Islamophobia in Uganda: Myths and realities; A

historical study of illusions of persecuted complex

among the Muslim community in Uganda from 1888 to
1985.

By Kasumba Yusuf

The author is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of History, at
the Islamic University in Uganda. He is also a consultant with Scoris Educational Services

Abstract

Islam in Uganda has gone through social, political and psychological challenges since its
introduction here in the first half of the 19th Century. Some of these challenges have roots in the
manner in which the religion was introduced in Uganda, the approach to propagation of Islam by
its adherents, the social relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, attitudes and behaviours of
Ugandans towards a multi-religious cosmopolitan setting and the changing nature of the political
barometer since 1888. These challenges have been interpreted by the Muslim community to be
tribulations related to Islamophobia. Prominent Scholars on the subject of Islam in Uganda have
attempted to reflect this psychological feeling by pointing to conspiracy between the Anglican
Dominated Colonial and Post-colonial regimes and the largely non-Muslim population in Uganda
to marginalize and peripherize the Muslim Community in all crucial sectors of National life. This
points to the tendency for some scholars and the general Muslim population to use history (the
plight of the Muslim community under colonial rule) to propagate the notion that there has been
Islamophobic episodes in Uganda History. On the other hand, some policy makers have relied on
history to promote marginalization of minorities (Muslims inclusive). This is tantamount to abuse
of history. For instance, the history of religio-political wars that created cleavages amongst the
population also widened the wedge between religious groups. The animosity that resulted from
these wars was a denominator in the distribution of power and the national product, hence laying a
foundation for further social divide. This debacle lingers in the behavioural systems of our people.

This paper attempts to critically analyse the historical roots of the psychological phenomenon of
Islamophobia. The paper will examine the extent to which the question of Islamophobia is illusory,
mythical or realism. While there are a host of indicators of anti-Muslim sentiments in the structures
and policies of the colonial regime in Uganda, we attempt to show that the Muslim community in
Uganda is partly accountable for such historical trends. We shall attempt to examine the internal
and external variables responsible for the plight of the Muslim community before, during and after
colonialism. On the other hand, we seek to examine whether, some Muslims have tended to
use or abuse history to promote sentiments of Islamophilia. The major questions this paper
seeks answers for will include;



Whether Islamophobia has been prevalent in Uganda since the colonial era;


what the manifestations of this Islamophobic atmosphere are;


whether the said Islamophobia has been a deliberate state policy;
And whether this is a mythical illusory claim that only based on psychological defense mechanisms
of the Muslim community which has been embroiled in wrangles and shaky political alliances.

The nexus of the discussion will be on the lessons that can be drawn from the past experience for
the contemporary historians. Therefore, a revisionist approach shall be employed in this paper.
I NTRODUCTION

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

While it is not my intention to delve into definitions, I find it imperative to contextualize the usage
of the concept of Islamophobia, which forms the central idea of this paper. The concept of
Islamophobia was first used in France in the 1920s but was popularized in 1997 following the
Runnymede‟ report by a Commission on British Muslims title, “Islamophobia: a challenge for us
all” a report that pioneered rising of an awareness about this dangerous phenomenon in the public
and political spaces. (Allen 2007). While the Runnymede report refers to Islamophobia as “the
shorthand way of referring to the dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike all or
most Muslims” its description is not quite sufficient in providing nuances of islamophobia from
other forms of anti-Islam debates.

However, for purposes of this paper we shall to borrow the Report‟s coinage of this concept in
respect of the "unfounded hostility towards Islam...to the practical consequences of such hostility
in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of
Muslims"1

It is thus palpable to conclude that the contextual usage of the term is useful when viewed from a
global perspective. In this sense, the hostility towards Islam or stereotypes and discriminatory
practices towards Muslims, attacks, insult, prejudice, violence against Muslims as well as the
resultant attempt at excluding them from mainstream society is what Islamophobia entails. While
the measurability of all this is quite contentious, manifestation of the practices and attitudes
towards Muslims are identifiable in public practice or even scholarly discourse. The definitions
provided by Umut Topcuoglu, and Cesari (2006) perhaps provide more clarity. While Umut
Topcuoglu defines Islamophobia as a contemporary form of racism and xenophobia motivated by
unfounded fear, mistrust, and hatred of Muslims and Islam.‟ Cesari (2006:6) believes that
“Islamophobia groups together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech and acts, by
suggesting that they all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is an „irrational fear’ of
Islam”. However, while the existence of stereotypes of all sorts that translate into phobic
elements against Islam or Muslims can be generally acknowledge, it is not possible that Cesari‟s
description of the phenomenon as irrational fear of Islam” is universally sustainable.

Since conceptualization is not the central idea of this paper, it cannot detain us here. Rather what is
important is to try and use Uganda‟s history and juxtapose two important ideas. The first idea is
that Islamophobic elements are traceable in Uganda‟s past over the last century. The contrary
opinion to these ideas is the feeling that what is paraded as islamophobia in Uganda, is a myth,
whose origin lies in the tendency for the Muslims is Uganda to harbor sentiments of Islamophilia,
which is a psychological degree of self-righteousness, where a social group considers itself to be
above blame. In the context of Uganda‟s past the nuances of Islamophobia and Islamophilia are
quite challenging delineate. What is a truism is that there is evidence that Uganda‟s past reveals
practical, behavioral, legal frameworks, procedural, institutional, and attitudinal underpinnings that
can help one conclude that the relationship which the Muslim Community entered into with the
State and with other social groups in the last century, culminated into anti-Islamism in Uganda.

T HE “R EALITY ” OF I SLAMOPHOBIA IN UGANDA: Islam in the Fog of Colonial Politics

The colonialism capitalized on the internal weaknesses within Uganda to sub-due the indigenous
nationals into total submission (Rodney: 1972). To the British, and perhaps colonists elsewhere,
the end justified the means. It is no accident therefore, that in Uganda, the inter-religious squabbles
and prejudices which the British found in place laid fertile grounds for the subjugation of its
peoples. However, this conquest also created pseudo-victors and vanquished among the local social
groups.2 The Muslim community falls in the latter category. By 1900, the social polarization along
religious lines had been institutionalized.

Muslim skeptics have always viewed the colonial policies as a deliberate ploy to balkanize
Muslims. This ploy, it is alleged, was hatched, in a conspiracy with the Christians, who were then
the political adversaries of Muslims. This reasoning oscillates on the assumption that since Uganda
was colonized by a Christian power; the Muslims automatically had to have a raw deal under that
Christian over-lordship. It is in connection with the above that in this paper seeks to analyze the
plight of Islam in Uganda during the colonial period.

1
Runnymede Report, 1997. P.74
2
See Karugire S. R., The roots of instability in Uganda (Kampala: The New Vision Publishers, 1988) and Khumar
Rupesinghe, ed., Conflict resolution in Uganda (London: IPRI, James Currey, 1989) for detailed analyses of the
colonial roots of conflict in Uganda. Apolo Kaggwa, Bassekabaka ba Buganda (London: Longman, 1953:164 -171)
The colonists' vigorously endeavored to check the influence and spread of Islam, and therefore
Muslims found themselves in a disfavoured position during the colonial era. According to Muslim
sources, what transpired during this period is of great historical importance. For, it marks the
genesis of Muslim tribulations that lingered to the post-colonial period. Accordingly, the socio-
political foundations laid by colonialists placed Muslims at the rear balcony in Uganda's political
theatre.

