Article Review 3 - Final Draft

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
FALL 2023
COURSE: IRL 7002: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ARTICLE REVIEW ON
PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A SCIENTIFIC

REALIST APPROACH
Joseph, J. (2007). Philosophy in international relations: A scientific realist

approach. Millennium, 35(2), 345-359.
BY
VICTOR K. MACHOKA 625162
Submitted to: PROFESSOR MACHARIA MUNENE
30TH OCTOBER 2023

Central thesis
Jonathan Joseph’s first clarification, presented somewhat dramatically at the beginning of the article,
is that scientific realism is not a theory but a philosophical position. The basic tenets of this
philosophical stance argue for the independent existence of reality beyond our attempts to explain it,
the existence of unobservable deep-lying structures, processes and generative mechanisms and
relationships with concomitant causal powers. This position is antithetical to positivist denial of
unobservable structures and underlying relations, thus painting an erroneous atomistic world. The
value of scientific realism is stated as its ability to raise an argument about the ontological and
epistemological assumptions of international relations theories, not only criticising their assumptions
but also attracting an analysis of the ontological consequences of their theoretical claims.
The key distinction between scientific realism and constructivism or political realism espoused is that
the former proposes the existence and reality of unobservable structures and generative mechanisms
with causative power of their own. For realists, the ontological consequence of situating international
politics within a bounded realm renders Kenneth Waltz positivist philosophy atomistic in nature, with
states as the basic units of analysis and structure being contingent on interaction between states. The
result of this ontology is perceiving international politics as constant, with recuring patterns through
the millennia; a notion that scientific theory considers overly simplistic.
The author analyses political realism and distinguishes it from scientific realism by depicting the
former as espousing the primacy of the state, power and anarchy. The philosophical distinction
between this and empirical realism being that the political realism is a philosophical approach finding
its roots in positivism. After refuting Jackson and Sorensen’s definition of positivism as a theory, but
rather a philosophical position, he explains how the primacy of the state, anarchy and balance of
power are the positivist ontological assumptions of political realist theory. With this definition
adjusted, he proceeds to elucidate the epistemic fallacy that flows from considering states as the basic
unit of international relations due to the ensuing ontological consequence of turning our back on
social relations and their causative powers by presuming to discuss the world without its ideological
factors.
When he draws attention to constructivism, he aims his rebuttal at Alexander Wendt, who he claims
focuses on the level of events, but ignores the presence of the unobservable social structures and
causal processes that produce those events, editing out the real question of social analysis. He explains
the nexus between the Marxist approach of focusing on the material aspect of production and the
bifurcated scientific realist approach of considering the structure of the society as well as the
intersubjectivity of social relations that form it.
The crux of his criticism of constructivism is that it fails to confect a singular coherent argument for
the theory, largely due to having their incipiency in neorealist concepts of materialism and structure.
2|Page
Critical review
The article is a highly intellectual piece written by a scholar with clear high-order thinking that
enables him to discuss the subject of scientific realism and international relations theory with
remarkably coherent thought. It is commendable that the author addresses foundational subjects in
international relations such as realism, constructivism, positivism and empirical realism, managing to
weave through the breadth and philosophical complexities of their ontologies, epistemologies,
assumptions and the consequences thereof.
The audacity of the author to correct authors and scholars considered hitherto as foundational scholars
in these fields, such as Alexander Wendt, George Sorensen and Kenneth waltz, takes laudable
scholarly courage. It is also commendable that he did it straightforwardly, making his counterclaims
without equivocating. Such boldness empowers the reader to think freely and consider the principles
being espoused by all the authors, including Joseph, without deifying them.
The whole corpus of the article is testament to Joseph’s dextrous understanding of constructivism,
scientific theory and its underpinnings. He seems to struggle to constrict himself to the fifteen pages
while delving into the controversial arguments, attempting to define and redefine terminologies such
as positivism, empirical realism, scientific theory and even to some extent expand the ambit of
Marxism theory. His quest to present his own philosophical arguments for scientific realism, without
denuding previous scholarly works of their academic relevance is evident.
The title of the article, however, may seem misleading to a reader expecting an informative piece on
international relations theory, but instead finding a critic of IR theory and constructivism, with
scientific theory itself only being discussed in the first half of the article. At some point in the article,
the author’s dabbling in several theories simultaneously may be construed as an inability to hold a
specific trail of thought to its logical conclusion. An example of this is when he discusses empirical
realism, scientific realism and political realism, while at the same time disproving some assumptions
of positivism and constructivism.
The author’s desire to decouple and distinguish the conflated aspects of the international relations
theory seems to imply an intolerance for the imbricating nature of concepts in social science. The
overlapping of international relations with sociology or positivism with realism, may not necessarily
imply a lack of order or coherence in the field, but rather a complex interdependence that does not
afford the IR scholar demarcations indicating where one ends and the other begins.
In his conclusion, the apology to the international relations scholars disenfranchised by the article’s
breadth is evidence of the extent to which his work wandered beyond the purview of the stated
mandate of the title. In the final analysis, Jonathan Joseph writes a very educative and intellectual
piece, probably addressing himself to the very scholars he criticises.
3|Page

Article Review 3 - Final Draft

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Article Review 3 - Final Draft

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Article Review 3 - Final Draft

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE: IRL 7002: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND METHODS

PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A SCIENTIFIC

Joseph, J. (2007). Philosophy in international relations: A scientific realist

VICTOR K. MACHOKA 625162

Submitted to: PROFESSOR MACHARIA MUNENE

30TH OCTOBER 2023

You might also like