The Eastern Enlargement

of the European Union

In May 2004, eight former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe
acceded to the European Union. The negotiation process took fifteen years and
was arguably the most contentious in EU history.
This comprehensive volume examines the eastern expansion of the EU through a
tripartite structure, developing an empirical, conceptual and institutional analysis to
provide a rounded and substantive account of the largest and most challenging
enlargement in EU history. Beginning with a foreword written by Pat Cox, who was
President of the European Parliament during the final enlargement negotiations of
2002, John O’Brennan’s new book explores and analyses:

• why the EU decided to expand its membership and the factors that drove this
process forward;
• the key roles played by individual EU institutions, such as the Council, Commis-
sion and European Parliament, in the enlargement process;
• the relative importance of geopolitical, economic and normative factors in the
EU’s enlargement decisions.

This important volume will be of great interest to students and scholars of Euro-
pean politics and European Union studies.

John O’Brennan is IRCHSS Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of

Limerick, Ireland.
Routledge Advances in European Politics

1 Russian Messianism 9 Democracy and Enlargement

Third Rome, revolution, in Post-Communist Europe
Communism and after The democratisation of the general
Peter J. S. Duncan public in fifteen Central and
Eastern European countries,
2 European Integration and the 1991–1998
Postmodern Condition Christian W. Haerpfer
Governance, democracy, identity
Peter van Ham 10 Private Sector Involvement in
the Euro
3 Nationalism in Italian Politics The power of ideas
The stories of the Northern Stefan Collignon and
League, 1980–2000 Daniela Schwarzer
Damian Tambini
11 Europe
4 International Intervention in A Nietzschean perspective
the Balkans since 1995 Stefan Elbe
Edited by Peter Siani-Davies
12 European Union and
5 Widening the European Union E-Voting
The politics of institutional change Addressing the European
and reform Parliament’s internet voting
Edited by Bernard Steunenberg challenge
Edited by Alexander H. Trechsel
6 Institutional Challenges in and Fernando Mendez
the European Union
Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian 13 European Union Council
van Deemen and Mika Widgrén Presidencies
A comparative perspective
7 Europe Unbound Edited by Ole Elgström
Enlarging and reshaping the
boundaries of the European Union 14 European Governance and
Edited by Jan Zielonka Supranational Institutions
Making states comply
8 Ethnic Cleansing in the Jonas Tallberg
Balkans
Nationalism and the destruction of 15 European Union, NATO and
tradition Russia
Cathie Carmichael Martin Smith and Graham Timmins
16 Business, the State and 24 Governing Europe
Economic Policy Discourse, governmentality and
The case of Italy European integration
G. Grant Amyot William Walters and
Jens Henrik Haahr
17 Europeanization and
Transnational States 25 Territory and Terror
Comparing Nordic central Conflicting nationalisms in the
governments Basque Country
Bengt Jacobsson, Per Lægreid Jan Mansvelt Beck
and Ove K. Pedersen
26 Multilateralism, German
18 European Union Foreign Policy and Central
Enlargement Europe
A comparative history Claus Hofhansel
Edited by Wolfram Kaiser
and Jürgen Elvert 27 Popular Protest in East
Germany
19 Gibraltar Gareth Dale
British or Spanish?
Peter Gold 28 Germany’s Foreign Policy
towards Poland and the
20 Gendering Spanish Czech Republic
Democracy Ostpolitik revisited
Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins Karl Cordell and
and Celia Valiente Stefan Wolff

21 European Union Negotiations 29 Kosovo

Processes, networks and The politics of identity and space
negotiations Denisa Kostovicova
Edited by Ole Elgström
and Christer Jönsson 30 The Politics of European
Union Enlargement
22 Evaluating Euro- Theoretical approaches
Mediterranean Relations Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig
Stephen C. Calleya and Ulrich Sedelmeier

23 The Changing Face of 31 Europeanizing Social

European Identity Democracy?
A seven-nation study of The rise of the Party of
(supra)national attachments European Socialists
Edited by Richard Robyn Simon Lightfoot
32 Conflict and Change in EU 36 The Eastern Enlargement of
Budgetary Politics the European Union
Johannes Lindner John O’Brennan

33 Gibraltar, Identity and 37 Values and Principles in

Empire European Union Foreign
E. G. Archer Policy
Edited by Sonia Lucarelli
34 Governance Stories and lan Manners
Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes
38 European Union and the
35 Britain and the Balkans Making of a Wider Northern
1991 until the present Europe
Carole Hodge Pami Aalto
The Eastern Enlargement
of the European Union

John O’Brennan
First published 2006 by
Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2006 John O’Brennan
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN10: 0-415-36126-5 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0-203-00870-7 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-415-36126-2 (hbk)

ISBN13: 978-0-203-00870-6 (ebk)
Contents

List of tables viii

Foreword ix
Acknowledgements xii
List of abbreviations xiv

1 Introduction 1

PART I
The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004 11

2 1989 and beyond: the New Europe takes shape 13

3 Beyond Copenhagen: the deepening of EU–CEE relations 25
4 Closing the deal: Helsinki to Copenhagen 38

PART II
The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement 53

5 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 55

6 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 74
7 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 95

PART III
Conceptualizing eastern enlargement 113

8 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 115

9 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 132
10 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 153

11 Conclusions 172
Notes 183
Bibliography 220
Index 235
Tables

2.1 EU GDP and potential financial aid to Central and Eastern 16

Europe 2004–6
4.1 Results of EU accession referendums in Central and 51
Eastern Europe
7.1 European Parliament vote on accession 111
Foreword

Ours is an old continent but for the first time in history we have come together on a
truly continental scale, not at the point of a sword nor through the barrel of an
imperial nor ideological gun but by the free will of free and sovereign governments
and peoples. Europe has reinvented itself successfully since the dark days of the
Second World War. It has equipped itself with institutions and capacities that have
proved enduring yet capable of change. Successive enlargements and Treaties,
testament to the vitality of the idea and ideals of Europe, have widened and deep-
ened the territorial and policy remit of the Union. Last year, 2004, was a high-
water mark with the accession to full membership of ten new member states –
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Cyprus and Malta – and the signing of the Constitutional Treaty in Rome.
I firmly believe that our continent, divided for decades by the Cold War, the
Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall, and faced by the Soviet threat, has taken a
dramatic turn for the better. Whatever challenges the new order poses they are as
nothing compared to the cost in human, economic and political terms of what went
before. This coming together is not, however, simply an event but is, rather, a
complex process of transformation, already long since engaged and set to continue.
It is a story that deserves to be told, to be analysed, and to be understood. This text
fulfils an important part of that mission and I congratulate its author Dr John
O’Brennan and the publishers for their endeavours.
Particularly pleasing for someone like myself who has served as a Member of the
European Parliament is the recognition in this book of the role played by the
Parliament in the enlargement process. Too often, both in the academic and, more
particularly, in the media communities this is the Cinderella of the European insti-
tutions. Its role, functions and influence have changed dramatically in recent years.
First directly elected in 1979 it had a mandate but was in search of a mission.
The Parliament has become today a significant European legislator. During the
last five years – 1999–2004 – 403 co-decision procedures have been concluded,
establishing the European Parliament as a mature and reliable legislative partner
with the Council of Ministers and the Commission on behalf of European citizens.
This is an increase of 250 per cent over the previous five-year mandate and reflects
the impact of successive treaty changes.
A respected MEP can lead Parliament in the adoption of amendments to
x Foreword
continental-scale legislation that in their ultimate effect equal the sum of amend-
ments of all the member states. Yet extraordinarily one still frequently hears and
reads, during elections and at other times, dated and ignorant commentaries that it
has no legislative powers and it is just a talking shop. Informed academic discourse
can contribute to reversing this prejudice.
The Parliament is an important arm of the budgetary authority of the European
Union. It is also an authorizing environment for executive action. I can think of no
national parliament in recent years on the issue of budgetary accountability of the
Executive that comes close to the decisive role played in 1999 by the European
Parliament in the unprecedented resignation of an entire European Commission.
As a tribune of the people, the Parliament and its members have increasingly
fulfilled a role as a focal point for the expression of concerns held by ordinary citi-
zens across a wide range of policy areas including the environment, consumer
protection, transport, financial and other services, not to mention wider issues of
war and peace such as Iraq or the Middle East.
It is the Parliament’s power of assent, a vote by a qualified majority to accept or
reject agreements with third countries such as the accession of new member
states, which introduces its role in the current text. Correctly the author has
chosen to look beyond the formal to the informal in appraising Parliament’s
influence on the enlargement process. Preparing for EU membership is an
arduous task for candidate states. They must adopt their legal base to accommo-
date the acquis communautaire, the entire body of EU law.
In engaging at all levels with national parliaments and parliamentarians in the
candidate states the European Parliament animated this grinding but indispens-
able process. We were a voice talking a common parliamentary and political
language, talking about a Europe of values and not just an arid Europe of directives
to be transposed. We were a bridge offering two-way advocacy for the EU and for
our interlocutors. We showed that when the Commission and the Parliament act
together in common European cause that the synergies can be powerful and influ-
ential. We pre-integrated nominated observer MPs from the accession states in the
work of the Parliament after the signature of the Accession Treaty, as earnest of our
determination to underpin the irreversibility of the process.
Before the vital Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 to decide the out-
standing terms of settlement for the candidate states, together with the Commission
and the Council, led respectively by President Romano Prodi and Prime Minister
Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, we hosted an unprecedented plenary debate
on the future of an enlarged Europe involving speakers from the European Parlia-
ment and the parliaments of the candidate states. Our message to Europe’s hold-
outs on budgetary matters could not have been clearer, that this was not the time
nor the occasion for backsliding.
Inside the European Parliament we drove our systems to prepare for this new
dawn. As the only directly elected European institution we had a special responsi-
bility to prepare for and to respect Europe’s cultural and linguistic diversity. This
was not simply the discharge of a duty to new MEPs but more fundamentally the
 Foreword xi
discharge of a duty to the citizens of new member states on whose behalf we would
act as their European legislature.
And we learned about each other, sharing not just a journey but developing a
narrative. Let me share one such story. I made a new Lithuanian friend, Vytenis
Andriukaitis. He served as the Chairman of the European Affairs Committee of
the Seimas (parliament) in Lithuania. I last met him in Greece on 16 April 2003, on
the day of signing of the Accession Treaty by the ten new member states of the
European Union. We were in the ancient Agora at the foot of the hill of the Acrop-
olis in the shadow of the Parthenon but it was new and not ancient history which
touched me on that day. He was overcome with emotion. ‘What’s wrong?’ I asked.
‘I have just been talking with my 95-year-old mother on my mobile phone,’ he
answered, ‘about my journey to Athens.’
In 1940 the Soviet Union brutally cast aside the young independence of the
three Baltic States under a dirty and self-serving deal between Hitler and Stalin.
Mr Andriukaitis Sr was a young married man, an engineer and a part-time munic-
ipal councillor in his home city of Kaunas. For this he was suspect in the eyes of
their new masters and so he and his young bride were sent to the Gulag. They were
placed on a godforsaken island in the Arctic circle that alternated between constant
nights and constant days but never altered in terms of its oppressive isolation. My
friend Vytenis was born on that prison island. Years later they were allowed to
return to Kaunas. He was speaking to his mother about his family’s journey from
the Gulag to freedom.
As a Member of the European Parliament from the collapse of the Berlin Wall
through to the reunification, perhaps the first unification, of our continent based
on common values and the exercise of free and sovereign engagement, I had a priv-
ileged view from the inside of this special moment and process. I am pleased that
scholarship too, through this text, is staking its claim.
Pat Cox, Cork
Acknowledgements

This book was a long time in preparation and I would like to express my apprecia-
tion to a large number of people for their assistance and support.
In the first place thanks are due to Professor Eddie Moxon-Browne who super-
vised my PhD thesis and offered me consistent support over the years. Thanks also
to Professor Mike Smith of Loughborough University, the external examiner of my
PhD thesis, who has been unfailingly generous in providing references since. I owe
a great deal of thanks to my colleague Brid Quinn and her husband John, for
dinners in Kilfinane and the odd racing tip (which did not help me pay the fees at
any level of university!). Many thanks also to my colleagues in the Department of
Politics and Public Administration at the University of Limerick, Maura Adshead,
Luke Ashworth, Bernadette Connaughton, Tracey Gleeson, Lucia Quaglia, Mary
Murphy, Nick Rees, John Stapleton, Alex Warleigh, and Owen Worth. Neil
Robinson has been a tremendously supportive head of department and at all times
enthusiastic about the book. Thank you to University of Limerick colleagues in
different departments: Liam Chambers, Patricia Conlan, Eoin Devereux, Marie
Dineen, Sean Donlan, Breda Grey, Vicky Kelly, Carmen Kuhling, Padraig
Lenihan, Alistair Malcolm, Orla McDonnell, Anthony McElligott, Angus Mitchell,
Caolfhionn Ní Bheachain, Eugene O’Brien, William O’Brien, Pat O’Connor and
Bernadette Whelan.
I owe a great debt of gratitude to John Logan, who read the text and provided
the most concise and valuable advice on textual changes. He has helped an enor-
mous number of young scholars find their feet in the academic world and I am
enormously grateful for the steadfast support he offered as head of department
and friend. Pat Cox wrote the foreword to the book at relatively short notice and
between trips to the United States. As a key participant in the enlargement negoti-
ations and witness to the historic events his contribution to the book is of immense
value and very much appreciated.
A special word of thanks to Catherine Lawless and Ruán O’Donnell, who have
been exemplary colleagues and stellar friends. They variously becalmed, cajoled,
and encouraged me with sound advice and constant reassurance that my methods
would eventually deliver the finished product. The weekly curry may have proved
a short-term hindrance to the completion of academic work but undoubtedly also
represented a most valuable forum for the exchange of ideas, so long as a measure
 Acknowledgements xiii
of sobriety was maintained! Dolores Taaffe has long been a source of inspiration as
she manages uncooperative cows, needy children and grandchildren, an irascible
husband, and less than engaged students. I am indebted to her for encouragement
and steadfast support.
Trish and Dave provided a bed and many a diverting night out in London.
Hillary Pierdt also offered me a bed (and a car) whilst completing the PhD
when I really was disconnected from the real world. Thank you also to Jack
Anderson, Hugh Atkinson, Brendan Bolger, Antoeneta Dimitrova, Mark
Downes, Milka Gancheva, Aidan Hehir, Kristana Ivanova, Jordan Jordanov,
Rory Keane, Fidelma Kilbride, Ian King, Sean Molloy, Anna Murphy, Cait ni
Ceallaigh, Christopher Lasch, John O’Connor, Liam Rimmer, Tapio Raunio,
Maria Tzankova Ros Wade and Dara Waldron.
The Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS)
supported both my doctoral and postdoctoral research. That support enabled me
to conduct research work away from Limerick and a vital period in writing-up in
2004–5. I would thus like to express my thanks to Dr Marc Caball and his staff. It
would have been much more difficult to get the book published without their help.
In 2005 I was a Visiting Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in
Paris, where I completed the manuscript and made many good friends. Thanks to
Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Walter Posch and to the other Visiting
Fellows. Thanks also to the University of Limerick Foundation and the College of
Humanities, both of which provided funding for parts of this research over the last
few years. At Routledge I want to thank Heidi Bagtazo and Harriet Brinton for
help in preparing the manuscript.
Finally, I owe the greatest debt to my parents, Mary and John, for years of
unstinting support.
Abbreviations

AP Association Partnership
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Area
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CoE Council of Europe
Coreper Committee of Permanent Representatives
COSAC Conference of Standing Committees of National Parliaments
DG Directorate General
EA Europe Agreement
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Community
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECU European Currency Unit
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Area
EIB European Investment Bank
ELDR European Liberal Party (European Parliament)
EMU European Monetary Union
EP European Parliament
EPP-PD European People’s Party (European Parliament)
ERT European Roundtable of Industrialists
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
EUI European University Institute
EUISS EU Institute for Security Studies
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
 Abbreviations xv
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDR German Democratic Republic
GNI Gross National Income
GNP Gross National Product
IFI International Financial Institution
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
IIA Inter-Institutional Agreement
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPE International Political Economy
IR International Relations
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
JPC Joint Parliamentary Committee
LI Liberal Intergovernmentalist
MEP Member of the European Parliament
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPAA National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PES Party of European Socialists (European Parliament)
PHARE Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies
SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAP Stabilization and Association Process
SAPARD Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural
Development
SEA Single European Act
SEM Single European Market
TEU Treaty on European Union
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO World Trade Organization
1 Introduction

On 1 May 2004 at a historic, if understated, signing ceremony in Dublin the Euro-

pean Union (EU) formally recognized the accession to the Union of ten new states.1
These were Cyprus, Malta, and eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) states
– the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia – which, for more than forty years, had been cut off from the European
integration process by virtue of their geopolitical imprisonment behind the Iron
Curtain. The history of European integration had been one of successive and
successful enlargement rounds. Indeed, there is some evidence that there existed
among the founding fathers an ambition to enlarge to continental scale. For more
than three decades after World War Two, the Cold War stood in the way of the
realization of that ambition. But with the demise of the Soviet Union and the loos-
ening of its post-war grip on its Central and Eastern European satellite states in the
wake of 1989’s so-called ‘geopolitical earthquake’, Jean Monnet’s ambition of a
European construction stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals suddenly seemed
possible. Thereafter, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe gradually made
its way to the top of the European Union’s political agenda. On 1 May 2004 the
ambition was finally realized.
Although most commentators describe the eastern enlargement as the fifth EU
enlargement, it would be more correct to describe it as the fourth such expansion.
In the process of expanding eastwards the EU has completed a geographic sweep
that first embraced western Europe, then the south and north in succession. The
first (western) enlargement came in 1973 with the accessions of Denmark, Ireland
and the United Kingdom. This was followed by the second (southern or Mediterra-
nean) expansion that saw the accessions of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal
in 1986. Although most commentators treat these as separate it is more correct to
consider them as part of a single process underpinned by the same structural
dynamics. The third (northern or EFTA) enlargement occurred in 1995, with the
accessions of Austria, Finland and Sweden. Thus eastern enlargement should be
considered the fourth such round of EU expansion and not the fifth.2
The eastern enlargement has frequently been depicted as the culmination of a
series of processes that has reunified Europe. This judgement is one that derives
from an understanding of Cold War Europe as one of artificial geopolitical division
of a previously indivisible civilizational unit, imposed by the strategic competition
2 Introduction
of the Cold War. It overlooks the fact that previous to the Second World War there
existed many different ‘Europes’. At no time could one identify a genuine collective
governed by common rules and legal norms. Where particular forms of political
unity had emerged that was usually as a result of coercion and territorial aggression
and acquisition. In addition, as William Wallace attests, one of the defining charac-
teristics of earlier ‘European projects’ was that, although most started in Western
Europe, they usually spread only some way eastwards. This was as true of Immanuel
Kant’s perpetual peace plan as it was of the Duc de Sully’s proposals for a Euro-
pean federation in the early sixteenth century. In the nineteenth century Prince
Metternich famously proclaimed that ‘Asia begins at the Landstrasse’.3 The idea of
a European collectivity binding together western and eastern Europe was not taken
seriously, partly because of the divisive structural environment emanating from
Great Power rivalries but also because of western perceptions of the east as exotic,
inferior and ‘oriental’.
The 2004 accessions are much better understood as part of an ongoing contem-
porary process, which has created the foundations of a genuinely trans-European
political community, built on shared values, reciprocal obligation and institutional-
ized rule-following. In that sense eastern enlargement constitutes one of the key
building blocks of the post-Cold War European integration process. But if in time
eastern enlargement is viewed as a critical advance in moving the EU towards
genuine political unity, the emerging Europe is a very different entity to those
which emerged from previous efforts of European unification. There are four
reasons for this.
First, the decisions made by sovereign governments to accede to the EU were
voluntary and not coerced. These governments made their decisions on the basis of
national interests and perceptions of common or European values, which linked
them solidly to each other and to the collective. The decisions of those sovereign
governments were then given formal popular sanction through the accession refer-
endums held in each accession state in 2003. Second, the European Union which
the CEE states joined is a political community with defined supranational, national,
and regional competences and autonomous institutions, which are delegated
responsibility by the member states in a range of policy areas deemed to be of
common interest. For all of the focus on the putative loss of sovereignty that accom-
panies entry into the club, member states retain a formidable capacity for inde-
pendent action.4 Third, the EU is also supported by a loose but nevertheless
identifiable socioeconomic system, which is highly regulated through suprana-
tional legislation and the Union-wide writ of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Finally, the enlarged EU is developing a collective approach to foreign and security
policy that increasingly seeks to give expression to the values that underpin the
European integration process. Thus the Europe of the early twenty-first century
can manifestly be understood as the first voluntarily enacted transnational political
community in the history of international politics. And eastern enlargement, facili-
tating as it has the transfer of EU norms on everything from human rights to envi-
ronmental legislation, has contributed as much to that process of European
unification as any constitutional or political project that preceded it. If a further
 Introduction 3
enlargement to the Balkans helps to embed democracy in modern Europe’s most
conflict-prone region then the process of enlargement will in the future stand as the
most significant contribution to the pacification and transformation of Europe.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the eastern enlargement was its scale and
magnitude, and the transformative effect it has had on the shape of the European
Union. From a membership of six countries and 185 million people in the late
1950s, the EU expanded gradually to 15 member states and a population of 375
million people after the 1995 EFTA enlargement. With eastern enlargement the
Union expands to 25 member states with a combined population of 450 million.5
Nor does this represent the culmination of even the eastern enlargement process.
In the latter part of 2004 Bulgaria and Romania completed negotiations for
membership and are expected to become members of the EU on 1 January 2007.
Croatia is expected to be next to open negotiations with the EU and, although in
the course of 2005 there arose significant difficulties that temporarily postponed
the opening of negotiations, that country is still widely expected to accede with
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 or soon after.6 EU strategy on southeastern Europe
has been closely modelled on eastern enlargement and seeks to gradually integrate
all of the states of former Yugoslavia including Serbia, for long Europe’s pariah
state. The Brussels European Council of December 2004 formally committed the
EU to the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. And with the ‘roses revo-
lution’ in Georgia in 2003 and the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004, the pros-
pect of those countries moving closer to and seeking membership of the EU
appeared much closer. So it is clear that the 2004 enlargement, although of great
significance for both the EU and the accession states, may end up constituting but
the first important part of a much larger process of expansion to eastern and south-
eastern Europe.
In developing arguments about the nature and content of the eastern enlarge-
ment process the book draws upon a variegated literature that expanded in tandem
with the political process it sought to depict. In the first place there are the general
texts that describe and analyse the main features of and important challenges
thrown up by eastern enlargement. Two types of approach in particular stand out.
The first includes empirical work that sought to describe the evolution of the
enlargement process and the development of EU relations with the CEE states.
This literature also includes the contributions of EU insiders such as Graham
Avery, Fraser Cameron, and Peter Ludlow.7 These books contain valuable accounts
of the internal EU deliberation on enlargement and especially the inter-institu-
tional context in which enlargement politics were played out. A second type of
general text presented comprehensive studies of important parts of the EU policy
process and the likely impact which eastern enlargement would have in specific
policy domains.8 The number and diversity of these studies increased steadily as
the negotiations on eastern enlargement moved toward conclusion.
A second stream of literature analysed eastern enlargement from the perspective
of country studies, especially of the candidate states in Central and Eastern Europe.
These included consideration of negotiation strategies, domestic enlargement
debates, the impact of ‘Europe’ on domestic institutions and institutional choice,
4 Introduction
and studies of public opinion.9 Where some of these studies provided important
information and analysis of developments in the candidate countries, increasingly
also they sought to engage with ongoing debates in EU studies in different
subdisciplines of political science, cultural studies, sociology and economics. On
the EU side there were a smaller number of studies, which analysed the implica-
tions of enlargement for specific member states, some of a general nature, others
focused on specific areas of public policy, élite contestation and public attitudes to
enlargement. The question of domestic institutional adaptation and policy choice
featured strongly in these studies, especially in those countries where enlargement
threatened the privileges of important interest groups.10
A third important stream of analysis flowed from scholars of economic integra-
tion. These studies included a range of macroeconomic analyses of the different
ways in which eastern enlargement would impact on key EU policies such as agri-
culture and structural funding, and others which analysed such issues as invest-
ment flows into Central and Eastern Europe and the transnational restructuring of
European industry which developed in parallel with the enlargement process.
Perhaps the most influential of these contributions was that of Alan Mayhew,
whose Recreating Europe analysed the political economy of eastern enlargement and
bridged the divide between academic analysis and policy-making.11
A fourth stream of literature examined the constituent elements of EU enlarge-
ment policy, highlighting the importance of various capacity-building programmes
and compliance strategies employed by the EU in its efforts to transfer its policy-
making apparatus and institutional culture to the candidate states. As the enlarge-
ment process developed, and measurement of EU ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ became
possible, a growing number of scholars sought to analyse the use of various types of
conditionality, and especially political conditionality, by the EU. In this respect
studies of the application of the Copenhagen criteria within the enlargement
process were increasingly foregrounded as scholars sought to determine the extent
to which Central and Eastern Europe was becoming (alternatively) ‘Europeanized’,
‘modernized’, and ‘democratized’ through the enlargement process.12
Finally, somewhat belatedly a theoretical literature began to develop, which
drew on two juxtaposed bodies of thought from the subdiscipline of International
Relations (IR), and conceptualized eastern enlargement from those perspectives.
In the first place, a rationalist literature grew up around the study of the constitu-
tional and institutional dimensions of the enlargement process. The study of
national decision-making and supranational bargaining that accompanied specific
aspects of the eastern enlargement framework drew attention to a part of the
process which was at least as important as the inside–outside bargaining between
the EU and the candidate states.13 In addition, scholars sought to determine the
likely impact of enlargement on EU decision-making by focusing on changes to the
rules governing the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) within the Council
and the general costs of institutional adaptation. Perhaps the most important theo-
retical template for analysing enlargement from a rationalist perspective was
Andrew Moravcsik’s The Choice for Europe, which offered a view of the European
integration process as one characterized by intergovernmental bargaining and
 Introduction 5
dominated by the powerful economic interests of the larger member states. The
Choice for Europe had very little to say about eastern enlargement (or indeed any
previous enlargement of the EU), but in other contributions Moravcsik applied his
liberal intergovernmentalist framework to argue that enlargement did not funda-
mentally re-order any of the important features of the integration process and that
the EU bargaining which accompanied the enlargement process resulted in typical
compromises which protected the structural interests of the larger member states
whilst buying off potential losers with compensatory ‘side payments’.14
The second strand of theoretical literature developed around the importance of
identity, norms, and social interaction within the eastern enlargement process.
This literature, although itself increasingly diverse, sought to highlight the norma-
tive importance of different features of the process, and especially the transposition
of EU values and identity on to Central and Eastern Europe. One school of
thought focused on EU motivations deriving from a sense of historical obligation,
such as ‘uniting Europe’, or ‘undoing the historical injury wrought on the CEE
states at Yalta’.15 Another approach analysed eastern enlargement from different
identity perspectives.16 A final stream focused on the content and role of norms
and normative transposition within the enlargement process.17 Where rationalist
scholars highlighted so-called ‘logics of consequentiality’ which allegedly governed
enlargement decision-making, sociologically-grounded scholars instead argued for
‘logics of appropriateness’ as the key cognitive templates which informed and
guided the behaviour of decision-makers. This disciplinary clash was both a
product of and contributed significantly to the rationalist/constructivist divide
which had come to define a large part of the academic conversation on EU public
policy-making.
This book contributes to that debate in a number of ways. First it embeds the
evolution of the eastern enlargement process in both conceptual and institutional
analysis. The focus is exclusively on the internal EU dimension, on the deliberation
and decision-making process, and how enlargement unfolded from the new dawn
of 1989 through to accession day on 1 May 2004. Second, the narrative that runs
through the book is a normative one. Its main claim is that normative and
ideational factors rooted in issues of identity, norms and values drove the eastern
enlargement process forward and proved decisive in determining its content and
form. The EU used the eastern enlargement process as the main instrument
supporting its efforts to ‘democratize’ and ‘Europeanize’ Central and Eastern
Europe and transform the geopolitics of Europe. Notwithstanding the criticisms of
those who point to the flawed fabric of democratic practice in many of the existing
member states, and those on the CEE side who rightly point out that the demo-
cratic revolutions in CEE were local and spontaneous, it is clear that a successful
transition to EU democratic norms, involving the entire reconstitution of political
life in the candidate states, was the major objective of EU policy. This is of a pattern
in that democracy promotion has ‘gone mainstream’ not just in EU practice but on
a global level, over the past two decades, with the UN, the OSCE, innumerable
NGOs and even the World Bank and IMF vigorously promoting best democratic
practice in their activities.18 It is in and through the EU, however, that the most
6 Introduction
explicit forms of democracy promotion are pursued. And nowhere more than in
the eastern enlargement process has that desire to effect positive and society-
enhancing democratization been as vigorously championed as by the European
Union.
The norms which the book focuses on as decisive in shaping the eastern enlarge-
ment are not all exclusive to the European Union. Indeed, many are universal in
their scope. But the European integration process has encouraged the develop-
ment of a specific norm set that has seen the salience of these norms increase in the
member states over time. The norms of reciprocity, multilateralism, respect for
fundamental freedoms and minority rights, and transparency of administrative,
judicial, and political institutions are now firmly rooted in both the domestic legal
systems of the member states and the cognitive templates that guide decision-
makers. In fact these norms are so deeply embedded that they have a ‘taken for
granted’ quality about them. And although one of the most important debates
occupying scholars of EU studies in the current period is that which focuses on the
diffusion, interpretation, penetration and resonance of these norms within indi-
vidual member states, it seems clear that the EU sought to use as many and as
varied a range of instruments as possible within the framework of its eastern
enlargement process so as to ensure the successful transposition of these norms in
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
The EU’s attachment to its political norms was highlighted again and again in
the course of the eastern enlargement process. Indeed it seems clear now that while
the Union was prepared to overlook deficiencies in the economic preparedness of
candidate states it would not do so with respect to the political criteria for member-
ship. This was especially evident in the case of negotiations with Bulgaria and
Romania and even more so in the decision to open negotiations with Turkey. The
norms of transparency of democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms for all
took precedence over those of market capitalism in every case. That is because
these norms most cogently represent what the European Union is in the interna-
tional political system – a transnational pluralistic security community, founded on
the principles of peaceable interstate relations, and dedicated to institutionalizing
both market relations and political problem-solving among its member states.
In outlining how the eastern enlargement came on to the EU agenda, and there-
after how the contours of EU policy developed, the book does three things. First, it
examines the evolution and unfolding of the eastern enlargement process, begin-
ning with the heady days of peaceful revolution in 1989 and ending with the
historic signing ceremony at Aras an Úachtaraan in Dublin on 1 May 2004. In
future years historians will no doubt provide a large range of narratives, which will,
of course, much more fully and satisfactorily explain the events, people and
processes at the heart of the enlargement story. The political scientist, at too close a
juncture to actual events, can only hope to produce a narrative that captures the
essential elements of the picture. That is what part I of the book seeks to do. It
describes how the EU relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe developed after the dramatic events of the annus mirabilis of 1989, the
important features of the early EU approach to enlargement, and the crucial
 Introduction 7
foundations of the enlargement process which were gradually introduced as EU
relations with Central and Eastern Europe deepened. It examines both the impor-
tant intergovernmental summit meetings from which important enlargement deci-
sions emerged and the supranational institutional processes that helped shape
those European Council gatherings. It analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the
various capacity-building instruments employed by the EU in Central and Eastern
Europe and how these linked to the macro-objectives of EU policy. Finally, part I
also traces the complex and contentious accession negotiations, which were offi-
cially instituted in early 1998 and completed in late 2002.
Part II of the book presents an analysis of the intra-EU institutional politics
which accompanied and in many senses shaped the eastern enlargement process.
This has been perhaps the most neglected area of academic analysis of enlarge-
ment and thus where the book’s main contribution to our understanding of
enlargement lies. The enlargement of such a complex and multifaceted interna-
tional entity as the EU entails an important institutional dimension. Enlargement
both arises out of specific forms of institutionalized cooperation and subsequently
produces a reconfiguration of the norms and practices which structure that cooper-
ation. Thus any substantive analysis of an enlargement process necessitates an
understanding of the institutional dimension of the process. The three chapters in
part II analyse the different roles played by the three principal institutions of the
EU – the Council, Commission and Parliament – in the accession process, focusing
on both the formal treaty-based division of labour which governs enlargement
decision-making and the informal practices which have grown up around the
enlargement process over the years. The chapters are concerned principally with
the following questions: What were the formal treaty-based responsibilities of each
of the three EU institutions with respect to enlargement decisions, and how did
each institution seek to assert its influence on the process? How and through what
instruments did each of the institutions engage with the candidate states during
the enlargement process? To what extent did each institution act as a unified
actor vis-à-vis the candidate states? Where there existed fragmentation within an
individual institution how did this manifest itself and with what effect on the
enlargement process? To what extent did each of the institutions act as European
‘institution builders’ and/or ‘identity builders’ within the structures of the enlarge-
ment process? And, finally, which of the institutions proved most important to
enlargement decisions?
Although the formal decision rules laid down in Article 49 TEU suggest that it is
the Council, and thus the member states, which makes the key decisions on
enlargement, a more substantive contextual analysis of Article 49, informed also
by knowledge of how the EU system operates in practice, reveals a more compli-
cated picture of the decision-making process. Indeed enlargement can now only
be understood as a process governed both by the formal/legal rules laid down in
the treaties and the customary enlargement practice which has developed over
the years.19 The very absence of formal institutional instructions regarding the
management of enlargement encouraged the development of a set of informal
practices which eastern enlargement further developed and entrenched. The
8 Introduction
European Commission, for example, although legally mandated only to deliver its
opinion on membership applications to the Council, effectively acts as principal
conduit with the candidate states and has an important influence on both the
content and shape of the process as it develops. The treaty articles also bestow an
important role on the European Parliament. No accession decision can be taken
without the Parliament’s assent. And, in the final instance, the outcome of the
process rests on the ratification procedures in both the acceding states and the
member states. All of this suggests that it is quite wrong to identify the Council as
the only EU actor that counts in the process. The chapters on the Commission
and Parliament thus outline the important ways those institutions contribute to
enlargement decision-making.
Part III of the book contributes to the developing literature on the conceptualiza-
tion of EU enlargement by analysing eastern enlargement from different conceptual
standpoints. The chapter on geopolitical perspectives analyses enlargement, and
particularly EU motivations for enlargement, from the standpoint of security,
statecraft and international diplomacy. It utilizes realist theory to conceptualize
important geopolitical issues such as the EU relationship with Russia, interstate
relations in Central and Eastern Europe, and the location and ubiquity of power
within the enlargement process. Although the central arguments of the book are
those which highlight the normative importance of eastern enlargement for the
EU, geopolitical issues also matter, and no serious examination of the subject can
avoid engaging with the geopolitics of the new Europe. The chapter on economic
perspectives focuses on EU economic motivations for enlargement and the main
economic issues which enlargement brought to the fore. It employs Andrew
Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmental framework in analysing the input into
enlargement decisions by important EU producer groups and the preferences of
transnational capital. In so doing it also highlights the extent to which domesti-
cally-generated enlargement preferences, especially in the larger, more powerful
member states impacted on the enlargement process. The nature of both internal
EU bargaining and the EU-candidate state negotiating relationship is also exam-
ined against Moravcsik’s explicit and parsimonious framework. The final chapter
in this section examines the normative dimension to eastern enlargement and
employs social constructivist approaches to international relations to assess the
importance of identity and norms within the enlargement process. It tests the prop-
osition that the eastern enlargement process was governed in the main by ‘logics of
appropriateness’, which helped define both member state preferences and EU
modes of action. It argues that although the enlargement process was contested to
different degrees and by a range of different actors within the EU, the logic which
won out was the normative one which stressed the centrality of EU values and the
importance of securing those values in Central and Eastern Europe. The norms
that the EU sought to transpose through the enlargement process were exactly
those that gave meaning to the existing process of European integration and
rendered legitimate the structures of institutionalized cooperation and decision-
making that supported that process.
The arguments presented in the book are constructed around a recognizable
 Introduction 9
methodological approach. Although the political scientist is constrained in some
important respects by his or her proximity to events, especially by the absence of
memoirs, biographies and official documentation that are crucial to the process of
historical reconstruction, there is nevertheless a greater range and diversity of
sources relating to the European integration process available now than ever
before. The EU institutions publish most of their documentation quickly and this is
disseminated widely via the worldwide web. These documents constitute the
crucial primary sources for this book. National documentation, although much
more scarce, is also increasingly accessible to scholars and makes a contribution
here throughout. The speeches and wider public discourse of national and EU
representatives are also a vital source of information and frequently go beyond offi-
cial papers in presenting public policy and the ideas that inform it. Secondary
material consisting of traditional sources such as monographs and peer reviewed
journal articles also constitute an important resource, especially in the effort to
interpret EU motivations for eastern enlargement. In addition the worldwide web
has facilitated the development of another type of secondary source – analysis and
opinion provided by dedicated think-tanks such as the Centre for European Policy
Studies (CEPS), the Centre for European Reform (CER), the European Policy
Centre (EPC), and many others which focus on more specific parts of the integra-
tion process. The analysis of these groups features prominently throughout the
book. In addition newspapers and magazines with established reputations in
covering EU politics such as The Economist, the Financial Times and others are
utilized throughout. Finally, interviews with policy-makers contribute to the anal-
ysis, especially in part II of the book, which focuses on the internal EU manage-
ment of eastern enlargement.
Enlargement, as Desmond Dinan reminds us ‘has been a central and quasi-
permanent element in the EU’s history’.20 The first set of new members (the UK,
Denmark and Ireland) had hardly been assimilated when the second set (Greece,
Spain and Portugal) applied to join. Similarly, the Community was still assimi-
lating the second set when the third set of ultimately successful applicants (Austria,
Finland, and Sweden) requested accession. There followed the absorption of the
old GDR, and, in the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, the tabling of accession
requests by the CEE states, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. So from the beginning of
the process of integration, enlargement has always hovered over internal and
external EU activity. EU Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), as well as day-to-
day activity, have, over the years, been influenced in important ways by enlarge-
ment issues.21 The main reason for the convening of an IGC in 1996 was to revisit
the Treaty on European Union (TEU). But, as Sedelmeier and Wallace point out,
the link was made early on between the constitutional conclave and eastern
enlargement. Both the Reflection Group – representatives of heads of government,
charged with preparing for the IGC – and the Commission presented eastern
enlargement as the main rationale for the IGC. Similarly, the IGC that concluded
with the Nice Treaty in December 2000 was very much an enlargement IGC, with
the treaty changes eventually agreed considered at least a minimum step toward
ensuring the continued functioning of an enlarged Union.22 The Convention on
10 Introduction
the Future of Europe and the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty that
followed it also took place against the shadow of eastern enlargement. In fact one of
the most important justifications for the Constitutional Treaty was that which
stressed the need to streamline decision-making in the EU of 25. Thus even if the
eastern enlargement differed significantly from previous rounds in terms of scale
and diversity, academic literature and political commentary continued to focus on
the established preoccupation with widening and deepening.23 The questions
related to the ‘finalité’ of integration are of course intimately connected with the
EU’s ambitions for further widening. This is because, as Jan Zielonka suggests, one
cannot study the question of enlargement without reference to that of more or less
integration, or at least the impact of enlargement on the process of integration.24
The relationship between the two phenomena therefore will also be a factor
throughout the book. This, however, will not impinge on the main task at hand,
which is the analysis of the eastern enlargement process and its significance for the
European Union.
Part I

The unfolding of eastern

enlargement 1989–2004
2 1989 and beyond
The New Europe takes shape

Introduction
In the spring of 1994, the first formal applications for membership of the European
Union by the Central and East European (CEE) states were made. Almost five years
had passed since the dramatic days of peaceful revolution of 1989. In that period,
many of the old certainties of the Cold War had disappeared. The Soviet Union’s
implosion had rendered the CEE states free to pursue their own external policies for
the first time since the 1930s. Across Europe the entire framework of economic,
political, security, and cultural relationships seemed to be in flux as the EU struggled
to put in place a concrete process that would govern its relationship with the new
democracies. Although it was cautious about making any categorical promises of
membership, it became clear that enlargement of the Union to include those coun-
tries in CEE that had expressed an interest in joining represented the only viable
policy option for the Union. This chapter serves a dual purpose. First, it seeks to
describe the evolution of the EU’s relations with the CEE states in the years after the
‘new beginning’ of 1989; second, it will outline the main elements of EU enlargement
strategy towards CEE and how the EU became progressively committed to a wide
enlargement round. It begins by describing the events of 1989–90 and their signifi-
cance for the European Union.

The EU response to the 1989 revolutions

The dramatic but largely peaceful revolutions that transformed Central and
Eastern Europe in 1989 are often described in grandiloquent terms. Phrases such
as ‘velvet revolutions’, ‘geopolitical earthquake’ and ‘acceleration of history’
quickly entered political discourse as scholars and public figures struggled to come
to terms with the magnitude of the events. Within a short time it became clear that
the demise of Communism held profound implications for the future of Europe –
both east and west. As the old certainties of the Cold War era gave way to a some-
what amorphous geopolitical framework, the EU found itself confronted with a
drastically altered European configuration. The Europe of the Twelve would now
have to address the question of how it might relate to and possibly assimilate its
neighbours to the East.
14 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
In Central and Eastern Europe, the Gorbachev reforms had effectively embold-
ened reformers and encouraged dissent. In short, internal Soviet disarray provided
Warsaw-Pact dissident opportunity. Prior to the era of glasnost and perestroika, rela-
tions between the EU and the CEE states were practically non-existent.1 EU
activity was mainly confined to a few narrowly concentrated areas of trade,
ensuring the protection of key economic sectors from unfair competition from the
Eastern Bloc.2 At a political level, Cold War geopolitical thinking hindered the
development of closer relations.
For the Central and East European states emerging from the shadow of the
Soviet monolith, the aspiration was clear: a ‘Return to Europe’ – the Europe from
which, it was frequently asserted, these states had been forcibly separated for over
four decades.3 The new CEE governments from the beginning framed their
endeavours and aspirations with explicit reference to the core values of European
integration.4 They sought freedom, prosperity, and a secure place in the interna-
tional community of nations, especially within European organizations. Opinion
polls pointed to massive support for ‘joining Europe’.5 For the European Union,
however, the aftermath to the peaceful revolutions would produce a period of
intensive questioning: first, what was actually meant by ‘European’; second, and
more pragmatically, how should the Community respond to the CEE states’ stated
desire for membership of the club. For the first time, Article 237 of the Treaty of
Rome, which simply stated that ‘any European State can apply’ for membership of
the Community, began to be scrutinized.6
Even at this early stage, however, a division between EC/EU ‘drivers’ (advo-
cates) and ‘brakemen’ (obstructionists) was in evidence. On one side British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher unashamedly made the case for an EC commitment
to enlarge. The question of what motivated her advocacy is usually answered with
the assertion that she saw a wider Europe as a tool for slowing down the integration
process and forestalling, if not derailing, any moves to embrace federalism. It was
undoubtedly the case, however, that she also admired the CEE states for over-
throwing communism and embracing the dual freedom of the market and the
ballot box. At the Aspen Institute in Colorado on 5 August 1990 she called for a
pan-European ‘Magna Carta’.7 Her foreign minister Douglas Hurd was equally
supportive, as was John Major once he became Prime Minister.8 For some Euro-
pean leaders, however, the idea of a speedy enlargement was just too big a leap of
the imagination. French President Francois Mitterand, for example, declared in
Prague that it would be several decades before the CEE states could become
members of the Community.9 The Commission for its part took a middle path at
this time, urging closer links but seeking to deflect the question of membership.10
In November 1989 the enthusiasm and readiness of the West to help was clearly
expressed.11 Altruism could indeed be detected, not just in the rhetoric but also in
the actual nature of the response.12 The heady atmosphere was captured in the
European Council’s declarations at the Strasbourg summit in December 1989
where it specifically acknowledged a ‘special responsibility’ for Central and Eastern
Europe and suggested that the Community was the only point of reference of
significance for the CEE states.13 This was despite the fact that the revolutions had
 1989 and beyond 15
caught the Community off guard. For the EU this was as much a question of
adjusting the cognitive, as well as the physical, map of Europe. EU policy,
according to Sedelmeier and Wallace, was characterized at this time by, among
other things, hyperactivity, enthusiastic pledges of support, and consensus that the
EU should play a leading role in the transformation process in CEE, even if it was
unclear what this might involve.14
Initially, talk of a Marshall-type Plan for Eastern Europe was commonplace,
with the EU appearing to acknowledge the existence of a moral imperative for
large-scale aid transfers to the eastern countries.15 The Luxembourg accord of June
1988, billed as the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Official Relations, led
to the initiation of bilateral trade deals with the CMEA member states, and can be
seen as ushering in a new phase of more normal relations.16 The Community
removed long-standing import quotas on a number of products and extended the
General System of Preferences (GSP) to the CEE countries. The Commission
began a major assessment of the progress of economic and political reform in the
region.17 The resulting Trade and Cooperation Agreements (TCAs) would, by
October 1990, be signed by all of the former Warsaw Pact states in Central and
Eastern Europe.18 A Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), formed
from former Comecon members, was also instituted in 1993 as an additional
mechanism for freeing up trade.19 This was in addition to a Central European
initiative – the so-called Visegrad declaration – which sought to turn the three
countries Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia into a single economic zone.20 Further
encouragement was garnered from the decisions made at the G24 summit of July
1989 (actually the G7 summit but recognized retrospectively as the wider G24
grouping), which provided substantive help to the reforming Eastern countries by
means of rescheduling of debt, provision of aid to tackle fiscal problems, and, most
significantly, commitments on aid for economic development. With respect to
pledges of financial aid, it is estimated that the G24 block together committed
approximately $45 billion over a three-year period.21 Further commitments were
made in the months that followed.22 Alan Mayhew’s calculations show that the
actual grant assistance delivered to the recipient countries amounted to only 15 per
cent of the headline figure promised.23
Despite the EU’s rhetorical support for the process of transition, however, the
reality was that doubt and vacillation soon replaced Western enthusiasm. Conse-
quently, a tremendous gap developed between, for example, the amount of aid
promised and that which was actually disbursed. Iver T. Berend showed that had
the Marshall Plan been emulated for Central and Eastern Europe, even on a
limited basis, with, for example, a Western contribution of only one half of one per
cent of GDP, this would have yielded up to $100 billion annually for reconstruction
and transition in Central and Eastern Europe.24 Nothing on this scale was real-
ized.25 If one shifts the focus to EU aid alone, and employs Berend’s model the
outcome reflects very poorly on the EU15. In 2004 the combined EU15 GDP
amounted to over €9 trillion. A Marshall-style financial aid programme would
have delivered approximately €90 billion per year to CEE. Even a contribution of
one half of one per cent of EU GDP would have yielded a figure of €45 billion
16 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
annually for a limited period. The financial package agreed for the acceding states
at the Copenhagen summit in 2002 amounted to a total of €40.8 billion for the
period 2004–2006.26 At first glance the headline figure seems quite generous. But it
equates only to approximately 0.15 per cent of EU15 GDP for each year 2004–
2006. Further probing, however, reveals a significant dilution of that headline
amount. It does not include contributions made to the EU budget by the incoming
states for 2004, 2005 and 2006. If that is factored in the net financial aid accorded
the CEE states in the period amounts to a sum of only €10.3 billion for 2004–2006.
That amounts to no more than one thousandth of EU GDP.27 As Table 2.1
demonstrates this is a very long way short of Marshall-era support and even signifi-
cantly less than the support the EU15 provide on a bilateral basis to developing
countries. The aggregate EU15 financial aid to developing countries amounts to

Table 2.1 EU GDP and potential financial aid to Central and Eastern Europe 2004–6

Country 2001 GDP (billion euros)

Austria 210
Belgium 257
Denmark 180
Finland 135
France 1446
Germany 2063
Greece 130
Ireland 116
Italy 1217
Luxembourg 22
Netherlands 427
Portugal 123
Spain 650
Sweden 234
United Kingdom 1591

EU15 Total GDP 8811

1% of EU15 GDP 88
0.5% of EU15 GDP 44
0.1% of EU GDP 8.8

Source: author’s calculations

 1989 and beyond 17
0.3 per cent of EU GDP, in other words about three times the amount the CEE
states will receive between 2004–2006.28
Further evidence of this apparent failure of response is provided by comparative
analysis of actual EC/EU aid to CEE and transfers to its own poorer member
states. In 1992, the peripheral EU countries (Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal)
received fifteen times more per capita than did the CEE countries.29 Ten years
later the gap had narrowed but was still very significant. Poland would receive €67
per capita, Hungary €49, Slovenia €41, and the Czech Republic €29 in the period
up to the end of the 2006 financial framework. By contrast, in 2000, Greece
received €437 per capita, while Ireland got €418, Spain €216 and Portugal €211.
Further, it was stipulated that aid to individual CEE states was not to exceed the
imposed ‘absorption capacity’ figure of 4 per cent of GDP. This threshold was set
much lower than had been the case in previous enlargement rounds. It is little
wonder that the CEE states look wistfully at the Cohesion states and their very
generous levels of subvention.30 The point is further put in perspective when one
considers that Ireland, although already by 2000 one of the richest states in the
Union, was still in receipt of almost six times more aid than was envisaged for
Poland.31 To further emphasize the lack of support offered CEE a comparison with
German transfers to its eastern Länder can be evinced: in 1993, these amounted to
a staggering $5900 per capita.32 In the decade after unification, net fiscal transfers
from the German Federal Government to the former East Germany amounted to
some 1.2 trillion DM. This figure amounts to ten times what the EU has allocated
in aid to all the CEE candidate countries in the financial framework to 2006.33 The
impression of the CEE countries remaining the poor relations is difficult to refute
and is reflected in the opinion of some that the Oder-Neisse line quickly trans-
muted into a new and lasting economic divide, separating Europe’s haves and
have-nots.34

PHARE
Notwithstanding the gap between EU commitments and disbursements, there did
emerge a more coherent collective approach to financial aid and economic re-
structuring in the transitioning states. The G24 conference of July 1989 committed
its members to aiding the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe.
Out of this would evolve a practical operational device to assist with financial aid
and technical matters. This became known as PHARE;35 it would eventually
encompass all of the CEE states.36 The European Commission at the time identi-
fied the prime missions of PHARE as supporting the process of economic transfor-
mation, with a focus on core areas such as industry, agriculture and energy, and
providing financial support for CEE efforts to reform and rebuild.37 In addition,
the programme included food and humanitarian aid, balance of payments help
and access to European Investment Bank (EIB) loans.38 PHARE soon became the
biggest assistance programme in CEE with funding increasing from an initial
amount of €500 million in 1990 to €1600 million in 1995. In total, the PHARE
programme allocated €4.2 billion for the period 1990–94; this increased to €6.693
18 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
billion for the period 1995–99, with another €4.7 billion provided between 1999
and 2002. The focus of PHARE would change in time from demand-driven
support for transition-related restructuring, developing in parallel with the pre-
accession strategy, into an entirely accession-driven instrument.39
If PHARE was intended as a crucial instrument for the support of restructuring
it quickly became apparent that inherent problems compromised its effective-
ness.40 Firstly, the financial support was very modest given the scale of ambitions
for PHARE. Second, analysts railed against the perceived inadequacies of the
PHARE distribution system and in particular against the preponderance of
western management consultants employed in implementation. Pflueger demon-
strated that only ten per cent of PHARE funds were channeled into investment in
the early 1990s, whereas management consultants, frequently from the west, pock-
eted vast amounts.41 Official concern was publicly expressed and this contributed
to a demonstrable loss of confidence in the programme on the CEE side.42 The EU
itself acknowledged the legitimacy of the complaints. In 1993, the EC Court of
Auditors brought into sharp focus the mismanagement of specific components of
the aid budget concluding that ‘almost none of the leading personnel in the
management units are nationals of the recipient countries. Thus, the claimed
recipient control over implementation seems specious.’43 The question of serious
fraud undermining the new aid programmes was also a recurring one. There did
not seem to be sufficiently rigorous scrutiny of EC aid.44 Further criticism of
PHARE was based on the employment of a mixture of bilateral and multilateral
aid, which at times compounded the problems of implementation and conspired
against the overall goals of the programme. A Belgian government memo expressed
the general frustration: it called for more consistency between the policies of
member states and that of the Community.45 The overall picture was one of good
intentions, compromised by administrative deficiencies and a lack of coordina-
tion.46 Acknowledgement of the inadequacies of the PHARE programme came at
the Copenhagen European Council summit meeting in June 1993. Consequently
PHARE took on a new and explicitly political orientation; it was redesigned to
keep pace with political developments, in particular with regard to a more concrete
accession scenario. After 1994 the programme was characterized by support for
the legislative framework and administrative structures, as well as for projects
promoting democratization and civil society, and for investment in infrastructure,
involving cross-border cooperation.47 The move to substantive capacity-building
had begun, even if it was somewhat tentative.
In addition to PHARE the EU also put in place two new financial institutions
intended to provide finance and advice to governments in Central and Eastern
Europe. These were the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EIB was guaranteed by the
EU and made project-based loans, targeted at productive or infrastructure invest-
ment available at competitive interest rates. EIB loans were hugely important for
the transitioning countries in the early 1990s when their access to investment
capital was negligible. Later investment would be focused on trans-European
infrastructure projects such as the upgrading of train and motorway routes.48 The
 1989 and beyond 19
EBRD, a French government initiative, was designed to provide support for
balance of payments problems, currency convertibility, and aid in instituting
programmes in technology, training and development.49 There was an enormous
amount of publicity attached to its launch on 15 April 1991.50 An amount of
disquiet, however, centred on both the choice of London as the headquarters for
the bank and on the activities of its larger-than-life president, Jacques Attali.51 As
early as 1991 there were suggestions that the bank was failing in its remit.52 At its
second annual meeting in London on 1 April 1993 there was uproar amid claims of
great extravagance.53 When Attali decided to resign there was little surprise.54 Even
after his departure, however, the Bank was dogged by negative publicity with
suggestions that management consistently favoured French companies and Gallic
interests.55 Nevertheless change was effected and the bank began to have an
impact.56

The Europe agreements

The third arm of early EU policy developed out of the existing template of associa-
tion and association agreements, which had been used to manage relations with
third countries since the inception of the EC.57 It became apparent that a deeper
form of association agreement would be required in managing relations with CEE.
Following on from the initial trade and cooperation agreements of 1989 and 1990,
the EU saw the need for a more effective institutional framework in which the new
relationships, both political and economic, might be consolidated. The Association
Agreements (or Europe Agreements as they were more commonly referred to)
were described as ‘second-generation’ agreements, symbolic of a second stage of
relations between the EU and the CEE countries. The first such Agreements, with
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, were signed on 18 December 1991 and
came into operation on 1 March 1992.58 The European Commission defined the
Agreements as ‘a legal, political and economic framework for the relationship of
the signatory CEE countries with the EU’.59 They provided the framework for
bilateral relations between the EU and its member states with the partner coun-
tries. Described as representing ‘far-reaching liberalization’ with respect to trade
and economic ties, the Agreements were viewed by the EU as a positive contribu-
tion to the CEE efforts to reduce the economic disparities with the EU member
states. They covered trade, political dialogue, legal approximation and other areas
of cooperation, including industry, environment, transport and customs. They
aimed progressively to establish a free trade area between the EU and the associ-
ated countries over a given period, on the basis of reciprocity, but applied in an
asymmetrical manner. According to the Commission, the Agreements were ‘based
on shared understanding and values’ and prepared the way for economic and
political convergence.60
For all of the normative rhetoric that framed the new EU–CEE relations, the
tectonic plates of economic reality continually impinged upon efforts at deeper
engagement. Testimony to the protectionist nature of the Europe Agreements
abounds.61 In this respect, they were frequently portrayed as being one-sided in
20 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
defending EU interests, and hardly representative of a mechanism designed to lead
to membership of the associated countries.62 CEE leaders were quick to point to the
incongruity of the EC position.63 Indeed, the delays and tensions which would
characterize much of the enlargement process to follow were very evident in the
negotiation of the Europe Agreements.64 Although the EC had made concessions
during the final negotiations, the Agreements nevertheless protected the so-called
‘sensitive’ sectors of key EU industries such as agricultural products, textiles and
coal and steel.65 These were the sectors where CEE producers wielded significant
comparative advantage relative to their EU competitors. Although the EU provided
greater market access, the restrictive features of the Agreements effectively limited
CEE market penetration. These sectors accounted for approximately 40 per cent of
total CEE exports. The impact of these restrictions on CEE trade may be gauged
by focusing on one important component of CEE trade: agricultural goods. The
clear trend is of a highly advantageous swing to the European Union in the terms of
trade. The EU, which in 1989 had a trade deficit in agricultural goods of some 960
million ECU, had by 1993 turned this into a surplus of 433 million ECU.66
Although CEE trade with the EU certainly increased, EU trade performance
improved much more significantly. Between 1995 and 2000, for example, while
EU total exports grew by 63 per cent, exports to CEE grew by 112 per cent.
Between 1995 and 2000, the EU’s global trade surplus amounted to some €45
billion. Its trade surplus with CEE, however, reached €100 billion, or more than
twice the global figure.67
The protectionist instincts of the EU were already evident during the negotiation
of the association agreements, as some member states sought to block generous
terms for the CEE countries.68 Mayhew identified three important results of such
use of instruments of commercial defence by the EU: it caused damage to the econ-
omies of the associated countries at a critical stage in their transition to market
economies, caused many in these countries to doubt the wisdom of trade liberaliza-
tion and had a negative impact on public opinion.69 Indeed, concern grew to such
an extent that Jacques Delors was forced to comment thus: ‘You cannot shed tears
of joy for the people of Eastern Europe one day and the next tell them that you will
not buy their products.’70 His view was shared across Europe.71 A second criticism
of the Europe Agreements was that they did not establish a clear link between asso-
ciation and membership.72 The Commission had attempted to pre-empt the argu-
ment by denying any clear relationship and stating that there was ‘no link either
explicit or implicit’ between association and accession with membership consti-
tuting a ‘totally separate question’.73 A formula in the preambles to the Agreements
recognized membership as a final objective of the CEE states. But this was very
different from endorsing in any way the prospect of CEE accessions.74
This hesitant and rather ungenerous response to CEE on the EU’s part was
predicated on a number of factors. First, the Union’s self-absorption in the early
1990s stands out. Paradoxically, the demise of Communism acted to the disadvan-
tage of the CEE-associated countries because it triggered an intensification of
Western European integration efforts.75 Indeed, Maastricht is singularly identified
as the quid pro quo for German Unification; the assurance of a united Germany’s
 1989 and beyond 21
renewed commitment to its EU partners. Suspicion of German hegemonic or
aggrandizing intent was not slow in materializing. Eastward enlargement, it was
widely thought, would benefit Germany economically and geopolitically much
more than any other EU member state. Thus, fear of the putative German giant
caused some of the present member states to steer enlargement along the ‘slow
lane’. For the CEE states this meant that, at precisely the moment of their return to
the mainstream European interstate arena, they were effectively locked out of the
central political process that would shape the future Europe. Their absence from
the Maastricht negotiations, for example, was striking.76 Exclusively the incumbent
members would determine the shape of the new European compact without any
input from the Central and Eastern European States. CEE leaders thus watched
Maastricht unfold with a great degree of concern.
Second, the impact of the 1990s Europe-wide recession on the member states,
and, later, the deflationary policies employed in many countries in order to
conform to the EMU convergence criteria, also had a measurable negative influ-
ence on the Union’s early approach to eastward enlargement. Budget deficits,
increased unemployment and attendant social strain resulted in the subordination
of enlargement to domestic policy issues in many member states in the early to mid
1990s. Third, the logistical problems encountered by the Commission in its efforts
to coordinate aid programmes for the CEE states were significant; it had never
before in its history been presented with a challenge on this scale. Dependent on
outside experts brought in on contract and with a lack of resources devoted to the
management of programmes in DG I, the Commission soon ran into implementa-
tion difficulties and lots of criticism. Sedelmeier and Wallace assert that the EU
found it easier to devise ad hoc policy than to design a more rounded approach.
This was a common charge, though mostly levelled with the benefit of hindsight
and with little regard to the problems relating to speed, timing, and staff and exper-
tise shortages.77 In addition, rivalries within the Commission – principally between
DG I and DGs III (industry) and VI (agriculture) – and within national administra-
tions – typically foreign ministries against sectoral ministries – contributed to the
problems in the early stages. Sedelmeier and Wallace present this as a ‘macro/
meso’ divide among policy makers, with ‘macro’ policy-makers (usually located
within the foreign ministries of national administrations) typically taking the long-
term view and being more sympathetic to the CEE concerns, while ‘meso’ policy-
makers (usually to be found in sectoral ministries) engaged in short-termism and
were very susceptible to the claims of special interests. Even within DG I there was
significant division along similar lines.78
Finally, the gradual realization, on the part of EU leaders, of the daunting insti-
tutional and policy implications of enlargement also encouraged caution and
inertia. Analysis of the micro-implications of enlargement was provided by a wide
range of commentators and by the European Commission and European Parlia-
ment.79 The shadow of enlargement thus hovered over every major internal EU
debate from the early 1990s onwards. Throughout that period growing concern
about the direction of EU policy towards Central and Eastern Europe manifested
itself on a regular basis. Indeed, a European Commission official was quoted as
22 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
saying: ‘The level of seriousness about enlargement is not minimal, it simply does
not exist.’80 The initial euphoria of 1989 then soon gave way to muted resignation
as the EU found that its response to the emerging democracies became increas-
ingly affected by the economic and political vicissitudes of both EU and global poli-
tics. For their part the CEE states continued to press for membership at the earliest
opportunity.81

Toward a new phase in relations: the Copenhagen

summit
If the peaceful revolutions of 1989 constituted a starting point for the EU’s efforts
to integrate Central and Eastern Europe into EU structures, then the decisions
taken by the European Council at Copenhagen in June 1993 represented no less
significant a milestone. Copenhagen provided real momentum, according to Peter
Ludlow, by transforming the enlargement question ‘from a theoretical possibility
to an agreed goal’, and by articulating substantial if vague criteria by which prog-
ress could be measured.82 In the run-up to the summit meeting the Commission
produced a new report on enlargement strategy.83 This proposed specific measures
for deepening the relationship with the associated countries, including accelerated
market access for the CEE states, increased economic and technical assistance, and
an intensification of political dialogue.84 Crucially also, it recommended that the
associated countries become eligible for accession once they met certain economic
and political conditions. EC foreign ministers, meeting in the General Affairs
Council (GAC) at Luxembourg on 8 June 1993, agreed in principle on measures to
accelerate the political and economic integration of CEE into the Community.
The European Council endorsed the Commission’s view, announcing that it
‘agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe shall become
members of the European Union’. As Graham Avery points out this was the first
time such a promise of membership had been extended to third countries even
before they had officially applied for it.85 Further, it was decreed that accession
would take place ‘as soon as the associated country is able to assume the obligations
of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required’.
These conditions included the achievement of stable institutions that guaranteed
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of
minority rights, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.86
The European Council also introduced another important criterion – the ability of
the Union to absorb new members ‘whilst maintaining momentum’ and without
compromising the deepening of the Union. Thus there was formed an explicit
linkage between further deepening and widening of the EU. Enlargement could
take place, as long as it did not impair the integrity of the integration process. The
European Council also agreed that ‘future cooperation with the associated coun-
tries shall be geared to the objective of membership’, thus establishing an explicit
link between cooperation and accession that did not exist in the Europe Agree-
ments. To this end, the European Council proposed the creation of a new
 1989 and beyond 23
‘structured relationship’ with the CEE states, which it defined as a ‘multilateral
framework for strengthened dialogue and consultation on matters of common
interest’.87 The structured relationship would consist of meetings between the
Council and its counterparts (government ministers) from the CEE states on policy
matters falling under each of the three pillars of EU activity: EC areas (single
market), CFSP, and JHA (immigration, asylum, combating organized crime
including the traffic of human beings). Separate procedures were also established
for meetings of foreign ministers under CFSP. The European Council also
proposed regular high-level meetings of the Commission President and EU Presi-
dency with their counterparts from the applicant states, and joint meetings of the
heads of state and government when appropriate.88
The Copenhagen summit also further elaborated measures to accelerate efforts
to open EC markets to CEE products, moving faster in this regard than was origi-
nally envisioned in the Europe Agreements.89 Important changes to the PHARE
programme came about as a response to the concerns about its efficacy.90 The
reorientation of PHARE included a new emphasis on infrastructural development.
The EC also committed itself to more financial assistance and help in the approxi-
mation of laws by providing training in EC law and procedure.91 As PHARE’s
objectives changed it became much more oriented towards the preparation of the
associated (later candidate) countries for accession.
In retrospect the Copenhagen Process was also notable for the activism displayed
by a range of different political actors. Most commentators now concede the
importance of the European Commission’s advocacy in pressing for the accommo-
dation of CEE preferences in respect of trade. Also of significance was the
approach adopted by CEE state representatives, much of which consisted of
reminding the EU leaders of the ‘historical obligation’ and ‘practical necessity’
which enlargement represented. In a key memorandum presented to the Commis-
sion in October 1992, the three Visegrad governments declared that:

Our three countries are convinced that stable democracy, respect for human
rights and continued policy of economic reforms will make accession possible.
We call upon the Communities and the member states to respond to our efforts
by clearly stating the integration of our economies and societies, leading to
membership of the Communities is the aim of the Communities themselves.
This simple, but historic statement would provide the anchor which we need. 92

The pressure from the CEE states was important in particular for highlighting
the gap between EU rhetoric about welcoming the post-Communist democracies
into the democratic and market capitalist fold, and the substance of actual EU
policy, which was much less accommodating of CEE interests. Through such pres-
sure, the CEE states exploited the feelings of moral obligation toward Central and
Eastern Europe held by many within the EU.93 To this we must add the pressure
exerted by the academic community and the governments of key member states.
The German government, in particular consistently argued that the post-Commu-
nist countries must be given a firm prospect of membership. During a visit to
24 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
Warsaw in February 1992, the then German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich
Genscher declared that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia should become full
EC members ‘as soon as possible’.94 The following month, he declared that these
countries should be admitted to the EC by the end of the decade.95 Even among the
member states that were less enthusiastic about enlargement, there was a growing
acceptance of the need to better integrate the CEE states. After Copenhagen the
enlargement process took on a more identifiable and discernible shape as new
modes of cooperation, adaptation and preparations for membership evolved.
3 Beyond Copenhagen
The deepening of EU–CEE relations

Introduction
For all of the positive developments that emerged from Copenhagen, progress was
difficult as ever in the months after the summit. At times it looked to the CEE states
as if the gap between the rhetorical commitments and EU action was alarming.
What was needed, it was frequently asserted, was a concrete timetable and a road
map for accession. This chapter examines the second stage in EU–CEE relations,
traces developments through the deepening of institutional relationships, and the
move to a firm pre-accession process. It concludes with an analysis of the 1999
Helsinki summit where enlargement was declared an ‘irreversible’ process by the
European Council.
In the aftermath of Copenhagen two particular problems presented themselves.
The first lay in the EU’s continued absorption with internal problems. With a
succession of exchange rate crises and attendant threats to the plans to launch
EMU, along with the problematic ratification of the TEU, enlargement seemed to
recede in importance.1 To this was added the distraction presented by the ongoing
accession negotiations with the EFTA states – Austria, Sweden, Finland and
Norway.2 A wide-ranging Commission policy review was followed by further
reform of PHARE and declarations stressing the need for the CEE states to harmo-
nize their competition and state-aid policies with EU regulation in these areas.3
The Commission’s strategy came together in a wide-ranging policy document
published in September.4 Perhaps less obvious, but nonetheless significant, was the
fact that with the arrival of the Santer Commission at the beginning of 1995, ‘there
was a major shift in priorities and commitment’. Jacques Santer and his Chef de
Cabinet Jim Cloos approached enlargement in reactive rather than proactive
terms. Where Delors and his team had taken a lead and acted as persuaders for
unity, Santer and his team were much more cautious in their approach; their essen-
tial view of enlargement was, according to one informed insider, one of ‘disbelief in
the feasibility of the enterprise’. They held to a ‘firm conviction that the EU would
do damage to itself, if it tried to go too far too fast’.5
Notwithstanding the inertia produced by this cautious approach, a deepening of
relations in the economic sphere continued apace.6 The integration of political and
security structures also came on to the agenda, if at a slower pace and fashioned
26 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
through more minimalist clothes. In early March 1994, plans for greater foreign
policy cooperation were aired which included plans for yearly meetings among the
EU Presidency, the Commission and the heads of state or government of the asso-
ciated countries as well as special Council meetings involving the foreign ministers
of the associated countries. The Council’s plan also provided for formal coopera-
tion between the EU and associated countries at international conferences. Signifi-
cantly, it provided them with the opportunity to associate with EU statements on
individual foreign policy questions and created the possibility of joint foreign policy
actions by the EU and the associated countries. Thus the extension of the nascent
CFSP began to take shape.
In the spring of 1994 the first formal applications for membership by the CEE
states were made.7 These formal applications only increased the pressure on the
EU to develop a strategy to prepare the associated states for membership and
added to existing tensions within the EU on the direction of policy. Especially
evident at this time was the divide between northern and southern member states.
This was partially resolved with a compromise that saw the southern member
states, led by France and Spain, accept the need for eastern enlargement, while the
German government endorsed the idea of a new Mediterranean policy (which
would become the Barcelona Process). With this agreement in place, the way was
clear for the institution of a comprehensive pre-accession strategy. At the Corfu
summit on 24–5 June 1994, the European Council asked the Commission to make
specific proposals to advance the process. Specifically, it called for a clear pre-
accession strategy to follow up on the Copenhagen decisions.
The Commission’s response to the Council request emerged within weeks. The
communication, entitled The Europe Agreements and Beyond, outlined the major
components of the pre-accession strategy:

The goal for the period before accession should be the progressive integration
of the political and economic systems as well as the foreign and security poli-
cies of the associated countries and the Union, together with increased cooper-
ation in the fields of justice and home affairs, so as to create an increasingly
unified area.8

