2009 Guyana Report v6 7dic11

………… … ………… … …… ………… … ……………… …… …………… ………………… … ………… ……… ……
The Political Culture of Democracy

in Guyana, 2009:
The Impact of Governance
by:
Margarita Corral
Brian Faughnan
Lawrence Lachmansingh
Diana Orcés
Elizabeth Zechmeister
Dominique Zéphyr
Series General Editor

Mitchell A. Seligson
………… … ………… … …… ………… … ……………… …… …………… ………………… … …………………… …

This study was done with support from the Program in Democracy and
Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The
opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.
September, 2009
The Political Culture of Democracy in Guyana, 2009: The Impact of Governance
Table of Contents
Index of Figures .................................................................................................................................................. v

Index of Tables .................................................................................................................................................. xi
Preface .............................................................................................................................................................. xiii
Prologue: Background to the Study................................................................................................................ xv
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................... xxii
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... xxv
PART ONE: THEORY AND CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISSONS...................................................................... 1
Context of Democratic Development in Guyana, Method and Description of Data. ................................... 3
Political Context ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
Economic Context ..................................................................................................................................................... 4
Sample Design............................................................................................................................................................ 6
Population ............................................................................................................................................................ 6
Sampling Method .................................................................................................................................................. 7
Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 2008 Sample .............................................................. 9
Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy ..................................................................................... 13
Theoretical Framework .......................................................................................................................................... 13
Working hypothesis................................................................................................................................................. 14
Support for the Idea of Democracy per se ............................................................................................................ 17
Support for Core Values on which Democracy Depends ..................................................................................... 18
Belief in the Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions ............................................................................ 22
Social Capital ........................................................................................................................................................... 25
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 26
PART TWO: GOVERNANCE ............................................................................................................................... 27
Chapter II. Corruption and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy ................................................ 29
How Might Corruption Affect Support for Stable Democracy? ......................................................................... 30
The Measurement of Corruption ........................................................................................................................... 31
Corruption in Guyana ............................................................................................................................................ 32
Where are bribes more common? ....................................................................................................................... 32
How frequently are bribes demanded? ............................................................................................................... 33
Corruption Victimization in Guyana: 2006 and 2009 ........................................................................................ 34
Corruption in Guyana in comparative perspective ............................................................................................ 35
Corruption in Guyana by Regions ...................................................................................................................... 37
Who is More Likely to Become a Victim of Corruption? .................................................................................... 37
The Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy .................................................... 40
Perception of Corruption........................................................................................................................................ 41
Perception of Corruption in Guyana: 2006 and 2009 ........................................................................................ 42
The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for Stable Democracy .............................................. 44
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 46
APPENDIX CHAPTER II...................................................................................................................................... 48
Chapter III. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy................................................................ 51
How Might Crime Victimization Affect Support for Stable Democracy?.......................................................... 54
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How do we measure crime? .................................................................................................................................... 55

Crime Victimization in Guyana ............................................................................................................................. 55
Crime Victimization in Guyana, 2006 and 2009 ................................................................................................ 55
Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective .............................................................................................. 56
Crime Victimization by Region ........................................................................................................................... 58
Who are those more likely to become victims of crime? ..................................................................................... 59
The Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy .......................................................... 62
The Impact of Crime Victimization ..................................................................................................................... 62
Perception of Insecurity in Guyana ....................................................................................................................... 63
How do we measure perception of insecurity? ................................................................................................... 63
Perception of Insecurity in Guyana, 2006 and 2009 .......................................................................................... 63
Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective ........................................................................................ 64
Perception of Insecurity by Region..................................................................................................................... 65
Who are those who tend to perceive more insecurity? ....................................................................................... 66
The Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for a Stable Democracy .................................................... 69
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 71
APPENDIX CHAPTER III. ................................................................................................................................... 72
Chapter IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance on the Support for Stable Democracy...... 75
Theoretical framework ........................................................................................................................................... 75
How Might Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy? ..... 76
Historical Background ............................................................................................................................................ 77
Trust in Local Government .................................................................................................................................... 79
Trust in Local Government vs. Trust in the National Government and in the Regional Government ................ 79
Trust in Local Government Over time ................................................................................................................ 80
Trust in Local Government in Comparative Perspective ................................................................................... 81
Trust in the Local Governments by Regions ....................................................................................................... 82
Determinants of Trust in Local Government ...................................................................................................... 83
Participation in Local Government Meetings ....................................................................................................... 85
Participation in Local Government Meetings Over time .................................................................................... 85
Participation in Local Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective ....................................................... 86
Participation in Local Government Meetings by Regions .................................................................................. 87
Determinants of Participation in Local Government Meetings .......................................................................... 88
Demand-Making to the Local Government .......................................................................................................... 90
Demand-Making at the Local Government Over Time....................................................................................... 90
Demand-Making at the Local Government in Comparative Perspective ........................................................... 91
Demand-Making at the Local Government by Regions ...................................................................................... 92
Determinants of Demand-Making at the Local Government .............................................................................. 93
Satisfaction with Local Government Services....................................................................................................... 95
Satisfaction with Local Government Services in 2009 ....................................................................................... 95
Satisfaction with Local Government Services Over Time................................................................................... 96
Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective ....................................................... 97
Satisfaction with Services Provided by Municipalities or NDCs ........................................................................ 98
Satisfaction with Local Services Provided by NDCs by Regions........................................................................ 99
Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services ........................................................................ 100
Support for the Descentralization of Responsibilities ........................................................................................ 103
Citizens Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Regional Democratic Council and Local
Government ...................................................................................................................................................... 104
Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective ........ 105
Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities by Regions ........................................................................... 105
Determinants of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government ..................... 106
Support for the descentralization of Economic Resources ................................................................................ 108
Citizens Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Regional Democratic Council and Local
Government ...................................................................................................................................................... 109
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Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective 110
Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government by Regions ........................... 111
Determinants of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources ..................................................... 111
The impact of satisfaction with local services (sgl1r) on support for stable democracy ................................. 113
Relationship between Belief in the Political Legitimacy and Satisfaction with Local Services........................ 113
Relationship between Interpersonal Trust and Satisfaction with Local Services ............................................. 114
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................. 115
APPENDIX CHAPTER IV. ................................................................................................................................. 117
Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for
Stable Democracy ........................................................................................................................................... 123
Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................................................ 123
How Might Perception of Government Economic Performace Affect Support for Stable Democracy? ....... 125
Government Economic Performance .................................................................................................................. 125
Measuring Perception of Government Economic Performance ....................................................................... 127
Perceptions of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective .......................................... 128
Perceptions of Government Economic Performance over Time ....................................................................... 129
Perceptions of Government Economic Performance by Region ....................................................................... 130
Determinants of Perception of Government Economic Performance in Guyana ............................................ 132
Perceptions of the Economic Situation and Its Impact on Specific Support in Guyana ................................. 135
Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Democratic Stability in Guyana ............. 141
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................ 145
APPENDIX CHAPTER V. ................................................................................................................................... 147
Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political legitimacy ........................................................... 151
The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation ................................................................................................................... 151
System Support...................................................................................................................................................... 152
Political Tolerance ........................................................................................................................................... 156
The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance................................................................. 159
Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana ........................................................................................................ 161
Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana ................................................................................... 164
Legitimacy of Other Democractic Institutions ................................................................................................... 166
The Justice System ............................................................................................................................................ 168
Other Opinions about Democracy ....................................................................................................................... 173
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................ 177
APPENDIX CHAPTER VI. ................................................................................................................................. 179
Chapter VII. Voting Behavior and Political Parties ................................................................................... 181
Electoral Participation in Guyana ....................................................................................................................... 181
Registering to Vote ................................................................................................................................................ 181
Turnout in the 2006 General Elections ............................................................................................................ 185
Ethnic Groups and Voting Preferences in 2006 Elections ............................................................................... 189
Identification with Political Parties in Guyana ................................................................................................ 190
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................ 196
APPENDIX CHAPTER VII. ................................................................................................................................ 198
PART THREE: BEYOND GOVERNANCE .......................................................................................................... 201
Chapter VIII. Interpersonal Trust and Civic Participation ....................................................................... 203
Theoretical framework ......................................................................................................................................... 203
Historical Background .......................................................................................................................................... 205
Interpersonal Trust ............................................................................................................................................... 207
Interpersonal Trust Over time .......................................................................................................................... 209
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Interpersonal Trust by Regions ........................................................................................................................ 210

Determinants of Interpersonal Trust ................................................................................................................ 211
Civic Participation................................................................................................................................................. 214
Participation in Solving Community Problems ................................................................................................ 214
Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups ................................................................................................ 216
Determinants of Participation in Religious Meetings ...................................................................................... 219
Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations ............................................................................................ 222
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations ................................................................................. 226
Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvement .......................................................... 228
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvement ............................................. 232
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations ....................................................................... 238
Participation in Labour Union Meetings ......................................................................................................... 240
Determinants of Participation in Labor Union Meetings ................................................................................................ 243
Participation in Meetings of Political Parties .................................................................................................. 245
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Political Parties ....................................................................................... 249
Participation in Meetings of Women’s Groups ................................................................................................ 252
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Women’s Associations or Groups........................................................... 255
Demand-Making, Protest and Civic Participation ............................................................................................. 257
Demand-Making according to civic participation............................................................................................ 258
Protest activity according to civic participation ................................................................................................. 260
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................. 262
APPENDIX CHAPTER VIII. .............................................................................................................................. 263
Appendixes ...................................................................................................................................................... 271
Appendix I: The IRB “informed consent” document ........................................................................................ 271
Appendix II: The Questionnaire .......................................................................................................................... 273
References ....................................................................................................................................................... 316
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Index of Figures
Figure i-1. Freedom House Scores in Guyana and Latin America, 1972-2008 ............................. 4
Figure i-2. Economic Growth in Guyana and Latin America 1972-2008 ...................................... 5
Figure i-3. Map of Guyana Showing the Administrative Regions ................................................. 6
Figure i -4. Sample Distribution by Geographic Area ................................................................... 9
Figure i -5. Sample Distribution by Sex ....................................................................................... 10
Figure i -6. Sample Distribution by Age ........................................................................................ 10
Figure i-7. Sample Distribution by Education Level ..................................................................... 11
Figure i-8. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification ....................................................... 12
Figure I-1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective ................................................. 18
Figure I-2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective ................ 20
Figure I-3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective....................................................................... 22
Figure I-4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective
(controlled for approval of chief executive performance) ............................................................. 24
Figure I-5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent
trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance) .......... 25
Figure I-6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective ........................................................ 26
Figure II-1. Modes of Corruption Victimization in Guyana ........................................................ 33
Figure II-2. Total Number of Modes of Corruption Victimization ............................................... 34
Figure II-3. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Year ..................................................... 35
Figure II-4. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective ............................................. 36
Figure II-5. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Region ................................................. 37
Figure II-6. Predictors of Corruption Victimization in Guyana ................................................... 38
Figure II-7. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Age, Wealth, Sex and Ethnic Self-
identification................................................................................................................................... 39
Figure II-8. The Impact of Corruption Victimization on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions 41
Figure II-9. Changes in Perception of Corruption in Guyana by Year ........................................ 42
Figure II-10. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective ........................................... 43
Figure II-11. Average of Perception of Corruption by Region .................................................... 44
Figure II-12. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on the Political Legitimacy of
Institutions ...................................................................................................................................... 45
Figure II-13. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for the Right of Public
Contestation .................................................................................................................................... 46
Figure III-1. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime in Guyana: 2006 and 2009 ............. 56
Figure III-2. Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective ..................................................... 57
Figure III-3. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime by Region in Guyana ..................... 58
Figure III-4. Distribution of 2009 AmericasBarometer Guyanese Sample by Ethnic Self-
Identification .................................................................................................................................. 60
Figure III-5. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime in Guyana .............................................. 60
Figure III-6. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime by Urban/Rural Area ..................... 61
Figure III-7. The Impact of Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust ...................................... 62
Figure III-8. Average Perception of Insecurity in Guyana: 2006 and 2009 ................................... 64
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Figure III-9. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective ............................................... 65

Figure III-10. Average of Perception of Insecurity by Region ...................................................... 66
Figure III-11. Guyanese Citizens Who Tend to Perceive More Insecurity ................................... 67
Figure III-12. Average Perception of Insecurity by Sex and Age .................................................. 68
Figure III-13. Average Perception of Insecurity by Urban and Rural Areas ................................. 68
Figure III-14. The Impact of the Perception of Insecurity on Support for Democracy and
Interpersonal Trust ......................................................................................................................... 69
Figure III-15. The Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for the Legitimacy of Political
Institutions ...................................................................................................................................... 70
Figure IV-1. Comparison between Trust in Local Government, Trust in National Government
and Trust in Regional Democratic Council .................................................................................... 80
Figure IV-2. Trust in Local Government by Year ....................................................................... 81
Figure IV-3. Trust in the Local Government in Comparative Perspective .................................. 82
Figure IV-4. Trust in Local Government by Regions .................................................................. 83
Figure IV-5. Predictors of Trust in the Local Government .......................................................... 84
Figure IV-6. Trust in the Local Government by Education Level, Age, Area and Ethnic Self-
identification................................................................................................................................... 85
Figure IV-7. Percentage Who Attended a Local Government Meeting by Year ......................... 86
Figure IV-8. Participation in Local Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective ............ 87
Figure IV-9. Participation in Local Government Meetings by Regions ...................................... 88
Figure IV-10. Predictors of Participation in Local Government Meetings .................................. 89
Figure IV-11. Participation at the Local Government meetings by Sex and Area....................... 90
Figure IV-12. Demand-Making at the Local Government by Year ............................................. 91
Figure IV-13. Demand-Making to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective ............. 92
Figure IV-14. Demand-Making at Local Government by Regions ............................................. 93
Figure IV-15. Predictors of Demand-Making at Local Government ........................................... 94
Figure IV-16. Demand-Making at Local Government by Victimization..................................... 94
Figure IV-17. Demand-Making at Local Government by Sex and Age ...................................... 95
Figure IV-18. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services .................................................. 96
Figure IV-19. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Year ........................................ 97
Figure IV-20. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services ................................................ 98
Figure IV-21. Satisfaction with Municipalities and NDCs Services ........................................... 99
Figure IV-22. Satisfaction with NDCs Services by Regions ..................................................... 100
Figure IV-23. Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services ............................... 101
Figure IV-24. Impact of the Trust in the Local Government on Satisfaction with the Local
Government Services ................................................................................................................... 102
Figure IV-25. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services by Area................................. 103
Figure IV-26. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Regional Democratic
Council and Local Government ................................................................................................... 104
Figure IV-27. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government in
Comparative Perspective .............................................................................................................. 105
Figure IV-28. Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government by
Region .......................................................................................................................................... 106
Figure IV-29. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local
Government .................................................................................................................................. 107
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Figure IV-30. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government by
Education Level and Age ............................................................................................................. 108
Figure IV-31. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Regional
Democratic Council and Local Government ................................................................................ 109
Figure IV-32. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government
in Comparative Perspective .......................................................................................................... 110
Figure IV-33. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources by Region ................. 111
Figure IV-34. Predictors of support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local
Government .................................................................................................................................. 112
Figure IV-35. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government
by Education Level and Ethnic Self-identification ...................................................................... 113
Figure IV-36. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Political Legitimacy .................. 114
Figure IV-37. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust .................... 115
Figure V-1. Economy as the Main Problem of the Country ...................................................... 126
Figure V-2. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective .. 128
Figure V-3. Perception of Government Economic Performance in 2006 and 2009 .................. 129
Figure V-4. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Region, 2009.................... 130
Figure V-5. Determinants of Perceptions of Government Economic Performance ................... 132
Figure V-6. Impact of the Perception of Personal Economic Situation on Perceptions of
Government Economic Performance, 2009 ................................................................................. 133
Figure V-7. Impact of the Perception of the National Economic Situation on Perceptions of
Government Economic Performance, 2009 ................................................................................. 134
Figure V-8. Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President, 2009......................... 135
Figure V-9. Average Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President by Region,
2009 .............................................................................................................................................. 136
Figure V-10. Average Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President by Ethnicity,
2009 .............................................................................................................................................. 137
Figure V-11. Determinants of the Approval of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009
...................................................................................................................................................... 138
Figure V-12. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on the Approval
of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009 ....................................................................... 139
Figure V-13. Impact of the Perception of One’s Personal Economic Situation on the Approval
of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009 ....................................................................... 140
Figure V-14. Impact of the Perception of the National Economic Situation on the Approval for
the Current President (Specific Support), 2009 ........................................................................... 140
Figure V-15. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on the Support
for Participation, 2009 .................................................................................................................. 142
Figure V-16. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on Tolerance,
2009 .............................................................................................................................................. 143
Figure V-17. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on the
Legitimacy of Political Institutions, 2009 .................................................................................... 144
Figure V-18. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on Interpersonal
Trust, 2009 ................................................................................................................................... 145
Figure VI-1. Average of the components of the System Support Index, 2009 .......................... 153
Figure VI-2. System Support Index in Guyana, 2006-2009 ...................................................... 154
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Figure VI-3. System Support Index in Comparative Perspective, 2008 ...................................... 155
Figure VI-4. System Support in Guyana by regions, 2009 ........................................................ 156
Figure VI-5. Average of the components of the Political Tolerance Index, 2009 ..................... 157
Figure VI-6. Political Tolerance Index in Guyana, 2006-2009.................................................. 158
Figure VI-7. Political Tolerance in Guyana by regions, 2009 ................................................... 159
Figure VI-8. Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana, 2006 and 2009 ................................... 162
Figure VI-9. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2009 ....................... 163
Figure VI-10. Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana by regions, 2009 ............................... 164
Figure VI-11. Predictors of Attitudes Favourable towards Stable Democracy, 2009................ 165
Figure VI-12. Support for Stable Democracy according to Perceptions of Government
Economic Performance, 2009 ...................................................................................................... 166
Figure VI-13. Legitimacy of Institutions in Guyana, 2009 ........................................................ 167
Figure VI-14. Legitimacy of Institutions in Guyana, 2006-2009 .............................................. 168
Figure VI-15. Legitimacy of the Justice System in Guyana, 2006 and 2009 ............................ 169
Figure VI-16. Legitimacy of the Justice System in comparative perspective ............................ 170
Figure VI-17. Legitimacy of the Justice System in Guyana by regions, 2009 .......................... 171
Figure VI-18. Predictors of Trust in the Justice System, 2009 .................................................. 172
Figure VI-19. Determinants of Trust in the Justice System, 2009 ............................................. 173
Figure VI-20. Preference for Democracy in Guyana, 2009 ....................................................... 174
Figure VI-21. Preference for Democracy by Regions, 2009...................................................... 175
Figure VI-22. Satisfaction with Democracy in Guyana, 2009 ..................................................... 176
Figure VI-23. Satisfaction with Democracy by Region, 2009 ..................................................... 177
Figure VII-1. Registration for the new voters list in Guyana, 2009........................................... 182
Figure VII-2. Registration for the new voters list by region, 2009 ............................................ 183
Figure VII-3. Determinants of registration for the new voters list............................................. 184
Figure VII-4. Electoral turnout in comparative perspective ...................................................... 186
Figure VII-5. Electoral Turnout by Region ................................................................................ 187
Figure VII-6. Predictors of Turnout in Guyana.......................................................................... 188
Figure VII-7. Determinants of Turnout in Guyana .................................................................... 189
Figure VII-8. Ethnic group and voting preferences in the 2006 Elections ................................ 190
Figure VII-9. Levels of Party Identification in Guyana, 2009 ................................................... 191
Figure VII-10. Party Identification in Comparative Perspective, 2008 ..................................... 192
Figure VII-11. Party Identification by Region in Guyana, 2009 ............................................... 193
Figure VII-12. Distribution of Party Identification by Political Party, 2009 ............................. 193
Figure VII-13. Identification with the PPP/C by region, 2009 .................................................. 194
Figure VII-14. Identification Strength with the PPP/C .............................................................. 195
Figure VII-15. Identification with the PNCR/1G by Region, 2009 ........................................... 195
Figure VII-16. Identification Strength with the PNCR/1G ........................................................ 196
Figure VIII-1. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective ................................................ 208
Figure VIII-2. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Year ................................................. 209
Figure VIII-3. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Regions ............................................ 210
Figure VIII-4. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust ........................................................................ 211
Figure VIII-5. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Crime Victimization ........................ 212
Figure VIII-6. Interpersonal Trust by Sex, Age, Wealth and Size of City/Town ...................... 213
Figure VIII-7. Participation in Solving Community Problems in Comparative Perspective ..... 215
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Figure VIII-8. Participation in Solving Community Problems by Region ................................ 216

Figure VIII-9. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Year..................................... 217
Figure VIII-10. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups in Comparative Perspective ... 218
Figure VIII-11. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Regions ............................. 219
Figure VIII-12. Predictors of Participation in Religious Meetings ............................................ 220
Figure VIII-13. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Sex, Age, Wealth and Size of
City or Town ................................................................................................................................ 221
Figure VIII-14. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations by Year ............................... 223
Figure VIII-15. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations in Comparative Perspective 223
Figure VIII-16. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations by Region ........................... 224
Figure VIII-17. Race of Other Participants at Parent Association Meetings ............................. 225
Figure VIII-18. Predictors of Participation in Parent Association Meetings ............................. 226
Figure VIII-19. Participation in Parent Association Meetings by Sex ....................................... 227
Figure VIII-20. Participation in Parent Association Meetings by Age and Marital Status ........ 228
Figure VIII-21. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements by
Year .............................................................................................................................................. 229
Figure VIII-22. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements in
Comparative Perspective .............................................................................................................. 230
Figure VIII-23. Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvements by
Region .......................................................................................................................................... 231
Figure VIII-24. Race of Other Participants at Committee for Community Improvement
Meetings ....................................................................................................................................... 232
Figure VIII-25. Predictors of Participation in Committee for Community Improvement
Meetings ....................................................................................................................................... 233
Figure VIII-26. Participation in Committee for Community Improvement Meetings by
Education Level, Sex and Marital Status ..................................................................................... 234
Figure VIII-27. Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations by Year ...................... 235
Figure VIII-28. Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations in Comparative
Perspective ................................................................................................................................... 236
Figure VIII-29. Participation in Meetings of Associations of Professionals by Region ............ 237
Figure VIII-30. Race of Other Participants at Professional Association Meetings ................... 238
Figure VIII-31. Predictors of Participation in Professional Association Meetings.................... 239
Figure VIII-32. Participation in Professional Association Meetings by Education Level and Sex
...................................................................................................................................................... 240
Figure VIII-33. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union by Year ..................................... 241
Figure VIII-34. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union in comparative perspective ....... 242
Figure VIII-35. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union by Region.................................. 243
Figure VIII-36. Predictors of Participation in Labour Union Meetings ..................................... 244
Figure VIII-37. Participation in Labour Union Meetings by Sex, Employment Status and Size of
City or Town ................................................................................................................................ 245
Figure VIII-38. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party by Year ..................................... 246
Figure VIII-39. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party in Comparative Perspective ...... 247
Figure VIII-40. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party by Region ................................. 248
Figure VIII-41. Race of Other Participants at Meetings of a Political Party ............................. 249
Figure VIII-42. Predictors of Participation in Political Party Meetings .................................... 250
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Figure VIII-43. Participation in Political Party Meetings by Political Interest .......................... 251
Figure VIII-44. Participation in Political Party Meetings by Size of City or Town .................. 252
Figure VIII-45. Participation in Meetings of Associations or Groups of Women in Comparative
Perspective ................................................................................................................................... 253
Figure VIII-46. Participation in Meetings of Associations or Groups of Women by Region ... 254
Figure VIII-47. Race of Other Participants at Meetings of Associations or Groups of Women255
Figure VIII-48. Predictors of Participation in Women’s Group or Association Meetings ........ 256
Figure VIII-49. Participation in Women’s Group or Association Meetings by Political Interest
...................................................................................................................................................... 257
Figure VIII-50. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Demand-making on Members
of Parliament ................................................................................................................................ 258
Figure VIII-51. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Demand-making on Local
Authorities .................................................................................................................................... 259
Figure VIII-52. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Demand-making on a
Ministry or State Agency ............................................................................................................. 260
Figure VIII-53. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Participation in Public
Demonstration or Protest .............................................................................................................. 261
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Index of Tables
Table i-1. Distribution of Population 20 Years and Over By Region ............................................. 7

Table i-2. Sample Size: Number of Interviews in Urban and Rural Areas by each Stratum ......... 8
Table i-3. Distribution of Sampling Points across Strata ............................................................... 8
Table VI.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support......................... 159
Table VI.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Guyana, 2009 . 161
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Preface
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support
of the AmericasBarometer. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of
important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers
throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.
USAID officers use the AmericasBarometer findings to prioritize funding allocation and
guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing
results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, AmericasBarometer is at
the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008
National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. AmericasBarometer also alerts
policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values
and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.
AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each

country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the
questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting
feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local
surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the
Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the
replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected,
Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country
reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.
While USAID continues to be the AmericasBarometer's biggest supporter, this year the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central
America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and
Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in
Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously,
allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the
country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country
stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how
these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific
themes and priorities.
USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of AmericasBarometer and

welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their
outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic
and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.
Regards,
Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez

AmericasBarometer Grant Manager at USAID
xiii
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Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project
Vanderbilt University
This study serves as the latest contribution of the AmericasBarometer series of surveys,
one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began
with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest
of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of
public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately,
such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The
AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the
Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of
surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and
incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of
surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective
data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the
realization of this study.
We embarked on the 2008 AmericasBarometer in the hope that the results would be of
interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international
donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the
democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been
engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable
democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to
bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best
questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The
scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the
Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the
decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.
For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was
used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which
took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the
research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s
Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team
from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for
the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus
allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy,
xv
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political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the
rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization,
corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the
important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found
surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.
A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common
design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level
quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.1 Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in
annexes of each country publication.
The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework
for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the
outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one
country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want
each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For
that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an
Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level
needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were
using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted
to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In
fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all
teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule,
applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample
N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the
individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only
when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For
example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the
average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items
were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.
LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader,
meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs
would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the
technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were
indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.
We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s
coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate
graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the
sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we
are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the
bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into
1
With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).
xvi
account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in
graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this
methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between
variables averages are statistically significant.
The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and
weighting2 in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable,
which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was
necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not
assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.
While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of
homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the
importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not
become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it
implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high
quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.
Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on
human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All
investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by
Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are
de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The
informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.
A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of
the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all
of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries,
and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a
random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were
then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted
of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the
interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved
comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were
encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of
auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the
2008 round of the AmericasBarometer. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert,
Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that
they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.
An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the
Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the
2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely
2
All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted expect for Bolivia and Ecuador.
xvii
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efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil
method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to
expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.
The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested
extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of
2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the
appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to
Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each
country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In
December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team.
In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18
was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument,
with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific
needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the
questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We
also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal
America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil.
In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of
the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each
country study.
Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft
studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections.
Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson,
the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for
final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before
you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample
design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000
respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are
utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin
America.
The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.
xviii
Mexico and Central America Group
Mexico
O p in ión P u b lica y M e rcad os
Guatemala
El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
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……
Andean/Southerm cone Group
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia
Paraguay
Chile
Uruguay
Brazil
Venezuela
xx
Caribbean Group
Dominican
Republic
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Canada and United States
Canada
United
States
xxi
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Acknowledgements
The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). Elizabeth Ramirez, Eric Kite and Sharon Carter assisted us
in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible
without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt’s Provost,
Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas
S. Zeppos, Chancellor generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and
had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center
for the Americas supported us with funding for various aspects of the study. Neal Tate, Chair of
the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since
its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the
Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director,
Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and
financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to
be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.
Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and
institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.
Country Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America Group
Mexico ● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados
● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala ● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES,
Guatemala
● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador ● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador
● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras ● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc.
● Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua
● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica ● Dr. Luís Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de
Costa Rica.
● Dr .Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
United States ● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canada ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University
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Country Researchers
Andean/Southern Cone Group
Colombia ● Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes
Ecuador ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt
University
● Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University
● Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
● Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University
● Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
● Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
● Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
● Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the
Peru Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
● Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt
University
● Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
● Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University
● Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
● Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
Paraguay ● Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay
Chile ● Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Uruguay ● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University
● Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
● Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of
Brazil
Brasilia
Venezuela ● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University
● Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois
● Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University
Country Researchers
Caribbean Group
Republica ● Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee
Dominicana ● Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University
Haiti ● Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University
Jamaica ● Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and
Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies
● Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work,
UWI, Mona.
Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time
away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would
have been impossible.
Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2008
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Executive Summary
The present study represents the second round of AmericasBarometer Surveys undertaken
by the Latin American Public Opinion Project in Guyana. The first, conducted in 2006, utilized
responses from a total of 1,555 Guyanese citizens of voting age, who were not institutionalized
and consented to anonymous interviews, to obtain a nationally representative sample of the
country’s population. Although only the second round conducted in Guyana, the Latin American
Public Opinion Project has been systematically measuring citizens’ values and attitudes in the
region for decades. Initially LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country,
Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive
regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human
rights and civil liberties). However, since then, the project has expanded to conducting bi-annual
nationally representative surveys in over twenty countries. In the 2008-09 round, over 40,000
people were interviewed throughout the Americas. Housed at Vanderbilt University in Nashville,
Tennessee, LAPOP is directed by founder Professor Mitchell A. Seligson and supported by an
International Advisory Board made up of scholars and leaders of international democracy
assistance organizations as well as a scientific support team and a large of group of graduate
student researchers.
From the 2006 round, LAPOP was able to arrive at a number of conclusions concerning
democratic attitudes, values and behaviours of the Guyanese population. For example, we found
that while the political culture in Guyana is clearly based on a democratic process, democratic
institutions within the country are still maturing. The second round of surveys has allowed the
LAPOP team to make comparison across time. In order to understand how attitudes and values
have changed during the three years between 2006 and 2009, throughout this report, the reader
will find comparisons between the two surveys at the national level.
In March and April of 2009, LAPOP, with the collaboration of local researchers,
completed interviews for the second round of the AmericasBarometer Survey in the Co-operative
Republic of Guyana. Like the 2006 survey, a nationally representative sample was drawn in the
current survey. However, the 2009 sample is larger and is able to more precisely represent the
regions in the country. Specifically, in this current round of surveys, by further refining the
stratification of the sample and increasing the sample size by about 1,000 respondents, we were
able to obtain representative samples of regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10. Given the relatively small
populations of regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 in the Guyanese hinterland, these regions were combined in a
single region. In total, 2,514 interviews were conducted throughout the country in the 2009 round
of the AmericasBarometer Survey in Guyana. The sampling by region has the distinct advantage
that it now allows researchers to come to conclusions at the sub-national (regional) level, in
addition to the national level as was done in 2006. Throughout this report, results from such
regional analyses are presented.
The present study is divided into three distinct sections. The first section is comprised of
both the preface and chapter one. The preface of this study briefly outlines the political and
economic contexts in Guyana while also going into more detail concerning the sample design.
xxv
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Chapter one, through the use of cross-national comparisons of the 24 participating countries in
the 2008/9 AmericasBarometer Survey, including Canada and the United States, proposes a
theoretical framework for the analysis of the current round of survey data, focusing primarily on
the impact of governance throughout the hemisphere. This chapter also presents the working
hypothesis utilized throughout the 2008/9 LAPOP series that citizen perception of a high quality
of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately lead to
consolidated democracies. For the current study, the LAPOP team defines the dependent
variable, support for stable democracy as central elements or dependent variables that could that
could reasonably be affected by the quality of governance. Borrowing from such canonical works
as Lipset’s The Political Man, Dahl’s Polyarchy and most notably Norris’ Critical Citizens, the
concept of support for stable democracy encapsulates (i) support for the right of participation and
citizen inclusion; (ii) political legitimacy, or the belief that the current political institutions are the
best for the system; (iii) interpersonal trust; and (iv) support for the idea that democracy per se is
the best form of government (also known as the Churchillean version of democracy). The 2009
round of the AmericasBarometer survey finds that for a majority of the essential components of a
stable democracy, Guyanese are in the intermediate range when compared with the other 23
countries included in the current survey round. For example, when asked whether given
democracies problems it is still better than any other form of government, the average score in
Guyana is 69.2 on the 0-100 scale. This places Guyana in the intermediate-low range, 16
positions below the highest country. In contrast, Canadians with an average score of 87.2, are at
the top end. In the area of belief in the right of public contestation, Guyana scores an average of
71.7 on the 0-100 scale. This places the country in the intermediate-high range, below eight other
countries in the region: Paraguay, Nicaragua, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay,
United States, Belize and Costa Rica. In regards to tolerance, the LAPOP data finds Guyana
scoring relatively high compared to the other countries in the region. Based on an index created
by LAPOP, we find that on a scale of 0-100, the average tolerance score is 58.1 in Guyana,
preceded only by Canada, Argentina, United States, Belize and Paraguay. While just over the
mid-point mark, the average Guyanese score for political legitimacy of core regime institutions of
52 points places the country in the high range in comparison with the other countries included in
the study, preceded only by Belize whose average was about 56. Finally, Guyana scored in the
intermediate range concerning interpersonal trust, with an average score of 60.1 points on the 0-
100 scale, 10 positions from the top. The chapters that follow in part II of this study more fully
develop the theory articulated in chapter I of this study, focusing in large measure on issues of
governance and the impact of governance on democratic stability.
Chapter two, examines the role of both public perceptions on the presence of corruption
as well as corruption victimization on support for stable democracy. The results in this chapter
suggest that corruption victimization remains relatively high in Guyana compared to other
countries in the region. Similarly, corruption appears to have increased in sectors such as the
police in 2009, when compared to 2006, whereas it has decreased within the work place, health,
and educational sectors during the same period. Furthermore, corruption victimization seems to
be most pronounced in Regions 3 and 4 in comparison to Region 2. Afro-Guyanese have a lower
probability of being victims of corruption compared to mixed Guyanese. These data also suggest
that corruption victimization has an impact on support for the legitimacy of core political
institutions, while also finding that the perception of corruption has a positive impact on the right
xxvi
of public contestation. These results suggest that discontented citizens agree with the idea of
making demands on the government for a change, especially with regards to corruption.
Chapter three examines the relationship between crime and its support on stable
democracy. This chapter distinguishes between perceptions of crime and actual crime
victimization. The results found here indicate that crime victimization varies by region and has a
negative impact on interpersonal trust, suggesting that those Guyanese who have been victims by
any act of delinquency may lose confidence in others. In addition, the fear of crime has a negative
effect on support for the idea of democracy, interpersonal trust, and the belief of legitimacy of
core political institutions. When people feel that they are unsafe, there is a higher probability that
they turn these feelings against others and the political system itself, increasing their disbelief in
the legitimacy of their political institutions, such as the police and the judiciary. Furthermore, the
fear of crime appears to be most pronounced among females, the young, and those who live in
larger cities.
Chapter four examines the impact of local government evaluations and participation on
support for stable democracy. In terms of perception of local government performance, the
Guyanese view it as roughly equal to the performance of both regional and national governments.
On the 0-100 scale, average support for local government performance is 48.9 points, statistically
indistinguishable from the other two levels of government. However, delving deeper into this
issue and examining it at the regional level, we find that sparsely populated Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9
hold higher levels of satisfaction in regards to local government performance than more urban
regions such as 10 and.
In terms of participation in local government, Guyana falls in an intermediate position in

comparison with the other countries included in the survey. Eleven percent of the Guyanese
population attended a municipal meeting in the past year. There is, however, significant variation
between regions, with 25% of citizens in Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 attending such a meeting while
only 6% of Guyanese in Region 4 did so. Likewise, 12.5% of the population made a demand on
their municipal government in the past year.
This chapter finds a significant relationship between satisfaction with local services and
both belief in political legitimacy of core institutions and interpersonal trust as well as core
democratic values as articulated in chapter one. As expected, both relationships are positive
leading us to conclude that those who hold lower satisfaction with local government services also
tend to have lower levels of belief in institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.
Chapter five turns to perceptions of economic performance by the government and how
these perceptions impact support for stable democracy in Guyana. In 2009, over 56% of the
Guyanese population identified the economy as being the main problem of the country; this is up
from 40% in 2006. However, in order to understand how the Guyanese perceive the economic
performance of the national government, the Latin American Public Opinion Project constructed
an index combining questions asking respondents to rate their government’s performance on
fighting poverty and combating unemployment. In comparative perspective, Guyana ranks in the
intermediate range of the other countries included in the 2008/09 survey round with an average
xxvii
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response of 45.4 points on a 0-100 scale. While the Guyanese population may be more concerned
with the economy today than in 2006, according to the data obtained from the current round, their
assessment of the national government’s economic performance is higher in 2009 than it was in
20061 suggesting that, as whole, the citizens of Guyana do not blame their own national
government for the economic difficulties.
This chapter also analyzes the relationship between perceptions of government economic
performance and specific support for democracy. This type of democratic support, in contrast to
diffuse support for democracy, addresses one’s support for the current government and not
necessarily for the democratic system. To measure specific support for democracy, this chapter
utilizes the question asking respondents to rate the performance of the government of Guyana. As
expected, a significant positive relationship resulted from the analysis with those who hold higher
perceptions of government economic performance also possessing higher satisfaction with the
work of the current government. In addition to one’s perception of government economic
performance, we also find that perception of one’s personal economic situation, the national
economic situation, living in a rural area and a small city and age all have positive effects on
one’s specific support for democracy.
Finally, chapter five examines the relationship of perception of economic performance of

the government on support for stable democracy. Of the essential components articulated in
chapter one, we find that several have significant relationships with one’s perception of economic
performance by the government. This analysis finds that perception of government economic
performance is negatively related to support for contestation. Perceived legitimacy toward
democratic institutions and interpersonal trust both hold positive relationships with perceptions of
government economic performance.
Chapter six addresses the topic of legitimacy of the political system as well as citizens’
perceptions about democracy and political institutions in Guyana. The citizens of Guyana express
rather high levels of attitudes favourable toward stable democracy compared to other countries in
the Americas. Around 35.7% of Guyanese express high levels of system support and political
tolerance, and this percentage has increased with respect to 2006. Within Guyana we observe
some differences across regions regarding attitudes favourable towards stable democracy. Region
2 has the highest percentage of people holding high levels of both system support and political
tolerance, whereas Region 4 has the lowest levels. Regarding the determinants of support for
stable democracy, we find that it depends above all upon citizens’ perceptions of government
economic performance, that is to say the extent to which the current government is fighting
poverty and unemployment. In this chapter we also examine the levels of confidence in the main
public institutions. In this regard, citizens show intermediate levels of trust in their institutions,
with averages around 50 points on a 0-100 scale. The Church and the Guyana Defence Force are
the institutions that reach the highest levels of confidence while the Mayor’s Office, the Guyana
Police Force and political parties are the most distrusted institutions. A third aspect analyzed in
this chapter was confidence in the justice system. Again, Guyanese express intermediate levels of
1
In 2009, the average score for the “econperf” index was 45.4 points on the 0-100 scale, this is up from 34.6 points
in 2006.
xxviii
trust. We find that this confidence depends on satisfaction with the current president, ethnic self-
identification (Indians and Amerindians trust more than Blacks and Mixed), region (Region 2 has
the highest levels whereas Region 4 has the lowest levels), and perceptions of and experiences
with corruption. These perceptions and personal experiences have a negative impact on one’s
confidence in the justice system. Finally, we note that despite the fact that a majority of Guyanese
citizens, 67.6%, consider democracy as the preferable form of government, only half are satisfied
or very satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Guyana.
In Chapter seven we analyse voting behaviour and party identification in Guyana. First,
we look at how many people have already registered to be included in the voters list in order to
be eligible to vote in the next general elections of 2011. We observe that 81.6% of Guyanese
report being registered to vote, with few notable differences among regions in the country.
Statistical analyses show that people in urban areas and wealthy citizens are more likely to be
registered as well as Indians. Regarding electoral behaviour, around 70% of respondents report
having voted in the last elections of 2006. Region 5 appears to be region with the highest levels
in both registered voters and electoral turnout. We also find that men and young people report
being less likely to vote in the 2006 elections. Furthermore, we also observe a strong correlation
between vote choice and ethnic self-identification. Finally, in the third section of this chapter, we
analyse party identification in Guyana, which reveals that the country displays the lowest levels
of party identification in the Americas. Only 12.2% of citizens identify with a political party,
most of them identifying with either the PPP or the PNC in similar percentages.
The final chapter of the report is part of the third section, Beyond Governance,
which examines democratic issues outside of the realm of governance. Chapter eight analyses,
in-depth, one of the five components of stable democracy laid out in chapter one, interpersonal
trust. Attempting to understand the role of interpersonal trust in a democratic society, this chapter
takes advantage of the comparative nature of the 2008/09 round of the AmericasBarometer
survey and examines the issue not only cross-nationally, but also across time between 2006 and
2009 in Guyana. First, it is discovered that Guyana falls in the intermediate range of interpersonal
trust compared with the 23 other countries included in the series. With an average score of 60.1
points on the 0-100 scale, Guyana ranks 11 places from the top country, which is occupied by
Canada with an average score of 79.6.
Over time, the differences between 2006 and 2009 are statistically
indistinguishable. However, we do find that in regard to region, Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 and Region
5 have significantly higher levels of interpersonal trust than do those living in Region 10 and
Region 4.
Chapter eight also examines the determinants of interpersonal trust, finding that,
in the case of Guyana, crime victimization, being female and being of mixed race all have
significant negative relationships with levels of interpersonal trust, while age, wealth, and living
in small cities and rural areas (compared to the nation’s capital) all hold significant positive
relationships with interpersonal trust.
xxix
……
The second part of chapter eight examines issues of civic participation and levels
of such types of participation in Guyana. Utilizing LAPOP’s “CP” series, this section analyses
individually participation in solving community problems, participation in meetings of religious
groups, participation in meetings of parents associations, participation in meetings of a committee
for community improvements, participation in meetings of professional associations,
participation in meetings of labour unions, participation in meetings of political parties and
participation in meetings of women’s’ associations or groups, all within the last twelve months.
In terms of civic participation in comparative perspective, Guyana consistently

ranks toward the top or intermediate high range in comparison with the other countries included
in the survey. The only two areas of civic participation where Guyana falls to the intermediate
low range is in participation in committees for community improvement where Guyana, with
25.3% of the population having participated, places it in the 16th position from the top and in
labour union participation where Guyana finds itself seventh from the bottom, with 5.5% of
Guyanese participating in the past year.
Regionally speaking, Guyanese living in the stratum of Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9

consistently show more civic participation than those of other regions. The only two areas of
civic participation where Guyanese of this particular region did not participate more than
residents in any other region were participation in labour unions (where residents of Regions 1, 7,
8 and 9 actually participated the least) and in participation in meetings of political parties, where
this particular stratum fell in the middle of the other regions being analysed.
Interestingly, across all types of civic participation included in this study, in

Guyana we found a decrease in participation over the previous round. The only category,
however, where this decrease in participation was statistically insignificant was in regards to
participation in meetings of professional associations. Participation in meetings of religious
groups, for example, decreased by almost 20 percentage points between 2006 and 2009 while
participation in parent associations decreased by almost nine percent. Participation in labour
union meetings decreased by almost 10% between 2006 and 2009 while participation in political
party meetings decreased by about 5 percentage points between the same time period.
Chapter eight also examined which Guyanese are more likely to engage in certain
types of civic participation. Employing statistical models for a number of types of participation,
we discovered that sex, age, wealth, area size and region were all consistently significant
predictors of civic participation, however, not always in the same direction. For example,
compared to men, women are more likely to participate in activities such as religious meetings
and parent association meetings while men are more likely to participate in meetings of
committees for community improvement, professional associations and labour unions. As regards
to age, we find that older Guyanese are more likely to participate in religious meetings and
meetings of professional associations while younger Guyanese participate more heavily in
meetings of parent associations. Wealth is a significant positive predictor in participation in
religious meetings and an insignificant predictor in all other types of civic participation.
xxx
Compared with the metropolitan area of the national capital (Georgetown), this
chapter finds that those living in rural areas are significantly less likely to participate in religious
meetings; those living in rural areas are significantly more likely to participate in labour union
meetings; and those living in both small cities and rural areas are more likely to participate in
political party meetings compared to those Guyanese living in the nation’s capital
Citizens in Region 4 are less likely to participate in meetings of religious

organizations than are Guyanese living in any other region of the country; Guyanese in Region 2
are significantly less likely to participate in parent association meetings compared to Guyanese
living in Region 4 while those living in Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 are significantly more likely to
participate in meetings of committees for community improvement than those Guyanese living in
Region 4. Citizens in Region 10 are more likely to participate in professional association
meetings than Guyanese living in Region 4 while Guyanese in Region 10 are less likely to
participate in political party meetings than are citizens in Region 4. Finally, we notice that
women in Region 6 and Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 are statistically more likely to participate in women
groups and associations than women in Region 4.
Details of all of the information presented above are contained in the full report.
xxxi
……
PART ONE:
THEORY AND
CROSS-NATIONAL
COMPARISSONS
Context of Democratic Development in Guyana,

Method and Description of Data.
Political Context
The political situation in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana has been, since at least
1957, marred by racial tensions and identity politics. It was in that year that the People’s
Progressive Party (PPP) split along racial lines with most Indo-Guyanese supporting it while the
majority of Guyana’s black population began supporting the newly formed People’s National
Congress (PNC). Indeed, as will be demonstrated at many places in this volume, these divisions
concerning race and party identification are still present in Guyana.
Below, Figure i-1 presents Guyana’s Freedom House score on Democracy since 1972 as
compared with Latin American averages.4 Given that in Freedom House’s measure the “freer” a
society is in terms of both civil and political rights, the lower the score, for ease of interpretation,
we have inverted the scale so that higher scores signify a more democratic society. As can be
seen from the figure, for much of the 1990s, following the election placing the PPP as the
majority party in the country, Guyana was classified as a “free” society, routinely scoring above
the Latin American average. It should be noted that in 1992 the PNC lost control of the
government for the first time since its election in 1964. During this time period the PNC led
Guyana amid “credible and persistent allegations of electoral irregularities, including vote rigging
and list padding.”5
4
In order to calculate average Freedom House score for the Latin American Region, the sum for each year was taken
from the following countries and divided by the total number of countries (32): Grenada Antigua & Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominical,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts & Nevis ,St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Country scores were not included in the analysis until they achieved independence.
5
Electoral Assistance Bureau. 2007. EAB Final Report: General and Regional Elections, 28th August 2006, Co-
Operative Republic of Guyana.
http://www.gecom.org.gy/pdf/Electoral%20Assistance%20Bureau%20Final_Report%202006%20elections.pdf.
Accessed 06 June 2009. Page 11.
3
……
12
Democracy Index (Inverted) 10