Uganda was formally taken over by the British in 1894. But this was simply a formal endorsement,
since the colonial conquest of the "country" had taken place almost a decade before. However, the
British declaration of her protectorate over Buganda perse did not alter the Legacy of
religio-political turbulence and discrimination against Muslims by their rivals

I t would be reasonable to assume that since the control of Buganda was now in the hands of a
democratic power, the latter would exercise an impartial policy in governing a country that had
been clustered asunder by ideological divergences.

On the contrary however, the colonial government simply perpetuated, if not, intensified the
problems of religio-political polarization. Whether this was deliberate or a political eventuality, the
British colonial administrators cannot escape criticism. The imperialists only exploited the
confusion and internal weaknesses in the periphery to their advantage. Their way of doing things
showed how they were inclined to the promotion of Anglican dominance, a policy they succeeded
in upholding until 1962. .

As had been the case before 1894, the missionaries perpetuated their negative attitude towards
Islam. They also doubled their effort to stop its spread, and if possible, its influence in the entire
country.

They thus became the auxiliaries of the colonial administration, which saw the success of the
imperialist venture lying partly in incapacitating Islam in Uganda. Therefore, these two parties,
worked together as allies in their common cause, as Soghayroun (1980:128) writes; "Government
and missionaries coordinated to further the spread of Christianity at the expense of
Islam".

Therefore, the impact of missionaries and the colonial administration on Islam will be discussed
concomitantly, focusing on Buganda which was then the nucleus of Uganda's political arena at the
time.

However, the idea of including religion in the realm of imperialism is rather debatable
controversial. From the political point of view, religion has always been used by imperialists as an
instrument of intimidation and exploitation used to bring people into subservience. This makes it
an indicator of cultural imperialism which is used to achieve political and economic objectives. For
instance in East Africa, like elsewhere in Africa, it may be quite taxing to delineate the role of
Christian missionaries from that of colonialists. This is based on the fact that in many instances,
colonial conquest was preceded by missionary activity; as the saying goes that 'the flag followed
the cross'.

Karugire (1980) believes that imperialism was extended to Uganda in three phases namely:
exploration, Christian Missionary activity and by actual agents of imperialism. In support of this
view, he writes that: "With the arrival of Christian Missionaries began the real
colonization of not only Buganda but of Uganda as a whole"(1980:62)

Although Karugire (1980:62) does not look at Islam as an Instrument of imperialism, he admits
that "British imperialism and Islam had been incompatible".

By 1890 it was vividly clear that some of the parties which had hitherto been flexing muscles were
tired of showdowns. This has particular reference to Muslims, who having been defeated were
desperately thirsty for peace. On the contrary, their Christian rivals were not in for
such an undertaking. They found it logical to share the national product amongst themselves,
they did this completely oblivious of the vanquished group and eyeing them as rebels and
disrupters of peace. This perhaps explains why Islam had a raw deal under the colonial
administration. Even the colonial agents such as Lugard were suspicious of Muslims although
from face value the latter appeared to be apolitically spent force. For instance, Lugard,
referring to the repatriation of the then exiled Muslims wrote thus;

"This vast mass of people must be dealt with and located somewhere. To me it
appears best to locate them where they shall be immediately under my control where
I may… their creed and check its evils. In a distant place, the evil may get better of
the good. My action is not encouraging Islam but rather controlling and limiting
it."(Lugard 1893:442).

However, it is doubtful that the Christian colonial administration had any moral obligation to
harness Islam or give concessions to the demands and interests of Muslims. Such a question may
receive different answers depending on the point of view of the response.

From a moral ecumenical point of view, it would appear irrelevant to ask such a question because
of the clarity of the answer. Naturally, favoring your opponent is self-destruction. In the context of
Uganda, the success of the colonialist lay (partly) not in helping Islam but in keeping the latter's
influence at bay. This was the policy which was administered almost throughout colonial rule. The
authenticity of the above statement can also be traced in Stanley's letter referred to earlier in the
previous chapter from which we extract the following words.

"I have undermined Islam so much that Muteesa has determined... that...
missionaries would come here...." (Maclean 1914:215)

We have already explained the connection between Stanley and the Christian missionaries and
between missionaries and imperialism. Therefore, taking this line of thought, the colonialists may
not so much be blamed for having treated Muslims the way they did. However, from the Muslim
view point, the colonial administration was expected to exercise fair (or impartial) treatment to its
colonized, irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliation. It is catastrophic to suppose that you can
silence your "foe" by denying him his due share and right. This political miscalculation by
colonialists was partly responsible for plunging the country into an abyss of political turbulence
and the wars that accompanied it.

The political potency of Muslims was marred after Lugard had worked tirelessly to deprive them of
princes, -Mbogo - who was hitherto their leader - and Alamanzane (Son of Kalema). This is
authenticated by Lugard's very words thus "I wrote a letter to Mohammedans... that if they
wished peace, they must give up their rival king Mbogo..."(Lugard 1893:126)

Lugard Insisted on not going into any form of negotiations with Muslims unless the above two had
been surrendered to him. Eventually, the two princes were surrendered by Muslim rebels and put
under "protective custody" of Lugard. This however had one important significance. It meant that
all their claims would be illegitimate since no faction could claim not to be an outlaw without a
Mulangira (member of the royal family).

A significant indicator of Islamophobia, is reflected in administrative and territorial division of

power during the colonial era. For instance, after their return from exile, Muslims were given only
three counties, - Butambala, Busujju and Gomba (out of twenty as was to be contained in the 1900
agreement). These counties were not only small but also Sandwiched between those of their rivals;
the Catholics in Buddu and protestant in Kyaddondo, and Mawokota. It had already been
successfully designed politically that the Muslims should be kept at bay from the "Cosmopolitan
counties” (Kiwanuka 1971:237).

However, we should also observe that although this territorial distribution of power seemed to be a
very small allotment to Muslims, it should be appreciated that it was quite reasonable given the
political rules of the game at the time. Muslims' being sandwiched between Christian parties'
domains is explained by the fact that although peace had been concluded the Muslims were still
looked at with Skepticism and Suspicion and in the words of Lugard, "the Waganda are never free
from suspicion or doubt". (Lugard 1893:129).

The Islamophobic tendencies of the Colonial administration were revealed further in 1893,
particularly after the Sudanese mutiny. The Muslims who were by now clamouring for more
territory, particularly the county of Busiro were shocked, when, on the instructions of Captain
MacDonald, two of the three counties which had been allocated to Muslims were removed from
them and re-allocated to Anglicans and Catholics. Gomba was allocated to Anglicans while Busujju
was taken by Catholics. This left Muslims squeezed in only Butambala County, almost totally
isolated from the capital in as far as national politics was concerned. Kaggwa (1953) Commenting
on the events which followed the foiled abortive coup plot, holds that at first MacDonald even
wanted Muslims to leave the country2. This would be done in order to out rightly do away with
the “Mohammedan nonsense" After the mutiny, Muslim leaders were arrested, others executed and
Mbogo marooned to Zanzibar. The most sordid atrocities committed against Muslims were at
Nateete, where Arab, Swahili and Baganda Muslims were brutally murdered, and their properties
destroyed. The Muslims were forced to surrender all arms and ammunitions in their
possession and many of them were "sprinkled" in various counties governed by Christians
(Kaggwa, 1953:164-165). This was a deliberate move by the colonialists to politically
debilitate Muslims beyond Recognizable status.

