VOLUME 11, NUMBER

Vietnamese Journal 02,Vol.

of Legal Sciences, 202411, No. 02, 2024, pp. 27-39 DOI: 10.2478/vjls-2024-0009 27

BLOCKCHAIN-BASED ELECTRONIC
VOTING: LESSONS FROM ESTONIA
LE TRAN QUOC CONG
Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, Vietnam
Email: ltqcong@hcmulaw.edu.vn
NGUYEN DAO PHUONG THUY
Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, Vietnam
Email: ndpthuy@hcmulaw.edu.vn
HUYNH THI NGOC NHI
Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, Vietnam
Email: huynhthngocnhi@gmail.com
TRAN VAN ANH
Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, Vietnam
Email: tvanh181016@gmail.com
Abstract
The article explores the challenges and possibilities of blockchain-based elections, drawing
comparisons with Estonia’s practical and legal experience in organizing and implementing
such systems. On that basis, the article provides an assessment of the potential for
electronic voting applications as well as recommendations on how to deploy this method
for Vietnam to improve the effectiveness of election activities in a comprehensive and
appropriate manner consistent with current Constitutional principles.
Keywords: blockchain, election, e-voting, elector, right to vote
Received: 10 June 2024 / Revised: 12 July 2024 / Accepted: 1 August 2024

1. Issues arising from traditional (paper ballot) voting in the

technological era
In a democracy, state power must belong to the people and be exercised
with the consent of the people. The fundamental mechanism to convert
this consent into state power is through organizing free and fair elections.1
Designing and implementing a progressive and appropriate electoral system is
a top priority for any democratic rule-of-law state, including Vietnam.2 This is
the most common method for people to exercise their direct democratic rights.
In Vietnam, the four election principles “universal, equal, direct and
secret suffrage” recognized in the 2013 Constitution have been seriously
and effectively implemented through the organization of recent elections.
However, in practice, the electoral rights of voters have not been
comprehensively guaranteed, with many shortcomings in the direct voting
process and related organizational tasks.
1 Suu, N. Q. (2016), ‘Bầu cử ở Việt Nam - Những nội dung cần quan tâm’, Tạp chí Quản lý
nhà nước [trans: ‘Elections in Vietnam - Contents that need to pay attention’, State Management
Journal], Vol. 5, No. 244, p. 7.
2 Vu, V. N. (2012), ‘Vai trò của bầu cử trong việc xây dựng nhà nước pháp quyền của dân, do
dân, vì dân’, Tạp chí Nhà nước và Pháp luật [trans: ‘The role of elections in building a rule of law
state of the people, by the people, for the people’, Journal of State and Law], Vol. 2, pp. 11-25.
28 VIETNAMESE JOURNAL OF LEGAL SCIENCES