Freedom House
v 5
ec 87
72
74
76
78
.1 No 80
91
93
95
97
99
01
03
05
07
N 98 ov. 3
9
.1 No 8
8
98
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
ov 6- 19
8- .19
ov 4- .19
.1
v
.1 N
D
ov 2-
Latin America
N 98
8
98
9
.1
g
Guyana
Au
Figure i-1. Freedom House Scores in Guyana and Latin America, 1972-2008
Between the years 1993 and 2004, Guyana’s combined Freedom House score of political
and civil liberties exceeded the average of the Latin American region. Indeed, for these 11 years
Guyana was classified as a “free” society. However, as can be seen in Figure i-1, Guyana’s
ranking declined somewhat in 2005, dropping from a score of 10 to 8 on the Freedom House
inverted index, and also reducing its classification from “free” to “partly free.” According to the
annual report released for that year by Freedom House, this change in classification was
attributed to “…the government’s failure to fully investigate the emergence of anticrime death
squads and the growing influence of the illegal narcotics trade on the country’s political system.”6
The following year, Guyana’s ranking increased by one point on the combined scale, enough to
elevate it back to being considered a “free” society, however, since 2005, Guyana’s Freedom
House score has again fallen below that of the regional average.
Economic Context
Since achieving independence from Great Britain in 1966, Guyana’s economic
performance can at best be described as inconsistent. Following a short period of economic
growth between 1970 and 1975, Guyana’s accumulated growth of GDP between 1976 and 1990
was -32.8% according the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean.
This economic inconsistency has persisted into more recent years; Figure i.2, shown below,
6
Freedom House. 2006. “Freedom in the World- Guyana (2006).”
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2006&country=6975. Accessed 05 June 2009.
4
presents average GDP growth for Guyana compared with averages for the entire Latin American
region.
10
-2
-4
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Guyana Latin America and the Caribbean
Figure i-2. Economic Growth in Guyana and Latin America 1972-2008
As is apparent from the figure above, as in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean
more generally, Guyana has experienced considerable ebbs and flows in economic growth. Since
1990, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana has witnessed five year of negative economic growth,
1990, 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2005 while the average for Latin America has fallen into negative
territory only once, in 2002. Following Guyana’s negative growth rate in 2005, the country saw a
significant improvement in economic performance the following year (2006) with 5% GDP
growth during that year as well as in 2007. In 2008 however, economic growth declined to just
3%.
As one of the Western Hemisphere’s poorest countries with a per capita income of about
one-fifth of the average in South America,7 Guyana faces formidable economic challenges. In
2007, following the most recent general and regional elections in the country, the Electoral
Assistance Bureau (EAB) attributed the current economic climate to a considerable external debt
estimated to be roughly $1.2 billion U.S. dollars which, according to the EAB has had direct
effects in “hamper[ing] efforts aimed at restoring the nation’s dilapidated physical and social
infrastructures.”8 Additionally, the report cites the European Market’s decision to reduce (and
eventually eliminate) preferential price regimes for Guyanese sugar as also contributing to its
most recent economic woes. Finally, an inadequate education system as well as high levels of
migration are also seen as impeding both short and long-term development in the country.
7
Electoral Assistance Bureau, page 12. See note 2.
8
Ibid.
5
……
Sample Design
In order to systematically assess democratic attitudes, behaviours, and values among the
Guyanese population, the Latin American Public Opinion Project in March and April of 2009
interviewed a total of 2,514 Guyanese who were of voting age, not institutionalized and who
consented to participate anonymously in the study. This most current round of surveys in Guyana
complements the first AmericasBarometer Survey conducted in Guyana in 2006, allowing us to
begin carrying out analyses of the values, behaviours and attitudes of the Guyanese population
across time. In both years, the questionnaire was pretested and interviewers and supervisors were
trained by Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr. The full questionnaire is contained in the
appendix of this report.
Population
The distribution of the sample was based on the 2002 census data carried out by the
Bureau of Statistics. According to the 2002 census data, Guyana has a total of 751,223
inhabitants. Twenty eight percent (28%) of the population was living in municipalities that
constitute what is categorized as the urban area in this study and the remaining seventy-two
percent (72%) live in rural and hinterland areas administered by Neighbourhood Democratic
Councils (NDCs), Amerindian Village Councils (AVCs) and Community Development Councils
(CDCs). The country is divided into 10 administrative regions as shown in the map below.
Figure i-3. Map of Guyana Showing the Administrative Regions
6
Table i-1 shows the distribution of the population 20 years old and over by region and
urban and rural areas. The census bureau did not release information on the 18 and over
population, hence the team had little option but to use the 20 and over age group, making the
reasonable assumption that the distribution of the 18 and 19 year olds does not vary from the 20
and over population.
Table i-1. Distribution of Population 20 Years and Over By Region

Population Urban Rural
Region % % %
total area area
Region 1 (Barima/Waini) 9,845 2.40% - 0.00% 9,845 2.40%
Region 2 (Pomeroon/Supenaam) 25,568 6.20% 7,131 1.70% 18,437 4.50%
Region 3 (West Demerara/Essequibo
58,215 14.20% - 0.00% 58,215 14.20%
Island)
Region 4 (Demerara/Mahaica) 176,812 43.00% 80,874 19.70% 95,938 23.40%
Region 5 (Mahaica/West Berbice) 28,620 7.00% - 0.00% 28,620 7.00%
Region 6 (East Berbice/Corentyne) 68,972 16.80% 18,523 4.50% 50,449 12.30%
Region 7 (Cuyuni/Mazaruni) 8,483 2.10% - 0.00% 8,483 2.10%
Region 8 (Siparuni/Potaro) 5,028 1.20% - 0.00% 5,028 1.20%
Region 9 (Upper Takatu/UpperEssequibo) 8,375 2.00% - 0.00% 8,375 2.00%
Region 10 (Upper Demerara/Berbice) 20,948 5.10% 15,587 3.80% 5,361 1.30%
Total 410,866 100% 122,115 29.70% 288,751 70.30%
Source: Guyana Census (2002)
Sampling Method
The sample was designed by Dominique Zéphyr from the LAPOP central office. The goal
was to have a sample that represents the entire adult population of Guyana. It is a random
stratified sample representative at the national, urban and rural, and regional levels. The
stratification ensures the inclusion and representation of the most important geographic regions in
the country. Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 (Barima-Waini, Cuyani-Mazaruni, Potaro-Siparuni and Upper
Takutu-Upper Essequibo), because of their relatively small populations, were combined into a
single group while each of the other regions (Regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10: Pomeroon-
Supenamm, Essequibo Islands-West Demerara, Demerara-Mahica, Mahaica-Berbice, East
Berbice-Corentyne and Upper Demerar-Berbice) are in their own strata. The sample was further
sub-stratified into urban and rural areas. The proposed size of the sample for each stratum (by
urban and rural areas) is shown in the Table i-2.
7
……
Table i-2. Sample Size: Number of Interviews in Urban and Rural Areas by each Stratum
Number of
Total Number of
Population % Urban % Rural Interviews
Stratum Stratum Name Number of Interviews in
total population population in Rural
Interviews Urban Area
Area
I Region 2 25,568 312 27.9% 96 72.1% 216
II Region 3 58,215 300 - 0 100.0% 300
III Region 4 176,812 666 45.7% 336 54.3% 330
IV Region 5 28,620 300 - 0 100.0% 300
V Region 6 68,972 306 26.9% 96 73.1% 210
VI Region 10 20,948 330 74.4% 240 25.6% 90
VII Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9 31,731 300 - 0 100.0% 300
Total Country total 410,866 2514 29.7% 768 70.3% 1746
In order to draw the sample, we followed a multistage procedure. We first selected the
municipalities and Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDC) according to their population
size, followed by the selection of sectors (imply economic sectors – agri, health, education, etc)
and villages, and in the last stage enumeration districts (EDs) and households were chosen. For
the selection of units in each stage, we implemented the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS)
method.
In order to minimize travel time and costs, a fixed number of interviews was carried out in
each sampling point within each stratum. Thus, the Guyana sample follows a clustered sample
design. A total of 10 to 12 and 8 interviews were conducted in each sampling point in rural and
urban areas, correspondingly. In total, as shown in Table i-3, the sample is composed of 267
sampling points: 171 urban and 96 rural.
Table i-3. Distribution of Sampling Points across Strata

Number of interviews Sampling points
Stratum Stratum Name
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
I Region 2 96 216 312 12 18 30
II Region 3 - 300 300 - 30 30
III Region 4 336 330 666 42 33 75
IV Region 5 - 300 300 - 30 30
V Region 6 96 210 306 12 21 33
VI Region 10 240 90 330 30 9 39
VII Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9 - 300 300 - 30 30
Total Country total 768 1746 2514 96 171 267
8
The margin of error anticipated for the national sample is ±2.0%, assuming a Simple
Random Sample (SRS) design, and a 50-50% distribution for a dichotomous variable (a
maximum possible variation) and a 95% confidence level (z=1.96).
The sample is not self-weighted. Different sampling fractions were used in each stratum.
Consequently, different sample weights were calculated for each stratum. Since the sample is
stratified, clustered, and weighted, in the analysis of the data we took into account the complex
sample design to accurately estimate the precision (standard errors) of the results presented in this
study.
Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 2008

Sample
100% Location
Urban
Rural
80%
70.0% 67.4%
Percentage
60%
40%
20%
30.0% 32.6%
0%
2006 2009
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
Figure i -4. Sample Distribution by Geographic Area
In addition to stratifying by region, the 2009 AmericasBarometer Survey also accounts

for the urban vs. rural geographic dispersion in the population. We have therefore also stratified
for geographic zone, dividing the sample into rural and urban populations, Figure i-4 presents
both the 2006 and 2009 sample distributions by geographic area. As can seen in the above figure,
about 67% of the 2009 sample came from rural areas of the country while almost 33% lived in
urban zones. This compares to 70% from rural areas and 30% from urban areas of Guyana during
the 2006 round.
9
……
100% Sex
Male
Female
80%
49.4% 50.0%
Percentage
60%
40%
50.6% 50.0%
20%
0%
2006 2009
Figure i -5. Sample Distribution by Sex
Focusing now on gender, both the 2006 and 2009 surveys, Figure i-4, shown above
presents the distribution of the sample by sex after applying the appropriate weights. As can be
seen, for the current round in Guyana 50% of the sample consists of male respondents while the
other 50% is comprised of female respondents. Additionally, Figure i-5 displays the sample
distribution from the 2006 round by sex, which is directly comparable to 2009. The differences
are minor and not statistically significant.
2.1%
100% 6.2% Age
7.5% 16-25
7.3%
26-35
80%
16.0%
16.9% 36-45
46-55
56-65
21.5%
Percentage
60% 66+
22.2%
40%
30.4%
25.5%
20%
22.6% 21.9%
0%
2006 2009
Figure i -6. Sample Distribution by Age
10
Figure i-6 displays the sample distribution according to age range for both the 2006 and
2009 rounds in Guyana. The age distribution between the two rounds appear relatively similar,
although we notice a slight decrease in the proportion of respondents falling into the 26-35 year
old age range and a slight increase in those respondents reporting their age as being 66 years old
or older.
100% Education Level

10.8% Primary
17.3%
Secondary
80% Higher
Percentage
60% 56.4%
58.3%
40%
20%
32.8%
24.4%
0%
2006 2009
Figure i-7. Sample Distribution by Education Level
In terms of the sample distribution by education, Figure i-7, illustrated below, shows that
compared with the 2006 sample, in 2009 the AmericasBarometer Survey has an increased
proportion of respondents reporting only a primary education while seeing a decrease in terms of
both higher educated respondents and those with secondary educations, although for the latter the
decrease was only about 2 percentage points. In 2006 those with only primary education made up
roughly 24% of the sample while in 2009 they represented almost 33%. Those with secondary
education accounted for about 58% of the sample in 2006 while in 2009 their representation
decreased to just over 56% of the total sample. Finally those Guyanese who reported having had
completed higher education accounted for about 17% of the total sample in 2006 while in 2009
just under 11%.
11
……
100% Ethnicity
7.2% 8.9%
Indian
Black
80% 25.4% 21.3% Mixed
Amerindian
Percentage 60%
31.6% 31.6%
40%
20% 38.1%
35.8%
0%
2006 2009
Figure i-8. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification
Finally, and of particular import in the case of Guyana is the ethnic distribution of the
2009 sample. This study will show that tensions exist between the two dominant ethnic groups in
the country, those of Afro-Guyanese or black descent and those of Indo-Guyanese or Indian
descent. After applying the appropriate weights, we see, in Figure i.8 the sample distributions for
both 2006 and 2009 according to ethnic self-identification. As can be seen above, in both rounds
Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese make up a majority of respondents in the sample. For 2006
the combined proportion of these two ethnicities is just over 67% while 7% of the sample is
comprised of those self identifying as indigenous or Amerindian and the remaining 25% as being
of mixed race. In 2009 however, we see that roughly 70% of the sample self-identifies as being
either Black or Indian, about 9% identify as Amerindian and the remaining 21% as mixed race. It
is worth pointing out that the ethnic distribution of the 2009 AmericasBarometer sample in
Guyana compares relatively well with the official ethnic breakdown of the country as reported by
the Guyanese government. In their 2007 post-election report, the Electoral Assistance Bureau
estimated the proportion of Guyanese of Indian descent being 43.5% of the population, those of
African descent accounting for roughly 30% of the total population; indigenous citizens make up
9% while mixed race and those of other ethnicities account for about 17% of the total population.
12
Chapter I. Building Support for Stable

Democracy 9
Theoretical Framework
Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an
elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via
executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington
1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the
chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of
every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are
many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of
stability and breakdown , such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966),
studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring,
et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy
makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term they can best help to consolidate
democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.
The best advice, of course, for achieving democratic stability for countries that have made
the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what
the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, et al. 2000).10 Yet, generating
national wealth is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place overnight.
Can governments, and international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic
stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-
level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an
unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel,
Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, et al. 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán
forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive
impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is
really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can
be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the
focus of this study, is ideal.
9
This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.
10
This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to
democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once
a country becomes democractic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.
13
……
Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly, attention is being placed on good
governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not
a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago.
Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve
problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the performance of
regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we
increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish,
often rendered as gobernabilidad, or more accurately, gobernanza11).12 Good governance may
well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the
same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help
produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman
2000a).
Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout
the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from
many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some
countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding
(Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but
questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.
Working hypothesis
Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the
2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception
of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that citizen perception of a high quality
of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to
consolidated democracies.13 Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not
performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and
11
Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use
the term “gobernabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.”
Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “gobernabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what
is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the quality or performance of government as
perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we
are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño
gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term,
“gobernabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use
“governance” in the English languague versions.
12
According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define governance as the traditions and institutions by
which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in
authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively
manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the
state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”
13
We emphasize support for stable democracy; recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts,
ultimately affect the stability of any regime.
14
thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly
popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where
serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which
liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a
single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for
some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable
democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that
a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot
think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion
research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong
link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).14
Therefore, demonstrating that governance matters, and more particularly what forms of
governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an
important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.
To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series
of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen
support for stable democracy. We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a
significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy. Indeed, we
strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are
linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance
and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant
advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?
There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of
which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel
Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult
to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP
AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series
provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and
does not allow for sub national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy
practitioners want to determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover,
the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a
series of surveys of expert opinion on the perception of the quality of governance (Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and
therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences
(e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986;
Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given
country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.15 The AmericasBarometer data
14
Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those
proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questions those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the
direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).
15
For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006;
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).
15
……
allows us to measure the quality of governance as perceived and experienced by the citizens of
the Americas themselves, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach,
while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes
depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the
values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to
influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.
There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience
with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the
extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005;
Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence
citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the
ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly
democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that
governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose,
Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of
Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to
successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).
Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of citizen perception of and
experience with governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the
Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by
LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy.
In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II
of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by
itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have
taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the
combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report,
we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or
four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance.
In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work
(Norris 1999):
1) Belief in democracy as the best possible system. Belief in the Churchillean concept of
democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
2) Belief in the core values on which democracy depends. Belief in the two key dimensions that
defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
3) Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy: the executive, the legislature, the
justice system, and political parties.
4) Belief that others can be trusted. Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.
16
Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for
democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn16:
Support for the Idea of Democracy per se

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If
citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a
question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, et al. 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The
item is often called the “Churchillean concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston
Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler
and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of
sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that
democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried
from time to time.”
In the Americas Barometer, we tap this concept with the following item:
ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.
The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I-1. The reader should
note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are
close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically
significant difference among those countries.17 At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed
in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with
the Churchillean notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of
agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this
notion. In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.
16
We acknowlede that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these
dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important
for demoratic stability.
17
Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these
studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by
neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this
study.
17
……
Canada 87.2
Argentina 86.9
Uruguay 85.3
Venezuela 83.8
United States 78.4
Costa Rica 78.2
Dominican Republic 74.9
Jamaica 73.9
Colombia 73.0
Nicaragua 72.9
Belize 71.9
Bolivia 71.8
Panama 71.6
Brazil 70.5
Chile 69.5
Guyana 69.2
Mexico 68.5
El Salvador 68.4
Haiti 66.6
Ecuador 66.6
Peru 65.5
Paraguay 62.9
Guatemala 60.5
Honduras 59.9
0 20 40 60 80 100
Support for Democracy

95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)
Figure I-1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective
We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident
that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we
understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006
AmericasBarometer it was found that that there is significant variation in the meaning of
democracy among respondents and countries (see www.AmericasBarometer.org to download
these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three
additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.
Support for Core Values on which Democracy Depends

In Robert Dahl’s classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the
belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) Contestation and 2) Inclusiveness. An recent
extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.)
that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two
18
dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured
with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:
A. Support for the Right of Public Contestation (contest) which is measured as belief in a
system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior
studies by LAPOP the following three items have been found to form a reliable scale.18
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstration. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much
do you approve or disapprove?
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or
disapprove?
The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in the Figure I-2
below. Once again, majorities in every country support these critical rights. Even among the
countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive
range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen’s right to contestation. In eight
countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with no real difference
among these countries.
18
Cronbach alpha coefficients are amost always above .7.
19
……
Paraguay 82.3
Nicaragua 81.2
Argentina 80.3
Uruguay 77.6
United States 77.2
Belize 76.0
Costa Rica 76.0
Guyana 71.7
Jamaica 70.9
El Salvador 70.6
Venezuela 70.0
Colombia 67.8
Panama 67.7
Brazil 67.4
Mexico 66.6
Peru 65.8
Chile 64.8
Guatemala 64.4
Ecuador 62.2
Haiti 61.6
Bolivia 61.1
Honduras 58.0
0 20 40 60 80
Support for the Right

of Public Contestation
Figure I-2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation

in Comparative Perspective
B. Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness (support for minority rights, or opposition
rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as
Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of
uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a
wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become
majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections
opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or
demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power,
and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the
PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In
order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is
important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The
LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political
tolerance:
20
D1. There are people who speak negatively of the (national) form of government, not just the
government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such
people’s right to vote?
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful
demonstrations in order to express their views?
D3. Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (national) form of government, how strongly do you
approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make
speeches?
The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I-3. These results,
based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key
democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only five countries are above 60, and eight
countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the
intolerant end of the continuum.
It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance,
depend in part upon one’s position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a
high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election
in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency.
When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (D5) is used, then Paraguay
falls to the country 6th lowest in tolerance.
21
……
Canada 73.3
Argentina 67.8
United States 66.3
Belize 65.6
Paraguay 63.1
Guyana 58.1
Jamaica 57.2
Costa Rica 56.7
Brazil 56.3
Uruguay 54.9
Venezuela 54.6
El Salvador 54.2
Mexico 52.6
Panama 51.9
Nicaragua 50.4
Chile 49.1
Colombia 49.0
Peru 48.5
Haiti 48.2
Ecuador 47.3
Honduras 47.1
Guatemala 43.6
Bolivia 43.0
0 20 40 60 80
Political Tolerance
Figure I-3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective
Belief in the Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives,
and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries
with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that
effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic
ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and
judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical
defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006;
Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political
legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index19 based on five items from the
AmericasBarometer survey:
19
This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.
22
B14. To what extent do you trust the national government?
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure I-4. These
results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy,
many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a
number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the
incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely
popular (e.g. Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key
institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures
support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that
administration.
There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on
support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the
scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative,
controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item
M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the
institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.
The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on
the negative size. Indeed, only Mexico, Guyana, and Belize, just barely have a score above 50 on
the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of
legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999;
Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington
2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for
opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of
including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.
23
……
Belize 56.1
Guyana 52.0
Mexico 50.7
Uruguay 49.8
Jamaica 49.5
Colombia 49.0
Chile 48.4
United States 47.8
Costa Rica 45.5
Haiti 45.2
Bolivia 44.7
El Salvador 43.5
Venezuela 42.7
Guatemala 42.2
Panama 41.7
Honduras 41.5
Nicaragua 38.8
Brazil 38.6
Argentina 37.9
Peru 35.7
Ecuador 31.1
Paraguay 29.5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Political Legitimacy of
Core Regime Institutions
95% I.C.
(Results controlled for approval of chief executive performance)
Figure I-4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions

in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief
executive performance)
The impact of excluding the measuring trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown
in Figure I-5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of
nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that
suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings with the question on the
administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.
24
Belize 56.3
Guyana 52.2
Mexico 49.1
Jamaica 48.9
Uruguay 48.7
United States 48.4
Colombia 47.6
Chile 46.2
Costa Rica 43.8
Haiti 43.3
Bolivia 42.5
El Salvador 42.3
Venezuela 41.4
Panama 41.0
Guatemala 40.6
Honduras 40.3
Nicaragua 37.5
Brazil 36.6
Argentina 36.2
Peru 34.6
Paraguay 28.2
Ecuador 26.9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
95% I.C.
(Results controlled for approval of chief executive performance)
Figure I-5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions

in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national
government and controlled for approval of chief executive
performance)
Social Capital
Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant
research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of
social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and
Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found
to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the
extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national
governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein
and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables
we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:
25
……
IT1. Now, talking about the people from around here, would you say that the people are very
trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy.
The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I-6. On the familiar
0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the
true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a
level of only 68.1.
Canada 79.6
Costa Rica 68.1
United States 67.0
Paraguay 66.1
El Salvador 64.9
Colombia 62.6
Uruguay 62.4
Venezuela 60.5
Jamaica 60.3
Guatemala 60.2
Guyana 60.1
Nicaragua 58.1
Panama 58.0
Mexico 57.3
Chile 56.6
Ecuador 54.2
Argentina 54.2
Brazil 53.7
Belize 53.2
Bolivia 52.1
Honduras 51.8
Peru 47.1
Haiti 40.8
0 20 40 60 80
Interpersonal Trust
Figure I-6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective
Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer
data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of
and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined
here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior
research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to
determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four
dimensions.
26
PART TWO:
GOVERNANCE
27
……
Chapter II. Corruption and its Impact

on Support for Stable
Democracy
Theoretical Framework20
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of
the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues on the
international political agenda as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler,
Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private
gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. However,
since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at
serious risk of retribution, the topic was not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy
in almost every country in the region, however, reporting and discussion of corruption has
become widespread.
For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and unequal
distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often
results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. It also affects private
business and civil society organizations as well. More recently, corruption has been shown to
have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public
sector. There is growing understanding of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic
development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and
McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000;
Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).
In June, 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American

Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD and representatives
from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe
including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption. Then, in February, 1999, the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to
Combat Corruption in African Countries.”
The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of just a few years ago when corrupt
practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational
corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of
20
This theoretical section was prepared by Diana Orcés.
29
……
international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in
many developing nations.
It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the
nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.”
This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on
the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little
accountability, and perverse incentives.”21 Thus, effective initiatives should rely upon
“strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning
terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be
complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained
anti-corruption interventions.”
How Might Corruption Affect Support for Stable Democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently
begun to be explored, there is already strong evidence that victims of corruption are less likely to
trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell
Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research
showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger, soon to be
published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several
dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson
forthcoming).
In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to

measure its nature and magnitude. Is corruption greater in some areas than others? If we do not
know this for a fact, then we cannot really say much about variations, its causes or consequences.
We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index; however, this index does not purport to get at the facts of corruption, but only
the perceptions of it.22 And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as
it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.
Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Victims of corruption,

for instance, could be less accepting in the belief of the Churchillean notion of democracy. On
the other hand, it is far less likely to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It
may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow
man/woman.
21
USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance
(www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaid/indexpg.html) February.
22
The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by
international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.
30
The Measurement of Corruption

The AmericasBarometer has developed a series of items to measure corruption
victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson
1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of
corruption can vary by culture and to avoid ambiguity, we define corrupt practices by asking such
questions as: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We
ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public
schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two
kinds of information. First, we can determine where corruption occurs most frequently. Second,
we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between
respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been
victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of crime victimization, we assume that it makes a
difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.
The full series of corruption victimization items by the AmericasBarometer, which allows
for making comparisons across countries, is as follows:
N/A No Yes
Did not have
contact
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that
happen in everyday life...
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe during the past year? (0) (1)
EXC6. During the past year did any government employee ask you for
a bribe? (0) (1)
EXC11. During the past year did you have any official dealings in the
municipality or NDC?
If the answer is No  mark 9
If it is Yes ask the following: (9) (0) (1)
During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license,
for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by
law?
EXC13. Are you currently employed?
(9) (0) (1)
If it is Yes ask the following:
At your workplace, have you had to pay a bribe in the last year?
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings with the
courts?
If the answer is No  note down 9 (9) (0) (1)
Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?
EXC15. Have you used any public health services during the past
year?
(9) (0) (1)
In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past
year, did you have to pay a bribe?
31
……
N/A No Yes
Did not have
contact
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past year?
If it is Yes ask the following: (9) (0) (1)
Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past year?
This chapter has two objectives: first, to present levels of corruption in Guyana by
contrasting measures of victimization with measures of the perception of corruption; and
secondly, to determine the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy.
The first part of this chapter analyzes corruption in Guyana measured by citizens’
experience with corruption, namely, where are bribes most commonly demanded and how
frequently they are demanded. Next, it examines the changes in the index of corruption
victimization in Guyana compared to previous years, followed by a comparison of the levels of
corruption victimization in Guyana with all of the other countries included in the
AmericasBarometer 2008/09 survey by LAPOP. We then analyse corruption victimization by
region and explore who in Guyana are most likely to become victims of corruption. Finally, we
conclude the first section of this chapter by determining the effects of corruption victimization on
citizens’ support for stable democracy.
The second part of this chapter follows the same procedure as described above, but here
we focus on another variable that measures corruption— the perception of corruption— in order
to gain a better understanding of the effects of corruption on stable democracy.
Corruption in Guyana
In this section we explore places and occasions in which citizens of Guyana are more
likely to be asked to pay a bribe and how frequently such bribes are demanded. To determine the
answer to place and occasion, we analyze the various components of the corruption victimization
index created by LAPOP. Similarly, to have a better idea of the frequency of demands for bribes,
we examine the total index of corruption victimization, allowing us to know if respondents were
victims of corruption during the last year as well as how many times they were asked to pay a
bribe.
Where are bribes more common?

Figure II-1 shows citizens’ experience with corruption in various public and private
entities in Guyana for the years of 2006 and 2009. First, we note that corruption victimization has
significantly decreased during this period primarily at work places, and the health and education
sectors, declining from 16.7 to 2.5 percent, 13.6 to 2.7 percent, and from 13.2 to 3.6 percent,
respectively. However, the data also show that corruption victimization by the police in Guyana
has increased from 11.8 to 17.6 percent. In addition, we notice that citizens who carry out
32
transactions at town councils, public entities, and the courts were victimized by corruption more
in 2009 compared to 2006; nonetheless, these differences are not statistically significant. Thus,
there are at least two ways in which we can interpret these findings. The first is that while
corruption seems to have decreased in 2009 in certain sectors, it also seems to have increased in
other sectors compared to 2006. Secondly, corruption by the police has worsened, eroding
citizens’ trust in this institution. Hence, programs aimed at improving the effectiveness of
institutions, while presumably having been effective in reducing corruption in some sectors, still
need to target other sectors, namely, the police and town councils where the highest corruption
victimization is registered.
2009 2.5 %
Bribe at Work
2006 16.7 %
2009 2.7 %
Health Service Bribe
2006 13.6 %
2009 3.8 %
School Bribe
2006 13.2 %
2009 8.2 %
Public Employee Bribe
2006 6.4 %
2009 9.7 %
Bribe at Courts
2006 10.2 %
2009 17.6 %
Police Demand Bribe
2006 11.8 %
2009 19.2 %
Municipal Bribe
2006 13.6 %
.
.
.
0% 5% 10 % 15 % 20 % 25 %
Percentage
Figure II-1. Modes of Corruption Victimization in Guyana
How frequently are bribes demanded?

To measure corruption we take into account its various dimensions as well as where it
occurs, its pervasiveness, and its severity. To do this, LAPOP created a total index of corruption
victmization which shows the percentage of people being victimized by corruption and the
number of times that they were asked to pay a bribe. Figure II-2 shows the percentage of people
who were victims of corruption in 2009, taking into account the number of times that payment of
a bribe was demanded during the last year.
33
……
We observe in Figure II-2 that approximately 14 percent of citizens of Guyana have

experienced at least one type of corruption victimization. Similarly, almost 9 percent of Guyanese
citizens have been victimized by corruption in two or more ways. These results indicate that even
though the majority (77.6%) have not had any experience with corruption in the 12 months prior
to the survey, nearly one fourth of the population has been victimized, making the reduction of
corruption victimization an important policy objective. We continue with the analysis of
corruption victimization by year.
Three+
1.4%
Two
7.4%
One
13.5%
None
77.6%
Number of Ways Victimized in Past Year

Figure II-2. Total Number of Modes of Corruption Victimization
Corruption Victimization in Guyana: 2006 and 2009

Figure II-3 shows the change in the level of corruption victimization in Guyana from
2006, when the previous round of the AmericasBarometer survey took place, to 2009. We notice
in Figure II-3 that about 22.4 percent of Guyana’s population has been victimized by corruption
in the 2009 survey, a few percentage points lower than in 2006. The decrease in the levels of
corruption victimization (from 25 to 22%), however, is not statistically significant (that is, the
two percentages fall within a range in which there is no real difference between them), suggesting
that the same levels remain in Guyana in 2009. We continue with the comparison of the levels of
corruption victimization across the Americas in order to see how severe the problem of
corruption in Guyana is in relation to other countries included in the AmericasBarometer 2008, a
region widely known for its high levels of corruption, comparable to those found in Africa
(Freedom House 2008).
34
30 %
Percentage of Population
Victimized by Corruption
25 %
20 %
15 %
25.2%
22.4%
10 %
5%
0%
2006 2009
Year
Figure II-3. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Year
Corruption in Guyana in comparative perspective

The 2006 AmericasBarometer study showed a higher level of corruption in Guyana
compared to other countries in the region. For example, more than 25% of the population in
Guyana reported having been victimized by corruption in 2006.23 Similarly, Guyana ranked very
high in 2006 and 2009 in corruption compared to other countries in this study, according to the
Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International. This index ranges from zero to ten,
with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten representing low levels of
perceived corruption. Specifically, Guyana ranked 126 out of 180 countries surveyed in 2009
with a score of 2.6, surpassed in Latin America and the Caribbean only by Haiti, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Honduras in the perception of corruption. In addition, these
data indicate that Guyana has levels of corruption similar to those of African countries, such as
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda.24
The AmericasBarometer survey allows us to measure and study corruption from the
experiences and opinions of citizens. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, in addition to
measuring corruption by using a question about perception, LAPOP has also developed a
measure concerning victimization, described above, which allows us to have a more realistic
view of how corruption affects the daily lives of citizens. The index of corruption victimization
by LAPOP was created using the questions EXC1 to EXC16 (shown in the previous section) and
takes a value of 1 if the respondent affirms having been a victim of corruption at least one time
23
See previous studies on Guyana in the official LAPOP webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org
24
See www.transparency.org (page visited on May 6th, 2009).
35
……
during the last year. The results by the AmericasBarometer 2008 show that corruption is fairly
high in Guyana.
Haiti 48.2%
Bolivia 32.9%
Mexico 30.3%
Argentina 27.5%
Peru 27.1%
Ecuador 25.5%
Jamaica 24.5%
Guyana 22.4%
Guatemala 19.6%
Belize 19.0%
Paraguay 18.2%
Costa Rica 17.5%
Nicaragua 16.6%
Dominican Republic 16.3%
El Salvador 14.8%
Honduras 13.8%
Chile 11.7%
Brazil 11.5%
Venezuela 10.6%
Colombia 9.5%
Panama 9.2%
United States 9.0%
Uruguay 8.9%
0 10 20 30 40 50
Percent of Population
Figure II-4. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective
Figure II-4 shows that Guyana compared to other countries included in the
AmericasBarometer has a relatively high percentage of its population being victimized by
corruption (22.4%), exceeded only by 7 countries (Jamaica, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Mexico,
Bolivia and Haiti) out of the 24 in the sample. At the other extreme, Colombia, Panama, the
United States, and Uruguay are the countries in the region with the lowest corruption
victimization, indicating percentages lower than 10.25 Therefore, these results coincide with
those registered by the Index of Corruption Perception by Transparency International, in which
Guyana presents high levels of perception of corruption. However, in contrast to perception of
25
Some of these questions that were asked in Guyana were not asked in Canada and for this reason; Canada is not
shown in the Figure.
36
corruption, Figure II-4 shows citizens’ actual experience with it, which certainly is a more direct
measure of the levels of corruption within a country. Next, we show how corruption varies by
regions in Guyana.
Corruption in Guyana by Regions

Figure II-5 indicates the differences in levels of corruption victimization by region.
Specifically, more than 25 percent of Guyanese who live in regions 3 and 4 have been victims of
corruption in contrast to only 10.3 percent of the Guyanese who live in regions 1, 7, 8, and 9 as
illustrated in Figure II-5. By the same token, a lower percentage of corruption victimization is
registered in regions 2 and 5 with 12.5 and 14.3 percent, respectively.
40
30
20
27.3% 27.7%
10 20.6%
18.3%
14.3%
12.5%
10.3%
Regions Region 2 Region 5 Region 6 Region 10 Region 4 Region 3

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure II-5. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Region
Who is More Likely to Become a Victim of Corruption?

In this section we examine the characteristics of citizens of Guyana with a higher probability of
becoming victims of corruption. In the previous LAPOP study, it was found that men, those who
live in urban areas, younger and wealthier citizens are more likely to be asked to pay a bribe.26
Through the application of a multivariate logistic statistical model, we determine who has a
higher probability of being victimized by corruption in Guyana. The dependent variable is the
index of corruption victimization by LAPOP, which takes a value of 1 if the respondent
mentioned having experienced corruption and 0 if the respondent did not. In this model, we
include the following independent variables: ethnicity, education, sex, wealth (measured by
26
For a detailed treatment of corruption across the Americas and the specific case of Guyana, see
www.lapopsurveys.org
37
……
capital goods ownership), urban/rural area, number of children, and region. The results are shown
in Figure II-6.27
Perception of Family Economic Situation

Wealth
Education
Number of Children
Age
Female
Black
Amerindian
Mixed
Rural
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
F=11.327 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)

N =2364
The reference groups are: Indian and Region 5

Figure II-6. Predictors of Corruption Victimization in Guyana
Figure II-6 illustrates the effects of individual level characteristics on the probability of being
asked for a bribe.28 Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The
impact of each variable on experience with corruption victimization is shown graphically by a
dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the
left of the “0” line a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by
confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot that do not overlap the vertical
“0” line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant.
The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients. For instance, we
observe in Figure II-6 that individuals who are wealthier and who live in regions 3 and 4 are
more likely to be asked to pay bribes. On the other hand, females and older individuals are less
likely to become victims of corruption. We will continue with the examination of each of the
variables that have an impact on corruption victimization in Guyana.
27
The Appendix at the end of this chapter shows full results for the multivariate logistic regression.
28
While Region 5, Indian and male are not displayed in the figure, they are accounted for. Being dummy variables,
these three categories are referred to as “reference categories” meaning that all other categories of that variable are
compared in relation to the reference.
38
30% 60%
25% 50%
20% 40%
15% 30%
10% 20%
5% 10%
16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Age Wealth
30% 40%
25% 30%
20%
15% 20%
28.4%
28.6%
10% 10% 19.9% 23.6%
16.4%
5% 11.1%
0% 0%
Female Male Amerindian Black Indian Mixed

Sex Ethnic Self-identification

Figure II-7. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Age, Wealth, Sex and Ethnic Self-
identification
Figure II-7 shows that more than 50 percent of Guyanese who were victimized by
corruption in the past year are between the ages of 26 and 45 years old. On the other hand, only
around 21.2 and 22.4 percent of Guyanese between 16 and 25 years old and individuals older
than fifty years old respectively, were victims of corruption. In addition, Figure II-7 demonstrates
that corruption victimization is higher among the wealthy. All these findings corroborate with
those of previous studies carried out by LAPOP.
The results of the analysis also show that women are significantly less likely to have been
victims of corruption compared to men. Figure II-7 shows that 28.4 percent of men were victims
of corruption in the last year, compared with 16.4 percent of women were victims during the
same period. Female respondents may be housewives on a fixed allowance, thus, opening the
possibility that they refuse to pay bribes because it would reduce their “income” that must go
toward meeting their household food needs. It may also reflect the fact that women are less likely
to be the ones paying the bills or having other public transactions and as a result are less likely to
be exposed to instances of corruption victimization (Seligson 2007). However, one should
interpret these findings with caution as more women have been entering the workforce in recent
years.
Additionally, Figure II-7 illustrates the impact of ethnicity on corruption victimization. It

is noteworthy that none of the ethnicity variables became significant in the regression. However,
39
……
once the reference group is changed to mixed, we observe statistical significant results. As it is
well documented that ethnicity plays an important role in the lives of the Guyanese, we decided
to illustrate the impact of ethnicity on corruption victimization. For instance, mixed individuals
reveal a significantly higher percentage of corruption victimization (28, 6%) during the last year
compared to 23.6, 19.9, and 11.1 percent of Indo, Afro, and Amerindo Guyanese, respectively,
who were victimized by corruption during the same period.
The Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for Stable

Democracy
In order to assess the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy, we apply a
multivariate regression model for each of the components of support for stable democracy
included in this study. In other words, we estimated a multivariate statistical model to determine
the impact of corruption victimization on support for the idea of democracy, support for the right
of public contestation, political tolerance, belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions,
and interpersonal trust. 29 There is strong evidence that victims of corruption are less likely to
trust the political institutions of their country (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). Corruption
victimization could also influence democracy in other ways. For instance, victims’ belief in the
Churchillean notion of democracy could diminish. Similarly, corruption may erode social capital,
making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow citizens. However, it is less likely that
corruption victimization has an effect on support for public contestation or inclusiveness.
29
The Appendix at the end of this chapter shows full results for each of the multivariate regressions employed in this
section.
40
55

50
45
40
35
30
None One Two Three +
Sig. <0.05 Number of Ways Victimized in Past Year

Figure II-8. The Impact of Corruption Victimization on the Political Legitimacy

of Institutions
In the current section of this chapter we find that corruption victimization has a significant
statistical impact only on the legitimacy of core political institutions as shown in Figure II-8.
More specifically, Guyanese who have had multiple experiences with corruption during the last
year show lower support for their political institutions.30 It is noteworthy that the results of the
multivariate regression reveal a statistically significant negative effect of corruption victimization
at the accepted level of p<0.05.
Perception of Corruption
The second section of this chapter analyzes corruption in Guyana measured by citizens’
perception of corruption. First, it examines the changes in the perception of corruption from 2006
to 2009, followed by a comparison of the levels of perception of corruption in Guyana with the
rest of the countries included in the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey by LAPOP. Next, we
continue with the analysis of the perception of corruption by region and we explore which
Guyanese tend to perceive higher levels of corruption. Finally, we conclude this chapter by
determining the impact of the perception of corruption on citizens’ support for a stable
30
A more complete display and discussion of the items that make up the index of Support for the Legitimacy of Core
Regime Institutions is found in Chapter I of this study.
41
……
democracy. The AmericasBarometer 2008 employed the following question to measure citizens’
perception of corruption:
EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public
officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or
(4) Very uncommon?
Perception of Corruption in Guyana: 2006 and 2009

Average of Perception of Corruption
80
60
40 78.1
72.2
20
2006 2009
Year
Figure II-9. Changes in Perception of Corruption in Guyana by Year
Figure II-9 shows that there has been a decline in the levels of the perception of
corruption in Guyana during the past three years, dropping from 78.1 to 72.2 points on a scale
from 0 to 100. However, these levels remain high compared to other countries in the sample, as
observed in the following section.
Figure II-10 shows that Guyanese citizens, compared to citizens in other countries
included in the sample perceive high levels of corruption (72.2). Countries in the region that
reveal higher levels of corruption perception and are statistically different from Guyana are
Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, Argentina, and Jamaica, ranging anywhere from 76.6
to 85.6 average points on a scale from 0 to 100. The country showing the lowest perception of
corruption in the sample is Haiti with an average even lower than Canada of 50.4 points.
42
In short, when we compare these results with those of corruption victimization, we

conclude that both measures of corruption indicate that corruption in Guyana is a problem and
needs to be addressed if the country is to make measurable socio-economic progress in the short
to medium term. We continue with a comparison of the perception of corruption in Guyana by
regions.
Jamaica 85.6
Argentina 84.5
Guatemala 80.4
Venezuela 79.9
Paraguay 78.1
Ecuador 76.6
Honduras 76.5
Peru 75.8
Mexico 74.4
Nicaragua 74.3
Colombia 72.3
Guyana 72.2
Costa Rica 72.1
Bolivia 71.8
El Salvador 70.7
Panama 70.2
Brazil 69.3
Belize 68.4
Chile 65.9
United States 64.8
Uruguay 63.1
Canada 56.6
Haiti 56.4
0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure II-10. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective
Figure II-11 shows that perceptions of corruption do not vary significantly across regions.
The only difference observed is between Regions 10 and 2, where perception of corruption is
much higher in Region 10 with 78 points on a scale from 0 to 100 compared to 62.1 points. The
rest of the regions in Guyana reveal similar levels of the perception of corruption.
Strong evidence indicates that high levels of corruption lead to deficiencies in the delivery
of public services and undermine the overall effectiveness of the systems of governance and rule
43
……
of law (Seligson 2006). Thus, it is important that public policy be designed to fight corruption,
especially in countries where corruption is far more common as in the specific case of Guyana.
80
60
Average of
40 78.0
71.1 72.5 73.4 74.0
68.3
62.1
20
Region 2 Regions Region 3 Region 5 Region 4 Region 6 Region 10

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure II-11. Average of Perception of Corruption by Region
The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for Stable

Democracy
In this section we focus on the analysis of the impact of the perception of corruption on
support for stable democracy. More specifically, we apply various multivariate regressions for
each of the components of support for stable democracy included in this study: support for the
idea of democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, belief in the
legitimacy of core political institutions, and interpersonal trust, as we did in the previous section
with corruption victimization.31
31
The Appendix at the end of this chapter shows full results for each of the multivariate regressions employed in this
section.
44
65
Political Legitimacy of Core

60
Regime Institutions
55
50
45
Very Uncommon Common Very
uncommon common
Figure II-12. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on the Political

Legitimacy of Institutions
We find that perception of corruption has a significant statistical impact on the legitimacy
of core political institutions and support for the right of public contestation. Figure II-12 indicates
that as Guyanese perceived levels of corruption among public officials increase, their support for
the legitimacy of core political institutions diminishes.32 It is worth noting that the results of the
multivariate regression reveal a statistically significant negative effect of perception of corruption
at the accepted levels of p<0.05. These results echo those shown in the previous section in which
higher levels of corruption victimization have a negative effect on the support for the legitimacy
of core political institutions as well. This suggests that corruption in Guyana, measured by both
experience and perception, has a detrimental effect on how the Guyanese view their political
institutions.
An interesting finding, however, is that citizens’ perception of high levels of corruption

among public officials translates into higher support for the right of public contestation; that is to
say, these individuals reveal higher support for citizens’ participation in legal activities to protest
and to solve problems. These results make sense as Guyanese who perceive high levels of
corruption also support people’s right to make demands to the government, perhaps as a way to
solve the problem of corruption in the country.
32
A more extensive display and discussion of the items that make up the indices of Support for the Legitimacy of
Core Political and Support for the Right of Public Contestation is found in Chapter I of this study.
45
……
76
74
of Public Contestation
Support for the Right
72
70
68
66
Very Uncommon Common Very

uncommon common
Figure II-13. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for the
Right of Public Contestation
Figure II-13 shows that Guyanese who perceive higher levels of corruption among public
officials also tend to display higher support for the right for public contestation with levels of this
support ranging anywhere from 66 to 76 points on a scale from 0 to 100. Still, we notice a slight
decrease in this support. These results reveal a statistically significant positive effect of
perception of corruption at the accepted levels of p<0.05.
Conclusion
The analysis of the data from the AmericasBarometer survey by LAPOP in 2009 confirms
that corruption remains relatively high in Guyana compared to other countries in the region. In
addition, even though we register a decrease in the levels of corruption victimization from 2006
to 2009 in Guyana, these differences are statistically insignificant. The only significant decrease
during this period is citizens’ perception of corruption (i.e., from 78 to 72 points). Additionally,
we find that despite various instances of corruption—be they in the private or public sectors—
having decreased in 2009 compared to 2006 (e.g., the work place, health or educational sectors),
corruption has increased remarkably in other sectors such as the police. Thus, anti-corruption
programs in Guyana must also target these areas given that high levels of corruption may erode
citizens’ trust in the related institutions.
Furthermore, the statistical analyses of the determinants of corruption victimization in

Guyana in 2009 indicate that individuals who are younger, male, and wealthy have a higher
probability of becoming victims of corruption. By the same token, Guyanese who live in certain
46
regions of the country, such as regions 3 and 4 in comparison to region 2 are more likely to be
victims of corruption.
Finally, to determine the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy, the results
in this chapter suggest that corruption, measured by victimization and perception, has a negative
impact on support for the legitimacy of core political institutions, rendering support to the idea
that corruption erodes institutional legitimacy (Seligson 2002). Moreover, we find that citizens’
perception of corruption translates into higher support for the right of public contestation, perhaps
as a direct response to the high levels of corruption in the country, suggesting that people may be
more supportive of making demands to the government for change. In short, we conclude that
corruption has a negative impact on the prospects of democratic stability in Guyana because it
negatively affects citizens’ support for institutional legitimacy. Without this support, democracy
may be at risk.
47
……
APPENDIX CHAPTER II.
Appendix II-1. Predictors of Corruption Victimization

Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption
Independent Variables Coefficients (t)
Regions 1,7,8,9 a -0.073 (-0.69)
Region 10 0.175 (1.74)
Region 6 0.122 (1.65)
Region 4 0.402* (3.64)
Region 3 0.286* (3.70)
Region 2 -0.035 (-0.43)
Rural 0.067 (0.87)
Mixed a 0.077 (0.98)
Amerindian -0.061 (-0.64)
Black -0.140 (-1.77)
Female -0.382* (-6.52)
Age -0.263* (-4.27)
Number of Children 0.126 (1.99)
Education 0.043 (0.70)
Wealth 0.181* (2.31)
Perception of Family Economic Situation 0.077 (1.19)
Constant -1.505* (-24.17)
F = 11.33
Number of Obs. = 2364
p<0.05
a Reference groups: Region 5 and Indian
48
Appendix II-2. The Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy
Support for Support for the Legitimacy of Core Interpersonal
Democracy Right Public Political Tolerance Institutions Trust
Contestation
Independent Variables Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Number of Ways 0.034 (1.26) 0.510 (0.61) 0.561 (0.92) -4.345* (0.79) -2.118 (1.13)
Victimized in Past Year
by Corruption
Satisfaction with the 0.078* (0.04) -0.016 (0.02) -0.083* (0.03)
Performance of the Current
President
Political Interest -0.008 (0.02) 0.046* (0.02) 0.046* (0.02) 0.076* (0.02)
Education 0.241 (0.22) 0.302 (0.19) 0.214 (0.19) -0.739* (0.21) 0.036 (0.20)
Female -2.265 (1.44) -2.208* (0.91) -2.421* (1.03) -0.099 (1.00) -1.853 (1.03)
Age 0.370 (0.21) 0.169 (0.17) 0.288 (0.18) -0.619* (0.19) 0.214 (0.19)
Age squared -0.004 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) 0.006* (0.00) -0.001 (0.00)
Wealth 0.161 (0.40) 0.291 (0.31) 0.748* (0.37) 0.109 (0.30) 0.153 (0.32)
Perception of Family -0.422 (0.82) -0.832* (0.39) -1.207* (0.58) 3.266* (0.62) 1.889* (0.58)
Economic Situation
size of city/town -0.400 (0.69) -1.830* (0.49) -1.605* (0.74) 4.033* (0.50) 2.094* (0.57)
Constant 59.061* (6.79) 72.187* (4.76) 60.633* (7.19) 47.278* (5.30) 41.396* (5.01)
R-Squared 0.009 0.046 0.047 0.133 0.033
N. of cases 2103 2308 2260 2297 2323
* p<0.05
49
……
Appendix II-3. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for a Stable Democracy
Support for Support for the Political Legitimacy of Core Interpersonal
Democracy Right Public Tolerance Institutions Trust
Contestation
Perception of Corruption 0.019 (0.03) 0.050* (0.02) 0.073* (0.02) -0.132* (0.02) -0.002 (0.03)
Satisfaction with the 0.073* (0.03) -0.019 (0.02) -0.081* (0.02)
Performance of the
Current President
Political Interest -0.014 (0.03) 0.043* (0.02) 0.037 (0.02) 0.078* (0.02)
Education 0.275 (0.22) 0.294 (0.20) 0.160 (0.19) -0.642* (0.21) -0.004 (0.20)
Female -2.017 (1.44) -2.166* (0.94) -2.271* (0.99) 0.598 (1.07) -1.230 (1.00)
Age 0.245 (0.20) 0.061 (0.17) 0.202 (0.18) -0.671* (0.19) 0.089 (0.18)
Age squared -0.003 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) 0.007* (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)
Wealth 0.162 (0.40) 0.200 (0.31) 0.594 (0.37) 0.064 (0.31) 0.069 (0.33)
Perception of Family -0.382 (0.79) -0.670 (0.41) -1.093 (0.58) 3.290* (0.64) 1.870* (0.61)
Economic Situation
size of city/town -0.397 (0.69) -1.704* (0.49) -1.406 (0.77) 3.984* (0.50) 2.203* (0.59)
Constant 60.320* (6.76) 70.639* (5.17) 57.234* (7.62) 54.498* (5.84) 43.257* (5.48)
R-Squared 0.008 0.050 0.050 0.143 0.031
N. of Cases 2050 2233 2190 2226 2232
* p<0.05
50
Chapter III. Impact of Crime on Support

for Stable Democracy
Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least
violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the
U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region
have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with
European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive
report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4),
states:
In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region
provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best
source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the
standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International
Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the
Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other
survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of
precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.
The UN/World Bank report also states that official crime figures that are gathered and
published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the
public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among respondents who say they
have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country; do not report the crime to
the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study indicates that the official data may actually
show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in
which the true crime rate is higher. This is so because “Making comparisons across jurisdictions
is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries,
and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to
have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand… it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas
that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin
America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by
using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since their records often
51
……
times only cover public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require
hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and
family violence, make it difficult to know what to make of reports of these types of crime.
A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be
crime. One noteworthy example of this situation occurs in Guatemala, where people who die in
automobile accidents have been counted among homicides; in most other countries this is not the
case. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would
skyrocket if those who died in car accidents were to be included. Furthermore, in some countries
attempted murder is included in the murder rates.
The result is major confusion among sources as to the real rates of crime and violence.
The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data
Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police
statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest
rates in the world…” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the
Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).
In the present study, we rely upon household survey data, which, as noted above by the
UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable type of data with which to measure crime. Even so,
survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously
cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible
with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to
lead to inflated crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data given that the
definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and
because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report
on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can
determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are
highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims can be saved, whereas in areas where such
services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem
to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed
regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would if they had better EMS.
A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is the variation of

concentration or dispersion of crime. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, urban crime levels
rose sharply because of gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases
found in many large cities. The national average, however, was heavily influenced by the weight
of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, city crime became
increasingly more influential in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin
America, the same phenomenon has emerged in a number of countries. In El Salvador, for
example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of
the country. The same phenomenon is also observed regarding corruption; in nearly all countries,
reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.
52
For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next
round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future
studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its
comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting,
those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have significantly different
attitudes toward democracy from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.
It is said that there are no victimless crimes; thus, we tend to consider the impact on the
individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and point toward
lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the
“social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do,
they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those
perspectives arise from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at
the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin
American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the
1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported
rate has been four times this rate for a number of years; moreover, in some regions such as the
area around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the
norm (Leyva 2001).
Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few
murders go unreported.33 According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates
for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajinzylber, Daniel Lederman and
Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per
year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom,
Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average
for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,34 says that “violence is one of the main
causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and
in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”35 In the region there are 140,000
reported homicides each year.36 According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America
is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover,
33
In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders
were frequently overlooked.
34
According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide
significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths
made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average
about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, Global Report on Crime and Justice, ed. Graeme
Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.
35
Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 (www.paho.org/english/DPI/rl970717.htm).
36
Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties,
Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide
rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political
conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana
de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las
Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996;
mimeographed).
53
……
according to Gaviria and Pagés, homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America,
but also the gap with the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above data, using
1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin
America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African
countries.37
In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy
makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the
durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists
have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts
that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and
corruption are beginning to find a place on the political agenda of the Latin American region
(Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving
relative economic stability, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for
political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of
dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In
short, crime is seen as an outcome of a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore
this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the levels of crime victimization and
perception of insecurity in Guyana in order to determine their impact on support for a stable
democracy.
How Might Crime Victimization Affect Support for Stable

Democracy?
It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on
citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if its
citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others
and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital if they have been victims or
fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public
contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in
their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is
whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that carries the most import. Even in countries with
high murder rates, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious
crime is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of
crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a far greater portion of the population than the
number of victims themselves. Citizens hear about crime from their neighbours, read about it in
37
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia,
Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica,
Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El
Salvador.
54
the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on TV. In the
sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our five dimensions of support for stable
democracy.
How do we measure crime?

The first section of this chapter concentrates on the analysis of the following variable:
VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12
months? (1) Yes (2) No
This chapter begins with an examination of the changes in crime victimization in Guyana
during the last three years, followed by a comparative analysis of most of the countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, as well as the U.S. and Canada, in order to assess Guyana’s ranking
on crime victimization in relation to the other countries in the sample. Next, we continue with the
analysis of crime victimization by region and explore who in Guyana have a higher probability of
becoming victims of crime. Finally, this section concludes with a statistical analysis of the impact
of crime on support for stable democracy. The same procedure is applied to the perception of
crime in the second section of this chapter.
Crime Victimization in Guyana

Crime Victimization in Guyana, 2006 and 2009
We observe in Figure III-1 that crime victimization in Guyana has decreased from 11 to
8.7 percent over the past three years. Yet these differences are not statistically significant. In
short, while there does seem to be some decline in crime victimization, the drop is not large
enough for us to be completely confident that crime has actually declined in Guyana.
55
……
12%
10%
Victimized by Crime
8%
6%
11.0%
4%
8.7%
2%
0%
2006 2009
Year
Figure III-1. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime in Guyana: 2006

and 2009
Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective

The prior LAPOP study found that Guyana has relatively low levels of crime
victimization in comparison to other countries in the region.38 Likewise, Figure III-2 shows that
in Guyana in 2009, crime victimization remains low with 8.7% of its population being
victimized, slightly higher but not significantly different, statistically speaking, than that of
Panama (8.4%) and Jamaica (8.3%).
38
For more information about crime in the Americas, see www.lapopsurveys.org
56
Argentina 27.5%
Peru 25.4%
Ecuador 22.6%
Chile 22.2%
Uruguay 22.0%
Venezuela 21.4%
El Salvador 19.0%
Bolivia 19.0%
Guatemala 17.1%
United States 17.0%
Paraguay 16.6%
Nicaragua 16.5%
Brazil 16.3%
Mexico 16.1%
Costa Rica 15.9%
Colombia 15.5%
Haiti 14.3%
Canada 14.2%
Honduras 13.7%
Belize 10.6%
Guyana 8.7%
Panama 8.4%
Jamaica 8.3%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Crime Victimization
Figure III-2. Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective
These relatively low levels of crime victimization in Guyana may indicate that efforts to
reduce crime have taken effect following the escalation of serious crimes in 2002, according to
the LAPOP report of Guyana 2007 (Seligson 2007). This same report argues that the levels of
crime are accompanied by slow and often insufficient follow up by the Police Force as many
cases go un-reported, in particular those related to petty crime and domestic violence. Some of
the results reported here may seem inconsistent with the conventional image of countries having
high crime rates vs. those that have lower rates. One explanation for these somewhat unexpected
results is that in countries where violence is more prevalent, such as in Colombia, where higher
levels of homicide are much more common, citizens in these countries may report fewer crimes
related to robbery, thefts, minor assaults, etc, as these types of offenses may not be perceived as
worthy of reporting, given the high homicide rate. The AmericasBarometer survey does not
record homicides since we are interviewing living persons. Likewise, citizens in countries where
homicides are far less common (e.g., Argentina), individuals may be more prone to report any
57
……
type of crime, even minor ones, explaining the higher percentage of reported crime victimization
in that country. LAPOP continues to study this issue of crime victimization and how it is reported
by respondents.
Crime Victimization by Region
20
Victimized by Crime
15
10
13.4%
5 10.7%
8.4% 8.8%
3.0% 3.8% 4.2%

0
Region 5 Region 2 Region 6 Regions Region 10 Region 4 Region 3

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure III-3. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime by Region in Guyana
Crime victimization varies sharply by region in Guyana. For instance, we notice in Figure
III-3 that Guyanese who live in Regions 3 and 4 are by far more likely to be victims of crime
with 10.7 and 13.4 percent of its population being victimized, respectively. On the other hand,
individuals who live in Regions 2, 5, and 6 are significantly less likely to become victims of
crime with only 3 to 4 percent of its population reporting having had an experience with some
type of crime. The seemingly high level in Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 may be largely due to the
“Bartica massacre” in Region 7 in February 2008.
In order to have a better understanding of the impact of crime on democracy in Guyana,

we first examine those Guyanese citizens who are more likely to become victims of crime and
then analyze the impact of crime victimization on each of the components of stable democracy:
support for the idea of democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance,
belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions, and interpersonal trust.
58
Who are those more likely to become victims of crime?

To determine who is more likely to become a victim of crime, we estimate a multivariate
statistical model, more specifically, a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is crime
victimization. In this case the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the person responds
affirmatively to having been a victim of crime during the last year, and a 0, if the individual did
not have any experience with it. In this model we incorporate the following independent
variables: education, sex, age, wealth (measured by the LAPOP index of household capital goods
ownership), urban/rural area, and region.
According to the Freedom House Report (2008), racial polarization has eroded law
enforcement in Guyana. This has resulted in perceptions about who is a victim, perpetrator and
protector, based on ethnicity. For instance, many citizens who identify themselves as Indians
claim to have been victimized by Afro-Guyanese criminals and at the same time, they claim not
to have been protected by the police force which is predominantly staffed by Afro-Guyanese. By
the same token, many Afro-Guyanese claim that the police are manipulated by the government,
which is seen as being dominated by Indo-Guyanese. This hostility between Afro- and Indo-
Guyanese has been a long standing concern in Guyana, as evidenced by the Racial Hostility Bill
amended in September 2002, which increased the penalties for race-based crimes (Freedom
House 2008). According to the LAPOP survey, the racial make up in Guyana is as follows:
citizens who identify themselves as Indian represent 38 percent of the sample as a whole,
whereas Blacks, mixed, and Amerindians represent 32, 21, and 9 percent, respectively. Figure III-
4 below presents the ethnic makeup of the 2009 AmericasBarometer Survey in graphic form. To
be able to capture this self-defined ethnic diversity our analysis includes a variable (technically, a
“dummy variable”) for each category of ethnic self-identification registered in the 2009 Guyana
survey by LAPOP. The results for the multivariate logistic regression model are shown in Figure
III-5.39
39
Full results of the logistic regression model are found in Table 1 in the Appendix.
59
……
Mixed
21.3%
Indian
38.1%
Amerindian
8.9%
Black
31.6%
Figure III-4. Distribution of 2009 AmericasBarometer Guyanese Sample by

Ethnic Self-Identification
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Black
Amerindian
Mixed
Rural
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
F=3.030 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)

N =2483

Figure III-5. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime in Guyana
60
Figure III-5 illustrates the effects of individual level characteristics on the probability of
being victimized by crime.40 Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y)
axis. The impact of each variable on crime victimization shown graphically by a dot, which if
located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the “0”
line a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence
interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot that do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at
.05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant. The
relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients.
We observe in Figure III-5 that contrary to our expectations, none of the variables for
self-defined ethnicity are statistically significant. In fact, crime victimization varies significantly
only by region and urban/rural area. Individuals who live in Regions 3 and 4 are more likely to
become victims of crime compared to those who live in Region 5. On the other hand, those who
live in rural areas are less likely to become victims of crime. These results make sense as it is
well known that larger cities and more urbanized areas experience by far more instances of crime,
as illustrated in Figure III- 6. Specifically, Figure III-6 shows that more than 10 percent of
Guyanese who live in urban areas are victimized by crime compared to less than 8 percent of
Guyanese who live in rural areas. The remaining variables did not reach statistical significance.
12%
10%
Victimized by Crime
8%
6%
10.7%
4% 7.8%
2%
0%
Rural Urban
Urban/Rural Area
Figure III-6. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime by Urban/Rural Area
40
61
……
The Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for a Stable

Democracy
In this section of the chapter we focus on the analysis of the impact of crime victimization
on support for stable democracy. To accomplish this objective, we estimate various statistical
models for each of the components of support for stable democracy. Specifically, we are able to
determine the impact of crime on support for democracy, support for the right of public
contestation, political tolerance, belief in the legitimacy of political institutions, and interpersonal
trust.41
The Impact of Crime Victimization

Our analysis finds that the only significant impact that crime victimization has on support
for stable democracy is on interpersonal trust. None of the other components of support for stable
democracy analyzed in this study indicate that crime significantly influences support for
democracy. We conclude, therefore, that the impact of crime victimization on support for stable
democracy in the Guyanese case is not as acute as previously thought and that there may be other
variables that have a greater impact such as corruption, which is analyzed in the previous chapter.
We now illustrate the relationship between interpersonal trust and crime victimization.
60
Average Interpersonal Trust
50
40
30 60.7
54.4
20
10
Yes No
Crime Victimization
Figure III-7. The Impact of Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust
41
To see the full results of the statistical regressions, see Table 3 and 4 in the Appendix of this chapter.
62
Figure III-7 reveals that citizens of Guyana who have experienced crime show lower
levels of interpersonal trust than those who have not been victimized, showing an average of 54.4
points compared to 60.7 points on a scale from 0 to 100. These results suggest that when
someone is a victim of crime, this individual will lose confidence in others, and since
interpersonal trust has long been shown to be an important element in stable democracy, crime
does have a negative impact on democracy. We continue with the analysis of another measure of
crime: perception of insecurity to determine if beyond crime itself, if the fear of crime has an
important impact on democracy.
Perception of Insecurity in Guyana

This section of the current chapter examines the changes in the fear of crime in Guyana
over the past three years, followed by a comparative analysis of how Guyana ranks in the
perception of crime related to other countries included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey by
LAPOP. Next, we continue with the analysis of fear of crime by region while exploring who in
Guyana tend to perceive higher levels of insecurity. Finally, this chapter concludes with a
statistical analysis of the impact of fear of crime on support for stable democracy.
How do we measure perception of insecurity?

The following variable measures the perception of insecurity.
AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and, thinking of the possibility of being
assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
Perception of Insecurity in Guyana, 2006 and 2009

Figure III-8 shows that the average fear of crime or perception of insecurity in Guyana
has decreased from 40.7 to 36.2 points on a scale from 0 to 100, making these differences
statistically significant. These results suggest that efforts to address crime in Guyana have
impacted citizen perception of insecurity.
63
……
50
Average Perception of Insecurity

40
30
20 40.7
36.2
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure III-8. Average Perception of Insecurity in Guyana: 2006 and 2009
Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective

As we observed in the previous section, Figure III-9 shows that Guyana is also located
among the countries with the lowest levels of perception of insecurity with an average of 36.2
points on a scale from 0 to 100, only a fewer points higher and statistically different from
Jamaica, the United States, and Canada. Specifically, Jamaica shows an average perception of
31.3 points, while Canada and the Unites States have an average of 20.8 and 23.3 points,
respectively. These results make sense as, for example in Jamaica, the country that shows the
lowest crime victimization in the sample (8.3%), we would have expected low levels of fear of
crime as well, which is indeed the case.
64
Argentina 57.3
Peru 51.6
Chile 49.3
Bolivia 48.7
Venezuela 46.7
Ecuador 45.5
Haiti 45.2
Uruguay 44.5
Paraguay 42.2
Honduras 41.7
El Salvador 41.5
Brazil 41.3
Mexico 39.6
Guatemala 39.6
Colombia 39.0
Guyana 36.2
Panama 35.5
Costa Rica 34.5
Nicaragua 33.7
Belize 32.6
Jamaica 31.3
United States 23.2
Canada 20.8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Perception of Insecurity
Figure III-9. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective
Perception of Insecurity by Region

Figure III-10 shows that the perception of insecurity also varies by region. These
differences are not as sharp, however as those found for corruption victimization. Specifically,
the majority of the regions have an average level of perceived insecurity of more than 35 points
on a scale from 0 to a 100. Region 2 reveals the highest levels of fear of crime with 39.7 points
compared to Region 5, showing the lowest levels of perceptions of insecurity (28.4 points).
65
……
50

40
30
20
37.6 37.6 39.7
35.0 36.4
33.3
28.4
10
Region 5 Region 3 Regions Region 10 Region 4 Region 6 Region 2

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure III-10. Average of Perception of Insecurity by Region
Who are those who tend to perceive more insecurity?

Now, we continue with the analysis of those Guyanese who express higher levels of fear of
crime or perception of insecurity. Since the dependent variable is continuous, the statistical model
employed in this section of this chapter is a multivariate linear regression model, taking higher
values when the perception of insecurity of the Guyanese increases. In this model we include the
same independent variables incorporated in the previous model related to crime victimization
(e.g., education, sex, age, wealth, ethnicity, urban/rural area, and region). The results of this
model are shown in Figure III-11.
66
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Black
Amerindian
Mixed
Rural
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
R-Squared =0.030 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)

F=3.260 N =2481

Figure III-11. Guyanese Citizens Who Tend to Perceive More Insecurity
Specifically, we note in Figure III-11 that older individuals and those who live in rural
areas have a lower tendency to perceive insecurity compared to younger individuals and those
who live in urban areas, when we observe that their confidence intervals stretching to the left do
not overlap the vertical “0” line, demonstrating a statistically significant negative effect. In
contrast, females and those who live in Regions 2 and 6 show a higher perception of insecurity,
illustrated by their confidence intervals stretching to the right and not overlapping the vertical “0”
line. The rest of the variables do not yield statistically significant results. In the following section
we explore these relationships.42
Figure III-12 illustrates more clearly the relationships between sex, age and the perception
of insecurity. Males show an average of fear of crime of 34.6 points on the 0 to 100 scale, while
females show an average of 37.8 points on the same scale, a relatively high figure. Similarly, the
older the individual, the less they tend to perceive insecurity. There is a minor increase of
perception of insecurity among individuals between ages 46-56, but these levels fall among
individuals over age 56. We attribute this finding to the fact that younger people are more likely
to be “out on the streets,” especially at night, increasing their perceived chances of becoming
victims of crimes and thus increasing their perceived levels of insecurity.
42
To see the full results of this multivariate linear regression model, refer to Table 2 in the Appendix.
67
……
40 40

Average Perception of Insecurity 38
30
36
20
34
37.8
34.6
32
10
30
28
0
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+
Male Female
Sex Age
Figure III-12. Average Perception of Insecurity by Sex and Age
50
40
30
20 40.9
33.9
10
Rural Urban
Urban/Rural Area
Figure III-13. Average Perception of Insecurity by Urban and Rural Areas
In the same fashion, Figure III-13 reveals the average perception of insecurity by rural vs.
urban areas. Guyanese who live in rural areas show an average fear of crime (33.9 points)
significantly lower than those who live in urban areas (40.9 points). As we expected, perceived
68
insecurity is much higher in urban areas: the bigger the city the more elevated the fear of crime.
Clearly, these results echo the usual high levels of crime that occur in urbanized areas.
The Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for a Stable

Democracy
It is not difficult to see how fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for
democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens consistently perceive
high levels of insecurity, making them more likely to lose faith in their political institutions,
especially the police and the judiciary. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or
lose faith in their fellow citizens. Finally, the perception of insecurity could also make citizens
less willing to support the right to public contestation.
In this section of this chapter we find that the perception of insecurity seems to have a
greater impact on support for a stable democracy than actual experience with crime does. Fear of
crime has a statistically negative effect on support for democracy, interpersonal trust, and the
belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions. An important reason for this difference is
that crime victims in any given year are a small minority of the population, whereas fear can be
pervasive and affect many.
71 70
70
65
Support for Democracy
Interpersonal Trust
69
60
68
55
67
50
66
65 45
Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Very Somewhat Somewhat Very
safe safe unsafe unsafe safe safe unsafe unsafe
Perception of Insecurity
Figure III-14. The Impact of the Perception of Insecurity on Support for Democracy and
Interpersonal Trust
69
……
We observe in Figure III-14 that the relationships between perception of insecurity and
support for the idea of democracy and interpersonal trust are negative. In the specific case of
support for democracy, as people feel more insecure, they express lower levels of support for the
idea of democracy. In particular, going from feeling very safe to very unsafe diminishes support
for the idea of democracy by around 6 points on a scale from 0 to 100. Similarly, we note in
Figure III-14 that the same happens for interpersonal trust. Guyanese who feel very unsafe show
significantly lower levels of interpersonal trust than those who feel very safe. These results are
not surprising since people who feel that they are in constant danger may turn those feelings
against others and the political system itself. Indeed, we also find that those who feel unsafe
express low levels of belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions, as illustrated in Figure
III-15. Consequently, the AmericasBarometer survey results show that the fear of crime may be a
more acute problem in Guyana than actual crime victimization.
56
Political Legitim ac y of Co re
54
Re gim e In stitutions
52
50
48
Very Safe Somewhat Somewhat Very
Safe Unsafe Unsafe
Sig. <0.05 Average Perception of Insecurity

Figure III-15. The Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for the

Legitimacy of Political Institutions
Even in countries with high murder rates, the chance of an individual being murdered or
victimized by a serious crime in any given year is generally not high. In this study, we have
demonstrated that the impact of crime victimization may not be as great as the perception of
insecurity, which is a feeling that can be held by a far greater portion of the population than the
victims themselves. For instance, 8.7% of the Guyanese population was victimized by crime,
whereas the perception of insecurity among the Guyanese reached an average of 36.2 on the 0 to
100 scale. As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, citizens hear about crime from their
neighbours, read about it in the newspapers, and are often flooded by gruesome images of crime
70
on the TV. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that individual feelings of insecurity can be
high in spite of not having had direct experiences with crime.
Conclusion
The statistical analysis of the determinants of crime victimization in Guyana in 2009
shows that crime victimization varies primarily by region and area. Similarly, those who live in
urban areas are by far more likely to be victimized by crime than those who live in rural areas.
Another interesting finding is that crime victimization has a negative impact on only one
component of support for stable democracy: interpersonal trust, suggesting that Guyanese who
have been victims by any act of delinquency may lose confidence in others.
This study also points to the detrimental effects that fear of crime have on support for
stable democracy, namely, support for the idea of democracy, interpersonal trust, and the belief
of the legitimacy of core political institutions. When people feel that they are unsafe, it is more
likely that they will turn those feelings against others and the political system, diminishing their
belief in the legitimacy of political institutions, such as the police and the judiciary. In addition,
females, younger individuals, and those who live in bigger cities tend to perceive more
insecurity.
71
……
APPENDIX CHAPTER III.
Appendix III-1. Predictors of Crime Victimization

Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.358 (1.65)
Region 10 0.246 (1.37)
Region 6 0.061 (0.36)
Region 4 0.462* (2.12)
Region 3 0.511* (2.88)
Region 2 0.026 (0.14)
Rural -0.181* (-2.06)
Mixed 0.094 (1.09)
Black -0.001 (-0.01)
Wealth 0.037 (0.31)
Age -0.030 (-0.37)
Female -0.158 (-1.82)
Constant -2.595* (-25.04)
F = 3.03
P<0.05
Appendix III-2. Predictors of Perception of Insecurity

Predictors of Perception of Insecurity
Independent Variables Coefficient. t
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.044 (0.99)
Region 10 0.024 (0.57)
Region 6 0.078* (2.04)
Region 4 0.085 (1.74)
Region 3 0.052 (1.27)
Region 2 0.092* (2.25)
Rural -0.097* (-2.75)
Mixed 0.050 (1.86)
Amerindian 0.012 (0.33)
Black 0.035 (1.15)
Wealth -0.042 (-1.59)
Age -0.095* (-4.08)
Female 0.050* (2.24)
Education -0.028 (-0.92)
Constant 0.002 (0.06)
R-Squared = 0.030
P<0.05
72
Appendix III-3. The Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy
Support for the
Support for Legitimacy of Core Interpersonal
Right of Public Political Tolerance
Democracy Institutions Trust
Contestation
Crime Victimization 0.041 (0.02) 0.007 (0.02) 0.035 (0.02) -0.033 (0.02) -0.052* (0.02)
Satisfaction with the
Performance of the Current 0.088* (0.03) -0.017 (0.02) -0.083* (0.03)
President
Education 0.249 (0.22) 0.306 (0.19) 0.235 (0.20) -0.775* (0.22) 0.037 (0.19)
Female -1.685 (1.43) -2.319* (0.91) -2.409* (1.01) 0.592 (1.03) -1.588 (0.95)
Age 0.379 (0.21) 0.180 (0.16) 0.305 (0.18) -0.685* (0.19) 0.190 (0.18)
Age Squared -0.004 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) 0.007* (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Wealth 0.062 (0.41) 0.293 (0.31) 0.719* (0.36) -0.002 (0.30) 0.088 (0.31)
Perception of Family (0.80) -0.816* (0.40) -1.206* (0.58) 3.163* (0.63) 1.852* (0.59)
Economic Situation
size of city/town -0.574 (0.69) -1.839* (0.49) -1.584* (0.74) 4.098* (0.50) 2.081* (0.57)
Constant 56.800* (6.80) 72.143* (4.77) 60.024* (7.25) 47.626* (5.36) 41.738* (5.04)
R-Squared 0.011 0.046 0.048 0.120 0.033
N of Cases 2198 2304 2256 2293 2319
* p<0.05
73
……
Appendix III-4. The Impact of the Perception of Insecurity on Support for a Stable Democracy
Support for the
Support for Legitimacy of Core Interpersonal
Right of Public Political Tolerance
Democracy Institutions Trust
Contestation
Independent Variables Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err..
Perception of Insecurity -0.069* (0.02) -0.029 (0.02) 0.001 (0.02) -0.040* (0.02) -0.207* (0.02)
President
Political Interest 0.003 (0.02) 0.050* (0.02) 0.046* (0.02) 0.075* (0.02)
Education 0.207 (0.22) 0.288 (0.19) 0.211 (0.19) -0.794* (0.21) -0.036 (0.20)
Female -1.597 (1.43) -2.279* (0.91) -2.505* (1.00) 0.851 (1.03) -0.870 (0.89)
Age 0.382 (0.21) 0.161 (0.16) 0.300 (0.18) -0.681* (0.19) 0.208 (0.17)
Age Squared -0.004 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) 0.007* (0.00) -0.001 (0.00)
Wealth 0.030 (0.41) 0.270 (0.31) 0.765* (0.35) -0.005 (0.30) 0.055 (0.31)
Perception of Family (0.82) -0.850* (0.39) -1.262* (0.58) 3.028* (0.64) 1.375* (0.53)
Economic Situation
size of city/town -0.666 (0.70) -1.873* (0.49) -1.585* (0.74) 4.034* (0.48) 1.658* (0.48)
Constant 60.928* (6.88) 74.328* (4.74) 60.634* (7.09) 49.365* (5.44) 52.459* (4.74)
R-Squared 0.015 0.047 0.047 0.120 0.092
N of cases 2198 2304 2256 2293 2319
* p<0.05
74
Chapter IV. The Impact of Local

Government Performance
on the Support for Stable
Democracy43
Theoretical framework
What role, if any, does local level politics and participation play in the democratization
process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity
in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-
wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities;
in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent
contact with their local elected officials. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for
stable democracy of citizen participation in local government.
For those who live at a distance from their nation’s capital, which is, of course most
citizens in the Americas (with the exception of perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national
legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in
contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of
government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that “all
politics is local” emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local
governments, with many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the
provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the
police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services
that powerfully determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.
In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America has a long history of

governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for
funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, most local
governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal
with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local
services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been with
local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region
express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in
general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government.
43
This chapter was written by Lawrence Lachmansingh with support from Winston Cramer.
……
75
Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion
and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power
and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots.
There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin
America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O’Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falleti 2005; O'Neill 2005;
Daughters and Harper 2007). One of the presumed most important advantages of consists in
bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Alburquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot
2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).44
Is decentralization and expanding the resources and power of local government a good
idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development
by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing
the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement
and interpersonal trust (Aghón, et al. 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of
decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to
an increase in the competition for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b;
Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative
results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar forthcoming).What do the
citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views on
democracy ? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.
How Might Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect

Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?
Citizens who participate in and who trust their local governments may well have a higher
belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries
has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of
public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation
(i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants
in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group,
and oppose the participation of “outsiders.” There is strong evidence that trust in local
government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova
Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and
Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in
local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of the
evaluation of and participation in local government on support for stable democracy.
44
There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and
administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).
76
Historical Background
The genesis of local government in Guyana lies in the post-emancipation era of British
Guiana when Ordinance 2 of 1837 created the Mayor and Town Council of Georgetown as an
adaptation of the English Municipal Corporation Act of 1835. Generally, local government in
colonial times saw the transplanting of British models to the Commonwealth Caribbean colonies.
At the end of the apprenticeship period in 1838, the freed slaves pooled their resources
and purchased abandoned coffee and sugar plantations. Plantation Northbrook, later renamed
Victoria, was the first such purchase (Young 1955). This initial purchase started what is referred
to in Guyana as the village movement, which some identify as the birth of local government in
British Guiana (Alexander 1991). Other collective purchases include Buxton on the East Coast of
Demerara, Danielstown on the Essequibo Coast and Litchfield on the West Coast of Berbice.
These communal villages were an attempt by the ex-slaves to pursue a path of self-
reliance and self-management. The former they achieved by cultivating the land to provide food
and the latter through the development of a committee of management comprising a Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer and no less than 7 committee members (Mangar 2002).
These were the acknowledged village leaders whose authority flowed with the mutual agreement
of the villagers. In addition to the collective purchases, there were also individual ones, such as
Queenstown on the Essequibo Coast. By 1850, 25 communal villages were established and 7000
persons owned land in proprietary villages (Smith 2000). In its initial stages, the village
administration was concerned with the maintenance of roads, bridges, dams as well as sea
defence, and drainage and irrigation works. This often proved challenging because of the limited
resources received through self-taxation, as well as resistance from the plantocracy who saw the
village movement as counter to their interests.
The 1892 Village Ordinance was yet another significant milestone in local government
history in British Guiana and perhaps the first evidence of local government decentralization.
This Ordinance led to improved functioning of village councils and improvement in public
works, particularly streets and drainage, thanks to new revenue sources flowing from property tax
and a streamlined system of oversight by the Board of Health. The first conference of village
Chairmen occurred in 1902. Five years later, local governments were established throughout the
country and a Local Government Board appointed by central government (Mangar 2002).
A more comprehensive system of local government emerged in 1970 through the

Municipal and District Councils Act 28:01 and the Local Authorities Act 28:02, which divided
the coastland of the country into district, village and country district councils with the District
Commissioner as the form of decentralized Central Government authority (Young 1955).
Regional Ministers and Regional Development Authorities eventually replaced the District
Commissioner system with the introduction of the Regional Development Authorities Act 1977.
These became the immediate forerunners of the current Regional system.
……
77
The current local government system has its basis in the 1980 Constitution and its
institutional and operational framework is prescribed in the Local Democratic Organs Act 12 of
1980. This Act provides for the division of the country into 10 administrative regions and a six-
tier system: region, sub-region, district, community, neighborhood and people’s cooperative unit.
However, only two levels – region and neighborhood are operational. At the regional level, the
Regional Democratic Council (RDC) is responsible for management and administration and
carries out delegated functions of central government and provides oversight and assistance to the
65 Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDCs), 6 municipalities, Amerindian village councils
and community development councils, save for the city of Georgetown and the town of New
Amsterdam - which enjoy relative autonomy. This system of local government seeks to give
effect to Article 71 of the Constitution of Guyana, which states, “Local government is a vital
aspect of democracy and shall be organized so as to involve as many people as possible in the
task of managing and developing the communities in which they live.”
RDC elections are held at the same time as national elections: statutorily due every five
years. The NDC and municipal elections are statutorily due every three years but these have not
been held since 1994 and prior to this, in 1974. Because of this protracted delay in holding local
government elections, almost all NDCs and Municipalities have hemorrhaged significant
numbers of elected members. With performance diminishing, at least a dozen NDCs and one
municipality were sufficiently defunct by 2009 to require the appointment of Interim
Management Committees, pending the local government elections.
While RDCs have been functioning and are renewed regularly through elections and
receive annual budgetary allocations, local government organs in Guyana generally suffer from
inadequate human and financial resources to carry out their roles and responsibilities effectively.
Even the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development does not have its full
complement of professional staff. Recognising the need for substantial reform to the local
government system, the constitutional reform process (1999-2001) saw several agreements being
reached and approved, including increased roles, responsibilities and independence for local
governments. In anticipation of these agreements being implemented, several national and
international initiatives were implemented over the past decade to build the capacity of local
government in Guyana. These initiatives yielded less than optimum results due in large part to the
lack of implementation of the constitutional agreements and to the subsequent delays in holding
local government elections.
A bipartisan Task Force on Local Government Reform, with membership from the PPP/C
and the main opposition party, the PNCR, was established at the recommendation of the 2001
Constitution Reform Commission to undertake the task of implementing the provisions of Local
Government Reform legislation. Some of the Terms of Reference for the Task Force were:
1. Generally, to ensure the conclusion of the Constitutional reform process and give effect to
the new constitutional provisions regarding local democracy.
2. Specifically monitor and address the deficiencies within the local government system.
The mandate of this task force included: to develop a local government electoral system that
combines constituency and proportionality elements; to develop objective criteria for transferring
78
funds from central government to local government; to establish a local government commission
with dispute resolution and other powers, and; to review the local government Act accordingly.
The Task Force achieved considerable progress in pursuing its mandate but, after eight
years, was unable to conclude all of its tasks, at which time the Government moved the local
government reform process into the National Assembly. In May and June of 2009, the
Government tabled bills in the Assembly intended to address the reforms identified during the
constitutional reform process relating to local government, including the holding local
government elections before the end of 2009.
Trust in Local Government

Local Government is an integral part of democratic and development processes, since it
provides tangible opportunities for citizens to be involved in the management of their
communities. The trust of citizens in local government is thus a key measure of a democracy’s
health. The AmericasBarometer includes a very general question on such trust, in the same series
of items (the “B series”) in which trust in all other branches of government is measured. The item
reads as follows:
B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor’s office of your city or town/ NDC chairman’s office?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Not at all A lot Doesn’t know
Trust in Local Government vs. Trust in the National Government and in the Regional
Government
Notwithstanding the challenges faced in the functioning of local government in Guyana,
respondents are generally disposed to trusting their local government systems at levels
comparable to the trust levels for Regional and National Governments. As indicated in Figure
IV-1 below, local government is trusted at 48.9 average points, which is three points lower than
the national government and just 1.1 point behind the regional government.45 However, given
the 95% confidence intervals,46 there is no statistically significant difference between the trust
levels of citizens across national, regional and local governments.
45
Note about average points - Valid responses to this variable have been recoded into a 0 to 100 scale, where 100
represent the highest level of trust in the local government. All the other dependent variables in this chapter have also
been recoded into a 0 to 100 scale to facilitate their interpretation.
46
Note about confidence Intervals- The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each
bar. Whenever two or more bars are close, enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there
is no statistically significant difference among those countries. Note that these confidence intervals take into account
the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase
the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost).
……
79
60
50
Average Level of Trust
40
30
51.9 50.0 48.9
20
10
. National Government Regional Democratic Council Local Government
95% C.I. (Design- Effects Based)
Figure IV-1. Comparison between Trust in Local Government, Trust in National

Government and Trust in Regional Democratic Council
Trust in Local Government Over time

Local government has experienced no significant change in the level of trust from
Guyanese in the 2009 LAPOP survey. Since the previous survey in 2006, the level of trust has
declined by 1.3 points, as illustrated in figure V-2. However, given the confidence intervals there
is no statistically significant change in trust levels over the intervening period.
80
50
the Local Government

40
Average Trust in
30
50.2 48.9
20
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure IV-2. Trust in Local Government by Year
Trust in Local Government in Comparative Perspective

On a comparative scale depicting the level of trust of citizens in local government (Figure
IV-3) across countries included in the AmericasBarometer LAPOP survey, Guyana ranks just
about mid-way of the participating countries. It is positioned eleventh from the top and thirteenth
from the bottom with 48.9 average points. Leading the region with 63.7 points is the Dominican
Republic while Haiti with 38.3 points occupies the lowest position. Guyana’s trust level is
comparable to those of other English-speaking Caribbean members that are included in the
survey, Belize and Jamaica, which demonstrated trust levels in local government at 47.2 and 43.4
average points respectively.
……
81
Chile 59.5
Colombia 58.8
Mexico 57.3
El Salvador 57.1
Guatemala 56.1
Uruguay 54.3
Bolivia 53.4
Costa Rica 52.6
United States 51.8
Guyana 48.9
Ecuador 48.1
Belize 47.2
Brazil 47.1
Venezuela 46.3
Nicaragua 45.5
Argentina 45.5
Honduras 45.5
Jamaica 43.4
Paraguay 43.3
Peru 42.1
Panama 42.1
Haiti 38.3
0 20 40 60 80
Trust in the Municipal Government
Figure IV-3. Trust in the Local Government in Comparative

Perspective
Trust in the Local Governments by Regions

The Hinterland Regions of Guyana (Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9), with 64.2 average points, are
more inclined than any other region to trust their local governments (Figure IV-4). The more
rural regions, 2 and 6, follow with 57.1 and 54.7 average points respectively. The remaining four
regions then fall well below 50 with regions 10 and 4 - which have the largest population of any
region - obtaining the lowest trust ratings with 42.8 and 45 average points respectively. It would
seem that trust levels in the more rural regions of Guyana. The following sections delve deeper
into the characteristics of trust in local government.
82
80
in the Local Government

60
Average Trust
40
64.2
54.7 57.1
20 42.8 45.0 45.4 45.8
Region 10 Region 4 Region 5 Region 3 Region 6 Region 2 Regions

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure IV-4. Trust in Local Government by Regions
Determinants of Trust in Local Government

Variations in the characteristics of respondents can produce significant impacts upon the
overall opinion of citizens. Regression analysis is used in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP to
assess the relative influences on national opinions by examining these characteristics or
predictors.47
In assessing the predictors of trust in local government, it was found that persons from the
hinterland regions (1, 7, 8 and 9) and Region 2 express higher levels of trust in local government.
Higher education levels, urban residents, age and those who self-identify as Black are the
significant factors producing lower levels of trust in local government, as shown in Figure IV-5.
47
Note on regression analysis - In the regression charts, we standardize all variables and indicate the zero mean as a
red line. Each predictor that does not intersect with that line is a significant predictor (p<0.05). Notice that any
coefficient to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect of that variable on
the dependent variable. In contrast, any coefficient to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically
significant net effect.
……
83
Crime Victimization
R-Squared =0.073
Education F=10.481
Female N =2256
Age
Wealth
Urban
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2

Figure IV-5. Predictors of Trust in the Local Government
In further examining the levels of trust in local authorities according to age, ethnic self-
identification, area and education, we find some sharp difference across these demographics as
seen in Figure IV-6. In terms of age, responses from the age ranges 18-25 and 66+ indicate
higher levels of trust in local authorities with levels of 52.2 and 54.7 average points respectively.
Reponses from the remaining four age ranges are less inclined to trust local authorities, falling
between 45.1 and 48.2 average points. In respect of ethnicity, Amerindians are by far the most
trusting group with 62.3 average points, possibly because most of these communities are
dominated by one tribe and communal living is a way of life of most hinterland communities.
The trust levels for Indo-Guyanese is 52 while Guyanese of Mixed and Black ethnicities are the
least trusting of local governments, reflecting levels of 46.3 and 44 average points respectively.
Another predictor of trust levels is education. Here, the more educated a respondent the less
likely they are to trust local governments. Respondents with a primary education demonstrate a
trust level of 52.4 while respondents with higher education only trust at a level of 41.7 average
points. The final predictor of trust is area of residence, or simply area, and the finding confirms
the suggestion made earlier that levels of trust decrease the more urban the region: respondents
from urban areas lag behind their rural counterparts by almost 10 average points (42.5 vs. 52.1).
This finding has particular application to the national capital, Guyana’s main urban area, and the
functioning of the City Council.
84
Average Trust in the

60
Local Government
Local Government
60
50 50
40 40
30 30
52.4 48.4 52.2 48.2 54.7
20 41.7 20
47.6 47.7 45.1
10 10
0 0
Primary Secondary Higher 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+
Education Level Age


60 80
Local Government
Local Government
50
60
40
30 40
52.1 62.3
20 42.5 46.3 52.0
20 44.0
10
0 0
Urban Rural Black Mixed Indian Amerindian
Area Ethnic Self-identification
Figure IV-6. Trust in the Local Government by Education Level, Age, Area and Ethnic Self-
identification
Participation in Local Government Meetings

Trust in local government reflects, in part, the degree of involvement by citizens in the
work of local government. One means of involvement is participation in local government
meetings. In order to determine levels of such participation, respondents were asked the
following question:
NP1. Have you attended a city/town/NDC council meeting or otherr meeting convened by the mayor
or NDC chairman in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn’t know/Doesn’t remember
Participation in Local Government Meetings Over time

The data suggests that there has been a decrease of 3% in attendance at local government
meetings since 2006 (Figure IV-7), from 14% to 11%. The finding does not indicate frequency
of attendance, being limited to some or no attendance “in the past 12 months.” However, when
one considers the 95% confidence intervals, which overlap between 2006 and 2009, there is no
statistically significant difference in the two findings.
……
85
20
a Local Government Meeting

Percentage Who Attended
15
10
14.0%
5 11.0%
2006 2009
Year
Figure IV-7. Percentage Who Attended a Local Government Meeting by Year
Participation in Local Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective

Of the countries included in the AmericasBaromert by LAPOP, Guyana’s ranks 11th (at
11%) in citizens’ attendance at local government meetings. Guyana is thus positioned in the
upper half of the ranking, along with the two other English-speaking Caribbean countries - Belize
(2nd ranked with 16% participation level) and Jamaica (7th ranked with 13.8%). The Dominican
Republic tops the group with 16.8% while Panama, with 3.5%, demonstrates the lowest level of
participation (Figure IV-8).
86
Belize 16.0%
Venezuela 14.6%
United States 14.6%
Haiti 14.0%
Guatemala 14.0%
Jamaica 13.8%
Bolivia 12.5%
Peru 12.3%
El Salvador 12.0%
Guyana 11.0%
Uruguay 10.4%
Honduras 10.3%
Nicaragua 10.3%
Mexico 9.9%
Colombia 9.9%
Brazil 9.4%
Chile 6.9%
Costa Rica 6.6%
Paraguay 6.5%
Argentina 6.0%
Ecuador 5.7%
Panama 3.5%
0 5 10 15 20
Attended a Municipal Meeting
Figure IV-8. Participation in Local Government Meetings in

Comparative Perspective
Participation in Local Government Meetings by Regions

Participation of citizens in local government meetings by region (Figure IV-9) highlights
again the importance of this form of government in the hinterland regions (1, 7, 8 and 9). 25% of
the respondents from the hinterland regions attend local government meetings, well ahead of the
2nd highest region, Region 6, which demonstrated a 15.5% participation level. In stark contrast,
region 4 exhibits the lowest participation level – 6%. The following discussion examines the
predictors that influence the levels of participation in local government meetings.
……
87
30
a Local Government Meeting

Percentage Who Attended
25
20
15
25.0%
10
15.5%
13.2%
5 10.1% 11.6%
11.5%
6.0%
0

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure IV-9. Participation in Local Government Meetings by Regions
Determinants of Participation in Local Government Meetings

