Equalprotection Cases Consti2

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Inchong vs Hernandez

Facts:

Lao H. Ichong, representing himself and other foreign residents, corporations, and partnerships,
stood before the courts to challenge Republic Act No. 1180. His opponents in the case were
Jaime Hernandez, the Secretary of Finance, and Marcelino Sarmiento, the City Treasurer of
Manila. The case was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on May 31,
1957.

Republic Act No. 1180 sought to nationalize the retail trade business in the Philippines,
imposing restrictions on non-citizens and entities not wholly owned by Filipino citizens,
effectively barring them from engaging in retail trade. However, the Act made certain
concessions: foreign individuals already involved in retail trade were permitted to continue
their businesses until their death or voluntary retirement, while juridical entities were granted
a ten-year grace period to comply.

Ichong, the petitioner, contended that the Act was unconstitutional. He argued that it violated
the due process and equal protection clauses, had an improper title, and infringed upon
international treaties. Despite his objections, the lower courts upheld the Act, leading to his
appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Does Republic Act No. 1180 violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution?
2. Is the subject of Republic Act No. 1180 properly expressed in its title?
3. Does Republic Act No. 1180 violate international treaties and obligations?

Ruling:

1. The Act was upheld as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power, designed to
protect both the national economy and security. In making this decision, the distinction
drawn between Filipino citizens and foreign nationals was deemed reasonable,
reflecting the differing relationships these groups had with the state.

The law specifically aimed to address a real concern: the potential for foreign
dominance in the retail trade sector, which could pose a threat to the country's economic
independence and national security. Despite its restrictive nature, the law was not seen
as arbitrary or oppressive, as it was applied prospectively. Foreign retailers already
engaged in the business were allowed to continue operating, preserving a sense of
fairness while safeguarding the nation’s broader interests.

2. The title of the law, "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business," was found to be clear and
not misleading. Although the term "regulate" is broad, it was considered sufficient to
encompass the prohibition and nationalization elements of the law. The title did not
need to provide an exhaustive list of the law's contents; rather, it needed only to
reasonably inform both legislators and the public about the law's general nature and
scope.
In this case, there was no confusion about the law's intent. Legislators and the public
were well aware of its objectives, as evidenced by the widespread discussions and
campaigns that surrounded its approval. The title served its purpose in reflecting the
law’s essence, aligning with the public’s understanding of its implications.

3. The petitioner argued that international treaties, such as the United Nations Charter and
the Declaration of Human Rights, protected the rights and freedoms of foreign
nationals. However, the court found that these international agreements did not impose
binding legal obligations on the Philippines regarding the treatment of aliens.

Additionally, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China, which aimed to
ensure equality of treatment for Chinese nationals, did not prevent the Philippines from
enacting laws that applied to all foreign nationals, including the regulation of retail
trade. The court emphasized that treaties, while important, remain subject to
modification by later laws and cannot override the state's inherent police power to enact
measures aimed at safeguarding national security and public welfare.
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

Facts:

The case Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho revolves around a petition for certiorari to review
a decision made by Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
17, 1968, in Civil Case No. 72797. The petitioner in the case is Mayor Antonio J. Villegas,
while the respondents are Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho and Judge Francisco Arca.

The dispute centers on Ordinance No. 6537, which was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968, and signed into law by Mayor Villegas on March 27, 1968. The
ordinance made it illegal for non-Filipino citizens to be employed or engage in any business,
trade, or occupation in Manila without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor
and paying a permit fee of P50.00. Certain individuals, such as those employed in diplomatic
or consular missions, technical assistance programs, and religious orders, were exempted from
this requirement.

Violating the ordinance could result in imprisonment or fines. On May 4, 1968, Hiu Chiong
Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition challenging the ordinance. He
sought a writ of preliminary injunction and a declaration that the ordinance was null and void.
The court granted the writ and, on September 17, 1968, ruled the ordinance invalid.

