Naturalism

(philosophy)

In philosophy, naturalism is the idea that only natural laws and forces
(as opposed to supernatural ones) operate in the universe.[1] In its
primary sense,[2] it is also known as ontological naturalism, metaphysical
naturalism, pure naturalism, philosophical naturalism and
antisupernaturalism. "Ontological" refers to ontology, the philosophical
study of what exists. Philosophers often treat naturalism as equivalent to
materialism.

Double rainbow at Yosemite National

Park. According to naturalism, the causes
of all phenomena are to be found within
the universe and not transcendental
factors beyond it.

For example, philosopher Paul Kurtz argues that nature is best

accounted for by reference to material principles. These principles
include mass, energy, and other physical and chemical properties
accepted by the scientific community. Further, this sense of naturalism
holds that spirits, deities, and ghosts are not real and that there is no
"purpose" in nature. This stronger formulation of naturalism is commonly
referred to as metaphysical naturalism.[3] On the other hand, the more
moderate view that naturalism should be assumed in one's working
methods as the current paradigm, without any further consideration of
whether naturalism is true in the robust metaphysical sense, is called
methodological naturalism.[4]

With the exception of pantheists – who believe that nature is identical

with divinity while not recognizing a distinct personal anthropomorphic
god – theists challenge the idea that nature contains all of reality.
According to some theists, natural laws may be viewed as secondary
causes of God(s).

In the 20th century, Willard Van Orman Quine, George Santayana, and
other philosophers argued that the success of naturalism in science
meant that scientific methods should also be used in philosophy.
According to this view, science and philosophy are not always distinct
from one another, but instead form a continuum.

"Naturalism is not so much a special system as a point of view

or tendency common to a number of philosophical and religious
systems; not so much a well-defined set of positive and negative
doctrines as an attitude or spirit pervading and influencing
many doctrines. As the name implies, this tendency consists
essentially in looking upon nature as the one original and
fundamental source of all that exists, and in attempting to
explain everything in terms of nature. Either the limits of nature
are also the limits of existing reality, or at least the first cause, if
its existence is found necessary, has nothing to do with the
working of natural agencies. All events, therefore, find their
adequate explanation within nature itself. But, as the terms
 nature and natural are themselves used in more than one sense,
the term naturalism is also far from having one fixed meaning".

— Dubray 1911

History of naturalism

Ancient and medieval philosophy

Naturalism is most notably a Western phenomenon, but an equivalent
idea has long existed in the East. Naturalism was the foundation of two
out of six orthodox schools and one heterodox school of Hinduism.[5][6]
Samkhya, one of the oldest schools of Indian philosophy puts nature
(Prakriti) as the primary cause of the universe, without assuming the
existence of a personal God or Ishvara. The Carvaka, Nyaya, Vaisheshika
schools originated in the 7th, 6th, and 2nd century BCE, respectively.[7]
Similarly, though unnamed and never articulated into a coherent system,
one tradition within Confucian philosophy embraced a form of
Naturalism dating to the Wang Chong in the 1st century, if not earlier,
but it arose independently and had little influence on the development of
modern naturalist philosophy or on Eastern or Western culture.
 Ancient Roman mosaic showing
Anaximander holding a sundial. One
of the contributors to naturalism in
ancient Greek philosophy

Western metaphysical naturalism originated in ancient Greek philosophy.

The earliest pre-Socratic philosophers, especially the Milesians (Thales,
Anaximander, and Anaximenes) and the atomists (Leucippus and
Democritus), were labeled by their peers and successors "the physikoi"
(from the Greek φυσικός or physikos, meaning "natural philosopher"
borrowing on the word φύσις or physis, meaning "nature") because they
investigated natural causes, often excluding any role for gods in the
creation or operation of the world. This eventually led to fully developed
systems such as Epicureanism, which sought to explain everything that
exists as the product of atoms falling and swerving in a void.[8]

Aristotle surveyed the thought of his predecessors and conceived of

nature in a way that charted a middle course between their excesses.[9]

Plato's world of eternal and unchanging Forms, imperfectly

represented in matter by a divine Artisan, contrasts sharply
with the various mechanistic Weltanschauungen, of which
atomism was, by the fourth century at least, the most
prominent ... This debate was to persist throughout the ancient
world. Atomistic mechanism got a shot in the arm from
Epicurus ... while the Stoics adopted a divine teleology ... The
choice seems simple: either show how a structured, regular
 world could arise out of undirected processes, or inject
intelligence into the system. This was how Aristotle… when still
a young acolyte of Plato, saw matters. Cicero… preserves
Aristotle's own cave-image: if troglodytes were brought on a
sudden into the upper world, they would immediately suppose it
to have been intelligently arranged. But Aristotle grew to
abandon this view; although he believes in a divine being, the
Prime Mover is not the efficient cause of action in the Universe,
and plays no part in constructing or arranging it ... But,
although he rejects the divine Artificer, Aristotle does not resort
to a pure mechanism of random forces. Instead he seeks to find
a middle way between the two positions, one which relies
heavily on the notion of Nature, or phusis.[10]

With the rise and dominance of Christianity in the West and the later
spread of Islam, metaphysical naturalism was generally abandoned by
intellectuals. Thus, there is little evidence for it in medieval philosophy.