Examining the determinants of participation levels in local government meetings using
linear regression shows that being a crime victim, and resident in Regions 6, 10 and the
hinterland regions (1,7,8 and 9) are characteristics of persons more likely to participate in
meetings (Figure.IV.10) while females and urban residents tend to participate less in such
meetings.
88
Crime Victimization
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Number of Children
Married or common law
Urban
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5 F=4.820
Region 6 N =2448
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Figure IV-10. Predictors of Participation in Local Government Meetings
When participation in local government meetings is viewed through the lens of gender
(Figure IV.11), male respondents exercise a positive effect on the overall participation percentage
with a participation level of 12.8%, although the confidence intervals do overlap, suggesting that
the difference is statistically insignificant. Yet we already know from the multivariate analysis
that gender differences are significant in Guyana. In addition, attendance at meetings may
demonstrate a gender-based effect depending on the purpose and focus of the meeting. In terms
of area, respondents from rural areas are more than twice as likely to attend (13.6%) local
government meetings over their urban counterparts (5.5%). This finding is consistent with the
diminished levels of trust in local governments found in urban areas. It may also reflect the
urban phenomenon (not limited to Guyana by any means) of increased individualism and the
subsequent reduction in interest for activities of a communal nature.
……
89
15 15
Government Meeting
Government Meeting
Attended a Local
Attended a Local
10 10
12.8% 13.6%
5 5
9.1%
5.5%
0 0
Male Female Urban Rural

Sex Area
Figure IV-11. Participation at the Local Government meetings by Sex and Area
Demand-Making to the Local Government

Another contributor to the trust that citizens have in local government is the extent to
which they feel they can call upon the local authorities to help meet the needs of citizens. To
assess the level to which citizens are making demands of local governments, respondents were
asked as follows:
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councillor of
the city/town/NDC within the past 12 months?
Demand-Making at the Local Government Over Time

The percentage of persons making requests to the local government declined slightly,
from 13.9% in 2006 to 12.5% in the 2009 dataset (Figure IV-12). However, this difference is
statistically insignificant given the 95% confidence interval.
90
20
Percentage of People Who Sought

Request to the Local Government
Assistance from or Presented a
15
10
13.9%
12.5%
5
2006 2009
Year
Figure IV-12. Demand-Making at the Local Government by Year
Demand-Making at the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Despite the moderate decline in requests made to local government in the 2009 dataset,
Guyana’s overall standing in comparison to the 23 countries included in the AmericasBarometer
by LAPOP is at number 9, just behind Jamaica with 13%. Interestingly, the third English-
speaking Caribbean country in the comparison, Belize, lags third from the bottom with a 7.9%
demand-making level. This is despite Belize demonstrating one of the highest levels of
participation in local government meetings in the region. Panama has the lowest demand level
with 7.3% (see Figure IV-13).
……
91
Uruguay 19.7%
Chile 17.1%
Peru 17.1%
Brazil 16.9%
Mexico 15.8%
El Salvador 15.6%
Argentina 14.9%
Jamaica 13.0%
Guyana 12.5%
Venezuela 12.2%
Bolivia 12.1%
United States 12.0%
Guatemala 12.0%
Nicaragua 11.1%
Paraguay 10.6%
Ecuador 10.2%
Costa Rica 10.0%
Haiti 9.7%
Colombia 9.6%
Belize 7.9%
Honduras 7.8%
Panama 7.3%
0 5 10 15 20 25
Demand-Making on
Municipal Government
Figure IV-13. Demand-Making to the Local Government

Demand-Making at the Local Government by Regions

Figure IV-14 illustrates the level of demand making to local government by region.
Region 2 has the highest demand making levels (20.8%), followed by the hinterland regions with
17.2%. At the other end of the scale, Region 4 demonstrates the lowest level of demand-making
on local government - 8.2%. Another region with strong urban characteristics, region 10, lags
with region 4 at the bottom of the regional comparison with a 10% demand-making level. The
following discussion examines the determinants of demand-making in Guyana.
92
25

20
15
10 20.8%
16.1% 17.2%
15.7%
13.1%
5
8.2%
10.0%
0
Region 4 Region 10 Region 5 Region 6 Region 3 Regions Region 2

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure IV-14. Demand-Making at Local Government by Regions
Determinants of Demand-Making at the Local Government

Victims of a crime and residents in Regions 2, 3, 5 and 6 and the hinterland regions
(Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9) are more engaged in demand-making to local government. The only
variable which serves as a statistically significant negative predictor of demand-making at the
local government is being female, in other words, in the case of Guyana, females are significantly
less likely to make a demand of the local government than their male counterparts (Figure IV-
15).
……
93
Crime Victimization
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Number of Children
Urban
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5 F=4.435
N =2452
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Figure IV-15. Predictors of Demand-Making at Local Government
Respondents that were victims of any type of criminal acts in the past year (19.2%) are
likely to seek assistance from the local government organs, in contrast, to those who were not
(11.9%) as demonstrated in Figure IV-16.
25

20
15
10 19.2%
11.9%
5
Yes No
Victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months

Figure IV-16. Demand-Making at Local Government by Victimization
94
Utilizing the age and gender demographics to examine demand-making trends, as shown
in Figure IV-17, reveal that demand-making increases with age, peaking at 16.3% with the 46-55
age group and then declines as age increases. This corresponds with the increased
responsibilities that come with property ownership, family needs, and other drivers of demand for
local government services as one grows older. In terms of gender, males made more requests than
females of local governments by a significant degree – 15.7% vs. 9.3%, consistent with other
LAPOP 2009 findings on civic participation in meetings of community improvement committees.
20 20


15 15
10 10
15.7% 15.5% 16.3%

14.4%
12.4%
5 9.3% 5
11.6%
6.1%
0 0
Male Female 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+
Sex Age
Figure IV-17. Demand-Making at Local Government by Sex and Age
Satisfaction with Local Government Services

A key result indicator in the functioning of local governments is the level of satisfaction
with services received by citizens and taxpayers. The quality of that service is intrinsically linked
to local government design and implementation issues, such as has been the focus of the Joint
Task Force and which now occupies the attention of the National Assembly. To assess this
indicator, respondents were asked the following question:
SGL1. Would you say that the services the city/town/ NDC is providing are…? [Read options]
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor
(8) Doesn’t know
Satisfaction with Local Government Services in 2009

Overall, a total of 28.8% of respondents considered that the quality of local government
services provided by local governments is either good or very good (Figure IV-18), while 40.6%
felt the opposite, that services were either poor or very poor. A significant proportion of
……
95
respondents (30.5%) held a neutral view, being of the opinion that the services provided are
neither good nor poor (fair).
Very
good
6.3%
Very poor
15.4%
Good
22.5%
Poor
25.2%
Neither good
nor bad
30.5%

Figure IV-18. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services
Satisfaction with Local Government Services Over Time

Citizens were slightly more satisfied with their local government services in 2006
(48.5%) than in 2009 (44.7%), a decrease of 3.8% as reflected in Figure IV-19. The following
discussion compares Guyana to the other countries included in the AmericasBarometer by
LAPOP and then examines in greater detail the drivers behind popular opinion on local
government services.
96
50
Local Government Services

Average Satisfaction with
40
30
48.5
44.7
20
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure IV-19. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Year
Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective

Brazil leads the countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP for level of
satisfaction with local government services, with 58.2% (Figure IV-20). Indeed, the majority of
countries are above 50%. Strikingly, Guyana and its three sister CARICOM counties
convincingly occupy the bottom four positions with satisfaction levels ranging from 44.7 %
(Guyana) to 37% (Jamaica). Despite these poor satisfaction levels, citizens of these four
CARICOM countries do not exhibit a particularly high level of demand-making on local
governments (see Figure IV-13), with Haiti and Belize being among the bottom five demand-
making countries.
……
97
Brazil 58.2
Ecuador 56.3
Colombia 56.1
Guatemala 55.9
Uruguay 54.8
United States 53.6
El Salvador 53.5
Chile 53.1
Bolivia 51.0
Costa Rica 50.6
Mexico 50.3
Nicaragua 49.2
Argentina 48.3
Venezuela 48.0
Honduras 47.9
Peru 46.8
Paraguay 46.3
Panama 46.0
Guyana 44.7
Belize 39.6
Haiti 39.5
Jamaica 37.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Satisfaction with
Figure IV-20. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services
Satisfaction with Services Provided by Municipalities or NDCs

The majority of Guyanese are supposed to benefit from the work of two local government
bodies, Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDCs) and Municipalities. When one delves into
the satisfaction levels of respondents resident in either NDC- or municipality-governed areas, it
becomes apparent that municipalities are particularly stricken with a lack of confidence in their
performance. Only 36.1 % of respondents in municipal areas expressed satisfaction with the
local government services they received while for respondents resident in NDC areas, the
satisfaction percentage was a full 13 percentage points higher – 49.1% (Figure IV-21).
This finding confirms the earlier suggestion that the City Council in the national capital
faces particular challenges, although other municipalities are by no means exempted. That
demand-making in regions 4 and 10, where the two largest municipalities in Guyana are located,
98
is the lowest in the country (see Figure IV-14) suggests a lack of confidence by citizens in the
ability of municipalities to respond to citizens’ needs, and thus they demand less. The LAPOP
2009 survey also found that citizens in regions 4 and 10 had the lowest level of interpersonal
trust, a phenomena more marked in the national capital, and they consistently lagged in terms of
civic participation measures (see chapter on Interpersonal trust and Civic Participation). These
findings suggest a particular need to address the local governance and civic participation
challenges in regions 4 and 10, within the general needs that exist nationally.
50
40
Average Satisfaction
with Local Services
30
49.1
20
36.1
10
. Municipalities NDCs
Figure IV-21. Satisfaction with Municipalities and NDCs Services
Satisfaction with Local Services Provided by NDCs by Regions

Measuring satisfaction with local services offered by the NDCs (Figure IV-22), by region,
shows that Region 6 is most satisfied at 54.8 percent followed by the hinterland regions and
Region 2 at 52.6 and 51.7 percent respectively. Region 10 brings up the rear with a level well
below all others: 30.7%. It should be noted that there are only 5 NDCs in the regions
characterised in the survey as being hinterland48 (regions 1, 7, 8 and 9) and region 10. The
findings for these regions are based on a small number of NDCs and thus the negative findings
could be a function of one or two NDCs that have been less responsive than others. The
following discussion examines in greater detail the predictors of satisfaction with local
government services.
48
Region 1 has two NDCs, while regions 7, 9 and 10 have one each. Region 8 does not have any NDCs.
……
99
60
Services Provided by NDCs

50
40
30
51.7 52.6 54.8
45.9 47.2 49.1
20
30.7
10

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure IV-22. Satisfaction with NDCs Services by Regions
Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The correlation between the satisfaction with local government services and trust in these
entities is very high, as seen in Figure IV-23. Urban residents are significantly dissatisfied with
the services they receive, and this is the only negative predictor in this regression analysis.
100
Trust in the Local Government

Crime Victimization
Education
Female F=8.050
Age N =2144
Wealth
Urban
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Figure IV-23. Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services
Figure IV-24 illustrates the relationship between persons who are generally satisfied with
local government services and trust in local government levels (see earlier discussion, starting on
page 5). The correlations between trust and satisfaction are clearly positive: as one increases so
does the other.
……
101
60

55
50
45
40
35
30
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100

Trust in the Local Government
Figure IV-24. Impact of the Trust in the Local Government on Satisfaction with the
The significant difference in satisfaction levels between citizens in urban and rural areas
(36 .1 vs 49.1%), indicated in Figure IV-25, continues the trend of urban weakness in the area of
local government. However, this is not to say that the rural levels are cause for much comfort:
even if 49.1% represented the national level of satisfaction, Guyana would still fall in the lower
half of the AmericasBarometer countries, although well ahead of sister CARICOM countries.
There is therefore cause for concern regarding the performance levels of local government
in Guyana, particularly in urban areas, and these confirm the urgency to undertake measures that
assure improved performance. Were an improvement in satisfaction levels to be achieved, it may
very likely result in an increased level of trust in local government.
102
50
the Local Government Services

40
30
49.1
20
36.1
10
Urban Rural
Area
Figure IV-25. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services by Area
Support for the Descentralization of Responsibilities

Decentralization of responsibilities to local government is integral to the achievement of
mandates, efficiencies, effectiveness and the development of communities, within the context of
national policy objectives. Decentralization, however, is fundamentally about which level of
government ought to possess more power, or less. Citizens are likely to consider the relative
strengths and weaknesses of central, regional and local governments and to support, or not, the
decentralization of responsibilities based on an assessment of the capacity to assure local
services. The following questions sought to gauge public support for the decentralization of
responsibilities.
LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given more
responsibilities? [Read options]
(1) Much more to the central government
(2) Somewhat more to the central government
(3) The same amount to the central government and the city/town/ NDC
(4) Some more to the city/town/ NDC
(5) Much more to the city/town/ NDC
(8) DK/DA
……
103
Now, let’s talk about the allocation of responsibilities and resources to Regional Democratic
Councils (RDC)
LGL2C. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given more
responsibilities? [Read options]
(3) The same amount to the central government and the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(4) Some more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(5) Much more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(8) DK/DA
Citizens Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Regional Democratic

Council and Local Government
When citizens were questioned about the extent to which responsibilities should be
decentalised to RDCs and local government, citizens leaned significantly towards either the
retention of the status quo or an increase in responsibilities for central government (Figure IV-
26). Specifically, when given the choice between central and local governments, 68% of
respondents preferred that responsibilities remain the same or that more responsibilities be given
to central government. Only 32% of respondents felt that more responsibilities should be given
to local governments. When asked about responsibility levels for RDCs, the numbers were
similar: 70.5% in favour of more or the same levels of central government responsibilities and
only 29.5% in favour of more RDC responsibilities.
Much more to the Much more to the

central government 25.9 central government 26.5
Somewhat more to Somewhat more to

the central government 13.4 the central government 13.4
Same amount to the Same amount to the central

central government and 28.7 government and the RDC 30.6
the city/town/NDC
Some more to
the city/town/NDC 15.2 Some more to the RDC 14.0
Much more to
the city/town/NDC 16.7 Much more to the RDC 15.5
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Percent Percent
Support for the Decentralization Support for the Decentralization
of Responsibilities to the Local Government of Responsibilities to RDC
Figure IV-26. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Regional Democratic
Council and Local Government
104
Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government in

Guyana, with an average score of 45.8 points on our 0-100 scale, ranks fifth from the
bottom among countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, above the Dominican
Republic, Panama, Haiti and Honduras, in terms of support for the decentralisation of
responsibilities to local government (Figure IV-27). Nine countries have levels above 50 with
Bolivia topping the scale significantly at 61 average-points.
Bolivia 61.0
Costa Rica 55.3
Mexico 55.3
Chile 55.2
Colombia 54.0
Peru 53.6
Jamaica 53.2
Venezuela 51.9
Uruguay 50.1
Guatemala 49.7
Brazil 49.5
Paraguay 49.4
El Salvador 49.3
Ecuador 47.8
Argentina 47.5
Belize 47.3
Nicaragua 46.3
Guyana 45.8
Panama 39.8
Haiti 35.2
Honduras 32.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Support for the Decentralization

of Responsabilities
Figure IV-27. Support for the Decentralization of

Responsibilities to the Local Government in Comparative
Perspective
Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities by Regions

In assessing the support of citizens in the ten administrative regions for the
decentralization of responsibilities, it was found that support levels are fairly consistent across the
……
105
regions (Figure IV-28). Region 3 (51.7 points) has the highest support levels, followed by
regions 10, 5, 6 and 4, with ranges from 49.4 to 44 points. Region 2 has the lowest support levels
of the ten regions, at 39.7 points. A more in-depth discussion of the determinants of support for
decentralisation follows below.
Decentralization of Responsibilities
60
50
Average Support for
40
30
48.3 49.4 51.7

44.0 45.1 45.7
20 39.7
10

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure IV-28. Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local

Government by Region
Determinants of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local

Government
In determining the factors that influence support for the decentralisation of
responsibilities to the local government, it was found that support levels are higher for citizens in
Regions 10 and 3, and for those who are older and who have higher levels of education, as shown
in Appendix IV-5. There are no significant negative predictors in determining levels of support.
106

Attended a Municipal Meeting
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Urban
Region 2
Region 3 R-Squared =0.030
F=3.691
Region 5 N =2080
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1

Figure IV-29. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to
In dissecting the support for decentralization (Figure IV-30) according to education level,
it was found that the more educated the respondent, the more they supported decentralisation of
responsibilities to local governments. Individuals who have acquired a higher level of education
are more inclined to support decentralization (49.5 points) than those with primary education
levels (43.9 points). In terms of age, support for decentralisation of responsibilities to local
government rises steadily as one grows older, with the 18-25 age range supporting
decentralisation with 43.3 points and those aged 66+ supporting at 53.4 points.
……
107
60
50
Average Support for the 50
Average Support for the

40
40
30
30
46.3 49.5 53.4
43.9 48.0 48.3
20
20 43.3 44.4 45.7
10
10
0 0
Primary Secondary Higher 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+
Education Level Age
Figure IV-30. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government by
Education Level and Age
Support for the descentralization of Economic Resources

The management of money in the pursuit of governmental mandates is a key
consideration, and one that is under consideration in the local government reform process within
the National Assembly. The 2009 LAPOP survey asked citizens the following questions to
gauge public opinion as to how decentralized the management of money or economic resources
ought to be.
LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should
manage more money? [Read options]
(1) Much more the central government
(2) Some more the central government
(3) The same amount the central government and the city/town/ NDC
(4) Some more the city/town/ NDC
(5) Much more the city/town/NDC
(8) DK/DA
LGL2D. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should
manage more money? [Read options]
(3) The same amount the central government and the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(4) Some more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(5) Much more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(8) DK/DA
108
Citizens Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Regional

Democratic Council and Local Government
When citizens were questioned about the level of decentalisation of economic resources
that should occur, citizens leaned again significantly towards either the retention of the status quo
or an increase in money for central government (Figure IV-31). Specifically, 70.7% of
respondents preferred that the status quo be retained or that central government should manage
more money. Only 29.4% of respondents felt that local governments should manage more
money.49 For RDCs, the numbers were starker: 73.2% of respondents favoured more or the same
levels of money for central government and only 26.7% in favour of RDCs managing more
money.
These findings, together with the earlier discussion on the decentralization of

responsibilities, are relevant to the policy discussions that have been taking place on these
subjects at the national political level, as elected representatives seek to give meaning to the
constitutional reforms of 2001. The 2009 survey confirms a lack of citizen confidence in the
ability of regional and local governments to manage additional responsibilities, including
increased fiscal responsibilities, and a preference for the status quo and the perceived strengths of
the central government. The effort to develop legislation that provides for greater levels of
decentralization and responsibility would likely benefit from support for public confidence-
building measures, including the capacity building of local and regional governments.
Much more the Much more the

Some more the Some more the

Same amount the central Same amount the central

government and the 27.8 government and the RDC 32.0
city/town/NDC
Some more the

city/town/NDC 14.9 Some more the RDC 11.6
Much more the

city/town/NDC 14.5 Much more the RDC 15.1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Percent Percent
Support for the Decentralization Support for the Decentralization
of Economic Resources to Local Government of Economic Resources to RDC
Figure IV-31. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Regional
Democratic Council and Local Government
49
Percentages do not total 100% due to rounding errors.
……
109
Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government in

Among countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, public support for the
decentralization of economic resources is led by Costa Rica with a level of 61.1 average points
(Figure IV-32). Guyana, with 43.1, is fifth from the bottom. Honduras has the lowest level of
support (35.8 average points). With the notable exception of Jamaica (8th with 50.7), the two
other CARICOM countries also demonstrate relatively low levels of support for the management
of more money at the local government levels, with Belize and Haiti demonstrating levels of 44.5
and 37.4 average points respectively.
Costa Rica 61.1
Paraguay 57.4
Bolivia 56.2
Colombia 56.0
Mexico 54.9
Chile 53.8
Nicaragua 52.9
Jamaica 50.7
Venezuela 50.3
Peru 48.7
Guatemala 48.4
El Salvador 48.1
Brazil 46.9
Argentina 46.5
Panama 46.4
Belize 44.5
Uruguay 43.8
Guyana 43.1
Ecuador 40.3
Haiti 37.4
Honduras 35.8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Support for the Decentralization

of Economic Resources
Figure IV-32. Support for the Decentralization of Economic

Resources to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective
110
Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government by

Regions
Region 3 with 49.6 average points leads local support for the decentralization of
economic resources to the local government, followed by region 5 and the hinterland regions with
46.9 and 45.4 average points respectively (Figure IV.33). Citizens in regions 2 and 6 are the least
supportive of the decentralization of economic resources, with support levels falling to 36 and
39.6 points respectively. A discussion on the predictors of support for increased management of
money by local government follows.
Average Support for Decentralization
60
50
of Economic Resources
40
30
46.9 49.6
42.7 45.4
20 39.6 40.0
36.0
10
Region 2 Region 6 Region 10 Region 4 Regions Region 5 Region 3

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure IV-33. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources by Region
Determinants of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources

Support for the decentralization of the economic resources to the local government is
positively affected by the predictors of higher education, self-identification as Black, age and
Region 3 (Figure IV-34). In this regression analysis there are no statistically significant negative
predictors.
……
111
Satisfaction with Local Government Services R-Squared =0.030

F=4.351
Attended a Municipal Meeting N =2054
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Urban
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1

Figure IV-34. Predictors of support for the Decentralization of Economic
Resources to the Local Government
Analysis of support for the decentralization of economic resources by education level and
self-identified ethnicity (Figure IV.35) indicates that citizens with a higher educational level are
much more inclined to support decentralization to local governments (48.6 points) than those
with only a primary education (41.8 points), consistent with the earlier finding on the general
decentralization of responsibilities. In terms of ethnicity, respondents who identified themselves
as Black (45.7 points) led the other ethnic groups in supporting the decentralization of economic
resources. Persons who self-identified as Indian demonstrated the lowest level of support among
ethnic groups, at a level of 40.6 points. This statistically significant difference in viewpoint
between Blacks and Indians as to whether more money should be managed by local governments
likely reflects the correlation between ethnicity and party voted for, but that analysis would take
us beyond the focus of this chapter. However, it is noticeable that not only is the spread across
this difference in opinion relatively small (5.1 points) but that the level of support is low,
regardless of ethnic group, in comparison to the other countries included in the
AmericasBarometer.
112
50
Decentralization of Economic Resources

Decentralization of Economic Resources
50
40

40
30
30
48.6 43.2 45.7

41.8 42.9 20 40.6 42.3
20
10 10
0 0
Primary Secondary Higher Indian Amerindian Mixed Black
Education Level Ethnic Self-identification
Figure IV-35. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government by
Education Level and Ethnic Self-identification
The impact of satisfaction with local services (sgl1r) on support for

stable democracy
A regression analysis was created (see Appendix IV-7) to establish the relationship
between the impact of satisfaction with local services on support for a stable democracy, using
independent variables such as satisfaction with local government services, satisfaction with the
performance of the current President, education, gender and age.
Relationship between Belief in the Political Legitimacy and Satisfaction with Local
Services
The line chart shown in Figure IV-36 illustrates that the more Guyanese are satisfied with
local government services, the more they are disposed to supporting the political legitimacy of
core democratic institutions. Similarly, as the level of dissatisfaction rises, the level of support
for the legitimacy of core institutions falls. Thus, for democracy to be deepened and consolidated
through the according of legitimacy to core democratic institutions by citizens, it is imperative
that satisfaction levels with the services received from local governments be increased.
……
113
60
Average Political Legitimacy

of Core Regime Institutions
55
50
45
40
35
Very good Good Neither good Poor Very poor
nor bad
Sartisfaction with Local Services
Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP
Figure IV-36. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Political Legitimacy
Relationship between Interpersonal Trust and Satisfaction with Local Services

A final line chart, again based on the regression analysis contained in Appendix IV-7, was
created to assess the relationship between interpersonal trust and satisfaction with local services.
As seen in Figure IV-37, there is a strong positive correlation between interpersonal trust and
satisfaction with local services: the more satisfied citizens are with local government services, the
more they will tend to trust others in the society. These findings highlight the role that
democratic institutions can play in creating greater cohesion within the Guyanese society.
114
64

62
60
58
56
54
52
Very good Good Neither good Poor Very poor
nor bad
Satisfaction with Local Services
Figure IV-37. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust
Conclusion
In the 2009 LAPOP survey, Guyanese demonstrated a similar level of trust in the three
levels of government – central, regional and local. This puts Guyana into a relatively high
category within the Latin American and Caribbean region, where trust levels in local government
ranked 11th of 23 countries surveyed and the best among four participating CARICOM countries.
When one examines how local government is viewed by citizens in Guyana it is evident
that hinterland areas possess the highest levels of both trust in local government and participation
in local government meetings, exceeding the top performers in the AmericasBarometer countries.
The hinterland regions also demonstrated the second highest levels of demand-making to local
governments in Guyana, and satisfaction with the services of their local governments.
Despite the positive influence of the hinterland opinion, Guyanese in general are
considerably dissatisfied with the local government services they receive. Guyanese in urban
areas hold even lower levels of trust and satisfaction in the services of their local governments,
and particularly of municipalities. There is much to suggest that Guyanese could learn from the
experiences of their fellow-citizens in the hinterland regions, with a view to improving
democratic and developmental results such as increased participation and satisfaction with
services.
……
115
Citizens of the other CARICOM countries in the AmericasBarometer survey are

significantly dissatisfied with the services of their local governments. Specifically, the
participating CARICOM countries occupy the bottom four positions in the regional comparison,
suggesting that there may be a commonality of causes and effects within CARICOM countries.
There may thus be value in exploring for common solutions across the sub-region.
The general lack of trust, satisfaction, demand-making and participation has contributed
to a situation where Guyanese are very cautious in contemplating the decentralization of
responsibilities, including the management of more money, by local governments. Despite their
misgivings about local governments, however, Blacks are slightly more inclined than other ethnic
groups to support increased decentralization.
Finally, the findings suggest worrisome trends in terms of the health of Guyana’s
democracy, particularly as relate to institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust. These two
crucial elements of democratic stability are eroded as levels of citizen satisfaction with the
services they receive from local governments decrease. When the citizens perceive little benefit,
they will be less inclined to invest themselves or their resources. In this way, the democratic
dividends of healthy social relations and human development remain unrealized, threatening the
viability of democracy itself.
The efforts of elected representatives at the national level to address the challenges facing
local government are thus highly relevant and of critical importance at this time.
116
APPENDIX CHAPTER IV.
Appendix IV-1. Predictors of Trust in the Local Government

Predictors of Trust in the Local Government
Black -0.082* (-2.36)
Mixed -0.053 (-1.75)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.133* (2.90)
Region 10 0.001 (0.04)
Region 6 0.069 (1.76)
Region 5 -0.053 (-1.29)
Region 3 -0.054 (-1.10)
Region 2 0.095* (2.88)
Urban -0.117* (-2.83)
Wealth 0.052 (1.78)
Age -0.053* (-2.22)
Female -0.020 (-1.07)
Education -0.077* (-2.35)
Crime Victimization -0.039 (-1.48)
Constant 0.005 (0.16)
R-Squared = 0.073
* p<0.05
……
117
Appendix IV-2. Predictors of Participation in Local Government Meetings

Predictors of Participation in Local Government Meetings
Black 0.084 (0.80)
Mixed -0.046 (-0.60)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.305* (3.33)
Region 10 0.296* (2.39)
Region 6 0.328* (3.13)
Region 5 0.080 (0.79)
Region 3 0.186 (1.92)
Region 2 0.183 (1.98)
Urban -0.337* (-2.34)
Married or common law 0.061 (0.85)
Wealth -0.132 (-1.39)
Age 0.107 (1.26)
Female -0.190* (-2.79)
Crime Victimization 0.154* (2.34)
Constant -2.184* (-22.72)
F = 4.82
* p<0.05
Appendix IV-3. Predictors of Demand-Making at the Local Government

Predictors of Demand-Making at the Local Government
Black 0.012 (0.14)
Mixed -0.013 (-0.20)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.217* (2.48)
Region 10 0.073 (0.62)
Region 6 0.266* (3.30)
Region 5 0.168* (2.26)
Region 3 0.236* (3.25)
Region 2 0.375* (6.21)
Urban -0.066 (-0.74)
Wealth 0.059 (0.79)
Age 0.182* (1.99)
Female -0.296* (-3.88)
Crime Victimization 0.167* (2.68)
Constant -1.977* (-25.80)
F = 4.43
* p<0.05
118
Appendix IV-4. Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services
Black 0.009 (0.10)
Mixed 0.056 (0.68)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.137 (0.94)
Region 10 -0.009 (-0.10)
Region 6 0.081 (1.06)
Region 5 -0.012 (-0.10)
Region 3 0.067 (0.71)
Region 2 0.237* (2.03)
Urban -0.314* (-3.11)
Wealth 0.031 (0.32)
Age -0.023 (-0.29)
Female 0.135 (1.73)
Crime Victimization 0.001 (0.02)
Trust in the Municipal Government 0.846* (10.19)
Constant 2.091* (20.47)
F = 8.05
* p<0.05
Appendix IV-5. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to

Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government
Black 0.027 (0.93)
Mixed 0.019 (0.55)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.054 (1.02)
Region 10 0.057* (2.35)
Region 6 0.034 (1.52)
Region 5 0.058 (1.82)
Region 3 0.092* (4.01)
Region 2 -0.017 (-0.61)
Urban -0.034 (-1.13)
Wealth 0.054 (1.57)
Age 0.087* (3.33)
Female -0.030 (-1.46)
Education 0.077* (2.43)
Attended a Municipal Meeting 0.036 (1.38)
Satisfaction with Local Government
-0.049 (-1.74)
Services
Constant -0.002 (-0.07)
R-Squared = 0.030
* p<0.05
……
119
Appendix IV-6. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources

Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources
Black 0.085* (3.28)
Mixed 0.045 (1.74)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.060 (1.20)
Region 10 -0.026 (-0.79)
Region 6 -0.021 (-0.74)
Region 5 0.051 (1.57)
Region 3 0.086* (4.94)
Region 2 -0.036 (-1.37)
Urban -0.038 (-1.10)
Wealth 0.046 (1.32)
Age 0.058* (2.06)
Female -0.042 (-1.82)
Education 0.046* (2.05)
Attended a Municipal Meeting 0.028 (1.15)
Satisfaction with Local Government
-0.002 (-0.07)
Services
Constant 0.009 (0.31)
R-Squared = 0.030
* p<0.05
120
Appendix IV-7. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy
Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy
Support for the Right Legitimacy of Core
Support for Democracy Political Tolerance Interpersonal Trust
Independent Variables Public Contestation Institutions
Coef. Err. est. Coef. Err. est. Coef. Err. est. Coef. Err. est. Coef. Err. est.
Satisfaction with Local
-0.029 (0.03) 0.002 (0.02) -0.005 (0.03) 0.198* (0.02) 0.081* (0.02)
Government Services
President
Education 0.223 (0.24) 0.370 (0.20) 0.211 (0.21) -0.621* (0.20) 0.050 (0.20)
Female -2.156 (1.47) -2.218* (0.95) -2.630* (1.06) -0.296 (1.11) -1.811* (0.91)
Age 0.367 (0.22) 0.051 (0.17) 0.210 (0.19) -0.678* (0.20) 0.136 (0.19)
q2sq -0.004 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) 0.007* (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Wealth -0.047 (0.40) 0.302 (0.32) 0.625 (0.36) 0.319 (0.29) 0.304 (0.34)
Perception of Family
0.189 (0.75) -0.922* (0.43) -1.156 (0.59) 2.298* (0.65) 1.482* (0.63)
Economic Situation
Size of city/town -0.604 (0.74) -1.595* (0.48) -1.865* (0.82) 3.917* (0.51) 2.046* (0.59)
Constant 60.016* (6.72) 73.210* (4.80) 64.655* (7.48) 38.678* (5.44) 38.348* (5.11)
R-cuadrado 0.011 0.043 0.052 0.180 0.040
N of Cases 1952 2132 2092 2123 2142
* p<0.05
……
121
Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception

of Government Economic
Performance on Support for
Stable Democracy50
The final chapter in Part II of this study deals with the issue of the impact of perception of
government performance on support for stable democracy. It has become common place in the
field of democratic governance, especially when speaking about election outcomes, to comment:
“It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often attributed
to current economic performance. Citizens directly associate the performance of the economy
with those who are in control of the national government. In Latin America where, as has been
shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of
governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the
performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This
chapter, then, looks at citizen perceptions of the success/failure of the government to deal with
these two critical economic challenges and their impact on support for stable democracy.
While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for
democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s that researchers began to take note.
During this time, largely in the developed world, especially the United States, survey research
began to see a considerable drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions.
While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as
the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not
rising and falling according to these events. Rather, it seemed, macro and micro economic
conditions were falling more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion. As perceptions of
economic conditions improved, so too did opinions of political leaders, institutions and overall
support for the system.
Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three
tier categorization of political support, articulated as political community, the regime, and
50
This chapter was written by Brian Faughnan.
……
123
political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support,
diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukam and Seligson (1982) can be
defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can
take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her
moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere” (Muller et al. 1982, 241)
while specific support involves evaluations of the current incumbents within the political system.
Despite the fact that early research focuses on the effects of economic performance on
political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made
between Easton’s three tiers and diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and
Schneider found that in the United States, negative economic outlooks and perceptions affected
“peoples’ feelings about their leaders and institutions” (Lipset and Schneider 1987, 2) and that
“the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should
increase faith in institutions” (ibid, 5). In other words, poor economic conditions in the United
States affected specific support to a large extent with little or no effect on diffuse support.
More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support
for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed in doubt, especially aggregate-
level economic performance which, according to Dalton, “offers limited systematic empirical
evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels
of political support across the advanced industrial democracies” (2004, 113). He does continue
to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual
level analyses of a society’s economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of support of the
system within that society. Kornberg and Clarke (1992) also note that the political community
should remain rather unaffected by short-term economic perceptions, but that political authorities
are not as fortunate. In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observes a
moderate correlation with a person’s financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent
(specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, citizens
who are more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tend to be more trusting of
government. However, according to Dalton, “perceptions of the national economy are more
closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition
is weaker.” In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government responsible for
the state of the national economy, they are “less likely to generalize from their own financial
circumstances to their evaluations of government overall” (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless,
Dalton’s conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are
cautious ones and that “the link between economic performance and political support appears
tenuous” (ibid, 127) within the OECD nations.
Turning now toward a government’s economic performance and support for stable
democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate
cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according
to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the
authors’ preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less
important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58). However, they caution
124
that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.
Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that, contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others
who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one’s individual assessment of
both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support
for the political system, and that citizens who evaluate more highly both the national as well as
their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those
citizens who hold lower perceptions. Given the inconclusive results from the previous research
conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data, will examine the
impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of
support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.
How Might Perception of Government Economic Performace Affect

Support for Stable Democracy?
Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic
growth may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however,
that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive
contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of
economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be
that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time may have a more negative sense
of social capital, but we anticipate that the relationship will be particularly strong. In the pages
below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.
Government Economic Performance

Like many citizens of the Western Hemisphere, the citizens of Guyana tend, more than
any other category, to rate the economy as the main problem of the country. As can be observed
in Figure V-1, in 2009, 56.2% of respondents identified the economy as the main problem facing
the country today. The next highest category is security concerns, accounting for 13.1% of
respondents followed by politics (12.3%), other (11.3%) and basic services (7.1%). Comparing
these results to those of 2006, it quickly becomes clear that the economy has become much more
of a perceived problem in the three years between the two survey rounds. While in 2006 a
plurality of respondents labelled the economy as being the main problem facing the country, at
just over 40% of respondents, this is 10 percentage points from a majority. Likewise, a
significantly higher proportion (27% vs. 13%) of Guyanese labelled security as their main
concern in 2006 than 2009, while all other categories remained comparable in terms of
respondents labelling them as the primary problem.
Fully understanding the reasons for the significant shifts between 2006 and 2009 in terms
of the economy being the number one problem in the country goes beyond the scope of this
chapter. However, there are a number of plausible explanations that deserve at least brief
mention. First, and perhaps most likely, is that of the 24 AmericasBarometer surveys
……
125
administered by LAPOP in 2008/09, the Guyana survey was the only one that took place
following the collapse of the U.S. financial sector and the resulting global economic troubles. It is
possible, perhaps likely, that the significant increase in the economy as the primary concern is a
response to the events of the second half of 2008.
Second, between 2006 and 2009, a 14% decrease was observed between those who saw
security as the major concern for the country. Given that the other possible categories, politics,
basic services, and other remained relatively stable between the two rounds, it could also be
hypothesized that citizens are feeling safer and more secure in 2009 than they were in 2006. The
analysis of this issue is developed more in-depth in other chapters in this volume.
Other Other
10.2% 11.3%
Politics Politics
14.5% 12.3%
Economy
40.8%
Basic Services
Basic Services 7.1% Economy
7.4% 56.2%
Security
13.1%
Security
27.0%
2006 2009
Figure V-1. Economy as the Main Problem of the Country
Whatever the reasoning, however, the data are clear that in 2009, over 50% of the
Guyanese population viewed the economy as the primary problem facing their country.
Furthermore, the proportion of respondents holding this view increased almost 16 percentage
points since the last AmericasBarometer was conducted in the country in 2006. To understand
how these attitudes might affect democracy and democratic stability, we must dig deeper into the
AmericasBarometer data. This chapter will first examine how Guyanese feel about the economic
performance of their government, including comparisons across the hemisphere, time, and
regions within the country. It will then examine the role of economic outlooks (both national and
personal) on specific support for the government. Finally, before concluding, the chapter will
126
examine the impact of perception of government economic performance on democratic stability

in Guyana.
Measuring Perception of Government Economic Performance

In order to measure citizens’ perceptions of their government’s handling of the economy,
the Latin American Public Opinion Project has created a new index (econperf). This index is a
product of two items in the 2008/09 survey conducted in 23 countries throughout the Americas;51
both items ask respondents to rate their respective government’s performance on economic
issues. The first item (N1) asks respondents how well they believe their current government
fights poverty. The second question included in the index (N12) asks respondents to rate their
government’s performance on combating unemployment. Below the exact wording for each
question is included.
N1. To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty?
N12. To what extent would you say the current government combats unemployment?
51
The total number of countries included in the 2008/09 Round of the AmericasBarometer Survey was 24; however,
the applicable questions for this chapter were not included in the Canadian questionnaire, therefore 23 countries will
be used for this specific analysis.
……
127
Perceptions of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective
Uruguay 54.6
Bolivia 51.9
Costa Rica 51.8
Guatemala 50.6
Chile 50.5
Colombia 48.7
Brazil 46.1
Mexico 45.6
Guyana 45.4
Ecuador 43.4
Belize 41.0
Venezuela 40.6
Panama 36.5
El Salvador 36.0
Jamaica 36.0
Argentina 35.0
United States 34.2
Nicaragua 30.4
Peru 29.5
Honduras 27.4
Haiti 27.1
Paraguay 14.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Perception of Government
Economic Performance
Figure V-2. Perception of Government Economic Performance in

Citizen perception of government economic performance varies greatly throughout the

Americas. The results of the economic performance index, in a comparative perspective, can be
seen in Figure V-2. The average score for the 23 countries is 41.3 on the 0 to 100 scale where 0
signifies that citizens believe the economic performance of their government is poor while 100
signifies satisfaction with the government’s economic perforamance. However, as can be seen
from the figure above, a significant disparity exists between the countries. For example, five
countries, Chile, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Uruguay, have scores which exceed the
mid-point of 50 on the 0-100 scale. Uruguay is the country which has the highest average score
128
for citizen perceptions of government economic performance at 54.6. Alternatively, a separate

group of countries falls at or below the thirty point mark in their average perception of
government economic performance, and one of those countries, Paraguay, has an average score
which is almost 14 points below the next closest country, Haiti.
As can be seen from the figure above, in relation to the other countries included in the
2008/09 AmericasBarometer survey, Guyana’s average score of 45.4 slightly exceeds the region
average of 41.3. Of the 23 countries, Guyana is 10 places from the top, and has a score which is
statistically indistinguishable (as demonstrated by the confidence interval bars) from Venezuela,
Belize, Ecuador, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic.
To better understand the case of Guyana, however, we must move away from the
hemispheric comparison and look more in-depth at the country level data. The first question we
will seek to answer is how the data concerning citizens’ perceptions of government economic
performance differs between the two rounds of surveys (2006 and 2009) that have been
conducted by LAPOP in Guyana. The section below addresses this issue.
Perceptions of Government Economic Performance over Time

50
Average Perception of
40
30
45.4
20
34.6
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure V-3. Perception of Government Economic Performance in 2006 and 2009
Interestingly, as the proportion of Guyanese who view the economy as the main problem
facing the country increased between 2006 and 2009 (as seen in Figure V-1), the average score of
perceptions of government economic performance also increased. As can be seen in Figure V-3
above, in 2006, the average score for the index was 34.6, while in 2009 it increased to 45.4, an
……
129
increase of almost 11 points. If we follow the hypothesis laid out in the beginning of the chapter,
namely, that when rating the economy as the country’s most pressing problem, interviewees were
responding in large part to the global economic crisis. We could, therefore surmise from the
results of Figure V-3 that the Guyanese, in large part, do not blame the incumbent government
for the current economic situation.
Perceptions of Government Economic Performance by Region

60
50
40
30 60.3
53.6
46.6 46.6 48.2
20 39.7 39.9
10

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure V-4. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Region, 2009
As in the previous two figures, Figure V-4, shown above, employs the index of
perceptions of government economic performance as the dependent variable, examining it in
relationship to the ten regions in Guyana. Region 4 is shown to register the lowest average in
citizen perception of government economic performace with an average score of 39.7 while
Region 2 displays the highest perception in government economic performance with an average
score of 60.3. In addition to Region 2, we also find that the Guyanese from Region 3 also tend to
have relatively high evaluations of government economic performance with an average score
exceeding the mid-point; statistically, the respondents Regions 2 and 3 hold roughly the same
views concerning their government’s performance on economic matters. Beyond these two
regions, however, we find lower evaluations of government economic performance, with
averagees failing to reach 50 points on the 0-100 scale. Regions 4 and 10 are especially low, each
of which averages less than 40 points.
130
While examining the results of citizen perceptions of government economic performance

in the aggregate assists us in understanding and coming to macro-level conclusions, in order to
truly understand the data in the AmericasBarometer surveys, we must dig deeper and examine
them at the individual level. The remaining pages of this chapter will do just that. Basing our
theoretical argument on the research of Easton (1975), Lipset and Schneider (1987) and Dalton
(2004), the independent variables of interest will include what political scientists call both
sociotropic and isotropic economic perceptions. In other words, we are interested in
understanding how individuals’ perception of the national economic situation as well as their
perception on their own personal economic situation influences how they perceive the
government’s economic performance.
To measure the sociotropic and isotropic economic situations, the analyses below employ
two items from the AmericasBarometer core questionnaire. Shown below, SOCT1 asks
respondents how they would describe the country’s economic situation, while IDIO1 asks
respondents to rate their own eoconomic situation.
SOCT1. How would you describe the economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is very
good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know
IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good,
good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know
While the relationship between individuals’ evaluation of national and personal economic
situations and their assessment of government economic performance is by no means immune
from the ever-present threat of endogeniety, we contend that it is reasonable to assume that the
causal arrows flow from the previously stated independent variables to determine perceptions of
government economic performance. It is not unrealistic to presume that in evaluating the
economic performance of their government, citizens first evaluate their own personal economic
situation as well as the current health of their national economy.
In addition to the two independent variables mentioned above, the quantitative analyses in
this chapter will also employ a number of control variables to hold those effects constant.
Included as controls will be the size of the city or town in which the respondents live, their
wealth (as measured by household possessions), age, sex, and the education level of the
respondents. Furthermore, regions are also included as control variables in the regression models
below. It should be noted that in order to preserve the readabillity of the figures, not all control
are depicted; however, for those interested, all variables included in the regressions, along with
their coefficients, standard errors, and t-values are included in tabular form in the appendix of this
chapter.
……
131
Determinants of Perception of Government Economic Performance

in Guyana
Figure V-5 presents the results of the multivariate regression predicting perceptions of
government economic performance. Variables which cross the red vertical line do not carry any
statistical significance (at the .05 level) while those whose horizontal lines (representing the
confidence intervals) fall to the right of the 0 mark have a significant, positive impact on the
dependent variable, and those to the left of the red line have a significant, negative impact on
predicting perceptions of government economic performance. The dots in the centre of the line
represent the expected impact.
Perception of
Personal Economic Situation
Perception of
National Economic Situation
Rural Area
Small City
Wealth
Age R-Squared =0.264

F=39.813
N =2416
Female
Education
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
The reference group is: Metropolitan Area

Figure V-5. Determinants of Perceptions of Government Economic Performance
As can be seen from Figure V-5,52 the two variables of interest, individual perception of
the national economic situation and one’s own economic situation are both statistically and
substantively significant in the expected direction. We find that as people’s attitudes become
more positive towards their personal and national economic situations, their perceptions of the
52
While urban area and male are not displayed in the figure, they are accounted for. Being dummy variables, these
two categories are referred to as “reference categories” meaning that all other categories of that variable are
compared in relation to the reference. Additionally, in the table in the appendix, for the region variables Region 4 is
omitted from the table as is the Indian variable for race. These two categories are also reference categories for their
respective variables.
132
government’s economic performance increase. The linear relationships of these two variables are
depicted in Figures V-6 and V-7, showing that in the case of citizens’ perception of their personal
economic situation, as their evaluation increases so to does their perception of the government’s
handling of the economy.
More interestingly, however, is Figure V-7 which shows a positive linear relationship
between one’s evaluation of the national economic situation and perceptions of government
economic performance between the ratings of “very bad” to “good” on the evaluation of the
national economy (we notice an insignificant decrease in the perceptions of government
economic performance by those who rate the sociotropic economic situation as “very good”).
Figure V-5 shows that compared to those living in Georgetown, the capital city, Guyanese
who live in rural areas are statistically more likely to hold positive perceptions regarding
governmental economic performance. Likewise, age shows a significant, negative relationship,
meaning that younger Guyanese tend to hold more pessimistic perceptions of government
economic performance. The final significant variable in the regression predicting government
economic performance is education, which impacts the dependent variable negatively; those with
less education hold more favourable perceptions of government economic performance.
55
50
45
40
35
30
Very Bad Bad Neither Good Good Very Good
nor Bad (Fair)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation
Sig. < 0.001
Figure V-6. Impact of the Perception of Personal Economic Situation on Perceptions

of Government Economic Performance, 2009
……
133

60
55
50
45
40
35
30

nor Bad (Fair)
Sig. < 0.001
Perception of National Economic Situation
Figure V-7. Impact of the Perception of the National Economic Situation on Perceptions
of Government Economic Performance, 2009
From the regression results presented above, the data from Guyana support the research of
both Dalton and Schwarz-Blum. In the former, Dalton contends that, in developed countries,
citizens use their evaluations of the national economic situation to evaluate government economic
performance. As can be seen above, the most significant variable, statistically as well as
substantially significant, is one’s perception of the national economic situation. However,
Schwarz-Blum contends that while in developed countries, personal economic situations may not
impact one’s evaluation of governmental economic performance, in Latin America, this is not
case. Guyana supports this claim: we find that although citizens’ evaluation of the national
economy is a stronger predictor of their perception of government economic performance,
evaluations of their personal economic situation is also a statistically and substantively significant
predictor of the dependent variable.
The previous analysis examined perceptions of government economic performance as a

dependent variable finding that both personal and national economic evaluations are significant
predictors in the case of Guyana. The remaining pages of this chapter, will examine the impact of
these variables on support for both specific and diffuse democracy, or, how individuals view the
current government (specific) and the impact these variables have on democratic stability
(diffuse).
134
Perceptions of the Economic Situation and Its Impact on Specific

