149,796.
• Because businesses generally sell for between 5% and 10% below their asking price, Mr.
Rolley has decided to ask $160,000 for the business.
GAME THEORY
l Chapter 1 Introduction
l Brief History
l Game Theory Defined
l Importance and Applications of Game
Theory
l Methodology
l Classification of Game Models
l Elements of a Game
2
Outline
l Chapter 2 Two-Person, Zero-Sum Game
l Conservative Strategies
l Minimax Criterion
l Nash Equilibrium
l Dominance
l Pure Strategy Game
l Mixed Strategy Game
l Analytical Method
l Graphical Method
l Linear Programming Solution
3
Outline
l Chapter 5 Applications
4
INTRODUCTION
Brief History of Game Theory
7
What is Game Theory?
8
Why Study Game Theory?
9
Why Study Game Theory?
Because the press tells us to …
– Ecology
– Networks
– Economics
Applications
l Marketing strategies
l Labor-management negotiations
l Potential mergers
l International military conflicts
l Competitive bidding
l Advertising
l Etc.
13
Limitations & Problems
15
Strategy
16
Classification of Game Models
17
Elements of a Game
l Players
l Set of possible actions
l Information available
l Payoff consequences (in matrix form)
l Players’ preference over payoffs
18
Payoff Matrix
Brilliant Lights
Use radio Use newspaper
Use radio 3 5
Bright Lights
Use
newspaper 1 -2
l Payoffs are shown only for the row player (Bright Lights).
Brilliant Light’ payoffs are just the negative of each number.
19
Illustration 1
20
Bright Lights’ Payoff Table
Brilliant Lights
Use radio Use newspaper
Use radio 3 5
Bright Lights
Use
newspaper 1 -2
Use radio 3 5
Bright Lights
Use
newspaper 1 -2
Assumption:
l Row player tries to maximize winnings
while column player tries to minimize
losses.
22
Two-Person, Zero-Sum Game
23
MINIMAX CRITERION
Conservative Strategies
l Playing safe by adopting the conservative strategy
of assuming the worst:
l The row player chooses the move where
smallest payoff is as large as possible (to guard
himself when his opponent manage to select
the column that will result in the smallest
payoff).
l The column player (wanting to maximize his
payoff) minimizes his opponent’s payoff by
choosing the column where maximum entry is
as small as possible.
25
Minimax Criterion
l an approach to selecting strategies that
will minimize losses for each player
Bad news: Knowing game theory does not
guarantee winning
Column max 4 1 5
minimax
28
Illustration 2
Consider B Row min
é -1 - 3 5 ù - 3
A ê- 2.5 1 3 ú -2.5
ê ú
ê 4
ë 0 - 2ú -2 ûmaximin
Column max 4 1 5
minimax
29
Illustration 3
30
Remark
31
PURE STRATEGY GAMES
Pure Strategy
(or Strictly Determined) Games
l neither player can benefit from the
knowledge that the opponent is using the
conservative strategy
l the strategy of each player does not
change regardless of the other player’s
strategy.
l if and only if its payoff matrix has a
saddle point (or minimax point)
33
Saddle Point
34
Value of the Game
35
Remark
36
Illustration 4
37
Air Speed
pricing service
pricing 25 18
Express Airlines
service -15 15
39
Exercise
a) b) é3 54 3ù
é 8 0 - 2ù
ê- 6 4 1 ú ê2 40 - 2ú
ê ú ê ú
êë 4 3 2 úû ê1 - 6 5 0 ú
ê0 ú
ë 2 6 -1 û
40
Illustration 5
Two video rental chains, VCity and Vvid, are thinking
about opening a new store in one of three cities. If
chain VCity locates its new store in city 1, its estimate
earning per year will be PhP 225,000 more than chain
Vvid if Vvid also locates in city 1 and PhP 90,000 more
if Vvid locates in city 3, but it will earn PhP 450,000
less than Vvid if Vvid locates in city 2. If chain Vcity
locates in city 2, it will earn PhP 900,000, PhP
675,000, and PhP 540,000 more than Vvid if Vvid
locates in cities 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Finally, if
chain VCity locates in city 3, it will earn PhP 675,000
and PhP 450,000 more than Vvid if Vvid locates in
cities 1 and 3, respectively, and it will earn PhP
225,000 less than Vvid if Vvid locates in city 2. Where
should each chain locate its new store?
41
Solution
VCity
city 1 city 2 city 3
city 1
Vvid city 2
city 3
42
Dominance
43
Procedure for Finding the Reduced
Form of a Matrix Game
1. Compare the rows in the matrix. Delete any
row that is dominated by another row (i.e.,
each entry is less than the corresponding
entry of the other row).