Modern philosophy
It was not until the early modern era of philosophy and the Age of
Enlightenment that naturalists like Benedict Spinoza (who put forward a
theory of psychophysical parallelism), David Hume,[11] and the
proponents of French materialism (notably Denis Diderot, Julien La
Mettrie, and Baron d'Holbach) started to emerge again in the 17th and
18th centuries. In this period, some metaphysical naturalists adhered to a
distinct doctrine, materialism, which became the dominant category of
metaphysical naturalism widely defended until the end of the 19th
century.
Thomas Hobbes was a proponent of naturalism in ethics who
acknowledged normative truths and properties.[12] Immanuel Kant
rejected (reductionist) materialist positions in metaphysics,[13] but he was
not hostile to naturalism. His transcendental philosophy is considered to
be a form of liberal naturalism.[14]

Hegel who together with Joseph von

Schelling developed the form of
natural philosophy recognised as
Naturphilosophie

In late modern philosophy, Naturphilosophie, a form of natural

philosophy, was developed by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling[15]
and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel[15] as an attempt to comprehend
nature in its totality and to outline its general theoretical structure.

A version of naturalism that arose after Hegel was Ludwig Feuerbach's

anthropological materialism,[16] which influenced Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels's historical materialism, Engels's "materialist dialectic" philosophy
of nature (Dialectics of Nature), and their follower Georgi Plekhanov's
dialectical materialism.[17]

Another notable school of late modern philosophy advocating naturalism

was German materialism: members included Ludwig Büchner, Jacob
Moleschott, and Carl Vogt.[18][19]
The current usage of the term naturalism "derives from debates in
America in the first half of the 20th century. The self-proclaimed
'naturalists' from that period included John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney
Hook, and Roy Wood Sellars."[20]

Contemporary philosophy
A politicized version of naturalism that has arisen in contemporary
philosophy is Ayn Rand's Objectivism. Objectivism is an expression of
capitalist ethical idealism within a naturalistic framework. An example of
a more progressive naturalistic philosophy is secular humanism.

The current usage of the term naturalism "derives from debates in

America in the first half of the last century.[20]

Currently, metaphysical naturalism is more widely embraced than in

previous centuries, especially but not exclusively in the natural sciences
and the Anglo-American, analytic philosophical communities. While the
vast majority of the population of the world remains firmly committed to
non-naturalistic worldviews, contemporary defenders of naturalism
and/or naturalistic theses and doctrines today include Kai Nielsen, J. J. C.
Smart, David Malet Armstrong, David Papineau, Paul Kurtz, Brian Leiter,
Daniel Dennett, Michael Devitt, Fred Dretske, Paul and Patricia
Churchland, Mario Bunge, Jonathan Schaffer, Hilary Kornblith, Leonard
Olson, Quentin Smith, Paul Draper and Michael Martin, among many
other academic philosophers.

According to David Papineau, contemporary naturalism is a consequence

of the build-up of scientific evidence during the twentieth century for the
"causal closure of the physical", the doctrine that all physical effects can
be accounted for by physical causes.[21]
 By the middle of the twentieth century, the acceptance of the
causal closure of the physical realm led to even stronger
naturalist views. The causal closure thesis implies that any
mental and biological causes must themselves be physically
constituted, if they are to produce physical effects. It thus gives
rise to a particularly strong form of ontological naturalism,
namely the physicalist doctrine that any state that has physical
effects must itself be physical. From the 1950s onwards,
philosophers began to formulate arguments for ontological
physicalism. Some of these arguments appealed explicitly to the
causal closure of the physical realm (Feigl 1958, Oppenheim and
Putnam 1958). In other cases, the reliance on causal closure lay
below the surface. However, it is not hard to see that even in
these latter cases the causal closure thesis played a crucial role.

— Papineau 2007
In contemporary continental philosophy, Quentin Meillassoux proposed
speculative materialism, a post-Kantian return to David Hume which can
strengthen classical materialist ideas.[22]

Etymology
The term "methodological naturalism" is much more recent, though.
According to Ronald Numbers, it was coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, a
Wheaton College philosopher. De Vries distinguished between what he
called "methodological naturalism", a disciplinary method that says
nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism", which
"denies the existence of a transcendent God".[23] The term
"methodological naturalism" had been used in 1937 by Edgar S.
Brightman in an article in The Philosophical Review as a contrast to
"naturalism" in general, but there the idea was not really developed to its
more recent distinctions.[24]

Description

Hubble Ultra-Deep Field Flammarion engraving

A 21st century image of the universe and a 1888 illustration of the cosmos

According to Steven Schafersman, naturalism is a philosophy that

maintains that;

1. "Nature encompasses all that exists

throughout space and time;
2. Nature (the universe or cosmos)
consists only of natural elements,
that is, of spatio-temporal physical
substance – mass –energy. Non-
 physical or quasi-physical
substance, such as information,
ideas, values, logic, mathematics,
intellect, and other emergent
phenomena, either supervene upon
the physical or can be reduced to a
physical account;
3. Nature operates by the laws of
physics and in principle, can be
explained and understood by
science and philosophy;
4. The supernatural does not exist, i.e.,
only nature is real. Naturalism is
therefore a metaphysical
philosophy opposed primarily by
supernaturalism".[25]
Or, as Carl Sagan succinctly put it: "The Cosmos is all that is or ever was
or ever will be."[26]
In addition Arthur C. Danto states that naturalism, in recent usage, is a
species of philosophical monism according to which whatever exists or
happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation
through methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in the
natural sciences, are continuous from domain to domain of objects and
events. Hence, naturalism is polemically defined as repudiating the view
that there exists or could exist any entities which lie, in principle, beyond
the scope of scientific explanation.[27][28]