Support in Guyana
Figure V-1 above showed that a majority of Guyanese rate the economy as being the
primary concern facing the country. Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated significant
variation in attitudes concerning how people view the economic performance of the Guyanese
national government. Given that we have already examined the determinants of perceptions of
economic performance in Guyana, the remaining pages of this chapter attempt to explain
attitudes toward democracy. As was articulated in the theoretical framework of this chapter,
David Easton theorized over 30 years ago that democratic support could be sub-classified into
both specific and diffuse support; specific support referring to one’s support for the current
democratic government and leaders of the society and diffuse support referring to one’s support
of democratic institutions, regardless of the current leadership.
This section examines the impact that perceptions of government economic performance
has on specific support for democracy. To measure this concept, we utilize question M1 from the
2009 AmericasBarometer Survey in Guyana which asks the following:
M1. Speaking in general of the current government, how would you rate the job performance of
President Jagdeo? [Read the options]
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/DR
Very Bad
4.2%
Very Bad
Very Good Very Good 6.7%
8.3% 14.0%
Bad Bad
15.4% 11.9%
Good
21.3%
Good
29.3%
Neither Good Nor Bad

38.1%
Neither Good Nor Bad
50.6%
2006 2009
Figure V-8. Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President, 2009
……
135
The two pie charts in Figure V-8 depict the assessments of the work of the current
president given by respondents in both 2006 and 2009. As can be observed, in 2009 the ratings
for President Jagdeo increased in both the “very good” and “very bad” categories, while the
proportion of Guyanese responding “neither good nor bad” decreased. In the most recent survey,
14% of respondents rated their satisfaction with the current president as “very good” while
almost 30% rated their satisfaction as “good”. The middle response, “neither good nor bad”
decreased by more than 12 percentage points between the two surveys with only 38% of
respondents rating the president that way. Finally, about 12% rated their satisfaction with the
president as “bad” and 6.7% as “very bad”.
In order to facilitate the analysis of this variable, the Latin American Public Opinion
Project has converted it into a scale from 0-100 where 0 signifies the least satisfaction with the
performance of the current president, while 100 represents the most satisfied.
Performance of the Current President
80
Average Satisfaction with the
60
40
62.8 66.0 67.3

56.3 60.2
50.5 52.9
20

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure V-9. Average Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President by
Region, 2009
On the 0-100 scale, the average satisfaction with the performance of the current president
is 58.4. Figure V-9 shows how that support is dispersed by region in Guyana. Region 2 has the
highest satisfaction with the job of the president. Statistically speaking, we can only conclude that
the population of Region 2, on average, is more satisfied with the president’s performance than
are the citizens of Regions 4 and 10, which hold the lowest opinion of presidential performance.
136
Of note are the racial tensions represented in this variable. Below, Figure V-10 stratifies
the satisfaction variable (M1) by race, showing that the levels of satisfaction expressed by
respondents who identified with each race. The differences are statistically different.
80
60
40
70.9
62.8
52.1
20
45.2
Black Mixed Amerindian Indian
Figure V-10. Average Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President by
Ethnicity, 2009
It is commonplace in surveys to find that ethnic identities matter in rating job

performance of elected officials. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the self-identifying Indian
population of Guyana is the most strongly satisfied with the current president’s job performance.
The Amerindian population, with a level of 62.8 is the next most satisfied group, while those of
mixed race rate the performance of the current president at over the 50 point threshold. Persons
who identify themselves as Black rate the work of the current president below the mid-point at
45.2 points.
To understand the impact of perceptions of economic performance on specific support for

democracy, a multivariate regression is estimated below with perceptions of government
economic performance serving as an independent or explanatory variable.
……
137
Perception of
Perception of
Personal Economic Situation
Perception of
National Economic Situation
Rural Area
Small City
Wealth
R-Squared =0.386
F=68.040
Age N =2390
Female
Education Level
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
The reference group is: Metropolitan Area

Figure V-11. Determinants of the Approval of the Current President (Specific
Support), 2009
Figure V-11 above, depicts the predictors for specific support of democracy in Guyana,
(i.e., approval of the current president). In addition to a number of control variables, all the
economic perception variables result in statistically and substantively significant relationships
with the dependent variable. Not surprisingly, and consistent with the well-established literature
in political science on topics such as retrospective voting and candidate evaluation, in Guyana we
find that citizens use evaluations of current economic conditions, both personal and national, to
evaluate political leaders, in this case, the Guyanese president. Specifically, of the variables
included in the multivariate model predicting specific support for democracy, age, size of city or
town of the respondent, perception of one’s personal economic situation, perception of the
national economic situation, and, our variable of interest, perception of government economic
performance, all have positive impacts on specific support for democracy.
In Figure V-12, the strong, positive relationship between perception of government

economic performance and specific support for democracy is depicted. As one’s perception of the
economic performance of the Guyanese government increases, we would also expect, on average,
an increase in satisfaction with the work of the current president. Indeed, for those who hold the
highest perception of government economic performance, we would expect an average score of
80 for the specific support measure, while those with the lowest levels on the independent
variable would have and average score close to 40 points on the 0-100 scale.
138
80

Average Satisfaction with the 70
60
50
40
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100

Perception of Government Economic Performance
Sig.<0.001

Approval of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009
Shown below in Figures V-13 and V-14 are the linear relationships of isotropic and
sociotropic economic perceptions and approval of the current president, Bharrat Jagdeo. In both
charts, we see a clear linear relationship between the two variables. We can confidently conclude
that perceptions of economic situations serve as strong predictors in determining a person’s
specific support for democracy; as economic perceptions improve, so too does support for the
current leader of Guyana.
……
139

70

65
60
55
50
45
40

nor Bad (Fair)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation
Sig. < 0.001
Figure V-13. Impact of the Perception of One’s Personal Economic Situation on the
Approval of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009
80
70
60
50
40

nor Bad (Fair)
Perception of National Economic Situation
Sig. < 0.001
Figure V-14. Impact of the Perception of the National Economic Situation on the
Approval for the Current President (Specific Support), 2009
140
In sum, this section of this chapter has examined the impact of economic perceptions on
specific support for democracy, or their support for the current democratic government. To
measure this, the study employs the question regarding presidential performance. This item, M1,
asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with the current president. In addition to the size of the
city or town of the respondent, in the case of Guyana, we also find that individuals’ current
attitude toward not only the national economic situation but also their own personal economic
situation are significant variables for predicting specific support for democracy: as positive
economic perceptions increase, so too does support for the current president. Finally, we also find
that as one’s perception of government economic performance increases, specific support is also
likely to increase.
The next section examines another facet of democratic support for democracy— diffuse
support. To do so, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey in Guyana to understand the
impact of perceptions of government economic performance on democratic stability, finding that
in a number of different aspects of democratic stability this variable has significant explanatory
power.
Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on

Democratic Stability in Guyana
To analyze support for democratic stability in Guyana, this analysis will continue to
utilize the index measuring government economic performance. Specifically, this part of the
current chapter seeks to understand, what impact if any, perception of government performance
has on support for democratic stability. As democracy and democratic stability are multi-faceted
concepts, to adequately measure them we are required to utilize multi-faceted techniques.
Therefore, LAPOP has identified five key aspects of democratic stability and measures each of
the five in the most recent round of the Guyanese survey. The five aspects of democratic stability
are (1) support for democracy, (2) support for the right of participation, (3) political tolerance, (4)
legitimacy of political institutions, and (5) interpersonal trust. To understand how perceptions of
government economic performance affects support for a stable democracy in Guyana, each
dimension is modelled separately using multivariate regression techniques. The charts below
depict only the significant linear relationships between perceptions of government economic
performance and the respective aspects of democratic stability; however, included in the
appendix of this chapter are regression tables which present the results for all five regression
models including all co-variates.
……
141
76
75

Right of Participation
74
73
72
71
70
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100

Sig. < 0.05

Support for Participation, 2009
Figure V-15 above depicts the significant relationship between perception of government
economic performance and support for the right of participation. The results shown above,
although not perfectly linear, suggest that support for the right of participation depends in large
measure on how economic performance of the government is perceived. In the first quartile,
those who perceive government economic performance in the most negative terms have the
highest regard for the right of participation. Moving from the first to the second quartile in
perceptions of government economic performance, we notice a sharp decrease in support for the
right of protest. While there is a slight increase between those who fall in the second and third
quartile, a noticeable jump in support for the right to participate occurs between the third and
fourth quartiles, but the difference is not significant.
As is the case throughout the Americas, in Guyana we find a significant positive

correlation between trust in the national government and the perception of government economic
performance.53 Although it goes beyond the purview of this chapter to systematically test this
relationship, the high correlation between the two variables in the case of Guyana leads us to
conclude that higher levels of support for the right to participate, given their negative perceptions
of government economic performance, is ultimately a product of lack of citizen confidence in the
central government of Guyana. Those who have low levels of trust in the central government also
53
Throughout the 23 countries included in this analysis, the correlation between trust in the national government and
perception of government economic performance is 0.58 (sig.<0.001). In Guyana the correlation between the two
variables is 0.57 (sig.<0.001),
142
express the most negative opinions regarding government economic performance and are more
likely to support the right of participation and opposition.
64
Average Level of Tolerance
62
60
58
56
54
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100

Sig. < 0.05
Figure V-16. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on

Tolerance, 2009
A second aspect of stable democracy of which perception of government economic

performance is a significant predictor is tolerance. Figure V-16 shows a negative linear
relationship between the two variables. Citizens whose perceptions regarding government
economic performance are the most negative tend to also have the highest levels of political
tolerance. In this graph, like the previous ones, we find that those whose perceptions of
government economic performance are the most negative show the highest rates of political
tolerance as measured by an index created by LAPOP while those with the most faith in
government economic performance score the lowest on the same measure.
……
143
80
Average Legitimacy of
Political Institutions
70
60
50
40
30
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
Sig. < 0.001

Legitimacy of Political Institutions, 2009
A further aspect of democratic stability with which perceptions of democratic economic

performance have a significant relationship is shown above in Figure V-17. In this case, support
for the government’s economic performance correlates with higher levels of legitimacy of
political institutions. As can be seen from the clear linear relationship between the two variables,
Guyanese whose perceptions of government economic performance are most negative also tend
to have the weakest belief in the legitimacy of political institutions. Alternatively, those with the
highest perceptions of government economic performance also express the highest levels of
belief in the legitimacy of the country’s political institutions.
It is legitimacy in political institutions which is most closely associated with David

Easton’s definition of diffuse support for democracy (1975). The figure above supports our
hypothesis that individuals’ perception of the government’s economic performance greatly
impacts their diffuse support for democracy in a positive direction. It is the diffuse support of
democracy which most preoccupies democratization scholars, given that, unlike specific support
for democracy, diffuse support goes beyond support for the current government or leaders and
addresses support for the government system within the society.
144
68
66
Interpersonal Trust
Average Level of
64
62
60
58
56
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
Sig. < 0.001
Figure V-18. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on

Interpersonal Trust, 2009
The final aspect of a stable democracy with which perceptions of government economic
performance has a significant relationship is that of interpersonal trust. Figure V-18 presents this
relationship and shows that as citizens’ positive perception of government economic performance
increases, so to does their level of interpersonal trust. Specifically, we see an average difference
of about 10 points in interpersonal trust between those with the lowest perceptions of government
economic performance and those with the highest levels of the dependent variable.
In Guyana, the only aspect of democratic stability with which perceptions of government
economic performance do not have a significant relationship is the measure used for support for
democracy. This variable was measured using what has become known as the “Churchillean
question,” asking respondents to what point do they agree or disagree (on a 0-7 scale) that
“Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government;” In the
2009 Guyana sample, almost 70% of respondents answered that question with a 5 or above.
Conclusions
The current chapter analyzes the extent to which individuals’ perception of current
economic conditions and government economic performance has an impact on various aspects of
democratic support in Guyana. Although we primarily employed data gathered from the 2009
AmericasBarometer Survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project conducted in Guyana,
……
145
the opening sections of the chapter enlisted a number of comparisons to place the data into a
temporal context. First, it was demonstrated that since 2006 Guyanese have become more
concerned with the economy, with over half labelling it as the primary concern facing the country
in the most recent round of surveys (2009). Furthermore, while the Guyanese have grown more
preoccupied with the current state of the economy, average perceptions of government economic
performance have actually increased by over 10 points since the previous round, placing Guyana
over the regional average of 41.3.
Concerning perceptions of economic conditions and their support for democracy, the
current chapter estimated several multivariate models to reflect the multifaceted nature of the
concept. First, in Guyana we find a significant relationship between perceptions of government
economic performance and specific support for democracy. As has been demonstrated in
advanced industrial democracies, and also in Guyana, citizens employ economic perceptions to
evaluate their political leaders. Other variables such as age and size of city or town were also
found to be significant predictors.
Perception of government economic performance is also found to be a significant

explanatory variable for many aspects of democratic stability, although not in consistent
directions. Regarding support for the right of participation it was shown that in Guyana, those
with the lowest perceptions of government economic performance are the most supportive while
those in the second quartile are the least supportive. A negative linear relationship exists between
perceptions of government economic performance and political tolerance; on average, those with
the most positive perceptions exhibit lower levels of tolerance. Finally, in what most closely
resembles Easton’s definition of diffuse support for democracy, perception of government
economic performance has a positive, significant relationship on the legitimacy of political
institutions, while a positive relationship also exists between the key independent variable and
interpersonal trust.
In short, economic perceptions do matter. In this chapter we have demonstrated that in

Guyana perception of government economic stability is a strong predictor not only for specific
and diffuse support of democracy among the citizenry but also for democratic stability more
broadly. While in the latter concept, support for democratic stability, the relationship is not
consistent among all five spheres of the concept, it is clear that this variable is essential to
democratic support in the broadest sense of the term.
146
APPENDIX CHAPTER V.
Appendix V-1. The Most Serious Problem Facing the Country (A4) Recoded by Category
Economy Security Basic Services Politics Other
Lack of Credit Delinquency, Crime, Water, Lack of (19) Armed Conflict Inequality (58)
(09) Violence (05) (30)
Unemployment/Lack Gangs (14) Roads in poor Corruption (13) Forced
of Jobs (03) condition (18) Displacement
(32)
Economy, problems Kidnapping (31) Education, lack of, Human rights, Discrimination (25)
with, crisis of (01) poor quality (21) violations of (56)
Inflation, high prices Security (Lack of) Electricity, lack of Politicians (59) Drug addiction (11)
(02) (27) (24)
Poverty (04) War on Terror Health Services, lack Bad Government Population explosion
(17) of (22) (15) (20)
Land to Farm, Lack Terrorism (33) Transportation, Environment (10)
of (07) problems with (60)
External Debt (26) Violence (57) Housing (55) Migration (16)
Malnutrition (23) Narco-trafficking (12)
Popular protest
(Strikes, street
closings, work
stoppages, etc.) (06)
Narcoterrorism (65)
Other (70)
……
147
Appendix V-2. Predictors of Perception of Government Economic Performance

Perception of Personal Economic Situation 0.102* (4.44)
Perception of National Economic Situation 0.188* (8.49)
Small City 0.100 (1.93)
Rural Area 0.187* (3.65)
Household wealth 0.047 (1.73)
Age -0.058* (-2.84)
Female 0.004 (0.28)
Education -0.099* (-4.57)
Region 2 0.169* (4.99)
Region 3 0.072* (2.14)
Region 4 0.078 (1.52)
Region 6 0.029 (0.86)
Region 10 0.071 (1.66)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.012 (0.21)
Mixed -0.169* (-5.00)
Amerindian -0.076* (-2.43)
Black -0.294* (-9.12)
Constant -0.000 (-0.01)
R-Squared = 0.264
* p<0.05
148
Appendix V-3. Predictors of Satisfactions with the Performance of the Current

President (Specific Support)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President
Education Level 0.014 (0.61)
Female -0.026 (-1.79)
Age 0.045* (2.54)
Wealth -0.014 (-0.55)
Small City 0.092* (2.61)
Rural Area 0.091* (2.39)
Perception of National Economic Situation 0.221* (9.59)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation 0.083* (3.42)
Perception of Government Economic Performance 0.336* (16.51)
Region 2 0.076* (2.08)
Region 3 0.095* (2.32)
Region 4 0.111* (2.34)
Region 6 0.071* (2.00)
Region 10 0.050 (1.29)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.075 (1.68)
Mixed -0.136* (-5.57)
Black -0.210* (-8.51)
Constant -0.006 (-0.28)
R-Squared = 0.386
* p<0.05
……
149
Appendix V-4. The Impact of Government Economic Performance on Support for a Stable Democracy
Support for Support for Legitimacy toward Interpersonal
Political Tolerance
Democracy Participation Political Institutions Trust
Independent Variables Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err.
Economic Performance 0.020 (0.03) -0.040* (0.02) -0.066* (0.03) 0.540* (0.02) 0.120* (0.03)
Satisfaction w/
0.054 (0.04) 0.027 (0.03) -0.020 (0.03)
Performance of President
Political Interest -0.010 (0.02) 0.039 (0.02) 0.034 (0.02) 0.063 (0.02)
Education 0.310 (0.24) 0.219 (0.19) 0.086 (0.20) -0.005 (0.15) 0.169 (0.20)
Female -2.016 (1.40) -2.064* (0.91) -2.195* (1.05) -0.028 (0.86) -1.221 (1.00)
Age 0.357 (0.21) 0.192 (0.16) 0.299 (0.19) -0.512* (0.13) 0.188 (0.18)
Age Squared -0.004 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) 0.006* (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Wealth 0.398 (0.41) 0.405 (0.33) 0.801* (0.33) -0.107 (0.26) 0.358 (0.34)
Perception of Family
-0.379 (0.84) -0.512 (0.41) -0.795 (0.57) 0.471 (0.45) 1.376* (0.59)
Economy
Small City -4.188 (4.39) -9.942* (2.88) -9.839* (4.51) 0.681 (2.23) 7.287 (3.94)
Rural Area -7.094 (3.78) -10.448* (2.32) -8.161* (3.17) 3.812* (1.54) 7.164* (2.46)
Region 2 0.240 (3.75) 0.274 (2.83) 0.381 (2.38) 0.524 (1.54) -5.305 (2.82)
Region 3 7.960* (3.94) 5.837* (2.82) 0.936 (2.03) 0.166 (1.73) -6.525* (3.23)
Region 4 -3.108 (4.26) -2.711 (2.92) -3.076 (2.24) -2.171 (1.40) -3.884 (2.49)
Region 6 -0.547 (4.26) 2.123 (2.95) 2.961 (1.92) 1.195 (1.84) -6.711* (3.08)
Region 10 0.108 (4.69) 7.919* (3.24) 1.642 (2.99 3.760 (2.13) -8.252* (3.80)
Regions 1,7,8,9 8.022 (4.64) 1.532 (3.16) -1.656 (2.76) 1.952 1.88 3.389 (3.47)
Mixed -4.097 (2.09) 2.408 (1.29) 2.815 (1.58) -3.036* (1.26) -1.821 (1.72)
Amerindian -2.729 (3.31) 1.160 (2.60) 1.317 (2.15) 2.118 (2.16) -0.604 (2.62)
Black -0.985 (2.10) 4.400* (1.39) 6.085* (1.77) 4.442* (1.20) 1.451 (1.63)
Constant 62.892* (8.54) 69.116* (5.23) 58.742* (7.08) 34.627* (4.00) 41.132* (5.49)
R-squared 0.029 0.074 0.066 0.477 0.055
N of cases 2084 2280 2235 2275 2289
* p<0.05
150
Chapter VI. Deepening our

Understanding of Political
legitimacy54
The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in
democratic stability.55 New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson,
Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley
2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we
have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus
has been narrow, as we were simultaneously examining several other key elements in the stability
equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning
to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP), namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political
tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range
of political institutions than are used in that approach or in the approach used in the previous
chapters of this volume.
The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation

In prior studies of the AmericasBarometer survey, political legitimacy, defined in terms of
“system support” along with tolerance for political opposition has been used in combination to
create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful in identifying democracies in the region
which may be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term
democratic stability. Citizens must both believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions
and be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority
rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential
definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in Table VI- 1 represents all of
the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables
are divided between high and low.
54
This chapter was written by Margarita Corral
55
Dictatorships, of course, may seek to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when
they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to
coercion usually quickly fall.
……
151
System Support
Before analyzing political legitimacy and political tolerance as a whole, we will first
examine both components separately in Guyana. We will focus on how these two elements have
changed between 2006 and 2009, while also examining the position of the country compared to
other countries in the Americas, and then we will consider the levels of system support and
political tolerance by regions.
As we pointed out before, a democratic political system cannot survive for long without
the support of its citizens. Part of this support comes from the belief that the components of the
political system, political institutions, and politicians are trustworthy. In order to analyze support
for the political system, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed an index
composed of five questions, the “System Support Index”, which has been considered a valid
measure to capture the level of support and confidence that citizens give to their political system.
The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the
courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot,
choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of
(country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?
These variables are measured on a seven-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 “a
lot”. However, in order to better interpret the results and to facilitate the comparison across
questions and survey waves, these responses were recalibrated to a 0-100 scale. An average close
to zero indicates low levels of support for the political system whereas an average close to 100
represents high levels of system support.
Figure VI-1 depicts the average level for each of the five components of the System
Support Index in Guyana for 2009. In general terms, the average score for all the components
falls above 50 points on a 0-100 scale, which we interpret as indicating moderate levels of
support. The element with the highest average is respect for the political institutions of the
country, which reaches 60.2 points on the 0-100 scale. The lowest level of support, with a score
of 50.3 points, is the belief that the system protects citizens’ basic rights. Between these two
measures we observe support for the political system (56.5), belief that courts in Guyana
guarantee a fair trial (55.5) and pride in being Guyanese (51.6).
The confidence intervals in Figure VI-1 show that there are statistically significant
differences between support for the political institutions, the belief in fair trials, and the belief
that basic rights are well protected by the Guyanese political system.
152
60
50
40
Average
30 60.2
56.5 55.5
51.6 50.3
20
10
. Institutions Support Courts Proud Rights
Figure VI-1. Average of the components of the System Support Index, 2009
In order to gain a deeper understanding of system support in Guyana, we take into

account the evolution of such support over time. Figure VI-2 shows the average scores of this
index in 2009 compared to 2006. As we can observe, there has been a slight increase between the
years. The average for the system support index was 52.7 in 2006 while in 2009 it reached 54.8
points on the 0-100 scale. However, the differences between 2006 and 2009 are not statistically
significant.
……
153
60
Average System Support

50
40
30
52.7 54.8
20
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure VI-2. System Support Index in Guyana, 2006-2009
Thus far, we could say that Guyana displays intermediate levels of system support which
have increased slightly over time. However, to have a broader scope for these results, we should
consider the levels of system support in other countries in the Americas. Figure VI-3 shows
levels of system support in comparative perspective. When making a regional comparison, we
observe that Guyana holds a high-intermediate position scoring 54.8 points on the 0-100 scale.
Seven countries are above Guyana, with Canadians expressing the highest levels of system
support. At the other extreme, with scores below 45 points we find Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Haiti,
and Paraguay.
154
Canada 64.8
Costa Rica 63.1
Colombia 61.1
Uruguay 60.8
Mexico 58.9
Belize 58.5
Guyana 54.8
United States 54.4
Chile 54.3
Jamaica 52.6
El Salvador 51.8
Bolivia 51.6
Venezuela 49.7
Panama 49.2
Guatemala 48.8
Nicaragua 48.0
Argentina 47.6
Honduras 46.4
Ecuador 44.4
Peru 44.3
Brazil 43.9
Haiti 40.6
Paraguay 29.5
0 20 40 60 80
Average System Support

Figure VI-3. System Support Index in Comparative Perspective, 2008
Returning now to the analysis of system support in Guyana, we now examine variation in
levels of system support by region. Figure VI-4 displays these levels stratified by the seven
regions under consideration in this study on the political culture of Guyanese citizens.
……
155
80
Average System Support 60
40
66.9
55.7 56.7 57.8 58.3 58.5
49.5
20
Region 4 Region 10 Region 5 Region 6 Region 3 Regions 1,7,8,9 Region 2
Region
Figure VI-4. System Support in Guyana by regions, 2009
All the regions, except for one (Region 4), have citizens who on average score on the
positive end of the continuum, that is, higher than 50 on the 0-100 scale. However, the average
for Region 4 is slightly below 50 points (49.5) and the differences among the majority of the
regions are not statistically significant. The region with the highest level of system support is
Region 2, the only region that displays statistically significant differences from the rest of the
country. In short, we could say that levels of system support are quite similar across the country
except for Region 2 where the average score exceeds 65 points on our scale, and Region 4, which
is lower than all the others.
Political Tolerance
As discussed above, along with system support, political tolerance is the other element
needed for long-term democratic stability. In general terms, political tolerance refers to the
degree to which citizens are willing to accept the rights of minorities or those with whom they
may disagree. As Seligson and Córdova (1993) point out, the continuation of democracy may be
jeopardized if “disliked groups” or minorities are denied the right to participate and express
themselves freely. In order to have a stable democracy over the long term, minority rights must
be guaranteed, and citizens must support their system.
156
The political tolerance index is a scale based on the following four LAPOP items:
D1. There are people who always say bad things of the Guyanese form of government, not just the
government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such
people’s right to vote?
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful
demonstrations in order to express their views?
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things of the Guyanese form of government, how strongly
do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make
speeches?
These variables were measured on a ten-point scale, where 1 means “strongly disapprove”
and 10 “strongly approve.” However, as is done elsewhere in this study, the variables are re-
coded on a 0-100 scale with scores closer to zero indicating low levels of political tolerance and
those closer to 100 representing higher levels.
80
60
Average
40
65.7 61.9
53.5 51.0
20
. Protest Vote Free Speech Run for Office
Figure VI-5. Average of the components of the Political Tolerance Index, 2009
Figure VI-5 shows the average level for each of the four components of the Political
Tolerance Index in Guyana for 2009. In general terms, the average score for all the components
rises above 50 points on a 0-100 scale, displaying intermediate averages of political tolerance
which range from 51 to 65.7 points. The component with the highest average is approval of the
right to conduct peaceful demonstrations by people who always speak negatively about the
Guyanese form of government. Support for the right to protest reaches 65.7 points. At the other
……
157
extreme we find support for the right for those people to run for office, with a score of 51 points
on our 0-100 scale. Support for the right to vote and the right of free speech fall in between, with
average scores of 61.9 and 53.5 points respectively.
The confidence intervals in Figure VI-5 show that there are statistically significant
differences between approval of protests and right to vote and the two other components of the
political tolerance index (right of free speech and right to run for office).
80
Average Political Tolerance
60
40
64.3
58.1
20
2006 2009
Year
Figure VI-6. Political Tolerance Index in Guyana, 2006-2009
Figure VI-6 shows the average scores of political tolerance in 2009 compared to 2006.
When we look at the temporal evolution of this index, we observe a decline of six points during
the last three years. The average level of political tolerance in Guyana in 2006 was 64.3, which
drops to 54.8 in 2009. Furthermore, the difference between 2006 and 2009 is statistically
significant. Unlike what we observed regarding levels of system support in Guyana, levels of
political tolerance are decreasing which could impact support for stable democracy, although
levels have not fallen below the mid-point of the scale.
When we compare regions within Guyana, we observe similar levels across those regions,
with averages above 50 points on our 0-100 scale. Figure VI-7 displays the average for the seven
regions under consideration. Individuals from Regions 1,7,8,9 occupy the lowest position of
political tolerance with an average score of 52 points. At the other extreme, with a score of 60.4,
is Region 10 with the highest level of political tolerance. The remaining regions are in
intermediate positions with no statistically significant differences among them. The only
statistically significant difference in the levels of political tolerance is between Region 10 and
Regions 1,7,8,9.
158
60
Average Political Tolerance
40
57.5 59.5 59.8 60.4

54.5 56.4
52.0
20
Regions 1,7,8,9 Region 2 Region 3 Region 5 Region 4 Region 6 Region 10
Region
Figure VI-7. Political Tolerance in Guyana by regions, 2009
The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

In this section we analyze the interaction between System Support and Political
Tolerance, and how this relationship functions in the case of Guyana.
Table VI.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support

in Institutionally Democratic Polities
Tolerance
System Support
High Low
(i.e., legitimacy)
Stable Authoritarian
High
Democracy Stability
Unstable Democratic
Low
Democracy Breakdown
From a theoretical point of view, we propose to analyze the relationship between support
for the political system and tolerance. To do so it is necessary to transform both variables from
continuous to dichotomous, “high” and “low.”56 It is important to analyze the four possible
combinations between system support and tolerance that appear in Table VI-1. Political systems
populated largely by citizens who express high system support and high tolerance would be
56
Each of these scales ranges from 0 to 100, with 50 as the mid-point.
……
159
predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed
in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political
system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual
inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless
minority rights are assured. While assurance could, of course, come from constitutional
guarantees, unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be
little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under these conditions,
of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both
politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support, and that have citizens who are
reasonably tolerant of minority rights are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).
When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, the system should remain stable
(because of the high support), but democratic rule may ultimately be placed in jeopardy. Such
systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights
would be restricted.
Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table and
are directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into
the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to
deepen its democracy, especially when values tend to converge toward political tolerance.
Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict whether
instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized
by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance,
democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course,
on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors,
including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international
players, are crucial to this process. But systems in which the general public supports neither the
basic institutions of the nation nor the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic
breakdown.
It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the
relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic.
That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread
participation is permitted. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely
different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the
breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the
assumption made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the general public make a
difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years.
Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, such incongruence may
have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the
Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long
been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its
citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).
160
Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana

We now turn to the analysis of Guyana, first to determine the percentage of Guyanese
citizens who would be classified within each cell. Table VI-2 shows the distribution of such
results for 2006 and 2009 so that we can compare the evolution during the last three years. In this
sense, results for 2009 are hopeful, given the improvement in support for stable democracy,
however slight. The percentage of citizens who placed into the category of stable democracy
increased from 31.5% in 2006 to 35.7 in 2009. The two intermediate cells, authoritarian stability
and unstable democracy also experienced change. The percentage for authoritarian stability
increased from 21% to 24% whereas the percentage for unstable democracy dropped from 32%
in 2006 to 26.3% in 2009. Finally, the democracy at risk cell shows an almost constant pattern,
given that in 2006 15.5% of respondents were in that category, similar to the 14% in 2009.
Therefore, the category with the highest percentage of respondents in Guyana is stable
democracy, that is to say, the percentage of the population expressing both high system support
and high levels of political tolerance, and this cell has increased between 2006 and 2009.
Table VI.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Guyana, 2009
Tolerance
System Support
High Low
(i.e., legitimacy)
Stable Democracy Authoritarian Stability
High 2006 2009 2006 2009
31.5% 35.7% 21% 24.0%
Unstable Democracy Democracy at Risk
Low 2006 2009 2006 2009
32% 26.3% 15.5% 14.0%
This same positive pattern can be observed in Figure VI-8, which shows the percentage of
the population with attitudes favourable towards stable democracy in 2006 and 2009. In 2006
31.4% of Guyanese displayed high levels of both system support and political tolerance, whereas
this percentage increased to 35.7% in 2009. However, the differences between these two years
are not statistically significant.
……
161
Favorable towards Stable Democracy

40%
Percentage with Attitudes

30%
20%
35.7%
31.4%
10%
0%
2006 2009
Year
Figure VI-8. Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana, 2006 and 2009
In order to have a broader perspective of the percentage of citizens who hold attitudes
favourable to stable democracy in Guyana, we compare the situation with the other countries
included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. As we can see in Figure VI-9, Guyana displays one the
highest percentages of citizens with attitudes favourable towards stable democracy. Only five
countries appear above Guyana, with Canada being the country with the highest percentage
(61.8%), followed by Costa Rica, Belize and the United States. At the other extreme we find
countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Haiti, and Paraguay where percentages fail to reach
20% of the population. The most worrisome case is Paraguay where fewer than 10% of citizens
hold high levels of both system support and political tolerance.
162
Canada 61.8%
Costa Rica 42.0%
Belize 40.0%
United States 37.7%
Uruguay 37.1%
Guyana 35.7%
Jamaica 34.3%
Mexico 32.0%
Colombia 30.8%
Argentina 28.9%
Venezuela 26.8%
Panama 26.7%
El Salvador 23.4%
Chile 23.2%
Honduras 21.1%
Brazil 20.6%
Nicaragua 20.6%
Guatemala 18.5%
Bolivia 18.3%
Peru 16.5%
Ecuador 15.1%
Haiti 13.9%
Paraguay 9.8%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Figure VI-9. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative

Perspective, 2009
Returning our focus to Guyana, we observe differences among the regions in the country.
As we can see in Figure VI-10 a majority of the regions average roughly 30% of the population
as being classified as possessing attitudes amenable toward stable democracy. The highest
percentages are reached in Regions 10 and 2, with levels of 44.9% and 53.9%, respectively.
Alternatively, the region with the lowest percentage is Region 4. However, the only differences
that are statistically significant are those between Region 2 and Region 4. In short, aside from one
region, the rest of the country displays similar or higher percentages of citizens with attitudes
favourable toward stable democracy than when we analyze the country as a whole.
……
163

60%
40%
53.9%
44.9%
20%
36.0% 37.7% 38.6% 39.9%
29.2%
0%
Region 4 Region 6 Region 5 Regions 1,7,8,9 Region 3 Region 10 Region 2
Region
Figure VI-10. Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana by regions, 2009
Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana

A more in-depth analysis of the attitudes that are favourable to stable democracy requires
an understanding of the factors that help to explain such attitudes. In this sense, Figure VI-11
(and its respective table in the Appendix) shows the results from the logistic regression that was
conducted in order to determine those variables that have an impact on the levels of both system
support and political tolerance57.
The logistic regression model includes the following independent variables: dummy
variables for region (Region 4 being the category of reference), ethnic identification (Indians as
the baseline), education, gender, age, wealth, rural or urban residence, crime victimization,
corruption victimization, perception of government economic performance,58 and interpersonal
trust.
57
To carry out this analysis we use a new dependent variable, called “bar2x2”, which was generated from the data.
This variable reflects the percentage of respondents who express both high system support and high political
tolerance averages.
58
The perception of the Government Economic Performance is an Index constructed from two items that asked
respondents to what extent they think that the current administration fights poverty and unemployment.
164
Interpersonal Trust
Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption
Crime Victimization
Urban / rural
Wealth
Age
Female F=8.313
Education N =2277
Black
Amerindian
Mixed
Regions 1,7,8,9
Region 10
Region 6
Region 5
Region 3
Region 2
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Figure VI-11. Predictors of Attitudes Favourable towards Stable Democracy, 2009
Figure VI-11 shows the effects of these individual level variables on the probability of
expressing attitudes favourable toward stable democracy. The impact of each variable is shown
graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive
effect, and if to the left, a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, the confidence
interval lines to the left and right of each dot do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better).
If they overlap the vertical line, the impact is not statistically significant. We observe in Figure
VI-11 that the only variable with a significant impact is the perception of government economic
performance. In short, people who believe that the current government is fighting poverty and
unemployment are more likely to express high levels of system support and political tolerance,
holding the remaining variables constant.
Furthermore, there are statistically significant effects for some regions.59 Citizens of
Regions 10 and 2 tend to express higher levels of attitudes favourable towards stable democracy
compared to citizens of Region 4. These effects can be seen graphically in Figure VI-10.
Figure VI-11 presents the relationship between attitudes favourable toward stable
democracy and the resulting significant variable of perception of government economic
performance. The line demonstrates a positive relationship between both variables. As the
perception that the government is fighting poverty and unemployment increases, levels of system
support and political tolerance increase as well.
59
……
165

50%

40%
30%
20%
10%
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
Figure VI-12. Support for Stable Democracy according to Perceptions of Government

Economic Performance, 2009
Legitimacy of Other Democractic Institutions

Utilizing various survey waves of the AmericasBarometer, we are able to examine the
evolution of trust in a wide series of democratic institutions. Although in Chapter I we explored
some of the temporal variations of some institutions (those forming the institutional legitimacy
index, i.e., national government, justice system, Supreme Court of Justice, Congress and political
parties), in this section we present a general comparison of the legitimacy of a wider range of
political institutions in Guyana. We measure “trust” in each of the key institutions using a 1-7
scale where 1 means “not at all” and 7 “a lot”. This scale is recoded into the same 0-100 scale
used throughout this study.
Figure VI-13 illustrates the levels of trust expressed by Guyanese citizens in the main
institutions of the political system. Although the Church is not a political institution, it was
included as an anchoring parameter for the measurement of trust in public institutions. In this
sense, the Church, in generic terms, receives the greatest average of trust among Guyanese, with
86 points on the 0-100 scale. Furthermore, it is the only institution along with the Guyana
Defence Force that displays statistically significant differences with the remaining institutions.
166
Church 86.0
Guyana Defence Force 62.6
Supreme Court 57.4
President 56.9
Attorney General 54.9
Parliament 52.4
National government 51.9
Director of Public Prosecutions 51.7
Integrity Commission 51.5
Guyana Elections Commission 51.2
Regional Democratic Council 50.0
Mayor's Office/NDC Chairman's Office 48.9
Guyana Police Force 48.1
Political Parties 46.9

. .
0 20 40 60 80 100
Average
Figure VI-13. Legitimacy of Institutions in Guyana, 2009
A majority of the institutions receive an intermediate level of legitimacy, with levels

around 50 points. In this group of institutions we find the Supreme Court, the President, the
Attorney General, the Parliament, the National Government, the Director of Public Prosecutions,
the Integrity Commission, the Guyana Elections Commission and the Regional Democratic
Council. These institutions score between 50 and 57.4 points, without any statistically significant
differences among them. At the bottom we find the Mayor’s Office or the NDC Chairman’s
Office, the Guyana Police Force, and political parties, with average scores between 46 and 48.9
points on the 0-100 scale.
Beyond the comparison among institutions, it is important to observe whether or not

changes have occurred over time. In this sense, Figure VI-14 shows the average of trust in
different public institutions in Guyana for 2006 and 2009. In general terms we observe few
changes for the majority of institutions between the two survey waves. The largest differences are
seen in the Guyana Defence Force and in the Integrity Commission. They are the only institutions
that exhibit statistically significant differences in both years. In the case of the Guyana Defence
Force, there has been a decrease of 7 points, from 69.2 in 2006 to 62.6 in 2009. In contrast, in the
case of the Integrity Commission, the change shows an increase in its legitimacy among
Guyanese citizens, from 46.3 to 51.5. For the rest of institutions we do not find statistically
significant differences between 2006 and 2009. Trust has decreased slightly or remains at
essentially the same levels for the majority of the institutions under consideration: the
Parliament, the Regional Democratic Council, the Mayor’s Office or the NDC Chairman’s
……
167
Office, the Guyana Police Force, and political parties. On the other hand, we see slight increases
in the confidence in the Church, in the Supreme Court, the National Government and the Guyana
Elections Commission.
2009 86.0
Church
2006 83.3
2009 62.6
Guyana Defence Force
2006 69.2
2009 57.4
Supreme Court
2006 55.0
2009 52.4
Parliament
2006 55.6
2009 51.9
National government
2006 51.5
2009 51.5
Integrity Commission
2006 46.3
2009 51.2
Guyana Elections Commission
2006 50.9
2009 50.0
Regional Democratic Council
2006 51.4
2009 48.9
Mayor's Office/NDC Chairman's Office
2006 50.2
2009 48.1
Guyana Police Force
2006 51.1
2009 46.9
Political Parties
2006 48.5
.
.
.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Average
Figure VI-14. Legitimacy of Institutions in Guyana, 2006-2009
The Justice System

Every democracy needs the “rule of law” to assure citizen exercise of political rights and
civil liberties and to provide the accountability mechanisms which both limit the abuses of the
state and guarantee the equality of all citizens (O’Donnell 2004). Furthermore, this justice system
must be perceived as accessible and efficient by the citizenry in order to generate the necessary
levels of commitment with the political system (O’Donnell 1994).
Given the importance of the justice system, it is necessary to analyze Guyanese citizens’
opinions of their system more in depth. This section will focus on the legitimacy of the justice
system in general terms, first comparing levels of trust between 2006 and 2009 and then
Guyana’s position among other countries in the Americas. We also look at levels of trust in the
justice system considering the different regions within the country. Finally, we will present the
determinants of the levels of confidence in the justice system among Guyanese citizens.
168
In order to analyze levels of trust in the Guyanese justice system, we take into account the
responses to the following question in the 2009 questionnaire:
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
The responses were given on a seven-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 “a lot.”
However, as is done throughout this report, the scale is recalibrated to a 0-100 scale. An average
close to zero indicates low levels of trust in the justice system while an average close to 100
represents high levels of trust.
Figure VI-15 depicts the levels of trust in the judicial system for 2006 and 2009. Results
indicate stable levels of confidence between both years. Averages are almost identical: 51.7 for
2006 and 51.9 for 2009. Therefore, Guyanese show intermediate levels of trust close to the
midpoint on the 0-100 scale.
Average Trust in the Justice System
50
40
30
51.7 51.9
20
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure VI-15. Legitimacy of the Justice System in Guyana, 2006 and 2009
Further, we seek to determine trust levels that Guyanese show in their judicial system
compared to other countries in the AmericasBarometer sample. We see in Figure VI-16 that
Guyana ranks sixth in terms of confidence in the justice system, sharing similar averages with
older democracies such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, and the United States. Canada is the only
country in the sample that reaches 60 points on the 0-100 scale. At the other extreme, the
countries with the lowest levels of trust are Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay.
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169
Canada 60.0
Belize 57.4
Colombia 56.3
Uruguay 54.9
Costa Rica 52.0
Guyana 51.9
Mexico 50.8
United States 50.8
Jamaica 50.6
El Salvador 45.9
Chile 45.8
Brazil 45.2
Guatemala 44.9
Bolivia 43.5
Panama 43.2
Venezuela 42.0
Nicaragua 41.4
Honduras 41.3
Haiti 40.1
Argentina 36.9
Ecuador 35.5
Peru 33.9
Paraguay 23.3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
AverageTrust in the Justice System

Figure VI-16. Legitimacy of the Justice System in comparative perspective
When we compare regions within Guyana, we find differences among them regarding
levels of trust in the judicial system. Figure VI-17 shows averages for the seven regions we
consider in this study. We see averages that range from 45.8 points in Region 4 to 62.1 in Region
2. The remaining regions score between 50 and 60 points on our 0-100 scale, with no statistically
significant differences among them. The only statistically significant differences in the levels of
trust in the justice system are between Region 2 and Region 4, and Region 10 and Region 2.
170

60
50
40
30 58.5 59.5 62.1

51.2 53.2 54.3
45.8
20
10
Region 4 Region 10 Region 6 Region 5 Regions 1,7,8,9 Region 3 Region 2
Region
Figure VI-17. Legitimacy of the Justice System in Guyana by regions, 2009
Finally, when we analyze the legitimacy of the justice system in Guyana, it is also
important to understand the reasons why some citizens express higher levels of trust in the justice
system than others. In order to find the determinants of these levels of confidence, we ran a
multivariate regression taking into account the classic socio-demographic characteristics along
with opinions concerning the performance of the current president, the perception of corruption,
and crime and corruption victimization as independent variables. Figure VI-18 and Table 2 in the
Appendix show the results of this regression. As we noticed in Figure VI-17 living in some
regions makes a difference in one’s trust in the justice system; holding constant all other
variables, people in Regions 2, 3 and 10 express higher levels of trust in the justice system
compared to those living in Region 4. Ethnic self-identification, living in a rural or urban area,
satisfaction with the performance of the current president, and experiences with and perceptions
of corruption are statistically significant predictors of confidence in the justice system. The
relationship between these significant variables and trust in the justice system are presented in
Figure VI-19.
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171
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President

Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption
Crime Victimization
Wealth
Age R-Squared =0.176
Female F=33.924
N =2272
Education
Urban / rural
Black
Amerindian
Mixed
Regions 1,7,8,9
Region 10
Region 6
Region 5
Region 3
Region 2
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Figure VI-18. Predictors of Trust in the Justice System, 2009
As we observe in Figure VI-19 people who have higher levels of satisfaction with the
current president also express higher levels of trust in the justice system. Those who rate the
performance of the current president as poor have an average score of 29.3 in their trust of the
justice system whereas those who believe that he is doing a very good job score 69.2 on the trust
measure. Moreover, citizens who have been victims of corruption show less confidence in the
justice system, an average of 53.7 points compared to the 45.9 by those who have not been
victimized. Furthermore, we find that ethnic self-identification has a statistically significant
impact as well. Those who self-identify as Indians and Amerindians have higher levels of trust in
the justice system than Black and Mixed citizens. Finally, we see that Guyanese living in rural
areas are more trusting of the justice system than people living in urban areas, 56 points versus
43.4.
172
80 60
50
60
40
40
69.2 30
58.6 53.7
49.7 45.9
20 20
36.1
29.6
10
0
Very Bad Neither Good Very 0

bad good good
nor bad No Yes
Satisfaction with the Performance of Percentage of Population
the Current President Victimized by Corruption
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30 59.3 60.4 56.0
44.2 47.3
20 43.4
20
10 10
0 0
Black Mixed Indian Amerindian Urban Rural
Ethnic Self-identification Area
Figure VI-19. Determinants of Trust in the Justice System, 2009
Other Opinions about Democracy

The last section of this chapter addresses two other general aspects of democracy.
Specifically, we analyze citizen preferences for democracy as a form of government and also
their satisfaction with the way democracy works in Guyana. These two topics are analyzed first
for the entire country and then by region.
Figure VI-20 displays the distribution of the responses given by Guyanese citizens when
they were asked what kind of government they preferred. As we can observe, three response
options were possible: democracy is preferable, for people like me it does not matter, and an
……
173
authoritarian government may be preferable. We see that 67.6% of respondents said that
democracy is their preferred form of government. For 15.95% of Guyanese citizens an
authoritarian government may be preferable under some circumstances, whereas for 16.5% the
form of government does not matter.
Authoritarian For people

government like me
may be it doesn't
preferable matter
15.9% 16.5%
Democracy is
preferable
67.6%
Preference for Democracy