2. Compare the columns in the matrix. Delete
any column that dominates another column
(i.e., each entry is greater than the
corresponding entry of the other column).
3. Repeat Steps 1 and 2 to eliminate all
redundant rows and columns.
44
Illustration
Consider the following matrix game:
C
é3 1 0 - 3ù
R
ê7 -1 1 6 ú
ê ú
êë2 4 5 1 úû
45
Reduced form of the game:
R
é-1 6ù
ê 4 1ú
ë û
46
Exercise
1. é 2 -1 4 ù 2. é 3 -2 6 2ù
ê-1 5 ê 4 -1 - 2 0 ú
1ú ê ú
ê ú
ê-1 0 6 - 2ú
ëê-1 3 - 4úû ê2 ú
ë 1 5 0 û
47
Exercise
é6 3 5 2ù
é2 - 3 - 2 -1ù ê1 7 4ú
3. 4.
ê1 ê 9 ú
ê 2 - 2 - 3úú
ê4 - 4 0 5ú
êë 0 -1 0 1 úû ê ú
ë3 - 6 4 4û
48
Exercise
5. é- 3 4 3 2 0ù
ê2 1 4 6 ú3ú
ê
ê2 1 3 5 1ú
ê1 ú
ê 6 - 4 3 1ú
êë 2 1 3 4 1úû
49
Nash Equilibrium (NE)
52
NE History
l Modern game-theoretic concept of NE is defined in
terms of mixed-strategies, where players choose a
probability distribution over possible actions.
l John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
introduced the concept of the mixed strategy NE in
their 1944 book The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior.
l Their analysis was restricted to the very special case of zero-
sum games. They showed that a mixed-strategy NE will exist
for any zero-sum game with a finite set of actions.
l John Forbes Nash in his 1951 article Non-Cooperative
Games defined a mixed strategy NE for any game
with a finite set of actions and prove that at least one
(mixed strategy) NE must exist. the
53
NE History
l John Forbes Nash, Jr. in his 1951 article Non-
Cooperative Games defined a mixed strategy NE for
any game with a finite set of actions and prove that at
least one (mixed strategy) NE must exist.
54
Basic Strategies
Use strategy 1
Eliminate any dominated strategy
Eliminate strategy
2 as it’s dominated
by strategy 1
Look for any equilibrium
l Dominating Equilibrium
l Minimax Equilibrium
l Nash Equilibrium
The Golden Rule
COMMANDMENT
Never assume that your opponents’
behavior is fixed.
Predict their reaction to your behavior.
Decision Theory
vs. Game Theory
CAVEAT
Predict opponents’ reaction
to your behavior.
BUT
Be sure you understand who your
opponents are.
(Do you know everyone who may
react to your decisions?)
Summary
Defining the Game
65
Marketing Example
Consider two competing companies who are to make a
decision regarding an investment in a new promotional
campaign.
Co. A’s course of actions:
a1: Advertise in all media.
a2: Advertise in newspaper only.
Co. B’s alternatives:
b1: Run a sweepstakes.
b2: Run a big sale.
66
Payoff Matrix
Company B
b1 b2
a1 4 -1
Company A
a2 -2 1
67
Both players will soon find out that
69
Consider a 2 x 2 game.
Let P = fraction of the time A plays a1
1- P = fraction of the time A plays a2
Q = fraction of the time B plays b1
1- Q = fraction of the time B plays b2
Q 1–Q
P
1–P
70
Determining A’s best strategy
Multiply P and 1 – P with the corresponding
payoff and solve for P and 1- P by setting
column 1 equal to column 2 in the game.
Q 1–Q
P 4 2
1–P 1 10
4P +1(1- P) = 2P +10(1- P)
P=?
71
Determining B’s best strategy
Multiply Q and 1 – Q with the corresponding
payoff and solve for Q and 1 – Q by setting
column 1 equal to column 2 in the game.
Q 1–Q
P 4 2
1–P 1 10
4Q + 2(1- Q) = 1Q +10(1- Q)
Q=?
72
References
l Jin Xiao, J. Thomas, and J. Westwell. An Introduction
to Evolutionary Game Theory
l http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium
l Hoffmann, L.D. and G.L. Bradley. 1995. Applied
Finite Mathematics
l Mike Shor. Game Theory & Business Strategy
l Harcourt Brace & Company. 2001. Game Theory
73
Nonlinear Programming
Nonlinear Programming
n The methods seen so far have assumed that the
objective function and constraints are linear.
n Terms such as X13, 1/X2, log X3, or 5X1X2 are not
allowed.
n But there are many nonlinear relationships in the real
world that would require the objective function,
constraint equations, or both to be nonlinear.
n Excel can be used to solve these nonlinear
programming (NLP) problems.
n One disadvantage of NLP is that the solution yielded
may only be a local optimum, rather than a global
optimum.
n In other words, it may be an optimum over a
particular range, but not overall.
