Journal: Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal

Volume: DBSJ 22:1 (NA 2017)

Article: A Good God In A Wicked World: Considering The Problem Of Evil
Author: Jonathan Moreno

DBSJ 22 (2017) p. 75

A Good God In A Wicked World:

Considering The Problem Of Evil
Jonathan Moreno1

Introduction
Elie Wiesel trusted in God. As a boy, he believed that Yahweh cared deeply for him and his people. All that changed in the grueling death
camps of Nazi Germany. Elie was a Jew. Subjected to the horrific atrocities of Auschwitz, his faith was shattered as his God seemed to sit idly
by while countless victims suffered through the darkest evils imaginable at the hands of wicked men. In the preface to his memoir Wiesel
writes:
In the beginning there was faith—which is childish; trust—which is vain; and illusion—which is dangerous. We believed in God,
trusted in man, and lived with the illusion that every one of us has been entrusted with a sacred spark from the Shekhinah’s
flame; that every one of us carries in his eyes and in his soul a reflection of God’s image. That was the source if not the cause of
all our ordeals.2
How could a good God exist in a world filled with such mindless cruelty? In the face of crippling evil, many have concluded with Wiesel that
God is dead. If there truly was a good and powerful God, he would never permit such suffering and pain. Therefore, since evil exists, God
does not.
The problem of evil is not a new one. In fact, it has been the cause of countless articles, lectures, and debates for centuries. Due to the
prevalence and influence of evil, this is a problem that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to address the problem of
evil from a Christian worldview. The first section will endeavor to delineate the problem, and the second section will seek to present a viable
solution, viz., that God is good in decreeing evil because it results in his greatest glory and subsequently, his children’s greatest good.

The Problem
The intention of this section is to bring the ambiguous problem of evil into full view by establishing the problem’s nature, complexity, and
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validity. A complete picture of the problem will lay the foundation for the discussion and set the course for an adequate response.

The Nature Of The Problem

Before any plausible solution to the problem of evil is identified, it is imperative that the nature of the problem be clearly defined and
delineated. Historically, critics have presented the problem of evil using both deductive and inductive reasoning.

The Deductive Problem

In his book, The Miracle of Theism, J. L. Mackie contends that the existence of the God described in the Scriptures is not merely implausible,
but is logically impossible.3 Through deductive reasoning, he seeks to provide conclusive evidence that traditional theism is logically
contradictory. His deductive problem can be summarized with the four following propositions:

God exists.
God is omnipotent.
God is omnibenevolent.
Evil exists.

Conceding that none of the statements above explicitly contradict each other, Mackie inserts two corollary premises into the equation in order
to bolster his position:
If we add the at least initially plausible premisses [ sic] that good is opposed to evil in such a way that a being who is wholly good
eliminates evil as far as he can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do, then we do have a contradiction.
A wholly good omnipotent being would eliminate evil completely; if there really are evils, then there cannot be any such being.4
With his new insertions, the modified propositions looks like this:

God exists.
God is omnipotent (i.e., there is no limit to what God can do).
God is omnibenevolent (i.e., God eliminates evil as far as he can).
Evil exists.

It is at this point that a clear contradiction comes to the fore. If God has the desire and ability to eliminate evil entirely, then it follows that God
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and evil cannot coexist. Therefore, through the undeniable presence of evil, Mackie believes that he has successfully exposed the internal
contradiction within the worldview of the traditional theist. In a universe like ours, God cannot exist.

Although the deductive problem of evil seems compelling, it contains a fatal flaw, viz., the validity of Mackie’s “plausible premisses [ sic].”5 It is
undeniable that if all theists affirmed his premises, then the theist’s worldview would be irreconcilably contradictory. However, the assertions
that God’s omnipotence affords him the contra-causal freedom to do anything at all and that his omnibenevolence compels him to eliminate
every trace of evil are not positions held by responsible biblical scholars. As this paper will demonstrate, a biblical understanding of the
attributes ascribed to God creates no internal contradiction within the theist’s worldview. Therefore, the deductive case against God falls flat.6