The conscious effort to link pillars two and three to the most integrated area of
activity (pillar one) was most striking. This was backed up by the insistence that all
acceding states would have to accept not only the acquis communautaire but also the
acquis politique and the finalité politique of the Union. In this sense, the EU approach
was markedly different to that of previous enlargement rounds. The CEE states
were effectively set a much higher threshold than had ever been set for prospective
members. The Commission claimed that the existing ‘structured relationship’ held
out the dual benefit of promoting a closer working relationship between the EU
and the CEE states, while encouraging cooperation in resolving collective (or
trans-European) problems.9 However, the Commission called for expansion of the
structured relationship beyond joint meetings with the Council to include other
EU institutions, especially the European Parliament. It also argued that CFSP and
 Beyond Copenhagen 27
JHA issues should be included in the EU’s multilateral dialogue with the associated
states.10 The main focus of the Commission’s proposed strategy, however, was inte-
grating the CEE states into the Community’s internal market. Thus the greatest
importance was attached to the transposition of EU law into the domestic legisla-
tion of the CEE states. In a more detailed follow-up, the Commission proposed
specific measures for promoting its pre-accession strategy. These included recom-
mendations regarding critical policy areas, from state aid and competition policy to
further changes to the PHARE programme, and suggestions on the further adapta-
tion of the corpus of EU law and new financial aid instruments.11
While the Commission spearheaded EU strategy, it was also greatly promoted
by the German government, which held the EU presidency in the second half of
1994. Upon assuming the presidency, the Kohl government declared that progress
on enlargement was a key goal of its term in office.12 Germany encouraged an
‘enhanced structured relationship’ that would be multilateral in nature and would
complement existing bilateral meetings held under the Europe Agreements. Such
an arrangement would allow representatives of the associated states to participate
in extended meetings of the Council of Ministers and European Council.13 Not all
member states favoured this arrangement, however, and in securing this agree-
ment the German presidency, as Baun shows, had to overcome the fears of some
member state governments that Bonn was trying to give the CEE states EU
membership ‘through the backdoor’.14 With the invitation to CEE leaders to
attend the Essen summit, scheduled for 9–10 December 1994, the German feeling
was that this represented an important symbolic gesture, because it would send the
CEE states an unequivocal message that the EU was ‘not a closed shop’. As Helmut
Kohl put it: ‘we want to show that these countries will be welcome if they want to
join’.15 Exactly five years after the Berlin Wall had come down, however, ideas
about how to best realize enlargement were far from clear.16
If, in retrospect, the 1993 Copenhagen summit is identified as the summit which
laid out the macro-basis for a successful eastern enlargement, then the Essen
summit should be viewed as no less important in terms of outlining the micro-
agenda of economic reform necessary to prepare the associated countries for
membership. In Essen, EU leaders formally approved a comprehensive pre-acces-
sion strategy. Following the Commission’s original proposals, this strategy had two
key parts: first, an enhanced structured relationship, and second, a White Paper
drawn up by the Commission that would provide a ‘route plan’ for progressively
integrating the CEE states into the Single Market.17 The enhanced structured rela-
tionship was aimed at integrating the associated countries politically and at
promoting cooperation between the EU and the associated countries in addressing
common problems. It also aimed at socializing them into the complex process of
EU policy formation and decision-making.18 Again, the emphasis was cross-pillar
in nature. Although the primary focus of the Essen framework was economic, there
was also a symbolic and normative importance attached to having the CEE leaders
present.19 Just as important was the inclusion of an insistence on ‘good neighbourly
relations’, effectively a new pre-condition for membership, which in time would
evolve into the Pact on Stability in Europe. Based on a French plan,20 the Pact was
28 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
designed to help ‘resolve the problems of minorities and strengthen the inviolability
of frontiers’. In addition, it was supposed to be a ‘staple component of a joint action
to promote stability and peace in Europe’ and help ‘reinforce the democratic
process and regional cooperation in CEE’.21 In the end, the Pact was a success for
the fledgling CFSP and a positive step in the EU’s efforts to become an effective
external actor. By helping to resolve potentially dangerous bilateral disputes, the
pact promoted stability and security in CEE.22 It also helped to create the political
and security preconditions for enlargement by minimizing the security risks of
taking in new member states.
The main element of the pre-accession strategy set out at Essen was, however,
the outline of a detailed road map for integrating the CEE economies into the
Single Market. The European Council requested the Commission to prepare and
deliver this White Paper in time for its next regularly scheduled meeting at Cannes
in June 1995. Despite a number of problems, the Commission delivered on the
request and approved the final version of the White Paper in early May.23 The
stated purpose of the White Paper was to provide guidance to assist the associated
countries in preparing themselves for operating under the requirements of the
European Union’s internal market.24
Baun suggests that the White Paper did three things. First, it identified the key
legislation (or elements of the acquis communautaire), to be adopted by the associated
countries in domestic law; second, it stressed that the simple transposition of EU
legislation by the associated countries would not be enough. Each country was
required to put in place a comprehensive legal and administrative infrastructure
capable of supporting the legislation. Many felt that this represented the greatest
challenge facing the candidate states. Finally, the White Paper also outlined the
various forms of financial and technical assistance the EU would provide the CEE
states to help in the reform process.25 Although there were many complaints from
the associated countries, the EU insisted that the measures were non-negotiable.
Commissioner van den Bröek pointed out that the White Paper was not an
obstacle but rather an essential mechanism which would facilitate economic adap-
tation in the CEE states.26 The European Council at its Cannes summit formally
approved the White Paper. In stressing the importance of not just the transposition
but actual implementation of key legislative instruments, the White Paper presented
the process of adaptation as both technical and horizontal, in every sense a rational
policy process. This meant that it reduced the opportunities for veto groups on the
EU side to intervene and block progress. There were both practical and tactical
reasons for using this sort of approach. Seen in this light the White Paper stands out
as a proactive measure by the Commission to draw out opponents of deeper
engagement with CEE.27
Given the impetus provided by successive summits, it seemed that the essential
building blocks were now successfully in place. Not surprisingly attention increas-
ingly turned to the issue of a timetable for accession. During a visit to Warsaw,
Chancellor Kohl promised that Poland, and by implication Hungary and the
Czech Republic, would enter the EU by 2000. He thus became the first EU leader
to advance a prospective date for enlargement. According to Baun, Kohl’s statement
 Beyond Copenhagen 29
surprised ‘almost everyone’ and Bonn officials were soon backtracking, suggesting
that the date should only be regarded as an assurance of future entry: it need not
actually happen prior to or on the date.28 However, German government officials
also acknowledged that Kohl was setting out a strategy that Germany intended to
pursue.29
In advance of the Madrid summit (15–16 December 1995) the European
Council asked the Commission to prepare official Opinions on all ten CEE coun-
tries and to forward these to the Council as soon as possible after the conclusion of
the intergovernmental conference, due to begin in early 1996 under the Italian
Presidency. It also asked the Commission to prepare a ‘composite paper’ on
enlargement and to pursue further its analysis of the impact of enlargement on EU
policies, especially the CAP and structural funds.30 These various reports and anal-
yses would form the basis of the Commission’s document, Agenda 2000, which
would be published in July 1997. Given the large number of countries to be
assessed and the short timeframe in which to produce the Opinions the exercise
represented a considerable test of the Commission’s organizational capacity.31 By
the end of 1995, the focus of policy had thus switched firmly from pre-accession to
an accession scenario, though there were still many contingent factors, not least,
the upcoming IGC.32

The Luxembourg and Helsinki summits

The impression that the enlargement process was one where each step forward was
followed by the proverbial two steps back was yet again reinforced when in 1996
the EU’s agenda shifted once more to domestic issues, namely the IGC scheduled
to be formally launched in Florence in March 1996, and the continuing difficulties
faced by many countries in meeting the Maastricht criteria for monetary union.
Although advances in the structured dialogue were noted, it was clear that further
decisions on enlargement could be taken only when the Commission had completed
its various analyses.33 These were due to be delivered prior to the June 1997
Amsterdam summit, which would conclude the IGC process. The Commission
began work on the Opinions in early 1996.34
The Opinions were primarily technical assessments of the capacity of each
applicant to assume the obligations of membership. The Commission took into
account information provided by each candidate country, assessments made by
the member states of the Union, European Parliament reports and resolutions, the
analysis of other international organisations such as the Council of Europe (CoE),
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Interna-
tional Financial Institutions (IFIs).35 They were intended as an aid to the European
Council, which would make the final political decisions about the opening of acces-
sion negotiations with individual candidate countries.36 The Commission’s work
involved an assessment of the compatibility of the laws, regulations and policies of
the applicant countries with the acquis communautaire, as well as their ability to trans-
pose EU legislation.37 The Commission also had to take account of the prevailing
political and economic conditions in the associated countries in accordance with
30 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
the Copenhagen criteria. On 16 July the Commission formally presented the
Opinions (avis in French) as part of the Agenda 2000 report.38 The Opinions differed
from previous enlargement rounds in some crucial respects. Most importantly,
they did not evaluate the applicants’ preparedness for membership at the time of
assessment, but rather in the medium term.
The Commission identified problems in each applicant country with estab-
lishing the rule of law and ensuring fundamental freedoms. However, only
Slovakia was given an overall negative evaluation in the form of explicit references
to, among other things, the treatment of the parliamentary opposition and the lack
of independence of the judiciary. Consequently, the Commission recommended
that Slovakia be excluded from the group of applicants with which the EU should
open accession negotiations, even though it met the economic criteria for begin-
ning accession. The treatment of Slovakia demonstrated clearly that the Union’s
political criteria were non-negotiable. Whilst there was some latitude in relation to
economic issues such as market access and agricultural reform, no such approach
could be adopted on the fundamental value system upon which the Union was
founded.
In addition to the Opinions and a report on enlargement strategy, Agenda 2000
also contained the Commission’s analysis of key EU policies and their future
development. In particular, it focused on the CAP and the Structural and
Cohesion funds, two policy sectors that together consumed a great majority
(approximately 80 per cent) of the EU budget.39 The third part contained the
Commission’s proposed financial framework for the 2000–6 period. In this
section the Commission argued that enlargement could be accomplished without
any increased budgetary contributions from the member states. Instead, EU
spending would be kept within the 1.27 per cent budget ceiling agreed at the Edin-
burgh summit in December 1992. The Commission’s financial perspective included
spending on agricultural and structural assistance for new members and pre-acces-
sion aid for the applicant states not included in the first wave. The proposals would
be the subject of intensive debate and intergovernmental negotiations over the next
two years, before a final agreement was reached at the Berlin summit in March
1999.40 The Commission recommended in effect that enlargement should take
place in a series of ‘waves’, and that a policy of differentiation (among the appli-
cants) should be adopted. Although this led to charges of favouritism, the Commis-
sion retorted that its strategy was not based on exclusion of any associated country
but rather ‘it is a process of inclusion, which will be pursued permanently’.41 Reac-
tion to the package, needless to say varied according to cost–benefit calculations of
both insiders and outsiders.42
Agenda 2000 helped shift the enlargement debate to new ground, according to
Sedelmeier and Wallace. In effect, the EU had moved to consider the practical
policy and institutional implications of enlargement and away from purely
external matters such as trade liberalization and political dialogue. The external
was now rapidly becoming the internal.43 Agenda 2000 also allowed for a much
more transparent analysis of progress made by individual candidate states. Each
state could now compare its own performance in specific areas to that of other
 Beyond Copenhagen 31
candidate states and engage in thinking about the type of policy changes neces-
sary to sustain progress. The availability of much more information on the differ-
ential rates of progress being made by the candidate states also arguably helped
provide a template for EU policy-makers to move the enlargement game forward
in a more substantive way. It could equally be argued, however, that Agenda 2000
further muddied the enlargement waters. The Commission’s insistence on balanced
and uniform language, designed to bolster reforms whilst underlining the impor-
tance of better and more substantive progress left candidate states none the wiser
as to the desired pathways of reform in given policy areas. This was especially the
case with CFSP and JHA.44 Neither did the new approach betray any clue as to
the eventual date of accessions.
The main instrument that would underpin the Commission’s ‘reinforced pre-
accession strategy’ would be the bilateral ‘Accession Partnerships’ (APs). These
would identify specific priorities for reform in each country; each applicant would
make precise commitments and outline the ways in which the PHARE programme
would support such commitments.45 These Partnerships provided, inter alia, for a
single framework covering the priorities in and preparations for accession in each
candidate country.46 Each candidate country would receive its own specific set of
accession-related goals and objectives. Future aid would then be conditional upon
the achievement of specified objectives and the general direction of reforms. The
Commission also recommended increased participation by the applicant countries
in various EU educational, cultural, and technological programmes as part of the
enhanced pre-accession strategy. Toward the end of March 1998 the EU finalized
and approved its Accession Partnerships for each of the CEE candidate states.47
These included National Programs for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAAs) within a
precise timetable, focusing on the priority areas outlined by the Commission in its
Opinions. In this sense, each NPAA complemented the Association Partnership: it
contained a timetable for achieving the priorities and objectives and, where
possible, indicated the human and financial resources to be allocated. The Acces-
sion Partnerships would also provide a single framework for EU financial aid and
constitute the basis for the Commission’s annual reports on the progress of the
candidate states.
Each of the Accession Partnerships followed a similar format, setting out both
short- and medium-term objectives. These reflected the various chapters of the
acquis communautaire and covered areas such as the political criteria for membership,
economic reform, reinforcement of institutional and administrative capacity, prep-
aration for membership of the internal market, justice and home affairs, agricul-
ture, environment, transport, employment and social affairs, regional policy, and
cohesion.48 The Partnerships would contain precise commitments on the part of
the candidate countries relating in particular to democratic norms, macroeco-
nomic stabilization, industrial restructuring, nuclear safety, and the adoption of the
acquis, focusing on the priority areas identified in each of the Commission Opin-
ions. The programming of accession priorities, as set out in the Opinions, broke
down into short-, medium- and long-term priorities to be adjusted in subsequent
revisions of the Association Partnerships. The progress made by each applicant
32 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
country would be recorded in a screening process and thereafter in individual
annual reports.49
Although welcomed by CEE governmental leaders, the Accession Partnerships
also came in for some criticism, not least for the strictly defined conditionality that
accompanied many of the constituent elements of the process. The asymmetry of
positions between insiders and outsiders was obvious.50 Not unnaturally, CEE
governments were upset at the explicit linkage within the framework of the Part-
nerships between future aid and the progress of reforms. Sedelmeier and Wallace
thus concluded that ‘the language of partnership disguises rather thinly the imposi-
tion of EU priorities’.51 Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, it seems clear
that the Accession Partnerships provided an important institutional step toward
immersing and integrating the candidate states in Community structures. Famil-
iarity with EU best practice, with respect to issues such as the certification and
standardization of professional bodies, or the norms pertaining to structural and
cohesion funding would prove important as the process developed. The Partner-
ships thus represented a further step toward substantive institutionalization of rela-
tions short of membership.
In accordance with the priorities of the Association Partnerships, PHARE’s role
changed again. Two clear priorities emerged. First, because the capacity of the
candidate countries to implement the acquis was deemed paramount, PHARE
would help national and regional administrations – as well as regulatory, supervi-
sory and other bodies – in the candidate countries to familiarize themselves with
Community law and procedures. Second, PHARE would continue to help the
candidate countries bring their industries and economic infrastructure up to EU
standards by helping mobilize the investment required to drive forward technolog-
ical change and sectoral competitiveness. Particular emphasis was to be accorded
to areas such as environment, transport, industrial plant, and quality standards in
products, all areas where EU norms were becoming increasingly demanding.
PHARE was also allotted a key role in helping with institution-building in the
candidate countries. This work centred on adapting and strengthening democratic
institutions, public administration, and organizations that had a responsibility in
implementing and enforcing Community legislation. It included the development
of relevant structures, human resources and management skills and training for a
wide range of civil servants, public officials, professionals and relevant private
sector actors: from judges and financial controllers to environmental inspectors
and statisticians, to name but a few. After the Luxembourg summit PHARE
funds were channelled specifically toward these institution-building needs. Later
PHARE would be used as a learning vehicle of sorts for the administrative under-
pinning of the structural funding regimes for the new member states.52 A review of
PHARE commissioned by Gunter Verheugen in 1999 showed that the reforms
introduced in 1997 had begun to show positive results even if still quite uneven in
terms of outcomes.53
 Beyond Copenhagen 33
Capacity-building instruments
The EU’s support for pre-accession reforms in CEE also took on a more goal-
oriented form with the introduction of three new instruments of support. The
Commission saw these instruments as the most important pillars of the re-struc-
turing programmes underway in the candidate states. The Instrument for Struc-
tural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) was launched in 1998. It provided support
for the emerging regional entities in CEE and closely paralleled the existing EU
structures supporting structural and cohesion funding.54 The Special Accession
Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) would become
the second plank of administrative capacity building. SAPARD foresaw the dele-
gation of substantial responsibility to the candidate states themselves regarding the
management of EU funds for rural development.55 The Commission also showed
some innovation by encouraging meaningful local participation including social
partners, NGOs and local representatives.56 The third and final pre-accession
instrument, the Twinning project, was launched in March 1998. Twinning aimed
to help the candidate countries in their development of modern and efficient public
administrations, with the structures, human resources, and management skills
needed to implement the acquis communautaire. Twinning provided the framework
for administrations and semi-public organizations in the candidate countries to
work with their counterparts in specific member states. The main feature of the
Twinning mechanism was that it set out to deliver specific and guaranteed results
and not to foster general cooperation. The parties agreed in advance on detailed
programmes designed to meet objectives concerning priority areas of the acquis.
The key input from the member state administration came in the form of a core
team made up of at least one pre-accession adviser seconded to work full time for a
minimum of a year in the corresponding ministry of the candidate country, and a
senior project leader responsible for the overall thrust and coordination of the
project. They were supplemented by carefully planned and timed missions of other
specialists, training events, and awareness-raising activities.
The assessment of such capacity-building efforts by the EU yields mixed results.
In May 2003 the Court of Auditors reported on environmental aid programmes
(effectively an audit of PHARE/ISPA) and on Twinning. It was clear that the
acceding states still had a lot of work to do to build their administrative capacity for
implementation. Certain EU projects designed to assist institution-building could
be seen, at best, as only partially successful.57 The finding on Twinning was that it
had not lived up to initial expectations. Significant progress was made, according
to the Auditors, in adopting Community law, but much less on implementation
and enforcement. It admitted that it was ‘too optimistic’ to expect that ‘fully-func-
tioning, efficient and sustainable’ candidate country organization could be estab-
lished within a framework of a single project – eighteen months on average. In
addition the Court described the Twinning project as excessively bureaucratic,
with lengthy periods between needs-assessment and project-realisation, as well as
having complicated payment systems. The old PHARE problem of deficiencies in
consultant performance was again in evidence. Management shortcomings on
34 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
both the candidate state and Commission sides were noted. The low level of take-
up of ISPA projects in some candidate countries was telling.58
The PHARE annual report for 2002 and the interim evaluation produced in
March 2004 (covering the period 1999 through to November 2003) highlighted
the strengths and weaknesses of the different forms of capacity-building. The
reports revealed an increased emphasis on support for national programmes
(NPAAs) designed to address specific weaknesses identified in the annual Commis-
sion reports. The 2002 report detailed spending of €1700 million for the year was
achieved including some 191 Twinning projects.59 Some of the internal judge-
ments on PHARE were extremely critical however. The 2004 report stressed that
as many as one-third of programmes proved unsatisfactory with substantial weak-
nesses in needs analysis and design.60 The most effective of the various programmes
were those in the sphere of civil society, where there seemed convincing evidence
of successful capacity-building among NGOs.61 Despite the negative assessment
of the programmes most candidate countries could point to some successes in
achieving macro policy objectives by the time accession came around. Poland,
despite difficulties with ISPA, succeeded in meeting most of its environmental
targets. Similarly the Czech Republic could cite improved air quality partly as a
result of PHARE-funded monitoring instruments and expert help.62

The Luxembourg summit

After Agenda 2000 the sequencing of both intra-EU decisions and accession negoti-
ations started to take a much clearer shape. The issue of enlargement strategy,
however, continued to be the subject of considerable debate within the Commis-
sion. This came to a head in early July 1998. By this point, there was general agree-
ment that differentiation among the CEE applicants was necessary, and that an
‘enlargement in waves’ strategy was preferable to a common start or so-called ‘big
bang’. Disagreement remained, however, on the number of countries to be included
in the first wave.63 The main proponents of a broader first wave were Commissioner
van den Bröek and the Nordic Commissioners. President Santer was among those
who favoured limiting the first wave to a smaller number of countries. On 10 July,
after an intense week of discussion, the full Commission met to endorse van den
Bröek’s proposal for opening negotiations with five CEE states plus Cyprus. There-
after, this would become known as the five-plus-one strategy. Michael Baun argues
that the intervention of two important Commissioners, the United Kingdom’s
Leon Brittan (trade) and Germany’s Martin Bangemann (industry), was critical.
Each argued that the two countries which were the main subject of debate, Estonia
and Slovakia, were prepared for accession negotiations based on an objective
assessment of economic performance and that to exclude them would amount to
political discrimination.64 In recommending that the EU begin negotiations with
five CEE countries, the Commission claimed that its decision was based on objec-
tive performance and adherence to specified economic and political criteria by the
applicant states.65
The European Council, meeting in Luxembourg on 12–13 December 1997,
 Beyond Copenhagen 35
formally decided to begin the accession process for the ten CEE states plus Cyprus.
In the Presidency Conclusions the European Council underlined the historic
significance of this decision, declaring that ‘with the launch of the enlargement
process we see the dawn of a new era, finally putting an end to the divisions of the
past’.66 To provide an inclusive framework for enlargement, the Council decided to
set up a European Conference ‘which will bring together the member states of the
European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it and sharing its
values and internal and external objectives’.67 The European Council also decided
that formal accession negotiations would be launched in March 1998. The deci-
sions were generally welcomed by the applicant countries, including those not in
the first wave of negotiations.
The first phase of the accession process for all applicants was the analytical
examination or ‘screening’ of the 31 chapters of the acquis communautaire. The
Commission, with the help of the applicant countries, carried out this exercise. By
early summer 1998 the screening process was well under way and the EU was
contemplating the next step, the launching of substantive negotiations with the
first-wave countries.68 Those negotiations actually began on 29 October, with a
deputy-level meeting in Brussels between EU permanent representatives and the
chief negotiator of each of the six applicant states. The European Council followed
the Commission’s recommendation of a two-tier approach, even if this was to be
subsumed within a ‘single framework’ that would treat the second-wave candidate
countries as equals and give them the chance to catch up. From this point attention
focused on the Commission, which was expected to issue the first of its ‘Regular
Reports’ on candidate countries’ progress in meeting the criteria in late 1998.
The lobbying efforts of the second-wave countries were quite intense in the run-
up to the publication of the Commission’s second set of Regular Reports in
December, as government leaders from these countries visited Brussels.69 The
hopes of the second-wave countries were disappointed, however. Whilst the
Commission praised the reform efforts made by the second-wave countries, it
nevertheless restated its view that none was ready to begin accession negotiations.70
In the aftermath of the Kosovo War in 1999, the Commission proposed that
accession negotiations should be opened with all remaining candidate countries.71
This was despite doubts about whether some had made enough progress in their
preparations.72 Clearly the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo propelled much
more serious thought on enlargement strategy.73 Momentum was in evidence
from early in the year. Even the resignation crisis that destabilized the Santer
Commission failed to have a serious impact on the process.74 This strategy
rethink reflected the shift in focus to Southeastern Europe and support grew for
the idea of including Bulgaria and Romania in the accession negotiations. Many
felt that to continue to exclude them would send the wrong message, thus under-
mining their efforts at political and economic reform with potentially disastrous
consequences for stability and security in Southeastern Europe.75 It was also felt
that Bulgaria and Romania should be rewarded for their (domestically unpopular)
support for NATO’s bombing campaign against their neighbour Serbia, a fellow
Orthodox country. The EU also recognized the economic hardship these countries
36 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
faced in the wake of the Kosovo conflict and agreed that this deserved special consid-
eration in the EU’s decisions on enlargement strategy. The UK and Germany were
especially active in promoting the change of strategy, with Prime Minister Tony
Blair visiting Bulgaria and Romania in May 1999 and promising to work for their
inclusion in negotiations.76
The Commission took the view that Slovakia alone did not satisfy the Copen-
hagen political criteria, but stressed the importance of institution-building in the
candidate countries, especially reform of the judiciary and public administration.77
In justifying the Commission’s new ‘regatta’ approach for accession negotiations,
President Prodi declared that it was necessary to ‘take a bold step forward’. Thus,
the Commission recommended to the Council that it open accession negotiations
in 2000 with all applicants that had met the Copenhagen political criteria, and that
‘have proved ready to take the necessary measures to comply with the economic
criteria’. Commenting on the decision, Commissioner Verheugen argued:

This strategy will help strike the right balance between two potentially con-
flicting objectives in the enlargement process: speed and quality. Speed is of
the essence because there is a window of opportunity for enhanced momentum
in the preparations for enlargement, in accordance with the expectations of the
candidate countries. Quality is vital because the EU does not want partial
membership, but new members exercising full rights and responsibilities.78

The element of conditionality was strong once more with the Commission
insisting that the opening of negotiations with Bulgaria should be conditional on a
decision by the Bulgarian authorities before the end of 1999 on acceptable closure
dates for the Kozludy nuclear power plant. In the case of Romania, the opening of
negotiations would depend on progress in reform of childcare institutions. At an
extraordinary meeting in Tampere, Finland, several days after the Commission
issued its report, the European Council largely endorsed the Commission’s new
strategy. A broad consensus among the member states in favour of the Commis-
sion’s plan to expand the accession negotiations was reported, thus paving the way
for a formal decision at Helsinki.79
At the Helsinki European Council on 10–11 December 1999 the decision was
taken to formally invite the second-wave candidates – Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Latvia, and Lithuania – to open accession negotiations in early 2000. It was also
announced that, in the accession negotiations, ‘each candidate will be judged on its
own merits’.80 With these decisions the EU formally abandoned the strategy of
‘enlargement in waves’ that had been adopted at Luxembourg and guided the
process in the interim period. In explaining the change Commissioner Verheugen
argued that the political situation had changed completely, making it necessary
to adopt a more inclusive strategy, in particular with respect to Southeastern
Europe.81 Verheugen described the summit’s decision as an historic step towards
the unification of Europe, declaring ‘the iron curtain has been definitively
removed’.82 The Helsinki summit also represented a major turning point in EU
relations with Turkey, and specifically, Turkey’s place within the accession
 Beyond Copenhagen 37
83
framework. Turkey would now be considered as a candidate country although
there was no question of opening negotiations at that stage. Whilst it is clear that
Helsinki represented a major step forward in the process there was still an amount
of work to be done to ‘seal the deal’.84 The next two and a half years would involve
complex and protracted negotiations, periods of regression, and eventually a
triumphal end to negotiations at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002.
4 Closing the deal
Helsinki to Copenhagen

Introduction
If Helsinki had produced a commitment from the EU that enlargement was now
‘irreversible’ then the millennium began with the now familiar shadow-boxing that
had characterized the process over the previous six years. The EU desired more
tangible evidence of successful transposition and implementation in the candidate
states, while on the candidate state side the by now regular expressions of frustra-
tion were never far from the surface. The momentum gained at Helsinki was not
totally lost, however. Some member states pressed the initiative using the language
of the timetable outlined at Helsinki to make the case for a concrete date.1
In the Commission’s third series of Regular Reports in November 2000, the
same basic procedure was followed as in 1998 and 1999.2 The Commission’s atten-
tion was focused on whether the reforms announced or recommended had actually
been implemented since 1998. It also assessed each candidate country’s progress in
terms of ability to implement the acquis. The Commission’s chief concern was the
‘revitalization’ of the negotiations, to ‘take them into a more substantial phase’, and
point the way toward a conclusion. The need to reinforce administrative and judi-
cial reform was again a major concern.3 As to the specific requirements embodied
in the acquis the picture was generally positive. Many of the legislative changes that
the enlargement process required either had been made or were in the process of
being introduced. There was also a marked improvement in implementation
capacity.
The Regular Reports were accompanied by an Enlargement Strategy Paper,
which contained a new accession ‘road map’.4 The ‘road map’ effectively revolved
around the negotiation of the 31 ‘negotiating chapters’ of the acquis and was under-
stood as a timetable for completing the negotiations, chapter by chapter, by the end
of 2002.5 Negotiations on each chapter could only begin when both parties – the
EU and the candidate countries – were in a position to communicate their respec-
tive starting positions. This process alone required a considerable amount of effort,
not least on the EU side, where every draft ‘common position’ submitted by the
Commission had to be approved by the Council. In nine cases out of ten, this
meant agreement within the Council Working Group on Enlargement composed
of middle-ranking officials in the member states’ permanent representations.6
 Closing the deal 39
The French Presidency
With substantive negotiations under way France took over the Presidency of the
EU in July 2000. Although many were disappointed by the results the EU did at
least manage agreement on the institutional reforms necessary to underpin the
enlarged Union. The European Council also endorsed the Commission’s road
map and made important gestures towards non-EU states, particularly those of the
Western Balkans.7 Most commentators, however, took a very negative view of the
French Presidency’s impact on the course of negotiations. At both the Biarritz
summit in October and the Nice summit in December, Jacques Chirac, the French
President, tried to force unilaterally formulated decisions on France’s EU part-
ners.8 Matters were not helped by the complications of French domestic politics,
with growing ‘cohabitation’ rivalry evident between Prime Minister Jospin and
President Chirac in the weeks leading up to the Nice summit. In fact, the French
EU Presidency frequently put forward draft texts that were then opposed by the
French government delegation sitting at the same table. Diplomats from other EU
states also found that points apparently agreed during negotiations in Brussels
acquired a different spin after having been sent back to Paris to be formulated as
texts for further negotiation.9
The shabby bargaining surrounding institutional recalibration was perhaps best
symbolized by President Chirac, who ‘like a late medieval Pope doling out indul-
gences to prop up an impossible cause, ended up distributing parliamentary seats
to anybody who looked likely to cause trouble’.10 All of this contributed to an atmo-
sphere in which everybody looked for trophies rather than consensus’.11 This
would not be the last time that French politicians wrought controversy and uncer-
tainty upon the enlargement negotiations. In late 2001 foreign minister Hubert
Védrine caused consternation in Brussels by suggesting that Bulgaria and
Romania should both be fast-tracked to join the other eight CEE states in an even
larger ‘big bang’ enlargement. Citing the need for fairness and the risk of leaving
the two countries behind, Védrine argued that there wasn’t much difference
between adding ten or twelve countries. Many commentators interpreted his
suggestion as one designed to derail rather than accelerate enlargement and based
on a view that the French government in fact was terrified at the implications of
enlargement and the prospect of the EU’s centre of gravity moving eastwards.12 All
of this contributed to the existing impression that enlargement negotiations were
bogged down and not likely to make much progress.13 Public opinion polls also
tended to reflect the negative mood – in both the EU and in the candidate coun-
tries.14

The Swedish Presidency

Sweden took on the EU Presidency for the first time on 1 January 2001. Declaring
definitive progress on enlargement the central priority of the presidency from the
outset, the government of Göran Persson won many plaudits for its handling of the
negotiations.15 Ludlow asserts that although the Swedish Presidency was far from
40 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
unblemished, the management of the accession negotiations was an unqualified
success, and that no Presidency could have done a better job. Although public
opinion surveys showed Sweden to be among the EU’s least enthusiastic members,
paradoxically the Swedes were the most enthusiastic about enlargement. This
prompted Persson to remark ‘the Swedes want other countries to join the EU and
our own to leave’.16 At the European Council summit meeting at Gothenburg on
15–16 June 2001 the EU ‘confirmed the breakthrough in negotiations and agreed
the framework for the successful completion of the enlargement’. Attesting to the
fact that the candidate countries had made ‘impressive progress’ in meeting the
accession criteria, the European Council made two other historic statements. The
first declared the enlargement process ‘irreversible’. The second provided the long-
awaited ‘road map’ or timetable for the first accessions by suggesting ‘the road map
should make it possible to complete negotiations by the end of 2002 for those
candidate countries that are ready. The objective is that they should participate in
the European Parliament elections of 2004 as members’.17 Ludlow asserts that the
language used in the Gothenburg conclusions was indicative ‘of how much the
process had moved on’. First, rather than (Nice) ‘welcome new member states
which are ready as from the end of 2002’, it talked about ‘complete negotiations by
the end of 2002’. Second, it emphasized that the aim was to enable the new
member states to take part in the European Parliament elections of 2004 ‘as
members’.18 Another significant development was the upgrading of some of the
later negotiating entrants to the top tier of negotiations. These included Slovakia,
Latvia, and Lithuania. This meant ‘the principle of catch-up in the negotiations
has been fully realized’, according to Gunnar Lund, the Swedish ambassador to
the EU.19
The breakthrough had come in the final session when Germany, which had
resisted the idea of setting the end of 2002 as the date for completing negotia-
tions, bowed to the will of a strong majority of EU states. German hesitation had
been based partly on a fear that the provision of a deadline would undermine the
EU’s negotiating hand, and more importantly, by fears that Poland simply would
not be ready in time.20 The Swedish Presidency managed ‘not just to resist but to
sweep away most of the objections to enlargement’ according to one commen-
tator. By putting the timetable in place it was clear that outstanding differences
among EU member states in areas such as agriculture and regional aid would
now have to be seriously addressed.21 Reaction to the breakthrough was uniformly
positive with speculation rising that the ‘big bang’ was not such an unlikely scenario
after all.22 Many people had been sceptical that the big bang could be achieved.
The number of such people decreased after Gothenburg.23 For many observers the
political entrepreneurship of Göran Persson was crucial.24 The Swedish strategy
could only succeed, however, because of the substantive attachment on the part of
EU political élites to a normative understanding of the enlargement process. The
sense of drama was captured in Prime Minister Persson’s assertion that ‘I was over-
whelmed, almost every one of them [leaders of the candidate states] took the floor
and expressed their gratitude for what we have done during the last six months’.25
The November 2001 annual reports, the fourth, recorded steady progress
 Closing the deal 41
26
towards accession by the candidate countries. The reports also clearly indicated
that the ‘enlargement in waves’ strategy had bitten the dust and that all candidates
were being assessed on merit. This was neatly summed up in the definition of a so-
called ‘Laeken group’ of ten countries, which signalled the end of the distinction
between the ‘Luxembourg’ and ‘Helsinki’ groups.27

The Danish Presidency

With momentum building in the early part of 2002, Denmark took over the Pres-
idency of the Union in July. The Danish game plan for concluding negotiations
revolved around three interrelated aims: movement toward substantive agree-
ment on Council reform; a holding operation on agriculture; and a timetable
which prioritized the October European Council summit meeting. Danish Prime
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen brought to the presidency energy, commitment
and evident communication skills. As importantly, he was supported by a solid
administrative and diplomatic foundation. At every level, the Danes were solidly
equipped to broker the upcoming talks at the most critical stage in the process.
Along with Rasmussen Danish Permanent Representative Poul Christoffersen
played a crucial role in anchoring the accession talks.28 There were still considerable
problems to be faced, however, not least the uncertainty surrounding the German
elections in September and the second referendum on the Nice Treaty in Ireland,
which was due to be held in October and the outcome of which was far from
certain.29

Financial issues
Financial and budgetary issues, although they had dominated debate on the ‘how’
and ‘when’ of the eastern enlargement debate since Agenda 2000’s publication in
1997, were left to the very latter stages of the accession negotiations. The Danes
assumed the EU Presidency facing the prospect of a total disagreement among the
EU15 about how to proceed with the financial and agriculture chapters.30
The Berlin agreement of 1999 assumed an entry of six countries in 2002, not ten
in 2004. Some form of re-adjustment would thus have to take place in the calcula-
tions. And this was reflected in a Commission memorandum in January 2002.31
The memorandum proposed significant changes in the negotiating position of the
Union but without breaking the commitment ceiling entered into at Berlin.32 The
essence of the Commission proposal lay in a phasing-in of both agricultural and
regional aid to the candidate states, and the requirement that they pay contribu-
tions to the EU budget in full from the moment of accession. The package made a
significant concession to the candidates by accepting the principle of direct aid to
CEE farmers, even if only on a gradual basis. It also provided the member states
with estimates of what each country would contribute to the EU budget in the first
years after accession. Commission calculations showed that in addition to Cyprus
and Malta, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia would be losers in net
terms. The budgetary imbalances to be redressed were not insignificant.33 In the
42 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
end it was decided that no new member state should end up in a worse budgetary
state after accession than before.
The Berlin agreement had not provided for any direct payments to farmers in
the new member states. The level of uncertainty regarding the future form and
nature of the CAP made it possible for a Commission fudge to be utilized. It argued
that the newcomers should be given credible assurances that they would be ‘fully
integrated into the CAP, whatever its nature may be’. This at least went some way to
meeting the charge of second-class membership and outright discrimination.34 The
Commission thus went on to propose the introduction of direct payments from
2004, but on only a limited basis, beginning at 25 per cent of the EU15 level in
2004, and progressing to parity by 2013.35 The Commission judgement was
informed in large part by the existence of large numbers of semi-subsistence farms
in Central and Eastern Europe.36 The Commission thus argued that introducing
direct aid too quickly could slow down the restructuring process. This could create
a vicious circle of low productivity, low standards and high hidden unemploy-
ment.37 The Commission’s paper was widely criticized both inside the EU and
amongst the candidates.38 In the immediate aftermath the member states ‘gave an
impressive display of their disunity. The confrontation was as always three-cornered,
with the net contributors in one corner, the partisans of the CAP in another and the
Cohesion countries in yet another. All of them expressed their concerns but none
more so than the French and the Germans.’39
The German view that CAP reform was a precondition for enlargement to take
place was accepted neither by the French nor the candidate states. The impasse
suggested nothing of significance could be resolved until after the French and
German elections. The deterioration in the German domestic budgetary situation
was clearly an important factor behind Chancellor Schröder’s position, notwith-
standing consistent German pressure for CAP reform. Schröder put it like this in
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung on 16 June 2002:

Even if many find it difficult to believe, Germany is at the limits of its capacity
to pay. If I were in these circumstances to countenance the application of the
direct payments system to the candidate countries, Commissioner Solbes
might as well start immediately to draft a series of blue letters.40

To the Germans and their allies on CAP such as the UK the prospect of a mid-
term review was to be welcomed. It opened up the possibility of using CAP reform
(necessary as an end in itself) as an instrument for alleviating the financial pain of
enlargement provision. It was clear also that Germany’s concerns were widely
shared. Gerrit Zalm, the Dutch finance minister, and his Austrian counterpart,
Karl Heinz Grasser, both publicly voiced opposition to the extension of the direct
aid programme to candidate states.41
The EU began the final lap of the accession negotiations on 19 April 2002. As
anticipated the talks would cover the most difficult matters relating to finances and
voting powers. The draft common positions drawn up by the Commission came in
for extensive review and discussion in the Council working group on enlargement
 Closing the deal 43
whilst bilateral talks between the Commission and the candidates accompanied
this process.42 The Germans, the Dutch, and other net contributors clung firmly to
their objections and refused to sign blank cheques before they knew what was in the
Fischler CAP reform paper. In an effort to calm fears of a delay in enlargement
ministers pledged to reach an agreement on direct payments at the EU summit in
Brussels in October. Commissioner Verheugen aptly summed up the sense of drift
in his address to the European Parliament on 12 June when he admitted: ‘there are
winds of resistance growing. The climate has become more brutal, more sceptical
… all based on a lack of knowledge and fear’. Chancellor Schröder in a newspaper
interview again re-iterated that Germany could not and would not bear the cost of
extending the CAP eastward.43
On 10 July 2002, Franz Fischler presented his long-expected mid-term review of
the CAP.44 Its main proposals included first, and most importantly, a decoupling of
the link between production and direct payments. The Commission recommended
that the whole payments system should be replaced by a single payment per farm,
the level and character of which would no longer be linked to production. Second,
the Commission argued for a reinforcement of environmental, food safety, animal
welfare and occupational safety standards. The new payments would be condi-
tional on the recipients’ respect for these enhanced standards, thereby increasing
the pressure on farmers to follow ‘good farming practices’. In addition new
schemes in quality assurance and food certification were proposed. Third, there
was increased support for rural development particularly by small farmers. This
would be achieved by a new system of ‘dynamic modulation’, which would reduce
direct payments by 3 per cent per annum to farmers.45 The reforms were much
more ambitious than most had expected and, according to Ludlow the ‘thrust was
unpalatable’.46 Rasmussen, as incoming President of the EU, sought consistently to
decouple the enlargement negotiations from debates about CAP reform. But agri-
culture would continue to complicate the enlargement negotiations to the end.

The 2002 Regular Reports

The next important milestone in the process would be the (earlier than usual)
publication of the Commission’s annual reports prior to the October Brussels
European Council. The reports divided into two parts. The first consisted of a
series of so-called regular reports on progress made by the candidates in specific
areas (more or less conforming to the negotiating chapters of the acquis). The
second – the Strategy paper – represented a macro-political analysis of overall
progress.47 Given that the political desire for enlargement had been ratcheted up,
however, by the Gothenburg timetable, it was clear that these reports would not
simply consist of a functional reporting of progress but indicate also a definite polit-
ical determination to complete the process. The Commission’s determination to
conclude the process successfully was manifested in a change in the language
employed in the Strategy Report. From an early version, which stated that candi-
dates ‘should’ be ready to assume the obligations of membership in 2004, the final
version inserted ‘will’ over ‘should’, thus signaling the Commission’s desire to bring
44 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
finality to the process.48 The Commission also endorsed what was already accepted,
namely that once the Accession Treaty had been signed, the new member states in
waiting should become active observers in all Community institutions and activi-
ties. In addition, the Commission also proposed detailed monitoring of the applica-
tion of Community law in the acceding member states. Six months before the
accession date a comprehensive monitoring report, not dissimilar to the regular
reports, would be produced. This was unprecedented in previous enlargement
rounds and more than anything else reflected the serious gap in legislative imple-
mentation still in evidence.
The task of improving the administrative and judicial capacity of the acceding
states was also central and had been prioritized in the pre-accession agreements
and the NPAAs.49 Although the Commission had worked with each candidate
country on an Action Plan to reinforce their administrative and judicial systems
there still existed serious gaps not only in legislation, but in necessary complimen-
tary measures, such as setting up management structures and authorities, estab-
lishing coordination and arbitration systems, the training of judges and upgrading
of IT systems.50 Acknowledging the ongoing difficulties in capacity-building the
Commission proposed a special, three-year transitional facility for institution-
building after accession. In a sense this was an acknowledgement of failure to build
up capacity over the past number of years, or at least to do enough, but more
importantly it represented a commitment to substantive help in respect of ongoing
reform efforts.51
Administrative capacity became an even more prominent issue in the run-up to
the accession date in 2004 with revelations that the acceding member states were
having great difficulty in finding suitable projects to match spending appropria-
tions. The Commission warned that there was a great risk that the new member
states would not be able to use the €22 billion allocated to them under the struc-
tural and cohesion funds in the programming period 2004–6. Most concern was
centred on the apparent failure to fully transpose and implement the necessary
statutory legislation.52 Corruption continued to be a serious impediment to prog-
ress. An Open Society Institute publication, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy,
suggested the EU had ‘missed or neglected’ a number of key areas in examining
corruption – ‘state capture, public procurement, and public administration in
particular’. Collusion between public procurement bidders ‘appears to be wide-
spread’.53
Although the negotiations continued to deliver results, there remained some
troubling issues, which had the capacity to wreck the timetable if not the negotia-
tions themselves. Three in particular stood out in the early autumn of 2002 in the
run-up to the crucial Brussels European Council summit. The first was the second
referendum on the Nice Treaty in Ireland, which the Irish government went some
way toward turning into a referendum on enlargement.54 The second issue was
how the net contributors would deal with the financial implications of enlarge-
ment. Finally, there was the destabilizing impact of the Dutch government’s polit-
ical problems to contend with. In particular, one of the three coalition parties, the
Dutch Liberal Party (VVD), sought to whip up fears about enlargement. As early
 Closing the deal 45
as 1 October, the VVD minister for European affairs, Atzo Nikolai told the Finan-
cial Times Deutschland that his government would not sanction direct payments to
candidate country farmers unless there was at the same time a clear commitment
by present member states of the EU to reform the CAP: ‘No phasing in without
phasing out’. The Dutch, he declared, were bigger net contributors to the EU
budget than even the Germans. At a time when the new coalition was pledged to
austerity at home, it could not countenance additional burdens abroad.55 Gerrit
Zalm, the influential VVD leader and former finance minister, argued that the
entry of most candidate states as planned by the Commission was premature. In
an interview on 13 October Zalm claimed that Poland in particular and also
Slovakia and Latvia were not ready to take up the obligations of membership.
Other members of the VVD expressed strong doubts about Latvia’s membership.
Sources close to the Dutch government asserted publicly that the decision to be
taken in December should not be irrevocable and that, until eventual accession in
2004, it should always be possible to say no to a candidate country that does not
meet the criteria.56 Eventually the caretaker government of Jean Peter Balkenende
agreed that it would not exercise a veto over enlargement but insisted on some
greater guarantees on monitoring especially of frontier controls. The amount of
time given over by Rasmussen and the Danish Presidency to ameliorating Dutch
concerns was considerable in the run up to Brussels.

The Brussels European Council

In advance of the Brussels European Council in October 2002 there was consider-
able pessimism that the meeting would fail to resolve important issues such as CAP
reform, the financing of enlargement, and outstanding institutional issues.57 The
proposals of the Commission remained simply proposals.58 Disagreements on
direct payments to candidate state farmers continued to generate tension and also
entangled the enlargement negotiations in the debate on the future of the CAP. As
Mayhew points out this meant that as the negotiations proceeded the countries
most in favour of enlargement, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands
were those against conceding direct income subsidies to the new member states
because this would impede the reform of the CAP, while countries traditionally less
positive about enlargement, such as France, Portugal and Ireland, were in favour
of accommodating CEE preferences.59 More positively Coreper and the GAERC
managed to resolve a lot of outstanding difficulties before the actual European
Council meeting took place.60
At the summit meeting itself the European Council agreed to the Commission’s
proposal on direct income subsidies, whilst simultaneously agreeing that budgetary
expenditure on market support and direct income subsidies in the period 2007–13
could not rise by more than 1 per cent per year over the level reached in 2006.61
The dispute about CAP, however, produced ‘an open clash between Prime
Minister Blair and President Chirac at the table, and, it is said, an even sharper one
in the margins of the meeting’.62 Chirac’s suggestion of tying CAP reform to re-
negotiation of the UK budget rebate, which had been in place since 1984, was
46 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
rebuffed not just by the British but also by Rasmussen who argued: ‘if we raise all of
those questions, we will never finish’.63 Many saw France as the undisputable
winner in the deliberations over agriculture.64 This was not least because the agree-
ment delayed any lowering of expenditure on the CAP. There was significant
resentment at the ‘private deal’ on agriculture thrashed out between Chirac and
Schröder at a pre-summit meeting at the Hotel Conrad in Brussels. Despite
constant protestations from Germany about the need to ensure that the cost of
enlargement would not be excessive, it looked to many as if the outcome of the
Chirac–Schröder Conrad meeting indicated that Schröder was prepared to accept
continuing to shoulder the expense of CAP and extending it to new member states
as the price to be paid for a successful enlargement.65
The Brussels European Council cleared the way for the negotiations to move to a
conclusion. But the intra-EU bargaining was far from concluded. There remained
significant hurdles and time was running out quickly. Poul Christoffersen, the
Danish Permanent Representative believed, however, that an intra-EU negotia-
tion would endanger the Presidency’s timetable. He therefore decided to dispense
with it. On that basis the Presidency and the Commission proceeded to prepare a
‘final offer’ that Ludlow argues went well beyond the ‘absolute limits’ laid down at
the Brussels Council. Subsequently there was ‘consternation’ when Christoffersen
announced his plan to Coreper on 25 November.66 It represented a ‘calculated
risk’ that Copenhagen would present an opportunity to iron out difficulties. What
the Commission and the Presidency dubbed ‘the final position’ in the final week of
November was thus their final position and not that of the EU15. It is highly
unusual for the Presidency to operate without a mandate from the member states,
yet it was, Denmark believed, the only way to progress the negotiations to a conclu-
sion in the short time left.67
The joint Presidency–Commission paper went some way toward tackling the
considerable difficulties of the candidate countries.68 This meant, inevitably,
increasing the costs of enlargement to the existing member states. The proposal
raised considerably, for example, the payments for the decommissioning of nuclear
facilities in the acceding states.69 Cumulatively they implied a significant increase in
EU spending over the three-year period, compared with the Brussels European
Council figures. According to estimates attached to the 8 November document,
total commitments would be just over €1 billion higher than the heads of state and
government had agreed to at the Brussels meeting, even though, by moving the
accession date forwards from January to May 2004, the Union should in prin-
ciple have been saving a significant amount of money. It was inevitable that such
proposed increases would be contested, perhaps vigorously, by some of the
member states.70
On 24 November Christoffersen presented, as part of the final negotiating
package, a revised budget proposal. Although coming in at about €1 billion less
than that of the Commission in January 2002, it was nevertheless significantly more
(about €2.5 billion) than that proposed at Brussels in October.71 The budget included
€900 million for a so-called ‘Schengen facility’, to reimburse candidates for the
expenditure, and to accelerate their preparations on border control; €600 million for
 Closing the deal 47
decommissioning nuclear power plants; and €1 billion as a lump sum for budgetary
compensation, to be distributed among the new member states on the basis of their
GNI.72 Although some of the permanent representatives expressed concern about
and even opposition to the package, Christoffersen was not for changing course.
His out was that governments would have ample room to negotiate with the Presi-
dency in the weeks ahead. In both Germany and the Nethelands the proposals
generated considerable unease, being seen as far too generous and having been
conceded far too early in the final negotiating process. The Commission and Presi-
dency were thus presented as ‘allies’ of the candidates rather than negotiators on
behalf of the EU15. Both Chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Joschka
Fischer argued that the Brussels figures had to be respected, as did President
Chirac on another bilateral visit to Germany.
The package, of course, was not read routinely in all the candidate countries. In
fact adjusted for population size there seemed to be some remarkable differences.
The Baltic States emerged well over the period 2004–6, Poland and the Czech
Republic significantly less so.73 Thus the likelihood of very difficult negotiations
with the latter group of candidate states now presented itself. For many states the
prospect of referendums on membership to follow the conclusion of negotiations
meant that securing a generous financial package was of the utmost importance if
the accession deal was to be sold domestically. Not surprisingly the Polish govern-
ment was proving particularly difficult. A formal statement from the ten heads of
government after a meeting in Warsaw highlighted many of the difficulties the
candidate countries had with the package. The statement called for greater
budgetary relief, a faster phasing-in of farm subsidies, and a ‘fair balance of the
rights and obligations of membership’.74 Less pressing issues related to the prob-
lems of individual countries continued to be worked on if not solved. The candidate
states seemed to be moving in private toward greater realism in their negotiating
positions and it was striking that their most contentious demand – on full and
immediate access to direct payments – was not even mentioned in the formal
exchanges at the meeting.75 The Danish Presidency presented its draft ‘final
package’ to each of the ten leading candidate states on 26 November – but without
any certainty it would be accepted by the candidates or by the EU member states.76

The Copenhagen European Council summit

For many observers it was fitting that the endgame of the eastern enlargement
negotiations would be played out at Copenhagen. After all it was at Copenhagen in
1993 that the EU had taken the first important steps toward accepting the former
Communist states into its ranks. Going in to the summit meeting the rhetoric of the
main players demonstrated no more than a cautious optimism. One early indicator
of the negotiating difficulties was the cancellation of the reception and dinner at the
Christianborg Palace.77 The sense of occasion and nervousness was captured in a
letter to the Gazeta Wyborzca from many of the leading figures in the communist
dissident movements who feared the collapse of the negotiations and the opportu-
nity to re-unite the continent: ‘We urge that the original idea of solidarity in a
48 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
united and democratic Europe should not be buried under the negotiations and
group and local lobby interests.’78
The most important question to be addressed remained the size and shape of the
final financial package for enlargement. In effect the Danish Presidency ‘took a
punt’, to use a gambling expression, on the Copenhagen summit delivering the
right result, on the member states not being able to countenance disappointing the
candidate states again with another delay. Given the problems experienced at Nice
and protracted arguments on the cost of enlargement this was a considerable risk to
run. As far as the financial package was concerned the Presidency made clear that
this was a matter for the heads of state and government at the summit meeting.
Gerhard Schröder, before leaving Berlin, told journalists that a fifth enlargement
without Poland was simply inconceivable. The Danish Presidency took this as a
signal of Schröder’s willingness to go that extra mile for a fair accord. This hopeful-
ness was not as obvious in Warsaw, where after a whole day’s meeting of the Polish
Council of Ministers it was still less than clear what the Polish bottom lines might
be.79 The Polish position was extraordinary in negotiating terms. Prime Minister
Miller was supported by his coalition partner and deputy prime minister Jaroslav
Kolinowski, of the Polish Peasants’ Party, who over the previous few months had
repeatedly threatened to quit the government if Poland failed to get a good enough
deal. Miller was being far from disingenuous when claiming that if the deal for
Poland was not improved his government would implode. And this was of the
utmost importance as the negotiations at Copenhagen were largely centred on the
bilateral negotiation between Poland and the EU.80
The ‘final offer’ made by Rasmussen was the revised version of the lengthy
paper on the financial package which had been represented to Coreper on 25
November and reflected developments in the last pre-Copenhagen round of nego-
tiations with the candidates on 9 December and the GAERC meeting of 10
December. The total package of financial aid amounted to €40.8 billion (to 2006).
But given that the new member states would also contribute to the budget some-
thing approaching €15 billion, the net figure was reduced to about €25 billion. The
Commission thus suggested a net cost for ten countries over three years of just
€10.3 billion per annum, which amounted to just one-thousandth of EU GDP.81
The Polish delegation continued to express disquiet. What was to be done? It
seems clear that Verheugen was quite heavily involved with the German govern-
ment in coming up with the idea for a transfer of some money earmarked for future
structural operations into a special cashflow facility, which Christoffersen had
created after Coreper on 25 November. For the Poles the merit of this was first and
foremost that it involved the delivery of cash up front rather than commitments
into the future.82 A figure of about €1 billion ‘extra’ could thus be procured for the
Poles. This was because German Chancellor Schröder agreed to another €1 billion
being found for Poland but only by a process of re-classifying money earmarked
later for regional aid as a straight and immediate cash transfer.83 This certainly
constituted a negotiating success for the Poles. They clearly envisaged difficulties in
finding enough viable projects for regional aid. But the ‘cashflow facility’ instead
represented a lump sum paid into the national treasury with few strings attached.84
 Closing the deal 49
Once this measure was agreed the success of the negotiations was guaranteed. The
successful conclusion of the eastern enlargement process was then announced to
the world press in suitably colourful language. The outcome was one which ‘testi-
fies to the common determination of the peoples of Europe to come together in a
Union that has become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability and pros-
perity on our continent’.85 Whatever the nature of the descriptives, the deal had
been successfully concluded.
Reaction to the summit focused on the historic nature of the outcome as well as
the outstanding contribution of the Danish Presidency. Others took the historical
view that this meant, finally, the closing of the darkest chapters in Europe’s
history. Poland’s daily RzecPospolita summed up the acceding states mood: ‘Good
morning, Europe.’ The Czech daily Lidove noviny asserted: ‘A new Europe is
born.’ The Hungarian broadsheet Magyar Hirlap announced: ‘The end of divided
Europe.’86 Not surprisingly British Prime Minister Tony Blair felt the hand of
history once more upon all present! Not all commentators were as dewy-eyed. In
the Eurosceptic London Times Roger Boynes castigated the EU for ‘behaving
disgracefully … bullying and bludgeoning Central Europe’ and cautioned the
newcomers on dampening their entrepreneurial spirit within a stagnant EU
economy. Conservative leader Ian Duncan Smith attacked the EU for delaying
enlargement for so long.87 The overriding feeling, however, both in the EU and the
accession states, was one of relief that the negotiations, which had seemed to teeter
on the brink of collapse at regular intervals, had been brought to a successful
conclusion.

Completing the formalities and tying the knot

The interregnum between the Copenhagen summit meeting and the signing cere-
mony in Dublin on 1 May 2004 was not without its moments of excitement. The
American-led invasion of Iraq brought to the fore important differences in respect
of attitudes to European foreign policy. President Jacques Chirac succeeded in
alienating a great number of the new member states in castigating them as ‘infan-
tile’ and ‘reckless’ because of their support for the United States in the Iraq war.88
There was discontent also in some of the acceding states as the accession terms
were studied closely. In Poland small farmers were the most vocal in their criticism
of the Copenhagen package. Religious groups also complained when it became
clear that Poland’s accession treaty was not going to include a measure to ban
same-sex marriages. All of this boded ill for the referendum.89
The finalized text of each accession treaty was the outcome of intensive discus-
sion during January 2003 between the Commission and the acceding states, and
was not significantly different from that which was negotiated at Copenhagen. The
treaty itself consisted of two parts; the first listed the acceding countries and their
dates of accession as well as the official languages in which the treaty was drawn up.
The second part was much more complex and voluminous, being composed of five
parts, nine protocols, 44 declarations, the Final Act, and 18 annexes. The complete
set of documents, drawn up in 21 languages, each occupying 1,000 pages in the
50 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
Official Journal or up to 6,000 pages in normal text, was then deposited officially in
the archives of the Italian government.90 The sheer complexity of the treaties threw
open different interpretations. The EU stance was simple: any changes were
merely the consequences of detailed clarifications.91 The Accession Treaty itself
was signed at the foot of the Parthenon in Athens on 16 April 2003.92 The Athens
daily Apoyevmatini referred to the accession treaty as a ‘contract of hope’. The EU’s
expansion not only guaranteed a peaceful future, but would increase solidarity
among the member states. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared: ‘With
this step, the Union is finally overcoming the division of Europe into east and west
… just like the Berlin Wall [in 1989] today it is a reason for shared joy – joy that we
are creating a united and peaceful Europe.’93 The Declaration which accompanied
the Accession Treaty and was signed by all 25 signatory heads of state or govern-
ment was explicit in setting out the fundamental basis not only for the enlargement
being realized but the European integration process itself:

Our achievement is unique. The Union represents our common determina-

tion to put an end to centuries of conflict and to transcend former divisions on
our continent. The Union represents our will to embark on a new future based
on co-operation, respect for diversity and mutual understanding. Our Union
represents a collective project: A project to share our future as a community of
values.94

The sui generis nature of the European Union and the determination to further
transpose its value system on to neighbouring states and regions was also clearly
emphasized:

Accession is a new contract between our citizens and not merely a treaty
between states. As citizens of this new enlarged Union we proclaim our
commitment to the citizens of the candidate countries. We are also committed
to developing ever deeper ties and bridges of cooperation with our neighbours
and to share the future of this community of values with others beyond our
shores.

The accession referendums

In the aftermath of Copenhagen attention turned toward the accession referen-
dums that were planned for each acceding state. Recent experience of the refer-
endum process in Denmark and Ireland had demonstrated that voters simply
could not be taken for granted. And although ‘Yes’ votes were expected in most
states there arose concern about unfavourable opinion polls in Poland, Hungary
and Estonia especially. A more likely scenario was that turnout figures would fail to
reach the required threshold levels in a number of states. If that happened the
accession referendums would fail, at least in those states where reaching the
threshold level was a constitutional requirement.95 The first state to vote on the
Accession Treaty was Malta on 9 March. The result there – a ‘Yes’ vote of 53 per
 Closing the deal 51
Table 4.1 Results of EU accession referendums in Central and Eastern Europe

Country Ref. Date Yes (%) No (%) Turnout (%)

Slovenia 23 March 2003 89.66 10.34 55

Hungary 12 April 2003 83.76 16.24 46
Lithuania 10–11 May 2003 89.92 10.08 64
Slovakia 16–17 May 2003 92.46 7.54 52
Poland 7–8 June 2003 77.45 22.55 58.85
Czech Republic 13–14 June 2003 77.33 22.67 55.21
Estonia 14 September 2003 66.92 33.08 63.4
Latvia 20 September 2003 67 32.3 72.53

cent – undoubtedly emboldened pro-Europeans in Central and Eastern Europe.

This was followed by a comfortable majority in Slovenia, despite public opposition
to the war in Iraq, which had complicated the government’s case for a ‘Yes’ vote.96
The Slovak referendum on 16 and 17 May resulted in a resounding vote for acces-
sion, although again on a less than overwhelming turnout. The Polish referendum
held over two days on 7 and 8 June resulted in a strong ‘Yes’ vote once again and
was achieved on a relatively high turnout of almost 60 per cent.97 In the Czech
Republic on 13 and 14 June a turnout of 77.3 per cent saw a winning majority of
55.2 per cent of votes cast. Estonia voted to join the EU by a decisive 67 per cent to
33 per cent in its vote on 14 September 2003 on a turnout of 66 per cent. Latvia
completed the set on 21 September with a similar 67 per cent ‘Yes’ vote.98 There
was widespread relief after the latter result as Latvia had been seen as the most
Eurosceptic of the candidate states.99 With the referendum process complete
national ratification procedures were fully realized.
At the Salonika summit attention turned naturally enough to the Balkans and
the prospect of further enlargement. EU leaders effectively promised the political
direction necessary to guide the region toward and possibly into the EU. As
Romano Prodi put it: ‘Europe’s unification will not be complete until the Balkan
countries are members of the Union.’100 The task of maintaining momentum
toward the accession date was, as ever, that of the Commission. In its so-called
‘comprehensive monitoring reports’ of 5 November, a post-negotiation continua-
tion of the screening reports of previous years, the Commission made it clear that
although there were no serious obstacles now in the way of accession, the problems
still being experienced in implementing EU legislation in the acceding states might
mean the imposition of safeguard clauses which had been outlined in the Accession
Treaty.101
For all of the caution on the EU side, however, there was also a palpable sense of
relief that the most difficult and protracted enlargement negotiation in its history
had been successfully concluded. The fact that the honour of hosting the accession
52 The unfolding of eastern enlargement 1989–2004
ceremony fell to Ireland during its 2004 Presidency of the EU was highly symbolic
in that Ireland had joined the Community as a poor peripheral state, beset by
economic underperformance and high emigration, and made membership of the
Union work for it by transforming and modernizing its economy. Ireland indeed
was an exemplar of what EU membership offered for the new member states.
Part II

The institutional
dimension of eastern
enlargement
5 The Council of Ministers and
eastern enlargement

Introduction
It has become a truism in politics that institutions matter. In recent years much of
the literature on international relations has sought to locate institutional power and
analyse its significance within local, national and global politics. For some, political
decisions are largely a function of embedded institutional power or the product of
specific patterns of institutional interaction and delegation. Others, while less
accepting of the claims for institutional efficacy, acknowledge the increasing
number of international institutions and their impact on at least some forms of
interstate relations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the European Union has attracted
most attention from scholars of international institutions in recent years. For it is
within the EU’s variegated structure that the most advanced patterns may be
found in global politics of interstate institutionalization of economic, political and,
increasingly, security relations.1 The enlargement of such a complex and multifac-
eted international entity necessarily entails an important institutional dimension.
Enlargement both arises out of specific forms of institutionalized cooperation and
subsequently produces a reconfiguration of those institutionalized norms, practices
and structures. Thus any substantive analysis of an enlargement process necessi-
tates an appreciation of the institutional dynamics that influence and underpin
decision-making.
The three chapters of part II of this book focus on the internal EU decision-
making process on eastern enlargement. As such they analyse the different roles
played by the three principal EU institutions – the Council, Commission and
Parliament – in the accession process. The timeframe under review includes the
various periods encompassing association, pre-accession and actual negotiations
with the focus on a number of key questions. What were the formal treaty-based
responsibilities of each of the three EU institutions with respect to enlargement
decisions, and how did each institution seek to assert its influence on the process?
How and through what instruments did each of the institutions engage with the
candidate states during the enlargement process? Where there existed fragmenta-
tion within an individual institution how did this manifest itself and with what effect
on the enlargement process? To what extent did each of the institutions act as
European ‘institution-builders’ and/or ‘identity-builders’ within the structures of
56 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
the enlargement process? Before proceeding to examine the role played by the
Council of Ministers it seems useful to briefly outline the formal treaty-based provi-
sions which govern EU enlargement decisions.

Enlargement decisions
Enlargement is a policy domain which involves each of the main EU institutions in
a distinctive way. This is clearly reflected in the institutional division of labour laid
down in the treaties, with respect to accession decisions:

Any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may
apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the
Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and
after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an
absolute majority of its component members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustment to the treaties on which the
Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agree-
ment shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional requirements.2

Thus the formal hierarchy of power with respect to an enlargement decision

appears very clear: the Council, consisting of representatives of the member state
governments, takes the decision, having consulted the Commission. The decision
seems then to be purely a matter for the member states. But a more substantive
contextual analysis of Article 49, informed by an understanding of how the EU
system works in practice, reveals a more complicated picture of the decision-
making process. The European Commission effectively acts as principal interloc-
utor with the candidate states and has an important influence on both the content
and shape of the process as it develops. The treaty articles also bestow an important
role on the European Parliament in that no accession decision can be taken
without the Parliament’s assent. And, in the final instance, the outcome of the
process rests on the ratification procedures in both the acceding states and the
member states. All of this suggests that it is quite wrong to identify the Council as
the only EU actor that counts in the process.3
In this respect four points substantiate the argument. First, the requirement
that the Council makes a unanimous decision makes it more difficult to reach
agreement on acceptance of specific candidates. Member states may have different
preferences as to which countries to invite in. On the other hand, the unanimity
requirement makes it less likely that disagreement will spill over into the post-
enlargement Union and undermine the cohesiveness of the organization. In
addition, the history of enlargement shows that member states use the enlarge-
ment negotiations to re-open so-called ‘package deals’, either with respect to
institutional arrangements or important EU policies such as agriculture or
regional funding. In this sense the veto offers the opportunity to protect vital
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 57
national interests. Accession negotiations thus can, and do, become entangled
with different elements of the existing integration process. Or, in EU jargon,
‘widening’ is extremely difficult to disentangle from ‘deepening’.
Second, the Commission, which, in its key normative role is the custodian of
the Community interest, is a much more uniform actor throughout the accession
negotiations than the Council. This is because commissioners, under the treaty,
are enjoined not to ‘seek nor take instructions from any government or from any
other body’.4 Although it is usually accepted that the link between commissioners
and their national governments is, in practice, much closer than the treaties
allow, this has not normally translated into partisan approaches being adopted
on enlargement-related issues. There is a sense in which all parties respect the
fact that enlargement supersedes the normal ‘low’ politics of integration; it is thus
deemed inappropriate for commissioners to make representation on behalf of
their particular state interests. This principle of non-interference tends to make
the Commission a more consistent and credible actor within the process, espe-
cially for the candidate states. The Council, because of its attachment to national
prerogatives, has historically tended to produce much more division on key
enlargement issues.
Third, Article 49 makes it clear that the Council can only act on the basis of
engagement and consultation with the Commission. This poses the question of the
degree to which the Commission’s general oversight and day-to-day management
of the enlargement process privileges it in terms of access to candidate states, infor-
mation and expertise. The Council may in fact be reliant on the Commission at
critical stages in the process of decision-making. It is the Commission after all that
shapes the substantive enlargement agenda through its right of initiative, that issues
Opinions on the candidate states’ ability to meet the membership criteria, and that,
during the eastern enlargement round, issued Regular Reports, largely consisting
of measurements of compliance by candidate states with the Copenhagen criteria
and acquis communautaire. Similarly, the European Parliament by virtue of its right of
assent, enjoys a degree of formal power within the decision-making process. It will
be argued, however, that this formal power also bestowed upon the Parliament a
degree of informal power throughout the process in the sense that neither the
Commission nor Council were willing to disregard the Parliament’s views and risk
that body’s eventually withholding consent. In addition, accession decisions are
governed not only by the primary law of the EU, but also by a much less developed
but nevertheless important set of quasi-legal means, including the Copenhagen
criteria and a vast body of documentation produced by the Commission and
adopted by the Council regarding the transposition and implementation of partic-
ular rules and normative practices. As Kochenov has pointed out, the scope,
meaning and legal effect of these instruments are far from clear. Within that
context then the scope for interpretation of rules by the Commission and Parliament
acts to deprive the Council of full authority in decision-making. It was precisely
because the Copenhagen criteria were rather vague and imprecise as to implemen-
tation that the Commission was able to exert great influence on the eastern
enlargement process at different stages.5
58 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
Finally, the accession treaties can only be implemented after ratification has
taken place in each and every member state of the Union and in the candidate
states, in accordance with each state’s constitutional requirements. This means
that even if a consensus emerges in the Council on specific issues, it may be subject
to, or qualified by, the particularistic demands of any member state or candidate
state in the final negotiations. Council deliberations and EU-candidate state nego-
tiations thus take place with one eye on prospective ratification prospects. Less
likely but also possible is the chance of negative public opinion in the acceding state
resulting in a rejection of the accession treaty. The Norwegian rejection of EU
membership on two occasions (1972 and 1994) is one such example. Should, for
example, the terms of entry prove unsatisfactory to public opinion in the candidate
state then a referendum could well result in a rejection of the accession treaty. This
was a real concern in the case of the Polish referendum on accession, although, in
the event this concern was misplaced, as Poles voted by a strong majority to accept
the accession treaty. Nevertheless the rejection of EU Treaties by both the Danish
and Irish electorates in recent years (and more recently the French and Dutch
rejections of the Constitutional Treaty) suggests that where referendums are
required for ratification, the EU cannot simply rely on the mechanism of permis-
sive consensus – nothing can be taken for granted where European issues are
subject to popular control.
All of this suggests that the institutional politics of enlargement are a lot more
complex than a simple reading of the treaty articles suggests. It is clear that it is not
simply a matter of the Commission proposing and the Council disposing. Although
the European Council is the ultimate arbiter of any accession decision, there are a
number of reasons for suggesting that such power is limited. Subsequent chapters
will argue for prominent and proactive institutional roles played by both the
Commission and the Parliament. In the case of both institutions the case can be
made for a much more significant role in this enlargement process than previous
rounds. Notwithstanding that, it is the Council of the European Union that sits at
the apex of the decision-making structure of the EU. Institutional analyses of EU
politics and, in our case, of eastern enlargement, must begin by examining the role,
influence and organizational input of the Council.