10-2
General NLP
Minimize f(x)
s.t. gi(x) (£, ³, =) bi, i = 1,…,m
objective objective
function level function level
curve curve
optimal optimal
solution solution
Feasible Feasible
Region Region
objective
function level objective
curve function level
curves
optimal
solution optimal
solution
Feasible
Region
Feasible
Region
nonlinear objective, nonlinear objective,
nonlinear constraints linear constraints
Linearly Constrained Convex
Function with Unique Global
Maximum
x2
Maximize f (x) = (x1 – 2)2 + (x2 – 2)2 5
–x1 + x2 ≤ 3 3
2
x1 + x2 ≤ 7
1
2x1 – 3x2 ≤ 4
1 3 x1
2 4 5
An NLP Solution Strategy
X2 C D
B E
objective
function level
curves
Feasible
Region
A
(the starting point)
X1
Local vs. Global Optimal
Solutions
X2
Local optimal
solution
C
Local and
F global
E
Feasible G optimal
Region B solution
A
D
X1
Nonlinear Objective Function and
Linear Constraints
n The Great Western Appliance Company sells two
models of toaster ovens, the Microtoaster (X1)
and the Self-Clean Toaster Oven (X2).
n They earn a profit of $28 for each Microtoaster no
matter the number of units sold.
n For the Self-Clean oven, profits increase as more
units are sold due to a fixed overhead.
n The profit function for the Self-Clean over may be
expressed as:
21X2 + 0.25X22
Program 10.9
Program 10.10
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 10-13
Linear Objective Function and
Nonlinear Constraints
n Thermlock Corp. produces massive rubber
washers and gaskets like the type used to seal
joints on the NASA Space Shuttles.
n It combines two ingredients, rubber (X1) and oil
(X2).
n The cost of the industrial quality rubber is $5 per
pound and the cost of high viscosity oil is $7 per
pound.
n Two of the three constraints are nonlinear.
Program 10.11
To accompany
Quantitative Analysis for Management, Eleventh Edition,
by Render, Stair, and Hanna
Power Point slides created by Brian Peterson
Learning Objectives
After completing this chapter, students will be able to:
1. Tackle a wide variety of problems by
simulation.
2. Understand the seven steps of conducting a
simulation.
3. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of
simulation.
4. Develop random number intervals and use
them to generate outcomes.
5. Understand alternative simulation packages
available.
Introduce Important
Variables
Construct Simulation
Model
Specify Values of
Variables to Be Tested
Conduct the
Simulation
Examine the
Results
0 10 10/200 = 0.05
1 20 20/200 = 0.10
2 40 40/200 = 0.20
3 60 60/200 = 0.30
4 40 40/200 = 0.20
5 30 30/200 = 0.15
200 200/200 = 1.00
Table 14.1
Table 14.2
0.65 66
– 65
0.60 –
Random
Number
0.40 – 0.35
s
– 36
35
0.20 – 0.15
– 16
15 Represents 1
0.05 06 Tire Demanded
– 05
Figure 14.2 0.00 – –
01
0 1 2 3 4 5
Daily Demand for Radials
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 14-16
Harry’s Auto Tire
Assignment of Random Number Intervals for Harry’s
Auto Tire
DAILY DEMAND PROBABILITY CUMULATIVE INTERVAL OF
PROBABILITY RANDOM NUMBERS
0 0.05 0.05 01 to 05
1 0.10 0.15 06 to 15
2 0.20 0.35 16 to 35
3 0.30 0.65 36 to 65
4 0.20 0.85 66 to 85
5 0.15 1.00 86 to 00
Table 14.3
Program 14.1
Program 14.2
Program 14.2
Program 14.3
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 14-26
Simulation with Excel Spreadsheets
Excel QM Simulation of Harry’s Auto Tire Example
Program 14.4
Table 14.6
Table 14.7
Figure 14.3
Table 14.8
Table 14.9
Table 14.10
Table 14.11
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 14-44
Port of New Orleans
Three important pieces of information:
Program 14.5
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall 14-46
Excel Model for the Port of New
Orleans Queuing Simulation
Program 14.5
Figure 14.4
Table 14.12
NUMBER RANDOM
REPAIR TIME OF TIMES CUMULATIVE NUMBER
REQUIRED (HRS) OBSERVED PROBABILITY PROBABILITY INTERVAL
1 28 0.28 0.28 01 to 28
2 52 0.52 0.80 29 to 80
3 20 0.20 1.00 81 to 00
Total 100 1.00
Table 14.13
Program 14.6
Program 14.6