The Inductive Problem

Recognizing the deficiencies of the deductive problem, many critics have utilized an inductive method for their case against the existence of
God in an evil world. This strategy adjusts the reality of God’s existence from impossible to improbable. Although this position cannot generate
a definitive contradiction within theism, it utilizes the evidence to assert that in a world like ours the God of the Bible is highly unlikely. This
position is considerably easier for the critic to sustain due to its softened agenda.
Where the deductive method focuses on the presence of evil generally, the inductive method considers the kinds of evil specifically. The
strength of the argument rests on the presence of gratuitous evil. It is argued that if a good God permits evil, then evil must be for a good
purpose. Thus, in the face of numerous examples of meaningless evils (e.g., molestation, rape, infanticide, genocide, etc.), a Christian God is
unlikely. William L. Rowe, a prominent atheist and philosopher, presents the inductive argument with the following syllogism:

There exist horrendous evils that an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being would have no justifying reason to permit.
An all-powerful, all knowing, perfectly good being would not permit an evil unless he had a justifying reason to permit it.
God does not exist.7

In light of this argument, Rowe concludes that “the facts about evil in our world provide good reason to think that God does not exist.” 8
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Responding to arguments like this, Tim Keller notes that the weakness of the inductive argument is the assertion that the evil that appears to
be pointless is pointless.9 Due to the finiteness of mankind, and the incomprehensibility of God and his ways ( Rom 11:33), this is a premise
that cannot be substantiated.10 Ironically, the accusation of actual gratuitous evil goes beyond verifiable fact and is thus founded on “a blind
faith of the highest order.” 11 As meaningless as particular evils may seem, it cannot be proven that the appearance represents the reality.
Although the inductive problem raises legitimate concerns, this method cannot be regarded as compelling proof against the existence of God.

The Complexity Of The Problem

Grappling with the problem of evil is a notoriously dubious endeavor due in part to the complexity of the problem. Therefore, if any viable
solutions are to be reached, the specific kind of evil must be recognized and defined, and the theological system in which that evil resides
must be identified.

Two Kinds Of Evil

The first step toward a profitable discussion of the problem of evil is to identify the kind of evil under consideration. The two categories of evil
in the universe are identified as moral and natural. The former is the sin that mankind commits (e.g., murder, rape, neglect, deceit, etc.). The
latter is the amoral events and circumstances that come about in nature that cause suffering or pain for God’s creatures (e.g., earthquakes,
hurricanes, drought, etc.). In Genesis 3:17-19, Moses presents natural evil as the result of moral evil. Due to Adam’s rebellion and
disobedience in the garden, all nature bears the weight of the curse (Rom 8:19-22). John Frame writes:
Scripture…gives us an explicit answer to the problem of natural evil. Natural evil is a curse brought on the world because of
moral evil. It functions as punishment to the wicked and as a means of discipline for those who are righteous by God’s grace. It
also reminds us of the cosmic dimensions of sin and redemption. Sin brought death to the human race, but also to the universe
over which man was to rule.”12
In light of the clear teachings in the Scriptures, the presence of natural
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evil presents no logical problem for the Christian. Therefore, this paper will focus primarily on the problem of moral evil.

Various Theological Systems

Another factor that contributes to the complexity of the problem is the variety of disparate theological systems present within theism. With
every system, the problem takes on a unique shape. As Feinberg observes, “The traditional formulation of the problem is too simplistic. There
is not just one problem of evil, but rather many different problems.”13
Each system has its own unique set of problems. Therefore, before a solution can be formulated, a theological system must first be
established. For the sake of this discussion, it will be helpful to define the meaning and implications of four of God’s attributes, viz., his
omniscience, omnisapience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.

God’s Omniscience
Omniscience ascribes to God an infinite and perfect knowledge of all things both actual and possible. 14 Moreover, he knows all events
because he sovereignly ordained them. Nothing happens outside of God’s knowledge, decree, and divine sanction. Not only does he see the
future, he designs it, working everything out “to the council of his will” ( Eph 1:11). Thus, it necessarily follows that nothing exists or operates
outside of God’s purview.15 Not only does God decree the good (Eph 2:10), he also decrees the bad ( Prov 16:4).
Many theists reject this understanding of God’s sovereign omniscience, concluding that it makes God responsible for evil and casts doubt on
his goodness and love.16 In an effort to resolve this tension and absolve God of any wrongdoing, some have sought to adjust the meaning of
omniscience, effectively emptying it of all its significance. A fitting example of this is reflected in the writings of Harold S. Kushner. In his
popular book, When Bad Things Happen to Good People, he concludes that “God wants the righteous to live peaceful, happy lives, but
sometimes even he cannot bring that about. It is difficult even for God to keep cruelty and chaos from claiming their innocent victims.” 17 In an
effort to maintain God’s goodness and love, Kushner compromises God’s knowledge and power. According to Kushner’s theological
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system, God is not responsible for evil because God is powerless to prevent it, restrain it, or end it. 18 Although this position resolves the
problem of evil, it does so at great and terrible cost. As Wayne Grudem effectively cautions:
If evil came into the world in spite of the fact that God did not intend it and did not want it to be there, then what guarantee do we
have that there will not be more and more evil that he does not intend and that he does not want? And what guarantee do we
have that he will be able to use it for his purposes, or even that he can triumph over it? Surely this is an undesirable alternative
position.19

