ML060730040 - Dry Storage

Dry
Transfer
System
A o
Analysis
Report :
Volume 3
U.S. Department of Energy

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
Washington, DC 20585
@ P.dAwi soy hilnon recyded pqr
DOE - DTS - TSAR Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF INSTALLATION
1.1 Introduction ................. 1.1-2

1.1.1 Preparation Area ......... 1.1-2
1.1.2 Lower Access Area ....... 1.1-3
1.1.3 Transfer Confinement Area . . 1.1-4
1.1.4 Principle Features of DTS ... 1.1-5
1.2 General Description of Installation ................................ 1.2-1

1.2.1 Principal Design Criteria .................................. 1.2-1
1.2.2 Major Structural Subsystems ............................... 1.2-3
1.2.3 Major-Operations Subsystems .............................. 1.2-3
1.2.3.1 Receiving and Source Cask Transfer Subsystem ............ 1.2-3
1.2.3.2 Receiving and Source Cask Mating Subsystem ............. 1.2-4
1.2.3.3 Receiving and Source Cask Transfer Confinement Port Cover
Handling Subsystem ............................... 1.2-4
1.2.3.4 Receiving Cask Shield Plug and Source Cask Lid Handling
Subsystem ............................ ...... 1.2-4
1.2.3.5 Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem ......... . 1.2-5 ... ...
1.2.3.6 Control Subsystem ..................... . . 1.2-6 . ... ..
1.2.3.7 Closed Circuit Television Subsystem and Lighting Subsystem 1.2-6

1.2.4 Major Support Subsystems ..................... . 1.2-7 . . . . . .
1.2.4.1 HVAC Subsystem ...................... . . 1.2-7 . . . . . .
1.2.4.2 Radiation Monitoring Subsystem ............ ... 1.2-7

..... . . . . .
1.2.4.3 Receiving Cask Lid Handling Subsystem ...... ... 1.2-7

..... . . . . .
1.2.4.4 Decontamination Subsystem ............... .... 1.2-7 ......... . . ..
1.2.5 Other Subsystems, not Provided as Part of the DTS .... . . 1.2-8
... ....... ...
1.2.5.1 Cask Transport and Lifting Subsystem ........ . . 1.2-8 ......
1.2.5.2 Cask Vacuum/Inerting/Leak Test System ...... . . 1.2-8 ... ....... .
1.2.5.3 Canister Welding Subsystem ............... . . 1.2-8 . . . . . .
1.2.5.4 DTS Power Subsystem .................. .. 1.2-8

. . . . . . .
1.2.6 Master Drawing List ......................... .... 1.2-9 ......... . . . .
1.3 General Systems Description .................................... 1.3-1
1.4 Identification of Agents and Subcontractors .......................... 1.4-1
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September 30, 1996
CHAPTER 2
SITE CHARACTERISTICS
CHAPTER 3
PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA
3.1 Purposes of Installation ........................... ............. 3.1-1

3.1.1 Materials to be Transferred ................... ............. 3.1-2
3.1.2 General Operating Functions .................. ............. 3.1-4
3.2 Structural andMechanical Safety Criteria .............. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. 3.2-1

3.2.1 Tornado and Wind Loadings ................... .. . ... .. .. .. .. 3.2-1
Applicable Design Parameters ............
3.2.1.1 ..... .. .. .. .. . 3.2-1
Determination of Forces on Structures ......
3.2.1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 3.2-2
Ability of Structures to
3.2.1.3 Perform Despite Failure e of Structures Not
Designed for Tornado Loads ............. . .. .... .. .. .. . 3.2-5
3.2.1.4 Tornado Missiles ..................... .............. 3.2-7

3.2.2 Water Level (Flood) Design .................. . . . . .... . 3.2-17
3.2.3 Seismic Design ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-17

.............
3.2.4 Snow and Ice Loadings ..................... ............. . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-18
3.2.5 Load Combination Criteria ................... . . . . . . . . . . . ... 3.2-18
3.2.5.1 DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure ........ . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 3.2-18
3.2.5.2 Structural Steelwork .................. . .... . .. .. . . 3.2-24

3.2.5.3 Major Operating Equipment ............ . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 3.2-27
3.3 Safety Protection Systems ......................... 3.3-1

3.3.1 General ................................ 3.3-1
3.3.2 Multiple Confinement Barriers and Systems ....... 3.3-2
3.3.2.1 Conlfinement Barriers and Systems ........ 3.3-2
3.3.2.2 Ventilation -- Offgas ................. 3.3-4
3.3.3 Protection by Equipment and Instrumentation Selection 3.3-5
3.3.3.1 Equipment ......................... 3.3-5
3.3.3.2 Instrumentation ...................... 3.3-7
3.3.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety .................... 3.3-8
3.3.5 Radiological Protection ...................... 3.3-8
3.3.5.1 Access Control ...................... 3.3-8
3.3.5.2 Shielding .......................... 3.3-9
3.3.5.3 Radiological Alarm Systems ............. 3.3-9
3.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection .................. 3.3-9
3.3.7 Materials Handling and Storage ...................... ... 3.3-10
3.3.7.1 Spent Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste Handling Storage . 3.3-10
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3.3.7.2 Radioactive Waste Treatment ........................ 3.3-11

3.3.7.3 Waste Storage Facilities ............................ 3.3-11
3.3.8 Industrial and Chemical Safety ............................. 3.3-11
3.4 Classifications of Structures, Components and Systems ...... ............ 3.4-1
3.5 Decommissioning Considerations . 3.5-1
3.6 Summary of Design Criteria . 3.6-1
3.7 References . 3.7-1
CHAPTER 4
INSTALLATION DESIGN
4.1 Summary Description . 4.1-1

4.1.1 Location and Layout of Installation . 4.1-2
4.1.2 Principal Features . 4.1-2
4.1.2.1 Site Boundary .................................... 4.1-2
4.1.2.2 Controlled Area . 4.1-2
4.1.2.3 Site Utility Supplies and Systems . 4.1-2
4.1.2.4 Storage Facilities . 4.1-2
4.1.2.5 Stacks . 4.1-3
4.2 Confinement Structures . 4.2-1

4.2.1 Structural Specification . 4.2-1
4.2.2 Installation Layout . 4.2-3
4.2.2.1 Building Plans . 4.2-4
4.2.2.2 Building Sections . 4.2-4
4.2.2.3 Confinement Features . 4.2-4
4.2.3 Individual Unit Description . 4.2-5
4.2.3.1 Reinforced Concrete Basemat and Superstructure . 4.2-5
4.2.3.2 Protective Cover . 4.2-5
4.2.3.3 Structural Steel Roof Plate . 4.2-5
4.2.3.4 Mezzanine Plate . 4.2-6
4.2.3.5 Sliding Door . 4.2-6
4.2.3.6 Preparation Area . 4.2-7
4.3 Auxiliary Subsystems .. 4.3-1

4.3.1 Ventilation and Offgas Systems . 4.3-1
4.3.1.1 Functional Description . 4.3-1
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September 30, 1996
Applicable Documents ..............................

4.3.1.2 4.3-2
Design Requirements ...............................
4.3.1.3 4.3-2
Operational Description .............................
4.3.1.4 4.3-3
Major Equipment and Components .....................
4.3.1.5 4.3-5
HVAC Control Subsystem - Control Logic
4.3.1.6
(Sequence of Operations) .......... .. ................ 4.3-7
4.3.1.7 Design Calculations ............ .. .................. 4.3-8
4.3.1.8 Interface Requirements with Other Systems ...... ......... 4.3-8
4.3.1.9 Safety Considerations and Controls ...... .. ............ 4.3-10
4.3.2 Electrical Systems ................. ..................... 4.3-10
4.3.3 Air Supply Systems ................. .................... 4.3-12
4.3.4 Steam Supply and Distribution System ........ .. .............. 4.3-12
4.3.5 Water Supply Subsystem ............... .................. 4.3-12
4.3.6 Sewage Treatment System ............... .................. 4.3-12
4.3.7 Communication and Alarm Systems ......... .. ............... 4.3-12
4.3.7.1 Communication System .......... .. ................ 4.3-12
4.3.7.2 Alarms ................... ..................... 4.3-13
4.3.8 Fire Protection System ............... ................... 4.3-16
4.3.9 Maintenance Systems ................ .................... 4.3-17
4.3.10 Cold Chemical Systems ............... .................. 4.3-18
4.3.11 Air Sampling Systems ............... ................... 4.3-18
4.4 Decontamination Systems .. 4.4-1

4.4.1 Equipment Decontamination .4.4-1
4.4.1.1 Major Component and Operating Characteristics .4.4-2
4.4.1.2 Safety Considerations and Controls .4.4-2
4.4.2 Personnel Decontamination .4.4-2
4.5 Shipping Cask Repair and Maintenance .. 4.5-1
4.6 Cathodic Protection .4.6-1
4.7 Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste Handling Operation System ... 4.7-1
APPENDIX 4A
HVAC COMPUTER CODE PRINTOUT
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September 30, 1996
CHAPTER 5
OPERATION SYSTEMS
5.1 Operation Description. 5.1-1

5.1.1 Narrative Description .................................... 5.1-1
5.1.1.1 Receiving Cask Receipt, Preparation, Inspection, Positioning and
Mating ......................................... 5.1-2
5.1.1.2 Source Cask Receipt, Preparation, Inspection, Position and Mating 5.1-6
5.1.1.3 Source Cask Opening ............... 5.1-9 .
5.1.1.4 Receiving Cask Opening ............. .... 5.1-12
5.1.1.5 Fuel Transfer ..................... .... 5.1-15
5.1.1.6 Receiving Cask Closing ............. .... 5.1-20
5.1.1.7 Source Cask Closing ............... .... 5.1-23
5.1.1.8 Source Cask Detachment and Removal ... .... 5.1-26
5.1.1.9 Receiving Cask Detachment and Removal .... 5.1-28
5.1.1.10 Ancillary Activities ................ .... 5.1-31
5.1.2 Flowsheets ............................ .... 5.1-31
5.1.3 Identification of Subjects for Safety Analysis .... .... 5.1-32
5.1.3.1 Criticality Prevention ............... .... 5.1-32
5.1.3.2 Chemical Safety ................... .... 5.1-32
5.1.3.3 Operational Shutdown Modes ......... .... 5.1-32
5.1.3.4 Instrumentation .................... .... 5.1-33
5.1.3.5 Maintenance Techniques ............. .... 5.1-36
5.2 Spent Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste Handling Systems ......... .. 5.2-1
5.2.1 Receiving and Source Cask Transfer Subsystem ................. .. 5.2-1
5.2.2 Receiving and Source Cask Mating Subsystem ................. .. 5.2-7
5.2.3 Receiving and Source Cask Transfer Confinement Port Cover Handling
Subsystem ......................................... . 5.2-13
.
5.2.4 Receiving Cask Shield Plug and Source Cask Lid Handling Subsystem 5.2-16
.
5.2.4.1 Receiving and Source Cask Upper Shield Port Covers ...... 5.2-16
5.2.4.2 Upper Crane ................................... . 5.2-17
5.2.5 Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem ........................ . 5.2-23
5.3 Other Operating Systems .................................... . 5.3-1

5.3.1 HVAC Subsystem ..................................... . 5.3-1
5.3.2 Welding Subsystem .................................... . 5.3-1
5.3.3 Inerting Subsystem ..................................... . 5.3-1
5.4 Operation Support Systems ................................... . 5.4-1

5.4.1 Instrumentation and Control Systems ........................ . 5.4-1
5.4.1.1 Control System Structure .......................... . 5.4-1
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5.4.1.2 Cask Transfer Subsystem .......................... 5.4-12

5.4.1.3 Transfer Confinement Cask Mating Subsystem .... ....... 5.4-14
5.4.1.4 Transfer Confinement Port/Shield Handling Subsystem ...... 5.4-16
5.4.1.5 Receiving Cask Shield Plug and Source Cask Lid Handling
Subsystem ........... .......................... 5.4-19
5.4.1.6 Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem ..... .............. 5.4-28
5.5 Control Room and Control Area ......... ........................ 5.5-1

5.5.1 Control Location and Operations ............................. 5.5-1
5.5.2 Local Control and Monitoring Under Normal Conditions .... ........ 5.5-1
5.5.3 Remote-Control and Monitoring Under Normal Conditions .... ....... 5.5-1
5.5.4 Local Control Under Off-Normal Conditions ..... ............... 5.5-2
5.5.5 Remote Control Under Off-Normal Conditions ..... .............. 5.5-2
5.6 Analytical Sampling . ......................................... 5.6-1
APPENDIX 5A
TECHNICAL REPORT FOR THE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM OF THE DRY TRANSFER
SYSTEM
1.0 References ................................................... 1
2.0 Definitions ................................................... 2

2.1 Introduction . ............................................ 2
2.2 Scope ................................................. 2
3.0 Structure .................................................... 3

3.1 Introduction . ........................................... 3
3.2 Human/Machine interface locations ............................ 3
3.3 Local control and monitoring means ............................ 3
3.4 Remote control and monitoring means .......................... 4
3.5 Between control request and operation processing ..... ............. 5
3.6 Alarms ................................................. 5
4.0 Analysis of the Transition Conditions ......... ......................... 6

4.1 Introduction . ............................................ 6
4.2 Nomenclature . .......................................... 6
4.3 Analysis ................. ............................. 9
4.4 Transition validation .......... ........................... 13
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September 30,1996
5.0 Control and Monitoring of the Equipment under Normal Operating Conditions ..... 14
5.1 Introduction .. 14
5.2 Control and monitoring of the mechanical equipment . .25
5.2.1 Control and monitoring of the Cask Transfer Subsystem .... .... 25
5.2.2 Control and monitoring of the Transfer Confinement Cask
Mating Subsystem .................................. 34
5.2.3 Control and monitoring of the Transfer Confinement Port/Shield
Handling Subsystem ................................ 41
5.2.4 Control and monitoring of the Receiving Cask Shield Plug and
Source Cask Lid Handling Subsystem .................... 54
5.2.5 Control and monitoring of the Fuel Assembly Handling
Subsystem ....................................... 86
5.3 Control and monitoring of the Structural Subsystem's doors ... 11......
I
5.4 Interfaces with the HVAC Subsystem ............... 116
5.4.1 Description ....................................... 116
5.4.2 Monitoring and alarms of the HVAC Subsystem .... ......... 116
5.4.3 Control of the HVAC Subsystem ........................ 117
5.5 Interfaces with the Radiation Monitoring Subsystem ...... ......... 120
5.5.1 Monitoring requirements .............................. 120
5.5.2 Interlocking requirements ............................. 120
5.6 Interfaces with the CCTV and Lighting Subsystems .... ........... 121
5.6.1 Description ....................................... 121
5.6.2 Interfaces with the Transfer Confinement Cask Mating Subsystem . 121
5.6.3 Interfaces with the Transfer Confinement Port/Shield Subsystem 121
5.6.4 Interfaces with the Source Cask Lid and Receiving Cask Shield
Plug Handling Subsystem ............................. 121
5.6.5 Interfaces with the Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem .... ..... 122
5.7 Transition conditions validation synthesis ....................... 123
6.0 Control and Monitoring of the Equipment under Off Normal Operating Conditions . 132
6.1 Alarms, Warnings and Emergencies .......... .. .............. 132
6.1.1 Principles ....................................... 132
6.1.2 Classification .................................... 132
6.2 Control and monitoring ................ .................. 134
7.0 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis ................. .................. 135

7.1 Introduction .135
7.2 Failure Analysis .135
Appendix A Instrumentation and Control Structural Diagram .143
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September 30, 1996
CHAPTER 6
SITE GENERATED WASTE CONFINEMENT AND MANAGEMENT
6.1 Onsite Waste Sources ............................. 6.1-1
6.2 Offgas Treatment and Ventilation ..................... 6.2-1
6.3 Liquid Waste Treatment and Retention .................... ........ .
6.4 Solid Waste ...................................... 6.4-1
6.5 Radiological Impact of Normal Operations - Summary ...... 6.5-1
CHAPTER 7
RADIATION PROTECTION
7.1 Ensuring That Occupational Radiation Exposures Are As Low As Is Reasonably

Achievable (ALARA) ......................................... 7.1-1
7.1.1 Policy Considerations ..................................... 7.1-1
7.1.2 Design Considerations .................................... 7.1-1
7.1.3 Occupational Considerations ................................ 7.1-3
7.2 Radiation Sources .................................. 7.2-1

7.2.1 Characterization of Sources ........................ 7.2-1
7.2.2 Airborne Radioactive Material Sources ................ 7.2-1
7.3 Radiation Protection Design Features ...................... 7.3-1 .

7.3.1 Installation Design Features ......................... 7.3-1 .
7.3.1.1 Access Control of Radiation Areas ............. 7.3-1 .
7.3.1.2 Radiation Shields and Geometry .............. 7.3-3 .
7.3.1.3 Process Instrumentation and Controls ........... 7.3.3 .
7.3.1.4 Confinement of Airborne Contaminants and Gaseous
Radiation Sources ......................... 7.3-4 .
7.3.1.5 Crud Control ............................ 7.3-4 .
7.3.1.6 Radiation Monitoring ...................... 7.3-5 .
7.3.2 Shielding ..................................... 7.3-5 .
7.3.2.1 Shielding Evaluation ....................... 7.3-5 .
7.3.2.2 Dose Rates ............................. 7.3-7 .
7.3.3 Ventilation .................................... .... 7.3-12
7.3.4 Radiation Monitoring Subsystem .................... .... 7.3-12
7.3.4.1 Area Radiation Monitors ......................... .... 7.3-12
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7.3.4.2 Airborne Monitors . ................................ 7.3-14
7.4 Estimated Onsite Collective Dose Assessment ........... ............. 7.4-1
7.5 Health Physics Program . ................................ 7.5-1
7.6 Estimated Offsite Collective Dose Assessment ........... ............. 7.6-1
7.7 References ................................ 7.7-1
APPENDIX 7A
SHIELDING EVALUATION OF THE DRY TRANSFER SYSTEM
7A.I Evaluation of the DTS Shielding Performance .. 7A-2

7A.1.1 DTS Shielding Evaluation - Open Source Cask Containing Four
Fuel Assemblies .. 7A-4
7A. 1.1.1 Model Specification .. 7A-4
7A.1.1.2 Material Densities 7A-7
7A.1.1.3 Gamma Source .. 7A-8
7A.1.1.4 Dose Locations .. 7A-8
7A.1.2 DTS Shielding Evaluation -Open Receiving Cask Containing
Twenty One Fuel Assemblies .. 7A-1 1
7A.1.2.1 Model Specification .................................. 7A-1 1
7A.1.2.2 Material Densities ................................... 7A-14
7A.1.2.3 Gamma Source ...................................... 7A-14
7A.1.2.4 Dose Locations ..................................... 7A-15
7A.1.3 DTS Shielding Evaluation - One Fuel Assembly at Start of Fuel Transfer
Fully Removed from Source Cask and in Position Closest Sliding Door .... 7A-18
7A.1.3.1 Model Specification .................................. 7A-18
7A.1.3.2 Material Densities ................................... 7A-20
7A.1.3.3 Gamma Source ..................................... 7A-20
7A.1.4 DTS Shielding Evaluation - One Fuel assembly During Fuel Transfer
in the Position Closest to the DTS Roof .. 7A-25
7A.1.4.1 Model Specification .................................. 7A-25
7A. 1.4.2 Material Densities ................................... 7A-27
7A. 1.4.3 Gamma Source ...................................... 7A-27
7A.1.5 Determination of the Highest Dose Rates Around DTS Structure During Fuel
Transfer Operations .. 7A-31
7A.1.6 References .. 7A-37
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September 30, 1996
7A.2 Evaluation of Worker Doses in the DTS ........................... 7A-38

7A.2.1 Source Cask Evaluation ................................. 7A-39
7A.2.1.1 Source Cask Gamma Source ............................. 7A-39
7A.2.1.2 Source Cask Neutron Source ............................ 7A40
7A.2.1.3 Description of Radiation and Axial Shielding Configurations .... .. 7A-40
7A.2.1.4 Source and Shield Regional Densities ...................... 7A-41
7A.2.1.5 Source Cask Shielding Evaluation ......................... 7A-44
7A.2.1.6 Estimated Operational Doses ............................ 7A-47
7A.2.2 Receiving Cask Evaluation .................................... 7A-49
7A.2.2.1 Receiving Cask Gamma Source .......................... 7A49
7A.2.2.2 Receiving Cask Neutron Source .......................... 7A49
7A.2.2.3 Description of Radiation and Axial Shielding Configuration .... ... 7A-49
7A.2.2.5 Receiving Cask Shielding Evaluation ....................... 7A-55
7A.2.2.6 Estimnating Operational Doses from the Receiving Cask .... ...... 7A-62
7A.2.3 References ............................................... 7A-67
7A.3 Evaluation of Off-Site Doses ................................... 7A-68

7A.3.1 Doses at Long Distances from the Filled Source Cask ................. 7A-68
7A.3.1.1 Source Cask Gamma Source ............................. 7A-68
7A.3.1.2 Source Cask Neutron Source ............................ 7A-68
7A.3.1.3 Description of the Spherical Shielding Configuration .... ........ 7A-68
7A.3.1.5 Source Cask Spherical Shielding Evaluation ....................... 7A-70
7A.3.2 Doses at Long Distances from the Filled Receiving Cask ............... 7A-72
7A.3.2.1 Receiving Cask Gamma Source .......................... 7A-72
7A.3.2.2 Receiving Cask Neutron Source .......................... 7A-72
7A.3.2.3 Description of the Spherical Shielding Configuration .... ........ 7A-72
7A.3.2.5 Receiving Cask Spherical Shielding Evaluation ................ 7A-74
7A.3.3 Doses at Long Distances from Fuel Transfer Operations ................. 7A-75
7A.3.5 Skyshine Analysis from DTS Operations .......................... 7A-78
7A.3.6 Off-Site Dose Assessment ..................................... 7A-82
7A.3.6.1 Direct Dose from the Filled Source Cask Arriving at the DTS ..... 7A-82
7A.3.6.2 Direct and Scatter Dose from Fuel Transfer Operations .... ...... 7A-84
7A.3.6.3 Direct Dose from the Filled Receiving Cask Under Cask
Removal Operations .................................. 7A-86
7A.3.6.4 Off-Site Dose Assessment .............................. 7A-88
7A.3.7 References ............................................... 7A-89
7A.4 Computer Input Files ......................................... 7A-90
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September 30, 1996
7A.4.1 SCALE 4.3/QADS Input Files - DTS Shielding Evaluation - Open Source
Cask Containing Four Fuel Assemblies ............................ 7A-90
7A.4.2 SCALE QADS Input Files - DTS Shielding Evaluation - Open Receiving
Cask Containing Twenty One Fuel Assemblies ...................... 7A-93
7A.4.3 SCALE QADS Input Files - DTS Shielding Evaluation - One Fuel
Assembly at Start of Fuel Transfer Fully Removed from Source
Cask and in Position closest to Sliding Door ....................... 7A-95
7A.4.4 SCALE QADS Input Files - DTS Shielding Evaluation - One Fuel
Assembly During Fuel Transfer in the Position Closest to the DTS Roof .... 7A-97
7A.4.5 SCALE 4.3/SASI Input Files - Source Cask Shielding Evaluation .... ..... 7A-99
7A.4.5.1 Radial Model ....................................... 7A-99
7A.4.5.2 Axial Model ....................................... 7A-100
7A.4.6 SCALE 4.3/SAS1 Input Files - Receiving Cask Shielding Evaluation .... .. 7A-102
7A.4.6.1 Radial Model ...................................... 7A-102
7A.4.6.2 Axial Model ....................................... 7A-103
7A.4.7 SCALE 4.3/SASI Input Files - Spherical Shielding Evaluation .... ...... 7A-104
7A.4.7.1 Source Cask Spherical Model ........................... 7A-104
7A.4.7.2 Receiving Cask Spherical Model ......................... 7A-104
7A.4.8 SKYSHINE II Input Files .................................... 7A-105
7A.4.8.1 Input File - Fuel Assembly in Transfer Position Near Roof
with Filled Receiving Cask ................. . . ......... 7A-105
7A.4.8.2 SKYSHINE Input File - Open Receiving Cask Containing
Twenty one Fuel Assemblies ........................... 7A-106
CHAPTER 8
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
8.1 Off-Normal Events ..................................... 8.1-1 .

8.1.1 Evaluation of Normal Conditions ..................... ........ .
8.1.1.1 Thermal Evaluation ............................. 8.1-2 .
8.1.1.2 Building Structural Analysis ....................... 8.1-8 .
8.1.1.2.1 Reinforced Concrete (Structure) Structural Analysis 8.1-10 .
8.1.1.2.2 Protective Cover Structural analysis ........... 8.1-11 .
8.1.1.2.3 Roof Plate Structural Analysis ............... 8.1-13 .
8.1.1.2.4 Mezzanine Plate Structural Analysis ........... 8.1-13 .
8.1.1.2.5 Sliding Door Structural Analysis .............. 8.1-13 .
8.1.1.3 Operating Equipment Structural Analysis 8.1-14
8.1.1.4 Confinement .................................. 8.1-15 .
8.1.2 Evaluation of Off-Normal Conditions ....................... 8.1-16 .

8.1.2.1 Failure of a Single Active Component ................ 8.1-16 .
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September 30, 1996
8.1.2.1.1 Failures of the Cask Transfer Subsystem ..... .......... 8.1-16

8.1.2.1.2 Failures of the Cask Mating Subsystem ..... ........... 8.1-18
8.1.2.1.3 Failures of the TC Port Covers and the Related
Instrumentation ............... 8.1-19
8.1.2.1.4 Failures of the Upper Shield Port Covers and
Related Instrumentation ............... 8.1-20
8.1.2.1.5 Failure of the Upper Crane and Related Instrumentation .... 8.1-25
8.1.2.1.6 Failures of the Fuel Handling Equipment .... ........... 8.1-25
8.1.2.1.7 Failure of the HVAC Subsystem Components .... ....... 8.1-34
8.1.2.1.8 Failure of the Control Subsystem Components .... ....... 8.1-34
8.1.2.1.9 Failure of the Radiation Monitoring Equipment .... ...... 8.1-41
8.1.2.1.10 Failure of Equipment in the Preparation Area .... ....... 8.1-41
8.1.2.2 Loss of External Power Supply for up to 24 Hours .... .......... 8.1-41
8.1.2.3 Heavy Snow Storm .................................... 8.1-41
8.1.2.4 Lightning ........................................... 8.1-42
8.1.3 Radiological Impact from Off-Normal Operations ...................... 8.1-42
8.2 Accidents . 8.2-1

8.2.1 Loss of External Power for an Extended Interval. 8.2-1
8.2.2 Stuck Fuel Assembly or Inability to Insert a Fuel Assembly into a Cask . . 8.2-2
8.2.3 Failure of the Fuel Grapple to Disengage . 8.2-5
8.2.4 Seismic Event. 8.2-5
8.2.4.1 Seismic Effects on Structure . 8.2-5
8.2.4.2 Seismic Effects on HVAC Subsystem .................. 8.2-12
8.2.4.3 Seismic Effects on the Major Operating Equipment ......... 8.2-13
8.2.4.4 Seismic Effects on the Control Subsystem ............... 8.2-23
8.2.4.5 Seismic Effects on CCTV Subsystem .................. 8.2-23
8.2.4.6 Conclusions .................................... 8.2-23
8.2.5 Tornado Missiles, Hurricanes and High Winds ................... 8.2-23
8.2.5.1 Tornado and Tornado Missile Effects on Structure ......... 8.2-24
8.2.5.2 Effect of Tornado on HVAC Subsystem ................. 8.2-26
8.2.5.3 Effect of Tornado on Major Operating Subsystem .......... 8.2-26
8.2.5.4 Effect of Tornado on Control Subsystem ................ 8.2-27
8.2.5.5 Closed Circuit Television Subsystem ................... 8.2-27
8.2.5.6 Conclusions .................................... 8.2-28
8.2.6 Fire or Explosion ....................................... 8.2-28
8.2.6.1 Fire and Explosion Effects on Structure ................. 8.2-28
8.2.6.2 Fire and Explosion Effects on HVAC Subsystem .......... 8.2-28
8.2.6.3 Fire and Explosion Effects on the Major Operating Equipment . 8.2-28
8.2.6.4 Fire and Explosion Effects on the Control Subsystem ....... 8.2-29
8.2.6.5 Closed Circuit Television Subsystem ................... 8.2-29
8.2.6.6 Conclusions .................................... 8.2-29
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September 30, 1996
8.2.7 Fuel Assembly Drop .................................... 8.2-30

8.2.8 Complete Loss of HEPA Filters and Loss of Pressure Differential ..... 8.2-30
8.2.9 Loss of a Shield Plug or Source Cask Lid ...................... 8.2-33
8.3 Site Characteristics Affecting Safety Analysis ........................... 8.3-1
8.4 References . ................................................... 8.4-1
APPENDIX 8A.1
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF DTS
8A. 1.1 Structural Specifications ........................... 8A.1-1

8A. 1.2 General Description of the DTS Structure ................ 8A.1-1
8A.1.3 Design Loadings and Input Parameters .................. 8A.1-3
8A.1.4 Design Basis and Philosophy ........................ 8A.1-3
8A.1.5 Normal Operation Structural Analysis .................. 8A.1-4
8A.1.5.1 Normal Operationg Loads ...... ............... 8A.1-10
8A.1.5.2 Reinforced Concrete Structural Analysis .... ....... 8A.1-12
8A.1.5.3 Protective Cover Structural Analysis ..... ........ 8A.1-16
8A.1.5.4 Roof Plate Structural Analysis ..... ............ 8A.1-16
8A.1.5.5 Mezzanine Plate Structural Analysis ..... ........ 8A.1-20
8A.1.5.6 Sliding Door Structural Analysis ..... ........... 8A.1-23
8A.1.6 Accident Loads Structural Analysis . .8A.1-29
8A.1.6.1 Reinforced Concrete Structural Analysis .8A.1-30
8A.1.6.1.1 Tornado Wind Load . .8A.1-30
*8A.1.6.1.2 Tornado Missiles .. 8A.1-35
8A.1.6.1.3 Seismic Evaluation . .8A.1-37
8A.1.6.2 Protective Cover Structural Analysis .8A.1-80
8A.1.6.3 Roof Plate Structural Analysis .8A.1-81
8A.1.6.4 Mezzanine Plate Structural Analysis .8A.1-82
8A.1.6.5 Sliding Door Structural Analysis .8A.1-83
8A.1.6.5.1 Tornado Wind Load . .8A.1-83
8A.1.6.5.2 Tornado Missiles .. 8A.1-83
8A.1.6.5.3 Seismic Evaluation . .8A.1-84
8A. 1.7 References ................................... 8A.1-86
xiii
September 30, 1996
APPENDIX 8A.2
CASK TRANSFER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
8A.2.1 Source Cask Transfer Subsystem General Description .... ........ 8A.2-1
8A.2.2 Receiving Cask Transfer Subsystem General Description .... ...... 8A.2-5
8A.2.3 Runway Rails - General Description ........................ 8A.2-7
8A.2.4 Source Cask Trolley Calculations ......................... 8A.2-10

8A.2.4.1 Assumptions ................................. 8A.2-10
8A.2.4.2 Design Criteria ................................ 8A.2-10
8A.2.4.3 Seismic Loading ............................... 8A.2-11
8A.2.4.4 Operational Loading ............................ 8A.2-12
8A.2.4.5 Evaluation of Bolts ............................. 8A.2-12
8A.2.4.6 Evaluation of Anti-Taking Off Device and Locking Pin .... 8A.2-19
8A.2.4.7 Evaluation of Wheels ........................... 8A.2-29
8A.2.4.8 Evaluation of the Guiding Rollers ................... 8A.2-31
8A.2.4.9 Summary of Stresses - Source Cask Transfer Trolley ..... 8A.2-31
8A.2.5 Receiving Cask Trolley Calculations ....................... 8A.2-32

8A.2.5.1 Assumptions ................................. 8A.2-32
8A.2.5.2 Design Criteria ................................ 8A.2-33
8A.2.5.3 Seismic Loading .............................. 8A.2-33
8A.2.5.4 Operational Loading ............................ 8A.2-33
8A.2.5.5 Evaluation of Bolts ............................. 8A.2-34
8A.2.5.6 Evaluation of Anti-Taking Off Device and Locking Pin .... 8A.2-37
8A.2.5.7 Evaluation of Wheels ........................... 8A.2-43
8A.2.5.8 Evaluation of the Guiding Rollers ................... 8A.2-44
8A.2.5.9 Summary of Stresses - Receiving Cask Transfer Trolley ... 8A.2-44
APPENDIX 8A.3
RECEIVING AND SOURCE CASK MATING SUBSYSTEM
APPENDIX 8A.4
SHIELD PLUG AN) SOURCE CASK LID HANDLING SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
8A.4.1 Positions Evaluated .................................... 8A.4-1

8A.4.2 Load Combinations .................................... 8A.4-1
8A.4.3 Material Properties .................................... 8A.4-2
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September 30, 1996
8A.4.4 Design Criteria ....................................... 8A.4-2

8A.4.5 Component Weights .................................... 8A.4-5
8A.4.6 Upper Crane Model .................................... 8A.4-5
8A.4.7 Input Spectra ....................................... 8A.4-26
8A.4.8 Seismic Results ...................................... 8A.4-29
8A.4.9 Rail Deflection ...................................... 8A.4-32
8A.4.10 Modal Analysis ..................................... 8A.4-32
8A.4.11 Evaluation of the Cables and Pulleys ...................... 8A.4-39
8A.4.12 Wheel Analysis ..................................... 8A.4-39
8A.4.13 Evaluation of Guidance Rollers .......................... 8A.4-42
8A.4.14 Evaluation of the Anti-Taking Off Device(of the Bridge) .... .... 8A.4-42
8A.4.15 Evaluation of the Anti-Derailing Devices ................... 8A.4-44
8A.4.16 Evaluation of the Fingers and Axis of the Grapple .... ......... 8A.4-46
8A.4.17 Compensator Axis Analysis ............................ 8A.4-48
8A.4.18 Analysis of the Locking Pins ............................ 8A.4-50
8A.4.19 Summary of Results .................................. 8A.4-52
APPENDIX 8A.5
FUEL HANDLING CRANE ANALYSIS
8A.5.1 Positions Evaluated ....................... 8A.5-1

8A.5.2 Load Combinations ....................... 8A.5-4
8A.5.3 Material Properties ....................... 8A.5-5
8A.5.4 Design Criteria ........................ 8A.5-5
8A.5.5 Component Weights ....................... 8A.5-9
8A.5.6 Fuel Handling Crane Model ........... ............ 8A.5-9
8A.5.7 Boundary Conditions ....................... 8A.5-14
8A.5.8 Results ....................... 8A.5-29
8A.5.9 Reaction Forces ....................... 8A.5-39
8A.5.10 Static Calculations ....................... 8A.5-39
8A.5.11 Summary of Results ....................... 8A.5-53
APPENDIX 8A.6
DOSE ASSESSMENT FROM OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS
8A.6.1 Introduction ........................ 8A.6-1

SA.6.2 Source Evaluation ........................ 8A.6-1
8A.6.3 Off-Normal Release Analysis ........ ................ 8A.6-3
8A.6.4 Air Dispersion Evaluation ........................ 8A.6-4
8A.6.5 Radioactive Gas Inventory ........................ 8A.6-6
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September 30, 1996
8A.6.6 Exposure to Dose Conversion Factors ...................... ...... .6-7 .

8A.6.6.1 Dose Calculations at 100 Meters from the Source ........ ...... .6-7 .
8A.6.6.2 Dose from Exposure to Semi-Infinite Cloud Effective Dose
from Air Immersion ............................ ...... .6-8 .
8A.6.7 Dose Calculations at 500 Meters from the Source .............. ...... .6-9 .
8A.6.7.1 Doses from Inhalation ........................... ...... .6-9 .
8A.6.7.2 Doses from Immersion .......................... ...... .6-9 .
8A.6.8 Estimated Doses from Off-Normal Conditions ................. ...... .6-9 .
8A.6.9 References ......................................... ..... .6-11 .
CHAPTER 9
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
9.1 Organizational Structure .... ....... 9.1-1
9.2 Preoperational Testing and Operation ........... ...................... 9.2-1
9.3 Training Program ........................ 9.3-1
9.4 Normal Operations ........................ 9.4-1

. ... .... .
9.4.1 Procedures ....................... 9.4-1
. . .......
9.4.1.1 Administrative Procedures ...... 9.4-1
. . . . ....
9.4.1.2 Annunciator Response Guides .... 9.4-1
.... . . . .
9.4.1.3 Radiation Protection Procedures 9.4-1
.... . . . .
9.4.1.4 Maintenance Procedures ........ 9.4-2
.... .
9.4.1.5 Operating Procedures .......... 9.4-2
. ....
9.4.1.6 Test Procedures .............. 9.4-2
9.4.1.7 Pre-Operational Test Procedures ... . 9.4-2
9.4.1.8 Quality Assurance Procedures .... 9.4-2
9.4.2 Records ......................... . ... .... . 9.4-2
9.5 Emergency Planning ....................... 9.5-1
9.6 Decommissioning Plan ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 9.6-1

9.6.1 Decommissioning Program .......... 9.6-1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................
9.6.2 Cost of Decommissioning ........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6-2

.
..............
9.6.3 Decommissioning Facilitation ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6-2

..
..........
9.6.4 Recordkeeping of Decommissioning .... ........... .. .. . 9.6-2
9.7 Physical Security and Safeguards and Contingency Plans ................... 9.7-1
xvi
September 30, 1996
CHAPTER 10
OPERATING CONTROLS AND LIMITS
10.1 Proposed Operating Controls and Limits ............................ 10.1-1
10.2 Development of Operating Controls and Limits ....................... 10.2-1

10.2.1 Functional and Operational Limits, Monitoring
Instruments and Limiting Control Settings .................... 10.2-1
10.2.1.1 Surface Dose Rate of Source Cask .................... 10.2-1
10.2.1.2 Alignment of the Source Cask or the Receiving Cask
*with the TCS ................................... 10.2-1
10.2.1.3 Cask Characteristics .............................. 10.2-2
10.2.1.4 Spent Fuel Specifications .......................... 10.2-2
10.2.1.5 Cask Transfer Trolley Locking ...................... 10.2-3
10.2.1.6 Tiedown of Casks on Trolleys ....................... 10.2-4
10.2.1.7 Load Testing of Upper Crane and Fuel Handling Crane. 10.2-4
10.2.1.8 Operational Testing of Grapples and Gripping Devices .... 10.2-4
10.2.1.9 Sensor Functional Testing ............... . . . 10.2-5
10.2.1.10 Port Cover Locking .................. . . . 10.2.6
10.2.1.11 Upper Crane Alignrnent ............... . . . 10.2.6
10.2.1.12 Upper Crane Operation ................ . . . 10.2.7
10.2.1.13 Fuel Handling Subsystem Operation ....... . . . 10.2.7
10.2.1.14 Sliding Door ....................... . . . 10.2.8
10.2.2 Limiting Conditions for Operations ............... . . . 10.2-8
10.2.2.1 HVAC Subsystem Operational Checks ...... 10.2-8
10.2.2.1.1 Ventilation System Pre-shift Checks . . . 10.2-8
10.2.2.1.2 HEPA Filter Leak Detection ....... .. . . 10.2-9
10.2.2.1.3 Air Particulate Check ........... 10.2-9
. . .
10.2.2.2 Cask Handling ...................... 10.2-10
10.2.2.2.1 Health Physics Surveys on the Receiving Cask .... 10.2-10
*10.2.2.2.2 Security of Cask on Cask Trolleys .10.2-10
10.2.2.2.3 Interlocks .10.2-10
10.2.3 Surveillance Requirements .10.2.11

10.2.3.1 Area Gamma Radiation Monitoring .................. 10.2-11
10.2.3.2 Portable Radiation Detection .10.2-12
10.2.3.3 Ventilation Systems Radioactivity Monitoring .10.2-12
10.2.3.4 Shut Down During Tornado Watch or Warning .10.2-12
10.2.4 Design Features .10.2-13
10.2.5 Administrative Controls .10.2-13
xvii
September 30, 1996
CHAPTER 11
QUALITY ASSURANCE
APPENDIX IA
TRANSNUCLEAR QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
1. Organization . ............................................. 1
2. Quality Assurance Program .......................................... 6
3. Design Control . ............................................. 9
4. Procurement Document Control .1...................................... 1
5. Instructions, Procedures and Drawings .......... ....................... 13
6. Document Control ............................................. 14
7. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Material 16
8. Identification and Control of Materials, Parts and Components ..... ............ 18
9. Control of Special Processes . ........................................ 19
10. Inspection . ............................................... 20
1. Test Control ............................................... 21
12. Control of Measurement and Test Equipment ........ ..................... 22
13. Handling, Storage and Shipping . ...................................... 23
14. Inspection, Test and Operating Status .......... ........................ 24
15. Nonconforming Materials, Parts or Components ....... .................... 25
16. Corrective Action ............................................... 26
17. Quality Assurance Records . ........................................ 27
18. Audits . ................................................. 28
Appendix A . ................................................. A-1
xviii
September 30, 1996
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
CHAPTER 1
1.2-1 Principal Design Criteria of the DTS ............................. . 1.2-2
CHAPTER 3
3.1-1 Spent Fuel Assembly Characteristics .............................. 3.1-3

3.1-2 Normalized Gamma Source Spectra Characteristics for Fuel Region
Fission Products, Actinides & Activated Light Elements ................. 3.1-3
3.1-3 Normalized Neutron Source Spectra for Fuel Region Spontaneous
Fission & Alpha-N Reaction Sources .............................. 3.1-4
3.1-4 Multipurpose Canister Characteristics .............................. 3.1-5
3.1-5 Transportation Overpack Characteristics ............................ 3.1-6
3.1-6 Design Basis Source Cask Charactistics ............................ 3.1-7
3.2-1 Tornado Missile Spectrum ...... ............................... 3.2-2

3.2-2 Gust Response Factors and Velocity Pressure Exposure Coefficients for the
DTS Structure Analysis ....... ................................ 3.2-3
3.2-3 Design Basis Wind Pressure .................................... 3.2-4
3.2-4 Design Basis Tornado Wind Pressure .............................. 3.2-5
3.2-5 Summary of Structure Design Loadings ........................... 3.2-19
3.2-6 Load Combinations of reinforced Concrete Structure .................. 3.2-21
3.2-7 DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure Ultimate Strength Reduction Factors .... 3.2-24
3.2-8 Load Combinations and Stress Limits of Structural Steelwork ... ......... 3.2-25
3.2-9 Stress Limits for Structural Steelwork ............................. 3.2-26
3.2-10 Stress Limits for Bolts ....... ................................ 3.2-26
CHAPTER 4
Table 4.3-1 Dimensions and Weight of Major HVAC Components ... .......... 4.3-6
CHAPTER 5
5.1-1 Locations of Area Radiation Monitors within the DTS ................. 5.1-35
5.2-1 Receiving Cask Transfer Subsystem Specified Dimensions ... ............ 5.2-4
5.2-2 Source Cask Transfer Subsystem ................................. 5.2-6
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September 30, 1996
5.2-3 Receiving and Source CaskMating Subsystem Overlid

Dimensions and Loading ........................... ........ .5.2-10
5.2-4 TC Cask Mating Subsystem Calculated Dimensions and Stresses ........ .5.2-10
5.2-5 Confinement Bellows Characteristics ................... ........ 5.2-11
5.2-6 Jack Characteristics ............................... ........ .5.2-12
5.2-7 Source Cask TC Port Cover Characteristics ............... ........ .5.2-15
5.2-8 Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Characteristics ............ ........ 5.2-15
5.2-9 Upper Crane Trolley Calculated Dimensions .............. ........ 5.2-20
5.4-1 Interlocks ...................................... . 5.4-5

5.4-2 CasksTranser Subsystem Instrumentation ................ 5.4-14
5.4-3 Transfer Confinement Casks Mating Subsystem Instrumentation 5.4-16
5.4-4 TC port Shield Subsystem Instrumentation ............... 5.4-19
5.4-5 Source Cask Lid and Receiving Cask Shield Plug Handling ... 5.4-26
5.4-6 Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem Instrumentation ........ 5.4-35
APPENDIX 5A
4.2.a Equipment Status Acronyms ....................... .7
4.3.a Transition Conditions ............................ ............. 10
5.2.1.a Cask Transfer Subsystem Instrumentation ........... 27

5.2.2.a TC Casks Mating Subsystem Instrumentation ........... 36
5.2.3.a TC Port shield Subsystem Instrumentation ........... 44
5.2.4.a Source Cask Lid/Receiving Cask Shield Plug Handling Subsystem
Trolley Instrumentation ........... 57
5.2.4.4.a Source Cask Lid/Receiving Cask Shield Plug Handling Subsystem
Upper Shield Ports Instrumentation ........... 63
5.2.4.5.a Source Cask Lid/Receiving Cask Shield Handling Subsystem
Hoist Instrumentaton ........... 75
5.2.4.6.a Source Cask Lid/Receiving Cask Shield Plug Handling Subsystem
Grapple Instrumentation ........... 83
5. 2 .5.3.a Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem Crane Carriage Instrumentation .89
5.2.5.4.a Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem Rotating Platform Instrumentation .93
5.2.4.5.a Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem Crud Catcher Instrumentation .97
5.2.4.6.a Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem Hoist System Instrumentation .102
5.2.4.7.a Fuel Assembly Handling Grapple Instrumentation .108
5.3.a Structural Subsystem Sliding Door Instrumentation .113
5.7.1.a Viewing and Means Requirements for Transition Conditions Valadation .123
xx
September 30, 1996
5.7.2.a Interlocks Synthesis .................................... 127 .

