(Artículo) Hall - The Work of Representation (Long)

Representation
enter the domain ofthese practices, if it is to circulate effectively within a culhire. And it cannot be
considered to have completed its 'passage' around the cultural circuit until it has been 'decoded'
or intelligibly receivedat anotherpoint in the chain. Language,then, is the property ofneitherthe
sender nor the receiver of meanings. It is the shared cultural 'space' in which the production of
meaning through language - that is, representation - takes place. The receiver of messages and
meanings is not a passive screen on which the original meaning is accurately and transparently
projected. The 'taking of meaning' is as much a signifying practice as the 'putting into meaning'.
Speakerandbearerorwriterandreaderareactiveparticipantsin a processwhich- sincetheyoften
THE WORK OF REPRESENTATION
exchangeroles - is alwaysdouble-sided,alwaysinteractive. Representationfunctions less like the
model of a one-way transmitter and more like the model of a dialogue - it is, as they say, dialogic. Stuart Hali
Whatsustainsthis 'dialogue'is the presenceof sharedcultural codes, whichcannot guaranteethat
meanings will remain stable forever - though attempting to fix meaning is exactly why power
intervenes in discourse. But, even when power is circulating through meaning and knowledge,
the codes only work if they are to some degree shared, at least to the extent that they make effec-
tive 'translation' between 'speakers' possible. We should perhaps learn to think of meaning less in
terms of 'accuracy' and 'truth' and more in terms of effective exchange - a process of translation, 1 REPRESENTATION, MEANING AND LANGUAGE
which facilitates cultural communication while always recognizing the persistence of difference
andpowerbetweendifferent 'speakers'withinthe same cultural circuit. In this chapter we will be concentrating on one of the key processes in the 'cultural circuit' (see
DuGay et al., 1997, andthe Introduction to this volume) - the practices ofrepresentation. The aim
ofthischapteris to introduceyouto thistopic, andto explainwhatit is aboutandwhywe give it
such importance in cultural studies.
REFERENCES The concept ofrepresentationhas come to occupy a new andimportantplace in the study of
culture. Representation connects meaning and language to culture. But what exactly do people
DU GAY, p. (ed. ) (1997) Production of Culture/Cultures of Production, London, Sage/The Open
mean by it? What does representation have to do with culture and meaning? One common-sense
University (Book 4 in this series).
usageoftheterm is asfollows: 'Representationmeansusinglanguageto saysomethingmeaning-
DUGAY,P., HALL,S., JANES,L., MACKAY,H. andNEGUS,K. (1997) Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of fill about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to other people. ' You may well ask, 'Is that all?'
the Sony Walhnan,London, Sage/TheOpenUniversity (Book 1 in this series). Well,yes andno. Representationis anessentialpartoftheprocessbywhichmeaningisproduced
HALL, s. (ed.) (1977) Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, London, andexchangedbetweenmembers of a culture. It does involve the use of language, of signs and
Sage/The Open University (Book 2 in this series). imageswhichstandfororrepresentthings.Butthisis a farfromsimpleorstraightforwardprocess,
asyou will soon discover.
MACKAY,H. (ed.) (1997) ConsumptionandEverydayLife,London,Sage/TheOpenUniversity(Book
5 in this series).
How does the concept of representation connect meaning and language to culture? In order to
explorethisconnectionfurther,wewilllookata numberofdifferenttheoriesabouthowlanguageis
THOMPSON, K. (ed.) (1997) Media and Cultural Regulation, London, Sage/The Open University usedto representthe world. Herewewill be drawinga distinctionbetweenthreedifferentaccounts
(Book 6 in this series). ortheories:thereflective,theintentionalandtheconstructionistapproachestorepresentation.Does
WOODWARD,K. (ed.) (1997) Identity and Difference,London, Sage/TheOpenUniversity (Book 3 in language simply reflect a meaning which already exists out there in the world of objects, people
this series). andevents (reflective)^ Doeslanguageexpressonlywhatthe speakeror writerorpainterwantsto
say,hisorherpersonallyintendedmeaning(intentionaFf!Orismeaningconstructedin andthrough
language (constructionist)? Youwill learn more in a moment aboutthese three approaches.
Most of the chapter will be spent exploring the constructionist approach, because it is this
perspective which has had the most significant impact on cultural studies in recent years. This
xxvi
Representation The Work of Representation
chapter chooses to examine two major variants ormodels ofthe constmctionist approach - the semi- ju havejust used. The word stands for or represents the concept, and can be used to reference or
otic approach, greatly influenced by the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, andthe discursive ;esignateeithera 'real'objectintheworldor indeedevensome imaginaryobject, likeangelsdancingon
approach, associated with the French philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault. Later chapters ie head of a pin, which no one has ever actually seen.
in this bookwill takeup thesetwo theories again,amongothers, so youwill havean opportunity
to consolidate your understanding ofthem, andto apply them to different areas of analysis. Other This is howyou give meaningto things throughlanguage.This is howyou 'make senseof the
chapters will introduce theoretical paradigms which apply constructionist approaches in different \v arid of people, objects and events, and how you are able to express a complex thought about
waystothatofsemiotics andFoucault. All, however, putinquestionthevery nature ofrepresentation. ihose things to other people, or communicate about them through language in ways which other
We turn to this question first. people are able to understand.
Why do we have to go through this complex process to represent our thoughts? If you put down
j glass you are holding andwalk out ofthe room, you can still think about the glass, even though
1. 1 Making meaning, representing things it is no longerphysicallythere.Actually, you can't think with a glass. You can only think with the
What does the word representation really mean, in this context? What does the process ofrepre- concept ofthe glass. As the linguists are fond of saying, 'Dogs bark. But the concept of "dog" can-
sentation involve? How does representation work? aot bark or bite. ' You can't speakwith the actual glass, either. You can only speakwith the word
To put it briefly, representation is the production of meaning through language. The Shorter for glass - GLASS- which is the linguistic sign which we use in Englishto refer to objects out
ufwhichyou drink water. This is whererepresentation comes in. Representationis the production
OxfordEnglishDictionarysuggeststworelevantmeaningsfortheword:
ofthe meaning ofthe concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and
languagewhichenablesus to refer to eitherthe 'real' world ofobjects, people or events, or indeed
1 To representsomethingis to describeor depictit, to call it up in themindby descriptionorpor- [Dimaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events.
trayalorimagination;to placea likenessofit beforeusinourmindorinthesenses;as,forexam- Sothere are two processes,two systems ofrepresentation, involved. First, thereis the 'system'
pie, in the sentence, 'This picture represents the murder ofAbel by Cain.
bywhich all sorts ofobjects, people and events are correlated with a set of concepts or mental rep-
2 Torepresentalsomeansto symbolize,standfor,tobea specimenof, orto substitutefor; asinthe resentations which we carry around in our heads. Without them, we could not interpret the world
sentence, 'InChristianity,the crossrepresentsthe sufferingandcmcifixionofChrist. ineaningfully at all. In the first place, then, meaning depends on the system of concepts and images
formed in our thoughts which can stand for or 'represent' the world, enabling us to refer to things
The figures inthepainting standintheplace of, andatthe sametime, standfor the story ofCain and both inside and outside our heads.
Abel. Likewise,thecross simply consists oftwowoodenplanks nailedtogether; butinthecontext of Before we move on to look at the second 'system of representation', we should observe that what
Christianbeliefandteaching,it takeson, symbolizesor comesto standfor a widersetofmeanings wehavejust saidis a very simpleversionofa rathercomplexprocess. It is simple enoughto seehow
aboutthe cmcifixionofthe SonofGod, andthis is a conceptwecanput into wordsandpictures. we might form concepts for things we can perceive - people or material objects, like chairs, tables
and desks. But we also form concepts of rather obscure and abstract things, which we can't in any
ACT !V!TV : simplewaysee, feel or touch. Think, for example,ofourconceptsofwar, or death,or friendshipor
love.And,aswehaveremarked,wealsoformconceptsaboutthingswehaveneverseen,andpossibly
Hereisa simpleexerciseaboutrepresentation.Lookatanyfamiliarobjectintheroom.Youwillimmediately
cant orwon t ever see, andaboutpeople andplaceswehaveplainlymadeup. Wemayhave a clear
recognizewhatit is. Buthowdoyou knowwhatthe object is?Whatdoes'recognize'mean?
concept of, say, angels, mermaids, God, the Devil, or of Heaven and Hell, or of Middlemarch (the
Nowtry to make yourself conscious of whatyou are doing - observe what is going on as you do it. You fictional provincial town in George Eliot's novel), or Elizabeth (the heroine of JaneAusten's Pride
recognizewhatit isbecauseyour thoughtprocessesdecodeyourvisualperceptionoftheobjectinterms andPrejudice).
ofa concept ofitwhichyou haveinyour head.This must be so because, ifyou look awayfrom the object, We have called this a 'system of representation'. That is because it consists not of individual
you can still think about it by conjuring it up, as we say, 'in your mind's eye'. Go on - try to follow the concepts, but ofdifferentways oforganizing,clustering, arrangingandclassifyingconcepts, and
process as it happens:there isthe object... and there is the concept in your headwhichtells you whatit ofestablishing complex relations between them. For example, we use the principles of similarity
is, what your visual image of it means. anddifferenceto establishrelationshipsbetweenconceptsorto distinguishthemfromoneanother.
Now, tell me what it is. Say it aloud: 'It's a lamp' - or a table or a book or the phone or whatever. The Thus,I haveanideathatinsomerespectsbirdsarelikeplanesinthesky,basedonthefactthatthey
concept of the object has passed through your mental representation of it to me viathe word for it which are similar because they both fly - but I also have an idea that in other respects they are different,
because one is part ofnature while the other is man-made. This mixing andmatching ofrelations reference actual things or objects in the world (a point further elaborated in Du Gay, ed., 1997,
betweenconceptstoformcomplexideasandthoughtsispossiblebecauseourconceptsarearranged j Mackay, ed., 1997). Any sound, word, image or object which functions as a sign, and is
into different classifying systems. Inthisexample, thefirstisbasedona distinctionbetweenflying/not ;anizedwith other signs into a system which is capable of carrying and expressing meaning is,
flying andthe secondisbasedonthe distinction betweennatural/man-made. There areotherprinci- om thispoint ofview, 'a language'. It is in this sensethatthe model ofmeaningwhichI have
pies of organization like this at work in all conceptual systems: for example, classifying according ien analysing here is often described as a 'linguistic' one; and that all the theories of meaning
to sequence - whichconcept follows which- orcausality- whatcauseswhat- andsoon. Thepoint hichfollow this basic model are described asbelonging to 'the linguistic turn' inthe social sciences
hereis thatwe aretalkingaboutnotjust a randomcollection ofconcepts,but concepts organized, j cultural studies.
arrangedandclassifiedinto complex relations withoneanother. Thatiswhatourconceptual system At the heart of the meaning process in culture, then, are two related 'systems of representa-
actually is like. However, this doesnotundermine thebasicpoint. Meaning depends ontherelation- m'. The first enablesus to give meaningto the world by constmcting a set of correspondences
shipbetweenthings intheworld - people, objects andevents, real or fictional - andthe conceptual . a chain of equivalences between things - people, objects, events, abstract ideas, etc. - and our
system, which can operate as mental representations ofthem. stem of concepts, our conceptual maps. The second depends on constmcting a set ofcorrespond-
Nowit couldbethe casethatthe conceptual map whichI carry around in my headis totally differ- ices between our conceptual map and a set of signs, arranged or organized into various languages
entfromyours, inwhichcaseyouandI wouldinterpret ormake senseoftheworldintotally different hich stand for or represent those concepts. The relation between 'things', concepts and signs lies
ways. We would be incapable of sharing our thoughts or expressing ideas about the world to each the heart ofthe production of meaning in language. The process which links these three elements
other.Infact,eachofusprobablydoesunderstandandinterprettheworldina uniqueandindividual igether is what we call 'representation'.
way.However, weareableto communicate becausewesharebroadlythe sameconceptual maps and
thusmakesenseoforinterprettheworldinroughlysimilarways.Thatisindeedwhatit meanswhen
we saywe 'belong to the same culture'. Because we interpret theworld inroughly similar ways, we . 2 Language and representation
are ableto buildup a sharedculture ofmeanings andthus construct a socialworldwhichweinhabit
together. Thatiswhy'culture' issometimes definedinterms of'sharedmeanings orsharedconceptual lust as people who belong to the same culture must share a broadly similar conceptual map, so
maps' (see Du Gay et aL, 1997). icymust also share the same way of interpreting the signs of a language, for only in this way can
However, a shared conceptual map is not enough. We must also be able to represent or leanings be effectively exchanged between people. But how do we know which concept stands for
exchange meanings andconcepts, andwe can only do that whenwe also have access to a shared hichthing? Or which word effectively represents which concept? How do I know which sounds or
language. Language is therefore the second system of representation involved in the overall aages will carry, through language, the meaning of my concepts and what I want to say with them
process of constmcting meaning. Our shared conceptual map must be translated into a common 1 you? This may seemrelatively simple in the case ofvisual signs,becausethe drawing,painting,
language, so that we can correlate our concepts and ideas with certain written words, spoken .
amera or TV image of a sheep bears a resemblance to the animal with a woolly coat grazing in a
sounds or visual images. The general term we use for words, sounds or images which carry 'ield to which I want to refer. Even so, we need to remind ourselves that a drawn or painted or digital
meaning is signs. These signs stand for or represent the concepts and the conceptual relations .
ersion ofa sheep is not exactly like a 'real' sheep. For one thing, most images are in two dimensions
between them which we carry around in our heads and together they make up the meaning- hereas the 'real' sheep exists in three dimensions.
systems of our culture. Visual signs and images, even when they bear a close resemblance to the things to which they
Signs are organized into languages and it is the existence of common languages which enable ;fer,are still signs:they carrymeaning andthus haveto be interpreted. In orderto interpret them,
usto translateourthoughts(concepts) into words, soundsor images,andthento usethese,oper- e must have access to the two systems of representation discussed earlier: to a conceptual map
ating as a language, to express meanings and communicate thoughts to other people. Remember hichcorrelatesthe sheepinthefieldwiththe conceptofa'sheep';anda languagesystemwhichin
thattheterm 'language'isbeingusedherein a verybroadandinclusiveway.Thewritingsystem "isuallanguage,bears someresemblanceto the realthing or 'looks like it' in someway. This argu-
or the spoken system ofa particular language areboth obviously 'languages'. But so arevisual inentis clearestifwethinkofa cartoondrawingor anabstractpaintingofa 'sheep',whereweneed
images, whether produced by hand, mechanically, electronically, digitally or some other means, a very sophisticatedconceptual and sharedlinguistic system to be certainthat we are all 'reading'
when they are used to express meaning. And so are other things which aren't 'linguistic' in any thesigninthesameway.Eventhenwemayfindourselveswonderingwhetherit reallyis a picture
ordinary sense: the 'language' offacial expressions or ofgesture, for example, or the 'language' ofa sheepat all. As the relationshipbetweenthe signandits referentbecomes less clear-cut, the
of fashion, of clothes, or of traffic lights. Even music is a 'language', with complex relations meaning begins to slip and slide away from us into uncertainty. Meaning is no longer transparently
between different sounds and chords, though it is a very special case since it can't easily beused passingfrom onepersonto another...
.
i. thisisbecausetherearedifferentkindsofsigns.Visualsignsarewhatarecallediconicsigns.
atis, theybear,intheirform, a certainresemblanceto theobject,personoreventto whichthey
i'er.A photograph ofa tree reproduces some ofthe actual conditions ofour visual perception in
i visual sign. Written or spoken signs, on the other hand, are what is called indexical.
They bearno obvious relationship atall to the things to which they refer. The letters T, R, E, E do
t look anything like trees in nature, nor does the word 'tree' in English sound like 'real' trees (if
leed they make any sound at all!). The relationship in these systems of representation between
; sign, the concept andthe object to whichthey might beusedto refer is entirely arbitrary. By
rbitrary' we mean that in principle any collection of letters or any sound in any order would do
e trick equally well. Trees would not mind if we used the word SEERT- 'trees' written back-
ards- to representthe conceptofthem. Thisis clearfrom the factthat, in French,quite different
;tters anda quite different soundis usedto refer to what, to all appearances,is the samething -
.
real' tree - and, as far as we can tell, to the same concept a large plant that grows in nature.
ie French and English seem to be using the same concept. But the concept which in English is
presented by the word TREE is represented in French by the word ARERE.
FIGURE 1. 1 William Holman Hunt, Our English Coasts ('Strayed Sheep'), 1852
3 Sharing the codes
ne question, then, is: how do people who belong to the same culture, who share the same
jnceptual map and who speak or write the same language (English) know that the arbitrary
jmbination of letters and sounds that makes up the word TREE will stand for or represent the
jncept 'a largeplant that grows in nature'? Onepossibilitywouldbethatthe objects in theworld
.
hemselves embody and fix in some way their 'true' meaning. But it is not at all clear that real
.
rees know that they are trees, and even less clear that they know that the word in English which
..epresentsthe conceptofthemselves is writtenTREEwhereasin Frenchit is writtenARBRE!As
r'ar as they are concerned, it could just as well be written COW or VACHE or indeed XYZ. The
leaningis not in the object or person or thing, nor is it in the word. It is wewho fix the meaning
>ofirmly that, after a while, it comes to seem natural and inevitable. The meaning is constructed
'iy the system of representation. It is constructed and fixed by the code, which sets up the cor-
i-elationbetweenour conceptual system and our language system in such a way that, every time
ive think of a tree, the code tells us to use the English word TREE, or the French word ARBRE.
Fhecode tells us that, in our culture - that is, in our conceptual and language codes - the concept
tree isrepresentedbythe letters T, R, E, E, arrangedin a certainsequence,just asin Morsecode,
the sign for V (which in the Second World War Churchill made 'stand for' or represent 'Victory')
FIGURE 1.2
Q: When is a sheep not a sheep? is Dot, Dot, Dot, Dash, and in the 'language oftraffic lights', Green = Go! and Red = Stop!
A: When it's a work of art. (Damien Hirst, Awayfrom the Flock, 1994) Oneway ofthinking about 'culture', then, is in terms ofthese shared conceptual maps, shared lan-
guage systems and the codes which govern the relationships of translation between them. Codes fix
So,eveninthecaseofvisuallanguage,wheretherelationshipbetweentheconceptandthesign therelationships between concepts andsigns. They stabilize meaning within different languages and
seems fairly straightforward, the matter is far from simple. It is evenmore difficult withwritten or cultures.Theytelluswhichlanguagetouseto conveywhichidea.Thereverseisalsotrue. Codestell
spokenlanguage, wherewords don'tlook or soundanything likethethingsto whichtheyrefer. In iiswhichconceptsarebeingreferredto whenwehearor readwhichsigns. By arbitrarilyfixingthe
relationships between our conceptual system and our linguistic systems (remember, 'linguistic' in a 3LE 1. 1 lnuitterms ôr snowanclice
broad sense), codes make it possible for us to speak andto hearintelligibly, andestablish the translat-
»now ice siku
abilitybetweenourconceptsandourlanguageswhichenablesmeaningtopassfromspeakertobearer
andbeeffectivelycommunicatedwithina culture. Thistranslatabilityisnotgivenbynatureor fixed ifowing - piqtuluk - pan, broken - siqumniq
bythegods.It istheresultofa setofsocialconventions.It is fixedsocially,fixedin culture. English s snowstorming piqtuluktuq - water immiugaq
or French or Hindi speakers have, over time, and without conscious decision or choice, come to an jlling - qanik melts - to make water immiuqtuaq
- is falling; - is snowing qaniktuq candle - illauyiniq
unwritten agreement, a sort of unwritten cultural covenant that, in their various languages, certain
;ht falling - qaniaraq flat -
signswill standfor or representcertainconcepts.This is whatchildrenlearn, andhowtheybecome qaimiq
7ht - is falling qaniaraqtuq glare - quasaq
not simply biological individuals but cultural subjects. They learn the system and conventions of
.
st layer of - in fall
.
apilraun piled - ivunrit
representation,thecodesoftheirlanguageandculture, whichequipthemwithcultural 'know-how',
leep soft - mauya rough - iwuit
enabling them to function as culturally competent subjects. Not because such knowledge is imprinted .
packed- to makewater aniu shore - tugiu