Unhappy with the ruling, Mayor Villegas contested the decision, resulting in the current
petition for review.

Issue:

1. Did Ordinance No. 6537 violate the rule of uniformity in taxation?


2. Did Ordinance No. 6537 constitute an illegal delegation of legislative powers?
3. Did Ordinance No. 6537 violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution?

Ruling:

1. The ordinance was declared invalid. While the requirement to obtain an employment
permit was considered regulatory, the imposition of the P50.00 fee was deemed a
revenue measure disguised as regulation. The court ruled that there was no justification
for charging such a fee to all non-citizens without considering differences in their
employment status, thus violating the principle of equal protection. The uniform
application of the fee to all foreign workers, regardless of their circumstances, was
found to be excessive, arbitrary, and unreasonable. The ordinance was struck down for
failing to meet constitutional standards.
2. Ordinance No. 6537 is invalid due to its failure to provide any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in exercising discretion. The ordinance lacked a defined policy or
conditions for the grant or refusal of permits, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary
and unchecked power. This situation constitutes an improper delegation of authority,
rendering the ordinance void.
The court cited precedents where similar failures to set standards or policies in
legislative measures led to their invalidation. In Chinese Flour Importers Association
vs. Price Stabilization Board, the Supreme Court held that granting an agency
uncontrolled power without guiding principles was impermissible. Similarly, in
Primicias vs. Fugoso, it was established that discretion must be exercised within legal
limits. The lack of any guiding standards in Ordinance No. 6537 resulted in its being
struck down as unconstitutional.

3. Ordinance No. 6537 violates the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection. The requirement for individuals to obtain an employment permit from the
City Mayor of Manila, who has the discretion to grant or deny the permit, effectively
denies the right to engage in a means of livelihood.

While the state is not obligated to admit aliens, once admitted, they are entitled to the
protections of due process, which includes the right to livelihood. The ordinance's
arbitrary nature infringes upon these constitutional protections, as it unfairly affects
both aliens and citizens by denying them their right to work without due process. The
ordinance, therefore, is unconstitutional.
People vs Cayat

Facts:

Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, found himself at the center
of legal proceedings for violating Act No. 1639, specifically sections 2 and 3. Originally, the
justice of the peace court in Baguio sentenced him to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or to serve
subsidiary imprisonment if he failed to pay. The charges stemmed from an incident on January
25, 1937, in Baguio City, where Cayat, a member of a non-Christian tribe, was discovered in
possession of a bottle of A-1-1 gin, which Act No. 1639 prohibits as it was not among the
native wines or liquors traditionally made by his tribe.

In response to the charges, Cayat filed a demurrer, which was subsequently overruled. During
the trial, he admitted to the factual basis of the case but pleaded not guilty, relying on the
arguments presented in his demurrer. He chose to submit the case based on the pleadings. The
trial court ultimately found him guilty and imposed a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Following this, the case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals for further review.

Issues:

1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Ruling:

1. The Court ruled that the Act was not violative of the equal protection clause. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.

The Court ruled that the classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The
classification in the Act is based on the level of civilization and culture, not on birth or
parentage. The term "non-Christian tribes" refers to groups with lower levels of societal
development and tribal lifestyles, rather than religious beliefs. This classification is
reasonable as it addresses the specific conditions of these tribes.

The Court ruled that the prohibition is germane to the purposes of law. The law's
prohibition against non-Christian tribes buying, possessing, or consuming intoxicating
liquors (except native wines) is clearly aimed at maintaining peace and order within
these tribes. Historical evidence shows that the unrestricted use of such liquors has led
to lawlessness and crime, which has hindered the government's efforts to improve the
tribes' standards of living and civilization.
The Court ruled that the law is not restricted to the conditions present when it was
enacted but is meant to apply as long as those conditions persist. Contrary to the
appellant's claim, the Act does not assume that non-Christians are resistant to
civilization. Instead, the Legislature recognized that societal advancement is gradual
and must be accompanied by protective and security measures.