1.1. Problems arising from the manual nature of traditional paper ballot voting
Regarding the issue of election organization costs, according to the
2015 Law on Election of deputies to the National Assembly and deputies
to the People’s Councils (“Election Law”), all costs for an election such as
(i) document and publication costs for the election; (ii) administrative and
election guidance propaganda costs; (iii) conference organization costs; (iv)
Leadership, inspection, and election supervision costs; (v) citizen reception and
election complaint resolution costs,...3 are all sourced from the state budget.4
As guided by Circular No. 102/2020/TT-BTC dated 23 November 2020,
of the Ministry of Finance, from the practical elections of the 15th National
Assembly and People’s Councils at all levels for the 2021-2026 term, the
budget was used for a large number of tasks, from the smallest logistical tasks.5
Summarizing the election, the total cost for the election organization, as
calculated, was over 2,000 billion VND for additional budget allocations.6
Organizing a complete election requires a huge budget and long preparation
time, but despite such huge costs, the infrastructure and documents from the
previous election are hardly reusable, raising concerns.
Concerning errors in the election service stages, the timing of this election
coincided with the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, exposing the existing
limitations of paper ballot voting. The pandemic posed many challenges for
election-related tasks, such as determining the voting rights of quarantined
voters, especially those quarantined in their residential administrative unit.
Some localities with many workers, students, and pupils faced difficulties in
reviewing, compiling voter lists, printing, and distributing additional voter
cards; there were reports of voters not receiving voter cards.7
For the National Election Council, the past period has shown that in
performing its tasks and powers, there were limitations such as errors in ballot
printing leading to the cancellation of election results and re-elections in
some areas; mistakes in controlling the number of ballots issued, the number
3 Dung, N. D., Duong, L. B., Liem, D. V. (2021), ‘Vietnamese Constitutional law textbook’,
Hanoi National University Publisher, Hanoi, p. 227.
4 Article 7 of the Law on Election of Deputies to the National Assembly and Deputies to the
People’s Councils No. 85/2015/QH13 (signed on 25 June 2015).
5 Circular No. 102/2020/TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance guiding the preparation of estimates,
management, use and settlement of funds for the election of XV National Assembly deputies and
Council deputies at all levels for the 2021-2026 term (signed 23 November 2020).
6 Bich, L. (2021), ‘Bổ sung kinh phí bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội và đại biểu HĐND các cấp’, Báo
điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam [trans: ‘Additional funding for elections of National Assembly
deputies and People’s Council deputies at all levels’, Communist Party of Vietnam electronic
newspaper]. Retrieved from: https://daihoi13.dangcongsan.vn/bau-cu-dai-bieu-quoc-hoi-
khoa-xv-va-dai-bieu-hdnd-cac-cap/tin-tuc/bo-sung-kinh-phi-bau-cu-dai-bieu-quoc-hoi-
va-dai-bieu-hdnd-cac-cap-7164 [accessed 07 June 2024].
7 National Election Council (2021), Summary report of the election of XV National Assembly deputies and
People’s Council deputies at all levels for the 2021 - 2026 term, No. 783/BC-HĐBCQG, pp. 26-27.
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 02, 2024 29

of collected ballots, stamping voted ballots, reports of voters not receiving

voter cards, and printing and distributing additional voter cards.8
About persistent issues of proxy voting, based on the previous analysis,
Vietnam’s election procedures need to comply with four constitutional
election principles. Specifically, Vietnam’s principles of secret ballots and
direct elections are being implemented to require people to be physically
present at the voting locations to cast their votes. As a result, it differs from
certain other nations, like France, Belgium, Japan, etc.9 which occasionally
permits proxy voting to establish an environment that best protects the
citizens’ right to vote. According to Vietnamese law, proxy voting is a
violation of the principles of direct voting and secret voting (Clause 3, Article
69 of the 2015 Election Law contains the only exception that permits proxy
voting), which is to minimize mistakes in elections. However, looking at
the practical implementation of these principles in Vietnam through the
National Election Council’s records, in the election of deputies to the 15th
National Assembly and People’s Councils at all levels for the 2021-2026
term, there were still cases of voters voting on behalf of others in their
families.10 Proxy voting does not reflect the will and aspirations of voters in
the nation’s most important political activity, making the election’s purpose
unattainable. However, it is necessary to recognize the reality that, with
traditional voting methods where people must vote in person at polling
stations, densely populated areas pose difficulties in reviewing and identifying
voters and their ballots. Another aspect to consider is whether the individuals
and organizations responsible for conducting and supervising the voting
activities perform their duties properly without a “quick completion”
mentality. The reliance on human resources leads to certain limitations in
controlling the “direct” and “secret” nature of ballots.
1.2. Difficulties in ensuring voting rights for voters in special cases
In practice, ensuring the voting rights of voters in special cases such as those
in remote areas, overseas Vietnamese citizens, voters in hospitals, maternity
homes, facilities for disabled people, elderly care facilities with fewer than fifty
voters, or in cases of national pandemics, faces many obstacles with traditional
paper ballot voting.11 Therefore, traditional elections still face challenges in
ensuring the voting rights of voters in remote areas and special cases.
8 Tuan, N. M. (2021), ‘Những bất cập của chế định Hội đồng Bầu cử quốc gia và hướng hoàn thiện’,
Tạp chí Nghiên cứu lập pháp [trans: ‘Inadequacies of the National Exlection Council institution and
directions for improvement’, Journal of Legislative Studies], Vol. 14, No. 438, p. 9.
9 International IDEA, “Global in-country proxy voting data”. Retrieved from: https://www.
idea.int/data-tools/tools/special-voting-arrangements/proxy-voting-in-country [accessed 26
June 2024].
10 National Election Council (2021), supra note 7, p. 27.
11 Clauses 3 and 4, Article 69 of the 2015 Law on Election of National Assembly Deputies and
People’s Council Deputies.
30 VIETNAMESE JOURNAL OF LEGAL SCIENCES

