Lubinda V Daily Nation
Lubinda V Daily Nation
Lubinda V Daily Nation
AND
For the 2nd Defendant: Mr. M. Muchende, Messrs. Dindi & Company
RULING
The Plaintiffs action was for, inter alia, damages for alleged libel
contained in an article titled “UPND WRITES OFF LUBINDA” attributed
to the 1st Defendant which appeared at page 4 of the SUNDAY NATION
Edition of 18th March 2014, Vol.3 issue 747, a publication of the 2nd
Defendant.
Pending the hearing and determination of the action, the Plaintiff applied
for an order of interim injunction restraining the Defendants from
uttering and publishing similar and other defamatory statements of the
Plaintiff. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by the
Plaintiff to which was exhibited an extract of the offending publication.
The article in issue reads:
Mr. Lifwekelo said Mr Lubinda had been blinded by his desire to get
back a government job and that the Kabwata Parliamentarian had
become political myopic and disoriented following a surge of anti-
Lubinda campaigns that were meant to hound him out of the ruling
party.
He said Mr. Lubinda was looking for empathy from the cartel that
started the campaign to expel him out of the party and advised that
it was politically wrong for the Kabwata MP to write off the
opposition because more than 90 percent of Zambians were angry
with the PF and its form of governance.
Mr. Lifwekelo explained that it was clear Mr. Lubinda had lost touch
with the current political realities and hoped that soon the Kabwata
legislature would be shocked when Zambians would show the PF the
exit door from government.
“We do not know how much Lubinda knows about the opposition
and it would appear that he has become disoriented and myopic
following the surge of demonstrations meant to hound him out of
the ruling party.”
R4
“Mr. Lubinda could only be trying to blind his masters that the PF is
still popular but we know that deep down his political heart, he has
seen that the tides have changed and that the PF stands no chance
under President Michael Sata or any other candidate in 2016. Let
him understand that the popularity the PF enjoyed in 2011, has
since evaporated and Zambians are so angry that they want change
now,” Mr. Lifwekelo said.
He said Mr. Lubinda had on several occasions pleaded with the UPND
members to support him because his time in the PF had expired.
He said Mr. Lubinda had in the not so distant past been claiming
that he was no longer a PF member and that he was more
comfortable with the UPND than any other opposition political
party.”
6. That I believe this is the reason the said article does not
state the names of the reporter.
The 1st Defendant had not appeared to the Writ of Summons or filed any
opposing affidavit. However, the 2nd Defendant had caused an
appearance to be filed together with a defence. In the said defence, the
2nd Defendant pleaded partly as follows:
Particulars
(a) The 1st Defendant who issued the statement is and was
the Publicity and Information Secretary for a lawfully
recognised Opposition Political Party in Zambia by the
name of United Party for National Development (UPND).
The said fundamental freedom can only be abridged by laws that are
“reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the reputations,
rights and freedoms of other persons....”
In its decision in the case of FRASER v. EVANS (1969) 1 Q.B. 349, the
English Court of Appeal gave the guidelines as to why the legal right
ought not to be rushly interfered with. In the words of Lord Denning at
pages 360 and 361 of the report:
In the case of Zambia where there are no trials before a jury, it is the
Judge who must decide the question of libel or no libel, but generally
only after the trial of the action.
In the instant case, the 2nd Defendant did not ju st make a general, or
what used to be called a “rolled up plea”, of justification or fair comment
on a matter of public interest, but it gave particulars of the facts upon
which the comment alleged to be fair was based. In other words, the
Plaintiff was not only given notice of the case he was going to meet at the
trial, but he was also given the particulars of the facts which would be
relied on by the 2nd Defendant in support of the plea.
Now for the Plaintiff to ask me to take away the 2nd Defendant’s right to
freedom of expression in respect to the Plaintiff under these
circumstances would be to judge that defence peremptorily.
Firstly, in the light of the defence raised by the 2nd Defendant, the
Plaintiffs right to relief was not clear. It may only be clear after the trial,
if he succeeds in demolishing the defence pleaded.
Secondly, and as Counsel for the 2nd Defendant pointed out in his
submissions, the Plaintiff claimed damages, including punitive damages,
for the alleged libel. It is trite that the object of an injunction is to
protect the Plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he
may not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the
action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.
Lastly, the Plaintiff did not show by evidence that the Defendants
intended to repeat or publish the same or similar alleged defamatory
statements or comments of him. The fear, in my view, appeared
speculative and remote. I came to the conclusion that there was no
immediate possibility of injury to the Plaintiff for which he required the
protection of the Court by an order of injunction.
R12
For the reasons given, the Plaintiffs application for an interim injunction
is refused and is accordingly dismissed.
JUDGE