this Court finds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

Since the
complaint fell short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the CA
correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case against the Spouses Estomo.

The petitioners obtained a loan form Demdam in the amount of 75,000, However, when the loan
became due and demandable, the petitioners failed to pay the principal amount and its accrued interest,
despite several demands. After several years, or on August 1, 2001, the respondent filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money against the petitioners and Gil D. Doniña, in the principal amount of
P75,000.00 and its accrued interest in the amount of P414,000.00 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City

the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, where they alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case, since the principal amount being claimed by the respondent is only P75,000.00, an amount falling
within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

CA rendered its Decision,21 granting respondent's appeal. The CA ruled that in the amended complaint,
the respondent prayed for the total amount of P489,000.00, already inclusive of the interest on the loan
which had accrued from 1996.

As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the aforementioned issues all pertain to questions of
law. The primordial issue of the case involves the application of the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (BP 129)

In view of the foregoing, this Court subscribes to the petitioners' view that the CA committed an error
when it gave due course and took cognizance of respondent's appeal, considering that the Rules of Court
expressly requires that appeals before the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed.

Rule 50

Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. — An appeal under Rule 41 taken from
the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues
purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court
but shall be dismissed outright.
Jose Cuenca Garcia (Garcia) is the registered owner of a 10.999-hectare rice land in Ajuy, Iloilo. The
government offered Garcia the price of roughly P5.58 per square meter,7 or a total of P647,508.49 for
his 10.999 hectare rice land. Believing that his land should have been valued at a higher price, Garcia
rejected the offer.8

Aggrieved, Garcia filed a petition for fixing of just compensation against the Department of Agrarian
Reform. he trial court,17 acting as a Special Agrarian Court, ruled in favor of Garcia and increased just
compensation

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, Land Bank argued that the trial court erred in considering the
value of non-agricultural land like residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as well as the potential
use of the rice land, and its strategic location in its determination of just compensation

the Court of Appeals held that while Rule 42 was the correct mode of appeal, the motion for
reconsideration before the trial court was filed beyond the prescribed period. It pointed out that the
decision already attained finality as Land Bank received the Regional Trial Court decision on September
11, 2009 but it only moved for reconsideration on October 16, 2009

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL?

NO,

RULING:

In this case, petitioner should have filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 and not an appeal under Rule
42, because the decision of the Regional Trial Court was rendered in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

the petitioner had 15 days from its receipt or notice of judgment to file a notice of appeal before the
Regional Trial Court to perfect its appeal. Here, petitioner received a copy of Regional Trial Court decision
on September 11, 2009. Counting 15 days from this date, petitioner only had until September 26, 2009
to file its appeal. Hence, the decision already attained finality when the appeal was belatedly filed on
October 16, 2009.

A final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable.

This case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Hence, there is no reason to review the decision of
the trial court. In any case, even if We disregard this procedural infirmity, the petition will still fail on the
merits.
Fausta Brual (Fausta) remained single during her lifetime and was under the care of her nephew, Ireneo
Brual, and his wife Elizabeth Brual (Elizabeth; petitioner).6 On July 22, 2009 Elizabeth, as instituted heir
and co-executor, filed before the RTC a petition for probate of the last will and testament of the late
Fausta

The respondents alleged that Fausta's testamentary act of supposedly leaving all her properties to
Elizabeth and her husband was dubious.

On November 4, 2010, the RTC issued an Order/Resolution11 denying the respondents' motion for
intervention and supplemental allegation. The RTC held that Fausta, who died single and without
compulsory heirs, may dispose of her entire estate by will pursuant to Article 842 of the Civil Code.

Respondents then filed their motion for reconsideration13 but it was denied by the RTC in its January 14,
2011 Order.14

On April 27, 2011, the RTC issued an Order17 dismissing respondents' appeal due to their failure to file a
record on appeal pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.18

The CA granted respondents' petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's dismissal of respondents'
appeal.

WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE DISMISSAL OF APPEAL BY THE RTC?

YES

The period for appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from receipt of the notice of the final order
dismissing the motion for intervention, or from November 15, 2010, the date respondents' counsel
received the order of denial.42 Respondents had until December 15, 2010 within which to file their
notice and record on appeal.

Since they filed their motion for reconsideration43 on November 26, 2010, the period for filing of the
appeal was duly interrupted. When respondents however received the final order denying their motion
for reconsideration on January 24, 2011,44 the period to appeal, applying the fresh period
rule,45 resumed and they had 30 days thereafter or until February 23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in
accordance with the rules.46 Verily, respondents filed their notice of appeal on February 3, 2011 without
a record on appeal.47 Thus, on April 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the notice of appeal due to its non-
perfection and failure to file the required record on appeal.48 It was only on June 27, 2011 that
respondents filed their omnibus motion for reconsideration with motion to admit record on appeal while
claiming inadvertence and lack of knowledge on the timing of the filing of the record on appeal.
petitioner filed a Petition[6] for the probate of the Last Will and Testament[7] of decedent Concepcion A.
Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra (decedent) before the RTC of Makati City, docketed as SP Proc. No. M-5599,
where she prayed for the allowance of the decedent's will and for her appointment as executor [8] of the
estate.

the RTC issued an Order,[12] which allowed the decedent's will, ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to petitioner, but invalidated the disinheritance provision contained in the will

After several years of litigation, the RTC finally rendered its Resolution[18] (Partial Distribution Order)
dated October 21, 2013, which directed the partial distribution of the decedent's estate.

In the Final Distribution Order, the RTC directed the distribution of all remaining assets in the decedent's
estate, thereby completing all the provisions set out in the will.

respondents filed their Notice of Appeal[35] with attached Record on Appeal,[36] challenging the Final
Distribution Order.

the RTC issued its Order,[37] which disapproved respondents' record on appeal for being filed out of time,
to wit:

Upon careful evaluation of the record on appeal and the arguments of the parties, the Court is inclined
to disapprove the record on appeal filed by Oppositors Manguerra-[Aberasturi], et al. Petitioner is
correct that this case has already been finally disposed of and the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal.

ISSUE:

The crux of the controversy the Court is now tasked to resolve is whether a record on appeal is still
necessary in special proceedings, when the trial court has already completely disposed of the case.

RULING

it is clear that the purpose of a record on appeal is to allow the lower court to continue with the rest of
the case considering that the records, which do not pertain to the matter being appealed, remains with
the lower court. This also allows the appellate court the full opportunity to review the records, and to
resolve the appealed matter without hindrance.

