Political Ideas and Movements U N D e R

UNDERSTANDINGPOLITICS
Unders tanding
political ideas
and
movements
KEVIN HARRISON
and T O N Y B O Y D
UNDERSTANDING
POLITICAL IDEAS
AND MOVEMENTS
UNDERSTANDING POLITICS
Series editor DUNCAN WATTS
Following the review of the national curriculum for

16–19 year olds, UK examining boards introduced
new specifications, first used in 2001 and 2002.
A level courses are now divided into A/S level for the
first year of sixth-form studies, and the more difficult
A2 level thereafter. The Understanding Politics
series comprehensively covers the politics syllabuses
of all the major examination boards, featuring a
dedicated A/S level textbook and five books
aimed at A2 students. The books are written in an
accessible, user-friendly and jargon-free manner
and will be essential to students sitting these
examinations.
Already published
Understanding American government and

politics
Duncan Watts
Understanding A/S level government and

politics
Chris Wilson
Understanding
political ideas
and movements
A guide for A2 politics students
KEVIN HARRISON and TONY BOYD
Manchester University Press

Manchester and New York
distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave

Copyright © Kevin Harrison and Tony Boyd 2003
The right of Kevin Harrison and Tony Boyd to be identified as the authors of this work has been
asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Published by Manchester University Press

Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK
and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA
www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk
Distributed exclusively in the USA by

Palgrave, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York,
NY 10010, USA
Distribued exclusively in Canada by

UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall,
Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for
ISBN 0 7190 6151 2 paperback
First published 2003
11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Typeset by Northern Phototypesetting Co. Ltd, Bolton

Printed in Great Britain
by Bell & Bain Ltd, Glasgow
Contents
Preface and acknowledgements page vii
Introduction 1
1 The state and sovereignty 16
2 The nation 37
3 Democracy 58
4 Freedom 83
5 Equality 103
6 Rights, obligations and citizenship 121
7 The role of ideology in politics and society 135
8 Nationalism 154
9 Conservatism 174
10 Liberalism 195
11 Socialism 214
12 Marxism and anarchism 237
13 Fascism 256
14 Environmentalism and ecologism 274
15 Feminism 295
Concluding remarks 309
Glossary of major figures 323

Suggested further reading 340
Index 345
Introduction vii
Preface and acknowledgements
The contents of this book, and its general structure, have been very largely governed
by the aim of fulfilling the various examining board syllabuses for GCE Government
and Politics A2 level. It is particularly relevant to OCR (Module 7), ‘UK Politics and
Modern Political Ideas: Theory and Practice’; EDEXCEL Route B (Units 4, 5 and 6),
‘Political Ideologies’; AQA (Module 7), ‘Ideas in Contemporary British Politics’; and
AQA (Module 8), ‘Government and Politics – Synoptic Module’.
The book should also be relevant to a broad range of Open College Network Level Three
Access courses in Political Ideas, Political Studies or Modern Political Movements, and
introductory undergraduate courses in Politics.
We hope that people not studying for examinations will find this book of use in helping
them understand the political world and the assumptions that shape the clatter and
chatter of those who presume to govern us.
We must gratefully acknowledge those who have made a contribution to this book: Erik
Olive for his cynical and amusing comments on a number of chapters and Angela Dale,
who took on the daunting task of correcting grammar and spelling and untangling the
meaning of the more complicated sentences. Our heartfelt thanks to them both. Our
sincere thanks to family, friends and colleagues for tolerating us in normal times and
even more so as the book moved towards its completion.
Finally, we would like to dedicate this book to Tony Ivers, our late friend and colleague,
who is much missed.
Kevin Harrison
Tony Boyd
THE POLITICS ASSOCIATION
is a registered educational charity, committed to the diffusion of

political knowledge and understanding. It produces a wide range of
resources on government and politics, and on citizenship. Members
receive the journal, Talking Politics, three times a year.
Further details can be obtained from the Politics Association, Old Hall
Lane, Manchester, M13 0XT, Tel./Fax.: 0161 256 3906; email: politic@enablis.co.uk
Introduction
(W)e should try to grasp, in outline at any rate, what the good is, and which science
or capacity is concerned with it.
It seems to concern the most controlling science, the one that, more than any other
is the master science. And political science apparently has this character. (Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1:2)
A good politician is quite as unthinkable as an honest burglar. (H. L. Mencken,

Prejudices, 1925)
Readers will peruse this book in vain if they seek an outline of the British
political system, discussion on comparative government, identification of the
structure and roles of parties and pressure groups in modern democracies, or
even detailed discussions of the major thinkers and philosophers in the Western
political tradition. Neither will they find a guide to the detailed policies of the
major political movements in Britain and other liberal democracies.
In liberal democracies there is a belief that citizens ought to take an active
interest in what is happening in the political world. It is a view that the authors
of this book share. For generations, people have fought and died for the right
to put a cross on a piece of paper (or some other means of recording a vote)
in countries such as the UK. In far too many countries the sort of views about
the government that we regularly express in Britain land people in prison – or
worse. We strongly believe that you, as a citizen, should take an interest in
politics; after all, even if you don’t, you can rest assured that politics will take
an interest in you! During your lifetime you will be taxed, observed, regulated
and, potentially, conscripted into Her Majesty’s armed forces. You are likely to
be educated in state schools, colleges and universities, be treated at state-run
hospitals by state-trained doctors and nurses when ill, and claim state benefits
when unemployed, sick or retired.
Political debate in modern Western democracies is a complex and often rowdy
affair. It often gives the impression that it involves little thought and contem-
plation beyond shouting and opposing whatever the other side proposes as the
solution to the ills of society. Indeed, it may have contributed to declining
2 Understanding political ideas and movements
voter turnout in most Western democracies. Some recent studies showed that
voter ‘apathy’ during the record low turnout in the 2001 general election may
have little to do with apathy and much to do with voter disappointment in
politicians and the political process. The ‘yah-boo’ behaviour of some
Westminster politicians does, nevertheless, reflect the intense passions that
politics can elicit from its participants. Think about what politicians carry
around as their intellectual baggage when they are discussing – shouting
about – some of the following questions:
• How much should be spent on health, education, welfare, defence and
transport? Should key services and industries be within the public sector,
owned by ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ – in fact, by ‘the state’ – or would these
be more efficiently provided by the private sector of the economy?
• Is being motivated by the values of ‘public service’ likely to produce better
value for money in such services than the ‘profit motive’ of private business?
• What should be the levels of taxation in order to fund these services?
• What is the proper role of the state in society? What are the proper limits
on its powers?
• Are there areas of private life, such as religion and conscience, into which
the state should not intrude? Or does the survival of the society and the
crucial role of the state in ensuring this mean that in times of war and
economic crisis the individual and his or her liberty may have to be sacri-
ficed for the greater good? What do ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’, ‘rights’ and
‘obligations’, in the political community mean?
• Is democracy the best means by which such desirable goals can be
achieved? Indeed, what is meant by democracy?
• How ‘democratic’ are Western democracies?
• Can politics have a moral basis, or is it merely the pursuit of power?
One could go on listing questions that exercise the mind of the active citizen.
Indeed, you might believe that this list of questions has already gone too far.
If, however, you’ve ever talked about any of these issues with your friends and
family, if you are concerned with what sort of country you want to live in, what
sort of future you, your friends, family and future generations might have,
then you will have thought about these issues, and will want to pursue your
ideas further.
We do not presume to provide answers to these questions. We hope only to
provide the beginnings of a structure of core ideas and concepts that overtly
or covertly influence the political debate in countries such as ours. We
believe that much voter disillusionment about politics and politicians stems
from the failure of political and educational systems to provide voters with
the intellectual tools to analyse the vitally important issues that shape our
lives and prospects.
Introduction 3
Politics is a messy business, often full of ‘grey’ areas when one seeks clear
answers to the problems of the moment. The complexity of political issues is
revealed in most of the chapters of this book. A great deal of politics is, as one
ancient philosopher declared, about defining terms and then applying them to
society. There is a statement at the beginning of almost every chapter, for
example, that warns the reader that this or that concept is ‘contested’, ‘open
to considerable debate and argument’ or ‘a difficult one to grasp’.
Having said so much already about politics as a way of introducing the book,
we will look at three fundamental terms – politics, power and justice – and
provide an outline of the chapters.
Three fundamental terms: politics, power and justice

There are three fundamental political issues which appear in all the chapters
of this book and feature in almost all political discussions and conflicts. These
are ‘politics’, ‘power’ and ‘justice’.
Politics
It may at first sight seem superfluous to define ‘politics’: the word is in
common use and everyone knows what it means. In fact there is more than
one way of describing politics and exploration of these different approaches
can cast a useful light on the nature of the topic. Supposedly value-free defini-
tions often reveal submerged ideological preconceptions.
Michael Oakeshott, in Rationalism in Politics (1962), focuses on the derivation
of the word: politiki in Greek, res publicae in Latin, refers to ‘affairs of state’.
This superficially straightforward definition implies that there are some things
which are not ‘affairs of state’, but belong to the personal, private or civil
realm. This is a view that Oakeshott himself held. For Oakeshott, personal and
family life was the stuff of existence; ordinary people rightly gave little
attention to politics. Liberals, like the traditionalist Oakeshott, identify a
private space into which the state has no right to enter. An invasion of this
private space by the state appears, to liberals, the essence of tyranny.
In marked contrast, Aristotle famously observed in his Politics that ‘man is a
political animal’; thus, it was entirely appropriate for rational human beings
to involve themselves fully in political matters. Totalitarian regimes, like
that of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, have similarly dismissed all
ideas that the individual has a life, with its own value, outside the realm of
the political. As the Italian Fascist thinker Giovanni Gentile declared: ‘Every-
thing for the state; nothing against the state; nothing outside the state.’
Feminist writers also reject distinctions between the political and the
personal worlds, as they believe that politics is about power and the most
intense power conflicts and greatest oppression lie precisely in the personal
relations of men and women.
In private it is not easy to disentangle the political from the non-political. If
the state takes an interest in a matter, then it becomes ‘political’. The state’s
interest can vary dramatically from culture to culture and over the centuries.
Some states, for example, impose rigid laws governing dress, recreational
activities, sexual relationships and the consumption of alcohol. In other
societies these are not believed to be the concern of the state to any great
degree. At present, the use of recreational drugs is illegal in Britain but in the
future it might cease to be so. Thus what is political may be said to expand and
contract depending on whether or not the state involves itself in different
aspects of social life.
So far we have assumed, without spelling it out, that the essence of politics is
something to do with government. But in ordinary speech it is common to
refer to ‘office politics’, ‘college politics’, ‘church politics’, usually pejoratively,
and implying machinations.
Bernard Crick’s in In Defence of Politics (1962), approached the matter from
another angle by proposing that politics is a process, a means of resolving
conflict by peaceful means. Such conflict may well be at the level of the state
but need not be so. Politics can refer to international conflict, ‘parish pump’
disputes in local government, and industrial strife. Crick assumes differences
among people – differences of opinion, differences of values, differences of
interests. This, for him, is a basic fact of human existence. Politics deals with
this fundamental fact by seeking to resolve the resulting conflicts by rational
and peaceful means. Politics requires tolerance, rational discourse, prepared-
ness to compromise, democratically accountable institutions and procedures,
and, crucially, an acceptance of an authoritative pronouncement of the
outcome. ‘Politics’ in this sense would be clearly evident in a general election,
where parties (with their distinctive programmes, principles and interests)
compete in a lawful and orderly manner to obtain votes and so gain
dominance in the legislature.
The weakness of this position is that it resembles a sophisticated debating
society, and has little application to the real world except perhaps as an ideal
of what democratic politics is about. It assumes that politics cannot function
except in a liberal democratic context. It thus excludes not only dictatorships
and other autocracies but also even the political life of actual democracies
where strikes, pressures of all kinds, even perhaps including terrorism,
influence events as much as dispassionate dialogues. It is difficult, for
instance, to fit the politics of Northern Ireland into Crick’s framework. Politics
there involves a very wide range of democratic and violent elements that
clearly influence both the political culture and the processes in the province.
Introduction 5
A more robust approach was that of Harold Lasswell. In Politics: Who Gets
What, When, How? (1931), Lasswell bluntly asserts that politics is about
power and is a study of power relationships. It is the task of political scien-
tists to reveal where power really lies, how it is exercised, by whom and for
what purposes.
Attractive though this no-nonsense approach may seem, critics have argued
that it is two-dimensional. A third dimension is required and that is ‘authority’.
This point is persuasively put by David Easton in The Political System (1953),
where he argues that politics is about the ‘authoritative allocation of values’.
He makes an important distinction between legislative authority and mere
force. A dictator may impose his will by the gun or propaganda but this is not
a legitimate use of power. Authoritative politics requires legitimate authority.
There may, of course, be dispute as to what constitutes legitimate authority, and
what the sources of such authority are. Max Weber, in Economy and Society
(1922), described three different types of authority: ‘rational legal’ (the
outcome of accepted procedures such as elections, parliaments, constitutions),
‘traditional’ (the result of history and custom, such as that of tribal elders, kings
and other rules), and ‘charismatic’ (the product of the personal qualities of a
leader). Actual political systems involve more than one of these sources.
For Marxists the whole idea of ‘legitimate’ politics is a sham. Authority is
merely a disguise for power, a disguise invented and manipulated by the
ruling class the better to dominate and exploit the proletariat. There is,
however, a certain ambiguity in the Marxist position. If politics is an
instrument of class oppression, it is also an instrument of class liberation, a
component in the struggle by which the workers will eventually overthrow the
capitalist class and the instruments of their power. This having been achieved,
and communism having been successfully established, ‘politics’ would cease to
exist. Pre-communist politics is interpreted as being about class conflict and
material scarcity. Such undesirable conditions will be superseded and fade
away together with the instruments of state oppression, government, the
army, the police and the judiciary. Presumably there will still be some public
discussion on the best course of action in the post-capitalist society but it will
not be politics as we have known it.
There is a persistent tendency in democracies to regard politics as somehow
disreputable, unclean, a ‘dirty’ business. In part this is due to the perceived
dishonesty of politicians, who are all ‘in it for themselves’, manipulating the
electorate by mendacious propaganda, making promises that will not be kept,
and general skulduggery. Parties are perceived by a cynical electorate as
conspiracies against the public good. Such negative views can be heard in
every bar-room in the country. Another strand in this anti-politics thesis,
though, appears to be distaste for conflict itself. Even quite sophisticated
commentators sometimes suggest that important national matters, such as

education or defence, should be ‘outside’ or ‘above’ politics.
Public opinion polls regularly place politicians below estate agents and double-
glazing salesmen in terms of trust, a view radically different from the ancient
ideal, as enunciated by Aristotle, which did not mean everyone was naturally
interested in politics but that participation in public affairs was appropriate to
man’s dignity and moral identity – an entirely praiseworthy activity.
In the Middle Ages, Saint Augustine, in The City of God (413–27), regarded the
state and politics as little more than a regrettable necessity (‘the badge of
Man’s lost innocence’) and an instrument of maintaining order. Thomas
Aquinas, writing in the thirteenth century, claimed a more positive role for the
political activity within the state. That role was the promotion of justice. From
this perspective, politics may be regarded as a branch of ethics – the study of
what is right.
Focusing on morality in politics has been a feature of political ideologies,
government decisions and party campaigners to the present day. Discourse on
‘ends’ or values, and the morality (not just practicality) of ‘means’ is a funda-
mental dimension of politics and is inherent in its very meaning. Descriptions
of political systems solely in terms of power relationships and the conflict of
interests would, from this perspective, seem quite inadequate.
Niccolo Machiavelli, in The Prince (1513), explained how to win and hold
power. It was a book that notoriously ignored all moral considerations and
was justly condemned, according to many modern political scientists, not
because it was wicked or untrue but because it was one-dimensional.
Man is unique in being a social animal. Whereas a colony of baboons exhibits,
perhaps embarrassingly, many attributes of human society such as hierarchy,
conflict, the emergence of leaders, co-operation, even collective action, it lacks
rational debate, discussion, compromise, principle, commitment, analysis and
justice. Politics is missing, even if power patently exists in baboon society.
Power
Politics is primarily about the acquisition and maintenance of power. Power is
inherent in the relationships between individuals, groups, the state and a wide
range of what are known as ‘actors’ in international politics. Power is the
underlying concept in political science, a concept that runs through any
discussion on the state, the nation, democracy, freedom, equality and the
ideologies and movements that mould history. Like the other major concepts
and ideologies discussed in this book, the definition of ‘power’ remains a
source of dispute.
Introduction 7
At a fundamental level politics is about who gets power, what they do with it,
how legitimate is its exercise, and on whom the power is exercised. All
thinkers about politics agree that power involves one actor affecting the
actions and attitudes of another. As Denis Healey, a leading British Labour
politician, once brutally stated: ‘Power is the capacity one has to help one’s
friends and to harm one’s enemies.’ The existence and use of power is not
confined to the world of politics. Power exists wherever there are social
relations: within families, between employer and employee, between friends,
in the ‘sex war’ between men and women, and between racial and ethnic
groups. Power is everywhere and affects every political calculation. To ignore
it or pretend that it doesn’t exist is to invite disaster, or at least guarantee that
political goals will not be achieved.
Let us now look at some major thinkers and their ideas about power.
Thomas Hobbes
Living through the turmoil of the civil wars in Britain and the Thirty Years’ War
in Europe, Hobbes was acutely aware of the importance of power in
maintaining a stable political system and the terrible consequences when
government lacked sufficient power to enforce order and obedience in society.
Power to Hobbes was a relationship of cause and effect, between an ‘agent’
who has power to produce an effect and a ‘patient’ who is the passive object
of that power. Agents seek to satisfy their desires. Mankind, according to
Hobbes in Leviathan (1651), is involved in ‘a perpetuall and restlesse desire of
Power after power that ceaseth onely in Death’. Without government, in a
state of nature, such a power struggle would lead to a perpetual state of war.
Only by establishing an effective supreme power of the sovereign could the
chaotic ‘state of nature’ be brought to an end and peace be established. The
legitimacy, the ‘right’, of the sovereign to rule is founded on the effectiveness
with which such order is established and maintained. If a sovereign fails to
maintain sufficient power to ensure order then his legitimacy disappears.
Karl Marx
Marx’s voluminous writings may all be described as analysing power. He
believes power to be a reflection of class and economic relations in society.
Marx makes a distinction between the reality of power, as understood in terms
of property ownership and the political power that derives from that
ownership, and the representation of power as seen in the ‘false consciousness’
of individuals, groups or classes who believe their perceived interests are the
same as their real interests. The state, the legal system, education, religion and
the new media are all tools by which the power of the property owning classes
over the working classes is upheld.
Max Weber
In Economy and Society (1922) Weber defined power as ‘the possibility that
one actor in a social relationship . . . will carry out his own will’ against others
who will be resisting. To Weber, power is something one either possesses or
does not. Those who have power use it to further their interests and goals over
the objections and resistance of others who do not have power. Power is
always organised in a hierarchical structure, Weber observes, and its processes
are always clear to see, with some people near the top of the hierarchy giving
orders to those below them. This will be the case in government and state
bureaucracies, businesses and families, with power being demonstrated in
various forms of supervision and control by those in charge. The right to
exercise power legitimately rests on the authority and status of individuals at
different levels within power structures in society. Legitimacy derives from
authority conferred by a job title, such as foreman or manager in a factory, and
by religious and social mores, such as those that underpin the position of
parents within a family.
Steven Lukes
In his Power: A Radical View (1974) Lukes identifies a number of approaches
to understanding the nature of power.
The ‘one-dimensional view’ of Robert Dahl in Who Governs? Democracy and
Power in an American City (1961) and Modern Political Analysis (1963)
concentrates on decision-making as the central task of politics and the need to
identify ‘who prevails in the decision-making process’ in order to determine
which groups and individuals have power in society.
The ‘two-dimensional view’ of power is discussed by Peter Bachrach and
Martin Baratz in Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (1970), who state that
power has two ‘Janus-like’ faces. One face of power is overt and observable;
the other is covert or hidden from view. The lack of challenge to overt power
may not mean that there is in fact no challenge, but that covert forms of power
may be being used very effectively. Thus two-dimensional power involves
decision-making and non-decision-making. Decision-making involves choice
among a range of possible actions. Non-decision-making is a ‘decision that
results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the
values or interests of the decision-maker’. Both clearly involve power.
Lukes stresses the importance of having a ‘three-dimensional view’ of power.
He believes the previous dimensions of power still concentrate on Weber’s
ideas that power involves individuals realising their will in the face of
resistance from others. The first dimension of power, according to Lukes,
involves identifying the group or collective nature of decision-making –
Introduction 9
‘surface details of power’ which can easily be observed and which most people
believe is what politics is about. However, Lukes claims that the two other
dimensions of power are more important. The second dimension involves
‘political agenda-setting’ and the degree to which government and groups are
able to decide what will be discussed, what will become part of the arena of
debate. Power is reflected in the ability of politicians and private groups to get
issues on to, or keep them off, the political agenda. The third dimension is
what Lukes calls the ‘bias of the system’, the ‘socially structured and culturally
patterned . . . practices of institutions’ that ensure some groups and
individuals exercise greater power because they are attuned to these practices,
while others find it difficult to succeed against these biases.
Michel Foucault
Foucault argued in many essays during the 1970s, brought together under the
title Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings (1980), that power
never rests in the possession of one person, or in any obvious willed manner. It
permeates all our minds and directs the way we all act. Within institutions, such
as government or a business, power not only flows ‘top-down’, from higher levels
in the institution to the lower, but everyone in an institution exercises some
degree of power. The extent to which they can do this depends on what people
in the institution regard as ‘self-evident truths’. Even in an extremely hierarchical
structure, such as government or the armed forces, the ability of the most
powerful individuals to get their way can be frustrated by much weaker
individuals exercising whatever power they have to obstruct the implementation
of policies they disagree with. Power is about the achievement of one’s own goals
or the prevention of others achieving their goals. Power, if effective, enables
people to collude in their own subjugation. All have some power and all have
some choices as to how to use it. We are influenced in our choices by our
knowledge of, or belief in, the opportunities and constraints before us. These
constitute an indirect form of self-regulation within systems of power.
Power, however defined, has usually been accompanied by claims that it is
being used, or should be used, to ensure ‘justice’.
Justice
Justice has been upheld by most political theorists as a vitally important
feature of a ‘good’ political system; so important, in fact, that justice has often
been identified as the single most important objective of political activity.
Revolutionaries often use ‘justice’ as a rallying cry to overthrow an ‘unjust’
political system.
Plato’s Republic was the first and most important attempt to define justice and
what constitutes a just society. Most political philosophy over the past 2500
years has involved discussing the issue of justice raised by Plato in his work,
which takes the form of a dialogue between Plato’s friend and teacher Socrates
and a number of other philosophers. Several ideas of justice are identified,
outlined, examined and dismissed. For example, Simonides claims that justice
consists of ensuring that everyone is given their due, such as doing good to
one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies (a standpoint which might be
immoral and unjust if one’s enemies are essentially good men). Thrasymachus
defines justice as simply whatever the strongest in society claims it to be. The
powerful people control the state; they define justice in terms of their own
interests and impose this concept on all others in society. Any other basis of an
appeal to justice is simply the weak making feeble attempts to persuade the
strong to act against their self-interest. Such a view is always attractive to the
powerful, but has little to do with the idea of morality that most thinkers
believe should underpin justice. In the Republic Plato has Socrates identifying
justice as residing in the achievement of harmony between each part in society
and each carrying out its social role, the creation of a ‘balance’ of parts being
the basis of both justice and social peace. This is a more refined version of
Simonides’s idea of justice.
What constitutes ‘giving everyone his due’ is a useful departure point in the
search for the concept of justice and includes both rewards and punishments.
Just punishment, for example, involves ensuring that only those found guilty
of wrong-doing are punished, that any differences in punishment should corre-
spond to the differences in the wrong-doing, and that the degree of
punishment should be appropriate to the offence. Simply imposing order on
society is not enough to ensure justice is done.
Most people identify a link between law and justice. A just person is a law-
abiding person. Morality is a fundamental underpinning of society and the law
reflects this in broad rules about social behaviour and the rights and obliga-
tions of people. Justice involves demonstrating respect for these rules. Hence,
justice derives from fundamental natural or moral law in society.
Associated with this legally defined view of justice is an essentially conser-
vative desire to preserve a particular social order, an order seen as sustaining
justice by giving everyone a legally defined status. Such an idea is rather old
fashioned today, and would be condemned as having little to do with modern
concepts of justice, but it dominated discussions of the meaning of justice until
the eighteenth century. Justice involved accepting inequality in society, as long
as each person was given what was appropriate to their status.
Some modern thinkers claim that justice should be a straightforward estab-
lishment of respect for law and rights with little reference to ‘social justice’.
Friedrich von Hayek and Robert Nozick, for example, claim that social
justice confuses the issue of justice. It merely encourages the expansion of
Introduction 11
state involvement in society in a misplaced desire to achieve social justice.

Justice, so Hayek and Nozick argue, is damaged by a growing state presence
in every aspect of life, restricting individual liberty without expanding
social justice.
During the nineteenth century, justice became connected with ‘social justice’.
This involves a belief that it is both proper and realistic to bring the pattern of
wealth and income distribution, along with education, health and other
desirable social goods, into line with principles of justice. Social justice as a
concept involves a belief that one can identify the processes by which society
is governed and that one can identify a source of power, usually believed to be
the government, to bring about social justice (although neo-liberals, for
example, claim that the free market can deliver social justice).
Social justice is usually seen as embodying two major elements: firstly, merit
and deserts; secondly, need and equality.
Merit and deserts

In a just society, status and rewards should give recognition to merit. Justice
challenges any rewards based on hereditary principles and demands the
creation of a society in which people can demonstrate their merit. Conserva-
tives see little problem with privilege and hierarchy, as justice is a consequence
of order. In a well-ordered society all are rewarded with peace, a peace that
emanates from the order created by a widely accepted social hierarchy.
Liberals argue for the free market as the most effective mechanism for distrib-
uting rewards in society. Price, which reflects the value placed on an
individual’s products and services, is itself an instrument of justice in a free-
market economy and society. Socialists question the degree of justice implicit
in the free market. They believe that success in such an economic system has
relatively little to do with merit and the justice of rewards: luck and social class
determine most rewards in society.
Need and equality

This element of justice involves the distribution of material rewards among
people according to need and is greatly influenced by ideas of equality. The
problem here is the great difficulty in distinguishing ‘need’ from simple ‘desire’.
The former is an important, even vital, aspect of life (involving food, shelter,
clothing and warmth), while the latter consists largely of frivolous non-essen-
tials (there are almost infinite examples of these).
The issue of ‘need’ is, because of its close association with equality, a strong
part of socialist views of justice. Marxism, for example, allows people the full
attainment of their needs, while social democracy claims that needs will vary
in accordance with the available resources and the existing standards of need
in a society. In Western societies this element of justice is identified with the
equality of basic needs fulfilled by welfare states.
Other thinkers base claims for social justice on different criteria. Jeremy
Bentham and the Utilitarians, for example, claimed that social justice was
associated with the distribution of goods and services that generate the
greatest degree of happiness. The production of happiness may or may not
require egalitarian social policies. John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971),
argued that social justice does not automatically involve social equality. He
argues for everyone having access to an extensive system of equal liberties and
opportunities. An unequal distribution of goods and services may be quite
compatible with justice if the least well-off in society benefit from it in some
way. The provision of incentives to stimulate individual effort, for example,
involves unequal rewards but if they help raise the overall wealth in society
all, including the very poor, will benefit.
Justice is, along with power, a key underlying theme of our book. Let us now
look at the topics covered.
An outline of the chapters

In most of the topics under discussion here we make reference to some of the
major political thinkers and writers and to their most important works. We
identify some of the basic concepts around which political discourse is struc-
tured. This is not an exhaustive compendium, neither are these chapters by
any means the last word on key concepts and movements. We hope that there
is enough in this book to whet the appetite, to stir the interest, of the reader
and to encourage further study of the many excellent books, articles and
seminal writing mentioned.
The first few chapters will identify and discuss some key concepts involved in
political theory and debate, such as the state, the nation, liberty, equality,
democracy, rights, which form the underpinning for the ideologies and
movements discussed in the rest of the book.
1 The state and sovereignty

The state is arguably the most important concept in political theory. We
introduce you to the main features of the state: territoriality, longevity, a
power structure and sovereignty. The second part of the chapter assesses the
degree to which the state and state sovereignty are disappearing in the
modern world of ‘globalised’ politics, economics and culture and new interna-
tional institutions.
Introduction 13
2 The nation
Nations dominate many aspects of contemporary politics. The main features
of the nation and the problems of defining it are outlined: population, culture,
history, language, religion, race. Then the ideas of national identity, how they
are formed and their importance are discussed. We make particular reference
to the nations of Britain.
3 Democracy
Democracy is not only a very important idea in the modern world but it is also
a difficult one to define. Different types of democracy and their most
important features are discussed here. The creation of a ‘democratic culture’,
arguments for and against democratic systems of government, and some
prospects for the future of liberal democracies are examined.
4 Freedom
‘Freedom’ is usually claimed to be the prime objective of political activity. Few
people are likely to argue that they want less freedom than they already have.
The real issue in politics is to discover what is meant by freedom and how it is
to be achieved. We discuss the concept in relation to the ideas of some of the
major political thinkers on freedom and how it relates to the state and society.
5 Equality
Equality is a major element in modern political discourse. We discuss equality
and its value in politics: equality of human rights, distributional equality,
equality before the law, the claims for group equality on the grounds of race,
gender, class. It is important to be aware of the challenges to equality as a
principle, especially when it is seen to conflict with a greater value, liberty.
6 Rights, obligations and citizenship

Rights, obligations and citizenship are closely associated. We look at the
nature of rights in society and whether they are natural, innate, created or
acquired. Then the issue of political obligations and duties is outlined,
especially within the context of a liberal-democratic state. Finally, the issue of
citizenship is addressed in relation to these rights and obligations.
7 The role of ideology in politics and society

Ideology is the driving force of political discourse. Politics can be defined as
the clash of interests dressed up as ideologies. This chapter examines what is
meant by ideology, what forms it takes, how it is transmitted and its impact in
both international and domestic British politics.
8 Nationalism
Nationalism is arguably the most important force in modern politics. We
discuss nationalism’s growth and development over the last two centuries
with particular reference to its main features and assumptions. It is an
ideology with the chameleon-like quality of adapting to the needs of countries,
ideologies and the times. The impact of nationalism in both domestic and
international politics is examined.
9 Conservatism
Conservatism is ‘a policy of imperfection’, based on a pessimistic view of
human nature. It argues for a limited style of politics, tradition, organic
society, hierarchy, order, authority, private property, the importance of the
state and national institutions. We outline the development of conservatism as
a political ideology and movement in Britain during the last two centuries.
10 Liberalism
Liberalism can be regarded as the Western world’s dominant ideology,
stressing ideas of individualism, optimism about society, human nature and its
capacity for change, rationality and balance in society, freedom, justice,
democracy, human rights, toleration, the minimal state and free-market
capitalism. Liberalism is examined to discover how it has changed in order
maintain its central position today.
11 Socialism
We investigate the main features and concepts associated with socialism. These
include: a class analysis of society, co-operation, fraternity, collectivism, social
equality, social justice, an optimistic view of human nature, the role of the state,
society and the economy. The development of the British Labour Party will then
be studied to reveal the characteristic features of British socialism.
12 Marxism and anarchism

Marxism and anarchism are usually seen as varieties of socialism. Both are
critical of capitalist society and both advocate radical and revolutionary change
in society. Here we discuss the main features of each movement and the degree
of success they have had in improving society. Marxism as a state ideology is
studied, as well as anarchism’s critique of both capitalism and state socialism.
13 Fascism
Fascism is a reaction to liberalism and socialism, and in many ways it is a truly
twentieth-century ideology. We identify some of the many thinkers and ideas
Introduction 15
associated with fascism and, although concentrating on German Nazism and

Italian Fascism, we look at the rise of modern fascism in recent years in both
Britain and Western Europe.
14 Environmentalism and ecologism

Environmentalism may be seen as the new political movement of the twenty-
first century. The principles of environmental thought are identified and
discussed. These include sustainable development, an earth-centred view of
the world, the debate between the ‘deep greens’ and the ‘light greens’. The
impact of Green thinking on the major political movements will be identified.
15 Feminism
Feminism is an ideology and a movement that tries to explain the reasons for
the social, political and economic subjection of women, as well as putting
forward proposals for the social, economic and political advancement of
women. We look at its origins and development, its major beliefs and
approaches to women and their future.
Concluding remarks
It is important to address some areas of concern not covered elsewhere in this
book. We look here at some of the new issues involved in politics that might
be of significance in the future: politicised religion, disabled rights, gay rights
and animal rights. We will also discuss how ideological change occurs and
stress the importance of rationality in politics.
Glossary of major figures

This includes the names of most of the major figures mentioned in the text
with brief details of their lives, works and contributions to the development of
political ideas and movements.
Suggested further reading

Each chapter concludes with some suggested reading on the subject
concerned. We include here most sources mentioned in the text and those we
have used in the preparation of this volume.
The state and sovereignty 1
This chapter explores the concept of the state, looking at various theories of the
state and identifying its major characteristics and then how far real states
measure up to these characteristics. Finally, it examines the issue of whether the
state is still as fundamental a political institution as it has been over the past four
centuries.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Why are there so many states today?
➤ How does the state differ from the ‘government’ and the ‘nation’?
➤ There are several different analyses of the state. What are the key points of each?
➤ What are the major characteristics of the state? Do all states have them in equal
degrees?
➤ Has the state ‘had its day’?

The state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only. (Aristotle,
Politics, 4th century BC)
Free speech, raised in protest, is the life-blood of democracy, yet the freer the
speech the more likely it is to inflame its audience to violence. But violence can kill
democracy, for if given rein it will destroy the democracy that licensed it; while to
curb it freedom itself may have to be restricted, and democracy thus impaled on
the horns of a dilemma. Any nation which so orders its affairs as to achieve a
maximum of freedom of speech with a maximum of freedom from public disorder
may fairly claim a prize among the highest achievements of the human race. In
terms of individual happiness it surely ranks higher than a successful landing on
the moon. How has the prize been won? Can it be held? (T. A. Crichley, The Conquest
of Violence, 1970)
The state in some form has existed since urbanised and complex societies arose
in Egypt, China, India and Mesopotamia over five thousand years ago. Since
then, the more ‘civilised’ members of humanity
have never been without the state. States have also state
always existed in an ‘international society’ with A political association that
trade, diplomacy, law, morality and, inevitably, establishes sovereign power
within a defined territorial area
war, shaping their relations.
and possesses a monopoly of
legitimate violence.
The modern state arose from the break-up of
European Christendom during the early sixteenth
century. The Reformation instigated a century of religious wars between
Catholics and Protestant powers. By the end of the century the modern state
had been established in Western Europe: a centralised power with exclusive
law-making and law-enforcing authority over a territory. Conventionally,
however, the modern state and state system is dated from the Treaty of
Westphalia, which ended both the Thirty Years’
War (1618–48) and the wars of religion. sovereignty
Westphalia established the key principle of The distinguishing characteris-
modern statehood: sovereignty. tic of the state. Sovereignty is
the right to have absolute and
After around 1500, European expansion into the unlimited power, either legal or
Americas, Asia and Africa spread the concept of political, within the territory of a
state.
the state. European imperialism, itself a product
of inter-state competition, encouraged non-
Europeans to study the secret of their subjection. Anti-colonial nationalists
took European ideas of the ‘rights of man’, ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ and, especially,
‘national self-determination’, using them against their colonial masters in
struggles for independence.
Independence took on the form of Western-style states. The number of states
in international society grew dramatically. Only twenty-six states existed in
1914, some tracing their independence from the British and Spanish empires
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. After the Second World War
the remaining European empires collapsed, creating over 160 states by 1980.
With the end of communist domination in Eastern Europe and the break-up of
the USSR the number rose to 192 ten years later.
Although often derided as an outworn concept by its critics, the state
continues to have a deep resonance for most people’s political aspirations. In
the twenty-first century many stateless peoples and nations aspire to
statehood as an expression of their national identity. The number of states is,
therefore, likely to grow still further.
One problem in discussing the ‘state’ is that it is much more difficult to define
than one might expect. We will first discuss two major misconceptions about
what the state is. Then we will identify different ‘types’ of state in political
theory. Characteristics common to all states will then be analysed, the most
important of these being sovereignty. Finally, we will discuss the degree to
which state sovereignty is being undermined in the modern world.
What the state is not

It is crucial to realise that the ‘state’ is not the same thing as ‘government’.
Governments are temporary holders of state office, directing state power.
They are the means by which state authority is manifested. Ministers and
civil servants make the state ‘flesh’, so to speak. Indeed, the state is a
theoretical concept that has no physical manifestation. It can be seen as
remote and impersonal, above particular regimes, while governments are
shaped by often deeply held ideological values and driven by strong personal
ambitions.
Neither is the state the same thing as the ‘nation’, as suggested in the term
‘nation-state’. The nation and the state are very different concepts, very
different aspects of social and political life. It is rare, very rare, for a nation to
correspond exactly to a state. The UK, for example, is not a nation-state. It is
a state that comprises several clearly identifiable nations. The Kurds,
meanwhile, are a nation spread across parts of the territories of several states.
Essentially, the state is a legal concept that defines a structure of power. The
nation on the other hand is composed of a people who share certain charac-
teristics, among which are culture, ethnicity and history.
The state claims the loyalty and support of its population, or at least the vast
majority of its population. Many states, while dominated by a particular
nation, include national minorities who sometimes feel an affinity to co-
national members residing in other states or demand their own state. Such
cross-border allegiances can undermine the practical sovereignty of a state
and, under certain circumstances, lead to its failure or break-up. The violent
end to the Yugoslav Federation and the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia

in the 1990s are both examples of this.
Nevertheless, the state plays a vital role in ‘nation-building’ – the creation of a
sense of national identity on the part of its population. This can be seen in the
USA, where oaths of allegiance, displays of flags and the veneration of the
Constitution are closely associated with building up and reinforcing a sense of
‘American’ national identity.
Theories of the state

The state owes much to political theory. Although not a tangible thing, the very
intangible nature of the state ensures its key political role. The ‘state’ as a
political concept is almost endlessly discussed. Indeed, one might define
‘politics’ as a distinct human activity – setting it apart from business, trade
unions, religion, the family or the local gardening club – as a power struggle
that takes place only in relation to the state.
All political activity revolves around the state.
● Concepts of rights, liberty, equality, the nation, power, only have practical
meaning in relation to the state. It acts as defender or abuser of human rights.
It creates national identity. It is the prime structure by which political power
is manipulated in a society.
● Conservatism, liberalism, socialism, fascism and ecologism, as models,
analyse power in relation to the state. As political parties they seek state
power, to use it to implement political, social and cultural programmes. If
unable to achieve control of the state, parties will at least try to influence those
directing state institutions.
● Some movements do not aim to control the state, but to influence political
debate and policy. They are usually described as ‘pressure’ or ‘interest groups’.
Here, it does not matter whether they are economic interest groups like trade
unions and business associations, essentially defending the pay, conditions
and employment of their members, or cause interest groups like Amnesty
International or Greenpeace, supporting an issue that their members feel
strongly about. Such groups seek to influence holders of state power.
Nevertheless, there are considerable differences in the theoretical approaches
to the role and functions of the state. These may be classified as:
• the liberal-pluralist state;
• the social-democratic state;
• the Marxist analysis;
• the feminist analysis;
• the self-serving state.
The liberal-pluralist analysis of the state

Liberal-pluralists reject the class analysis of Marxists and the nation-based
view of conservatives to stress the central role of individuals and private
groups in society.
Liberal-pluralists see society as large numbers of groups and individuals
competing, sometimes co-operating, for power to control and/or influence
state institutions. The state is neutral, curbing the power of some and
bolstering the power of others. Indeed, the state itself is composed of many
groups and interests. At times, state institutions and their interests may
overlap with the interests of social groups. However, the state is seen to ‘stand
above’ these groups as a ‘referee’ in their struggle for power.
The state acts for the whole nation. It is a ‘servant’ of the ‘people’, set up to
defend their natural rights against oppression from home or abroad. Indeed,
a ‘social contract’ exists between people and state, similar to any contract
between employer and employee. Officials of the state must, therefore, be
accountable for their actions to the people. Should the state abuse its power,
and infringe the rights of the people, then state officials can be removed from
office – ‘sacked’ – like any other servant who abused his position of trust. This
justification of revolt was one of many reasons
why conservatives have seen liberalism as neo-liberalism
dangerously radical and socially disruptive, and A modern version of classical
liberalism, sometimes called
why radicals have found it so attractive.
the ‘New Right’, which empha-
sises the central role of individ-
Early nineteenth-century classical liberal thinkers
ual choice and motivations,
were so concerned to curb the power of the state free market economics and a
that they saw its role in extremely minimal terms. minimal role for the state.
Essentially, the state should ensure the mainte-
nance of internal law and order, defend against external attack, create a
structure of laws to protect individual rights, and raise taxes to pay for these
three tasks. All else – education, health, welfare, pensions – could, and should,
be provided by private organisations. Such views reappeared towards the end
of the twentieth century as key elements of neo-liberalism in many Western
conservative parties.
The social-democratic view of the state

Modern Western states are characterised by features of the social-democratic
state. So dominant an ideology is social democracy that it is now almost to
impossible to imagine that a modern state could be shaped by any other beliefs.
Yet the idea that the state should take upon itself responsibilities for key indus-
tries, economic development, health, education, pensions and a wide range of
social benefit payments is a new one. In only a few states, such as Germany,
did that system exist prior to 1900. The social-

social democracy
democratic state arose during the middle years of A reformist and moderate ver-
the twentieth century in response to economic sion of socialism that accepts
crises, the rise of socialist and labour movements a significant proportion of mar-
ket capitalism, rather than
to greater economic and political power and the
seeking its outright abolition.
demands of war. As a consequence of the effec-
tiveness of state intervention in staving off social
revolution and prosecuting total war it was increasingly believed that the state
could and should have a greater role in society to deal with social problems:
want, poverty, unemployment, sickness, ignorance. The state was seen as a
tool to achieve social justice, fairness and liberty by setting up institutions to
ensure health provision and education. A range of financial benefits provided
protection against the consequences of unemployment, sickness, disability
and old age. In most Western European countries key industries were taken
into public ownership – ‘nationalised’, as it was known in Britain – and the
state became responsible for running railways, coalmines, steelworks, utilities
and a growing range of services and businesses.
The apparent economic and social failures of the 1970s discredited social
democracy as an ideological direction for the state. In the 1980s and 1990s
assaults on the social-democratic state saw state industries in many countries
‘privatised’, the tax burden on individuals and businesses reduced and
state provision of benefits curbed. Nevertheless, many – indeed most – of
the core features of the social-democratic state remain in place. The state
remains the major provider of healthcare and education, basic welfare and
pension payments, and is still seen as a tool of social change in the direction
of social justice.
The Marxist analysis of the state

Marxists view the state in terms of class struggle. It reflects the economic
structures of society and the class struggles that arise out of a particular
economic system. As the economy changes through shifts in the means of
production, so does the class structure. As the
class structure alters so will the power relations class struggle
and the political struggle between the classes. The conflict between social
classes, themselves products
The state is, therefore, not neutral. It is an instru- of a given economic system
ment of power and domination of the ruling class which Marx regarded as the
(or classes) in society, the means by which the driving force of history.
capitalist class maintains exploitative social struc-
tures that benefit them and keep the working class in subjection to them and
their interests. Even when the state intervenes to mediate between the capitalist
class and the working class, for example in an industrial dispute, the funda-
mental objective of the state is to ensure the dominance of the capitalist class.
Only when the working class seizes control of the state will the state act in
their interests and the interests of the whole people. Indeed, when the working
class has created the communist society, free of the capitalist class, the need
for the state will disappear and the state, losing its reason for existence, will
wither away: thus runs the argument.
The feminist view of the state

Feminists see the state as the most powerful of many social institutions that
are instruments of male domination in society. The state is run mainly by men
and for the interests of men.
Equal opportunities and equal pay legislation are mere decorations to hide the
patriarchal nature of the state and its many sub-institutions. Women are rarely
chosen as candidates for parliamentary seats, and, if chosen, are likely to be
campaigning in unwinnable seats. The few women who are elected tend to
remain out of governmental power. Those tiny numbers that get into
government are likely to be ministers in ‘low-prestige’ or ‘women’s issues’ areas
of the government such as health and education rather than high-powered
posts such as foreign policy and defence, economic and trade, all ‘male’ issues.
Women have to work harder than men to achieve political power within the
state and generally have less power than men do.
The self-serving state

With the decline of the political power of monarchism in the early nineteenth
century the appeal of state power was transferred from the king to the state.
The state acquired in the minds of men a degree of powerful, mystic authority.
This process helped create the idea of the state as something greater than the
people who composed it, and indeed, raised the possibility that people would
come to see the state not as their servant but as their master in the service of
a greater goal than individual happiness.
The twentieth century gave form to the state as a self-serving power machine,
pursuing its own interests and agenda, crushing opposition and bending all
other social institutions to its will. It is sometimes called the ‘Leviathan state’.
Intervening in every aspect of social life, it leaves no room for individual
conscience, or for any private institutions existing outside it. All social and
political activity serves the state.
Modern fascist, communist, religious and military regimes increasingly have
had access to technologies and organisational systems of observation and
control, manipulation and oppression that their predecessors could only aspire
to. All aspects of human existence were subject to the needs of the state in
Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, Hitler’s Germany and,
to a considerable degree, Mussolini’s Italy. Common ownership of property, or

state direction of private property, surveillance techniques and the role of
secret police and terror are concomitant with the higher ‘good’ of the state
acting in the interests of the collective and not the individual.
However, critics of the self-serving state do not confine their warnings to states
shaped by these regimes. Many liberal thinkers and politicians have argued
that even social-democratic states, for the best of intentions, will create
bureaucracies and interest groups that will, little by little, tax by tax, create
structures of dependency and control that eventually lead to the suppression
of freedom. It is not necessarily the intention of policymakers that this should
become so, but it is inherent in the logic of increasing state power infiltrating
areas that should be firmly outside the remit of politics: family, religion,
education. Indeed, this is the consequence of democratic pressures for greater
state spending and involvement in solutions to society’s ills. Thus this critique
of the modern state becomes a critique of some aspects of modern mass
democracy.
Major characteristics of the state

Whatever the particular style of the state, its philosophical underpinnings, or
the governmental system that directs it, a number of features common to all
states can be identified:
• it has the control of an identifiable population;
• It has the control of an identifiable geographical territory;
• it has high degrees of longevity compared to other social institutions;
• it is a structure of law in society;
• it is characterised by sovereignty.
Population
All states have a constituent population that mostly voluntarily, but if
necessary by compulsion, will be loyal to their state.
Having said that, there is no maximum or minimum number of people that
must exist together to constitute a state. There are enormous differences in the
sizes of populations of viable states. Nauru has a population of a few
thousand; the UK, France and Italy are all sixty million strong; while Russia,
the USA, India and China, with 160, 280, 1,000 and 1,200 million respectively,
are clearly in a different population league.
It does not necessarily follow that population size translates automatically
into political power for a state. Clearly, population size will determine the
human resources upon which a state’s power rests: industrial population, the
size of armed forces, and so on. Population size does have an impact on the
power ranking of a state in world affairs – a large population is needed

for great-power status – but technological and industrial prowess and the
educational levels of the population are of greater importance in the
contemporary world. India, for example, is a large, well-populated country
with a strong industrial base, but the USA, with a quarter of its population,
has much greater resources to call on than India and is many times more
powerful.
Geography
A state has control over an identifiable geographic territory. A state may have
enormous territory, such as Russia, Canada and the USA, or may be geograph-
ically small, such as the Vatican City State, Fiji and Nauru. There is no
maximum or minimum size for statehood. However, what is required is
territory, and territory that is recognised as being under the control of a state
by the inhabitants of that state and, what is more important, by other states –
especially the great powers and the states most closely bordering on it.
State territory is not fixed. A glance at the shifting boundaries of the states
of Europe over the last two centuries should demonstrate this most clearly.
The Polish state was once geographically very large. During the course of
the eighteenth century its territory was nibbled away by Prussia, Russia and
Austria until it disappeared altogether. Reappearing as a state under the
Versailles Treaty (1919), Polish territory stretched far to the east, taking in
lands that had once been part of the Russian Empire, only to disappear in
1940. The post-1945 state lost territories in the east and was compensated by
German territories in the west. Even apparently long-established states, such
as France and the UK, ended the twentieth century with territory different
from a century earlier.
The collapse of the European empires during the twenty years after 1945 and
the collapse of Soviet power in 1991 created many new state territories based
on national claims for self-government. However, like old states, these new
ones often had to resort to war to establish their territorial integrity against
other states and internal national minorities. New territorial boundaries, like
old ones, require the recognition of other states. Hence, the continued
struggles and conflicts over where state boundaries should lie.
Longevity
States claim long lives, because longevity tends to confer legitimacy in the
eyes of their populations, and legitimacy invites loyalty. The UK state, for
example, can trace its ancestry back to the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Wessex of
over a thousand years ago. The Russian and French states declare their origins
to be almost lost in the mists of antiquity. Even modern states, such as those
created out of the collapse of Yugoslavia, seek to claim that they are the heirs
of long traditions of national statehood.
One can observe, therefore, that the state is something more than the
government of the day. Governments come and go with elections. Political
parties may change the policies of the government, but not the nature of the
state. Sometimes, after a revolution, crisis or war, even the political and
constitutional system that characterises a state may be subject to change. But
the state goes on. Indeed, its legitimacy depends heavily on its real or
supposed age. If necessary, ‘age-old’ traditions will be invented to strengthen
claims of ancient origins.
Nevertheless, most modern states are just that: modern. The vast majority
were created during the last fifty years; many are a little older (post-1919);
some were in place at the start of the nineteenth century, but very few are
above a couple of centuries old and even fewer can trace their present shape
beyond 1700. The UK, for example, was founded in 1801, but its present
geographical form dates from 1921. Modern Germany was established by
Bismarck in 1871; however, the present German state was created in 1949 by
the Americans and British, while its contemporary form, which encompasses
the former German Democratic Republic, only just pre-dates the 1990s. Even
the USA, over two centuries old, acquired its present geographical form only
in 1958.
Law and government

The state can be seen as a system of laws. There is no legal authority above it
either within its territory or in international society. It is sovereign within its
territory, as the only law-making authority, and is bound only by those inter-
national treaties – international laws – it has agreed to accept.
A legal tradition shapes the legal order within a state. Order in society must
be subject to law and not the other way around. Power must be constrained
by law and law must be the basis for the transfer of power. Indeed, appeals to
the ‘common good’, the ‘general will’ of the people, the needs of ‘absolute
power’ to ensure the ‘higher goal’ of order without reference to law are
arbitrary uses of power which inevitably lead to abuses of power on the part
of political holders of office. Legal principles for the basis of the state are
essentially a nineteenth-century development in the establishment of the rule
of law to check the political whims of monarchs, ministers and the mob.
Domestically, the state can give itself whatever constitutional and political
system it likes. The principle assumes that no other state or international
organisation has the right under normal circumstances to determine the
internal political arrangements of a state. The Treaty of Westphalia established
this principle. It is a key element of the legal basis for the modern state. Never-
theless, a major defeat in a foreign war, such as that of Germany after 1945,
will involve massive changes in the internal political and legal arrangements
of a state.
Over the last few decades the nature of some regimes – South Africa’s racist
apartheid regime and the religious intolerance of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan – have been subject to considerable international pressure to
reform in line with international moral principles. However, such pressure
from other governments is likely to occur only when the internal regime
affects the interests of other states.
International law is a law created by legally equal, co-ordinated bodies, not
subordinated bodies. States are subject to law in international society, but are
in a system where enforcement is only possible through states. Enforcement
depends, therefore, very much on the power available to a state and on its
calculations of self-interest. But it does not undermine the principle of state
sovereignty as applied to law. Most international courts recognise the right of
a state to refuse to attend a particular case when issues of national security are
involved; and the state itself will decide what constitutes ‘national security’.
State sovereignty
Most human associations have many of the above characteristics. A school or
college has an identifiable population, a territory, a structure of power, and may
have existed for a long time. It may even have a loyal group of students and
staff. But there is one defining characteristic that distinguishes a school or any
other social organisation or asociation from the state: sovereignty. It is impos-
sible to grasp the concept of the state without reference to this defining feature.
‘External sovereignty’ is used to describe two elements. Firstly, states have
legal equality in international society. Wealthy or poor, strong or weak, every
sovereign state is legally equal in international law. The United States and
Mauritius are both sovereign states, even though clearly one has a greater
range of policy options in domestic and international affairs than the other.
This manifests itself in institutions such as the United Nations General
Assembly where each state has one vote. Secondly, for a state to achieve full
external sovereignty it must be recognised as a fellow sovereign state by
‘enough’ of the other members of the international system, especially the most
powerful states. For example, the apartheid regime in South Africa set up and
recognised a number of ‘states’ within its territory as part of its policy of
‘separate development’. Having all the apparent attributes of sovereignty,
these ‘pseudo-states’ were only recognised as sovereign in reality by South
Africa and each other. All the other states refused to recognise them as an
equal. Hence, they failed to acquire this key attribute of a state.
‘Internal sovereignty’ is the other vital component of this concept. It consists

of two elements: ‘legal’ and ‘practical’ sovereignty.
Legal sovereignty encapsulates the right of a state to be the only law-making
body for the population inhabiting a given territory. The state has the right to
construct and impose laws free of any external involvement by other states or
bodies. It must be the sole law-making and law-enforcing authority for a
territory. Any sharing of sovereignty must, by the very nature of the term,
mean that whatever arises out of such an act, the result cannot be called
‘sovereign’. Sovereignty does not recognise any superior or equal in the legal
right to make laws for a territory.
The citizens and others residing in a state’s territory are obliged to obey the
laws of only that state. This is a peculiar feature of the state. It existed long
before the seventeenth century although it is usually associated with the
Treaty of Westphalia that established the legal principle of the duty to conform
to the religious and political policies of a state’s ruler. As a consequence of the
UK’s membership of the European Union one hears much of the decline, or
even end, of British state sovereignty. However, one might argue that state
sovereignty is still intact. Membership of the EU was an act of a sovereign state
and continued membership is a demonstration of state decision-making. As
long as the state remains the supreme law-making and law-enforcing authority
for a territory, it will be sovereign.
However fundamental the concept of legal sovereignty is, one must always
remember that it would remain a ‘fiction’ without the other element of state
sovereignty: its practical ability to ensure that the laws of the state are obeyed
throughout its territory. This element of the concept of sovereignty raises the
issue of a hierarchy of states as a consequence of their power. Clearly, some
states are more powerful than others. Generally speaking the more powerful a
state the more it will have the practical sovereignty to ensure its writ runs
within its territory and that it will be able to defend and advance its interests
abroad. A weak state at home and abroad will still retain its external sover-
eignty and its legal internal sovereignty, but the important element of practical
sovereignty will raise issues over its very effectiveness as a state.
State sovereignty, therefore, is not just a legal concept. It must be closely linked
to the practical power available to a state. A state defeated in a war will lose,
usually temporarily, the right to run its domestic and foreign policy in line with
its own principles and interests. That is especially the case if the state is
defeated in a major war and is over-run by its enemies (as was the case with
Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War). Peace treaties,
however onerous their imposed obligations on a defeated state, do not deprive
the defeated state of its legal sovereignty. Indeed, principles of sovereignty can
be appealed to by a state to throw off or reduce the burden of such impositions.
Practical state sovereignty can be undermined and even fatally weakened by

internal revolt. The consequences for the population of a state when its
practical sovereignty fails are usually horrendous. The Lebanese state during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, remained the legally sovereign
entity for its territory. However, that practical sovereignty was at one time
reduced to a few Beirut city blocks while the rest of the country was in the
hands of militias and, later, Israeli and Syrian armed forces. Similar problems
have been seen in Somalia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.
Challenges to state sovereignty

Now nearly four hundred years old, the ‘Westphalian state’, with sovereignty
as its defining characteristic, may be coming to the end of its useful existence,
for one reason: its legal sovereignty is undermined by the growing corpus of
international treaties that restrict the right of the state to make domestic laws.
The twentieth century raised deep moral questions about the consequences of
allowing states under the guise of sovereign independence to have free reign
over their citizens. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states ended
highly destructive religious wars in the early seventeenth century. However, it
is a dangerous policy to pursue today, when some states slaughter ethnic and
other minorities, suppress human rights and construct appalling tyrannies.
Practical sovereignty is challenged by the problems facing human society at the
dawn of the twenty-first century, problems so great, so complex, that the
sovereign state is too small a unit, the concept of sovereignty too archaic, to be
of much practical use in solving them. Pollution, environmental degradation,
global poverty can be effectively addressed only by new international organi-
sations acting globally, without the intervention of state-based power politics.
These challenges to state sovereignty may sound convincing but are not new.
Sovereign states have always placed legal curbs on their own freedom of
action by signing and acting in accordance with international treaties. Never,
though, have states been bound by so many agreements as today. They accept
more international interference in their internal affairs than ever before. One
might consider this a matter of degree. States are obliged only to carry out
treaties they have signed, the signature being itself an act of state sovereignty.
State sovereignty, in legal terms, remains intact.
International organisations designed to deal with international problems are
still either state-based, such as the United Nations, or, if non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), they have to act through power structures created and
maintained by states. State sovereignty remains the practical feature of
political activity. States remain by far the greatest donors of international aid,
the most important actors in international affairs, and, of course, are the major
military players in conflicts. The state remains the

globalisation
central feature of the international system.
The process by which econom-
Indeed, alternatives to the state look, on closer ic, political and cultural power
examination, to be somewhat larger ‘states’ with and influence are transferred to
different names. organisations such as multi-
national corporations and so
Nevertheless, there is an issue here about the removed from the control of
those most affected by them.
future of state sovereignty. It is challenged, even This involves the increasing
if it still is the central feature of the state. While interdependence of states,
legal state sovereignty remains intact, it is the social and economic organisa-
tions and individuals in the
erosion of practical state sovereignty that will
modern world
determine the validity of the concept of the state
in the future. We will look here at the major
challenges to practical state sovereignty in the neo-colonialism
modern world: The process by which powerful
• The structure of international society; Western states reassert their
• The impact of globalisation; dominance over nominally inde-
pendent states by economically
• the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
exploiting them through bodies
• the growth of informal ties; such as the International
• the rise of new international actors; Monetary Fund and the World
• neo-colonialism. Bank, and especially multi-
national corporations and finan-
cial institutions.
The structure of international society
State sovereignty has always been predicated upon political power: the
practical ability of the state to defend its sovereignty against internal revolt
and external enemies. In international society there have always been consid-
erable differences in practical power among sovereign states; although states
are legally equal, the differences mean that some states are more ‘equal’ than
others. However, the modern international system has seen the rise of a whole
new class of state, known as the ‘superpower’. Superpowers are so powerful
that they undermine the practical sovereignty of all other states in the inter-
national system.
During the Cold War, so it is argued, the USA and USSR constituted the only
superpowers in the international system. They created alliances: structures
built around one or other superpower. Junior members of these alliances were
subject to interference in their internal affairs by the dominant superpower, so
much interference that practical sovereignty was drastically reduced. The
present post-Cold War world now has only one superpower, the USA, with
enormous economic and military potential to undermine state sovereignty of
weaker members of the international system.
This view of the over-riding might of a superpower fails to acknowledge that
legal sovereignty, even of smaller states, has a practical validity. Junior states
in the international system may use legal sovereignty to ensure a considerable

degree of practical sovereignty in the face of superpower pressure. France in
1965 asserted its legal and practical sovereignty by removing NATO and US
bases from its territory. The Soviet Union found that its claims of limited sover-
eignty within the Warsaw Pact were challenged by its member states. Poland
and Romania regularly asserted their sovereignty in the face of considerable
Soviet pressure. Despite the assertion of Hungarian and Czechoslovakian
political sovereignty it was crushed by Soviet military force in 1956 and 1968,
respectively, but the desire to restore practical sovereignty remained within
those states and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
It does not therefore follow that sovereignty is automatically undermined by
the existence of superpowers. At times, the sovereignty of small states can be
strengthened in the face of superpower pressure. They can be seen as the
victims of superpower bullying and can embarrass the superpower accord-
ingly. Perhaps the most obvious element in the continuing importance of states
is their sheer number in the international system despite the hierarchical
nature of power in international society.
The impact of globalisation

Globalisation is said to undermine practical sovereignty by the rapid spread of
technology, ideas, electronic communications and the swift movement of
people and capital around the globe. The global economy has created such
strong economic ties between states that old concepts of national economic
independence are obsolete and, therefore, the economic basis of practical
sovereignty has gone.
State sovereignty in the past could be protected by state action to prevent
movements of people and ideas across frontiers. However, global technology
ensures that states are unable to isolate their people from new ideas. State
frontiers and concomitant state sovereignty have become increasingly
meaningless as a concept in the modern world.
There is, though, little that is new in this thesis. State sovereignty has always
been subject to challenge by communications technology and capital
movements around the globe. Even states most integrated into the interna-
tional economy are ones in which the bulk of economic activity is domestic
and only a small part of economic activity is related to foreign trade.
Nevertheless, technological developments ensure that states, for good or ill,
increasingly have at their command the means for greater control and surveil-
lance of their populations than ever before. Even the most liberal-democratic
state has enlarged its powers to the extent of strengthening its practical sover-
eignty in the face of challenges to it from within and without.
Weapons of mass destruction

In the centuries before the development of nuclear weapons, it is argued,
practical state sovereignty in military affairs was very strong. A foreign power
had to destroy the armed forces of an enemy state in order to inflict total
destruction on the economic and population resources available to that state.
The enterprise was difficult, enormously taxing and prone to failure, and the
gains from such actions might be seen to be relatively minor when measured
against the inevitable weakening of even the victorious power.
Now the existence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction available
to states and, potentially, terrorist organisations, means that even the
strongest state is vulnerable to devastating military strikes, without warning,
which would inflict enormous damage on political, economic and social struc-
tures. As a consequence the military basis of sovereignty has been reduced
and, possibly, removed. With this key element of sovereignty gone or fatally
weakened, the Westphalian state has lost is major characteristic – the
monopoly on organised political violence, and its major function, the use of
military power to promote the policy aims of the state.
Nevertheless, the state remains the major organiser of military power in the
world. Even the most sophisticated terrorist organisations can only compete
militarily with the resources available to a very small state. The majority of
sovereign states retain considerable military power. Nuclear weapons can
strengthen relations between nuclear-armed states by developing concepts of
‘nuclear deterrence’ to ensure that peace is maintained and caution is a feature
of the handling of crises between such armed states. In confrontations
between nuclear and non-nuclear armed states, however, one cannot see any
evidence that the non-nuclear state is significantly intimidated by the nuclear
power and alters its behaviour. Nuclear weapons may not be a credible
political tool in crises with non-nuclear-weapons powers. What nuclear-
weapons power would threaten, let alone use, nuclear weapons against a
small non-nuclear power? The threat would be hollow and would merely
isolate the nuclear-weapons state in international society. Hence, the practical
sovereignty of states is unlikely to be significantly reduced by developments in
weapons technology.
Growing informal ties

The practical sovereign functions of the state are undermined by the growth
of informal links between people outside inter-state relations. Subversion,
propaganda, ethnic cross-border ties, religious affiliations, the internet,
tourism, international media and the creation and spread of a global culture
all weaken the power of the state to call automatically upon and expect the
loyalty of the people under its legal sovereignty.
For example, religious affiliations place demands for allegiance on co-

religionists above the demands of the state in which they reside. Young British
Muslims have travelled to Afghanistan to fight for fellow Muslims against the
armed forces of their own state, claiming a higher duty than one associated
with citizenship. Christian groups challenge their own governments when
they violate Christian principles. Indeed, in the struggle against particular
state regimes religion plays a very important role. The end of the communist
regime in Poland was, in part, connected with the role of the Catholic church
led by a Polish pope who could call on the moral and political support of
millions of fellow Catholics.
Tourism involves millions of people travelling for leisure to other countries,
creating new relationships between peoples that weaken the automatic
support of people for their own state. Only over the last thirty-five years or so
have millions of people been able to travel to other countries and experience
their cultures other than as members of an invading army. Tourism is only a
mass phenomenon in relatively rich nations but as with other phenomena it is
likely to expand.
The internet and the international media have created the opportunity to spread
with ease cultural and political values that challenge and weaken the capacity
of a state to control its population free of external and alternative points of
view. Indeed, the political messages carried by modern technology may
influence the internal political debates and social conditions within other states.
These changes have affected the power of the state to maintain its sovereignty.
States may have had to modify their functions in response to tourism and
technological change. However, it is doubtful whether practical sovereignty
has automatically been undermined. Modern technology is probably more
likely to increase the ability of a state to control, track and regulate its
population. Cross-border religious affiliations of some members of a
population may strengthen the allegiance of the rest of the population to the
values of their own state, the former being seen as potential, or real, traitors.
Travel and the international media may not broaden the mind. The more
people know about foreigners the more they may dislike them and find them
a threat. Greater knowledge about other societies and their peculiarities may
strengthen xenophobia.
New international actors

State sovereignty is certainly challenged by the growth of a vast range of
actors in international affairs. These include Multi-National Corporations
(MNCs), environmental and aid pressure groups, terrorist organisations, inter-
national capital markets, religious movements and international organisations
created by states. Thousands of such groups exist and certainly make the
workings of international society more complex than if it had been composed

of sovereign states alone.
These new international actors have their own interests and objectives, which
will often not coincide with the interests and objectives of states, and may
actually be in conflict with them. The very number and diversity of these
actors make it difficult for states to assert their practical sovereignty over
them. The power of some of these new actors, especially the economic power
of MNCs, which is often greater than that of many sovereign states, challenges
and undermines the sovereignty of states.
However, it must be acknowledged that most of these new actors are very small
and very, very weak compared to states. Furthermore, only a few of these actors
perceive themselves as being involved in a challenge to state sovereignty.
Although terrorist and guerrilla organisations see themselves challenging state
power, usually to create a new state or severely modify a state in line with their
own interests, most dissident groups are aware of the need to work through
states and to influence state policies if their objectives are to be achieved. MNCs
and pressure groups act within a framework that assumes a key role for the
state. Many new international actors, such as the European Union, the United
Nations or international courts, are created by states themselves and exist to
reflect state interests. Indeed, the European Union and the United Nations,
among many such bodies, exist only as state-created structures and can only be
understood in relation to legal and practical state sovereignty. The state,
therefore, remains a major factor in the calculations of most new actors.
Neo-colonialism
Globalisation and international trade in the world economy has, it is argued,
undermined the practical sovereignty of states, especially the smaller, ex-
colonial states.
Sovereignty is made meaningless by the economic control of foreign-owned
MNCs. This is especially true in Africa, Asia, Latin America and parts of the
Middle East. Governments may retain legal sovereignty of a state but practical
sovereignty is undermined by the influence of MNCs, acting out of self-interest
rather than the interests of the state in which they operate. Even powerful
states in the developed world find themselves struggling to exert sovereignty
in the face of economic pressures from powerful MNCs.
The extent to which such economic processes undermine state sovereignty can
be exaggerated. States need the tax revenues, jobs, investment and wealth
that MNCs can bring and these, in themselves, can strengthen practical sover-
eignty. MNCs know they need to tread carefully in dealing with states, as states
can assert their control over key national resources by the nationalisation of
foreign assets. Many Middle Eastern states nationalised foreign oil companies
in the 1960s and used the revenues to develop their countries. However, the
success of such a strategy depends on the value of the resources concerned. Oil
is a vital commodity for modern industrial societies, being used in products
such as petrol, plastics and paint, while bananas, for example, are of major
concern only to banana producers. Oil is one thing, bananas are another!
The state is still the major form of political association in the world. It remains
the major concentration of political, military and economic power, the major
focus of loyalty for people and the one political association for which most
people are willing to run the risk of injury and death to create or defend it.
Nevertheless, its nature changes over time. For most people the state is no
longer ‘The Divine Idea as it exists on earth’,1 but it does have a powerful pull
on their emotions. It is still the form towards which political nationalists aspire
and in recent decades its phenomenal explosion in numbers is further
evidence of its attractions.
Sovereignty is not a static concept. It, too, changes as political realities change.
The debate in Britain, for example, over the impact of the EU on sovereignty,
sometimes sounds as if the idea is an eternal reality and not subject to change.
Sovereignty is an attribute of states that is both an idea and a reality of state
power. It is one of the means, an important one, by which the government of
a state seeks to ensure the best it possibly can for its people. As such, it also
changes over time. One might consider the supposed decline in legal sover-
eignty resulting from membership of the EU as more than compensated for by
the rise in the practical sovereignty of enhanced economic and political clout
available to the British state in international politics which results from EU
membership and the pooling of sovereignty.
One can over-estimate the power of the state. The vast majority of states are
poor, weak, with very little practical sovereignty abroad and often precious
little at home in the face of powerful economic and sectional interests. Mere
sovereign equality does not ensure the ability to exercise real power. The
condition of internal chaos in some states poses a threat to their neighbours as
well as to the well-being of their own citizens. So great is this problem, and so
great the dangers to international stability, that in recent years it has been
argued that some form of benign Western ‘imperialism’, for want of a better
word, may be required. Some territories may have to be taken over by
powerful states, reconstructed and have order restored.
One may, however, perceive this as demonstrating the importance of state
power, rather than the declining value of the concept. The state is likely to
remain the most important political actor far into the future.
Summary
Although the state can be traced as far back as ancient times, the modern state
really emerged in the seventeenth century. The state is not the same thing as
‘society’, the ‘government’ or the ‘nation’ but has its own defining character-
istics. Although it is of fundamental importance, in that all political activities
revolve around it, there are several interpretations of the state, but certain
features are common to them all: the state controls an identifiable population
and geographical territory; it has a high degree of longevity; it can be
described as a structure of law in society; it is characterised by sovereignty. In
recent years, questions have been raised as to the continued significance of the
state, which appears to be challenged by such developments as the restruc-
turing of international society, globalisation, new forms of warfare, new types
of international organisations (such as MNCs) and neo-colonialism. In spite of
this the state remains the major form of political association in the world and
is likely to remain so.
REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING
1 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 1821.
D’Agostino, F. ‘The State under the Rule of Law’, in G. Duprat, N.

Parker and A.-M. Rieu (eds.), WHAT IS EUROPE? Book 3: European
Democratic Culture (The Open University and European
Association of Distance Teaching Universities, 1993), pp. 105–31.
Bartleson, J. A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge University
Press, 1995).
Cooper, R. ‘Dawn Chorus for the New Age of Empire’, The Sunday Times (28 October,
2001).
Goodwin, G. L. ‘The Erosion of External Sovereignty?’, Government and Opposition 9:1
(1974), pp. 61–78.
Hertz, J. ‘Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’, in R. I. Matthews et al., International
Conflict and Conflict Management (Prentice Hall, 1984), pp. 182–93.
Heywood, A. ‘Sovereignty, the Nation and Supranationalism’, in A. Heywood, Political
Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1994), pp. 48–56.
Hinsley, F. H. Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
James, A. Sovereign Statehood (Allen and Unwin, 1986).
Millar, J. D. B. ‘The Significance of the Sovereign State’, in J. D. B. Millar, The World of
States (Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 16–32.
Morgenthau, H. J. and. Thompson, K. W ‘Sovereignty’, in H. J. Morgenthau and K. W.
Thompson, Politics Among Nations (Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 328–46.
Puchala, D. J. ‘Origins and Characteristics of the Modern State’, in R. I. Matthews et al.,
International Conflict and Conflict Management (Prentice Hall, 1984), pp. 177–81.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 What is the state?
2 What should the functions of the state be?
3 Is sovereignty indivisible?
4 How accurate is it to say that sovereignty is the ultimate source of

authority in society?
5 ‘State sovereignty is an outmoded concept.’ Discuss.
6 How would you define the concept of a ‘failed state’ and is the concept a useful one in
the contemporary world?
The nation 2
The powerful but elusive concept of the nation is investigated here. It is distin-
guished from the ‘state’ and the relationship between them is examined. Other
elements which make the nation are considered, such as religion, language,
government, cultural and historical ties, and finally the subjective but still
important ‘sense of nationhood’. There is also an analysis of contemporary Britain
as a nation. Perhaps more accurately the United Kingdom should be considered
as a ‘state’ made up of several ‘nations’, each of which is discussed in turn. This
problem of nation and national identity can be investigated through a study of
Northern Ireland, where issues of national and state identity have contributed to
the political crisis.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ How do the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ differ?
➤ Are the state and the nation always linked in some way?
➤ To what extent do race, language, religion, government and shared culture and history
shape nations? How do these factors vary from nation to nation?
➤ Is a ‘sense of nationhood’ a purely subjective thing?
➤ How far does a sense of nationhood exist in England, Wales and Scotland? In what ways
does this sense, if it exists, manifest itself within modern British society?
➤ Is the sense of nationhood a valuable and useful concept in explaining the politics of
Northern Ireland?
A nation is a group of people linked together by a common error about their

ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours. (Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and
Social Communications, 1953)
The great nations have always acted like gangsters and the small nations like
prostitutes. (Stanley Kubrick, 1963)
A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its laws. The territory
is the only part which is of certain durability. (Abraham Lincoln, message to
Congress, 1st December 1862)
Many powerful concepts and ideologies have motivated humans. It is difficult

to identify a concept more powerful in shaping political activity than the
‘nation’, or any ideology that motivates people to greater sacrifices or crimes
than that of nationalism. Some political movements, such as conservatism and
fascism, strongly identify with the nation and are greatly influenced by nation-
alism. Other movements claim to place the individual at the centre of political
activity, as in liberalism, or class, as in socialism, but even these have found
that national ‘characteristics’ greatly influence – indeed, determine – the form
in which their ideologies are expressed.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to define the ‘nation’. As with the concept of the
state, one has an idea as to its meaning that swiftly disintegrates when one
attempts to analyse or define it. The state and the nation are not identical,
even though the two terms are often used interchangeably by politicians,
historians and political scientists. The state is, remember, a legal entity that is
directed by a government. The nation, on the other hand, may or may not be
closely associated with the state. A nation is composed of a people that share
certain characteristics and have a sense of belonging to that nation.
So powerful is the concept of nations as fundamental units of human organi-
sation that international organisations rarely talk of them as being made up of
states, which is what they are, and they are usually described in such terms as
the League of Nations and the United Nations.
The concept of the ‘nation’ will be discussed here, first in general terms and
then in relation to the nations of the United Kingdom.
The nation
The concept of the nation developed in Western Europe during the post-
Reformation struggles of the sixteen and seventeenth centuries, and was
further shaped by the industrial and political revolutions of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. During the nineteenth century, the development of the
political power of the middle classes within capitalist states also refined
the concept of the nation. The creation of mass democracies and notions of
The nation 39
popular sovereignty during the twentiety century

citizenship
created the notion of nationality being related The rights and duties that an
to citizenship. Nations and national identity, in individual has as a member of
the eyes of some commentators, are artificial a state. Citizenship can be
acquired by birth or by choice,
formulations:
as a consequence of ‘naturali-
Once you have swallowed the truth that neither sation’ into the citizenship body
our English nor our British identity has their rootsof state.
in pre-history; once you accept the essential
shallowness of nationhood; once you understand that a national identity can be
designed in a cynical, professional and calculated way as a life assurance
company’s corporate personality, you will see why, though our nationhood has
fewer certainties, it has fewer shackles too.1
Some analysts see ‘nations’ as modern ideas, largely created by intellectuals

and rulers to unite, or fool, the people. Benedict Anderson, in Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (1983),
powerfully argues that nations are ‘imagined communities’, artificially
constructed and sustained, and are not deeply rooted in history or some
‘natural’ cultural identity. Eric Hobsbawm, in Nations and Nationalism since
1780 (1990), sees nations as constructed around myths of age-old identity
and linked to capitalist economic development with the intention of
constructing an identity capable of countering the emerging class identity of
the proletariat.
Adrian Hastings, in The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion
and Nationalism (1997), has argued, however, that one can identify the devel-
opment of European nations and national identities from the early Middle
Ages. Some nations create states as expressions of political nationhood. For
Hastings three elements were especially important in the creation of
nationhood. War stimulated a sense of national identity and nationalism. The
awareness of a wider linguistic sense of identity, rather than dialect, developed
as the consequence of writing and the spread of printing. Finally, religion
was especially important. The idea of a ‘chosen’ nation comes from the
Old Testament, and kings and national priesthoods used religion to shape
national identity.
Friedrich Meinecke, in Cosmopolitanism and the Nation State (1907), distin-
guished between ‘cultural nations’ and ‘political nations’. Cultural nations are
shaped by deep historical, linguistic and ethnic ties that pre-date modern
states and may or may not generate demands for political independence. All
nations have some elements of ‘culture’ in their national identity. Examples
include the Welsh, the Germans and the Bretons. Political nations, on the other
hand, such as the UK and the USA, are bound together by political principles
such as ‘liberty’, ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘the rule of law’. Such principles can
come into conflict with other loyalties engendered by ‘cultural’ national
identity. Citizens often find cultural national identity more attractive than
political national identity.
Ernest Gellner, in Nations and Nationalism (1983), believes that a sense of
belonging to a nation, in the cultural sense, is not enough. Nationhood, to
have meaning, must be closely associated with the desire for self-government
and the creation of state to express that desire.
Thus ‘nation’ defies a clear definition. Below are some features associated with
the nation, identifying both cultural and political aspects of nationhood:
• nation and state;
• race and nation;
• language and the nation;
• religion and national identity;
• government and nation;
• common historical and cultural ties;
• a sense of ‘nationhood’.
Nation and state

Although the term ‘nation-state’ is a popular one in political science it is one
which does not easily help define the concept of the nation. It implies that the
vast majority of the population of a territory feels itself as part of a nation and
recognises the state as the sovereign power. Indeed, since the concept of
‘national self-determination’ was announced in 1919 at the Versailles Peace
Conference the creation of ‘nation-states’, as an expression of national identity,
has been seen as a political ideal and a desirable objective.
In reality very few ‘nation-states’ can be identified in any clear sense of the
term. One might claim Turkey, Thailand, Japan or Sweden, Denmark, Finland
and Norway as constituting examples of this species. But even these might be
subject to such qualifications as to cast doubt on the validity of the concept. If
one talks of Turkey as a nation-state, for example, then one must ignore the
presence of Kurdish, Armenian and other ‘national’ minorities. The same is
true of Belgium, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, South Africa and India. All these
‘nation-states’ have ‘national’ minorities of various sizes that challenge the
actuality of the idea. The political reality is far more complicated, especially as
national self-determination can generate dangerous political tensions within a
state, potentially leading to its demise.
Most states are in fact multi-national. The United Kingdom, for example, is a
multi-national state, consisting of four or five identifiable nations. Attempts to
create a ‘British’ nation and national identity since, say, the union of the
English and Scottish crowns in 1603, the union of Scottish and English parlia-
ments in 1707, or the union with Ireland in 1801, have at best been only
The nation 41
partially successful. Most people within the UK would perceive their national
identity as English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish or else some other national or ethnic
identity first and British second. Only Loyalists in Northern Ireland define
their national identity as solely ‘British’.
One needs to distinguish between ‘nationality’ as an emotional tie with other
people of the same ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ as a legal status which may or may
not involve a deep emotional identification. Many people have ‘British’ nation-
ality in the legal sense, but little commitment to British nationality in an
emotional sense. The concept of ‘citizenship nationality’ is often seen as a
means by which migrants to the UK can be integrated into national life without
giving up their sense of national cultural identity. The concept of legal nation-
ality is often the basis of a strong sense of emotional national identity. For
example, the United States has clearly been very successful in encouraging its
citizens, many being recent migrants or the children of recent migrants, to
develop a strong sense of being ‘American’ in both legal and emotional terms. At
the same time they maintain their sense of ethnic national identity as ‘African-
Americans’, ‘Polish-Americans’, ‘Jewish-Americans’, ‘Italian-Americans’, ‘Irish-
Americans’, and so on.
Many nations, however, are spread over two or more states, as in the case of
Koreans, Chinese, Hungarians, Irish, Kurds and Russians. Some of these states
may constitute national majorities; in many the nation is a minority, often
perceiving itself to be an ‘oppressed’ national minority. Following the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union in 1991 an estimated 25 million Russians now live
as minorities, often sizeable ones, in new states outside Russia. In some of
these states Russians, once associated with the dominant ‘imperial’ nation,
have been subject to discrimination in jobs, education and civil rights. Such
national minorities will often appeal to their co-nationals across a state
frontier for help, sometimes with dangerous political consequences.
In some cases a nation has no state, not even one which it can share with other
nations. Kurds, Armenians, Palestinians all see their national identity as being
oppressed, or at least unable to be fully expressed because of the lack of a
state. Indeed, it was an article of liberal nationalism in the nineteenth century,
and modern nationalism since, that one of the major causes of conflict in the
world was the failure of many nations to have a state of their own. Once this
was achieved, war, arising from frustrated national identities, would become
a thing of the past.
The reality has often been the creation of states that are either too small
to be viable economic and political units, or themselves contain disgruntled
national minorities that demand further devolution of power, thus weakening
the ability of the government to achieve other desirable goals. Oppressive as
multi-national states and empires often are, they do ‘stop the natives from
killing each other’ and create a degree of order over large geographical areas.
In some parts of the world there is no relationship between state and nation.
This is especially so in Africa, where the great powers in the late nineteenth
century drew the borders of their colonies, and where ‘spheres of influence’
bore no relation to tribal, linguistic or other deeply rooted social groupings.
Western-educated local elites, using Western concepts of the nation, agitated
for national independence from the former colonial powers, and sought to
create modern nations after leaving a colonial empire. However, they faced
considerable difficulties in attempting to overlay, or even replace, traditional
and age-old social groupings with stronger emotional ties to the population at
large than the ‘foreign’ concept of the nation. In many cases this led to consid-
erable social tension and, in Biafra, Ethiopia, Katanga, Sudan, Chad, Uganda
and elsewhere, violent conflict. However, it is worth noting that, in Africa at
least, the very weakness of national identities alternative to the ‘national
identity’ associated with the state has ensured that almost all of these states
have retained the state frontiers acquired at independence, contrary to
widespread fears at the time. One might award much of the credit for this to
the role of the state in ‘nation-building’.
It is not just in the developing world that the state has played a crucial role in
nation-building. A distinction is often made between ‘old’ nations and ‘new’
nations. In Europe, or in societies derived from European culture, nations are
somehow ‘natural’ and deeply rooted in ethnic, linguistic or other identity.
‘New’ nations, usually in Africa and Asia, were ‘artificially’ created by elites,
often somewhat detached from the mass of the population. Here colonial
masters imposed the state before a nation existed and the creation of a
‘national’ identity was, and is, extremely difficult. In Nigeria, for example,
there are four main and 245 smaller ethnic groups, and considerable religious,
linguistic and regional differences between them.
States thus play a vital role in both old and new nations in creating national
identity. ‘National’ symbols are usually state symbols: flags, anthems, uniforms.
The state plays a crucial role in attempting to create a sense of national identity
by its educational system, inculcating new generations of citizens with national
history, national heroes, national identity and national achievements. It may
often identify a national language as the one that all members of the ‘nation’
should be fluent in. Conscription into the armed forces of the state is often seen
as a very important vehicle for encouraging a sense of national identity. This
was often used, and still is, as a major justification for the retention of
compulsory military service. Indeed, it may even take a civil war to ensure
compulsory membership of the nation for disaffected sections of its population
(for example, the American Civil War).
Although the state and nation are not the same thing they do play a very
important role in shaping one another’s identity. Nevertheless, there are many
other elements involved in the concept of the nation.
The nation 43
Race and nation

During the nineteenth century ‘race’ and ‘nation’ were terms used inter-
changeably. ‘Races’ peopled Europe: the British race, the German race, the
Slav race(s), and so on. Race and nation became so intertwined that they were
often used to mean the same thing. Indeed, international politics became, as
a consequence of the misapplication of the evolutionary theories of Charles
Darwin, a struggle for supremacy and survival among nations. Weak nations
were doomed, as ‘a law of nature’, to come under the thrall of the most
powerful nations.
However powerful such theories were, especially by the end of the nineteenth
century, they are largely discredited today – except on the fringes of right-wing
politics. Science and politics have discredited race-based ideas of national
identity.
Science, especially genetics, has demonstrated that human beings form one
species (homo sapiens sapiens) and race consists of a set of superficial biological
characteristics, (skin colour, hair-type, eye colour) that bears no relationship to
cultural characteristics, which are learnt, such as national identity.
Twentieth-century politics saw many bloody conflicts, both international and
civil, fought around racial and ethnic identity. In particular, the racial theories
of Nazi Germany contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War and
were responsible for the mass murder of ethnic groups identified as racially
‘inferior’ or a threat to ‘superior’ races. As a consequence of such theories
millions of Gypsies, Slavs and, especially, Jews were killed.
Although patently responsible for the bloody nature of conflicts in Bosnia and
Kosovo in the 1990s the link between race and nation cannot be sustained in
general. Yes, certain biological characteristics are often associated with
particular nations. Most Swedes are blond, Italians tend to have darker skins,
most Nigerians are black, but these characteristics are shared with peoples
who have different national identity. On the other hand, Americans as a nation
present themselves with great diversity without claiming race as a defining
feature of American national identity.
Language and the nation

Language is often seized on as being related to national identity. A language
expresses the particular experience of a people that constitute a nation. Its
words and structure are shaped by and in turn shape the nation. A language
carries cultural forms and ideas, expressing national identity. One can hardly
imagine English national identity without reference to the impact that the
language has had upon it through its literature, especially the works of
Shakespeare and Dickens.
Within the British Isles English was spread as the language of social
advancement in the nineteenth century to the detriment – and denigration – of
Welsh, Scots Gaelic and Irish. Indeed, the survival of Welsh, Scots Gaelic and
Irish Gaelic has become a cause championed by nationalists struggling against
English imperialism. Even so, English remains the dominant language spoken
in those countries and the Welsh, Scottish and Irish have used the English
language to great effect to express aspects of their own national identity.
Nevertheless, while language expresses the cultural identity of a nation it
cannot be seen as the same thing as the nation. English is spoken by millions
of people in many countries. They may share the language, but would not
claim their national identity to be English. Indeed, English (and, for that
matter, Spanish, Portuguese and other European languages that are now
spoken around the globe as a consequence of European colonial expansion)
has developed words and expressions that reflect the experience of the popula-
tions of the ‘new’ nations.
Most nations are, in fact, multi-lingual. Belgium is a small nation deeply
divided by language and culture, yet Belgians would not see themselves as
French or Dutch. The Swiss have a very strong sense of national identity, yet
they have three distinct languages in their country. India has dozens of
languages, and this is a factor in inter-communal strife, yet there is still a
strong sense of Indian national identity.
Religion and national identity

Religion is a factor that has played a very important role in the formation of
national identity, but one with a mixed relevance today.
Most modern nations in Europe developed out of the collapse of a united
Christendom during the early sixteenth century. Prior to that kings and princes
fought to establish a degree of independence against the universalist claims of
the church. The Protestant Reformation was seized upon by many princes and
kings as a means of reinforcing their sovereignty against the papacy. Catholic
monarchs at the same time sought to strengthen their political independence
of the papacy. The ‘Divine Right of Kings’, the right to rule being derived from
God and not the people, was a doctrine appealing to both Protestant and
Catholic monarchs. In fact, adherence to the religious views of the state
became a test of loyalty. Individual conscience may have been claimed as a
guide for individual Protestants but Protestant states were no more willing to
allow freedom of conscience in practice than the Catholic church and Catholic
monarchs were.
All across Europe religious identity became closely allied to national identity
and was reinforced by the power of the state. English, Welsh and Scottish
The nation 45
nationhood was closely linked to particular forms of Protestantism developed

in their countries. Dutch and Scandinavian national identity was linked to
various Protestant churches. Catholicism is closely associated with Italian,
Spanish, Portuguese, Croatian, French and Polish national identity, while
Russian, Serbian and Greek nationhood is still shaped by Orthodox Christianity.
Religious affiliation was also linked to national identity in the ‘new’ nations
born of European colonial empires. Thus Catholicism is the dominant form of
Christianity among the nations of Central and South America, the Philippines
and the French population of Quebec. Protestantism has played a key role in
creating American identity.
However, the growth of the concept of the sovereignty of the people, first
effectively aired by the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth
century, was strengthened by the rise of nationalism, the love of the nation, as
the new secular ‘god’ for the people. To man’s insignificance before God was
now added obeisance towards the nation. Nationalism became, for many, a
form of secular religion, with its own heroes, martyrs, worship, creed, and so
on. The twentieth century was to witness nationalist wars comparable in
destructiveness to the wars of religion in the seventeenth century.
Religion is not integral to national identity solely within the Christian world.
Japan with Shintoism, India with Hinduism, Israel with Judaism, Pakistan
with Islam, and many other nations are closely identified with religions.
Religious beliefs are an essential element in shaping a sense of belonging to a
nation for many, probably most, peoples on earth.
Modern nations are multi-religious, even if there is a dominant religion, or
they are largely secular. While religious affiliation has an impact on
nationhood and identity, one must remember that religions are usually shared
across national frontiers. Indeed, religions tend to develop national character-
istics. Polish Catholicism, for example, is distinctively Polish. Irish and Italian
Catholicism very much reflect aspects of their respective national cultures.
However, religion is only one feature, albeit an important one, in creating a
nation.
Government and nation

Government as an element in influencing national identity is linked to a
concept known as ‘political nationalism’. National identity, according to
political nationalism, is essentially a civic and legal concept that as a conse-
quence does not necessarily stimulate among its citizens deep emotional
commitment to the nation concerned. People may choose to join a nation and
take on its citizenship without feeling deeply emotionally attached to their
new country.
Nations are often created by particular systems of government, not only, as we

have seen, in the conscious creation of a sense of national identity, but they
also become closely identified with particular systems of government.
American national identity is closely associated with the United States Consti-
tution and liberal democracy. The British, when they think about it at all, see
parliamentary democracy as an expression of their national development over
the centuries. By the twentieth century nationality in such countries was
associated with citizenship, regardless of the people’s country of origin or any
‘blood ties’. Nationality in this sense became a symbol of a new cultural
identity which was shared with or replaced other, older, national identities.
In Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, nationality was linked to
communal groups, based on religion or language, identified as such by the
government and with legal political and social status. Often these groups
enjoyed a considerable degree of self-government, such as the Jews and Finns
had in Imperial Russia, but at the same time they were denied equal
citizenship rights and equal legal status before the courts.
The experience of history and the effectiveness of particular types of
government system affect the sense of national identity. We have already
mentioned the American and British experiences. Russian nationhood has
been moulded by experience of strong, powerful, autocratic governments
under the tsars and, later, communism as a means of defending the nation
against powerful external enemies that threaten the long national frontiers.
National existence depends heavily upon the conditions of power, or lack of it,
and political circumstances existing both internally and internationally. Strong
governments are better able to strengthen the nation at home and defend its
interests abroad. The success or otherwise of a government in achieving its
domestic and foreign goals will affect its legitimacy and, as a consequence, the
strength and effectiveness of the sense of national identity.
Common historical and cultural ties

Often connected with the idea of ‘cultural nationalism’ is the idea that a nation
exists because of a shared historical and cultural experience that is different
from that of other nations. Anthony Smith, in The Ethnic Origins of Nations
(1986), identifies a link between ethnic communities and modern nations,
having deep roots in language and history and pre-dating modern political
structures. To a great extent this form of nationalism assumes that one can only
be born into the nation, and cannot join it. It is often closely associated with the
idea that there are deep ‘blood ties’ between members of an ethnic community.
War has been a major historical element in the creation of modern nations:
wars for the expansion of powerful nations, wars for defence, wars to ensure
The nation 47
the survival of a nation, wars for national liberation. Indeed, it is difficult to

find a nation that has not been, in some sense, created and shaped by its
experience of war – either as victor or as defeated contestant. English, and
later British, nationhood was forged by centuries of war with the French.
American identity was forged in the War of Independence. Israel, India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam are just a few modern nations created or
shaped by the experience of war.
The cultural concept of the nation can be traced back to the writings of the
eighteenth-century German philosopher-poet Johann Gottfried Herder,
challenging the Enlightenment, rationality, the consequences of the industrial
revolution and, especially, the cultural domination of France among the
German elite. He conceived the nation in terms
of the Volk, a term difficult to translate into Enlightenment
English. ‘People’, the usual translation, is too An intellectual movement that
narrow. The Volk is a vehicle of culture, language, began in the late seventeenth
century and reached its height
heritage, historical experience, a Volksgeist
in the eighteenth. It exalted rea-
(‘national spirit’) shared by a particular people – son and challenged the reli-
nation – and develops its special genius. Johann gious and political status quo.
Fichte, writing about the same time as Herder, The Enlightenment is credited
with forming the intellectual
declared that Germany’s unique culture could underpinning of the French
only be defended and enhanced by the political Revolution.
unification of the German people.
This view of nationhood became very influential during the nineteenth
century, both in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. In Italy Guiseppe Mazzini
adapted the concept to the nationalist cause, and gave it a liberal ‘spin’. He
believed that once each nation had its own government there would be peace,
both internally and internationally. However, this historical and cultural
concept is usually associated with the bitter competitive nationalisms of the
late nineteenth century and, especially, Nazism in the 1920s and 1930s. There
are modern versions of such views, often connected with far-right and extreme
nationalist groups who think they are fighting ‘globalisation’ and the effects of
‘globalised’ culture, which are undermining ‘authentic’ national identity.
A ‘sense of nationhood’
Although it might seem rather circular, a nation is best defined as a group of
people who believe themselves to constitute a nation, have things in common
with each other and share a sense of nationhood. The nation can be defined
as an ‘imagined community’ where people believe themselves to have some
sort of link, or commitment, to others in the nation, most of whom they
will never meet. The imagined community also extends into the past.
Members of a nation identify with people who lived centuries before and were
of the same nation. These other people ‘belong’ to each other by having the
same birthplace, and having membership of the same national ‘family’.