First, for voters in remote areas, election propaganda activities are limited
compared to other areas due to difficulties in terrain, weather conditions, and
economy. Additionally, issues such as funding, human resources, and other
supporting means require more investment in these areas.12
Second, for overseas Vietnamese citizens, Article 29(4) of the Election
Law is still formal and does not create maximum convenience for this
group of voters. According to this provision, overseas Vietnamese citizens
only have the right to vote if they return to Vietnam 24 hours before the
voting starts. This implies that overseas Vietnamese citizens can only vote
if they are in Vietnam, despite not being among those deprived of voting
rights by law. Additionally, for voters listed in the voter list but having to
go abroad on election day, they will essentially lose their voting rights. This
directly conflicts with the principles of direct, secret voting and universal
suffrage. Overseas voters, although fully entitled to vote, cannot exercise their
legitimate rights, leading to election results not truly reflecting the will of all
Vietnamese people on critical national issues, and the principle of universal
suffrage is not fully realized.
Third, for voters as stipulated in point b, clause 3, Article 11 of the Election
Law, where the location has fewer than fifty voters, a separate polling station
cannot be established.13 The law stipulates that in such cases, if voters cannot
go to the polling station, the Election Committee will bring auxiliary ballot
boxes and ballots to their residence or treatment place for voting.14 However,
ensuring the principle of direct voting by transporting ballot boxes to voters
makes the organization more difficult, costlier, and often does not guarantee
the principle of secret voting as these facilities typically do not have private
voting rooms.
Fourth, in unforeseen events such as natural disasters or pandemics, fully
and seriously implementing election principles is challenging. Notably, the
election of deputies to the 15th National Assembly and People’s Councils at
all levels for the 2021-2026 term occurred amid the unresolved Covid-19
pandemic, leading to people voting during the pandemic. Voting rights can
be restricted for public health protection reasons,15 but postponing elections
inevitably impacts the exercise of citizens’ fundamental rights and the nation’s
democracy, especially if postponement is prolonged when previous term
12 Trinh, L. X. (2016), ‘Đảm bảo quyền bầu cử, ứng cử của người dân tộc thiểu số’, Báo Biên
phòng [trans: ‘Ensure the right to vote and run for election of ethnic minorities’, Border Guard
Newspaper]. Retrieved from: https://www.bienphong.com.vn/dam-bao-quyen-bau-cu-ung-
cu-cua-nguoi-dan-toc-thieu-so-post [accessed 15 May 2024].
13 Point b, Clause 3, Article 11 of the Law on Election of Deputies to the National Assembly and
Deputies to the People’s Councils No. 85/2015/QH13 dated 25 June 2015.
14 Article 60 of the Law on Election of Deputies to the National Assembly and Deputies to the
People’s Councils No. 85/2015/QH13 dated 25 June 2015.
15 Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966).
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 02, 2024 31