To a lesser degree, the Arminian system is also guilty of stripping God of his knowledge and power by its position on human free will. 20 In this
system, God cedes his sovereign authority to his image-bearers by giving man the freedom to make his own decisions and choose his own
path. In his divine wisdom, God determined that creating free beings with the potential for evil was of greater value than creating a perfect
world filled with preprogrammed automatons. In this system, evil originates in the free choices of man and for that reason God is not
responsible for it.21 Although this explanation harmonizes the existence of God and evil, it does so at the expense of God’s sovereignty and
should therefore be abandoned.
Rather than creating trouble for the believer, a proper understanding of God’s sovereignty should bring profound confidence and peace. For
even in the face of the greatest of evils, the Christian can be assured that God remains in control. As powerful and dominant as evil may
appear, it can never step outside the bounds of God’s sovereign design. Perhaps the clearest display of this is witnessed in John’s prophecy
contained in the book of Revelation. Within this book, John describes some of the vilest evils imaginable wreaking havoc upon the earth. Yet
in spite of their commanding authority and extensive influence, John is clear that God reigns supreme. For every evil John describes is limited
by God in its scope (e.g., Rev 9:1-21) and in its duration (e.g., Rev 17:1-18:24).

God’s Omnisapience

God’s wisdom is directly tied to his knowledge. Possessing a full and perfect understanding of all facts both actual and possible, in infinite
wisdom God applies the greatest means in order to bring about the highest ends.22 The necessary implication of God’s wisdom is that our
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world, with all of its evils and imperfections, is the best of all possible worlds.23 This is a presupposition that is foundational to any discussion
of the problem of evil. As Van Til notes, “It goes without saying that this self-sufficient God, who controls all things and knows all things
because he controls them, can use the best means to attain his end. But what are the best means? They are those that God sees fit to use.” 24
Although it may not be apparent to finite man, it must be affirmed that this world is the best possible means of accomplishing the greatest
possible ends. The character and infinite wisdom of the Creator demand this conclusion.

God’s Omnipotence

As noted above, J. L. Mackie defines omnipotence as the limitless power of God. It is upon this definition that his deductive argument rests.
Yet is his definition biblically valid? Although there are several passages in Scripture that seem to suggest that God’s power is unlimited (e.g.,
Job 42:1-2; Matt 19:26), the Bible explicitly states that God cannot do everything.25 Instead, “God can do all things consistent with his nature
and purpose.” 26 God can only do that which he wants to do. The scope of his power is not limited by any external restraints ( Dan 4:35), but
rather by his own nature. God walks in conformity with his laws and standards not because he is subservient to them but because they are a
reflection of his being (Lev 19:2).
As it relates to the problem of evil, one of the things that God cannot do is actualize contradictions. 27 He cannot, for example, create a square
circle or make two plus two equal five, for such a contradiction would be in violation of his nature. Understanding God’s omnipotence within
these parameters sets the course for addressing the faulty assumption that “a wholly good omnipotent being would eliminate evil
completely.”28 As Feinberg argues, when presented with the decision of
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creating a world like ours or a world without evil, “God had to choose between actualizing one of two good things. The two goods are mutually
contradictory, so God couldn’t do both…. If he removes evil, he cannot also create the best of all possible worlds .” 29 Since evil exists, the
logical conclusion is that it plays a vital role in the existence of the best possible world.30 Thus, a world without evil would be a world that is
less than best.31 Since God cannot create both a world without evil and the best of all possible worlds (i.e., actualize a contradiction), Feinberg
rightly concludes that “he is not guilty for failing to do both.” 32
God’s Omnibenevolence

The final term to be defined is omnibenevolence. As demonstrated above, in order for the Christian worldview to be a logical contradiction, it
must be proven that the goodness of God necessitates the eradication of all evil. If this can be demonstrated, then the presence of evil would
nullify the goodness of an omnipotent deity. According to this interpretation, a God that is capable of removing evil yet unwilling to do so is
himself evil.
As compelling as the argument appears, it contains a deficient interpretation of the goodness of God. For although God in his goodness is
opposed to evil, it does not necessarily follow that he must eliminate evil. Good parents seek to protect their children from as much pain and
suffering as possible, but never at the expense of their child’s own welfare. No good parent would refuse necessary medical care for his child
in an effort to spare him the pain of the surgeon’s scalpel, nor would he neglect corrective discipline simply to make the child’s life more
comfortable. As will be illustrated in due course, God in his infinite wisdom uses even the darkest of evil for the good of his children and the
glory of his name (Rom 8:28).