Figure VI-20. Preference for Democracy in Guyana, 2009
When we look at these preferences by region, we observe that the percentage of people
who prefer democracy over other forms of government vary across regions. Figure VI-21
displays the percentage of people who prefer democracy throughout the seven regions we
consider in this study. We observe percentages that range from 57.2% in Region 3 to 83.9% in
Region 10. These are the only two regions that show statistically significant differences. The rest
of regions achieve percentages between 61.4% (Region 5) and 71.8% (Region 6), and do not
show statistically significant differences among them.
174
100
that Democracy is Preferable

Percentage who Agree
80
60
40 83.9%
67.0% 68.2% 69.0% 71.8%
57.2% 61.4%
20
Region
Figure VI-21. Preference for Democracy by Regions, 2009
Finally, we could expect that although citizens prefer democracy in general terms, as we
see in Guyana, albeit they may not be satisfied with its performance. Furthermore, citizens with
strong democratic values may prefer democracy even if it is not working as well as they would
like. Figure VI-22 displays the level of satisfaction with democracy in Guyana. In this regard we
observe that about half of the population is satisfied (45.1%) or very satisfied (5.6%) with the
way democracy works in the country. The other half holds negative views, 38.8% are dissatisfied
and 10.5% are very dissatisfied.
……
175
Very Satisfied
Very Dissatisfied 5.6%
10.5%
Satisfied
Dissatisfied 45.1%
38.8%
Satisfaction with Democracy

Figure VI-22. Satisfaction with Democracy in Guyana, 2009
When we examine levels of satisfaction with democracy by region we notice differences

across the country. Figure VI-23 displays the averages for each of the seven regions considered in
this study. In this sense, three regions (Region 10, 4, and 5) find themselves in the lowest position
with average scores below 50 points. It is noteworthy that Region 10 displays the highest
percentage of people preferring democracy while also being the Region holding the lowest level
of satisfaction with democracy. At the other extreme, with a score close to 60 we find Region 2.
This region shows statistically significant differences with regions 10 and 4 as does Region 3
176
Average Satisfaction with Democracy

60
50
40
30 59.9
50.5 52.3 53.7
49.4
20 40.0 43.1
10
Region
Figure VI-23. Satisfaction with Democracy by Region, 2009
Conclusions
In this chapter we have addressed the relationship between system support and political
tolerance, two basic elements for any stable democracy. First, we examined each of these aspects
separately and then combined them into our Index of Political Stability. We discovered that
Guyana displays similar levels of system support and political tolerance, with averages close to
50 points on our 0-100 scale. However, tendencies for both measures have varied during the last
three years. While system support increased slightly, political stability declined between 2006
and 2009.
When we observe the percentage of citizens who express high levels of system support
and high levels of political tolerance, Guyana ranks rather high compared to other countries in the
Americas, sharing percentages similar to older democracies such as Uruguay and the United
States. This percentage increased slightly from 2006 to 2009, from 31.4% to 35.7%. Within
Guyana we also noticed differences across regions regarding attitudes favourable towards stable
democracy. Region 2 is the region with the highest percentage of people holding high levels of
both system support and political tolerance. At the other extreme, we find Region 4. Regarding
the determinants of support for stable democracy, we found that such support depends above all
upon citizens’ perceptions of government economic performance, that is to say, the extent to
which the current government is fighting poverty and unemployment.
Apart from the analysis of stable democracy in Guyana, this chapter also examined the
levels of trust in the primary public institutions of the country. In general terms, Guyanese
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177
citizens have intermediate levels of confidence in their institutions, with averages close to 50
points on a 0-100 scale. The institutions that inspire the highest levels of trust are the Church and
the Guyana Defence Force, with averages above 60 points. At the other extreme, the Mayor’s
Office, the Guyana Police Force, and political parties are the most distrusted institutions among
the citizenry. Regarding the evolution of trust between 2006 and 2009, levels of confidence
remain essentially identical; the only significant variations occur with regard to the Defence
Force, which has decreased, and the Integrity Commission, which has increased.
A third aspect analyzed in this chapter was the legitimacy of the justice system. As is the
case for the other aspects, Guyanese express intermediate levels of trust in the justice system,
levels that remain constant if we compare 2006 to 2009. In comparative perspective, Guyana
ranks among the countries with the highest levels of trust in the Americas. We also found that
levels of confidence in the justice system depend on the satisfaction with the current president, on
the ethnic self-identification (Indians and Amerindians trust the system more than Blacks and
Mixed), on the region (Region 2 displays the highest levels whereas Region 4 has the lowest
levels), and on perceptions of and experiences with corruption. These perceptions and personal
experiences have a negative impact on one’s confidence in the justice system.
Finally, we observed that despite the fact that a majority of Guyanese citizens, 67.6%,
consider democracy as the preferable form of government, only half are satisfied or very satisfied
with the way democracy is functioning in Guyana.
178
APPENDIX CHAPTER VI.
Appendix VI-1. Determinants of Support for Stable Democracy

Support for Stable Democracy
Region 2 0.225* (2.94)
Region 3 0.027 (0.44)
Region 5 0.041 (0.71)
Region 6 0.017 (0.26)
Region 10 0.280* (4.15)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.113 (1.58)
Mixed -0.035 (-0.67)
Black -0.099 (-1.89)
Education -0.038 (-0.60)
Female -0.018 (-0.35)
Age -0.083 (-1.66)
Wealth 0.075 (1.19)
Urban / rural 0.111 (1.35)
Crime Victimization 0.061 (1.14)
-0.007 (-0.14)
Perception of Government
0.529* (9.06)
Economic Performance
Interpersonal Trust 0.082 (1.48)
Constant -0.510* (-8.86)
F = 8.31
* p<0.05
……
179
Appendix VI-2. Determinant of Trust in the Justice System

Trust in the Justice System
Region 2 0.067* (3.71)
Region 3 0.055* (2.28)
Region 5 0.034 (1.26)
Region 6 0.008 (0.32)
Region 10 0.087* (3.74)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.052 (1.79)
Mixed -0.065* (-2.39)
Black -0.071* (-2.51)
Urban / rural 0.077* (2.85)
Female 0.014 (0.69)
Age -0.037 (-1.58)
Wealth 0.009 (0.34)
Crime Victimization -0.025 (-0.99)
-0.087* (-3.47)
Perception of Corruption -0.093* (-4.61)
Performance of the Current 0.294* (11.01)
President
Constant 0.011 (0.60)
R-Squared = 0.176
* p<0.05
180
Chapter VII. Voting Behavior and

Political Parties60
This chapter addresses issues of voting behaviour in Guyana as well as the attachments
Guyanese citizens have developed with political parties. The first section examines a key
prerequisite to voting, namely registration. We will analyse to what extent citizens appear on
voter lists that will allow them to vote in the next general elections. We will then look at levels of
electoral participation in the most recent elections of 2006, in general and by region, comparing
them to the rest of countries in the Americas. Next we will explore the factors that explain
electoral turnout in Guyana. In the third section, we focus on one of the principal elements that
characterize Guyanese politics— the relationship between ethnicity and voting preferences. The
last section examines party identification, looking at its temporal evolution, the distribution
across regions, and its strength among Guyanese citizens.
Electoral Participation in Guyana

Electoral participation is one of the most important and common forms of political
participation in every democracy. Aside from being the mechanism to select public officials, it is
a way to express citizen belief in the legitimacy of the political system. In Guyana, there have
been four general elections since 1992 when the first free elections took place. Since 1992, the
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) has been in power, following twenty-eight years of rule by the
People’s National Congress (PNC). In this section, we will examine the levels and determinants
of registering to vote, after which we will look at the primary individual level factors that explain
electoral participation in the elections of 2006.
Registering to Vote
In Guyana, one of the requisites to exercise the right to vote is appearing on the Official
List of Electors, which is maintained by the Elections Commission (GECOM). In order to vote in
the next general elections, Guyanese 18 and older must appear on this new list of voters.
Therefore, it is important to know the percentage of Guyanese who are thus far registered to vote.
60
This chapter was written by Margarita Corral.
……
181
The AmericasBarometer survey directly asks respondents if they are registered to vote. The
question is formulated as follows:
VB1. Did you register for the new voters list? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK
Results for this question can be found in Figure VII-1. As is shown below, 81.6% of
voting age Guyanese report being registered for the new voters list while the remaining 18.4%
have not yet registered.
No
18.4%
Yes
81.6%
Percentage who registered for the new voters list

Figure VII-1. Registration for the new voters list in Guyana, 2009
Apart from these general percentages, it is also important to know if there are differences
among regions within Guyana regarding the levels of voter registration. Figure VII-2 depicts the
results taking into account the seven areas we consider in this report. We see that there are no
statistically significant differences among regions; percentages of registered Guyanese range
from 76.9% in Regions 1,7,8,9 to 88% in Region 5.
182
100%
Percentage who registered

for the new voters list 80%
60%
86.9% 88.0%
40% 76.9% 78.7% 79.9% 80.4% 80.9%
20%
0%
Region
Figure VII-2. Registration for the new voters list by region, 2009
A more in-depth analysis of the process of registering to vote deserves an understanding

of the factors that help to explain this most common form of political behaviour. Here we are
interested in learning whether or not socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Guyanese
citizens have an impact on the likelihood of registering to vote. Figure VII-2 (and Table I in the
Appendix) presents the results from the logistic regression that was modelled in order to
determine the variables that influence registering for the new voters list. The logistic regression
model includes the following independent variables: dummy variables for region (Region 4 being
the reference category), ethnic identification (Indians serving as the baseline), education, gender,
age, wealth, and rural or urban residence.
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183
Age
Female
Urban / rural
Wealth
Education
Black
F=3.732
Amerindian N =2474
Mixed
Regions 1,7,8,9
Region 10
Region 6
Region 5
Region 3
Region 2
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4

Figure VII-3. Determinants of registration for the new voters list
Figure VII-3 shows the effects of these individual level variables on the probability of having
registered for the new voters list. The impact of each variable is shown graphically by a dot,
which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left, a
negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, the confidence interval lines to the left
and right of each dot do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they do overlap, the
impact is not statistically significant. We observe in Figure VII-3 that there are three variables
with a significant impact: personal wealth, living in rural or urban areas, and ethnic self-
identification. People with higher levels of personal wealth are more likely to have registered for
the new voters list than those with lower levels of wealth. People living in urban areas are more
likely to register than people living in rural areas. And, compared to Indians, Amerindians and
Mixed-race citizens are less likely to be registered on the new voters list.61
61
184
Turnout in the 2006 General Elections

In 2006, the fourth general election under democratic rule was held in Guyana. This
election kept Bharrat Jagdeo, the People’s Progressive Party/Civic’s leader (PPP/C), in power. In
this section we analyse the electoral behaviour in that election, specifically voter turnout. We will
compare percentages of participation within the country and with the rest of the countries
included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer wave. We also seek to determine who voted and which
variables influenced turnout.
In order to examine electoral participation in the 2006 elections we asked the following
question:
VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections of 2006?

(1) Voted [Continue]
(2) Did not vote [Go to VB50]
(8) DK [Go to VB50]
Seventy-one and eight-tenths percent of voting age Guyanese responded to having voted
in the last general elections of 2006. Of course respondent recall of 2006 is blurred by the three
year-gap since the election was held; however, this statistic is comparable to the 68.8% turnout
rate as reported by the Electoral Assistance Bureau of Guyana.62 Figure VII-4 places Guyana in a
low-intermediate position in comparison to other countries in the Americas. It displays similar
levels of turnout to the United States, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Panama, all with percentages
close to 71%.
62
Electoral Assistance Bureau. 2007. EAB Final Report: General and Regional Elections, 28th August 2006, Co-
Operative Republic of Guyana.
http://www.gecom.org.gy/pdf/Electoral%20Assistance%20Bureau%20Final_Report%202006%20elections.pdf
Accessed 06 June 2009.
……
185
Ecuador 89.9%
Peru 88.5%
Uruguay 88.2%
Brazil 85.0%
Venezuela 81.8%
Argentina 78.5%
Belize 76.3%
Mexico 75.4%
Bolivia 74.3%
Guatemala 73.3%
United States 72.6%
Paraguay 71.9%
Guyana 71.8%
Nicaragua 71.8%
Panama 71.3%
Haiti 69.8%
Chile 68.6%
El Salvador 68.5%
Costa Rica 67.2%
Colombia 65.4%
Jamaica 64.7%
Honduras 64.2%
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage who voted in the last election

Figure VII-4. Electoral turnout in comparative perspective
Figure VII-5 shows electoral turnout in Guyana by region. We observe that percentages of
turnout for the majority of regions are quite similar, about 70%. The highest percentage is
reached in Region 5 with levels of 80.7%. This region is the only one that displays statistically
significant differences with other areas (Region 10, Region 4 and Regions 1, 7, 8, 9). At the other
extreme, the region with the lowest percentage is Region 10, reporting 68.5% voter turnout.
186
100%
Percentage who voted in the last

general elections of 2006
80%
60%
40%
76.7% 80.7%
68.5% 69.5% 69.6% 70.7% 74.2%
20%
0%
Region
Figure VII-5. Electoral Turnout by Region
When we analyse electoral participation, it is important to understand the reasons why

some citizens participate in elections and others do not. In order to have an understanding of this
issue, we estimate a logistic regression, taking into account the main socioeconomic and
demographic variables. Figure VII-6 (and Table VII-2 in the Appendix) displays graphically the
results of this analysis. The independent variables considered are dummy variables for region
(Region 4 being the reference category), ethnic identification (Indians as the baseline), education,
gender, age, wealth, and rural or urban residence.
As we saw in Figure VII-5, some regions, specifically Regions 5 and 6 display higher
levels of voter turnout. The regression results also show how Amerindians compared to Indians
were less likely to participate in the 2006 election.
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187
Age
Female
Urban / rural
Wealth
Education F=14.138
Black N =2480
Amerindian
Mixed
Regions 1,7,8,9
Region 10
Region 6
Region 5
Region 3
Region 2
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Figure VII-6. Predictors of Turnout in Guyana
However, the two variables with the largest impact are gender and age. The relationship
between these two variables and turnout is shown in Figure VII-7. Here we see that young
citizens, between 18 and 25 years old, display statistically significantly lower levels of
participation than the other cohorts. People who vote in higher proportions are between 36 and 45
years old and between 56 and 65. This is a typical pattern, with younger people less interested in
voting and the oldest having more difficulty getting to the polls. Regarding gender, we observe
that Guyanese females were more likely to vote in 2006 than men. The difference is statistically
significant: turnout was 75.1% for women whereas in the case of men that percentage drops to
68.6%. This is a very unusual finding since most countries have a higher turnout among men than
women.
188
100% 80%


80%
60%
60%
40%
75.1%
40% 77.5%
85.8% 83.3% 85.9% 68.6%
77.8%
20%
20% 35.7%
0% 0%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+ Male Female

Sex
Age
Figure VII-7. Determinants of Turnout in Guyana
Ethnic Groups and Voting Preferences in 2006 Elections

One of the primary characteristics of Guyanese democracy is political competition based
on ethnicity. The 2009 survey offers an ideal opportunity in which to test this relationship. Figure
VII-8 shows voting preferences by ethnic group. We observe that 68.7% of Indians voted for the
PPP/C while only 3.7% of Blacks voted for that party. Alternatively, the PNC is the preferred
political party of Black citizens; 75.1% of Blacks voted for this party, whereas only 1.7% of
Indians voted for the PNC. Therefore, it appears that the two main ethnic groups in Guyana have
very different party preferences. Finally, the AFC gathers votes from all ethnic groups, mainly
from Mixed-race citizens (39.6%) and the Black population (31.7%).
……
189
Voted for PPP/C Voted for PNCR/1G Voted for AFC
80% 80% 40%
60% 60% 30%

Percentage
Percentage
Percentage
40% 40% 20% 39.6%
71.5%
68.7%
31.7%
20% 20% 10%

17.3%
22.7% 11.5%
16.3%
11.3% 1.7%
4.0%
3.7%
0% 0% 0%
Mixed Amerindian Black Indian Mixed Amerindian Black Indian Mixed Amerindian Black Indian
Figure VII-8. Ethnic group and voting preferences in the 2006 Elections
Identification with Political Parties in Guyana

Apart from electoral behaviour, we also analyse party identification in Guyana. Political
parties are key institutions in any democratic system; they perform essential functions for the
stability and consolidation of liberal democracies. Among these crucial functions are aggregating
interests, channelling citizens’ demands, and selecting candidates for public office (Mainwaring
and Scully 1995). In this sense, it is important to have political systems in which citizens develop
affective ties or attachments to political parties that help to build stable and institutionalized party
systems.
In order to understand levels of party identification in Guyana, the 2009

AmericasBarometer survey asked Guyanese the following question:
VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (8) DK [Go to POL1]
Figure VII-9 shows the responses to this question comparing them to the results from the
2006 survey. We observe that party identification has dropped significantly during the last three
years. While in 2006 19.4% of respondents identified with a political party, this percentage falls
to 12.2% in 2009.
190
25%
Percentage who identifies

20%
with a political party

15%
10% 19.4%
12.2%
5%
0%
2006 2009
Year
Figure VII-9. Levels of Party Identification in Guyana, 2009
In order to determine whether a percentage of 12.2% identifying with a political party is

high or low, we compare Guyana with other countries in the Americas. Figure VII-10 reveals that
Guyana is the country with the lowest percentage of party identification in our sample. Except for
Guatemala, the difference between Guyana and the other countries is statistically significant. The
country with the highest levels of party identification is the Dominican Republic, with 70.3% of
its population identifying with a political party, followed by Paraguay, Jamaica and Uruguay. In
general terms we can say that levels of party identification in the Americas is quite low, with
percentages below 50% in the majority of countries.
……
191
Paraguay 59.0%
Jamaica 58.5%
Uruguay 50.4%
Honduras 48.7%
El Salvador 40.9%
Nicaragua 40.3%
Venezuela 32.6%
Mexico 32.2%
Panama 32.1%
Costa Rica 30.3%
Colombia 29.2%
Bolivia 29.0%
Haiti 28.8%
Brazil 25.2%
Argentina 24.8%
Belize 23.3%
Chile 21.4%
Peru 19.2%
Ecuador 18.9%
Guatemala 15.9%
Guyana 12.2%
0 20 40 60 80
with a political party
Figure VII-10. Party Identification in Comparative Perspective, 2008
Going back to the analysis of party identification in Guyana, we now turn to levels of
party identification by region. Figure VII-11 displays these levels stratified by the seven regions
under consideration in this study on the political culture of Guyanese citizens. As we can see, all
the regions, except for two (Region 2 and Region 10), present percentages between 11.6% and
15.1%; the region with the highest levels of party identification is Region 3. However, the only
statistically significant difference is found between Region 6 and Region 2. In short, we can
conclude that levels of party identification remain low across the country with slight variation
among regions.
192
20%

with a political party 15%
10%
14.1% 15.1%
11.6% 11.8% 12.3%
5%
7.7% 8.2%
0%
Region
Figure VII-11. Party Identification by Region in Guyana, 2009
Aside from levels of party identification, we are interested in determining the distribution
of such identification. That is to say, which political parties have larger levels of identification
among citizens? Figure VII-12 shows that the PPP/C and the PNCR/1G have similar levels of
citizens identifying with them, 48.2% and 47.5%, respectively, which articulates the leading
position of these two parties in the Guyanese party system. Alternatively, only 5.9% of
Guyanese who identify with a political party identify with the Alliance for Change (AFC).
Other
0.2%
Alliance for
Change (AFC)
5.9%
People's Progressive
Party Civic (PPP/C)
48.2%
People's National Congress/
One Guyana (PNCR/1G)
45.7%
Which political party do you identify with?

Figure VII-12. Distribution of Party Identification by Political Party, 2009
……
193
Given this distribution of party identification, it would be interesting to analyse

identification patterns across regions. For the purpose of this study, we have considered only the
two main political parties in Guyana. Figure VII-13 shows the percentage of people identifying
with the PPP/C by region. We observe that identification with this party occurs mainly in
Regions 1,7,8,9 and Region 2, where about 80% of those who identify with a political party do so
with the PPP/C. At the other extreme, with percentages of approximately 30% we find Regions 4
and 10. The remaining regions place in intermediate positions, with percentages between 51.5%-
63.6%, with no statistically significant differences among them. The two regions with the highest
percentages display statistically significant differences with the two regions in the lowest
positions.
100%
Percentage Identifying with PPP/C
80%
60%
40% 79.2% 81.5%

63.6%
51.5% 56.1%
20%
30.7% 34.6%
0%
Region 4 Region 10 Region 5 Region 6 Region 3 Region 2 Regions 1,7,8,9
Region
Figure VII-13. Identification with the PPP/C by region, 2009
Not only is it interesting to determine the levels of party identification but also the
strength of such identification. When respondents said they identified with a political party and
which political party they identified with, they were then asked about the strength of that
identification. Figure VII-14 shows levels of strength for the PPP/C. Here we see that a majority
of those identifying with this party hold a strong (43.1%) or very strong (13.8%) identification.
Only 6.1% say they hold a very weak identification with the party.
194
Very
Weak
6.1%
Very
Strong
13.8%
Weak
18.0%
Not Weak,
Strong or Strong
43.1% 19.0%
Identification with PPP/C

Figure VII-14. Identification Strength with the PPP/C
Regarding the PNCR/1G we also observe that their supporters are concentrated in specific
regions. As we can see in Figure VII-15, in Region 4, 61.3% of Guyanese who identify with a
political party identify with the PNCR/1G. In Region 5 that percentage drops to 48.5%.
Alternatively, the region with the lowest percentage is Regions 1,7,8,9, with 11.1%. However,
the only differences that are statistically significant are those between Region 4 and Regions
1,7,8,9, and Region 4 and Region 2.
Percentage Identifying with PNCR/1G
100%
80%
60%
40%
61.3%
48.5%
20%
34.1% 38.5% 39.0%
20.8%
11.1%
0%
Region
Figure VII-15. Identification with the PNCR/1G by Region, 2009
……
195
Finally, we observe the identification strength of Guyanese who identify with the
PNC/1R. From Figure VII-16 we see that 33.6% of this group consider their identification with
that party as strong, and 7.8% as very strong. A large proportion, 28.7%, consider their
identification neither strong nor weak while almost a third of respondents report having weak or
very weak identification with the PNC/1R.
Very Very
Strong Weak
7.8% 6.8%
Weak
23.2%
Strong
33.6%
Not Weak,
or Strong
28.7%
Identification with PNCR/1G

Figure VII-16. Identification Strength with the PNCR/1G
Conclusions
In this chapter we have analysed questions related to voting behaviour and party
identification in Guyana. First, we examined how many people have already registered to appear
on the new voters list in order to be eligible to vote in local government elections and the 2011
national elections. We saw that 81.6% of Guyanese report being registered for the new list,
without many differences among regions in the country. Statistical analyses demonstrated that
people in urban areas and wealthy citizens are more likely to be registered. Furthermore,
Amerindian and Mixed-race citizens are registered at lower levels than Indians.
We then looked at levels of electoral participation in the previous election of 2006. About
70% of respondents reported having voted in the last election, displaying similar levels across
regions and similar levels to the majority of countries in the Americas. Region 5 was the region
with the highest levels in both registered voters and electoral turnout. When determining the
factors that explain electoral turnout, we found that men and young people were less likely to
196
vote in the 2006 elections, as well as Amerindians compared to Indians. We also observed a
strong correlation between voting choice and ethnic self-identification.
Finally, in the third section of this chapter, we focused on the analysis of party
identification in Guyana. In this sense, the country displays the lowest levels of party
identification in the Americas. Only 12.2% of citizens identify with a political party, most of
them identifying with either the PPP or the PNC in similar percentages. The main differences
occur among regions. Despite these low levels of party identification, parties have strong
supporters among those identifying with them.
……
197
APPENDIX CHAPTER VII.
Appendix VII-1. Predictors of Registration for the New Voters List

Registered for the new voter list
Region 2 0.040 (0.46)
Region 3 0.092 (1.28)
Region 5 0.122 (1.55)
Region 6 -0.055 (-0.86)
Region 10 0.018 (0.22)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.113 (0.98)
Mixed -0.152* (-2.24)
Amerindian -0.228* (-2.68)
Black -0.061 (-0.89)
Wealth 0.249* (3.18)
Urban / rural 0.199* (2.32)
Female 0.058 (0.94)
Age 0.135 (1.96)
Constant 1.545* (22.80)
F = 3.73
* p<0.05
198
Appendix VII-2. Predictors of Electoral Turnout in 2006

Electoral Turnout
Region 2 0.121 (1.70)
Region 3 -0.047 (-0.70)
Region 5 0.155* (2.29)
Region 6 0.107* (2.24)
Region 10 0.053 (0.69)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.131 (1.66)
Mixed -0.110 (-1.75)
Amerindian -0.239* (-2.98)
Black -0.106 (-1.40)
Wealth -0.016 (-0.21)
Urban / rural 0.104 (1.48)
Female 0.195* (3.42)
Age 0.868* (11.24)
Constant 1.134* (18.21)
F = 14.14
* p<0.05
……
199
PART THREE:
BEYOND
GOVERNANCE
Chapter VIII. Interpersonal Trust and

Civic Participation63
Theoretical framework
Since the publication of Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations on American democracy in
1835, a strong and vibrant civil society has not just been seen as an expendable component of
stable democracy, but as an essential characteristic of it. In the almost two centuries since the
original release of Democracy in America, scholars have been attempting to understand just how
civil society contributes to the consolidation of democratic governance within a polity.
Originally, for example, it was presumed that the act of participating in civil organizations and
associations increased levels of trust among citizens within a society, however, that assumption
has recently been challenged as scholars have begun to posit that a baseline level of interpersonal
or societal trust must exist within a society before citizens will be willing to associate with their
compatriots. Furthermore, scholars such as Uslaner (2000; 2002) contend that while citizens may
become more trusting through their participation in civic organizations, that trust is better defined
as ‘particularized’ to certain segments of the population and not ‘generalized’ throughout the
entire society.
Robert Putnam famously argues that through participation in civic organizations such as
religious groups, parent-teacher associations (PTAs) and even bowling leagues, mass publics
begin to build a social capital which increases trust and efficiency throughout society (Putnam
1993; 2000). In his seminal work on democracy in Italy, Putnam argues that a primary difference
between the more efficient, less corrupt and more developed north and the less developed
southern regions of Italy is their civic participation and the resulting lack of interpersonal trust.
Banfield also noted this lack of trust in his ethnographic study of a rural southern Italian village,
concluding that an “amoral familism” hampers the development of “Montegrano” (Banfield
1958). One aspect of this hypothesis goes in direct opposition to Newton’s definition of social
trust as being “the actor’s belief that, at worst, others will not knowingly or willingly do him
harm, and at best, that they will act in his interests” (Newton 2001, 202). A key component to
“amoral familism” according to Banfield is that “no one will further the interest of the group or
community except as it is to his private advantage to do so (Banfield 1958, 83-84). Clearly, at the
very least, in the case of Italy, civic participation seems to play a pivotal role in the functioning
and efficiency of democratic institutions.
Even in the most advanced democratic societies, civic participation and the creation and
maintenance of a strong civil society are of utmost concern to democratic scholars. Putnam
63
This chapter was written by Lawrence Lachmansingh.
203
……
(2000), for example, contends that due in large party to the advancement of technology
(especially the television) since the 1950s, Americans participation in civic organizations
continues to decline, putting at risk the foundations of democratic governance that have in large
part been taken for granted by the American public. As Putnam explains, it is not so much that
Americans are no longer bowling; it is that they are now opting to bowl alone instead of
participating in leagues. Social trust, argues Putnam, is dependent on a participatory citizenry and
without it; the quality of democracy will begin to decline.
Recently however, scholars have begun to question the fundamental assumptions

concerning our understanding of participation in civic organizations and interpersonal or societal
trust. Uslaner and Brown (2005), for example, contend that it is not participation which leads to
trust, but is in fact the other way around, “the causal relationship” they argue “runs from trust to
participation” (Uslaner and Brown 2005, 868). Scholars have also begun to note the impact of
structural variables such as inequality on interpersonal trust and civic participation. In the same
work, Uslaner and Brown find that while inequality does not have a substantive effect on
communal participation in the United States (volunteering, giving to charity), it does have a
pronounced effect on political participation (voting, signing petitions, and working for a political
party), with those less well off participating less. Furthermore, using multi-level statistical
methodologies to examine inequality, social trust and civic participation in Latin America,
Córdova (2008) argues that “civic participation by itself is unlikely to foster democracy unless it
forms part of a broader agenda that included policies that facilitate the conditions for the
construction of generalized social trust, such as economic policies designed to promote equality”
(Córdova 2008, 149). While the causal relationship has not been conclusively determined, it has
become essentially unanimous among scholars that both interpersonal trust and civic
participation are key components to a well-functioning, liberal democracy.
Recognizing the importance of these two variables, interpersonal trust and civic
participation, the current chapter explores individual level variables which cause a person to both
trust and participate more in a variety of organizations. The first part of the chapter will examine
levels of interpersonal trust (IT1) in Guyana, comparing those levels to years past and throughout
the several regions of the country. We will then, through the use of regression analysis, examine
the primary predictors of interpersonal trust at the individual level.
Following our analysis of interpersonal trust, we will then proceed to examine civic
participation within the country. Using the “CP series” from the 2009 Americas Barometer
Survey administered in Guyana, our analysis will examine each organization included in the
questionnaire, including participating in meetings of religious organizations (CP6), parent
associations (CP7), committees for community improvement (CP8), professional associations
(CP9), labour unions (CP10), political parties (CP13) and finally women’s groups and
associations (CP20). For each organization, we will examine levels of participation in Guyana in
comparison with the 22 other countries included in the Americas Barometer Survey, the
difference in participation across time (2006 and 2009) and regions.64 Furthermore, where
appropriate and when the data permits, we will examine participation in organizations with those
64
Given data constraints, some analyses may be lacking from certain types of organizations.
204
of differing race. Finally, we will investigate the individual level variables that influence people’s
participation in each type of organization.
Next, we will look at the relationship between participation in civic organizations and
demand-making on different governmental institutions including parliament (CP2), local
authorities (CP4A) and ministries or state agencies (CP4). The final section will then examine the
relationship between participation in public demonstrations or protests (PROT2) and participation
in civic organizations.
Historical Background
In a country as ethnically diverse as Guyana, which boasts of six races, building
interpersonal trust is a major consideration in the pursuit of sustainable development. The
dominant political ideology, which formed in the pre-Independence period, proposed that
development challenges posed by ethnic, geographic, class and other divisions could be
overcome by political independence and the embracing of inclusive policies. Indeed, the newly
independent Guyana of 1966 declared its national motto as “One People, One Nation, One
Destiny.”
Civil society has contributed significantly towards the achievement of the “One People”
notion over the decades by reflecting the diversity of needs and interests that exists across the
country. Hundreds of groups at the local and national levels are currently addressing
developmental issues and seeking to make a positive difference in the quality of life of citizens.
These groups are reinforced by hundreds more in the extensive Guyanese diaspora, who typically
maintain Guyana-focused agendas. By pursuing public goods such as worker’s rights,
humanitarian relief, education, health, economic development, environmental protection, security
and HIV/AIDS prevention, for example, these groups are increasingly seeking ways of working
across divisions in a manner that promotes social cohesion and capital.
Guyana’s civil society is typified, as elsewhere, by mass-based organisations (MBOs),

such as religious groups and labour unions, and a growing Non-Governmental Organisation
(NGO) sector. These have co-existed along with political parties, as demonstrated by the extent
of cooperation – or lack thereof – with partisan agendas, which unfortunately since their
inception are still perceived to mirror ethnic divisions. Thus, while civil society world-wide has
been a potent force for contributing to increased levels of interpersonal trust, it can also
contribute to distrust.
While MBOs have existed for decades and have developed norms for functioning that
permit sustainability, they are beset by much of the same challenges that face the more newly
formed NGOs: an outdated legal infrastructure, limited resources, poor governance and
tendencies toward authoritarianism. Despite these obstacles, many groups are demonstrating a
capacity for healthy organisational performance, are achieving results and meaningful impact.
There are numerous examples of successful NGOs. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain at
205
……
all levels to better equip civil society to build interpersonal trust.
In recent years, civil society has benefitted from a national recognition that trust-building
remains a key challenge in the pursuit of nation-building. With an eye to deepening Guyana’s
democracy, constitutional reforms in 2001 established Article 13, which states:
“The principal objective of the political system of the State is to establish an inclusionary
democracy by providing increasing opportunities for the participation of citizens, and their
organizations, in the management and decision-making processes of the State, with particular
emphasis on those areas of decision-making that directly affect their well-being.”
Specific roles for civil society were to be assured in part through membership in five
rights-based constitutional commissions to address issues of ethnic relations, children, Indigenous
Peoples, women and gender, and human rights. Unfortunately, the establishment of these
Commissions has been significantly delayed – with only the Ethnic Relations Commission being
operational.
In addition to the slow implementation of the agreed constitutional reforms, the post-2001
period was characterised by political and social tensions that further threatened the levels of
interpersonal trust, particularly across members of Guyana’s different communities. Civil society
responded through the ‘Social Partners’ (the Private Sector Commission, the Trades Union
Congress and the Guyana Bar Association) and promoted a process of dialogue between the main
political parties. These and subsequent processes yielded additional political agreements and
eventually saw a reduction in tensions.
Generally, however, civil society’s participation in decision-making processes in the areas

of governance and peace – key sectors for building and demonstrating interpersonal trust - have
yielded limited successes. Among the collaborative efforts that civil society has recently pursued
are the Forum for Effectiveness and Solidarity (FES), the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) and
the Peacebuilders Network. Broader processes such as the National Development Strategy,
Multi-stakeholder Fora and the Poverty Reduction Strategy also enjoyed considerable civil
society support.
The reasons for these limited successes have been outlined earlier. The net effect is that
stakeholder confidence, particularly of political parties, in the abilities and motivations of civil
society, is low. The capacity of civil society to occupy a more prominent position in trust-
building, whether at the local or national level, is thus constrained.
The following analysis suggests the extent of both the will and capacity within civil
society to participate in the development process. It may also contribute towards an improved
understanding of how critically needed capacity can be identified and strengthened.
206
Interpersonal Trust
The key measure of interpersonal trust in the AmericasBarometer survey is one that has
been used many times before, and was also included in the 2006 LAPOP survey in Guyana. It
reads as follows:
IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally
very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? [Read options]
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK/DR
We will examine the responses to this item by recoding them in the traditional LAPOP
format, namely to convert to a 0-100 scale, with 0 equal to untrustworthy and 100 equal to very
trusthworthy.
As already shown in Chapter I, but repeated here because of its relevance, Guyana scored
just above the middle in the AmericasBarometer series of countries. The average score for
Guyana was 60.1 in 2008, just about the same as Guamatela (60.2) and Jamaica (60.3), but far
below Canada (79.6), and yet sharply above Haiti (40.8).
207
……
Canada 79.6
Costa Rica 68.1
United States 67.0
Paraguay 66.1
El Salvador 64.9
Colombia 62.6
Uruguay 62.4
Venezuela 60.5
Jamaica 60.3
Guatemala 60.2
Guyana 60.1
Nicaragua 58.1
Panama 58.0
Mexico 57.3
Chile 56.6
Ecuador 54.2
Argentina 54.2
Brazil 53.7
Belize 53.2
Bolivia 52.1
Honduras 51.8
Peru 47.1
Haiti 40.8
0 20 40 60 80
Interpersonal Trust
Figure VIII-1. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective
208
Interpersonal Trust Over time
60

50
40
30 59.9 60.1
20
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure VIII-2. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Year
Figure VIII-2 shows that levels of interpersonal trust between the period of 2006 and
2009 in Guyana have only changed by 0.2 average points in a 0-100 scale This statistically
insigificant change suggests that the major causes of trust and distrust within communities
remained the same over the period in question or that the changes that did occur effectively
balanced each other out. Further analysis in this chapter will investigate the determinants of trust
levels in Guyana.
209
……
Interpersonal Trust by Regions
80
60
40
61.5 65.9 66.3

57.5 58.5 59.1 59.9
20

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure VIII-3. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Regions
Figure VIII-3, characterizing interpersonal trust by region, indicates that those citizens
likely to have higher levels of interpersonal trust reside in region 5 (66.3 points) and the
hinterland regions – 1, 7, 8 & 9 (65.9 points). While the most populated region, Region 4, and
Region 10 have the lowest levels of interpersonal trust (58.5 points and 57.5 points respectively),
it is noticeable that when the 95% Confidence Interval is considered there is no significant
difference between trust levels in the vast majority of the citizens (regions 2, 3, 4, 6 and 10).
210
Determinants of Interpersonal Trust
Crime Victimization
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Small City
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
R-Squared =0.041
Region 6 F=4.280
Region 10 N =2416
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area

Figure VIII-4. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust
Having examined regional comparisons, we now turn to the predictors of interpersonal

trust in Guyana (Figure VIII-4).65 This linear regression shows that a significant negative effect
upon levels of trust is driven by respondents being either female, of mixed ethnicity or the victim
of a crime in the past year. It is not surprising that females and victims of crime would tend to be
less trusting, as females are all too often the victims of various forms of abuse, and, crime
victims, of course, are likely to become suspicious of their fellow citizens. The discussion
around Figure V.4 delves deeper into this question. The regression results also show that those
who are older, wealthier, and who reside in a small city or rural area have significantly higher
levels of interpersonal trust than younger, poorer and more urban citizens. It is striking that
ethnic self identification so important a factor in Guyana, has no significant impact on
interpersonal trust once these demographic and socio-economic factors are taken into
consideration, with the minor exception of slightly lower trust among those who self-identify as
“mixed.” More discussion on these predictors follows Figure V.5 below.
65
In the regression charts, we standardize all variables and indicate the zero mean as a red line. Each predictor that
does not intersect with that line is a significant predictor (p<0.05). Notice that any coefficient to the right of the zero
line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect of that variable on the dependent variable. In contrast,
any coefficient to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.
211
……
60

50
40
30 60.7
54.4
20
10
No Yes
Crime Victimization
Figure VIII-5. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Crime Victimization
Crime victimization has a significantly negative impact on interpersonal trust in Guyana.

As illustrated in Figure VIII-5, those who have been a victim of a crime within the past year have
an almost 6-points lower level of interpersonal trust than those who had not been victimized.
Crime victimization has the effect of reducing citizen’s trust in each other likely due to the
human phenomenon of “once bitten, twice shy.”
212
80
60
Interpersonal Trust
Interpersonal Trust
50
60
Average
Average
40
30 61.2 59.0 40
20 57.3 59.0 59.7 64.7 61.0 62.5

20
10
0 0
Male Female 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+
Sex Age
80
60
Interpersonal Trust
Interpersonal Trust
50 60
Average
Average
40
30 59.2 62.1 40
53.8 61.3 60.6 57.8 61.5 59.2 57.8 61.0 63.0
20
20
10
0 0
National Capital Small City Rural Area 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Size of city/town Wealth
Figure VIII-6. Interpersonal Trust by Sex, Age, Wealth and Size of City/Town
Figure VIII-6 graphically displays the significant predictors that positively affect
interpersonal trust in Guyana: age, sex, wealth and the size city/town. In terms of gender, men
demonstrate a 2 average-points higher level of trust than women. When it comes to age, there is
higher interpersonal trust among those older than the youngest cohort of 18-25, which can be as a
result of adult maturation and increased community involvement as well as an increased
acceptance of and comfort with the status quo. These levels remain relatively high for older
citizens. Younger citizens between the ages of 18-25, however, have the lowest level of
interpersonal trust. This may result from those in this age group being more concerned with
personal development issues than with community related issues. It may also reflect an idealistic
frustration with the status quo, as higher standards and expectations are not realised in the real
world.
The size of the city66 lived in is a significant predictor of interpersonal trust, with levels
being markedly higher in rural areas (62.1 points) and small cities (59.2 points), when compared
with the national capital. Persons in the national capital are only likely to have a 53.8 points
degree of interpersonal trust. This can be as a result of the lower level of community
participation that tends to prevail in urban areas, as confirmed in Figure V.7 below. Other urban
66
For the 2009 survey, three categories of size were used: National Capital (Georgetown), small city (all the other
municipalities) and rural areas (all other areas).
213
……
phenomenon, such as a perception of increased levels of crime and political competition,

particularly of the rancorous kind, may also contribute to lower levels of trust.
Finally, in terms of wealth, the wealthiest Guyanese have the highest levels of
interpersonal trust (63 points). Major differences in trust-levels are not demonstrated among less
well-off Guyanese, the lowest level being 57.8 points.
Civic Participation
Participation in Solving Community Problems
The extent to which citizens participate in solving community problems can be a tangible
indicator of a democracy’s health, particularly as relates to the confidence of citizens that such
involvement can make a difference in their lives. At the same time, it may also indicate a view
on the state of local institutions and their capacity (or lack thereof) as relates to addressing
community issues. Deeper analysis into the views of citizens on local government is covered in a
separate chapter.
To assess the level of citizen participation in solving community problems, the following
question was asked:
CP5. Now, changing the subject…Over the Once a Once or Once or Never DK
last 12 months have you tried to help to week twice a twice a
solve a problem in your community or in your month year
neighbourhood?
Please, tell me if you did it at least once a (2) (3)
(1) (4) (8)
week, once or twice a month, once or twice
a year or never.
214
Paraguay 65.6%
Haiti 56.4%
Jamaica 41.9%
Ecuador 39.8%
United States 39.1%
Brazil 38.6%
Guyana 37.8%
Bolivia 37.8%
Guatemala 37.5%
Peru 36.3%
Venezuela 34.3%
El Salvador 31.9%
Honduras 31.9%
Belize 31.4%
Costa Rica 31.3%
Uruguay 29.5%
Colombia 28.9%
Mexico 28.8%
Argentina 28.0%
Panama 26.5%
Nicaragua 25.4%
Chile 24.5%
0 20 40 60 80
Participation in Solving
Community Problems
Figure VIII-7. Participation in Solving Community Problems

Figure VIII-7 shows that across the countries included in the AmericasBarometer survey
by LAPOP, Guyana ranks highly (7th, with 37.8%) as it relates to participation in solving
community problems. Paraguay and Haiti, at 65.6 and 56.4% respectively, convincingly occupy
the top two positions while Chile and Nicaragua, with 24.5 and 25.4% respectively, placing them
at the bottom of the graph. It is interesting to note that in a region dominated by Spanish-
speaking countries, only two of the top seven countries are Spanish-speaking. While it may be
tempting to view a higher ranking as a positive from the perspective of participation, it may also
be that the necessity for participation, warranted by a preponderance of community problems
(including weak local government), is what drives the higher level of participation or forces
people to take matters into their own hands.
215
……
60
Percentage Who Participated in

Solving Community Problems
50
40
30
51.0%
20 40.8% 41.3% 41.3%

36.5% 37.4%
33.5%
10

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure VIII-8. Participation in Solving Community Problems by Region
Among the regions in Guyana, the highest percentage of participation in solving

community problems (51%) occurs in the cluster of regions, 1, 7, 8 and 9, as shown in Figure
VIII-8 above. These regions are comprised of mainly indigenous communities that are
traditionally organized along communal lines. The statistics drawn from the survey also suggests
that the community councils and other community bodies in the hinterland are active and provide
citizens with the vehicles for organizing and directing local energies.
However there is a noticeable decrease in participation among the other regions, with
Region 4 – the most populous region - recording the lowest level (33.5%). This is reflective of
the coastal response to community issues, which is magnified in the capital, where communities
are less cohesive and local authorities are in a state of considerable disarray. This latter issue will
be covered in a separate chapter on local governance. Suffice it to note at this stage that needed
local government reforms remain outstanding, with local elections now being 12 years overdue.
Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups

Religion plays an important role in the fabric of Guyanese society, where the vast
majority of citizens profess belief in a higher being. According to the AmericasBarometer
survey, various Christian groups comprise the largest segment of the population (about 64%),
about 21% are Hindus, 7.5% Muslim, with only 4% declaring no religion. A scattering of other
groupings (Bahai, Rastafarian, etc.) make up the remainder. The 2009 survey sought to elicit the
216
extent to which citizens participated in meetings of religious organizations by asking the

following question:
Once a Once or Once or Never DK/DR

week twice a twice a
month year
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization?
Do you attend them…
(1) (2) (3)
(4) (8)
in Meetings of any Religious Group
80
Percentage Who Participated
60
40 81.4%
62.2%
20
2006 2009
Year
Figure VIII-9. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Year
According to the 2009 data, there has been a sharp drop of almost 20% in the level of
participation in religious meetings since 2006. As will be seen in the analysis of subsequent
types of civic participation, there has been an across-the-board decrease in participation between
the LAPOP surveys of 2006 and 2009.
217
……
Haiti 81.6%
Jamaica 80.7%
Guatemala 73.2%
Bolivia 63.2%
Honduras 63.1%
Belize 62.3%
Guyana 62.2%
Ecuador 62.1%
Paraguay 61.9%
Nicaragua 61.8%
Mexico 61.3%
Brazil 61.2%
Costa Rica 59.4%
Colombia 58.8%
United States 51.8%
El Salvador 51.4%
Canada 50.4%
Panama 46.2%
Peru 42.2%
Venezuela 41.0%
Chile 38.5%
Argentina 37.7%
Uruguay 26.5%
0 20 40 60 80
Participation in Meetings
of any Religious Group
Figure VIII-10. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups in

At 62.2%, Guyana is ranked 8th for the level of participation in meetings of any religious
group among the countries included in the AmericasBarometer survey by LAPOP, with Uruguay
demonstrating the lowest level of participation. Guyana lies within a cluster of 11 countries that
share a similar level of participation, from 63.2% (Bolivia) to 58.8% (Colombia). Interestingly,
the four CARICOM countries in the AmericasBarometer survey are found within the top eight
countries for participation in religious meetings, with Haiti and Jamaica topping the ratings.
218
80

Meetings of any Religious Group
60
40
74.9%
66.5% 69.5%
62.9% 65.4%
61.5%
56.1%
20

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure VIII-11. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Regions
Determinants of Participation in Religious Meetings

In exploring the regions in Guyana as a determinant of participation in religious meetings
it can be seen according to Figure VIII-11 that levels are greatest (74.9%) in the hinterland
regions (regions 1, 7, 8, and 9). As argued earlier, the higher degree of community interaction in
the hinterland translates into benefits for civic participation. By contrast, and again holding true
in this case, Region 4 (lowest, with 56.1%) and the other coastal regions demonstrate markedly
lower levels of participation in religious meetings. It is interesting to note that Region 6 defied
the coastal trend and exhibited the second highest level of participation in religious meetings –
69.5%.
219
……
Interpersonal Trust
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Number of Children
Small City
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3 F=4.099
Region 5 N =2401
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Figure VIII-12. Predictors of Participation in Religious Meetings
Figure VIII-12 above illustrates the predictors of participation in religious meetings in