in then- genes, but because they learn its conventions and so gradually become 'cultured persons - i.e. aquluraq shorefast -
,
ight soft - tuvaq
members of their culture. They unconsciously internalize the codes which allow them to express sugar- pukak slush - quna
certain concepts andideas through their systems ofrepresentation - writing, speech, gesture, visuali- vaterlogged, mushy -
.
masak young sikuliaq
zation, and so on - andto interpret ideas which are communicated to them using the same systems. - is turning into masak masaguqtuaq
You may find it easier to understand, now, why meaning, language and representation are such watery - maqayak
critical elements in the study of culture. To belong to a culture is to belong to roughly the same con- wet- misak
ceptualandlinguisticuniverse,toknowhowconceptsandideastranslateintodifferentlanguages,and wet falling - qanikkuk
howlanguagecanbeinterpretedto referto orreferencetheworld.To sharethesethingsis to seethe wet - is falling qanikkuktuq
world from withinthe same conceptualmap andto make senseofit throughthe samelanguagesys- - drifting along a surface natiruvik
tems. Earlyanthropologistsoflanguage,like SapirandWhorf,tookthisinsightto itslogicalextreme - is drifting along a surface natiruviktuaq

whentheyarguedthatweareall, asit were,lockedinto ourculturalperspectivesor 'mind-sets',and - lying on a surface apun
snowflake qanik
thatlanguageis thebestcluewehaveto thatconceptualuniverse.Thisobservation,whenappliedto
is being drifted over with - apiyuaq
all human cultures, lies at the root ofwhat, today, we may think ofas cultural or linguistic relativism.
ACTIVITY 2 One implication of this argument about cultural codes is that, if meaning is the result, not of
You might like to think further about this question of how different cultures conceptually classify the world something fixed out there, in nature, but of our social, cultural and linguistic conventions, then
and what implications this has for meaning and representation. meaningcanneverbefinally fixed. We can all 'agree'to allowwordsto carry somewhatdifferent
The English make a rather simple distinction between sleet and snow. The Inuit (Eskimos) who have to meanings- aswehave,forexample,withtheword'gay',ortheuse,byyoungpeople, oftheword
survive in a very different, more extreme and hostile climate, apparently have many more words for snow 'wicked' as a term ofapproval. Ofcourse, there must besome fixing ofmeaning in language or we
and snowy weather. Consider the list of Inuit terms for snow from the Scott Polar Research Institute in would never be able to understand one another. We can't get up one morning and suddenly decide
Table 1. 1. There are many more than in English, making much finer and more complex distinctions. The torepresentthe conceptofa 'tree'withtheletters orthewordVYXZ,andexpectpeopleto follow
Inuit have a complex classificatory conceptual system for the weather compared with the English. The whatweare saying. Onthe otherhand, there is no absolute or final fixingofmeaning. Social and
novelist Peter Hoeg, for example, writing about Greenland in his novel, Miss Smiffa's Feefing For Snow linguistic conventions do change over time. In the language ofmodem managerialism, what we
(1994, pp. 5-6), graphicallydescribes 'frazzilice' whichis 'kneadedtogether into a soapymash called usedtocall 'students', 'clients', 'patients'and'passengers'haveallbecome 'customers'. Linguistic
porridge ice, which gradually forms free-floating plates, pancake ice, which one, cold, noonday hour, on a codes vary significantly between one language and another. Many cultures do not have words for
Sunday,freezesintoa singlesolidsheet'.SuchdistinctionsaretoofineandelaborateevenfortheEnglish concepts which arenormal andwidely acceptable to us. Words constantly go out ofcommon usage,
who are always talking about the weather! The question, however, is - do the Inuit actually experience andnewphrases arecoined: think, forexample, oftheuseof'down-sizing' torepresent theprocess
snow differently from the English? Their language system suggests they conceptualize the weather affirms laying people offwork. Even when the actual words remain stable, their connotations shift
differently. Buthowfar is our experienceactuallyboundedby our linguisticandconceptual universe? ortheyacquire a different nuance. Theproblem isespecially acuteintranslation. Forexample, doesthe
8
difference in English between know and understand correspond exactly to and capture exactly the general theory ofrepresentation through language, the intentional approach is also flawed. We
same conceptual distinction as the French make between savoir and connaitre] Perhaps; but can not be the sole or unique source ofmeanings in language, since that would mean that we could
we be sure? ourselves in entirelyprivate languages.But the essenceoflanguageis communicationand
The main point is that meaning does not inhere in things, in the world. It is constmcted, produced. ihat, in turn, depends on shared linguistic conventions and shared codes. Language can never be
It is the result of a signifying practice - a practice that produces meaning, that makes things mean. wholly a private game. Our private intended meanings, however personal to us, have to enter into
sherules, codes andconventions oflanguage to be shared andunderstood. Language is a social sys-
tem through and through. This means that our private thoughts have to negotiate with all the other
1. 4 Theories of representation meanings for words or images which have been stored in language which our use ofthe language
systemwill inevitably trigger into action.
Thereare,broadlyspeaking,threeapproachesto explaininghowrepresentationofmeaningthrough Thethird approach recognizes this public, social character oflanguage. It acknowledges that nei-
language works. We may call these the reflective, the intentional and the constmctionist or con- iherthingsinthemselvesnorthe individualusersoflanguagecanfixmeaningin language.Things
structivist approaches. You might think of each as an attempt to answer the questions, 'Where do don't mean: we construct meaning, using representational systems - concepts and signs. Hence
meanings come from?' and 'How can we tell the "true" meaning of a word or image?' it is called the constmctivist or constructionist approach to meaning in language. According to
In the reflective approach, meaning is thought to lie in the object, person, idea or event in this approach, we must not confuse the material world, where things and people exist, and the
the real world, and language functions like a mirror, to reflect the true meaning as it already symbolic practices and processes through which representation, meaning and language operate.
exists in the world. As the poet Gertrude Stein once said, 'A rose is a rose is a rose'. In the Constructivists do not deny the existence of the material world. However, it is not the material
fourth century BC, the Greeks used the notion ofmimesis to explain how language, even draw- worldwhichconveysmeaning:it is the languagesystem or whateversystemwe areusingto repre-
ing and painting, mirrored or imitated nature; they thought of Homer's great poem, The Iliad, sentour concepts. It is social actors who use the conceptual systems oftheir culture andthe linguis-
as 'imitating' a heroic series of events. So the theory which says that language works by simply tie and other representational systems to construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and to
reflecting or imitating the truth that is already there and fixed in the world is sometimes called communicate aboutthat world meaningfully to others.
'mimetic'. Ofcourse, signs may also have a material dimension. Representational systems consist ofthe
Of course there is a certain obvious tmth to mimetic theories of representation and language. As actual sounds we make with our vocal chords, the images we make on light-sensitive paper with
we've pointed out, visual signs do bear some relationship to the shape and texture of the objects cameras, the marks we make with paint on canvas, the digital impulses we transmit electroni-
which they represent. But, as was also pointed out earlier, a two-dimensional visual image of a rose cally. Representation is a practice, a kind of 'work', which uses material objects and effects.
is a sign - it should not be confused with the real plant with thorns andblooms growing in the garden. Butthe meaning dependsnot on the material quality ofthe sign, but on its symbolicfunction. It
Remember also that there are many words, sounds and images which we fully well understand but is because a particular sound or word standsfor, symbolizes or represents a concept that it can
which are entirely fictional or fantasy and refer to worlds which are wholly imaginary - including, function, in language, as a sign and convey meaning or, as the constructionists say, signify
many people now think, most of The Iliad\ Of course, I can use the word 'rose' to refer to real, (sign-i-fy).
actual plants growing in a garden, as we have said before. But this is because I know the code
which links the concept with a particular word or image. I cannot think or speak or draw with
an actual rose. And if someone says to me that there is no such word as 'rose' for a plant in her 1. 5 The anguage of traffic lights
culture, the actual plant in the garden cannot resolve the failure of communication between us.
Within the conventions of the different language codes we are using, we are both right - and for Thesimplestexampleofthispoint, whichis criticalforanunderstandingofhowlanguagesfunction
us to understand each other, one of us must learn the code linking the flower with the word for it asrepresentational systems, is the famoustraffic lights example.A traffic light is a machinewhich
in the other's culture. produces different coloured lights in sequence. The effect oflight ofdifferentwavelengths on the
The second approach to meaning in representation argues the opposite case. It holds that it is eye - which is a natural and material phenomenon- produces the sensation of different colours.
the speaker, the author, who imposes his or her unique meaning on the world through language. Nowthesethingscertainlydo existinthematerialworld. But it is ourculturewhichbreaksthe spec-
Words mean what the author intends they should mean. This is the intentional approach. Again, trum oflight into differentcolours, distinguishesthem from one anotherandattachesnames- Red,
there is some point to this argument since we all, as individuals, do use language to convey or Green, Yellow, Blue - to them. We use a way of classifyingthe colour spectmm to create colours
communicate things which are special or unique to us, to our way of seeing the world. However, whichare different from one another. Werepresent or symbolizethe differentcolours andclassify
10 11
them accordingto differentcolour-concepts. This is the conceptual colour system of our culture. between Red and Green, you couldn't use one to mean 'Stop' and the other to
We say 'our culture' because, ofcourse, other cultures may divide the colour spectmm differently. s;an 'G°'- ^n tê same way>11: ls c)nly the difference between the letters P and T which enable
What'smore, theycertainlyusedifferentactualwordsor letters to identifydifferentcolours: what e word SHEEPto be linked, in the Englishlanguagecode, to the concept of 'the animalwith
we call 'red', the Frenchcall 'rouge', and so on. This is the linguistic code- the one whichcor- . ur legs anda woolly coat', and the word SHEETto 'the material we use to cover ourselves
relates certain words (signs) with certain colours (concepts), and thus enables us to communicate 1 bedat night'.
about colours to other people, using 'the language ofcolours'.
Inprinciple, anycombination ofcolours - like anycollection ofletters inwritten language or of
But how do we use this representational or symbolic system to regulate the traffic? Colours Miundsin spokenlanguage- woulddo, providedthey are sufficientlydifferentnot to be confused.
do not have any 'true' or fixed meaning in that sense. Red does not mean 'Stop' in nature, any t'onstructionists expressthis ideaby sayingthat all signsare arbitrary. 'Arbitrary'meansthatthere
more than Green means 'Go'. In other settings, Red may stand for, symbolize or represent isnonaturalrelationshipbetweenthe signandits meaningor concept. SinceRedonlymeans'Stop'
'Blood' or 'Danger'or 'Communism'; and Green may represent 'Ireland' or 'The Countryside' decausethat ishowthe codeworks, inprinciple anycolour would do, including Green. It is the code
or 'Environmentalism'.Eventhesemeaningscanchange.Inthe 'languageofelectricplugs', Red that fixes the meaning, not the colour itself. This also has wider implications for the theory ofrep-
used to mean 'the connection with the positive charge' but this was arbitrarily andwithout expla- resentation andmeaningin language. It means that signs themselves cannot fix meaning. Instead,
nation changed to Brown! But then for many years the producers ofplugs hadto attach a slip of meaning depends on the relation between a sign and a concept which is fixed by a code. Meaning,
paper telling people that the code or convention had changed, otherwise how would they know? the constructionists would say, is 'relational'.
Red and Green work in the language of traffic lights because 'Stop' and 'Go' are the meanings
which have been assigned to them in our culture by the code or conventions governing this lan-
guage, and this code is widely known and almost universally obeyed in our culture and cultures ACTIVITY 3
like ours - thoughwe canwell imagineother cultures whichdidnot possessthe code, in which Whynottest this pointaboutthe arbitrarynature ofthe sign andthe importance ofthe codefor yourself?
this language would be a complete mystery. Construct a code to govern the movement of traffic using two different colours - Yellow and Blue - as in
Let us stay with the example for a moment, to explore a little further how, according to the the following:
constructionist approach to representation, colours and the 'language of traffic lights' work as a Whenthe yellow light is showing...
signifyingorrepresentationalsystem. Recallthe two representationalsystemswe spokeofearlier.
Nowadd an instruction allowingpedestrians and cyclists onlyto cross, using Pink.
First,thereistheconceptualmapofcoloursin ourculture- thewaycoloursaredistinguishedfrom
one another, classifiedand arrangedin our mental universe. Secondly, there are the ways words
or images are correlated with colours in our language - our linguistic colour codes. Actually, of Providedthe code tells us clearly how to read or interpret each colour, and everyone agreesto
course, a languageofcolours consistsofmore thanjust the individualwords for differentpoints interpret them in this way, any colour will do. These arejust colours, just as the word SHEEPis
on the colour spectrum. It also depends on how they function in relation to one another - the sorts simply a jumble ofletters. InFrenchthe same animal is referred to using the very different linguistic
ofthingswhicharegovernedbygrammarandsyntaxinwrittenor spokenlanguages,whichallow sign,MOUTON. Signsare arbitrary. Theirmeaningsare fixedby codes.
us to express rather complex ideas. In the language oftraffic lights, it is the sequence andposition As we said earlier, traffic lights are machines, and colours are the material effect of light waves
of the colours, as well as the colours themselves, whichenable them to carry meaningandthus ontheretinaofthe eye. But objects - things- can also functionas signs,providedthey havebeen
function as signs. assigned a concept and meaning within our cultural and linguistic codes. As signs, theywork sym-
Does it matter whichcolours we use? No, the constructionists argue. This is becausewhat bolically- they represent concepts, andsignify. Their effects, however, are felt in the material and
signifies is not the colours themselves but (a) the fact that they are different and can be distin- socialworld. RedandGreen functionin the languageoftraffic lights as signs,but they havereal
guished from one another; and (b) the fact that they are organized into a particular sequence - material and social effects. They regulate the social behaviour of drivers and, without them, there
Red followed by Green, with sometimes a warningAmber in between which says, in effect, wouldbemanymore traffic accidentsat roadintersections.
'Get ready! Lights about to change. ' Constmctionists put this point in the following way. What
signifies, what carries meaning - they argue - is not each colour in itself nor even the concept
or word for it. It is the difference between Redand Green which signifies. This is a very impor- 1. 6 Summary
tant principle, in general, about representation and meaning, and we shall return to it on more Wehave come a long way in exploring the nature ofrepresentation. It is time to summarize whatwe
than one occasion in the chapters that follow. Think about it in these terms. If you couldn't havelearned aboutthe constmctionist approach to representation through language.
12 13
Representationis theproductionofmeaningthroughlanguage.Inrepresentation, constmction-

