Vgabler, Fulltext
Vgabler, Fulltext
Vgabler, Fulltext
Proper names are the prototypical, unmarked nouns; they refer rather
than describe or predicate as do common nouns. Proper names systemati-
cally appear in close appositional structures of such types as the poet
Burns, Hurricane Edna, Fido the dog, the City of London, where they
constitute the identifying unit, while common nouns in such appositional
structures characterize the name. Proper names are definite, mostly
countable, singular and nonrecursive (nongeneric) and concrete; since these
are the unmarked features of nouns, proper names regularly display zero
or no affixes, except for marked proprial subcategories. This view· of
proper names apparently contradicts the co"gnitivist ideas of Ronald
Langacker; however, Langacker's analysis can be interpreted in such a way
that proper names constitute the prototypical nominal class.
Introduction
I argue that the nominal subclass of proper names represents the
prototypical (or, if one prefers, the unmarked) subclass of nouns. In
particular I argue that proper names are unmarked or prototypical vis-a-
vis common nouns. This conclusion runs counter to Ronald Langacker's
cognitivist view, which claims that the common noun phrase is the
prototypical nominal.
myself, assume that proper names are used primarily to refer to a thing,
and not to describe it, Le., not to predicate something about it. If it is the
essence of a nouns to refer to a thing, this seems to entail that the proper
name constitutes the prototypical noun. By contrast, common nouns are
then less prototypical nouns since they contain a predication, which is
rather typical of verbs. For example, a table is an x which is a table.
Proper names contain no such definitional lexical meaning, no descrip-
tion in the way that common nouns do; this has been argued time and
again by philosophers as well as linguists. It is impossible, indeed, to
ask, for instance, What do you understand by London? (cf. Ullmann
1962; 1969, 33), whereas it is quite possible to ask What do you under-
stand by (a) city?
Elsewhere (Van Langendonck 1999; 2007), I have posited the thesis
that proper names have no asserted (definitional) meaning, but they do
have certain presuppositional meanings. An important feature of proper
names is that they carry a categorical presupposition, and more specifi-
cally, a basic level meaning. Basic level meanings constitute the most
accessible meaning category, for instance dog in the hierarchical
threesome animal > dog > beagle. From a perceptual and conceptual
point of view, basic level senses are the easiest to process. That all
proper names carry a categorical presupposition or a basic level meaning
has been pointed out by philosophers such as Ziff (1960; 1977) and
Searle (1958; 1969), and psychologists (see La Palme Reyes et ale 1993
and Bayer 1991, who uses a different term). When you say John, it
normally concerns a male being, while Mary is rather about a woman. In
certain names, the basic level meaning figures in the name-form itself.
In European languages, this is only the case in such inanimate names as
Fleet Street, the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, Lake Ontario, Mount
Palomar, etc. Sometimes, suffixes indicate the basic level meaning, for
instance the -y in German-y or the -a in Chin-a. (As a rule, in European
languages, personal names lack an overt indication of their basic level
meaning male or female.) Since presuppositions make utterances easier
to process, we can argue that proper names are simpler or less marked
than common nouns, which can display both presuppositional and
asserted senses.
Proper Names and Nominal Categories 439
uniting deixis and basic level meaning· in one word. In this view, proper
names are not far from Langacker's prototypical nominal this spoon
(further see Van Langendonck 2007, chapter 2,3.1.6).
Langacker (1991, 18) proposes that a noun profiles a "thing" in the
most general sense. However, although a thing can be "anything,"
prototypically a thing is a concrete, physical object. Now it appears that
proper. names typically denote concrete things, so they may be termed
typical nouns (or nominals). Moreover, Langacker comes close to my
feeling that proper names exhibit the unmarked nominal feature of
definiteness and that they are prototypically singular, countable, non-
generic, and concrete. After having stated that "a natural path is . . .
defined by the hierarchy definite > specific indefinite > non-specific
indefinite," he goes on to say
References
Bayer, Joseph. 1991. "Representatie van algemene namen eneigennamen
in het mentale lexicon: neurolinguistische evidentie" ["Representation
of Common Nouns and Proper Names in the Mental Lexicon:
Neurolinguistic Evidence"]. Tabu 21 :53-66.
444 Names 55.4 (December 2007)