The Court ruled that the law applies equally to all members of the non-Christian tribes,
despite any potential unfairness to some due to their cultural development. Even if
educated non-Christians suffer incidental disadvantages, the law's application is
justified by the principle that public safety and morals take precedence. The Legislature
is entitled to enact measures that address public concerns, even if they cause some
inconvenience to individuals within the affected class, prioritizing national interests
over private ones.

Therefore, having met all the requirements, the Court ruled that the law was not
violative of the equal protection clause.

2. The Court ruled that, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always
necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. Thus, a person's property
may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or
property used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the property constitutes
corpus delicti, as in the instant case.

3. The Court ruled that the law is not an improper use of the state's police power. Measures
aimed at improving public health, order, education, and economic growth are
considered valid uses of police power, as long as they are not arbitrary or excessively
infringe on individual rights.

Act No. 1639 is designed to foster peace and order among non-Christian tribes,
removing barriers to their moral and intellectual development. Its ultimate goal is to
facilitate their integration and unity with the rest of the population, contributing to a
more unified and prosperous Philippines.
Dumlao vs COMELEC

The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of disqualifying retired officials over 65 from
running for the same local office, but declares the provision considering the filing of charges
as prima facie evidence of guilt null and void due to violation of the presumption of innocence
and the right to due process.

For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case: (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.

1. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No
petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
2. The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in
their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be
denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the
State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one
of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the
statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance.
They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate
interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.

The Court noted that the provisions challenged by the petitioners—sections 7 of BP


Blg. 51 and sections 4, 1, and 6 of BP Blg. 52—do not directly pertain to the
disbursement of public funds. While these provisions relate to elections that involve
public spending, the petitioners did not claim that their tax money was being misused
or spent in violation of constitutional protections. They also did not allege any improper
application of funds by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) or seek to prevent
the waste of public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.

The Court pointed out that a taxpayer's suit does not automatically guarantee judicial
review. It has discretion over whether to entertain such suits, as established in previous
rulings

3. Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present
is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and
Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would
require that this suit be dismissed.

Facts:

Petitioners Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot, and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. took legal action by
filing a Petition for Prohibition with a request for a Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Order against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They aimed to stop COMELEC
from enforcing specific provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53, which, among
others, considers the filing of charges for acts of disloyalty as prima facie evidence of guilt and
is therefore unconstitutional.

Patricio Dumlao, a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, had submitted his certificate of
candidacy for the same position in the upcoming January 30, 1980 elections. Alongside him,
Romeo B. Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., both taxpayers and qualified voters, joined the
petition.

Dumlao specifically challenged Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which disqualifies
retired elective local officials over 65 from running for the same office, arguing that it was
discriminatory and violated the equal protection and due process guarantees enshrined in the
Constitution. Meanwhile, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. questioned additional provisions, including
those concerning the term of office for local elective officials and the disqualification of
candidates based on acts of disloyalty to the State.

The petitioners contended that these provisions were unconstitutional and sought their
nullification.

Issue:

1. Is Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 unconstitutional for being discriminatory and


violating the equal protection clause?
2. Is the provision in Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 unconstitutional for violating the
presumption of innocence and the right to due process?

Ruling:

1. The Court examined the classification outlined in Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
and concluded that it was based on reasonable and substantive distinctions. The purpose
of the law was to encourage the inclusion of younger individuals in local government
roles, which the Court recognized as a legitimate state interest.

The classification was deemed neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. It applied uniformly
to all retired elective local officials over the age of 65 who had received retirement
benefits. The Court underscored that the equal protection clause does not prohibit all
forms of legal classification, but only those that are arbitrary and unreasonable.

2. The Court addressed a provision that deemed the filing of charges as prima facie
evidence of guilt. It ruled that this provision contravened the constitutional principle of
presumption of innocence, which guarantees that an accused individual is presumed
innocent until proven guilty. By declaring a candidate guilty before a full hearing could
take place, the provision violated fundamental due process principles. The Court
emphasizes that a judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable to be
considered conclusive evidence of disqualification.