ists argue, we use signs, organized into languages of different kinds, to communicate meaning-
fully with others. Languages can use signs to symbolize, stand for or reference objects, people
andevents in the so-called 'real' world. Buttheycanalsoreferenceimaginarythingsandfantasy
worlds or abstract ideas which are not in any obvious sense part of our material world. There is
no simple relationship of reflection, imitation or one-to-one correspondence between language
and the real world. The world is not accurately or otherwise reflected in the mirror of language.
Languagedoesnot worklike a mirror. Meaningis producedwithinlanguage,in andthroughvari-
ous representational systems which, for convenience, we call 'languages'. Meaning is produced
by the practice, the 'work', of representation. It is constmcted through signifying - i. e. meaning-
producing - practices.
How does this take place? In fact, it depends on two different but related systems of rep-
resentation. First, the concepts which are formed in the mind function as a system of mental
representation which classifies and organizes the world into meaningful categories. If we have a
concept for something, we can say we know its 'meaning'. But we cannot communicate this mean-
ing without a second system of representation, a language. Languageconsists of signs organized
into various relationships. But signs can only convey meaning if we possess codes which allow ]GURE 1. 3 Juan Cotan, Quince, Cabbage, Melon and Cucumber, c. 1602
us to translate our concept into language - and vice versa. These codes are cmcial for meaning
and representation. They do not exist in nature but are the result of social conventions. They are
a cmcial part of our culture - our shared 'maps of meaning' - which we learn and unconsciously
READING A:
internalize as we become members of our culture. This constmctionist approachto languagethus 'jow readthe edited extract from an analysis of the still life bythe art critic and theorist, Norman Bryson,
introduces the symbolic domain of life, where words and things function as signs, into the very jcluded as ReadingA at the end of this chapter. Don't be concerned, at this stage, if the language seems
heart of social life itself. j little difficult and you don't understand all the terms. Pick out the main points aboutthe way represenfa-
Lionworks in the painting, accordingto Bryson.
tfryson is by no means the only critic of Cotan's painting, and certainly doesn't provide the only 'correct'
reading of it. That's not the point. The point of the example is that he helps us to see how, even in a still
ACTIVnY 4 life, the 'language of painting' does not-function simply to reflect or imitate a meaning which is already
All this may seem rather abstract. But we can quickly demonstrate its relevance by an example from there in nature, but to produce meanings. The act of painting is a signifying practice. Take note, in par-
painting. ticular, of what Bryson says about the following points:
Look at the painting of a still life by the Spanish painter, Juan Sanchez Cotan (1521-1627), entitled
1 The waythe painting invites you, the viewer, to look - whathe calls its 'mode of seeing'; in part, the
Quf'nce, Cabbage, Melon and Cucumber (Figure 1. 3). It seems as if the painter has made every effortto function of the language is to position you, the viewer, in a certain relation to meaning.
use the language of painting' accurately to reflect these four objects, to capture or 'imitate nature'. Is
2 The relationship to food which is posed by the painting.
this, then, an example of a refJectn/eor mf'meftcform of representation - a painting reflecting the 'true
meaning' of what already exists in Cotan's kitchen? Or can we tind the operation of certain codes, the 3 How, accordingto Bryson, 'mathematical form' is used by Cotan to distort the painting so as to
languageof painting usedto produce a certain meaning?Startwith the question, whatdoesthe painting bring out a particular meaning. Can a distorted meaning in painting be 'true'?
mean to you? What is it 'saying'? Then go on to ask, how is it saying it - how does representation work 4 The meaning of the difference between 'creatural' and 'geometric' space: the languageof painting
in this painting? creates its own kind of space.
Write down any thoughts at all that come to you on looking at the painting. What do these objects say Ifnecessary, work through the extract again, picking up these specific points.
to you? What meanings do they trigger off?
14 15
2 SAUSSURE'S LEGACY ences between black and fi?arA;grey, dark grey and /;g/i? grey, grey and cream and off-white,
:vhite andbrilliant white, just asthere are between night, dawn, daylight, noon, dusk, and so on.
The social constmctionist view of language and representation which we have been discussing ivever, his attention to binary oppositions brought Saussure to the revolutionary proposition that a
owesa greatdealto theworkandinfluenceofthe Swisslinguist, Saussure,whowasbornin Geneva juage consists ofsignifiers, but in order to produce meaning, the signifiers have to beorganized
in 1857, did much of his work in Paris, and died in 1913. He is known as the 'father of modem j -asystem ofdifferences'. It is the differences between signifiers which signify.
linguistics'. For our purposes, his importance lies not in his detailed work in linguistics, but in his Furthermore, the relation between the signifier andthe signified, which is fixedby our cultural
general view ofrepresentation and the way his model of language shaped the semiotic approach to les is not - Saussure argued - permanently fixed. Words shift their meanings. The concepts
the problem of representation in a wide variety of cultural fields. You will recognize much about .
ignifieds) to whichthey refer also change, historically, andevery shift alters the conceptual map
Saussure's thinking from what we have already said about the constructionist approach. 'theculture, leadingdifferentcultures, atdifferenthistoricalmoments,to classifyandthinkabout
For Saussure, according to Jonathan Culler (1976, p. 19), the production ofmeaning depends on idworlddifferently.Formanycenturies,westernsocietieshaveassociatedthewordBLACKwith
language: 'Languageis a systemofsigns. ' Sounds,images,writtenwords,paintings,photographs, i/erythingthat is dark, evil, forbidding,devilish, dangerousandsinful.Andyet, thinkofhowthe
etc. function as signs within language 'only whenthey serve to express or communicate ideas. ... irception of black people in America in the 1960s changed after the phrase 'Black is Beautiful'
[To] communicate ideas, they must be part of a system of conventions ... ' (ibid. ). Material objects becamea popular slogan- where the signifier, BLACK,was made to signifythe exact opposite
can function as signs and communicate meaning too, aswe sawfrom the 'language oftraffic lights' ineaning(signified} to itsprevious associations. In Saussure's terms, 'Language setsup anarbitrary
example. In an important move, Saussure analysed the sign into two further elements. There was, relation between signifiers ofits own choosing on the one hand, and signifieds ofits own choosing
he argued, theform (the actual word, image, photo, etc. ), andthere was the idea or concept in your ontheother. Not only does eachlanguage produce a different setofsignifiers, articulating anddividing
head with which the form was associated. Saussure called the first element, the signifier, and the the continuumofsound(or writing or drawingor photography) in a distinctive way; each language
second element - the corresponding concept it triggered offin your head- the signified. Every time produces a different set of signifieds; it has a distinctive and thus arbitrary way of organizing the
you hearorread or seethe signifier (e. g. the word or image ofa Walkman, for example), it correlates world into concepts and categories' (Culler, 1976, p. 23).
with the signified (the concept of a portable cassette-player in your head). Both are required to pro- The implications ofthis argument are very far-reaching for a theory ofrepresentation and for our
duce meaning but it is the relation between them, fixed by our cultural and linguistic codes, which understandingofculture. Iftherelationshipbetweena signifierandits signifiedistheresultofa sys-
sustains representation. Thus, 'the sign is the union of a form which signifies (signifier) ... and an temofsocialconventionsspecificto eachsocietyandto specifichistoricalmoments, thenall mean-
idea signified (signified). Though we may speak ... as if they are separate entities, they exist only as ingsareproducedwithinhistoryandculture. Theycanneverbe finallyfixedbutarealwayssubject
components ofthe sign ... [whichis] the central fact oflanguage'(Culler, 1976,p. 19). to change, both from one cultural context and from one period to another. There is thus no single,
Saussure also insisted on what in section 1 we called the arbitrary nature of the sign: 'There is unchanging, universal 'true meaning'. 'Because it is arbitrary, the sign is totally subject to history
no natural or inevitable link between the signifier and the signified' (ibid. ). Signs do not possess andthecombinationattheparticularmomentofa givensignifierandsignifiedis a contingentresult
a fixed or essential meaning. What signifies, accordingto Saussure, is not RED or the essence of ofthehistoricalprocess'(Culler, 1976,p. 36). Thisopensupmeaningandrepresentation,in a radical
'red-ness', but the difference between RED and GREEN. Signs, Saussure argued, 'are members of way, to history and change. It is true that Saussure himself focused exclusively on the state of the
a system and are definedin relation to the other members of that system'. For example, it is hard languagesystemat onemomentoftimeratherthanlookingatlinguisticchangeovertime. However,
to define the meaning of FATHERexcept in relation to, and in terms of its difference from, other forourpurposes,theimportantpointis thewaythis approachto languageunfrxesmeaning,breaking
kinship terms, like MOTHER, DAUGHTER, SON, and so on. any natural and inevitable tie between signifier and signified. This opens representation to the con-
This marking ofdifference within language is fundamental to the production ofmeaning, accord- stant 'play' or slippage ofmeaning, to the constant production ofnew meanings, new interpretations.
ing to Saussure. Even at a simple level (to repeat an earlier example), we must be able to distin- However, if meaningchanges,historically, andis never finally fixed,then it follows that 'taking
guish, withinlanguage,betweenSHEEPandSHEET,beforewe canlink one ofthosewordsto the the meaning'must involve an active process of interpretation. Meaninghas to be actively 'read'
conceptofan animalthatproduceswool, andthe otherto the concept of a cloth that covers a bed. or 'interpreted'. Consequently, there is a necessary and inevitable imprecision about language. The
The simplest way of marking difference is, of course, by means of a binary opposition - in this meaning we take, as viewers, readers or audiences, is never exactly the meaning which has been
example, all the letters are the same except P and T. Similarly, the meaning of a concept or word given by the speaker or writer or by other viewers. And since, in order to say something meaning-
is often defined in relation to its direct opposite - as in night/day. Later critics of Saussure were to ful, we have to 'enter language',where all sorts of older meaningswhichpre-dateus, are already
observe that binaries (e. g. black/white) are only one, rather simplistic, way of establishing differ- stored from previous eras, we can never cleanse language completely, screening out all the other,
ence.As well asthe starkdifferencebetweenblackandwhite,there arealsothemanyother, subtler hiddenmeaningswhichmightmodifyordistortwhatwewantto say.Forexample,wecan'tentirely
16 17
prevent some ofthe negative connotations of the word BLACKfrom returning to mind whenwe hored statement only becomes possible because the 'author' shares with other language-users
read a headline like, 'WEDNESDAY- A BLACK DAY ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE', even if common mles and codes of the language system - the langue- whichallows them to com-
thiswasnotintended.Thereis a constantslidingofmeaningin all interpretation, a margin- some- inicatewitheachothermeaningfully.The authordecideswhatshewantsto say.But shecannot
thing in excess of what we intend to say - in which other meanings overshadow the statement or ^cide' whether or not to use the rules oflanguage, if shewants to be understood. We are born into
the text, where other associations are awakened to life, giving what we say a different twist. So ;, its codes andits meanings. Languageis therefore, for Saussure, a socialphenomenon.
interpretation becomes an essential aspect ofthe process by which meaning is given andtaken. The cannot be an individual matter because we cannot make up the mles oflanguage individually, for
readeris asimportantasthewriter in theproductionofmeaning.Everysignifiergivenor encoded irselves. Their source lies in society, in the culture, in our shared cultural codes, in the language
with meaning has to be meaningfully interpreted or decoded by the receiver (Hall, 1980). Signs .
\ stem - not in nature or in the individual subject.
whichhavenotbeenintelligiblyreceivedandinterpretedarenot, inanyusefulsense,'meaningful' Wewill move on in section 3 to consider how the constmctionist approach to representation, and
inparticular Saussure's linguistic model, wasapplied to a wider set ofcultural objects andpractices,
mdevolved into the semioticmethodwhichso influencedthe field. First, we oughtto take account
2. 1 The socia part of language ofsome ofthe criticisms levelled at hisposition.
Saussure divided language into two parts. The first consisted of the general mles and codes of the
linguistic system, which all its users must share, if it is to be of use as a means of communication.
2. 2 Critique of Saussure's mode
The rules are the principles whichwe learn whenwe learn a languageandthey enableus to use
languagetosaywhateverwewant.Forexample,inEnglish,thepreferredwordorderissubject-verb- Saussure's great achievement was to force us to focus on language itself, as a social fact; on the pro-
object ('the cat sat on the mat'), whereas in Latin, the verb usually comes at the end. Saussure cess of representation itself; on how language actually works and the role it plays in the production
called this underlying mle-govemed structure of language, which enables us to produce well- ofmeaning. In doing so, he saved language from the status of a mere transparent medium between
formed sentences, the langue (the languagesystem). The secondpart consistedofthe particular [kings and meaning. He showed, instead, that representation was a practice. However, in his own
acts of speakingor writing or drawing,which- usingthe structure andmles ofthe langue- are work, he tended to focus almost exclusively on the two aspects of the sign - signifier and signified.
producedby anactual speakerorwriter. He calledthisparole. 'Lalangue isthe system oflanguage, Hegavelittle or no attentionto howthis relationbetweensignifier/signifiedcouldservethepurpose
the language as a system of forms, whereasparole is actual speech [or writing], the speech acts ofwhat earlier we called reference - i. e. referring us to the world ofthings, people and events outside
which are made possible by the language' (Culler, 1976, p. 29). languageinthe 'real'world. Laterlinguistsmadea distinctionbetween,say,themeaningoftheword
For Saussure, the underlying structure ofrules and codes (langue) was the social part of lan- BOOK and the use of the word to refer to a specific book lying before us on the table. The linguist,
guage, the part whichcould be studied with the law-like precision ofa science because ofits closed, Charles Sanders Pierce, while adopting a similar approach to Saussure, paid greater attention to the
limited nature. It washis preference for studying language at this level ofits 'deep structure' which relationship between signifiers/signifieds and what he called their referents. What Saussure called
madepeople call Saussureandhismodel oflanguage,structuralist. The secondpart oflanguage, signification really involves both meaning and reference, but he focused mainly on the former.
theindividualspeech-actorutterance(parole), heregardedasthe 'surface'oflanguage.Therewere Another problem is that Saussure tended to focus on the formal aspects of language - how
an infinite number of such possible utterances. Hence, parole inevitably lacked those structural language actually works. This has the great advantage of making us examine representation as a
properties - forming a closed and limited set - whichwould have enabledus to study it 'scien- practice worthy of detailed study in its own right. It forces us to look at language for itself, and
tifically'. What made Saussure's model appeal to many later scholars was the fact that the closed, not just as an empty, transparent, 'window on the world'. However, Saussure's focus on language
structured characterof languageat the level of its mles and laws, which, accordingto Saussure, mayhavebeentoo exclusive. The attentionto its formal aspectsdiddivert attentionawayfrom the
enabledit to be studiedscientifically,wascombinedwiththe capacityto be freeandunpredictably more interactive and dialogic feahires of language - language as it is actually used, as it functions
creative in our actual speech acts. They believed he had offered them, at last, a scientific approach in actual situations, in dialoguebetween differentkinds of speakers. It is thus not surprising that,
to that least scientificobject ofinquiry- culture. for Saussure, questions of power in language - for example, between speakers of different status
In separating the social part of language (langue) from the individual act of communication and positions - did not arise.
(parole), Saussure broke with our common-sense notion of how language works. Our common- Ashas oftenbeenthe case,the 'scientific'dreamwhichlay behindthe stmcturalist impulse ofhis
sense intuition is that language comes from withinus - from the individual speakeror writer; that work, though influential in alerting usto certain aspects ofhow language works, proved to be illusory.
it is this speaking or writing subject who is the author or originator of meaning. This is what we Language is not an object which can be studied with the law-like precision of a science. Later cul-
called, earlier, the intentional model of representation. But according to Saussure's schema, each tural theorists learned from Saussure's 'structuralism' but abandoned its scientific premise. Language
18 19
remains mle-govemed. But it is not a 'closed' system which can be reduced to its formal elements.
Since it is constantly changing, it is by definition open-ended. Meaning continues to be produced
throughlanguagein formswhichcanneverbepredictedbeforehandandits 'sliding',aswedescribed
it above, cannot be halted. Saussure may have been tempted to the former view because, like a good
structuralist, hetended to study the state ofthe language system at one moment, as if it hadstood still,
and he could halt the flow of language-change. Nevertheless it is the case that many of those who
havebeenmost influencedby Saussure'sradicalbreakwithall reflective andintentionalmodels of
representation, have built on hiswork notby imitating his scientific and'structuralist' approach, butby
applying his model in a much looser, more open-ended - i.e. 'post-structuralist' way.
2. 3 Summary
Howfar,then,havewecomeinourdiscussionoftheoriesof'representation^Webeganbycontrasting
three different approaches. The reflective or mimetic approach proposed a direct andtransparent rela-
tionship of imitation or reflection between words (signs) and things. The intentional theory reduced
representationto theintentionsofits authoror subject.Theconstructionisttheoryproposeda complex
andmediated relationship between things intheworld, our concepts inthought andlanguage. Wehave
focusedat greatest length on this approach. The correlations betweenthese levels - the material, the
conceptual andthe signifying- are governedby our cultural andlinguistic codes andit is this set of FIGURE 1. 4 Wrestling as a language of 'excess'
interconnectionswhichproducesmeaning.Wethenshowedhowmuchthisgeneralmodelofhowsys-
tems ofrepresentationworkintheproductionofmeaningowedto theworkofFerdinandde Saussure.
Here, the keypointwasthe linkprovidedby the codesbetweenthe forms ofexpressionusedby lan- The underlying argument behind the semiotic approach is that, since all cultural objects convey
guage (whether speech, writing, drawing, or other types ofrepresentation) - which Saussurecalled meaning, and all cultural practices depend on meaning, they must make use of signs; and in so
the signifiers- andthementalconceptsassociatedwiththem- thesignifieds.Theconnectionbetween far as they do, they must work like language works, and be amenable to an analysis which basi-
these two systems of representation produced signs; and signs, organized into languages, produced cally makes use of Saussure's linguistic concepts (e. g. the signifier/signified and langue/parole
meanings,andcouldbeusedto referenceobjects, people andeventsin the 'real'world. distinctions, his idea of underlying codes and structures, and the arbitrary nature of the sign). Thus,
when in his collection of essays, Mythologies (1972), the French critic, Roland Barthes, studied
The world of wrestling', 'Soap powders and detergents', 'The face ofGreta Garbo' or The Blue
3 FROM LANGUAGE TO CULTURE: L NGUISTICS TO Guides to Europe', he brought a semiotic approach to bear on 'reading' popular culture, treating
these activities and objects as signs, as a language through which meaning is communicated. For
SEMIOTICS example, most of us would think of a wrestling match as a competitive game or sport designed for
one wrestler to gain victory over an opponent. Barthes, however, asks, not 'Who won?' but 'What
Saussure's main contribution was to the study oflinguistics in a narrow sense. However, since his isthemeaningofthis event?'Hetreats it asa textto beread.He 'reads'the exaggeratedgestures of
death, his theories have been widely deployed, as a foundation for a general approach to language wrestlers as a grandiloquentlanguageofwhathe calls the pure spectacleofexcess.
andmeaning,providinga modelofrepresentationwhichhasbeenappliedto a widerangeofcultural
objectsandpractices. Saussurehimselfforesawthispossibilityinhisfamouslecturenotes, collected
posthumouslyby his studentsasthe Course in GeneralLinguistics(1960), wherehelookedforward READING 3:
to 'A sciencethat studiesthe life ofsignswithin society ... I shall call it semiology, from the Greek You should now read the brief extract from Barthes's 'reading' of The world of wrestling', provided as
semeion "signs'"(p. 16). This general approachto the study of signs in culture, andofculture as a ReadingB at the end of this chapter.
sort of language',whichSaussureforeshadowed,is nowgenerallyknownbythe term semiotics.
20 21
In much the same way, the French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, studied the customs,
rituals, totemic objects, designs, myths and folk-tales of so-called 'primitive' peoples in Brazil,
not by analysinghow these things were produced andused in the context of daily life among the
Amazonian peoples, but in terms ofwhat they were trying to 'say', what messages about the culture
they communicated. He analysed their meaning, not by interpreting their content, but by looking at
the underlying mles and codes through which such objects or practices produced meaning and, in
doing so, he was making a classic Saussurean or structuralist 'move', from the paroles of a culture
to the underlying structure, its langue. To undertake this kind of work, in studying the meaning of
a television programme like EastEnders, for example, we would have to treat the pictures on the
screen as signifiers, and use the code of the television soap opera as a genre, to discover how each
image on the screen made use of these mles to 'say something' (signifieds) which the viewer could
'read' or interpret within the formal framework of a particular kind of television narrative (see the
discussion and analysis of TV soap operas in Chapter 6).
Inthe semioticapproach,notonlywordsandimagesbutobjectsthemselvescanfunctionassigni-
fiers in the production of meaning. Clothes, for example, may have a simple physical function - to
cover the body and protect it from the weather. But clothes also double up as signs. They construct a
meaning and carry a message. An evening dress may signify 'elegance'; a bow tie and tails, 'formal-
ity'; jeans and trainers, 'casual dress'; a certain kind of sweater in the right setting, 'a long, romantic,
autumn walk in the wood' (Barthes, 1967). These signs enable clothes to convey meaning and to
function like a language 'the language of fashion'. How do they do this?
FIGURE1.5 Advertisementfor Gucci, in Vogue, September 1995