The Validity Of The Problem

One final facet to consider before formulating a response is the validity of the problem. When confronted with the problem of evil, a commonly
cited objection is that the atheist has no right to use evil to disprove God’s existence since, according to his own worldview, evil cannot exist.
Objective moral evil requires an objective moral law, and an objective moral law necessitates an objective moral lawgiver.33 Since
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the atheistic worldview rejects objective moralism, it must also reject objective evil. Thus, with no basis or mechanism for identifying evil, it is
argued that the atheist’s groundless accusations require no serious consideration. Pointing to the contradictions within the atheist’s own
worldview (i.e., his belief in relative moralism and objective evil), this objection 34 endeavors to end the discussion before it begins.
Although this defense is insightful, 35 it does not resolve the tension within the theistic worldview and is therefore not a viable response to the
problem. The burden of proof for the theist is not primarily to expose the inconsistencies of opposing worldviews, but rather to give an account
for the apparent inconsistencies within his own. As helpful as this observation is, it simply proves that the presence of evil is a problem for the
theist and the atheist alike. The responsible atheist raises a valid argument if he limits the problem to that of the theist’s internally inconsistent
worldview. For example, if the atheist rests his defense against the existence of God on his belief in the objective reality of evil, then his
argument is self-contradictory and therefore invalid. However, if he presents his argument against God by entering, for the sake of argument,
into the theists’ worldview and contending that their belief in God and evil is logically inconsistent, then his complaint is valid. Therefore, any
worldview that affirms the simultaneous existence of God and evil must give an account for the apparent contradiction that arises.

An Answer
The purpose of this section is to present a viable theodicy. 36 However, before embarking upon this endeavor, it will be helpful to temper
expectations by briefly considering the parameters and limitations of any conclusions that are drawn.

The Parameters Of The Answer

A complete and acceptable answer to the problem need only demonstrate that the presence of evil in the universe creates no internal
contradictions within a given theological system. A satisfactory solution is not required to alleviate every tension caused by evil or to provide
the
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specific reasons for every instance of evil. The Christian’s answer need only prove that all his theological beliefs are sufficiently harmonized.

The Limitations Of The Answer

An additional consideration preliminary to formulating a theodicy is the recognition of its limitations. The answer to the problem is limited by
mankind’s finiteness and inferiority.

Mankind’s Finiteness: Is This A Problem That Can Be Solved?

Due to mankind’s physical and cognitive limitations, he is incapable of fully comprehending an infinite God ( Ps 139:6). For this reason, many
see the quest for theodicy as a futile and foolish endeavor. It is beyond the scope of man’s ability, it is argued, to understand an
incomprehensible God whose judgments are unsearchable, and whose ways inscrutable (Rom 11:33). Humanity’s responsibility is simply to
hold all antinomies in faith, without attempting to resolve the contradictions. Due to man’s limitations, the presence of evil is a problem that
cannot be solved in the mind of man.
While it is crucial that man come to terms with his finite qualities in theodicy building, his limitations do not disqualify him from the task entirely:
though God is incomprehensible, he is not inapprehensible. Although God cannot be known exhaustively, he can be known truly by finite
creatures (Jer 9:23-24). Additionally, it is man’s responsibility to pursue a deeper understanding of the mind, ways, and judgments of God that
have been revealed in the Scriptures (Deut 29:29).

Mankind’s Inferiority: Is This A Problem That Should Be Solved?