Differentiated responsibility and fragmentation

within the Council
A starting point for consideration of the role of the Council within the enlargement
process, or indeed the integration process in general, is recognition of the multiplicity
of institutional entities, each occupying a different institutional space, which it
embodies. Implicitly one includes the Council of Ministers and Coreper (Committee
of Permanent Representatives) and the technical or working groups, which report
to Coreper.6 In addition, the European Council, consisting of heads of state and
government, and meeting up to four times annually, has carved out an important
role for itself within the EU system.7 Finally, the Presidency of the EU is also part of
the Council machinery, and one, which, in some ways, now plays the most
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 59
influential role in the final stages of an enlargement negotiation. The Presidency, as
Jonas Tallberg points out, ‘can play a crucial role in unlocking incompatible nego-
tiating positions and securing agreement, thus preventing negotiation failure from
emerging’.8 These different parts of the machinery combine to form a Council
which is complex and multifaceted and which has responsibility across a wide
range of policy domains, with negotiations going on concurrently. This differenti-
ated sharing of responsibility, however, can, and in the case of eastern enlargement
manifestly did, contribute to a fragmentation of EU policy, to the detriment of the
goals set for the process. The fragmentation in the Council undermined the coher-
ence of the EU position and alienated the candidate states, sometimes leaving them
quite unsure as to the modes of action to be pursued. In addition, such fragmenta-
tion offered the opportunity to enlargement obstructionists within the EU15 to
slow down the process at certain junctures. Fragmentation manifested itself in a
number of different ways.
In the first instance there arose a problem of territorial fragmentation. The Council,
as the ‘ultimate guardian of the territorial dimension in EU decision-making’,9 was
in a markedly different position to the Commission and EP within enlargement
decision-making. As Conrad points out, though fragmented across sectors, the
individuals working together in the Council are there exclusively as representatives
of their respective member states, and as such, they represent relatively clearly
defined and fixed national policy objectives, communicated to them regularly by
their national administrations. Hence the Council’s ability to develop its own
distinctive ‘enlargement perspective’ or ‘enlargement identity’ within the process
was somewhat circumscribed by this form of fragmentation.10 Not surprisingly
fifteen different national perspectives on eastern enlargement produced frequent
clashes on such issues as the selection of candidate states, the content of specific EU
pre-accession programmes, the nature of support offered the candidates, and the
timescale for accession.
The second identifiable form of fragmentation was that of sectoral fragmentation.
This arose from the fact that the Council is something of a ‘hydra-headed
conglomerate’ of more than fifteen functional Councils, each comprising the
ministers in a given sectoral area such as environment, agriculture or transport.11
Although the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) is tasked
with the coordination of other Councils, this is not always an easy task, especially
given the power of key ministries such as finance and agriculture within domestic
political settings. As Sedelmeier attests internal EU policy debates are character-
ized as much by functional cleavages as by national cleavages. This means that
the policy process is frequently disrupted by a transgovernmental cleavage,
which pits foreign policy-makers against different coalitions of sectoral policy-
makers from across the EU.12
In the case of enlargement decisions there were consistent efforts by the GAERC
to coordinate and move the process along, but these were frequently impeded by
difficulties of coordination. Finance ministers, particularly those from the net
contributor states such as Germany and the Netherlands, feared the budgetary
consequences of enlargement. Powerful agriculture ministries (such as those of
60 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
France) undermined their governments’ espousal of enlargement by staking out
recalcitrant positions on specific elements of the negotiations, and clashed with
other important ministries, principally the ‘high politics’-oriented foreign minis-
tries, which were on the whole much more enthusiastic about enlargement.13 The
sectoral fragmentation this produced frequently undermined the Council’s ability
to carve out a consistent enlargement policy. Sedelmeier demonstrates that meso
or sectoral policy-makers tended to support the status quo and oppose accommo-
dation of CEE preferences in enlargement negotiations. When macro policy-
makers took the lead, as, for example, at Copenhagen in 1993, the access of
sectoral veto players was much more restricted and the Council decisions were
generally much more accommodating of CEE interests.14
A third problem was intra-institutional fragmentation. This arose principally out of
the relations between the sectoral Councils, Coreper, the GAERC, and the Presi-
dency. Coreper is responsible for preparing Council meetings but in practice the
bulk of day-to-day Council work takes place at the expert working group level. It is
within Coreper, however, that the substance of all legislative proposals is first
discussed.15 With respect to enlargement three parts of the Council machinery
carried principal responsibility: the Enlargement Working Group, supported by a
group of experts on financial issues; Coreper 2; and the GAERC. The inter-rela-
tionship of all three with the Presidency was also of some importance throughout
and very significant toward the end of the negotiations. Where the Enlargement
Working Group provided the important functional expertise, Coreper 2 and the
GAERC added bureaucratic problem-solving and political nous. The Council
Secretariat, particularly in liaising with and supporting the Presidency, acted as a
vital information channel, which assisted the Presidency in negotiations.
So how did this complex intra-institutional mosaic of political and bureaucratic
decision-making actually function? It seems clear that in the early stages of the
enlargement process (1989–93) the Council machinery was much less important
than that of the Commission. This was because European political leaders, although
publicly supportive of the CEE states’ desire for membership, were quite unclear as
to the modalities and content of any potential membership negotiation. The
Commission was effectively delegated the task of managing the EU’s relations with
the former Communist states; input from the Council began to increase only after
the EU decided to seriously embrace the idea of enlargement after the Copen-
hagen summit in 1993. Thereafter, as the relationship with CEE deepened, the
Council machinery took on more responsibility, sometimes duplicating the work of
the Commission bureaucracy, but gradually assuming more and more impor-
tance. Ludlow’s insider account of the final stages of negotiations in 2002 presents a
convincing picture of how the structure worked. The Enlargement Working
Group, composed of middle-ranking officials in the permanent representations,
chaired by Lars Bjørn Holbøll, took a leading role. Coreper 2 was led by Poul
Christoffersen, the Danish Permanent Representative, while Per Stig Moller, the
Danish foreign minister, chaired the GAERC.16 Ludlow’s account, however, pres-
ents evidence of the intra-institutional competition for influence. He points out that
Coreper was effectively neutralized by the forcefulness of Poul Christoffersen and
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 61
his colleagues, working in tandem with Eneko Landaburu and his Commission
staff. Similarly, the Swedish Permanent Representation had performed very
effectively during the Swedish Presidency in 2002.17 There was also remarkable
harmony between Christoffersen and Prime Minister Rasmussen in Copenhagen,
which it is alleged, angered the Danish foreign minister and his officials.18 The
picture that emerges from this account is confirmed by others, which show that
policy debates within the Council were often impeded by bureaucratic clashes over
territory and policy choices. In addition the fact that the coordination of Council
work was supported by both the Council bureaucracy described here and the Pres-
idency’s own national civil service made for another form of bureaucratic fragmen-
tation. A key factor underlying the successful conclusion of the enlargement
negotiations, however, was the coordination and political commitment of the
Danish Presidency. As Ludlow argues, it may have been the exception rather than
the rule.19
The final form of fragmentation arose out of the tendency to leave key enlarge-
ment decisions to gatherings of the European Council at summit meetings. We
may term this a problem of the ‘theatre of summitry’. Intergovernmentalists would
argue that these summit meetings produced important political guidelines, which
facilitated, even guided, the development of the enlargement process. Part I of
this book demonstrated how the European Council meetings at Copenhagen
(June 1993), Essen (December 1994), Luxembourg (December 1997), Helsinki
(December 1999), Gothenburg (June 2001) and, finally, Brussels and Copenhagen
(October and December 2002) contributed very effectively to the shape of enlarge-
ment policy by providing explicit directions to the Commission and candidate
states regarding practical steps towards accession. Even if the proceedings were
sometimes characterized more by declaratory diplomacy than by hard decisions,
the summit meetings still encouraged an ever deeper and more explicit commit-
ment to CEE membership.
However, it is also true that the organizational dynamics of European Council
summitry frequently undermined the political decisions that emerged from the
high-octane gatherings. One important structural feature of the system that has
grown over the years is the tendency of heads of state and government to come
away from summit meetings claiming ‘victory’ on issues of national importance, of
having successfully defended their ‘red lines’, no matter how trivial the issues at
stake. The national media and domestic opinion must be presented with a ‘win’. In
the case of eastern enlargement this did not occur as obviously or as often as it did
with more mainstream integration issues. However, on sensitive issues, such as
agriculture, migration, institutional representation, and the EU budget, there was
a marked tendency toward the defence of putative national red lines at the expense
of collective problem-solving and accommodation of candidate state preferences.
The cumulative effect of this was threefold. First, it frequently left candidate states
exasperated and reduced the level of trust between insiders and outsiders. Second,
it reinforced the impression that instead of providing political direction, the Euro-
pean Council was more apt to descend into petty squabbling when faced with
important decisions. This was demonstrated most obviously in the debacle that was
62 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
Nice in December 2000. Finally, the ‘theatre of summitry’ encouraged a kind of
negotiating stasis, which meant that the negotiations on eastern enlargement
dragged on for longer than any others in EU history.

Presidencies
One of the most remarkable changes in the politics of EU enlargement in recent
years relates to the development of the role of the EU Presidency. The Presidency
of the EU Council of Ministers is one of the key institutional actors in the EU nego-
tiating arena. The Presidency is expected to take a leadership role, act as a broker
in situations of institutional or policy disputes, and generally guides the integration
process forward in its period in office. In recent years, the Council Presidency has
received increasing attention in EU studies.20 Few of these works, however, have
sought to analyse the agenda-shaping powers of the Presidency in any great
detail.21 The role of the Presidency in enlargement negotiations, however, presents
a good opportunity to study its modes of agenda-setting and agenda-shaping. The
ability to set and shape the enlargement agenda mattered for two crucial reasons.
In the first place, where a large number of member states had no fixed preferences
on given issues the Presidency was in a good position to impose its agenda, if what it
proposed seemed reasoned and neutral. More importantly, where there existed
profound disagreement between the member states on some issues, the Presidency
was able to use its brokerage role to argue for sometimes innovative solutions that it
could design and pursue. The Presidency’s role has evolved over time as part of
what Kochenov terms ‘customary enlargement practice’. Article 49 does not
specify any role for the Presidency in the enlargement process, nor indeed for the
European Council, yet both parts of the Council machinery proved decisive in
shaping enlargement decisions.22
Following Tallberg’s conception of agenda-shaping three distinct forms of Presi-
dency input into enlargement policy may be identified: agenda-setting, agenda-
structuring and agenda-exclusion.23 Agenda-setting refers to the Presidency’s ability
to introduce its own initiatives and policy preferences in the process. Agenda-struc-
turing refers to the ability to shape the substantive form of those enlargement issues
already on the Council agenda. Third, agenda-exclusion, in the shape of the non-
selection of specific issues, was just as evident in Presidency enlargement activities.
Analysis of the agenda-shaping efforts by the Presidency offers the opportunity to
compare and contrast Presidencies, their different priorities and emphases, and the
balance they struck between national agendas and the collective EU interest. As
with the Commission, the Presidency was able to use both formal and informal
institutional and political instruments for advancing its own enlargement agenda.
In addition, this analysis assumes, as does Tallberg elsewhere, that the Presidency
can play a crucial role in unlocking what may at first, and for long periods, seem
like incompatible negotiating positions, thus preventing total negotiation failure
which would effectively derail accession.24 In particular, four aspects of Presidency
agenda-shaping may be identified in the eastern enlargement process. First, Presi-
dencies developed concrete proposals for action, sometimes on request from the
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 63
member states, sometimes on their own initiative, in response to recognized macro-
and micro-problems within the process. Second, some Presidencies brought entirely
new issue areas and sometimes neglected ones to the forefront of enlargement
policy debates. Third, Presidencies engaged in acts of both institutional and polit-
ical entrepreneurship aimed at decisively influencing specific parts of the policy
process. Finally, all Presidencies sought to use their powers of mediation and
brokerage to advance the collective decision-making process and move the enlarge-
ment process forward.
In the first instance Presidencies developed concrete proposals for action in
response to recognized problems within the enlargement process. Sometimes these
related to problematic policy areas such as agriculture or budgetary matters. More
often they related to macro-questions such as the timing and sequencing of acces-
sion and the parameters of negotiations. Frequently this activity helped to change
the way particular problems were framed and perceived. Here the complex rela-
tionship with the Commission became particularly important.25 In general Presi-
dencies that enjoyed good working relations with the Commission were better able
to achieve consensus within the Council and bring about solutions to existing prob-
lems. Where the agenda-shaping activity was a joint Presidency–Commission
effort it was difficult for member states to oppose the proposed policy solutions.
The Swedish Presidency of 2001 serves as a good example. More chapters were
closed during the Swedish Presidency than expected.26 In part this was because of a
successful alliance forged with the Commission. But it was also a function of the
Swedish government’s commitment to the normative goal of enlargement and a
penchant for framing enlargement issues in collectivist terms. Sweden found
creative solutions in areas such as environment, freedom of movement for capital
and labour, and other enlargement issues. Bjurulf argues that the most important
outcome authored by the Swedes, however, was a shift in the framing of enlarge-
ment from one dominated by negative issues such as migration, budgetary prob-
lems and welfare provision, to one centred on security and prosperity for the
collective Europe. Sweden’s guiding logic can be seen as a normative power logic
and rooted in Swedish commitment to internationalism and the global spread of
democratic norms. From a Swedish perspective the Presidency was clearly of some
importance. After all, it was the first time Sweden had held the Presidency of the
EU since it acceded in 1995. Some even suggested that it was the most important
responsibility and contribution of Sweden to international affairs since the
Congress of Vienna in 1815.27 Thus the Swedish EU Presidency was driven by
notions among Swedish decision-makers about how a ‘good European’ should
behave and by their visions of European governance. Even with a strongly inter-
governmental preference for decision-making, officials firmly held to the demo-
cratic peace model of international relations and framed their enlargement policy
and EU Presidency in those terms.28 The Swedish preference for framing enlarge-
ment in these liberal internationalist macro terms (rather than instrumentalist
micro terms) effectively shaped the enlargement agenda of the EU at a crucial
period and made it much more difficult for enlargement obstructionists within the
EU to make a convincing case.
64 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
A similar argument may be made for the Danish Presidency’s proactive stance
on the financial package available to the candidate states during the final stage of
negotiations in late 2002. It represented an outstanding example of a Presidency’s
proactive engagement with a specific problem leading to a change in the macro
framing of enlargement. After a meeting between the foreign ministers of the appli-
cant countries and their EU counterparts on 18 November 2002, the Danish Presi-
dency went on to launch a compromise package which increased the amount
available to incoming states for 2004–06 by €1.3 billion and allowed them to ‘top
up’ the direct payments in agriculture by switching some budgetary resources from
rural development. A second proposal to delay the date of accession until 1 May
2004 (rather than 1 January) meant that the incoming states would pay signifi-
cantly less into the EU budget for that year, thereby helping to solve the ‘cashflow’
problem which they were facing.29 The Danes, like the Swedes, effectively framed
the problem in collectivist and normative terms and achieved an outcome, at once
accommodating of candidate state preferences, and neutral in respect of the EU
budget, which many had imagined unattainable.
A second feature was the extent to which Presidencies shaped the policy agenda
by raising the awareness of problems hitherto neglected within the enlargement
process or brought entirely new issues to attention. It seems clear that whilst both
intensely supportive of the macro goal of enlargement, both Finland and Sweden
sought to change the framing of the eastern enlargement process by developing a
more distinct ‘Northern’ dimension to the enlargement process. Whilst some saw
this as a counter to the EU’s Mediterranean focus (centred on the Barcelona
Process), it was also about re-positioning EU enlargement policy around Russia
and the Baltic region, ensuring a more balanced geopolitical underpinning of the
process, and improving the overall coherence of policy. In particular both Presi-
dencies sought to prioritize the resolution of the Kaliningrad issue in advance of the
final stages of negotiations.30 In much the same way a number of Presidencies
sought to foreground the importance of decommissioning aged nuclear power
stations in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia. Indeed a considerable sum was set
aside for this in the financial package which accompanied the final deal on acces-
sion. And while some of these initiatives were undoubtedly motivated by instru-
mentalist concerns of individual Presidencies, it is also true that the prioritizing of
these issues helped foreground problems which had hitherto been quite marginal
within the enlargement process.
A third form of agenda-shaping by the Presidency can be demonstrated by refer-
ence to specific practices of institutional and political entrepreneurship. In the first
instance institutional entrepreneurship can be evinced in the development of new
or innovative institutional practices that structure future cooperation and influence
the future shape of decision-making. This is in addition to the fact that the Presi-
dency ‘enjoys asymmetrical control of the negotiating process, on the basis of a
broad repertoire of procedural instruments’.31 The fact that the Presidency has
relatively few formal responsibilities has (ironically) meant that Presidencies have
had ample room for institutional and administrative manoeuvring within the
Council structures.32 Tallberg’s analysis of the procedural instruments open to the
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 65
Presidency can as usefully be applied to enlargement as the general integration
framework. In the first place, the Presidency holds the formal prerogative to decide
the format of negotiating sessions. These may take the form of a formal ministerial
meeting at the Council’s headquarters in Brussels, a more restricted session where
only a few officials participate and ministers have more room for manoeuvre, or a
meeting in the home country where the more collegial atmosphere can ‘soften up’
opponents of particular Presidency initiatives.33 Second, the Presidency enjoys a
degree of flexibility and control in determining the pace of the negotiations. It is the
Presidency that fixes the meeting schedule and decides the number and frequency
of formal and informal negotiating sessions. Should the Presidency decide so,
further meetings can be scheduled on specific issues, meeting agendas can be
altered to allow greater room for negotiation, and formal time restrictions placed
on the length of particular deliberations.34
The evidence from the eastern enlargement process suggests that different Presi-
dencies relied to different degrees on particular forms of procedural control. Some
Presidencies introduced innovative institutional practices and sought to shape the
enlargement agenda with them. The German Presidency of 1998, for example,
made full use of the various instruments of control and mediation available to it to
steer the negotiations on Agenda 2000 toward a successful conclusion. Its strategy
was to exploit its powers of procedure, intensifying the formal meeting schedule,
and moving Agenda 2000 to the top of specific meeting agendas. Where Sweden and
Denmark also demonstrated a willingness to test the boundaries of the formal
powers of innovation of the Presidency in the cause of accommodating CEE pref-
erences, France, however, made active use of the procedural and informational
advantages of the chair in 2000 to advance its own national interests. As Tallberg
observes: ‘the French government scrupulously used the position of the chair to
advance proposals that essentially constituted national position papers framed as
Presidency compromises’.35
If different Presidencies used different types of formal and informal resources to
engage in institutional entrepreneurship then they also employed different forms of
political entrepreneurship to advance their goals. Political entrepreneurship, loosely
defined as the willingness and ability to frame and publicize key enlargement issues
in specific ways, manifested itself in two distinct forms. The first was the utilization
and deployment of distinct strands of public discourse in which the Presidency’s
enlargement agenda was made clear. The second was the frequent resort to
shaming tactics by different Presidencies as they sought to move the enlargement
game along. In many instances such shaming tactics took on both a private and
public dimension with quiet diplomacy being matched by a public discourse
designed to achieve the desired outcome.
Such political entrepreneurship, whether in the form of an official Presidency
position on a specific issue or a discursive intervention from a prominent state
leader, was sometimes ineffective but never less than interesting as a reflection of
the different attitudes to eastern enlargement on the part of member states. And
where some Presidencies deployed a utilitarian enlargement discourse, which
highlighted economic or security externalities, it was more common to find
66 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
enlargement presented in normative terms. This normative discourse usually
framed eastern enlargement as (variously) a moral imperative for the European
Union, an outgrowth of EU institutional norms and practices, and/or the key
instrument for the successful transposition of EU values in Central and Eastern
Europe. This was often accompanied by willingness on the part of some Presi-
dencies to name and shame those member states more attached to a more instru-
mentalist or narrow enlargement perspective. In publicly deploying such a
normative discourse some Presidencies went much further than others. What
such cases demonstrate is the importance of such discursive interventions as acts
of political entrepreneurship.
The combination of normative discourse and a willingness to name and shame
recalcitrant member states was perhaps most evident in the leadership of Göran
Persson, during the Swedish Presidency. In particular his activism and strategy
before and during the Gothenburg summit in June 2001 was designed to frame
enlargement in normative and collectivist terms and ‘smoke out’ the obstructionists
within EU ranks. Ludlow puts it thus:

Persson engaged in an energetic campaign to discredit his opponents. Led by

the Financial Times, many newspapers that appeared on the Saturday of the
Gothenburg summit gave the impression that German Chancellor Schröder
in particular was ‘turning sour on enlargement’. The German Chancellor
made no secret of the fact that he deeply resented his Swedish colleague’s
tactics.36

Two other aspects of Persson’s activity also emphasize the point. His insistence that
Gothenburg should produce an ‘irrevocable’ commitment to enlargement was an
act of significant political leadership at a time when that commitment was only
surface-deep in many member states. Another key Presidency aim of the Swedes
was to bring the second-track countries up to the speed of the fast-track candidates.
To this end negotiations on important chapters were opened with Latvia, Lithuania
and Slovakia.37 Swedish representatives, were from the outset strongly attached to a
‘regatta’ model, based on equality of treatment of candidates, as opposed to a
model of political differentiation, which would have slowed down the process and,
most certainly, have left some of the candidates isolated. Ludlow argues that the
single most important achievement of the Swedish Presidency was the decision to
open up the process and go for a so-called ‘big bang’ enlargement: ‘Lots of people
had been sceptical that the big bang could be achieved. The number of such people
decreased after Gothenburg.’38
A fourth important role performed by the Presidency in the enlargement process
was that of mediator. Within the enlargement framework this meant three different
foci. The first was inside–outside mediator, with the Presidency acting as principal EU
interlocutor with the applicant states. This was important at all stages of the process
but arguably critical toward the end of negotiations. The second was internal medi-
ator between member states who disagreed about aspects of policy or the general
course of negotiations. And finally, the Presidency acted as an inter-institutional
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 67
mediator between the Council and Commission (and less often the Parliament) in the
inter-institutional setting. The role of mediation played by the Presidency within
the EU is facilitated by the perception of it as a neutral arbiter or ‘honest broker’.
Elgström argues that the norm that the Presidency should be neutral and impartial
is almost uncontested within the EU, thereby providing a substantial instrument
which works against biased behaviour by Presidencies. The norm is highly institu-
tionalized and permeates both academic and practitioner thinking to a substantive
degree. It might be expected that the norm has even greater salience in the enlarge-
ment domain, as member states tend to view enlargement as a non-partisan issue
area. Therefore all parties, and especially the Presidency, are expected to make
that further effort to accommodate the Union interest. To persistently challenge
progress, or to obstruct negotiations, is seen not only as unacceptable but almost as
a negation of membership and of the value system upon which the EU rests. That
necessarily means sublimating national interests to those of the Union as a whole.
That of course represents a problem in enlargement decision-making, as the
Presidency is manifestly the collective representative of the insiders in the negotia-
tions with outsiders, and sometimes it will hold specific and intense attachments to
existing policies, which may need to be reconfigured in anticipation of or as a
consequence of enlargement. Thus the conflict presented to Presidencies in seeking
to base their activities on neutrality and impartiality is not insignificant. Member
states holding the Presidency cannot simply be expected to change their own posi-
tions in the desire to achieve a collective outcome which can then be presented to
outsiders. The French resistance to CAP reform, for example, did not disappear on
the assumption of the French Presidency in 2000. It did, however, make it more
difficult for the Presidency to gain the trust of both outsiders and insiders in
progressing the agriculture dimension of the enlargement process. Similarly it
affected the general search for consensus in a markedly negative way. Thus the
evidence from the enlargement process contradicts, to some extent, this wide-
spread assumption about the behaviour of the Presidency. This accords with Ole
Elgström’s view that Council Presidencies are, despite the deep institutionalization
of the norm, ‘seldom neutral and not always impartial’.39 But the reaction to
French behaviour in 2000, perceived as strongly corrosive of the European inte-
gration ideal (and of Presidency practice), also suggests Elgström is correct in
arguing that the norm of impartiality is so embedded in the organizational culture
of the EU that contradictory actions are seen as ‘immoral and aberrant’.40
The French Presidency and the negative reactions to it also highlight the differ-
ences of approach to eastern enlargement taken by large-state and small-state Pres-
idencies. French interventions during Nice, especially on issues such as the future
institutional balance of power and the distribution of votes in Council, were reflec-
tive of a view that large-state interests had to be protected no matter the collective
wish to advance the enlargement negotiations to a successful conclusion. This view
was also very evident in President Chirac’s now infamous suggestion that in
offering support to the American-led coalition against Iraq in 2003 the Central and
East European states were ‘behaving like infants’. Of course large member states
tend to have national interests which sometimes bring them into conflict with the
68 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
consensus opinion in any given issue area. That will be the case during a Presi-
dency as in any other situation. Smaller states may incline more toward compro-
mise out of a recognition of asymmetry in terms of distribution of power or simply
because they do not have important interests at stake, or at least not nearly as many
as larger states. Thus conducting negotiations and mediating between the different
internal and external players in enlargement is more difficult for larger member
states than for smaller states. Another issue is that larger member states prefer to
manage their Presidencies from their own national capitals thus tending to negate
the supranational or Union influence on process. Smaller states tend to be much
more reliant on their own permanent representations in Brussels and on coopera-
tion with the Commission to operate effectively.41 That was certainly the case for
the Finnish Presidency of 1999, the Swedish Presidency of 2001, and the Danish
Presidency of 2002. A smaller and more confined set of national interests and a
positive relationship with the Commission, combined with attachment to the
normative appeal of enlargement, made for more engaged and neutral Presi-
dencies, which each produced significant advances in the process.42

Advocacy and obstructionism within the Council

Notwithstanding the important institutional and political resources deployed by
different Presidencies, internal EU divisions on enlargement remained significant.
Neither peer pressure nor the normative claims of the candidate states caused them
to completely disappear. From beginning to the end of the process, deliberation
and bargaining within the Council structures was characterized by clashes between
enlargement advocates and enlargement obstructionists. Disagreements arose
initially on the substantive question of whether to enlarge at all and later on ques-
tions of which countries to include, the terms under which accession could be
agreed, and the timetable. Although open opposition to eastern enlargement rarely
manifested itself, there were nevertheless suggestions of alternative frameworks
such as ‘privileged partnership’ or ‘associated membership’, which more often than
not were intended as a substitute for, not a stepping stone to, membership.
The support for enlargement within the Council needs to be viewed within the
parameters of what Sedelmeier and Wallace term a wide-ranging ‘advocacy alli-
ance’, which included key actors within the European Commission and important
figures in the domestic politics of leading member states. This loose and rather ad-
hoc grouping helped ensure that there was movement in the EU’s enlargement
policy, crucially between the Europe Agreements and the Copenhagen summit
and then again towards a more coherent pre-accession strategy.43 It made effective
use of agenda-setting powers and successfully carved out transgovernmental and
inter-institutional alliances. In a policy area where there was no concerted lead role
played by any national actors (with the possible exception of Germany), it was the
Commission, at crucial periods, which kept enlargement on the agenda and acted
as persuader in the EU context. But the Commission’s influence, even if significant
throughout, also needed to be buttressed by the advocacy and public rhetoric of
representatives of member states and their governments. This advocacy alliance
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 69
also included leading academics or public intellectuals such as Timothy Garton
Ash and Jürgen Habermas, and former political leaders such as the long-serving
German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.44 Finally, Central and Eastern
European politicians, academics, intellectuals and writers made the public case for
membership forcefully and frequently.45 The prestige and intellectual standing of
Vaclav Havel and other former dissidents such as Adam Michnik and Milan
Kundera, who were not slow to remind EU leaders of the promises made during the
Cold War period, was also deployed to some effect. The editorial and opinion
pages of major publications such as The Economist, El Pais, the Financial Times, the
Guardian, the Independent, the Irish Times, and Libération also frequently made the
case for early and wide enlargement.46 Such advocacy discourse consisted of
different elements depending on the advocate, location, the intended audience,
and the situational context. Nevertheless it would be true to say that it usually
included a reference to the following: the idea of an EU ‘special responsibility’ for
Central and Eastern Europe; enlargement as a moral imperative influenced
crucially by the guilt induced by the Cold War division of Europe; and enlarge-
ment as integral to the transposition of EU democracy and human rights norms
on a pan-European scale.
Notions of affiliation and a EU ‘special responsibility’ for CEE were evident
from the earliest days of the process, where the EU issued a public pledge of full
support for the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe at the
Strasbourg European Council in December 1989:

The Community and its member states are fully conscious of the common
responsibility which devolves on them in this decisive phase in the history of
Europe … They are prepared to develop … closer and more substantive rela-
tions in all areas … The Community is at the present time the European iden-
tity which serves as the point of reference for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe.47

The Strasbourg statement, although it stopped short of an outright offer of

membership, laid down the basis for the Community’s relationship with Central
and Eastern Europe as one rooted in a common identity with the prospect of
anchoring CEE on existing structures. The emphasis on the Community’s special
responsibility for integrating the transitioning countries was consistently promi-
nent in the speeches of EU leaders in the early 1990s and was justified by a variety
of references to historical connectedness, cultural indivisibility, and the achieve-
ments of the integration process. The latter in particular emphasized the inclusivity
of the European project, its civic-secular basis, and that enlargement was not just a
prize in the gift of the existing Community but a community-enhancing process to
be nurtured and brought to a successful conclusion. The leadership role ascribed to
the EU became all the more important and anxieties about it the more acute as
Yugoslavia descended into bitter sectarian warfare. The Community remained on
the sidelines and manifestly failed to demonstrate the leadership qualities implicitly
referred to in the Strasbourg statement. In the now infamous phrase of then
70 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, ‘the hour of Europe’ had struck,
and Europe had patently failed the test. Paradoxically, however, that failure
made it all the more imperative that the EU succeed in Central and Eastern
Europe. And thus European leaders’ sense of responsibility for the process of tran-
sition and integration in CEE only increased with the failure of EU policy in Yugo-
slavia. Full membership of the EU for the candidate states became the only real
alternative to the chaos in the Balkans.
The second discursive theme of enlargement advocates was that of expansion as
a moral imperative for the EU. It is clear that many within the EU (individual citi-
zens, individual policy-makers, governments) felt a strong sense of moral obligation
toward the former Communist states, believing that the West’s freedom and pros-
perity was somehow paid for by Eastern Europe’s subjugation during the Cold
War.48 Now that the Iron Curtain was down, they felt an obligation to assist their
eastern neighbours by integrating them with the EU and the Western zone of
peace and prosperity. By doing so, some Westerners clearly hoped to assuage the
feelings of guilt for the abandonment of the Central and Eastern European states at
Yalta and the Cold War division of Europe. Enlargement provided a moral instru-
ment for ‘undoing the wrongs of half a century’, as Leon Brittan put it.49
Foremost among those making such arguments were senior German politicians
and policy-makers. Now that conditions permitted, former Chancellor Helmut
Kohl argued in 1996, the EU ‘should not … disappoint the trust that these coun-
tries have put in us’. Further, Kohl argued, by failing to enlarge, the EU would lose
moral and political credibility and this ‘would be a terrible loss that Europe would
not quickly recover from’.50 Notwithstanding Kohl’s penchant for framing his
European arguments in dramatic ‘Europe or war’ tones, the feeling was widely
shared in Germany. Many felt a moral obligation to the people of Poland,
Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia whose actions in 1989 brought about the
end of Communism and so rendered German unification possible. Many were also
motivated by the desire to atone for past aggression and atrocities committed
against Germany’s Eastern neighbours by the Nazi regime. Because of such feel-
ings of moral obligation, the German government repeatedly proclaimed itself the
primary advocate (Anwalt) of the CEE states on behalf of their efforts to join the EU.
Joschka Fischer, in his important and expansive Humboldt University speech of 12
May 2000, spoke of enlargement not just as a ‘supreme national interest’ of
Germany but also as a ‘moral duty’ of the EU.51 The representation of enlargement
as moral obligation was not confined to the discourse of German politicians. It
permeated the discourse of government representatives throughout the European
Union. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt similarly displayed the West
European ‘guilt complex’ in many of his speeches:

For me, enlarging Europe is a question of fairness. Peoples and nations in this
part of Europe have suffered most of the greatest enemies of European prog-
ress in the twentieth century, Nazism and Communism. They deserve our
greatest efforts to heal the wounds of the twentieth century.52
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 71
The framing of eastern enlargement in such moral terms was not exclusive to
northern Europeans. The discourse of Spanish, Greek and Portuguese leaders also
demonstrated a clear attachment to the idea of EU membership as a natural right
of the transitioning states, and one rooted in a moral interpretation of the recent
European past. Former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar, for example,
argued before the Cortés in 1994 that the CEE states ‘have acquired an indisputable
right to become members that nobody has the moral authority to deny’. Spain’s
consolidation of democratic institutions and practices was routinely presented as
underwritten by the EU and appeared as a moral script for interpreting eastern
enlargement. As Aznar’s foreign minister, Josep Piqué, put it in 2000: ‘a country
with this perspective cannot deny the same perspective to the current candidates’.53
Enlargement advocates consistently argued the importance of the process as a
vehicle for the transfer of EU democratic norms and practices to a potentially vola-
tile and unstable region. The violent break-up of Yugoslavia made clear just how
high were the stakes in the geopolitical reconstitution of Europe. From early in the
process the EU thus sought to prioritize the domestic adoption of EU democracy
norms and EU shared values as an integral part of the enlargement process. The
reshaping of everything from electoral systems to minority rights legislation, judi-
cial appointments and public administration could be used to ensure the successful
transposition of EU best practice in the candidate states in advance of accession.
Guy Verhofstadt put it succinctly in denying the importance of materialist consid-
erations in the enlargement process, arguing that it was ‘hardly a question of
figures and arithmetic. We are witnessing a peaceful revolution without any prece-
dent in the past’. He went on to underline the importance of the values of the inte-
gration project:

We uphold both the ancient values of liberty and equality but also the newer
values of growth, progress and opportunity for all and not only for the happy
few. And we want an open, a tolerant and a humanist Europe, taking up its
unique responsibility for European and non-European nations alike. I have
come here to make clear that no European nation willing to join us shall be
refused. For Europe is an inclusive, not an exclusive idea. Indeed, that is what
enlargement is about. It is about restoring through peaceful means the historic,
philosophical and geographical unity of Europe.54

More recently other examples of such discourse have served to emphasize the
normative importance of enlargement. Launching the idea of a Stability Pact for
Southeast Europe, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer urged an opening of
the door to ‘a long term political and economic stabilisation process’. This would
aim to prevent ethnic conflict, create stable conditions for democracy and ‘anchor
the countries of South East Europe firmly in the values of and institutional struc-
tures of the Euro-Atlantic community’.55 Fischer’s ideas undoubtedly drew on the
experience of eastern enlargement. The process made possible the democratiza-
tion of CEE, including the remaking of political institutions and civil society.
Enlargement structures were used and justified as centres of social learning and
72 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
policy transfer from the EU to the candidate states. The deepening of those struc-
tures over time would ensure the successful transposition of EU practice and
further support the case for the EU model as the only frame of reference for states
in pan-Europe. Enlargement advocates continually reminded their audiences,
both private and public, of the benefits which this would deliver over time. The
combined impact of these diverse discursive strands used by the enlargement advo-
cates produced a cumulative effect which helped frame enlargement cognitively in
a specific and decisive fashion and which made it difficult for obstructionists or
outright oppositionists to make their case.

Conclusions
This chapter examined the internal EU decision-making process which governed
the eastern enlargement and, specifically, the role played by the different parts of
the EU Council of Ministers. The Council’s role is a complex and multifaceted
one, not least because of the lack of specification of institutional responsibilities in
Article 49. The Council was disadvantaged by various forms of fragmentation
which hampered its ability to act in a unified way throughout the enlargement
process. Nevertheless the Council mattered to enlargement outcomes in three
crucial ways. First, the member states, through the Council of Ministers, Coreper,
and the working groups, sought to maintain a high degree of control over the
process from the outset. This was important because the Commission succeeded
early on in establishing authority in key parts of the EU’s enlargement framework.
The member states thus sought to use the Council structures to scrutinize the
Commission’s activities and ensure that their national interests were articulated
and defended as the process developed. Second, the European Council provided
political direction to the enlargement process, by negotiating agreements at crucial
summit meetings at regular intervals and instructing the Commission to follow up
with analysis and recommendations regarding key parts of the policy process. And
although summit meetings such as Copenhagen in 1993, Luxembourg in 1997 and
Gothenburg in 2001 certainly provided momentum where it was lacking, the struc-
tural dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining were as often inclined to produce
non-decisions, which set back progress and in equal measure disappointed and
frustrated the applicant states. Where summit meetings did produce EU agree-
ment, that was more often than not because of the informal day-to-day suprana-
tional process which increasingly characterized EU enlargement practice and
provided the problem-solving capacity in advance of intergovernmental gatherings.
Finally, the Presidency played perhaps the most crucial role within the Council struc-
tures in facilitating agreement and maintaining momentum in the process. Whilst
the analysis presented here demonstrates significant differences of emphasis, enthu-
siasm and activity by different Presidencies, it also shows that where the political will
existed Presidencies could and indeed did prove crucial to outcomes. The Swedish
and Danish Presidencies emerge from the analysis of eastern enlargement with
particular credit, facilitating as they did the important internal EU and EU-candi-
date state deals that accelerated and eventually concluded the negotiations. What
 The Council of Ministers and eastern enlargement 73
both Presidencies demonstrated was a willingness and ability to structure and
shape the negotiating agenda, to bring into focus new or neglected issues within the
enlargement process, engage in different forms of institutional and political entre-
preneurship, and mediate between the different parties in both the internal and
external negotiations. The complex nature of the EU’s evolving enlargement prac-
tice is demonstrated, however, in the fact that the institutional activity of the Presi-
dency was much more likely to succeed where it forged a good working relationship
with the Commission and combined with the latter to frame the parameters of EU
policy. In particular the horizontal fragmentation of the Council left member states
vulnerable to pressure emanating from a Presidency–Commission alliance. Thus
evidence from the eastern enlargement process demonstrates that the formal insti-
tutional division of labour laid out in Article 49 no longer reflects what actually
happens in practice. In effect the formal/legal structure of responsibilities has been
overtaken by a new and quite amorphous decision-making structure which is both
intergovernmental and supranational and provides opportunity structures within
the enlargement process for institutional and policy entrepreneurship. As the next
chapter will show it is no longer the case (if indeed it ever was) that the Commission
‘proposes’ and the Council ‘disposes’.
6 The European Commission
and eastern enlargement

Introduction
Although of immense political significance for the EU, the eastern enlargement
was characterized principally by modes of technocratic and functional policy adap-
tation by the candidate states and policy transfer by the EU. The requirement that
candidate states in Central and Eastern Europe adopt in its entirety the EU’s acquis
communautaire meant that oversight and monitoring of the process of adaptation
gradually became the primary concern of EU policy. And it is in this respect that
the role of the European Commission becomes central to the institutional politics
of eastern enlargement. Arguments about the role of the Commission are espe-
cially important in the context of integration perspectives, as they go to the heart of
the traditional academic divide between realists and intergovernmentalists on the
one hand, and neofunctionalists and constructivists on the other.1 Intergovern-
mentalists view the Commission as little more than the bureaucratic agent of
the Council of Ministers whereas neofunctionalists, and more recently, many
constructivist scholars, posit the Commission as a strategically important and
sophisticated institutional actor, possessed of the resources and scope to crucially
influence the direction of EU policy-making.
Given the formal responsibilities each institution is assigned under Article 49
of the treaties, it might be expected that state actors would dominate an enlarge-
ment process, with the critical decisions made in intergovernmental forums.
After all, the Commission acts only in an advisory capacity; the Council as a
collective body takes the important political decisions. Undoubtedly this is why
the role played by the Commission in enlargement policy-making has been so
neglected by scholars of enlargement over the years. If that neglect was somewhat
justified in the analysis of previous enlargement rounds, it cannot be justified in
the case of the eastern enlargement. From the institution of relations with the
former Communist bloc in 1989, the Commission carved out for itself a much
more significant role in the eastern enlargement process than any formal reading
of Article 49 might have suggested. This chapter analyses the different dimen-
sions of the Commission role and argues that, inter alia, its formal right of initiative
under the treaties, its direct engagement with a range of internal EU and candi-
date state actors, its extensive network of technical expertise and its ability and
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 75
willingness to act as a political entrepreneur all combined to ensure that the
Commission played a crucial role (at times the crucial role) in the important
decisions that marked the eastern enlargement process. Its role was thus both
functional-bureaucratic and normative-political.

Eastern enlargement: a different type of challenge

for the Commission
In seeking to explain the complex role played by the Commission in the eastern
enlargement process, it seems useful to embed this analysis in something of a histor-
ical context. This enables us to determine how and in what ways the Commission’s
role differed with previous rounds. Three reasons can be advanced for the more
visible and ‘hands-on’ role played by the Commission in this enlargement.
In the first place, the sheer scale of the eastern enlargement dwarfed all previous
expansions. Specifically, it would mean parallel negotiations with up to ten candi-
date states (including Cyprus and Malta), each defined by its own cultural and
historical experiences and each with different sets of demands that would require
EU attention. The EU had only ever negotiated simultaneously with a maximum
of four states, each of which was much closer to the Union in respect of economic
development and political maturity and so presented a fairly straightforward nego-
tiating challenge. Recognition of the scale of the challenge led some influential
insiders from the outset to argue that the process would be best served by investing
management authority in a single EU institutional actor. Support for this position
was further encouraged after the confusion caused by the duplication of functions,
and mix of bilateral and collective initiatives, which characterized early EU policy
toward Central and Eastern Europe. It quickly became evident that only the
Commission, with its strategic organizational know-how and informational reach,
could properly coordinate the integration of the CEE states into EU processes.
The Commission’s role had also changed because of the extension, especially
after the Single European Act, in the nature and reach of the acquis communautaire.
For aspiring members this meant a significant ‘moving of the goalposts’, a vast
increase in the quantity of EU-generated legislation to be absorbed into domestic
law. For the EU significant difficulties potentially arose in measuring the progress
of applicant states without a far-reaching and deeply institutionalized scrutiny of
the process of transposition and implementation. The Commission, which was
already responsible for compliance monitoring within the EU, was thought to be
the best-placed institutional actor to advise on and interpret the acquis.
The expansion of the acquis continued apace as the EU deepened in anticipation
of widening and as it put in place the elements of a new economic and political rela-
tionship with Central and Eastern Europe. But the sheer vagueness of Article 237 –
‘any European state may apply’ – meant that by the early 1990s, as more demands
for membership were received, a new ‘quasi-legal’ set of enlargement instruments
had to be adopted. Whilst some of these measures were introduced with the Medi-
terranean enlargements it was really only with the prospect of eastern enlargement
that a new set of priorities for applicant states became informally introduced into
76 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
the process.2 Over time this meant a vast body of new rules being imposed on the
applicant states, including some such as state protection for minority rights, which
had no legal basis in the treaties, and which had been completely absent from
previous enlargement rounds. Thus the Commission’s role in compliance moni-
toring was much more extensive (and intrusive) than ever before.
A third significant change to the Commission’s role is evident in the fact that it
became a significant actor in the domestic politics of the CEE applicant states to an
extent not previously imagined let alone experienced. Indeed Commissioners van
den Bröek, Verheugen, Fischler, Patten and Wallström became so well known and
influential within applicant state politics that they sometimes carried more clout
than domestic cabinet ministers. The depth of their influence can clearly be
discerned from the scale of media coverage of their visits to the applicant states,
which frequently eclipsed coverage of domestic political issues. While this is
certainly reflective of the asymmetry of power between the EU and the candidate
states, it also suggests a much more significant role for the Commission in the
external governance of the Union than intergovernmentalists and realists would
allow.
Thus the combined effect of the changes in the legal regulation of enlargement,
the development of new informal accession norms, and the sheer scale of the chal-
lenge before the Union, meant that the Commission gradually assumed a very
different role within the eastern enlargement process than in previous rounds.
Whilst the member states were free to disregard the Commission’s views they chose
consistently to support the recommendations that it put forward.

The Commission as agenda-setter

Within the structures of EU policy-making the Commission’s agenda-shaping and
agenda-setting ability derive principally from its formal treaty-based power – the
sole right of initiative it enjoys for nearly all ‘first-pillar’ legislation – meaning that
any legislative measure can only proceed through the EU system on the basis of a
proposal from the Commission. In conceptualizing EU public policy-making
formal agenda-setting refers to the ‘ability of an actor to set the procedural agenda of
a legislature by placing before it legislative proposals that can be adopted more
easily than amended, thus structuring and constraining the choices faced by a
group of legislators’.3 Even Moravcsik, who regards the Commission as little
more than an agent of the member states’ will, concedes that ‘the ability to select
among viable proposals grants the Commission considerable formal agenda-
setting power’.4 It is with respect to this formal role that Pierson has stressed the
importance of the Commission as ‘process manager’ of large parts of EU public
policy-making, which is heavily tilted toward regulation. The development of
complex social regulation requires the assembly and coordination in particular of
dense networks of experts.5 This power, of course, is far from uniform and, as
Pollack points out, varies across the dozens of distinct legal bases and complex
voting rules that have been developed through the treaties and subsequent amend-
ments. Further, this influence is also contingent upon a number of key factors,
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 77
including the sensitivity of the particular issue, the institutional rules governing
which actor may propose an initiative, the distribution of actor preferences, and
prospective deadlines for securing agreement.6 Notwithstanding such caveats it is
clear that within the formal rules and procedures that govern the integration
process the Commission wields considerable influence on policy-making.7
In tandem with its formal powers of initiative the Commission also utilizes a
range of informal agenda-setting instruments. This broader concept of institutional
power refers to the ability of a policy entrepreneur to ‘set the substantive agenda of
an organization, not through its formal powers, but through its ability to define
issues and present proposals that can rally consensus among the final decision-
makers’.8 This power, as Marlene Wind suggests, derives from the norm-consti-
tuting and informal practices that have developed through the years at EU level.9
Similarly, for Friis, an important component of the Commission’s power derives
from its ability to frame the policy agenda in certain ways. Specifically, the exact
social and political construction of the issues before the EU proves crucial to policy
outcomes. The argument here is that in an environment characterized by uncer-
tainty, imperfect information and limited timeframes for decision-making, supra-
national agents such as the Commission can progress negotiations by constructing
focal points for deliberation and negotiation, around which discussion can be struc-
tured and state preferences teased out.10 Framing is an activity of selection, aggre-
gation (of options) and interpretation of a complex reality, so as to provide a
cognitive road map for analysis and coordinated response to perceived common
problems.11 Thus where the Commission finds that its formal treaty-based powers
are insufficient to shape policy it readily resorts to such informal methods of
agenda-shaping.
Like any self-interested political actor the Commission has an institutional interest
in having its initiatives adopted; it will take the pulse of the different institutional
actors within the decision-making system and only produce policy proposals it feels
can be successfully adopted. In addition, the Commission, as guardian of the trea-
ties, holds a systemic interest in the adoption of successful policy proposals. The integ-
rity of the EU public policy process is predicated upon the production of a sufficient
number of policy proposals to drive the integration project forward and make it
work for the member states. Prior to submitting a proposal the Commission will
have been lobbied by interest groups, engaged with national officials in Coreper,
and taken soundings on the views of Parliament. It may well modify a proposal in
anticipation of difficulties that might be encountered at different stages of the
policy process. Thus the complex nature of the bargaining process within the EU
makes it difficult to identify ‘ownership’ of specific policy proposals with precision,
even if they emerge from the Commission. The difficulties of attributing ‘success’
to individual institutional actors are as evident in the enlargement process as in any
other area of EU public policy.
The Commission’s formal responsibility under Article 49 of the treaty is to
prepare and present an Opinion (avis) on an applicant state’s suitability for member-
ship and on the likely impact of enlargement on the Union. The Commission at
this stage is supposed to consult and reflect and make recommendations (to the
78 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
Council).12 The Commission submits compromise solutions that usually become
the basis for joint positions of the existing member states and then for an agreement
between them and the candidate states.13 But the Commission also has a key role in
the formulation and implementation of policies; within the enlargement process
this applies to the association and pre-accession strategies as well as in the accession
negotiations.14 At all stages of the process, therefore, the Commission is well posi-
tioned to contribute to enlargement policy-making.
In the case of selecting and proposing policy initiatives on eastern enlargement,
the Commission, from the beginning, sought to use its formal powers to the fullest
extent. Undoubtedly it won success in finding acceptance for many of its own
policy initiatives because they were tailored to fit with the policy interests of key
member states. In other cases the Commission was able to forge alliances with
shifting coalitions of member states on specific issues. Undoubtedly also, the
normative appeal of proposals which the Commission routinely presented as
‘Community-enhancing’ made for acceptance over rejection of many proposals. A
key reason, however, for the Commission’s success in enlargement agenda-setting,
was the fact that, from the beginning of the process in 1989, the member states
were unclear about how to embrace the Warsaw Pact states (despite the rhetorical
offerings of wholehearted support), fearful of the institutional and policy implica-
tions of a potential large-scale enlargement, and thus reluctant to embrace any
radical policy proposals. The sheer uncertainty surrounding the transition process
in Central and Eastern Europe also meant that the member states were reluctant to
take control of a process that was not necessarily going to lead to membership for
the CEE aspirants. Thus, almost by default, the Commission found itself playing
the principal EU role in the eastern enlargement process from the earliest stage.
There were some striking early examples of the Commission’s willingness and
ability to use its formal agenda-setting powers on important issues. Sedelmeier and
Wallace, for example, demonstrate that during the negotiations on the initial
Europe Agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Commission
successfully persuaded the Council to amend the negotiation directives in order to
take better account of CEE demands.15 With respect to the groundbreaking
Copenhagen summit of June 1993, which effectively reshaped EU policy toward
Central and Eastern Europe, the services of DG I and Franz Andriessen’s cabinet
proved particularly important. The Commission succeeded in forging a coalition
with Denmark, Germany and the UK, thus succeeding to a large extent in circum-
venting the more hesitant and protectionist member states and vested interests.
One result (discussed in chapter 2) was a significant increase in CEE access to the
EU market. EU producers in the steel sector were particularly opposed to the
Commission’s liberal strategy of opening markets to CEE producers. In the end the
Commission’s adept management of alliances and advocacy neutralized their
opposition.16 Again, in the run-up to the Corfu summit in 1994, there is evidence of
effective Commission agenda-setting. In cooperation with the German govern-
ment (due to take up the Presidency in the second half of the year), the Commission
secured a mandate to produce what in effect would amount to a pre-accession
strategy for the applicant states. This mandate secured for those enlargement
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 79
advocates within the Commission a much more secure platform from which to
continue their work.17 As importantly, the Commission’s 1995 White Paper on
CEE adoption of internal market measures accommodated the preferences of CEE
producers to a degree that suggests that the Commission’s ability to author and
frame the content of policy proposals significantly reduced the veto opportunities
open to EU producer interests and their state sponsors.
One of the best examples of the Commission’s ability to frame the EU’s eastern
enlargement agenda is provided by Friis in relation to the Luxembourg summit of
1997, where many member states entered the negotiation with loosely defined
preferences. In this situation the Commission was able to ‘move the game along’ by
framing the agenda in a specific way (typically invoking the normative importance
of enlargement to the EU) and forging alliances with key member states (Denmark,
Germany and Sweden) on important issues. Luxembourg produced the commit-
ment that the applicant states had desired – the opening of negotiations early in
1998, which a number of member states opposed. The Commission had objected
to a mooted minimalist accession and succeeded in particular in the inclusion of
Estonia and Slovakia in the first wave of negotiations. Such an outcome suggests, as
Frank Schimmelfennig argues, that the Commission’s extensive use of its powers of
proposal along with its ability to construct alliances within the Council helped
‘lock’ the EU into an enlargement commitment.18 As the relationship with the
candidate states deepened the Commission continued to force the pace, but,
conscious also of the sensitivity of many issues in the negotiating process, relied also
on its relationship with the Presidency and forging successful alliances in order to
achieve its objectives.

Commission advocacy and the framing of eastern

enlargement
Outside of its formal treaty-based powers the Commission also sought to shape the
contours of the internal EU debate on eastern enlargement through a sustained
public discourse, designed to neutralize the opponents of enlargement and create a
EU-wide consensus on the normative character of the process. Far from being
content with the disinterested provision of policy advice on enlargement issues,
parts of the Commission were often the most vocal and enthusiastic proponents of
early and inclusive CEE membership of the EU. The Commission was just one
arm of a highly visible and vocal advocacy coalition which also included key deci-
sion-makers within member state governments, important interest groups and
epistemic communities, academics, media commentators and public intellectuals,
all of whom consistently made the case (publicly and privately) for the inclusion of
the candidate states and a generous accommodation of their preferences. The
Commission’s pivotal position within the EU as guardian of the treaties and inde-
pendent arbiter of policy proposals, as well as its mastery of the detail of enlarge-
ment issues, left it uniquely placed to inform, harangue, cajole and persuade both
the applicant states and the member states of the merits of its strategy. The
methods by which it sought to frame enlargement are thus deserving of attention.
80 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
Jeffrey Checkel’s work on agency is a reminder that well-placed and influential
actors with entrepreneurial skills can often turn their individual beliefs into
broader, shared understandings. In effect, these individuals have the ability to
transpose their beliefs and values on to other actors in a given policy environ-
ment. In this situation, as agents engage in cognitive information searches and
alignment of preferences, seemingly fixed preferences often dissolve. Processes of
social learning are crucial for furthering the norm-creating potential first begun
by individual agents. Checkel identifies two distinct diffusion pathways through
which norms are transmitted: a ‘bottom-up’ approach, whereby non-state actors
and policy networks are most influential, and, second, a ‘top-down’ approach
where social learning among élites is the vital mechanism for norm diffusion.19
Although elements of both tendencies may be identified within different aspects
of the eastern enlargement framework, the Commission’s discursive framing
activities may only properly be understood as part of an élite-centred social
learning process. In addition, it must be acknowledged that some officials and
policy-makers were more important than others. This might be because of their
relative seniority and records in public life or their handling of policy issues where
they gained special understanding of the issues involved. It is clear that the diffu-
sion of norms through processes of socialization and social learning was given a
high priority by the Commission as institutional relations with the candidate
states deepened.
Identifying the most important public advocates of eastern enlargement within
the Commission is not difficult. From an early stage the EU’s external policy repre-
sentatives took the lead in both private and public discussion of enlargement.
Commission officials, especially those located around the cabinets of Commissioners
Franz Andriessen and Leon Brittan, ‘promoted an accommodation of the CEEC’s
interests not only because of far-sighted self-interest, but also for its own sake’. This
group of policy-makers was most frequently the source of statements acknowl-
edging and asserting a special role for the EU with respect to CEE, and frequently
justified policy preferences with reference to norms of accommodation and EU
responsibility.20 In many instances the exertion of such discursive pressure left
them at odds with state representatives who were less inclined to cast aside their
partisan preferences. Both Andriessen and Brittan in their public advocacy of
enlargement went far beyond what might have been expected of a supposedly
neutral bureaucratic arm of the EU. Their rhetorical support for the applicant
states underscores the deeply political role played by the Commission throughout
the eastern enlargement process.21
Commission presidents also played their part. Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer
and Romano Prodi all acted as advocates of eastern enlargement, even if they
exhibited significant differences of tone and emphasis. During the negotiation of
the Europe Agreements, for example, Jacques Delors excoriated member states
for their continued protectionist instincts vis-à-vis CEE.22 Like other enlargement
supporters the father of the Single Market programme also frequently framed his
speeches in normative terms: ‘Building an area of peace brings us back to the
basic foundations of the initial European project. Europe was built to say no to
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 81
conflict, no to the wars that repeatedly tore the continent apart.’ Enlargement
thus constituted the most important security-enhancing project which the EU
had attempted.23 In contrast, as Peter Ludlow shows, the Santer Commission was
much more reactive than proactive: ‘they acquiesced in demands placed upon the
Commission by successive European Councils. They did not, as the Commission
had done at Copenhagen in June 1993, help to provoke these demands.’ In large
part this was because Santer’s Commission worked from a ‘bleak and unimagina-
tive political strategy’ with ‘the earliest advice emanating from Hans van den Bröek
and his officials brutal. None of the CEECs were anywhere near the required stan-
dards.’24 Santer himself was known to favour only a small enlargement intake of
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. It was little wonder then that the period
in office of the Santer Commission saw enlargement recede as a political priority
for the European Union.
The Prodi Commission, in contrast, was not just more committed to enlarge-
ment but was both privately and publicly enthusiastic and proactive. From the
beginning of his term Prodi signalled that eastern enlargement represented an
absolute political priority and he subsequently lost no opportunity to publicly
commit the Union to the cause of speedy accession whilst emphasizing the need for
CEE adaptation and substantive reform. A key contribution to the EU’s more sure-
footed enlargement strategy under Prodi was the administrative reorganization of
the Commission machinery that he effected.25 The newly created Enlargement
DG acquired a new director in Eneko Landaburu, one of the most senior officials
in the Commission, with a proven success record as an administrator and connec-
tions at the highest levels.26 His remoulding of the Enlargement Task Force was
particularly important in providing a credible organizational structure from which
the move to final negotiations could proceed. Neither was he afraid to venture into
sensitive political territory by publicly discussing the opportunity costs of non-
enlargement.27 The most significant innovation was the establishment of an entirely
new administrative tier within the Enlargement DG, consisting of five directors,
who together with Landaburu shaped and agreed almost all the most important
elements in the Commission’s new enlargement strategy. Three of the directors,
Francoise Gaudenzi, Pierre Mirel and Michael Leigh, were each responsible for a
group of candidate countries, while the other two, Matthias Ruete and Augosto
Bonucci, were in charge respectively of the coordination of pre-accession policies,
including the appropriate financial instruments, and resources and finance. Graham
Avery, one of the Commission’s most experienced enlargement experts, was also
party to the most important decisions.28

Günter Verheugen
If administrative support helped underpin the Commission’s strategy, the polit-
ical lead given by commissioners was of the utmost importance. In this respect
the outstanding figure was Günter Verheugen, who succeeded Hans van den
Bröek as Commissioner for enlargement in 1999. In office,Verheugen demon-
strated from the outset remarkable energy and enthusiasm, and had ‘political
82 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
clout and imagination well above the average in any Commission’.29 Verheugen,
in effect, became a classic ‘norm entrepreneur’, engaging in public discourse across
the membership–non-membership nexus and consistently deploying ideas about
appropriate and non-appropriate behaviour for both insiders and outsiders. He was
more trusted in the candidate states than his predecessor and enjoyed close
working relations with a large number of senior EU leaders.
The record demonstrates Verheugen’s aptitude for enlargement entrepre-
neurship. In the aftermath of the election of Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party as part
of the Austrian coalition government, Verheugen insisted that this could not and
would not slow down the enlargement negotiations. This was in a context where
Haider was making veiled threats about Austria vetoing eastern enlargement, in
a country where there existed greater fears about the implications of enlargement
than any other.30 Verheugen was also adamant that the ongoing deepening of the
EU should not interfere with the timetable or negotiations on enlargement. At
Salzburg in June 2000 Verheugen insisted that enlargement should not be
delayed by IGC-related disagreements on major constitutional reform in the EU.
The two processes had to be kept apart.31 More controversially, Verheugen also
supported the right of applicant states to delay the sale of land to wealthy EU15
nationals for periods after accession, at a time when this was a difficult issue in the
negotiations with some candidate states.32 His visits to candidate state countries
were characterized by speeches seeking to enthuse and encourage further reform
whilst expressing confidence that negotiations could be concluded speedily.33 He
was also not averse to directly interfering in the domestic debate on EU member-
ship in candidate states. In Poland, for example, in a wide-ranging speech on 11
July 2002, he warned Poles against falling for lies about what EU accession would
mean for them.34 He openly attacked Polish Eurosceptics, and assertively set out
the advantages of EU membership.
Such strident advocacy of enlargement made Verheugen seem at times to
member states as a traitor in the ranks, recalling the old pun by a German
diplomat that he was known in Bonn not as the ständiger Vertreter (permanent
representative) but as the ständiger Verräter (permanent traitor). The mirror
image of this negative persona could be found in his depiction in the candi-
date states, where Verheugen was sometimes presented as the representative
of an ever-demanding and unreasonable EU.35 Unlike Commission President
Prodi, Verheugen’s tenure was relatively free of controversy and gaffes.36
Although it was the Danish Presidency that took the principal negotiating role
on behalf of the Union in the final stages, Verheugen and Eneko Landaburu
both acted as interlocutors with candidate state governments. Verheugen was
by then so trusted in CEE capitals that ministers and officials confided in him,
consulted him, and continually lobbied him. His importance as a key broker in
the negotiations was demonstrated in the part he played liaising with and
between Chancellor Schröder and Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller in the
weeks immediately before the final Copenhagen summit.37
The Commission, however, was far from a uniform actor in the eastern enlarge-
ment process. The Delors, Santer and Prodi Commissions contained commissioners
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 83
who were sceptical about the benefits of enlargement and sought to highlight the
inadequacy of CEE preparations. In retrospect, Hans van den Bröek, for example,
seems much more an enlargement ‘realist’ than ‘idealist’. Internal Market Commis-
sioner Fritz Bolkstein was at times the scourge of the candidate states or certainly the
most consistently trenchant critic of Commission policy. He had in 1996, for
example, while still in Dutch politics, fought hard to block Poland’s entry into
NATO. He had also expressed scepticism about the Commission’s analysis of candi-
date state preparation in some of the annual reports. In particular he was far from
convinced that the candidate states could meet the internal market competition they
would face. He was not the only doubtful commissioner. Loyola de Palacio, Viviane
Reding and David Byrne are also mentioned as reluctant enlargers in Ludlow’s
account.38 Thus, for Verheugen and Prodi, where enlargement proposals were
concerned, the internal battle within the Commission was sometimes as charged as
any battle with the Council or candidate states. But for all that the Commission was
still the most unified institutional body within the enlargement process throughout
and more often than not succeeded in turning its own positions into collective EU
positions.

The Commission’s discursive framing of

enlargement
If individual Commissioners and parts of the Commission bureaucracy contrib-
uted significantly to EU support for eastern enlargement, a crucial part of their
strategic armoury may be located in the discursive deployment of strategic rhet-
oric. There were two dimensions to this, an internal EU dimension aimed at mobi-
lizing member states and EU citizens, and an external dimension involving key
commissioners and their staff in selling enlargement to candidate state representa-
tives and their citizens. In this respect, policy speeches and statements, along with
official communications to the Council, are revealing of a body that framed its
arguments with respect to EU values, norms and obligations rather than instru-
mental benefits. In effect, the Commission usually sought to appeal to the member
states in terms of the medium- to long-term potential of enlargement to secure
peace and prosperity for a wider Europe, rather than a short-term perspective
based on economic and utilitarian concerns. On some occasions, depending on
circumstance and the commissioner in question, enlargement was also framed as a
‘win–win’ economic prospect. But the dominant discourse was that of a liberal
international peace community seeking to export its value system to its eastern
neighbours, in the greater interest of securing, on a wider basis, the very values
from which it derived its legitimacy.39
In arguing for an important discursive dimension to the Commission’s role the
importance of language and discourse in the social construction of reality is
foregrounded. Indeed the material fact of eastern enlargement can only properly
be understood as socially constructed by language, representation and symbolism.
And it was the Commission that played a lead role in discursively constructing
enlargement. It is possible to dissect the Commission’s normative framing of
84 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
enlargement more precisely. In doing so one can identify three distinct pillars of the
Commission’s discursive strategy. The first presented enlargement as a vehicle
for the expansion of the EU value system and legal and democratic norms to
Eastern Europe. The second sought to present enlargement to Central and
Eastern Europe as a ‘special responsibility’ and moral imperative for the EU.
This pillar also sought to link this moral dimension to the ‘Return to Europe’
narrative that was the main discursive foundation of CEE claims to membership.
Finally, a materialist discourse, which posited enlargement as a ‘win–win’
scenario for both member states and candidates, was also deployed to support the
primary normative discourse.
In the first instance Commission representatives routinely presented enlarge-
ment as an effort to extend the EU model of interstate reconciliation eastwards
and, as such, as the vehicle for reshaping the emerging Europe in the image of the
EU. In his controversial book Paradise and Power American neo-conservative Robert
Kagan, although fundamentally underestimating the normative underpinnings of
the EU, does capture an essential part of the post-Second World War European
compact. The European states embraced a Kantian concept of interstate relations,
what Kagan terms a ‘postmodern paradise’, and thereafter embraced a genuinely
pacific perspective on the role of power in international relations. The modern
European strategic culture represents ‘a conscious rejection of the European past, a
rejection of the evils of European Machtpolitik. It is a reflection of Europeans’ ardent
and understandable desire never to return to that past.’40
The EU value system and its model of interstate reconciliation and reciprocity
evolved only slowly over the years but with the prospect of eastern enlargement
assumed a new importance in EU thinking. At every point during the eastern
enlargement process the Commission stressed the importance of EU values as the
underlying basis for membership. And while those values assumed a central impor-
tance in the framing of the Copenhagen criteria for membership the Commission
also suggested several additional criteria, which had not been in evidence in earlier
rounds. Applicants now had to accept the entire Community system, the acquis
communautaire and the acquis politique as well as the finalité politique of the Union.41 The
core of the Commission’s enlargement strategy thus lay in the effort to successfully
export the EU norms and practices at the heart of the acquis. This is surely what
Commission President Romano Prodi meant when he said that ‘our enlargement
strategy ensures that these values are enshrined in the candidate countries before
they can join the EU. Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will
become the norm throughout the expanding Union.’42
Reflecting on the eastern enlargement and musing on its significance as a
template for future enlargement, Olli Rehn, the Finn who succeeded Günter
Verheugen as enlargement commissioner in the Barroso Commission, makes the
point succinctly: ‘Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that
make the borders of Europe. Enlargement is a matter of extending the zone of
European values, the most fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, toler-
ance and human rights, democracy and the rule of law.’43 Of equal importance was
the fact that enlargement is based on the fundamental post-war European compact
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 85
referred to by Kagan. As Rehn asserts: ‘equally important is that countries relin-
quish power politics and spheres of influence as their modes of operation inside the
EU. The greatest achievement of post-war Europe is that its governing principle is
no longer “might is right”.’44 Extending that principle to Eastern Europe became a
central part of EU strategy and this found a prominent place in Commission
discourse.
The second strand of the Commission’s enlargement discourse centred on the
notion of the EU’s ‘special responsibility’ for Central and Eastern Europe and the
moral approach to enlargement that this impelled. Sedelmeier argues that EU–
CEE relations were, to a great extent, shaped by this EU desire to act appropri-
ately. This approach was fundamentally based on different types of identity
linkage and was present throughout the enlargement process.45 In the previous
chapter this discursive strand was also identified in the public framing of enlarge-
ment by key state representatives and public intellectuals across the EU. The
European Commission regularly stressed the notion of a EU special responsi-
bility, not as some latter-day ‘White Man’s Burden’ but as something located in a
shared historical experience, a common cultural repertoire, and the sense of
kinship duty that linked Western to Central and Eastern Europe. This strand of
Commission discursive support manifested itself especially in buttressing the
‘Return to Europe’ discourse regularly deployed by candidate state representa-
tives. European Commission officials were in fact explicit in outlining the moral
claims of the applicant states. Commissioner Verheugen, for example, in a
speech to the European Parliament in 2000, suggested:

Enlargement is the only adequate response to two great historical changes that
have occurred in our lifetimes: the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Communist camp. How could we say to the nations of Europe who have so
recently won through to freedom and self-determination, sorry, the benefits of
European integration are reserved for those who happened to be on the ‘right’
side of the Iron Curtain in 1945?46

In its policy documents and public pronouncements the Commission frequently

resorted to the moral argument in its efforts to accelerate the negotiation process.47
The Regular Reports, for example, just as they stressed the importance of enlarge-
ment as a vehicle for securing EU values across Europe also presented eastern
enlargement as one with ‘an unprecedented moral dimension’.48 The speeches of
Romano Prodi and Günter Verheugen in particular were studded with references
to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland as ‘an integral part of Europe’, or part
of the ‘extended family of European nations’.49 Jacques Delors too in retrospect
presented enlargement as an act of historical and moral justice:

Active peace is not the ‘peace of cemeteries’ we experienced during the Cold
War. We must not forget that we west Europeans found ourselves on the right
side of the line drawn by the Yalta agreement and that our East European
relatives were less fortunate. I consider we have a debt toward them from a
86 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
historical point of view. Not in terms of negotiating the body of Community
law, but in terms of history. At the same time, we are overjoyed at seeing the
whole family brought together.50

This notion of indivisibility of the European family of nations recurs frequently as a

predominant and systematic pattern, underlying the idea of East and West in Europe
as two parts of the same entity. The aim of policies toward CEE is ‘to overcome the
division’. Thus ‘we will not let Europe be divided again’.51 The underlying argument
is that CEE is a part of ‘us’ that must be returned. This emphasis on indivisibility
foregrounded the element of justice inherent in the ‘Return to Europe’ claims, and
further helped frame eastern enlargement as not just a moral good but a moral
imperative for the EU.
The final thematic strand of Commission discourse was an interest-based one,
stressing the economic benefits to be derived from enlargement, of expansion as a
‘win–win’ scenario for both the EU and the candidate states. The expansion of
democracy and consolidation of democratic institutions would be underpinned by
a market system which brought solid benefits to both the EU and candidate states.
Even if the gains were more on the candidate state side and, within the EU, distrib-
uted somewhat unequally, enlargement would provide the basis for a dynamic
medium-term reconstitution of market relations. This type of argument was a
subsidiary one, however, and more usually deployed in support of the normative
discourse outlined above. It rarely featured as a stand-alone logic for expansion.
How important was this discourse as an argument based on first principles? If we
accept the notion that discourse matters in international politics the case for the
‘Return to Europe’ looks much more convincing than rationalists would allow.
Neumann would suggest that this is a concrete example not only of the unfolding of
identity politics but also of how specific carriers of discourse – artists, intellectuals,
policy-making groups, epistemic communities – have the ability to change the
frame of reference of a particular debate in what they consider an advantageous
direction.52 If we consider this in tandem with the EU’s own self-consciousness
about its image and credibility, then it is quite tenable. The Commission, as
guardian of the treaties, honest broker, and moral conscience of the enlargement
process, acted principally from a cognitive template that stressed legitimacy,
justice, responsibility, and the normative desire to secure the core values of the
European integration process on the widest scale possible.
In employing such a ‘logic of appropriateness’ it sought to guide the candidate
states toward membership, whilst exerting pressure, privately and publicly, on
those states within the EU which were cautious or reluctant about enlargement.
The articulation by Commission officials of a certain vision of Europe (inclusive,
indivisible, whole) consistently represented Central and Eastern Europe as integral
to the process of European integration and the candidate states as equal partners.
Unquestionably this bolstered their claims to membership of the Union. In effect,
the Commission, where it made distinctions in its public pronouncements, did so
not on the basis of insider and outsider but rather on the basis of the ‘us’ and the
‘future us’, as Commission advisor Graham Avery put it so succinctly.53 And whilst
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 87
private solicitation and institutional innovation were the Commission’s preferred
instruments for securing its policy preferences, we should not ignore the cumula-
tive impact that the Commission’s normative discourse produced within the
enlargement process.