ACTIVITY 5
Look at the example of clothes in a magazine fashion spread (Figure 1. 5). Apply Saussure's model
to analyse what the clothes are 'saying'? How would you decode their message? In particular, which two linked operations are required to complete the representation process by which meaning is
elements are operating as signifiers and whatconcepts - signitieds- are you applyingto them? Don'tjust produced. First, we need a basic code which links a particular piece of material which is cut and
get an overall impression - work it out in detail. How is the 'language of fashion' working in this example? sewnin a particularway(signifier)to ourmental conceptofit (signified)- saya particularcut of
material to our concept of 'a dress' or 'jeans'. (Remember that only some cultures would 'read'the
The clothes themselves are the signifiers. The fashion code in western consumer cultures like ours signifier in this way, or indeed possess the concept of(i. e. have classified clothes into) 'a dress', as
correlates particular kinds or combinations of clothing with certain concepts ('elegance', 'formal- different from 'jeans'. ) The combination ofsignifier and signified is what Saussure called a sign.
ity', 'casualness', 'romance'). These are the signifieds. This coding converts the clothes into signs, Then, having recognized the material as a dress, or asjeans, andproduced a sign, we canprogress
which can then be read as a language. In the language of fashion, the signifiers are arranged in a cer- to a second,widerlevel, whichlinks these signsto broader, cultural themes, concepts or meanings
tain sequence, in certain relations to one another. Relations may be of similarity - certain items 'go - for example, an eveningdressto 'formality' or 'elegance',jeans to 'casualness'.Barthes called
together' (e. g. casual shoes with jeans). Differences are also marked - no leather belts with evening thefirst, descriptive level, the level ofdenotation; the second level, that ofconnotation. Both, of
course, require the use ofcodes.
wear. Some signs actually create meaningby exploiting 'difference': e.g. Doc Martenboots with a
flowing long skirt. These bits of clothing 'say something' - they convey meaning. Of course, not Denotation is the simple, basic, descriptive level, where consensus is wide and most people
everybody reads fashion in the same way. There are differences of gender, age, class, race. But all would agree on the meaning ('dress', 'jeans'). At the second level - connotation - these signi-
those who share the same fashion code will interpret the signs in roughly the same ways. 'Oh, jeans tiers,whichwehavebeenableto 'decode'at a simple level byusingourconventional conceptual
don't look right for that event. It's a formal occasion- it demands somethingmore elegant.' classifications ofdress to readtheir meaning, enter a wider, second kind ofcode - 'the language
You may have noticed that, in this example, we have moved from the very narrow linguistic offashion'- which connects them to broader themes andmeanings, linking them with what we
level from which we drew examples in the first section, to a wider, cultural level. Note, also, that call the wider semantic fields of our culture: ideas of 'elegance', 'formality', 'casualness' and
22 23
'romance'. This second, wider meaning is no longer a descriptive level of obvious interpretation. Here READING C=
we are beginning to interpret the completed signs in terms ofthe wider realms of social ideology - the
general beliefs, conceptual frameworks and value systems of society. This second level of significa-
tothe short extract from 'Myth today' (Reading C atthe end ofthis chapter), and read Barthes's account
tion, Barthes suggests, is more 'general, global and diffuse. ... It deals with "fragments of an ideol- iw myth functions as a system of representation. Make sure you understand what Barthes means by
ogy... ". These signifieds have a very close communication with culture, knowledge, history and it
, staggeredsystems'andbythe ideathatmythis a 'meta-language'(a second-orderlanguage).
is through them, so to speak, that the environmental world [of the culture] invades the system [of
representation]' (Barthes, 1967, pp. 91-2). r another example of this two-stage process of signification, we can turn now to another of
rthes's famous essays.
3. 1 Myth today
In his essay 'Myth today', in Mythologies, Barthes gives another example which helps us to see
:TIVITY 6
exactly how representation is working at this second, broader cultural level. Visiting the barbers' jw, look carefully at the advertisement for Panzani products (Figure 1. 6) and, with Barthes's analysis in
.
day, Barthes is shown a copy of the French magazine Paris Match, which has on its cover a picture
.
ind, dothe following exercise:

of 'a young Negro in a Frenchuniform saluting with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on the fold of 1 What ssgnifiers can you identify in the ad?
the tricolour'(the French flag) (1972, p. 116). At the first level, to get any meaning at all, we need to 2 What do they mean? What are their signifteds?
decode each of the signifiers in the image into their appropriate concepts: e.g. a soldier, a uniform,
3 Now, look at the ad as a whole, at the level of 'myth' What is its wider, cultural message or theme?
an arm raised, eyes lifted, a French flag. This yields a set of signs with a simple, literal message or
Can you construct one?
meaning: a black soldier is giving the Frenchflag a salute (denotation). However, Barthes argues that
this image also has a wider, cultural meaning. Ifwe ask, 'What is Paris Match telling us by using this
picture of a black soldier saluting a French flag?', Barthes suggests that we may come up with the
message: 'that France is a great Empire, and that all her sons, without any colour discrimination,
faithfully serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colo-
nialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors' (connotation) (ibid. ).
Whatever you think of the actual 'message' which Barthes finds, for a proper semiotic analysis
you must be able to outline precisely the different steps by which this broader meaning has been
produced. Barthes argues that here representation takes place through two separate but linked pro-
cesses. In the first, the signifiers (the elements ofthe image) and the signifieds (the concepts - soldier,
flag and so on) unite to form a sign with a simple denoted message: a black soldier is giving the
French flag a salute. At the second stage, this completed message or sign is linked to a second set
of signifieds - a broad, ideological theme about French colonialism. The first completed meaning
functions as the signifier in the second stage of the representation process and, when linked with
a wider theme by a reader, yields a second, more elaborate and ideologically framed message or
meaning. Barthes gives this second concept or theme a name - he calls it 'a purposeful mixture
of "French imperiality" and "militariness"'. This, he says, adds up to a 'message' about French
colonialism and her faithful Negro soldier-sons. Barthes calls this second level of signification the
level of myth. In this reading, he adds, 'French imperiality is the very drive behind the myth. The
concept reconstitutes a chain of causes and effects, motives and intentions. ... Through the concept
... a whole new history ... is implanted in the myth ... the concept of French imperiality ... is again
tied to the totality of the world: to the general history of France, to its colonial adventures, to its
present difficulties' (Barthes, 1972, p. 119). FIGURE 1. 6 'Italian-ness' and the Panzani ad
24 25
HEADING D Saussure's 'linguistic' model is developed through its application to a much wider field of
Now read the second extract from Barthes, in which he offers an interpretation of the Panzani ad for gndrepresentations (advertising, photography, popular culture, travel, fashion, etc.). Also,
spaghetti and vegetables in a string bag as a 'myth' about Italian national culture. The extract from jg less concern with how individual words function as signs in language, and more about the
'Rhetoric of the image', in frnage-A/iusic-Text (1977), is included as Reading D at the end of this chapter. licationofthelanguagemodelto a muchbroadersetofculturalpractices. Saussureheldoutthe
nisethatthe wholedomainofmeaningcould, at last, be systematicallymapped.Barthes,too,
[ a 'method', but his semiotic approach is much more loosely and interpretively applied; and, in
BarthessuggeststhatwecanreadthePanzaniadasa 'myth'bylinkingits completedmessage(this later work (for example. The Pleasure of the Text, 1975), he is more concerned with the 'play'
is a picture of some packets of pasta, a tin, a sachet, some tomatoes, onions, peppers, a mushroom, meaning anddesire across texts than he is with the attempt to fix meaning by a scientific analysis
all emerging from a half-open string bag) with the cultural theme or concept ofltalianicity' (or as we language'smles andlaws.
would say, 'Italian-ness'). Then, at the level of the myth or meta-language, the Panzani ad becomes Subsequently, as we observed, the project of a 'science of meaning' has appeared increas-
a message about the essential meaning of Italian-ness as a national culture. Can commodities really irlv untenable. Meaning and representation seem to belong irrevocably to the interpretative
become the signifiers for myths of nationality? Can you think of ads, in magazines or on television, ie of the human and cultural sciences, whose subject matter - society, culture, the human
which work in the same way, drawing on the myth of 'Englishness'? Or Trenchness'? Or 'American- bject - is not amenable to a positivistic approach (i. e. one which seeks to discover scientific
ness'? Or 'Indian-ness'? Try to apply the idea of 'Englishness' to the ad reproduced as Figure 1.7 ivs about society). Later developments have recognized the necessarily interpretative nature
' culture and the fact that interpretations never produce a final moment of absolute truth.
[Stead, interpretations are always followed by other interpretations, in an endless chain. As the
renchphilosopher,JacquesDerrida,put it, writingalwaysleadsto more writing. Difference,he
argued,canneverbe wholly capturedwithinanybinarysystem (Derrida, 1981). So anynotion
of a final meaning is always endlessly put off, deferred. Cultural studies of this interpretative
kind, like other qualitative forms of sociological inquiry, are inevitably caught up in this 'circle
ofmeaning'.
In the semiotic approach, representation was understood on the basis of the way words func-
tioned as signs within language. But, for a start, in a culture, meaning often depends on larger units
of analysis - narratives, statements, groups of images, whole discourses which operate across a
variety of texts, areas of knowledge about a subject which have acquired widespread authority.
Semiotics seemed to confine the process of representation to language, and to treat it as a closed,
rather static, system. Subsequent developments became more concerned with representation as a
source for the production of social knowledge - a more open system, connected in more intimate
ways with social practices and questions of power. In the semiotic approach, the subject was dis-
placed from the centre of language. Later theorists returned to the question of the subject, or at least
to the empty space which Saussure's theory had left; without, of course, putting him/her back in the
(..(AfA-.
centre, as the author or source ofmeaning. Even if language, in some sense, 'spoke us' (as Saussure
FIGURE 1. 7 An image of 'Englishness'- advertisementfor Jaguar tendedto argue), it was also important that in certain historical moments, some people had more
power to speak about some subjects than others (male doctors about mad female patients in the late
nineteenth century, for example, to take one of the key examples developed in the work of Michel
4 D SCOURSE, POWER AND THE SUBJECT Foucault). Models ofrepresentation, these critics argued, oughtto focus onthese broaderissues of
knowledge and power.
What the examples above show is that the semiotic approach provides a method for analysing how Foucault used the word 'representation' in a narrower sense than we are using it here, but
visual representations convey meaning. Already, in Roland Barthes's work in the 1960s, as we have he is considered to have contributed to a novel and significant general approach to the problem of
26 27
representation. What concerned him was the production of knowledge (rather thanjust mean-
ing) through what he called discourse (rather than just language). His project, he said, was
From language to discourse
to analyse 'how human beings understand themselves in our culture' and how our knowledge . irst point to note, then, is the shift of attention in Foucault from 'language' to 'discourse'.
about 'the social, the embodied individual and shared meanings' comes to be produced in dif- died not language, but discourse as a system of representation. Normally, the term dis-
ferent periods. With its emphasis on cultural understanding and shared meanings, you can see ' js usedas a linguistic concept. It simply meanspassages ofconnected writing or speech.
that Foucault's project was still to some degree indebted to Saussure and Barthes (see Dreyfus lel Foucault, however, gave it a different meaning. What interested him were the rules and
and Rabinow, 1982, p. 17) while in other ways departing radically from them. Foucault's ;tices that produced meaningful statements and regulated discourse in different historical
work was much more historically grounded, more attentive to historical specificities, than the ods. By 'discourse', Foucault meant 'a group of statements which provide a language for
semiotic approach. As he said, 'relations of power, not relations of meaning' were his main about - a way of representing the knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular
concern. The particular objects ofFoucault's attention were the various disciplines ofknowl- orical moment. ... Discourse is about the production ofknowledge through language. But...
edge in the human and social sciences - what he called 'the subjectifying social sciences'. ;e all social practices entail meaning, andmeanings shape and influence whatwe do - our
These had acquired an increasingly prominent and influential role in modern culture and were, duct- all practiceshavea discursiveaspect'(Hall, 1992,p. 291). It is importantto note that
in many instances, considered to be the discourses which, like religion in earlier times, could ; concept of discoursein this usage is not purely a 'linguistic' concept. It is about language
give us the 'truth' about knowledge. id practice. It attempts to overcome the traditional distinction between what one says (lan-
We will return to Foucault's work in some of the subsequent chapters in this book (for lage) andwhat one does (practice). Discourse, Foucault argues, constmcts the topic. It defines
example, Chapter 5). Here, we want to introduce Foucault and the discursive approach to rep- idproduces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully
resentation by outlining three of his major ideas: his concept of discourse; the issue of power talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to
and knowledge; and the question of the subject. It might be useful, however, to start by giving regulate the conduct ofothers. Just as a discourse 'rules in' certain ways oftalking about a topic,
you a general flavour, in Foucault's graphic (and somewhat over-stated) terms, of how he saw defininganacceptableandintelligible wayto talk, write, or conductoneself, so also, by defini-
his project differing from that of the semiotic approach to representation. He moved away from
don, it 'rules out', limits andrestricts otherways oftalking, of conducting ourselves in relation
an approach like that of Saussure and Barthes, based on 'the domain of signifying structure', to the topic or constructing knowledge about it. Discourse, Foucault argued, never consists of
one statement, one text, one action or one source. The same discourse, characteristic of the way
towards one based on analysing what he called 'relations of force, strategic developments and
tactics':
ofthinking or the state of knowledge at any one time (what Foucault called the episteme), will
appearacross a range of texts, and as forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional
siteswithin society. However, wheneverthese discursive events 'referto the same object, share
Here I believe one's point ofreference shouldnot be to the great model of language(langue) and the same style and ... support a strategy ... a common institutional, administrative or political
signs, but to that of war and battle. The history whichbears and determines us has the form of a
drift and pattern' (Cousins and Hussain, 1984, pp. 84-5), then they are said by Foucault to
war ratherthanthat of a language:relations ofpowernot relations ofmeaning ...
belong to the same discursive formation.
(Foucault, 1980, pp. 114-15) Meaning and meaningful practice is therefore constmcted within discourse. Like the semioti-
cians, Foucault was a 'constructionist'. However, unlike them, he was concerned with the produc-
Rejecting both Hegelian Marxism (what he calls 'the dialectic') and semiotics, Foucault argued that: tion ofknowledgeandmeaning,not throughlanguagebut throughdiscourse. Thereweretherefore
similarities, but also substantive differences between these two versions.
Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication,
The ideathat 'discourseproducesthe objects ofknowledge'andthatnothingwhichis meaning-
can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. 'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always ful exists outside discourse, is at first sight a disconcertingproposition, which seems to run right
open andhazardousreality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and 'semiology' is a againstthe grainofcommon-sensethinking. It is worthspendinga momentto explorethis ideafur-
way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal characterby reducing it to the calm Platonic form ther.IsFoucaultsaying- assomeofhiscriticshavecharged- thatnothingexistsoutsidediscourse^
of languageanddialogue. In fact, Foucault does not deny that things can have a real, material existence in the world. What
hedoesargueis that 'nothinghas any meaningoutside discourse'(Foucault, 1972).As Laclauand
(ibid.) Mouffeput it, 'we use [the term discourse] to emphasizethe fact that every social configurationis
28 29
meaningful' (1990, p. 100). The concept ofdiscourse is not about whether things exist, but about that a different discourse or episteme will arise at a later historical moment,
wheremeaningcomes from. the existing one, opening up a new discursiveformation, and producing, in its turn,
idWconceptionsof'madness'or 'punishment'or 'sexuality',newdiscourseswiththepowerand
-READING E thority,the 'truth', to regulatesocialpracticesinnewways.
Turn nowto ReadingE, by Ernesto Laclauand Chantal Mouffe, a short extractfrom NewReflectf'onson
the Revolution ofOurTime(1990), from whichwe havejust quoted, and read it carefully. Whatthey argue Historicizing discourse: d scursive practices
isthatphysicalobjects doexist, buttheyhavenofixedmeaning;theyonlytakeon meaningandbecome
objects of knowledgewithindiscourse.Makesureyoufollowtheirargumentbefore readingfurther. main point to get hold of here is the way discourse, representation, knowledge and 'truth'
i-adicallyhistoricizedby Foucault, in contrastto the rather ahistoricaltendency in semiotics.
1 Interms ofthe discourse about'building a wall', the distinction between the linguistic part(asking meant something and were 'true', he argued, only within a specific historical context.
for a brick) andthe physicalact (putting the brick in place) does not matter. Thetirst is linguistic, cault didnot believe that the same phenomena would be found across different historical peri-
the second is physical, but both are 'discursive'- meaningfulwithin discourse. He thought that, in each period, discourse produced forms of knowledge, objects, subjects
2 The round leather object which you kick is a physical object - a ball. But it only becomes 'a football' dees of knowledge, which differed radically from period to period, with no necessary
withinthe context of the rules of the game, whichare socially constructed. itinuitybetweenthem.
Thus, for Foucault, for example, mental illness was not an objective fact, whichremainedthe
3 It is impossibleto determinethe meaningof an object outside its context of use. A stone thrown in me in all historical periods, and meant the same thing in all cultures. It was only within a definite
a fightis a differentthing('a projectile')from a stonedisplayedina museum('a pieceofsculpture'). iscursive formation that the object, 'madness', could appear at all as a meaningful or intelligible
jonstruct. It was 'constituted by all that was said, in all the statements that named it, divided it up,
describedit, explainedit, traced its development, indicatedits various correlations,judged it, and
Thisideathatphysicalthingsandactionsexist,buttheyonlytakeonmeaningandbecomeobjects possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own'
ofknowledgewithindiscourse,isattheheartoftheconstructionisttheoryofmeaningandrepresenta- (1972, p. 32). And it was only after a certain definition of 'madness' was put into practice, that the
tion. Foucaultarguesthatsincewecanonlyhavea knowledgeofthingsiftheyhavea meaning,it is appropriatesubject- 'themadman'ascurrentmedicalandpsychiatricknowledgedefined'him' -
discourse- notthethings-in-themselves- whichproducesknowledge.Subjectslike 'madness','pun- could appear.
ishmenf and 'sexuality' only existmeaningfully withinthe discourses aboutthem. Thus, the study of Or, take some other examples of discursive practices from his work. There have always been
thediscoursesofmadness,punishmentor sexualitywouldhaveto includethefollowingelements: sexual relations. But 'sexuality', as a specific way of talking about, studying and regulating sexual
desire, its secrets and its fantasies, Foucault argued, only appeared in western societies at a par-
1 statements about 'madness', 'punishment' or 'sexuality' whichgiveus a certainkind ofknowledge ticular historical moment (Foucault, 1978). There may always have been what we now call homo-
aboutthesethings;
sexual fonns of behaviour. But 'the homosexual' as a specific kind of social subject, was produced,
2 themles whichprescribe certainways oftalking aboutthesetopics andexclude otherways- which and could only make its appearance, within the moral, legal, medical and psychiatric discourses,
govern what is 'sayable' or 'thinkable' about insanity, punishment or sexuality, at a particular practices and institutional apparatuses of the late nineteenth century, with their particular theories
historicalmoment; of sexual perversity (Weeks, 1981, 1985). Similarly, it makes nonsense to talk of the 'hysterical
3 'subjects' who in some ways personify the discourse - the madman, the hysterical woman, the woman' outside the nineteenth-century view ofhysteria as a very widespread female malady. In The
criminal, the deviant, the sexually perverse person - with the attributes we would expect these Birth ofthe Clinic (1973), Foucault charted how 'in less than halfa century, the medical understand-
subjects to have, given the way knowledge about the topic was constructed at that time; ing ofdiseasewas transformed' from a classical notion that diseaseexisted separate from the body,
4 howthis knowledgeaboutthe topic acquiresauthority, a senseofembodyingthe 'truth' aboutit, to the modem idea that disease arose within and could be mapped directly by its course through
constituting the 'truth of the matter', at a historical moment; the human body (McNay, 1994). This discursive shift changed medical practice. It gave greater
importance to the doctor's 'gaze' which could now 'read' the course ofdisease simply by a powerful
5 the practices within institutions for dealingwith the subjects - medical treatment for the insane,
look at what Foucault called 'the visible body' of the patient - following the 'routes ... laid down in
punishmentregimes for the guilty, moral discipline for the sexually deviant whose conduct is
accordance with a now familiar geometry ... the anatomical atlas' (Foucault, 1973, pp. 3^t). This
being regulated and organized according to those ideas;
greater knowledge increased the doctor's power of surveillance vis-a-vis the patient.
30 31
The Work of Representation
Representation
Knowledge about andpractices around all these subjects, Foucault argued, were historically knowledgeandpowertoa questionofclasspowerandclassinterests. Foucaultdidnotdeny
culturally specific. They did not and could not meaningfully exist outside specific discourses, i.e. Tr pnceof classes, but he was strongly opposed element of economic
to this powerfulclass or
outside the ways they were represented in discourse, produced in knowledge and regulated by the 1^-Tn intheMarxisttheoryofideology. Secondly,hearguedthatMarxismtendedtocontrast
discursive practices anddisciplinary techniques ofa particular society andtime. Far from accepting ;^rtions'~of bourgeoisknowledge againstits ownclaimsto 'truth' - Marxist^science. But
the trans-historical continuities of which historians are so fond, Foucault believed that more signifi-
ormofthoughtcouldclaimanabsolute'truth'ofthiskind,outside
cant were the radical breaks, ruptures and discontinuities between one period and another, between ,
^loufdiscourse. Allpolitical andsocialformsofthought,hebelieved,wereinevitablycaught
one discursive formation and another. ^th'emterplayofknowledgeandpower.So,hisworkrejectsthetraditionalMarxistquestion,-m
êclassinterestdoeslanguage,representation andpoweroperate?' _ ^
nsts"Ukethe Italian,Antonio Gramsci, whowasinfluenced byMarxbutrejected class
4. 3 From discourse to power/knowledge ^Msmâdvanceda definitionof'ideology'whichisconsiderablyclosertoFoucault'spo^
Tough'still toopreoccupiedwithclassquestionstobeacceptabletohim.Gramsc^snotim
In his later work Foucault became even more concerned with how knowledge was put to work r socialgroupsstmggleinmanydifferentways,includingideologically, towinthe
throughdiscursivepractices in specific institutional settings to regulatethe conductofothers. He 't'ofothergroupsandachieve'akmdofascendancyinboththoughtandpracticeoverthenL
focused on the relationship between knowledge and power, and how power operated within what i"ofpowerGramscicalledhegemony. Hegemony isneverpermanent andisnotjeduclble
he calledaninstitutionalapparatusandits technologies(techniques). Foucault'sconceptionofthe Mcmterestsortoa simpleclassmodelofsociety.ThishassomesimilaritiestoFoucaulfs
is briefly
apparatus of punishment, for example, included a variety of diverse elements, linguistic and 'îtmTt hough'on'some key issues they differ radically. (The question of hegemony
non-linguistic: addressedagainin Chapter 4.) ... , _. _" ^. _ ^^ A^^;.