A second limitation to consider is man’s positional subordination to an autonomous and sovereign God. Even if the problem of evil is a
question that can be answered, it is needful to consider if it is one that should be answered. When Job demanded an explanation from God for
the evils in his life, instead of providing an answer, God responded with a barrage of questions of his own ( Job 38-41). In the face of God’s
overwhelming glory, Job humbly cried, “I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know….
Therefore I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes” (Job 42:3, 6). 37
Is it ever man’s place to question the attributes of God even if those attributes seem to contradict the experience of pain, suffering and evil?
Does man have the authority to investigate the veracity of God’s love, power, and wisdom in the face of evil? Does God really need man to
rush to his defense in order to appease his critics? For these reasons, many believe that man has no right to pose questions like these, and
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would do well to stop asking questions and simply trust that the Judge of all the earth will do right ( Gen 18:24).
The warning is valid. When dealing with a topic that seeks to defend God to man, it is vital that it be placed in a proper perspective.
Concerning man’s subordination to God, there are a number of implications that must be considered. First, God does not need man to defend
him like a defendant needs an attorney. Second, God is not obligated to justify his deeds to his creation. Whenever antinomies arise in
theology that the finite mind cannot resolve, it must be affirmed that a resolution is possible even if solely in the mind of God. The presence of
evil is a problem for man, but not a problem for God. Finally, mankind never has the authority to accuse God or level any complaint against
him. As Frame warns, “When we put ourselves in the proud position of demanding an answer then we can expect a rebuke from God like the
[rebuke] he gave to Job.”38
In spite of these limitations and pitfalls, formulating a biblical defense for the problem of evil is necessary not only so that the believer can
contend for the faith (Jude 1:3) and make a defense for the hope that is in him (1 Peter 3:15), but also so that the orthodox Christian can
identify and “protest against those solutions of this great problem which destroy either the nature of sin or the nature of God.” 39 It is with this in
mind that we now turn to the most viable answer to the problem of evil.

A Viable Answer

This section will present the defense that the author believes to be the most viable solution to the problem of evil. It is accepted as the best
option for three primary reasons. First, it provides a coherent explanation for the problem of evil within a biblical worldview. Second, it does not
compromise any biblical doctrines or soften any of God’s attributes in order to retain its logical coherence, and third, it contains clear biblical
support. Since this solution is a modification of the greater-good defense, it will be helpful to briefly examine the greater-good defense before
the position affirmed by the author is considered.

The Greater-Good Defense

At the heart of the greater-good defense is the premise that God is justified in permitting evil because it results in the greater good of his
people. Not only does good often come out of evil, but many goods are dependent upon evil for their expression. For example, man would
never experience courage without conflict, compassion without distress, mercy without offense, or perseverance without hardship. In light of
this, God remains good in permitting evil because he uses it for good.40
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As R. C. Sproul concludes, “God’s sovereignty stands over evil, and he is able to bring good out of evil and to use evil for his holy purposes.” 41
Although this defense does not relieve all tensions, it is not without biblical support. The life of Joseph is a fitting example. He was mistreated
by his brothers, torn from his family, sold into slavery, falsely accused, and thrown into prison. Yet at the end of his story, Joseph sees that
God, in his infinite goodness, used the evils in his life to bring about the salvation of thousands from famine (Gen 50:20). Perhaps the clearest
example of good coming through evil is demonstrated in the greatest atrocity in history, viz., the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. This wicked act of
sinful men was not gratuitous, but was the means by which God would bring about the salvation of his elect (Acts 2:23).
The greater-good defense provides a theodicy that is both internally coherent and biblically based; however, it is not without its issues. First,
this defense appears to rely upon the erroneous ethic of consequentialism.42 For if God is justified in causing evil solely on the basis of its
positive results, then the necessary implication is that the ends can justify the means. This, however, is an ethic that cannot comport with the
teachings in Scripture (e.g., Rom 6:1-2). Second, the greater-good defense tends to build its case on an anthropocentric focus for God’s
eternal plans and purposes. Although man’s greatest pleasure is found in God (Ps 16:11), and he benefits from God’s plans, it is arrogant and
fallacious to hold that the center of God’s activity in the universe is the welfare and happiness of man. Robert Reymond aptly notes:
We have not penetrated God’s purpose sufficiently if we conclude that we are the center of God’s purpose or that his purpose
terminates finally upon us by accomplishing our glorification. Rather, our glorification is only the means to a higher, indeed, the
highest end conceivable—“that God’s Son might be the Firstborn among many brothers” ( Rom 8:29), and all to the praise of
God’s glorious grace (Eph 1:6, 10, 12, 14; 2:7). 43
In spite of these issues, the greater-good defense should not be rejected completely. It is possible to salvage this position by altering the result
of evil from the anthropocentric good of man to the theocentric glory of God.44 This revised defense, identified as The Greatest-Glory
Defense,45 will be the focus of the following section.
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The Greatest-Glory Defense

The solution proposed by the author is best understood as a modified greater-good defense. Although both responses contain a similar line of
reasoning, the point of divergence is the content of the good that is produced from evil. Instead of focusing the positive results of evil solely
upon the happiness and welfare of mankind, this defense sees a greater purpose at work, namely, the glory of God. Thus God uses evil to
communicate the fullest manifestation of himself to his image-bearers. Hodge observes that “there could be no manifestation of [God’s] mercy
without misery or of his grace and justice if there were no sin. As the heavens declare the glory of God, so he has devised the plan of
redemption ‘to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of
God’ (Eph 3:10).”46 Thus evil is a necessary means by which God reveals aspects of himself to his creation. Without evil, mankind would
know nothing of God’s patience, forgiveness, mercy, and grace.47
A fitting biblical example is seen in the eleventh chapter of John’s gospel. In this narrative, Jesus is informed that his friend Lazarus is fatally
ill. Upon receiving the report, Jesus makes it clear that Lazarus’s illness is neither an accident nor a tragedy. Instead, “it is for the glory of God,
so that the Son of God might be glorified through it” (John 11:4). In this passage, Jesus uses the death of his beloved friend to display his
glory to grieving sisters, doubting Jews, and ignorant apostles. 48 Throughout biblical history, God glorifies himself though his victory over evil,
and his punishment of it (either at the cross or in the lake of fire).49
Although it is difficult to comprehend how a world with evil could be God’s greatest means of receiving glory, it is not hard to imagine how a
world without evil would diminish his glory. For example, if Adam as humanity’s representative would have passed the test in the
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garden then his confirmed holiness, being imputed to all his progeny, would guarantee a world for humanity that is free from sin and death. In
a world like this, Adam’s obedience and imputed righteousness would be man’s hope and assurance. He would be the Savior of mankind.
Consequently, man’s praise would go to the first Adam instead of the second Adam. Reymond argues that had Adam been confirmed in
holiness through his obedience, “God would then have been required eternally to share his glory with the creature, and his own beloved Son
would have been denied the mediatorial role which led to his messianic lordship over men and to his Father’s glory which followed.” 50 With
this in view, the conclusion is clear: God decreed the fall and all of its ensuing evils for the glory of his name.

Lingering Concerns
In an effort to present the greatest-glory defense with sharper clarity, this section will seek to address three objections that may be levied
against it. Although this defense may encounter countless additional objections, the three selected seem to be the most pertinent to the
discussion.

How Is God Good?

One accusation that could arise from the greatest-glory defense is that it strips God of his goodness. If God decrees evil primarily for the sake
of his own glory, and not the good of his people, then it is difficult to see how God can retain his benevolence by any meaningful sense of the
word. Such a self-centered God as this does not comport with the God of love who promises to work everything together for the good of his
children (Rom 8:28).
Although the concern is legitimate, the charge is flawed because it stands on a false dichotomy. For the Bible is clear that God’s passion for
his own glory is not at the expense of mankind’s happiness, but is the means by which greatest joy, happiness, and satisfaction can be
found.51 It is readily acknowledged that God uses evil for the good of his children; however, that good is not the terminus of God’s purposes,
but rather an ancillary implication of a far greater end, namely, God’s glory. Therefore God retains his goodness because of the immense
benefit his children enjoy as God acts in his own self-interest.

Do The Ends Justify The Means?

Second, it can be charged that the greatest-glory defense, like the greater-good defense, rests on the fallacious ethic of consequentialism
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and should therefore be rejected. If God can hold men responsible for evil irrespective of its noble result (e.g., 2 Sam 6:5-7), how then is he
pardoned in decreeing evil on the basis of its noble result? Is this not a glaring and troubling inconsistency on God’s part?
The accusation is compelling, but misguided. In order for this charge to stick, it must be demonstrated that in decreeing evil, God is doing evil.
However, a biblical understanding of God’s wisdom demands that both God’s ends and his means are right. Decreeing evil is not an evil act
coincidentally redeemed by a favorable outcome (i.e., consequentialism), instead decreeing evil, as painful as it may be, is good.52
In order to clarify this point, an analogy may prove helpful. A good medical surgeon regularly inflicts pain on his patients with his surgical
equipment. However, his pokes and cuts are not considered evil means, but necessary means. Similarly, the evils that God decrees for his
children are the necessary means for their greatest ends. Thus, even in the face of hardship, God’s people can “count it all joy” ( Jas 1:2).

How Can God Decree What Is Evil?

Perhaps the most significant objection to the greatest-glory defense is that it is built upon a faulty view of God’s sovereignty that effectively
renders him the cause and author of evil. If God sovereignly determines everything that happens he is consequently responsible for every evil
that exists. To many, a God who decrees evil cannot be trusted, should not be worshiped, and cannot be good. For this reason, it can be
argued that the greatest-glory defense is not a valid theodicy because it rests upon a dangerously erroneous view of God.
Before addressing this difficult issue, it should be noted that this objection moves beyond the scope of theodicy. As it has previously been
established, in order for a theodicy to be credible, it need only prove internal consistency within its own theological system. The greatest-glory
defense successfully accomplishes this requirement. The objection currently under consideration moves beyond the coherence of the defense
to the validity of its theological system. That being said, this is a legitimate concern that is both raised and dealt with in Scripture.
In the book of Habakkuk, the prophet raises this very complaint before God himself. Upon hearing of God’s plan to use the Chaldeans to
punish Judah for her wickedness (Hab 1:5-11), Habakkuk cries out, “You who are of purer eyes than to see evil and cannot look at wrong,
why do you idly look at traitors and remain silent when the wicked swallows up the man more righteous than he?”( Hab 1:13) The reason for
the prophet’s concern was that God’s plan to use evil did not comport with his understanding of God’s righteous character.
God responds by calling the prophet to faith and patience (2:2-4).
DBSJ 22 (2017) p. 90

Through a series of devastating “woes,” God makes it clear to Habakkuk that he will deal with the invading Chaldeans for their wickedness,
arrogance, and idolatry (2:6-20). Although they are acting in accordance with God’s decree ( Hab 1:6), they do so willingly. Therefore God
holds them justly responsible for their sins (Hab 1:11). In his sovereignty, God did not compel or coerce the Chaldeans to sin, and for this
reason, he is not responsible for their wickedness. Although this explanation does not release all of the tension, it was sufficient for Habakkuk
(Hab 3:17-19), and it should be sufficient for us as well.

Conclusion
God is real, and so is evil. To many, that statement is both illogical and self-contradictory. Regrettably, the sincere effort to justify God to man
by presenting an acceptable theodicy has historically come at the costly expense of the attributes and character of God. However, without
providing all the answers or releasing all the tensions, this paper has endeavored to provide a viable solution to the problem of evil that
corresponds with Scripture and is logically coherent. It is the belief of this author that the greatest-glory defense accomplishes these
requirements and therefore presents a viable theodicy.
1Itis our privilege this year to feature a student article by an M.Div. student at Detroit Baptist Theological Seminary. Mr. Moreno submitted this
article and won runner-up standing in the student paper contest at the Midwest Regional meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society that
met in Wheaton, IL, on March 10-11, 2017.
2Night (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), x–xi.
3According to Mackie, “This problem seems to show not merely that traditional theism lacks rational support, but rather that it is positively
irrational, in that some of its central doctrines are, as a set, inconsistent with one another” (The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against
the Existence of God [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982], 150).
4Ibid.

5Ibid.