Indeed, the very term has its roots in the Latin nasci, ‘to be born’, and can be
seen when expressed in the terms ‘Motherland’ or ‘Fatherland’. Germans talk
of their ‘Fatherland’, Russians of their ‘Motherland’ and the British, cosily and
curiously, of their ‘Homeland’.
A sense of nationhood is clearly associated with loyalty to the nation, the
largest political community from which people will accept a claim over all
other forms of social loyalty. Betrayal of one’s nation is still regarded as one of
the greatest crimes, putting at risk one’s fellow national members.
Britain and the ‘British’ nations

The United Kingdom has great difficulty in being identified as a ‘nation-state’.
For most of its people there are two competing ‘national’ identities: ‘British’,
associated with the UK, and ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Scottish’, and in Northern
Ireland ‘Loyalist British’ and ‘Irish’. We will look at these in turn.
Britain
Britain has an image of being an ancient nation, with its national flag, national
anthem, and national governing and other institutions, but in recent years it
has been under challenge by other identities. The problem with British
nationhood, as with all nations, arises out of its history.
British national identity is closely linked with English national identity and the
English national experience. ‘British’ and ‘English’ are often used inter-
changeably by foreigners and by the English themselves (a mistake rarely
made by people of the other British nations). This indicates a sense of union
of the two national identities in a way that no member of the ‘Celtic fringe’ (as
compared with the English ‘centre’) would make.
The creation of the United Kingdom is very much the result of England being
the dominant power within the British Isles. It has for centuries been the
wealthiest country, the most powerful government, and the largest population
in these islands. It took centuries of war in Wales and Ireland, and war and
economic leverage in Scotland, to establish political union. But it was English
power that brought about this union.
After the union of the Scottish and English crowns in 1603, King James I of
England (and VI of Scotland) frequently used the term ‘British’ to describe his
new realm. After the union of the English and Scottish parliaments in 1707 the
terms ‘British’ and ‘British nation’ became increasingly accepted by most
people in the Protestant nations of England, Scotland and Wales, and the
Protestant ‘British’ of Ireland; but never so by the Catholic Irish to the same
The nation 49
degree. Nevertheless, ‘British’ and ‘Britishness’ were useful notions for uniting
the peoples of the British Isles, who then directed their aggression overseas
and created the British Empire. With the development of ‘popular’ imperi-
alism, associated with the rise of mass democracy, in the late nineteenth
century this British national identity established itself as dominant for the
peoples of the UK. The wars of the following century strengthened this British
national identity, but this configuration did not remain static.
Twenty years after the Second World War almost all the empire had gone. In
1997 Hong Kong was returned to China and the empire was finally laid to rest.
Long before then, the strengthening national identities of the constituent
nations of Britain were threatening the UK itself.
Nevertheless, one might say there is much life left in the idea of a British
national identity. Citizenship is still ‘British’. No ‘English’, ‘Scottish’ or ‘Welsh’
national identity exists in domestic or international law. Many – perhaps a
majority of – non-white citizens see ‘British’ as a valuable form of national
identity, along civic national lines. English, Scottish and Welsh still have strong
ethnic/cultural national connotations. ‘Britishness’, for ‘Black-Britons’, ‘Asian-
Britons’, and ‘Chinese-Britons’, may be an intermediate stage before their
ultimate national integration as English, Welsh or Scottish.
‘Britishness’ was created by 250 years of near permanent war with other great
powers and within the empire. The UK state was a very effective tool for
the potential military power of the British nations. The recent conflicts in the
Falklands (1982) and the Gulf (1990–91), and the ‘war against terrorism’
in Afghanistan and elsewhere, may well strengthen the British sense of
national identity.
England
The close identification of ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ often means that insufficient
attention is given to English national identity and its distinctiveness from the
other nations that constitute Britain.
English nationhood has been shaped by war. Battles and wars of the fifth and
sixth centuries determined the very territory of England. The English–Welsh
frontier was established long before King Offa of Mercia built his Dyke in the
eighth century. The frontier of Scotland moved backwards and forwards for
centuries until Elizabeth I’s time. Both the Welsh and Scottish borderlands
were for centuries wild and violent frontier zones.
Strong regional identities, having deep roots, still exist in this most centralised
of nations. Yet England has had a strong centralised state, and with it a
concept of national identity, for well over a thousand years. The Norman
Conquest took over a very effective state structure and by the thirteenth
century the Normans and Saxons had fused into an English national identity.
This national identity survived civil wars and was greatly strengthened by
Tudor monarchs during the sixteenth century and the civil wars and political
upheavals of the seventeenth century.
England was shaped by many social develop-
secular society
ments, especially by being the earliest industri-
A society where religion has no
alised nation and an old urbanised nation. There privileged position and is con-
are strong strains of political liberalism and social fined to what is presumed to
conservatism running through English culture. be its rightful non-privileged
sphere, as in the United States.
The Protestantism of the majority of its Whereas a ‘theocratic state’ is
population, the Catholicism of a large minority of one in which a particular reli-
its people, and its religious toleration all have had gion has a special and privi-
leged position, such as Saudi
a profound influence on the development of
Arabia and Iran.
England. Modern England is, however, a highly
secular society.
Immigration and emigration has for centuries moulded English national

identity. Empire, economics, politics and overseas colonies encouraged the
English to travel and settle widely. These same historical forces were respon-
sible for waves of non- British immigrants over centuries: Jews, Dutch,
Germans, Italians, Poles, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Africans, South Asians and
Chinese are only some of the major populations that settled in English cities.
England is by far the most multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious of
the nations of the British Isles.
Some people, especially the English, think there is no such thing as English
nationalism. However, many of England’s Celtic neighbours think there is,
and, moreover, that English nationalism has for centuries oppressed the
Welsh, Scots and Irish. Conversely, some English people believe that England
actually subsidises Wales and Scotland, for example through over-generous
central government grants paid for by English taxpayers.
Scotland
Scottish identity has been shaped by war, especially against the English; deep
regional divisions between Highland and Lowland Scots; religious conflicts
between Protestant and Catholic, Presbyterian and Anglican; and rivalries
between Glasgow and Edinburgh.
Scotland retained its independence as a consequence of the wars of Robert the
Bruce at the start of the fourteenth century. Although Scotland was frequently
at war with England over the following two centuries, the English and Scottish
crowns were united in 1603 with James VI of Scotland succeeding Elizabeth
as James I of England. Nevertheless, Scotland saw little of its Stuart kings
and, although playing a crucial role in the mid-seventeenth-century civil wars,
The nation 51
it retained its own parliament until 1707, when it merged with the
Westminster Parliament.
The Act of Union was bitterly resented by many Scots as ending national
independence. The accession of the Hanoverians to the British throne in 1714
ended any possibility of peaceful restoration of the Stuart monarchy. The British
government, with much Scottish support, crushed Highland rebellions in 1715
and 1745. Emigration from Scotland to England and overseas became a feature
of the Scottish national experience. For two hundred years Scots participated in
empire-building and the industrial revolution, and in British politics. Scotland
retained distinct national institutions: its own legal system, church, local
government and education systems; and its banks issued its own paper
currency. Few travelling in Scotland for any length of time could be in any doubt
that they have entered a country with distinct national characteristics.
By the 1960s the decline of once prosperous Scottish industries – coal, steel,
shipbuilding, heavy engineering – and rising unemployment, combined with
the discovery of oil, ‘Scotland’s oil’, as nationalists declared it, stimulated
demands for greater self-government by the Scottish National Party (SNP).
The SNP, founded in 1934, argued that the major political parties and the
Westminster Parliament or the British government did not adequately serve
Scotland. Many SNP supporters came from cultural nationalist movements
seeking to protect the Gaelic language, Scottish culture and a distinct national
identity. The majority, however, came from the Scottish socialist tradition and
believed that a progressive, just society could not be created by a Westminster
dominated by the English, who often, too often, returned Conservative
governments.
The economic crises of the 1970s particularly hit Scotland, with its heavy
reliance on declining industries for employment and wealth. The Conservative
governments of the 1980s and 1990s, with their electoral roots in England,
were regarded as governing Scotland with little legitimacy. Scottish Tories
became a very rare political species as national economic policies seemed
to be particularly damaging to Scotland. Tory attacks on public housing
and public spending particularly hurt Scotland, which had high levels of
public-sector employment and was heavily dependent on state support. The
introduction of the poll tax in Scotland a year earlier than in England was
signally stimulating to Scottish grievances against an ‘English’ Conservative
government.
In the 1990s strong economic growth in Scotland centred on the new IT and
service sectors, and the importance of oil to the Scottish economy declined.
There was a strong revival of a confident, distinct Scottish cultural identity, as
displayed in music, literature and the arts, instead of in the widely derided
‘tartan’ identity of kilts, bagpipes, Bonnie Prince Charlie, and so on. Demands
for a Scottish parliament to reflect this identity grew. The Conservative Party
resisted these demands but Labour and the Liberal Democrats support the
implementation of devolution for Scotland. The SNP was somewhat dubious
about the merits of a devolved parliament when they argued for an
independent Scotland.
In 1997 the Labour Party returned to power with a ‘landslide’ victory,
involving the eradication of Scottish Tory MPs and a strong Scottish presence
among leading members of the government. Proposals for a devolved
parliament with tax-raising powers were approved by a referendum in 1998
and enacted into law. The first Scottish parliament in nearly three hundred
years was elected in 1999 and began work with a joint Labour–Liberal
Democrat coalition government.
It was clear that the Scottish Parliament would seek to introduce measures
reflecting the more left-wing Scottish political culture rather than the
Westminster Labour government. Tuition fees were removed for Scottish
university students, and higher levels of financial support for the elderly in care
homes and greater levels of health and education spending were introduced.
Whether such forms of self-government will for long satisfy Scottish national
identity remains to be seen. Pressures are growing for more powers to be trans-
ferred to the Scottish Parliament. The SNP continues to argue that only full
independence from the UK and membership of the EU will properly allow
Scottish nationhood to be fully expressed. This seems unlikely at present. But
one may envisage problems with a Labour–Liberal Democrat Scottish
government and a Conservative Westminster government at some future time.
Wales
Welsh identity, even more than Scottish, has been influenced by military
resistance to English domination. Political disunity and relative weakness in
medieval Wales encouraged English monarchs to intervene. Centuries of
warfare, celebrated in Welsh literature and evidenced by dozens of castles and
strongholds, ultimately ended with political union with England and, with the
Tudors, the ‘Welsh’ acquisition of the monarchy in 1485. Since then Wales and
the Welsh have played a major, often crucial, role in ‘English’ history.
Welsh political independence ended centuries ago. Welsh cultural nation-
alism, however, has been at the core of its identity. One element has been its
nonconformist Christian tradition. Also important is the Welsh language. This
was a language in decline during the nineteenth century and most of the
twentieth. English became the language of the Welsh elite. The industriali-
sation of South Wales disrupted ancient ways of life and sucked in non-Welsh
The nation 53
speakers from England and Scotland. Welsh people emigrated to England and
overseas. Finally, there was a systematic attempt by the authorities to destroy
Welsh as a language of education and government.
Welsh nationalism finds political expression in Plaid Cymru, which was
founded in 1925 and which sought rather to defend Welsh culture than seek
Welsh independence. Some Welsh activists believed this programme to be too
tame. Some thought radical action was needed to defend the language in
order to challenge the growth of English-owned second homes and their
impact on Welsh culture and house prices; and to push for economic aid to
offset the decline of farming, steel, coal and engineering in Wales. A few
planted bombs, burnt English second homes and defaced English on road
signs, but the defence of Welsh national identity was overwhelmingly peaceful
and parliamentary.
By the end of the twentieth century Welsh was no longer in decline and was
officially supported in education, government and the media. New industries
had been attracted to Wales by UK regional aid programmes and the EU.
Nevertheless, Wales remained a nation divided by language and geography.
Transport links tend to run from England into Wales, rather than to connect
areas within the country, and Welsh remained largely confined to its heart-
lands in the north and west.
Wales, partly as a consequence of long integration into English politics, has
been lukewarm about devolution. The 1979 referendum on devolution
returned a ‘No’ vote. Conservative policies in Wales during the 1980s and
1990s combined simultaneously the run-down of traditional industries
and considerable regional aid, as well as support for the Welsh language
and culture.
In 1997, however, the Conservative Party was eliminated from Wales in the
general election, while the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru parties
were all committed to devolution. However, both in the 1998 referendum and
the 1999 elections to the Welsh Assembly turnout was low and interest hard
to stimulate, especially as the assembly has no tax-raising powers. After some
initial teething problems, most notably over the degree of influence the
national Labour Party should have over the leadership of the Welsh Party, the
assembly is becoming an effective expansion of Welsh national identity within
the UK and the EU.
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland is a very peculiar part of the UK in terms of national identity.
One might perceive three ‘national identities’ here: ‘British’, ‘Irish’ and
‘Northern Irish’.
‘British’ is the legal national identity available to all citizens in Northern

Ireland. However, for the Protestant population of the province, the descen-
dants of Scottish and English settlers of the early seventeenth century, this is
their sole national identity. These people were intended as the rulers of
Ireland, a distinct minority defined by their religion and political power, in a
largely hostile country. Seething resentment and occasional revolt by the Irish
encouraged a ‘siege’ mentality among these British (sometimes identified also
as ‘Unionists’ or ‘Loyalists’).
Having once dominated the Irish Parliament until its abolition in 1801,
Unionists were hostile to Irish Home Rule as a wider franchise would result in
a permanent parliamentary majority for the Catholic Irish. By this time the
concept of ‘Loyalism’ was a feature of Northern Irish ‘British’ identity. This
meant loyalty to the British Crown, their British identity, and the Protestant
religion, celebrating the Battle of the Boyne (1690) and other landmarks of
Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. By 1910, and the Third Irish Home Rule Bill,
Loyalists had armed themselves to resist both the Catholic Irish and the British
government with the rallying cry, ‘Home Rule is Rome Rule’.
The First World War put Home Rule on hold. But by 1919 the issue had
reappeared with a vengeance. An Irish revolt in 1916, and its brutal
suppression by the British, produced a majority of Irish MPs for Sinn Fein in
the post-war election who refused to go to Westminster and promptly declared
an Irish Republic. The subsequent Anglo-Irish War lasted until 1921, when the
British Government and the Irish ‘government’ agreed to the partition of the
island into a twenty-six-county Free State and a six-county Northern Ireland
remaining within the UK, but with its own
‘devolved’ government at Stormont Castle. partition
The division of a nation or state
For sixty years Stormont was an expression of into two or more parts, such as
British/Unionist rule in Ireland and Loyalist Poland in the eighteenth centu-
ry, and Ireland, Korea and
national identity. Having lost control of Ireland, Cyprus in the twentieth.
Loyalists determined not to lose ‘Ulster’, as they
called the province. Vote-rigging, gerrymandering, job and housing discrimi-
nation and Loyalist violence were all used to oppress Catholics and ensure
their own community was kept voting for Unionist politicians.
By the late 1960s this policy of control was breaking down into sectarian
violence arising out of conflicting national identities. By 1972 the situation
had reached such a pass that the UK government ended Stormont and intro-
duced Direct Rule. Attempts at a new devolved parliament, involving power-
sharing between Catholic and Protestant politicians, broke down in 1974, in
the face of Loyalist intransigence, and are at present by no means certain of
success as the Northern Ireland Assembly struggles with the competing
national identities of the population.
The nation 55
For many Protestants, British governments over the last thirty years have been
seeking to accommodate the Irish population in the North and the Republic
at their own expense. Every concession to Catholics is perceived by Loyalists
as a threat to the British national identity of the majority population. Restric-
tions on Loyalist marches (a celebration of their identity), changes in the
police service (traditionally dominated by Protestants), and Sinn Fein
ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive (men associated with Republican
terrorism) are seen as part of a long process of pushing the ‘British’ people of
Northern Ireland into some form of Catholic-dominated political system and,
thereby, a betrayal of their services to the Crown and Protestantism over the
past four centuries.
Irish national identity is largely, but not entirely, Catholic and Celtic, and
shaped by centuries of struggle against English, British and ‘Loyalist’
domination and oppression in Ireland.
English and, later, British imperialism in Ireland began in the late twelfth
century with Edward I. The Elizabethan and Cromwellian conquests of the late
sixteenth century and the 1650s left bitter memories for Irish nationalists.
Revolt in the 1790s, the Fenians in the nineteenth century and the Easter Rising
in 1916 are part of a revolutionary tradition in Irish nationalism which believes
the British will only leave Ireland when forced out. Only then might Loyalists
identify themselves as ‘Irishmen’. Failure and defeat only provided another set
of nationalist myths and martyrs for the next round of struggle against the
British. Running in tandem with this violent struggle for Irish national
independence was the parliamentary strain of Land Reform, Home Rule, and
cultural renaissance throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
This struggle did not cease with Partition, but has continued, sometimes
violent, sometimes peaceful, but always facing the power of the British state
and the ‘British’ rulers of Northern Ireland. Partition was declared an
‘unnatural division of the island’; a united Ireland is the ultimate expression of
Irish national identity for both Catholics and Protestants.
One problem with the aspiration to a united Ireland is that the British and Irish
identities in Northern Ireland have less and less in common with those of the
Republic and Great Britain. Both are active participants in the EU, a project
designed in part to reduce national antagonisms and national identities, and
both are modern, secular, prosperous liberal democracies, to which the sectarian
nationalism of Northern Ireland appears archaic, socially divisive, oppressive,
unsuccessful, repulsive and a drag on economic and social development.
One might perceive Northern Ireland as a ‘proto-nation’, not quite Irish and not
quite British but having a national, cultural and political identity of its own
deriving from its unique history. Eighty years of the Northern Ireland state have
created a social and political environment in which Catholics and Protestants,

Irish and British, have more in common with each other and less with the
Republic of Ireland and Britain. If this is the case, then Northern Ireland requires
unique political and social institutions to reflect this ‘proto-nationhood’. Perhaps
that is why the Good Friday Agreements have, with all their problems and
tensions, come closest to a political settlement in the province which satisfies at
least some of the national aspirations of Irish and British.
Some political community corresponding to the nation has existed so long in
human history that it is almost impossible to imagine that there might be any
alternative to it as a focus of identity and loyalty in the political and cultural
world. So strong is nationhood that it is relatively easy to be persuaded how
‘natural’ the division of the human race into nations is.
Nations and national identity are constantly in flux as social and economic
forces work on human societies. However, seemingly strong nations have
disappeared during the last century. New nations have appeared, with similar
very high levels of identity and emotional resonance for their people. One can
see that, however powerful the idea of the nation might be, however likely to
continue as a defining feature of human political activity, the particular nation
with which people will identify is likely to change considerably during the
coming century. Nations in some form are here to stay, although one might
question whether the nations of today will exist in their present form by the
twenty-second century.
Summary
Perhaps the most powerful of all political concepts to motivate human beings
is that of the ‘nation’. But the concept is an elusive one. While the ‘nation-state’
is a term commonly used, many ‘nations’ do not have states, and there are
states comprised of many nations. Important elements in national identity
include language, religion, government and common historical and cultural
ties. There are enormous differences, however, in the significance of these
factors from nation to nation. Perhaps the most useful way of defining a nation
is a subjective one. A nation is what its members feel it is, and they are
identified by their deep loyalty to it. Britain illustrates the difficulty of identi-
fication of the ‘nation’. Historically and to a degree culturally it is composed of
at least three nations: England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland further
complicates matters by being arguably composed of two nations, Irish and
British. Moreover, these two nations are themselves not entirely clear about
what precisely their individual national identity is.
The nation 57
1 M. Parris, ‘An off-the-peg identity’, The Times (7 November 1998).
Alter, P. Nationalism (Edward Arnold, 1989).

Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and
Spread of Nationalism (NLB/Verso, 1983).
Deutsch, K. Nationalism and Social Communication (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1953).
‘Nations and their Past: The Uses and Abuses of History’, Economist (21 December
1996), pp. 53–6.
Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell, 1983).
Hastings, A. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism
(Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Heywood, A. ‘Nationalism’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction
(Macmillan, 1994), pp. 152–85.
Heywood, A. ‘Nations and Nationalism’, in A. Heywood, POLITICS (Macmillan, 1997), pp.
103–19.
Hobsbawm, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge University Press,
1990).
Jay, R. ‘Nationalism’, in Robert Eccleshall et al., Political Ideologies: An Introduction
(Routledge, 1994), pp. 153–84.
Kedourie, E. Nationalism (Hutchinson, 1985).
Purnell, R. ‘The Notion of the Nation: Some Images and Myths’, in R. Purnell, The
Society of States: An Introduction to International Politics (Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1973), pp. 110–27.
Smith, A. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Blackwell, 1986).
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 To what extent is the nation the fundamental unit of human

organisation?
2 What are the main characteristics of nationhood? Do all nations

have all of these characteristics?
3 How recent is the concept of the ‘nation’?
4 How far have such developments as globalisation and the creation of supranational
entities like the European Union rendered the notion of the nation-state obsolete?
5 Is Britain a nation?
Democracy 3
Here we examine the expression ‘democracy’, and try to disentangle its value as
an objective term of analysis and its misuse as a tool of propaganda. The focus
is on ‘liberal democracy’. First the various dimensions of democracy and the
notion of democracy are considered, and the idea of democracy as ‘the
sovereign people’ governed by consent is closely examined. Then the issue of
whether there are particular conditions for the development of democracy is
investigated. Arguments for and against democracy are explored and finally
there are some reflections on the future of democracy in the twenty-first century.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Why is democracy a great ‘hurrah’ word?
➤ Have forms of democracy other than liberal democracy (such as the communist
‘people’s democracy’) any validity?
➤ To what extent does modern Britain fit Aristotle’s categories of types of government?
➤ What are the differences between ‘defensive’ and ‘citizen’ democracy, and is one
preferable to the other?
➤ To what extent are claims that in a democracy ‘the sovereign people are governed by
consent’ merely rhetorical flourishes?
➤ Are claims of the universal applicability of democracy valid?
➤ What would you identify as the main threats to democracy in the modern world?
Democracy 59
Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the

corrupt few. (George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman, 1903)
It has been said that Democracy is the worst form of government except all those
other forms that have been tried from time to time. (Sir Winston Churchill, Speech,
House of Commons, November 1947)
The difference between a Democracy and a Dictatorship is that in a Democracy you

vote first and take orders later; in a Dictatorship you don’t have to waste your time
voting. (Charles Bukowski, Erections, Ejaculations, Exhibitions and Tales of Ordinary
Madness, 1972)
Democracy is a great ‘hurrah’ word of modern times. From being associated

with mob rule at the beginning of the nineteenth century, democracy had
become the objective of every ‘civilised’ nation by its end. A century later, there
is hardly a state or regime, no matter how despotic, that does not proclaim its
devotion to ‘democracy’. Along with ‘God, Queen and country’ (in Britain), or
‘mom and apple pie’ (in the USA), ‘democracy’ is now associated with
something good and wholesome, something worth defending and, if necessary,
dying (and killing) for.
One can see that there is a problem with the term ‘democracy’. If every
political system is a ‘democracy’ then what value can be attached to the word
as an analytical tool? One must question, however, Bernard Crick’s assertion,
in his In Defence of Politics (1962), that politics primarily takes place only in
democratic systems of government. Politics can take place under any form of
governmental system, as it involves a struggle for power. Democratic political
systems involve power struggles of a kind very different from those of other
political systems, such as dictatorships and one-party states.
We identify here the main features of a democratic form of government.
Indeed, as will become apparent, underlying our discussion is an identification
of democracy with ‘liberal-democratic’ forms of government. Liberal democ-
racies are closely associated with particular forms of intellectual, cultural,
social and economic development identified and discussed below.
Liberal democracies are among the great creations of the human mind. They
establish the conditions for individual freedom and participation in
government, for freedom of speech and thought,
and, within the rule of law, the stability and order
rule of law
required for that freedom to flourish. In the great
The principle that everyone,
struggles and fearful wars of the twentieth even the ruler, is under the
century liberal democracy met the challenges authority of the law (and those
from authoritarianism and totalitarianism and who administer the law in the
courts).
ultimately triumphed.
Liberal democracies are relatively new, only appearing from the late
nineteenth century onwards. They are still in a minority among nations, albeit
the wealthiest and most powerful ones. Democratic ideas are worth studying
in some detail since they claim universal applicability.
Defining democracy
‘Democracy’ comes from Ancient Greek: demos means ‘the people’ and kratein
means ‘to rule’. Hence, demokratia, ‘democracy’, means ‘rule by the people’, as
defined in, for example, The Concise Oxford Dictionary:
democracy 1a. a system of government by the whole population, usually through
elected representatives. b. a state so governed. c. any organisation governed on
democratic principles.
Democracy can refer to popular government, or representative government, or

participation in government, or republican government, or some overlap between
some or all of these. Defining democracy may
appear to be easy, but is in fact full of problems. representative government
A political system in which the
Many forms of government are described as government is chosen by the
‘democratic’. For example, Adolf Hitler called the people (for example, by
Third Reich ‘The German democracy, which is the elections), governs on their
behalf, is accountable to them
true democracy’. Benito Mussolini described and owes its legitimacy to the
Italian Fascism as ‘the purest form of democracy’. fact that it is representative of
Communist regimes call themselves ‘people’s the people in some manner.
democracies’. Most dictatorships in the devel-
oping world claim to be ‘democratic’. Finally, our own political system is called
a ‘liberal democracy’, combining two political ‘hurrah’ words. The difference
between liberal democracies, established in Western Europe, North America
and elsewhere, and other so-called ‘democracies’ might appear so obvious as
not to need defining. Yet define it we must, if we are to have a tool with which
to analyse this particular form of government. So, then, what is ‘democracy’?
One might start by contrasting democracies with other types of government.
Democracies have a number of elements by which they might be distinguished
from non-democratic systems and ‘pseudo-democracies’ – systems that claim
to be democratic and, indeed, which apparently have some democratic
features, but lack certain fundamental elements of ‘genuine’ democracies.
Elements of democracy
A number of features of democracy can be identified:
• Democracy as a system of government. Here we can discern two forms of
democracy: ‘defensive democracy’ and ‘citizen democracy’/‘republican
democracy’;
Democracy 61
• democracy and legitimising government;

• majority rule and democracy;
• equality of citizenship rights;
• public opinion in democracies;
• the rule of law and democracy.
Democracy as a system of government

Ancient Greeks, such as Aristotle in The Politics, identified three kinds of
government, each with a corresponding ‘corrupt’ form.
● Monarchy: rule by one man, usually as the consequence of birth: the corrupt
form being tyranny.
● Aristocracy: rule by a few men, based on education, property ownership,
merit or some other quality that distinguished them from most other people:
the corrupt form being oligarchy.
● Democracy: rule by the whole people – or at least a majority: the corrupt form
being mob rule, although ‘democracy’ and ‘mob rule’ were seen as the same
thing by most thinkers.
All these political systems make decisions accepted as binding on the whole
community. Every one has a mixture of decision-making by one person, a few
or many people. Monarchs, for example, consult widely about government.
Even dictators have to take into account how far they can control the people.
Hitler’s oratorical powers facilitated his seizure of power in Germany, but also
helped him as leader to persuade, cajole and inspire the German people.
Ancient Athenian democracy involved the direct participation of all citizens in
government and is often seen as the inspiration
for modern democracies. Citizenship itself, mandate
though, was very restricted. No women, slaves or This can mean either a general
foreigners could take part, or ever hope to authority to govern conferred
on a government by an election
become citizens, in the democracy. In all political or a specific authority (and
systems, ancient and modern, there is a tendency duty) to implement a policy put
for an ‘oligarchy’ of professional administrators before the electorate in a
manifesto.
and politicians to arise. There are also always
groups – defending economic interests or
advancing particular causes – that influence government without a popular
mandate to do so.
Britain’s political system, for example, has elements of: monarchy in the power
of the prime minister; aristocracy, or its modern non-corrupt meaning of the
form oligarchy, in the domination of the political system by a few political
parties and relatively small groups of political leaders; and democracy, in its
widespread political debate and regular elections.
Consideration of the term ‘democracy’ involves identifying the degree to

which these three elements exist in a political system. A state may be called
‘democratic’ because features associated with democracy predominate, while
in ‘undemocratic’ systems they are at a minimum and anti-democratic values
predominate. However, this takes us back to the central issue: what is meant
by ‘democracy’?
One might see a political system defined as democratic by the degree to which
people can exercise effective influence on govern-
ment policy. Democracy is not just about voting suffrage
and voting rights. Most modern political systems The right to vote in public
have some form of election and legislative elections. It is now usually
defined in terms of citizenship
assembly. Even in countries that one would and age. In the nineteenth
never consider democratic – certainly not liberal century suffrage was restricted
democratic – we need to consider other factors to people on the grounds of
gender, education and property
than suffrage and elections as the basis for a ownership
democracy.
Crucially, popular opinion can influence government decisions in democracies
without votes being taken. Governments, political parties and politicians want
to win future elections and so will take notice of public opinion.
Oligarchy and monarchy still exist in ‘democratic’ states, but it is the
democratic element that is of greatest value and should be a prominent
influence in government. Thus democracy can be interpreted as a positive
description of the democratic element in government.
In ‘non-democratic’ states the democratic element may exist but popular
influence on government decision-making is kept to a minimum. Here,
democracy is interpreted negatively.
Support for or against the democratic element among a population depends
on many factors. These include emotional, personal, family or class interests,
loyalties and traditions; the national historical experience; and cultural
support for democratic principles of government. Combinations of these and
other factors may lead to a movement in favour of democracy (as in Spain
after the death of General Franco in 1975) or against democracy (as in the
German Weimar Republic during the 1920s).
Most important are economic conditions. Poor, unemployed, desperate
people are, to say the least, likely to be unenthusiastic supporters of a
democratic government presiding over their misery. (Alternatively, wealthy
societies, too, may be in danger from citizen apathy. Democracy may be
viewed as no more than a means by which to remain rich. Plump and
prosperous people resent even the time it takes to vote to ensure the survival
of their democracy.)
Democracy 63
Factors favouring or undermining democracy vary from country to country

and from time to time. There is no automatic presumption in favour of
democracy or its effortless, inevitable, spread across the globe.
Another way of identifying or classifying democratic systems of government is
outlined below.
Defensive democracy
Democracy is the means by which citizens are protected from an oppressive
state. It defends the rights of citizens and promotes liberty. Defensive
democracy sees a tension between citizens and the state, and a distinction
between public and private spheres of life. It has strong roots in liberalism.
Citizens participate in defensive democracies when they fear their rights and
freedoms are threatened by the state or a foreign power. Once the threat is
removed most citizens will not participate in democracy. In the twentieth
century democratic theory extended citizen rights to include full participation
in society. State activities expanded into areas of what had once been
considered private life, establishing health, education and welfare systems.
One might still relate this to defensive democracy. The rights to be defended
have expanded to include those of the welfare state. They still have to be
advanced and defended by democratic action and most people will only
participate when they see threats to these rights. This can be done by either
‘direct’ or ‘representative’ democracy. We will concentrate on representative
democracy here.
Modern representative democracy includes most of the things that one
associates with liberal democracy. It consists of:
A cluster of rules and obligations permitting the broadest participation by the
majority of the citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make
political decisions (that is decisions affecting the whole of the community).
This cluster includes elected government; free and fair elections in which every
citizen’s vote has an equal weight; a suffrage which embraces all citizens
irrespective of distinctions of race, religion, class, sex, and so on; freedom of
conscience, information and expression of all public matters broadly defined; the
right of all adults to oppose their government and stand for office; and associa-
tional autonomy – the right to form independent associations including social
movements, interest groups and political parties.1
Representative democracies are closely associated with constitutional arrange-

ments designed to legitimise the state and ensure that citizenship rights are
protected. They still assume greater judgement, more political intelligence,
among political leaders than among the electorate. Such democracies function
as a means of containing the dangers of a direct democracy.
Consent to govern is expressed by regular elections, which also legitimise the

actions of the government during the period between elections. Once elected,
the government has a mandate from the people to carry out policies outlined
in its manifesto. It can take whatever steps it deems necessary, within the
bounds of political accountability, to ensure the survival and success of that
society and the defence of its citizens.
The vast majority of citizens confine participation in politics to voting. Only a
tiny number are likely to join a political party. Even fewer will become party
activists, of which a tiny proportion will become a
member of the local and national political class. elite
Apathy, or at least non-involvement, is the charac- Those regarded (by themselves
teristic of modern representative democracies. and those they govern) as
They are run by elites. superior in some manner to
others. In a political sense,
Robert Michels, in Political Parties (1900), formu- those with special access to
lated an ‘iron law of oligarchy’ at play in democ- power.
racies. Small elite groups have a disproportionate

role in the running of democratic organisations. Michels and other ‘elite
theorists’, such as Max Weber in his many writings, Gaetano Mosca in The
Ruling Class (1896), and Mosei Ostrogorski in Democracy and the Organisation
of Political Parties (1902), stressed the deceptiveness of democracy. They
recognised that it was the few at the top of power structures, rather than the
many (as in democratic theory), who shaped ‘democratic’ government. Joseph
Schumpeter, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), claimed that
modern democracy is little more than a power struggle between elites. Voters
choose between ‘auctions’ of public services by oligarchic party elites. Indeed,
as others have identified, modern democracy has become so money orientated
that it corrupts the democratic process. Politicians and political parties raise
vast sums of money to fund campaigns, especially in the USA. All social
democracies have large public sectors and elections have become little more
than attempts to ‘bribe the people with their own money’, with scant mature
public debate over policies.
The complexity of modern political issues means that political representatives
must use their judgement on the basis of the evidence available to decide on
the most appropriate policies. It is simply impossible for the majority of voters
to understand policy details and reach a rational decision. Ordinary voters
have to rely on the experienced judgement of politicians. Edmund Burke, in a
speech to the electors of Bristol (1774), drew a significant distinction between
a ‘delegate’ and a ‘representative’. Delegates merely reflect the views of their
constituents in parliament, while a representative is elected to use his own
judgement. Burke clearly states that MPs should be representatives and,
indeed, could not be delegates even for the tiny electorates of an eighteenth-
century constituency.
Democracy 65
This raises the issue of whom the elected politician ‘represents’. Modern parlia-
mentary constituencies have tens of thousands of voters, large numbers of
whom did not vote for the elected representative. Members of the local party
expect their views to be listened to by the person they worked to elect. Local
businesses, trade unions, councils and other social organisations all have a
right to be represented in the House of Commons by their MP. National
pressure groups, trade unions, businesses and the national party all claim and
seek representation in the democratic forum of the nation.
Clearly, it is impossible for a politician to represent all these interests equally.
Indeed, party discipline, party loyalty and ideological compatibility will
reduce the potential for ‘representative conflict and stalemate’. The reduction
is so great, in the view of many modern democrats and elite theorists, that
representation on important issues in modern parliamentary democracies has
been replaced by party control and party instructions on how to vote and what
to think on issues. Compared with the British system, the US Congress has a
weak party system. On the one hand, this offers greater scope for politicians’
judgement; but on the other, as critics point out, they are more subject to
powerful private interests, especially when these are exacerbated by the
demands of almost constant electioneering and fundraising.
Citizen democracy/republican democracy

According to this type of democracy citizens should be active in order to
advance their rights. Very importantly, the education and character devel-
opment of the citizen is encouraged by participation in the political system. It
improves the whole of society. Citizen democracy assumes, therefore, greater
involvement than merely voting, with citizens taking an active part in the
political system. ‘Direct democracy’ is the means by which this can come about.
Direct democracy describes the citizen’s personal involvement in government.
It developed in Ancient Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries BC. It
worked quite well in a small society, consisting of no more than fifty thousand
citizens at most (and probably nearer thirty thousand). Modern states are too
large, in terms of both population and geography, for Athenian-style direct
democracy to be a feasible means of national government. Direct democracy
is limited to school governor boards, trade-union branches, town meetings in
New England, some pressure-group activity, and so on. In Switzerland,
however, there is a form of direct democracy in central government, its
twenty-six cantons and three thousand communities. Referenda can be called
for on any national law. In fact, over 450 have been held during the last 150
years and the number is rising to around ten referenda a year.
A society could still have a strong democratic culture in a citizen democracy
with representative democratic institutions. Representative democracies often
have elements of direct democracy in them. Radicals on the left want more
active participation of citizens in decision-making. Some, on both the left and
the right, believe citizens should have military training as a means of being
integrated into society and learning what their democracy means.
Many democracies allow for referenda on important issues as a form of direct
democracy. They can come from the government or be demanded by the
populace. The result may or may not be binding on government; it depends
on the constitutional rules. Just over half the US states have some form of
direct democracy. Referenda are used in Italy, Denmark, France and New
Zealand. Australia has had over fifty referenda. The UK has held referenda on
political and constitutional issues in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland,
but only one throughout the UK (concerning continued membership of the
European Union, in 1975).
The time for greater direct democracy may have come. People are better
educated, have greater access to information, and have more wealth and leisure
time than ever before. Representative systems of democracy belong to a less
democratic, less educated and less affluent age. Their constitutional systems are
increasingly viewed as museum pieces by their electorates, who become
frustrated by the lack of effective accountability of the government to the
people. Their elected representatives, to put it politely, do not seem to demon-
strate a greater level of political judgement than the people they represent.
Democracy and legitimising government

All democracies claim ‘popular sovereignty’ as providing government legit-
imacy – ‘legitimacy’ meaning ‘the moral and political right to govern and
expect to be obeyed’. Democratic government acts on behalf of the ‘people’,
who are politically ‘sovereign’. Democratic governments govern by ‘consent’.
We need at this stage to define the ‘people’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘consent’.
The people
This may describe the whole adult citizen body of the democracy, as it now
tends to be the case, or it may merely define a group with special political
privileges derived from wealth, class or education. There are many variations
on this theme, for example:
● The British consider that the people have shared traditions, shared customs,
shared history, and a sense of being part of the nation. The British people exist
independently of their state. The state is their servant, carrying out their will
as expressed through parliament. Democracy recognises the rights and
freedoms of the people and the need to keep government under some form of
control and accountability to the elected representatives of the people.
Democracy 67
● The French believe the state reflects the ‘general will’ of the people. The state
is closely linked to the identity of the people and reflects their interests. It is
part of the people and contributes to national identity. It must not oppress the
rights of the people.
● German political tradition maintains that the state reflects the people as the
nation. German national identity pre-dates the existence of the state. The state
is the machine for the expression of the will of the people. Democracy is one
of the means by which the sovereignty of the people in their state is expressed.
Sovereignty
This concept claims that the people have the right to create the government of
their choice and to replace it when they see fit. Legitimacy derives from the
democratic will of the people, not from the sovereign or a ruling class defined
by birth (or some other restrictive attribute). All are subject to government. All
should have a say in how it is constructed and, within what is practicable,
should be allowed to participate. All democratic governments derive their
legitimacy from this concept, a vital element of which is ‘consent’.
Consent
In direct democracies citizens give consent to a course of action. In represen-
tative democracies consent is the consequence of ‘mandates’ given to govern-
ments by election victories or referenda. Consent is reaffirmed by free and
regular elections, with competing political parties putting a programme before
the people. Parties that win elections are said to have a ‘specific mandate’ to
govern – a right to carry out those policies they included in their manifesto. A
‘general mandate’ to govern is also provided by an election victory. A
government can take whatever measures are necessary to meet unforeseen
problems. Consent for these actions will come from the elected body that
seeks, on behalf of the people, to make the government accountable for its
actions. Mandates acquired by national governments have superiority over
mandates acquired by winners of local government elections.
Majority rule and democracy

Democracy is not the same thing as ‘majority rule’. Indeed, many democrats
have seen great dangers to individual and minority group freedoms from
simple ‘majority rule’ principles.
One problem is defining ‘majority’. No political party in Britain, for example,
has won a majority of the turnout in a general election since 1935, although
the governing party usually has a majority of the seats in the House of
Commons. Many MPs are elected on a minority of the vote in their
constituency. Votes are cast for a party and, as a consequence, entail automat-
ically voting for specific policies that one may oppose. Turnouts in local
government and European parliamentary elections are low in Britain
(averaging 20–40 per cent), and falling in general elections (down to 59 per
cent in 2001). To what extent should the views of those who have not voted
be considered? One might declare that if one doesn’t vote one has forfeited
one’s say. However, studies in ‘voter apathy’ in the 2001 general election seem
to show not ‘apathy’ but irritation and disgust at the political class. One might
consider the ‘democratic’ element of public opinion polling as a better
reflection of popular opinion than elections. Indeed, we are all in minorities
on many issues, and we should be very concerned about the rights of
expression of ‘minorities’.
In many ways the best criterion for judging a democracy is how it treats its
minorities. Minority views of today often become the majority opinion of
tomorrow. It is vital, therefore, that there should be a ‘free market’ of ideas in
democracies. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, there has to be some appeal
to majority interests and views as the basis of democratic rule after debate and
argument has been undertaken. In the last analysis, minority opinion cannot
over-rule the views of the majority.
Equality of citizenship rights

Democratic theory argues that all citizens have equal political rights. Citizens
(unless disqualified on legal grounds, such as imprisonment or bankruptcy) all
have one vote, of equal value, in constituencies of roughly equal size. All
citizens have an equal right to run for office. None of these rights can be
legally circumscribed by property or by educational or social status.
Such equality is a recent achievement. In the UK, for example, multiple voting
rights, based on property and educational attainment, were not abolished
until 1948. Fear of the poor and of mass democracy by those with wealth and
power has since Plato and Aristotle been the basis of resistance to equal
citizenship rights and democracy. Constitutional and other political restraints
have ensured that the excesses of mass democracy have been largely
contained (although there are those who see a corrupting effect of ‘dumbing-
down’ of political debate in a mass democracy).
In recent decades there has been a challenge to the individual basis of
citizenship rights in a democracy by the advocates of group rights, who
demand the recognition of social equality by political and institutional means.
It is argued that women, the disabled, ethnic minorities, gays and others are
disadvantaged by the emphasis on individual rights.
Democracy 69
Public opinion in democracies

Democratic systems of government are supposed in some way to reflect ‘public
opinion’. As we have observed, some form of ‘majority rule’ is one basic
premise of democracy. We have also seen that many democratic theorists have
feared mass democracy and the dangers of ‘rule by the mob’. One problem
arises from differing definitions of ‘public opinion’.
Although the term is often used as if it were a single concept, public opinion
is rather more complex than one would initially think. There are few issues, if
any, on which the public will all have any opinion, let alone the same opinion.
In pluralistic democracies there are many groups and individuals with highly
diverse views on issues. One can identify three types of public opinion. First,
there is ‘expert opinion’. Politicians and civil servants will often consult
specialists and professionals on policy. Second, one might identify ‘informed
general opinion’ of interested, well-read people, who, without being profes-
sional experts, might write to newspapers or MPs, or support particular
pressure groups. Finally, we have ‘mass uninformed public opinion’, with
views on the issues of the day, shaped by the mass media and by what appears
of immediate concern. Interest is temporary and will pass quickly on to other
‘new’ issues. Depending on the issue, most of us will belong to one or other of
these blocks of public opinion.
Public opinion is cited by politicians as the major factor influencing policy
formation. There are a number of problems for democracy in this idea.
Appeals to ‘public opinion’ are often used to silence minority or dissenting
opinions. The ‘will of the people’ is a fine phrase, but one which is usually used
to over-rule objections from some parts of the public. Powerful groups will
often claim that they express ‘public opinion’ when they are, if fact, advancing
their own sectional interests. Some groups, especially business and other
economic interests groups, are sufficiently powerful to have many channels of
manipulating and shaping public opinion along lines that essentially benefit
themselves. If this were the situation one might regard ‘public opinion’ as
without value as a tool for analysing democratic societies. Public opinion
arises from the political culture of a society and is only partly influenced by
elites manipulating it by using ‘spin doctors’.
Public opinion supporting the essentials of democratic values and norms is a
vital element in underpinning democratic culture. When it is essentially
‘conservative’ in its attitudes it might be considered as a useful check on some
of the radical and ill-thought out programmes that sometimes appear from
reformist groups. Public opinion on important issues can be influenced and
changed by democratic action. It is, therefore, of great value in democracies.
The rule of law and democracy

The rule of law is the basis of modern government. There is a logical series of
stages in the rule of law for understanding the basis of liberal democracy.
Humans have natural rights, based on natural law, which can be discerned by
reason. These provide the foundations for the law. Laws are based on universal
moral principles, like universal scientific laws. Hence, government could be
seen as the rational discovery and application of legal principles to a society
with the consent of the governed, accepting the rule of law as the foundation
for stable and rational government. Different societies have different legal
traditions, but all are shaped by their legal systems. Democratic government,
based on the principle of the rule of law, is, therefore, fundamentally different
from political systems that claim that the authority to govern, the making of
law itself, derives from God, the laws of economics or racial struggle, or some
other source.
The above constitutes a ‘democratic culture’, one that has taken centuries to
develop and become established in liberal democracies, a culture that is still
some way from being fully developed in most modern societies.
Conditions for the development of democracy

Democracy arises from a peculiar set of historical, social and economic
circumstances. One might speculate about the nature of modern society if
scientific and humanistic thought had not appeared and if intellectual enquiry
had not developed in the form that it did. We can observe this through a
resumé of the history of the development of democratic thinking and how
modern democracies were founded.
The development of democracies and scientific modes of thought coincided
in the Greek world of the sixth and fifth centuries BC. Science sought to under-
stand the structure of the universe, explore its laws, develop intellectual
discipline and establish knowledge. Democratic thought entailed similar
applications of logic, in this case to the problems facing society. Debate,
argument, the testing of theories and experimentation were applied to society
to improve the lot of human beings. Greek city-states or poleis (singular polis)
were riven by class conflict. Greek democratic thinkers hoped that argument
and debate might reduce such struggle and identify the common causes of the
people. Athenian democracy involved the direct participation of all citizens in
government. It may or may not have done much to reduce tensions but it did
stimulate political thought. Plato, in Republic, used reason to identify the
principles of the ‘best’ political system. Aristotle, in Politics, classified political
systems: democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, tyranny, and so on. However, the
decline of Athenian democracy in the fourth century paralleled Greek
Democracy 71
economic and population decline. Greece eventually became subject, first to

Macedon and later to Rome. Its experiment in democracy ended.
The Roman Republican constitution was composed of balanced parts, repre-

senting the various social classes of Roman society: patrician, equestrian and
plebeian. The Republic built the empire. The Republic destroyed itself in
decades of civil wars, giving birth to the imperial system under Augustus
(emperor 27BC–AD14). Indeed, it was the Republic that provided many
modern constitution-makers, such as the founding fathers of America, with a
model to copy. The imperial system claimed to have restored the Republic,
but crushed genuine democratic activity beyond the election of low-level
officials.
The decline of democracy in the ancient world paralleled the decline of

scientific thought. Rome’s political and scientific development stagnated.
This stagnation continued throughout the Middle Ages, reinforced by the
domination and authority of the church. Power struggles between the
church and the secular rulers of Europe occurred
without reference to the people’s views. Intel- Renaissance
lectual enquiry was overwhelmingly about A cultural and intellectual
theological issues which were untestable by movement in Europe during the
fifteenth and sixteenth
scientific method.
centuries. In part it involved a
revival of classical learning. It
Nevertheless, change, though very slow and brought an understanding of
halting, was underway. It would eventually man and the universe which
flower into the Renaissance – among whose many owed little to religious teaching
and much to the development
achievements, the gradual recovery of scientific
and application of scientific
and rational forms of thought paved the way for methods of thought.
the development of democracy.
The Renaissance involved new forms of thinking that, although they need not
necessarily have led to democratic society, helped develop scientific thought,
enquiry and a constant challenge to dictatorship and totalitarianism. Thought
would progress by observation, experiment, the application of reason and the
challenging of scientific orthodoxy. It was but a step to apply the same
principles to society. Like nature, society was subject to enquiry, under-
standing and the possibility of change and improvement through the appli-
cation of scientific principles. Established governments and political ideas
were also, like the scientific ideas of Aristotle now being challenged by the new
science, subject to challenge, reform and, potentially, overthrow.
Machiavelli, in The Discourses (1513–17), argued for a mixed constitution,

along the lines of Republican Rome, as the most efficient and free system of
government. He was highly suspicious of unrestrained government whether
democratic, aristocratic or monarchic.
Particularly important was the Renaissance principle of society as the ‘stage’

on which man shaped his destiny – the basis of modern forms of democratic
political thought. Humans were God’s perfect creation, fully capable of under-
standing the world. As part of this understanding, human beings discerned the
existence of natural law and natural rights. They also perceived that in a ‘state
of nature’ human beings were essentially equal. Given these assumptions
authority was not derived by rulers directly from God, but from the consent of
the governed.
By the late seventeenth century new scientific and philosophical ideas,
tempered by the horrific religious wars of the first half of the century, had led
to the development of new social and political ideas. Men such as Hobbes,
Descartes, Pufendorf, Locke, and a host of lesser figures, constructed systems
of thought that influenced politics. They placed the individual at the centre of
society, along with concepts of citizenship, the state and the law, and, although
the term would not be used at this time, ‘democracy’. Consent to be governed
was not a ‘one-off’ event. It had to be regularly reaffirmed by some form of
consultation – elections, for example. Indeed, some thinkers, later identified
as ‘liberals’, provided the basis for resistance to, and even revolutionary
overthrow of, a government that abused the natural rights of its citizens and
ruled without consent.
Modern politics, from the mid-eighteenth century, arose from struggles
between democrats and anti-democrats. Democrats were associated with
modernity and progress, optimism and hope, and the development of balanced
constitutions. Anti-democrats were regarded as supporters of out-dated and
reactionary institutions and views and the defenders of undeserved privileges
of wealth and political power. Rousseau, in The Social Contract (1762), was the
most influential of many writers who attacked the concept of absolutist
monarchy. He wanted a new society based on reason, free individuals, and a
social contract between government and people. The American and French
revolutions (1776 and 1789, respectively) derived their ideological under-
pinning from English liberals such as Locke, and
French rationalists such as Montesquieu and absolutist monarchy
Rousseau. They sought to implement democracy, A monarchy where the king is
above the law and the law is
although it took longer than they imagined.
valid only in so far as it is the
Modern democratic constitutional systems will of the king. The term is
often applied to the monarchs
involve universal suffrage, the existence of of the seventeenth and
competing political parties, debate, free media eighteenth centuries (for
and a highly educated citizenry. Even pro- example, Louis XIV of France).
democrats worried about giving the uneducated
and unpropertied too much power before they were ready for democracy’s
responsibilities. Democratic political systems, to be secure, required a strong
democratic political culture.
Democracy 73
This culture involves the application of reason to political issues, a belief in

reasoned argument, a rejection of violence, an acceptance of the ‘rules of the
political game’ by all parties, and a willingness to compromise in the face of
valid evidence. One might argue that democracy requires an underlying
political ‘myth’ of shared political beliefs, not subject to rational and scientific
enquiry, to bind people together.
Politics is not just an activity for an elite. The population should feel they can
involve themselves in politics. In practical terms this means elite support for
democratic systems of government, the existence of a liberal middle class of
some size, and working-class identification with, and participation in,
democratic culture. All must be willing to make sacrifices to ensure its
survival. There should be a high degree of social mobility. People should be
able to rise – and fall – in the social structure, depending on ability; and the
elite political class should be open to all on the basis of competition and ability
and be subject to regular infusions of new people and new ideas.
Such conditions are very hard to acquire and maintain. Democracy demands
constant effort and support; it entails the commitment of individuals and
groups who might find democracy working against their particular interests
and of others who might not want the responsibility of self-government. There
are always those who argue that the burdens of democracy are too much for a
people to bear.
Let us now look at some of the major arguments against and for the principle
of democracy.
Arguments against and in support of democracy

Democracy has never lost its capacity to stimulate arguments about its desir-
ability. Much recent criticism has been directed at its ineffectiveness in
delivering the wishes of the electorate. We shall discuss some fundamental
objections to and arguments in support of democracy.
Arguments against democracy

Democracy has always had its critics. The origins of the major arguments
against democracy can be traced back, like its origins, to Ancient Greece and
the ideas of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. It should be remembered that the
opinions of anti-democrats – usually the rich, the literate, the educated, the
aristocratic – have tended to be preserved in the written record.
The anti-democratic argument includes a number of elements
● Government requires a specialised elite. This might be described as a ‘conser-
vative’ view.
● The majority of the population is incapable of effective self-government. This

is an element of ‘liberal’ concerns about democracy.
● Political democracy tends to ignore the fundamental lack of democracy in
economic relations. This is a strong element of the ‘Marxist’ criticism of
democracy.
● Democratic systems reflect gender divisions in society. This is a strong element
of the ‘feminist’ critique.
Government requires a specialised elite: the conservative view

Plato, in Republic, put forward one of the most effective attacks on democracy.
He argued that any kind of work involves the principle of the ‘division of
labour’. Thus, specialisation in society – experts in each field refining their art
or craft – has led to an overall increase in the wealth and level of civilisation.
People choose their work and contribution to society in accordance with their
wishes and their abilities. Each function requires the acquisition of specialist
knowledge.
The argument runs thus: this principle of specialisation should be applied to
government. Why should all people have a say in government, either by voting
or in public opinion polls? The work of government is difficult and important,
requiring training and specialised knowledge. Most people (however much
they flatter themselves) know little of politics, the major issues and how to
make important decisions. government should be left to the specialists and
those who know best. So, in Plato’s Republic, the ‘Guardians’ trained for
government on the basis of intelligence and ability. They were committed to
government and the administration of society on behalf of the people.
Such an anti-democratic view is rarely stated in such clear terms, outside the
ranks of the fascistic right and some on the Marxist left. Yet often reformers
and administrators, politicians of both the left and the right, may profess their
support for democracy while at the same time expressing the wish to avoid its
constraints and frustrations and often evincing a fundamental distrust of the
people. For example, an East European Communist official in 1946 stated,‘We
could not allow our plans for the betterment of the people of our country to
be jeopardised by the votes of a load of ignorant peasants in an election’,2
while Henry Kissenger opined, ‘I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch
a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people’.3
The criteria for membership of Plato’s Guardians were ability, training and a
commitment to seeking the benefit of the whole community. Later anti-
democratic thinkers defended elites based on wealth, race, religion or birth.
One would not, modern anti-democrats say, sail a ship with reference to the
opinion of its crew, nor, for that matter, choose the captain on the basis of birth
Democracy 75
or wealth. Captains should be appointed on merit, and only merit. So should

the ship of state.
In Britain, the upper reaches of the permanent civil service have been likened
to Plato’s Guardians. They are chosen on merit. One might observe permanent
secretaries wielding more expert power and influence than ministers. Yet
ministers are specialists in wielding political power. Both in government and
parliament leadership groups are chosen by competition and merit, with a
very limited role for the populace. Democracy may be a political and
ideological tool of government, but one with a very limited reality in modern
Western democracies (a fact welcomed by anti-democrats).
The majority of the population are incapable of effective

self-government: liberal concerns
Plato associated democracy with passion dominating over reason. Most people
lack the intellectual abilities for balanced and sensible participation in
government. Hence his argument for government by the philosophically
trained. Aristotle declared that democracy polarised the rich against the poor,
contributing to political instability. Indeed, most Greek and Roman writers
stressed the importance in political systems of having elements of monarchy,
aristocracy and democracy in ‘mixed’, or ‘balanced’, constitutions; the best
features of each would act to counter and restrain their worst.
Nineteenth-century liberals were deeply concerned about the dangers of
majority rule by an ill-educated mass of voters. There was a need to restrict
democratic rights to those capable of reasoned thought. They also argued for
a balanced constitution to contain democracy. Twentieth-century political
theorists have been concerned with the complexity of modern societies, which
makes issues difficult to understand, about the declining interest in politics,
and about the ‘dumbing-down’ of political debate on complex issues.
Supporters of democracy believe that this fear is exaggerated. There is plenty
of evidence that voters understand complex issues. Indeed, those who partic-
ipate in democracy show considerable knowledge and capacity. Western
democracies have high levels of education and information.
Political democracy ignores the lack of democracy in

economic relations: the Marxist criticism
Democratic systems do little to mitigate the fundamentally exploitative nature
of capitalist economies. Deep social and economic inequalities continue to
exist and undermine the democratic system by restricting the real power and
influence available to working-class people. Without fundamental reforms of
economic inequalities in society the equality of political rights becomes
meaningless, democracy is a sham, merely the ideological means by which the
many are governed – and exploited – by the few. Only with the transformation
of modern society into a socialist, classless one would real democracy occur.
Democratic systems reflect gender divisions in society:

the feminist critique
Women are placed at a disadvantage in democracies through the burdens
imposed upon them by domestic duties and by their secondary social and
economic role in a male-dominated society and political system. Liberal-
democratic political systems are dependent on gender divisions and, in that
sense, are no different from non-democratic systems. In suppressing the
potential contribution of women no society can be truly democratic. This view
is not so much against democracy as convinced that there can be no
democratic society until women are truly free and equal.
Arguments in support of democracy

A democrat might recognise much truth in the foregoing criticisms. All too
often supporters of democracy have lacked powerful intellectual champions to
publicise its value. The views of ordinary Athenians on democracy, for
example, are inferred from their willingness to make great sacrifices to ensure
its survival. The relative silence of the poor and their views on democracy – or
anything else for that matter – was the norm until the last century and a half
or so. Support for democracy has been rare among the wealthy, educated,
powerful and literate. Equally rare were cogent arguments on its behalf until
the late nineteenth century.
The pro-democratic argument includes a number of elements:
• the democratic view of elites and democracy;
• democracy contributes to social cohesion;
• democracy encourages citizen development;
• a moral claim for participation;
• democracy as an engine of social change.
The democratic view of elites and democracy

The democrat does not believe that the expert element in government should
be abolished, but argues that this element should not be trusted with absolute
and unchecked power. At the same time, the democrat argues that democracy
is of positive value. A strong democratic element in government is important
for good government. There are a number of reasons for this.
It is unlikely that an ideal aristocracy or oligarchy, however attractive it may be
in anti-democratic theory, could ever be attained in practice. Most kinds of
oligarchy would, in practice, be far from ideal. Democracy, for all its
Democracy 77
weaknesses, would be safer. Any body of people, however carefully chosen, if

they were freed from all democratic control and accountability, would become
a special class with interests of their own. Elites tend to become self-serving and
pursue their interests at the expense of the community. They seek to amass
wealth and power for themselves (rather than for the benefit of the
community). This corruption would occur no matter how high-minded or how
well trained they were. As Lord Acton stated: ‘Power tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost invariably bad men.4
Undemocratic elites would become increasingly remote from the people,
steadily less capable of understanding popular desires and feelings, and less
concerned with the welfare of the people. Eventually, to make the people obey
the elite, coercion and repression would be introduced. At the very least,
democratic societies tend to reduce corruption, violence and oppression.
A healthy society requires its citizens to think for themselves and to form their
own opinions. If citizens are repressed, or discouraged from taking part in
government or influencing government decisions, then much useful infor-
mation becomes unavailable to the government. Ill-informed and wrong
decisions are made, damaging society.
As society is made up of a great number of individuals and groups, no elite can
know what is best for all. Strong democratic elements in the political system
help government make its decisions taking into account the complex nature of
society. Dissenting groups should be tolerated as some truth may exist in their
arguments and the discussion of many opinions aids the formation of sound
policy. Democratic societies are simply better governed than monarchic or
oligarchic ones.
Democracy contributes to social cohesion

Governments prefer to govern by consent rather than by force. Creating a
sense of membership of a political system, democracy provides the basis for
governmental legitimacy and social and political stability. It creates
commitment to one’s society and, contrary to the views of anti-democrats, it
has not led to mob rule, but to a stronger and more balanced society with
greater freedom for the vast majority of people.
Democracies are closely associated with liberal capitalism and social welfare.
Some democratic theorists believe democracy is possible only in market
capitalist societies that allow individual competition to flourish. Others assert
that democracy requires social welfare systems to ensure individual freedoms
and education for the population. It isn’t absolutely proven that these are
essential requirements for ‘democracy’. There may be other means of estab-
lishing it. But there is a close correlation between liberal democracies and
capitalist-welfare societies. Such societies do appear to be well governed,

prosperous and highly cohesive.
Democracy encourages citizen development

A democratic political system requires that its citizens have knowledge of the
major issues of the day. An informed populace is a responsible one, one that
takes its role in the political system seriously. Governments and political
parties also benefit from a citizen body growing and maturing in its
democratic roles and responsibilities, as new people with different experiences
and knowledge take part in politics and government at all levels. The dangers
of stagnation and of a self-serving elite are reduced.
A moral claim for participation

All citizens have a stake in their society. Whether people will be rich or poor,
well or ill educated, free, healthy, even happy and contented, depends largely
on politics. Their government affects them all. All have lives to lead, children
to raise, friends and family to care for, and taxes to pay. Democrats argue that
morality demands the right to participate in one’s political system. Indeed,
most democrats would argue that there is not only a moral right but also a
moral duty to take an interest in politics, vote and get involved. Not to do so
puts existing democracies at risk, perpetuates tyrannical and brutal regimes,
and is a moral betrayal of those who fought and died in the past for the right
to participate and of those putting their lives at risk for democracy today.
Democracy as an engine of social change

Rational political action – short of violence – has been a vital engine of social
change and reform in democracies. Demonstrations, strikes, protests, are often
needed to bring issues onto a political agenda. The constitutional system itself
may support an unjust society by ensuring the maintenance of a status quo.
Britain in the nineteenth century may have been relatively democratic,
compared to other European societies, but political and social reform required
political agitation. Even in the twentieth century, mass democratic Britain
retained a need for extra-parliamentary action to ‘improve’ society and seek an
end to social injustices, such as racial and sexual discrimination.
There is always a danger that deeply committed, ideologically motivated
groups that have a grievance, a sense of the ‘fraudulent’ and ‘unjust’ nature of
the system, will use violence to try to change policy or even overthrow a
regime. One might even agree, without supporting violence, that in Northern
Ireland political and social reforms have come about as a consequence of
Republican and Loyalist violence – the ‘bullet and the ballot box’. But in a
democracy the legitimacy of violence to secure social and political change
Democracy 79
is always dubious, except in the minds of its supporters. It lays itself open
to such questions as ‘Who voted for you?’ and ‘Who gave you the right to kill
in my name?’
The future of democracy

Democracy appeared to be on the march by the end of the twentieth century.
It was attractive, successful, adaptable and able to combine freedom with
order. The end of the Cold War saw democracies established in Eastern Europe
and the former states of the USSR. Elsewhere, too, concepts of citizenship and
popular sovereignty appeared to be on the rise. The future of democracy
appeared to be rosy. But all is not as well as one might have hoped. There are
a number of challenges to democracy that have to be overcome.
Globalisation
The effectiveness of democracy is challenged by ‘globalisation’. Capitalism and
democracy have often been closely associated, especially in liberal-democratic
political theory. However, the power of big businesses, international financial
institutions and international money markets challenges both state sover-
eignty and the ability of democracy to respond to both the demands of the
people and pressures from the global economy.
Welfare systems have been challenged by global businesses. Demands for
lower corporation taxes and reduced health and welfare provision are linked
to demands to improve economic competition. There are also pressures for a
greater role for ‘market solutions’ to social problems. Businesses have easy
access to government. They have a dominant influence within the media.
Indeed, the media are often part of global business empires.
‘Rolling back the state’, a rallying cry of many on the libertarian right, involves
a curtailing of the ability of the state to control corporations and produces a
capitulation to the self-interested demands of businesses. It also involves the
decline of the people’s influence on their political system, a decline reflected
by a dwindling interest in politics in most democracies.
Apathy
The greatest danger to democracy is not violence, but apathy. Growing lack of
interest in democratic politics can be perceived in several important areas.
Voting is the minimal degree of involvement in a democracy. Turnout in
general elections, local elections and referenda is in decline. In the USA, for
example, presidential election voter turnout is only around 50 per cent of
those eligible and only 39 per cent turnout was achieved in the November
2002 Congressional elections. In Britain’s 2001 general election only 59 per

cent of those registered voted, and Swiss referenda stimulate around 40 per
cent voter participation. This may, of course, not be apathy, but could be taken
as evidence of contentment with one’s society. However, opinion polls show
widespread disillusionment with politics and politicians, and – by implication
– democracy. A belief exists in most democracies that voting never changes
much, and that participation can have very little influence on events, a view
that bolsters cynicism about the democratic process. This can be observed in
the declining membership of political parties. Membership has always been a
minority interest, but is a shrinking one. Fewer people join political parties
than ever before. In the UK, for example, the three main political parties have
a combined membership of less than 800,000.
Declining interest and participation in democracy allow political and ideo-
logical extremists to have a greater impact on politics than would otherwise
be the case.
Anti-democratic and irrational forces

Democracies are not immortal. They have shown considerable resilience to the
threats from fascism and communism during the twentieth century and
triumphed, but anti-democratic and irrational forces could reappear to
challenge them and, perhaps, win. There is evidence of the growth of such
forces in Europe: fascism, nationalism, terrorism, religious fundamentalism,
and extremism in the cause of animal rights and environmentalism. At present
they are on the fringes of politics. However, levels of intolerance of minorities
– such as migrants and asylum seekers – have grown among democratic
leaderships and among voters.
Nevertheless, despite all these reservations, democratic forms of government
continue to show considerable degrees of vigour and reform. The great
challenge for democracy in the twenty-first century will be to spread and
deepen its roots in those countries from which it has been absent, while
finding new democratic systems, reinvigorated democratic cultures, to ensure
that it does not wither in its heartlands.
Summary
Democracy claims, and at least in theory is granted, universal applicability. It
is such a ‘feel-good’ word that almost every regime, however tyrannical,
describes itself as ‘democratic’. In reality, the degree to which a government is
democratic can be measured by the extent to which ‘the people’ influence
government. From other perspectives, we need to consider how far the people
are protected from an oppressive state (‘defensive democracy’) or the extent
Democracy 81
to which they are encouraged to participate in decision-making (‘citizen

democracy’). Democratic government can be described as governing with the
consent of the people. Majority rule, equality of rights and the rule of law are
also important dimensions to democracy. Moreover, democracy requires the
social underpinning of a democratic culture. Democracy has often been
attacked. A conservative view is that governance is best left to a highly-skilled
elite; a liberal view is the idea that the masses cannot be entrusted with power.
Others, such as Marxists and feminists, argue that ‘democracy’ is but a façade
to hide unjust class rule. Defenders of democracy argue that elites are not to
be trusted with power. Besides, democracy promotes social cohesion,
encourages citizenship development and enables social change to occur
without violence. There is also a claim that, as all have a stake in society, all
have a right to participate in its decisions. Democracy’s future is bright. It has
confronted its fascist and communist enemies during the twentieth century
and defeated them. It is quite capable of defeating the threats to it that are
apparent in the twenty-first century.
1 David Held, ‘Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order’,

Political Studies, 11 (1992), pp. 10–39.
2 Apocryphal reference.
3 Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, on the American policy of
destabilising the socialist regime of Salvador Allende in Chile. CIA
Official Minutes of 27 June 1970.
4 Lord Acton, Letter to Mandell Creighton (April 5, 1887).
Beetham, D. ‘Political Theory and British Politics’, in P. Dunleavy et al., Developments in

British Politics 4 (Macmillan, 1993), pp. 353–70.
Coxall, B. and Robins, L. Contemporary British Politics, 2nd edn (Macmillan, 1994),
pp. 12–17.
Crick, B. In Defence of Politics (Penguin, 1994).
Dahl, R. Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989).
Dunn, J. (ed.) Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508BC to AD1993 (Oxford University
Press, 1992).
‘Survey: FULL DEMOCRACY: Happy 21st century, voters!’, The Economist (21
December, 1996).
Finer, S. E. ‘The Liberal Democratic State’, in S. E. Finer, Comparative government
(Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 62–74.
Goodwin, B. ‘Democracy’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and Sons,
2001), pp. 271–303.
Held, D. (ed.) Models of Democracy (Polity, 1987).
Held, D. ‘Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order’, Political Studies, 11
(1992), pp. 10–39.
Held, D. Prospects for Democracy (Polity, 1996).

Heywood, A. ‘Democracy, Representation and the Public Interest’, in A. Heywood,
Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1994), pp. 166–94.
Jay, R. ‘Democracy’, in Robert Eccleshall et al., Political Ideologies: An Introduction
(Routledge, 1996), pp. 118–52.
Macpherson, C. B. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford University Press,
1977).
Renwick, A. and Swinburn, I. ‘Democracy’, in A. Renwick and I. Swinburn, Basic Political
Concepts (Stanley Thornes, 1990), pp. 124–49.
Watts, Duncan ‘The Growing Attractions of Direct Democracy’, Talking Politics, 10:1
(1997), pp. 44–9.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 What are the essential characteristics of a ‘liberal democracy’?
2 How valid are historical and recent critiques of democracy?
3 ‘Although democracy has successfully withstood the challenges of

the twentieth century, it would be unwise to think it will be equally
successful in the twenty-first century.’ Discuss this statement.
4 Are there any valid forms of democracy other than ‘liberal democracy’?
5 What difficulties are encountered in modern democracies in answering the question ‘who
governs’?
6 Are there any preconditions for a successful democracy?

Freedom 4
Most people have some idea of what the word ‘freedom’ means, and most
approve of it. In our analysis we examine the term more closely, exploring such
themes as freedom of opinion, freedom under the law and economic freedom. To
further elucidate the concept we present brief summaries of the ideas of a
number of political philosophers on the subject. In particular we analyse the views
of John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin on ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedom. Then we
focus on the central issue of freedom and the state, concentrating on three major
areas of dispute: conscientious objection, state acquisition of private property,
civil disobedience and terrorism. We end with some observations on the cultural
environment conducive to freedom and reflect on the problems of freedom in the
modern world.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Why does the term ‘freedom’ have such a strong emotional appeal?
➤ Is private property essential to human freedom?
➤ To what extent are the writers cited in this chapter agreed as to the meaning of free-
dom?
➤ Are the concepts of positive and negative freedom mutually exclusive?
➤ What criteria would you suggest as useful in establishing whether a specific restraint on
freedom was justifiable?
➤ Does a truly free society demand impossible levels of moral restraint on the part of its
citizens?
Forward, you sons of Hellas! Set your country free!

Set free your sons, your wives, tombs of your ancestors,
And temples of your gods. All is at stake: now fight!
(Aeschylus, The Persians, 472BC)
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person
than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (J. S. Mill, On
Liberty, 1859)
Liberty does not carry out each of its undertakings with the same perfection as an
intelligent despotism, but in the long run it produces more than the latter. It does
not always and in all circumstances give the peoples a more skilful and faultless
government; but it infuses throughout the body social an activity, a force and an
energy which never exist without it, and which bring forth wonders. (Alexis de
Tocquveille, Diary, 25th August 1831)
Everyone is against ‘sin’ and everyone is in favour of ‘freedom’, although

neither can be defined so as to ensure agreement on their meaning. From its
origins in the Ancient Greek city-states and their democracies, freedom has
usually been considered a political ‘good’, good for individuals, organisations
and society. ‘Liberty’ or ‘freedom’ has great advantages as a rallying call in
politics arising from its opaqueness in popular usage. Freedom seems to mean
whatever the speaker wants it to be and can be used to gloss over potential
conflicts about a course of policy. Everyone can agree that ‘freedom’ is worth
defending only because of its vagueness.
People may not know much about political theory, but they know what they
mean by ‘liberty’. Usually, people are only aware of liberty when they are
deprived of it in an illegal or unfair manner by the deliberate acts of other
individuals. Thus, freedom concerns human relationships and is clearly
related to power in its many forms: financial, physical and political. Some
people in positions of power will attempt to constrain liberty, usually with
appeals to the ‘common good’ or a ‘higher principle’ beneficial to the whole of
society or mankind.
For the last two centuries or so freedom and equality, sometimes allied, often
opposed, have been the two great horses that pull the carriage of modern
politics along. Some critics, usually on the political left, argue that freedom
without a greater degree of economic and social equality between people is
largely meaningless, as the rich and the powerful can exploit their own
freedom to restrict that of the many. Other critics, mainly among classical and
neo-liberals and some members on the modern conservative right, argue that
freedom is such an important value in society that it must always take priority
over equality. One can have freedom, they argue, which might or might not
involve greater equality in society as a consequence. However, if equality is
Freedom 85
pursued as a political goal over all else, then liberty is certain to be degraded
and damaged (if not extinguished) as a political ‘good’. Western politics since
the French Revolution has been essentially a discourse between these two
fundamental concepts in which freedom has generally prevailed.
Freedom: a starting point

It is worth noting that some thinkers identify a difference between ‘liberty’
and ‘freedom’. ‘Liberty’ is associated with the type of political system existing
in a society, constitutional constraints on state power and guaranteed consti-
tutional liberties. ‘Freedom’, on the other hand, is a looser term, describing
both freedom in relation to the state and freedom for individuals in society.
For the sake of simplicity we will use ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ as inter-
changeable terms.
There are many ways in which the concept of freedom is expressed in political
discourse. A useful starting point in our exploration of the idea is to introduce
a number of these elements:
• individual freedom;
• freedom of opinion and expression;
• freedom under the law;
• economic freedom;
• property and freedom;
• national freedom.
Individual freedom
Individual freedom is the central element in Western liberal political thought
and has become part of the political discourse in most nations. This aspect of
freedom includes freedom of expression, freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, freedom to travel. It is linked with the other central element of liber-
alism (especially in its ‘classical’ form): the minimal state. The state is seen as
a potential threat to freedom and its powers and involvement in society should
be kept to the minimum levels possible, concomitant with the requirements of
law, order and justice.
Freedom of opinion and expression

Most advocates of liberty believe that academic, religious and political
opinions should be allowed to compete freely in order for society to solve its
problems, to make progress and to function in a healthy way. Freedom of
expression is a central tenet of liberal thought: without it no other freedom can
exist. Freedom of opinion is associated with attempting to achieve many other
‘good’ political and social goals, such as the pursuit by individuals of a better
and richer lifestyle, and attempts by governments to stimulate economic

growth, reduce crime and eliminate poverty.
Freedom under the law

One of the most important aspects of freedom in the Western political
tradition is that there must be some limits if it is to have meaning. These limits
may be the consequence of internal restraint and judgements, freeing oneself
from, for example, irrational passions and cravings to gain freedom to pursue
one’s ‘true’ goals in life. Some limits are what might be called ‘normative’
constraints. By this is meant the acceptance of social morals, values and
customs constraining one’s behaviour. However, almost all discussions of
freedom sooner or later have to analyse the concept of freedom under the law.
Freedom under the law means that there are areas of social life that are not
regulated by self-awareness or moral and customary values and thus require
the introduction of law to set clearly defined limits on social behaviour with
identifiable penalties for their infringement.
Economic freedom
Economic freedom is the right of individuals and businesses to pursue their
economic objectives in competition without undue state regulation and inter-
ference in the workings both of businesses and the free market. Owners of
businesses, in this light, need to be able to run their companies to maximise
profits and growth, to employ staff on flexible terms in line with the require-
ments of the business. Workers must be able to negotiate contracts related to
working conditions and pay, free of government regulations and impositions.
Freedom is therefore a vital component in promoting economic efficiency and
rationality for the benefit of all in society.
Work and employment form a very important part of most people’s conception
of liberty. They play a significant role in creating a source of individual identity
and self-image that is important if people are to act freely. A larger income and
greater wealth tend to give people a greater sense of practical freedom, and
more choices in their lives than the poor enjoy. Freedom without some form of
economic dimension is likely to remain merely theoretical, and will not survive
if its opponents offer better economic rewards. The hungry and starving will
readily give up theoretical freedoms if they can instead be fed.
State intervention in economic relations may be necessary to rectify an
imbalance between employer and employees, producers and consumers. For
instance, employees may be ruthlessly exploited by their employers; unions
may use their industrial muscle to force unreasonable concessions on wages
and conditions out of employers; businesses sometimes work together to
manipulate the market price for goods and exploit consumers. In practice,
Freedom 87
therefore, the free market may not work to the equal benefit of all and the
enhancement of everyone’s economic freedom. The concept of the ‘greater
good’ in society may require laws, rules, controls, regulations and taxes to
ensure a greater degree of ‘freedom’ in the ‘market’.
Property and freedom

Property is a vital component in most theories of the meaning of freedom.
Essentially ‘property’ can be identified as having two meanings: property in
the sense of one’s person and property in the conventional sense of goods,
wealth and land.
Individuals own property of their person in its body and capacities. This is the
foundation on which persons can expand their potential and powers to
maximise freedom. Hence, restrictions on freedom of speech are an abuse of a
person’s ‘property’ rights to speak one’s own views. Similarly, imprisonment
without trial is an abuse of freedom of property of one’s own body by wrongly
restricting the use of it as a means of having
freedom of movement. (In Stoic tradition, Stoic
however, one could claim that a person who is Zeno of Athens established the
wrongly imprisoned could still maintain his Stoic school of philosophy in
the late fourth century BC.
property of freedom of thought and ideas,
Stoicism sought virtue as the
especially if he has access to books.) greatest good and taught that
self-control of one’s feelings
The conventional meaning of the term ‘property’ is and passions, especially in the
of course tangible material goods and wealth. face of adversity, was the mark
From a liberal viewpoint, if one’s wealth increases, of a good man.
then one’s freedom, in terms of exercising practical

choices, also increases. Moreover, the ownership of property by groups, organi-
sations and private individuals acts as a check on the power of the state, thus
giving society a greater sense of security. Socialists might add a warning that an
over-concentration of wealth in private hands is likely to enhance the freedom
of the few at the expense of that of the many.
National freedom
National freedom is connected with the concepts of the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’.
The doctrine of ‘national self-determination’, first enshrined in the Versailles
Treaty (1919) as a fundamental principle of international society and interna-
tional law, is the political manifestation of national freedom. According to this
doctrine all nations have a right to govern themselves, and for national
freedom to have a political reality a nation must be able to govern itself
without being dominated or controlled by another nation. This concept of
exclusive self-government is the key characteristic of ‘sovereignty’, the most
important attribute of a state. Hence, the creation of its own state becomes a
desirable goal for a nation seeking its freedom, since the state, once estab-
lished, will exercise exclusive legal and political rights and powers within the
national territory. National freedom, therefore, is expressed and given reality
by the existence of the state.
Some major contributors

Freedom is the most popular political and social aspiration of the modern
world. However, most political thinkers have tended to take the term ‘freedom’
for granted and have tended to discuss other political ideas such as order, duty,
good government, sound political leadership, rather than liberty. It is worth-
while examining freedom as discussed by a number of major political thinkers.
A brief survey will give a flavour of the debate.
Plato
Plato’s Republic is an attempt to establish the meaning of the term ‘justice’
and identify the characteristics of the ‘good’ state. Plato believed that
freedom was bound up with self-discipline and morality. He doubted that the
law was able to establish meaningful moral conditions in society without
there first being a moral impetus from within people themselves. Never-
theless, he had no objection to the principle of morality being enforced by
the law. Without reason and self-discipline, individuals cannot attain
freedom, Plato believed, while doubting whether most people possessed
these requisite qualities. Freedom certainly did not require the existence
of democracy. On the contrary, Plato was keenly aware that the emphasis
placed on ‘freedom’, so called by the Athenian democracy, created an ill-disci-
plined people who, lacking self-control, generated factions, which degen-
erated into disorder that, in turn, inevitably gave birth to tyrants and
dictators. Arbitrary and oppressive government, not freedom, is the defining
characteristic of tyrants and dictators and the ultimate consequence of
Athenian-style ‘democratic freedoms’.
The Stoics
The Roman Stoic philosophy stressed the possibility of freedom existing within
a person’s mind, irrespective of external conditions. Self-discipline and
contemplation of life allow even the slave or the prisoner to be free in a
meaningful sense. The slave could cultivate habits of thought that enabled
him to be free within his mind, whatever his legal status or the physical
constraints placed upon him. In the last resort the slave has the choice
between obedience and death: such a choice is a statement of freedom.
Freedom 89
Niccolo Machiavelli
In the Discourses, Machiavelli argued for a republic as the embodiment of the
positive value of freedom. Self-government was essentially the same thing as
freedom, although the people enjoying such freedom would, as in the Roman
Republic Machiavelli admired, be constrained in their political influence by a
range of political and social factors that confined self-government to the
wealthy, powerful and educated. Freedom in the sense of self-government did
not mean direct democracy as it did in Ancient Athens. In his other major
political work, The Prince (1513), Machiavelli glories in the exercise of
freedom by the great man, the strong personality, the individual pushing his
power and talents to the limit, constrained only by the actions of other men
similarly engaged in exercising their freedom to the utmost.
Thomas Hobbes
Hobbes placed ‘order’ and ‘security’ as much higher political goals than
‘freedom’ in his Leviathan (1651). Men had ‘freedom’ in the state of nature, a
condition in which government did not exist, but this only led to an appalling
state of permanent war of all against all in which only the freedom of the
strongest had any reality. Hobbes argued that the creation of the state was a
rational response to the excess of freedom previously existing in the state of
nature. Freedom was only possible within the order created by the powerful
state. Once the state was established, freedom was to be found in the subse-
quent order and in those areas of life that were not proscribed by the law; this
theory is described in modern political thought as ‘negative freedom’. To
Hobbes the area of private life that should remain outside some state
involvement is remarkably small and, in his view, should remain so. Hobbes
was highly resistant to the idea that freedom was consequent on self-
government and democracy: a democracy would swiftly slide into the violence
and chaos of the state of nature and with such a disaster freedom would be
extinguished.
John Locke
Locke, in Two Treatises on Government (1690), declared that the law is the
means by which liberty is defended and enhanced. He believed that
government should be regarded as the servant of the people and, as such, an
instrument to preserve liberty. The best way to do this is to ensure that
government is highly restricted in its functions (essentially to the maintenance
of internal law and order, defence against external enemies and the raising of
taxes to pay for these two). Freedom in this sense is defined in terms
associated with ‘negative’ freedom: all that is not restricted by law is left over
for individuals to enjoy. Locke argued that there should be as large an area of
private life as possible over which the state has no right to trespass. Indeed, he
declared that the right to the greatest possible degree of freedom was second
only to the right to life.
Immanuel Kant
Running through Kant’s many works, most notably Critique of Pure Reason
(1781), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Critique of Judgement (1790), is
the linking of freedom with making voluntary choices to do good. Kant argues
that all men seek to do good and attempt a rational understanding of the
universe to discover the goals of life associated with the pursuit of good. Men
can call themselves truly free only when their actions are aimed at these goals.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Rousseau argues in The Social Contract (1762) that true freedom lies in
obedience to the laws we have worked out for ourselves. This manifests itself in
the social contract, which creates civil and political society, and the subsequent
‘General Will’ that creates unanimous agreement to obey the law. Laws are valid
when they obey the General Will, and freedom consists in obeying these laws.
Rousseau even advocated the use of the power of the state to ‘force people to be
free’, if necessary. Rousseau’s concept of the General Will and its relationship to
freedom has been the subject of considerable attention and controversy since its
formulation. On the one hand, the idea of the General Will is condemned as a
fundamental threat to freedom, providing the intellectual justification for total-
itarian and authoritarian political regimes, as well as providing ready-made
excuses for self-appointed guardians of public morals in the non-political and
private sphere of life. On the other hand one might claim that the General Will
is merely a complex and convoluted way of identifying a popular constraint on
the actions of government and making it accountable to the people.
Henri Benjamin Constant

In his many works Constant formulated his views on many aspects of politics
as a French liberal. In his important lecture of 1819 Constant identified the
considerable differences between what he called the ‘liberty of the ancients’
and the ‘liberty of the moderns’. The liberty of the ancients rested upon slavery
and warfare, and was restricted to citizenship and taking part in the delibera-
tions of the assembly. Constant claimed that this form of liberty did not
guarantee the rights of the individual. Indeed, ancient liberty was essentially
a form of privilege of the free man over the slave. In contrast, liberty of the
moderns guaranteed individuals equality before the law and also their
freedom to pursue their own interests. Constant used this theory to challenge
Rousseau’s idea of the General Will. In his view the liberty of the moderns was
Freedom 91
the basis of representative government. The state existed to protect the private
interests of the individual.
Karl Marx
Freedom, to Marx and his followers, is not possible under capitalism. The highly
exploitative capitalist system reduces both the working class and their capitalist
exploiters to a level of servitude to the system. Those who control the means of
production may have somewhat greater freedom than those who merely sell
their labour to scrape a living, but bourgeoisie and
proletariat alike possess a freedom reduced to capitalism
mere work and consumption. Some modern The economic system in which
Marxists claim that capitalism is even more wealth is privately owned and in
inimical to freedom than it was in the nineteenth which goods and services are
produced for profit, as dictated
century when Marx analysed its workings.
by market forces, which has
Contemporary capitalism, so modern Marxists developed over the last five
argue, enslaves workers by means of ideological hundred years to be the
indoctrination, making them compliant to a economic driving force of the
modern global economy.
progressively more exploitative system. Contem-
porary workers in capitalist societies have been
enslaved with ‘chains of gold’: the material trappings of consumer capitalism
have hidden the raw nature of exploitation to some degree, but capitalism is still
inimical to the development of human potential in a condition of true freedom.
John Rawls
Defending social democracy in A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls argued
for liberty in an unequal society. He stated that every person has a right to the
greatest possible liberty concomitant with the same degree of liberty allowed
to others. Liberty is defined in rather narrow terms: freedom of speech and
movement, and participation in the democratic system. Rawls also stressed
the importance of each person having adequate material resources to enjoy
their liberty. He did not argue for material equality, only the existence of suffi-
cient material resources for all. To Rawls, freedom, not equality, is the
paramount priority in politics. Freedom must not be sacrificed in order to
achieve a higher degree of material equality. Nevertheless, Rawls argued for
the existence of a welfare state to ensure that the poorest in society have the
resources to attempt to achieve their greater freedom.
Mill and Berlin: two key thinkers on liberty

We propose here to discuss some of the issues of liberty in relation to the ideas
of John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin. We will offer just a few pointers to their
contribution to the debate on the meaning of freedom.
John Stuart Mill

Mill’s On Liberty (1859) is quite rightly regarded as one of the classical studies
of freedom and liberty in society. His ideas are particularly associated with
concepts of ‘negative freedom’. Mill claimed freedom was the basis for moral
improvement of individuals and society, for truth to be discovered and for
originality and genius to develop to the full. Freedom of choice allowed men
and women to judge what would make them happy, and only individuals, not
the state (however enlightened), could know what makes them happy.
Mill, like most nineteenth-century liberals, perceived a considerable threat to
freedom from the growth of a mass democracy. Individuals were entitled to a
private sphere in which they were able to act and think as they saw fit, one which
would serve as a great buttress against public opinion and the much-feared
‘tyranny of the majority’. Mill made a distinction between actions that affect
only oneself, which do not justify restrictions on them, and actions that affect
others, which may need to be restrained by other individuals and/or the state:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively, in inter-
fering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do so or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise,
or even right. There are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which
it is desired to defer him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The
only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own mind and body, the
individual is sovereign.1
This may seem a very clear-cut distinction. But it is extremely rare that one’s
actions do not have an effect on others. For example, suicide may be thought
the ultimate act of individual freedom; whatever other constraints exist on
one’s freedom one retains the power of deciding to take one’s own life; no other
individual will be injured. However, family, friends and the social networks in
which the individual exists will be deeply affected by a person’s suicide.
Smoking, to give another example, may damage only one’s own health, but
does drain health service resources that might be used elsewhere, so smoking
cannot be considered in isolation from the social consequences of one’s actions.
To Mill, constraints on individuals are only justifiable if they are needed to
protect others from harm. What is immediately apparent is the problem of
defining the nature of ‘harm’. Sometimes the definition of harm is so wide that
Freedom 93
it can be used to excuse any constraint. Most pornography, blasphemy and film
violence for entertainment may not involve harming others directly, but one
might claim that long-term harm to individuals and society arises from lack of
restraint in these areas. Freedom must, to Mill, involve not infringing the
rights and freedoms of other people. Indeed, all Western democracies are
founded on this principle, although the problems of its practical application
are the stuff of modern political debate.
Although Mill’s concept of liberty has been very influential throughout the
English-speaking world in particular, and Western democratic societies in
general, its universal validity is open to doubt. Severely disciplined societies
can also nurture love of truth, integrity and individualism, as witness Ancient
Sparta, Medieval Islam and Calvinist Switzerland during the sixteenth
century. One must point out that the concept of individual freedom is a rather
modern one. Few people before the nineteenth century would have defined
freedom in terms used by Mill or modern liberals.
Isaiah Berlin
In Two Concepts of Liberty (1958) Isaiah Berlin took up the long-standing ideas
of ‘positive freedom’ (or ‘freedom to’ act) and ‘negative freedom’ (or ‘freedom
from’ external restraint).
Positive freedom
This entails people having a choice about their actions. Usually what we
choose to do is what we want to do, but this is not always the case as choices
may be determined by internalised attitudes to social duties, what is the right
thing to do, linked with freedom of conscience. Hence, a very strong
component of positive freedom is the idea of humans being able to strive to
reach their full potential. Positive freedom implies individuals’ capacity to
assert their individuality by means of reason. To enhance their opportunities,
education is vital; the state may give poor people financial and other aid
towards this end, as late nineteenth-century New Liberals, and modern
liberals and socialists have advocated.
Positive freedom reflects the desire of the individual to use his/her own power
and reason to assert themselves against the mass of other people, to stand out,
to strive to achieve their full potential. Self-discipline is a key element in this
view of freedom, involving the suppression of aspects of one’s character that
might interfere with the achievement of the higher self. Positive freedom
involves testing one’s own limits and the constraints society places upon one.
Successful people in all walks of life see freedom in such terms and not in the
rather uninspiring negative form of being simply left alone.
However, positive freedom does have its detractors. Those individuals who are
able to achieve their higher self by assertion of positive freedom are often
unsympathetic to others who, for whatever reason, are unable or unwilling to
pursue a life devoted to self-discovery. All too often positive freedom enables
the few to develop iconic status and dominate others. History is littered with
oppression and coercion inflicted by people who claimed to have achieved
their ‘higher self’ above those they deemed to be
‘inferior’. The positive freedom of the few may libertarian
involve the extinction of the freedom of the many One who puts a very high value
as the history of nationalism, communism, on freedom of the individual.
Extreme libertarians argue for
fascism and religion demonstrates. the removal of the state from
almost all areas of social and
One might argue that the libertarian pursuit of economic life, including health,
power and success, associated with the concept of drug control, education and
positive liberty, is fundamentally immoral as it even policing.
inevitably involves the assertion of the power of
some people over others. One might, however, counter that positive freedom
does not involve such crude forms of self-assertion. Positive freedom when
exercised with reason can liberate people from the pursuit of tawdry baubles
to pursue a ‘higher self’ and goals that do not involve mere pomp and display.
Negative freedom
This is a view of freedom particularly strong among English philosophers.
Liberty cannot be unlimited; law and custom set limits to freedom and give it
shape and meaning. Negative freedom is usually defined as the absence of
restrictions, usually legal, on one’s freedom to act. Restrictions on freedom
must, in this view, be human restrictions and not the consequence of some
natural incapacity or inability to achieve a goal. Under ideas of negative
freedom people are free to do whatever they desire so long as there is no law
or widely accepted standard of public behaviour forbidding them, but laws
and customs must exist to provide some framework within which liberty might
be enjoyed. Liberty should be for all and not just for a few.
Negative freedom is not in itself a ‘negative’ concept in that it is ‘bad’; it entails

the absence of legal or other restraints on choices of action. Law, for example,
enhances the liberty of individuals by protecting them from infringements of
their liberties by others. The ‘minimal’ or ‘caretaker’ state exists as the main
means by which negative freedom is upheld. The state, according to this view,
has no business in laying down frameworks of state education and welfare
benefits, as they undermine the freedom which all individuals have to decide
their own destiny and to make their own choices. Reduction of social disad-
vantages, as under positive freedom, does not enhance freedom but may
undermine it by giving too much potential and actual power to the state.
Freedom 95
People, under negative freedom, have the right to choose options. They must
have as large an area of private life, free of state control or influence, as is
concomitant with public order and this should include freedom of religious views
and opinion, freedom of expression and freedom over property. These areas
should be as free from state interference as possible, as they constitute what
humans cannot give up without offending against the essence of human nature.
Some have argued that negative liberty is rather unsatisfactory as an ideal of
freedom. ‘Freedom from restraint’ lacks the inspiration that positive freedom
can offer to the poor and oppressed to expand their human potential. One
could argue that even some kinds of tyranny might be compatible with negative
liberty: a liberal-minded despot may allow his oppressed people to have large
areas of freedom within the private sphere, so long as they obey the state.
The ideas of positive and negative freedom are not mutually exclusive. Their
practical application to the affairs of society should ensure that freedom
becomes more than a theoretical construct.
Freedom in relation to the state