Arthur Newell Strahler states: "The naturalistic view is that the particular
universe we observe came into existence and has operated through all
time and in all its parts without the impetus or guidance of any
supernatural agency."[29] "The great majority of contemporary
philosophers urge that that reality is exhausted by nature, containing
nothing 'supernatural', and that the scientific method should be used to
investigate all areas of reality, including the 'human spirit'." Philosophers
widely regard naturalism as a "positive" term, and "few active
philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as 'non-
naturalists'". "Philosophers concerned with religion tend to be less
enthusiastic about 'naturalism'" and that despite an "inevitable"
divergence due to its popularity, if more narrowly construed, (to the
chagrin of John McDowell, David Chalmers and Jennifer Hornsby, for
example), those not so disqualified remain nonetheless content "to set
the bar for 'naturalism' higher."[30]

Alvin Plantinga stated that Naturalism is presumed to not be a religion.

However, in one very important respect it resembles religion by
performing the cognitive function of a religion. There is a set of deep
human questions to which a religion typically provides an answer. In like
manner naturalism gives a set of answers to these questions".[31]
Providing assumptions
required for science
According to Robert Priddy, all scientific study inescapably builds on at
least some essential assumptions that cannot be tested by scientific
processes;[32] that is, that scientists must start with some assumptions as
to the ultimate analysis of the facts with which it deals. These
assumptions would then be justified partly by their adherence to the
types of occurrence of which we are directly conscious, and partly by
their success in representing the observed facts with a certain generality,
devoid of ad hoc suppositions."[33] Kuhn also claims that all science is
based on assumptions about the character of the universe, rather than
merely on empirical facts. These assumptions – a paradigm – comprise a
collection of beliefs, values and techniques that are held by a given
scientific community, which legitimize their systems and set the
limitations to their investigation.[34] For naturalists, nature is the only
reality, the "correct" paradigm, and there is no such thing as
supernatural, i.e. anything above, beyond, or outside of nature. The
scientific method is to be used to investigate all reality, including the
human spirit.[35]

Some claim that naturalism is the implicit philosophy of working

scientists, and that the following basic assumptions are needed to justify
the scientific method:[36]

1. That there is an objective reality

shared by all rational
observers.[36][37]
"The basis for rationality is
acceptance of an external objective
reality."[38] "Objective reality is
clearly an essential thing if we are
to develop a meaningful
perspective of the world.
Nevertheless its very existence is
assumed."[39] "Our belief that
objective reality exist is an
assumption that it arises from a
real world outside of ourselves. As
infants we made this assumption
unconsciously. People are happy to
make this assumption that adds
meaning to our sensations and
feelings, than live with
solipsism."[40] "Without this
assumption, there would be only
 the thoughts and images in our
own mind (which would be the only
existing mind) and there would be
no need of science, or anything
else."[41]
2. That this objective reality is
governed by natural laws;[36][37]
"Science, at least today, assumes
that the universe obeys knowable
principles that don't depend on
time or place, nor on subjective
parameters such as what we think,
know or how we behave."[38] Hugh
Gauch argues that science
presupposes that "the physical
world is orderly and
comprehensible."[42]
3. That reality can be discovered by
means of systematic observation
and experimentation.[36][37]
Stanley Sobottka said: "The
assumption of external reality is
necessary for science to function
and to flourish. For the most part,
science is the discovering and
explaining of the external world."[41]
"Science attempts to produce
knowledge that is as universal and
objective as possible within the
realm of human understanding."[38]
4. That Nature has uniformity of laws
and most if not all things in nature
must have at least a natural
cause.[37]
Biologist Stephen Jay Gould
referred to these two closely
related propositions as the
constancy of nature's laws and the
operation of known processes.[43]
Simpson agrees that the axiom of
uniformity of law, an unprovable
postulate, is necessary in order for
scientists to extrapolate inductive
inference into the unobservable
past in order to meaningfully study
it.[44] "The assumption of spatial
and temporal invariance of natural
laws is by no means unique to
geology since it amounts to a
warrant for inductive inference
which, as Bacon showed nearly four
hundred years ago, is the basic
mode of reasoning in empirical
science. Without assuming this
spatial and temporal invariance, we
have no basis for extrapolating
from the known to the unknown
and, therefore, no way of reaching
general conclusions from a finite
number of observations. (Since the
assumption is itself vindicated by
induction, it can in no way "prove"
the validity of induction — an
endeavor virtually abandoned after
Hume demonstrated its futility two
centuries ago)."[45] Gould also notes
that natural processes such as
Lyell's "uniformity of process" are
an assumption: "As such, it is
another a priori assumption shared
by all scientists and not a
statement about the empirical
world."[46] According to R.
Hooykaas: "The principle of
uniformity is not a law, not a rule
established after comparison of
facts, but a principle, preceding the
observation of facts ... It is the
logical principle of parsimony of
causes and of economy of scientific
notions. By explaining past changes
by analogy with present
phenomena, a limit is set to
conjecture, for there is only one
way in which two things are equal,
but there are an infinity of ways in
which they could be supposed
different."[47]
5. That experimental procedures will
be done satisfactorily without any
deliberate or unintentional
mistakes that will influence the
results.[37]
6. That experimenters won't be
significantly biased by their
presumptions.[37]
7. That random sampling is
representative of the entire
population.[37]
A simple random sample (SRS) is
the most basic probabilistic option
used for creating a sample from a
population. The benefit of SRS is
that the investigator is guaranteed
to choose a sample that represents
 the population that ensures
statistically valid conclusions.[48]

Methodological naturalism

Aristotle, one of the philosophers

behind the modern day scientific
method used as a central term in
methodological naturalism

Methodological naturalism, the second sense of the term "naturalism",

(see above) is "the adoption or assumption of philosophical naturalism …
with or without fully accepting or believing it.”[25] Robert T. Pennock used
the term to clarify that the scientific method confines itself to natural
explanations without assuming the existence or non-existence of the
supernatural.[49] "We may therefore be agnostic about the ultimate truth
of [philosophical] naturalism, but nevertheless adopt it and investigate
nature as if nature is all that there is."[25]

According to Ronald Numbers, the term "methodological naturalism" was

coined in 1983 by Paul de Vries, a Wheaton College philosopher.[23]
Both Schafersman and Strahler assert that it is illogical to try to
decouple the two senses of naturalism. "While science as a process only
requires methodological naturalism, the practice or adoption of
methodological naturalism entails a logical and moral belief in
philosophical naturalism, so they are not logically decoupled."[25] This
“[philosophical] naturalistic view is espoused by science as its
fundamental assumption."[29]

But Eugenie Scott finds it imperative to do so for the expediency of

deprogramming the religious. "Scientists can defuse some of the
opposition to evolution by first recognizing that the vast majority of
Americans are believers, and that most Americans want to retain their
faith." Scott apparently believes that "individuals can retain religious
beliefs and still accept evolution through methodological naturalism.
Scientists should therefore avoid mentioning metaphysical naturalism
and use methodological naturalism instead."[50] "Even someone who may
disagree with my logic … often understands the strategic reasons for
separating methodological from philosophical naturalism—if we want
more Americans to understand evolution."[51]

Scott’s approach has found success as illustrated in Ecklund’s study

where some religious scientists reported that their religious beliefs affect
the way they think about the implications – often moral – of their work,
but not the way they practice science within methodological
naturalism.[52] Papineau notes that "Philosophers concerned with religion
tend to be less enthusiastic about metaphysical naturalism and that
those not so disqualified remain content "to set the bar for 'naturalism'
higher."[30]

In contrast to Schafersman, Strahler, and Scott, Robert T. Pennock, an

expert witness[49] at the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial and
cited by the Judge in his Memorandum Opinion.[53] described
"methodological naturalism" stating that it is not based on dogmatic
metaphysical naturalism.[54]
Pennock further states that as supernatural agents and powers "are
above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers" and
"are not constrained by natural laws", only logical impossibilities
constrain what a supernatural agent cannot do. In addition he says: "If
we could apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers,
then, by definition, they would not be supernatural." "Because the
supernatural is necessarily a mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on
which one can judge scientific models." "Experimentation requires
observation and control of the variables.... But by definition we have no
control over supernatural entities or forces."

The position that the study of the function of nature is also the study of
the origin of nature is in contrast with opponents who take the position
that functioning of the cosmos is unrelated to how it originated. While
they are open to supernatural fiat in its invention and coming into
existence, during scientific study to explain the functioning of the cosmos,
they do not appeal to the supernatural. They agree that allowing
"science to appeal to untestable supernatural powers to explain how
nature functions would make the scientist's task meaningless, undermine
the discipline that allows science to make progress, and would be as
profoundly unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's reliance upon
the deus ex machina to extract his hero from a difficult predicament."[55]

Views on methodological naturalism

W. V. O. Quine
W. V. O. Quine describes naturalism as the position that there is no
higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. In his view, there is no
better method than the scientific method for judging the claims of
science, and there is neither any need nor any place for a "first
philosophy", such as (abstract) metaphysics or epistemology, that could
stand behind and justify science or the scientific method.

Therefore, philosophy should feel free to make use of the findings of

scientists in its own pursuit, while also feeling free to offer criticism when
those claims are ungrounded, confused, or inconsistent. In Quine's view,
philosophy is "continuous with" science, and both are empirical.[56]
Naturalism is not a dogmatic belief that the modern view of science is
entirely correct. Instead, it simply holds that science is the best way to
explore the processes of the universe and that those processes are what
modern science is striving to understand.[57]

Karl Popper
Karl Popper equated naturalism with inductive theory of science. He
rejected it based on his general critique of induction (see problem of
induction), yet acknowledged its utility as means for inventing
conjectures.

A naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive

theory of science") has its value, no doubt. ... I reject the
naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that
whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only
proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn
into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not
only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science,
and consequently to its idea of empirical method.

— Karl R. Popper, The Logic

of Scientific Discovery,
 (Routledge, 2002), pp. 52–53,
ISBN 0-415-27844-9.
Popper instead proposed that science should adopt a methodology
based on falsifiability for demarcation, because no number of
experiments can ever prove a theory, but a single experiment can
contradict one. Popper holds that scientific theories are characterized by
falsifiability.