The Commission as an agent of socialization

If its ability to shape the EU agenda on eastern enlargement was boosted by its
ability to frame enlargement in specific ways and build alliances to fight internal
battles, then the Commission’s direct engagement with the candidate states also
helped it influence the nature and direction of EU policy. One route to under-
standing the Commission’s ability to influence outcomes in the candidate states is
to employ the typology developed by Tanja Börzel with respect to its role in
monitoring compliance with EU legislation within the EU. Börzel identifies four
strategies that the Commission uses either singly or in combination with each
other within the integration process: capacity-building (positive incentives), persua-
sion (learning), sanctioning (negative incentives), and legal internalization (litigation).54
Given that the candidates were not yet members of the club, the last strategy was
not available within the pre-accession process. But the inside–outside nature of the
negotiations gave the Commission extraordinary room for manoeuvre with respect
to the other modes of compliance. In particular two important dimensions of the
Commission’s ability to act as inside–outside mediator and agent of socialization of
the applicant states into EU normative practice may be identified. In the first place
a range of capacity-building instruments was deployed to boost the candidate
states’ ability to transpose the acquis. In tandem with this the Commission employed
an intensive strategy of political conditionality and compliance monitoring in over-
seeing the transposition and implementation of EU norms in CEE. Whereas the
former rendered the Commission a positive agent of change within the domestic
politics of candidate states, the latter frequently left it at odds with candidate state
governments.
The extent of the Commission’s involvement in such activities effectively allowed
it to act in what Brigid Laffan terms an identity-building capacity in the process of
eastern enlargement. Laffan argues that the identity-building capacity of the
formal EU institutions depends on their place in the institutional landscape, the roles
that are associated with the institutions, the proactive identity-building policies that
institutions foster, and the attitudes of the individual social agents that occupy these
roles.55 Institutionalized cooperation does indeed have the identity-shaping effects
that normative and constructivist approaches suggest. Such approaches stress the
importance of institutionalized communicative practices, social learning and delib-
eration.56 The Commission, in managing the functional socialization of the appli-
cant states into EU normative practice, acted as both institution-builder and
identity-builder within the process. Such a perspective has a starting point in the
acknowledgement that the Commission exists at the centre of a web of functional
networks in Brussels. But those functional relationships are endowed with substan-
tive meaning only by the complex social relationships that underpin them and
88 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
shape their content. This is the context for understanding the journey of enlargement
policy proposals and the macro-politics of EU engagement with the candidate coun-
tries. The Commission’s pre-eminent role in the enlargement process, stemming
from its position as chief interlocutor of the CEE states, translated into layer after
layer of social and institutional interaction, which enabled it to contribute decisively
to policy and institutional innovation in the candidate states. In effect the Commis-
sion became the central agent for what is now known as the ‘Europeanization’ of
large parts of the policy process in the candidate countries.57

Socialization through capacity-building

Two specific modes of capacity-building may be discerned from the Commission’s
enlargement activities. The first was the institutional management of structural aid
programmes in the candidate states. The second focused on building human
capital particularly through reform of public administration systems. And through
that process of building institutional capacity the Commission implicitly also
sought to build a European consciousness, first in the minds of CEE political élites,
and, it was hoped, through the demonstrated success of the programmes, in the
hearts and minds of candidate state citizens. And whereas at élite level there seems
little doubt that the process succeeded in engendering an EU identity, citizens of
the new member states seem as remote from and unconnected with ‘Brussels’ as
their counterparts in EU15 member states.
The clearest early indication of the Commission’s eagerness to forge a leadership
role in institutional innovation was reflected in its assumption of responsibility for
coordinating the early financial and technical aid programmes for Central and
Eastern Europe in the wake of the 1989 revolutions. At the G24 conference in Paris
in 1989, as outlined in chapter 2, the Commission took on responsibility for coordi-
nating financial aid to the CEE states through what would evolve into the PHARE
programme. For some observers this responsibility was of only secondary impor-
tance, revolving as it did around classic modes of functional institutional delega-
tion. The evidence, however, suggests that the Commission used its resources and
autonomy to shape the content of the aid programmes, from the initial proposals
through to management and implementation. Its direct oversight of such programmes
rendered it the best-placed EU actor in formally engaging the candidate state
representatives in EU policy-making procedures and practices. PHARE became
the umbrella programme for the distribution of large amounts of EU aid. So from
the beginning the Commission was the EU actor most directly associated with the
positive programmes supporting CEE transition, which, over time, would deliver
more and more direct aid to the candidate states. And although the early PHARE
programme experienced considerable management difficulties, the delivery of
large tranches of subvention undoubtedly helped to counter the image of the EU as
imperialist and over-demanding.58
The Commission also learnt an enormous amount about candidate state econo-
mies and systems of public administration through the management of PHARE
programmes, which undoubtedly helped it to make more precise judgements
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 89
about the wider policy mix needed in CEE. The informational advantages it
enjoyed meant that over time its arguments carried more weight than any others
within EU deliberations. Early on the Commission decided to establish official
representation in all the candidate states. The Commission Delegations were
responsible for collecting information, administering programmes and advising on
key parts of legislative programmes designed to assist the candidate states in effec-
tively transposing the acquis. As important was their role in liaising with govern-
ment ministers, members of national parliaments, and civil society groups in
explaining EU policy. The case for the socialization mechanism described by
normative scholars can certainly be made in these factors and the highly institu-
tionalized relations established by the Commission in the candidate countries.
The capacity-building measures introduced by the Commission expanded from
the early relatively straightforward and narrow PHARE regime to much more
specific and targeted institution-building instruments such as ISPA, aimed at struc-
tural policy support, and SAPARD, designed to provide aid to CEE agricultural
regimes. But the need for far-going change in systems of public administration
meant that other capacity-building instruments had to be developed in tandem
with the main pillars of PHARE. Two main vehicles, the Technical Assistance
Information Exchange Office (TAIEX), and the Twinning model, were designed
to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from member states to candidate states and
to help build technical capacity in selected sectoral areas.59 Papadimitriou and
Phinnemore argue that the Commission in a sense developed policy in an ad hoc
manner. This was because of the absence of a specific ‘European model’ of public
administration. Therefore the Twinning model as an instrument for capacity
building was unusual if not peculiar.60
The Commission’s role in designing and moulding Twinning arrangements was
crucial. In large part this was because it was determined to avoid the type of errors
of implementation and control which plagued the early PHARE programme.
With this in mind the Commission insisted on its officials having a high degree of
control over implementation.61 With each new programme the Commission effec-
tively colonized important parts of the enlargement process, using its resources,
informational expertise and epistemic networks to impose specific concepts and
templates of transposition and policy adaptation. In addition, the Commission also
negotiated transition measures with the candidate states, which were negotiated
with the Council and then built into the bilateral accession agreements. This of
course allowed for more flexibility in the implementation of European law and
allowed crucial ‘breathing space’ for catch-up by the accession states. Some
aspects of the Twinning programme also yielded unexpected but welcome
effects. Commissioner Verheugen points out that the long-term exchange of senior
administrative officials further increased interest in and knowledge of enlargement
in the member states, by producing a ‘trickle-down’ effect from the government
level to the working level in the various branches of the national administrations.
There was also a benefit in that the process of socialization increased the member
states’ expertise in the problems of transition and adaptation, which in turn made
it easier for solutions to be found for specific problems in the final accession
90 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
negotiations. The various modes of capacity-building also succeeded in integrating
candidate state officials into the political as well as administrative decision-making
processes in the EU in advance of membership thus making for a smoother transi-
tion after accession.62 The capacity-building instruments used by the Commission
thus emerge from the enlargement process as a high value, low-cost mode of
administrative and institutional knowledge transfer. These instruments developed
from the ad hoc and catch-all type of the early PHARE years to increasingly
sophisticated models of institution-building that became important elements of EU
enlargement policy.

Socialization through compliance

The Commission’s socialization of candidate states was not confined to positive
capacity-building measures. It also extended to a much more intrusive programme
of monitoring and compliance of candidate state commitments. Milada Ana
Vachudova uses the term ‘active leverage’ to describe the use of conditionality and
compliance monitoring by the Commission within the enlargement process.63 She
argues that up to 1994 the EU had minimum impact on domestic political change
in Central and Eastern Europe. That changed with the development of a more
concrete membership perspective and EU efforts to explicate membership condi-
tions. It was the Commission that was at the forefront of these efforts. The principle
concern, of course, in pursuing compliance, lies in the need to ensure credible
commitments by all partner states in the process of integration. Contractual reci-
procity necessarily requires the utilization by member states of an independent
monitoring body. Given its experience in monitoring compliance within the EU it
was not surprising to find the Commission asked to perform a similar role as the
acquis communautaire was extended to candidate states.
Phedon Nicolaides points out that the issues of effective implementation and
compliance only came to the forefront of enlargement debates and practice in a
gradual way. The conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council meeting in
June 1993 made no mention of transposition or implementation capacity. The first
reference to these came at the Madrid European Council in December 1995,
which merely alluded to the need for adjustment in candidate state administrative
structures. This new focus followed the White Paper on the internal market intro-
duced at Cannes earlier in June. Implementation capacity only really came into
focus, or was at least tentatively defined, after the Luxembourg summit in
December 1997, and the launch of the pre-accession process and specific and
tailored Accession Partnerships (APs) and National Programmes for the Adoption
of the Acquis (NPAAs) for the candidate states. The Luxembourg communiqué
stated: ‘incorporation of the acquis into legislation is necessary, but not in itself suffi-
cient; it will also be necessary to ensure that it is actually applied’. At Helsinki in
December 1999 the European Council restated: ‘progress in negotiations must go
hand in hand with progress in incorporating the acquis into legislation and actually
implementing and enforcing it’. However, it was only at Feira in June 2000 that the
most explicit statement regarding capacity to implement was made: ‘in addition to
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 91
finding solutions to negotiating issues, progress in the negotiations depends on
incorporation by candidate states of the acquis in national legislation and especially
on their capacity to effectively implement and enforce it’.64 The Regular Reports
thereafter increasingly stressed the centrality of transposition and implementation
capacity.65
Although the EU has no formal mechanisms for monitoring member state
compliance and does not, for example, pass judgements on the quality of their
public administration systems, it does use ‘informal’ channels to evaluate and
encourage compliance. In order to detect violations, the Commission uses a
number of different approaches, including the assembly and analysis of legal data
from the member states and, where necessary, targeted local checks.66 However, as
with monitoring of EU legislation in the EU15, the Commission’s ability to assess
CEE adaptation was weakened by resource incapacity and thus it had to rely to a
significant extent on contacts with national implementation authorities, non-govern-
mental organizations, academic bodies and private corporations in the candidate
states, all of which provided information on national records on transposition of
directives, the publication of surveys of business opinion about continued barriers to
trade within the internal market, and individual citizen and company court actions
against national administrations.67 But, given the lack of resources the Commission
had for effective monitoring, why did the candidate states not take advantage and
cheat more? A number of reasons might be cited. These consisted of a mix of cost–
benefit calculations regarding compliance and non-compliance and the familiar logics
of appropriateness which governed candidate state behaviour.
First and foremost, candidate states had to factor in the risk of non-compliance
interfering with and hampering progress in the drive for membership. Therefore it had
to be considered whether the short-term benefit of non-compliance superseded the
long-term goal of membership of the EU. Second, the potential economic cost of non-
compliance was much higher for candidate states than for EU15 states that failed
to implement collective policy. The threat of the withdrawal of pre-accession aid
especially was a potent weapon in the armoury of the Commission. Just as the
Commission was able to use the threat of ECJ-sanctioned fines for persistent non-
compliance and infringement against EU15 states, it was in a much better position
to use the credible threat of financial sanctions against candidate states. Third, the
candidate states ran the risk of significant reputational costs if non-compliance
persisted. Being perceived as ‘awkward’ in advance of membership would not help
in the final negotiations for accession. All candidates sought to present themselves
as ‘good Europeans’. Non-compliance threatened such positive images and was
thus avoided wherever possible.
The Commission was reluctant to impose direct sanctions for non-compliance
but did so when it found overt opposition or unwillingness to implement the acquis
effectively. In this respect it was more disposed to using economic sanctions for
infringements of clauses of the Europe Agreements, and content merely to wield
the political weapon of potentially consigning candidate states to a delayed acces-
sion as the only form of sanction for failure to meet the Copenhagen political
criteria. This reluctance to embrace direct and substantive political sanctions
92 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
prompted Kochenov to argue that the Commission consistently failed to be critical
enough in its oversight of key political requirements such as transparency of polit-
ical institutions, the development of judicial systems, and corruption.68 Maresceau
is similarly critical of the Commission’s approach to minority rights.69 In the
Commission’s defence, however, it must be pointed out that those criteria were so
vaguely defined by the EU that compliance assessments would always be perceived
as highly subjective. Candidate states could also readily point to deficiencies in the
‘quality’ of democracy in many of the EU15 states. In addition commentators often
forget that the Commission’s strategy was one of effecting long-term change rather
than short-term direct adaptation. Neither was the Commission unwilling to issue
vocal condemnation of candidate states for non-compliance or ongoing problems
of implementation.
Whilst the Commission’s preferred option was for private representation leading
to voluntary enforcement, it did also opt for more forceful measures where they
were deemed necessary. In May 1998 the Commission did not hesitate to withhold
PHARE projects worth a combined €34 million from Poland in response to poor
preparation and domestic political wrangling.70 During the same period, agricul-
ture commissioner Franz Fischler, accounting for the delay in the introduction of
SAPARD in Poland, suggested the delay in the establishment of paying agencies in
the candidate states was the main problem and that subvention would not be
supplied until proper procedures were in place.71 In 2001 the EU suspended aid to
Slovakia because of irregularities in its internal disbursement of monies. Earlier,
during the Meciar era, EU policy was much less effective, but Vachudova argues
v

that the Commission’s increased institutional capacity to follow domestic politics in

the candidate states at least enabled it to provide detailed criticisms of the Meciar
v

government policies, which then had a significant domestic impact.72

Neither should the importance of the Commission’s annual Regular Reports as
assessments of compliance and templates for further change be underestimated.
The publication of the Regular Reports created an ‘atmosphere of permanent
follow-up’ which gradually deepened the institutional capacity to implement.73
The Reports contained assessments of the efforts made to meet the Copenhagen
criteria and the quality of reforms enacted in each individual candidate state. The
great media attention generated by the publication of the Reports was one asset
that the Commission used effectively. More important was the presentation of the
Reports as a sort of administrative beauty contest, with each state examining its
progress against that of the other candidates, and seeking above all to maintain
momentum toward accession by securing public approval by the Commission of its
efforts. This generally favoured a ‘compliance push’ in advance of the publication
of the Reports in order to avoid reputational damage.
The Commission’s vigilance regarding compliance monitoring persisted even
after the successful completion of accession negotiations in late 2002. Its mantra of
continued application to effective implementation of the acquis may be seen in
many of its communications to the candidate countries. Even after the signing of
the accession treaty in Athens in May 2003 it was urging the acceding member
states to progress rapidly with reform. Keeping the pressure on meant offering
 The European Commission and eastern enlargement 93
advice and exerting informal coercion in many forms. In May 2003, for example,
the Commission sent a letter to Poland urging it to make efforts to improve food
safety standards in the run-up to accession.74 The seriousness of the measures was
set out by Eneko Landaburu when he told an EU–Poland Joint Parliamentary
Committee in Warsaw at the end of April 2003 that Poland might face EU safe-
guard mechanisms if it did not accelerate its preparations for accession – particu-
larly on freedom of movement of services, agriculture and food safety.75 This
followed on from a Commission initiative which saw nine acceding countries
issued with so-called ‘early warning’ letters on specific areas where they were
deemed to be behind schedule in their efforts to transpose and implement the
acquis. All these points were underlined in the comprehensive monitoring reports of
5 November 2003.76 The Commission again stressed that ‘immediate and decisive’
action should be taken by acceding member states in specific areas. Poland, with
nine issues to tackle, had the largest number and Slovenia, with one, the smallest.77
Clearly the pressure would be kept up all the way to the finishing post on 1 May
2004.78 The monitoring reports were intended to be a crucial link in the chain of
ensuring that EU enlargement imposed no undue strains – and offered protection
where needed through a series of safeguard clauses. These were set out in the
Accession Treaty and were phrased in a way that aimed at being even-handed,
protecting new member states as well as existing members.79 A seemingly even
more invasive monitoring stance was adopted by both the Commission and the
European Parliament with respect to Bulgarian and Romanian preparations for
membership after they had signed accession treaties in April 2005.
Not unnaturally, the candidate states felt that there was an element of unfairness
and arbitrary judgement by the Commission in the assessment of their prepared-
ness. As Nicolaides points out the EU does not have explicit criteria for judging
whether its member states have capacity for effective implementation of EU rules
and it does not subject its own members to the same sort of scrutiny of their
domestic implementation mechanisms and procedures. This point underscores the
fact that this enlargement has seen very different treatment of the candidate states
on this issue. Nicolaides points out, for example, that a recent publication on
Finland’s entry into the EU in 1995 contained no details at all about transposition
and implementation. He argues that the EU was not at all concerned about the
capacity of the EFTA entrants to transpose, ‘it even accepted vague commitments
from them to establish the requisite implementing procedures to enforce EU rules
after they had entered the EU’.80 The Commission’s compliance monitoring,
however intrusive it may have seemed to the candidate states, was part of a
concerted effort to socialize CEE public officials into the variegated patterns of EU
public policy-making.

Conclusions
The chapter set out to demonstrate the extraordinary challenge which confronted
the European Commission when it took on the task of managing EU relations with
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. The
94 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
challenge was quite unlike anything the Commission had previously faced in EU
enlargement history. Although at many levels the Commission acted throughout
the enlargement process in conformity with Article 49, and thus as a classic bureau-
cratic agent of the member states of the EU, the claims advanced in this chapter
suggest that the Commission also managed to carve out for itself a very significant
role in the eastern enlargement. In the first place it was responsible for most of the
important formal policy proposals that shaped the deepening of relations with the
CEE states. The Commission was both able and willing to act as an agenda-setter
and so frame the parameters of EU policy toward the applicant states. And
although more often than not its choice was to operate through coalitions within
the Council, and where possible with the Presidency, it also frequently drove the
EU agenda on key parts of the process. Where formal prerogatives were absent
the Commission used customary enlargement practice to carve out an informal
agenda-setting role, framing problems and urging consensus where difficulties
arose. Individual commissioners such as Günter Verheugen emerged from the
enlargement story as political entrepreneurs, forceful and proactive and integral to
the eventual success of the negotiations in late 2002. And the Commission itself,
through its capacity-building and compliance functions within the process, was the
EU institutional actor closest to the candidate states throughout the process,
providing advice, urging broader and deeper transposition of EU norms, and
actively socializing CEE public representatives into EU practice. Viewed by the
candidate states as ever-demanding and frequently unreasonable in its insistence
on full and unconditional implementation of the acquis, viewed by the member
states as too accommodating of candidate state preferences, the Commission often
trod a thin line between process manager and political entrepreneur. More often
than not, however, it was the only actor within the process to look beyond narrow
partisanship and focus on the Community-building logic which eastern enlarge-
ment rested upon. If that sometimes meant being perceived as a bully that was a
price well worth paying given the greater prize which enlargement facilitated. If it
meant being watched suspiciously by the member states as it engaged with the
candidate states then that too was simply a function of the tensions inherent in the
EU’s unique governance structure. And although it might seem decidedly unfash-
ionable to describe what is sometimes misidentified as the ‘Brussels Bureaucracy’
as the unsung hero of the eastern enlargement process, much of the evidence
suggests that this is exactly how the Commission emerges from the process. In its
engagement with the candidate states, imaginative framing of policy proposals
within the EU, and not inconsiderable diplomatic skill in pushing the sometimes
reluctant member states toward completion of the negotiations, the Commission
performed the type of role which, if indeed unglamorous and hidden from the
European public, was integral to the success story that was eastern enlargement.
7 The European Parliament in
the enlargement process

Introduction
If the Council and Commission maintained their traditional dominance of the
institutional politics of enlargement throughout the eastern expansion, there was
also another dimension to the drama that was often neglected by political actors,
media commentators and academics. That was the parliamentary dimension.
More than any previous enlargement in the EU’s history the eastern enlargement
was conceptualized and understood as an expansion of democratic ideals, norms
and practices. Where previous enlargements focused almost exclusively on economic
issues and market integration, eastern enlargement highlighted the importance of
human rights, fundamental freedoms, representative political institutions and good
governance in the emerging Europe. This was hardly surprising given that the
1989 revolutions had been forged out of a yearning for freedom and political
choice whilst the central legacy of Communism was one of moribund and dysfunc-
tional political systems. It was clear from the outset that EU efforts to integrate
Central and Eastern Europe into the structures of the European integration
process would be focused as much on shaping political institutions as on market
relations. Thus no analysis of the institutional politics of enlargement can be
attempted without extensive reference to the role played by the EU’s most impor-
tant representative institution – the European Parliament (EP) – in the process.
The Parliament was involved in the process from the beginning and sought to
assert its influence in specific ways and through a range of political instruments.
A literal reading of Article 49 of the treaty would suggest that the European
Parliament’s contribution to enlargement decision-making occurs only at the end
of the process when it is required to decide whether or not to accept each candidate
state. This power constitutes a veto power but is seen as a negative type of power in
that the EP has no options other than to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’. But it seems clear now that
the eastern enlargement saw the European Parliament come of age within the insti-
tutional politics of enlargement and play a significant role at all stages in the
process. Its formal power of assent translated also into other forms of informal
influence on the process, not least on the shape of new democratic thinking and
representative politics in the candidate states. The chapter examines the input of
the EP into the enlargement process and the various instruments through which it
96 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
sought to influence the outcome of events. And whilst less influential than the
Council and Commission, neither the candidate states nor the other EU institu-
tions were prepared to disregard the Parliament’s views on critical issues such as
human rights, minority protections, and administrative preparedness.

Previous enlargements
The European Parliament’s role in EU enlargement has evolved over time. Prior
to the introduction of direct elections in 1979, the Parliament had a role in acces-
sion procedures, and whilst this was formally quite limited, its views on accession
and association were nevertheless ‘clearly influential’, as David Phinnemore points
out.1 The Birkelbach Report of 1961, drawn up by the European Parliament’s
Political Committee, emphasized the inclusivity of the integration process by
arguing that the norm for European states should be EEC membership and not
just association. It pointed to the dangers of being formally associated with coun-
tries deemed unable or unwilling to become members, most importantly the
danger that the Community would undermine its own long-term development
prospects. In a crucial sense, the Birkelbach Report demonstrated a willingness on
the part of the Parliament to take the lead in formulating guidelines for a policy of
outside states establishing closer links with the Community beyond mere trade
agreements. It claimed that Association should not be in a category of its own but
should be considered with a view to membership; basically, it should be reserved
for those countries that did not yet fulfil the economic conditions for full member-
ship but which were politically willing to do so.2 These guidelines became quite
important, since they were followed by the Commission in subsequent opinions on
membership or association, and had two immediate effects: they opened the way
for transitional association agreements for both Greece and Turkey.3
In the aftermath of the so-called Colonels’ coup in Greece in 1967, the Parlia-
ment also played an important role in calling for the abolition of the existing associ-
ation agreement. This was not followed, either by the Commission or by the
member states, which claimed that the text of the agreement did not allow for such
one-sided action. The Parliament then claimed that Greece prevented the institu-
tions of the association agreement from functioning because it had put an end to
the existence of the Greek Parliament, and thus the joining committee was not
operational. This argument succeeded in at least having the association agreement
frozen. After the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974 the EP became one of
the most ardent advocates of early Greek membership, arguing that membership
was the best instrument for strengthening Greek democracy.4
Long before eastern enlargement of the EU became even imaginable, the Euro-
pean Parliament had also, since the 1970s, dealt in different resolutions and reports
with the Community’s relations with the Warsaw Pact countries and expressed its
positions on human rights issues and on the general developments in these coun-
tries. After 1988 interparliamentary delegations for relations with the respective
countries in Central and Eastern Europe were established as new forms of political
dialogue began to emerge in the region. That was a key date in the forging of
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 97
constructive relations as it opened the way for new perspectives on a wide range of
issues. In 1989, however, the political situation in Europe radically changed. And
thus inter-parliamentary relations would face a radical reconstitution also as new
democracies emerged from the shadow of Soviet domination and the politics of
EU–CEE relations began to take shape.

Formal role: the assent procedure

Like the Commission, the Parliament is involved in the enlargement process partly
in a formal capacity, partly in an informal capacity. Prior to the Single European
Act (SEA), it was only required that the Parliament be consulted; the SEA in 1987
introduced the ‘assent’ procedure, whereby the European Parliament effectively
obtained a veto over any accession decisions made by the Council. This advance in
institutional power was a precursor for more important gains by the Parliament in
the 1990s. The Maastricht Treaty and, later, the Amsterdam Treaty both signifi-
cantly advanced parliamentary influence in deciding EU legislation. During the
Convention and IGC of 2003–4 the Parliament again played a very significant part
and achieved many of its objectives.5
In general terms the assent procedure provides that, in a restricted number of
issue areas, the Council may act only after receiving the assent of the European
Parliament, which is required to vote on the proposed measure. Originally
confined by the SEA to the approval of EC association and accession agreements
with third countries, the procedure has subsequently been extended to six addi-
tional areas including, importantly, the right under Article 7 TEU to recommend
sanctions in the event of a significant and persistent breach of human rights by a
member state.6 It is one of the many curiosities of the Parliament’s role within the
EU structure of decision-making that the power of assent which the Parliament
enjoys on accession agreements has not been extended to other important inter-
national agreements to which the EU is party such as those in international trade.
It is similarly excluded from, and, by implication, marginal to, processes of
constitutional revision. But enlargement is viewed differently from other interna-
tional agreements. In a sense it represents more a domestic European affair than
an international one.
In formal terms, the European Parliament has one very clear role in the
enlargement process – it has to vote by an absolute majority at the end of the
accession negotiations, in order to permit the ratification of each individual
accession treaty.7 A similar ratification procedure has to take place in the national
parliaments of the member states of the European Union and, indeed, in the
parliaments of the candidate countries (or ratification according to the constitu-
tional requirements of each state).8 The assent procedure is also governed by a
‘logic of appropriateness’ in that member state governments, in granting the EP a
veto power over the accession of outside states, do so on the normative under-
standing that the assent of a directly elected representative assembly bestows an
important layer of democratic legitimacy on an élite-negotiated process. Clearly
the view is that the EP’s assent adds to the democratic mandate garnered from
98 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
the assent of the member states through their governments and various national
ratification procedures.9
Rationalist scholars would argue that member states were aware, in granting the
power of assent to the EP, that this constituted a so-called ‘nuclear option’, that it
was something which, in practice, the Parliament could not and would not resort to
using. Bailer and Schneider, for example, argue that because the Parliament tends
to be more integrationist than other EU actors, the threat of a future veto is not
credible since the legislature will typically perceive the admission of new member
states as an improvement on the status quo.10 For other scholars assent represents a
‘cruder form of codecision’, in that there is no scope for amendments to be put
forward in the case of disagreement with the Council.11 Thus, in this view, the
power garnered by the EP through the assent procedure was quite illusory. The EP
would rubber-stamp the Council’s decisions in all conceivable circumstances. In
addition, whereas the Parliament has demonstrated a clear and consistent willing-
ness to confront both the Council and the Commission in an adversarial fashion
over such issues as budgetary matters, the nature and scope of inter-institutional
agreements, and the selection and performance of the Commission, there has
always been a sense that enlargement, because of the magnitude of the issues,
somehow transcended the normal political boundaries and lay outside the terrain
of ‘politics’. However, the chapter will show that in quite a number of ways the
Parliament did manage to impose its perspective on Council, Commission and
candidate countries at various stages of the enlargement process. At the very least
the Parliament had to be taken seriously by all actors. The different mechanisms
used by the EP to assert its influence are examined in the context of the general
framework of agenda-shaping examined in the previous two chapters. Thus, it will
be argued, the formal power to withhold consent actually facilitated an informal
parliamentary power within different stages of the process, which ensured that deci-
sions went some way toward satisfying the Parliament on its key concerns. The
Parliament was also highly successful in socializing candidate state representatives
into its own modes of operation and practice. The chapter now goes on to examine
the various mechanisms used by the EP to assert its influence on the process and
the concerns it sought to uphold throughout.

The European Parliament as norm entrepreneur

The European Parliament, throughout the eastern enlargement process, main-
tained strongly held views on the nature and direction of the process. It may
genuinely be viewed as an important norm entrepreneur on the EU side, using a
carrot-and-stick approach to induce candidate states into accepting EU norms,
and actively socializing candidate state parliamentarians into EP practices. Parlia-
mentary activism produced important constituent effects, not least in inducing
candidate states to more effective transposition of EU norms, and more satisfac-
tory implementation of agreements concluded with the EU. It also encouraged
a transnationalization of party groupings within and outside the structures of
the enlargement process. In particular three aspects of the Parliament’s norm
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 99
entrepreneurship can be demonstrated. First, it insisted on placing the EU’s
democracy norms at the core of the eastern enlargement process and was willing to
defend those norms in its engagement with the candidate states and within the
EU’s institutional structure. Where other parts of the EU institutional machinery
may have been more concerned with candidate state adjustment to the EU’s
market regime, the Parliament provided a significant counterweight in its emphasis
on substantive commitment to representative democracy. Second, the Parliament
insisted throughout the enlargement process on the equality of treatment of all
candidate states. It thus sought from an early stage to establish this as a core norm
for the EU in its selection and monitoring of candidate states. A third aspect of the
Parliament’s approach was its eagerness to protect the integrity of enlargement-
related inter-institutional prerogatives. Where the Council in particular sought to
dominate EU policy the Parliament countered by invoking the norms governing
the institutional division of labour on enlargement policy-making. In these three
areas of Parliamentary activism we find both the willingness and the capacity to act
in a consistently forceful and entrepreneurial manner.

Embedding EU democracy norms

The EP’s role as a norm entrepreneur and defender of the EU value system stressed
as a first principle the importance of the Parliament’s attachment to and insistence
on upholding the EU’s value system. Thus from the beginning of the enlargement
process, the Parliament, in an explicit and forthright way, staked out positions on
human rights, fundamental freedoms, and protection of individual and minority
rights within the association and pre-accession frameworks and the actual acces-
sion negotiations. Candidate state preparation, in the Parliament’s view, had to
focus as strongly and substantively on strengthening the fragile institutions of the
new democracies, as on the market reforms which were boldly being enacted. It
was the Parliament in 1992 that effectively introduced political conditionality
into the enlargement process by insisting on the insertion of a democracy clause
into the general budget for 1992, ‘in order to focus more attention on politics and
civil society’ within the process.12 Clearly, the principles enunciated earlier in the
Birkelbach Report served as a template for the emerging parliamentary perspec-
tive on relations with the transitioning states. Human rights groups had for long
been utilizing the EP as an arena for generating precisely the sort of normative
pressure one might expect from a representative parliamentary body. Such pres-
sure meant that the Parliament kept a watchful eye over the unfolding and devel-
opment of the democratic process throughout Central and Eastern Europe as the
enlargement process took shape. In its communications on the process the Parlia-
ment lost no opportunity to highlight the importance of the different components
of the EU’s democratic framework.
If the Parliament sought to ensure that the Commission and Council protected
the fabric of EU democracy in negotiating with the former Communist states,
then it was equally insistent in its contacts with candidate state representatives.
Indeed a significant component of the EP’s enlargement strategy focused on deep
100 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
institutional engagement with and socialization of CEE representatives into EP
norms and practices. From the outset the European Parliament was the most
outspoken EU actor on civil society issues, whether it be the commitment to parlia-
mentary democracy in Slovakia, media freedom and diversity in Bulgaria, homo-
sexual rights in Romania, or the rights of Russian-speakers in Estonia or Latvia.13
The Parliament’s country monitoring reports consistently highlighted such issues
as police brutality, disenfranchisement of voters because of artificial language
barriers and discrimination against certain sections of the population. EP Commit-
tees pressed for full implementation of the EU’s non-discrimination legislation and
the ending of all forms of discrimination related to ethnic origins, cultural and reli-
gious difference or sexual orientation.14 The Parliament considered these to be
issues of fundamental concern and not matters for negotiation. In many instances
strategic use of domestic CEE media outlets, especially in the run-up to important
EU decisions (such as the Commission’s publication of Regular Reports), created
enough pressure that changes to domestic legislation or on-the-ground policy
followed.15 And although the role of the EP constituted just one arm of the EU
machinery, the Parliament’s democratic legitimacy often left it better placed to
argue for the substantive changes sought by the EU in specific candidate countries
than any other EU body.
The Parliament’s willingness to deploy the ‘democratic stick’ reminded all
parties of the widespread attachment within the assembly, irrespective of ideolog-
ical bent, to the Copenhagen political criteria, and other quasi-formal member-
ship criteria. The transposition of clear and transparent democratic norms was
not only necessary for the adoption of good governance practice in the candidate
states, it also represented a clear and unequivocal commitment to the normative
integrationist ideals built into the treaties that the Parliament had always champi-
oned. The record of parliamentary activism was particularly evident in respect of
human rights issues. Attending the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee on 20 February
2002, for example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was accused by Green
party MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit of flirting with anti-Semitism. In a newspaper
interview the day before, Orban had refused to rule out a post-election coalition
with the far right Justice and Life Party. Orban was also criticized for his govern-
ment’s handling of the Roma minority with MEPs arguing that Hungary had
made insufficient progress in meeting the Parliament’s concerns. In addressing
another of the EP’s committees, Commissioner Verheugen was pressed consis-
tently on the Roma issue, particularly on what MEPs perceived as the wide gap
between candidate state commitments on their Roma minorities and the actual
situation confronting the Roma.16 The Commission was urged to press for a deeper
commitment to the implementation of reforms. This was part of a pattern in that
the EP asked candidate states to develop and implement policies, strategies and
action programmes to improve the living conditions of their Roma minorities and
their integration into society, and used every opportunity to emphasize the direct
link between this issue and overall progress in each state’s enlargement prospects.
The Parliament’s determination to effect change was underlined by its decision to
make progress on Roma issues a precondition for garnering its assent.17
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 101
For some the attachment to and employment of different variants of political
conditionality by the Parliament suggested a body attempting to place further
obstacles in the way of the candidate states. But most observers would rather
concur with the view that Parliamentary vigilance on the transposition of EU
democratic norms and practices was simply a reflection of the deep attachment to
those norms upon which the very legitimacy of the EU was founded. The fact that
member states of the EU tended to promote their own national interests in the
enlargement process, even if these sometimes conflicted with declared EU commit-
ment to democratic norms, made it all the more important, the Parliament argued,
that their institution take the lead on embedding democratic practice within the
candidate states.18

Direct socialization of candidate states

As the enlargement process unfolded it encouraged a cumulative institutionalization
of individual, state, and bureaucratic contacts, and the Parliament, no less than the
other EU actors in the process, sought to imprint its own integration perspective on
the candidate states. Conrad points out that the EP provides the most intriguing
and/or promising arena for testing claims for institutional socialization within the
EU. This has to do primarily with organizational factors such as the trans-territorial
composition of the Parliament and the fact that ideological or party cleavages take
precedence over national cleavages.19 Viewed from a rationalist or self-interested
perspective the Parliament’s socialization efforts seem perfectly logical. The institu-
tion’s desire to function optimally in a Union of 25 states encouraged the adoption of
its own rules and structures by the political representatives of the candidate states in
advance of accession. Therefore from an early stage, the EP sought to communicate
with national parliaments in the candidate countries (and prospective MEPs) a sense
of best parliamentary practice. The two principal channels for such communicative
exchange were the transnational party groupings in the EP and the Joint Parliamen-
tary Committees (JPCs). Both channels also allowed for a significant degree of indi-
vidual interparliamentary contact and socialization.20
One interesting study that provides a template for understanding the socializing
role played by the EP examines the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and its efforts to
inculcate a sense of ‘we-ness’ amongst European and North American parliamentar-
ians since 1989.21 Flockhart argues that social learning has been much in evidence
and facilitated through the participation of parliamentarians and their parliamen-
tary support staff in programmes aimed at teaching, intensive networking and
building personal and institutional relationships.22 The comparison with eastern
enlargement of the EU holds especially for the important social learning process
located in the committee system. These represented a forum for both familiarizing
delegates with specific areas of policy and fostering strong interpersonal ties. It is
clear that many parliamentarians, on both the EU and candidate state sides, devel-
oped a sense of attachment to the idea of being a part of a transnational liberal demo-
cratic family of parliamentarians. On the candidate state side individuals wanted to
be seen as upholding EU and EP norms to the highest degree. MEPs saw their role as
102 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
educational and one of collective responsibility.23 Such socialization activity repre-
sented another important feature of the EP’s efforts to ‘export’ its norms and prac-
tices and was buttressed by intensive forms of inter-parliamentary dialogue, both
EU–CEE and intra-EU. The latter centred in particular on advice and briefings to
EU member state parliaments on the parliamentary dimension to enlargement.24
Ludlow points out that some of the leading figures on both sides acquired real
expertise, and, in the case of the MEPs, a significant profile in the countries with
which they dealt. As a result, the EP was able to get its messages across to the candi-
dates in a striking way.25

Transnational party groupings

The EP’s successful transfer of normative practice can be demonstrated firstly in
the transnational and pan-European party linkages established in advance of accession.
These left the 2004–9 European Parliament organizationally (and ideologically)
indistinct from its predecessor, with new member state parliamentarians being
readily absorbed into existing groups. Thus the EP and its party groupings used the
eastern enlargement process as a transnational learning framework, successfully
instituting a genuinely trans-European and familiar (if indeed embryonic) ‘Euro-
pean party system’. The importance of the transnational structure of the Parlia-
ment mattered in two crucial ways with respect to enlargement. First, the transna-
tional socialization culture within the Parliament meant that its members were
more receptive to the European interest than member states, and indeed some-
times the Commission, when faced with difficult enlargement decisions.26 Second,
as Raunio and others have demonstrated, party group cohesion within the Parlia-
ment is strong.27 Since the political groupings have a vested institutional interest in
arriving at common positions, in combination with the fact that the Parliament
itself has a clear systemic interest in achieving consensus in order to have its prefer-
ences taken seriously by the Council, there is a dual impetus toward overcoming
interest-based and nationally oriented positions on enlargement. Thus during the
past decade, as Day and Shaw have pointed out, the Euro-parties have been
engaged in their own independent enlargement exercise.28
The European Parliament, not unnaturally, encouraged this and provided func-
tional help toward the realization of the ambition of the enlargement of party
groupings. This, however, is not to argue that party groups were in complete agree-
ment about the objectives of the EU’s enlargement strategy at all times, nor indeed
that there did not exist significant divisions within the different party groupings at all
times also.29 It does suggest, however, that party group pressure towards estab-
lishing and maintaining a unified parliamentary position helped, first, to legitimate
the EP in the eyes of both the candidate states and the other EU institutional actors,
and, second, to override some of the less integrationist national positions on
enlargement.30 MEPs and their umbrella groups were also not unaware of the
medium-term institutional benefit to be garnered from being viewed as more posi-
tively disposed toward CEE preferences. Making friends in Hungary, Poland and
Lithuania in advance of accession would undoubtedly increase the prestige and
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 103
legitimacy of the Parliament in the eyes of élites in those countries and potentially
advantage the EP in the enlarged EU’s inter-institutional battles.31

Joint Parliamentary Committees

Originally the Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs) provided a forum for dis-
cussing political and economic aspects of the associated countries’ integration into
the EU, as well as problems encountered in the functioning of the Association
Agreements and EU assistance programmes. With the evolution of the reinforced
pre-accession strategy and the start of the formal accession negotiations in 1998,
their role became more important than the limited tasks assigned to them by the
Association Agreements. Primarily, the JPCs provided an opportunity for the
members of each parliament to share information and deliberate on methods of
joint parliamentary oversight of the enlargement process. The JPC, it has been
argued, also represented the one forum within the enlargement process where,
prior to accession, both incumbent and candidate were equal.32 The presence at
the JPC meetings of representatives of the governments concerned, the European
Commission and the Presidency gave the members a chance to question key deci-
sion-makers directly and in unison. For the Commission and the Presidency, the
JPC framework provided a convenient opportunity to convey EU perspectives
directly into the heart of the political system of a candidate country.
Perhaps the most striking feature of this forum was the willingness of MEPs to
speak frankly, sometimes on matters that were extremely sensitive. This was partic-
ularly notable in the JPCs with Romania and Slovakia, where fundamental ques-
tions about the nature of democracy in those countries were consistently raised.
Meetings with the Czech Republic were sometimes dominated by trade disputes
and lingering tensions associated with the Beneš Decrees; meetings with Poland
often highlighted the Parliament’s dissatisfaction with the rate of progress in trans-
posing the acquis.33 The JPCs had a very high public profile in the CEE countries
throughout the enlargement process. This is reflected by the political importance
of some of the leading figures involved. For example, before becoming Prime
Minister of Hungary in 1998, Viktor Orban was the chairman of his Parliament’s
European Affairs Committee. Similarly the former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz
Masowiecki was chairman of the Polish delegation to the EU–Poland JPC for a
period. Other candidate state leaders to address the JPCs included the Latvian
President Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, and
Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda. Harris asserts that the JPCs significantly
tested the commitment to parliamentary democracy in the candidate countries.
The criticism offered by MEPs of particular countries on specific issues was often
misinterpreted as hostility. On the candidate state side, if opposition MPs asked
questions of their own government’s performance in meeting EU criteria this was
often presented back home as a form of national betrayal.34 For all the contestation,
however, the JPCs added significant value to the Parliament’s efforts to integrate
candidate state representatives into existing EP structures, norms and practices.
If the JPCs offered the opportunity for MEPs to press the importance of full and
104 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
effective transposition of EU democracy norms, they also evolved over time into
unmistakable enlargement advocacy fora. It became difficult in fact to distinguish
the EP position on enlargement issues from candidate state positions. Thus the
socialization process also worked in reverse to a significant degree. The JPCs were
less impartial than the EP as a whole and to many observers too uncritically in
favour of enlargement.35 The establishment of close contacts and the deeply polit-
ical nature of the work made it difficult for MEPs to stay on the fence. Rapporteurs
in particular were likely to adopt positions closer to the candidate state position
than the EU position and rapporteurs usually took the lead in formulating EP posi-
tions.36 Two examples of the close-knit positions emerging out of the JPC process
can be cited here. In the heat of the final negotiations on enlargement in late 2002 a
joint declaration issued by MEPs and Estonian parliamentarians largely supported
Estonia’s position on key negotiating chapters. The declaration of the EU–Estonia
JPC on 28 May 2002 urged that ‘the introduction of full direct payments’ from the
CAP for Estonian farmers following accession ‘should be open to discussion
concerning the length of the transition period’. Further, the JPC declaration
recommended ‘that every effort be made to introduce full direct payments as soon
as possible’. The JPC position was clearly one which was much closer to the candi-
date state than to the Commission or the Council and which held as a central
concern complaints about second-class membership from the candidate state.37
The second example involves Bulgaria. As the enlargement process unfolded the
decommissioning of the Kozludy nuclear power plant became a real thorn in the
side of EU–Bulgarian relations. The EP–Bulgarian JPC in 2002 came out strongly
in favour of Bulgaria’s position on Kozludy. In its official declaration, the JPC said
it was ‘aware of the strength of feeling in Bulgaria, and of expert opinion, in favour
of prolonging the life of units three and four’ of the plant. The European Commis-
sion had insisted on the closure of these units before 2006. The JPC supported
Bulgarian arguments that it had invested in enhanced safety measures for reactor
three and four and warned of ‘the impact closure would have on local employment,
foreign currency earnings and overall energy capacity’. The Commission position
was very different in insisting on outright closure of the units as soon as possible.38
The JPC’s work did not go unnoticed outside the Parliament.39 To summarize, the
JPCs represented a vast ‘getting to know you exercise’, given that the members of
the European Parliament and the members of the parliaments of the candidate
countries did not know much about each other. They also provided a democratic
forum where the citizens of both the EU and the applicant countries were repre-
sented in what for many was a process dominated by executive bodies. This made
them the main framework for ensuring that the enlargement process was subject to
a measure of democratic oversight and control.
Alongside these bilateral meetings, the European Parliament also encouraged the
development of a multilateral Parliamentary dialogue. This dialogue conducted with
the presidents of the parliaments of the participating candidate countries was broad
in nature and intended to buttress the more micro-oriented work at JPC level.
Starting with Enrique Baron Crespo in 1989, the Presidents of the European Parlia-
ment made an increasing number of visits to the countries concerned. The purpose
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 105
of these visits was at first to initiate relations between the EP and the parliaments of
the new democracies, later to strengthen dialogue with and amongst those states
aspiring to join the EU. To further strengthen cooperation, a programme of admin-
istrative fusion was launched. This consisted of a staff exchange programme, training
sessions, information visits, and the transmission of documents and seminars. In
addition national parliamentarians from the EU member states and candidate states
met regularly in the Conference of Standing Committees of National Parliaments
dealing with EU Affairs (COSAC). Although too large and unwieldy to be utilized in
any formal way within the enlargement process, COSAC provided an extra parlia-
mentary forum within which views could be exchanged. The combined impact of
these different forms of parliamentary consultation, engagement and deliberation
certainly helped the European Parliament achieve a key aim of helping the candi-
date states internalize EU democratic norms and rules.

EP enlargement advocacy
If the Parliament’s socialization of candidate states proved critical to the inside–
outside dimension of the enlargement process, then as noteworthy within the
internal EU debate was its consistent willingness to champion the macro goal of
enlargement, whilst urging the accommodation of CEE preferences to the greatest
extent possible within the process. Although this was apparent throughout the
different periods of association and pre-accession it was perhaps most evident (and
important) in the difficult negotiations of 2002. The Parliament’s position was made
clear in May 2002 with the publication of two key reports that were strongly
supportive of the completion of negotiations. Reimer Böge’s report on the financial
implications of enlargement urged a realistic effort by member states to find work-
able compromises with the candidates, as did that of Elmar Brok on progress in the
negotiations that carried a similar message.40 Both reports were debated at the
Parliament’s plenary session in June in Strasbourg when the Parliament again
enjoined the member states to take a more generous view of the funding arrange-
ments. Many speakers made expressions of support for the Böge and Brok reports.41
An even more striking indication of the Parliament’s willingness to go much
further than the Council was apparent in its opening the chamber to candidate
state representatives before their accessions had been successfully negotiated. On
the initiative of its President Pat Cox, it did so for the first time for the debate of 20
November 2002, when almost 200 deputies participated in the special debate on
‘The Future of an Enlarged Europe’ in a plenary session in Strasbourg.42 The EP
President described the gathering as ‘unprecedented’ and ‘an early investment in
cultural diversity’.43 Its significance lay in the fact that candidate countries were
effectively placed inside the European Parliament’s structures whilst negotiations on
accession were still at a very delicate stage. The EP was thus taking a stance and
laying down a marker to member states as to where it stood and what should
happen. European Parliament political families expanded with the inclusion of
delegates representing candidate countries who had decided which groups they
would align with.44 Within the Parliament it was thought that the debate would
106 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
also serve as an important functional test of the enlarged Parliament’s operational
capacity. For the first time simultaneous translation into 23 languages was utilized
without any major difficulties being experienced.45
Another important component of the Parliament’s enlargement entrepreneur-
ship was the discursive support and public advocacy offered by EP presidents.
Certainly there were striking differences between the various holders of the office.
In the 1994–9 Parliament, Klaus Hänsch was more active than his successor Gil-
Delgado Gil-Robles, and, in the 1999–2004 Parliament, Pat Cox was much more
prominent than his predecessor, Nicole Fontaine. Cox’s energy, enthusiasm and
commitment were a remarkable asset, which the Parliament deployed to some
effect.46 Even as head of the Liberal group in Parliament Cox had invested consid-
erable time and energy in cross-crossing the candidate states explaining the EP’s
attitude to enlargement and encouraging movement on the Copenhagen criteria.
Cox’s view was that politicians had to get out and make the political case for
enlargement to the widest possible audience.47 He succeeded in forging a dynamic
working partnership with the Commission that worked particularly well during the
final critical part of the negotiating process. Indeed Cox is on record describing his
relationship with Commissioner Verheugen and his Enlargement Task Force as
unprecedented in its closeness and intensity. Clearly, the Commission saw an ally
in a Parliament which was consistently supportive of its enlargement aims and
strategy; all the more so where certain member states were somewhat obstruc-
tionist in their attachment to national interests. Cox also enjoyed an excellent
working relationship with the Danish Presidency. Cox’s public discourse mirrored
that of the enlargement ‘drivers’ within the Commission and Council, stressing the
importance of extending the EU Community of values to the east and presenting
enlargement both as a viable economic opportunity and a moral imperative for the
EU.48 At earlier periods he actively cautioned against postponement where that
was being considered in some quarters.49 Parliament was thus one arm of a formi-
dable cross-institutional advocacy network within the internal EU debate on
enlargement.

Equality of treatment
The second identifiable norm that the EP sought to embed in the enlargement
process developed gradually. That was an insistence on the equal treatment of
candidates in a rational and non-discriminatory process centred exclusively on the
ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria and transpose the acquis communautaire. In a
1996 resolution the Parliament stressed the importance of beginning negotiations
simultaneously with all countries of Central and Eastern Europe which had applied
for membership and which were aiming to fulfil both the economic and the polit-
ical criteria as set out by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, so as to
prevent the emergence of first- and second-class groups of applicant countries.
This was at a time when the Council and Commission had effectively embraced a
strategy of differentiation or ‘enlargement in waves’.50
Therefore, while the Parliament welcomed, in principle, the opening of the
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 107
enlargement process in March 1998 with all of the candidate countries, as well as
the opening of negotiations with a first group of five plus one (Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus), it reminded the Council that the
enlargement process must ‘remain open at all times’ to all applicants. This was
pointed out on 3 December 1998, when the Parliament adopted a series of reports
on the five applicant countries that had not yet begun accession negotiations with
the EU (Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia). The Parliament simi-
larly endorsed the views of its rapporteurs who – with regard to the two Baltic states
and Slovakia – distanced themselves from the recommendations the European
Commission made in its Progress Reports.51 Thus the EP stance was one of keeping
the door to membership open whilst insisting that candidate states maintain real
progress toward reform.
The Parliament’s position was made even clearer in the run-up to the Helsinki
Council in December 1999, when it called on the Council ‘to put an end to the
invidious divide between two classes of applicant countries’.52 Again in the wake of
the Gothenburg European Council and the Irish rejection of Nice in the summer of
2001, which placed the timetable for accession in some doubt, the Parliament
staked out its position in its own annual progress reports by insisting firmly that the
CEE countries should be welcomed by 2004. This should happen irrespective of
whether Ireland ratified the Nice treaty or not. This forthright and consistent
stance demonstrated clearly an institution that was independent-minded and more
embracing of the European interest than the Council.53
The Parliament’s greater willingness to accommodate CEE interests was also
in evidence on the issue of institutional representation. Perhaps the most facile of
the institutional negotiations at Nice had been that on the future voting rights in
the EP. Against the ceiling of 700 members set at Amsterdam, the Danish Presi-
dency came up against the desire of some member states to compensate them-
selves for other institutional concessions by accruing additional representation in
the enlarged Parliament. To the irritation of the Council the European Parlia-
ment demonstrated its support for Hungary and the Czech Republic when both
demanded the same number of seats in the EP as Belgium and Portugal.54 For the
Parliament there could be no justification for any institutional re-calibration that
did not, as a solid principle, recognize the new member states as full partners in
the integration process.
The Parliament’s inclusive approach to enlargement was also manifest in its
decision to invite 162 observers from the ten candidate countries to take part in its
work after the signing of the Accession Treaty in April 2003. This continued the
process of involving what Cecilia Malmström of the ELDR termed the ‘virtual
MEPs’ in the work of the Parliament, which had been ongoing for a number of
years.55 These representatives from the accession countries would, until 1 May
2004, have a national mandate without formal status within the European Parlia-
ment. This meant they had only limited rights to participate in its work.56 In late
2004 the Parliament again staked out a collectivist and courageous position on
Turkish membership of the Union. In the run-up to a Brussels summit dedicated to
the issue of whether or not to open negotiations with Turkey, MEPs in a vote in
108 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
plenary session in Strasbourg on 15 December voted 407 to 262 on a resolution
calling for membership talks with Turkey to begin as soon as possible. Amendments
that offered Turkey associate membership or such as a ‘privileged partnership’
(favoured by conservative MEPs) were rejected.57 In the middle of a contentious EU-
wide debate on the merits of opening negotiations the EP again sought, as it had
done during the eastern enlargement process, to press the member states into
agreeing a collective EU position that was inclusive and open rather than partial and
selective. Again the European Commission lined up as an ally of the EP in
supporting the non-member in question. Commission President José Manuel
Barroso told MEPs that, after 40 years, ‘it is now time for the European Council to
honour its commitment to Turkey and announce the opening of accession negotia-
tions’.58 Enlargement watchers recognized in this a familiar alliance between
Commission and Parliament. Where there existed division among the member
states the Parliament was consistently willing to take a lead and urge a more inclu-
sive and forward-looking engagement with the prospective member state.

Protecting the integrity of the EU enlargement

process
The third discernible element of parliamentary enlargement activity was that of
the promotion of specific ideas about the protection of EU institutional capacity,
the need for enlargement to be facilitated by internal institutional reform and
adjustments to the Union’s financial framework, and the preservation of inter-insti-
tutional balance within the enlarged Union’s structures.59 From the outset the
Parliament stressed that expansion and internal institutional reform both revolved
around the key concept of legitimacy. The European Parliament, the national
parliaments of the member states, as well as the national parliaments of the candi-
date countries, were considered the vehicles for the harnessing of such legitimacy.
Thus the need to strengthen the role of parliaments was stressed when the Parlia-
ment gave its Opinion on the general outline for the Association Agreements in
1991.60 Starting with the Hänsch report of 1993, the position of the Parliament can
be found in several resolutions, which all focus on one or more aspects of demo-
cratic legitimacy and created the basis for the Parliament’s resolutions on Agenda
2000 in 1997.61 The main message of the report was that the Parliament consid-
ered enlargement as inevitable but that it would also be necessary to ensure that the
Union remained intact as a viable institutional and political system. Indeed
enlargement could not proceed without transparent institutional reform. As the
enlargement process developed the Parliament remained insistent that the EU had
to reform itself in advance of the accessions.
The belief in ensuring a sound financial structure for an enlarged EU repre-
sented the second foundation stone of the Parliament’s position on the internal EU
preparation for enlargement and was spelt out in a resolution that was adopted in
1996.62 Parliament concluded that the accession of the CEE states would give rise
to additional needs, and that the system of own resources would be inadequate to
fund enlargement. In particular the agricultural and structural policies needed
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 109
reform. In this sense the Parliament took the middle ground, manoeuvring between
those member states who felt that the financial strain to be endured as a result of
(even limited) CEE accession was simply too great and the Commission view, laid
down in Agenda 2000 that enlargement was affordable.63 The various strands of the
Parliament’s position finally came together in the reaction to the new reinforced
pre-accession strategy as proposed by the Commission in Agenda 2000 and adopted
by the Council at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997. In three different
resolutions it expressed its most significant views.64 The Parliament stated that the
institutional framework that had emerged from the Amsterdam Treaty did not
meet the necessary conditions for achieving enlargement without endangering the
operation of the Union and the effectiveness of its institutions.
A good example of the Parliament’s doggedness on the matter of financial
soundness and respect for inter-institutional agreements can be evinced in the
stand-off with the Council on the Parliament’s right to approve the budget compo-
nent of the 2002 Copenhagen deal. This dragged on through the early part of 2003
and threatened at various junctures to result in the withholding of the EP’s consent.
This was the so-called ‘Annex XV’ struggle. The Parliament argued that the
Copenhagen deal did not respect the Inter-Institutional agreement (IIA) of May
1999 on budgetary discipline because the EP was not consulted before it was
agreed at Copenhagen.65 Under the IIA, the EP has a right to negotiate with the
Council actual spending amounts within agreed spending limits. The EP argued
that this right was not respected in the Copenhagen deal. The annex effectively
meant a restriction of the EP’s powers to establish payment appropriations, a
power conferred on it by the Treaty for non-compulsory spending, i.e. other than
agriculture. MEPs were of the view that the issue could be compared to the
ground-breaking Isoglucose case in 1981.66 Through February and March 2003 the
EP threatened to withhold consent. On 11 March the EP’s legal service informed
President Pat Cox that the Copenhagen deal not only encroached upon Parlia-
ment’s prerogatives under co-decision, but also could cause legal problems with the
budgetary procedure in the future.67 Cox was appalled by the failure of the Presi-
dency under Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis to take Parliament’s concern
seriously.68
The prospect of re-opening what had been a difficult budgetary negotiation
deal needless to say frightened many, not least many MEPs who understood what
might ensue. The Parliament’s Committee on Budgets subsequently engaged in a
‘trialogue’ with the Commission and Council in an effort to resolve the stand-off,
but in the end obtained no substantive change regarding the principle of parlia-
mentary input on the Copenhagen budgetary deal. Although more money was
again found for the new member states, the Council did not concede the substan-
tive issue. Given the tight schedule for gaining Parliament’s assent and the signing
in Athens within one week it seems likely that the Council dared the Parliament
to withhold or at least delay granting its consent (the so-called ‘nuclear option’)
and risk being castigated by the new member states as the villain of the piece. On
this issue at least the Parliament’s sabre-rattling simply did not work.69 Budget
Committee Chairman Terry Wynn (PES, UK) captured the mood by describing
110 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
the agreement as a ‘second best solution’ and a direct attack on the European
Parliament’s rights.70 Daniel Cohn-Bendit of the Greens went further in referring
to the episode as one of ‘institutional rape’.71 If nothing else the episode demon-
strated the European Parliament’s determination to safeguard the integrity of the
EU’s internal institutional boundaries and responsibilities.

The EP vote on accession of candidate states

The principal reports guiding MEPs on the enlargement vote was that drawn up by
Elmar Brok on behalf of the powerful Foreign Affairs Committee and that drawn
up by Reimer Böge and Joan Colom i Naval on behalf of the Budgets Committee.72
The EP insisted on consultation on any modifications to the accession treaty. The
reports were mostly uncontroversial, except for that on the Czech Republic, which
again expressed concerns about the surviving laws and decrees associated with
Beneš issues.73 A clear statement of the Parliament’s self-understanding of the EU
as a ‘community of values’ underpinned the report on the Czech Republic.
‘Putting the principles of respect for human rights and the rule of law into practice
is a continuing challenge which is one of the fundamental obligations of the
member states of the European Union’, the report declared. And the report laid
down a marker as to post-accession monitoring of minority rights: ‘Parliament will
make sure that the stated fundamental values of the Czech Republic will not be under-
mined in the future’, i.e. after its accession.74 The definitive tone of the language
should leave no doubt as to Parliament’s determination to remain the European
Union’s guardian of fundamental freedoms and human rights. In some ways it is
remarkable that diplomatic protocol can be so casually cast aside, especially in a
context where the earlier asymmetry of the enlargement process had been much
reduced by the time of the Copenhagen deal.
As Table 7.1 demonstrates, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in
support of enlargement in a plenary session in Strasbourg on 9 April.75 This
followed an agreement with the Council on the financing of enlargement the
previous day. Article 49 of the EU treaty required the Assent of the EP voting by
an absolute majority (i.e. 314 out of 626 votes). The Parliament considered the
accession of each country separately and voted on ten different legislative resolu-
tions. These were accompanied by a non-legislative resolution where Parliament
expressed its political opinion. A vote on a separate resolution drawn up by
Reimer Böge and Joan Colom i Naval confirmed the Parliament’s endorsement of
the solution reached the previous day on the budgetary disagreement with the
Council that had been casting a shadow over the enlargement vote for several
weeks.76 To those present the event, which might have been expected to produce a
lightning-charged atmosphere, came off as rather a dull occasion. Some speakers
undoubtedly did capture the sense of realization and historic significance. The
leader of the EPP-ED group, Hans Gert Pöttering, for example, invoked the spirit
of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik when declaring that ‘those who should always have been
together are now converging’. President Pat Cox asserted that ‘the political
message is now clear and very straightforward: the hour of enlargement has now
 The European Parliament in the enlargement process 111

Table 7.1 European Parliament vote on accession, 9 April 2003

Country In favour Against Abstention

Czech Republic 489 39 37

Cyprus 507 29 26
Estonia 520 22 24
Hungary 522 23 23
Latvia 522 22 24
Lithuania 521 22 24
Malta 521 23 23
Poland 509 25 31
Slovakia 521 21 25
Slovenia 522 22 22

Source: European Parliament

struck’.77 The votes on individual candidate states were unremarkable, save perhaps
for the 39 votes cast against Czech accession (with another 37 abstentions). Overall
the support for accession was overwhelming.

Conclusions
Since its foundation, Parliament has had a long history of supporting integrationist
EU perspectives on enlargement. This was no less true of eastern enlargement than
any previous round. In some ways the role of the European Parliament in the
eastern enlargement process was still a minor one. Testimony for such is provided
by Parliamentary pleas for greater responsibility and involvement in various
aspects of the negotiations and, on occasion, a sense of powerlessness at negotiation
outcomes. The Parliament’s formal role came at the very end of the enlargement
process, where it voted to give assent to the accession of the candidate states. That
formal power, however, represented just one aspect of the European Parliament’s
role. It also exercised all kinds of informal power throughout the enlargement
process which meant that the Commission and the Council had to pay attention
to Parliament’s concerns on enlargement issues. Thus concessions to Parlia-
ment’s position were granted at various stages of the process. But it may well be in
the long-term impact of creating a pan-European parliamentary network and
supporting ideas about democracy, oversight and control over executive politics
that the real value of the Parliament’s contribution to the eastern enlargement
process may lie. Certainly the Parliament’s insistence on full and unequivocal
transposition and implementation of EU human rights norms influenced the
content of legislation in the candidate states and identified the EP as the most vocal
and stalwart champion of democratic norms within the enlargement process. The
112 The institutional dimension of eastern enlargement
Parliament was also keen to involve itself as substantially as possible in different
components of the EU strategy for enlargement as it developed. It was not simply
content to pronounce on the fitness of the candidates after the issuing of regular
reports much less the final vote on accession.78 The Parliament’s willingness to
push the Council toward greater accommodation of candidate state preferences
was not unimportant in the ‘push’ for a conclusion to negotiations in 2002. The
activism and public role of EP President Pat Cox raised the profile of the EP within
enlargement deliberations and also helped remind both insiders and outsiders of
the normative importance of enlargement. None of this is meant to overstate the
importance of the Parliament’s role within the eastern enlargement process. For
much of the long negotiation period it remained a junior partner within the
internal EU process. What the chapter demonstrates, however, is that contrary to
the passive role implied by Article 49 of the treaties, the European Parliament
proved itself capable of contributing in important ways to the enlargement process.
As it has increased its legislative and oversight powers within the broad integration
process, so has it also ensured that it can, in different ways, influence an enlarge-
ment negotiation. In the final analysis this ensured that the parliamentary dimen-
sion of the EU’s most ambitious expansion was anything but marginal.
Part III

Conceptualizing
eastern enlargement
8 Geopolitical explanations of
eastern enlargement

Introduction
If the eastern enlargement of the European Union generated a significant flow of
academic analysis it was only belatedly that scholars began to produce conceptual
research. The neglect of enlargement by scholars of integration theory led,
amongst others, Phillippe Schmitter and Helen Wallace to observe that the discus-
sion of the enlargement issue was taking place in a ‘theoretical vacuum’.1 This was
surprising in that eastern enlargement was clearly going to change the EU in
important ways and represented a major new foreign policy and geopolitical chal-
lenge for the Union, consisting of nothing less than the potential reconstitution of
the map of Europe.2 Furthermore, if eastern enlargement constitutes but a first
step, with further enlargement to the Balkans, and, as importantly, Turkey, to
follow, the process will eventually entirely reshape the territorial, political, institu-
tional, economic, and perhaps even, cultural contours of the European and
Eurasian landmass. EU borders might potentially reach Iran, Iraq, Syria, large
swathes of Russia and the Caucasus. Thus no serious analysis of the eastern
enlargement can ignore the geopolitical dimension to the process.3
Notwithstanding the functional and technocratic basis of the European integra-
tion process, and the fact that the accession criteria hardly mention security issues,
eastern enlargement brought to the forefront of EU politics important geopolitical
and security issues at every stage. In short, geopolitics mattered. It mattered to the
decision taken by the EU to embark on expansion in the early 1990s, and there-
after security issues remained prominent in enlargement debates. This chapter
seeks to analyse the most important geopolitical issues which eastern enlargement
brought to the fore. In the process it utilizes realist and neorealist theories of Inter-
national Relations (IR). Realist scholars frame their approach to the study of inter-
national relations in ideas focusing on power, the role of the state, and the
structural distribution of power and resources in the international system. In
seeking realist and neorealist explanations of eastern enlargement the chapter fore-
grounds some key issues, including the potential power realignments in Europe
triggered by enlargement, the EU relationship with Russia and its importance to
the unfolding of the enlargement process, and how, if at all, eastern enlargement
augmented and increased EU power in the international arena. The chapter
116 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
begins, however, by introducing a range of realist precepts and their arguments
about the nature of international politics.4

The realist worldview

As a way of thinking about the world, realism is distinguished by its pessimism
regarding moral progress and the perfectibility of the human condition.5 Realists
are sceptical that human beings and collectivities can overcome recurrent conflict
and establish cooperative or peaceable relations on a durable basis. This pessimism
is rooted in both the nature and history of the international system itself and, at a
deeper level, in human nature.6 Hans Morgenthau began his classic text Politics
Among the Nations by observing that the conflict-ridden international arena was the
consequence of ‘forces inherent in human nature’, and that the best humanity
could hope for was the ‘realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute
good’.7 For contemporary realists the absence of a leviathan in the international
system inevitably and tragically leads to insecurity, conflict, and the routine resort
to organized violence.8 States can mitigate the consequences of anarchy by relying
on time-honoured instruments such as diplomacy and the balance of power. But
they cannot escape it altogether. Statecraft is more a matter of damage limitation
than of fundamental problem-solving. Both classical and contemporary realists
would accept the following set of assumptions as central to their intellectual and
scholarly endeavour.
In the first place, the most important actors in international politics are ‘territori-
ally-organized entities’ – city states in antiquity, empires in the late modern period,
and nation states in the contemporary arena.9 Nation states are not the only actors
that count in international politics, but realists assume that more can be under-
stood about world politics by focusing on the behaviour of and interaction among
nation states than by analysing the behaviour of individuals, social classes, transna-
tional firms, or indeed international organizations. Second, realists believe that
relations among nation states are inherently conflictual. States compete most
intensely in the realm of military security, but coexist uneasily in other realms as
well, in particular in economic areas and competition for trade and international
investment. When analysing the nature of interstate competition realists draw a
sharp distinction between domestic and international politics. For realists, it is self-
evident that the level of violence is greater at the international than the domestic
level. The international system is a self-help system in which states hold security as
their primary concern in order to protect their autonomy. According to Hans
Morgenthau, the fundamental national interest of any state is always the protection
of its physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other
nations. In fact Morgenthau’s view of politics in the international arena was one of
a Manichean contest for power and resources.10
From this perspective states are capable of cooperation but this is extremely diffi-
cult. Cooperation is undertaken only to specific ends and always with the need to
protect or enhance the state’s power in the interstate system.11 Competition is a
consequence of anarchy, which forces states ultimately to rely on themselves to
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 117
ensure their survival and autonomy. This does not imply that cooperation is impos-
sible, only that states will approach cooperation with a concern for their impact on
relative power positions.12 Third, realists emphazise the close connection between
state power and interests. States seek power in order to achieve their interests, and
they calculate their interests in terms of their power and in the context of the inter-
national environment they confront. The key point for realists is that in defining
the so-called national interest, state officials look outward and respond to the
opportunities and constraints of the international environment. Finally, realists
assume that state behaviour can be explained as the product of rational decision-
making. As Robert Keohane puts it: for the realist ‘world politics can be analyzed
as if states were unitary rational actors, carefully calculating the costs of alternative
course of action and seeking to maximise their expected utility, although doing so
under conditions of uncertainty’.13 States act strategically and instrumentally, in an
arena in which the ‘noise level’ is high.14
Summing up, power is crucial to the realist lexicon and traditionally has been
defined narrowly in military and geopolitical terms. It is the ability to get what you
want either through the threat or use of force. Yet irrespective of how much power
a state may possess, the core national interest of all states must be survival. These
assumptions constitute the starting point for realist analysis. They do not lead to a
single, unified theory of contemporary world politics or to a single conceptualiza-
tion of state behaviour. Each realist image however embraces these core assump-
tions. The chapter now goes on to apply key realist and neorealist concepts to the
eastern enlargement process. In doing so it poses important questions regarding
the nature, exercise and ubiquity of power within the process. It also addresses key
issues of geopolitics and foreign policy decision-making which eastern enlargement
brought to the fore.

Post-1989 Europe: the return of anarchy?

In the period following the collapse of Communism and the bipolar system the
academic community rushed to contribute to the debate on the future of interna-
tional politics. Whilst Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the ‘End of History’, and
Samuel Huntington the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, realist scholars, although them-
selves divided on any number of issues, were generally very pessimistic about the
prospects for progress. Some indeed forecast a return to the pre-1914 or interwar
period, characterized by multipolarity and a new balance of power model. Although
realists (and especially neorealists) had little to say about the European integration
process,15 John Mearsheimer for one predicted that Europe (along with much of
the rest of the world) would remain mired in history and indeed go ‘back to the
future’.16 This was a world of historical déjà vu, as Jim George put it, characterized
by elementary and structurally induced threat.17 And that future would inevitably
bring a fracturing of the European compact, power balancing against perceived
threats to state security, and the return of irredentist conflict.
These pessimistic predictions seemed apposite as Yugoslavia imploded and
Europeans caught a glimpse of the disturbing new reality of fratricidal interstate
118 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
ethno-nationalist conflagrations. As the violence spiralled out of control in the
Balkans, European political élites worried about similar conflicts breaking out in
other parts of the continent. The disturbing legacy of European history meant the
potential re-emergence of irredentism, and the presence of sizeable minorities in
many of the new states left many fearful that the Yugoslav imbroglio rather than
the relative harmony of the EU model was the template for the future. The realist
argument was based on a view that, with the removal of the artificial straitjacket
provided by the Cold War, the new European geopolitics would, for Europe’s
nation states, be one of competitive coexistence, a return to a more pure form of
Hobbesian anarchy. Where in 1989 there existed 27 states in Europe, by 1992 this
had risen to 42 with the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.18 One esti-
mate suggested that 8,000 miles of new borders were created out of the old demar-
cations.19 And where there were new borders there existed the manifest potential
for conflict. New international frontiers were created such as those of the Baltic
States, the Yugoslav successor states, and out of the break-up of Czechoslovakia.
Some were reconfigured as a result of war, others by democratic agreement.20 The
Cold War, some argued, had provided Western Europe with a secure and stable
eastern frontier.21 But where the Cold War had provided the critical leviathans for
each geopolitical bloc in the US and USSR, this new world seemed to herald the
return of self-help attitudes straight from the canon of classical realist thinking.
Neorealists identified these new states as new units in a reconfigured and still
reconfiguring international system, all of them responding to the new climate on
the basis of the distribution of power in the system and seeking to balance against
existential threats to state security.
Although these new states proclaimed their attachment to the European inte-
gration model and pursued membership of the European Community, realists
argued that this was simply a strategic effort to guard against instability and
potential threats and ensure economic gains from the process of integration.
Interstate cooperation along the lines of the West European integration system
would prove extremely difficult to achieve. This was not least because this
system had been developed under the protective military shield of the United
States, which would now turn its attention away from Europe, as it redefined its
own security interests in the new world order.22 Thus hopes of an extension of
that successful post-war cooperative model on a pan-European basis were
simply illusory given the absence of the Cold War stabilizer and the return of
multipolarity. The sceptics pointed, for example to the failure of the Visegrad
group of states (Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia) to maintain a collective
approach to the question of EU membership in the early 1990s. Each state
preferred to deal directly with the EU rather than establish unified positions,
which might better have aided their membership ambitions. Indeed each
Visegrad state consistently demonstrated suspicion of its fellow Central Euro-
peans and sought to enhance its own standing with Brussels. For its part the EU,
even when it had decided on membership for CEE as the best option, persisted
with a policy of differentiation between candidate states, at least up to the
Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999.
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 119
Realist perspectives also offered the view that enlargement presented an enor-
mous challenge to the task of preserving the balance of power in Europe. In short,
the new geopolitical environment brought into sharp focus a new set of security
externalities that threatened the achievements of the successful post-1945 Euro-
pean compact. For one thing the 1989 revolutions had brought the German Ques-
tion back to the centre of European politics. The question of how German power
might reassert itself occupied the minds of many policy-makers, not least the
Germans themselves. The mantra that what German élites sought was ‘not a
German Europe but a European Germany’ was consistently deployed to assuage
the concerns of those who feared a resurgence of German power. Similarly,
German commitment to the deeper integration embedded in the Maastricht
Treaty was presented as evidence of German bona fides. Despite such assurances,
however, there were many who argued that, in the long run, the worst German
tendencies would re-assert themselves and Central and Eastern Europe would
become again, either directly through the projection of military and political
power, or indirectly through the projection of Germany’s vast economic power, a
zone of vassal states, which over time would help destabilize the peaceable interstate
system built up through the integration process. The prospect of the Bonn–Paris
axis being replaced by a Berlin–Warsaw axis was one which triggered fears in
particular about the continued viability of the Franco-German alliance. But for all
of these concerns, paradoxically, enlargement represented at the same time the
only viable solution to the new balance of power problem. Eastern enlargement,
notwithstanding parallel developments in respect of NATO enlargement, could
become the primary mechanism for buttressing the European integration process
against renewed German power ambitions. Locking in both the CEE states and the
new Germany to the institutional and political commitments of the enlargement
process and wider integration framework would represent the best means of
guarding against this important security externality weakening the commitment to
the new Europe.

States as central actors in the enlargement process

Realists are agreed on a core proposition regarding international politics – that its
central actors are and continue to be nation states. Despite the claims made by
advocates of globalization, and despite the existence of layers of important networks
and institutions of international governance, states remain at the core of the realist
worldview. Thus, for realists, the new European system of international relations to
emerge in the wake of 1989’s geopolitical revolutions was fashioned by states
pursuing their own interests in the new geopolitical climate. State actors and their
concerns dominated this system. It was state actors who took the lead in reconsti-
tuting EU relations with Central and Eastern Europe, both on a bilateral and
multilateral basis, and, crucially, it was state actors who proved pivotal at all times
to the key decisions which emerged from the eastern enlargement process.
Supranational institutions, to the extent that they mattered at all, were signifi-
cant only in so far as they were delegated specific tasks by the member state
120 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
governments whose control over the enlargement process was enshrined in Article
49 of the treaties and remained intact right up to the conclusion of negotiations.
The European Commission and European Parliament in this view remained
marginal to the process throughout because state actors dominated on both the EU
and CEE sides. All of the important enlargement decisions, whether with respect to
issues such as trade, agriculture, migration, or institutional recalibration, emerged
out of key intergovernmental summit meetings such as Copenhagen in 1993,
Luxembourg in 1997, Helsinki in 1999 and Copenhagen again in 2002. Very often
enlargement-related outcomes relating to, for example, CAP or budgetary matters
were resolved by meetings of heads of state and government at the last minute.23
Realists would also argue that the structure of the enlargement negotiations
favoured national actors. The role of the Presidency proved crucial as time went
on, and very often this involved bilateral internal as well as external talks between
the Presidency and national administrations. In fact the tour des capitals by the Presi-
dency was consistently important in moving the internal EU deliberation on
enlargement forward and establishing (or making clearer) negotiating positions. In
Brussels the Permanent Representations and their contact with candidate state
representatives also proved highly significant. All of this suggests that the most
convincing explanations of enlargement are those that privilege the role of govern-
ments and classical interstate bargaining models.