Freedom is related to the concept of the state. Liberals regard the state as an
institution that represents and defends its members. There should not be any
essential conflict between a state and its individual members, but liberals are
particularly suspicious of state power and its potential threat to the freedom
of the individual. They perceive a fundamental tension and possible conflict
between the individual and the state.
British liberal Herbert Spencer, in Man Versus the State (1884), doubted that
there was a universal conflict between the individual and the state. Spencer
believed that one can identify particular conflicts and that the intensity of
conflicts between individuals and the state may vary over time and from
country to country. Freedom is associated with the development of a
democratic state. The more democratic a state the more opportunities exist for
individuals to influence its policy outcomes and, consequently, the greater the
freedom existing within society. Democratic states should thus seek to reduce
the sources of grievance or hostility within society to ensure good government,
while providing the maximum degree of freedom in society. Ultimately,
however, the state has coercive power over all other sources of power in
society and is in the supreme position to dominate its members and to infringe
their liberty.
There will always be points of conflict between the state and the individual
which raise issues of freedom. Citizens have recourse to law and the courts to
defend freedom in relation to the state and the rule of law. However, political
struggle determines the effectiveness of the rule of law in society. Politics
creates the kind of political culture in a society, the effectiveness of the rule of
law, and the commitment to freedom among its citizens. Anarchists, for
example, argue that the state has no right to interfere with individual liberty,
while fascists, on the other hand, claim that individuals can only know true
freedom when they identify their individual interests with the state. These are
two extremes in the debate on individual liberty. Most political debate on this
issue falls between these two positions. The greater good of the community
may require that some individuals make sacrifices, sacrifices that are imposed
by the state. Some such issues associated with freedom and the state can be
addressed in the following examples:
• conscription and conscientious objection;
• state acquisition of private property;
• civil disobedience and terrorism.
Conscription and conscientious objection

In wars of national survival the state claims the right to conscript its citizens
into the armed forces, train them and expect them to fight and kill for the
greater good of the citizens of the state. Many states claim that citizens should
be expected to serve some time in the armed forces as a natural obligation of
their citizenship. After all, so the argument goes, the liberty of the individual
depends on the effective functioning of the state as the defender of its citizens
against their external enemies. It is reasonable, therefore, for citizens to be
prepared to participate in the defence of the state and undergo military
training to do so.
Western states are steadily giving up conscription. Most allow non-partici-
pation in the armed forces on conscientious and religious grounds. Citizens
who object on principle to training to fight and kill are usually accommodated
in some manner, but it does not exempt them from some form of non-military
national service. Conscription is in one sense a clear infringement of the
principle of individual freedom. It can be argued, however, that freedom
involves responsibilities and recognition of obligations to one’s society, the
society that instils ideas of freedom within us and provides the means by
which freedom can be expressed.
State acquisition of private property

Private property, especially among Western liberals, is considered a vital
element in advancing and protecting freedom against dangers from state
power. However, property is not entirely free from state control or state
takeover. The principle of private property does not preclude the state from
acquiring private property, by compulsion if necessary. Advocates of freedom
argue that four fundamental requirements need to be met for such state action
Freedom 97
to be acceptable: first, that the property is essential for the achievement of

common goals for the good of the whole community, such as the acquisition
of land in wartime for air bases and training camps or the state control of vital
industries; next, that the desirable goals are achievable only by acquisition of
this property; thirdly, that the property acquisition process is clearly enshrined
in law for all to see and, if necessary, challenge; finally, that the owner of the
property will be compensated for its loss and will have first chance to retrieve
the property when it is no longer needed by the state. Nevertheless, there is
the fundamental assumption in most ideas of liberty that, all other things
being equal, the vast bulk of private property will remain in the hands of
private individuals and companies.
Civil disobedience and terrorism

Generally speaking, most theorists on freedom accept that there will be
circumstances in which individuals might be justified in challenging the state
by recourse to methods that are outside the usual structures of the political
process. Civil disobedience and terrorism are
usually seen as being appropriate only in societies civil disobedience
that are not democracies and lack peaceful and The deliberate violation of the
deliberative means of changing law and policies. law, usually in a non-violent
manner to advance a political
Even democracies, however, act at times in some cause. Civil disobedience was
way that suppresses the interests of minorities. used by the Committee of One
Hundred in the 1960s to
Civil disobedience is an assertion of the freedom to promote nuclear disarmament
protest about issues that are being neglected or and in the 1990s by
rights that are being abused. Civil disobedience environmentalist groups
campaigning against road and
can involve the refusal to pay taxes, deliberate
airport development in Britain.
flouting of the law and other acts designed to
demonstrate opposition to a particular policy. As a
political strategy, civil disobedience is intended to raise the public profile of an
issue of concern by seeking publicity and highlighting where, in the view of the
protesters, the government has gone wrong. Those involved in civil disobe-
dience are aware that they are likely to be breaking the law by their campaign.
Indeed, a trial is often sought by campaigners as a platform to gain further
publicity. However, governments may choose to ignore the activities of those
involved in civil disobedience as of little import, unless the campaigners move
towards more violent tactics.
Where civil disobedience has had most impact as a defence of liberty is when
it has been attuned to the aims and objectives of large numbers of people.
Perhaps the most effective example of campaigning civil disobedience in
pursuit of freedom is that organised by Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian
Congress Party for national freedom during the 1930s and 1940s. However,
one might doubt the effectiveness of such campaigning if civil disobedience

had been directed against a regime other than the British Raj. Civil disobe-
dience campaigners in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia were somewhat
ineffectual in defending freedom against these monstrous regimes. The anti-
nuclear campaign in Western Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s
had civil disobedience elements to it. While it failed to stop the deployment of
Pershing and Cruise missiles it did contribute to getting governments to
explain their nuclear strategy when they would rather have kept it a matter of
state secrecy. The Solidarity Movement in Poland used civil disobedience
which eventually helped bring down the corrupt and incompetent communist
regime and began the unravelling of Soviet and communist domination in
Eastern Europe.
Terrorism is a much more controversial political tactic for achieving freedom.
Most people would deny it as a valid means of defending and advancing the
cause of freedom, especially in democracies. Terrorism uses violence to
influence public opinion and state policy in favour of the interests and goals
of the terrorist group. Violence might be directed against the forces of state
power, such as the police, the armed forces or
civil officials, or it might involve attacking civilian
paramilitary
targets in order to create public pressure on the
Paramilitary organisations
government to change policy to the advantage of operate on military lines and
the terrorist group concerned. Even when use force to achieve a political
terrorism achieves some or all of its political goal – e.g., the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) in
goals, it severely damages ideas of liberty and Northern Ireland.
taints the democratic process by demonstrating
that freedom can be achieved by violent means.
After all, if one can bomb and shoot one’s way to the negotiating table with
government why should one pursue electoral politics and attempt to persuade
voters of the rightness of one’s cause?
Paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland have had an enormous
influence on the politics of the Province over the last three decades, arguably
more so than democratic political parties. Some, such as Sinn Fein/PIRA and
some Loyalist paramilitary organisations, have adopted a ‘bullet and ballot
box’ strategy that has paid considerable political dividends in recent years.
Both Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organ-
isations claim they are defending the sectarian PIRA/Sinn Fein
freedom of ‘their’ people against oppression. The PIRA is a terrorist
organisation that seeks to
Some violent organisations, such as those on the
achieve a united Ireland by
fringes of the animal rights movement, see no armed force. It is currently
need to be involved in any democratic action to (2002) on ‘ceasefire’. Sinn Fein
pursue their aims and use violence as a principal is a political party closely
associated with the PIRA.
means of political action.
Freedom 99
Political theorists have rightly concentrated on threats to freedom from the

state. State oppression, because of its potential to be all-embracing, is the
major threat that defenders of liberty have concentrated on challenging. State
oppression has sometimes led to revolution that overthrows the oppressive
state, proclaims freedom, struggles with chaos and, eventually, establishes an
even more oppressive system of dominance. One can interpret the progress of
the French and Russian revolutions as a warning that liberty does not always
follow the end of a particular form of state oppression. Both sought to liberate
people and create freedom for the oppressed majority, and both involved
terror, violence and dictatorship and the extinction of liberty (as Plato and
Hobbes would have predicted).
Freedom and society

Liberty is associated with being ‘ourselves’, whatever that might be. Ideas of
liberty and self-help by citizens derive from their society and from the political
culture they have assimilated. If a sense of the importance of freedom is not
part of a society’s culture, or is not deeply ingrained in the political mores of
citizens and leaders alike, then no amount of talk of liberty and the freedom
enshrined in a well-balanced constitution will protect it from the enemies of
freedom. One can observe this in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Pol Pot’s
Cambodia and a host of tyrannies, large and small, that litter the pages of
twentieth-century history.
Defenders of liberty are usually aware that the state is not the only, or neces-
sarily the most important, threat to freedom. Contrary to the strongly held
beliefs of liberals, one might identify elements within most of us in favour of
compulsion and against liberty. Psychologists often identify the desire to
dominate and the oppressive exercise of power as part of human nature; they
note the ease with which some people will identify with a group or a leader,
abandoning their own judgement. Men in Nazi extermination squads were
often family men and good neighbours, loving fathers and kind to small
animals, but they committed appalling crimes with little sense of their
immorality or their abuse of the lives and freedom of their victims. The cause
of National Socialism was their political god. As Max Stirner, writing in the
1840s, rather chillingly stated: ‘Most people are not looking for freedom at all,
but for a cause to enslave themselves to.’
Community values and morals may influence the formulation of law, but are
not entirely enshrined in law. Normative values such as unpopularity,
ostracism and disapproval do have considerable influence over individuals, in
some cases a coercive influence. To a considerable degree, such values may be
considered important elements in underpinning individual freedom: they
establish constraints on individual behaviour that allow other individuals to
enjoy their freedom, without recourse to law. However, they can become a
source of oppression, imposing restrictions on individual liberty that cannot be
challenged in courts of law but are none the less keenly felt. This may be seen
in school bullying, the shunning of individuals believed to be somehow ‘odd’
or ‘eccentric’ by their ‘normal’ neighbours, or ‘group-think’ and pressures to
conform to the crowd: all are examples of the fundamental fragility of liberty
in social groups.
Restrictions on liberty are needed to avoid licence. Constraints are always
required in society to ensure the existence of freedom for all. Licence is not the
same thing as liberty. Licence is a lack of restraint, an abuse of freedom, a lack
of control and proportion in one’s actions. It is a failure to be aware of the ways
in which one’s actions affect others (however much they may appear initially
only to affect oneself), the consequence of which is the erosion of real liberty.
For example, there are desirable social restrictions on displays of emotions
such as anger, irritation and love – emotions which do not attract legal
sanctions themselves but which can infringe the freedom of others by creating
fear or embarrassment. While one might question the motives of campaigners
for censorship in the arts and information, one might also question the
benefits to society of pornography, violence in film and television, or the idea
that swearing is some fundamental expression of free speech. In themselves
such actions might be regarded as harmless, but they may corrode standards
of behaviour and damage the sense of living in a free and balanced society,
where respect for others is an important element in social relations.
Moral and political principles directly determine a person’s attitudes to liberty.
One should not confuse liberty of thinking with liberty of talking. The latter
can be legally restrained; the former cannot. As we have seen in relation to the
Stoics, the development of a strong set of internal moral values can be the
basis of freedom. One might be able to be free in one’s own mind even in the
most oppressive state and society. However, state and society have many ways
in which the private world of the mind can be colonised and ultimately
controlled by the values of the oppressor. The neat distinction between the
private world of the mind and the public world of society is not today as clear
as was once believed. Modern psychology identified the roots of personality,
modern totalitarian regimes have demonstrated the political means of control
that can be established, and modern advertising techniques mould and manip-
ulate people’s thoughts in favour of values that support capitalist businesses.
A future for freedom

One could easily lapse into despair when one contemplates the crimes and
disasters committed in the name of political programmes claiming to be
defending or advancing the freedom of this or that group, whether they are
Freedom 101
individuals, the nation, a religion or a race. Nevertheless, freedom has a way

of bubbling up through the cracks of even the most oppressive monolith, with
the most ruthless systems of terror and mind control. Luckily for the cause of
human freedom its enemies fail because of the very strengths of free societies,
the ability to question, criticise, challenge and seek out the best options for
social change and experiment, the willingness to change when the facts
change. The triumph of Western liberal democracy towards the end of the
twentieth century has not ended the need to maintain eternal vigilance to
defend the cause of freedom. Perhaps the post-Cold War world has made it
even more important that freedom survives in our own societies with the trivi-
alisation of politics and the manipulations of the advertising industry, the
impact of business interests on government policy and the political ‘spin
doctors’.
Summary
Freedom is a popular cause, and, at first glance, an easy concept to grasp.
However, as soon as we begin to think of whose ‘freedom’, to do what, matters
become more complex. What limits, for example, should there be to freedom
of expression? Does personal freedom imply economic freedom? Is private
property a precondition of political freedom? A number of political philoso-
phers have been concerned with freedom, among the most important being
John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin. Mill propounded a theory of what has
become known as ‘negative freedom’, or freedom from external constraints,
centred on the principle of the ‘sovereign individual’. In his view the citizen
should be completely free to do whatever they want, unrestrained by state or
law, with the key proviso that what they do does not harm others. Berlin
pointed out that for many people freedom was a mere abstraction, of no
relevance to their actual lives. To correct this deficiency, positive freedom has
been proposed – that is, the provision by public authorities of the material
requirements such as healthcare and education that would enable all citizens
to enjoy genuine freedom. Generally speaking, the attitude in the English-
speaking world has been to regard the state as the main potential threat to
freedom, a viewpoint reinforced by the experience of twentieth-century dicta-
torships. Left-wing thinkers have usually argued that the state has a more
positive role to play in the promotion of freedom.
Freedom remains an issue of contemporary relevance. Areas of controversy
include the degree to which the state can legitimately curtail its citizens’
rights; how far the citizen can justifiably resist the commands of the state; and
to what degree a free society depends not on constitutional arrangements but
on widely shared cultural values and moral principles. For some, the twenty-
first century has already witnessed the decisive victory of freedom. Others are
less sanguine. They question whether in Western culture liberty is confused

with licence. They point to the essential triviality of so many of our so-called
‘choices’. Others aver that multi-national corporations operate virtually
without restraint in a worldwide free-trade environment; it is these corpora-
tions, not the state, that now most gravely threaten freedom. Finally, modern
techniques of propaganda have become so skilled and subtle that a real
tyranny of the mind can exist within a superficially liberal democratic society.
1 J.S Mill, On Liberty (1859).
Barker, E. Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford University

Press, 1961).
Berlin, I. ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford
University Press, 1958).
Cranston, M. Freedom: A New Analysis (Longmans, 1954).
Friedman, D. The Machinery of Freedom (Harper and Row, 1973).
Gray, T. Freedom (Macmillan, 1984).
Heywood, A. Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1994), pp.
195–224.
Raphael, D. D. Problems of Political Philosophy (Macmillan, 1990).
Ryan, A. (ed.) The Idea of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1979).
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Which is the most important in modern societies, freedom, equality

or democracy?
2 To what extent is the freedom of individuals in conflict with the

freedom of groups?
3 Is freedom only really possible within a free-market capitalist eco-

nomic system?
4 Is liberty unattainable?
5 ‘Far from inhibiting freedom, state intervention can in fact enhance it.’ Discuss.
6 Which is the best guarantee of freedom, a liberal constitution or a liberal culture?

Equality 5
We now explore the term ‘equality’, defined in two ways: first, that which concerns
equality as a starting point to life; second, equality as an outcome. We also
consider equality before the law, equal political rights and equal social rights.
After that we examine individual and group equality, and equality in terms of the
class structure and international relations. Finally, we discuss the present position
of ‘equality’: has its value decreased in general esteem because of the almost
universal acceptance of liberal capitalism and its emphasis on ‘freedom’ as the
prime political and social goal?
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Why has equality been valued less than liberty in Western societies?
➤ Do recent advances in genetics give the lie to the statement ‘all men are created equal’?
➤ Is absolute equality an unrealisable ideal? If so, is the quest for greater equality of any
value?
➤ Equality of opportunity or equality of outcome – which is more desirable?
➤ In what ways, if any, is a society based on ‘merit’ better than one based on ‘privilege’?
When Adam delved, and Eve span, Who was then the gentleman? (John Ball, Black-
heath Sermon, 1381)
The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread. (Anatole France, The Red Lily, 1894)
‘Equality’ has usually been the poor theoretical relation of ‘liberty’. The former
is usually perceived as less important, less life enhancing and a weaker
rallying call to action than liberty. Nevertheless, equality has been a significant
element in political theory from its Greek beginnings in the fifth century BC
until the present. Plato, for example, denied that men were equal. He observed
that they were endowed with unequal talents and virtues. It was unjust to
treat men as equal when they were patently not equal. Aristotle agreed with
his teacher on the fundamental inequality of men, but he asserted that
equality was a major driving force in politics:
The universal and chief cause of . . . revolutionary feeling . . . (is) the desire of
equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than
themselves; or again the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving
themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less
than their inferiors . . . Now in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the
idea that they are unjustly treated, because as I said before, they are equals, and
have not an equal share, and in democracies the
notables revolt, because they are not equals, and
Levellers
yet have only an equal share.1
A faction of Cromwell’s army
Rebellious medieval peasants, the Levellers and who in the 1640s made
remarkably ‘modern’ political
the Diggers during the political ferment of the demands, including voting
English Civil Wars, and many other oppressed rights for all males who were
people all appealed to equality as a fundamental not servants.
human right and a basis for better treatment by
their social and political superiors (who listened to and then suppressed
them). The American rebels in 1776 declared that ‘all men are created equal’,
but it was for liberty they fought, not equality. No revolutionary declared,
‘Give me equality or give me death’.
Equality became an important feature of politics with the growth of liberalism
and socialism as ideological movements during the nineteenth century. One
forgets today how radical the principle of equality
once was and how deeply held were beliefs in a Diggers
natural hierarchy and human inequality. Liber- A faction in the English Civil
alism stakes a claim for the fundamental equality Wars of the mid-seventeenth
century who set up communes
of rights possessed by all humans as a birthright. on both common land and the
But it was socialism, in its many forms, that land of wealthy men. They
positioned equality at the heart of its ideology advocated the eventual
abolition of private property.
and its programme for social change. Both
Equality 105
movements linked equality with democracy. Unequal societies were declared to

be undemocratic. Democratic societies had to address fundamental social and
economic inequalities if democracy was to have real meaning.
Few modern politicians defend social and political inequality, at least not in
their public pronouncements to a mass electorate. Questions are raised,
however, as to what form of equality should be pursued. Most people support
equality of opportunity, but what does it mean in practice? Is it impossible to
achieve? Should there be greater equality in rewards, or ‘outcomes’, in society?
If so, how much? Does greater equality always means erosion of liberty? If it
does, should liberty be given the higher priority? Are we right to concentrate
on individual equality when people are unequal as a consequence of being a
member of a social group? If equality can best be pursued by extending the
opportunities available to members of oppressed groups, which groups are to
be identified and what are the best ways of creating greater equality for them?
All too often such issues have been raised to disguise a fundamental
opposition to equality and resist reforms made in favour of greater equality.
One can realise, therefore, that equality is a rather complex political and social
issue, one that is worthy of scrutiny.
Equality: a starting point

Complex as the issue of equality is, one can reduce it to two major themes, as
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1754),
attempted:
I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species; one,
which I shall call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and
consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind
or of the soul: and another, which may be called moral or political inequality,
because it depends on a kind of convention, and is established, or at least autho-
rised, by the consent of men. This latter consists of the different privileges which
some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of being more rich, more
honoured, more powerful, or even in a position to exact obedience.2
In other words, one can discern inequalities based on nature and inequalities
that arise out of social factors. Egalitarians, as the supporters of the principle
of greater equality are known, have taken up this idea and identify two kinds
of equality:
● Foundational, or primary, equality: all human beings are claimed to be equal
in some fundamental sense, irrespective of race, creed, class, gender or any
other biological or social characteristics. Human beings are equal because they
are endowed with ‘certain inalienable rights’, a proposition that is open to
question and is often left rather vague.
● Distributional, or secondary, equality: it follows that if all humans are equal,

as foundational equality claims, one must consider how such equality might
be brought about. Society is characterised by a multiplicity of degrees of
inequality, as evinced by the present distribution of wealth, power and status
among people.
Foundational equality appears to assert a statement of fact: all humans are
equal, while distributional equality may be seen as a statement of political
principle: that all people should be equal. These two forms of equality, founda-
tional and distributional, are clearly intertwined. If, for instance, human
beings are not equal in a foundational sense then there is no need to attempt
to reduce social inequalities by distributional means.
If, on the other hand, as liberals and socialists aver, we are all fundamentally
equal in some sense, then social inequalities are not ‘natural’ but come under
the realm of politics and raise the prospects of social change. Social inequal-
ities are thus ‘unjust’. Some people acquire wealth, power and privilege for no
better reasons than the luck of parentage, a win on the National Lottery, or
having natural abilities valued in society – so that an ability to sing, for
instance, or play football to a high standard, will bring massive financial and
other rewards. Egalitarians believe that some inequalities should be removed,
such as hereditary peerages in the House of Lords, and that others, such as
ownership of wealth, should be greatly reduced.
Let us now study each of the forms of equality in turn.
Foundational, or primary, equality

Here are some anti-egalitarian arguments against the idea of foundational
equality and some of the relevant egalitarian retorts.
The major problem with equality as a political principle is that it is very
difficult to establish, especially as a starting point from which to develop a
political programme. Society is patently unequal and opponents of equality
maintain that this is because people are not equal in their innate qualities.
Human beings vary considerably in intelligence, height, physical strength,
artistic and musical skill, and many other attributes. Anti-egalitarians point
out that humans also vary greatly in their capacity for reason and under-
standing. Indeed, if people were treated equally (in whatever manner this
might be defined, such as in terms of legal rights and material rewards) when
they are so obviously unequal, one would not only be ignoring reality but
would also be acting unjustly. Injustice would arise because people with
‘superior’ talent or intelligence, or some other attribute valuable to society,
should not be treated as if they were the same as those without these qualities,
or possessing inferior versions of them.
Equality 107
Egalitarians point out that modern anti-egalitarians have moved from

attacking the principle that people are basically equal in some undefined sense
to questioning the idea of equal rewards for people of equal talent. However,
egalitarians claim that this is merely a tactic by their opponents, who still
believe that people are innately unequal and should be treated as such. Egali-
tarians argue that fundamental equality remains a very important element in
the theoretical discussions about equality, one which has enormous implica-
tions for social and welfare policies.
Most egalitarians distinguish between the principle of human equality, which
applies to all people in all societies, and the reality of the inequalities of rewards
that vary considerably in particular societies, depending on the prevailing
economic, social, political and cultural traditions. Very few egalitarians, in
fact, support a fundamental equality of rewards. However, they accuse anti-
egalitarians of creating a false notion of fundamental equality in order to defeat
it as a principle and so undermine the egalitarian hope of greater social equality
in health, welfare, education, income and property ownership.
Egalitarians therefore make a strong case for fundamental human equality on
the basis of our common humanity. Egalitarians believe that humans resemble
each other more than they differ: all people are born, have lives to live as best
they can, and all will die. Furthermore, all people have, as Jeremy Bentham
and the Utilitarians claimed, an equal capacity to experience pain and
pleasure. Finally, all human beings have some basic capacity to act as moral
agents, to use reason to discover and follow moral laws, to distinguish right
from wrong and to identify their own interest.
From these beliefs derives the principle that all people have equal rights
to what might be summed up as ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’.
One might dispute what these rights are in practice and one must recognise
that they may change over time, but the principle of equal rights is the
issue. If this principle is established, then one can use reason to discern what
these rights might be. Such equal rights might include freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, the right to own property, freedom of association, and so
on. (One can see how this concept of equality is closely associated with the
issue of ‘liberty’.)
The principle of equal rights does not mean the same as equality of rewards or
outcomes; as we have mentioned, few egalitarians would endorse that. One
might have freedom of speech, for example, but it does not mean that all
opinions are of equal validity. Everyone has a right to own property, but the
principle does not mean that all should have an equal amount of property. All
citizens have the vote, but it does not follow that all can equally influence
government policy.
One can discern that the principle of fundamental equality is the basis for a
number of principles in modern societies, principles that shape both political
culture and political and social institutions:
• equal consideration;
• equal opportunities;
• equal voting and participation rights;
• equality before the law;
• equality of welfare and social rights.
Equal consideration
‘Equal consideration’ is a vague notion but it links the principle of fundamental
equality with the fair treatment of people, unless there is some clear and
generally recognised legal or moral reason why they should not be treated
equally. In public institutions all citizens have a right to equal consideration,
as all pay taxes and all are affected by the decisions of government. In private
life everyone is considered to be equally worthy of respect in line with the
‘golden rule’: ‘Treat others as you would yourself wish to be treated.’ This
assertion of the fundamental equality of all humans acts as a defence against
discriminatory and morally wrong policies against innocent individuals and
groups, such as existed under the Nazi regime in Germany and apartheid in
South Africa.
Equal opportunities
A belief in ‘equal opportunities’ points to a basic right of an equal chance for
people to make the most of their talents. It argues, for example, that equal
educational provision is vital if every person is to have such a chance. In
practice, some will work harder than others, some have greater abilities, some
will take advantage of these chances and others will not. But justice will have
been done if such opportunities have been provided. It is important to be clear
that, for most egalitarians, equal opportunities do not automatically translate
into equal rewards. ‘Rewards’ are determined by the value placed on a
particular skill by the prevailing social system. For example, a schoolteacher
and a stockbroker may be equally well educated but the financial rewards for
each are significantly different.
Equal voting and participation rights

‘Democratic equality’ means that all have a fundamental right to participate in
political institutions. Rousseau agreed with Aristotle that political commu-
nities should be as small as possible, allowing all citizens equal participation
in decision-making. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the claims
for democratic equality by women and the working classes would be met, they
Equality 109
believed, through achieving the right to vote. In Britain the principle of ‘one
person, one vote, one value’ was finally established in 1948 when multiple
voting rights were abolished. Supporters of democratic equality doubt that
equality of ‘value’ has in fact been achieved. Parliamentary constituencies are
of unequal size, most are ‘safe’ seats that remain in the hands of one political
party, and the voting system ensures that most MPs and all governments are
elected on minorities of the popular vote. Democratic equality does not exist
in most modern democracies, according to egalitarians, and will not exist until
there is greater devolution of political power to institutions which are closer
to the people and which offer a greater degree of direct democracy than at
present exists.
Equality before the law

‘Legal equality’ is in modern societies the basis for equality in political,
economic and cultural activities. However, this was not always the case. It was
once assumed that inequality in social standing should be reflected in the law.
Nonconformists, Roman Catholics and Jews in Britain did not have the same
legal rights as Anglicans until the late 1820s. Slaves had no right to recourse
to law until 1772. Members of the House of Lords
accused of a serious criminal act could elect to be
Nonconformists
tried by their fellow peers until 1910. The poor
Churches in the Protestant
were excluded from the vote until 1918. Women tradition which in the 1660s did
lacked property rights on the same bases as men not ‘conform’ to the established
until 1870 and were excluded from equal voting church. Non-conformists today
include all mainstream
rights until 1928. Fundamental legal equality is Protestant churches outside the
now accepted as a form of strict equality in any Church of England, such as
democratic society’s legal system. Judges should Baptists, Methodists, Quakers
and Unitarians.
treat all before them equally. Any discrimination
in law has to be made on the grounds of relevant
elements in the case and all similar cases should be treated alike. Equality
before the law as a principle is not, however, balanced by an equal power to
exercise legal equality because of the sheer expense of going to law and the
very unequal distribution of wealth in society. As Lord Justice Darling said in
1920: ‘The law courts of England are open to all men, like the doors of the Ritz
Hotel’. Legal aid schemes exist in most modern societies to ensure that the
poor get legal advice and some degree of equal access to the law.
Equality of welfare and social rights

‘Equal welfare and social rights’ are viewed as vital elements in fundamental
equality. Strictly speaking, one should include these under ‘distributional
equality’ as they involve some degree of equalising wealth and power in
society. The egalitarian principle, however, is relevant here and is quite
straightforward. All citizens pay taxes to support health, educational and

welfare systems provided by the state. All citizens, therefore, whatever their
personal wealth, have an equal right to a range of benefits constituting a
‘citizenship package’. This package includes child benefit, state pensions,
disability benefits, unemployment payments and access to health, education
and social services. Citizens may claim other ‘means-tested’ benefits on the
basis of an assessment of their assets. If, however, citizens choose to exercise
their freedom and pay for private health and education, for example, it does
not entitle them to reduce their contributions to the state scheme, nor does it
disqualify them from access to state provision.
Anti-egalitarians have not given up the attack on egalitarianism as a principle
even though a strong element of egalitarianism has been introduced into
modern societies. They doubt the existence of fundamental equality by
claiming that modern genetic science provides evidence of innate human
inequality. Geneticists have been demonstrating
that some human characteristics previously egalitarianism
believed to have been social in their origins now The belief that social equality is
lie in a person’s genetic make-up. Individual intel- the main political good.
ligence, for example, may owe a great deal more
to genetics than was previously assumed and thus a great deal less to social
influences. If genetics are the fundamental determinant of human inequality
then, obviously, calls for social engineering to reduce or remove inequalities
are doomed to fail.
Egalitarians challenge the implications for morality and fundamental equality

of scientific developments that are as yet in their infancy. Genetic differences,
they assert, no more justify social inequality than does the long-established
genetic basis for hair colour, skin colour or gender, or whether one has blue or
brown eyes. People still have fundamental equality irrespective of genetic
make-up. Whatever the role of science and technology in advancing genetics
and its application to the overcoming of biological inequalities, the funda-
mental moral equality of people remains unchanged.
In the opinion of anti-egalitarians, foundational equality contributes to the

undermining of social order. If people are equal, and are conscious of being so,
the authority of those in command will be undermined. Authority requires
from the mass of the population the recognition of the basic inequality of
humans in a hierarchy of social and political power.
Egalitarians challenge the view that good government and social order require
fundamental inequality, which in their view is little more than a ‘political
myth’ that serves the interests of those who are against greater equality and
democracy. Politicians, police and other functionaries of government derive
their authority in modern societies, so egalitarians assert, from merit and
Equality 111
competitive recruitment rather than from appealing to an underlying

inequality of people.
Anti-egalitarians claim that the recognition of natural inequality among
people benefits all in society. The moral and religious bases of human equality
might be acceptable, declare the critics of fundamental equality, but
inequality is a powerful engine in the improvement of civilisation, art, culture,
science, and so on. The resultant social progress benefits everyone and
not just the ‘elite’, even if the latter get greater rewards. (If they do so, it is
because they deserve such rewards for their crucial role in leading and
improving society.)
Egalitarians challenge the idea that culture and progress is an inevitable by-
product of fundamental inequality. The social inequalities that create ‘high’
culture and ‘progress’ do not, they argue, undermine the egalitarian premise
that humans are fundamentally equal in their capacity or potential to enjoy
high culture or contribute to progress. There are some egalitarians who would
deny that some forms of cultural expression are ‘better’ than others and that
‘progress’ is to be applauded.
Most egalitarians claim that fundamental equality exists. Some, however, do
not think that the existence or not of an innate right to equality is important
to the egalitarian case. One must look, they claim, to the social inequalities
created by man in a practical analysis of society, rather than merely debating
theoretical ones. Many egalitarians doubt that rights of any kind, let alone
equality, are inherent in humans by virtue of their common humanity.
According to most modern egalitarians equality, or the lack of it, corresponds
to the social conditions of real people, in actual social circumstances. In this
view, equality is exclusively related to the level of opportunity available in a
society. Nobody can reasonably object to a person possessing greater natural
abilities than another. However, one can reasonably object to a society where
some people acquire opportunities to develop their talents, while other people
are denied such opportunities on the grounds of class, gender, race or some
other socially determined inequalities. We will now examine how these
inequalities might be rectified or moderated.
Distributional, or secondary, equality

If inequality is a consequence of nature, little can be done to alleviate it; if,
however, society is responsible, equality can be promoted by changing social
conditions and providing the means for people to realise their full potential.
The two major areas governed by distributional equality are equality of oppor-
tunity and equality of outcome.
Equality of opportunity
Egalitarians claim that the absence of equal opportunities programmes, or
their ineffective implementation, is morally unjust and economically ineffi-
cient. It is unjust that people are unable to have the chances to realise what
they are capable of and inefficient that talent is wasted while the less able,
but more privileged, get access to economic and political power they are
incapable of using effectively. Society is damaged by inequality. It is less
prosperous than it might be and less united, less cohesive. Political action is
required to rectify this undesirable situation: ‘Because men are men social
institutions . . . should be planned, as far as possible, to emphasise and
strengthen, not the . . . differences which divide, but the common humanity
which unites, them’.3
This principle is generally accepted across the political spectrum. Conser-

vatism (a political stance not usually associated with equality) claims
‘equality of opportunity’ as a desirable goal of social policy. Conservatives
advocate a ‘levelling up’ rather than a ‘levelling down’ (as they accuse their
leftist opponents of wanting), if for no other reason than claiming to be inter-
ested in ‘equality’ to attract votes. However, they would be opposed to the
rise in taxes needed to give all schoolchildren the resources of their counter-
parts at Eton.
Nevertheless, both Labour and Conservative governments since the Second

World War have steadily increased public spending (with concomitant tax
rises), providing greater equal opportunities through welfare state policies
that originated in the 1940s. Members of all political parties (and none)
created the bases for the egalitarian nature of the post-war consensus in
welfare, education, employment and health.
William Beveridge (a New Liberal) produced his 1942 report, Full Employment
in a Free Society, on the provision of ‘cradle to grave’ welfare protection within
a National Insurance scheme and universal benefits for all citizens irrespective
of wealth or poverty. Conservative politician R. A. Butler’s Education Act
(1944) created an education system based on elitism but with greater equality
of educational provision and more opportunities for children than had ever
existed. J. M. Keynes (another New Liberal) produced an employment white
paper (1944) which committed governments to maintaining full employment
using state economic intervention. Finally, the Labour Government introduced
the National Health Service Act (1946) to establish a greater equality of health
provision in Britain than had ever existed before.
All of these measures, influenced by principles of collectivism, were related to

increasing equal opportunity in society along distributional lines. All involved
creating a united society around common institutions guaranteeing an
Equality 113
equality of basic services, available to all on the

collectivism
basis of need.
The belief that co-operative
effort is the best way to
However admirable these institutions (and their
achieve human goals; often
counterparts in other countries) may be, egali- taken to imply common
tarians realise that people have a different ownership of property.
starting point in life. Advantages of income,
parental education, social environment and so on, ensure that some
individuals have greater opportunities for achievement than others do. Equal
opportunity ideals might have influenced the welfare state and some aspects
of government policy for decades now but massive inequalities of opportunity
remain in British society, inequalities that are unlikely to be significantly
reduced without unacceptably high levels of state interference in family life
and personal liberty.
Equality of outcome
‘Merit’ may well be the modern basis of rewards and achievement in society
but equality of opportunity, even if it were possible, does not justify equality
of rewards. As Margaret Thatcher once bluntly stated: ‘What is equality of
opportunity if it is not the opportunity to be unequal?’ Few egalitarians would
disagree with her.
It is a matter of equality and justice that people should get paid the same for
the same work and for work of equal worth without reference to personal
characteristics of age, gender or race. Few egalitarians would support the idea
of equal rewards for unequal work. Such a policy, most believe, would be
unnatural and unjust and would remove incentives for effort and ability, incen-
tives vital for the economic and cultural advancement of society. Obviously,
most egalitarians would be in favour of a basic wage, a ‘minimum wage’, to
ensure an equal starting point for income and to enable people to fulfil their
basic needs of food, clothing, shelter and warmth. Most egalitarians would
also favour a ‘maximum wage’ and taxes to reduce levels of wealth accumu-
lation. As Rousseau declared in The Social Contract (1762): ‘no citizen shall be
rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself’.4
Some egalitarians argue that such policies would help the rich by reducing the
burden of wealth and the dangers of corruption associated with it.
Greater equality in outcomes, but not total equality, does seem to have social
benefits. Scandinavian countries have very high levels of taxation on income
and wealth and very high levels of distributional equality. Such societies do
appear to have lower levels of crime, higher levels of social cohesion and more
harmonious social relations than countries with greater social and economic
inequalities, such as the USA and the UK. Indeed, there is little evidence to
support the anti-egalitarian view that such societies lack incentives for effort
or are less free than Britain and the USA. Neither is there much to support the
Marxist contention that inequality will only be removed when private property
has been abolished. No Scandinavian country has supported the abolition of
private property and unequal incomes in pursuit of greater social equality.
Group rights and equality

The discussion so far has concentrated on the essentially liberal doctrine of
equal rights as being inherent in individuals. This principle was not generally
accepted at the beginning of the nineteenth century but had been established
in modern societies by the mid-twentieth century. For about 150 years political
debate centred on the degree to which individual equality should or could be
advanced by state intervention in health, education and welfare.
A great deal of equality was achieved by the creation of welfare systems,
greater educational opportunities and access to healthcare. However, egali-
tarians became increasingly dissatisfied as the persistent inequalities in society
blunted equality of opportunity for many people who were female, non-white
or working class. Many women and many black and working-class people
continue to succeed in Western societies, but fundamental inequalities remain
for people as members of these and other social groups. Over the last thirty
years or so there has developed the concept of ‘group rights’ to tackle these
forms of inequality in society:
• gender equality;
• racial equality;
• class equality.
Gender equality
Feminists perceive debate about equality as being about equality between
males. They point out that Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau and most political
philosophers, regarded women as fundamentally inferior and not entitled to
share equal democratic citizenship with men. Most feminists strongly believe
that formal legal and political equality, finally achieved in Britain by the late
1920s, did not remove the remaining deep inequalities for women in income
and career opportunities. From the early 1960s feminists campaigned with
success for legal measures to advance female equality. In Britain a number of
Acts of Parliament established a legal basis for female equality: the Equal Pay
Act (1970) and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) are the most prominent.
However, great inequalities remain for women in job security, pay and career
advancement. Mere legal reforms do not appear to have advanced women’s
equality as significantly or swiftly as feminists want. The struggle for gender
equality goes on.
Equality 115
Racial equality
Few people outside the fascistic right would today claim that ethnic and racial
groups are fundamentally inferior. Nevertheless British society does distribute
rewards and penalties in a very unequal manner that results in most black and
Asian people having higher levels of unemployment, lower incomes and greater
overall poverty that their white neighbours. Black Britons have a higher rate of
incarceration in prisons than white Britons and tend to serve longer sentences
for the same offences. Legislation, from the Race Relations Act (1968) onwards,
has removed most forms of overt discrimination from British society. But covert
forms of discrimination continue to exist (usually called ‘institutional’ racism)
and impede the development of non-white people in Britain.
Class equality
Marxists and the political left tend to believe that the fundamental problem of
equality in society is the product of social class and the privileges and disad-
vantages that it confers. Class, rather than gender, race or some other group
classification, is the major cause of inequality in society. An Asian businessman
or female barrister does not have the same interests as an unskilled Asian
textile worker or a part-time woman office cleaner. Address the issue of
continuing class inequality in modern society and all the other issues of
economic and social discrimination will be alleviated. This type of inequality
is particularly related to the distributional equality discussed earlier.
The exercising of group rights and group equality seems to undermine the
liberal concept of individual rights and individual equality as the central
concern of political discourse. Group-rights theorists argue for unequal
treatment for women and ethnic or racial minorities to overcome their
unequal treatment in society. One might have ‘quotas’ of women and non-
whites in education or job appointments to reflect their numbers in society.
Such a policy might be combined with ‘positive discrimination’ to offer oppor-
tunities to groups who have suffered past discrimination and disadvantage if
other things are equal between candidates.
However, critics argue that the selection of such ‘disadvantaged’ groups is
often rather arbitrary and favours those who can ‘shout the loudest’. They also
claim that ‘equal opportunities’ doctrines do little to help those who are disad-
vantaged but provides many opportunities for those who get jobs in the race
relations and equal opportunities ‘industry’. Finally, critics believe that
equality as a principle is undermined by making some groups more ‘equal’
than others on the grounds of race or sex. They claim that ‘positive discrimi-
nation’, as this principle is called, causes resentment among those who are not
‘privileged’ to be members of a ‘disadvantaged’ group. Group equality will
remain as an issue in contemporary political debate.
Equality in international society

We have observed the issue of equality as it pertains to individuals and groups.
This principle also applies to international society, where the members of the
community are not individuals but nations and sovereign states. We have
discussed the issues surrounding national self-determination and state sover-
eignty elsewhere, but it is worth mentioning them again here.
National self-determination refers to the principle that all nations have an
equal right to be independent and self-governing – free, that is, of being ruled
by people from another nation within an empire. Nations are notoriously
difficult to define, but one might describe them as a body of people having
some shared sense of belonging together by dint of language, history, culture,
geographical proximity and so on.
National self-determination was a rallying cause of nationalists within the
Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires during the nineteenth century. At the
Versailles Peace Treaty (1919) this principle was enshrined in international
law (although it only initially applied to nations within the defeated powers,
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey). After the Second World War national
self-determination was used by nationalists in European colonial empires to
demand independence. In the modern world the equality of nations is a
principle that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
disintegration of Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. It remains a major
principle in international law and politics.
States are recognised as sovereign legal entities in international society. This
is a very important principle on which international law and international
institutions, such as the European Union and the United Nations, rest. The UN
General Assembly, for example, enshrines this legal equality in the principle of
‘one state, one vote’. However, as in domestic society, there are great differ-
ences between the principle of equality and the notable differences in power
existing between members of that society. States are unequal in their military
capacity, economic power and technological prowess. This guarantees a
massive inequality in the ability of states to protect and advance their interests
in international society.
The principle of state equality before international law remains. However,
states are obliged to obey only those laws that they have agreed to in an inter-
national treaty. Even then, a state can give notice if it intends to withdraw
from a treaty, or if national security precludes its involvement in a particular
court case. States are not subject to a higher authority in international law.
The power of strong states has to be recognised by weaker ones. But no legal
authority exists over one state by another, unless by an agreed international
treaty, unlike in domestic society where the state imposes a legal equality on
all individual and group members.
Equality 117
It is to domestic society that we must return to conclude our discussion of

equality.
The decline of equality

It is to be hoped that by now you will be aware that equality is an important
issue in political discourse. Nevertheless, as we stated right at the start of this
chapter, equality remains the ‘poor relation’ of liberty in political theory.
Freedom is always a more appealing concept than equality. If anything, the last
quarter of a century or so has seen a decline in the fortunes of equality and a
rise in those of liberty in modern political struggle. Why might this be so? We
shall suggest a number of reasons, although they are by no means an
exhaustive collection.
Western societies are permeated by ideological beliefs and social structures
that militate against equality, especially collectivist measures to enhance
equality. Individual ‘liberty’ and ‘choice’ remain the dominant ideology, and
social policies reflect this. Egalitarian policies and institutions have a limited
role in comparison. The ideological stress on freedom over equality ensures that
the most powerful economic and social forces are those of the capitalist free
market. Public-sector services are perceived as merely a safety net for when the
private option is unavailable or too expensive. No British government has been
willing to reduce tax and other incentives to, say, private health and educa-
tional provision let alone take steps to abolish them. No government has been
prepared to raise taxes to the level needed to provide resources sufficient to
make state services so attractive that private provision ‘withers on the vine’. In
fact the trend in recent decades has been to extend the role of the private sector
in the provision of health, education and pension provision.
Most politicians and also the public place a greater priority on liberty over
equality in their policy preferences. There is no great constituency among
voters for extending state provision and raising taxes to pay for it, with the
possible exception of the health service. This, of course, may simply be a
reflection of the powerful anti-egalitarian ideological elements in Western
societies. It may, however, be more the result of the growth of new class and
income structures in society that reinforce a commitment to liberty rather
than equality. Big industries with large workforces, infused with collectivist
and egalitarian beliefs (industries such as coal, steel, shipbuilding, heavy
engineering), have largely disappeared, to be replaced by a growing white-
collar and professional sector, non-unionised and influenced by individualist
ideological assumptions, including the priority of freedom over equality. The
‘new’ workers in the expanding middle classes do not believe that increasing
taxes to pay for greater redistribution in pursuit of greater social equality –
taxes they would largely have to find – would be in their interests, and
middle-class voters have considerable power to ensure that their interests

are protected.
Scepticism among voters about egalitarian policies is reinforced by their
awareness that the tax burden to pay for redistributive policies tends to fall on
the poor and middle-income groups. In Britain, for example, there is an upper
limit on the amount people pay in National Insurance contributions, an
amount which remains the same above a prescribed income level. Despite
some minor changes in the National Insurance ceiling announced in the 2002
Budget, higher earners pay proportionally less of their income on welfare
payments than others, hardly an egalitarian measure. Many studies of the
welfare state reveal that middle-income people and the better off benefit
disproportionately from the welfare state: they are more likely to stay on in
education, demand more from the health services, and draw their state
pensions for longer than the poor.
In Britain and most other Western societies there has been little effort to
challenge dominant ideological assumptions that militate against equality.
Similarly there has been little effort by governments to tackle the sources of
inequality in society. There has been no sustained challenge to economic and
social inequalities, most of which originate in the capitalist and private
sectors. In fact, state and welfare systems are viewed as a drain on the
productive private sector of the economy and as weakening initiative and
effort, especially of the poor (an idea that has changed little since the Poor
Law reforms of the early nineteenth century). There has been little attempt to
integrate the public and private sectors to increase social equality and little
desire to do so.
One can set declining interest in equality in Britain within an international
context. The decline and fall of the Soviet Union removed a major force for
equality in the West. The USSR was oppressive, bureaucratic and a disaster for
its own working class. But it was of great benefit to the Western working
classes as their governments created welfare systems to ‘tame’ capitalism and
make it more attractive in comparison to the socialist alternative in the East.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism exposed not only the
bankruptcy of socialism but also the apparent failure of egalitarian policies as
pursued by the Soviet Union. The globalised economy of the post-Cold War
world has been dominated by the USA and large corporations. Acting on free-
market principles, it has reinforced inequality both within societies and
between nations and regions.
There seems little likelihood that equality will move up the political agenda in
the foreseeable future, but the problems remain. Social inequality and poverty
in Western societies are sources of instability and crime, insecurity and fear
that will have to be addressed at some point. Similarly, the increasing
Equality 119
inequality between people in different countries is one source of war, distur-

bance and mass migration that will also have to be alleviated if the hopes of a
peaceful and prosperous world stand any chance of being realised in the
twenty-first century.
Summary
Equality is a word capable of several different meanings. One can speak of
‘primary’ equality, which is the claim that, whatever the actual circumstances,
all human beings are ‘equal’ by virtue of being human. However, even if this
is conceded, it has little practical consequence unless one accepts a range of
other ‘equalities’ such as equality of consideration, equality before the law,
political equality and equal opportunities. These different forms of equality
have proved highly contentious. One of the main divisions lies between those
who advocate equality of outcome and those who favour equality of oppor-
tunity. Equality of opportunity may be a fine thing, but it must include the
opportunity for unequal outcomes if liberty is to be respected. Equality as a
goal of social policy seems currently to be out of fashion, though in the West
there is a general consensus on the desirability of such ‘group’ equalities as
gender equality and race equality which are important elements in achieving
greater liberty for disadvantaged groups.
1 Aristotle, The Politics (1236–7).

2 Rousseau, J.-J. A Discourse on the Origin of Equality (1754).
3 Tawney, R. H. Equality (Allen and Unwin, 1931).
4 Rousseau, J.-J. The Social Contract (1792).
Barker, J. Arguing for Equality (Verso, 1987).

Heywood, A. ‘Equality’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideas and Concept:
An Introduction (Macmillan, 1994), pp. 225–35.
Lucas, J. R. ‘Against Equality’, in H. A. Bedau (ed.), Justice and Equality (Prentice-Hall,
1971).
Rae, D. Equalities (Harvard University Press, 1981).
Raphael, D. D. Problems of Political Philosophy (Macmillan, 1984).
Rees, J. C. Equality (Macmillan, 1972).
Tawney, R. H. Equality (Allen and Unwin, 1931).
Wilding, P. ‘Equality in British Social Policy Since the War’, Talking Politics, 2:2
(1989/90), pp. 54–8.
Williams, B. ‘The Idea of Equality’, in H. A. Bedau (ed.), Justice and Equality (Prentice-
Hall, 1971).
Williams, B. ‘The Idea of Equality’, in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, Philosophy, Politics
and Society (Blackwell, 1972).
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 To what extent is inequality incompatible with democracy?
2 Is ‘equality before the law’ a ‘fig leaf’ concealing the privileges of

the rich?
3 To what extent and in what ways do British political parties differ in

their commitment to equality?
4 Is it possible to make a serious case for the existence of primary equality? Is this not
merely a figment of the imagination of political and social idealists?
5 ‘The concept of group inequality, and the need to rectify supposed injustices based on
this idea, is a dangerous distraction from the essential issue of creating the conditions
for greater equality between individuals.’ Discuss.
Rights, obligations and
citizenship 6
Three related concepts are addressed here: rights, obligations and citizenship.
We first consider the development of the concept of ‘rights’ as being intrinsic to
human beings because they are human. Different interpretations of the term
‘rights’ are discussed together with some of the controversies which surround the
issue at the present. Next we analyse the idea of ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’, notably the
obligations the citizen is said to owe to society and to the government. Various
theories of such obligation are examined. We look at the currently fashionable
idea of ‘citizenship’, and the various ways in which the term is used. Lastly, we
reflect upon the implications of the present British government’s promotion of
‘citizenship’.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Is it reasonable to claim that there are universal human rights that should be upheld by
all governments?
➤ Should ‘positive’ rights be included among universal human rights since their obser-
vance depends on resources beyond the scope of most governments?
➤ Has the experience of totalitarianism confirmed the traditional liberal view that the main
threat to human rights comes from the state?
➤ Does acceptance of ‘rights’ automatically imply an acceptance of duties?
➤ To whom or what is the citizen’s highest duty owed?
➤ Does the term ‘citizenship’ imply both legal rights and social obligations?
➤ Does the government’s emphasis on the duties of citizenship conceal the possibility that
it is reneging on its own duties?
Wherever there is a human being, I see God-given rights inherent in that being,
whatever may be the sex or complexion. (William Lloyd Garrison, Life, 1885–89)
All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority
is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the
minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate
would be oppression. (Thomas Jefferson, first inaugural address, 4 March 1801)
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. (Article 1, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948)
Rights
The concept of ‘rights’ is nowadays so familiar, and so intertwined with that of
‘democracy’, so much part of everyday usage and serious political discourse
that it is surprising to discover that ‘rights’ in the modern sense are very much
a creation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Although today ‘democracy’ is universally assumed to presuppose the
existence of ‘rights’, the democracy of the Greek city-states functioned without
this concept at all. Certainly, there were some people who had the right to
vote, but this was because they were ‘citizens’; the franchise was by no means
universal, and only male citizens had the vote.
In feudal times there was certainly a notion of rights but the word ‘right’ was
closer in meaning to our modern idea of ‘property’. Individuals and groups
had rights to do various things – to hold markets,
to graze animals on specific common lands – but feudalism
these rights were specific to them as individuals. A social structure based on
They did not enjoy them because they were strict social differentiation and
involving rigid reciprocal rights
citizens, still less because they were human and obligations. Feudalism was
beings. Medieval society was a complex tapestry the social structure of medieval
of such rights; rights which also often involved Europe.
duties, such as providing monies or armed forces
for their lord or king. As late as the English Civil Wars of 1642–49, Parliament’s
stand against the king was justified as a defence of ‘ancient and undoubted
rights and privileges’.
The whole business of rights has in fact been a greater source of controversy
than their currently fashionable acceptance would suggest. Eighteenth-century
conservative thinkers vigorously contested concepts of the ‘rights of man’, most
notably Edmund Burke. Burke argued that rights did not exist in the abstract
as ‘human rights’, but only in the concrete and specific world of a political
system. One could certainly enjoy rights as an Englishman or a Frenchman, as
the subject of a state, but not as ‘man’ in general. Socialist thinkers were also,
at least initially, less than enthusiastic about rights, particularly individual
rights. Like Burke they tended to emphasise group rights, in this case the rights
Rights, obligations and citizenship 123
of the working class or trade unions. The far left tended to dismiss the whole
idea of individual rights as a disguise for the actual exploitation of the working
classes, whatever theoretical ‘individual’ rights they might enjoy. Thus while
liberals argued for the individual’s right to enter into economic relations, to
make bargains and contracts, socialists argued that the possession of such
rights ignored the plain fact that the ‘playing field’ was far from level. In fact,
it was tilted steeply against the working class, whose relative social and
political weakness made bargaining with employers unequal.
Events in the twentieth century were to modify this belief drastically. Liberals
were forced by the inter-war slump to realise that individualism was not
enough. The atrocities of the Nazi period forced conservative thinkers to
accept that there were real ‘human’ rights. The experience of Soviet-style
communism led the left, even the far left, to a reluctant acquiescence in recog-
nising the importance of upholding individual rights as a defence against the
might of totalitarian regimes.
Thus the post-war period was notable for a plethora of proclamations of
‘rights’. Human rights were espoused by the Vatican and adopted by the United
Nations. Even the British, suspicious of legalistic positive rights, eventually
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into law. The UK was
the first to sign the Convention in 1950 and the last to adopt it as part of its
domestic law in 2000. Political demands were often articulated in the language
of rights: minority rights, women’s rights, gay rights, even animal rights. There
were assertions of national ‘rights to self-determination’ after the First World
War, the right to suicide, rights to ingest harmful drugs, the ‘right to choose’ (to
have an abortion), and so on. Ordinary speech soon translated wishes into the
language of rights – the right to have children, to various forms of sexual
experience, to foreign travel and to self-expression and discovery.
Such language actually tended to debase the whole concept of rights and rob
it of meaning.
Moreover, it soon became apparent that simply upholding rights was by no
means an uncontentious formula for government action. Rights became
highly contentious, as it soon became apparent that there was no universal
agreement as to what specific legal or civil rights there should be. Should
women, for example, have an exclusive ‘right to choose’ to have an abortion
or not? Such a right would conflict with a child’s ‘right to life’, the right of the
father to a say over the welfare of his progeny, and the right of society to
ensure sufficient citizens are produced to guarantee its survival. Many other
controversial issues spring to mind. Are rights absolute? Does the right to life
extend to all persons in all circumstances? If one has a right to life, does one
also have the right to end it? Where do the right to freedom of speech end and
the right to privacy, and to freedom from racial harassment, begin?
If anything, an appeal to alleged rights does not end controversy; it merely

gives it a powerful emotional charge.
Further difficulties have arisen as philosophers have tried to establish the
rational basis of human rights. John Locke, for example, argued that human
rights are ‘God-given’, but modern secularisation has lessened the impact of
this assertion. Man’s claim to special treatment among living things by virtue
of his capacity for moral choice, his intellectual pre-eminence and his manifest
superiority to the animal kingdom, has been shaken by scientific advances. As
a result, some argue for animal rights to be as valid as a human’s and that man
has a moral obligation to observe them. In fact, animal rights campaigners
question the entire legitimacy of a political system based on rights that apply
only to humans.
The nature of rights

At this point it might be useful to distinguish between various kinds of rights.
Four types can be suggested:
• ‘natural’ and ‘human’ rights;
• legal rights;
• civil rights;
• welfare rights.
‘Natural’ and ‘human’ rights

Natural or, in today’s terminology, human rights are held by people as part of
their very humanity. They are a gift from God or nature to every human being.
The state is the guardian of such rights, not the creator of them. To deprive
human beings of such rights is therefore morally wrong. Governments are
obliged to uphold these rights; if a government does not, it acts immorally.
The most articulate early exponent of this view was John Locke, writing in the
late seventeenth century. In his Two Treatises on Government (1690) he
itemised these rights as ‘Life, Liberty and Property’. Eighty-six years later,
Thomas Jefferson wrote this principle into the American Declaration of
Independence as ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’. This proclamation
of the centrality of rights in the system of government implied that
government was ‘good’ in so far as it observed these rights, a doctrine which
had important consequences for the institutions of government, and for the
principles of which they were the expression. One such principle is the
‘separation of powers’ in the US Constitution which has separate bodies for the
legislature (Congress), executive (President), and judiciary (Supreme Court).
The framers of the American Constitution further assumed that limited
government would be in practice essential if rights were to be preserved.
Moreover, the whole legitimacy of the American War of Independence itself
was predicated on the assumption that ‘rights’ are essential to decent human
existence – so essential, in fact, that there was in nature itself another ‘right’,
the right to rebel: ‘whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these Ends it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to initiate new
government’ (Declaration of Independence, 1776).
Legal rights
Legal rights are those which are enforceable in courts of law. These may derive
from natural rights but are not identical to them. Thus, for example, a child
might be said to have the human right to life, but not the legal right to vote or
dispose of property.
Civil rights
The term civil rights is sometimes applied to legal rights but more often refers
to rights which do not actually exist in law but which in some sense ought to
exist, or to rights which may exist on paper but not in reality. Civil rights are
held to be essential for the satisfactory functioning of society. Thus the civil
rights movement in America in the 1960s campaigned for non-discrimination
towards African-Americans in education, transport and restaurant facilities. In
Northern Ireland the civil rights movement of the late 1960s campaigned for
a wide measure of social justice in housing and jobs, as well as in ‘genuine’
democratic institutions and non-sectarian policing.
Welfare rights
Welfare rights include the right to employment, education and adequate
healthcare. Such rights are, it is claimed, ‘positive’ rights, as opposed to the
‘negative’ rights that protect the individual from the actions of a tyrannical
state. As has been suggested, the liberal approach to rights, exemplified by
Locke and, later, J. S. Mill, assumes that the greatest potential threat to rights
is the state – the state whose prime function ought to be the very protection
of these rights.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though, many thinkers
had come to regard this fear of the state as misplaced. The real threat to vast
numbers of people, they argued, is not the state but powerful institutions and
ingrained economic and social forces before which the ordinary citizen is
powerless. This understanding implied a positive role for the state as the
guarantor and even provider of welfare rights.
This new conception of rights has had a major influence on the European
Union. In 1989 the Commission proposed a draft ‘Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights’, concerned with conditions of work, minimum wage rates, equal
opportunities and so on. That charter was eventually incorporated into the
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) as the ‘Social Chapter’.
The reappraisal of rights and the role of the state in providing them have not
been without controversy. Some have argued that these are not ‘rights’ in the
usual sense at all, since they are contingent on the state’s actually being able
to supply them. If they are rights at all, they are better described as ‘aspira-
tional rights’; in other words, they are desirable objectives but not necessarily
ones that are possible to implement practically.
Obligations
Although much attention has been paid to ‘rights’ in recent years, some consid-
eration is now being given to ‘duties’ (or, as it has become more usual to call
them, ‘obligations’). The implicit assumption is that rights need to be balanced
by duties. Historically, the left has been more anxious to stress rights;
nowadays even the liberal left has focused on duties. In part this is a conse-
quence of the development of the belief in ‘civil society’, the network of family,
voluntary and informal groups and activities that underpin a decent society.
This belief derives partly from a reaction to the rampant individualism of the
Thatcher years. Another source of this belief is an analysis of the weaknesses
of the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe, regimes in which there
were no intermediate stages, no buffer, between the state and the individual.
Since 2000 both the Labour and Conservative parties in Britain have stressed the
need for people to recognise their public duties and to act upon this recognition.
The nature of obligations

As with rights, the terms duties and obligations cover a number of rather
different concepts, which may be summarised as follows:
• moral obligations;
• legal obligations;
• civic obligations;
• social obligations.
Moral obligations
Moral obligations are the things people ought to do because in some sense
they owe such actions to God, to others or to themselves. Thus there is a moral
obligation to speak the truth, to help others in need, to refrain from adultery,
and so on. These obligations are not enforceable by law in Britain (although
in some countries they are: adultery is illegal in Saudi Arabia; failing to assist
an injured person is illegal in Spain). Moral obligations do, however, often
become the basis of legal obligations, as the foregoing examples illustrate.
Legal obligations
Legal obligations are things one has to do which are enforceable in the courts,
such as paying one’s taxes and driving only when in possession of a valid
driving licence. Such obligations are closely linked to state sovereignty.
Citizens and other individuals resident in the territory of a state are under an
obligation to obey the laws of that state.
Civic obligations
Civic obligations are actions we should perform as a tribute to the rights we
enjoy as part of a political community. We may be said to have the right to vote
and also the civic obligation to do so. (In some countries, such as Australia,
this is a legal obligation which incurs a fine if breached.)
Social obligations
Social obligations are an extension of civic obligations. They involve a broadly
similar concept but have wider application. They include those obligations we
owe to society that contribute to the general good. Such duties are only
tangentially linked to specific rights. For example, one might claim the right
to have children and decide on their education. The concomitant obligation
would be to bring them up properly, as good citizens, introduce them into the
culture of their society, and teach them right from wrong. Such obligations can
be discharged on a personal and an individual basis. The present British
government encourages people to fulfil their obligations by operating within
groups and organisations of all kinds; for example, the obligation of childcare
can include the care of other children besides one’s own, by such means as
working in the Guide or Scout movements.
The sources of obligations

By and large, obligations have proved less contentious than rights. Many
supposed obligations seem little more than pious aspirations with which no one
would quarrel. There are few campaigns, violent or otherwise, in defence of an
extension of obligations. This is not, however, to say that there are no areas of
dispute. One question concerns the source of such obligations. If they are to be
taken seriously they need a firmer grounding than just decent feelings.
The earliest basis for asserting the binding nature of obligation is the idea of
contract. In a sense this can be traced back to the biblical notion of the covenant
of God with His people, who keep His laws in exchange for His protection.
Of greater importance to our deliberations here, though, are the theories
concerning the notion of a social contract which were devised in the seven-
teenth century by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Both men sought to explain
the origins of government by reference to a state

state of nature
of nature, a situation of primal chaos caused by the
Human society as it was before
absence of established authority. Having logically the establishment of
discerned what such a condition would be Hobbes government characterised by
and Locke used logic to establish the basis for total freedom and the absence
of law or authority.
government and the obligation of the citizen to
obey. In such situations, they argued, human
beings established a ‘contract’ between the governed and the governors. This
formed the basis for both rights and obligations of both parties. Neither writer
regarded the ‘state of nature’ and the subsequent creation of a contract as
historically based; they both saw it as a sort of metaphor, an ‘explanatory myth’.
Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651), argued that in order to escape the barbarism of
the ‘state of nature’, where every man was pitted against every other in an
endless cycle of violence and distrust, human beings voluntarily surrendered
their unbridled freedom to an authority, a government, which subsequently
had absolute claims on their obedience. As long as such a government
provided security for those people they were obliged to support it. However,
should the government fail in this crucial duty then the citizenry were released
from their obligation to obey and were, in fact, obliged to obey any new
government able to offer them security.
A less totalitarian interpretation of the social contract was that of Locke. His
state of nature was not one of instability and violence. Human beings could
maintain order and peace without government, but government was
necessary to provide a stronger framework for the protection of their natural
rights. In his Two Treatises of Government (1690), Locke argued that there were
in effect two contracts. The first was one in which individuals agreed to
impose limits on themselves to form ‘society’. The second was a contract
between society and government by which government would be obeyed in
exchange for its protection of natural rights. Both contracts form the basis of
liberal ideas of politics and government.
Conservatives have not been impressed by Locke’s thesis, particularly by its

dependence on a belief in ‘natural rights’. Instead, they have suggested that
every individual owes a natural loyalty to his society, in much the same way
as he bears a loyalty to his own family: ‘We begin our public affections in our
families. No cold relation is a zealous citizen.’1 Society and the family are
natural rather than artificially contrived institutions and can therefore rightly
lay claim to a natural obligation.
A more pragmatic argument is one based on the value to the individual of

fulfilling his obligations to society and, by extension, to the government. A
‘good’ government will, in the words of Jeremy Bentham, pursue ‘the greatest
happiness of the greatest number’. This principle is called utilitarianism.
Questions necessarily arise. Are obligations to

utilitarianism
society the same as obligations to the state? If
A political philosophy that sees
not, what if there is a clash between the two? If the highest political goal as
we equate ‘state’ with ‘nation’ then much conflict promoting the ‘greatest
might well occur. For example, Germany defeated happiness of the greatest
number’.
France in 1940. The French government surren-
dered and ordered its armed forces to cease hostil-
ities. Some Frenchmen, such as Charles de Gaulle, felt this as a betrayal of
the French nation by the French state. In his view this betrayal absolved him of
all loyalty to the (admittedly legal) government of Marshal Philippe Pétain that
emerged after the fall of France. Indeed, de Gaulle and his followers believed
that they had not only the right to continue the war, but a positive obligation
to do so.
Yet another question arises. Can the ‘nation’ be equated with ‘society’? Or is
there a global society that has an equal, if not superior, claim on loyalty? Other
claimants to loyalty may also be considered: conscience, race, class, church,
religious community, the environment, even the
human race itself. All of these may, in certain totalitarianism
circumstances, appear to have a greater claim A political system in which the
than the state or nation. government controls all areas
of political, economic, social
Even if it is admitted that the state has valid and cultural life. It allows no
opposition and effectively
claims to obedience (and Marxists and anarchists
eliminates ‘private’ life.
explicitly reject such claims), what is the nature Examples of such totalitarian
of that obedience? Is it simply observing the law societies include Nazi Germany
or does it go beyond that to a positive and enthu- and the Soviet Union.
siastic support of the regime? Totalitarian states,

like Nazi Germany, clearly demanded unconditional obedience to the state
(regarded by them as the ultimate representation of the Volk or ‘people’).
Liberal theorists have argued that there are limits to the obligations which the
state can impose on people. They have proposed specific constitutional
arrangements to give effect to these limitations. Liberals assume that the
state’s role in society is very largely to safeguard natural or human rights.
A problem arises if the state does not, in fact, guarantee such rights. At what
point does the bond of obedience dissolve? Is there a right of the citizen to
rebel against, and even overthrow, such a state by force? This question has, of
course, been of acute interest in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
but originally arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Locke argued
that there was such a right and the argument was made explicit in the
American Declaration of Independence (1776), which boldly asserted that
when government degenerated into despotism ‘it is the right of the people to
alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government’.
Even if it is accepted that there is such a right to revolt, difficult questions arise
as to precisely what circumstances justify such a rebellion and whether there
should be any constraints on the methods of the revolutionaries. These
questions, of course, are points not simply of academic interest, but of urgent
contemporary political importance. As early as the thirteenth century Thomas
Aquinas had laid down certain conditions for justified rebellion that were
subsequently absorbed into the writings of other theorists. The Latin American
bishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador has in the twentieth century reiterated
this view: ‘When a dictatorship seriously violates human rights . . ., when it
becomes unbearable and closes channels of dialogue . . ., the church speaks of
the legitimate right of insurrectional violence.’2 The main criteria were that
oppression was intolerable, that no other means were available, that the good
done would exceed the harm, that there was a reasonable chance of success
and that the struggle be conducted by ‘just means’. Many of these principles
were also associated with those of the just war, for example avoiding delib-
erate injury to the innocent. In practice such conditions are necessarily highly
subjective.
Citizenship
‘Citizenship’ appears to be enjoying something of a vogue. It has been incor-
porated into the lexicon of the major parties and the present British
government (2002) intends making classes in ‘citizenship’ part of the National
Curriculum. The general impression given is that a ‘good citizen’ more or less
equates with a ‘good person’, and what is ‘good’ appears to be what is held to
be so in contemporary society. Hence, much emphasis is apparently to be
placed on ‘tolerance’ as a value to be promoted in citizenship classes.
The nature of citizenship

There is more to the term ‘citizenship’ than simply pious do-gooding. It is a
word capable of multiple meanings:
• legal citizenship;
• sociological citizenship;
• participatory citizenship.
Legal citizenship
Legal citizenship can simply mean ‘having legal status’. A citizen of a country
enjoys certain legal rights (for example, to live and work there) in contrast to
‘aliens’ who may be admitted and may enjoy some of the rights of citizenship,
but not all. Legal citizenship may well involve political rights, such as the right
to vote, campaign and stand for public office.
Sociological citizenship
This category, ‘sociological’, means that a person may be a ‘citizen’ of a country
(or of a larger unit, such as the European Union) as well as holding other
identities such as race, class, religious affiliation and so on. One can, of course,
also be a citizen of a city (indeed, ‘city’ is the root origin of the word), and
proud of it. Cicero, the Roman writer and politician, was proud of being a
Roman citizen: civis Romanus sum (‘I am a Roman citizen’).
Cicero’s pride in his Roman identity suggests that there is something more to
citizenship than just legal status or sociological classification. It indicates an
emotional tie with that identity. In most understandings of citizenship there is
a sense not only of the right, but also of the privilege of participation in society
as a matter of pride, even of honour and duty.
Participatory citizenship
The idea of ‘participation’ as an important feature of citizenship has raised the
issue of what in reality (as aside from formal legal provision) makes such
participation possible. Obvious factors include the opportunity to work and to
contribute to society, a reasonable level of income, access to public authorities
and channels for the expression of views.
There are many in society to whom these desiderata do not in fact apply:
‘second-class citizens’, the ‘excluded’, the ‘underclass’. Recently government
attention has been given to regeneration schemes, skills training, social
welfare benefits, so as to bring these people within the normal functioning of
society – in short, to make them citizens. This necessitates the empowerment
of the socially excluded by means ranging from consultation mechanisms to
advocacy schemes (whereby a trusted person acts as ‘advocate’ for the less
articulate and educated members of society).
One problem with this approach is its open-endedness. Just what constitutes
normal participation in society – being able to afford Christmas and birthday
presents, holidays abroad, tickets for football matches? There is also the
practical difficulty of the cost to the state (or really to its taxpayers) of such
initiatives. A further criticism is that state intervention in this area is counter-
productive. Far from being empowered, the subjects of this intervention are in
fact made dependent on the state. A ‘dependency culture’ emerges in which
the poor, ethnic minorities and other under-privileged citizens have their self-
reliance undermined. They may eventually come to expect the local council or
the state to do everything for them, with disastrous consequences for
themselves and the wider society.
In reaction, therefore, to the notion of ‘social citizenship’, in which the state
intervenes to ensure a measure of social equality, right-wing commentators
have redefined citizenship in terms of not being a burden, of contributing to

society positively by hard work and engagement in various voluntary activ-
ities. These activities create what the Conservatives have recently called a
‘neighbourly society’.
A similar concept of citizenship seems also to have informed New Labour’s
approach to the matter. One aspect of Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’ is a fruitful
partnership of the public, private and, crucially, voluntary sectors in improving
the community. In this vision the state would aid charities by funding assis-
tance, expertise, ‘charity friendly’ regulations, and so on. Such a project would
rely heavily on volunteers, on ‘active’ citizens.
For both the Labour and Conservative parties these versions of citizenship
represent a considerable divergence from previously held positions. The
Conservatives under John Major introduced a ‘Citizen’s Charter’ which
provided quality benchmarks for public services such as hospitals and
railways. By doing so, they redefined the citizen as essentially a consumer of
services rather than as an active participant in the workings of political society.
At one level ‘active citizenship’ is unexceptionable. One can hardly advocate
‘bad neighbourliness’. On the other hand, there are problems. Who, for
example, sets the agenda of ‘socially beneficial’ initiatives – voluntary bodies
or the state? The very association of voluntary bodies with the state may
deprive their members and clients of ‘ownership’ of those bodies. The vital role
of voluntary associations as potential critics of government policy is also
blunted if their criticism leads to a withdrawal of state funding, or, even more
seriously, of access to the locus of power.
Moreover, imposing citizenship on the school curriculum can be criticised as
producing a bland and conformist citizenry, ‘voluntarily’ doing the government’s
bidding while being rendered intellectually and emotionally incapable of critical
analysis and evaluation of the effects. It is worth noting that all the totalitarian
regimes of the twentieth century have been keen to promote such ‘voluntary’
activity by their citizens.
Finally, one could argue that the government is shifting responsibility for what
is properly its own function on to the shoulders of its people. These functions
include, for instance, care of the elderly, reduction of street crime and preser-
vation of the environment.
Summary
Rights in some sense existed in the Middle Ages, although the idea of ‘human
rights’ dates from the eighteenth century. Historically, there has been some
debate on what exactly these rights consist of, while conservatives and
socialists have, from different directions, supported the liberal commitment to

universal human rights. By the end of the nineteenth century it was widely
agreed that a focus on ‘individual’ and ‘negative rights’ was inadequate to
meet the social needs of the time. This led to the development of ‘group’ and
‘social’ rights, such as those accorded to groups like trade unions and to
individuals in the form of welfare benefits. Critics have questioned whether
social rights are properly so described; the expression ‘aspirations’ might be
more appropriate. Obligations, or duties, to society and the state have received
considerable attention in recent years, partly in an attempt to give them a
sound philosophical underpinning and partly to establish what are the limits
to the individual’s duty to the state. Governments, especially ‘New Labour’,
have been anxious to incorporate the idea of obligations as well as rights into
the political consensus. Citizenship has been subject to some reappraisal in
recent years. It is a reappraisal that moves away from a purely legal definition
to a concept that includes full participation of citizens in the democratic
process.
1 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).

2 Archbishop Oscar Romero, quoted in Anthony Jay (ed.), Oxford
Dictionary of Political Quotations (Oxford University Press, 1999),
p. 308.
Barbalet, J. M. Citizenship (Open University Press, 1988).

Cranston, M. What are Human Rights? (The Bodley Head, 1973).
Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1979).
Heywood, A. ‘Rights, Obligations and Citizenship’, ch. 6 in A. Haywood, Political Ideas
and Concepts: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1994), pp. 137–65.
Finnis, J. Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980).
Flathman, R. Political Obligation (Atheneum, 1972).
Heater, D. Citizenship: The Civil Ideal in World History, Politics and Education (Longman,
1990).
Meldon, A. (ed.) Human Rights (Wadsworth, 1970).
Pateman, C. The Problem of Political Obligation (Wiley, 1979).
Raphael, D. D. (ed.) Political Theory and the Rights of Man (Macmillan, 1967).
Waldren, J. The Problems of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984).
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Compare and contrast the liberal, socialist and conservative concepts of rights.
2 To what extent is belief in human rights founded on reason?
3 What is the basis of political obligation in a democracy?
4 Is rebellion against the state ever justified?
5 Are there fundamental differences between the democratic and

totalitarian concepts of citizenship?
6 ‘All too often modern concepts of citizenship tend to over-emphasise the rights a citizen
has and to ignore the corresponding duties associated with citizenship.’ Discuss.
The role of ideology in politics
and society 7
We attempt here to clarify ideas about ideology – what it is, how it is transmitted,
how useful it is in making sense of society. We also examine its relevance to
recent modern history both in Britain and in other parts of the world. Then we
analyse the situation in contemporary Britain and consider whether it can be
reasonably asserted that there is an ideological consensus in Britain or whether
we are now ‘beyond ideology’.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Do ideologies help or hinder us in our understanding of society?
➤ Is there any sense in which ideologies (or any specific ideology) are ‘true’?
➤ How might one distinguish between ‘dominant ideologies’ and ‘ideologies of resistance’,
and also between ‘restrictive’ and ‘relaxed’ ideologies?
➤ Are the terms ‘left’ ‘right’, and ‘centre’ still useful ways of categorising ideological posi-
tions?
➤ What do some writers mean by the ‘end of ideology’?
➤ British political parties nowadays often claim to be ‘non-ideological’ – are they right to
do so?
Our lives may be more boring than those who lived in apocalyptic times, but being
bored is greatly preferable to being prematurely dead because of some ideological
fantasy. (Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History, 2000)
We are now again in an epoch of wars of religion, but a religion is now called an
‘ideology’. (Bertrand Russell, ‘Philosophy and Politics’, Unpopular Essays, 1950)
Ideology is . . . a system of definite views, ideas, conceptions, and notions adhered

to by some class or political party. [Ideology] is always a reflection of the economic
system predominant at any given time. (Soviet Philosophical Dictionary, 1954)
Political debate is widespread in society. Whether we are aware of it or not,

most of us are, at a very simple level, political philosophers. In democratic
societies like the UK and the USA citizens are expected to have opinions on a
wide range of issues that either directly as individuals or collectively as
citizens affect their lives.
Even at a simple, unsophisticated level we have views on the ‘correct’ form of
government, freedom, equality and equal rights, the ‘proper’ role of government
in society, how ‘democratic’ one’s own political system is, the right levels of
public spending, and so on. How we think about these and many other subjects
will be influenced by the kinds of ideological beliefs we carry around in our
heads, the product of our social conditioning, our life experiences and our reflec-
tions on them, the nation we live in, our educational level and our social class.
We regularly draw on this store of ideological beliefs when we try to make
sense of the world. They may not be logical, well structured or even consistent
(tortured are those who try to force their experiences into an ideological strait-
jacket; and, given enough power, they will often similarly torture others into
wearing the same garment), but one’s opinions and actions will make
reference to those beliefs. Ideologies can be seen as a form of intellectual ‘map’
to help us find our way about the world, understand our place in it, analyse
the political and social events going on around us. Maps vary in their degree
of accuracy. One can assess their value by comparison with objective reality
and debate with others.
Ideologies are associated with power structures. Politicians seek power. Their
ideology and the social, economic and political circumstances of the time
influence what they do with that power when they have achieved it. Indeed,
it is impossible to separate the two. This applies even to those who deny
having an ideology. The use of power always takes place in a framework of
ideology. Modern politics can only be properly understood by reference to the
great ideological movements: conservatism, liberalism, socialism, fascism,
and so on.
Ideologies tend to have a bad press. They are often dismissed as ‘errors’ or
‘untruths’. If ideology is ‘a window on the world’ it is a window with glass
Role of ideology in politics and society 137
that distorts the vision. The viewer has difficulty thinking beyond these distor-
tions and assumes what he or she believes to be the ‘truth’. Ideology often distorts
‘reality’ and encourages conflict: ‘One man’s ideology is another man’s falsehood.’
Nevertheless, one must not fall into the trap of assuming that all ideologies are
of equal validity. They should be respected as important ways of understanding
the world. One should also attempt to examine one’s own ideological beliefs, to
better understand the role of ideology in politics and society.
The meaning of the term ‘ideology’

So, given that ideology is very important in politics, what is ‘ideology’? Is there
something about ideological thought that is distinct from other forms of
thinking? David Joravsky provides a useful starting point:
When we call a belief ideological, we are saying at least three things about it:
although it is unverified or unverifiable, it is accepted as verified by a particular
group, because it performs social functions for that group.1
In other words, holders of beliefs do not need to have had them ‘proved’ by
some rational, scientific form of testing. To the believers they are the ‘truth’,
the ‘reality’. All political ideologies claim ‘true’ definitions of liberty, equality,
justice, rights and the ‘best’ society. The ‘particular group’ mentioned above
might be any social group: class, nation, profession, religious organisation,
party or pressure group. All will have sets of ideological assumptions that are
unquestioningly accepted as ‘proper’. The ‘social functions’ ideologies perform
are numerous. They will include the creation of a sense of group solidarity and
cohesion for members of that group through shared ideological values; an
explanation of the past, an analysis of the present, and, usually, a vision of the
future with some description of how a better future will come about.
There has always been a widely held view in politics and political philosophy
that ‘ideology’ merely provides a cloak for the struggle for power, the real stuff
of politics. To justify their power and to persuade the people to obey, follow
and support them, rulers use ideologies of various kinds. Machiavelli advised,
in The Prince (1513), that religion was a very useful tool for the ruler. To
Machiavelli the real objective of politics was the getting and keeping of power.
Appeals to the welfare of the people were merely part of what we would call
the ideological window-dressing, hiding the raw struggle for power.
Machiavelli put his finger on one of the most important roles of ideological
belief systems (if we may include religion as one of these, for the moment).
Until the last couple of centuries, in most societies the dominant form of belief
was religion. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rational and
scientific forms of thought provided a growing challenge to religion. By the
eighteenth century there were sharp and bitter tensions between religious and
secular attitudes. One of the features of the Enlightenment was a strong,

rational critique of religious beliefs and the perceived baleful influence of
religion on politics. It was hoped that one could use reason to discover the
laws governing the organisation and functioning of society as the laws of
science were being used to discover the workings of nature. Once religion and
other forms of irrational thought were removed from political discourse, it was
believed, rational programmes would enable human society to improve
dramatically.
These ‘rational’ forms of thought contributed to the criticism of the ancien
régime in France, the French Revolution, and the development of what we
now call ‘political ideologies’ that dominated political debate in Europe and
the world during the following two centuries. Far from introducing new forms
of rationality into politics, ideological forms of thinking tended to create new
forms of ‘irrational’ thinking, stirring up and
releasing deep political passions that in many ancien régime
ways resembled the emotional commitment to The political and social order
religion. Indeed, political ideologies for many that existed in France before
the Revolution of 1789
became ‘pseudo-religious’ belief systems that had
many of the hallmarks of religious commitment:
‘heretics’ were persecuted, ‘true’ interpretations of the creed formulated,
ideological ‘prophets’ identified and definitive texts written to direct the
‘faithful’ into ‘correct’ ways of thought.
Marxism and economic/class factors

By the middle years of the nineteenth century industrialisation was trans-
forming the economies, societies and the belief systems of the Western world.
A new way of thinking about society was required. Many writers at the time
contributed to the development of what came to be called a science of society:
‘sociology’. The most influential were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who
had a striking influence on the study of ideology. In fact, they claimed to have
created a ‘science’ of ideology.
In their studies of early industrial society Marx and Engels, especially in The
German Ideology (1846), argued that there was a close link between the
material conditions of society, the ways in which wealth was produced (the
‘substructure’), and the resultant class structure and belief systems (the ‘super-
structure’). As the economic system changed so would the ideological system
that sustained it, as would the class system that arose from the economic
‘relations of production’ associated with it. Class interests, in their view, shape
ideologies. Take liberalism, for example.
Liberalism is an ideology. It claims, like all ideologies, to be a universal set of
‘true’ values that are appropriate for all people in all societies, and not just in
a liberal society. Marxists believe that this is not

liberal society
the case. They argue that liberalism is of consid-
A society characterised by
erable use as an ideological tool to protect and freedom of thought, expression
reinforce the class interests of the property- and political activity.
owning classes (the ‘bourgeoisie’) and help them
to exploit the working classes (the proletariat).
proletariat
Liberalism may make eminent sense to the
In Marxist terminology the
bourgeoisie, Marxists argue, and it may even proletariat is the class that lives
convince members of the proletariat, but it essen- by selling its labour for a wage.
tially serves the interests of the former and helps Often, but not strictly
accurately, identified with the
the exploitation of the latter.
working class.
As ideology is associated with class interests,
once society has become a one-class society as a consequence of the inevitable
‘proletarian revolution’, these ‘false’ bourgeois ideologies will disappear.
It is worthwhile identifying the interests behind ideological statements of
principle by politicians. There is much that is of value in the Marxist analysis
of ideology, despite the failure of political systems that described themselves
as ‘Marxist’, such as the Soviet Union. However, there was a tendency for Marx
and Engels and their ideological descendants to claim that their analysis of
society is the one most in line with objective reality – the ‘truth’.
V. I. Lenin, the Russian revolutionary, refined this doctrine of ideology further.
In What is to be Done? (1902) Lenin not only worked out a strategy for a
revolutionary party but saw socialist ideology as the ideology of the prole-
tariat, a tool which they could use in their struggle for power with the ruling
classes. This is a key development in the study of ideology. Henceforth, all
Marxist analysis of ideology would treat it as a tool of class interests, whether
working-class or ruling-class. Thus the Soviet Union, created by Lenin and
built around his revolutionary party, was governed by people using a socialist
ideology as the justification for their rule. The ‘exploitation of man by man’
under capitalism was replaced by the ‘exploitation of man by man’ under
Soviet socialism.
‘Dominant ideologies’ and ‘ideologies of resistance’

One can understand that ideologies may be perceived as a tool used by
dominant social groups to maintain and enhance their established power
position in a struggle of ideas. Antonio Gramsci, in Selections from the Prison
Notebooks (1921–35), stressed the important role of dominant, or
‘hegemonic’, ideologies in capitalist societies as the means by which the
dominant capitalist classes maintain their rule. Dominant ideologies permeate
all aspects of society, from popular culture to the education system, from
religious institutions to sports. Such ideologies legitimise the political system
and the established social system in the minds of the working classes and
ensure that the ‘slave is persuaded that he is free’: ‘The proletariat wear their
chains willingly. Condemned to perceive reality through the conceptual
spectacles of the ruling class they are unable to recognise the nature or extent
of their own servitude.’2
However, dominant ideologies do not have the field all to themselves. Social
and political groups in subservient power positions do not always accept the
legitimacy of the system in which they live. Ideologies of resistance, or
‘counter-ideologies’, develop to give purpose and meaning to the social and
political struggles of those wishing to reform or overthrow a given social and
political structure.
An ideology may shift from being a counter-ideology to a dominant ideology
by means of political success: Lenin’s Bolshevik Party, for example, took over
the Russian state and created the Soviet Union. Or an ideology might be one
of both domination and resistance. Nationalism, for example, can be used by
dominant nations as ‘imperialist nationalism’ or by subject nations as ‘anti-
colonial nationalism’, the former to support their power, the latter to
challenge the status quo.
‘Restrictive’ and ‘relaxed’ ideologies

It would be wrong to assume that, although ideological thinking forms a part
of all our waking thoughts, the experience of it and degree or intensity of
commitment to a set of ideological beliefs are the same for all people. One can
make a distinction between what might be called ‘restrictive’ ideological
thought and ‘relaxed’ ideological thought.
‘Restrictive ideologies’ are a tightly argued body of ideas that logically hang
together in a well-constructed framework, as can be seen in the ‘great texts’ of
the ideological traditions that have shaped modern political life. Liberalism,
conservatism, socialism, Marxism, fascism and the other ideological traditions
and movements all have a recognised body of literature expounding the main
tenets of their ideological belief systems. So, for example, the writings of John
Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill have considerably
influenced the development of liberalism. No study of conservatism in Britain
would be complete without reference to the speeches and writings of Edmund
Burke, in particular his Reflections of the Revolution in France (1790). Marxism,
and its class analysis of capitalist society, is, of course, honoured by its
eponymous core thinker and voluminous writer, Karl Marx. Hitler and Nazism,
Stalin and Stalinism, Mao and Maoism. In all these cases it is impossible to
think of the movement without also thinking of the ideological tracts that
shaped its image along lines formulated by the leader.
The term ‘restrictive ideologies’ conjures up the image of rigidity, narrowness

and bigotry in the ideological cause. It does not necessarily describe some of
the great texts associated with political movements. They provide a reference
point for thought and action, a sense of identity with, and commitment to, the
movement, and often demonstrate a degree of flexibility in practical use that
enables ideologies to keep in touch with the world around us and so remain
relevant to contemporary concerns. Indeed, democratic politicians sometimes
clearly state their political programme in terms of a struggle of ideologies
Paradoxically unless we stake out our ideological boundaries and defend them
against external assault and internal subversion we will not attract to our cause
the millions of non-ideological supporters who are necessary for our victory. A
clear statement of our philosophy is essential to our success and perhaps our
survival as a major political force.3
However, all too often restrictive ideologies can become mere excuses for lack
of rationality on the part of the ideologically committed. Ideology becomes a
source of narrow-mindedness and unthinking conformity that crushes the
originality of the individual adherent. The lives of millions can be oppressed,
distorted or lost by political movements driven to impose an ideological ‘truth’
on their society.
‘Relaxed ideologies’, on the other hand, are sets of ideological assumptions

shared by a social group. Such beliefs are often not clearly thought out or
logical or coherent. They may be indirect and accidental connections of
ideology and power. We are all creatures of ideology, even though our
ideologies are not necessarily well thought out or logical. The holders of
relaxed ideological beliefs may not even be aware that their opinions are
ideological; they seem to be just ‘common sense’.
‘Left’, ‘Right’, and ‘Centre’

These terms are a common shorthand in discussions of politics – so common,
in fact, that one often uses them without a real grasp of what they mean. The
application of ‘left’ and ‘right’ to politics derives
Estates General
from the French Estates General (1789), chaired
The body which in pre-
by King Louis XVI. Delegates were divided into Revolutionary France
aristocratic members, who sat at the right hand represented the three ‘Estates’
of the king, and the revolutionary and populist or legal and social
classifications. The First Estate
members, who sat to the left.
was the nobility, the Second the
clergy, and the Third was the
Those on the political right stress patriotism,
rest of society.
order, social discipline, traditional values,
suspicion of over-powerful governments, and
freedom and individuality as a higher political ‘good’ than equality. The centre
has somewhat different political values, involving less inequality, a greater
role for the state in helping individuals, a greater stress on freedom, and
optimism about the possibilities for improving human nature and society. To
the left of the centre the emphasis on the role of the state in creating greater
social equality grows, including collective ownership of the means of
production, greater emphasis on class rights and a class analysis of society.
One might imagine a political ‘spectrum’, a horizontal axis, with these ideas
and principles shading into one another, rather than distinctive ‘boxes’ with
sharp dividing lines between them on principles of social and economic policy.
Political scientists also identify a vertical axis of degrees of ‘authoritarian’ or
‘democratic’ inclinations of ideological supporters. Another vertical axis might
be identified as leaning towards the ‘status quo’, or ‘conservative’, view of
resisting change as compared with the ‘revolutionary’ or ‘radical change’ wings
of an ideological movement.
In recent years the political ‘spectrum’ has been largely replaced as a conceptual
tool by a ‘political horseshoe’, in which the far left and far right bend round to
be so close as to have much in common in terms of authoritarianism and total-
itarianism. It is relatively easy for some voters to shift their support from
communist to fascist parties and vice versa.
The nature of modern domestic and international politics has raised questions
about the continuing validity of the spectrum model of political values and
ideologies, which originated in the nineteenth century, for the early twenty-
first century. Green politics, environmentalism, feminism, gay politics and
animal rights, as well as religious politics, do not fit very easily into such a
conceptual framework.
The end of ideology?