Alvin Plantinga
Alvin Plantinga, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Notre Dame, and a
Christian, has become a well-known critic of naturalism.[58] He suggests,
in his evolutionary argument against naturalism, that the probability that
evolution has produced humans with reliable true beliefs, is low or
inscrutable, unless the evolution of humans was guided (for example, by
God). According to David Kahan of the University of Glasgow, in order
to understand how beliefs are warranted, a justification must be found in
the context of supernatural theism, as in Plantinga's
epistemology.[59][60][61] (See also supernormal stimuli).

Plantinga argues that together, naturalism and evolution provide an

insurmountable "defeater for the belief that our cognitive faculties are
reliable", i.e., a skeptical argument along the lines of Descartes' evil
demon or brain in a vat.[62]

Take philosophical naturalism to be the belief that there aren't

any supernatural entities – no such person as God, for example,
but also no other supernatural entities, and nothing at all like
God. My claim was that naturalism and contemporary
 evolutionary theory are at serious odds with one another – and
this despite the fact that the latter is ordinarily thought to be
one of the main pillars supporting the edifice of the former. (Of
course I am not attacking the theory of evolution, or anything
in that neighborhood; I am instead attacking the conjunction of
naturalism with the view that human beings have evolved in
that way. I see no similar problems with the conjunction of
theism and the idea that human beings have evolved in the way
contemporary evolutionary science suggests.) More
particularly, I argued that the conjunction of naturalism with
the belief that we human beings have evolved in conformity
with current evolutionary doctrine ... is in a certain interesting
way self-defeating or self-referentially incoherent.

— Alvin Plantinga,
Naturalism Defeated?:
Essays on Plantinga's
Evolutionary Argument
Against Naturalism,
"Introduction"[62]
The argument is controversial and has been criticized as seriously flawed,
for example, by Elliott Sober.[63][64]
Robert T. Pennock
Robert T. Pennock states that as supernatural agents and powers "are
above and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers" and
"are not constrained by natural laws", only logical impossibilities
constrain what a supernatural agent cannot do. He says: "If we could
apply natural knowledge to understand supernatural powers, then, by
definition, they would not be supernatural." As the supernatural is
necessarily a mystery to us, it can provide no grounds on which one can
judge scientific models. "Experimentation requires observation and
control of the variables.... But by definition we have no control over
supernatural entities or forces." Science does not deal with meanings; the
closed system of scientific reasoning cannot be used to define itself.
Allowing science to appeal to untestable supernatural powers would
make the scientist's task meaningless, undermine the discipline that
allows science to make progress, and "would be as profoundly
unsatisfying as the ancient Greek playwright's reliance upon the deus ex
machina to extract his hero from a difficult predicament."[65]

Naturalism of this sort says nothing about the existence or nonexistence

of the supernatural, which by this definition is beyond natural testing. As
a practical consideration, the rejection of supernatural explanations
would merely be pragmatic, thus it would nonetheless be possible for an
ontological supernaturalist to espouse and practice methodological
naturalism. For example, scientists may believe in God while practicing
methodological naturalism in their scientific work. This position does not
preclude knowledge that is somehow connected to the supernatural.
Generally however, anything that one can examine and explain
scientifically would not be supernatural, simply by definition.
Criticism

Colin Murray Turbayne

The Australian philosopher Colin Murray Turbayne puts forth an
objection to naturalism which is based upon linguistic grounds. His
objections refer to several of the concepts which form the a priori
foundation for naturalism in general. In particular, Turbayne calls
attention to the concepts of "substance" and "substratum" which in his
view convey little if any meaning at best.[66] [67] He asserts that along
with several "physicalist" constructs, these concepts have been mistakenly
incorporated through the use of deductive reasoning into the hypotheses
underlying materialism in the modern world.[68] In addition, he argues
further that they are more properly characterized as being purely
metaphorical in nature rather than literal descriptions of an independent
objective truth. Specifically, he identifies the "mechanistic" metaphors
utilized by Isaac Newton and the mind-body dualism which was
embraced by René Descartes as being particularly problematic.[67]
Turbayne argues that over time humanity has become victimized by
mistaking such metaphorical constructs for literal truths, which now form
the basis for considerable obfuscation and confusion within the realms of
metaphysics and epistemology.[68][69] He concludes by observing that
humanity can readily adopt more useful models of the natural world only
after first acknowledging the manner in which such purely metaphorical
constructs have taken on the guise of literal truth within much of the
modern world.[67][69][68][66]
Applicability of mathematics to the
material universe
The late philosopher of mathematics Mark Steiner has written
extensively on this matter and acknowledges that the applicability of
mathematics constitutes "a challenge to the entrenched dogma of
naturalism."[70][71]

See also

Atheism
Clockwork universe
Daoism
Deism
Dysteleology
Empiricism
Hylomorphism
Legal naturalism
Liberal naturalism
Materialism
Monism
Naturalist computationalism
Naturalistic fallacy
Naturalistic pantheism
Philosophy of nature
Physicalism
Platonized naturalism
Poetic naturalism
Religious naturalism
Scientism
Sociological naturalism
Supernaturalism
Transcendental naturalism
Vaisheshika
References

Citations

1. "naturalism" (http://www.oed.com/view/E
ntry/125337?redirectedFrom=naturalis
m) . Oxford English Dictionary Online.
2. Papineau, David (22 February 2007).
"Naturalism" (http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2007/entries/naturalism/#N
atPhy) . In Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"According to philosopher Steven
Lockwood, naturalism can be separated
into an ontological sense and a
methodological sense."
3. Kurtz, Paul (Spring 1998). "Darwin Re-
Crucified: Why Are So Many Afraid of
Naturalism?" (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20121018023306/http://www.secularhu
manism.org/library/fi/kurtz_18_2.html) .
Free Inquiry. 18 (2). Archived from the
original (http://www.secularhumanism.or
g/library/fi/kurtz_18_2.html) on 18
October 2012. Retrieved 6 April 2011.
4. Schafersman 1996, Methodological
naturalism is the adoption or
assumption of naturalism in scientific
belief and practice without really
believing in naturalism.
5. Chatterjee, A (2012). "Naturalism in
Classical Indian Philosophy" (http://plat
o.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/
naturalism-india/) . In Zalta, Edward N.
(ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition).
6. Riepe, Dale (1996). Naturalistic
Tradition in Indian Thought. Motilal
Banarsidass Publ. pp. 227–246.
ISBN 978-8120812932.
7. Leaman, Oliver (1999). Key Concepts in
Eastern Philosophy. Routledge. p. 269.
ISBN 978-0415173629.
8. O'Keefe, Tim (2010). Epicureanism.
University of California Press. pp. 11–13.
9. See especially Physics, books I and II.
10. Hankinson, R. J. (1997). Cause and
Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought
(https://books.google.com/books?id=iwf
y-n5IWL8C) . Oxford University Press.
p. 125. ISBN 978-0-19-924656-4.
11. William Edward Morris, "David Hume"
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hum
e/) , The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (21 May 2014), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.)
12. Abizadeh, A. (2018). Hobbes and the
Two Faces of Ethics (https://books.googl
e.com/books?id=CWJjDwAAQBAJ&pg=
PA23) . Cambridge University Press.
p. 23. ISBN 978-1-108-41729-7. Retrieved
14 June 2023.
13. Rohlf, Michael (28 July 2020).
"Immanuel Kant". Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plat
o.stanford.edu/entries/kant/) .
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
14. Hanna, Robert, Kant, Science, and
Human Nature. Clarendon Press, 2006,
p. 16.
15. Frederick C. Beiser(2002), German
Idealism: The Struggle Against
Subjectivism 1781–1801, Harvard
university Press, p. 506.
16. Axel Honneth, Hans Joas, Social Action
and Human Nature, Cambridge
University Press, 1988, p. 18.
17. See Georgi Plekhanov, "For the Sixtieth
Anniversary of Hegel's Death" (1891).
See also Plekhanov, Essays on the
History of Materialism (1893)
and Plekhanov, The Development of the
Monist View of History (1895).
18. Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of
the European Mind in the Nineteenth
Century, Cambridge University Press,
1990, p. 165: "During the 1850s German ...
scientists conducted a controversy
known ... as the materialistic controversy.
It was specially associated with the
names of Vogt, Moleschott and
Büchner" and p. 173: "Frenchmen were
surprised to see Büchner and Vogt. ...
[T]he French were surprised at German
materialism".
19. The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol.
151 (https://books.google.com/books?id=
8-VXAAAAIAAJ&q=) , 1952, p. 227: "the
Continental materialism of Moleschott
and Buchner".
20. Papineau, David "Naturalism" (http://pl
ato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/) ,
in "The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy"
21. Papineau, David (2011). "The Rise of
Physicalism" (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20160601180141/http://ebooks.cambrid
ge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO978051157079
7) . In Gillett, Carl; Loewer, Barry (eds.).
Physicalism and its Discontents.
Cambridge.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511570797 (https://d
oi.org/10.1017%2FCBO9780511570797) .
ISBN 9780521801751. Archived from the
original (http://ebooks.cambridge.org/e
book.jsf?bid=CBO9780511570797) on 1
June 2016. Retrieved 9 January 2018.
22. Quentin Meillassoux (2008), After
Finitude, Bloomsbury, p. 90.
23. Nick Matzke: On the Origins of
Methodological Naturalism (http://www.
pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/03/on
_the_origins.html) Archived (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20060903191457/htt
p://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/200
6/03/on_the_origins.html) 2006-09-03
at the Wayback Machine. The Pandas
Thumb (March 20, 2006)
24. "ASA March 2006 – Re: Methodological
Naturalism" (https://archive.today/2012
0801144730/http://www.calvin.edu/archiv
e/asa/200603/0501.html) . Archived
from the original (http://www.calvin.edu/
archive/asa/200603/0501.html) on 1
August 2012. Retrieved 18 June 2006.
25. Schafersman 1996.
26. Sagan, Carl (2002). Cosmos. Random
House. ISBN 9780375508325.
27. Danto 1967, p. 448.
28. Stone 2008, p. 2: Personally, I place
great emphasis on the phrase "in
principle", since there are many things
that science does not now explain. And
perhaps we need some natural piety
concerning the ontological limit
question as to why there is anything at
all. But the idea that naturalism is a
polemical notion is important"
29. Strahler 1992, p. 3.
30. Papineau 2007.
31. (Plantinga 2010)
32. Priddy, Robert (1998). "Chapter Five,
Scientific Objectivity in Question" (htt
p://robertpriddy.com/lim/5.html) .
Science Limited.
33. Whitehead 1997, p. 135.
34. Boldman, Lee (2007). "Chapter 6, The
Privileged Status of Science" (http://pre
ss-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p98
831/pdf/ch0615.pdf) (PDF).
35. Papineau, David "Naturalism" (http://pl
ato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/) ,
in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, quote, "The great majority
of contemporary philosophers would
happily... reject 'supernatural' entities,
and allow that science is a possible
route (if not necessarily the only one) to
important truths about the 'human
spirit'."
36. Heilbron 2003, p. vii.
37. Chen 2009, pp. 1–2.
38. Durak 2008.
39. Vaccaro, Joan. "Reality" (http://www.ict.g
riffith.edu.au/joan/atheism/reality.php) .
Retrieved 22 December 2017.
40. Vaccaro, Joan. "Objectiveism" (http://ww
w.ict.griffith.edu.au/joan/atheism/objecti
vism.php) . Retrieved 22 December
2017. "Objective reality exists beyond or
outside our self. Any belief that it arises
from a real world outside us is actually
an assumption. It seems more beneficial
to assume that an objective reality
exists than to live with solipsism, and so
people are quite happy to make this
assumption. In fact we made this
assumption unconsciously when we
began to learn about the world as
infants. The world outside ourselves
appears to respond in ways which are
consistent with it being real. The
assumption of objectivism is essential if
we are to attach the contemporary
meanings to our sensations and feelings
and make more sense of them."
41. Sobottka 2005, p. 11.
42. Gauch 2002, p. 154, "Expressed as a
single grand statement, science
presupposes that the physical world is
orderly and comprehensible. The most
obvious components of this
comprehensive presupposition are that
the physical world exists and that our
sense perceptions are generally
reliable."
43. Gould 1987, p. 120, "You cannot go to a
rocky outcrop and observe either the
constancy of nature's laws or the
working of known processes. It works the
other way around." You first assume
these propositions and "then you go to
the outcrop of rock."
44. Simpson 1963, pp. 24–48, "Uniformity is
an unprovable postulate justified, or
indeed required, on two grounds. First,
nothing in our incomplete but extensive
knowledge of history disagrees with it.
Second, only with this postulate is a
rational interpretation of history
possible and we are justified in seeking
—as scientists we must seek—such a
rational interpretation."
45. Gould 1965, pp. 223–228.
46. Gould 1984, p. 11.
47. Hooykaas 1963, p. 38.
48. "Simple Random Sampling" (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20180102073443/htt
p://www.betterevaluation.org/evaluation-
options/simplerandom) . Archived from
the original (http://betterevaluation.org/
evaluation-options/simplerandom) on 2
January 2018. Retrieved 6 January 2018.
"A simple random sample (SRS) is the
most basic probabilistic option used for
creating a sample from a population.
Each SRS is made of individuals drawn
from a larger population, completely at
random. As a result, said individuals
have an equal chance of being selected
throughout the sampling process. The
benefit of SRS is that as a result, the
investigator is guaranteed to choose a
sample which is representative of the
population, which ensures statistically
valid conclusions."
49. "Kitzmiller v. Dover: Day 3, AM: Robert
Pennock (continued)" (http://www.talkori
gins.org/faqs/dover/day3am2.html) .
www.talkorigins.org.
50. Scott, Eugenie C. (1996). " "Creationism,
Ideology, and Science" ". In Gross; Levitt;
Lewis (eds.). The Flight From Science
and Reason. The New York Academy of
Sciences. pp. 519–520.
51. Scott, Eugenie C. (2008). "Science and
Religion, Methodology and Humanism"
(http://ncse.com/religion/science-religion
-methodology-humanism) . NCSE.
Retrieved 20 March 2012.
52. Ecklund, Elaine Howard (2010). Science
vs. Religion: What Scientists Really
Think. Oxford University Press.
ISBN 978-0195392982.
53. [[wikisource:Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
School District/4:Whether ID Is
Science#4. Whether ID is Science
|Kitzmiller v. Dover: Whether ID is
Science]]
54. "Kitzmiller v. Dover: Day 3, AM: Robert
Pennock (continued)" (http://www.talkori
gins.org/faqs/dover/day3am2.html) .
www.talkorigins.org.
55. Pennock, Robert T. (10 June 2015).
"Supernaturalist Explanations..." (https://
web.archive.org/web/20150610013620/ht
tp://www.msu.edu/~pennock5/research/p
apers/Pennock_SupNatExpl.html)
msu.edu. Archived from the original (htt
p://www.msu.edu/~pennock5/research/pa
pers/Pennock_SupNatExpl.html) on 10
June 2015. Retrieved 16 June 2021.
56. Lynne Rudder (2013). Naturalism and
the First-Person Perspective (https://boo
ks.google.com/books?id=9G_bIWzgjFkC
&pg=PA5) . Oxford University Press.
p. 5. ISBN 978-0199914746.
57. Quine has argued that "Epistemology,
or something like it, simply falls into
place as a chapter of psychology." The
Quinean view that we should abandon
epistemology for psychology, however, is
not widely accepted by contemporary
naturalists in epistemology. See
Feldman, Richard (2012). "Naturalized
Epistemology" (http://plato.stanford.ed
u/archives/sum2012/entries/epistemolog
y-naturalized/) . In Zalta, Edward N.
(ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2012 ed.).
Retrieved 4 June 2014. "Quinean
Replacement Naturalism finds relatively
few supporters."
58. Beilby, J.K. (2002). Naturalism
Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's
Evolutionary Argument Against
Naturalism (https://books.google.com/b
ooks?id=p40tc_T7-rMC&pg=PR9) . G –
Reference, Information and
Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. Cornell
University Press. p. ix.
ISBN 9780801487637. LCCN 2001006111
(https://lccn.loc.gov/2001006111) .
59. "Gifford Lecture Series – Warrant and
Proper Function 1987–1988" (https://web.
archive.org/web/20120104024641/http://
www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubI
D=TPWAPF&Cover=TRUE) . Archived
from the original (http://www.giffordlect
ures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPWAPF&C
over=TRUE) on 4 January 2012.
Retrieved 14 January 2012.
60. Plantinga, Alvin (11 April 2010).
"Evolution, Shibboleths, and
Philosophers — Letters to the Editor" (ht
tp://chronicle.com/article/Evolution-Shib
boleths-and/64990/) . The Chronicle of
Higher Education. "...I do indeed think
that evolution functions as a
contemporary shibboleth by which to
distinguish the ignorant fundamentalist
goats from the informed and
scientifically literate sheep.