* Whatdistinguished Foucault's position ondiscourse, knowledge andpower from radically
discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, theor7o f"dass° interests and ideological 'distortion'? Foucault advanced least two, at
scientific statements, philosophic propositions, morality, philanthropy, etc. ... The apparatus is novel, propositions.
thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain co-ordinates of
knowledge. ... This is whatthe apparatus consists in: strategies ofrelations offorces supporting 1^.. ^^:^
and supported by types ofknowledge (Foucault, 1980, pp. 194, 196).
ThefirstconcernsthewayFoucaultconceivedthelinkagebetweenknowledgeandpowerHitherto^
This approach took as one of its key subjects of investigation the relations between knowledge, w7havetendeTtothinkthatpoweroperatesina directandbmtallyrepressivefashion,dispensing
power and the body in modem society. It saw knowledge as always inextricably enmeshed in rela- wkh"politething'slik7cultureandknowledge,thoughGramscicertainlybrokewiththatmodelj
is impUcated
tions of power because it was always being applied to the regulation of social conduct in practice
rF oucault='argued that not only is knowledge always
form of but a power, power
(i. e. to particular 'bodies'). This foregrounding of the relation between discourse, knowledge and 5nthequestionsofwhetherandinwhatcircumstances knowledgeistobeappliedornot. Th^qu^
power marked a significant development in the constructionist approach to representation whichwe
tionlofltheappTicationand effectiveness ofpower/knowledge important, he thought, than
was more
have been outlining. It rescued representation from the clutches of a purely formal theory and gave the question of its 'truth'.
it a historical, practical and 'worldly' context ofoperation. 'Knowledge linkedtopowernotonly assumes theauthority of'thetmA', buthasthepowerto
You may wonder to what extent this concern with discourse, knowledge and power brought makeitselftrue.All knowledge, onceappliedintherealworld,hasrealeffectsand,inthatsenseat
Foucault's interests closer to those of the classical sociological theories of ideology, especially least, 'becomestrue'. Knowledge, onceusedtoregulatetheconductofothers, entailsconstraint,
Marxismwithits concernto identifythe classpositionsandclass interests concealedwithinparticu- regulationanTthe'disciplmmgofpractices.Thus,'Thereisnopowerrelationwithout^correla^
lar forms of knowledge. Foucault, indeed, does come closer to addressing some of these questions tweconstitutionofa fieldofknowledge,noranyknowledgethatdoesnotpresupposeandconstitute
about ideology than, perhaps, formal semiotics did (though Roland Barthes was also concerned with atthe same time, power relations' (Foucault, 1977, p. 27).
questions of ideology and myth, as we saw earlier). But Foucault had quite specific and cogent rea- AccordingtoFoucault,whatwethinkwe'know'ina particularperiodabout,say,crime,has a
sons why he rejected the classical Marxist problematic of 'ideology'. Mara hadargued that, in every bearmg'onTow we"regulate,control andpunishcriminals. Knowledge doesnotoperateina void.
epoch, ideas reflect the economic basis of society, and thus the 'ruling ideas' are those ofthe mling Itisputtowork, through certaintechnologies andstrategies ofapplication, in specific situations,
class which governs a capitalist economy, and correspond to its dominant interests. Foucault's main histoncal'contexts andmstitutional regimes. To study punishment, you must study howthe com-
argument againstthe classical Marxist theory ofideology wasthat it tendedto reduce all the relations binationofdiscourseandpower power/knowledge- hasproduceda certainconceptionofcrime
32 33
andthecriminal, hashadcertainrealeffectsbothforcriminalandforthepunisher, andhowthesc towardsthemany,localizedcircuits, tactics, mechanisms andeffectsthroughwhichpower

have been set into practice in certain historically specific prison regimes. .
:ilpT- what Foucault calls the 'meticulous rituals' the 'micro-physics' of power. These
or
This ledFoucaultto speak, notofthe 'truth' ofknowledge intheabsolute sense- a truth which ""relations 'gorightdowntothedepthofsociety' (Foucault, 1977 p.27) Theyconnectthe
remained so, whatever the period, setting, context - but of a discursive formation sustaining a is actually working onthe ground to the greatpyramids ofpower by whathe calls a
regime of truth. Thus, it may or may not be true that single parenting inevitably leads to delin- movement (capillaries being the thin-walled vessels that aid the exchange of oxygen
quency andcrime. But if everyone believes it to be so, andpunishes singleparents accordingly. '^nthebloodinourbodiesandthesurroundmg tissues) Notbecausepoweratthese. lower
thiswill haverealconsequences forbothparents andchildrenandwillbecome 'true' interms ofits ^me'relyreflectsor'reproduces,atthelevelofindividuals bodies,gestures
the
andbehaviour
because
real effects, even ifin some absolute sense it has never been conclusively proven. Inthe human and ','rln eral form of the law or government' (Foucault, 1977, p. 27) but, on contrary,
social sciences, Foucault argued: ;15aiTapproach'roots[power] informsofbehaviour,bodiesand\oca\ relationsofpowerwhich

midnotatallbeseenasa simpleprojectionofthecentralpower'(Foucault 1980 p 201)
Tmth isn't outside power.... Truth is a thing ofthis world; it isproduced only byvirtue ofmultiple Towhatobjectarethemicro-physicsofpowerprimarilyapplied inFoucault'smodel?Tothe
forms ofconstraint. Andit inducesregulareffects ofpower. Eachsocietyhasitsregime oftmth, its He'placesthebodyatthe'centre ofthestrugglesbetweendifferentformations ofpower/
'generalpolities' oftruth; thatis,thetypes ofdiscoursewhichit acceptsandmakes function astrue, owledge.Thetechniquesofregulationareappliedtothebody.Differentdiscursiveformations
themechanismsandinstanceswhichenableoneto distinguishtrueandfalsestatements,themeans d'apâratusesdivide,' classifyandinscribethebodydifferentlyintheirresPectiveJe§imeôf
bywhicheachis sanctioned ... thestatus ofthosewhoarechargedwith sayingwhatcounts astrue. weiând'truth'.InDisciplineandPunish,forexample,Foucaultanalysestheverydifferentways
(Foucault, 1980, p. 131) , whichthebodyofthecriminal is 'produced' anddisciplined indifferent punishment regimes m
.rance7ln earlier periods, punishment washaphazard, prisons wereplaces into whichthepublic
jouldwanderandtheultimate punishment wasinscribedviolently onthebodybyshould meansbeofinstm-
ce nt's of torture and execution, etc. practice the
-
a of which is that it
essence public,
Secondly, Foucault advanced analtogether novel conception ofpower. Wetendto think ofpower visibletoeveryone. Themodemformofdisciplinaryregulationandpower,bycontrast, isprivate,
asalways radiating in a single direction - from top to bottom - andcoming from a specific source - individualized; prisoners areshutawayfromthepublic andoftenfromoneanother, thoughcontinu-
the sovereign, the state, the mling class and so on. For Foucault, however, power does not 'func- allyundersurveillance fromtheauthorities; andpunishment isindividualized. Here,thebodyhas
tion in the form ofa chain'- it circulates. It is never monopolized by one centre. It 'is deployed become the site of a new kind of disciplinary regime.
and exercised through a net-like organization' (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). This suggests that we are Ofcoursethis 'body'isnotsimplythenaturalbodywhichallhumanbeingspossessatalltimes.
all, to some degree, caught up in its circulation - oppressors and oppressed. It does not radiate Thisbodyisproducedwithindiscourse,accordingtothedifferentdiscursiveformations- thestate
downwards, either from one source or from one place. Power relations permeate all levels ofsocial of'knowledge aboutcrime andthecriminal, whatcounts as 'true' abouthowto changeor deter
existence and are therefore to be found operating at every site ofsocial life - in the private spheres criminalbehaviour, the specific apparatus andtechnologies ofpunishment prevailing atthetime.
ofthe family and sexuality as much as in the public spheres ofpolitics, the economy and the law. Thisisa radicallyhistoricizedconceptionofthebody- a sortofsurfaceonwhichdifferentregimes
What'smore, powerisnotonlynegative, repressingwhatit seeksto control. It isalsoproductive. It ofpower/knowledge writetheirmeanings andeffects. Itthinksofthebodyas'totally imprintedby
'doesn't only weighonus asa force thatsaysno,but... it traverses andproduces things, it induces history andtheprocesses ofhistory's deconstmction ofthebody' (Foucault, 1977,p. 63).
pleasure, forms ofknowledge, produces discourse. It needs to bethought ofasa productive network
whichmns through the whole social body' (Foucault, 1980, p. 119). 4. 4 Summary: Foucault and representation
Thepunishment system, for example, produces books, treatises, regulations, new strategies of
control andresistance, debatesinParliament, conversations, confessions, legalbriefsandappeals, Foucault'sapproachtorepresentationisnoteasytosummarize.Heisconcernedwiththeproduc-
trainingregimesforprisonofficers, andso on. The effortsto control sexualityproducea veritable tionofknowledge andmeaningthrough discourse. Foucault doesindeedanalyseparticular texts
explosion ofdiscourse - talk about sex, television andradioprogrammes, sermons andlegislation, andrepresentations, asthesemioticians did.Butheismoreinclinedtoanalysethewhole discursive
novels, stories andmagazine features, medical and counselling advice, essays and articles, learned formation to which a text or a practice belongs. His concern is with knowledge provided by the
theses andresearchprogrammes, aswell asnewsexualpractices (e. g. 'safe'sex) andthepomogra- humanandsocialsciences,whichorganizes conduct, understanding, practice andbelief, theregu-
phyindustry. Withoutdenyingthatthestate,thelaw,thesovereignorthedominantclassmayhave lation ofbodies as well as whole populations. Although his work is clearly done in the wake of,
positions of dominance, Foucault shifts our attention away from the grand, overall strategies of andisprofoundlyinfluencedby,the'turntolanguage'whichmarkedtheconstructionistapproach
34 35
to representation, his definition of discourse is much broader than language, and includes mam
otherelements ofpractice andinstitutional regulationwhichSaussure's approach, withitslinguis-
tie focus, excluded. Foucault is always much more historically specific, seeing forms of power/
knowledge asalwaysrooted inparticular contexts andhistories. Above all, for Foucault, thepro.
duction ofknowledge is always crossedwith questions ofpower andthe body; andthis
expandsthe scope ofwhatis involved in representation.
The major critique levelled against his work is that he tends to absorb too much into 'discourse'.
andthishastheeffectofencouraginghisfollowerstoneglecttheinfluenceofthematerial,economic
and structural factors in the operation ofpower/knowledge. Some critics also find his rejection of
any criterion of 'truth' in the human sciences in favour of the idea of a 'regime of truth' and the
will-to-power(thewill to makethings 'true') vulnerableto the chargeofrelativism. Nevertheless.
there is little doubt about the major impact which his work has had on contemporary theories of
representation and meaning.
4. 5 Charcot and the performance of hysteria

Inthe following example, wewill try to apply Foucault's method to a particular example. Figure 1.8
showsa paintingbyAndre Brouillet ofthe famous Frenchpsychiatrist andneurologist, Jean-Martin
Charcot(1825-93), lecturing on the subject offemalehysteriato students in the lecture theatre SURE 1. 8 Andre Brouillet, A Clinical Lesson at La Salpetriere (given by Charcot), 1887
his famousParisclinic at La Salpetriere.
ACTIVITY 7 Dyhypnotic suggestion' (Showalter, 1987, p. 148). Here we see the practice ofhypnosis being
applied in practice.
Lookat Brouillet's painting(Figure 1.8). Whatdoes it reveal as a representation ofthe studyof hysteria? Indeed,the image seemsto capture two suchmoments ofknowledgeproduction. Charcotdidnot
paymuchattentionto whatthepatients said(thoughhe observedtheiractionsandgesturesmeticu-
Brouillet shows a hysterical patient beingsupported by anassistant andattended bytwowomen. lously). But Freud and his friend Breuer did. At first, in their work when they returned home, they
Formanyyears, hysteriahadbeentraditionally identified asa female malady andalthough Charcot usedCharcot'shypnosismethod,whichhadattractedsuchwideattentionasa novelapproachto treat-
demonstrated conclusively that many hysterical symptoms were to be found in men, and a signifi- ment ofhysteria at La Salpetriere. But some years later they treated a young woman called Bertha
cantproportion ofhispatients were diagnosedmale hysterics, Elaine Showalterobservesthat 'for Pappenheimforhysteria,andshe,underthepseudonym'Anna0', becamethefirstcasestudywritten
Charcot, too, hysteria remains symbolically, if not medically, a female malady' (1987, p. 148). up in Freud andBreuer's path-breakingStudiesin Hysteria(1974/1895). It wasthe 'loss ofwords',
Charcotwas a very humanemanwhotook hispatients' sufferingseriously andtreatedthemwith herfailinggraspofthe syntaxofherownlanguage(German), the silencesandmeaninglessbabbleof
dignity.Hediagnosedhysteriaasa genuineailmentratherthana malingerer'sexcuse(muchashas thisbrilliantly intellectual, poetic andimaginativebut rebellious young woman, whichgave Breuer
happened, in ourtime, after many stmggles, with other illnesses, like anorexia andME). This paint- andFreudthe first clue that her linguistic disturbancewasrelatedto herresentment at her 'place' as
ing represents a regular feature of Charcot's treatment regime, where hysterical female patients dutiful daughterof a decidedlypatriarchal father, andthus deeply connectedwith her ilhiess. After
displayed before an audience of medical staff and students the symptoms oftheir malady, ending hypnosis,her capacityto speakcoherentlyreturned, andshe spoke fluently in three other languages,
oftenwith a full hysterical seizure. thoughnot inhernativeGerman.ThroughherdialoguewithBreuer, andherabilityto 'workthrough'
The painting could be said to capture and represent, visually, a discursive 'event' - the emer- herdifficultrelationshipinrelationto language, 'Anna0' gavethe first exampleofthe 'talkingcure'
gence of a new regime of knowledge. Charcot's great distinction, which drew students from far which,ofcourse, thenprovidedthe wholebasis for Freud's subsequentdevelopment ofthe psycho-
and wide to study with him (including, in 1885, the young Sigmund Freud from Vienna), was analytic method. So we are looking, in this image, at the 'birth' of two new psychiatric epistemes:
his demonstration 'that hysterical symptoms such as paralysis could be produced and relieved Charcot'smethodofhypnosisandthe conditionswhichlaterproducedpsychoanalysis.
36 37
The example also has many connections with the question ofrepresentation. In the picture, the
patientisperformingor 'representing'withherbodythehystericalsymptomsfromwhichsheis 'suf-
HERE IS THE SUBJECT?
fering'. But these symptoms are also being 're-presented' - in the very different medical language ve tracedthe shiftin Foucault'sworkfrom languageto discourseandknowledge,andtheir
of diagnosis and analysis - to her (his?) audience by the professor: a relationship which involves jn to questions ofpower. But where in all this, you might ask, is the subject? Saussure tended
power. Showalter notes that, in general, 'the representation of female hysteria was a central aspect lish the subject from the question of representation. Language, he argued, speaks us. The
ofCharcot's work' (1987, p. 148). Indeed, the clinic was filled with lithographs andpaintings. He ;ct appears in Saussure's schema as the author of individual speech-acts (paroles). But, as
had his assistants assemble a photographic album of nervous patients, a sort of visual inventory ave seen, Saussure did not think that the level of the paroles was one at which a 'scientific'
ofthe various 'types' ofhystericalpatient. He later employed a professionalphotographerto take sisoflanguagecouldbe conducted.In one sense,Foucaultsharesthisposition. Forhim, it is
charge ofthe service. His analysis ofthe displayed symptoms, which seems to be what is happenii
ourse, not the subject, whichproducesknowledge. Discourseis enmeshedwithpower, but it
in the painting, accompanied the hysterical 'performance'. He did not flinch from the spectacular )t necessaryto find 'a subject'- theking, themling class,thebourgeoisie,the state, etc. - for
and theatrical aspects associated with his demonstrations of hypnosis as a treatment regime. Freud
,
'er/knowledge to operate.
thought that 'Every one of his "fascinatinglectures'" was 'a little work of art in constmction and
,
On the other hand, Foucault did include the subject in his theorizing, though he did not restore
composition'. Indeed,Freudnoted, 'heneverappearedgreaterto hislistenersthanafterhehadmade
subjectto itsposition asthe centre andauthor ofrepresentation. Indeed, ashiswork developed,
the effort, by giving the most detailed account ofhis train ofthought, by the greatest frankness about became more and more concernedwith questions about 'the subject', and in his very late and
his doubts andhesitations, to reduce the gulfbetween teacher andpupil' (Gay, 1988, p. 49). inishedwork, he even went so far as to give the subject a certain reflexive awarenessofhis or
.
ownconduct, thoughthis still stopped short ofrestoringthe subjectto his/herfull sovereignty.