It might seem strange, given our view that ideological thought is a permanent
feature of politics, to claim that ideology is in decline or even ‘dead’. Yet
several writers have argued this, most notably Daniel Bell and Francis
Fukuyama.
Daniel Bell, in The End of Ideology (1960) and later in an article in Government
and Opposition (1988), argued that ideological debate was in decline as a
means of understanding society. Societies have changed so much that ‘old
ideological’ forms of analysing those societies, especially Marxism, are
virtually useless. Modern societies are concerned with non-ideological
problem solving. They have become more moral, more liberal and only
distantly connected with a class analysis of society. Bell’s analysis was greatly
influenced by the Cold War struggle and the need to show that Marxism was
defunct both as a conceptual tool and for political action.
Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man (1992), elaborated
ideas he had previously published to argue that the end of the Cold War had
shown the triumph of liberalism and liberal democracy to be the ideologies of
modern scientific and technological societies. Liberal democracy was of
universal application and represented the ultimate objective of mankind.
Ideological conflicts arising out of feminism, nationalism, environmentalism
and anti-racism are merely representations of the fundamental worth of
liberal-democratic values. Indeed, they take place within a framework of
liberal-democratic ideological assumptions.
Bell and Fukuyama and other ‘end of ideology’ writers have been very influ-
ential. But they have been attacked for being propagandists for American
economic and political domination of the planet. They have also been attacked
for having ideas that are in fact highly ideological in themselves and for
systematically ignoring evidence that challenges their thesis. There are many
peoples, such as those in the Islamic world, who adhere to ideological systems
that do not assume that the ‘American’ way is best, or that liberal democracy
is the answer to their social and economic problems.
The transmission of ideologies

We have observed that ideologies arise out of particular social circumstances
and reflect the structures of power in society. An ideology, however, is custom-
arily presented as a natural and rational analysis of society. It will carry with
it the assumption, overt or covert, that opposing ideologies are somehow
unnatural and irrational. Ideologies claim they are universally applicable to all
peoples in all societies and are not the product of a particular time and place.
They create a particular language of meaning and explanation to encourage
the individual to develop a sense of being a full member of a major movement
for social reform. Certain words and images will act as ‘triggers’ to stimulate a
chain of ideas associated with a particular ideology, to encourage solidarity
among its supporters and stress the divisions among the supporters of counter-
ideologies. As part of this, criticism of the ideology will be associated with
negativity and can be dismissed as such by its supporters.
These points may give the impression that one is talking about the restrictive
ideological forms of ideology, but they also apply to the relaxed forms of
ideology in society. A study of newspapers, television programmes and adver-
tisements reveals many subtle, and not so subtle, conscious or unconscious,
‘tricks’ of the ideological transmission trade.
Ideological assumptions thus affect all aspects of society: family, political
parties and pressure groups, local and national politics, and international
politics. One must not, however, think that ideologies emerge as part of a
conspiracy by a Machiavellian elite to brainwash the public. This would be far

too simplistic a view of how ideology develops. Members of the elite in any
society rise from that society and generally share the ideological and cultural
values of most of its members. There is an ideological element to most aspects
of culture. The elite themselves may not realise they are acting selfishly. They
may genuinely believe that their views are in the interests of all in society.
Marxists, however, would claim such a view of the elite’s awareness of their
interests and ideology to be naive.
There are many vehicles by which ideological values are transmitted to
society: they include family, work, friends, the mass media, political parties
and other political and social institutions. The family plays a crucial role in the
socialisation of new citizens into the ideological values of their society. There
are power relations between men and women, parents and children, all of
whom are influenced by ideological concepts, often unthinkingly acted upon
by the members of that family. A child’s first experiences of power in society
and the ideological values it acquires occur, almost literally, with their
mother’s milk in the context of the family.
Families have an enormous effect on the life chances of their members.
Especially important are their occupational and social-class positions, which
will play a major role in influencing the educational level of the children, their
future occupations, their religious and moral values and their choice of
friends. All of these factors will have ideological messages that influence the
political values of the individuals concerned. Most such ideological values will
be of the relaxed kind, but some people will seek a more restrictive ideological
expression of their political views and will join a political party.
Political parties are clearly ideological vehicles, designed to fight elections by
appealing to the electorate with a manifesto containing policy proposals that
are shaped by ideological values. They must appeal to the electorate with some
resonance with the electorate’s own ideological values, garnering enough
support to win seats in parliament and, possibly, control of the local or national
government. Appointments to cabinet posts by, say, the British prime minister,
will be made with reference to a range of factors, which will include
experience, competence, intelligence, loyalty; but one of the most important
will be ideological compatibility and conformity with the prime minister’s
outlook and the broad ideological and policy aims and objectives of the party.
The importance of ideology in modern history

By now the importance of ideologies in political discourse should be clear. But
if there are any lingering doubts, the importance of ideology can be observed
in the shaping of world history.
The musings of thinkers have ideological content which, in a myriad of direct

and indirect ways, influences the thoughts, policies and actions of politicians
and people alike. There is not some ‘real’ world where people act in a pragmatic
manner. We can only understand the world by reference to ideological points
of view, while at the same time being aware of the limitations and distortions
of our own deeply held ideological beliefs. One can, therefore, gain some idea
of the importance of this key link between ideology, thinkers, power and society
by studying examples from history.
Ideological debate was an important feature of political life before the
twentieth century, but it has influenced politics during the twentieth century
in ways that are different from previous times. To begin with, governments
and politicians seek clear ideological justifications for their actions and
consciously attempt to carry out policies in line with an ideological agenda.
Next, modern communications technology ensures that ideological debate
and competition is now global in scope. Furthermore, modern states buttress
their power by manipulating public opinion along ideological lines by
appealing to ideological principles shared by voters and rulers alike. Third, the
role of genuine public opinion (formed as a result of people’s own experi-
ences) in influencing policy is reduced. Ideological ‘spin doctors’ manipulate
public opinion to such an extent that there is little ideological debate that does
not originate from within the political elites. Finally, sections of the intel-
lectual classes in liberal societies adopt the ideological views and positions of
extreme political parties and provide political and economic elites with
powerful ideological tools for manipulation of the citizenry.
Political ideology now, more than ever before, is very closely linked to state
power whatever the political system. The twentieth century, and one sees
little hope that this will change in the twenty-first, was one in which
ideological falsification, exaggeration and simplification held sway. Ideo-
logies have often taken on the guise of ‘political religions’, pursuing some
form of human perfection, the elimination of all social conflicts, and making
claims of being the only vehicles for the ‘truth’. It seems as if this form of
ideological politics is a natural product of the mobilisation of millions of
voters in a mass democracy.
If one accepts Eric Hobsbawm’s thesis, in The Age of Uncertainty (1994), that
the twentieth century makes historical coherence by being considered as
lasting from 1914 to 1991, then it was dominated by ideological struggles for
dominance among liberal democracy, fascism and communism.
Societies shaped by liberalism dominated the international system at the start
of the twentieth century, although a strain of pessimism seemed to be in the
ideological and intellectual air, despite a previous century of great economic,
social, political, technological and cultural progress. A belief that the onward
march of liberal civilisation would not last was a theme among many thinkers
as 1900 dawned.
The First World War was a greater shock than people could possibly have
imagined. It badly disrupted the global economic system that had been created
by Britain in the nineteenth century and wrecked the liberal assumption of
inevitable progress. During the two decades after 1918 pessimism deepened as
liberalism appeared discredited and out-dated to millions of Europeans. Many
therefore turned to fascism and communism, which they envisaged as offering
youthful, optimistic and more effective ideologies of renewal and progress.
One could hardly say that ideology does not matter when one considers its
impact on the domestic politics of Italy, Germany and the USSR under
Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin, respectively. Fascism and communism contained
the most extreme elements of ideology found among the many forms of
twentieth-century ideological thought. Complex realities were simplified into
one fundamental truth of a struggle of good and evil, right and wrong, with a
chosen group based on class, race or belief leading the way to a better world.
Political opponents, ‘undesirable’ racial groups and whole social classes were
subject to stereotyping, oppression, incarceration and extermination in line
with ideological considerations. Common also to both fascist and communist
movements was the hatred and contempt for liberal values and parliamentary
democracy, which supposedly betrayed the nation or the class.
The consequences for the international balance of power were very great. Nazi
foreign policy was formed by an aggressive ideology of expansion. Western
liberal democratic suspicions of communist Russia (suspicions that were recip-
rocated by Stalin) dogged attempts to create a united diplomatic front in the
face of the Nazi threat and contributed to the slide into war in the late 1930s.
The Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939 was shocking not only in terms of its
strategic implications, but also in the breathtaking implausibility of two
ideological enemies making a non-aggression treaty. Equally implausible was
the alliance between liberal democracy and communism that arose during the
war that followed.
The Second World War was an ideological struggle with several military
dimensions. Fascism and Nazism fought a war against liberal democracies in
the West, which their leaderships hoped could be ended by a negotiated peace,
despite the Allied declared policy of ‘unconditional surrender’. Nazism fought
another war against Soviet communism in the East, a war in which there could
be no ideological compromise, no end other than the total defeat of side or the
other, a war of incredible levels of ferocity and brutality. Nazi ideology defined
whole groups as ‘sub-human’ and the extermination of millions of Jews,
Gypsies and Slavs followed. A third ideological conflict, that between the
liberal West and Soviet communism, was suspended while Nazi Germany still
posed a threat. But even before fighting in Europe had ended, the conflict that
was to lead to the Cold War was well under way, with growing suspicion and
hostility between the Anglo-Americans on one side of a divided Europe and
the Soviets on the other.
The Cold War was the second great ideological struggle of the century. The
planet divided into a bi-polar world of liberal-democratic nations under the
leadership of the USA and a communist world under Soviet leadership. A
‘Third World’ between the two, neither communist nor capitalist, progressively
became the battleground for the ideological and military conflicts of the Cold
War. Only the possession of massive conventional forces and nuclear weapons
by both the USA and the USSR prevented the deep ideological animosity
between the two superpowers from erupting into war during the many crises
that punctuated their struggle. By the mid-1980s the Cold War was coming to
an end and the ideological conflict was winding down. However, nothing
prepared the world for the dramatic end of the Soviet Union and the
communist regimes in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991.
The post-Cold War world seemed to be one in which the ideological struggles
of the previous seventy years had come to an end. Liberal democracy appeared
triumphant, with the last of its totalitarian enemies gone. However, the end of
communism did not mean the end of ideology. Virulent nationalism erupted
in Yugoslavia, tearing the state apart, and again in Chechnya, Georgia and
other parts of the former Soviet Union. Fascism began to march again in many
of the previously communist nations of the East and gained new supporters in
the West. Finally, as the new century dawned, virulent Islamic fundamen-
talism offered a massive challenge to the smug ideological assumptions of the
West of a decade earlier.
Ideology was not dead. It had never been absent even in the supremely
pragmatic politics of Britain.
The role of ideology in British politics during

the age of consensus
It is often stated that the British are ‘pragmatic’ in their political and social
arrangements and not greatly influenced by ideological considerations.
Implied in this is an assumption, itself ideological (related to nationalism),
that British politics is a superior way of doing things compared to the
consciously ideological ‘European’ politics. Yet ideological values greatly influ-
enced the development of British politics during the twentieth century, as one
can see from a quick resumé of British political thought.
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), and David Ricardo, in Principles
of Political Economy (1817), have had great influence on the development of
free-market economics in Britain during the last two hundred years. Liberal
ideas about the minimal state and free trade as the best means towards
economic growth and the generation of wealth owe much to their works.
Indeed, it is impossible to follow an economic debate today without hearing
people, often unconsciously, using the ideas of
these long-dead liberal economists. John Locke, consensus
writing almost a century before Smith, expressed A general agreement on basic
key liberal elements of the importance of principles, disagreement being
property and individual conscience in economic confined to details. Government
in Britain from 1945 to 1979 is
and political discourse in his Two Treatises of often said to have been
Government (1690). John Stuart Mill, in On ‘consensual’ since most main
Liberty (1859), drew together widespread liberal parties accepted a mixed
economy with a substantial
beliefs of his day to create a powerful statement public sector, welfare state
on behalf of individual freedom. Late nineteenth- provision and a measure of
century New Liberals reinterpreted liberalism to social equality.
encourage a greater role for the state in society so
as to enhance individual potential in ways that the minimal state would not
do. These thinkers and their ideas have had a considerable influence on the
development of the post-war consensus, and will no doubt continue to
influence twenty-first century politics and economics.
The modern British political debate over the welfare state, the NHS,
education, employment and taxation levels makes reference to ideological
values. Modern Neo-Liberals (who make a strong case for a return to
nineteenth-century classical liberalism) face an uphill battle against the
dominance of social-democratic ideology in the debate. So strong is the
ideological consensus, so deeply entrenched in the social and political values
of modern Britain, that it is almost impossible for us to imagine life in a society
without these values and the institutions created to bring them into existence.
This may be true in the case of the restrictive view of ideology. There is, apart
from the political extremes, very little reference to liberalism, socialism,
conservatism, and so on, in the debates that occur in British politics. Even at
election time, so it is argued, there is little that might be called ideological,
only a pragmatic reference to, for example, what level of taxes to pay for
public services.
However, that is not the case with relaxed ideologies. Some writers, such as
Samuel Beer, in Modern British Politics (1965) and Britain Against Itself
(1982), and Peter Jenkins, Mrs Thatcher’s Revolution (1987), have argued that
British politics is very ideological; so ideological, in fact, that it has damaged
the country’s economic performance as incoming governments abruptly
changed policies in line with their ideological commitments: nationalisation
and privatisation, high taxes or low taxes, high public spending or spending
cuts, and so on.
The post-war consensus and ideology

Even if the arguments of Beer and Jenkins are not completely accepted there
are grounds for claiming that British politics has been very ideological in the
relaxed sense of the term, even if not in the restricted sense.
The post-war era since 1945 has been dominated by an ideological
‘consensus’, whatever the pragmatic claims made for it. Policy considerations,
while acquiring the label ‘pragmatic’ or even ‘common-sense’, can be
ideological in their underlying assumptions, in a sense that is associated with
social democracy. From the wartime coalition government until the early
1980s all the major parties, both in and out of government, largely agreed on
the basics of government policy. These included the following:
• a commitment to full employment by the use, if necessary, of Keynesian
Demand Management techniques;
• the creation of a welfare state with extensive social benefits in terms of
health (the NHS), pensions, childcare and benefits, unemployment and
sickness payments and expanding educational opportunities;
• the encouragement of economic growth to ensure full employment and the
means to pay for welfare state provision;
• a ‘mixed economy’ of state-owned (‘nationalised’) key industries, such as
coal, steel, railways, working within an economy that largely remained in
private hands;
• a ‘corporatist’ (sometimes called ‘tri-partist’) approach to economic
planning that involved the co-operation of government, business and
organised labour;
• the dissolution of the empire (largely completed within twenty years of
1945);
• a commitment in defence and foreign policy to the Atlantic Alliance with
the USA, the acquisition and maintenance of a nuclear deterrence, and,
from the late 1950s, closer political and economic links with the states of
Western Europe.
There was often little difference between Labour and Conservative govern-
ments. Their pragmatism was based on the acceptance of similar policy goals
in order to win elections. Yet this is clearly an example of ideology. It assumes
a significant role for the state in the economy and society. There is a strong
belief in state intervention to improve social and economic conditions, a belief
based on a very clear set of ideological assump-
tions that can be identified as being ‘centre-left’ or pragmatism
‘social-democratic’ in their orientation. An approach to decision-making
that is focused on desirable
However, even during the high point of this con- outcomes to solving social and
sensus, from, say, 1945 to the early 1970s, there economic problems, rather than
ideological principles.
were those in both major parties who were
opposed to the consensus policies of their respective leaderships. The left of the
Labour Party wanted greater state intervention and control in society and the
economy, while the right of the Conservative Party wanted a massive
withdrawal of the state from any areas of social and economic activity and a
significant reduction in the levels of taxation. They had little actual effect on
the policies of their parties, as consensus politics appeared to be what the
majority of the electorate wanted. Political debate and electoral competition
revolved around who could manage the system best, who could deliver the
greatest level of economic growth, public services and social improvement for
least cost and effort.
This social-democratic consensus was successful in establishing an ideological
grip on British politics for a number of reasons. The mass unemployment,
poverty and failure of the 1930s discredited the minimal state policies of the
governments of the day. The Second World War involved massive state inter-
vention in the form of ‘War Socialism’ that led to victory. If such methods could
defeat the Nazis why, it was widely demanded, should state planning not
defeat poverty and unemployment afterwards? At last, the long economic
boom of the 1950s and 1960s appeared to show that Keynesian economics
worked and governments did not have to make difficult choices about state
spending and private income levels. Economic growth would enable Britain to
have both excellent public services and high individual standards of living.
Challenges in the 1970s

The 1970s challenged the post-war consensus. There were a number of
reasons for this. The post-war economic boom came to an end with growing
economic difficulties, especially rising inflation and unemployment. Economic
decline became more obvious as mining, shipbuilding, steelmaking, textiles
and heavy engineering went into apparently terminal decline. With that
decline came the shrinking of trade-union membership. By the 1970s the post-
war generation that grew up with the welfare state and social democracy were
a majority of the electorate. At the same time economic prosperity was
growing in the new service sector and white-collar areas of the economy. With
that came a new individualism, a new impatience at the inefficient and collec-
tivist provision of state-run services and industries.
In both the Labour and the Conservative parties the anti-consensus elements
recognised their opportunities for power. The Labour Party moved to the left,
thereby losing both members and a close connection with the Labour
Government (1974–79). In 1981 it split over ideological issues, with many of
its right wing going on to form the Social Democratic Party (before ending up
after its demise a few years later in the Liberal Democrat Party). The Conser-
vatives moved to the right, slowly at first, but gathering pace under the
leadership of Mrs Thatcher after 1975. These ideological changes were of

significance in the following decade. The Labour Party was condemned by
voters as extreme, and it subsequently lost four elections in a row. The Conser-
vative Party, in power (1979–97), was able to pursue policies that challenged
many aspects of the post-war consensus.
A new consensus?
The Thatcher and Major governments attempted to create a new right-of-
centre ideological consensus for British politics, heavily influenced by neo-
liberalism, and to bring about a fundamental shift away from the social-
democratic consensus. The features included the following:
● The concept of the mixed economy was to be challenged by the transfer of
state-owned industries to the private sector, a process known as ‘privatisation’.
● Corporatism was to be rejected and the role for trade unions and business in
formal government economic planning was to be ended.
● There was a strong commitment to market economics as the best means of
ensuring economic efficiency and high levels of economic growth.
● Keynesian economic management was to be abandoned, along with the
commitment to maintaining full employment. Inflation was to be the major
economic ‘dragon’ for the government to slay, by the adoption of free-market
and ‘monetarist’ policies.
● The welfare state was to be challenged with cuts in benefits and entitlements,
the introduction of more means testing for claimants, and the introduction of
market solutions into the health and education services.
● The level of taxation on both individuals and businesses was to be steadily
reduced as incentives for both to work harder, and take risks and succeed.
There were clearly strong elements of liberalism at work here in the economic
policies and in the stress on individualism and individual choice and effort.
Conservatism raised the role of the family, traditional values, patriotism, disci-
pline and hierarchy. It was even possible to see elements of Marxism in the
emphasis on the role of economics in building society.
The new consensus can be recognised in the Labour Party’s shift to a right-
of-centre programme under Neil Kinnock, John Smith and, especially, Tony
Blair. There was no significant reversal of Conservative policies after Labour
came to power in 1997. Welfare spending was kept under tight control, helped
by high levels of economic growth and low unemployment. Attacks were made
on benefit fraudsters and the automatic nature of some benefits. There was
considerable support for free-market capitalism, no return to corporatism
and no great changes to the tough trade-union legislation of the 1980s. No
nationalisation occurred, although Conservatives claimed that the end of

RailTrack in 2001, during Labour’s second term, was the thin end of the wedge
leading to renationalisation. Even policies such as the minimum wage and
family income-tax credits were designed to encourage people into work rather
than rely on state benefits. Pragmatic policies, yes, but with ideological under-
pinnings familiar to the post-war consensus and its successor.
Summary
People have ideological beliefs, even if these beliefs are not very coherent.
Ideological beliefs are beyond rational or scientific testing, whatever the
claims of their proponents. Such beliefs perform a social role for those who
hold them. Some critics argue that ideologies are simply instruments of power,
wielded by the dominant groups in society. Another hostile opinion is that
ideologies, especially ‘restrictive’ ones, mentally enslave those who believe in
them. Some modern thinkers have argued that ‘ideology is dead’, that no one
believes in any ideology, and that conflicts no longer have an ideological basis.
Opponents of such views can point to abundant evidence that liberal
capitalism is deeply influenced by ideology. Ideological beliefs were of
profound influence in twentieth-century history. New forms of ideology, such
as militant Islamism, seem likely to be important in the twenty-first century.
While it may be true that ideology in the ‘restrictive’ sense is largely absent
from British politics, this is certainly not the case with ‘relaxed’ ideology. From
1945 to 1979 there was a clear consensus between the major parties which
constituted such an ideology. A consensus exists today, though it is far more
influenced by neo-liberalism than was the case in the period before 1979.
1 D. Joravsky, ‘Soviet Ideology’, Soviet Studies, 18 (1966).

2 J. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought (Oxford University Press, 1981).
3 R. Hattersley, Choose Freedom (Michael Joseph, 1987).
Barry, N. ‘Ideology’, in P. Dunleavy et al., Developments in British
Politics 3 (Macmillan, 1990), pp. 17–41.
Dutton, D. British Politics Since 1945: The Rise and Fall of
Consensus (Blackwell, 1991).
Eagleton, T. Ideology: An Introduction (Verso, 1991).
Eatwell, R. ‘Ideologies: Approaches and Trends’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.),
Contemporary Political Ideologies (Pinter, 1993), pp. 1–22.
Goodwin, B. ‘Ideology’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and Sons,
2001), pp. 17–31.
Heywood, A. ‘Introduction: Understanding Ideology’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideologies:
An Introduction (Macmillan, 1992), pp. 1–23.
Leach, R. British Political Ideologies (Philip Allen, 1991).

MacKenzie, I. ‘Introduction: The Arena of Ideology’, in R. Eccleshall et al., Political
Ideologies: An Introduction (Routledge, 1994), pp. 1–27.
McLellan, D. Ideology (Open University Press, 1986).
Plamenatz, J. Ideology (Macmillan, 1972).
Plant, R. ‘The Resurgence of Ideology’, in H. Drucker et al., Developments in British
Politics (Macmillan, 1984), pp. 7–29.
Plant, R. ‘Ideology’, in H. Drucker et al., Developments in British Politics 2 (Macmillan,
1988), pp. 8–33.
Seliger, M. Ideology and Politics (Allen and Unwin, 1976).
Thomas, G. P. ‘British Politics 1945 to Date: The Postwar Consensus’, Taking Politics,
7:2 (1995), pp. 117–24.
Vincent, A. ‘The Nature of Ideology’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell,
1996), pp. 1–21.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Are ideologies simply a cloak for the pursuit of power?
2 Are ideologies developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

of any value in the twenty-first?
3 ‘While ideology shaped the twentieth century, we have now come

to the end of ideology.’ Do you think this is true, and if so is it a
cause for rejoicing?
4 Why do you think ‘ideological’ is seen as such a term of abuse in modern Western
democracies?
5 To what extent would you agree with the opinion that politics has become less
ideological?
6 ‘In Britain at least, the old ideological divisions between the parties are obsolete.’ Is
this true?
Nationalism 8
Nationalism is perhaps the most powerful ideology of the last couple of centuries.
We attempt here to distinguish a number of varieties of nationalism – liberal,
reactionary and radical. There follows a brief history of nationalism from the pre-
Renaissance period to the twentieth century, after which we consider whether
nationalism as an ideology serves particular political interests. Then the psycho-
logical appeal of nationalism is examined, as is its impact on international
politics, and on empires and multi-national states. Finally, we offer a critique of
nationalism and some reflections on its possible future.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Is nationalism anything more than extreme patriotism?
➤ How would you define a ‘nation’?
➤ Is nationalism an ideology of the left or the right?
➤ To what extent is the nation a ‘natural’ social organisation and to what extent an artificial
construct?
➤ Is the principle of ‘national self-determination’ still a viable one? Was it ever a viable polit-
ical principle in international affairs?
➤ Why does nationalism still seem to be a powerful influence in the twenty-first century?
➤ What is the future of ‘identity politics’ and ‘regional nationalism’ in a ‘globalised’ world?
Nationalism 155
Nationalism has two fatal charms for its devotees: it presupposes local self-suffi-
ciency, which is a pleasant and desirable condition, and it suggests, very subtly,
one’s belonging to a place which is definable and familiar, as against a place which
is strange and remote. (E. B. White, ‘Intimations’, One Man’s Meat, 1944)
Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political unit and
the national unit should be congruent . . . Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of
anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused
by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.
(Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1983)
Nationalism has proved to be one of the most powerful of all political

ideologies over the last two centuries and seems likely to remain a potent force
well into the present century. Often presented as an ancient, even primal,
political ideology, nationalism in the modern sense of the word is arguably
a creation of the nineteenth century. As the word itself suggests, it is often
seen as somehow ‘natural’ for people to be members of a readily identifiable
‘nation’ and to have deep emotional ties to it. In fact, nationalism is much
more complex.
It is certainly possible to trace a sense of belonging to a particular group of
people, beyond family, clan or tribe, to classical times. By the Middle Ages love
of country, ‘patriotism’, was widespread in Europe. Nationalism, however,
goes beyond patriotism. It is, for example, perfectly possible to be a Welsh
patriot and cheer one’s rugby team without being a nationalist. Nationalism
has political implications; patriotism does not necessarily do so. A nation, in
nationalist theory, requires some form of political expression, with appropriate
institutions. This may involve full independence or devolved political institu-
tions within a larger state.
Nationalism as an ideology
As an ideology, nationalism involves creating a ‘world view’ – a Weltan-
schauung – a set of coherent ideas and values that gives meaning to the past
for a social group, explains the present, and offers a programme for possible
future action. Nationalism is the least intellectual of the major ideologies
while being the most irrational and emotional, tapping into deep passions.
Uniquely among ideologies, nationalism has no theory of human nature. It
may, of course, have theories as to the particular nature of specific peoples,
such as the unique ‘soul’ of the Russians or the commitment to fairness of the
English. However, there is a sense in which nationalism entails a view of
human nature. Nationalists claim that each nation is a ‘natural’ unit, and the
bonds that bind a nation are both natural and good. For the individual,
therefore, the welfare of the nation is a supreme good.
Nationalism places loyalty to the nation above all other forms of political and
social loyalties. One may place one’s moral or religious beliefs above national
identity, but nationalism assumes that these must give way to loyalty to the
nation if there is a clash. Nationalism not only makes the nation the focus of
political loyalty but also insists that the nation is the only proper basis for the
organisation of any political activity. Thus the nation, made up of all the people
who belong to it, can legitimately claim property, lives and any other sacrifice
from its members to ensure the survival of the collective.
One of the big questions of nationalism is just how ‘natural’ a nation is. It can
be plausibly argued that nations are ‘invented’ either by the literary
endeavours of poets or the processes of state power. Nationalism nevertheless
assumes that the ‘people’ or ‘the nation’ is an entity with sovereign rights and
a fundamental unity of ‘blood’, ‘culture’ or ‘citizenship’. We shall now consider
these elements of nationalism: sovereignty of the people; Ethnic nationalism
and Civic nationalism.
Sovereignty of the people

From this viewpoint the ‘nation’ is essentially the same as the ‘people’, involving
the idea that people are bound together into a group united in common
patriotic identification with the nation. Popular sovereignty is a very important
basis for loyalty to the state or for struggles by a subordinate nation to create a
state. Conservatives regard popular sovereignty as an appeal to national unity
over class, religion and other social divisions. Radicals use it to rally popular
support against an unjust government. Appeals to popular sovereignty can be
seen in revolutionary documents such as the American Declaration of Indepen-
dence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789).
Ethnic nationalism and Civic nationalism

Ethnic nationalism identifies a close connection between national members
linked by race, language or other cultural attributes that persist over centuries.
One is a member of the nation by birth and bloodline, by genetics, and bears
an identity that cannot be sloughed off by becoming a citizen of another
nation or acquired by choice and filling in an application form. So, for
example, ethnic Germans, who for centuries had lived in what had become
Russia, could apply to rejoin their nation and return to German soil. They
were, until recently, able to stake a better claim to German citizenship than
Turkish ‘guest workers’ and even the latter’s German-born descendants.
Civic nationalism is the basis of American, French or British nationalism. It
identifies the common historical ties that exist between the people in the
nation, ties that can easily be extended to other people through citizenship
and the loyalties and obligations associated with acquiring that citizenship.
Nationalism 157
There is no ethnic limitation on who can potentially be a member of the

nation. However, one should not forget the difficulty of attaining this form of
nationalism in practice. Existing members of the nation may have very strong
objections to large-scale additions of people to the nation by acquisition of
citizenship.
Nationalism is, therefore, not a straightforward ideology. It can wear many
faces, display many forms. It can be conservative, fascist, liberal, socialist,
even Marxist. All political ideologies have used nationalism for their ends.
Even anarchism, probably the least influenced by nationalism, is affected by
national identity and the national experience of anarchists, bringing different
theoretical contributions to the movement. Nevertheless, nationalism is
characterised at a fundamental level by the belief, demand even, that each
nation should be governed by its own sovereign state.
We can usefully sub-divide nationalism into three categories:
• liberal nationalism;
• reactionary nationalism;
• radical nationalism.
Liberal nationalism
According to this school of thought, mankind is naturally divided into nations,
all of which have certain territorial limits to which they are equally entitled.
Each should be sovereign, self-governing, with its own political institutions.
National rights are analogous to human rights and are also universal. This
form of nationalism sits easily with the more internationalist, pacifist and
idealist elements within liberalism. A world of sovereign nations would
respect each other’s national rights and co-operate readily within interna-
tional institutions. Certainly this was the hope of liberal nationalists such as
Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy. The revolutions that swept across Europe in 1848
were greatly influenced by liberals and were almost always successfully
crushed by the threatened states.
It is taken for granted that such nationalism would involve respect for minority
rights, whether ethnic, religious or linguistic. This ‘acceptable’ form of nation-
alism was popular among liberals and some socialists during the early
nineteenth century. After the First World War it was resurrected in the institution
of the League of Nations, founded on the principles of national self-determi-
nation and collective security. After the Second World War this form of nation-
alism was embodied in the United Nations and other liberal international bodies
set up to regulate human rights and the free-trade international economy.
Liberal nationalists under-estimate the problems of identifying natural
national units in terms of population, geography and economic viability. They
disregard nationalism’s potential for evil, and over-estimate its positive

elements. Nevertheless, liberal nationalism was and still remains a very strong
element in many modern nationalist movements.
Reactionary nationalism
With the failure of the liberal-nationalist revolutions of 1848, nationalism in
many European countries became increasingly associated with the conser-
vative and reactionary forces involved in creating and preserving the nation
and its institutions, which were threatened by revolution and socialism.
Nationalism became a means by which the national identity of some citizens
was crushed or suppressed to ensure the unity of the larger nation. This was
especially the case in the sprawling multi-national Austro-Hungarian and
Russian empires, both struggling with rising nationalism and both trying to
assert imperial nationalism and unity over the demands for greater self-
government and independence of restless subservient nations.
After 1870 with the setting up of the Third French Republic and the unification
of Germany, reactionary nationalism became ever more powerful in Europe. It
was linked with an organic national identity as expressed in religion, social order,
traditional hierarchies, language, culture and customs. Overseas, it involved
imperialism, racism, and claims of the right to rule
over ‘inferior’ nations, along with vigorous political imperialism
and military competition with other nations. Such The process of creating an
nationalism repudiated socialism and liberalism empire. An empire is a type of
and instilled itself as an ideological alternative in political system where one
nation by dint of its superior
the minds of the newly enfranchised masses. power dominates and controls
other nations. In Lenin’s view,
By the twentieth century, this model of nationalism imperialism was a phase of
became allied with conservatism, so closely that capitalist expansion involving
the radical and socialist left worked hard in most the subjugation and economic
exploitation of the less
Western democracies to distance themselves from
developed part of the world.
the nationalism of their political opponents and,
hence, from nationalism altogether. Reactionary
nationalism may stress patriotism and the unique nature of the nation but it is
not necessarily imperialistic, even if it was associated with late nineteenth-
century ‘popular imperialism’. It is often indifferent to events outside the nation,
so long as the rest of the world leaves it alone.
Radical nationalism
This emerged after the First World War, though arguably it could be traced
back to the French revolutionaries. Radical nationalism was (and is)
connected with a desire to change the domestic and/or international order, an
order that seemed to need changing in favour of one’s own nation. It took two
Nationalism 159
major forms. One form of radical nationalism was an essentially rightist form
of politics; the other was the mainstay of anti-colonialism.
Radical-right nationalism despised the old order, the privileged classes and
out-dated institutions, all of which were condemned as having betrayed the
nation. Often it required energetic and dramatic social, economic and political
reform, intended to renew the nation. It sought to offer the working classes an
alternative to the internationalism of communism and socialism after the
Russian Revolution.
Defeat in war was a stimulus to this form of nationalism in Germany and Turkey,
but it also emerged in Italy and France, where formal victory had been
purchased at a terrible cost. This form of radical nationalism tended to be intol-
erant of minorities that were not regarded as authentically part of the nation,
and vociferous in its claims against neighbouring states. In its extreme form it
sets the superiority of the nation above other nations and may be used to justify
wars of territorial aggrandisement. Such nationalism merges easily into fascism.
Radical nationalism may, however, take an almost entirely opposite path: anti-
colonial struggle against reactionary or imperialist radical nationalism. In this
form it uses the values of nationalism to make a case for independence from a
political structure that is seen as oppressive of the members of the nation. It
appeals to the doctrine of national self-determination and the logic of national
independence. Nationalism played a significant role in the ending of the
European empires during the decades after the Second World War.
In the same period this form of nationalism often contained a strong socialist
element as it was linked to the communal values of indigenous societies as
well as the overthrow of the colonial ruling class. After independence, this
form of nationalism involved resistance to Western economic, cultural and
political domination (condemned as ‘neo-colonialism’) and led many devel-
oping world states to nationalise the assets of foreign-owned multi-national
corporations based in their countries.
Nationalism: the history of an ideology

One might assert that modern history has been directed by the rise, devel-
opment and spread of nationalism. We can
identify a number of stages in the development of Cold War
nationalism: A term which refers to the
• proto-nationalism; struggle between the West and
the Soviet Union from just after
• early modern nationalism; the Second World War to the
• nationalism in the age of revolutions; late 1980s. It was a conflict
• twentieth-century nationalism; that stopped short of a full-
scale ‘hot war’.
• post-Cold War nationalism.
Proto-nationalism
Christendom
Before the European Renaissance there was Essentially an alternative name
for Europe during the Middle
among Europeans some sense of national differ-
Ages which described the
ences and identification with kings, princes, domination of Christianity and
languages and cultures. The context was the its claim to create a degree of
universalist claim of loyalty to Christendom in the unity among Christians in the
face of the threat from Islam.
shape of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor in
the face of the threat from the Muslim world.
Early modern nationalism Holy Roman Empire

The Western part of the Roman
The break-up of Christendom during the later Empire was revived by
Renaissance helped to create a sense of national Charlemagne in 800 when he
was crowned Emperor. The title
identity. Shared language, increasingly explicit Holy Roman Empire was
‘national’ culture, ‘national’ religion, constant wars established in 962 and endured
all helped strengthen the sense of national differ- until 1806 when it was
abolished by Napoleon who
ences, national identity and support for strong dismissed it as neither Holy,
centralised states that increasingly had the ability Roman nor an Empire.
to create national loyalty among their populations.
Nationalism in the age of revolutions

Nationalism, however ancient its roots, is a relatively modern phenomenon.
Agricultural and industrial revolutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries broke down many older, lesser loyalties without initially replacing
them with new ones. The nation would become that replacement.
The American Revolution and, especially, the French Revolutionary and

Napoleonic wars played a vital role in the development of modern nation-
alism. Before these conflicts an individual’s loyalty was essentially to another
individual (the monarch, for example). Most aspects of Europe’s ancien régime
were overthrown during the French Wars and a sense of nationhood was
stimulated in most nations across Europe, from Spain and Portugal to Russia.
The highest form of political loyalty shifted from the monarch to the ‘nation’,
or the ‘people’, from an individual who embodied the nation to a group.
Indeed, so powerful did the concept become that most nationalists argue that
the nation is a natural social organisation.
Although nationalism today is often related to the political right, during the
nineteenth century it was usually a liberal and revolutionary ideology,
certainly up to the revolutions of 1848. It played a vital role in the unification
of Italy (1861) and Germany (1871), and the struggles for national liberation
of oppressed nations such as the Irish, the Czechs and the Poles throughout the
nineteenth century.
Nationalism 161
In some ways the concept of the nation became more tangible as people
identified the nation as consisting of their fellow citizens, rather than some
remote monarch. During the nineteenth century centralised and powerful
states increasingly legitimised their actions by claiming to represent ‘the
people’. Nationalism legitimised a state’s actions and was often used as a
means to suppress opposition to the state’s policies and rule – hence the devel-
opment of the vague but powerful concept of the ‘national interest’.
By the end of the century nationalism had spread with European power across
the globe. Embryonic nationalist movements grew up within the colonial
empires to press for greater self-government and, eventually, independence.
Twentieth-century nationalism
The twentieth century was an era of total warfare that strengthened nation-
alism at the time. It was also a century during which the viability, and value, of
nations as political units was questioned with increasing urgency. Nationalism
as a valid ideology for human affairs was also challenged. Twentieth-century
wars were too destructive, the loss of life too great for nationalism to be free of
blame for its contribution to the horrors. A considerable degree of hostility to
nationalism grew during the century, especially after the world wars.
There were attempts to distinguish between imperialist nationalism (‘bad’)
and anti-colonialist nationalism (‘good’). After the Second World War
national liberation movements were boosted by the nature of the struggle
against fascist nationalism. The British, for instance, could hardly fight a war
against imperialism and racism and then go back to governing an empire
built on imperialism and racism. Whatever the form it took, nationalism
remained widely perceived as a dangerous and destructive force, open to
little rational explanation and unleashing extreme violence and intolerance
into politics.
Nationalism was used as a reinforcement of other political ideologies. Fascism
obviously had nationalism at the core of its values. However, the concept of
socialist internationalism also gave way to nationalism. Communist regimes,
such as the Soviet Union and Communist China, created ‘socialism in one
country’ and quarrelled over the ‘proper’ interpretation of the meaning of
socialism along national lines while pursuing traditional national foreign-
policy goals.
Nationalism remained the most powerful and widespread ideology in the
world, influencing, challenging and defeating other ideologies. As has already
been pointed out revolutionary communism, which stressed the common
interests of the working class, evolved into ‘national’ socialism in most
countries – especially when those movements took over the state.
Post-Cold War nationalism

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided
with the rise of ‘globalisation’ as a driving force for change in world society.
There were also increasing attempts to strengthen international institutions as
alternatives to states in international politics. Nationalism appeared to be an
idea that had had its day; but it refused to die.
Decades of suppression among the nations of the USSR and Yugoslavia culmi-
nated in the demise of communism and the uprising of virulent nationalism
in those societies. Wars broke out in Yugoslavia and several states of the
former Soviet Union, resulting in massacres and widespread destruction.
Nationalism remains a powerful force in many countries in Europe and in the
developing world. If anything nationalism has had a new lease of life after
the Cold War.
There are great movements of people taking place in the modern world,
migration on a scale not seen since the late nineteenth century. Some histo-
rians have characterised it as comparable to the great Volkswanderung –
people movements – of the fourth and fifth centuries AD that ended the
classical world and gave birth to modern European nations. The USA is a
nation of recent immigrants, and is still a major magnet for people seeking a
better life. Nationalists often feel threatened by large-scale migration into
their country. They feel that immigrants threaten their national identity. This
is especially true of nationalists in European nations who are not influenced
by the concept of the ‘melting pot’ of peoples that exists in the USA.
Nationalism and the serving of political interests

In any study of politics one sooner or later comes across the issue of who gains
from a political programme and who loses. In the case of nationalism, there is
a considerable debate among political scientists as to who benefits from
nationalism as an ideology.
Nationalism can be seen as being intimately linked to the interests of the
society as a whole. It is a product of the development of modern statehood and
industrialisation. Over the last two centuries there has been massive social
and technological change, involving scientific enquiry, greater rationality, the
development of a more centralised state, greater social mobility and
the prospect of social reform. These enormous changes created a modern sense
of history and also an understanding of the processes of social change. Pre-
industrial society and its deep emotional ties to traditional national identity
was the major casualty of this vast social and intellectual change. Nationalism,
as Ernest Gellner argues in Nations and Nationalism (1983), became an
ideological tool of elites to mobilise people to welcome change. The nation was
Nationalism 163
claimed to have deep historical roots, compensating people for the loss of their
strong pre-industrial social ties.
Critics who oppose these social and economic changes also use nationalism as
a support, appealing to some ancient ethnic past in their attacks on moderni-
sation. This may manifest itself as an ethnic nationalism fighting the nation-
alism of a dominant national group within a state or against other competing
national groups. For example, during the nineteenth century the subject
nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire resisted Austrian and Hungarian
domination and also asserted their national identity against each other and,
especially, Jews. The empire was a seething pot of nationalism, ethnic rivalries
and anti-Semitism.
The political uses of nationalist ideology depend on how one sees it in relation
to other major ideological traditions.
Conservatives, for example, assert that nationalism creates social cohesion and
social order. All people have a place and a valued role in the nation. The organic
nature of the nation must be upheld, as being a natural social unit. Conserva-
tives do not accept that patriotism and nationalism must lead to aggression and
imperialism. Nevertheless, nationalism in late nineteenth-century Britain was
used by the Conservatives as part of ‘popular imperialism’ to encourage
political support for themselves and to support overseas expansion.
Liberals sometimes claim nationalism is closely linked to ‘freedom’, both
national and individual. It is a means by which the common interests required
to enable a society to function can be balanced against the necessary individ-
ualism of a free-market economy and a free society. Indeed, the idea of
national self-determination and free trade is one of the major means by which
world peace can be established.
Social democrats have a similar view to the liberals. They make more of a class
analysis of nationalism, but many social democrats will stress the importance
of the nation over the individual. In practice, social-democratic governments
in modern democracies have shown themselves to be as nationalistic as
governments of other ideological hues.
Marxists declare that nationalism is an ideological tool of the ruling capitalist
classes and, as such, has developed out of industrialisation. Traditional
Marxists claim that capitalists use nationalism to divert the working class from
their ‘true’ predicament by encouraging a sense of commitment to ‘national’
identity: imperialism is one of the many unacceptable uses to which nation-
alism is put in the service of the interests of the capitalist class. Modern
Marxists have argued that nationalism can have legitimacy when it is
identified with the struggle for national independence of an oppressed nation,
or when it is used as the means of challenging class power within a nation.
This holds true during both the anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century
and the liberation struggles against neo-colonialism today. Nationalism, often
with a Marxist dimension, will sometimes be associated with demands for
greater democracy in oppressed nations. This kind of ‘revolutionary nation-
alism’ will claim to be more democratic and liberating than ‘old nationalism’.
The impact of nationalism

If, as it appears, nationalism is the most powerful ideology in modern politics,
one needs to identify and discuss the ways in which it has transformed the
modern world. In this section we will discuss the following areas:
• the psychological appeal of nationalism;
• national self-determination;
• nationalism and international politics;
• nationalism and the end of empires and multi-national states.
The psychological appeal of nationalism

Nationalism forms a vital focus of identification for citizens. Membership of a
nation is emotional and intangible. The nation can satisfy people’s basic psycho-
logical needs to identify with and belong to a group, to be part of something
greater than oneself, to take part in something that lifts one out of the ordinary.
People often complain that their lives are subject to uncomfortable pressures
and control. Employers, social customs, lack of money all regularly stress, in a
myriad ways, the essential powerlessness of most people. Identification with the
nation, that ‘super-individual’ made of a collective ‘we’, can give individuals a
sense of power, control, glory, success, greatness that they rarely, if ever, achieve
in mundane, everyday life.
Membership of a nation is bound up with notions of collective consciousness.
Increased contact with other national groups can stimulate consciousness of
national differences, cultivate a feeling of ‘us and them’ divisions, and create
and reinforce an impression of superiority over peoples of other nations.
Regular conflicts between nations over centuries reinforce that sense of
national identity. Irish nationalism was forged during the struggle against
English power. English and French, Turk and Greek, Serb and Bosnian Muslim,
Indian and Pakistani, all are nationalities wrought by centuries-old conflicts
and wars, the cheering of victories, the brooding on defeats. History, or
mythologised history, is therefore a crucial feature of nationalism.
National identification is stimulated by such myths, but also by flags, national
anthems, martial music, founding fathers of the nation, images of the country
– usually rural, rather than urban – and the national stereotyping of the
members of other nations.
Nationalism 165
However, nationalism is only one of a number of ideologies competing for the

attention and allegiance of an individual. Other ideologies, such as socialism
or Marxism, may challenge nationalism. There may be competing nation-
alisms, such as ‘British’ and ‘Scottish’, or even a growing sense of ‘European’
identity. One can understand in these circumstances that a certain degree of
psychological turmoil may affect a person.
National self-determination
Nationalism not only creates a sense of national identity. It presents the state
as the most important form of political organisation for a people. Nationalism
encourages the view that ‘nations’ should be governed by a ‘state’ made up of
members of that nation. National self-determination really strengthens the
validity of the state as an expression of ‘nationhood’. This is not a new idea:
‘All nations and reasonable men prefer to be governed by men of their own
country and nation, who share the same language as them . . . rather than by
strangers.’1 If this desirable state could not be achieved peacefully then it was
to be prosecuted by war, if necessary.
Nationalism seemed to offer freedom, wealth and power. Nineteenth-century
Europe was characterised by the rise of nationalism as an ideology and the
nationalisms of its many peoples. Indeed, the rise of nations was allied to the
acquisition of statehood. Italy existed as a nation before its political unification
into a state in 1860, as did Germany before Prussia created the Reich in 1871,
but both were forged into nation-states by war. Both countries became steadily
wealthier after they were unified. The national struggles of the Balkan nations
against Turkish rule are further examples of the success of this new powerful
ideology. For some nationalists in India and elsewhere if nationalism could be
used by Europeans to overthrow an Asian empire in Europe, such as Turkey,
perhaps it could be used by Asians to overthrow European empires in Asia. If
sacrifice was required to achieve this, then nationalism provided the justifica-
tions for the struggle.
Nationalism acquired a considerable degree of legitimacy after the First World
War through the concept of ‘national-self determination’. President Woodrow
Wilson had, at the Paris Peace Conference (1919), used American power
and prestige to establish the principle of ‘national self-determination’ (although
there was no clear formula as to what constituted a ‘nation’ to be ‘self-
determined’). This principle stated that ‘all peoples are equal in their right to
govern themselves as a nation’ and was incorporated into both the Covenant of
the League of Nations (1920) and the Charter of the United Nations (1945).
The preamble to the UN Charter claims that its members ‘. . . reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’.
Originally seen as an ideological and policy basis for the break-up of the
German and Austro-Hungarian empires in Europe, this principle also contained
the seed for dismantling the vast European empires in Africa and Asia.
However, it took another world war and the fundamental weakening of the
European colonial powers for this stage of imperial disintegration to take effect.
The logical consequence of the principle is the creation of ever-smaller states.
The great majority would be poor, small, unstable, and, in a fundamental
political and economic sense, unviable. This effect can be seen in the
fragmented ‘successor’ states that appeared across Eastern Europe after the
Versailles Treaty. Their existence between Germany and the USSR, weak
states between powerful ones, helped to make war inevitable. The post-war
break-up of the European empires created similar problems that have still not
faded from the international system.
The problem with national self-determination as a major political principle is
that few nations exactly correspond to the image of the nation-state. Most
have national minorities within their borders. Sometimes this has led to the
loss of territory to another state as a response to the vociferous demands of the
minority (the Sudetenland Germans in Czechoslovakia during the 1930s, for
example). Sometimes such minorities are expelled. In 1945–46 over 8 million
Germans were expelled from Poland when its western frontiers were moved
further west into formerly German territory. On the partition of British India
into India and Pakistan in 1947 millions of Muslims and Hindus moved,
forcibly or peacefully, across the new international boundaries about to be
created. It is estimated that over 2 million died. In Cyprus, Burma and
Rwanda, Palestine, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, national
identity has been a source of violent expulsion of national and other ethnic
minorities from a particular territory in the desire to create a ‘pure’ ethnic
national identity.
European expansion spread the concept of the nation and nationalism right
across the globe. Some form of national identification existed in most parts of
the world, but that was often confined to ruling elites and often had little
popular support. But it was the experience of European power and, usually,
colonisation that stimulated the development of non-European nationalism.
Nationalism and international politics

Nationalism, as we have seen, developed in its modern form during the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. First in France and then among the
enemies of France, nationalism mobilised the powerful emotions of loyalty
and fighting for a cause. By 1815 almost all the nations of Europe had become
carriers of ideological nationalism. Evidently, the nineteenth century was the
major formative era of modern nationalism. By the end of the century it was
Nationalism 167
a powerful political force in the politics of the emerging European democ-

racies, the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, and the autocracy of the
Russian Empire. All governments appealed to national images and national
identity as means of building political legitimacy for their governments.
However, nationalism also contributed to increasing rivalry and suspicion
between the Great Powers during the years before 1914. It promoted conflict
by stressing the differences between nations, and stimulated arms races and
the building of alliances. It also made peaceful resolution of differences by
diplomacy increasingly difficult. Nationalism did not make war inevitable, but
it made war more difficult to avoid, less easy to contain once begun, more
violent and destructive as it progressed and extremely difficult to end. War
became a struggle for whole nations, for national self-determination, even
national survival. Thus war was intensified by becoming an ideological
struggle of peoples, of popular passions, of national pride. Any questioning of
the motives for which the war was fought, any demand for peace, was likely
to be suppressed as potential or actual ‘treason’. The greater the national sacri-
fices, the greater the demands for the war to go on until final victory for the
nation was achieved.
Even more destructive was the Second World War. Fascists and Nazis used
nationalism to strengthen their idea of the world being made up of nations
struggling for survival. The 1930s experienced the world steady drifting
towards conflict, and after 1939, the Second World War was on a scale of
destruction unimaginable even after the 1914–18 War.
The defeat of the Axis powers by 1945 was not the end of nationalism as a
powerful motivating ideology. The ideological conflicts of the Cold War, the
struggles between Western democracy and communism, were given an edge
by nationalism. Anti-communism in the USA became associated with
‘Americanism’, a set of ideological and national ideals that led to the
creation of an ‘Un-American Activities Committee’ in the House of Repre-
sentatives and the attempted suppression of any dissent characterised as
‘unpatriotic’. The Soviet Union, Communist China and North Vietnam may
all have claimed to be socialist states, but their rivalries with each other
were deeply influenced by nationalism. Indeed, at times it is difficult to see
where the ‘socialism’ lay in their exchange of vitriolic statements, while
their ‘nationalism’ is clear. Almost all of the many wars and conflicts in the
developing world during the Cold War and afterwards were impelled by
nationalism and national aspirations.
Nationalism and the end of empires and multinational states

Nationalism played a crucial role in the overthrow of the European empires.
Canada, the USA, Australia, New Zealand, all nurtured a sense of national
identity even when they were part of the British Empire, eventually leading to
their independence. In Africa and Asia, Western-educated nationalist elites
sought the creation of new nations, but there was usually the lack of a strong
sense of ‘national’ identity in these European colonies, compared with
religious, ethnic, linguistic or other identities.
This is because the borders of most African and Middle Eastern states were
established by European Great Powers mainly concerned with the interna-
tional balance of power and showing little or no consideration for ethnic,
linguistic or cultural affinities. The European withdrawal from the continent
left ‘nations’ with little or no sense of nationalist identity and affinity among
the bulk of the population: civil wars and political upheavals were too often
the consequence. Middle Eastern states are also the result of balance of power
politics following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World
War. The claims of Iraq to Kuwait and Syrian interest in Lebanon are just two
of the modern tensions in the region arising from a weak sense of nationalism
among the members of the local states.
Elites, especially in Africa, tried to create a sense of national, racial or even
continental identity but were themselves seen as somewhat ‘alien’. They had
often spent much time outside the country, usually in the colonial power, and
were often thought to be connected with a particular ethnic group. Appeals to
these broad identities were an attempt to skate over the very real differences
between people who had little in common with the new ‘national’ identity.
Many of the new nations were, in turn, riven by the demands of other
competing divisions, often impelled by nationalism or at least ethnicity
presented as nationalism. The stability of these countries often remains
tentative: nationalist movements frequently grew up within the newly
independent ‘nations’, creating forces for further disintegration. Biafra in
Nigeria, India and Kashmir, Sikhs in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka all have
involved and are still beset by levels of conflict that threaten the unity of the
modern state.
In some societies, such as China, India and the Arab world, nationalists could
appeal to ‘real’ national identities of ancient origin in their struggle with the
Europeans. Nevertheless, colonial powers and their colonial boundaries
moulded even their national identity. Appeals were made by some African and
Arab politicians to identities that cut across nations, such as Pan-Africanism,
Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism, often with little, or at most temporary,
success. Usually ‘traditional’ nationalism was too powerful a force for such
broad identities to have much popular appeal.
Anti-colonialism was especially linked to Marxism and socialism. Nationalism
when seen as serving the interests of a colonial or capitalist elite was attacked,
but ‘revolutionary’ nationalism was a challenge to the capitalist exploitation
Nationalism 169
of the world’s poor. Only ‘national’ control of ‘national’ resources and the
establishment of a new level of international justice could overcome the
backwardness of the developing world.
The end of the Cold War was not the end of nationalism as a powerful force in
world affairs. It has, in fact, become stronger in many countries. The collapse
of the Soviet Union, the heir of the Russian Empire (‘the prisonhouse of the
nations’, as Marx called it), was partly due to the failure to create a sense of
Soviet nationalism as distinct from Russian nationalism. With the weakening
of totalitarian controls under Gorbachev the suppressed nationalisms within
the USSR helped break it up into nation-states. This process of disintegration
has not ended there. National conflicts have exploded in Georgia, Armenia
and the Chechnya region of Russia. Nationalist tensions were already present
in the new nations of the post-Soviet states, where large Russian minorities
lived within the boundaries of the ‘new’ nation. It is estimated that 25 million
Russians live in the former states of the USSR outside the Russian Republic.
Many ex-communist politicians reinvented themselves as nationalists in order
to retain power as the Soviet state collapsed. Nationalism played a violent role
in the break-up of Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the peaceful dismem-
berment of Czechoslovakia in 1992.
These forces of disintegration and re-creation can be seen in nations such as
Canada and Britain, countries far more stable and well established than the
communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the USSR. Canada’s future is
questionable because of the continuing conflicts between its English and
French-speaking peoples. The UK, even, may disintegrate as a consequence of
the various nationalisms within its multi-national state territory
The unification of Germany, on the other hand, seems to have stimulated
nationalism in that country, especially in the former communist eastern part
of the republic. In Western Europe the expansion of the European Union, both
geographically and in its powers, appears to have stimulated a nationalist
reaction to this ‘usurpation’ of many of the roles of the state. This has occurred
both at the level of the formal state members of the EU and at sub-state,
regional, levels with demands for ‘national’ recognition of the political aspira-
tions of many nations: Welsh, Scots, Basques, Bretons, Corsicans. Most of this
nationalist argument, one must recognise, pre-dates the European Union and
the modern force of globalisation.
Critique of nationalism
Nationalism is out of favour in the West. Even the alleged ideological benefits
of the nationalist tradition, such as its potential for social cohesion, are looked
on askance. It has been subject to much criticism over the last fifty years.
Up to the mid-twentieth century, socialists believed that nationalism was a

liberating ideology because of its support for national self-determination and
anti-imperialism. However, they usually saw nationalism as, at best, a
distraction from the class struggle and, more often, as a means of manipu-
lating the working class, to divert it from the reality of its exploitation by the
bourgeoisie. For most of the twentieth century nationalism, especially in the
opinion of liberals and socialists, became identified with reaction, aggression,
intolerance, war, religious bigotry and atrocity. It is certainly possible to make
a case against it with reference to the Second World War, to the recent wars in
the former Yugoslav and post-Soviet states, to the nationalist conflicts in the
developing world, and the activities of various fascist movements in Europe
and elsewhere.
Based on the nation, itself a concept with multifarious interpretations, and on
an irrational, emotional response, nationalism remains a force for division and
aggression. Assumptions that nations occupy distinct areas that they legiti-
mately call ‘theirs’, and which are hallowed by history and validated by
geography, are simply misguided. Minority groups, perceived as outside the
larger national community, are frequently threatened by nationalist fervour.
Nationalism may have arisen out of the eighteenth century, but it represents
the dark alternative to the rationalism of the Enlightenment.
Nationalism is irrelevant to internationalists in a world where problems
transcend national boundaries and must be addressed on a global basis.
Liberals see it as an impediment to greater international co-operation and
integration. From a conservative standpoint, competing nationalisms disrupt
the social order. A socialist, like a Marxist, believes nationalism is at best a
diversion from the class struggle, at worst a weapon used by exploiters to
divide the international working classes.
The future of nationalism

After the Second World War nationalism was thought by many in Europe to be
out of date and discredited, confined to the ‘backward’ parts of Europe –
conservative, poor, often Catholic. By the 1960s and 1970s nationalism was
back in fashion in many parts of Europe. It was used by many as the basis for
resisting dominant nationalist and cultural values linked to the most powerful
nations on earth, especially the USA. By the 1990s, ‘globalisation’ was used to
describe a range of social and economic processes, long in existence but
‘maturing’ in the post-Cold War world. Nationalism and national identity were
taken up by many on both the left and the right as ideological instruments to
resist globalisation and assert the positive claims of cultural diversity in an
increasingly homogenised world.
Nationalism 171
Within the UK nationalism was linked to the economic crises of the 1970s and
1980s and the growth of regional and national disparities of wealth. This can
be observed in the violent conflict in Northern Ireland, the rise of Scottish and
Welsh nationalism and their demands for better treatment from the British
Government. Northern England has not been able to make a coherent
‘national’ claim, but shares a degree of resentment with the Celtic nations of
the UK towards the economic, political and cultural dominance of London and
the South-East of England.
Nationalism is still a major force in world affairs. Nevertheless, there are
powerful economic and cultural forces undermining nationalism, usually
described as ‘globalisation’, developing around multi-national corporations,
banks, insurance companies, global communications, the dominance of the
English language.
Globalisation creates new identities and new loyalties by its cultural and
economic processes, but it also creates a potential ‘backlash’ of resistance to
the ‘threats’ to national identity that it produces by its international,
Westernised, homogenised character. Many people appeal to nationalist senti-
ments for an ideological basis to resist the ‘McDonaldisation’ of their culture.
Nationalism is used in a very broad sense to support the claims of ‘identity’
politics. Political claims are asserted by groups acutely aware of their identity
– but an identity that falls short of being a nation as measured by the usual
criteria. African-Americans constitute a fairly clearly delineated group with
identifiable political goals. Louis Farrakhan, the leader of the ‘Nation of Islam’,
has called for a separate state for black people in America. The Unionists in
Northern Ireland might also be said to constitute a similar group, as do the
Inuit in Canada. Northern Irish nationalists might aspire to a unification of
Ireland but will settle, at least temporarily, for power-sharing with the
Unionists. Flemish groups in Belgium focus on equal rights with the Walloon
(French-speaking) population. Such groups may polarise around language,
race and religion.
‘Regional nationalism’ is another sub-species of nationalism. It refers to a
claim for regional autonomy, which nevertheless stops short of outright
independence. A good example would be Catalan nationalism in Spain or the
Northern League in Italy. In practice regionalism and nationalism often
converge because nationalist parties perceive tactical political advantage in
seeking the minimum goal of autonomy rather than full independence.
From a Western liberal perspective it is difficult not to be uneasy about nation-
alism. It is evidently still a powerful force. Even in Europe some forms of
nationalism are clearly alive and well. It may be argued that it is possibly a
countervailing force to the insidious processes of economic and cultural
globalisation, and in the confused and atomised societies undergoing

profound changes it is a source of dignity, security and social cohesion. It is not
likely to fade away in this century. Growing competition for water, oil, food,
land and clear air is likely to be a feature of international and domestic
political life during the twenty-first century, so war between nations is likely
to continue.
Summary
Nationalism in some sense of the word can be traced back to pre-Renaissance
times. In its modern sense, of having political implications, it is a relatively
recent phenomenon. We can distinguish between ‘ethnic nationalism’, which
links nation with race and language and birth, and ‘civic nationalism’, which
links nation with citizenship, with no ethnic limitation on who is potentially a
member of the nation. We can also distinguish between liberal, reactionary
and radical nationalism. Furthermore, nationalism can fulfil a number of
political functions such as promoting social change, creating social cohesion,
or strengthening the hold of the ruling class. Nationalism has had an immense
impact in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially in undermining
empires and multi-national states. To critics, this process has not necessarily
been beneficial; witness the atrocities committed in its name in, for example,
Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, even in the ‘global’ society of the twenty-first
century it remains a powerful force.
1 Claude de Seyssel, bishop and chancellor of France (1510).
Alter, P. Nationalism (Edward Arnold, 1989).

Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and
Spread of Nationalism (NLB/Verso, 1983).
Barraclough, G. An Introduction to Contemporary History (Penguin,
1967).
‘Nations and their Past: The Uses and Abuses of History’, The Economist (21
December, 1996), pp. 53–6.
Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell, 1983).
Goodwin, B. ‘Beyond Nationalism’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and
Sons, 2001), pp. 249–67.
Griffin, R. ‘Nationalism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.), Contemporary Political
Ideologies (Pinter, 1993), pp. 147–68.
Heywood, A. ‘The Nation’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction
(Macmillan, 1994), pp. 56–66.
Heywood, A. ‘Nations and Nationalism’, in A. Heywood, POLITICS (Macmillan, 1997),
pp. 103–19.
Nationalism 173
Heywood, A. Political Ideologies: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1998).

Hobsbawm, E. Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge University Press,
1990).
Jay, R. ‘Nationalism’, in R. Eccleshall et al., Political Ideas: An Introduction (Routledge,
1994), pp. 153–84.
Kedourie, E. Nationalism (Hutchinson, 1985).
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Morgenthau and K. W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations (Alfred A. Knopf, 1985),
pp. 120–6.
Purnell, R. ‘The Notion of the Nation: Some Images and Myths’, in R. Purnell, The
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pp. 238–77.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Is it possible to argue a rational case for nationalism?
2 How useful is it to distinguish between liberal nationalism, reac-

tionary nationalism and radical nationalism?
3 ‘Nationalism has a very bad press today, one which is undeserved

when one considers the contribution nationalism has made to the
progress of human culture.’ Why might you agree or disagree with
this statement?
4 Which form of nationalism characterises contemporary nationalist movements?
5 Can we expect an increase or decrease in nationalist sentiment in the twenty-first century?

Conservatism 9
Conservatism is one of the major intellectual and political strains of thought in

Western culture over the last two centuries. Originating as something of a
‘reaction’ to the radical, liberal and, later, socialist movements during the early
period of industrialisation in Britain and Europe, conservatism remains a powerful
ideological force in Western societies today. We explore conservatism from its
intellectual and cultural roots in the eighteenth century to current developments
in the early twenty-first century. Considerable attention is given to the historical
experiences of conservative parties, especially in Britain, in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, experiences that have been at least as significant in the
development of conservative ideology as particular individual thinkers.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Why was the conservative reaction to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution less
structured than that of other ideological and political movements?
➤ How far have events in the last hundred years tended to support conservative attitudes
to human nature, society, the economy, and the importance of law and tradition?
➤ To what degree has the British Conservative Party reflected the conservative intellectual
tradition?
➤ Is the future of conservatism as an ideology bound up with the future of the nation-state?
Conservatism 175
Society is indeed a contract . . . but it is not a partnership in things . . . of a

temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in
all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection . . . As the ends of such a
partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership
between . . . those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are yet to be
born. (Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790)
Conservatism is less a political doctrine than a habit of mind, a mode of feeling, a

way of living. (R. J. White, The Conservative Tradition, 1964)
A conservative is a man with two perfectly good legs who, however, has never
learnt to walk forward. (Franklin D. Roosevelt, radio talk, October 1939)
There are a number of caveats to be made before we explore the nature of

conservative thought. In Britain the connection between the Conservative
Party and conservative thinkers is tenuous. Edmund Burke, who is generally
regarded as the greatest early conservative thinker, was a ‘Whig’. Many
modern ‘conservative’ thinkers have little or no connection with the Conserv-
ative Party. Moreover, the meaning of ‘conservatism’ has shifted over time.
European or American conservatism is not the same as British. To add to our
difficulties, some conservatives have argued that the British Conservative
Party has a distinctive way of thought, including its ‘common-sense’, realist
and non-ideological or pragmatic nature. As the former Conservative leader,
William Hague, once said in a Today (Radio 4) interview: ‘We’re not claiming
to have an ideology; the Conservative Party is not based on ideology, it is
based on doing what is best.’
Cynics point to the electoral success of the British Conservative Party during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as evidence that it is simply the
political instrument of the ‘haves’ against the ‘have nots’, a fact that it has
successfully obscured. Or that it simply defends the status quo (whatever that
happens to be) against change (whatever that happens to be). This is the sense
in which journalists and political commentators often use it. Thus we get the
paradoxical situation where in extreme Marxist or Islamic regimes those who
oppose ‘liberal’ reforms are often condemned as ‘conservatives’.
Like socialism, and to a lesser extent liberalism, conservative thought comes in
many varieties and there is considerable tension between rival schools, and, of
course, within contemporary ‘conservative’ parties. Even if it lacks the universal
scope and intellectual coherence of other ideologies, it has characteristic ideas
and values. In Britain these ideas and values continue to have an impact on
modern conservative thought and the contemporary Conservative Party.
Given the emphasis on tradition and the historical roots of society it is
especially important to look at the historical roots of conservative thought.
The historical origins and later evolution of

Conservative thought
As with most political philosophies, it is difficult to establish a particular
starting point for conservatism. Some commentators look to Plato, others to
the Middle Ages, still others, especially in England, pinpoint the seventeenth
century. This latter starting point has its merits. The crises that led to the civil
wars produced defenders of royal power and of order, such writers as Thomas
Hobbes (who is claimed by both liberals and Marxists as one of their
ideological forebears) and Sir Robert Filmer (a defender of the traditional
rights of kings). The loosely organised political groupings later to be known as
the Tories are the direct ancestor of the modern Conservative Party.
However, systematic forms of conservative thought can be attributed to fear
of domestic political radicalism, as for instance developed in reaction to the
American and French revolutions. The revolutionary consequences to British
society (and its later manifestations in Western Europe) of the agricultural and
industrial revolutions also called for some sort of conservative analysis of
resistance and accommodation.
Conservatism arose and developed as an ideology in response to the claims of
other, radical, movements: liberalism, at first, then nationalism, socialism,
fascism, feminism, environmentalism, all of which sought change, massive
social ‘improvement’, reform and the removal of ‘old’, ‘discredited’, social
orders, institutions and ways of life. Conservatism sought, and still seeks, to
resist such change, to retard change, arguing for reflection, reassessment, and
a willingness to consider the possibility that reformers might be mistaken.
They believe that one should be very cautious about removing or radically
changing old and long-lasting institutions and ways of life.
This was the argument of Edmund Burke, especially his Reflections on the
Revolution in France (1790). Burke, almost the ‘founding father’ of British conser-
vatism, was a distinguished parliamentarian and fully involved in the contro-
versies of his day. He was not a reactionary thinker; for example, he showed
considerable sympathy for the American rebels. Burke’s ideas fed into existing
traditions and political debate, to have a profound and enduring impact.
He realised that the crucial trigger for the revolutionary changes of his own
time was the cultural and intellectual movements (known as the ‘Enlight-
enment’) which swept Europe and the American colonies in the late
eighteenth century and culminated in the French Revolution (1789). Burke’s
political philosophy was based on a critique of the Enlightenment and its
consequences. The intellectual basis of the Enlightenment and subsequent
revolutions was the assumption, founded on a particular understanding of
Newtonian physics, that human society was like a machine, and that this
Conservatism 177
machine could be rationally understood. It was composed of discrete elements

and could be dismantled, reassembled and radically improved by men in the
light of reason.
Burke’s understanding, and that of later conservative theorists, was based on
a quite different analogy. Human society was ‘organic’. It was like a living
being, highly complex, with a distinctive history and nature. In fact, although
all human societies had similarities, their differences were more significant
than what they had in common. Thus arbitrary interference in the natural
course of social development would be, metaphorically speaking, ‘fatal’ to that
society. Moreover, the intellect of any one man, or even the knowledge of any
particular epoch, is inadequate to grasp the complexities of a society. The
accumulated wisdom of the centuries (what Burke called ‘prejudice’),
experience, tradition, custom should be brought to bear and any adjustment
should be made with the greatest caution: ‘The individual is foolish, the
multitude, for the moment, is foolish when they act without deliberation, but
the species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species, it always acts
right.’1 ‘Prejudice’ in fact was a better guide in human affairs than the short-
term intellectual fashions of any particular age. Attempts to base society on
abstract principles, such as the French Revolution’s ‘Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity’, were particularly dangerous and would have, as the Revolution
clearly demonstrated, calamitous results.
During the nineteenth century, while conservative thinkers in Europe tended
to stress monarchy and authoritarian government, bolstered by strong conser-
vative nationalism, British conservatism followed its pragmatic approach to
social and political affairs. Sir Robert Peel sought new links between the
landed gentry and the rising manufacturing classes around principles of free-
market economics, principles of which conservatives were deeply suspicious
during the early part of the century. Benjamin
Disraeli dealt with the political consequences of one-nation conservatism
the growth of a skilled industrial working class A strand in conservative
and demands for extension of the franchise to thought going back to the
include them. In particular, he stressed in his nineteenth-century Conservative
politician Benjamin Disraeli,
speeches and, especially, his novels, such as which emphasises reform as an
Coningsby and Sybil, the need for social instrument of preventing social
improvement to integrate the working class into conflict and uniting the nation.
the one nation he believed Britain should become.
Popular imperialism was one means of encouraging the working classes to
identify with the Conservatives and not be seduced by the appeals of socialism.
Conservatives were also committed to educational and social reforms.
Post-1945 Conservative leaders came to terms with the social-democratic
welfare state by both accepting and extending it. Harold Macmillan, R. A. Butler
and other modernisers within the Conservative Party ensured its post-war
electoral successes. In the 1980s Mrs Thatcher struggled with what she
perceived as the hegemony of socialist and social-democratic doctrine perme-
ating all levels of British society. Her conservatism sought to link the prosperous
and ambitious sections of the working classes with her ideas of popular
capitalism and ‘traditional’ values. The ideas of ‘liberal’ thinkers such as Karl
Popper and F. A. von Hayek were brought in to provide intellectual weight for
her brand of conservatism. These responses to social and political change are
typical of the pragmatism that is a special feature of British conservatism.
Major conservative themes

Conservatism adjusted, with some difficulty at times, to two hundred years of
unprecedented social and political change. Claims to being ‘non-ideological’
by some conservatives are, in essence, claims to superiority over the ‘nonsense’
of other perspectives. The main themes varied in importance at different
times, but they had a number of things in common, to create a body of ideas,
an ideology, that could be called conservative:
• a pessimistic view of human nature;
• an organic view of society;
• a view of politics as a limited activity;
• a belief in patriotism;
• a valuing of tradition;
• a commitment to strong national institutions;
• a high regard for property and the economy;
• an emphasis on law, freedom and authority.
A pessimistic view of human nature

From Burke onwards, conservatives have had a pessimistic view of human
nature. For some, this view is rooted in the Christian doctrine of ‘the Fall of
Man’ (or St Augustine’s understanding of it). As a consequence of disobe-
dience to divine command, human nature is flawed: greedy, irrational, selfish
and power hungry. Improvements to human behaviour and hence to society as
a whole require religious references and God’s grace rather than philosophy
and rational action. Imperfect individuals in imperfect societies produce
imperfect human nature, even if some conserva-
tives do not accept the religious basis of the Utopia
assumption, and this means that radical social A word that literally means
‘Nowhere’. It is an imaginary
improvement is impossible. perfect society and is usually
used dismissively by those who
Using human virtue, individually and especially disapprove of plans for social
collectively, to create a Utopia by political action improvement. The word derives
will make things worse, not better. Belief in, and from the book of the same
name by Sir Thomas More.
attempts to create, human perfectibility is one of
Conservatism 179
the great causes of human misery. The best a government can do is to hold
society together while awaiting the heavenly ‘Jerusalem’. Indeed, one must see
the very severely limited scope of politics in society as far as ‘social improve-
ments’ are concerned. Any social improvement can come only though morals
and faith, not through government or newly invented social institutions. It is
not that people are bad. Most people most of the time are kind, considerate
and law-abiding and are concerned with the well-being of their neighbours.
Nevertheless, flawed human nature needs to be constrained so as not to
damage society.
An organic view of society

Society or, perhaps more accurately, the ‘nation’ is essentially organic in its
nature, a kind of living creature, developing according to its own laws and to
specific historical and cultural circumstances. Individuals are the ‘cells’ that
make up the nation, each having a vital role to play in its well-being. This
analogy of society with a living organism has proved to be of fundamental
importance to conservatives. As a living thing has structure and hierarchy,
with various parts contributing to the overall functioning and well-being of
the whole, so it is with human society. The organism analogy also allows for
adaptation and change. This view can, however, lead to a dislike and suspicion
of foreigners and immigrants (xenophobia) who are seen as ‘alien’ bodies
‘infecting’ the national organism and undermining social cohesion and
homogeneity. While most conservatives would reject racism they would also
reject ‘multi-culturalism’ as divisive and stress the need for immigrants to
‘assimilate’ into national culture
It would be a mistake to assume that conservatism implies total opposition to
change. Change should be gradual, natural and appropriate – evolutionary,
not revolutionary. Social and economic change should be incorporated within
the body politic. Disraeli, for example, defended both the Trade Union Act
(1871), which gave the unions legal recognition, and the extension of the
franchise (1867) in order to accommodate the social realities within the
nation and to ensure its long-term survival by making limited compromises
with rising political and social forces that might become revolutionary if
endlessly frustrated.
Structure implies order, direction and hierarchy. Conservatives may vary on
the precise nature of this order, and how a hierarchy develops and is sustained,
but all are agreed on their necessity. Conservatives stress their importance to
ensure the maintenance of a sound and well-governed society. Authority
derives from tradition and the legitimacy that attaches to those individuals
who hold positions in the nation’s institutions. Hierarchy, both within national
institutions and in society, is vital for the well-organised society, for the
instilling of habits of social discipline, obedience and obligation. Conserva-

tives see nothing wrong in a hierarchy based on birth, wealth, authority, so
long as that hierarchy and its authority are founded on tradition and the rule
of law. Indeed, some conservatives have been suspicious of meritocracy as the
basis for social hierarchy as it creates stresses and competition in society that
put its harmony at risk.
Conservatives see, therefore, a natural inequality among people in society,
caused by the wide and unequal distribution of talents among people. Elites
are the foundation for successful organisation, for the development of higher
elements of culture and for the establishment and defence of property. These
factors benefit everyone in society, and not just the elite, so long as the elite
recognises and carries out its social obligations to lead. Attempts to create
egalitarian societies fail, but they create misery and oppression, often death
and destruction, before they are abandoned.
The basic and most important institution in society is the family. It educates
children into the values of the nation and binds them into a set of strong social
ties. Strong families create strong societies and family breakdown weakens the
bedrock on which society and the nation are built. Family life is not just a
private matter. Government should pursue policies that encourage successful
family life.
A view of politics as a limited activity

Conservatives claim that politics is a limited activity. As Lord Hailsham
observed in The Case for Conservatism (1947): ‘Conservatives do not believe
that the political struggle is the most important thing in life . . . The simplest
of them prefer foxhunting.’ Belief in the limitation, the desirable limitation, of
state power is a recurrent conservative theme from Burke to Thatcher’s ‘rolling
back’ the frontiers of the state and contemporary conservatives looking to the
voluntary sector to redress society’s ills. Politics is a practical pursuit, not a
theoretical or technical one. Living society cannot be deliberately planned,
organised or controlled according to some technical blueprint, some master
plan. If politicians fail to recognise this, then they will attempt to force society
and people to conform to theory with resulting misery and, ultimately, failure.
The main object of politics is the survival of the nation, even, if necessary, at
the expense of individuals. Some twentieth-century conservatives, such as the
poet T. S. Eliot, have maintained a religious element in their resistance to an
over-optimistic view of the effectiveness of politics in bringing happiness,
while others, like the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott, have dispensed
with the religious underpinning to a conservative society. The latter argued
that simply observing the catastrophes arising from attempts to construct new
societies, such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, provides evidence
Conservatism 181
enough of man’s imperfectibility and the dangers of attempting to create a

‘perfect’ society.
Conservatism raises questions as to how ‘democratic’ it is, or should be. Early
conservatives, like Burke, rejected the notion outright. (He famously called the
voters of Bristol ‘The swinish multitude’.) Democracy would rapidly degen-
erate into mob rule, violence and, ultimately, dictatorship and the end of
liberty. Later conservatives sought to hold democratic pressures in check by
emphasising hierarchy (based on an aristocracy, property ownership or merit).
Traditional constitutional barriers to democracy are often emphasised, such
as, in Britain, the monarchy, and the (unreformed, now partially reformed)
House of Lords. The rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and consti-
tutional checks and balances are also emphasised by conservatives.
Indeed, it is the erosion of constitutional balances that many conservatives see
as the basis of the Britain’s elected dictatorship, the government’s domination
over parliament. Conservatives have not, however, been keen to support the
idea of a written constitution. This is presumably
because it would lead to a Bill of Rights, itself the elected dictatorship
product of that whole line of reasoning about A term used to describe the
‘natural rights’ which Burke, among others, British system of government
by the Conservative politician
deplored as being both nonsense and a stimulus Lord Hailsham. It implies that,
to revolution. except at elections, the
executive has almost total
Conservatism, unlike some ideologies, does not domination over the legislature
place politics at the centre of human concerns. and society in general.
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, for example,
once famously advised those who needed to find meaning in their lives to look
to the bishops rather than to politicians. In terms of party politics, this has meant
an emphasis on self-help, and on private education, private property, privacy,
and the family. Politicians, it is assumed, can do much evil, but little good.
A belief in patriotism
Conservatives stress their love of country, implying that they are more patriotic
than their opponents. The nation, with its distinctive culture, history and
identity, is second only to the family as the natural unit of human society and
having a similar emotional tie, can demand huge sacrifice from its members.
Often, explicitly or not, conservatives doubt the patriotism of their opponents
and deride the ‘foreignness’ of their ideas.
Conservative politicians are often strident about promoting the ‘national
interest’, the touchstone of right action in foreign and defence policy. Much is
made of national institutions: flag, armed forces and the constitution. The
Conservative Party identified itself closely with the empire and the UK state.
Patriotism, however, has caused problems for British conservatism. The
empire has gone and, with Welsh and Scottish devolution, the new adminis-
tration in Northern Ireland, and the advance of European integration, the UK
is not what it was. Immigration, especially from the ‘New Commonwealth’, has
raised difficult questions of national identity. The Conservative Party has many
internal tensions over its policy towards the European Union.
British ‘Euro-sceptics’ regularly make references to Britain’s glorious and
independent past and the dangers of becoming subject to ‘Europe’, ‘Brussels’,
or, even, the Germans. A senior Conservative minister once described the EU
as ‘a German racket’. A Tory backbencher once summed up the danger to
British sovereignty from the EU:
Here is a country that has defended its sovereignty for a thousand years against
Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, Napoleon, Kaiser Bill and Adolf Hitler. It is
now expected to give up its sovereignty to Jacques Delors [the then EU president]
with the squiggle of a pen.
Also troublesome is the question of the object of one’s patriotism. In multi-

national states, or states with ethnic and linguistic diversity, a problem arises
for conservative patriots. For example, are Conservatives patriotic to Britain as
a whole or, – as the party’s support in Wales and Scotland weakened in the
1990s – specifically, England? Is English nationalism emerging as the hallmark
of modern British conservatism? Time will tell.
A valuing of tradition
Tradition is very important to conservatives. Tradition, that collection of
values, myths, attitudes of mind and beliefs that make up the common ‘mental
baggage’, is what gives a nation its ‘character’, its resources to act in the face
of adversity, its courage to face and shape the future. Past glories, great
military victories and even defeats, heroes and villains all play their part.
Tradition binds the people together creating that sense of an organic identity
linking individuals to the nation. Where ancient traditions do not exist,
conservatives will invent them and invest them with archaic language,
ceremony and architecture so that the nation will readily accept them.
Conservatives’ reverence for tradition is not to be interpreted as slavish
adherence to the notions, values and institutions of the past but as the
bringing to bear on contemporary problems the accumulated wisdom of the
past, especially the national past. This wisdom is a better guide to policy than
the fickle fashions of the present. National history, particularly its more
glorious moments, is therefore rightly venerated, as are the institutions,
customs and values associated with it. Tradition also places the individual in
a wider context than his own selfish and limited perspective. It gives meaning
and dignity to all members of society, however humble, and binds the society
together in a shared community of experience. By extension, ‘tradition’ may
Conservatism 183
even include the seemingly trivial, with imperial weights and measures being
British as against the foreign metric ones, Sterling against the Euro, British
English spelling against American English.
A commitment to strong national institutions

Conservatives lay great stress on the institutions that embody the nation and
unite it. Indeed, ancient institutions, with the blood of tradition pumping
through their veins, play a vital role in the organic notion of the nation.
Monarchy, the constitution, churches, ancient universities, old regiments, all
have or claim to have ancient roots that ensure, as Burke said, that the
national contact between generations long gone, those alive today and gener-
ations yet to be born is constantly renewed. The revolutionary overthrow of
ancient institutions and their traditions is disastrous to the psychological as
well as the physical well-being of the nation and its people.
A high regard for property and the economy

Property, to conservatives, has particular significance. The ownership of
property gives independence and dignity to the individual, relieving him of
complete dependence on the state. It also acts as another ‘check and balance’
in society on the power of the state. The desire to acquire property encourages
initiative and a constant replenishing of social elites. Inheritance and the
passing on of wealth link both individuals and societies with their past and
future, underpin order and emphasise the continuity of society. Most conser-
vatives emphasise the ‘sanctity of property’, but this is not necessarily incom-
patible with a degree of redistribution if that is what is needed to ensure social
stability. It is, however, incompatible with state ownership except for the most
cautious, modest and pragmatic of measures.
One of the fundamental bases of law and liberty in conservatism is the right
to private property, a right guaranteed by the law, traditions and values of a
nation. Conservatives nevertheless believe that great wealth and ownership of
property, whether inherited or the result of hard work and enterprise, carries
obligations towards those less fortunate. The wealthy and powerful have a
duty to lead society, provide models of high standards of personal behaviour,
and take action to alleviate the sufferings of the poor (although not necessarily
by governmental action).
Conservative attachment to private property raises the issue of the link
between conservative thought and the market economy. Since the late
nineteenth century, the British Conservative Party, for example, has drawn
support from ‘big business’. It generally opposed the extension of public
ownership in the 1950s and 1970s and, under Thatcher’s governments of the
1980s, privatised huge swathes of state-owned industry. Nevertheless, the
party’s position on untrammelled free enterprise has been more complex than
that of uncritical enthusiasm.
The principle of free trade, for example, has had varying fortunes among
British Conservatives. In the nineteenth century they were usually opposed to
it. By the end of the century substantial sections
of the party supported protection or imperial free trade
preference. Now they are generally strongly in Trade within and between
favour of it. The Conservatives tolerated state nations with little or no
ownership of substantial sections of industry in restraints imposed by the state,
particularly tariffs on imported
the 1950s and 1960s. In the early 1970s the goods.
Heath Government imposed state controls on
prices and incomes in the face of serious inflation
problems, and nationalised Rolls Royce. Even at imperial preference
the height of the commitment to privatisation The practice of allowing goods
and a liberal-economic ideology during the to be imported into Britain from
1980s there were Conservative politicians like the empire without being
subject to the same duty as
Ian Gilmour and conservative philosophers like that imposed on goods from
Roger Scruton who challenged the idea that all outside the empire.
could be reduced to the market.
Continental parties generally regarded as conservative, such as the German
Christian Democrats, found themselves theoretically and practically at odds with
the British Conservative Party because of the former’s commitment to the ‘social
market’. This term describes a basically market economy, substantially comple-
mented by detailed regulation by the state and generous social welfare provision.
Wholehearted conservative commitment to the free market has been evident
only since 1979, with the phenomenon known as ‘Thatcherism’, the intel-
lectual foundation of which was laid by reference to philosophers such as
Hayek, economists like Milton Friedman, social commentators such as Charles
Murray and politicians such as Sir Keith Joseph.
The essence of their message was the economic and social excellence of the
free market. For Hayek, it was the indispensable prerequisite of the free
society. For Milton Friedman even such modest state intervention as
advocated by Keynes (and practised by all Western governments since the
1940s) was ultimately futile in reducing unemployment; it produced inflation,
undermined competitiveness and ultimately corrupted the economic order.
Murray argued that a large welfare state actually exacerbated social problems
by creating a socially irresponsible and dependent underclass.
Some philosophers, such as Michael Oakeshott, and politicians such as Enoch
Powell sought to reconcile traditional conservative values with a vigorous
championing of the free market. Others, mainly on the left of the party, have
been very unhappy at the way some neo-liberal enthusiasts have tried to apply
Conservatism 185
the free market to social as well as economic issues, for example by advocating
a free market in hard drugs. Critics have raised doubts as to whether such
‘libertarianism’ is really conservative at all.
An emphasis on law, freedom and authority

Their opponents accuse Conservatives of favouring a highly controlled society,
one with human rights and freedoms drastically curtailed. It is a charge they
vehemently rebut. Actually, contemporary conservatives have tended to
support economic liberalism and the free market precisely because economic
freedom is an essential prerequisite for other freedoms. For conservatives,
freedom is both possible and desirable, but only ‘under the law’. As Lord
Hailsham said in 1975:
I believe there is a golden thread which alone gives meaning to the political history
of the West, from Marathon to Alamein, from Solon to Winston Churchill and after.
This I dare to call the doctrine of liberty under the law.2
Law, the rule of law, and its effective enforcement are key elements in estab-
lishing and maintaining order and, thereby, freedom. In their absence anarchy
would reign: only the strong would be free (and then only so long as they
remained strong) and the majority would be terrorised and oppressed.
Thomas Hobbes made clear the consequences of weak government and a
breakdown of law and order:
In such a condition, there is no place for industry; . . . no culture of the earth; no
navigation, . . . no commodious building; . . . no knowledge of the face of the earth;
no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all,
continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.3
Human rights are less the inherent properties of human beings than the result
of a particular social and historical context. Much conservative unease with
the incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights into British,
and especially English, law in 2000 sprang from this view. The ECHR is seen
by many conservatives in Britain as undermining English common law and
parliamentary sovereignty by importing European legal systems and principles
from the European Union or, as in the case of the ECHR, from other European
organisations.
Law presupposes an authoritative legislature. Historically, in Britain this has
been the ‘sovereign in Parliament’ (often designated as ‘parliamentary sover-
eignty’) – the single source of legislative power in the United Kingdom. Conser-
vatives tend to venerate the British Constitution, a constitution that still exists
in the twenty-first century after centuries of steady evolutionary development,
gradually adapting to massive social change. This veneration underlay the
strong conservative opposition to Labour’s proposed constitutional changes
after 1997, especially devolution and the reform (albeit partial) of the
House of Lords.
Conservatives profess devotion to freedom and a commitment to law and
order. However, this may give rise to practical and philosophical contradic-
tions. One strand, the libertarian, emphasises freedom as the highest social
and political good (the Federation of Conservative Students in the 1980s, for
example, caused embarrassment to the government by proposing the legali-
sation of hard drugs and abortion on demand). The other strand, the author-
itarian (sometimes described as the ‘New Right’), on the other hand, places
emphasis on order and the institutions and values associated with order: the
moral pluralism of contending ethical positions, which liberals applaud, is
viewed with intense suspicion as a threat to order.
British Conservatism in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries: adaptation to change
British conservatives stress constitutional limits on government, pragmatism,
scepticism and flexibility. They, more than their European and American
counterparts, are very suspicious of ‘grand plans’ for social reform, empha-
sising the importance of social organisations outside the state. Indeed, British
conservatives have absorbed liberalism’s belief in minimal state involvement
in health, education and welfare. Nevertheless, pragmatism has enabled the
Conservative Party to adapt successfully to change and remain a major force
in politics – almost the ‘natural party of government’. It is worth considering
the career of Europe’s most successful conservative political movement.
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

The early emphasis on Burke’s ideas and theories, which can be discerned
running through conservative thought, obscures the factors that have enabled
conservatism to sustain itself and even thrive though the cataclysmic changes
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There are a number of reasons for
this. Conservatism adjusted to new social realities and brought new classes and
groups within the Conservative ‘broad church’ and garnered support for Tory
policies. Conservative beliefs were able to adapt to some of the intellectual
current of the last two centuries. Finally, in their vigorous desire to take and
keep power, they moderated their ideological stance to gain electoral support.
These factors are apparent throughout the period. The early nineteenth
century was rocked by the French Revolution, war and the agricultural and
industrial revolutions and their consequences. The Conservative prime
minister, Robert Peel, tried to reconcile the party to the 1832 extension of the
franchise to the new manufacturing classes. This involved the attempted but
Conservatism 187
abortive conversion of the party to free trade and the scrapping of the Corn
Laws (1846) that, to some extent, damaged landed interests and so split the
party. It was around this time that the term ‘Conservative Party’ began to be
generally used.
Later in the century Disraeli was to attempt to adjust the party to new realities
once more, notably the 1867 Reform Act, which enfranchised some of the
skilled working class, the continued growth of industry and towns, and the
emergence of trade unionism. At the practical level Disraeli sought to
construct an alliance of the old ruling class, the new middle classes and the
emerging skilled working class (the ‘respectable working class’) for the
Conservative Party. At the intellectual level he sought to construct ‘one nation’
in which the upper classes, animated by a sense of social obligation, would
pursue a paternalistic approach towards the needy and try to incorporate the
authentic interests of the trade unions into the body politic.
Disraeli, in his novels Coningsby (1845) and Sybil (1844), identified the
emergence of ‘Two Nations – the Rich and the Poor’, an idea much more
dramatic in theory than in practice. There were some practical reforms in the
legalisation of trade unions, and in health and housing. Most significantly,
Disraeli envisaged a more routine role for public institutions, notably at local
level in the field of health and social welfare. These ideas were taken up in the
1890s by figures such as Joseph Chamberlain, who tried to convert the party
to ‘fair trade’ (as opposed to ‘free trade’ espoused by Peel). This involved a
tariff on imports, the proceeds of which would be used by the state to fund
social-welfare benefits such as old-age pensions. Chamberlain failed to carry
the party with him. Notions of tariffs and state welfare only became orthodox
Conservative doctrine after the First World War.
By the end of the nineteenth century the Conservative Party was increasingly
identified with business interests in resisting organised labour, while its support
for farming interests was reduced but not eliminated. At the same time the
party was very successful in mobilising working class support. This was partic-
ularly so under ‘one-nation conservatism’, attracting a third of the working-
class vote, and ensuring long periods in power during the twentieth century.
Conservatism in the inter-war years