According to Richard Dawkins, 'It is

absolutely safe to say that, if you meet
somebody who claims not to believe in
evolution, that person is ignorant,
stupid, or insane (or wicked, but I'd
rather not consider that).' Daniel
Dennett goes Dawkins one (or two)
further: 'Anyone today who doubts that
the variety of life on this planet was
 produced by a process of evolution is
simply ignorant—inexcusably ignorant.'
You wake up in the middle of the night;
you think, can that whole Darwinian
story really be true? Wham! You are
inexcusably ignorant.

I do think that evolution has become a

modern idol of the tribe. But of course it
doesn't even begin to follow that I think
the scientific theory of evolution is false.
And I don't."
61. Plantinga, Alvin (1993). Warrant and
Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Chap. 11. ISBN 0-19-
507863-2.
62. Beilby, J.K., ed. (2002). "Introduction by
Alvin Plantinga". Naturalism Defeated?:
Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary
Argument Against Naturalism.
Reference, Information and
Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press. pp. 1–2, 10 (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=p40tc_T
7-rMC&pg=PA1) . ISBN 978-0-8014-
8763-7. LCCN 2001006111 (https://lccn.lo
c.gov/2001006111) .
63. Oppy, Graham; Trakakis, N. N. (11
September 2014). Twentieth-Century
Philosophy of Religion: The History of
Western Philosophy of Religion (https://
books.google.com/books?id=N2h_BAAA
QBAJ&q=Although+the+argument+has
+been+criticized+by+some+philosopher
s%2C+like+Elliott+Sober&pg=PT305) .
Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-54638-2.
64. Fitelson, Branden; Sober, Elliott (1998).
"Plantinga's Probability Arguments
Against Evolutionary Naturalism" (http
s://philpapers.org/rec/FITPPA) . Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. 79 (2): 115–129.
doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00053 (https://doi.or
g/10.1111%2F1468-0114.00053) .
65. T., Robert (10 June 2015).
"Supernaturalist Explanations..." (https://
web.archive.org/web/20150610013620/ht
tp://www.msu.edu/~pennock5/research/p
apers/Pennock_SupNatExpl.html)
msu.edu. Archived from the original (htt
p://www.msu.edu/~pennock5/research/pa
pers/Pennock_SupNatExpl.html) on 10
June 2015. Retrieved 16 June 2021.
66. Murphy, Jeffrie G. "Berkeley and the
Metaphor of Mental Substance." Ratio 7
(1965):171, note 3.
67. Hesse, Mary (1966). "Review of The
Myth of Metaphor". Foundations of
Language. 2 (3): 282–284.
JSTOR 25000234 (https://www.jstor.org/
stable/25000234) .
68. Dictionary of Modern American
Philosophers Shook, John. 2005 p. 2451
Biography of Colin Murray Turbayne on
Google Books (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=DsKvAwAAQBAJ&dq=Coli
n+Murray+Turbayne&pg=PA2451)
69. The University of Rochester Department
of Philosophy- Berkley Essay Prize
Competition - History of the Prize Colin
Turbayne's The Myth of Metaphor on
rochester.edu (http://www.sas.rochester.e
du/phl/about/prize.html)
 70. Steiner, Mark (1998). The Applicability
of Mathematics as a Philosophical
Problem. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press. p. 176.
ISBN 0674043987.
71. The Applicability of Mathematics as a
Philosophical Problem — Mark Steiner
(https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.ph
p?isbn=9780674009707) . Harvard
University Press. 30 September 2002.
ISBN 9780674009707. Retrieved
11 December 2022. {{cite book}}:
|website= ignored (help)

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Further reading

Mario De Caro and David Macarthur

(eds) Naturalism in Question.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 2004.
Mario De Caro and David Macarthur
(eds) Naturalism and Normativity.
New York: Columbia University Press,
2010.
Friedrich Albert Lange, The History of
Materialism, London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd, 1925,
ISBN 0-415-22525-6
David Macarthur, "Quinean
Naturalism in Question," Philo. vol 11,
no. 1 (2008).
 Sander Verhaeg, Working from
Within: The Nature and Development
of Quine's Naturalism. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2018.

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