Guyana. From the regression analysis we find that racial self-identification once again does not
define Guyanese. Participation levels are higher outside region 4, particularly in the hinterland
regions, as already noted. Moreover, we found that women, older people, and wealthier people
participate more. However, rural areas demonstrate a negative relationship on levels of
participation in religious meetings.
220
80 80

60 60
40 40 59.4% 56.6% 66.5% 65.7% 63.4% 68.6%

65.6%
58.7%
20 20
0 0
Male Female 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+
Sex Age
80 80

60 60
40 40
62.6% 59.1% 59.5% 62.2% 60.1% 63.4% 63.6% 68.0%
61.3% 67.8% 61.6%
20
20
0
0
National Capital Small City Rural Area
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7, 8, 9 (Metropolitan Area)
Wealth Size of City/Town
Figure VIII-13. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Sex, Age, Wealth and Size
of City or Town
Not surprisingly, and as reflected in Figure VIII-13 above, when it comes to gender,
females attend religious meetings at higher levels than males. What is perhaps surprising is that
the difference in levels is only 7%. Indeed, when we examine another variable in the survey
(Q5a), which asks directly about the frequency of participation in religious services (since many
of those who attend such services also attend meetings of their church group before/after such
services), we find that whereas 23% of males attend such services once a week, 35% of females
do so. In contrast, whereas 13% of males never attend, only 5% of females never attend. Finally,
while 15% of males attend more than once a week, 23% of females do.
In terms of age, participation in religious meetings rises noticeably with the 36-45 age
group, at 66.5%, and generally increases the older one becomes. While younger citizens tend to
participate less, the decrease is not particularly dramatic: the lowest level of participation is only
56.6% (age 26-35). In terms of wealth, the more wealthy citizens (>$120K/month household
income) exhibit the highest degree of participation at 68%. Yet, that participation is not very
different from that of the less well-off citizens. Indeed, the remaining Guyanese (<$120K/month
household income) participate in religious meetings at levels above 59%. Finally, in terms of
size of city/town, being a resident of a small city (municipalities other than Georgetown) also has
a positive effect on participation in meetings of religious groups. These residents participate at a
level of 67.8%.
221
……
Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations

In most countries, including Guyana, local schools play an important role in civic society.
Schools offer parents multiple opportunities to meet with other parents, teachers and
administrators. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer includes a question on frequency of
attendance at parents’ associations. The wording is as follows (CP7), along with the special item
we added for Guyana, given the importance of race in this country (CP7A).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (8)

CP7. Meetings of a parents’ association
at school? Do you attend them… [Go to [Go to
CP8] CP8]
CP7A. In general, would All of Mostly of About Mostly All of DK/D N/A
you say that the people the the same half the of a a R
who attend those meetings same race as same differen differe
with you are [read each race yours race t race nt
option]… as as than race (9)
yours yours yours than
(2)
(4) yours
(1) (3) (8)
(5)
Once again we find a significant decrease in participation levels in the 2009 dataset when
compared with 2006. In this instance, and as depicted in Figure VIII-14 below, citizens reduced
their participation levels in Parent Associations by over 9%, from 54.9% to 46%. There are no
apparent reasons for this general decrease. From all accounts the situation as pertains to parents,
children and the circumstances surrounding parent associations in Guyana have remained the
same between 2006 and 2009.
222
in Meetings of a Parents Association

60

50
40
30
54.9%
46.0%
20
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure VIII-14. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations by Year
Haiti 65.5%
Bolivia 53.3%
Peru 51.5%
Ecuador 49.4%
Guatemala 49.1%
Jamaica 48.4%
Belize 48.3%
Guyana 46.0%
Paraguay 44.0%
Nicaragua 41.4%
Colombia 40.5%
Mexico 40.4%
Costa Rica 39.3%
Honduras 38.9%
El Salvador 37.1%
Brazil 36.8%
Chile 36.1%
Venezuela 35.6%
Uruguay 35.0%
Argentina 29.3%
Panama 27.4%
Canada 24.7%
United States 23.6%
0 20 40 60 80
of a Parents Association
Figure VIII-15. Participation in Meetings of

Parent Associations in Comparative Perspective
223
……
Despite this decline, within the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey countries, Guyana
exhibits the eighth highest level of participation in parents associations, placing immediately
behind the other English-speaking Caribbean countries in the survey – Jamaica and Belize. Haiti
leads the group with the highest level of participation in parent associations (65.5%), followed
immediately by another poor country, Bolivia (53.3%). This phenomenon may reflect the
increased compulsion citizens feel to participate when institutional performance is weak (see
parallel discussions on civic participation in local issues and trust in local government).
Interestingly, the countries with the lowest levels of participation in parent associations are two
more developed countries, Canada (24.7%) and the United States (23.6%), but this is at least in
part a function of the much lower family size in those countries, which is also the case in
countries like Argentina and Uruguay, where birth rates are low.
80
Meetings of a Parents Association
60
40
66.3%
43.8% 45.6% 46.3% 47.3%

20 42.4%
38.8%

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure VIII-16. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations by Region
Consistent with earlier findings, the hinterland regions (1, 7, 8, 9) demonstrate the highest
level of participation in parent associations to a significant degree – 66.3%. Regions 3, 4, 5, 6
and 10 follow in a cluster that ranges from 42.4% to 47.3%, as shown in Figure VIII-16 above.
The remaining region, Region 2, demonstrates the lowest level of participation in parent
associations, 38.3%, but that difference is not significant when compared to all other regions
except the hinterland regions. The analyses in this chapter suggest that the higher levels of
participation in school-related meetings in Region 1, 7, 8, and 9 vs. all other regions is, at least in
224
part, due to the much higher number of children that hinterland parents have. The mean number
of children in these regions is 3.6 vs. 2.4 for the nation as a whole. Indeed, in region 1,7,8,9 only
18% of the respondents report having no children, vs. the national average of 27%. In Region 2,
where participation in schools is the lowest, 31% of respondents had no children, the highest of
any region. Other factors include that the hinterland communities are nucleated and relatively
isolated. There are few forms of ‘social’ activity. Thus, involvement in activities in the
community is generally high.
All of a different
race than yours All of the same
7.3% race as yours
9.1%
Mostly of the same

race as yours
Mostly of a different 22.4%
race than yours
31.2%
About half the same

race as yours
30.0%
Would you say that the people who attend

those meetings with you are...
Figure VIII-17. Race of Other Participants at Parent Association Meetings
To further explore participation in parent association meetings Figure VIII-17 looks at the
ethnicity of those who attended such meetings, from the perspective of the respondent. About
half of the other attendees at parent association meetings are of the same race for 30% of the
respondents. In 31.5% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race
as the respondent while in 38.5% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a
different race. In the majority of cases, Guyanese are engaging with each other as parents across
the racial divide, thus reflecting – and contributing to – levels of interpersonal trust. We will see
below that this figure is much lower in other kinds of associations and therefore the school seems
to be a particularly good venue for Guyanese to meet and mix.
It is useful to note that when it comes to geographic coverage, the model for schools is
similar to that for local government. School areas, like NDCs, comprise a collection of local
areas that are almost by definition multi-ethnic. The pursuit of a common agenda through a
model that insists upon multi-ethnicity may offer an opportunity for addressing development
issues and deepening levels of interpersonal trust.
225
……
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations
Interpersonal Trust
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Number of Children
Small City F=11.863
N =2394
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Figure VIII-18. Predictors of Participation in Parent Association Meetings
Further characteristics were used to determine the attendance at parent association

meetings (Figure VIII-18). From those characteristics it can be seen that having children and
being female are among the strongest factors. This makes sense, since, as already noted, having
children provides a motivation for attending school-related meetings. As is traditional among
females over generations of civilization, women are generally more interested in their children’s
education than males. This was confirmed in most of the AmericasBarometer surveys. Age is a
strong negative determinant of participation in school activities, since both younger and older
individuals are less likely to have children in school. Residents in region 2 participate less in part
because they have fewer children in school, but also because of some unknown factor that
requires further exploration since the regression results reported above already take into account
the number of children (as well as age and other factors). On the other hand, married or common
law, Amerindian and Black are those characteristics that have a positive impact on levels of
attendance at these meetings in Guyana, net of other factors. We shall explore some of these
characteristics in the following charts.
226
60

50
40
30
55.5%
20
36.6%
10
Male Female
Sex
Figure VIII-19. Participation in Parent Association Meetings by Sex
Not surprisingly, we found that women were significantly more likely to participate in
parent association meetings than men, by a margin of 18.9% (Figure VIII-19). Some might be
impressed that as many as 36.6% of males attend such meetings, given perceptions of the role of
males in Guyanese families. From a gender equality perspective, it would be useful to examine
the levels over time of male participation.
227
……
80

60
40
66.8%
57.3%
20 44.0%
27.1% 30.2%
16.5%
0
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66+
Age
Figure VIII-20. Participation in Parent Association Meetings by Age and Marital Status
The age breakdown for attendance at parent association meetings shows a harmonic rise
and fall in attendance, with levels rising as one grows older to a peak of 66.8% for those aged 36-
45 and then subsequently tapering off. Attendance by the over 45 age ranges may be indicative
of the parenting function assumed by grandparents in the Guyana context.
Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvement

Throughout the Americas, citizens participate actively in community improvement
associations and organizations. In the 2009 survey we asked the following two questions:
Once a Once or twice a Once or twice Never DK/DR

week month a year
CP8. And meetings of a
committee or association for
community improvement? Do (1) (2) (3) (4) (8)
you attend them…
[Go to [Go to
CP9] CP9]
228
All of Mostly of About Mostly All of a DK/DR N/A

the the half the of a different (9)
CP8A. In general, would same same same different race
you say that the people race race as race race than
who attend those meetings as yours as than yours
with you are [read each yours yours yours
option]…
(4) (5)
(2) (3)
(1) (8)
40
Meetings for Community Improvements
30
20
35.1%
25.3%
10
2006 2009
Year
Figure VIII-21. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community

Improvements by Year
Figure VIII-21 compares participation in meetings of a committee for community

improvements in 2006 and 2009. The data shows that there has been a decline in 2009 of almost
10%. The decline is consistent with other declines in civic participation noted between 2006 and
2009. We strongly suspect that one explanation is that there may have been a heightened focus
on community improvements in 2006 as a result of the national elections that were held in
August of that year, some months prior to the survey. More likely, however, given the other data
generated in 2009, is that the state of disrepair of local governments has generally discouraged
the participation of citizens in community affairs. Other community organizations, such as
Community Development Committees and NGOs, may also not be gaining the confidence of
citizens enough to inspire participation.
229
……
Thus, while a higher number of Guyanese help solve problems in their communities
(37.8%, Figure VIII-22) they appear to perform this service without formalising the engagement
through meetings, as shown in the next chart. Perhaps much of the problem solving is also being
done at an individual level.
Canada 50.0%
Bolivia 46.6%
Haiti 41.2%
Guatemala 39.6%
Venezuela 38.3%
Peru 36.8%
Jamaica 32.8%
Paraguay 30.8%
Mexico 27.6%
El Salvador 26.8%
Ecuador 26.6%
Honduras 26.3%
Nicaragua 26.2%
United States 25.8%
Guyana 25.3%
Costa Rica 23.8%
Belize 22.9%
Chile 22.7%
Colombia 22.2%
Panama 21.1%
Brazil 19.9%
Argentina 17.3%
Uruguay 13.3%
0 10 20 30 40 50
Participation in Meetings of a
Committee for Community Improvements
Figure VIII-22. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for

Community Improvements in Comparative Perspective
A comparative perspective of participation in meetings of a committee for community

improvements, Figure VIII-22, shows the highest level of participation is found in Canada (50%)
while the lowest level occurs in Uruguay (13.3%). Guyana is located just eight places above
Uruguay. There is a noticeably consistent and gradual decrease in participation levels across the
top nine countries, who are followed by a clustering of seven countries ranging in levels from
27.6% (Mexico) to 25.3% (Guyana). Thereafter the participation levels trend downwards, ending
with Uruguay.
230
80
Percentage Who Participated in Meetings

for Community Improvements 60
40
55.6%
20
32.2% 33.3%
26.5%
19.1% 20.1% 20.1%

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure VIII-23. Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community

Improvements by Region
Consistent with other forms of participation, the highest participation levels (55.6%) in
meetings of committees for community improvements are found in the hinterland regions
(Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9), after which participation levels decrease dramatically. The hinterland
communities are generally considered to be more cohesive and community-based in their
approach to community issues. They also have the highest number of children and thus benefit
more from the increased benefits seen earlier in parent association participation levels. That the
hinterland registers such a dramatically higher level of participation in meetings of committees
for community improvement than the rest of the country strongly suggests that these committees
benefit from a higher degree of legitimacy and public confidence. We have already seen
(Chapter IV), that Amerindians and hinterland regions exhibit the highest levels of trust in local
governments, suggesting that the structures for participation in community development bodies
are generating relatively high levels of legitimacy and public confidence.
The region recording the lowest participation level is region 5 (19.1%), with regions 4 and
3 (20.1% each) at the low end of Figure VIII-23 above. That the majority of the population
resides in these three regions suggests that either opportunities for participation or confidence in
existing mechanisms is lacking. Suffice it to say that significant room for increased participation
in the area of community improvement exists, representing a development opportunity through
the use of a currently under-utilized resource – the People.
231
……
All of a different
race than yours
5.1% All of the same
race as yours
16.5%
Mostly of a different
race than yours
23.4%
Mostly of the same

race as yours
31.6%
About half the same

race as yours
23.4%

Figure VIII-24. Race of Other Participants at Committee for Community

Improvement Meetings
For community improvement meetings, Figure VIII-24 displays the ethnicity of those
who attended such meetings, from the perspective of the respondent. About half of the other
attendees at Community Improvement Meetings are of the same race for 23.4% of the
respondents. In 48.1% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race
as the respondent while in 28.5% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a
different race. Thus, while there is some ethnic mixing occurring in community improvement
meetings, 76.6% of the attendees were either all or mostly of one race. This likely reflects the
racial consolidation that occurred at the village levels during the early 1960s.
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvement
We now turn to a systematic analysis of the factors that determine participation in

community development organizations.
232
Interpersonal Trust
Education
Female
Age F=5.051
Wealth N =2377
Number of Children
Small City
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Figure VIII-25. Predictors of Participation in Committee for Community
Improvement Meetings
Among the characteristics of persons that attend the committee meetings for community
participation (Figure VIII-25), females are much less active than males. The positive predictors
of participation are education, being married or in a common law relationship, as opposed to
being single, residing in region 10, regions 1,7,8,9 and self-identifying as Amerindian. It has
already been noted that the hinterland areas, where Amerindians are concentrated, exhibit a
dramatically higher level of civic participation in Guyana as a result of more cohesive community
structures and relations. A more detailed discussion on the other predictors occurs around the
following Figure.
233
……
40 40
Community Improvements
of a Committee for
of a Committee for
30 30
20 20
26.0% 29.1% 29.0%

24.2% 21.6%
10 10
0 0
Primary Secondary Higher Male Female
Education Level Sex
80 40
of a Committee for
60 30
of a Committee for
20
40
30.0%
55.4%
20
10 19.9%
21.6% 22.0% 22.9%
0
0
Single, Divorced, Married
Indian Mixed Black Amerindian Widowed Common Law
Ethnic self-identification Marital Status

Figure VIII-26. Participation in Committee for Community Improvement

Meetings by Education Level, Sex and Marital Status
Figure VIII-26 examines four key predictors in assessing participation in community

development committees. Education contributes positively to levels of participation, with
persons possessing higher education demonstrating the highest levels of participation (29.1%).
Gender plays a significant role as well, with males participating at significantly higher levels than
females (29% vs 21.6%). This likely reflects the social and cultural norms that males are more
involved outside the home and particularly in infrastructural-type works, such as are likely to be
the subject of community improvement efforts. But it may also reflect “machismo” norms that
limit women to “the kitchen” and the school, but not the “important” activities at the community
level. Ethnicity, as discussed earlier, sees Amerindians being far and away the most active
participants in community improvement meetings, with a participation percentage of 55.4.
Interestingly, the other major ethnic groupings (Indian, Mixed and Black) are all at about the
same low level, approximating to 22%. Finally, Marital Status identified as persons in a
marriage or common-law relationship are much more likely to be involved in community
improvement meetings than those who are single, divorced or widowed (30% vs. 19.9%).
We included a catch-all question on participating in several types of associations that

depend on one’s profession. The item read as follows, along with its follow-up question on
diversity.
234
Once a Once or twice a Once or twice Never DK/DR

week month a year
CP9. And meetings of an
association of professionals,
traders or farmers? Do you (1) (2) (3) (4) (8)
attend them…
[Go to [Go to
CP10] CP10]

the the same half the of a different (9)
CP9A. In general, would you say same race as same different race
that the people who attend those race yours race race than
meetings with you are [read as as than yours
each option]… yours yours yours
(4) (5)
(2)
(3)
(1) (8)
25
Association of Professionals
20
in Meetings of an
15
10 20.0%
15.9%
5
2006 2009
Year
Figure VIII-27. Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations by Year
Meetings of professional associations also saw a drop in participation over the 2006-2009
period, with levels of participation falling from 20% to 15.9% (Figure VIII-27). This decline
corresponds with reductions in all other spheres of civic participation assessed thus far in this
analysis. The comparative data show that even with these reduced levels, Guyana scores
relatively well.
235
……
Canada 42.7%
Haiti 25.1%
United States 23.6%
Bolivia 23.2%
Peru 22.0%
Guyana 15.9%
Belize 15.1%
Nicaragua 14.7%
Guatemala 13.8%
Ecuador 13.1%
Argentina 13.0%
Jamaica 12.9%
Mexico 12.6%
Colombia 12.3%
Honduras 12.1%
Brazil 11.9%
Uruguay 10.6%
Costa Rica 10.1%
Paraguay 9.8%
El Salvador 9.7%
Venezuela 9.1%
Panama 8.5%
Chile 7.7%
0 10 20 30 40 50
of an Association of Professionals
Figure VIII-28. Participation in Meetings of Professional

Associations in Comparative Perspective
On the face of it, a level of 15.9% participation level seems to be a low and unsatisfactory
performance. However, when compared with other countries within the LAPOP survey, Guyana
actually compares well at #6 (Figure VIII-28). Canada is far and away the best performer in this
category, at 42.7%, while a cluster of four countries follow at some distance with levels ranging
from 25.1% to 22%.
236
40

Association of Professionals
in Meetings of an 30
20
31.0%
25.7%
23.4%
10 20.0%
11.7% 14.4%
12.7%

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure VIII-29. Participation in Meetings of Associations of Professionals by Region
The picture that arises when one examines the participation of professionals in
associations is similar to that established with other forms of civic participation: hinterland
communities lead the way (31%), while the majority who live on the coast lag significantly
behind (Figure VIII-29). Regions 4, 6 and 3 demonstrate levels of participation of only 11.7,
12.7 and 14.4% respectively. Interestingly, the more rural regions are noticeably better in
comparison. Professionals in regions 10, 5 and 2 engage each other at levels of 20, 23.4 and
25.7% respectively.
237
……
All of a different
race than yours
5.2% All of the same
race as yours
14.1%
race than yours
21.1%
Mostly of the same

race as yours
29.3%
About half the same

race as yours
30.3%

Figure VIII-30. Race of Other Participants at Professional Association Meetings
For professional association meetings, respondents were asked to describe the ethnic
makeup of attendees. About half of the other attendees at professional association meetings were
of the same race for 30.3% of the respondents. In 43.4% of the cases, the other attendees were
either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 26.3% of the cases, the other
attendees were either all or mostly of a different race.
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations
We next explore the characteristics of those who participate in professional associations.
238
Interpersonal Trust
Education
Female
Age
Wealth
Small City
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5 F=7.135
Region 6 N =2379
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Figure VIII-31. Predictors of Participation in Professional Association Meetings
The linear regression chart Figure VIII-31 identifies the predictors of participation in
professional association meetings as education, female, age, and regions 2 and 10. Of these, all
exercise a positive influence on levels of participation with the exception of female, which will
be discussed further in the following paragraph.
239
……
25
30
20
20 15
25.9% 10 20.1%
10
16.3% 11.7%
14.0% 5
0 0
Primary Secondary Higher Male Female
Education Level Sex
Figure VIII-32. Participation in Professional Association Meetings by Education Level and

Sex
Figure VIII-32 shows sex and education level as these relate to participants at professional
association meetings. In terms of education, 25.9% of those who possess higher education attend
meetings of professional associations as compared with those with primary (16.3%) or secondary
(14%) education. With regard to gender, males are much more likely to participate in
professional associations than females (20.1% vs. 11.7%), suggesting that more needs to be done
to encourage female participation in professional associations.
Participation in Labour Union Meetings

The question we asked about labor union participation is as follows:
Once a week Once or twice a Once or twice Never DK/DR

month a year
CP10. And meetings of a
labour union? Do you attend (1)
them… (2) (3) (4) (8)
240
20
in Meetings of a Labour Union

Percentage Who participated
15
10
14.5%
5
5.5%
2006 2009
Year
Figure VIII-33. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union by Year
As indicated in Figure VIII-33 there has been a sharp decline in participation levels for
meetings of labour unions over the 2006-9 period. In 2006, 14.5% of respondents indicated that
they attended union meetings at least once per year. By 2009, the corresponding percentage had
declined to 5.5%. Again, civic participation levels in 2009 are consistently and significantly
down from their 2006 levels.
241
……
Bolivia 21.1%
Brazil 12.4%
Peru 11.1%
Belize 9.4%
Uruguay 9.1%
United States 8.0%
Mexico 7.7%
Haiti 7.5%
Chile 7.4%
Honduras 6.9%
Argentina 6.6%
Panama 6.6%
Jamaica 6.4%
Venezuela 6.2%
Ecuador 6.2%
Guyana 5.5%
Nicaragua 4.3%
Paraguay 4.1%
Costa Rica 3.7%
Guatemala 3.7%
Colombia 3.4%
El Salvador 1.7%
0 5 10 15 20 25
of a Labour Union
Figure VIII-34. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union in

comparative perspective
As shown in Figure VIII-34 Guyana is ranked seventh from the bottom, with 5.5%, of the
LAPOP survey countries. The highest level of participation in labour union meetings is found in
Bolivia, with 21.1%, after which levels drop of dramatically: the second highest level of
participation is 12.4% (Brazil) followed by Peru (11.1%). All other countries in the
AmericasBarometer survey are in single digits. Guyana’s two sister English-speaking countries
in the survey, Jamaica and Belize, also demonstrate low levels of participation – 6.4 and 9.4%
respectively.
242
15

Meetings of a Labour Union 10
7.2% 9.2%
5.0% 5.4%
4.5% 5.2%
2.0%
0
Regions Region 4 Region 5 Region 10 Region 2 Region 6 Region 3

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure VIII-35. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union by Region
In a deviation from the picture thus far across regions in Guyana, as shown by figure
VIII-35, the highest participation is in region 3 with 9.2% while the lowest level was recorded in
the hinterland regions, at 2%. This latter observation reflects the relative absence of labour
unions in hinterland regions, while the relatively higher levels in Regions 3 and 6 may be
attributed to sugar workers and the agricultural workers unions.
Determinants of Participation in Labor Union Meetings
We next examine the factors that relate to levels of participation in labour union meetings.
243
……
Interpersonal Trust
Education F=2.751
Female N =2382
Age
Wealth
Employed
Small City
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Figure VIII-36. Predictors of Participation in Labour Union Meetings
The regression model in Figure VIII-36 above shows those characteristics that impact
labour union participation in Guyana as being female, employed, living in a rural area and self-
identified as Black. While females tend to participate less in labour union meetings, persons who
are employed, resident in a rural area and self-identify as Black are inclined to participate more.
244
10 10
of a Labour Union 8 8
of a Labour Union
6 6
4 8.1% 4
6.5% 6.4%
2 2
2.9%
2.4%
0 0
Male Female National Capital Small City Rural Area

Sex Size of city/town
Figure VIII-37. Participation in Labour Union Meetings by Sex, Employment Status and Size of
City or Town
Figure VIII-37 explores sex and size of town as characteristics of participation in labour
union meetings. In terms of gender, males participate in labour unions meetings at a level of
8.1% while females account for only a 2.9% participation level. In terms of size of city/town,
participation is greater in small cities and rural areas at levels of 6.5 and 6.4% respectively. The
national capital is well below these levels, at 2.4%. The geographic disparities will be of
particular interest to individual unions, since it speaks to their appeal, and indicates – in tandem
with earlier findings in this report – some of the challenges unions must address if participation
levels in their meetings are to increase.
Participation in Meetings of Political Parties

The final civil society organization included in the AmericasBarometer is participation in
meetings of political parties. The questions we asked are as follows:

CP13. Meetings of a political month a year
party or political movement? (1) (2) (3) (4) (8)
Do you attend them… [Go to [Go to
CP20] CP20]
245
……
All of Mostly of About Mostly All of a DK/D N/A

the the same half the of a differen R (9)
CP13A. In general, would you same race as same differen t race
say that the people who attend race yours race t race than
those meetings with you are as as than yours
[read each option]… yours yours yours
(2) (4) (5)
(3)
(1) (8)
25
Meetings of a Political Party
20
15
10
21.6%
16.4%
5
2006 2009
Year
Figure VIII-38. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party by Year
While there has been a decrease in the participation levels at meetings of political parties
in 2009 (16.4%), when compared with 2006 (21.6%), this is readily explained by 2006 being an
election year. The following sections describe in greater detail the 2009 findings.
246
Belize 24.4%
Jamaica 23.8%
United States 22.2%
Paraguay 20.0%
Canada 19.7%
Honduras 19.4%
Nicaragua 19.4%
Colombia 19.1%
Haiti 18.8%
Guyana 16.4%
Argentina 14.7%
Panama 13.9%
Mexico 13.1%
El Salvador 13.0%
Guatemala 12.3%
Venezuela 12.1%
Uruguay 11.7%
Peru 11.2%
Brazil 10.4%
Costa Rica 10.3%
Bolivia 8.3%
Ecuador 7.1%
Chile 2.8%
0 10 20 30 40
of a Political Party
Figure VIII-39. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party in

When compared to other LAPOP survey countries, as in Figure VIII-39 above, Guyana
falls in the mid-range in terms of participation in political party meetings. Citizens of the
Dominican Republic exhibit the highest level of political party participation, at 35.2%.
Interestingly, the DR is followed in the ranking, at some distance, by Guyana’s two sister
English-speaking Caribbean countries, Belize and Jamaica, with 24.4 and 23.8% respectively.
Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile trail the other countries with participation levels in single-digits, with
Chile being the lowest at 2.8%.
247
……
30

Meetings of a Political Party
25
20
15
22.7% 23.1%
10 20.1%
18.7%
11.7% 13.1%
5 10.3%

1,7,8,9
Region

Figure VIII-40. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party by Region
Figure VIII-40 shows the participation levels in political meetings across the ten regions
of Guyana. Regions 2, 3 and 6, traditional PPP/C strongholds, demonstrate the highest levels of
participation in political party meetings with 23.1, 22.7 and 20.1% respectively. In contrast, and
further to the suggestion made in relation to Figure VIII-38 above, traditional PNCR strongholds
occupy the lower end of the comparison with region 10 showing the lowest levels of participation
– 10.3%. The hinterland regions fall exactly in the middle of the ranking at a level of 18.7%.
248
All of a different
race than yours All of the same
4.3% race as yours
10.8%
race than yours
20.0%
Mostly of the same

race as yours
37.4%
About half the same

race as yours
27.5%

Figure VIII-41. Race of Other Participants at Meetings of a Political Party
For political party meetings, respondents were asked to describe the ethnic makeup of
attendees (Figure VIII-41). About half of the other attendees at political party meetings were of
the same race for 27.5% of the respondents. In 48.2% of the cases, the other attendees were
either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 24.3% of the cases, the other
attendees were either all or mostly of a different race. As with community meetings, the majority
of respondents (72.7%) reported attending political party meetings at which the attendees were all
or mostly of one race.
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Political Parties
The characteristics of those who are more likely to participate in political party meetings
are shown in the following chart.
249
……
Political Interest
Interpersonal Trust
Education
Female F=6.695
N =2389
Age
Wealth
Small City
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0

Figure VIII-42. Predictors of Participation in Political Party Meetings
Figure VIII-42 shows that political interest, living in a small city (municipalities other
than Georgetown), living in a rural area, and self-identifying as Amerindian or Black are factors
that significantly and positively influence participation at political meetings in Guyana. Region
10 is the only significant predictor that has a negative relationship with participation.
250
50
in Meetings of a Political Party

40
30
20
35.6%
26.6%
10
17.4%
9.1%
0
None Little Some A lot
Political Interest
Figure VIII-43. Participation in Political Party Meetings by Political Interest
Figure VIII-43 looks at political interest as a characteristic of participation at political

party meetings. Not surprisingly, the data show that political interest is a strong positive predictor
of participation in political meetings. 35.6% of the respondents who were interested in politics “a
lot” attended political party meetings while 26.5% of those who had little or no interest in politics
attended meetings of political parties.
251
……
25
in Meetings of a Political Party

20
15
10
18.8%
16.5%
5
9.1%
0
National Capital Small City Rural Area

(Metropolitan area)
Size of city/town
Figure VIII-44. Participation in Political Party Meetings by Size of City or Town
Figure VIII-44 shows that the national capital, a PNCR stronghold, witnessed the lowest
level of participation in meetings at 9.1%. By contrast, rural areas and small cities exercised a
positive influence on the overall participation levels, with 16.5 and 18.8% respectively of
respondents from those areas attending political party meetings.
Participation in Meetings of Women’s Groups

A question was asked only of women regarding their participation in women’s groups.
The items read as follows:

CP20. [Women only]
month a year
Associations or groups of
(1) (2) (3) (4) (8)
women or home makers. Do
[Go to [Go to
you attend them…
LS6] LS6]
252

the the same half the of a different (9)
CP20A. In general, would
same race as same differen race
you say that the people
race yours race t race than
who attend those
as as than yours
meetings with you are
yours yours yours
[read each option]…
(2) (4) (5)
(3) (8)
(1)
Haiti 25.5%
Guatemala 24.0%
Bolivia 22.8%
Jamaica 21.3%
Peru 21.3%
Guyana 18.6%
Belize 13.9%
Ecuador 13.8%
Mexico 13.6%
Paraguay 13.3%
Brazil 12.8%
Chile 11.9%
Nicaragua 11.8%
Honduras 10.6%
Costa Rica 10.3%
Venezuela 9.9%
Argentina 9.1%
Uruguay 9.0%
Panama 8.9%
El Salvador 7.6%
Colombia 7.2%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Participation in Meetings of
Associations or Groups of Women
Figure VIII-45. Participation in Meetings of Associations or

Groups of Women in Comparative Perspective
253
……
As shown in Figure VIII-45 above, Guyana ranked 6th with 18.6% among the LAPOP
countries, in terms of level of attendance at meetings of women’s groups. Here, women would
have attended such meetings at least once per year. Haiti is the regional leader with 25.5%
followed by Guatemala (24%). El Salvador and Colombia bring up the rear with 7.6 and 7.2%
respectively. The two other English-speaking Caribbean countries, Jamaica and Belize,
demonstrate levels of participation comparable to Guyana’s, at 21.3 and 13.9% respectively.
60
Percentage Who participated in
Meetings of Associations
50
or groups of Women
40
30
20
39.6%
10 21.2% 21.7%
15.3% 17.6% 21.4%
13.0%
0

1,7,8,9
Region
Figure VIII-46. Participation in Meetings of Associations or Groups of Women by Region
Figure VIII-46 returns us to the pattern that had existed before we assessed more sensitive
civic participation mechanisms, such as labour unions and political parties. When it comes to
participation in meetings of associations or groups of women, the hinterland regions (Regions 1,
7, 8 & 9) are well ahead of the rest of the country with a 39.6% participation rate. Regions 2, 3
and 6 follow the hinterland regions at some distance with levels approximating 22%. Regions 4,
5 and 10 bring up the rear with participation levels of 13, 15.3 and 17.6% respectively.
254
All of a different race All of the same

than yours race as yours
5.2% 15.3%
race than yours
27.4%
Mostly of the same

race as yours
30.0%
About half the same

race as yours
22.0%

Figure VIII-47. Race of Other Participants at Meetings of Associations or Groups of

Women
For meetings of women’s associations or groups, respondents were asked to describe the
ethnic makeup of attendees. About half of the other attendees at such meetings were of the same
race for 22% of the respondents, as can be seen in Figure VIII-47. In 45.3% of the cases, the
other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 32.7% of the
cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a different race. Thus, meetings of women’s
groups are attended by persons mostly or entirely of one race at a level of 78%.
Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Women’s Associations or Groups
The characteristics of those who are more likely to participate in women’s association or
group meetings are shown in the following figure:
255
……
Political Interest
Interpersonal Trust
Education
Age F=2.045
Wealth N =1185
Number of Children
Small City
Rural Area
Region 2
Region 3
Region 5
Region 6
Region 10
Regions 1,7,8,9
Mixed
Amerindian
Black
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
95% I.C. (Corregido por efecto de diseño)

Figure VIII-48. Predictors of Participation in Women’s Group or Association Meetings
Figure VIII-48 shows that of the predictors of higher levels of participation in meetings of
women’s groups or associations include: greater political interest, and living in region 6 and the
hinterland (regions 1, 7, 8 & 9).
256
50
Percentage Who Participeted

in Meetings of Associations
40
or groups of Women 30
20
36.9%
10 21.1% 21.8%
14.4%
0
None Little Some A lot
Political Interest
Figure VIII-49. Participation in Women’s Group or Association Meetings by Political

Interest
Women who indicated that their interest in politics as “a lot” have a very high degree of
participation in meetings of women’s groups and associations (36.9%). Given that such persons
also attend political party meetings to a high degree, it might be the case that a significant amount
of the work to organize women’s groups and associations is being done by or through political
parties. It also may be that women who have high political interest are “joiners,” and involve
themselves in these organizations.
Demand-Making, Protest and Civic Participation

The survey included a separate battery of items measuring activities beyond mere
participation in civic groups. These items measured a more direct and active type of
participation. The first item in this series is reproduced below:
In order to solve your problems have you ever Yes No DK/DR

requested help or cooperation from...?
CP2. A member of Parliament (1) (2) (8)
CP4A. A local authority (e.g., a mayor/ municipality or
(1) (2) (8)
town councillor/Neighbourhood Democratic Council)
CP4. Any ministry, public institution or state agency (1) (2) (8)
257
……
Demand-Making according to civic participation

In the survey all respondents were asked the above question with a view to identifying the
extent to which they had approached someone in authority for help in resolving problems.
Responses are grouped according to the type of civic organization for which the respondent had
indicated he/she had attended at least one meeting in the past year.
12 15
10
Requested Help or Cooperation from a Member of Parliament
8 10
6
10.0% 11.8%
4 7.7% 5
2
6.9%
0 0
Yes No Yes No
Religious Group Parents Association
25 20
20
15
15
10
10 19.8% 15.1%
5
5 8.1%
5.7%
0 0
Yes No Yes No
Community Improvements Association of Professionals
20
25
15 20
15
10
10
13.5%
5 18.7%
8.3% 5 8.7%
0 0
Yes No Yes No
Political Party Labour Union
Figure VIII-50. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by

Demand-making on Members of Parliament
Figure VIII-50 shows the percentage of the population that requested help and
cooperation from Members of Parliament (MPs), by level of participation in civic organizations.
The percentage of respondents who said they asked a Member of Parliament for help, of those
who participated in a particular civic organization, is higher for those who attended meetings of
that civic organization than for those who did not.
258
20 20
15 15
10
Requested Help or Cooperation from a Local Autority

10
17.9% 17.9%
12.6% 14.4%
5 5
0 0
Yes No Yes No
40
30
30 25
20
20 15
29.9% 26.6%
10
10 13.8%
11.1% 5
0 0
Yes No Yes No
40 30
25
30
20
20 15
29.6% 10 22.7%
10 15.4%
13.1% 5
0 0
Yes No Yes No

Demand-making on Local Authorities
Figure VIII-51 examines demand-making on local authorities. Again we see a strong

relationship between those who both make requests of local authorities and attend meetings of
religious groups. We find that 17.9% of those who participated in religious groups made a
demand on local authorities whereas only 12.6% of those who do not participate in such religious
organizations made a demand. Furthermore, participation in each of the other civic groups is also
positively correlated with demand-making.
259
……
20
Requested Help or Cooperation from any Ministry or State Agency

20
15 15
10 10
16.8% 17.8%
5 12.1% 5
12.6%
0 0
Yes No Yes No
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
24.8% 24.4%
10 10
5 11.8% 5 13.1%
0 0
Yes No Yes No
25 30
20 25
20
15
15
10 22.0% 23.4%
10
5
13.6% 14.5%
5
0 0
Yes No Yes No
Figure VIII-52. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Demand-

making on a Ministry or State Agency
The emerging picture for demand-making remains quite similar when one considers
requests for help made to a ministry or state agency (Figure VIII-52). Once again we find that
those who participate in civil society organizations are far more likely to make demands.
Protest activity according to civic participation

At times, citizens protest in favor or against a government action. We asked respondents
about their participation in such protests in the year prior to the survey.
260
PROT2. In the past year, did you participate in (1) (2) (3) (8) (9)
a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it Sometimes Almost Never DK N/A
sometimes, almost never or never? never
12 15
10
8 10
Participation in a Public Demonstraion or Protest
6
9.4% 10.0% 12.8%
4 5
2
6.9%
0 0
Yes No Yes No
20 20
15 15
10 10
16.3%
13.4%
5 5 8.9%
7.5%
0 0
Yes No Yes No
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 22.9% 10 22.5%
5 5 8.8%
7.0%
0 0
Yes No Yes No

Participation in Public Demonstration or Protest
The survey found that community improvement organisations, political parties and unions
were the only civic organisations with a significant impact on protest behavior (Figure VIII-53).
For example, only 7.5% of those who did not participate in community improvement
organizations participated in protests while 16.3% of those who did participate in such
organisations protested during the previous year. Participants in religious organizations with
9.4% had the lowest level of participation in a public demonstration or protest while those
participating in political parties had the highest (22.9%).
261
……
Conclusion
Interpersonal trust is a tangible indicator of the state of a democracy. Guyana
demonstrates a moderate level of interpersonal trust in comparison with other countries in the
survey, ranking 11th out of 23 countries surveyed. Despite the hypothesis that ethnic differences
in Guyana are a threat to interpersonal trust, the 2009 survey confirms that ethnicity is not a
significant determinant of interpersonal trust, with only Guyanese of mixed ethnicity
demonstrating slightly lower trust levels.
The involvement of citizens in pursuing issues of concern to them is a key objective in

Guyana’s Constitution. Guyana compares well with the other AmericasBarometer countries –
ranking 7th - when it comes to civic participation. Such participation, which is driven in
significant measure by the extent of interpersonal trust, is noticeably higher in the hinterland
regions of Guyana. For all forms of civic participation, with the exception of political parties and
trade unions, citizens from the hinterland participate at much higher levels than other citizens.
On the other hand, the most populous region - Region 4 – is ranked last or second-to-last for
participation levels when it comes to solving community problems, and participating in meetings
of religious groups, community improvement committees, professional associations, and labour
unions.
At the same time, however, participation levels across all forms of civic participation have
decreased since the previous survey in 2006. Some of these decreases have been quite dramatic,
from 14.5% to 5.5% for unions and from 81.4% to 62.2% for religious groups, for example. That
the 2006 survey occurred in an election year and close to the Christmas season may explain some
of the overall decreases but not why the decrease is across-the-board.
The extent of ethnic mixing in the various forms of civic associations was examined and
found generally to be of a low level. Generally, respondents indicated that regardless of the type
of association they participated in, their fellow-participants were either mostly or entirely of one
race at levels ranging between 69.7 and 78%.
When it comes to the more active forms of civic participation - demand-making and
protesting - the 2009 survey found that citizens were much more likely to participate if they were
members of a civic association, and particularly if they were a member of a political party, union
or community improvement committee. Religious groups, on the other hand, exercise the least
effect on the levels of demand-making and protest.
262
APPENDIX CHAPTER VIII.
Appendix VIII-1. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust

Interpersonal Trust
Black -0.035 (-1.34)
Mixed -0.056* (-2.10)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.081 (1.97)
Region 10 -0.056 (-1.21)
Region 6 -0.048 (-1.38)
Region 5 0.042 (1.24)
Region 3 -0.047 (-1.36)
Region 2 -0.007 (-0.21)
Rural Area 0.158* (3.26)
Small City 0.123* (2.20)
Wealth 0.059* (2.26)
Age 0.085* (3.52)
Female -0.045* (-2.33)
Crime Victimization -0.060* (-3.06)
Constant -0.005 (-0.17)
R-Squared = 0.041
* p<0.05
263
……
Appendix VIII-2. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group

Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group
Black -0.012 (-0.17)
Mixed -0.087 (-1.28)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.351* (3.86)
Region 10 0.262* (2.85)
Region 6 0.282* (3.98)
Region 5 0.194* (2.32)
Region 3 0.146* (2.16)
Region 2 0.240* (2.92)
Rural Area -0.223* (-2.66)
Small City -0.220 (-1.78)
Wealth 0.152* (2.31)
Age 0.171* (2.61)
Female 0.155* (3.20)
Constant 0.609* (11.15)
F = 4.10
* p<0.05
264
Appendix VIII-3. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations

Participation in Meetings of a Parent Associations
Black 0.146* (2.42)
Amerindian 0.183* (2.18)
Mixed 0.099 (1.55)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.096 (1.03)
Region 10 -0.104 (-1.61)
Region 6 0.014 (0.31)
Region 5 0.007 (0.11)
Region 3 -0.010 (-0.20)
Region 2 -0.169* (-3.38)
Rural Area 0.059 (0.70)
Small City 0.041 (0.47)
Married or common law 0.508* (9.54)
Number of Children 0.437* (6.28)
Wealth -0.035 (-0.48)
Age -0.391* (-5.85)
Female 0.406* (7.91)
Interpersonal Trust -0.082 (-1.85)
Constant -0.132* (-2.72)
F = 11.86
* p<0.05
265
……
Appendix VIII-4. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community

Improvements
Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements
Black 0.102 (1.21)
Mixed 0.044 (0.56)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.254* (2.24)
Region 10 0.241* (2.03)
Region 6 0.100 (1.07)
Region 5 -0.115 (-1.36)
Region 3 -0.105 (-1.19)
Region 2 0.134 (1.49)
Rural Area 0.286 (1.69)
Small City 0.018 (0.11)
Married or common law 0.227* (3.82)
Number of Children -0.052 (-0.79)
Wealth 0.030 (0.47)
Age 0.096 (1.51)
Female -0.207* (-3.67)
Education 0.168* (2.23)
Constant -1.015* (-14.70)
F = 5.05
* p<0.05
266
Appendix VIII-5. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Professional Association

Participation in Meetings of a Professional Association
Black -0.117 (-1.38)
Mixed -0.130 (-1.48)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.270 (1.91)
Region 10 0.377* (2.62)
Region 6 0.026 (0.21)
Region 5 0.205 (1.90)
Region 3 -0.043 (-0.33)
Region 2 0.287* (2.29)
Rural Area 0.262 (1.50)
Small City -0.202 (-1.16)
Wealth 0.097 (1.08)
Age 0.122* (2.26)
Female -0.356* (-5.79)
Education 0.250* (3.65)
Constant -1.613* (-19.02)
F = 7.13
* p<0.05
Appendix VIII-6. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union

Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union
Black 0.243* (2.28)
Mixed 0.055 (0.56)
Regions 1,7,8,9 -0.186 (-0.96)
Region 10 -0.114 (-0.75)
Region 6 0.036 (0.32)
Region 5 -0.080 (-0.86)
Region 3 0.095 (0.77)
Region 2 -0.006 (-0.06)
Rural Area 0.541* (3.05)
Small City 0.388* (2.02)
Employed 0.604* (3.69)
Wealth 0.185 (1.76)
Age -0.166 (-1.72)
Female -0.355* (-2.85)
Constant -3.314* (-22.02)
F = 2.75
* p<0.05
267
……
Appendix VIII-7. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Political Party

Participation in Meetings of a Political Party
Black 0.191* (2.35)
Mixed -0.026 (-0.30)
Regions 1,7,8,9 -0.115 (-1.00)
Region 10 -0.287* (-2.67)
Region 6 -0.030 (-0.32)
Region 5 -0.173* (-2.05)
Region 3 0.080 (1.10)
Region 2 0.049 (0.56)
Rural Area 0.438* (3.64)
Small City 0.361* (2.74)
Wealth -0.066 (-0.90)
Age 0.103 (1.53)
Female 0.004 (0.06)
Education -0.082 (-1.13)
Political Interest 0.566* (8.81)
Constant -1.816* (-26.48)
F = 6.70
* p<0.05
268
Appendix VIII-8. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Political Party

Participation in Meetings of Associations or groups of Women
Black 0.178 (1.43)
Mixed 0.193 (1.60)
Regions 1,7,8,9 0.434* (3.27)
Region 10 0.187 (1.43)
Region 6 0.242* (2.44)
Region 5 0.113 (1.24)
Region 3 0.230 (1.79)
Region 2 0.205 (1.89)
Rural Area 0.141 (0.85)
Small City -0.051 (-0.29)
Wealth 0.103 (0.94)
Age 0.000 (0.00)
Political Interest 0.339* (3.56)
Constant -1.476* (-15.63)
F = 2.05
Num of Obs. = 1185
* p<0.05
269
……
Appendixes
Appendix I: The IRB “informed consent” document
Dear Sir/Madam:
You are being asked to participate in a public opinion study funded by Vanderbilt University. I
come on behalf of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to ask to participate in
this survey that will take 30 to 40 minutes to complete.
The goal of the study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of the
local and national situation.
This survey is completely voluntary. Your answers will be kept confidential. We will not ask for
your name and nobody will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any
questions unanswered, and you may stop the interviews at any time.
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Lawrence Lachmansingh whose phone
number is 226-8430.
We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.
Do you wish to participate?
271
……
Appendix II: The Questionnaire

Guyana 2009 v20 Version #18Q V10 IRB Approval: 060187
Political Culture of Democracy: Guyana, 2009