Power and geopolitics in the enlargement process

A second principal preoccupation of realist perspectives on international politics is
that of the exercise of power. Enlargement, from this perspective, can be viewed as
part of an ongoing project – to turn the EU into a superstate and a genuine great
power that could compete with the United States and emerging powers such as
China and India. The EU, in this view, instrumentally used eastern enlargement as
the primary vehicle for this geopolitical advance, which brought into the Union
eight new states in Central and Eastern Europe, moved the EU border hundreds of
miles east from Berlin to Tallinn (within miles of St Petersburg), and added 80
million new citizens. Territorial expansion will only continue as the addition of
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 will bring the Union’s borders right up to the shore
of the Black Sea. Christopher Hill suggests that the EU already shows signs of
behaving like a great power. In evidence he points to the EU’s increasingly
prioritizing its own ‘near abroad’ through the Euro Mediterranean Partnership
and a common strategy on Russia.24 Further evidence for this conclusion, Hill
suggests, is provided by the reaction to Europe’s relative impotence in the face of the
Balkan Wars of the 1990s. The EU, many argue, can only hope to manage these
problems successfully by attaining the attributes (military and political) of a great
power. Thus the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) is, in this view, a first step towards the
formation of a European army with significant capability and geopolitical reach.
The ESDP has developed because of the EU desire to compete as a great power on
the world stage.
Such a power perspective presents the EU’s Stabilization and Association
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 121
Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans as a mirror image of the early eastern
enlargement process. It is designed to ensure that EU influence over the Balkans
proves decisive in the medium to long term. At the Thessaloniki Summit in June
2003 the EU effectively committed itself (at least rhetorically) to membership for
the Western Balkans.25 The EU SAP has been highly interventionist and indicative
of a much more robust and proactive geopolitical approach to the region than had
been evident earlier during the Bosnia War.26 As it becomes clear that the United
States is slowly disengaging from the region the EU will increasingly seek responsi-
bility for conflict resolution and crisis management and assert regional leadership.
Indeed, this was already apparent in the EU decision to take over responsibility for
security in Bosnia.27 The French view, that the enlarging EU should become a real
geopolitical power in the world, although not widely shared, was still a recurring
theme in the enlargement debate. French political élites worried that an over-
ambitious enlargement would compromise European power; they thus fretted
about any expansion that would take the Union beyond 25 members. They espe-
cially opposed the principle of Turkish membership for this reason.28 For realists,
however, the important point is that the continual expansion of the EU is reflective
of a general desire for security and power maximization.
Further evidence for EU power ambitions can be gleaned from the rhetoric and
public discourse of key actors. Former Commission President Romano Prodi, for
example, in a speech to the European Parliament in 2001, pointed out that a key
advantage of eastern enlargement was the fact that it would boost the EU’s power
in the world. Already, he suggested, ‘we are an emerging power, dare I say, a
potential power’. He then suggested that enlargement had the potential to ‘trans-
form the Union into a continental power’.29 Similarly, Karen Smith argues that
EU policy toward Central and Eastern Europe could be viewed as a desire to
preserve and enhance its position in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.
She cites the EU stance on negotiating the Europe Agreements with the CEE states
and policy toward Russia that suggests a power-based approach by the Union.30
Irrespective of whether or not the intention exists to use enlargement as a spring-
board to greater geopolitical power on a global level, the enlarged EU will figure
prominently in the cognitive maps of decision-makers worldwide from 2004
onwards.31 It is also true to say that outsiders such as Russia, China and the United
States simply will not remain indifferent to the way in which enlargement changes
the fundamentals of EU power.32 Thus, even if security and power did not feature
prominently initially in the calculus of EU decision-makers, the enlargement
process could not but trigger important geopolitical questions for the Union.
Whether in response to internal or external considerations, the EU, throughout
the enlargement process, presented important security and geopolitical arguments
as part of the underlying rationale for justifying expansion. Atsuko Higashino, for
example, cites the declaration at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, which
portrayed enlargement as a means to ‘lend a positive contribution to security and
stability on the European continent’. The rhetoric of EU leaders was as focused on
security issues, she argues, as on economic or normative ones.33 Her analysis of the
speeches and statements of EU leaders throws up a rhetorical structure that
122 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
consistently highlights the ‘existential threats’ to European security as a specific
opportunity cost of failure to enlarge. Enlargement represented the only viable
alternative to the various threat scenarios. CEE state representatives, of course,
also deployed this form of discourse strategically as a supplementary weapon used
in conjunction with their more usual norm-based appeals for membership.34 EU
leaders routinely invoked a combination of the dreadful European past, the spectre
of instability and conflicts such as the Yugoslav conflagration or the instability of
Russia, as central to the enlargement logic. In addition, a ‘soft security’ discourse,
which focused on the social disorder deriving from trans-European organized
crime, the trafficking of drugs and people, and endemic corruption in Central and
Eastern Europe, regularly featured in the public commentary of EU leaders, both
supranational and national. In particular the Kosovo war in 1999 focused atten-
tion on the potential for recurrent interstate and intrastate conflicts in the absence of
concrete EU institutional relationships (with the prospect of membership attached)
and EU leadership for states in the region. Later, after what Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili termed ‘Europe’s third wave of liberation’, the EU’s attention
would turn to Georgia and Ukraine.35 Security and geopolitics would constitute as
central a part of EU policy toward these states as it had earlier in respect of Central
and Eastern Europe.

Eastern enlargement and CFSP/ESDP

Another important way of conceptualizing eastern enlargement in geopolitical
terms arises out of the potential if not actual political muscle it adds to the EU’s
fledgling security and defence policy.36 Conceivably the addition of ten new states,
most of them already members of NATO, could boost the security dimension of
the integration process, not least in the increase in potential military resources
available for CFSP/ESDP operations. Just as the events of 1989 played an impor-
tant part in the initial development of a CFSP, enlargement adds new momentum
to the process by providing critical mass, where it has, for most of its history, been
lacking. One important study of voting trends at the United Nations General
Assembly demonstrates a dramatic increase in the 1990s in convergence among
EU15 member states.37 The same study challenges the rationalist view that enlarge-
ment inevitably compromises the search for common positions by demonstrating
that the trend of convergence also applies to the new member states. Voting
convergence has been most apparent in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, with the Baltic States catching up in recent years.38
Thus enlargement at the least does not appear to hinder the search for collective
solutions in the area of foreign and security policy.
The empirical evidence, however, also suggests that the growing pains experi-
enced in the foreign policy-making domain in the 1990s have not receded and that
enlargement may in fact compound them. The difficulties in establishing a common
EU position on important international issues was underlined most dramatically
by the split on Iraq in the latter part of 2002 and early 2003. With enlargement
negotiations completed, a majority of CEE states sided with the United States and
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 123
Britain, and against Germany and France on the question of an attack on Baghdad.
Some commentators argued that the former communist states had been far too
easily drawn into the US orbit as a consequence of the weakness of existing CFSP/
ESDP structures.39 An unseemly row was then triggered by President Chirac’s
description of CEE behaviour as ‘infantile’ and ‘reckless’.40 Thus enlargement can
hardly be said to have helped overcome the problem of political will in CFSP.41
The aspiration to speak with one voice was no closer to being realized in 2004 than
ten years earlier during the height of the Yugoslav crises. Realist perspectives
which highlight the impossibility of meaningful interstate military and security
cooperation suggest that the capacity of CFSP and ESDP to deal with the security
agenda will be further reduced as a result of enlargement. Christopher Hill, indeed,
expresses the fear that the enlarged EU may lose any distinction it now possesses
with, for example, the OSCE or the Council of Europe.42 Those making the pessi-
mistic argument doubt that the decision-making machinery of CFSP/ESDP has
the capacity to cope and suggest that the efficacy of systemic decision-making in the
enlarged Union of 25 will be so sub-optimal as to further compromise the overall
scope of foreign policy activity by the EU.

The selection of candidate states

Another important focus of attention for realist scholars of eastern enlargement was
the distinct geopolitical dimension to the decisions on which countries were to be
favoured with candidate status and the timeframe in which they could expect to
successfully conclude negotiations. Although the Commission and Council for long
adhered to a policy of differentiation on the grounds of merit and progress in trans-
position of the acquis communautaire, it is clear that at least some of the candidate states
were included for purely geopolitical reasons. Some decisions proved contentious
within the internal EU deliberations. Others caused tension in the negotiations with
the candidate states and with important regional powers such as Russia. Across every
dimension of the process of selecting candidates geopolitics mattered.
The recommendations made by the Commission in Agenda 2000, and subse-
quently acted upon by the Council, to include both Estonia and Slovenia in the first
wave of accession, represent a textbook example of the significance of geopolitics.
In this case, as Baun points out, the Commission favoured a geographically
balanced enlargement that would not be limited to just Central Europe but would
also include a country from the north (Estonia) and one from the south (Slovenia).43
It is clear now that the decision subsequently to open up the eastern enlargement
process to those countries placed on the slow lane at Luxembourg in 1997 was also
one largely influenced by geopolitical considerations. After the decisions at Luxem-
bourg the Romanian and Bulgarian governments argued that the double rejection
shock of exclusion from the first wave of both NATO and EU expansion would
consign them to a ‘geopolitical grey zone’ between Western Europe and Russia.44
The consequences for them (and by implication for the EU also) might be extreme
if it resulted in a retardation of the democratic process and further economic
decline. It is clear that these factors, in addition to the new situation arising out of
124 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
the Kosovo crisis, were instrumental in the decision to open negotiations with them
at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. This was, in large part, a geopolitical
response on the part of the EU to fears of Bulgarian and Romanian drift.45 Bulgaria
and Romania went on to conclude their membership negotiations with the EU in
late 2004. Although both countries had made demonstrable progress toward
fulfilling the obligations of membership, there remained the lingering conviction
that they had been subject to a much less exacting critique than the states that had
acceded in 2004. Indeed the accession treaties included so-called safeguard clauses
that allowed the EU to postpone or delay entry into the EU in the absence of
further improvement in implementation capacity. But for all of that the opportu-
nity cost of their continued exclusion was simply too great for the EU to justify
refusal or continued prevarication.

Balancing against existential threats

If the internal EU debate on questions of inclusion, exclusion, and the possible
geographical limit of eastern enlargement proved important, no less so were the
arguments which stressed the expansion process as an instrument for guarding
against both conventional and more contemporary threats to European security
and stability. A core enlargement proposition for neorealists in particular, as Frank
Schimmelfennig has pointed out, was that expansion was a desirable option if it
represented a necessary and efficient means of balancing superior power or
perceived threats. And where neorealists would emphasize the threat represented
by Russian military power, other realists favoured expansion as a means of
guarding against other forms of instability on the EU’s eastern borders. Both justifi-
cations for eastern enlargement are intimately connected with the end of Commu-
nism as a competing political system and the emergence of a ‘zone of instability’ in
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Ensuring that the ‘zone
of instability’ had at least the prospect of becoming a ‘zone of stability’ thus repre-
sented a key reason for expansion.46 And the eastern enlargement process repre-
sented, if not the best or indeed the only mechanism in fighting existential threats
or security externalities, at least an important component of EU policy.

Russia as existential threat

The principal existential threat to be considered here is that of Russian power,
both actual and potential. The power-based approach suggests that although the
implosion of the Soviet Union and the loss of its satellite states left the successor
state – the Russian Federation – weaker, it still represented a considerable security
threat to EU interests. In 1994 Richard Ned Lebow had argued that ‘post-Soviet
Russia is a smaller less populous state, consumed with the problems of political
instability, ethnic fragmentation and precipitous economic decline’. With respect
to Russian military capacity, he pointed out that most armoured divisions lacked
spare parts and effective maintenance, with much of the former Soviet navy ‘rot-
ting in port and unable to put to sea’.47 With the economic disruption that followed
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 125
the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has fallen further and further behind the
West in the development and deployment of state-of-the-art weaponry and has lost
for the foreseeable future the ability to exploit and utilize military technology on a
large scale. According to UN projections, Russia’s population will plummet from
about 146 million in 2000 to about 104 million in 2050. Russia will go from being
the sixth-most-populous country in the world to being the 17th.48 The ongoing
Russian failure to tame the Chechen insurgency also brought Russian military
weakness into sharp focus. The botched response to Chechen terrorist operations
such as the Nord-Ost (Dubrovka) theatre siege in October 2002 and the Beslan
school massacre in September 2004 reinforced the view of Russian military incom-
petence deriving from post-Soviet decline.49 Lebow’s observations were thus no
less relevant in 2004 than they had been ten years previously.
For all of the evidence of Russian decline, however, Russia still arguably repre-
sents the greatest potential ‘existential threat’ to the power of the EU and to the
peace and stability of the continent. In the first place Russia retains a formidable
military capacity and significant natural resources.50 It provides over a fifth of EU
energy needs and almost one-third of Germany’s.51 It boasts the largest standing
army on the European continent, a significant air, land and naval capability and,
most crucially, a nuclear arsenal far in excess of those of the UK and France, the
EU’s only nuclear powers. Enlargement thus could be viewed as a straightforward
power-balancing and power-maximization act by the EU in response to both the
dangers that accompany Russian military retrenchment and fear of a resurgence in
Russian power. This is despite the fact that it is NATO and not the EU which is the
primary repository of EU members’ security interests. The addition of ten new
member states, most of which are already NATO members, immeasurably boosts
the EU’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia.
In simple terms enlargement encompassed a straight geopolitical switch of alle-
giance by Russia’s former vassal states, from the Russian or Soviet sphere of influ-
ence to the EU sphere. The EU might have chosen to placate and assuage Russian
concerns by offering the former Soviet satellites something short of membership
such as a ‘privileged partnership’ or associate membership, which would effectively
have rendered them once again a buffer zone between Western Europe and
Russia. The EU, however, sought to absorb them fully and wholly in EU struc-
tures, including defence and security structures. The swing in the power pendulum
has been such that, more often than not, it is now the EU that dictates to Russia
rather than the other way around, on matters of regional security. At the least,
Russia had to accommodate itself to the changes happening on its western borders
without having any influence over developments. Or to put it in explicitly realist
terms: the EU acted as it did because it could and did not compromise when asked
to by Russia. Russia acted as it could but what it could do was much more limited
than in Soviet or Romanov times.
Changing the focus somewhat from pure power politics and geopolitical compe-
tition, the eastern enlargement of the EU might also be viewed as an effort to
balance against the instability created by the fragmentation of Russian power and
the lack of stability in Russia’s domestic politics. Russia, for Georg Sørensen, is akin
126 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
to a drifting supertanker, uncertain of what kind of statehood it will end up with.
Political institutions outside of the Presidency are impotent and citizenship has
little substantive meaning.52 The success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the Russian
parliamentary elections of December 1992, and the popularity of the ‘red/brown’
alliance (communist and nationalist) raised early concerns within the EU about the
prospects for democracy in Russia, and increased fears in Central and Eastern
Europe that a more nationalist and aggressive Russia would upset the geostrategic
balance in the new Europe by seeking to reclaim its Empire.53 This triggered new
demands from CEE and a EU response that privileged CEE accession as the only
credible strategy whilst developing a new EU–Russia strategic partnership.54 It is
not too difficult to envisage a sclerotic Russia turning toward a revived nationalism
in whatever new form, increasingly causing difficulties with the Baltic States or
Ukraine, for example.55 As Christopher Hill argues, it would not be too dramatic a
leap then for the EU and Russia to seem to each other like real security threats.56
President Putin’s rhetoric in the run-up to the 60th anniversary of victory in the
Great Patriotic War unnerved many with its nostalgia for Russia’s imperial past
and its message that Russia continued to define its interests at the expense of its
neighbours.57
Of equal concern throughout the eastern enlargement process was the fact that
Russian central government was extremely weak, under both Yeltsin and Putin.
And where Vladamir Putin acted to restore Moscow’s prerogatives within the
Russian Federation this had the effect of convincing western policy-makers that he
was taking Russia back to a more authoritarian and hostile form of state.58 The
Putin government’s actions against Mikhael Khodorkovsky and Yukos in 2004
only reinforced this perception. Putin’s determination to reassert Russian power
manifested itself most obviously in the ‘near abroad’ and on the Chechen question.
Russian military adventurism in the Caucasus both undermined Russian power
and contributed to growing instability on the EU’s eastern frontiers. Continued
interference in Georgia and manifest interference in Ukrainian domestic politics
(especially during the Presidential election in 2004), left EU policy-makers convinced
that the Russian threat was now defined by its propensity for creating instability as
much as by any military threat it could wield. Thus EU policy-makers acknowl-
edged this type of security externality and presented eastern enlargement as in part
an effort to ‘lock in’ the CEE states into the EU orbit and guard against the west-
ward migration of the problems generated by Russian instability.

Instability in Central and Eastern Europe as

existential threat
If Russian power and instability created one set of geopolitical motivations for
eastern enlargement, then of equal weight was the EU’s concern about instability
within Central and Eastern Europe itself. In the wake of 1989 the Yugoslav conflict
provided convincing evidence of the potentially fratricidal nature of future interstate
relations in the region. The volatility of Central and Eastern Europe was a function
of longstanding historical grievances regarding territory, irredentist border claims,
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 127
the presence of significant ethnic minorities in neighbouring states and their treat-
ment by those states, and the weakness of the emerging governance structures in the
new democracies. Together these issues constituted both a reason for EU caution
regarding enlargement and also one of the primary geopolitical motivations for
expansion. At the macro-level only the real prospect of membership could be used to
good effect. But at the micro-level the EU sought to put in place a substantive instru-
ment for guarding against the possible corrosion of interstate relations. This repre-
sented a crucial part of the EU’s pre-accession strategy and was introduced, as we
saw in chapter 2, at the Essen summit in 1994 and further developed through the
‘Pact on Stability in Europe’.59 In this the EU sought to minimize the security risk
attached to enlargement and thus it constituted a substantive process of preventa-
tive diplomacy.60 All these developments were of course heavily influenced by the
ongoing carnage in Bosnia.
The Pact on Stability can be viewed as rational from the EU perspective in two
crucial ways. First, it represented an act of balancing against potential Russian
power in the Balkans. The EU, after an initial period of inaction during the 1992–
1995 Bosnian war, was much more forceful and proactive on Kosovo in 1998 and
1999, and, later, Macedonia. Especially during Kosovo the Russian government
sought to establish itself as an important presence on the ground in the Balkans.
From an early policy, which sought recognition and equal status, later Russian
interventions looked to Europeans to be obstructionist and belligerent, backed up
by a more bellicose rhetoric than had been in evidence since Soviet times.61 An
impasse over a Russian move to ‘take’ Pristina airport was indicative to Europeans
not just of Russian perfidy but also its continued aggressive posture. EU actions
were to a large degree designed to ensure that Russia could not establish itself as a
presence and exert influence. The Pact on Stability was thus one crucial mecha-
nism for ensuring that all states in the troubled Balkan region would gravitate
toward Brussels and not Moscow in the emerging geopolitical landscape.
The EU approach was again evident in the proactive diplomacy that brought
about a direct solution to the Macedonian crisis in 2001, and in the EU taking over
direct responsibility for policing from NATO in Bosnia in 2004.62 But the more
obvious and well publicized reason behind the Pact on Stability was to ensure that
the EU model of peaceful coexistence and stable interstate relations could be
expanded east and south so as to ensure the elimination of all significant security
issues.63 It would put an end to irredentist claims, encourage trans-border economic
development and cooperation and help inculcate the European spirit in a region
more traditionally defined by ethnic tensions and lingering post-war hostilities. In
the early 1990s many commentators argued that the worst potential flashpoint in
Europe was that between Hungary and Romania. This dated back to the Treaty of
Trianon in 1920 under which Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and 60 per
cent of its population. In the aftermath of 1989 ethnic Hungarian populations of
significance remained not only in Romania but also in Slovakia and Vojvodina in
Yugoslavia. Bulgaria contained within its territory a significant Turkish population
that had been subject to a programme of discrimination and deportation under the
Todor Zhikov regime in the 1980s. Although there were real differences manifest
128 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
in the attitudes of different states to the welfare of their co-nationals in non-national
settings, EU attitudes clearly weighed heavily with each. Hungary had the most
important concerns with an estimated 2.7 million ethnic Hungarians in Romania
and about 500,000 in Slovakia. The sizeable Russian minorities in the Baltic States
also presented a challenge to EU strategists.64 And EU policy, whilst it encom-
passed different instruments in different contexts and jurisdictions, was undertaken
in the spirit of the original 1994 formulation of the Pact. The combination of
capacity-building and coercion through conditionality was used throughout. And
although as time went on the EU focused its efforts more on the transformation of
domestic conditions as the optimum strategy, the Pact’s significance in terms of
norm generation and diffusion was of the utmost significance.65 It certainly contrib-
uted to the building of trust and the dissipation of geopolitical tensions.

Eastern enlargement and terrorism

No geopolitical approach to enlargement can be considered without examining the
change in conceptions of security after the atrocities of 11 September 2001. For one
thing the attacks led some commentators to argue that enlargement would be
delayed on the grounds that the EU would place yet more stringent conditions before
the candidate states to counter the threat of importing new internal security prob-
lems into the Union. New demands concerning the tightening of border controls
especially loomed large.66 Others worried that enlargement would be superseded by
terrorism as the EU’s most important priority in the years ahead. But this did not
happen and the enlargement timetable was realized as scheduled on 1 May 2004.
Clearly the normative desire to complete the accession process prevailed over any
lingering fears regarding new terrorism-based security externalities.
In the immediate aftermath of 11 September the support offered the United
States by the EU and the candidate states was substantial and not unimportant to
the US-led campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.67 On the one hand,
enlargement offered the opportunity of institutionalizing in a much deeper way
existing modes of transnational cooperation on such issues as border controls,
organized crime, and asylum and migration flows. The EU took many steps
towards tracking down and freezing terrorist funds. All the member states and
candidate states undertook to ratify the UN Convention on the suppression of the
financing of terrorism.68 In a more defined way the enlargement process offered the
opportunity for tackling the pervasive problem of trans-European terrorist and
criminal mafia money-laundering.69 Thus one important effect of September 11
was to recognize that if markets had become globalized then so had terrorism and
the threat it represented. Therefore the concepts of internal and external security,
which had hitherto been quite separate, now became bound up with each other to
a much more significant degree. If September 11 was the main catalyst for that
then eastern enlargement provided both the opportunity and the instruments to
reconceptualize European security in a more holistic manner.
The advantages of cooperation might, however, be cancelled out by the greater
vulnerability to terrorism of an enlarged transterritorial space and the greater
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 129
access to Europe offered potential terrorist cells. Europe, because of its porous
borders, it could be argued, is much more difficult to defend than North America.70
In particular the Balkans and Southeast Europe represent in this sphere, as in
others, the ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe. Already the most common routes into
Europe for illicit drugs, illegal immigrants and trafficked people were through the
Balkans. So would not terrorist groups use exactly those same well-established
routes in planning their operations?71 Enlargement to Southeastern Europe poten-
tially exacerbated the existing difficulties by many degrees. Yet it has to be
acknowledged that Al Qaeda’s assaults on North America and Europe have to date
been accomplished mainly with the aid of operatives (sleepers) based in Britain,
Germany and Spain and not the Balkans, much less Central and Eastern Europe.72
In another sense the support that many of the new member states offered the
United States regarding the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq meant that the
new Europe became more vulnerable to attacks by militant Islamic groups in partic-
ular. The professed Euro-Atlanticism and NATO membership of these states also
made them more conspicuous. Indeed Romania and Bulgaria both sought to site
American military bases on their territory as the US contemplated full-scale with-
drawal from Germany. The March 2004 bomb attacks on the Madrid commuter
rail lines simultaneously highlighted the danger and contributed to a strengthening
of EU defences.73 Thus late in the day the enlargement debate became fused with
that on the terror threat to Europe. And whilst terrorism did not feature largely in the
calculus of policy-makers on eastern enlargement, it loomed larger in their thoughts
as further enlargement became a realistic prospect.

The distribution of power in the enlargement process

The realist conception of the enlargement process as grounded in fundamental
questions of material power and interests has also been demonstrated in the power
gap between the EU and the candidate countries. Specifically the clear power
asymmetry in the EU–CEE relationship was such that enlargement appeared as a
‘take it or leave it’ proposition from the larger, more powerful entity to the (mostly)
small and vulnerable states which sought membership. Haggard et al. are correct to
point out that the transitioning countries were ‘impelled to seek close association
with the West’ in the search for aid and resources to help overcome the daunting
problems they faced. Economic difficulties left them as ‘regime-takers’ in their
negotiations with the EU.74 This study suggested there would be no fundamental
modification of policies by the EU to accommodate the CEE states. Rather the
expectation was that the regime-takers would adapt to existing norms. This is
consistent with the view expressed elsewhere by Moravcsik that ‘Western Europe is
likely to be stable no matter what happens in the East’ and that ‘the West is likely to
gain little by opening up to these countries’.75 The asymmetric relationship was
very evident in two other respects also. First, the applicant states had no choice but
to accept in full the entire corpus of EU legislation – the 80,000 pages of the acquis
communautaire. This was considered non-negotiable. Second, the introduction of
conditionality as a key instrument of EU negotiating strategy again is suggestive of
130 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
the EU states as ‘regime-makers’ and the applicants as classic ‘regime-takers’, even
if, as within the EU itself, the precise domestic impact of different forms of condi-
tionality is difficult to specify. To the candidate states it must have seemed that
there was little room for manoeuvre and little inclination on the part of the EU to
compromise. Yet the evidence also demonstrates that EU negotiating positions
were often watered down in response to the canvassing of CEE representatives or
their internal EU allies. CEE preferences were accommodated to a much more
significant degree than realists suggest.

Conclusions
Eastern enlargement of the EU arose out of the dramatic changes wrought by the
1989 revolutions. Enlargement quickly became a priority for the Union, if indeed
others such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were more quickly realized.
From the outset geopolitical issues featured strongly in the calculus of EU leaders.
Enlargement increased both the size of the EU population and the territory it covers
by a significant degree (about one-third in each case). In terms of area that meant the
European Union now stretched from the Atlantic in the west to within miles of St
Petersburg in the east, and after 2007, to the Black Sea coast in the southeast.
Enlargement thus brought with it new dangers and new geopolitical opportunities
for the Union. Some saw it as a vehicle for turning the EU into a global geopolitical
power that would match the EU’s power in the economic realm. Enlargement would
thus transform the Union as a presence not just in Europe and Eurasia but also in the
world. The chapter analysed EU motivations for eastern enlargement utilizing realist
concepts of power and interests. While undoubtedly geopolitical motivations can be
found in many aspects of EU activity, there are also unsatisfactory outcomes to many
of the questions posed. While eastern enlargement may have been a vehicle for
containing both Russian power and the consequences of Russian state weakness, EU
policy toward Russia was both assertive and conciliatory. Enlargement is better
understood as a specific geopolitical response to instability in Central and Eastern
Europe and a determination to avoid the fragmentation and horrors of Yugoslavia.
It was an indication of the success of the eastern enlargement that Serbia and
Montenegro, for long outside the loop of European integration, began to gravitate
toward the very geopolitical model which they had for long disdained. Eastern
enlargement helped stabilize and then normalize interstate relations in Eastern
Europe and ensure a peaceful transition from Communism to European integration.
Security considerations were especially important in both moving the enlargement
process forward at critical junctures and also changing the contours of enlargement
in specific ways. The Kosovo war of 1999 especially stood out in this regard. Kosovo
was a warning shot to the EU about the dangers of excluding the Balkans from the
integration process. This not only accelerated the eastern enlargement process, it
also produced a much more sure-footed and concrete EU model for the integration
of the Balkans. The same political-institutional mix employed for eastern enlarge-
ment began to be deployed in Southeast Europe also, albeit allowing for very
different economic and political circumstances in some states. Thus geopolitical
 Geopolitical explanations of eastern enlargement 131
factors certainly counted in the timing and nature of enlargement policy-making,
even if they were frequently superseded by economic and normative considerations
on the part of the EU. Realist concepts thus help to explain an important dimension
of the process but in their exclusive and narrow focus on security and power explana-
tions also limit our understanding of what was an extraordinarily multifaceted
process. Eastern enlargement was built upon and unfolded from a much wider set of
motivations on the EU’s part.
9 Economic explanations of
eastern enlargement

Introduction
There seems little doubt that the gradual deepening of the European integration
process, leading to a cumulatively more unified political and institutional environ-
ment, has been underpinned to a very significant degree by the willingness of the
member states to pool sovereignty in the economic sphere. Just as specific steps
such as the Single European Act and the 1992 programme advanced the process of
economic integration, so each successive enlargement of the EU has had its own
important economic logic and in different ways also changed the contours of EU
economic activity and contributed to the process of institutionalizing supranational
decision-making. This was no less true of the eastern enlargement than the three
previous expansions of the EU. This chapter examines the economic dimension to
eastern enlargement, and more specifically, the different economic motivations
that influenced the EU’s approach to enlargement. It investigates the nature of
economic power and how it manifested itself in EU decisions. It analyses the
importance of key economic issues in the enlargement process, ranging from agri-
culture and the EU financial framework to the challenges posed by cross-border
environmental externalities and EU perspectives on future immigration from
Central and Eastern Europe. All of these issues featured strongly in EU enlarge-
ment debates, even if they were interpreted differently depending on the jurisdic-
tion and the context. The chapter relies heavily on the theoretical framework
developed by Andrew Moravcsik in his contributions to European integration
theory.1 It begins by outlining the importance of economic power within the
eastern enlargement process.

Economics and power

Consideration of the geopolitical dimension to eastern enlargement reminds us of
the ongoing importance of power and security in international politics, but no less
important is the domain of economic power. For some indeed the international
political economy follows the same logic of power competition and rivalrous coex-
istence as does the international political system. This approach asserts that mate-
rial resources such as oil, natural gas, nuclear power, and financial strength
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 133
represent an indispensable component of the national resource base and that the
state pursues foreign economic policies in order to maintain and strengthen its
autonomy, security and position in the international power structure.2 Economic
organization then serves much the same purpose as military alignment. The
greater the economic power and influence of the state the safer and more promi-
nent it is in a competitive world system. Or, as Christopher Hill puts it when
analysing the EU, ‘even without the development of a single military policy
economic power cannot avoid being political in its use and implications’.3 What-
ever the arguments about the EU as an emerging global political power, it is
inarguable that the Union constitutes the world’s foremost economic bloc.
Viewed in this way, the EU’s motivations for eastern enlargement centre on
the protection and enhancement of the Union’s position in the world market and
augmenting and enhancing its economic power relative to peer competitors.
Extending the economic community eastward would, first, guard against cheap
competition from Central and Eastern Europe, in what are perceived to be vital
economic sectors in the EU.4 These include agriculture, steel, and textiles – the
so-called ‘sensitive sectors’ – the sectors most protected within the EU and, also,
during the early negotiation process with the candidate countries, the most
contentious. The enlargement process would ensure that CEE producers would
gradually become subsumed into EU regulatory structures, thus ensuring that
CEE advantages in respect of the costs of inputs would dissolve over time. As
chapter 2 demonstrated, much of the evidence from the early 1990s and, in
particular, during the negotiation of the Europe Agreements with the CEE states,
suggests that this was indeed the EU position. Markets had to be protected even if
it meant retarding EU–CEE relations and weakening the overall commitment to
eastern enlargement.
Another important economic power explanation for eastern enlargement may be
found in the EU’s positive expectations of increased market share in emerging CEE
markets. The opportunity for EU firms and industries to take advantage of the great
possibilities presented as Central and Eastern Europe began to realize its growth
potential and generate new business for EU companies seems obvious. In this respect
it should hardly surprise that large and medium-sized European and global corpora-
tions were among the most enthusiastic supporters of Eastern enlargement.5 Simi-
larly, Helene Sjursen points out that access to primary resources and low cost labour
in the CEE states further strengthens the competitiveness of the EU, even if there is
uneven distribution of benefits in the short to medium term.6 By transferring some
labour-intensive production to CEE, EU companies made sure they stayed competi-
tive on a global scale and continued to expand in home markets. Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in CEE therefore helped to some extent to preserve jobs in
Germany, France and the UK.7 Potentially, the trade creation effects of eastern
enlargement outweigh those of trade diversion within the EU and act to boost EU
economic power in the world economy, vis-à-vis both existing rivals and emerging
trade competitors such as China and India. In addition, enlargement boosts the EU’s
negotiating muscle within institutions of international trade such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Already the EU can claim to be the most significant economic
134 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
bloc in the world; in the medium to long term, eastern enlargement would solidify
and enhance that position.8
If we analyse the extent of economic integration between the EU15 and the new
member states it is striking to note the extent of economic liberalization which had
taken place in CEE even prior to accession in 2004. EU–CEE trade grew exponen-
tially throughout the 1990s. Czech exports, for example, grew by 230 per cent after
1993 and Hungarian exports by more than 400 per cent. By 2000 the accession
countries were trading with the EU just as much as the EU members were trading
with each other.9 Further, in the decade preceding accession growth in the CEE
states, at an average of almost 4 per cent per year, was double that of the EU15
area. While the EU increasingly threw open its markets to CEE goods, it also
exploited growing export opportunities in the candidate states. In fact by the time
of accession the EU sold much more to the newcomers than it bought in return.
The result has been consistently large EU trade surpluses with CEE. According to
the Osteuropainstitut, a German research institute, this trade surplus created as
many as 114,000 jobs in the EU during the 1990s.10
EU companies not only sold their goods in the new markets but they also bought
existing businesses there and launched new ones. Since 1990 the new members
have received about €130 billion in FDI. Most of this came from the large
eurozone countries.11 The Osteuropainstitut calculated that German FDI alone
created almost 450,000 jobs in CEE. But crucially this did not come at the expense
of existing German jobs. FDI was largely directed at the new emerging businesses
in CEE and not displaced across EU borders. Where Coca Cola set up new
bottling plants to service the Hungarian market it retained such plants in Germany
and Austria. Financial institutions bought banks and insurance companies exclu-
sively to service emerging domestic markets in CEE rather than as cost-cutting or
downsizing measures. So most FDI came in addition to, not instead of, investments
in the existing EU. By investing abroad, EU companies mostly sought to access
new and fast-growing markets rather than to cut costs at home.12
Eastern enlargement also offered the possibility to revisit (and reform) existing EU
policies. If enacted, the reforms would render the EU more efficient and competitive in
the global economic market. This was especially the case with the CAP, where
enlargement-inspired reforms, although threatening to reduce the power of important
producer interests within the EU, equally promised to enhance the efficiency of the
notoriously wasteful agricultural regime. Enlargement would thus provide another
significant transformative dynamic which potentially boosted the EU’s global
economic power and influence. And although WTO-related pressure was at least as
important in triggering ideas about CAP reform, it was only the prospect of eastern
enlargement which prompted the substantive moves to streamline the CAP in 2002.
At official level the EU consistently presented arguments justifying eastern enlarge-
ment as boosting EU power vis-à-vis competitors in an increasingly competitive global
market. EU documents on enlargement or specific sectoral aspects of the process
consistently stressed the beneficial effects of expansion over time. Frequently it was
described as a ‘win–win’ process, as economically positive for both incumbents and
incoming states, and as a potential boon to the EU’s macroeconomic performance.
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 135
These assertions seemed hollow to many who pointed to the yawning gap in economic
performance between insiders and outsiders, which, it was frequently asserted, could
not be easily overcome, even through accession of the outsiders. Enlargement after all
added about one-third to EU territory, slightly less in population terms, but crucially,
less than 10 per cent to EU GDP. Even the most optimistic assessments suggested that
the average CEE ‘catch-up’ with Greece, Portugal and Spain would take at least 20
years to achieve. The internal EU debate on the economic merits of eastern enlarge-
ment, however, was much more diverse and wide-ranging than such simplified
measurements suggest. It needs to be understood in more nuanced terms encom-
passing consideration of winners and losers in important economic sectors within the
EU, regional variations in levels of interdependence with the countries of CEE, the
degree of embeddedness of specific EU policies such as CAP and regional policy and
different national attachments to each, and also, the distribution of bargaining power
among EU member states and transnational interest groups. All these issues are best
understood viewed through a key body of integration theory – Andrew Moravcsik’s
liberal intergovernmental model.

The liberal intergovernmental model of

European integration
In the neoliberal perspective the international system is characterized by complex
patterns of economic interdependence. States are concerned about the implica-
tions of such interdependence and international institutions are therefore instituted
as functional regimes, for the purpose of transnational management of common
problems.13 Andrew Moravcsik’s application of neoliberal theory to the European
integration process – liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) – represents a sophisticated
model of EU preference formation and bargaining, predicated on the assumption
of the crucial importance to state behaviour of domestic interests (principally
domestic producer interests). Bargaining power is determined by the relative inten-
sity of member state preferences and not by military or other material power
considerations. Economic issues and interstate economic competition dominate all
others in the international political arena.
Moravcsik’s theory is a tripartite one. It assumes rational behaviour on the part
of the state; it asserts a liberal theory of national preference formation; and it
utilizes an intergovernmental analysis of interstate negotiation where the distribu-
tion of power among the member states is a key determinant of outcomes.14
Combining the three constituent elements, Moravcsik explains how the costs and
benefits of economic interdependence primarily determine national preferences
on EU issues. Governments act as domestic gatekeepers and aggregate those
domestically generated preferences and then deliberate on and negotiate those
preferences at EU level. The most important negotiations are those which fall
under the flagship of what Lee Miles terms ‘super-systemic’ Intergovernmental
Conferences (IGCs), which pave the way for the so-called ‘grand bargains’ of the
integration project.15 And where neofunctionalist approaches to integration
argued for a so-called ‘spillover motor’ which drove the integration process
136 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
forward, Moravcsik asserts the centrality of interstate bargains and the conver-
gence of domestic preferences at international level as crucial to the unfolding of
the integration process.
In The Choice for Europe Moravcsik posits the notion that ‘economic (and) in
particular, commercial interests have been the “drivers” of European integration’
and that ‘the foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in
response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups’.16 The social groups that
receive most attention are business organizations such as the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI), the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), the
trade union organizations, and agricultural producer lobbies. All are concentrated
in the economic sphere in national settings. Moravcsik then presents European
integration historically as:

a series of rational adaptations by national leaders to constraints and opportu-

nities stemming from the evolution of an interdependent world economy, the
relative power of states in the international system, and the potential for inter-
national institutions to bolster the credibility of interstate commitments.17

The question then is whether we might view EU enlargement policy in such a light.
If one were to trace the evolution of the process would we observe a ‘series of
rational policy adaptations’ arising out of rising interdependence between the EU
and CEE, and mediated at EU level by bargains which resulted from disparities in
relative power? Was the politics of eastern enlargement a battle between competing
producer groups? If enlargement was dominated by such interstate clashes what then
of the role played by the European Commission in the process?
It is worth noting that analysis of previous enlargement rounds hardly features in
The Choice for Europe, save for extended commentary on British efforts to join the
Community and French policy of obstructing Britain. In a 2003 paper on eastern
enlargement, however, Moravcsik and Milada Ana Vachudova present three
reasons to support an LI perspective on enlargement. In the first place they argue
that the overall effect of eastern enlargement is rather benign from the EU’s
perspective. Second, distinct material benefits, even if modest, and only likely to
kick in over the medium to long term, do indeed accrue to the EU15. The addition
of 100 million new consumers to the EU market, and, in addition, the macro
stability garnered through the management of EU–CEE interdependence, guar-
antee at least a benign and potentially a positive outcome for the EU. Third, the
EU managed during the negotiations with the CEE applicant states to limit the
costs to itself even if some member states and groups would bear a disproportionate
share of the costs of enlargement.18 In addition, they argue that the role of ideas and
norms was only important in a subordinate context. Only when the normative ran
parallel to and supported EU material self-interest did normative arguments influ-
ence key decisions. Thus in contrast to some interpretations of enlargement, the LI
view is that eastern enlargement was only of marginal importance to the EU. A
deeper application of liberal intergovernmentalism seems apposite, however, and
in particular, an investigation of the dynamics of national preference formation
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 137
and both EU internal bargaining and the inside–outside bargaining that followed
during the actual negotiations.

Domestic enlargement preference generation and

aggregation
The LI model suggests that governments in each member state of the European
Union aggregate domestic preferences and establish positions on individual issues
of interstate economic governance as a result of a competitive intra-state bargaining
process. Important economic interest groups compete to shape national preferences
on everything from fishing quotas to telecoms regulation. Moravcsik’s theory offers
the benefit of a parsimonious model of domestic preference formation. We should
expect that national preference formation on enlargement follows the pattern and
that national preferences will primarily derive from each state’s dominant economic
interest groups and from relative expectations of ‘exogenous increase in opportu-
nity for cross-border trade and capital movements’.19
Although a full analysis of all 15 member state enlargement debates and modes
of preference generation lies beyond the scope of this book, there is potential in a
more limited application of LI that examines preference formation and aggrega-
tion in key member states. Among the key issues to be considered are the differen-
tial impact of enlargement arising from perceptions of positive and negative
interdependence with Central and Eastern Europe; geographical proximity and its
relation to levels of economic interdependence; and variations in socioeconomic
structure among the EU15, in the context of the uneven distribution of costs associ-
ated with enlargement. The distributional consequences of eastern enlargement
fall on member states rather differently and crucially influence national prefer-
ences.20 Enlargement threatened to create particularly high costs, resulting from
trade and budgetary competition, for the poorer, less developed and more
dependent member states such as Greece, Portugal and Spain.21 This is because
these states largely specialize in the same traditional and resource-intensive indus-
tries as many of the CEE states and were thus more likely to be adversely affected
by trade diversion effects than more developed member states. A second key distri-
butional issue was the expected recalibration of structural and cohesion funding,
where the prospect of competing for subvention in a much enlarged Union meant
that those same states stood to suffer disproportionately from any redirection of
funds to the accession states, especially in a context where the net contributing
states were now consistently stating their opposition to the idea of any increase in
the size of the EU budget. But eastern enlargement, equally, presented challenges
and opportunities to the larger and wealthier EU states, challenges which crucially
influenced attitudes to enlargement in those member states.

British and German enlargement preferences

Analysis of the macroeconomic implications of eastern enlargement demonstrates
that it is the net contributors to the EU budget that stand to gain the most. It seems
138 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
hardly surprising then that Germany, the UK and the Nordic states all consistently
supported enlargement, if indeed they simultaneously held some doubts about
certain implications of the process.22 From a German perspective, analysis suggests
that the argument of economic gains is especially apparent. This is also the case
with Finland, which has close economic ties with the Baltic States, and also for
Austria whose geographic proximity to CEE makes it an important economic
player in the region.23 Germany is the main trading partner for all of the CEE states
and the largest contributor of humanitarian aid as well as the largest foreign
investor in the region.24 One survey conducted in 2004 found that 40 per cent of all
German manufacturing firms had already diversified into CEE, and 90 per cent
were planning to institute production over the next five years.25 German FDI alone
was responsible for the creation of 450,000 jobs in CEE by 2004. Crucially, this
was not a case of job displacement as most investment was aimed at the construc-
tion and development of domestic markets in the accession states rather than shifts
in production from Germany. A study by Baldwin, Francois and Portes demon-
strated that, among EU member states, Germany had much more to gain in terms
of increased trade than any other EU state.26 This was confirmed subsequently in
numerous studies, including those conducted by the European Commission. Thus
interdependence with CEE was and is much more of a fact for Germany (and
Austria) than for any other EU15 state. For German governments that meant that
eastern enlargement did not present any fundamental conflict, at least in terms of
the trade effects anticipated.
Given the underlying factors encouraging the expected increase in trade it is
hardly surprising that a powerful network of German multinational corporations
headed by Volkswagen and Siemens, and financial institutions such as Deutsche
Bank, which had invested substantially in the candidate countries in advance of
accession, made for a significant corporate influence on German policy. Indeed
Bohle points out that in the run-up to accession the Audi plant in Györ, Hungary,
contributed around 12 per cent of the group’s entire turnover, and with a generous
Hungarian government tax break, 74 per cent of Audi profits.27 Management of
important negative externalities such as environmental problems and migration
flows associated with increased interdependence also helps explain German advo-
cacy of enlargement. As Zaborowski points out: ‘EU and NATO enlargements to
the east represent a stabilization of (Germany’s) external environment, therefore
an improvement on its own security.’28
Notwithstanding these factors, however, German governments consistently
adopted a schizophrenic attitude to enlargement. This anomaly is understand-
able perhaps in the context of a balancing act between the ‘high politics’ and ‘low
politics’ of enlargement, with Germany particularly fearful of having to bear a
disproportionate part of the cost of the extension of EU distributive policies.
German governments also worried about negative public opinion toward eastern
enlargement. As accession approached the German public increasingly linked high
and persistent domestic unemployment and the generally depressed economic
climate in their country with such issues as low labour costs and unfair tax competi-
tion in CEE. All of this made for a difficult balancing act in German attitudes to
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 139
enlargement. Neoliberal approaches, while very useful in highlighting the issues
mentioned here, also have difficulties in explaining German enlargement policy,
and in particular the consistent normative framing of eastern enlargement by
German policy-makers.29 For Germany enlargement was not simply, or even
primarily, about the extension of markets but a matter of historical justice and
moral retribution.30 So while acknowledging the influence of important German
producer interests it is important to emphasize how this complemented rather
than singularly framed German policy.
In the UK case the economic gains from eastern enlargement are expected to be
lower. It does not have the substantial local trade interests in Central and Eastern
Europe that Germany does. Having said that, there is no suggestion that the UK
would be a significant loser from enlargement, at least not in economic terms. If the
argument were to turn to institutional issues and the question of whether widening,
as a matter of course, produces further deepening, then one might expect a
different attitude from the UK. It may also be that the UK’s neoliberal economic
outlook is important here. The extension of the internal market and the market
creed may have proved decisive for the UK in encouraging deregulation, privatiza-
tion, and the vigorous pursuit of microeconomic reform in the candidate countries.
Certainly the CBI and the Institute of Directors consistently promoted early and
wide enlargement. The change in government from Conservative to Labour in
1997 produced no appreciable change in direction. In some ways, in fact, the
Labour government was even more attached to the neoliberal model of economic
development. While some commentators continually sought to paint British support
for enlargement in negative terms as support for a diluted form of European inte-
gration (that further widening would effectively cripple the Federalist project), the
evidence suggests more that UK governments evaluated national preferences in
terms of economic benefits to the UK and the normative benefit of ensuring peace
and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Tony Blair in
particular was conspicuous in publicly supporting the candidate states and calling
for the acceleration of the enlargement process at important junctures.31
In one important respect the prospect of eastern enlargement did bring about a
convergence of German and British preferences. Both countries sought to change
the shape and financial burden of the CAP and saw eastern enlargement as a golden
opportunity to pursue their national preferences by arguing that the CAP in its
present design simply could not be transferred to the new member states without
bankrupting the EU. In fact British and German attachment to CAP reform was so
strong that in the final negotiations with the candidate states both countries set out
their stall against paying direct income subsidies to the new member states because
this would slow down the reform of the CAP.32 This presented an extraordinary
paradox in that, at a vital period in the negotiations, both countries appeared to be
the main obstruction to achieving a deal, when both had in fact been unwavering
supporters of enlargement throughout the process. Both the UK and Germany also
consistently pushed the goal of reining in spending on the EU budget. In both juris-
dictions the dominant interest groups that influenced governmental enlargement
positions were industrial conglomerates which saw enlargement as a significant
140 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
opportunity for market expansion and investment. Their positions were based on
arguments that stressed the size of the new markets, the availability of relatively
cheap pools of skilled labour, and economies of scale to be realized from transna-
tional production processes. But against those arguments, in both Britain and
Germany, different normative logics also influenced policy-makers to quite a degree.
The enlargement discourse of state representatives stressed the importance of securing
peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe as much as market share and
financial gain.

French enlargement preferences

If expectations of economic gain and the influence of important domestic producer
groups significantly influenced British and German enlargement preferences, then
one can plausibly argue that the reluctance of successive French governments to
embrace eastern enlargement resulted from the ability of French agricultural inter-
ests in particular to shape national preferences. Smaller states such as Ireland were
quite content to have the French fight the major battles on agriculture in the
knowledge that no major change in the status quo could be effected without French
consent. The prospect of a radical overhaul in the CAP drove the French govern-
ment to protect French interests at the expense of the normative desire to expand
the EU’s democratic club. Later on, opposition to the European Commission’s
proposed services directive, which would have liberalized the provision of services
across the enlarged EU, was again based on a French fear of domestic service
providers being undercut by arriviste Easterners, who would accept far lower rates
than local architects or plumbers, for example, for the same work. The attachment
of the CEE states to the Anglo-Saxon rather than European social model meant that
the fabric of French socioeconomic structures would inevitably fray as CEE influ-
ence began to assert itself within the Council of Ministers. In early 2005 President
Chirac (in an offhand comment) suggested that ‘ultra-liberalism is the communism
of our times’. For many in Central and Eastern Europe this jibe seemed targeted at
them rather than the allegedly neoliberal-obsessed Barroso Commission. They
made a direct connection with Chirac’s earlier insult about them behaving ‘in an
infantile manner’ in their earlier support for the American-led invasion of Iraq. If
nothing else the episode represented the culmination of a pattern of French behav-
iour demonstrating ‘how out of sympathy is France with the newly enlarged EU’.33
The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty on 29 May 2005 was in some measure a
rejection of eastern enlargement, or at least a demonstration of serious concern at
its impact on France.
French obstructionism manifested itself in different ways but French fears about
the impact of enlargement on the nature of the integration project were regularly
aired, not least after the Helsinki decision to open up the process to Bulgaria,
Romania and Turkey in 1999.34 Earlier, in September 1998, the French govern-
ment had sought to delay the beginning of negotiations by requesting that the
Commission draw up a full political assessment of the accession process, including
an analysis of the Cyprus situation. According to the then French Minister for
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 141
European Affairs, Pierre Moscovici, the accession process should be ‘under polit-
ical control’, not on ‘automatic pilot’.35 This was a less than subtle reference to the
role and influence of the Commission within the accession process. The French
requests were viewed as an attempt to postpone the beginning of substantive nego-
tiations and to delay enlargement. The French government, however, angrily
denied any suggestions that it wanted to delay enlargement. Instead, it claimed that
it was merely trying to get its fellow member states to focus on the real problems
created by enlargement.
There is little doubt that the French Presidency of 2000 did much less than other
EU Presidencies to advance the enlargement timetable and agenda. In the dispute
between Germany and Spain over the future financing of the structural funds, for
example, France hardened its position on agriculture rather than seek a compro-
mise solution.36 Notwithstanding the difficulties presented by the unique character-
istics of the French foreign policy machinery (Cohabitation), and the normal large
state EU presidency juggling of national and collective interests, outside observers
could not but conclude that defending French interests overrode the collective
desire to progress the enlargement process.37 Such a perspective also had a distinc-
tive geopolitical dimension in the shape of French fears that eastern enlargement
would produce a more German Europe by moving the centre of gravity of the new
EU eastward with Berlin at its core. In short, enlargement changed the funda-
mental dynamic that had powered the integration process, namely the Franco-
German relationship. Liberal intergovernmental theory therefore, although it does
capture the essential basis for French preferences on eastern enlargement, also falls
short in its relative neglect of geopolitics. Rather, a complex interplay of economic
and geopolitical issues crucially influenced French policy on eastern enlargement.

Spanish and Irish enlargement preferences

With regard to the states that were consistently identified as the most reluctant to
embrace eastern enlargement, liberal intergovernmentalism might most usefully
be applied to Spain. Spain for long held major concerns about the impact of
enlargement on the existing arrangements for regional spending and agriculture
and at various important junctures argued against producing a timetable for acces-
sions, and against the provision of financial appropriations that would disadvan-
tage Spain or reduce the levels of subvention it enjoyed from the EU budget.38
Before taking over the presidency in 2001 the Swedish foreign minister attacked
Spain as especially ‘irresponsible’ in blocking negotiations by demanding guaran-
tees for its national interests.39 And Spain ‘did not refrain from manipulative and
forcing strategies’ even during the course of its own EU Presidency in 2002.40
In the first place Spain stood to gain much less from the expansion of trade which
accompanied enlargement. As late as 2000, Spanish exports to CEE amounted to
only 2 per cent of the EU total exports. And this amounted to less than 8 per cent of
Spanish exports outside the EU. This pattern was as evident in CEE exports to the
EU, which showed that Spain only accounted for about 2.5 per cent of the total,
making it one of the least important trading partners for the accession states within
142 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
the EU bloc. The relative paucity of economic contact was also evident in the figures
for FDI, which showed that Spanish investment in CEE was very low, and had
barely increased as CEE had opened up to new investment.41 Spanish preferences
also turned on the consequences of enlargement for EU structural funding. By
1999 Spain had become the highest net recipient of structural funds, and the
fourth largest recipient of CAP monies leaving it with a net EU financial
balance of €6 billion.42 The 2000–6 financial framework guaranteed Spain €55
billion from the EU budget. This represented more than double the amount distrib-
uted to all of the CEE states combined. Thus the redistributive consequences of any
reorganization of the existing structural fund regime particularly threatened Spanish
subvention.
A determination to protect Spanish prerogatives was in evidence as early as
1989 when Spain vetoed the EC budget in order to force agreement on doubling
the structural funds as a compensatory side payment for accepting the Single Euro-
pean Act. A similar strategy was employed in the Maastricht negotiations, which
eventually yielded the Cohesion fund agreed at Edinburgh in December 1992.43
This massively boosted Spanish receipts from the EU budget. In November 1991
the Spanish government had threatened to veto the conclusion of Europe Agree-
ments with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia because the agreements included
provision for aid to CEE iron and steel production which could negatively affect
the Spanish sector, which was undergoing a troublesome restructuring process at
home.44 Former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez put it forcefully in an interview
with the Financial Times in 1992: ‘we should not pull the wool over our own eyes. I
don’t think Lech Walesa realizes that Western Europe is not going to foot the bill
for forty years of Communism. Just like it didn’t pay for forty years of Franquismo.
No one feels obliged to pay this bill.’45 Again, during the Amsterdam negotiations,
Spain sought to prevent any decision that would harm Spanish subsidies. It fiercely
opposed the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to Structural and
Cohesion funding, for example, and in 1999 it again blocked the reform of the
cohesion funds and claimed further financial compensation for its less developed
regions to counteract the negative impact of prospective eastern enlargement on its
financial position.46
The Spanish argument, formally expressed in a 2001 memorandum to Romano
Prodi, President of the European Commission, stated that the admission of 12 or
13 countries would lower average per capita incomes across the EU, and ‘enlarge-
ment will therefore produce an artificial acceleration of economic convergence of
those states and regions which do not match average incomes in the European
Union of today’.47 Spanish policy was to ‘minimize’ or ‘neutralize’ this effect and
Spanish negotiators did not refrain from forcing and manipulative bargaining
strategies.48 The Barcelona Process was one important concession wrung from the
EU for accepting eastern enlargement. Thus Spanish enlargement preferences
seem to fall much more favourably into Moravcsik’s framework than do those of
Britain or France.
The Spanish case, however, also demonstrates how political élites also conceived
of enlargement in normative terms and struggled to balance their commitment to the
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 143
process with the need to defend important national economic interests. Piedrifita
Tremosa shows that Spanish policy-makers were extremely concerned throughout
the eastern enlargement process with their reputation within the EU. They consid-
ered enlargement as much an issue of justice and legitimacy as economic utility. In
particular Spanish élites felt they could not legitimately oppose eastern enlarge-
ment ‘given the similarity of its own accession to the moral foundation – peace,
stability, and support for democracy – of this round of enlargement’.49 Whereas
EFTA enlargement was deemed different in that the candidates were rich coun-
tries which did not need accession as a means of consolidating democracy, to block
or threaten to veto the eastern enlargement was morally unacceptable to successive
Spanish governments.50
Similarly, Portugal and Greece were faced not just with a potential reduction in
subvention but also the prospect of serious competition from CEE producers in
certain industries and redirection of FDI. Along with France and Italy they were also
inclined toward the protection of existing privileges over the collective pursuit of
enlargement objectives.51 Ireland was also identified as one of the states most reluctant
to accommodate the preferences of the candidate states. Indeed Schimmelfennig
and others categorize Ireland as one of the ‘brakemen’ along with Spain, Portugal
and Greece.52 Ireland had benefited quite disproportionately from the EU budget
over the years and largely succeeded in protecting its subvention even as it shot up
the EU wealth table from about 1995 on. For some the rejection in 2001 by Irish
voters of the Treaty of Nice was viewed as deriving from unwillingness on the part
of the Irish electorate to offer substantial economic support to the applicant coun-
tries and general fears regarding the economic implications of enlargement. Will
Hutton, for example, made an explicit link between the No vote and enlargement:
‘Italy’s Berlusconi is openly sceptical about the costs of enlargement; the Irish voted
against it in their referendum for the same reason.’53 George Soros, in an address in
Budapest, suggested that one of the reasons Ireland rejected the Nice Treaty was
‘over fears aid to EU states would dwindle after eastern candidates joined’.54
Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan argued that ‘asked to endorse a Treaty that
would turn them into net contributors, Irish voters were unimpressed’.55 Another
editorial asserted that ‘there is no reciprocal sense that Irish GDP having ballooned,
a similar effort should now be made on behalf of Eastern Europe. Geo-politics and
geo-gratitude do not go together, it seems’.56
Irish preferences on eastern enlargement, however, did not only flow from
determinations of economic interest. While Irish governments sought to protect
EU subvention flows they also offered consistent support for enlargement. And
while one might argue that the radical change in its economic position after 1995
may have led to a more benign outlook on enlargement, it is clear that normative
considerations also crucially influenced Irish governments. Indeed the Irish govern-
ment effectively turned the second referendum on Nice in October 2002 into a
referendum on enlargement. The question mutated from ‘Are you in favour of the
ratification of the Treaty of Nice?’ to ‘Are you in favour of eastern enlargement?’.
To argue against enlargement would be to deny to the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe all the benefits of membership that had flowed to Ireland since it
144 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
acceded in 1973. It would be hypocritical and morally unacceptable to deny the
CEE states the same opportunities to prosper. This suggests that ideational or
normative issues were at least as important as material issues in the construction of
Irish enlargement preferences.
More convincing support for Moravcsik’s view is provided by analysis of the
role of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), which was forceful in
arguing for a full and substantive EU commitment to enlargement from the
beginning and actively lobbied for acceleration in the pace of negotiations in the
late 1990s. For the ERT (and other such nationally located groups also), enlarge-
ment meant access to new production facilities, comparatively cheap labour and
well educated workforces and opportunities to reorganize production chains on a
more effective and rational trans-European basis, thus increasing global competi-
tiveness.57 Enlargement meant that foreign investors could gradually and more
fully exert control over strategic sectors of CEE economies and provide a reliable
and consistent regulatory framework which made investment attractive.58 The EU
also employed different forms of conditionality in its relations with CEE to ensure
the direct transposition of its deregulatory economic framework while withholding
commitment to the great subventions granted its own poorer member states. In
contrast to the Mediterranean round, where the acceding member states were
expected to open their markets on entry to the EU or thereafter with exemptions
granted, EU treatment of CEE was very different and consistent with views which
sought to support EU industry at the expense of a level playing field. In sum, there-
fore, liberal intergovernmental analysis is well equipped to account for the prefer-
ences of transnational capital in the eastern enlargement process.

The interstate level: internal EU bargaining and

EU–CEE bargaining
In its third part Moravcsik’s framework focuses on the strategic state interaction
and bargaining which takes place in Brussels. The Choice for Europe revolves around
the key interstate ‘grand bargains’, which, Moravcsik asserts, decisively shaped the
trajectory and form of the European integration process; these were, respectively,
the Common Market, the CAP, the European Monetary System (EMS), the Single
European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty including European Monetary Union
(EMU). If Moravcsik’s central thesis regarding interstate bargaining is to hold then
there is no reason one cannot identify similar ‘grand bargains’ which characterized
the development of enlargement policy, encompassing as it did every conceivable
aspect of the wider integration process. The ‘grand bargains’ which stand out in the
eastern enlargement process include crucial summit meetings such as Copenhagen
(June 1993), Essen (December 1994), Cannes (June 1995), Luxembourg (December
1997), Helsinki (December 1998), Gothenburg (June 2001), Brussels (October
2002) and Copenhagen (December 2002). If Moravcsik is correct those European
Council summit meetings should have proved crucial to enlargement outcomes.
Intergovernmental bargaining should have proved consistently more important
than supranational entrepreneurship. Interstate negotiation should have been
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 145
relatively straightforward with governments having aggregated preferences at
domestic level and pursued them in intergovernmental settings. Enlargement
outcomes should reflect the distribution of power at EU level and result in so-called
‘side payments’ to those member states who held a veto on enlargement but for
domestic reasons were not supportive of expansion and needed to be ‘bought off’ to
ensure their cooperation. The EU enjoyed a significant bargaining advantage over
the candidate states and outcomes should reflect that also.
Moravcsik and Vachudova argue that, consistent with past enlargement rounds,
EU leaders promoted eastern enlargement because they considered it to be in their
long-term economic and geopolitical interests. They see the same bargaining
patterns, which have for long characterized the bargaining process within the EU,
similarly evident in the enlargement negotiations. In particular, specific interstate
concessions and compromises have ‘tended to reflect the priorities of the EU’s core
countries, and disproportionately the most powerful among them’.59 In previous
enlargement rounds, bargaining demands by applicant states were effectively
‘stripped away one by one until a deal was struck that disproportionately reflected
the priorities of existing member states’.60 Further, they see in the asymmetry in
power relations between the insider (EU) and outsiders (CEE applicant states),
evidence that the distribution of power impacts on the enlargement negotiations in
much the same fashion as LI suggests with respect to the integration process. The
Copenhagen criteria for membership were non-negotiable and reflected the deep
chasm of power between the EU and the outsiders who simply had to accept the
demands made upon them. Financial aid to the candidate states compared very
poorly with that awarded the EU’s Cohesion four.61
The EU was unrelenting in defending its interests in the negotiations with the
candidate states and the final outcome was clearly reflective of the yawning
power gap. In addition they cite the imposition, in the course of the eastern
enlargement process, of additional requirements to be met by the candidate
states. This is in keeping with the core of LI thinking about the integration
process. EU conditions were narrowly self-interested in their design and intrusive
in their implementation. Applicants were forced to forgo, at least in the short to
medium term, some of the significant benefits of membership available to
member states. Moravcsik and Vachudova cite the outcome of negotiations in
late 2002 in support of their contention. They argue that the acceding CEE
member states will receive ‘lower (albeit still substantial) subsidies from the CAP
and from the structural and cohesion funds than did the previous poorer appli-
cants’. In this instance they cite the fact that transfers to the CEE states will be
capped at 4 per cent of GDP, far lower than their predecessors, some of which
received up to 8 per cent per year of GDP through EU funds. The authors argue
that not only does this limit potential CEE receipts from the EU. It also protects
the prerogatives of both richer and poorer EU15 members.62 The richer states
succeeded in the negotiations in limiting the amount of aid to be transferred to
the new member states whilst Cohesion states such as Spain managed to protect
their subventions going forward. Thus the interstate context in which the enlarge-
ment negotiations reached a conclusion chimes perfectly with LI predictions.
146 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
While it is not difficult to assert that the sheer asymmetrical power of the EU vis-
á-vis the applicant states proved important throughout the process, and certainly in
the final negotiations, one could also argue that the outcome of the Brussels and
Copenhagen negotiations in the autumn of 2002 did not entirely coincide with LI
expectations. After all, the CAP was extended to the applicant states, albeit in a
reduced form and after delays. The budgetary deal struck also suggests that the
applicant states did not simply have to take what was being offered to them. They
bargained and in some cases (such as Poland) managed to pull off a better than
expected outcome. Against LI one might also ask why it was that, with the extraor-
dinary asymmetrical advantage enjoyed by the EU (regarding material bargaining
capacity) vis-à-vis the applicant states, the option was for full integration of CEE into
EU structures? Neoliberal theory would suggest that something short of outright
enlargement, such as a preferential free trade arrangement, a customs union or even
association status would be the EU’s preferred option. Yet the EU–CEE relationship
moved quickly from trade and cooperation agreements (early 1990s), through Asso-
ciation agreements (mid 1990s), and advanced political dialogue and impending
accession (late 1990s), to eventual accession. This evolution cannot be accounted for
satisfactorily by liberal intergovernmentalism.
Liberal intergovernmental theory proves better able to account for the internal
EU bargaining and decision-making, which accompanied and facilitated eastern
enlargement. Even if eastern enlargement prompted new thinking about impor-
tant EU policies such as CAP, the outcome of negotiations suggests, first, that the
usual EU vested interests succeeded in protecting their transfers and, second, that
the decisions on CAP reflected as much external and ongoing pressure for reform,
which Moravcsik argues, has been a longstanding one. This has been in evidence
through WTO reform proposals and from pressure from EU member states such
as the UK and Germany. Thus enlargement-influenced or related CAP outcomes
coincide exactly with what LI would predict – the protection of resources and privi-
leges by dominant producer interests within the EU, postponement of any radical
decisions on the recalibration of the CAP and an EU outcome that was reflective of
the distribution of power in bargaining and negotiations.

Migration
Because economic interpretations of eastern enlargement revolved largely around
perceptions of positive and negative interdependence with the candidate countries,
two particular types of economic externalities played an important part in the
calculations of EU actors. These were expectations about how enlargement would
impact on migration flows into EU member states and, second, the considerable
challenge posed by the candidate states’ environmental degradation. EU fears
about the possibility of large flows of migrants from east to west in the wake of
accession were not consistent across the member states but were crucial in the deter-
mination of some member state preferences such as Austria and Germany. West
European publics increasingly viewed crime, asylum and immigration, although
quite separate issues, as inseparable. Migration thus became a dominant theme in
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 147
a large number of European countries just in the period when eastern enlargement
was reaching a critical negotiating point. In many EU member states alarmist
projections relating to an influx of ‘eastern hordes’ were propagated. At the
extreme margin of this discourse the United Kingdom’s viciously xenophobic
tabloid press hysterically claimed that after 1 May 2004, millions of East European
‘scroungers’ or welfare tourists would come to Britain.63
These existential fears derived to some degree from the fact that people in
Europe seem to harbour an unfocused, general anxiety about frontiers no longer
providing the protection they once did. Some might even look back to the Cold
War days with nostalgia. Organized cross-border crime, drug and people traf-
ficking, smuggling and prostitution seemed to indicate that frontier controls are no
longer as effective as they once were.64 In some states such as Germany and France,
eastern enlargement was increasingly viewed through the prism of the immigration
threat as accession loomed. Further migration threatened domestic wage levels,
welfare expenditure and the domestic socioeconomic compact, it was frequently
stated. In addition, in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, the new salience
of international terrorism means that in many jurisdictions ‘foreigners’ were now
viewed with unrelenting suspicion. Thus the debate on eastern enlargement
became entangled with the various strands of debate on transnational migration.
In their analysis of the enlargement negotiations Moravcsik and Vachudova
argue that the inclusion in the accession treaties of special provisions including
transition measures on inward migration to the EU15 ‘reflect the demands of
special interests or the concerns of voting publics in the existing members’. Their
argument is that the outcome of the accession negotiations closely follows that
which LI would have predicted. Candidate states found it difficult to have their
preferences accommodated by the EU and in most instances found themselves
having to accept less than favourable terms. The costs of non-membership were
simply too great not to compromise on the EU’s terms. Thus applicants made
concessions even where no coercion was threatened.65 Back in 2001 in the run-up
to the Gothenburg summit, a number of EU member states, led by Sweden,
Denmark, and the Netherlands, had announced that they would unilaterally
deviate from EU policy by granting unrestricted access to their labour markets for
job seekers from the new member states after accession. The three countries
announced they would not apply the seven-year transition period which had been
proposed by Austria and Germany in the negotiations.66 By late 2002, however, all
member states except for the UK, Ireland, and Sweden had insisted on some
restrictions being placed on free movement.67 This was entirely consistent with LI
expectations in that even those member states which had earlier displayed a benign
attitude to CEE labour migration changed their stance as accession loomed. The
German and Austrian governments were the most active in insisting upon a protec-
tionist stance as they considered themselves to come under the most serious
threat.68
Where migration featured strongly in the calculation of EU actors in the direct
sense of legislative iniatives and constitutional safeguards, it also mattered in other
informal ways. The EU, for example, sought to connect the Pact on Stability to its
148 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
Justice and Home Affairs acquis. Unlike previous enlargements, eastern enlarge-
ment was the first to include a specific JHA acquis, which covered asylum, migra-
tion and border controls, organized crime, terrorism, drug and people trafficking,
as well as police, customs and judicial cooperation. The acquis also included the
Schengen Agreement on the internal EU removal of border controls.69 All of this
suggests an EU which viewed enlargement, at best, nervously, and sought the most
substantive legal protections against mass inward migration. This was despite all
the economic evidence from the Mediterranean enlargement (the only comparable
expansion on this issue), which showed that even after the lifting of restrictions on
free movement, out-migration from Greece, Portugal and Spain to the rest of the
EU simply did not materialize.
EU attitudes hardened as the enlargement process unfolded; officials from the
member states routinely presented cross-border organized crime in particular as
an important existential threat to the integrity and legitimacy of the integration
process. The interesting observation here is that the EU offered little or no flexi-
bility to the candidate states during enlargement negotiations. The Union was the
‘regime-maker’ and the candidate states the ‘regime-takers’. This, of course,
created serious difficulties for many CEE states, especially those such as Hungary,
which had large ethnic diaspora communities in neighbouring states that were not
part of the enlargement process.70 CEE states resented the Schengen-related
demands in particular, as they had no part in designing the rules of the Schengen
regime.71 Implementation of tough new border rules often came with a real
economic cost. This was certainly the case with the Polish re-bordering of its fron-
tier with Ukraine.72 Although one might view this as purely a security-related issue,
the nature of globalization meant that the EU also looked at these issues from a
pronounced economic and welfare perspective and as a problem of domestic
governance rather than external relations. The huge flows of money generated by
human trafficking, prostitution rackets, narco-transportation and other forms of
organized crime were seen as a destabilizing phenomenon. Ensuring these did not
become an even bigger problem for the EU after enlargement was thus a key
concern of policy-makers. Thus the liberal intergovernmental framework also
helps account for attitudes to migration externalities within the enlargement
process.