7.2.2.a Sensor Failure Analysis .................................. ..... 137
7.2.3a Interlock Failure Analysis ................................ 140 .
CHAPTER 6
6.1-1 Expected Waste Sources .. 6.1-2
CHAPTER 7
7.2-1 Estimated Fission Gas and Volatile Nuclides Inventory . ... 7.2-2
7.3-1 Radiation Zone Designations .................................. 7.3-1

7.3-2 Expected Zone Designations within the DTS During Normal Operations .... 7.3-2
7.3-3 Summary of Maximum Dose Rates aaround Bare Fuel Assembly ......... 7.3-8
7.3-4 Summary of Maximum Dose Rates Around Filled Source Cask .......... 7.3-8
7.3-5 Summary of Maximum Dose Rates Around Filled Receiving Cask ........ 7.3-9
7.3-6 Summary of Maximum Dose Rates in Radial Direction from Bare
Spent Fuel Assembly in Transfer Position ........................ 7.3-10
7.3-7 Summary of Maximum Dose Rates in Axial Direction ............... 7.3-11
7.3-8 Locations of Area Radiation Monitors within the DTS ............... 7.3-13
7.4-1 Design Basis Operations - Estimated Exposures from DTS 7.4-2 .
7.6-1 Calculated Maximum Offsite Exposures . 7.6-2
APPENDIX 7A
7A-1 Gamma Source Term used in QADS ............................ 7A-3

7A-2 Top Fitting Zone- Gamma Source Terms Used in QADS .7A-3
7A-3 Material Densities for QADS Model - Open Source Cask
Containing Four Fuel Assemblies .7A-7
7A-4 Dose Rate Analysis Results Open Source Cask
Containing.Four Fuel Assemblies .7A-9
7A-5 Material Densities Open Receiving Cask Containing Twenty
One Fuel Assemblies .7A-14
7A-6 Dose Rate Analysis Results Open Receiving Cask Containing
Twenty One Fuel Assemblies .7A-16
7A-7 Material Dennsities One Fuel Assembly at Start of Fuel Transfer
Fully Removed from Source Cask and in Position Closest Sliding Door ... 7A-20
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September 30, 1996
7A-8 Dose Rate Analysis Results One Fuel Assembly at Start of Fuel
Transfer Fully Removed from Source Cask and in Position Closest
Sliding Door ............................................ 7A-:21
7A-9 Dose Rate Analysis Results One Fuel Assembly at Start of Fuel
Transfer Fully Removed from Source Cask and in Position Closest
Sliding Door .7A-' 27
7A-10 Material Densities One Fuel Assembly During Fuel Transfer in
Position closest to the DTS Roof .7A-. 29
7A-1 1 Dose Rate Analysis Results - Scenario 1 Open Receiving Cask
Containing Twenty One Fuel Assembies and One Fuel Asembly
Suspended Near Sliding Door .7A-: 32
7A-12 Dose Rate Analysis Results - Scenario 2 Open Receiving Cask
Containing Twenty One Fuel assemblies and One Fuel Assembly Suspended Over
Receiving Cask .7A-: 34
7A-13 Gamma Source Spectrum Used in SASI .7A-: 38
7A-14 Top Fitting Zone - Gamma Source Terms Used in SASI .7A-: 39
7A-15 Normalized Neutron Source Spectra for Fuel Region Spontaneous
Fission and Alpha-N Reaction Sources .7A-: 39
7A-16 Source Cask Evaluation - Material Densities .7A- 41
7A-17 Dose Rate Analysis Results Source Cask Radial Analysis .7A- 45
7A-18 Dose Rate Analysis Rsults Source Cask Axial Analysis .7A-' 47
7A-19 Operational Doses around the Source Cask .7A- 48
7A-20 Receiving Cask Material Densities .7A-' 55
7A-21 Dose Rate Analysis Results Receiving Cask Radial Analysis .7A-' 56
7A-22 Dose Rate Analysis Results Receiving Cask Axial Analysis .7A-' 59
7A-23 Basis Operations - Estimated Exposures from DTS .7A-I *63
7A-24 Material Densities - Source Cask Spherical Model .7A-' 70
7A-25 Dose Rate Analysis results Source Cask Spherical Model .7A-' 71
7A-26 Dose Rate Analysis Results Receiving Cask Spherical Model .7A-, 75
7A-27 Doses at Long Distances from the One Fuel Assembly at
Start of Fuel Transfer Fully Removed from Source Cask and in
Position Closest to Sliding Door .7A-, 76
7A-28 Doses at Long Distances from the One Fuel Assembly
During Fuel Transfer in Position closest to the DTS Roof .7A-' 77
7A-29 Skyshine Dose Factors .7A-, 79
7A-30 Skyshine Dose Analysis Results Fuel Assembly in Transfer
Position Near Roof with Filled Receiving Cask .7A-1 *81
7A-31 Design Basis Operations - Estimated Source Cask Times .7A-1 *3
7A-32 Dose at Long Distances from Source Cask Receipt Operations .7A-1
R3
7A-33 Design Basis Operations - Estimated Exposures from DTS .7A-E *84
7A-34 Off Site Doses from Fuel Transfer .7A-E *86
7A-35 Design Basis Operations - Estimated Exposures from DTS .7A-1 87
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September 30, 1996
7A-36 Dose at Long Distances from Receiving Cask Removal Operations . . ..... 7A-88
7A-37 Calculated Maximum Offsite Exposures .................... .. ... 7A-88
CHAPTER 8
8.1-1 DTS Normal Operating Loads ............................. 8.1-9

8.1-2 DTS Component Weights .............................. 8.1-12
8.1-3 TC Port Cover Postulated Failures, Effects and
Compensating Provisions .............................. 8.1-21
8.1-4 Upper Shield Port Cover Postulated Failures, Effects and
8.1-5 Upper Crane Postulated Failures, Effects and Compensating
Provisions ............... ............... 8.1-26
8.1-6 Fuel Handling Subsystem Postulated Failures, Effects and
8.1-7 HVAC Subsystem Postulated Failures, Effects and
8.1-8 Failures of the Control Subsystem Interlocks ................... 8.1-36
8.2-1 Radiological Consequences from a Stuck Fuel Assembly .... ....... 8.2-4
8.2-2 DTS Reinforced Concrete Wall Enveloping Load
Combination Results ............. ...................... 8.2-8
8.2-3 DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure - Building Sheer Stress ... ...... 8.2-9
8.2-4 DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure - Building Stability .... ....... 8.2-10
8.2-5 Summary Source Cask Transfer Trolley Stressses ...... ......... 8.2-15
8.2-6 Summary Receiving Cask Transfer Trolley Stresses ..... ......... 8.2-16
8.2-7 Summary - Stresses in the Cask Mating Device Lifting Components 8.2-17
8.2-8 Summary of Results - Shield Plug and Source Cask Lid Handling
Subsystem ........................................... 8.2-18
8.2-9 Fuel Handling Crane Results .............. ................ 8.2-20
8.2-10 Confinement Failure Dose .............. ................. 8.2-32
APPENDIX 8A.1
8A.1-1 DTS Normal Operating Loads ................... .. 8A.1-5

8A.1-2A Mechanical Properties of Material - Protective Cover and
Roof Plate ................................ .. 8A.1-6
8A.1-2B Mechanical Properties of Material - Mezzanine Plate ... .. 8A.1-7
8A.1-2C Mechanical Properties of Material - Sliding Door ..... .. 8A.1-8
8A.1-2D Mechanical Properties of Reinforced Concrete and Rebar .. 8A.1-9
8A.1-3 DTS Component Weights ...................... . 8A.1-l1
8A.1-4 Bending Moment Calculation due to Thermal Load Only . 8A.1-14
Xxiii
September 30, 1996
8A.1-5 Bending Moment Calculation due to Thermal Load in

Conjunction with SeismictTornado Loads ................... 8A.1-15
8A.1-6 Roof Plate Support Beam Stress Analysis Results Summary ....... 8A.1-17
8A.1-7 Material properties for Finite Element Analysis - Roof Plate
Support Beams ...................................... . 8A.1-7
8A.1-8 Mezzanine plate Support Beam Stress Analysis Results Summary ... 8A.1-20
8A.1-9 Material Properties for Finite Analysis - Mezzanine Plate
Support Beams ...................................... 8A.1-21
8A.1-10 Sliding Door Wheels and Axel Stress Calculations .............. 8A.1-24
8A.1-11 Sliding Door Axel Bracket Stress Calculations ................ 8A.1-25
8A.1-12 Sliding Door Rail Stress Calculations ....................... 8A.1-26
8A.1-13 Sliding Door Support Bracket Stress Calculations .............. 8A.1-27
8A.1-14 Sliding Door and Major Components Stress Analysis Results
Summary (Dead Loads and Handling Loads) .................. 8A.1-28
8A.1-15 DTS Accident Loads Identification ........................ 8A.1-29
8A.1-16 Tornado Wind Pressure Effect - Local Wall Horizontal Bending .... 8A.1-32
8A.1-17 Tornado Wind Pressure Effect - Global Building Effect .......... 8A.1-33
8A.1-18 DTS Supersstructure Building Stability - DBT Wind Loading ...... 8A.1-34
8A.1-19 Global Effect for Automobile Impacting "Head On" into Center
of Longer Wall .................................... 8A.1-36
8A.1-20 Global Average Seismic Accelerations Combined with ZPA ....... 8A.1-47
8A.1-21 Forces and Moments Analysis Results Summary - Global
Seismic Effects ...................................... 8A.1-50
8A.1-22 Acceleration for Selected Locations ........................ 8A.1-51
8A.1-23 DTS Superstructure Building Stability - SSE Loading ........... 8A.1-65
8A.1-24 Basemat Bearing Pressure Calculation - Weight + SSE Load ....... 8A.1-66
8A.1-25 Basemat Bearing Pressure Calculation - Weight + DBT
Wind Loading ....................................... 8A.1-67
8A.1-26 DTS Reinforced Concrete Wall Enveloping Load
Combination Results ................................. 8A.1-78
8A.1-27 DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure - Building Shear Stress ....... 8A.1-79
8A.1-28 DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure - Building Stability .......... 8A.1-79
8A.1-29 Sliding Dooi and Major Components stress Analysis
ResultsSummary (Dead Loads, Handling Loads and Seismic Loads) 1.. 8A.1-85
APPENDIX 8A2
8A.2-1 Source Cask Transfer Trolley Characteristics .................. . 8A.2-2

8A.2-2 Calculated Dimensions of Source Cask Trolley ................ . 8A.2-5
8A.2-3 Receiving Cask Transfer trolley Characteristics ................ . 8A.2-6
8A.2-4 Calculated Dimensions of Receiving Cask Trolley .............. . 8A.2-7
8A.2-5 Rail Tolerances ...................................... . 8A.2-8
xxiv
September 30, 1996
8A.2-6 Properties of Materials ....................... . . . . ... 8A.2-10

8A.2-7 Summary Source Cask Transfer Trolley Stresses ..... . . . . ... 8A.2-32
8A.2-8 Summary Receiving Cask Transfer Trolley Stresses ... . . .. .. . ... 8A.2-45
APPENDIX 8A.4
8A.4-1 Node Constraints ........................... 8A.4-10

8A.4-2 Restraint Conditions - Roof Plate ................ 8A.4-16
8A.4-3 Restraint Conditions Between the Roof Plate and the
Crane Supports ............................ 8A.4-19
8A.4-4 Seismic Stresses Load Combination 1 ............ 8A.4-29
8A.4-7 Trolley with a Mass ......................... 8A.4-33
8A.4-8 Trolley without Mass ........................ 8A.4-36
8A.4-9 Forces on the Locking Pins .................... 8A.4-51
8A.4-10 Summary of Results ......................... 8A.4-53
APPENDIX 8A.5
8A.5-1 Beam Stresses Load Combination 1....................... 8A.5-29

8A.5-2 Beam Stresses Load Combination 2....................... 8A.5-34
8A.5-3 Fuel Handling Crane Results ............................ 8A.5-54
APPENDIX 8A.6
8A.6-1 Fission Gas and Volitile Nuclides Inventory ...... . . . ... .... . . 8A.6-3
8A.6-2 Fission Gas Inventory ..................... . . . . . .... . . 8A.6-6
8A.6-3 Exposure to Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation . . . .. .. . 8A.6-7
8A.6-4 Estimated Doses from Off-Normal Conditions ..... . . . .. .. 8A.6-10
CHAPTER 9
9.2-1 Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Instrumentation Logic Table .... ..... 9.2-3
9.2-2 Source Cask TC Port Cover Instrumentation Logic Table .... ....... 9.2-4
9.2-3 Source and Receiving Cask Upper Shield Ports Instrumentation ...... 9.2-4
Logic Table
CHAPTER 10
10.1-1 General Areas Where Control and Limits are Necessary ... ........ 10.1-2
xxv
September 30, 1996
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
CHAPTER 1
1.1-1 Conceptual Sketch of DTS .........................................

1.2-1 Dry Transfer System General Overview ................................
1.2-2 Dry Transfer System Receiving Cask Transfer Subsystem ....................
1.2-3 Dry Transfer System Receiving Cask Mating Subsystem .....................
1.2-4 Dry Transfer System Receiving Cask Shield Plug and Source Cask Lid Handling
Subsystem ...............................................
1.2-5 Dry Transfer SystemSliding Door ....................................
1.2-6 Dry Transfer SystemSource Cask Transfer Subsystem ......................
1.2-7 Dry Transfer SystemSource Cask Mating Subsystem .......................
1.2-8 Dry Transfer SystemTC Port Cover Handling Subsystem ....................
1.2-9 Dry Transfer SystemFuel Assembly Handling Subsystem ....................
1.2-10 Dry Transfer SystemRadiation Monitoring Subsystem ......................
1.2-11 Dry Transfer System Receiving Cask Shield Plug and Source Cask Lid Handling
Subsystem Upper Crane Detail .................................
1.2-12 Dry Transfer System HVAC Subsystem ................................
1.2-13 Dry Transfer System HVAC Subsystem Control Schematics ..................
1.2-14 Dry Transfer System Closed Circuit Television and Lighting Subsystems .........
1.2-15 Dry Transfer System Structural Details .................................
1.2-16 Dry Transfer System Structural Details of Cast Items .......................
1.2-17 Dry Transfer System Roof Plate, Protective Cover & Mezzanine Details ..........
1.2-18 Dry Transfer System Penetration Details ................................
1.2-19 Dry Transfer System Preparation Area Details ............................
1.2-20 Dry Transfer System Preparation Area Details ............................
1.3-1 Receiving Cask Receipt, Preparation, Inspection and Positioning ...............
1.3-2 Source Cask Receipt, Preparation, Inspection and Positioning .................
1.3-3 Source Cask Removal ............................................
1.3-4 Receiving Cask Removal .........................................
1.3-5 Receiving and Source Cask Mating and Opening ..........................
1.3-6 Transfer Operations ..............................................
1.3-7 Receiving and Source Cask Closing and Detachment .......................
xxvi
September 30, 1996
CHAPTER 3
3.1-1 Design Basis Receiving Cask Canister .................................

3.1-2 Design Basis Receiving Cask Transportation Overpack ......................
3.1-3 Design Basis Source Cask ..........................................
3.1-4 Pintle Concept ..................................................
CHAPTER 4
4.2-1 Typical DTS Site Layout ................................

4.3-1 HVAC Subsystem Schematic .............................
4.3-2 HVAC Subsystem Lower Access Area and Preparation Area Plan View
4.3-3 HVAC Subsystem Elevation Section of Lower Access Area and TCA
4.3-4 HVAC Subsystem End Section of Lower Access Area and TCA with
Protective Cover ......................................
4.3-5 HVAC Details and Schedules .............................
CHAPTER 5
5.1-1 DTS Operating Sequence Flow Chart of Macro-Operations ......

5.1-2 Positioning of Source and Receiving Casks Macro-Operation
Flow Chart of Operations .............................
5.1-3 Opening of Source and Receiving Casks Macro-Operation
Flow Chart of Operations .............................
5.1-4 Fuel Assembly Transfer Loop Macro-Operation
Flow Chart Of Operations .............................
5.1-5 Fuel Assembly Transfer Macro-Operation Flow Chart of Operations
5.1-6 Closing of Source and Receiving Casks Macro-Operation
Flow Chart of Operations ........................
5.1-7 Removal of Source and Receiving Casks Macro-Operation
Flow Chart of Operations ........................
5.2-1 Cask Transfer Subsystem Trunnion Cradles ............
5.2-2 Cask Transfer Subsystem Locking Pin ...............
5.2-3 Cask Transfer Subsystem Trolley Guidance and Anti-Taking Off Device .........
5.2-4 Receiving and Source Cask Mating Subsystem .........
5.2-5 Gripping Device- Initial Open Position ...............
5.2-6 Gripping Device - Intermediate Position ..............
5.2-7 Gripping Device - Final Engaged Position .............
5.2-8 Dimension of Gripping Device ....................
5.2-9 Confinement Bellows Schematic ...................
xxvii
September 30, 1996
5.2-10 TC Port Cover Rails .............................................

5.2-11 Upper Shield Port Cover Rails .......................................
5.2-12 Upper Crane Trolley Rails .........................................
5.2-13 Upper Crane Trolley Anti-Derailing Device ..............................
5.2-14 Upper Crane Hoist Motorization .....................................
5.2-15 Upper Crane Kinematic Chain .......................................
5.2-16 Upper Crane Motorized Grapple Showing Jacking Mechanism .................
5.2-17 Upper Crane Motorized Grapple Showing Overlid Gripping Device Activation.
5.2-18 Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem ...................................
5.2-19 Fuel Handling Bridge Rail .........................................
5.2-20 Fuel Handling Bridge Anti-Derailing Device .............................
5.2-21 Fuel Handling Bridge Anti-Taking Off Device ............................
5.2-22 Schematic of Fuel Handling Bridge ...................................
5.2-23 Fuel Assembly Handling Trolley .....................................
5.2-24 Fuel Assembly Handling Trolley Rail ................................
5.2-25 Fuel Assembly Handling Trolley Anti-Derailing Device ....................
5.2-26 Rotating Platform Schematic ......................................
5.2-27 Fuel Assembly Hoisting System ....................................
5.2-28 Fuel Handling Grapple ..........................................
5.2-29 Crud Catcher .................................................
5.4-1 Instrumentation and Control Structural Diagram, con't ......................
APPENDIX 5A
Flow Chart Legend ......................... . .. 15

Complete Transfer Operations .................. . .. 16
Source and Receiving Casks Positioning ........... .. . 17
Source and Receiving Casks Removal ............ .. . 18
Source and Receiving Casks Opening ............. .. . 19
Source and Receiving Casks Closing ............. . .. 21
Fuel Assembly Transfer Loop .................. . . 23
Fuel Assembly Transfer ...................... . .. 24
Transfer Cask Entering-Receiving Cask ........... 28
Transfer Cask Entering-Source Cask .............. 29
. ..
Transfer Cask Positioning-Receiving and Source Casks. 30
Transfer Cask Locking-Receiving and Source Casks ... 31
. ..
Transfer Cask Unlocking-Receiving and Source Casks 32
. .
Transfer Cask Removal-Receiving and Source Casks 33
Receiving Cask Mating Flange Lowering .......... . .. 37
Source Cask Mating Flange Lowering ............ 38
Receiving Cask Mating Flange Lifting ............ ........................ .
xxviii
September 30, 1996
Source Cask Mating Flange Lifting. 40

Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Unlocking ........ . . .. ... ... 45
Source Cask TC Port Cover Unlocking .......... . . . . . . . 46
Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Opening ......... . . ..... 47
Source Cask TC Port Cover Opening ........... . . ... ....... . . 48
Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Closing ......... . . . . . ....... . 49
Source Cask TC Port Cover Closing ............ . . . . . ....... . . 50
Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Off-centering ..... . . ... ....... . . 51
Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Locking ......... . . . . . . 52
Source Cask TC Port Cover Locking ........... . ... ...... . . . 53
Upper Crane Positioning above the Receiving Cask . . . . . . . 58
Upper Crane Positioning above the Source Cask ... . . . . . . 59
Receiving Cask Upper Shield Port Unlocking ..... . .... . . 64
Source Cask Upper Shield Port Unlocking ....... . ... ....... . . . 65
Receiving Cask Upper Shield Port Locking ....... . ... ....... . . . 66
Source Cask Upper Shield Port Locking ......... . ... ....... . . . 67
Receiving Cask Upper Shield Port Opening ....... . .... ........... .. 68
Source Cask Upper Shield Port Opening ......... . .... ........... .. 69
Receiving Cask Upper Shield Port Closing ....... . .... ........... . . 70
Source Cask Upper Shield Port Closing ......... . . . . . ........... . 71
Source Cask Lid/Receiving Cask Shield Plug Grapple Lowering 76
Source Cask Lid/Rec.eiving Cask Shield Plug Grapple Lifting . . 80
Lid/Shield Plug Grapple Connecting ............ . . . .............. . 84
Lid/Shield Plug Grapple Disconnecting .......... . . ..... .............. . 85
Fuel Assembly Handling Crane Carriage Positioning . . . ..... 90
Rotating Platform Positioning ................ . . . . . . 94
Crud Catcher Opening ..................... . . . ..... 98
Crud Catcher Closing ...................... . . . . 99
Fuel Assembly Grapple Lowering ............. . . . ..... 103
Fuel Assembly Grapple Lifting ............... . . .. .... 105
Fuel Assembly Grapple Connecting ............ . . . . . 109
Fuel Assembly Grapple Disconnecting .......... . . . . 110
Sliding Door Opening ...................... . . . . ... 114
Sliding Door Closing ...................... 115
CHAPTER 7
7.3-1 Cross Section of DTS ............................................

7.3-2 Dose Rates During Fuel Transfer Scenario 1............................
7.3-3 Dose Rates During Fuel Transfer Scenario 2............................
xxix
September 30, 1996
APPENDIX 7A
7A-1 QADS Model for the Open Source Cask Containing Four Fuel Assemblies ... 7.A-5
7A-2 Dose Point Locations Open Source Cask Containing Four Fuel Assemblies ... 7A-10
7A-3 QADS Model for the Open Receiving Cask Containing
Twenty One Fuel Assemblies ................................. 7A-12
7A-4 Dose Point Locations Open Receiving Cask Containing
Twenty One Fuel assemblies .................................. 7A-17
7A-5 QADS Model for the one Fuel Assembly at Start of Fuel Transfer
Removed from Source Cask and in Position Closest Sliding Door ........ 7A-19
7A-6 Dose Point Locations One Fuel Assembly at Start of Fuel Transfer
Fully Removed from Source Cask and in Position Closest Sliding Door .... 7A-24
7A-7 QADS Model for the One Fuel Assembly During Fuel Transfer
Position Closest to the DTS Roof ............................... 7A-26
7A-8 Dose Point Locations One Fuel Assembly at Start of Fuel Transfer
Fully Remove from Source Cask and in Position Closest to the DTS Roof 7A-30
7A-9 Dose Point Locations - Scenario 1 Open Receiving Cask Containing
Twenty One Fuel Assemblies and One Fuel Assembly Suspended
near Sliding Door .......................................... 7A-35
7A-l ODose Point Locations - Scenario 2 Open Receiving Cask Containing
Twenty One Fuel Assemblies and One Fuel Assembly Suspended
Over Receiving Cask ....................................... 7A-36
7A-l 1 Source Cask Analysis - Radial Model ............................ 7A-42
7A-12 Source Cask Analysis - Axial Model ............................. 7A-43
7A-13 7A46
Dose Point Locations Source Cask Radial and Axial Analysis ...........
7A-14 Receiving Cask Analysis - Radial Model ..........................
7A-50
7A-15 Receiving Cask Analysis - Axial Model ...........................
7A-51
7A-16 7A-57
Dose Point Locations Receiving Cask Radial Analysis .................
7A-17 Dose Point Locations Receiving Cask Axial Analysis .................
7A-60
7A-18 Source Cask Spherical Model .................................. 7A-69
7A-19 Receiving Cask Spherical Model ................................ 7A-73
CHAPTER 8
8.1-1 Transfer Confinement Area Equipment Heat Loads ........................

8.1-2 Roof Enclosure Area Equipment Heat Loads ............................
8.1-3 Lower Access Area Equipment Heat Loads .............................
xxx
September 30, 1996
APPENDIX 8A.1
8A.1-1 Dry Transfer Overview ..................... 8A.1-2

8A.1-2 Finite Element Model, Loading and Boundary Conditions - Roof Plate ... 8A.1-19
Support Beams
8A.1-3 Finite Element Model, Loading and Boundary Conditions - Mezzanine ... 8A.1-22
Plate Support Beams
8A. 1-4 Seismic Analysis - Input Response Spectrum .......... 8A .1-38 .
8A. 1-5 Finite Element Model of Reinforced Concrete Structure ... 8A .1-40 .
8A.1-6 Roof Floor Modeling Assumptions ................. 8A .1-41 .
8A.1-7 Fuel Assembly Crane Modeling Assumptions .......... 8A.1-42 .
8A. 1-8 Me7zanine Floor Modeling Assumptions ............. 8A .1-43 .
8A. 1-9 Sliding Door and Preparation Area Modeling Assumptions . 8A .1-44 .
8A.l-I0 Wall Peak Accelerations - Global Seismic Effects ....... 8A .1-46 .
8A.I-Il Secondary Response Spectra - X Direction (14.45m Level) 8A.1-53 .
8A.1-12 Secondary Response Spectra - Y Direction (14.45m Level) 8A .1-54 .
8A.1-13 Secondary Response Spectra - Z Direction (14.45m Level) 8A .1-55 .
8A.1-14 Secondary Response Spectra - X Direction (7.9m Level) 8A .1-56 .
8A.1-15 Secondary Response Spectra - Y Direction (7.9m Level) 8A.1-57 .
8A.1-16 Secondary Response Spectra - Z Direction (7.9m Level) 8A.1-58 .
8A.1-17 Secondary Response Spectra - X Direction (6.Om Level) 8A .1-59 .
8A.1-18 Secondary Response Spectra - Y Direction (6.Om Level) 8A .1-60 .
8A.1-19 Secondary Response Spectra - Z Direction (6.0m Level) 8A .1-61 .
8A.1-20 Roof Plate Hold Down Details .................... 8A .1-75 .
8A.1-21 Roof Plate Support Beam Connection ............... 8A .1-76 .
8A.1-22 Mezzanine Plate Support Beam Connection Details ...... 8A .1-77 .
APPENDIX 8A.2
8A.2-1 Trolley Guidance and Anti-Taking Off Device ........... . 8A.2-4

8A.2-2 Runway Rails ................................. . 8A.2-9
8A.2-3 Isometric Sketch of Cask on Trolley .................. 8A.2-14
8A.2-4 Top View of Cask on Trolley ...................... 8A.2-15
8A.2-5 Cask Transfer Subsystem Trunnion Cradles ............. 8A.2-16
8A.2-6 Cask on Trolley ................................ 8A.2-21
8A.2-7 Rails of Trolley ................................ 8A.2-22
8A.2-8 Cask on Trolley Showing Distances Between Reaction Forces 8A.2-23
8A.2-9 Source Cask Anti-Taking Off Device ................. 8A.2-28
8A.2-10 Locking Pin ................................... 8A.2-30
8A.2-1 1 Receiving Cask Anti-Taking off Device ................ 8A.2-42
xxxi
September 30, 1996
APPENDIX 8A.3
8A.3-1 Pintle of the Plug ............. 8A.3-2

8A.3-2 Finger ................ 8A.3-4
8A.3-3 Pintle on the Overlid ............. 8A.3-6
APPENDIX SAA4
8A.4-1 ANSYS Trolley Model .................... .. .

... 8A.4-7
8A.4-2 Model of Rails and Poles .................. .. . 8A.4-9
8A.4-3 Links Between the Trolley and the Rails ....... .. . 8A.4-11
8A.4-4 Left Pulley Support ...................... .. . 8A.4-13
8A.4-5 Right Pulley Support ..................... .. . 8A.4-15
8A.4-6 W14 x 550 Beams and Roof Plate ............ .. . 8A.4-17
8A.4-7 Upper Plate and Crane Supports ............. .. . 8A.4-18
8A.4-8 Model of Crane Supports .................. .. . 8A.4-20
8A.4-9 Model of Left Pulley Support ............... . . . 8A.4-21
8A.4-10 Model of Right Pulley Support .............. . . . 8A.4-22
8A.4-11 Model of Trolley ........................ .. . 8A.4-23
8A.4-12 Model of Trolley with Cable and Mass ......... . . . 8A.4-24
8A.4-13 Model of Roof Plate ..................... . . . 8A.4-25
8A.4-14 Secondary Response Spectra, 46' Level, Y Direction .. . 8A.4-27
8A.4-15 Secondary Response Spectra, 46' Level X Direction .. . 8A.4-28
8A.4-16 Rails BURBACH KS22-A45 ................ 8A.4-41
8A.4-17 Dimensions of Anti-Taking Off Device ........ . .. .A.4-43
8A.4-18 Anti-Derailing Device .................... . .. 8A.4-45
8A.4-19 Sketch of Compensator .................... .. . 8A.4-49
APPENDIX 8A.5
8A.5-1 Position of the Bridge Resulting in Maximum Bending . 8A.5-2

8A.5-2 Forces Applied to the Trolley .................. . 8A.5-3
8A.5-3 Trolley Model ............................. 8A.5-11
8A.5-4 Model of Vertical Beam ...................... 8A.5-13
8A.5-5 Link Between Trolley and Bridge ............... 8A.5-15
8A.5-6 Link Between Bridge and Rails ................. 8A.5-17
8A.5-7 ANSYS Model & Boundary Conditions Trolley
8A.5-8
Positioned at 550 mm Top View ................
ANSYS Model and Boundary Conditions Trolley
8A.5-19 .
Positioned at 550 mm Isometric View ............ 8A.5-20 .
xxxii
September 30, 1996
8A.5-9 ANSYS Model and Boundary Conditions Trolley ................. 8A.5-21

Positioned at 550 mm Side View
8A.5-10 ANSYS Model & Boundary Conditions Trolley .8A.5-22
Positioned at 550mm End View
8A.5-11 ANSYS Model & Boundary Conditions Trolley. 8A.5-23
Positioned at 550 mm Second Isometric View
8A.5-12 ANSYS model Trolley Positioned at End Isometric View from Top .8A.5-24
8A.5-13 ANSYS Model Trolley Positioned at End Isomentric View from Side .... 8A.5-25
8A.5-14 ANSYS Model Trolley Positioned at End View .8A.5-26
8A.5-15 Secondary Response Spectra 27' 0" Level, Y Direction 7% Damping .... 8A.5-27
8A.5-16 Secondary Response Spectra 27' 0" Level, X Direction 7% Damping .... 8A.5-28
8A.5-17 Plate Stresses Top of Plate Load Combination 1
Primary + Secondary Stresses ..................... 8A.5-30
8A.5-18 Plate Strresses Middle of Plate Load Combination 1
Primary + Secondary Stresses ..................... ........... 8A.5-31
8A.5-19 Plate Stresses Middle of Plate Load Combination I
Primary - Secondary Stresses ...................... ........... 8A.5-32
Primary - Secondary Stresses ...................... ........... 8A.5-33
Primary + Secondary Stresses ..................... 8A.5-35
8A.5-22 Plate Stresses Middle of Plate Load Combination 2
Primary + Secondary Stresses ..................... ........... 8A.5-36
8A.5-23 Plate Stresses Middle of Plate Combination 2
Primary - Secondary Stresses ..................... ........... 8A.5-37
Primary - Secondary Stresses ......................
........... 8A.5-38
8A.5-25 Bridge Rails BURBACH KS22-A45 ................. ........... 8A.5-41
8A.5-26 Dimensions of Bridge Anti-Taking off Device ..........
........... 8A.5-44
8A.5-27a Rotating Platform Anti-Taking Off Device ............
........... 8A.546
8A.5-27b Rotating Platform Anti-Taking Off Device ............
........... 8A.547
8A.5-28 Anti-Seismic Transverse Bumpers ...................
........... 8A.5-49
8A.5-29 Grapple Finger ................................ ........... 8A.5-52
APPENDIX 11A
1 Transnuclear Organization Chart ....................... 2

2 Typical Overall Organization Chart ....................... S5
xxciii
September 30, 1996
Appendix 8A.1 Structural Analysis of DTS
8A. 1.1 Structural Specifications
The design bases for the DTS are described in Chapter 3.0. The structure will be
constructed from reinforced concrete and structural steel work, the design of which complies
with the following principle specifications:
American Concrete Institute ACI 349-85: Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety
Related Concrete Structures.
* American Concrete Institute ACI 318-89: Building Code Requirements for Reinforced
Concrete with Commentary.
* American Institute of Steel Construction: AISC Specification for the Design,

Fabrication and Erection of Structured Steel for Buildings. June, 1989.
8A. 1.2 General Description of the DTS Structure
The primary functions of the DTS structure are to provide radiation shielding, tornado
missile protection, and confinement of radioactive material. The Dry Transfer System
Overview is shown on Figure 8A.1-l.
The DTS structure includes the following major elements:
* Reinforced concrete basemat;

* Reinforced concrete superstructure which encloses the Transfer Confinement Area and
Lower Access Area, provides a radiation shield, tornado missile barrier, and primary
confinement, and contains the fuel transfer equipment;
* Embedments for support of the fuel handling crane;
* Protective cover;
* Structural steel roof plate that supports the upper crane;
Mezzanine plate that supports the Cask Mating Subsystem;
* Sliding door between the Lower Access Area and the Preparation Area; and
* Preparation Area Enclosure.
8A.1-1
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-1
Dry Transfer System Overview
LIZ / SHULOI ?LUC CRAXZ
DuL ASSZNULZE MANDLINC SDBSYSTEK
TRANSYtR CONFZSVaZKT
LOVER ACCESS ARZA
?RRVARAIXON rnOoD
RMANINR
XRCLOSDRNC
MASZXAS
Y.
8A.1-2
September 30, 1996
8A. 1.3 Design Loadings and Input Parameters
In preparing the design of the DTS, the loadings and other input parameters have been
based upon the following principle codes and standards:
* American National Standards Institute, Design Criteria for an Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation. ANSI/ANS 57.9-1992.
* American National Standards Institute, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and
Other Structures. ANSI/ASCE 7-88-1990.
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.60. Design Response

Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, 1973.
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.61. Damping Values for
Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, 1973.
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.76. Design Basis Tornado
for Nuclear Power Plants, 1974.
"Missile Generated by Natural Phenomena." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

NUREG-0800. Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for
Nuclear Power Plants, July 1981. Para. 3.5.1.4.
Since the design presented in this report is based on a non-site specific location,
conservative assumptions have been made for the selection of input parameters (wind loading,
seismic loading, soil conditions, missiles, etc.).
8A. 1.4 Design Basis and Philosophy
The reinforced concrete structure forms a heavy rigid box structure with substantial
stiff cross walls in both directions.
A. Seismic Analysis
The seismic analysis is performed assuming the structure is founded on a hard rock
site. A response spectrum analysis was used to verify the structural design. The seismic
input was taken from 10 CFR 72.102.
8A.1-3
September 30, 1996
B. Tornado Missiles
The design of the structure has taken into account the missiles produced by the design
basis tornado. The most damaging missiles are the automobile, wood utility pole and 12"
(305 mm) diameter pipe. The automobile and utility pole impacts are limited to a height of
no more than 30' (9.1 m) above grade.
The automobile does not create local damage since it is a "soft" missile and crushes
on impact. It is considered with respect to overall barrier stability and energy absorption.
Similarly, the wood utility pole is subject to considerable deformation and will not locally
deform the structure. Thus, the 12" diameter (305 mm) Schedule 40 steel pipe is considered
the missile that can produce the worst local damage effects.
The DTS wall thickness is primarily-dictated by shielding requirements. The massive

walls adequately protect the DTS against tornado missiles and other adverse natural
phenomena. The tornado generated missile impacts are considered to bound all other
reasonable impact-type accidents.
8A.1.5 Normal Operation Structural Analysis
Table 8A.1-1 shows the normal operating loads for which the DTS structural
components are designed. The table also lists the individual components which are affected
by each loading. The magnitude and characteristics of each load are described in Section
8A.1.5.1.
The method of analysis and analytical results for each load are described in sections
8A.1.5.2 through 8A.1.5.6. The mechanical properties of materials employed in the structural
analysis of the DTS system components are presented in Table 8A. 1-2.
8A.1-4
September 30, 1996
Table SA.1-1
DTS Normal Operating Loads
Affected Component
Load Type
Reinforced
Concrete Protective Mezzanine Sliding
Structure Cove Roof Plate Plate Dpor
Dead Loads x x x x x
Operational
Handling Loads x x x
Live Loads x x x x
Normal Thermal
Loads x x x x x
Internal Pressure x x x x x
Design Basis Wind
Pressure x x
8A. 1-5
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-2A
Mechanical Properties of Material - Protective Cover & Roof Plate
Component Material Temp. Yield Ultimate Remark

(IF) Strength Strength
Sy (ksi) S. (ksi)
Protective A-36 70 36 58
Cover
Protective A-441(') 70 50 70
Cover
Beams
Protective A-193-B7 70 105 125
Cover
Bolts
Roof Plate A-105 70 36 70
Roof Plate A-441(2) 70 46 67
Beams
Roof Plate A-193-B7 70 105 125
Bolts
Roof Plate A-325(3) 70 56 73
Corbel
Connection
Bolts
Notes:
1. For thickness 3/4 in. (19 mm) and under
2. For thickness over 3/4 in. to 1-1/2 in. (19 mm to 38 mm)
3. For 1 in. bolt
8A.1-6
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-2B
Mechanical Properties of Material - Mezzanine Plate

(0F) Strength Strength
Sy (ksi) S. (ksi)
Mezzanine A-36 70 36 58
Plate
Mezzanine A-441(') 70 50 70
Plate
Beams
Mezzanine A-193-B7 70 105 125
Plate
Bolts
Mezzanine A-325(2 ) 70 56 73
Plate Corbel
Connection
Bolts . _
Notes:
1. For thickness 3/4 in. (19 mm) and under
2. For 1 in. bolt
8A. 1-7
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-2C
Mechanical Properties of Material - Sliding Door

l(F) Strength Strength
I Sy (ksi) S. (ksi)
Sliding A-105 70 36 70
Door
Sliding Drop 70 _ 64
Door Forged Steel
Wheels
Sliding A-564 70 115 140
Door Type 630
wheel Axle H 1100
Axle A-514 70 100 110

Bracket
Axle A-514 70 22 45
Bracket
Bearing
Sliding A-514 70 100 110
Door
Support
Bracket
Sliding A-441(1) 70 42 63
Door
Shear Pin
Sliding A-514 70 100 110
Door
Rail
Note:
1. For thickness over 3/4 in. to 1-1/2 in. (19 mm to 38 mm)
8A.1-8
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-2D
Mechanical Properties of Reinforced Concrete and Rebar

(CF) Strength Strength
Sy (ksi) S. (ksi)
Reinforcing A-615 70 60 90
Steel Grade 60
Component Density 28 days Modulus of Remark

(lbs/fe) Compress. Elasticity
Strength (ksi)
l Qksi) I
Reinforced 150 3 3000
Concrete
8A.1-9
September 30, 1996
8A.1.5.1 Normal Operating Loads
The normal operating loads are described in detail in the following paragraphs.
A. Dead Loads
Table 8A. 1-3 shows the weights of various components of the DTS. The dead weight
of each component is determined based on nominal component dimensions.
B. Operational Handling Loads
The operational handling loads are included in the weight of the equipment presented
in Table 8A.1-3.
C. Live Loads
As discussed in Chapter 4.0, a live load of 250 lbs/ft2 (11,970 Pa) is conservatively
selected to envelope all postulated live loads acting on the DTS, including the effects of snow
and ice.
D. Normal Thermal Loads
The DTS is subject to thermal expansion loads associated with normal operating
conditions. The range of normal operating temperature used for the design of the DTS is
60 0F to 100 0F (16 0 C to 38 0C) in the Preparation Area and 40'F to 1300 F (40 C to 540 C) in
other areas.
E. Internal Pressure
The internal pressures (created by the HVAC system) during operation are as follows:
TCA: 1 in (25.4 mm) H20 less than ambient.

Lower Access Area: 0.5 in (12.7 mm) H20 less than ambient.
Preparation Area: 0.25 in (6.4 mm) H20 less than ambient.
F. Design Basis Wind Pressure
Design wind pressures for the structure have been determined at 25 ft (7.6 m), 50 ft
(15.2 m) and 55 ft (16.8 m) above grade, and are summarized in Table 3.2-3.
8A. 1-10
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-3
DTS Component Weights
Component Description Calculated Weight
Reinforced Concrete Structure 2,195,600 lbs (995,920 kg)
R. C. Basemat 2,200,000 lbs (997,920 kg)
Protective Cover & Beams 135,000 lbs (61,200 kg)
Roof Plate Level Roof Plate 166,875 lbs (75,700 kg)

Support Beam 56,741 lbs (25,700 kg)
Equipment (including handling 27,258 lbs (12,300 kg)
loads)
Fuel Handling Crane 22,000 lbs (10,000 kg)
Mezzanine Plate Level Mezzanine Plate 25,230 lbs (11,400 kg)

Support Beam 8,220 lbs (3,700 kg)
Equipment (including handling 49,500 lbs (22,400 kg)
loads)
Sliding Door 85,000 lbs (38,560 kg)
8A.1-11
September 30, 1996
8A.1.5.2 Reinforced Concrete (Structure) Structural Analysis
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.1 provides the detailed description of the reinforced concrete
structure. The configuration details including dimensions are shown on drawings 1051-12,
1051-16, and 1051-28. The structure is designed to withstand a number of different loads and
combinations of loads. The relevant normal operating loads are as follows (Refer to Table
8A.l-1):
* Dead loads
* Operational handling loads
* Live loads
* Normal thermal loads
* Internal pressure
* Design basis wind pressure
The DTS reinforced concrete wall thickness is primarily dictated by shielding

requirements. For calculation of stresses, the design is dominated by the design basis tornado
(DBT) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loads (Reference Section 8A.1.6.1). Other loads
are much smaller; for example, the design basis wind pressure of 59 lb/ft 2 (2825 Pa) is much
less than the design basis tornado wind, which is taken to be 447 lb/ft2 (21,400 Pa). In
general, loads which are clearly not limiting are not evaluated; brief checks are included on
less obviously unimportant loads.
The compressive stress of the reinforced concrete wall due to dead weights and
operating loads are calculated as:
Weight of reinforced concrete = 2,195,600 lbs (Table 8A.1-3)

Weight of equipments including handling loads = 575,824 lbs (Table 8A.1-3)
TOTAL WIGHT = 2,771,424 lbs
Cross section area: A = ((379-72)(2) + (280-36) + (280-36-150)) x36 = 34,272 in. 2

S = compression stress = 2,771,424/34,272 = 81 psi
Saj, = 'D x 0.85 (fc) = 0.7 x 0.85 x 3000 = 1,785 psi
The compressive stress is much less than the allowable compressive stress of 1,785
psi.
The thermal analysis of the concrete building is also evaluated. Thermal loads within
the structure due to the presence of the fuel assemblies and operating equipment induce two
effects in the concrete walls.
8A.1-12
September 30, 1996
* Bending due to temperature gradients across the walls

* Expansion due to rise in bulk temperature above base (setting) temperature
Thermal loading is considered to induce horizontal forces/moments in the walls due to

restraint provided by adjacent orthogonal walls.
Thermal loads are considered both:
Acting alone on uncracked sections.

Acting in conjunction with other loads (Seismic/Tornado) on cracked sections.
Thermal loads are assessed in accordance with ACI-349-IR (Reference 8A.1.7-1) and
are calculated in Tables 8A.1-4 and 8A.1-5. These calculated bending moments are to be
combined with other loads for reinforced concrete wall design. The wall expansion due to
bulk rise in temperature is found to be negligible.
8A. 1-13
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-4
Bending Moment Calculation due to Thermal Load Only
(a) TEMPERATURE CROSS WALL EFFECTS
r- 6 m (379-.j
TEMP. GRADIENT
=43 C/m
7.1 m (280) =39eC TOTAL
.9 m (36)
(b) BENDING MOMENT DIAGRAM DUE TO THERMAL LOAD
T'MT
_/-M T=MEO T12

T 12
E = 21 X 109*2
MT= 9.9 X 16,6
~T
109 X 9.9 X 10O6 X 39 X 1 X0

MT= 21 X T= 12
09210 3
= 547 KNm
= 4,841 IN-RIPS
8A. 1-14
DOE - D TS - ITAR
._ _._ .
Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-5
Bending Moment Calculation due to Thermal Load in Conjunction With

Seismic/Tornado Loads
(a) BENDING MOMEIT DIAGRAIP-END CRACKED
M~l= XT X L (1-COl )
HS /DST FROX ACI 3 R9.11-91, YIG. 2.6
LT * O a. e
0.5LS
l R1
=!>Ml w 2.0, C0O- 0.37
LT MT1' 547 Xi2 (1-0.37)
22 2
I |*45 3 KN=
INSIDE l 3,054 S-XIllS
lb) BENIDING MOMENT DIAGRAK-INTERIOR CRACKED
HSSE/DhT
/-MSSEJD~t T0w N X"ffil1-Co
UT 2 }
CtROX AC% 349.1K, FIG. 2.11
7 L w L *0.6L, r - 0.5(L-LT)
X TO *-X0 * 2.t, COoa 0.°s2
LT .
MTV 547 X .2 (1-0.62)
(
INSIDE a* 291 X~a

= 2,576 IN-KIPS
8A.1-15
September 30, 1996
8A. 1.5.3 Protective Cover Structural Analysis
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.2 provides the detailed description of the protective cover
structure. The configuration details including dimensions are shown on drawing 1051-27.
For normal operating conditions, a design load of 250 lbs/fl2 (11,970 Pa) is conservatively
used to calculate the stress in the protective cover roof plate. The shell stress in the plate is
evaluated using Roark, page 225, case 36, conservatively assuming the plate is simply
supported with a uniform load over the entire surface (Reference8A. 1.7- 2).
f wi 2
S =--
t2
where w = design load + dead load = 250 lbs/ft2 +.29 (1.5) = 1.736 lbs/in 2 + 0.435 lbs/in 2
= 2.171 lbs/in 2
a= 120
b = 90
a/b = 1.33
= 0.42
2.171 x9O2
S = 0.42 x --- ---- =3,283 psi
1.52
The analysis results show a maximum stress of 3,283 psi (22.8 MPa) which is less
than the allowable stress of 21,600 psi (149 MPa).
The protective cover is a free standing structure which permits free thermal expansion.
Therefore, there are no significant thermal stresses.
8A.1.5.4 Roof Plate Structural Analysis
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.3 provides the detailed description of the roof plate structure.
The configuration details including dimensions are shown on drawing 1051-27. Normal
operating loads on the roof plate and supporting beams are conservatively evaluated
assuming all the weight (weight of roof plate, support beam and equipment loads) is
supported by the five (5) W 14 x 550 beams only. An ANSYS (Reference 8A.1.7-3) finite
element model was developed using stiff 4 3D beam element. The material properties for
finite element analysis are calculated in Table 8A.1-7 and the finite element model, loading
conditions, and boundary conditions are shown on Figure 8A.1-2. The analytical results and
comparisons with the acceptance criteria defined in Chapter 3 are also presented in Table
8A.1-16
September 30, 1996
8A.1-6. The maximum calculated stress in the beams is 8,850 psi (61 MPa) which is much
less than the allowable stress of 25,200 psi (174 MPa).
Table 8A.1-6
Roof Plate Support Beam Stress Analysis Results Summary
Load Case Location Max. S.I. Allow. Stress(l) Remark

I (psi) (psi)
PI A 6,912 25,200
P2 B 5,775 25,200
P3 C 8,850 25,200
Note: 1. The allowable is based on 0.6 Sy = 0.6 x 42,000 = 25,200 psi
The thermal expansion between the roof plate and reinforced concrete wall is
calculated as follows:
Assume roof plate temperature = 130 0F

Assume concrete temperature = 70 0F
a,,, = 6.5 x 10 in./OF
t} = 307 (130-70) x 6.5 x 106 = 0.1197 in.
8
concrete = 0 (conservative)
Both the roof plate and beam are bolted to the reinforced concrete. 1-1/4 in. diameter
oversized holes (1 in. bolt) are provided at the plate and beam connection points to allow
free thermal expansion.
8A.1-17
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-7
Material Properties for Finite Element Analysis - Roof Plate Support Beams
NUMBER AND SIZE OF SUPPORT BEAMS = 5- W14 x 550
b 17,
Y
I
A = 162 IN. 2
4
IX c 9430 IN.
I y = 3250 IN. 4
BEAM CONNECTION DETAIL
8A.1-18
I )OE - DTS - TSAR Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-2
Finite Element Model, Loading and Boundary Conditions - Roof Plate Support Beams
STIF 4t
3D ELASTIC I '2 f
BEAM ELEMENT | l 5'
5 - . - - - - - - - '- &8.5- 6 I 1i
/13.3 00.2 M8.5 5 Z
LOAD CASE
P 1i P 2 =P3 =WEIGRT OF ROOF PLATEXEAMS, AND EQUIPMENT
=166,875 + 56,741 + 27,258
=250,874 # (1,116 KN)
8A. 1-19
September 30, 1996
8A.1.5.5 Mezzanine Plate Structural Analysis
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.4 provides the detailed description of the mezzanine plate
structure. The configuration details including dimensions are shown on drawing 1051-27.
Normal operating condition loads on the mezzanine plate consist of the plate weight, the
support beam dead weight, the Receiving and Source Cask Mating Subsystem dead weight,
the Receiving and Source TC port cover weights, the receiving cask shield plug weight and
the source cask lid weight The analysis was performed conservatively assuming all the loads
are supported by the beams only. A finite element (stiff 4) model of the assembly is utilized
to evaluate the beam stress.
The material properties for finite element analysis are calculated in Table 8A.1-9 and
the finite element model, loading conditions, and boundary conditions are shown on Figure
8A.1-3. The analytical results and comparisons with the acceptance criteria defined in
Chapter 3 are also presented in Table 8A.1-8. The analysis shows a maximum stress of
22,500 psi (155 MPa) in the beams which is less than the allowable stress of 27,600 psi (190
MPa).
Table 8A.1-8
Mezzanine Plate Support Beam Stress Analysis Results Summary
Load Case Location Max. S.I. Allow. Stress(') Remark

(psi) (psi)
PI A 16,658 27,600
P2 B 16,916 27,600
P3 C 22,500 27,600
P4 D 17,488 27,600 _ _ _
Note: 1. The allowable is based on 0.6 Sy = 0.6 x 46,000 = 27,600 psi
For thermal expansion, the required minimum clearance between the end of the plate
and the inside surface of the concrete wall is approximately 0.125"(3 mm) (Reference Section
8A. 1.5.4). An adequate clearance is provided between the plate and the concrete wall to
permit free thermal expansion under the maximum differential temperatures expected during
normal operation. The mezzanine plates are bolted to the support beams and the beams are
bolted to the reinforced concrete. The 1-1/4 in. diameter oversized hole has been provided in
the support beams and will permit free thermal expansion of the support beams and thus
minimize thermal stress.
8A.1-20
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-9
Material Properties for Finite Element Analysis - Mezzanine Plate Support Beams
NUMBER AND SIZE OF SUPPORT BEARS = 5- W12 x 120
Go= 12.327
I A 35,3 IN2
d= 33.12 X- X Ixx '1070 IN. 4

vj3.12. c 345 IN 4
By
M CONCTO DE IL
Yt/Y .
TY U 3=
8A. 1-21
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-3
Finite Element Model, Loading and Boundary Conditions - Mezzanine Plate Support
Beams
FROM TABLE 8.1-2: Z

LOAD CASE
Pi P -P'wP = WEIGHT OF PLATE,BEAMS, AND EQUIPMENT
=25,230 4 6,220 + 49,500
w82,950 1 (369 RN)
8A. 1-22
September 30, 1996
8A.1.5.6 Sliding Door Structural Analysis
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.5 provides the detailed description of the sliding door
structure. The configuration details including dimensions are shown on drawing 1051-5. The
design of the sliding door is based on shielding requirements. For the dead load analysis, the
most limiting conditions are considered. By considering the sliding door to be supported at
the rails, the weight of the sliding door is conservatively increased by a factor of 1.5.
The weight of the sliding door is 85,000 lbs (Reference Table 8A.1-3). This load is
increased by 1.5 to include the handling load. The total design load becomes:
W = 85,000 x 1.5 = 127,500 lbs
S = Tension Stress = 127,500/(133.5 x 9) =106 psi
This is much less than the allowable stress of 0.6 x Sy= 0.6 x 36,000 = 21,600 psi.
Other loads are much smaller; for example, the internal pressure is 2.59 lb/ft 2 (124 Pa), and is
much less than the suction on the door due to the tornado wind, which is 419 lb/ft2 (20,100
Pa). In general, loads which are clearly non-limiting are not considered explicitly; brief
checks are included on less obviously unimportant loads. The stress calculations due to the
DBT and SSE loads are described in Section 8A.1.6.5)
The sliding door is a free standing structure which permits free thermal expansion.
Therefore, there are no significant thermal stresses.
The other components of the sliding door affected by the normal handling loads are
door wheels and door wheel axle, axle bracket, door rail, and support bracket. The stresses of
these components are calculated in:
a. Door wheels and door wheel axle - Table 8A.1-10

b. Axle bracket - Table 8A.l- 1-
c. Door rail - Table 8A.I-12
d. Support bracket - Table 8A.1-13
The summary of the analytical results and comparisons with the acceptance criteria
define in Chapter 3 are also presented in Table 8A.1-14.
8A. 1-23
__ _
DOE - DTS -TSAR Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-10
Sliding Door Wheels and Axle Stress Calculations
4.SM-¢ 4^
DOOR *XIGau * 85,000 I
_DSIGEN WXERT a 1.S x 65.000 * 127.500 0
U, VOKMXw caVAZfyt a 20.000 0

S x 20,000 8 a 160,000 I > 127.10
LOAD AT lAC: SET or WxEELg
,127.S00 31,S756
AXLE BRACKET
if _ 12
(a) CALCULATZ TUZ BREAR STR7SS - AXLE

31875
8 a 2t1a (07532 - 2,O*S1aL<46,GOa9gj
(b) CALCULATX SEX BIUDEO STRESS - AXLE

A aways PrxsTE ELzEzxT MODEL was
DSVXLOFED OUSEW STEP 16
yp * 31,87S
ax
TUX XAXIZEU BZXDING ST1ESS AT LOCATION a

I8 12l104vsl, WRECK XS LESS T31A
TEE KLLOVARLE ST1ESS Or 69,00psiL
8A.1-24
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-11
Sliding Door Axle Bracket Stress Calculations
v - 31,87S #
A
1.56a I.D. X 1.94 O.D.
4.56 F±/ BEARING (SAE CA905)
"In LO
X
i -SLIDING DOOR
(a) CALCULATE THE BEARING STRESS
3187955 c 21,2S0sVL<45,000psL
1 X1.5
(b) CALCULATE THE SHEAR STRESS
9 =( 5 131875 - = 6*375psi<00,000psi
(4.5-2) X I X 2 635s< O ~ ~ s
(c) CALCULATE THE TENSION STRESS
g a .1M3xi2-) a 7,969PSL60(,O0pL8
1 X (G'2
8A.1-25
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-12
Sliding Door Rail Stress Calculations
2.575750-
23 5
2.875- 4(-
*I- 1.5*
6. 6 8 7 S- -4 _ | l 1.1
TOTAL LENGTH OF DOOR RAIL ' 355( . DMG. 1051-5)

ASSUME ONLY 133.5' (SAME AS TEE WIDTE OF THE DOOR)
WILL SUPPORT TEE WEIGHT OF THE DOOR.
N S153XASA00- 63,750 1
X * BENDING MOMENT -63,750 X (2.875 + 0.75) 22A94 1N-4

x .13L 5) .. 37.5 Z4
12 12
S SENDING
R STRESS '-I' 231A494 0.75
I 37.5
8A. 1-26
Rev. 0
DOE - DTS - TSAR September 30, 1996
Table sA.1-13
Sliding Door Support Bracket Stress Calculations
P 31,875 #
ASSWC UT OF DOOR VEII WILL 1 MPORBI D ST

CON SIT or la: UACKIT
) !IirSZON Mtn AT WzL a(3SDIS B9IT WIII38 PxATE
mmD DOOR RAZZ
(13 S 2 . 1) X LS5 X707 7SpsI
(b) SIEXA 8TR88 DITYXIN SRA51 AXD IXNBDKSR? STgL PLATS
Lua 31.A75 - a 733pt

)1. s 2 + 12) 3 1. IL 0.'07
(b) SMIwo 871188 AT BOPPOR? DRACUT?
12+X I3J4. 2 (.L IJ 7, -133 1 gX
L* l 31.975 ; 25 s 7 125
1 278
8A.1-27
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-14
Sliding Door and Major Components Stress Analysis Results Summary

(Dead Loads and Handling Loads)
Comp. Calculated Stress Allowable Stress

Tension Bending Shear Tension Bending Shear
Door 106 21,600
Door 127,500 160,000
Wheel (Load) (Capacity)
Wheel 18,108 9,019 69,000 46,000
Axle
Axle 7,969 6,375 60,000 40,000
Bracket
Bracket 21,250 45,000
Bearing (Bearing) (Bearing)
Support 791 6,027 733 60,000 60,000 40,000
Bracket
Door Rail 4,622 69,000
8A.1-28
September 30, 1996
8A.1.6 Accident Loads Structural Analysis
Table 8A.1-15 shows the accident loads for which the DTS structural components are
designed. The table also lists the individual components which are affected by each loading.
In the following sections, each accident condition is analyzed to demonstrate that the
requirements of the applicable codes are met and that adequate safety margins exist for the
DTS design.
Table 8A.1-15
DTS Accident Loads Identification
Affected Component
Reinfrced
Concrete Protective Roof-PLate Mezzanine Sliding
Load Type Structure Cover Pate Door
Seismic Load X X X X X
Tornado Wind Load x X X
Tornado Missiles x X X
8A. 1-29
September 30, 1996
8A.1.6.1 Reinforced Concrete (Building) Structural Analysis
As described in Secti, concrete structure is dominated by

shielding requirement ed to evaluate the effects of tornado wind,
tornado missiles and ! *;
->
1, '-
8A.1.6.1.1 Tornad I,
The most sever .-_- corresponding to Region 1 in NRC

_neters
Regulatory Guide 1.76 (Reference8A.1.7- 4 ) are assumed for the design basis tornado. The
design parameters are specified in Section 3.2.1.1 and Table 3.2-4. These loads are applied to
the exterior of the DTS structure.
The bending moments of the local wall due to the tornado wind pressure effect are
calculated in Table 8A.1-16 and the results are:
Mw&Z = ± 135 KNm
Mhogsng = 165 KNm
Building Stability - Overturning
The global building effects including overturning moment at the base and base shear
force are calculated in Table 8A.1-17 and the results are:
Movermmimg moment = 60,500 KNm
Fb shea force = 6,560 KN
The stabilizing and overturning moments due to the tornado wind pressure are
calculated in Table 8A.1-18 and the results are:
M, = stabilizing moment = 138,225 KNm
MO = overturning moment = 70,340 KNm
Factor of Safety = 138,225/70,340 = 1.98 > 1.5 OK
Since the overturning moment is smaller than the stabilizing moment, the DTS
building will not overturn. The resulting factor of safety against overturning effects for
Design Basis Tornado ( DBT) wind loads is 1.98.
8A. 1-30
September 30, 1996
Building Stability - Sliding
First assume sliding resisted by base friction. Assumed reasonable friction angle
between basemat and subsoil, 30°.
Coefficient of Friction = Tan 300 = 0.58
Allowable Friction = 0.58/Factor of Safety = 0.58/1.1 = 0.53
W.,, = Weight of Concrete Superstructure +Weight of Basemat = 9828 + 8480 = 18,308 KN
F = Shear Force due to DBT = 6,560 KN
Required p = 6560/18308 = 0.36 < 0.53 OK
8A. 1-31
-P
DOE - DTSI I -TAK Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-16
Tornado Wind Pressure Effect - Local Wall Horizontal Bending
P = 21.5 KRN/m 2
P -20.1 KN/m 2
8.7m ]8.7m
PLAN ON WALLS
MAX. PRESSURE = 21.5 ItN/m 2
MAX. SUCTION a 20.2 KN/m 2
DESIGN HORIZONTAL BENDING MOMENTS
SAGGING (MIDDLE SPAN)
M 21.5 X 8.72 c±135 KNm

12
HOGGONG (SUPPORTS)
Mm= 21.5 X 8-72 m165 1Mm

M= ~ 10 16 m
8A. 1-32
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-17
Tornado Wind Pressure Effect - Global Building Effect
CONSIDER DBT ACTING IN Y DIRECTION ON TRANSFER

CONFINEMENT AND LOWER ACCESS AREA.
~tt tt l tt30.3 X 9.6 e 290 IN/mn
P
U-
20.1 X 9.6 U- 21.5 X 9.6

U-
= 193 KN/m .206 KN/r
U-
U-
BUILDING WEIGHT = 12276 IN

BUILDING HEIGHT e 16.5 m
BUILDING LENGTH = 9.6 rn
OVERTURNING MOMENT AT TOP OF THE BASE

M = (206 4 193) X 2 + 290 2 7.12=60500 1XZ
BASE SHEAR FORCE
F = (206 + 193) X 16.5 = 6560 IN
8A. 1-33
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-18
DTS Superstructure Building Stability - DBT Wind Loading
X , pY
rjj I
< ~15.1 m
BUILDING STABILITYYOVRaTURNING
BY INSPECTION Y DIRECTION LOADING GOVERNS
F * 6560 IN (DUE TO HORIZONTAL ACCELERATION)

K G 60500 1Km
N c 12285 X 0.8 (TO ALLOW FOR KIN. EQUIP. WEIGHT) 9828B
WAu 8480 KN
FACTOR OF SAFETY ' STBIITNG KOWENTB

OVERTURNING MOMENT
((9828 + 64B01 X 15.1(0.51
(60500a+ 6560 X 15)
138225 98>1.5 0
70,340
8A. 1-34
September 30, 1996
8A.1.6.1.2 Tornado Missiles
The side walls of the reinforced concrete are 36 inches thick (914 mm). The walls are
designed to provide adequate radiation shielding and easily meet the minimum acceptable
barrier thickness requirements for local damage against tornado generated missiles, specified
in Chapter 3.0. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate the adequacy of the DTS design for
tornado missiles, detail analysis of the concrete wall has been performed and presented in
Section 3.2.1.4. The items evaluated include the resistance to penetration, spalling, scabbing
and perforation for a postulated missile impact.
Based on the analysis shown on Section 3.2.1.4, tornado missile impacts on the
structure cause only superficial damage. The structure thickness is far greater than the
minimum required thickness. Local damage to the outer surfaces of the structure will not
compromise their confinement capability. Local repair to the structure will be performed if
required after a missile impact.
The concrete superstructure stability due to impact of the postulated DBT massive
consisting of 1,800 Kg automobile, 28 sq. ft'. frontal area travelling at 59 m/sec., is evaluated
at Table 8A.1-19.
*for calculating the bending moment in the structural wall, 21sq. ft. was conservatively used
(see calculation in Table 8A.1-19).
8A.1-35
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-19
Global Effect For Automobile Impacting "Head On" Into Center of Longer Wall
6MISSLE (AUTOMOBILE)
I_ FRONTAL AREA 21 FT 1.95 m2
_X = 1810 KG
Lv~m k0 9 V = 59 Mf S
7.10f mi * r0.7 AVERAGE DYNAMIC FORCE
F = 15.5 2/3V1.62
* + A s~s~elo2/3 (59)1.62
I IMPACT = 1700 KN
PLAN ON CONCRETE WALL
DYNAMIC INCREASED FACTOR AS ACI 349 APP. C FOR

GRADE 60 REINFORCING STEEL
DIF * 1.1
:>-EQUIVALENT AVERAGE DYNAMIC FORCE F = 1700 = 1545 KN
1.1
CONSERVATIVELY USING DYNAMIC FORCE AS STATIC FORCE FOR

BENDING MOMENT CALCULATION
:> EQUIVALENT STATIC FORCE = 1545 RN
45 LOAD SPREAD SAGGING (MIDDLE SPAN)
-3S
3.5Q = 1.95 M x . 15 X 8-7=632 KNm
6 X 3.55
i I HOGGING (SUPPORT)
- o.a m EFFECTIVE DEPTR N - 632 KRm
8A. 1-36
September 30, 1996
8A.1.6.1.3 Seismic Evaluation
A. Discussion of the Seismic Analysis
The design basis response spectra of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 (Reference 8A.1.7-
6) is selected for the DTS design earthquake as defined in lOCFR72.102. From the
Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 8A.1.7- 7) Table 1, a damping value of seven (7) percent
of critical damping is used for the reinforced concrete superstructure. The horizontal and
vertical components of the response spectra (in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, of the NRC
Regulatory Guide 1.60) correspond to a maximum horizontal and vertical ground acceleration
of 1.0g. The maximum ground displacement is taken to be proportional to the maximum
ground acceleration, and is set at 36 inches for a ground acceleration of 1.0g.
NRC regulatory Guide 1.60 also states that for sites with different acceleration values
specified for the design basis earthquake, the response spectra used for design should be
linearly scaled from Regulatory Guide 1.60, Figures 1 and 2, in proportion to the maximum
specified horizontal grounding acceleration. The maximum horizontal ground acceleration
component selected for design of the DTS superstructure is 0.25g. The maximum vertical
acceleration component selected is two - thirds of the horizontal component which is 0.17g.
These ground acceleration values comply with the recommendations of the 1OCFR72.102 for
sites underlaid by rock east of the Rocky Mountain front, except in the areas of known
seismic activity. The input response spectrum for this analysis is shown on Figure 8A.1-4.
An appropriate design basis earthquake (also described as a Safe Shutdown

Earthquake) can be represented by three orthogonal translational components (2 horizontal
and 1 vertical) consisting of free field ground acceleration response spectra These ground
response spectra represent the maximum acceleration response to the earthquake motion of a
series of single degree of freedom oscillators of natural frequency varying between 0.1 Hertz
and 33 Hertz.
The seismic analysis of the DTS assumes that the structure founded on competent
rock. In this circumstance, the phenomenon of Soil Structure Interaction (SSI) in which
dynamic interaction between the structure and supporting soil medium need not be considered.
Furthermore the structure can be analyzed as fully fixed at the base of the shear walls
at the top of the basement.
8A. 1-37
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-4
Seismic Analysis - Input Response Spectrum
11SPLRY III - CEOMM WDOJIC SYSTt1 (93A. PFVOST rMU

2ImaMW
8 .7308 _ l RESP'ONSE-AISPECTRUM____________ I it ccr
-, *- '
0.2341- e- ___…-IC
11-82 - l{FT
_il T_ _l ~ .1Tt iT
8.09 .49 .42 2.5 4.6 7.7 12.5 264 346 58.67 188.
. RE. <H2)
8A.1-38
September 30, 1996
B. Model Generation
The structure has been modeled for seismic analysis purposes using the computer code
ANSYS 4.4A.
The superstructure of the DTS facility comprises a relatively stiff shear wall structure
in reinforced concrete supporting plant items and equipment on two flexible internal structural
steel floors. In common with normal practice, equipment and internal structural steel floors
are assumed not to contribute to the stiffness of the supporting reinforced concrete structure.
A three dimensional plate model of concrete superstructure above top of base,

including plant masses was prepared. All reinforced concrete walls have been represented by
four-node shell elements with elastic material properties based on gross uncracked concrete
sections. Walls have been modeled at center locations throughout.
Rigid equipment is generally represented as lumped translational mass. Internal floors

(including the roof level and mezzanine floor ) which support major plant items and
equipment are flexible in the vertical direction and have been represented as structural beam
elements supporting vertical mass elements representing equipment, self weight, and floor
imposed loading. The model generation and modeling assumption are shown in the following
Figures:
Figure 8A.1-5: Finite element model of reinforced concrete structure

Figure 8A.1-6: Roof floor modeling assumptions
Figure 8A.1-7: Fuel assembly crane modeling assumptions
Figure 8A.1-8: Mezzanine floor modeling assumptions
Figure 8A.l-9: Sliding door and preparation area modeling assumptions
All concrete walls assumed 36" thick. Wall overall center line dimensions assumed
343" x 244" O/A in plan by 570.8" high.
8A. 1-39
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-5
Finite Element Model of Reinforced Concrete Structure
ly
x
i _ _ A
. . _W
, .. .. .
8A.1-40
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-6
Roof Floor Modeling Assumptions
14 X 550, TYP.
3
rfALL
9 MASS
HORIZONTAL
LUMPED AT
- -
A POINTS A - J ON
CONCRETE STRUCTURE
EQUIPMENT PLUS
ENCLOSURE VERTICAL
_MAS^S 25% TO
EACH OF 4 LOCATIONS
CCK PLATE
GHTOUT
ISTRUBUTED VERTICAL MASS

SELF WEIGHT BEAMS
PLUS 7" PLATE
&WALL WALL
ELEVATION(TOP OF 7' PLATE)

IL 7 570.81
f , "-VERTICAL LUMPER MASS

W14 X 550T EQUIPMENT PLUS ENCLOSURE
STIFFNESS
SPAN TO &WALLS
8A.1-41
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-7
Fuel Assembly Crane Modeling Assumptions
, 13
_ _ as
TOTAL EQUIPMENT MASS = 22,000 LB.

(FUEL ASSEMBLY CRANE)
MASS XYZ DIRECTIONS (22000/6 = 3667 LB.)

APPLIED EQUALLY AT POINTS A-F
8A.1-42
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-8
Mezzanine Floor Modeling Assumptions
jW12 X 120, TYP.

. F OS~s/
;lO: H RIZONTAL
,UNPED AT
OITS A - F ON
CCRE'TE STRUCTURE
\;QUIPMEWNP VERTICAL MASS,

aS THICK FLOOR
91,550 LB.,I TO
APPLIED IIERE
THROUGiITOUT (50 % EACIEH LOCATION)
ISTRUBUTED VERTICAL MASS

SELF WEIGHT FLOOR AND BEAMS
& WALL &WALL
'tS.Y2;9
L.-J
- wwvvrvellwq
ELEVATION (TOP OF. BEAMS)
`;7 2711
;
EQUIUPMENT VERTICAL
W12 X 120' LUMPED MASS (91,550 LB.)
BEAM
STIFFNESS
.
SPAN 343w
8A.1-43
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-9
Sliding Door and Preparation Area Modeling Assumptions
PREP. AREA
ENCLOSURE
LUMPED MASS
f a. .
_V 5 7 0. 8 6
I' _V 4L238
I I
280 la
I
240 11 -SLIDING DOOR
LUMPED MASS
I I
I
I I
BASEMAT
t#SL°' L r7 0#-0o
8A.1-44
September 30, 1996
C. Analysis
A fixed base modal analysis technique was used to predict the structure response (in
terms of acceleration) to the design earthquake input motion. A damping level of 7% was
used which reflects the overall damping in a reinforced concrete structure stressed to levels
approaching yield at the SSE.
A separate modal analysis has been carried out for each earthquake direction. The
results from the 3 runs were combined using the square root sum of the squares method
(SRSS). Results for individual earthquake direction analysis have been combined using the
Complete Quadratic Combination technique (CQC).
Results from the modal analysis are as follows:
* Mode shapes, frequencies and mass participation factors for all structure modes of
vibration up to approximately 50 Hertz.
* Zero Period Accelerations (also known as rigid body accelerations) at selected

locations throughout the structure. These represent the maximum acceleration
response at the locations in 2 horizontal and the vertical translational directions on the
structure.
Zero Period Accelerations (ZPA)are subsequently adjusted manually by adding base

input accelerations by SRSS to correct for:
* Dynamic mass missing from the modes considered and
* Base input motion constant acceleration profile.
To produce design acceleration profiles due to global seismic effects it is necessary to

combine output profiles with the ZPA values (0.25g horizontal, 0.17g vertical) using the
SRSS method to account for fixed base analysis giving zero response at 0 m elevation, which
should be ZPA value.
For global considerations, use acceleration values from "Middle Wall" positions.
Figure 8A.l-10 shows both the global average seismic accelerations and global average
seismic acceleration combined with ZPA. These accelerations are also listed in the Table
8A.1-20 and to be used for the reinforced concrete superstructure design.
8A.145
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-10
Wall Peak Accelerations - Global Seismic Effects
H(M)
V 14.45
'f 7.S
V 4.31
ACC(co)
0.170.25 03 1.-
-GLOBAL AV. SEISMIC ACCELERATION COMBINEn WITH TPA
H(M)
10
'.9.
5.-
ACC(q)
0 0.2 O 0.6 OA 1.0
GLOBAL AV. SEISMIC ACCELERATION
8A.146
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-20
Global Average Seismic Accelerations Combined With ZPA
Location Global Av. Seismic Acceleration Combined

With ZPA
Acel X Acel Y Acel Z
0m 0.25g 0.25g 0.1 7g
6.9 m 0.34g 0.46g 0.17g
7.9 m 0.37g 0.50g 0.21g _
14.45m 0.61g 0.71g 0.21g
8A.147
September 30, 1996
D. Global Seismic Forces
First calculate total weights of structure and equipments (From Table 8A.1-3):
Roof Structure + Equipment (14.45m Level):
166,875 +56,741 + 27,258 = 250,874 lbs (286,600 lbs is used for calculation)
286,600 + 2,240 x 9.81 = 1255 KN
Fuel Assembly Crane (7.9m Level):
22,000 - 2,240 x 9.81 = 100 KN
Mezzanine Floor + Equipment (6.89m Level):
25,230 + 8,220 + 49,500 = 82,950 lbs (125,000 lbs is used for calculation)
125,000 + 2,240 x 9.81 = 550 KN
Sliding Door (6.82m Level):
85,000 lbs (96,500 lbs is used for calculation)

96,500 - 2,240 x 9.81 = 420 KN
Concrete Structure (CG at 7.9m Level):
2,234,624 - 2,240 x 9.81 = 9,790 KN
Consider X - Direction:
Base Shear,
F, = 1255 x 0.61 + 100 x 0.37 + 550 x 0.34 + 210 x 0.34 + 380 x 0.47 + 9790 x 0.34
= 766 + 37 + 187 + 72 + 179 + 3329 = 4,570 KN
Base Moment
M. = 766 x 14.45 + 37 x 7.9 + 187 x 6.89 + 72 x 8.82 + 179 x 10.7 + 3329 x 7.9
= 11069 + 292 + 1289 + 491 + 1915 + 26299
= 41,355KNm f 41,360 KNm
8A.148
September 30, 1996
Consider Y - Direction:
Base Shear.
Fy = 1255 x 0.71 + 100 x 0.5 + 550 x 0.46 + 210 x 0.46 + 380 x 0.59 + 9790 x 0.46
= 891 + 50 + 250 + 97 + 225 + 4505
= 6,021KNt 6050 KN
BaseMoment
MK= 891 x 14.45 +50 x 7.9+253 x 6.89+97 x6.82+225 x 10.7+4505 x 7.9
= 12,875 + 395 + 1743 + 662 +2408 + 35,590
=53,673 KNm = 53,680 KNm
Consider Z - Direction:
Vertical Force.
F, = (1255 +100 +550 + 210 + 380 + 9790) x 0.2
= 12,285 x 0.2
= 2,460 KN
Base Moment.M
There are very small eccentricities in both directions, M0 = 0
The above calculated forces and moments are summarized in Table 8A.1-21.
8A.149
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-21
Forces and Moments Analysis Results Summary - Global Seismic Effects
X- Direction Y - Direction Z- Direction

(Longitudinal) (lateral) (Vertical)
FX(KN) M,(KNm) FY(KN) M(IKNm) FZ(KN) MK(KNm)
4,570 41,360 6,050 53,680 2,460 0
Calculated
at the Top
of
Basemat
8A. 1-50
September 30, 1996
F. Accelerations at Selected Locations on The Concrete Structure and

Flexible Steel Floors.
Accelerations appropriate for a competent rock site are listed in the Table 8A.1-22 for
selected locations on the concrete structure and flexible structural steel floors.
Table 8A.1-22
Acceleration For Selected Locations
Location Equipment ZPA Accelerations

Acel X Acel Y Acel Z
om Cask Trolley 0.25g 0.25g 0.17g
Base of
Sliding Door
6.9 m Mezz. Floor 0.37g 0.5g 0.7g
Top of
l_ Sliding Door
7.9 m Fuel Crane 0.37g 0.50g 0.21g
Prep Area
Roof Struc.
14.45 m 0.69g 0.77g 0.40g
Roof Floor
Lid Crane
Shield Plug
8A. 1-51
September 30, 1996
G. Seismic Accelerations and Estimated Secondary Response Spectra For Design of

support equipment.
Figures 8A. 1-11 to 19 present the secondary response spectra which is to be used for
equipment design. Spectra at 7% damping have been derived using the following data from
the fixed base model analysis:
- Structure zero period accelerations at the location or area of interest.

- Structure mode shapes, frequencies and mass participation factors to identify
modes of interest.
- Amplifications at important frequencies above zero period accelerations have
been estimated using systems of single degree of freedom oscillators attached
to locations in a separate finite element model.
8A. 1-52
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-11
Secondary Response Spectra - X Direction (14.45m Level)
4=
cm
"1>
I
8A. 1-53
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-12
Secondary Response Spectra - Y Direction (14.45m Level)
I 1 - T 111 111111
11-X
ao
M0£0
A S1 f1111 1
=I I/- hI IIA I
I 1 __ Ii= If-
ow I----
w
J.
"Mowyot
8A. 1-54
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-13
Secondary Response Spectra - Z Direction (14.m Level)
sWo
II20M0
Io
10.00
Q4O
0.1 I
8A. 1-55
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-14
Secondary Response Spectra - X Direction (7.9m Level)
f=O
40.0
I
G0.o
gmD
0Om.
os I
rMcAWMwbYCo REaIm
wto VA= Ibc eF
8A. 1-56
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-15
Secondary Response Spectra - Y Direction (7.9m Level)
5000
40DO
I, X030
2000
boo
o=
01 1 100
FEMOICYOW
(Gus , fw%=Mb
8A. 1-57
TV A
DOE - DTE, - ITAKi
>
Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-16
Secondary Response Spectra - Z Direction (7.9m Level)
A ' - 1 - T 11 1 -
8A. 1-58
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-17
Secondary Response Spectra - X Direction (6.Om Level)
40O0O -
I am
moo
0.00-
al 1 t0o
PEfDUN W
8A. 1-59
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-18
Secondary Response Spectra - Y Direction (6.Om Level)
5ono
40.00
I 3000
10.00
0.00
CLI I 100
8A.1-60
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-19
Secondary Response Spectra - Z Direction (6.Om Level)
1.
a:-
7a
a
2
0
To
01 I
MCBCY w)
TWpti diw
8A.1-61
September 30, 1996
H. Basemat Design
The following are considered:
1. Building Stability (Overturning/Sliding):
Building stability due to DBT loading is discussed in Section 8A.1.6.1.1. The stability
due to SSE is calculated as follow.
Stability and bearing pressure calculations based on area of basement local to TC/LA area
only, ie. Area 15.5m x 15.1m. This approach is considered reasonal and conservative.
The stabilizing and overturning moments due to the SSE loading are calculated in Table
8A.1-23 and the results are:
M, = stabilizing moment = 144,205 KNm
M, = overturning moment = 62,755 KNm
Factor of Safety = 144,205/62,755 = 2.3 > 1.5 OK
Since the overturning moment is smaller than the stabilizing moment, the DTS building
will not overturn. The resulting factor of safety against overturning effects for SSE loads is 2.3.
Building Stability - Sliding
First assume sliding resisted by base friction. Assumed reasonable friction angle between
basemat and subsoil, 300.
Coefficient of Friction = Tan 300 = 0.58
Allowable Friction = 0.58/Factor of Safety = 0.58/1.1 = 0.53
Seismic Force (Reference Table 8A.1-21):
Fx = 4,570 KN
FY = 6,050 KN
F, = 2,460 KN
8A.1-62
September 30, 1996
Horizontal Resultant = (6050( +45702)I2 = 7582 KN
For minimum weight, use 40% of the vertical seismic component,
W,,n = 12285 - 2460 (0.4) + 8480 x (1-0.4 x 0.2) = 19,103 KN
Required g = 7582/19103 = 0.4 < 0.53 OK
Foundation Bearing Pressure
Foundation bearing pressures due to weight of concrete and equipment combined with
SSE or DBT loads are calculated in Tables 8A.1-24 and 8A.1-25 and the results are:
Pw +SSE = 207 KN/m2 < 225 KN/m2 OK
Pw+DBT = 213 KN/m2 < 225 KN/m2 OK
Basemat Reinforced Concrete Design
External Cantileer - Design as one way spanning slab
Thickness - 1.50m
SSE loading govern, at root of cantilever;
V = (207 + 115)/2 x 4 = 644 KN

Say effective depth = 1400 mm
VP = 644 x 103 /1400 x 1000 = 0.46 N/nmn

Allowable Pressure = (D2 x (fc)" 2 = 0.85 x 2 x (3000)12= 93psi = 0.64 N/mm2 > 0.46 N/mm2
Minimum reinforcement required = 0.0018 x 1500 x 1000 = 2700mm 2 /m =r 1.282 /ft
M = 115 x 42/2 + (207 - 115)/2 x 42 x 2/3 = 1910 KNm
M,, /cD b d2 = 1910 x 106 /0.9 X1000 X14002 = 1.08 N/mm 2
L = 0.0028
8A.1-63
September 30, 1996
=>0.0028 xlO00 x1400 = 3920 mm/m = 1.86 in2/ft => #10 at 8" (1.9 in2 /ft)
Internal Slab
By inspection, use minimum reinforcement.
ie. 1800 mm2 /m = 0.85 in2/ft
8A. 1-64
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-23
DTS Superstructure Building Stability - SSE Loading
15.1 m
BUILDING 6?ABIMTY-OVERTtRNING
IN Y DIRECTION y- 6050 Ku ly= 53680 ZMm
IN X DIRECTION ri- 4570 IX 1 41360 IKE
MX
IN Z DIRECTION ze ± 2460 KM
BUILDING WRIGT - 1225 EN

EASEMAT ARE. a 15.1 X 15.6 a 23s M2
IN Y DIM CTMON (Z DIRECTION RESPONSES-USE 40% RUL)

W 12285 - 2460 X OA a 11300 rX
M m
My S360 KNm
F -Fy * 6050 IN
WRe (15.1 X 15.6 x 1.5 X 24) X (1 - 0.2 X 0.4) 1 7800 KU
FACTOR OF SAFETY TI MOMENT

OVERTURNING MObENT
(11300 + 7800) X 1S.1(0.51
(53680 e 6050 X 1)
144-S 2.>1.5OK
62,755
BY INSPECTION BUILDXNG STABILITY IN X DIRECTION *
8A.1-65
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-24
Basemat Bearing Pressure Calculation - Weight + SSE Load
1<*F Prmy
_ 1t3.12
a 15.1 a
(a) 5SATZC LOADING AND Y DIRECTION 63MIC COX2ONZNT

JL,122fli .±. i 88
APPLY ZES0LTANT OVZRTURNING MOINT ON9 WIEl AXIS:

My - 53,680 + 6050 i 1.5 - 62,755 lAz
IX a 41360 + 4570 X 1.5 a 48215 SM
RESULTANT N - 6275(2 1 SX
148M ) 65650 IN
5
e .-IL. 65
95 3.1 6 L' -* 3.16) X 3 *3.1
V 20765 2
BEARING PRESSRa*20765X 2
15.6 X 13.1
a 202 IN/a 2
(b) Z DIRECTION COMPONENT

NOw AlPLY 0% OF Z D>IECTION COMPONENT ON REDVCED WIDTH LV
2
BEARING PUESSURE e 2460 X s t; XN/
15.6 1 1151
TOTAL DIARING PRESSURE ft 202 +5 w 207 IN/ 2 2
8A. 1-66
DUE - DTS - TSAR Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-25
Basemat Bearing Pressure Calculation - Weight + DBT Wind Loading
1< L o12 A
(a) STATIC ZaOADDIG AND DS LOAD1EG

ILC. 2285XS5-
:t 1848 yNa
A 15.111. mS a 8 U/M 2
DST LOADING
py a 6560 Ki JDUE TO HORIZONTAL ACCELERATION)
lly a 6050 IN=
e6°500 +i6s6 X 15 - 39
* 20765
2LLt 3.39) 3-248 12A .
TOTAL DEARING PRESSURE -207i 2 a

15.6 X 12.48
21 X/&
8A.1-67
September 30, 1996
I. Concrete Wall Above Mezzanine Floor at 6.9m Level
Horizontal Spn
Horizontal Moments (KNm) Remark

Span Hogging Sagging
SSE 742 721

DBT 165 135 Table 8A.1-16
(Pressure)
DBT 632 632 Table 8A.1-19
(Missile)
Thermal 547 -547 Table 8A.1-4
(Alone)
Thermal 345 -291 Table 8A.1-5
(±_SSE/DBT)
By inspection (SSE + Thermal) governs
=:>Mde,,/m width = 742 + 345 =1087 KNm
M/Abd2 = 1087 x 106 /0.9 X 1000 x 8002 = 1.89 N/mm2
=o = 0.0048
As = 0.0048 x 1000 x 800 = 3840 mm2 /m = 1.82 in2 /ft = use # 10 at 8" C/C (1.90 in 2/ft)(each
face horizontal)
8A.1-68
September 30, 1996
In Plan Shear
Total shears at 6.9m level in Y direction:
Load Case Shear Force (Fy) Remark
SSE 6050
DBT 3960
(Wind Load)
DBT 1140
(Missile)
=> Fy (dSign) = 6050 KN
In plan shear stress

VY = F/0.8 x w x t x2 walls = 6050 x 103/0.8 x 7100 x 900 x 2 = 0.59 N/mm2 = 85 psi
Allowable shear stress

cI V, = <Z x2 (f,)l'= 0.85 x2 x (300 0 )"f = 93 psi OK
Vertical Span
By inspection, use minimum reinforcement
As = 0.0018 x 1000 x 900 = 1620 mx 2 /m = 0.76 in 2 /ft => use # 8 at 8" (1.18 in2/ft)
Local to Equipment Anchorages
Check top of wall for roof beam horizontal seismic force F (Reference Table 8A.1-22):
F = (1255/2 No. beams) x 0.77g = 483 KN (Assume taken on one side only)
Check Shear at 14.45m Level;
b~ff= 2 x d (assume 450 load spread), d = 800mm, bff = 1600mm
V = 483 x 103/1600 x 800 = 0.38 N/mm2 = 55 psi < 93 psi =s OK
8A.1-69
September 30, 1996
Check flexural strength as vertical nib:
M = 483 KN x 575mm/2 = 138879 KN/mm
Maximum tension in vertical reinforcement;
T = 138870/800 x 2/3 = 262 mm 2 =>small => Minimum rebar are adequate
J. Walls Between Base and Mezzanine Floor
Horizontal Span: As above mezzanine floor
In Plan Sher
Load Case Shear Force Remark

=05a
SSE Fy = 6050 Table 8A.1-21
SSE FX = 4570 Table 8A.1-21
DBT Fy = 6560 Table 8A.1-17

(Wind Load)
> Fy (deip) = 6560 KN
Allowable shear stress

cD VC = aD x2 (fQ) 2 = 0.85 x2 x (3000)12 = 93 psi
Y. - direction:
Front wall
2
V; = (6560/2 sides)/0.8 x (280" + 120" -150") x 25.4 x 900 = 0.71 N/mm = 104 psi
8A. 1-70
September 30, 1996
i~ Back wall
2
V; = (6560/2 sides)/0.8 x 280"x25.4 x 900 = 0.64 N/mm = 93 psi
Shear on front wall just over allowable, hence by inspection nominal reinforcement will be
adequate. i.e. # 10 at 8" horizontal & # 8 at 8" vertical.
Calculate shear reinforcement required at comers of door opening.
With reference to ICE designers manual;
As = V/A) f =6050/2 x 0.9 x 424 = 8158 mm2 = 12.64 in2

=>use 10 - #10 at each corner A. = 12.7 in2 > 12.64 in2
X - direction
2 OK
V; = 4570/2x 0.8 x 379" x 25.4 x900 = 0.33 N/mm = 48 psi < 93 psi
Axial stress due to tornado wind overturn moment
Reference Table 8A.1-17:
= 60,500 KNm = 535,475 in-kips

y= 50,200 KNm = 444,311 in-kips
Check stress due to Mx;
F = 535,475/244 = 2194.57 kips

A= 343 x 36 = 12348 in2
C= 2194.57/12348 = 178 psi
Check stress due to weight:
W = 12285 KN = 2761668 lbs

2
A= ((379-72) x 2 + (280-36) + (280-36 -150)) x 36 = 34272 in
cr= 2761668/34272 = 81 psi
Tmon ~=178-81 = 97 psi

Cmpcession= 178 + 81 = 259 psi < 1785 psi (1P x 0.85 x f, = 0.7 x 0.85 x 3000 = 1785 psi)
8A.1-71
September 30, 1996
Axial stress due to seismic load
From Table 8A.1-20:
My = 53680 KNm = 475,112 in-kips

K = 41360 KNm = 366,070 in-kips
Fz = 2460 KN = 553 kips
Check stress due to
F = 475112/244 = 1947 kips

A = 343 x 36 = 12348 in 2
y= 1947/12348 = 158 psi
Check stress due to M,;
F = 366070/343 = 1067 kips

A = (244-150+120) x 36 = 7704 in2
x= 1067/7704 = 138 psi
Check stress due to Fz;
F2 = 2460 KN = 553008 lbs

A = ((379-72) x 2 + (280-36) + (280-36 -150)) x 36 = 34272 in2
,, = 553008/34272 = 16 psi
Check stress due to weight:
W= 12285 KN = 2761668 lbs

A = ((379-72) x 2 + (280-36) + (280-36 -150)) x 36 = 34272 in 2
a,,= 2761668/34272 = 81 psi
Ccmbined = (1582 + 1382 + 162)12 = 210 psi
aTensin = 210 - 81 = 129 psi

acpr,,j. = 210 + 81 = 291 psi < 1785 psi (O x 0.85 x f, = 0.7 x 0.85 x 3000 = 1785 psi)
8A.1-72
September 30, 1996
Arqid= 129 x 36 x12 / 0.9 x 60000 = 1.032 in2/ft
=use #10 at 8" vertical up to mezzanine floor

=>A = 7c(1.25)2 /4 x 1.5 = 1.84 in 2 /ft > 1.032 in2 /ft
Allowable tension stress =>0.9 x 60000 = 54000 psi

Calculated tension stress 54000 x 1.032/1.84 = 30287 psi
L Roof Plate/Beam Hold Down Arrangement
From Table 8A.1-22. seismic loads at roof floor are:
Acel X = 0.69g
Acel Y = 0.77g
Acel Z = 0.40g
Check for seismic load uplift on the roof:
Weight of roof plate = 166875 lbs (Table 8A.1-3)

Vertical seismic acceleration = 0.40g
By inspection, no uplift, small and nominal anchors would cater for it.
The hold down detail is shown in Figure 8A.1-20.
Check for seismic load uplift on the beam:
Floor steel beams are supported on two sides vertical and anchored on one side only
horizontally (conservative assumption)
Weight of roof plate, beams and equipment = 286600 lbs = 1255 KN ( Reference Section
8A.1.6.1.3- D).
By inspection, there is no seismic uplift occurring on the roof and beams, hence nominal hold
down connection is adequate. The hold down detail is shown in Figure 8A.1-21.
Check for horizontal shear:
The horizontal shear force F. = (1255/2) x 0.77 = 483 KN = 108,578 lbs

Allowable shear stress = 0.42 (Su) = 0.42 x 73000 = 30,600 psi
Try 4 No. of bolts through the 900mm wall to take floor seismic shear in direct tension.
Am.,,Fd= FO f4 = 108578/30600 = 3.54 in2

i.e. use 4-1-1/4"dia. A-325 bolts (A= 4 x 0.969 = 3.876 in2)
8A. 1-73
September 30, 1996
The hold down detail is shown in Figure 8A.1-21.

L Mezzanine Plate/Beam Hold Down Arrangement
From Table 8A.1-21. seismic loads at roof floor are:
Acel X = 0.37g
Acel Y = O.50g
Acel Z = 0.70g
By inspection use as roof details. The hold down detail is shown in Figure 8A.1-22.
8A.1-74
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-20
Roof Plate Hold Down Details
7^1 PLAT~g 1
562.86
1 SQ. X 1.50a
SHEAR LUGS AT
I O d AT ALTERNATE
CENTERS TO
H.D. BOLTS
PEIETR BDE ' IN0

as, X SON THE.J '.62a DIA. A-325
EPLATEo CONTINOUSt IN TID. ROD, HIN
SECTIONS, AROUND THRE EMS. 22'(TYP.
PERXHBTERr BEDDED} IN ROOF PLATE
,.iO- NOR SHRINK GROUT IED. BOLTS)
8A.1-75
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-21
Roof Plate Support Beam Connection Details
SLI
-(4) L25' DIA.

A325 BOLTS
1.38' NOR
SHRINK GROUT
TUD. ROD, HIN.

EBK. 28'
8A. 1-76
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.1-22
Mezzanine Plate Support Beam Connection Details
STEEL BEAM TO-

SUPPORT EDGE
OF PLATE
SLOTTED HOLES ON ONE

END OF BEAM ONLY GAP
1.5 TEX PLA,
STEEL BEAM 1325
12 . sQ. x.75 TEXL
-(4) .62 DIA. A325

TED. RODMIN.
EMD. 22'
2 SO. x 3' Di
SHEAR BLOCK
8A. 1-77
September 30, 1996
M1 Reinforced Concrete Superstructure Load Combination
The applicable loads for the DTS reinforced concrete superstructure include the dead
weight, handling loads, tornado wind/missile loads, and seismic loads. The load combinations
are based on ANSI - 57.9 as shown in Chapter 3. Table 8A.1-26 shows the maximum
combined stress and are compared to AISC code allowables (Reference Chapte 3). Table
8A.1-27 summary the building shear stresses and are compared to the Code allowables. The
results of the building stability analysis are also shown in Table 8A.1-28, The minimum
margin of safety against overturning is 1.98.
Table 8A.1-26
DTS Reinforced Concrete Wall Enveloping Load Combination Results
LMad Calculated Stress Allowable Stress

Compression Tension Bending Compression 1ension Bending
(Concrete! Mdebar) (Rebar) (Concrete) (Rebar) (Rebar)
D+L+E, 291 psi 1,785 psi

(2.01 MPa) (12.3 MPa)
30,287 psi 54,000 psi
(209 Mpa) (372 MPa)
D+L+Wt 259 psi 1,785 psi

(1.79 MPa) (12.3 MPa)
22,774 psi 54,000 psi
(157 MPa) (372 MPa)
D+L+T 0 +E,, 51,726 psi 54,000 psi
(357 MPa) (372 MPa)
D+L+T 0+W, 37,515 psi 54,000 psi
(259 MPa) (372 MPa)
Where: D = Dead Loads

L = Live Loads and Handling Loads
E. = Seismic Loads
W, = Tornado Wind/Missile Loads
T. = Thermal Loads
8A. 1-78
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-27
DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure - Building Shear Stress
Calculated
Concrete Shear Allowable Concrete
Governing Lad Stress Shear Stre
Wall at Roof 540" 55 psi 93 psi
Level (0.038 MPa) (0.64 MPa)
Wall above 85 psi 93 psi

Mezzanine Floor at (0.59 MPa) (0.64 MPa)
271" Level
Walls Between Base Wt 104 psi* 93 psi
and mezzanine Floor (0.72 MPa) (0.64 MPa)
Front Wall
Back Wall Wt 93 psi 93 psi
(0.64 MPa) (0.64 MPa)
* Shear Stress on the front concrete wall just over the allowable. Shear reinforcements
are calculated per ACI-349, Section 11.5.6.
Required Rebar Area = 0.06 in 2/ft
Provide Rebar Area = 1.58 i 2/ft
Table 8A.1-28
DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure - Building Stability
Overturning
Loading moment Stabilizing Moment Factor of Saft
62,755 kNm 144,205 kNm 2.3
(555,434 in-kips) (1,276,333 in-kips)
Wt 70,340 kNm 138,225 kNm 1.98
(622,567 in-kips) (1,223,409 in-kips)
8A.1-79
September 30, 1996
8A.1.6.2 Protective Cover Structural Analysis
The protective cover is designed to withstand the following accident loads:
* Tornado winds,
* Tornado generated missiles, and
* Design basis earthquake.
Tornado Winds
The maximum DBT wind load pressure at protective cover is 630 lbs/ft 2 . The
maximum force applied to the wall of the protective cover is;
F = 379 x 107 x 630/144 = 177,419 lbs

SX,..= allowable bolt shear stress = 0.42 SQ = 0.42 x 125,000 =52,500 psi
A,,.d = required area = 177,419/52,500 = 3.38 m
N,.4d = no. of bolt required = 3.38/0.226 = 14.95 =>15 << 108
S,, = bolt shear stress = 177,419/108 x 0.226 = 7,270 psi < 0.42 S. = 52,500 psi
The shear stress in the bolt is 7,270 psi (50.12 MPa) which is less than the allowable
shear stress of 52,500 psi (362 MPa).
For calculating the tensile stress in the bolts, conservatively assuming the maximum
lifting load is equal to the maximum horizontal force applied to the wall. This force is held
by 32 bolts (one side), the maximum tensile stress is:
S = 177,419/32 x 0.226 = 24,532 psi < 0.7 S_ = 87,500 psi (603 MPa)
Tornado Generated Missiles
The protective cover is analyzed to verify its adequacy for local barrier impingement
of a DBT missile. Detail analysis of the protective cover has been performed and presented
in Section 3.2.1.4. Based on the analysis shown on Section 3.2.1.4, there is a adequate
protection against local design basis tornado missile impact damage. Local bending and
distortion to protective cover is acceptable, since the DTS will not be operated during a
tornado watch or warning.
8A.1-80
September 30, 1996
Design Basis Earthquake
The maximum calculated seismic accelerations for the roof plate are 0.77g horizontally
and 0.4g vertically. With the protective cover plate bolted to the support beam, the beam
stresses due to the resulting 0.4g vertical acceleration are calculated by factoring the normal
operating condition load analysis results reported in Section 8A.1.5.3;
S = 3283 x (1 + 0.4) = 4,596 psi
This maximum combined stress of 4,596 psi (31.68 MPa) is much less than the
allowable stress of 44,160 psi (304 MPa).
S.,1m. = 1.6 x 0.6 x 46000 = 44,160 psi
For the load evaluation of the protective cover plate due to seismic accelerations in the
lateral direction, the resulting equivalent acceleration of 0.77g is assumed to be resisted by the
one hundred and ten (108) - 5/8"(16 mm) bolts:
W = total weight = 135,000 lbs

F = horizontal force = 135,000 x 0.77 = 103,950 lbs
S.,010 = allowable bolt shear stress = 0.42 Su= 0.42 x 125,000 = 52,500 psi
2
Am-d = required area = 103,950/52,500 = 1.98 in
N.qd = no. of bolt required = 1.98/0.226 = 8.76 =>9 << 110
Sth,,, = bolt shear stress = 103,950/110 x 0.226 = 4,184 psi
8A.1.6.3 Roof Plate Structural Analysis
The maximum calculated seismic accelerations for the roof plate are 0.77g horizontally
and 0.4g vertically. With the roof plate bolted to the support beam, the beam stresses due to
the resulting 0.4g vertical acceleration are calculated by factoring the normal operating
condition load analysis results reported in Section 8A.1.5.4;
S = 8850 x (1 + 0.4) = 12,390 psi
This maximum combined stress of 12,390 psi (85.4 MPa) is much less than the
allowable stress of 44,160 psi (304 MPa).
Swim = 1.6 x 0.6 x 42000 = 40,320 psi (278 MPa)
8A.1-81
September 30, 1996
For the load evaluation of the roof plate due to seismic accelerations in the lateral
direction, the resulting equivalent acceleration of 0.77g is assumed to be resisted by the one
hundred and ten (110) - 5/8"(16 mm) bolts:

S.1,, = allowable bolt shear stress = 0.42 (Sj = 0.42 x 125,000 = 52,500 psi
2
A,.qgd = required area = 193,173/52,500 = 3.68 in
Ne4d = no. of bolt required = 3.68/0.226 = 16.28 m 17 << 110
So = bolt shear stress = 193,173/1 10 x 0.226 = 7,770 psi
8A.1.6.4 Mezzanine Plate Structural Analysis
The maximum calculated seismic accelerations for the mezzanine plate are 0.5g
horizontally and 0.7g vertically. With the mezzanine plate bolted to the support beam, the
beam stresses due to the resulting 0.7g vertical acceleration are calculated by factoring the
normal operating condition load analysis results reported in Section 8A.1.5.5.
S = 22,500 x (1 + 0.7) = 38,250 psi
S,,<,, = 1.6 x 0.6 x 46,000 = 44,160 psi
The maximum combined beam stress obtained from this analysis is 38,250 psi (264
MPa) which is less than the allowable stress of 44,160 psi (304 MPa).
For the load evaluation of the mezzanine plate due to seismic accelerations in the
lateral direction, the resulting equivalent acceleration of 0.5g is assumed to be resisted by the
sixty three (63) - 5/8" (16 mm) bolts:

Sa1iow = allowable bolt shear stress = 0.42 (S.) = 0.42 x 125,000 = 52,500 psi
2
A.d = required area = 41,475/52,500 = 0.79 in
N,.ed = no. of bolt required = 0.79/0.226 = 3.5=>4 << 63
Ssj,, = bolt shear stress = 41,475/63 x 0.226 = 2,913 psi
The shear stress in the bolt is 2,913 psi (20 Ma) which is less than the allowable shear
stress of 52,500 psi (362MPa).
8A.1-82
September 30, 1996
8A. 1.6.5 Sliding Door Structural Analysis
The design of the sliding door is based on shielding requirements. Analyses are also
performed to evaluate the effects of tornado wind, tornado missiles and seismic loads.
8A.1.6.5.1 Tornado Wind Load
The sliding door design is evaluated for the effects of tornado wind loads in
accordance with the design criteria indicated in Section 3.0. The maximum stresses induced
in the sliding door by DBT wind pressure loads are very conservatively calculated using the
correlation presented in Roark, page 228, Case 48 (Reference 8A.1.7- 2). The wind pressure
load, 419 lbs/fl2, (0.02 Ma) is applied as a uniform load over the entire surface.
Jiw b2
S = -------
t2
where w= 419 lbs/ft2 = 2.91 lbs/in 2

a =240.
b= 109.5
a/b = 2.19
13 = 0.792
2.91 X109.52
S = 0.792 x ---- = 564 psi
7.02
S.,1Ow = 1.6 x 0.6 x 36000 = 34,560 psi
The analysis results show a maximum stress of 564 psi (3.9 Ma) which is less than the
allowable stress of 34,560 psi (238.3 Ma). Since the resulting sliding door stress is a small
fraction of the code allowable, DBT wind loads are not considered further.
8A.1.6.5.2 Tomado Missiles
The thickness of the sliding door is 7" (bottom) and 9" (top) (178 mm and 229 mm,
respectively). The walls are designed to provide adequate radiation shielding and easily meet
the minimum acceptable barrier thickness requirements for local damage against tornado
generated missiles, specified in Section 3.0. Detail analysis of the sliding door has been
performed and presented in Section 3.2.1.4. Based on the analysis shown on Section 3.2.1.4,
tornado missile impacts on the sliding door cause only superficial damage. The sliding door
8A.1-83
September 30, 1996
thickness is far greater than the minimum required thickness. Local damage to the outer
surfaces of the sliding door will not compromise their confinement capability.
The maximum stress induced in the sliding door by the automobile impact load is
calculated using the correlation presented in Roark, page 226, Case 38. The impact pressure,
196 psi (1.35 MNa) is applied as a uniform load over the impact area, 4029.4 in2 (2.6 m2 ).
Substituting the sliding door physical dimensions and the pressure load into the correction, the
maximum calculated stress is 8,704 psi (60 MPa) which is less than the allowable stress of
21,600 psi (148.9 MPa).
8A.1.6.5.3 Seismic Evaluation
The maximum calculated seismic accelerations for the sliding door are 0.7g vertically,
0.37g longitudinally, and 0.5g laterally. With the sliding door hanging on the support rails,
the door stresses due to the resulting 0.7g vertical acceleration are calculated by factoring the
dead load analysis results reported in Section 8A.1.5.6. Table 8A.1-29 summarized the
combined stresses.
8A.1-84
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.1-29
Sliding Door and Major Components Stress Analysis Results Summary

(Dead Loads, Handling Loads, and seismic Load)
Comp. Calculated Stress Allowable Stress

Tension Bending Shear Tension Bending Shear
Door 180 34,560
Door 144,500 160,000
Wheel (Load) (Capacity)
Wheel 30,784 15,332 110,400 64,400
Axle
Axle 13,547 10,838 96,000 56,000
Bracket
Bracket 36,125 45,000
Bearing (Bearing) (Bearing)
Support 1,348 10,246 1,246 96,000 96,000 56,000
Bracket
Door Rail 7,857 110,400
For the stress evaluation of the sliding door due to seismic acceleration in the lateral
direction, the resulting equivalent static acceleration of 0.5g is assumed to be resisted by four
(4) - 2"(508 mm) dia. pin. The local bearing stresses of the sliding door at the support pin
locations are calculated to be;
F = Lateral force = 85,000 x 0.5 = 42,500 lbs
Ab =Bearing area= 3.1416 x 2/2 x 7 x 4 = 87.96 in2
As= shear area = 3.1414 (1)2 x2 x 4 = 25 in2
Sbeari,,g = 42,500/87.96 = 483 psi < 1.6 x 0.6 x42000 = 40,320 psi
Sshew sf= 42,500/25 = 1,700 psi < 1.4 x 0.4 x42000 = 23,520 psi
Since the resulting sliding door stress is a small fraction of the Code allowable, SSE
load is not considered further.
8A.1-85
September 30, 1996
8A. 1.7 References
8A.1.7-1 American Concrete Institute ACI 349-IR: Code Requirements for Nuclear
Safety Related Concrete Structures - Thermal effects.
8A.1.7-2 Formulas for Stress and Strain by R. Roark, Fourth Edition.
8A. 1.7-3 ANSYS Engineering Analysis Systems User's Manual Volume 1 and 2,
Revision 4.4A.
8A.1.7-4 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.76, "Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power
Plants," April 1974.
8A. 1.7-5 Guidelines for the Design and Assessment of Concrete Structures Subjected to
Impact, UKAEA, SRDR439, Issue 3, May 1990.
8A.1.7-6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.60. Design

Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, 1973.
8A.1.7-7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.61. Damping

Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, 1973.
8A. 1.7-8 J.R. Mcdonald, K.C. Mehta, and J.E. Minor, "Design Guidelines for Wind
Resistant Structures," Institute for Disaster Research and Department of Civil
Engineering, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, June 1975.
8A.1.7-9 "Design of Structures for Missile Impact," Bechtel Topical Report, BC-TOP-
9A (8.51).
8A.1-86
September 30, 1996
Appendix 8A.2 Cask Transfer Subsystem Analysis
This appendix describes the analysis performed on the cask transfer subsystems. The
Cask Transfer Subsystem accepts vertical casks at the entrance to the Preparation Area and
moves it laterally in the X direction to the Lower Access Area, aligns it with the Cask Mating
Subsystem and supports it during transfer of the spent fuel assembly.
The following calculations form a part of this appendix:
1. Analysis of the Locking Pins

2. Analysis of the Transmission Cradles
3. Analysis of the anti-derailing devices
4. Analysis of the guidance rollers and wheels.
The Cask Transfer Subsystem is designed to receive 157 shipments of PWR fuel or
133 shipments of BWR fuel per year (or approximately 53 shipments of PWR fuel or 44
shipments of BWR fuel per 100 day operating period).
The operating period is defined as the calendar year less the annual maintenance
periods. The standard operating period is 300 days/year (24 hours/working day), with an
average cycle of a 100 day operating period followed by a 21 - 22 day maintenance period.
The production period is defined as the operating period less the shutdown periods due
to routine maintenance or due to equipment failure and the corresponding repair time.
0
The cask transfer subsystem is designed to operate at temperatures between 40 F to
1300F, or at temperatures between 20'F to 2000F for short periods of time.
8A2.1 Source Cask Transfer Subsystem General Desciption
The transfer of the source cask is performed by a motor driven trolley on rails. This
trolley is designed to be loaded with the source cask. Centering guides ensure that the cask is
properly positioned on the trolley.
The source cask is held onto the trolley by means of its lower trunnions. Single-piece
devices, all-bolted on the trolley plate and above the trunnions, are removable and cask
specific. The bolted plates weigh a maximum of 60 pounds (27 kg) and are manually
removed.
The trolley structure and the cask holding system prevent the cask from falling due to
any design event.
8A.2-1
September 30, 1996
The cask is elevated 15.7 inches (400 mm) above the base of the trolley, to allow
proper alignment with the source cask mating subsystem.
When the trolley is stopped in a specific position in the Preparation area or in the
Lower Access Area, it is locked at its front by means of a vertical pin actuated by a jack,
which penetrates into the concrete base mat of the DTS. The locking pin prevents the trolley
from accidental forward and backward movement along the rails, and also prevents the trolley
from moving due to a seismic event.
The general characteristics of the source cask transfer trolley are presented in Table
8A.2- 1.
Table 8A.2-1
Source Cask Transfer Trolley Characteristics
U.S. Units Metric Units

Overall Dimensions 10.2 ft x 8.5 ft x 4.4 ft 3.1 m x 2.6 m x 1.3 m
Runway Length 49 ft 15 m
Span 9.1 ft 2.8 m
Wheelbase 6.6 ft 2m
Maximum Design Load 30 tons 27.2 mtons
Material Main components are painted carbon steel. Wheels are
carbon steel. The beams and plates are A36. The bolts are
A193-B7.
Coating Coating meets requirements of Category A - Service Level
1 coating as defined in ASME-NOG-1.
The trolley moves along the X-axis through the use of an synchronous motor/brake
with a manual brake disengagement. Two of the four trolley wheels (one on each side) are
driven. The trolley has two speeds 0.7 ftlrnin (0.2 m/min) and 10 ft/nin (3 m/min). The
trolley has 2 braking systems: a service brake and an emergency brake. The emergency brake
is used as a parking brake.
Trolley guidance is made by two sets of lateral rollers on one of the two runway rails.
An anti-taking off device is implemented on both rails. See Figure 8A.2-1. Source cask
guidance, during loading, is made by four centering guides.
8A.2-2
September 30, 1996
A summary of the calculated dimensions, based on seismic and static loads is

presented in Table 8A.2-2.
8A.2-3
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-1
Trolley Guidance and Anti-Taking Off Device
-ANTI-TAKING 01F DEVICE
8A.24
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.2-2
Calculated Dimensions of Source Cask Trolley

Part Load Calculated Size
Bolts of Cradle Seismic 6 bolts M30 (1.2 in.)
Plate of anti-taking off Seismic 30 mm thick (1.2 in.)
device
Bolts of anti-taking off Seismic 4 bolts M16 (0.6 in)
Device
Diameter of the locking pin Seismic 80 mm (3.2 in.)
Wheel diameter Static 450 mm (17.7 in.)
Rail width minimum Static 40 mm (1.6 in.)
Guidance roller Static 150 mm (5.9 in.)
Rail height minimumStatic 30 mm (1.2 in.)
8A.2.2 Receiving Cask Transfer Subsystem General Description
The transfer of the receiving cask is performed by a motor driven trolley on rails.
This trolley is designed to be loaded with the receiving cask. The structure of the trolley
prevents the cask from tipping under all design events. Centering guides ensure that the cask
is properly positioned on the trolley.
The receiving cask is held onto the trolley by means of its lower trunnions. Single-
piece devices, all-bolted on the trolley plate and above the trunnions, are removable and cask
specific. The bolted plates weigh a maximum of 60 pounds (27 kg) and are manually
removed.
When the trolley is stopped in a specific position in the Preparation area or in the
Lower Access Area, it is locked at its front by means of a vertical pin actuated by a jack,
which penetrates into the concrete base mat of the DTS. The locking pin prevents the trolley
from accidental forward and backward movement along the rails, and also prevents the trolley
from moving due to a seismic event.
The general characteristics of the receiving cask transfer trolley are presented in Table
8A.2-3.
8A.2-5
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.2-3
Receiving Cask Transfer Trolley Characteristics
U.S. Units Metric Units

Overall Dimensions 11.2 ft x 10.2 ft x 3.4 ft 3.4 m x 3.1 m x 1.0 m
Runway Length 49 ft 15 m
Span 9.2 ft 2.8 m
Wheelbase 8.9 ft 2.7 In
Maximum Design Load 125 tons 113.4 mtons
Material Main components are painted carbon steel. Wheels are
carbon steel. The beams and plates are A36. The bolts are
A193-B7.
Coating Coating meets requirements of Category A - Service Level
1 coating as defined in ASME-NOG-1.
The trolley moves along the X-axis through the use of an synchronous motor/brake
with a manual brake disengagement. Two of the foul trolley wheels (one on each side) are
driven. The trolley has two speeds 0.7 f/min (0.2 m/min) and 10 ft/min (3 rn/min). The
trolley has 2 braking systems: a service brake and an emergency brake. The emergency brake
is used as a parking brake.
Trolley guidance is made by two sets of lateral rollers on one of the two runway rails.
An anti-taking off device is implemented on both rails. See Figure 8A.2-1. Receiving cask
guidance, during loading, is made by four centering guides.
A summary of the calculated dimensions, based on seismic and static loads is

presented in Table 8A.2-4.
8A.2-6
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.2-4
Calculated Dimensions of Receiving Cask Trolley

Part Load Calculated Size
Bolts of Cradle Seismic 6 bolts M30 (1.2 in.)
Plate of anti-taking off Seismic 40 mm thick (1.6 in.)
device
Bolts of anti-taking off Seismic 4 bolts M24 ( 1 in)
Device
Diameter of the locking pin Seismic 120 mm (4.8 in.)
Wheel diameter Static 700 mm (27.6 in.)
Rail width minimum Static 100 mm (3.9 in.)
Guidance roller Static 180 mm (7.1 in.)
Rail height minimum Static 50 mm (1.97 in.)
8A.2.3 Runway Rails - General Description
The same runway rails are used by the source and receiving cask transfer subsystems.
The runway rail length is 49 feet (15 m). At the end of each runway, there is a bumper
guard. The rail tolerances are shown in Table 8A.2-5.
At the attachment position (beneath the cask mating subsystems), the overall tolerance
shall be, in the vertical direction (for rails + trolley on rails + cask on trolley) E 5 mm/m (±
0.005 in/in).
The runway rails are shown in Figure 8A.2-2.
8A.2-7
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.2-5
Rail Tolerances
8A.2-8
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-2
Runway Rails
RAIL
am
SA.2-9
September 30, 1996
8A.2.4 Source Cask Trolley Calculations
8A.2.4. 1 Assumptions
It is assumed that the trolley is protected from environmental loads such as wind and
snow by the DTS or the Preparation Area Roof. When the trolley is in the cask loading area,
the cask is fully sealed and locked. It is assumed that damage due to the source cask during
loading on to the trolley has been evaluated as part of the licensing process of the source
cask.
The trunnion hold downs and the anti-derailing devices are calculated with the seismic
load and the live load. The guiding roller wheels are calculated with the live load with
motion.
The material properties used in the analysis are taken from NOG-1, Tables NOG
4211-1 and 422 1-1 and are presented in Table 8A.2-6 below.
The trolley and casks are assumed to be rigid. The length of the source cask is 4,826
mm (190 inches). The outside diameter of the source cask is 1,028 mm (40.5 inches).
Table 8A.2-6
Properties of Materials
Material Yield Strength Ultimate Strength

A36 36 ksi (248 MPa) 58 ksi (399 MPa)
A193-B7 75 ksi (517 MWa) 100 ksi (689 MPa)
8A.2.4.2 Design Criteria
The design criteria are taken from ASME NOG-4300 and are repeated below. The
nomenclature of NOG-4120 is used.
For beams subjected to axial tension and bending:
a /ah + CbX / SbX + aby / ay 1.0 (1)
where a. = 0abx = Baby = 0.9 Sy (for the seismic case)
a. is the axial stress
8A.2-10
September 30, 1996
CabX and aby are the stresses due to the bending moment.
The maximum allowable shear stress under seismic load is 0.5 cy.
An additional safety factor of 1.2 is used to take into account imprecision of the data.
For the beams, which are made from A36 steel:
The tensile stress allowable is:
F/A + MbXx/ Ix + Mbyy/ Iy < 0.9 ay /1.2 = 186 MPa = 27.0 ksi (2)
The shear stress allowable is 0.5ay /1.2 = 103 MPa = 15 ksi.
where A is the cross sectional area.

F is the axial force
Mbx and Mby are bending moments about the x and y axes
Ix and IYare the moduli of inertia
The allowable stresses in the bolts are taken from NOG-4513. For seismic loading, the
maximum allowable tensile load is 0.5 cu , and the maximum allowable shear stress is 0.26
Cu. An additional safety factor of 1.2 is used to take into account imprecision of the data.
Therefore, the allowable tensile stress is 0.5 x 100 ksi / 1.2 = 287 MPa =41.6 ksi. The
allowable shear stress is 149 MPa = 21.6 ksi.
8A.2.4.3 Seismic Loading
The source cask and source cask trolley are assumed to be rigid. Since the trolley and
source cask are not perfectly rigid, an addition factor of 1.5 is used.
The trolley is analyzed for a horizontal g loading of 0.25 g x 1.5 = 0.375 g and a
vertical g loading of 0.17 g x 1.5 = 0.255 g.
The trolley's response to each of the three components of seismic input are combined
by taking the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) per NOG-4153.10:
SRSS = 4(Sx2 + Sy2 + Sz2 )
The seismic analysis was performed for two load combinations: seismic loading +
static loading and seismic loading - static loading. The static load is the live load of the cask
and the trolley due to gravity.
8A.2-11
DOE - DTS - TSAR
_30, 1996
The acceleration due to gravity is g = 9.81 m/sec 2.
8A.2.4.4 Operational Loading
The following operational loads are taken into account:
* The live load of the cask and trolley under gravity (Used for t ov.ulating the stresses
on the wheels)
* The transverse horizontal load (5% of the live load of the cask and the trolley dead
load in the transverse direction per NOG-4133(b)) This load is used to size the
guiding rollers.
An isometric sketch of the cask on the trolley is shown in Figure 8A.2-3. A top view
of the cask on the trolley is shown in Figure 8A.2-4. The bumpers are welded to the beams
of the trolley.
8A.2.4.5 Evaluation of Bolts
The trunnion cradles are shown in Figure 8A.2-5. Six M30 (1.2 in. diameter) bolts are
evaluated using the maximum vertical reaction in the + Z direction on the cradle. This
reaction is obtained by subtracting the static load from the seismic load.
X direction seismic loading
The seismic load in the X direction is applied at the center of gravity of the cask, G.
The load is reacted at the point C (Figure 8A.2-3) which is the center of the compression
zone.
The seismic loading in the X direction is reacted by the trolley base at C and by the
cradle supports.
The force in the x direction is the seismic acceleration in the x direction times the
mass of the cask.
FX = ma.
The distance to the center of the compression zone is L, = D/3 where D is the
diameter of the cask.
OG is the distance between the center of gravity and the base of the cask. Assuming
that the cask weight is approximately equally distributed along its length, OG = L/2.
8A.2-12
September 30, 1996
The reaction forces in the z direction due to the x axis seismic acceleration at the
trunnion locations are equal due to symmetry:
RBZX = RAZX
8A.2-13
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-3
Isometric Sketch of Cask on Trolley
8A.2-14
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-4
Top View of Cask on Trolley
Astvahts
kz uwsi.F
8A.2-15
September 30, 1996
FIGURE 8A2-5
CASK TRANSFER SUBSYSTEM TRUNNION CRADLES
CASK
8Ak2-16
i
September 30, 1996
Then, summing the equations in the z direction:
RBm + RAZX + 0
=CZX
Therefore,
RAZx = RBZX =- RP- /2
Summing the moments about C to 0:
F. x OG - (R0 + RBzx)LI = 0 or
RAZX = RBzX = F, x OG/2L, = makL/2/(2D/3) = ma;(3L/4D)
This reaction force is taken by the cradle.
The x axis reaction is equally taken by the two bumpers. Figure 8A.2-4)
RKX = Rjx = ma,/2

Y direction seismic loading
The seismic load in the Y direction is applied at the center of gravity of the cask, G.
The load is reacted at the point B (Figure 8A.2-3) which is the center of the compression
zone and by one cradle at location A.
The force in the y direction is the seismic acceleration in the y direction times the
mass of the cask.
FY = may
AB is the distance between the two cradles. AB is approximately equal to D.
The static equations are:
FYOG - RAzyAB = 0
8A.2-17
September 30, 1996
Therefore,
RAZY RBZY = FYOG/AB = maYL/2D (cradle reaction force)
Summing the forces in the Y direction:
Rr = Rjy = may /2 (bumper reaction forces)
Z direction Seismic Loading
The Z direction seismic loading is equally divided between the two cradles:
Fz = ma,
RZ= = m; /2 (cradle reaction loads)
Static Z direction loads
The weight of the cask is equally divided by the two cradles.
PZ = -Mg
The vertical reactions at the two cradle locations are RAzs and RBZs.
RAZS = RBzs = -Mg/2 (at the cradles)
Load Combination
Combining the results:
The maximum +Z reaction on the cradle is: (Seismic - Static)
RAZ =4(RA2X2 + RAZ,2 + RAZ2 ) + RAZS
The maximum X and Y reaction on the bumper is at J, where:
Rjx = ma. /2
and Rjy = may /2
8A.2-18
September 30, 1996
Solving numerically:
RAzx = mak(3L/4D) =388,577 N
RAzy = maYL/2D = 259,052 N
R~n = ma /2 = 37,524 N
R~zs = -Mg/2 = -147,150 N
Rjx = mk /2= 110,363 N
Rjy = may /2 110,363 N
Therefore, the maximum reaction force in the Z direction on the cradle is:
RAZ = qRaAM 2 + RAZY2 + RAZZ2 ) + RAn = 321,366 N = 72,293 lbf
Six M30 bolts attach each cradle. The vertical force RAZ is the tension in the bolts.
The cross sectional area for an M30 bolt is AB = 561 mm2

The tensile stress in the bolt is:
C = RAz/6AB = 96 MPa = 13.9 ksi < 287 MPa = 41.6 ksi
The safety factor in the bolts is SF = 287/96 = 3. Therefore the stresses in the bolts are
acceptable.
8A.2.4.6 Evaluation of Anti-Taking Off Device and Locking Pin
The Anti-taking off device is shown in Figure 8A.2-1. The anti-taking off device
prevents the trolley from tipping during a seismic event. This section calculates the stresses
on the anti-taking off device. Figures 8A.2-6 through 8A.2-8 are used to perform this
analysis.
The anti-taking off device is sized to withstand the maximum vertical force in the Z-
direction. This force is obtained by combining the static and seismic loads. The reaction
forces for each load step (x-direction seismic load, y-direction seismic load, z-direction
seismic load and static load) are calculated and then combined to determine the maximum
reaction force.
8A.2-19
September 30, 1996
X direction Seismic Load
The seismic load on the trolley (Mi) is applied at G' shown in Figure 8A.2-8. The
seismic load on the cask (M) is applied at G shown in Figure 8A.2-8. The seismic load is
reacted by compression on the wheel at locations A & D and tension in the anti taking-off
devices at locations B and C.
The vertical reaction forces due to the x direction seismic load at the anti-taking off
devices are defined as RBzx and Rczx. From symmetry, RBzx = RCZX .
O'G is the vertical distance between the center of gravity of the cask and the base of
the anti-taking off device.
8A.2-20
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-6
Cask on Trolley
7-s
_.
8A.2-21
DOE - DTS - TSAR
Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-7
Rails of Trolley
8A.2-22
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-8
Cask on Trolley
Showing Distances between Reaction Forces
8A.2-23
September 30, 1996
From Figure 8A.2-8,
O'G = L/2 + Lz.
O'G' is the vertical distance between the center of gravity of the trolley and the base of the
anti-taking off device.
O'G0= Lz /2.
Summing the moments to zero about AD:
Mta.O'U + Ma.oG - (RBzx + Rczx )Lx = °
Therefore,
RBzx = (MtaxO'G' + MkO'G)/2Lx or
Rm = (MKak Lz /2+ Max(L/2 + Lz ))/2L.
The locking pin takes the force in the x direction:
Rx = (M + MK )ax
Y direction Seismic Loading
The seismic load on the trolley (M, ) is applied at G' shown in Figure 8A.2-8. The
reacted by compression on the wheel at locations C & D and tension in the anti taking-off
devices at locations A and B.
The vertical reaction forces due to the y direction seismic load at the anti-taking off
devices are defined as RBAzy and RBzy. From symmetry, RAzy = RBzy .
From Figure 8A.2-8,
O'G = L/2 + Lz.
O'G' is the vertical distance between the center of gravity of the trolley and the base of the
anti-taking off device.
8A.2-24
September 30, 1996
O'G' = Lz /2.
MKaYO'G' + MaYO'G - (RAZY + RBZY )Ly = 0
Therefore,
RBzy = ( MayO'G' + MaYO'G )/ 2LY or
RBzy = ( MALz /2+ Ma.(L/2 + Lz) )/ MY
The y direction force is taken by the superior plate under the rail on the two anti-
taking off devices at A and B.
RAY = RBy = (M + M )ay / 2
Z Direction Seismic Loading
The z direction seismic loads are taken equally by the four anti-taking off devices:
RBzz = (M + MK )a / 4
Static Z Direction Loading
The static compression load is taken equally by the four wheels. The dead load is:
Pz= (M+ MK)g
The vertical compression at point B is:
RBzs = - (M + M )g/4
Load Combination
The maximum vertical force on the anti-taking off device is the combination of the
static + seismic load:
Rez= (RBZX 2 + RB2 + RBz 2 ) RBZS
8A.2-25
September 30, 1996
The maximum force on the locking pin is:
Rx = (M +M )ax
The maximum force in the Y direction on the anti-taking off device is:
RBY = (M + M )ay/ 2
given M = 30 tons
L = 4,826 mm
= 15 tons
L= 2000 mm
Ly= 2550 mm
LZ 600 mm
a= 0.375 g
ay = 0.375 g
Then RBzx = 87,269 N

RBzy = 68,446 N
RBz = 28,142 N
RBZS = -110,363 N
The forces taken by the anti-taking off device are:
RBz= 4,061 N = 912 bf

Rzy = 82,772 N = 18,694 lbf
The force on the locking pin is:
R. = 165,544 N = 37,216 lbf
The dimensions of the Anti-Taking Off Device are shown in Figure 8A.2-9. The anti-
taking off device is made from A36 carbon steel, with A193 B7 bolts.
The maximum bending moment in the plate is at bolt position 2:
M.a = RBz a = (4061 N)(50mm) = 203 mN
8A.2-26
September 30, 1996
The maximum tension in a bolt occurs at position 2:
F = tension in bolt
Ab = bolt cross sectional area = 157 mm2
Then 2FL - RBZ (L + a) = O
8A.2-27
DOE - DTS - TSAR
Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-9
Source Cask Anti-Taking Off Device
.; (I l
u). 4zd f 4nI
±3
U
-ftT
8A.2-28
September 30, 1996
Solving for F:
F = RBZ (L + a)/2L = 2880 N
a = F/Ab = 2880/157 = 19 MPa < 287 MPa
The safety factor is:
SF = 287/19 = 15
The section modulus of the plate is:
S = (H-2*18)t 3/6t = 18,600 mm3
where t = the thickness of the plate = 30 mm and H = 160 mm.
The bending stress in the plate is:
a = M../ S = 11 MPa= 1.6 ksi < 186 MPa= 27 ksi
The safety factor is SF = 186/11 = 17.
The force RBy is taken directly by the trolley.
The locking pin is shown in Figure 8A.2-10. The pin diameter is D = 2L = 80 mm.
The shear stress in the pin is r = R.; / A = 33 MPa < 103 MPa = 15 ksi where
R.= 165,544 N = 37,216 lbf
and 2/4 = 5,026 mm2
A = nVD
The safety factor on the locking pin is SF = 103/33 = 3.1.
8A.2.4.7 Evaluation of Wheels
The wheels are sized based on static loads. The trolley wheels are 450 mm in
diameter (17.7 in. The effective width of the rail head is 40 mm (1.6 in). The allowable
wheel load is taken from NOG 5452.3:
P.= KbD Obs)

333 = 1393
where K = 1300 (BHN/260)
8A.2-29
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-10
Locking Pin
0,16
8A.2-30
September 30, 1996
The load is equally distributed between the four wheels. Therefore the load on each
wheel is:
F, = (M + M, )g/4 = 110,363 N = 24,811 lbf
The allowable load is P.= KbD = 1393(1.6)(17.7) = 39,449 lbf. Therefore the loads
on the wheels are acceptable. The safety factor is SF = 39449/24811 = 1.5.
8A.2.4.8 Evaluation of the Guiding Rollers
The guiding rollers are calculated based on static loads. The rail width, b = 1.2 in.
(30mm). The roller diameter, D, is 5.9 in (150 mm). The allowable load is taken from NOG
5452.3:
Pa= KbD (lbs)

where K = 1300 (BHN/260) 033 3= 1393
The total load is equally distributed between the 2 guidance rollers. From NOG
4133(b), the lateral load is taken as 5% of the vertical load:
PY = 5% (trolley + cask) live load = 0.05 (M + M, )g = 22,073 N
FY = PY /2 = 11,037 N = 2,481 lbf
The allowable load is Pa= KbD = 1393(1.2)(5.9) = 9863 lb. Therefore the loads on
the wheels are acceptable. The safety factor is SF = 9863/2481 = 3.9.
8A.2.4.9 Summary of Stresses - Source Cask Transfer Trolley
The sizes of the structural components of the source cask trolley, together with the
calculated stresses and allowable stresses are presented in Table 8A.2-7.
8A.2-31
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.2-7
Summary Source Cask Transfer Trolley Stresses
Part Loading Allowable Calculated Size Safety

stress or Stress or Factor
value Value
Bolts of Seismic 287 MPa 96 MPa 6 bolts M30 3
Cradle (1.2 in dia.)
Plate of Seismic 186 MPa 11 MPa 30 mm thick 17
anti-taking (1.2 in)
off device
Bolts of Seismic 287 MPa 19 MPa 4 bolts M16 15
off Device
Diameter of Seismic 103 MPa 33 MPa D = 80 mm 3.1
the locking (3.2 in)
pin
Wheel Static 39,449 lbf 24,811 lbf D = 450 mm 1.5

diameter (17.7 in)
Rail width Static 39,449 lbf 24,811 lbf b = 40 mm 1.5
minimum (1.6 in)
Guidance Static 9,863 lbf 2,481 lbf D = 150 mm 3.9
roller (5.9 in)
Rail height Static 9,863 lbf 2,481 lbf b = 30 mm 3.9
minimum _(1.2 in)
8A.2.5 Receiving Cask Trolley Calculations
8A.2.5.1 Assumptions
It is assumed that the trolley is protected from environmental loads such as wind and
snow by the DTS or the Preparation Area Roof. When the trolley is in the cask loading area,
the cask is fully sealed and locked. It is assumed that potential damage to the receiving cask
during loading on to the trolley has been evaluated as part of the licensing process of the
source cask.
8A.2-32
September 30, 1996
The trunnion hold downs and the anti-derailing devices are calculated with the seismic
load and the live load. The guiding roller wheels are calculated with the live load with
motion.
The material properties used in the analysis are taken from NOG-1, Tables NOG
4211-1 and 4221-1 and are presented in Table 8A.2-6.
The trolley and casks are assumed to be rigid. The length of the receiving cask is
5,290 mm (208.3 inches). The outside diameter of the receiving cask is 1,855 mm (73.0
inches).
8A.2.5.2 Design Criteria
The design criteria are taken from ASME NOG-4300 and presented in Section 8A.2.4.
8A.2.5.3 Seismic Loading
The receiving cask and receiving cask trolley are assumed to be rigid. Since the
trolley and source cask are not perfectly rigid, an addition factor of 1.5 is used.
The trolley is analyzed for a horizontal g loading of 0.25 g x 1.5 = 0.375 g and a
vertical g loading of 0.17 g x 1.5 = 0.255 g.
The trolley's response to each of the three components of seismic input are combined
by taking the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) per NOG-4153.10:
SRSS = 4$(SX2 + Sy2 + Sz2)
The seismic analysis was performed for two load combinations: seismic loading +
static loading and seismic loading - static loading. The static load is the live load of the cask
and the trolley due to gravity.
The acceleration due to gravity is g = 9.81 m/sec 2.
8A.2.5.4 Qperational Loading
The following operational loads are taken into account:
The live load of the cask and trolley under gravity (Used for calculating the stresses
on the wheels)
The transverse horizontal load (5% of the live load of the cask and the trolley dead
8A.2-33
September 30, 1996
load in the transverse direction per NOG-4133(b)) This load is used to size the
guiding rollers.
An isometric sketch of the cask on the trolley is shown in Figure 8A.2-3. A top view
of the cask on the trolley is shown in Figure 8A.2-4. The bumpers are welded to the beams
of the trolley.
8A.2.5.5 Evaluation of Bolts
Six M30 (1.2 in. diameter) bolts are evaluated using the maximum vertical reaction in
the + Z direction on the cradle. This reaction is obtained by subtracting the static load from
the seismic load.
X direction seismic loading
The seismic load in the X direction is applied at the center of gravity of the cask, G.
The load is reacted at the point C (Figure 8A.2-3) which is the center of the compression
zone.
The seismic loading in the X direction is reacted by the trolley base at C and by the
cradle supports.
The force in the x direction is the seismic acceleration in the x direction times the
mass of the cask.
F. = max
The distance to the center of the compression zone is L, = D/3 where D is the
diameter of the cask.
The reaction forces in the z direction due to the x axis seismic acceleration at the
trunnion locations are equal due to symmetry:
RBZX = RAZX
Then, summing the equations in the z direction:
RTBzx + RAM + Rczx = 0
8A.2-34
September 30, 1996
Therefore,
RAZX = RBZX = - RCZX /2
Summing the moments about C to 0:
Fx x OG - (ROAz +RPzxL =O or
RAzx = RBzx = Fx x OG/2L, = maxL/21(2D/3) = mak(3L/4D)
This reaction force is taken by the cradle.
The x axis reaction is equally taken by the two bumpers. Figure 8A.2-4)
RKX = Rjx = maxI2
Y direction seismic loading
The seismic load in the Y direction is applied at the center of gravity of the cask, G.
The load is reacted at the point B (Figure 8A.2-3) which is the center of the compression
zone and by one cradle at location A.
The force in the y direction is the seismic acceleration in the y direction times the
mass of the cask.
FY = may
AB is the distance between the two cradles. AB is approximately equal to D.
The static equations are:
FYOG - R~zyAB = 0
Therefore,
RAzy= -RBz = FY0G/AB = ma 7 L/22D (cradle reaction force)
Summing the forces in the Y direction:
8A.2-35
September 30, 1996
RlY= RjY = may /2 (bumper reaction forces)
Z direction Seismic Loading
The Z direction seismic loading is equally divided between the two cradles:
Fz = ma,
RAZZ = RBzz = ma= /2 (cradle reaction loads)
Static Z direction loads
The weight of the cask is equally divided by the two cradles.
Pz = -Mg
The vertical reactions at the two cradle locations are RAM and RBzs.
RAzs = RBzs = -Mg/2 (at the cradles)
The maximum +Z reaction on the cradle is: (Seismic - Static)
RAZ= 4(IR 2 RAZY + RA2 ) + RAZS

The maximum X and Y reaction on the bumper is at J, where:
Rjx = ma /2
and Rjy = may /2
RAZ= ma.(3L/4D) = 983,520 N
RAZY= maYL/2D = 655,682 N
RA = ma /2= 156,348 N
RA = -Mg/2 = -613,125 N
8A.2-36
September 30, 1996
Rjx = mak /2 = 229,922 N
Ryy = may /2 = 229,922 N
Therefore, the maximum reaction force in the Z direction on the cradle is:
Rz= 1A(Rz 2 + R 2 + RAzz2 ) + RAzs = 579,215 N = 130,300 Ibf
Six M30 bolts attach each cradle. The vertical force RAZ is the tension in the bolts.
The cross sectional area for an M30 bolt is A. = 561 mm2

a = RAz/6AB = 172 MPa = 25 ksi < 287 MPa = 41.6 ksi
The safety factor in the bolts is SF = 287/172 = 1.6. Therefore the stresses in the
bolts are acceptable.
8A.2.5.6 Evaluation of Anti-Taking Off Device and Locking Pin
The Anti-taking off device is shown in Figure 8A.2-1. The anti-taking off device
prevents the trolley from tipping during a seismic event. This section calculates the stresses
on the anti-taking off device. Figures 8A.2-6 through 8A.2-8 are used to perform this
analysis.
The anti-taking off device is sized to withstand the maximum vertical force in the Z-
direction. This force is obtained by combining the static and seismic loads. The reaction
forces for each load step (x-direction seismic load, y-direction seismic load, z-direction
seismic load and static load) are calculated and then combined to determine the maximum
reaction force.
X direction Seismic Load
The seismic load on the trolley (Mi) is applied at G' shown in Figure 8A.2-8. The
seismic load on the cask (M) is applied at 0 shown in Figure 8A.2-8. The seismic load is
reacted by compression on the wheel at locations A & D and tension in the anti taking-off
devices at locations B and C.
The vertical reaction forces due to the x direction seismic load at the anti-taking off
devices are defined as RBzx and RP . From symmetry, RBzx = Rz .
8A.2-37
September 30, 1996
From Figure 8A.2-8,
O'G = L/2 + Lz.
O'G' is the vertical distance between the center of gravity of the trolley and the base of
O'G' = Lz /2.
K O'G +1 MaO'G - (RBzx + Rm )Lx = 0
Therefore,
Rm = (MAaO'GU + MkO'G)/2L. or
Rm = (Max Lz /2+ Ma.(L/2 + Lz ))/2L.
The locking pin takes the force in the x direction:
Rx = (M +M )a.
Y direction Seismic Loading
The seismic load on the trolley (M ) is applied at G' shown in Figure 8A.2-8. The
reacted by compression on the wheel at locations C & D and tension in the anti taking-off
devices at locations A and B.
The vertical reaction forces due to the y direction seismic load at the anti-taking off
devices are defined as RBAzy and RBzy. From symmetry, RAZy = RBzy .
From Figure 8A.2-8,
O'G = L/2 + Lz.
8A.2-38
September 30, 1996
O'G' is the vertical distance between the center of gravity of the trolley and the base of
O'G' = Lz /2.
MtaYO'G' + MaYO'G - UZAzy + RBzy )LY = 0
Therefore,
RBzy = ( MNayO'G' + MaYO'G )/ 2LY or
RBZY = ( MtayLz /2+ Ma.(L/2 + Lz) )/ 2LY
The y direction force is taken by the superior plate under the rail on the two anti-
taking off devices at A and B.
RAY = RBY = (M + M )ay / 2
Z Direction Seismic Loading
The z direction seismic loads are taken equally by the four anti-taking off devices:
RBzz = (M + M )a. / 4
Static Z Direction Loading
The static compression load is taken equally by the four wheels. The dead load is:
PZ = (M + MK)g
The vertical compression at point B is:
Rms = - (M + M )g/4
Load Combination
The maximum vertical force on the anti-taking off device is the combination of the
static + seismic load:
8A.2-39
September 30, 1996
RBZ = I + RBZY
2(pBZX
2 + RBZZ2 )- RBZS
The maximum force on the locking pin is:
Rx = (M +M )a.
The maximum force in the Y direction on the anti-taking off device is:
RBy = (M + M )a, 2
given M= 125 tons

L = 5,290 mm
M = 20 tons
L= 2770 mm
Ly= 2550 mm
L= 700 mm
ax = 0.375 g
ay = 0.375 g
Then Rm = 289,617 N
RBzy = 306,654 N
RBzz = 90,683 N
RBzs = -355,612 N
The forces taken by the anti-taking off device are:
RBz = 78,525 N = 17,047 Ibf

RBY = 266,710 N = 59,960 lbf
The force on the locking pin is:
R. = 533,420 N = 119,920 Ibf
The dimensions of the Anti-Taking Off Device are shown in Figure 8A.2-11. The
anti-taking off device is made from A36 carbon steel, with A193 B7 bolts.
The maximum bending moment in the plate is at bolt position 2:
Mma = RBZ a = (78,525 N)(50mm) = 3,975 mN
8A.2-40
September 30, 1996
The maximum tension in a bolt occurs at position 2:
F = tension in bolt
Ab = bolt cross sectional area = 353 mm 2
Then 2FL - RBZ(L + a) = O
Solving for F:
F = RBz (L + a)/2L = 53,800 N per bolt
8A.2-41
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.2-11
Receiving Cask Anti-Taking Off Device
V_ f
k za gelof r zhe
uric 4- Softst Mn24
Re.
II I V Alu
. _e i
Io-1T
8A.2-42
September 30, 1996
a = F/Ab = 53,800/353 = 153 MPa < 287 MPa

SF = 287/153 = 1.8
The section modulus of the plate is:
S = (H-2*26)t 3/6t = 28,800 mm3
where t = the thickness of the plate = 40 mm and H = 160 mm.
The bending stress in the plate is:
cr = M../ S = 138 MPa = 20 ksi < 186 MPa = 27 ksi
The safety factor is SF = 186/138 = 1.3.
The force Riy is taken directly by the trolley.
The locking pin is shown in Figure 8A.2-10. The pin diameter is D = 2L = 120 mm.
The shear stress in the pin is X = R, / A = 47 MPa < 103 MPa = 15 ksi where
R= 533,420 N = 119,919 lbf
and A = D2/4 = 11,310 mm2
The safety factor on the locking pin is SF = 103/47 = 2.2.
8A.2.5.7 Evaluation of Wheels
The wheels are sized based on static loads. The trolley wheels are 700 mm in
diameter (27.6 in). The effective width of the rail head is 100 mm (3.9 in). The allowable
wheel load is taken from NOG 5452.3:
P.= KbD (lbs)
where K = 1300 (BHN/260) 03 33 = 1393
The load is equally distributed between the four wheels. Therefore the load on each
wheel is:
F2 = (M + M, )g/4 = 355,612 N = 79,946 lbf
8A.243
September 30, 1996
The allowable load is Pa= KbD = 1393(3.9)(27.6) = 151,141 lbf. Therefore the loads
on the wheels are acceptable. The safety factor is SF =151141/79946 = 1.9.
8A.2.5.8 Evaluation of the Guiding Rollers
The guiding rollers are calculated based on static loads. The rail width, b = 1.97 in.
(50mm). The roller diameter, D, is 7.1 in (180 mm). The allowable load is taken from NOG
5452.3:
P.= KbD (Ibs)

where K = 1300 (BHN/260) 03 33 = 1393
The total load is equally distributed between the 2 guidance rollers. From NOG
4133(b), the lateral load is taken as 5% of the vertical load:
Py = 5% (trolley + cask) live load = 0.05 (M + M, )g = 71,123 N
FY = PY /2 = 35,562 N = 7,995 lbf
The allowable load is Pa= KbD = 1393(l.97)(7.1) = 19,490 lbf. Therefore the loads
on the wheels are acceptable. The safety factor is SF = 19490/7995 = 2.4.
8A.2.5.9 Summary of Stresses - Receiving Cask Transfer Trolley
The sizes of the structural components of the source cask trolley, together with the
calculated stresses and allowable stresses are presented in Table 8A.2-8.
8A.2-44
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.2-8
Summary Receiving Cask Transfer Trolley Stresses
Part Loading Allowable Calculated Size Safety

stress or Stress or Factor
value Value
Bolts of Seismic 287 MPa 172 MPa 6 bolts M30 1.6
Cradle (1.2 in dia.)
Plate of Seismic 186 MPa 138 MPa 40 mm thick 1.3
off device
Bolts of Seismic 287 MPa 153 MPa 4 bolts M24 1.8
anti-taking (I in)
off Device
Diameter of Seismic 103 MPa 47 MPa D = 120 mm 2.2
the locking (4.8 in)
pin
Wheel Static 151,141 lbf 79,946 lbf D = 700 mm 1.9
diameter (27.6 in)
Rail width Static 151,141 lbf 79,946 lbf b = 100 mm 1.9
minimu ___(3.9 in)
Guidance Static 19,490 lbf 7,995 lbf D = 180 mm 2.4
roller (7.1 in)
Rail height Static 19,490 lbf 7,995 lbf b = 50 mm 2.4
minimum (1.97 in)
8A.2-45
September 30, 1996
Appendix 8A.3 Receiving and Source Cask Mating Subsystem
This appendix describes the calculations performed to ensure that the Receiving and
Source Cask Mating Subsystem functions safely. The only portion of the Cask Mating
Subsystem which is important to safety is the lifting of the cask lid, through the use of the
overlid. Calculations are presented which evaluate the thickness of the overlid pintle, the
thickness of the shield plug pintle, and the size of the overlid gripping device.
The source cask lid pintle and the shield plug pintle are identical. The grapple for the
source cask lid and the grapple for the shield plug are also identical. Since the source cask
lid is lighter than the shield plug, the analysis is performed on the shield plug pintle.
The forces are taken from the ANSYS analysis of the upper crane presented in
Appendix 8A4. There are 4 fingers on each grapple. Any two opposing fingers can
accommodate the entire load. The vertical force Fz is taken from the ANSYS model and is
150,000 N. This is the maximum force at the finger location for all positions analyzed. The
mass used in the ANSYS analysis is 7000 kg.
The following masses are taken into account:
nip = 3000 kg = mass of the shield plug

in0 = 1500 kg = mass of the overlid
The fingers, pintle and axis are all made from A36 forged carbon steel, with the
following minimum properties:
yield strength, ay 36 ksi (248 MPa)

ultimate strength, a. 58 ksi (399 MPa)
The mass of the plug and overlid is less than that used in the ANSYS analysis.
Therefore, the force is corrected below.
P. = F.(computed) x m/mT
where m is the mass of the system and mT is the mass used in the analysis (7000 kg).
PEitle of the plug
The maximum force on the pintle of the plug due to seismic loading is:
F, = 150,000 x np/mT = 150,000 x 3000/7000 = 64,300 N= 14,454 lbs
8A.3-1
September 30, 1996
The maximum force in the static case (including a factor of 6 to yield for a
nonredundant lift system) is:
F = 3000 x 9.81 x 6.0 = 1.77 x 105 N = 39,654 lbs
Therefore the static case is limiting. The pintle of the plug is shown below:
FIGURE 8A.3-1
PINTLE OF THE PLUG
D- - 3.94"(100mm)
l I lDo= 6.94"(176mm)
8A.3-2
September 30, 1996
Using the loading from the static analysis, the force on one finger is:
T = F, /2 = 19,827 lbs
The contact length t is the width of the finger, 2" (50 mm). The modulus of inertia of the
bending resistant section is:
S = te2/6 where e is the thickness of the pintle, 2" (50 mm) and t is the width of
the finger
S = 2 x 22/6 = 1.33 in'
The bending moment is M = Td = 19,827 x 1.5 = 29,741 in- Ibs
The bending stress is:
a = MWS = 29741/1.33 = 22,362 psi -< 36,000 psi ( 6 to yield strength)
a = 22,362 x 10/6 = 37,270 psi -<58,000 psi (10 to tensile strength)
Finge and axis of the overlid
The axis of the grapple is 1 in. ( 25 mm).

The cross sectional area is therefore A = 0.785 in2 (491 mm 2). The shear force in the pin for
the static loading is:
F = 19,827 lbs
The shear stress is:
T = T/2A = 19,827/2 x 0.785 = 12,629 psi -<36,000 psi
T = 12,629 x 10/6 = 21,048 psi -< 58,000 psi
A sketch of a finger is shown below. The following dimensions are used for the
finger:
L2 = 60 mm = 2.36 in
LI =S0 mm=2.0 in.
L3 = 20 mm = 0.8 in.
t= 50 mm = 2.0 in.
b 20 mm =0.8 in.
d =25 mm = 1.0"
8A.3-3
September 30, 1996
FIGURE 8A.3-2
FINGER
-jI
8A.3-4
September 30, 1996
The shear stress in the LI section is:
T = T/Lit = 19,827/2x2 = 4,957 psi < 36,000 psi
T = 4,957 x 10/6 = 7,828 psi < 58,000 psi
The shear stress in the L3 section is:
T = T/L 3 t = 19,827/0.8 x 2 = 12,392 psi < 36,000 psi
X= 12,392x 10/6 =20,653 psi < 58,000 psi
The tensile and bending stress in the L2 section is:
as = T/L2 t + MS
where M = T(b + L2 /2) = 19,827 (0.8 + 2.36/2) = 39,257 psi
and S = tL2 2/6 = 2 x 2.362/6 = 1.86 in3
Then a = 19,827/2.36 x 2 + 39,257/1.86 = 4,200 + 21,106 = 25,306 psi < 36,000 psi
a = 25,306 x 10/6 = 42,176 psi < 58,000 psi
Pintle of the Overlid
The maximum force based on the seismic analysis is:
Fz = 150,000(mp + mO)/mT = (150000)(4500)/7000 = 96,429 N = 21,677 lbs
The maximum force due to the static case using a safety factor of 6 for nonredundant
loading is:
F = 4500 * 9.81 * 6 = 2.65 x 105 N = 59,572 lbs
We conservatively assume that the load is handled by 2 fingers only. Then the
maximum force applied to each finger is:
T = Fz/2 = 29,786 lbs
8A.3-5
September 30, 1996
The pintle on the overlid is shown below:
FIGURE 8A.3-3
PINTLE ON THE OVERLID
t, = 40 mm =
1.6 in.
t2 = 40 nm = 1.6 in.
The bending stress is:
es = M/S = 6T t1j2 = 6 x 29,786 /7c x 1.62 = 22,220 psi i < 36,000 psi
a = 22,220 x 10/6 = 37,033 psi < 58,000 psi
The stress at t2 is equal to the stress at tj.
8A.3-6
September 30, 1996
Summary of Results
The summary of the stresses in the cask mating subsystem are shown below.
Part Load Allowable Calculated Calculate

Value (ksi) Value(ksi) d Size
Axis for Static 36 (yield) 12.6 (shear) 25 mm
finger of the (1.0 in)
overlid 58 (tensile) 21.0 (shear)
diameter
Overlid Static 36 (yield) 25.3(bending) 50 mm
finger (2 in.)
thickness 58 (tensile) 42.2(bending)
Plug Pintle Static 36 (yield) 22.3(bending) 50 mm
thickness (2 in.)
58 (tensile) 37.2(bending)
Overlid Static 36 (yield) 22.2(bending) 40 mm
Pintle (1.6 in.)
Thickness 58 (tensile) 37.0(bending)
8A.3-7
September 30, 1996
Appendix 8A.4 Shield Plug and Source Cask Lid Handling Subsystem Analysis
This appendix describes the analysis performed on the upper crane, TC port covers
and upper shield port covers. The upper crane has been analyzed using the finite element
analysis program ANSYS 4.4. Certain components of the crane, such as the grapple, have
been evaluated using hand calculations.
The seismic analysis is performed on the crane to ensure retention of the load and the
prevention of any component from becoming a missile that would be detrimental to the DTS's
safety related equipment. Seismic evaluation is performed with and without the rated load.
8A.4.1 Positions Evaluated
The crane is analyzed with the rated load with the trolley in two positions: over the
source cask and over the receiving cask. The crane is evaluated with the trolley at mid-span
without the rated load. The length of the cable is calculated and introduced to have the
vertical frequency at the maximum of the vertical spectrum. This position is more severe
than the position with the hook in the full up or full down positions.
8A.4.2 Load Combinations
The following loads are used for the seismic evaluation. The symbols and
nomenclature are taken from NOG-1.
Pd= the trolley dead load

Pdb= frame and rail dead load
Pi,= the rated load of the crane
P,: = the credible critical load with safe shutdown earthquake
Pe.= safe shutdown earthquake load
Note that the rated load of the crane is equal to the credible critical load, Ps = PI,
The following load combinations were evaluated for the seismic event, as specified in
NOG-4140(d):
Polo = Pdt + Pd& + P. + P. (evaluated with trolley positioned over a cask - Load
Combination 1)
P11 = Pdt + Pdb + Pe (evaluated with the trolley at mid-span - Load Combination 2)
P = Pdft + Pi, (evaluated with trolley positioned over a cask -Load

Combination 3)
8A.-1
September 30, 1996
P = Pdt (evaluated with the trolley at mid-span - Load Combination 4)
The force in the cable is obtained from Load combination 1. The stresses in the
supporting structure of the compensator and the support of pulleys #1 and #6 are obtained
from this cable force. This is load combination 5.
Load combination 1 and 5 are combined to take into account the forces in the trolley
induced by the cables in the seismic calculation. This is load combination 6.
Load combinations 2 and 6 are used to analyze the crane during a seismic event.
Load combination 6 is used to analyze the supporting structure of the compensator and the
support of pulleys #1 and #6 during a seismic event. Combinations 3 and 4 are used to verify
the girder deflection.
8A.4.3 Material Properties
The properties for the structural components of the crane were taken from Tables
NOG-4211-1 and NOG-4221-1 of NOG-1, and are summarized below:
The plates and beams will be constructed from A36 Steel, with a minimum yield
strength of 36 ksi (248 MPa) and a minimum tensile strength of 58 ksi (399 MPa).
The structural connections will be constructed from A193 Grade B7, with a minimum
yield strength of 75 ksi (517 MPa) and a minimum tensile strength of 100 ksi (689 MPa).
The cable minimum ultimate strength used in the analytical model is 256.7 ksi (1770
MPa). A shape factor including the strand factor of 0.57 is used in the analysis.
8A.4.4 Design Criteria
The design criteria for the crane are taken from NOG-4300 and are repeated following.
Allowable Stresses in the beams
For compression members with an equivalent slenderness ratio:
Id/r < C. = 4 (27cE/ca) (6)
where E = modulus of elasticity

cry = the yield point
k = effective length factor
1 = length of compression member
8A.4-2
September 30, 1996
r = radius of gyration of member

and Cc = column slenderness ratio separating elastic and inelastic buckling
The allowable axial compression stress shall not exceed the value:
a. = (l-(dl/r)2 / 2C, 2 ))(ay / FS) (7)
where FS = factor of safety and the other variables are as noted above.
The required factor of safety is equal to:
FS = N{5/3 + ( 3/8) ((kdr)/C, ) - (1/8) ( (klr)/C, )3} (8)
For severe environmental loads, the value of N is 0.67. For compression members
with an equivalent slenderness ratio kl/r > C, , the allowable axial compression stress shall
not exceed the value:
Ca = 12w2E / (23N(klIr) 2 ) (9)
Members subjected to both axial compression and bending stresses shall satisfy the
following requirements:
a / aa + C. abx / ((1 - a/pe )45abx ) + Cmyaby / ((1- /0'y )Caby ) < 1-0 (10)
a / a.c + abX / ab + aby /0by < 1-0 (I 1)
where a'l = 12n2E / (23N(kl/r)2 ) (12)
The subscripts x and y, combined with subscripts b, m, and e, indicate the axis of
bending about which a particular stress or design property applies; and a., a b are the
allowable axial and bending stresses respectively.
The I is the actual unbraced length in the plane of bending, r is the corresponding
radius of gyration, K is the effective length factor in the plane of bending and N is the
loading condition factor, 0.67 for extreme environmental loading.
8A.4-3
September 30, 1996
Cm is a coefficient whose value is:
(a) Cm = 0.85 for compression members in frames subject to joint translation;

(b) Cm = 0.6 - 0.4 (M, /M2) but not less than 0.4 for restrained compression
members in frames braced against joint translation and not subject to transverse
loading between their supports in the plane of bending. M, /M2 is the ratio of
the smaller to the larger moments at the ends of that portion of the member
unbraced in the plane of bending under consideration.
(c) For compression members in frames braced against joint translation in the
plane of loading and subjected to transverse loading between their supports, Cm
= 0.85 for members whose ends are restrained, and Cm = 1.0 for members
whose ends are unrestrained.
If a/ a < 0.15, then only equation (11) needs to be evaluated.
Members subjected to both axial tension and bending stresses shall satisfy equation
(11). The computed bending tensile stress, taken alone, shall not exceed the 0.9cay.
The maximum allowable shear stress under seismic load is 0.5 ay.
An additional factor of 1.2 is applied to all stresses to account for uncertainties since
the loading may change from site to site.
F/A + M,,x/I 1 + Myy/I < 0.9 ay/1.2 = 186 MIPa = 27.0 ksi (13)
Allowable stresses in Bolts
The allowable stresses in the bolts are taken from NOG-4513. For seismic loading,
the maximum allowable tensile load is 0.5 ay, and the maximum allowable shear stress is
0.26 asy. For bearing type joints, the stresses shall meet the following criteria:
a •0.6 ayR- 1.6 'r (14)
The maximum allowable tensile stress due to seismic loading, assuming an additional
safety factor of 1.2 is therefore 41.6 ksi (287 MPa). The maximum allowable shear stress,
assuming an additional safety factor of 1.2 is 21.6 ksi (149 MPa).
8A.4-4
September 30, 1996
Allowable Deflections
The total vertical deflection of the girder during operational loading for the rated live
load plus trolley (Pd. + PIr ), and not including impact or dead load of the girder, shall not
exceed 1/1000 of the span.
Allowable stress for the Cables.
The maximum allowable stresses in the cables is governed by NOG-5425.1. The

maximum critical load (without impact), plus the weight of the load block divided by the total
number of parts of rope per system, shall not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published
breaking strength on the total system. The seismic load with all parts of rope intact shall not
exceed 40% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength.
For the cables, a,,= 1770 MPa = 256.7 ksi. For the static case,
F/KA < ru / 10 = 177 MPa = 25.6 ksi (15)
K is the shape coefficient, which is taken as 0.57. A = 7rd 2/4.
Then:
dmEN = '1(40F/K71GU) (16)
and F = P,1 /nn (17)
where Pd = the credible critical load and the weight of the load block
n = the number of parts of the rope
-i= the efficiency, which is taken as 0.94 to start.
8A.4.5 Component Weights
The following masses were used in the model of the upper crane:
Live load: 7,000 kg (lifting capacity and grapple)

Trolley: 2,000 kg
8A.4.6 Upper Crane Model
A model of the upper crane was made to evaluate it under seismic loading. The
response spectrum method was used according to the requirements of NOG 4153.1. The
response of the crane to the input response spectra in three directions was determined on a
8A.4-5
September 30, 1996
modal basis. An ANSYS model was used to perform the analysis. The program searches the
frequency and the modal participation factor up to the cutoff frequency (around 33 Hz). If
the sum of the participation of the mass is less than 90% in a direction, the program is
completed with the equivalent static component in this direction. The residual mass is
affected with the acceleration of the cutoff frequency in this direction.
The dynamic responses of the structure are combined using the "grouping method" in
accordance with NOG 4153.10. The three directional components of the earthquake motion
are combined by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the maximum
representation values of the codirectional responses caused by each of the three components
of earthquake motion at each mode of the crane mathematical model.
The model consists of:
* a plate for the mezzanine and its beams

* a left support for the pulleys
* a right support for the pulleys
* a trolley with a cable and a mass
* rails and poles.
The finite element required 1,350 elements and 1,178 nodes.
Trolley and Cable Model
The trolley is represented by STIF 4 beams with corrected densities to simulate the
weight of the trolley. A sketch of the trolley model is shown in Figure 8A.4-1. The dotted
lines are rigid beams with nearly no mass (material density of 0.1 x 10-" kg/m3). The single
solid lines represent rectangular structural tubing 12 in. x 18 in x 1/2 in with a density of 0.55
x I0' kg/mm 3. The double solid lines represent rectangular structural tubing 16 in. x 12 in. x
1/2 in. with a density of 0.347 x 1i0 kg/mm3. These corrected densities give a total mass of
2.67 metric tons or 5,732 lbs.
The cable is modeled as a spar element (LINK 8 of ANSYS) with a stiffness and a
length which provides a vertical frequency of 10 Hz:
F = (l/27r)'1k/m = 10 Hz
The spring constant k = EA/L
8A.4-6
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-1
ANSYS Trolley Model
r nk
/-'-CABLE
I
Ifit I ASS
l ln iZ7~~
I I
8A.4-7
September 30, 1996
The truss element area and length are chosen to provide resonance at the spectrum
peak of 10 Hz. The actual cable stiffness is much less than a truss. However, we are only
interested in resonance at 10 Hz in order to obtain a peak load from the truss.
where E = Young's Modulus = 201,000 MPa

A = cross sectional area
L = length of the cable = 1 m
m = mass = 7,000 kg
Solving for k: k = (2 -nF)2m = 2.77 x I07 N/m

Then solving for A = 137.8 mm2
Model of Rails and Poles
The rails and poles are modeled as beam elements (ANSYS STIF 4). A sketch of the
model shown in Figure 8A.4-2. The dotted lines represent W 10 x 60 beams with 2 lateral
is
shells reinforcing them. The double lines represent W1O x 60 beams. The single lines
represent W 6 x 25 beams. The density used for the beams is 7,850 kg/zn3 . All beams are
made from A36 steel.
8A.4-8
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-2
Model of Rails and Poles
- _ _ a a.
0.
I\\-a a a
8A.4-9
September 30, 1996
Link Between the Trolley and the Rails
The link between the trolley and the rails is shown in Figure 8A.4-3. STIF 14 spring
dampers with a high degree of stiffness are used to model the coupled nodes. The node
constraints are summarized in Table 8A.4-1.
Table 8A.4-1
Node Constraints
Translation Rotation
Nodes X Y Z ex I ey I 0Z
AA' Free Coupled Coupled FREE
BB' Coupled Coupled Coupled
CC' Coupled Coupled Coupled
DD' Free Coupled Coupled
8A.4-10
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-3
Links Between the Trolley and the Rails
'A' - - - - - -
IC'
Ni
- B'
= -R- IGID BEAMS
BEAMW IOxGO
8A.4-1 1
September 30, 1996
Left Support of the Pulleys
The left support of the pulleys is a beam structure modeled as shown in Figure 8A.4-
4. The dotted lines represent W 10 x 60 beams (STIF4 ANSYS). The solid lines represent
W10 x 60 beams reinforced by two lateral plates. The beams are made from A36 carbon
steel, with a density of 7850 kg/r 3 .
8A.-12
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-4
Left Pulley Support
I'I
I\
I \
Y
x
&A.4-13
September 30, 1996
Rig Support of the Pulleys
The right support of the pulleys is a beam structure modeled as shown in Figure 8A.4-
5. The solid lines represent W 8 x 35 beams, and the dotted lines represent W6 x 25 beams.
The beams are made from A36 carbon steel with a density of 7,850 kg/in3 .
8A.4-14
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-5
Right Pulley Support
II
8A.4-15S
September 30, 1996
Rooflate
The roof plate is modeled using ANSYS shell element 43. The analysis was made
using a 4 inch thick plate. Since the analysis was performed, the plate was increased to 7
inches to provide additional shielding. This analysis is expected to be conservative. The
plate is made from A36 steel with a density of 7,850 kg/m3. The plate is reinforced by 5
W14 x 550 beams.
The plate consists of 4 shells which are attached by bolts at the level of the fillets A,
B and C. The boundary conditions are shown in Table 8A.4-2.
Table 8A.4-2
Restraint Conditions - Roof Plate
Fillet X Y Z O Ix yz
AA' Coupled Free Coupled FREE

BB' Coupled Free Coupled
cc' Coupled Free Coupled
E Fixed Free Fixed
F Free Fixed Fixed
D Free Free Fixed
F' Free Free Fixed
The coupling conditions between the 2 fillets are realized by coupled set equations.
The fixed degrees of freedom are imposed by displacement constraints. (No displacement in
the given degree of freedom).
The W14 x 550 beams are welded to the plates. Therefore, the nodes are coupled in
all directions. For conservatism, the neutral axis of the beams are set coincident with those of
the plate as shown in Figure 8A.4-6.
8A.4-16
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-6
W14 x 550 Beams and Roof Plate
hzbJ F'
I VK
-P
Protective Cover
The protective cover is considered as a mass. The weight of the protective cover used
in the analysis is 16 metric tons, or 35,274 lbs. The mass is uniformly distributed on the
intersection of the plate and the protective cover. ANSYS mass elements 21 are used to
represent the protective cover.
Link Between the Roof Plate and the Crane Supports
The crane supports and the roof plate are shown in Figure 8A.4-7. The node restraints
are summarized in Table 8A.4-3.
8A.4-17
je-ppme 30, A996
IoE -TS - IS,

,,Co
sud' Cras
Ujpper 1?1ate
.K' I*1
pi4t#
/
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.4-3
Restraint Conditions between the Roof Plate and the Crane Supports
Nodes X VY z ex YF
O
AA' Coupled
BB' Coupled
CC' Coupled
DD' Coupled
EE' Coupled Free Coupled

FF' Coupled Free Coupled
GG' Coupled Free Coupled
HH Coupled Free Coupled
HtCoupled Fe Coupled Fe Coupled
II' Free Coupled Coupled
MI Coupled Coupled Coupled
KK' Coupled Free Coupled
LU Coupled Coupled Coupled
MIM Free Coupled Coupled
NN Coupled Free Coupled
00' Coupled
PP _ Coupled
The ANSYS model is shown in Figures 8A.4-8 through 8A.4-13.
8A.4-19
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-8
Model of Crane Supports
4...
- . .--..
if
-I / ... . . ,
let i't * s
'S
i \
if
hi "
S . %
S
SA.4-20
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-9
Model of Left Pulley Support
zSA.4-21
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-10
Model of Right Pulley Support
.Si
.. A.;
I
I
i1.
i1.
I
II
I
I
.I II
I
3 11
4I
i
i 1;
2
x
I.
i I
I
II
I
I
II
II
8A.-22
DOE - DTS - TSAR
Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-11
Model of Trolley
I S
:.-*--
.- II
-a-.
a-
I I
8A.4-23
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-12.
Model of Trolley with Cable and Mass
8A.4-24
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-13
Model of Roof Plate
8A.4-25
September 30, 1996
8A.4.7 Input Spetra
The spectra is presented in Figures 8A.4-14 and 8A.4-15. The spectrum is based on a
hard rock site (a basemat founded on competent bedrock with shear wave velocity > 1100
m/s. It is not valid for other site conditions such as sands, gravel, silt or clay. Note that the
spectrum used for this analysis is slightly different from the spectrum determined in Appendix
8A.1. This analysis will be redone when a site location is determined with actual site
spectrum. This analysis is only used to size the equipment and to be representative of the
expected spectrum at the various potential DTS locations.
8A.4-26
DOIE - DTS - TSAR Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-14
Secondary Response Spectra, 46' Level, Y Direction
or i
ff 3Wr 9if-M
wo IT I.II
&A.4-27
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-15
Secondary Response Spectra, 46' Level, X Direction
so"
4=oo
_ - - - .- - - - - : _
mmoo
200
; . ~l H
-I-.i--._
0.0oo
A. O,. 'C
I I - Fw
wu
8A.4-28
September 30, 1996
8A.4.8 Seismic Reults
The maximum stresses in the beams and plates due to load combination 1 are
summarized in Table 8A.4-4. All the stresses are well below the allowable stress.
Table 8A.4-4
Seismic Stresses
Load Combination 1
Component Maximum Tension Maximum Shear

Calculated Allowable Calculated Allowable
W10 x 60 25.5 MPa 186 MPa 18.6 MPa 103 MPa
with shell 3.7 ksi 27 ksi 2.7 ksi 15 ksi
W10 x 60 26 MPa 186 MPa 16 MPa 103 MPa
3.8 ksi 27 ksi 2.3 ksi 15 ksi
300 x 200 x 13.2 MPa 186 MPa 25.3 MPa 103 MPa
10 1.9 ksi 27 ksi 3.6 ksi 15 ksi
400 x 200 x 10.6 MPa 186 MPa 10.7 Ma 103 MPa
10 1.54 ksi 27 ksi 1.55 ksi 15 ksi
W8x35 13.3 MPa 186 MPa 2.15 MPa 103 MPa
W 6 x 25 6.15 MPa 186 Ma 0.97 MPa 103 MPa
W14 x 550 18.7 MPa 186 MPa 2.5 MPa 103 MPa
The maximum stresses in the beams and plates due to load combination 2 are summarized in
Table 8A.4-5. All the stresses are well below the allowable stress.
8A.4-29
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.4-5
Seismic Stresses
Load Combination 2

W10 x 60 53 MPa 186 MPa 8.88 MPa 103 MPa
W10 x 60 26 MPa 186 MPa 16 MPa 103 MPa
300 x 200 x 5.6 MPa 186 MPa 11.3 MPa 103 MPa
10 0.81ksi 27 ksi 1.64 ksi 15 ksi
400 x 200 x 5.22 MNa 186 MPa 2.56 MPa 103 MPa
10 0.75 ksi 27 ksi 0.37 ksi 15 ksi
W 8 x 35 12.9 MPa 186 MPa 2.07 MPa 103 MPa
W 6 x 25 5.96 MPa 186 MPa 0.94 MPa 103 MPa
0.86 ksi 27 ksi 0.13 ksi 15 ksi
W14 x 550 18.4 MPa 186 MPa 2.47 Pa 103 MPa
. 2.67 ksi 27 ksi .36 ksi 15 ksi
Combination 5 is obtained by applying the cable force from combination 1(150,000 N)

to the 4 top nodes of the right and left pulley supports. These results are combined with load
combination 1 to form load combination 6.
The maximum stresses in the beams and plates due to load combination 6 are
summarized in Table 8A.4-6. All the stresses are well below the allowable stress.
8A.4-30
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.4-6
Seismic Stresses
Load Combination 6

W10 x 60 19.8 MPa 186 MPa 19.8 MPa 103 MPa
W10 x 60 39 MPa 186 Ma 17.1 MPa 103 MPa
300 x 200 x 13.9 MPa 186 MPa 28 MPa 103 MPa
10 2 ksi 27 ksi 4 ksi 15 ksi
400 x 200 x 10.33 MPa 186 MPa 4.09 MPa 103 MPa
10 1.5 ksi 27 ksi 0.6 ksi 15 ksi
W 8 x 35 21.5 MPa 186 MPa 2.2 MPa 103 MPa
W 6 x 25 21.6 MPa 186 MPa 0.96 MPa 103 MPa
W14 x 550 21 MPa 186 MPa 2.77 MPa 103 MPa

3 ksi 27 ksi 3.4 ksi 15 ksi
8A.4-31
September 30, 1996
8A.4.9 Rail Deflection
The maximum deflection in the rails is obtained from combination 3 and 4. The
maximum deflection with the trolley over a cask due to the trolley dead load and rated load
(combination 3) is 1.063 mm. The maximum deflection from the trolley dead load only with
the trolley positioned at midspan 0.08 mm. The allowable deflection, from NOG 4341 is
1/1000 of the length of the girder, or 4.9 mm. Therefore, the rail deflection is acceptable.
8A.4.10 Modal analysis
The results of the modal analysis are presented in the two following tables. Two cases
are presented: the trolley at midspan and the trolley positioned over a cask.
The following information is provided:
* The first frequencies below the critical fiequency

* The associated acceleration of the mode
* The dragged mass
8A.4-32
September 30, 1996
TABLE 8A.4-7
TROLLEY WITH A MASS

(TROLLEY OVER A CASK)
Total Weight 101.000
Nodes Reading (Direction X)
Load Step Number 1
MODE FREQ. ACCEL WEIGHT % WEIGHT

CUM
Hz m.s-2 kg
1 7.80 23.00 0.01 0.00

2 9.44 23.00 1.19 0.00
3 20.87 15.56 61.51 0.06
4 24.97 11.06 0.00 0.00
5 33.08 6.50 118.76 0.12
6 36.07 6.50 1280.14 1.27
7 41.55 6.50 1153.54 1.14
8A.4-33
September 30, 1996
TABLE 8A.4-7 (Continued)
TROLLEY WITH A MASS

Nodes Reading (Direction Y)
Load Step Number 2

CUM
Hz m.s-2 kg
1 7.80 31.00 300.29 0.30

2 9.44 31.00 0.05 0.00
3 20.87 21.00 0.07 0.00
4 24.97 14.94 341.31 0.34
5 33.08 8.80 3500.60 3.47
6 36.07 8.80 42.21 0.05
7 41.55 8.80 24.29 0.02
8A.4-34
September 30, 1996
TROLLEY WITH A MASS

Nodes Reading (Direction Z)
Load Step Number 3

CUM
Hz m.s-2 kg
1 7.80 8.80 0.05 0.00

2 9.44 8.80 12103.00 11.98
3 20.87 4.99 61136.90 60.53
4 24.97 3.40 5.30 0.01

5 33.08 2.00 7.40 0.01
6 36.07 2.00 9.50 0.01
7 41.55 2.00 215.96 0.21
8A.4-35
September 30, 1996
TABLE 8A.4-8
TROLLEY WITHOUT MASS

(TROLLEY AT MID-SPAN)
Total Weight 94.002
Nodes Reading (Direction X)
Load Step Number 1

CUM
Hz m.s-2 kg
1 7.80 23.00 0.00 0.00

2 16.49 23.00 0.00 0.00
3 19.63 17.49 31.62 0.03
4 24.97 11.06 0.02 0.00
5 27.34 9.30 46.23 0.05
6 29.40 8.10 1.63 0.00
7 38.76 6.50 84.29 0.09
8A.4-36
September 30, 1996

Total Weight 94.002
Nodes Reading (Direction Y)
Load Step Number 2

CUM
Hz m.s-2 kg
1 7.80 31.00 300.61 0.32

2 16.49 31.00 3875.72 4.12
3 19.63 23.00 0.09 0.00
4 24.97 14.94 315.64 0.34
5 27.34 12.57 0.45 0.00-
6 29.40 10.96 55.28 0.06
7 38.76 8.80 0.09 0.00
8A.4-37
September 30, 1996

Total Weight 94.002
Nodes Reading (Direction Z)
Load Step Number 3

CUM
Hz m.s-2 kg
1 7.80 8.80 0.01 0.00

2 16.49 8.25 0.50 0.00
3 19.63 5.69 61370.60 65.29
4 24.97 3.40 0.99 0.00
5 27.34 2.80 4682.92 4.98
6 29.40 2.40 34.02 0.04
7 38.76 2.00 19.09 0.02
8A.4-38
September 30, 1996
8A.4.11 Evaluation of the Cables and Pulleys
There are 8 parts to the cable.
The static load is the limiting case, due to the safety factor of 10 on ultimate strength.
The maximum credible critical load, P¢i= Mg = 70,000 N.
The rope efficiency, TI, is 0.94.
The number of parts to the rope is 2 x 4 = 8. The force on the rope is therefore:
F = Pet / n-n = 9,308 N

k = the shape factor = 0.57
(Yu = 1770 MPa
The minimum required cable diameter is:
dn = 4(10F/(krn-/4) = 41(93,080)/((0.57)(1770) n/4) = 10.7 mm
The cable is 12 mm in diameter. Therefore, the cable is acceptable.
From NOG-5427.1, the pitch diameter of all sheaves except equalizer sheaves shall be
not less than 24 times the diameter of the hoist rope. The sheave diameter is 300 mm (11.9
in) which is > 24 x 12 = 288. Therefore the sheave diameter is acceptable.
The allowable force in the cable P = P 1 (12/10.7)2 = 88,042 N
SF = P/P 1 = 1.25
8A.4.12 Whe Analysis
The wheels are sized using the static case plus the impact load during lifting. The
bridge rail dimensions are shown in Figure 8A.5-16. The effective width of the rail head is
37 mm (1.45 in.) The diameter of the wheel is 139 mm (5.5 in.) The allowable wheel load
is taken from from NOG-5452.3:
Pa = KbD (lbs) (18)
where K = 1300 (BHN/260)03 33 = 1393

b = the effective width of the rail head
D = diameter of the wheel.
8A.4-39
September 30, 1996
Therefore Pa = (1393)(1.45)(5.5) = 11,109 lbs.
The actual load is P = (MK + 1.15 Ml )g (19)

2
where MK is the mass of the trolley and M, is the mass of the rated load. G is 9.81 m/s .
Then P = 100,500 N = 22,157 Mbf.
The operational load is equally distributed between the four wheels. Therefore each
wheel takes a load of P/4 = 25,125 N = 5,540 Lbf.
The safety factor is therefore 11,109/5,540 = 2.
SA.4-40
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-16
Rails BURBACH KS22-A45
8A.4-41
September 30, 1996
8A.4.13 Evaluation of Guidance Rollers
The guidance rollers are calculated using the impact load in the transverse direction.
The lateral rail width is 13 mm = 0.51 in. The roller diameter is 1.4 in (36 mm). The
allowable load is taken from from NOG-5452.3:
P. = KbD (ibs)
where K = 1300 (BHN/260) °0 33 = 1393

b = the effective width of the rail side
D = diameter of the roller.
Therefore P. = (1393)(1.4)(0.51) = 994 lbs.
The actual load is P = 5% (weight of trolley + rated load) = 0.05(MK +Ml )g

2
where M is the mass of the trolley and Ml is the mass of the rated load. G is the 9.81 m/s .
Then P = 4500 N = 992 lbf.
The operational load is equally taken by the two guidance rollers. Therefore for each roller
Fx = p/2 = 2250 N = 496 Wbf. The safety factor is therefore 994/496 = 2.0.
8A.4.14 Evaluation of the Anti-Taking Off Device (of the Bridge)
To evaluate the anti-taking off devices, the static and seismic reactions must be added.
The maximum reaction force from the seismic analysis is used. This occurs for the load
combination with the trolley above a cask opening. The force F. = 3,731 N (Node 439). The
maximum bending moment in the plate occurs along the plane 2-2 in Figure 8A.4-17. The
bending moment = Fza = (3,731)(50 mm) = 187 N-m. The maximum bending moment in
the plate is at the plane 2-2.
8A.4-42
September 30, 1996
Figure SA4-17
Dimensions of Anti-Taking Off Device
i I,-
'z.
f..J
a I
I I..
8A.4-43
September 30, 1996
The maximum bolt tension is on the two bolts at 2. The bolts are M16, made from
A193 Gr B7 steel. The cross sectional area of each bolt is 157 mm2 . The force in each bolt
is Fb:
Fb = F, (L+a)/2L = (3,731)(140)/180 = 2,902 N
The tensile stress in the bolt is therefore:
c = Fb /Ab = 2902/157 = 19MPa 0.5 aU /1.2 = 287 MPa = 41.6 ksi
The safety factor is SF = 287/19 = 15.
The section modulus of the plate is: S = (H-2*18)t3/6t = 6,900 mm3 where the
thickness of the plate, t = 20 mm = 0.8 in.
The bending stress is C = M/S = 187 mN/6,900 mm 3 = 27 vPa = 3.9 ksi. This is
well below the allowable stress of 186 MPa. The safety factor is 186/27 = 6.8.
8A.4.15 Evaluation of the Anti-Derailing Devices
The anti-derailing device is the lateral stop on the rail and is fixed to the trolley.
K. There are four anti-derailing devices on the trolley. To calculate the stresses on the anti-
derailing device, the maximum lateral force is needed. This is obtained from the seismic
analysis. The lateral force is extracted from the ANSYS output.
The maximum force is FY = 59,848 Ibs and is obtained from load combination I with
the trolley positioned above the cask, at node 1178.
A sketch of the anti-derailing device is shown in Figure 8A.4-18.

The static equations are as follows:
RA = Fy
RA (15/2) + Fy * C - RB*a/2 = 0 (Summing moments about 0)
Therefore:
Rc = RB = Fy (C + 15/2)/(a/2) = 67,329 N for C = 60 mm
Two M16 bolts hold the anti-derailing device in place. The tensile force in each bolt is
Fb= Rc /2 = 33,665 N
The tensile stress in each bolt is cSb = FWAb = 215 MPa = 31.1 ksi < 287 MPa= 41.6 ksi.
The cross sectional area of each bolt is 157 mm 2. The safety factor is 287/215 = 1.3.
8A.4-44
September 30, 199i6
Figure 8A.4-18
Anti-Derailing Device
8A.4-45
September 30, 1996
8A.4.16 Evaluation of the Fingers and Axis of the Grapple
Seismic Loads
The forces are taken from the ANSYS seismic analysis. For conservatism, the force is
assumed to be carried by only two of the four fingers. The vertical force Fz is taken from
the ANSYS model and is 150,000 N. This is the maximum force at the finger location for all
positions analyzed. The mass used in the ANSYS analysis is 7000 kg.
The following masses are taken into account:
mp = 3000 kg = mass of the shield plug

mn = 1500 kg = mass of the overlid
The fingers and axis are all made from A36 forged carbon steel, with the following
minimum properties:
yield strength, ay 36 ksi (248 MPa)

ultimate strength, cr 58 ksi (399 MPa)
The allowable stress is 0.9 V/1.2 = 186 MPa = 27 ksi. Note that an additional safety
K. factor of 1.2 has been added to allow for uncertainties in the dimensions. The shear stress
allowable is 0.5 c/1.2 = 103 MPa = 15 ksi.
The mass of the plug and overlid is less than that used in the ANSYS analysis.
Therefore, the force is corrected below.
F. = F.(computed) x m/mT
where m is the mass of the system and mT is the mass used in the analysis (7000 kg).
Pintle of the plug
The maximum force on the pintle of the plug due to seismic loading is:
F2 = 150,000 x mP/mT = 150,000 x 4500/7000 = 96,429 N
Static-Load
For a nonredundant lift, a safety factor of 6 to yield and 10 to ultimate is used. For
this component, the ultimate strength is limiting.
8A.4-46
DOE - DTS - TSAR . Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
The maximum force in the static case including a factor of 10 to ultimate strength for
a nonredundant lift is:
F = 4500 x 9.81 x 10 = 4.41 x 105 N
Using the loading from the seismic analysis, and assuming that the load is handled by
2 fingers, the force on one finger is:
T=Fz/2=2.2x 10 5N
The axis of the grapple is 30 mm.

The cross sectional area is therefore 707 mm2 . The shear force in the pin is:
F = T/2 = 1.1 x IO' N (because the axis is a rod supported at the ends)
The shear stress is:
r = F/A = 1.1 x 105/707 = 156 MPa = 22.6 ksi < 200 MPa = 29 ksi
The safety factor is SF = (200/156)*10 = 12.8
A sketch of a finger is shown below. The following lengths are used for the finger:
L2 = 60 mm = 2.4 in
LI = 30 mm = 1.2 in.
L3 = 30 mm = 1.2 in.
t = 60 mm = 2.4 in.
b 20 mm =0.8 in.
The shear stress in the LI section is:
T = T/Ljt = (2.2 x 105)1(30*50) = 147 MPa = 21 ksi < 200 MPa = 29 ksi
The shear stress in the L3 section is:
T= T/L3 t = (2.2 x 105)/(30*50) = 147 MPa = 21 ksi < 200 MPa = 29 ksi
The tensile and bending stress in the L2 section is:
a = T/L2 t + M/S
where M = T(b + L2 /2) = (2.2 x 105X20 +30) = 1.1 x 0 mN
8A.4-47
September 30, 1996
and S = tL22/6 = (60)(60)2/6 = 36 cm3
Then car = (2.2 x 105)/(60*60) + 1.1 x I10 / 36 = 367 MPa = 53.2 ksi < 399 MPa = 58 ksi
The safety factor on the maximum stress is:
SF = 399 x 10 / 367 = 10.9
8A.4.17 Compensator Axis Analysis
The maximum force on the compensator axis occurs in the event of a cable breaking
combined with the seismic load. The compensator is shown conceptually in Figure 8A.4-18.
RA is the reaction on the compensator axis. Re is the reaction at point B. P is the

maximum force on the cable. It is exerted only at point C. The compensator is supported on
B on the frame of the structure.
8A.4-48
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.4-19
Sketch of Compensator
I,= ~35 000?)
8A.4-49
September 30, 1996
Summing the forces:
RA+ RB = P
Summing the moments:
P(a + b) - RAb = 0
Then, RA = P(a + b)/b
For the case of the broken cable:
P = Mg/2 = 35,000 N
where M is the mass of the rated load = 7,000 kg
g = 10 m/sec2
Then RA = 105,000 N = 23,147 lbf.
The diameter of the compensator axis D = 40 mm 1.6 in.

The cross sectional area of the axis is 1,256 mm2 .
K> There are two shear areas on the axis. Therefore the shear stress is:
T = RA/2S = 42 MPa = 6.1 ksi < 0.45a/1.2 = 93 MPa = 13.5 ksi
The force taken from the seismic analysis is 75,OOON. Therefore, the static case is limiting.
8A.4.18 Analysis of the Locking Pins
Locking Pins of the Trolley
The maximum force on the locking pin is taken from the seismic analysis. The
maximum force is from load combination 1 at node 1123, where FX = 15,600 N and at node
1178, where F.= 17,045 N. The force on the pin is the suam of the two reactions.
Fp = 15,600 + 17,045 = 32,645 N.
The diameter of the pin is D = 30 mm = 1.2 in.

The cross sectional area is A = 707 mm2 .
The shear stress is r = F/A = 47 MPa = 6.82 ksi < 05a/1.2 = 103 MPa = 15 ksi.
8A.4-50
September 30, 1996
Locking Pins of the Port Covers
The pin is used to stop the port cover in the direction of the port cover railway. The
covers are assumed to be rigid. The horizontal acceleration in the Y direction is ay = 0.74 x
9.81 x 1.5 = 10.9 m/sec2 at the 27' level and ay = 0.88 x 9.81 x 1.5 = 13 m/sec2 at the 46'
level. The forces in the Y direction due to seismic loading are shown in Table 8A.4-9.
Table 8A.4-9
Forces on the Locking Pins
I _Mass |FY
US Units Metric Units US Units Metric Units
Upper Shield 1.9 tons 1700 kg 4873 lbf 22,100 N
Port Cover
Receiving Cask . 9.3 tons 9500 kg 20426 lbf 92,650 N
TC Port Cover
Source Cask 6 tons 5500 kg 13217 lbf 59,950 N
TC Port Cover
The locking pins are selected such that the distance between the lower part of the port cover
and the plate is less than D/2 to ensure that there is no bending moment on the pin.
Unper Shield Port Cover
The diameter of the pin D = 24 mm = 0.95 in. The cross sectional area A = 452
mm2. Therefore, the shear stress T = F/A = 49 MPa = 7.1 ksi. The safety factor is SF =
103/49 = 2.1.
Receiving Cask TC Port Cover
The diameter of the pin D = 40 mm = 1.6 in. The cross sectional area A = 1256
mm2. Therefore, the shear stress r = F/A = 48 MPa = 7 ksi. The safety factor is SF =
103/48 = 2.1.
8A.4-51
September 30, 1996
Source Cask TC Port Cover
The diameter of the pin D = 50 mm = 2 in. The cross sectional area A = 1963 mm.2
Therefore, the shear stress T = F/A = 47 MPa = 6.85 ksi. The safety factor is SF = 103/47 =
2.2.
8A.4.19 Summary of Results
A summary of the analysis results on the Shield Plug and Source Cask Handling
Subsystem is presented in Table 8A.4-10 below:
8A.4-52
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.4-10
Summary of Results
Component Load Allowable Calculated Size Safety

Value Value Factor
Cable Static 88,042 N 70,000 N 12 mrn 1.25
Diameter (0.48 in.) l
Trolley Wheel Static 11,109 Ibf 5,540 lbf 139 mm 2

Diameter . (5.5 in.) l
Rail Width Static 11,109 lbf 5,540 lbf 37 mm 2
(1.45 in) l
Guidance Static 994 lbf 496 lbf 36 mm 2
Roller (1.4 in)
Diameter l
Anti-Taking Seismic 287 MPa 19 MPa 16 mm dia. 15

Off Device (0.63 in)
Bolt
Anti-Taking Seismic 186 MPa 27 MPa 20 mm 6.8
Off Device (0.8 in)
Plate
Thickness
Anti-Seismic Seismic 287 MPa 215 MPa 16 mm dia. 1.3
Bumper Bolt (0.63 in)
Diameter
Finger of Static 200 MPa 15.6 MPa 30 mm 12.8
grapple axis (1.2 in)
diameter
8A.4-53
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.4-10 (Continued)
Summary of Results
Component Load Allowable Calculated Size Safety

Value Value Factor
Grapple finger Static 399 MPa 36.7 MPa 60 mm 10.9
thickness (2.4 in)
Compensator Cable 93 MPa 42 MPa 40 mm 2.2
axis diameter Breaking (1.6 in.)
Trolley Seismic 103 MPa 47 MPa 30 mm 2.2
locking pin (1.2 in)
diameter
Upper Shield Seismic 103 MPa 49 MPa 24 mm 2.1
Port locking (I in)
pin diameter
Receiving Seismic 103 MPa 48 MPa 40 mm 2.1
Cask TC port (1.6 in.)
cover locking
pin diameter
Source Cask Seismic 103 MPa 47 MPa 50 mm 2.2
TC port cover (2 in)
locking pin
diameter
8A.4-54
September 30, 1996
Appendix 8A.5 Fuel Handling Crane Analysis
The fuel handling crane has been analyzed using the finite element analysis program
ANSYS 4.4. Certain components of the crane, such as the grapple, have been evaluated
using hand calculations.
The seismic analysis is performed on the crane to ensure retention of the load and the
prevention of any component from becoming a missile that would be detrimental to the DTS's
safety related equipment. Seismic evaluation is performed with and without the rated load.
8A.5.1 Positions Evaluated
The crane and the trolley can have any position during the earthquake. This section
evaluates the possible positions of the crane and trolley to determine the worst orientations for
analysis.
A. Bridge Position
The bridge rails are each simply supported by three equally spaced supports, one on
each end and one at the center of the beam. The position of the bridge which results in the
maximum bending moment in the bridge rails is where one of the two bridge wheels is
located at mid span between an end support and the center support. (See Figure 8A.5-1).
This is also the position which results in the maximum force on the rail support. This
position is possible provided that the distance between the 2 wheels of the bridge along the
X-axis, e, is greater than or equal to 0.586L, where L is the span. For the DTS, e = 2400
mm and L = 2000 mm. Therefore, e 2 0.586L = 1,172 mm. Therefore, the bridge is
analyzed with one wheel at mid-span.
8A.5-1
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-1
Position of the Bridge Resulting in Maximum Bending
---
T 4t
L.
LA
Ii
L = span
e = distance between the 2 wheels of the bridge along the X axis
B. Trolley Position
The beams supporting the trolley on the bridge are simply supported on two supports
of span L. The distance between the two wheels of the trolley is e. A sketch of the forces
imposed by the trolley on the beam is provided in Figure 8A.5-2. The forces applied by the
trolley in any direction are approximately equally distributed. Then if e < 0.586 L, for a < b,
the maximum bending moment is at M2, where:
a = L/4(2-3e/L) (1)
and
Mu. =( PL/2)(l-e/21,2 (2)
The distance between trolley wheels is e = 2.4 m = 94.5 inches. The span, L = 4.7 m
= 185 in. Therefore, a = 0.55 m = 21.6 inches. The position which results in the maximum
bending moment is at the position b = L - a - e = 1.75 m = 68.9 in.
The position which results in the maximum force at a support is where one wheel is at
the end of the span.
Therefore, two positions of the trolley have been analyzed: a = 0.55 m = 21.6 in. and
a = 0 (end of span).
8A.5-2
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-2
Forces Applied to the Trolley
RIL p P
C. Cable Position
The length of the cable, L, is selected such that the cable under load will have the first
vertical frequency at the peak of the spectrum. This cable length will result in higher stresses
than would occur if the hook were in the full up or full down position. The peak acceleration
during the seismic event occurs at around 10 Hz. The weight of the load on the cable is 1500
kg = 3,300 lbs. The spring constant of the cable which would result in a natural frequency of
10 Hz is derived below:
Of= R1 (3)
2xn M
K = (27rt) M = 5.92 x 106 N/m (4)
8A.5-3
September 30, 1996
The length of the cable, L, which results in the first vertical frequency at 10 Hz is:
L = EAIK (5)
where E = the modulus of elasticity = 201,000 MPa = 29.2 x 10 6psi and A = the cross
sectional area of the cable. The cable is modeled as a spar element of length = 1 meter. To
get a natural frequency of 10 Hz, the area of the spar is input as A = 29.46 mm 2 = 0.046 in2.
8A.5.2 Load Combinations
The following loads are used for the seismic evaluation. The symbols and
nomenclature are taken from NOG-1.
Pd= the trolley dead load

Pdb= the bridge dead load
PI,= the rated load of the crane
PCS = the credible critical load with safe shutdown earthquake
Pe = safe shutdown earthquake load
Note that the rated load of the crane is equal to the credible critical load, PCS = PI,.
The following load combinations were evaluated for the seismic event, as specified in
NOG-4140(d):
Pco= Pdt + P s++ P. (evaluated with the trolley at 0.55 m (21.6 in.) from the end
and under load - Load Combination 1)
POcO = Pdt + Pdb + P.s + Pe (evaluated with the trolley at the end under load - Load
Combination 2)
PCI= P& + Pdb + Pe (evaluated with the trolley at 0.55 m (21.6 in. ) from the end and
no load - Load Combination 3)
PCI = Pd. + Pdb + Pe (evaluated with the trolley at the end with with no load - Load
Combination 4)
The calculations were performed with the following:
The length of the cable was fixed to have the vertical frequency at the peak of the
spectrum.
8A.54
September 30, 1996
The position of the bridge for all cases was with one wheel at mid-span.
Additionally, the girder deflection was evaluated with the trolley at 0.55 m (21.6 in.)
under the maximum rated load using the following load:
P = Pd. + P., (Load Combination 5)
8A.5.3 Material Properties
The properties for the structural components of the crane were taken from Tables
NOG-4211-1 and NOG-4221-1 of NOG-1, and are summarized below:
The plates and beams will be constructed from A36 Steel, with a minimum yield
strength of 36 ksi (248 MPa) and a minimum tensile strength of 58 ksi (399 MPa).
The structural connections will be constructed from A193 Grade B7, with a minimum
yield strength of 75 ksi (517 Ma) and a minimum tensile strength of 100 ksi (689
MPa).
The cable minimum ultimate strength used in the analytical model is 256.7 ksi (1770
MPa). A shape factor including the strand factor of 0.57 is used in the analysis.
8A.5.4 Design Criteria
The design criteria for the crane are taken from NOG-4300 and are repeated following.
Allowable Stresses in the beams
For compression members with an equivalent slenderness ratio:
kl/r < Cc = n (2OE/ac) (6)
where E = modulus of elasticity

cry = the yield point
k = effective length factor
1 = length of compression member
r = radius of gyration of member
and Cc = column slenderness ratio separating elastic and inelastic buckling
8A.5-5
September 30, 1996
The allowable axial compression stress shall not exceed the value:
a. = (l-((kIr)2 / 2C2 ))(ay / FS) (7)
where FS = factor of safety and the other variables are as noted above.
The required factor of safety is equal to:
FS = N{5/3 + ( 3/8) ((kl/r)/C. ) - (1/8) ( (kl/r)/C. )3 } (8)
For severe environmental loads, the value of N is 0.67. For compression members
with an equivalent slenderness ratio kl/r > C¢ , the allowable axial compression stress shall
not exceed the value:
a. = 12n 2 E / (23N(kd/r)2 ) (9)
Members subjected to both axial compression and bending stresses shall satisfy the
following requirements:
CT / Ga + C.X abx / ((1 - CY/G. )aab. ) + Cmyaby / ((1- a/hey ) ) < 1-0 (10)
a /'U +ab. /ab. + aby /by < 1.0 ( 1)
where ate = 12n 2E / (23N(kl/r)2 ) (12)
The subscripts x and y, combined with subscripts b, m, and e, indicate the axis of
bending about which a particular stress or design property applies; and a. , aab are the
allowable axial and bending stresses respectively.
The I is the actual unbraced length in the plane of bending, r is the corresponding
radius of gyration, K is the effective length factor in the plane of bending and N is the
loading condition factor, 0.67 for extreme environmental loading.
Cm is a coefficient whose value is:
(a) Cm = 0.85 for compression members in frames subject to joint translation;

(b) Cm = 0.6 - 0.4 (Ml /M2 ) but not less than 0.4 for restrained compression
members in frames braced against joint translation and not subject to transverse
8A.5-6
September 30, 1996
loading between their supports in the plane of bending. M, /M2 is the ratio of
the smaller to the larger moments at the ends of that portion of the member
unbraced in the plane of bending under consideration.
(c) For compression members in frames braced against joint translation in the
plane of loading and subjected to transverse loading between their supports, C.
= 0.85 for members whose ends are restrained, and Cm = 1.0 for members
whose ends are unrestrained.
If a/ a. < 0. 15, then only equation (11) needs to be evaluated.
Members subjected to both axial tension and bending stresses shall satisfy equation
(11 ). The computed bending tensile stress, taken alone, shall not exceed the 0.9ay.
The maximum allowable shear stress under seismic load is 0.5 ay.
An additional factor of 1.2 is applied to all stresses to account for uncertainties since
the loading may change from site to site.
F/A + Max Ix +Mbyy/ Iy < 0.9 cy /1.2 = 186 MPa = 27.0 ksi (13)
Allowable stresses in Bolts
The allowable stresses in the bolts are taken from NOG4513. For seismic loading,
the maximum allowable tensile load is 0.5 a, , and the maximum allowable shear stress is
0.26 C;.. For bearing type joints, the stresses shall meet the following criteria:
car < 0.6 a), R - 1.6 r (14)
The maximum allowable tensile stress due to seismic loading, assuming an additional
safety factor of 1.2 is therefore 41.6 ksi (287 MPa). The maximum allowable shear stress,
assuming an additional safety factor of 1.2 is 21.6 ksi (149 MPa).
8A.5-7
September 30, 1996
Allowable Deflections
The total vertical deflection of the girder during operational loading for the rated live
load plus trolley (Pd. + Pi, ), and not including impact or dead load of the girder, shall not
exceed 1/1000 of the span.
Allowable stress for the Cables.
The maximum allowable stresses in the cables is governed by NOG-5425.I. The

maximum critical load (without impact), plus the weight of the load block divided by the total
number of parts of rope per system, shall not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published
breaking strength on the total system. The seismic load with all parts of rope intact shall not
exceed 40% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength.
For the cables, a. = 1770 MPa = 256.7 ksi. For the static case,
F[KA < au / 10 = 177 MPa = 25.6 ksi (15)
K is the shape coefficient, which is taken as 0.57. A = rd2/4.

Then:
dMN = 4(40F/Kxa.) (16)
and F = P! /nTI (17)
where P,, = the credible critical load and the weight of the load block
n = the number of parts of the rope
i= the efficiency, which is taken as 0.94 to start.
8A.5-8
September 30, 1996
8A.5.5 Componen Weights
The following loads were used in the model of the fuel handling crane:
Beams and Rails 4000 kg 4.4 tons

Bridge 4000 kg 4.4 tons
Trolley 1500 kg 1.7 tons
Rotating Platform + Roller 4000 kg 4.4 tons
Crane Rated Load 1500 kg 1.7 tons
Total load 15,000 kg 16.6 tons
8A.5.6 Fuel Handling Crane Model
A model of the fuel handling crane was made to evaluate the crane under seismic
loading. The response spectrum method was used according to the requirements of NOG
4153.1. The response of the crane to the input response spectra in three directions was
determined on a modal basis. An ANSYS model was used to perform the analysis. The
program searches the frequency and the modal participation factor up to the cutoff frequency
(around 33 Hz). If the sum of the participation of the mass is less than 90% in a direction,
the program is completed with the equivalent static component in this direction. The residual
mass is affected with the acceleration of the cutoff frequency in this direction.
The dynamic responses of the structure are combined using the "grouping method" in
accordance with NOG 4153.10. The three directional components of the earthquake motion
are combined by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the maximum
representation values of the codirectional responses caused by each of the three components
of earthquake motion at each mode of the crane mathematical model.
The model consists of 900 elements and 680 nodes. The model is made up of a
trolley, a vertical beam with a cable and a mass, a bridge, and rails.
Trollcy Model
The trolley is made up of frame of beams W12 x 12 x 0.5 linked with rigid beams to
a square plate with a circular centered hole receiving a rotating circular plate. See Figure
8A.5-9
September 30, 1996
8A.5-3. The link between the circular plate and the square one is made with spring elements
as shown in the figure. The circular plate is reinforced by rigid beams.
The nodes identified as AA' are coupled in the radial and vertical directions, and are
free in the rotational direction. The nodes identified as BB' are coupled in the radial
direction, and free in all other directions. The square plate is 3.0 inches thick and the circular
plate is 3.0 inches thick.
8A.5-10
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-3
Trolley Model
rat A bawns
* hc4A, A- A
8A.5-1 1
September 30, 1996
Vertical Beam
The vertical beam is a square beam of 400 x 400 x 15 mm (15.75 in x 15.75 in. x 0.6
inch). It is linked with the circular plate in all degrees of freedom. The additional weight of
the equipment supported by the vertical beam (crud catcher, pulleys, etc. are modeled by
mass elements all along the length of the beam to get a total weight of 1.5 tons in the x and y
directions. The model consists of 25 mass elements, each 57.7 kg.)
A cable with a mass of 1.5 metric tons is fixed to the beam. Since we want the cable
and the mass to have a vertical frequency of 10 Hz, we model the cable using a spar element
with a length of 1 meter. The cross sectional area is calculated below:
F = (1/27r)41(k/m) = 10 Hz (18)
where k = EA/L
E is the modulus of elasticity of the cable
A is the cross sectional area
L is the length of the cable
and m is the mass = 1.5 metric tons
Solving equation (18) for k results in k = 5.922 x 106 kg.
The cable has an elastic modulus, E of 201,000 MPa. Therefore the cross sectional
area which results in a frequency of 10 Hz is 29.46 mm2.
The model of the vertical beam is shown in Figure 8A.5-4.
8A.5-12
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-4
Model of Vertical Beam
_za AoIf S
- - 2a L
4pro.
1, err)
,A
AL 4 h
Z= *473
r
8A.5-13
September 30, 1996
The bridge is modeled by two kinds of beams (W12 x 8 x 0.5 and W14 x 82)
reinforced by 2 lateral shells.
Rails
The rails are modeled by W 12 x 96 beams reinforced by 2 lateral shells.
Material Densities
The material densities used in the model are corrected to have the following mass:
Component mass (kg)

4 bridge beams 4000
Cable negligible
Frame of the trolley 1500 kg
Rails 4000 kg
Plates (circular and square) 2000 kg
Vertical Beam 2000 kg
Mass elements 1500 kg.
Total mass 15000 kg
8A.5.7 Bound=r Condition
The bridge rails are supported by brackets. The rail nodes which contact the bracket
are fixed in the x, y z and Ox directions. To ensure that there is no instability, the mass
element at the end of the cable is fixed in the x and y directions. The connection between
the trolley and bridge is shown in Figure 8A.5-5.
8A.5-14
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-5
Link Between Trolley and Bridge
L2wI IL,)LeOjf
2C
c.
MAWA, ix X
d
8A.5-15
September 30, 1996
The coupled degrees of freedom are provided below:
Restraint Conditions - Trolley and Bridge Connection

Nodes X Y ZOx ey 0z
AA' Coupled Coupled Coupled Free Free Free
BB' Coupled Coupled Coupled Free Free Free
CC' Coupled Free Coupled Free Free Free
DD' Coupled Free Coupled Free Free Free
The connection between the bridge and the rails is shown in Figure 8A.5-6.
8A.5-16
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-6
Link Between Bridge and Rails
c,
x
* ,.4 lv sz
c9c UKl{. L 1a4-ZJ se&a
-, wizxgxear
vWii X IL 2 4A{LI4 A L alJ]tgobe TAh4e.
8A.5-17
September 30, 1996
The node coupling between the bridge and the rails is summarized below:
Restraint Conditions - Bridge and Rail Connection

Nodes X Y Z 0x,Oz
AA' Free Coupled Coupled Free Free Free
BB' Coupled Coupled Coupled Free Free Free
CC' Coupled Free Coupled Free Free Free
DD' Free Free Coupled Free Free Free
The model and boundary conditions of the trolley positioned at 550 mm is shown in
Figures 8A.5-7 and 8A.5-1 1. The model of the trolley positioned at the end is shown in
Figures 8A.5-12 through 8A.5-14. The boundary conditions for this case are identical to
those for the trolley positioned at 550 mm.
The accelerations due to the seismic event used for evaluation of the fuel handling
crane are presented in Figures 8A.5-15 and 8A.5-16. The spectrum is based on a hard rock
site (a basemat founded on competent bedrock with shear wave velocity > 1100 m/s. It is not
valid for other site conditions such as sands, gravel, silt or clay. Note that the spectrum used
for this analysis is slightly different from the spectrum determined in Appendix 8A1. The
analysis will be redone when a site location is determined with actual site spectrum. This
analysis is only used to size the equipment and to be representative of the expected spectrum
at the various potential DTS locations.
8A.5-18
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-7
ANSYS Model & Boundary Conditions Trolley Positioned at 550 mm
Top View
I"
8A.5-19
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-8
ANSYS Model & Boundary Conditions
Trolley Positioned at 550 mm
Isometric View
I
I
*H e He *t----
I
8A.5-20
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-9
SideView
8A.5-21
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-10
End View
i1111111
,____.L.L..I_
.... . . .
'_L.__S.
Ii111 1
I.. .'_ § SS_
I1.........'.'.''''.''.'.'.'.....'.. - 1 ..... ..... ....1....
8A.5-22
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-11
Second Isometric View
Xk1...
8A.5-23
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-12
ANSYS Model
Trolley Positioned at End
Isometric View from Top
8A.5-24
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-13
ANSYS Model
Trolley Positioned at End
Isometric View from Side
8A.5-25
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-14
ANSYS Model & Boundary Conditions Trolley Positioned at End
End View
8A.5-26
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September 30, 1996
8A.5.8 Results
The stresses in the main beams due to load combination 1 are presented below in
Table 8A.5-1:
Table 8A.5-1
Beam Stresses Load Combination 1

(Seismic Analysis)
Beams Maximum Tension Maximum Shear Conclusion

W 14 x 82 48.2 MPa 186 MPa 20.5 MPa 103 MPa Acceptable
with shell 7 KSI 27 KSI 3 KSI 15 KSI
(bridge)
with shell 5 KSI 27 KSI 1.4 KSI 15 KSI
(rails) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
12 x 8 x 0.5 62 MPa 186 MPa 35.8 MPa 103 MPa Acceptable

(bridge) 9 KSI 27 KSI 5.2 KSI 15 KSI
12 x 12 x 0.5 32.8 MPa 186 MPa 23.1 MPa 103 MPa Acceptable
(trolley) 4.7 KSI 27 KSI 3.3 KSI 15 KSI
400 x 400 x 15 65.6 MPa 186 MPa 5 MPa 103 MPa Acceptable
(fuel tube) 9.52 KSI 27 KSI 0.7 KSI 15 KSI
As shown in the Table, the stresses in the beams are well below the allowable stresses.
The forces in the links are presented in Section 8A.5.9-1. All units are metric.
The maximum stress in the plates (both the rotational table and the trolley plates ) is
101 MPa (14.4 ksi). This value is well below the allowable stress of 186 MPa (27 ksi). A
plot of the stresses in the plates is shown in Figures 8A.5-17 through 8A.5-20. The stresses
are plotted in metric (MPa).
The reaction forces at the brackets are presented in Section 8A.5.10-1. Metric units
are used. In Section 8A.5.1 1, the first frequencies below the critical frequency are presented.
8A.5-29
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-17
Plate Stresses
Top of Plate
Load Combination 1
Primary + Secondary Stresses
PLO NO.
DXF -422
gm -175098
D1ST93
.M
101.043
8A.5-30
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-18
Plate Stresses
Middle of Plate
Load Combination 1
NstYS 4 4A
APR 26 1995
-1751
___5 .6
9M
3.098
_ Sr22 23.115
8A.5-3 1
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-19
Plate Stresses
Middle of Plate
Load Combination 1
Primary - Secondary Stresses
ANSYS_ 4 .4A
APR 26 199 5
26:23:.24
1101 MO. 5
*POSTI STRESS
*STZP?-1
SI CAVrG
KIDDLE
DIX -1.644
StO -0.073565
- SMX -92.154 -
0.079356
41.2565
mm51.562
mm72.1so
82 .456j
92 .754
8A.5-32
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-20
Plate Stresses
Top of Plate
Load Combination 1
ANSYS 4. 4k
APR 26 1995
PS -. 717STES
ZF a-115
T0.343
1x 90. 681
8A.5-33
September 30, 1996
The stresses in the beams due to load combination 2 are presented in the table 8A.5-2 below.
Table 8A.5-2
Beam Stresses Load Combination 2

(Seismic Analysis)
Beams Maximum Tension Maximum Shear Conclusion

with shell 7.35 KSI 27KSI 0.92 KSI 15 KSI
(bridge)
with shell 4.83 KSI 27 KSI 1.37 KSI 15 KSI
(rails)
(bridge) 8.96 KSI 27 KSI 5.2 KSI 15 KSI
(trolley) 5.1 KSI 27 KSI 3.4 KSI 15 KSI
400 x 400 x 15 78MPa 186 MPa 5.9 MPa 103 MPa Acceptable
(fuel tube) 11.3 KSI 27 KSI 0.8 KSI 15 KSI
As shown in the Table, the stresses in the beams are well below the allowable stresses.
The forces in the links are presented in Section 8A.5.9-2. All units are presented in
metric.
The reaction forces at the brackets are presented in Section 8A.5.10-2.
In Section 8A.5.1 1, the first frequencies below the critical frequency are presented.
The maximum stress in the plates (both the rotational table and the trolley plates) is 102 MPa
(14.8 ksi). This value is well below the allowable stress of 186 MPa (27 ksi). A plot of the
stresses in the plates due to this load is shown in Figures 8A.5-21 through 8A.5-24.
The maximum deflection of the bridge rails under normal loads (Load combination 5)
is 1.065 mm. This is below the allowable deflection of 1/1000 (span) = 1/1000 x 4700 mm =
4.7 mm. Therefore the deflection is acceptable.
8A.5-34
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-21
Plate Stresses
Top of Plate
Load Combination 2
XNSYS 4 .4A
$TXP-1010
DM-8.412
101-Ii.03 -
SA.5-35
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-22
Plate Stresses
Middle of Plate
Load Combination 2
Y.a
ANSTS
STc -10.5
PLO -0.197
.. S X 102.995
8A.5-36
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.S-23
Plate Stresses
Middle of Plate
Load Combination 2
ANSTS 4.4A
mu -z_ 018
STEP-120
ZTR -115
24 .2422
l! 35r. 5216100
___ 46.63
Val.323
___ 9.68
___ 81.04
92.40242
13.:602
8A.5-37
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-24
Plate Stresses
Top of Plate
Load Combination 2
ANSYS 4.4A
__-1
63.664
-S~ 213.373
8A.5-38
September 30, 1996
8A.5.9 Raction Forces
The reaction forces for Load Combinations 1 and 2 are provided in the following
pages. All units are metric.
8A.5.10 Static Calculations
Cables and Pulleys
A cable with a minimum diameter of 12 mm (0.48 inches) and an ultimate strength of

1770 MPa (256.7 ksi) has been selected. A factor of 10 is required on breaking strength.
Therefore the maximum credible load is 10 x the lifting load. Using an efficiency factor 'i =
0.94 and 2 rope parts, the force on the rope is:
F = 15000 N/(0.94*2) = 7979 N
The allowable force on the cable is P = P 1 (1211904)2 = 21,428 N
Therefore the safety factor is P/Pj 1 = 1.4.
The sheave to rope ratio is 24 in accordance with NOG-5427.1. The minimum sheave
diameter is therefore 24 x 12 = 288 mm. A sheave diameter of 300 mm has been selected.
Wheels of the Bridge
bridge rail dimensions are shown in Figure 8A.5-25. The effective width of the rail head is
37 mm (1.45 in.) The diameter of the wheel is 153 mm (6.1 in.) The allowable wheel load
is taken from from NOG-5452.3:
P. = KbD (lbs)
where K = 1300 (BHN/260)"33 = 1393
b= the effective width of the rail head
Therefore P. = (1393)(1.45)(6.1) = 12,321 lbs.
The actual load P = ((Mt + Mb + Mr) + 1.15 M1)g

where Mt is the mass of the trolley, Mb is the mass of the bridge, Mr is the mass of the
rotating platform and Ml is the mass of the rated load. G is the 9.81 m/s2.
Then P = 220,228 N = 24,278 lb.
8A.5-39
September 30, 1996
The operational load is equally distributed between the four wheels. Therefore each wheel
takes a load of P/4 = 27,530 N = 6,070 Lbf.
The safety factor is therefore 12321/6070 = 2.03
8A.5-40
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-25
Bridge Rails BURBACH KS22-A45
Wheels of the Trolley
trolley rails are identical to the bridge rails. The effective width of the rail head is 37 mm
(1.45 in.) The diameter of the wheel is 99 mm (3.9 in.) The allowable wheel load is taken
from from NOG-5452.3:
P. = KbD (lbs)
where K = 1300 (BHN/260) 033 3 = 1393

b = the effective width of the rail head
8A.5-41
September 30, 1996
Therefore P. = (1393)(1.45)(3.9) = 7878 lbs.
The actual load P = ((M + M) + 1.15 M,)g
where M, is the mass of the trolley, MK is the mass of the rotating platform and Ml is the mass
of the rated load. G is the 9.81 m/s2.
Then P = 70 N = 24,278 lbf.
The operational load is equally distributed between the four wheels. Therefore each wheel
takes a load of P/4 = 27,530 N = 6,070 Lbf.
The safety factor is therefore 12321/6070 = 2.03
Evaluation of Guidance RollUrs
The guidance rollers are calculated using the impact load in the transverse direction.
The lateral rail width is 13 mm = 0.51 in. The roller diameter is 1.1 in (28 mm). The
allowable load is taken from from NOG-5452.3:
Pa = KbD (lbs)
where K = 1300 (BHN/260)0 33 3 = 1393

b = the effective width of the rail side
D = diameter of the roller.
Therefore P. = (1393)(1.1)(0.51) = 781 lbs. lbs.
The actual load P = 5% (weight of trolley + rotating platform + rated load) = 0.05(Mt +Mr
+M)g
where Mt is the mass of the trolley, Mr is the mass of the rotating platform and MNis the
mass of the rated load. G is the 9.81 m/s2 .
Then P = 3434 N = 758 lbf.
The operational load is equally taken by the two guidance rollers. Therefore for each roller
Fx = p/2 = 1717 N = 379 lb. The safety factor is therefore 781/379 = 2.06.
Evaluation of the Anti-Taking Off Device (of the Bridge)
To evaluate the anit-taking off devices, the static and seismic reactions must be added.
The maximum reaction force from the seismic analysis is used. This occurs for the load
combination with the trolley at 550 mm. The force F. = 35,638 N (Node 526). The
8A.5-42
September 30, 1996
maximum bending moment in the plate occurs along the plane 2-2 in Figure 8A.5-26. The
beinding moment = Fza = (35,638)(50 mm) = 1782 N-m.
The two bolts on the plane 2-2 see the maximum tension. The cross sectional area of
each bolt is 157 mm 2. The Tensile force in each bolt is:
Fb = F2 (L+a)/2L = 27,719 N per bolt.
This results in a tensile stress in each bolt of a = FJA = 177 MPa. The bolt allowable stress
is 287 MPa. Therefore the safety factor is SF = 287/177 = 1.6.
3 3
The plate stress is evaluated below. The section modulus = S = (H-2x18)t /6t = 15,600 mm .
3
The bending stress is car = MIS = 1782 mN/15,600 mm = 114 MPa = 16.6 ksi. This is well
below the allowable stress of 189 MPa. The safety factor is 186/114 = 1.6.
8A.5-43
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-26
Dimensions of Bridge Anti-Taking Off Device
- 4 - --41
____- __4 boles of 0 18 with 4 bots

lI jMl6.
I I t
8A.5-44
September 30, 1996
Evaluation of the anti-taking off of the trolley
The trolley anti-taking off device is identical to the bridge anti-taking off device
shown in Figure 8A.5-26. The maximum reaction force from the seismic analysisis taken
from the case with the trolley at the end. The maximum force F, = 46,973 N (Node 439).
The maximum bending moment in the plate occurs along the plane 2-2 in Figure 8A.5-26.
The bending moment = Fza = (46,973)(50 mm) = 2,349 N-m.
The two bolts on the plane 2-2 see the maximum tension. The cross sectional area of
each bolt is 157 mm2 . The tensile force in each bolt is:
Fb = F2(L+a)/2L = 36,535 N per bolt.
This results in a tensile stress in each bolt of a = F1/A = 233 MPa. The bolt allowable stress
The plate stress is evaluated below. The section modulus = S = (H-2x18)t3 /6t = 15,600 mm 3.
The bending stress is a = M/S = 2349 mN/15,600 mm 3 = 150 MPa = 21.8 ksi. This is below
the allowable stress of 189 MPa. The safety factor is 186/150 = 1.2.
Anti-Taking Off device of the Rotating Platform
The anti-taking off device of the rotating platform is shown in figure 8A.5-27. The
vertical force is taken from the results of the ANSYS analysis. The maximum vertical force
is 41,445 N (element 396) and occurs with the trolley at 550 mm.
The cross sectional area of each bolt is 157 mm2 . The Tensile force in each bolt is:
Fb = F2(C-A/2)/2A = 20,728 N per bolt.
A =200 mm
B = 200 mm
C= 300 mm
Bolt cross sectional area = 157 mm2
This results in a tensile stress in each bolt of a = FbA =132 MPa. The bolt allowable stress
The plate stress is evaluated below. The plate thickness , t, is 25 mm, and section modulus =
S =ndt3 /6t = 13.08 cm 3.
8A.5-45
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-27a
Rotating Platform Anti-Taldng Off Device
8A.546
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-27b
Rotating Platform Anti-Taking Off Device
Four bolts M16.
SA.5-47
September 30, 1996
The bending moment on the plate is M = Fd = 829 inN. The bending stress is therefore
a = MIS = 64 MPa = 9.2 ksi < 0.5 au / 1.2 = 186 MPa = 27 ksi
The safety factor SF = 186/64 = 2.9.
The bending moment in the W 6 x 20 beams is
FZ C = M = 12,437 mN
The section modulus of inertia of the beam is 219 cm3 . The cross sectional area A = 37.8
cm'. The tensile stress in the beam is therefore:
C= (Fi/A + MWS) = 68 MPa = 9.9 ksi < 0.9 vy/2 = 186 MPa= 27 Ksi
Anti-Seismic Transverse Bumpers
Thc transverse bumpers are the lateral end stops on the rails. They are fixed on the
bridge and the trolley. There are four bumpers on the bridge and four bumpers on the trolley.
The-ateral forees exerted due to the seismic event, taken from the ANSYS runs are used for
this analysis.
Bridge Anti-Seismic Transverse Bumpers
The anti-seismic bumpers used on the bridge and trolley are shown in Figure 8A.5-28.
They are made of A36 steel and held in place using two A193 Gr B7 bolts. The maximum
transverse force due to the seismic loading, F. is ten from node 526 from the case with the
trolley located at 550 mm.
The equations of static equilibrium are:
RA= FY and
RAx 15/2+FY xC- RBXa/2=0(ato')
Solving the equations RC = RB= FY( C + 15/2)/ (a/2) = 69,964 N with C = 60 mm
The tensile force on cach of the two bolts is Fbo1h = RC / 2 = 34,982 N
The bolt diameter is 16 mm = 0.63 in. Therefore A = 157 mm'
The tensile stress in each bolt is therefore:
a = Fwtt/A = 223 MPa= 31.1 ksi < 0.5 a. / 1.2 = 287 MPa = 41.6 ksi
8A.5-48
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-28
Anti-Seismic Transverse Bumpers
Trolley Ant-Seismic Transverse Bumpers

The bumpers on the trolley are identical to those used on the bridge. The maximum
transverse loading on the trolley due to the seismic event is FX = 62k,88N taken from node
442 from the case where the trolley is located at the end.
The equations of static equilibrium are:
RA = FX = 62,886 N and
RAx 15/2 + Fx x C - RI X a2 =0 (at o')

Solving the equations Rc = RB = F. (C + 15/2)/(a/2) = 70,747 N with C = 60 mm
The tensile force on each of the two bolts is Fjlt = Rc/2 = 35,374 N
The bolt diameter is 16 mm = 0.63 in. Therefore A = 157 mm2 .
The tensile stress in each bolt is therefore:
a = Fwh / A = 226 MPa = 32.7 ksi < 0.5 cu / 1.2 = 287 MPa = 41.6 ksi
8A.5-49
September 30, 1996
Grapple. Axis. Pins and Head

For a mass of M = 1500 kg, the maximum force on the cables during a seismic event
is Fz = 43,580 N. There will be four fingers on each grapple for a PWR and 2 fingers on
each grapple for a BWR. Therefore, for the following calculations, the force F, is exerted on
2 fingers on the PWQR and one finger on the BWR.
The vertical force F2 is taken from the output of the ANSYS seismic analysis. It is
the maximum vertical force for all load comibinations.
PWR Gpple
The mass for a PWR fuel assembly is MF = 780 kg. The grapple pivot axis, fingers
and pintle will be made from A36 forged carbon steel. The properties of this material are
provided below:
Yield Strength, ay 36 ksi 348 MPa
Tensile Strength, c, 58 ksi 399 MPa
The weight of the fuel assembly is less than the number used to evaluate the seismic event
using ANSYS. (MT = 1500 kg was used for the ANSYS analysis). Therefore the force
exerted on the grapple (corrected) is:
F, = F2 (computed) x MF/MT = 43,580 x 780/1500 = 22,661 N = 5,094 lbs.
The maximum force in the static case (including a factor of 6 to yield for a nonredundant lift
system) is:
F 2 =780x6=4680kg= 10,317 lbs.
Therefore the maximum stress is found from the static case:
F(per finger) = 10,317/2 = 5,159 lbs.
Stresses on the Pivot Axis
The diameter of the pivot axis is 18 mm = 0.7 in.
The cross sectional area is 254 mm 2 (0.385 in2)
The shear force is T = 5,159 lbs.
The shear stress is r = T/2A = 5159/(2 x 0.385)= 6,700 psi < 36,000 psi (6 to yield strength)
or T = 6,700 x 10/6 = 11,170 psi < 58,000 psi (10 to Ultimate Strength)
Stresses in the Grapple Finger
The grapple finger is shown in Figure 8A.5-29. The shear stress in the LI section is:
X= F/(Ljt) = 5159/(0.6x 0.8) = 10,748 psi < 36,000 psi
c = F/(Ljt) = 10,748 x 10/6 = 17,913 psi < 58,000 psi
8A.5-50
September 30, 1996
The horizontal force Fx at the pivot point is F. = FH 2/Hj

Since H2 < HI, , F, < F. Then the shear stress in the L3 section is
T = F/(L 3 t) = 51591(0.4 x 0.8) = 16,122 psi < 36,000 psi
T = F/(L3 t) = 16,122 x 10/6 = 26,870 psi < 58,000 psi
The tensile and bending stress in the L2 section is
a = F/(L2 t) + M/S
where M = F(b + L2 /2) = 5,159 (0.4 + 1.25/2) = 5,288 in-lbs
and S = tl 2/6 = 0.8(1.25)2/6 = 0.2083 in3
then a = 5150/(1.25 x 0.8) + 5288/0.2083 = 30,545 psi < 36,000 psi to yield strength
and a = 30545 x 10/6 = 50,908 psi < 58,000 psi to ultimate strength
8A.5-51
September 30, 1996
Figure 8A.5-29
Grapple Finger
The following lengths are

used in the analysts:
L2=32mm= 1.25in.
L1 = 15 mm = 0.6 in.
L3 = 10 mm = 0.4 in.
b l0 mm 0.4 in.
t =20 mm 0.8 in.
F = 22,950 N = 5159 lbs.
d= 18mm-0.7 in
X t)
8A.5-52
September 30, 1996
BWR Grapple
The mass for a BWR fuel assembly is MF = 330 kg. The grapple pivot axis, fingers
and pintle will be made from A36 forged carbon steel. The properties of this material are
provided below:
Yield Strength, a3y 36 ksi 348 MPa
Tensile Strength, a. 58 ksi 399 MPa
The weight of the fuel assembly is less than the number used to evaluate the seismic
event using ANSYS. (MT = 1500 kg was used for the ANSYS analysis). Therefore the force
exerted on the grapple (corrected) is:
F2 = F2(computed) x MF/MT = 43,580 x 330/1500 = 9,588 N = 2,155 lbs.
The maximum force in the static case (including a factor of 6 to yield for a
nonredundant lift system) is:
F, = 330 x 6 = 1,980 kg = 4,365 lbs.
Therefore the static case is limiting. The force per finger is 4,365 lbs (The force is exerted
on one finger only).
Stresses on the Pivot Axis
The diameter of the pivot axis is 18 mm = 0.7 in.
The cross sectional area is 254 mm2 (0.385 in2)
The shear stress is T = T/2A = 4365/(2 x 0.385)= 5,670 psi < 36,000 psi (6 to yield
strength)
or 'r = 5,670 x 10/6 = 9,450 psi < 58,000 psi (10 to Ultimate Strength)
Stresses in the Grapple Finger
Since the forces are lower in the BWR case than in the PWR case, the stresses are
acceptable.
8A.5.11 Sunmarn of Results
The results of the analyses on the Fuel Handling Crane are summarized in Table 8A.5-
3. All the stresses are below the allowable stresses, and are therefore acceptable.
8A.5-53
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.5-3
Fuel Handling Crane Results
Part Load Allowable Calculated Calculated Safety

Value Value Size Factor
Cable Static 21,420 N 15,000 N 12 mm 1.4
Diameter (0.48 in.)
Bridge Static 12,321 lbf 6,070 lbf 153 mm 2
wheel (6.1 in.)
diameter
Bridge Rail Static 12,321 lbf 6,070 lbf 37 mm 2
Wid (1.45 in)
Trolley Static 7,878 lbf 3,906 lbf 99 mm 2
Wheel (3.9 in)
Diameter _
Trolley rail Static 7,878 lbf 3,906 lbf 37 mm 2
width (1.45 in.)
Guidance Static 781 lbf 379 lbf 28 mm 2
roller (1.1 in)
diameter
Bolt of Seismic 287 MPa 177 MPa 16 mm 1.6
Bridge anti- (0.63 in)
taking off
device
Plate of Seismic 186 MPa 114 MPa t= 30mm 1.6
Bridge anti- (1.2 in.)
taldng off
Device
8A.5-54
September 30, 1996


Bolt of Seismic 287 MPa 233 MPa 16 mm 1.2
Trolley anti- (0.63 in.)
taking off
Device
Plate of Seismic 186 MPa 150 MPa t_ 30 mm 1.2
Trolley anti- (1.2 in)
Taking Off
Device
Bolts of Seismic 287 MPa 1321 MPa 16 mm 2.1
Rotating (0.63 in.)
Platform
anti-taking
Off Device
Plate of Seismic 186 MPa 64 MPa t = 25 mm 2.9
Rotating (I in)
Device
Anti-Taking
Off Device
W6x 20 Seismic 186 MPa 68 MPa W 6 x 20 2.7
Beam of the
Platform
Anti-taking
Off Device
Bolts of Seismic 287 MPa 226 MPa 16 mm dia. 1.2
Bridge anti- (0.63 in)
seismic
bumper
8A.5-55
September 30, 1996