ACTIVITY 8 Foucault was certainly deeply critical of what we might call the traditional conception of the
Now look carefully at the picture again and, bearing in mind whatwe have said about Foucault's method ibject. The conventional notion thinks of'the subject' asanindividual who is fully endowedwith
of and approachto representation, answerthe following questions: jnsciousness;anautonomous andstable entity, the 'core' ofthe self, andthe independent,authen-
ic source ofaction andmeaning.Accordingto this conception, whenwe hearourselves speak,we
1 Who commands the centre of the picture? i'eelweareidenticalwithwhathasbeensaid.Andthis identityofthe subjectwithwhatis saidgives
2 Who or what is its 'subject'? Are (1) and (2) the same? him/hera privileged position in relation to meaning. It suggests that, although other people may
3 Canyou tell that knowledgeis being produced here? How? misunderstandus, we alwaysunderstandourselves becausewewere the source ofmeaning in the
firstplace.
4 Whatdo you notice about relations of power in the picture? Howare they represented? Howdoes However, as we have seen, the shift towards a constmctionist conception of language and
the form and spaba; relationships of the picture represent this?
representation did a great deal to displace the subject from a privileged position in relation to
5 Describethe 'gaze'of the people in the image:who is looking at whom?Whatdoes thattell us? knowledge and meaning. The same is tme of Foucault's discursive approach. It is discourse, not
6 What does the age and gender of the participants tell us? the subjects who speak it, which produces knowledge. Subjects may produce particular texts, but
7 What message does the patient's body convey? they are operating within the limits of the episteme, the discursive formation, the regime of truth,
of a particular period and culture. Indeed, this is one ofFoucault's most radical propositions:
8 Is there a sexua/ meaning in the image? If so, what?
the 'subject' is produced within discourse. This subject of discourse cannot be outside discourse
9 Whatis the relationshipof you, the viewer, to the image? because it must be subjected to discourse. It must submit to its mles and conventions, to its dispo-
10 Do you notice anythingelse aboutthe imagewhichwe have missed? sitions ofpower/knowledge. The subject can become the bearer of the kind of knowledge which
discourse produces. It can become the object through which power is relayed. But it cannot stand
outside power/knowledge as its source and author. In 'The subject and power' (1982), Foucault
HEADING F writes that:
Now read the account of Charcot and La Salpetriere offered by Elaine Showalter in The performance of
hysteria' from The Female Malady, reproduced as Reading F at the end of this chapter. Look carefully at My objective ... hasbeento create a history ofthe differentmodesby which, in our culture, human
the two photographs of Charcot's hysterical women patients. What do you make of their captions? beings are made subjects.... It is a form ofpower which makes individuals subjects. There are two
meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else's control and dependence, and tied to his
38 39
[sic] own identity by a conscience and self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form ofpower t's is the 'true', correct or even the definitive reading ofthe painting's meaning. That the
which subjugates andmakes subject to. /'hasnoone,fixedorfinalmeaningis,indeed,oneofFoucault'smostpowerfularguments.
. 'painting is unique in Velasquez' work. It was part of the Spanish court's royal collection
(Foucault, 1982,pp. 208, 212) inthepalace in a roomwhichwassubsequently destroyedby fire. Itwasdated'1656 by
;' successor as court painter. It was originally called 'The Empress with her Ladies and a
Making discourse andrepresentation more historical has therefore beenmatched, in Foucault, byan f, butbytheinventory of1666,ithadacquiredthetitleof'APortrait oftheInfantaofSpainwith
equally radical historicization of the subject. 'One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to ad'iesinWaiting andServants, bythe Court Painter andPalace Chamberlain DiegoVelasquez'.
getridofthesubjectitself, that'sto say,to arriveatananalysiswhichcanaccountfortheconstitu- {subsequently called LasMeninas - 'TheMaidsofHonour'. Some arguethatthepainting shows
tion ofthe subject within a historical framework' (Foucault, 1980, p. 115). uezworkingonLasMeninasitselfandwaspaintedwiththeaidofa mirror- butthisnowseems
Where,then,is 'thesubject'inthismorediscursiveapproachtomeaning,representationandpower? Themostwidelyheld andconvincing explanation is thatVelasquezwasworking on a full-
Foucault's 'subject' seems to be producedthroughdiscoursein two different senses or places. th portrait ofthe King and Queen, and that it is the royal couple who are reflected in the mirror
First, the discourse itselfproduces 'subjects' - figures whopersonify the particular forms ofknowl- thebackwall. It is atthecouple thattheprincess andherattendants arelooking andonthem that
edgewhichthediscourseproduces.Thesesubjectshavetheattributeswewouldexpectastheseare artist's gaze appears to rest ashe steps back from his canvas. The reflection artfully includes the
definedby the discourse: the madman, the hysterical woman, the homosexual, the individualized âlcouple in the picture. This is essentially the account which Foucault accepts.
criminal, and so on. These figures are specificto specific discursive regimes andhistoricalperi-
ods. But the discourse also produces a.place for the subject (i. e. the reader or viewer, who is also
'subjected to' discourse) from which its particular knowledge and meaning most makes sense. It
^TIVITY 9
is not inevitablethat all individualsin a particularperiodwill becomethe subjects ofa particular iok at the picture carefully, while we summarize Foucault's argument.
discourse in this sense, and thus the bearers of its power/knowledge. But for them - us - to do so,
they - we - must locate themselves/ourselves in theposition from which the discourse makes most
sense, andthusbecomeits 'subjects'by 'subjecting'ourselves to its meanings,powerandregula-
tion.All discourses,then, constmctsubject-positions,fromwhichalonetheymakesense.
This approachhas radical implications for a theory of representation. For it suggests that dis-
courses themselves construct the subject-positions from which they become meaningful and have
effects. Individuals may differ as to their social class, gender, 'racial' and ethnic characteristics
(among other factors), but they will not be able to take meaninguntil they have identified with
those positions which the discourse constmcts, subjected themselves to its mles, and hence become
the subjects ofitspower/knowledge.Forexample,pornographyproducedfor menwill only 'work'
for women, accordingto this theory, if in some sensewomenputthemselves in thepositionofthe
'desiringmalevoyeur'- whichistheidealsubject-position whichthediscourse ofmalepornography
constructs - and look at the models from this 'masculine' discursive position. This may seem, and
is, a highlycontestableproposition.Butletus consideranexamplewhichillustratestheargument.
5. 1 How to make sense of Velasquez' Las Meninas

Foucault'sThe OrderofThings(1970) openswitha discussionofa paintingbythefamousSpanish
painter,Velasquez,calledLasMeninas.It hasbeena topicofconsiderablescholarlydebateandcon-
troversy. ThereasonI amusingit hereisbecause,asallthecriticsagree,thepaintingitselfdoesraise
certain questions about the nature of representation, and Foucault himself uses it to talk about these
widerissuesofthe subject. It is theseargumentswhichinterestushere,notthe questionofwhether FIGURE 1.9 DiegoVelasquez, LasMeninas, 1656
40 41
Las Meninas showsthe interior ofa room - perhaps thepainter's studio or some otherroom representation here is not about a 'true' reflection or imitation ofreality. Ofcourse, the
in the Spanish Royal Palace, the Escorial. The scene, though in its deeper recesses rather dark, is in the painting 'may look like' the actual people in the Spanish court. But the discourse
bathed in light from a window on the right. 'We are looking at a picture in which the painter is in in the picture is doinga greatdealmore than simply trying to mirror accuratelywhat
turn looking outatus, ' saysFoucault (1970, p. 4). Totheleft, looking forwards, isthepainterhim. jxists.
self, Velasquez. He is inthe actofpainting andhisbmsh israised, 'perhaps ... considering whether Everything in a sense isvisible in the painting. And yet, what it is 'about' - its meaning - depends
to add some finishing touch to the canvas' (p. 3). He is looking at his model, who is sitting in the on howwe 'read' it. It is as much constructed aroundwhatyou can't see aswhatyou can. You
place from whichwearelooking, butwe cannot seewhothemodel isbecause the canvas onwhich can't see what is being painted on the canvas, though this seems to be the point ofthe whole
Velasquezispaintinghasitsbacktous, its faceresolutely turnedawayfromourgaze.Inthecentre exercise.Youcan'tseewhateveryoneis lookingat,whichis the sitters,unlessweassumeit is a
ofthe painting stands what tradition recognizes as the little princess, the Infanta Maragarita, who reflection ofthem in the mirror. They are both in andnot in the picture. Orrather, they arepresent
has come to watch the proceedings. She is the centre ofthe picture we are looking at, but sheis through a kind ofsubstitution. Wecannot seethem because they arenot directly represented: but
not the 'subject' ofVelasquez' canvas. The Infanta has with her an 'entourage ofduennas, maids of their 'absence' is represented - mirrored through their reflection in the mirror at the back. The
honour, courtiers anddwarfs' andherdog (p. 9). The courtiers stand behind, towards theback onthe meaning of the picture is produced, Foucault argues, through this complex inter-play between
right. Her maids ofhonour stand on either side ofher, framing her. To the right at the front are two /ou see, the visible) andabsence(whatyou can't see,whathasdisplacedit within
dwarfs, onea famous courtjester. The eyes ofmany ofthese figures, like thatofthepainter himself, the frame). Representationworksasmuchthroughwhatis not shown,asthroughwhatis.
are looking out towards the front ofthe picture at the sitters.
4 In fact, a number of substitutions or displacements seem to be going on here. For example, the
Who arethey- the figures atwhom everyone is looking butwhomwecannot look at andwhose
'subject' and centre ofthe painting we are looking at seems to be the Infanta. But the 'subject' or
portraitsonthecanvasweareforbiddento see?Infact,thoughatfirstwethinkwecannotseethem.
centre is also, ofcourse, the sitters - the King and Queen - whom we can't seebut whom the others
thepicturetells uswhotheyarebecause,behindtheInfanta'sheadanda little to thelefitofthecen-
are looking at. You cantell this from the fact that the mirror on the wall in whichthe King and
tre ofthepicture, surrounded by a heavywooden frame, is a mirror; andin the mirror - at last- are
Queenarereflectedis also almost exactlyatthe centre ofthe fieldofvisionofthepicture. Sothe
reflected the sitters, whoarein factseatedin thepositionfrom whichweare looking: 'areflection Infantaandtheroyal couple, in a sense, sharetheplace ofthe centre astheprincipal 'subjects'of
that showsus quite simply whatis lacking in everyone's gaze'(p. 15). The figures reflected inthe thepainting.It all dependsonwhereyouarelookingfrom- intowardsthe scenefromwhereyou,
mirror are,infact,theKing,PhilipIV,andhiswife,Mariana.Besidethemirror, totherightofit, in the spectator, is sitting or outwardsfrom the scene, fromthepositionofthepeople in thepicture.
the back wall, is another 'frame', but this is not a mirror reflecting forwards; it is a doorway lead- IfyouacceptFoucault'sargument,thentherearetwosubjectsto thepaintingandtwocentres.And
ing backwards out of the room. On the stair, his feet placed on different steps, 'a man stands out the composition of the picture - its discourse - forces us to oscillate between these two 'subjects
in full-length silhouette'. He hasjust entered or isjust leaving the scene and is looking at it from without ever finally deciding with which one to identify. Representation in the painting seems firm
behind, observing what is going on in it but 'content to surprise those within without being seen and clear - everything in place. But our vision, the way we look at the picture, oscillates between
himself (p. 10).
two centres, two subjects, two positions oflooking, two meanings. Far from being finally resolved
into some absolute tmth which is the meaning of the picture, the discourse of the painting quite
deliberatelykeepsus inthis state ofsuspendedattention, inthis oscillatingprocessoflooking. Its
5. 2 The subject of/in representation meaningis alwaysin theprocessofemerging,yet anyfinalmeaningis constantlydeferred.
Whoorwhatis the subjectofthispainting?In his comments, Foucaultuses LasMeninasto make 5 You can tell a great deal about how the picture works as a discourse, and what it means, by
somegeneralpointsabouthistheoryofrepresentation andspecifically abouttheroleofthesubject: followingthe orchestrationoflooking- who is looking atwhator whom. Our look- the eyes of
the person looking at the picture, the spectator - follows the relationships oflooking asrepresented
1 Foucault reads thepainting in terms ofrepresentation andthe subject' (Dreyfus andRabinow, in the picture. We know the figure ofthe Infanta is important because her attendants are looking at
1982, p. 20). As well as being a painting which shows us (represents) a scene in which a her. But we knowthatsomeoneevenmore importantis sittingin front ofthe scene,whomwe can't
portrait of the King and Queen of Spain is being painted, it is also a painting which tells see, because many figures - the Infanta, thejester, the painter himself- are looking at them! So the
us something about how representation and the subject work. It produces its own kind of spectator (who is also 'subjected' to the discourse of the painting) is doing two kinds of looking.
knowledge. Representation and the subject are the painting's underlying message what it is Looking at the scene from the position outside, in front of, the picture. And at the same time,
about, its sub-text. looking out ofthe scene, by identifying with the looking being done by the figures in the painting.
42 43
Projectingourselvesintothe subjectsofthepaintinghelpus as spectatorsto see,to 'makesense

ofit. Wetakeup thepositions indicatedby the discourse, identify withthem, subject ourselves to L/
ÔNCLUS ON: REPRESENTATION, MEANING AND
-\
its meanings, andbecome its 'subjects'. NGUAGE RECONSIDERED

6 It is criticalforFoucault'sargumentthatthepaintingdoesnothavea completedmeaning.It
means something in relation to the spectator who is looking at it. The spectator completes the startedwith a fairly simple definition ofrepresentation. Representation is theprocess bywhich
.
meaningofthepicture.Meaningis thereforeconstmctedinthedialoguebetweenthepaintingand ibers ofa culture use language (broadly definedasanysystem whichdeploys signs, any signify-
the spectator.Velasquez,ofcourse, couldnot knowwhowouldsubsequentlyoccupytheposition system) to produce meaning. Already, this definition carries the important premise that things -
ofthe spectator. Nevertheless, the whole 'scene' ofthe painting hadto be laidout in relation to that people, events in the world - do not have in themselves any fixed, final or tme meaning. It
idealpointin front ofthepaintingfrom whichany spectatormustlook ifthepaintingis to make us- in society, within human cultures - who make things mean, who signify. Meanings, conse-
sense. The spectator, we might say, is painted into position in front of the picture. In this sense. will always change, from one culture or period to another. There is no guarantee that every
in one culture will have anequivalentmeaningin another,preciselybecausecultures differ,
the discourseproduces a subject-positionfor the spectator-subject. Forthe paintingto work, the
spectator, whoever he or she may be, must first 'subject' himself/herselfto thepainting's discourse imetimesradically, from oneanotherin theircodes- thewaystheycarveup, classifyandassign
and, in thisway,becomethepainting'sidealviewer,the producerofits meanings- its 'subject'. eaningto the world. So one important ideaabout representation is the acceptance ofa degree of
Thisis whatis meantbysayingthatthediscourseconstructsthe spectatorasa subject- bywhich ulturalrelativism betweenone culture andanother, a certain lack ofequivalence, andhencethe
wemeanthat it constructs a place forthe subject-spectator who is looking atandmaking sense ofit. iieedfor translation aswe move from the mind-set or conceptual universe ofone culture or another.
We call this the constructionist approach to representation, contrasting it with both the reflec-
7 Representation therefore occurs from at least three positions in the painting. First of all there is live and the intentional approaches. Now, if culture is a process, a practice, how does it work? In
us, the spectator, whose 'look' puts together andunifies the different elements andrelationships theconstructionistperspective, representation involves makingmeaningby forging links between
inthepictureinto anoverall meaning.Thissubjectmustbethereforthepaintingto makesense, threedifferentorders ofthings: whatwemightbroadlycall the world ofthings,people, events and
but he/she is not represented in the painting. Then there is the painter who painted the scene. He experiences; the conceptual world - the mental concepts we carry around in our heads; and the
is present in twoplacesat once, sincehemustat onetime havebeenstandingwherewe arenow signs, arrangedinto languages, which 'stand for' or communicate these concepts. Now, ifyouhave
sitting, in order to paint the scene, but he has then put himself into (represented himself in) the tomakea linkbetweensystemswhicharenotthe same,andfixtheseat leastfora time sothatother
picture, looking back towards that point of view where we, the spectator, have taken his place. peopleknowwhat, in one system, corresponds to whatin another system, thentheremust be some-
Wemay also saythatthe scenemakessenseandis pulledtogetherin relationto the court figure thingwhichallowsusto translatebetweenthem- tellinguswhatwordtouseforwhatconcept,and
standingonthestairattheback,sincehetoo surveysit allbut- likeusandlikethepainter- from so on. Hence the notion of codes.
somewhat outside it.
Producing meaning depends on the practice of interpretation, and interpretation is sustained by
8 Finally, considerthemirror onthebackwall. Ifitwerea 'real'mirror, it shouldnowberepresenting us actively using the code - encoding, putting things into the code - and by the person at the other
or reflecting us, since we are standing in that position in front of the scene to which everyone is endinterpreting or decoding the meaning (Hall, 1980). But note that, because meanings are always
lookingandfromwhicheverythingmakessense.But it doesnotmirrorus, it showsin ourplace changing and slipping, codes operate more like social conventions than like fixed laws or unbreak-
theKingandQueenofSpain.Somehowthe discourseofthepaintingpositionsus intheplaceof ablemles. As meanings shift and slide, so inevitably the codes ofa culture imperceptibly change.
the Sovereign!You can imaginewhat fun Foucaulthadwiththis substitution. The great advantage of the concepts and classifications ofthe culture which we cany around with
us in our heads is that they enableus to thinkaboutthings, whetherthey are there, present, or not;
Foucault argues that it is clear from the way the discourse ofrepresentation works in the painting indeed,whetherthey ever existedor not. There are concepts for our fantasies, desires andimagin-
that it must be looked at andmade sense of from that one subject-position in front of it from which ings as well as for so-called 'real' objects in the material world. And the advantage of language is
we, the spectators, are looking. This is also the point-of-viewfrom whicha camerawouldhaveto thatourthoughtsabouttheworldneednotremainexclusiveto us, andsilent. Wecantranslatethem
be positioned in order to film the scene. And, lo andbehold, the person whom Velasquez chooses into language, make them 'speak', through the use of signs which stand for them - and thus talk,
to 'represent' sittingin thispositionis the Sovereign- 'masterofall he surveys'- whois boththe write, communicate about them to others.
'subject of the painting (what it is about) andthe 'subject in' thepainting- the one whomthe dis- Gradually, then, we complexifiedwhatwe meant by representation. It cameto be less and less
course sets in place, but who, simultaneously, makes sense of it and understands it all by a look of the straightforwardthing we assumedit to be at first - which is why we need theories to explain
supreme mastery. it. We looked at two versions of constmctionism that which concentrated on how language and
44 45
signification (the use of signs in language) works to produce meanings, which after Saussure and p. (ed.) (1997) Production of Culture/Cultures of Production, London, Sage/The Open
Barthes we called semiotics; and that, following Foucault, which concentrated on how discourse '\ ersity(Book4 inthis series).
and discursive practices produce knowledge. I won't run through the finer points in these two p HALL,S., JANES,L., MACKAY,H. ANDNEGUS,K. (1997) DoingCultural Studies: The Story of
approaches again, since you can go back to them in the main body of the chapter and refresh SonyWalkman, London, Sage/The Open University (Book 1 in this series).
your memory. In semiotics, you will recall the importance ofsignifier/signified, langue/parole and
UILT,M. (1970) The Order of Things, London, Tavistock.
myth', and how the marking of difference and binary oppositions are cmcial for meaning. In the
discursive approach, you will recall discursive formations, power/knowledge, the idea ofa 'regime ULT,M. (1972) TheArchaeology of Knowledge,London,Tavistock.
oftruth', the waydiscourse alsoproduces the subject anddefines the subject-positions from which \ULT, M. (1973) The Birth ofthe Clinic, London, Tavistock.
knowledge proceeds and, indeed, the return ofquestions about 'the subject' to the field ofrepresen- AULT,M. (1977) DisciplineandPunish,London,Tavistock.
tation.Inseveralexamples,wetriedto getyoutoworkwiththesetheoriesandto applythem.There CAULT,M. (1978) The History of Sexuality,Harmondsworth,Alien Lane/Penguin.
will befurtherdebateaboutthemin subsequentchapters.
Notice thatthe chapter does not argue that the discursive approach overturned everything in the 1 AULT,M. (1980) Power/Knowledge,Brighton, Harvester.
semioticapproach.Theoreticaldevelopmentdoesnotusuallyproceedinthislinearway.Therewas CAULT, M. (1982) 'The subject and power', in Dreyfus and Rabinow (eds). Beyond Structuralism
muchto learnfrom SaussureandBarthes, andwearestill discoveringwaysoffi-uitfully applying indHermeneutics, Brighton, Harvester.
their insights - without necessarily swallowing everything they said. We offered you some critical LID,S. AND BREUER, J. (1974) Studies on Hysteria, Harmondsworth, Pelican. First published 1895.
thoughts on the subject. There is a great deal to learn from Foucault and the discursive approach, Y.p. (1988) Freud: A Lifefor Our Time, London,Macmillan.
,
butby no means everything it claims is correct andthe theory is opento, andhasattracted, many
criticisms.Again,inlaterchapters,asweencounterfurtherdevelopmentsinthetheoryofrepresen- ^LL, s. (1980) 'Encoding and decoding', in Hall, S., Hobson, D., Lowe,A. andWillis, P. (eds),
Culture, Media, Language, London, Hutchinson.
tation, andseethe strengthsandweaknessesofthesepositionsappliedinpractice,wewill cometo
appreciate more fully thatweareonly atthebeginning ofthe exciting taskofexploring thisprocess \LL, s. (1992) 'TheWestandthe Rest', in Hall, S. andGieben,B. (eds), Formations ofModernity,
ofmeaningconstmction, whichis at the heartofculture, to its full depths.Whatwe have offered Cambridge, Polity Press/The Open University.
here is, we hope, a relatively clear account of a set of complex, and as yet tentative, ideas in an IUEG, P. (1994) Miss Smilla 's Feeling For Snow, London, Flamingo.
unfinished project.
, ACLAU, E. AND MOUFFE, C. (1990) 'Post-Mamsm without apologies', in Laclau, E (ed.), New
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, London,Versa.
UACKAY, H. (ed. ) (1997) Consumption and Everyday Life, London, Sage/The Open University (Book 5
REFERENCES in this series).
.
^CNAY, L. (1994) Foucault: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, Polity Press.