© Vanderbilt University 2009. All rights reserved.
Country: 1. Mexico 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6.
Costa Rica 7. Panama 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13.
Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. Dominican Republic COUNTRY 24
22. Haiti 23. Jamaica 24.Guyana 25. Trinidad 26. Belize 40. Canada 41. United
States
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office] IDNUM
ESTRATOPRI:
(2401) Region 2 (2404) Region 5 (2407)
Regions 1, 7,8,9 ESTRATOPRI
(2402) Region 3 (2405) Region 6
(2403) Region 4 (2406) Region 10
UPM_______________________ UPM
Regions:
(1) Region 1 (6) Region 6
PROV
MUNICIPALITY (Urban Areas):
(206) Anna Regina (619) New Amsterdam
(416) Georgetown (1002) Linden
MUNICIPALITY
(417) Suburbs of Georgetown (8888) Rural areas
(618) Rose Hall
(617) Corriverton
NDC (Rural Areas): ___________________ (8888)Urban Areas GUYNDC
273
……
SECTOR OR VILLAGES SEC

Enumeration
GUYSEGMENTO
districts_______________________________________________
[CLUSTER]:
CLUSTER
______________________________________________
UR (1) Urban (2) Rural UR
TAMANO: Size of City/Town
(1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3)
TAMANO
Medium City
(4) Small City (5) Rural Area
Questionnaire language: (1) English IDIOMAQ
Start time: _____:_____ ----------
Date Day: ____ Month:_______ Year: 2009 FECHA
NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT
BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.
Q1. Sex (note down; do not ask): (1) Male (2) Female Q1
LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you LS3
are...?
(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR
274
A4 [COA4]. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? A4
[DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]
Water, lack of 19 Inflation, high prices 02

Roads in poor condition 18 Politicians 59
Armed conflict 30 Bad government 15
Corruption 13 Environment 10
Credit, lack of 09 Migration 16
Delinquency, crime, violence 05 Drug trafficking 12
Human rights, violations of 56 Gangs 14
Unemployment 03 Poverty 04
Inequality 58 Popular protests (strikes, road 06
blocks, work stoppages, etc.)
Malnutrition 23 Health services, lack of 22
Forced displacement of persons 32 Kidnappings 31
External debt 26 Security (lack of) 27
Discrimination 25 Terrorism 33
Drug addiction 11 Land to farm, lack of 07
Economy, problems with, crisis of 01 Transportation, problems of 60
Education, lack of, poor quality 21 Violence 57
Electricity, lack of 24 Housing 55
Population explosion 20 Other 70
War against terrorism 17 Doesn’t know 88
SOCT1. How would you describe the economic situation of the country? Would
you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
SOCT1
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(8) Doesn’t know
SOCT2. Do you think that the current economic situation of the country is better
than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Better [Continue] (2) Same [go to IDIO1] (3) Worse SOCT2
[go to SOCT2B]
(8) Doesn’t know [Go to IDIO1]
SOCT2A. Would you say that the current economic situation of the country is
slightly better, somewhat better, or much better than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Slightly better (2) Somewhat better (3) Much better (8) Doesn’t know SOCT2A
(9) N/A (“Worse”, same or DK to SOCT2)
[After this question go to IDIO1]
SOCT2B. Would you say that the current economic situation of the country is
slightly worse, somewhat worse, or much worse than it was 12 months ago?
SOCT2B
(1) Slightly worse (2) Somewhat worse (3) Much worse (8) Doesn’t know
(9)N/A (“better” same or “DK” to SOCT2)
275
……
IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that
it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
IDIO1
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(8) Doesn’t know
IDIO2. How do you think that your current economic situation is compared to 12
months ago? Is it better, same, or worse
(1) Better [Continue] (2) Same [Go to CR1] (3) Worse [Go IDIO2
to IDIO2B]
(8) Doesn’t know [Go to CR1]
IDIO2A. Would you say that your current economic situation is slightly better,
somewhat better, or much better than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Slightly better (2) Somewhat better (3) Much better IDIO2A
(8) Doesn’t know (9) N/A (“worse”, same or DK to IDIO2)
[After this question go to CR1]
IDIO2B. Would you say that your current economic situation is slightly worse,
somewhat worse, or much worse than it was 12 months ago?
IDIO2B
(1) Slightly worse (2) Somewhat worse (3) Much worse
(8) Doesn’t know (9)N/A (“better” or DK to IDIO2)
Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks
that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please
tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have:
CR1. Independence or Respect for (1) (2) Respect for
(8) DK CR1
elders Independence elders
(2) Good
CR2. Curiosity or Good manners (1) Curiosity (8) DK CR2
manners
CR3. Obedience or Self-reliance (1) Obedience (2) Self-reliance (8) DK CR3
CR4. Being considerate or Well- (2) Well-
(1) Considerate (8) DK CR4
behaved Behaved
Now we have some questions about how you feel about different groups [Read Options].
GRIDEN1. How close do you Very close Close Somewha Not DK/DR
feel to other Guyanese people? (1) (2) t close close 8 GRIDEN1
(3) (4)
feel to Black people? (1) (2) t close close 8 GRIDEN2
(3) (4)
feel to Indian people? (1) (2) t close close 8 GRIDEN3
(3) (4)
feel to Mixed people? (1) (2) t close close 8 GRIDEN4
(3) (4)
276
feel to Amerindian people? (1) (2) t close close 8 GRIDEN5
(3) (4)
RSTEREO1. Thinking about Extremely Quite Not too Not DK/DR

racial groups in Guyana other well well well well at 8
than your own, would you say (1) (2) (3) all
that trustworthiness describes (4)
RSTEREO1
people in those groups
extremely well, quite well, not
too well, or not well at all?

that intelligent describes (4) RSTEREO2

that hardworking describes (4)
RSTEREO3
Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they
cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official
or agency.
In order to solve your problems have you ever Yes No DK/DR
requested help or cooperation from...?
CP2. A member of Parliament (1) (2) (8) CP2
CP4A. A local authority (e.g., a mayor/
municipality or town councillor/Neighbourhood (1) (2) (8) CP4A
Democratic Council)
CP4. Any ministry, public institution or state
(1) (2) (8) CP4
agency
Now let’s talk about your local government...
NP1. Have you attended a city/town/NDC council meeting or other meeting
convened by the mayor or NDC chairman in the past 12 months? NP1
277
……
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official
or councillor of the city/town/NDC within the past 12 months? NP2
SGL1. Would you say that the services the city/town/ NDC is providing are…? [Read
options]
SGL1
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor
(5) Very poor (8) Doesn’t know
LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should
be given more responsibilities? [Read options]
LGL2A
(3) The same amount to the central government and the city/town/ NDC
(4) Some more to the city/town/ NDC
(5) Much more to the city/town/ NDC
(8) DK/DA
LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country,
who should manage more money? [Read options]
(2) Some more the central government LGL2B
(3) The same amount the central government and the city/town/ NDC
(4) Some more the city/town/ NDC
(5) Much more the city/town/NDC
(8) DK/DA
Now, let’s talk about the allocation of responsibilities and resources to
Regional Democratic Councils (RDC)
LGL2C. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should
be given more responsibilities? [Read options]
LGL2C
(3) The same amount to the central government and the Regional Democratic
Council (RDC)
(4) Some more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(5) Much more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(8) DK/DA
LGL2D. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country,
who should manage more money? [Read options]
(3) The same amount the central government and the Regional Democratic Council LGL2D
(RDC)
(4) Some more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(5) Much more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
(8) DK/DA
278
CP5. Now, changing the Once a Once or Once or Never DK

subject…Over the last 12 months week twice a twice a
have you tried to help to solve a month year
problem in your community or in your
CP5
neighbourhood? (1) (2) (3) (4) (8)
Please, tell me if you did it at least
once a week, once or twice a month,
once or twice a year or never.
I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings
at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each
question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to
help the respondent]
Once a Once Once Never DK/DR

week or or
CP6. Meetings of any religious twice a twice a
organization? Do you attend month year CP6
them… (1) (4) (8)
(2) (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (8)

CP7. Meetings of a parents’
[Go [Go to
association at school? Do you CP7
to CP8]
attend them…
CP8]
All of Mostly About Mostly All of DK/D N/A

CP7A. In general, the of the half of a a R
would you say that the same same the differe differ
people who attend race race as same nt race ent (9)
those meetings with as yours race than race CP7A
you are [read each yours as yours than
option]… yours (4) yours
(2)
(1) (3) (5) (8)

CP8. And meetings of a week twice a twice a
committee or association month year
for community (1) (4) (8) CP8
improvement? Do you (2) (3) [Go [Go to
attend them… to CP9]
CP9]
279
……
All of Mostly About Mostly All of a DK/DR N/A

CP8A. In general, the of the half of a different (9)
would you say that the same same the different race
people who attend race race same race than
those meetings with as as race than yours CP8A
you are [read each yours yours as yours
option]… yours (4) (5)
(8)
(1) (2) (3)

CP9. And meetings of an week twice a twice a
association of month year
professionals, traders or (1) (4) (8) CP9
farmers? Do you attend (2) (3) [Go [Go to
them… to CP10]
CP10]
CP9A. In general, All of Mostly About Mostly All of a DK/DR N/A CP9A
would you say that the of the half of a different (9)
the people who same same the different race
race race as same race than
attend those
as yours race than yours
meetings with you yours as yours
are [read each yours (4) (5) (8)
option]… (2)
(1) (3)

week twice a twice a
CP10. And meetings of
month year
a labour union? Do you (1) (4) (8)
CP10
attend them… (2) (3)
Once a Once or Once or Never DK/D

week twice a twice a R
CP13. Meetings of a month year (4)
political party or (1) (2) (3) [Go (8)
CP13
political movement? Do to [Go
you attend them… CP20 to
] CP20
]
280
CP13A. In general, All of Mostly About Mostly All of a DK/DR N/A

race race same race than
attend those
as as race than yours CP13A
meetings with you yours yours as yours
are [read each yours (4) (5)
option]… (8)
(1) (2) (3)
Once a Once or Once or Never DK/D

CP20. [Women only] week twice a twice a R
Associations or groups month year (4)
of women or home (1) (2) (3) [Go (8) CP20
makers. Do you attend to [Go
them… LS6] to
LS6]
CP20A. In general, All of Mostly About Mostly All of a DK/DR N/A

race race same race than
attend those
as as race than yours CP20A
meetings with you yours yours as yours
are [read each yours (4) (5)
option]… (8)
(1) (2) (3)
[Use card #0]

LS6. Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten
at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible
life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.
On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this LS6
time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the
lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way
you feel?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88
Worst possible life Best DK

possible life
LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago? LS6A
281
……
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88
Worst possible life Best DK

possible life
[COLLECT CARD #0]
IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this
community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy
or untrustworthy...? [Read options] IT1
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4)
untrustworthy (8) DK/DR
IT1B. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you
can't be too careful in dealing with people?
(1) Most people can be trusted IT1B
(2) One can't be too careful in dealing with people
(8) DK/DR
SHOW CARD # 1
L1. (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from
left to right, where 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we
talk of those who sympathize more with the left and those who sympathize more with the right.
According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political
leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own
position.
L1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88
Left Right DK/DR
Collect Card # 1
PROT2. In the past year, did you (1) (2) (3) (8) (9)
participate in a public demonstration or Sometime N/A
Almost Never DK PROT2
protest? Did you do it sometimes, s never
almost never or never?
Now let’s change the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances a military take-over
would be justified. In your opinion would a military coup be justified in the following circumstances?
[Read the options after each question]:
(1) A military take- (2) A military (8)
JC1. When there is high
over would be take-over would DK JC1
unemployment.
justified not be justified
282

JC4. When there are a lot of social
protests.
JC10. When there is a lot of crime. over would be take-over would DK JC10
JC13. When there is a lot of
corruption.
‘
JC15. Do you think that sometimes
(2) No, there
there can be sufficient grounds for the (1) Yes, there can
can never be
President to shut down the Parliament be sufficient (8)DK JC15
sufficient
or do you think there can never be grounds
grounds
sufficient grounds to do so?
JC16. Do you think that sometimes
there can be sufficient grounds for the (2) No, there
(1) Yes, there can
President to dissolve the Supreme can never be
be sufficient (8)DK JC16
Court (High Court) or do you think that sufficient
grounds
there can never be sufficient grounds grounds
to do so?
VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in
the past 12 months? VIC1
(1) Yes (2) No [Skip to AOJ8] (8) DK/DR [Skip to AOJ8]
VIC2. What kind of crime were you the victim of? [Read the options]
(1) Robbery without physical aggression or threat (2) Robbery with
physical aggression or threat
(3) Physical aggression without robbery (4) Rape or sexual VIC2
assault
(5) Kidnapping (6) Damage to property (7) Home burglary
(8) Other (88) DK (99) N/A (was not a victim)
AOJ1. Did you report the crime to any institution?
(1) Yes [Skip to AOJ8] (2) Did not report [Continue]
AOJ1
(8) DK/DR [Skip to AOJ8] (9) N/A (not a victim) [Skip to
AOJ8]
283
……
AOJ1B. Why did you not report the crime? [Do not read options]
(1) Does not work
(2) It is dangerous and afraid of retaliation
(3) Did not have any proof
(4) It was not that serious
AOJ1B
(5) Did not know where to report
(7) Little confidence in the Police
(6) Other reason
(8) DK/DR
(9) N/A
AOJ8. In order to apprehend criminals do you think that the authorities should
always respect the law or that occasionally they can operate at the margin of
the law? AOJ8
(1) They should always respect the law
(2) Can operate at the margin of the law occasionally (8)DK/DR
AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and, thinking of the
possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe,
somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? AOJ11
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4)
Very unsafe (8) DK/DR
AOJ11A. And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think
that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future AOJ11A
well-being? [Read the options]
(1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR
AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you
have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read the options]
AOJ12
(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8)
DK/DR
AOJ12a. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you
have that the police would apprehend the guilty? [Read the options]
AOJ12a
(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None
(8) DK/DR
AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect
people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal
activity. What do you think?
(1) Police protect or AOJ18
(2) Police involved in crime
(3) [Don’t Read] Some of them protect and others are involved in crime
(8) DK/DR
[Give card "A" to the respondent]
284
Now we will use a card. This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1,
meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like
watching television, if you don’t like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in the
contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is
between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching
television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Not at all A lot Doesn’t know
Note down a number 1-7, or 8 for

those who don’t know
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Guyana guarantee a fair trial? (Read:
If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the B1
courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two).
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Guyana? B2
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the
B3
political system of Guyana?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of
Guyana? B4
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of
Guyana? B6
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system? B10A
B11. To what extent do you trust the Guyana Electionsl Commission (GECOM)? B11
B12. To what extent do you trust the Guyana Defence Force? B12
B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament? B13
B14. To what extent do you trust the National Government? B14
GUYB15. To what extent do you trust the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)? GUY
B15
B18. To what extent do you trust the Guyana Police Force? B18
B20. To what extent do you trust the Church? B20
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties? B21
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President? B21A
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court (High Court)? B31
B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor’s office of your city or town/ NDC
chairman’s office? B32
B33. To what extent do you trust the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)? B33
B43. To what extent are you proud of being a Guyanese? B43
B16. To what extent do you trust the Attorney General? B16
B46 [b45]. To what extent do you trust the Integrity Commission? B46
B47. To what extent do you trust elections? B47
B48. To what extent do you believe that free trade agreement will help to improve
the economy? B48
285
……
Now, using the same scale, (continue with card A: 1-7 point scale) Note down
1-7, 8 = DK
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A Lot
N1. To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty? N1
N3. To what extent would you say the current government promotes and protects N3
democratic principles?
N9. To what extent would you say the current government combats government N9
corruption?
N11. To what extent would you say the current government improves the security N11
of citizens?
N12. To what extent would you say the current government combats N12
unemployment?
[Take back card A]
M1. Speaking in general of the current government, how would you rate the job
performance of President Jagdeo? [Read the options]
M1
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad
(5) Very bad (8) DK/DR
M2. Now speaking of the Parliament. Thinking of those members of the
Parliament as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they
belong, do you believe that the Members of the Parliament are performing their
M2
jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?
(1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly
(5) Very poorly (8) DK/DR
[Give card B]: Now we will use a similar card, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7
means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score. I am
going to read various statements and I would like you to tell me to what extent you agree or
disagree with these statements.
Write a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don’t know
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Strongly disagree Doesn’t

Strongly agree know
Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me
how much you agree or disagree with the following statements, again using card
B:
POP101
POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit
the voice and vote of opposition parties, How much do you agree or disagree?
(8) DK/DR
286
POP102. When the Parliament obstructs the work of our government, our
presidents should govern without the Parliament. How much do you agree or
POP102
disagree?
(8) DK/DR
POP103. When the Supreme Court [High Court] obstructs the work of our
government, it should be ignored by our presidents. How much do you agree or
POP103
disagree?
(8) DK/DR
POP106. Our presidents must follow the will of the people because what the
people want is always right. How much do you agree or disagree? POP106
(8) DK/DR
POP107. The people should govern directly and not through elected
representatives. How much do you agree or disagree? POP107
(8) DK/DR
POP109. In today’s world there is a battle between good and evil, and people
must choose between one of the two. How much do you agree or disagree that
POP109
such a battle between good and evil exits?
(8) DK/DR
POP110. Once the people decide what is right, we must prevent a minority from
opposing them. How much do you agree or disagree? POP110
(8) DK/DR
POP112. The largest obstacle to progress in our country is the ruling class (or
oligarchy) taking advantage of the people. How much do you agree or disagree? POP112
(8) DK/DR
POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the interests
of the country. How much do you agree or disagree? POP113
(8) DK/DR
EFF1. Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like you
EFF1
think. How much do you agree or disagree?
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this
EFF2
country. How much do you agree or disagree?
[Don’t take back Card B]
Write a number 1-7, or 8 for

those who don’t know
ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of
ING4
government. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
PN2. Despite our differences, we Guyanese have many things that unite us as a
PN2
country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or
DEM23
disagree with this statement?
287
……
Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what
extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same scale
from 1 to 7.
ROS1. The government, instead of the private sector, should own the most
important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or ROS1
disagree with this statement?
ROS2. The government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible
for ensuring the well-being of the people. How much do you agree or disagree ROS2
with this statement?
ROS3. The government, more than the private sector, should be primarily
responsible for creating jobs. How much do you agree or disagree with this ROS3
statement?
ROS4. The government should implement strong policies to reduce inequality
between the rich and the poor. How much do you agree or disagree with this ROS4
statement?
ROS5. The government, more than the private sector should be primarily
responsible for retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree with ROS5
this statement?
ROS6. The government, more than the private sector should be primarily
responsible for health care. How much do you agree or disagree with this ROS6
statement?
[Take back Card "B"]
PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied
or very dissatisfied with the form of democracy in Guyana?
PN4
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied
(8) DK/DR
PN5. In your opinion, is Guyana very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very
democratic or not at all democratic?
PN5
(1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not
very democratic (4) Not at all democratic (8) DK/DR
[Give the respondent card "C"]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point scale, which goes from 1 to 10,
where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to
read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives.
Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88
Strongly disapprove Strongly Doesn’t

approve know
288
1-10, 88
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or
E5
disapprove?
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community
E8
problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How
E11
much do you approve or disapprove?
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads. Using the same scale, how
E15
much do you approve or disapprove?
E14. Of people squatting on private property or land. How much do you approve
E14
or disapprove?
E2. Of people taking control over factories, offices and other buildings as a form
E2
of protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected
E3
government. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does
E16
not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?
The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who
live in Guyana. Please continue using the 10 point scale [card C].
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88
Strongly disapprove Strongly approve Doesn’t

know
1-10, 88
D1. There are people who always say bad things of the Guyanese form of
government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly
D1
do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote? Please read me the
number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to
conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read D2
me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things of the Guyanese form of
government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being D3
permitted to run for public office?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on
D4
television to make speeches?
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do
you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public D5
office?
289
……
[COLLECT CARD “C”]
Now changing the subject…

DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree with the most:
(1) For most people it doesn’t matter whether a regime is democratic or non-
democratic.
(2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government DEM2
(3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable
to a democratic one.
(8) DK/DR
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government that rules with an
iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?
DEM11
(1) Iron fist (2) Participation for all (8) DK/DR
AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not
have to be elected. Others say that although things may not work, electoral
democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? [Read]
AUT1
(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected
(2) Electoral democracy is the best
(8) DK/DR
AUT2. With which of the following statements do you agree the most: [Read
choices]
(1) As citizens we should be more active in questioning our leaders or AUT2
(2) As citizens we should show more respect for the authority of our leaders
(8) DK/DR
PP1. During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a
party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a
party or candidate? [Read the options] PP1
(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (8)
DK/DR
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral
campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections
PP2
of 2006?
(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (8) DK/DR
290
Now, I would like for you to tell me if you consider the following actions as:
(1) Corrupt and should be punished; (2) Corrupt but justified under the circumstances; or (3) not
corrupt.
DC10. A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of
them. In order not to be wasting time waiting, she pays to an official of the
registrar’s office G$1000. Do you think that what the woman did is [Read the
DC10
options, and if answer “the municipal official has to be punished,” Ask:
and the mother?]: (1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but
justified (3) Not corrupt (8) DK
DC13. An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician,
and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think
that what the politician did is [Read the options] DC13
(1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justified
(3) Not corrupt (8) DK
N/A No Yes DK/DR

Did not
have
contact
Now we want to talk about your personal experience
with things that happen in everyday life...
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe
(0) (1) (8) EXC2
during the past year?
EXC6. During the past year did any government
(0) (1) (8) EXC6
employee ask you for a bribe?
EXC11. During the past year did you have any
official dealings in the municipality or NDC?
If it is Yes ask the following: (9) (0) (1) (8) EXC11
During the past year, to process any kind of
document (like a license, for example), did you have
to pay any money above that required by law?
EXC13. Are you currently employed?
If it is Yes ask the following: (9) (0) (1) (8) EXC13
At your workplace, have you had to pay a bribe in the
last year?
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any
dealings with the courts?
If the answer is No  note down 9
(9) (0) (1) (8) EXC14
Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the
past year?
291
……
N/A No Yes DK/DR

Did not
have
contact
EXC15. Have you used any public health services
during the past year?
(9) (0) (1) (8) EXC15
In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic
during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the
past year?
(9) (0) (1) (8) EXC16
Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the
past year?
EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid
(0) (1) (8) EXC17
having the electricity cut off?
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are,
(0) (1) (8) EXC18
sometimes paying a bribe is justified?
EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard,
corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2)
EXC7
Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon?
(8) DK/DR
COMUNETID. How would you describe most of the people here in the
community where you are living? Would you say that they are mainly white,
mixed, Amerindian, Black , Indian, Chinese, or Portuguese?
(1) White
(2) Mixed
(3) Amerindian COMUNETID
(4) Black or Afro-Guyanese
(5) Indo-Guyanese
(6) Chinese
(7) Other
(8) Portuguese (88) DK
COMCON1. How much of a problem do you think that racial differences are
for Guyana? Would you say that it is a serious problem, a moderate
COMCON1
problem, or not a problem at all?
(1) Serious (2) Moderate (3) Not at all (8) DK
COMCON2. How much of a problem do you think that racial differences are
for your community? Would you say that it is a serious problem, a moderate
COMCON2
problem, or not a problem at all?
(1) Serious (2) Moderate (3) Not at all. (8). DK
292
COMCON3. Would it bother you to live in a neighbourhood with people from

another racial group? COMCON3
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK.
COMCON4. Would you allow a child of yours to marry someone of another
racial group?
COMCON4
(1) Yes (2) No. ( 8) DK
COMCON5. Do you attend a church or other religious service in which
people from a racial group different from yours also attend?
(1) Yes (2) No. (8) DK (9) INAP [does not attend church or services]
Now changing the subject, have you ever felt discriminated or treated unfairly because of your
physical appearance or the way you talk in the following places:
DIS2. In government offices (courts, ministries, city halls, NDC offices)
DIS2
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR
DIS4. In social events or meetings
DIS4
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR
DIS5. In public places (such as on the street, market)
DIS5
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR
Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is
known by the people...
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States? [Don’t GI1
read, Barack Obama
(1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer
GI2. What is the name of the Speaker of the Parliament in Guyana? [Don’t
read, Hari Narayen (Ralph) Ramkarran] GI2
GI3. How many regions does Guyana have? [Don’t read, 10]
GI3
GI4. How long is the government’s term of office in Guyana? [Don’t read, 5 GI4
years]
GI5. What is the name of the current president of Brazil? [Don’t read, Luis GI5
Inacio Lula da Silva, also accept “Lula” or “Lui”] (1) Correct (2)
Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer
VB1. Did you register for the new voters list? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK VB1
VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections of 2006?
(1) Voted [Continue]
VB2
(2) Did not vote [Go to VB50]
(8) DK [Go to VB50]
293
……
VB3. Who did you vote for in the last general elections of 2006? [DON’T READ THE
LIST]
(0) None (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot)
(2401) Bharrat Jagdeo, People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/C)
(2402) Robert Corbin, People's National Congress /One Guyana (PNCR/1G)
(2403) Raphael Trotman, Alliance for Change (AFC)
VB3
(2404) Paul Hardy, Guyana Action Party/ Rise Organise And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR)
(2405) Manzoor Nadir, The United Force (TUF)
(2406) Chandra Narine Sharma, Justice For All Party (JFAP)
(77) Other
(88) DK/DR
(99) N/A (Did not vote)
VB50. [Ask to everyone] In general, men are better political leaders than women.
Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?
VB50
(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (8)
DK/DR
VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?
VB10
(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (8) DK [Go to POL1]
VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [Don’t read the list]
(2401)People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/C)
(2402) People's National Congress /One Guyana (PNCR/1G)
(2403) Alliance for Change (AFC)
(2404) Guyana Action Party/ Rise Organise And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR)
(2405) The United Force (TUF)
(2406) Justice For All Party (JFAP)
VB11
(2407) GNC
(2408) LD
(2409) PRP
(2410) National Democratic Font (NDF)
(77) Other
(88) DK/DR [Skip to POL1]
(99) NA [Skip to POL1]
VB12. Would you say that your identification with that party [the party mentioned in
VB11] is very weak, weak, not weak or strong, strong, very strong?
VB12
(1) Very weak (2) Weak (3) Not weak, or strong (4) Strong
(5) Very strong (8) DK/DR (9) N/A
POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
POL1
(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR
POL2. How often do you discuss politics with other people? [Read the options]
(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month POL2
(4) Rarely (5) Never (8) DK/DR
[Use card #2]
294
The following section contains pairs of words. On a scale of zero to ten, please 0-10,
tell us which word best describes you. For example, the number zero means 88
“relaxed” the number ten means “tense,” the number five that is exactly in the DK
middle means neither relaxed nor tense. On this scale, what number best
describes you? You can use any number from zero to ten.
PER1. Then, if 0 is relaxed and 10 is tense, what number best describes you? PER1
PER2. Next, 0 is outgoing, and 10 is shy, what number best describes you? PER2
PER3. Next, 0 is hard-working, and 10 is lazy, what number best describes
PER3
you?
PER4. Next, 0 is imaginative, and 10 is unimaginative, what number best
PER4
describes you?
PER5. Next, 0 is introverted, and 10 is extroverted, what number best
PER5
describes you?
PER6. Next, 0 is nervous, and 10 is calm, what number best describes you? PER6
PER7. Next, If 0 is sympathetic, and 10 unsympathetic, what number best
PER7
describes you?
PER8. Next, 0 is not an intellectual, and 10 is an intellectual, what number
PER8
best describes you?
PER9. Next, 0 is unkind, and 10 is kind, what number best describes you? PER9
PER10. Next, 0 is irresponsible, and 10 is responsible, what number best
PER10
describes you?
[Collect Card #2]
Now, I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes.

ED. What was the highest level of education that you have reached?
______________(primary, secondary, “A” level, university/tertiary) What was the last grade/year
that you completed ___________________ = ________ total number of years [Use the table
below for the code]
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
None 0
Primary 1 2 3 4 5 6
Secondary/Vocational 7 8 9 10 11
ED
“A” level 12 13
University/Tertiary 12 13 14 15 16 17 18+
Doesn’t know/Doesn’t respond 88
295
……
ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mixed, Amerindian, Black, Indian, Chinese,
or Portuguese?
(1) White
(2) Mixed
(3) Amerindian
(4) Black or Afro-Guyanese ETID
(5) Indo-Guyanese
(6) Chinese
(7) Other
(8) Portuguese
(88) DK
LINK1. Do you think what happens (1)Yes (2)No[Go (8)DK/DR LINK1

generally to the (Race of Respondent [Continue] to q2] [Go to q2]
based on respondent self-report in
ETID) in this country will have something
to do with what happens in your life?
LINK2. Will it affect you a lot, some, (1) (2) (3) (8) 9 LINK2
or not very much? A lot Some Not DK/DR N/A
very
much
Q2. How old are you? __________ years Q2
GUYQ3. What is your religion/denomination? [Do not read options]

(1) Anglican
(2) Methodist
(3) Pentecostal
(4) Roman Catholic
(5) Jehovah Witness
(6) Seventh Day Adventist
(7) Bahai Q3
(10) Muslim
(11) Hindu
(12) Rastafarian
(13) Other Christians
(14) None
(15) Other religions
(88) DK/DR
296
Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? [Read options]

(1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once a month Q5A
(4) Once or twice a year (5) Never (8) DK/DR
[Show the list of ranges on Card D ]
Q10. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income
of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all
the working adults and children?
(00) No income
((01) Less than 10,000
(02) 10,001- 20,000
(03) 20,001-40,000
(04) 40,001-60,000 Q10
(05) 60,001-90,000
(06) 90,001-120,000
(07) 120,001-150,000
(08) 150,001-200,000
(09) 200,001-250,000
(10) Above 250,000
(88) DK/DR
[COLLECT CARD D]
Q10A. Does your family receive remittances from abroad?
Q10A
(1) Yes (2) No [Go to Q10C] (8) DK/NA [Go to Q10C]
Q10A1. [Only for those who receive remittances] How do you generally use
the remittances from abroad? [Don’t Read]
(1) Consumption (food, clothing)
(2) Housing (construction, repair)
(3) Education
(4) Community (schools repairs, reconstruction of churches/temples,
Q10A1
community parties)
(5) Health care
(6) Savings/Investment
(7) Other
(8) DK/DR
(9) N/A
Q10B. [Only for those who receive remittances] To what extent does the
income of this household depend on remittances from abroad? [Read
Q10B
Options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little
(4) Nothing (8) DK/NA (9) N/A
297
……
Q10C. [Ask to everybody] Do you have close relatives who use to live in this
household and are now living abroad? [If answer “Yes”, Ask where]
[Don’t Read]
(1) Yes, in the United States only
Q10C
(2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries
(3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States)
(4) No [Skip to Q14]
(8) DK/NA [Skip to Q14]
Q16. [Only for those who answered Yes to Q10C] How often do you
communicate with them? [Read options]
(1) Every day
(2) Once or twice a week
(3) Once or twice a month Q16
(4) Rarely
(5) Never
(8) DK/DR
(9) N/A
Q14. [Ask to everyone] Do you have any intention of going to live or work in
another country in the next three years? Q14
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR
Q10D. [Ask to everyone] The salary that you receive and total family income
: [ Read the options]
(1) Is good enough for you, you can save from it
(2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems Q10D
(3) Is not enough for you, you are stretched
(4) Is not enough for you, you are having a hard time
(8) [Don’t read] DK/DR
Q 10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [Read
options]
) (1) Increased? [Go to Q11] Q10E
(2) Remained the same? [Go to Q11]
Decreased? [Go to Q10F] (8) DK/DR[Go to Q11]
Q10F. What was the main reason why the income of your household
decreased in the past two years? [Do not read options]
(1) Reduction in hours of work
(2) A member of the household lost his or her job
(3) Reduction in sales/Business not good
(4) A family business went into bankruptcy Q10F
(5) Remittances from abroad decreased or stopped
(6) A member of the household who received income was sick or died
(7) Natural disaster /lost of crop
(8)Other
298
(88) Doesn’t know

(99) N/A ( “increased”, “remained the same” or DK in 10E)
Q11. What is your marital status? [Don’t read options]
(1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law (4) Divorced Q11
(5) Separated (6) Widowed (8) DK/DR
Q12. How many children do you have? _________ (00 = none  Skip to LENG1)
Q12
(88) DK
Q12A. [If has children] How many children live with you at the present time?
Q12A
_________ (00) = none, (99) N/A (doesn’t have children).
LENG1. What language have you spoken at home since childhood?

(2401) English
(2402) Indigenous or Amerindian language
LENG1
(2403) Chinese
(2405) Other foreign
(88) DK
WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read
options]
(1) Everyday or almost everyday
(2) At least once a week
WWW1
(3) At least once a month
(4) Rarely
(5) Never
(8) DK/DR [Don’t read]
We would like to ask your opinion regarding some incidents that could occur here in Guyana.
HC1. [ Only for those with Typeinf2 =1] In one incident, a Black man is stabbed by two Indian
men following an argument.
Suppose the two attackers plead guilty. Of the possible sentences that I will read to you, which do
you believe would be most appropriate to administer to the two attackers? [Read Options]
(1) The death penalty
(2) Life imprisonment
(3) 30 years
(4) 15 years
(5) 5 years
(6) No punishment [Do not read]
(8) DK/DR
299
……
HC1EXP. [Only for those with Typeinf2 =2] In one incident, an Indian man is stabbed by two
Black men following an argument.
Suppose the two attackers plead guilty. Of the possible sentences that I will read to you, which do
you believe would be most appropriate to administer to the two attackers? [Read Options]
(1) The death penalty
(2) Life imprisonment
(3) 30 years
(4) 15 years
(5) 5 years
(6) No punishment [Do not read]
(8) DK/DR
HC2. Now suppose that the attackers are set free since there was not enough evidence to
prosecute or convict them. In this case, to what extent would you approve or disapprove of
people taking the law into their own hands and punishing in the attackers? Would you say that
you.... [Read options]
(1) Approve (2) Somewhat approve (3) Somewhat disapprove
(4) Disapprove (8) DK/DR
TREATMENTB.
PV1. [ Only for those with Typeinf3 =1] In another incident, a Black man is fatally shot by the
police. The police allege that he opened fire when presented with a warrant to search his house.
Witnesses in his neighbourhood claim he was shot dead while posing no threat.
Who are you more likely to believe in this case – the police, who claim the man opened fire, or the
neighbourhood witnesses, who claim the man posed no threat?” [Do not Read Options]
(1) Police
(2) Neighbourhood Witnesses
(3) Neither
(88) DK/DR
PV1EXP. [ Only for those with Typeinf3 =1] In another incident, an Indian man is fatally shot by
the police. The police allege that he opened fire when presented with a warrant to search his
house. Witnesses in his neighbourhood claim he was shot dead while posing no threat.
Who are you more likely to believe in this case – the police, who claim the man opened fire, or the
neighbourhood witnesses, who claim the man posed no threat?” [Do not Read Options]
(1) Police
(2) Neighbourhood Witnesses
(3) Neither
(88) DK/DR
PV2. Suppose some citizens plan to organize a public demonstration in front of the police station.
To what extent would you approve or disapprove of such a protest over this issue? [Read Options]

300
PV3. Suppose some citizens do organize a public demonstration in front of the police station. If
asked, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this issue? [Read
Options]
(1) Not at all likely [skip to PV5] (2) Somewhat likely (3) Likely
(4) Very likely (8) DK/DR [skip to PV5]
PV4. Suppose there is a risk that some, but not all, participants in the demonstration could turn
violent. Knowing this, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this
issue? [Read Options]
(1) Not at all likely (2) Somewhat likely (3) Likely (4) Very likely
(8) DK/DR (9) N/A
PV5. [ Only for those with Typeinf4 =1] Now suppose a bipartisan panel comprised of equal
numbers of both PPP and PNC members conducted a thorough investigation of this incident. They
conclude that the police action was justified and call for the police to be freed. To what extent
would you support or oppose the prosecution of the police involved in this case? [Read Options]
(1) Strongly support
(2) Support
(3) Somewhat support
(4) Neither support nor oppose
(5) Somewhat oppose
(6) Oppose
(7) Strongly oppose
(8) DK/DR
PV5EXP. [ Only for those with Typeinf4 =2] Now suppose a bipartisan panel comprised of
equal numbers of both PPP and PNC members conducted a thorough investigation of this incident.
They conclude that the police action was not justified and call for the police to be prosecuted. To
what extent would you support or oppose the prosecution of the police involved in this case? [Read
Options]
(1) Strongly support
(2) Support
(3) Somewhat support
(4) Neither support nor oppose
(5) Somewhat oppose
(6) Oppose
(7) Strongly oppose
(8) DK/DR
301
……
TREATMENTD.
POLV1. [ Only for those with Typeinf5 =1] Now please consider a different incident. Suppose
that in the next election in a town that has in the past supported the PPP, a PNC candidate who has
made efforts to reach out to all citizens in the town wins. Some citizens claim that there were
electoral irregularities, while international observers report no irregularities.
To what extent would you believe the claims of irregularities? [Read Options]
(1) Strongly believe
(2) Believe
(3) Somewhat believe
(4) Not sure whether to believe or disbelieve
(5) Somewhat disbelieve
(6) Disbelieve
(7) Strongly disbelieve
(8) DK/DR
POLV1EXP. [ Only for those with Typeinf5 =1] Now please consider a different incident.
Suppose that in the next election in a town that has in the past supported the PNC, a PPP
candidate who has made efforts to reach out to all citizens in the town wins. Some citizens claim
that there were electoral irregularities, while international observers report no irregularities.
To what extent would you believe the claims of irregularities? [Read Options]
(1) Strongly believe
(2) Believe
(3) Somewhat believe
(4) Not sure whether to believe or disbelieve
(5) Somewhat disbelieve
(6) Disbelieve
(7) Strongly disbelieve
(8) DK/DR
POLV2. Suppose some citizens plan to organize a public demonstration to protest the election
outcome. To what extent would you approve or disapprove of a protest over this issue? [Read
Options]
POLV3. Suppose some citizens do organize a public demonstration to protest the election
outcome. If asked, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this issue?
[Read Options]
(1) Not at all likely [SKIP TO R1] (2) Somewhat likely (3) Likely (4) Very likely
(8) DK/DR [SKIP TO R1]
POLV4. Suppose there is a risk that some, but not all, participants in the demonstration could turn
violent. Knowing this, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this
issue? [Read Options]
(1) Not at all likely (2) Somewhat likely (3) Likely
(4) Very likely (8) DK/DR (9) N/A
302
We would now like to ask you about your interest in programs that could be carried out in Guyana
to increase tolerance and understanding between racial groups.
ACTION1. How interested would you be in attending an event at which speakers from different
racial groups talked about their experiences in Guyana?
(1) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (3) Not very interested
(4) Not interested (8) DK/DR
ACTION2. How interested would you be in attending such an event if it were hosted by a religious
organization?
ACTION3. How interested would you be in attending such an event if it were hosted jointly by both
the PPP and the PNC?
ACTION4. How interested would you be in attending such an event if it were hosted by a group
from your neighbourhood?
(1) Very interested
(2) Somewhat interested
(3) Not very interested
(4) Not interested
(8) DK/DR
To end, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: (read out all items]
R1. Television (0) No (1) Yes R1
R3. Refrigerator (0) No (1) Yes R3
R4. Conventional or landline (0) No (1) Yes
R4
telephone
R4A. Cellular telephone (0) No (1) Yes R4A
R5. Vehicle (0) No (1) One (2) Two (3) Three or more R5
R6. Washing machine (0) No (1) Yes R6
R7. Microwave oven (0) No (1) Yes R7
R8. Motorcycle (0) No (1) Yes R8
R12. Potable water Indoors (0) No (1) Yes R12
R14. Indoor bathroom (0) No (1) Yes R14
R15. Computer (0) No (1) Yes R15
R16. Flat panel TV (0) No (1) Yes R16
R17. Stereo (0) No (1) Yes R17
R18. High Speed Cable
(0) No (1) Yes R18
Internet
303
……
OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently…[ Read
the options]
(1) Working? [Continue]
(2) Not working, but have a job? [Continue]
(3) Actively looking for a job? [Go to MIG1]
OCUP4A
(4) A student? [Go to MIG1]
(5) Taking care of the home? [Go to MIG1]
(6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disable to work [Go to MIG1]
(7) Notworking and not looking for a job? [Go to MIG1]
(8) DK/DR
OCUP1. What is your main occupation or type of work? [Probe: what is
your job about? ] [Don’t read the options]
(1) Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor,
physician, engineer, architect, accountant, engineer, etc.)
(2) Manager
(3) Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school
teacher, artist, athlete, etc.)
(4) Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician,
etc.)
(5) Government official (member of government legislative, executive or
judicial branches, or other government employee)
(6) Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service
representative, etc.)
(7) Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.)
OCUP1 |__|__|
(8) Food vendor
(9) Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee,
taxi driver, etc.)
(10) Farmer
(11) Farmhand (works for others, does not own land)
(12) Artisan
(13) Domestic servant
(14) Servant
(15) Member of the armed forces or of the civil services (police, fire-
fighters, etc.)
(88) DK
(99) N/A
OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]
(1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-
owned enterprise?
OCUP1A
(2) A salaried employee in the private sector?
(3) Owner or partner in a business
(4) Self-employed
304
(5) Unpaid worker

(8) DK/DR
(9) N/A
OCUP1C. Do you have health insurance through your business or
employer? OCUP1C
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR (9) N/A
MIG1. During your childhood, where did you mainly live? In the countryside?
In a town? Or in a city?:
MIG1
(1) In the countryside, a rural area (2) In a town (3) In a city
(8) DK/DR
MIG2. Where were you living 5 years ago? [Read options]
(1) In the same town/city or NDC [Go to TI] (2) In another town/city
MIG2
or NDC in the country [Continue] (3) In another country [Go to TI]
(8) DK/DR [Go to TI]
MIG3. The place where you lived 5 years ago was: [Read options]
(1) A NDC or town/city smaller than this one
(2) A NDC or town/city larger than this one
MIG3
(3) A NDC or town/city like this one
(8) DK
(9) NA (did not migrate)
Time interview ended _______ : ______ |__|__|__|

TI
TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____________
These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Interviewer ID number_____ IID

Interviewer self-identification of his/her own ethnicity IETID
Do you consider yourself White, Mixed, Amerindian, Black , Indian , Chinese,
or Portuguese?
(1) White
(2) Mixed
(3) Amerindian
(4) Black or Afro-Guyanese
(5) Indo-Guyanese
(6) Chinese
(7) Otro
(8) Portuguese
(88) DK
305
……
I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.
A4 [COA4]. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country?
[DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]
Water, lack of 19 Inflation, high prices 02
Roads in poor condition 18 Politicians 59
Armed conflict 30 Bad government 15
Interviewer’s signature__________________ Date ____ /_____ /_____
Field supervisor’s signature _________________

Comments: ___________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
Signature of the person who entered the data __________________________________
Signature of the person who verified the data _______________________________
306
Corruption 13 Environment 10
Credit, lack of 09 Migration 16
Delinquency, crime, violence 05 Drug trafficking 12
Human rights, violations of 56 Gangs 14
Unemployment 03 Poverty 04
Inequality 58 Popular protests (strikes, road 06
blocks, work stoppages, etc.)
Malnutrition 23 Health services, lack of 22
Forced displacement of persons 32 Kidnappings 31
External debt 26 Security (lack of) 27
Discrimination 25 Terrorism 33
Drug addiction 11 Land to farm, lack of 07
Economy, problems with, crisis of 01 Transportation, problems of 60
Education, lack of, poor quality 21 Violence 57
Electricity, lack of 24 Housing 55
Population explosion 20 Other 70
War against terrorism 17 Doesn’t know 88
Card for Interviewer
Card for Interviewer
307
……
OCUP1. What is your main occupation or type of work? [Probe: what is your job
about? ] [Don’t read the options]
(1) Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor, physician,
engineer, architect, accountant, engineer, etc.)
(2) Manager
(3) Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school teacher, artist,
athlete, etc.)
(4) Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician, etc.)
(5) Government official (member of government legislative, executive or judicial
branches, or other government employee)
(6) Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service representative,
etc.)
(7) Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.)
(8) Food vendor
(9) Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, taxi driver,
etc.)
(10) Farmer
(11) Farmhand (works for others, does not own land)
(12) Artisan
(13) Domestic servant
(14) Servant
(15) Member of the armed forces or of the civil services (police, fire-fighters, etc.)
(88) DK
(99) N/A
Card #0
308
Best
possible life 10
Worst 0
possible life
309
……
Card # 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Left Right
310
Card “A”
A lot 7
4
3
Not at all 1
311
……
Card “B”
Strongly
agree 7
5
4
Strongly 1
disagree
312
Card “C”
Strongly
approve 10
7
6
4
3
Strongly 1
disapprove
313
……
Card # 2
10
314
Card “D”
(00) No income
(01) Less than 10,000
(02) 10,001- 20,000
(03) 20,001-40,000
(04) 40,001-60,000
(05) 60,001-90,000
(06) 90,001-120,000
(07) 120,001-150,000
(08) 150,001-200,000
(09) 200,001-250,000
(10) Above 250,000
315
……
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………… … ………… … …… ………… … ……………… …… …………… ………………… … ………… ……… ……

The Political Culture of Democracy

Series General Editor

………… … ………… … …… ………… … ……………… …… …………… ………………… … …………………… …

Index of Figures .................................................................................................................................................. v

How do we measure crime? .................................................................................................................................... 55

Interpersonal Trust by Regions ........................................................................................................................ 210

Figure III-9. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective ............................................... 65

Figure VIII-8. Participation in Solving Community Problems by Region ................................ 216

Table i-1. Distribution of Population 20 Years and Over By Region ............................................. 7

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of AmericasBarometer and

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mexico and Central America Group

Andean/Southerm cone Group

Peru IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos

Canada and United States

United States ● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University

Canada ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

In terms of participation in local government, Guyana falls in an intermediate position in

Finally, chapter five examines the relationship of perception of economic performance of

In terms of civic participation in comparative perspective, Guyana consistently

Regionally speaking, Guyanese living in the stratum of Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9

Interestingly, across all types of civic participation included in this study, in

Citizens in Region 4 are less likely to participate in meetings of religious

Context of Democratic Development in Guyana,

Democracy Index (Inverted) 10

Figure i-2. Economic Growth in Guyana and Latin America 1972-2008

Figure i-3. Map of Guyana Showing the Administrative Regions

Table i-1. Distribution of Population 20 Years and Over By Region

Table i-3. Distribution of Sampling Points across Strata

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 2008

Figure i -4. Sample Distribution by Geographic Area

In addition to stratifying by region, the 2009 AmericasBarometer Survey also accounts

Figure i -5. Sample Distribution by Sex

Figure i -6. Sample Distribution by Age

100% Education Level

Figure i-7. Sample Distribution by Education Level

Figure i-8. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification

Chapter I. Building Support for Stable

Support for the Idea of Democracy per se

United States 78.4

Costa Rica 78.2

Dominican Republic 74.9

Support for Democracy

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Figure I-1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

Support for Core Values on which Democracy Depends

Dominican Republic 78.6

United States 77.2

Costa Rica 76.0

Support for the Right

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Figure I-2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation

United States 66.3

Costa Rica 56.7

Dominican Republic 52.0

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Figure I-3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective