The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons: Thomas P. Wilson

The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons*
Thomas P. Wilson
University of California, Santa Barbara
Abstract. Schutz and Parsons had fundamentally different conceptions

of sociology that led them to quite different approaches to the problem of
developing theory based on general concepts and having claims to uni-
versal validity but nevertheless incorporating the actor’s subjective point
of view. Their treatments of this problem of subjectivity and the contro-
versy that arose between them over this issue are examined in detail. In
both cases, despite programmatic insistence to the contrary, the concrete
subjective view of the actor ends up being treated as irrelevant to their
systematic theories. It is suggested that the nature of general concepts in
sociological inquiry must be reconsidered if the subjective view of the
actor is to be retained as central to sociological inquiry.
The problem of subjectivity in social theory arises when one wants to

give a central place to actors’ understandings and motives in the concrete
situations in which they act while seeking to describe and explain social
phenomena in terms of fixed categories specified in a theoretical frame-
work. The challenge then is to represent the actors’ subjective views
within those categories in a way which preserves that centrality. Al-
though the problem appears in many forms of theorizing, it is especially
urgent when theoretical concepts are proposed as universal, holding ir-
respective of time and place. The purpose of this essay is to examine the
way two important mid-twentieth century theorists, Alfred Schutz and
Talcott Parsons, addressed the problem of subjectivity within the con-
texts of their fundamentally different conceptions of sociological theory,
with the aim of illuminating an issue that still has relevance in contempo-
rary theorizing.
Schutz’s most widely known and influential writings are his phen-
omenological investigations and especially his studies of the actor in the
attitude of everyday life. These have served as inspiration for phenome-
nological sociology, and in a rather different way they profoundly influ-
*
I am indebted to the editors for their helpful comments and suggestions for revising
the paper.
20 THOMAS P. WILSON
enced Garfinkel’s classical empirical studies in ethnomethodology. How-

ever, Prendergast (1986) has called attention to another side of Schutz’s
work: his commitment to the distinctive view of social science held by
the Austrian School of Economics and his methodology of concept for-
mation. Schutz’s methodology, presented most fully in The Meaningful
Structure of the Social Worldd (1932/1967),1 was directed to two critical
problems in the foundations of the Austrian School: giving an account of
how actors can have knowledge of one another’s beliefs and motives suf-
ficiently reliable to allow stable economic exchange; and providing a
foundation for the School’s fundamental assumption that basic theoreti-
cal concepts cannot be contingent but instead must be valid a priori.
In addition, however, Schutz was concerned with a deeper question.
Following the Austrian view, and in common with virtually all social
scientists at the time, he assumed that at the most fundamental level
sociological theory must be universal, holding across all times and places
and perforce standing outside societal members’ motives and subjective
understandings of their social world at any particular time and place.
Nevertheless, strongly influenced by Max Weber and in explicit oppo-
sition to behaviorism and logical positivism, he insisted that those sub-
jective understandings must be taken into account in any tenable theory
of action. Consequently, Schutz faced the problem of subjectivity in so-
cial theory: how can one have an understanding of the social world based
on universal concepts when that world is founded on the subjective expe-
rience of its members? His methodology of concept formation was di-
rected in part to this problem.
It is illuminating to compare Schutz’s approach with that of Parsons,
whose classic study The Structure of Social Action (1937) laid the basis
for the dominant theoretical position in mid-twentieth century American
sociology. Schutz and Parsons both sought a theory of action that holds
universally, though for Parsons that claim to universality is empirically
contingent rather than a priori. They likewise agreed that the subjective
1
Walsh and Lehnert translate the phrase, ‘sinnhafte Aufbau’ in the title of Schutz’s
book as ‘Phenomenology.’ Instead, I have followed Kauder’s rendering as “Meaning-
ful Structure” (1965: 122), and I use this as a short title in the text to help make
citations transparent. Schutz maintained the methodological position presented in
Meaningful Structure throughout his subsequent work. (e.g., 1943/1964; 1953/1962;
1954/1962; 1945/1962a)

The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons: Thomas P. Wilson

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons: Thomas P. Wilson

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons: Thomas P. Wilson

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Problem of Subjectivity in Schutz and Parsons*

Abstract. Schutz and Parsons had fundamentally different conceptions

The problem of subjectivity in social theory arises when one wants to

enced Garfinkel’s classical empirical studies in ethnomethodology. How-

You might also like