The Court further highlighted that the timing of the elections might hinder a candidate’s
ability to present evidence to counter the prima facie case against them. As a result, this
provision was deemed null and void.
PASEI vs Drilon

5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of


similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are
exempted from the suspension.

5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and


Government;

5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government
officials; and

5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited
international organizations.

5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic]
bilateral labor agreements or understanding.

xxx xxx xxx

7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--


Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with
the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an
existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve
a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines.

xxx xxx xxx

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon


recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the


welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 24

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may
be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code,
in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned,
the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers
in the enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right
granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's
power of regulation.

The Constitution declares that:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. 30

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the
loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all
other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has
never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.

FACTS:

The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), which recruits Filipino workers
for overseas jobs, challenged the constitutionality of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988,
issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. The Order, titled "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," was contested on grounds of discrimination,
as it allegedly targeted only domestic helpers and females with specific skills, and infringed on
the right to travel. PASEI also argued that the Order was an invalid exercise of legislative
power, which should be reserved for the legislature rather than the executive.

Additionally, PASEI claimed that the Order was enacted without proper worker consultation,
violating the Constitution's provisions for worker participation in policy-making. They also
argued that the Order violated the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and could cause
significant harm to PASEI members.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, representing the Secretary of Labor and the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, responded that the deployment ban had been lifted in
several countries. The Solicitor General defended the Order as a legitimate exercise of police
power. The central issue before the Court was whether the Department Order was
constitutionally valid.

ISSUE:

Whether the Department Order is unconstitutional for, among others, being violative of the
equal protection clause.
Ruling:

Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution - The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.

1. The Court highlighted that "equality before the law" does not require identical rights
for everyone but allows for reasonable classifications. For a classification to be valid,
it must: (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be relevant to the law's purpose, (3) not
be limited to existing conditions, and (4) apply equally to all members of the class.
Department Order No. 1, which prioritizes female workers, meets these criteria. The
Court noted that the Order does not impose a total ban on overseas deployment but
rather regulates it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

The Court found that the classification favoring female workers in Department Order
No. 1 was based on substantial distinctions. The Court recognized the severe
exploitation and abuse faced by female domestic workers abroad, supported by
numerous testimonies of mistreatment. This situation provided a compelling reason for
the government to act specifically to protect these women.

In contrast, there was no similar evidence of widespread problems faced by male


workers abroad. The petitioner did not present any argument or evidence suggesting
that male workers experienced comparable issues that would warrant similar protective
measures. The Court clarified that the decision was based on evidence of widespread
abuse among female workers, not on arbitrary distinctions. Therefore, the Court upheld
the classification as justified and based on concrete evidence.

The Court agreed that the classification in Department Order No. 1 is relevant to its
purpose. The measure aims to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas
workers," and given the severe mistreatment of Filipina workers abroad, the
deployment ban is seen as beneficial for their welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself
("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the
host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means
impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.

The Court found that the guidelines in Department Order No. 1, which apply to all
female domestic overseas workers, are constitutional. The fact that the ban does not
cover "all Filipina workers" is not grounds for unconstitutionality. A universal ban
might be unreasonable and arbitrary, but applying it only to those who need protection,
rather than singling out specific individuals or groups unfairly, aligns with the equal
protection clause. The Court emphasized that the measure aims to protect female
workers who are vulnerable to mistreatment, and it does not constitute discriminatory
legislation against them.
The Court also addressed concerns about the Order’s impact on the right to travel, ruling that
this right is not absolute and can be subject to reasonable limitations for public safety.
Department Order No. 1 is a legitimate implementation of the Labor Code’s goal to protect
labor and falls within the Department of Labor’s rule-making authority.

Finally, the Court found no merit in the claim that Department Order No. 1 represents an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It acknowledged that while police power is primarily a legislative
domain, it can be lawfully delegated.
Himagan vs People

A policeman accused of murder and attempted murder challenges his suspension during the
trial, claiming it violates his constitutional right to equal protection of laws, but the court
upholds the suspension, stating it is necessary to protect witnesses and prevent intimidation.

Relying on Layno and Deloso

Petitioner's reliance on the cases of Layno and Deloso is misplaced because those cases
involved the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019), which is silent on the duration
of preventive suspension. Section 13 of R.A. 3019 provides for suspension during the pendency
of criminal charges but does not specify its length.

In Layno's case, the mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, faced indefinite preventive suspension
under R.A. 3019. The Supreme Court found this indefinite suspension violated both the equal
protection clause and due process rights. The Court emphasized that prolonged preventive
suspension without a final conviction could unjustly deprive an elected official of their office
and the public of their services, resulting in undue harm and oppression.

The Court also noted that administrative cases under the Local Government Code limit
preventive suspension to 60 days. It argued that applying indefinite suspension for officials
under R.A. 3019 would contradict constitutional protections and equal protection guarantees,
essentially allowing suspension to act as a de facto penalty without due process. Thus, the
principle of not allowing indefinite suspension is upheld to avoid such constitutional violations.

In the case of Deloso, an elective official was preventively suspended under R.A. 3019, similar
to Layno’s case. The Court applied the same principles regarding due process and equal
protection. R.A. 3019 did not specify the duration of preventive suspension, leading to due
process concerns over prolonged suspensions.

In contrast, in this case, the petitioner faces charges under the Revised Penal Code, and Section
47 of R.A. 6975 mandates suspension until the case is resolved. This section specifies that the
trial must be completed within 90 days from arraignment, but it does not limit the suspension
period to 90 days. The law clearly states that suspension lasts until the case concludes, and this
should be interpreted as written.

Discussion in the legislative intent

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a
member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six
years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can
be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws.

Facts:

Ishmael Himagan, a policeman assigned to the medical company of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in Davao City, was charged with the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the
attempted murder of Barnabe Machitar. On September 16, 1992, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) issued an order suspending Himagan until the case was resolved, based on Section 47
of R.A. 6975, which mandates suspension for PNP members facing grave felony charges.

Himagan filed a motion on October 11, 1993, seeking to lift the suspension, arguing that it
should be limited to ninety days under Section 42 of P.D. 807 (Civil Service Decree), citing
prior Supreme Court rulings. The court denied his motion on December 14, 1993, affirming
that Section 47 of R.A. 6975 required suspension until the case's termination. Himagan's
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus to challenge the court's orders and seek the lifting of his suspension.

Issue:

1. Does Section 47 of R.A. 6975 limit the period of preventive suspension to ninety days?
2. Does the imposition of preventive suspension for over ninety days violate the
petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection of laws?

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court found the petition lacking merit. Section 47 of R.A. 6975 explicitly
states that a PNP member charged with a grave offense—one punishable by six years
and one day or more—must remain suspended until the case concludes. The law also
stipulates that the trial should be completed within ninety days from the arraignment,
but this provision does not limit or affect the duration of the suspension. The two
clauses are independent: one addresses the suspension period, while the other concerns
the trial length.

The Court noted that there is no provision in R.A. 6975 that suggests preventive
suspension should end if the trial exceeds ninety days. Additionally, Section 42 of P.D.
807 pertains to administrative investigations, not criminal cases.

3. The Court distinguished this case from the Layno and Deloso cases, which involved
preventive suspensions under R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Unlike R.A. 6975, R.A. 3019 does not specify the duration of preventive suspension,
which led to issues of due process in those cases. The legislative intent behind Section
47 of R.A. 6975 is to ensure that PNP members charged with serious crimes remain
suspended to prevent them from using their positions to influence witnesses. The
classification in Section 47 was deemed to be based on substantial and relevant
differences, aligned with the purpose of the law, and compliant with the equal
protection clause.
Quinto vs Comelec.

A petition challenging the constitutionality of provisions requiring public appointive officials


to resign in order to run for an elective position is denied by the Supreme Court, which rules
that the provisions do not violate the equal protection clause and serve a compelling state
interest in preventing conflict of interest and maintaining the integrity of the electoral process.

History

The provision in question, Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, is rooted in the
history of Philippine election laws. It stems from the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9369, which establishes that any person holding a public appointive office,
including military personnel and employees of government-controlled corporations, is
considered resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy.

This idea of automatic resignation can be traced back to the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), the 1978 Election Code, and even earlier laws such as the Election Code of 1971 and the
Revised Election Code of 1947. These provisions consistently emphasized that public officials
who file for candidacy automatically lose their positions, reflecting a longstanding practice
from the American colonial period in 1907.

The consistency of this rule across decades shows a long-standing policy in Philippine election
law regarding public office and candidacy.

Elective vs Appointed

Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No.
8436 contained a similar provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing
of their CoCs for any office other than that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for
President or Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair
Election Act,19 in 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 1420 of the said act. There was,
thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were
deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective
officials were not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupies their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. - Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part
in any election except to vote.- Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political
and electoral activities.

Expression and Association

The Court, after addressing procedural issues, moves on to the constitutional challenge, noting
that the right to run for public office is deeply connected to two fundamental freedoms:
expression and association.

This idea is explored through the U.S. case Mancuso v. Taft, which emphasizes that running
for public office is a powerful form of expression. Like other methods of advocacy, it allows
individuals to amplify their messages and participate in public debate. As Mancuso suggests,
a person's commitment to their beliefs can evolve from simple protest to actively seeking office
to enact change, underscoring that candidacy is not just political, but a form of "the most
important expression an individual can summon."

Additionally, the right to run for office also affects the freedom of association. This was
highlighted in Williams v. Rhodes, where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that restrictions on
ballot access for third parties violated associational rights. The act of running for office allows
political groups and supporters to promote shared values, making candidacy a crucial
mechanism for political participation. Without this opportunity, the effectiveness of associating
in a political party or group is diminished.

In summary, the Court acknowledges that candidacy is both a form of expression and a key
part of political association, which means that any law that significantly burdens this right must
undergo strict judicial scrutiny.

Not germane to the purpose of the law

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment
of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane
to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline
of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public.34 The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would
be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

Overbreadth

The challenged provision is deemed overbroad for two primary reasons:

1. Scope of Civil Servants Affected: It applies to all civil servants, from high-ranking
officials to low-level employees, like utility workers. This indiscriminate rule is seen
as unreasonable, especially for positions that do not carry enough influence to warrant
such restrictions.
2. Application to All Public Offices: The provision covers candidacies for any public
office, whether national or local, partisan or non-partisan. Congress has not
demonstrated a compelling state interest justifying such a broad restriction.

The Court refers to the case Mancuso v. Taft, which suggests a less restrictive alternative, like
allowing leaves of absence for civil servants running for office. It also highlights that laws
addressing conflicts of interest should be targeted and specific, rather than sweeping, as the
challenged provision unnecessarily burdens civil servants’ First Amendment rights and voting
rights.

The decision contrasts the challenged law with a more tailored U.S. rule upheld in Clements v.
Fashing, where automatic resignation applied only to specific types of officials under a
narrower classification.

In conclusion, the Court finds the provision overreaching and unconstitutional, urging for a
balance that upholds democratic freedoms without overly restricting civil servants’ rights to
candidacy.

Facts:

The case addresses the petition challenging Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,
which automatically considers appointive government officials resigned upon filing their
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC). The petitioners, who hold appointive positions and plan to
run in the upcoming elections, sought to have this provision declared void, fearing it would
force them to resign immediately upon filing.

The Court notes that laws, including constitutions, are often compromises that may become
outdated over time. It emphasizes the need to scrutinize such statutes in light of contemporary
relevance, particularly in this case concerning the implementation of an automated election
system and related electoral rules.