Environmental externalities
While control over migration flows represented one key negative externality, the
issue of transnational and cross-border environmental problems also occupied
EU policy-makers throughout the eastern enlargement process. Environmental
problems, because of their transnational nature, are by definition classic collec-
tive action problems. As Hill points out, eastern enlargement promised the
opportunity of institutional regulation of the environmental problems associated
with the old smokestack industries in Eastern Europe, and created new possibili-
ties for protecting the peoples of both candidate states and existing member states
from any future environmental disasters on their borders.73 The candidate states
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 149
inherited daunting environmental challenges, however. Before 1989 air pollu-
tion was a major problem, particularly in the northern region (Poland, the Czech
Republic and former East Germany), due to heavy industries and reliance on
brown coal for energy. Water pollution in the form of hazardous substances and
nutrients affected all CEE countries, and soil degradation was also part of the
negative inheritance from the past. As the transition process took hold economic
and social restructuring presented new environmental problems, arising from
particularly mass consumerism, the increase in all forms of transportation and
sharp rises in waste disposal. In addition, the candidate states, faced with multiple
economic challenges, did not prioritize environmental issues to the same degree
as other western states and the NGO sector that emerged in this area was gener-
ally weak.74 So, in a myriad of ways, eastern enlargement threatened to impose a
significant economic cost on the EU, and especially on those states which shared
borders with the candidate countries.
EU policy, in insisting on candidate state adoption of the entire environmental
acquis prior to accession, was forceful and intrusive. The EU is frequently described
as the most progressive environmental zone in the world. Given the problems
manifest in CEE there were many who feared that enlargement would lead to a
slowdown or even reversal of EU environmental policy. Where the 1995 EFTA
enlargement seemed to strengthen the environmental lobby within the EU, eastern
enlargement could only compromise it. Or so the argument went. Therefore EU
policy, at least those parts driven by the environmental leaders, was to insist on
transposition and implementation in advance of membership. On this same point
one could also cite the strong pro-enlargement positions adopted by the Nordic
states of the EU – Sweden, Denmark and Finland. These states had taken the lead
on such issues as reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other pollutants. Their
consistent advocacy of eastern enlargement was not unconnected to their strong
attachment to multilateralizing environmental issues. Without enlargement the
ability of the EU to institutionalize the management of common environmental
problems would be significantly impaired. The experience of previous enlargements
suggested that those states that were not as environmentally conscious were slowly
socialized into more robust norms of performance through institutionalized regula-
tion. One of the best examples was Ireland, which had progressively improved its
levels of environmental protection through its membership of the EU. One must ask,
however, whether management of perceived common problems of this nature would
have evolved anyway even without a structured accession process? The answer to this
is probably yes. The asymmetrical nature of the negotiations meant, however, that
the CEE states were vulnerable to more pressure from the EU in a negotiation and
accession context.75
Among other things Agenda 2000 outlined a strategy that required the candidate
countries to upgrade nuclear installations to best international safety standards,
and stipulated that those installations that could not be upgraded at a reasonable
cost would be shut down. The Kosovo War and the problems it presented to the
Danubian CEE states, especially Bulgaria and Romania, reinforced the fears
about environmental degradation impacting as seriously on Austria, Germany and
150 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
other countries. The Danube is the second largest river in Europe and in one way
or another binds together 80 million people. Thirteen separate countries share its
catchment area. It became a major focus of attention in the enlargement process.76
Moreover, on the front of energy and the security of its supply, the eastern enlarge-
ment was likely to worsen the ratio of consumers to producers within the EU. The
CEE states may have coal and steel, but they lack oil and gas. Many of the CEE
states remained dependent on Russia for energy supplies.77 This may not matter
too much in a period of stability and free trade, but things might look very different
in the event of foreign policy crises with Russia or the Middle East. Even a rise in
the price of energy for economic and ecological reasons might cause an enlarged and
more variegated EU significant problems.78 Again liberal intergovernmentalism
presents a plausible set of arguments from which to analyse EU preferences on envi-
ronmental issues.

Conclusions
For all of the explanatory power which derives from these applications of liberal
intergovernmentalist theory, there are also some important problems which it has
difficulties explaining. Firstly, if economic rationalism lay at the core of the EU’s
approach there is reason to doubt the benign outcome predicted. While the antici-
pated surge in trade certainly took place (even in advance of 2004) the potential
budgetary cost of eastern enlargement may be difficult to contain, for all the deter-
mination displayed by the net contributors to limit EU spending. Although the
Commission insisted throughout the process that the cost of enlargement could be
met within the terms of the current financial arrangements (1.27 per cent of Union
GDP) there are reasons to believe that this may not be the case. One could cite the
impact on the budget of the accession of the Mediterranean countries in the 1980s,
or, more dramatically, the absorption of the GDR by West Germany in 1990. In
each case much more money ended up being transferred than had been envisaged.
Thus the negative dynamic arising out of domestic dissatisfaction produced in
member states such as Portugal and Spain on the one hand (the prospect of
reduced subvention), and Germany and Britain (increased budgetary burden) on
the other, should have been enough to derail the entire enlargement project or at
least severely limit its potential cost. And where Moravcsik and others have argued
that the member states succeeded in doing just that in the 2002 negotiations, the
increase in bargaining power of the new member states may well produce signifi-
cant friction over future financial frameworks, beginning with the negotiation of
the 2007–13 budget. This suggests a less than rational approach to enlargement on
the part of member states and weakens the case for LI at a number of levels.
The asymmetric nature of inside–outside bargaining that accompanied eastern
enlargement, and which LI privileges, also prompts the question of why the EU
was backed into a corner on agriculture reform. As one of the world’s foremost
agricultural powers, it might have been expected that the EU would not be willing
to renegotiate (internally) its own longstanding agriculture regime. LI projects a
recalcitrant position from the big domestic agriculture concerns which in turn
 Economic explanations of eastern enlargement 151
would decisively shape member state behaviour on the CAP. And although
Moravcsik argues that the Copenhagen deal effectively locked in the prerogatives
of those producer interests until 2013, the concession on direct subsidies, which will
be gradually extended to the new member states, is more difficult for LI to explain,
except perhaps as a short-term measure designed to postpone dealing with a very
divisive issue.
A further problem with liberal intergovernmentalism lies in its attachment to the
so-called ‘grand bargain’ model of European integration. The focus on the grand
bargains (the Treaty of Rome, the consolidation of the Common Market, the
founding of the European Monetary System, the Single European Act and the
Treaty on European Union) is simply too narrow, tending to vitiate the role of
everyday activity at EU level, and means that liberal intergovernmentalism is
consequently ill equipped to account for the sheer density of issues and level of
institutionalized cooperation evident in the EU.79 In short, Moravcsik tends to
marginalize process. The liberal intergovernmental model cannot adequately depict
the enlargement process, characterized as it has been by an ever-expanding range
of institutional arrangements and commitments. Applying the Moravcsikian ‘logic’
to the ‘enlargement grand bargains’ over the past decade – the European Council
Summits from Copenhagen (1993), through to Copenhagen (2002) – the outcomes
demonstrate not just or even primarily the decisive import of domestic producer
interests and unchanging national preferences, but rather an ongoing process char-
acterized by member state uncertainty, complex patterns of intra-EU bargaining,
and an important entrepreneurial role played by the European Commission. In
this connection Moravcsik’s ‘bias against supranationalism’ prevents a rounded
analysis of eastern enlargement and its institutional context.80 It may be especially
the case that LI is simply blind to the proactive role played by the EU’s institutions
and denies them the status of purposive actors. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated
how the Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament, contributed
effectively, sometimes decisively, to enlargement decision-making. Wincott asks
whether ‘the application of state theories to European integration begs the ques-
tion of why the political institutions of states can have an impact, but those of the
EC cannot’.81 The argument is not one that replaces Moravcsik’s with a straight-
forward swap to a supranational model. Rather, it is that there is a complex process
of interaction between member states, EU institutions and candidate states with
preferences sometimes quite identifiable but at other times undecided and suscep-
tible to pressure in the process of interaction. Reductionism, of the state-centric or
any other variety, does not help to explain our enlargement questions.
Acknowledging these deficiencies of LI does not lead one to disregard explana-
tions of eastern enlargement which centre on economics and rational cost–benefit
calculation. Important parts of the process can only be properly understood by
reference to the desire of important EU companies for market penetration and
neoliberal reform measures in CEE, and the classical predictions of regional
economic integration theory. Economic studies consistently demonstrated that the
effect of enlargement would be benign, if not entirely negligible. If the economies of
the new member states were too small to trigger real disruption or change within
152 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
the old EU, there would be an uneven distribution of costs which member states
would have to bear. LI also helps us depict the complex pattern of transnational
enlargement advocacy, especially the influence in key member states of powerful
multinational corporations. It is less successful in explicating how eastern enlarge-
ment was negotiated in a complex terrain which was simultaneously intergovern-
mental and supranational. While the early stages of the enlargement process
certainly lend empirical confirmation to liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-
liberal institutionalism, being characterized on the EU side by blockage of trade
liberalization measures, an obsession with side payments issues and continued
prevarication on the question of a clear membership perspective for the CEE
states, it is clear that it cannot account for what appears after the Helsinki (1999)
and especially the Copenhagen (2002) summits to be a normatively determined
outcome. This is what Schimmelfennig referred to as the major puzzle of EU
enlargement. The collective outcome is as explicable by the constitutive values of
the EU as the relative power or pursuit of interests by the member states.82 Indeed,
as the next chapter will demonstrate, normative factors proved consistently more
important than any others in determining the shape and trajectory of eastern
enlargement.
10 Normative explanations of
eastern enlargement

Introduction
In recent years the study of European integration has broadened considerably
beyond the previously rather narrow debate between neofunctionalism and clas-
sical (and later liberal) intergovernmentalism. In fact a rich and diverse set of
competing claims about the fundamental nature of the European integration
process has encouraged the sense that Europe’s great diversity is now reflected in
European scholarship also. One of the most important approaches to EU politics
has developed out of a normative literature which itself breaks down into two iden-
tifiable camps. The first explores EU decision-making through rational choice
institutionalism and focuses particularly on the interactions of member states and
institutional actors under specific constitutional and institutional rule structures.
The second normative approach revolves around sociological institutionalism and
highlights the nature of state interaction within international forums, and in partic-
ular the relationship between state identity and interests under conditions of interna-
tional interaction and intersubjectivity. Scholarship from both camps has become
increasingly sophisticated and responded to calls to test claims empirically.1 The
eastern enlargement of the EU provides an important test case for the rival claims.
On the one hand, rules – devised by the Commission, shaped by the Council, and
imposed on the candidate states – played an important part in the enlargement
process. On the other hand, norms – sometimes framed as rules, but more usually
considered cognitive guides to appropriate behaviour, reflecting EU values and
collective identity – also helped shape the EU approach to eastern enlargement to a
considerable degree. And whilst there is little doubt that both geopolitical and
economic motivations were instrumental in guiding EU policy, it is equally clear
that eastern enlargement was driven by a normative logic which proved more deci-
sive to outcomes than arguments about power, territory or new markets. In short,
enlargement was conceived in a normative environment, governed by specific norms
and rules, and carried forward to a successful conclusion by attachment to those
norms. This chapter examines eastern enlargement with the aid of constructivist
ideas about ideational factors in international politics, the EU self-conception as a
‘community of values’, the norm-rich environment which has underpinned the
integration process and helped produce a distinct EU identity in world politics.
154 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
The constructivist worldview
Constructivist approaches to international politics are distinguished by the effort to
seek some sort of understanding between the natural world and the human or
social world. Nicholas Onuf points to a ‘world of our making’ and suggests that
social relations make or construct people into the kind of beings that we are.2 Alex-
ander Wendt, in his seminal Social Theory of International Politics, tries to understand
‘social kinds’ and ‘natural kinds’.3 The constructivist approach, although increas-
ingly diverse, is made up of three important hypotheses. First, it is contended that
the structures of international life are not exclusively material but also consist of a
substantial ideational dimension; this means that the security dilemma tradition-
ally associated with anarchy is, in fact, what Wendt suggests it is – what we make of it –
in other words, an ideational construct rather than a material reality. Second, the
contribution made by intersubjective shared meanings between purposive state
actors decisively determines identities and interests in the international system. In
other words, as Risse-Kappen suggests, actors’ interests and preferences cannot
simply be treated as unproblematic and exogenous to structure. To a great extent
those interests are made clearer as a result of interaction with other states and
membership of international organizations.4 Wendt refers to this approach as
‘structural idealism’ (in opposition to existing structural realist theories such as
those of Waltz).5 Finally, it is contended that ideas and norms have to be taken
more seriously in IR than traditional approaches have allowed.
Combining these elements of the constructivist approach, a key feature of inter-
national politics is the co-constitution of the material and ideational in human life.
Constructivism does not deny the importance of material structures or a phenom-
enal world external to thought but rather seeks to understand that world in relation
to human behaviour or social structure. The differences between and among the
different streams of constructivist thought are significant.6 Nevertheless all
constructivist approaches share the basic claim that the ‘neo-neo’ synthesis (and by
implication most IR theory) is ‘undersocialized’ in the sense that it pays insufficient
attention to the ways in which international life is socially constructed.7 And for
constructivists one of the most important features of contemporary international
politics is the way in which community-building and security-enhancing possibili-
ties arise out of state engagement with multilateral international institutions. Inter-
national institutions open up new opportunities for interstate cooperation, change
the patterns of state behaviour, and can create the conditions under which the
structural quicksand that is international anarchy may be overcome.

Security and peace communities and the

democratic peace
Constructivists interested in exploring the links between state identities and inter-
ests have re-discovered the concept of security community in seeking to develop
ideas about the norm-generating potential of international organizations. In the
original formulation by Karl Deutsch, a security community was defined as a
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 155
collection of states that had become integrated to such a point that there is a ‘real
assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically,
but will settle their disputes in a peaceful way’.8 The concept thus revolves around
‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. That is that states within the commu-
nity possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and
mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of ‘we-
ness’ – and are integrated so closely that the aforementioned ‘dependable expecta-
tions of peaceful change’ has become the norm.9
Deutsch distinguished between an ‘amalgamated security community’ (formal
unity) and so-called ‘pluralistic security communities’ (where sovereignty is retained).
Building on Deutsch, Adler and Barnett identify three important characteristics of
modern transnational political communities. First, members of the community
have as a starting point a set of shared values and meaning to underpin their collec-
tive identity. State interaction is thus informed to a crucial degree by such common
values. Second, interaction among members takes place in a multitude of forums,
concerning transactions of every kind (material and non-material). As the pace of
globalization has quickened since the 1980s a great acceleration in both the quan-
tity and quality of contact has encouraged the deepening of regional groupings,
especially of the European Union. This in turn has produced new forms of legal
regulation which are designed to institutionalize and manage such interdepen-
dence. Third, members of the community exhibit a reciprocity that expresses, if
not pure altruism, then acknowledgement of long-term collective interests. These
in turn derive from the process of interaction and prompt a sense of obligation and
collective responsibility.10 One key element of the neo-Deutschian security commu-
nity argument is that centred on the ‘democratic peace’, the idea that democracies
do not fight each other. Thus for democratic peace theorists Immanuel Kant’s postu-
late, developed in his Perpetual Peace (1795), has been empirically substantiated.
Wendt’s Social Theory (chapter 6) argues that at its core the international system is
being slowly transformed into a Kantian culture. In this sense we have moved from
Hobbesian state rivalries (defined by enmity), to a Lockean culture (defined by
rivalrous competition), to one where we see the emergence of a growing number of
states that are predisposed toward external self-restraint and interdependence.11 The
implication of such emerging communities might be profound:

quasi-Kantian peaceful change without its teleological and universal elements

might be presently evolving. If so, peaceful change need not rely on the tran-
scendence of the nation state or the elimination of existing cultural and ethnic
loyalties and identities; what matters is the creation of social cognitive and
normative bonds that can encourage peoples to identify, and to expect their
security and welfare to be intimately intertwined with those that exist on the
same side of spatial and cognitive borders.12

For most analysts the European Union is the best example of a pluralistic secu-
rity community in today’s international system. Indeed, member states tend to take
‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ and EU core values for granted.13
156 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
These core values have become a central referent for member state conceptions of
their own identities and interests. Since the foundation of the European Commu-
nities in the 1950s, European integration was meant to create and stabilize a secu-
rity community that would replace the traditional rivalries and contestation for
power and resources between and among the European states. In its course, the
Community members not only established a stable democratic peace amongst
themselves but also a unique set of institutions and legal order. This is indeed a type
of regional organization representing a community of values. Often, arguments
about low politics, as Gardner Feldman points out, succeed in diverting attention
from the real achievement of the EU, which has been lasting reconciliation
between former enemies.14 Since 1989 European security has revolved almost
exclusively (if not always directly) around the institutional settings of the EU.15 And
the eastern enlargement of the European Union became the most direct and
important instrument for extending the existing security community eastward.

Enlarging the European security community

Eastern enlargement as such duplicated the earlier processes of interstate cooper-
ation and community-building which shaped the early integration process in
Western Europe. Its aim was that of transforming former adversaries into allies
and transporting the CEE states directly into the heart of the European security
community, which, although comprising a range of different institutions,16 never-
theless has a distinct centre of gravity in the EU. Enlargement would facilitate the
transmission of new norms from the EU to the candidate states, thus helping to
transform the ‘Eastern’ European states into ‘European’ states’.17 This is surely
what Commission President Romano Prodi meant when he said that ‘our
enlargement strategy ensures that these values are enshrined in the candidate
countries before they can join the EU. Democracy, the rule of law and respect for
human rights will become the norm throughout the expanding Union.’18 The
cognitive model was one which highlighted the transformation in Franco-German
relations after the Second World War, as one which could be emulated in the re-
constitution of German–Polish relations, Hungarian–Romanian relations, indeed
any interstate relationship previously characterized by tensions over territory,
ethnic minorities, or disputed versions of history. Thus the earlier patterns of
peace building have been replicated in Central and Eastern Europe and indeed
extended far beyond what was initially envisaged in the early 1990s. The EU has
employed a virtually identical political-institutional mix in Southeastern Europe
(Stabilization and Association Process), the Euro-Mediterranean area (the Barce-
lona Process) and beyond (the Wider Neighbourhood policy), even if different
(non-accession) outcomes are likely. The very success of EU community-building
in Central and Eastern Europe thus promoted the extension of community-
enhancing instruments to the wider Europe.
Analysis of the enlargement discourse employed by EU representatives indicates
a clear attachment to the concept of an expanding political community. Former
enlargement Commissioner Hans van den Bröek, in a 1997 speech, for example,
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 157
referred to the EU as a ‘genuine security community in which the very idea of war
between any members can be dismissed out of hand’.19 This is a direct articulation
of the academic concept of the security community as a Deutschian ‘non-war
community’.20 It was of a pattern where the European Commission actively sought
to create a we-feeling both amongst the applicant states from CEE and also, obvi-
ously, between the EU member states and the individual applicant states. The
building of trust through institutional engagement and capacity-building became a
central preoccupation of EU strategists.21 This assertion is supported by a stream of
Commission documentation that emphasizes that the EU wanted to create in the
East a ‘psychological environment of mutual trust’, and a ‘feeling of belonging’.22
Council and Commission officials regularly reiterated the importance of extending
the post-1945 model of reconciliation and legitimacy. Sometimes it was stated
explicitly by officials such as Commissioner van den Bröek when he again stated
that ‘enlargement can thus be seen as an extension of the EU’s zone of stability to
the East’.23 Commissioner Verheugen similarly suggested that ‘all the experience
shows that the projection of political stability and economic prosperity implicit in
enlargement enhances the security of Europe as a whole’. He went on to stress that
‘the EU is by definition pacific’. It is, among other things, ‘a highly successful
example of conflict prevention and dispute settlement’.24 Thus from the beginning
eastern enlargement was conceptualized as a contemporary security enhancing
project, one which would embed EU norms in the former Communist states and
ensure a successful extension of the existing pluralistic security community. To a
large extent, however, this process was dependent for success on a genuine coales-
cence between insiders and outsiders around a particular set of values and shared
collective identity.

European collective identity

Constructivism emphasizes the ways in which membership of international organi-
zations offers the possibility of transforming member states’ identities as well as inter-
ests. Governance clearly involves shaping identities in different ways. Preferences,
expectations, and beliefs relating to a state’s identity and interests are not immune
from or exogenous to political history associated with different levels of international
embeddedness.25 Identities and interests indeed, according to constructivists, are
created and changed with that history and through different forms of international
interaction. Notwithstanding the difficulties in making claims for a unified European
identity, constructivists argue that the European integration process has facilitated
the construction of a different type of collective identity around EU processes and
normative practice.26 This identity is neither national nor supranational. Rather it is
constructed around transnational institutional and civic politics and encourages
ever-deeper identification between state actors and EU structures. It is fundamen-
tally an identity built around real and substantive commitments on the part of
member states to the principles of collective decision-making and contractual obliga-
tion, and embedded in perceptions of shared values, and a commitment to diffuse
those values internationally. This evolving EU identity is also one that challenges
158 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
cultural essentialists such as Pope Benedict XVI and Samuel Huntington, who argue
that Europe remains one indivisible (Christian) civilizational entity.27 The debate on
God and whether or not the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty should contain
a reference to Europe’s Christian heritage saw the triumph of the constructivist
over the essentialist definition of EU identity. The enlarged EU was not to be
defined in a cultural or religious sense but rather as a shared civic and secular Euro-
pean consciousness.28
Beginning with François Duchêne’s description of the EU as a ‘civilian power’,
scholars have sought to articulate and analyse the meaning of the EU’s interna-
tional identity as it has developed.29 This posited the EU as a different sort of inter-
national entity, less concerned with material power and hard security than with
seeking to domesticate foreign policy along the successful domestic post-1945
template of progressive politics. This is a representation of an international actor
which seeks to encourage civic virtue, transparent representative institutions, and
the highest standards of democratic governance, on the basis of shared commit-
ment to a specific value set. Most recently, Ian Manners borrowing from Duchêne
in depicting a ‘normative power’ Europe, has analysed how EU policies and activi-
ties shape our understandings of the EU, and the different ways in which the EU
can be viewed as a political and social agent embedded in and employing economic,
political, and social institutions.30 As Manners puts it:

The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the
EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly this predisposes it to act
in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, but usually over-
looked observation, that the most important factor shaping the international
role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.31

The EU’s constitutional norms represent the crucial foundations determining its
international identity. The principles of democracy, rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms were first made explicit in the 1970s
although only given constitutional expression in the 1990s.32 Within the European
Union these core norms have been elaborated through a series of declarations,
treaties, policies, and the development of an explicit set of membership conditions.
These norms helped define the acquis communautaire and acquis politique and by defini-
tion the EU’s international identity. It is no coincidence that these norms were
placed at the heart of EU enlargement policy during the 1990s. Eastern enlarge-
ment unfolded from and thus was a product of what Helen Wallace termed the
‘affiliational’ or normative dimension of the European integration process.33 In
other words expansion could not have been undertaken without such a solid
affiliational connection between insider and outsider.
This is a Europe that even American neoconservatives such as Robert Kagan
admit has moved away from power toward a ‘self-contained world of laws and rules
and transnational negotiation and cooperation’. The territory with the European
Union at its core has entered a ‘post-historical paradise of peace and relative pros-
perity, the realization of Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace”’.34 In the aftermath of
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 159
the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, and in particular the Amer-
ican-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, it became clear that the European Union’s collec-
tive international identity had evolved to such a point that it now diverged radically
from the United States. Notwithstanding EU support offered the US in the campaign
against the Taliban in Afghanistan and European divisions on Iraq, subsequent
events gave support to the view that European norms and values (as manifested in
the EU) were now significantly different from those of the United States. Where the
EU had embraced a Kantian international identity the United States remained
mired in history and attached to a Hobbesian Weltanschauung.
If the development of a norm-based collective European identity laid the basis
for a successful enlargement of the Union to Central and Eastern Europe then a
number of important themes stand out as worthy of further attention. In particular
three important phenomena can be identified as crucial to the normative under-
pinning of the eastern enlargement process. Each contributed to the progression of
the process by providing cognitive road maps for policy-makers, which, although
competing with other non-normative templates, proved decisive to enlargement
decision-making. First, enlargement emerged fundamentally from the EU self-
understanding and collective identity based on the values which had come to
define ‘Europeanness’. Second, the eastern enlargement process was driven by an
explicit moral dimension, which manifested itself in the ‘return to Europe’ argu-
ment deployed by the Central and East European states, and on the EU side, by
acceptance of those claims for membership on the basis that accession was a
natural right for and could not be denied to the CEE states. Finally, another ‘logic
of appropriateness’ can be identified in the institutional path dependency of EU
enlargement history and in particular, the precedents set by previous enlargement
rounds. All three phenomena can only be understood as emanating from under-
standings of the EU as a contemporary pluralistic security community.

Enlargement and the EU – self-understanding

The EU’s self-understanding and the importance to this of a core set of values is
reflected in the principles of governance that have grown up around the integra-
tion process. This self-understanding and self-representation cannot simply be
dismissed as cognitive or rhetorical as rationalist scholars frequently suggest.
Rather, as Sedelmeier argues, eastern enlargement reflected a sense of what EU
institutional actors and member state representatives considered appropriate behav-
iour for the role that they collectively ascribed to themselves – as representatives of
the EU – in their relationships with Central and Eastern Europe (and indeed other
non-member states on the eastern and southeastern fringes of the EU) and the
behavioural obligations implied for this particular relationship.35 The normative
basis for this self-understanding can be analysed through a number of different
phenomena most of which can be sourced to earlier processes of norm construction
within the European integration process. The Laeken Declaration of 2001 provided
an important representation of EU self-understanding and its role in international
politics:
160 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a
new world order, that of a power able to play a stabilizing role worldwide and
to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as a continent
of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution
and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all
diversity, meaning respect for others’ languages, cultures and traditions.36

This representation includes the key ideational and philosophical influences that
helped mould today’s European Union and frame its international identity. At
regular intervals during the eastern enlargement process key actors on both the EU
and candidate state side made reference to the values and principles that arose out
of those ideational influences and the behavioural obligations they implied.
If the core of this EU self-understanding lies in such commitment to its constitu-
tive values and norms then this creates an obligation to diffuse them internationally
and to grant membership to the states that share them.37 Crucially, that process of
diffusion can only be implemented with the voluntary acceptance of these norms
by outside states. These norms are constitutive for the political culture and collec-
tive identity of democratic societies; democratic states tend to externalize them.
They want their international relations to be governed by the same norms of non-
violence and rule-based conflict management as their domestic politics. For the
constructivist the constitutive character of liberal norms is reflected in the basic
treaties of the European Union.38 This point is underscored by Lykke Friis, who
suggests that the EU can sit down to negotiate with applicant states not simply in
response to pressures of economic interdependence and worries about stability,
(though of course these are important factors), but also because of its own self-
understanding. The system of international cooperation breaks down – or loses
prestige – if the member states have difficulty solving their national questions
through supranational means. This logic is reflective of a system where over time
national interests also develop a ‘system interest’.39 Or, as Roy Ginsberg puts it, ‘a
synthesis between regional and national interests develops’.40
Thus the effort to export the core EU norms of peace, economic cooperation
and legal interdiction was a natural outgrowth of systemic change within the Euro-
pean integration process. Had the EU failed to respond positively to the requests
for membership from Central and Eastern Europe, it would have constituted a
negation of the integration process itself and the values upon which the member
states structured their cooperative interstate relations. This central truth of the
enlargement process was captured by Joschka Fischer’s observation that ‘following
the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the EU had to open to the East, otherwise the
very idea of European integration would have undermined itself and eventually
self-destructed’.41
In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolutions the search for recognition by
the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe was met by a European
Union that found it difficult to depart from the ideals it supposedly stood for
throughout the entire period of the Cold War. In their examination of ‘norm
construction’ within both the EU and NATO enlargement processes, Fierke and
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 161
Wiener identified a complex relationship between identity, norms and practices.42
Their analysis suggested the central importance of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,
the significance of which lay ‘less in the force of the law than in constructing a
moral obligation’ toward the CEE states.43 The goal was to translate the promise of
Helsinki into reality. Patricia Chilton also underscores the importance of the
Helsinki accords for both Western and Eastern European states. At their core they
reflected and progressively reified a certain image of Western Europe. That image
captured the imagination of dissidents in Central and Eastern Europe. Even if a
primarily rhetorical device, the consistent declarations of attachment to those
ideals by western policy-makers meant that after 1989 the rhetorical commitments
came in for substantive scrutiny and the promises made could not be reneged
upon.44
It is also worth remembering that while the Cold War may have artificially cut off
east from west Europe, it may also in fact may have led to a greater awareness across
Europe of what a collective European identity actually consisted of. Throughout the
Cold War period, two things were stressed in official statements from EU and
national representatives. First, there were consistent expressions of solidarity with
what Milan Kundera called the ‘kidnapped west’, and, second, the there was the
involuntary nature of the eastern exclusion from western structures, and specifically
from the evolving integration process.45 Reinforcement of this normative discourse
was usually supported by assertions that if and when geopolitical circumstances were
to change, this would be met on the Community side by a clear commitment to
bringing the states of Central and Eastern Europe into the Community structures.
The implication of a natural right to accession was always there, if indeed it seemed
very unlikely that such a scenario could ever be realized in the dark days of domina-
tion by the Soviet Union.
A perusal of communiqués and official statements from European Council
meetings throughout the late 1970s and 1980s reveals a strong attachment to a
perception of special responsibility for Central and Eastern Europe. It was taken
for granted that this implied an obligation to support economic and political devel-
opment in CEE, and potentially, integration into the EU. These notions of affilia-
tion and an EU ‘special responsibility’ can clearly be evinced from the discourse of
EU political élites and from Commission officials. This affiliational discourse,
which would help lock the EU into a commitment to eastern enlargement, was
already to the fore in the pledge of full support for the transformation process in
Central and Eastern Europe, offered at the Strasbourg European Council in
December 1989:

The Community and its member states are fully conscious of the common
responsibility which devolves on them in this decisive phase in the history of
Europe … They are prepared to develop … closer and more substantive rela-
tions in all areas … The Community is at the present time the European iden-
tity which serves as the point of reference for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe.46
162 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
The importance to the EU of its own self-image is also reflected in the sensitivity
to criticism, especially when it originated with political representatives and public
intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe. This criticism, although often quite
guarded and moderate in tone, was very obvious with respect to the perceived
protectionist tendencies of the EU on the negotiation of the Europe Agreements.
Despite the prominence of EU material interests (and the activities and influence of
important interest groups), the criticism did have an impact on policy and led to a
speedier resolution of issues in favour of CEE interests. Continued reference to EU
special responsibility to CEE made this possible. Schimmelfennig’s emphasis on
‘rhetorical argument’ and CEE officials ‘exposing inconsistencies’ in EU policy
provides striking evidence for such a supposition with these representatives using
emotive language in phrases such as ‘economic Yalta’ and ‘a new economic Iron
Curtain’.47 Later, in deploring the various delays imposed on the enlargement
process, and in seeking to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, CEE state
representatives would consistently deploy the language of shared values, community,
and normative resonance in an effort to move the process forward. Their success in
exposing inconsistent EU behaviour could not have been achieved without reference
to the shared values which underpinned the European integration process and the
EU desire to uphold its own self-image and self-understanding.

Membership conditions
The EU self-understanding and value system was made manifest within the
enlargement process in the membership conditions laid down before the candidate
states. These conditions represented not just the ‘rational’ or functional basis for
the incorporation of non-member states into the EU, but also a cogent representa-
tion of the EU’s own self-identification. The core values of the EU are all cited in
the membership criteria first enunciated at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993
and are worth recalling. They include the need for a functioning market economy
governed by rules of credible legal enforcement, open and transparent representa-
tive democratic institutions and respect for minorities and fundamental human
rights.48
These membership conditions had only evolved slowly since the inception of the
European Communities in the 1950s. The basic condition for membership stipu-
lated in Article 237 of the Rome Treaty – European identity (‘any European state
may apply’) – was always very ambiguous. How was ‘European’ to be defined?
Was this a geographic-territorial definition? Or a political definition? During the
Cold War, eligibility was not a troubling issue, as membership for the Warsaw Pact
states, which happened also to be European, was not on the cards. But Sjursen and
Smith point out that even in the 1970s the adherence to democratic norms as a
basis for Community membership represented an important signal that the EEC
was not just an economic integration bloc or free trade zone: deeper values
pervaded the Community and bound member states together. This interpretation
is reinforced if one bears in mind that Portugal and Spain asked to open negotia-
tions in the early 1960s but their candidatures were not at that time taken seriously.
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 163
It would only be a return to the democratic fold that would render these states
eligible for membership.49 So despite the fact that no substantive membership
criteria existed outside of the vague Article 237, it was clear that a commitment to
democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms constituted an implicit basis for
consideration of a membership request.
If such an informal values-based criterion governed Community attitudes to
membership requests then it is clear that the development of more explicit and
formal conditions followed from and in response to both the internal deepening of
the Community and changes in external conditions. Helen Wallace, for example,
demonstrates that the EU value-set (and thus the template by which membership
requests would be judged) was developed only very slowly over the years. The
Treaty of Rome (Article 237), as we have seen, had simply noted that ‘any Euro-
pean state’ could apply for EU membership. The 1987 Joint Declaration by the
Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament on fundamental rights
was, in Wallace’s view, a ‘rather feeble attempt’ at a rhetorical statement of shared
democratic values. Not until the Treaty on European Union in 1993 (Article F) did
the member states note that their Union was founded on the principles of democ-
racy and their ‘respect for fundamental rights’.50
In the aftermath of the June 1993 Copenhagen summit more general statements
concerning membership conditions were forthcoming. The Amsterdam Treaty
formalized the political conditions of membership and in effect, codified the
Copenhagen criteria. Article 6 of the Amsterdam Treaty set out the basic member-
ship conditions. It stated: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of
law.’ Further, ‘any European state that respects these principles may apply to
become a member of the Union’ (Article 49). It is these two treaty articles that
provided the legal basis for the conduct of the negotiations on eastern enlargement.
And if, as some scholars argued, Article 6 still remained somewhat vague and
ambiguous, it at least provided the basis and justification for the Commission’s
close monitoring of reform of political institutions, public administration, judicial
systems and rights legislation in Central and Eastern Europe.
Technically the treaty articles would seem to rule out even the acceptance of an
application from states deemed in violation of such principles. Article 7, in setting out
a sanctions regime to be deployed against member states which fail to uphold the
value-set outlined in Article 6, seems just as salient, however, in setting out a consti-
tutional instrument for the protection of those values, not just with respect to the
applicant states but also to the existing members of the Union. The haphazard way
in which the Union sought to impose sanctions on Austria after the formation of a
coalition including the far-right Freedom Party in early 2000 perhaps represented
a poor initial effort (poorly executed at least) in the defence of those principles. Its
failure, however, should not detract from the fact that the reaction of the member
states of the EU to the Haider phenomenon demonstrated clearly the universal
attachment to those principles set down in Article 6 within the Union.
In insisting on various forms of conditionality, but especially binding condition-
ality with respect to the political criteria laid down at Copenhagen, the EU acted
164 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
robustly to uphold its own value system. For example, when framing the Europe
Agreements, the Commission included an explicit suspension clause that effec-
tively hardened political conditionality.51 As the enlargement process deepened the
framework of political conditionality made more and more demands on the candi-
date states. Even though the use of political conditionality has been much criti-
cized,52 one cannot but argue that the strict application of the principle was
reflective of a deep attachment within the EU to the democratic process.
The substance of EU enlargement policy also stipulated, and, over time,
increased, the salience of the EU’s role in the protection of human rights and
democracy. This should be understood in the context of the wider attachment to
democracy promotion within the EU, as Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse point
out. Democracy promotion has become a centrepiece of EU foreign policy
activity and is backed up by considerable financial resources. Eastern enlarge-
ment, however, stands out as by far the most ambitious effort by the EU to
promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in third countries.53 The
remarkable success of democratization in much (but far from all) of Europe in the
post-1989 period is undoubtedly linked to the demands of the enlargement
process and the values of the integration project.54
Sedelmeier identifies two specific aspects of EU enlargement policy, which, in
highlighting the importance of human rights norms, underpin the importance of
such to the EU value-set and self-understanding.55 The first was the consistent
assertion of the promotion and protection of democratic norms as a core rationale
for enlargement and the explicit establishment of respect for democracy and
human rights as a precondition for membership. The European Parliament, in
particular, consistently sought to expose inconsistencies in applicant state behav-
iour and inadequate adaptation to democratic norms and practices. The Commis-
sion’s annual reports on applicant state progress also placed compliance with
democracy norms at the top of its agenda. As Marc Maresceau put it, the publica-
tion of progress reports created ‘an atmosphere of permanent follow-up and
contributed considerably to the enhancement in the candidate countries of an
awareness that the necessary measures must be taken’.56 Measuring the extent of
EU success in this regard is undoubtedly difficult. But there exists some evidence
that local political élites in Central and Eastern Europe assessed seriously the
opportunity-cost of non-compliance with EU norms and in many cases shifted
their positions substantially on such issues as ethnic minority rights and constitu-
tional protections to make their parties and political programmes accord with the
new ‘pro-EU space’ in their domestic political systems.57
EU enlargement policy practice also spelled out more explicitly as time went on
the principles that underpin membership.58 Certain aspects of EU policy were aimed
at directly promoting democracy and human rights, such as the PHARE Democracy
Programme. And even if the EU privileged capacity-building within CEE public
sectors more than democracy promotion, over time the latter strengthened local civil
society groups, helped change the preferences of domestic political élites, and under-
mined the claims to legitimacy of populist nationalist regimes. As importantly,
through articulating the promotion of human rights and democracy as a distinct and
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 165
central rationale for its eastern enlargement policy, EU policy-makers affirmed a self-
image of the EU as progressive, internationalist and normative.59
The seriousness attached to the democracy norm was underlined by the EU’s
refusal to open membership negotiations with Slovakia in 1997 on the basis of
concerns over the Meciar government’s emasculation of political institutions and
v

independent media in that country. And although, as Vachudova points out, the
EU démarches did not succeed in compelling the Meciar government to end its
v

chauvinist practices and concentration of political power, they did help tone down
the anti-democratic excesses.60 Even if the EU did not take the ‘nuclear option’ of
suspending Slovakia’s Europe Agreement the Commission’s criticisms made it
clear that membership of the EU was certainly at risk. Negotiations had to wait
until Meciar’s administration was replaced with a new administration committed
v

to transparent democratic norms. In this situation therefore the weapon of political

conditionality was ‘entirely credible’.61 One prominent Slovak, Pavol Demes, of
the German Marshall Fund in Bratislava, attested: ‘we would not have got rid of
Meciar, were it not for the vision of the EU’.62
v

Later the EU was much more explicit in spelling out its expectations and
demands regarding reform of democratic institutions in Bulgaria and Romania
and in the Balkans.63 Concerns about human rights infringements arose regularly
in EU–Turkish relations and constituted a significant barrier to progress even if in
its 2004 Report, the Commission judged that Turkey did fulfil the political criteria
for membership.64 Even after the EU agreed to open negotiations with Turkey it
very publicly criticized the country on a range of issues, including the heavy-
handed police response to an International Women’s Day march in early 2005.
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of EU attachment to democratic norms,
however, was the decision not to proceed to the opening of membership talks with
Croatia. Widely expected to open negotiations for membership in March 2005,
Croatia’s failure to arrest General Ante Gotovina, indicted by the International
Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for alleged war crimes, was taken by
the EU to represent so serious an instance of non-compliance as to warrant at least
the temporary postponement of negotiations.65 This decision spelled out clearly for
Croat élites the potential cost of non-compliance and at the same time represented
the clearest statement of EU principles.
As Wallace suggests the recent articulation within the Union of core principles
of democracy and the sketching of key elements of a European Citizenship
programme assert the importance of the ‘affiliational’ dimension of European
integration. This is the context around which the normative dimension of eastern
enlargement developed. This does not mean that prior to the 1990s there was not
a deep attachment to these values. Rather they had a ‘taken for granted quality’
about them. The prospect of CEE enlargement meant rethinking and refash-
ioning the EU’s own self-understanding. The enlargement process in this sense
has thus helped clarify what the EU represents – a peaceable international
community dedicated to preserving peace within its borders and projecting its
value system on to the world outside.66
166 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
Enlargement as moral imperative
The argument about EU values and self-understanding is reinforced if one considers
that there was also a powerful moral argument for enlargement deployed in both the
candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe and by their supporters within
the European Union. The evidence suggests that the ‘moral imperative’ argument
had a very significant impact and this partly explains why eastern enlargement was
eventually realized in 2004. From a constructivist perspective, there is an interesting
link between the construction and presentation of the moral obligation on the EU
side, the strategic use of moral arguments by the candidate countries and the way in
which both of these phenomena fed into other normative elements of the integration
process such as the EU self-understanding.
In the first instance the moral argument surfaced in the ideas and discourse of
important EU actors, as previous chapters demonstrated. It is clear that many
within the EU (individual citizens, individual policy-makers, governments) felt a
strong sense of moral obligation toward the former Communist states, believing
that the West’s freedom and prosperity was somehow paid for by Eastern Europe’s
subjugation during the Cold War.67 The 1989 revolutions had been successfully
realized because of the brave self-sacrifice of many thousands of individuals, who
had, in many instances, cited West European norms as their yardsticks for reform.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall commitments entered into had to be honoured with
a firm perspective on membership for those countries which desired it. Thus from
an early stage in the new EU–CEE relations a moral discourse was developed and
deployed by advocates of enlargement. Sometimes this discourse was free-standing
and designed to appeal solely to the moral conscience of the target audience. More
usually it was deployed in combination with economic and utilitarian arguments
for enlargement.
Whatever the context in which the moral argument was presented the content
can be unpacked quite easily. As chapter 5 demonstrated, foremost among those
making the moral argument were senior German politicians and policy-makers.
Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer appealed, within their own
borders, to the German sense of shame at the misdeeds of Nazism and the need to
offer EU membership as the principle form of political reparation for such. Outside
Germany, they stressed the shared values which underpinned the European inte-
gration process and acceptance of CEE accession as a collective affirmation of
those values. And although German policy-makers, no less than other EU actors,
sought to protect German prerogatives to the fullest extent possible, they were also
much more willing to accommodate the preferences of the CEE states, as a demon-
stration of their moral commitment to enlargement.
The guiding force that was the sense of moral obligation was not confined to
German élites however. In fact it permeated the discourse and policies of govern-
ment representatives throughout the European Union. For some, eastern enlarge-
ment was necessary to demonstrate solidarity with the states that, in historical
terms, were demonstrably part of the shared European historical experience and
had involuntarily been shut out of the integration process in the 1950s. That
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 167
process had yielded enormous benefits to the participating states and should not
now be denied the CEE states. Another variant of this argument harked back to the
freedom fighters who opposed both Nazism and Communism during the Second
World War and now steadfastly proclaimed attachment to Western models of
government and institutional practice. Others highlighted the potential hypocrisy
of the EU position, in having consistently supported the reform efforts of the
Warsaw Pact states, and then seemingly failing to reach out adequately to anchor
their transition to EU norms and practices.
The vast disparity in economic wealth between insiders and outsiders also
contributed to the moral framing of enlargement. From the outset the integration
process had privileged the narrowing of regional gaps in income and general pros-
perity. Whilst relatively unimportant in the relatively homogeneous EEC of six
states, previous enlargements had added a much poorer set of countries to the
Union. In time this produced a new consensus on social and economic cohesion
and the imperative of reducing economic disparities between the richest and the
poorest regions. Indeed the EU budget became as focused on providing subvention
to its poorest regions as on its traditional concentration of CAP support. The
obvious need for infrastructural support and human capacity-building in CEE also
stood out. Thus the dual combination of existing practice within the EU and the
manifest wealth gap with the candidate countries provided a dual moral argument
to candidate states and it is also one that found significant support within the EU.
Acknowledgement of this discourse and the impact it had on the process of
enlargement should not blind one to the fact that progress was, from the perspec-
tive of the applicant states, painfully slow. That would suggest that the moral
dimension should not be over-emphasized. After all if it were the only logic which
mattered the CEE accessions would have taken place much earlier than they did.
The moral argument to some extent competed in policy-makers’ cognitive frames
with others such as utility arguments and security arguments. The difficult thing is
gauging exactly when and how the force of the moral arguments really mattered.
The constructivist answer is that viewed as one important component of the
normative understanding of eastern enlargement, and one which also fed off and
into the EU’s own self-understanding, the moral argument was a convincing one.
At the very least it made it difficult to refuse an application for membership, or
justify continued obstruction of accession, even if other logics permeated the actual
negotiations for accession.

Historical precedent and path dependency

If the process of eastern enlargement was driven to some extent by the logic of
appropriateness inherent in moral arguments then such a logic also found expres-
sion in the EU’s own experience of enlargement. On the one hand a form of institu-
tional path dependency could be traced through the evolution of EU handling of
applications for membership and subsequent negotiations for accession. On the
other hand individual member states also conceptualized enlargement and their
own preferences through the lenses of their own specific experiences of past
168 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
enlargements. Constructivist approaches, borrowing from sociologically-driven
historical-institutionalist theories, alert us to the importance of both phenomena
within the eastern enlargement process.
In the first place eastern enlargement can be viewed as governed by specific
forms of institutional path dependency. Paul Pierson has emphasized the ways in
which initial institutional or policy decisions – even sub-optimal ones – can become
self-reinforcing over time.68 Elsewhere, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett write
that ‘Path dependent patterns are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feed-
back’.69 These can arise from different combinations of deliberate advocacy and
unintended consequences and lead to ‘gaps’ in member state control.70 These
initial choices encourage the emergence of elaborate social and economic networks,
greatly increasing the transaction costs of change and therefore inhibiting exit from
the current policy path. Collective commitments can be subsequently adduced
from even modest statements of intent. Thus the path dependent analysis of
enlargement politics suggests that outcomes depend not only on the current envi-
ronment and the important policy and institutional choices at issue in a given nego-
tiation. The ‘shadow of the past’, in historical-institutional-speak, also looms large
in collective decision-making.
Enlargement negotiations take place in the shadow of institutional deals from
past enlargement rounds which give shape and form to the negotiation agenda.
Everything from the structure of association agreements to programmes of capacity-
building and the formal institutional structuring of negotiations draws to some
extent from past experience. And while institutional innovation is not uncommon,
the history of enlargement does indeed demonstrate important evidence for path
dependent outcomes. Perhaps the most important path dependent phenomenon is
that once negotiations have been opened with a candidate state they have always
been brought to a successful conclusion and accession usually followed.71 This
feature of the EU’s enlargement history encouraged many to oppose the opening
of negotiations with Turkey in 2004, aware that to proceed to the opening of nego-
tiations would almost certainly invite substantive negotiations in the medium term.
When the EU eventually agreed to the opening of negotiations with Turkey it
included a crucial caveat that allowed for a suspension of negotiations should
Turkey not make substantial progress in its reform process.72
Other variants of normative path dependency can be sourced to the eastern
enlargement process itself. Each makes the case for a gradual ‘lock-in’ of the EU to
the process and each is based on different suppositions. For one thing there was the
issue of just how many applications for membership would be submitted. In the
early 1990s the ‘official queue’ consisted of only about 8 or 10 states in total.73 By
2005 in the aftermath of the accession of 10 new states to the Union, there were still
at least another 10 states which had either negotiated successfully (Bulgaria,
Romania), or opened negotiations (Turkey), or were actively pursuing member-
ship (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro,
Albania, Georgia, Ukraine). Clearly one of the unintended consequences of the orig-
inal decision to open up membership to Central and Eastern Europe was the trig-
gering of a much larger number of applications from a much wider geographical
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 169
area. The development of a meritocratic and rational process for judging applica-
tions within the EU, which was to a large extent culturally neutral, made it difficult
to determine where the process might end. The pluralistic security community
centred on the EU was and remains a regional magnet for states aspiring to
modernize, democratize and Europeanize their countries.
Another variant of path dependency evident within the enlargement process
related to the credibility of EU commitments and efforts to enforce those by
outsiders. Sjursen, for example, makes the case for the importance of publicity and
the ability to ‘shame’ any one party during the enlargement process, for not living
up to expectations and commitments. She invokes Elster’s ‘civilising force of
hypocrisy’ to demonstrate the importance of this. Elster had argued that ‘the effect
of an audience is to replace the language of interest by the language of reason …
the presence of a public makes it especially difficult to appear motivated merely by
self-interest … publicity does not eliminate base motives, but forces or induces
speakers to hide them’.74 Schimmelfennig’s ‘rhetorical entrapment’ should be simi-
larly understood.75 When does rhetorical support turn into rhetorical entrapment?
At what point do considerations of credibility and legitimacy come into play on the
EU side? How did the applicants seek to gain leverage by manipulating the
supportive rhetoric of EU policy representatives? In this respect the importance of
the rhetorical commitments made in the course of the EU enlargement process
stand out. The very acknowledgement that there existed a right to accession, allied
to promises of membership from the EU (even if insincerely meant), created a
framework where over time the EU became ‘locked in’ to an accession process that
for short-term economic and political reasons might prove difficult. The argument
is premised on the supposition that one cannot go on making promises and state-
ments of support without compromising one’s credibility if there is a failure to
deliver on those commitments.
On the CEE side, the case can also be made for another type of path depend-
ency specific to this enlargement process. The candidate states were progressively
locked into a set of commitments from the Copenhagen summit onwards. Some of
these had been passed down from previous enlargement rounds, some derived
from developments in the integration process. Others still were introduced in
response to specific problems ‘on the ground’ in the applicant states. As Sedelmeier
and Wallace suggest, the scope for accommodating the preferences of the CEE
states was predetermined by existing arrangements among and for the incumbent
members of the EU.76 But it also evolved in the specific context of the enlargement
process itself and the challenges it generated. Individual candidate states struggled
to achieve ‘wiggle room’ in the accession negotiations in particular, as more and
more parts of the policy process demonstrated path dependent features.
Eastern enlargement also highlighted another form of path dependent structural
feature. That was the experience of the EU’s non-original members who them-
selves had experienced being outside the club, negotiated with the EU, and
succeeded in attaining membership. Being an alumnus of this particular club made
it exceptionally difficult to act toward the CEE applicant states in anything other
than a supportive fashion. In this respect the accessions in the 1980s of the
170 Conceptualizing eastern enlargement
Mediterranean states set an especially important historic precedent. The Southern
accessions were thus to some extent negotiating cards in the arsenal of the appli-
cant states. After all Greece, Spain and Portugal had all been in a similar position in
the 1970s. Just emerging from years of authoritarian rule they sought membership
in the West European club as a means of buttressing their emerging democracies.
Then they themselves invoked arguments related to rights and the return to the
European fold. The precedent meant that they could hardly deny the same to
other returning states. CEE representatives were not slow to remind the EU of this.
Already in 1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kodolonyi argued that the Iberian
enlargement ‘had been the result of a political settlement’ (the European Council’s
decision to over-ride the Commission’s ruling on Greece) and that ‘the Commu-
nity would do the right thing now to take a similar decision’.77
The arguments related to historical precedent were even more cogent when
highlighting how membership of the EU had ‘worked’ for those states that had
acceded in previous enlargement rounds. Perhaps the outstanding example here
was the Republic of Ireland which had benefited enormously from EU member-
ship and had catapulted itself up the EU wealth table as a consequence. Central
and East European political representatives consistently held up Ireland as a
shining example of the transformative potential offered by membership. For
Ireland that made it all the more difficult to invoke its material interests at crucial
stages of the eastern enlargement negotiations. And although lagging behind
Ireland in terms of socioeconomic advance, Greece, Portugal and Spain had also
manifestly transformed their countries through membership of the EU, which
made it all the more difficult for them to block or obstruct CEE accession. Spain in
particular had experienced significant economic growth in the decade prior to
2004, to some extent underpinned by the inflow of structural and cohesion funding
from the EU, making it extremely difficult for Spanish officials to make a simple
‘rational’ or interest-based objection to CEE accession. When combined with the
other outlined forms of path dependency this structural feature of the enlargement
process exerted an important degree of influence on outcomes.

Conclusions
Well before eastern enlargement even came onto the EU’s agenda there existed what
might be called a customary enlargement practice within the EU, which had devel-
oped through previous enlargement rounds with only a minimum legal guide on
how to conduct an enlargement process provided by the treaties. Thus the eastern
enlargement developed out of an existing set of norms and practices but itself devel-
oped in a way which both helped better define existing practice and created a new
more concrete normative template for future enlargement rounds. In developing a
normative conceptualization of the eastern enlargement process this chapter intro-
duced constructivist explanations of international politics and particularly those
which focus on the normative reach and influence of international organizations.
The constructivist worldview, although itself increasingly variegated, highlights the
importance of both material and human/social dimensions of the European
 Normative explanations of eastern enlargement 171
integration process and is especially useful in identifying the complex relationship
between state identities and interests at EU level. Eastern enlargement, no less than
the wider integration process, saw member states continually seeking to clarify
their preferences, and achieve an acceptable fit between the claims made for the
normative importance of enlargement against the need to protect vital national
interests. The chapter argued that although interests mattered in the determina-
tion of outcomes, the enlargement process was governed by a more fundamental
norm-set which prevailed over interest-based cost–benefit calculation and other
conceptualizations of expansion. The norms that ultimately proved most impor-
tant to the realization of eastern enlargement were those of representative democ-
racy, fundamental freedoms and minority rights – precisely those norms which
emanated from the EU self-understanding as a pluralistic security community and
a community of values in the international political system. The primacy of these
democracy norms was such that the EU was not prepared to compromise with the
candidate states on their implementation in the way that it was prepared to over-
look the deficiencies in economic preparedness or in other areas. The legitimacy of
the EU itself increasingly turned on its identification (and self-identification) as a
transnational organization committed to the community-building and security-
enhancing norms which both flowed from and guided its efforts to democratize the
wider Europe. And although the eastern enlargement process, and EU motivations
for enlargement, can only be understood as a complex combination of geopolitical,
economic and normative reasoning, it is clear that the normative desire to ensure a
peaceful, law-governed, democratic wider Europe consistently triumphed over
narrower and more instrumentalist logics within the enlargement process and ulti-
mately facilitated the 2004 accessions.
11 Conclusions

The accessions to the EU of the Central and East European states on 1 May 2004
brought to a close a series of processes that had been instituted by the democratic
revolutions of 1989. While some of these developments (such as NATO enlarge-
ment) took place outside the EU, most of them converged around structures put in
place by Brussels: these structures would in time become the main vehicles for
‘Europeanizing’ the new democracies. And while transitologists studied the different
forms that transition took on in CEE, it became increasingly difficult to disentangle
each and every mode of transition from the institutional structures developed
under the eastern enlargement process. From the outset the new democracies
represented their endeavours as designed to deliver their ‘return to Europe’, a
rhetorical construction loaded with historical and normative symbolism. The
‘return’ was finally secured on 1 May 2004 but only after an extended period of
protracted negotiations, characterized by long periods of uncertainty and no little
tension on both sides.
Eastern enlargement, although closely modelled on the EU’s previous enlarge-
ments, especially the southern (Mediterranean) enlargement round of the 1980s,
was also manifestly different in its fundamental constituent elements. This became
increasingly clear as time went on. Never before had the EU engaged so closely and
negotiated with so many countries simultaneously. Never before had the negotia-
tions extended for so long. Never before had the EU introduced such a large range
of extra measures to be implemented by the candidate states in advance of acces-
sion. Undoubtedly also eastern enlargement was disruptive for the EU, forcing it to
recalibrate both major policies and decision-making rules in a way which had not
occurred in any previous enlargement round. The sheer scale of the process
dwarfed anything previously attempted by the EU – enlargement added 100
million new EU citizens from ten extremely diverse countries but added only just
over 5 per cent to EU GDP. The scale of the challenge of economic integration was
particularly visible in the stark differences in wealth between old and new member
states. Average GDP per head in the ten new members (including Cyprus and
Malta) was only 46 per cent of the EU average. Only one newcomer – Slovenia –
was as wealthy as the poorest EU15 state – Greece. The poorest new country –
Latvia – had a GDP per head of only 36 per cent of the EU average.1
Accession took place against a backdrop of distinct unease about the direction of
 Conclusions 173
the EU in many member states and part of that unease was rooted in a fear of the
consequences of eastern enlargement (and potential future enlargements). Scle-
rotic economic growth in many of the old member states and a failure to tackle
structural domestic economic problems meant that eastern enlargement was more
often than not presented as another economic problem inflicted on the old EU.
The much higher rates of growth and evident embrace of the market left the new
member states vulnerable to the charge that they represented an Anglo-Saxon fifth
column within the enlarged Union, ready to tear apart German wage-bargaining
mechanisms or undermine the role of the state in social protection in France. EU
politicians for the most part had not bothered to explain the enlargement process
and the important benefits it offered to their citizens, either before 1 May 2004 or
after.2 Thus eastern enlargement became something of a convenient foil for politi-
cians in France and Germany who refused to embrace a more laissez faire
approach to economic organization. The communication gap was not significant
in the ratification process as that was exclusively the privilege of executives and
parliaments within the old EU, but one year after enlargement its impact had
become a serious issue in the domestic politics of many member states, not least in
France and the Netherlands where it was prominent in the Constitutional treaty
referendum campaigns.3 Indeed, for some enlargement had resulted in a sort of theft
– ‘they are taking our jobs’ (or they will in the future), ‘they are living off our welfare
systems’, ‘stealing from our limited resource pool’. It did not help that unemploy-
ment levels had increased across the board in Europe in the intervening year. On 1
May 2004 German unemployment stood at 9.3 per cent, in France 9.4 per cent.
One year later it was 11.1 per cent in Germany and 10.2 per cent in France. It was
little wonder then that the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty referendum in
France was attributed in some part to French unease with the enlarged EU. Accu-
sations of ‘social dumping’ abounded and the French political classes choose to
minimize enlargement as an issue rather than highlighting its benefits for the Euro-
pean Union.
The public misunderstanding of eastern enlargement and its impact on the EU
was at odds with the early evidence of its effects – all indications point in fact to a
smooth transition by both old and new member states. Despite the fact that trade
integration was almost complete by the time of accession, exports and imports
between the EU and CEE grew at double digit rates in 2004, spurred by the
removal of remaining trade barriers.4 Though investments in manufacturing made
headlines it was clear that agriculture in the new member states did at least as well.
The first tranches of EU farm aid were distributed with fewer bureaucratic tangles
than expected, especially in Poland, where 1.4 million farmers successfully applied
for direct payments. The European Commission estimated that farmers’ incomes
in CEE had risen 50 per cent across the board.5 Exports of food from Poland and
the Czech Republic roughly doubled from 2003 to 2004, while Slovakia’s food
exports trebled.6 The new member states saw economic growth increase 5 per cent
in 2004 after an increase of 3.7 per cent in 2003. And although FDI into Central
and Eastern Europe increased exponentially this was not at the expense of the old
member states. The greater profitability of enterprises operating in the new
174 Conclusions
member states helped EU companies toward better results and probably saved jobs
in their home countries. De-localization of jobs remained more a myth than reality
in the old member states. Neither was there anything like the expected wave of
migration, even to the UK, Ireland, and Sweden, whose labour markets were open
to citizens of the new member states. But if enlargement had indeed proved a posi-
tive economic project for the EU (with more discernible benefits down the line) citi-
zens in the old member states were either not aware of it or did not believe the
evidence.
One of the great paradoxes of the European integration process which eastern
enlargement magnified was that of the different value attached to membership by
citizens of ‘insider’ states and those of ‘outsider’ states. While those outside desper-
ately want to get in, those inside increasingly express frustration with ‘Europe’ and
indeed in many states a desire to exit the process. Whilst those outside readily
proclaim their allegiance to the EU and demonstrate a willingness to accept the
demanding measures of implementation implicit in the process, insider citizens feel
increasingly remote from Brussels and in many jurisdictions blame the EU for
everything from the imposition of allegedly neoliberal economic policies which
threaten the social fabric, to the standard charge of ‘Brussels Bureaucrats’ seeking
to create a vast nanny-state by imposing regulation on every conceivable variant of
social market activity. Swedish prime minister Göran Persson summed up this
paradox in 2001 during the Swedish Presidency of the EU when he attested that
while so many countries wanted nothing else but to get in, all the Swedes wanted
was to get out. Perhaps the luxury of being able to gripe is one reserved for
members of the club – the cynicism of the secure – but nevertheless it seems strange
that such disaffection did not spill over into public opinion in the candidate states.
The CEE states saw membership as the only viable means of securing their ‘return
to Europe’, of embedding themselves in the successful structures of the European
integration process.
In some ways enlargement further added to the democratic deficit which the EU
is alleged to suffer from, and perhaps even created new such deficits. After all the
process was undertaken by both CEE and Western élites without any significant
input from their societies. Enlargement was driven forward largely by the bureau-
cratic expertise of the Commission and most issues remained removed from any
form of public deliberation. The negotiations of 1998–2002 were classic Euroelite
talks. CEE publics only got a say after the completion of negotiations with no
chance to influence the content of the accession treaties. EU publics did not even
get a vote, despite opinion polls showing great concern about the impact of
enlargement. And while this may not have mattered too much to the course of
negotiations the evidence cited above about perceptions in the old member states
suggests a large gap between the public and their representatives. At the very least
it will make further enlargement more difficult to negotiate than previously.
Some saw enlargement as a natural consequence of the geopolitical changes
wrought by the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As such it
represented the reunification of the continent. This argument is often accompa-
nied by claims that enlargement was facilitated primarily by cultural connectedness,
 Conclusions 175
that ‘Europe’ was and remains an indivisible civilizational and religio-cultural
entity simply waiting for circumstances to allow it to be made whole through polit-
ical unification. Such a view entirely misreads the eastern enlargement process and
indeed the fundamental nature of the European integration process. Cultural affili-
ation undoubtedly helped the process of reconstituting political relations among
the European states. But this view underestimates the degree to which the contem-
porary integration process is neutral as to culture, religion and history. Enlarge-
ment proceeded on the basis of agreed norms and shared values regarding state
behaviour, interstate reciprocity and legal interdiction. The process was entirely
secular and rule-governed. Just as private morality has largely ceased to count as a
factor in the determination of attitudes to individual politicians across Europe, so
cultural essentialism (or reductionism) played no part in the framework of enlarge-
ment decision-making.
In the aftermath of the election of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger to the Papacy in
April 2005 (coinciding, incidentally, almost exactly with the first anniversary of the
eastern enlargement of the EU), there were some commentators who sought to
expressly link the two events. The German cardinal succeeded the Polish Pope.
Europe’s twentieth-century history was thus manifest in the succession – the Polish
tragedy, the horrors of Nazi empire, Europe’s cataclysmic wars. Just as eastern
enlargement helped heal the continent’s wounds Ratzinger’s election symbolized
Germany’s rehabilitation in international politics and the wider process of interstate
reconciliation.7
At an abstract level this was a consoling thought. But it concealed an important
truth, which underlined the extraordinary difference between the two events.
Ratzinger’s worldview was that of the cultural essentialist. This was most apparent
in his view that Turkey should not be admitted to the European Union because
‘Europe is a cultural continent, not a geographic one’.8 For good measure he
stressed that Europe’s roots were Christian and it was these roots that gave legiti-
macy to current political structures. Eastern enlargement was undertaken on a
premise which was exactly opposite to that put forward by Ratzinger – that the EU
was not an exclusive club, much less a defined civilizational or religious entity. In
fact eastern enlargement highlighted the degree to which the EU marginalized
culture and religion as criteria for membership. The Copenhagen criteria were and
remain genuinely secular in their scope, privileging technocratic capacity, repre-
sentative government and market capitalism. EU membership is no different for
Orthodox Greece than for Catholic Poland, nor a secular France which includes a
growing Muslim population.

Why norms mattered

While this book has sought to describe the eastern enlargement process, its impor-
tant structural features, and the way in which negotiations unfolded, its more
important contribution lies in its institutional and conceptual analysis. The argu-
ments presented centre on three important and interrelated phenomena, which, it
is claimed, can only be properly understood by embracing constructivist and
176 Conclusions
ideational interpretations of the European integration process. The first argues
that the EU should be understood as a genuine pluralistic security community and
that eastern enlargement represented an extension of that community, and espe-
cially its value system, to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The
second argument concerns norms and their centrality to the enlargement process.
A core set of norms developed in and around the European integration process and
influenced the EU’s enlargement policy in a decisive way. Finally, the institutional
politics of the eastern enlargement, although intricate and multifaceted, reveal a
complex division of responsibilities between the EU’s three leading institutions –
the Council, Commission, and Parliament. In particular the European Commis-
sion played the decisive role in shaping and guiding the enlargement process to a
conclusion.
We can summarize each of the component parts of each of these three interlinked
arguments. First, eastern enlargement constituted an extension of the EU-centred
security community in Europe. The book argued for an emerging Kantian envi-
ronment in the interstate and supranational politics of pan-Europe, characterized
by deep and still developing economic interdependence and a high level of cooper-
ation between states. The security community centred on the EU acted as a
magnet for outside states and, in the aftermath of the Cold War, represented a
formidable guarantor of ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. In effect
the eastern enlargement process became the main instrument by which the EU
sought to export its constitutive order to Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.
Thus the EU expanded the framework under which lasting peace and reconcilia-
tion was achieved in Western Europe after 1945 to the eastern part of the continent
which had been cut off from those developments involuntarily for the duration of the
Cold War. The enlargement policies adopted by the member states were character-
ized not just by the egoistic pursuit of national interests but a real endogenization of
the European interest also, and this greatly facilitated agreement on enlargement.
Member states did not refrain from pushing their own preferences but they also
demonstrated remarkable attachment to the community-building and security-
enhancing potential of the eastern enlargement process. Although the early stages
of the process seemed suggestive of ambiguity (if not recalcitrance) on the part of
the EU (protectionism, delaying tactics, unwillingness to consider real and substan-
tive institutional and policy reforms), it is also clear that the EU might have opted
for some other form of institutional and political relations with Central and Eastern
Europe such as associate membership, privileged partnerships or purely economic
links. That it did not demonstrates the profound attachment to the Deutschian
model of community. The wider Europe was not just a space to exploit market
potential but a genuine community centred on a set of core values and norms.
The second argument made in this book is that, consistent with constructivist
thinking about the European integration project, the eastern enlargement process
was dominated by a set of normative logics. Chapters 8, 9 and 10 examined EU
motivations for enlargement from the perspectives of geopolitics, economics, and
norms. The process demonstrated a complex mix of all three motivations on the
EU’s part, and the mix varied from member state to member state, as did the
 Conclusions 177
degree of enthusiasm for enlargement, and the degree of acceptance of CEE claims
for membership. What is extraordinary is that the less enthusiastic or indeed
outrightly obstructionist states among the EU15 were persuaded to consent to an
expansion which threatened their economic interests either directly or indirectly
by changing the nature of the underlying bargains which characterized the integra-
tion process. Whether one argues that such consent was garnered through a
process of social learning, rhetorical entrapment, unintended consequences or
path-dependent institutional factors, one can manifestly single out member states
such as France, Spain and Greece and ask why, in the face of specific integration
preferences, they agreed to something which, on the surface, appeared inimical to
their interests.
Andrew Moravcsik argues that member state consent was secured along the
familiar lines of liberal intergovernmental bargaining. The prerogatives of Britain,
France and Germany took precedence; smaller, less powerful member states were
effectively bought off with the ring fencing of existing side payments and a modest
recalibration of institutional arrangements. Preferences and power dominated the
enlargement process as they had for long dominated most important parts of the
integration process in Europe. This seems at best a partial explanation. It may
account for French or Spanish acquiescence if their state representatives simply
conceptualized eastern enlargement within a short timescale. It may well explain
some recurrent features of the process. But it is much less convincing as a macro-
explanation of outcomes.
The book argues that throughout the eastern enlargement process norms
mattered as much as interests, and indeed that normative explanations of the
eastern enlargement prove much more compelling than either geopolitical or
economic-centred arguments. To argue that the actors within the enlargement
process conformed mostly to logics of appropriateness is not to suggest that these
very logics did not themselves change over time. Certainly the content and
meaning of ‘appropriate behaviour’ was contested and challenged. These logics
also adapted to, inter alia, the external environment, domestic political dynamics
and the ongoing institutional politics of the EU. However, the most significant
logics of appropriateness – in this case justice, legitimacy, reciprocity, shared values
– remained more or less constant throughout and proved decisive to enlargement
outcomes.
Within the enlargement process some norms mattered more than others. Clearly
those of democracy, representative and transparent political institutions, funda-
mental freedoms, and minority rights were of much greater significance than
others. This became more and more evident as the enlargement process progressed
and the political criteria took on an importance outweighing economic or security
criteria. These norms were of the highest importance to the EU’s own constitu-
tional order and to its own self-understanding. They represented its very raison d’être
as a transnational community of values. In fact such norms were so deeply rooted
that they could be considered part of the EU’s DNA, and they were increasingly
codified in its constitutional order. To fail to live up to the behavioural characteris-
tics implied by these norms represented a negation not just of the membership
178 Conclusions
aspirations of fellow European states but also of the very norms from which the EU
itself drew its legitimacy. The EU simply could not exist if it refused membership to
the CEE states, which shared the same value-set as the EU, and had made extraor-
dinary efforts, carrying a high domestic social cost, to complete the necessary tran-
sition to accommodate the EU’s acquis communautaire.
Although the process of transposition and implementation of EU norms was
cumbersome, contested, and sometimes placed enormous strain on the emerging
systems of public administration in Central and Eastern Europe, there was no
fundamental norm conflict that may have caused serious difficulties. The process
may have been asymmetrical but CEE élites, even if they complained of logistical
difficulties and arbitrary imposition of new rules, rarely contested the norms being
transferred in a serious way. Thus norm entrepreneurship and diffusion succeeded
not just because of the asymmetry of positions between insider and outsider but
also because of the resonance of the norms being transferred domestically in CEE.
Even where they imposed significant economic and social costs in the short term
there was usually acknowledgement that in the medium term they could only
benefit the economy and society. Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig suggest that the
key factor in candidate state compliance was not norm resonance but the strict
conditionality applied by the EU and the lack of room for manoeuvre of the candi-
dates. Logics of rational action and consequentiality thus dominated the process of
norms transfer and diffusion.9 The evidence, however, suggests a much more
complex picture. The sort of changes which accompanied these measures simply
could not have been entertained without a consensus in the receiving countries that
these measures simply had to be adopted, or that they could not be adopted if there
was any fundamental conflict with local norms and societal practices.
Eastern enlargement was also governed on the EU side by a certain moral
dimension, especially the notion of having a ‘special responsibility’ for Central and
Eastern Europe and incorporating the region into EU structures. There is strong
evidence that German enlargement policy in particular was driven by a sense of
shame at Nazi tyranny in CEE and the need to atone for such. A similar view cast
enlargement as potentially ‘rescuing’ CEE in the same way that Germany had
been rescued by the European integration process and restored its reputation in the
world. The normative explanation also provides a powerful explanation of the
policies of those member states which themselves had acceded to the Union in the
course of previous enlargements. In particular Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, although they sought to protect their prerogatives within the integration
process, were also deeply influenced by their own experiences of acceptance into
the club, and general experience of membership, which because it was overwhelm-
ingly positive, made it difficult to obstruct CEE aspirations. Although this might
represent a negative cognitive assessment of enlargement on the part of these élites,
it was nevertheless an analysis governed by normative logics of appropriateness.
The normative dimension to the process also manifested itself in some more
subtle ways. Eastern enlargement helped define the criteria for membership and
especially the norms and rules which govern enlargement processes. Previously the
process was quite ad hoc and lacking in structure. The development of a specific set
 Conclusions 179
of practices and rules under the rubric of eastern enlargement led to much more
concrete (and realistic) expectations of what was expected of aspiring members.
And even if enlargement law remained, in the wake of eastern enlargement, more
customary than treaty-defined, the practices, institutional rules and behavioural
expectations surrounding the process had all evolved to such a point that substan-
tive enlargement practice existed and was itself being utilized as further enlarge-
ment began to occupy the EU’s attention.10 Indeed, the same identifiable mix of
political and institutional practices began to define the EU’s efforts to integrate the
Western Balkan states and, in a slightly different sense, relations with the Wider
Europe.