ANALYSIS

In this case, the RTC, in its Order dated April 5, 2017, stated that the case has been fully disposed of, and
thus, the proper remedy is filing a notice of appeal. Indeed, the ratiocination behind such ruling appears
to be sound because when the case is fully disposed of and resolved by the lower court, it seems that
there is no need for a record on appeal because the lower court has nothing left to do and such record
on appeal would serve no purpose.
DOCTRINE:

a record on appeal is only required when the whole case is not yet fully disposed of

respondent Dayamon Didato Alo (Alo) was formally charged with unprofessional conduct and/or
dishonorable conduct before the Board for Professional Teachers (Board), which operates under
petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) And found guilty, Alo filed a motion for
reconsideration but denied

Without elevating the case to the PRC, Alo directly filed a petition for review26 with the CA under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. the CA rendered the assailed Decision,31 granting Alo's petition for review and
reversing the ruling of the Board

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA HAS AN APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DECIDED BY THE QUASI-
JUDICIAL BODIES?

YES,

RULING

The above-cited provisions by the PRC, while showing that they may have appellate jurisdiction over
decisions or orders of the Board, does not divest the CA of its own appellate jurisdiction. To put it simply,
there is no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by the Board, nor is
there any law excluding such cases from being taken cognizance by the CA through a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as will be discussed further below.

Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is consistent with the aforequoted provision, particularly Section 9(3) of BP
129, which grants the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.

PRC BOARD IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY

The Board, by virtue of the power vested in it by the provision above, clearly exercised its quasi-judicial
functions when it investigated the case, held a hearing, and issued a decision that affected the rights of a
private party, herein respondent Alo.
The case stemmed from the administrative complaint7 filed by Evelyn A. Conag (Conag) in 2011 against
the vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan of Esperanza, Masbate (local government
officials), for Gross Negligence, and violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.

the Ombudsman found merit in the complaint and held that the local government officials were indeed
remiss in their duties

the Ombudsman rendered its March 24, 2014 Order22 (second assailed Order), holding that the
condonation doctrine does not apply in petitioners' case because the decision that found them guilty of
the offense had already become executory even before their re-election.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA HAS THE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES APPEALED FROM OMBUDSMAN?

YES,

It is well-settled that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

As to the second assailed Order, which is an interlocutory order, even though the special civil action
of certiorari may be the proper remedy, petitioners still violated the hierarchy of courts when they filed
the petition directly to this Court without citing any exception to the rule.

PPCI avers that the CA gravely erred in giving due course to Renato's petition for certiorari despite being
filed out of time or beyond the 60-day reglementary period. PPCI explains that the Bailiff's Return
showed that the counsel of Renato received on December 29, 2016 the NLRC Resolution dated October
28, 2016 denying his motion for reconsideration. As such, Renato had until February 27, 2017 to avail a
petition for certiorari. However, Renato filed the petition for certiorari only on March 13, 2017 or
fourteen (14) days late. In his comment, Renato contends that he timely filed his petition
for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period reckoned from his receipt on January 12, 2017 of
the NLRC Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
BEING FILED OUT OF TIME?

YES

As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice
of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. There can no longer be any
extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari,41 save in exceptional or
meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons.42 Contrary to Renato's theory, the
reglementary period to avail the remedy of certiorari must be reckoned on December 29, 2016 or the
date his counsel received the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsiderati on, and not on
January 12, 2017 when he allegedly received the assailed resolution. To be sure, the records reveal that
Renato's counsel was validly notified of the assailed NLRC Resolution on December 29, 2016,

Respondent Anita Agra Caranto (Anita) is the registered owner of a 347-square-meter parcel of land
situated in Barangay Hagdang Bato, Mandaluyong City

Rodolfo alleged that he is the son of Juan C. Caranto, Sr. and Guillerma Lopez-Caranto. He has a sister
named Rizalina Caranto (Rizalina), and a brother named Juan Caranto (Juan) who was Anita's husband.

When Rodolfo learned about Anita's Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, he filed a Notice of Adverse Claim to
protect his share in the subject property.

Anita sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action and that Rodolfo is barred by
laches or prescription. Further, Anita claimed that the subject property is her exclusive property since
she purchased the same with her own money. She denied that Rodolfo is a legitimate brother of her
husband, Juan.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION MUST BE DENIED?

The Petition must be denied. The allegations of Rodolfo are a mere rehash of his arguments before the
CA and essentially raise questions of fact as to be beyond the ambit of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under the said rule since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. The
Court will thus not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate court are
considered final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court especially when supported by
substantial evidence.

On January 1, 1997, Republic Act (RA) No. 8240 took effect, adopting a specific tax system instead of
the ad valorem tax system imposed on, among others, fermented liquor.

Contending that Revenue Regulation (RR) No. 17-99 did not conform to the letter and intent of Republic
Act (RA) No. 8240, SMC filed on January 10, 2003 a letter9 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to
claim tax refund or credit of the alleged excess excise taxes it paid on its Red Horse beer product from
January 11, 2001 to December 31, 2002 in the amount of P94,494,801.96.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES DID NOT RESOLVEB BY THE LOWER COURT CAN BE RAISED UNDER RULE
45?
NO,

the Court had previously ruled that "the sufficiency of a claimant's evidence and the determination of
the amount of refund, as called for in this case, are questions of fact, which are for the judicious
determination by the CTA of the evidence on record."64 It is already an established rule in this
jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not this
Court's function to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below, as its jurisdiction under Section 1, Rule 45 is limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court.

Ester Delmolin-Magno (Ester), Justina Delmolin-Paloma (Justina), and the late Cristobal R. Delmolin
(Cristobal) are the legitimate children of spouses Santiago and Eulalia Delmolin.5 Eulalia passed away on
January 11, 1944,6 while Santiago died on October 24, 1996.7 Cristobal passed away on May 22,
1984,8 and is survived by his wife Abigail Delmolin,9 and children Melanie, Myla, and Michael.10

During Santiago's lifetime, he was the registered conjugal owner of a parcel of land situated at Brgy.
Concepcion, San Pablo City, with an area of 684 square meters, as evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-153911 issued on February 1, 1977

Santiago sold the 300-square meter portion of the disputed land in favor of Justina for ₱10,000.00.

At that time, she asked her father, Santiago, about the documents involving the land and discovered that
the same were in the possession of Justina.

the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents.

the CA sustained the ruling of the court a quo ordering the partition of the lot in question.

WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTION OF FACT CAN BE RAISED UNDER RULE 45?