Bolts of Seismic 287 MPa 226 MPa 16 mm dia 1.2
Trolley anti- (0.63 in.)
seismic
bumper
PWR Static 36 ksi yield 6.7 ksi 18 mm dia. >6 to yield
Grapple (shear) (0.7 in.) >10 to
Finger Axis 58 ksi 11.2 ksi ultimate
tensile (shear)
BWR Static 36 ksi yield 5.7 ksi 18 mrnm dia. >6 to yield
Grapple (shear) (0.7 in) >10 to
Finger Axis 58 ksi 9.4 ksi ultimate
tensile (shear)
Grapple Static 36 ksi yield 30.5 ksi t = 20 mm >6 to yield
Finger (bending) (0.8 in) >10 to
WWR and 58 ksi 50.9 ksi ultimate
8WR) tensile (bending)
8A.5-56
DOE- DTS -TSAR Rev. 0
September 30, 1996
Appendix 8A.6 Dose Assessment from Off-Normal Conditions
8A.6 .1 Introduction
For the dose assessment for off-normal conditions, the worst scenario considered is
that the HEPA filters are inoperable while the receiving cask is open and filled with 21 fuel
assemblies.
8A.6.2 Source Evaluation
For this analysis, the irradiation is performed on a per MTU basis using a
Westinghouse 17 x 17 assembly. For the Curie content of burned fuel, the values calculated
from a B&W 15x15 assembly will be similar to the Westinghouse 17x17. The Westinghouse
17x17 assembly will lead to slightly more conservative results.
The Westinghouse 17x17 assembly described in Reference 8A.6 -2 is utilized as the

model. The assembly is assumed to have a 3.85w0 /o enrichment. The fuel is irradiated with a
typical specific power of 37.5 MW/MTU to a total burnup of 40,000 MWDtMTU. Three
cycles will be used with a down time of 30 days between cycles.
Material compositions are taken from Reference SA.6-2 and adjusted for 3.85 W/o
0
enrichment. Of particular interest is the amount of Co-59 in each material. From Table 4.3:
Zr-4 0.001 W0 /o
Inconel-718 0.4694 w%/o
SS304 0.08 w0/o
For the irradiation of the materials outside of the fuel region, the methodology of
Reference 8A.6-2 is used; i.e., to account for the axial flux variation and the neutron
spectrum, the flux and material quantities are modified as follows. The flux for the end
fittings and plenum are multiplied by 0.011 and 0.042, respectively. The quantity of Mn, Co,
and Zr in these regions is multiplied by 0.8, 0.67 and 0.40, respectively.
8A.6-1
September 30, 1996
Materials (Reference 8A.6-2, Table 4.4)
Region Material Kg/MTU

Fuel Zone
Cladding Zircaloy-4 223.0
Grid Spacers & Springs Inconel 718 12.8
Grid Brazing Nicrobraze 50 2.6
Miscellaneous SS 304 9.9
Plenum Zone
Cladding Zircaloy4 12.0
Spring SS 302 4.2
End Fitting Zone
Top Fitting SS 304 14.8
Bottom Fitting SS 304 12.4
As previously mentioned, the elemental compositions of each of the materials listed

above is taken from Table 4.3 of Reference 8A.6-2, as modified in the plenum and end zones.
From the ORIGEN2 run, fission gases and volatile nuclides were selected. The
following values were calculated:
8A.6-2
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.6-1
Fission Gas and Volatile Nuclides Inv( %ntory

(Curies/Assembly)
Westinghouse 17x17 3.85 w% U-235, 40,000 MWD/MTU
Ci/asay
Nuclide QiAMfl {x0.461 (MTU/assy)}
H-3 2.084E+2 + 4.922E+2 323
Co-60 4.493E+03 2,070
Kr-85 8.235E+03 3,800
Sr-90 7.948E+04 36,600
Ru-106 1.937E+04 8,930
I-129 3.722E-02 0.0172
Cs-134 3.698E+04 17,000
Cs-137 1.11 7E+05 51,500
8A.6.3 Off-Normal Release Analysis
The concentration of gaseous nuclides at a given distance from the DTS is determined
by the method of Reference 8A.6-3, Section 1.3, assuming stable (Pasquill F) conditions and
a wind speed of 1 m/s.
This method provides short term relative concentrations (X/Q) for releases at a low
height above ground level. Unlike stack releases, ground level release relative concentration
declines monotonically with distance from the release point; so a maximum need not be
found. Short term relative concentrations are conservative because they do not account for
the fluctuations in wind speed and direction and atmospheric conditions which occur over a
longer time.
8A.6-3
September 30, 1996
The dose is calculated according to Reference 8A.6-4, assuming that the major dose
components are from immersion in a semi-infinite gas cloud and from inhalation. The dose
conversion factors are taken from references 8A.6-5 and 8A.6-6. The gaseous radionuclide
inventory is taken from ORIGEN2 runs for 5 years decay time. The only gaseous
radioisotopes of significance are H-3, Kr-85 and 1-129. Tritium occurs both as a fission
products and from activation in the cladding.It is assumed that 30% of the Kr-85 escapes
from the pellet into the fuel rod plenum as a free gas and that 10% of other noble gases
become free gas.
8A.6.4 Air Dispersion Evaluation
The worst scenario considered is that the HEPA filters are inoperable while the
receiving cask is open and filled with 21 fuel assemblies. Two distances from DTS are
considered; 100 m (minimum controlled boundary distance) and 500 m.
X/ Calculation
The atmospheric diffusion from vents and other building penetrations at 100 meters
(Reference 8A.6-3, Section 1.3.1) is calculated below:
X 1(1
" = I A (1)
Q U_ 1G0 +A
+2 (2)oo
Q U (3 an oyoz)(2)
X = 1
Q Uu F 0.a
where:
X/Q is the relative concentration, in sec/n 3

U is wind speed at 10 meters above plant grade, in m/sec
cry is lateral plume spread , in m, a function of atmospheric stability and distance
(see Figure 1 from Regulatory Guide 1.145)
a, is the vertical plume spread, in m, a function of atmospheric stability and
distance (see Figure 2 from Regulatory Guide 1.145)
M Correction factors for cry values by atmospheric stability class (see Figure 3
from Regulatory Guide 1.145)
Zy is lateral plume spread with meander and building wake effects, in m, a
function of atmospheric stability, wind speed, U, and distance. Sy = May for
8A.6-4
September 30, 1996
distances less than 800 meters. 2

A is the smallest vertical-plane cross-sectional area of the DTS building, in m .
Calculating:
A= 7.11 mx 13.8m=98.1 m2
From Regulatory Guide 1.145, Figure 1
acy at 100 meters, Pasquill Stability Category F = 4 meters
acy at 500 meters, Pasquill Stability Category F = 20 meters
a,, at 100 meters, Pasquill Stability Category F = 2.3 meters
,a at 500 meters, Pasquill Stability Category F = 8.4 meters
M at U = 1 m/sec, Pasquill Stability Category F = 4
therefore, Ey at 100 meters, Pasquill Stability Category F = 4 * 4 m = 16 in
therefore, My at 500 meters, Pasquill Stability Category F = 4 * 20 m = 80 m
For 100 m, substituting into Equations (1), (2), and (3) yields:
3
(1) X/Q = 1 / 1(7 * 4 * 2.3 + 98.1/2) = 1.28E-2 sec/in
3
(2) X/Q = 1/1@l( * 3 * 4 * 2.3 ) =1.l5E-2 sec
(3) x/Q = I / l(n * 16 * 2.3) = 8.65E-3 sec/m 3
Choosing the larger of calculations (1) and (2), and the lesser of that selection and (3) yields:
XLQ = 8.65E-3 sec/m3 , which includes wake and meander effects.
8A.6-5
September 30, 1996
Similarly, substitutingfor 500 meters
(1) X/Q = 1 / 1(7c *20 *8.4 + 98.1/2) = 1.73E-03 sec/m 3

X/Q = 1 / 1(7n * 3 *20*8.4) = 6.32E-04 sec/r 3
(2)
(3) X/Q = 1 / 1(r *80*8.4) = 4.74E-04 sec/r 3
Choosing the larger of calculations (1) and (2), and the lesser of that selection and (3) yields:
XLQ = 4.74E-04 sec/m 3, which includes wake and meander effects.
8A.6.5 Radioactive Gas Inventory
The radioactive gas inventory was taken from the ORIGEN2 results. From Reference
8A.6-7, for assumptions related to the release of radioactive material from a fuel handling
accident "the gap activity in the damaged rods released consists of 10% of the total noble
gases other than Kr-85, 30% of Kr-85." Therefore a 30% release is assumed for the Kr-85
and 10% release is assumed for the I-129.
The tritium was assumed that of the gap activity, 10% is released. Cs-134 and Cs-137
are not typically considered volatile nuclide following a fuel handling accidents (Reg Guide
1.25 considers the release of noble gases and radioactive iodine following a fuel handling
accident. Other nuclides are not considered). As an estimate, these gases are considered
volatile and available for release. These are assumed to release 10% of the activity. (Table
8A.6-2)
Table 8A.6-2
Fission Gas Inventory

(Curies/Assembly)
Westinghouse 17x17 3.85 w% U-235, 40,000 MWD/MTU
Ci/assy Fraction
Nuclide Ci/MTLJ ( mL Ci/21 assy Released (C
H-3 2.084E+02 + 323 6,780 6.78E+08
4.922E+02
Kr-85 8.235E+03 3,800 79,800 2.39E+10
I-129 3.722E-02 0.0172 0.361 3.61E+04
8A.6-6
September 30, 1996
8A.6.6 Exposure to Dose Conversion Factors
The exposure-to-dose conversion factors for inhalation effects are taken from Reference
8A6-5 and for air immersion are taken from Reference 8A6-6.
Table 8A.6-3
Exposure to Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation
Effective DCF Effective DCE

Inhalation Air Immersion
Lwwpt m=em/LMCi) (mrem/yr per MCi/cm 3 )
H-3 6.401E-02 3.866E+04
Kr-85 2.57E+07
1-129 5772 7.78E+07
8A.6.6.1 Dose Calculations at 100 meters from the source:
_
_ 6 _ AAAAAA_ _ _ A_ _ _ _ A_ A_ A_
.JViNW Fprfam
nnop s SVlil Tnhalation of Non-Noble Radionuclides
J
Dose%,m.p = R * X * DCFwm.ONjSOtOPe
01 = R * X/Q * Q * DCFww.,j. .jn
Dosej ,,O,,
where:
R is the inhalation rate, 8000 m3/yr (from Reference 8A.6-9)

X/Q is the atmospheric dispersion value dependent on distance (sec/m3)
Q is the amount of material released (pCi)
DCFwwstj.,0;o, is the exposure dose conversion faction by isotope (mrem/lCi)
Substituting for H-3:
DoseisOp, = (8000 m3/yr)*(8.65E-03 secfm 3)*(6.78E+08 gCi)*(0.0641 mrem/PCi)*(3.1706E-08

yr/sec)
Dosej-top.= 95.2 mrem
8A.6-7
September 30, 1996
Similarly for other isotopes:
dbi Breath Rate DCF-inhalatin Dose

IsQotpe m^)3uci- (mA3Lyr) (mrem/uCi)
H-3 1.86e-01 8000 0.06401 9.52E+01
Kr-85 6.57E+00 8000
1-129 9.90e-06 8000 5772 4.57E+02
Subtotal (Fission Gases): 552
8A.6.6.2 Dose from Exposure to Semi-Infinite Cloud Effective Dose from Air
mmersion
Doser imnersion = X* DCFajr immersion = Q * x/Q * DCFir immersion
For Kr-85:
Doseyr s5 = (6.57E-06 pCi)*(8.65E-03 sec/m 3 )*{2.57E+07 (mrem/yr)/(pCi/cm 3 )}*(3.1706E-

08 yr/sec)*(lE-06 m3/cm3) = 169 mrem
Similarly for other isotopes:
DCF-imm n Dos
Isotope (uCi-Xr/cmA3) (mrcmj W3)(uCj/cm^3!
H-3 1.86e-07 3.87E+04 7.19e-03
Kr-85 6.57e-06 2.57E+07 1.69E+02
1-129 9.90e-12 7.78E+07 7.70e-04
8A.6-8
September 30, 1996
8A.6.7 Dose Calculations at 500 meters from the Source
8A.6.7.1 Doses from Inhalation
X BreathRat DCF-inhalatin Dos

(IlCi-yr/m3) (mLyr (mrcw/uZi)
H-3 1.02E-02 8000 0.06401 5.22E+00
Kr-85 3.60E-01 8000

1-129 5.43E-07 8000 5772 2.51E+01
Subtotal (Fission Gases): 30.3
8A.6.7.2 Doses from Immersion
DCF-immersion
IQotomp (uci=y3cm3) (mrem/yr(aCi/cm3 )
H-3 1.02E-08 3.87E+04 3.94E-04
Kr-85 3.60E-07 2.57E+07 9.25E+00
1-129 5.43E-13 7.78E+07 4.22E-05

8A.6.8 Estimated Doses from Off-normal Conditions
A summary of the estimated doses are presented in Table 8A.6-4.
8A.6-9
September 30, 1996
Table 8A.6-4
Estimated Doses from Off-Normal Conditions
Cmplete Failure at 100 meters

Isotope Inhalation Dose Immersion Dose
(mrom (mrom)
H-3 95.2 7.19E-03
Kr-85 169
I-129 457 7.70E-04
Total 552 169
Compete Failure at 500 mers
H-3 5.22 3.94E-04
Kr-85 9.25
1-129 25.1 4.22E-05
Total 30.3 9.25
At 100 meters, the total inhalation plus immersion dose is 721 mrem.
At 500 meters, the total inhalation plus immersion dose is 39.6 mrem.
8A.6-10
September 30, 1996
8A.6.9 References
8A.6-1 ORIGEN2 Users Manual
8A.6-2 Croff, et al, "Revised Uranium - Plutonium Cycle PWR and BWR Models for
the ORIGEN Computer Code," ORNL/TM-6051, September 1978.
8A.6-3 Regulatory Guide 1.145, "Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential

Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1,
1983.
8A.6-4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of

Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluent for the
Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I" Revision
1, October 1977.
8A.6-5 Environmental Protection Agency Federal Guidance Report No. 11, "Limiting
Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion
Factors for Inhalation, Submersion and Ingestion," EPA-520/1-88-020,
September, 1988.
8A.6-6 Environmental Protection Agency Federal Guidance Report No. 12, "External
Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil" EPA402-R-93-081,
September, 1993.
8A.6-7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.25, (Safety Guide 25)
Assumptions used for evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a
Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling
and Pressurized Water Reactors," March, 23, 1972.
8A.6-9 TN & Westinghouse, Extended Fuel Bumup Demonstration. Topical Report,

DOE/ET 34014-1 1.
8A.6-11
September 30, 1996
CHAPTER 9
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
9.1 Organizational Structure
The organizational structure for the DTS is site specific and will be addressed in the
site specific license application.
9.1-1
September 30, 1996
9.2 Preoperational Testing and Operation
The detailed pre-operational testing program will be submitted as part of the site-
specific application. The testing shall prove compliance with the capabilities, features and
parameters presented in this Topical Report and the site-specific design and specifications
upon which approval of a specific installation is based. Testing shall progressively include
components, subsystems and complete systems. Testing shall include compliance in
manufacturing, shop and field fabrication and processes, assembly operations and interfaces
with other systems.
The anticipated off-normal operation scenarios shall be tested to validate operation

safety and function.
The monitoring function of the Control Subsystem shall be validated during the system
testing as well as all the interlocks between the equipment. Bypasses can be used to set
equipment status or conditions linked indirectly with the control (HVAC with sliding door
position for example). Bypasses can not be used to test alarms.
Structural Subsystem
The structural subsystem shall undergo the following testing:
Normal operations:
Test the opening and closing functions of the sliding door. Test the inflating of the
seal. Process the locking operation.
The interface with the HVAC Subsystem (including sealing effectiveness) and the TC
Cask Mating Subsystem (for HVAC) shall be tested during HVAC tests.
Interlock testing:
The opening of the sliding door is interlocked with the closed position of the two TC
port covers and the radiation monitoring information. The TC port covers shall be
placed in the "not closed" position to test the interlocks. The radiation monitoring
interface shall be tested by manually generating a radiation alarm.
HVAQ Subsystem
The following tests shall be performed on the HVAC Subsystem:
All components of the HVAC Subsystem shall be factory tested to ensure that design
9.2-1
September 30, 1996
specifications are met. Prior to operation, the exhaust fans will be run to verify proper
operation. The heat pump and cooling units will also be run to verify that they are
operating properly.
The temperature monitoring equipment will be calibrated. The temperture sensors and
alarms will be checked by locally cooling and heating the sensors.
The temperature of the DTS will be monitored for at least 96 hours to ensure that the
system is operating properly.
Check the proper monitoring of the temperature in each room.
Pressure Differential Control:
Test the capability of the HVAC Subsystem to establish the pressure differential
between the three areas. Check the proper monitoring of the pressure in each room.
After establishment of the proper pressure differential between the three areas, bypass
automatic damper and fan control and check that alarms corresponding to the
incapability of the HVAC to maintain the proper pressure differential are generated.
Test the automatic switching from lead to backup fan by shutting off the lead exhaust
fan power. Test the monitoring and alarms linked to this status. Shut off the backup
exhaust fan (loss of double confinement). Check that proper alarms are activated.
Check that in each case the damper associated with the fan is closed.
Check that each damper failure (detected by the equipment) triggers an alarm and that
the failing equipment can be identified (monitoring display).
Interface with Sliding Door & Cask Mating Subsystem
With the sliding door closed, the source and receiving cask mated, the pressure
differential between areas established, open the sliding door or disengage one or the
other cask and check that in each case the exhaust fan speed is kept constant.
Reestablish the conditions and check that the pressure differential is reestablished.
Bypasses can be used to change the conditions.
Cask Transfer Subsystem
Test the positioning of the transfer trolleys, generate off-normal operations activating
different sensors (over travel, collision...) while the trolleys are running.
9.2-2
September 30, 1996
Test the locking operation. Check that the monitoring system displays the locking
information.
Transfer Confinement Casks Mating Subsystem
Mating:
With the casks (or a mockup of a cask) in position, test the mating operations under
normal conditions. Visually check the platform position. Check that the vertical
positioning of the three electrical jacks and the mating status are displayed in the
Control Center.
Disengagement:
Verify that the Cask Mating Subsystem moves to the full up position without binding.
Transfer Confinement Port Covers
Positioning:
Test the positioning of each TC port cover. Check the proper alignment of the port
covers with lines drawn on the mezzanine plate. Test off-normal operations (over
travel).
Test the locking operation when the TC port cover is open. Test the time-out
detection. Test inconsistencies between lock and port cover positions as shown in
Tables 9.2-1 and 9.2-2.
Table 9.2-1
Receiving Cask TC Port Cover Instrumentation Logic Table
1 Open I Closed Off Centered Locked Unlocked
Open X X 0 0
Closed X X X 0
Off Centered X X X 0
Locked 0 X X X
Unlocked 0 0 0 X
9.2-3
September 30, 1996
Table 9.2-2
Source Cask TC port cover instrumentation logic table
Information Open Closed Locked I Unlocked
Open X 0 0
Closed X X 0
Locked 0 X X
Unlocked 0 0 X
Test the interlocks between the positioning and locking operations.
Verify proper operation of manual backup system for TC port covers, including
moving platforms from worst condition positions.
Source Cask Lid and Receiving Cask Shield Plug Handling Subsystem
The two upper shield port covers opening, closing and locking functions shall be
tested independently.
Test the positioning of the upper shield port. Test off-normal operations (over travel).
Test the locking operation when the upper shield port is closed. Test the time-out
detection. Test inconsistencies between lock and shield port positions as shown in Table 9.2-
3.
Table 9.2-3
Source and Receiving Cask Upper Shield Ports Instrumentation Logic Table
I Information I Open I Closed I Locked I Unlocked I
Open _ x x 0
Closed X 0 0
Locked X 0 X
Unlocked 0 0 X l
9.2-4
September 30, 1996
Test the interlocks on the positioning and locking operations.
Preoperational testing of the upper crane shall be performed in accordance with NOG-
7420. Inspections prior to performance testing shall be in accordance with NOG-7520. A
load test of the hoist and grapple will be performed at 125% of the rated load in accordance
with NOG-7523.
Perform an operation functional check on the hoist lowering and lifting. Verify that
the positions of the hoist do not result in any interferences. Verify that the grapple engages
and disengages properly. Verify that the gripping device engages and disengages properly.
Verify that all sensors are functioning including verification of proper position and function of
limit switches for positioning trolley and function of the over travel limit switches. Verify
absolute positioning of the hoist with and without load. Verify functionality of all limit
switches and associated instrumentation.
Verify that the load cell is reading correctly by lifting known loads.
Verify that the upper crane hoist can not operate of the lid/shield plug handling
grapple is not stopped in its upper z position. Verify that the upper crane trolley can not be
operated unless the upper shield ports are closed.
Verify that the upper shield ports cannot be closed unless the lid/shield plug grapple is
in the upper z position or if the hoist is loaded.
Verify that the upper shield port covers cannot be opened if the opposite TC port
cover is not closed.
Verify that the upper shield ports cannot be unlocked if the fuel handling system is in
operation.
Verify that only one upper shield port can be open at one time.
Verify that the upper shield ports cannot be locked in the closed position.
Verify that motion of the hoist is stopped when the cables are under loaded during
lowering.
Verify that the motion of the hoist is automatically stopped when the grapple reaches
the upper position (with no load) and the position above the TC port cover when the cables
are loaded.
9.2-5
September 30, 1996
Verify that the hoist cannot be operated unless the fuel assembly handling crane
carriage is stopped in the parking position.
Verify that the hoist cannot be used for lifting unless the grapple is totally disengaged
from the overlid or unless both the gripping device and grapple are fully engaged.
Verify that the grapple can not be disengaged if the cables are loaded or if the grapple
is not in its proper z position.
Fuel Assembly Handling Subsystem
Inspections of the Fuel Handling Subsystem prior to performance testing shall be in

accordance with NOG-7520. Preoperational testing of the upper crane shall be performed in
accordance with NOG-7420 A load test will be performed on the system at 125% of the
rated load in accordance with NOG-7523.
Perform a functional test to ensure that the crane carriage and the rotating platform
can move to locate the fuel transfer tube above all locations in both the source and receiving
casks.
Perform a complete checkout of the positioning system to ensure that the gross
positioning is programmed correctly. Verify that all operations can be monitored visually
with the assistance of the CCTV's.
Verify that the crane carriage and the rotating platform will not move unless the fuel
assembly grapple is in the upper z position.
Verify that the crane carriage and the rotating platform cannot be moved if the crud
catcher is not closed.
Verify that the crane carriage cannot be moved unless the two upper shield ports are
locked in the closed position. Verify that the crane carriage cannot be moved unless the two
TC port covers are locked in the open position.
Verify that the crud catcher cannot be opened unless the crane carriage is stopped in
both the x and y directions and the rotating platform is also stopped.
Verify that the crud catcher cannot be closed unless the grapple is in the upper z
position.
Verify that the hoist operates properly under load and without load. Verify, using a
dummy fuel assembly that the pass through to the fuel transfer tube is smooth and no binding
9.2-6
September 30, 1996
results.
Verify that the grapple fully engages and disengages. Verify that disengagement will
not occur if the cable is loaded or if the grapple is not stopped in the proper position.
Verify proper operation of all sensors including verification of grapple fingers closed
and open and fuel assembly presence. Verify proper operation and readout of the load cell.
Verify proper operation of all manual backup positioning equipment and verify proper
operation of all electrical backup equipment.
Verify proper operation of backup power supply.
Fire Suppression System
Verify proper operation of smoke and fire detection systems.
Radiation Monitoring System
The Radiation Monitoring System shall be calibrated and functionally tested prior to
operation. It is expected that these tests will be incorporated into the reactor's instrumentation
maintenance program.
Cameras and Lighting
Verify proper positioning of all cameras and lights. Verify that all operations which
require visual monitoring can be seen using the cameras and monitors.
9.2-7
September 30, 1996
9.3 Training Progrm
The training program plans for the DTS are site specific and will be submitted with
the site-specific license applications.
9.3-1
September 30, 1996
9.4 Normal Opraions
9.4.1 Procedures
Detailed written procedures for all normal operating, maintenance, and testing
procedures will be prepared and in effect prior to operation of the DTS. These procedures are
briefly described in the following subsections.
These procedures will be expanded in detail, presented on a site specific format and
included in the submission of the
9.4.1.1 Administrative Procedures
Administrative procedures will provide rules and instructions to DTS personnel to

provide a clear understanding of operating philosophy and management policies. These
procedures included instructions pertaining to personnel conduct and control, including
consideration of job-related factors which influence the effectiveness of operating and
maintenance personnel, e.g. work hours, entering and exiting the DTS, organization, and
responsibility, etc.
9.4.1.2 Annunciator Response Guides
Annunciator response guides will provide information relative to each alarm

annunciator which monitors cask and fuel parameters. The procedures will provide alarm set
points and appropriate corrective action.
9.4.1.3 Radiation Protection Procedures
Radiation protection procedures are used to implement a radiation control program.

The radiation control program will involve the acquisition of data and provision of equipment
to perform necessary radiation surveys, measurements, and evaluations for the assessment
and control of radiation hazards associated with the operation of the DTS. Procedures will be
developed and implemented for: monitoring exposures of employees; radiation surveys of
work areas; and radiation monitoring of maintenance activities.
Regularly scheduled surveillance will be required, but calculations show that dose
received by personnel from anticipated activities are within the guidelines set forth in 10 CFR
20. There are no credible events during normal operations that could lead to high radiation
releases. Accident analyses in Chapter 8 also show no credible event leading to high
radiation releases.
9.4-1
September 30, 1996
9.4.1.4 Maintenance Procedures
Maintenance procedures will be established for performing preventative and corrective

maintenance on the DTS equipment. Preventive maintenance will be performed on a periodic
basis to preclude the degradation of DTS systems, equipment and components. Corrective
maintenance is that performed to rectify any unexpected system, equipment, or component
malfunction, and is initiated as necessary.
9.4.1.5 Operating Procedures
Operating procedures will provide instructions for the use of DTS subsystems.
9.4.1.6 Test Procedures
Periodic test procedures will be developed to ensure that DTS subsystems, equipment,
and components are observed on a routine basis to verify operability.
9.4.1.7 Pre-operational Test Procedures
Pre-operational test procedures will be established to ensure that DTS structures,

systems, and components satisfactorily perform their required functions. These test
procedures will further ensure that the DTS has been properly designed and constructed and is
ready to operate in a manner that will not endanger the health and safety of the public.
9.4.1.8 Quality Assurance Procedures
Quality assurance procedures will be established to ensure that the operation and
maintenance of the DTS is performed in accordance with 1OCFR72 Subpart G or 1OCFR50
Appendix B, as applicable.
9.4.2 Records
Records will be maintained in accordance with the site specific program and will be
described in the site specific license application.
9.4-2
September 30, 1996
9.5 Emergen Planning
The site specific Emergency Plan will describe the organization, assessment actions,
conditions for activation of the emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency
facilities and equipment, training, provisions for maintaining emergency preparedness, and
recovery criteria used at the site utilizing the DTS.
Portions of the Emergency Plan and applicable implementing procedures will be

modified to reflect the actions to be taken during off-normal and accident conditions. Design
Event III will require the declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event. Design Event IV
will require declaration of an Alert.
A comprehensive analysis of the DTS due to various accidents has been performed
and is presented in Chapter 8. For each postulated accident, appropriate corrective action and
recovery procedures, which would minimize the consequences of the accident, have been
described.
Detailed emergency plans will rely heavily on the emergency services and
organizations available at the on-site reactor. Details of how the DTS will be incorporated
into the Emergency Plans will be provided by the utility applying for certification of a
specific site.
9.5-1
September 30, 1996
9.6 Decommissioning Plan
The DTS is designed so that the major components can be disassembled and
transported as LSA material to a new site for reuse. The concrete structure, interior walls and
floor, can be decontaminated and disposed of as either low level waste, or preferably, as
normal debris, minor equipment items will be disposed as low level waste.
9.6.1 Decommissioning Program
The DTS is designed to confine contamination within its three areas. After each
completed dry transfer, equipment and structure surfaces of the DTS are decontaminated to
levels that permit maintenance activities. The level of radiation and the contamination in the
three areas is expected to be low. This approach facilitates decontamination at the
termination of the DTS use.
All three areas will be vacuumed to remove any loose contamination. Each equipment
item will be wiped with damp cloths, surveyed and removed to appropriate disposition. The
only equipment which is expected to present high contamination levels is the fuel transfer
tube and its associated crud catcher. Efforts will be taken to decontaminate the fuel transfer
tube. If unsuccessful, the fuel transfer tube may be disposed of. All other major equipment
which is decontaminated on site will be packed and transported to the next location. This
equipment includes: upper crane, CCTV and lighting, fuel assembly handling, cask mating,
upper shield cover, roof plate, cask mating, TC port cover handling, mezzanine plate, cask
transfer, cask, lid handling, HVAC. Only the sliding door, the protective cover, and concrete
structure will not be removed.
Once only the shell of the DTS remains, the inside walls of will be cleaned as
required. The walls of the DTS are painted to facilitate decontamination and to prevent the
need for scabbling the concrete.
No residual contamination is expected to be left behind outside the DTS. The rails
and peripheral utility structure will be decommissioned when all equipment inside the DTS
building is removed.
Decommissioning is estimated to use a 5 member crew and last for 60 days. Waste
from decontamination and decommissioning will consist of cloths, protective clothing from
workers, HEPA filters, and minor equipment.
9.6-1
September 30, 1996
9.6.2 Cost of Decommissioning
The amount of material expected to be disposed of as low level waste is expected to

be negligible. The primary source of contamination is the spalled material from the fuel
assembly (crud), however, the fuel assembly is enclosed by the transfer tube through most of
the fuel transfer process. This tube is the only piece of equipment that potentially will not be
decontaminated. All other major equipment items and the walls of the DTS will be
decontaminated. The volume is estimated to be 20-40 55-gallon drums (Approximately, 2-4
55-gallon drums per week). These are expected to be easily incorporated into the waste
streams from other site operations.
Demolition of the DTS structure is not included in this waste volume estimate. The
DTS building is not expected to be contaminated following cleaning and it will be demolished
and disposed of through standard construction methods.
9.6.3 Decommissioning Facilitation
The DTS is designed for its ease of decontamination. The fuel during the fuel transfer
process is enclosed in a steel tube with a crud catcher. The majority of crud from a fuel
assembly is expected to be captured by this crud catcher. When the fuel is lowered into the
receiving cask, this spalled material is expected to fall into the receiving cask. Therefore, the
amount of loose contamination in the DTS is expected to be minimal.
The concrete walls are coated with paint to eliminate the need to scabble the concrete.
The painted walls will only require wiping with damp cloths or at most high pressure water
cleaning for decontamination.
Due to the design features of the DTS, the amount of material requiring disposal
generated from decontamination is minimal.
9.6.4 Recordkeing of Decomisionin
Recordkeeping in support of decommissioning will consist of the source cask records,

the receiving cask records, the fuel transferred records, and facility records (operating
procedures, maintenance, incident reports, decontamination, etc.). These will be kept in a
secure storage area at the host facility.
9.6-2
September 30, 1996
9.7 Physical Security and Safeguards and Contingency Plans
The physical security and safeguards and contingency plans are site specific and will
be discussed in the site specific license applications.
9.7-1
September 30, 1996
10. OPERATING CONTROLS AND LIMITS
10.1 proposed Operating Controls and Limits
The general areas where controls and limits are necessary for safe operations of the
DTS system are shown in Table 10.1-1. The conditions and other items to be controlled have
been selected based on the safety assessments for normal and accident conditions provided
mainly in Chapter 8.
In addition to the operating controls and limits proposed herein, there will be specific
operating controls related to welding of the receiving cask lids, inerting of the receiving cask,
and site specific controls. These controls and limits will be specified in the site application.
10.1-1
September 30, 1996
'-
Table 10.1-1
General Areas Where Controls and Limits are Necessary
AREAS FOR OPERATING CONTROLS CONDITIONS OR OTHER ITEMS

AND LIMITS TO BE CONTROLLED
1. Cask Characteristics Surface Dose Rates, Alignment with
the TCS, Dimensional characteristics of lid
opening, weight of lid and shield plug,
compatibility with lifting pintle
2. IFA Characteristics Type and physical condition, burnup, initial

enrichment, total weight, gamma source
strength, neutron source strength, decay
heat power, post irradiation time
3. Cask Transfer Trolleys Security of Load

Locking Mechanism
4. Upper Crane Load testing

Grapple operation
Sensor operation
5. Fuel Handling Subsystem Load testing

Sensor operation
Operation of grapple
Crud catcher operation
6. Cask Mating Subsystem Mating of Cask with Cask Mating

Subsystem
Sensor Operation
Operation of gripping device
7. Sliding Door Interlocks
8. Health Physics Radiation Detection

Radioactivity Detection
Health Physics Surveys
9. HVAC System Operability

Radioactivity Monitoring
HEPA filter pressure differences
HEPA filter testing
10.1-2
September 30, 1996
10.2 Development of Operating Controls and Limits
This section provides a description and discussion of the operating controls and limits
specified in this Topical Report. These specifications cover generic issues associated with the
operation of the DTS so as to ensure the protection of operators, the environment and the
public's health and safety. Any additional operating controls and limits on site specific issues
will be supplied by site license applicants.
10.2.1 Functional and Operational Limits. Monitoring Instruments and Limiting Control
Settings
This category of operating controls and limits applies to operating variables that are
observable and measurable during operation of the DTS.
10.2.1.1 Surface Dose Rate of Source Cask
Title: Surface Dose Rate of Source Cask
Specification: The source cask shall provide shielding for the design basis fuel at least
as well as the design basis fuel. The maximum contact dose rate at
axial midpoint on the top of the cask shall not exceed 250 mrern/hr.
The maximum contact dose rate at the radial midpoint at the side of the
cask shall not exceed 300 mrem/hr. (Gamma and Neutron)
Applicability: All source casks
Objective: Ensure that the operational dose rates to workers are within site
acceptance criteria and ALARA.
Action: Casks with higher surface dose rates will not be permitted inside the
DTS.
Surveillance: Surface dose rates on all incoming source casks will be surveyed.
Basis: Shielding analysis of Chapter 7.
10.2.1.2 Alignment of the Source Cask or Receiving Cask with the TCS
Title: Cask Alignment
Specification: All source casks and receiving casks must mate properly with the cask
mating system.
10.2-1
September 30, 1996
Applicability: All casks.
Objective: Maintain confinement between the Lower Access Area and the TCS to
minimize the spread of contamination and ensure proper alignment.
Action: If cask will not fitup properly, operators can investigate the cask mating
system by entering the lower access area after verification that both
casks are closed, and that radiation levels within the Lower Access Area
are low enough to permit entry.
Surveillance: The mating of the casks with the cask mating subsystem will be verified
by video camera from the Control Center. Shield plug or source cask
lid removal will not be performed prior to verification of proper fitup.
Basis: ALARA
10.2.1.3
Title: Cask Characteristics
Specification: All source casks and receiving casks must interface with the DTS to
ensure proper operation.
Applicability: All casks.
Objective: Ensure that the DTS will properly function, and prevent operational
interference.
Action: All cask designs shall be verified to ensure that the cask height,
diameter, inside diameter, lid diameter, shield plug diameter, fuel cell
opening, trunnion sizes and locations and pintle dimensions are
acceptable for proper interface with the DTS.
Surveillance: Design verification.
Bases: Section 3.1.2
10.2.1.4 Spent Fuel Snecifications
Title: Fuel Specifications
Specifications: Type Intact PWR fuel assemblies
10.2-2
September 30, 1996
Weight 1720 lbs. max.
Burnup < 40,000 MWD/MTU
Initial Enrichment • 3.75 w/o U-235
Cooling Time minimum 5 years
Decay Heat /
Fuel Assembly < 0.74 kW
Neutron Source < 2.4E+08 n/sec with spectrum bounded by

per assembly Table 3.1-3
Gamma Source < 7.8E15 photon/sec with spectrum bounded by

per assembly Table 3.1-2
Applicability: All fuel.
Objective: To avoid exceeding the ranges for which the thermal, shielding,
criticality and release calculations are valid.
Action: Spent Fuel which do not meet these specifications may not be
transferred in the DTS.
Surveillance: Each spent fuel assembly will be demonstrated to meet these

specifications by reactor staff, using site-specific procedures, before fuel
transfer within the DTS.
Basis: The basic design of the DTS against the physical and radiological
parameters specified.
10.2.1.5 Cask Transfer Trolley Locking
Title: Locking of Source Cask and Receiving Cask Trolleys in the Preparation
Area and the Lower Access Area.
Applicability: Source Cask and Receiving Cask Trolleys
Objective: Prevention of inadvertent movement of the trolleys during a seismic

event.
10.2-3
September 30, 1996
Action: The cask trolleys will be locked in place in the Preparation Area prior
to removing the lid bolts of the source cask and prior to initiating
closure operations on the receiving cask. Both cask trolleys will be
locked in place in the Lower Access Area after positioning of the cask
below the opening in the Mezzanine plate.
Surveillance: Interlock of locking pin and TC port cover opening.
Basis: Prevention of movement of the trolleys during a seismic event.
10.2.1.6 Tiedown of Casks on Trolleys
Title: Tiedown of Casks on Trolleys
Applicability: Source cask and receiving cask trolleys.
Objective: Prevention of cask tipover during tornado or seismic event.
Action: Cask shall be securely fastened to the trolley prior to movement of the
trolley into the Preparation Area.
Surveillance: Operational Procedure.
Basis: Prevention of cask tipover due to tornado or seismic event.
10.2.1.7 Load Testing of Upper Crane and Fuel Handling Crane
Title: Pre-Operational Testing of Upper Crane and Fuel Handling Crane
Applicability: Cranes
Objective: Prevention of loss of load.
Action: Cranes shall be inspected and tested in accordance with NOG-7000.
Surveillance: Testing and inspections shall be verified by appropriate site personnel.

Documentation shall be in accordance with NOG-7600.
Basis: Prevention of loss of load.
10.2.1.8 Operational Testing of Grapples and Gripping Devices
10.2-4
September 30, 1996
Title: Grapples and Gripping Devices Operational Testing
Applicability: Fuel Handling Crane Grapple, Cask Mating Subsystem Gripping Device
and Upper Crane Grapple
Objective: Ensure grapples stay engaged while under load, can be easily
disengaged with no load, and all sensors operate properly.
Action: Full check out of grapple and gripping device operations including
operational testing of all sensors, load indicators, and grapple
movements prior to first use and during each scheduled maintenance
period.
Surveillance: Full operational testing.
Basis: Prevention of loss of load, and prevent need for maintenance on

equipment located in high radiation environment.
10.2.1.9 Sensor Functional Testing
Title: Sensor Functional Testing
Applicability: Fuel Handling Crane, Cask Mating Subsystem, Shield Plug and Source
Cask Lid Handling Subsystem, Cask Transfer Subsystems
Objective: Verification of proper function of all sensors.
Action: 1. Prior to first use of the DTS, all equipment shall go through
complete system functional testing including verification of
proper positioning of all sensors, proper indications, proper
activation of interlocks, proper disengagement of interlocks
through the use of bypasses. This shall include functional
testing of all backup instrumentation.
2. During each scheduled maintenance period, all equipment shall

be functionally checked to ensure that all instrumentation is in
good working order.
Surveillance: See action above.
Basis: Assurance that operators and the control system are provided with
accurate information from the equipment.
10.2-5
September 30, 1996
10.2.1.10 Port Cover Locking
Title: Port Cover Locking.
Applicability: Upper shield port cover locking in closed position and TC port cover
locking in open position.
Objective: Upper shield port covers: Ensure that radiation dose rates on the roof
of the DTS are within calculated values, thus ensuring that off-site dose
rates are within allowable limits.
TC port covers: Prevention of collision with fuel handling machine

and ensuring that the opening to the casks is clear for fuel transfer.
Action: The upper shield port cover will be locked in the closed position during
fuel transfer. The TC port covers will be locked in the open position
during fuel transfer.
Surveillance: Verification that sensors and interlocks are working properly prior to
first use and during scheduled maintenance periods. Verification of
proper operation and fitup of locking devices prior to first use.
Basis: Shielding evaluation presented in Section 7 and proper operation.
10.2.1.11 Upper Crane Alignment
Title: Upper Crane Alignment
Specification: Upper crane must align with the lifting pintle on the cask mating
subsystem.
Applicability: Upper Crane
Objective: Ensure proper fitup and operability of grapple and gripping device.
Action: Locate crane above each cask opening and engage and disengage with
overlid pintle.
Surveillance: Verify proper engagement, disengagement and operation prior to first

use and during scheduled maintenance periods.
Basis: Ensure that source cask lid and shield plug can be removed and
10.2-6
September 30, 1996
replaced during operations.
10.2.1.12 Upper Crane Operations
Title: Upper Crane Vertical Positioning
Specification: Upper crane must be capable of proper positioning in full up position,

above TC port cover with lid (or shield plug), above TC port cover with
lid (or shield plug) disengaged, and at location of overlid gripping
device in the cask mating subsystem.
Applicability: Upper Crane
Objective: Ensure proper fitup and operability of grapple and gripping device.
Action: Locate grapple in vertical orientation in positions specified in the

operating procedures.
Surveillance: Preoperational testing of sensors and crane prior to first use.
Basis: Ensure proper functioning of crane hoist.
10.2.1.13 Fuel Handling Subsystem Operation
Title: Fuel Handling Subsystem Operation
Specification: Fuel Handling Subsystem must be able to safely lift one fuel assembly
out of the source cask and place it into a specified location in the
receiving cask.
Applicability: Fuel Handling Subsystem
Objective: Ensure safe handling of the fuel assembly.
Action: Demonstrate using a dummy fuel assembly that the fuel handg
subsystem works properly prior to first use of the DTS. Full
operational testing would include verification of crud catcher operation,
full operation of bridge, trolley and rotating platform and all sensors.
Verification of all computer assisted positioning.
Surveillance: Proper alignment and positioning is continuously checked during

operation using video cameras.
10.2-7
September 30, 1996
Basis: The fuel handling subsystem must transfer fuel from the source cask to
the receiving cask.
10.2.1.14 Sliding Door
Title: Operation of Sliding Door
Specification: The sliding door must properly shield the preparation area from
radiation during fuel transfer.
Applicability: Sliding Door
Action: Sliding Door must interlock with radiation monitoring system to ensure
that door will not be opened during fuel transfer. Sliding door must
provide adequate shielding during fuel transfer.
Surveillance: Continuous radiation monitoring in the Preparation Area during DTS

operation. Check out of interlocks prior to first use of DTS, and
periodic testing of interlocks during scheduled maintenance periods.
Basis: Radiation safety.
10.2.2 Limiting Conditions for Operation
Limiting conditions for operation of equipment, systems and components (in terms of lowest
acceptable level of performance, minimum number of components available, etc.) will be
concerned with operating systems.
Technical conditions and characteristics are provided in terms of allowable levels of operating
variables which are measured before operation of the equipment is permitted. Also included
in this section are interlocks which automatically inhibit operations unless certain conditions
are met.
10.2.2.1 HVAC Subsystem Operational Checks
10.2.2.1.1 Ventilation System Pre-shift Checks
Title: Ventilation System Pre-shift Checks
Specification: Fans are running. Pressure differences across HEPA filters within
range, typically 1-4 in. wg. Pressures in each of the DTS areas (TCA,
Lower Access Area, and Preparation Area) are within range.
10.2-8
September 30, 1996
Applicability: HVAC Subsystem
Objective: To minimize spread of contaminated material.
Action: If fans are not running, shift to backup system. Investigate cause of
problem and repair. Adjust flow rates to ensure pressure differentials.
Surveillance: Check flows, pressure differentials and operation of fans before starting
each shift. Replace filters when casks are moved out of Lower Access
Area if required, and as part of scheduled maintenance.
Basis: HEPA filters are typically designed for pressure differentials of 1 - 4 in

wg, depending on dust load and flow. Actual values are site-specific,
depending on type and make of filters used. High pressure differences
indicate filters need changing. Radiation levels in the Lower Access
Area may also indicate need for filter change.
10.2.2.1.2 HEPA Filter Leak Detection
Title: HEPA filter leak detection
Specification: Filters must pass DOP, sodium flame or similar test.
Applicability: All HEPA filters
Objective: To ensure that exhaust air is adequately filtered.
Action: If filters fail test, change them. Also change filters as part of scheduled
maintenance.
Surveillance: Perform test after installing filters.
Basis: Filters will be tested in accordance with ANSI/ASME N509.
10.2.2.1.3 Air Particulate Check
Title: Air Particulate Check
Specification: Air samples from the exhaust stack shall be monitored and meet site
specific limits.
Applicability: This will be addressed in the site-specific Health Physics Control
10.2-9
September 30, 1996
procedure. See also Section 7.3.4.2.
Objective: Ensure particulate release is within allowable values.
Action: The exhaust stack will be equipped with a continuous air monitor,
which collects and monitors airborne particulate, iodine and noble gases.
Surveillance: Continuous monitoring.
Basis: Off Site Dose rates.
10.2.2.2 Cask Handling
10.2.2.2.1 Health Physics Surveys on the Receiving Cask
This will be addressed in the sit e specific health physics control procedure.
10.2.2.2.2 Security of Casks on Cask Trolleys
Title: Security of Casks on Cask Trolleys
Specification: Casks must be secured on the casks.
Applicability: Source Cask and Receiving Cask and their trolleys.
Objective: Prevention of cask tipover due to seismic event.
Action: Loaded trolleys will not be moved until casks are sedurely fastened.
Surveillance: Bolt torques shall be verified prior to moving trolley.
Basis: The cask holddown devices are designed against the design basis
earthquake loadings assuming that they are securely fastened.
10.2.2.2.3 Interlocks
Title: Interlocks
Specification: Interlocks prevent operators from incorrectly performing operations

which would affect the safety of the DTS, such as lifting a load without
proper engagement, or opening the sliding door during fuel transfer.
10.2-10
September 30, 1996
Applicability: Control System
Objective: Prevention of inadvertent incorrect operations.
Action: Interlocks are provided per Table 5.4-1 which prevent the operator from
performing operations which would result in an unsafe condition.
Surveillance: Interlocks cannot be bypasses without supervisory password or key.
Basis: DTS is designed so that operators cannot render the system unsafe by
incorrect commands.
10.2.3 Surveillance Requirements
This section addresses the routine checking or continuous monitoring carried out to
ensure that no undetected radiation or gas leak may occur tend to ensure no degradation of air
flow through the DTS.
Tests and inspections of equipment necessary to maintain limits are addressed in

Section 10.2.1 and 10.2.2.
10.2.3.1 Area Gamma Radiation Monitoring
Title: Area Gamma Radiation Monitoring
Specification: Alarm if in excess of limits specified in Chapter 7.
Applicability: Monitors specified in 7.3.4.1.
Objective: To warn operators of high radiation fields where they might otherwise
be working.
Action: If alarm triggered, evacuate/do not enter affected area. Supervisor will
arrange to find source of radiation and correct fault under health physics
control.
Surveillance: Permanent monitoring with alarms locally, in the Control Center and
repeated as a general alarm in the on-site Reactor Control Room.
Basis: See Chapter 7.
10.2-11
September 30, 1996
10.2.3.2 Portable Radiation Detection
Title: Portable Radiation Detection
Specification
Applicability These will be addressed in the site specific
Objective Health Physics Procedure
Action
Surveillance
10.2.3.3 Ventilation Systems Radioactivity Monitoring
Title: Ventilation Systems Radioactivity Monitoring
Specification: Alarm if radioactivity exceeds instrument set points
Applicability: Ventilation systems radioactivity monitor at exhaust stack
Objective: To measure, record and alarm radioactivity which may be discharged to

atmosphere
Action: If radioactivity is detected, return fuel to casks,and install source cask

lid and receiving cask shield plug. Supervisor will arrange to find
source of radiation and correct fault under health physics control.
Surveillance: Permanent Monitoring
Periodically check that sampling method is accurate.
Basis: To ensure that discharges are maintained at ALARA levels in

accordance with 10CFR20.
10.2.3.4 Shut down during Tornado Watch or Warning
Title: Tornado Watch or Warning Shutdown
Specification: If a tornado watch or warning is issued for the vicinity of the DTS, the
DTS will be shut down.
Applicability: Any tornado watch or warning within a specified radius of the DTS.
Objective: To ensure recovery of the fuel assemblies after a tornado.
10.2-12
September 30, 1996
Action: Fuel assembly being transferred will be installed in nearest cask.