Why institutions mattered

The third argument the book makes relates to the institutional management of
eastern enlargement. This concerns the roles played by the three primary EU insti-
tutions – the Council, Commission and Parliament. The European Union consti-
tutes one of the most densely institutionalized interstate negotiating arenas in
international politics. In many ways the intra-EU institutional politics of enlarge-
ment were the most important feature of the process. It is therefore puzzling that
this subject has been so neglected within studies of eastern enlargement. In fact
only one article to date has sought to measure the influence of an institutional actor
within the eastern enlargement process.11 Analysis of the internal EU bargaining
on enlargement reveals an enormous amount about such issues as how power is
exercised within the EU, how the complex institutional design works in a charged
negotiation setting, and the relative importance of specific elements of the enlarge-
ment process. It is also true that we know much more about how the eastern
enlargement process was conceptualized, deliberated and negotiated than any
previous enlargement of the EU.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 sought to analyse the roles played within the eastern
enlargement process by the Council, Commission and Parliament. The first
striking observation to be made is the great disjunction between the sparse and
highly ambiguous legal-formal hierarchy of responsibilities laid down in the EU
treaties and what has evolved as customary enlargement practice. The sheer scale
of the eastern enlargement round encouraged the development of a clear, if not
entirely transparent, set of guidelines or enlargement rules, which although devel-
oped in a rather ad hoc manner nevertheless came to constitute la règle du jeu for all
participants. In developing those rules each of the institutions sought to maximize
its own input and influence and shape the process to the best degree possible. For
different reasons, however, it was the Commission who emerged from the eastern
enlargement process as the most important, or at least, the most effective, institu-
tional actor.
Although the Council is identified in the treaties as the primary institutional actor
in the process, its role is complex and hampered by a number of different structural
problems, not least of which is the fragmentation of its power along territorial and
sectoral lines. The differentiated sharing of responsibilities across the Council meant
180 Conclusions
that enlargement decisions were discussed, deliberated, problematized and negotiated
in a context where such territorial and sectoral divisions weakened the coherence of
Council positions. In addition to confusing the candidate states as to desired modes
of action this fragmentation of power ensured that the Commission enjoyed a much
greater role in policy and in the negotiations than the treaty provisions suggested.
The European Council, consisting of heads of state and government, plays an
increasingly important role in EU politics and certainly provided much of the loosely
framed political direction which guided eastern enlargement. Its role, however, was
frequently undermined by one of the structural weaknesses of customary EU deliber-
ation, the tendency to leave important policy-making decisions to the high-octane
summit meetings which take place about four times per year. If on some occasions
there was enough political will to provide real momentum, there were many other
summit meetings that produced nothing but stasis and left the candidate states exas-
perated and the process itself in limbo. The European Council only really contrib-
uted effectively within the enlargement process when the Presidency galvanized
opinion and effectively mediated between parties, enabling the problem of fragmen-
tation within the Council to be overcome.
Chapter 5 suggested that the EU Presidency played a crucial institutional role in
the eastern enlargement process. Presidencies were able to shape the enlargement
agenda by using a range of instruments and deploying them effectively within the
largely informal and arbitrary decision-making structures. While there were impor-
tant differences in the way the member states approached enlargement during
their Presidencies, it is clear that those of Sweden and Denmark in particular used
innovative institutional measures and a not inconsiderable amount of political
entrepreneurship in moderating between insiders and outsiders, and between
member states, as the negotiations drew to a conclusion. The ability of the Presi-
dency to exploit the very ambiguity of its own institutional functions was hugely
important in creating political space where positions could be assessed, deliberated
and moderated if necessary. The analysis suggests that it also more difficult for
large states to put their interests aside in an enlargement negotiation. Small states
were manifestly more successful in promoting bargains which accommodated
candidate state preferences and collective outcomes over partisan attachments.
That may be because of the realities of power asymmetry within the internal EU
negotiation setting, or because small states often do not have the same range of
issues or intensity of preferences in the negotiations. It is clear, however, that the
Presidency plays an increasingly important role within enlargement decision-
making.
The proactive and very effective role played by the European Commission
within the eastern enlargement process also stands out in the institutional context.
Whilst member states (through the European Council and the various parts of the
Council machinery such as Coreper) may have seemed to be in command of the
enlargement process, the conclusions presented in chapter 6 suggest that the
Commission was consistently able to shape the policy agenda and structure negoti-
ations in a way which proved decisive. Facing the challenge of managing relations
with the new democracies the Commission was confronted with an environment it
 Conclusions 181
had never previously encountered. That led to many mistakes in the early part of
the enlargement process where the Commission found itself as much student as
teacher. But gradually a more sure-footed approach developed. The Commission’s
influence stemmed principally from two sources. The first was its formal power to
initiate policy proposals, which helped it set and shape the enlargement policy
agenda. And although as in the general integration framework it sought to incorpo-
rate and adjust for the specific concerns of member states, as frequently it found
itself the sole policy innovator and thus the best placed EU actor within the process.
As importantly it deployed a formidable range of informal agenda-shaping instru-
ments as it sought to progress the enlargement process. Most importantly it consis-
tently sought to frame eastern enlargement as a ‘win–win’ process for both
candidates and the EU, and as community-enhancing and morally just. From the
outset of the process member states were dependent on the Commission for leader-
ship and policy advice. It was the Commission which took responsibility for
managing the initial aid programmes for CEE, produced the Opinions on the
ability of the candidate states to meet the criteria for membership, and oversaw the
screening process, that is, the analysis of the transposition and implementation
efforts by candidate states. Even in the latter stage of negotiations where the
member states were in the ascendancy and the Presidency played a crucial role, the
Commission continued to promote its enlargement strategy to both insiders and
outsiders, with a mixture of cajolery, debate and persuasion. Crucially the Commis-
sion’s socialization of the candidate states into EU norms and practices was
achieved through its dual responsibility for capacity-building in the candidate
states and ensuring compliance with EU norms and legal regulations. This dual
role allowed it to exert an extraordinary degree of influence on both the candidate
states and on the enlargement process itself as it developed. Indeed it is not going
too far to suggest that the Commission emerges as the unsung hero of the process,
guiding enlargement from behind the scenes and demonstrating a sureness of
diplomatic touch which helped mediate between parties and bring the process to a
successful conclusion.
Another part of the eastern enlargement’s institutional story emerges in the
activity of the European Parliament, for long, as Pat Cox attests, the Cinderella of
the European integration process. It is clear that the Parliament is now a major
institutional force within the EU, empowered as it has been by successive processes
of constitutional revision. And although within the enlargement process the Parlia-
ment’s role remains somewhat marginal, chapter 7 suggested that it managed to
carve out for itself an influential role both with the candidate states and with the
Council and Commission. While the Parliament’s role remained confined to
issuing its assent on completion of negotiations there is plenty of evidence that it
managed also to exert informal power throughout the process, not least in shaping
parliamentary practice as it developed in Central and Eastern Europe. The Parlia-
ment was insistent from the beginning of the process that the EU’s core norms of
democracy, legitimacy, justice, and fundamental freedoms be placed at the forefront
of both EU policy and CEE transition. There were many occasions throughout the
process when the Parliament asserted the importance of EU values. And while it
182 Conclusions
did not refrain from challenging the candidate states to up their performance in
given areas, it also remained throughout the most consistent advocate of enlarge-
ment and of the accommodation of candidate state preferences within the negotia-
tion process. At the very least the Parliament’s formal power to withhold assent
guaranteed that other actors within the process desisted from taking actions which
provoked it and potentially resulted in its refusal to sanction the accession of any
one country or indeed all candidates.
Eastern enlargement emerged out of the dramatic changes in the European
landscape after 1989. It consisted of a geopolitical dimension that revolved around
the construction of a new security architecture in Europe. This developed in the
shadow of NATO structures, which assumed much more importance for the
management of Europe’s new security relations. But the eastern enlargement of
the EU also threw up important security issues and was partly governed by security
logics, even if these were more ‘soft’ than ‘hard’. Enlargement also grew out of a set
of economic pressures or logics. The EU saw enlargement both as an instrument
for enhancing market opportunities and entrenching the market economic system
in Central and Eastern Europe and as a means of managing a range of economic
externalities such as environmental problems, immigration and social dumping. In
the final analysis, however, eastern enlargement of the EU is best understood as a
norm-driven phenomenon, representing, as Vaclav Havel has suggested, an attempt
to extend the European community of values to the eastward part of the continent.
That such enlargement was only realized 15 years after the new dawn of 1989 says
something about the shifting sands of European politics and the continued tension
between national interests and collective values. It is difficult to speculate how
eastern enlargement will change the EU. It is clear, however, that the process by
which enlargement was realized will continue to fascinate scholars and political
commentators long into the future. Such a profound change in the status quo,
effected by such a diverse range of actors in a dense and complex institutional envi-
ronment perhaps constitutes one of the most remarkable achievements of the
European integration process to date.
Notes

Chapter 1
1 The EU was established by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union), which
came into force in November 1993. Preceding the EU was the European Economic Community
(EEC), which was created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC), established by the 1951 Paris Treaty, preceded the EEC itself. The term European
Union (EU) will be used throughout this book. Where a distinction with the old EEC or ECSC is
deemed necessary that will be made clear in the text.
2 I do not include the accession of the old East Germany (GDR), which formally acceded to the EU
after its absorption into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1991. This is considered a
purely domestic matter.
3 William Wallace, ‘Where Does Europe End? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion’, in Jan
Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London:
Routledge, 2002), p. 88.
4 See Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, ‘European Integration Since the 1990s: Member States
and the European Commission’, ARENA Working Papers, WP 6/04, Oslo: ARENA.
5 Fraser Cameron, ‘Widening and Deepening’, in Fraser Cameron (ed.), The Future of Europe: Inte-
gration and Enlargement (London; Routledge, 2004), p. 1.
6 ‘EU delays Croatian entry talks’, Guardian, 17 March 2005; ‘EU makes Croatia suffer for allowing
war criminal to flee EU’, European Voice, 10–16 March 2005; ‘Postponed, but Croatia talks still on
if Gotovina is found’, European Voice, 17–23 March 2005.
7 Graham Avery, ‘The Enlargement Negotiations’, in Fraser Cameron (ed.), The Future of Europe:
Integration and Enlargement, pp. 35–62; Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, Enlarging the European
Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998); Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and
Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Peter Ludlow,
The Making of the New Europe: the European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002, European Council
Commentary, vol. 2/1 (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004).
8 Karen Hendersen (ed.), Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union (London:
University of London Press, 1999); Hillary Ingham and Mike Ingham (eds), EU Expansion to the
East: Prospects and Problems (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002); Mike Mannin (ed.), Pushing Back the
Boundaries: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1999); Marc Maresceau, Enlarging the European Union (Harlow: Longman, 1997); Neil
Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004); Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe
Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002).
9 Atila Ágh, ‘Europeanization of Policy-Making in East Central Europe: the Hungarian Approach
to EU Accession’, Journal of European Public Policy 6/5, 1999: 839–54; Irene Brinar and Marjan
Svetlicic, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: the Case of Slovenia’, Journal of European Public
Policy 6/5, 1999: 802–21; Petr Bugge, ‘Czech Perceptions of the Perspective of EU Membership:
Havel versus Klaus’, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2000/10; Jerzy Buzek, ‘Poland’s Future in a
184 Notes
United Europe’, ZEI Discussion Paper, Centre for European Integration Studies, Bonn, 1998;
Rachel Cichowski, ‘Choosing Democracy: Citizen Attitudes and the Eastern Enlargement of the
European Union’, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2000/12; Martin Ferry, ‘The EU and Recent
Regional Reform in Poland’, Europe–Asia Studies 55/7, 2003: 1097–116; Vello Pettai and Jan
Zielonka (eds), The Road to the European Union, vol. 2: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2003); Frederik Pflueger, ‘Poland and the European Union’, Aussen
Politik 46/3, 1995: 228–38; Jacques Rupnik and Jan Zielonka (eds), The Road to the European Union,
vol. 1: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Renata
Stawarska, ‘EU Enlargement from the Polish Perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy 6/5,
1999: 822–38; Aleks Szcerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds), EU Enlargement and Referendums (London:
Routledge, 2005).
10 Stephen D. Collins, German Policy-Making and Eastern Enlargement of the EU During the Kohl Era
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); John O’Brennan, ‘Enlargement as a Factor in
the Irish Referendum on the Nice Treaty’, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs VII/III, 2002:
78–94; Henning Tewes, ‘Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in Germany’s
Enlargement Policy’, West European Politics 21/2, 1998: 117–33; Sonia Piedrafita Tremosa, ‘The
EU Eastern Enlargement: Policy Choices of the Spanish Government’, European Integration online
Papers 9/3, 2005, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-003a.htm; Jean Marc Trouille, ‘France,
Germany and the Eastwards Expansion of the EU: Towards a Common Ostpolitik’, in Hillary
Ingham and Mike Ingham (eds), EU Expansion to the East: Prospects and Problems, pp. 50–64.
11 Richard E. Baldwin, Toward an Integrated Europe (London: Centre for Economic Policy Reform,
1994); Richard E. Baldwin, Jean E. Francois and Ricardo Portes, ‘The Costs and Benefits of
Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe’, Economic Policy 24, 1997: 125–
76; Niklas Baltas, ‘The Economy of the European Union’, in Neil Nugent (ed.), European Union
Enlargement, pp. 146–57; Dorothee Bohle, ‘The Ties That Bind: Neoliberal Restructuring and
Transnational Actors in the Deepening and Widening of the European Union’, Paper presented
at the ECPR Joint Session Workshops ‘Enlargement and European Governance’, Turin, 22–27
March 2002; Fritz Breuss, ‘Macroeconomic Effects of EU Enlargement for Old and New
Members’, WIFO Working Papers 143/2001 (Vienna: Austrian Institute of Economic Research
(WIFO), 2001); Terry Caslin and Laszlo Czaban, ‘Economic Transformation in CEE’, in Mike
Mannin (ed.), Pushing Back the Boundaries: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 70–
98; ERT (European Roundtable of Industrialists), Opening Up: The Business Opportunities of EU
Enlargement, ERT Position Paper and Analysis of the Economic Costs and Benefits of EU
Enlargement (Brussels: ERT, 2001); Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998); Alan Mayhew, ‘The Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement
and Accession’, SEI Working Paper no. 65 (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2003).
12 David Bailey and Lisa de Propris, ‘A Bridge too PHARE? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity
Building in the Candidate Countries’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42/1, 2004: 77–98;
Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003); Antoeneta Dimitrova, ‘Enlargement, Institution Building and the EU’s Administrative
Capacity’, West European Politics 25/4: 171–90; Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva,
‘Europeanization as a Gravity Model of Democratization’, CEPS Working Document no. 214,
(Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004); Heather Grabbe, ‘Europeanization Goes
East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process’, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint
Sessions Workshop ‘Enlargement and European Governance’, Turin, 22–27 March 2002;
James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Clare Gordon, ‘Conditionality and Compliance in the
EU’s Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-National Government, Journal of Common Market
Studies 42/3, 2004: 523–51; Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade: The Meaning
and Structure of the Copenhagen Political Criteria of Democracy and the Rule of Law, European
Integration online Papers 8/10, 2004, http://eiop.or.at/texte/2004-010.htm; Marc Maresceau,
‘The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: a Political and Legal Analysis’, in Marc Maresceau and
Erwan Lannon (eds), The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative Analysis
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Phedon Nicolaides, ‘Preparing for Accession to the European
Union: How to Establish Capacity for Effective and Credible Application of EU Rules’, in
 Notes 185
Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, pp. 43–78; Dimitri Papadimitriou and
David Phinnemore, ‘Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning
Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42/3, 2004:
619–39; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern
Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier,
‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 11/4, 2004: 661–79; Frank Schimmelfennig,
Stefan Engbert, and Heiko Knobel, ‘The Conditions of Conditionality: The Impact of the EU on
Democracy and Human Rights in European Non-Member States’, Paper presented at the ECPR
Joint Sessions Workshop ‘Enlargement and European Governance’, Turin, 22–27 March 2002;
Karen E. Smith, ‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’ in Marise
Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, pp. 105–40; Milada Ana Vachudova, ‘The
Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States: Eastern Europe and the European
Union’, RSC No. 2001/33, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence: European
University Institute.
13 Stefanie Balier and Gerald Schneider, ‘The Power of Legislative Hot Air: Informal Rules and the
Enlargement Debate in the European Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies 6/2, 2000: 19–44;
Thomas Braüninger and Thomas König, ‘Enlargement and the Union’s Institutional Reform’,
Paper presented at the Conference on Enlargement and Constitutional Change in the European
Union, Leiden University, Netherlands, 26–28 November 1999; Herbert Hubel, ‘The EU’s
Three-Level Game in Dealing with Neighbours’, European Foreign Affairs Review 9, 2004: 347–62;
14 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Ana Vachudova,
‘National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement’, East European Politics and Society 17/1,
2003: 42–57.
15 Karen Fierke and Antje Wiener, ‘Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlarge-
ment’, Journal of European Public Policy 6/5, 1999: 721–42; Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘East of Amsterdam:
The Implications of the Amsterdam Treaty for Eastern Enlargement’, in Karlheinz Neunreither
and Antje Wiener (eds), European Integration After Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16 Iver T. Berend, ‘The Further Enlargement of the European Union in a Historical Perspective’,
European Review 7/2, 1999: 175–81; Iver B. Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the
Integration/Exclusion Nexus’, Alternatives 23, 1998: 397–416; Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘EU Enlarge-
ment, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy: Identity Formation through Policy
Practice’, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2003/13.
17 Ronald H. Linden (ed.), Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central
and East European States (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Frank Schimmelfennig,
The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003);
Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization 55/1, 2001: 47–80;
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public
Policy 11/4, 2004: 661–79; Antje Wiener, ‘Contested Compliance: Interventions on the
Normative Structure of World Politics’, European Journal of International Relations 10/2, 2004:
189–234.
18 See Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘One Size Fits All: EU Policies for the Promotion of
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, Paper presented to the Workshop on Democ-
racy Promotion, Centre for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Stanford Univer-
sity, 4–5 October 2004. See also Antje Wiener, op. cit.
19 See Dimitri Kochenov, ‘EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments’, European
Integration online Papers 9/6, 2005, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-006a.htm.
20 Desmond Dinan, ‘The Commission and Enlargement’, in John Redmond and Glenda Rosenthal
(eds), The Expanding European Union: Past, Present and Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 20.
21 Ibid., p. 36.
186 Notes
22 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?’ in
Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 446.
23 See, for example, Markus Jachtenfuchs, ‘Deepening and Widening Integration Theory’, Journal
of European Public Policy 9/4, 2002: 650–57.
24 Jan Zielonka, ‘Ambiguity as a Remedy for the EU’s Eastward Enlargement’, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs XII/1, 1998: 15.

Chapter 2
1 John Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe (London: Pinter/RIIA, 1991), pp. 8–23;
Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?’ in
Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 427–60.
2 The CMEA, or Comecon as it was more popularly referred to, was the economic arm of the
Warsaw Pact Alliance. For analysis of its demise see ‘East Europeans meet to bury Warsaw Pact’,
Independent, 25 February 1991; ‘Comecon: life after death’, Economist, 20 April 1991; ‘Comecon
put out of its misery after 42 years’, Financial Times, 29 June 1991.
3 The ‘Return to Europe’ quickly emerged as the central pillar upon which membership bids by
the CEE states were founded. The ‘Return’ has been the subject of an exhaustive range of
academic analysis. For our purposes it is sufficient to note the extent to which CEE political
leaders deployed the phrase and the reigning idea very regularly in the early 1990s. For some
examples, see Iver B. Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclu-
sion Nexus’, Alternatives 23, 1998: 397–416; Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap:
Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, Interna-
tional Organization 55/1, 2001: 68–9.
4 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 433.
5 See, for example, ‘Poll finds yearning to join Community’, The European, 30 November 1990.
6 ‘EC dilemma over Eastern Europe’, Guardian, 10 April 1990.
7 See ‘Thatcher urges closer EC ties with East bloc nations’, Financial Times, 15 November 1989;
‘Thatcher seeks commitment on EC entry for Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 6 August 1990;
‘Thatcher defies EC over East bloc members’, Independent on Sunday, 12 August 1990.
8 See, for example, ‘Hurd foresees East Europe joining EC’, Independent, 28 February 1990; ‘Hurd
pushes for EU expansion’, Guardian, 1 May 1995; ‘Major promises to help Poland join the
twelve’, Independent, 27 May 1992. Major visited Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland between
26 and 28 May 1992 and pledged support for early entry to the Community.
9 ‘Eastern Europe “threatens to destabilise EC’’’, Financial Times, 7 November 1990. Mitterand
was not alone. During the Irish Presidency of the Community in 1990, Taoiseach Charles
Haughey ruled out membership of the EC for Eastern Europe and instead advocated special
individual links, Financial Times, 6 February 1990. On Mitterand’s position see Jean-Marc
Trouille, ‘France, Germany and the Eastwards Expansion of the EU: Towards a Common
Ostpolitik’, pp. 50–64. On differences between Thatcher and Mitterand see ‘Umpteen ways to
spell Europe’, Independent, 22 September 1990.
10 ‘Delors frames EC “Ostpolitik”’, Independent, 16 November 1989; ‘Brussels urges wider links with
East bloc’, Financial Times, 2 February 1990.
11 Iver T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993: Detour from the Centre to the Periphery (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 335.
12 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community, (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1994), p. 475.
13 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Strasbourg European Council, Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities, EC 12– 1989.
14 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 432.
 Notes 187
15 See, for example, Wim Duisenberg’s contribution: ‘Lessons from the Marshall Plan’, European
Affairs 5/3, 1991: 21–5.
16 Werner Ungerer, ‘The Development of the EC and its Relationship with Central and Eastern
Europe’, Aussen Politik 41/3, 1990: 278.
17 See, for example, ‘EC pushes for fresh trade pacts with East Europe’, Financial Times, 4 January
1990; ‘Brussels to widen trade favours in East Europe’, Financial Times, 18 October 1990; ‘EC
takes stock of eastern promise’, Financial Times, 6 March 1991.
18 ‘EC to offer Eastern Europe new links’, Financial Times, 2 August 1990.
19 One of the interesting side effects of the eventually successful conclusion to the enlargement
negotiations was the virtual collapse of CEFTA. It lost most of its members on 1 May 2004
leaving only three members – Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. This has its parallel in the reduc-
tion in size of the EFTA through successive enlargements of the European Community/Union.
It is left with three members also – Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. See ‘CEFTA trading bloc
to collapse?’ European Report, No. 2826, 6 December 2003, V.11.
20 ‘Linking arms on the march to Europe’, Independent, 15 February 1991.
21 Iver T. Berend, op. cit., p.336.
22 ‘G 24 may offer more aid to Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 17 February 1990; ‘EC proposes to
offer £1.7 billion aid package to Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 22 February 1990; ‘Twelve
plan more aid to Eastern Europe’, Independent, 29 October 1990.
23 Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 134–7.
24 Iver T. Berend, op. cit., pp. 334–5.
25 See Neal Ascherson, ‘A new Iron Curtain in Europe is dividing rich from poor’, Independent on
Sunday, 11 November 1990. See also ‘Eastern promise betrayed by latter-day Marshall Plan’,
Guardian, 8 May 1994.
26 The amount applies not for three whole financial years but two and a half approximately, taking
into account the date of accession of 1 May 2004.
27 Heather Grabbe, ‘The Copenhagen Deal for Enlargement’, Briefing Note, Centre for European
Reform, London, December 2002.
28 The UN target figure for aid to developing countries is 0.7 per cent of GDP. Among the EU states
only Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden contribute at or above the UN
figure. The United Kingdom contributes less than 0.4 per cent of its GDP to developing coun-
tries, Germany 0.3 per cent, whilst Italy is the worst performer, donating only 0.15 per cent of
GDP. See The Economist, 7 May 2005.
29 Hubert Leipold, ‘The Eastwards Enlargement of the European Union: Opportunities and
Obstacles’, Aussen Politik 46/2, 1995, p. 131.
30 The figures are cited by Heather Grabbe, op. cit.
31 The Irish government was very successful in arguing for and then maintaining a disproportionate
share of the Cohesion funds. Helpfully for Ireland the negotiation of the 2000–6 financial frame-
work took place at a time when Irish GDP, although growing rapidly, had not yet reached a point
where the country could be excluded from the poorer cohort of member states. The Irish govern-
ment also argued successfully that Ireland was the only country in the industrialized world to
demonstrate a marked difference between GDP and GNP, a phenomenon attributable to the
transfer-pricing activities of multinational companies operating in the Republic. The Irish
government argued that the country’s entitlement should be based on the lower figure of GNP
rather than the normal GDP. Thus Ireland managed to hold on to a much more significant share
of Structural and Cohesion funding over the period 2000–6 than might have been expected.
32 See The Economist, 17 June 1995.
33 ERT (European Roundtable of Industrialists), Opening Up: the Business Opportunities of EU Enlarge-
ment, ERT Position Paper and Analysis of the Economic Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement
(Brussels: ERT, 2001), p. 32.
34 Arnuf Baring, Germany’s New Position in Eastern Europe: Problems and Perspectives (Oxford: Berg, 1996),
p. 68.
35 The French acronym for: ‘Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies’. See
188 Notes
‘PHARE: a beacon of hope’, The Courier, 121, 1990; ‘Coordinated aid to Poland and Hungary’,
Bulletin of the European Communities 10, 1989.
36 ‘EC to extend its financial aid’, Financial Times, 3 May 1990; ‘Directing aid at an explosive situa-
tion’, Guardian, 27 November 1991.
37 European Commission, Second Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment: On the Implementation of Community Assistance to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, COM
(93) 172 final, Brussels, 1993.
38 By early 2004 the EIB had lent over €23 billion to Central and Eastern Europe.
39 European Commission DG Enlargement, From Pre-Accession to Accession: Interim Evaluation of
PHARE Support Allocated in 1999–2002 and Implemented until November 2003, Consolidated Summary
Report, March 2004, p. 3.
40 See Alan Mayhew, op. cit., pp. 138–50.
41 Frederick Pflueger, ‘Poland and the European Union’, Aussen Politik, 46/3, 1995, p. 229.
42 The Vice-President of the EIB, Wolfgang Roth, for example, urged the EU to cut funds to the
myriad range of advisers and contractors. See Financial Times, 15 November 1996.
43 Court of Auditors, Annual Report, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. 309, 16
November 1993, pp. 179–80.
44 See ‘Watchdog urged to halt aid swindlers’, The European, 1 June 1990; ‘Aid hit by fraud’, The
European, 30 November 1990.
45 Cited in Desmond Dinan, op. cit., p. 475.
46 ‘EC aid to the East – Good intentions, poor performance’, The Economist, 10 April 1993.
47 For a retrospective evaluation of PHARE see European Commission DG Enlargement, 2004,
op. cit.
48 Alan Mayhew, op. cit., pp. 154–6.
49 Ibid., p. 14.
50 Council Decision of 19 November 1990 on the conclusion of agreement establishing the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 90/674/EEC, OJ L372, 31 December 1990
(includes the text of the agreement). For commentary see ‘Big ambitions are born with pan-
European bank’, Financial Times, 18 September 1990; ‘EBRD has 200 projects in hand’, Finan-
cial Times, 3 January 1991; ‘European bank aims to start lending by June’, Financial Times, 15
April 1991.
51 ‘European bank site sparks deep row’, Financial Times, 21 May 1990; for a profile of Attali see the
Independent, 22 June 1991.
52 See ‘Attali and his bank fail to match up to expectations’, Guardian, 27 August 1991.
53 ‘EBRD spends more on itself than on loans to Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 13 April 1993;
European Report, No. 1850, 8 April 1993, V.8; ‘EBRD lending falls far short of targets’, Financial
Times, 24 May 1993.
54 ‘Attali quits as EBRD chief “in bank’s interest’’’, Financial Times, 26 June 1993. See also Guardian,
26 June 1993; European Report, No. 1870, 26 June 1993.
55 ‘De Larosièré’s new Banque de France’, Euromoney, April 1996.
56 ‘EBRD casts off its profligate image’, Financial Times, 7 March 1996; ‘EBRD lends a helping
hand’, European Dialogue, 4, July–August 1997.
57 On association and association agreements see David Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-stone or
Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); Alan Mayhew, op. cit.,
Part II, Association, pp. 41–59.
58 See European Commission, Communication on the Association Agreements with the Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe: a General Outline, COM (90) 398 final, Brussels, 18 November 1990; European
Commission, Proposals Concerning the Conclusion of the Interim Agreements between the EC and Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, COM (91) 524 final, Brussels, 13 December 1991. See also ‘Central
Europeans sign EC trade deal’, Financial Times, 17 December 1991; ‘EC paves way for free trade
with Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 23 November 1991. See also Independent, 23 November
1991; European Report, No. 1721, 16 November 1991, V.5; ‘The shape of agreements to come’,
Financial Times, 5 December 1991.
 Notes 189
59 European Commission, Third and Fourth Annual Reports From the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, COM (95) 13 final, Brussels, 1995.
60 Ibid.
61 An early and cogent criticism of the EC’s protectionist stance came in the form of a Financial Times
editorial, ‘With friends like these’, on 9 September 1991. See ‘Open Up’, The Economist, 3 August
1991; ‘A new Iron Curtain descends’, Independent, 30 September 1992; ‘Fortress Europe keeps
Eastern neighbours out’, Financial Times, 19 October 1992.
62 Ernst Wistrich, The United States of Europe (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 129.
63 ‘East Europe hopes of EC integration being dashed’, Financial Times, 26 March 1991; ‘East Euro-
peans hit at EC barriers’, Guardian, 8 June 1991. See also Financial Times, 10 June 1991; ‘Steel
dumping duties upset Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 20 November 1992.
64 ‘Delay angers East Europe’, Guardian, 10 April 1991.
65 ‘Brussels opens its doors to trade with Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 19 April 1991; ‘Food
surplus war looms’, The European, 19 July 1991; ‘EEC industry wants limits to Association Agree-
ments’, European Report, No. 1704, 18 September 1991, V.5–7; ‘French retreat stiffens east’s EC
links’, Guardian, 1 October 1991; ‘Polish dispute threatens EC hopes for East Europeans’, The
European, 1 November 1991.
66 ERT, op. cit.
67 Anders Inotai, ‘The “Eastern Enlargements” of the European Union’, in Marise Cremona (ed.),
The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 90–1.
68 Desmond Dinan, op. cit., p. 428.
69 Alan Mayhew, op. cit., p. 99.
70 Quoted in Desmond Dinan, op. cit., p. 478.
71 See also ‘East Europe calls EC’s bluff over free trade’, Financial Times, 16 April 1993; European Report,
No. 1851, 17 April 1993, V.4; ‘Iron curtain in the way of trade’, Financial Times, 29 April 1993.
72 David Phinnemore, op. cit., pp. 67–70; Sedelmeier and Wallace, op. cit., p. 438.
73 European Commission, op. cit., COM (90) 398 final, Brussels, 27 August 1990.
74 See ‘Association Agreements under strain’, European Report, No. 1794, 12 September 1992, V.4-5.
75 Perry Anderson identifies a triangular relationship between the removal of the Iron Curtain,
which triggered the unification of Germany, which in turn necessitated locking Germany into a
more integrated European Community. See Independent, 29 January 1996. For a detailed rejec-
tion of such a view see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from
Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 407–17.
76 ‘Absent friends frozen out of unity talks’, Guardian, 7 December 1991; ‘Eastern Europe keeps half
an eye on the EC’, Financial Times, 12 December 1991.
77 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 435. See also Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Sectoral
Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access, and Alliances in a Composite Polity’, Journal of
European Public Policy, 9/4, 2002: 627–34.
78 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 439.
79 See, for example, Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph E. Francois and Ricardo Portes, ‘The Costs and
Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe’, Economic Policy 24,
1997; Alan Mayhew, op. cit.; Karen Hendersen (ed.), Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and
the European Union (London: University of London Press, 1999).
80 Quoted by Lionel Barber, Financial Times, 16 November 1995. Headlines such as ‘2001 Is Too
Late’ (The Economist, 13 March 1993) and ‘The EU Goes Cold On Enlargement’ (The Economist,
25 October 1995) were representative of the concerns about the lack of priority accorded to
eastward enlargement in EU circles.
81 See, for example, ‘Unwilling to take no for an answer’, The European, 23 July 1992; ‘East Euro-
pean states put case for EC entry’, Financial Times, 6 October 1992; ‘Eastern Europe steps up
pressure’, Financial Times, 21 September 1992; ‘Applicants knock loudly on EC door’, Guardian,
30 September 1992.
82 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002,
European Council Commentary 2/1 (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004), p. 21.
190 Notes
83 European Commission, Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
COM (93) 648 final, Brussels, 18 May 1993.
84 Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 44.
85 Graham Avery, ‘The Enlargement Negotiations’, in Fraser Cameron (ed.), The Future of Europe:
Integration and Enlargement (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 36.
86 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities, EC 6–1993.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 On help with market access see European Commission, Follow-up to the European Council in Copen-
hagen: Market Access Measures to help the Central and Eastern European Countries, COM (93) 321 final,
Brussels, 7 July 1993.
90 In advance of Copenhagen Commissioner Leon Brittan was particularly forthright in calling for
PHARE to be ‘streamlined and decentralised’ in order to improve its effectiveness. ‘Brittan
admits flaws in aid’, Financial Times, 10 June 1993. See also European Report, No. 1863, 2 June
1993, Memo, page 1.
91 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 45.
92 Cited in Anna Michalski and Helen Wallace, The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement
(London: RIIA, 1992), p. 114.
93 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 46.
94 Quoted in the Financial Times, 5 February 1992.
95 Financial Times, 23 March 1993.

Chapter 3
1 Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000): p. 53.
2 Switzerland, another EFTA state, had also applied for membership in May 1992, but its applica-
tion was effectively withdrawn after Swiss voters rejected the European Economic Area (EEA) in
a December 1992 referendum.
3 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?’ in
Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 442.
4 European Commission, Communication on Relations with the Associated Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. Task force on Approximation of Laws, COM (94) 391 final, Brussels, 16 September
1994.
5 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002,
European Council Commentary 2/1 (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004), p. 23.
6 See, for example, ‘Big boost in EU trade with Central and Eastern Europe’, Eurostat News
Release, No. 53, 14 November 1994.
7 Hungary was the first state to apply for membership on 31 March 1994, followed by Poland on 5
April 1994. Romania was next on 22 June 1995, Slovakia on 27 June 1995, Latvia on 13 October
1995, Estonia on 24 November 1995, Lithuania on 8 December 1995, and Bulgaria on 14
December 1995. The following year, applications were formally lodged by the Czech Republic
on 17 January and Slovenia on 10 June 1996.
8 European Commission, The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central
and Eastern Europe for Accession, COM (94) 320 final, Brussels, 13 July 1994.
9 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 56.
10 European Commission, The Europe Agreements and Beyond.
11 European Commission, Follow Up to Commission Communication on The Europe Agreements and Beyond:
A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession, COM (94) 361 final,
Brussels, 27 July 1994.
 Notes 191
12 See Stephen D. Collins, German Policy-making and Eastern Enlargement of the EU during the Kohl Era
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 100–5.
13 ‘Kohl wants East Europeans invited to EU summits’, Financial Times, 19 July 994.
14 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., pp. 56–7.
15 Quoted by Lionel Barber, ‘Kohl Invites Eastern States to EU Summit’, Financial Times, 1 December
1994. See also ‘Six ex-communist states take big step towards EU’, Guardian, 1 November 1994.
16 See the Financial Times editorial, ‘Europe’s Big Challenge’, 9 November 1994; ‘When the East’s
dream evaporates’, Guardian, 19 November 1994; ‘EU’s outstretched hand to the east begins to
waver’, Financial Times, 23 November 1994; ‘East Europe impatient for seat at the table’, Financial
Times, 9 December 1994.
17 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Essen Summit, Bulletin of the European Union, EU-12
1994.
18 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 58.
19 The leaders of the six states that had signed Europe Agreements by that stage were present –
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.
20 The Balladur Plan, named after its instigator, French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur.
21 European Dialogue, March–April 1995.
22 There is a solid case for arguing that the Pact on Stability ensured that potentially corrosive long-
standing disputes relating to borders and extraterritorial national minority groups could find
peaceful resolution. Many commentators point out that the Hungarian–Romanian relationship
might easily have degenerated into a fratricidal conflict every bit as bloody as the break-up of
Yugoslavia without the conditionality imposed by the EU in its enlargement design. Other
disputes successfully settled before the International Court of Justice under the influence of the
Pact included those between Hungary and Slovakia over a dam on the river Danube and the
question of the maritime frontier between Lithuania and Latvia. See Jacek Saryusz-Wolski,
‘Looking to the Future’, in Antonio Missiroli (ed.), Enlargement and European Defence after 11 Septem-
ber, Chaillot Papers No. 53 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies), pp. 55–69.
23 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 64.
24 European Commission, White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
for Integration Into the Internal Market of the Union, COM (95) 163 final, Brussels, 3 May 1995.
25 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., pp. 64–5.
26 Quoted by Lionel Barber, ‘East Europe’s Reform Route to EU’, Financial Times, 4 May 1995. See
also ‘A White Paper approved for nine CEECs’, European Report, 14 June 1995, V.6–7.
27 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 443.
28 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 67. See also Economist, 15 July 1995.
29 For the internal German politics of eastern enlargement see Stephen D. Collins, op. cit., ch. 2.
30 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Madrid, Bulletin of the European Union, EU-12 1995.
31 Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, Enlarging the European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1998), p. 39.
32 ‘Brussels keeps the gates to the east shut’, Financial Times, 16 November 1995.
33 ‘Improvements proposed to EU–East Europe structured dialogue’, European Report, No. 2111, 28
February 1996, V.7.
34 On preparation of the Commission’s Opinions, see Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, op. cit.,
pp. 35–43; Michael Baun, op. cit., pp. 78–95; Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, Enlarging the
EU Eastwards (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), pp. 41–54; and Alan
Mayhew, Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 174–6.
35 The Commission had supplied the CEE states with a very extensive questionnaire related to their
legislative capacity. See ‘CEEC’s face extensive list of questions’, European Report, No. 2128, 1
May 1996, V.4–6; ‘Commission prepares to analyse mountain of enlargement replies’, European
Voice, 11 July 1996.
36 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 78.
37 The assessment process was a difficult one for the Commission with an amount of technical detail
and a degree of uncertainty about the accuracy of the information provided. See ‘Officials find
192 Notes
the devil is in the detail’, European Voice, 21 November 1996. See also Graham Avery and Fraser
Cameron, op. cit., pp. 35–7.
38 European Commission, Agenda 2000: For A Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the European Union,
Supp. 5/97. The full texts of the ten Opinions can be found in Supps 6/97 to 15/97, in separate
volumes.
39 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 83.
40 Ibid., p. 84.
41 Cited in Lionel Barber, ‘Brussels Unveils Plans for Reforms in an Enlarged EU’, Financial Times,
17 July 1997.
42 ‘EU braced for enlargement war’, Financial Times, 14 July 1997. See also Graham Avery and
Fraser Cameron, ‘Reactions to Agenda 2000’, op. cit., pp. 121–39.
43 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 448.
44 Marie Soveroski, ‘Agenda 2000: A Blueprint for Successful EU Enlargement?’, Eipascope 1998/1.
45 See the Commission Press Release on the new orientation of PHARE, IP/97/234, 19 March
1997. For background see also, ‘New mandate sought for guarantees on CEEC loans’, European
Voice, 23 January 1997; ‘EU takes firmer grip on PHARE funding’, European Voice, 27 February
1997.
46 Marc Maresceau, ‘The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: a Political and Legal Analysis’, in Marc
Maresceau and Erwan Lannon (eds), The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative
Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 7.
47 Council Regulation (EC) No. 622/98, ‘Assistance to the applicant states in the framework of the
pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession Partnerships’, OJ
L85, 20 March 1998; the text of the Accession Partnerships can be accessed in OJC202, 29 June
1998. See also Commission Press Releases IP/98/117, 4 February 1998 and IP/98/274, 25
March 1998; European Report, No. 2301, 21 March 1998, V.1.
48 European Commission, ‘Enlarging the European Union: Accession Partnerships with the Central
European Applicant Countries’, MEMO 98/21, Brussels, 27 March 1998.
49 ‘Accession partnership accord on fast track for approval’, European Voice, 15 January 1998;
‘Screening formula under scrutiny’, European Voice, 19 February 1998; ‘EU enlargement –
Commission Task Force negotiations start work’, European Report, No. 2305, 4 April 1998, I.1–2;
‘Including the excluded: Screening the other applicants’, European Report, No. 2309, 22 April
1998, V.3–4.
50 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 102.
51 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 452.
52 ‘Candidates gear up for structural funds’, European Report, No. 2759, 15 March 2003, V.5.
53 Commission Press Release IP/00/1228, 27 October 2000.
54 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) establishing an Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-
Accession, OJC164, 29 May 1998. On ISPA’s impact see, for example, ‘EU spending on infra-
structure tops one billion euro in 2001’, European Report, No. 2660, 16 February 2002, V.6. For
concerns about the efficacy of ISPA spending see European Report, No. 2692, 15 June 2002, V.11.
55 See the comments of Agriculture commissioner Franz Fischler in ‘SAPARD can be showcase for
restructuring’, Commission Press Release IP/00/580, 6 June 2000.
56 See the feature on SAPARD in European Report, No. 2398, 10 April 1999, V.1–2; ‘Commission
gives green light to 2002 rural development programmes’, European Report, No. 2721, 23 October
2002, V.7.
57 For an authoritative analysis of the Twinning exercise and its impact in Romania see Dimitris
Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, ‘Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change:
The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania’, Journal of Common Market Studies
42/3, 2004: 619–39.
58 ‘Need for stronger administration highlighted by Auditors’ reports’, European Report, No. 2779, 24
May 2000, V.2; ‘Poland sent letter on food safety’, European Report, No. 2775, 10 May 2003, V.8.
Among the claims, supported by Poland’s own audit office, were that Poland had only used 0.15
per cent of the ISPA environment funds at its disposal for 2000–2. It was also claimed that of the
€575 million available for over 20 projects, only €28 million had actually been transferred to
 Notes 193
Poland and under €1 million actually spent by mid-2002. The Commission subsequently argued
that the take-up rate in Poland and elsewhere had been higher but that the substance of the
report was correct.
59 Poland had the most number of such Twinning projects with 32, followed by Romania with 30,
and the Czech Republic with 19. The concentration of these projects was in judicial and police
cooperation, public finance, and agriculture and fisheries.
60 European Commission DG Enlargement, From Pre-Accession to Accession: Interim Evaluation of
PHARE Support Allocated in 1999-2002 and Implemented until November 2003, Consolidated Summary
Report, Brussels, March 2004, p. 1.
61 ‘Information trickles from PHARE’, European Report, No. 286, 27 September 2003, V.7. See also
‘PHARE, twinning and partnerships need refinement’, European Report, No. 2259, 15 October
1997, V.8–9; ‘Auditors launch renewed attack on aid schemes’, European Voice, 6 November 1997;
‘EU conditions for aid under attack’, Financial Times, 22 December 1997.
62 A 2003 report by the OECD showed that in Poland pollutant emissions had been cut substan-
tially with sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions falling by 53 and 35 per cent respectively.
There was significant improvement in the provision of water supply and sewage systems and a
decline in nitrogen and phosphorus presence in coastal waters. See ‘Poland making progress on
environment’, European Report, No. 2786, 21 June 2003, V.6; ‘Enlargement: PHARE helps clear
the fog in the Czech Republic’, European Report, No. 2794, 19 July 2003, V.4. See also ‘New
member states ahead on key environment law’, EUobserver.com, 2 May 2005.
63 ‘New members wait in line for EU entry’, Financial Times, 19 June 1997; ‘EU talks boost for
Slovenia and Estonia’, Financial Times, 8 July 1997.
64 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 86. See Mark Turner’s analysis of the divisions: ‘Split over accession
candidates’, European Voice, 2 October 1997; European Report, No. 2257, 8 October 1997, V.4;
European Report, No. 2258, 11 October 1997, V.5.
65 ‘Key decisions imminent on EU applicants’, European Voice, 16 October 1997; ‘New battle over
EU expansion’, European Voice, 27 November 1997.
66 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg Summit, Bulletin of the European Union,
EU-12 1997.
67 Ibid.
68 On screening see ‘First wave screening will run to July 1999’, European Report, No. 2319, 30 May
1998, I.1.
69 ‘Foreign ministers recommend no promotions to first wave’, European Report, No. 2366, 9 December
1998; ‘Encouraging signals are the most applicants can hope for’, European Voice, 10 December
1998; ‘EU hopefuls fear membership delay’, Independent, 14 December 1998; ‘Enlargement train
slow to leave station’, European Voice, 17 December 1998; interview with Bulgarian Foreign Ministry
official, Sofia, 2 March 2001.
70 European Commission, ‘Reports on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate
Countries: Composite Paper’, 4 November 1998, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/
report_11_98/
71 On the impact of Kosovo see ‘Kosovo raises enlargement hopes’, European Voice, 22 July 1999;
Timothy Garton Ash, ‘An appeal to Europe: now is the moment to take the leap’, Independent, 30
July 1999.
72 ‘Enlarging the European Union: a new pace’, Economist, 2 October 1999; ‘Commission opens
door to all six applicants’, European Voice, 14 October 1999.
73 Atsuko Higashino, ‘For the Sake of Peace and Security? The Role of Security in the European
Union Enlargement Eastwards’, Cooperation and Conflict 39/4, p. 358.
74 ‘Signs that enlargement is increasingly on the political agenda’, European Report, No. 2382, 13
February 1999, V.2–3; ‘Enlargement talks on target despite crisis’, European Voice, 25 March
1999.
75 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., p. 123; See also Joschka Fischer’s linkage between enlargement and a
potential Yugoslav-style imbroglio: ‘Fischer in the Eurosceptics’ den’, Guardian, 25 January 2001.
76 ‘Romania Still Looks West in the Long Term’, Financial Times, 14 May 1999; ‘Bulgarians Start to
Ponder Hidden Costs of the Conflict’, Financial Times, 18 May 1999.
194 Notes
77 European Commission, Composite Paper: Reports on Progress Towards Accession by each of the Candidate
Countries, COM (1999) 500 final, Brussels, 13 October 1999.
78 Verheugen quoted in Agence Europe, Europe Daily Bulletin, no. 7572, 14 October 1999.
79 Agence Europe, Europe Daily Bulletin, no. 7575, 18–19 October 1999.
80 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki Summit, Bulletin of the European Union, EU-
12 1999.
81 ‘EU Paves the Way for Another Six’, Financial Times, 11–12 December 1999.
82 Cited in Agence Europe, Europe Daily Bulletin, no. 7612, 11 December 1999.
83 Michael J. Baun, op. cit., pp.129–33.
84 ‘EU paves the way for another six members’, Financial Times, 11 December 1999; ‘Major head-
aches in prospect as talks with the applicant countries enter crucial phase’, European Voice, 16
December 1999.

Chapter 4
1 See, for example, ‘Britain to push for a firm deadline on next phase of EU expansion’, Independent,
25 July 2000. See also the text of UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s speech in Budapest in the
Independent, 27 July 2000.
2 European Commission, Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the
Candidate Countries, Brussels, 8 November 2000. The Regular Reports can be found on the Commis-
sion’s Website at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/index.htm
3 See, for example, ‘Clean up your act, EU tells aspiring members’, Independent, 9 November 2000;
‘Bigger when?’, The Economist, 11 November 2000; ‘Onward to the Holy Land’, Transitions, 13
November 2000.
4 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy Paper, Report on Progress Towards Accession by
Each of the Candidate Countries, Bulletin of the European Union, Supp. No. 3, 2000. See also
Commission Press Release IP/00/1264, 8 November 2000; ‘Commission timetable for enlarge-
ment under attack’, European Voice, 16 November 2000.
5 Graham Avery, ‘The Enlargement Negotiations’, in Fraser Cameron (ed.), The Future of Europe:
Integration and Enlargement (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 48.
6 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002,
European Council Commentary 2/1 (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004), pp. 45–6.
7 Ibid., p. 47.
8 On Biarritz, see ‘All in accord – on procrastination’, The Economist, 21 October 2000.
9 See the Financial Times, 29 December 2000.
10 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 54.
11 Ibid., p. 52.
12 ‘Védrine: Romania and Bulgaria in the “big bang”’, EUobserver.com, 20 November 2001;
‘Védrine’s vision dismissed as speculation’, EUobserver.com, 11 December 2001; see also
Graham Avery, op. cit., p. 52.
13 See, for example, ‘War of words erupts over enlargement’, European Voice, 23–29 March 2000;
‘Sound and fury in debate on Union’s future’, European Voice, 22–28 June 2000; ‘Members in
2005?’, The Economist, 10 June 2000. On the deliberations at Nice see ‘Prodi reminds Europe of
the importance of expansion’, Guardian, 9 November 2000; ‘EU leaders agree to reform
package, opening way to negotiations’, Independent, 11 December 2000; ‘Commission timetable
for enlargement under attack’, European Voice, 16–22 November 2000.
14 See ‘Enthusiasm for a larger Europe starts to wane’, Financial Times, 5 June 2001.
15 ‘Sweden pushes for early breakthrough on EU expansion’, European Voice, 4 January 2001;
‘Sweden wants clear enlargement dates’, Financial Times, 6 June 2001.
16 Quoted in the Financial Times, 11 January 2001.
17 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Gothenburg, Bulletin of the European Union, EU-6
2001.
18 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 52.
 Notes 195
19 Quoted in ‘Crowded field in race to join EU’, Financial Times, 27 June 2001.
20 Graham Avery, op. cit., p. 51.
21 See also ‘Enlargement agreed after Swedish push’, Financial Times, 17 June 2001; ‘Enlargement
agreed for 2004 after Persson push’, Financial Times, 18 June 2001; ‘Progress amid the mayhem’,
Guardian, 18 June 2001. For a negative reading of Gothenburg see Will Hutton, ‘The summit of
Europe’s ambitions?’, Observer, 17 June 2001.
22 See ‘Brussels Backs “Big Bang” Plan For 10 Nations’, Independent, 29 June 2001; ‘EU Expansion’
(editorial comment), Financial Times, 13 November 2001; ‘EU prepares for “big bang” entry of 10
countries’, Daily Telegraph, 14 November 2001.
23 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 56.
24 Persson engaged in an energetic campaign to discredit and draw out the opponents of enlarge-
ment. Led by the Financial Times, many newspapers that appeared on the Saturday of the summit
gave the impression that German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in particular ‘was turning sour
on enlargement’. See Peter Ludlow, ibid., 57–8.
25 ‘EU Agrees to Speed up Enlargement Momentum’, Financial Times, 16 June 2001.
26 See European Commission, Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress Towards Accession by Each
of the Candidate Countries 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/
See also ‘Ten nations on track to join the EU’, Financial Times, 13 November 2001; ‘EU on
course for big enlargement’, Guardian, 14 November 2001; ‘European Union facing “big bang”
expansion in 2004’, Independent, 14 November 2001; ‘The European Union heads for “Big Bang”
enlargement’, Financial Times, 14 November 2001; ‘Brussels’ high hopes for EU candidates’,
Financial Times, 14 November 2001; ‘Top German politicians call for radical EU shake-up’,
Financial Times, 19 November 2001.
27 Graham Avery, op. cit., p. 52.
28 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., pp. 84–5.
29 See The Economist, 28 August 2002, for a bleak analysis of the prospects of success of the Irish
referendum. On the 2002 elections in France, Germany and some of the candidate states see
European Report, No. 2652, 19 January 2002.
30 For a flavour of the issues and their interpretation in early 2002 see ‘First year of EU expansion to
cost €5.6bn’, Financial Times, 27 January 2002; ‘EU newcomers will receive less regional aid’,
Financial Times, 28 January 2002; ‘Wider and dearer’ (editorial comment), Financial Times, 30
January 2002; ‘Prodi defends 2004 deal as Poles hit out’, European Voice, 31 January 2002;
‘Playing for real now the talk is of money’, European Report, No. 2656, 2 February 2002, V.1;
‘Paying for a bigger Europe’, Financial Times, 10 February 2002; ‘EU warns accession countries
on agriculture’, Financial Times, 19 March 2002; ‘EU starts to stake out positions over aid’, Finan-
cial Times, 4 April 2002.
31 European Commission, Common Financial Framework 2004–06 for the Accession Negotiations, SEC
(2002) 102 final, Brussels, 30 January 2002.
32 Alan Mayhew, ‘The Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement and Accession’, SEI
Working Paper No. 65 (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2003), p. 13.
33 Commission figures showed the Czech Republic would suffer most: after receiving €158 million
in 2003, it would be €342 million worse off in 2004 and €109 million in 2005. Slovenia would be a
net contributor for three consecutive years. For the full range of calculations, see ‘European
Commission calculates net EU budgets for the candidates’, European Report, No. 2712, 21
September 2002, V.3–4. See also ‘Budget contributions worry applicants for EU’, Financial Times,
12 September 2002.
34 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 68.
35 Alan Mayhew, op. cit., p. 13.
36 In the case of Poland, for example, 350,000 farmers alone. Or, to put it another way, 60 per cent
of Polish farmers hold plots as small as one hectare.
37 ‘Commission offers limited aid to accession-country farmers’, European Report, No. 2654, 26
January 2002, V.11.
38 For candidate state reaction see ‘Hungarian PM attacks EU subsidies offer’, Financial Times, 31
January 2002; ‘Trouble brews over regional policy on eve of negotiations’, European Report, No.
196 Notes
2655, 30 January, V.6; ‘Opposition leader very critical of Commission proposals on farm aid’,
European Report, No. 2657, 6 February 2002, V.6; ‘Poles demand better deal for commercial farm-
ers’, European Report, No. 2659, 13 February 2002, V.8; ‘Commission tells candidates their
farmers will gain by joining’, European Report, No. 2669, 20 March 2002, V.7; ‘Czech farmers
warn against EU package’, European Report, No. 2709, 11 September 2002, V.3.
39 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 72. See also ‘Enlarging the European Union – to get them in cut the
costs’, The Economist, 2 February 2002; ‘Member states sift the financing plan for the candidates’,
European Report, No. 2557, 6 February 2002, V.12; ‘Cost of enlargement €7.5 billion too much,
says Germany’, European Voice, 7 February 2002; ‘Paying for enlargement’, Financial Times, 11
February 2002; ‘Tremonti attacks EU expansion’, Financial Times, 13 March 2002.
40 Schröder, quoted by Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 74. Germany’s EU commissioner Michaele
Schreyer disagreed, pointing out in an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung that the German
contribution to the EU had fallen from 33 per cent of the EU household in the mid-1990s to
about 23.5 per cent in 2002. She also claimed that Berlin had paid three billion euro less into the
EU budget in the year 2000 than five years before – see EUobserver.com, 3 April 2002.
41 ‘Finance ministers split over funding plan’, European Report, No. 2660, 16 February, V.6.
42 ‘EU debating how to handle agriculture negotiations’, European Report, No. 2682, 8 May 2002,
V.3; ‘General Affairs Council fails to agree on farm payments for new members’, European Report,
No. 2691, 12 June 2002, V.1–2; ‘Agreement on agriculture but not direct payments to farmers’,
European Report, No. 2693, 19 June, V.10–11; ‘Large gap persists between EU and candidates on
agriculture’, European Report, 27 July 2002, V.3.
43 See ‘Enlargement talks still on track despite hurdles’, EUobserver.com, 11 June 2002; ‘Divisions
widen over costs of enlargement’, Financial Times, 11 June 2002; Verheugen quoted in European
Report, No. 2692, 15 June 2002, V.1.
44 European Commission, Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, COM (2002) 394 final,
Brussels, 10 July 2002.
45 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., pp.129–30
46 Ibid.
47 European Commission, Towards the Enlarged Union, COM (2002) 700 final. Available online at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/Brussels, 9 October 2002.
48 Peter Ludlow, op.cit., p.136.
49 The difficulties associated with ‘administrative capacity’ of course varied from country to
country. Perhaps the most manifest example of deficiency among the candidate states was
Romania. ‘Administrative capacity’ takes on a whole new meaning, as one leader writer put it, in
a country where the President earns only around €800 per month, and senior civil servants take
home only €200. See ‘Fitting Romania into the EU jigsaw’, European Report, No. 2762, 26 March
2003, V.6–7.
50 For a cogent example of the ‘transposition-implementation’ gap see ‘Telecoms battle in Slovenia
exposes implementation gap’, European Report, No. 2775, 10 May 2003, V.9. The article focuses
on the problems faced by companies in the Slovenian telecommunications market in competing
with the dominant market player, the state-owned Telekom Slovenije which held 75 per cent of
the market.
51 On the Action Plans and their importance to the candidate’s efforts see ‘Verheugen sets high
administrative hurdle for candidates’, European Report, No. 2690, 8 June 2002, V.1–2.
52 ‘Commission confirms risk of delay on structural funding’, European Report, No. 2794, 19 July
2003, V.3.
53 ‘Corruption is still a problem in most candidate countries’, European Report, No. 2726, 9 November
2002.
54 On the emphasis placed by the Irish government on enlargement in the second referendum see
John O’Brennan, ‘Ireland’s Return to “Normal” EU Voting Patterns: the 2002 Nice Treaty
Referendum’, European Political Science 2/2, 2003: 5–14.
55 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 166. The three-party coalition was composed of six ministers from the
Christian Democrats (CDA), four from the People’s Party for Freedom and Justice (VVD) and
four from the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF).
 Notes 197
56 ‘Dutch government in crisis over enlargement’, EUobserver.com, 15 October 2002; ‘Dutch raise
doubts over candidates’ fitness to join EU’, Financial Times, 15 October 2002.
57 See, for example, ‘EU defers hot issues to late October’, European Report, No. 2715, 2 October
2002, V.5; ‘The high price of admission: why the eastern states’ entry to the EU is not yet a done
deal’, Financial Times, 9 October 2002; ‘Chirac and Schröder: no agreement on CAP reform’,
EUobserver.com, 15 October 2002.
58 Alan Mayhew, op. cit., p. 15.
59 Ibid.
60 The GAERC meeting of 21–22 October effectively narrowed the agenda for the European
Council by achieving agreement on such important issues as the number of MEPs, the formula
for structural fund spending and agreement on safeguard clauses. See ‘Challenges for Brussels
summit … and beyond’, European Report, No. 2721, 23 October 2002, V.6.
61 Alan Mayhew, op.cit., p.15.
62 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 187.
63 Quoted in ‘Enlargement to be delayed if Brussels summit fails’, EUobserver.com, 23 October
2002.
64 ‘Round one to France in fight over cost of enlargement’, European Report, No. 2722, 26 October
2002.
65 See the Financial Times, 29 October 2002; ‘Enlargement: negotiations “end game” begins’, Euro-
pean Report, No. 2723, 30 October 2002, V.6.
66 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 219.
67 ‘Danish presidency shows its negotiating hand’, European Report, No. 2732, 30 November 2002,
V.1–2.
68 Unpublished paper, 8 November 2002. ‘Elements for a negotiating package’. The paper was
drafted by the Commission but was nevertheless a joint Presidency–Commission paper following
on from their meeting of 7 November 2002.
69 Alan Mayhew, op. cit., p. 17.
70 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 235.
71 Ibid., p. 238.
72 ‘Danish presidency shows its negotiating hand’, European Report, No. 2732, 30 November 2002,
V.1–2.
73 Of the ten countries that would join the EU on 1 May 2004, Lithuania was due to receive the
largest amount of financial assistance per capita: €390 per head during the first years after
accession. Estonia and Latvia would receive €360 and €350 per capita. By contrast, Poland
would receive only €166 per capita, and the Czech Republic a meagre €87 per capita. The
headline figures can be misleading however. In the case of Lithuania almost 10 per cent of the
total would go toward the cost of decommissioning the Ignalina nuclear power plant. That
reduced the per capita subvention to less than €350. The figures also do not indicate the
massive differentials in funding within receiving countries. In Lithuania’s case, for example,
farmers benefit excessively, to the tune of €800 per capita. See ‘Lithuania: Is EU largesse a
victory or defeat?’, Radio Free Europe, 16 December 2002, http://www.rferl.org/nca/
features/2002/12/16122002171611.asp.
74 See, for example, ‘EU entry talks test Polish PM’s skills’, Financial Times, 23 November 2002. See
also ‘EU candidates demand fair treatment from Brussels’, Financial Times, 17 November 2002;
‘Candidate countries unhappy with financial package’, EUobserver.com, 18 November 2002.
75 ‘EU candidates accepting EU “realism” in Copenhagen countdown’, European Report, No. 2729,
20 November 2002, V.10; ‘Denmark pushes on towards deal at Copenhagen’, European Report,
No. 2734, 7 December 2002, V.12.
76 ‘EU presidency hands its final offer to candidates’, European Report, No. 2731, 27 November 2002,
V.5; ‘Candidates maintain demands ahead of Copenhagen Summit’, European Report, No. 2735,
11 December 2002, V.5–7.
77 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 283.
78 Former Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, quoted in the Observer, 15 December 2002.
79 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., pp. 286–8.
198 Notes
80 Alan Mayhew, op. cit., p. 18.
81 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 299.
82 Ibid., p. 301.
83 See Heather Grabbe, ‘The Copenhagen Deal for Enlargement’, Briefing note, Centre for Euro-
pean Reform, London.
84 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 303.
85 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copehagen Summit, Bulletin of the European Union,
EU 12–2002.
86 See, for example, ‘EU embraces 10 new members – and opens the door to Turkey’, Guardian, 14
December 2002; ‘Outstanding performance by Danish Presidency’, EUobserver.com, 14 December
2002; ‘The shake-up that Europe needs’, Observer, 15 December 2002; ‘Enlargement – cheap at
the price’, EUobserver.com, 17 December 2002; ‘Big Bang achieved with little money’, European
Report, No. 2737, 18 December 2002, I.2–4.
87 ‘Duncan Smith slams EU on enlargement’, Guardian, 17 December 2002.
88 ‘Furious Chirac hits out at “infantile” easterners’, Guardian, 18 February 2003; ‘Eastern Europe
dismayed at Chirac snub’, Guardian, 19 February 2003.
89 ‘Some Polish farmers still fear annihilation’, European Report, No. 2747, 1 February 2003, V.10.
90 Council of the European Union, Treaty of Accession, AA 2003 final, Brussels, 3 April 2003. For
commentary on the text of the Accession Treaty see Graham Avery, op. cit., p. 58.
91 ‘Bated breath for accession treaty’, European Report, No. 2748, 5 February 2003, V.11.
92 See ‘Ten countries sign on the dotted line in Athens’, Guardian, 17 April 2003; ‘Treaty seals
Europe’s historic expansion to the east’, Independent, 17 April 2003; ‘Emotions run high amid
warm welcome’, Guardian, 18 April 2003; Will Hutton, ‘Why I back this Warsaw pact’, Observer,
1 June 2003; Heather Grabbe, ‘A Union of shifting coalitions’, Warsaw Business Journal, 2 June
2003; Heather Grabbe, ‘Shaken to the Core’, Prospect, May 2003.
93 Quoted in the Guardian, 18 April 2003. For a detailed analysis of the content of the accession treaty,
see also ‘The terms of the accession treaty’, European Report, No. 2752, 19 February 2003, V.1–3.
94 ‘Athens Declaration issued as leaders sign Accession Treaty’, European Report, No. 2769, 18 April
2003, V.4–5.
95 In most of the CEE states the threshold level was set at 50 per cent of the turnout. In Lithuania,
however, the initial figure had been set at 75 per cent for amendments to Article 1 of the Consti-
tution which outlined the nature of Lithuania’s independence. Concern over likely turnout and
its implications for ratification of the Accession Treaty resulted in a reduction in the constitu-
tional requirement to 50 per cent. See Anneli Albi, ‘Referendums in Eastern Europe: the Effects
on Reforming the EU Treaties and on the Candidate Countries’ Positions in the Convention’,
EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2002/65.
96 See ‘Malta flags assent to EU membership’, Guardian, 10 March 2003; ‘Slovene double “yes” to
Nato and EU leaves pollsters red-faced’, Guardian, 24 March 2002.
97 ‘Poland votes yes to joining EU’s big powers’, Guardian, 9 June 2003.
98 ‘Estonia says Yes to EU’, European Report, No. 2803, 17 September 2003, V.1; ‘Latvian yes
completes EU sweep’, Guardian, 22 September 2003.
99 For an overview of the accession referendums see Alexs Szcerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds), EU
Enlargement and Referendums (London: Routledge, 2005).
100 Quoted in the Guardian, 23 June 2003.
101 European Commission, Regular Reports and Strategy Paper 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/report_2003/ See also ‘An almost clear road for the ten’, European Report, No. 2818,
8 November 2003, V.1.

Chapter 5
1 See, for example, Kenneth A. Armstrong and Simon Bulmer, The Governance of the Single European
Market (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone
Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
 Notes 199
1998); Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein (eds), The Institutionalization of
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
2 Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Article 6 (1) (Ex Article F) effectively codified
the Copenhagen criteria for membership of the Union. It reads: ‘The Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the
rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’. In the Constitutional Treaty,
agreed by heads of State and Government of the Union in June 2004, Article 49 is replaced by
Article I-58 of Title IX. The only significant change is the inclusion of notification of national
parliaments on receipt of a membership application. Article 1-2 of Title I replaces Article 6. At
the time of writing the Constitutional Treaty had not been ratified and so is only referred to in
passing here. More importantly, the 2004 accessions were negotiated and agreed on the basis of
the existing constitutional provisions, thus it is those to which the text here refers.
3 On the development of ‘enlargement law’ and in particular the differences between the way the
EU enlargement process is inscribed in the treaties and customary enlargement practice as it has
evolved, see Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments’,
European Integration online Papers 9/6, 2005, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-006a.htm
4 Article 213 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
5 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade: The Meaning and Structure of the
Copenhagen Political Criteria of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, European Integration online
Papers 8/10, 2004, http://www.eiop.or.at/texte/2004-010.htm
6 Coreper itself is divided into two parts. Coreper I consists of deputy ambassadors and Coreper II
consists of the ambassadors, or permanent representatives as they are known. Broadly speaking
Coreper II meetings cover issues of external relations and ‘high’ politics while Coreper I, also
known as the ‘technical councils’, broadly cover the sectoral councils or ‘low’ politics.
7 The European Council is considered here as part of the Council machinery even though it was
designed as a purely intergovernmental forum and not as a Community institution. In respect of
enlargement decision-making the structural dynamics of the European Council proved very
similar to those of the Council of Ministers.
8 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU
Negotiations’, Journal of Common Market Studies 42/5, 2004, p. 999.
9 John Peterson and Elisabeth Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1999), p. 34.
10 Maximilian Conrad, ‘Persuasion, Communicative Action and Socialization after EU Enlarge-
ment’, Paper presented to the Second ECPR Pan-European Conference, Bologna, 24-26 June
2004, p. 20.
11 John Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe (London: Pinter/RIIA, 1991), p. 25.
12 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Sectoral Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access, and Alliances in
a Composite Polity’, Journal of European Public Policy 9/4, 2002, p. 631.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 634.
15 See Fiona Hayes Renshaw, ‘The Council of Ministers’, in John Peterson and Michael Shackleton
(eds), The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 55.
16 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002,
European Council Commentary 2/1 (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004), p. 115.
17 Lee Miles, ‘Enlargement: From the Fusion Perspective’, Cooperation and Conflict 37/2, 2002,
p. 197.
18 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., pp. 224–5.
19 Ibid.
20 See, for example, Fiona Hayes Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers (New York:
St Martin’s Press, 1997); Pippa Sherrington, The Council of Ministers: Political Authority in the European
Union (London: Pinter, 2000); Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the Council Pres-
idency’, in Ole Elgström (ed.), European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Perspective (London:
Routledge, 2003), pp. 18–37.
21 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the Council Presidency’, p. 19.
200 Notes
22 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments’, p. 17.
23 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the Council Presidency’, p. 21.
24 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU
Negotiations’, p. 999.
25 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the Council Presidency’, p. 24.
26 Lee Miles points out that some 64 chapters were opened during the Swedish Presidency and a
further 66 chapters provisionally closed by 27 June 2001. In particular the Presidency established
EU positions on the nine chapters identified by the Nice ‘road map’. See Lee Miles, op. cit., p. 194.
27 See Bo Bjurulf, ‘The Swedish Presidency of 2001: A Reflection of Swedish Identity’, in Ole
Elgström (ed.), European Union Council Presidencies, p. 138.
28 Ibid., p. 140.
29 Graham Avery, ‘The Enlargement Negotiations’, in Fraser Cameron (ed.), The Future of Europe:
Integration and Enlargement (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 57.
30 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the Council Presidency’, p. 24. On Kaliningrad
and its importance in the later stages of the enlargement process, see ‘Russia’s hell-hole
enclave’, Guardian, 7 April 2001; ‘Kaliningrad cuts deeper into EU-Russia relations’, European
Report, 2712, 21 September 2002; ‘Still at loggerheads over Kaliningrad’, European Report,
2684, 18 May 2002.
31 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU
Negotiations’, p. 1004.
32 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the Council Presidency’, p. 25.
33 Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU
Negotiations’, p. 1004.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 1017.
36 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., pp. 57–8.
37 Lee Miles, op. cit., p. 194.
38 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 56.
39 Ole Elgström, ‘The Honest Broker? The Council Presidency as a Mediator’, in Ole Elgström
(ed.), European Union Council Presidencies, p. 38.
40 Ibid., p. 45.
41 Ibid., p. 49.
42 Teija Tilikainen, ‘The Finnish Presidency of 1999: Pragmatism and Promotion of Finland’s Posi-
tion in Europe’, in Ole Elgström (ed.), European Union Council Presidencies, p. 111.
43 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?’, in
Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 457.
44 See the feature on Genscher: ‘Turning a warhorse into a peacemaker’, The European, 27 May
1994.
45 See, for example, former Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, ‘Don’t be greedy – let the
prodigal sons of the East come home’, The European, 3 June 1994.
46 For typical examples see ‘EU Must reach out to Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 15 April 1994;
‘For a bigger, better EU’, The Economist, 3 August 1996.
47 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Strasbourg European Council, Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities, EC 12-1989.
48 Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 10.
49 Leon Brittan, The Europe We Need (London: Hamilton, 1994), p. 4.
50 Helmut Kohl, Address by Chancellor Kohl to the Bundestag, Bulletin, No. 103, 16 December
1996.
51 Joschka Fischer, ‘From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the Finality of European Inte-
gration’, Humboldt University, Berlin, 12 May 2000.
52 Guy Verhofsdadt, ‘The Enlargement of the European Union: A Unique Opportunity to Restore
the Unity of Europe’, Speech to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 13 March 2001.
 Notes 201
53 Aznar and Piqué, cited in Sonia Piedrafita Tremosa, ‘The EU Eastern Enlargement: Policy
Choices of the Spanish Government’, European Integration online Papers 9/3, http://eiop.or.at/
eiop/texte/2005-003a.htm
54 Guy Verhofstadt, op. cit.
55 Fischer, quoted in Agence Europe, Europe Daily Bulletin, 6 April 1999.