Once again British conservatism had to redefine itself in reaction to events.
Near full democracy arrived in 1918 with the extension of the franchise to
virtually all men over 21 and all women over 30. (Women finally got the vote
on the same age basis as men in 1928 – under a Conservative Government.)
The ‘threat’ from socialism grew with the Russian Revolution in 1917, and,
more immediately, the rise of the Labour Party which formed its first
(minority) government in 1924.
Conservatism adapted to new conditions. A prime minister could no longer sit

in the House of Lords (as had often been the case until Lord Salisbury left
office in 1902). Conservative leaders had to project an image of being ‘one of
the people’. High levels of unemployment, upheavals like the General Strike
(1926) and the perceived threat from international communism pushed the
party into emphasising law and order, but also social reform (albeit very
limited and of no threat to the established order).
During the 1930s the rise of the fascist and Nazi threat led conservatives to
emphasise traditional national institutions, such as the monarchy and the
empire, and the politics of moderation. Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative
leader who dominated the inter-war years, was no intellectual. Within the
party there was little attempt to underpin Conservative policy by ideological
means. There were, however, some contributions. Harold Macmillan, in The
Middle Way (1938), advocated mixed state/private ownership and ‘planned
capitalism’. In 1936 he claimed: ‘Toryism has always been a form of paternal
socialism.’ This approach looked back to Disraeli and the combination of a
hierarchical social structure with state intervention to benefit the under-privi-
leged and also to preserve the social order. Not all conservatives were as
accommodating towards the lower orders. T. S. Eliot, for example, defended
conservatism as a bulwark against the barbarism of mass democracy.
Conservatism after 1945

After the Second World War the Conservative Party was once again confronted
by major changes in society, and once again it chose the path of accommo-
dation. Some conservatives condemned its new policies as ‘domestic
appeasement’ of the working classes, just as it was associated with ‘interna-
tional appeasement’ of the fascist dictators – with similar potential for disaster.
But most supported them as a necessary adjustment to new realities.
The Labour landslide victory in 1945 led to the acceptance of a consensus
in British politics by most Conservatives. The consensus included the
creation of the modern welfare state, a mixed economy and a commitment
to full employment, all of which involved a substantial role for the state in
society. The end of empire and the Cold War struggle with the USSR also
involved a commitment to a strong state. The
victory in the world war apparently vindicated paternalism
such a strong state. This capitulation to the A mode of conservative thought
spirit of the times could be justified ideologi- in which the relationship of
governors to the governed is
cally by politicians, such as Iain Macleod and R.
compared to that of father and
A. Butler, as being in substantial harmony with children. The governors provide
‘one-nation’ conservatism and the tradition of the needs of the governed but
Conservative paternalism traceable back to the maintain their authority and
superiority.
nineteenth century.
Conservatism 189
The adaptation to new realities proved politically astute. The Conservatives

won a succession of elections in the 1950s. In many ways conservatism at the
time resembled the ‘revisionist’ socialism of leading contemporary Labour
figures such as Anthony Crosland and Hugh Gaitskell. From the outset,
however, Conservatives had their own particular understanding of
‘consensus’, an understanding which held that it was fully in harmony with
traditional conservative beliefs; for example, the belief in the merits of private
property (an emphasis that was very apparent in the ideas of a ‘property-
owning democracy’ in the 1980s).
From their inception consensus policies had their critics from within and outside
the party. Pressure groups and think tanks, such as the Institute for Economic
Affairs and Aims of Industry, and politicians such as Enoch Powell from the late
1950s and Sir Keith Joseph in the 1970s, began to question the intellectual bases
of the post-war consensus and whether conservatives should share it. Drawing
on the works of philosophers such as Hayek and Oakeshott they emphasised
free-market economics as being more economically viable, more socially
effective and morally preferable to the semi-socialism of welfare-statism.
In 1970 the Conservative victory of Edward Heath suggested that a
commitment to a more robust free market would be more evident in
government. Two years earlier he had made a number of speeches at the
Selsdon Hotel in London, proposing a reversal of British economic decline by
a vigorous promotion of private business, a reduction of trade-union power
and a major rethinking about the welfare state. However, domestic problems
such as industrial unrest, rising unemployment and high inflation led to a
reversal of such policies in 1972; massive oil price rises in 1973–74 and their
impact on the weakening British economy also contributed to a return to the
consensus within the Conservative Party.
This, however, proved to be a brief aberration. The two humiliating Conserv-
ative election defeats in 1974 and Labour’s seemingly inexorable march to the
left, as well as the continuing failures of the consensus to stop Britain’s decline
as an economic power, rising unemployment and near hyper-inflation,
encouraged a movement in the Conservative Party towards those who
challenged the consensus. Although not clearly offering a reversal of such
policies at the time, the political beneficiary of these crises was Margaret
Thatcher, who was elected Tory leader in 1975. It soon became apparent that
she was determined to follow a different political course from her post-war
Conservative predecessors.
Thatcherism
‘Thatcherism’, as the constellation of attitudes identified with Margaret
Thatcher (Conservative prime minister 1979–90) came to be called, was a
reaction against the collectivist drift of post-war Britain and the crisis of the
1970s. This drift, in her view, had led to economic failure, social problems,
national decline, moral decay and a general undermining of freedom and
individual self-respect. Conservative Party leaders had shamefully colluded in
this consensus.
Herself no intellectual, Margaret Thatcher nevertheless had an ability to take
the ideas of others and was adept at combining them with populist attitudes
into a formidable political project. Mrs Thatcher’s political astuteness,
personal charisma, toughness of character and luck in the weakness of her
opponents both within and outside the party produced a period of radical
transformation of the British political and ideological landscape in favour of
‘New Right’ or ‘neo-liberal’ ideas with her electoral successes in 1979, 1983
and 1987.
Thatcherism involved a wholehearted commitment to the market economy.
This was combined with a drastic reduction in state economic management,
‘monetarist’ policies to tackle inflation by control of the money supply, an
attack on economic vested interests, an extension of property ownership and
the privatisation of state assets, including even utilities such as electricity, gas
and water. There was a rhetorical commitment to cutting taxation, although,
in practice, taxes tended to rise during the 1980s.
There was to be a reduced role for the ‘nanny’ state in providing welfare, in
line with liberal elements of Thatcherism. This would be associated with a
move towards private provision of healthcare, education and pensions. The
aim of these policies was both to reduce the tax burden on society and to
encourage greater self-reliance in individuals and their families.
Paradoxically, although the functions of the state were to be reduced, its
strength was to be increased in areas of social control and governance, in line
with authoritarian elements of Thatcherism. The police acquired both higher
pay and greater powers. There was a corresponding reduction in the power of
those viewed with suspicion, notably the trade unions. The end of the miners’
strike (1984–85) finally dispelled any doubts as to the ability of British govern-
ments to govern, a common theme of the 1970s.
Conservative themes such as patriotism, freedom under the law, order,
hierarchy, discipline, inequality and traditional institutions were emphasised.
The final element of this ragbag of liberal and conservative ideas was a moral
crusade that emphasised individualism rather than collectivism and self-
reliance rather than state support.
The practical outcomes of these positions, notably the huge increase in
unemployment, an increase in the gap between rich and poor and a general
sense of deepening social division, caused great unease among ‘one-nation’
Conservatism 191
Conservatives. Indeed, for some, at least, the question was raised as to

whether Thatcherism was an authentic expression of Conservatism (and
conservatism) at all, or some form of neo-liberalism.
There was also an inherent problem that only fully emerged under Thatcher’s
successors, John Major and William Hague. How far was an emphasis on a
rapidly changing competitive society, the minimal state and the central value
of economic freedom, compatible with other conservative values, such as the
organic community, the obligations of the privileged towards the needy and
the value of hallowed institutions, customs and values?
Post-Thatcher conservatism
John Major’s values, in rhetoric at least, were far less ideological in character
than those of his predecessor. As prime minister (1990–97), however, he
continued with privatisation. Coal and the railways were moved into private
ownership. His commitment to the creation of a ‘classless society’ proved on
closer examination to be a commitment to ‘equality of opportunity’, a belief
quite compatible with Thatcherism. A public image of a more humane and
compassionate conservatism was promoted, ‘Thatcherism with a human face’,
but this had little of intellectual or practical substance. Some attempt was made
to extend market economics into public services. The ‘Citizen’s Charter’, which
set down standards for the services to meet, redefined citizenship in consumer
terms, placing the citizen’s relationship to the public services on a footing
somewhat akin to the same person’s relationship with private businesses.
Major’s disinclination to develop a distinctive intellectual contribution to conser-
vatism lay with his own pragmatic personality, and with the government’s
political difficulties caused by its small and ever-shrinking parliamentary
majority (only twenty-one in 1992). Its internal divisions over Europe, and
the growth of a much more right-wing and ideologically motivated body of MPs
and party members, also contributed to party difficulties and the subsequent
crushing defeat of the Conservatives in 1997. There was, however, another
factor. Conservatism had historically defined itself as being ‘against’ something,
such as the French Revolution, early manufacturing, the rise of socialism, the
labour movement, communism. Now there was little left to be against. Interna-
tionally, the Soviet Empire and the communist threat had collapsed. Domesti-
cally, the Labour Party had adopted the quasi-Conservative economic and social
policies, as the whole area of political discourse in Britain had moved from left
of centre to right of centre.
The dilemma of what to react to was even more acute under Major’s successor,
William Hague (party leader 1997–2001). His initial thinking was to see the
problem as one of adaptation. As previous leaders had adapted the party to
new social and economic circumstances, so Hague would adapt to new
realities. The new realties he at first confronted were changing patterns of

sexual morality, a decline in marriage, more single parents, a growing
acceptance of homosexuality. Here, a morally neutral position was advanced,
emphasising ‘tolerance’ and ‘compassion’. Michael Portillo, a leading shadow
cabinet member, admitted to homosexual behaviour in his youth and received
support from Hague for his honesty. A general policy of ‘inclusion’ of groups
not historically associated with the Conservative Party, such as ethnic
minorities, was announced. A more relaxed attitude to the new moral climate,
especially among younger voters, had emerged and had to be responded to
by the party.
This libertarian strand of conservatism was, however, soon abandoned. Ordinary
party members rejected this shift to permissiveness as Hague adopted a strategy
of ‘listening’ to the party. Even Hague’s choice of Steven Norris as Conservative
candidate for Mayor of London provoked grass-roots unease because of Norris’s
social liberalism and his reputation as a womaniser. However, Hague later
appointed him as the party’s vice-chairman. As Conservative Party membership
shrank it became increasingly elderly, right-wing, ‘Euro-phobic’ and intolerant
of social permissiveness among some of its leaders. Indeed, Tory MPs were, as
their numbers dwindled after the 1997 electoral debacle, more ideologically
right-wing, more ‘Thatcherite’ as a body, than ever before.
This reaction, and the internal party realities, soon led to a change of
direction. A party document, The Commonsense Revolution, reaffirmed ‘tradi-
tional’ Conservative positions, ‘traditional’ now meaning much more right-
wing than previously. By 1999 the Conservatives were loudly denouncing the
repeal of Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act that forbade the
‘promotion’ of homosexuality in schools. At the 2000 Party Conference Ann
Widdecombe, the shadow home secretary, proclaimed a policy of instant fines
for the possession of cannabis. This was soon abandoned when a number of
shadow cabinet members admitted to trying cannabis when young. Increas-
ingly, the party sought to align itself with the churches and a (presumed)
religious right. By 2001 the party was advocating the delivery of some social
welfare services by the churches and other religious organisations.
The British Conservative Party suffered a repeat defeat at the 2001 general
election. William Hague resigned as leader and was succeeded by Iain Duncan
Smith. Party membership continued to shrink and to become more elderly and
right-wing, more ideological and intolerant. It seemed that the Conservatives
were doomed to be out of government for a long time. The relatively weak
upturn in the Conservative position in the May 2002 local government
elections, at a time of growing popular disenchantment with the Labour
Government, seemed to offer little hope of a renaissance in Conservative
political fortunes.
Conservatism 193
Conservatism has been successful because of its willingness to adapt to social

change – and even initiate it. Its pragmatism, lack of ideological constraints
and an ability to tap into deep-seated strains of popular emotion and beliefs
have ensured its importance in Western democracies as a major political force.
British conservatism has been the most successful of the species, both in terms
of mobilising support for electoral victories and adapting to social and
political realities, even over the last century and a quarter of mass democracy.
It is unlikely, whatever problems face British Toryism at the start of the twenty-
first century, that it will disappear.
Nevertheless a Labour Party that has successfully positioned itself as the
‘caring conservative’ party, adopting many of the elements of traditional
conservatism into its policies, leaves the Conservative Party with a major
problem. It needs to offer an alternative programme to the Labour Party, but
that might involve becoming more ideological and right-wing and less likely
to get elected.
Summary
Conservatism cannot be simply identified with the Conservative Party in
Britain (or elsewhere). Moreover, although conservatism is less universal in
scope or intellectually coherent than other political theories, there are
nonetheless clearly defined conservative attitudes, values and assumptions.
Conservatism, for our purposes, may be traced back to a reaction to the
eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Although there
are different nuances within conservatism some broad themes are common to
all. These are a pessimistic view of human nature; a reverence for each society
as organic and unique; a belief that politics is of limited relevance to human
affairs; a high value on patriotism, tradition, strong national institutions; a
belief in private property, authority and liberty under the law. British conser-
vatism has essentially been the adaptation of these values and beliefs to the
realities of the nineteenth, twentieth and now twenty-first centuries. Different
strands of conservative thought have been stressed at different times – for
example, under Thatcher there was greater emphasis on the market economy.
Although in the 1997 and 2001 general elections the British Conservative
Party did badly, conservatism as a philosophy has proved adaptable and
resilient and a revival in Britain is by no means impossible.
1 Edmund Burke, speech on the reform of representation in the House

of Commons (1782).
2 Lord Hailsham, quoted in Anthony Sampson, The Changing Anatomy
of Britain (Hodder and Stoughton, 1982).
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIII (1651).
Eccleshall, R. ‘Conservatism’, in R. Eccleshall et al., Political Ideas:

An Introduction (Routledge, 1994), pp. 66–102.
Goodwin, B. ‘Conservatism’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and Sons,
2001), pp. 147–67.
Green, D. G. The New Right (Wheatsheaf Books, 1987).
Heywood, A. ‘Conservatism’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction
(Macmillan, 1998), pp. 66–102.
Leach, R. ‘Conservatism’, in R. Leach, British Political Ideologies (Philip Allen, 1991),
pp. 88–116.
O’Sullivan, N. Conservatism (Dent, 1976).
O’Sullivan, N. ‘Conservatism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.), Contemporary Political
Scruton, R. The Meaning of Conservatism (Macmillan, 1984).
Vincent, A. ‘Conservatism’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1996),
pp. 55–83.
White, R. J. The Conservative Tradition (Adam and Unwin, 1964).
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 ‘Conservatism is anything that enables the ruling class to carry on

ruling.’ Do you agree?
2 Is conservatism anything more than a ‘rag-bag of prejudices’?
3 To what extent does conservatism go with the grain of human

nature?
4 Are the views of the ‘New Right’ a repudiation of traditional conservatism?
5 Why has the Conservative Party been so spectacularly successful in winning political
power in Britain during most of the time since a mass democracy has existed?
Liberalism 10
Liberalism has become the dominant ideology at the start of the third millennium.
Like conservatism it cannot be easily identified with one particular political party.
We trace the origins of liberalism back to the late seventeenth century and the
political turmoil in England that followed the civil wars of the middle of the
century. After this, liberalism’s ‘golden age’ during the nineteenth century is
studied and the main themes of ‘classical’ and ‘New’ liberalism are outlined and
discussed. The limitations of British liberalism began to become evident just
before the First World War and it was almost eclipsed during the inter-war period.
We discuss the apparent renaissance of liberalism that followed the collapse of
Soviet communism during the late 1980s and the apparent triumph of liberal
capitalist democracy on a global scale. Some of the inadequacies of contem-
porary liberalism are discussed and an estimate is made of the future that lies in
store for liberalism.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Is liberalism culturally specific to Westernisation or is it of universal value?
➤ To what extent is the liberal focus on the individual based on a misunderstanding of

human nature?
➤ At what point does liberalism end and socialism begin?
➤ Why were nineteenth-century liberals so uncomfortable with democracy and why don’t
modern liberals appear to share the doubts?
➤ In the twenty-first century is the state still the main threat to the individual?
➤ How far is it true to say that the triumph of liberal ideology has been at the price of the
eclipse of liberal political parties?
A rich man told me recently that a liberal is a man who tells other people what to
do with their money. (Le Roi Jones, Home, 1966)
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person,
than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (John Stuart
Mill, On Liberty, 1859)
Liberalism . . . it is well to record this today – is the supreme form of generosity; it

is the right by which the majority concedes to minorities and hence it is the noblest
cry that has ever resounded on this planet. (José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the
Masses, 1930)
In many ways liberalism is the dominant ideology of Western society. It could

be claimed that it is not just an ideology but is the ideology for all mankind, a
fundamental truth that is not culturally specific to the West but is of global
value. Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the adoption
of elements of liberal capitalism in most countries, some liberals were moved
to declare that liberalism and liberal values were now the only future for
mankind’s development.
However, although liberalism has in many ways been the defining political
ideology of the Western world for nearly three centuries, this very ubiquity
makes it difficult to separate out from Western culture a distinctive ‘liberal’
identity. Many values once regarded as characteristically ‘liberal’, such as
freedom of speech and religious toleration, have become so much part of the
mainstream of Western life that only the most extreme dare challenge them.
While there is no universally agreed corpus of writings that is specific to the
liberal creed, several key writers appear in all lists of the liberal canon.
Nor can liberalism be simply identified with a particular political party, such
as the Liberal/Liberal Democrat Party. In the 1980s and 1990s one could
plausibly argue that the Conservative Party was in some respects closer to the
tenets of classical liberalism than were the Liberal or Liberal Democratic
parties. Moreover, the term ‘liberal’ has non-political connotations, such as
generous, or broadly or humanistically educated, or, in religious terms,
opposed to a rigid orthodoxy. In contrast to such a positive perspective, for
many on the political right in the USA today ‘liberal’ is a term of abuse, with
accusations of naive or semi-socialist values that supposedly threaten ‘natural’
conservative American ones.
The origins of liberalism

Forewarned by these caveats, we may reasonably locate the origins of liber-
alism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It arose with the early
Liberalism 197
development of capitalism and became particularly strong with the devel-

opment of an industrial middle class from the 1750s onwards. Locke, Voltaire,
Montesquieu and Adam Smith were all regarded by nineteenth-century
liberals seeking intellectual ancestors as being early liberals, although they
themselves would never have used such a term. Before, during and to a degree
after the English Civil Wars there was turmoil in political speculation and
debate from which a number of theories emerged that entered into liberalism.
Among these was the idea, eloquently articulated by John Locke in Two
Treatises on Government (1690), that society was based on a ‘social contract’.
Authority was conferred on government by the consent of the governed ‘to
maintain order and justice and to uphold essential rights’ such as those of
property. It followed that citizens have a right to rebel if the state abuses
the rights of the citizen as included in the social contract. Another liberal
value put forward by Locke, in his Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), was
that of religious toleration. Indeed, many seventeenth-century writers and
thinkers, such as the Englishmen Thomas Hobbes and John Milton, and
Baruch Spinoza in Holland, all called for a debate on religious principles and
the granting of a degree of toleration concomitant with social order and
loyalty to the state.
In so far as these ideas found practical expression, they did so through the
Whig Party that emerged as the dominant political force in the eighteenth
century. For the Whigs, ‘rights’ were applicable to all freeborn Englishmen.
These rights were embodied in the Act of Settlement (1688) and the Bill of
Rights (1689) that established a monarchy constrained by the rights and privi-
leges of Parliament. This was the outcome of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ (1688),
an outcome that the Whigs regarded as a definite conclusion to the political
struggles of the seventeenth century. Dominated by a few wealthy aristocratic
families, the Whigs were actually less than radical.
Many of the more radical elements of the struggle emigrated, physically and
intellectually, to the American colonies. Further fortified by the influx of ideas
from the European Enlightenment and by further waves of the disgruntled
from Britain, they provided the intellectual bases for the American Revolution
and its subsequent constitution (1787). The Declaration of Independence
(1776) is a classic statement of the liberal contract theory of government.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organising its powers
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
Happiness.
Fundamental was a belief in the right to representation (though not neces-

sarily on a ‘one-man, one-vote’ basis) and a national government that incor-
porated the notion of ‘balance’ between the various branches of government
(legislature, executive and judiciary). This fitted well with the concept,
derived from the physics of Isaac Newton, that identified a natural equilibrium
of forces in the universe. Liberalism similarly identified a number of political
laws of nature: a ‘balanced’ society, the universalism of political laws and the
consistency and predictability of human nature. Social harmony and social
cohesion could, liberals averred, be achieved if individuals established their
fundamentally common interest in holding society together.
The French Revolution (1789) was to have an impact on the development of
liberalism by injecting into its mainstream a sharper, more radical element.
Thomas Paine, in The Rights of Man (1791–92) and The Age of Reason (1794),
proclaimed a radical liberal programme. Paine, having taken part in the
American Revolution, took up the cause of the French Revolution. His
passionate belief in human reason, his optimistic view of human nature and
his robust atheism were much influenced by, and in turn influenced, conti-
nental liberalism. He also attacked monarchical and hereditary government,
and insisted on popular sovereignty, republicanism and human rights. He
offended virtually everyone, including the British Government, the French
Revolutionaries and American Radicals, but provided the basis for many
liberal and socialist ideas of the nineteenth century.
The nineteenth century and ‘classical liberalism’

The nineteenth century was the heyday of what can be termed ‘classical liber-
alism’. Indeed, Britain can be seen as the society which took liberalism most
to its heart in shaping its development during that century, as the USA was to
do in the twentieth. By the 1840s a recognisable set of ideas generally
described as ‘liberalism’ had emerged but it wasn’t until 1868, and William E.
Gladstone’s first ministry, that a distinct ‘Liberal’ government rather than a
simply relabelled Whig Party came to power in Britain.
‘Utilitarianism’ provided a further moral basis for liberalism in the early
nineteenth century. As advanced by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, Utilitar-
ianism argued that reason could be used to discover human rights and
organise human institutions. Utilitarianism measured the rightness of any act
by the degree to which it contributed to happiness. People sought to maximise
pleasure and minimise pain in the rational pursuit of their own interests. Only
individuals could know what was considered best for them, not the state. Utili-
tarians declared that democracy was the best means of securing ‘the greatest
happiness for the greatest number’ in society. This doctrine substantially influ-
enced liberal thought and practical measures, although it was open to the
Liberalism 199
criticism that it subordinated individual human rights to the perceived good

of society.
Although Adam Smith lived in the eighteenth century his ideas triumphed in
the nineteenth with the progress of the industrial revolution. In The Wealth of
Nations (1776) Smith laid the theoretical foundation in economics for what
became known as ‘classical’ liberalism. He argued
that free markets, and trade unhampered by market
government interference, were fundamental to A system of exchange between
successful economic development. Free markets buyers and sellers in which
prices are established by the
were efficient, in that they led to the most interplay of ‘supply’ and
productive use of resources and everyone got ‘demand’, in other words by
what economic rewards they deserved. They were ‘market forces’.
‘free’ in that economic decisions, agreements and
commitments were freely made by individuals and ultimately beneficial to the
whole society as market economies provided the social dynamic that ensured
ever-greater prosperity for all.
John Stuart Mill’s particular contribution was to systematise nineteenth-
century political liberalism. In his numerous writings, chiefly On Liberty
(1859) and Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Mill argued
for democracy, tempered by a ‘balanced’ constitution with enshrined rights;
firstly, rights to freedom of thought and belief, and freedom of expression,
because of his conviction that individual opinion and belief were the highest
good in society; and secondly, a franchise weighted to strengthen the voting
power of the better-educated, so as to prevent the smothering of informed
opinion by the uneducated majority. He feared that demagogues might
mislead the masses and thus destroy the very foundations of a free society in
the name of equality. They might stifle the unorthodox by making public
opinion the touchstone of ‘right’, as the French liberal writer Alexis de
Tocqueville had previously suggested in his influential Democracy in America
(1835–40).
However, in other writings, such as his Principles of Political Economy (1848),

Mill was more sympathetic towards some degree of state intervention in
society to deal with social evils, such as poverty, than were most mid-
nineteenth-century liberals. He also supported trade unions and even ideas
later seen as socialist, such as worker co-operatives. The improvement of
social conditions would enable the working class to get better educated,
become ‘rational human beings’ and so be intellectually equipped to take part
in democracy.
By the late nineteenth century, however, reality had begun to present a serious
challenge to classical liberalism and the laissez-faire policies of government
associated with it. Poverty, disease and ignorance remained brutal facts of
existence for most people. The scale of the catastrophe of the Irish Famine
(1845–48) was partly due to these economic doctrines and the belief that the
state should not intervene to alleviate social problems. Practical politicians
and liberal philosophers began to revise their views of the role of the state
although they faced opposition from the ‘Social Darwinian’ wing of liberalism.
Although ‘Social Darwinists’, such as Herbert Spencer and Samuel Smiles, are
sometimes described as ‘liberal’, on the grounds that they emphasised rigorous
laissez-faire policies, the harshness of their conclusions was usually too far
removed from the humanitarian impulses of liberalism to be acceptable to
most liberals. Spencer, in The Man Versus the State
(1884), claimed to have based his theories on laissez-faire
Charles Darwin’s ideas of evolution and the idea ‘let it be’ or ‘leave it alone’. A
term used to describe the
that a species evolves and ‘ascends’ by conflict political and ideological belief
between members of that species for survival. dominant in Britain during the
Social Darwinists proposed applying these nineteenth century that the
state has no active role in
principles to human society. Society was seen as a
running the economy or solving
struggle for survival among individuals, the social problems.
weakest being trampled underfoot by the
strongest. Smiles, in Self-Help (1859), proclaimed vigorous self-reliance as the
means by which the individual and society might be improved. This became
something of a gospel for laissez-faire liberalism during the second half of the
nineteenth century. It was claimed that this was not only how things are but
also how things should be. State intervention on behalf of the weakest was
thus counter-productive and should be rejected.
Late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century

‘New Liberalism’
Most liberals, however, were moving in the direction of more rather than less
state intervention. It was not only a matter of principle. It was a recognition
of the need for liberalism to respond to the rise of organised labour if it was to
survive as a political force, attracting the vote of the newly enfranchised
working classes. T. H. Green was the leading exponent of what came to be
known as ‘New Liberalism’.
Green, in his Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (1879–80),
emphasised a more tender understanding of human nature. Man was not
simply an asocial individual leading a life of rationally calculating self-interest,
but was from the start immersed in society, from which his rights derived. The
market economy and the policy of laissez-faire capitalism thwarted the values
which liberals expounded so well. Classical liberalism had advocated a
‘negative freedom’ in which the external restraints to freedom, such as law,
were reduced. Green argued that in reality the impoverished masses were
Liberalism 201
effectively denied such freedom by factors of social inequality such as ill

health, poverty and ignorance. Only collective, rather than individual, action
could remove these obstacles, empower the poor, and create a genuinely free
society:
Only through the possession of rights can the power of the individual freely to
make a common good of his own have reality given to it . . . The idea of true
freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society to make the
best of themselves.1
These rights were similar to the ones associated with classical liberalism; but
New Liberalism offered working-class people the chance to acquire ‘positive’
freedoms, to achieve property rights and levels of health, liberty and
happiness similar to those enjoyed by the better-off in society.
Other New Liberals, such as L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (1911), and John
Hobson, in Crisis of Liberalism (1909), went even further. They did not believe
that the free market alone could solve social problems and create social justice.
They emphasised co-operation rather than competition. Hobson even argued
that capitalism was not the best mechanism for producing and distributing
goods but tended, in fact, to concentrate wealth in the hands of the few at the
expense of the many. Extensive state ownership, welfare provision and redis-
tributive taxation should counter this undesirable social trend. Wealth was the
product of social conditions, not just of individual effort. However, most New
Liberals were against extensive state ownership of industries.
So radical a departure was this from classical liberalism that some doubted if
it could be still called ‘liberalism’ at all. Defenders of the New Liberalism (or
‘social liberalism’ as it is sometimes called) argued that the ends of a liberal
society remained unchanged. Such a liberal society would be based on
individual liberty, but classical liberalism had been found to be inadequate for
the task; it had become the ideology of the powerful, the only individuals who
were fully able to take advantage of individual liberty.
New Liberalism had a powerful influence on the Liberal Party in Britain
throughout the twentieth century. In Lloyd George’s ‘People’s Budget’ (1909)
a National Insurance scheme was introduced to cover sickness, unemployment
and pensions. Moreover, it was very largely absorbed into the other main
parties so that, although the Liberal Party’s political fortunes languished, New
Liberal ideals lived on. It is no accident that the basis of the post-1945 social-
democratic consensus originated with two New Liberals: William Beveridge,
the architect of the welfare state (1942 White Paper), and John Maynard
Keynes, the apostle of state management of demand in the economy to ensure
full employment (1944 White Paper). These and other elements of the welfare
state have been accepted by the Labour and Conservative parties, both in and
out of government, until the present day.
We have touched upon some of the key ideas associated with liberalism. It is
time to take stock of these in greater detail.
Liberal themes
To liberals, society is underpinned by a morality of self-interest and mutual
support and respect. While the driving force of the liberal society is enlightened
self-interest, this becomes a balance of interests, institutions and, ultimately,
political power in society. Thus both chaos and tyranny are avoided. Liberalism
has a number of key themes:
• the individual and his/her rights;
• an optimistic view of human nature;
• a belief in progress;
• a commitment to freedom;
• limited government;
• the economy and liberalism;
• a commitment to internationalism.
The individual and his/her rights

At the heart of liberalism is the individual. Each human being is unique. Every
individual is endowed with innate rights of equal value. Each person is
capable of understanding what is best for him or her. This is the rationale for
the liberal idea of equality as the basis of justice for everyone. For some this
takes the form of claiming that, as a matter of fact, individuals act rationally
and choose what they need to be happy in their own interests. For classical
liberals this has the effect of benefiting society as a whole. In a famous passage
Mill made the case for the defence of individual rights:
The only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.2
Others approach the individual from a more ethical direction: that the
individual’s welfare is the highest good and that this principle should be the
basis of society. Along with positive attitudes to the individual comes the value
placed on tolerance for individuals and pluralism for society as a whole.
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British liberals vigorously defended
religious freedom and opposed the accordance of privileged status to particular
Liberalism 203
creeds such as the church of England. Liberals championed the rights of slaves
in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century liberals have promoted
homosexual rights, gender and racial equality,
rights for the disabled and civil rights in general. pluralism
Some have even sought to extend some form of A belief in the diversity of
rights to animals, especially the higher primates opinion, freedom of choice and
the value of a society made up
(such as gorillas and chimpanzees).
of many competing and co-
To liberals, rights are innate, inherited as a conse- operating groups. In a pluralist
society the state exists to act
quence of being born human. The state exists to as a referee between these
support these rights, to defend them. Human competing groups and
rights, which liberals regard as inalienable (i.e. individuals.
they cannot be transferred to someone else), are
derived from God (or Nature) and it should therefore be the first duty of
government to defend them. The state cannot take away these rights. It may
abuse them, it may claim that they do not exist, but they are not the state’s
property to dispose of. In practice, liberals have historically promoted the
inclusion of such rights in constitutions such as the American in the eighteenth
century and, recently, the British in the form of the Human Rights Act (2000).
Towards groups, liberals favour toleration. Pluralism in which different
beliefs, values and interests freely compete is regarded as good, indeed
essential. Liberals have a tendency to be anti-censorship and strongly in favour
of the maximum degree of freedom of speech (although most would place
limits on this in line with laws of slander, libel and incitement to racial hatred).
This is in contrast to conservatives, who are uneasy with pluralism, which they
regard as potentially socially divisive. Tolerance was apparent in liberal
attitudes to the emancipation of Catholics, Jews and nonconformists in the
early nineteenth century and acceptance (or even welcoming) of a multi-
cultural society in the late twentieth. Religion was a matter for individual
consciences and not for the state.
It is, of course, easy to tolerate views we agree with. The real test of a liberal
is allowing the right of people to hold and propagate views one disagrees with
– even views that are fundamentally intolerant: fascism, racism, religious
bigotry, sexism. People have a right to hold and express such views, but they
can expect – should expect – such views to be vigorously challenged. All
liberals have a duty to defend liberal values and challenge illiberal ones.
Tolerance does not mean that one should be unquestioningly open-minded.
Nor should all views be seen as morally of the same value.
Linked with this theme of tolerance is a general disposition to ‘humane’

approaches to such issues as the treatment of prisoners and animal welfare.
Tolerance, however, has difficulties for those liberals who regard some groups as
illiberal (such as the Catholic church on abortion or some Islamic views on
women’s rights). This dilemma was thrown into fatwa

sharp relief by the Salman Rushdie affair, when his A term used in Islam to denote
book The Satanic Verses (1988) enraged Muslims an authoritative judgement by a
because of its alleged blasphemy. Iranian clerics religious institution or dignitary.
issued a fatwa, condemning Rushdie to death. Most
liberals sprang to Rushdie’s defence on the grounds of freedom of speech. Some,
however, were uneasy that this book used freedom to affront a religious group.
An optimistic view of human nature

Liberalism tends to an optimistic view of human nature, which is perceived as
‘individual human nature’, with apparently little influence from society, history
or culture. There is an underlying assumption that liberal principles about
human nature are of universal value, applicable to all societies at all levels and
types of social and economic development. This inclines liberals to support
human rights movements throughout the world. They dislike justifications for
the denial of human rights by reference to cultural, economic, developmental
or historical circumstances. Thus the extension of liberty contributes towards
‘progress’, moral, educational and material.
Human beings will act and think rationally, provided they have the freedom to
do so. Rationality is the key element in liberal views about human nature.
Human beings have the capacity to decide what is best for themselves when
considering the advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action.
Reason will ensure that individuals and society progress in an essentially
beneficial manner. Debate, not violence, is the means by which differences
should be resolved.
A belief in progress
The optimism that liberals evince towards human nature is also apparent in
their attitudes towards the past. They are much less inclined than conserva-
tives to perceive the past as a source of wisdom, or regard the antiquity of insti-
tutions as any guarantee of their worth. Historically, liberals have been
friendly towards science and evolutionary theory in particular (though the
misapplication of science in war and environmental destruction in the
twentieth century have caused distress to liberals). Generally, liberals look to
the future with optimism, believing that social improvement is not only
possible and desirable, but is likely to take place over the long term.
A commitment to freedom
Liberal attitudes to human nature, progress and the individual all come together
in the very high value placed on freedom. Mill, as we saw above, talked of the
‘sovereignty of the individual’. This freedom includes freedom from restraint on
Liberalism 205
the (adult and rational) individual and freedom of nations and groups from
oppression, freedom of economic activity, and freedom of thought and
expression. Freedom, though, it is conceded, cannot be an absolute – there must
be some restraint on those who in exercising their own liberty, infringe that of
others. Without such restraint freedom becomes licence. Liberals hold to the
general assumption that restraint should be mild, but they have little in the way
of logical principles to define just how mild.
Restraint should be imposed by a clear set of rules under the law. Indeed, most
liberals think of liberty as only being possible within a framework of law to
settle potential disputes between individuals. As John Locke stated: ‘where
there is no law, there is no Freedom. For Liberty is to be free from restraint and
violence from others which cannot be, where there is no law’.3 Human reason
and human energy, stimulated by living in a free society, ensure the self-
regulation and progress of society. The moral underpinning of these relation-
ships is natural law and natural rights that ensure that individuals live in a
high degree of harmony with one another. Government should, therefore,
create the conditions in which moral life is possible and the widest possible
degree of freedom can be maintained. A repressive society would be ineffi-
cient, immoral and unstable. Thus, to liberals, a free society is a stable society
and a stable society is one in which freedom can flourish.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries liberals focused on the state as the
most serious threat to freedom and therefore in need of most restraint. Later
liberals realised that poverty, and the unjust distribution of private property
and the political power that went with that, were the main limitations on the
freedom of the common man. This has led to some tension between twentieth-
century liberals. Friedrich von Hayek, in The Road to Serfdom (1944), The
Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973–9),
argued for the rule of law, under which individuals exercise choices, as the key
principle of justice. John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1970), argues that
inequality is permissible only if it contributes to the advantage of the ‘least
favoured’. He believes in civil liberties for all as the basis for a principle of
justice. He claims that in practice inequalities in wealth can ultimately benefit
even the poorest citizens. However, there is an important role for the welfare
state to ensure a degree of equality and fairness.
Limited government
As a general rule, liberals have been inclined to view the state with suspicion,
as a threat to the rights of the individual. It is a necessary ‘servant’ employed
to ensure order and efficiency, and the protection of individual rights, but it is
a servant that should be kept under close restraint, and one that can be
dismissed if it breaks its ‘contract of employment’.
Institutions of government should be so arranged as to minimise this risk – hence

the principle of the ‘separation of powers’ in which the legislative, executive and
judicial functions of government were kept separate. Montesquieu crystallised
this theory in The Spirit of the Laws (1748). He believed that, as every man
invested with power is apt to abuse it, to prevent such abuse ‘power should be a
check to power’. Recognition of this is the foundation of entrenched rights and
written constitutions in political systems, structured around the rule of law. This
strand in liberal thought has continued into the twenty-first century, with liberals
showing enthusiasm for constitutional reform in Britain and Europe.
It might appear that democracy is the natural partner of liberalism, but that is
not so. Liberals have been almost as afraid of the mob and its ignorance and
envy as they have been of the state and the aristocracy – hence the emphasis
on ‘balancing’ the institutions of government in the American Constitution.
Even J. S. Mill advocated a system of ‘weighted’ votes to favour the propertied
classes as a bulwark of a liberal society against the mob, misled by
demagogues. De Tocqueville also feared the ‘tyranny of the majority’. Modern
British liberals have been in the forefront of constitutional reform, advocating
such restraints on the state as a written constitution, a bill of rights and
dispersal of power to devolved authorities. Although no modern liberal would
support differential voting patterns, based on property or educational level, all
would support democratic systems of government and are inclined to support
the devolution of power.
Government must be based on the consent of the governed. Consent is the
basis for its legitimacy, its right to rule. Government agents should be
accountable to the elected representatives of the people. Thus government
must represent the interests of all the people, not just of interest groups.
Indeed, liberals see the state as a sort of ‘referee’ between the competing
groups and individuals. It should not become merely one among other interest
groups, which is the danger if the state gets too involved itself in the providing
of goods and services. Therefore the state – the ‘minimal state’ – should for
classical liberals be confined to three essential roles: the maintenance of
defence against external enemies, the ensuring of internal law and order, and
the raising of taxes to fund these two roles.
The economy and liberalism

Both in theory and in practice liberals have favoured private property and the
market economy as efficient, just and essential to the underpinning of liberal
political institutions and a free society. Choice is seen as a positive good, an
end in itself and a key element of freedom in a liberal society. Individuals
should be rewarded in line with the ‘market value’ of their talents: the market
acts as an incentive to individual effort and realisation of human potential.
Liberalism 207
Free trade and the self-regulating, balanced working of the free market for
goods, services and labour are also seen as positive goods in encouraging
economic efficiency and well-being. These beliefs were particularly associated
with Adam Smith and, later, the nineteenth-century ‘Manchester School’ of
economists, dominated by the Anti-Corn Law activists John Bright and
Richard Cobden, and were reiterated in the twentieth century by the ‘Chicago
School’ and the ideas of Milton Friedman, von Hayek and Robert Nozick.
However, the limitations of this approach led to the emergence of New Liber-
alism at the end of the nineteenth century. New Liberals sought the
management of the market economy by the state in a manner advocated later
by J. M. Keynes and his followers in the twentieth. For modern liberals there
is something of a dilemma over how far to go in regulating a market economy.
No obvious answer is forthcoming, but in general liberals have been inclined
to support the principles of the welfare state, this being justified as promoting
‘positive rights’, as opposed to the classical liberal insistence on negative
rights, that is rights which depend on the withdrawal of state power. Modern
liberals tend to see a major – and proper – role for the state in economic
management and the provision of goods and services. In fact, in America, the
term ‘liberal’ can be applied to those who support an extension of state action
in the area of welfare and human rights.
The chief British intellectual contributor to the development of liberal economic
thought was J. M. Keynes. Classical liberals, like Adam Smith, had regarded a
free economy as ‘self-regulating’ through the operation of a ‘hidden hand’ (i.e.
the personal self-interested choices of producers and consumers). Keynes, in
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), argued that the
capitalist system could work efficiently only if the government managed
‘demand’. Put crudely, this meant that when there was high unemployment the
government should increase demand in the economy by pumping money into
it, cutting taxes and/or increasing public spending on housing, roads and
services. When inflation was a problem the state should raise interest rates, cut
public spending and increase taxes to reduce demand in the economy.
Highly controversial in the 1930s, these views became established orthodoxy
after the Second World War throughout Western liberal capitalist economies.
By the 1970s, however, severe and persistent inflation and high levels of
unemployment led to a formidable challenge to the apparently failing
Keynesian ‘demand management’ by economists known as ‘monetarists’, such
as Milton Friedman. They claimed as their intellectual ancestors classical
liberal economists of an earlier era. To some extent, Margaret Thatcher’s
governments in the 1980s adopted their values, with mixed results, but by the
end of the twentieth century Keynesian demand management was back in
fashion, up to a point.
A commitment to internationalism
This is an oft-neglected theme of liberalism, but it is important. Its practical
application found expression in the liberal emphasis on ‘free trade’ in the mid-
nineteenth century as a means of ensuring peace and the universalist nature
of morality and human rights that should be defended when threatened by
oppressive governments in other countries.
Many liberals were against British imperialism in the nineteenth century on
the grounds that it was not necessary for trade and economic development
and that it infringed the rights of those over whom Britain ruled. Some
Liberals strongly opposed Britain’s involvement in the First World War – even
though it was a Liberal Government that declared war on Germany. Still
others, Keynes for example, were highly critical of the Versailles Treaty (1919)
that ended the war and imposed punitive financial reparations on Germany.
Nevertheless, most liberals were highly supportive of the League of Nations,
which was established by the Treaty, during the inter-War period. They
believed that it, and ‘collective security’ (whereby states would unite to resist
an aggressor), offered an alternative to the balance of power in organising
international relations, creating a law- and custom-based society in interna-
tional affairs similar to that which prevailed in domestic society.
The failure of the League and collective security with the outbreak of the Second
World War did not destroy liberal support for internationalism. Liberals have
been vigorous in their support for the United Nations since its foundation in
1945. They are the most enthusiastic supporters of wholehearted commitment
by Britain to the European Union and its project for European integration.
This internationalism springs from the liberal belief in free trade and from the
assumption that human nature is everywhere essentially the same and that
human beings enjoy rights by virtue of their humanity rather than of the
particular society or culture into which they are born. These rights are
universal, indivisible and inalienable. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, attached to the United Nations Charter, is a classic statement of liberal
principles on this issue.
Liberal attitudes in this field, however, do not necessarily translate easily into
specific political choices. For example, in the 1930s liberals were divided on
‘appeasement’ as the mainspring of British foreign policy, and in recent years
they have been divided on Western intervention in the Gulf, the Balkans,
Africa and, recently, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Liberalism in the twentieth century

The twentieth century began with liberalism triumphant, being a major
element of the dominant states that ruled the world by means of their empires
Liberalism 209
and committed themselves to the continuation of the social, economic,

political and cultural progress that liberal societies had undergone in the
previous century.
However, liberalism suffered a severe shock to its ideas of progress during the
horrors of the First World War. After the war, liberalism not only produced the
disastrous Versailles Treaty, but the ineffectual League of Nations. Liberalism
failed to ensure a prosperous world economy in the inter-War era. It failed to
deal with the tide of fascism and communism and slid into war again in 1939.
Indeed, fascism and communism appeared as young, vibrant alternatives to
what had become the apparently old, tired and worn out ideology of liberalism.
Nevertheless, liberalism prevailed in the twentieth century’s ideological wars.
On a world scale its greatest enemies, fascism and communism, had been
destroyed: fascism by the Second World War and communism by the end of
the Cold War. Liberal values, a global free-trade system, moderate welfarism
and the onward march of technology seemed to be universally accepted.
Western military, economic, technological and cultural domination of the
world at the end of the century ensured that essentially liberal economic
systems, political institutions and moral values were extensively imposed on
Africa, Asia and Latin America and the states of the former Soviet Empire. This
has, of course, stimulated resistance to the ‘globalisation’ of Western liberal
values and Western power.
Ideologically, liberalism flourished as never before. As the Soviet Empire
collapsed in the early 1990s and Marxism withered on the vine, liberalism was
refreshed by a plethora of writers such as Karl Popper, Friedrich von Hayek,
Isaiah Berlin, Ronald Dworkin, Milton Friedman, Robert Nozick, John Rawls
and Michael Walzer. A number of right-wing ‘think-tanks’ such as the Adam
Smith Institute, the Institute of Directors and the Freedom Association
contributed policy ideas to the neo-liberal assault on the social-democratic
state. Thinkers such as these, arguing for a much reduced state and a greater
role for private initiative and the rigours of the free market, were very
attractive to Western conservative politicians seeking a way out of the low
growth and ‘stagflation’ (a term coined to describe simultaneous inflation and
zero economic growth) of the 1970s and long-term American and British
economic decline.
In the 1980s most Western societies had apparently adopted classical liberal
economic theories, usually now known as ‘neo-liberalism’. In the USA it was
known as ‘Reaganomics’, after President Reagan, and in Britain as ‘Thatch-
erism’, but in different forms it appeared in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and
other countries and with governments of both the political left and right.
Privatisation of state-owned assets, reductions in income tax, the weakening
of organised labour and attempts to reduce the role of the state in welfare
provision were all tried in these countries, with varying degrees of success.
The British ‘New’ Labour Party converted to this and the rest of the liberal
credo (devolution, civil rights and communitarianism) in the 1990s. Liberal
attitudes to divorce, abortion and homosexuality all seemed to be generally
accepted across the political spectrum.
This very achievement created problems for liberal parties, such as the British
Liberal/Liberal Democrat Party, as they seemed to have worked their way out
of a job. The British Liberals had been perceived by the electorate as a party
of the middle ground during the post-war era. By 2001 the Liberal Democrats
were beginning to position themselves somewhere to the left of New Labour
on taxation, asylum seekers and immigration, public spending, constitutional
reform, and many other issues. Serious questions have been raised within the
Liberal Democrat party about the strategy, pursued since 1997, of a ‘critical
alliance’ with the Labour Party. Nevertheless, the strategy appeared to work in
the 1997 and 2001 elections when it helped establish a strong Liberal
Democrat presence in the House of Commons.
Internationally, challenges to liberalism emerged in various guises. In the
United States, the election of George W. Bush in 2000 signalled a new attitude
to welfare, abortion, crime and internationalism which was clearly a sharp
move to the right. More alarming was the upsurge of religious fundamentalism
especially in, but not confined to, the Islamic world, the flare-up of intense
nationalism in the Balkans and the Middle East, and the rise of racist and fascist
movements in Europe. Liberalism, closely associated with globalisation, was
clearly subject to challenges to its values and to the globalising process.
There were also more profound intellectual challenges. Reappraisals of human
nature from a neo-Darwinist perspective, based on scientific study of animal
behaviour, cast doubt on liberalism’s optimistic perception of human nature.
From another angle environmentalists pointed to the inadequacy of liberal
theory to deal with the environmental destruction being perpetrated as much
by liberal capitalist regimes as by totalitarian ones. Finally, there was a
growing unease that a society based on the absolute primacy of the individual
as the source of all moral values was simply unsustainable: it would degen-
erate into licence and anarchy, to be replaced by dangerous and reactionary
fanaticisms, or some form of popular authoritarianism.
In practical terms this has caused problems for liberals over deciding which
side of the barricades to stand. Was British intervention in Kosovo in 1998 a
‘humanitarian war’ (and thus to be supported) or ‘imperialism’ by another
name (and thus to be opposed)? Liberals were often to be found campaigning
for non-intervention in crises that involved massive abuse of human rights
and loss of life.
Liberalism 211
After the end of the Cold War it had seemed as though liberalism had
conquered the last of the great totalitarian ideologies that had challenged and
warped twentieth-century history. There appeared to be no realistic alter-
native to liberal-capitalist democracy as the most effective form of creating
and maintaining freedom, progress and social and intellectual achievement
and improving the material standards of living of the majority of mankind.
However, this confidence was to be succeeded by some loss of faith.
The stubborn problems of the past, like crime, ignorance and poverty, seemed
ineradicable, and new problems, such as illegal drugs and environmental degra-
dation, did not seem remediable by either classical or social liberalism. Indeed,
liberal ideas of ‘liberty’ appeared to be increasingly taken by many people to
mean ‘licence’, a lack of restraint, a lack of moderation and self-respect, as well
as lacking the central liberal value of respect for the rights of others.
Liberalism, as a distinct ideological movement, continued to be squeezed by
both conservatism and social democracy. Politicians of both the right and the
left plundered liberalism for ideas and made them their own, leaving a
prominent question mark over what modern liberalism was meant to represent:
what did it stand for? Some liberals lapse into an almost conservative
dependence on the past in their hope of the survival of liberalism. Others pursue
radical policies of state intervention and higher taxation that make it difficult
for the observer to distinguish them from socialists.
Nevertheless, such doubts and worries over the nature and future of liberalism
are to be expected. Liberalism has always had a capacity for self-analysis and
adaptability. One can assume that liberalism will continue to be a major
influence on the future development of human society on a global scale: ‘In
the West, by and large, we are all liberals now. Instead of ignoring or affecting
to deplore this, we should be recognising and reaffirming it. Or else, you never
know, it might one day no longer be true.’4
Summary
Liberalism now appears to be the universal ideology, its assumptions being
almost automatically accepted – certainly in the West. Liberalism had its origins
in the seventeenth century, developed in the eighteenth and flowered in the
nineteenth, when ‘classical liberalism’ emerged. By the early twentieth century
liberal doctrines were subject to considerable revision and ‘new liberalism’
emerged. There are several themes of central importance to the individual and
his/her rights. The prime duty of government is to defend these rights. Liberals
have an optimistic view of human nature, the future and the possibility of
progress. Freedom is highly esteemed, while the state is viewed with some
suspicion as a potential threat to individual freedom. Institutional arrangements
to restrain the state are therefore necessary; and the rule of the mob is as
dangerous a threat as any tyrant. Private property and a market economy are
efficient from an economic perspective, although at the same time may
undermine other liberties. Furthermore, while national independence is
generally ‘good’, liberals favour an international approach to foreign affairs and
reject imperialism. Although liberalism may be said to have vanquished its main
opponents, fascism and communism, in the twentieth century, it has not been
without its critics. A market economy does not necessarily produce social
justice. Liberalism has not so far provided very satisfactory answers to problems
such as crime, poverty, terrorism and environmental destruction. Nevertheless,
liberalism has, more than any other ideology, a built-in capacity for self-criticism
and change that augurs well for its future.
1 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation

(1879–80).
2 J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1859).
3 J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (1690).
4 ‘Liberalism Defined: The Perils of Complacency’, The Economist
(21 December 1996), pp. 19–21.
Arblaster, A. The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Blackwell, 1984).

Beer, S. ‘The Roots of New Labour: Liberalism Rediscovered’, Economist (7 February
1998), pp. 23–5.
Bellamy, R. Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical Argument (Polity Press, 1992).
Bellamy, R. ‘Liberalism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.), Contemporary Political
Eccleshall, R. British Liberalism: Liberal Thought from the 1640s to 1980 (Longman,
1986).
Eccleshall, R. ‘Liberalism’, in R. Eccleshall et al., Political Ideologies: An Introduction
(Routledge, 1996), pp. 28–59.
‘Liberalism Defined: The Perils of Complacency’, The Economist (21 December 1996),
pp. 19–21.
Goodwin, B. ‘Liberalism’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and Sons,
2001), pp. 35–63.
Gray, J. Liberalism (Open University Press, 1995).
Heywood, A. ‘Liberalism’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction (Macmillan,
1992), pp. 24–65.
Leach, R. ‘Liberalism’, in R. Leach, British Political Ideologies (Philip Allen, 1991),
pp. 54–87.
Manning, D. J. Modern Ideologies: Liberalism (Dent, 1976).
Vincent, A. ‘Liberalism’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1996),
pp. 22–54.
Liberalism 213
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 How would you characterise the role of the state in liberalism? Is it

always perceived as the enemy of freedom?
2 Is liberalism fundamentally mistaken in allocating a central role to

the individual in its social and political theory?
3 How true is it to say that liberalism is now the ‘dominant ideology’ in

the Western world and globally?
4 ‘The liberal obsession has been the fear of the all-powerful state; but the real threat to
freedom is now elsewhere.’ Do you agree?
5 ‘Once used to defend individual liberties, liberalism has become the ideology of powerful
business interests that most threaten individual freedom in a capitalist society.’ Discuss.
Socialism 11
Here we explore socialism – an ideology that, uniquely, sprang from the industrial
revolution and the experience of the class that was its product, the working class.
Though a more coherent ideology than conservatism, socialism has several
markedly different strands. In order to appreciate these, and the roots of
socialism in a concrete historical experience, we explore its origins and devel-
opment in the last two centuries in some depth, giving particular attention to the
British Labour Party. We conclude with some reflections on ‘Blairism’ and the
‘Third Way’, and the possible future of socialism as an ideology.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Does the assertion that socialism is the product of specific historical circumstances
cast doubt on its claims to universal validity?
➤ Is utopian socialism mere daydreaming?
➤ Which is the more important of socialism’s claims: justice or efficiency?
➤ Does common ownership equate with state ownership?
➤ Do socialists mean more by equality than liberals do?
➤ Is socialism in Britain simply what the Labour Party does?
➤ Is there a future for socialism?

Socialism 215
The general diffusion of manufacturers throughout a country generates a new

character in its inhabitants; and as this character is formed upon a principle quite
unfavourable to individual or general happiness, it will produce the most lamen-
table and permanent evils, unless the tendency be counteracted by legislative
interference and direction. (Robert Owen, Observations on the Effects of the Manufac-
turing System, 1815)
(T)he difference is that the enemy is more subtle and stealthy than before.
Capitalism remains the oppressor it has always been, but the inequality and
humiliation which used to stare out at you at every street corner is now harder to
see, even possible to miss altogether. (A delegate at the Labour Party Annual
Conference, 1973)
Like liberalism and conservatism, socialism was a nineteenth-century devel-

opment with its roots in the eighteenth century and even earlier. It grew up with
industrialisation and urbanisation, a process that was under way in Britain by
the 1750s and spread to Western Europe during the early part of the 1800s.
This process created the modern factory system (which is only now beginning
to disappear in the industrialised West) and
generated new industrial and manufacturing industrialisation
classes and elites, and, most important for The process of developing
socialism, the modern industrial working class. increased output of
manufactured goods by the
Out of this working class arose trade unions,
application of technology and
building societies, co-operatives, all influenced by capital resources. It involves a
socialism, the ideology of the working classes. massive reform of all social,
economic, cultural and
Any political movement or ideology requires a ideological structures in
group in society to which it can appeal. Socialism society.
without industrialisation, without a working

class, was essentially a utopian or idealistic movement. Without a collectivist
or class doctrine it would have essentially been an ideological wing of radical
liberalism. To reiterate: it was nineteenth-century capitalist industrialisation
that created the working class and socialism.
From its very beginnings socialism was a many-faceted ideology, one that can
be roughly divided into four main types, all of which have been influenced by
idealist or ‘utopian’ socialism:
• social reformism or social democracy;
• Marxism or Marxism–Leninism;
• anarchism;
• Third World socialism.
All these movements would call themselves ‘socialist’; all criticise liberal
capitalism; all desire social change to improve the lot of the mass of the
population. However, they are often involved in bitter ideological argument
with each other. Socialism is the most self-consciously ideological of the major
political movements. Theory and ideas are essential to an analysis of capitalist

society and how it might be replaced or at least reformed. As a consequence it
has a tendency to fragment into competing ideological groups, each claiming
the ‘truth’, each based on the ‘correct’ interpretations of key texts.
The experience of these socialist strains in changing society is varied. In most
Western societies socialism or social reformism has rarely held political power
for long. However, it has greatly influenced Western European political culture
and may be considered a major element of the dominant ideologies in those
societies, as it is closely associated with welfare states, Keynesian economic
management and a culture of social and political rights. While it constitutes a
class analysis of society social reformism offers high levels of personal freedom
aided by state action and state institutions.
Socialism of the Marxist strain was connected with the communist states of
Eastern Europe, the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It stressed
egalitarian values more than individual freedom. State power was used to
strengthen these values as a stage towards the achievement of communism. All
too often state socialism tended to stress the ‘state’, rather than ‘socialism’, and
oppressed the working classes more than the capitalism it replaced. The
opponents of social democracy in the West tended to envisage Marxist
socialism as the kind that social-democratic parties were planning to introduce.
Anarchism is confined to the fringes of politics and socialist movements. It is
dismissed as largely an irrelevance in complex Western societies, confined to
‘eccentrics’, ‘drop outs’, and the like. However, it offers an often-powerful
critique of state power.
Third World socialist states have attempted to create a form of socialism
without a working class or the industrialism that goes with it. Such states have
usually become associated with poverty, backwardness and failure. There is a
strong current of nationalism and anti-colonialism in this form of socialism.
We concentrate here on social reformism, also known as ‘revisionist socialism’,
‘social democracy’ and ‘democratic socialism’. In particular, we look at the
British version of socialism in the form of the Labour Party. Marxist and
anarchist contributions to socialism will be discussed in Chapter 12. Third
World socialism is usually a variation of one of the three other versions
adapted, with varying degrees of commitment and success, to non-industri-
alised societies.
Defining socialism
Perhaps more than most political philosophies, socialism resists easy defini-
tione, chiefly because of the wide range of theorists, writers and activists who
Socialism 217
have claimed (or have been accorded) the title ‘socialist’. Confusion has been
compounded by the eagerness with which many ‘socialists’ have denounced
the beliefs and actions of other ‘socialists’ as a betrayal of the faith.
It could, however, be argued that there are at least two fundamental points on
which all socialists agree, and which distinguish all the many varieties of
socialism from other ideologies. First is their attitude to property. For socialists
the structure of property ownership in a capitalist society at any given time is
radically unsatisfactory. Property, at least productive property rather than
personal possessions, should be redistributed, not to individuals but rather to
some form of communal or collective ownership.
The second feature is that socialism offers a class analysis of society arising out
of the relationships between social groups as a consequence of the unequal
distribution of property ownership. Financial inequality and the unequal
opportunities open to people as a consequence of their position in the
capitalist class structure are seen as fundamentally unjust and should be
reformed in favour of greater social equality.
Admittedly, even this definition does not entirely suffice to cover the extensive
rethinking of socialism in very recent times, but it forms a useful starting point.
Divisions within socialism

From the outset there were major divisions within socialism. One obvious
source of division concerned the end product: what sort of society ought to
replace the existing system? While this might seem an obvious question, in
fact the main dispute within socialism, the basic faultline, was the issue of how
a new society might be brought about.
Utopian and revolutionary socialism

Early nineteenth-century socialists may be divided into ‘utopian’ and ‘revolu-
tionary’ socialists.
Utopians believed that moral argument, reason and action within the existing
order constituted the way forward. They spoke in the name of reason and
natural rights, but they still had a mystical belief in change. Hence, for
example, the visionary schemes of Charles Fourier in France, who argued for
the creation of associations and planned co-operatives; and as another
instance, the founding of ‘communes’ by Robert Owen in Britain and America
as an alternative to capitalist systems of production and ways of living.
Revolutionary socialists, such as Karl Marx, dismissed these schemes as pipe
dreams. Only the violent overthrow of the state, the tool of the capitalist class
to oppress the workers, would make possible the creation of a socialist society.
While revolutionary attitudes dominated the middle part of the nineteenth

century the slow evolution of at least a degree of democracy through the
extension of the franchise, and slow but steadily rising living standards for the
workers, led to the emergence of ‘revisionism’.
Revisionist and revolutionary socialism

The revisionist view of socialism was that the state was more or less neutral
and that socialists could gain control of it by peaceful, constitutional means by
contesting elections and ultimately being voted into power. Once in
government they would enact socialism via the normal legal processes. These
ideas developed out of the German Social Democratic Party from the middle
of the century.
An important figure here was Eduard Bernstein, who joined the SDP in 1872
and soon became one of its leading journalists. In Evolutionary Socialism
(1898) he argued for reform through parliamentary action, rather than by
revolution, as the basis for a socialist party. He believed that Marx’s predictions
of revolution were simply wrong. Working-class movements, such as trade
unions, offered a means to achieve real gains for workers without revolution
or some form of ‘proletarian dictatorship’. Despite Bismarck’s anti-socialist
laws the SDP’s vote continued to grow, thus showing that a democratic means
to socialism had developed. Revolution was redundant.
The socialist Second International (1889–1914) was dominated by rows
between supporters of revolutionary and revisionist roads to socialism. Marx
and Engels opposed Bernstein’s revisionist views of socialism and called for his
resignation from the SDP and the Second International. They disliked intensely
his claims that Marxism was irrelevant and a nuisance to socialist development.
To revolutionary socialists revisionism – or ‘reformism’ – failed to grasp the
essentially exploitative nature of capitalism and the capitalist state. They
believed that capitalism could not be reformed. At best it would only make
sufficient concessions to ensure the continuation of capitalist power.
While during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century the main
conflicts were over alternative ‘roads to socialism’, by the late twentieth
century socialists were increasingly questioning what the ultimate destination
should be. Revisionism, first applied to the means of gaining power, was now
applied to what should be done with that power once it was achieved.
Continental and British socialism

Socialists have historically been anxious to stress the international nature of
the movement and the universal applicability of its principles. In fact, though,
the various strands of socialist thought have been powerfully influenced by
Socialism 219
the historical and cultural setting in which they

anti-clericalism
developed. Continental socialism evolved in a A feature of most leftist politics
markedly different context from that of British in Catholic European countries.
socialism. Of particular significance were the Anti-clericalism claims that the
Roman Catholic Church has too
powerful traditions of despotism, revolution and
much say in politics and its role
anti-clericalism in many European countries. British should be resisted and,
socialism, by contrast, had its own indigenous eventually, eliminated.
roots, its own political and economic environment
and its own distinctive qualities. Of major importance were the traditions
of constitutional government and political continuity.
British socialism has rejected Marxism as a major trend. It has been greatly
influenced by revisionism and the Fabian movement of Sydney and Beatrice
Webb, who regarded Owen as the founder of British socialism and preached
human brotherhood rather than class war. A class analysis is certainly part of
British socialism but class war is regarded as irrelevant to the solving of
practical social problems. Indeed, parliamentary roads to socialism can be
more effective than revolutionary means. British socialism has always
considered, for example, the European socialist stress on the political general
strike or activity outside the lawful political system to be illegitimate and
actually counter-productive.
The close links between the Labour Party and the trade unions have under-
mined the role of extra-parliamentary movements for socialism. Only in recent
years, under New Labour, have these links been weakened.
The Labour Party as the dominant form of socialism in Britain has close
cultural links with the natural conservatism and moderate values of British
society. Early nineteenth-century near-revolutionary conditions abated with
mid-nineteenth-century prosperity. Marx, who believed the Chartist campaign
for parliamentary reform had the potential for a mass revolutionary
movement in the 1830s and 1840s, eventually came to see little potential for
revolution in Britain. He once famously described Britain as having ‘a
bourgeois aristocracy, a bourgeois middle class and a bourgeois working class’.
The Labour Party steadily emerged as the major
anti-Conservative party during the 1920s and Chartism
1930s. The ‘safe’ nature of the Labour Party A mass working-class
was underlined by two short periods in movement for political reform
in Britain during the 1830s
government and, especially, by its role as a and 1840s. It called for six
partner in the National Government during the reforms, among which were
Second World War. No charges of unpatriotic universal adult male suffrage,
annual parliaments and wages
‘shirking’ could be made against it when it came
for MPs.
to power in 1945.
Scientific and romantic socialism

Another tension within the socialist tradition might be identified as that
between ‘scientific’ and ‘romantic’ socialism.
Scientific socialism harks back to the Enlightenment, the idea of human
perfectibility and the application of human reason to the understanding and
appropriate modification of human society. For this school, socialism was right
because it was more rational and more efficient a means of organising society
than the free market. A variant of this approach was that of the later writings
of Karl Marx, where he claimed that the ultimate triumph of socialism was
built into laws governing the development of human society. These laws could
be uncovered by the application of scientific method and once discovered
could be applied to improving society, ‘nudging’ historical events along to
bring inevitable change forward.
Romantic socialists based their approach on a moral vision of humanity. The
existing capitalist order crushed the human spirit, blighted creativity, caused
poverty, misery, degradation and crime. It was deemed a fundamentally unjust
system, based on selfishness, cruelty, exploitation and greed. These evils could
and should be removed or mitigated. Romantic socialism, therefore, was
essentially moral, its inspiration revolutionary and its appeal emotional.
Socialist themes
There are, in addition to the common views of socialists already identified, a
number of major themes around which socialists build their creed, even if they
do not agree on the relative importance or priority of their realisation:
• an optimistic view of human nature;
• a belief in some form of common ownership;
• a commitment to equality;
• freedom as a goal of socialism;
• socialism and the state.
An optimistic view of human nature

Socialists of all persuasions have generally held an optimistic view of human
nature. They themselves would call it realistic. Most people have a natural
desire to help others, to be part of a common project, to be valued members of
society. Man is perfectible by his own efforts. A good society is possible. Such a
society will come about by greatly modifying the existing capitalist society or
replacing it with one based on socialist values, however they might be defined.
The evils of war, crime, ignorance, unemployment, poverty and even disease are
regarded as largely the product of capitalist economic and social arrangements.
Socialism 221
Remove these and all would be improved. Scientific socialists can, in this sense,
be regarded as heirs to the Enlightenment tradition. Romantic socialists, with
their preoccupation with the soul of man, may have had a post-Enlightenment
starting point but their conclusions were much the same.
Such a socialist vision has a strong ethical component, even when, in the case
of scientific socialism, it purports to be based on scientifically proven fact.
This moral drive comes from a belief in the essentially social nature of
humanity. As we attain our ‘true’ humanity through social interaction, and
this interaction occurs in a specific context, it is crucial that the structures in
which the interaction takes place be designed to maximise human co-
operation and community. Given the appropriate structures, man’s instinct to
co-operate will flourish and the individual will achieve his full potential. Co-
operation, therefore, rather than competition, is the hallmark of a socialist
society. This applies with particular force to economic competition.
A belief in some form of common ownership

Since co-operation is essential to human well-being, and humans are naturally
co-operative, social animals, it follows that economic co-operation is crucial.
Socialists criticise capitalism and the institution of private property for
promoting conflict rather than co-operation. Moreover, the private ownership
of productive wealth is unjust since the owner of such wealth derives personal
profit from the product of the community’s work.
Classical socialists, therefore, argue that private ownership be replaced by
collective ownership. More moderate or revisionist socialists propose various
means by which private ownership should be subject to the common good.
These involve either state ownership of certain key industries on behalf of the
whole people, or some form of worker joint ownership, or joint ownership by
means of a co-operative community working together to earn a living and
raise children.
A commitment to equality
It might seem from the above that socialists are committed to full equality,
or egalitarianism, as one might define it. In a sense they are, but this
commitment is often misrepresented. Only the most extreme versions of
socialism propose that everyone should have exactly the same amount of
material wealth. Most socialists assume some variations in wealth among
people and, in practice, are inclined to favour less inequality rather than
mathematically exact equality.
While they share with liberals a belief in the equal value of human beings
(who should all be accorded equal rights and consideration), socialists
attribute most inequality not to differences in inherent talent, effort or respon-

sibility, but to social factors, such as access to education, wealth and social
class. Thus unequal outcomes in education or health are due to inequalities in
starting points. Such unequal outcomes are both unjust and inefficient, since
much human capital is thereby squandered. Moreover, only in a society
founded on equality can the liberal goal of liberty be achieved.
As private property is the root cause of social inequality, socialists say that it
must be tackled as an issue. Revolutionary socialists see a need to control most
private property for the public good and social improvement. Revisionist
socialists, on the other hand, seek not the abolition of private property but the
application of measures, most notably by the tax system and public spending,
to redistribute wealth in society along more equitable lines.
Freedom as a goal of socialism

Liberals defend the freedom of the individual to pursue his or her own
interests, trusting in the ‘hidden hand’ for the overall amelioration of society.
Socialists, however, believe that the deep inequality and poverty created by
capitalism mean that society cannot be free until the economic system is trans-
formed. To them such a society will have a ‘hidden elbow’ as the poor, the
weak and the working classes are pushed to one side. Their freedom will be
infringed, if not removed altogether, by untrammelled capitalism and the
minimal state.
Hence, to ensure increased real freedom for the majority of the people, the
freedom of the few may need to be curbed and institutions set in place to help
people realise their potential as individuals. This may involve the outright
removal of capitalism or its reform, including state-provided education, health
services and benefit systems.
Socialism and the state

It is a widespread misconception that socialism’s commitment to the
collective ownership of property equates with state ownership, and that the
state therefore plays a very positive role in
socialist thinking. In fact, there have historically
nationalisation
been many attitudes towards the state within
The taking into state ownership
the socialist tradition. The equation of state of major industries to be
ownership and collectivism was dominant only managed for the public good
from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth rather than private profit. In
Britain during the late 1940s
century and even then it was never complete. this involved the nationalisation
For example, many early twentieth-century of the coal, steel, railway,
British socialists thought nationalisation would water, electricity and gas
industries.
just replace oppressive private capitalists with
Socialism 223
even more powerful oppressive state employers. Indeed, it could be argued

that in the twenty-first century Western social democrats are moving away
from state ownership as rapidly as conservatives are. Nevertheless, it is
true that some versions of socialism present state ownership as the absolute
and defining truth, denouncing all deviation from this as a gross betrayal
of fundamentals.
Broadly speaking, socialists have held three contrasting attitudes to the state.
One is that the state is essentially irrelevant. The people, especially the
working class, must construct socialism. Another view is that the state is an
enemy, the tool of the oppressing classes that must be smashed by force for any
real socialist advance to be made. Thirdly, there is the belief that the state can
be captured and turned to the positive benefit of the people.
During the early nineteenth century, prior to the existence of states with
universal suffrage and respect for civil rights, and when the working class was
but a small minority of the population, revolutionary socialism aiming at the
overthrow of the state predominated. The dismal failure of revolutionary
action throughout Europe during 1848–9, the widening of the franchise and
extensive social reform in countries such as Britain, even state provision of
welfare benefits like pensions as in Germany, led many socialists to a funda-
mental reappraisal of the role of the state. Some, such as Bernstein in Germany
and the Fabians in Britain, concluded that the state could be adapted to a very
positive role if socialist parties acquired power by constitutional means.
This belief reached its apogee in Britain during and just after the Second World
War. State planning helped to defeat Britain’s enemies and could, it was
believed, win the war against ignorance, poverty and want at home. Social
reformism was the dominant ideology throughout most of the post-war era.
Recently, though, socialist thought in Britain and in the Western world has lost
confidence in state ownership as a panacea.
The early history of socialism

Although most critics have argued that the term ‘socialist’ can be applied only
to critiques of capitalist society, some have seen the genesis of socialism in Plato
and even Moses. Others have seen radical socialism in the declarations made by
the leaders of peasant revolts in England in the 1380s or Germany in the 1520s.
There may even be a plausible case for the origins of British socialism to be
found in Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) or in the activities of Gerrard Winstanley
and the Diggers in the mid-seventeenth century. For our purposes, however,
modern socialism can be said to have originated in the early nineteenth century
as a response to two major historical events, the French Revolution (1789) and
the industrial revolution from the mid-eighteenth century onwards.
The French Revolution overturned the existing political order and thrust such
concepts as the rights of man and values such as equality and fraternity to the
forefront of political discourse. Such was the perceived threat to the estab-
lished order from British radicalism that it was ruthlessly suppressed by
the authorities during and after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
(1792–1815). However, radical ideas remained to fertilise the development of
socialism in Britain.
The industrial revolution produced, as we have observed, new economic and
social structures – a new class system – based on capitalism. These structures
nullified in practice the values espoused by the French Revolution. Industrial-
isation was characterised by injustice, inequality, suffering and degradation
for the vast majority of the population. It was this state of affairs that early
socialists tried to confront and turn to good.
Socialism before the Labour Party

We have already seen some ways in which British socialism differs from
its European counterparts. We will now study its development in somewhat
more detail.
Utopian socialism
Utopian socialism (so-called by Marx to distinguish it from his own scientific
socialism) emerged in the backwash of the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars and the steady spread of the industrial revolution in Europe.
In continental Europe the most notable figures were Charles Fourier and his
schemes for new associations, and Claude, Comte de Saint-Simon, who
believed industrialisation could be harnessed by engineers and technicians to
modernise society for the benefit of all.
In Britain it was Robert Owen who played a crucial role. Owen’s socialist
career began with his development of the New Lanark cotton mill in Scotland
into a model factory and community (after 1800). He believed that people
could be changed if society was changed. Owen subsequently developed
ideas for other ideal communities based on the co-operative principle and
when these received little support in Britain he set one up at New Harmony
in America (1824–29). Later in Britain he promoted a wide range of organi-
sations, such as trade unions, co-operative societies and friendly societies.
Crucially, Owen’s socialism depended not on the state but on voluntary
action. Most of these initiatives proved stillborn and, apart from the
Christian Socialists, who urged moral revival rather than institutional
reform, the utopian socialist movement in Britain faded. The nascent trade-
union movement, which Owen once thought would play an important role
Socialism 225
in socialist development, concentrated on improving working conditions

within the existing capitalist framework, rather than on changing the whole
of society.
British Marxism and William Morris

Marx spent much of his time in England. His ideas were largely based on an
analysis of the capitalist system in England and he borrowed many of his
concepts from British economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.
However, Marx’s ideas had little impact in Britain until the worsening
economic circumstances of the 1880s led to the creation by the wealthy
eccentric H. M. Hyndman of the Social Democratic Federation (1884), a tiny
and unorthodox Marxist faction which came to nothing.
A more significant figure was William Morris, who was much influenced by the
art critic John Ruskin. Ruskin argued that the ‘bad’ art which he thought
characteristic of the nineteenth century was the product of a bad society.
Morris, himself an artist, craftsman and poet, further refined these notions,
believing that all human beings were essentially creative. The exploitative
capitalist system and its associated industrial production methods stifled this
creative urge. Originally a member of Hyndman’s SDF, Morris soon left to
found the Socialist League (1884). In his extensive writings, such as News
from Nowhere (1891), Morris tried to propagate his beliefs, though without
any discernible impact on the politics of the day.
Ethical socialism
Another tributary flowing into the broader current of British socialism was
‘ethical socialism’. In part derived from an interpretation of Christianity, in
part a quasi-religion in its own right, ethical socialism had considerable
influence on the New Trade Unionism, which was developing in the 1890s,
and subsequently on the Labour Party, founded in 1900. Important figures
were the pioneer Labour leader, Keir Hardie, and Robert Blatchford and John
Bruce-Glasier. Although ethical socialism had little intellectual content it
nevertheless combined romantic socialism with Fabian gradualness and
legality.
Ethical socialism stressed a strong commitment to social justice and the better
distribution of economic and other rewards in society – to reduce inequality,
not actually to create equality. There is little here about abolishing capitalism,
only reforming it. Justice and freedom are as important in this strain of British
socialism as in any other. Indeed, British socialism derives its inspiration from
some of the New Liberal thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, while shading into Fabian socialism.
Fabianism
Perhaps the most distinctively British contribution to socialist thought was
that of the Fabians. The Fabians took their name from the Roman general
Fabius Maximus Cunctator who fought Hannibal with what today would be
described as guerrilla tactics. Founded in 1884, the Fabian Society was essen-
tially a group of intellectuals with a keen interest in social reform.
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Graham Wallas and George Bernard Shaw elabo-
rated Fabian ideas. They argued that there was an identity in class interest
between the middle classes and the working classes, both of which were
exploited by the few ‘idle rich’ who lived off the rent on land or capital.
Moreover, socialism was seen to be emerging as a reality, with the steady
advance of collectivist institutions, notably local government bodies.
Socialism would be advanced not by the setting up of a socialist party, still less
a working-class socialist party, but by permeating
society in general with socialist arguments pacifism
founded on irrefutable, factual and, especially, The belief that violence in any
statistical evidence. The Fabians envisaged that in cause is morally wrong and
should not be resorted to in
a future socialist society a major role would be order to pursue political goals
played by an enlightened, uncorrupted and in domestic or foreign policy.
highly efficient civil service. The Fabians could Pacifism is particularly
associated with religious
claim to be the ‘wave of the future’, as such a civil movements such as the
service was already emerging. Simultaneously, Quakers.
even the Liberal Party was moving towards state
provision of pensions, while local authorities were increasingly providing
utilities like gas and electricity, public transport, and amenities like parks,
swimming baths and libraries.
The Labour Party: a very British socialism

Utopian socialism, Marxism, nonconformist Christianity, class struggle, trade
unionism, Fabianism, vegetarianism, pacifism and New Liberalism all
contributed to the development of British socialism in the form of the Labour
Party. The Labour Party is one of the least ideological socialist parties in
Europe but, arguably, one that has changed its society the most.
The formation of the Labour Party

The formation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 led to the
creation of the Labour Party in 1901, which was to prove of the utmost impor-
tance for the development of British socialism. Its initial inspiration was not,
however, socialism but ‘labourism’ – that is, the promotion of the interests of
the working class, especially the male, skilled working class, by vigorous
trade-union action.
Socialism 227
Although the trade unions were developing rapidly at the end of the
nineteenth century, with the emergence of large unions composed of unskilled
workers, they were badly hit by an adverse court decision in the Taff Vale Case
(1901). A railway company sued a union for damages caused to its business
when its employees went on strike. The court’s decision in favour of the
company undermined the entire legal basis on which trade unionism had
operated for decades, so the unions were anxious for legislation to redefine
their legal position. Moreover, while the unions had tended to support the
Liberal Party, even sponsoring some Liberal parliamentary candidates in
working-class areas, the intellectual baggage and social composition of the
Liberal Party were not unambiguously on the side of the unions.
The initial aim of the Labour Party was to secure the return of working-class
and trade-union men to the House of Commons. The party’s name and its
complex structure, which incorporated trade unions and socialist societies,
like the Fabians, clearly proclaimed its identity.
Before the First World War the Labour Party enjoyed some electoral success –
by 1914 it had forty-two MPs. By 1918 the situation had been transformed.
The Liberals had split in 1916 over the formation of a wartime coalition
government with the Conservatives. In 1918 the franchise had been extended
to include most men and women. Finally, the party adopted a new constitution
whose famous Clause IV committed it:
To secure for the worker by hand or brain the full fruits of their industry and the
most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of common
ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange and the best
obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service.
This could only mean socialism, but the exact form of socialism remained
unclear.
Labour in office: the 1920s and 1930s

Labour came to office in 1924 and again in 1929–
31. In both cases it was a minority government. coalition government
The first term, on the face of it, achieved nothing. A government made up of two
or more different political
The second ended in apparent disaster when Labour parties or groups. The National
Party leader Ramsay Macdonald split the party by governments of 1931–35 and
joining a coalition government dominated by the 1940–45 were coalition
governments.
Conservatives in response to the world economic
slump and financial crisis.
These two periods of office were, however, not as futile as might first appear.
Under Macdonald the party established that it had the capacity to govern, moved
further away from Marxism, and decisively committed itself to the ‘parlia-
mentary road’ to socialism, especially after the abortive General Strike (1926).
Intellectually, there was considerable activity. ‘Syndicalism’, the doctrine that

the working class could and should seize power by a ‘general strike’ prompted
by the unions, was increasingly attractive as an industrial road to socialism.
Syndicalism had been popular on the fringes of the movement but was
decisively rejected.
Ramsay Macdonald made some contribution to socialist thought, arguing, for
example, in The Socialist Movement (1911), that socialism was in a sense a
conservative creed in that it aimed at moving society back to its natural path of
evolutionary social integration, a path temporarily blocked by capitalism.
G. D. H. Cole advocated ‘guild socialism’, in which each individual industry
would be run by the workers in a co-operative system, the whole being co-
ordinated by the state. In Guild Socialism Restated (1920) Cole helped guild
socialism to become a major element in socialist theory in the early twentieth
century. He believed that it would strengthen democracy and resist the
capitalist treatment of workers as a commodity.
The most significant thinker, however, was R. H. Tawney. Tawney based his
socialism on Christian ethics. In The Acquisitive Society (1921) and Equality
(1931), as well as in many public lectures, he emphasised community, co-
operation, service, duties – rather than rights – in a way that has interesting
echoes in attitudes displayed by Tony Blair in recent years.
Nevertheless, advocates were still to be heard for the radical transformation of
society, one of the most important of whom was Harold Laski. In Democracy in
Crisis (1933) Laski argued that capitalism still controlled the state and would
prevent the realisation of democracy and socialism unless a radical Labour
Government used whatever methods were necessary to overcome capitalist
resistance and to introduce socialism. Such methods might include emergency
powers and a radical departure from traditional constitutional means.
Labour in power: 1945–51

In 1945 Labour swept to power with an unprecedented majority. It was in a
position for the first time to embark on a genuinely democratic socialist
programme. Events during the war had had a profound influence on Labour.
Labour was part of the wartime coalition government. Its leader, Clement
Attlee, was deputy prime minister. Other senior Labour figures held important
Cabinet posts and dealt with real and pressing problems, demonstrating
judgement and competence.
The war effort had involved state control and planning on a huge scale, estab-
lishing a general consensus that state wartime planning could successfully be
applied to peacetime problems. Once more, the general sense of optimism and
of ‘no turning back’ to the evils of the twenties and thirties boosted Labour’s
Socialism 229
confidence. Already before the war, the National Government had introduced
a number of welfare reforms, which culminated in the Beveridge Report
(1942) on which Labour based its ‘welfare state’, a ‘cradle to grave’ protection
of the citizen by the state. Keynesian theories of Demand Management to
regulate levels of employment in the economy were now part of the conven-
tional wisdom of both government and governed.
The government was also determined to ‘nationalise’ major industries and
utilities. These would be organised into state-owned public corporations, run
in the ‘national interest’ as a hard-headed, practical form of socialism, as
distinct from the unrealistic dreams of syndicalists and guild socialists.
In many ways the government was extraordinarily successful. Unemployment
did not recur, as it had after the First World War. A National Health Service was
established. Major industries, coal, steel, shipbuilding and railways, were taken
into public ownership. A host of social reforms accompanied these remarkable
achievements, all accomplished in spite of the material and financial devas-
tation created by war and the perceived threat from Soviet communism.
Paradoxically, though, Labour’s style of socialism was beginning to decline in
the moment of its apparent triumph. Planning proved inefficient, over-bureau-
cratic and less appropriate for the goals of peace than it had been in wartime.
Added to the acute economic problems of the post-war world were rationing,
shortages and a general feeling of overbearing officialdom. Nationalisation
became less and less popular, even among workers in the state corporations,
and the welfare state became steadily more expensive, with the bulk of the tax
burden to pay for it resting on working-class people.
By 1951 Labour was widely perceived as an exhausted government. Many of
its ministers had been in government for ten years through war and post-war
reconstruction. Nevertheless, the Conservatives only just won the election.
They were to stay in power for thirteen years.
Labour in opposition and in government: 1951–79

During these years Labour was riven by tensions between the ‘democratic
socialists’ who wanted to press on along the road Labour had taken in 1945,
and the ‘social democrats’ who hoped Labour’s goals might be achieved by
another route. This was no mere intellectual debate. At all points, electoral
considerations were fundamental.
Anthony Crosland made an important contribution to the debate. In The
Future of Socialism (1956) his revisionist thesis stressed that the essence
of socialism was the ends not the means. Crosland argued that capitalism
had changed radically. Ownership was irrelevant since the typical business
enterprise was now a corporation run by managers concerned with the
long-term success of the company. Owners were essentially passive share-

holders. Such firms were a positive benefit to socialism. Their profits were
ploughed back into businesses, improving efficiency and raising living
standards. Full employment would eliminate the exploitation of the workforce
since workers could choose whom to work for and competition would
eliminate the exploitation of consumers. Such wealth-producing enterprises
could contribute to social improvement by making possible the provision of
welfare benefits and the reduction of inequality by redistribution and
progressive taxation.
These ideas had a seismic impact on the Labour Party. The right-wing ‘social
democrats’ seized on them enthusiastically, while the left wing rejected them.
Rows over the direction for the Labour Party were to contribute to Labour’s
successive electoral defeats in the 1950s.
In spite of these tensions Labour was returned to power in 1964 (and again in
1966) under Harold Wilson. Intellectually, these proved sterile years. Wilson
and several Labour leaders were later to produce memoirs, diaries and
analyses of their Labour Government, although they rarely discussed the
nature of British socialism. Indeed, many Labour supporters were deeply disil-
lusioned by Labour’s failures to manage the economy successfully or extend
socialism in society.
Labour returned to power in 1974 with a considerably more left-wing agenda,
but with very little in the way of a mandate from the voters to carry it out and
almost no commitment to it by the Labour leadership. It did increase welfare
spending and take over some failing industries, notably British Leyland in
1975, but it was soon overwhelmed by the world economic recession that
gathered pace after 1973. Inflation and unemployment rose. The Labour
Government cut public spending; social conflicts, especially strikes, multiplied.
The social-democratic approach appeared bankrupt. Keynesian economic
management techniques no longer worked and the inherent conflict between
high taxation (for welfare and wealth redistribution) and economic efficiency
became clearly evident.
Labour in opposition again: 1979–97

After losing power to the Conservatives in 1979 Labour had once again to face
internal sectional conflicts. The result was the defection of a substantial part
of the right wing of the party to the newly formed Social Democrats in 1981;
and on the left there was a revival of ‘classical socialism’, tinged with Marxism.
The ideological civil war in the Labour Party, which was to contribute to its
being out of power for eighteen years, was exacerbated by rows over nuclear
disarmament and Europe.
Socialism 231
The re-emergence of classical socialism was already under way during the
1970s. It became closely identified with Tony Benn, who campaigned energet-
ically for it in the Labour Party. Benn’s ideas were propounded in Arguments for
Socialism (1980) and Arguments for Democracy (1981). For Benn, socialism and
democracy were two sides of the same coin. He argued for full-blooded Clause
IV socialism, a radical foreign and defence policy, wealth distribution and
democratisation, especially of the Labour Party itself. This last was imple-
mented in the new arrangements for the election of the leader in 1981. The
Labour manifesto for the 1983 general election was so radically socialist that
one senior Labour politician described it as ‘the longest suicide note in history’.
After the crushing defeat that followed, the party leader, Michael Foot,
resigned and was replaced by Neil Kinnock. Despite his leftist reputation,
Kinnock began the process of reform by purging Militant supporters. Although
the party was mindful of electoral considerations (but still defeated in 1987
and 1992) there was a strong ideological rethink under Kinnock and his
immediate successor John Smith, and at an accelerated pace under Tony Blair
(who became leader in 1994 on Smith’s death).
Symbolic of these reforms was the abolition of Clause IV at the 1995 party
conference. The new Clause IV was considerably longer than the 1918 version,
and less dignified in its language. It described the Labour Party as a
‘democratic socialist party’, but its essence was to commit the party to:
work for a dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in which the enterprise of
the market and the rigour of competition are joined with the forces of partnership
and co-operation to produce the wealth the nation needs and the opportunity for
all to work and prosper, with a thriving private sector and high quality public
services, where those undertakings essential to the public good are either owned
by the public or accountable to them.
‘New Labour’, as it liked to be called, had clearly moved a long way from
classical socialism. The question remained, where was it moving to? Politi-
cally, New Labour was far more a party of the centre than of the left. Beyond
that it was difficult to tell.
To make sense of New Labour, it needs to be set in both a global and a
domestic context. On the global stage, the collapse of Soviet communism in
the late 1980s and early 1990s sounded the death-knell of the command
economy as a viable alternative to capitalism. The term ‘globalisation’ suggests
that the nation-state no longer had a sufficient power base to control its own
economy or even effectively to influence global economic forces. There were
important consequences for all forms of state regulation, but especially
taxation, interest rates, exchange rates, subsidies and, ultimately, welfare
benefits. The power of international markets was clearly illustrated by
Britain’s forced withdrawal from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in
September 1992 (membership of which had been a key plank of the

government’s economic policy) – a policy debacle from which, politically, the
Conservative Government never really recovered. Globalisation was
reinforced at an institutional level by such bodies as the World Trade Organi-
sation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, all of which are
designed to ensure the effective running of the global capitalist economy.
Socialist parties were thus confronted by acute social problems. Most have
been forced into some sort of accommodation with the global market system,
dominated by the arch capitalist power, the USA.
Domestically, British society has been transformed over the last twenty years.
Old industries, coal, steel, shipbuilding, heavy industry, large factories, the
bedrock of Labour’s traditional voting strength, have largely disappeared. As
a result, the power of trade unions has declined, especially after they suffered
a number of spectacular defeats during the early 1980s at the hands of the
Thatcher Government. New industries arose, especially in new technology
areas and the service sector, with little unionisation and very little sense of
class solidarity among the workers. Indeed, the class system was radically
altered and with it the nation’s voting patterns. Most of the population could
be described as ‘middle class’ by the 1990s. Property ownership had grown:
houses, cars, shares, private pensions were all more widespread than previ-
ously. Voters increasingly perceived their lives in personal terms, rather than
as members of a group. Individual choice, responsibility and advancement
became the prevailing aspirations of a majority of the population. An appeal
to simple class resentment or class solidarity would not garner the votes
Labour needed to win power again.
It was these changes that Tony Blair sought to address. Perhaps the most
surprising influence on him was Margaret Thatcher. She astutely exploited the
changes in society that were weakening the skilled working class’s traditional
commitment to Labour. Labour was associated with high taxes and apparent
over-generous support for the work-shy, and Mrs Thatcher persuaded enough
workers to vote Conservative to win several elections. Blair admired her
challenge to entrenched vested interests and encouragement of an enter-
prising and dynamic society. For Blair, though, Thatcherism was inadequate.
There were still powerful interests to curb – hence his commitment to
‘modernisation’ in the face of the ‘forces of conservatism’, few of which seemed
to be in the Conservative Party itself. Mrs Thatcher’s antipathy to the state led
her to under-estimate its positive economic value in promoting, for example,
‘education, education, education’ (Blair’s three top priorities as identified
during the 1997 general election). Worst of all, Thatcher had ignored the
social and cultural impact of globalisation and competition and the conse-
quent destruction of communities, families, social stability and moral values.
Socialism 233
‘Blairism’ and the ‘Third Way’

Unless one accepts Herbert Morrison’s definition, ‘Socialism is whatever a
Labour Government does’, one might argue that under the leadership of Tony
Blair the Labour Party has finally cut its bonds with the form of socialism estab-
lished in 1918, and has become more of a social liberal party. One could claim
that there is no distinctive New Labour or ‘Blairite’ ideology at all, merely an
intellectual black hole attracting any passing fad. Is it merely ‘conservatism
with a human face’, a ‘nice’ form of Thatcherism, which is electorally highly
successful but intellectually and ideologically completely barren?
Alternately a more positive interpretation can be maintained. While Blair is in
no way an ‘old Clause IV’ socialist, his ‘Third Way’ is genuinely based on
socialist tradition and enriched by contemporary socialist thought.
Blair certainly accepts the economic and social changes of the last two
decades. He even welcomes them. What he does not accept are the ethics of
selfishness and greed associated with them. In this, Blair consciously reaches
back to the Christian and ethical socialism of the nineteenth century, later
expounded by R. H. Tawney and others. The focus is on community – the
world, the nation, the local area and the family. These naturally co-operative
entities should be strengthened by a sympathetic state. This ‘communitarian’
approach is clearly evident in Blair’s rhetoric. It emphasises duties rather than
rights, a ‘stakeholder capitalism’ in which all have an interest in a successful
market economy, ‘one-nation socialism’, where economic efficiency is married
to ‘fairness’, the sovereignty of the people, and the benefit of the many rather
than the few.
In so far as these slogans translate into policy, there has been a number of
radical measures, for example a general toughening up on tackling crime.
Welfare has moved towards ‘handups’, rather than ‘handouts’. ‘Prudence’ has
characterised economic management, with a very cautious approach to public
spending (now redefined as ‘public investment’). More specifically, there has
been a policy of partnership of the state with private capital in, for example,
Education Action Zones and the Public–Private Partnership to finance hospital
building, the London Underground and air traffic control. In 2001 there was
much talk of expanding the role of ‘faith communities’ (churches and religious
groups) in education and welfare, with state backing. At the same time the
participation by the people has been enhanced by constitutional reform,
especially devolution in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The question arises, is this in any meaningful sense, other than Morrison’s,
‘socialism’? Certainly, there is a role for the state as regulator, enabler and
deliverer of social guidance, but not as owner. Equality is proclaimed but it is
the equality of the ‘level playing field’: that is, equality of opportunity rather
than equality of outcome. Redistribution of wealth via the tax and welfare
system has had only modest support. The emphasis has been on bettering the
lot of the poor by full employment, a dynamic economy and compulsory
training rather than state handouts. There has been occasional reference to the
‘stakeholder’ society, though this has been interpreted as to do with promoting
private pension schemes rather than retaining the meaning first given to the
term by Will Hutton in his book The State We’re In (1995). In his view, it was
not merely the shareholders who had a ‘stake’ in a business, but employees,
customers and the wider national community. This reality, therefore, should
have ‘institutional recognition’.
If this is socialism, it is socialism of a highly modified variety. Critics of
Blairism (who are not confined to the left of Labour) assert that this simply
isn’t socialism, and whatever its merits, it shouldn’t pretend to be so.
Blair has spoken much of citizenship and the value of a caring and responsible
community. Not surprisingly Robert Putnam, whose book Bowling Alone: The
Collapse and Revival of American Community (2001), deplores the decline of
community in the USA, was rewarded with a personal audience with Tony Blair.
Socialism outside the Labour Party

Labour has not always been avowedly a socialist party. Some critics have dis-
puted its claim to the title and many more would dispute its socialist credentials
today. For socialism this may be an advantage. It can be argued that socialism
has been released from the constraints of its association with the Labour Party,
in much the same way as the demise of the Soviet Union has liberated Marxism.
For example, some, like the Socialist Philosophers Group, have tried to reconcile
socialism with the market economy. Others, such as Alisdair MacIntyre and
Michael Sandel, have stressed the over-arching importance of the ‘public
good’. The difficulty here is that such concepts might logically be aligned with
the liberal or conservative tradition; or else they might be reduced to mere
platitudes so anodyne that virtually no one could disagree with them.
More positively, it could be maintained that socialist ideas and values have
migrated elsewhere, possibly to the Green Party and the ecology movement,
or even outside conventional politics. Here, suitably modified, they may yet
prove fruitful sources of intellectual and moral challenge and political action.
A socialist future?
The end of the Soviet Union and the apparent triumph of liberal capitalism
appear to have marked the end of socialism as an experiment in state power
and pose a major challenge to social democracy in the West. Conservatives
Socialism 235
have pronounced socialism discredited and capitalism vindicated, but one

might reflect that such announcements are premature.
Western voters appear deeply committed to the main planks of the welfare
state as they have been described over the past half-century or so. The state
institutions created to deliver social-democratic priorities such as health,
welfare, education and benefit payment are stubbornly popular. Opinion polls
regularly show people’s willingness to pay higher taxes to improve public
services. Globalisation and free markets are not automatically seen as the
boon to mankind that they claim to be.
According to many opinion polls in the West, voters are strongly in favour of
state planning and state ownership of key services such as electricity, water,
the railways, gas, and so on. Continuing of global poverty and growing
inequalities at home and abroad demonstrate that all is not well in the new
liberal capitalist world.
Capitalism may, once again, be dominant in the world, but there are many
people willing to challenge its moral validity and efficiency. Socialism, married
to other movements such as ecologism and feminism, may yet prove an
effective challenge to the dominance of the market and offer a rallying call for
opponents of capitalism.
Summary
Socialism is very much a product of the industrial revolution and the class to
which it gave birth, the industrial working class. While socialism has many
competing branches, all agree that the existing structure of property ownership
is unsatisfactory. Furthermore, socialism presents a ‘class analysis’ of society
based on property ownership. Socialism contains many divisions – the main
area of dispute being how a socialist society could be achieved. Utopian
socialists believed that society could be transformed by peaceful processes.
Revolutionary socialists advocated the violent overthrow of the state by the
working class. Revisionist socialists declared that social change was possible by
working within the existing political order. The values espoused by socialists
include common ownership and social equality. Human nature is regarded as
moulded by social structures. Attitudes to the state vary from outright hostility
to the more positive view of the revisionist school, which believed the state
could be turned to good. This latter view powerfully influenced the British
Labour Party, drawing on an indigenous socialist tradition. Labour held office
for a number of periods during the twentieth century and broadly implemented
a socialist programme. By the 1990s, and after a long period out of office, the
Labour Party reinvented itself as ‘New Labour’ with a more centrist and less
socialist programme for government.
FURTHER READING
Berki, R. N. Modern Ideology: SOCIALISM (J. M. Dent, 1975).