6AlvinC. Plantinga is widely credited for exposing the deficiencies of the deductive problem of evil. See God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977).
7God and the Problem of Evil (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 126.
8Ibid., 136.
9The Reason for God (New York: Riverhead Books, 2008), 23.
10Nash correctly notes, “Given the limitations of human knowledge, it is hard to see how any human being could actually know that some
particular evil is totally senseless and purposeless. It seems, then, that the most any human can know is that some evils appear gratuitous”
(Faith & Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith [Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1988], 218).
11Tim Keller, Reason for God, 24.
12Apologetics: A Justification of Christian Belief (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2015), 157.
13No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), 777-78 .
14It should be noted that although God knows all possibilities, he never sees them as potential actualities.
15“Who has spoken and it came to pass, unless the Lord has commanded it? Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that good and bad
come?” (Lam 3:37-38).
16See the section titled “How Can God Decree What is Evil?” for the author’s response to this accusation.
17When Bad Things Happen to Good People (New York: Anchor Books, 1981), 62.
18This errant system of thought is commonly referred to as “Open Theism.”
19Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 328-29.
20The Arminian interpretation of man’s freedom is commonly described as contra-causal, non-determinist, or libertarian free will.
21This theodicy, labeled the “free-will” defense, is presented most clearly in Alvin Plantinga’s book God, Freedom, and Evil.
22Mark A. Snoeberger, “Systematic Theology I” (course notes, Detroit Baptist Theological Seminary, Fall 2016), 106.
23Van Til writes; “Because of his self-contained and necessary knowledge he can, when he chooses, create a universe, and create this
universe just as he wants to create it. This is, therefore, ‘the best of possible worlds.’ God’s wisdom is displayed in it” (An Introduction to
Systematic Theology, [Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007], 237).
24Introduction to Systematic Theology, 237.
25For example, he cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13), tell a lie ( Heb 6:18), or be tempted to sin ( Jas 1:13). The reason he cannot do these
things is not because he is deficient or inept, but because he will not act against his nature.
26RollandMcCune, Systematic Theology of Biblical Christianity, 3 vols. (Allen Park, MI: Detroit Baptist Theological Seminary, 2009-2010),
1:218, emphasis added.
27Feinberg believes that limiting God’s omnipotence to exclude the logically nonsensical is the essential component to resolving the problem
of evil. In this paragraph, I rely heavily upon his strategy to theodicy building. For a concise presentation of his four-part strategy, see No One
Like Him, 781-82.
28Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 150.
29No One Like Him, 781, emphasis added.
30As demonstrated in the previous section, the wisdom of God demands this conclusion.
31This is not to say that the best possible world does not include the eventual eradication of evil (see Rev 21:1-4), but rather the best possible
world cannot include the absence of evil from world history.
32No One Like Him, 782.
33It is this line of reasoning that has led theistic apologists like Gregory Koukl to the conclusion that “the existence of evil is actually evidence
for the existence of God, not against it” (Tactics: A Game Plan for Discussing your Christian Convictions [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009],
84).
34Labeled by Frame as the “Ad Hominem Defense” ( Apologetics, 171).
35The famous Christian apologist C. S. Lewis identifies this observation as a crucial turning point in his own personal journey from atheism to
Christianity (Mere Christianity: What One Must Believe to Be a Christian [New York: MacMillan, 1960], 45-46).
36Theodicy is defined as “a response to the problem of evil in the world that attempts logically, relevantly and consistently to defend God as
simultaneously omnipotent, all-loving and just despite the reality of evil” (Stanley J. Grenz, David Guretzki, and Cherith Fee Nordling, Pocket
Dictionary of Theological Terms [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999], 112-13).
37All Scripture quotations are taken from the 2011 edition of ESV.
38Apologetics, 176.
39Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (repr., Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1997), 158.
40Frame notes, “It is essential to realize that even though God does bring evil into the world, he does it for a good reason. Therefore, he does
not do evil in bringing evil to pass” ( Apologetics, 154).
41The Invisible Hand: Do All Things Really Work for Good? (Dallas: Word, 1996), 167.
42Consequentialism is the ethic that holds the position that “what makes an action morally right is its consequences”(None Like Him, 783). It is
for this reason that Feinberg rejects the greater-good defense.
43A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Nelson, 1998), 377.
44Acknowledging the man-centered tendency of the greater-good defense, Frame notes that the response is a viable one “if instead of
rejecting the greater-good defense we simply understand it theocentrically. That is, one good is greater than another when it is more
conducive to the glory of God” (Apologetics, 184).
45This label coined by the author is used to distinguish it from the greater-good defense. The reason for the superlative “greatest” (contra
“greater”) is based on the author’s understanding of God’s omnisapience. Since God only uses the best means to accomplish his highest
ends, it necessarily follows that everything that happens is not merely for God’s greater glory, but for his greatest glory.
46Systematic Theology, 161.
47Thatis not to say that without evil God would not possess these attributes and characteristics, but rather that without evil there would be no
avenue through which they could be expressed.
48Another fitting example is found just two chapters earlier in John 9. In this passage Jesus reveals that the blindness of a beggar, with all its
ensuing evils, was decreed by God so that “the works of God might be displayed in him” (John 9:3).
49Hodge rightly concludes that sin “is permitted so that the justice of God may be known in its punishment, and his grace in its forgiveness.
And the universe, without the knowledge of these attributes, would be like the earth without the light of the sun” (Systematic Theology, 161).
50New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 377.
51For
a helpful discussion of this point, see John Piper and Jonathan Edwards, God’s Passion for His Glory: Living the Vision of Jonathan
Edwards, with the Complete Text of the End for Which God Created the World (Wheaton: Crossway, 1998).
52Sproul rightly concludes, “Ultimately it must be good that there is evil or evil would not exist” (Invisible Hand, 167).
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