Chapter 6
1 The former privilege statist conceptions of inter-state relations within the European integration
process while the latter argue for a significant supranationalist dimension to European integration
and patterns of governance in Europe.
2 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade: The Meaning and Structure of the
Copenhagen Political Criteria of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, European Integration online
Papers 8/10, 2004, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-010.htm
3 Mark Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting in the EU (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 48–9. In this respect, as Pollack points out, the use of
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) within the EU is of crucial importance in that it is much easier
for the Commission to forge alliances with certain member states in an effort to get a measure
through whilst it is much more difficult to amend proposals. In contrast, unanimity effectively
means that the Commission is marginalized as a player in certain policy areas.
4 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inter-
governmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies 31/4, 1993, p. 480.
5 Paul Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historic-Institutionalist Analysis’, in Wayne
Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 36.
6 Mark Pollack, op. cit., pp. 48–9 and pp. 84–5.
7 This view is challenged by a number of scholars who argue that the Commission has continually
lost ground to the member states as the European integration process has been increasingly inter-
governmentalized through constitutional revision from the early 1990s on. See, for example,
Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, ‘European Integration Since the 1990s: Member States and
the European Commission’, ARENA Working Papers, WP 6/04 (Oslo: ARENA, 2004),p. 10.
8 Mark Pollack ‘Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting in the Treaty of Amsterdam’, European
Integration online Papers 3/6, 1999, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-006.htm
9 Marlene Wind, ‘Europe Toward A Post-Hobbesian Political Order: Constructivism and Euro-
pean Integration’, EUI Working Paper, European University Institute, Florence, 1996, p. 2.
10 Lykke Friis, ‘“The End of the Beginning” of Eastern Enlargement – The Luxembourg Summit
and Agenda-Setting’, European Integration online Papers 2/7, 1998, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/
1998-007a.htm
11 Ibid.
12 Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The Constitutional Treaty, agreed by heads
of state and government in June 2004, but not yet ratified at the time of going to print, does not
change the European Commission’s role in the enlargement process.
13 Desmond Dinan, ‘The Commission and Enlargement’, in John Redmond and Glenda Rosenthal
(eds), The Expanding European Union: Past, Present and Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 21.
14 Marc Maresceau, ‘The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: a Political and Legal Analysis’, in Marc
Maresceau and Ewart Lannon (eds), The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies: A Comparative
Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 3.
15 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?’, in
Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 438.
16 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Sectoral Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access, and Alliances in
a Composite Polity’, Journal of European Public Policy 9/4, 2002, p. 638.
17 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 443.
202 Notes
18 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical
Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East’, ARENA Working Papers, No. 15, June 1999.
19 Jeffrey Checkel, ‘International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist–Con-
structivist Divide’, European Journal of International Relations 3/4, 1997, pp. 473–5.
20 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘East of Amsterdam: The Implications of the Amsterdam Treaty for Eastern
Enlargement’, in Karl-Heinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener (eds), European Integration After
Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
p. 229.
21 See, for example, ‘Brittan bangs drum for East European trade’, Financial Times, 14 April 1993.
22 ‘Delors calls for closer ties to Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 29 January 1994; see also European
Report, No. 1932, 9 March 1994, V.3.
23 Jacques Delors, ‘An Ambitious Vision for the Enlarged Union’, Speech delivered to the Notre
Europe Conference, Brussels, 21 January 2002.
24 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002,
European Council Commentary 2/1, (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004), pp. 23–5. On van den
Bröek’s role see also ‘Europe’s expander’ (profile), The Economist, 6 June 1998.
25 ‘Commission reorganizes on eve of regular reports’, European Report, No. 2436, 22 September
1999, V.4-5.
26 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 43.
27 See the interview with Landaburu in European Voice, 19 September 2002, in which he argues that
enlargement is cheap at the price and to place it in its proper context would bring nothing like the
problems with the war on terror.
28 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., pp. 43–4.
29 Ibid., pp. 34–5.
30 Quoted in European Voice, 10 February 2000.
31 Quoted in the Financial Times, 30 June 2000.
32 ‘Eastern land issue clouds EU negotiations’, Financial Times, 3 April 2001; ‘Verheugen supports
applicants’ right to delay sale of land to wealthy West’, European Voice, 5 April 2001.
33 See, for example, ‘Verheugen meets new Hungarian government’, European Report, No. 2701, 17
July 2002, V.8.
34 ‘Verheugen warns Poles against “lies”’, European Report, No. 2700, 13 July 2002, V.3.
35 Whilst addressing the European Parliament, for example, in early 2003, commissioner Verheugen
was the subject of a withering attack by Spanish socialist María Izquierdo Rojo who accused him of
being the commissioner for the candidate countries instead of representing the interests of the EU.
See European Report, No. 2745, 25 January 2003, V.3. Former Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus
accused Verheugen of a ‘tragic misuse of his position’ after the Commissioner had warned that the
Czech Republic’s prospects of EU membership would be set back if the Klaus-led Civic Democrats
won the 2002 general election. See ‘Verheugen accused of meddling by former Czech PM’, Euro-
pean Voice, 29 September 2001.
36 The one notable blip in Verheugen’s smooth steering of enlargement policy came in an interview
with the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 2 September 2000 when he suggested that a referendum on eastern
enlargement should be held in Germany to ensure that the public there were not simply
presented with a ‘fait accompli’. The Commissioner claimed that the euro had been introduced
‘behind the backs of the German people’ and said that there should have been a referendum on
the single currency to ‘force the élites to come down from their ivory towers and campaign for the
euro in a dialogue with the people’. Speculation that this constituted a German effort to delay
enlargement was prompted by the close relationship Verheugen enjoyed with German Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schröder, a former colleague in the Social Democratic Party. See ‘EU enlarge-
ment row deepens’, Guardian, 4 September 2000: ‘Commissioner’s comments spark furore’,
Financial Times, 4 September 2000; ‘EU commissioner casts new doubts on enlargement’, Inde-
pendent, 4 September 2000; ‘A row about a bigger EU’, The Economist, 9 September 2000.
37 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 225.
38 Ibid., p. 137.
39 Typical of the Commission’s approach is the language to be found in the Regular Reports of
 Notes 203
2002. See European Commission, Towards the Enlarged Union: Strategy Paper, COM (2002) 700
final. Available online at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/, Brussels, 9
October 2002. These were the final monitoring reports to be released before the crucial end stage
of the negotiations in November–December 2002.
40 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2003), p. 55.
41 David Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1999), p. 105; Jan Zielonka, ‘Ambiguity as a Remedy for the EU’s Eastward
Enlargement’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs XII/1, 1998, p. 17.
42 Romano Prodi, ‘Catching the Tide of History: Enlargement and the Future of the Union’, Paul
Henri Spaak Foundation, Speech/00/374, Brussels, 11 October 2000.
43 Olli Rehn, ‘Values define Europe, not Borders’, Financial Times, 4 January 2005.
44 Ibid.
45 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘East of Amsterdam’, p. 219.
46 Günter Verheugen, ‘Enlargement is Irreversible’, Speech to the European Parliament, Speech
00/351, Brussels, 3 October 2000.
47 Frank Schimmelfennig, op. cit.
48 See, for example, European Commission, Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress Towards
Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, Brussels, 8 November 2000. Available online at: http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/index.htm
49 See, for example, Prodi’s 2001 speech to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Its title is indica-
tive of the ‘drivers’ inclusive approach. Romano Prodi, ‘Bringing the Family Together’, Speech
to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Speech/01/158, Budapest, 4 April 2001.
50 Jacques Delors, op. cit.
51 Günter Verheugen, op. cit.
52 Iver B. Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus’,
Alternatives 23, 1998, p. 405.
53 Graham Avery, The Commission’s Perspective on the Negotiations, SEI Working Paper No. 12, June
1995.
54 Tanja A. Börzel, ‘Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commis-
sion’, in Tanja A. Börzel and Rachel A. Cichowski (eds), The State of the European Union, vol. 6: Law,
Politics and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 198–202.
55 Brigid Laffan, ‘The European Union and its Institutions as “Identity Builders” in R. K Hermann,
Thomas Risse and Mark Brewer (eds), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 85.
56 Maximilian Conrad, ‘Persuasion, Communicative Action and Socialization after EU Enlarge-
ment’, Paper presented at the Second ECPR Pan-European Conference, Bologna, 24–6 June
2004, p. 2.
57 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, ‘Europeanization, Conditionality, and Domestic
Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 42/3, 2004, p. 620.
58 See Commissioner Verheugen’s retrospective overview of the PHARE Programme: Günter
Verheugen, Speech at the 100th Meeting of the PHARE Management Committee, Brussels, 12
June 2003.
59 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human
Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, Paper Presented at the Workshop on Democracy
Promotion, Stanford University, 2–4 October 2004.
60 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, op. cit., p. 623.
61 Ibid., p. 625.
62 Günter Verheugen, Speech at the 100th Meeting of the PHARE Management Committee,
Brussels, 12 June 2003.
63 Milada Ana Vachudova, ‘The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States:
Eastern Europe and the European Union’, RSC No. 2001/33, Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies (Florence: European University Institute, 2001), p. 2.
204 Notes
64 Phedon Nicolaides, ‘Preparing for Accession to the European Union: How to Establish Capacity
for Effective and Credible Application of EU Rules’, in Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of
the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 46.
65 See, for example, European Commission, Towards the Enlarged Union: Strategy Paper 2002, http://
europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/, Brussels, 2002.
66 Phedon Nicolaides, op. cit., p. 48.
67 Ibid., p. 49.
68 Dimitry Kochenov, op. cit.
69 Marc Maresceau, op. cit..
70 Martin Ferry ‘The EU and Recent Regional Reform in Poland’, Europe–Asia Studies 55/7, 2003,
p. 1107.
71 Phedon Nicolaides, op. cit., p. 43.
72 Milada Ana Vachudova, op. cit., p. 27.
73 Marc Maresceau, op. cit., pp. 32–4.
74 ‘Poland sent letter on food safety’, European Report, No. 2775, 10 May 2003, V.8.
75 ‘Preparing for accession safeguards’, European Report, No. 2816, 1 November 2003, V.5.
76 European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm./enlarge-
ment/report_2003/
77 ‘Monitoring reports warn of “serious concern”’, European Report, No. 2817, 5 November 2003,
V.1. On food safety and Polish efforts to comply with the Commission’s demands see ‘Poland
aims to ease its passage’, European Report, No. 2834, 14 January 2004, V.8
78 ‘Candidate countries receive warning letters’, European Report, No. 2761 22 March 2003, V.3;
‘Latvia needs to do more work in the social field’, European Report, No. 2789, 2 July 2003, V.9.
79 ‘Preparing for accession safeguards’, European Report, No. 2816, 1 November 2003, V.5.
80 Phedon Nicolaides, op. cit., p. 47.

Chapter 7
1 David Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1999), pp. 31–2.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 70.
4 Karlheinz Neunreither, ‘The European Parliament and Enlargement, 1973–2000’ in John
Redmond and Glenda Rosenthal (eds), The Expanding European Union: Past, Present and Future
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 70–1.
5 On the advances made by the European Parliament, see Uwe Diedrichs and Wolfgang Wessels,
‘A New Kind of Legitimacy for A New Kind Of Parliament’, European Integration online Papers 1/6,
1997, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997_006a.htm; Anders Rasmussen, ‘Institutional Games Rational
Actors Play – The Empowering of the European Parliament’, European Integration online Papers 4/1,
2000, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-001a.htm; on the Convention Process and Constitu-
tional Treaty see Giacomo Benedetto, ‘How Influential was Europe’s Parliament during the
Convention and IGC, 2002–2004?’, Paper presented to the Second ECPR Pan European
Conference, Bologna, 24–26 June 2004; http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna
6 Mark Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agenda-setting in the EU (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 229. The majority threshold for EP assent in the case of
an Article 7 breach is stronger (at two-thirds of the members) than the majority required for the
Parliament’s assent on accession decisions. In the Constitutional Treaty Article 7 is replaced by
Article I-59, which does not alter the European Parliament’s role within the sanctioning process.
7 Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In the Constitutional Treaty, agreed by
heads of state and government in June 2004 (but at the time of going to press not yet ratified), the
European Parliament’s role does not change.
8 One crucial difference between the role of the European Parliament and that of national
parliaments of the member states in the ratification process is that the latter ratify the Accession
 Notes 205
Treaty after it has been signed and approve all the accession states en bloc, whereas the EP
has to give its assent to each country’s application individually before the Accession Treaty
can be signed. Thus the EP has the opportunity in theory to block the accession of any indi-
vidual state while national parliaments can only register disapproval by voting down the
entire enlargement.
9 In the case of eastern enlargement ratification by EU member states took place exclusively by
parliamentary approval. This has been the norm in all previous enlargements, except in the case
of British entry into the Community, when the French government decided that the issue was too
important for simple parliamentary approval. A referendum was held in France, which approved
British entry, by a large majority. More recently, in the aftermath of the EU decision to begin
accession negotiations with Turkey, attention has turned to the desirability of approval through
popular referendums and these have been proposed for a number of EU member states such as
Austria and France.
10 Stefanie Bailer and Gerald Schneider, ‘The Power of Legislative Hot Air’, Journal of Legislative
Studies 6/2, 2000, p. 21.
11 Richard Corbett, Frances Jacobs and Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament, 4th edn
(London: John Harper, 2000), p. 204; David Judge and David Earnshaw, The European Parliament
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), p. 210.
12 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?’ in
Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 433.
13 See, for example, ‘Romania Warned of EU Entry Block Over Anti-Gay Laws’, European Voice 7/23,
7–13 June 2001; ‘Anti-Gay Laws Could Return, Warn MEPs’, European Voice, 28 June–4 July
2001.
14 See European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and
Defence Policy, The Committee’s Enlargement Activities During the Fifth Legislature (1999–2004), Notice
to Members No. 08/2004, PE 329.317, Brussels, 5 May 2004, p. 2.
15 Interviews, PSE and ELDR MEPs, Brussels, October 2002.
16 On Viktor Orban’s grilling before the Committee see European Report, No. 2662, 23 February
2002, V.1. See also ‘Hungarian minorities a big problem, Verheugen admits’, European Report,
No. 2662, 23 February 2002, V.4.
17 European Parliament, The Committee’s Enlargement Activities During the Fifth Legislature (1999–2004),
p. 10.
18 Interview, ELDR MEP, Brussels, October 2002.
19 Maximilian Conrad, ‘Persuasion, Communicative Action and Socialization after EU Enlarge-
ment’, Paper presented at the Second ECPR Pan-European Conference, Bologna, 24–6 June
2004, p. 15.
20 For a more precise examination of socialization within the European Parliament see Roger
Scully, Becoming Europeans? Attitudes, Behaviour, and Socialization in the European Parliament (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005).
21 Trine Flockhart, ‘Masters and Novices: Socialization and Social Learning through the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly’, International Relations 18/3, 2004: 361–80.
22 Trine Flockhart, op. cit., p. 372.
23 Interviews PPE-DE and ELDR members, Brussels, October 2002.
24 On the EP’s relations with national parliaments see European Parliament, National Parliaments and
Enlargement/Accession, Briefing No. 45, PE 186.571, Brussels, 10 November 1999.
25 Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: The European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 2002,
European Council Commentary 2/1 (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004), p. 65.
26 Interviews PPE-DE and ELDR members, Brussels, October 2002.
27 Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland, ‘Power to the Parties: Competition and Cohesion
in the European Parliament, 1979–2001’, British Journal of Political Science 34/4: 767–93; Tapio
Raunio, Party Group Behaviour in the European Parliament: An Analysis of Transnational Political Groups in
the 1989–1994 Parliament (Tampere: University of Tampere Press, 1996), pp. 202–5.
28 Stephen Day and Jo Shaw, ‘The Evolution of Europe’s Transnational Political Parties in the Era
206 Notes
of European Citizenship’, in Tanja A. Börzel and Rachel A. Cichowski (eds), The State of the Euro-
pean Union, vol. 6: Law, Politics and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 161–2.
29 See Stefanie Bailer and Gerald Schneider, op. cit., for an in-depth analysis of these divisions.
30 Interview PES MEP, Brussels, October 2002.
31 I thank Tapio Raunio for this point.
32 Geoffrey Harris, ‘The Democratic Dimension of EU Enlargement: the Role of Parliament and
Public Opinion’, in Ronald. H. Linden (ed.), Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organiza-
tions on the Central and East European States (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 46.
33 For a comprehensive exposition of the Parliament’s position on the Beneš Decrees see European
Parliament, The Committee’s Enlargement Activities During the Fifth Legislature (1999–2004), pp. 11–12.
34 Geoffrey Harris, op. cit., p. 46.
35 Interview UEN MEP, Dublin, March 2004.
36 There is demonstrable proof for this hypothesis in the final reports of each country Rapporteur,
which were delivered in advance of the key enlargement debate on 9 April 2003. The great
majority of Rapporteurs waxed lyrical on the achievements of the candidate states and the
historic sense of occasion that permeated the EP vote. The only exception was the Report of the
Rapporteur for the Czech Republic, Jürgen Schröder (PPE), whose criticism mainly revolved
around the Czech failure to respond positively (or positively enough) on the Beneš Decrees.
37 See ‘MEPs back candidate’s stance on farm talks’, European Report, No. 2688, 1 June 2002, V.1.
38 ‘MEPs back Sofia on nuclear power plant closure’, European Report, No. 2690, 8 June 2002, V.4.
On a similarly supportive JPC position on Slovakia see ‘Parliamentarians call for democratic
continuity’, European Report, No. 2690, 8 June 2002, V.7.
39 At the EP debate on enlargement on 9 April 2003, Minister Yiannitsis, representing the Greek
Presidency of the European Union, specifically cited the work carried out by the JPCs as ‘invalu-
able’ to the process.
40 European Parliament, Draft Report on the Financial Impact of EU Enlargement (Rapporteur Reimer
Böge), A5-0178/2002, Brussels, 13 June 2002; European Parliament, Draft Report on the State of the
Enlargement Negotiations (Rapporteur Elmar Brok), A5-0190/2002, Brussels, 13 June 2002. For
detailed analysis see ‘MEPs give their backing against sombre background’, European Report, No.
2686, 25 May 2002, V.6–7.
41 ‘MEPs pleased with progress in accession negotiations’, European Report, No. 2692, 15 June 2002,
V.11.
42 Turkey was not represented in the debate because the Turkish Grand Assembly was not able to
select the 12 members of parliament it was allocated for the debate, as the Turkish Parliament
had not been constituted after parliamentary elections.
43 Quoted by EUobserver.com, 19 November 2002. See also ‘European Parliament debate with
candidates’, European Report, No. 2729, 20 November 2002, V.14–15; ‘MEPs back plans for
accession negotiations’, European Report, No. 2730, 23 November 2002, V.3–4.
44 The biggest gain within the Parliament was recorded by the socialist grouping (PES). It gained 79
new deputies, one third of the total number of new deputies. Of this figure 26 deputies were from
Poland. See ‘Socialists to get most candidate deputies’, EUobserver.com, 19 November 2002.
45 The logistical impact of eastern enlargement on the Parliament should not be underestimated.
The Parliament’s estimate for spending on such as extra administrative and infrastructural
support would amount to €90 million in 2003, €156 million in 2004, €186 million in 2005 and
almost €200 million in 2006. Extra office space would also be needed, thus the EP set about the
construction of two new office blocks to be ready by the end of 2006. Extra personnel would
amount to about 1,120 posts of which approximately 70 per cent would be accounted for by
translation services. The increase in membership naturally would add many new languages, in
fact ten new languages, from 11 to 21. The EP decided to guarantee multilingualism through a
policy known as ‘controlled multilingualism’. This would mean that MEPs would still be able to
speak in their mother tongue to other MEPs through interpretation. On recruitment and the
spread of post-enlargement positions see European Report, No. 2678, 24 April 2002.
46 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 64–5.
47 Interview, Pat Cox, March 2005.
 Notes 207
48 See, for example, Pat Cox, Speech at the Conference on EU Enlargement Day, Dublin Castle, 1
May 2004.
49 See Cox’s speech at the Seville summit, Bulletin of the European Union, EU 6-1999, 19 June 2002.
50 See European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission’s White Paper: Preparation of Associated Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union (Rapporteur Arie Oostlander),
A4-0101/1996, Brussels, 17 April 1996. See also European Parliament, Resolution on the Communica-
tion of the Commission on ‘Agenda 2000’ – the 2000-06 Financial Framework for the Union and the Future
Financing System (Rapporteur Colom i Naval), A4-0331/97, PE 223.701/def, Brussels, 1997.
51 See European Parliament, Resolution on the Commission Proposals for Council Decisions on the Principles,
Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnerships, A4-0081/1998,
A4-0087/1998, Brussels, 11 March 1998.
52 Peter Ludlow, op. cit., p. 64. See also European Parliament, Resolution on the Preparation of the
Meeting of the European Council in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, B5-0308/99, B5-0309/99, B5-
0311/99, B5-0312/99, Brussels, 2 December 1999; European Parliament, Resolution on the
Helsinki European Council, B5-0327/99, B5-0353/99, B5-0354/99, B5-0357/99, Brussels, 16
December 1999.
53 See ‘MEPs call for enlargement with or without Nice’, EUobserver.com, 4 September 2001. See
also Stefanie Bailer and Gerald Schneider, op. cit., p. 28.
54 ‘Council to defer institutional chapter until end of negotiations?’, European Report, No. 2713, 25
September 2002, V.4–5.
55 Cecilia Malmström, European Parliament Debate on Enlargement, 9 April 2003; available
online at: http://europarl.eu.int/enlargement/default_en.htm
56 In practice this meant that observers from the accession states would be able to attend plenary
sessions of the European Parliament but would not have the right to vote or speak. However,
within the EP’s committees they had the right to speak – although again not to vote. In addition
observer status meant second-class status when it came to claiming expenses for the year before
formal accession. They were only able to claim for actual travel expenses incurred – rather than
the lucrative regime enjoyed by the EU15 MEPs who could claim a sum derived from the
mileage travelled, sometimes well in excess of the actual cost incurred.
57 ‘EU leaders to offer Turkey deal on membership talks’, Independent, 16 December 2004; ‘EU
chiefs set for late 2005 talks start date’, Irish Times, 16 December 2004.
58 Quoted in the Irish Times, 16 December 2004.
59 For an overview of the Parliament’s position on institutional recalibration see European Parlia-
ment, The Institutional Aspects of Enlargement of the European Union, Briefing No. 15, PE 167.299/
rev.1, 21 June 1999.
60 European Parliament, Resolution on the Association Agreements, A3-0055/1991, Brussels, 18 April 1991.
61 European Parliament, Resolution on the Structure and Strategy for the European Union with Regard to its
Enlargement and the Creation of a Europe-Wide Order (Hänsch Report), A3-0189/1992, Brussels, 20
January 1993.
62 European Parliament, Resolution on the Financing of the Enlargement of the European Union (Rapporteur
Efthymios Christodoulou), A4-0353/1996, Brussels, 12 December 1996.
63 At the time German finance minister Theo Waigel and his Dutch counterpart, Gerrit Zalm, led
the way in suggesting cuts in the structural and cohesion funds as the appropriate means to
finance eastern enlargement. See ‘MEPs count the cost of enlargement’, European Voice, 28
November 1996.
64 European Parliament, Resolution on the Communication of the Commission on ‘Agenda 2000’ – the 2000–
2006 Financial Framework for the Union and the Future Financing System (Rapporteur Colom i Naval),
A4-0331/1997; European Parliament, Resolution on the Communication from the Commission ‘Agenda
2000 – For a Stronger and Wider Union’ (Rapporteurs Oostlander/Baron Crespo), A4-0368/1997,
Brussels, 4 December 1997; European Parliament, Enlargement: Pre Accession Strategy for Enlargement
of the European Union, Briefing no. 24 of the Parliament’s Secretariat’s Task Force, PE 167.631,
Luxembourg, 17 June 1998.
65 European Union, Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the European
Commission on Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure, 1999/C 172/01, Brussels,
208 Notes
6 May 1999. On the significance of the IIA to the Parliament’s budgetary powers see David
Judge and Robert Earnshaw, op. cit., pp. 216–17.
66 In 1980 the Council of Ministers agreed on a Commission proposal for a Community Regulation
before the EP had delivered its opinion, which was mandated under the treaty’s consultation
procedure. When the Council proceeded with the legislative proposal without Parliament’s
opinion, the EP took the issue to the ECJ claiming that the Council had exceeded its powers
under the treaties. The ECJ agreed and in effect granted the Parliament the power to delay legis-
lation to ensure the consultation procedure could be properly carried out.
67 ‘Parliament could delay approval of accession treaty’, European Report, No. 2758, 12 March 2003,
V.15; ‘Parliament insists on renegotiating Copenhagen deal’, European Report, No. 2759, 15
March 2003, V.10.
68 Cox wrote to Simitis urging the Presidency to re-open the issue of the budget, underlining how
seriously Parliament was taking the issue. He got no reply to his letter.
69 See ‘Parliament resigned to compromise on financing of enlargement’, European Report, No. 2766,
9 April 2003, V.5.
70 Quoted in ‘European Parliament gives its assent’, European Report, No. 2767, 12 April 2003, V.13.
71 Daniel Cohn-Bendit, European Parliament Debate on Enlargement, 9 April 2003; available
online at: http://europarl.eu.int/enlargement/default_en.htm.
72 European Parliament, Report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and
Defence Policy on the Conclusions of Negotiations with the Candidate States in Copenhagen (Rapporteur Elmar
Brok), A5-0081/2003; European Parliament, Report by the Committee on Budgets on the Financial
Perspective on Enlargement presented by the Commission in accordance with point 25 of the Inter-institutional
Agreement of 6 May 1999 on Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure (Rapporteurs
Reimer Böge and Joan Colm I Naval), A5-0117/2003.
73 In particular the Foreign Affairs Committee singled out the so-called Law No.115 of 8 May 1946,
which granted blanket legitimacy to the most serious criminal acts and even post-war crimes.
The Committee held a special exchange of views with the Czech Foreign Minister, Cyril
Svoboda, on 11 February 2003, which was dominated by the Beneš Decrees.
74 ‘Parliament makes its check on candidates before historic vote’, European Report, No. 2764, 2 April
2003, V.8–10. The emphasis is my own.
75 The plenary debate and the historic vote were disturbed by an unofficial strike by session staff at
the Parliament who were protesting over EU public service staff rules. Work in the interpreters’
booth was stopped from time to time. One MEP, Maes of the Greens, commented that although
he had every sympathy for the strikers he did think it ‘a bit steep that the best paid officials in
Europe should be expressing themselves in this way on a day on which we are welcoming the
worst paid and the least prosperous people in Europe’. See European Parliament Debate on
Enlargement, 9 April 2003.
76 ‘European Parliament gives its assent’, European Report, No. 2767, 12 April 2003, V.12–13.
77 Ibid., V.13.
78 See, for example, ‘MEPs seek role in enlargement conference’, European Voice, 6 November 1997;
‘European Parliament to demand input on Accession Partnerships’, European Report, No. 2296, 4
March 1998, V.7–9

Chapter 8
1 Phillippe Schmitter, ‘Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the Help of Past Theories’, in Gary
Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Phillippe Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streek, Governance in the European
Union (London: Sage, 1996), p. 14; Helen Wallace, ‘EU Enlargement: A Neglected Subject’, in
Maria Green Cowles and Mike Smith (eds), The State of the European Union, vol. 5: Risks, Reforms,
Resistance and Revival (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 149–63.
2 Christopher Hill, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement’ in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe
Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 96.
3 Jan Zielonka, ‘Introduction’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound, p. 9.
 Notes 209
4 The realist school of International Relations is of course extremely diverse. The chapter does not
privilege any particular branch of the realist school but rather takes the central propositions
advanced by both classical and contemporary realists as the basis for analysis.
5 Robert Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, in Robert Keohane (ed.),
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 304.
6 See Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002). Chapter 2 deals with human nature and how it influences state motivations.
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edn (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1985), pp. 3–4.
8 See, for example, John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of the Great Powers (New York: Norton, 2001).
9 Robert Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 304–5.
10 Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 12.
11 See, for example, David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Joseph M. Grieco, ‘The Maastricht Treaty, Economic
and Monetary Union and the Neorealist Research Programme’, Review of International Studies 21,
1995: 21–40; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
12 Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1990).
13 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, in Robert O.
Keohane (ed.), op. cit., p. 165.
14 John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability after the Cold War’, International Security 15/1,
1990, pp. 5–9.
15 Within the discipline of IR European integration for a long time was treated as an insignificant
and provincial terrain unworthy of the interest of (mostly American) scholars. See Knud Erik
Jørgensen, ‘Continental IR Theory: the Best Kept Secret’, European Journal of International Relations
6/1, 2000, pp. 9–42.
16 John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future’, p. 5.
17 Jim George, ‘Back to the Future?’, in Greg Fry and Jacinta O’Hagan (eds), Contending Images of
World Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 33.
18 My estimate includes all of the new states of Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia (later the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) and Slovenia, which emerged after
the break-up of Yugoslavia. It also includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine,
Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia as the states to emerge from the old Soviet
Union. The Central Asian states to emerge from the Soviet Union are excluded. Finally, the
Czech and Slovak republics are included as separate entities, as are Cyprus, Malta, and
Turkey.
19 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Facing the “desert of Tartars”: The Eastern Border of Europe’, in Jan
Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound, p. 52.
20 Eberhard Bort, ‘Illegal Migration and Cross-Border Crime: Challenges at the Eastern Frontier
of the European Union’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound, p. 191.
21 William Wallace, ‘Where Does Europe End? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion’, in Jan
Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound, p. 78.
22 The early foreign policy of the Clinton administration brought a new emphasis to the Asia-
Pacific region. This was reflected in IR scholarship of the period, a significant body of which
focused on the coming twenty-first century as the ‘Pacific Century’.
23 A classic example is the agreement on CAP between President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder
thrashed out at the Hotel Conrad in advance of the crucial Brussels summit in October 2002.
24 Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 96.
25 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council Summit Meeting,
Bulletin of the European Union, EU 6-2003.
26 See Christian Pippan, ‘The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilization and Association
Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality’, European Foreign Affairs
Review 9, 2004, p. 243.
27 Operation ALTHEA, the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was launched on 2
210 Notes
December 2004, following adoption of United Nations Resolution 1575. Operation ALTHEA is
an EU-led operation making use of NATO common assets and capabilities.
28 Pierre Hassner, ‘Fixed Borders or Moving Borderlands: A New Type of Border for a New Type
of Entity’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound, p. 38.
29 Romano Prodi, ‘After Stockholm’: Speech to the European Parliament, Speech/01/156,
Strasbourg, 4 April 2001.
30 Karen Smith, The Making of European Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1999).
31 Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 96.
32 Ibid., p. 97.
33 Atsuko Higashino, ‘For the Sake of “Peace and Security”? The Role of Security in the European
Union Enlargement Eastwards’, Cooperation and Conflict 39/4, p. 348.
34 Ibid., p. 351.
35 Mikheil Saakashvili, ‘Europe’s Third Wave of Liberation’, Financial Times, 20 December 2004.
36 Since its coinage in 1999 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has come to cover a
specific policy and set of institutional arrangements. Primarily identified as a crisis management
instrument it has translated into a series of operations, both civilian and military. ESDP is an inte-
gral part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which in turn is but one arm
of EU external action. See Antonio Missiroli, ‘EDSP – How it Works’, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.),
EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004) (Paris: EU Institute for Security
Studies, 2004), pp. 55–72.
37 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, ‘The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly:
What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the “Old” and the “New”
Europe?’, European Foreign Affairs Review 9/1, 2004, p. 72.
38 Ibid., pp. 76–7.
39 See, for example, ‘The New Vassals’, Guardian, 7 February 2003.
40 ‘Furious Chirac hits out at “infantile” easterners’, Guardian, 18 February 2003; ‘Eastern Europe
dismayed at Chirac snub’, Guardian, 19 February 2003.
41 Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, op. cit., p. 67.
42 Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 107.
43 Michael Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 86.
44 Anatol Lieven, ‘Romania presses its case’, Financial Times, 30 September 1997.
45 Consider that in the mid-1990s Boris Yeltsin made an ostensibly serious suggestion that Bulgaria
forget about EU membership and join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This
suggestion was not taken seriously in Bulgaria (despite very close historic ties, which predated the
Soviet period). Arguably, however, Yeltsin’s ‘offer’ gave Bulgarian leaders extra leverage in
discussions with the EU.
46 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical
Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East’, ARENA Working Papers 15, Oslo, June 1999.
47 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism’,
International Organization 48/2, 1994, pp. 258–9.
48 David Brooks, ‘Mourning Mother Russia’, International Herald Tribune, 29 April 2005.
49 See Anna Politkovskaya, Putin’s Russia (London: Harvill Press, 2004), chapter 1, ‘My Coun-
try’s Army, and its Mothers’, and chapter 5, ‘Nord-Ost: the Latest Tale of Destruction’. See
also Dov Lynch (ed.), What Russia Sees, Chaillot Papers, No. 74, January 2005 (Paris: EU
Institute for Security Studies); Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Papers, No. 60, May
2003 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies); Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice (London:
Routledge, 2004).
50 See Neil Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty (London: Routledge, 2002), chapter 5, ‘The Poli-
tics of Failed Grandeur: Russia’s new international relations’; Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and
Society (London: Routledge, 2002), part 5. See also Rick Fawn (ed.), Realignments in Russian Foreign
Policy (London: Routledge, 2003).
51 ‘Russian Gas to Flow to Europe via Baltic Sea’, International Herald Tribune, 11 April 2005.
 Notes 211
52 Georg Sørensen, Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International Relations (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2001), p. 46.
53 See Thomas Parland, The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia (London: Routledge, 2004).
54 Michael Baun, op. cit., p. 54.
55 The Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia represent respectively 29.6 per cent and 28.1 per
cent of the population, while the proportion is much smaller in Lithuania at 8.7 per cent. See Dov
Lynch, ‘Russia Faces Europe’, p. 84.
56 Christopher Hill, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement’, p. 105.
57 Putin referred to the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 1939 as a measure to enhance Russia’s national security
and went on to describe the collapse of the Soviet Union as the ‘greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the 20th century’. See Janusz Bugajski, ‘History is politics in Putin’s Russia’, Financial Times, 27
April 2005.
58 This was most obviously demonstrated in the decision post-Beslan (the justification) to replace
Russia’s directly elected regional governors with governmental appointees.
59 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Essen Summit, 9–10 December 1994. The text
of the ‘Concluding Document’ from the inaugural conference for a Pact on Stability in Europe is
reprinted in Bulletin of the European Union 12-1994, pp. 100–1.
60 Michael Baun, A Wider Europe, p. 61.
61 Neil Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty, p. 141.
62 The EU Police Mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was called
PROXIMA and was given the mandate of supporting the development of an efficient and profes-
sional police service in FYROM based on European standards of policing. This was accompa-
nied by CONCORDIA, a military crisis mission. The EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the
first civilian crisis management operation under ESDP. See Gustav Lindstrom, ‘On the Ground:
ESDP Operations’, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), op. cit., pp. 111–30.
63 One of the many double standards evident in the eastern enlargement process was that the prin-
ciple of achieving lasting resolution of border disputes was not applied to the accession of the
Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cyprus). Although prior to the 2004 accessions one final effort was
made to resolve the question (through the UN), the Greek threat to veto the entire eastern
enlargement process was sufficient to ensure that the Cyprus question was treated differently to
similar (if not as protracted) problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Greek Cypriot accession
did not require an a priori resolution of the Cyprus problem.
64 Andre Liebich, ‘Ethnic Minorities and Implications of EU Enlargement’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.),
Europe Unbound, p. 131–4.
65 Bruno de Witte, ‘Politics vs Law in the EU’s Approach to Minorities’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe
Unbound, p. 142.
66 Timothy Garton Ash, cited in Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, ‘Looking to the Future’, in Antonio
Missiroli (ed.), Enlargement and European Defence after 11 September, Chaillot Papers, No. 53, June
(Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003), p. 56.
67 Charles Grant, ‘The Eleventh of September and Beyond: the Impact on the European Union’, in
Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Superterrorism: Policy Responses (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 135.
68 Ibid., p. 137.
69 One headline-grabbing example of the loose alliances between terrorist groups and criminal
organizations was that of the IRA and a Bulgarian mafia group, which made the headlines in
early 2005. The IRA sought out the Bulgarian group in order to help launder the bulk of the
money stolen from the Northern Bank in Belfast (up to €40 million) in December 2004. The two
organizations were alleged to be behind a plan to buy a Bulgarian bank as an instrument for their
joint operations.
70 Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 106.
71 See, for example, ‘Al Qaeda’s Balkan Links’, Wall Street Journal Europe, 1 November 2001;
‘Warning on Balkan Bases for Al Qaeda’, Irish Times, 12 January 2005.
72 On the Al Qaeda presence in Western Europe and the threat it poses see Therese Délpèch, Inter-
national Terrorism and Europe, Chaillot Papers, No. 56, December (Paris: EU Institute for Security
Studies, 2002), pp. 16-21.
212 Notes
73 Gijs de Vries, ‘Europe must Unite to end Terror’, Financial Times, 30 November 2004.
74 Stephen Haggard, M. A. Levy, Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘Integrating the Two
Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining and Institutions’, in Stanley Hoffmann,
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (eds), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State
Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 187.
75 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Studying Europe After the Cold War: A Perspective from International
Relations’, TKI Working Papers on European Integration and Regime Formation (Esbjerg: South Jutland
University Press, 1996).

Chapter 9
1 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Inter-
governmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies 31/4, 1993: 473–524; Andrew
Moravcsik, ‘Studying Europe After the Cold War: A Perspective from International Relations’,
TKI Working Papers on European Integration and Regime Formation (Esbjerg: South Jutland University
Press, 1996); Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Andrew Moravcsik, ‘A New Statecraft?
Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation’, International Organization 53/2, 1999:
267–306; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and
European Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 6/4, 1999: 669–81; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The
European Constitutional Compromise and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism’, Journal of European
Public Policy 12/2, 2005: 1–37.
2 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical
Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East’, ARENA Working Papers 15, June 1999.
3 Christopher Hill, ‘The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe
Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 99.
4 Frank Schimmelfennig, op. cit.
5 See, for example, ERT, Opening Up: The Business Opportunities of EU Enlargement, ERT Position
Paper and Analysis of the Economic Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement (Brussels, 2001).
6 Helene Sjursen, ‘Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’,
ARENA Working Paper WP 01/6, Oslo.
7 Katinka Barysch, ‘EU Enlargement: How to Reap the Benefits’, Economic Trends 2, 2004.
8 Fritz Breuss, ‘Macroeconomic Effects of EU Enlargement for Old and New Members’, WIFO
Working Papers 143/2001, Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Vienna, 29 March
2001.
9 Katinka Barysch, op. cit.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Frank Schimmelfennig, op. cit.
14 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 3.
15 Lee Miles, ‘Theoretical Considerations’, in Neil Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2004), p. 257.
16 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 473.
17 Ibid., p. 472.
18 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Ana Vachudova, ‘National Interests, State Power, and EU
Enlargement’, East European Politics and Society 17/1, p. 50.
19 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 26.
20 Lee Miles, op. cit., p. 257.
21 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 180.
22 Helene Sjursen, op. cit.
23 Fritz Breuss, op. cit.
 Notes 213
24 See figures in Michael Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), chapter 7, for example.
25 Cited in Katinka Barysch, op. cit.
26 Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph E. Francois, and Ricardo Portes, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Eastern
Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe’, Economic Policy 24, April 1997, pp.
125–76.
27 Dorothee Bohle, ‘The Ties that Bind: Neoliberal Restructuring and Transnational Actors in the
Deepening and Widening of the European Union’, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session
Workshops ‘Enlargement and European Governance’, Turin, 22–27 March 2002, p. 31.
28 Marcin Zaborowski, ‘Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement: The Rising Prominence of
Domestic Politics’, ZEI Discussion Paper C 51, Centre for European Integration Studies, Bonn,
1999.
29 For analysis of the paradoxical positions of both Germany and Austria see Kirsty Hughes, ‘A
Most Exclusive Club’, Financial Times, 11 August 1999. For juxtaposed views of the German
policy stance on eastern enlargement see Thomas Banchoff, ‘German Identity and European
Integration’, European Journal of International Relations 5/3, 1999: 259–89; and Marcin Zaborowski,
op. cit. See also Stephen D. Collins, German Policy-Making and Eastern Enlargement of the EU During the
Kohl Era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
30 German EU Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, in a 2000 speech, stressed that enlargement was
‘not a project whose aim is bigger markets, more economic opportunities and more competition’.
Rather, the fundamental aim was, he said, ‘lasting peace between the peoples of Europe’. See
Günter Verheugen, ‘Enlargement is irreversible’, Speech to the European Parliament, Speech
00/351, Brussels, 3 October 2000. This point is also emphasized repeatedly in the discourse of
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and his officials.
31 See ‘Britain to champion enlargement of EU’, The Times, 29 June 2000.
32 Alan Mayhew, ‘The Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement and Accession’, SEI
Working Paper No. 65 (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2003), p. 15.
33 Paul Gillespie, ‘French Disenchanted with the EU’, Irish Times, 26 March 2005. See also ‘Are
They Winning?’, The Economist, 23 March 2005; ‘The New Infantilism’, The Times, 24 March
2005.
34 Pierre Hassner, ‘Fixed Borders or Moving Borderlands: A New Type of Border for a New Type
of Entity’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European
Union (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 38.
35 Quoted by Quentin Peel, ‘EU States Try to Slow Enlargement’, Financial Times, 30 September
1998.
36 ‘France has firmly rejected calls for a firm date for accessions’, European Voice, 3 August 2000;
‘France to launch charm offensive with applicants to silence critics’, European Voice, 12 April 2001;
‘France joins EU enlargement dispute’, Financial Times, 21 May 2001.
37 See Olivier Costa, Anne Couvidat and Jean Pascal Daloz, ‘The French Presidency of 2000’, in
Ole Elgström (ed.), European Union Council Presidencies: a Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge,
2003), pp. 129–31.
38 See, for example, ‘Spain’s cash plea threatens EU enlargement talks’, Financial Times, 14
February 1994; ‘Aznar digs in for a fight’, Financial Times, 17 May 2001; ‘Madrid casts doubt over
target date for enlargement’, European Voice, 15 November 2001.
39 See, for example, ‘Rich EU citizens oppose enlargement’, Guardian, 30 April 2001; ‘Expansionist
dream turns into nightmare for Europe’s leaders’, Independent, 7 May 2001; ‘EU ministers at odds
over funding for enlargement’, Financial Times, 7 May 2001; ‘Sweden scolds Spain for guarding its
EU money’, Guardian, 16 May 2001.
40 Francesc Morata and Ana-Mar Fernandez, ‘The Spanish Presidencies: 1989, 1995 and 2002’, in
Ole Elgström (ed.), European Union Council Presidencies: a Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge,
2003), p. 174.
41 Sonia Piedrafita Tremosa, ‘The EU Eastern Enlargement: Policy Choices of the Spanish
Government’, European Integration online Papers 9/3, http://eiop. or.at/eiop/texte/2005-003a.htm
42 Ibid.
214 Notes
43 Francesc Morata and Ana-Mar Fernández, op. cit., p. 177.
44 Sonia Piedrafita Tremosa, op. cit.
45 Cited in Dorothee Bohle, op. cit., pp. 25–6.
46 Francesc Morata and Ana-Mar Fernández, op. cit., p. 178.
47 ‘Spain spells out stance on aid in bigger EU’, Financial Times, 23 April 2001. The Spanish Govern-
ment insisted that the European Council Summit at Gothenburg (14–15 June 2001) adopt a
political declaration that specified development aid received by Spain would not fall significantly
after enlargement. In the event no such declaration was adopted.
48 Francesc Morata and Ana-Mar Fernández, op. cit., p. 184.
49 Sonia Piedrafita Tremosa, op. cit.
50 Ibid.
51 See ‘Italy warns against speedy enlargement of the EU to the east’, Financial Times, 18 May 2001;
‘Tremonti attacks EU expansion’, Financial Times, 13 March 2002.
52 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization 55/1, p. 52.
53 The Observer, 17 June 2001.
54 Quoted in the Irish Times, 19 June 2001.
55 Daily Telegraph, 10 June 2001.
56 Guardian, editorial, 11 June 2001.
57 Dorothee Bohle, op. cit., p. 23.
58 Ibid., p. 24.
59 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Vachudova, op. cit., p. 45.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 The Sun, Mail, and Daily Express led the ceaseless anti-immigrant campaign. But some of the
broadsheets were just as prominent (if a little more subtle) in presenting eastern enlargement as
primarily about the immigration threat. See, for example, ‘Adverts to deter Euro dole seekers’,
Sunday Times, 8 February 2004. The Sun argued, inter alia, that hundreds of thousands of migrants
would arrive on 1 May 2004 to take advantage of Britain’s healthcare system. See ‘See you on 1
May’, Sun, 19 January 2004; ‘Sick Britain’, Sun, 24 February 2004. The Daily Express argued in the
same week that the ‘work-shy of Europe’, ‘tens of thousands of them’, would be facilitated in their
desire to decamp to the UK by new low cost airlines expanding their operations into Eastern
Europe. See ‘Migrants will fly for just £2’, Daily Express, 25 February 2004. The ‘flood’ scenario
was one the tabloid suggested would follow on from the decision of Easyjet to introduce just one
new route to Ljubljana, Slovenia, ironically one of the wealthiest cities among the accession capi-
tals. For a summary of the tabloid commentary on eastern enlargement see Peter Preston, ‘Tab-
loids brimming with bile’, Observer, 29 February 2004.
64 Eberhart Bort, ‘Illegal Migration and Cross-Border Crime: Challenges at the Eastern Frontier of
the European Union’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of
the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 199.
65 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Vachudova, op. cit., p. 48.
66 See Financial Times, 12 June 2001.
67 Both the UK and Ireland, although they granted full rights of residency and work, placed restric-
tions on CEE citizens’ entitlements to benefits. The benign economic environment in both states
may account for the greater generosity of access. In 2004 and 2005, for example, the unemploy-
ment rate in the UK hovered at under 5 per cent. In Ireland, the unemployment rate dropped to
4.2 per cent by the end of 2004, despite the entrance into the labour market of up to 80,000
workers from the new EU member states. In both countries important parts of industry had
become hugely dependent on low cost migrant labour.
68 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Facing the “desert of Tartars”: the Eastern Border of Europe’, in Jan
Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London:
Routledge, 2002), pp. 57–8.
69 Ibid., p. 66.
 Notes 215
70 Ibid., p. 67.
71 Eberhart Bort, op. cit., p. 194.
72 Ibid., p. 195.
73 Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 106.
74 Jon Birger Skjaerseth and Jorgen Wettestad, ‘EU Enlargement: Challenges to the Effectiveness
of EU Environmental Policy’, Paper presented at the ECPR Second Pan-European Conference,
Bologna, 24–26 June 2004, http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-bologna, p. 9–12.
75 Consider the case of Bulgaria. In the Commission’s Regular Reports on the progress of enlarge-
ment negotiations Bulgaria’s nuclear power plant at Kozludy has been consistently cited as a
thorn in the negotiations. The Commission insisted that Bulgaria close it down. This was difficult
for Bulgaria as the plant contributed about 25 per cent of the country’s electricity and the issue
provoked strong reactions in Bulgaria.
76 The European Commission set up a River Danube Task Force in the aftermath of a major silage
spillage in Romania in 2001. The Task Force brought together ministers from all the Danubian
states to work together on cleaning up the river.
77 See, for example, Poland’s decision to buy natural gas from Denmark: ‘Poland, Denmark to Sign
Deal for New Baltic Pipe Gas Link’, Central Europe Online, 3 July 2001.
78 Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 106. For the Commission view see former Environment Commis-
sioner Margot Wallström, Speech to the Polish Parliament, Speech 00/77; Warsaw, 9 March
2000; Margot Wallström, Speech to the Environment Committee of the European Parliament,
Speech 00/228, Brussels, 20 June 2000.
79 Daniel Wincott, ‘Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday
Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, Journal of Common Market Studies 33/4, 1995, p. 602.
80 Ibid., p. 600.
81 Ibid., p. 602.
82 Frank Schimmelfennig, op. cit.

Chapter 10
1 Antoeneta Dimitrova and Mark Rhinard, ‘The Power of Norms in the Transposition of EU Direc-
tives’, Paper Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Grenada, Spain, 14–19 April 2005, p. 5.
2 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 59.
3 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), pp. 69–71.
4 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Democratic Peace – War-like Democracies? A Social Constructivist
Interpretation of the Liberal Argument’, European Journal of International Relations 1/4, 1995, p. 502.
5 Alexander Wendt, op. cit., p. 24.
6 On differences within the Constructivist school see Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Social Constructivisms in
Global and European Politics’, ARENA Working Paper 15/03, 2003; Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Recon-
struction of Constructivism in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 6/2,
2000: 147–82; John Kurt Jacobsen, ‘Duelling Constructivisms: A Post-Mortem on the Ideas
Debate in Mainstream IR/IPE’, Review of International Studies 29/1, 2003: 39–60; John Gerard
Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist
Challenge’, International Organization 52/4, 1998: 855–85; Steve Smith, ‘Social Constructivisms and
European Studies: A Reflectivist Critique’, Journal of European Public Policy 6/4, 1999: 682–91.
7 Alexander Wendt, op. cit., p. 4.
8 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective’, in
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1998), p. 6.
9 Bruce Russet, ‘A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence and International
Organizations in Building Security Communities’, in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett
(eds), Security Communities, p. 373.
216 Notes
10 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘A Framework for the Study of Security Communities’ in
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities, p. 31.
11 Alexander Wendt, op. cit., p. 174.
12 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), op. cit., p. 59.
13 Ole Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European non-war Community’, in
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities, pp. 69–70.
14 Lily Gardner Feldman, ‘Reconciliation and Legitimacy: Foreign Relations and Enlargement of
the European Union’, in Thomas Banchoff and M. P. Smith (eds), Legitimacy and the European
Union: The Contested Polity (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 66.
15 Ole Wæver, op. cit., p. 99.
16 These include the non-EU organizations the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO. The legal obligations inherent under
CoE membership include adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supported by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The
European Union’s Constitutional Treaty, if ratified, will see the EU itself accede to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms thus establishing a formal identity
between the hitherto separate behavioural codes.
17 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Studying Security Communities in Theory, Compar-
ison, and History’, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), Security Communities, p. 420.
18 Romano Prodi, ‘Catching the Tide of History: Enlargement and the Future of the Union’, Paul
Henri Spaak Foundation, Speech/00/374, Brussels, 11 October 2000.
19 Hans van den Bröek, Speech to the EU Enlargement Conference organized by the International
Press Institute, Speech 97/264, Brussels, 27 November 1997.
20 For more see Ole Wæver, op. cit., p. 6–70.
21 Lily Gardner Feldman, op. cit., p. 81.
22 European Commission, ‘The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession’, COM (94) 320 final, Brussels, 1994.
23 Hans Van den Bröek, Speech to ‘Forum 2000’ Conference, Speech 98/198, Prague, 13
October 1998.
24 Günter Verheugen, Speech at the University of Tartu, ‘Changing the History, Shaping the
Future’, Speech 01/215, Tartu, Estonia, 19 April 2001.
25 James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, ‘Institutional Perspectives on Governance’, ARENA
Working Paper 94/2, Oslo, 1994.
26 On efforts to construct a European identity see Lars Erik Cederman, ‘Nationalism and Bounded
Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European Demos’, EUI Working Papers, RSC
No. 2000/34; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, European Journal of
International Relations 2/2, 1996: 139–74; Iver B. Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion,
and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus’, Alternatives 23, 1998: 397–416; Iver B. Neumann and
Jennifer Welsh, ‘The “Other” in European Identity: An Addendum to the Literature on Interna-
tional Societies’, Review of International Studies 17: 327–45; Thomas Risse et al., ‘To Euro or Not To
Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union’, European Journal of International
Relations 5/2: 147–87; Anthony D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’,
International Affairs 68: 55–76; Anthony D. Smith, ‘A Europe of Nations – Or the Nations of
Europe?’, Journal of Peace Research 30: 129–35.
27 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs 72, 1993: 22–49; Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996).
28 See Augustin José Menéndez, ‘A Pious Europe? Why Europe Should Not Define Itself as Chris-
tian’, ARENA Working Paper No. 10/04, Oslo, 2004. The article critiques Joseph Weiler’s view
that there should be an explicit reference to the Christian roots of European identity in the
Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty.
29 François Duchêne, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Independence’, in Max
Kohnstamm and Walter Hager (eds), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European
Community (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973).
 Notes 217
30 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market
Studies 40/2, 2002: 235–58.
31 Ibid., p. 252.
32 Ibid., p. 241.
33 Helen Wallace, ‘Which Europe Is It Anyway?’ (The 1998 Stein Rokkan Lecture), European Journal
of Political Research 35, 1998, p. 294.
34 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf,
2003), p. 3.
35 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy:
Identity Formation through Policy Practice’, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2003/13, p. 4.
36 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Laeken European Council, Bulletin of the European
Union 12-2001, Brussels, 14 and 15 December 2001.
37 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 267.
38 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, International Organization 55/1, 2001, p. 59.
39 Lykke Friis, ‘When Europe Negotiates: From Europe Agreements to Eastern Enlargement’, PhD
Dissertation (Copenhagen: Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1996),
pp. 84–90.
40 Roy Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 36.
41 Joschka Fischer, ‘From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the Finality of European Inte-
gration’, Humboldt University, Berlin, 12 May 2000.
42 Karen Fierke and Antje Wiener, ‘Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlarge-
ment’, Journal of European Public Policy 6/5, 1999: 721–42.
43 Ibid., p. 727.
44 Patricia Chilton, ‘Mechanics of Change in Eastern Europe’, in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.),
Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 201.
45 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘East of Amsterdam: The Implications of the Amsterdam Treaty for Eastern
Enlargement’, in Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener (eds), European Integration After Amsterdam:
Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 228.
46 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Strasbourg European Council, Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities, EC 12-1989.
47 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap’, op. cit., pp. 68–9.
48 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities, EC 6-1993.
49 Helene Sjursen and Karen E. Smith, ‘Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning
EU Enlargement’, ARENA Working Paper WP 01/1, Oslo, 2001.
50 Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 294.
51 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts? in
Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 435.
52 See, for example, Antoeneta Dimitrova, ‘Enlargement, Institution Building and the EU’s
Administrative Capacity’, West European Politics 25/4, 2001: 171–90; James Hughes, Gwyndelon
Sasse, and Claire Gordon, ‘Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s Regional Policy and the
Reform of Sub-National Government, Journal of Common Market Studies 42/3, 2004: 523–51; Jan
Zielonka, ‘Ambiguity as a Remedy for the EU’s Eastward Enlargement’, Cambridge Review of Inter-
national Affairs XII/1, 1998: 14–29.
53 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human
Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, Paper Presented at the Workshop on Democracy
Promotion, Stanford University, 2–4 October 2004.
54 Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, ‘Europeanization as a Gravity Model of Democratiza-
tion’, CEPS Working Document No. 214 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004), p. 21.
218 Notes
55 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy:
Identity Formation through Policy Practice’, p. 7.
56 Marc Maresceau, ‘Pre-accession’, in Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 32–4.
57 Milada Ana Vachudova, ‘The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States:
Eastern Europe and the European Union’, RSC No. 2001/33, Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies, Florence: European University Institute, p. 28; Michael Emerson and
Gergana Noutcheva, op. cit., pp. 6–7.
58 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy:
Identity Formation through Policy Practice’, p. 7.
59 Ibid.
60 Milada Ana Vachudova, op. cit., p. 27.
61 Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, op. cit., p. 6.
62 Quoted in The Economist, 30 April 2005.
63 On a visit to Sofia enlargement commissioner Ollie Rehn reminded the Bulgarian Parliament
that the safeguard clauses included in the accession treaty would be invoked ‘where the country is
manifestly unprepared in an important number of areas’. These included fighting crime and
corruption and protecting the rights of the Roma minority. See the Irish Times, 19 March 2005.
64 European Commission, Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Toward Accession,
Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM (2004) 656 final, Brussels, 6 October 2004.
65 Tim Judah, ‘Want to join the EU? Turn in your war criminals’, Observer, 20 March 2005; ‘EU
shelves Croatia talks over war crimes dispute’, Financial Times, 15 March 2005; ‘Juncker presents
Croatia with ultimatum’, EUobserver.com, 15 March 2005; ‘EU delays Croatian entry talks’,
Guardian, 17 March 2005; ‘EU makes Croatia suffer for allowing war criminal to flee EU’, Euro-
pean Voice, 10–16 March 2005; ‘Postponed, but Croatia talks still on if Gotovina is found’, Euro-
pean Voice, 17–23 March 2005; ‘Croatia’s chances dim as Hague says state is protecting war
criminal’, International Herald Tribune, 27 April 2005.
66 Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 294.
67 Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 10.
68 Paul Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historic-Institutionalist Analysis’, in Wayne
Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 46.
69 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, p. 49.
70 Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy:
Identity Formation through Policy Practice’, p. 15.
71 The only exception to this rule has been Norway, where after the successful conclusion of negoti-
ations on two occasions the Norwegian people voted against membership.
72 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, Bulletin of the European
Union, 12-2004, Brussels, 16–17 December 2004.
73 Milada Ana Vachudova, op. cit., p. 11.
74 Helene Sjursen, ‘Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’,
ARENA Working Paper WP 01/6, Oslo, 2001.
75 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap’, op. cit., pp. 72–6.
76 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 457.
77 Cited by Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap’, op. cit., pp. 70–1.

Chapter 11
1 ‘A club in need of a new vision’, The Economist, 29 April 2004.
2 Christine Ockrent, ‘The price of arrogance’, International Herald Tribune, 23–24 April 2005.
3 See, for example, Katinka Barysch, ‘One year after enlargement’, CER Bulletin, No. 41, April/
May 2005; ‘How can France’s elite sell the EU constitution?’, International Herald Tribune, 26 April
 Notes 219
2005; ‘As Poles take jobs, bitterness in Germany’, International Herald Tribune, 27 April 2005;
‘Mixed feelings one year after enlargement’, EUobserver.com, 1 May 2005.
4 Katinka Barysch, op. cit.
5 Stefan Wagstyl, ‘Accession states reap rewards of EU membership’, Financial Times, 27 April
2005.
6 ‘In EU, boons and optimism after expansion’, International Herald Tribune, 25 April 2005.
7 See, for example, Roger Cohen, ‘Guilt, reconciliation and the German Pope’, International Herald
Tribune, 23–24 April 2005.
8 Ibid.
9 See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier,
‘Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 11/4, 2004: 661–79.
10 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments’, European Integra-
tion online Papers 9/6, 2005, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-006a.htm
11 Stefanie Bailer and Gerald Schneider, ‘The Power of Legislative Hot Air: Informal Rules and the
Enlargement Debate in the European Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies 6/2, 2000: 19–44.
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Index

Accession Partnerships 31–2 Bulgarian mafia: and IRA 211

accession referendums 50–2
Accession Treaty 49–50 candidate countries: equality of treatment
acquis communautaire: and CEE countries 35, 106–8
38, 74, 75, 90–1 CAP: and enlargement 42–3, 139, 145
Agenda 2000 30–1, 65 CAP reform 42–3, 45–6, 134; French
Amsterdam Treaty: membership resistance 67, 140
conditions 163 capacity-building 33–4, 44, 87, 88–90
anarchy: cause of competition 116–17 CEE: accession process 34–5, 38–52, 169–
Andriessen, Franz: advocacy of 70; accession timetable 43–4; and acquis
enlargement 80 communautaire 35, 38, 74, 75, 90–1;
Article 49: and enlargement 56–7, 74, 199, agricultural trade 20; applications for
see also Copenhagen criteria EU membership 13, 26; CAP subsidies
Association: stepping-stone to full 145; cohesion funds 145; democracy 5,
membership 96 70–1; equality of treatment 106–7; EU
Attali, Jacques: and EBRD 19 accession strategy 2, 27–8, 129–30; EU
Austria: GDP 16 aid 15–19, 23, 31, 41, 88, 129, 145,
Aznar, José Maria: moral case for 190, 197; EU investment 133–4; EU
enlargement 71 special responsibility 84, 85–6, 160–2,
178; Euro-Atlanticism 129; as
Balkans: EU attitude towards 120–1, 127, existential threat 126–8; financial
130, 165; Russian influence 127; contributions 41; gas supplies 150, 215;
Stabilization and Association Process GDP 135, 172; migration to EU 146–8,
(SAP) 120–1; violence in 117–18, see also 174, 214; peaceful revolutions 13–14;
Bosnia; Bulgaria; Croatia; Kosovo War; pollution 149, 193, 215; population
Macedonian crisis; Slovenia; Yugoslavia 172; referendums 51; ‘return to Europe’
Baltic states see Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania 14, 186; and Single Market 28;
Belgium: GDP 16 structural funds 145; support for USA
Benedict XVI, Pope: and EU 157–8, 175 122–3; threat to stability 126–8; trade
Birkelbach Report 96 with EU 134, 138, 173, see also under
Bosnia: EU military operation 121, 209 individual countries
Brittan, Leon: advocacy of enlargement 80 Central Area Free Trade Association
Brussels European council (2002) 45–7 (CEFTA) 15, 187
budgetary contributions: and enlargement 30 Central and Eastern Europe see CEE
Bulgaria: application to join EU 190; EU Chirac, Jacques: at odds with own
accession 3, 6, 35–6, 123–4, 165, 210, government 39; ‘infantilism’ of CEE
218; invitation to join CIS 210; nuclear countries 67, 123, 140; ‘ultra-liberalism
power plant decommissioning 36, 64, as communism’ 140
104, 215; Turkish population 127 Christianity: and EU 158, 175
236 Index
citizens: remoteness from ‘Brussels’ 88 and budgetary contributions 30; and
cohesion funds 142, 145 CAP 42–3, 139; and CFSP 122–3; and
Cold War: and European identity 161 Copenhagen summit 22–4; cost to
Common Agricultural Policy see CAP European Parliament 206; and Council
Common Foreign and Security Policy of Ministers 55–73, 179–80; and
(CFSP) 122–3 democracy 99–101, 177; and economic
Commonwealth of Independent States power 132–52; and environmental
(CIS): invitation to Bulgaria 210 problems 148–50, 193, 215; and ESDP
competition: result of anarchy 116–17 123, 210; and European Commission
Conference of Standing Committees of 56–8, 74–94, 179–81, 201; and
National Parliaments (COSAC) 105 European Parliament 56–7, 95–112,
Constructivism: and EU enlargement 179, 181–2; financial implications
154–71, 176–9; worldview 154 44–7, 59; and financial structure 108–9;
Copenhagen criteria 22–3, 162–4, 199, and geopolitics 115–30, 176–7; and
see also Article 49 IGCs 9–10; and institutional path
Copenhagen European Council summit dependency 167–70; and liberal
(2002) 47–9 intergovernmentalism 135–52, 177;
Copenhagen summit (1993) 22–4 ‘logics of appropriateness’ 5, 8; ‘logics
Coreper (Committee of Permanent of consequentiality’ 5; material benefits
Representatives) 45, 58, 60, 199 84, 86–7; and migration 146–8, 174,
corruption: EU 44 214; moral case 70–1, 166–7; and
Council of Europe 216 nation states 119–20; national
Council of Ministers: and enlargement ratification 58, 97; phases of 1, 9; and
55–73, 179–80; and intra-institutional security 121–2, 125, 155–7, 176, 182,
fragmentation 60–1; obstructionism 68; 213; and supranational institutions
sectoral fragmentation 59–60; 119–20; and terrorism 128–9; and
territorial fragmentation 59 Treaty of European Union 9
Cox, Pat 105–6 Enlargement Directorate General 81
Croatia: postponement of negotiations environmental problems: and enlargement
165, 183 148–50, 193, 215
Cyprus: accession to EU 34–5, 211; Essen summit (1994) 27–8
financial contributions 41 Estonia: accession referendum 51;
Czech Republic: accession referendum 51; application to join EU 190; EU
air pollution 149; application to join financial assistance 197; Russian
EU 190; budget contributions 195; EU minority 128, 211
financial assistance 197; trade with EU EU: accession conditions 22–3, 26–7,
134, 173 129–30, 162–4, 199; agricultural trade
Czechoslovakia: Visegrad declaration 15 20; aid to CEE 15–19, 41, 88, 129, 145,
197; aid to developing countries 16,
Danish presidency (2002) 41, 64, 65, 68 187; application for membership 13,
Delors, Jacques: advocacy of enlargement 26, 170, 190; attitudes to Russia 130;
80–1, 85–6 and Balkans 120–1, 127, 130, 165;
democracy: and EU 99–101, 155, 162–5, borders 120, 130; Bosnian military
177 operation 121, 209; corruption 44;
Denmark: GDP 16 democracy 5–6, 71, 99–101, 155,
Deutsch, Karl: on security communities 162–5, 177; differences from USA
154–5 158–9; existential threats 124–8; GDP
developing countries: EU aid 16, 187 16, 172; as geopolitical power 121; and
German reunification 20–1; and
East Germany: accession to EU 183; human rights 164; and interstate
pollution 149, see also Germany reconciliation 84–5, 213; investment in
eastern enlargement see enlargement CEE 133–4; job creation 134; market
EFTA 187 protection 133; migration from CEE
enlargement: and Article 49 56–7, 74, 199; 146–8, 174, 214; non-discrimination
 Index 237
legislation 100; population 3, 120, 172; Finland: GDP 16
protectionism 19–20, 189; secularism Fischer, Joschka: and enlargement 70, 71,
158, 175; security 121–2, 125, 155–7, 160, 193
176, 182, 213; selection of candidate food safety: Poland 93
states 123–4; self-absorption 20–1, 25; France: advancement of national interests
self-understanding 159–62; 65; GDP 16; obstructionism 140–1;
socioeconomic system 2; special resistance to CAP reform 67, 140;
responsibility for CEE 84, 85–6, 160–2, terrified of eastern enlargement 39,
178; trade with CEE 134, 138, 173; as 141; unemployment 173; views EU as
world’s foremost economic bloc 133–4 geopolitical power 121
EU enlargement see enlargement French presidency (2000) 39, 67
EU member states: independence of 2 frontiers: creation of new ones 118
EU Presidency see Presidency
Euro-Atlanticism: CEE 129 gas supplies: CEE 150, 215
Europe: definition 162; number of GDP: EU 16
countries 118, 209; ‘reunification’ 1–2, General Affairs and External Relations
174–5 Council (GAERC) 45, 59, 197
Europe Agreements 19–22, 164 geopolitics: and enlargement 115–30,
European Bank for Reconstruction and 176–7
Development (EBRD) 18–19, 188 German presidency (1998): and Agenda
European collective identity 157–9 2000 65
European Commission: as agenda-setter Germany: budget contributions 42, 196;
76–9, 94; bullying 94; capacity-building and CAP reform 42–3; and
87, 88–90, 94; compliance monitoring enlargement 27, 28–9, 137–40, 166;
90–3, 94; and EU enlargement 56–8, GDP 16; pollution 149; reassertion of
74–94, 179–81, 201; identity-building power 119; reunification 17, 20–1, 183;
87–8; and interstate reconciliation trade with CEE 138; unemployment
84–5; intrusion 76; and socialization 173, see also East Germany
87–93; and special responsibility for Gothenburg summit (2001) 40
CEE 84, 85–6 Greece: application to join EC 170;
European Council 58, 199 colonels’ coup 96; and eastern
European Court of Justice: and EU enlargement 143, 178; GDP 16
socioeconomic system 2
European family of nations: ‘indivisibility’ Haughey, Charles: EC enlargement 186
85–6 Havel, Vaclav: support for enlargement 69
European identity 157–9; and Cold War Helsinki summit (1998) 29–32, 36–7
161 human condition: imperfectability 116
European Investment Bank (EIB) 18 human rights 100, 110, 111, 164
European Parliament: budget approval Hungary: accession referendum 51;
109–10, 208; cost of enlargement 206; application to join EU 190; Danube
and enlargement 56–7, 95–112, 179, dam 191; populations in other countries
181–2, 204–5; and financial structure 127–8; relations with Romania 127–8,
108–9; and human rights 100, 110, 191; trade with EU 134; and Treaty of
111; and institutional reform 108; as Trianon 127; Visegrad declaration 15
norm entrepreneur 98–9; and
socialization 101–2; transnational party Instrument for Structural policies for Pre-
groupings 102–3; veto 95, 98; vote on Accession (ISPA) 33–4, 192–3
accession 110–11, 208 Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs):
European Roundtable of Industrialists: and enlargement 9–10
and eastern enlargement 144 international politics: and nation states 119
European Security and Defence Policy international relations: realist theories
(ESDP) 123, 210 115–17, 208–9
European Union see EU interpreters’ strike 208
existential threats 124–8 IRA: and Bulgarian mafia 211
238 Index
Ireland: cohesion funds 187; and eastern National Programmes for the Adoption of
enlargement 143–4, 178; GDP 16, 187; the Acquis (NPAAs) 31, 34
Nice Treaty referendum 41, 44, 143 NATO: and EU security 125
Italy: GDP 16 Netherlands: GDP 16
Newspapers: opposition to enlargement
Joint Parliamentary Committees 103–5 147, 214; support for enlargement 69
Nice Treaty: Irish referendum 41, 44, 143
Köhl, Helmut: moral case for enlargement Norway: rejection of EU membership 58,
70 218
Kosovo War: and EU accession 35–6 nuclear power stations: decommissioning
Kundera, Milan: support for enlargement 36, 64, 104, 197, 215
69
obstructionism: Council of Ministers 68
Laeken Declaration (2001) 159–60 Operation ALTHEA 209
Laeken group 41
Landaburu, Eneko: and Enlargement Task Pact on Stability in Europe 27–8, 127–8,
Force 81 191
Latvia: accession negotiations 36, 40; PHARE: aid to CEE 17–19, 23, 31, 88,
accession referendum 51; application to 187–8; inefficiency of 18, 23, 33–4, 88,
join EU 190; border with Lithuania 190; institution building 32
191; EU financial assistance 197; GDP Poland: accession negotiations 47, 48–9;
172; Russian minority 128, 211 accession referendum 51; agriculture
liberal intergovernmentalism 135–52, 177 173, 195; application to join EU 190;
Lithuania: accession negotiations 36, 40; EU financial assistance 173, 197; food
accession referendum 51, 198; safety 93; ISPA projects 192–3; pollution
application to join EU 190; border with 149, 193; Visegrad declaration 15
Latvia 191; EU financial assistance 197; pollution: CEE 149, 193, 215
nuclear power plant decommissioning Portugal: application to join EC 170; and
197; Russian minority 128, 211 eastern enlargement 143, 178; GDP 16
‘logics of appropriateness’: EU Presidency: and enlargement 58–9, 62–8,
enlargement 5, 8 180, see also Danish presidency (2002);
‘logics of consequentiality’: EU French presidency (2000); German
enlargement 5 presidency (1998); Swedish presidency
Luxembourg: GDP 16 (2001)
Luxembourg accord 15 Prodi Commission: and enlargement 80–1,
Luxembourg summit (1997) 29–32, 34–5 82–3
Prodi, Romani: and EU power 121
Macedonian crisis 127, 211 protectionism: EU 19–20, 189
Malta: accession referendum 50–1; Putin, Vladimir: and Russian power 126,
financial contributions 41 211
Michnik, Adam: support for enlargement
69 Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 201
migration: and enlargement 146–8, 174,
214 Ratzinger, Cardinal: election as Pope 175
minority rights 76, 177 realist worldview: nature of 116–17
Mitterand, François: EC enlargement 14, Rehn, Olli: and EU value system 84–5
186 ‘return to Europe’ 14, 172, 174, 186
Moravcsik, Andrew: liberal ‘reunification’: Europe 1–2, 174–5
intergovernmentalism 135–7 Roma minorities 100
Morgenthau, Hans: on international Romania: accession to EU 3, 6, 35–6,
politics 116 123–4, 165; administrative capacity
196; application to join EU 190;
nation states: and EU enlargement Hungarian population 127–8, 191;
119–20; and international politics 119 salaries 196; water pollution 215
 Index 239
Russia: EU attitudes towards 130; as Stabilization and Association Process
existentialist threat 124–6; influence in (SAP): Balkans 120–1
Balkans 127; military capacity 124–5; supranational institutions: and
population decline 125 enlargement 119–20
Sweden: GDP 16
Santer Commission: and enlargement 25, Swedish presidency (2001) 39–41, 63, 65,
80–1 66, 68, 195, 200
Santer, Jacques: advocacy of enlargement Switzerland: rejection of EU membership
80–1 190
security: and enlargement 121–2, 125,
155–7, 176, 182, 213 terrorism: and EU enlargement 128–9
security communities 154–6 Thatcher, Margaret: EC enlargement 14,
Single Market: and CEE 28 186
Slovakia: accession negotiations 36, 40, ‘theatre of summitry’ 61–2
165; accession referendum 51; Treaty of European Union 9
application to join EU 190; Danube Treaty of Trianon 127
dam 191; food exports 173; Hungarian Turkey: human rights infringements 165;
population 127–8; political membership candidate 36–7, 107–8,
unpreparednes 30, 36, 165 175; negotiations with EU 3, 6, 168,
Slovenia: accession referendum 51; 206
application to join EU 190; budget Twinning programme 33–4, 89–90, 193;
contributions 195 excess bureaucracy 33
Socialization: and European Commission
87–93; and European Parliament United Kingdom: attitudes to enlargement
101–2; through capacity-building 139–40; GDP 16
88–90; through compliance 90–3 United Nations: EU voting trends 122
Spain: application to join EC 170; USA: differences from EU 158–9
cohesion funds 142, 145; and EU
enlargement 141–3, 178; EU structural Verheugen, Günter: advocacy of
funding 141–2; GDP 16; trade with enlargement 81–3, 85, 94, 202, 213
CEE 141–2 Visegrad declaration 15
Special Accession Programme for
Agriculture and Rural Development Yugoslavia: failure of European policy
(SAPARD) 33 69–70