Callaghan, J. Socialism in Britain since 1884 (Blackwell, 1990).
Geoghegan, V. ‘Socialism’, in R. Eccleshall et al., Political Ideologies:
An introduction (Routledge, 1994), pp. 91–117.
Goodwin, B. ‘Socialism’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John
Wiley and Sons, 2001), pp. 97–119.
Heywood, A. ‘Socialism’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction (Macmillan,
1998), pp. 103–51.
Leach, R. ‘Labourism and Socialism’, in R. Leach, British Political Ideologies (Philip Allan,
1991), pp. 117–49.
Lichtheim, G. A Short History of Socialism (Fontana/Collins, 1977).
Sassoon, D. One Hundred Years of Socialism (Fontana, 1997).
Vincent, A. ‘Socialism’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1996), pp.
84–113.
Wright, A. British Socialism (Longman, 1983).
Wright, A. Socialisms: Theories and Practices (Oxford University Press, 1987).
Wright, A. ‘Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright
(eds.), Contemporary Political Ideologies (Pinter, 1993), pp. 78–99.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 In what sense is socialism uniquely a class ideology?
2 Are the differences between revolutionary and revisionist socialism

greater than the factors which unite them?
3 What does it mean to say socialism is about ‘equality’?
4 How socialist is ‘Blairism’?
5 ‘Revolutionary socialism does not achieve liberty; revisionist socialism does not achieve
equality.’ Discuss.
Marxism and anarchism 12
Although Marxism and even anarchism are sometimes treated as if they are
simply varieties of socialism, we consider that they have sufficiently distinctive
characteristics to warrant separate treatment. Starting with Marxism, we
examine Marx’s theories of history, economics and politics before discussing the
controversies within Marx-inspired political organisations in the nineteenth
century, particularly the challenge mounted to orthodox Marxism by the
‘revisionist’ school.
We then analyse twentieth-century attempts to establish concrete political

systems claiming ‘Marxist’ legitimacy, with particular attention to the rise and fall
of the Soviet Union. Finally we examine attempts to reinterpret Marxism to make
it relevant to twenty-first-century social and economic conditions. Turning to the
wide-ranging form of political thought known as anarchism, we discuss anarchist
views of human nature, the state, liberty and equality, and economic life. The
chapter ends with a critique of anarchism and some thoughts as to its relevance
to modern politics.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Is Marxism correct in identifying class as the most important form of social identity and
‘class struggle’ as the driving force of history?
➤ Does the importance of theory in Marxism undermine its potential for political action
against capitalism by stimulating intra-Marxist strife and the proliferation of Marxist
movements?
➤ Has Marxism’s association with oppressive communist regimes in, say, the Soviet Union
been damaging to its professed role as a liberating movement for the working classes?
Or is Marxism inherently oppressive?
➤ Are we too precipitate in dismissing anarchism’s analysis of the oppressive nature of the
state?
➤ Has anarchism’s importance as a political movement been undermined by its over-

concentration on theory and its neglect of practical measures for reforming society?
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and
journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to
one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that
each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the
common ruin of the contending classes. (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The
Communist Manifesto, 1848)
No conception of anarchism is further from the truth than that which regards it as
an extreme form of democracy. Democracy advocates the sovereignty of the people.
anarchism advocates the sovereignty of the person. (George Woodcock, Anarchism,
1962)
Revolutions have never lightened the burden of tyranny, they have only shifted it
to another shoulder. (George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman, 1903)
Marxism and anarchism are very important parts of the socialist tradition but
they differ so significantly from democratic socialism and social democracy as
to be worth studying as distinct ideological movements.
The collapse of the USSR and its empire in Eastern Europe during 1989–91
is often hailed by Western conservatives as vindicating their belief that
Marxism is a failed ideological system, unrealistic and of no value as a
political movement or an ideological tool. However, for many Western
Marxists the demise of the USSR removed an oppressive and corrupt form
of Marxism that held back its potential as an anti-capitalist movement.
They claim that Marxism remains a perceptive critique of capitalism and
its class system – a critique that has, they believe, increasing value in the
modern ‘globalised’ economy of multi-national businesses and international
financial markets.
Anarchism in Northern Europe and the USA has always been a minor strain of
socialism, though in Spain, Italy and France it has been very influential within
both trade unions and socialist politics. Anarchism’s anti-state analysis has
much value. Particularly interesting and important is anarchism’s critique of
capitalism, social democracy and Marxism as state-oriented ideologies
doomed to create and maintain political and economic systems that are funda-
mentally oppressive of the human spirit and its potential.
Marxism
It is usual to regard ‘Marxism’ as a branch of socialism, but we have chosen to
deal with it separately for a number of reasons:
• Marxism constitutes by far the most internally consistent of socialist
theories and forms an all-embracing ideology.
• Although Marxists have sometimes suggested that their brand of socialism

is uniquely valuable and authentic, there is, in fact, much more to the
socialist tradition, especially in England.
• The major divide in socialist thought is between evolutionary and revolu-
tionary socialism: Marxism is the obvious example of the latter.
• Marxism has had, for good or ill, a greater impact on human history than
other strands of socialism, notably in the emergence in the twentieth
century of the self-styled ‘socialist’ states of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba
and Eastern Europe.
• Karl Marx, who after all gave his name to the ideology, rather disliked
the term ‘socialism’, which he associated with daydreaming and impracti-
cality. From The Communist Manifesto (1848) to his final writings, Marx
preferred the word ‘communist’ with its unambiguously revolutionary
connotations.
As the term suggests, it is customary to regard Karl Marx as the only begetter
of Marxism. It is worth mentioning, though, that most Marxists attribute a
major influence on the development of his theory to his friend, patron and
collaborator, Friedrich Engels. Some have even detected nuances of difference
between the views of Marx and Engels, especially concerning the alleged ‘scien-
tific’ basis of Marxism. Some argue that much of what we now describe as
‘Marxism’ was largely created by Engels’s writings after the death of his friend.
Although German, Marx spent most of his life in exile in England, after having
been identified by the authorities in his homeland, denounced as a threat to
public order and forced to flee. He devoted himself full-time to writing, revolu-
tionary agitation and political organisation. Marx’s ideas made a substantial
impact on nineteenth-century European political thought and in the twentieth
century they profoundly influenced the course of world history.
By then, however, the processes of systematisation and reinterpretation by
professed followers, such as Karl Kautsky and Georg Plekhanov, had arguably
led to much distortion of the original message. Further distortions of Marxism
were made by Lenin, Stalin, Mao and other Marxist revolutionaries during the
twentieth century. The emergence of powerful totalitarian regimes, such as
the Soviet Union and Communist China, which claimed Marxist legitimacy
on the grounds that they were more authentic, exacerbated the process of
reinterpretation.
Marx himself revised his ideas considerably over time. His earlier writings, for
example, reveal a more humane, even liberal, Marx than the narrow deter-
minist of his later years. Moreover, the prestige accorded to Marx by some of
his followers led to his words being accorded the status of sacred scripture,
rather than debatable propositions. Thus Marxism’s claim to be a ‘scientific’
analysis of society was somewhat weakened, to Marx’s irritation. He once
famously asserted that if some of the latest ideas being described as ‘Marxist’
were indeed such, ‘I am not a Marxist’.
Marx’s ideas on historical development

It has been observed that Marxism is essentially a mixture of German Hegelian
philosophy, English liberal political economy and French revolutionary
politics. Marx emphasised the practical functions of his theories when, in his
Theses on Feuerbach (1845), he said: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted
the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.’1
Marx believed he had uncovered the laws governing human society by
empirical, scientific investigation. The modern capitalist industrial society was
emerging in Britain (especially in Manchester) during his lifetime. Britain was
by far the most advanced capitalist society on earth. Industrialisation and the
class system it spawned were the most developed in Europe. These economic
and social trends would, Marx argued, be repeated in other industrialising
countries in Europe and in the USA.
Marx’s starting point was the German idealist philosopher G. W. F. Hegel.
According to Hegel, history was a process of self-realisation and unfolding
by the ‘World Spirit’. It proceeded through conflict (‘dialectic’) between a
given state of affairs (‘thesis’), which produced its opposite (‘anti-thesis’), a
conflict resolved in a higher state (‘synthesis’), which in turn becomes another
‘thesis’, and so on. This mode of thinking is particularly alien to the Anglo-
Saxon mind, to which Marx’s drastic remoulding of Hegel’s theory is
somewhat more congenial, if still rather too theoretical and revolutionary for
most Britons and Americans.
History was Marx’s preoccupation as well as Hegel’s but Marx held to a materi-
alist theory in which the material conditions of human existence were funda-
mental, and which determined all other facets of life, such as philosophy,
religion, art, culture and politics.
In Marx’s scheme of things each successive stage of history rested on economic
foundations, called the ‘substructure’. Marx asserted that all humans must first
earn a living and that all societies must therefore rest upon some system of
wealth production. Thus the ‘mode of production’ played a key role. The mode
of production was not just the type of technology prevalent at each stage but
the associated economic system with its attendant social and cultural ‘super-
structure’. Art, culture, ideology, politics, family structure and the rest all
belong to the superstructure and change with the economic sub-structure.
The dynamic that drove human history onwards was the disfunction, or
‘contradiction’, within each mode of production. Each mode had its own
definitive stage, which Marx identified in The German Ideology (1846) as
‘primitive communism’, ‘slavery’, ‘feudalism’ and ‘capitalism’. Each, apart

from primitive communism, had a characteristic class system. As each mode
developed, antagonism between the classes grew. In political terms, this class
war always culminated in violent revolution. Thus the French Revolution
(1789) was essentially a class struggle between serf and landowner in which
the feudal system, established in the Middle
Ages, was challenged and overthrown by the bourgeoisie
emerging capitalist system. In class terms, the Originally the French word for
‘town dweller’ it has come to
bourgeoisie (the capitalist owners of the new mean ‘middle class’. In Marxist
means of production) emerged as the new ruling terminology it refers to the
class who were soon engaged in class war with owners of productive wealth,
the ruling class in capitalist
the proletariat (the newly created industrial society.
working class).
It is important to realise that by ‘class’ Marx meant not social status as conferred
by occupation, education or culture, but relationship to the means of production
(specifically, the ownership or non-ownership of productive property). At the
time Marx was writing, the bourgeoisie owned all the means of production –
factories, banks, shops. The proletariat owned nothing. Conflict between the
two classes was growing, driving history forward, and, Marx believed, would
culminate in the violent overthrow of the capitalist class by the working class
(the ‘grave-digger’ of capitalism) and the emergence of ‘socialism’.
Under socialism, property would be collectively owned, class would disappear
and with it class conflict and the state, which was a crucial actor in this
struggle. Socialism would then evolve peacefully into ‘communism’, a barely
imaginable utopia, characterised by material and cultural abundance and an
end to conflict, war, crime and all the miseries of the ages. Even if suffering,
sickness and death remained, humanity would be equipped, scientifically,
economically and politically, to at least ameliorate the worst of these afflic-
tions of mankind.
Marxist economics
Much of the plausibility of Marxism derives from its economic theories which,
supported by considerable statistical data, gave an apparently solid, down-to-
earth basis to its more abstruse philosophical dimensions. The most impressive
manifestation of his work is Marx’s multi-volume Capital (Volume I: 1867,
Volume II: 1885, Volume III: 1893–94), a magnificent, if now largely unread,
early example of social science research.
Marx held to the ‘labour theory of value’. That is, the value of goods or services
was not based on the interplay of supply and demand in a free market but on
the amount of labour, physical and intellectual, invested in their production.
The proletariat provided this investment, but they did not receive the full
value of their labour, because capitalists creamed off a substantial part of

the profits (known as ‘surplus value’). In effect, the workers were robbed by
their employers.
Factory conditions further dehumanised the proletariat, who were oppressed
not only physically but even spiritually by being alienated from the objects of
their labour (which they did not own and whose production brought them no
creative satisfaction) and from the society which created these conditions.
Even worse, the position of the proletariat would deteriorate, if not absolutely
then relatively, since the capitalist system was inherently very unstable.
Competition between capitalists increased the exploitation of the proletariat
as it drove down wages and extended working hours to maintain profits. Alter-
natively, capitalists would combine in monopolies that pushed up prices.
Society would be polarised into rich and poor, with growing class conflict.
The worst aspect of the capitalist system was its inevitable tendency to
produce more than could be sold in an economic boom (‘a crisis of overpro-
duction’), causing regular slumps of ever-increasing severity, length and
unpredictability. The polarisation of society would intensify, the misery of the
proletariat would grow and class conflict would become ever more intense.
Eventually, the proletariat would shed its illusions (which Marx described
as ‘false consciousness’). Those illusions were political, moral, religious and
cultural beliefs and values held by the working class but benefiting only
the capitalists. Perceiving, at last, its own real interests the proletariat would
organise itself and fight back through militant trade unionism. Finally, the
proletariat would overthrow its oppressors by violent revolution. Towards
the end of his life, however, Marx modified his position somewhat to allow
for the possibility of a peaceful revolution.
Marxist politics
Marxist politics followed logically from Marxist historical theory and
economics. The aim was to promote a proletarian revolution, which would
overthrow the bourgeois state (run in the interests of the capitalist class) and
usher in socialism (and a state run by and for the workers). For Marx, the
contemporary liberal state was a class instrument, the means by which the
bourgeoisie maintained its privileges and oppressed the proletariat. In strictly
limited circumstances, as in the France of Emperor Napoleon III (1848–71), a
balance of social forces could allow the state to develop something of a life of
its own and hold the ring between conflicting classes. However, to Marx the
state rarely maintained a role as a ‘referee’. The slightest challenge from the
proletariat would cause the mask of neutrality to slip from the face of the
bourgeois state, revealing the ugly reality of class power underpinning it.
Marx believed that the capitalist system would undergo a series of revolu-
tionary crises that would create a revolutionary situation and cause the
overthrow of the bourgeois state. A temporary ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’
would establish itself to secure the revolution and govern in the interests of all
the people. This proletarian state would soon ‘wither away’ as the new society,
having no class conflicts, had no need for state instruments of bourgeois class
repression, such as the army, the judiciary and the police. The new society
would be communist, a society of harmony, prosperity and peace.
Marxism in the nineteenth century

Many commentators have pointed out that Marx was quintessentially a figure
of the nineteenth century. Critics have claimed that Marx’s relevance to later
historical periods is seriously limited, as his analysis is specific to mid-nineteenth-
century industrialisation.
Clearly, Marxism owed much of its impact to its effective blending of many
elements of nineteenth-century culture: science, the belief in progress, the
revolutionary and romantic traditions and a powerful moral critique of the
industrial revolution and the civilisation derived from it. Moreover, Marxism
was a European creed and strongly influenced socialist movements and
thinkers across that continent. It provided the framework of language and
ideas within which most socialist thought developed from the 1870s onward.
It is important to realise that there was, and is, no one united Marxist party.
There were many parties, groups and factions among which ferocious quarrels
of interpretation and reinterpretation soon began. The German Social Democ-
ratic Party (SDP), the largest and most significant socialist party in Europe by
the 1870s, was divided over ‘revisionism’, which was a reworking of Marxism
associated with Eduard Bernstein. He argued that a socialist society could be
brought about without violent revolution by political action within the
existing framework of the Imperial German Constitution, a policy formally
adopted by the SDP in its Gotha Programme (1875).
Attempts were made to hold the major Marxist and socialist parties together by
means of international organisations. The International Working Men’s Associ-
ation (known also as the First International, 1864–76) fell apart because of
tensions between Marxists and anarchists. The Second International (1889–
1914) was divided by rows between revolutionary and revisionist socialists.
These attempts at unity finally collapsed when most European socialist parties
chose to support their individual national governments at the outbreak of the
First World War. Contrary to the socialist belief that international working-class
solidarity would halt a European war by calling a universal ‘general strike’, the
events of 1914 demonstrated the superior hold of nationalism over socialism as
an ideology in the hearts and minds of the working class.
Thus Marxism entered the twentieth century divided and has remained so to
the present day, the doctrinal divisions over ‘true’ Marxism usually being
sharpened by nationalism and national rivalries.
Marxism in the twentieth century: 1914–53

By far the most successful branch of Marxism in the early twentieth century
was that associated with V. I. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. Lenin developed
Marxist thought by tailoring it to specifically Russian conditions. He led the
Bolshevik Party as a revolutionary movement, seized power in 1917 and
ultimately set up the world’s first socialist state in 1924. This state, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, survived until 1991.
‘Marxism-Leninism’, as it was later officially styled, recognised that Russia was
not economically, socially and politically advanced enough for a socialist
revolution on the Marxist model. Marx had assumed that such a revolution
would occur in the most developed capitalist societies of Western Europe and
the United States. According to Lenin, historical conditions in which a
‘bourgeois’ revolution would precede a ‘socialist’ revolution by decades or even
centuries could be telescoped into one dramatic event. This, as Lenin outlined
in What is to be Done? (1902), could be accomplished if the proletariat were
organised and led by a ‘vanguard’ of full-time, professional revolutionaries,
highly disciplined and of sufficient commitment and intellectual calibre to
devise and carry out an appropriate strategy. In Lenin’s view, expounded in
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916), revolution in the West
had been temporarily postponed because the leading capitalist powers had
exported the most acute forms of exploitation to their colonies and ‘semi-
colonies’, such as Russia.
The collapse of the Tsarist regime under the pressures of the First World War
gave the Bolsheviks their chance. The bourgeois revolution in March 1917, led
by liberals under Kerensky, overthrew the tsar but lost popular support
through the new government’s commitment to continue the war. Russian
military collapse followed and the Bolsheviks,
very much a minority party, seized their oppor- democratic centralism
tunity. They began to establish their regime, A principle of party organisation
accepted a humiliating peace with Germany in applied to the Communist Party
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), and after years of the Soviet Union by Lenin
and later Stalin. It supposedly
of civil war founded the Soviet Union (1924). The meant free discussion of issues
construction of socialism could at last begin. until an authoritative decision
was made, after which dissent
Marx’s concept of the ‘dictatorship of the prole- was not tolerated. In practice, it
tariat’ was implemented, as was Lenin’s principle was a cloak for dictatorship and
of strict party discipline (democratic centralism). the suppression of opposing
points of view.
Further justification of Bolshevik control was
based on the claim of the party’s particular status as the vanguard of the
working class. Because of the very real danger of internal ‘counter-revolution’
a dictatorship was set up, complete with all the apparatus of tyranny: secret
police, censorship, control of the media and the suppression of all possible
sources of opposition.
Stalin, Lenin’s successor, consolidated this system and emerged as absolute
dictator. He liquidated all critics within the party, including most Old
Bolsheviks, notably Leon Trotsky, in a series of purges known as the ‘Great
Terror’. Trotsky had argued for a vigorous export of socialism to capitalist
countries. Stalin, however, stressed the importance, as his slogan stated, of
‘socialism in one country’, and in a series of Five-Year Plans set about a massive
programme of industrialisation. Military expansion was also undertaken to
protect the Soviet Union from its capitalist and fascist enemies.
The creation and apparent success of the USSR meant that, with few excep-
tions, Marxism was effectively the same thing as Soviet communism. This
process reached its zenith by about 1950. By this time the USSR had become
a military and industrial superpower, the rival of the USA. It had overcome the
Nazi invasion (1941–45) and had used the Red Army and compliant local
communists to impose its ideology on Eastern Europe. Marxist parties
throughout the world looked to the Soviet Union for inspiration and guidance.
Some, like China, had their own communist revolution, and powerful
communist parties emerged in Western countries like Italy and France.
The seeming success of Soviet communism, reinforced by intense propaganda
at home and abroad, stifled criticism among Marxists and presented other
socialist parties with a major problem. To what extent was the Soviet Union
an exemplar for socialists everywhere? Some, such as the British socialist
George Orwell, would have none of it. He denounced Soviet tyranny in
uncompromising language in articles and novels. Others, notably the
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), were far less condemnatory until
the 1950s. The more pro-Soviet elements on the left and outside the CPGB
became known as ‘fellow travellers’.
Marxism in the twentieth century: 1953–2000

Cracks appeared in the Soviet hegemony after the death of Stalin (1953). His
successor, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ and other
excesses, to the Twentieth Party Congress (1956), raising the hope of a more
‘liberal’ communism in Eastern Europe. A wave of disillusion swept through
Western communist parties, exacerbated by the violent Soviet repression of the
Hungarian Revolution (November 1956). Later Soviet actions in Czechoslo-
vakia (1968), Poland (1979–80) and Afghanistan (1979) drove many Western
communist parties to distance themselves from Russia and to modify their own
ideologies in a more ‘Eurocommunist’ direction. The Italian, Spanish and

French communist parties particularly stressed an ideological distancing from
the Soviet party, emphasising individual as well as class rights and accepting
parliamentary ‘roads to communism’.
The People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong, meanwhile, had gone its
own way after the death of Stalin. In Mao’s view revolutionary movements
need not come from the industrial working class. They could be initiated by
the peasants in non-industrial societies and create socialism in line with their
class needs. This was an analysis particularly attractive to Marxist and revolu-
tionary movements in developing countries, fighting colonialism and imperi-
alism. By the early 1960s there was an open split between the Soviet and the
Chinese communists over ideology and strategy.
Marxist groups elsewhere progressively withdrew from the Soviet model.
Paradoxically, some of these groups became more significant the further they
moved away from Soviet Communism, as exemplified in the multiplicity of
Marxist groups involved in the revolutionary upheavals in Paris in 1968. In the
Third World, orthodox communist parties were either crushed by the state, as
in Indonesia in the 1960s, or evolved along lines of their own, as in Yugoslavia,
North Korea and Albania.
During the 1980s, change had begun in the USSR itself when Mikhail
Gorbachev became leader. He attempted to reform the system by ‘glasnost’
(‘openness’) and ‘perestroika’ (‘modernisation’). This sent shock waves
through the communist world, leading rapidly to the demise of pro-Soviet
communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Communism then collapsed in the
Soviet Union itself and the USSR fell apart under the pressure of long-
suppressed nationalisms. It was dissolved in December 1991, giving birth to
fifteen independent states.
At present only Cuba and North Korea can be regarded as old-style communist
states. China purports to remain true to the faith but it is very definitely
‘communism with Chinese business characteristics’. One wonders how long
the booming capitalist nature of the Chinese economy, and the new social
groups it has generated, can be squared with the democratic centralism of the
Chinese party.
Marxism in the twenty-first century

The collapse of Soviet communism caused many people to believe that
Marxism itself would shortly be extinct: it had obviously failed. On the other
hand, some Marxists rejoiced. Marxism was now liberated from its association
with totalitarian regimes, both in theory and in practice, as well as in the
popular mind. Already in the 1960s and 1970s some continental theorists, like
Georg Lukács and Louis Althusser, had attempted to reform Marxist theory.
They softened the harsh features of the later Marx by stressing his pre-1848
writings which were less ‘scientific’ and more humanistic.
Of particular interest was Herbert Marcuse, who had considerable influence
on the radical student movements of the 1960s. According to Marcuse, the
capitalist class maintained its grip by absorbing into the system any opposition
it could not crush: a strategy Marcuse called repressive tolerance. The working
class was thus rendered impotent by means of material prosperity and trashy
popular culture, which were orchestrated by the
capitalist mass media. Indeed, most social insti- repressive tolerance
tutions conspired in this invisible oppression, A term coined by Herbert
including schools, universities, churches, trade Marcuse in the 1960s to
describe the way in which
unions and the family. Only those excluded from
Western democracies
the system could be expected even to dream of contained and manipulated
challenging it. Such elements included students, dissent, thus preserving the
ethnic minorities and others on the fringes of power of the privileged.
society. Marcuse’s analysis held a particular

attraction for young people, since he associated economic and political liber-
ation with cultural and sexual freedom. By the 1990s, however, his influence
had waned as economic crises within the capitalist system and the triumph of
consumer capitalism undermined the revolutionary potential of the very
groups he had identified as the new revolutionaries.
More conventional leftist politics, at least in Britain, was conducted by a new
plethora of small, quarrelsome groups such as the Socialist Party of Great
Britain, the Socialist Workers’ Party, the Workers’ Revolutionary Party, the
Socialist Labour League, the Communist Party of Great Britain and the
Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist). Few of these had much
impact. Most of their energies were consumed in constant splits, regroupings,
purges and reorganisations. Some of them contested ‘bourgeois’ elections but
gained derisory support.
An exception to this was Militant Tendency, a group that infiltrated the Labour
Party in the 1970s and early 1980s under the guise of promoting a newspaper,
the Militant. They gained control of Liverpool City Council and a number of
Westminster MPs were said to be Militants. After bitter struggles in the early
1980s the Labour Party eventually proscribed Militant and its membership,
purging them from the party and paving the way for the decidedly reformist
‘New’ Labour Party of the late 1990s.
Initial hopes that the fall of the USSR would liberate Marxism from Stalinism
do not appear to have been realised, as global capitalism and liberal
democracy seemed to carry all before them. This very triumph has aroused
radical challenges, however, as exemplified in recent years by vigorous
demonstrations against globalisation at European

liberation theology
summits and meetings of the International
An approach to Christianity that
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the G8 (the arose in the Catholic Church,
group of eight leading industrial economies). particularly in Latin America. It
How far such challenges can be accurately emphasises the political and
social implications of the
described as ‘Marxist’ is questionable. One anti- teachings of Jesus and often
capitalist demonstrator in London (May 2001) uses Marxist theory to argue
wanted to ‘smash capitalism and replace it with for radical social reforms to
improve the lot of the poor.
something nicer’.
Marxism can be regarded as having, to some extent, escaped the narrow
confines of party and state politics and as now being free to rethink its role.
It influences the women’s movement, social and artistic analysis, environ-
mentalism and, in the guise of liberation theology in the Third World, the
Christian churches.
Encouraging though this may be to some, it leaves Marxist socialism without
a clear ideological programme for revolutionary change in the modern world
economy, which is characterised by growing social and economic inequalities
at home and abroad.
Anarchism
In popular parlance today ‘anarchy’ is associated with terrorist violence,
disorder and naive extremism. Historically, this understanding of the term has
some validity. In fact, the word is Greek in origin and means ‘without a ruler’;
it does not mean ‘chaos’. There has been a certain ambiguity in the term as it
applies to politics. One interpretation is ‘without government’ (or, as modern
anarchists say, ‘without the state’). Another interpretation, though, implies
‘without laws or rules’. It is, of course, possible to envisage societies without
instruments of state coercion; religious communities or Israeli kibbutzim offer
models of these. Anarchists have been inclined to attack authority of any kind
as an intolerable oppression. This applies particularly to religious authority
but may even extend to science, medicine, education and the family.
Although anarchists concur in their detestation of the state they present no
generally agreed definition of that term, as one might expect from anarchists. A
clear grasp of their thought is further complicated by the wide disagreement
among anarchists themselves on even fundamental points, conflicts that they
rather relish. It is, however, customary to divide anarchists, at least for the
purposes of analysis, into those whose starting point is the individual, such as
William Godwin and Max Stirner, and those whose starting point is the
community, such as Peter Kropotkin. Another important difference is between
those anarchists who advocate violence as a crucial tactic in advancing the cause,
such as Georges Sorel, and those who absolutely reject it, such as Leo Tolstoy.
Marx attacked his critics in the First International (an early attempt to create
a united international revolutionary organisation), notably Michael Bakunin,
as ‘anarchists’ for their opposition to organisation in the socialist movement.
The French revolutionary Pierre-Joseph Proudhon described himself as an
‘anarchist’ when he proclaimed a coherent set of recognisably anarchist ideas
in What is Property? (1840) and The Federal Principle (1863).
Unlike most political ideologies, anarchism has never really been put to the test
of achieving power in the modern state. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, however, anarchism had some influence in Russia, France,
Italy, the USA and Latin America. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–39)
interesting social experiments were attempted in Catalonia and Andalusia by a
strong anarchist movement. Anarchist movements, writers and communes still
exist today and have some influence as profoundly radical challenges to the
existing Western social and political order. Increasingly, though, anarchism is a
rather marginal movement within socialism and is often associated with radical
individualism rather than with socialism.
Main themes
There are a number of themes that most anarchists share, although with
considerable differences in emphasis:
• human nature;
• the state;
• liberty and equality;
• economic life.
Human nature
Generally speaking anarchists have taken a highly optimistic view of human
nature, seeing it as capable of almost unlimited development. However, they
regard it as having been radically warped by systems of economic, political
and intellectual control.
The central objective of anarchist movements, therefore, is to destroy these
obstacles to human fulfilment. Exactly how this is to be done varies according
to different thinkers’ perspectives. William Godwin, in An Enquiry Concerning
Political Justice (1793), observed human nature as determined by the
environment but perceived human existence as the product not of nature but
of reason. Rational beings were capable of individuality, but this could flourish
only in conditions of freedom. Taken to its logical conclusion, this meant that
almost any form of joint endeavour, even a theatrical performance, since it
involved authority, direction and rules on the part of those involved, consti-
tuted an infringement of the individual’s liberty.
Peter Kropotkin, in Mutual Aid (1897), believed that the development of

human liberty and co-operation was a biological imperative. From his studies
of animal and primitive human behaviour in Siberia he concluded that the
Darwinian account of endless competition and conflict among species
required drastic modification. In Kropotkin’s view, animal species survived and
developed through a process of spontaneous, natural co-operation without the
equivalent of government. This idea re-emerged in late twentieth-century
ecological theories and powerfully influenced the Green movement.
The state
While most ideologies have taken a positive attitude to the state, or regarded
it as a necessary evil, to anarchists it is anathema since it is, by its very nature,
coercive. State power is in principle, and frequently in practice, absolute.
Potentially no area of life is free from the state’s interference. To anarchists its
taxes rob the citizen and its agents and laws oppress him.
Basically, then, the state is ‘anti-human’. Its ultimate expression is war. This is
not merely a critique of totalitarian states: even liberal democracies constitute
a systematic oppression of individuals. Indeed, liberal and representative
democracy is especially reviled as fraudulent. Democratic majorities are likely
to be as tyrannical as dictatorships. Majorities can be easily manipulated by
elites, who use them to impose a subtle form of social control (Marcuse’s
‘repressive tolerance’). From the anarchist perspective the individual has
inalienable rights which cannot be transferred to a democratically elected
assembly, or even infringed by the decisions of a direct democracy, which
includes the active participation of all citizens.
Such radical rejection of the state raises acute problems. First, there is the
practical question of how anarchists can be tolerated by a political system from
which they are so deeply alienated and which they seek to overthrow.
Moreover, anarchists eschew the option of political action within a democratic
state – except perhaps as a means of propaganda. Anarchists do not usually
participate in the democratic process to change government since their object
is to destroy government altogether. The logical anarchist alternative,
therefore, is the overthrow of the state by revolution. Some, like Godwin, have
argued this could be by peaceful means through rational argument, while
others have advocated various forms of illegal, if non-violent, direct action. Yet
others, such as Georges Sorel, in Reflections on Violence (1905), asserted that
the general strike, in which organised labour would demolish the economic
and political system by refusing to work, would be an effective form of such
action. Still others, following the ideas of Sergei Nechaev, go the whole way
in urging outright revolutionary violence, utterly unrestrained by moral or
humanitarian considerations.
Not surprisingly, this hostile attitude to the state is counter-productive since

even the most liberal of regimes, when faced with a serious revolutionary
threat, would take firm steps to suppress it. Even apparently innocuous inter-
action with the authorities could be construed as collaboration with the
detested state. On these grounds, demonstrators against capitalism in London
(May Day 2001) refused to negotiate arrangements with police for an orderly
march; predictably, the demonstration ended in turmoil.
Given their intense dislike of organisation, authority and discipline it is not
surprising that anarchists have, with few exceptions, been unable to mobilise
themselves effectively.
A further difficulty with anarchism is that although its advocates are very clear
about the need to abolish the state, they are far less clear about its
replacement. Anarchists of a liberal or individualist perspective argue that a
system of ‘market forces’ would emerge in which even law enforcement would
be, in effect, revenge carried out by the victims of criminals or by agents hired
for that purpose. Those of a ‘collectivist’ inclination try to devise federations
of small self-governing communities or, like Proudhon, place their faith in the
emergence of a constellation of voluntary organisations, which they envisage
springing up spontaneously.
Liberty and equality

Anarchism has been described as an attempt to fuse together the two main
values of post-French Revolutionary thought: liberty and equality.
Both the individualist and the collectivist wings of anarchism are agreed that
the state is the main enemy of liberty and its abolition is, therefore, axiomatic.
The individualist wing emphasises this negative liberty, in other words
freedom from state or other social coercion. The collectivist outlook stresses
positive freedom, freedom to pursue positive purposes through full human
development. This, it is claimed, can only occur in a social context, since our
authentic goals are derived from our communal nature.
As for equality, individualist anarchists argue that this is implicit in the belief
that every human being is a rational creature, capable of deciding his own best
interests. Collectivist anarchists argue that all human beings have needs –
physical, mental and cultural – which society ought to be constituted to fulfil,
recognising equality of entitlement.
There is clearly tension between the two schools of thought, since individualist
anarchists regard any attempt to determine and supply these needs by the
collective action of institutions as, in itself, a threat to freedom.
Some anarchists of Christian inspiration, such as Tolstoy, argue from the
premise of the equality of man before God.
Economic life
One point on which all shades of anarchist thought are united is the rejection
of ‘state socialism’, or the command economy, on the old Soviet model. Beyond
this point, agreement breaks down. ‘Individualist
anarchists’, a notable American anarchist strain, command economy
emphasise the merits of a totally unregulated A system in which all economic
market economy, to supply such usually collec- decisions, such as wages,
prices and output, are made by
tivised services as policing, law enforcement, the state. It was a particular
defence and fire protection. Each individual can do feature of Eastern European
whatever he likes with his own property and freely communist regimes.
exchange goods and services with others. Property
in this context is taken to include his life and person. In this regard individualist
anarchism resembles classical liberalism pushed to an extreme position.
Collectivist anarchists view this form of anarchism with utter horror. They
denounce the injustice of a society in which the rich and powerful would
flourish and the rest be trampled underfoot. Moreover, market transactions
affect others with, for example, devastating effects on the environment and
on the poor.
Collectivist anarchists begin with two assumptions: first, all wealth production
is essentially social, rather than individual, involving collective effort; second,
if they are to enjoy a free and full life, all individuals have needs which should
be met by society.
For the achievement of these goals various models have been proposed, such
as communes, co-operatives and mutual societies of all kinds, some modelled
on the medieval guild system. Most of these models, however, remain at the
level of vague aspirations. Nor is it clear how such a dramatic shift from
existing economic arrangements could be made without catastrophic
disruption to the economic system, with all that would imply for the poor –
the supposed principal beneficiaries of an anarchist society.
Sub-species of anarchism
Just like other ideologies, anarchism has fragmented into numerous different
and conflicting sub-groups.
One of the most important was ‘mutualism’. This assumed that groups can
emerge from within society to conduct trade without exploitation and thus can
form the nuclei of a new society. These ideas, articulated by Proudhon, were
fashionable before the First World War and spilled over into socialist, co-
operative, friendly society and similar movements. Harsh reality, however,
caused mutualism to lose ground to the ‘anarcho-syndicalists’ who later
merged their ideas with a type of revolutionary trade unionism known as
‘syndicalism’. Syndicalism was powerful in Britain before 1914 and in France,

where it dominated the largest trade union, the CGT (Confédération Général
du Travail). The key intention was to challenge and ultimately overthrow
the existing order through militant trade unionism. Trade unions would
channel the revolutionary aspirations of the working class into a general strike
in which there would be a total withdrawal of labour by a united working
class. The economies of the advanced capitalist states and their associated
governmental apparatus would thereby be subverted. A new society would
emerge on the basis of these syndicates, or ‘workers’ unions’. Notably,
anarcho-syndicalism played a significant role in Spain during the Civil War
(1936–39).
‘Anarcho-communism’ was a critique of the state capitalism that emerged in
post-Revolutionary Russia among Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik socialists alike.
A significant force in the period 1917–21, it was eliminated by Lenin and Stalin,
though it survived as a hostile commentary on the Soviet Union in the West.
Critiques of anarchism
Many commentators have dismissed anarchism as peripheral to worthwhile
political debate. Self-proclaimed anarchists manifesting their beliefs in street
demonstrations are seen more as a public nuisance than a serious challenge to
the status quo.
Anarchism has for many people seemed contrary to human experience.
Anarchists have been unconvincing in their proposals as to how, in any society
established on their principles, criminals, deviants and social misfits would be
dealt with. Similarly, they have been strikingly weak in their concrete
proposals for the construction of a just and efficient economic system. With
doctrines that militate against any realistic application, anarchism has not
only failed to change society but has never been tried.
There is, moreover, a deep-seated contradiction in that anarchism fails to
reconcile the twin values of individual liberty and the common good. Even if
the state were eliminated completely, experience of societies where the state
has collapsed suggests that this would be followed not by utopia but by a
period of chaos, swiftly succeeded by renewed tyranny. Those parts of the
world where organised government has failed, such as parts of Africa and the
former Yugoslavia, are scarcely evidence to support anarchist optimism for the
end of the state.
There is further evidence to challenge the rosy view many anarchists have of
the world of nature and primitive peoples. Kropotkin’s ideas of a co-operative
animal commonwealth have not been upheld by studies of animal behaviour,
particularly of primates. Anthropological investigation into ‘primitive’ societies
shows them to be riddled with superstition, cruelty, hierarchy and arbitrary

power, rather than tranquil oases of ‘noble savages’.
The basic premises of anarchism, it can be argued, are logically inconsistent.
How, for example, could such an evil as the state have arisen in the first place
if early man had, in fact, lived in a condition of innocent communistic bliss?
There are ethical difficulties as well. Most people find the justifications of
revolutionary violence advanced by some anarchists morally repugnant. Even
advocacy of direct action by more moderate elements can be opposed as being
an indefensible challenge to authority, at least in a liberal democracy. In any
case, the practical outcome is always far short of an anarchist society and often
enough the prelude to violence and a reaction by the authorities that erodes
such liberty as already exists.
These criticisms suggest that anarchism is an ideological dead end, especially
if narrowly defined. From a wider perspective, though, anarchist thought has
spilled over into a whole range of political movements such as feminism,
environmentalism, civil rights and challenges to globalisation. If anarchism
does not provide answers, perhaps it raises some good questions, and if
anarchism is but a dream, dreams are not without their value.
Summary
Marxism is rightly identified with one man, Karl Marx. Marx modified his
ideas over time and other Marxist writers have contributed to the devel-
opment of Marxist thought. Marx borrowed his philosophical methodology
from Hegel, developing a theory of history in which the dynamic of progress
was class conflict, a conflict that would ultimately result in the end of class
altogether. Marx incorporated the concept of inherent conflict (‘contradic-
tions’) into his theories of economics and politics. Whether or not ‘socialism’
could be achieved only by revolutionary means divided Marxists and
democratic socialists during the late nineteenth century. The twentieth
century appeared to vindicate aspects of Marxist theory. By the 1960s over one
third of humanity lived under regimes that claimed to be ‘Marxist’. By the early
twenty-first century, however, Marxist states had almost disappeared or had
drastically modified their policies. Some might question whether Marxism has
much to offer today. Marxists believe it still offers a valid critique of capitalist
society in the modern globalised economy. Others believe it is a failed ideology
associated with failed political experiments in the USSR and elsewhere.
Anarchism is associated in popular opinion with terrorism and chaos, or
with unrealistic ‘utopian’ politics. This perception is largely inaccurate. Most
anarchists have a very optimistic view of human nature; all detest the state;
some reject all authority. Anarchists have proposed alternative ways of
overthrowing the state, ranging from rational persuasion to a general strike, or

even violent revolution. Liberty and equality are highly esteemed by all varieties
of anarchist, and all reject the Soviet model of the ‘command economy’ in which
all economic activity is controlled by the state. About the future structure of
society anarchists are vague. They favour small-scale, co-operative social and
economic units. Anarchist attitudes and ideas have influenced such movements
as the ecologists and still provide a critique of Western society.
1 Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and Engles: Basic Writings on Politics and

Philosophy (Fontana, 1976), p. 286; italics in original.
Berki, R. N. Modern Ideology: SOCIALISM (J. M. Dent, 1975).

Bottomore T. B. and Rubel, M. Karl Marx, Selected Writings in
Sociology and Social Philosophy (Penguin, 1974).
Femia, J. V. ‘Marxism and Communism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright
Goodwin, B. ‘Marxism’ and ‘Anarchism’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley
and Sons, 2001), pp. 65–96 and pp. 121–45.
Jennings, J. ‘Anarchism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.), Contemporary Political
Lichtheim, G. A Short History of Socialism (Fontana/Collins, 1977).
MacIntyre, A. Marxism and Christianity (Penguin, 1971).
Vincent, A. ‘Anarchism’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1996), pp.
114–40.
Woodcock, G. Anarchism (Penguin, 1983).
Wright Mills, C. The Marxists (Penguin, 1975).
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Write a critical appraisal of the Marxist analysis of society and politics.
2 Is Marxism an inherently revolutionary creed?
3 ‘A discredited and obsolete ideology.’ Examine this view of Marxism.
4 How might anarchism be seen as part of the socialist tradition of

politics? Is anarchism merely an extreme form of liberalism?
5 Does adherence to anarchist ideology render anarchist movements politically impotent?
6 ‘Anarchism is a political indulgence by the privileged, it has no relevance to the real

issues involved in governing a society.’ To what extent would you agree with this con-
demnation of anarchism?
Fascism 13
Events have made ‘fascism’ a term of political abuse rather than one of serious
ideological analysis. Moreover, self-proclaimed fascists have claimed that
fascism is beyond intellectual analysis and have despised those who favour
rational examination of their beliefs. However, we take fascism seriously as an
ideology by examining fascist values and the concrete actions of some of the
regimes that have declared themselves fascist, notably Hitler’s Germany and
Mussolini’s Italy. We also consider movements often described as fascist in
modern Britain and elsewhere and consider whether facism is still a viable
political creed.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ How far do explanations of the rise of fascism cast light on its nature?
➤ What does it mean to say that fascism was essentially non-materialistic?
➤ How useful is it to distinguish Italian Fascism from German Nazism?
➤ Was fascism as hostile to international capitalism as it was to Bolshevism?
➤ Why did fascism have such little impact on Britain compared with its effect on continen-
tal European countries?
➤ Is fascism a realistic threat to modern democracies?

Fascism 257
We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, a passion. It is not necessary for it
to be a reality. It is a reality in the sense that it is a stimulus, is hope, is faith, is
courage. Our myth is the nation, our myth is the greatness of the nation! And to this
myth, this greatness, which we want to translate into a total reality, we subordinate
everything else. (Benito Mussolini, The Naples Speech, 24th October 1922)
Blood mixture and the resultant drop in the racial level is the sole cause of the
dying out of old cultures; for men do not perish as a result of lost wars, but by the
loss of that force of resistance which is continued only in pure blood. All who are
not of good race in this world are chaff. (Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 1925)
Fascists were originally revolutionary socialists of the 1890s. By the era

following the First World War fascism had acquired its modern links with
radical right-wing politics. The term ‘fascist’ originated in the early 1920s as a
self-description of the political movement in Italy led by Benito Mussolini. The
word itself is generally thought to derive from the bundle of wooden rods
(fasces) carried before Roman consuls as a sign of authority, symbolising
strength in unity. The movement was initially based on the nationalist groups
(facsi) which emerged during and after the First World War and which were
largely composed of ex-servicemen and claimed to be a new political force to
rejuvenate tired nations made decadent by liberalism and democracy. Indeed,
it might be claimed that fascism is the only genuine twentieth-century ideology.
As an analytical term, ‘fascism’ has its limitations. It has become used,
especially by the left, as a blanket expression of political abuse of their
opponents. Moreover, the label ‘fascist’ has been applied to a wide variety of
regimes from Pinochet’s Chile to Saddam Hussain’s Iraq, to the point where it
becomes almost meaningless. Even before 1945 there were wide divergences
in theory and practice among states generally described as fascist, such as
Franco’s Spain, Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. It is possible to argue
that Nazism’s extreme racism, for example, makes it an ideology in its own
right and not merely an extreme form of fascism.
Fascists themselves have compounded the problem by emphasising, and even
glorying in, its non-rational essence. A clear, authoritative, internally consistent
exposition of fascist ideology simply does not exist. Besides, historical manifes-
tations of fascism have been so tied up with the extraordinary personalities of its
leaders that some critics have simply dismissed it as a vehicle for political power.
Such articulation as exists was later fudged to provide a spurious intellectual
justification for illegitimate power, such as Franco’s fascist regime in Spain.
There is a problem caused by fascism’s ambiguous relationship with both past
and future. German Nazism and Italian Fascism both sought justification and
inspiration in a glorious, if largely mythical, past. They challenged many of the
modern world’s values and assumptions, especially those proceeding from the
eighteenth-century Enlightenment. At the same time they emphasised youth,

energy and dynamism and made full use of available twentieth-century
technology for propaganda purposes. Hitler, for example, proclaimed the
excellence of traditional, rural, peasant Germany but his election campaigns
made imaginative use of the then novel instruments of cinema, microphone
and aircraft.
Fascism cannot be regarded as belonging to a particular historical period, even
though it reached its greatest force as a movement during the 1920s and 1930s
and its greatest political power in the early 1940s. Many aspects of fascist
thought are alive and well in the modern world and not just in formally
‘fascist’ political parties.
Explanations of fascism
Faced with the difficulty of clearly articulating a comprehensive account of
fascist ideology, some critics have tried to provide explanations for the
emergence of fascist regimes in the inter-War period derived from cultural,
historical and even psychological interpretations.
Anti-Semitism had been a feature of European culture and thought for many
centuries before the Nazis adopted it as a major element of their philosophy.
Fascism’s roots may be found in pre-Christian
German mythology, early nineteenth-century futurism
Romantic literature, and even traditional fairy A movement in art in the early
tales. Italian Fascism, in particular, has been twentieth century, especially
identified with artistic movements like futurism. in Italy, which delighted in
machines, speed, aircraft,
The nineteenth-century roots of much of what cars and all aspects of the
new century.
became fascist thought can be more clearly
identified. G. W. F. Hegel, the great German phil-
osopher and nationalist, was one important thinker who stressed the organic
nature of the state and society. Some have drawn attention to the importance of
racist theorists in the nineteenth century, such as Arthur Gobineau with his Essay
on the Inequality of Human Races (1855) and Houston Stewart Chamberlain
with his The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1899). Friedrich Nietzsche
was also especially influential. He identified the importance of inequality
between individuals, sexes, nations and races, the will to power of Übermen-
schen (‘Supermen’) who create their own morality. Fascists, especially Nazis,
seized on Nietzsche’s ideas of society as made up of the leader, the elite and the
masses – the ‘true’ democracy’. The Nazis added a fourth group, the Unter-
mensch (‘sub-human’), parasitic on society and doomed to eradication.
Psychological explanations have also been presented, such as the interpre-

tation of fascism as a ‘mass psychosis’ or the political manifestation of the
Fascism 259
‘authoritarian personality’. A particularly influential explanation has been that

of Erich Fromm, in The Fear of Freedom (1942), that fascism proceeds from the
isolation, loneliness and insecurity created in a liberal society and people’s
desire to end this situation by relinquishing their freedom to others.
After 1945 a fashionable explanation provided by Karl Popper and Hannah
Arendt was that fascism was very similar to communism in that it also was a
form of totalitarianism. This was essentially a system in which all distinctions
between the state and society were obliterated and in which the state was the
supreme authority, having absolute control of all forms of intellectual, cultural,
economic and social activity and to which the citizen owed absolute obedience.
Although much historical analysis has concentrated on detailed biographical
study of key figures such as Hitler and Mussolini, one of the most widely
accepted approaches has been the Marxist view that fascism was a last-ditch
stand by monopoly capitalism against its inevitable collapse. Other analysts
have pointed to the extraordinary impact of the First World War on European
society – the militarisation of society, the overheated patriotism and the stress
on such values as self-sacrifice, obedience and dramatic action.
While these approaches all have some value they are open to challenge.
Excessive reliance on psychological explanation removes the essential historical
dimension. Moreover, if fascism were to be related to certain individual person-
ality characteristics, it would imply particularly high concentrations of such
personality types at particular times and places, which would seem absurd.
Marxist explanations omit matters of race, which are surely fundamental, at
least to Nazism, and provide no real explanation for the mass support enjoyed
by Hitler and Mussolini. Nor is it obvious that fascist regimes in fact serve the
interests of capitalism. On the contrary, both Hitler and Mussolini at various
times expressed strong anti-capitalist sentiments and, of course, the ‘Nazi’ Party
was an abbreviation for the National Socialist German Workers Party.
The most serious objection to these explanations is that they do not take fascist
ideas seriously enough. They may tell us something of the nature of the
regimes but not of the beliefs which shaped them.
Fascist ideas
We must state at the outset that, although it is difficult to present a structured
account of fascist ideology there are a number of fascist values that inter-relate
more or less logically. (Though there were marked differences between Italian
Fascism and German Nazism.) It is to these factors that we now turn. They can
be grouped under the following:
• conflict, struggle and war;
• non-materialism;
• irrationalism and anti-intellectualism;

• nation and race;
• the leader and the elite;
• the state and government;
• fascist economic and social theory.
Conflict, struggle and war

Fascism attached an astonishingly positive value to war. War was regarded as
the ultimate conflict in a world in which struggle was the essence of existence.
Permanent peace was not only nonsense, it was dangerous nonsense, as
humans grow strong in permanent struggle and decadent in an era of peace.
Modifying (or distorting) Charles Darwin’s theories on the struggle for survival
as the motor of the biological evolution of species, fascists claimed that human
societies, like other organisms, were similarly engaged in what Herbert Spencer
described as ‘the survival of the fittest’. In some interpretations this Social
Darwinism was regarded as an endorsement of untrammelled market
economics. Fascists rejected such conclusions. For them the basic unit was, in
the Italian Fascist case, the nation and, for the German Nazis, the race.
Inequality between the peoples of the earth was an unquestioned presumption.
On these premises of inequality and the necessity
genocide
and desirability of conflict, a whole moral system
The extermination of all
was erected in which the victory of the nation or members of an ethnic group,
race was the ultimate ‘good’. In Germany this led usually on the grounds of racial
to racial laws governing marriage, and allowing ‘inferiority’. Usually associated
with the Nazi attempt to rid
systematic racial persecution. Ultimately, the
Europe of Jews, Gypsies and
attempted genocide of Europe’s Jews and Gypsies, other peoples by a process of
and the enslavement of ‘inferior’ races, such as mass murders during the
Russians and Poles, grew out of these ideological Second World War.
assumptions of racial struggle. In attempts to

purify the German nation and return it to its original ‘Aryan’ purity, selective
breeding and adoption programmes were inaugurated. Persons with physical
or mental disabilities were sterilised or even systematically murdered.
Italian Fascism did not go to these extremes, but under German influence
racial laws were introduced in the late 1930s and some collaboration with the
elimination of European Jewry occurred in the latter stages of the war. Other
fascist and semi-fascist regimes in Rumania, Hungary and elsewhere in
Eastern Europe followed suit.
The myth of racial superiority was also used to justify German and Italian
external expansion. In the case of Nazi Germany it was justified by the desire
to acquire Lebensraum (‘living space’) for the German people at the expense of
the ‘racially inferior’ Slavs. Italy sought to create a new Roman empire in Africa,
Fascism 261
Germany sought expansion in Eastern Europe in the late 1930s, while Italy
invaded Ethiopia in 1935. This, with the all-pervasive culture of militarism,
aggression and conflict, was to lead directly to the Second World War.
Fascism was anti-internationalist in regard to national identity, but promoted
a form of internationalism with other fascist movements involved in their own
struggle against liberalism, communism and bourgeois democracy. A kind of
‘fascist international’ was created by Mussolini and Hitler to advance the
movement against its enemies in struggles such as the Spanish Civil War
(1936–39). Fascist movements gained control in several countries prior to the
Second World War, most notably in Hungary, Rumania and Finland. Modern
technology enables contemporary fascist movements to exchange ideas and
tactics via the internet.
Non-materialism
A very important source for fascist values was ‘non-materialism’, the belief
that materialistic values of modern ‘bourgeois’ society – of material comfort,
security and easy living – were utterly destructive of ‘traditional’ society and
‘higher’ civilisation. For fascists, the values of war were far superior to the
values of peace. These values included daring, courage, comradeship,
obedience, patriotism and unswerving loyalty to leaders. Fascist doctrine can
be summed up as a combining of radical nationalism, revolutionary action,
authoritarianism and aggressive violent purposes.
Much of this was derived from the military experience of many fascists during
the First World War, though there were important sources in cultural and
artistic movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Another inspiration was the spiritual qualities of the countryside, nature and
peasant life – the embodiment of ‘true’ national values – as a healthy alter-
native to the harsh economic and social realities of the city.
Irrationalism and anti-intellectualism

One of the difficulties of analysing fascism on an intellectual plane is the fact
that fascists vigorously rejected rational analysis as the basis of a political
philosophy. In this, they rejected the entire intellectual project of the European
Enlightenment of the previous two hundred years. However, fascist beliefs are
not beyond rational examination.
Fascists preferred, in a famous phrase, to ‘think with the blood’. This meant
relying on experience, intuition, emotion and action rather than reflection,
faith rather than reason, trust rather than doubt, aggression rather than
debate. Within this culture, in marked contrast to the liberal tradition, there
was no room for dissent or debate, only conformity. Nor was conformity to be
merely external. Fascism wanted minds and hearts as well. Here, it has been
presciently observed, fascism was closer to a religion than to a conventional,
secular political movement. This similarity was not merely confined to
external trappings, such as official ‘feast days’, rites of passage, ceremonies of
initiation, quasi-religious songs, images, rallies, and styles of art and archi-
tecture. The established churches, especially the Catholic, were uneasily aware
that beneath such symbols was a value and belief system that rivalled their
own. Both Mussolini and Hitler were raised as Catholics, but both rejected
their church and Christianity. Mussolini was atheistic; Hitler sought to create
a new religion based on pagan Germanic values. For both, Christianity was a
threat both because it competed for the belief of the people and, more
seriously, because it preached a doctrine of peace, humanity and fellowship
clearly at odds with the core of fascist doctrines of conquest and struggle.
Nation and race

The central position of race and nation in fascist thought has already been
mentioned. It is important to distinguish between the two. Race is in theory a
biological fact with distinguishing features that are genetically inherited. It is
thus a ‘given’ set of physical characteristics that cannot be changed. It does not
automatically follow that a sense of racial hierarchy should lead to eugenics,
euthanasia or genocide (after all, racism was a key ideological feature of the
British Empire), but racial hatred was a major feature of Nazism and most
modern fascist movements.
Nationality, however, is in principle a legal status. States have procedures by
which one can change one’s nationality. ‘Nation’ can also imply a sense of
identification with, and belonging to, a group of people shaped by a common
culture, history, language and other factors. In both cases national identity is
not a permanent characteristic of a human being. It can be changed, admit-
tedly with difficulty, but changed none the less.
Italian Fascism tended to emphasise the ‘nation’ as the ultimate political
source of all legitimacy and an object of absolute allegiance. German Nazism,
by contrast, emphasised both the Volk and the ‘race’.
The term Volk means more than just ‘people’. It has elements of the special
spiritual and cultural qualities of a nation that should, must, be defended
against all forces that would weaken and undermine its vitality. Each nation,
each Volk, has its own special qualities, but the German Volk carries the seeds
of a higher spiritual and cultural order, a special role in human history.
An elaborate theory of race was made the basis of state policy. According to
this, humanity was sub-divided into different races, which had different and
identifiable characteristics and could be placed in a hierarchical order. The
Fascism 263
highest race was the ‘Aryan’, of which the Germans were the nearest contem-
porary example (though their Aryan purity had been somewhat compromised
by the admission of inferior races into their bloodline). Aryan superiority was
partly physical and intellectual, but also cultural. Aryans alone were capable
of originality and progress. Other races could be placed in a hierarchy, with
negroes, Gypsies and aboriginal peoples at the bottom. Jews were in a special
position as they could mimic Aryan qualities, but were ultimately parasitic and
utterly destructive of the Aryan race. As the First Programme of the Nazi Party
(1920) made clear: ‘None but those of German blood, whatever their creed,
may be members of the nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the
nation.’ Nazi rhetoric often compared Jews to vermin or a dangerous virus.
This belief was used to ‘justify’ the introduction of racial laws in 1933, discrim-
ination and persecution on racial grounds, and, ultimately, the racial extermi-
nation of such enemies as an act of ‘self-defence’ by Aryans.
In practice, Nazi theories on race were perhaps that creed’s most significant
doctrine. Hitler was obsessed with it and German state policy was dominated
by it before and during the Second World War, regardless of the military,
practical and economic consequences. It is important to realise that in Nazi
thinking their racial theories were scientifically established facts. They
devoted much effort to identifying and classifying various racial groups and
sub-groups according to pseudo-scientific criteria.
Italian Fascism was far less racist, acquiring a racist dimension only in 1938
when there was a need to strengthen the alliance with Nazi Germany, and
racism was seen by most Italian Fascists as irrelevant and was not strictly
enforced. Much greater emphasis was placed on the nation, which was
identified both with the existing Italian people and the Italy of the Renaissance
and Imperial Rome.
Emphasis on nation and race made the creation of any form of international
political movements particularly abhorrent to fascists. International fascist
movements were rather difficult to create, but were attempted nevertheless.
However, had fascism triumphed in war against its enemies the tensions
between such extreme nationalist movements would have come to the fore.
Communism and liberalism were obvious candidates for fascist detestation,
but so also was global capitalism, all on grounds of their internationalism. In
Hitler’s case the fact that Jewish identity transcended national boundaries,
and that Jews were prominent in both communism and capitalism, was
another reason to fear and hate them.
The leader and the elite

All versions of fascism despise democracy and communism for their emphasis
on equality. Fascists believe that inequality of individuals, as well as of peoples,
is a plain fact of nature. Political systems should take account of this – hence
their belief in a ruling elite and a powerful and authoritative ruler, the
‘Superman’, who embodied the General Will of the people and would lead the
nation to renewal and glory.
Fascist Italy and, especially, Nazi Germany rejected the former governing
classes, which they blamed for their nation’s misfortunes. In Italy the Fascist
Party would constitute the new elite, comprised of those who had the requisite
moral values. In Nazi Germany, an explicitly racial elite was to emerge in
the form of the SS. Originally a bodyguard for
Hitler, the SS was developed by its leader,
SS (Schutzstaffel)
Heinrich Himmler, into a military and political Originally Hitler’s bodyguard, it
elite, chosen according to criteria of racial purity, evolved under Heinrich Himmler
to form guardians for the new Germany. into a racially elite organisation
which was intended to be the
Even more important than the elite was the ruling caste when Germany
concept of the leader. The leader would relate to achieved victory.
the nation in an almost mystical way, personi-
fying and articulating its aspirations beyond any mere constitutional status,
untrammelled by legal restraint or the ‘unnecessary’ intermediaries of
elections, parliament and the media to hold him to account.
So significant was the role of the leader, in both theory and practice, that
subsequently almost any regime with a dictatorial and charismatic leader has
been liable to be labelled ‘fascist’. Indeed, fascist movements are so identified
with their leaders that they rarely outlast in power the death of their leader.
In Germany this ‘Führer principle’ was applied generally to society with major
concentrations of power being vested in individuals in industry, regional
government, universities and central government ministries.
The state and government

Fascism is an anti-democratic and anti-individualist doctrine. Individuals are
subordinate to the needs of the state and nation. It is believed in fascist theory
and practice that the state should be absolute and totalitarian as the embod-
iment of the nation. This entails using state terror against its opponents, a
single party dictatorship and a monopoly of ideology and communication to
create a perfectly co-ordinated national community and solve society’s ills.
Certainly, in both Germany and Italy the state acquired immense legal and
practical powers, intruding into all areas of life and tolerating no opposition.
However, there were differences between the two countries.
For Mussolini the state was superior to all else, even the nation itself. In fact,
the Italian nation, in Italian Fascist theory (and arguably in historical reality)
was the creation of the state. In Hitler’s scheme of things, the state was
certainly very powerful but was ultimately an instrument of the race, which
Fascism 265
preceded it in importance. The German race was by no means confined to the

geographical area known as ‘Germany’. Many Germans lived outside the
boundaries of the German state of the 1930s. It was, therefore, Hitler’s aim to
bring them within the rule of the Reich.
Both Hitler and Mussolini assumed that the individual had meaning and value
only as part of these larger and superior entities, and that true freedom was
found only in the total submission of the individual to them.
Neither Nazism nor fascism had a well-developed theory of government
beyond the dictatorial powers of the Führer or Duce (respectively the German
and Italian for ‘leader’). Technically, Germany was ruled under emergency
powers granted to Hitler in March 1933 by the constitutional procedures of
the Weimar Republic. Indeed, the Führer’s powers were assumed to transcend
the normal boundaries associated with government. The ultimate law of
Germany thus became the ‘will of the Führer’. In practice, and in spite of its
reputation for ruthless efficiency, historical research on the Third Reich shows
it to have been disorganised, arbitrary and chaotic, riddled with disputes,
ambition and petty jealousies. In fact, Hitler was a ‘lazy dictator’ who often
stood aside from internal Nazi Party conflicts, was indecisive and delegated
much authority to subordinates.
Mussolini’s powers were, in reality, more constrained that Hitler’s. In 1943 his
party’s supreme body, the ‘Fascist Grand Council’, overthrew him. Mussolini
did, however, give some thought to a political structure to rival the discredited
parliamentary system. This resulted in the ‘Corporate State’, an attempt to
reconcile the conflicts of various groups in society (especially labour and
capital) by organising ‘corporations’, largely based on professional or
economic groups (such as doctors or vine growers), and having these repre-
sented in a deliberative body under the firm control of the state. In 1939 it
replaced the Chamber of Deputies. Fascist movements elsewhere in Europe
were impressed by the apparent success of Germany and Italy in conquering
unemployment. How far this was a genuine attempt to create an alternative to
political democracy and how far simply a cloak for Mussolini’s personal power
is debated. However, one must note here that the fascist principle of the
supremacy of the group over the individual was clearly apparent, as groups
rather than individuals were represented.
Fascist economic and social theory

For a movement that owed its popularity in large measure to the economic
stresses of the inter-War period, fascism developed no very organised
economic theory. Such as it was, fascist economic theory inclined towards a
socialist approach, with a suspicion of and hostility to capitalism – notwith-
standing the Marxist understanding of fascism as ‘the ugliest face of
capitalism’. The Italian Fascist Party manifesto of 1919 was emphatically

socialist in context. It called for the confiscation of large landholdings,
extensive public ownership and minimum wages. In part this was tactical, an
attempt to wean the newly enfranchised working class away from interna-
tional socialists. There is, however, more to fascist economic approaches than
political opportunism.
While claiming to represent the interests of both workers and employers in the
national socialist society that was being created, both Nazism and fascism
eventually turned to policies which strengthened the power of employers and
weakened the rights of employees. This was especially true as fascist parties
sought more extensive support among the middle classes after they had
largely failed to create high levels of working-class support. At the same time
the power of the state to represent the whole nation and not simply factions
or groups was strengthened.
Under both Hitler and Mussolini the state played a major role in the economy.
Though Hitler personally had little interest in economics, his finance minister,
Schacht, applied, without acknowledging it, Keynesian methods of state
spending to stimulate the economy. Mussolini tried, with some degree of
seriousness, to create a ‘corporate state’ in which specific industries were
organised under state direction, so as to eliminate any potential conflict
between them and the national interest, or between competing groups,
especially capital and labour. In 1930 a National Council of Corporations was
set up, placing workers in categories and designed to protect their interests.
This was to lead Oswald Mosley, a former British cabinet minister, to abandon
the Labour Party and set up the British Union of Fascists in 1932, with the goal
of establishing a similar structure in Britain.
Fascist economic goals were strictly subordinated to the policy of national self-
assertion. Industrialisation in Italy was encouraged to strengthen the military
base. Within this general approach, the policy of ‘autarchy’, or self-sufficiency,
played an important role. The policy, pursued with only limited success, was
intended to strengthen the nation by reducing its dependence on imports and
external economic forces in general.
Social policy had much the same goal. In Germany, the basic community was
held to be the Volk, which was perceived as transcending all classes or
sectional interests. The word has a racial rather than a political or socio-
logical meaning. The Volk’s cultural, physical and moral health was of crucial
importance. It was here that fascist regimes played a strong part, from
material benefits to entertainment facilities, from youth movements to
subsidised opera. The goal, however, was the well-being not of the individual
but of the nation. Nazi social policy, for example, involved both the banning
of abortion in order to expand the population and euthanasia of the mentally
Fascism 267
and some physically handicapped people in order to improve the genetic

stock of the nation.
Women were to be confined to the private sphere of the home. They were
subordinate to men, their proper role being to provide support for their
menfolk and to produce lots of healthy workers and warriors. In that sphere
they were to be honoured – and patronised – as heroines of the new fascist
society.
Modern European fascism

Fascist movements in Europe were strongest from the 1920s to the early
1940s. They appeared to have been discredited and defeated by 1945. Fascist
governments in Spain and Portugal survived until the 1970s, ending only with
the death of General Franco (1975) in the former and a military coup in the
latter (1974). But fascist movements never entirely went away; they distanced
themselves from the excesses of the past, reformed and repackaged their
programmes, sought respectability and new opportunities and power. Fascism
in Europe today is confined strictly to the political fringe. However, elements
of the above are certainly apparent in many political groupings in modern
Europe and elsewhere.
A case can be made that full-blooded fascism was a temporary aberration in

European history, very much of its time and place (between 1919 and 1945)
and finally annihilated for ever by total defeat in
the Second World War. However, one can Holocaust
envisage that as the memories of 1939–45 recede The systematic murder of Jews
into the mists of time, a new and substantially in Europe by the Nazis during
the Second World War.
modified form of fascism may yet prove a
powerful political force. Primo Levi, an Italian
Jewish writer and Auschwitz survivor, killed himself in 1987 partly because he
observed that fascism was on the march among a new generation, a gener-
ation that did not understand the nature of a fascist regime and who were
highly susceptible to the blandishments of revisionist historians who denied
the Holocaust.
Many of the ingredients of fascism are demonstrable today. The collapse of

communism has left a gaping economic, political and even spiritual hole in
Eastern Europe. Many countries, such as France and Britain, now have
sizeable ethnic minorities with evident possibilities of friction with the
majority community. Dramatic economic, social and cultural change, partly
the product of globalisation, has shattered old certainties, weakened tradi-
tional institutions and left many social groups uneasy and bewildered. Anti-
cosmopolitanism is a major feature of modern fascist parties as it was of their
inter-war predecessors, generating a rejection of the multi-cultural, multi-

racial and multi-religious nature of modern Western societies.
Growing assertion of national awareness, regional identity and the devel-
opment of ‘minor’ nationalisms in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Spain’s
Basque country have accompanied the evolution of the European Union.
Terrorist violence and disturbing echoes of fascist style and atmosphere have
been characteristic features. Virulent nationalism has exploded in former
Yugoslavia and elsewhere with terrible consequences. The flood of migrants
into Western Europe from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe has provided fertile
grounds for fascist-style propaganda. In many countries there seems to be
growing disillusionment with liberal democracy itself as voters demonstrate
low turn-out and opinion polls register deep cynicism about politicians.
The expansion of the European Union to the poorer nations of Eastern Europe
may fuel fascist movements in both Western and Eastern Europe. Economic
restructuring and job losses in inefficient agriculture and industry in the East
will create poverty while stimulating population flows into the West and
competition for jobs.
One interesting, and perhaps alarming, phenomenon has been the emergence
of new movements with a strong emphasis on the nation, authority and disci-
pline. The uniforms, parades and mass rallies have receded and a much
slicker, television-friendly, ‘reasonable’ and ‘unthreatening’ image is presented
to the electorate. Democratic processes are accepted and elections contested.
Leaders wear business suits rather than military-style uniforms. Links with
violent and illegal behaviour are publicly repudiated. Such movements have
had some success. One example is the National Front in France.
The National Front appeals to the working classes and lower middle classes
threatened by globalisation, job losses, insecurity, immigration, big business and
the far left. The 1986 National Assembly elections, using proportional represen-
tation for the first and only time during the Fifth Republic, resulted in the
National Front winning thirty-five seats for its 10 per cent share of the vote. By
the 1997 elections the National Front’s share of the vote rose to 15 per cent but
won only one seat in the National Assembly, a seat from which it was later
disqualified for financial irregularities. In the first round of the presidential
election in April 2002 Jean-Marie Le Pen, the National Front’s charismatic (if
somewhat eccentric) leader, slightly increased his shared of the vote to almost 17
per cent, pushing Lionel Jospin, the Socialist candidate, out of the race
altogether. Le Pen’s subsequent defeat in the final vote (gaining only 18 per cent
share of the vote) did not remove the impression that fascism had become a
major political force in France, giving encouragement to far-right political parties
across Europe. This impression was not entirely removed by the failure of the
National Front to win a single seat in the 2002 elections to the National Assembly.
Fascism 269
The Northern League and the National Alliance in Italy, and also Austria’s
Freedom Party, have received significant electoral support, the latter even
joining Austria’s coalition government in 2000. German extreme-right parties
have tended to be most successful in the former communist parts of Eastern
Germany, at the expense of the Christian Democrats. Finally, the anti-
immigrant Lijst Fortuyn party became the second party in the Dutch
parliament in the May 2002 election, following the assassination of its leader.
In the newer democracies of Eastern Europe, more blatantly fascist movements
have sprung up, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s avowedly anti-Semitic (and
curiously named) Liberal-Democratic Party in Russia. The regimes of Tudjman
in Croatia and Slobodan Milosovich in Serbia during the 1990s displayed many
of fascism’s most appalling features, including ‘ethnic cleansing’.
These developments raise the question whether fascism is in reality under-
going a revival, or whether these movements, at least in Western Europe, are
no more than hard-right conservative parties still fully compatible with the
democratic tradition.
Overall, the prospects for revived fascism still look poor. Democratic
government has been the norm in Western Europe for over half a century.
Political and economic stability, rising living standards, welfare measures and
full employment have dulled the edge of political controversy. Travel,
television and education have produced,
according to some liberals, a more tolerant and apartheid
sophisticated populace. Only a very serious crisis, The system of ‘separate
such as a world economic slump or a long and development’ of the different
unsuccessful war, seems likely radically to disturb races of South Africa which
allocated legal rights and status
this relative domestic political tranquillity, on the basis of race. It lasted
although one might point to the ‘social apartheid’ from the late 1940s until the
existing in some northern English cities between accession to power of Nelson
Mandela in 1994.
white and Asian populations that erupted into
violence in the summer of 2001 as evidence of a
less optimistic situation. In such a grave crisis the far right in Europe would be
forced to reveal whether it is genuinely committed to the democratic process
and liberal institutions or fundamentally rejects them.
Fascism in modern Britain

Prior to the 1930s, fascism in Britain was confined to a handful of tiny groupings
of admirers of Mussolini’s Italy. But with the formation of the British Union of
Fascists (BUF) in 1932, under the leadership of Oswald Mosley, it became a
significant movement. Mosley fitted the role of charismatic leader nicely. He
was strikingly handsome, with an impressive military record. He had been a
Conservative MP and, later, a Labour minister. Mosley was disillusioned over
the failures of parliamentary democracy to tackle the severe unemployment of

the 1920s and 1930s, which he attributed to a failure of free-market economics
and international finance. His solution was a mixture of Keynesian spending by
government on public works, a ‘common market’ composed of the British
Empire, and a corporate state on the Italian model, with economic self-suffi-
ciency as a major goal. Government would be dynamic and vigorously involved
in society and the economy.
While Mosley assumed that the BUF would gain a parliamentary majority by
constitutional and conventional means, once in power it would take extraor-
dinary powers radically to reconstruct the political system on fascist lines.
Initially, Mosley’s movement was not overtly anti-Semitic, but with Hitler’s
successes after 1933 the BUF increasingly imitated the Nazi Party. Mosley’s
movement was seriously discredited (notably at a party rally at Olympia in
1934) by its violence, its attacks on Jews, communists and other opponents,
and its general image of aping alien, un-English ideologies. The outbreak of
war with Germany and Italy, Mosley’s internment and the later revelations of
Nazi bestiality finally demolished it.
After the war and a spell in prison, Mosley tried to revive his political fortunes
by launching the Union Movement, which aimed at a united Europe and the
expulsion of Afro-Caribbean and other immigrants. This achieved very little
and Mosley became wholly marginalised.
Fascism in Britain seemed extinct. At its height it never returned even one
MP (partly, of course, due to the British electoral system, but mainly because
of its unpalatable political views). In 1967, however, the National Front (NF)
was formed. It purveyed a strongly anti-immigrant policy, rather than the
anti-Semitism of the BUF. Itself an amalgam of a complex grouping of tiny
racist parties, the National Front was riven by dissension and splits, and
although it caused something of a stir in the 1970s it failed disastrously in the
1979 general election. Right-wing sentiment favoured the Conservatives
under Margaret Thatcher. The NF lost much support in 1979 and subsequently
splintered into the NF and the British National Party in 1982.
The BNP’s ideology is avowedly neo-Nazi, adapted to the British outlook. In
recent years it has cloaked itself with the mantle of democracy and has
enjoyed some electoral success at local level, as when it won a council seat in
the Isle of Dogs in London in 1993. In reality it wants to dismantle the liberal
British state and replace it with a corporatist one under an authoritarian
leader. Other far-right groups indulged in some low-level terrorist activity
directed against non-white Britons, leftists and gays. Groups like Combat 18
and the League of St. George have been associated with football violence and
‘white’ rock music and have formed links with continental far-right groups and
Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.
Fascism 271
In 1997 the BNP put up fifty-six candidates and in ten constituencies won over
one thousand votes. While it never came near winning a seat it acquired the
right to a television election broadcast, received much-needed publicity in a
media that largely ignores the politically extreme BNP, and won some new
members to its cause.
By 2001 there were disturbing signs of a far-right revival in Britain. In the
general election the BNP took 16 per cent of the vote in Oldham. This was
followed by violent disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, in part
stimulated by the activities of the BNP and other far-right organisations.
Liberal opinion was bewildered, alarmed and uncomprehending. While it is
too early to assess these developments fully, some factors appear salient, and
were identified as such in a series of reports on the riots published in
December 2001. The economic stagnation of much of urban England,
especially in the former textile towns of northern England, was identified as a
major cause of racial and other social problems. In the 2002 local government
elections the BNP won three council seats in Burnley, a small but significant
number of the seats they contested. These BNP results can either be seen as a
crushing defeat, as their opponents averred, or, as they themselves claimed, a
significant electoral breakthrough in the face of universal hostility from the
liberal media.
There has been a failure of the white working class and the deeply traditional
Muslim Asian community to integrate with or even understand each other.
Both white and Asian youths are alienated from society in general and
(especially among Asian Muslims) their elders in particular. There is in
addition general economic, social and cultural deprivation and a widely held
perception by poor whites that ‘the immigrants get everything’ from the local
authorities.
More generally, the BNP has also been able to capitalise on popular dislike of
the European Union and the Euro, on a general impression of crime and moral
decay, and on fears of an uncontrolled flood of ‘bogus’ asylum seekers.
Moreover, many traditional, white, working-class Labour voters plainly
believe New Labour is no longer their party and has become middle-class,
liberal and overly concerned with the rights of minorities more than with the
interests of the working class and the poor.
In these circumstances the far right has been able to peddle easy solutions to
complex problems. It is too early to decide whether the rise of the far right is
a temporary aberration or a significant development. Past experience suggests
that they are unlikely to gain 20 per cent of the vote in any constituency and
the electoral system effectively disbars them from parliament. Only a massive
economic or political crisis is likely to change this. None the less, the far right
have a considerable capacity to provoke conflict and disturbance.
As has been noted, categorising states, regimes or movements as ‘fascist’ is not

always easy. It has proved convenient for the left to label a wide range of
unpalatable views and regimes as ‘fascist’. Many modern historians have been
anxious to stress the differences between various ‘fascist’ regimes, rather than
their similarities, but some salient characteristics are recognisable.
Fascist values are rejected as morally alien to the Judeo-Christian and Enlight-
enment-liberal tradition. Fascists themselves would not find this a problem, as
they are opposed to these traditions as a key element of their philosophy (for
want of a better word). Claims that fascism ‘had its good points’, such as
tackling crime, creating political stability and ending unemployment, should
be dismissed as ephemeral, superficial and far out-weighed by its enormous
crimes against humanity. Fascism was and is not a coherent ideology.
All fascist movements may be said to have all or most of these characteristics:
racism, opposition to democracy, to liberalism and to equality, aggressive
assertion of the nation-state, dictatorial government under a strong leader and
an emphasis on military or quasi-military values. These values involve
obedience, loyalty, order, hierarchy and a cult of violence, physical strength
and all the paraphernalia of flags, drums, marching, ceremonies, uniforms,
emotionally roused crowds and general political theatricality.
It is easy to get carried away by the threat fascism poses to modern democ-
racies. The possibility of a fascist party coming to power in Britain or any other
democracy today is so remote as to be hardly worth worrying about. Democ-
ratic culture in the EU is very strong and deep. However, the fascist right does
threaten the rights of ethnic, racial and religious minorities and other groups
to live their lives free from abuse and from the threat of violence or of
vandalism to their homes and businesses. Complacency is hardly possible in a
continent that produced so much racism, xenophobia and violence during its
long and turbulent history – a continent from which fascism sprang as one of
its less admirable accomplishments.
Summary
Fascism is particularly resistant to rational enquiry, partly because fascists
themselves scorn the intellect and partly because it has become a portmanteau
term of political abuse. However, even if fascist ideas are difficult to present in
structured form, fascist values can be fairly easily identified. These include a
positive view of conflict, struggle and war; a stress on non-material values,
irrationalism and anti-intellectualism; and a glorification of the nation or race.
Obedience to the leader and state are ultimate values, and society and
mankind in general are seen very much in hierarchical terms. Fascist economic
theory is subordinate to the foregoing. The European experience of fascism of
Fascism 273
course culminated in a disastrous war and terrible atrocities, and some have
argued that fascism ended in 1945. However, many of the factors that engen-
dered fascism, such as racism, alienation and moral confusion, are around
today, so reports of its demise were perhaps greatly exaggerated.
FURTHER READING
Eatwell, R. ‘Fascism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.), Contemporary

Political Ideologies (Pinter, 1993), pp. 169–91.
Eatwell, R. Fascism: A History (Vintage, 1996).
Griffin, R. The Nature of Fascism (Routledge, 1993).
Griffin, R. (ed.) Oxford Readers: Fascism (Oxford University Press,
1995).
Harris, G. The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today (Edinburgh University
Press, 1990).
Harris, G. ‘The Extreme Right in contemporary Europe’, Politics Review, 8:3 (1999),
pp. 8–10.
Hayes, P. Fascism (Allen and Unwin, 1973).
Heywood, A. ‘Fascism’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideas: An Introduction (Macmillan,
1998), pp. 212–37.
Leach, R. British Political Ideologies (Prentice Hall, 1996).
Merkl, P. H. and Weinberg, L. (eds.) The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties
(Frank Cass, 1997).
Spiller, J. ‘A Future for British Fascism?’ Politics Review, 9:2 (1999), pp. 10–12.
Thurlow, R. Fascism in Britain (Blackwell, 1987).
Vincent, A. ‘Fascism’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1996),
pp. 141–71.
Wilford, R. ‘Fascism’, in R. Eccleshall et al., Political Ideas: An Introduction (Routledge,
1996), pp. 185–217.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 Is fascism anything more than an ‘emotional spasm’?
2 How crucial to fascism is racism?
3 Has the tragic experience of Europe with fascism disqualified it

from serious intellectual consideration?
4 ‘Fascism was an aberration, a product of particular circumstances;

it has no future in the twenty-first century.’ Do you agree?
5 Does fascism offer serious solutions to the problems of industrial society?
6 Are all fascist movements innately totalitarian?

Environmentalism and
ecologism 14
Environmentalism and ecologism constitute one of the most recent ideological

movements. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, it is more useful
to regard ecologism as a philosophy that believes in a thorough-going root and
branch transformation of society, whereas environmentalism believes that
dangers to the environment can be tackled within the existing political, economic
and cultural order. We examine here the genesis of the movement in the
explosion of concern at the apparent threat to the planet in the 1960s, and its
subsequent evolution as an ideological force and political movement. The various
elements, spiritual and scientific, which have influenced the ‘green’ movement
are presented and subjected to critical analysis. Finally, we consider whether the
movement is little more than a current fad, or whether we are all ‘green’ now.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Can the origins of the ecological movement be realistically traced back to the
eighteenth or nineteenth century?
➤ How far is ecologism a political ideology and how far a quasi-religious faith?
➤ How far is the green view of man’s place in nature a valid one?
➤ Are the greens correct to adopt such negative views of industrialism?
➤ How far is green ideology intellectually coherent and based on empirical evidence?
➤ Are green politics practical politics?

Environmentalism and ecologism 275
After ten thousand years of settled societies, and only two hundred years of
substantial industrialisation, human activities and the pollution they generate
threaten irreversible changes on an unprecedented scale to the world’s climate.
(Clive Ponting, A Green History of the World, 1991)
When viewing some of the dumpier parts of the earth, it is hard to imagine that
there might be arguments in favour of pollution. And yet there are. By any standard
of measurement the majority of people on earth are now richer, healthier, and
longer-lived than they have ever been . . . These improvements in the human
condition came with the industrial revolution, which created most of our pollution.
. . . The countries that are most industrialised and hence, one would think, most
polluted have the best morbidity, mortality and income statistics. National well-
being might also be said to be a by-product of pollution. (P. J. O’Rourke, All the
Trouble in the World, 1994)
What would the world be, once bereft

Of wet and of wildness? Let them be left,
O let them be left, wildness and wet;
Long live the weeds and the wildness yet.
(Gerard Manley Hopkins, Inversnaid, 1881)
Environmentalism and ecologism are two strains of what has come to be labelled
the ‘green movement’ or the ‘greens’ (with or without a capital ‘G’). Though the
terms ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ were once used interchangeably, most
people would now discern a distinction between them. Environmentalists
believe that green issues, however important they are, can be addressed within
the existing political and economic structures. To succeed, this would require
wise government, appropriate legislation and the voluntary adoption of
environmentally sound practices by consumers. Ecologists deny that this is
possible. The environmental crisis is so great, they believe, that only a thorough-
going reorganisation of the political, social and economic system would achieve
a solution. This would necessitate a massive change in human values.
The green movement, like all ideological and political movements, is driven by
people with a complex mix of ideas, often in conflict and usually involved in
controversy with their fellow greens and with their ideological opponents.
This is to be expected of a movement that is so new and is still working out its
fundamental beliefs and a political strategy to garner support and win
influence and power in the conventional political world. It is not an easy task
for a movement that challenges many of the fundamental assumptions of the
modern industrialised world.
For most of this chapter we will concentrate on the more ideologically distinct
views of ecologism, but the ways in which other movements have been influ-
enced by environmentalism will also be discussed. For convenience we shall
use the term ‘green’ when referring to any position with an ecological slant to
it, and ‘Green’ when referring to a political party.
The rise of environmentalism and ecologism

The term ‘environmentalism’ defines concern for the natural world and its
protection from excessive human depredation. It constitutes no clear political or
ideological agenda. The term is derived from the Ancient Greek words oikos
(‘household’, ‘habitat’) and logos (‘science’, ‘argument’). Precursors of ecologism
can be found in the writings of Greek and Roman poets and their love of the
bucolic life on their country estates (although they might be more properly
viewed as, at most, ‘environmentalist’ in their view of nature). Medieval and
Renaissance poets and artists celebrated the natural world and its spiritual
values. But it was during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that there
arose a strong reaction to the world view derived from Judeo-Christian religious
and moral values, the mechanistic ideas of Cartesian philosophy and Newtonian
physics, and, most of all, the industrial revolution.
Rousseau’s writings were highly critical of the Romanticism
‘corrupting’ nature of ‘civilisation’ and contrasted A style of arts and thought of
the modern world unfavourably with the peaceful, the late eighteenth century
agrarian world of the American ‘noble savage’. concerned with expressing
feeling and emotion. It involved
Nineteenth-century Romanticism and a love of a revolution in thinking about
wild places as displayed in the poems of William the basic values of art, morals,
politics and religion. It sought to
Wordsworth and the Lakeland poets were also create a world view infinitely
part of the reaction to industrialism. The larger and more varied than the
twentieth century saw the growth of the one it set out to supplant.
‘countryside’ as a place of recreation and leisure
pursuits, a place for the urbanised to live out
Arcadia
Arcadian fantasies (especially if they earned their
A word used to describe an
living in the towns). Perhaps most significant are idealised landscape of rural
such critics of industrialisation as William Morris simplicity. Arcadia is something
and Leo Tolstoy, both of whom exposed industri- of a fantasy-land of happy,
contented peasants enjoying
alisation as taking the human value, satisfaction
the fruits of their labour,
and skill out of work, as well as destroying what conjured up by those who have
was beautiful in the natural world. Nor are the never had to earn a living from
origins of ecologism always to be found among the land.
the libertarian left – rather embarrassingly for

modern greens. The Nazis, for example, were influenced by some green
concerns, such as alternative energy sources and soil conservation.
The experience of most people in the industrial cities of the nineteenth century
was one of breaking human ties with nature and the natural world. Britain has
the oldest industrial-urban population in the world. Most Britons are now five
generations from the land and from working the natural environment. Indeed,
for most of the last century the British rural environment has itself been subject
to the processes of industrialised agriculture to meet the demand for food
and raw materials.
While environmentalism is manifestly of long biosphere

standing, the modern ecological movement can The area of the earth in which
be dated from the 1960s and 1970s when a life in its many and varied forms
number of books, studies and reports appeared exists; the film of life that
covers the surface of the earth
which argued that humanity, even the living
both on land and in the seas.
world – the biosphere – was under unique threat Environmentalists argue that
from a combination of over-population, intensive the biosphere is threatened by
agricultural methods and chemical pollution. The modern industrial and farming
activities.
greatest single threat was the profligacy of the
industrial process itself, a process based on false
assumptions. Economic resources (most notably fossil fuels) were not infinite.
The external costs of economic development, such as the destruction of the
rain forests, the poisoning of the oceans and the rapid extinction of many
living species, could not be simply dismissed.
Other anxieties were to follow as the century drew to a close. These included
the harmful consequences of the erosion of the ozone layer, global warming,
the proliferation of nuclear power generation (and with it nuclear weapons),
and the impact of motor vehicles and road building on the environment,
human health and wildlife. Spectacular environmental disasters, such as the
Seveso dioxin chemical plant disaster in Italy (1976), the Bhopal chemical
plant explosion in India (1984) and the Chernobyl nuclear power explosion in
the USSR (1986), intensified environmental worries.
The crucial point is that these portents of deep gloom were based on an
allegedly scientific analysis of the situation, which gave them an apparently
solid intellectual basis and greatly enhanced their persuasiveness. Rachel
Carson, in Silent Spring (1962), exposed the damaging impact of pesticides
on the human food chain. Paul Ehrlich, in The Population Bomb (1968),
raised concerns about rapid population growth and its impact on the
environment. Scientific reports, such as the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth
(1972), Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos’s Only One Earth (1972), and United
Nations conferences highlighted the environmental threats. A drumbeat of
articles, books and television programmes throughout the 1980s and 1990s
produced growing evidence of ozone damage, rising rates of species
extinction, resource depletion, and the dangers to the biosphere of new forms
of pollution.
The emergence of these concerns coincided neatly with a wide range of
spiritual and cultural developments that gave a powerful ethical, almost
religious, dimension to the issue. These ranged from criticisms of the
dehumanising effects of society and large-scale industrial enterprises, such as
Fritz Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (1973),
to alternative ‘New Age’ religiosity, and a widespread scepticism, especially
among the young, towards the value system of capitalist society.
These scientific and spiritual dimensions influenced the creation of a political

response, which constituted the development of an ideology and the belief
that something radical could and should be done about the headlong rush to
destruction. This belief emerged from the political upheavals from the 1960s
onwards. Political parties with a commitment to an ecologist ideology
appeared in the 1980s, and became known as – and even officially called
themselves – ‘greens’. In the 1990s the collapse of communism, and the
apparent intellectual and practical bankruptcy of socialism, have subsequently
bolstered the political dimension of the ecological movement. If you still want
to be radical, there is nowhere else to go.
The importance of the formation of green political parties lay in their underlying
belief that it was necessary and possible to preserve the world. This involved
political action. Support for green issues has steadily grown over the last four
decades, although it ebbs and flows with the expansion or contraction of the
economy. Usually, concern rises with economic growth and full employment and
declines when the economy moves into recession and jobs are at risk.
Green is different
At this juncture it is perhaps useful to point out that ecologism is different from
other ideologies in several ways, besides its comparative youth. First, though,
a caveat. In practice there is often a marked gap between the policies of parties
which profess a particular ideology and the principles of the ideology itself.
Differences arise from the exigencies of functioning as a political party in a
given constitutional, social and cultural context, such as the simple need to
win as many votes as possible. As we shall see later, that certainly applies to
Green parties in Britain and continental Europe. Moreover, greens themselves
tend to confuse issues by implying that they are somehow beyond ideology:
for instance, ‘neither right nor left but forward’ is the slogan of the German
Green Party. This is true in the sense that, unlike other ideologies, ecologism
puts the animate and inanimate world centre stage, rather than regarding it
simply as a resource for human exploitation. Indeed, some thinkers have
attempted to construct complete ethical systems in which humankind is not
the central concern. Instead, ‘Life’ itself is.
One can pursue this theme further. Green political allegiance tends to impose
certain lifestyle obligations, ranging from utilising bottle banks for recycling
to vegetarianism. Ecologism can thus resemble a religious, rather than political
creed. There is nothing new in that. All political movements have strong
elements of faith and ‘pseudo-religious’ beliefs in them.
Both the British and the German Green parties have been racked by conflict
between ‘dark’ (or ‘deep’) ‘greens’, who favour the most radical approach, and
‘light’ (or ‘shallow’) ‘greens’ who are much more moderate, pragmatic and,
above all, prepared to operate within the existing systems. Dark greens believe
that humans should interfere in nature as little as possible, that all species –
and not just humans – have moral value (and, potentially, moral values). Most
dark greens would encourage direct action against polluters and environ-
mental destroyers, and support a move away from the consumerist, industri-
alist values of modern society. Light greens think that change must come from
within the present system, through regulations, tax changes and slower, more
sensitive economic growth.
Underlying these differences is a question of fundamental importance: for
whom or what is the environment being preserved? The obvious answer is ‘for
humankind’; we cannot live on ‘spaceship earth’ without taking into account
the well-being of all non-human passengers. The dark green answer, however,
is ‘not for the benefit of humans, but for the benefit of all creatures’. If one
takes this stance man is dethroned from his position at the centre of all things
and drastically new ethical structures must be generated.
Green themes
We will now explore a number of themes that are fundamental to the
ecological perspective:
• human nature and nature;
• green views on politics;
• green economics.
Human nature and nature

Like all ideologies, ecologism incorporates a view of human nature. Unusually,
though, human nature is firmly situated in the context of nature in general.
Other ideologies, notably liberalism, tend to present the natural world as
simply a backdrop for human activities or, as in Marxism, a resource to be
exploited for the fulfilment of human aspirations, aspirations assumed to be
unlimited. For ecologists, human beings are merely part of a much wider
natural order. This order is characterised by interdependence: the well-being
of one living species depending on that of others and, in turn, contributing to
the well-being of the whole biosphere.
‘Spaceship earth’
It is imperative that humans individually and as societies live in harmony with
the rest of creation and according to principles implicit in the natural order. An
analogy is sometimes made with a ‘spaceship’ – ‘spaceship earth’ – a beautiful
but fragile craft and, crucially, all we have got. This fact, plus the inherent
limitations on resources in the closed system of the ‘spaceship’, implies definite

limits to human activity, especially limits to material consumption. Moreover,
the spaceship and the natural world are useful models for human societies,
being based on co-operation, diversity, equality of value, balance and self-
regulatory stability. Neither the spaceship nor the natural world would survive
without these values.
Alone in space, alone in its life-supporting systems, powered by inconceivable
energies, mediating them to us through the most delicate adjustments, wayward,
unlikely, unpredictable, but nourishing, enlivening, and enriching in the largest
degree – is this not a precious home for all of us earthlings?1
Population control
If spaceship earth is to survive, there must be a reduction in the number of
passengers it is expected to carry. Greatly influenced by the ideas of Thomas
Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), an economist who
realised that human population growth would inevitably outstrip food supply
and create disaster, ecologists have argued for population control and
reduction. The twentieth century experienced massive population growth,
reaching over 6 billion by its end. By the middle of the twenty-first century
world population may stabilise at 8 to 10 billion. Greens fear there are already
too many people and that present levels of material wealth (and pollution)
cannot be sustained, let alone universal aspirations to (Western) affluence.
Excess population has detrimental consequences for bio-diversity, food
supplies, environmental preservation, quality of life and the ability of the eco-
system to sustain life – certainly advanced life. Policies should be designed to
encourage smaller families, to reduce world population over the long term to
perhaps one billion, the estimated population of the world in 1800.
Such theories are in conflict with many religious and cultural beliefs. Greens
apparently have an up-hill struggle in persuading poor folk to reduce their
family size when the logic of their societies is that children are assets to help
bring in an income and sustain one in old age. Some greens have cheered
China’s ‘one child’ policy and even the compulsory sterilisation that occurred
in India under a state of emergency during the 1970s, and have advocated
even more authoritarian measures. Other greens, alongside politicians in the
developing world, point out that one Westerner uses – and wastes – far more
of the earth’s resources than many dozens of the poorest people. Some discern
racist tinges in concern over population growth in Africa and Asia.
Science, mysticism and nature

In part, green beliefs are based on a scientific analysis of the natural world, an
analysis that is generally accepted within the scientific community and lends
ecologism much of its legitimacy. However, science is often identified by

greens as contributing to the problem by creating the technologies that have
driven industrialisation and consumerism. Environmentalists believe that
science and technology are major elements in the solution to environmental
problems. Many ecologists, however, reject science and believe that only
major changes in the religious and moral bases of mankind can restore the
world and bring humans into a new balance with nature.
Ecologists’ mystical appreciation of the natural world is derived from a number
of sources, including Eastern religions. The ‘oneness’ of the human and natural
world (especially in Buddhism); the alleged beliefs and natural lifestyles of
‘primitive’ peoples; and a (largely imaginary) understanding of pre-civilised
and pre-Christian societies of the West are enlisted in the green cause.
The quasi-religious understanding of the Gaia hypothesis and the supposed
speech of a nineteenth-century American, Chief Seattle, provide an illus-
tration of this strand of green thinking.
The conjunction of scientific theory with a quasi-religious perception of the
biosphere is most clearly seen in the ‘Gaia hypothesis’ of James Lovelock, in
Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (1979) and The Ages of Gaia: A Biography of
Our Living Earth (1989). Put simply, Lovelock argued that the earth was kept
habitable for living things by the interaction of innumerable biological
systems. Life itself made life possible by a built-in, self-correcting mechanism
which automatically took account of changes in the environment and made
appropriate adjustments. Thus, although the temperature of the earth has
varied considerably over time, the atmosphere has been kept breathable by
compensating processes among living creatures.
This apparently objective, scientific description, which has been widely
accepted, was translated into a powerful ideological underpinning of green
politics by the cultural resonances created by the fact that ‘Gaia’ was a Greek
goddess, ‘Mother Earth’. The Gaia thesis was interpreted by some as implying
that all life on earth constituted a sort of single living organism, possibly
endowed with consciousness and will. It also claimed that the present
economic, political and social system was wrecking the subtle interactions that
preserved life on planet earth, with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Although actually a forgery, Chief Seattle’s speech neatly summarises the
ecologists’ attitude to the modern world, on which has been conferred the
imprimatur of Rousseau’s ‘noble savage’:
If we do not own the freshness of the air and the sparkle of the water, how can you
buy them?
We are part of the Earth, and it is part of us. The rocky crests, the juices of the
meadows, the body heat of the pony, and man – all belong to the same family.
The shining water that moves in the streams is not just water, but the blood of
our ancestors. If we sell you land, you must teach your children that it is sacred –
that each ghostly reflection in the clear water of the lakes tells of memories in the
lives of my people. The water’s murmur is the voice of my father’s father.2
Such a perception is, of course, in marked contrast to the idea of the natural
world and man’s relationship to it, as presented in the Judeo-Christian
tradition in Genesis. Here God’s creation is inherently good but it is emphati-
cally placed under the authority of Man. Indeed, man dominates the rest of
creation:
. . . God said unto man, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the Earth and
subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air
and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth.3
In contrast to humankind’s ‘domination’, modern Christian thinking has

redefined man’s role as ‘steward’ over nature, with authority counter-balanced
by responsibility for its proper use. Nature is the creation of God and should
be treated with respect as His handiwork.
The Christian perception jars with the scientific view of the universe which
emerged in the seventeenth century, and which subsequently underpinned the
‘Enlightenment’ of the eighteenth century. Here the assumption was that the
universe could be rationally understood and manipulated to human advantage
by breaking it down into its component parts, rather like a machine, to ‘see how
it worked’. The ecological perspective emphasises a holistic understanding in
which the whole is not simply the sum of its parts but transcends them in a
developing system, of which mankind is but a part.
It is evident, then, that there is a tension within ecologism, between its ‘scien-
tific’ and its ‘mystical’ bases, which has never been wholly resolved.
Critics have denounced as improper the greens’ inclination to extract eternal
moral principles from scientific studies. For example, although humans are said
to be simply part of nature, even the most rigorous advocates of this position
imply that humans are somehow outside the system as well. Humans have,
uniquely, a moral responsibility to proceed in particular ways, but the question
arises why shouldn’t humans simply exploit the environment like any other
animal? If human actions destroy a species, so what? Millions of species have
been eliminated throughout the history of the planet, which would get along
well enough without humans, as it did for aeons before humans evolved. Nor
is it evident that there is a moral imperative to preserve life on earth; it might
be prudent to do so for humankind’s survival, but that is not the same thing.
Green views on politics

It is not easy to fit green political views into the conventional left–right
spectrum, nor is it evident that green ideology can be subsumed under the
general headings of liberal, conservative and socialist. Greens tend to be rather

proud of this exclusivity, though in fact most subscribe to the liberal-democratic
ideal of much of the Western world. (Eastern religions and primitive tribes
seem to be little esteemed as useful models in this regard.) The other major
political movements and ideologies all, in the view of greens, tend to assume
industrialisation and the consumer society to be a ‘good’ thing. All believe
politics to be heavily involved in the creation of conditions for economic
growth, at whatever cost to the planet and its other inhabitants. Traditional
ideologies remain overwhelmingly ‘human-centric’, or anthropocentric, in their
beliefs and policies, a bias that green politics sets out to change.
However, this position is not obviously derived from green theories of nature.
Indeed, one could argue that conservative thought, with its emphasis on links
across the generations, its cautious approach to technological quick-fixes, its
precautionary attitude to change, and the value it accords to the agricultural
sector, natural harmony and awe in the face of the universe, is closely related
to ecologism. More alarmingly, it might be argued that the full implementation
of a green agenda would be possible only under a highly authoritarian
political system. So far, greens have had only
modest success in persuading the masses that eugenics
they should voluntarily reduce their standard of The ‘science’ of selective
living. Besides, proposals for reducing population breeding by promoting the
size evoke disturbing comparisons with forced reproduction of ‘desirable
humans’ and preventing the
sterilisation in India, the ‘one child’ policy in creation of the ‘less desirable’.
China and even eugenics and ‘ethnic cleansing’. Eugenics was widely supported
by people of all political
There is some sense in which ‘democracy’ as an persuasions, left and right,
ideal can be generated from basic green principles. prior to the Second World War
All living beings can be regarded as ‘stakeholders’ and Nazi eugenics which
discredited its precepts.
in the health of the planet. For many greens, this
has important implications for the treatment of
animals. Greens also champion a very inclusive concept of democracy which
includes generations yet unborn who are also ‘stakeholders’ in the well-being of
the planet. Furthermore, nature itself appears to show the value of harmony in
diversity – a model therefore for tolerance and a pluralistic society.
Critics have pointed out that ‘nature’ is a very ambiguous guide for the recon-
struction of human society. Nature contains many models, some resembling
the most mechanical of totalitarianisms, others a ‘Hobbesian’ ‘war of all
against all’. Natural selection, for example, is, as Charles Darwin discovered,
a major engine of biological evolution. However, Social Darwinism, an
attempt to apply evolutionary ideas to human society, was an important
underpinning of racism, fascism, eugenics and mass extermination of assorted
people defined as ‘sub-human’ – hardly a model of natural balance, let alone
a basis for human morality.
As a new ideology, ecologism is still vague about how to move from this
wasteful society to a green one. In that sense it is like nineteenth-century
Marxism or late eighteenth-century liberalism in presenting a strong critical
analysis of society but a weak theory of transformation to another society. This
is certainly an area that has to be addressed by green politicians if they wish
to make headway in electoral politics.
Green economics
The starting point of green economics is a critique of the all-pervasive system
of ‘industrialisation’, which constitutes a sort of ‘super-ideology’, of greater
significance than whether society is organised on free-market capitalist or
state socialist principles.
Industrialism
This applies to more than the factory system, more than capitalism, even more
than what would be regarded as ‘conventional’ economics. The main features
have been succinctly itemised by Ian Adams:
• a devotion to economic growth and industrial expansion and continuous
technical innovation;
• a belief in the overriding importance of satisfying people’s material needs;
• large-scale centralised bureaucratic control;
• scientific rationality being the only kind of reasoning that matters;
• large scale units – in industry, administration, etc – are most efficient;
• a predominance of patriarchy and an emphasis on ‘masculine’ values of compe-
tition, aggression and assertiveness;
• an anthropocentric view that sees the earth and all that lives on it as simply there
to be exploited for any human purpose;
• a hierarchical social structure where power and wealth is concentrated at the top;
• economic considerations predominate in society and moral, social and artistic
values are of lesser importance.4
From the green perspective, a society built around the above value system is
utterly pernicious. It not only debases human beliefs, it also squanders
irreplaceable physical and biological resources and degrades the environment,
ultimately to the point of ecological collapse. Nor does such a system provide
for genuine human needs: material and spiritual poverty are everywhere
apparent, even in the so-called ‘developed’ world.
Though this system is powerfully entrenched it is based on several demon-
strable fallacies. First it assumes, against all reason, that the resources of the
earth are infinite, as is its capacity to absorb the detritus of rampant
consumerism. Furthermore, against all evidence, the general method of
measuring well-being, especially in terms of Gross National Product (GNP), is
utterly inadequate and misleading, mostly for what it leaves out of the
reckoning. GNP does not measure ‘externalities’, for example, such as the costs
to the community of atmospheric pollution, noise, accidents, stress, and so on

caused by the constant increase in motor transport. Nor does it measure the
distribution of ‘wealth’ so produced. Even more seriously, the future viability
of the economic developments it purports to measure is ignored. Whole
swathes of the ‘real’ economy, such as goods and services provided by informal
family and community systems (of crucial significance in any society, but
especially in the Third World) are dismissed as insignificant because they are
not measurable in monetary terms.
Anti-materialism
The modern economic system has created vast material wealth, but has done
little to increase the sum of human happiness over the last few decades.
Material comfort in itself cannot significantly improve the quality of life once
most basic material needs have been met (as they have been in the West).
Environmentalism, along with justice and equality, is an issue that becomes
more important in what many greens call ‘post-materialist societies’ where
quality of life rather than the quantity of material goods becomes increasingly
meaningful.
The problem is that most people on earth are poor. They struggle to get the
basics of life, let alone comfort. Economic development has progressively
dislocated their contact with the natural world but has not established new
foundations of social harmony. Greens believe these problems can be solved
by the better distribution of existing wealth rather than by greater production.
Many in the developing world regard this view as essentially a Western indul-
gence, even a new form of Western imperialism – ‘ecological imperialism’ – to
keep them subservient.
There are growing numbers of ecologists who realise that there must be close
links between environmental programmes and developmental programmes if
humans and nature are to have the natural ecological balance restored.
Growth
Above all, the industrialised system is based on the principle of ‘growth’. Greens
argue that this growth can and should be halted, or at the very least, dramati-
cally reduced. This would involve a range of radical measures, among them a
redefinition of the concept of ‘work’. The term ‘work’ should no longer be
confined to paid employment, but should include just about any activity with a
beneficial (according to green criteria) outcome. Growing one’s own vegetables,
helping elderly neighbours, playing the guitar or teaching one’s own children
at home could all be included. One of the practical consequences is the notion
of a guaranteed basic income, in which all citizens would receive as of right a
minimum income whether they ‘worked’ in the conventional sense or not.
For greens, economic activity should satisfy need, rather than greed.
Moreover, it should be so organised as to provide for the social and emotional
needs of producers and consumers. To achieve this, greens favour small-scale
and co-operative enterprises.
Sustainability
The application of green criteria to the economy in general would also focus
on reducing the consumption of energy and non-renewable resources with the
goal of establishing a sustainable system. Greens declare interest in such
energy sources as solar, wind, wave and geo-thermal power, rather than non-
renewable fossil fuels like coal or oil, or potentially highly dangerous and
costly nuclear power. Greens are also inclined to favour, as part of this
‘sustainable’ system, reducing trade (so often rigged against the interests of
the poor) and encouraging localised production (so as to reduce the drastic
environmental costs of transport). New social and political values built around
the reduction of pollution and consumption and a more just distribution of
wealth within and between societies will be required.
Attractive though this might sound, ‘sustainability’ is nowhere very clearly
defined. Does it mean modest and strictly directed growth, no growth at all,
or a reduction in growth?
In fact, green economics poses a number of serious problems, which will be
examined further under a critique of the ecologist position.
Critique of the ecologist position

At first sight ecologism is a persuasive blend of incontrovertible scientific
evidence, ethical purity, spiritual insight and humane sensibility. It has an
immediate appeal to many, especially the young. Moreover, a green political
position implies an almost religious commitment to a lifestyle consonant with
its principles. Furthermore, although Green political parties, with an agenda
avowedly based on these principles, seem to make as many compromises with
mundane reality as any other ideological movement, green thinking has perco-
lated into all the mainstream parties and movements.
Nonetheless, the green position is open to challenge in several key areas.
These are:
• Intellectual incoherence;
• scientific implausibility;
• practical difficulties.
Intellectual incoherence
Critics have not been slow to point to some fundamental weaknesses. An
obvious difficulty is the green argument that because nature exhibits certain
features of inter-species co-operation which maintains the biosphere indefi-
nitely, human beings should act in harmony with this fact. This is strikingly
evident in the way greens tend to interpret Lovelock’s Gaia theory. Philoso-
phers, however, sternly reject the notion that one can make such an ethical
link, a logical leap from what is to what ought to be.
Greens are not always consistent about how they understand man’s position vis-
à-vis the rest of nature. Sometimes it is implied that mankind is simply a part of
nature, with no claims to superiority or special treatment, in which case
mankind has no more obligations to nature than a slug has to a cabbage leaf.
Sometimes, though, they rather shamefacedly admit humans have unique
awareness and moral responsibility – mankind is in nature, but not wholly of it.
This confusion is related to another question. Are greens bio-centric or anthro-
pocentric? In other words, is the environment to be preserved for its own sake
and its own values, or simply because it suits humanity and human values? For
example, it is often argued that the enormous diversity of species in the rain
forests should be nurtured because of their possible medicinal value, or that
wilderness should be preserved for aesthetic reasons. Deep or dark greens
often specifically reject such human-centred values. To them, nature has its
own values independent of human concerns.
Again, a number of highly contentious issues lurk along the borderlands of the
green world view. Many greens espouse the cause of animal rights, in itself
contentious, because such ethical positions appear to be in harmony with the
broader green outlook, which might suggest that mosquitoes and flu viruses
have as much right to live as humans. But the full interpretation of animal
rights could be electorally unpopular; and, even though animal species are in
ferocious competition for resources, the concession of full citizenship rights to
disease and vermin would amount to mass human suicide. Some fringe groups
advocate just that. Critics have been quick to point out an eccentric, even
downright crank, element in some green organisations that, for all their claims
of scientific probity, give houseroom to ‘alternative’ medicine, ‘pagan’
mysticism and general irrationalism.
This brings us to a central conflict within the green outlook, which is its
attitude to reason and rationality. Although greens claim to uphold a uniquely
science-based ideology, they harbour a deep and abiding suspicion of the
scientific tradition and its rational and mechanistic understanding of the
universe as a universe that can be analysed and understood rather than mysti-
cally apprehended.
Hard-nosed critics argue that myth, rather than science, dominates the whole
green outlook, and the myth in question is the most potent one of all, that of
the ‘Fall of Man’. This myth presents itself in manifold guises. Sometimes it is
suggested that prehistoric man lived in blissful harmony with nature and that
all went awry with the invention of agriculture. Sometimes the fall is
postponed to the emergence of modern science during the seventeenth
century; sometimes the Enlightenment is to blame. But generally the villain is
held to be the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth century and after.
Scientific implausibility
Green writers in the 1960s and 1970s made much of scientific evidence that
forecast impending doom. Predictions were made, and given quite detailed
statistical support, that raw materials and fuel resources were running out.
This would lead to price rises, economic turmoil and ultimately the collapse of
the whole economic system. Similarly, population growth would outstrip food
production, causing calamitous famines. Pollution would render the atmos-
phere unbreathable. All these apocalyptic disasters were confidently forecast
to occur by the year 2000 at the latest. But they didn’t. As a result, critics have
dismissed the green outlook as a modern version of the ‘end of the world’
terrors which have gripped the West at various times over the last millennium.
Of course, in a real sense, all things will come to an end, but this is no basis
for a serious political philosophy. In fact, the world has abundant resources.
The known reserves of fossil fuels and most metals have risen since the doom-
laded predictions of the early 1970s. Indeed, the price of most raw materials
has tended to decline over the long term as new sources become available. Oil
price rises in the 1970s, for example, had much to do with Middle Eastern
politics, and the existence of a strong oil-producing cartel, but little to do with
the availability of a fossil fuel supply. The high price encouraged fuel conser-
vation and the search for new, more secure deposits of oil in Alaska and the
North Sea. Technology has reduced the need for copper in telecommunica-
tions and electricity supplies. Most manufactured goods require fewer raw
materials in their construction than previously.
Food production has continued to outstrip population growth, reducing the
incidence of famine among the world’s poor. Malthusian predictions appear to
have been confounded (though not, perhaps, proved wrong for all time) as
science and technology have dramatically improved the yield of most crops.
Deforestation and diminishing bio-diversity are concerns, but they do not
constitute the disaster that most greens would claim. Greens have a record of
exaggerating the scale of the crisis, using sloppy scientific methodology, manip-
ulating statistics and making downright dishonest use of many scientific reports
to create a false impression of environmental disaster. Indeed, whatever claims
they make of holding the moral high ground, greens are yet another body of
self-interested pressure groups seeking special treatment by government.
Of course there are difficulties, but these can be managed by wise government
decisions. The free market can help reduce wasteful consumption of
irreplaceable resources, as is the case with oil, and stimulate new pollution-
reducing technologies. Alternative energy sources will be developed when the
time and prices indicate.
Green preoccupation with planet earth may be parochial; there are effectively
unlimited resources of energy and raw materials in outer space which humans
will eventually access. The overcoming of adversity by intelligence and
ingenuity is the story of human history. Scare stories have always abounded.
There was once a fear that the scarcity of oak trees for shipbuilding would
render Britain defenceless at sea. Similarly, a shortage of charcoal was
supposed to lead to the end of the iron industry in the eighteenth century,
except that coal came along as a viable alternative.
Critics regard much green concern about the environment as reactionary. To
greens the past is better than the present or any likely future. Greens lack a
serious understanding of human history and the
social, technological and scientific improvements Easter Island
that have created healthier, wealthier and, in An isolated Pacific Ocean island
some ways, environmentally more friendly which when visited by
Europeans in the eighteenth
societies. Third World poverty and early death are
century appeared to have
not, critics point out, very green. Primitive people reached a high level of
do not have some superior wisdom, only a shorter civilisation that subsequently
life expectancy. Pre-industrial societies also collapsed. Recent studies
suggest this was a
reduce bio-diversity by poor environmental consequence of poor
management. (Easter Island is a fine example of husbanding of the island’s
‘primitive wisdom’ to be avoided.) Much modern resources.
environmental degradation, so the anti-greens
argue, arises from the desperation of poor people to keep themselves and their
families alive. Much Western green thinking can be seen as the indulgence of
the scientifically illiterate and the comfortably off.
Practical difficulties
A ‘common-sense’ view of the green version of society is that it is impractical
and utopian. It is all very well to urge the abolition of capitalism and its
replacement by ‘something nice’, but more details are urgently required. Green
supporters are often criticised for being typically Western, white, middle-class
people with no direct experience of industry or business – teachers, lecturers
and the like. Almost by definition these are impractical people, dreamers with
little understanding that a green society is a luxury that the poor, especially in
the Third World, simply cannot afford.
Such criticism is not wholly fair. Greens can argue, with some justification,
that theirs is a relatively new and dramatically different ideology that is
exploring as yet largely uncharted waters.
More serious is the accusation that greens simply have no strategy for moving
on from where we are now to where greens want us to be. Sometimes it appears
that simply appealing to reason and evidence will in itself transform society.
Sometimes the adoption of green lifestyles, ranging from vegetarianism and
cycling to various forms of communal living, is presented as the road forward.
There seems little awareness that immensely powerful structures, interest
groups and value systems have created the present order, and will be fiercely
resistant to any attempts to change it. Moreover, any transformation is likely
to be, in the short run and probably in the long run, highly distasteful to large
numbers of people. Greens are rather deficient in revolutionary theory, and,
unlike Marxists, do not pinpoint any particular social groups who will develop
into engines of social change. The assumption that ‘everyone’ or ‘all living
things’ will be the beneficiaries and thus the instruments of change leaves
greens wide open to accusations of naivety and living in a fantasy-world,
particularly from the more tough-minded political left who see them as
distracting attention from the class struggle.
Green political parties, certainly in the West (and ecologism is very distinctly
an ideology of the West), operate within the liberal-democratic political
system, but so far not very successfully. Indeed, deep greens tend to regard
democratic politics as a form of collaboration with the system that, far from
being part of the solution, is in fact part of the problem. Meanwhile, conven-
tional political parties appropriate just enough of the green analysis to give a
‘greenish’ tinge to some of their own policies, thus neutralising the more
radical demands of the movement. The electorate is, in effect, inoculated
against a genuine green revolution by mild doses of environmentalism.
However, the deep green programme is no more effective. Demonstrations
and media stunts get some publicity but do not drastically challenge the
existing order. Some deep greens have sought to remedy this deficiency by
constructing some sort of coalition among those most adversely affected by
the present arrangements – the unemployed, the marginalised, hill farmers for
instance – but with little success. It is uncertain whether such groups are
particularly politically aware or open to green persuasion. In fact, most groups
appear anxious to get a foothold in the world as it is, rather than to transform
it into something different, even if it is ‘something nicer’.
The greening of politics

Many European countries have green political parties. Some, notably in
Germany, where Green Party politicians have served in coalition governments,
have enjoyed modest success. In Britain the Green Party (formed in 1985 out
of the Ecology Party, which was founded in 1975) has been far less successful
if measured in the conventional terms of votes, elected representatives and
levels of opinion-poll support. Votes peaked in the 1989 European Parliament
elections but declined rapidly in subsequent Westminster elections, although
greens have won a few council seats in local government and the occasional
Euro-Parliament seat (on the basis of very low voter turnouts).
Although this might appear to suggest that ecologism is a fringe movement,
such an inference would be mistaken. Ecologist, or at least environmental
influence, has spread far beyond the Green Party to become a significant
feature in mainstream politics. All political parties and movements are anxious
to advertise their green credentials.
Conservative environmentalism
An important element in conservatism is ‘conservation’ and slow, incremental
change in society. Conservatives stress the importance of the generational links
between those who have gone before, those who are alive today, and those yet
to be born. Conservatism is often linked to anti-industrialisation, anti-urbanism
and pro-hunting, the countryside and hunting being vital elements in environ-
mental protection. Environmentalism is very much a countryside and small
town or ‘historic’ city concern. Care about the urban environment tends to
centre on the preservation of ancient buildings and townscapes. Somehow,
Bath seems more worthy of preservation than Manchester, even though both
are Roman towns and both are of considerable ‘historical’ importance.
Socialist environmentalism
Socialists argue that capitalism exploits both humans and the natural world.
Environmental objectives will be met only by a move towards a post-capitalist
society. Many Marxists look on environmentalism as a diversion from the class
struggle, while some socialists see it as even more important than the class
struggle. Environmental socialists think that class struggle unjustifiably
postpones the need to reform society along environmental lines. Planning, tax,
regulations and other reforms are needed now to encourage a green lifestyle,
including recycling, greater use of public transport and energy efficiency.
Liberal environmentalism
Liberals argue that the ‘market’ can help solve most environmental problems.
The key issue is that ‘public goods’, such as fresh air, fish and water, an aesthet-
ically pleasing environment and wild animal species, are ‘free’. There is an
incentive for people to use up a declining free resource before it is gone. If,
however, one places a price on everything in the natural world then the
market will ensure that valued goods, such as animals, plants, air and water,
will survive. The failure of the market adequately to protect the environment
derives from interference by government regulations – which distort markets
– and from the lack of value placed on the environment by people and
businesses. Indeed, the latter exploit the environment with the polluting and
damaging side effects of their activities (known as externalities) and leave
society to clean up, thus keeping their own costs down. Create a properly
functioning market, where people carry the full costs of their activities, and
you produce a better way of protecting the environment.
Feminist environmentalism
This term applies to the belief that a link exists between the male oppression
of women and male oppression of Mother Earth as a consequence of male
power and male ideologies of domination of the human and natural world.
Women have a special role in green politics because of their crucial role as
mothers and carers.
Fascist environmentalism
Environmental concerns are seen as important elements in fascist movements.
Earth, forests and mountains are of special significance to the ‘soul’ of a nation
or race. Both Italian Fascism and German Nazism invoked rural and peasant
values as the backbone of their movements, even though their militarism
involved an expansion of industrialisation to provide the materiel for war. In
recent years the French National Front and the British National Party have also
sought to stress their green credentials as another way of garnering support
from elements of the electorate who are disillusioned at the failures of
mainstream parties to treat green issues with great urgency.
Anarchist environmentalism
Nature left to its own devices exhibits a degree of self-government, harmony,
balance and diversity – ‘anarchy’ – attractive to anarchists, who believe the
world’s problems spring mainly from formal structures of government. Small
communities and self-sufficiency are the goals of this element in the environ-
mental movement.
Several other social and political movements are highly consonant with green
attitudes, such as animal rights, vegetarianism, nature conservation and even
folk music, canal restoration and real ale.
Radical green politics may be on the wane. In part this is because of insoluble
contradictions within the movement. For example, if ‘traditional’ parties and
governments do adopt and implement some effective green proposals, the need
for revolutionary change is reduced. Again, some green policies are, however
much this is denied, essentially technological fixes – such as the development
of wind and tidal power, and the introduction of the catalytic converter for
motor car exhaust fumes. These, if they work (or at least appear to be working),
undermine the deep green case for root and branch social revolution.
However, the evidence still mounts that there are major problems. Global
warming and radical climate change continue to be proved by scientific and
personal observation of the weather. Reports increasingly identify the scale of
the problem. The 2002 Environmental Sustainability Index, for example,
placed the UK ninety-eighth out of 142 countries, noting its poor record on
reducing air pollution, protecting habitats and reducing greenhouse gases.
The UK has one of the worst records for reducing household waste and
increasing recycling.
Whether in fact the shift in global consciousness in a green direction leads to
a total political change remains to be seen. As things stand, the jury is out. At
most it appears to be painfully slow, while the environmental challenges
appear to grow. If change does occur it may well be by means outside the
conventional constitutional or even revolutionary political traditions by an as
yet unidentified process.
Summary
As ideologies go, environmentalism and ecologism are very recent creations.
Environmentalism has come to mean a concern with threats to the
environment, threats which can be effectively dealt with within the status quo,
while ecologism radically challenges the entire economic and social structure
and even proposes a new value system and morality. Both are traceable to a
reaction to the Enlightenment, Newtonian physics and industrialisation, but
the concerns grew with a widespread realisation in the 1960s that economic
expansion and the social structure and value system underlying it could not go
on indefinitely without making the planet unfit for life. Greens therefore
proposed alternatives ranging from technological solutions to a reordered
society and a new value system. Attractive though green ideas appear, they
have been attacked as unscientific, impractical and even immoral. Politically
the greens have received little electoral support, especially in Britain, but
green assumptions and values are increasingly becoming part of the wider
political culture.
1 B. Ward and R. Dubos, Only One Earth (André Deutsch, 1972).

2 Chief Seattle, supposedly spoken by him in 1854.
3 Genesis 1:28.
4 I. Adams, Ideology and Politics in Britain Today (Manchester
University Press, 1998), p. 177.
Adams, I. Ideology and Politics in Britain Today (Manchester

University Press, 1998).
Bramwell, A. Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (Yale University Press, 1989).
Connelly, J. and Norris, P. ‘Making Green Policy: A Guide to the Politics of the
Environment’, Talking Politics, 4:2 (1991/2), pp. 96–100.
Dobson, A. The Green Reader (Andre Deutsch, 1991).
Dobson, A. Green Political Thought: An Introduction (Routledge, 1992).
Dobson, A. ‘Ecologism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.) Contemporary Political
Goodwin, B. ‘Green Ideologies’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and
Sons, 2001), pp. 223–48.
Heywood, A. ‘Ecologism’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction (Macmillan,
1998), pp. 264–90.
Kenny, M. ‘Ecologism’, in R. Eccleshall et al., Political Ideologies: An Introduction
(Routledge, 1996), pp. 218–51.
McCormick, J. ‘Environmental Politics’, in Patrick Dunleavy et al., Developments in
Myers, N. (ed.) The Gaia Book of Planet Management (Pan, 1985).
O’Rourke, P. J. All the Trouble in the World (Picador, 1994).
Ponting, C. A Green History of the World (Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991).
Porritt, J. Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained (Blackwell, 1984).
Vincent, A. ‘Ecologism’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1996),
pp. 208–37.
Ward, H. ‘Environmental Politics and Policy’, in Patrick Dunleavy et al., Developments in
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 On what grounds do ecologists attack industrialism?
2 Is the green analysis simply nostalgia for a non-existent past?
3 How fundamental are the differences between environmentalists and

ecologists?
4 How scientific is the ecologist position?
5 Is it true to say ‘we are all green now’?

Feminism 15
Feminism is one of the most recent ideologies to emerge, although its origins can
be traced far back into history. We examine its historical roots and identify and
discuss the different forms of feminism that have developed over the last two
centuries. We then link feminism with other ideologies and conclude with a
critique and assessment of feminism in the modern world.
POINTS TO CONSIDER
➤ Since feminism is ignored in so many areas of key importance in other ideologies, is the
term ‘ideology’ really appropriate for it?
➤ Why is feminism very new, very middle class and very Western? Or is it?
➤ How susceptible to rational analysis is radical feminism?
➤ Have the main elements of the feminist critique of Western society been answered and
reformed over the last three decades?
➤ Why have so many feminist perspectives been absorbed into mainstream culture and
political parties?
➤ Are men the new ‘oppressed’ gender in Western society?

Women must keep quiet at gatherings of the church. They are not allowed to speak;
they must take a subordinate place, as the Law enjoins. If they want any infor-
mation let them ask their husbands at home; it is disgraceful for a woman to speak
in church. (St Paul, First Letter to the Corinthians, 14:34–5)
St. Paul enjoined self-effacement and discretion upon women; he based the subor-
dination of woman to man upon both the Old and the New Dispensations. . . . In a
religion that holds the flesh accursed woman becomes the devil’s most fearful
temptation. (Simone de Beauvior, The Second Sex, 1949)
While women represent 50 per cent of the world population, they perform nearly
two thirds of all working hours, receive one-tenth of world income and own less
than 1 per cent of world property. (UN Report, 1980)
It is an obvious point that half of humanity has always been women, obvious,
that is, until one considers how few women appear on lists of ‘great people’
who have shaped the course of human history. History – or ‘His-story’ as some
feminists describe it – is that of men and their doings. Women, if they appear
at all, do so as a support for men, or as suffering the consequences of war and
disaster. Rarely, they appear as rulers in their own right, often characterised
by male historians as endowed with particular viciousness and ruthlessness,
qualities common in men but ‘unseemly’ in women. Either women lack the
potential to make noteworthy contributions to society, which is unlikely, or
something else is at work here.
Feminism, one of the most recent ideologies to emerge, attempts to analyse
the social position of women, explain their apparent subsidiary role in history
and offer the basis for reform and the advancement of women in all areas of
society. Feminists believe that there is a fundamental power struggle between
men and women. This, like the struggles around class and race, is potentially
revolutionary. Indeed, it is the oldest power struggle, the least public in its
manifestations of conflict, the most fundamental in its implications for society.
Although concerns about the condition of women have been traced to medieval
times, or even classical antiquity, it makes more sense to begin our survey with
the end of the eighteenth century and the French Revolution. The Enlight-
enment and the revolution influenced women in France and elsewhere in
Europe with the prospect of liberty and equality. Mary Wollstonecraft, in A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), is an important early ‘feminist’
writer. She argued that women should have the same legal rights as men on the
grounds of equal humanity, moral worth, rationality and freedom. It was wrong
that women should be defined by their sex so as to be denied educational, legal,
economic and political rights. Once equality was established there would be a
beneficial revolution in the relationship between men and women.
Sensible as such ideas appear today, they challenged the male-dominated
power structures that held sway at all levels of society during the nineteenth
Feminism 297
century. Men who recognised the case for universal male suffrage, who fought
for rights for the industrial working classes, usually resisted their extension to
women. As men were steadily enfranchised women hoped that their interests
could be advanced by means of vote and parliament. The campaign for female
suffrage became the major feature of what is called ‘first-wave feminism’.
‘First-wave’ feminism
The ‘first wave’ of feminism (roughly 1830–1930) was similar to other
nineteenth-century political campaigns, such as Catholic emancipation or
anti-slavery, in which women had been active. These early feminist philo-
sophical arguments were translated into political movements that focused on
property and divorce rights, and equality in voting rights.
J. S. Mill’s The Subjection of Women (1869) supported those rights. Greatly
influenced by his wife, Harriet Taylor, Mill argued that women should have
equal rights with men, based on equal reason and education, an equal right to
work and to vote. There was no rational reason why the uniqueness of women
in having children should lead to their being denied equal rights with men.
Indeed, in 1867 Mill, as an MP, made a failed attempt to add female suffrage
to the Reform Bill.
In the USA the rights of man, spelt out in the Declaration of Independence,
were an obvious starting point to argue for the rights of woman. A ‘National
Women’s Suffrage Association’ was set up in 1869 to advance these rights.
Political campaigns by women began later in Britain, but in 1903 the ‘Women’s
Social and Political Union’ was formed to fight for female suffrage. So was
born the Suffragette movement.
As the male franchise grew, the arguments for denying women the same rights
as acquired by working-class men steadily lost their force. New Zealand was
the first country to give women the vote on the same basis as men in 1893.
The USA followed in 1920. The First World War had raised the profile of
women in employment and so political recognition had to be made of their
contribution to the war effort. In 1918 women were allowed to vote on
reaching the age of 30. By 1928 women in Britain had the vote on the same
basis as men, though in much of continental Europe the vote came much later
– in France not until after the Second World War and in Switzerland in
the 1980s. By then women in the democracies had acquired legal and
political equality.
The results, however, were not entirely satisfactory. The extension of the
franchise did not dramatically increase female participation in political
life. Women also remained worse off than men, especially in wages and job
opportunities.
Suffrage alone clearly was, and is, not enough to transform the position of
women. Feminists of the ‘second wave’ sought to analyse why this should be
so and what was to be done.
‘Second-wave’ feminism
A radically new development occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called
‘second wave’ of feminism, inspired by such writers as Simone de Beauvoir,
The Second Sex (1953), Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963), Kate
Millet, Sexual Politics (1970) and, most famously, Germaine Greer, The Female
Eunuch (1970). It shifted the entire debate from
what might be generally considered political to oppression
the psychological, cultural and anthropological The social process whereby
fields. These explorations extended the women’s one group or individual holds
back other groups or individuals
movement far outside the conventional bounds from having the power to
of political discourse and posed a formidable pursue their own interests and
challenge to most basic assumptions of culture keeps them in a position of
subservience by coercion.
and civilisation. Women, social classes, the
disabled, racial and religious
Women needed radical social change and political
groups, homosexuals are all
emancipation if they were to be ‘liberated’ from groups that see themselves
thousands of years of male oppression. Liberal and oppressed by the power and
radical feminism agreed in their demand for both values of ‘majority’ society.
elements to improve women’s lot. Both equal

rights legislation and considerable social change, especially in popular attitudes
on gender issues, are needed to improve the lot of women and redress the power
balance between men and women.
In Britain, a great deal of legislation has been introduced to advance the cause
of greater gender equality: Abortion Law Reform (1967), Divorce Law Reform
(1969), Equal Pay Act (1970), Sex Discrimination Act (1975), Employment
Protection Act (1975) and Domestic Violence Act (1977). However, there has
been very limited progress in dealing with the forces of structural gender
inequality in society and enforcement of legislation is weak.
Some second-wave feminists argued for greater inclusion of women on the
grounds of female moral superiority. Women were especially endowed with
sympathy, emotion and a culture of co-operation as a consequence of their
experience of motherhood. Men were seen as being tough, competitive and
emotionally limited. Human history was a struggle between these
conflicting male and female virtues between and within people. Feminists
involved in the peace movement, for example, argued that the potential for
destruction is now so great that it is vital that the female side of humanity
gains more influence in politics and society to avoid nuclear war and
environmental destruction.
Feminism 299
‘Third-wave’ feminism
By the 1990s some feminists argued that second-wave feminism was
becoming rather dated. Major civil liberties and legal advances for women had
occurred. Technological developments, such as the contraceptive pill and
household labour-saving devices, had liberated women from the burdens of
unplanned childbearing and the grind of housework that had held back earlier
generations. Some of the major writers of second-wave feminism, such as
Germaine Greer in Sex and Destiny (1985), became sympathetic to the impor-
tance of family life and child rearing for women, while Camille Paglia, in Sex,
Art and American Culture (1990), questioned the ‘victim’ status of women in
much feminist writing.
The 1990s, it was claimed by feminists of what might be called ‘third wave’ or
‘new’ feminism, was the time to consolidate what had been achieved. Women
are still disadvantaged in many areas of life in modern societies, but the
principle of female equality, now largely accepted and backed by legislation,
needed to be made a stronger reality in practical rather than just theoretical
terms. A number of issues of gender discrimination remain to be addressed:
female pay in Britain remains, on average, around 75 per cent of male wages;
women are more likely to be found in low-paid, part-time, low-status,
insecure, low-skilled and temporary work than men are; few women are at the
top of the major professions of law, medicine, academia, the media and the
senior civil service. In addition, in 2001 40 per cent of the FTSE Index
companies were identified as having no women on their board and the
proportion of leading businesses with women on the board fell from 69 per
cent in 1999 to 57 per cent in 2001.
Unlike second-wave feminism, contemporary feminism doubts the importance
of conventional political activity in changing structures of inequality in society.
Natasha Walter, in The New Feminism (1998) and On the Move: Feminism for a
New Generation (1999), is an important contemporary feminist writer. She
addresses some of the issues raised by the position of women in contemporary
society and argues that, while a great deal of gender inequality still exists in
modern societies, there are a number of changes to be considered. Women’s
lives cannot be seen just in terms of ‘oppression’, or inequalities addressed by
politics. Women have new forms of power in work, politics and the media
available to them to redress gender inequalities. Besides, women do not need a
‘feminist’ movement as such to advance their interests. They can use the existing
power structures in work and the many other organisations in which women
participate to forward the feminist cause while advancing their own individual
interests. Finally, these changes in feminist thinking amount to a new form of
feminism, one much more in tune with the individualistic and apolitical world in
Western societies.
New feminism can be criticised on similar apolitical

grounds to its second-wave predecessor. It Put simply, this term means
concentrates on privileged women – white, ‘lacking in political content’. One
middle-class, well-educated, Western, Christian, might see apolitical views as
having no ideological
employed, heterosexual – and does little for the
perspective, no underpinning
vast majority of women in the world. Women in political beliefs. ‘Apolitical’ is
developing countries face far worse forms of often used as a term of
gender inequality than those in the West, with far criticism for those who have no
interest in politics.
fewer resources than their sisters in industrialised
nations, and receive little help in their struggle.
Today, any self-respecting Western woman would individualistic
Ideas and actions that centre on
see herself as a ‘feminist’, with considerable choice
the individual and his/her needs
in lifestyle and career, and not automatically and interests. By contrast,
dependent on a male. Feminism is not associated ‘collectivist’ ideas and policies
only with the radical or political left of politics. that see social progress and
individual advancement as
Women of all political persuasions argue for occurring only by the action of a
female equality in principle. Neither is it only a group, such as a nation, class,
movement confined to the developed world. religion or race.
Women in developing countries increasingly see a
crucial role for themselves in social and economic progress, in population
control and environmental protection. They look to both the traditions of their
own society and the major elements of Western feminist thinking for inspiration.
Main elements of feminist thought

Feminist thinkers do not adhere to a simple ‘left-right’ view of politics (politics
being based on fundamental class and economic conflicts in modern democ-
racies). Neither do they see politics in terms of the state, as most ‘traditional’
ideologies and movements do. Female emancipation, and the achievement of
female equality with men, requires a broader front than party politics or the
achievement of power within the state. It requires an analysis of the power
relations between men and women in all areas of society. One can see this in
a number of areas:
• sex, gender and ‘sexism’;
• public and private spheres of life;
• patriarchy.
Sex, gender and ‘sexism’

Another crucial principle is the distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. Sex is a
biological fact; the key difference between men and women is women’s ability
to have children. Men have physical power and aggressive tendencies, the
biological function of which is to protect their women and children. Most
Feminism 301
societies have placed a major emphasis on male physical power. Industrial

societies still place great stress on these gender divisions, even when their
importance is clearly in decline with falling birth rates and growth of work
dependent on educational and intellectual abilities.
For most feminists (but not all) these biological distinctions were of very
minor significance. What was significant was gender. This is a social construct;
a cultural phenomenon that assigned different roles to women and a whole
apparatus of imposed behaviour patterns, expectations, thoughts, aspirations
and even dreams. It is not ‘biological’ or ‘natural’ that women should take the
bulk of childcare responsibilities; this has occurred as a result of social and
cultural developments that should be changed to the benefit of women and,
most feminists believe, men.
Sexism is an ideology of oppression of one gender over another that promotes
the idea that ‘genderised’, socialised relations between men and women are
natural and biological, and unable to be changed. There are sexist women but
most sexism in society is male and directed towards the subjugation and
exploitation (sexual or economic) of women. It is an ideology of ‘imperialism’
of men over women and reflects the power relations between men and women
in society, with men having control over most forms of power.
Public and private spheres

The first challenge was the conventional distinction between public and
private spheres of social life. Most, but not all, political writers had focused
almost exclusively on the public realm of government, law, economics, the
state, and had more or less assumed that the relationship between men and
women (especially the married relationship) was essentially a private matter,
outside the scope of politics.
Feminists boldly asserted that there was no such public–private distinction and
that the most intimate dimensions of such relationships had profound political
consequences. Moreover, the politically powerful public sphere, dominated by
men, impacted on the politically weak private sphere, still dominated by men
but within which the lives of women were confined.
If women were to be truly equal with men then there would need to be female
emancipation within both the private sphere and the public sphere. Perhaps
men or the state should have a greater role in child-rearing, releasing women
for a greater role in the public sphere. Perhaps there should be a ‘wage’ for the
work done by women in the private sphere. Whatever the answer, there is
agreement among feminists that such divisions are not ‘natural’ or ‘biological’
in origin, but social, and as such can be reformed by social and political change.
Patriarchy
This can be perceived as the mainspring of feminism. Men and women have
gender roles in society, but women have their role imposed on them by men.
Consciously and unconsciously, in virtually all cultures and all times, women
have been imprisoned within this imposed world. This patriarchy (‘rule by
men’) permeates all aspects of society, public and private, as well as language
and intellectual discourse. It thus remains the most profound of all tyrannies,
the most ancient of all hierarchies. The root of oppression rests in men’s
superior strength and greater brutality, together with the female terror of
being raped and the patriarchal ideologies that enslave minds.
One of the most important ideological props of patriarchy is religion. Most
religions allot a predominant role to male gods. Most known societies are
matriarchal (‘ruled by women’) in neither their social structures nor their
theology. Nevertheless, Judaism, Christianity and Islam are particularly
singled out for opprobrium by feminists as being religions that place women
in a role subordinate to men in both theology and society. Patriarchy is thus a
social construct, not a natural condition.
Women’s movements therefore seek liberation from patriarchy by various
means ranging from specific political campaigns, such as demand for liberal
abortion laws, to ‘consciousness-raising’ by debate, discussion and publica-
tions, or simply ‘living the future’ – adopting a ‘liberated’ lifestyle and related
values and sharing these with the ‘sisterhood’.
Schools of feminism
‘Feminism’ is an ideology with a difference. This makes it peculiarly difficult to
analyse and criticise in the terms usually applied to ideologies. Firstly, it
includes a great deal that other ideologies skim over or take for granted,
especially the distinct experience of women in society. Secondly, it leaves out
much of the territory usually dealt with by ideology, such as law, the state,
government, legitimacy, economic systems and historical explanation. Much
of its language, ideas and evidence are drawn from such disparate disciplines
as psychology, socio-biology, literary studies, sociology and anthropology.
Some critics have even challenged the notion that feminism can properly be
called an ‘ideology’ at all, preferring to see it as a cultural or even a literary
movement. Others have argued that it is an incomplete ideology, and really
makes sense only if incorporated into more orthodox schools of thought such
as liberalism, socialism or conservatism. However, it can hardly be denied that
feminism has made a substantial impact and, whatever one’s reservations in
according it the title of ‘ideology’, it is like most ideologies in at least one
respect: there are sharp, even bitter, divisions within feminism on its aims,
Feminism 303
goals, methods, theories and inspirations. Four major strands of feminist

thinking can be identified:
• liberal feminism;
• socialist feminism;
• conservative feminism;
• radical feminism.
Liberal feminism
Liberal feminism dominated the ‘first wave’ of feminism during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, with intellectuals such as Mary Wollstonecraft,
Harriet Taylor and J. S. Mill all making contributions. Liberal feminism focuses
on the full extension of civil and legal rights to women by legislation. This
form of feminism is essentially liberalism, stressing the importance of the
individual, with the emphatic assertion of female equality. It demands a ‘level
playing field’, secured by law, so that women earn the same as men and can
aspire to the same jobs as men. It accepts the competition of the marketplace
and assumes that women can, and should, compete equally with men.
In the second wave Betty Friedan, among others, argued that women were
directed by a cultural myth that made them look to the family, the private
sphere, as their proper role in life. Equal rights would enable women to become
educated and have a greater role in public life. British feminists took up this
cause, and later, so did politicians. A series of acts assigned greater rights to
women, among which were the Abortion Act (1967), the Equal Pay Act (1970)
and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975). Such legislation gives women rights
that enable them as individuals to have greater choice about their lives.
Liberal feminism may be criticised as little more than Western liberalism with
a female dimension, and most of its goals are already achieved or within
striking distance. Less moderate critics regard it as merely a prop to sustain the
status quo. Others see it as essentially the preserve of middle-class women
who ignore the plight of their counterparts in the working-class.
Liberal feminism remains a very important element in the West today. Most
women in developed societies have individual choices and freedoms that are
now almost taken for granted, but they owe much to the liberal feminist
struggles for equal civil and political rights over the last two centuries.
Socialist feminism
Some of the ‘utopian socialists’ of the nineteenth century, such as Fourier, Saint-
Simon and Robert Owen, believed that their ideas had important implications
for women. For example, Fourier envisaged a highly permissive sexual
environment, with women liberated from the burdens of childcare and
housework by transferring most of these family functions to the community.

Owen, in particular, thought of religion as enslaving women through marriage.
Marx, however, was much less interested specifically in the liberation of
women, and was conservative in his own family life. A socialist revolution, he
believed, would liberate women as a desirable side effect. Subsequent
communist regimes have paid lip service to women’s equality but in practice
have tended to take a conservative position, especially on the political role of
women. Male left-wing leaders in many movements, especially in the 1960s,
had attitudes that led some women to lose faith in traditional socialist politics
and drove them towards a more radical agenda. Some groups, like ‘Militant’ in
the 1980s, were scornful of the women’s movement, seeing it as irrelevant, a
middle-class intellectual indulgence and a diversion (like anti-racism) from
the central revolutionary task of overthrowing capitalism.
Engels, on the other hand, showed considerable interest in the situation of
women. In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884) he
stated that the family was the root of women’s oppression, but that it had its
origin in an economic system, capitalism, based on private property. It is
dominated by men; property is owned by men and passed on mainly to men.
The whole ideology of the system was designed to reinforce this control of
women by men, which reduces women to the status of men’s property.
Socialist feminists, therefore, see that only the ending of capitalism and the
liberation of women from its shackles, both ideological and institutional, can
end the oppression of women. Feminism is part of the class struggle and can
only be achieved as part of that general struggle. Some socialist feminists
believe that class is so important in forming attitudes that it cuts women off
from their fellow women in other, opposing classes. Middle-class women have
more in common with each other and their fellow middle-class men than they
have with their working-class sisters.
Women play a key role in capitalism, serving its interests in several ways.
Women in the labour force increase productivity, weaken the wage bargaining
powers of male labour, and enter or leave the labour market in times of
capitalist ‘boom’ or ‘bust’. They are vital in producing, raising and socialising
the next generation of workers into the values of the system. The family
ensures that men at work will remain disciplined in order to keep an income.
Finally, women reduce the domestic burden of child rearing, allowing men to
concentrate on meeting the demands of the capitalist system.
Marxist feminist Juliet Mitchell, in Woman’s Estate (1971) and Psychoanalysis
and Feminism (1974), argues that female oppression in capitalist society is not
just economic, but involves many aspects of psychology and culture that can
and must be changed.
Feminism 305
Socialist feminism is open to criticism from a variety of angles; for example,

the destruction of the family as the cement of the private property system is as
likely to produce an atomised and irresponsible society (perhaps modified by
despotism) as a co-operative one. Such experiments in collective living as have
been tried have not been a great success. Marxists of a more traditional hue
have taken the view that the pursuit of such goals as pay for housework diverts
attention from the central goal of abolishing capitalism. Non-Marxist socialists
dismiss the image of the working man cosseted and indulged by his house-
keeping, child-raising and domesticated wife as hopelessly outdated.
Conservative feminism
This may at first sight appear something of a contradiction in terms. There have
been, however, some attempts to construct a theory of female liberation based
on the belief in ‘equal but different’ roles and the natural division between the
public and private areas of social life. Attempts to be equal on men’s terms,
according to men’s values and in men’s interests are doomed to failure and
create a new form of female exploitation and manipulation, with grave social
consequences for the upbringing of children and the relationship between the
sexes. Conservative feminists take the view that women should have ‘sover-
eignty’ within their own sphere of life. Cultural manifestations of this approach,
such as the strict dress code of many Islamic countries, may appear repressive
but in reality they strengthen respect for women and their freedom.
Thus family life is a very important and respected sphere of female activity and
fulfilment. Many conservative feminists argue that too much feminist theory
attacks the vital role of women in child rearing and home making. Indeed,
many women actually want to be family centred, and find deep fulfilment
there, rather than in careers and salaried work in the public sphere. Some
feminist writers, such as Jean Bethke Elshtain in Public Man, Private Woman
(1981), have evolved a variation of these views and claim that women’s life
experience, for example of motherhood, has nourished values such as co-
operation, tenderness and sensitivity that have universal application.
Radical feminism
The most recent and most interesting form of feminism, if the most difficult to
fit into the conventional definitions of ideology, is radical feminism. It is a very
important element in the second wave of feminism.
Radical feminism holds that the suppression of women is a fundamental
feature of almost all societies, past and present, and is the most profound of
all the tyrannies. This oppression, this patriarchal oppression, is all-pervasive
and takes many forms – political, cultural, economic, religious and social. It
functions by a socially defined role for women, gender, which has little to do
with genuine social differences and everything to do with the exploitation of

women as a group by men. This exploitation permeates the whole culture and
must therefore be challenged by an attack on all fronts – political, economic,
cultural, artistic, philosophical and scientific.
Within this broad coalition there are a number of competing standpoints. One
of the most extreme of these claims that everything, including science,
philosophy and even language itself, is the product of a given social order, an
order totally dominated by men. This male hegemony must be challenged by
a rejection of all that it entails, even to the point of creating a new language
for ‘women to speak unto woman’. A rather less extreme, but nonetheless
challenging, view is that women are essentially different from men, more
attuned to the maternal virtues of tenderness, caring and intuition, and are
more in harmony with life, nature and the ecological nature of the planet itself.
Feminist critics, however, feel this is a retreat to the comfort of a romanticised
version of woman’s nature favoured by men. This, of course, raises the funda-
mental, and as yet unresolved, issue of whether women are actually substan-
tially different from men.
The implications of feminism for men raise interesting points. Some feminists
believe that to liberate women is simultaneously to liberate men: the two sexes
will be able to negotiate a new and healthier relationship. To others, men seem
redundant: women simply do not need them (hence the famous remark, ‘a
woman needs a man as a fish needs a bicycle’). This easily leads to the more
extreme manifestations of feminism; for example, Andrea Dworkin, in Pornog-
raphy: Men Possessing Women (1974), comes close to defining ‘maleness’ as
essentially violent, negative, destructive. Male sexual redundancy might even be
approaching, thanks to modern scientific advances, to the point of men being
unnecessary even for breeding. For some feminists this has led to ‘political
lesbianism’ in which women relate only to each other at every level, not just
sexual, in modes determined by themselves without reference to the male world.
Critics argue that these several strands of feminism are mutually incompatible.
The widest gap is between those who argue that there is very little funda-
mental difference between men and women, and those who identify profound
biological, even spiritual, differences. Some critics of feminism condemn it as
essentially elitist, ethnocentric, racist and even sexist. Feminism’s strongest
supporters are to be found in the wealthy industrialised societies of the West,
among women who have largely achieved legal and political equality. Women
in the developing world, whom Western feminists are accused of neglecting,
suffer oppression on a scale unimaginable in the developed world. Indeed,
within developed countries feminism is criticised by black women as being
concerned with emancipation that essentially benefits white women and does
little for their black and brown sisters.
Feminism 307
Changes in the economy have reduced the role of large-scale, male-dominated

industries that placed a premium on physical strength. The ‘new economy’ of
‘high-tech’ industries and services is almost designed to enhance the
employment opportunities of women, reliant as they are on education and
social skills, brain rather than brawn. Women do not require men for economic
support. Increasingly, many women do not need a man for his role in child
rearing. The economic value of men to women as providers declines with
rising male unemployment – and unemployability – rates. There are growing
concerns about the ‘redundant’ male in modern society. Seeking solace in
drink, violence and crime, as his ‘proper’, traditional social roles decline, the
‘redundant’ male falls behind women in education and the world of well-paid
jobs that are associated with the new knowledge-based economy. Time will
tell if there will be a need for a ‘men’s movement’ to enhance the role of men
in society.
Summary
Feminism is a relatively new ideology, dating, for all practical purposes, from
the late eighteenth century. Three ‘waves’ of feminism can be detected. The
first, of about 1830–1930, was concerned chiefly with legal and political
rights. The second, in the 1960s and 1970s, focused on much more funda-
mental personal and relationship issues. The ‘third wave’ in the last decade or
so has been essentially a reflection on and reappraisal of what has been
achieved. Feminism is different from other ideologies in that it largely ignores
or takes for granted much of what other ideologies are concerned with. Even
more significantly it denies the boundaries between the ‘private’ and ‘public’
spheres. The key target of feminism is ‘patriarchy’ – male domination in all its
myriad forms. Feminism can, however, be divided into several different
‘schools’ each with a distinctive focus – liberal, socialist, conservative and
radical – that sit uneasily with each other. Critics of feminism have denied that
it is really a distinctive ideology at all; the most sceptical have dismissed it as
an indulgence of middle-class Westerners. Finally, unlike almost all other
ideologies which eventually give birth to political parties, feminism has not
done so. Its influence, at least in the West, has been enormous.
FURTHER READING
Bryson, V. Feminist Political Theory: An Introduction (Macmillan,

1984).
Bryson, V. ‘Feminism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright (eds.)
Contemporary Political Ideologies (Pinter, 1993), pp. 192–215.
Bryson, V. Women in British Politics (Huddersfield Pamphlets in
History and Politics, 1994).
Goodwin, B. ‘Feminism’, in B. Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and Sons,
2001), pp. 189–221.
Heywood, A. ‘Feminism’, in A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction (Macmillan,
1998), pp. 238–63.
Jowett, M. ‘New Feminism in Contemporary Britain’, Politics Review, 9:3 (2000), pp.
12–14.
Kemp, S. and Squires, J. Oxford Readers: Feminism (Oxford University Press, 1995).
Lovenduski, J. and Randall, V. ‘Feminist Perspectives on Thatchersim’, Talking Politics,
3:3 (1991).
Purvis, J. ‘Equal Opportunities for Women’, Talking Politics, 2:1 (1989), pp. 20–3.
Vincent, A. ‘Feminism’, in A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Blackwell, 1996),
pp. 172–207.
Walter, N. The New Feminism (Little, Brown, 1998).
Wilford, R. ‘Feminism’, in R. Eccleshall et al. Political Ideologies: An Introduction
(Routledge, 1996), pp. 252–83.
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
1 ‘The central concept of feminism is patriarchy.’ Do you agree with

this statement?
2 ‘Feminism is unique in that it makes no distinction between the

public and private areas of life.’ Discuss.
3 ‘Feminism ignores almost everything that other ideologies regard

as crucial; that is its fundamental weakness.’ Do you agree?
4 Is feminism obsolete?
5 Are the divisions between feminists more important than the beliefs they have in common?
Concluding remarks
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was
the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it
was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope,
it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we were all going direct
to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way – in short, the period was so far
like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on it being
received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only. (Charles
Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, 1859)
Politics takes place within a framework of ideas and concepts, ideological and
religious beliefs, and social and political institutions moulded by the struggles
arising from their interplay. Ideas greatly influence the practical politics of any
society and are always closely associated with the complex interactions
between principle (what an individual feels is morally right) and how it affects
their self-interest (however defined). One might strongly argue, with justifi-
cation, that much of relevance to the study of key concepts and movements
has been missed out of this book, things that are of greater concern and impact
on society than the ‘tired, old’ ideas and movements discussed above. We
believe that these ideas and movements are not out-dated, that they are still
the main influences on modern politics, particularly in the Western world, as
well as in other societies.
This book concentrates on the Western Enlightenment tradition of political
concepts and ideas. Elements of the tradition can be found in modern political
movements, as we have already discussed, and also in some new ones as yet
on the political fringes. Some have had a marked effect on mainstream
political debate; some have sought an influence on the main political parties;
but it is as interest or pressure groups that such movements have had most
effect on political parties and state institutions.
As space precludes a discussion of all of them, we will briefly examine:
• religion and politics;
• disabled rights movements;
• gay rights movements;
• animal rights movements.
Religion and politics

Religion has always played a major part in politics. Marxists have been especially
strong on recognising the crucial role of religion as a means of social control, of
reinforcing the status quo in society. Indeed, many conservatives have claimed
that religion is a vital and positive social ‘cement’, holding society together.
Religious identity plays a very important role in the creation of the national
identity of most countries. Judaism and Christianity, via the Bible, have had
a great influence on the development of concepts of human rights in Western
countries. British socialism has been deeply influenced by the nonconformist
Christian tradition. Conservatism in Britain and the Christian Democratic
parties of Germany and Italy have been closely identified with particular forms
of the Christian tradition (Anglicanism in Britain and Catholicism in Germany
and Italy).
However, the Christian tradition in Western Europe is declining in importance
as a form of moral and political reference. Church attendances are down to a
tiny proportion of the population (although they do tend to rise during periods
of political and economic crisis). Religion is believed by many to be at best a
marginal influence on modern politics and at worst a dangerous purveyor of
intolerance, bigotry and hatred. When one considers the ‘Troubles’ in
Northern Ireland, the Israeli–Palestinian struggle, the conflict between India
and Pakistan, religion plays a crucial part as an irritant. The term ‘religious
fundamentalist’ conjures up the image of the religious bigot, but we shall
argue that this is often an unjust verdict.
The nature of religious fundamentalism

‘Fundamentalism’ was a term originally applied to an approach to religion in
which it was assumed that the original purity of the faith had been compro-
mised and that purification by means of a return to the well springs was
required. For religions with a strong basis in scriptures, notably Protestant
Christianity, Islam and Judaism, this involves going back to what is taken to
be the original meaning of the texts, texts whose ultimate validity is their
divine inspiration. Fundamentalism is, however, not confined to these faiths.
There are versions of it in Roman Catholicism, with some Catholics hoping for
a return to pre-Vatican II (1962–65) doctrines and practices.
One might even speak of ‘secular fundamentalism’ on the far left, appealing to
the original (or what is claimed to be the original) doctrines of socialism and
a rejection of various compromises or ‘revisionism’. ‘Secular fundamentalists’
are so called because they are vehemently opposed to any religious contri-
bution to politics and society, and condemn religion outright as having
nothing of value to give to the human experience.
However, the word ‘fundamentalism’ has recently acquired a specific political

sense, especially in the USA, where there has been an attempt to apply moral
absolutes, derived from Christianity, to a wide spectrum of political, social and
economic issues. Islamic fundamentalism, as evinced in Iran and, until 2002,
Afghanistan, is similarly an attempt to apply a strict interpretation of religious
beliefs, in this case based on the Koran, to a restructuring of those countries.
Historically, organised religion has always attempted to influence the political
process, partly to promote its own moral values and partly to strengthen its own
institutional position within society. Fundamentalism is somewhat different.
First, it denies the convention, implicit in Western liberalism, of distinct
private and public spheres of belief and activity. The concept of a secular
society assumes that religion will be confined to an individual’s private life,
that church and state will be separate and each will stick firmly to its own
business. Fundamentalism flatly denies this distinction. Moreover, it claims
that certain moral principles readily translate into a political programme and
are founded on divine authority. In America, these tend towards extreme
rigidity, justified as being based on the unchangeable word of God as revealed
in the Bible. In Europe the Catholic Church has certainly sought and achieved
political influence, for example, through Christian Democrat parties. Catholic
social teaching, promulgated in a number of papal and conciliar documents
over the last two centuries, has plainly developed substantially and has, in
practice, shown considerable flexibility.
A second striking feature is that, while fundamentalists of all varieties tend
to reject modern culture, they are adept at using modern technology and the
processes of manipulation associated with it. This was vividly illustrated in
the use, among other things, of television, the internet and electronic data
by evangelical Christians and fundamentalist Muslims to promote their
religious beliefs and support candidates for public office who share their
political programmes.
Many commentators have described fundamentalism as a characteristic of
profoundly disturbed societies. Much of its strength comes from its simplifica-
tions, its claim to ultimate authority, its confidence in explaining crises and
providing solutions and in the case of Islamic fundamentalism its validation of
indigenous culture, values, tradition and history against the powerful and
secular West.
Fundamentalism today
It would be unwise to under-estimate the power of fundamentalism in many
societies. Perhaps most significantly, the sense of participation in a cosmic
struggle between good and evil gives a sense of deep inner commitment to its
followers. With the collapse of communism and, arguably, the decline of

nationalism, perhaps only fundamentalism can give beliefs this inner
assurance. Religious fundamentalism has been on the rise in the USA (Chris-
tianity and Islam), Israel (Judaism), India (Hinduism), and throughout the
Islamic world of the Middle and Far East and Northern Africa.
However, in Europe and particularly in Britain, fundamentalism seems to have
virtually no mainstream political impact. There are occasional flurries of moral
reaction, as with John Major’s ‘back to basics’ proposals in the early 1990s, but
there is no substantial organised political campaign. The Protestant Unionist
parties of Northern Ireland are sometimes perceived as ‘fundamentalist’, but
their political goal of Protestant domination, or at least independence from
the Irish Republic, is closer to the political goal of the tribe than to a moral
crusade. Islamic fundamentalism is a small but significant element among
British Muslims, a community characterised by being both highly law-abiding
but also poorly integrated into British society.
Critiques of fundamentalism
Fundamentalism has come under ferocious attack on a number of counts
from the liberal, socialist and even conservative traditions (with which it is
often confused).
The first count is that many people do not accept the claim that moral imper-
atives have divine sanction at all. Even for those who do, the problem is how
to accommodate such claims within a modern pluralist society. Vigorous
pursuit of fundamentalist goals will inevitably cause intolerably divisive
pressures in society. Civilised and rational discourse becomes impossible with
those who regard all opposition as diabolical, all criticism as immoral and all
compromise as treason.
In practice, fundamentalism, it is alleged, drives people to extremes by justi-
fying acts which reasonable people would see as outrageous – suicide
bombings in Israel, attacks on abortion clinics in America, anti-Western
terrorist attacks in the USA and elsewhere. Within America, fundamentalists
have been strongly criticised by mainstream Christian churches such as the
Catholics, Episcopalians and Quakers, for promoting a narrow, intolerant,
over-literal reading of the Bible and for taking positions on nuclear weapons,
capital punishment, economic liberalism and environmental issues which
have only the most tenuous biblical authority. Fundamentalists, their
detractors argue, confuse early American principles with Christian values.
Similar criticisms are made of the Islamic world where, for example, Arab or
Iranian nationalism is sometimes confused with Islamic orthodoxy.
Finally, according to its critics, fundamentalism does not work. It provides no
real solutions to the problems in the modern world. In those countries where it
is a powerful influence it has been characterised by a puritan minority imposing

their fanatical will on the majority with little tangible benefit to society.
One must not blame religion or religious fundamentalism for the ills of the
world. Radical secularism and the political pseudo-religions of fascism and
communism have created as much misery and death as has religion during the
twentieth century. In fact, it has often been religion that has inspired people
to enormous sacrifices in resisting such tyrannies: Protestants in Nazi
Germany, Catholics in Communist Poland and Orthodox Christians in the
USSR all contributed to the resistance to their respective totalitarian regimes.
Disabled rights movements

The term ‘disability’ is a controversial one. It has a number of negative conno-
tations: a disabled person is physically or mentally ‘unfit’ or ‘incapable’, or
somehow ‘inferior’ to one who is ‘able’, and is ‘separated’ from the ‘able-
bodied’ population. Campaigners for ‘disabled rights’ often prefer to use
‘differently abled’ as a more positive description of people who do not have the
same physical or mental capacities as others but who are still capable of
making positive contributions to society. In law, ‘disability’ is defined as ‘a
physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse
effect on the person’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities’.1
Most disabled rights campaigners seek to change public attitudes towards the
disabled by challenging the use of words that are claimed to be derogatory. For
example, referring to a ‘hearing impairment’ is preferable to saying ‘deaf’;
‘visually impaired’ is a more accurate description of most of those described as
‘blind’; and ‘cripple’ is a now unacceptable word to describe people with
mobility problems. Words are important and influence how disabled people
are treated by the able-bodied. Carefully thought-out descriptive terms are
part of a process, disabled campaigners hope, of creating a more positive
image of people with disabilities and their potential contribution to the
common good.
The growth of the disabled rights movement (although ‘movements’ is a
probably a more accurate description of the wide range of organisations
involved) comes from a number of social trends. Three factors have multiplied
the numbers of disabled voters in society: insurance companies estimate that
people are five times more likely by the age of 65 to become disabled and
unable to work than to die; advances in medical technology have amplified
the likelihood that congenitally disabled people will survive into adulthood;
rising life expectancy ensures that more people will live long enough to
become disabled in old age. When one adds to the steadily growing
constituency for disabled rights the increasing unwillingness of disabled
people, like other disadvantaged groups, to tolerate discrimination and a

‘second-class’ status in life one can see that the potential for political action is
strong and rising.
Disabled people have a moral right as human beings to equal opportunity and
equal treatment in society. Disabled rights activists argue that it is not enough
to be sympathetic to disabled people; more needs to be done to enable them
to play a full part in society, including the world of work.
A person’s particular disability may preclude them from certain types of work
but not all types of employment. Relatively few people are so disabled that
they cannot work and are forced to be totally dependent on welfare benefits.
In practice, discrimination in the labour market ensures that disabled people
are less likely to be appointed to a job, are less likely to be promoted once in
an occupation, and are far more likely to be unemployed than able-bodied
people, trapping them in poverty. The Disability Discrimination Act (1995)
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against disabled people but,
say disability campaigners, the legislation lacks effective enforcement powers.
Public attitudes towards the disabled need reform. Too often the disabled are
ignored, patronised, treated with distaste by the able-bodied. Only when there
is a more positive image of the disabled will public attitudes change and
opportunities for the disabled in society improve. Some disabled activists are
not prepared to play the ‘noble victim’, suffering in silence and gratefully
receiving society’s charity – a role that flatters the feelings of the able-bodied
and does nothing for the disabled.
Disabled activists are also deeply worried about the implications for the
disabled of modern medicine and genetics. At one level, science offers the
possibility of identifying inherited genetic disabilities and alleviating or even
eliminating them. At another level, however, medical and genetic science
raises the potential for identifying ‘defective’ foetuses and offering parents the
choice of abortion. A whole class of people is created, a disabled ‘second class’
that can be eliminated from society before they are born, removing their
potential contribution to society as well as their right to life. Disabled rights
activists would want to know who has the right to determine what is
‘normality’ and to set the standards by which human life will be determined.
Disabled rights campaigners try to influence government in ways similar to
other pressure groups. Some are insider groups, such as the Royal National
Institute for the Blind (RNIB), quietly at work behind the scenes to influence
government policies and legislation. Other disabled rights campaigners point
out that Acts of Parliament give rights and protection to disabled people but
that there is no effective enforcement by bodies such as the Disability Rights
Commission. Radical campaigners believe direct action and protests are the
only way to bring the discrimination faced by disabled people onto the
political agenda, to empower the disabled and encourage them to be socially
integrated. They want to make it clear to government and the public that
disabled people are not to be ignored, patronised and given a few ‘crumbs’ for
which they are supposed to be grateful.
Gay rights movements

One might assume that sexual preference is a matter for individual choice and
is of little concern to government and society at large so long as individuals
consent to their involvement in particular sexual activities which take place in
private and ‘don’t scare the horses’. Perhaps only 4 per cent of the population are
exclusively homosexual, but possibly over 20 per cent have had some form of
homosexual experience. The ‘gay’ population in society, whether great or small
in number, is a significant one in politics (if only because of the higher
percentage of gay people found in elite political and, especially, cultural groups).
Sexual activity has always been subject to social (or ‘normative’) sanctions and
legal constraints. Society and the state always assume that private sexual
activity has a public dimension that comes within the political sphere. Gay
activists agree. They have involved themselves in political campaigning to
change the law, especially on the age of consent for male homosexual activity
and opposition to ‘Clause 28’ of the Local Government Act (which made
teaching children about homosexuality, or ‘promoting’ it, a criminal offence),
and to change public attitudes towards homosexuality.
Unlike lesbianism, which is not affected by the criminal law and forms a
separate feminist issue, male homosexuality, has been a criminal offence in
most Western countries until quite recently. Until the Sexual Offences Reform
Act (1967) gay men faced prosecution for homosexual sex, even between
consenting adults in a private place. This provided a ‘blackmailer’s charter’
and posed a threat to the careers and reputations of gay men if their sexual
orientation were exposed.
The 1967 Act removed the criminal nature of homosexuality. However, a
number of legal discriminations remained. Anal sex remained illegal (whether
gay or straight), gay men were still committing an offence if they indulged in
group sex, gay couples had no joint property and pension rights comparable
to heterosexuals and the age of consent for gay men remained at 21 years. Gay
activists challenged these and other legal discriminations.
The age of consent for gay men remained at 21 after the 1967 Act, while
heterosexual sex was legal at 16. Gay rights activists attacked the different age
limits as discriminatory, unfair and against equal rights principles. They
argued that gay people knew their sexuality at the same age as straight people.
If this was the case, the age of consent created undue suffering for gay
teenagers and unfair criminalising of adult males having sex with young men
(whereas it was not a crime to have sex with women over 16). After many
years of campaigning the age of consent was reduced to 18 in 1994 and then
further to 16 in 2001, but only after the Parliament Act had been invoked to
overturn the opposition of the House of Lords to the proposed legislation.
The law recognises only heterosexual couples as having the right to marry.
According to gay rights activists, gay couples suffer legal discrimination in
pension, social security and property rights because they are not allowed to
marry. The law needs to be changed to give long-term gay couples the right to
some form of legally recognised ‘marriage’ (for want of a better word) with its
concomitant rights and obligations.
Immigration legislation is also believed to discriminate against gay people.
British citizens can bring into the country their alien wives and husbands,
but not their non-British gay partners. This is another area of gay rights
campaigning.
Whatever legal improvements occur in society gay men and women face
considerable discrimination in work and social situations that damages their
receipt of equal rights and equal opportunities and amounts to ‘oppression’ of
a group of people on the grounds of sexual orientation. Gay activists assert
that the majority heterosexual society (the one that generates most sexual
criminality) has established a dominant ideology that asserts their sexual
activities as ‘normal’ and gay sex as ‘perverted’, ‘deviant’ and ‘abnormal’. This
sanctions discrimination and also verbal and physical assaults on gay people
and their property. It also creates a culture of intimidation that makes straight
politicians and other holders of power in society unwilling to address gay
concerns for fear of damaging their own careers and personal standing.
It is believed that there are far more gay MPs than have openly declared their
sexuality and that gay people are less likely than straight to be chosen by
political parties as candidates for parliament, especially the Conservative
Party and the Labour Party in some of the old industrial constituencies. This
belief may owe more to perceptions of popular prejudice than to reality. There
is little evidence that voters are unwilling in large numbers to vote against a
gay candidate. Indeed, anti-gay votes are likely to be countered by the votes
attracted to candidates who openly state their gay sexuality. ‘Outing’, the
publicising of the gay sexuality of reticent public figures, is a controversial
tactic used by some gay rights campaigners – a strategy that their opponents
within the gay community say does more harm than good to the cause of equal
rights opportunities for gay people. Gay activists in groups such as ‘Stonewall’
and ‘Outrage’ have been willing to ‘out’ MPs and other public figures who
support anti-gay legislation or make anti-gay statements in public.
Another target of gay rights campaigners is the insurance industry, which

discriminates against gay males, in particular in policy acceptance, premiums
and payouts, because of AIDS. Gay men in Western societies are more likely to
suffer with HIV and AIDS than are heterosexuals. Some insurance companies
refuse to offer policies to gay men, others charge significantly higher
premiums for gay men than straight and all offer lower rewards on completion
of policies if the policyholder is a gay man.
Some gay activists target the major religions, especially Christianity, Judaism
and Islam, for homophobic beliefs which legitimise anti-gay beliefs in society
and contribute to the social oppression of gays.
Sexual orientation does not easily equate with formal political ideologies and
gay activists attack all the major political parties for their homophobic
policies. Much gay rights political activity has strong elements of counter-
culture to it. ‘Outing’, ‘gay pride’ marches and the provocatively outrageous
activities of some gay activists in pursuit of gay rights might, in the minds of
moderate gays and their supporters, cause more harm than good. Unhelpful
stereotypes of gay people are reinforced in some campaigns even when these
campaigns are themselves attacking the stereotyping of gays by heterosexual
culture as consisting of butch women, effeminate men and ‘screaming queens’.
However, perhaps such high-profile campaigning by gay rights activists is
important. There are still widespread assumptions in society that homosexu-
ality, especially male homosexuality, is deeply ‘wrong’. Improving the
treatment of gay people in society is a matter not just of changing legal
discrimination, but also of changing the attitudes of the majority of the
population. There is still a long way to go.
Animal rights movements

Animal rights campaigners are concerned with many aspects of humanity’s
relationship with the animal world. Fundamentally, activists object to the
exploitation of animals by humans in whatever area: for food, as an industrial
resource, as objects of scientific testing, or for sport. Upholders of animal
rights, even from ancient times, have a concern that the abuse and
exploitation of animals somehow weakens the moral restraints placed on
humans not to abuse and exploit other people. They often identify a close link
between the denial of rights for animals, especially the higher primates such
as chimps and gorillas, and the denial of full and equal rights to some classi-
fications of humans on the spurious bases of race, gender, sexual orientation
and disability.
Many philosophers of the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries argued strongly that animals did not have any rational basis for
rights as compared to humans. Animals were not rational, did not have a
consciousness, and were merely resources placed on earth for human conven-
ience. Any attempt to give them rights was not only nonsense but would
weaken the claims human beings had to a moral autonomy superior to the
rest of creation.
However, by the late eighteenth century some thinkers were attempting to
place restraints on human cruelty to animals. Jeremy Bentham, in Intro-
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), declared that
humans were wrong in seeing rationality as the basis for treating animals with
care: ‘The question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But Can they
suffer?’ It is the perceived suffering of animals that led to bans on badger , bull
and bear baiting, and cock fighting over the century after Bentham and may
eventually lead to the banning of fox, deer and hare hunting with dogs in the
twenty-first.
Concern over cruelty, exploitation and suffering led many in Britain during the
nineteenth century to establish the major principles of vegetarianism. The
growth of vegetarianism closely paralleled the rise of a wide range of radical
and socialist movements which have campaigned for human rights and better
animal welfare legislation over the last two centuries.
Strictly speaking, one should distinguish between animal rights movements,
which emphasise the moral status of non-human creatures, and animal welfare
movements, which seek to improve the conditions under which animals are
reared for food or used as pets. Animal rights activists often dislike animal
welfare campaigners as the latter accept the subordinate position of animals
in relation to humans but desire to improve the conditions under which they
are kept. Some animal rights campaigners assert that exploitation, not
welfare, is the issue.
We shall cast a very cursory glance at a number of areas in which animal rights
campaigners are active.
Modern writers, such as Tom Regan in The Case for Animal Rights (1983) and
Peter Singer in Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals
(1965), have argued that animals possess rights, rights that are oppressed and
abused by humans. Animals can feel suffering, have some understanding of
their environment and are thus entitled to proper treatment from humans. In
recent years, genetic science has reinforced the case for human rights to be
recognised as appertaining to chimpanzees and gorillas and other higher
primates who share almost all the genetic make-up of homo sapiens sapiens.
Many animal rights campaigners attack vivisection and animal experimen-
tation on the grounds that they are part of the structure of exploitation of
animals by men. The British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, for example,
rejects the claim made by scientists that animal experimentation is necessary

for scientific and medical research. Computer technology and other means of
research have made vivisection redundant, according to the Humane Research
Trust (another anti-vivisection group). The government is condemned for being
more concerned with the needs of business than with animal welfare. Particu-
larly objectionable are farms that breed animals for experimentation.
Factory farming methods are also a target of animal rights campaigners. The
conditions under which animals are raised for intensive food production
disregard animal welfare and are primarily concerned with protecting business
interests and the supply of cheap food.
Hunting is a special target of animal rights campaigners as it is simply
exploiting animals for sport. Particularly subject to condemnation is fox
hunting (especially as it is perceived as combining cruelty and high-class
status). If some cruel sports such as badger baiting are banned, why should
other animal cruelty sports still be legal? Cruel sports exploit animals, involve
inflicting pain and fear and degrade the people who take part in them. Some
success in the campaign against fox hunting was achieved in 2002 when the
Scottish Parliament voted to introduce a ban on hunting with dogs. The
Scottish decision will have an impact on the anti-hunting campaign in
England and Wales.
Animal rights campaigning uses every form of political action, from protesting
and attempting to lobby government to terrorism. Some animal rights
campaigners have sought to work within organisations such as the National
Trust and the RSPCA to bring about change. They have had very limited
success. The Animal Liberation Front appeals to a higher moral law than legis-
lation when it campaigns against the exploitation of animals by businesses,
whose interests are protected by the same oppressive legal system that allows
animal exploitation and cruelty. Other direct-action campaigners are not inter-
ested in having a dialogue with hunters or animal experimenters, or even in
influencing public opinion. They see traditional political methods as having
failed to protect animal rights and the level of animal suffering as too great to
wait for a change in public opinion or for eform through government action.
The competitive nature of ideologies and movements

Some of the movements we have discussed are, by the standards of the
‘dominant’ ideologies of the Western world, ‘extreme’ or ‘fundamentalist’. This
is not surprising. Most ideologies and movements in their early stages are in
competition with and in opposition to the prevailing beliefs and opinions of
their age. With the exception of conservatism, all the other movements we
have looked at underwent long periods of apprenticeship as ‘new’ movements,
challenging the established social values and social and political order of their
day. One can identify a number of ‘stages’ through which they pass to become,
sometimes, part of mainstream ideas.
1 They have to establish clear parameters to their own ideological distinc-
tiveness. What are they trying to say? What does someone have to believe as
a set of core values in order to be part of this movement? This often creates an
impression of extremism and radicalism, generating bitter resistance to the
ideas of the new movement in mainstream society.
2 The political and ideological struggle of the new movement will have no
access to power in its early stages of development. It lacks the need to
compromise, to adjust to other views, and to face the realities of power. Thus
a level of ideological purity can be maintained that is never possible once in
government. Governments that attempt to pursue ideologically pure
programmes usually result in terror for millions. A regime that is built on an
immature ideology tries to make or reform society in its own image, to force
reality into conformity with its theoretical straitjacket.
3 If such a movement fails to achieve power quickly, as is usually the case, the
compromises required to attain power will mean that, over time, it becomes less
‘radical’, more ‘pragmatic’, more ‘respectable’, its ideas becoming part of the
‘common-sense’ ideological baggage of society. It will have made the transition
from being primarily a ‘restrictive’ ideological movement to being a ‘relaxed’
one: from a movement less concerned with detailed understanding of the ideas
of the key thinkers associated with it to one that attempts to bring into play
policy programmes broadly in sympathy with basic – but flexible – principles.
4 Eventually, the movement may become part of the ‘establishment’, the
‘dominant’ ideology of its society, the ‘respectable consensus’. As such, while it
may make references to its past and present ‘radicalism’, it will, in practice,
have no desire to reform society significantly along the lines envisaged by its
early idealists. It is thus likely to provoke new critiques of society, new plans
for reform, new movements and new ideological debate.
These stages, for want of a better word, will not take place in a vacuum. They
are usually ‘archaeological’ records of social and economic, intellectual and
moral changes and the struggles connected with them. Ideologies and
movements that fail to adapt to social change, that do not reflect its direction
and impetus, will not only have a declining influence on society but will cease
to be politically relevant and will eventually fade from the political scene.
One recent intellectual movement – ‘fashion’ might be a more accurate term –
that has attempted to recreate a vacuum at the heart of political analysis is
‘post-modernism’. Post-modernism asserts that there is no objective truth and
no ultimate reality. It challenges the assumption of the Enlightenment that it
is possible to use reason to understand reality as a unified and integrated

theoretical construct and so be able to impose intellectual order and under-
standing on the world. Post-modernists claim that social reality is too complex
to be subject to the tenets of the major ideological traditions.
Some might find this a reasonable response to the modern world. But one
needs to understand the world, to make sense of it in order to act. There is the
great danger that post-modernism simply leads to a nihilistic world view, an
intellectual atomisation and an inability to act to make the world a better
place, or at least to stop it getting worse. Post-modernism might be an inter-
esting academic debate, but it may not be one that citizens and politicians
facing real and pressing problems are willing to join.
The importance of rationality

Western society over the last three centuries or so has been greatly influenced by
the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment took many forms in different European
countries during the late seventeenth and through the eighteenth centuries. It
presupposed the importance of rational thought, enquiry, belief in progress,
investigation of evidence, a rejection of superstition, a dislike of irrational
thought, and a scepticism about all religious, moral and scientific thinking.
Concurrent with this intellectual movement there has been the continuing
presence of atavistic and irrational beliefs, destructive, fatalistic and always
waiting, patiently, for the tiring rigours of rationality and experimentation,
assessment and rejection of failure to overwhelm their supporters. Out of
these dark crannies of the minds of millions come irrational and radical
movements and ideas trying to change society in their image. The members of
such movements regard their goals as so important that they devalue and
degrade constitutional structures and promote simple solutions to complex
problems, solutions often associated with a romanticised view of violence as a
political tool. They also appeal to the supreme ‘truth’ of their belief that those
who resist or do not share their views are ‘legitimate’ targets for terror, death
and the infliction of pain.
Such elemental ideological forces can be easily identified in fascism, extreme
nationalism, far left-wing politics, and religious fundamentalism of all kinds.
But ideological flight from reality into irrationality can also be observed in
some parts of the environmental and animal rights movements, and in
feminism, liberalism, conservatism and socialism. The demands of ‘political
correctness’ in many American universities have played a valuable role in
challenging many of the assumptions of an ideological world of ‘dead, white,
European males’. All too often, political correctness has become a means by
which those who do not share the same ideological and political agenda are
subject to abuse rather than debate, threats rather than arguments, and in
some cases disciplinary procedures and loss of jobs, all in the cause of
advancing ‘disadvantaged’ groups in liberal societies.
The values of an open society will not be defended if its enemies are only to
be identified by their wearing of swastika armbands, red berets or the accou-
trements of religion. Ideological oppressions associated with political
movements and ideas one supports must also be subject to the same level of
critical analysis one applies to the opinions one dislikes if a free society worth
the name is to be sustained.
Glossary of major figures
The following individuals are among the most important of those mentioned in the
text. Space precludes going into detail, but we hope by means of three or four short
sentences at least to place them in the context of their time and work.
Louis ALTHUSSER (1918–90) French Marxist philosopher. Stressed scientific nature

of Marxism. Knowledge was a ‘production process’ involving theoretical raw materials
related to the society of the day and its particular circumstances. The economy deter-
mined knowledge only ‘in the last resort’. Major works: For Marx (1969), Lenin and
Philosophy, and Other Essays (1971).
St Thomas AQUINAS (c.1224–74) Italian Dominican friar and Aristotelian scholar.

Major theologian and writer. Produced rational basis for arguing the existence of God. Very
influential in the development of the concept of the just war. Strong believer in the moral
basis of political activity. Major work: Summa Theologica (1266–73) (60 volumes).
Hannah ARENDT (1906–75) German-Jewish philosopher and political theorist. Fled

Nazi Germany to the USA and became citizen. Particularly concerned with justice and order
in society. Saw modern political thinking as having abandoned political values for social
ones. Major works: The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), On Revolution (1963), Eichmann
in Jerusalem (1963).
ARISTOTLE (384–322BC) Athenian scientist, educator and philosopher. Student of

Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great of Macedon. Major figure in the study of politics.
Classifier of political systems. Founded a university in Athens known as the Lyceum. Critical
of radical democracy, preferring government by the educated and competent few. Major
influence on the development of science until the Renaissance and on political science until
the present. Major work: The Politics.
Clement ATTLEE, First Earl (1883–1967) Leader of the British Labour Party (1935–
55), deputy prime minister during World War (1942–45), and prime minister (1945–51). As
PM he led a government that established the welfare state, nationalised many key industries,
began dismantling the British Empire, and authorised the British A-bomb project.
St AUGUSTINE of Hippo (354–430) Roman bishop, writer, rhetorician and theologian

from North Africa. Defended the newly established state religion of Christianity against its
critics. Only earthly state can protect men as God can. Politics and government seeks
peace but can never replace Christianity as the true object of life. Evil in the world is the
conscious decision to misuse free will. Major work: City of God (413–25).
324 Glossary of major figures
Caius Octavianus AUGUSTUS (63BC–AD14) Roman politician and statesman.

Adopted son of Julius Caesar. Destroyed Caesar’s assassins in civil war. Defeated Mark
Antony and Cleopatra in another civil war. Became first Roman emperor. Restorer of the
Roman world after a century of wars. One of the Western world’s greatest – and most
ruthless – political geniuses.
Michael BAKUNIN (1814–76) Russian anarchist, revolutionary and atheist. Opposed

Marx in the First International. Saw state and religion as working together to oppress
mankind. Identified need for free communities of people working together with communal
property rights. Not a systematic thinker and writer. Never completed his major books.
Stanley BALDWIN, First Earl of Bewdley (1867–1947) British Conservative PM

(1923–24, 1924–29, 1935–7). Dominated inter-war British politics. Symbol of political
stability in the turmoil of the inter-war years. Chief figure in the abdication crisis of Edward
VIII in 1936.
John BALL (d.1381) English priest and leader of the Peasants’ Revolt (1381).
Simone de BEAUVOIR (1908–86) French feminist writer and philosopher. Author,

among many other things, of The Second Sex (1949), which was a major influence on
‘second-wave’ feminism. Its key argument is that ‘a woman is not born, but made’.
Samuel BEER (b.1911) Contemporary American political scientist. Specialist in British

politics.
Daniel BELL (b.1919) American political scientist and sociologist. Neo-conservative

polemicist. Argues that politics is not longer ideological, but is dominated by practical
problems of economic growth and social reform. Suspicious of big government. Author of
The End of Ideology (1960) and The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973).
Tony BENN (b.1925) British Labour politician, diarist, broadcaster. Minister in Labour
governments in the 1960s and 1970s. On left of the party. Supporter of constitutional
reform. Campaigned to become Labour leader in 1980s. Author of Arguments for
Socialism (1980) and Arguments for Democracy (1981).
Jeremy BENTHAM (1748–1832) British Utilitarian philosopher and legal writer.

Humans are motivated by self-interest and the pursuit of happiness. These are basis for
democratic government, law and social policy. Great influence on nineteenth-century liber-
alism. Main works: Fragments on Government (1776) and Principles of Morals and Legis-
lation (1789).
Sir Isaiah BERLIN (1909–97) British university teacher and writer. Great influence on
liberal thought, especially his Two Concepts of Liberty (1957). Other major works: Karl
Marx (1939), The Lion and the Fox (1953), Four Essays on Liberty (1969).
Eduard BERNSTEIN (1850–1932) German Social Democrat politician, journalist and

leading thinker on revisionist socialism. Saw himself as modernising Marxism in light of
modern developments. Sought a peaceful transition to socialism. Major work: Evolutionary
Socialism (1898).
Sir William BEVERIDGE, First Baron Beveridge (1879–1963) British civil servant
and economist. Chair of the Beveridge Committee that produced the 1942 White Paper on
the establishment of the social security element of the welfare state.
Otto von BISMARCK, Prince Bismarck, Duke of Lauenburg (1815–98) Prussian-

German statesman and creator of the Second German Empire (1871–1918).
Robert BLACHFORD (1851–1943) British leading figure in the early Independent

Labour Party (ILP).
Tony BLAIR (b.1953) British Labour leader (1994–) and prime minister (1997–).
Moderniser of Labour Party under banner of New Labour. Replaced Clause IV and the
‘socialist’ commitment to public ownership. Moved party to the right. Led party to landslide
election victories in 1997 and 2001.
John BRIGHT (1811–89) British radical Quaker orator and politician. Along with
Richard Cobden he was a leading figure in the Anti-Corn Law League that campaigned for
free trade in the 1830s and 1840s.
John BRUCE-GLASIER (1859–1920) British Independent Labour Party figure.
Charles BUKOWSKI (1920–94) American poet and author.
Edmund BURKE (1729–97) British-Irish politician, thinker and writer. Usually identified
as inspiring conservatism and its values. Great believer in social stability, limited
government and gradual change, tradition. Supported many of the demands of the
American colonists but was highly critical of the French Revolution. Major work: Reflections
on the Revolution in France (1790).
George W. BUSH (b.1946) Republican president of the USA (2001–). Former

governor of Texas. Seen as a right-wing conservative. Strong advocate of unilateralist
American foreign policy initiatives such as National Missile Defense and withdrawal from
some arms control and environmental treaties.
R. A. BUTLER, Richard Austin (‘RAB’), and Baron Butler of Saffron Walden

(1902–82) Senior British Conservative politician. On the liberal-left of the party. Respon-
sible for Education Act (1944) and aided Conservative acceptance of the welfare state.
With Labour’s Hugh Gaitskell he gave his name to Butskellism to describe Conservative and
Labour economic policies of the 1950s.
Rachel CARSON (1907–64) American scientist, biologist and writer. Major work:
Silent Spring (1962).
Houston Stewart CHAMBERLAIN (1855–1927) British, later German, writer on

racist structuring of human society. Saw Germanic peoples as superior. Major work: The
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1899). Much admired in Nazi Germany as an influ-
ential thinker on racial theory.
Joseph CHAMBERLAIN (1836–1914) British Radical and, later, Conservative

politician. Made his reputation as a social reformer in Birmingham politics. A leading
political figure of his time. Campaigned against Irish Home Rule and for partial trade
protection measures.
CHARLEMAGNE, Charles the Great (742–814) King of the Franks. Created an

empire that covered most of modern France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and
parts of Spain and Italy. Holy Roman Emperor (800–814). Seen as an early advocate of a
united Europe.
Winston Spencer CHURCHILL (1874–1965) Conservative, Liberal and again

Conservative politician and statesman. Major twentieth-century British political figure.
Nobel Prize winner. Soldier, historian, orator, writer. Held several government posts over
a long political career: home secretary, first lord of the Admiralty, minister of munitions,
lord chancellor and several others. Prime minister (1940–45 and 1951–55). Crucial
role as war leader in the Second World War. Wrote A History of the English Speaking
Peoples, memoirs of both world wars, a biography of Marlborough and many other
articles and books.
Marcus Tullius CICERO (106–43BC) Roman writer, orator, lawyer, statesman and
philosopher. Major figure during the last century of the Roman Republic. Held many senior
government posts. Put down the Cateline Conspiracy to overthrow the state. Opponent of
Julius Caesar and later Mark Antony and Octavian. Executed by Mark Antony. Surviving
writings include Letters, Speeches.
Richard COBDEN (1804–65) British manufacturer and politician. With John Bright, the
leading advocate of free trade and the Anti-Corn Law League. His campaign, resulting in
the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, ruined him financially.
G. D. H. COLE, George Douglas Howard (1889–1959) British economist, journalist

and academic. Leading social-democratic thinker. Advocated ‘Guild Socialism’, a co-
operative system co-ordinated by the state. Wrote A History of Socialist Thought (1953)
and many studies of Fabian and Marxist socialism, as well as contributing to practical ideas
for social improvement.
Bernard CRICK (b.1929) Former British professor of politics. Major works: In Defence
of Politics (1962), Essay on Citizenship (2000).
Anthony CROSLAND (1918–77) British Labour politician, economist and writer.

Social-democratic thinker and writer. Held many government posts: foreign secretary,
education secretary, local government minister. Wrote The Future of Socialism (1956).
Charles DARWIN (1808–82) British naturalist. Theorist on evolution, based on

researches conducted on world voyage in the Beagle. Major work was The Origin of
Species (1859). Ideas on ‘natural selection’ as the engine of evolution were distorted by
late nineteenth-century political thinkers into the concept of ‘Social Darwinism’ to advocate
racism, imperialism and class domination.
Jacques DELORS (b.1925) French politician and civil servant. President of the
European Commission (1985–95). Strong advocate of European Union. Formulated
‘Delors Plan’ for the creation of a single European currency.
Jacques DERRIDA (b.1930) French linguistic philosopher, literary critic and psycho-
analyst. Major work: Margins of Philosophy (1972).
René DESCARTES (1596–1650) French mathematician and philosopher. Challenged

the scholarly tradition and dogmas of his day. Sought to understand the basis for truth.
Cartesian philosophy can be summed up in his phrase, ‘I think, therefore I am’.
Charles DICKENS (1812–70) British novelist. Massive number of novels and letters.
Supporter of social reform and social justice. Best-known writings: Oliver Twist (1837), A
Christmas Carol (1843), Great Expectations (1860-1), A Tale of Two Cities (1859, David
Copperfield (1849–50).
Benjamin DISRAELI, First Earl of Beaconsfield (1804–81) British Conservative
politician. Novelist: Coningsby (1844) and Sybil (1845). Coined notion of ‘two nations’ in
Britain that modern Conservatism should strive to bring together. Hence, creator of ‘one-
nation conservatism’. Prime minister (1868 and 1874–80). Popular imperialist and
advocate of a greater role for skilled working-class people in the democratic process
(under Conservative leadership).
Iain DUNCAN SMITH (b.1954) British Conservative politician. Party leader (2001–).
Ronald DWORKIN (b.1931) Lawyer and jurist. Major work: Taking Rights Seriously
(1978).
Paul EHRLICH (b.1932) American population biologist. Author of many works on
environmental and population matters, most notably The Population Bomb (1968).
T. S. ELIOT, Thomas Stearns (1888–1965) American, later British, writer and poet.
Politically, on the right: ‘a classicist in literature, a royalist in politics and an Anglo-Catholic
in religion’. Chief works include: Prufrock (1917), Murder in the Cathedral (1935), The
Waste Land (1922), Four Quartets (1935–42).
Friedrich ENGELS (1820–95) German socialist. Part of the ‘Manchester circle’ of
German industrialists. Major work: The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845).
Collaborated with – and financially supported – Karl Marx. Many joint works on socialism
and revolution. Major collaborative effort: The Communist Manifesto (1848). Worked to
create a revolutionary workers’ movement. Major role in establishing Marx’s reputation
after his death in 1883.
Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS, CUNCATOR (‘Delayer’) (275?–203BC) Roman general during
Second Punic War (218–201BC). Sought to defeat Carthaginians by delaying battle until
such a time as would be most favourable to victory.
Louis FARRAKHAN, Louis Eugene Wolcott (Louis X) (b.1933) Black American
leader of radical ‘Nation of Islam’.
Johann Gottlieb FICHTE (1762–1814) German philosopher and nationalist. Seen as
one of the intellectual ancestors of German nationalism in the nineteenth century and
German totalitarianism in the twentieth.
Sir Robert FILMER (d.1653) English royalist. Defender of hereditary monarchy. Major
work: Patriarcha: or the Natural Power of Kings (1680). John Locke’s First Treatise on
Government is a refutation of Filmer.
Michael FOOT (b.1913) British Labour politician and journalist. On left of the party.
Leader of the Labour Party 1980–83.
Michel FOUCAULT (1926–84) French philosopher. Saw power as widely spread in
society. Exercised within and outside formal political institutions in a manner that severely
limits real choice. Actions become self-evident truths that ensure compliance by most
people in being controlled. Major works: Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other
writings 1972–1977 (1980).
Charles FOURIER (1772–1837) French utopian socialist, social reformer. Advocate of

a system of associated enterprises as an alternative to capitalism.
Anatole FRANCE, Jacques Anatole François Thibault (1844–1924) French

novelist, poet, critic. Nobel Prize winner (1921).
General Francisco FRANCO (1892–1975) Spanish general and Fascist dictator

(1939–75).
Betty FRIEDAN (b.1921) American feminist writer and activist in ‘second-wave’

feminism. Founded National Organisation of Women (NOW). Author of The Feminine
Mystique (1963).
Milton FRIEDMAN (b.1912) American economist. Leading member of ‘Chicago School’

of economics. Major theorist of tight monetary control by government (‘monetarism’).
Very influential on neo-liberal and New Right politics. Strong critic of Keynesianism. Chief
works: Capitalism and Freedom (1962), and, with wife Rose, Free to Choose (1980).
Erich FROMM (1900–80) German psychoanalyst and social philosopher. His To Have
and To Be (1979) discusses the drive to ownership and consumerism in a materialist society.
Francis FUKUYAMA (b.1952) American political writer on the right. Very influential in
the US Republican Party and the New Right. Analyst for both US government and private
business. Major work: The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Controversially claimed
that liberal democracy was the end product of human political development – especially in
the wake of the end of the Cold War.
Hugh GAITSKELL (1906–63) British Labour politician and economist, on right of the
party. Labour leader 1955–63. Advocated reform of the Labour Party to make it more
electable.
William Lloyd GARRISON (1805–79) American campaigner for the abolition of

slavery.
José ORTEGA Y GASSET (1883–1955) Spanish philosopher and writer. Author of The
Revolt of the Masses (1930), a critical account of mass society.
Charles de GAULLE (1890–1970) French general and statesman. Leader of Free

French forces after fall of France (1940). First president of the Fifth Republic (1959–69).
Suspicious of American domination of Western Europe. Rejected British applications to join
the EEC in 1963 and 1967.
Ernest GELLNER (b.1925) Cambridge academic and social anthropologist. Major

work: Nations and Nationalism (1983).
Sir Ian GILMOUR, Lord Gilmour of Craigmillor (b.1926) British historian and
Conservative politician on left of the party.
William Ewart GLADSTONE (1809–98) British Liberal politician and statesman,

classical scholar. Chancellor of the exchequer, prime minister (1868–74, 1880–5, 1886,
1892–4). Dominated British politics throughout most of the nineteenth century. Strong
supporter of liberal causes at home and abroad. Supported Irish Home Rule, failed to
implement it in the face of opposition both within and outside the Liberal Party.
Arthur GOBINEAU, Count Joseph Arthur de (1816–82) French aristocrat and racial
theorist. His Essay on the Inequality of Human Races (1859) was highly influential on devel-
opment of theories of racial hierarchy, and, later, on Nazi theories of racial superiority.
William GODWIN (1756–1836) British philosopher and political writer. Strong

influence on anarchist and socialist thinking. Married Mary Wollstonecraft. Father of Mary
Shelley, author of Frankenstein. Major work: An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
(1793).
Mikhail GORBACHEV (b.1931) Soviet politician and statesman. Last leader of the
USSR (1985–91). Sought to reform the communist system and end the Cold War with the
West. Began end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
T. H. GREEN, Thomas Hill (1836–82) British philosopher and social reformer. Major
influence on the development of New Liberalism. Critical of laissez-faire liberalism. Saw a
limited role for the state in improving individual and social conditions. Major works: Prole-
gomena on Ethics (1883) and Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (1879–80).
Germaine GREER (b.1939) Australian feminist writer. Major works: The Female
Eunuch (1970) and Sex and Destiny (1985).
William HAGUE (b.1961) British Conservative politician. Leader of the Conservative

Party (1997–2001).
Lord HAILSHAM, Quintin HOGG (1907–2001) British Conservative politician and

lawyer. Lord chancellor under Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher. Supporter of consti-
tutional reform. Wrote a number of books on British politics, notably Elective Dictatorship
(1976) and Dilemma of Democracy (1977).
Keir HARDIE (1856–1915) British Labour politician. One of the founders of the Labour
Party. First Labour MP.
Roy HATTERSLEY (b.1932) British Labour politician, journalist and commentator.

Holder of several senior Cabinet posts.
Friedrich von HAYEK (1899–1992) British political philosopher and economist of

Austrian descent. Strong believer in liberty. Major influence on neo-liberalism and New
Right ideas of the 1980s and 1990s. Major works: The Road to Serfdom (1948), The
Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law, Legislation and Liberty (1979).
Denis HEALEY (b.1917) British Labour politician on right of the party. Has held many
senior posts in government, notably defence minister, chancellor of the exchequer.
Sir Edward HEATH (b.1916) Senior Conservative politician and statesman. Tory Party
leader 1965–75). Prime minister (1970–74). Deeply committed to British membership of
the EU.
G. W. F. HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831) German philosopher and

university teacher. Very influential on nineteenth century thought, especially Marx.
Developed model of dialectical thinking (hypothesis–antithesis–synthesis–hypothesis) as
the way knowledge develops. Saw the state as an ethical ideal: ‘The Divine Idea as it exists
on earth’. Major works: Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and Philosophy of Right (1821).
Johann Gottfried HERDER (1744–1803) German poet, philosopher and theorist of

nationalism. Major Romantic and anti-Enlightenment thinker. Saw nations as having a
distinct cultural ‘spirit’, natural units into which humans are divided. Strongly anti-state as
it crushes national spirit.
Heinrich HIMMLER (1900–45) German Nazi leader of the SS. Played a key role in the
organisation of the state terror and extermination of Jews and others as part of Hitler’s New
Order in Europe. Condemned to death at Nuremburg war crimes trials. Committed suicide.
Adolf HITLER (1889–1945) German leader of the Nazi Party. Created it as powerful
political force. Chancellor of Germany (1933–45). Instituted totalitarian dictatorship and
the suppression of opposition parties and organisations. Persecutions and attempted
extermination of Jews and others identified as ‘sub-humans’. Ideas clearly laid out in My
Struggle (1925). Committed suicide.
Thomas HOBBES (1588–1679) English political philosopher, mathematician and

classical scholar. Lived through the Civil Wars, Cromwell’s rule and the Restoration. Argued
for a strong state to ensure order in society. Suspicious of democracy as leading to strife
and civil war. Major work: Leviathan (1651).
L. T. HOBHOUSE, Leonard Trelawney (1864–1929) British sociologist, academic

and journalist. Leading influence on development of New Liberalism. Strong role for the
state in promoting individual liberty and social good. Major works: The Theory of
Knowledge (1896), Morals in Education (1906), Development and Purpose (1913).
J. A. HOBSON, John Atkinson (1858–1940) British economist and writer of

economics and sociology. Made significant contribution to New Liberalism. Major works:
The Evolution of Modern Capitalism: a Study of Machine Production (1894), Imperialism
(1902).
Quintin HOGG, see Lord Hailsham
Saddam HUSSEIN (b.1937) President of Iraq (1969–2003).
H. M. HYNDMAN, Henry Mayers (1841–1931) British socialist leader. Helped found

(Social) Democratic Federation (1881). Left to form National Socialists (1916). Defender
of Marxism in several books.
Thomas JEFFERSON (1743–1826) Third American president (1801–9). Major figure

in the American Revolution and War of Independence (1776–83). Helped draft Declaration
of Independence (1776).
Peter JENKINS (b.1934) British journalist, political commentator and broadcaster.
Sir Keith JOSEPH (1918–95) British Conservative politician. Held senior Cabinet
posts under PMs Heath and Thatcher. Major influence on development of New Right and
neo-liberal opinions in the Conservative Party during the 1980s.
Karl KAUTSKY (1854–1938) German Social Democratic journalist, theorist and

politician. Strong Marxist element to his thought when he was young. Became less of a
Marxist in later life.
Alesander KERENSKY (1881–1970) Russian socialist. Led Russian government after

the overthrow of the tsar from May to November 1917. Fled Russia when Bolsheviks
seized power. Settled in USA.
John Maynard KEYNES, First Baron (1883–1946) British economist of New Liberal
views. Major influence on the social-democratic consensus and on mid-twentieth-century
economic thought by his Treatise on Money (1930) and The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money (1936). Stressed the importance of using state
economic levers to ensure full employment.
Nikita S. KHRUSHCHEV (1894–1971) Soviet politician and statesman. Became

Soviet leader soon after the death of Stalin (1953). Began de-Stalinisation process at home
and improvement of relations with the West abroad. Built Berlin Wall (1961). Overthrown in
1964 after perceived failures, including the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).
Neil KINNOCK (b.1942) British Labour politician. Leader (1983–92). European

commissioner.
Peter KROPOTKIN (1842–1921) Russian aristocrat, explorer, geographer and

anarchist thinker and writer. Argued for the creation of a society of self-sufficient commu-
nities. Major works: The Conquest of Bread (1906), Fields, Factories and Workshops
(1901) and Mutual Aid (1902).
Harold J. LASKI (1883–1950) British socialist writer, academic and Labour politician
on the left of the party. Major work: Democracy in Crisis (1933).
V. I. LENIN (Vladimir Ilyich ULYANOV) (1870–1924) Russian revolutionary leader of

the Bolsheviks (1893–1917) and Soviet leader (1917–24). Major reviser of Marxism in
voluminous writings. Created concept of a revolutionary elite to lead the working classes
in revolution. Major works: The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899), What Is To Be
Done? (1902), Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916).
Jean-Marie LE PEN (b.1928) French politician. Leader of the French National Front, a
party of the far right.
Primo LEVI (1919–87) Italian writer, chemist and commentator. Survivor of Auschwitz.
Wrote accounts of his experiences in books such as If This Is A Man (1947) and If Not Now,
When? (1982).
David LLOYD GEORGE, First Earl of Dwyfor (1863–1945) British Liberal politician
and statesman. As chancellor of the exchequer in 1909 introduced National Insurance as
part of the ‘People’s Budget’. Prime minister (1916–22). One of main figures at the
Versailles Peace Conference (1919).
John LOCKE (1632–1704) English liberal political philosopher, epistemologist,

medical and psychological researcher. His political writings stressed tolerance, the
existence of natural rights, the importance of property, the need for representative
government, justification for revolt. Very influential in British and American political thought.
Major works: Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), A Letter Concerning Toler-
ation (1689), Two Treatises on Government (1690).
LOUIS XIV (1638–1715) French monarch. Established the principle of ‘absolutism’

after many years of domestic conflict. Dominated Europe.
James LOVELOCK (b.1919) British scientist and writer. Developed the ‘Gaia
Hypothesis’ that sees the planet as a living, self-regulating system.
Georg LUKÁCS (1885–1971) Hungarian philosopher and critic. Marxist theorist.

Stalinist and supporter of the infallibility of the Communist Party. Major work: History and
Class Consciousness (1923).
James Ramsay MACDONALD (1866–1937) British Labour politician. A founder of

the Labour Party. Prime minister (1924, 1929–31 and 1931–5). His forming and
leadership of a Conservative-dominated coalition government in 1931 split the Labour
Party.
Niccolo MACHIAVELLI (1469–1527) Italian/Florentine writer, public official, diplomat

and playwright. Advocate of Italian unity. Established many of the major theoretical
principles of modern political science. Developed a theory on state power and how to get
and keep it. In his major works, The Prince and The Discourses on Livy, was seen to
advocate an immoral and wicked approach to practical politics. The church placed his
works on the Index of banned books after his death.
Alistair MACINTYRE (b.1929) British academic and philosopher. Major works: Short
History of Ethics (1963), Secularism and Moral Change (1967).
Iain MACLEOD (1913–70) British Conservative politician on ‘one nation’ wing of the party.
Harold MACMILLAN, First Earl of Stockton (1894–1986) British Conservative

politician. Held many senior posts in government. Prime minister (1957–63). In retirement
was very critical of Mrs Thatcher’s social and economic policies.
John MAJOR (b.1943) British Conservative politician. Held several senior government
posts before becoming Prime minister (1990–7).
Rev. Thomas R. MALTHUS (1766–1834) British economist. Supporter of liberal

economic principles. His rather gloomy Essay on the Principles of Population (1798)
argued that population would tend to outstrip food supply unless kept under control.
MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976) Chinese nationalist and communist leader. Leader of

China (1949–76). Revised Marxist-Leninist thinking to claim that revolution can occur in a
peasant as well as an industrial society. Believed in continuous revolution of the masses.
Stirred up the disastrous ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China during the 1960s.
Herbert MARCUSE (1898–1979) German neo-Marxist political philosopher. Strong

critic of industrial capitalism and its oppression. Stressed revolutionary potential of groups
other than the working classes. Major works: Reason and Revolution (1941), Eros and Civil-
isation (1958) and One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Capitalist
Society (1964).
Karl MARX (1818–83) German revolutionary socialist. Highly methodical and original
thinker. Major sociologist, historian and economist. Journalist and political activist. Collab-
orated with Friedrich Engels on development of socialist theory and critical analysis of
capitalism. Voluminous writer. The greatest single influence on the development of socialist
thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Major works: German Ideology (1846),
Communist Manifesto (1848), Capital (1867, 1885, 1894).
Giuseppe MAZZINI (1805–72) Italian nationalist leader, revolutionary, republican and

fighter for Italian unity and independence. Believed that world peace would follow when all
peoples lived under their own national governments.
Friedrich MEINECKE (1862–1954) German historian. Distinguished between ‘cultural
nations’ and ‘ political nations’. The former tend to have strong cultural unity, the latter are
more open. Major work: Cosmopolitanism and the National State (1907).
Robert MICHELS (1876–1936) German sociologist. In Political Parties (1911) Michels
developed his ‘iron law of oligarchy’: all organisations, however democratic or socialist, are
essentially run by specialised oligarchies, dominating apathetic and subordinate members.
James MILL (1773–1836) British philosopher, radical and economist. Closely
associated with Utilitarianism and classical liberalism. Supporter of the values of middle
classes. Father of J. S. Mill.
J. S. MILL, John Stuart (1806–73) British Utilitarian and liberal philosopher,
sometime MP. Great defender of individual freedom against tyrannical government and
tyrannical public opinion. Supported votes for women and working-class rights. A consid-
erable influence in development of liberal theory. Major works: On Liberty (1859), Consid-
erations in Representative Government (1861), The Subjection of Women (1869).
Kate MILLET (b.1934) American feminist writer of ‘second-wave’ feminism. Major
work: Sexual Politics (1970).
John MILTON (1608–74) English poet and political figure of the Civil Wars and Inter-
regnum. Justified the trial and execution of Charles I in The Tenure of Kings and Magis-
trates (1649). Defended the principle of press freedom in Areopagitica (1644). Major
poetical work: Paradise Lost (1667).
Juliet MITCHELL (b.1940) British Marxist socialist and feminist. Strong on interplay of
economic, social and cultural elements in position of women in society. Major work:
Women’s Estate (1971).
Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de MONTESQUIEU (1689–1755)
French philosopher. His Spirit of the Laws (1748) identified and discussed the concept of
the ‘Separation of Powers’ of legislature, executive and judiciary. Great influence on
American Constitution.
Thomas MORE (1478–1535) English statesman and writer. Chancellor under Henry
VIII. Refused to recognise Henry as head of the Church of England. Executed. Major work:
Utopia (1516).
William MORRIS (1834–96) British utopian socialist, poet and craftsman. Saw indus-
trialisation as undermining the pleasure of craftsmanship. Founded Socialist League and
Works and Crafts Movement.
Herbert MORRISON, Baron Morrison of Lambeth (1888–1965) Senior Labour
politician of the 1930s and 1940s. Architect of nationalisation policies of the 1940s.
Gaetano MOSCA (1857–1941) Italian political sociologist and legal academic.
Theorist of elitism. In The Ruling Class (1896) he saw elite rule a fact of history. Elites
exploit the ruled and seek to turn themselves into permanent elites.
Oswald MOSLEY (1896–1980) British politician. Once a leading Labour figure.

Founder and leader of British Union of Fascists. Imprisoned during the Second World War.
Charles MURRAY (b.1943) American conservative writer and thinker. Attempts to

explain poverty and the creation of the ‘underclass’ in terms of welfare dependency and
individual inadequacy. Major works: Losing Ground: American Social Policy (1950–1980)
(1984), The Bell Curve (1995).
Benito MUSSOLINI (1883–1945) Italian Fascist leader and dictator (1922–43).

Initially sceptical of Hitler, he allied Italy with Nazi Germany.
NAPOLEON I (Bonaparte) (1769–1821) French general and emperor (1804–14).

Brought order to France after the Revolution. Conqueror of much of Europe. Supported
expanding frontiers of human knowledge. Innovator in government and law. Major influence
on nineteenth-century politics, even after his defeat, exile and death.
NAPOLEON III (Bonaparte) (1808–73) French emperor (1852–71). Nephew of

Napoleon I. Overthrew the Second French Republic. Pursued expansionist foreign policy.
Defeated by Germany in Franco-Prussian War (1870–71).
Sergei NECHAEV (1847–82) Russian revolutionary and apostle of terrorist violence.

Major work: Revolutionary Catechism (1869).
Sir Isaac NEWTON (1642–1727) English scientist and mathematician. Discoverer of

the laws of gravity.
Friedrich NIETZSCHE (1844–1900) German philosopher, writer and essayist. Major

European thinker. Great believer in the importance of ‘Will’ in history and society, and the
role of strong individuals. Ideas picked up and misused by Nazis. Major works: Thus Spoke
Zarathustra (1883–4), Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Ecce Homo (1908), The Will to Power
(1901).
Steven NORRIS (b.1945) British Conservative politician of liberal views. MP

(1983–97).
Robert NOZICK (1938–2002) American philosopher and politics academic. Great

influence on New Right politics. Supporter of minimal state and minimal intervention.
Strong defence of property rights should be the basis of government and society. Major
work: Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
Michael OAKESHOTT (1901–90) British conservative political philosopher. Very influ-

ential thinker on modern New Right. Stressed important role of civil associations to
underline his support for a limited role for the state. Major works: Rationalism in Politics
and Other Essays (1962), On Human Conduct (1975).
George ORWELL, Eric Blair (1903–50) British socialist, journalist and novelist. Major
political novels were Animal Farm (1945) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).
Mosei OSTROGORSKI (1854–1919) Russian political scientist. Argued that modern

political parties were controlled by senior figures who undermined democratic influence of
individual members. Major work: Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties
(1902).
Robert OWEN (1771–1858) British utopian socialist, philanthropist and wealthy self-
made manufacturer. Challenged laissez-faire economic doctrines. Influential on devel-
opment of co-operative movement and British socialism. Experimented in new forms of
economic and social life at New Lanark (Scotland) and New Harmony (USA).
Thomas PAINE (1737–1809) British political writer and radical. Supported and was
personally involved in American Revolution and French Revolution. Personally involved in
both. Stressed egalitarianism and individual freedom. Influential on both socialism and liber-
alism. Major works: The Rights of Man (1791/2), The Age of Reason (1794).
Matthew PARRIS (b.1949) British broadcaster and journalist. Once a Conservative MP.
Sir Robert PEEL, Second Baron (1788–1850) British Conservative politician and
statesman. Held several Cabinet posts, including home secretary where he established the
police force. Repealed Corn Laws (1846). Supported Catholic Emancipation (1829). Prime
minister (1834–35, 1841–46).
PERICLES (c.490–429BC) Athenian statesman.
Philippe PÉTAIN (1856–1951) French general and politician. Hero in the First World
War. President of the Vichy regime which collaborated with Nazi Germany (1940–44).
Imprisoned after the Second World War.
General Augusto PINOCHET (b.1915) Chilean general and politician. Overthrew

elected government of Salvador Allende (1973). President of Chile (1973–98).
PLATO (427–347BC) Athenian philosopher. Pupil of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle.

Founded a university in Athens, the Academy. Writings are one of the most influential collec-
tions in history. Often seen as founding philosophy. His major works are Republic and Laws.
The former advocates a structured society with trained specialists as political leaders.
Major influence on the early development of Christianity and on Western culture.
Georgii V. PLEKHANOV (1856–1918) Russian Marxist thinker. Invented term ‘dialec-

tical materialism’. Introduced Marxism into Russian revolutionary movements.
Sir Karl R. POPPER (1902–94) British philosopher of Austrian descent. Defender of

liberal values and scientific thought. Opponent of Nazism and communism. Very influential
on neo-liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Major works: The Open society and Its Enemies
(1945), The Poverty of Historicism (1957), The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).
Michael PORTILLO (b.1953) British Conservative politician.
Enoch POWELL (1912–98) British Conservative and, later, Unionist politician on the
right of the party. Strongly opposed non-white immigration into Britain. Opposed Britain’s
membership of the European Union. Suspicious of US power in the world.
Pierre-Joseph PROUDHON (1809–65) French socialist and anarchist thinker. Early

writings stress a strong opposition to the state. Later writings see role for a very minimal
state. Major works: System of Alternative Economics (1846), What is Property? (1840),
The Federal Principle (1863).
Samuel von PUFENDORFF (1632–94) German writer on law. Major work: Of the Law
and Nature of Nations (1672).
Thomas RAINSBOROUGH (d.1648) English soldier and republican advocate during

the Civil War.
John RAWLS (1921–2002) American political philosopher. Very influential thinker on

liberalism and social democracy. Major works: A Theory of Justice (1970), Political Liber-
alism (1993).
Ronald REAGAN (b.1911) Thirty-ninth president of the USA (1981–89). Presided over
massive US military build-up and record federal budget deficit. But instrumental in helping
to bring Cold War to an end in the 1980s.
David RICARDO (1772–1823) British economist, politician and stockbroker. Political

radical. Founder of classical school of political economy. Major work: Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation (1817).
Oscar ROMERO (1917–80) Salvadorean Roman Catholic bishop and Nobel Prize
winner (1979). Murdered after speaking out in favour of the poor.
Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU (1712–78) French political philosopher and educational

theorist. Offended French government. Major intellectual influence on French Revolutionary
thought. Belief in natural human goodness and the corrupting influence of civilisation on
human nature. Wide impact on socialist, liberal, anarchist and fascist ideas. Concept of the
‘General Will’ a basis for democracy and totalitarianism. Major works: The Social Contract
(1762), Emile (1762), Confessions (1770).
Salman RUSHDIE (b.1947) British novelist and journalist. Offended orthodox Muslims
by his The Satanic Verses (1988) and subsequently went into hiding after death threats.
John RUSKIN (1819–1900) British author, social philosopher and art critic; estab-
lished the Pre-Raphaelites. Founded Ruskin College, Oxford, for working people. Highly
critical of capitalist industrialism and its damaging impact on beauty, sound social relation-
ships and misuse of wealth.
Claude, Comte de SAINT-SIMON (1760–1835) French aristocrat and socialist.

With Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, Saint-Simon is seen as one of the founding fathers
of socialism. Stressed importance of application of knowledge to solution of social
problems.
Lord SALISBURY, Robert Arthur Salisbury, Third Marquess (1830–1903) British

Conservative politician and statesman. Held numerous senior government posts. Prime
minister (1885–86, 1886–92, 1895–1902).
Michael SANDEL (b.1953) Contemporary American professor of government. Commu-

nitarian thinker, one of several who have stressed the failings of liberal individualism. Has
written many books on politics and democracy. Major work: Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice (1982).
Hjalmar SCHACHT (1877–1970) Nazi German finance minister.
Fritz SCHUMACHER (1911–77) British-German environmental theorist, conserva-

tionist and economist. Stress on importance of self-help technology for developing nations.
Major work: Small is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered (1973).
Joseph Alois SCHUMPETER (1883–1950) Austrian-American sociologist and

economist. Stress on the role of the innovative capitalist in economic change. ‘Creative
destruction’ is at heart of capitalism. Major works: Theory of Economic Development
(1912), Business Cycles (1939), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942).
Roger SCRUTON (b.1944) British Conservative philosopher and historian of

philosophy.
Claude de SEYSSEL (c.1510) Councillor to King Louis XII of France.
George Bernard SHAW (1856–1950) Irish playwright, commentator and wit. Member
of Fabian society.
Samuel SMILES (1812–1904) British doctor and writer. Advocate of individual effort
and initiative as outlined in biographies of great engineers and, chiefly, Self Help (1859).
Adam SMITH (1723–90) British economist. In The Wealth of Nations (1776) he

outlined the basic theory of free-market economics. Of considerable influence on the devel-
opment of nineteenth-century liberalism and modern neo-liberalism.
John SMITH (1938–94) British Labour politician and leader 1992–1994.
Georges SOREL (1847–1922) French supporter of revolutionary violence. Very influ-

ential on fascist thinking. Major work: Reflections on Violence (1905).
Herbert SPENCER (1820–1903) British philosopher and journalist. Supporter of

evolutionary concepts. Major work: Principles of Psychology (1855) and Man Versus the
State (1884).
Baruch SPINOZA (1632–77) Dutch philosopher. Major writings are on religion and
ethics.
Joseph STALIN, Joseph Djugeshvili (1879–1953) Soviet leader (1924–53) and

dictator. Developed concept of ‘Socialism in One Country’ and shaped Marxist theory to
suit his own grip on power. Industrialised USSR in 1930s. Massive purges of real and
imagined opponents in 1930s under ‘The Terror’. Deal with Nazi Germany in August 1939
did not prevent the USSR being attacked in 1941. War leader in Second World War. Spread
communist control over a number of states in Eastern Europe.
Max STIRNER, real name Johann Casper Schmidt (1806–56) German

philosopher. Influential on Marx and individualist anarchism. Major work: The Ego and His
Own (1845).
R. H. TAWNEY, Richard Henry (1880–1962) British socialist, educator and

economic historian. Active in trade union and Labour movement. One of first critics of an
affluent society. Believed that capitalism created moral disorder. Major works: Religion and
the Rise of Capitalism (1926), The Acquisitive Society (1921), Equality (1931).
Harriet TAYLOR (1807–58) British feminist. Wife of J. S. Mill. Influenced his views on
female suffrage.
Margaret H. THATCHER (b.1925) British politician. Leader of Conservative Party

(1975–90). Supporter of neo-liberal and New Right policies for social reform.
Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE (1805–59) French aristocrat, liberal historian, sociologist

and politician. Very influential thinker on the problems of democracy. Author of Democracy
in America (1835 and 1840).
Leo TOLSTOY (1828–1910) Russian aristocrat, novelist and pacifist. Writer of consid-
erable eminence. Chief works: War and Peace (1863–9), Anna Karenina (1873–7).
Destutt de TRACEY (1754–1836) French philosopher. Invented term ‘ideology’ as the

science of ideas.
Leon TROTSKY, Lev Davidovich Bronstein (1879–1940) Russian revolutionary and

opponent of Stalin. Supporter of concept of global revolutionary movement for socialism.
Murdered by Stalin’s agent in 1940.
Franjo TUDJMAN (1922–99) Croatian president (1990–99). Academic historian and

Croatian nationalist. Declared Republic of Croatia independent of Yugoslavia (1992).
Graham WALLAS (1858–1932) British socialist and political psychologist. Stressed

the irrational forces that influence politics. Major works: Human Nature and Politics (1908),
The Great Society (1914).
Michael WALZER (b.1935) American academic in politics, history, moral philosophy,

concepts of the just war and the welfare state.
Barbara WARD (1914–81) and Rene DUBOS (1901–82) Ward was a British
economist, journalist and conservationist, Dubos an American-French genetic scientist.
Authors of Spaceship Earth (1966) and Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a
Small Planet (1972).
Beatrice WEBB (1858–1943) and Sidney WEBB, Baron Passfield (1859–1947)

Leading British members of the Fabian Society, researchers in economic and social
history, and campaigners for social reform.
Max WEBER (1864–1920) German sociologist. Major theorist of social class, bureau-
cracy and development of capitalism. Believed that he was modernising Marxism –
although usually seen as challenging it. Major work: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism (1904–5).
Ann WIDDECOMBE (b.1947) British Conservative politician and novelist.
Harold WILSON, Baron Wilson of Rievaulx (1916–95) British Labour politician,

academic and writer. Cabinet minister in post-war Labour Government. Labour leader
(1963–75). Prime minister (1964–70 and 1974–76). Author of a number of books on
British politics and Cabinet government.
Thomas Woodrow WILSON (1856–1924) 27th US President (1913–21). Liberal and

idealist politician. Took USA into the First World War. At Versailles Peace Conference
pressed for national self-determination and the League of Nations. Introduced women’s
suffrage.
Gerrard WINSTANLEY (1609–after 1660) English radical pamphleteer. Leader of the

Diggers movement for land reform. Influential on socialist ideas. Major work: The Laws of
Freedom in a Platform (1652).
Mary WOLLSTONECRAFT (1759–97) British early feminist and campaigner for

women’s rights. Major work: A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792).
William WORDSWORTH (1770–1850) British poet. Particularly associated with

Lakeland and the Romantic movement. Major works: Lyrical Ballads (1798), The Prelude
(1850), ‘Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood’ (1807).
Suggested further reading
Below is a portion of the vast literature available for further reading in this subject and
which has been consulted during the preparation of this book. Key texts by major
authors are cited in individual chapters and so are not included here. You should also
keep up to date with Talking Politics and Politics Review, magazines that often publish
articles about political ideas and movements. Ultimately, even the best textbooks
cannot keep you abreast of how key ideas relate to the world of politics. Regular
reading of good-quality newspapers and newsmagazines is vital to developing a fully
rounded grasp of the subject. We particularly recommend the Guardian Weekly and The
Economist. Similarly, television and radio (especially BBC2 and Radio 4) broadcast
many valuable and interesting programmes that relate to the issues raised by this book.
Adams, A., The Logic of Political Belief (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).

Adams, I., Ideology and Politics in Britain Today (Manchester University Press, 1998).
Alter, P., Nationalism (Edward Arnold, 1989).
Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nation-
alism (NLB/Verso, 1983).
Arblaster, A., The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Blackwell, 1984).
Bacherach, P., and M. Baratz, ‘The Two Faces of Power’, in F. G. Castles, D. J. Murray and
D. C. Potter (eds.), Decisions, Organisations and Society (Penguin, 1981).
Barbalet, J. M., Citizenship (Open University Press, 1988).
Barker, E., Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, 1961).
Barker, J., Arguing for Equality (Verso, 1987).
Bartleson, J., A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Bauman, Z., Freedom (Open University press, 1988).
Beauvoir, S. de, The Second Sex (Penguin, 1953).
Bedau, H. A. (ed.), Justice and Equality (Prentice-Hall, 1971).
Beer, S., ‘The Roots of New Labour: Liberalism Rediscovered’, The Economist (7 February
1998), pp. 23–5.
Bellamy, R., Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical Argument (Polity Press, 1992).
Berki, R. N., Modern Ideology: SOCIALISM (J. M. Dent, 1975).
Berlin, I., ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press,
1958).
Birch, A. H., The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy (Routledge, 1993).
Bosenquet, B., The Philosophical Theory of the State (Macmillan, 1923).
Bottomore, T. B. and M. Rubel, Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social
Philosophy (Penguin, 1974).
Bramwell, A., Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (Yale University Press, 1989).
Bryson, V., Feminist Political Theory: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1992).

Bryson, V., Women in British Politics (Huddersfield Pamphlets in History and Politics,
1994).
Burleigh, M., The Third Reich: A New History (Macmillan, 2000).
Callaghan, J., Socialism in Britain since 1884 (Blackwell, 1990).
Connelly, J. and P. Norris, ‘Making Green Policy: A Guide to the Politics of the Environment’,
Talking Politics 4:2 (1991/92,), pp. 96–100.
Cooper, R., ‘Dawn Chorus for the New Age of Empire’, Sunday Times (28 October 2001).
Coxall, B. and L. Robins, Contemporary British Politics, 2nd edn, (Macmillan, 1994).
Cranston, M., Freedom: A New Analysis (Longmans, 1954).
Cranston, M., What are Human Rights? (The Bodley Head, 1963).
Crespigny, A. de and K. Minogue, Contemporary Political Philosophers (Methuen, 1976).
Crichley, T. A., The Conquest of Violence (Constable, 1970).
Crick, B., Socialism (Open University, 1987).
Crick, B. (ed.), National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom (Blackwell, 1991).
Crick, B., In Defence of Politics (Penguin, 1994).
Dahl, R., Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989).
Deutsch, K., Nationalism and Social Communication (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1953).
Dobson, A., The Green Reader (Andre Deutsch, 1991).
Dobson, A., Green Political Thought: An Introduction (Routledge, 1992).
Drucker, H., P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble and G. Peele (eds.), Developments in British Politics
(Macmillan, 1984).
Drucker, H., P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble and G. Peele (eds.), Developments in British Politics 2
(Macmillan, 1988).
Dunleavy, P., A. Gamble and G. Peele, Developments in British Politics 3 (Macmillan, 1990).
Dunleavy, P., A. Gamble, I. Holliday and G. Peele (eds.), Developments in British Politics 4
(Macmillan, 1993).
Dunn, J. (ed.), Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508BC to AD1993 (Oxford University
Press, 1992).
Duprat, G., N. Parker and A.-M. Rieu (eds.), WHAT IS EUROPE? Book 3: European Democ-
ratic Culture (The Open University and European Association of Distance Teaching
Universities, 1993).
Dutton, D., British Politics Since 1945: The Rise and Fall of Consensus (Blackwell, 1991).
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1979).
Eagleton, T., Ideology: An Introduction (Verso, 1991).
Eatwell, R., Fascism: A History (Vintage, 1996).
Eatwell, R. and A. Wright (eds.), Contemporary Political Ideologies (Pinter, 1993).
Eccleshall, R., British Liberalism: Liberal Thought from the 1640s to 1980 (Longman,
1986).
Eccleshall, R., V. Geoghegan, R. Jay, M. Kenny, I. MacKenzie and R. Wilford, Political Ideas:
An Introduction (Routledge, 1996).
‘Liberalism Defined: The Perils of Complacency’, The Economist (21 December 1996),
pp. 19–21.
‘Survey: FULL DEMOCRACY: Happy 21st century, voters!’, The Economist (21 December
1996).
342 Suggested further reading
‘Nations and their Past: The Uses and Abuses of History’, The Economist (21 December
1996), pp. 53–6.
Etzioni, A., The Spirit of Community (Fontana, 1995).
Femia, J., Gramsci’s Political Thought (Oxford University Press, 1981).
Finer, S. E., Comparative Government (Penguin Books, 1974).
Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980).
Flathman, R., Political Obligation (Atheneum, 1972).
Friedman, D., The Machinery of Freedom (Harper & Row, 1973).
Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell, 1983).
Goodwin, B., Using Political Ideas (John Wiley and Sons, 2001).
Goodwin, G. L., ‘The Erosion of External Sovereignty?’ Government and Opposition, 9:1
(1974), pp. 61–78.
Goodwin, R. E., Green Political Theory (Polity Press, 1992).
Gray, J., Liberalism (Open University Press, 1995).
Gray, T., Freedom (Macmillan, 1990).
Green, D. G., The New Right (Wheatsheaf Books, 1987).
Griffin, R., The Nature of Fascism (Routledge, 1993).
Griffin, R. (ed.), Oxford Readers: Fascism (Oxford University Press, 1995).
Hampsher-Monk, I., A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from
Hobbes to Marx (Blackwell, 1995).
Harris, G., The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today (Edinburgh University Press,
1990).
Harris, G., ‘The Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe’, Politics Review, 8:3 (1999), pp.
8–10.
Hastings, A., The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism
(Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Hattersley, R., Choose Freedom (Michael Joseph, 1987).
Hayes, P., Fascism (Allen and Unwin, 1973).
Heater, D., Citizenship: The Civil Ideal in World History, Politics and Education (Longman,
1990).
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Held, D., Political Theory Today (Polity, 1991).
Held, D., ‘Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order’, Political Studies, 11
(1992), pp. 10–39.
Held, D., Prospects for Democracy (Polity, 1996).
Heywood, A., Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1994).
Heywood, A., POLITICS (Macmillan, 1997).
Heywood, A., Political Ideologies: An Introduction (Macmillan, 1998).
Hinsley, F. H., Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Hobsbawm, E., Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
James, A., Sovereign Statehood (Allen and Unwin, 1986).
Jowett, M., ‘New Feminism in Contemporary Britain’, Politics Review, 9:3 (2000), pp.
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Kedourie, E., Nationalism (Hutchinson, 1985).
Kennedy, P., Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (HarperCollins, 1993).
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Leach, R. Contemporary Political Studies: BRITISH POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES (Philip Allen,
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Plamenatz, J., Man and Society, Volume One (Longman, 1976).
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344 Suggested further reading
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Thomas, G. P., ‘British Politics 1945 to Date: The Postwar Consensus’, Taking Politics, 7:2
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Waldren, J., The Problems of Rights (Oxford University Press, 1984).
Walter, N., The New Feminism (Little, Brown, 1998).
Watts, D., ‘The Growing Attractions of Direct Democracy’, Talking Politics, 10:1 (1997),
pp. 44–9.
White, R. J., The Conservative Tradition (Adam and Unwin, 1964).
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pp. 54–8.
Woodcock, G., Anarchism (Penguin, 1983).
Wright, A., British Socialism (Longman, 1983).
Wright, A., Socialisms: Theories and Practices (Oxford University Press, 1987).
Wright, A., ‘Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism’, in R. Eatwell and A. Wright
Wright Mills, C., The Marxists (Penguin, 1975).
Index
Abortion Act (1967) 303 anti-Semitism 163, 270

Abortion Law Reform (1967) 298 apartheid 26, 108
absolutist monarchy 72 apathy, political 68, 79–80
Act of Settlement (1688) 197 apolitical, meaning 300
Act of Union (1801) 51 Aquinas, St Thomas 323
active citizenship 132 Arab world 168
Adam Smith Institute 209 Arcadia 276
Adams, Ian 284 Arendt, Hannah 259, 323
Aeschylus 84 aristocracy 61
‘affairs of state’ 3 Aristotle 3, 6, 17, 61, 70, 323
Afghanistan 26, 28, 208, 245 see also Plato
Africa 42, 168 Armenians 40, 41
agenda-setting 9 Aryan purity 263
AIDS 317 Atlantic Alliance 149
Althusser, Louis 247, 323 Attlee, Clement 228, 323
American Revolution (1776–83) 160, 186, Augustus, Caius Octavianus 324
197, 198 Australia 66, 167
Amnesty International 19 authority 5, 179, 185–6
anarchism 14, 248–55 Axis powers, defeat of 167
critiques 253–4
economics 252 Bachrach, Peter 8
and environmentalism 292–3 Bakunin, Michael 324
equality 251 Baldwin, Stanley 188, 324
human nature 249–50 Balkans 165, 208
liberty 251 Ball, John 324
meaning 248 Bangladesh 47
role 216 Baratz, Martin 8
and socialism 238 Battle of the Boyne (1690) 54
state 250–1 Beer, Samuel 148, 324
sub-species 252–3 Belgium 40, 44, 171
anarcho-communism 253 Bell, Daniel 142, 143, 324
anarcho-syndicalists 252 Benn, Tony 231, 324
ancien régime 138, 160 Bentham, Jeremy 12, 107, 128, 198, 318,
Ancient Greece 65, 70–1 324
Ancient Sparta 93 Berlin, Sir Isaiah 93–5, 101, 209, 324
Anderson, Benedict 39 Bernstein, Eduard 218, 243, 324
Anglo-Irish War (1919–21) 54 Beveridge, Sir William/Beveridge Report
Animal Liberation Front 319 (1942) 112, 201, 229, 324
animal rights movement 124, 317–19 Bhopal chemical plant explosion (India,
anti-clericalism 219 1984) 277
anti-colonialism 168 Biafra 42
346 Index
bias of the system (Steven Lukes) 9 Butler, R. A. 112, 177, 188, 325
Bill of Rights (1689) 197
biological characteristics 43 Cambodia, as self-serving state 22
biosphere 277 Canada 24, 167, 169
Bismarck, Otto von 25, 325 capitalism 91
Blachford, Robert 225, 325 Carson, Rachel 277, 325
Blair, Tony 132, 151, 231, 232, 233–4, 325 Catholicism 44, 45, 50
BNP (British National Party) 270, 271 Central and South America, religious
Bolshevik Party 140, 253 affiliation 45
Bosnia 28, 43, 166 CGT (Confédération Général du Travail)
bourgeoisie 139, 241 253
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918) 244 Chad 42
Bright, John 207, 325 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart 258, 325
Britain 48–9 Chamberlain, Joseph 187, 325
civil service 75 charismatic authority 5
civil wars in 7 Charlemagne, Charles the Great 325
Communist Party 245, 247 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights
democracy 61 125–6
elected dictatorship 181 Chartists 219
fascism in 269–72 Chechnya 147
gender equality 114 Chernobyl nuclear power explosion (Soviet
Green Party 278 Union) (1986) 277
ideology, role of (age of consensus) Chicago School of economists 207
147–52 China
language use 44 Hong Kong returned to 49
legitimation of government 66 national identity 41, 49
majority rule 67 nationalism 161, 167, 168
Marxism 225 ‘one child’ policy 280
moral obligations 126 People’s Republic 246
National Front 270 population 23
national identity 40–1, 48–9 as self-serving state 22
nationalism 156 state theories/characteristics 22, 23
socialism 218–19 states of 41
Socialist Party 247 Christendom 160
sovereignty 27 Christian Democrats, Germany 184
danger to 182, 185 Christian Socialists 224
see also United Kingdom Christianity 17, 32, 44, 45, 225, 310
British Empire 49 Churchill, Sir Winston 59, 326
British Isles 44, 49 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 131, 326
British National Party (BNP) 270, 271 citizen democracy 65–6, 81
British nations 48–56 citizen development 78
Britain 48–9 citizens 131
England 49–50 Citizen’s Charter 132, 191
Northern Ireland 53–6 citizenship 13, 130–2, 133
Scotland 50–2 British 49
Wales 52–3 equality of rights 68
Bruce-Glasier, John 225, 325 legal 130
BUF (British Union of Fascists) 269, 270 and nation 39
Bukowski, Charles 59, 325 nature 130–1
Burke, Edmund 64, 140, 175, 176, 177, participatory 131–2
181, 325 sociological 131
Burma 166 citizenship nationality 41
Bush, George W. 210, 325 civic nationalism 156–7, 172
Index 347
civic obligations 127 history

civil disobedience 97–8 nineteenth/early twentieth centuries
civil rights 125 186–7
class analysis 217, 219 inter-war years 187–8
see also social class after 1945 188–9
class equality 115 Thatcherism 189–91
class struggle 21–2 post-Thatcherism 191–3
classical liberalism 20, 198–200, 207, libertarian strand 186
211 on nationalism 163
classical socialism 230 and New Liberalism 201
classless society 191 New Right 186, 190
Claude, Comte de Saint-Simon 224, 336 patriotism 181
Clause IV 227, 231, 233 Scotland 51
Clause 28 315 Wales 53
coalition government 227 see also Labour Party (British); Thatcher,
Cobden, Richard 207, 326 Margaret; Thatcherism
Cold War 29, 147, 157, 159, 188 Constant, Henri Benjamin 90–1
Cole, G. D. H. 228, 326 constitutionalism 39
collectivism/collective ownership 112, 222, covenant (religion) 127
241 CPGB (Communist Party of Great Britain)
Combat 18 270 245, 247
command economy 252 Crichley, T. A. 17
common ownership 221 Crick, Bernard 4, 59, 326
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) Croatia 45, 166, 269
245, 247 Crosland, Anthony 189, 229, 326
conscientious objection 96 Cuba 246
conscription 96 cultural characteristics 43
consensus, age of 147–52 Cyprus 166
post-war 148, 149–50 Czechoslovakia 19, 30, 166, 169, 245
Thatcher/Major governments 151–2
conservatism 14, 174–94 Dahl, Robert 8
American 175 dark greens 278, 290
authority 185–6 Darwin, Charles 43, 200, 210, 260, 326
democracy 73 de Beauvoir, Simone 298, 324
economy 183–5 de Gaulle, Charles 129, 328
environmentalism 291 de Tocqueville, Alexis 199, 206, 338
evolution of thought 176–8 decision-making 8
feminism 305 deep greens 278, 290
freedom 186 defensive democracy 63–5, 80
historical origins 176–8 Delors, Jacques 326
human nature 178–9 Demand Management techniques 149,
institutions 183 207, 229
law 185 democracy 58–82
organic view of society 179–80 and anti-democratic forces 80
patriotism 181–2 and apathy 68, 79–80
politics, as limited activity 180–1 arguments against 73–6
property 183 economic relations 75–6
tradition 182–3 feminist critique 76
Conservative Party (British) incapability 75
authoritarian strand 186 liberal concerns 75
‘big business’, support from 183 specialisation 74–5
consensus, political 150 arguments in support 76–9
and equality of opportunity 112 citizen development 78
348 Index
elites 73, 76–7 Duce 265

participation 78 Dworkin, Andrea 306
social change 78–9 Dworkin, Ronald 209, 327
social cohesion 77–8
citizen 65–6 Easter Island 289
conditions for development 70–3 Easter Rising (1916) 55
consent 67 Eastern Europe, nationality 46
decline of, ancient world 71 Easton, David 5
defensive 63–5, 80 ECHR (European Convention on Human
defining 13, 60 Rights) 123, 185
direct 63–5, 66, 67 ecologism see environmentalism
elements 60–70 economic freedom 86–7
equality of citizenship rights 68 economics
future 79–81 anarchism 252
and globalisation 79 conservatism 183–5
green issues 283 Demand Management techniques 149,
irrational forces 80 207, 229
legitimation of government 66–7 and democracy, critique of 75–6
and majority rule 67–8, 81 environmentalism/ecologism 284–6
Marxist 75–6 fascism 265–6
and nationality 46 ideology 138–9
and need 11–12 liberalism 206–7
people 66–7 Marxism 241–2
and politics 5–6 see also Keynes, John Maynard
public opinion 69 Education Act (1944) 112
republican 65–6 Education Action Zones 233
rule of law 39, 59, 70 egalitarians/egalitarianism 105, 107,
and social change 78–9 109–10, 113, 221
sovereignty 67 anti-egalitarians 111
as system of government 61–6 Ehrlich, Paul 277, 327
democratic centralism 244 Eliot, T. S. 180, 188, 327
democratic culture 70 elites
demos (people) 60 and democracy 73, 76–7
Denmark 40, 66 and fascism 263–4
Derrida, Jacques 326 and nationalism 162
Descartes, R. 72, 326 and politics 73
deserts, just 11 and state 42
Deutsch, Karl 38 Elshtain, Jean Bethke 305
devolution 233 Employment Protection Act (1975)
Dickens, Charles 43, 326–7 298
Diggers 104, 223 Engels, Friedrich 138, 239, 304, 327
direct democracy 63–5, 66, 67 England 49–50
Direct Rule (Northern Ireland) 54 English Civil Wars (1642–49) 104, 122
Disability Discrimination Act (1995) 314 English language 44
disabled rights movement 313–15 Enlightenment
disasters, environmental 277 conservatism 176, 193
Disraeli, Benjamin 179, 187, 327 fascism 258
distributional equality 106, 111–14 feminism 296
Divine Right of Kings 44 ideology 138
division of labour 74 national identity 47
Divorce Law Reform (1969) 298 socialism 220, 221
Domestic Violence Act (1977) 298 Environmental Sustainability Index (2002)
Dubos, Rene 277, 338 293
Index 349
environmentalism/ecologism 15, 274–94 eugenics 262, 283

anti-materialism 285 Euro-sceptics 182
conservative 291 European Commission 125
critique of green position see green European Convention on Human Rights
themes: critique 123, 185
growth 285–6 European Union (EU) 27, 33, 125, 268
industrialism 284–5 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 231–2
liberal 291–3 expert opinion 69
mysticism 281 extermination camps 99
other ideologies contrasted 278–9 externalities 292
rise of 276–8
socialist 291 Fabianism 219, 226
sustainability 286 Fabius Maximus Cunctator 226
see also green themes faith communities 233
equal consideration principle 108 Falklands war (1982) 49
equal opportunities 22, 108, 112–13 Fall of Man 178
Equal Pay Act (1970) 114, 298, 303 false consciousness 242
equal pay legislation 22 family, importance of 180
equal rights principle 107 Farrakhan, Louis 171, 327
equal voting 108–9 fascism 14–15, 256–73
equality 13, 103–20 aggression/conflict 261
anarchism 251 anti-intellectualism 261
before the law 109 in Britain 269–72
of citizenship rights 68 conformity 261–2
class 115 economic theory 265–6
decline of 117–19 and environmentalism 292
development of 104–5 explanations 258–9
distributional 106, 111–14 government 265
equal consideration 108 ideas 259–67
equal opportunities 22, 108, 112–13 irrationalism 261–2
foundational 105, 106–11 leader/elite 263–4
and freedom 84–5 modern European 267–9
gender 114 nation/race 262–3
group rights 114–15 non-materialism 261
individual 105 racial laws 260
international society 116–17 and religion 262
and need 11–12 social policy 266–7
participation rights 108–9 state 264–5
as political principle 106, 107 war 260
primary 105, 106–11 Fascist Grand Council 265
racial 115 Fatherland 48
secondary 106, 111–14 Federation of Conservative Students 186
social rights 109–11 feminism 15, 295–308
and socialism 221–2 ‘first-wave’ 297–8
welfare 109–11 ‘second-wave’ 298, 299
equality of outcome 113–14 ‘third-wave’ 299–300
ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) 231–2 democracy, critique of 76
Estates General 141 and environmentalism 292
ethical socialism 225 gender 300, 301
Ethiopia 42 ideology 302
ethnic cleansing 269, 283 legislation 298, 303
ethnic nationalism 156, 172 patriarchy 302
EU (European Union) 27, 33, 125, 268 and politics 3–4
350 Index
public/private spheres 301 negative 89, 94–5

schools 302–6 positive 93–4
conservative 305 and property 87
liberal 303 as socialist goal 222
radical 305–7 and society 99–100
socialist 303 and state 95–9
sex 300 under the law 86
sexism 301 Freedom Association 209
state theories 22 freedom of opinion/expression 85–6
Fenians 55 French Revolution (1789)
feudal era 122 and conservatism 176, 177, 186, 193
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 47, 327 and feminism 296
Fiji 24 and liberalism 198
Filmer, Sir Robert 176, 327 and nationalism 160
Finland 40 and socialism 223–4
Finns 46 Friedan, Betty 298, 303, 328
First International (1864–76) 243 Friedman, Milton 184, 207, 209, 328
First World War (1914–18) 54, 244, 259, Fromm, Erich 259, 328
297 Führer principle 264, 265
Five-Year Plans (USSR) 245 Fukuyama, Francis 142, 143, 328
Foot, Michael 231, 327 fundamentalism
Foucault, Michel 9, 327 critique 312–13
foundational equality 105, 106–11 current 311–12
Fourier, Charles 217, 224, 303, 328 religious 310–11
France secular 310
Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) futurism 258
156
Estates General 141 G8 group 248
Germany, defeat by 129 Gaitskell, Hugh 189, 328
legitimation of government 67 Gandhi, Mahatma 97
National Front 268 Garrison, William Lloyd 328
national identity 45 gay rights movement 315–17
nationalism 156, 159 Gellner, Ernest 40, 162, 328
origins 24 gender, sex/sexism distinguished 300–1
population 23 gender equality 114
referenda in 66 General Strike (1926) 188, 227
sovereignty, asserting of 30 General Will 67, 90, 264
Third French Republic (1870–1940) 158 Genesis 282
see also French Revolution (1789) genocide 260, 262
France, Anatole 328 Gentile, Giovanni 3
franchise, extension of 179 geography of states 24
Franco, General Francisco 62, 267, 328 Georgia 147
free market 11, 148 Germany
free trade 184 Christian Democrats 184
freedom 13, 83–102 ethnic nationalism 156
conservatism 186 Green Party 278
contributors 88–95 legitimation of government 67
economic 86–7 modern 25
and equality 84–5 national identity 39
individual 85 nationalism 159
liberalism 204–5 and social democracy 20–1
and liberty 84 Social Democratic Party 218
national 87–8 unification (1871) 158, 160, 169
Index 351
Weimar Republic 62 Hailsham, Lord Quintin Hogg 180, 185,

see also Nazi Germany 329
Gilmour, Sir Ian 184, 328 Hanoverians, accession to British throne
Gladstone, William Ewart 198, 328 (1714) 51
glasnost (openness) 246 Hardie, Keir 225, 329
globalisation 30, 33, 79, 162, 231 Hastings, Adrian 39
Glorious Revolution (1688) 197 Hattersley, Roy 329
GNP (Gross National Product) 284 Healey, Denis 329
Gobineau, Arthur 258, 329 Heath, Sir Edward 189, 329
Godwin, William 248, 249, 329 Hegel, G. W. F. 240, 258, 329
Gorbachev, Mikhail 246, 329 Herder, Johann Gottfried 47, 330
Gotha Programme (SDP) 243 hierarchy 179
government Himmler, Heinrich 264, 330
coalition 227 Hinduism 45
democracy, as system of 61–6 Hitler, Adolf
fascism 265 and democracy 60
and law 25–6 and fascism 258, 259, 261, 262, 265,
limited (liberalism) 205–6 266
and nation 45–6 and state 22
popular 60 HIV/AIDS 317
representative 60 Hobbes, Thomas
state distinguished from 18 and conservatism 176, 185
weak, consequences of 185 and democracy 72
Gramsci, Antonio 139 and environmentalism 283
Great Britain see Britain and freedom 89
Greece 45 and liberalism 197
Green, T. H. 200, 329 and obligation 127–8
green movement/greens 275 and power 7
Green Party Hobhouse, L. T. 201, 330
Britain 234, 278 Hobsbawm, Eric 39, 145
Germany 278 Hobson, J. A. 201, 330
green themes Holocaust 267
critique 286–90 Holy Roman Emperor 160
intellectual incoherence 287–8 Home Rule (Northern Ireland) 54, 55
practical difficulties 289–90 Homeland 48
scientific implausibility 288–9 homo sapiens 43
economics 284–6 homosexuality 315–17
human nature 279–82 Hong Kong 49
mysticism 280–1 House of Lords, reform proposals 186
nature 279–82 human nature
politics 282–4 anarchism 249–50
population control 280 environmentalism/ecologism 279–82
science 280–1 Hobbes on 7
‘spaceship earth’ 279–80 optimistic view of 204, 220–1
Greenpeace 19 pessimistic view of 178–9
Greer, Germaine 298, 299, 329 human rights 123, 124–5
Gross National Product (GNP) 284 Hungarian Revolution (1956) 245
group rights 114–15 Hungary 30, 41
Guardians (Plato) 74, 75 Hutton, Will 234
Gulf War (1990–91) 49, 208 Hyndman, H. M. 225, 330
Gypsies, massacre of 43, 146
ideology 13, 135–53
Hague, William 175, 191–2, 329 challenges (1970s) 150–1
352 Index
class structure 138–9 Jenkins, Peter 148, 330

consensus, age of 147–52 Jewish people 46, 263
‘dominant’ 139–40 massacre of 43, 146, 260
economic factors 138–9 see also anti-Semitism
end of 142–3 Joravsky, David 137
feminism 302 Joseph, Sir Keith 330
horizontal/vertical axis 142 Jospin, Lionel 268
‘left’, ‘right’, ‘centre’ 141–2 Judaism 45, 310
Marxists 138–9 Judeo-Christian tradition 282
meaning 137–42 justice 9–12
modern history 144–7
and movements, competitive nature Kant, Immanuel 90
319–21 Katanga 42
nationalism as 155–9 Kautsky, Karl 239, 330
political spectrum 142 Kerensky, Alesander 244, 330–1
‘relaxed’ 141 Keynes, John Maynard 112, 149, 151, 184,
‘restrictive’ 140–1 201, 207, 229
transmission 143–4 Khrushchev, Nikita S. 245, 331
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 232, Kinnock, Neil 151, 231, 331
248 Kissinger, Henry 74
imperialism 140, 158, 161, 210, 285 Korea 41, 246
India 23, 40, 45, 47, 166, 168, 277 Kosovo 43, 210
Indian Congress Party 97 kratein (to rule) 60
individual equality 105 Kropotkin, Peter 248, 250, 253, 331
individual freedom 85 Kubrick, Stanley 38
individualistic, meaning 300 Kurds 18, 40, 41
industrialisation/industrialism 215, 284–5
inequality 180, 225 Labour Party (British) 226–34
inflation 230 Blairism 233–4
informed general opinion 69 constitutional changes, proposed
Institute of Directors 209 185–6
Institute for Economic Affairs and Aims of and equality of opportunity 112
Industry 189 formation 226–7
institutions 183 history
interest groups 19 1920s and 1930s 187, 227–8
interests, real/perceived 7 1945–51 188, 228–9
international law 26 1951–79 229–30
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 232, 1979–97 52, 53, 230–2
248 New Labour 132, 210, 231, 233, 235
international politics 166–7 and New Liberalism 201
international society 17, 29–30, 116–17 in opposition and government 229–32
International Working Men’s Association in power 228–30
(First International) 243 prior to 224–6
internet, sovereignty, challenges to 32 and quasi-Conservative policies 191
Iraq 168, 208 and Scotland 52
Ireland 41, 44 socialism outside 234
Islam 45, 93 trade unions, links with 219
Israel 45, 47 and Wales 53
Italy 23, 43, 45, 66, 159, 160 see also Conservative Party (British);
socialism
James VI and I, King 48, 50 Labour Representation Committee 226
Japan 40, 45 labour theory of value 241
Jefferson, Thomas 122, 124, 330 laissez-faire policies 199, 200
Index 353
Land Reform (Northern Ireland) 55 progress, belief in 204

language, and national identity 43–4 see also neo-liberalism
Laski, Harold J. 228, 331 liberation theology 248
Lasswell, Harold 5 ‘liberty of the ancients/moderns’ (Henri
law Constant) 90
and conservatism 185 liberty doctrine 39, 84, 251
equality before the 109 life, right to 123
freedom under the 86 light greens 279
and government 25–6 Lijst Fortuyn party (Netherlands) 269
and justice 10 Lincoln, Abraham 38
rule of 59, 70 Lloyd George, David 201, 331
Le Pen, Jean-Marie 268, 331 Locke, John
leader concept 264 on democracy 72
League of Nations 38, 157, 208, 209 on freedom 89–90, 205
Covenant of (1920) 165 on ideology 140, 148
League of St. George 270 on liberalism 197
Lebanon 28, 168 on obligations 127–8, 129
Lebensraum (living space) 260 on rights 124, 125
legal citizenship 130 logos (science) 276
legal equality 109 Louis XIV (King) 331
legal obligations 127 Lovelock, James 281, 287, 332
legal rights 125 Loyalists (Northern Ireland) 54, 55, 98
legal sovereignty 27, 28 Lukács, Georg 247, 332
legitimacy, meaning 66 Lukes, Steven 8–9
Lenin, V. I. 139, 140, 244, 331
lesbianism 315 Maastricht Treaty (1992) 126
Levellers 104 Macdonald, James Ramsay 227, 228, 332
Levi, Primo 267, 331 Machiavelli, Niccolo 6, 71, 89, 137, 332
Leviathan state 22 Macintyre, Alistair 234, 332
Liberal/Liberal Democrat Party (British) Macleod, Iain 188, 332
52, 53, 150, 196, 210, 226, 227 Macmillan, Harold 177, 181, 188, 332
liberal feminism 303 Major, John 132, 151, 191, 332
liberal nationalism 157–8, 172 majority rule 67–8, 81
Liberal-Democratic Party, Russia 269 Malthus, Thomas R. 280, 288, 332
liberal-pluralist analysis 20 Manchester School of economics 207
liberalism 14, 195–213 mandates 61
British history legitimation of government 67
nineteenth century 198–200 Mao Zedong 22, 246, 332
late nineteenth century/early Marcuse, Herbert 247, 250, 332
twentieth century 200–2 market, meaning 199
twentieth century 208–11 Marx, Karl 239, 254, 332
classical 20, 198–200, 207, 211 and feminism 304
and economy 206–7 and freedom 91
freedom 204–5 and ideology 138
human nature 204 and power 7
as ideology 138–9 and socialism 217, 219
individual, rights of 123, 202–4 Marxism 14, 238–48
internationalism, commitment to 208 anti-colonialism 168
and justice 11 British 225
limited government 205–6 economics 241–2
nationalism 163 historical development, ideas on 240–1
New Liberals 93, 200–2, 211, 225 history
origins 196–8 nineteenth century 243–4
354 Index
twentieth century (1914–53) 244–5 Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) 32–3,

twentieth century (1953–2000) 35
245–6 Murray, Charles 334
twenty-first century 247–8 Muslim religion 32
ideology 138–9 Mussolini, Benito
and nationalism 163–4 and democracy 60
and need 11 and fascism 23, 60, 257, 259, 261, 262,
and politics 5, 242–3 264, 265, 266
Russia 244–6 and state theories 23
state theories 21–2 mutualism 252
see also anarchism; Marx, Karl; mysticism 280–1
socialism
Marxism/Leninism 244, 247 nanny state 190
Marxist democracy 75–6 Napoleon I (Bonaparte) 334
mass uninformed general opinion 69 Napoleon III (Bonaparte) 242, 334
materialism 240 Napoleonic wars (1792–1815) 160, 166,
Mazzini, Giuseppe 47, 157, 333 224
media, sovereignty, challenges to 32 nation 13, 37–57
Meinecke, Friedrich 39, 333 British 48–56
merit 11 family, national 48
Michels, Robert 64, 333 fascism 262–3
Middle Eastern states 34, 168 and government 45–6
Militant Tendency 247 historical/cultural ties 46–7
Mill, James 333 history 38–9
Mill, John Stuart as imagined community 47
and feminism 297, 303 and language 43–4
and freedom 91, 92–3, 101 meaning 40
and ideology 140, 148 and race 43
and liberalism 198 religion 44–5
and rights 125 ‘sense of nationhood’ 47–8
Millet, Kate 298, 333 and state 18, 40–2
Milosovich, Slobodan 269 see also national identity; nationalism
Milton, John 197, 333 nation-building 19, 42
miners’ strike (1984–85) 190 Nation of Islam 171
minimum/maximum wage 113 nation-state 18
Mitchell, Juliet 304, 333 National Alliance (Italy) 269
MNCs (Multi-National Corporations) 32–3, National Council of Corporations
35 (Germany) 266
mode of production 240 National Curriculum, citizenship as part of
monarchy 61 130, 132
absolutist 72 national freedom 87–8
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat 72, National Front
197, 206, 333 Britain 270
moral obligations 126 France 268
More, Thomas 223, 333 National Health Service Act (1946) 112
Morris, William 225, 276, 333 national identity
Morrison, Herbert 233, 333 American 46
Mosca, Gaetano 64, 333 British 40–1, 48–9
Mosley, Sir Oswald Ernald 266, 269–70, culture 39–40
334 empires, end of 167–8, 182
Motherland 48 England 49–50
movements, competitive nature 319–21 government 45–6
multi-culturalism 179 language 43–4
Index 355
nation/state 41, 42 equal consideration principle 108

Northern Ireland 53–6 First Programme 263
religion 44–5 green concerns 276
Scotland 50–2 and nation 262
Wales 52–3 national identity 43, 47
see also nation; nationalism obedience 129
national security 26 politics 3
National Socialism 99 and rights 123
see also Nazi Germany state theories 22
National Socialist German Workers Party terrorism 98, 99
see Nazi Germany see also fascism; Germany; National
national symbols 42 Socialism
National Trust 319 Nazi–Soviet Pact (1939) 146
National Women’s Suffrage Association Nechaev, Sergei 250, 334
297 need 11–12
nationalisation 21, 222 negative freedom 89, 94–5
nationalism 45, 154–73 neo-colonialism 33–4, 159
in age of revolutions 160–1 neo-liberalism 20, 148, 190, 209
anti-colonialist 161 Netherlands 45
civic 156–7, 172 New Harmony 224
critique 169–70 New Labour 132, 210, 231, 233, 235
early modern 160 New Liberals 93, 200–2, 211, 225
and empires, end of 167–8, 182 New Right 186, 190
English 182 New Trade Unionism 225
ethnic 156, 172 New Zealand 66, 167
future 170–2 Newton, Sir Isaac 198, 334
and government 45–6 NGOs (non-governmental organisations) 28
history 159–62 Nietzsche, Friedrich 258, 334
as ideology 155–9, 166 Nonconformists 109
impact 164–9, 172 Norman Conquest 49
imperialist 140, 161 Norris, Steven 192, 334
and international politics 166–7 Northern Ireland
liberal 157–8, 172 and British nation 53–6
and multinational states, end of 167–9 conflict 171
political interests 162–4 national identity 41
post-Cold War 162 nationalism 164, 166
proto- 160 paramilitary organisations 98
psychological appeal 164–5 politics 4
radical 158–9 ‘Troubles’ 310
reactionary 158 see also Ireland
self-determination 40, 165–6 Northern League (Italy) 269
sovereignty 156 Norway 40
twentieth-century 161 Nozick, Robert 10–11, 209, 334
see also nation; national identity nuclear weapons 31
nationality, meaning 41
nations 13 Oakeshott, Michael 3, 180, 184, 189, 334
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) obligations 126–30, 133
30 civic 127
natural rights 124–5 moral 126
nature 279–82 nature 126–7
Nauru 23, 24 social 127
Nazi Germany sources 127–30
and democracy 60 state sovereignty 13
356 Index
Offa of Mercia, King 49 Marxism 242–3

oikos (household) 276 meaning 3–6
Old Bolsheviks 245 negative views of 5–6
Old Testament 39 participation in, importance 1
oligarchy 61 political/non-political distinguished 4
oppression 298 and religion 310–13
O’Rourke, P. J. 275 politiki 3
Orwell, George 245, 334 Popper, Sir Karl R. 178, 209, 259, 335
Ostrogorski, Mosei 64, 334 population, and state 23–4
Ottoman Empire, collapse 168 population control 280
Owen, Robert 217, 224, 303, 335 Portillo, Michael 192, 335
Portugal 45
pacifism 226 language of 44
Paglia, Camille 299 positive freedom 93–4
Paine, Thomas 198, 335 Powell, Enoch 189, 335
Pakistan 45, 47 power 6–9
Palestine/Palestinians 41, 166 authority as 5
paramilitary organisations 98 dimensions of 8–9
Paris Peace Conference (1919) 165 and equality before the law 109
parliamentary sovereignty 185 Hobbes on 7
Parris, Matthew 335 libertarian pursuit of 94
participation Lukes on 8–9
equal rights 108–9 political agenda-setting 9
moral claim for 78 reality of 7
participatory citizenship 131–2 representation of 7
Partition (Northern Ireland, 1921) 54 Weber on 8
paternalism 188 power structures 136
patriarchy 302 practical sovereignty 28, 30, 31
patriotism 163, 181–2 pragmatism 149, 186
Peel, Sir Robert 177, 186, 335 pressure groups 19, 189
perestroika (modernisation) 246 price, and justice 11
Pericles 335 primary equality 105, 106–11
Pétain, Marshal Philippe 129, 335 private property 96–7, 183, 222
Philippines, religious affiliation 45 privatisation 21, 183, 209
Pinochet, General Augusto 335 proletariat 139, 242
Plaid Cymru 53 property 87, 96–7, 183, 222
Plato 9–10, 75, 176, 223, 335 see also collectivism/collective
Republic 9, 10, 70, 74, 88 ownership
Plekhanov, Georgii V. 239, 335 Protestant Reformation 17, 44
pluralism 202 Protestantism 44, 45, 50, 55
Pol Pot 22 proto-nationalism 160
Poland 24, 30, 45, 245 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph 249, 251, 252,
poleis (city-state) 70 335
political ideologies 137 pseudo-democracies 60
political nationalism 45 ‘pseudo-states’ 26
political parties 19 public opinion 69
politicians, perception of 6 public spending 112
politics Public–Private Partnership 233
‘affairs of state’ 3 Pufendorf, Samuel von 72, 335
environmentalism/ecologism Putnam, Robert 234
282–4
ideology, role in 13 race, and nation 43
as limited activity 180–1 Race Relations Act (1968) 115
Index 357
racial equality 115 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 72, 90, 105, 113,

radical feminism 305–7 281, 336
radical nationalism 158–9 Royal National Institute for the Blind
Rainsborough, Thomas 336 (RNIB) 314
rational legal authority 5 rule of law 39, 59, 70
rationality 321–2 Rushdie, Salman 204, 336
Rawls, John 12, 91, 205, 209, 336 Ruskin, John 336
reactionary nationalism 158 Russia
Reagan, Ronald 209, 336 civil disobedience 98
Red Army 245 communal groups in 46
referenda 65, 66 geography 24
reform, social 78–9 Liberal-Democratic Party 269
Reformation 17, 44 Marxism 244–6
reformism 218 as nation-state 40
Regan, Tom 318 national identity 45
religion 32, 44–5, 262, 281, 310–13 origins 24
religious wars 17 population 23
Renaissance 71, 72, 160 Revolution (1917) 187
representative government 60 states of 41
repressive tolerance 247, 250 see also Soviet Union
republican democracy 65–6 Rwanda 166
res publicae 3
revisionism 243 Saint Augustine of Hippo 6, 178, 323
revolutions Saint-Simon, Claude 224, 336
French see French Revolution (1789) Salisbury, Lord Robert Arthur 188, 336
‘Glorious’ (1688) 197 Sandel, Michael 234, 336
Hungarian (1956) 245 Saudi Arabia 126
nationalism 160–1 Scandinavia 44, 45, 113
Russian (1917) 187 Schacht, Hjalmar 336
and socialism 217–18 Schumacher, Fritz 277, 336
United States (1776–83) 160, 176, 197 Schumpeter, Joseph Alois 64, 337
rewards 108 science, environmentalism/ecologism
Ricardo, David 140, 147, 225, 336 280–1
rights 13, 122–6, 132 scientific socialism 220, 224
citizenship 68 Scotland 44, 50–52, 171
civil 125 Scottish National Party (SNP) 51, 52
group 114–15 Scruton, Roger 184, 337
human 124–5 SDP (German Social Democratic Party)
individual, of 123, 202–4 218, 243
legal 125 Second International (1889–1914) 218,
natural 124–5 243
nature 124–6 Second World War (1939–45) 43, 143,
participation 108–9 150, 167, 208, 261, 297
social 109–11 secondary equality 106, 111–14
welfare 125–6 secular society 50
see also citizenship; obligations self-determination, national 40, 116,
rights of man 122, 297 165–6
Romania, Republic of 30 separation of powers 124
romantic socialism 220 Serbia 45, 166, 269
Romanticism 276 sex, gender distinguished 300
Rome, democracy, origins of 71 Sex Discrimination Act (1975) 114, 298,
Romero, Oscar 130, 336 303
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 175 Sexual Offences Reform Act (1967) 315
358 Index
Seyssel, Claude de 337 Utopian 217, 224–5

Shakespeare, William 43 see also Labour Party (British); Marxism
shallow greens 279 socialist feminism 303
Shaw, George Bernard 59, 226, 337 Socialist Labour League 247
Shintoism 45 Socialist League 225
Sierra Leone 28 Socialist Party of Great Britain 247
Simonides 10 Socialist Workers’ Party 247
Singer, Peter 318 society, organic view of 179–80
Sinn Fein 98 sociological citizenship 131
Slavs, massacre of 43, 146, 260 Socrates 10
Smiles, Samuel 200, 337 Somalia 28
Smith, Adam 140, 147, 197, 199, 207, Sorel, Georges 248, 250, 337
225, 337 South Africa
Smith, Anthony 46 apartheid regime 26, 108
Smith, Iain Duncan 192, 327 as nation-state 40
Smith, John 151, 231, 337 sovereignty
SNP (Scottish National Party) 51, 52 British, danger to 182, 185
Social Chapter 126 democracy 67
social class 23–4, 115, 177 as dynamic concept 34
see also class analysis external 26
social cohesion 77–8, 163 internal 27
social contract 127–8 legal 27, 28, 30
Social Darwinism 260, 283 nationalism 156
Social Democratic Federation 225 practical 28, 30, 31
Social Democratic Party self-government 87
Britain 150, 230 see also state sovereignty
Germany 218, 243 Soviet Union
social function ideologies 137 Chernobyl nuclear power explosion
social justice 10–11, 12 (1986) 277
social obligations 127 Cold War 29
social rights 109–11 collapse (1991) 18, 24, 41, 116, 118,
social democracy 20–1 162, 196, 238
socialism 14, 214–36 and freedom 99
and anarchism 238 ideology, socialist 139
anti-colonialism 168 nationalism 161, 167, 169
classical 230 self-serving state 22
common ownership 221 sovereignty claims 30
continental/British 218–19 as totalitarian regime 3
defining 216–17 see also Cold War; Russia
divisions 217–20 ‘spaceship earth’, environmentalism
environmentalism 291 279–80
equality 221–2 Spain 40, 45, 62, 126
ethical 225 language of 44
freedom 222 Spanish Civil War (1936–39) 249
history 223–4 specialisation 74–5
human nature 220–1 Spencer, Herbert 95, 200, 260, 337
and justice 11 spin doctors 145
revisionist 218 Spinoza, Baruch 197, 337
revolutionary 217–18 Sri Lanka 40
role 217 stagflation 209
romantic 220 Stalin, Joseph 22, 245, 337
scientific 220, 224 state
and state 222–3 abuse of power 20
Index 359
anarchism 250–1 Sudan 42

characteristics of 23–4 suffrage 62
fascism 264–5 superpowers 29–30
freedom in relation to 95–9 supply and demand 241
government distinguished 18 surplus value 242
history 17–18 Sweden 40, 43
independence 17–18 Switzerland 44, 65, 93
and models 19 symbols, national 42
modern 25 Syndicalism 228, 253
nation distinguished 18, 40–2
power of 34 Taff Vale Case (1901) 227
self-serving 22–3 Taliban regime 26
as ‘servant’ of ‘people’ 20 Tawney, R. H. 228, 233, 337
and socialism 222–3 Taylor, Harriet 303, 337
as theoretical concept 18 terrorism 97, 98–9
theories of 19–23 Thailand 40
see also state sovereignty Thatcher, Margaret. 126, 151, 178, 183,
state characteristics 23–4 189, 190, 207, 232, 337
geography 24 Thatcherism 184, 189–91, 209
law/government 25–6 post-Thatcher conservatism 191–3
longevity 24–5 think-tanks 209
population 23–4 Third Reich (1933–45) 3, 22, 43, 47, 60
sovereignty 12, 26–8 Thirty Years’ War (1618–48, Europe) 7,
challenges 28–34 17
state of nature 7, 128 Thrasymachus 10
state sovereignty 12, 26–8 Tolstoy, Leo 248, 251, 276, 338
challenges to 28–34 Tory Party 182, 193
external 26 totalitarianism 3, 129, 259
globalisation, impact 30 tourism 32
informal ties, growing 31–2 Tracey, Destutt de 338
internal 27 Trade Union Act (1871) 179
international actors 32–3 Trade Unionism 225
international society, structure 29–30 tradition 182–3
legal 27, 28, 30 traditional authority 5
neo-colonialism 33–4 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht)
practical 28, 30, 31 (1992) 126
weapons of mass destruction 31 Trotsky, Leon 245, 338
Westphalia, Treaty of 17 Tudjman, Franjo 269, 338
see also sovereignty Turkey 40, 159
state theories 19–23 Twentieth Party Congress (1956) 245
feminist views 22
liberal-pluralist analysis 20 Uganda 42
Marxism 21–2 UK see United Kingdom
models 19 Ulster 54
political parties 19 Unionists (Northern Ireland) 54
pressure/interest groups 19 United Kingdom
self-serving states 22–3 equality of outcome 113
social democracy 20–1 European Union, membership of 27
Stirner, Max (aka Johann Casper Schmidt) as multi-national state 40
99, 248, 337 multiple voting rights 68
Stoics 87, 88 national identity 39, 41
Stormont, government at 54 nationalism 171
substructure 240 political debate 136
360 Index
political parties see Conservative Party Versailles Peace Conference (1919) 40

(British); Labour Party (British); Versailles Treaty (1919) 24, 87, 116, 208,
Liberal/Liberal Democrat Party 209
(British) Vietnam 47, 167
population 23 Volk/Volksgeist 47, 129, 262, 266
referenda 66 Volkswanderung 162
as state 18, 24, 25, 40–1 Voltaire (aka François-Marie Arouet) 197
voting apathy 80 von Hayek, Friedrich 10–11, 178, 184,
see also Britain; England 189, 205, 207, 209
United Nations von Pufendorf, Samuel 335
Charter (1945) 165, 208 voting apathy 68, 79–80
General Assembly 26, 116
as international actor 33 Wales 39, 44, 52–3, 171
liberal nationalism 157 Wallas, Graham 226, 338
and rights 123 Walter, Natasha 299
state sovereignty, challenges to 28 Walzer, Michael 209, 338
terminology 38 Ward, Barbara 277, 338
United States Warsaw Pact 30
American Revolution (1776–83) 160, weapons of mass destruction 31
176, 197, 198 Webb, Beatrice and Sidney 219, 226,
anarchism 238 338
civil rights movement (1960s) 125 Weber, Max 5, 8, 64, 338
Cold War 29 Weimar Republic, Germany 62
conservatism 175 welfare, equality of 109–11
Declaration of Independence (1776) 124, welfare rights 125–6
125, 129, 156, 197, 297 Wessex, Anglo-Saxon kingdom of 24
direct democracy 66 Westphalia, Treaty of (1648) 17, 25–6,
equality of outcome 113 27
feminism 297 Whigs 175, 197
fundamentalism 312 White, R. J. 175
geography 24 Widdecombe, Ann 192, 338
national identity 39, 46 Wilson, Harold 230, 338
nationalism 156, 167 Wilson, Thomas Woodrow 165, 338
political debate 136 Winstanley, Gerrard 223, 338
population 23 Wollstonecraft, Mary 296, 303, 339
and race 43 Women’s Social and Political Union 297
religious identity 45 Wordsworth, William 339
War of Independence (1776–83) 47, Workers’ Revolutionary Party (WRP) 247
124–5 World Bank 232, 248
see also Cold War World Spirit 240
Universal Declaration of Human Rights World Trade Organisation (WTO) 232
(1948) 122, 208 world view (Weltanschauung) 155
US see United States
USSR see Soviet Union xenophobia 32, 179
Utilitarianism 12, 107, 128, 198
Utopia 178 Yugoslav Federation, end of 18–19, 116,
Utopian socialism 217, 224–5 169
Vatican City State 24, 123 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 269

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UNDERSTANDINGPOLITICS

Following the review of the national curriculum for

Understanding American government and

Understanding A/S level government and

KEVIN HARRISON and TONY BOYD

Manchester University Press

distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave

Published by Manchester University Press

Distributed exclusively in the USA by

Distribued exclusively in Canada by

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN 0 7190 6151 2 paperback

First published 2003

Typeset by Northern Phototypesetting Co. Ltd, Bolton

Preface and acknowledgements page vii

1 The state and sovereignty 16

6 Rights, obligations and citizenship 121

7 The role of ideology in politics and society 135

12 Marxism and anarchism 237

14 Environmentalism and ecologism 274

Concluding remarks 309

Glossary of major figures 323

Preface and acknowledgements

THE POLITICS ASSOCIATION

is a registered educational charity, committed to the diffusion of

A good politician is quite as unthinkable as an honest burglar. (H. L. Mencken,

Three fundamental terms: politics, power and justice

commentators sometimes suggest that important national matters, such as

state involvement in society in a misplaced desire to achieve social justice.

Merit and deserts

Need and equality

An outline of the chapters

1 The state and sovereignty

6 Rights, obligations and citizenship

7 The role of ideology in politics and society

12 Marxism and anarchism

associated with fascism and, although concentrating on German Nazism and

14 Environmentalism and ecologism

Glossary of major figures

Suggested further reading

➤ Why are there so many states today?

➤ Has the state ‘had its day’?

What the state is not

end to the Yugoslav Federation and the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia

Theories of the state

The liberal-pluralist analysis of the state

The social-democratic view of the state

did that system exist prior to 1900. The social-

The Marxist analysis of the state

The feminist view of the state

The self-serving state

to a considerable degree, Mussolini’s Italy. Common ownership of property, or

Major characteristics of the state

power ranking of a state in world affairs – a large population is needed

Law and government

‘Internal sovereignty’ is the other vital component of this concept. It consists

Practical state sovereignty can be undermined and even fatally weakened by

Challenges to state sovereignty