YES, THERE IS AN EXCEPTION

It is well-settled that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the courts below.71 Moreover, the factual findings of the lower courts,
if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded great respect and even finality by this Court72 unless
the case falls under any of the following exceptions: "(1) [w]hen the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) [w]hen the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) [w]here there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) [w]hen the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) [w]hen the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) [w]hen the [CA], in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) [w]hen the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) [w]hen
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
[w]hen the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) [w]hen the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record."73 The present case does
not fall under any of the exceptions.

the Court, in its November 5, 2018 Decision, found the CA to have committed a reversible error in
denying the Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment5 of the January 27, 1992 Amended
Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 18 of Tagaytay City, in Civil
Case No. TG-893 that was filed by Marilyn Go Ramos-Yeo, Laurence Go and Montgomery Go (the Gos). In
so ruling, We held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Gos because of
invalid substituted service of summons. Neither did it have jurisdiction over the subject matter which is
within the jurisdiction of a court sitting as a land registration court.

WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTION OVER JURISDICTION CAN BE RAISED IN APPEAL?

YES,

Contrary to the Spouses Chua's claim, the determination of the propriety of substituted service effected
on the Gos is a question of law. It is a question of what and how the law should be applied.22 Hence, the
petition is within the purview of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

Contrary to the findings of the CA, Alampay's receipt of the Spouses Chua's Motion for Reconsideration
that was filed on November 23, 1990 does not conclude that the Gos flagrantly refused or avoided to
receive the service of summons. At most, it only showed that Alampay received a copy of the motion of
the Chuas. This alone does not validate the presence of the requisites prescribed by law so as to effect a
valid substituted service. Thus, the impossibility of personal service of summons is clearly wanting in this
case to warrant a substituted service.

Consequently, the RTC Amended Decision is null and void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter

SSS filed an Affidavit-Complaint10 against respondents together with Ruth De Leon (De Leon), Celso
Librando (Librando), and Edgar Froyalde (Froyalde), in their capacities as JMA Transport's Board of
Directors before the Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City for failure to remit the social security (SS)
contributions of their employees in violation of Section 22(a)11 in relation to Sections 22(d)12 and
28(e)13 and (f)14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Act of 1997."

Manuel refuted SSS' claims and alleged that JMA Transport had already ceased operations in July 1999.
Therefore, he and the other respondents should not be held liable for the SS contributions after July
1999.

SSS thereafter submitted its Reply20 maintaining that it assessed JMA Transport the additional SS
contributions on the presumption that the company was still in operation since the records of the SSS
did not show that it has ceased business operations.
RULING OF THE RTC

It held that based on the three Franchise Verifications issued by the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) that were attached to SSS' Reply-Affidavit31 dated December 8, 2004, JMA
Transport was in active status either from August 13, 2003 or June 4, 2004 until March 31, 2006. It
therefore showed that from July 1999 onwards, it was still in continuous business operation contrary to
respondents' claim.

the trial court did not order the grant or denial thereof; rather, it directed the public prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation for the purpose of receiving respondents' controverting evidence with respect
to the Franchise Verifications

CA

It held that the trial court went beyond the records of the case when it based its May Order on
Franchise Verifications that were not attached to or even mentioned in SSS' Reply-Affidavit.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS?

YES,

The instant case falls under the exceptions since the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the RTC, and is based on the supposed absence of evidence, i.e., the Franchise Verifications, but
is contracted by the evidence on record. True, the issues of whether the Franchise Verifications were
indeed attached to the Reply-Affidavit filed by SSS so as to prove that JMA Transport was still in
operation after 1999

In his Position Paper3 filed before the Labor Arbiter, Department of Labor and Employment, Zonio
alleged that on March 13, 2011, he was hired as a security guard by 1st Quantum Leap Security Agency,
Inc., owned and managed by respondent Romulo Q. Par

Zonio, along with some of his colleagues, received a memorandum suspending them from April 21, 2014
to May 20, 2014, for sleeping while on duty.

Zonio filed a complaint4 against respondents for illegal suspension underpayment of salary and
13th month pay; non-payment of overtime and holiday pay; holiday and rest day premiums pay; service
incentive leave pay; night shift differential pay; reimbursement of cash bond and miscellaneous fees;
moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees.

Labor Arbiter Joel A. Allones ruled that Zonio was validly suspended for sleeping in his post as proved by
photographs, which Zonio did not dispute. And also ruled that he is not entitled for the benefits prayed.

the NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that Zonio is entitled to overtime and
holiday pay; holiday and rest day premiums pay; and night shift differentials pay.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to question the award of overtime and holiday
pay, holiday and rest day premiums, and night shift differentials pay in favor of Zonio, and the NLRC's
failure to award damages

respondents countered that the petition is premature and must be denied because Zonio did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision before filing the present petition.

WHETHER OR NOT ZONIO AVAILED A PROPER REMEDY?

YES,

A motion for reconsideration is

not required for the filing of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

These provisions clearly do not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a condition
precedent. Section 2 states that "the petition shall be filed x x x from notice of judgment x x x appealed
from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x." The use of the
word "or" indicates an alternative or choice, as opposed to being mandatory. Verily, the petitioner has an
option to file a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or
directly file an appeal or a petition for review to the appellate court without filing a motion for
reconsideration, as what Zonio did.

IMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT

Earl Alphonso Thomas (Alphonso), an American citizen, was married to Rachel Trono (Rachel) on October
7, 1984. The couple begot a son, Earl James Thomas (Earl)

Upon Alphonso's petition for declaration of nullity, his marriage to Rachel was declared void ab initio

Alphonso cohabited with Jocelyn C. Ledres (Jocelyn). On August 21, 1998, Jocelyn gave birth to their
child, Charnnel.

Alphonso died on February 12, 2011. To settle his affairs, Jocelyn, requested for certified true copies of
the August 22, 1997 Decision, its certificate of finality, and the entry of judgment from the RTC believing
in good faith that the judgment had already attained finality

The RTC, instead of granting Jocelyn's request, furnished the OSG with a copy of the Decision and gave it
15 days from receipt to perfect an appeal, or to file a motion for reconsideration.8

OSG sought reconsideration of the August 22, 1997 Decision contending that Alphonso's marriage with
Nancy was not proven by competent evidence, that it was not furnished with copies of the orders and
processes, and that the case proceeded without a definitive determination that no collusion existed
between the parties.

RTC granted the OSG's motion, reversed its August 22, 1997 Decision, and ruled that the marriage
between Alphonso and Rachel is valid and subsisting.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE WHO ATTAINED FINALITY CAN BE REVERSED?

NO,

the jurisdiction of the RTC to rule on the OSG's motion for reconsideration and reverse its Decision
dated August 22, 1997, the CA overlooked the fact that the OSG's motion for reconsideration was
belatedly filed.1avvphi1 Considering that the OSG received a copy of the August 22, 1997 Decision on
March 8, 2011, it had until March 23, 2011 to file its motion for reconsideration. However, the motion
was filed only on March 28, 2011, beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, the August 22, 1997
Decision became final. In effect, the RTC already lost its jurisdiction over the case and could no longer
alter or reverse the August 22, 1997 Decision.

It is a well-established rule that a judgment, once it has attained finality, can never be altered, amended,
or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is to correct an erroneous judgment. This
is the principle of immutability of judgments — to put an end to what would be an endless
litigation. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. In the interest of society as a whole, litigation must come
to an end. But this tenet admits several exceptions, these are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the
so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable,28 none of which exists in this case.

RULE 38

petitioner city caused the demolition of the commercial fish center, allegedly without giving direct notice
to Maramba and with threat of taking over the property

The complaint alleged that the demolition was unlawful and that the "complete demolition and
destruction ofthe previously existing commercial fish center of plaintiff is valued at Five Million
(₱10,000,000.00) pesos

the trial court decision,11 penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron, ruled in favor of Maramba and awarded 10
million as actual damages

petitioner city filed a motion for reconsideration. Maramba filed an opposition on the ground that the
motion was not set for hearing.

the trial court denied petitioner city’s motion for lack of notice of time and place ofhearing

the Court of Appeals24 granted Maramba’s petition for certiorari. It held that petitioner city’s motion for
reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing and was a mere scrap of paper

The lack of notice of hearing in the motion for reconsideration was due to counsel’s oversight, and a
denial of the motion on this ground alone sacrificed substantial rights for mere technicalities

WHETHER OR NOT LACK OF NOTICE OF HEARING IS AN EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE?

YES,
This Court has indeed held time and time again that, under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, mandatory is the notice requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply
with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro formaand does
not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading

**Dr. Fe Lasam v. Philippine National Bank and RTC, Branch 66, San Fernando City, La Union**

### Facts:

1. **Initial Filing:**
– On January 14, 2003, Dr. Fe Lasam (Lasam) filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage against
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6778.

2. **Hearing and Dismissal:**

– Lasam was present for a hearing set for initial reception of evidence on February 23, 2010, but her
counsel failed to appear. Consequently, the RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute and for her
counsel’s absence.

3. **First Set of Post-Judgement Filings:**

– Lasam’s former counsel filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion explaining her missed appearance,
but the RTC denied it on April 29, 2010, for being untimely filed.
– Subsequently, her former counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on May 24, 2010, which was
denied as a second motion for reconsideration on July 7, 2010.

4. **Appellate Level Attempts:**

– A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116446,
but was dismissed.
– An Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction was
filed and similarly dismissed by the CA on November 21, 2012, citing the finality of the RTC’s decisions.

5. **Consultation with New Counsel and Relief Petition:**

– Lasam consulted a different lawyer and subsequently filed a petition for relief from judgment on
January 22, 2013, asserting that she was seriously deprived of her rights due to her former counsel’s
gross negligence.

### Issues:
1. **Primary Issue:**
– Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it dismissed outright Lasam’s petition for relief from judgment and denied her motion for
reconsideration.

2. **Timeliness of Petitions:**
– Whether Lasam’s filings fulfilled the strict statutory timelines specified under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court for petitions for relief from judgment.
### Court’s Decision:
1. **Improperly Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court:**
– The Supreme Court dismissed Lasam’s petition for certiorari as it should have been filed with the Court
of Appeals due to the principle of hierarchy of courts.

2. **Assessment on the Merits – Timeliness:**

– It was determined that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Lasam’s petition for relief
was declared filed out of time:
– The petition was filed almost three years after Lasam learned of the RTC’s February 23, 2010 Order.
– The six-month period from the entry of judgment (dated May 3, 2012) had lapsed by the time Lasam
filed the petition on January 22, 2013.

### Doctrine:
– **Strict Compliance with Timelines:** Under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, strict compliance
with reglementary periods (within 60 days of knowledge and six months from entry of judgment) is
jurisdictional and non-negotiable.
– **Hierarchy of Courts:** Direct recourse to the Supreme Court is only justified under special
circumstances. The proper route for extraordinary writs against RTC orders is through the Court of
Appeals.

RULE 47

Title:
Bobie Rose D. V. Frias vs. Rolando F. Alcayde (Doctrine of Proper Service of Summons)

Facts:
Petitioner Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, represented by Marie Regine F. Fujita, entered into a lease contract with
respondent Rolando Alcayde for a property in Muntinlupa City on December 5, 2003. Alcayde
accumulated rental arrears for 24 months as of December 2005, prompting Frias to file an Unlawful
Detainer complaint with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Muntinlupa City. Service of summons
through personal delivery to Alcayde was attempted on January 14 and 22, 2006, but was not successful.
Summons were eventually served via substituted service on Alcayde’s caretaker, May Ann Fortiles.

The MeTC issued a judgment for Frias on July 26, 2006, which went to order execution on July 4, 2007,
despite Alcayde’s Omnibus Motion. Alcayde then filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), alleging improper court jurisdiction due to failure of personal service and
issues with barangay conciliation.

The RTC, after service via substituted service upon Frias through her counsel’s secretary, initially issued a
preliminary injunction on the enforcement of the MeTC judgment on December 3, 2007. However, the
RTC later dismissed the petition on August 22, 2008, ruling that there was improper service of summons
to Frias. Alcayde’s motions led the RTC to reinstate the annulment case, eventually resulting in denial of
Frias’s motion.
Frias filed a certiorari petition with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was subsequently denied, leading
her to appeal to the Philippine Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in ruling that a petition for annulment of judgment is not an action in personam
and that jurisdiction over the person is unnecessary.
2. Whether there was proper service of summons on Frias.
3. Whether Alcayde’s petition for annulment of judgment was the correct remedy.

Court’s Decision:
The Philippine Supreme Court granted Frias’s petition, reversing the CA’s decision. It affirmed that the
petition for annulment of judgment is an action in personam and jurisdiction over the person of Frias
was necessary. It found the substituted service of summons on Frias defective and, thus, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person. The Court concluded that Alcayde’s petition for annulment of
judgment was an improper remedy as it cannot serve as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.

Doctrine:
The Philippine Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine that due process dictates that jurisdiction over the
person can only be acquired through strict compliance with the rules on proper service of summons,
whether by personal service or through voluntary appearance.

Facts

- In *Chico v. Ciudadano*, G.R. No. 249815, decided on July 4, 2022, Gloria A. Chico sought to reverse the
Court of Appeals' (CA) decision that annulled the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City's ruling in her
favor.

- On April 10, 2012, Chico filed a Petition for Issuance of a New Title, claiming she was the highest bidder
in a July 8, 2010 Tax Delinquency Sale for a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 57394 (PR-11986), registered in the name of Rosalita G. Bengzon.

- After the one-year redemption period lapsed, the Quezon City Treasurer executed a Final Bill of Sale,
conveying the property to Chico.

- The RTC granted Chico's petition on December 10, 2012, ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 57394
(PR-11986) and the issuance of a new TCT in Chico's name.

- On January 16, 2017, Elsie Ciudadano filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA,
alleging that she and her husband had purchased the property from Bengzon in 1989 and had been
residing there since 1992.

- Ciudadano claimed extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Chico failed to include her as a
party in the case despite knowing her ownership and possession of the property.

- The CA granted Ciudadano's petition, annulling the RTC's decision and reinstating the original title in
Bengzon's name.
- Chico then appealed to the Supreme Court.

### Issue

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in giving due course to the Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court?

2. Was the Petition for Annulment of Judgment a collateral attack on the title registered under Chico's
name?

3. Did the Court of Appeals err in declaring the RTC's decision void on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction?

### Ruling

- The Supreme Court denied Chico's petition and affirmed the CA's April 5, 2019 Decision and October 8,
2019 Resolution in toto.

### Ratio

- The Supreme Court held that the CA correctly granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, which is an extraordinary remedy available only under exceptional
circumstances.

- The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

- Ciudadano was a real party in interest as she had a claim of ownership and possession of the property,
evidenced by a notarized 1989 Deed of Absolute Sale annotated on TCT No. 57394 (PR-11986).

- Chico's failure to include Ciudadano as a party in the petition for issuance of a new title constituted
extrinsic fraud, as it prevented Ciudadano from presenting her case.

- The RTC lacked jurisdiction over Ciudadano, as she was not notified of the proceedings, violating her
right to procedural due process.

- The Court emphasized that a void judgment, such as the RTC's decision in this case, is subject to
collateral attack and cannot give rise to a valid title.

- Therefore, the CA's annulment of the RTC's decision and the reinstatement of the original title in
Bengzon's name were proper.
Billy M. Aceron (Aceron) and Oliver R. Soriano (Oliver) entered into an unnotarized Deed of Conditional
Sale6 for a consideration of P1.6 million over a parcel of land located in Quezon City

the title was reconstituted, prompting Aceron to demand from Oliver the execution of a Deed of
Absolute Sale. However, Oliver informed Aceron that he would cancel the Deed of Conditional Sale.

Oliver claimed that he had to cancel the Deed of Conditional Sale because Aceron failed to pay the total
amount of the contract

RTC in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 rendered its Decision10 in favor of Aceron and ordered Oliver to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale

Oliver obtained a loan in the amount of P1.6 million from petitioner Calubad and as a security therefor,
he mortgaged the subject property covered by TCT No. N-253373

Calubad filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Resolution29 under Rule 47

the appellate court dismissed30 outright Calubad's petition on the ground that he had been negligent in
not pursuing an action or remedy to protect his legal interest upon knowledge of Aceron and Oliver's
pending case

WHETHER THE RULE 47 IS THE PROPER REMEDY?

NO,

While it is true that petitioner Calubad is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, the foregoing
provision states that the Resolution dated December 13, 2004 is conclusive and binding upon him being
the successor-in-interest of Oliver who acquired title to the subject property after Civil Case No. Q-93-
18011 has become final and executory. As a general rule, a person not impleaded and given the
opportunity to present his or her case cannot be bound by the decision.40 However, having acquired
alleged interest over the subject property only after the finality of Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, he is bound
by the judgment and the determination of rights of the original parties therein.

In other words, Calubad, being a privy to the judgment debtor, Oliver, can be reached by an order of
execution.41 Evidently, petitioner Calubad's claim over the subject property is not adverse to that of
Oliver as he derived his alleged ownership or interest thereof from Oliver by virtue of a contract of loan
and deed of real estate mortgage. Hence, petitioner Calubad cannot enforce his alleged interest or claim
over the subject property as against Aceron who is the adjudged owner of the subject prope1iy in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18011 against his predecessor-in-interest Oliver; nor exempt himself from the execution
of Civil Case No. Q-93-18011 on the pretext that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value relying on
the indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

As a non-party in Civil Case No. Q-93-18011, petitioner Calubad could not bring the action for annulment
of judgment considering that the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal or setting the judgment
aside through a petition for relief42 are not available to him in the first instance.
Facts:

Petition is captioned as “Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with Preliminary Injunction”.

Petitioners were charged before the RTC with the crime of “Other Forms of Swindling”. The RTC
convicted them of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

This prompted the petitioner to appeal the decision to the SC. However, the SC denied the same for
failure to state the material dates. Consequently, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.
A warrant of arrest was issued against Carmelita and Francisco Llamas, but the latter was nowhere to be
found.

Almost a year thereafter, petitioner Francisco Llamas moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest,
raising for the first time the issue that the RTC had no jurisdiciton over the offense charged. However,
since no action was taken by the RTC on Francisco’s motion, petitioners instituted an action for the
annulment of the judgment issued by the court.

Issue:
Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgment is proper.

Held:
No.

The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.

Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the
following:

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.

The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
case.

This case revolves around a dispute over a piece of agricultural land owned by the spouses Dominador
Ramos and Damiana Porciuncula in Nueva Ecija, Philippines. Following their deaths in 1945, conflicting
claims emerged regarding the rightful heirs to the property. On one side were the petitioners, Margarita,
Felix, and Manuel Fernando, descendants of Tomas Fernando, a party to a pacto de retro sale with the
spouses Lucena and Alfredo (from the Ramos lineage). On the other side were the respondents, direct
descendants and legal heirs of the Ramos spouses.