Although the Anglicans, who controlled the state machinery, always oppressed their opponents
(Catholics and Muslims), the degree of repression was not the same for both victims. At times,
some concessions could be made to Catholics. For instance, Kiwanuka (1971:238) writes:
"MacDonald had concluded an honorable peace with the Catholics because of their
numbers, but perhaps also because they were Christians. But nothing of the sort was
made to Muslims".

In Christian counties where the rest of the Muslims settled they were despised and subjected to
untold indignities. This fact is also authenticated by Sekimwanyi's narration that "even where we
settled, we were given the poorest, dry and unproductive..."(1945 :40)3. During this era,
Muslims lost their once audible political voice and almost sank into oblivion in Uganda political
circles.

There is a strong belief that considerable effort was made to marginalize Muslims and to halt the
spread of their religion in the protectorate of Uganda. This was largely done by the imperialists and
the missionaries. For instance, on December 1, 1900, Sir Harry Johnston wrote to Bishop Tucker
assuring him that government was behind the latter in checking Islamic expansionism.

Finally let me assure you that if there is one thing which I am

doggedly opposed to…. It is the spread of Muhammedanism in
Busoga....For this country to become a focus of
Mohammedanism would be one of the most dangerous threats
to the future of the prosperity of the protectorate....
(Soghayroun[1980] also Entebbe archives A/23.Johnston to
Tucker December,1st1900)

Another case in point to illustrate the anti-Islamic sentiments by the colonial government is the
Sudanese mutiny of 1898. The mutiny was not engineered by Ugandan Muslims and its cause was
not for Islam. The Mutineers' grievances were purely overwork, low pay and inadequate facilities.
Despite this however, the mutiny was construed by imperialists and their Christian allies as an
attempt to bring about Islamic rule over Uganda.

Austin (1903:71) for instance interpreted whose saga as "a Sudanese dream of a
Mohammedan Kingdom". That is probably why some Christian missionaries actively
participated in the undertaking to crush the Sudanese rebellion. One such missionary was Rev.
Pilkington of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) who is reported by Kiwanuka (1971:240) as
having "died in action, defending the colonialism of his own country and perhaps
attempting to frustrate the imagined spread of Islam, which would have resulted from
Sudanese victory."

Muslim leaders today complain that even Nsambya Hill had been allocated to them as their piece
of land in the capital, but the same land was allocated to British catholic Fathers in 1895 and
nothing was allocated to Muslims in return as compensation for this loss 4. However, the
authenticity of this claim is yet to be established since the claim is entirely verbal.

In northern Uganda, government officials and missionaries consciously exhibited Islamophobia by

coordinating actively to propagate Christianity at the expense of Islam. The Colonial government at
one time urged the CMS to establish a high school in the province to educate Christian children to
check Islamic expansionism. SOURCE

Bishop J.J Wills is yet one of the clergymen who undermined the development of Islam in northern
Uganda. In one of his to treatises, he reported that a more serious danger looms in the north from
Muhammedanism advancing slowly from Egypt, Southwards through the Sudan" (Willis,
1904:448). He was concerned about the influence of Islam in the north and always urged the
central authority to address the issue with optimum seriousness.
3
See Sekimwanyi Abdullah. Ebyafayo Ebitonotono ku Kuyingira kw‟eddiini y‟obusiramu mu Uganda. Kampala.,
1945
4
Hussein Kyanjo emphasised this when he was discussing a paper titled "Religion in Uganda”, presented by
Lieutenant. Noble Mayombo, in a seminar organised by UMYA, on 5 March, 1995 at Kampala High school. This
view is shared by many leading Muslims such as, Ali Kulumba, Abas Kiyimba, Jamil Mukulu, Kasozi Imam and
Yunus Kamoga.
In West Nile, the story was no different either. Fr. Toni La Salandra (in History of the Catholic
Church in West Nile p. 30) states the real motive, which pushed the missionaries to start a mission
in Arua, was “to stop the advance of Islam and Protestantism”, both of them considered as enemies
to the Catholic Faith”

In Aringa, the missionaries considered the Muslim presence a threat. “These people are very
simple; they can accept anything. You can imagine how the Muslim danger can be destructive for
this district!” A missionary wrote these words for “ Kirgizia” in November 1924.

Aringa county, had been the hub of Muslims since in West Nile since 1914. This activity prompted
a hasty advance of catholic missionaries from Arua to Aringa in 1920 and the subsequent
establishment of churches in Aringa, Aupi, Wandi, Odravu, and Odupi in Terego County. This
rush was more than a normal competition to for religious groups win converts. The cardinal
intention was to. Indicating that among others there was a big need to curtail Islamic presence and
influenced. This was referred to as “the Islam propaganda” in the report made by Fr. Sembiante
Fernando in 1937. This report contained an exaggerated image of the Islamic propaganda,
spreading all over the area of the Protectorate of Uganda, through the work of some old Muslim
soldiers, appointed chiefs by the English government (La Sandra P. 50) The report ends: “May
the Immaculate Virgin stop the Islam danger that is a threat for our people not only but also for the
Uganda Protectorate as a whole”.

In Rubaga Johnston used to complain to the sub-commissioner in Busoga about the latter's
reluctance to check Islamic influence in Busoga. At one time Johnston ordered the arrest of one
Sallih who was relentlessly propagating Islam in Busoga. Johnston's argument was that Muslims "
are proverbially difficult to manage and are always...opposed to the administration
of a Christian power 5

Another landmark in the political history of Uganda which illustrates the prejudicial treatment of
Muslims was in 1898 when Mwanga II was ousted from the Buganda throne and succeeded by his
son Daudi Cwa II (as King) who was a minor. The Buganda Kingdom was put under the regency
of three people of whom none was a Muslim. The two regents, Apollo Kaggwa and Zakaria
Kisingiri were Anglicans while Stanislus Mugwanya was catholic. This means that while
the Anglicans and Catholics wielded 66.6% and 33.3% (respectively) of State power,
Muslims held nothing,

With the defeat of Mwanga, a deposition council comprising 21 members (20 Anglicans and 1
Catholic) was formed and again none was Muslim. (Kiwanuka 1971:240) This was an obvious
discrimination and peripherisation of the Muslim community in the religio-political balance of
power. Muslims were now a people with no political representation. They had been virtually
reduced to mere hewers of wood and drawers of water; and in the coinage of Kiwanuka, they were
"hardly taken note of, except on the issue of slaughtering animals"(Kiwanuka
1971:260).

Table showing members of the Deposition Council and their respective religions

NAME TITLE RELIGION

Apolo Kaggwa Katikkiro Protestant
Zakaria Kisingiri Kangawo Protestant
Stanislus Mugwanya P .M Catholic
Mesusera Kubudde Sekiboobo Protestant
Paulo Bakunga Mukwenda Protestant
Matayo Nsubuga Mujaaasi Protestant
Yokana Muwanga Kitunzi Protestant
Yokana Bunjo queen Mother's PM Protestant
Rev.H. Kitaakule Omukubira Protestant
Serwano Mazinga Kawuta Protestant
Rev B.Zimbe Omukubira Protestant
Andereya Luwandagga Omukubira Protestant
Rev. T. Senfuma Omukubira Protestant
Thomas Semukasa Omukabya Protestant

5
Entebbe Government Archives, H.M Commissioner (Johnston) To Busoga. 3 December 1900. Busoga
correspondences, Item 1/53 A.11/53 outward. See Corrrespondings of the Legislative Council, Official report,
21st session, 1941, P. 52.
 Absolom Mudima Muwanika Protestant
Nova Naluswa Jumba Protestant
Stefano Kyakwambala Baludiri Protestant
Sawulo Mayanja Omuwogozi Protestant
Yoswa Kate Mugema Protestant

Daudi Sebbowa Mubiito Protestant

Mesusera Kamya Sekyoya Protestant

Source: Apolo Kaggwa, 1953: 207-8

If colonial regime had reasons to exclude Muslims from the public service, they did not have the
same for Catholics. Catholic marginalization had no convincing basis. As Karugire (1980:134) has
correctly argued "discrimination against Catholics, took the form of denying them Public offices
or not giving them such number of offices as were commensurate with their numbers. Despite their
numerical superiority, Catholics were tactfully forced into an inferior politico-administrative
status.

Muslims automatically became the most insignificant of all, given the nature of their
history in Uganda. An example to illustrate the Anglican dominance is that in the four Kingdom
areas, none of the Kings was a Catholic or Muslims. Indeed, it had become fashionable, if not
constitutional, that it would never be so.

Ibingira (1964) mentions that in Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro, a tradition had been adopted that the
kings should be protestants. And that no catholic, or Muslims (my addition) should assume the
office of Enganzi (Leading Minister). This seems to have stemmed from a long term plan made by
the "fathers" of Protestantism in Uganda the CMS and the colonialists.

It sounds plausible to argue that the Anglican ascendancy would perhaps not have been perpetually
unchallengeable had it not been for the backing of imperialists, who were themselves adherents of
the protestant religion. This 'injustice by design' has its roots explained by Welbourn (1965:9) in
the following words "Protestants did not obtain administrative influence in Buganda
merely because Lugard gave them power. The whole tendency of protestant
education was to train for leadership".

Denial of access to Education

It was in the education sector that Muslims suffered the greatest psychological at reverses. The
history of Muslim education is very unfortunate, even within the circles of the faith itself. The
Arabs who introduced the religion here did not put into consideration the importance of education.
To be sure, judging from their "modus o p e r a n d i ' during their hey days in Buganda one does not
help conclude that the issue of education was not accorded the priority it deserved. For instance,
even the teaching of Islamic knowledge per se was peripatetic. Worse still it was so insufficient
that it left the tutees swimming in a sea of half-bakedness and mediocrity.

From the onset of colonialism, it became apparent that Muslims could not freely enjoy the fruits of
the education sector. Yet, it was the quality of education which was later to form a basis in the
attainment of other goals of national orientation. This is in line with Low's (1949:10-11)
observation that political influence in Uganda came to be predominantly a function of modern
education. In Low's view, Muslims' failure to achieve mastery in modern education explains their
hitherto weak political position.

The protectorate government did not do anything substantial to improve on the sorry state of
Muslims, who had lagged behind in education partly due to lack of missionaries to establish
education institutions of the fashions of Christians on this Karugire (1980:136) minces no words
when he laments: "the protectorate government did not see anything anomalous in a
situation in which the whole faith had virtually no access to educational facilities and
this despite the fact that the issue was brought to government attention frequently".

Despite many appeals to government to address the illiteracy question of Muslims, nothing
meaningful was always done. The government officials usually blankly ignored such appeals on
the pretext that there was no discrimination against Muslims. A case of interest was in 1949 in the
LEGCO where Mr. Margarch - an advocate of non-denomination education, was gagged by the
then Director of education, who blind-folded the council members into believing that there was no
discrepancy in his Ministry. In a lengthy contribution to the house the director laboured to illustrate
government "even-handed" policy on education. He is quoted as having argued that, "there is
strict parity of treatment as be between a moslem and one of any agency” 6

Karugire does not agree that there was parity of treatment between Christians and Muslims in
education (as was argued by government officials). He takes a swipe at the colonial government for
having gone ahead to grant sites to Christians to build denominational institutions, without nothing
of the sort, or even comparable, given to given to Muslims7.

Worse still there was no fair or equitable distribution of education grants to various religious
institutions. For instance, in 1941 out of a grant of £ 6,631 earmarked for the development of
education, Muslims were given only £ 265.18s; and, in the coinage of Karugire (1980:137) "no
one would call this generous."

Under such miserable circumstances, the development of Muslim education had to take a
staggering course. This means that ignorance had to loom high among the Muslims, while their
counterparts were enjoying good learning in well-organized schools such as Budo, Gayaza and
Kisubi. Muslims were now at cross roads. They had one choice; if their children were to achieve
western education they had to enroll in Christian founded schools.

A sizeable number of parents therefore took up the choice as a necessary evil. But the inter-
religious rivalries of the 1880s had left behind indelible scars of animosity and bigotry among rival
parties. In this connection the Muslim children who joined Christian schools had an unpalatable
experience in such schools. They were for instance, usually alienated and subjected to
psychological torture resulting from intimidation and mockery from their Christian schoolmates.
They were considered inferior beings that never merited being educated in such schools. Those
who did not have the Dutch courage and stamina to withstand the situation opted to drop out rather
than being discriminated against.

Such scenario created fear and tension into Muslim parents who always nursed a feeling that their
children would convert to Christianity. The apostasy of Yusuf Lule from Islam to Christianity
scared many Muslim parents in Buganda. It also served as a signal to warn Muslims of the heavy
price they had to pay for sending their children to be reared in Christian circles. Many Muslim
parents pulled their sons out of secular schools (after the Lule incidence). The then crumbling
Quranic schools were once again crammed with children. Therefore, the efforts of Muslim parents
to fit their children in the system were thwarted by their own psychological defeatism. This partly
explains why even to date the number of Muslims educated in the secular system is far too small to
out-match their Christian counter parts.

The children who would persevere in Christian schools would in the end adopt Christian ethos and
change "Islamic" names to sound a bit Christian such as Abbot from Abdul8 Eddie for Idris, Juliet
for Janat, Hilda for Aidah, Isaac for Ishak, Alex for Ali" Betty for Batuuli, Abbey from
Abbas and Dick for Siddiq.

In many cases when such students left the Christian schools which forced to them to change their
names, they found it a bit hard revert to using Islamic names. They consequently adopted another
style that was not Christian as such, but not Islamic either. They took a middle course where they
abandoned their religious names and used the African ones. Names such as Kirunda Kiveidinda,
Bidandi Ssali, Jumba Masagazi, Nsereko Gyagenda, Mukwanason Hyuha, Nsubuga Nsambu,
Kafumbe Mukasa became very common among the Muslim elites. This sort of camouflage was not
without reason. Apparently it appeared a bit shameful, and degrading to be identified as a Muslim
in such "modernized" Christian circles.

6
Also cited in Karugire, A political history of Uganda (London: Heinemann, 1980), Pp. 136 -137.
7
Karugire Ibid., P. 137.
8
This has particular reference to the late Abbot Sebuliba whose real name was Abdul. Many people learnt of his
having been a Muslim after his death, and many were astonished, when, during his burial, Muslim sheikhs presided
over the ceremonies.
On the other hand, it was considered quite status-awarding to be identified with Christianity.
Research has revealed that some students were implored to disguise (change names and norms)
either under duress or undue influence9. Muslim students were under intermittent pressure from
either their Christian schoolmates or teachers (or both) to convert to Christianity. In Budo for
instance this was not uncommon. The system there had developed into a state of "do-or-go" style.
One example will suffice to concretize our argument. Realising the dangers of forceful conversion,
in 1925 King Daudi Chwa had to use his offices to order the headmaster of Budo Rev.G. Gareth
not to attempt to convert Prince Badru Kakungulu (Gee,1958:143). Kakungulu survived
conversion partly because of the edict and more so because he had both colonial and royal
protection. But sons of other lay Muslims had no protection of this kind. They therefore became
victims of such circumstances. Muslim children who persevered under such conditions were
subjected to a more rigorous but subtle method of conversion.

The assimilative methods administered on such accommodative chaps ranged from forcing them
to attend church service -which had become part of school co-curricular activities to offering
Christian religious education as a compulsory subject. Such measures definitely increased
their propensity to convert to Christianity.

The above notion is supported by Pinycwa (197:72) in the following words:

To be sure, pagans, Muslims and protestants could not enroll in Catholic

Schools, and in the like manner, pagans, Muslims and Catholics could not
enroll in protestant schools but they did generally so under one assumption. In
the former case they were expected to relinquish their faith and to convert to
Catholicism, and in the latter case they were expected to relinquish their faiths
and to convert to Protestantism.

Towards the early 1930s the colonial government changed its attitude towards the education of
Muslims. This should not be taken to mean that colonial government had never thought of
Muslim education question. Some colonial Administrators had tried, but the Christian missionaries'
pressure to drop the idea usually overwhelmed them. When a proposal to set up a Muslim school
was aired out by Governor Wilson George, Bishop Tucker of CMS dismissed it as unacceptable.
He even appealed to the home government for support. Later, Governor Eric Hassey also fell
victim to Rev. Willis's furious opposition when the former hinted on erecting elementary and
intermediate schools for Muslims (Kiyimba 1990:95). In addition, Bishop, Spiss Cassion is
remembered to have derogatorily remarked that Muslims have no morals and are
deceitful…..To educate them is useless"

All such efforts from missionaries help to explain why government always dragged its feet in as far
as Muslim education was concerned. But the dramatic shift in policy in the 1930's was not merely
confessional. It was partly due to the fact that Muslims were no longer considered to be a
threatening political force to British Imperialism. Yet still, British Imperialism had been
consolidated, throughout Uganda. The colonial administrators then started encouraging
Muslims to build schools.

Following the Musoke report on Muslim education of 1938, the colonial government devised
means of helping Muslims further to elevate their literacy standards. The authority urged Muslims
to form a single coherent organ through which all possible assistance from government could be
channeled.

Kasozi (1986) Kiyimba (1990) Kulumba (1953 1991) and Kakungulu and Kasozi (1977) have
tackled this question in detail. However, what is pertinent here, is the mention of the fact that the
problem of Muslims' being laggards in education cannot be solely attributed to the protectorate
government or Christian missionaries' machinations. An objective apportioning of the
blame will show that Muslims themselves were also a factor to this plight. Their laxity and
apathy towards secular education during those days cost them heavily in the political game that
was to gain weight shortly before and after independence.

9
Ali Kirunda Kivejinja tells us that when he joined school in Busoga, the Headmaster of the School forced him to call
himself Alex as long as he was in that School. This was revealed by Kirunda, when he was addressing IUIU students in
1989
They seem to have suffered from the "unprepared syndrome" Contrary to what may be sheepishly
believed that they are always prone to forces of persecution.

Thus, as a result of their unfortunate educational history, Muslims found themselves at the
bottom of the social strata, considered inferior to Christians (4th class), in what I choose
to call denominational distribution of guilt. Utterly despondent, Muslims were swallowed
up in despicable jobs such as chauffeurs, butchers, cooks, night watchmen and as
Welbourn‟s (1965:8) derogatory statement illustrates;

Because the boys do not go to school they have been able to practice wrestling
all day and to become champion wrestlers...and, as deliverers of milk, they are
now becoming its leading cyclists.’

Exercabating Muslim Divisionalism

It was not until the final colonisation of Uganda that serious Muslim divisionalism surfaced. Before
1921, the colonial administration considered the Muslims of Uganda as a single community under
the leadership of Nuh Mbogo. So was the Mengo government. (Kiyimba 1990:91 and Gee
1958:141). This recognition of Mbogo was not without reason. First, after Muslims had been
politically debilitated and sought asylum, Mbogo had recognised their feeble position and decided
to cooperate with leading colonial and Buganda administrators. This was particularly so during the
process of repatriation and resettlement of Muslims in Buganda. (Lugard (1893) and Kasozi
1986).

However, research findings have revealed that the colonial administrators and some non-
Muslim political pundits remained skeptical of Muslims. To leave them as United force was
seemingly a recipe for further political strife in the form of vengeance and clamor for more
opportunities in the political game of the time. Sir Harry Johnston had already issued a policy
statement on Muslims in 1900 that:

It is not in the interest of the colonial government that

Mohammadanism should receive any more adherents than we can help
in Uganda as Muslims are proverbially difficult to manage and are
always...opposed to the administration of a Christian power. In Uganda
itself we are obliged to put up with the existence of this faith because
they were here before we came...it is particularly necessary that we
should have no Mohammedan nonsense 10.

The colonial and Baganda administrators who followed him had to take a leaf from his perception
of the Muslim community. It was no accident therefore that the first seeds of discord were sown by
the Buganda Katikkiro Apollo Kaggwa. In 1913, perhaps trying to implement his colonial masters'
policy of divide and rule, Kaggwa incited the Butambala Saza chief Taib Magatto to challenge the
authority of Mbogo. This was the beginning of state -inspired factionalism. Magatto's dissent was
however incombustible until the death of Mbogo in 1921. It was then that the Muslim
community started witnessing serious dissension.

The conflicts in the Muslim community were stirred by the leadership question. The death of
Mbogo almost caught Muslims unaware, and unprepared. The question of choosing a leader
amongst themselves after Mbogo's demise became contentious. Kasozi (1986:94) does not
exonerate Mbogo for the leadership vacuum which the latter's demise created within Muslim
circles. It is not my intent to inculpate Mbogo for having-either by Commission or Omission -,
made the Muslim community predisposed to intra-denominational political and diabolical dissent.
However judging from Mbogo's position and the privilege he wielded11, one cannot help criticizing
him for having been party to the dilemma in which Muslims were after his demise.

The major blunder that Mbogo made was his attempt to maintain the status quo of hereditarisation
of Muslim spiritual leadership. In 1913, he had privily hatched a ploy of making Muslim leadership
a family affair or a royal affair. This he did by appointing Masudi Kisasa as the Katikkiro to his son
Badru Kakungulu. Religious affairs of the entire Ugandan Muslims were charged with his Muallim
Ali Kadogo (as head). (Kasozi 1986:94) Mbogo assumed and rightly so that his sycophants would

10
Entebbe Government Archives. Busoga correspondence -inward A 11/1 Johnston to sub-commissioner in Busoga,
Dec 3, 1900.
11
Mbogo‟s influence was so great that even the colonial Government had given him powers to imprison for not more
than six weeks. See Kiyimba (1990:97)
 ease the oscillation of Muslim leadership around the royal orbit. Mbogo‟s aspirations are cleared
explained by Gee (1958:143) in the following words "He was anxious for succession to
remain in his family and later explained that his son should be head of the
community".

Therefore, in 1921, three meetings were held in which the focal point of discussion was who was to
lead the "Orphaned" Muslim community. What transpired was the unanimous selection of Badru
Kakungulu as the overall leader.

This division, though created by Muslims themselves was precipitated by the bureaucratic state and
the political petty Bourgeois. Definitely those who kindled these squabbles had their own motives
to achieve. The motives could have been selfish or otherwise. However one remarkable point need
be observed about this situation. It marks a milestone in non-Muslim politicians' meddling in
Muslim' affairs. For the first time in Uganda's history, Muslims also started forming horizontal
alliances with non-Muslim politicians against fellow Muslims. This phenomenon has intermittently
recurred to the present day.

Apolo Kaggwa's probable motive in imploring Muslim division has already been talked about.
However, we need to stress here that having participated in the religion-political skirmishes of the
1880's and 1890's his acts (in the 1920's) were a function of his political bogey about Muslims.
Secondly the divisions seem to have had a touch of class struggle. Note should be taken that
having descended from the Bakopi class the likes of Magatto, Sekimwanyi and Kaggwa wanted to
break the royalists‟ dominance in Muslim leadership. On the other hand, the royalist like Chwa and
Kakungulu were determined to keep Muslim leadership in their circles.

By 1924 the cleavages within the Muslim community had raised national concern. This prompted
Kabaka Daudi Chwa to politically intervene, in order to halt any danger that would accompany
such dissension.

Under the auspices of Chwa II and Sir Geoffrey Archer, an expert was appointed to enlighten
Muslims on the controversies at hand. The expert Muhammad Ibrahim from Tanganyika was
rejected by Sekimwanyi12 who preferred Sharif Ali bin Mohammad of Saudi Arabia. All these
endeavors to reconcile the warring factions were thwarted. In July 1928, Badru Kakungulu (at 21
years) was confirmed by the reigning Buganda monarch, Daudi Chwa, as the undisputable leader
of Muslims. According to Gee, however, this confirmation was queried by the Provincial
commissioner of Buganda. His skepticism was based on his realisation that there were
now two factions:- the Kakungulu's Kibuli sect and Magatto's Butambala (Juma) sect. The latter
had the spiritual guidance of Sekimwanyi (Gee 1958:144). Accordingly the Commissioner
expressed doubts whether Kakungulu commended enough Charisma and leadership skills to enable
him to settle religious conflicts of high class delicacy.

A perusal through Archival notes reveals that by 1913 Mbogo had embarked on a vigorous campaign
demanding the colonial administration to appoint more Muslim chiefs such effort was fruitless
however.24 (Kaliisa 1994:122). Gee (1952:144) writes

If government had prepared to accept Badru as a leader of Muslims, not

in the religious capacity, but in some quasi-administrative
capacity...then by suggesting the appointment of a learned Sheikh to
perform duties of religious leadership.

Thus, the conflict lingered increasing in scope and spectrum every other day. Earlier on in 1923, Sir
Geoffrey Archer had suggested that an expert be appointed to reconcile Muslims. The wrangles that
engulfed Muslims failed them in this particular area. Muslims were the minority. Yet they had to
complete with much more organized and populous Christian religio-political parties.

Now, if Muslims had to level the ground, one instrument that ought to have been used would have been
the size of their population. However, factionalism led to a reduction in the number of Islamic
adherents. Between 1921 and 1931 for instance, the Muslim population had been reduced from
71,000(1921) to 69,813(1931), A difference which Gee (1958:146) ascribes to "Lack of unity among
Muslims".

12
Entebbe Government Archives: files S.44, the Muhammedan community. Also see file 750, Muslim community .
 The table below, shows the estimated numbers of Muslims, Catholics and protestant in
Buganda between 1911 and 1950.

AAI 1911 1921 Rl 1931 Rl 1950

Muslims 15 58,000 71,000 22 .4 68,000 -4 . 2 180, 0
PROTESTANT 4 140,000 179,000 27.9 242,000 35 445 , 000
CATHOLICS 5 181,000 184,000 165 2 6 8,00 0 45.6 5 7 9,0 00

Key

AAI= Annual Average rate of increase in percentage, RI= Rate of Increase in percentage SOURCE:
figures were obtained from Gee (1958)

The data indicates that between 1911 and 1921 the number of Muslims had grown by 17%. This can be
attributed to the fact that this was about the time when the wounds of the religious wars were
beginning to heal.

Muslims under Mbogo had been repatriated a score of years before and they had already settled
peacefully in Buganda. This was also a period of hectic development campaign by Muslims to catch up
with Christians. One strategy they laid to that effect was to produce as many off springs as Allah could
provide. The loss of about 300 adherents within a decade (as indicated in the table above) must have
caused Islam some fortunes.

However, by dividing themselves, and always appealing to the colonial government for conflict
resolution, Muslims increased the degree of susceptibility to external manipulation. The colonial
government was a Christian-dominated institution from which Muslims would have expected least
assistance in matters pertaining to the stability of their religion. To the colonialists Muslims were a
tolerable but inevitable inconvenience. This is a fact that even the colonialists themselves, never felt
remorseful in mentioning. For instance, Sir Fredrick Jackson once said that: "Muslims are
proverbially difficult to manage... we are obliged to put up with the existence of those people
because they were here before we came"13.

Except in acute and extreme circumstance the colonial government was largely insensitive to affairs
concerning improving the predicament of Muslims. And even when it did intervene - usually in
response to factions' appeals - no resolute progress would usually be achieved. Statements giving
"green light" to the continued existence of division would be made in circumstances where government
would have helped (See Mutyaba, 1975:10).

The conflict within the Muslim community also cost the faith its would-be basic assets to enhance
development. One such asset was land. Muslim conflicts made it difficult for them to procure 10 square
miles of land that the colonial government had allotted to them in 1913. Moreover, this land had been
granted purposely for construction of mosques and schools. But the factions always strove to frustrate
government effort in the venture for utterly selfish interests (see Kasozi 1986, Gee, 1958). This
illustrates instances where Islamophobia in Uganda becomes merely mythical.

The view that the politics of the country was determined at the pulpit is shared by many historians and
political scientists leave one being an incontestable historical fact. Pinycwa (1978:23) for instance
observes accurately that:

The fact is that religion and the modern political Uganda were like
Siamese twins that saw the light of day at the same time. And, to
continue with the metaphor, the two had not been really separated even
when independence came some eighty years.

Mamdani (1977) also contends that politics in Uganda before, and after independence was largely based
on petty sectarian considerations. On the formation of political parties, apart from being formed along
ethnic or religious parameters, Mamdani argues that parties had a petty bourgeois leadership.

Lubowa (1994:137) also argues rightly that. "It is the religious factor that determined the policy,
activities and support of political parties”. In addition to religion, merit was considered depending on
one's agility, ability and education.

13
Entebbe Archives. Busoga correspondences. inward. All/l. Johnston to sub-commissioner in Busoga. Dec, 3,1900. *
The apparent conclusion to be drawn from such an arrangement of political leadership is that Muslims
were pushed to a peripheral position in as far as political activity was concerned. The competition
between Catholics and Protestants also played a crucial role in making Muslims more negligible
politically.

While the Anglicans strived to maintain themselves in the higher echelons of power, the Catholics on
the other hand looked at themselves as the oppressed group and struggled to change the existing order
of things in their favor. In the face of such acute competition from more "advanced" and privileged
religio-political communities, Muslims mainly played less active role. Lubowa (1994:137) contends
that they continued to be passive observers, with a few holding minor positions and seeking to maintain
them. Although Lubowa's contention that they sought to maintain the positions they wielded is right, it
is erroneous for him to assert that the role they played was passive. The truth of the matter, however, is
that the magnitude of Muslim political activity was by far less compared to that of their counterparts.

For instance, even before the formation of political parties, when the Bataka movement shook the
colonialists, it was the Christians who played the leading role. The leadership of the Bataka movement
was overwhelmingly Christian. Its founder (James Miti), Chairman (I.K. Musaazi) and Secretary
(Spartus Mukasa) were Anglicans. Semei Kakungulu one of the leaders and Simon Musoke, Saza chief
of Buwekula, were Malakite and Alexandist respectively. Only one catholic Semakula Mulumba
Mathias participated in the highest ranks. None of the leaders was a Muslim14. However, although few
Muslims with minor positions of responsibility, participated in the movement (Lubowa 1994:139), the
sympathizers who were predominantly peasant included Muslims as well15.

The first political party to founded was the Uganda National Congress (UNC) in 1952. Although the
party's name and slogan sounded nationalistic, the party itself was neither national nor nationalist. Its
composition was predominantly protestant. It's founder Ignatius K. Musaazi and almost the entire
leadership were protestant and mostly old Budonians.16 Even at grassroots level, the Anglicans
dominated the UNC. For instance, out of 121 branch Chairmen 78 were protestants, 18 Catholics, 18
Muslims and 7 belonging to other creeds. The Democratic party founded by Matayo Mugwanya in 1954
was overwhelmingly Catholic both in leadership and support. The progressive party (PP) founded in
1955 was dominated by protestants. This was even manifested in its 38-man leadership which
comprised 35 Protestants, 2 Catholics and 2 Muslims. The UPC (1960) and the UNM were also largely
protestant in leadership and membership. In fact, in derogatory terms the DP was branded Diini ya
Paapa while UPC was labeled United Protestants of Canterbury17

With each party identified with a given religion, Muslims found themselves with no political mouth
piece in form of a political association to bolster them into active politics; and more so, to represent
their interests and aspirations.

The reasons for their failure to form a political party -though not transparent - are generally
understandable and convincing. The said failure has historical roots. They had suffered colonial
repression. The colonialists, who, as we observed earlier had no intentions of seeing Muslims at the
helm of Uganda's politics, had done enough i n subjugating the political potential of Muslims.

Their minority position also worked against them. Muslims formed only 5.6% of the total population of
Uganda by 1959.18 Given the political environment of the time, under which religion and ethnicity
were crucial variables, the formation of a Muslim political party would have had problems. Once
formed, such a party would have been one, confident of losing in any election. On the other hand,
perhaps, such a party would be assured of winning at most two seats in parliament. The rest of Muslims
were scattered all-over the country in minority positions. This means that the task of mobilizing their
supporters would have been difficult and therefore futile.

Although Islam regards its adherents as the most superior community (Quran 3:103, 33:4), Muslims in
Uganda suffered from an acute inferiority complex. Having desperately occupied the 4th stratum in the
denominational distribution of significance.

14
For details about the leadership structure of the Bataka, movement, see D.A. Low, Political parties in Uganda
(london: Longmans, 1963)
15
Lubowa (1994) gives detailed lists of dominant political figures of the period. See tables 7,8,9, and 10 in his Thesis
16
For details about the leadership structure for the UNC, see Maiso (1994), Ibingira (1964), and Jorgensen (1981)
17
Uganda national Congress papers. A copy is available in Makerere University Library. Also see Lubowa
(1994:141).
18
However, Kasozi (1986:5) and many Muslim sources doubt the authenticity of the 1959 population figures
Having failed to form a Political party of their own, Muslims founded solace in joining the existing
parties of the time. For instance, most of the Baganda Muslims loyal to Kakungulu joined Kabaka
Yekka (KY) while most non-Muslim Baganda embraced UPC and DP. This disarray in political
alignment in a way widened the scope of Muslim marginalization. This is based on the fact
that factional loyalty was a significant determining factor in explaining who joined which party.

From a generalist point of view, the Muslims found UPC more acceptable than DP. This kind
of conceptual preference was based largely on historical and psychological factors. From historical
considerations, Muslims still nursed nostalgic memories of the days when they controlled state
apparatus (1870's and 1880's). Political nostalgia of this sort bred a phobia for Christians among
Muslims.

True, there existed a general Christian phobia. But the catholic mistrust was more immense in the
face of Muslims than the Anglican mistrust. Ironically Muslims considered Catholics to be more of
their adversaries than the Anglicans.

Muslims also widely believed that the Catholics harbored a natural, irreversible, and irreconcilable
hatred of Muslims. They therefore found in the Protestants a better choice to ally with. Protestants after
all were ready to deal with them and were perhaps more tolerant with Muslims than were Catholics.
(Mudoola, 1993:48) 19

While it is true that Muslims fared rather poorly under the Christian rule, it should not be forgotten that
they had also administered such egoistic political approaches during the time when they held power in
the post-Mwanga days. However, brief as their era was, it engendered the feeling among Christians that
Muslims, once allowed to operate unchecked, were capable of tilting the order to their
advantage.

The Post-independence era

Islamophobia in the first ten years of Uganda‟s independence era was more succinct in its reflection. It
was mainly reflected in the continuity of prejudicial treatment of Muslims, in form of denial,
peripherisation and divisionalism. In the UPC government, between 1962 and 1971, Shaban Nkuutu,
Ntege-Lubwama, and Shafic Arain were the only Muslims to be appointed to ministerial positions. The
table below serves to illustrate political power sharing during Oboe‟s regime in the 1960s.

Ministers Deputy Ministers

Anglicans 53 % 66%
Catholics 40 % 25%
Muslims 7% 9%

However, there was a change in the tide of Islamophobia after the fall of the First Republic. The
coming of Amin on the political stage of Uganda positively altered the status of Muslims, their identity,
and the general level of Muslims‟ social, economic and political significance in the country. The
objectives of Amin, during his formative years of political participation (1966-72), his methods,
character, attitude and behaviour did least reflect a person ready to overhaul the status of his co-
religionists in Uganda. But after 1972, Amin changed all the above elements to sway his efforts in
favour of Muslims. The story of Amin and Muslims yields a convincing conclusion that there was a
massive attempt by the establishment to rejuvenate Muslim identity; an identity that had been denuded
during the century of Anglican dominance in ownership of the means of production and state apparatus
in Uganda.

However, it is not contestable that Amin had pro-Muslim plans at the start of his regime. For instance,
in 1971/72, out of a cabinet of 20 ministers, only two were Muslims. He also heavily relied on an
advisory panel of non-Muslims such as Wannume Kibedi, Wadada Nabudere, Edward Rugumayo, Bob
and Astles (Jorgensen, 1981:267)

Amin‟s ecumenical stance was rather short lived. By the end of 1972 he had drastically changed his
inclination. Amin, without regard to public opinion, embarked on an ambitious campaign to rejuvenate
the identity of Muslims. Therefore, Amin found in Islam a ready instrument to perpetuate himself in

19
Muslims consider the Catholic Church conservative and impermeable. Also see Pinycwa (1978), Kasenene (1993)
and Welbourn (1965).
power. Already the Muslims had applauded his coming to power. Kakungulu their respected leader,
who had just been released, had in 1971 extended a congratulatory message to Amin saying, "We
Muslims have added reasons to feel grateful for your Excellency, since under the previous regime our
religion had been debased to a play thing and we had been denied the most elementary freedom of
worship."(Kasozi, 1994). What marked the beginning of a 7-year Muslim dominated era was Amin's
visit to Libya in 1972 which resulted in the signing of a communiqué of cooperation between the two
countries.

Amin's expulsion of the Israelis and his denunciation of Zionism were a boost to the development of the
Islamic influence and to the strengthening of his newly adopted pro-Arab attachments. His government
started reaping immediate economic, financial and political benefits. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia
visited Uganda later in 1972, the visit being his first ever to Africa. Faisal also granted 6.1 million
Riyals and promised more in consideration of Amin's stance to fight Zionism and imperialism. This
increased morale in Amin and escalated his zeal for Islamic promotion. Qaddhafi's visit to Uganda in
1973 signaled confirmation of Amin's allegiance to the Arab world. With this visit, Amin totally
abandoned his non-partisan religious spirit and bent towards the furtherance of Islam.
Amin then embarked on an ambitious task of trying to Islamise Uganda. For instance, he expelled 58
white Christian missionaries in 1973. Later, Amin's move to Islamise Uganda increased his bigotry
towards non-Muslims. For instance, he banned all the minor Christian churches (religions/sects) such as
the Adventist Church, the Orthodox Church, "Mungu Mwema" (redeemed) Church and others, leaving
only Islam, Anglicanism and Catholicism. For example, while in 1971 his cabinet had only 2 Muslims,
by 1975 it was dominated by Muslims where 70% of his ministers were Muslims (Kokole: 1989; 25).

The expulsion of the Asians in 1972 also intensified the influence of Muslims. This is because, most of
the departed Asians' property was entrusted to Muslims, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, in
addition to the Baganda, the Muslims found themselves at the top in terms of economic power sharing
through the Mafutamingi. In the army, religion inter alia became a criterion for recruitment and
promotion. This saw an influx of Sudanic speaking Muslims into the army from southern Sudan. By the
end of Amin's rule, most of the commanders were Muslims. The Islamisation process was also
characterized by massive conversion of people to Islam. According to Kokole (1989) most people
converted in order to have access to the then scarce resources, win favours, respect and for the purposes
of security for the job-posts they held or out of fear of persecution. The number of pilgrims to Mecca
increased manifold every year during Amin's regime, despite the economic hardships that the country
faced during those years.

Uganda's admission to the OIC as a full member state in 1974, marked the acme of the Islamisation of
Uganda. This was at a conference, at Lahore, Pakistan. At the conference, Uganda was admitted to the
OIC as a member state. Uganda's admission to the OIC opened more veins for the inflow of petrol
dollars into Uganda from the Arab world. In addition to the military and technical assistance that was
extended to Uganda from Libya, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, Muslims benefitted in the field
of education through scholarships awarded to Ugandan Muslim students to pursue education in the
Arab world. Another indicator of the proliferation of the Muslim influence was the decreeing, in 1978,
of Friday as a non-working day (public holiday) of the week (Mamdani, 1983:56). In doing this Amin
was trying to refurbish the status of Muslims and to observe recognition of their rights of worship
which had been denied to them since the colonial times.
Amin also coerced Muslims into getting united with the formation of the Uganda Muslim Supreme
Council in 1972. Yet after achieving this, he had egoistically prevailed upon them in the running of
their affairs.
However, the more Amin promoted Islam, the more resentment he generated from among non-
Muslims. Such resentment, for instance, was expressed in form of people fleeing the country to seek
asylum outside Uganda. Amin‟s interference in the affairs of Islam and his usage of the Islam to
achieve his personal goals, almost undid whatever he had done for Muslims. By the end of his reign for
instance, all his vices were accounted to Muslims.
This led to' further balkanisation of Muslims immediately after the fall of Amin. Amin's adversaries
inaccurately mistook him for a Jihadist whose legacy would prevail even after his exit. Therefore, his
co-religionists had to have a rough time lest they would pursue Amin's plans further.
If arguments pointing to the prevalence of islamophobic sentiments in post-colonial Uganda hold any
water, it was during the aftermath of the liberation war in 1979 that the Muslim community experience
most suffering. I have argued elsewhere (Kasumba 1995:170) that the face of the liberation changed
from being anti Amin to anti-Muslims. It appeared therefore that the Muslim community was made to
pay a price for the excesses of Amin‟s bellicose regime. A great deal of vengeance was unleashed
against the Muslim population especially between 1979 and 1980. This resulted in wanton destruction
of Muslim property countrywide. For instance, it is reported that in Ankole, over 45 mosques were
either destroyed or looted, while in Masaka 24 houses, 17 schools, 19quran schools belonging to
Muslims were destroyed (Kasumba 1995:174). According the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council
records, in total, over 400 Muslims were imprisoned and 122 families had their property grabbed by
non-Muslims in 1979. The number of innocent Muslims killed in Masaka amounted to 53, while in
Mbarara, about 55 people, 23 of them children were killed and dumped in River Rwizi (also see
Kiyimba 1989:9).

This Muslim bloodbath was experience in other parts of the country such as Kampala, West Nile.
Mbale, Jinja and Bombo. In addition, many Muslims who could not withstand the atrocities fled to
neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Sudan, and Zaire.
Another indicator of Islamophobia during this period was that Muslim suffering and ridicule appeared
to be supported by the Political and social leadership in Uganda. Arguably, Muslims were excluded
from political participation in the UNLF government. The UPC government, which was formed after
the 1980 elections, had only 1 Muslim, Ntege Lubwama, on its cabinet. Even then, his service was
short-lived, as his house was bombarded, forcing him to flee the country. To make matters worse The
UPC Government fueled and intensified factionalism within the Muslim community, with the then
president, Milton Obote, supporting one faction led by Sheik Obeid Kamulegeya, while the Vice
President, Paulo Muwanga allied with the Mulumba faction. By 1985, the Muslim community remained
weak, disorganized, despised and not appropriately represented in the Muslim crucial sectors of
National life.
It is on the basis of such scenarios that there exists a high feeling of marginalization amongst the
Muslims of Uganda.

Conclusion
The history of Muslim-state relations in Uganda, just like that of Muslim-Christian relations has been a
history dominated by intolerance and un-comfortable co-existence during the last 100 years. While
violent confrontation seemed to subside after the consolidation of colonial rule, the unease between
Muslims and the Non-muslim dominated State and the community at large prevailed even after the
attainment of independence in 1962. The manifestations of the discomfort relation are palpable, but
most importantly, often tended to disfavor the Muslim community. It is owing the malignant nature of
the relationship that this paper finds credibility in the argument that Islamophobia in Uganda has had
facets of realism rather being mythical illusions. What can be argued is that the attitudes of successive
regimes towards the Muslim community varied depending on social and political circumstance. It is
evident that the colonial regime and the post-colonial state were inclined to abuse of the past, when the
past itself was used as justification for lingering the marginalization of the Muslim community.
However, history cannot wholly exonerate the Muslims in Uganda and portray them as innocent
victims of Islamophobia. This owes to the fact that in the history of Uganda, the occasions when
Muslims have been in political leadership, or when they held political power and influence, there has
been a tendency for them to promote Islam and Muslims at the expense of those who don‟t subscribe to
the religion of Islam. This was witnessed more considerably during the era of Idi Amin. The Muslim
ascendancy during Amin‟s regime, is often erroneously adjudged as a historical accident, especially in
consideration of the assertion that Amin was abandoned by the rest and was left with only the Muslims
as a trusted political constituency. This line of thinking also tends to link the victims of Amin‟s regime
as conspirators and allies of a rebel group that attempted to overthrow the regime beginning September,
1972 until 1979 when Amin fell. This points to abuse of the past too. It is an indicator of Islamophilia,
which is a defense mechanism that attempts to place the Muslim community above blame. What can be
concluded is that Islamophobia and Islamophilia have been juxtaposed parts of our history in Uganda.
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