Source cask lid and receiving cask shield plug will be installed on the
casks. TC port covers and upper shield port covers will be closed.
Control center may be moved to a sheltered area. Casks which are not
fully closed (partially welded or bolted) will be moved into the Lower
Access Area and the sliding door will be closed.
Surveillance: Weather shall be monitored on site or from a weather tower within 10

miles of the DTS.
Basis: Ensure that the fuel assemblies can be removed from the DTS safely
after the DTS is struck by a tornado missile.
10.2.4 Design Features
Any minor changes in the design of essential equipment to suit specific site
requirements will be covered in site-specific license applications. Control of further changes
will be addressed then, and therefore no design controls are provided in this Topical Report.
10.2.5 Administrative Controls
Site specific license applications will contain a full description and discussion of
organization and administrative systems and procedures, record keeping, review, audit and
reporting necessary to ensure that the operation of the DTS is performed in a safe manner.
Therefore, no administrative controls are provided in this report.
10.2-13
September 30, 1996
CHAPTER I1
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
This chapter describes the quality assurance controls which apply to activities that
affect the components and systems important to safety. "Quality Assurance" includes quality
control, which comprises those quality assurance actions related to control of the physical
characteristics and quality of the material or components to predetermined requirements.
The design of the DTS was performed in accordance with Transnuclear Quality
Assurance Program that has been established in conformance with the requirements of 10
CFR 72, Subpart G. -Likewise, the organizations that select the site, construct the facility,
fabricate and install the equipment, test the systems, operate the systems and decommission
the facility and site shall have a Quality Assurance Program appropriate to these activities.
The QA programs shall be implemented for all activities which are important to safety
including those that are subcontracted for this project. The components and systems
important to safety are listed in Section 3.4, "Classification of Structures, Components and
Systems."
Supplier organizations and their subcontractors shall be made aware of the mandatory
QA requirements including the applicability of Codes and Standards by identifying such in
procurement documents. These requirements must cover the activities identified throughout
the life of the activity.
The eighteen (18) criteria described in Subpart G are as follows:
1. Quality Assurance Organization

2. Quality Assurance Program
3. Design Control
4. Procurement Document Control
5. Instructions, Procedures and Drawings
6. Document Control
7. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services
8. Identification and Control of Materials, Parts and Components
9. Control of Special Processes
10. Licensee Inspection
11. Test Control
12. Control of Measuring and Test Equipment
13. Handling, Storage, and Shipping Control
14. Inspection, Test and Operating Status
11 - 1
September 30, 1996
15. Nonconforming Materials, Parts or Components

16. Corrective Action
17. Quality Assurance Records
18. Audits
A copy of TN's Quality Assurance Program for Design, Fabrication, Inspection and
Testing of Storage Systems for Spent Fuel and Associated Radioactive Materials (E-9213) is
enclosed attached as Appendix 1IA.I for reference.
11 - 2
E-9213
Rev 2
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
FOR
DESIGN, FABRICATION, INSPECTION, MODIFICATION AND TESTING OF
STORAGE SYSTEMS FOR SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Transnuclear, Inc.
Two Skyline Drive
Hawthorne, NY 10532
E-9213
Rev 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pacr
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
1. Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Quality Assurance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Design Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Procurement Document Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Instructions, Procedures and Drawings . . . . . . . 13
6. Document Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and

Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Identification and Control of Materials,

Parts and Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Control of Special Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11. Test Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12. Control of Measuring and Test Equipment . . . . . . 22
13. Handling, Storage and Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14. Inspection, Test and Operating Status . . . . . . . 24
15. Nonconforming Materials, Parts or Components . . . . 25
16. Corrective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
17. Quality Assurance Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
18. Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix A
Matrix of Existing QA Procedures Against the
Applicable Criteria of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50.
i
E-9213
Rev 2
INTRODUCTION
The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 72 "Licensing

Requirements for the Storage of Spent Fuel in an Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation" (ISFSI), requires in Subpart G
that a quality assurance program based on the criteria in
Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 be established and implemented for the
structures, systems and components of an ISFSI that are important
to safety. This document describes how Transnuclear, Inc. (TN)
intends to satisfy these requirements as a supplier of storage
systems* for spent fuel and associated radioactive materials.
As a supplier, TN has QA responsibility for all phases of design,

fabrication, inspection and testing of storage systems, which TN
delivers to an ISFSI for storage of licensed material. This QA
responsibility exists whether TN has contractual responsibility
for each of the individual phases or not.
For example, if TN intends to deliver equipment which was

constructed by others without TN involvement, TN shall assure
itself that activities associated with its construction were
performed, where applicable, in accordance with the quality
assurance requirements of 10 CFR 72, Subpart G. On the other
hand, if a storage system is designed, fabricated, inspected and
tested by TN or under contract to TN, TN shall assure that the QA
Program, as described herein, is implemented during these phases.
Organizations that perform such work under direct contract to TN
are identified herein as major participating organizations. They
may provide hardware, services or both.
This document describes TN's generic QA Program for the design,
fabrication, inspection, modification and testing of storage
systems in accordance with 10 CPR 72, Subpart G. Additionally,
TN's Topical Safety Analysis Report (TSAR) for a storage system
shall contain specific provisions as required. These specific
provisions shall consider the complexity and the proposed use of
the structures, systems and components.
The organization of this document follows that of Appendix B of

10 CFR 50, in that sections are numbered and titled the same as
the corresponding 18 criteria of Appendix B.
* A storage system consists of a storage module and any

associated equipment which may be required for loading and
unloading at the ISFSI.
ii
E-9213
Rev 2
1. ORGANIZATION
The organizational structure which has been set up at TN to

establish and implement its QA Programs is shown in Fig. 1. The
authority and duties of the personnel performing activities
affecting the safety related functions are described below.
The Chief Engineer is the person responsible for establishing the

QA Program. He reports to the President of TN. The President
shall approve the QA Program and any revisions thereto. The
Chief Engineer shall approve Corporate QA Procedures and any
revisions thereto. The minimum qualification requirements for
the position of Chief Engineer are a bachelor's degree in
engineering from an accredited institution and ten years of
experience in engineering and quality assurance activities.
For each project, a person shall be assigned as the QA Engineer

for that project. In his capacity as Project QA Engineer he
reports directly to the Office of the President, as shown by the
solid line in Fig. 1. The person who is assigned as the QA
Engineer for a particular project shall have no other
responsibilities on that project. He shall be functionally
independent of any group or individual directly responsible for
the activities which he monitors. He shall also be sufficiently
independent of undue influences and responsibilities for
schedules and costs. He shall have the authority and
organizational freedom to enforce QA requirements, to identify
problem areas, to recommend or provide solutions to QA problems,
and to verify the effectiveness of the solutions. The minimum
qualification requirements for the position of Project QA
Engineer are a bachelor's degree in engineering, physical
sciences or mathematics from an accredited institution and five
years of experience in engineering activities with at least one
year of experience in quality assurance activities.
The services of a Quality Assurance consultant may be utilized.

The minimum qualification requirements for the QA consultant
shall be the same as those for a Project QA Engineer. The
consultant may provide auditing and oversight services to assure
that quality assurance requirements are fulfilled in accordance
with this document and applicable procedures. The QA consultant
may serve as the QA Engineer on specific projects.
- 1 -
E-9213
Rev 2
-- - - COMMUNICATIONS ONLY
PRESIDENT
F 1
|EtNGUTEER ||OPERATIONS
|PROJECT -L - - - - - - - - -QUA=
|MANAGER ASSURANCE
ENGINEE
FIG. I MNY ORGANIZATION CHART
- 2 -
E-9213
Rev 2
The Project QA Engineer has the following typical

responsibilities:
a. Prepare TN's QA Program Plans and QA Procedures for
specific projects.
b. Verify that major participating organizations have

approved QA Programs, as required.
c. Approve QA Program Plans of participating organizations

for a project for which he has been assigned as the QA
Engineer.
d. Verify that major participating organizations have QA

procedures, as required.
e. Assure that TN design documents contain applicable QA

requirements.
f. Approve TN safety related procurement specifications,

instructions, procedures and drawings.
g. Assure that further processing, delivery, installation

or use of non-conforming items is controlled until
proper disposition has occurred.
h. Perform audits to verify that QA requirements are being

met,(if qualified as a lead auditor).
The Project QA Engineer may delegate the performance of one or

more of these functions to other qualified individuals at TN, or
from contractor organizations, who do not have direct
responsibility for performing the work being monitored.
A Project Manager or Project Engineer shall be responsible to the
Chief Engineer for all technical aspects of a project including
design, issuing of procurement documents, preparation of TSAR's,
construction and delivery of storage systems, as applicable.
- 3 -
E-9213
Rev 2
A possible interrelationship between TN and another major

participating organization is shown in Fig. 2. The other
organization could be a design agent, manufacturer, supplier or
sub-contractor. The chart is provided to establish that any
organization performing functions affecting quality must have a
QA position with the required authority and organizational
freedom as well as direct access to upper levels of management.
The chart also shows the requirement for direct communication
between Quality Assurance of TN and the other organization.
However, TN shall retain overall responsibility for the QA
program.
Specific organization charts of major participating organizations
shall be detailed in their respective QA documents, and shall be
in full compliance with the QA requirements of 10 CFR Part 72.
- 4 -
E-9213
Rev 2
_ | PRESMENT|
CIE
QUALITY
ECT ASSURANCE
MANAG5|ERGINEER
TNYr
GENERAL
MANAGEMNT
QUALITY
PROJECT ASSURANCE
MANAGEMENT ENGINEER
OTHER PARTICIPAMTG ORGANIZATION
FIG. 2 TYPICAL OVERALL ORGANIZATION CHART

- 5 -
E-9213
Rev 2
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
The program described herein is a generic program which shall be

implemented by TN as a supplier of storage systems. The program
is intended to be in full compliance with the requirements of
Subpart G of 10 CFR 72.
It is the policy of TN to establish and maintain an integrated

quality assurance system which governs the design, fabrication,
inspection, modification and testing of structures, systems and
components for storage of spent fuel and associated radioactive
materials. This system applies to all safety related activities
performed by TN, or its' contractors, to assure that the storage
systems meet the required high standards of reliability and
safety. The quality assurance system utilizes Project QA Program
Plans, Corporate QA Procedures and Project QA Procedures to
define specific quality assurance requirements for implementation
of the generic QA Program at TN. Comparable plans and procedures
shall be utilized by TN contractors.
Specific QA Program Plans shall be prepared to detail the actual
measures which are to be established and implemented for a
particular project or portion of a project. Each specific
project QA Program Plan shall identify the participating
organizations, their inter-relationships, and the
responsibilities of each of the participants. The scope of
specific QA Program Plans will differ based upon the type and
complexity of the quality affected activities to be performed.
QA Program Plans for new projects shall be established at the
earliest time consistent with the schedule for accomplishing
activities on such projects. Specific measures shall be
established in the QA Program Plans directly or by reference to
Corporate QA Procedures, which are applicable to all TN projects,
or to Project QA Procedures which are only applicable to specific
projects. The Corporate QA Procedures are used for activities
such as Drawing Control, Procedure Format, Document Transmittals,
etc. Project QA Procedures are used for specific project
activities unique to a particular project. The TN Project QA
Engineer shall identify all QA procedures required during a
particular phase of a project during the development of the QA
Program Plan. If QA procedures so identified do not yet exist,
they shall be prepared as either Corporate or Project QA
Procedures, approved, and issued prior to the performance of the
activities covered by the procedures. Appendix A to this Program
lists the Corporate QA Procedures presently applicable to TN QA
activities against a matrix of the 18 criteria of Appendix B of
10 CFR 50.
- 6 -
E-9213
Rev 2
Preparation of the QA Program, and subsequent revisions thereto,

are the responsibility of the Chief Engineer. The President of
TN shall approve the original QA Program and any subsequent
revisions. QA Program Plans for specific projects and any
revisions thereto, shall be approved by the Project QA Engineer.
Corporate QA Procedures shall be approved by the Chief Engineer.
Project QA Procedures shall be approved by the Project QA
Engineer.
The distribution of the generic QA Program is controlled by TN's

Chief Engineer. He is also responsible for the distribution of
Corporate QA Procedures. The Project QA Engineer is responsible
for the distribution of Project QA Procedures. He assures that
responsible organizations and individuals are aware of all
mandatory QA requirements for project activities under their
cognizance and that copies of the general and specific QA
program, plans and procedures are distributed to them, as
applicable.
Major organizations participating in a project shall have
approved quality assurance programs including written procedures
and instructions to implement their respective programs. Their
programs, procedures and instructions shall be in full compliance
with the applicable criteria of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50. These
QA programs shall be formally reviewed and accepted for use by
the TN Project QA Engineer prior to the initiation of activities
affecting quality.
Specific project QA Program Plans prepared by major participating

organizations shall be approved by the TN Project QA Engineer.
Audits and/or overchecks shall be performed to assure that these
programs and procedures are properly implemented by the
participating organizations.
The Project QA Engineer is responsible for verifying on a

particular project that all activities on safety-related
structures, systems and components are controlled by the QA
program. In case of disputes with the TN Project Manager or
others over quality matters, he can request resolution by TN's
President.
Safety related items shall be identified by the Project Engineer

for each specific design. The complexity and importance of these
items shall be defined and any special requirements shall be
described.
- 7 -
E-9213
Rev 2
TN shall hold annual QA Review Meetings to assess the adequacy

and effectiveness of the generic and specific Project QA
Programs. These review meetings shall be chaired by the
President. The Chief Engineer, Project Engineers and QA
Engineers for ongoing projects shall attend. These reviews shall
be documented and shall include a list of follow-up action items,
designating responsibilities and schedules for implementation.
TN and major participating organizations shall provide suitable
conditions, environment and equipment for activities affecting
quality. Special controls, tools, equipment, etc. shall be
provided to attain the appropriate level of quality.
Inspections, tests and other controls shall be implemented to
assure that the appropriate levels of quality are attained.
Personnel performing activities affecting quality shall be
properly trained and indoctrinated as to the purpose, scope and
proper implementation of the QA Program, the specific QA Program
Plan, and QA Procedures to assure that they recognize that the
implementation of the QA Program is mandatory for safety related
items and to assure proficiency for the tasks which they are to
perform. The proficiency of TN personnel performing activities
affecting quality shall be maintained through a program of
on-the-job training and indoctrination meetings as required.
Meeting reports shall identify the subject matter, attending
personnel and dates for training and indoctrination sessions.
- 8 -
E-9213
Rev 2
3. DESIGN CONTROL
TN shall establish measures to assure that regulatory

requirements and storage system designs have been or are
correctly translated into drawings, specifications, procedures
and instructions. The design shall consider, but shall not be
limited to the following designs aspects: criticality, shielding,
stresses, thermal and hydraulic performance, accident conditions,
compatibility of materials, accessibility for in-service
inspection, maintenance and repair.
Measures shall be established for the selection of suitable
materials, parts, equipment, and processes for safety-related
structures, systems and components. Valid industry standards and
specifications shall be utilized to the greatest practical
extent.
Written instructions, procedures and/or plans shall identify the

methods of control for the design of the storage system. These
documents shall identify the safety related items, regulatory
requirements, applicable codes or standards, design criteria and
measures for coordination and control of design interfaces, and
appropriate quality standards. Deviations from applicable codes
and standards shall be identified and controlled.
Design calculations and drawings shall be prepared and checked in
accordance with approved procedures. Materials, parts and
equipment which are standard, commercial (off the shelf) or which
have been previously approved for a different application shall
be reviewed for suitability prior to selection. The Project
Manager and Project QA Engineer shall review design documents to
assure that the design characteristics of the storage module can
be controlled, inspected, and tested and that appropriate
inspection and test criteria have been identified.
The adequacy of the design shall be verified by individuals or

groups, other than those who performed the original design based
on reviews of design documents, supplemented, as appropriate, by
test data from prototype or scale model tests. These reviews
shall culminate in formal Design Review Meetings. The Project
Manager shall schedule and chair such meetings. The meetings
shall be held to confirm that various aspects of the design have
been properly considered, including conformance to licensing
requirements when applicable. The Design Review Meetings shall
also assure that there has been, is and will be appropriate
coordination between organizations participating in the design,
fabrication, inspection and testing of the storage system.
- 9 -
E-9213
Rev 2
Questions and concerns expressed at a design review meeting that

require resolution shall be identified as action items in the
design review meeting report which is issued by the Project
Engineer. The report assigns an individual and due date for the
resolution of each item.
After satisfactory completion of action items, a memorandum shall

be prepared by the Project Engineer documenting the fact that the
design review verification process has been completed. If
testing is used to verify design, the test program and results
will in addition be subjected to the design review process.
Design verification tests may be conducted with appropriately
scaled models or full size components. The tests would be
conducted under the most adverse design conditions.
Any errors or deficiencies in the design or design documents,

including the design process, that could adversely affect
safety-related structures, systems or components shall be
documented, and corrective action shall be taken in accordance
with Section 16 of this Program.
TN shall assure that measures are established and implemented to

verify that the fabrication and assembly drawings, prepared by
the Fabricator are consistent with design documents. For storage
systems of TN design, TN shall review all fabrication drawings,
approve design changes and establish procedures for the
documentary control of design changes.
All design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to

the same or equivalent design control measures as are applicable
to the original design.
TN shall establish measures to assure that the approved design
and operating conditions are not changed unless the effect of the
changes on the design are evaluated and approved. For any change
which affects the basis for a license to use a storage system at
an ISFSI, approval for the change shall be obtained from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to its use under the modified
conditions.
- 10 -
E-9213
Rev 2
4. PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL
Procurement documents shall be prepared which clearly define all

design requirements including quality assurance requirements, and
shall reference all applicable documents, including codes,
standards, regulatory requirements and the storage system design.
These documents shall serve as the principal technical documents
for the procurement of structures, systems and components and
related services to be used in the design, fabrication,
inspection and testing of the storage systems.
These documents may be prepared by TN or by one or more major
participating organizations, e.g. Design Agent, Manufacturer,
etc. Each of these organizations shall have a documented,
approved quality assurance program which shall be supplemented by
detailed procedures and instructions as required to assure
adequate control for preparing safety related procurement
documents. Changes and revisions to these documents shall be
reviewed and approved in an equivalent manner as the original
document in accordance with documented procedures. These
programs shall also include measures to qualify/accept the
quality assurance programs of their suppliers and subcontractors
for safety related equipment, materials or services.
Procurement documents shall also address the applicability of the
provisions of 10 CFR 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.
Safety related procurement specifications prepared and/or issued
by TN shall be reviewed by the Project QA Engineer to determine
that appropriate quality requirements are correctly stated,
inspectable and controllable. The QA Engineer shall also verify
that adequate acceptance and rejection criteria are identified
and that the procurement specification was prepared, reviewed and
approved in accordance with the applicable procedures. The QA
Engineer's written approval of the procurement specification
shall signify that he has verified these items prior to release.
TN's safety related procurement specifications shall identify
which documents (e.g. drawings, specifications, procedures,
inspection and fabrication plans, inspection and test records,
personnel and procedure qualifications, and chemical and physical
test results of materials) are to be prepared by a supplier and
which documents are to be submitted to TN or its agents for
review, information and/or approval. They shall also specify
which documents are to be retained, controlled and maintained by
the supplier for specified periods and which records shall be
transmitted to TN prior to use of the storage system. Duplicate
records may be maintained for specified periods by both the
supplier and TN to facilitate permanent record storage.
- 11 -
E-9213
Rev 2
Procurement specifications shall also include requirements to

insure that TN or its agents have reasonable rights of access to
the supplier's facility and records for source inspection and
audit prior to contract award, and inspection and audits during
and after completion of fabrication.
Purchase Orders may be prepared by TN management and shall be in

compliance with the technical and quality assurance requirements
identified in the procurement specifications.
- 12 -
E-9213
Rev 2
5. INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS
Methods for complying with each of the applicable 18 criteria of

Appendix G of 10 CFR 72, for activities affecting quality during
design, fabrication, inspection and testing shall be specified in
instructions, procedures and/or drawings. They shall be
prepared, reviewed, approved and controlled in accordance with
written document control procedures.
These instructions, procedures and drawings shall include
quantitative and/or qualitative acceptance criteria to permit
verification that activities affecting quality have been
satisfactorily accomplished.
The QA Engineer on a project shall review and approve Project
instructions, procedures and drawings which are prepared by TN.
These documents may include, but are not limited to
specifications, drawings, special process, calibration, test,
operating, maintenance and repair instructions and procedures and
any changes thereto.
- 13 -
E-9213
Rev 2
6. DOCUMENT CONTROL
TN shall establish and implement procedures to control the

issuance of TN documents which prescribe activities affecting
quality. These procedures shall define document control measures
to assure adequate review, approval, release and distribution of
original documents and subsequent revisions. These documents may
include, but are not limited to design specifications, drawings,
procurement specifications, and special process, test and
operating procedures. A specific QA Plan for each project shall
identify the persons, groups and/or organizations responsible for
reviewing and approving documents and their revisions for that
project.
Major participating organizations shall establish and implement

document control procedures in accordance with their approved QA
program.
Changes to documents shall be reviewed and approved by the same

organizations that performed the original review and approval
unless otherwise delegated by TN or a major participating
organization. Approved changes shall be included in the
applicable drawings, procedures, instructions or other documents
prior to the implementation of the change.
The Project Manager shall be responsible for the control of

Project documents which are issued by TN. He shall also be
responsible for the receipt and distribution of Project documents
to and from participating organizations. He shall distribute
controlled documents in accordance with TN's established QA
procedures to prevent the inadvertent use of obsolete/superseded
documents. He shall maintain an up-to-date file of all Project
records.
The originals of documents which require distribution control to
prevent their inadvertent use shall be stamped on the cover sheet
with the TN Document Control stamp. All copies made from the
original shall be identified as "controlled" or "uncontrolled" as
determined by the individual who is responsible for the
distribution of that document. All controlled copies shall be
entered on a controlled copy log which is filed with the original
document. Individual recipients are required to acknowledge
receipt of the document by initialling the log. When a
controlled copy is transmitted to an outside user, it shall be
accompanied by a TN Document Transmittal Form which the recipient
signs and returns to Transnuclear verifying that he has received
the document and carried out the instructions indicated thereon.
These receipts shall be filed with the original document.
- 14 -
E-9213
Rev 2
When a document is changed, revised copies shall be distributed

in the same manner to the users identified on the controlled copy
log. The recipient shall be required to void the superseded
document or return it for destruction.
Documents shall be available at the location where activities

affecting quality are performed prior to commencing the work.
For certain types of documents which are issued by TN, the

Project Engineer shall maintain Master Lists to identify current
revisions. He shall update and distribute these lists to
responsible personnel to preclude the use of superseded
documents. Major participating organizations shall utilize the
same or equivalent measures.
- 15 -
E-9213
Rev 2
7. CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL,

EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES
Measures shall be established and implemented to assure that all

purchased material, equipment, and services conform to
procurement documents.
An engineering source evaluation of prospective supplier's

facilities shall be performed by the TN Project Engineer to
confirm that the organization has the technical capability to
supply safety related equipment, materials or services in
accordance with the project's design, manufacturing, quality
assurance and procurement requirements.
The TN Project QA Engineer shall assure that source evaluation

audits of potential suppliers are performed in accordance with TN
Corporate QA Procedures to verify that they can comply with the
criteria of Appendix G of 10 CFR 72 that are applicable to the
material, equipment, or service being procured.
The resultant reports of the engineering source evaluations and

source evaluation audits shall be filed and retained in
accordance with Section 17 and the applicable QA procedures.
Contractors and sub-contractors shall be inspected and audited

at planned intervals to verify that they comply with quality
requirements and to assess the effectiveness of their QA program.
The inspections and audits shall be performed as described in
Sections 10 and 18, respectively.
Suppliers shall provide objective evidence that storage modules
and associated items, including repaired or spare parts, meet all
quality requirements. All items shall be properly identified.
Appropriate records shall be available prior to use or
installation to permit verification of conformance with
procurement documents. These records shall be retained
accessibly (See Section 17). The supplier shall furnish to TN
all documentation which identifies all procurement requirements
which have not been met together with nonconformance reports
dispositioned "accept as is" or "repair". These documents shall
be reviewed by the Project Engineer, Project QA Engineer and TN's
design agent (if applicable) to assure conformance with
procurement document requirements. The Project Engineer shall
accept these documents in writing.
- 16 -
E-9213
Rev 2
Supplier's certificates of conformance for safety related

structures, systems and components furnished to TN shall be
periodically evaluated by audits, independent inspections or
tests to verify that they are valid. The frequency and extent of
these evaluations shall be related to the safety importance of
the procured material or equipment. An acceptance test program
approved by TN shall be performed for each storage system in
accordance with the requirements of the procurement documents.
TN or its agent(s) shall perform receiving inspections on safety

related structures, systems and components furnished to TN, to
assure that they are properly identified and correspond to the
receiving documentation. These receiving inspections may be
performed at a supplier's facility, if appropriate. The
inspections shall verify that the material or equipment conforms
to the requirements specified in procurement documents.
Nonconforming materials, parts or components shall be controlled
in accordance with Section 15. These inspections shall be
performed utilizing previously established inspection
instructions. Fabrication records, acceptance test records and
certificates of conformance shall be made available by TN at the
ISFSI prior to first use of a storage system.
- 17 -
E-9213
Rev 2
8. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF

MATERIALS, PARTS AND COMPONENTS
Measures shall be established and implemented to identify and

control materials, parts, and components. These measures shall
assure identification of an item by an appropriate means during
the fabrication, installation and use of the item and shall
prevent the inadvertent use of incorrect or defective items. The
requirements for identification shall be established during the
preparation of procurement specifications and design drawings.
The methods and location of identification information shall be
selected so as to not adversely affect the fit, function or
quality of the items being identified.
The identification and control of safety-related items shall be

traceable through procurement, fabrication, inspection and test
records. Correct identification of materials, parts and
components shall be verified and documented prior to their
release for fabrication, assembly, shipping and installation.
- 18 -
E-9213
Rev 2
9. CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES
Measures shall be established and implemented for the control of

special processes used in the fabrication and inspection of
storage systems. These processes include welding,
non-destructive examinations and other processes special to a
specific component as identified in the procurement
specifications.
System suppliers shall prepare and qualify procedures for special

processes. These procedures shall be approved by TN.
Special processes shall be performed in accordance with approved

written procedures. Personnel who perform special processes
shall be formally trained and qualified in accordance with
applicable codes, standards or specifications. Qualification
records of procedures and personnel shall be filed and kept
current by the organization which performs the special process.
- 19 -
E-9213
Rev 2
10. INSPECTION
Measures shall be established and implemented to inspect

materials, parts, processes or other activities affecting quality
to verify conformance with documented instructions, procedures,
specifications, drawings, or other procurement documents. These
inspections shall be performed by personnel other than those who
performed the activity being inspected. Inspectors shall be
qualified in accordance with the applicable codes, standards, and
the training programs of TN or its contractors. Inspector
qualifications and certifications shall be maintained current and
these records shall be retained in accordance with Section 17 of
this Program.
Inspections shall be performed in accordance with approved,
written instructions and procedures. The instructions and
procedures shall include and address acceptance criteria;
identify the characteristics and activities to be inspected;
describe the method of inspection; record evidence of completion
and verifying of a manufacturing, inspection or test operation;
and record the identity of the recording inspector or data
recorder and the results of the inspection operation. When
direct inspection is not possible, provisions shall be
established for indirect control by monitoring processing
methods, equipment, and personnel.
Mandatory hold points shall be established for inspections or
witnessing of those items or activities whose conformance to
requirements can not be determined subsequently. Work shall not
proceed beyond a hold point without the consent of the designated
inspector.
Modifications and/or repairs to and replacements of safety
related structures, systems and components shall be inspected in
accordance with the original design and inspection requirements
or acceptable alternatives.
- 20 -
E-9213
Rev 2
11. TEST CONTROL
A program shall be established and implemented to perform

required proof, acceptance and operational tests, as identified
in procurement specifications.
The tests shall be performed by qualified personnel in accordance

with approved, written instructions, procedures and/or
checklists. Test procedures shall incorporate or reference the
applicable requirements and acceptance limits contained in the
design and procurement documents; instructions for performance of
the test; test prerequisites such as test equipment requirements,
personnel qualification requirements, fabrication or operational
status of the item to be tested, and the provisions for data
recording and retention; and mandatory inspection hold points to
allow witnessing by TN or it's agents.
Test results shall be documented and evaluated. They shall
demonstrate that acceptance criteria have been met. Acceptance
of test results for a specific project shall be acknowledged in
writing by the TN Project Engineer for that project or his
designee. Tests performed after modifications, repairs or
replacements of safety related structures, systems or components
shall be performed in accordance with the original design and
testing requirements or acceptable alternatives.
- 21 -
E-9213
Rev 2
12. CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT
Measures shall be established and implemented to assure that

tools, gages, instruments and other measuring and testing devices
used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled,
calibrated and adjusted to maintain accuracy within required
limits. These measuring devices shall be calibrated at scheduled
intervals against certified standards having known, valid
relationships to national standards. Intervals are based on
required accuracy, precision, purpose, amount of use, stability
characteristics and other conditions which could affect the
measurements. All calibrations shall be performed in accordance
with approved written procedures.
Measuring and test equipment shall be identified and traceable to

the calibration records, and shall be labeled or tagged
indicating the next required calibration date. Standards
utilized for calibration of measuring and test equipment shall
have an uncertainty requirement of no greater than one-fourth of
the tolerance of the equipment being calibrated, unless limited
by the state of the art of the equipment or calibrating standard.
When measuring and test equipment is found to be out of

calibration, measures shall be taken and documented to determine
the validity of inspections performed during the period the
equipment was out of calibration. The complete status of all
measuring and test equipment under the calibration system shall
be recorded and maintained.
Test equipment shall be subjected to a proof test to demonstrate

that it performs its intended function prior to its use.
Operational checks shall be performed on test equipment, as
required, to assure that the equipment is still functioning
properly prior to actual testing.
- 22 -
E-9213
Rev 2
13. HANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING
Measures shall be established and implemented to assure that all

materials, parts, assemblies, spare parts, special tools, and
equipment are handled, stored, packaged and shipped in a manner
which prevents damage, loss of identity or deterioration. These
activities shall be carried out in accordance with written
approved procedures.
When necessary, storage procedures shall address special

requirements for environmental protection such as inert gas
atmospheres, moisture, temperature levels, etc.
- 23 -
E-9213
Rev 2
14. INSPECTION, TEST AND OPERATING STATUS
Measures shall be established and implemented to assure that the

status of required inspections and tests are clearly indicated by
some suitable means, e.g. tags, labels, cards, form sheets, check
lists, etc. The status of nonconforming items is of particular
concern (see Section 15).
By-passing of required inspections, tests, or other critical

operations shall be controlled in accordance with written
procedures or instructions by the TN QA Engineer and/or TN's
inspection agent.
Where appropriate, the operating status of components of a

storage system e.g. valves, switches, etc. shall be indicated to
prevent inadvertent operation.
The application and removal of status indicators shall be in

accordance with approved written instructions and procedures.
- 24 -
E-9213
Rev 2
15. NONCONFORMING MATERIALS, PARTS OR COMPONENTS
Measures shall be established and implemented to control

materials, parts, and components which do not conform to
requirements so as to prevent their inadvertent use in
manufacturing operations or during service.
These measures shall be described in approved written

instructions and procedures. The nonconforming items shall
include items which do not meet specification or drawing
requirements, as well as items which are not fabricated or tested
in accordance with approved written procedures or by qualified
processes or by qualified personnel, where the use of such
procedures, processes or personnel is required by the
fabrication, test, inspection or quality control documents.
Nonconforming items shall be identified and segregated to prevent

their inadvertent use. Nonconformance reports shall be utilized
for the procedural control of nonconformances. They shall
describe the nonconformances and provide for their disposition.
Inspection requirements for nonconforming items following rework,
repair or modification shall be detailed in the nonconformance
reports which shall be approved and signed following completion
of the disposition. The acceptability of the rework or repair of
nonconforming materials, parts, and components shall be verified
by reinspecting and/or retesting the reworked or repaired item to
the original requirements, or by a method which is at least equal
to the original inspection and/or testing method. Inspection,
testing, rework, and repair procedures shall be documented and
controlled.
Nonconformance reports shall be utilized to notify other affected
organizations. Items which are not in conformance with TN
approved documents shall be reviewed by TN's Project Manager and
QA Engineer. Their disposition shall be approved by TN's QA
Engineer. Nonconformances with documents such as fabrication
details, which may not require TN approval, may be resolved
without TN approval by major participating organizations, as
appropriate, in accordance with their approved QA programs.
Nonconformance reports shall be made part of the inspection

records and shall be forwarded by TN to the purchaser of a
storage system prior to its use. Nonconformance reports shall
also be reviewed periodically to identify quality trends. The
results of these reviews shall be reported to management for
their assessment.
Procedures shall be established and implemented to report defects
and noncompliance in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 21.
- 25 -
E-9213
Rev 2
16. CORRECTIVE ACTION
All conditions adverse to quality are documented in

nonconformance reports in accordance with established TN QA
Procedures. The cause for the condition is identified and a
disposition is recommended, justified and approved. If the
condition is significant, corrective actions to preclude
recurrence are identified and implemented.
TN nonconformance reports require approvals by the Project

Engineer and Project QA Engineer. Nonconformance reports are
reviewed annually to identify trends which may require further
corrective actions. Such actions are then implemented by the
Chief Engineer or his designee.
- 26 -
E-9213
Rev 2
17. QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS
For each storage system a program shall be established and

implemented to assure that sufficient written records are
maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality.
These records include, but are not limited to, design records,
procurement records, results of reviews, inspections, tests,
audits, monitoring of work performance, materials analyses, and
related procedures such as qualifications of personnel and
equipment.
Quality assurance records shall be collected by the originating
organization as the documents are completed. They shall be
stored by these organization(s) until delivery of the storage
system. The requirements and responsibilities for record
transmittals, record retention, and maintenance by the
originating organization(s) prior to completion of the work shall
be in accordance with the applicable codes, standards,
procurement specifications, and the organizations' QA program.
Approved, written procedures shall be utilized to control and
maintain QA records.
Inspection and test records shall contain, where applicable, the
description of the type of observation; evidence of the
completion and verification of a fabrication, inspection, or test
operation; the date and results of the inspection or test; any
information related to conditions adverse to quality; the
identification of the inspector, data recorder, or test operator;
and evidence of the acceptability of the test or inspection
results.
The records program shall identify which types of records are to
be transmitted to TN for retention at TN and which ones shall be
retained by the originating organization in accordance with
procurement specification requirements, Section 4. "Lifetime"
records shall be retained by TN, the fabricator, or TN's
customer, as appropriate. The records shall be identified,
indexed and stored in accessible locations. The record storage
facility shall be constructed, located and secured in accordance
with written procedures to prevent destruction of the records by
fire, flooding, theft, and deterioration by environmental
conditions such as temperature and humidity. Alternatively,
duplicate storage of records at two separate locations may be
utilized to prevent loss or destruction.
Maintenance of records at TN shall be in accordance with written
approved procedures. These procedures shall address duration of
storage, responsibilities for safekeeping, preservation, and
disposition of nonpermanent records. Maintenance of records at
participating organizations shall be in accordance with their
approved program.
- 27 -
E-9213
Rev 2
18. AUDITS
A comprehensive program of planned and periodic audits shall be

established and implemented by TN to verify compliance with all
aspects of the TN QA Program and to determine its effectiveness.
The audit program shall include audits by TN of it's suppliers'
QA programs, procedures and activities to verify and evaluate
that the suppliers' procedures and activities are meaningful and
comply with the overall QA Program. Suppliers of safety related
equipment, material or services to TN shall implement a program
to verify compliance with all aspects of their QA program and to
determine its effectiveness.
The audit program shall describe the areas to be audited, such as

design activities, procurement, fabrication, inspection and
testing of storage systems. The schedule for such audits shall
be based upon the safety importance of the activities being
audited.
The audits shall be performed by qualified personnel not having
direct responsibilities in the areas being audited. The audits
shall be conducted in accordance with written approved procedures
and/or check lists. Audit results shall be documented, and shall
be reviewed with personnel having responsibility for the area
audited. Corrective actions and schedules for implementation
shall be established and recorded. Reaudits of deficient areas
shall be scheduled on a timely basis to verify implementation of
agreed upon corrective actions. Audit reports shall include an
objective evaluation by the auditor of the quality related
practices, procedures and instructions for the area or activity
being audited and the effectiveness of their implementation.
Audit reports shall be distributed to management. The reports
shall be reviewed for indications of adverse trends which could
affect quality. If the results of such assessments so indicate,
pertinent sections of the QA program shall be revised.
Audits of project activities for which TN has direct
responsibility shall be performed by a qualified lead auditor.
- 28 -
C ( E-9213 (
Rev 1
APPENDIX A
MATRIX OF EXISTING QA PROCEDURES

AGAINST THE APPLICABLE CRITERIA OF APPENDIX B OF 10 CFR 50
Corporate QA Title 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criteria

Procedures 16 17 18
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1.2 Personnel Training and X X

Project Responsibility
Qualification of Inspection X X X X X X X X X X X X X
2.1
and Test Personnel
2.2 Q/A Procedure Format X X X
Qualification of QA Program X X X X X X X X
2.3
Audit Personnel
Qualification of Operations X X X X X X X X
2.4
Personnel
Control of Engineering X X X X X X
3.1
Calculations
X X X X X X X
3.2 Design Control
Computer Program Control X X X X X X X X X X X

3.3
X X X X X X X X
4.1 Procurement Specification
Preparation and Control
for Special Equipment
Procurement Document X X X X X X X X X X X X
4.2
Preparation and Control
of Commercial Grade Items
Drawing Control X X X X X X
5.1
A-1
C C E-9213 (
Rev I
APPENDIX A

Corporate Q Title 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criteria

Procedures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
5.2 Control of Operating Manuals X X X X X
5.3 Preparation and Control of X X X X X X X X

Test, Inspection, Maintenance
and Operations Procedures
6.1 Document Transmittals X X X X X X X
6.2 Identification & Distribution X X X X X X X

of Controlled Documents
7.1 Procurement Source Evaluation X X X XX X X
7.2 Receipt Inspection X X X X X X X X X X X X
7.3 Procurement Planning X X X X X X X X
8.1 Identification and Control X X X X X X X X

of Parts and Equipment
10.1 Procedure for Visual Method X X X X X X X

Non Destructive Examination
10.2 Personnel Qualification for X X X X

Non Destructive Examination(V.T.)
11.1 Test Control X X X X X X X X X X X
A-2
C if
1$
E-9213 (
Rev 1
APPENDIX A

Corporate QA Title 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criteria

Procedures
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
12.1 Control of Measuring X X X X X X X X X X X X X

and Test Equipment
13.1 Handling, Storage & Shipping X X X X X X X X X

15.1 Reporting of Defects X X X X X X
and Noncompliance
15.2 Nonconformance Control X X X X X X X X X X X X
16.1 Corrective Action X X X X X X X
17.1 Temporary Working Files- X X X X X X X
Design and Procurement
17.2 Permanent Storage and X X X X X X X X X
Maintenance of Design and
Procurement Records
17.3 Project Close-Out Procedure X X X X X X

18.1 Source Evaluation Overchecks X X X X X X X X X K X X X X X X .X X
18.2 Audits of Agent for Design X X X X X X X X X
and Procurement
18.3 QA Audits X X X X X X X X X
A-3

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Dry

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1.1 Introduction ................. 1.1-2

1.2 General Description of Installation ................................ 1.2-1

1.2.3.6 Control Subsystem ..................... . . 1.2-6 . ... ..

1.2.3.7 Closed Circuit Television Subsystem and Lighting Subsystem 1.2-6

1.2.4.1 HVAC Subsystem ...................... . . 1.2-7 . . . . . .

1.2.4.2 Radiation Monitoring Subsystem ............ ... 1.2-7

1.2.4.3 Receiving Cask Lid Handling Subsystem ...... ... 1.2-7

1.2.4.4 Decontamination Subsystem ............... .... 1.2-7 ......... . . ..

1.2.5.1 Cask Transport and Lifting Subsystem ........ . . 1.2-8 ......

1.2.5.2 Cask Vacuum/Inerting/Leak Test System ...... . . 1.2-8 ... ....... .

1.2.5.3 Canister Welding Subsystem ............... . . 1.2-8 . . . . . .

1.2.5.4 DTS Power Subsystem .................. .. 1.2-8

1.2.6 Master Drawing List ......................... .... 1.2-9 ......... . . . .

1.3 General Systems Description .................................... 1.3-1

1.4 Identification of Agents and Subcontractors .......................... 1.4-1

3.1 Purposes of Installation ........................... ............. 3.1-1

3.2 Structural andMechanical Safety Criteria .............. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. 3.2-1

3.2.1.4 Tornado Missiles ..................... .............. 3.2-7

3.2.3 Seismic Design ........................... . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-17

3.2.4 Snow and Ice Loadings ..................... ............. . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2-18

3.2.5 Load Combination Criteria ................... . . . . . . . . . . . ... 3.2-18

3.2.5.1 DTS Reinforced Concrete Structure ........ . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 3.2-18

3.2.5.2 Structural Steelwork .................. . .... . .. .. . . 3.2-24

3.3 Safety Protection Systems ......................... 3.3-1

3.3.7.2 Radioactive Waste Treatment ........................ 3.3-11

3.4 Classifications of Structures, Components and Systems ...... ............ 3.4-1

3.5 Decommissioning Considerations . 3.5-1

3.6 Summary of Design Criteria . 3.6-1

3.7 References . 3.7-1

4.1 Summary Description . 4.1-1

4.2 Confinement Structures . 4.2-1

4.3 Auxiliary Subsystems .. 4.3-1

Applicable Documents ..............................

4.4 Decontamination Systems .. 4.4-1

4.5 Shipping Cask Repair and Maintenance .. 4.5-1

4.6 Cathodic Protection .4.6-1

5.1 Operation Description. 5.1-1

5.3 Other Operating Systems .................................... . 5.3-1

5.4 Operation Support Systems ................................... . 5.4-1

5.4.1.2 Cask Transfer Subsystem .......................... 5.4-12

5.5 Control Room and Control Area ......... ........................ 5.5-1

5.6 Analytical Sampling . ......................................... 5.6-1

1.0 References ................................................... 1

2.0 Definitions ................................................... 2

3.0 Structure .................................................... 3

4.0 Analysis of the Transition Conditions ......... ......................... 6

7.0 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis ................. .................. 135

Appendix A Instrumentation and Control Structural Diagram .143

6.1 Onsite Waste Sources ............................. 6.1-1

6.2 Offgas Treatment and Ventilation ..................... 6.2-1

6.3 Liquid Waste Treatment and Retention .................... ........ .

6.4 Solid Waste ...................................... 6.4-1

6.5 Radiological Impact of Normal Operations - Summary ...... 6.5-1

7.1 Ensuring That Occupational Radiation Exposures Are As Low As Is Reasonably

7.2 Radiation Sources .................................. 7.2-1

7.3 Radiation Protection Design Features ...................... 7.3-1 .

7.3.4.2 Airborne Monitors . ................................ 7.3-14