The COMELEC, under its authority, issued guidelines for the filing of CoCs, including the
contentious provision, which triggered the petition for prohibition and certiorari.

Issue:

1. Do the provisions requiring public appointive officials to resign upon filing their
certificates of candidacy violate the equal protection clause?
2. Are these provisions overly broad in their application?

Ruling:

1. In determining whether a discriminatory government act passes the constitutional test


of equal protection, the Court outlined four essential requisites for valid classification:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions, (2) it must be relevant to the law’s
purpose, (3) it must not be limited to current conditions, and (4) it must apply equally
to all members of the class.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court found that the classification
distinguishing appointive officials from elective officials is not germane to the law's
purpose. The Court recognized that the provision aims to prevent the misuse of
government positions for campaign purposes and to maintain efficiency and integrity
in public service. However, both appointive and elective officials could influence
elections or neglect duties due to their candidacies. As a result, the classification failed
to satisfy the requirement that it be relevant to the law’s objectives. Therefore, the
differential treatment between appointive and elective officials was deemed
unconstitutional.

2. The Court found that the challenged provision was overly broad and unconstitutional.
The provision applied to all appointive civil servants, regardless of their position, from
high-ranking officials to lower-level employees like utility workers, without distinction
as to their influence or ability to affect elections. This broad application was deemed
unreasonable, as it included individuals whose roles did not involve political power or
influence, and thus it was unnecessary to consider them resigned upon filing their
Certificates of Candidacy (CoCs).

The Court emphasized that while laws should prevent public officials from misusing
their positions for political advantage, such measures must be narrowly tailored to target
specific problems. Broad restrictions like those in the provision unnecessarily restricted
fundamental rights, such as the right to seek public office. The provision also failed to
consider less restrictive alternatives, such as implementing a leave of absence policy
for candidates.
Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commission

MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1
for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and
to appropriate funds therefor.7

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010
elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people,
convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good
senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body
to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent
provisions of said executive order read:

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation
and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is
their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues
to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions
and question Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.19

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In
private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-
in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could
be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out
a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or
"taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions.
The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff
is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of
the public concern.

Prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference - "direct injury" test ---The same
Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result
of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members
of the public. (VERA DOCTRINE)

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct
injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.

The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to
know the status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing
authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission
considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer,"
"consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."

This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the
Constitution.39

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding
investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and
employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions
of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices.
For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the
reported large-scale graft and corruption in the government.45

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit
of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section
31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31
is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure"– an
"alteration of an existing structure."

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control
is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches
of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws
on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief
Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that
he is bereft of such authority.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard.
They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent
of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in
partisan hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover
reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President
Arroyo.67

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption
must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but
also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of controversies and
anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the
classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions
because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office
for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of
Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the
petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent
to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force."70

Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as
the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to
cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said administration.71 Assuming
arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous
administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection
clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration
as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and
is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo
administration from past administrations, it recited the following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is,
therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale
graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate
cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore
the people’s faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted
by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely
bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in
the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery
of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption
laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede
the current administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to


provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due
diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive
Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President
Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President
Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens’
committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial
projects" of his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.79 Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are:

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other
past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the
investigation to the "previous administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the
Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier
administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are
not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports
involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously,
deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of
inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous
administrations, given the body’s limited time and resources. "The law does not require the
impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility
of investigating almost a century’s worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive
Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching
for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.

To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial distinctions" would only confirm
the petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is only an "adventure in partisan hostility."

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was
picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored
at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1
does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative
commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and
intentional discrimination."103.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the
scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in
other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such
expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President.
If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify
the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution
of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration."105

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Biraogo vs TPTC

Facts:

The Court is considering two consolidated cases that challenge the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, which created the Philippine Truth Commission
(PTC) of 2010.