BARTHES, R. (1967) The Elements ofSemiology, London, Cape.
SAUSSURE, F. DE (1960) Course in General Linguistics, London, Peter Owen.
BARTHES,R. (1972) Mythologies,London,Cape.
SHOWALTER, E. (1987) The Female Malady, London, Virago.
BARTHES,R. (1975) The PleasureoftheText,NewYork, Hall & Wang. WEEKS,J. (1981) Sex, Politics and Society,London,Longman.
BARTHES,R. (1977) Image-Music-Text,Glasgow,Fontana.
WEEKS,J. (1985) Sexuality and its Discontents, London, Routledge.
BRYSON,N. (1990) Looking atthe Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life Painting, London, Reaktion
Books.
COUSINS,M. ANDHUSSAIN,A. (1984) Michel Foucault, Basingstoke,Macmillan.

CULLER,j. (1976) Saussure, London, Fontana.
DERRIDA,j. (1981) Positions,Chicago,IL,UniversityofChicagoPress.
DREYFUS, H. AND RABINOW, P. (eds) (1982) Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton,
Harvester.
46 47
. ~:. ^ MG A: Norman order Cotan jointed as a lay brother in Tolec the ideas of sphere, ellipse and replaces this cocoon-like space, defined by habit-
in 1603. Whatdistinguishesthe Carthusianru reusedfor examplein El Grecoto assist ual gestures, with an abstracted and homogene-
iiryson, "Language, is its stress on solitude over communal life: fl anising pictorial composition, here they ous space which has broken with the matrix of
reflection and still 3!fe' monks live in individualcells, wheretheypra\ almost for their own sake. One can the body. This is the point: to suppress the body
study - and eat - alone, meeting only for th ofQuince, Cabbage, MelonandCucumber as a source of space. That bodily or tactile space
night office, morning mass and afternoon ve> experiment in the kind oftransformations is profoundly unvisual: the things we find there
With Cotan, too, the images have as their imme-
pers. There is total abstention from meat, and o are explored in the branch of mathematics are things we reach for - a knife, a plate, a bit of
diate function the separation of the viewer from
Fridays and other fast days the diet is bread an as topology. We begin on the left with food - instinctively and almost without looking.
the previous mode of seeing [...]: they decondi-
water.Absent from Cotan's work is anyconcep uuince, a pure sphere revolving on its axis. It is this space, the true home ofblurred and hazy
tion the habitual andabolishthe endless eclips- tion of nourishment as involving the convivial wingtotheright, the sphere seemsto peel off vision, that Cotan's rigours aim to abolish. And
ing and fatigue of worldly vision, replacing
ity ofthe meal - the sharing ofhospitality [..,] i-ioundary and disintegrate into a ball of con- the tendency to geometrise fulfils another aim, no
these with brilliance. The enemy is a mode of The unvarying stage of his paintings is neve iiricshellsrevolvingaroundthe samevertical less severe: to disavow the painter's work as the
seeing which thinks it knows in advance what
thekitchenbut alwaysthe cantarero,a cooling s. Moving to the melon the sphere becomes source ofthe composition andto re-assign respon-
is worth looking at and what is not: against
space where for preservation the foods are oftei cllipse, from whicha segmenthasbeencut; sibility for its forms elsewhere- to mathematics,
that, the imagepresents the constant surprise of hung on strings (piled together, or in contac
)art of the segment is independently shown. not creativity. Inmuch ofstill life, thepainter first
things seen for the first time. Sight is taken back
with a surface, they would decay more quickly) the right the segmented shapesrecover their arrays the objects into a satisfactory configura-
to a [primal] stage before it learned how to sco-
Placed in a kitchen, next to plates and knives ntinuous boundary in the corrugated form of tion, and then uses that arrangement as the basis
tomise [break up/divide] the visual field, how to
bowls and pitchers, the objects would inevita- ; encumber. The curve described by all these for the composition. But to organise the world
screen out the unimportant and not see, but scan.
blypointtowardstheirconsumptionattable, bui Tjectstakentogetheris not at all informal but pictorially in this fashion is to impose upon it an
In place of the abbreviated forms for which
the cantarero maintains the idea of the objects .
eciselylogarithmic; it follows a series ofhar- order that is infinitely inferior to the order already
the world scans, Cotan supplies forms that are
as separable from, dissociatedhorn, their func- ;onic or musical proportions with the vertical revealed to the soul through the contemplation
articulatedat immense length, forms so copious tion as food. In Quince, Cabbage, Melon and o-ordinates of the curve exactly marked by the
or prolix that one cannot see where or how to of geometric form: Cotan's renunciation of com-
Cucumber [Figure 1.3] no-one can touch the '[rings. And it is a complex curve, not just the
begin to simplify them. They offer no inroads position is a further, private act of self-negation.
suspended quince or cabbage without disturb- ;irc of a graph on a two-dimensional surface. In
for reductionbecausethey omit nothing. Just at He approaches painting in terms of a discipline,
ing them and setting them rocking in space: idlation to the quince, the cabbage appears to
the point where the eye thinks it knows the form or ritual: always the same cantarero, which one
their motionlessness is the mark of human t;ome forward slightly; the melon is further for-
and can affordto skip, the image proves that in must assume has been painted in first, as a blank
absence, distance from the hand that reaches to ward than the quince, the melon slice projects
fact the eye had not understood at all what it was template; alwaysthe samerecurring elements, the
eat; and it renders them immaculate. Hanging out beyond the ledge, and the cucumber over-
about to discard. lightrakingatforty-fivedegrees,thesamealtema-
on strings, the quince and the cabbage lack the hangs it still further. The arc is therefore not on
tion ofbright greens andyellows against the grey
The relation proposed in Cotan between the weight known to the hand. Their weightless- the same plane as its co-ordinates, it curves in
ground, the same scale, the same size of frame.
viewer and the foodstuffs so meticulously dis- ness disowns such intimate knowledge. Having three dimensions: it is a true hyperbola [... ].
To alter any of these would be to allow too much
played seems to involve, paradoxically, no none of the familiarity that comes from touch.
The mathematical engagement of these forms room for personal self-assertion, and the pride
reference to appetite or to the function of sus- and divorced from the idea of consumption, the
shows every sign of exact calculation, as though of creativity; down to its last details the painting
tenance which becomes coincidental; it might objects take on a value that is nothing to do with
the scene were being viewed with scientific, but must be presented as the result of discovery, not
their role as nourishment.
be described as anorexic, taking this word in not with creaturely, interest. Geometric space invention, a picture ofthe work of God that com-
its literal and Greek sense as meaning 'with- What replaces their interest as sustenance is replaces creatural space, the space around the pletely efifaces the hand of man (in Cotan visible
out desire'. All Cotan's still lifes are rooted in their interest as mathematical form. Like many body that is known by touch and is created by bmshwork would be like blasphemy).
the outlook of monasticism, specifically the painters of his period in Spain, Cotan has a familiar movements of the hands and arms.
monasticism ofthe Carthusians [monks], whose highly developed sense of geometrical order; Cotan's play with geometric andvolumetric ideas Source: Bryson, 1990, pp. 65-70.
48 49
READING B: RcEand
D
< 'I
the contestant. Thauvin, a fifty-year-old w' jant,inthesamewayThauvinwillnever on the good sportsman; sometimes he gives
rt an obese and sagging body, whose type ting but an ignoble traitor, Reineires (a the crowd a conceited smile which forebodes
8arHies, The world o-' asexual hideousness always inspires feminii Hid fellow with a limp body and unkempt an early revenge; sometimes, pinned to the
w:"c. STf:r;p' nicknames, displays in his flesh the characte he moving image of passivity, Mazaud ground, he hits the floor ostentatiously to
ofbaseness ... [H]is part is to represent wh; andarrogantlikea cock)thatofgrotesque make evident to all the intolerable nature of
in the classical concept ofthe salaud, the 'ba; it. and Orsano (an effeminate teddy-boy his situation; and sometimes he erects a com-
[T]he function of the wrestler is not to win; it
tard' (the key-concept of anywrestling-match een in a blue-and-pink dressing-gown) plicated set of signs meant to make the public
is to go exactly through the motions which are ,
appears as organically repugnant. The nause loubly humorous, of a vindictive salope, understand that he legitimately personifies the
expected of him. It is said thatjudo contains a
voluntarily provoked by Thauvin shows then ch (for I do not think that the public of ever-entertaining image of the gmmbler, end-
hidden symbolic aspect; even in the midst of
fore a very extended use of signs: not only j lysee-Montmartre, like Littre, believes the lessly confabulating about his displeasure.
efficiency, its gestures are measured, precise
ugliness used here in order to signify basenes; salopetobea masculine).
but restricted, drawn accurately but by a stroke We are therefore dealing with a real Human
but in addition ugliness is wholly gathered int
without volume. Wrestling, on the contrary, a particularly repulsive quality of matter: th Comedy, where the most socially-inspired
physique ofthe wrestlers therefore consti-
offers excessive gestures, exploited to the limit , a basic sign, which like a seed contains nuances of passion (conceit, rightfulness,
pallid collapse of dead flesh (the public call.
of their meaning. In judo, a man who is down whole fight. But this seed proliferates, for refined cmelty, a sense of 'paying one's debts')
Thauvin la barbeque, 'stinking meat'), so tha
is hardly down at all, he rolls over, he draws at every turn during the fight, in each new always felicitously find the clearest sign which
the passionate condemnation of the crowd IK
back, he eludes defeat, or, if the latter is obvi- can receive them, express them and trium-
longer stems from its judgement, but instea. lation, that the body of the wrestler casts
ous, he immediately disappears; in wrestling, a from the very depth of its humours. It wi]i the public the magical entertainment of a phantly carry them to the confines of the hall.
manwhois downis exaggeratedlyso, andcom- It is obvious that at such a pitch, it no longer
thereafter let itself be frenetically embroiled in nperament which finds its natural expres-
pletely fills the eyes of the spectators with the an idea ofThauvin which will conform entireh n in a gesture. The different strata ofmean- matters whether the passion is genuine or not.
intolerable spectacle ofhis powerlessness. i throw light on each other, and form the What the public wants is the image of passion,
with this physical origin: his actions will per-
3St intelligible of spectacles. Wrestling is not passion itself. There is no more a problem
This function of grandiloquence is indeed the fectly correspond to the essential viscosity 01
:e a diacritic writing: above the fundamen- of tmth in wrestling than in the theatre. In both,
same as that of ancient theatre, whose princi- his personage.
meaning of his body, the wrestler arranges what is expected is the intelligible representa-
pie, language and props (masks and buskins)
It is therefore in the body of the wrestler that we omments which are episodic but always tion of moral situations which are usually pri-
concurred in the exaggeratedly visible [... ]. The .
find the first key to the contest. I know from the opportune, and constantly help the read- vate. This emptying out of interiority to the
gesture of the vanquished wrestler [signifies] to
start that all of Thauvin's actions, his treacher- ing of the fight by means of gestures, atti- benefit of its exterior signs, this exhaustion of
the world a defeat which, far from disguising,
ies, cruelties and acts of cowardice, will not fail tudes and mimicry which make the intention the content by the form, is the very principle of
he emphasizes and holds like a pause in music
to measureup to the first image ofignobilityhe utterly obvious. Sometimes the wrestler tri- triumphant classical art. [...]
[...]. [This is] meant to signify the tragic mode
ofthe spectacle. In wrestling, as on the stage in gaveme; I cantrusthimto carryoutintelligently umphs with a repulsive sneer while kneeling Source: Barthes, 1972, pp. 16-18.
antiquity, one is not ashamedofone's suffering, and to the last detail all the gestures of a kind
one knows how to cry, one has a liking for tears. of amorphous baseness, and thus fill to the brim
the image of the most repugnant bastard there
Each sign in wrestling is therefore endowed is: the bastard-octopus. Wrestlers therefore have
with an absolute clarity, since one must always a physique as peremptory as those of the char-
understand everything on the spot. As soon as acters of the Commedia dell'Arte, who display
the adversaries are in the ring, the public is in advance, in their costumes and attitudes, the
overwhelmed with the obviousness of the roles. future contents of their parts: just as Pantaloon
As in the theatre, eachphysical type expresses can never be anything but a ridiculous cuckold,
to excess the part which has been assigned to Harlequin an astute servant and the Doctor a
50 51
Pl I f~^ r^ they are destined. Its signifieris the half-open
HI VHJ w W!dllU
Language
1 Signifier | 2 Signified , DING D: Roland bag which lets the provisions spill out over
^rfhpQ EVvfh fr»r. a-i/> 3 Sign
ui . fS'fOy iyiyi.i! tû' MYTH I SIGNIFIER
II SIGNIFIED
{hes, 'Rhetoric of the the table, 'unpacked'. To read this first sign
requires only a knowledge which is in some
In myth, we find again the tri-dimensional pat-
Ill SIGN
ige' sort implanted as part of the habits of a very
tem which I have just described: the signifier, widespread culture where 'shopping around
the signified andthe sign. But myth is a peculiar It can be seen that in myth there are two semi
i-t>we have a Panzani advertisement: some for oneselfis opposedto the hasty stocking up
system, in that it is constructed from a semio- ketsofpasta,a tin, a sachet,sometomatoes, (preserves, refrigerators) of a more 'mechani-
ological systems, one of which is staggere
logical chain which existed before it: it is a ons,peppers, a mushroom, all emerging from cal' civilization. A second sign is more or less
in relation to the other: a linguistic system
second-order semiological system. That which the language (or the modes of representatior lalf-open string bag, in yellows andgreens on equally evident; its signifier is the bringing
is a sign (namely the associative total of a con- which are assimilated to it), which I shall call ,. ed background. Let us try to 'skim off the together of the tomato, the pepper and the tri-
cept and an image) in the first system, becomes the language-object, because it is the lan. fferentmessages it contains. colouredhues(yellow, green,red) oftheposter;
a mere signifier in the second. We must here guage which myth gets hold of in order u ,
ie image immediately yields a first message its signifiedis Italy or rather Italianicity. This
recall that the materials of mythical speech (the build its own system; and myth itself, whicl hose substance is linguistic; its supports are sign stands in a relation of redundancy with
language itself, photography, painting, posters, I shall call metalanguage, because it is a see- ,
e caption, which is marginal, and the labels, the connotedsign ofthe linguisticmessage(the
rituals, objects, etc.), however different at the and language, in which one speaks about the ese being inserted into the natural disposi- Italian assonance ofthe name Panzani) and the
start, are reduced to a pure signifying function first. When he reflects on a metalanguage. Jonofthe scene [...]. The codefromwhichthis knowledge it draws upon is already more par-
as soon as they are caught by myth. Myth sees the semiologist no longer needs to ask hini- message has been taken is none other than that ticular; it is a specifically 'French' knowledge
in them only the samerawmaterial; theirunity self questions about the composition of the of the French language; the only knowledge (an Italian would barely perceive the conno-
is that they all come down to the status of a mere language-object, he no longer has to take into required to decipher it is a knowledge of writ- tation of the name, no more probably than he
language. Whether it deals with alphabetical or account the details of the linguistic schema: ing andFrench. In fact, this message can itself would the Italianicity of tomato and pepper),
pictorial writing, myth wants to see in them only he will only need to know its total term, or be further broken down, for the sign Panzani based on a familiarity with certain tourist stere-
a sum ofsigns, a global sign, the final term of a global sign, and only inasmuch as this term gives not simply the name ofthe firm but also, otypes. Continuingto exploretheimage(which
first semiological chain.And it is precisely this lends itself to myth. This is why the semiolo- by its assonance, an additional signified, that is not to say that it is not entirely clear at the
final term which will become the first term of
gist is entitled to treat in the same way writing of 'Italianicity'. The linguistic message is thus first glance), there is no difficulty in discover-
the greater system which it builds and of which and pictures: what he retains from them is the twofold(at least in this particularimage): deno- ing at least two other signs: in the first, the ser-
it is only a part. Everything happens as if myth tational and connotational. Since, however, we ried collection of different objects transmits the
fact that they are both signs, that they both
shifted the formal system of the first significa- reachthe threshold ofmyth endowedwiththe have here only a single typical sign, namely ideaofa total culinary service, onthe one hand
tions sideways. As this lateral shift is essential same signifying function, that they constitute that of articulated (written) language, it will be as though Panzani furnished everything neces-
for the analysis of myth, I shall represent it counted as one message. sary for a carefully balanced dish and on the
one just as much as the other, a language-
in the following way, it being understood, of object. other as though the concentrate in the tin were
Putting aside the linguistic message, we are left
course, that the spatialization of the pattern is equivalent to the natural produce surround-
withthe pure image (even if the labels are part
here only a metaphor: Source:Barthes, 1972,pp. 114-15. ing it; in the other sign, the composition of the
of it, anecdotally). This image straightaway
image, evoking the memory of innumerable
provides a series of discontinuous signs. First
alimentary paintings, sends us to an aesthetic
(the order is unimportant as these signs are not
signified: the 'nature morte' or, as it is better
linear), the ideathat whatwe have in the scene
expressed in other languages, the 'still life'; the
represented is a return from the market. A signi-
knowledge on which this sign depends is heav-
fied which itself implies two euphoric values:
ily cultural. [...]
that of the freshness of the products and that of
the essentially domestic preparation for which Source: Barthes, 1977, pp. 33-5.
52 53
r~: ;r\
.
f. -
K:-. Aaj ;MG L: Ernestc configuration is meaningful. IfI kick a spheric, ofmeaning.Herethe classicaldistinction equation between the social and the discursive,
object in the street or if I kick a ball in a fooi ygen semantics - dealing with the mean- what can we say about the natural world, about
L,adau ana Cnantal ôuffe, ball match, thephysical fact is the same, but ;.;, Fwords;syntactics- dealingwithwordorder thefactsofphysics,biologyorastronomythatare
v. --.. . . ""i... -(I.. - .!.. _ . . ir
"'^'. w .-',^r?&-l/';'i'?n;'?c np '''n^
. ^".^ ' ^.^''..f :. '^: S t<~' '<''(_' (. * 1C'
meaningisdifferent.Theobjectisa footballonh ,
is consequences for meaning; andpragmat- not apparently integrated in meaningful totalities
to the extentthatit establishesa system ofrela. dealing with the way a word is actually constructed by men? The answer is that natural
^fGfi:^Grt Q? '^. \1: ;! !t i ;C tions with other objects, and these relations arp in certain speech contexts. The key point facts are also discursive facts. And they are so for
not given by the mere referential materiality of whatextenta rigidseparationcanbeestab- the simple reason that the idea of nature is not
DISCOURSE the objects, but are, rather, socially constructed. y\ betweensemanticsandpragmatics - that is, something that is ah-eady there, to be read from
This systematic set of relations is what we call veen meaning and use. From Wittgenstein the appearances of things, but is itself the result
Let us suppose that I am building a wall with discourse. The readerwill no doubt see that, as ârds it is precisely this separation which of a slow and complex historical and social con-
we showed in our book, the discursive charac- ever more blurred. It has become struction. To call something a natural object is a
anotherbricklayer.At a certainmomentI askmy
workmate to pass me a brick and then I add it ter of an object does not, by any means, imply ;reasingly accepted that the meaning of a way ofconceiving it that depends upon a classifi-
putting its existence into question. The fact that }rd is entirely context-dependent. As Hanna catory system. Again, this does not put into ques-
to the wall. The first act - asking for the brick -
is linguistic; the second - adding the brick to a football is only a football as long as it is inte- jnichel Pitkin points out: tion the fact that this entity which we call a stone
the wall - is extralinguistic. Do I exhaust the grated within a system of socially constructed exists, in the sense ofbeing present here and now,
reality of both acts by drawing the distinction mles doesnot meanthat it thereby ceasesto be Wittgenstein argues that meaning and use independently ofmy will; nevertheless the fact of
a physical object. A stone exists independently areintimately, inextricablyrelated, because its being a stone depends on a way of classifying
between them in terms of the linguistic/extra-
linguistic opposition? Evidently not, because, of any system of social relations, but it is, for use helps to determine meaning. Meaning objects that is historical and contingent. If there
instance, either a projectile or an object of aes- is learned from, and shaped in, instances werenohumanbeingsonearth,thoseobjectsthat
despite their differentiation in those terms, the
two actionssharesomethingthat allowsthemto thetic contemplation only withina specific dis- ofuse; so both its learning and its configu- we call stones would be there nonetheless; but
cursive configuration. A diamond in the market ration depend on pragmatics. ... Semantic they would not be 'stones', because there would
becompared,namelythe factthattheyareboth
be neithermineralogynor a languagecapable of
part ofa total operation which is the building of or at the bottom ofa mine is the samephysical
meaning is compounded out of cases of a
the wall. So, then, how could we characterize object; but, again, it is only a commodity within classifying them and distinguishing them from
word'suse, including all the many andvar-
a determinate system of social relations. For that ied language games that are played with other objects. We need not stop for long on this
thistotality ofwhichaskingfora brickandposi-
same reason it is the discoursewhichconstitutes it; so meaning is very much the product of point. The entire development of contemporary
tioning it are, both, partial moments? Obviously,
the subjectpositionofthe social agent, andnot, pragmatics. epistemologyhas establishedthat there is no fact
if this totality includesboth linguistic andnon-
linguistic elements, it cannot itself be either lin- therefore, the social agent which is the origin of (Pitkin, 1972)
that allows its meaning to be read transparently.
discourse- the same system ofmles that makes
guisticor extralinguistic;it hasto bepriorto this
that spherical object into a football, makes me a [...] That is to say, in our terminology, every
distinction. This totality which includes within REFERENCE
itselfthelinguisticandthenon-linguistic,iswhat player. The existence of objects is independent identityor discursiveobjectis constitutedin the
oftheir discursive articulation [... ]. context ofan action. [... ]
we call discourse. In a moment we will justify PITKIN, H.F. (1972) Wittgenstein and Justice,
this denomination; but what must be clear from [... ] This, however, leaves two problems Berkeley, CA, University ofCaliforniaPress.
The other problem to be considered is the fol-
the start is that by discourse we do not mean a unsolved. The first is this: is it not necessary lowing: even if we assume that there is a strict Source:LaclauandMouffe, 1990,pp. 100-3
combination of speech and writing, but rather to establishherea distinctionbetweenmeaning
that speech andwriting arethemselves but inter- and action? Even if we accept that the mean-
nal components ofdiscursive totalities. ing of an action depends on a discursive con-
figuration, is not the action itself something
Now, turning to the term discourse itself, we different from that meaning? Let us consider
use it to emphasize the fact that every social the problem from two angles. Firstly, from the
54 55
Llaine the credibility of the hysteric, Freud belie' ndfinale would betheperformance of a Iconographie photographique de la Salpetriere.
Charcothadjoined otherpsychiatric savior; crical seizure. Thus Charcot's hospital became an environment
Showaiter, The women and had 'repeated on a small scale
.
in which female hysteria was perpetually pre-