deputies’ mandates have expired.16 During the severe pandemic phase, over
80 countries and territories worldwide,17 such as North Macedonia, Sri Lanka,
and Ethiopia decided to postpone general elections to protect public health.18
Having to choose between the nation’s destiny and public health is a challenging
issue for traditional paper ballot voting in such unforeseen contexts.
Thus, despite being used continuously, traditional voting methods still
have certain limitations, even though relevant agencies and organizations
have made efforts to address them. Therefore, applying a more effective
and complete alternative voting method is necessary. In the context of
technological development, electronic voting is a method worth considering
due to its unique features.
2. Potential for electronic voting applications using blockchain
technology in election activities
2.1. Overview of electronic voting
In recent years, the robust development of 4.0 digital technologies has
opened many opportunities to improve the effectiveness of the electoral
process, and one of the methods being continuously tested globally is
electronic voting. This method has long been a topic of interest due to its
convenience and ability to address the limitations of traditional paper voting.19
According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)
and the Council of Europe with Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)/5,
electronic voting is defined as the use of information and communication
technology (ICT) for voting and vote counting.20
Despite its advancements over traditional voting methods, concerns
about the possible cybersecurity risks of this type of electronic voting system
and the legitimacy of election results are still being raised.21 An electronic
16 Ionel, Z. and Tessa, F. (2020), ‘Impact of the pandemic on elections around the world: From safety
concerns to political crises’, European Parliamentary Research Service, p. 4. Retrieved from: https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652017/EPRS_BRI(2020)652017_
EN.pdf [accessed 24 October 2024].
17 International IDEA (2022), ‘Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections’. Retrieved
from: https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-
impact-elections [accessed 29 April 2024].
18 Ionel, Z. and Tessa, F. (2020), supra note 16, p. 3.
19 International IDEA (2011), Introducing electronic voting: Essential considerations, Policy Paper, p. 10-11.
Retrieved from: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2023-09/introducing-electronic-voting.
pdf [accessed 29 April 2024].
20 OSCE/ODIHR (2013), Handbook for the observation of new voting technologies, Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Retrieved from: https://www.osce.org/odihr/
elections/new_voting_technologies [accessed 6 June 2024]; EU Committee of Ministers,
Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5 of the Committee of Ministers
to member States on standards for e-voting (14 June 2017). Retrieved from: https://rm.coe.
int/168071bc84 [accessed 6 June 2024].
21 European Commission (2018), Study on the benefits and drawbacks of remote voting, p. 8. Retrieved
from: https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020-06/20181121_remote_voting_final_
report_final_clean.pdf [accessed 26 June 2024].
32 VIETNAMESE JOURNAL OF LEGAL SCIENCES

voting system typically consists of multiple components and is deployed on

the Internet with a central server, making it susceptible to network attacks
that can compromise election results. It can present more severe issues
than traditional paper voting, such as ensuring voter anonymity, and voter
manipulation risks. When issues arose throughout the testing process - such
as the 2018 allegations regarding security and secrecy with the Voatz system
utilized by several U.S. states - doubts regarding this matter became more
profound.22 Alternatively, there is the issue of public trust in this voting
method, as evidenced by Norway, which tested it during municipal elections
in 2011 and 2013 but stopped because of security concerns,23 or Switzerland
because the percentage of citizens participating in using this voting method is
low.24 Therefore, it’s understandable why, at present, electronic voting trials
are limited and even suspended in some countries.25
In this context, Estonia is a notable exception, being the first country
worldwide to offer all voters the option of remote electronic voting in all
national elections. A key factor in the success of Estonia’s electronic voting
application is the use of decentralized blockchain technology. The potential
of this technology to enhance voting is analyzed in the sections below.
2.2. Blockchain’s technical potential to improve voting
According to the European Central Bank (ECB), blockchain is
understood as a ledger recording all transactions. These transactions are
grouped into blocks and executed by a decentralized system.26 Blockchain,
which is built on an advanced technical structure primarily intended for
data storage and electronic transaction processing, offers several exceptional
features27 that make it an effective solution for developing a dependable.
Its decentralized nature prevents single-point control and makes data
22 Greenhalgh, S. (2022), ‘Internet voting is being pushed by false claims and deceptive
marketing’, E-Vote-ID, Seventh International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting: E-Vote-ID
2022 - Proceedings II, University of Tartu, p. 62. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.
net/Seventh_International_Joint_Conference_on_Electronic_Voting_E-Vote-ID_2022
[accessed 10 November 2023]
23 Blanco, D. Y. M. del, Gasco, M. (2019), ‘A protocolized, comparative study of helios voting and
Scytl/iVote’, Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on eDemocracy & eGovernment (ICEDEG),
2019, p. 31–38.
24 Górny, M. (2021), ‘I - voting - opportunities and threats. Conditions for the effective implementation
of Internet voting on the example of Switzerland and Estonia’, pp. 138-139. Retrieved from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351082470_I-voting_-_opportunities_and_threats_
Conditions_for_the_effective_implementation_of_Internet_voting_on_the_example_of_
Switzerland_and_Estonia [accessed 26 June 2024].
25 Ehin, P. et al. (2022), ‘Internet voting in Estonia 2005 - 2019: Evidence from eleven
elections’, Government Information Quarterly, p. 2. Retrieved from: https://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0740624X2200051X [accessed 6 June 2024].
26 European Central Bank (ECB) (2015), Virtual currency schemes – A further analysis, p. 33; Finck, M.
(2018), ‘Blockchains: Regulating the unknown’, German Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 4, p. 667.
27 ASTRI (2016), Whitepaper on distributed ledger technology, commissioned by Hong Kong Monetary
Authority. Retrieved from: https://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-functions/finanical-
infrastructure/Whitepaper_On_Distributed_Ledger_Technology.pdf [accessed 6 June 2024].
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 02, 2024 33