The root of the conflict can be traced back to a unilateral Declaration of Heirship executed by Lucena
Ramos in 1952, claiming she was the sole heir and subsequently transferring the property title to her
name (TCT No. NT-12647). This led to a legal battle culminating in a January 25, 1961 CFI Decision, which
found that the ownership should be divided equally among the nine legal heirs of the Ramos spouses,
thus nullifying Lucena’s claims.
Despite this ruling, in 1993, Margarita Fernando attempted to execute a verbal agreement with the
spouses Lucena and Alfredo for consolidating ownership under the Fernandos, based on the earlier
pacto de retro sale. The refusal of the Ramos heirs to comply with the verbal agreement in 1997 led the
Fernandos to file a case for specific performance and damages (Civil Case No. 31-SD(97)), resulting in a
2001 RTC Decision favorably consolidating ownership under the Fernandos and ignoring the claims of
the Ramos heirs.

The Court of Appeals, upon reviewing a Petition for Annulment of Decision filed by the Ramos heirs,
found the RTC’s 2001 decision void for lack of jurisdiction, citing the non-joinder of indispensable parties
(the Ramos heirs) in the specific performance case.

**Issues:**
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the Regional Trial Court’s 2001 decision on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to the non-joinder of indispensable parties.

**Court’s Decision:**
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, emphasizing that all co-owners, in this case,
the Ramos heirs, were indispensable parties to the suit regarding the property. Their exclusion from the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 31-SD(97) rendered the RTC’s decision null and void due to lack of authority
to act in the absence of all necessary parties. The Supreme Court further dismissed the appeal of the
Fernandos, upholding the annulment of the 2001 RTC decision and ordering the cancellation of the title
issued under the Fernando’s name.

Kepco filed with the BIR its claim for refund in the amount of ₱49,569,448.73 representing input tax
incurred for the first and second quarters of the calendar year 2000 from its importation and domestic
purchases of capital goods and services preparatory to its production and sales of electricity to the
National Power Corporation.

Petitioner did not act upon respondent's claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate.
Consequently, respondent filed a Petition for Review.

In her Answer, petitioner alleged inter alia Special and Affirmative Defenses: that the petition was
prematurely filed for respondent's failure to exhaust administrative remedies;

CTA First Division rendered a decision finding petitioner entitled to a refund.

There being no motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the abovementioned decision became
final and executory and a corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued.

Petitioner alleges that she learned only of the Decision and the subsequent issuance of the writ of March
7, 2011 when the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection Group received a
Memorandum from the Appellate Division of the National Office recommending the issuance of a Tax
Credit Certificate in favor of the respondent in the amount of ₱443,447,184.50.

Accordingly, on April 11, 2011 petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CTA En
Banc, praying for the following reliefs: (1) that the Decision of the CTA First Division in CTA be annulled
and set aside; (2) that the Entry of Judgment and Writ of Execution be nullified; and (3) that the CTA First
Division be directed to re-open the case to allow petitioner to submit her memoranda setting forth her
substantial legal defenses.

CTA En Banc issued a Resolution dismissing the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioner.

(2) Whether the CTA En Banc correctly deny the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioner?

RULING:

(1) None, the Revised Rules of the CTA and even the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily thereto
provide for no instance in which the en banc may reverse, annul or void a final decision of a division.

What Rule 47, provides is with certain conditions, for annulment of judgment done by a superior court,
like the Court of Appeals, against the final judgment, decision or ruling of an inferior court, which is the
Regional Trial Court, based on the grounds of extrinsic' fraud and lack of .jurisdiction. The Regional Trial
Court, in turn, also is empowered to, upon a similar action, annul a judgment or ruling of the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts within its territorial jurisdiction. But said Rules are silent as to
whether a collegial court sitting en banc may annul a final judgment of its own division.

The silence of the Rules may be attributed to the need to preserve the principles that there can be no
hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and the en banc, and that a court's judgment,
once final, is immutable.

RULE 65

Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), an American citizen, met Rosalina Sibal Knutson (Rosalina) in
Singapore. They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby Sibal Knutson (Rhuby). In 2011, the
family lived in the Philippines. However, Randy and Rosalina became estranged after he discovered her
extra-marital affairs. Anyhow, Randy supported Rosalina and Rhuby.

Rosalina maltreated Rhuby so Randy reported the matter to the police station but the authorities
explained that they cannot assist him in domestic issues.

RTC dismissed the petition explaining that protection and custody orders in RA No. 9262 cannot be
issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child.
Aggrieved, Randy directly filed a Petition for Certiorari12 before the Court ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the application for protection and custody orders.

WHETHER OR NOT a party should respect a hierarchy of courts when availing a remedy?

the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule and is subject to recognized exceptions, to
wit: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first
impression where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (e) where exigency in certain situations
necessitate urgency in the resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ; (g) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated
by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice,
or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.

the Court finds grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC that amounted to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perfo1m a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.37 As in Ocampo, the RTC should have examined the evidence on record and made a prima
facie determination as to the ideal person to whom the temporary custody of the child should be
awarded. The best interest of the child should be the primordial and paramount concern

, Ramirez was issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4884 pursuant to Free Patent

Felomino filed a letter-protest with the Bureau of Lands of Los Baños, Laguna against the approval of the
application and issuance of the free patent to Ramirez. Felomino claimed that the patent application was
allegedly transferred to Ramirez by one Delfin Torinos (Torinos). Both Ramirez and Torinos were never in
possession of the subject land

The DENR pointed out that, upon ocular inspection, it was found that the members of the Elomina family
were in possession of the property,

Felomino prayed that he be declared the lawful owner of the subject property.

the trial court dismissed Felomino's complaint for lack of merit.

the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court.

Ramirez received a copy of the foregoing Decision on October 17, 2011.30 After 17 days from receipt
thereof, or on November 3, 2011, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration.31
ISSUE:

The instant Petition raised the lone assignment of error of whether or not the appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Ramirez's Motion for
Reconsideration for having been filed belatedly and thereafter issuing an order for the issuance of an
entry of judgment to the alleged undue prejudice of petitioner.37

[She] entrusted the filing thereof to her son [Herdy Ramirez] who stayed at Antipolo City while she lived
in Marikina City.

And because of [Leticia Ramirez's] old age and forgetfulness, the said decision was handed over by her to
Herdy only on October 27, 2011 or five days prior to its expiration to file a Motion for Reconsideration.

xxxx

Herdy had to look for a lawyer during those times that can render services to them .... in submitting the
Motion for Reconsideration before the deadline - November 2, 2011[,] in lieu of November 1, 2011
because the latter date is an official holiday.

xxxx

Nonetheless, the said Motion for Reconsideration was finished exactly on the deadline period
(November 2, 2012).

despite the copies of the said Motion for Reconsideration being timely sent by registered mail on
November 2, 2011 by Herdy himself at the Marikina Post Office to the addresses and parties in said case,
Herdy who travelled immediately to the Court of Appeals to personally file the said Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) arrived therein before the closing hours that afternoon but was not immediately
accommodated because he was required by the Court of Appeals personnel to photocopy certain
requirements for the filing of the subject Motion.

But after finishing all the photocopies of the required documents at the Court of Appeals during that
afternoon, the office where the motion is to be filed had already closed business transactions for that
day, nonetheless, a court personnel advised Herdy to file the said Motion on the next day (November 3,
2011).

xxxx

Believing in good faith that the Motion for Reconsideration can still be filed on the next day (November
3, 2012), Herdy immediately filed the said Motion on November 3, 2012.43

This Court finds no compelling reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Settled is the rule that
"[a]nyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal has the
burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such
deviation".45 However, this Court finds that Ramirez failed to discharge the same, thus warranting the
appellate court's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration.
 petitioner Adelaida Yatco (petitioner) filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against four (4) officials of
Biñan, Laguna, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause and lack of
substantial evidence.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Joint Order5 dated April 10, 2018
(Joint Order). She then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA,
assailing the entirety of the Ombudsman's ruling.

the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari "as regards the criminal aspect of the case." an aggrieved
party has "alternative remedies" in case of a consolidated decision by the Ombudsman resolving
administrative and criminal complaints.

whether or not the CA correctly dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari as regards the criminal
aspect of cases coming from the Ombudsman.

With respect to administrative charges, there is a delineation between appealable and unappealable
Ombudsman rulings. Pursuant to Section 2713 of the Ombudsman Act, any order, directive or decision of
the Ombudsman "imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, [or] suspension of not more
than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable." Case law has explained that Ombudsman
rulings which exonerate the respondent from administrative liability are, by implication, also considered
final and unappealable.14 In these instances, the Court has ruled that even though such rulings are final
and unappealable, it is still subject to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, and the
correct procedure is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.15

Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc. (GMCLI) engaged the services of Ross Systems International, Inc.
(RSII) for the construction of its hospital in Laguna

, RSII submitted to GMCLI its Progress Billing No. 15, which indicated that it had already accomplished
79.31% of the project, equivalent to ₱9,228,286.77

GMCLI only paid a total of ₱3,101,491.00, with computation as cited by the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC)

RSII sent two (2) demand letters to GMCLI, claiming that it still had a balance of ₱4,884,778.92 to collect
from the latter

After both parties submitted their respective affidavits and pieces of documentary evidence, and
presented their respective witnesses, CIAC promulgated its decision in favor of GMCLI.

Aggrieved, RSII filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals
(CA) and assailed the CIAC arbitral award on CIAC’s ruling
Was the appeal before the CA under Rule 43 proper? RULE 45

RULING NO. The Court held that the direct recourse of an appeal of a CIAC award on questions of law
directly to this Court is the rule, pursuant to Executive No. 1008 (E.O. No. 1008) otherwise known as the
Construction Industry Arbitration Law and Republic Act No. 9285 (R.A. No. 9285) otherwise known as
Alternative Dispute Resolution of 2004, notwithstanding Rule 43 of the Rules of Court on the CA's
jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies, and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in its exclusive application to
lower courts. Thus, an appeal from an arbitral award of the CIAC may take either of two tracks, as
determined by the subject matter of the challenge.

Rule 37

In 1996, Gotesco Properties, Inc. (Gotesco), as borrower, and International Exchange Bank (IBank), as
lender, executed a Credit Agreement. As security, Gotesco executed a real estate mortgage over a
20,673-square-meter property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-70389. When Gotesco was
unable to pay, IBank foreclosed the real estate mortgage and eventually bought the property.

Gotesco filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages with the Batangas Regional
Trial Court, alleging that IBank failed to comply with the posting and publication requirements of Act No.
3135. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 554

Issues:

First, whether or not Judge Ernesto L. Marajas committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he issued his August 18, 2011 Resolution granting the motion for
reconsideration of respondent International Exchange Bank, now Union Bank of the Philippines, and
setting aside the June 16, 2010 Order of Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor; andSecond, whether or not
respondent Union Bank of the Philippines has the right to cause the immediate execution of the
December 14, 2001 Judgment on the Compromise Agreement upon petitioner Gotesco Properties, Inc.'s
failure to pay its quarterly amor... tizations.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals held that the Regional Trial Court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting IBank's Motion for Reconsideration and granting
the Motion for Execution.[18] It found that the Compromise Agreement stated that Gotesco must pay
back its loan to IBank in quarterly amortizations of P8,812,214.29.[19] Should Gotesco fail to pay any
sum due to IBank within 60 days from due date, IBank was entitled to declare Gotesco's entire obligation
due and demandable and move for the immediate execution of the judgment
### Facts:
The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) solicited the Supreme Court’s review of a Court of
Appeals (CA) decision that reversed the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) finding of probable cause to
charge Manu Gidwani with estafa through falsification and for money laundering related to dejected
claims involving multiple closed rural banks within the Legacy Group of Companies. The CA’s reversal
followed the DOJ’s initial dismissal of the complaint and subsequent reinstatement of charges by then
Secretary of Justice, which had determined probable cause existed for filing criminal charges against
Gidwani and others. The case unwound through several steps, from PDIC’s initial claims processing of
purported individual account holders to their discovery of the funds being funneled into Gidwani’s
account, leading to their investigation and subsequent filing of criminal complaints. The procedural
journey saw multiple reversals at the DOJ level before moving to the CA, culminating in PDIC’s appeal to
the Supreme Court.

### Issues:
1. Whether the CA acted correctly in taking cognizance of Gidwani’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure despite his failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the DOJ.
2. Whether the CA erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reversing an earlier DOJ resolution, which dismissed the complaint against Gidwani for lack of probable
cause.
3. The determination of probable cause for the charges of estafa through falsification and for money
laundering.

### Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court granted PDIC’s petition, reversing the CA’s decision. It reinstated the DOJ’s resolution
that found probable cause to charge Gidwani for estafa through falsification and money laundering. The
Court clarified that the CA erred in holding that the Secretary of Justice could not reconsider an earlier
resolution in light of the same set of evidence. It further explained that a motion for reconsideration
does not necessitate new evidence but is an opportunity to reevaluate the findings based on existing
records. The Court underscored the preliminry nature of probable cause determination and pointed out
the suspicious behavior surrounding the consolidation of supposedly individual depositor’s checks into
Gidwani’s account, suggesting a likelihood of Gidwani’s involvement in the alleged offenses.
According to petitioners Prescilla, et al., they have been in possession in concepto de dueno of the
subject property since 1940, planting and cultivating crops thereon. However, it was alleged that the
respondents Lasquite and Andrade were able to fraudulently obtain original certificate of titles covering
the subject properties.