more, the representation of female hys- sented, represented, and reproduced.
performance of hysteria' act of liberation commemorated in the pici
of Pinel which adorned the lecture hall of asa centralaspectofCharcot'swork. His
Salpetriere'(Freud, 1948, p. 18). cal womenpatients were surroundedby Such techniques appealed to Charcot because
The first of the great European theorists ofhys- ., of female hysteria. In the lecture hall, his approachto psychiatric analysiswas strongly
teria was Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893), Yet for Charcot, too, hysteria remained sy ;ud noted, was Robert-Fleury's painting visual and imagistic. As Freud has explained,
who carried out his work in the Paris clinic at bolically, if not medically, a female malady. lel freeing the madwomen. On the oppo- Charcot 'had an artistically gifted temperament -
the Salpetriere. Charcot had begun his work on far the majority of his hysterical patients we /all was a famous lithograph of Charcot, as he said himself, he was a "visueF\ a seer, ... He
hysteria in 1870. While he believed that hyster- women, andseveral, suchasBlancheWittman and lecturing about a swooning and was accustomed to look again and again at things
ics suffered from a hereditary taint that weak- known as the 'Queen of the Hysterics, ' becaii undressed young woman before a room of thatwereincomprehensibleto him, to deepenhis
ened their nervous system, he also developed a celebrities who were regularly featured in 1- r andattentive men, yet anotherrepresenta- impression of them day by day until suddenly
theory that hysteria had psychological origins. books, the main attractions at the Salpetriere that seemed to be instmcting the hysterical understanding ofthem dawned upon him' (Freud,
Experimenting with hypnosis, Charcot demon- Bal des Folles, and hypnotized and exhibited, un in her act [Figure 1. 8]. 1948, pp. 10-11). Charcot's public lectures were
strated that hysterical symptoms such as paraly- hispopularpublic lectures.AxelMunthe, a doi among the first to use visual aids - pictures,
sis could be produced and relieved by hypnotic illy, Charcot's use of photography was the
tor practicing in Paris, wrote a vivid descriptic st extensive in nineteenth-century psychiat- graphs, statues, models, and illustrations that he
suggestion.Throughcarefulobservation,physical ofCharcot's Tuesday lectures at the Salpetrierc drew on the blackboard in colored chalk - as well
examination, and the use of hypnosis, Charcot practice. As one of his admirers remarked,
'The huge amphitheatre was filled to the las: ie camera was as cmcial to the study of asthepresenceofthepatientsasmodels.
was able to prove that hysterical symptoms, place with a multicoloured audience drawn fron
.
steria as the microscope was to histology'

while produced by emotions rather than by tout Paris, authors, journalists, leading actor? The specialtyofthe houseatthe Salpetrierewas
noted in Goldstein, 1982, p. 215). In 1875 one
physical injury, were genuine, and not under and actresses, fashionable demimondaines. 'The grande hysterie, or 'hystero-epilepsy, ' a pro-
'-'his assistants, Paul Regnard, had assembled
the conscious control ofthe patient. Freud, who hypnotized women patients put on a spectacular longed and elaborate convulsive seizure that
1 album of photographs of female nervous
studied at the Salpetriere from October 1885 to show before this crowd of curiosity seekers. occurred in women. A complete seizure involved
ttients. The pictures ofwomen exhibiting vari-
February1886,gaveCharcotthecreditforestab- three phases: the epileptoid phase, in which the
lishing the legitimacy of hysteria as a disorder. ius phases of hysterical attacks were deemed woman lost consciousness and foamed at the
Some of them smelt with delight a bottle of -o interesting that a photographic workshop or
According to Freud, 'Charcot's work restored mouth; the phase of clownism, involving eccen-
ammonia when told it was rose water, oth- atelier was installed within the hospital. By the
dignity to the subject; gradually the sneering trie physical contortions; and the phase of atti-
ers would eat a piece of charcoal when pre- 1880s a professional photographer.
attitude which the hysteric could reckon meet- tudes passionnelles, a miming of incidents and
sented to them as chocolate. Another would
ing with when she told her story, was given up; Albert Londe, had been brought in to take emotions from the patient's life. In the iconogra-
she was no longer a malingerer, since Charcot crawl on all fours on the floor, barking furi-
charge of a full-fledged photographic ser- phies, photographs of this last phase were given
hadthrown the whole weight ofhis authority on ously when told she was a dog, flap her arms
vice. Its methods included not only the most subtitles that suggested Charcot's interpretation
the side ofthe reality and objectivity ofhysteri- as if trying to fly when turned into a pigeon,
advanced technology and apparatus, such as of hysterical gestures as linked to female sexual-
lift her skirts with a shriek of terror when a
cal phenomena. ' Furthermore, Charcot demon- laboratories, a studio with platforms, a bed, ity, despite his disclaimers: 'amorous supplica-
strated that hysterical symptoms also occurred glove was thrown at her feet with a sugges-
screens, black, dark-gray, and light-gray back- tion', 'ecstasy', 'eroticism' [Figure 1. 10]. This
tion of being a snake. Another would walk
in men, and were not simply related to the ground curtains, headrests, and an iron support interpretation of hysterical gestures as sexual
vagaries of the female reproductive system. At with a top hat in her arms rocking it to and
for feeble patients, but also elaborate admini- was reinforced by Charcot's efforts to pinpoint
the Salpetriere there was even a special wing for fro andkissingit tenderly whenshewastold
strative techniques of observation, selection of areas of the body that might induce convulsions
male hysterias, who were frequently the victims it washerbaby.
models, andrecord-keeping. The photographs of when pressed. The ovarian region, he concluded,
of trauma from railway accidents. In restoring (Munthe, 1930, pp. 296, 302-3) women were published in three volumes called was a particularly sensitive hysterogenic zone.
56 57
Because the behavior of Charcot's hyste Charcot's photographs were even more began to rebel against the hospital regime; she
cal starswassotheatrical, andbecauseit v jrately framed and staged than Diamond's had periods of violence in which she tore her
rarely observed outside of the Parisian clin rianasylumpictures.Womenwerenotsim- clothes andbroke windows. During these angry
cal setting, many of his contemporaries. tographed once, but again and again, so outbreaks she was anaesthetized with ether or
well as subsequent medical historians, hai they became used to the camera and to the chloroform. In June of that year, the doctors
suspected that the women's performanci ;ial status they received as photogenic sub- gaveup their efforts withher case, and shewas
were the result of suggestion, imitation, u s.Somemade a sort ofcareer out ofmodeling put in a locked cell. But Augustine was able to
even fraud. In Charcot's own lifetime, on^ the iconographies. Among the most fre- use in her own behalf the histrionic abilities
of his assistants admitted that some of thi ;ntlyphotographed wasa fifteen-year-old girl that for a time had made her a star of the asy-
women had been coached in order to pro. nedAugustine, who had entered the hospital lum. Disguisingherselfas a man, she managed
duce attacks that would please the maitn [875. Her hysterical attacks hadbegun at the to escape from the Salpetriere. Nothing further
(discussed in Drinker, 1984, pp. 144-8) e ofthirteenwhen,accordingto hertestimony, was ever discovered about her whereabouts.
Furthermore, there was a dramatic increase iehadbeen raped by her employer, a man who
in the incidence of hysteria during Charcot'. as also her mother's lover. Intelligent, coquet- REFERENCES
tenure at the Salpetriere. From only 1 perceni sh, and eager to please, Augustine was an apt
in 1845, it rose to 17.3 percent ofall diagno- upil ofthe atelier. All ofher poses suggest the DIDI-HUBERMAN, G. (1982) Invention de 'Hysterie:
ses in 1883, at the height ofhis experimenta- exaggeratedgesturesoftheFrenchclassicalact- Charcot et I'lconographie Photographique
tion with hysterical patients (see Goldstein. ingstyle,or stills fromsilentmovies. Somepho- de La Salpetriere, Paris, Macula.
1982, pp. 209-10). tographs of Augustine with flowing locks and DMNKER, G.F. (1984) The Birth of Neurosis:
When challenged about the legitimacy of whitehospitalgownalso seemto imitateposesin Myth, Malady and the Victorians, New York,
hystero-epilepsy, however, Charcot vig- nineteenth-century paintings, as Stephen Heath Simon & Schuster.
orously defended the objectivity of his points out: 'a young girl composed on her bed,
FREUD, s. (1948) 'Charcot', in Jones, E. (ed. ),
vision. 'It seems that hystero-epilepsyonly something of the Pre-RaphaeliteMillais's paint-
Collected Papers, Vol. 1, London, Hogarth
exists in France, ' he declared in a lecture ing Ophelia' (Heath, 1982, pp. 36-7). Among
Press.
of 1887, 'and I could even say, as it has hergifts was her ability to time and divide her
hysterical performances into scenes, acts, tab- GOLDSTEIN,j. (1982) 'The hysteriadiagnosisand
sometimes been said, that it only exists at the politics of anticlericalism in late nine-
the Salpetriere, as if I had created it by the leaux, and intermissions, to perform on cue and
on schedule with the click of the camera. teenth-century France', Journal of Modern
force of my will. It would be tmly marvel-
History, No. 54.
lous if I were thus able to create illnesses at But Augustine's cheerful willingness to assume
the pleasure of my whim and my caprice. HEATH, s. (1982) The Sexual Fix, London,
whatever poses her audience desired took its
Macmillan.
But asforthetruth, I amabsolutelyonlythe toll on her psyche. During the period when she
photographer; I registerwhatI see' (quoted was being repeatedly photographed, she devel- MUNTHE, A. (1930) The Story of San Michele,
in Didi-Huberman, 1982,p. 32). LikeHugh oped a curious hysterical symptom: she began to London, JohnMurray.
Diamond at the Surrey Asylum, Charcot see everything in black and white. In 1880, she Source: Showalter, 1987, pp. 147-54.
and his followers had absolute faith in the
scientific neutrality of the photographic
image; Londe boasted: 'La plaque pho-
tographique est la vraie retine du savant'
FIGURE1. 10 Two portraits ofAugustine:amorous ('The photographic plate is the tme retina
supplication (top), ecstasy (bottom) of the scientist') (ibid., p. 35).
58 59

(Artículo) Hall - The Work of Representation (Long)

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Representation

packed- to makewater aniu shore - tugiu

tems. Earlyanthropologistsoflanguage,like SapirandWhorf,tookthisinsightto itslogicalextreme - is drifting along a surface natiruviktuaq

Representationis theproductionofmeaningthroughlanguage.Inrepresentation, constmction-

FIGURE1.5 Advertisementfor Gucci, in Vogue, September 1995

ind, dothe following exercise:

non-linguistic: addressedagainin Chapter 4.) ... , _. _" ^. _ ^^ A^^;.

andthecriminal, hashadcertainrealeffectsbothforcriminalandforthepunisher, andhowthesc towardsthemany,localizedcircuits, tactics, mechanisms andeffectsthroughwhichpower

social sciences, Foucault argued: ;15aiTapproach'roots[power] informsofbehaviour,bodiesand\oca\ relationsofpowerwhich

4. 5 Charcot and the performance of hysteria

ownconduct, thoughthis still stopped short ofrestoringthe subjectto his/herfull sovereignty.

5. 1 How to make sense of Velasquez' Las Meninas

Projectingourselvesintothe subjectsofthepaintinghelpus as spectatorsto see,to 'makesense

its meanings, andbecome its 'subjects'. NGUAGE RECONSIDERED

^CNAY, L. (1994) Foucault: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, Polity Press.

COUSINS,M. ANDHUSSAIN,A. (1984) Michel Foucault, Basingstoke,Macmillan.

in which female hysteria was perpetually pre-

steria as the microscope was to histology'

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