The first case (G.R. No. 192935) is a petition filed by Louis Biraogo, who argues that the
executive order violates Congress's legislative power to create public offices and appropriate
funds, as provided by the Constitution. The second case (G.R. No. 193036) is a petition filed
by several legislators who also challenge the constitutionality of the executive order.

The PTC is an ad hoc body created by the Office of the President to investigate graft and
corruption allegations against officials from the previous administration. While described as
an "independent collegial body," it operates under the Office of the President. The PTC has
investigative powers under the Administrative Code but is not a quasi-judicial body, meaning
it cannot adjudicate disputes, impose penalties, or initiate legal actions based on its findings.
Its role is limited to gathering evidence and making recommendations. It has subpoena powers
but cannot hold people in contempt or order arrests. This particular order is being assailed for,
among others, “singling out” the previous administration.

Issues:

WON Executive Order No.1 is violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling:

The equal protection clause mandates that all state actions, including those by the legislative,
political, and executive branches, must ensure that no person is denied equal protection under
the law. While the law allows for valid classifications, such classifications must satisfy four
criteria: (1) they must rest on substantial distinctions, (2) they must be relevant to the law’s
purpose, (3) they must not be limited to existing conditions, and (4) they must apply equally to
all members of the same class.

In the case of Executive Order No. 1, which established the Philippine Truth Commission, the
Court finds that it violates the equal protection clause. The executive order specifically targets
the previous administration for investigation of graft and corruption, revealing a clear intent to
single it out. The selective application of this order fails to meet the standards for valid
classification. The Arroyo administration is merely a member of a broader class, namely, all
past administrations, and should not be treated as a distinct class. The exclusion of other
similarly situated administrations constitutes arbitrariness, which the equal protection clause
does not allow. The discriminating differentiation evident in the order signals a form of
vindictiveness and selective retribution, thereby rendering Executive Order No. 1
unconstitutional.
Ormoc Sugar Co Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City

The Supreme Court declares a municipal tax on the export sale of sugar unconstitutional,
ruling that the tax ordinance violated the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of
taxation.

Facts:

In the case of Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. vs. the Treasurer of Ormoc City, the Municipal
Board of Ormoc City, Hon. Esteban C. Conejos as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Ormoc City, the
conflict arose from a tax ordinance passed by Ormoc City. On January 29, 1964, the Municipal
Board enacted Ordinance No. 4, which imposed a municipal tax of 1% on the export sales of
centrifugal sugar produced by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.

The sugar company complied with the ordinance but did so under protest, paying a total of
P12,087.50 in taxes on March 20, 1964, and April 20, 1964. Shortly after, on June 1, 1964, the
company filed a complaint challenging the ordinance's constitutionality. They argued that it
violated the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity in taxation. Furthermore, Ormoc
Sugar Company claimed that the tax amounted to an illegal export tax, prohibited by Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code, and was not authorized by Ormoc City's charter or
by Republic Act No. 2264.

The defendants, representing the city, countered that the tax was within the city's power under
the Local Autonomy Act and that no constitutional violations had occurred. The Court of First
Instance ruled in favor of Ormoc City, upholding the ordinance's constitutionality. Dissatisfied
with this ruling, Ormoc Sugar Company appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Does the tax ordinance violate the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity
of taxation?

Ruling:

For a classification to be valid, it must (1) be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not apply to existing conditions only; (4)
the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

The Supreme Court ruled that the tax ordinance enacted by Ormoc City did not satisfy the
requirements for reasonable classification under the equal protection clause. The ordinance
imposed a tax solely on the centrifugal sugar produced and exported by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., without taking into account other sugar producers or potential future sugar
mills. This exclusive and singular classification was considered unreasonable and
discriminatory.

While the taxes collected were not deemed arbitrary, and the ordinance was initially presumed
constitutional, the Court ultimately found it violated both the equal protection clause and the
rule of uniformity of taxation. As a result, the ordinance was declared unconstitutional.

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