In the course of the trial, Victory Hills, Inc. (Victory Hills) intervened, claiming to be the owner of the
subject property.

Petitioners Prescilla, et al., the Manahans and Victory Hills interposed their respective appeals before the
CA, Eighth Division.

the CA, Eighth Division annulled and set aside the RTC's Decision and declared Victory Hills the owner of
the subject property.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioners Prescilla, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration

the RTC granted respondents Lasquite and Andrade's Motion and issued a Writ of Execution in the
latter's favor.

whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution against petitioners
Prescilla, et al.

YES,

Section 4, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal: the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration filed on time and by the proper party shall stay the execution of the judgment or final
resolution sought to be reconsidered.

Therefore, as to petitioners Prescilla, et al., whose Motion for Reconsideration is still pending before the
CA, Eighth Division, it must be stressed that the controversy has not been resolved with finality.

Consequently, as far as petitioners Prescilla, et. al. are concerned, there is no judgment that is already
ripe for execution.

The Spouses Solis were the owners of a five-hectare untitled fishpond situated in Romblon.

After the death of the Spouses Solis, Salvador, one of their children and heirs, discovered from the
Provincial Assessor that the TD over the subject fishpond was changed allegedly to correct a
"typographical error" that resulted in the change of the owner's name from Ramon M. Solis, Sr. to
Ramon M. Solis, Jr.

When Ramon, Jr. died, the fishpond was included in his estate, which was settled by his heirs by virtue of
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate.

Alleging fraud and unlawful intent on the part of Marivic — petitioners, filed the complaint before the
RTC.14
It was also averred in the complaint that Marivic and her husband are now American citizens, but she
may be served with summons at her address in Poblacion, San Agustin, Romblon

The summons failed to deliver. Consequently, Salvador moved that Marivic be served with summons by
publication,

Salvador, however, failed to send a copy of the summons to Marivic's United States of America,
Expectedly, Marivic failed to file her answer

Marivic filed a Motion for New Trial30 on the ground of fraud and for violation of her constitutional right
to due process.

the RTC denied Marivic's motion. The CA held that there was no valid service of summons on Marivic.

WHETHER OR NOT MARIVIC CAN AVAIL A MOTION FOR TRIAL ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD?

YES

it has been held that fraud as a ground for new trial refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful
party by the opponent preventing the former from fully exhibiting his/her case by keeping him/her away
from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat.90

Evidently, Marivic did not know of the case against her because Salvador indicated an incorrect address
in the complaint, which address he also utilized in the defective extraterritorial service of summons.

G.R. No. 238203. September 03, 2020 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 1 ### Title: Ligaya Ang
vs. Court of Appeals and Warren T. Gutierrez ### Facts: In 2016,

Warren Gutierrez filed an action for unlawful detainer against Ligaya Ang and her spouse before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), alleging ownership of a lot sold to the Angs, who failed to complete
payment, prompting Gutierrez to seek their eviction. The Angs contested jurisdiction and invoked RA No.
6552 (Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act), claiming the contract’s invalid cancellation. The MeTC
favored Gutierrez, a decision affirmed by the RTC upon appeal. Ligaya Ang moved to elevate the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA) but faced dismissal for non-payment of appellate docket fees. Ligaya’s attempt
to assert payment and seek reconsideration was rejected by the CA, citing an absence of proof of such
payment and discrepancies in Ligaya’s claims. ### Procedural Posture: After the MeTC and RTC rulings,
Ligaya Ang’s petition for review to the CA was dismissed due to unpaid docket fees, despite her claim of
having enclosed the cash with her motion for extension. The CA’s refusal to consider her petition led
Ligaya to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, challenging the CA’s resolutions as grave abuse of
discretion

. ### Issues: 1. Whether the appellate docket fees were duly paid. 2. The appropriateness of the CA’s
dismissal of Ligaya’s motion for non-payment of docket fees. ###
Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed Ligaya Ang’s petition, reaffirming that the right to appeal
is not automatic and must comply with procedural requirements—specifically, the payment of docket
fees. The Court found Ligaya’s claims of having paid the fees unsubstantiated, noting procedural
discrepancies and a lack of compelling reason for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The decision
underscored the importance of strict adherence to procedural requirements for appellate review. ###

Doctrine: The full payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory and necessary for
G.R. No. 238203. September 03, 2020 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 2 the perfection of an
appeal. Non-payment is a ground for dismissal. However, the Directive for dismissal due to failure to pay
these fees gives courts discretionary, rather than automatic, authority to do so, considering justice and
fair play. ### Class Notes: 1. **Right to Appeal**: A statutory privilege subject to procedural compliance,
including the payment of docket fees. 2. **Rule 42, Rules of Court**: Governs the appellate procedure
to the CA, including docket fee payment requirements. 3. **Grounds for Dismissal**: Non-compliance
with procedural requirements, including docket fee payment, can result in dismissal of an appeal. 4.
**Procedural Compliance**: Critical for maintaining the orderly discharge of judicial business and
preventing undue delays in litigation. ### Historical Background: This case highlights the Philippine legal
system’s stringent adherence to procedural requirements in appellate practice. It accentuates the
balance courts must maintain between procedural discipline and the equitable administration of justice,
reflecting ongoing challenges in ensuring access to appellate review while discouraging frivolous or
noncompliant appeals.

the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) issued Sugar Order Nos. 1,4 1-A,5 and 3,6 Series of 2017-2018
which allocated Class "D" world market sugar to accredited Class "F" ethanol producers

Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc. (Central Azucarera) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief7 questioning the
legality of the SRA's Orders

the RTC declared null and void Sugar Order

the SRA elevated the case to the CA through an appeal16 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 160975. Central
Azucarera moved to dismiss the appeal and argued that the proper remedy is a direct recourse to the
Court.

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPEAL IS IMPROPER?

YES,

the CA correctly dismissed the SRA's appeal for being a wrong mode of review. The SRA should have filed
a petition for review on certiorari to this Court and not an appeal to the CA. Consequently, the RTC's
Order dated January 24, 2019 became final and executory. The improper appeal did not toll the
reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari.41 This means that the SRA has now lost its
remedy against the trial court's ruling.