alteration nearly impossible, enhancing security and transparency.28 The

immutability of recorded transactions ensures vote accuracy and prevents
tampering.29 The system’s elevated security protects against hacking attempts
and maintains voter privacy.30 Lastly, blockchain’s transparency allows for
complete transaction history tracking and auditing, further bolstering the
integrity of the voting process.31 These characteristics collectively address
many challenges faced by traditional and electronic voting systems, making
blockchain a promising tool for secure and transparent elections.
2.3. Potential to improve unresolved problems in the voting process
The blockchain technology can optimally address the shortcomings of
traditional voting and the risks faced by conventional electronic voting systems,32
as analyzed in section 2. First, by minimizing proxy voting, each voter is associated
with a unique electronic identification code, requiring biometric verification.
Vietnam’s 2023 Law Identification supports this by including biometric data in
the Identification Database. Second, electronic voting optimizes election funds,
allowing reuse of facilities from previous elections and reducing invalid ballots,
minimizing re-election risks. Third, electronic voting ensures voting rights for
special cases, such as for voters living overseas or in remote areas, voting during
pandemics. The principle of direct voting is maintained through candidate
selection and the pressing of the vote button on devices. For electronic voting,
the Internet or supporting software serves as a technical means to facilitate faster
and more convenient voting.33 Fourth, to address security risks, blockchain
voting systems use permitted or private blockchains, requiring special access.34
28 Farooq, M. S., Iftikhar, U. and Khelifi, A. (2022), ‘A framework to make voting system
transparent using blockchain technology’, IEEE Access, Vol. 10, p. 59959; Vladucu, M. V. et
al. (2023), ‘E-voting meets blockchain: A survey’, IEEE Access, Vol .11, p. 23294.
29 Sadia, K., Masuduzzaman, M., Paul R. K., and Islam, A. (2020), ‘Blockchain based secure E-voting
with the assistance of smart contract’, Proceedings of the International Conference on Blockchain Technology
(IC-BCT), Springer, pp. 161–176.
30 Rahman, M. R., Tripathi, A. M., and Noida, G. (2022), ‘E-voting with blockchain technology’,
YMER, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 641–644; Cetinkaya, O. and Cetinkaya, D. (2007), ‘Verification and
validation issues in electronic voting’, Electronic Journal E-Government, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 117–126.
31 Poniszewska-Marańda, A., Pawlak, M., and Guziur, J. (2020), ‘Auditable blockchain voting system-
the blockchain technology toward the electronic voting process’, International Journal of Web and Grid
Services, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1–21.; Awalu, I. L., Kook, P. H., and Lim, J. S. (2019), ‘Development of
a distributed blockchain eVoting system’, Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on E-Business,
Management, and Economics, pp. 207–216.
32 Jafar, U., Aziz, M. J. Ab and Shukur, Z. (2021), ‘Blockchain for electronic voting system
- Review and open research challenges’, National Library of Medicine - National Center for
Biotechnology Information. Retrieved from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC8434614/ [accessed 6 June 2024].
33 Nhiem, V. V. (2021), Giáo trình Luật Hiến pháp Việt Nam [Vietnamese Constitutional Law
Textbook], Hong Duc Publisher, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 280-281.
34 Zheng Z. et al. (2017), ‘An overview of blockchain technology: Architecture, consensus, and
future trends’, Proceedings of the IEEE International Congress on Big Data (Big Data Congress), pp. 557–
563. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318131748_An_Overview_of_
Blockchain_Technology_Architecture_Consensus_and_Future_Trends [accessed 6 June 2024];
Roopika, J. (2020), ‘Blockchain technology: History, concepts, and applications’, International
Research Journal of Engineering and Technology (IRJET). Retrieved from: https://www.irjet.net/
archives/V7/i10/IRJET-V7I10109.pdf [accessed 3 June 2024].
34 VIETNAMESE JOURNAL OF LEGAL SCIENCES

No single entity controls the system, and data is immutable and decentralized.35
These address network attacks and result tampering. Secret voting is ensured
through private keys, maintaining voter anonymity. 36
While enhancing efficiency, blockchain voting has limitations like third-
party identity verification dependency. However, ongoing research and
technological advancements continue to improve its security and efficiency.
Several countries, including Switzerland, the United States (US), Russia, and
notably Estonia, have trialed or adopted blockchain-supported electronic
voting systems.37
3. Estonia’s experience in implementing electronic voting with the
support of blockchain technology
Estonia’s success in electronic voting relies on (i) enhancing technical
infrastructure and citizen confidence, and (ii) establishing a robust legal framework.
Regarding technical infrastructure and building people’s trust, the
foundation for Estonia’s successful electronic voting is based on the X-Road
data exchange middleware and the national public key infrastructure (PKI)
with a strong encryption system - the electronic identification card (ID card).
The ID card, capable of tightly linking digital and physical identities, has
facilitated Estonia’s smooth online public services. In particular, ID card has the
potential to be used in public key infrastructure for authentication, protection
of certain data (such as electronic ballot data),38 and signature identification.39
These two pillars of Estonia’s digital society were first deployed in the 2000s and
still play an extremely important role in implementing public administrative
procedures for the Estonian people. Estonians have a great deal of faith in
their country’s digital government. According to survey data in 2020, 82% of
Estonians trust Estonia’s digital services and e-governance.40 It can be affirmed
that the high development of the national technical infrastructure has earned
the people’s trust, which is a favorable condition and key for this country to
conduct electronic voting successfully.41
Regarding the legal framework, at a general level, Article 60 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia42 stipulates the general principle for
the elections: “Elections shall be general, uniform and direct. Voting shall
35 ASTRI (2016), supra note 27, p. 30.
36 Champagne, P. (2014), The book of Satoshi, e53 Publishing LLC, United States of America, p. 21-22
37 Vladucu, M. V. et al. (2023), supra note 28, pp. 23293-23302.
38 Almeida, R. L. et al. (2023), ‘Impact of decentralization on electronic voting systems: A
systematic literature survey’, IEEE Access, Vol. 11, p. 132405.
39 OECD iLibrary (2019), ‘Digital opportunities for better agricultural policies’. Retrieved from: https://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/510a82b5-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/510a82b5-en
[accessed 9 June 2024].
40 Ragg, T. (2020), ‘Eesti digiriik naudib nii kohalike elanike kui e-residentide toetust’, Ajaleht
Pealinn. Retrieved from: https://pealinn.ee/2020/06/04/eesti-digiriik-naudib-nii-kohalike-
elanike-kui-e-residentide-toetust [accessed 27 June 2024].
41 Ehin, P. et al, supra note 25, p. 4.
42 Article 60 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia.
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 02, 2024 35

be secret”. Estonia’s electronic voting is governed by detailed laws such as

the Parliamentary Election Act, Local Government Council Election Act,
Referendum Act, and European Parliament Election Act. Over nearly two
decades, these frameworks have evolved through amendments to ensure
comprehensive regulations for electronic elections.
The most comprehensive and directly regulating laws on electronic
voting in Estonia are stipulated in the Parliamentary Election Act. It sets
electronic voting as a separate chapter (Chapter 7) regulating issues such
as procedures, methods, and how voters vote electronically. Additionally,
there are scattered regulations in other chapters addressing issues such as the
authority of the National Election Committee (equivalent to the National
Election Council in Vietnam), vote counting and verification methods
(Articles 60 and 85.1), or authorities responsible for electronic voting (Articles
9, 15, and 85.2). At the local level, there is the Municipal Council Election
Act. Similar to the Parliamentary Election Act, this law also dedicates Chapter
7 and has scattered regulations in other chapters addressing electronic voting
issues. The Local Government Council Election Act, European Parliament
Election Act, and Referendum Act all reference the Parliamentary Election
Act for electronic voting regulations. Uniquely, the Referendum Act outlines
specific steps for voter login, including identification, voting procedures,
signature verification, and voter confirmation (Article 41.3).
From Estonia’s practical experience, some observations about the
success reasons in applying electronic voting in this country can be drawn as
follows: First, Estonia has laid a solid foundation in the e-government model
and built people’s trust in electronic public services. Second, the country has
developed relatively comprehensive legal frameworks regulating election
management (both conventional and electronic elections) and technological
development. These factors have created the basic conditions for the successful
implementation of blockchain-applied electronic voting.
4. Potential for applying electronic voting using blockchain
technology for election activities in Vietnam
4.1. The Necessity of Applying Technology in Election Activities in Vietnam
In Vietnam, learning from the limitations of the 2021 election, the
summary report of the Election Council proposed promoting research and
enhancing the application of information technology and digital applications
to address the shortcomings of traditional paper voting.43 The implementation
of digital transformation goals includes Decision No. 942/QĐ-TTg,
outlining an e-government strategy and blockchain-based digital currency
by the State Bank of Vietnam. Decision No. 06/QĐ-TTg (6 January 2022)
43 National Election Council (2021), supra note 7, p. 31.
36 VIETNAMESE JOURNAL OF LEGAL SCIENCES

focuses on population data and electronic identification for national digital

transformation. Decision No. 422/QĐ-TTg (4 April 2022) lists online
public services, including free digital signatures.
Additionally, Resolution No. 27/NQ/TW in 2022 briefly proposes
researching voting rights for overseas Vietnamese citizens without specifying
the implementation process. This gap in the legal system presents an
opportunity for Vietnam to trial electronic voting, leveraging international
experiences and exploring non-traditional voting methods.
4.2. Specific suggestions
With Vietnam’s rapid digital transformation in public administration
and insights from Estonia’s technical infrastructure, the key technological
prerequisites for applying electronic voting in Vietnam include:
First, regarding the development level of online public services, two
foundational conditions need to be met: (i) electronic identification must
reach level 244 for all eligible citizens; (ii) the provision of online public services
in all state agencies, especially those directly related to election management,
must reach level 2.45
Second, a comprehensive electronic voting model needs to be built.
Detailed issues regarding the establishment and operation of this model need
to be listed and guided for the public to understand. According to the authors,
three key issues of the electronic voting model need to be clearly defined for
voters, including: (i) basic guidance on how the model is established and
operated; (ii) the agency which is primarily responsible for operating the
electronic voting system; and (iii) how voters vote and how the system records
the votes. Additionally, the conditions for Internet coverage, technological
devices for electronic voting, and voters wishing to use electronic voting
methods with digital signatures or electronic identification verification are
important for voters to carry out this voting method. Furthermore, adding
regulations for electronic voting is essential. The proposed Law on Election
of Deputies to the National Assembly and People’s Councils offers an
advantage for Vietnam, as it governs both central and local elections, unlike
Estonia’s separate laws. This streamlines electronic voting regulations and
avoids multiple law amendments. It is suggested to trial electronic voting in
technologically advanced provinces and for overseas voters, allowing people
to choose their voting method, ensuring the freedom to exercise their rights.
For Vietnam’s practical context, a key issue is building people’s trust in
digital transformation activities. People are the voters, the subjects deciding
whether to use electronic voting. Therefore, only with the people’s trust and
44 Clause 2, Article 12 of the Decree No. 59/2022/ND-CP regulating electronic identification
and authentication.
45 Point a, Clause 1, Article 11 of the Decree No. 42/2022/ND-CP regulating the provision of
information and online public services of state agencies in the network environment.
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 02, 2024 37

.
proactive participation in digital transformation processes, especially in public
administration, will the opportunity for successful electronic voting application
arise.46 Electronic voting should be seen as an advanced service, not a quick
fix for electoral limitations.47 Vietnam should carefully and comprehensively
evaluate potential risks and difficulties before deciding to trial this method.48
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Author Contribution
All authors contributed to the study conception and design. All authors read and approved
the final manuscript.
Declarations
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare no competing interests.
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